Annex 103
“Implementation Completion and Results Report on a credit in the amount of SDR 23.8
million (US$ 35 million equivalent) and on a grant from the Global Environment Facility
Trust Fund in the Amount of US$ 5.0 million to the Republic of Kenya for the Kenya
Coastal Development Project (P094692)”, The World Bank, 31 December 2017
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: ICR00004272
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
IDA-48010 AND TF-97578
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 23.8 MILLION
(US$ 35 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
AND ON A
GRANT FROM THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY TRUST FUND
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 5.0 MILLION
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
FOR THE
KENYA COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ( P094692 )
December 31, 2017
Environment & Natural Resources Global Practice
Africa Region
Annex 103
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2017)
Currency Unit = Kenyan Shilling
KES 105.484 = US$1
US$ 1.39 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
July 1 - June 30
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ALRMP Arid Lands Resource Management Project
BDS Business Development Services
BMU Beach Management Unit
CDA Coast Development Authority
CDD Community Driven Development
CIDP County Integrated Development Plan
CMA Co-Management Area
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
CVF Coastal Village Fund
DPP Department of Physical Planning
EA Environmental Audit
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework
FM Financial Management
FY Fiscal Year
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GEO Global Environmental Objective
GIS Geographical Information System
GoK Government of Kenya
HMP Hazina ya Maendeleo ya Pwani
ICBIMS Integrated Coastal Biodiversity Information Management System
ICR Implementation Completion Report
ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management
ISR Implementation Status and Results Report
IDA International Development Association
ISDS Integrated Safeguards Datasheet
IPPF Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework
KEFRI Kenya Forestry Research Institute
KEMFSED Kenya Marine Fisheries and Socioeconomic Development Project
Annex 103
KMFRI Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute
KMMP Kisite-Mpunguti Marine Protected Area
KWS Kenya Wildlife Service
KWSTI Kenya Wildlife Service Training Institute
METT Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoFD Ministry of Fisheries Development
MCS Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MLDP Ministry of Lands (Department of Physical Planning)
MMPA Malindi Marine Protected Area
MPA Marine Protected Area
MPs Management Plans
MSMEs Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
MTR Mid-Term Review
MS Moderately Satisfactory
MU Moderately Unsatisfactory
NEMA National Environment Management Authority
NRM Natural Resources Management
OPCS Operations Policy and Country Services
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PMU Project Management Unit
PDO Project Development Objective
SDF State Department of Fisheries
SDR Special Drawing Right
SHNP Shimba Hills National Reserve
TTL Task Team Leader
VMG Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups
WWF World Wildlife Fund
Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop
Country Director: Diarietou Gaye
Senior Global Practice Director: Karin Erika Kemper
Practice Manager: Magdolna Lovei
Task Team Leader(s): Dinesh Aryal, Veruschka Schmidt
ICR Main Contributor: Michael G. Carroll
Annex 103
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1
I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 6
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................6
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) .......................................9
II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 13
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 13
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 14
C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 18
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 19
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ......................................................................................... 20
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 22
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 22
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 23
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 24
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 24
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 25
C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 27
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 29
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 29
ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 31
ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 43
ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 45
ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 46
ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 49
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DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information
Project ID Project Name
P094692 KENYA COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ( P094692 )
Country Financing Instrument
Kenya Specific Investment Loan
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)
Related Projects
Relationship Project Approval Product Line
Supplement P108845-Kenya Coastal
Development Proejct
27-Jul-2010 Global Environment Project
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
Government of Kenya KEMFRI
Project Development Objective (PDO)
Original PDO
The project development objective is to promote an environmentally sustainable management of Kenya's coastal
and marine resourcesbystrengthening the capacity of existing relevant government agencies and by enhancing the
capacity of rural micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in selected coastal communities.
Revised PDO
To improve management effectiveness and enhance revenue generation of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources.
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FINANCING
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)
World Bank Financing
P094692 IDA-48010 35,000,000 30,054,759 29,704,529
P108845 TF-97578 5,000,000 4,953,531 4,953,531
Total 40,000,000 35,008,290 34,658,060
Non-World Bank Financing
Borrower 2,000,000 1,986,290 1,986,290
Total 2,000,000 1,986,290 1,986,290
Total Project Cost 42,000,000 36,994,580 36,644,350
KEY DATES
Project Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing
P094692 27-Jul-2010 30-Jun-2011 24-Apr-2015 29-Oct-2016 30-Jun-2017
P108845 27-Jul-2010 30-Jun-2011 24-Apr-2015 29-Oct-2016 30-Jun-2017
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RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions
21-Sep-2012 3.01 Change in Project Development Objectives
Change in Results Framework
Change in Financing Plan
Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
Change in Disbursements Arrangements
Change in Institutional Arrangements
Change in Procurement
06-Oct-2015 21.57 Change in Results Framework
Change in Components and Cost
Cancellation of Financing
Change in Financing Plan
Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
Change in Disbursements Arrangements
Change in Institutional Arrangements
Other Change(s)
29-Sep-2016 29.28 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality
Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Substantial
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating
Actual
Disbursements
(US$M)
01 19-Mar-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0
02 30-Nov-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.14
03 07-May-2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.84
04 23-Feb-2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 3.63
05 26-Jul-2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 8.66
06 18-Jan-2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.65
07 08-Oct-2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.61
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08 14-Apr-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 16.40
09 27-Oct-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 21.57
10 18-May-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.28
11 22-Dec-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.28
12 27-Jun-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 30.06
SECTORS AND THEMES
Sectors
Major Sector/Sector (%)
Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 100
Agricultural Extension, Research, and Other Support
Activities
4
Fisheries 1
Public Administration - Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 19
Livestock 1
Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 75
Themes
Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)
Private Sector Development 100
Jobs 100
Finance 4
Finance for Development 4
Agriculture Finance 4
Urban and Rural Development 83
Rural Development 83
Rural Markets 4
Rural Non-farm Income Generation 47
Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 14
Land Administration and Management 18
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Environment and Natural Resource Management 13
Water Resource Management 13
Water Institutions, Policies and Reform 13
ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Makhtar Diop
Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt Diarietou Gaye
Senior Global Practice Director: Inger Andersen Karin Erika Kemper
Practice Manager: Idah Z. Pswarayi-Riddihough Magdolna Lovei
Task Team Leader(s): William Leeds Lane
Dinesh Aryal, Veruschka
Schmidt
ICR Contributing Author: Michael G. Carroll
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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL
Context
1. Despite the considerable post-independence growth, which converted Kenya into the most prosperous
country in East Africa in the 1980’s, per capita GDP became stagnant during the ‘1990s and ‘2000s. Thus, at
appraisal, poverty in Kenya was widespread, with 46 percent of the country's population living below the poverty
line. Developed in 2008, the government's ambitious development blueprint (Kenya Vision 2030), was aimed at
transforming the country into a newly industrializing middle-income country, providing a high-quality life to all its
citizens by 2030. To achieve this goal, all sectors were expected to make significant efforts to bring the
governance issues under control, address social inequities and provide the poor with sound opportunities to
improve their income and living standards. This was consistent with the World Bank's 2010-2013 Country
Partnership Strategy (CPS) focus on supporting sustainability based on economic, environmental and social
principles. Of particular relevance was the focus on the coastal region and on tourism as a driver of future national
growth, job creation, poverty reduction and wealth generation. Coastal tourism was directly and indirectly
responsible for about 24 percent of the country's GDP, while about 70 percent of the per capita economic activity
of the coastal region derived from tourism-related activities, placing tourism at the center of development.
2. The coastal region extends 150 km inland from the seafront, covering an area of 67,500 km2 and
constituting about 11.5 percent of the total area of the country. Coral reefs run parallel to the coastline, from
Vanga to Malindi Bay, and mangrove forest, a vital part of the coastal ecosystem providing economic development
and environmental services, covered about 500 km2. The fishery sub-sector was an important contributor to the
GDP, sustaining the livelihoods of many coastal and inland lake residents. In 2007, the average fish production was
156,000 metric tons, with inland fisheries contributing up to 95 percent, followed by marine fisheries (4 percent)
and aquaculture (1 percent). In terms of biodiversity, the coastal region of Kenya has four marine parks and six
marine reserves that incorporate important marine wildlife and habitats including coral reefs, seagrass beds and
mangrove forests.
3. The Coast Province was one of the poorest in the country with over 62 percent of overall rural poverty,
and consequently the central and local government agencies were not equipped to handle the investments
needed to reduce poverty and improve environmental conditions. As a result, long-term neglect, resource
overuse, and poor management and planning have had a major negative impact on the coastal environment.
Overuse of fragile coral reefs by local residents and tourists, excessive fishing pressure in the inshore areas,
inappropriate land use in coastal districts, and poor development management have severely degraded the value
of coastal resources. In addition, organic pollution from human and solid waste produced by the major urban
areas and tourist hotels has also affected the natural resources upon which the coastal economy is based.
Furthermore, the benefits of exploiting valuable existing resources have not fully accrued to coastal residents or
the national economy due to the lack of proper management. Limited domestic fishing occurred beyond territorial
waters – most fishing within or close to the fringing coral reefs-- with a high prevalence of illegal coastal and
offshore fishing due to inadequate public-sector capacity to monitor and control fishing. The Kenya Coastal
Development Project (KCDP) was developed to address some of these challenges while contributing to the
poverty alleviation goals. The World Bank’s (WB) rationale for involvement was its significant experience in
addressing poverty and development issues in Africa’s coastal zones (the KCDP was the latest in a series of marine
and freshwater projects developed in the coastal zones of Mozambique, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Senegal,
Guinea-Bissau, and Kenya), and its technical and financing capacity, which was expected to attract and harmonize
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additional financing from other development partners and technical organizations.
Theory of Change (Results Chain)
4. While the initial aim of the KCDP was to build the capacity of implementing agencies to effectively
deliver services towards improved natural resources management, and ultimately increased revenue for the
Government of Kenya (GoK) and improved livelihood of the coastal communities, the theory of change was not
explicitly described or illustrated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) or any other project document.
However, as can be interpreted from the results framework, the underlying assumptions supporting the theory of
change to be pursued by the project were that the promotion of coastal tourism should integrate environmental
and social values in order to be sustainable. For this, the challenges facing the coastal region’s overall
development and its tourism needed to be addressed in an integrated manner. These included: (i) contradictory
regulatory and legal frameworks, (ii) a weak institutional framework, (iii) inadequate infrastructure, (iv) poor
coordination and marketing of the tourism product globally and domestically, (v) poor management of the
region’s natural resources associated with levels of poverty; and (vi) limited participation of coastal people in the
development of the sector.
Theory of Change: Kenya Coastal Development Project at Appraisal
PDO: To promote environmentally
sustainable management of Kenya’s
coastal and marine resources by
strengthening the capacity of
existing relevant government
agencies and by enhancing the
capacity of rural micro, small and
medium-sized enterprises in
selected coastal communities
50% increased revenue
generated to GoK from vessel
licensing in 200 mile EEZ and
from nearshore fisheries
development
10% increase in cost recovery of
MPAs
20% increase in micro, small
and medium sized enterprise
startups and business
expansions directly related to
project interventions in pilot
villages
The Global environmental objective
is to strengthen conservation and
sustainable use of marine and
coastal biodiversity
Quality of data, data coverage
and reporting frequency of catch
and effort (the frame) (15,000
records by EOP) improved. and
associated with by-catch
management measures
At least three of the more
important existing conservation
areas brought under effective
management (including comanagement)
by EOP)
Comp. 1): Sustainable Management of Fisheries
Resources
Installation of VMS on all licensed fishing vessels in
the EEZ by the end of PY4, leading to less illegal
and more legally licensed fishing when combined
with a strong MCS
Number of Fishery Management plans developed (3)
Number of stock assessment (five priority species
and others) (5)
Comp. 2): Sound management of natural resources
Number of Direct Beneficiaries, including
percentage of female beneficiaries (10,000/35%)
Three Integrated Conservation Management Plans
developed and implemented (3)
Reduction in destructive activities such as dynamite
fishing, cutting mangroves, charcoal manufacturing,
etc. (15%)
Number of communities engaged in activities to
preserve and use sustainably the coastal and marine
resources (5)
Number of community level resource-based
businesses established (3)
Comp. 3): Sustainable Livelihoods
Land Capability and Spatial Development Plans
prepared in 1 Coast Province; 2 Districts; 8
combined action plans developed (1 / 2 / 8)
Number of officers from lead agencies trained on
EIA/EA review process (85)
Number of environmental audits for KCDP
community-based projects undertaken (3)
Number of PPPs funded and still in operation at EOP
(5)
Number of CVF subprojects (community demand -
driven, social, and income generating) completed
and operational (500)
Comp. 4): Capacity Building, M&E System, Project
Management, Communication and Coastal Village
Fund
M&E reports produced (Y)
Number of staff from participating institutions
trained (60)
Communication strategy prepared by end of PY1 and
accomplished by EOP (Y)
Comp. 1: Licensing of vessels; Frame
surveys; Fisheries management plans; Comanagement
plans; Standard operation
procedures; Stock assessments; Patrols and
port state measures; Monitoring control and
surveillance (MCS), e.g., Vessel Monitoring
System (VMS); Infrastructures such as
MCS Center, and Marine Ocean Service
Center; Fish ponds and aquaculture;
Training and capacity building.
Comp. 2: Biodiversity assessments such as
in Shimba Hills Ecosystem, Kisite-
Mpunguti Marine Park and Reserves, Lamu,
Lake Kenyatta and Lake Jipe (Taita);
Mangrove and forest management plans;
Conservation area management plans (e.g.,
Kisite-Mpunguti, and Malindi-Watamu);
Conservation and management strategies
(e.g., Sable Antelope and Coral Reef/Sea
Grasses); Biodiversity management
information system; Community
conservation activities (e.g., woodlots and
nurseries); Infrastructures such as KEMFRI
Farmer’s Center, NEMA Green Point, and
KWS Shimoni Jetty; Training and capacity
building.
Comp. 3: Coast region land capacity
mapping; County land capacity mapping
(e.g., for Lamu); Ward level land capacity
mapping (e.g., Pongwe-Kikoneni); Land use
plans (e.g., Pongwe-Kikoneni ward and
Kilifi county); CDD (i.e., HMP and VMGP)
sub-projects; Scholarships, e.g., for MS and
BS level students; Environmental audits;
Capacity building including for micro and
small enterprises; PPP; Infrastructures (e.g.,
bandas in Kibuyuni and Shimoni).
Comp. 4: Capacity building;
Communication strategy; Project
management and M&E.
Intermediate outcomes
(components) with indicators
Outcomes (PDO) with
indicators
Long-term outcome
(impacts)
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5. Addressing the degradation of natural resources and shifting resource use to a more rational pattern,
required the sustainable utilization of the coastal areas. Such a strategy required interventions aimed at involving
capture fisheries, particularly in the deeper near-shore areas that were considered poorly exploited by artisanal
fishermen, increasing mariculture, reducing illegal offshore fishing, better understanding land capability and land
use, infrastructure improvements, capacity building, assessment of markets, and improving technology for value
addition.
Project Development Objectives (PDOs)
6. The original Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the PAD and Financing Agreement was
“to promote environmentally sustainable management of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources by strengthening
the capacity of existing relevant government agencies and by enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small and
medium-sized enterprises in selected coastal communities”. The Global Environment Objective (GEO) as
presented in both, the PAD and associated Financing Agreement was “to strengthen conservation and sustainable
use of marine and coastal biodiversity”.
Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators
7. In order to assess the achievement of the project’s development objectives, the PAD-stated compound
PDO and GEO of the project have been broken down, resulting in the following specific key expected outcomes
and respective indicators:
Expected Outcome Indicators
Promote environmentally sustainable management of
Kenya’s coastal and marine resources by:
1. Strengthening the capacity of existing relevant
government agencies
50% increased revenue generated to GoK from vessel licensing in 200 mile
EEZ and from near shore fisheries development
10% increase in cost recovery of MPAs
2. Enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small and
medium enterprises in selected coastal areas
20% increase in micro, small and medium sized enterprise startups
and business expansions directly related to project interventions in pilot
villages
3. Strengthen conservation and sustainable use of
marine and coastal biodiversity
Quality of data, data coverage and reporting frequency of catch and effort
(the frame) (15,000 records by EOP) improved. and associated with by-catch
management measures
At least three of the more important existing conservation areas brought
under effective management (including co-management) by EOP)
Components
8. As described in the original Project Results Framework, the project would be implemented through the
following four (4) main components:
Component 1 (US$8.88 million) - Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources: Implemented through
three sub-components: (i) governance and management of offshore and coastal fisheries resources; (ii)
research on fish stocks, fish value addition and market chain enhancement; and (iii) fish production
through sustainable aquaculture development. Actual disbursement at project closing was US$8.56 million,
equivalent to 96.5 percent of the original allocation.
Component 2 (US$9.04 million) - Sound Management of Natural Resources: Implemented through two
sub-components, namely: (i) biodiversity & natural resources Assessment and Information Systems; and (ii)
capacity Building, Research, Extension and Tourism Enhancement. Following a Level 2 restructuring in
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2015, several project activities were cancelled, resulting in a reduced budget allocation of US$4.52 million.
Actual disbursement at project closing eventually was US$6.93 million, equivalent to 77 percent of the
original amount.
Component 3 (US$12.20 million) - Support for Alternative Livelihoods: Implemented through three
subcomponents, namely: (i) spatial Planning; (ii) environmental governance; and (iii) microenterprise
development.
Component 4 (US$11.35 million) - Capacity building, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) System, Project
Management and Communication, and Coastal Village Fund (CVF): Implemented through two
subcomponents, namely: (i) project management, capacity building and M&E; and (ii) the Coastal Village
Fund (CVF). Following the Level 2 restructuring in 2015, Components 3 and 4 were merged and project
activities cancelled, resulting in a reduced combined budget allocation of US$18.58 million. Actual
disbursement at project closing eventually stood at US$18.72 million, equivalent to 79 percent of the
original allocation US$23.55 million (US$12.20 million plus US$11.35 million).
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)
Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets
9. The project has undergone three significant restructurings, which introduced major changes to all key
elements of the project, including the PDO, components, indicators, targets and financing.
10. In September 2012, only 15 months after project effectiveness, a Level 1 Restructuring was processed
and approved by the Board. The project had disbursed US$3.47 million, including US$2.95 million from IDA and
US$0.52 from GEF, or 8.16 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively. The restructuring aimed at expediting
implementation, through streamlining of activities, and included the simplification of the PDO, which became “to
improve management effectiveness and enhance revenue generation of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources”;
the GEO remained unchanged. The Results Framework was revised and simplified to include more relevant,
measurable and better-defined outcome indicators. The institutional arrangements were changed to allow for the
implementation of the Development Fund of the Coast or “Hazina Ya Maendeleo Ya Pwani” (HMP) by the Kenya
Marine Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI), replacing the Coastal Village Fund originally planned to be
implemented by the Arid Lands Resource Management Project II (ALMRP II), which was cancelled due to corruption
allegations after KCDP was approved, and thus represented one of the reasons for restructuring KCDP. Even though
Kenya had started implementing its devolution process, the overall project implementation responsibilities
remained at the ministry- and agency-level. Furthermore, funds were reallocated between categories to cover
unbudgeted costs associated with safeguards requirements and the management costs for the HMP. The
restructuring finally included changes in activities to be supported under each component, and adding Force
Account and Community Participation as procurement methods. The modifications were also intended to define
those project activities to be fully financed by the GEF grant, while retaining the original project design and
component structure.1
11. In October 2015, addressing the comprehensive independent assessment and subsequent agreements
reached during the Mid–Term Review (MTR), through a Level 2 Restructuring, a series of substantial changes were
introduced. These included a partial cancellation of US$4.59 million from the IDA credit (reducing the IDA
1 World Bank: Restructuring Paper on Proposed Project Restructuring of KCDP Approved on August 9, 2012
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contribution to US$ 30,413,780),2 the reallocation of funds among components and disbursement categories, a
realignment of implementation arrangements, and the revision of outcome indicators and targets. In addition,
project components were reduced to three by essentially merging Components 3 and 4.
12. In September 2016, the closing date was extended by 8 months, from October 31, 2016 to June 30,
2017.
13. The GEO: “strengthening conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity” remained
unchanged throughout the different restructurings. Similarly, the scope and ambition of the project were not
affected by the restructurings.
Revised PDO Indicators
Level 1 Restructuring September 2012
Original PDO Level Results Indicator Revised PDO Level Results Indicator Comments/Rationale for Change
1. 50% increased revenue generated to
GoK from vessel licensing in 200 mile
EEZ and from near shore fisheries
development
Increased revenue generation to GOK from
near shore and EEZ fisheries
Same indicator, but improved clarity of
formulation and annual fluctuation
corrected by using US$/yr based on threeyear
average for combined near shore and
EEZ.
2. 10% increase in cost recovery of MPAs Dropped Sustainability aspect already covered by
increased revenues in the above indicator
3. 20% increase in micro, small and
medium sized enterprise startups and
business expansions directly related to
project interventions in pilot villages
Dropped Not a direct aspect of the PDO
4. Direct Project Beneficiaries (number),
of which female (%)
Mandatory core indicator moved from the
intermediate level as required by OPCS
5. At least three of the more important
existing conservation areas brought
under effective management (including
co-management) by EOP
Conservation/target areas with management
plan in place, implemented and showing
improvement in management as shown by
effectiveness tracking tool by EoP.
Same indicator, but improved clarity of
formulation
Level 2 Restructuring October 2015
Original PDO Level Results
Indicator
Original
Target
New/Revised PDO Level Results
Indicator
New/Revised
Target
Comments/Rationale for
Change
1. Conservation/target areas with
management plan in place,
implemented and showing
improvement in management
as shown by effectiveness
tracking tool by EOP
Revised: Number of conservation areas
brought under effective management
(including co-management) as defined
by Management Effectiveness Tracking
Tool (METT) score of at least 55
Baseline: 0
End Target: 3
Same indicator, but
improved clarity of
formulation
2. N/A New: Areas outside protected areas
brought under improved management
(ha).
Baseline: 0 ha
End Target:
30 ha
To indicate the impact of
the Project outside
conservation areas
including buffer zones
3. N/A New: Number of coastal households
with annual earnings of US$50 or more
from commercial NRM activities
supported by the project.
Baseline: 0
End Target:
1,000
To indicate the
economic/livelihood
outcomes
4. Revenue generation to GOK
from near shore and EEZ
US$1 million Unchanged US$3.18
million
To make the target
consistent with
2 World Bank Mission Aide Memoire – KCDP MTR Mission, April 13 - 24, 2015
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fisheries implementation progress
5. Direct project beneficiaries
(number), of which female (%).
1,000 of
which
female 35%
Unchanged 10,000 of
which female
45%.
To make the target
consistent with
implementation progress
Revised Components
14. As part of the post MTR second restructuring, project implementation was reorganized into three main
components:
Component 1: Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources: The broad objective of this component was
“to increase revenue earning potential of the GoK through sound monitoring, control and surveillance and a
transparent process of licensing of foreign vessels”. The component also aimed at promoting research for
value addition and overall improvement of the fisheries’ sector governance. These objectives were pursued
through three key interventions/sub-components: (a) Governance and management of off-shore and
coastal fisheries resources; (b) Advanced research on coastal and near shore fish stocks and technologies
and value addition; and (c) Increased fish production.
Component 2: Sound Management of Natural Resources: The main aim of this component was “to improve
the management and regeneration of natural resources and biodiversity in the coastal region and marine
environment as well as provide assistance to communities in the development of eco-tourism ventures”.
The component was planned to be implemented through the following five key interventions/subcomponents:
(a) Development of a coastal biodiversity information system; (b) Improved biodiversity
management systems, guidelines and strategies; (c) Capacity building and institutional support and minor
infrastructural development to improve management effectiveness; (d) Improved research and technology
for extension services; and (e) Enhanced tourism and cultural heritage.
Component 3: Building Coastal Capacity for Sustainable Natural Resource Use and Management:
Resulting from the restructuring of the original Components 3 and 4, this component aimed at “building the
capacity for natural resources management” through the following five operational sub-components: (a)
Integrated spatial planning and land capability; (b) Environmental governance and integrated coastal
management; (c) Development of micro, small and medium enterprises Investments; (d) Capacity building;
and (e) Development Fund of the Coast or “Hazina Ya Maendeleo Ya Pwani” (HMP) - providing grants to
communities, including support to Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs).
Other Changes
15. Implementation of KCDP’s Community Driven Development (CDD) activities: A significant change was
required to implement activities supporting beneficiary communities. According to the original project design, the
World Bank-funded Kenya Arid Lands Resources Management Project II (ALRMP II) would have been responsible
for implementing the Coastal Village Fund (CVF). Specifically, the Project was to use established ALRMP II capacity,
experience, implementation tools and local presence at district and community levels to identify and implement
community subprojects, provide necessary training and disburse funds. Following the premature closing of the
ALRMP II on December 31, 2010, the Development Fund of the Coast, or Hazina ya Maendeleo ya Pwani (HMP)
formally replaced the CVF as part of the 2012 restructuring. Under the new HMP, responsibility for implementing
and overseeing the overall implementation of CDD activities was given to the Kenya Marine Fisheries Research
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Institute (KMFRI) - the agency responsible for implementing Component 4 and coordinating overall project
implementation - in collaboration with other implementing agencies (i.e., Kenya Forestry Research Institute
(KEFRI), Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), State Department of Fisheries (SDF), National Environment Management
Authority (NEMA), the Department of Physical Planning (DPP), and Coast Development Authority (CDA)). This
necessary change in the project’s institutional arrangements also resulted in (i) the reallocation of 26 percent of
funds for KMFRI to deliver this new function; (ii) establishing and equipping County Liaison Offices in each of the six
coastal counties; (iii) hiring staff for each of these offices; and (iv) developing and installing a management
information system to allow the handling, processing, monitoring and reporting of HMP activities. However, it is
important to note that with multiple implementing agencies and continued project implementation challenges, the
devolution of project management from national to county level was not considered in order to avoid further
complexities in project implementation. Nevertheless, the county representation in project implementation was
strengthened with regular project updates to participating county governments and integrating some of the project
activities into county integrated development plans, which also strengthened the sustainability of project
outcomes.
Rationale for Changes and their Implication on the Original Theory of Change
16. Changes introduced by the two major restructurings were mainly aimed at addressing the weaknesses
of project design, resolving issues related to readiness for implementation, and, as part of the MTR, introduce
realistic adjustments to activities and targets in light of pre-MTR performance and the limited implementation time
prior to project closing. The different sub-components represented stand-alone institutional priorities rather than a
coherent set of activities. As a result of this, the institutional changes introduced were critical to address the
minimal integration or synergy between different components, or even sub-components. These formal changes
were operationally significant and highly relevant to the final outcome of the project, but as they did not modify
the overall PDO and components, implications on the envisaged theory of change pursued were minimal.
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II. OUTCOME
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs
17. Initially, the objective of the project was well aligned with the development goals of both IDA and the
GEF as well as the Kenya Vision 2030 and the Constitutional Reform approved in 2010, which aimed at
narrowing long-term, deeply entrenched regional disparities and increasing the responsiveness of the
government. County governments started playing the primary on-the-ground role in delivering services (in the
agriculture, water, environment, urban, and health sectors), while the national government retained a policymaking,
regulatory, and research role. Kenya’s decentralization has been among the most rapid and ambitious
processes globally, with new governance challenges and opportunities rising as the country builds a new set of
county governments. In the coastal counties, KCDP played a role in supporting the initial work program of the
newly created county governments relating to the fisheries sector. Furthermore, the World Bank Country
Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2010-2013, highlighted that “sustainable growth calls for policies that address the
economic, environmental and social principles of development. These policies need to be agreed and
implemented on a cross-sectoral basis, with good governance and a spatial focus where possible”. This was the
basis of the KCDP, which promoted spatial-focused interventions to promote environmentally sustainable and
socially inclusive growth, and contributed to strengthening of environmental governance both in institutions
and in communities, who are engaged in promoting growth, livelihoods and value addition. In addition, fisheries
continued to have a significant role in employment generation, food security, and rural development.
18. At completion, KCDP’s objectives continued to be well aligned with the current CPS FY14-18, as
updated during the Performance and Learning Review in 2017, whose overarching goal is sustainable reduction
in poverty and increased shared prosperity. Aligned both with Kenya’s Vision 2030 and its Medium-Term Plan,
the CPS highlights three priority areas of engagement: (i) competitiveness and sustainability – growth to
eradicate poverty; (ii) protection and potential – human resource development for shared prosperity; and (iii)
building consistency and equity – delivering a devolution dividend. The project contributed to the
competitiveness and sustainability pillar of the CPS through development of a more robust marine and coastal
fishery economy, thereby addressing the government’s growth and poverty reduction strategies. By focusing on
the coastal region, the project is expected to contribute to economic prosperity, employment, and livelihood of
the coastal communities, where deep-rooted poverty and inequality are still a major concern for the
government.
Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating
19. Rating – Substantial: The relevance of the project’s PDO is rated as Substantial given that it was well
aligned with the priorities of the GoK, the World Bank, and the GEF at appraisal, and revised accordingly to maintain
this relevance. The PDO became even more relevant at completion, mainly as a result of its consistency with the
ongoing devolution process from the central to local governments and the high priority recently given by GoK to the
development of the Blue Economy.3 Moreover, the objective and activities of the project have been largely in line
with the mandate of various implementing agencies and have been broadly aligned with the respective strategies
3 Driven by a growing population and the need for sustainable growth in ocean-related economic activities, the GoK has made a strong commitment towards
improving the management of its marine fisheries by developing its Blue Economy. Several relevant State Departments have been established in 2016, with the
State Department for Fisheries and Blue Economy (SDF-BE) tasked to coordinate economic ocean activity and protect marine ecosystem. In addition, a new
Fisheries Management and Development Act is being implemented, and the Kenya Fisheries Service (KeFS) was established as a new national fisheries agency to
bolster management of the fisheries sector and lead the national coordination of blue economy development.
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included in the County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) of the six coastal counties comprising the project area.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)
Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome
20. Rating before restructuring – Modest. Following the delayed project effectiveness in June 2011, the
project had only been under implementation for approximately 15 months before the PDO was revised. Only 10
percent of project proceeds had been disbursed, with only limited progress towards achieving the PDO.
21. Rating after restructuring – Substantial. The PDO of the project has been broken down into the
following specific key expected outcomes and respective indicators:
22. PDO Outcome 1: To improve management effectiveness of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources. This
outcome was expected to be achieved mainly through enhancing the capacity and functions of public institutions
responsible for the management of natural resources, including Protected Areas (PAs) through the financing
provided by the GEF, and by enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in
conducting business activities in selected coastal areas. Consistent with this, the project financed a series of
interventions which contributed to the achievement of this outcome.
23. Management effectiveness of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources including improved biodiversity
conservation was achieved through strengthened capacity and functions of the public institutions responsible for
the management of natural resources including PAs:
a) Three highly relevant coastal areas including Kisite/Mpunguti Marine National Park (KMMNP) in Kwale
County, Malindi Marine Park Reserve (MMPR), and Shimba Hills National Reserve (SHNR), were brought
under effective management, as measured by the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT)4 score
(PDO indicator #1 – fully achieved). The support provided by GEF for the provision of infrastructure,
equipment and capacity building resulted in significant improvements in the management of these areas.
The METT was developed by World Bank and WWF to help track and monitor progress in the achievement
of worldwide targets related to PA management effectiveness. Using this instrument, the three PAs
recorded important improvements in relation to their baseline METT index (SHNR score increased from 54
to 58; KMMNP from 51 to 58; and MMPR from 52 to 56). Project activities that contributed to the improved
METT score included use of night vision cameras to enhance surveillance and security, implementation of
the Strategic Adaptive Management (SAM) program, implementation of community projects that supported
both biodiversity conservation and community livelihoods, the development or updating of management
plans, capacity building for all levels of staff, and investments in infrastructure such as the construction of a
tourist-dedicated jetty for KWS in the KMMNP and a nature trail at Sheldrick Falls in SHNR. In addition, the
participatory demarcation of boundaries in the KMMNP and MMPR served the objective of communicating
the MPA boundaries to the wider community, thus minimizing conflicts. In SHNR, a 6-Km electric fence was
established in a human/wildlife conflict hotspot. In addition, management effectiveness in three marine
protected areas (Mombasa, Watamu, and Kiunga) was improved. These investments, as well as conducting
4 The METT was developed by the World Bank-WWF Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable Use in 1999 and adapted
and used by many global and national organizations. It is a rapid assessment tool for protected area (PA) or conservation area
(CA) management with three main sections: datasheets of key information, an assessment form containing a questionnaire
with four potential scores for each of 30 questions including notes, justifications and steps to improve management (if
necessary), and financial sustainability assessment. PA managers may use METT (or an adapted version) to plan for and report
on the management effectiveness of a PA.
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comprehensive biodiversity assessments (expected to feed into the Integrated Coastal Biodiversity
Information Management System (ICBIMS)) and monitoring have enhanced management effectiveness in all
six PAs, therefore contributing towards both the overall common GEO and PDO objective.
b) Acknowledging that PAs in the coastal region cover only a small proportion of the areas in need of
conservation actions, an additional set of interventions was introduced at MTR aimed at bringing areas
outside PAs under effective management. At project closure, the management of 50 hectares of land
outside of PAs was improved (PDO indicator #3 – fully achieved). Project activities contributing towards this
outcome included the establishment of seed stands covering an estimated 50 hectares in several locations
in Kilifi County (Gede), Lamu County (Mpeketoni and Witu), and Mombasa County (Comensum and Amani
Jipange Mangrove Conservation community-based organizations). KEFRI has now taken up the cost of
maintaining the seed sources (seed stands and orchards) established by the project. Project support to comanagement
activities has also been instrumental in achieving this outcome. Undertaken by both KMFRI
(marine ecosystems) and KEFRI (terrestrial ecosystems), the process of strengthening co-management was
initiated by conducting need assessments in eight community-managed areas along the coast, which
resulted in the development of Co-Management Area (CMA) Plans. In addition, a pilot restoration program
of seagrass and degraded coral reefs was initiated in 2014 and implemented successfully in the Wasini CMA
by the local Beach Management Unit (BMU). Although the ecological or socio-economic value of these
initiatives (either in terms of biodiversity conservation, fisheries productivity or tourism revenue) still has to
be proven, the success in implementing this initiative can be attributed to the consistent support to the
BMU, which received training on diving and coral transplanting on concrete blocks and sea grass restoration,
and provision of diving and snorkeling gear. The Wasini CMA has also been demarcated with buoys and
community youth received training on Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) allowing them to work
collaboratively with KWS, the institution managing coastal and biodiversity resources. Improved comanagement
in the project area was further supported by the establishment of improved catch-related
data quality and coverage, and database management associated with catch statistics on over-exploited
native species, expected to include up to 15,000 new entries per year.
c) Construction of modern facilities for KMFRI headquarters, and a Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS)
Center at the KeFS offices in Mombasa, which included the installation of an advanced Vessel Monitoring
System (VMS), has strengthened capacity and functions of the respective institutions. Although it only
became fully operational during the last year of the project, the VMS contributed towards the monitoring of
the fishery which consequently increased management effectiveness. At project closing, a total of 38 vessels
had been licensed, and KeFS has made it a requirement for all vessels fishing within the Kenyan EEZ to be
linked to the VMS through onboard transponders, a measure expected to further increase revenue
collection and to provide additional benefits, including reduction of illegal fishing, enhanced regional
compliance and collaboration, and provision of scientific data for improved management of fisheries
resources within the EEZ. Further strengthening of capacity and functions was achieved through the
construction of the NEMA Green Point in Lamu, and the KEFRI Farmers Resource Center in Lamu.
d) The development of a draft MCS strategy and database (with further support from WWF and the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission - IOTC), and improved participation of Kenya in, and compliance with, and
contribution to relevant international initiatives such as Fish-i Africa, IOTC, Fish Crime, and Interpol's
Environmental Security Programs. Additionally, the project undertook a legal review and gap analysis of the
legal framework of Kenya's fisheries sector. The objective of the review was to provide support for the
development of regulations specific for the marine sector as well as enable adaptation and adoption of
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various international fisheries-related instruments. Due to initial procurement delays, although the review
was concluded, the parliamentary approval process is still pending.
e) Capacity was further strengthened through the development of valuable knowledge-related public goods.
This included marine frame surveys, Catch Assessment Surveys (CAS), the identification of stock status of
key species and the subsequent development of management plans for lobster, prawns, small purse seine
and aquarium species, development of co-management plans, and integrated spatial planning and land
capability mapping (at regional, county and ward levels), all of which not only have contributed to improving
management effectiveness and sustaining the revenue generation efforts, but also represent a solid base for
consolidation and expansion of sectoral revenue, one of the main pillars of the country’s decision to pursue
the challenges and benefits of the Blue Economy.
24. The capacity of MSMEs was strengthened through training provided to 521 SMEs, of which 213
developed business plans, representing 107 percent in relation to the target of 200 entrepreneurs. Of the fully
trained SMEs, there was almost equal gender participation, with 52 percent and 48 percent of male and female
beneficiaries, respectively. Indirect beneficiaries are estimated at approximately 350,000 people accruing benefits
from various training provided in a number of topics, including SMEs development, BMU organization, tourism
services, Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and biodiversity
assessments. Important to note that the project also supported a significant number of scholarships and internship
for the coastal youth. By project end, a total of 121 young students from coastal communities had been sponsored
to participate in Bachelor's and Master's Degree courses in several universities as well as certificate courses at the
Kenya Forestry College (KFC) and the Kenya Wildlife Service Training Institute (KWSTI).
25. In addition, project interventions comprised a combination of capacity building (i.e., awareness creation,
governance, development of business plans, business and financial management and governance, book keeping and
record keeping); infrastructure for enterprise development and for community services; and support to
communities in the establishment and development of socially and environmentally friendly commercial
enterprises. Benefits in terms of improved livelihoods were derived from a wide range of coastal and marine income
earning interventions, mainly from sale of poles (woodlots), tree seedlings, fishing and aquaculture (finfish and
milkfish), seaweed farming, waste management and eco-tourism, poultry farming, and water supply, among others.
The improved management effectiveness of coastal and marine resources made possible for the income earning
interventions to be successful.
26. End of project assessments and beneficiary surveys suggest that most interventions have achieved the
intended results and therefore contributed to the overall outcome. However, given that the bulk of activities linked
to this outcome were delivered during the last three years of the project due to the initial delays, the long-term
sustainability of the support provided to SMEs and BMUs may be affected by a number of factors, including overall
commercial viability, limited access to markets and financing, and inadequate skills regarding business planning,
financial management, and record-keeping. Should direct support to beneficiary groups had started earlier in the life
of the project, KCDP could have supported market research to allow for more informed decisions regarding market
demand for products and/or services; and support for market access to encourage sustainability of established
enterprises.
27. PDO Outcome 2: To enhance revenue generation of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources. The project’s
second PDO outcome can be seen as complementary to the first outcome, as its actions and results are mostly
aimed at promoting the sustainability of the improved management effectiveness of marine and coastal resources
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through enhanced revenue generation by both the public and private sectors. To achieve this, the project not only
supported a number of public and private revenue-generating initiatives, but most importantly contributed to the
development of a significant set of complementary tools and instruments which have undoubtedly improved the
sectoral knowledge base and the potential sustainability of project interventions.
28. One of the key anticipated sources of public sector revenue was the licensing of fishing vessels in the
200-mile EEZ and from near shore fisheries development. The expected sources of revenue increase included the
licensing of (i) foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ, (ii) fish exports and imports, (iii) fishing registration, (iv) local
fishermen, and (v) fish processing and aquarium dealers. At closing, the project has reported a cumulative combined
revenue from these sources of about US$4.09 million - which represents an overachievement of approximately 28.5
percent in relation to the original target of US$3.18 million, and a major increase compared to the June 2011
baseline of US$0.68 million. This commendable achievement can be attributed to the effective implementation of a
number of relevant activities, specifically undertaking regular patrols and frame surveys, which were used to
enhance the licensing of vessels used in in-shore areas, and conducting awareness campaigns. The installation of the
VMS indirectly supported revenue generation as a licensing condition.
29. Regarding the efforts to enhance private sector revenue generation, the project supported a series of
initiatives which provided technical and financial assistance for local communities to initiate or expand commercial
ventures. These included (i) support to livelihood-improving initiatives through HMP, which generated revenue
equivalent to US$660,000; (ii) the development and implementation of co-management plans for the Malindi-
Ungwana Bay and the Shimoni-Vanga Area; (ii) fish landing and marketing infrastructure to several fishing
communities in southern Kenya (Kibuyuni, Shimoni) and Faza in Lamu County; and (iii) development of community
SMEs aquaculture projects (seaweed, artemia, tilapia and milkfish trials). Although at project closing all SME
initiatives were reported as operational, the revenue generated has not been quantified, while their long-term
viability will require further training and technical support, particularly regarding business management and
marketing skills. In addition, the revised post MTR results framework included an indicator on the number of
coastal households with annual earnings of US$50 or more from commercial natural resource management
activities supported by the project. Although the number of 642 households reached represents a shortcoming
related to the target of 1000 households, the coverage and potential livelihood improvements achieved are
considered significant in light of the short implementation period for this activity.
30. GEO outcome: To strengthen conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity. The
project featured a commendable blend of PDO and GEO. Due to the particular nature of the resources comprising
the project area, this complementarity allowed for environmental outcomes to become an integral part of overall
project achievements. As such, through its GEO, KCDP supported the implementation of significant activities within
several marine and terrestrial protected areas, promoted effective management beyond the protected areas, and
most importantly developed and implemented pilot co-management schemes in the project’s marine ecosystems,
as described in the above assessment.
31. Overall, the project benefited a total of 73,660 people, against a target of 10,000 beneficiaries, including
members of 320 Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs). The target was overachieved by 600 percent, while
female beneficiaries accounted for 46 percent of the direct beneficiaries (PDO indicator #2 – fully achieved).
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C. EFFICIENCY
Assessment of Efficiency and Rating
32. Rating – Modest: The analysis conducted at appraisal showed that the proposed interventions were
economically and financially feasible. The potential benefits of the marine fisheries component had a Net Present
Value (NPV) equivalent to US$1.3 million (KES 98.7 million) at a discount rate of 12 percent, and the Internal Rate
of Return (IRR) was 31 percent. At project closure,5 using the same discount rate of 12 percent and the marine
fisheries component revenue flows from the monitoring and evaluation report,6 the NPV was equivalent to US$2.8
million, and the IRR 47 percent. Further, an incremental cost analysis assessed the incremental costs to justify the
added value of doing GEF supported investments (US$5 million) over the business as usual scenario and to inform
the “reasonableness” of the proposed GEF financing. GEF-funded activities towards sustainable management of
fisheries resources and sound management of natural resources (i.e., components 1 and 2), had an absorption rate
of 88 percent at the end of the project. The borrower’s project evaluation report provides evidence that the project
had significant benefits, both at global and national levels. The quantifiable benefit streams were estimated using
project-based data, and as presented in the subsequent sections, the benefits outweighed the costs. The main
limitation to this analysis was that there were several activities in each component whose benefit streams could
not be quantified ex-ante; hence non-quantifiable benefits of these components are also discussed.
33. Quantifiable benefits. According to the PAD, the investments towards establishing a VMS and
strengthening MCS were to improve the regime for monitoring fishing licenses in the Kenyan EEZ, with estimated
revenues from increased vessel licensing of approximately US$2.1 million (KES 159 million). By the end of the
project, the revenues reports were cumulatively US$4.09 million, which exceeded the targeted amount. The
increase in revenue was largely driven by improved licensing of vessels through frame surveys, enforcement
patrols, and sensitization. In addition, the HMP window aimed at supporting community-identified and
implemented micro-projects, by focusing on small scale livelihood-enhancing interventions. Groups receiving
grants were expected to contribute in cash and in-kind, and designed to maximize returns on the community’s
input of labor, time, materials and cash. At the end of the project, a total of 151 HMP sub-projects had been
financed, with an estimated US$660,000 (KES 69 million) generated from various income-generating activities. As
discussed previously, the revised results framework also measured the number of coastal households with annual
earnings of US$50 or more from commercial natural resource management activities supported by the project.
Finally, the Project’s MSME objective was to assist in establishing joint ventures between communities and the
private investor, in order to create a business environment that attracts more investments. The target was to
identify, train and assist 200 MSME’s and further help them develop business plans. The project surpassed the
target since 213 MSMEs were trained, in developing business plans. However, there were no PPPs established
between the MSMEs and local banks to ensure sustainability of the projects after the KCDP. In addition, the
selected projects should have been subjected to a rigorous commercial viability criterion in order to ensure
sustainability and eventually attracting private investors at the end of the KCDP project.
34. Non-quantifiable benefits. The Project had several activities which included community capacity
strengthening activities, and direct stakeholder support in extension-related activities and pilot projects, however,
5 Some of the elements that were considered in the ex-post economic analysis summarized in this ICR do not necessarily represent economic benefits in a
conventional sense. For example, public revenues from fishing license fees, represent transfers from private citizens to the State, and no economic benefits
were generated in the process. Nevertheless, in order to maintain consistency with the ex-ante economic analysis conducted at appraisal, the ex-post analysis
in this ICR used the approach and terminology as employed in the PAD.
6 Y1- 0.68 m, Y2- 1.38 m; Y3-2.18m Y4-3.18m- Source: M&E report 2017
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estimating the benefits of such projects ex-ante and consequently ex-poste is difficult. Non-quantifiable benefits
include those resulting from improved management of natural resources and restoration of degraded marine
resources. Under the KCDP, three target areas were brought under effective management: Kisite- Mpunguti in
Kwale County, area under management increased from 51 to 58 percent; Malindi Marine Park in Kilifi County, area
under management increased from 52 to 56 percent; and Shimba Hills in Taita Taveta County, area under
management increased from 54 to 58 percent. This surpassed the average target of 55 percent in all cases by 1.8 -
5.4 percent. Even though it is difficult to estimate the benefits of MPAs, empirical evidence on the benefits of
MPA7 shows that on average, a 1 percent increase in MPA results in an increased growth rate of fish populations
by about 1 percent, implying that protecting MPAs is a worthwhile investment. In addition, the Project carried out
various capacity building activities at the government, county, and community levels, which have led to both a
stronger enabling environment and increased capacity to sustainably manage coastal and marine resources.
35. Efficiency in design and implementation of the project. The project’s effectiveness was delayed by one
year as a result of delayed fulfillment of the project’s conditions for effectiveness, and overall project
implementation was slow up until MTR in 2015 (see Section III for more details). However, the project was
restructured twice which were instrumental to accelerated project implementation progress and completion of
project activities, particularly those associated with infrastructure. The financial absorption rate significantly
increased, particularly following the cancellation of funds as part of the restructuring after the MTR in 2015. As
most targets remained unchanged, the cancellation of funds contributed significantly to overall project efficiency.
The absorption rate increased from 30 percent in 2015, to 88 percent in 2017, equaling US$20.57 million in
disbursements, and comparing to US$12.17 million that had been utilized prior to MTR, during the first 4 years of
project implementation. The expenditure on travel and Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) is also important in
determining the level of efficiency of a project. There is no threshold for determining an optimal DSA to total
expenditure ratio, however, high rates of DSA to total expenditure tend to imply signs of inefficiency. DSA as a
proportion of total KCDP expenditure was approximately 30 percent, which is considered high. However, there are
a couple of attributing factors that need to be recognized. First, the project covered a wide geographical area that
necessitated long distance travel expenditures, and second, the project decided to utilize technical resources from
the various implementing agencies rather than consultants to conduct studies, assessments, and field work, in an
effort to strengthen technical capacity. By excluding DSA that can directly be associated with research activities and
technical assistance provided to communities under the HMP and VMG activities, expenditures associated with
DSA represent only 6 percent of total KCDP expenditures.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING
36. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. This overall outcome rating is based on the substantial relevance of
the project’s PDO, the substantial efficacy of project outputs in reaching its intended results, and the modest
efficiency achieved by the project. The relevance of the PDO is demonstrated by the decision of GoK to pursue the
upscaling and replication of KCDP interventions through an ambitious Blue Economy agenda, which will be fully
supported by the World Bank’s Kenya Marine Fisheries and Socioeconomic Development Project (KEMFSED)
currently under its initial stages of preparation.
37. Project outputs comprised a balanced combination of capacity building, public and private
infrastructure, development of valuable regulatory and knowledge-related public goods, and support to
communities in the establishment or strengthening of small-scale commercial enterprises. These interventions not
7 Heal, G. and Rising J. (2014). “Global Benefits of Marine Protected Areas” NBER Working Paper No. 19982
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Gender
only have contributed to improving the role of government agencies and local communities in the management
effectiveness and sustainable use of coastal resources, but also to improve the revenue generation of both the
public sector and local communities. Although a substantial portion of these outputs were delivered in the latter
part of the life of the project and therefore may not be fully verified at project closing, the initial benefits registered
and the commitment of sectoral agencies and local county governments to sustain project interventions, provide
adequate assurance that project outputs will further consolidate the achievement of the intended outcomes.
38. Despite disbursements of only 10 percent at the time of the Level 1 restructuring in 2012, the overall
outcome rating is based on a split rating, to be consistent with OPCS Guidelines. The rating takes into account the
original and formally revised targets, weighing pre- and post-revision performance by the share of actual
disbursements before and after the restructuring. The second and third restructurings did not warrant a split
rating. Project outputs comprised a balanced combination of capacity building, public and private infrastructure,
development of valuable regulatory and knowledge-related public goods, and support to communities in the
establishment or strengthening of small-scale commercial enterprises. These interventions not only have
contributed to improving the role of government agencies and local communities in the management effectiveness
and sustainable use of coastal resources, but also to improve the revenue generation of both the public sector and
local communities. Although a substantial portion of these outputs were delivered in the latter part of the life of
the project and therefore may not be fully verified at project closing, the initial benefits registered and the
commitment of sectoral agencies and local county governments to sustain project interventions, provide adequate
assurance that project outputs will further consolidate the achievement of the intended outcomes.
Before Restructuring After Restructuring
Relevance of Objective Substantial
Efficacy (PDO) Modest Substantial
Efficiency Modest
1. Outcome Ratings Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory
2. Numerical value of the outcome ratings 3 4
3. Disbursement US$3.47 million US$30.74
4. Share of Disbursement* 10% 90%
5. Weighted Value of the Outcome Rating 0.3 3.6
6. Final Outcome Rating Moderately Satisfactory
*Combined IDA Credit and GEF Grant
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS
39. At design, the project made reasonable and explicit consideration to inclusiveness and equity of women,
youth and vulnerable groups. In this regard, the original results framework in the PAD included a trackable
indicator of achievement of 35 percent of female beneficiaries within the total number of direct beneficiaries. As a
result of gender pro-activeness by the PMU (evidenced by the disaggregation of relevant indicators) and
subsequent support from Bank supervision, this target was fully achieved in relation to female participation in the
project. Of the total direct and indirect beneficiaries, female beneficiaries accounted for 46 percent surpassing the
revised target of 45 percent. Moreover, of the fully trained 213 MSMEs, there was almost equal gender
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presentation with 52 percent males and 48 percent females. Gender representation was also satisfactorily
achieved in the highly relevant support provided to undergraduate training on environmental and social disciplines.
Specifically, of the 29 students from local communities that were awarded scholarships, 57 percent were male and
43 percent were female. In addition, representative female participation was verified in the over 200 Vulnerable
and Marginalized Groups (VMGs) supported by the project. There was also a strong gender balance in all training
events supported by the project.
Institutional Strengthening
40. Despite the project’s institutional complexity, the overall capacity building efforts were mostly
successful and supportive of the PDO and GEO by enhancing skill development8 and providing relevant equipment
to all seven participating government agencies (and to some extent to staff of the six counties, both local staff and
those transferred from central ministries as part of the devolution process), and by improving the capacity of
micro, small and medium sized enterprises in coastal communities.
41. As a result of the project’s nature (and interventions), in addition to capacity building, collaboration and
cooperation between implementing agencies has improved considerably- especially in the last three years of
implementation. Besides technical capacity of staff which has been enhanced through project training, learning
tours, and participation of seconded staff in the PMU agencies exhibited improved cooperation, involving
component managers in management decision-making, and most importantly through the adoption of joint work
planning. These were major factors contributing to improved effectiveness and efficiency in project
implementation, and are expected to be institutionalized beyond the arrangements of KCDP, and further expanded
to incorporate the county governments (a relative shortcoming of the project) as key players in the development of
a sound Blue Economy, consistent with GoK’s devolution process. Synergy and collaboration with other
development agencies and projects represents a key factor towards project efficiency, sustainability, and
leveraging of resources. Although the PAD did not provide any indicative framework for synergy and collaboration
with other stakeholders, during implementation the PMU proactively engaged a wide range of collaborators,
including universities, NGOs, bilateral partners and Government institutions.
Mobilizing Private Sector Financing
42. The project supported the preparation of suitability maps for aquaculture, high value forest trees and 46
agricultural crops, creating a valuable source of information for potential private sector investors, if adequately
disseminated. In addition, beneficiary communities contributed their counterpart share of 10 percent of subproject
costs (of which 5 percent in cash) despite the poverty levels prevalent in the region. End of project surveys and
field visits suggest that the majority of projects linked to tourism are generating acceptable levels of revenue.
However, although the PMU structure included a private sector specialist, the project does not formally register
any relevant output with regard to this important element of the project implementation and its subsequent
sustainability. In this respect, the lack of private sector engagement (and financing) during implementation could
represent a significant factor affecting the viability of productive MSMEs and community subprojects, particularly
given the difficulties experienced in many cases regarding access to markets, and the financial limitations of most
beneficiaries. To address this shortcoming, the project could have reached out more actively to the considerable
number of microfinancing organizations operating in the coastal region.
8 A comprehensive training program allowed an estimated 63 public officials selected from the implementing agencies to engage in
graduate and undergraduate courses relevant to the objectives of the project.
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Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity
43. Although not an explicit objective, the project included a number of interventions directly targeted to
poor fishers and farmers of the coastal region as well as VMGs living in the project area, which according to end of
project assessments, have generated significant livelihood improvements to beneficiary households and
communities. As mentioned earlier, an estimated 73,660 poor community members benefited directly from project
activities.
44. Community livelihood interventions (HMP) included training and capacity building especially in business
management, and financial support through small grants to groups within local communities, which also included
demand driven social welfare and local environmental management interventions. In addition to the financial
support provided, direct beneficiaries earned an estimated KES 69 million (equivalent to almost US$700,000) from
various income-generating activities including aquaculture, seaweed farming, tree seedlings, woodlots (poles), ecotourism
enterprises, and crop and livestock production. Livelihood and infrastructural development for VMGs,
although introduced into the project work plan only after the MTR (June 2015), was aimed at VMGs living in
extreme poverty. Subprojects were successfully implemented in various sectors including social infrastructure
(health and education) and livelihoods (livestock and subsistence crops).
45. Despite the late start of this safeguard-related activity, the success of the 80 subprojects benefitting
over 200 marginalized communities was largely attributed to improved work planning approach (centralization of
project financial budgeting, common work planning and budgeting, adoption of the RRI approach); the support by
departments of public works (national and county government) in the design and supervision of civil works; the
participatory approach used, whereby VMGs could prioritize their own needs; as well as the fact that the demanddriven
interventions were fully consistent with their livelihood needs. In addition, other relevant county
government departments (mainly health, livestock and education) were also involved in the implementation of
VMG subprojects.
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION
46. Project design closely followed the structure of other WB-funded projects in coastal areas of Africa. The
PAD clearly states that “there was nothing new and untested in the design of the KCDP and its technical design and
implementation management arrangements are based on similar, successful, coastal and natural resource
management operations in Kenya, other countries in East and West Africa, and elsewhere”.9 Inconsistent with this
statement, the extensive preparation process (2006-2009) appears to have been insufficient to adequately identify
and address Kenya’s particular conditions and requirements for a successful coastal development project. As a
result project design and subsequent quality at entry were affected by shortcomings related to (i) limited adequacy
and robustness of basic sectoral information upon which the project was conceptualized; (ii) a not clearly
articulated and disseminated development model or theory of change; (iii) the intervention mix in terms of planned
activities, outputs, and anticipated outcomes; (iv) the definition and clarity of indicators; (v) the realism of project
9 World Bank-supported Tanzania Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project - MACEMP (P082492); World Bank-financed South
West Indian Ocean Fisheries – SWIOFP (P072202); World Bank-supported Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project – LVEMP
(P090680); Asian Development Bank-supported Coral Triangle Initiative in East Asia, Asian Development Bank-supported Coastal Resources
Management Project in Sri Lanka)
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timeline, geographical scope, institutional arrangements and implementation capacity; and (vi) the readiness for
implementation, as demonstrated by the inclusion of six conditions of effectiveness.
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION
47. Initially, the project faced a number of challenges leading to an extended period of slow implementation
progress, which resulted in low achievements in relation to set targets during the first 2-3 years of the project.
Main factors were:
a) Quality at entry deficiencies, reflected in the loss of almost one full year (July 27, 2010 to June 30, 2011)
since Board approval due to major, albeit foreseeable delays in the fulfilment of the various conditions for
effectiveness;
b) The premature closing of the Kenya Arid Lands Resource Management Project II (ALRMP II), designated in
the PAD to implement the project’s grants to communities, which delayed considerably the implementation
of community support initiatives;
c) The institutional changes caused by the Constitutional devolution process and the establishment of
Counties;
d) Delays caused by the design and processing of two comprehensive restructurings in 2012 (to address quality
at entry issues), and in 2015 (following the MTR);
e) Poor and disjointed work planning by the various implementing agencies prior to the MTR;
f) Slow procurement, primarily due to limitations in staff capacity and low responsiveness of the procurement
committee; and
g) Factors beyond the control of the project such as insecurity in coastal areas, especially in Lamu County, and
major disruptions related to the National Elections of 2012.
48. Some of the important shortcomings of project design and implementation readiness were proactively
addressed through the first restructuring. Preparation of the Level 1 restructuring began as part of the first
supervision mission, and was approved by the Board within 18 months of project effectiveness. The details of the
restructuring are described in Section 1. The second project restructuring was the result of a comprehensive MTR,
which included a detailed independent assessment of project implementation progress. This equally proactive and
well-designed Level 2 restructuring addressed the technical and operational recommendations of the MTR and
included a partial cancellation of US$4.6 million, the realignment of implementation arrangements, the revision of
project components and indicators, and a substantial change in the disbursement of funds, promoting the
elaboration of joint workplans by the implementing agencies. A third, minor restructuring was processed to extend
the closing date of the project by 8 months, to June 30, 2017.
49. In addition to the factors addressed as part of the restructurings, overall implementation and
performance was consistently affected by the complexity of institutional arrangements. Although this is to a large
extent a logical consequence of attempting to implement a comprehensive coastal development strategy (a major
challenge common to coastal interventions), the changes empowering the PMU to take a leading role in managing
project interventions proved that the negative impact of such complexity could be reduced. Furthermore, following
the constitutional devolution to counties, a deeper reform of institutional arrangements could have potentially
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facilitated more active engagement of the local governments located in the project area. However, the devolution
was a gradual process requiring time and resources, and taking account of the project challenges at the time, the
project implementation was retained at the ministry- and agency-level to avoid adding further complexities, and
involvement of local governments was strengthened, especially through capacity building. Despite being essential
to achieve satisfactory results, the improvements included in the project as part of the second restructuring were
not timely enough to ensure sustainable implementation and consolidation of project interventions, particularly
those activities supporting communities. For this to occur, more time was needed to build, and monitor results, of
stronger elements of capacity building and support in three main areas: (i) market research to allow for more
informed decisions by beneficiaries regarding market demand and channels for their target products and/or
services; (ii) support for market access/linkages so as to facilitate sustainability of established and commercially
oriented HMP and SMEs; and (iii) training on business management and access to financial resources in the case of
SMEs, and to supplement capacity building and provision of startup grants in the case of HMP projects. This would
have been particularly important for commercial-oriented or value addition interventions such as seaweed
farming, aquaculture and eco-tourism ventures.
IV.BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)
M&E Design
50. The PAD strongly emphasized the need to establish a robust M&E system for the project. In this regard,
it stated that “a long-term M&E strategy is needed to detect project-related changes in coastal areas, identify the
likely causes of these changes and the lessons learned, and recommend interim and long-term adaptive and
management responses applicable to KCDP implementation and future interventions in the Coast”. Despite the
identification of these critical functions, in the original results framework, a number of indicators were considered
at restructuring to have weaknesses in terms of definition and interpretation. Part of the reason for the poorly
defined M&E systems and indicators of achievement in the original results framework can be attributed to the
failure to fully involve an M&E specialist during project preparation. The project’s M&E greatly benefited from the
revised implementation arrangements where the role of the PMU was enhanced and implementation workplans
were jointly prepared by the various participating institutions. In addition, following the restructuring, the project’s
results framework was revised to include a total of 19 monitorable indicators of achievements, five of which were
PDO level indicators and the remaining 14 were intermediate level indicators. Unlike in the case of the original
design, the majority of the indicators of achievement in the revised framework were well defined, clear and fully
compliant with the definitions of specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound (SMART).
M&E Implementation
51. The project’s M&E greatly benefited from the revised implementation arrangements, as the collection
and flow of information became more timely, reliable and consistent with reporting requirements. As a result,
detailed quarterly and annual reports were produced by the M&E specialist of the PMU, containing in a
standardized format both the quantitative progress and qualitative assessment of each indicator of the results
framework. In addition, the conclusions and recommendations of the independent MTR were greatly supported by
the available M&E information, which was complemented by assessments using the Rapid Result Initiatives (RRI)
methodology.
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M&E Utilization
52. Although the project M&E system effectively started in 2014 following the recruitment of a qualified
M&E specialist at the PMU, M&E functions gradually improved and provided valuable information to inform
decision-making by project management. As an example, an internal evaluation report in 2014/2015 indicated that
business oriented sub-projects in fisheries, natural resource and HMP sub-components had no requisite business
management skill training and warned that this would adversely affect the sustainability of such projects. On the
basis of this, training on business development services (BDS) was introduced and offered in partnership with
Strathmore Business School. As a result, almost 200 additional enterprises received training in BDS – thereby
increasing the number of SMEs trained from 318 to 512. Subsequent to the MTR, the M&E system of the project
became fully functional and was an effective tool to monitor project progress, inform management decisions, and
support the Bank’s supervision requirements. At project closing, the quality and accurateness of the independent
Borrower Completion Report was significantly enhanced by the physical and financial information provided by the
M&E system, including the detailed quantification of all targets linked to the indicators of the Results Framework.
Further to the project specific M&E system, it should be noted that KCDP also supported the establishment of a
number of monitoring tools, ranging from the sophisticated system for monitoring of vessels fishing in the Kenya’s
EEZ (the VMS) to the development of methods and protocols to conduct regular monitoring of fish species and
biodiversity, for which the respective responsible agencies have committed continued support.
Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E
53. Rating – Substantial: Despite the initial deficiencies in terms of design of the indicators for the M&E
system, the retrofitting conducted, and the significant improvement achieved in terms of implementation and
utilization, made the M&E system an important tool for monitoring of project performance (i.e., physical and
financial indicators) and managerial decision-making by both the PMU and World Bank supervision team. The
design of the revised M&E system contained adequate indicators to monitor progress toward the PDOs and the
TOC, and was implemented by the PMU using effective M&E arrangements and data collection procedures.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE
54. Environmental Safeguards: Given KCDPs predominantly environmental nature, the project was
classified as a Category B for environmental risks. As such, no major issues related to environmental safeguard
compliance were recorded during the life of the project. Furthermore, many project interventions were aimed at
improving the management of marine and terrestrial natural resources and biodiversity of global significance.
Institutionally, the project included the participation of the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA)
and the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), which ensured that, beyond specific implementation functions, the key
environmental and biodiversity protection agencies of the country received considerable strengthening through
targeted capacity building and training. Project implementation also included annual environmental and social
audits aimed at improving compliance with safeguard requirements of KCDP interventions in line with the country’s
Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) Cap387 and the Environmental and Social Management
framework (ESMF) for the project put in place at the inception. Three audits were conducted in 2015, 2016 and
2017. The 2015 and 2017 audits covered all KCDP sub-projects while the 2016 was specifically focused on the
environmental impact of woodlots.
55. Social Safeguards: Project preparation included a comprehensive Environmental and Social
Management Framework (ESMF) and Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF). Project implementation took
into full consideration the guidelines and requirements to comply with the identified social safeguards, particularly
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in relation to the selection, participation and gender balance of project beneficiaries. However, after procurementrelated
delays, the ESMF was revised in 2015 to improve environmental and social management of project
activities and to ensure all relevant Bank safeguard policies were complied with. Similarily, due to major delays in
the recruitment of the consultancy for the identification of Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs) and design
of the corresponding support mechanisms for these communities, technical and financial support to VMGs was
only implemented during the last two years of project implementation, thus limiting the technical support and
capacity building received by VMG beneficiaries.
56. Despite this, VMG activities reached all identified marginalized communities located in remote areas of
the project counties. Communities assisted by KCDP activities included the Waata, Wakifundi, Wachwaka,
Wailwana, Mnyoyaya, Wasanye and Awer people through a total of 80 demand-driven subprojects. These were
identified after a social assessment and an action plan was prepared jointly by VMG representatives, County and
KCDP staff. A total of 11 subprojects provided social infrastructure (mainly dispensaries and educational facilities)
while the 69 livelihood improvement subprojects supplied improved small ruminants, inputs for crop production,
and fishing gear. Despite limited supervision due to remoteness, the independent end of project surveys conducted
indicate a high level of satisfaction by VMG beneficiaries, further demonstrated by the fact that no major
complaints were received through the grievance redress mechanism developed by the project (which in fact also
included the establishment of grievance committees). It should be noted, that one subproject involving the
rehabilitation of a pedestrian bridge in the Bombi area was approved as a VMG subproject but was not completed
prior to the closing date. At the time of the ICR mission (October 2017), Kenyan authorities provided written
confirmation that an additional Ksh 40 million (equivalent to US$390,000) had been allocated by Treasury to
finance the remaining works to complete the bridge, as well as strengthen sustainability aspects of the VMG
subprojects.
57. Procurement: During the early stages of project implementation, procurement-related delays were
identified as a bottleneck to overall project performance. Key factors causing delays were: limited staff capacity in
the procurement unit (i.e., lack of experience in the implementation of World Bank-financed operations, lack of a
fulltime procurement officer assigned to the project), limited technical capacity of implementing agencies to
develop procurement documents (e.g., ToR, designs, specifications), and poor coordination by the PMU of activities
undertaken by the many implementing agencies. To address these challenges, procurement functions and
processes were eventually reorganized, including the strengthening of the procurement planning and
administrative processes by hiring of a fulltime project procurement officer, centralized processing of procurement
activities through the PMU, use of indefinite delivery contracting arrangements, and processing of contracts and
contracts award through KMFRI. Enhanced procurement training and capacity building for PMU staff was also
undertaken in addition to increased World Bank hand-holding support and oversight, eventually significantly
improving procurement performance. Although this was only done in the early stages of 2015 as part of the MTR,
significant improvements were subsequently verified in the preparation and implementation of procurement plans,
especially with regards to the implementation of civil works as noted in the World Bank’s Aide Memoire of
November 2015. Further delays in the implementation of the procurement plan were experienced in late 2016,
caused by challenges related to budget utilization. However, implementation was back on track early 2017 through
improved activity coordination, better planning and enhanced procurement performance.
58. Procurement deficiencies and the delays in addressing them were undoubtedly a major contributing
factor to the limited implementation progress, especially in the initial years of the project. The subsequent
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backloading of critical project activities during the last two years of implementation, coupled with slow decision
making, affected not only the provision of project support to communities, but also the delivery of key products
and instruments, such as the biodiversity management information system, the hardware and software for
fisheries monitoring, the installation of the VMS, and the consultancies for the development of SME business plans
and VMG identification and interventions.
59. Financial Management (FM): Generally, adequate FM arrangements were maintained throughout
Project implementation, resulting in ratings of S and MS throughout most of the project life. The PMU had qualified
FM staff assisted by a project accountant, and each of the sub-implementing agencies had a qualified project
accountant. The Project was in compliance with the World Bank’s financial reporting requirements with the
quarterly Intermediate Financial Reports (IFRs) and annual audited financial statements submitted to the WB
within the stipulated timelines, and deemed to be in content and form acceptable to the World Bank. The internal
control arrangements were also deemed to be effective. The Project had a comprehensive FM Procedures Manual
and complied with Kenya’s Public Financial Management (PFM) laws and regulations. Due to procurement-related
delays, the Project was not able to install an accounting software at the PMU as planned in the beginning of project
implementation. However, the project managed to perform its FM obligations using a manual accounting system
until it procured and installed an off-the-shelf accounting software in mid-2015.
60. Concerning the results of external and internal audit procedures, no major issues were reported
throughout the life of the project, although a number of minor issues were raised by auditors from the Auditor
General’s office in their management letters. In general, the auditor’s opinions were mostly related to omissions
rather than impropriety by KCDP implementing agencies, which did not result in any loss or misuse of project
funds. The project experienced one case of ineligible expenditure, an amount of KES 2,736,470 (US$ 28,000
equivalent) incurred by KWS, however, the funds were promptly refunded to the Bank by the GoK. There were no
outstanding audit issues at project closure. Implementing agencies promptly responded to and addressed any FM
issues flagged during WB FM supervision reviews and the GoK internal and external audit reports. For example, in
2016, inaccurate FM data and delays in preparing cashflow projections slowed down the finalization of the annual
work program and budget approval. However, the PMU, together with the implementing agencies and support
from the WB, promptly addressed the issues to ensure continued project implementation.
61. Disbursement of project funds was consistent with the slow implementation progress experienced
initially, and remained below financial projections until the MTR. However, due to the managerial and institutional
improvements introduced by the second project restructuring (as well as the cancellation of US$4.59 million from
IDA), total disbursements accelerated and at project closing (including the grace period) represented over 99
percent of both the IDA credit and the GEF grant. Specifically, at the end of the grace period, the Project had
disbursed US$29.26 million (99 percent) and US$5 million (100 percent), of the IDA credit and GEF grant,
respectively.
C. BANK PERFORMANCE
Quality at Entry
62. Quality at entry was a determining factor in the overall implementation, performance and outcome of
the project. Regardless of the substantial relevance of the project for GoK and the World Bank, and despite the
extended three-year preparation process, further supported through Japan’s Policy and Human Resources
Development (PHRD) (US$650,000) and GEF (US$228,000), some key elements of project design were not
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adequately addressed. As described in the PAD, project design perhaps relied heavily on the World Bank’s
experience in other coastal development projects and did not fully adapt such experiences to the operational and
institutional conditions of Kenya, in particular the weakness of the organizational, administrative and governance
structure of the project. This, combined with the limited borrower ownership of project design (essential for a
project with the institutional complexity of KCDP) and the equally limited progress in developing the necessary
operational instruments to support implementation (M&E system, fiduciary procedures, operational manual,
safeguard compliance), resulted in inadequate readiness for implementation, partly illustrated by the inclusion of a
number of conditions of effectiveness in the financial agreement, which not only required almost one year to be
fulfilled, but also limited the World Bank’s dedication to routine supervision activities.
Quality of Supervision
63. The World Bank provided comprehensive support to the project throughout the implementation period.
A significant portion of the World Bank’s supervision efforts was dedicated to the preparation and processing of
the two major restructurings required by the project, which to some extent may have impacted the team’s
dedication to regular supervision tasks. The World Bank teams demonstrated commendable proactiveness and
candor to engage the client and World Bank management in the complexity and implications of undertaking such
comprehensive restructurings. Early in the life of the project, the first restructuring was focused on addressing the
overall weaknesses of project design, while the second restructuring was the result of the comprehensive
independent MTR promoted by the World Bank, which was aimed at incorporating substantial operational and
fiduciary adjustments required to accelerate implementation and attempt to achieve the project’s outcomes. Even
though Kenya had started implementing its devolution process, the overall project implementation responsibilities
remained at the ministry- and agency-level. The devolution transition was a gradual exercise requiring time and
resources, and taking account of the project’s challenges at the time, the task team adequately decided not to
devolve the project management to the county-level, to avoid further complexities. Instead, county representation
in project implementation was strengthened, resulting in some of the project activities having been integrated into
county integrated development plans.
64. Throughout the life of the project, the World Bank conducted a total of 12 full supervision mission,
which were complemented by numerous fiduciary and technical missions, the latter comprised of highly qualified
specialists in key project areas such as fisheries development, biodiversity and infrastructure, which provided
sound advice and guidance on implementation matters to the PMU and the respective implementing agencies. Due
to security restrictions, missions were often not granted clearance to visit sensitive project sites. The World Bank’s
supervision efforts were led by two different Task Team Leaders (TTL), who provided a smooth transition due to a
significant overlap period, including their joint participation in the MTR. Missions not only provided extensive
progress reviews and assessments as well as recommendations to address key implementation challenges as
documented in the Aide Memoires, but also complied in a timely manner with internal World Bank reporting
requirements through the filing of issues-oriented Implementation Status and Results (ISR) Reports. In the opinion
of the client, as expressed by the Directors of implementing agencies during the ICR mission, World Bank
supervision was instrumental to the resolution of implementing bottlenecks and consequently the significant
improvement in project performance and achievements. That notwithstanding, World Bank support could have
been further enhanced by ensuring more continuity and in-country presence of supervision TTLs and teams.
Activities of KCDP where the client considered that the World Bank could have provided stronger supervision
support included procurement, infrastructure development, entrepreneurship and community development
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Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance
65. Rating – Moderately Satisfactory: Based on the above assessment of the Bank throughout the different
phases of the project cycle, and the outcome rating achieved, the overall rating of Bank performance is rated as
Moderately Satisfactory, resulting from the combined rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory for Quality at Entry and
Satisfactory for Quality of Supervision.
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
66. Although the project did not conduct systematic and regular assessments of risks, relevant mitigation
measures for pre-identified and emerging risks were adequately taken into consideration, in particular the
security situation in certain project areas was appropriately reflected in revisions to project implementation
plans. At project closing, the main risks to the project’s development outcomes are related to the implications of
the backloading of many important project activities. The late implementation of many community, SME and
VMG subprojects, as well as public investments such as the VMS, increase the vulnerability of these activities.
Due to this, the effective continuity and in some cases the viability of project interventions will strongly rely on
Government capacity to provide adequate technical assistance (to communities) and operations and
maintenance costs to ensure the functionality of public instruments supported by the project. Both risks appear
to be minimized by the commitment of the government and counties to provide the necessary support beyond
project closing. After project closing, the National Treasury has allocated KES 40 million (i.e., US$380,000)
towards strengthening the sustainability mechanisms of the VMG subprojects. In addition, the presence of
several coastal initiatives financed by bilateral partners, and the World Bank’s decision to support GOK’s efforts
towards developing its blue economy through the KEMFSED project are expected to reduce the above described
risks and ensure the long-term impact of the project’s outcomes.
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
67. The Implementation of KCDP has generated a series on valuable technical and
operational lessons, which can be applied to coastal development projects or projects with a strong focus
on community development.
a) In countries with decentralization policies (or constitutional devolution, as in Kenya) strong and proactive
involvement of local governments may require additional institutional arrangements and capacity building
efforts, but it is essential to enhance local ownership, support implementation requirements, and provide
commitment to the long-term sustainability of project interventions.
b) Projects with spatial development focus especially on coastal areas to be sustainable, the design phase
must assess the appropriateness of the relevant policy and regulatory framework, and if needed,
incorporate support to develop improved policies and/or instruments to ensure that project investments
are mainstreamed in public-sector mandates.
c) In projects with multiple institutions and a broad stakeholder base, a sound, well designed communication
strategy is not only a good practice but can be instrumental in ensuring adequate collaboration among
institutions and to identify opportunities for stakeholder cooperation. The communication strategy and
other communication tools (e.g., video, website) that were prepared under KCDP provided the project
with a brand and identity, which served as incentives for good collaboration.
d) An additional requirement for complex institutional projects is the establishment of an appropriate work
planning and budgeting approach which includes the centralization of financial resources and budgeting
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under the PMU, the adoption of joint workplans, and the active involvement of component managers in
the decision-making process triggering coherence in planning, management and also enhanced teamwork
among project staff. The use of joint workplans had a particularly positive impact on the collaboration of
the various implementing agencies.
e) The alternative of direct implementation by technical staff of activities such as studies, management plans
or other tasks requiring considerable field work can be a cost-effective measure compared to the timeconsuming
process of recruiting consultants. However, such alternative may not be efficient and costeffective,
and may result in low product quality, and the risk of developing DSA dependency among public
employees. Where implemented, capacity building should be identified as part of project preparation and
delivered as a pre-requisite to engaging staff of implementing agencies in technical work.
f) For projects that include seconded staff from other government ministries/agencies as part of the PMU,
clear arrangements must be in place confirming that these staff are fully released from their parent
institutions for the agreed period. During project implementation, PMU staff were often performing their
normal duties in addition to their responsibilities under KCDP.
g) Business-related training of prospective or newly established SMEs can be of limited effectiveness if
conducted in the absence of financial support to investments, particularly when high levels of poverty
predominate among SME members.
h) Project implementation of the KCDP benefitted significantly from early restructuring. Early project
restructurings can be instrumental in reverting potentially severe quality at entry limitations to achieve
project objectives, including weak borrower ownership, inadequate institutional arrangements, and
absence of basic implementation instruments.
i) KCDP experience clearly indicates that strong elements of capacity building are essential to complement
financial support to and MSMEs beneficiaries in (i) value addition, market research and marketing skills to
facilitate informed decisions regarding the market conditions, challenges and opportunities and (ii)
business management and administration skills to facilitate enterprise operation, improved financial
management and access to financing.
.
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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS
A.1 PDO Indicators
Objective/Outcome: To improve management effectiveness of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of conservation areas
brought under effective
management (including comanagement)
as defined by
Management Effectiveness
Tracking Tool (METT) score of
at least 55
Number 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 05-Oct-2015 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): The protected areas brought under effective management are Shimba Hills, Kisite-
Mpunguti and Malindi. The METT score for the Shimba Hills increased from 54 to 57; the score for Kisite-Mpunguti increased from 51 to 57; and the score
for Malindi increased from 52 to 57. The activities that have contributed to the increases in the METT score include biodiversity assessments; the use of
night vision cameras to enhance security; development/review of management plans; staff training; boundary marking/fencing of protected areas, and
implementation of projects that enhance conservation and community welfare. The data was collected annually.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 1000.00 10000.00 73660.00
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01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 05-Oct-2015 30-Jun-2017
Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 35.00 45.00 46.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 05-Oct-2015 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (740%): Over 73,000 people have directly benefited from the project to date, which exceeds
the end-target of 10,000. Benefits have been drawn from woodlots, tree nurseries, ICZM training, and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) training,
SME capacity building, staff capacity building, HMP sub-projects, scholarships and internship for coastal students, sea seed farming, aquaculture, fin fish
farming, BMU training, beach inspectors workshops, fish quality control, processing and marketing, community managed areas, tour guide training,
biodiversity assessment training, school enrolment in classrooms supported by the project, and street paving users and clients of Kinondo banking hall.
Approximately 46 percent of the beneficiaries are female against a target of 45 percent. In addition to the direct beneficiaries referenced here, indirect
beneficiaries from HMP activities are estimated to be approximately 350,000 people. Data was collected bi-annually. The number of beneficiaries was
measured by counting all individuals that have benefited directly from KCDP through grants, scholarships and training, community sub-projects, and
through access to and/or use of goods and services from project financed sub-projects.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Areas outside protected areas
brought under improved
management
Hectare(Ha) 0.00 30.00 50.00
05-Oct-2015 05-Oct-2015 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (170%): The management of 50 hectares of land outside protected areas (i.e., in Gede,
Mpeketoni, Witu, and Comensum and Amani) has been improved through the establishment of seed stands and rehabilitation/restoration of degraded
areas, which has exceeded the end-target of 30 hectares. Data was collected annually.
Objective/Outcome: PDO Outcome 2: To enhance revenue generation of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Actual Achieved at
Completion
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Target
Revenue generation to GOK
from near shore and EEZ
fisheries
Amount(USD) 0.68 1.00 3.18 4.09
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 05-Oct-2015 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (129%): US$ 4.09 million in revenue has been generated from near shore and EEZ fisheries
through licensing of foreign fishing vessels, fishermen licenses, fishing registration, fish processing licenses, aquarium dealer licenses and inshore water
revenue collection, which exceeds the target of US$3.19 million. Frame survey information was used to enhance the licensing of vessels used in in-shore
areas. Enforcement patrols and sensitization were also carried out contributing to increase in revenue generation. The data was collected annually.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of coastal households
with annual earnings of US$50
or more from commercial NRM
activities supported by the
project
Number 0.00 1000.00 642.00
05-Oct-2015 05-Oct-2015 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target partly achieved (64%): This indicator was introduced following the mid-term restructuring in 2015.
Through commercial natural resource management activities supported by the KCDP, households have earned US$50 or more from selling sea weed, fin
fish, poles, and tree seedlings, or from waste management and ecotourism. Data was collected annually.
A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
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Number of vessels licensed to
fish in the Kenyan waters with
VMS installed
Number 0.00 20.00 44.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (220%): The newly installed and operationalized Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) has
registered six local, and 38 foreign vessels.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of species with Fishery
Management plans developed
Number 0.00 3.00 3.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): Fish management plans including ring net management, lobster and aquarium
Management plans were completed. The final plans were reviewed, verified by stakeholders, and distributed to stakeholders at various levels.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of key exploited
species with stock status
established
Number 0.00 5.00 3.00 5.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 21-Sep-2012 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (166%): Selection and prioritization of key commercial species using SICA framework. For the
five prioritized species (i.e., lobster, aquarium, small and medium pelagic, seganus suta, and prawns), standard operation procedures for stock
assessments have been developed, and actual stock assessments have been completed including the preparation of fact sheets.
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Component: Sound management of natural resources
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Target areas with annually
updated geo-referenced
biodiversity data
Hectare(Ha) 0.00 15000.00 10000.00 25000.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 21-Sep-2012 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (250%): Through biodiversity assessments in protected areas (i.e., Shimba Hills Ecosystem,
Kisite-Mpunguti Marine Park and Reserve and its environments) and outside protected areas (i.e., Lamu, Lake Kenyatta, Lake Jipe (Taita)), geo-referenced
biodiversity data has been generated, and subsequently used to develop a coastal biodiversity information system to support the management of marine
and coastal resources. The data was collected annually.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of Management Plans
developed or updated
Number 0.00 3.00 4.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (133%): Four management plans including the Mangrove Management Plan, the Witu Forest
Management Plan, the Kisite Mpunguti and Malindi Marine Management Plans, have been completed. The Mangrove Management Plan has been
integrated into County Integrated Development Plans, and is being implemented by the government through the Kenya Forest Service. In addition, two
conservation and management strategies have been developed for Coral Reef and Sea Grass Beds, and Sable Antelopes. The Coral Reef Strategy is
currently being implemented through the Climate Change Adaptation Program, and the Sable Antelope Strategy is being implemented through the Kenya
Wildlife Service and WWF. The plans were considered developed, when the process of developing the plans was commenced through KCDP, and
continued throughout implementation, until the plan was accepted and endorsed by the relevant government authority.
Indicator Name Unit of Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Actual Achieved at
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Measure Target Completion
Biodiversity management
information system is
developed, populated and
updated annually
Yes/No N N Y
21-Sep-2011 21-Sep-2012 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): The biodiversity management information system has been developed, installed, and
populated. The system is being used by stakeholders towards improving the management and conservation of the marine and coastal resources. Since the
installation of the system was only completed towards the end of the project, the system has not been updated (as per the envisaged annual update).
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of successful
community based
interventions documented and
disseminated
Number 0.00 5.00 10.00 10.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 21-Sep-2012 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): Ten successful community-based interventions were documented, and the associated
report was disseminated to stakeholders at a workshop held in 2017. Examples of successful community-based interventions include waste management
activities implemented by the Watamu Marine Association, mangrove conservation implemented by the Jimbo Environmental Group, or turtle
rehabilitation implemented by the Watamu Turtle Watch.
Component: Building Coastal Capacity for Sustainable Natural Resource Use and Management
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of regions and wards Number 0.00 11.00 6.00 6.00
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with coastal land capability
plans or maps developed
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 05-Oct-2015 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): Six coastal land capability plans/maps were developed including (i) the coastal region
land capability mapping; (ii) county land use plans for Kilifi and Lamu; and (iii) action area plans for Pongwe Kikoneni, Bomeni, and Kipini East. In addition,
26 tree species capability mappings were completed.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of officers from lead
agencies trained on ICZM & EIA
(including EIA certification)
Number 0.00 85.00 84.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (99%): Eighty-four of the targeted eighty-five officers have been trained in Environmental
Impact Assessments (EIA) and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). The indicator's end-target is considered achieved.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Annual environmental and
social audits for KCDP
supported projects undertaken
Number 0.00 3.00 3.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): Three environmental and social audits for KCDP supported sub-projects were
completed, and approved, with one of them having being on tree promotion activities.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
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Entrepreneurs identified,
trained, and with business plan
developed
Number 0.00 200.00 213.00
21-Sep-2012 21-Sep-2012 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (107%): Following substantial delays, this indicator's end-target has been achieved. 521
entrepreneurs have been trained under the KCDP, of which 213 have developed business plans. Progress and training reports documented the training.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Number of HMP subprojects
completed or operational
Number 0.00 500.00 200.00 230.00
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 21-Sep-2012 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (115%): Overall, 230 HMP sub-projects were completed and are operational, including 79
sub-projects targeted at Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs). Progress reports and sub-project reports confirmed the outcome.
Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Performance monitoring
reports (with progress on
agreed indicators) produced on
time and with satisfactory
quality
Yes/No N Y Y
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): M&E reports, including financial management reports, were regularly developed and
submitted to assess progress and inform decision-making processes.
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Indicator Name
Unit of
Measure
Baseline Original Target
Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at
Completion
Communication strategy in
place
Yes/No N Y Y
01-Jun-2011 01-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (100%): A communication strategy for the KCDP was developed and implemented. In
addition, the project developed a website and dedicated Facebook both, which have both been updated regularly. http://www.kcdp.co.ke
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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
Objective/Outcome 1 - To improve management effectiveness of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources
Outcome Indicators
1. Direct project beneficiaries
2. Areas outside protected areas brought under improved management
Intermediate Results Indicators
1. Number of species with fishery management plans developed
2. Number of key exploited species with stock status established
3. Number of HMP (community) subprojects completed or operational
4. Number of regions and wards with Coastal Capability plans or maps developed
Key Outputs by Component
(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)
1. A total of 73,660 beneficiaries received technical and financial assistance through HNP
and VMG subprojects, training, and support to SMEs, of which 46% were females
2. Management was improved in 50 has of four important sites outside of protected areas
3. Fish management plans were developed for ring-net management, lobster and
aquarium species
4. Stock status assessments were conducted for five key species (lobster, aquarium
species, pelagics, prawns, and siganus sp)
5. The project supported a total of 231 community subprojects through the HNP (162
subprojects) and VMG (69 subprojects) schemes. Predominant HNP community
subprojects included water supply (54), waste and sanitation (28), woodlots (26), and
health and education facilities (25), while VMG subprojects were mostly demanded for the
provision of small ruminants (61).
6. Six land capability assessments were prepared for the entire coastal region, Kilifi and
Lamu Counties, and Bomeni, Pongwe Kikoneni and Kipini areas
7. In collaboration with county governments, adaptive research was conducted by KMFRI
to improve fishing gear, including basket traps, prawn gear, and dropline.
8. Co-management arrangements were supported for a total of 13 Beach Management
Units (BMU) including four newly established and nine existing BMUs
9. In addition to a comprehensive short-term training program for project beneficiaries,
formal training on NRM management and environmental degrees was provided to a total
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of 183 individuals, of which 130 (mostly youth) were from coastal communities and 53
were staff from the seven project’s implementing agencies
10. Public sector performance and governance was improved through the provision of key
infrastructure and equipment, including the Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
Center (MCS), the development and operation of the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and
the construction of expanded facilities for the KMFRI Resource Center
Objective/Outcome 2 - To enhance revenue generation of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources
Outcome Indicators
1. Revenue generation by GOK
2. Number of coastal households with annual earnings of US$50 or more from commercial
NRM activities
Intermediate Results Indicators
1. Number of vessels licensed to fish in Kenyan waters with VMS installed
2. Entrepreneurs identified, trained and with business plans developed
3. Number of HMP subprojects completed
Key Outputs by Component
(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)
1. Through vessel licensing, frame surveys, patrols, port state measures and awareness
campaigns, accumulated revenue collected amounted to US$4.09 million
2. Through commercial NR-based activities such as seaweed, milkfish, shrimp and artemia
farming, wood poles and tree nurseries, a total of 642 households generated an income of
at least US$ 50.00
3. By project closing, a total of 44 fishing vessels (38 foreign and 6 local) operating in
Kenya’s EEZ had been registered, licensed and monitored through the VMS
4. The project provided training to over 500 small-scale entrepreneurs, of which 213
developed business plans
5. The project provided financing for the implementation of 231 community subprojects,
including 69 targeted at Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMG)
6. Private infrastructure for income generation through value addition was supported in
Shimoni (fish banda and ice plant), Faza (ice plant) and Kibuyuni (fish banda), as well as 39
community ponds for various aquaculture ventures, and facilities for seaweed harvesting
and processing
7. Suitability Maps were prepared for 26 tree species adapted to coastal conditions,
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expected to be valuable tools for County government planning and commercial feasibility
assessments by private investors
Objective/Outcome 3 - To strengthen conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity
Outcome Indicators 1. Number of Protected Areas brought under effective management
Intermediate Results Indicators
1. Target areas with annually updated geo-referenced biodiversity data
2. Number of Management Plans developed or updated
3. Biodiversity Management information system is developed, populated, and updated
annually
Key Outputs by Component
(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 3)
1. Through the provision of infrastructure and equipment, three Protected Areas (Kisite-
Mpunguti, Malindi, and Shimba Hills) were supported to improve overall management
performance, as verified by the higher individual METT score achieved
2. Biodiversity assessments were conducted for a total of 25,000 ha. Including the Kisite
Mpunguti and Shimba Hills protected areas, as well as biodiversity relevant areas in Lamu,
Lake Kenyatta and Lake Jipe
3. The project supported the preparation or updating of four Management Plans, including
the Mangrove Management Plan for the entire coastal area, and the plans for Kisite-
Mpunguti, Malindi and Witu Forest
4. Conservation and management strategies were prepared for Coral Reef and Seagrass
Beds, for turtles and for Sable Antelopes
5. A Biodiversity Information System for the coastal region was developed and installed
6. Relevant biodiversity conservation infrastructure supported by the project included the
Sheldrick Falls nature trail and the Lukore fence at Shimba Hills, the Shimoni jetty at Kisite-
Mpunguti Marine Area, and boundary demarcation buoys in five priority sites
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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION
A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS
Name Role
Preparation
William Leeds Lane Senior Environmental Specialist (former TTL)
Xavier Vincent Senior Fisheries Specialist
Nyambura Gihagui Senior Social Development Specialist
Henry Amena Amuguni Financial Management Specialist
Dahir Elmi Warsame Senior Procurement Specialist
Joel Munyori Procurement Specialist
Luis M. Schwarz Senior Finance Officer
Christiaan Johannes Nieuwoudt Financial Analyst
Maria Elizabeth Carneiro Finance Assistant
Clemencia R. Onesty Portfolio Officer
Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza Senior Counsel
Stephen Mukaindo Counsel
Supervision/ICR
Dinesh Aryal, Veruschka Schmidt Task Team Leader(s)
Ann Jeannette Glauber Lead Environmental Specialist (former TTL)
Anna Corsi Senior Land Administration Specialist
Maria Paulina Mogollon Senior Private Sector Development Specialist
Joel Buku Munyori, Tesfaye Ayele Senior Procurement Specialist(s)
Henry Amena Amuguni Senior Financial Management Specialist
Gibwa A. Kajubi Senior Social Safeguards Specialist
Johanna Michaela Weber Private Sector Specialist
Tobias Von Platen-Hallermund Environmental Safeguards Specialist (Consultant)
Agnes Yvonne Mkamaghanga Masaka Team Member
Lilian Wambui Kahindo Social Safeguards Specialist
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David Japp Fisheries Specialist (FAO)
Jason Rubens Community Fisheries Specialist (FAO)
Jo Sciortino Infrastructure Specialist (FAO)
Michael Carroll ICR Main Author
B. STAFF TIME AND COST
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost
No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation
FY06 7.513 48,622.03
FY07 4.925 27,578.03
FY08 17.447 100,956.55
FY09 11.318 80,751.81
FY10 25.126 198,220.69
FY11 0 - 0.54
Total 66.33 456,128.57
Supervision/ICR
FY11 15.781 80,422.43
FY12 31.680 124,213.90
FY13 30.500 122,256.11
FY14 20.683 108,683.15
FY15 27.391 161,116.29
FY16 24.301 129,729.78
FY17 24.625 156,997.96
FY18 8.913 70,094.67
Total 183.87 953,514.29
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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Components
Amount at
Approval
(US$M)
Actual at Project
Closing (US$M)
Percentage of Approval
(US$M)
1. Sustainable Management of Fisheries
Resources
7.41 8.56 115
2. Sound Management of Natural Resources 9.05 6.93 77
3. Building Coastal Capacity for Sustainable
Natural Resource Use and Management
20.64 18.72 91
4.Removed/merged with component 3. 2.90 0 0
Total 40.00 34.21 86
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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Background and limitations of Analysis. The analysis conducted at appraisal showed that the proposed interventions
were economically and financially feasible. The potential benefits of the marine fisheries component had a Net
Present Value (NPV) equivalent to US$1.3 million (KES 98.7 million) at a discount rate of 12 percent, and the Internal
Rate of Return (IRR) was 31 percent. At project closure,10 using the same discount rate of 12 percent and the project
revenue flows from the monitoring and evaluation report,11 the NPV was equivalent to US$2.8 million, and the IRR 47
percent. Further, an incremental cost analysis assessed the incremental costs that would be eligible for GEF financing
(US$5 million). GEF-funded activities towards sustainable management of fisheries resources and sound management
of natural resources (i.e., components 1 and 2), had an absorption rate of 88 percent at the end of the project. The
borrower’s project evaluation report provides evidence that the project had significant benefits. The quantifiable
benefit streams were estimated using project-based data, and as presented in the subsequent sections, the benefits
outweighed the costs. The main limitation to this analysis was that there were several activities in each component
whose benefit streams could not be quantified ex-ante; hence non-quantifiable benefits of these components are
also discussed.
Quantifiable benefits from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Fisheries Development. According to the PAD, the
investments towards establishing a VMS and strengthening MCS were to improve the regime for monitoring fishing
licenses in the Kenyan EEZ. The ‘without project scenario’ estimated that revenues from EEZ and fisheries
development would be US$ 0.8 million (KES 61.8 million), this amount was approximately 11 percent lower than the
historical average for the period 2000-2008. In the ‘with project scenario’ there would be a more efficient system
with increasing number of licenses, improved MCS and more offshore patrols and joint offshore patrols including
interlinking the Vessel Monitoring, consequently increasing the license fees resulting in total revenues increasing to
approximately US$2.1 million (KES 159 million). The project had a NPV at a 12 percent rate of US$1.3 million (KES
98.7 million) and internal IRR of 31 percent, making it a viable project. By the end of the project, the revenues reports
were cumulatively US$4.09 million, which exceeded the targeted amount. Using the same discount rate of 12 percent
and the project revenue flows from the monitoring and evaluation report, the NPV was equivalent to US$2.8 million,
and the IRR is 47 percent. The increase in revenue was largely driven by improved licensing of vessels through frame
surveys, enforcement patrols, and sensitization.
Quantifiable benefits from improved livelihoods. The HMP (Hazina ya Maendeleo ya Pwani) window aimed at
supporting community-identified and implemented micro-projects, by focusing on small scale livelihood-enhancig
interventions. Groups receiving grants were expected to contribute in cash and in-kind, and designed to maximize
returns on the community’s input of labor, time, materials and cash. At the end of the project, a total of 151 HMP
sub-projects had been financed, with an estimated US$660,000 (KES 69 million) generated from various income-
10 Some of the elements that were considered in the ex-post economic analysis summarized in this ICR do not necessarily represent
economic benefits in a conventional sense. For example, public revenues from fishing license fees, represent transfers from private
citizens to the State, and no economic benefits were generated in the process. Nevertheless, in order to maintain consistency with the
ex-ante economic analysis conducted at appraisal, the ex-post analysis in this ICR used the approach and terminology as employed in
the PAD.
11 Y1- 0.68 m, Y2- 1.38 m; Y3-2.18m Y4-3.18m- Source: M&E report 2017
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generating activities. Some of the income sources included: the sale of seaweed estimated at a cumulative total of
KES 1.3 million; sale of fin fish estimated at a cumulative total of KES 157,000; sale of Casuarina tree poles (woodlots)
estimated at a cumulative total of KES 4.6 million; sale of tree seedlings estimated at a cumulative total of KES 4.5
million; earnings from waste management ventures estimated at a cumulative total of KES 640,000; earnings from
eco-tourism related enterprises estimated at a cumulative total of KES 650,000, and additional earnings from
improved quality of marine fish estimated at a cumulative total KES 5.7 million. The revision of the results framework
following the MTR included an indicator targeting the number of coastal households with annual earnings of US$50
or more from commercial natural resource management activities supported by the project. The target number of
households was 1000, of which 642 households were eventually reached by the end of the project (approximately 64
percent).
Micro-credit Access and Sustainability of MSMEs. The MSME investments’ objective was to assist in establishing joint
ventures between the community and the private investor, in order to create a business environment that attracts
more investments. The target was to identify, train and assist 200 MSME’s and further help them develop business
plans. The project surpassed the target since 213 MSMEs were trained, in developing business plans. However, there
were no PPPs established between the MSMEs and local banks to ensure sustainability of the projects after the KCDP.
In addition, the selected projects should have been subjected to a rigorous commercial viability criterion in order to
ensure sustainability and eventually attracting private investors at the end of the KCDP project.
Non-quantifiable benefits. The Project included community capacity strengthening activities, and direct stakeholder
support in extension-related activities and pilot projects, however, estimating the benefits of such projects ex-ante
are difficult. Non-quantifiable benefits include those resulting from improved management of natural resources and
restoration of degraded marine resources. Under the KCDP, three target areas were brought under effective
management: Kisite- Mpunguti in Kwale County, area under management increased from 51 to 58 percent; Malindi
Marine Park in Kilifi County, area under management increased from 52 to 56 percent; and Shimba Hills in Taita
Taveta County, area under management increased from 54 to 58 percent. This surpassed the average target of 55
percent in all cases by 1.8 - 5.4 percent. Even though it is difficult to estimate the benefits of MPAs, empirical
evidence shows that on average, a 1 percent increase in MPA results in an increased growth rate of fish populations
by about 1 percent, suggesting that protecting MPAs is a worthwhile investment. In addition, the Project carried out
various capacity building activities at the government, county, and community level, which have led to increased
capacity to sustainably manage coastal and marine resources.
Design and implementation of the project: The project’s effectiveness was delayed by one year as a result of delayed
fulfillment of the project’s conditions for effectiveness, and overall project implementation was slow up until MTR in
2015 (see Section III for more details). However, several project restructurings targeted at simplifying and modifying
the results framework, and extending the overall project life time, allowed for accelerated project implementation
progress and completion of project activities, particularly those associated with infrastructure. The financial
absorption rate significantly increased, particularly following the restructuring after the MTR in 2015. The absorption
rate increased from 30 percent in 2015, to 88 percent in 2017, equaling US$20.57 million in disbursements, and
comparing to US$12,17 that had been utilized prior to MTR, during the first 4 years of project implementation.
The expenditure on travel and Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) is also important in determining the level of
efficiency of a project. There is no threshold for determining an optimal DSA to total expenditure ratio, however, high
rates of DSA to total expenditure tend to imply signs of inefficiency. DSA as a proportion of total KCDP expenditure
Annex 103
The World Bank
Kenya Coastal Development Project ( P094692 )
Page 48 of 52
was approximately 30 percent, which is considered high. However, there are a couple of attributing factors that need
to be recognized. First, the project covered a wide geographical area that necessitated long distance travel
expenditures, and second, the project decided to utilize technical resources from the various implementing agencies
rather than consultants to conduct studies, assessments, and field work, in an effort to strengthen technical capacity.
By excluding DSA that can directly be associated with research activities and technical assistance provided to
communities under the HMP and VMG activities, expenditures associated with DSA represent only 6 percent of total
KCDP expenditures.
Annex 103
The World Bank
Kenya Coastal Development Project ( P094692 )
Page 49 of 52
ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
Annex 103
The World Bank
Kenya Coastal Development Project ( P094692 )
Page 50 of 52
Annex 103
The World Bank
Kenya Coastal Development Project ( P094692 )
Page 51 of 52
Annex 103
The World Bank
Kenya Coastal Development Project ( P094692 )
Page 52 of 52
Annex 103
Annex 104
“Developing sustainable fisheries and healthy oceans for food and nutrition security”,
UN FAO, 27 July 2015, available at: http://www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/en/
c/318147/ (last accessed: 21 December 2020)
/
FAO in the region Regional perspectives News Events Resources Programmes and projects Partners
FAO Regional Oce for Africa
English
Fishermen using special shing nets provided by FAO
on Lake Victoria: (Photo: ©FAO/Ami Vitale)
Developing sustainable sheries and healthy oceans for food and nutrition security
The Government of Kenya and FAO launch the Blue Growth nitiative in Kenya
27 Jl 2015, Mombasa - Kenya: The Government of Kenya and FAO have launched the Blue
Growth nitiative (BG) to benet select areas in the coastal region of Kenya. BG is a FAO agship
initiative promoting more productive, sustainable and socioeconomically responsible sheries, and
aquaculture sectors.
The launch was held in Mombasa, Kenya, led by the acting Cabinet Secretary for Agriculture,
Livestock and Fisheries Mr. Adan Mohamed and FAO Representative in Kenya Dr. Luca Alinovi. n
attendance was county leadership from Kili, Kwale, Mombasa and TanaRiver counties.
n his opening remarks, the acting Cabinet Secretary for Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Mr.
Mohamed Adan noted that sustainability of sh supply in our waters requires concerted attention.
‘mprovements targeted across the various aspects of sheries management, as well as regulatory
barriers, diculty in accessing funding, fragmented research and development, and poor access to
markets need to be addressed. Particular attention may be given to empowering the small/rural or
artisanal shermen and sh farmers who contribute consistently to the seafood supply chain, but do not have the capacity to optimize their farming or
sh catch. he noted.
The inland aquaculture sector continues to grow, but mariculture is lagging behind. While most of the current aquaculture production is based in
freshwater sh farming, there exists a lot of potential in mariculture (aquaculture in coastal and marine environments) on the extensive Kenya coast.
‘We can sustainability develop mariculture through improving the governance and management of the aquatic eco-systems, conservation of biodiversity
and habitats and most importantly, empower vulnerable communities engaged in small-scale production to act as resource users and stewards noted
Dr. Alinovi.
mplemening BG hogh he Ecoem Appoach o Aacle (EAA) in Kena
The EAA is best implemented within a national aquaculture policy with a regulatory framework that promotes the growth of a healthy and competitive
aquaculture sector while providing protections from threats such as disease spread, pollution and environmental degradation.
Mr. Mohamed reiterated Kenyas commitment to developing sheries in Kenya. ‘ wish to stress that my ministry is committed to making the sheries
sector one of the key pillars of economic growth in Kenya he said. ‘t is therefore my strong belief that the modest initiative my ministry is starting with
FAO and other developing partners through these projects today will culminate in opportunities for major investments, additional livelihoods for the
coastal communities and overall well-being for the Kenyan people as envisaged in Kenyas development Blue Print Vision 2030.
n collaboration with the Government of Kenya, FAO has developed two projects worth a total of USD 1 million from the BG, namely ‘n Support of Food
Security and Nutrition, Poverty Alleviation and Healthy Oceans and ‘n support of implementation of mariculture in Kenya within an ecosystems
approach.Both projects aim to increase knowledge of water basin to coral reef ecosystem services supporting food, nutrition and livelihood security so
as to guide and improve investment in sustainable coastal mariculture.This includes a better integration of the sector into other activities in the coastal
zones so as to increase understanding in conserving and improving coastal ecosystem services.
Elaboaing he Ecoem Appoach o Aacle
The BG is designed around capture sheries, sustainable aquaculture, livelihoods and food systems, and economic growth from aquatic eco-system
services. t is also bringing support and more attention to enhance the implementation of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries and Aquaculture (EAF/EAA).
The launch is to be followed by a ve day training workshop on implementing the Ecosystem Approach to Aquaculture (EAA). The EAA strives to balance
diverse societal objectives, by taking account of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems including their
interactions, ows and processes and applying an integrated approach within ecologically and operationally meaningful boundaries.
h
Annex 104
Follow us on
The general objective of the workshop is to inform and train managers, developers, farmers and other relevant stakeholders on the EAA and how to
develop EAA management plans for mariculture areas in Kenya that incorporate other users of the coastal zones.
The workshop will produce better informed stakeholders on the EAA and its potential for aquaculture management at local and national level, and
improved understanding of aquaculture for stakeholders outside the agricultural sector. t is expected that one or more draft management plans for
piloting in selected aquaculture management areas and recommendations for the national aquaculture strategy in the context of EAA will be realized.
Relaed Link:
Contact:
Email: [email protected]
Share this page
The EAA Approach (FAO Site)
The Blue Growth nitiative (FAO Site)
State of the Worlds Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014 (FAO Report)
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
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Annex 104
Annex 105
“Silk Roads Programme: Kiunga”, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, available at: https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/silk-road-themes/biospherereserve/
kiunga (last accessed: 21 December 2020)
Kiunga Biosphere Reserve is located on the northernmost part of Kenya’s coast, about 16 km south of the Somali border.
On the coastal strip, there are sandy beaches with sand dunes and dry coastal shrubby forest. The coast consists of parallel
lines of old and living reefs with one line situated 1,6-16 km offshore forming a chain of about 50 calcareous islands
composed of coral and organic debris. In-between the islands and the coast, there are sheltered and calm water habitats.
The biosphere reserve is important for nesting seabirds, green turtles (Chelonia mydas) and dugongs (Dugong dugon) and
hosts relatively pristine mangroves.
Within the marine reserve, only traditional fishing with approved methods is permitted. Human impacts on the
environment derive from the collection of corals and shells, used in burning for lime. Poaching of green turtles and
dugongs has also been reported.
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) are collaborating to enhance the management of the
Kiunga Marine Reserve since 1996. Focus is on the conservation of the outstanding biodiversity, natural resources and
ecology of the area through consensus-based management with the full participation of local communities. Research and
monitoring is carried out on the status of coral reefs, their threats such as fishing, shell collecting, sedimentation, and
pollution in the Kenyan marine reserves. Read more about this reserve on the UNESCO Biosphere Reserves website.
© Profile picture: Walter Deshler
The Silk Road on he Ma
+−
Kinga
EGLH
Annex 105
Con ofile
Kenya
Caial: Nairobi
Region: Africa
Relaed Infomaion
Roe: Maritime
Local conac:
Kiunga Marine National Reserve,
Lamu District - P.O. Box 82,
Kiunga,
Kenya.
Email: [email protected]
Website: http://www.kws.org/
Sie Te: Biosphere reserves
Thi lafom ha been deeloed and mainained ih he o of:
Azerbaijan China Germany Kazakhstan Oman
Contact
UNESCO Headae
7 Place de Fontenoy
75007 Paris, France
Social and Hman Science Seco
Reeach, Polic and Foeigh Secion
Silk Road Pogamme
[email protected]
Follow us
EGLH
Annex 105
Annex 106
“UK-based Soma Oil & Gas talks about its plans in Somalia”, How we made it in Africa,
26 August 2013
HOW WE MAID1E
IT IN AFRICA,
AFRlCA BUSINESS INSIGHT
KATE DOUGLAS, 26 AUGUST 2013
UK-based Soma Oil & Gas talks about its plans in
Somalia
Soma Oil & Gas, a UK-based company established to survey and explore oil and gas
potential in Somalia, is the first to sign an oil deal with the new Somali government.
The East African country has suffered from years of political unrest and violence
since a civil war broke out in 1991, but saw the formation of an internationally
recognised government with the inauguration of President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud in September last year.
Soma, which was only established this year, is headed by chairman Michael Howard,
a former Conservative Party leader who has held various cabinet positions in British
government, and CEO Robert Sheppard, an ex-BP executive with over 40 years'
experience in the energy sector.
According to Sheppard, Somalia's oil and gas potential is relatively under-explored,
and with recent discoveries in East African countries such as Tanzania and Kenya,
Soma is reportedly investing over US$2om in exploring Somalia's oil and
gas potential. In addition, Sheppard told How we made it in Africa that the company
believes Somalia is beginning to move in a positive direction under its new central
government.
"There are green shoots of economic development, there are green shoots of
stability, and we combine that with the exploration prospectively and for a firstmover.
.. to fill that space very quickly I think is to Soma's advantage."
Annex 106
Despite this optimism, Somalia is still affected by conflict. Aid agency Medecins
Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) recently announced it would be pulling
out of Somalia. According to Unni Karunakara, the agency's international president,
the organisation could no longer put up with the attacks it was experiencing such as
looting, kidnapping and murder.
Sheppard said the global oil and gas exploration industry has a high risk profile, and
the additional risks that come with working in a country with a history of conflict
are diminishing in Somalia.
"They have a central government that is working very hard to stabilise the country.
There is a lot of international support for that stabilisation. So we think those risks
are being diminished."
He added that Soma's activities will be primarily devoted to offshore surveying and
exploration. "That gives us more control over the environment and then diminishes
the risk in that sense."
Collecting data
According to Soma, the agreement with the Somali government will allow the
company to conduct seismic surveying in specific areas in Somalia's territorial
waters and in limited onshore areas. In addition, the company will also collect and
reprocess historic seismic data and provide the government with an evaluation of
the country's petroleum potential.
"We have agreed to collate and collect the existing geologic and geophysical data
that may be out there, because much of that data was lost as a result of the
conflict," said Sheppard. "We are trying to reconstruct that information from other
sources and put it in a modern digital format and give that to the government."
In return, Soma will be able to get an application to nominate and obtain
exploration and drilling rights for reportedly up to 12 oil blocks.
"That agreement is a bit unique and in consideration of that we have been given the
opportunity to get an application for some production sharing agreement areas,
under the petroleum law of 2008 ... where we can take the exploration activity to the
next phase," said Sheppard.
Annex 106
Prior to the civil war, a number of major oil companies including Shell and Total had
claimed and signed deals for oil blocks, and according to statements by Soma, the
company will not impinge on these areas.
Concerns have been raised over Soma being picked for such a deal over more
experienced oil players. The East African Energy Forum, a lobby group which
seemingly aims to protect the natural resources and sovereignty of Somalia, has
accused Soma's deal of not being transparent. In addition, it has questioned Soma's
capacity and capability, considering that the company is only a few months old.
"I'm not sure what their concerns are," Sheppard responded. "The transparency
issues are pretty clear. We've got an open arrangement."
While Sheppard admitted that he cannot comment on the business potential in
other sectors, he said the country is beginning to rebuild itself and there is the
opportunity to benefit from being a first-mover in the country. He said foreign
businesses should contact the appropriate ministry in Somalia when looking to
enter the country, and engage with government in a straightforward manner.
"[The Somali government] is new, I will grant you that, but I think there is help
from international agencies and others that have tried to put together a government
system that is quite similar in nature to other countries," he said.
Annex 106
Annex 107
“Total renforce son exploration au Kenya avec la prise du permis d’exploration offshore
L22, situé dans le Bassin de Lamu”, Total, 27 June 2012
TOTAL RENFORCE SON EPLORATION A KENA AEC LA PRISE D PERMIS
D'EPLORATION OFFSHORE L22, SIT DANS LE BASSIN DE LAM
P E- F T L
S
27/06/2012 Aa SUIE-NOUS!
M : @. T. : +33 1 47 44 46 99 T :@TP
Parage Tee Parage
PUBLICATIONS
CONTACT PRESSE
, S
?
Annex 107
Annex 108
“Somalia signs Shell-ExxonMobil E&P roadmap”, Petroleum Economist, 3 March 2020
Smalia eached an ageemen ih a Shell-EnMbil jin ene n 24 Feba ha ce fe
elain f he il and ga blck, accding he Ea Afican cn’ Mini f Pelem and
Mineal Rece.
e ageemen enable hiic cncein held b he decade-ld Shell-En jin ene be cneed
a ne mdel dcin-haing ageemen (PSA), hich a blihed ealie hi mnh flling he
aicain n 8 Feba f he cn’ Pelem La.
Annex 108
“I am delighted we have agreed an initial roadmap with the Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture,” petroleum
minister Abdirashid Mohamed Ahmed wrote in a statement. “is gives us condence in [our] ability to
further explore any oshore hydrocarbon potential.”
e Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture made a $1.7mn payment to Somalia last October as retrospective rent for
ve blocks it was awarded three decades ago under former president Mohamed Siad Barrethe blocks were
never accessed due to the vicious civil conicts that erupted following Barre’s overthrow in 1991.
“We have a long relationship with the Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture and look forward to this continuing as
we seek to provide the building blocks we need to grow our economy,” says Ahmed.
Norwegian seismic data survey company TGS has estimated potentially 30bn bl of oil lies in the 15 shallow and
deepwater blocks on oer in a long-delayed licensing round that the country hopes to launch this year.
Ocials are yet to advise a new timeframe for the round, which was postponed last year due to a maritime
dispute with neighbouring Kenya. It covers approximately 75,000 km and It is backed by over 40,000km of
seismic data.
A Shell spokesman told Pelem Ecmi by email: “Shell EP Somalia and Mobil Exploration Somalia hold
exclusive petroleum exploration and production rights over ve oshore blocks in Somalia (M3/4/5/6/7)
under a Concession Agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia which has been under force majeure
since 1990.
“We have an ongoing and constructive dialogue with the Somali authorities about a roadmap potentially to
convert the existing concession to a production sharing agreement, in line with the new Petroleum Law which
is coming into eect. We continue to monitor the security and operating environment in and surrounding
Somalia.”
Annex 108
e industry's most comprehensive list of current and recent rounds for onshore and oshore licences
US major’s investment boosted prospects of Angola’s beleaguered oil sector, but its blocks are unlikely to be economically viable
without a crude price rebound
Expectations are high aer a string of upstream successes and both governments ending their political impasses
Annex 108
✉ d
Annex 108
Annex 109
“Somalia PM thanks Kenya for solid support”, Capital News, 13 June 2012
The Somali PM was speaking on Wednesday at State House Nairobi/FILE
By CAPITAL REPORTER
Published June 13, 2012
KENYA
Somalia PM Thanks
Kenya For Solid
Support
! " # ! !
0 SHARES
The Somali PM was speaking on Wednesday at State House Nairobi/FILE
NAIROBI, Kenya, Jun 13 – Somalia Prime Minister
Abdiweli Mohamed Ali has thanked Kenya for its
unwavering support to the war-torn nation.
Acknowledging the role Kenya has
continued to play towards the
restoration of peace in Somalia, the
prime minister expressed optimism
that his country was on the right path
towards stability.
Ali particularly welcomed the recent
signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding between Kenya and
the Commission of the African Union
for the Kenya Defence Forces to formally join AMISOM, saying the move will go a
long way towards rooting out negative forces in Somalia.
The Somali PM was speaking on Wednesday at State House Nairobi when he paid
a courtesy call on President Mwai Kibaki to brief him on the roadmap towards
ending of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia which will pave way for
the election of an all-inclusive national government.
Speaking during the meeting, President Mwai Kibaki reiterated Kenya’s desire for
the people of Somalia to take charge of the ongoing peace initiatives and move the
country forward.
The president emphasised the need for Somalia to strengthen state institutions
including the national army, police and Judiciary to steer the reconstruction
process.
President Kibaki and the Somali Prime Minister also discussed the plight of Somali
refugees where the president encouraged the Somali government to galvanise
international support to resettle the refugees in secured regions back in Somalia.
“We believe that the best place for the Somali refugees is in the regions that have
been liberated back in their native country,” President Kibaki said.
The president commended the signi[cant progress made by AMISOM in
collaboration with the TFG forces, in securing large swathes of South Central
Somalia from Al Shabaab and urged the Somali leadership to take advantage of
this development to consolidate its authority in the region.
“This will encourage the voluntary return of refugees and other migrants to
Somalia,” the President said.
President Kibaki, once again, rea\rmed Kenya’s continued support to the people of
Somalia particularly with regard to human and institutional capacity building.
Present during the meeting were acting Head Public Service and Secretary to the
Cabinet Francis Kimemia and Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi
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Annex 109
international support to resettle the refugees in secured regions back in Somalia.
“We believe that the best place for the Somali refugees is in the regions that have
been liberated back in their native country,” President Kibaki said.
The president commended the signi[cant progress made by AMISOM in
collaboration with the TFG forces, in securing large swathes of South Central
Somalia from Al Shabaab and urged the Somali leadership to take advantage of
this development to consolidate its authority in the region.
“This will encourage the voluntary return of refugees and other migrants to
Somalia,” the President said.
President Kibaki, once again, rea\rmed Kenya’s continued support to the people of
Somalia particularly with regard to human and institutional capacity building.
Present during the meeting were acting Head Public Service and Secretary to the
Cabinet Francis Kimemia and Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi
among other senior government o\cials.
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23,273
in Critical
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Annex 109
Annex 110
“Kenya and Somalia agree on plan to maintain peace along border”, The New York
Times, 21 July 1977
Published: July 21, 1977
Copyright © The New York Times
Kenya and Somqlia Agree on Plan I
To Maintain Peace Along Border
By JOHN DARNTON
Spediu to Tho 11/o..- York TI:nes
NAIROBI, Kenya, July 20-Kenya and
. Somalia have pledged to maintain peace
: along the:r border and agreed to set up
a border commiss!on to "normalize and
restore tranquility" in the region, it was
~announced today.
On June 30 Kenya stunned the Organization
of African Unity at its meeting
in Libreville, Gabon, by charging that it
had been invaded by thousands of armed
men from Somalia, which denied the accusation
and suggested that perhaps the
invaders were Ethiopians.
Somalia is actively backing secessionist
guerrillas in the vast Ogaden region of
southeastem Ethiopia, where fighting has
stepped up recently. Or.e route for Somali
infiltration into the Ogaden is thought
to be through the hot and desolate corner
of northern Kenya. The New Yark Times/ July 21. 1m
Somalia is aiding guerrillas in
Ethiopia's Ogaden area, with an
. infiltration route there said to go
through northern Kenya.
Western diplomatic sources have advanced
the theory that any large and
armed group of Somalis that crossed the
border would most likely have been headed
for Ethiopia. If so, the clash with Kenyan
units was probably unintentional, the
sources say, since Somali-Kenyan rela- the Marxist military regime in Addis
tions are not hostile. Ababa, Kenya would be unlikely to grant
Large Section Historically Claimed any such concession, observers here beIn
the past, Somalia has laid an histori- lieve.
cal claim to a large section of northern According to reports reaching Nairobi,
Kenya inhabited by Somali_ speaking fighting has increased markedly over the
nomads, but in recent years it has not last several months. in the Ogaden, where
pressed the claim but has concentrated the Ethiopian Government has deployed
instead on reunification with the Somali- part of a "peasant army" against a force
populated Ogaden. . of Somali-backed insurgents estimated at
Today's announcement came after a 30- 3,000 to 6,000.
minute meeting here yesterday between A report issued by the Western Somali
the Vice Presidents of the two countries, Liberation Front in Mogadishu, the Soma·
Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and Hussein Ii capital, contended that guerrillas had
Kulmia Afrah of Somalia. destroyed nine aircraft and damaged
At a news conference, Hussein Mo- factories and a telecommunications cen·
hamed Baullaleh, public relations officer ter in an attack last week upon Diredawa,
for the Somali Foreign Affairs Ministry, a city 90 miles from the Somali border.
repeated the assertion that his country The front said that 150 Ethiopian troops
was "not involved" in the bordez: clashes, had been killed in "bitter fighting" bu1
in which six men from each side· were gave no report of its own casualties.
kil_led, according. to the Kenya~~· But he The Ethiopian Government has not con·
said that So~aha and Kenya regrett~d firmed the fighting. Diredawa is strategic
the lt;iss. of hv~s" and resolved to avoid for Ethiopia because it is the midwa)
such incidents m the future. point of the railroad from Addis Ababa
Mr. Baullaleh also ,denied reports that to Djibouti. The line carries· more thar
during the talks Somalia had sought an half Ethiopia's imports and exports bu1
agreement to allow guerrillas to cross apparently has not been reopened sincE
Kenyan territory into Ethiopia. guerrilla attacks two months ago severed
"We are not aware of any Somali. lib- it in three places.
eration movements passing through
northern Kenya," he said.
For fear of damaging relations with
Annex 110
Annex 111
“Kenyan explorers look deeper offshore”, Offshore Engineer, 21 July 2014
DOWNLOAD PDF FOR FREE
DIGITAL EDITION
NEWS MAGAZINE ARCHIVE ADVERTISING CONTACT US
Published in Jul/Aug 2014
Contents
OE Thoughtstream: Stepping towards energy security
Offshore wind ready to float?
Automation can fulfill skills shortage remotely
Analyzing wireless machine condition monitoring for offshore applications
Looking for Ireland's Jubilee
Drilling optimization offshore Sarawak
Offshore drilling optimization: Utilizing the future of technology
Babcock beefs up
Intelligent energy in action
A heavy challenge
Inflatable seals for critical offshore applications
Global perspective on flow assurance
Taming Tanzania
Mozambique: resource curse or opportunity?
Colloquy: Energy and Capital: Operators reinvest cash
Floating FLNG facilities: are they 'vessels' for purposes of liability limitations?
Tank support for the LNG revolution
Enter the specialized LNG carrier
Spotlight: Newpark Drilling Fluid’s new North American leader focused on domestic growth
Stepping-up decommissioning
Kenyan explorers look deeper offshore
Annex 111
BG Group used Odfjell's Deepsea Metro I drillship for the Sunbird-1 in Block L10A this year. Photo from BG
Group.
July 21, 2014
Offshore East Africa is among the newest frontier exploration regions, with results of wildcats eagerly awaited.
The area still lacks infra- structure to support meaningful development and logistics remain a challenge to all
comers. The activity has spread beyond the shores of Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, reaching Madagascar,
the Comoros, and the Seychelles.
All of Kenya’s offshore blocks are in the Lamu basin, which formed during the separation of Madagascar from
Africa and has Middle to Late Jurassic source rocks. The exploration focused in the Lamu basin follows a
successful trend from Mozambique and Tanzania. Small independent operators are surrounded by majors,
leading to interesting industry partnerships and strategic opportunities for companies large and small.
Years of activity
In 1964, BP and Shell drilled the onshore Dodori-1 well to 4311m TD very close to the coast. The well reached
Campanian rocks in the late Cretaceous section, with oil and gas shows in Tertiary and Cretaceous. This well
flowed at 3.1mcf/d.
In 1971, BP and Shell drilled the Pate-1 well south of the Dodori well, in the L5 area, to 4188m TD, reaching
Eocene sediments with gas shows. It flowed at 12.7mcf/d.
In the same year, they drilled the Kipini well to the south, close to the coast in the nearby L-6 area, to 3663m
TD. It reached the Campanian section, with fluorescence and gas shows in Tertiary and Cretaceous section.
In 1978, France’s Total drilled the offshore Simba-1 well to 3604m TD, with wet gas shows (C1-C5) in the
Tertiary.
In 1982, a consortium of Cities Services, Marathon and Union drilled the offshore Maridadi-1 well to 4198m TD
with gas shows in the Tertiary, and in 1985, drilled the offshore Kofia-1 well to 3629m TD, with oil and gas
shows.
A Lamu basin study 1991- 1995 led Kenya to subdivide the Lamu embayment (both onshore and offshore) into
10 exploration blocks and then add two more after 2001.
Between 2000-2002, seven production sharing agreements were signed for offshore Lamu basin blocks L5, L6,
L7, L8, L9, L10, and L11. In 2003, Australia’s Woodside Petroleum acquired 7884 km of 2D seismic data
covering the seven licensed blocks as well as Block L12. Woodside then drilled the deepest offshore well in
2006.
Anadarko acquired 5000 line-km of 2D seismic data over offshore blocks L5, L7, L12, L11A and L11B, followed
by 3D seismic.
By December 2009, Origin Energy acquired 900sq km of 3D seismic over Block L8, using M/V Seisquest to tow
eight streamers, 5100m long.
Annex 111
Afren, through its subsidiary EAX, acquired 460km of
shallow-water and transition-zone 2D seismic over Blocks
L17 and L18, completed in October 2010.
In 2011-2012, Ophir Energy acquired Dominion Petroleum
for £118m (US$186million).
In November 2011, BG began acquiring 3D seismic data in
license areas L10A and L10B, followed by a 2D seismic
sur- vey over the western area of the blocks (the Sunbird
area).
In January 2012, Afren (EAX) completed acquisition of
1207km of 2D data in the deeper water portions of Blocks
L17 and L18. In December 2012, it completed acquisition
of 1006sq km of 3D data (in lieu of a well commitment),
and the 3D was processed by July 2013.
In June 2012, Total signed a PSC for 100% of offshore license Block L22, with water depths of 2000m to
3500m. The first phase of exploration is 3D seismic acquisition.
In July 2012, PTT E&P Thailand agreed to a $1.93billion acquisition of Cove Energy, which had interests in
several blocks offshore Kenya.
In 2012, Fugro-Geoteam AS completed the Kifaru 3D seismic survey including 778sq km over Block L6 for FAR
Ltd. and Pancontinental. Fugro’s Geo Caribbean seismic vessel stopped in Cape Town in May 2012.
Discoveries
Working oil and gas systems were only recently proven offshore Kenya, beginning with the Mbawa-1 well on
the western side of Block L8. The well reached 2553m in September 2012 and encountered 51.8m net gas pay
in porous Cretaceous sandstones. It was then drilled further to 3275m TD. Apache Corp. operates the license
(50%) on behalf of partners Origin Energy (20%), Pancontinental (15%), and Tullow (15%). Apache’s
Exploration Director Angus McCoss said at the time: “A gas discovery on prognosis in the shallowest objective
at Mbawa-1 is an encouraging start to our East African transform margin exploration campaign.” However, the
find was not commercial, although Apache said it would keep the option to re-enter the well open.
In April 2013, Anadarko announced that its Kubwa well in Block L7 was not commercial. The company’s Senior
Vice President for worldwide exploration Bob Daniels said, “The Kubwa well tested multiple play concepts and
provided useful data regarding the prospectivity of our six-million-acre position offshore Kenya.”
In October 2013, Apache relinquished its 50% stake in the L8 block, saying that gas volumes were not
commercially viable.
Likewise, in December 2013, Britain’s Premier Oil announced that it was with- drawing from Block L10A and
relinquishing its 20% stake in the license. However, Premier retained its 25% share in neighboring Block L10B.
Pancontinental announced a small gas discovery in Block L8 in December. Pancontinental’s finance director
Ernest Myers said, “The well on its own may not currently be commercially viable, but could be when
aggregated with other gas discoveries which may occur in the L8 or nearby blocks.” On 6 January 2014,
Pancontinental and BG spud the Sunbird-1 well with the Deepsea Metro-I drillship in 723m water depth, Block
L10A, and drilled to 2850m, penetrating the top of the Sunbird Miocene reef at 1583.7m subsea. It became
Kenya’s first offshore oil discovery, confirmed in June 2014.
What’s ahead
Several major international oil companies—BG Group, Tullow, Total, ENI, and Anadarko— have aggressively
pursued prospects off Kenya, and operators appear more willing to drill commercial- sized oil prospects now
that source rocks and oil-generation timing has been proven.
Annex 111
Will Anadarko drill again off Kenya? Perth-based
Pancontinental Oil & Gas NL said in a June 2014
presentation that it would potentially re-enter Kenya
offshore Block L8 in the second half of this year. The
Kenyan government also granted the company a 12-
month extension for the initial exploration period of the
L10B license area. Ophir Energy, which holds a 90% interest
in Block L9, had said it would drill a well in 3Q 2014,
but in a June 2014 investor presentation, announced that
it was pushed to 1H 2015. This may be related to the
farm-out to FAR of 30%, subject to government approval.
The prospect has P50 reserves of 190MMboe gross and
171 MMboe net.
FAR anticipates drilling a well in Block L6 at the end of 1Q
2015.
Afrin (EAX) is preparing to drill two wells in 2015 in Blocks
L17/L18.
Ultra-deepwater Block L26 is not currently under license.
Edgo Energy, the exploration unit of Jordan’s Edgo, and
joint venture partner Qatar First Bank relinquished the
block in January 2013. Mazen Masri, managing director of
Edgo, cited the technical and monetary challenges of
drilling in water depths beyond 1500m, and also
mentioned that the block is subject to a maritime border
dispute, claimed by both Kenya and Somalia.
NOCK
The National Oil Corp. of Kenya Ltd. (NOCK) is a stateowned
company that was established in April 1981 to
spearhead exploration.
A new Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act was
enacted in 1984, and revised in 1986, when royalties were replaced with production sharing con- tracts.
Through 2012, most of Kenya’s PSCs gave NOCK a 10% stake in production, raised to 25% in 2013, along
with higher fees and new capital gains tax rules. Kenya’s first competitive licensing round has been postponed
to at least
4Q 2014, and GlobalData’s sub-Saharan upstream analyst John Sisa said in May that the delay could benefit
the country if additional discoveries are made in the interim.
Logistics
Adequate ports and docking facilities are still in short supply along the East African coast. The different types of
vessels needed to support a robust exploration program require supply and repair yards and berthing options.
The Kenya Ports Authority manages the Port of Mombasa, named Africa’s fifth largest for container shipping in
2013, based on increased traffic after capacity expansion. In January, incoming KPA Chairman Danson
Mungatana expressed his support for the development of small ports program and said the new
commissioning of the standard gauge railway line would “revamp the transport sector and...support port
efficiency.”
Kenya is boosting existing port facilities with the construction of a $3.5billion Lamu port.
The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) was set up in June 2004 to provide regulatory oversight of the Kenyan
marine industry. KMA implements international maritime conventions and promotes safety, security, maritime
Annex 111
training, search and rescue, pollution prevention and the preservation of the marine environment. KMA’
mandate, as stipulated in Kenya’s KMA Act 2006, is “to regulate coordinate and oversee maritime affasirs.”
Roads connecting ports, airports, and other supply routes need to be bolstered to support the heavy loads, as
well as move personnel.
The oil and gas industry along with emerging sectors of the economy and a growing middle class have boosted
civil aviation needs in the region. The country’s main airport is Jomo Kenyatta International (Nairobi), and there
are smaller airports at Wilson, Mombasa, Eldoret, and Kisumu.
Bobby Bryan, Delta Airlines commer- cial manager for East Africa and West Africa, told the Discover Global
Markets Conference in May that airports, aircraft, adequate fuel supplies and staff are nec- essary to service
vessels and crews. Delta has an office in Nairobi and opened one in Dar es Salaam a year ago. It partners with
KLM and Kenya Airways.
In a January 2013 report, Deloitte & Touche described Kenya’s economy as “energy starved” and that may
hamper rapid infrastructure development.
Security
Securing infrastructure, operations and personnel safety is a primary consideration. Given Kenya’s proximity to
Somalia and shared, but porous, maritime border, critical infrastructure – electric, gas, telecoms, transportation,
water and food supplies – supporting the offshore industry may be a constant target.
Increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, some of which the Kenya National Disaster Operation Centre attributes
to Somali militant groups, may negatively influence investment investments and possibly forestall exploration
activity in Kenya.
Earlier this year, bomb and grenade attacks in Nairobi and the coastal city of Mombasa led the UK, US, France
and Australia to issue travel warnings. As this issue goes to press, Somali militants attacked hotels and killed
dozens in Mpeketoni, a coastal town in Kenya’s Lamu County, another blow towards destabilizing the tourist
economy.
With evolving threats, Kenyan govern- ment efforts to protect people and critical infrastructure must evolve as
well, or the country risks losing petroleum investment.
The East Africa Oil & Gas Summit (EAOGS) will take place in Nairobi this October, and we’ll see what a few
months more will bring.
© 2020 - AtComedia, Inc.
Annex 111
Annex 112
“Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition”, The Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, October 2014
October 2014
OIES PAPER: WPM 53 Luke Patey
Danish Institute for International Studies &
Research Associate, OIES
Kenya:
An African oil upstart in transition
Annex 112
October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition i
The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not
necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of
its members.
Copyright © 2014
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
(Registered Charity, No. 286084)
This publication may be reproduced in part for educational or non-profit purposes without special
permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgment of the source is made. No use of this
publication may be made for resale or for any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior
permission in writing from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
ISBN
978-1-78467-011-5
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition ii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Adrian Browne, Bassam Fattouh, Celeste Hicks, Martin Marani, and Mikkel
Funder for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. I alone remain responsible for any
errors or shortcomings.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition iii
Executive Summary
In late March 2012, Kenya entered the East African oil scene with a surprising splash. After decades
of unsuccessful on-and-off exploration by international oil companies, Tullow Oil, a UK-based firm,
discovered oil in Kenya’s north-west Turkana County. This paper analyses the opportunities and risks
facing Kenya’s oil industry and its role as a regional oil transport hub. It provides a snapshot of
Kenya’s economic, political, and security environment, offers a comprehensive overview of the
development of Kenya’s oil industry and possibilities for regional oil infrastructure cooperation with
neighbouring countries in East Africa, and considers the potential political, social, and security risks
facing the oil industry and regional infrastructure plans.
Kenya Overview
In the aftermath of the large-scale violence that followed its December 2007 general elections, Kenya
has turned a corner. In June 2008 its government launched Vision 2030, an ambitious development
blueprint, to modernize and make Kenya a middle-income economy; in 2010 it passed a new
constitution; and in 2013 contested, yet largely peaceful, general elections were held. The discovery
of oil in 2012 immediately provided an extra boost to Kenya’s already growing and diverse economy
and its position as East Africa’s strategic transport and communications hub.
But over the past two years, political and security tensions have risen dramatically to threaten Kenya’s
bright future. In the political arena, the 2010 constitution stipulated the devolution of powers from the
central government to newly constituted counties, but its full realization must overcome enormous
systematic, structural, and political implementation hurdles. At the same time, devolution will hardly be
a success if it only leads to the decentralization of Kenya’s political troubles (which include ethnopolitics
and corruption) to the local level, where more political officials are now in competition with one
another. Oil and other resources will influence disputes between central authorities and counties and
communities seeking to assert new-found powers.
On the security front, terrorist attacks, highlighted by the September 2013 killings by the Somaliabased
militant group al-Shabaab at Nairobi’s upscale Westgate Shopping Mall, have grown in
Kenya’s coastal and north-eastern regions. These attacks threaten to enflame and intermingle with
long-standing animosities between communities in these regions and the central government in
Nairobi, undermining the popular development aspirations introduced by the new constitution.
Possible insecurity from political and social tensions sits ominously alongside the oil industry’s plans
to move from the exploration to development phase and to construct key export infrastructure on the
coast.
Kenya’s oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation
Kenya’s role as a regional hub for East African crude oil and petroleum products may be more
significant than its potential position as an oil and gas producer. To date, Kenya’s oil resources are
estimated to be 600 million barrels and new discoveries may still only make the country a small
African producer. Oil exploration in Kenya began in the 1950s with Shell and BP carrying out the first
survey work, mapping out major geological basins, and drilling the first oil well in 1960. Over 40 wells
have since been drilled on and offshore, but it was not until 2012 that potential commercially viable oil
resources were discovered through Tullow Oil’s Ngamia 1, together with subsequent findings in
Turkana County in Kenya’s north-west.
Recent interest grew out of Uganda’s 2006 onshore oil discoveries, and offshore gas findings in
Mozambique and Tanzania. The regional proximity of proven oil and gas reserves, coupled with
sustained high international oil prices, attracted a wide variety of oil companies to Kenya; these
included Africa Oil, Tullow Oil, BG Group, and Total. Tullow is seeking to finalize appraisal and testing
of an estimated 600 million barrels of oil resources held in Turkana by the end of 2015. At that point, if
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition iv
the discoveries prove to be commercially viable, the company aims to also settle plans with the Kenya
government for an export pipeline to the coast at either Lamu or Mombasa.
However, the huge and diverse infrastructure development goals of Kenya’s $25 billion Lamu Port,
South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor will be significantly delayed and likely need to
be downsized. A piecemeal approach – beginning with a basic export pipeline and port terminal at
Lamu – may well be adopted. Rather than Kenya joining Ethiopia and South Sudan in plans for export
and product pipelines to Lamu, it is more likely that, in the short term, Uganda and Kenya will
establish the first pipeline links while other neighbours join through oil, road, and rail links in the
medium and long term.
Kenya could go it alone and develop an 850 kilometre export pipeline from Turkana to the coast for its
oil resources, but since its findings still remain relatively small, a regional agreement with Uganda to
share an oil pipeline would be more viable. But there remain hurdles to achieving such cooperation. It
will take two to four years to ascertain final commerciality of Kenya’s oil discoveries and in the
meantime Uganda remains eager to push forward with generating revenues from its long idle but
proven oil reserves.
Political, social, and security risks
As the oil industry shifts from exploration to development and production in Kenya, required
investments will grow from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars for new oil infrastructure. Tullow
Oil, and in particular its smaller and more exploration-orientated partner Africa Oil, will likely sell a
share of their interests in the Turkana concessions to larger industry players, such as oil majors and
Asian national oil companies, to provide the required capital investments to develop the oil fields. It is
at this juncture that risk incentives among the involved oil companies will decline profoundly. During
the exploration phase, in the initial drive to discover oil, oil industry operations have been left relatively
free from regulatory constraints and political interference. In the upcoming development and
production phase this will likely not be the case. The nascent oil industry will not be completely
insulated from increased risks in a shifting political and security landscape.
First, the regulatory environment for the oil industry in Kenya is in flux. The establishment and
implementation of a new National Energy Bill and Petroleum Exploration and Development Production
Act will have important consequences for the oil industry. New laws will encourage investment on one
hand, particularly in natural gas where there is a lack of regulation, but on the other hand such laws
can increase the costs of doing business. And since the political and regulatory environment in Kenya
is intertwined, the government may exploit new rules and regulations to advance political and
economic goals. Once production does begin, and petrodollars flow into government coffers, oil
revenue sharing will become a fixture of Kenya’s often-divisive politics.
Second, the successful advancement of the 2010 constitution offers potential economic and social
development benefits and help in reversing high levels of inequality in Kenya. Such a process,
however, offers challenges to the oil industry as communities in oil regions, and their political
representatives, grapple with the convergence of new economic resources and increased political
power through devolution. But a failure by the Kenyan government to implement devolution could be
even more damaging to the timely development of the oil industry. Such an outcome could see
aggrieved counties contest oil resources with the national government and international oil
companies. If the objectives of devolution in the new constitution are fulfilled and political power and
economic resources shift from the centre to county level (particularly in restless peripheral regions
such as Turkana) then conflicts over scarce resources can be mitigated.
Third, political instability and insecurity is threatening not only the commencement of Kenya’s oil
production, but also its exit to international markets on the coast. Kenya’s coastal and north-eastern
communities have longstanding social and political grievances with the central government in Nairobi.
Internal politics alone has the capacity to create insecurity for the oil industry if planned pipeline and
other downstream infrastructure are targeted. But there is also the possibility that these disputes
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition v
could become a toxic mix with the incursion of the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab, delaying
and hampering large-scale investments.
Al-Shabaab may be positioning itself to exploit social and political tensions to win support from local
populations on Kenya’s coast. But if the Kenyan government is able to advance political devolution to
coastal counties, while working to contain al-Shabaab in an apolitical manner, then there is a strong
likelihood that, with regional and international support, Nairobi can curb the militant group’s activities,
providing the oil industry with a relatively secure environment. If Kenya is to become the transit hub
for East Africa’s oil boom then relative stability and security on the coast must be achieved.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition vi
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition vii
Contents
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. ii
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................. iii
Kenya Overview ................................................................................................................................. iii
Kenya’s oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation ................................................................ iii
Political, social, and security risks ...................................................................................................... iv
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1
Kenya Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
Economic aspirations .......................................................................................................................... 1
Political and security challenges ......................................................................................................... 4
Kenya’s oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation............................................................. 8
Exploration ........................................................................................................................................10
Development and production ............................................................................................................12
Regional oil infrastructure development ............................................................................................14
Political, social, and security risks ...................................................................................................17
Political risk .......................................................................................................................................17
Social risk ..........................................................................................................................................19
Security risk .......................................................................................................................................24
Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................26
Figures
Figure 1: East African Community – GDP billion (USD, 2013) .............................................................. 2
Figure 2: East African Community – GNI per capita (USD, 2013) .......................................................... 2
Figure 3: Economic Structure, Kenya 2013 ............................................................................................ 3
Figure 4: Kenya’s annual growth rate (%) – illustrating economic decline and multi-party elections
(1992, 1997, 2002, 2007) ........................................................................................................................ 5
Figure 5: Kenya’s new political constituencies....................................................................................... 7
Figure 6: Licensed Petroleum Exploration Companies in Kenya as of June 2014 ................................. 9
Figure 7: Kenya exploration blocks .......................................................................................................11
Figure 8: Turkana County oil development prospects ..........................................................................13
Figure 9: Regional oil pipeline possibilities ...........................................................................................15
Annex 112
October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 1
Introduction
In late March 2012, Kenya entered the East African oil scene with a surprising splash. After decades
of unsuccessful on-and-off exploration by international oil companies, Tullow Oil, a UK-based firm,
discovered oil in Kenya’s north-west Turkana County. Quite unceremoniously, then President Mwai
Kibaki announced the find at the end of a planned speech on performance evaluation results for
public agencies: ‘I wish to make an important announcement to the nation ... This morning, I have
been informed by the Minister for Energy that our country has made a major breakthrough in oil
exploration … This is the first time Kenya has made such a discovery and it is very good news for our
country. It is, however, the beginning of a long journey to make our country an oil producer…’1
This paper analyses the opportunities and challenges facing Kenya’s oil industry and role as a
regional oil transport hub. First, it provides a snapshot of Kenya’s political and economic environment.
Second, the paper offers a comprehensive overview of the development of Kenya’s oil industry, from
exploration to the upcoming production phase, the main players, and the possibilities for regional oil
infrastructure in cooperation with neighbouring countries in East Africa. Finally, the paper considers
the potential political risk from new rules and regulations, the social risk from relations with local
communities and officials in Turkana County (where oil has been discovered), and the security risk
facing oil industry and regional infrastructure plans. The paper does not fully engage questions
revolving around the ‘resource curse’ in Africa – concerning how oil will impact Kenya’s economic,
political, and social development. Rather it does the reverse, by examining how Kenya’s political
economy and security environment will impact the industry in the future.
Kenya Overview
Economic aspirations
Kenya is the economic centre of East Africa. It has the largest economy in the East African
Community (Figures 1 and 2) and one of the largest in Africa. It also has one of the most diverse
economies on the continent. Tea, coffee, and other agriculture, alongside tourism and services, are a
major part of Kenya’s economic success story (Figure 3). This is in sharp contrast to other large
African economies where oil, gas, and minerals dominate. On the back of growth in tourism and
telecommunications, Kenya enjoyed average annual growth rates of 5.4 per cent between 2002 and
2007.2 The economy was unsettled by the insecurity that followed the 2007 general elections, but it
has picked up pace again in recent years. In 2014, international investors demonstrated their
confidence in the economy when Kenya raised $2 billion in its first sovereign bond offering, a recordbreaking
debut for an African country.3
1 ‘Speech by his excellency Hon. Mwai Kibaki, C.G.H., M.P., President and Commander-in-Chief of the defence forces of the
Republic of Kenya during the official announcement of the evaluation results of the performance of public agencies for the
financial year 2010/11’, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, 26 March 2012, statehousekenya.go.ke, accessed
23 July 2014.
2 Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, ‘Political Economy Analysis of Kenya’, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo, 2009,
10.
3 Katrina Manson & Javier Blas, ‘Kenya’s debut $2bn bond breaks Africa record’, Financial Times, 16 June 2014.
Annex 112
October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 2
Figure 1: East African Community – GDP billion (USD, 2013)
Source: World Bank
Figure 2: East African Community – GNI per capita (USD, 2013)
Source: World Bank
Kenya
41%
Burundi
Rwanda 2%
7%
Tanzania
30%
Uganda
20%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Kenya Burundi Rwanda Tanzania Uganda
Annex 112
October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 3
Figure 3: Economic Structure, Kenya 2013
Source: CIA – The World Factbook
Kenya’s economic strength is bolstered by its strategic position in East Africa. It is the main entry and
exit point for trade from landlocked East and Central African countries – Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
and South Sudan. Uganda was its largest export partner in 2013, accounting for 13.6 per cent of total
Kenyan exports.4 Mombasa is East Africa’s largest port, followed by those in Tanzania and Djibouti.
Kenya is seeking to exploit its strategic location on the Indian Ocean further by leveraging its relative
proximity to large and growing Asian markets, particularly those in India and China which are Kenya’s
largest import partners, representing 14.2 per cent and 12.2 per cent respectively of total imports in
2013.5 Kenya is also the financial and communications hub for East Africa. ‘Silicon Savannah’, an
initiative to establish a major techno-city in Konzo, 40 miles outside Nairobi, seeks to make Kenya
East Africa’s technology hub as well. IBM established its first African research lab in Nairobi, while
Google, Microsoft, and Intel also have regional headquarters there.6
Kenya’s diversified economy needs substantial infrastructure development in order to industrialize. In
2008, the Kenyan government under then President Mwai Kibaki established Vision 2030 to
modernize Kenya and make it a middle-income country. One of the flagship projects of the initiative is
the $25 billion Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. This seeks to
establish road, rail, and oil pipeline links between the regional neighbours, airports, and resort cities at
Isiolo and Lamu, as well as a new port at Manda Bay and a 120,000 barrels/day (b/d) oil refinery at
Lamu.7 The twin goals of this ambitious undertaking are to promote regional economic development
and to develop northern Kenya (which has long been economically marginalized compared to central
counties) and integrate it into the national economy.
Although there has been little progress in its implementation since the 2012 official launch of
LAPSSET,8 Kenya is also spearheading other related regional infrastructure agreements. President
Uhuru Kenyatta hosted Chinese Premier Li Keiqiang in May 2014 and, alongside regional leaders
4 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Kenya’, Country Report, EIU, London, 1 June 2014.
5 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Kenya’, Country Report, EIU, London, 1 June 2014.
6 Mwangi S. Kimenyi & Josephine Kibe, ‘Africa’s Powerhouse’, Brookings, Opinion, 6 January 2014
www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/30-kenya-economy-kimenyi, accessed 28 July 2014.
7 ‘Lamu Port and New Transport Corridor Development to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia (LAPSSET)’, Progress Report, Kenya
Vision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, www.vision2030.go.ke.
8 Drazen Jorgic, ‘Kenya attacks undermine plans for east African trade hub’, Reuters, 20 June 2014.
29%
17%
53%
Agriculture
Industry
Services
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 4
from South Sudan, Rwanda, and Uganda, signed an agreement to establish a new East African
railway line. At nearly $4 billion, Chinese companies will build the first stage, a 610-kilometre line from
Mombasa to Nairobi.9 As a sign of Kenya’s broadening international ties, the planned Chinese-built
railway will replace the original line established during British colonial rule over 100 years ago. If
Kenya is to continue to act as the gateway to East Africa in the face of outside competition (Tanzania
is busy enhancing its own ports with Chinese cooperation), then such infrastructure projects will need
to move forward.
The discovery of oil could help Kenya finance its large infrastructure needs. The current government,
under Uhuru Kenyatta, included oil, gas, and mineral resources as a sixth priority sector within the
economic pillar of Vision 2030; this seeks to harness oil to increase export earnings and produce
higher GDP growth, broader social development, infrastructure development, and job creation.10 The
oil industry needs billions in infrastructure development investment if it is to act as a driver for Kenya’s
broader economic and social development goals. But over the past two years political and security
tensions have risen dramatically, threatening to upend Kenya’s economic aspirations.
Political and security challenges
It had been expected that 2013 would be a breakout year for Kenya – the country was turning a
corner after having held largely peaceful general elections in March that year. Its new Jubilee
government may have been dogged by the indictment of President Uhuru and Deputy President Ruto
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged role in the 2007/08 post-election violence,
but a resurgent economy gave promise for the future. Jubilee pushed forward with former president
Kibaki’s Vision 2030 to modernize Kenya; the government was generally business friendly, engaging
a younger generation of industrialists and entrepreneurs compared to previous governments.11
But 2013 would not be the year of stability and growth for which Kenya had hoped. The 2010
constitution stipulated the devolution of powers from the central government to newly constituted
counties, but its full realization needed to overcome enormous systematic, structural, and political
implementation hurdles. All the while terrorist attacks – prominent among which was the September
2013 massacre carried out by the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab at Nairobi’s upscale
Westgate Shopping Mall – have grown in Kenya’s coastal and north-eastern regions. These attacks
threaten to enflame and intermingle with long-standing animosities between communities in these
regions and the central government in Nairobi, undermining the popular development aspirations put
forward by the new constitution.
Oil and other resources will influence disputes between central authorities and counties and
communities seeking to assert new-found powers stipulated by the constitution. Possible insecurity
due to political and social tensions sits ominously alongside the oil industry’s plans to move from the
exploration to the development phase, combined with construction of key export infrastructure on the
coast. The insecurity has hurt Kenya’s tourism sector, one of its main economic engines and job
producers. The World Bank downgraded its forecast on economic growth in 2014 and 2015 from 5.2
per cent to 4.7 per cent for both years on account of the insecurity.12 A failure to grapple with these
structural problems through fully implementing devolution, to settle the ICC indictment, and to tackle
terrorism will undermine development.
Kenyan politics are ethnically and regionally-driven and are deeply embedded in business. Kenya has
been described as an ‘ethnocracy’; a democracy in which politics are steered along ethnic lines and
9 ‘China to build new East Africa railway line’, BBC News, 12 May 2014.
10 ‘Second Medium Term Plan 2013-2017’, Kenya Vision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, Nairobi, 2013, 68.
11 David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, ‘East African prospects: An update on the
political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda’, Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 22.
12 David Malingha and Sarah McGregor, ‘East Africa Powerhouse Kenya Shaken as Attacks, Politics Mix’, Bloomberg, 8 July
2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 5
coalitions, or ‘tribal arithmetic’ applied to form and structure the government.13 The political culture is a
product of the manner in which the British colonial administration limited political organization to
specific regions in Kenya, to avoid the establishment of national movements; this served to ethnocize
Kenyan politics early on.14 The Kikuyu, roughly representing 20 per cent of the population, were the
dominant group after Kenya’s 1963 independence and remain so today. Kenya’s first president, Jomo
Kenyatta, the father of the current president Uhuru, established a patrimonial state where informal
networks which formed around the president and ruling party rewarded clients with land, state
contracts, and other preferential treatment.15 After Daniel arap Moi became president in 1979, he set
about shifting the centre of political and economic power away from the Kikuyu community and
towards his Kalenjin community and Kenyan Asian business allies.16 In 2002, the Kalenjin–Kenya–
Asia alliance lost its strong position in politics and business after a coalition of opposition parties led
by Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, rose to power. This brought central political influence back to the Kikuyu
community.
The political violence that followed the 2007 general elections dealt a serious blow to Kenya’s political
stability and growing economy. More than 1,000 people were killed and 650,000 displaced in the postelection
ethnic fighting, which was mainly between Kenya’s largest groups, the Kikuyus, Kalenjins,
and Luo. An African Union mediation team led by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan was able to broker a coalition government between President Kibaki and opposition leader
Raila Odinga. But this was not the first time that election outcomes had sparked widespread violence
and economic decline, political violence has been the norm rather than the exception in the lead up to
and aftermath of Kenyan elections. 17 Since multiparty elections were established in 1992, the
economy has suffered from periodic bouts of violence (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Kenya’s annual growth rate (%) – illustrating economic decline and multi-party
elections (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007)
Source: David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, ‘East African prospects: An
update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda’, Overseas Development Institute,
Report, May 2014, 30.
13 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Kenya’s Future Clouds as Tensions Rise and Tourists Flee’, The New York Times, 27 June 2014.
14 Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, ‘Political Economy Analysis of Kenya’, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo,
2009, 6.
15 Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, ‘Political Economy Analysis of Kenya’, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo,
2009, 1.
16 David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, ‘East African prospects: An update on the
political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda’, Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 13–15.
17 Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, ‘Political Economy Analysis of Kenya’, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo,
2009, 8.
how to undertake the constitution review process: whether to have a people-led or a parliamentary-led
initiative.
Figure 1: Variations in Kenya s economic growth, 1991-2012
Source: Adapted from Karuti Kanyinga, The Kenya 2013 General Elections and Implications for Development (Powerpoint
presentation to GIZ, Nairobi, June 2013)
In contrast, growth did not decline in the period from 2012 but continued to increase after a decline in
2010. In 2013 the economy was projected to grow at around 5.0 percent. Also, the new government
came to office when there were new opportunities to support growth. The coalition government
undertook considerable infrastructural development; the election was peaceful; and there have been
major discoveries of commercial oil deposits and gas as well as precious minerals and coal in
different parts of the country. Effective exploitation of these opportunities should spur growth and
generate resources for further investment.
If precedent is anything to go by, the government bureaucrats will follow the MTP II as a national
development plan for the next five years. Government ministries and public sector institutions, in
general, have already submitted their annual benchmarks for performance contracting, an approach
that is already institutionalised in the public service. The benchmarks are drawn from the annual
operational plans for MTP II.
There are, equally, a number of challenges, some of which contributed to the post-election violence of
the 2007/8 period. They include growing youth unemployment, rising insecurity, especially because
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 6
The coalition government formed in 2008 succeeded in passing a new constitution in 2010; this
strived to change the way in which Kenyan public affairs are managed and to repair the country’s
ethnocized and oft-violent political culture. It sets out to devolve political and economic decisionmaking
from the presidency to 47 new counties throughout the country (Figure 5). The aim is to
reverse the high regional inequalities and ethnic tensions that have mired politics and sparked
violence since independence. These institutional changes are geared towards making government
officials more accountable to local populations and addressing deep inequalities and grievances;
between 2000 and 2010 Kenya’s inequality levels were some of the worst in the world – higher than
other budding African oil and gas producers such as Uganda, Mozambique, and Tanzania.18 The
restructuring of the entire fabric of how politics and business have functioned in Kenya for over a half
century was to be a challenging endeavour.
In the 2012 general election then Prime Minister Raila Odinga faced off against Uhuru Kenyatta. It
was again a close and contested election, but Uhuru prevailed and The National Alliance party formed
a new government – the Jubilee Alliance – with William Ruto, a Kalenjin, leading the United
Republican Party, as deputy president. Both Uhuru and Ruto were indicted by the International
Criminal Court for their alleged role in inciting post-election violence in 2007/08. The ICC prosecutor’s
case, however, has been weakened by the retraction of statements and deaths of key witnesses, but
the indictments may still drive a wedge between Uhuru and Ruto’s political camps.19
While international oil companies are concerned about legal measures which may be taken by
western governments if Kenya’s leaders are convicted, in all likelihood Kenya’s relationship with the
USA and Europe will remain strong due to mutual regional security concerns revolving around al-
Shabaab and other militant groups operating out of Somalia.20 Kenya has, nonetheless, rebounded
from the strained diplomatic relations with western countries caused by the ICC indictments to look
east to China and other non-western partners for new avenues of economic engagement. Balancing
between foreign partners, however, will not solve political divides at the national level.
The 2013 election outcome was no exception in Kenya’s historical political trend. Kenyan politics
remains polarized along ethnic-regional lines, with the Kikuyu/Kalenjin Jubilee Alliance in government
and Odinga’s CORD Alliance of Luo, Kamba, Luhya, and coastal groups in opposition. 21 Political
tensions, corruption, poverty, and high levels of inequality are also still very real, and very challenging,
hurdles to overcome. Devolution will remain a central feature of Kenya’s political landscape in the
coming years, especially in the lead up to new elections in 2017.22 Important political questions on
whether central authorities will fully implement institutional changes remain unanswered, as the
process is in its early stages. At the same time, whether or not the counties will have the capacity and
expertise to manage their new-found power is also unclear.
Devolution may only lead to the decentralization of Kenya’s political troubles, including ethno-politics
and corruption, to the local level, where more political officials are now in competition with one
another. What is clear is that a failure to push forward with devolution and other key aspects of the
new constitution by the central government will only heighten political tensions. But if Uhuru and Ruto
were to move forward with implementing the new constitution, progress towards a more inclusive
government is possible; this would strengthen the government’s hand with both local constituents and
western partners. The oil industry is set to develop midst this shifting political and security
environment.
18 Patricia I. Vasquez, ‘Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves’, Articles
and Debates, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.
19 ‘Kenya, Chickens come home to roost’, Africa Confidential, Vol. 55, No. 1, 10 January 2014.
20 Andrea S. Pongo, ‘Effects of the 2013 National Elections on Oil Exploration in Kenya’, Institute for Defense Analyses,
Alexandria VA, 2013, 7–8.
21 David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, ‘East African prospects: An update on the
political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda’, Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 27.
22 David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, ‘East African prospects: An update on the
political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda’, Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 31–2.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 7
Figure 5: Kenya’s new political constituencies
Source: Kenya Open Data, Government of Kenya
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 8
Kenya’s oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation
Kenya’s long history of oil exploration has come in three waves. BP and Shell began the first
exploration work in the 1950s. Aeromagnetic, gravimetric, and seismic surveys identified over
300,000 square kilometres of sedimentary basin: the Tertiary Rift Basin to the north-west, Anza in the
north, Mandera in the east, and Lamu, which is both on and offshore, in the south-east.23 BP and
Shell also drilled the first well in 1960 in the Lamu embayment. In the 1970s, Kenya continued to
attract attention in the international oil industry as oil majors looked for alternative sources of
investment in the aftermath of major nationalizations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin
America. Altogether, a total of 15 wells were drilled in Kenya throughout the 1960s and 70s, but with
no commercial success.
The second wave of oil exploration came after Kenya established its Petroleum Act in 1985. This
encouraged new investment by changing previous royalty-based contracts to production-sharing
contracts.24 Another 15 wells were drilled in the 1980s and 90s. Among other companies, Total and
Amoco were most active in exploration work. They drilled in Anza and Mandera basins, discovered
indications of oil and gas, but no commercial finds. In 1992, the Loperot-1 well was drilled in Block
10BB by Shell some 100 kilometres south of the town of Lodwar in present-day Turkana County. This
showed signs of waxy crude, but Shell abandoned its work after failing to negotiate a contract
extension with the Moi government, which took power that year. Low international oil prices in the mid
and late 1980s provided little incentive for expensive exploration and development work.
The third and current wave of exploration in Kenya’s oil industry came in 2000, after the Kenyan
government had carried out new geological studies on the Lamu and Tertiary Rift basins.25 Interest
grew substantially after Uganda’s 2006 onshore oil discoveries, and offshore gas finds in
Mozambique and Tanzania. The regional proximity of proven oil and gas reserves, coupled with
sustained high international oil prices, attracted a wide variety of oil companies to Kenya, these
included: Africa Oil, Apache Corporation, Anadarko, BG Group, Centric, Cove Energy,
Pancontinental, Premier Oil, Simba Energy, CNOOC, Total, and Tullow Oil (Figure 6). By 2012, a total
of 33 wells had been drilled onshore, half of which showed signs of hydrocarbons, as well as four
non-commercial wells offshore.26 But it was not until Tullow’s Ngamia 1 discovery in early 2012,
together with a string of others in Block 10BB and Block 13T in Turkana County, that oil resources of
significant commercial potential were found.
23 ‘Untapped Oil Frontier: Hunting Elephants in East Africa’, Cormark Securities Inc., 3 February 2011, 15–7.
24 ‘Overview of Petroleum Exploration in Kenya’, Presentation to the 5th East African Petroleum Conference and Exhibition
2011, Ministry of Energy, Kenya, 25 February 2011, 6.
25 ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 14.
26 Deloitte, ‘The Deloitte Guide to Oil and Gas in East Africa: Where potential lies’, Deloitte, 2013, 4.
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Figure 6: Licensed Petroleum Exploration Companies in Kenya as of June 2014
Source: ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil
Society’, The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 17.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 10
Exploration
Kenya is an attractive investment location in the global oil business, particularly for upstart mid-sized
oil companies and Asian national oil companies looking to increase their international activities.
Sentiment remains upbeat for new finds in Kenya’s oil and gas concessions (Figure 7). As Africa Oil
CEO Keith Hill has said: ‘There are not many places left on earth where you can put together an
acreage portfolio like this ... Good contract terms, good support from the government – there are not
that many happy hunting grounds left’.27 Africa Oil, as part of the Lundin Group, has a longer history in
Kenya than most international oil companies. Lundin entered Kenya in late 2007, after signing a
contract in Block 10A in the Anza Basin, in the north. (Anza is an extension of the Muglad Basin in
South Sudan, where Lundin was once active.28) Lundin then bought an interest in Block 9, also in
Anza, from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a state-owned oil company. In
2009, Lundin sold its Kenya interests to Africa Oil, in which it was a majority shareholder.29
CNOOC had arrived in Kenya in 2006. It signed six contracts with Kenya in the Lamu, Anza, and
Mandera Basins in a well-publicized ceremony attended by China’s President Hu Jintao and Kenya’s
Mwai Kabiki.30 The political pomp, however, did not help CNOOC find oil, although it drilled the over
5,000 metre deep Bogal 1 well in Block 9 in 2009, at a cost of $25 million. This was the deepest well
ever drilled in Kenya,31 and while it confirmed there was hydrocarbon potential in Anza, no oil was
found. In 2010, CNOOC left Kenya to invest $1.45 billion into Uganda’s proven oil reserves with Total
and Tullow. Africa Oil, also a partner in Bogal 1, has not abandoned Block 9; it is re-evaluating
CNOOC data and planning Bogal 2 in search of gas.32
In hopes of repeating the natural gas discovery story of Mozambique and Tanzania, the Kenyan
Ministry of Energy was quick to establish new offshore deepwater concessions.33 In addition to a
number of mid-sized exploration companies, the French oil major Total was attracted to the prospects
and bought a 40 per cent stake in a number of Anadarko’s and Cove Energy’s concessions in 2011
(L5, L7, L11a, L11b, and L12) in the Lamu Basin. Total then acquired 100 per cent of offshore block
L22 the following year, but exploration wells drilled in Blocks L7 and L11b did not produce positive
results. 34 After Apache drilled its Mbawa 1 well in 2012 in Block L8 it did encounter gas, but
abandoned the concession in late 2013. 35 While offshore gas has still not been discovered in
commercial quantities, the BG Group and its partners found both oil and gas offshore in Lamu in 2014
and are assessing the commercial potential.36 Drilling an offshore well in Kenya typically costs $80
million, but if BG’s results prove positive, this may help to incentivize further exploration into Kenyan
waters.
27 Yadullah Hussain, ‘Canada’s Africa Oil Corp. sees promise in Kenya’, Financial Post, 24 October 2013.
28 Daniel Wells, ‘Sweden’s Lundin signs Kenya oil exploration deal’, Reuters, 8 October 2007.
29 Africa Oil bought these interests with a loan provided by Lundin; ‘Lundin Petroleum to sell its East African interests’, Lundin
Petroleum, 5 February 2009, www.lundin-petroleum.com/Press/pr_corp_05-02-09_e.html, accessed 28 July 2014.
30 ‘CNOOC signs deal to search for oil in Kenya’, CRIENGLISH.com, 29 April 2006,
http://english.cri.cn/811/2006/04/29/[email protected], accessed 28 July 2014.
31 ‘Untapped Oil Frontier: Hunting Elephants in East Africa’, Cormark Securities Inc., 3 February 2011, 17.
32 ‘Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy’, Energy Intelligence Finance, 4 April 2012.
33 ‘Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy’, Energy Intelligence Finance, 4 April 2012.
34 Total, ‘2013 Form 20-F Total S.A.’, Total, Paris, 17–18
35 Eduard Gismatullin, ‘Apache Exits Kenya to Focus on Energy Exploration Elsewhere’, Bloomberg, 9 October 2013.
36 Kennedy Senelwa, ‘BG to submit plans after Lamu oil find’, The East African, 21 June 2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 11
Figure 7: Kenya exploration blocks
Source: National Oil Corporation of Kenya
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Development and production
Kenya’s oil industry made a major breakthrough in 2012 with Tullow’s Ngamia 1 discovery in Turkana
County. Ngamia 1 helped to de-risk other prospects around Lake Turkana, opening up new
exploration options.37 Tullow first farmed into Kenya in 2010 after buying 50 per cent in Blocks 10BA,
10BB, 12A, and 13T from Africa Oil and Centric Energy. Tullow also bought into Uganda by
purchasing Energy Africa in 2004, Hardman Resources in 2007, and licences of Heritage Oil in 2010.
Uganda served dual purposes for Tullow’s eventual entry into Kenya: it attracted the company and
others due to the proximity of its discoveries, but it also benefited from the technical lessons Tullow
took on from its Ugandan operations. Tullow saw analogies between the Albertine Basin in Uganda
and geological features in Kenya and Ethiopia, and the company spent $23 million for licences in the
two countries.38 Sentiment (in the nature of a regional rivalry with Uganda) likely also encouraged
Kenya’s efforts to attract international oil companies, in order to re-energize exploration activity.39
Uganda’s 2006 oil discoveries and intervention in Somalia raised its stature in East Africa, while
Kenya’s position declined, alongside its economy, following the 2007/08 post-election violence.
Discovering oil offered the chance to reinvigorate the economy and maintain Kenya’s status as the
regional economic centre.
After a year in Kenya, Tullow made multiple discoveries south-west of Lake Turkana from 2012 to
2014. Nonetheless, by mid-2014, Tullow’s discoveries in Kenya remain only contingent resources, not
proven oil reserves. Mwendia Nyaga Chief Executive at Oil & Energy Services Limited, a Kenyan
company, has said: ‘We must be cautiously optimistic ... Unless someone tells you the actual
amounts they [Tullow] have discovered and stop calling the finds oil resources and start calling them
oil reserves, things can go either way’.40 Tullow plans to drill over 20 wells by the end of 2015, which
will consist of new exploration and appraisal of existing finds. 41 At that point, possibilities for
commercializing the oil resources will be better understood.
Tullow estimates that its finds in the South Lokichar sub-basin (within the Tertiary Basin) contain 600
million barrels of oil resources, and have the potential for 1 billion barrels.42 Following the discoveries
of Amosing 1 and Ewoi 1, Tullow’s estimates had increased from 300 million to 600 million barrels
from 2012 to 2014.43 A minimum of 500 million barrels has been regarded as the threshold to satisfy
onshore development costs and thus make the resources commercial. 44 Tullow estimates that
production from the South Lokichar sub-basin will be above 100,000 bpd (barrels per day).45
In addition, good potential still remains for an upside on oil resources in Kenya. The current
discoveries remain limited to the Lokichar area in Turkana County, but Tullow estimates that Kenya
could hold as much as 10 billion barrels of oil.46 Indications of slicks on the surface of Lake Turkana
and oil seeps on its northern shore suggest that drilling in the lake may be another possibility, 47
although environmental and social concerns will need to be properly addressed. But some of Tullow’s
2014 exploration and appraisal wells have been disappointing.48 Kenya could very well become only a
small oil producer.
37 ‘Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy’, Energy Intelligence Finance, 4 April 2012.
38 ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 22.
39 Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.
40 Macharia Kamau, ‘Kenya could take up to five years to pump oil’, The Standard, 17 January 2014.
41 Tullow, ‘Operational Update – Kenya’, Press Release, 15 January 2014.
42 ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 28.
43 Macharia Kamau, ‘Kenya on fast track to join world’s top oil producers’, The Standard, 16 January 2014.
44 ‘Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy’, Energy Intelligence Finance, 4 April 2012.
45 ‘Kenya’, Energy Information Agency, Country Analysis Note, April 2014.
46 Eduard Gismatullin, ‘Kenya From Nowhere Plans East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy’, Bloomberg, 19 August 2013.
47 ‘Kenya government approves Centric Energy farmout of Block 10BA to Tullow Oil’, Centric Energy, Press Release, 5
November 2010.
48 Eduard Gismatullin, ‘Tullow Oil Falls Most in Two Weeks on Well Results in Kenya’, Reuters, 27 March 2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 13
Figure 8: Turkana County oil development prospects
Source: Tullow Oil, Overview Presentation, April 2014, p. 30.
Tullow and its partner Africa Oil (an exploration company) believe they can monetize the discovered
oil resources. But this will prove challenging. Tullow Oil’s CEO, Aidan Heavey, said in May 2013 that
the company would be ready to produce if road networks were upgraded to allow for the
transportation of crude oil to Kenya’s Mombasa refinery.49 This underlines the underdeveloped state
of necessary infrastructure (lack of roads and railway) and the region’s remoteness. As a result,
getting oil out of Turkana is an expensive prospect. An 850-kilometre pipeline and supporting
infrastructure is required to export Turkana’s oil resources (Figure 8).50 The quality of oil will play a
role in defining Kenya’s infrastructure needs. Similar to that in Uganda, the oil found in Kenya is
medium light, between 25 and 35 degrees API, but waxy. The crude qualities are compatible for
comingling, without having a major impact on value. But the waxy content will require the pipeline to
49 ‘Kenya ready to produce oil ‘now’, Daily Nation, 23 May 2013.
50 ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 19.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 14
be heated to lower the oil’s viscosity, avoid the oil congealing, and allow it to flow. The pipeline will be
the longest heated pipeline in the world. 51 But this is not an enviable feat, as the heating and
insulation requirements will be enormously expensive. The pipeline from Turkana to Lamu on the
Kenyan coast could cost up to $3 billion.52
In 2012, Keith Hill, CEO of Africa Oil, indicated that the company would seek to bring in larger
investors to aid in developing the resource at a cost of $5 to $7 billion.53 Total and CNOOC (each
having experience in Kenya, being active, operating in partnership with Tullow in Uganda, and
possessing larger chequebooks) would be obvious candidates. The pan-African Ecobank suggests
that it will cost in the neighbourhood of $16 billion to develop the oil resources, construct a pipeline
from Turkana to the coast, and build a new port for oil exports at Lamu.54 Tullow wants to finalize a
development plan and gain government approval for an export pipeline plan from Turkana to Kenya’s
coast by the end of 2016. 55 The director of the National Oil Corporation of Kenya suggests oil
production could begin by 2018.56 These may be ambitious goals, but Kenya could arguably become
an oil exporter by the end of the decade.
Regional oil infrastructure development
Kenya’s role as a regional hub for East African crude oil and petroleum products may be more
significant than its potential position as an oil and gas producer. To date, Kenya’s oil resources are
estimated to be 600 million barrels. New discoveries may only make Kenya a small African producer –
at the same level, if not smaller than, Uganda or Ghana. As a result, involvement in an East African oil
pipeline is critical if Kenya wishes to remain the regional economic centre. Kenya can very well go it
alone on oil exports and develop a pipeline to the coast from Turkana. But if both Ugandan and
Kenyan oil were to run through the same pipeline network, the multi-billion dollar investment would be
more viable. It is feasible to link a pipeline from Uganda’s Lake Albert region, through Turkana, and
onward to the coast (see Figure 9). But a significant number of obstacles remain before a regional
pipeline is achieved. These include: finalizing the appraisal of discovered oil resources in Kenya,
regional government approval of a pipeline plan, securing the finance, acquiring land for the route,
and pipeline construction.57 There is a long way to go before the regional pipeline can be developed
and to date the neighbouring countries have been slow moving.
Progress on the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor is a case in point,
illustrating the arduous progress of regional infrastructure development in East Africa. The $25 billion
flagship project of Kenya’s Vision 2030 includes an oil pipeline, a 32-berth port, and a refinery at
Lamu. In the 1500s, Lamu was a bustling seaport connecting routes to and from the Middle East,
India, and the Far East to East Africa.58 Whether or not it will have a modern revival remains in
question. Of late, although a few preparatory developments are ongoing at the proposed port site,
LAPSSET remains very much a plan on paper alone. The ground breaking and signing of MoUs for a
railway and pipeline between Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan took place in March 2012 at Lamu.
But in a reflection of the long delay of the entire plan, construction of the oil refinery, which was
expected to be complete in 2015, had still not begun by mid-2014.59
51 It will likely have similar design features to the nearly 500-kilometre Mangala Development Pipeline between Rajasthan and
Gujarat in India; ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 29.
52 Zeddy Sambu, ‘Government to invite bids for Sh255 billion crude oil pipeline’, Daily Nation, 8 February 2014,
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/business/Government-to-invite-bids-for-Sh255…-
/format/xhtml/-/gqgndaz/-/index.html, accessed 28 July 2014.
53 Yadullah Hussain, ‘Canada’s Africa Oil Corp. sees promise in Kenya’, Financial Post, 24 October 2013.
54 George Mwangi, ‘Ecobank: Kenya Oil Segment Needs $16 Billion Investment’, Dow Jones Business News, 29 July 2014.
55 Tullow, ‘Operational Update – Kenya’, Press Release, 15 January 2014.
56 ‘A New Frontier: Oil and Gas in East Africa’, Control Risks, 2012, 10.
57 ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 29.
58 ‘Kenya: Lamu – Back to the Future’, African Business Magazine, 19 February 2012.
59 ‘Emerging East Africa Energy’, Energy Information Administration, 23 May 2013.
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Oil and construction companies are eager to sign contracts and begin work on LAPSSET. But who
pays the bill is still unclear. International investors have not been forthcoming to date, and Kenya’s
capacity to fund many parts of the massive undertaking is quite limited. Silvester Kasuku, chief
executive of LAPSSET, said that the China Communications Construction Company would lead the
construction of the nearly $500 million project to build the first three berths of the planned 32-berth
port at Lamu,60 But it took over a year for the Kenyan government to finalize the contract after the
Chinese company won the tender.61
Figure 9: Regional oil pipeline possibilities
Source: The Economist
The original LAPSSET plan and its huge and diverse infrastructure development goals may need to
be significantly downsized to increase viability. A piecemeal approach, beginning with a basic export
pipeline and port terminal at Lamu, will likely be the first parts developed. Different consortia have
submitted design proposals to construct pipelines within Kenya and between neighbouring Uganda
and South Sudan: Tullow/Africa Oil for a Lokichar–Lamu route; Toyota Tsusho for a Hoima (Uganda)–
Lamu route; Tullow, Total, and CNOOC for Hoima–Lokichar–Lamu route; LAPSSET for Juba–
Lokichar–Moyale–Lamu; and Total for a Hoima–Eldoret–Lamu/Mombasa route. 62 But rather than
Kenya joining Ethiopia and South Sudan for export and product pipelines to Lamu, in the short term it
is more likely that Uganda and Kenya will establish the first pipeline links with other neighbours joining
through oil, road, and rail links in the medium and long term. This in part due to the ongoing civil war
and lack of new oil discoveries in South Sudan, as well as unsuccessful exploration in Ethiopia, which
deters investors from developing tie-in export pipelines from both countries. Uganda, Rwanda, and
60 George Mwani, ‘Chinese Firm Signs $478.9 Million Kenya Lamu Port Deal’, The Wall Street Journal, 3 August 2014.
61 Drazen Jorgic, ‘Kenya says Chinese firm wins first tender for Lamu port project’, Reuters, 11 April 2013.
62 Zeddy Sambu, ‘Kenya amends conditions for pipeline tender following talks with Uganda’, Daily Nation, 19 July 2014.
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Kenya have also signed MoUs on product and export pipelines and may be the first to implement the
agreements.63
Several of the pipeline plans submitted by international oil companies operating in the region include
Mombasa as the end destination for Kenyan and Ugandan crude oil. This may be a more feasible
option because an expansion of the otherwise congested Mombasa port is ongoing, there is already
product pipeline infrastructure between Mombasa and Nairobi, existing road and rail support is in
place to develop new pipelines (unlike the case in Turkana and northern Kenya), and a new Chinesefinanced
and constructed railway is planned. But LAPSSET holds high political importance for
Kenya’s government and will not easily be abandoned.
The quality of Ugandan and Kenyan crude is compatible and can flow in the same pipeline, but
questions remain over whether the potential Kenya–Uganda oil cooperation will be upended by
longstanding competition between the two East African countries. In the words of one international oil
company advisor: ‘If relations are driven by economics, they will find a solution ... If politics decides, it
will be more arbitrary.’64 If all goes smoothly, the Uganda–Kenya pipeline could be finished by 2019.
‘It’s not certain, but it’s possible,’ said the advisor. A transparent regional agreement between Kenya
and neighbouring countries, particularly Uganda, and the speedy implementation of such a plan,
would help turn rivalries in East Africa into partnerships, and encourage investors. Kenya, which
initially did not invite Uganda to participate in regional pipeline plans, has since increased dialogue,
and established preliminary agreements with Kampala. But there are still differences that need to be
overcome between the East African neighbours.
The cost of a Uganda–Kenya pipeline could be between $2.5 and $5 billion.65 The exact route will
play a large role in dictating the final cost since the requirement that the pipe be heated and insulated
increases investment needs substantially. Keeping the pipeline as short as possible is vital for the
project’s viability. For its part, Uganda is eager to monetize its oil resources, a goal which has been
long delayed since its 2006 discoveries. Kampala favours a Southern Corridor, the Hoima–Eldoret–
Lamu/Mombasa route, and initially wants to avoid the pipeline link to Turkana.66 This would establish
an independent pipeline system along the existing Nairobi–Mombasa route.
Nairobi, however, is pushing for a Northern Corridor, through Lokichar, and to Lamu in order to
develop Turkana’s oil resources and meet some of its LAPSSET goals.67 But the Northern Corridor
has a 1,300 kilometre route which crosses over mountainous, isolated, and underdeveloped areas,
where rock will need to be removed and roads and supporting infrastructure built, while a three-month
rainy season would slow down operations. There would also need to be extensive social engagement
with local communities along the route. As a vice president of an international oil company in Kenya
said: ‘All your communities, all your local authorities, and all your levels of government, along the
route of the pipeline will need to be involved’. All these considerations push the costs of the Northern
Corridor pipeline to above $4.5 billion.68
Kenya’s oil resources are still under appraisal by Tullow and Africa Oil, which will help determine
whether an East African oil pipeline should first go through Turkana, or a spur line connecting the
isolated region to a southern route from Uganda be built later. It will take two to four years to ascertain
final commerciality and in the meantime Uganda remains eager to push forward with generating
63 Sulaiman Kakaire and David Tash Lumu, ‘East Africa: Museveni, Kenyatta, Kagame in Ambitious East Africa Devt Plan’, The
Observer, 23 June 2013.
64 Interview, advisor at international oil company active in East Africa, 26 June 2014.
65 Drazen Jorgic, ‘Kenya attacks undermine plans for east African trade hub’, Reuters, 20 June 2014.
66 Interview, vice-president of international oil company active in Kenya, 26 June 2014.
67 In either the Northern or Southern Corridor, pipeline construction would be spilt into two parts, one beginning from Hoima to
the Kenya/Uganda border, the other from the border to Lamu or Mombasa; ‘Kenya’, Energy Information Agency, Country
Analysis Note, April 2014.
68 Interview, vice-president of international oil company active in Kenya, 26 June 2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 17
revenues from its long idle but proven oil reserves. ‘Uganda is still the backbone of East Africa oil,’
said the international oil company vice president.69
Other regional oil infrastructure development plans may act as substitutes for a Kenya-centred
regional oil infrastructure network. Oil companies in Uganda are also considering a Uganda–Tanzania
route along the west side of Lake Victoria (see Figure 9) instead of through Kenya, but it would need
to be far longer than a route through Kenya, and Uganda alone may have to bear the costs.70 There is
competition between Kenya and Tanzania, and their respective ports at Mombasa and Dar es
Salaam, and new sites. Kenya is expanding the capacity of the Mombasa port and easing costs for
landlocked Uganda and Rwanda in the face of Tanzanian competition.71 If Kenya wants to maintain its
‘Gateway to East Africa’ status, it will need to move forward with its infrastructure plans.
Political, social, and security risks
As the oil industry shifts from exploration to development and production, required investments will
grow from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars for new oil infrastructure. Tullow Oil, and in
particular its smaller and more exploration-orientated partner Africa Oil, will likely sell a share of their
interests in the Turkana concessions to larger industry players, such as oil majors and Asian national
oil companies, to provide the required capital investments to develop the oil fields. It is at this juncture
that risk incentives among the involved oil companies will lower profoundly. During the exploration
phase, in the initial drive to discover oil, oil industry operations have been left relatively free from
regulatory constraints and political interference. In the upcoming development phase this will likely not
be the case. Rather, an ‘obsolescing bargain’, in which an initial favourable bargaining position for
international companies shifts in favour of the government over time, as fixed asset investments
increase, may be developing in East Africa.
Political risk
Any business activity is inherently political. This is particularly relevant in a country such as Kenya
where politics are so closely tied to business and ethnicity. As a result, the nascent oil industry will not
be completely insulated from growing risks in a shifting political and security landscape. The
regulatory environment for the oil industry in Kenya is in flux. The planning, establishment, and
implementation of a new National Energy Bill and Petroleum Exploration and Development Production
Act will have important consequences for the oil industry. New laws will encourage investment on the
one hand, particularly in natural gas where there is a lack of regulation, but on the other hand the
costs of doing business could increase. And since the political and regulatory environments in Kenya
are intertwined, the government may exploit new rules and regulations to advance political and
economic goals.
International oil companies have received ample support from both former and current governments
in Kenya. International oil companies are confident that the Kenyan government will not delay the
start of oil production by stymying foreign investment with restrictive regulations.72 But the onset of
production may very well coincide with political changes in Kenya, as the next general elections are
scheduled for August 2017. The incumbent, or a potential new government, may put forward new
policies for the oil industry, in an effort to leverage the government’s financial position and to gain
support from political constituencies, particularly in oil regions and those regions where related
infrastructure development is expected. Kenya’s mining industry offers examples of how political and
69 Interview, vice-president of international oil company active in Kenya, 26 June 2014.
70 Interviews, senior managers of international oil companies active in Kenya, 26 June 2014 & 9 July 2014.
71 Sara Jerving, ‘Kenya Fights Off Port Competition With $13 Billion Plan: Freight’, Bloomberg, 20 August 2013.
72 Interviews, senior managers of international oil companies active in Kenya, 26 June 2014 & 9 July 2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 18
legal disputes between local communities and county and central governments can delay commercial
activities.73 Once oil production does begin, and petrodollars flow into government coffers, oil revenue
sharing will become a fixture of Kenyan politics.
The Kenyan government is striving to enhance the relatively weak legal and regulatory framework of
its 1985 Petroleum Exploration and Production Act. The new law will change the governance structure
of the oil industry. To date, the National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee (NAFFAC), an interministerial
body, has been officially in charge of licensing concessions.74 This power will likely be fully
constituted under the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP) in the new energy policy, while
NAFFAC will become a consultation body.75 The Cabinet Secretary within the MEP will probably
maintain the most power in both policy-making and regulatory decisions, leaving space for political
interference in the industry.76 Nonetheless, the 2010 constitution, and the establishment of a National
Land Commission in 2012, may have consequences for oil governance in Kenya. It is likely that there
will be a multi-tier governance structure over the oil industry, as parliament should be given greater
ratification powers over other bodies of government, according to the new constitution.77 Regulatory
responsibility may be shared between national and county governments, as well as various
constitutional commissions and government companies and agencies. This presents a complex
regulatory landscape for investors to navigate, and may increase the cost of doing business.
There are also a number of specific policy changes in store for the oil industry. Kenya aims to improve
its technical capacity to engage and govern the oil and gas sector through the Ministry of Energy and
national companies such as: the National Oil Corporation of Kenya, Kenya Petroleum Refineries
Limited, and Kenya Pipeline Company Limited. 78 Although the majority of oil concessions have
already been licensed out, Kenya has indicated it will introduce bidding rounds in the future to replace
direct proposals and the first-come first-served basis under which the industry has operated to date.79
By mid-2014, the first round was still delayed because the new energy bill had not yet been brought in
line with the 2010 constitution and reviewed by parliament.80 Once competitive bidding does begin,
exploration concessions will be expanded from 46 to 51.81 Future contracts will include new licensing
fees, exploration schedules, and requirements to meet annual training fees for Kenyan civil servants.
These measures were taken to discourage speculators and encourage exploration and
development. 82 Kenya demonstrated the seriousness of its new approach to the industry by its
expulsion of Statoil, after the Norwegian company had failed to conduct a 3D survey of its licensed
offshore L26 block as demanded by the MEP.83
For contract terms, the former Commissioner for Petroleum Energy, Martin Mwaisakenyi, commented
that oil companies could recover their costs from exploration, ‘cost oil’, at 60 per cent per year once
production begins. The remaining ‘profit oil’ will be split between the companies and government
depending on production levels: the government share will be 50 per cent up to 30,000 bpd and rise
to 78 per cent above 100,000 bpd.84 The combination of high-cost payments by the government to oil
73 Steve Mbogo, ‘Mui coal plant row goes out of court’, The East African, 26 October 2013,
www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Mui-coal-plant-row-goes-out-of-court/… accessed on
10 September 2014.
74 ‘Kenya unveils new oil and gas licensing rules’, The East African, 15 December 2012.
75 ‘Draft National Energy Policy’, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Republic of Kenya, 24 February 2014, 22.
76 ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 31.
77 ‘Kenya’, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, March 2013, 2.
78 ‘Second Medium Term Plan 2013–2017’, Kenya Vision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, Nairobi, 2013, 69.
79 ‘Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy’, Energy Intelligence Finance, 4 April 2012.
80 George Obulutsa, ‘Kenya delays energy bill until June’, Reuters, 8 January 2014.
81 Oil companies will also need to cede 25% of exploration acreage after 2 years onshore and 3 years offshore if work
commitments not made; Kennedy Senelwa, ‘Kenya set to auction five oil, gas blocks as new rules take effect’, The East
African, 5 January 2013.
82 ‘Kenya unveils new oil and gas licensing rules’, The East African, 15 December 2012.
83 Rawlings Otini, ‘Kenya expels oil giant Statoil from exploration plan’, Business Daily, 5 November 2012.
84 ‘Kenya unveils new oil and gas licensing rules’, The East African, 15 December 2012.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 19
companies and initial low production will result in low initial government profit shares. This may cause
some public resentment towards oil companies if expectations of production are not properly
managed before it begins.
Kenyan officials have stressed that they do not wish to repeat the delays to oil development
witnessed in Uganda. President Kenyatta will likely strive to see oil production as soon as possible in
order to capitalize on political credit before the next election, particularly in launching major
infrastructure projects to develop the northern and coastal regions where his current support is weak
compared to the central counties. But at the same time, Kenyatta does not want to repeat Uganda’s
negative experience of not capturing significant gains during the development phase of its oil industry.
Foreseeing potential large concession interest sales by Tullow Oil and Africa Oil, Kenya plans to
impose taxes on oil, gas, and mining companies by the end of 2014, and President Kenyatta says:
‘We want to ensure that we as a country also are able to benefit from both the windfall and capital
gains tax ... Uganda has lost a lot of revenue as a result of not really having focused on that’.85
Unlike the position facing other regional neighbours, there is more potential in Kenya for bottom-up
oversight and intervention in the oil industry.86 In the coming years, Tullow and Africa Oil will need to
bring in larger partners to help develop oil resources in Blocks 10BB and 13T of Turkana County.
These sales will likely result in public scrutiny of how the two exploration companies acquired the
concessions. During the coalition government between 2008 and 2012, high-level politicians allegedly
profited from selling oil concessions to international oil companies through private companies (the
2003 Public Officer Ethics Act does not prohibit civil servants from owning stakes or having interests
in private companies unless these conflict with official duties). 87 These dealings, together with
unfavourable terms for the government in existing contracts, even if they were designed to attract
foreign investment to unproven oil regions, may face public backlash and potential review, as has
been the case in Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania in recent years.
Fearing a potential loss of negotiating power, local communities and county governments will also
respond to the entry of new oil companies, and may make renewed demands that delay the industry
from advancing forward. 88 There is also regional political risk from un-demarcated international
borders between Kenya and its neighbours. Somalia is seeking to take Kenya to the International
Court of Justice in The Hague over maritime border claims of some offshore concessions.89 Such
disputes may also arise onshore if oil exploration in Turkana County reaches the disputed Ilemi
Triangle between Kenya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Social risk
The successful advancement of the 2010 constitution offers potential economic and social
development boons and can help reverse high levels of inequality in Kenya. Such a process,
however, offers challenges to the oil industry as communities in oil regions and their political
representatives grapple with the convergence of new economic resources and increased political
power. But a failure by the Kenyan government to successfully implement political devolution could be
even more damaging to the timely development of the oil industry. This outcome could see aggrieved
counties contest oil resources with the national government and international oil companies. If the
objectives of devolution in the new constitution are fulfilled and political power and economic
resources shift from the centre to county level, particularly in restless peripheral regions such as
Turkana, then conflicts over scarce resources can be mitigated.
85 ‘Blow for Tullow as Kenya eyes windfall tax on oil companies’, The Irish Independent, 5 August 2014.
86 David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, ‘East African prospects: An update on the
political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda’, Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 27.
87 ‘Minister’s Firm Sold Turkana Oil Block for Sh800m’, The Daily Nation, 27 March 2012; Andrea S. Pongo, ‘Effects of the 2013
National Elections on Oil Exploration in Kenya’, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria VA, 2013, 2
88 Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 September 2014.
89 ‘Somalia takes Kenya to U.N. court in oil rights row’, Reuters, 29 August 2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 20
There has been widespread oil exploration over the past 60 years in Kenya. But to date oil has only
been found in Turkana County. Turkana is a large and isolated region located in Kenya’s north-west,
bordering Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Turkana is part of Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands
(as are counties within the Anza, Mandera, and Lamu Basins) and it is also one of Kenya’s poorest
regions, where the vast majority live under the poverty line. As a colonial officer once coarsely (and
mistakenly) said of Turkana, it is ‘the wildest and most worthless district in Kenya.’90
The Turkana population, estimated at over 1 million with a density of two people per square kilometre,
is largely pastoralist; the tending of livestock (cattle, sheep, and goats) providing both livelihood and
identity.91 Development in Turkana has been neglected by the central government in Nairobi for
decades. It lacks infrastructure, skilled labour, and security, with a large flow of small arms coming
through porous borders to and from conflicts in neighbouring countries.92 Working in such isolated
and underdeveloped regions is not uncommon in the international oil industry, but Turkana is
nonetheless a difficult and expensive operational environment.
The national–local political divides, local competition, and the possible and perceived environmental
impact of the oil industry have all fuelled concerns that Turkana may take on some of the negative
traits of poverty and conflict associated with oil development in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Sparking
superstitious concern, rig 804 operating at the Ngamia 1 well (the site of Kenya’s first oil discovery)
was previously used in the Niger Delta. 93 But the situation in Turkana is a long way off such
environmental degradation and armed conflict. And Kenya’s relatively strong civil society, media, and
judicial system can act to prevent these traits from developing, if mechanisms to settle political and
social grievances are conceived.
In Turkana, expectations are high that oil will bring fast-paced economic growth and development.
Managing these expectations according to both the long timeframe for oil development and the
limitations of what are still relatively small oil discoveries, is regarded as one of the main challenges
facing the Kenyan government and international oil companies in relations with local communities.94
As a senior manager at Africa Oil said: ‘The oil and gas industry cannot be the game changer in the
country’s north ... At best, it can be a stimulus’. 95 There is also apprehension among the local
population that they will be left out of the oil boom. In this sense, oil companies will be well advised to
manage their expectations of time constraints on operations, and the importance of relations with
local communities, in the social and political environment in which they are working.
Speaking at a meeting on the sidelines of the US-African Leaders Summit in Washington DC in
August 2014, President Kenyatta underlined his willingness to make oil contracts publicly available.96
Although the Kenyan president’s position may be geared towards attracting further US investment to
Kenya’s oil sector, Kenyatta visited Houston and potential investors, including ExxonMobil and
90 Rayner, H., The Ivory Traders, London: W. Heinemann, 1923, quoted in R. Dyson-Hudson and J. Terrence McCabe, South
Turkana Nomadism: Coping with an Unpredictably Varying Environment, Ethnography Series, FLl7-001. New Haven: HRAFlex
Books, 1985.
91 Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, ‘Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or
development?’, African Geographical Review, 2014, 3–5.
92 Patricia I. Vasquez, ‘Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves’, Articles
and Debates, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.
93 ‘Kenya oil: Inside Tullow Oil Ngamia 1 rig in Turkana’, Kenya Reporter, 12 April 2012.
94 Ryan Cummings, ‘Predicting Africa’s Next Oil Insurgency: The Precarious Case of Kenya’s Turkana County’, Think Africa
Press, 13 September 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting-next-oil-insurgency-precar…
accessed 14 August 2014.
95 ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 68.
96 Ian Gary, ‘“Absolutely” – Kenya President backs full oil contract disclosure’, The Politics of Poverty, 27 August 2014,
http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2014/08/absolutely-kenya-pres… accessed 11
September 2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 21
Conoco Philips,97 Tullow and other oil companies present in Kenya are supportive of publishing the
contracts and environmental impact assessments.98 The draft of the National Energy Policy calls for
20 per cent of ‘the government share of profits from energy natural resources’ to be shared with the
county government and 5 per cent with the local community (determined by the sub-county where the
resource exists and delivered by the county government).99 These are all positive indications, but
have not yet been followed through with action. If the central government does not manage the oil
industry in a relatively transparent manner, then the obscure distribution, budgeting, and expenditure
of oil revenues will create further grievances among local populations.
Just as political tensions are present around oil at the national–local level, they also exist between
local communities and their political representatives, together with wrangling between the governor,
MPs, and the senate. The lack of capacity, in county governments and local communities, to assess
the social and environmental impact of the oil industry, to negotiate business involvement, and to
manage possible future revenues, has created concern that governance flaws in Kenya will simply be
relocated from the central to the county level through political devolution.100 How the county level
government disseminates its oil revenue share is critical. Local communities not in the sub-counties
where oil is produced, but nonetheless affected by oil operations and infrastructure, may make strong
demands for revenue shares. Oil companies may become conduits for local communities to attempt
to amend social grievances with local and national government and be scrutinized for their own
behaviour in a regulatory weak business environment.
Even though still in the exploration and development phase, social grievances among the local
population have constrained oil operations in Turkana. In late October 2013, Tullow suspended its
operations in Block 10BB and 13T in Turkana in the face of demonstrations by hundreds of local
residents over the lack of employment and business opportunities. The respective members of
parliament in Turkana South and Turkana East led local residents in the protests. They marched on
the Twiga 1, Etuko, and Ngamia 1 oil well sites and shut down operations in the two districts for
several weeks in the process.101 While the local MPs were detained and questioned for a period by
Kenya’s Police Criminal Investigation Department,102 the central government sent representatives to
meet with community leaders to defuse the situation. There were wide-reaching consequences for
international oil companies involved in the concessions. Stock of Tullow Oil and its partner Africa Oil
dropped by 1.4 per cent and 2 per cent respectively upon the news.
Tullow responded to these grievances through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that
underlined the company’s commitment to using local staff, goods, and services (even before the
incident over half of its 1,400 staff in Kenya came from Turkana), pledged to agree on a formal
grievance resolution procedure, committed to doubling its social investments in 2014 to $2 million
(from $1 million in 2013), and opened community resource offices in Lodwar, Lokori, and Lokichar.103
97 Samuel Kamau Mbote, ‘President Kenyatta to visit Texas for energy related discussions’, Oil News Kenya, 8 August 2014,
http://oilnewskenya.com/2014/08/08/president-kenyatta-to-visit-texas-fo… accessed 28 September
2014
98 Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.
99 ‘Draft National Energy Policy’, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Republic of Kenya, 24 February 2014, 130 & 146.
100 Patricia I. Vasquez, ‘Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves’, Articles
and Debates, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.
101 Lucas Ngaasike, ‘Tullow Oil suspends operations over conflict with locals’, The Standard, 28 October 2013.
102 Cyrus Ombati and Lucas Ng’Asike, ‘MPs grilled over protests at Tullow Oil well, Turkana’, The Standard, 30 October 2013,
www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000096529/mps-grilled-over… accessed 14
August 2014.
103 Michael Kavanagh and Katrina Manson, ‘Tullow temporarily halts Kenya work after protests, Financial Times, 28 October
2013; ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The
Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 53; ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil,
London, 2014, 27.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 22
But since there is little oversight over the MoU, which excluded consultations with civil society in its
drafting, it may be only a temporary fix.104
The protest was a product of the desire of the Turkana people themselves, rather than ‘foreigners’, to
benefit from oil specifically (from the perspective of most Turkana people, other Kenyans who do not
come from the region are also regarded as foreigners).105 It was also the result of infighting among
the Turkana people. Oil has been confirmed in South Turkana, and people in the sub-county want to
see the majority of the jobs, contracts, and other boons from oil development come their way first
before they spread to others in the county.
There are also acute concerns among local residents that their political representatives will exploit
their positions to advance their own interests in collaboration with oil companies.106 In June 2012, in
Lodwar, the capital of Turkana County, community leaders claimed local officials had exploited their
positions to profit from land acquisitions by the oil industry and had intimidated and displaced
communities near oil wells. Tullow was accused by local communities of colluding with county and
national officials in not publishing environmental impact assessments, not compensating local
communities sufficiently, bribing local officials to secure land, not employing enough local people, and
not providing adequate compensation for claims of losses incurred from oil exploration activities.107
Local content will be a critical political and social issue for oil operations in Kenya. The national
government wants to leverage Kenyan companies’ activities and provision of goods and services in
the oil industry.108 But local content cannot be easily separated from often-divisive politics in Kenya
and close links between business and political interests. International oil companies will be hard
pressed to navigate, at times, competing interests between the national government, county
governors, MPs, the county senate, and local communities. 109 Tullow has been increasingly
transparent about its payments to Kenyan stakeholders. In 2013, it spent $71 million altogether on
local suppliers, taxes, and community development. 110 But as investment levels rise during the
development phase, oil companies will be expected to increase their engagement with Kenyan
companies, labour, and investments in local communities. Since there is a limit to engagement with
local communities in Turkana, due to their lack of skills and capacity to work in the oil industry,
tensions between the national and local level should be expected as other Kenyan companies and
non-Turkana labour move in to fill the vacuum, until the Turkana people can play a deeper role in the
oil industry through training.
In Turkana, where arable land and water are scarce, acute environmental concerns are attached to
the expansion of the oil industry. Kenya’s National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) is
charged with monitoring compliance to environmental and social safeguards, but is understaffed and
underfunded.111 NEMA may muster its resources to focus on big industries and projects, such as oil
104 ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 54.
105 Personal communications, Kenyan academic. 9 September 2014.
106 ‘Governor Nanok clarifies why Turkana county returned Sh3b to National treasury’, The Standard,
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/campus/story/2000133442/governor-nanok-…-
treasury, 1 September 2014, accessed 10 September 2014; Personal communications, Kenyan academic. 9
September 2014.
107 Ryan Cummings, ‘Predicting Africa’s Next Oil Insurgency: The Precarious Case of Kenya’s Turkana County’, Think Africa
Press, 13 September 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting-next-oil-insurgency-precar…
accessed 14 August 2014; Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.
108 ‘Kenya’, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, March 2013, 4.
109 ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 69.
110 In 2011, Tullow spent $23.6 million on local suppliers. This represented 23% of its overall spending in Kenya, ‘Kenya unveils
new oil and gas licensing rules’, The East African, 15 December 2012; ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil, London,
2014, 24.
111 Patricia I. Vasquez, ‘Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves’, Articles
and Debates, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 23
and gas, but there are also allegations that it is fraught with corruption.112 Since enforcement can be
lacking, some self-regulation may be required by the oil industry if a regulatory vacuum continues.
The struggle over scarce resources in Turkana is spilling over into oil. After the discovery of oil at
Ngamia 1 by Tullow Oil, the Turkana and Pokot (a neighbouring ethnic group) disputed the location of
the well; the Pokot accused the Turkana of illegally occupying the land.113 The Turkana–Pokot oil
dispute threatens to serve as a new frontier of a traditional rivalry over cattle, water, and pastures.114
Too often international oil companies have described such local disputes and armed fighting as
‘occasional intertribal conflict’ to assuage investor concerns.115 But when these are actually decadesold
conflicts,116 it does not serve the interests of companies to downplay their existence. While Tullow,
Total, and BG Group are signatories to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (a set
of human rights guidelines for extractive industry companies) some capacity to deal with insecurity in
a manner compatible with international best practice is required within the Kenyan security forces.117
The demands for more benefits from the oil industry are not necessarily just a product of overblown
expectations among local communities, they are also a result of witnessing the damage that oil
development has caused in the past in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. Local communities are not
unaccustomed to dealing with oil companies. Oil exploration has gone on for some six decades
across large swaths of Kenya, and not without negative experiences for local communities. Some
communities have accused oil companies once operating in the country of harming livestock, after
waste was dumped. 118 For example, in Marsabit County locals claim that waste dumped in
abandoned oil wells is the source of increased incidences of cancer and other chronic ailments
among humans and livestock.119
Employment issues are also hotly contested at the local level and have a history that predates oil. The
Kenyan government and NGOs and international organizations have been the largest employers in
Turkana to date, but nonlocal Kenyans hold the majority of the jobs.120 Although largely lacking the
skills and education to participate, the uneven distribution of jobs has nonetheless created discontent
among the Turkana; this, as a result, has amplified recent hostility towards the oil industry regarding
hiring practices. These negative experiences fuel mistrust towards current operators.
The Swedish firm, Lundin, claims that before it arrived in 2007 no oil company had ever taken a
systematic approach to community engagement.121 Many exploration companies have shorter time
horizons and little capacity to engage in community development programmes. Local politicians and
communities in Turkana remain fearful that Tullow, which has made significant discoveries, will exit
after selling these resources to new companies, while local communities will have to renegotiate
conditions with new companies, losing any commitments and benefits they negotiated with the current
companies.122 While Tullow is increasingly involved in production activities around the world, and will
most likely keep a significant share in its Kenyan concessions, other more exploration-focused
companies may seek early monetization of their interests.
112 Brian Otieno, ‘Two NEMA Officials Probed Over Graft’, The Star, 8 February 2014.
113 Patricia I. Vasquez, ‘Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves’, Articles
and Debates, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.
114 Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.
115 Christine Batruch, ‘Lundin Petroleum AB’s experience in East Africa: the role of the private sector in conflict-prone
Countries’, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2,2010, 7.
116 Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, ‘Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or
development?’, African Geographical Review, 2014, 7.
117 Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.
118 Christine Batruch, ‘Lundin Petroleum AB’s experience in East Africa: the role of the private sector in conflict-prone
Countries’, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2010, 9.
119 Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.
120 Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, ‘Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or
development?’, African Geographical Review, 2014, 11.
121 Christine Batruch, ‘Lundin Petroleum AB’s experience in East Africa: the role of the private sector in conflict-prone
Countries’, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2010, 7.
122 Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.
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October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 24
The implementation of new legislation may be the answer to settling community concerns on
concession sales. The possible retrospective effect of new laws coming out of Kenya’s 2010
constitution – such as the Community Land Bill – may at first glance appear to upset oil industry
interests,123 but opposition to the advancement of such laws may actually backfire if the alternative is
a hostile operational climate. If these social grievances go unaddressed then the operations of the oil
industry will be delayed and limited due to protests, blockages, sabotage, theft, and even armed
attacks.
Security risk
Not only is the starting point of Kenya’s oil production under threat from political instability and
insecurity, but also its exit to international markets on the coast. Kenya’s coastal communities have
longstanding social and political grievances with the central government in Nairobi. Internal politics
alone have the capacity to create insecurity for the oil industry if planned pipeline and other
downstream infrastructure is targeted. But there is also the possibility that these disputes could
become a toxic mix with the incursion of the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab on the coast –
delaying and hampering large-scale investments in the process.
Al-Shabaab may be positioning itself to exploit social and political tensions to win support from local
populations on Kenya’s coast. But if the Kenyan government is able to advance political devolution to
coastal counties, while working to contain al-Shabaab in an apolitical manner, then there is a strong
likelihood that, with regional and international support, Nairobi will be able to curb the militant group’s
activities, allowing the oil industry to operate in a relatively secure environment. If Kenya is to become
the transit hub for East Africa’s oil boom, and fend off competition from Tanzania, then relative
stability and security on the coast must be achieved.
The coastal regions, similar to Turkana, are some of the least developed in Kenya. There exist severe
social grievances over neglect by the central government in Nairobi, particularly among the Muslim
population. This is coupled with feelings of exploitation over land rights (since Kikuyu settlers came to
the region in the 1960s) and the incursion of Kenyan companies from the Nairobi area into the coast’s
prosperous tourism sector. These grievances have fuelled separatist sentiment through groups, such
as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) whose common slogan is Pwani Si Kenya or ‘The Coast
is not Kenya’.
At the same time, a series of terrorist attacks carried out by al-Shabaab over the past two years has
heightened security concerns in Kenya. The militant group claims that such attacks are in response to
Kenya’s military incursion, first unilaterally and then through the African Union force in southern
Somalia in 2011. In September 2013, 67 people were killed in a dramatic terrorist attack on the
Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi. A bomb attack killed 10 people in the capital in May 2014. Later,
following five attacks connected to al-Shabaab on coastal communities in Lamu and Tana River
counties, over 100 were left dead (Mombasa County had been targeted in earlier attacks). The
insecurity has negatively affected tourism, as the USA, Britain, and other western governments have
issued travel advisories.124 A security response from the Kenyan government may be necessary to
dissuade attacks in the near future, but a long-term solution to contain al-Shabaab requires a political
settlement, which must include some degree of stability in Somalia.125
The threat posed by al-Shabaab to the oil industry should not be over amplified. But there is growing
concern that terrorist attacks in Kenya over the past few years may widen political divides between
Nairobi and the coast. The targeting of, and discrimination shown against, Kenyan Somalis and
123 Harold Ayodo, ‘Tullow Oil’s move on land Bill opposed’, The Standard, 24 April 2014.
124 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Gruesome Attacks in Kenyan Villages Heighten Fears of a Nation on Edge’, The New York Times, 7 July
2014.
125 ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War’, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No 99, 26 June 2014.
Annex 112
October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 25
Muslims by Kenyan security forces in the wake of the Westgate attack provides recruitment
possibilities and avenues of support for al-Shabaab in Kenya.126 After the terrorist attacks on coastal
villages, in which the many of the victims were Kikuyu (Kenya’s dominant ethnic group, and that of
President Kenyatta) security authorities and the president himself linked the killings to local political
groups such as the MRC.127 In a statement on 17 June, Uhuru Kenyatta said: ‘The attack in Lamu
was well planned, orchestrated, and politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan
community, with the intention of profiling and evicting them for political reasons’.128
Some observers believe that al-Shabaab is deliberately trying to undermine political stability in Kenya
through targeted attacks on Kikuyus in coastal regions.129 Although he later advanced the theory that
al-Shabaab may have played a role, President Kenyatta’s politicization of the attacks sparked concern
that the security situation may worsen because internal divisions between ethnic groups had been
enflamed.130 Such tensions are aggravated when rich Kenyan speculators from Nairobi and the Rift
Valley buy up acreage in Lamu County, with intentions of later selling the land when schemes for
government-planned infrastructure increase prices.131 Possibly in an attempt to subdue some of these
concerns, President Kenyatta recently ordered the repossession of 500,000 acres of public land after
an audit found developers had acquired ownership under ‘dubious and suspicious corrupt
circumstances’.132
The consequences for the oil industry of the insecurity on Kenya’s coast are already starting to show.
One oil company assigned a ‘business critical’ status to travel to Nairobi in the wake of terrorist
attacks.133 Other exploration activity, in Blocks 3A and 3B in northern Kenya near the border with
Somalia, has been delayed, due in part to security concerns.134 ‘Al-Shabaab is target oriented and
pretty mobile’, said one advisor at an international oil company active in Kenya.135 The ability of
Kenya’s Defence Forces, National Intelligence Service, and National Police Service to protect critical
infrastructure in the energy sector has also come under question, on account of the lack of a key
authority covering security measures and competition between government ministries on security
issues that would foster information sharing, which is otherwise inhibited.136
Security concerns will entail extra insurance premiums for the financing of a possible Uganda–Kenya
pipeline, pushing its cost to the higher end of the $2.5 to $5 billion estimate.137 Tullow has suggested
that any consortium of companies building a pipeline will need to bury it underground for security and
environmental reasons, following international best practice in the industry. This would increase
construction time, but in the long run, a buried pipeline would help avoid the oil bunkering witnessed
in Nigeria and have a smaller footprint on pastoral livelihoods in Kenya’s north.138
126 ‘Kenya and its coastal discontents’, Aljazeera, 26 September 2012,
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/20129238293700321.html accessed 14 August 2014.
127 Robyn Dixon, ‘Tension rises in Kenya as 29 are killed in attacks on coastal towns’, The Los Angeles Times, 6 July 2014.
128 ‘Conflict dynamics on Kenya’s coast’, IRIN, 23 July 2014, www.irinnews.org/report/100394/analysis-conflict-dynamics-onkenya-
s-coast accessed 14 August 2014.
129 Mohamed Mubarak, ‘Al-Shabaab’s foreign operations arm is busy recruiting in Kenya’, African Arguments, 3 July 2014,
http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/03/al-shabaabs-foreign-operations-a…
accessed 14 August 2014.
130 Murithi Mutiga, ‘Al-Shabaab Lays a Trap for Kenya’, The New York Times, 29 June 2014.
131 ‘Lapsset, oil discovery triggers real estate boom in Lamu Archipengo’, The Standard, 21 May 2014.
132 ‘Kenya’s leader Kenyatta orders Lamu land repossession’, BBC News, 1 August 2014.
133 Magnus Taylor, ‘Kenyan gloom and ineffective authoritarianism: free-form thinking on the state of Eastern Africa’, African
Arguments, 7 July 2014, http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/07/kenyan-gloom-and-ineffective-aut…-
on-the-state-of-eastern-africa-by-magnus-taylor/ accessed 14 August 2014.
134 ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 10.
135 Interview, 26 June 2014.
136 E.O.S Odhiambo, T.L Maito, and K. Onkware, ‘Kenya’s oil pipeline and terrorism’, Journal of Defense Resources
Management, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2014, 27–8.
137 Drazen Jorgic, ‘Kenya attacks undermine plans for east African trade hub’, Reuters, 20 June 2014.
138 Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.
Annex 112
October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 26
Reform in Kenya’s security establishment and ongoing cooperation with the USA may serve to curtail
attacks against infrastructure and weaken al-Shabaab.139 International oil companies are also not
unaccustomed to operating in insecure environments. While there has been no serious attack against
oil installations in Kenya to date, investors are still concerned that ongoing insecurity along the coast
will delay planned infrastructure projects, increase costs, and prolong construction time. In particular,
if insecurity persists, the Kenyan government’s ability to obtain financing for the ambitious $25 billion
LAPSSET port and transport infrastructure project will be limited.
Conclusion
It is still early days for oil development in Kenya. Opportunities for new oil and gas exploration are
many, but it is far from certain that significant new discoveries will be made. Expectations of what oil
can bring for economic growth and development are far ahead of the level of actual discoveries to
date. Even if Kenya’s oil resources of 600 million barrels were to multiply with new finds in the coming
years, the country would still only be able to play the role of a small African producer. Kenya’s role as
a regional transit hub for East African oil and gas, however, could prove to be more significant.
Politics will weigh heavily on the oil industry in Kenya, regardless of how large it becomes. The
favourable business environment for international oil companies is shifting towards greater regulation
and the potential for higher levels of political interference. With the August 2017 general election on
the horizon, either the incumbent or a new government could exploit new rules and regulations to put
forward political and economic goals.
At the same time, the 2010 constitution promise of a decentralization of political and economic
decision-making power from the central government in Nairobi to 47 new counties is still underway.
Counties are coming to terms with the convergence of new economic resources and increased
political power through devolution. Oil has already become a point of contention between the national
and local level in Turkana County and has caused rifts between county political representatives and
local communities. Disputes will continue to stall progress in the oil industry, until the different levels
of government in cooperation with international oil companies and local communities develop formal
mechanisms to settle these grievances.
Finally, security concerns loom as the oil industry strives to move from the exploration to the
development phase. Already hostile relations between the central government and coastal and northeastern
counties could slow down or upend plans for large oil infrastructure. The incursions of al-
Shabaab in Kenya threaten to add fuel to these long-standing animosities, but the advancement of
the new constitution could help mitigate insecurity. Kenya could very well develop both into Africa’s
newest oil producer and the regional centre for oil and gas transit by the end of the decade.
139 In September 2014, a US armed drone targeted and reportedly killed the al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Aw Muhammad,
commonly known as Godane; Stig Jarle Hansen, ‘How will the death of its leader, Ahmed Godane, impact Al Shabaab?’,
African Arguments, 8 September 2014, http://africanarguments.org/2014/09/08/how-will-the-death-of-its-leader…-
al-shabaab-by-stig-jarle-hansen/ accessed 12 September 2014.
Annex 112
Annex 113
“Kenya’s PM urges S. Korea to support peace in Somalia”, Dow Jones Institutional
News, 10 July 2012
Kenya's PM Urges S. Korea to Support Peace in
Somalia
Infos sur la publication: Dow Jones Institutional News ; New York [New York]10 July 2012.
Lien de document ProQuest
TEXTE INTÉGRAL
By George Mwangi
Special to
NAIROBI--Kenya's Prime Minister Raila Odinga has urged the South Korean government to support ongoing efforts
to restore peace in Somalia and the feuding nations of Sudan, Mr. Odinga's press office said in a statement
Tuesday.
Mr. Odinga had asked South Korean premier Kim Hwang-Sik, who is on a four-day official visit, to help establish a
legitimate state in war-torn Somalia to contain the security threat posed by terrorist cells and pirates in the horn of
Africa, the statement said.
"We call upon South Korea to be steadfast in support for the reconstruction in Somalia and demanding stability
and peace in the Sudans," Mr. Odinga is quoted as saying.
He said the two nations should strengthen their ties on security issues to detect and deter any threats posed by
terrorist groups and pirates.
In October last year, Kenya sent troops to Somalia to fight Al Shebab militias who it accuses of carrying out several
attacks, including kidnapping international aid workers and tourists on its soil.
Somalia has been without an effective central government since 1991 following the ouster of then-President
Mohamed Siad Barre. The horn of Africa nation has since become a haven for terror groups, pirates and illegal
arms dealers.
On Monday, Mr. Hwang-Sik assured Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki that his government would join hands with
other members of the international community to support AMISOM (Africa Union Mission for Somalia) troops in
Somalia, the Kenyan presidential office said in a statement.
Write to George Mwangi at [email protected]
(END)
July 10, 2012 07:43 ET (11:43 GMT)
DÉTAILS
Lieu: Sudan Africa Somalia Kenya South Korea
Personnes: Kibaki, Mwai
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Titre: Kenya's PM Urges S. Korea to Support Peace in Somalia
Publication: Dow Jones Institutional News; New York
Année de publication: 2012
Date de publication: Jul 10, 2012
Éditeur: Dow Jones &Company Inc
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Pays de publication: United States, New York
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Annex 113
Annex 114
“SOLSTICE Project Group, SOLSTICE implementation plan version 4”, SOLSTICEWIO,
26 March 2018
SOLSTICE
Implementation Plan
Version 4
26 March 2018
Emerging fishery of the North Kenyan Bank:
The next frontier for food security of the coastal
population
(Kenyan Case Study)
Annex 114
1
Contents
Document Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 3
SOLSTICE project outputs ..................................................................................................................... 3
1. Resource summary ...................................................................................................................... 4
Contributions “in kind” (students and staff effort only) ............................................................. 5
2. Case Study background (J. Kamau, KMFRI) ............................................................................. 6
3. Description of work .................................................................................................................... 8
3.1 Synthesis ............................................................................................................................. 8
3.1.1. End-to-end literature review and formulation of key hypotheses ..................................... 8
3.1.2. Special Issue (Kenyan and Tanzanian Case Studies) ........................................................ 8
3.1.3. Synthesis paper(s) ............................................................................................................. 8
3.1.4. Final project Report for Kenyan Case Study .................................................................... 9
3.2. WP1a Remote Sensing ........................................................................................................ 9
3.2.1. Synthesis of the satellite-derived information to identify large scale drivers of
ecosystem variability .................................................................................................................. 9
3.2.2. Synthesis of the satellite-derived information to identify local drivers of the North
Kenyan Bank ecosystem variability .......................................................................................... 10
3.2.3. Real-time support of the fieldwork and optimisation of the cruise strategy ............. 10
3.2.4. Training/capacity development for WP1a (Remote sensing) ................................... 11
3.3. WP1b Modelling ............................................................................................................... 11
3.3.1. Model skill assessment .............................................................................................. 11
3.3.2. Biogeochemical modelling ....................................................................................... 11
3.3.3. Lagrangian modelling ............................................................................................... 12
3.3.4. Climate change stressors and their uncertainty ......................................................... 13
3.3.5. NEMO-MEDUSA data access server ....................................................................... 13
3.3.6. Training/capacity development for WP1b (Modelling) ............................................ 13
3.4. WP1d Fieldwork ............................................................................................................... 14
3.4.1. North Kenyan Bank biogeochemical survey (RV Mtafiti) ....................................... 14
3.4.2. North Kenyan Bank survey support .......................................................................... 16
3.5. WP2 Socio-economic studies ................................................................................................. 17
3.5.1. Multi-species fish modelling ........................................................................................... 17
3.5.2. Emergent Fisheries of the North Kenyan Bank .............................................................. 18
3.5.4. Input-output tables .......................................................................................................... 19
Annex 114
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3.5.5. Considering climate change as part of resilient Spatial Planning& Ecosystem Based
Management for the North Kenyan Bank ................................................................................. 20
3.6 WP3. Science into policy and wider stakeholder engagement.............................................. 21
3.6.1. Stakeholder engagement Action Plan ............................................................................ 22
3.6.2. Policy and practice notes ................................................................................................. 22
3.6.3. Final stakeholder engagement event ............................................................................... 22
3.7. WP4. Capacity Development ................................................................................................ 23
3.7.1. Full capacity development plan for Kenya ............................................................... 23
3.7.2. Training courses ........................................................................................................ 23
3.7.3. Training in analytical methods at KMFRI and analysis of historical data ................ 24
3.7.4. MOOC ....................................................................................................................... 25
3.7.5. MOOC Light ............................................................................................................. 26
3.8. WP5 Communication ............................................................................................................ 27
3.8.1. Regular channels of communication: ........................................................................ 27
3.8.2. One-off communication material: ............................................................................. 27
4. Monitoring and evaluation ........................................................................................................ 28
4.1. Network profiling ............................................................................................................... 28
4.2. M&E strategy ..................................................................................................................... 28
4.3. Monitoring and evaluation reports ..................................................................................... 28
5. Alignment with key regional programs..................................................................................... 29
5.1. PEACC .............................................................................................................................. 29
5.2. IIOE-II ............................................................................................................................... 29
5.3. The Western Indian Ocean Upwelling Research Initiative (WIOURI) ............................ 29
5.4. ACCORD .......................................................................................................................... 29
5.5 SAPPHIRE: ....................................................................................................................... 29
5.6 WIOSAP ........................................................................................................................... 30
6. Key events and workshops ........................................................................................................ 30
7. Institutional Contributions to the Case Study ........................................................................... 32
7.1. KMFRI ................................................................................................................................... 32
7.2. CORDIO ................................................................................................................................ 33
7.3. NMU ...................................................................................................................................... 33
7.4. Rhodes .................................................................................................................................... 33
7.5. PML ....................................................................................................................................... 33
7.6. NOC ....................................................................................................................................... 34
8. List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 35
Annex 114
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Document Purpose
The purpose of the SOLSTICE Implementation Plan is to identify key contributions of SOLSTICE
partners to research, capacity development and communication objectives of the project and their
associated timescales, milestones and deliverables.
This document underpins Institutional Agreements between the Lead Organisation (National
Oceanography Centre, UK) and the partner institutions. This document also underpins SOLSTICE
Monitoring and Evaluation Plan.
The document is available to project partners and the project Advisory Panel.
SOLSTICE Implementation Plan is an evolving document and subject to regular reviews by the
SOLSTICE Leadership Team. Any changes to this document must be approved by the Leadership
Team and communicated to all project participants. The latest version of this document can be found
on the password-protected SOLSTICE website.
Text shown in red requires updating.
SOLSTICE project outputs
SOLSTICE Logical Framework v1 (as submitted with the project proposal in May 2017) identifies
the following key project outputs:
Output1: Strong and self-sustaining scientific transdisciplinary WIO-UK network producing high
quality intensive body of knowledge on ecosystems dynamics, human dependence on them, their
future trends and human responses
Output 2: Capacity developed in WIO to conduct interdisciplinary ecosystem research that meets the
needs of ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF), policy, industry and markets. Capacity developed in
UK to meet the needs of official development assistance (ODA) compliant research.
Output 3: Strong body of evidence produced by the network in each Case Study addressing societal
challenges and providing strategy options co-created with stakeholders and based on ecosystem
approach
Output 4: Transfer of cost saving technologies underpinning ecosystem research to overcome
limited investment into research infrastructure in WIO.
SOLSTICE Logical Framework and Theory of Change are evolving documents and will be revised
regularly by the SOLSTIE Monitoring and Evaluation team. All changes to either of the documents
(including proposed Outputs above) are subject to approval by the Project Leadership Team
(appointment and Terms of Reference for the Project Leadership Team are expected by the end of
January 2018).
Annex 114
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1. Resource summary
Participant
short name
KMFRI
NOC-OBE
NOC-MPOC-PHY
NOC-MPOC-RS
NOC-MSM
PML-RS
PML-SE
SA-NMU
Person/ mon 36 12 2 18 24 6 7 6
The table above lists all SOLSTICE project partners contributing to the Kenyan Case study with the
number of months funded by SOLSTICE for this Case Study. The table includes only directly funded
contributions. Contributions “in kind” and studentships aligned with the project are not included into
this table and are listed below. Due to the size and complexity of NOC contribution, NOC
departments and groups are listed separately.
KMFRI – Kenyan Marine Fisheries Research Institute
WIOMSA – Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association
NOC – National Oceanography Centre, UK
NOC-OBE – Ocean Biogeochemistry and Ecosystems (NOC, UK)
NOC-MSM – Marine System modelling (NOC, UK)
NOC-RS – Remote Sensing (NOC, UK)
NOC-MPOC – Marine Physics and Ocean Climate (NOC, UK)
NOC-OTE – Ocean Technology and Engineering (NOC, UK)
NOC-MG – Marine Geoscience (NOC, UK)
PML – Plymouth Marine Laboratory (UK)
PML-RS – Remote Sensing (PML, UK)
PML-SE – Socio-Economics (PML, UK)
HWU – Heriot-Watt University (UK)
SAEON – South African Environmental Observation Network (SA)
Rhodes – Rhodes University (SA)
NMU – Nelson Mandela University (NMU)
CORDIO - Coastal Oceans Research and Development – Indian Ocean (Kenya)
Annex 114
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Contributions “in kind” (students and staff effort only)
KMFRI proposes to align the following PhD students with SOLSTICE:
Fridah Munyi: “Exploring livelihoods and dependency on the fishery resources and their
implications as a strategy for improving food security and resilience to climate change within the
North Kenya Bank fishery zone.” Supervisors: Start date: End date: S.Aswani and
E.Papathanasopoulou are happy to co-supervise if required.
Pascal Thoya: “Spatial temporal modeling of satellite imagery to map productivity zones: A case
study of the North Kenya Banks”. Supervisors: Start date: End date:
Pascal Thoya will participate in KMFRI cruise and will be offered training/exchange visits to UK for
biogeochemical measurements. He will lead a SI paper on biogeochemical processes at the North
Kenyan Bank. Pascal Thoya will use satellite imagery to determine productivity trends linking the
same to the long term fishery catches from NKB. The information obtained will help to assess the
effect of climate change and inform on the resilience of the system.
Amon K. Kimeli: “Plume dynamics and the historical sedimentation of the Tana River sediments–A
Combination of Field studies and Satellite Imagery Processing.” Supervisors: Start date: End date:
Amon K. Kimeli will participate in KMFRI cruise as part of the planned fieldwork on sediment coring
and bathymetry mapping of NKB. Any offer of training/exchange for satellite imagery processing and
modelling of plume dynamics will be appreciated.
Amon Kimeli Will use remote sensing to determine current and historical sediment plume dispersion
directions and extent. He will also employ in situ measurements to model the influence of
oceanographic parameters (currents and waves) while using satellite imagery to validate.
Amon Kimeli is keen to be trained on hands-on modelling he has a modelling component in his PhD
study. Amon Kimeli will participate in KMFRI cruise and needs training/exchange visits to UK for
plume dynamics modelling and remote sensing. He will lead a SI paper on current and historical Tana
River plume dynamics.
Athman Salim Hussein (BSc graduate with a Physics and Mathematics major): MSc student his
study to be focused on aspects of Biogeochemical modelling
KMFRI proposes to align the following researchers with SOLSTICE to participate in
training/exchange visits:
Annex 114
6
Mr. Noah Ngisiange: will participate in KMFRI cruise and will be offered training/exchange visits to
UK for ADCP measurements and marine robotics. Mr. Ngisiange will lead a SI paper on physical
processes at the North Kenyan Bank.
2. Case Study background (J. Kamau, KMFRI)
In Kenya, marine fishery is predominantly conducted on a small scale and is artisanal (Sanders et al,
1990; FAO, 2016). Small-scale fisheries generally constitute the pillar of coastal livelihoods and in
the provision of coastal food security (Barnes-Mauthe et al. 2013; A review conducted by UNEP
(1998) on Marine Fisheries Resources for Kenya estimated that the marine fishery supports about
60,000 people. Annual production from artisanal coastal fisheries average 9,928 MT (FAO 2016).
While, Le Manach et al., 2015 reported an annual marine fish landing from artisanal fisheries to be
8,406 tons.
The productivity of the Kenyan marine fishery is constrained by a number of biophysical factors
including the narrow continental shelf (estimated at 19,120 km2), low productivity waters and
seasonality. This, combined with increasing fishing pressure, has led to overexploitation in many
areas. The pelagic fishery conducted by small-scale fleet (motorized boats) is increasingly gaining
importance due to the decline of reef fish (Maina 2012).
In the last three years the North Kenya Bank has emerged as a new frontier for food security. The
bank is expansive (approximately 4325 km2) and presumed to be highly productive. According to a
recent hydro-acoustic survey study by Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI) it was
estimated that the North Kenya Banks has a pelagic fish density of about 21Mt per sq Km, which
translates to 401,520 Mt (KMFRI, 2016).
It is presumed that the productivity of the North Kenya bank is driven by wind driven upwelling
systems. The northward and southward flow of the monsoonal and local winds drive the surface flows
off the Kenyan coast causing localized upwellings. The alongshore stress of the equatorward winds
induces an acceleration of the surface currents, which drift offshore under the influence of the Coriolis
force. Johnson et al (1982) postulated that the deflection of the EACC seaward at its point of
convergence with the Somali Current is mainly due to topographic forcing in the North Kenyan
Banks.
Problem statement/Justification
The North Kenya Bank is an important emerging fishery that is expected to spur economic growth for
the local fishing communities. The sustainability of this resource requires formulation of informed
management interventions. Effective resource utilization will also require informed research on the
spatial and temporal distribution of the pelagic fishery by employing tracer proxies (Chl-a, upwelling
cells). There however, exists only scanty information on the ecological status, physical environment
and drivers of this important emerging fishery resource. If well managed, the fisheries can be a
window of opportunities for achieving national development goals including poverty eradication and
wealth creation. Moreover, this huge potential is a critical vehicle for the achievement of the Kenya
Vision 2030 development plan (Aloo, 2009).
Annex 114
7
The productivity of the North Kenya Bank is deemed to be driven by the Tana river sediments and
nutrients input (both dissolved and particulate). Tana river provides high nutrients that flow over the
North Kenya Banks at the convergence of the East African Coastal and Somali currents resulting in a
highly productive environment (Wakwabi et al., 2003).
Research questions
1. What is the potential of the North Kenya bank marine fisheries resource
2. What are the Ecosystem processes; identify and understand key ecosystem processes related
to productivity/resilience of ecosystems (biogeochemical process), to sustain fisheries
productivity and ecosystem health.
3. What are the relative impacts of the productivity drivers: upwelling and Tana river input,
4. Is Climate variability and change affecting the productivity of the North Kenya bank
5. How to optimize the use of the resources, integrating ecological and socioeconomic aspects,
to provide long-term benefits to society.
6. Is the North Kenya Banks a depositional sink of the Tana River sediments
References and further reading material
Aloo, P.A (2009). The Fisheries Industry in Kenya: a window of opportunity for Development. In:
Amutabi, M. (Ed). Kenya’s Economic History.Pp 394-411
Barnes-Mauthe M, Oleson KLL and Zafindrasilivonona B (2013) The total economic value of smallscale
fisheries with a characterization of post-landing trends: An application in Madagascar with
global relevance. Fisheries Research 147(0): 175–185.
FAO, 2016 [KENYA] National Report to the Scientific Committee of the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission, 2016 IOTC–2016–SC19–NR13
IOTC, 2011, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission National Report of Kenya (2011) IOTC-2011-SC14-
NR13
Le Manach F, Abunge CA, McClanahan TR and Pauly D (2015) Tentative reconstruction of Kenya's
marine fisheries catch, 1950–2010. Pp. 37–51 In Le Manach F and Pauly D (eds.) Fisheries catch
reconstructions in the Western Indian Ocean, 1950–2010. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 23(2).
Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia [ISSN 1198–6727].
Maina GW (2012) A baseline report for the Kenyan small and medium marine pelagic fishery.
Ministry of fisheries development, South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project (SWIOFP) and EAFNansen
Project. 74 p.
M Manyilizu, P Penven & CJC Reason (2016). Annual cycle of the upper-ocean circulation and
properties in the tropical western Indian Ocean. African Journal of Marine Science 2016, 38(1): 81–
99
Peter B.O. Ochumba MSc thesis (1983) Oceanographic Features Along the Kenyan Coast:
Implications for Fisheries Management and Development. Marine Resource Management Program;
School of Oceanography, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon 97331
Renison K. Ruwa (2004) Coastal And Offshore Marine Fisheries Of Kenya:Status And Opportunities.
KMFRI Technical Report/2004/FP/1
Annex 114
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3. Description of work
3.1 Synthesis
3.1.1. End-to-end literature review and formulation of key hypotheses
Deliverable: Internal project report (Month 12)
Milestone: M8 all contributors identified and agreed
Participating institutions: KMFRI, all participants.
PIs responsible for delivery: J.Kamau (KMFRI), K.Popova (NOC)
We will produce a comprehensive interdisciplinary literature review for the case study following the
structure of the SOLSTICE WPs including main challenges and formulation of the key hypotheses.
This review will underpin WP contributions to the case study. It is anticipated that this review will
form one of the SI papers. Preliminary hypothesis testing is anticipated by WP1a,b (Remote sensing
and modelling).
3.1.2. Special Issue (Kenyan and Tanzanian Case Studies)
Deliverable: Collection of peer-reviewed papers (Month 36)
PIs responsible for delivery: SOLSTICE directors (Roberts, Popova), J.Kamau (KMFRI)
Milestones:
M12: Full list of potential papers identified, journal agreed, guest editors assigned
M24: Full list of papers finalised
M30: All papers reviewed at the Science Progress Workshop
Participating institutions: Directors, IMS, KMFRI, all participants.
As a main deliverable for Output 3 (“Strong body of evidence”) we will produce a Special Issue (SI)
of DSR or a similar journal with socio-economic component. This is a combined Kenya-Tanzania
deliverable.
3.1.3. Synthesis paper(s)
Deliverable: Peer-reviewed papers (post-SI effort, Month 42)
PIs responsible for delivery: SOLSTICE directors (Roberts, Popova) and two guest editors (one
from each case study, to be identified by M12)
Milestones:
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M30: List of papers identified
M36: List of papers finalised and lead authors assigned.
M42: Papers submitted
Participating institutions: Directors, KMFRI, all participants.
Key end-to-end synthesis paper(s) with strong links to policy recommendations will be based on the
SI collection and submitted by Month 42.
3.1.4. Final project Report for Kenyan Case Study
Deliverable: External Project Report (Month 48)
PIs responsible for delivery: SOLSTICE directors (Roberts, Popova), J.Kamau (KMFRI)
Milestones:
M31: Decision if to proceed with the report, its content and alignment with the final project reporting
Participating institutions: all participants.
This report is likely to provide key end-to-end synthesis of the project findings with strong links to
policy recommendations. At this stage there is no consensus if such a report is needed/useful. This
will be decided by the Project Leadership Team in April 2020, M31). No reporting guidelines have
yet been received from the UK project funder (GCRF).
3.2. WP1a Remote Sensing
3.2.1. Synthesis of the satellite-derived information to identify large scale drivers
of ecosystem variability
Deliverables:
• Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
• SI paper or contribution to WP1b-led SI paper (Month 24)
• Contribution to MOOC (M30)
• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)
PIs responsible for delivery: M.Srokosz (NOC), B.Kuguru (KMFRI), Y.Shaghude (IMS),
S.Mahongo (TAFIRI)
Milestones:
M12 Preliminary results presented as internal project report (underpinning model verification)
Participating Institutions: NOC-RS, NOC-MSM, PML-RS, IMS, TAFIRI, KMFRI
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Description:
Analysis of temporal and spatial variability of parameters influencing ecosystem dynamics in the
Northwest Indian Ocean (chl-a, primary production, PFTs, ocean currents, coastal altimetry), working
with WP1b to support model validation and hypothesis testing and to identify further research
questions for investigation in joint African/UK postgraduate research projects. In addition, consider
effects of Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) and monsoon on ecosystem. This is a combined Kenya-
Tanzania study.
3.2.2. Synthesis of the satellite-derived information to identify local drivers of the
North Kenyan Bank ecosystem variability
Deliverables:
• Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
• SI paper (Month 24)
• Contribution to MOOC (M30)
• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)
PIs responsible for delivery: B.Kuguru (KMFRI), D.Raitsos (PML)
Participating Institutions: PML-RS, NOC-RS, KMFRI
Description:
Study of chl-a, SST, water quality with a focus on the river plume (complementary to the work of the
KMFRI PhD student on Sentinel-2 optical data) ultimately, linking remote sensing to available in situ
observations. Some satellite altimeter tracks intersect the North Kenya Bank so coastal altimetry data
will be used too. This study cannot take advantage of 1/12˚ NEMO model as the scale is too small and
NEMO does not have riverine input of nutrients, however a lagrangian modelling study of the riverine
input will be conducted as a part of the modelling package.
3.2.3. Real-time support of the fieldwork and optimisation of the cruise strategy
Deliverable: online data base and contribution to the cruise plan (Months 6-20)
Participating Institutions: PML-RS (PI: B.Taylor, NEODAAS)
This work will provide the consortium with near-real-time daily ocean colour and SST products at
1km resolution from MODIS and VIIRS satellite sensors to support field campaigns in the North
Kenyan Bank case study region - to cover the cruise duration + 1 month before fieldwork start and 1
month after field-work finish.
On-line / off-line data access: altimetry, chl-a, SST
Deliverable: on-line /off-line database and data discovery tools (Month 12 and on-going)
Participating Institutions: NOC-IT (PI V.Byfield), NOC-RS, PML-RS
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IT group at NOC will develop a web based system. NOC-MPOC and PML-RS will provide relevant
data to populate system. Initially, this could be large-scale data (e.g. ESA CCI altimetry, chl-a, SST)
on a ¼˚ grid and monthly for the whole WIO over the satellite era (1990s onwards). WP4 (Capacity
development) will engage with the WIO partners to identify requirements for remotely sensed data
and WP 1a will populate the database accordingly. Any remotely sensed data used in SOLSTICE
studies could be added to the database (e.g. 1km high resolution chl-a, SST).
In addition, given that internet links for researchers in WIO countries are limited in bandwidth, an offline
version of the database could be made available to those researchers to ease access. We note that
this request is strongly supported by WIO partners and an M&E indicator will be developed to reflect
availability of the offline data.
3.2.4. Training/capacity development for WP1a (Remote sensing)
Milestones:
• Student co-supervision and exchange visits identified (M4)
• See additional milestones related to the training courses in Section 3.7.
PIs responsible for delivery: V.Byfiled (NOC)
A 2-week remote sensing training course will be run at IMS.
Exchange/training visits dedicated to the remote sensing applications for the Kenyan case study up to
one month duration to NOC and PML (UK) are possible if prioritised by WIO institutions (see Note
on exchange Visits).
Co-supervision of the WIO students working on remote sensing data by UK partners is possible if
requested.
3.3. WP1b Modelling
3.3.1. Model skill assessment
Deliverables:
Internal project report (M6)
Participating institution: NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova)
We will assess NEMO-MEDUSA model skills in all three case study areas, establish model
limitations, identify most promising model applications, and range of possible projects and their costs.
3.3.2. Biogeochemical modelling
Deliverables:
• Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
• SI paper or contribution (Month 24)
• Contribution to MOOC (M30)
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• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)
PI responsible for delivery: K.Popova (NOC)
Participating institutions: NOC-MSM, NOC-RS, NOC-OBE, PML-RS, KMFRI, IMS, TAFIRI,
CORDIO
Description:
We will use NEMO-MEDUSA coupled physical and biogeochemical model at 1/12o (hindcast) and
1/4o (climate change projections for RCP8.5 to year 2099) to constrain the key large-scale drivers of
the ecosystem variability at seasonal (monsoon), decadal (ENSO, Indian Ocean Dipole) and
climatically driven (RCP8.5) variability along the Kenya-Northern Tanzania shelf. Note that
resolution and boundary conditions in the model will not allow addressing impacts of Tana deposition
of nutrients (these will be addressed in the lagrangian studies). We will focus on the mechanisms of
the marine nutrient supply and in particular dynamics and potential changes of the upwelling. The
model will be validated using available climatological data, ARGO floats, remote sensing
observations and IMS and KMFRI in-situ observations. The modelling package will assist with
optimisation of the fieldwork and synthesis of the observational information. This is a combined
Kenya-Tanzania study.
3.3.3. Lagrangian modelling
Deliverables:
• SI paper (M36);
• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)
• Internal report on numerical runs conducted for a number of studies co-designed with
WIO participants (M30)
• Contribution to MOOC (M30)
PI responsible for delivery: K.Popova (NOC)
Milestones:
M12 potential studies of interest and Kenyan collaborators identified
Participating institutions: NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova), NOC-RS, KMFRI
Description:
A collaborative KMFRI-NOC study will use lagrangian tracer approach to constrain key advective
pathways, their variability, potential modifications under the impact of climate change and
applications to the issues such as marine pollution (micro-plastics, potential oil spills), design of the
MPA, pathways of Tana river, invasive and non-native species, and connectivity with upstream areas.
Specific list of applications will be identified in collaboration with KMFRI. A substantial input from
local researchers will be required.
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3.3.4. Climate change stressors and their uncertainty
Deliverables:
• SI paper (month 36)
• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)
• Contribution to MOOC (M30)
PI responsible for delivery: K.Popova (NOC)
Participating institutions: NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova), NOC-RS, IMS, TAFIRI, KMFRI
We will analyse CMIP5 and CMIP6 model ensembles for the WIO, identify their predictive skills and
evaluate key drivers of uncertainty in future projections of the WIO ecosystem dynamics. We will
use the forward run of NEMO-MEDUSA (1/4o resolution or 1/120
if available by M30) to focus on the
future projections of upwelling. This is a combined Kenya-Tanzania study.
3.3.5. NEMO-MEDUSA data access server
Deliverable: online data access and user manual (months 18)
Participating institution: NOC (PI H.Snaith)
We will develop a server proving access to the model output with area-extraction capability suitable
for low bandwidth. This server will be essential for the wide use of the model by WIO researchers and
will underpin Modelling training course.
3.3.6. Training/capacity development for WP1b (Modelling)
Milestones:
• Student co-supervision and exchange visits identified (M4)
• Opportunities fro wider training of KMFRI researchers identified (M6)
• See additional milestones related to the training courses in Section 3.7
PIs responsible for delivery: V.Byfiled (NOC)
A 2-week remote modelling training course will be run at IMS.
Training in the use of available model output at any level will be provided during the North Kenyan
Bank workshops for a wide range of KMFRI scientists (to be discussed and confirmed with KMFRI
by M6).
Exchange/training visits dedicated to the modelling applications for the Kenyan case study up to one
month duration to NOC (UK) are possible if prioritised by WIO institutions (see note on exchange
visits).
Co-supervision of the WIO students working on modelling by UK partners is possible if requested.
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We note KMFRI specific request for training in Modelling, relationship between fisheries
and climate change , future changes in fisheries, Species Shifts, and Abundance.
3.4. WP1d Fieldwork
3.4.1. North Kenyan Bank biogeochemical survey (RV Mtafiti)
Deliverables:
• Fieldwork Plan (Internal Report; M8) including capacity development needs and
agreement on data archiving
• Workshop at KMFRI on historical data and cruise planning (M13).
• Contribution to CS review (M12)
• Fieldwork (Feb-Mar (M17) and June-July 2019, M22)
• Fieldwork Report (External Report; M28, January 2020)
• Data (archived via BODC M28)
• Papers for SI (M36):
• Contribution to final case study report (External Report M36)
Participating institutions: KMFRI (PI J.Kamau), NMU (M.Roberts only, but note the clash with
Tanzanian fieldwork – participation TBC)
Description:
KMFRI will conduct two biogeochemical surveys of 10 days duration each in Feb-Mar and June-July
2019. KMFRI will perform CTD casts, acquire ADCP cruise readings, conduct hydroacoustic
measurements, bong net tow, sample phytoplankton and obtain sediment cores using a piston corer.
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Figure 1. The Kenya coastline showing the tentative North Kenya banks sampling locations
North Kenya bank/Kiwayu tentative Stations
Station Long Latitude Station Long Latitude
NKB_1 40.87628917 -2.431126834 NKB_17 40.88181038 -2.790005501
NKB_2 41.05848911 -2.425605624 NKB_18 40.87904977 -2.878344866
NKB_3 41.23792844 -2.422845019 NKB_19 40.70237105 -2.881105471
NKB_4 41.06124971 -2.516705593 NKB_20 40.5174105 -2.883866076
NKB_5 40.87904977 -2.516705593 NKB_21 40.34625298 -2.881105471
NKB_6 40.69961044 -2.516705593 NKB_22 40.25515301 -2.97220544
NKB_7 40.70237105 -2.610566168 NKB_23 40.52293171 -2.969444835
NKB_8 40.87904977 -2.607805563 NKB_24 40.70789226 -2.969444835
NKB_9 41.06401032 -2.607805563 NKB_25 40.88181038 -2.97220544
NKB_10 41.06124971 -2.696144927 NKB_26 40.34073177 -3.06330541
NKB_11 40.87628917 -2.698905532 NKB_27 40.52017111 -3.066066015
NKB_12 40.70237105 -2.698905532 NKB_28 40.70513165 -3.0577842
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NKB_13 40.52017111 -2.698905532 NKB_29 40.34349238 -3.154405379
NKB_14 40.34073177 -2.790005501 NKB_30 41.06124971 -2.334505654
NKB_15 40.52293171 -2.790005501 NKB_31 41.24344965 -2.334505654
NKB_16 40.69408923 -2.792766107
Note that according to SOLSTICE Terms and Conditions regarding risks, health and safety, no
SOLSTICE researchers other than researchers from KMFRI will be allowed to participate in the
fieldwork in the north Kenyan waters. Mike Roberts is the only exception from this rule due to his
dual contract between UK and SA.
3.4.2. North Kenyan Bank survey support
Deliverables:
• Fieldwork Plan (Internal Report; M8) including capacity development needs and
agreement on data archiving
• Contribution to CS review (M12)
• Fieldwork (Feb-Mar (M17) and June-July 2019, M22)
• Fieldwork Report (External Report; M28, January 2020)
• Data (archived via BODC M28)
• Papers for SI (M36):
• Contribution to final case study report (External Report M36)
Milestones:
• Training exchange visits identified (M4)
Participating institutions: NOC, KMFRI
PIs responsible for delivery: S.Painter, J.Kamau
Description:
SOLSTICE will offer support of the cruise in form of equipment rental, analytical sample training of
Kenyan researchers in Kenya in UK, cruise planning and synthesis workshops, assistance with data
archiving, interpretation and throughput to peer reviewed publications in SOLSTICE Special Issue.
Workshop 1. Cruise planning (KMFRI, Mombasa, November 2018 - TBC):
Review of the past observational data, design and planning of the survey, synthesis of modelling and
satellite information to assist with the cruise planning and data interpretation; instrument cross-
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calibration and testing. This workshop can include additional training by UK researchers in analytical
methods.
Workshop 2. Data analysis and synthesis (KMFRI, Mombasa, March 2020 - TBC):
Data analysis and interpretation, preparation for publications, synthesis of modelling and satellite
information; data archiving.
Training/capacity development:
SOLSTICE will provide hands-on training for KMFRI in the areas which will be identified by
M6. SOLSTICE will provide post-cruise assistance in delivering the results of this fieldwork
into peer-reviewed literature.
SOLSTICE proposes to fund 1 month training visits to Liverpool for a physical scientist
during 2018. Visits will be designed to overlap with planned glider deployments in AlterEco
to enable hands-on seagoing training. Additional 1 month visits to UK in 2019 can be
provided for data processing and analysis leading to a SI publication. Exchange visits will be
funded from SOLSTICE central budget if prioritised by WIO institutions (see note on
Exchange Visits).
SOLSTICE proposes to fund 1 month training visits to Southampton for a biogeochemistryfocused
researcher during 2018 including one day training cruise on Calisto. Additional 1
month visits to UK in 2019 can be provided for data processing and analysis leading to a SI
publication. Exchange visits will be funded from SOLSTICE central budget if prioritised by
WIO institutions (see note on Exchange Visits) .
3.5. WP2 Socio-economic studies
3.5.1. Multi-species fish modelling
Deliverables:
• Contribution to the CS review (Month 12). Dependant on collected data regarding fish
and fisheries.
• SI paper (Month 24 paper identified and content finalised; Month 36 paper submitted to
SI)
• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (Month 30 paper(s) identified and finalised; Month
42 paper submitted)
• Fish model outputs (Month 15-18) made available to partners along with short
description of the outputs and how to use them. Plus delivery of model outputs for
further work within WP2 (specific data type and format).
• Report on the model outputs (Month 24) with case study specific aspects highlighted.
Plus comparison to available data.
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Milestones:
M6 Lead contacts for fish related enquiries identified by KMFRI.
M6 NEMO-MEDUSA data received from NOC
M7 list of main fish species of interest for the case study agreed on by case study partners.
M8 Additional data (where needed) for model parameterisation provided by partners or
gathered from literature
M10-15 Data on fish catch to validate the model output
Participating institutions: PML (PI: Sévrine Sailley), NOC, KMFRI
PI responsible for delivery: Sévrine Sailley, PML
Description:
The fish modelling will make use of the SS-DBEM model to obtain projections regarding possible
changes of fish species distribution and potential catch within the century. The model projections will
target key fish species for the case study (both in term of subsistence and economic value) and make
use of NEMO-MEDUSA model outputs to look at changes of distribution and abundance due to
change in climate. There will also be additional run(s) to look at effect of fishing and different
management approaches (whether the fishing is at or above the Maximum Sustainable Fishing Yield,
MSFY). Model outputs will be made available to project partners, and a report will be produced to
highlight the major findings regarding the sustainability of current targeted fishes and possible
alternatives.
Although the model and report deliverables will be specific to this case study, the model domain and
some of the fish species will overlap across all three SOLSTICE case studies (Kenya, Tanzania, and,
South Africa).
KMFRI researcher Dr. Gladys Okemwa will be a lead contact for queries regarding fishing (e.g. main
fish species, landing data).
3.5.2. Emergent Fisheries of the North Kenyan Bank
Participating institutions: KMFRI, all participants
PI responsible for delivery: J.Kamau (KMFRI), SOLSTICE directors (Popova, Roberts)
Deliverables:
• Key contribution to the CS literature review (M12)
• SI paper (M 36)
Description:
KMFRI will lead the key “foundation” study demonstrating what we know about the fishery,
why its sustainable management is critically dependent on understanding of the marine environment
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and biophysical drivers. This study should result in the SI “setting the scene” paper (a compulsory
requirement of the SI).
3.5.3. Wider engagement with fisheries: Importance of skip jack tuna along the east African coast
Participating institutions: Rhodes, NOC, PML
Deliverables:
• Detailed research plan presented including sampling program (M12)
• Project progress report (M24)
• SI paper (Month 36)
Milestones:
• Rhodes student identified (M6)
• Timing of the exchange visit agreed (M6)
• Deliverables agreed (M12)
• Input into policy identified (M24)
Description:
The project will address importance of skip jack tuna along the east African coast – synthesis of
current biological knowledge, understanding population structure, and potential impacts of climate
change. This project was created on request of the DSFA and is aligned with projects in the
University of Aberystwyth (UK, Prof. P. Shaw) and Rhodes. The project will include synthesise
available biological info (desk top), understand population structure, lagrangian modelling of the
ocean circulation related to tuna movement with emphasis on climate change, and provide
management advice. The project will include field trips to collect genetic samples - South Africa,
Tanzania (mainland, Zanzibar and Pemba Island), Kenya; collection of genetic samples across the
area.
Capacity development:
The following exchange visit will be offered to the Rhodes student (funded from NMU budget): Visit
to the UK for 4 months, 2 months to NOC (Ocean circulation models and lagrangian analysis),
Genetic analysis: - 2 month Aberystwyth (funded by Aberystwyth).
3.5.4. Input-output tables
Deliverables:
• Contribution to the CS literature review (Month 12)
• SI paper (Month 12, 24 paper identified and finalised; Month 36 paper submitted to SI)
• Contribution to MOOC (M30). Regionalising input-output tables and its application to
fisheries under climate change scenarios
• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (Month 30, 36 paper(s) identified and finalised;
Month 42 paper(s) submitted)
• Regional input-output data table and user document made available to partners and
wider community (Month 24)
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Milestones:
M6: Data required for regional input-output tables identified and agreed with UDSM,
TAFIRI, IMS
M21: Data collated for regional input-output table in collaboration with KMFRI, CORDIO
M18: Fish model outputs received from PML-fisheries
M30: Results of economic assessment produced and used in writing SI and synthesis papers
Participating institutions: PML (PI: E. Papathanasopoulou), KMFRI, CORDIO
Description:
Regionalised input-output (RIO) tables will be produced for the case study areas. These will be
developed using earlier productions of the table at a national level and scaled down by regional data
available through statistical records and collected by local partners. The RIO tables will be used to
estimate the direct and indirect economic impact on the local economies from changes in fisheries due
to climate change. The direct and indirect impacts provide insight into the wider economic impact of
the reliance on natural resources and can prove useful for structural regional development that aims to
ensure resilience and adaptive capacity. These impacts will be estimated in revenue and employment
units.
Training/Capacity development:
Two visits to PML, UK, will be offered to Fridah Munyi. One visit in the first year of her PhD to
work with Eleni to identify primary data requirements and its translation into macroeconomic analysis
and Sustainable Development Goal monitoring. The second visit will be organised for the last year of
her PhD research, where results from her research will be presented at PML and written publications
progressed.
3.5.5. Considering climate change as part of resilient Spatial Planning& Ecosystem Based
Management for the North Kenyan Bank
Participating institutions: PML (PI: A. Queirós), KMFRI, CORDIO & others (potentially Kenya
Wildlife Service)
Note: this study will go ahead if the associated Milestone at M9 (data scoping) has a positive
outcome.
Deliverables:
• Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
• SI paper (Month 36 paper submitted to SI)
• Report geared towards policy communicating main findings of spatial analysis
providing advice for resilient use of different gear fisheries & other wild capture
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resources, as well as conservation resources based activities in the NKB, within the
context of climate change and ecosystem based management. (Month 42).
• Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (Month 42 paper submitted)
Milestones:
M6: Spatial data on relevant marine sectors required co-mapping identified with KMFRI,
CORDIO & others
M9: Data scoping: feasibility assessment of the Marine Spatial Planning study
M12: Spatial data delivered or holder identified with KMFRI, CORDIO & others.
M18: Climate modelling projections for physics, biogeochemistry and fish models received
from PML-fisheries and NOC-modelling, ready for use in spatial meta-analysis.
M36: Results of spatial meta-analysis data finalised and delivered as manuscript to SI
M42: Report summarising results in less technical language and geared towards policy
delivered, with input from partners.
Description:
The main outcome of this task will be to:1) highlight potential opportunities for growth and resilience
for fisheries in the NKB that may result from potential changes in the distribution of resources, and/or
of key areas that may support their productivity, as climate change unfolds in the region; 2) anticipate
potential conflicts and opportunities for other sectors using the marine space of the NKB, given those
changes.
The contribution of local institutes will consist of: the provision of GIS data; support in the liaison
with other local partners that may hold available data (pending data availability); co-development of
the work through advice in the understanding of the local blue economy context; and participation in
publications & dissemination as appropriate.
We will assess the resilience (and vulnerability) of current economic sectors dependant on living
resources to climate change, in the NKB and encompassing waters, as well as their distribution. The
analysis will take into account the current distribution of activities (gear specific fishing grounds) and
co-located economic sectors (e.g. spatial data tourism, MPAs or other), as well as projected changes
to their associated environment and target resources (species specific), based on modelling projections
to the end of the 21st century undertaken by PML and NOC (NEMO-MEDUSA and SS-DBEM).
The completion of this activity will be dependent on the availability of spatial data for co-mapping
(local partner engagement) and model projection availability.
Capacity building for this task will be achieved through the collaboration in all aspects of the work,
co-design of the study and one-to-one/small team coaching on the methodology and result
interpretation. The main capacity building outcome is the analysis as a product for use by the local
partners in their marine management engagement and advice to government in Kenya.
3.6 WP3. Science into policy and wider stakeholder engagement
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3.6.1. Stakeholder engagement Action Plan
Deliverable: Project Report (Month 9)
Participating institutions: KMFRI (J.Kamau), CORDIO, NOC, PML
Description:
We will produce a report identifying key stakeholders in the following groups: policy, industry,
communities, and academia. The report will contain a detailed engagement plan including plans for
profiling (M&E indicators, surveys and interviews), identification of stakeholder capacity
development needs, stakeholder engagement events, and links with MOOC and MOOC-light.
KMFRI plans to engage the resource managers of the five riparian counties from the onset so that they
associate with the project and provide their thoughts on what they require the project to inform them
as concerns the resource. KMFRI will also engage the various relevant NGO's, institutions, BMUs,
and county development bodies as well as the state department of fisheries. We will require planned
visits to the county Governors office to initiate the process.
3.6.2. Policy and practice notes
Deliverable: Policy and practice information pack (M42)
Participating institutions: KMFRI, NOC, PML
Milestones:
M9: Science into policy framework and action plan developed; Examples of Policy and practice notes
from previous project reviewed.
M36: Full list and layout of Policy and practice notes identified
Description:
We will produce policy and practice notes aiming at key groups of stakeholders
3.6.3. Final stakeholder engagement event
Deliverable: Workshop with stakeholders (~July 2021)
Participating institutions: KMFRI, NOC, PML
We will run three stakeholder engagement workshops (beginning, mid-term and the end of the
project).
Final workshop: a targeted stakeholder information event on the key deliverables of the project, and
its legacy. We will present Policy and Practice information pack. We will use this event for the final
stakeholder related indicators for M&E profiling (interviews, surveys).
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3.7. WP4. Capacity Development
3.7.1. Full capacity development plan for Kenya
Deliverable: Project report and outcome/impact indicators (M9)
Participating institutions: NOC (Byfield), WP leaders 1a,b,c and 2, KMFRI,
We will produce a project report outlining the following:
• Institutional capacity baseline, including overview of facilities and expertise
• All project MSc/PhD studentships including UK-WIO supervisors, training needs,
participation in the project events and exchange visits and contribution to the key
deliverables.
• Institutional capacity development requirements in technologies (modelling, remote
sensing) and field work, key outcome indicators, baseline assessment of these
indicators, and capacity development plan.
• Stakeholder capacity development needs
• NOC/PML capacity development needs in application of core expertise in ODA arena
• GCRF might require additional activities on baselining of institutional capacity (TBC).
3.7.2. Training courses
Deliverable: Training courses and associated material (M12, M18, M30)
Description:
We will run three 2-week training courses: Applications of remote sensing, Applications of ocean
modelling, and Science communication. This will be available to junior staff and post-graduate
students at participating institutions, including at least one person from each of the supporting partners
in the wider WIO.
Course 1: Applications of marine remote sensing (M12)
Deliverables: Training course brochure (M8), delivery (M12); course report (M13); course lectures
and tutorials available on line (M13).
Participating: NOC-RS (PI V.Byfield), IMS, KMFRI, PML-RS, CORDIO, SAEON, Rhodes
Milestones (main milestones for wider distribution in bold)
M8: Course brochure for publication to partner institutions,
M12: Delivery of the training course
M13: Course report with analysis of student feedback
Course 2: Modelling training course (M24)
Annex 114
24
Deliverables: Training course brochure (M20), delivery (M24); course report (M25); course lectures
and tutorials available on line (M25).
Participating: NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova), NMU, PML
Milestones:
M20: Course brochure for publication to partner institutions,
M24: Delivery of the training course
M25: Course report with analysis of student feedback
M28: On-line availability of course material (lectures and tutorials) on SOLSTICE web site
Course 3: Science communication& MOOC production workshop (M30)
The aim of this training workshop is to develop skills for communicating science to different
audiences through participatory training exercises and produce SOLSTICE MOOC material based on
the case studies.
Deliverables: Training course brochure (M25), delivery (M30); course report (M19); course lectures
and tutorials available on line (M21), additional outreach resources on line (M24).
Participating: NOC-MPOC (PI V.Byfield), IMS, Imperative Space, NOC Coms, all partners
Milestones (main milestones for wider distribution in bold)
M30: Delivery of the training course;
M31: Course report with analysis of student feedback
M23: On-line availability of communication material developed during the course and refined by
participants in the following months.
3.7.3. Training in analytical methods at KMFRI and analysis of historical data
Deliverables:
M14 (Nov 2018): Cruise planning and data analysis workshop (at KMFRI)
M26 (Nov 2019): Cruise data analysis workshop
Milestones:
M4: Exchange visits identified
M6 Workshop dates, scope and format confirmed and development needs identified
Annex 114
25
PI responsible for delivery: S.Painter (NOC), V.Byfield
We will organise two training workshops at KMFRI: the first one will be dedicated to the analysis of
historical data, cruise planning and data archiving. The second workshop will be dedicated to the
analysis of the North Kenyan Bank cruise data.
In addition, a number of exchange visits dedicated to the training in analytical methods will be carried
out between KMFRI and NOC.
Additional deliverables
M16, M30 Report on the effectiveness of the fieldwork capacity development activities based on
feedback from participating mentors and ‘trainees’, as contribution to an M&E report.
3.7.4. MOOC
Deliverables: course content (M36) and screening (Months 37, 42, 48)
Provisional title: “Sustainable use of living marine resources: case studies from the Western Indian
Ocean”
PI: V.Byfield
Description:
The MOOC will run on the Future Learn (Open University) platform. Following its first screening,
an offline version will be made available for use by the partners, and other organisations in the WIO
in their course activities. The MOOC will build on research activities in WPs 1, 2 and capacity
development resources developed in 4.2, using examples from each of the three case studies, and from
SOLSTICE stakeholder engagement activities. The content will address selected capacity
development needs of partner institutions and stakeholders, as identified in the capacity development
plan. It will run over 6 weeks, each week covering a major theme in SOLSTICE research and
stakeholder engagement. Content related to Kenya will include:
• interviews with experts and selected stakeholders, transcript of interviews,
• video from research activities collected during training courses and workshops
• model and satellite animations,
• brief background text and figures with references to further information on the
SOLSTICE web site and elsewhere on-line,
• short Q/A exercises to test student understanding,
• forum where students can discuss the topic, ask questions, and share information.
Annex 114
26
All Co-Is in the UK and WIO are expected to contribute in areas of their expertise, and
encourage their students and junior scientists to engage with the MOOC development. Contributors
are expected to:
• give interviews about their work and area of expertise,
• facilitate filming of research and other project activities
• provide background text and references, figures, images and/or animations for the
MOOC content, related to their research and area of expertise
• follow the MOOC on-line while it runs to answer questions related to their area of
expertise.
Milestones:
M9: MOOC outline agreed, all contributors identified,
M12: detailed MOOC outline developed, presenter/interviewer identified for each country (Kenya,
Tanzania, South Africa, UK) KMFRI will engage Ms Jane Kiguta as a key MOOC liaison person, she
is in charge of public relations at the Institute.
M13: MOOC promotional video produced (NOC, IMS)
M13: MOOC sample lecture produced (NOC)
M18: MOOC CS1 &2 layout finalised (following fieldwork completion)
M24: MOOC CS3 layout finalised (following fieldwork completion)
M34: MOOC outline completed and advertised on Future Learn
M35: Full MOOC content compiled
M36 – Published on FutureLearn platform
M37: MOOC Run 1 (Oct 2020)
M40: Off-line version of MOOC available on SOLSTICE web site (Jan 2021)
M42: Off-line version on Ocean Teacher
M42: MOOC Run 2 (Apr 2021)
M48: MOOC Run 3 (Sep 2021)
M39,M44, M50 Short reports with statistics on MOOC uptake and user profiles for inclusion in
M&E reports
3.7.5. MOOC Light
Deliverables: M39 MOOC Light; M48 report on community testing
PI: V.Byfield
Annex 114
27
Description:
The MOOC Light will be designed for use in schools and as informal education tool to promote ocean
literacy. Covering the main themes addressed by the MOOC, it comprises video, informative
brochures and a selection of guided education activities to promote understanding of local habitats,
the global interconnectedness of the oceans, and of the productivity that supports larger marine
animals, including species important to local fisheries. It will be available in English and Swahili.
Milestones:
M12: recommendation from Science-to-policy WGs on MOOC content received
M30: MOOC Light layout agreed (following CS 1, 2 and 3 fieldwork) and
M39: Content compiled in English and Swahili
M45: MOOC light tested with local fishing communities (KMFRI, IMS, NMU, SAEON,SASMIA,
WWF, other participants involved in community engagement activities)
3.8. WP5 Communication
3.8.1. Regular channels of communication:
• Project website (external): Fully operational by 15th December 2017
• Project website (internal): Fully operational by 1st march 2018
• Project newsletter (internal): every 3 months starting 1st December 2017
• Project newsletter (external, summary for stakeholders): every 6 months, starting 1st April
2018
• Project newsletter (external, impact summary for funders): every 6 months, starting 1st April
2018
3.8.2. One-off communication material:
• SOLSTICE banners (M1)
• SOLSTICE brochure (M1)
• SOLSTICE promotional video: M9
• SOLSTICE MOOC promotional video: M13
• SOLSTICE MOOC sample lecture (video): M13
• Training course leaflets (M8, M14, M25)
• MOOC leaflets (M32)
• Infographics for the Case Studies (M42)
• Policy and practice notes for the Case Studies (M42)
• SOLSTICE: summary of outcomes and impacts leaflet
Annex 114
28
4. Monitoring and evaluation
4.1. Network profiling
Deliverables: survey and basic analysis tools (M6)
Participating institutions: NOC (Popova, Alexiou), PML, all partners
Milestones:
M5 questionnaire finalised
M6 survey returned
M6 methodology and indicators finalised
We will use a modified GULLS survey (social network analysis) to profile the network strength and
growth parameters (baseline, midterm and end term). International transdisciplinary network is the
key delivery of the GCRF Grow call, thus this survey is of extreme importance and should clearly
reflect our key success indicators.
4.2. M&E strategy
Participating institutions: NOC (Popova), PML
Deliverables: Project Report (M6)
In consultation with GCRF we will produce a strategy document detailing a complete M&E approach
including logframe, theory of change, profiling surveys and methods of qualitative information
collection.
4.3. Monitoring and evaluation reports
Participating institutions: NOC, PML
Deliverables: Project Report (M12, M30, M51, long term impact TBD)
Milestones: M&E indicators will be collected every six months
M&E will consider four evaluation categories: i) impact of capacity development both in WIO and
UK; ii) benefits, costs and practicalities of employing the new technologies and recommendations; iii)
societal impact of case study outcomes; and iv) strength and impact of UK-WIO transdisciplinary
networks.
Towards the end of the project we will secure additional funding for the post-project M&E when the
highest impacts are expected to be achieved (GCRF additional funding, NC, national and public good
are the most obvious routes).
Annex 114
29
5. Alignment with key regional programs
5.1. PEACC
Acronym: PEACC (Productivity in the EACC under Climate Change)
[Pronounced ‘peace’ – calling for mankind to be at peace with the environment]
Duration: 24 months (1 July 2016 – 30 June 2018)
Project Reference: MASMA/OP/2016/02
Budget: US$ 252 753
Engagement: We will engage with PEACC via partners in the project e.g. in synthesis: Dr Issufo Halo
and Majuto Manyilizu (modelling, Dodoma University and Cape Peninsular University of
Technology), Dr Rose Mwaipopo (socio-economics, UDSM) and Dr Albogast Kamukuru (fisheries,
UDSM)
5.2. IIOE-II
IIOE-II (Second International Indian Ocean Expedition (IIOE-2)
Engagement: We will engage with Mika Odido from IOC sub-commission for Africa and the adjacent
island states and with Ben Milligan (via SOLSTICE Advisory Panel).
5.3. The Western Indian Ocean Upwelling Research Initiative (WIOURI)
WIOURI (Western Indian Ocean Upwelling Research Initiative)
Engagement via WIOURI PI Mike Roberts
5.4. ACCORD
ACCORD (Addressing Challenges of Coastal Communities through Ocean Research for Developing
Economies) is a four year UK National Capability Program …
Engagement via K.Popova involved into both project.
5.5 SAPPHIRE:
SAPPHIRE (The Western Indian Ocean Large Marine Ecosystems Strategic Action Programme
Policy Harmonisation and Institutional Reforms). Engagement routes to be established by Science
into Policy WGs.
Annex 114
30
5.6 WIOSAP
WIOSAP (Strategic Action Programme for the protection of the Western Indian Ocean from landbased
sources and activities (WIO-SAP)
6. Key events and workshops
April 2018, London (TBC)
• Annual Leadership team meeting
• Annual Advisory Panel meeting
April 2018, Mombasa
• Science into policy working group (or in June 2018)
September 2018, Zanzibar
• Remote Sensing training course
November, 2018, Mombasa
• Cruise planning workshop
February-March, 2019
• First North Kenyan Bank cruise
April 2019, Mombasa (TBC)
• Annual Leadership team meeting
• Annual Advisory Panel meeting
June-July, 2019
• Second North Kenyan Bank cruise
June-July 2019, Zanzibar
Annex 114
31
• Operations room and stakeholder engagement event during robotics mission (2 weeks). This
event might be of interest to KMFRI to see the robotics in action and discuss future funding
opportunities in this area
September 2019, Zanzibar (preliminary date)
• Modelling training course
November 2019, Location?
• 11th WIOMSA symposium
• SOLSTICE exhibition and special session (if WIOMSA is run in one of the SOLSTICE
countries)
October 2019, Mombasa
• Cruise synthesis workshop
• Second stakeholder engagement workshop
April 2020, Zanzibar (TBC)
• Annual Leadership team meeting
• Annual Advisory Panel meeting
December 2020, Mombasa
• Science into policy WG
February 2020, Zanzibar (preliminary date)
• Communication training course
March 2020, Zanzibar (preliminary date)
• Science progress workshop in preparation to SI submission (combined Kenya and Tanzania
event)
April 2021, Port Elizabeth (TBC)
• Annual Leadership team meeting
• Annual Advisory Panel meeting
Annex 114
32
October 2021, Location?
• 12th WIOMSA symposium
• SOLSTICE exhibition and special session (if WIOMSA is run in one of the SOLSTICE
countries)
• SOLSTICE science-into-policy workshop with stakeholders
July 2021, Mombasa
• Synthesis, evaluation and science into policy workshop. Final stakeholder engagement
workshop for Kenyan Case Study
7. Institutional Contributions to the Case Study
7.1. KMFRI
KMFRI will lead the North Kenyan Bank Case Study. In particular KMFRI will coordinate the Case
Study literature review and the North Kenyan Bank foundation paper for the Special Issue (UK
contribution for the literature review will be coordinated by K.Popova).
KMFRI will assist with validation of the physical and biogeochemical model output using historical
data and knowledge of the region and contribute to the modelling publication.
KMFRI will conduct two biogeochemical surveys of 10 days duration in February-March and June-
July 2019.
KMFRI will aim to produce lead author publications (SOLSTICE Special Issue) in the following
areas:
• North Kenyan Bank foundation paper
• Physical processes driving ecosystem dynamics at the NKB (observations)
• Biogeochemical processes (observations)
• Current and historical Plume dynamics from satellite imagery
• Radiocarbon dating and historical sedimentation rates
KMFRI will lead Science into policy work package coordinating stakeholder engagement and
production of science into policy material (reports, infographics, policy and practice notes). A
substantial contribution of UK researchers (in particular WP2) will be provided to support this
activity.
KMFRI researchers will contribute to the MOOC and participate in filming of the material dedicated
to the case study; a local contact person will be identified to act as liaison for MOOC development.
KMFRI will facilitate making the off-line version of the MOOC available via Ocean Teacher Global
Academy (OTGA) Mr. Harrison Onganda will facilitate this activity.
Annex 114
33
KMFRI will provide meeting facilities for the SOLSTICE project meeting and workshops run in
Kenya.
Dr.J.Kamau will serve as members of the SOLSTICE Leadership Team reporting annually to the
Advisory Panel.
7.2. CORDIO
• CORDIO suggests a Beach Management Unit fisheries training course on fisheries
information for improved artisanal fisheries co-management (building on a course already
prepared and run by CORDIO in 2012 – under SmartFish (IOC)). This will reinforce catch
monitoring for at least one year - June 2018 to July 2019 - by BMUs operating in North
Kenya Banks.
7.3. NMU
Dr M. Noyon will lead a training session on plankton ecology at IMS in June 2018 with a special
focus on plankton collection, identification and measurements in collaboration with HWU and
KMFRI (Dr James Mwaluma). The workshop will include looking at samples that have been collected
or will be collected during various cruises (Nansen program and IIOE2).
Prof M.Roberts will participate in the North Kenyan Ban cruise if there is no overlap with eth South
African and Tanzanian fieldwork.
7.4. Rhodes
Prof. W Sauer will lead on SOLSTICE wider engagement with the WIO fisheries and DSFA (with
links to tuna) in particular.
Prof. W Sauer will strongly contribute to the Science into Policy working group activities and in
particular to the production of final Science into Policy briefings and material.
Prof. Sauer will serve as a member of the SOLSTICE Leadership Team reporting annually to the
Advisory Panel.
7.5. PML
PML will take the lead on WP2 (Socio Economics, PI: E. Papathanasopoulou) and contribute to: the
Remote Sensing component of WP1 (Remote Sensing, PI: D. Raitsos), WP3 (Science to Policy), WP4
(Capacity Development) and M&E.
PML will take a lead on the following WP2 tasks: Fish modelling; Input-Output tables; and Marine
Spatial Planning. It will also strongly contribute/lead WP1 tasks: synthesis of satellite information to
identify large scale drivers, local drivers, real-time support of fieldwork, on-line/off-line remote
sensing access; WP3: all relevant activities; WP4: 2-week remote sensing training course and
MOOCs.
Annex 114
34
PML will be involved in co-supervising master and PhD students aligned with the Kenyan case study,
particularly through the WP2 Input-output task (E. Papathanasopoulou).
E. Papathanasopoulou will serve as a member of the SOLSTICE Leadership Team reporting annually
to the Advisory Panel.
7.6. NOC
NOC as a lead organisation has overall responsibility for delivering the project. NOC PI is identified
in every WP.
Annex 114
35
8. List of abbreviations
AUV - Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
BGC - Biogeochemistry
CS – Case Study
EAF - ecosystem approach to fisheries
GCRF – Global Challenges Research Fund, UK (Project Funder)
MOOC – Massive Online Open Course
M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation
ODA - official development assistance
ROV - (Remotely Operated Vehicle)
RS – Remote Sensiong
SI – Special Issue
WG – Working Group
WP – Work Package
Annex 114
Annex 115
“Tullow Oil discovers gas pay at Mbawa 1 well offshore Kenya”, NS Energy,
10 September 2012
(https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/)
Home (Https://Www.nsenergybusiness.com) » News (Https://Www.nsenergybusiness.com/News) » Tullow Oil Discovers Gas Pay At Mbawa 1 Well O!shore Kenya
News ! Tullow Oil discovers gas pay at
Mbawa 1 well offshore Kenya
By NS Energy Staff Writer 10 Sep 2012
NEWS (HTTPS://WWW.NSENERGYBUSINESS.COM/./NEWS/)
UK-based oil company Tullow Oil has encountered 52m of net gas pay in porous
Cretaceous sandstones at the Mbawa-1 exploration well in the L8 licence area, offshore
Kenya.
The well was drilled to a depth of 2,553m and reported gas in the shallowest objective.
The company intends to drill the well to a total depth (TD) of 3,275m to target further exploration
objectives; a secondary exploration target lies above the planned TD.
Tullow Oil exploration director Angus McCoss said, "A gas discovery on prognosis in the shallowest
objective at Mbawa-1 is an encouraging start to our East African Transform Margin exploration
campaign."
Pancontinental Oil & Gas CEO and Director Barry Rushworth said the gas discovery proves the
presence of a working hydrocarbon system offshore Kenya.
"We thank the Government of Kenya for its cooperation and support in achieving this very positive
initial outcome for the country of Kenya, for the L8 joint venture and for Pancontinental," said
Rushworth.
"With drilling continuing to a deeper exploration target, these interim results may be the first part of the
story in this well, and they are certainly just the beginning of the main story of oil and gas exploration
offshore Kenya.
Apache is the operator with 50% stake in the joint venture which includes Origin Energy holding 20%,
Pancontinental Oil & Gas 15% and Tullow Kenya owns 15% stake respectively.
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Annex 115
Annex 116
“Somalia: oil thrown on the fire”, Financial Times, 13 May 2013
O gad: a iae he Gadg ca. Piae hae eaed ce $400 b aig 149 ee ice 2005
Kaia Ma MAY 13 2013
After an absence of more than 30 ears, Abdiriak Omar Mohamed has returned to
Somalia, the countr of his birth. Last ear he gave up his job as a civil servant in the
housing sector in Canada to take up a position as one of onl 10 ministers in
Mogadishus new, slimline cabinet.
As minister for natural resources in a dsfunctional countr divided b a continuing
war, he has to oversee a bulging portfolio that includes water, agriculture, the
environment and livestock. As if that were not enough, his brief now also includes
hdrocarbons just as Somalia and east Africa more broadl has become one of the
most attractive frontiers in oil eploration for leading companies such as Roal Dutch
Shell and ConocoPhillips.
The president and I have discussions ever da about oil, sas Mr Mohamed in his
office that looks out at the Indian Ocean across the tumbledown cit of Mogadishu.
Late last ear, Somalia caught the attention of foreign oil companies b announcing it
intended to auction some of 308 newl delineated oil blocks this ear.
The worlds leading oil companies are increasingl accepting that their quest for new
reserves will take them into challenging new territor. In regions such as the Arctic,
the problems are technical.
Energ ecor
Somalia: Oil thrown on the fire
Eeg caie cabig f eee i eig dage faie
Annex 116
Around the Horn of Africa, companies must calculate whether political and securit
risks will put too heav a burden on their production costs. This is haardous territor
in which to operate. A chunk of Somalia is still under the control of al-Shabaab, jihadi
militants allied with al-Qaeda. Its waters are the hunting ground of pirates, who since
2005 have earned close to $400m b ransoming 149 vessels.
The politics is also mess, internecine and riven b militias. Oil companies in the race
for contracts find themselves unsure whether the power lies in Mogadishu or in semiautonomous
regions such as Puntland or self-declared states such as Galmudug.
Somaliland to the north, bordering Djibouti, has declared itself a full independent
republic.
Attempts to carve up oil blocks before the Mogadishu government even controls the
whole national territor are undermining efforts to bring peace and stabilit to a state
that has been shattered b 22 ears of war and that eports terrorism. The race to la
claim to resources risks triggering wider conflicts: regional authorities have been
hostile to central government since the 22-ear militar dictatorship of Siad Barre.
When he was deposed in 1991, warlords carved up the countr and several clanbased
militias still hold swa, sometimes cutting deals with al-Shabaab.
The danger is that the race for oil will feed a destabilising rivalr between Mogadishu
and other regions some still influenced b former warlords just as the
international communit is celebrating progress. UK ambassador Matt Baugh sas the
situation remains ver, ver fragile. Rival administrations have issued several
companies rights to a clutch of overlapping oil blocks, redrawing the political map of
Somalia in line with their own interests.
On an international level, disagreement between Kena and Somalia over their
maritime boundar has also created what one diplomat terms a triangle of confusion
reaching across 120,000 square kilometres. Kenan troops defend the port of
Kismao, south of Mogadishu, notionall in support of the Mogadishu government,
but Somali officials worr Kena is keener on securing oil rights.
The biggest conflicts right now among Somalis are all about oil rights oil is the
main plaer in all of this mess, sas Mohamed Nur of Dissident Nation, a lobb
group. But its also a force that allows all sides to have bargaining chips and have an
equal role in the future of the nation.
Annex 116
Indeed, seven months into the job, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has called for
a consensus, saing he has not et signed an oil deals. He has also called on
international oil companies not to cut their own deals with regional authorities
because that will block their future engagement in Somalia.
Resources should not be used as a pretet for new conflict, he told the Financial
Times.
It is a short drive from the presidents office to the well-guarded steps of the resources
ministr. From behind the window of his bulletproof vehicle, Mr Mohamed points out
the recent additions to Mogadishus scars: a car bomb here; a suicide attack there.
We should wait until we have the right laws in place we are not read et, he sas,
before heading home for a lunch of chips, camel steak, spaghetti and cumin-infused
rice. Such a culinar hotch-potch offers a reminder that the former Italian colon has
long had to contend with foreign influence and interests.
But oil companies are not proving as patient as Mr Mohamud or as patient as he
would like. A quarter of a centur ago, BP, Chevron, Conoco, Eni and Shell bought oil
blocks and started ambitious eploration programmes. B 1991 the had all put them
on ice, declaring force majeure as civil war took hold. Now several companies want
them back.
The Somali government has alread started discussions with two previous concession
holders Eni and Shell that want to reclaim their pre-1991 blocks and enter into
production sharing agreements, sas a senior government official. He adds that
Conoco is also read to reclaim its stake and that BP is considering the idea.
While the companies have not presented concrete plans, oil eecutives sa the are
interested in Somalia should force majeure be lifted.
But haardous faultlines between competing authorities are beginning to erupt. In
Februar, PetroQuest Africa, an affiliate of US eploration compan Libert
Petroleum, signed a deal for a block with the regional government of Galmudug, a
self-declared state to the north of Mogadishu.
The move shows how quickl tensions can be inflamed because Liberts concession
overlaps an offshore block also claimed b Shell. In a letter of April 24, Shell asked the
Somali authorities to take action to safeguard its eclusive rights to the block.
Annex 116
Mr Mohamed is quick to defend Shell and the pre-eminence of his weak, donorbacked
Mogadishu government: Galmudug should not ever offer an block to an
compan let alone the Shell block; it should not be signing contracts theres onl one
president.
In Galmudug itself, the see things differentl. The president there is Abdi Hasan
Awale Qebdiid, a former warlord portraed in Black Hak D, the film of the
disastrous 1993 US mission when Somali militants downed US helicopters and
dragged US corpses through the streets. He told the FT that he believed his agreement
with Libert was in line with the new provisional, federal constitution.
We are not feeling an guilt for this kind of thing, he sas. If there is a problem
between the government and Galmudug we need to discuss, including Shell and
Libert and everone, let them come to court.
Phoeni-based Lane Franks, president of PetroQuest and Libert, co-founded b his
brother and US Congressman Trent Franks, suggests Shell should bu them out if the
compan wants to avoid stoking violence in Somalia. Shell could still maintain its
operatorship b compensating PQ with a modest roalt and reasonable fee to acquire
all the PQ rights, said Mr Franks in a letter to Shell eecutives on April 9. Shell
would also avoid potential rebellion or backlash from the autonomous states [that
could reignite] at worst, another civil war.
Abdillahi Mohamud of the East African Energ Forum, another lobb group, warns
that such frictions show the stakes are high: If we see a scramble for petroleum
concessions before a political settlement between the federal states and Mogadishu is
reached, we can definitel see a new conflict.
In 2005, when Marcus Edwards-Jones, now non-eecutive board director of Aimlisted
Range Resources, went to Puntland a semi-autonomous state of northern
Somalia he took a Ukrainian charter plane from Yemen, lured b the promise of
data left over from when Conoco conducted surves there.
It was a no-go area in those das humanitarian planes didnt even land, the would
just drop aid out the back of a plane, sas Mr Edwards-Jones. Undaunted, he went on
to raise $40m from London fund managers to eplore throughout Puntland following
an agreement with the government. Range and its partners have put more than
$100m into the one. In addition to drilling two wells, the built an airstrip and
deploed 250 troops, led b South African securit contractors, to counter al-Shabaab.
Annex 116
Mr Mohamed insists that an contracts signed with Puntland since 1991 are null and
void, and ConocoPhillips wrote in 2007 that it had not relinquished its rights in
Somalia. But Puntlands government countered in Februar that the Mogadishu
government was interfering illegitimatel on resource eploitation.
Both Ranges wells were dr, hitting the share price and making it harder to raise
mone for the net well. But Mr Edwards-Jones sas the area is so vast he would need
to drill 15 wells before he gave up hope. We did find traces of hdrocarbons down
there; ou can miss it b five feet, he sas.
His group has not been able to touch a more attractive block, Nugaal, because it lies in
a controversial one. In fact, Puntland draws its border with Somaliland to
accommodate the Nugaal block. Puntland came up with this creative imaginar
boundar to entice oil and gas companies, sas Hussein Abdi Dualeh, Somalilands
energ minister. He himself faces similar claims from Mogadishu, which sas
Somaliland has no right to make oil contracts of its own.
Mr Dualeh sas the earlier claims in Somaliland have lapsed. He has kept up the
pressure b bringing in new companies. Two weeks ago Somaliland signed over a
block to Norwas DNO International. Ophir Energ has an interest in two blocks that
overlap former BP blocks. Genel last ear took a stake in two other onshore blocks
one of which overlaps a former Conoco block and is conducting a seismic surve.
Ninet-five per cent of who has legalit is whoever controls the territor, sas Mr
Dualeh of Nugaal. No oil and gas compan in their right minds would come in will-
nill and start doing things.
But the situation is looking even more comple. The area around Nugaal, Khaatumo,
last ear declared independence from both Somaliland and Puntland, highlighting the
risk that oil could rupture the countr.
Mr Mohamed admits there are fissures. He wants to change the constitution crafted
at great epense b Somali lawmakers and UN legal eperts to accommodate an
amended version of the 2008 petroleum law, which stipulates that the central
government will determine oil deals. We want oil companies to come into the countr
but companies are taking huge risks, some of them deliberate.
Deelopmen: A angle of conerging foreign inere
Annex 116
Cigh The Fiacia Tie Liied 2020. A igh eeed.
In recent ears, foreign involvement in Somalia has been characterised as part of an
effort to combat terrorism.
But now Somalis are quick to identif a new set of self-interested motives. Of course
its all about oil, sas one senior Somali adviser about Norwas growing interest in
his countr.
Norwa, whose state oil compan Statoil is eploring off east Africa, has made various
commitments to Somalia. Oslo has installed solar-powered lamps on the streets of
Mogadishu and is setting up a special $30m finance facilit.
Last month a Somali parliamentar delegation visited Oslo to discuss co-operation,
development and the management of natural resources. Most criticall, these talks
included discussion of a triangle of water disputed between Kena and Somalia.
The Somali parliamentarians rejected a 2009 agreement b the previous transitional
government to sign awa the triangle to Kena. That has raised the political stakes
surrounding the status of Jubaland, a proposed Somali region neighbouring Kena
that would hold swa over the disputed offshore one. Diplomats sa that Kena,
whose peacekeeping troops guard Kismao, the port at the economic heart of
Jubaland, is keen to assert influence there, against the wishes of the new Mogadishu
government.
This tension between Somalia and Kena matters to western oil interests. Somalia has
alread warned Statoil, along with Total and Eni, not to accept an oil concessions
offered b Kena in the disputed triangle.
Oslo lobbied hard for a Norwegian to become UN envo to Somalia. That job instead
went this month to a diplomat from the UK, which last week hosted an important
conference on Somalia.
The attendees at the conference revealed the range of interests converging on
Somalia. Qatar, for eample, is an investor in Shell. Turke has led a diplomatic
charge for Somalia b setting up an embass outside the secure airport compound and
delivering prominent support, such as a camp for displaced people, a technical college
and scholarships.
In the cold war, the Soviet Union and the US competed for influence in Somalia. But
the competing forces are now eminentl more comple.
Annex 116
Annex 117
“Soma wins funding for Somali seismic survey”, African Energy, 30 January 2014
Home » News Centre » Soma wins funding for Somali seismic survey
Soma wins funding for Somali seismic
survey
Issue 270 - 30 Jan 2014
Soma Oil & Gas, led by former UK Conservative party leader Michael
Howard, has secured an equity investment of $50m from British Virgin
Islands-registered private investment company Winter Sky. Soma has an
agreement with the Somali Federal Government to acquire substantial
acreage in exchange for shooting seismic, (AE 261/4), and says the funding
means it can !nalise a contract for a planned 2D exploration programme.
“Negotiations with a small number of seismic contractors are at an
advanced stage, and Soma expects to make an appointment soon. The
seismic work programme will commence within Q1 2014,” a company
spokeswoman told African Energy.
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Annex 117
Annex 118
“Inquiry puts survival in doubt, says African oil explorer”, The Times, 14 October 2016
Inquiry puts survival in
doubt, says African oil
explorer
Lord Howard of Lympne has a 4 per cent stake in Soma, the African fuel explorer
JOHN STILLWELL/PA
Share Save
Marcus Leroux
Friday October 14 2016,
12.01am, The Times
Soma Oil and Gas, the African oil explorer chaired by
Lord Howard of Lympne, needs a fresh injection of cash
to stay afloat as the Serious Fraud O@ce’s inquiry enters
a new chapter.
In its annual report, Soma’s auditor warns that the SFO
investigation casts a “material doubt” over its ability to
continue as a going concern. The accounts also disclosed
Today’s sections " Past six days Explore " Times Radio
#
Annex 118
that Winter Sky Investments, a private equity company
controlled by Alexander Dzhaparidze, a Russian oil
tycoon, has taken control of the business.
The company has been under investigation by the SFO
since last summer. Initially, the agency was looking into
allegations that so-called “capacity building payments”
to the Somalian government amounted to bribes. That
line of inquiry has been dropped but the SFO is
continuing with “other strands” of its investigation.
Bevan Whitehead, an auditor for Deloitte’s energy and
resources practice, wrote in the company’s accounts,
which were posted yesterday at Companies House: “The
group is reliant on receiving financing from existing
shareholders in the next three months in order to
continue to meet its obligations.”
Mr Whitehead said that the SFO investigation would
make it di@cult to raise further finance and that if the
company was found guilty of corruption, it would forfeit
its rights to the oil concessions it is trying to secure from
the Somalian government.
The company lost $4.1 million (£3.3 million) last year,
down from $8.8 million in 2014. It has consistently
denied any wrongdoing and this week lost an
“extraordinary” legal bid to force the SFO to wind up its
investigation. It has also insisted that Lord Howard was
Annex 118
not personally suspected of any wrongdoing.
Lord Howard, the former Conservative leader, owns a 4
per cent stake. One of the founding investors is Basil
Shiblaq, the executive chairman, who controls 37 per
cent of the company through a British Virgin Islands
entity.
In December Soma handed over exploration data to the
Somalian government as part of a deal signed in 2013,
which included the capacity building payments. It has
also faced criticism from one adviser to the Somalian
government for not disclosing how much it was paying a
lawyer acting for the Somalians. Soma insisted the
payments to the lawyer were above board and approved
by all parties.
Annex 118
Annex 119
“EAEF moves to oppose Soma Oil and Gas deal”, Hiraan Online, 15 August 2013
Home Somali Map Sports Opinion RSS Somali Music Contact Us
EAEF moves to oppose Soma Oil and Gas deal
Thursday, August 15, 2013
The Federal Government of Somalia's recent deal with Soma Oil and Gas is facing heavy
opposition from the East African Energy Forum (EAEF), a group of Somali resource experts and
lawyers that monitor Somalia's natural resources, waters, territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The EAEF says it is opposing this deal after conducting a thorough investigation and concluding it
to be contrary to the Somali national interest with little net benefit to the public.
"This deal goes against the very principle of transparency and anti-corruption that this government
took an oath on last year, We are surprised at the cloud of secrecy and "behind-closed-doors"
methodology this government believes they can deal our natural resources in." says Abdillahi
Mohamud, the group's director.
The group says that the Federal Government has committed to the principles of the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) during the pre-G8 summit on trade, tax and transparency
this year in the UK and has duties to implement transparency and anti-corruption measures.
Aside from the lack of transparency, the group is also blasting the technical quality of the deal and
companies involved that have signed with the central government.
"Does this government and these companies believe that Somalis who are experienced in the fields
of petroleum and maritime affairs would blindly look the other way while unprofessional and
biased deals are made with their natural resources and waters; the only source of future wealth and
hope a nation of 10 million has left to recover?" asked Mr. Mohamud.
The EAEF has called on the central government to cancel the Soma Oil and Gas deal immediately
and to review the procedures used to strike this deal, believing that this will set a precedent of
shady deals being common practice in Somalia.
The EAEF's technical team says that Soma Oil and Gas does not have the expertise or the capacity
to conduct the offshore seismic survey themselves and would need to sub contract to a capable
Today from Hiiraan Online:
Annex 119
seismic company. It also added that it is a blatant conflict of interest to allow a company to collect
the seismic data that the government plans to use to sell oil blocks, at the same time allowing it to
choose whichever blocks it wants in a private sale.
"How can a company barely four months in existence be given the reigns to explore in our offshore
waters? Who are their sub-contractors that will actually do the work? Why aren't reputable seismic
companies being allowed to bid on this project in public as is the industry norm? The government
should cancel this deal and conduct itself in a transparent and open manner that is good business for
the country." said Feysal Mayow, the EAEF's technical director.
The group has also raised the alarm that the central government has abandoned its initial suggestion
that it will not engage in oil deals until it has harmonized a robust petroleum law with the
constitution and begin talks with the regions on this topic.
“Under what Somali law will this company be governed, which environmental standards, which
statutes will they be held accountable in Somalia? The answer is none, because the government has
found it a “nuisance” to have proper laws that Somalis can support and rally behind.” Said
Mr.Mayow.
The Somali insecurity situation is underpinned by a race for natural resources at a time when other
priorities should be taking center stage says the EAEF.
"Much of the conflict in Somalia today is about economic security, namely about ownership of
natural resources and land, this move will only exacerbate the powder-keg situation in the country
at a time when we should be focusing on reconciliation and security." Says Abdillahi Mohamud.
The EAEF says it has been supporting the central government with capacity building initiatives, but
that the FGS has got the cart before the horse in this deal and is pressuring the government to invest
in its institutions, public procurement, and transparency and anti-corruption systems.
"We should be focusing on building the relevant Ministries, training Somali bureaucrats in these
fields, producing laws that protect Somalia's resources economically and environmentally, not
signing shady deals with a barely four month old company." says Feysal Mayow.
"It seems elements within the FGS as well as some foreign companies still think that Somalia is
that place you can conduct a shady deal and go unnoticed. The Somalis are no longer dormant in
their politics and the EAEF as citizens of the country will continue to hold its government and
commercial partners to account." Mr. Mayow adds.
The group has said it will continue its investigation and monitor developments as well as using its
influence in parliament and other avenues to oppose this deal. It is encouraging Prime Minister
Shirdon to nullify this deal and open a review of how the deal was sourced and signed.
“I don’t think Somalis are interested in these unprofessional deals while their country is rife with
insecurity and political bickering. The government should be focusing on that which matters the
most and not signing shady oil deals. This is a sector that requires well functioning public
institutions and at the moment we haven’t got those to an acceptable standard” Said Abdillahi
Mohamud.
Annex 119
Annex 120
“Somalia removes prime minister in no-confidence vote”, The Guardian, 25 July 2020
Th ace e ha 3 monh old
Somaliaremovesprimeministerinnoconfidencevote
AgenceFancePee
fMPbackiagaiHaaAliKhaieffailigead
decaiceleci
Sa 25 J 2020 16.59BST
Somalia aliamen emoed he ime minie, Haan Ali Khaie, fom hi o in a oe of no
condence on Sada fo failing o ae he a oad fll democaic elecion, he eake
aid.
A hoing 170 of aliamen 178 MP backed he no-condence moion, and Khaie oe
a immediael endoed b he eiden, Mohamed Abdllahi Famajo, ho had aoined
him a ime minie in Feba 2017.
The deie had aied a he naional aembl on Sada o ok on he oganiaion of he
ne naional elecion in 2021.
Annex 120
Ae ea a e ee ad aed e eae a cea a a ae e
a e-e-e-e eec 2021 ... aae de a e cdece
aa e ee ad e e, Haa A Kae, aaea eae
Maed Ma d ee.
Te ede e edea ee Saa ... a a e e ad a
ee c ae e a eec, e added.
Te ce e ede ed a aee dca a Faa d ae a e
e e .
I ae decded acce e dec e aae, e ede ad e aee.
Te ae cea ee, caed b Faa, c a a Sa e ad
ac a ec e a-Qaeda-aaed a-Sabaab a .
Saa a e e e a d a e-e, e-e aa eec ea 2021 a
ed a ce e c eca deeae c aae e e e
ede a d be decac eec ce 1969.
Kae, 52, a a ece e ca cee e e becae e e, a
e ed e dec e Aca deae e B ca Sa O
ad Ga.
Kae a ebe e Hae ca e Faa e Dad ca, ee e
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Sinceorehere
... e ae a a a a. M ae c e Gada e,
deede, a e ee da, ad eade 180 ce ad e d
aca.
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Annex 120
hld eain f dcing gen, efl, high-imac eing n he
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made in 2019. We n lnge ake adeiing fm fil fel cmanie, and ee n
ce achiee ne e emiin b 2030.
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Middle Ea and Nh Afica
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Annex 120
Annex 121
“Corruption perceptions index 2019”, Transparency International, 2020
CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS
INDEX
2019
Annex 121
Transparency International is a global movement with
one vision: a world in which government, business,
civil society and the daily lives of people are free of
corruption. With more than 100 chapters worldwide and
an international secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the
fight against corruption to turn this vision into reality.
#cpi2019
www.transparency.org/cpi
Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information
contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of
January 2020. Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot accept
responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in
other contexts.
ISBN: 978-3-96076-134-1
2020 Transparency International. Except where otherwise noted, this
work is licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0 DE. Quotation permitted. Please
contact Transparency International – [email protected] –
regarding derivatives requests.
Annex 121
CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS
INDEX 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2-3
Map and results
4-5
Executive summary
Recommendations
6-8
Global highlights
9-11
Political integrity
Transparency in
campaign finance
Political decision-making
12-13
Americas
United States
Brazil
14-15
Asia Pacific
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
16-17
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Armenia
Kosovo
18-19
Middle East & North
Africa
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
20-21
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
Ghana
22-23
Western Europe &
European Union
Malta
Estonia
24-25
Trouble at the top
26
Methodology
27-29
Endnotes
Annex 121
180 COUNTRIES.
180 SCORES.
HOW DOES
YOUR COUNTRY
MEASURE UP?
The perceived levels of public sector corruption
in 180 countries/territories around the world.
69 France 23
69 United States of
America
23
68 Bhutan 25
67 Chile 26
66 Seychelles 27
65 Taiwan 28
64 Bahamas 29
62 Barbados 30
62 Portugal 30
62 Qatar 30
62 Spain 30
61 Botswana 34
60 Brunei
Darussalam
35
60 Israel 35
60 Lithuania 35
60 Slovenia 35
59 Korea, South 39
59 Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
39
58 Cabo Verde 41
58 Cyprus 41
58 Poland 41
56 Costa Rica 44
45 Montenegro 66
45 Senegal 66
44 Hungary 70
44 Romania 70
44 South Africa 70
44 Suriname 70
43 Bulgaria 74
43 Jamaica 74
43 Tunisia 74
42 Armenia 77
42 Bahrain 77
42 Solomon Islands 77
41 Benin 80
41 China 80
41 Ghana 80
41 India 80
41 Morocco 80
40 Burkina Faso 85
40 Guyana 85
40 Indonesia 85
40 Kuwait 85
40 Lesotho 85
40 Trinidad and
Tobago
85
87 Denmark 1
87 New Zealand 1
86 Finland 3
85 Singapore 4
85 Sweden 4
85 Switzerland 4
84 Norway 7
82 Netherlands 8
80 Germany 9
80 Luxembourg 9
78 Iceland 11
77 Australia 12
77 Austria 12
77 Canada 12
77 United Kingdom 12
76 Hong Kong 16
75 Belgium 17
74 Estonia 18
74 Ireland 18
73 Japan 20
71 United Arab
Emirates
21
71 Uruguay 21
SCORE COUNTRY/TERRITORY RANK 56 Czech Republic 44
56 Georgia 44
56 Latvia 44
55 Dominica 48
55 Saint Lucia 48
54 Malta 50
53 Grenada 51
53 Italy 51
53 Malaysia 51
53 Rwanda 51
53 Saudi Arabia 51
52 Mauritius 56
52 Namibia 56
52 Oman 56
50 Slovakia 59
48 Cuba 60
48 Greece 60
48 Jordan 60
47 Croatia 63
46 Sao Tome and
Principe
64
46 Vanuatu 64
45 Argentina 66
45 Belarus 66
SCORE
0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100 No data
Very
Clean
Highly
Corrupt
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
2
Annex 121
39 Serbia 91
39 Turkey 91
38 Ecuador 93
38 Sri Lanka 93
38 Timor-Leste 93
37 Colombia 96
37 Ethiopia 96
37 Gambia 96
37 Tanzania 96
37 Vietnam 96
36 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
101
36 Kosovo 101
36 Panama 101
36 Peru 101
36 Thailand 101
35 Albania 106
35 Algeria 106
35 Brazil 106
35 Cote d'Ivoire 106
35 Egypt 106
35 North Macedonia 106
35 Mongolia 106
34 El Salvador 113
34 Kazakhstan 113
34 Nepal 113
34 Philippines 113
34 Eswatini 113
34 Zambia 113
33 Sierra Leone 119
32 Moldova 120
32 Niger 120
32 Pakistan 120
31 Bolivia 123
31 Gabon 123
31 Malawi 123
30 Azerbaijan 126
30 Djibouti 126
30 Kyrgyzstan 126
30 Ukraine 126
29 Guinea 130
29 Laos 130
29 Maldives 130
29 Mali 130
29 Mexico 130
29 Myanmar 130
29 Togo 130
28 Dominican
Republic
137
28 Kenya 137
28 Lebanon 137
28 Liberia 137
28 Mauritania 137
28 Papua New
Guinea
137
28 Paraguay 137
28 Russia 137
28 Uganda 137
26 Angola 146
26 Bangladesh 146
26 Guatemala 146
26 Honduras 146
26 Iran 146
26 Mozambique 146
26 Nigeria 146
25 Cameroon 153
25 Central African
Republic
153
25 Comoros 153
25 Tajikistan 153
25 Uzbekistan 153
24 Madagascar 158
24 Zimbabwe 158
23 Eritrea 160
22 Nicaragua 161
20 Cambodia 162
20 Chad 162
20 Iraq 162
19 Burundi 165
19 Congo 165
19 Turkmenistan 165
18 Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
168
18 Guinea Bissau 168
18 Haiti 168
18 Libya 168
17 Korea, North 172
16 Afghanistan 173
16 Equatorial Guinea 173
16 Sudan 173
16 Venezuela 173
15 Yemen 177
13 Syria 178
12 South Sudan 179
9 Somalia 180
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
3
Annex 121
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Corruption Perceptions Index 2019 reveals a staggering
number of countries are showing little to no improvement in
tackling corruption. Our analysis also suggests that reducing
big money in politics and promoting inclusive political
decision-making are essential to curb corruption.
180
The CPI scores 180 countries and territories by
their perceived levels of public sector corruption,
according to experts and business people.
100 is very clean and 0 is highly corrupt
COUNTRIES
SCORED
THE CPI USES A
SCALE FROM 0
TO 100
50/100 43/100
2/3 OF COUNTRIES SCORE BELOW THE AVERAGE SCORE IS
100
0
In the last year, anti-corruption
movements across the globe
gained momentum as millions of
people joined together to speak
out against corruption in their
governments.
Protests from Latin America,
North Africa and Eastern Europe
to the Middle East and Central
Asia made headlines as citizens
marched in Santiago, Prague,
Beirut, and a host of other cities
to voice their frustrations in
the streets.
From fraud that occurs at the
highest levels of government to
petty bribery that blocks access
to basic public services like health
care and education, citizens
are fed up with corrupt leaders
and institutions. This frustration
fuels a growing lack of trust in
government and further erodes
public confidence in political
leaders, elected officials and
democracy.
The current state of corruption
speaks to a need for greater
political integrity in many
countries. To have any chance of
curbing corruption, governments
must strengthen checks and
balances, limit the influence
of big money in politics and
ensure broad input in political
decision-making. Public policies
and resources should not be
determined by economic power
or political influence, but by fair
consultation and impartial budget
allocation.
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
4
Annex 121
Recommendations
Governments must promote the
separation of powers, strengthen
judicial independence and
preserve checks and balances.
For democracy to be effective
against corruption, governments
must ensure that elections are
free and fair. Preventing and
sanctioning vote-buying and
misinformation campaigns are
essential to rebuilding trust in
government and ensuring that
citizens can use their vote to
punish corrupt politicians.
To end corruption and restore trust in politics, it is imperative to prevent opportunities for political corruption and
to foster the integrity of political systems. Transparency International recommends:
Governments should protect
civil liberties and political rights,
including freedom of speech,
expression and association.
Governments should engage
civil society and protect citizens,
activists, whistleblowers and
journalists in monitoring and
exposing corruption.
In order to prevent excessive
money and influence in politics,
governments should improve
and properly enforce campaign
finance regulations. Political
parties should also disclose their
sources of income, assets and
loans, and governments should
empower oversight agencies
with stronger mandates and
appropriate resources.
Governments should promote
open and meaningful access to
decision-making and consult a
wider range of groups, beyond
well-resourced lobbyists and a
few private interests. Lobbying
activities should be public and
easily accessible.
Governments should reduce
the risk of undue influence in
policy-making by tightening
controls over financial and
other interests of government
officials. Governments should
also address “revolving doors”,
establish cooling-off periods
for former officials and ensure
rules are properly enforced and
sanctioned.
Governments should create
mechanisms to ensure that
service delivery and public
resource allocation are not driven
by personal connections or are
biased towards special interest
groups at the expense of the
overall public good.
REINFORCE CHECKS AND
BALANCES
STRENGTHEN ELECTORAL
INTEGRITY
EMPOWER CITIZENS
CONTROL POLITICAL
FINANCING
REGULATE LOBBYING
ACTIVITIES
MANAGE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
TACKLE PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT
$
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
5
Annex 121
GLOBAL HIGHLIGHTS
This year’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows corruption is
more pervasive in countries where big money can flow freely into
electoral campaigns and where governments listen only to the
voices of wealthy or well-connected individuals.
AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE
HIGHEST SCORING REGION LOWEST SCORING REGION
SINCE 2018 SINCE 2018
66/100 32/100
WESTERN EUROPE &
EUROPEAN UNION
SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
6
Annex 121
87/100
87/100
9/100
15/100
13/100
86/100
85/100
85/100
85/100
12/100
16/100
DENMARK
SINGAPORE
NEW ZEALAND
SOMALIA
SWEDEN
YEMEN
SYRIA
FINLAND
SOUTH SUDAN
SWITZERLAND
VENEZUELA
TOP
COUNTRIES
BOTTOM
COUNTRIES
GLOBAL AVERAGE
180
179
178
177
176
06
05
04
03
02
01
0 100
0 100
The index ranks 180 countries
and territories by their perceived
levels of public sector corruption,
according to experts and
business people. It uses a scale of
zero to 100, where zero is highly
corrupt and 100 is very clean.
More than two-thirds of countries
score below 50 on this year’s CPI,
with an average score of just 43.
Similar to previous years, the
data shows that despite some
progress, a majority of countries
are still failing to tackle public
sector corruption effectively.
The top countries are New
Zealand and Denmark, with
scores of 87 each, followed by
Finland (86), Singapore (85),
Sweden (85) and Switzerland (85).
Governments must urgently address the
corrupting role of big money in political
party financing and the undue influence
it exerts on our political systems.
Delia Ferreira Rubio
Chair
Transparency International
Photo: World Economic Forum / Benedikt von Loebell https://flic.kr/p/H4VYaw CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
The bottom countries are
Somalia, South Sudan and Syria
with scores of 9, 12 and 13,
respectively. These countries
are closely followed by Yemen
(15), Venezuela (16), Sudan
(16), Equatorial Guinea (16) and
Afghanistan (16).
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
7
Annex 121
RESULTS BY REGION
Average regional scores, with top and bottom performers in each region.
In the last eight years, only 22
countries significantly improved
their CPI scores, including Greece,
Guyana and Estonia. In the same
period, 21 countries significantly
decreased their scores, including
Canada, Australia and Nicaragua.
In the remaining 137 countries,
the levels of corruption show
little to no change.
* In these six examples, the country score
changed significantly between 2012 and
2019.
COUNTRIES IMPROVED*
COUNTRIES DECLINED*
22
21
Including:
Including:
Greece (+12)
Guyana (+12)
Estonia (+10)
Canada (-7)
Nicaragua (-7)
Australia (-8)
THE REMAINING COUNTRIES MADE
LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST CORRUPTION IN RECENT YEARS
Since 2012:
WESTERN EUROPE
& EU
Average score
Top: Denmark (87/100)
Bottom: Bulgaria (43/100)
MIDDLE EAST
& NORTH AFRICA
Average score
Top: United Arab Emirates (71/100)
Bottom: Syria (13/100)
SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
Average score
Top: Seychelles (66/100)
Bottom: Somalia (9/100)
EASTERN EUROPE
& CENTRAL ASIA
Average score
Top: Georgia (56/100)
Bottom: Turkmenistan (19/100)
ASIA PACIFIC
Average score
Top: New Zealand (87/100)
Bottom: Afghanistan (16/100)
AMERICAS
Average score
Top: Canada (77/100)
Bottom: Venezuela (16/100)
43 39
66 35
45
32
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
8
Annex 121
POLITICAL INTEGRITY
Keeping big money out of politics is essential to ensure political
decision-making serves the public interest and curb opportunities
for corrupt deals.
This year, our research highlights
the relationship between
politics, money and corruption.
Unregulated flows of big money
in politics also make public policy
vulnerable to undue influence.
Countries with stronger
enforcement of campaign finance
regulations have lower levels of
corruption, as measured by
the CPI.
Countries where campaign
finance regulations are
comprehensive and
systematically enforced have an
average score of 70 on the CPI,
whereas countries where such
regulations either don’t exist
or are poorly enforced score
an average of just 34 and 35
respectively.
Sixty per cent of countries that
significantly improved their
CPI scores since 2012 also
strengthened their enforcement
of campaign finance regulations.
In addition, when policy-makers
listen only to wealthy or politically
connected individuals and
groups, they often do so at the
expense of the citizens
they serve.
Countries with broader and more
open consultation processes
score an average of 61 on the CPI.
By contrast, where there is little
to no consultation, the average
score is just 32.
A vast majority of countries that
significantly declined their CPI
scores since 2012 do not engage
the most relevant political, social
and business actors in political
decision-making.
Countries with lower CPI scores
also have a higher concentration
of political power among wealthy
citizens.1 Across the board,
there is a concerning popular
perception that rich people buy
elections, both among some of
the lowest-scoring countries on
the CPI, as well as among certain
higher-scoring countries, such as
the United States.2
To have any chance of ending corruption
and improving peoples’ lives, we must tackle
the relationship between politics and big
money. All citizens must be represented
in decision-making.
Patricia Moreira
Managing Director
Transparency International
Photo: Transparency International CC BY 4.0 DE
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
9
Annex 121
100
80
60
40
20
0
34 35
55
70
DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS NOT
COMPREHENSIVE, BUT
ENFORCED
COMPREHENSIVE
REQUIREMENTS,
ENFORCED
CPI 2019
VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) 2019 “DISCLOSURE OF CAMPAIGN DONATIONS”
TRANSPARENCY IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Greater transparency of campaign donations is associated with lower levels of corruption. Each dot represents a country’s
CPI 2019 score and the circles represent the average CPI score as compared to the strength of enforcement.3
36 59 35
NO DISCLOSURE EXIST DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS WITH
UNCLEAR ENFORCEMENT
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SOUTH KOREA CÔTE D’IVOIRE
With a score of 36, Bosnia and
Herzegovina significantly declined
by six points on the CPI since
2012. The country also suffers
from weak enforcement of
campaign finance regulations.
During the 2018 elections,
political parties and civil society
organisations raised concerns
over voting irregularities, threats
against voters, the misuse of
public resources and unequal
access to the media.4
With a score of 59, South Korea
significantly improved by six
points on the CPI since 2016.
While a large share of funding
comes from private donations,
campaign contributions are well
regulated and the rules enforced.5
Many elected officials and
parliamentarians have lost their
offices or seats due to violations
of these regulations.
This year, Côte d’Ivoire scores
35 on the CPI, a significant
increase of six points since 2012.
Campaign finance regulations are
partially enforced in the country.
Since 2010, there have been few
complaints about irregularities in
elections. International observers
have deemed elections inclusive
and transparent, from the
candidate registration process to
vote counting.6
Annex 121
100
80
60
40
20
0
32
41
61
NO OR LITTLE CONSULTATION
WITHIN RULING PARTY
PLURAL POLITICAL CONSULTATION SOME OR MOST RELEVANT
POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND BUSINESS
ACTORS ARE CONSULTED
CPI 2019
VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) 2019 “RANGE OF CONSULTATION”
POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING
Broad consultation in political decision-making is associated with lower levels of corruption. Each dot represents a country’s CPI
2019 score and the circles represent the average CPI score as compared to the extent of consultation.7
22 38 39
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
11
NICARAGUA ECUADOR TURKEY
With a score of 22, Nicaragua
significantly declined by seven
points on the CPI since 2012.
There is little to no consultation
on political decisions with
political, social and business
groups in the country. Civil
society and opposition parties
are systematically excluded from
the policy process, while groups
critical of the government operate
in an increasingly restrictive
environment.8
Since 2016, Ecuador significantly
improved six points to earn
a score of 38 on the CPI this
year. Over the past two years,
the government rolled back
some restrictions on civil
society. Despite these positive
developments, the government
retains excessive regulatory
power over NGOs and it remains
to be seen how it responds to
recent protests in the country.9
This year, Turkey scores 39 on the
CPI, a significant decrease
of 10 points since 2012. There
is little space for consultative
decision-making in the country.
The government recently
cracked down on NGOs, closing
at least 1,500 foundations and
associations and seizing their
assets, while continuing to harass,
arrest and prosecute civil society
leaders.10
Annex 121
AMERICAS
With an average score of 43 for the fourth consecutive year, the
Americas region fails to make significant progress in the fight
against corruption.
32
43/100
COUNTRIES ASSESSED
AVERAGE REGIONAL
SCORE
TOP SCORERS BOTTOM SCORERS
HAITI
URUGUAY
NICARAGUA
CANADA
77/100
71/100
69/100
22/100
18/100
16/100
VENEZUELA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
While Canada is consistently a
top performer, with a score of 77
out of 100, the country dropped
four points since last year and
seven points since 2012. At the
bottom of the index, Venezuela
scores 16, which is also one of
the bottom five scores globally.
The region faces significant
challenges from political leaders
acting in their own self-interest at
the expense of the citizens they
serve. Specifically, political party
financing and electoral integrity
are big challenges.
For example, the Lava Jato
investigation,11 or “Operation Car
Wash”, which exposed corruption
spanning at least 10 countries in
Latin America, points to a surge
in illegal political contributions or
donations as part of one of the
biggest corruption scandals
in history.12
Odebrecht, the Brazilian
construction giant at the heart
of the case, was convicted for
paying US$1 billion in bribes over
the past 15 years, including to
political leaders in Brazil, Peru
and Argentina during elections.
With scores of 22 and 29
respectively, Nicaragua and
Mexico are significant decliners
on the CPI since 2012. Although
the recent Global Corruption
Barometer – Latin America and the
Caribbean13 highlights vote-buying
and other corruption issues in
Mexico, a recent anti-corruption
reform, along with a new, legally
autonomous attorney general’s
office are positive changes.14
In Nicaragua, social unrest and
human rights violations are on
the rise.15 Public services and
consultative decision-making are
sorely lacking in the country.
With a score of 40, Guyana is
a significant improver on the
CPI since 2012.16 While there
is still much work to do, the
government is demonstrating
political will to hold former
politicians accountable for the
misuse of state resources.
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Annex 121
United States (US)
With a score of 69, the United
States drops two points since last
year to earn its lowest score on
the CPI in eight years. This comes
at a time when Americans’ trust in
government is at an historic low
of 17 per cent,17 according to the
Pew Research Center.
The US faces a wide range of
challenges, from threats to its
system of checks and balances,18
Brazil
Corruption remains one of the
biggest impediments to economic
and social development in Brazil.
With a score of 35, Brazil remains
stagnated, with its lowest CPI
score since 2012.
After the 2018 national elections,
which were strongly influenced by
and the ever-increasing
influence of special interests
in government,19 to the use of
anonymous shell companies by
criminals, corrupt individuals
and even terrorists, to hide illicit
activities.20
While President Trump
campaigned on a promise of
“draining the swamp” and making
government work for more
than just Washington insiders
and political elites, a series
an anti-corruption agenda, Brazil
experienced a series of setbacks
to its legal and institutional anticorruption
frameworks.24 The
country also faced difficulties in
advancing wide-ranging reforms
to its political system.
Setbacks included a Supreme
Court injunction that virtually
paralysed Brazil’s anti-money
of scandals, resignations and
allegations of unethical behaviour
suggest that the “pay-to-play”
culture has only become more
entrenched.21 In December 2019,
the US House of Representatives
formally impeached President
Trump for abuse of power and
obstruction of Congress.22
laundering system25 and an illegal
inquiry that secretly targeted law
enforcement agents.26
Ongoing challenges include
growing political interference
with anti-corruption institutions
by President Bolsonaro, and
congressional approval of
legislation that threatens
the independence of law
enforcement agents and the
accountability of political parties.
COUNTRIES TO WATCH
A whistleblower complaint sparked the impeachment
process, providing a powerful reminder of the need to
protect, and expand, the legal and everyday environment for
whistleblowers and to avoid the shame and blame that often
ensues if their identities are revealed.23
Progress in Brazil’s anti-corruption agenda is at
risk and mounting impunity threatens to weaken
democracy and destabilise the country.
Photo: Michael Fleshman https://flic.kr/p/eJrGgh CC BY-NC 2.0
Photo: Mario Roberto Duran Ortiz/Wikimedia Commons
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
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Annex 121
ASIA PACIFIC
A regional average of 45, after many consecutive years of an
average score of 44, illustrates general stagnation across
the Asia Pacific.
31
45/100
COUNTRIES ASSESSED
AVERAGE REGIONAL
SCORE
TOP SCORERS BOTTOM SCORERS
NORTH KOREA
SINGAPORE
CAMBODIA
NEW ZEALAND
87/100
85/100
77/100
20/100
17/100
16/100
AFGHANISTAN
AUSTRALIA
Despite the presence of high
performers like New Zealand
(87), Singapore (85), Australia
(77), Hong Kong (76) and Japan
(73), the region hasn’t witnessed
substantial progress in anticorruption
efforts or results. In
addition, low performers like
Afghanistan (16), North Korea (17)
and Cambodia (20) continue to
highlight serious challenges
in the region.
While often seen as an engine
of the global economy, in
terms of political integrity and
governance, the region performs
only marginally better than the
global average. Many countries
see economic openness as a way
forward, however, governments
across the region, from China to
Cambodia to Vietnam, continue
to restrict participation in public
affairs, silence dissenting voices
and keep decision-making out
of public scrutiny.27
Given these issues, it comes as
no surprise that vibrant economic
powers like China (41), Indonesia
(40), Vietnam (37), the Philippines
(34) and others continue to
struggle to tackle corruption.
Even in democracies, such as
Australia28 and India29, unfair
and opaque political financing
and undue influence in decisionmaking
and lobbying by powerful
corporate interest groups, result
in stagnation or decline in control
of corruption.
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Annex 121
Indonesia
With a score of 40, Indonesia
improves by two points on
the CPI. A promising emerging
economy is coupled with
repression of civil society and
weak oversight institutions. The
independence and effectiveness
of Indonesia’s anti-corruption
Papua New Guinea
With a score of 28, Papua New
Guinea remains stagnant on
the CPI. However, despite low
performance on the CPI for
years, recent anti-corruption
developments are encouraging.
Following the removal of former
Prime Minister O’Neill, currently
being investigated for alleged
commission, the KPK, is
currently being thwarted by the
government.30
The Komisi Pemberantasan
Korupsi (KPK), is seen as
a symbol of progress and
modernisation, but is undergoing
a loss of autonomy and power.
Paradoxically, this contradicts
corruption, the government
instituted structural changes
and introduced new legislation
to establish an Independent
Commission against Corruption
(ICAC). Together, these small
improvements give citizens a
reason for optimism.
Under the current leadership
of Prime Minister Marape, the
government should uphold its
the government’s aspirations
and President Widodo’s own
agenda, which prioritises foreign
investment and a booming
economy.31 With corruption
issues in the limelight, Indonesia
risks scaring off investors and
slowing economic progress.
previous commitments, as well
as its 20-year anti-corruption
strategy established in 2012,
and work to investigate and
punish bribery, fraud, conflicts
of interest, nepotism and other
corrupt acts.
COUNTRIES TO WATCH
The re-election of President Joko Widodo was
a setback to political integrity that surprised
many, undercutting the impressive democratic
and anti-corruption resurgence the country
experienced in the last few years.32
More progress is needed to make real change in Papua
New Guinea and civil society organisations must remain
vigilant in holding the government accountable.
Photo: Adek Berry/AFP
Photo: David Gray/Reuters
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
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Annex 121
EASTERN EUROPE &
CENTRAL ASIA
Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the second-lowest performing
region on the CPI, with an average score of 35.
19
35/100
COUNTRIES ASSESSED
AVERAGE REGIONAL
SCORE
TOP SCORERS BOTTOM SCORERS
UZBEKISTAN
BELARUS
TAJIKISTAN
GEORGIA
56/100
45/100
45/100
25/100
25/100
19/100
TURKMENISTAN
MONTENEGRO
Across the region, countries
experience limited separation of
powers, abuse of state resources
for electoral purposes, opaque
political party financing and
conflicts of interest.33 34
Only three countries score above
the global average: Georgia (56),
Belarus (45) and Montenegro (45).
At the bottom of the region are
Turkmenistan (19), Uzbekistan
(25) and Tajikistan (25).
Strong political influence over
oversight institutions, insufficient
judicial independence and limited
press freedoms serve to create
an over-concentration of power in
many countries across the region.
Despite aspirations to join the
European Union, the scores in
six Western Balkan countries and
Turkey have not improved.
Turkey (39) declined significantly
by 10 points since 2012, while
Bosnia and Herzegovina (36)
declined by six points in the same
period. A lack of political will and
a decline in implementation of
laws and regulations are real
challenges.
Since 2012, Belarus (45),
Kyrgyzstan (30) and Uzbekistan
(25) have significantly improved
on the CPI. However, these three
post-Soviet states continue to
experience state capture and a
failure to preserve checks
and balances.
While Uzbekistan has loosened
some media restrictions,
it still remains one of the
most authoritarian regimes
worldwide.35
State capture and the
concentration of power in private
hands remain a major stumbling
block in the region. Corruption
can only be addressed effectively
if political leaders prioritise public
interests and set an example for
transparency.
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Annex 121
Armenia
With a score of 42, Armenia
improves by seven points since
last year. Following the revolution
in 2018 and the formation of
a new parliament, the country
has demonstrated promising
developments in advancing anticorruption
policy reforms.36
Kosovo
With a score of 36, Kosovo,
is experiencing a shift in
parliamentary power that could
offer an opportunity for change.
After years of criticising the
government and international
community in Kosovo for their
failure to address corruption,39
Despite these improvements,
conflicts of interests and nontransparent
and unaccountable
public operations remain
impediments to ending
corruption in the country.37
While improving political integrity
will take time and resources,
increasing public trust in law
the Self-Determination
(Vetevendosje) party, which
recently won a majority of
parliamentary seats, has a chance
to demonstrate its commitment
to combating corruption.40
During the election campaign,
the party was one of a few
that responded to requests
to disclose campaign costs.
enforcement and the judiciary
are critical first steps in ensuring
appropriate checks and balances
and improving anti-corruption
efforts.38
However, it remains to be
seen if a new government will
live up to a higher standard of
political integrity. It can do so by
abandoning the usual practice
of political appointments in
state-owned enterprises and
by establishing a strong legal
obligation for financial disclosure
by political parties.
COUNTRIES TO WATCH
In Armenia, political will and implementation
of anti-corruption policies are important, while
fundamental and urgent change of political
culture and governance is crucial.
In Kosovo, the new parliament has an opportunity to
reverse the shortcomings of the previous administration
and prioritise anti-corruption efforts.
Photo: Amnat Phuthamrong/shutterstock.com
Photo: Albinfo/Wikimedia Commons
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
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Annex 121
MIDDLE EAST &
NORTH AFRICA
With the same average score of 39 as last year, there is little
progress in improving control of corruption in the Middle East and
North Africa region.
18
39/100
COUNTRIES ASSESSED
AVERAGE REGIONAL
SCORE
TOP SCORERS BOTTOM SCORERS
YEMEN
QATAR
LIBYA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
71/100
62/100
18/100
15/100
13/100
SYRIA
With a score of 71, the United
Arab Emirates is the best regional
performer, followed by Qatar
(62). At the bottom of the region,
Syria scores 13, followed by
Yemen with a score of 15. Both
countries are significant decliners
on the CPI, with Yemen dropping
eight points since 2012 and Syria
dropping 13 points during the
same period.
The region faces significant
corruption challenges that
highlight a lack of political
integrity. According to our
recent report, Global Corruption
Barometer — Middle East and
North Africa, nearly one in two
people in Lebanon is offered
bribes in exchange for their votes,
while more than one in four
receives threats if they don’t vote
a certain way.41
In a region where fair and
democratic elections are
the exception, state capture
is commonplace. Powerful
individuals routinely divert public
funds to their own pockets at
the expense of ordinary citizens.
Separation of powers is another
challenge: independent judiciaries
with the potential to act as a
check on the executive branch
are rare or non-existent.42
To improve citizens’ trust in
government, countries must build
transparent and accountable
institutions and prosecute
wrongdoing. They should also
hold free and fair elections and
allow for citizen engagement and
participation in decision-making.
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Annex 121
Tunisia
With a score of 43, Tunisia
remains at a standstill on the
CPI despite advances in anticorruption
legislation over the
past five years. Recent laws
to protect whistleblowers and
improve access to information,
combined with stronger social
accountability and space for civil
society, are important steps, but
they are not enough.
Saudi Arabia
With a score of 53, Saudi Arabia
improved by four points since
last year. However, its score does
not reflect the myriad problems
in the country, including a dismal
human rights record and severe
restrictions on journalists, political
activists and other citizens.
For anti-corruption laws to
be effective, decrees and
implementing orders from the
executive branch are needed.
In addition, financial and human
resources are vital to strengthen
the country’s anti-corruption
commission and increase its
independence.
To date, few political leaders have
been prosecuted for corruption,43
and recovery of stolen assets is
In 2017, the Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammad Bin Salman carried
out an ”anti-corruption” purge as
part of his reform of the country.
Despite government claims of
recovering approximately US$106
billion of stolen assets,46 there
was no due process, transparent
investigation or fair and free trial
for suspects.47
slow.44 An independent judiciary
is another major challenge. While
the recent establishment of a
judiciary council is encouraging,
the council is not yet fully
operational and still lacks total
independence from the
legislative branch.45
This year, Saudi Arabia takes on
the presidency of the G20. As it
assumes this leadership role, the
country must end its crackdown
on civil liberties and strengthen
further checks on the executive
branch to foster transparency
and accountability.
COUNTRIES TO WATCH
In Tunisia, the lack of enforcement of laws and regulations is a
major challenge. Without proper implementation mechanisms and
administrative decrees, laws will remain ineffective.
The social and economic reforms that helped
improve Saudi Arabia’s business environment
and attract foreign investment came with a heavy
human rights price tag.
Photo: ColorMaker/Shutterstock.com
Photo: Faisal Nasser/Reuters
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
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Annex 121
SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
As the lowest-scoring region on the CPI, with an average of 32,
Sub-Saharan Africa’s performance paints a bleak picture of
inaction against corruption.
49
32/100
COUNTRIES ASSESSED
AVERAGE REGIONAL
SCORE
TOP SCORERS BOTTOM SCORERS
SOUTH SUDAN
BOTSWANA
SUDAN
SEYCHELLES
66/100
61/100
58/100
16/100
12/100
9/100
SOMALIA
CABO VERDE
With a score of 66, the Seychelles
earns the highest mark in the
region, followed by Botswana
(61), Cabo Verde (58), Rwanda (53)
and Mauritius (52). At the bottom
of the index are Somalia (9),
South Sudan (12), Sudan (16) and
Equatorial Guinea (16).
Significant improvers since 2012,
Cote d’Ivoire (35) and Senegal
(45) still have much work to do.
The political will demonstrated
by the leaders of both countries,
which saw a number of key legal,
policy and institutional reforms
implemented in their early days
in office, has been on a backslide
since 2016.
Since 2012, several countries,
including Congo (19), Liberia (28),
Madagascar (24) and Malawi (31)
have significantly declined on the
CPI. Congo has been the subject
of repeated reports of money
laundering and embezzlement
of public funds by the country’s
political elite48 with no action
taken by national authorities.49
In Madagascar, despite a 2018
constitutional court ruling against
electoral amendments favouring
the incumbent president and
cited as unconstitutional,
judicial independence remains
a concern.50 More recently, the
national anti-corruption agency
began legal action against
more than half of the country’s
parliamentarians, who stand
accused of taking bribes.51
Money is used to win elections,
consolidate power and further
personal interests. Although
the African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combatting
Corruption has provisions
to prevent corruption and
encourage transparency
in campaign financing,
implementation is weak.
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Annex 121
Angola
Following four decades of
authoritarian rule, Angola (26)
jumped seven points in this
year’s CPI, making it a significant
improver. However, given its
overall low score, the country is
still well below the global average
of 43.
Isabel Dos Santos, the former
president’s daughter, who is
Ghana
Known as a beacon of democracy
in West Africa, Ghana dropped
seven points on the CPI since
2014, moving from 48 in 2014 to
41 in 2019. Revelations of bribery
in Ghana’s high court in 201554
also known as “Africa’s richest
woman”, was fired from her job
as head of the state oil and gas
firm, Sonangol, months after
President Lourenço’s election. In
December 2019, as investigations
into corruption allegations
progressed, an Angolan court
ordered a freeze of Dos
Santos’s assets.52
Although the
country has
and the murder of investigative
journalist Ahmed Hussein-Suale
in early 201955 cast serious
doubts on the country’s anticorruption
efforts.
Despite these developments,
there is hope for change. In 2017,
recovered US$5 billion in stolen
assets, more needs to be done to
strengthen integrity and promote
transparency in accounting for
oil revenue.53
the Office of Special Prosecutor
was established, which has
the power to investigate and
prosecute cases of corruption. In
2019, a right to information bill
was also passed. These efforts,
combined with the enhanced
performance of the Auditor
General’s office, offer hope
for improvement.
COUNTRIES TO WATCH
Following a change of regime in 2017, the Angolan
government introduced a set of governance reforms to
crack down on corruption.
Given recent scandals, corruption is expected to
feature prominently in electoral debates during the
upcoming elections in 2020.
Photo: Stephen Eisenhammer/Reuters
Photo: demerzel21/iStockphoto.com
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Annex 121
WESTERN EUROPE
& EUROPEAN UNION
Fourteen of the top 20 countries in this year’s CPI are from Western
Europe and the European Union (EU), including nine countries
from the EU alone.
31
66/100
COUNTRIES ASSESSED
AVERAGE REGIONAL
SCORE
TOP SCORERS BOTTOM SCORERS
ROMANIA
FINLAND
HUNGARY
DENMARK
87/100
86/100
85/100
44/100
44/100
43/100
BULGARIA
SWEDEN
Despite being the best
performing region, with an
average score of 66 out of 100,
Western Europe and the EU are
not immune to corruption.
With 87 points, Denmark is the
highest-scoring country in the
region, followed by Finland (86),
Sweden (85) and Switzerland (85).
At the bottom of the region are
Bulgaria (43), Romania (44) and
Hungary (44).
With a score of 53, Italy increased
by 11 points since 2012 while
Greece (48) increased by 12
points during the same period.
Both countries experienced
concrete improvements, including
legislative progress in Italy with
the passage of anti-corruption
laws56 and the creation of an
anti-corruption agency57 in both
countries.
Most post-communist EU
member states are struggling to
address corruption effectively.
Several countries, including
Hungary, Poland and Romania,
have taken steps to undermine
judicial independence, which
weakens their ability to prosecute
cases of high-level corruption.58
In the Czech Republic (56),
recent scandals involving the
prime minister and his efforts
to obtain public money through
EU subsidies for his company
highlight a startling lack of
political integrity.59 The scandals
also point to an insufficient
level of transparency in political
campaign financing.
Issues of conflict of interest,
abuse of state resources for
electoral purposes, insufficient
disclosure of political party and
campaign financing, and a lack
of media independence are
prevalent and should take priority
both for national governments
and the EU.
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Annex 121
Malta
With a score of 54, Malta
is a significant decliner on
the CPI, dropping six points
since 2015. Given the “pair of
political machines [that] have
[for decades] operated with
impunity on the island”60 it’s no
wonder that two years after
Estonia
For the past decade, Estonia
(74) has seen a stable rise on
the CPI. A significant improver,
the country increased its
score by 10 points since 2012.
A comprehensive legislative
framework, independent
institutions and effective online
tools make it possible to reduce
the assassination of journalist
Daphne Caruana Galizia, who
was killed while reporting on
corruption, the country is still
mired in corruption.
Despite calls from Maltese
citizens, Caruana Galizia’s family
and the international community
to solve the case, the government
petty corruption and make
political party financing open
and transparent. There is a need,
however, to legally define and
regulate lobbying to prevent and
detect undue influence on
policy-making.
Although private sector
corruption is not captured
on the CPI, recent money
dragged its feet in the judicial
procedures. Several scandals
involving the Panama Papers,
the collapse of a Maltese bank
and the “golden visa” scheme
that sells Maltese citizenship to
wealthy overseas investors may
also contribute to Malta’s decline
on the CPI.
laundering scandals involving the
Estonian branch of Danske Bank
demonstrate a greater need for
integrity and accountability in the
banking and business sectors.61
The scandal also highlights a
need for better and stronger
EU-wide anti-money laundering
supervision.62
COUNTRIES TO WATCH
In Malta, corruption is undermining the rule of law.
A significant lack of political integrity contributes
to politicians and others hiding illicit wealth behind
secret companies.
The public institutions of Estonia are largely
characterised by high levels of integrity and
transparency.
Photo: Darrin Zammit Lupi/Reuters
Photo: Kollawat Somsri/shutterstock.com
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
23
Annex 121
TROUBLE AT THE TOP
Top scoring countries on the CPI like Denmark, Switzerland and
Iceland are not immune to corruption. While the CPI shows these
public sectors to be among the cleanest in the world, corruption
still exists, particularly in cases of money laundering and other
private sector corruption.
The Nordic economies stand
out as leaders on the CPI, with
Denmark (87), Finland (86),
Sweden (85), Norway (84) and
Iceland (78) taking five of the
top 11 places.
However, integrity at home
does not always translate into
integrity abroad, and multiple
scandals in 2019 demonstrated
that transnational corruption is
often facilitated, enabled and
perpetuated by seemingly clean
Nordic countries.
Despite some high-profile fines
and prosecutions, our research
shows that enforcement of
foreign bribery laws among OECD
countries is shockingly low.63
The outsized roles that some
companies play in their national
economies gives them political
support that too often triumphs
over real accountability. Some
banks and businesses aren’t just
too big to fail – they’re also too
powerful to pay. Anti-money
laundering supervision and
sanctions for breaches are often
disjointed and ineffective.
The CPI highlights where
stronger anti-corruption efforts
are needed across the globe. It
emphasises where businesses
should show the greatest
responsibility to promote
integrity and accountability,
and where governments must
eliminate undue influence from
private interests that can have a
devastating impact on sustainable
development.
ICELAND
78/100
NORWAY
84/100
CYPRUS
58/100
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
71/100
MAURITIUS
52/100
NAMIBIA
52/100 MARSHALL ISLANDS
ANGOLA
26/100
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
24
In November, the Fishrot Files
investigation revealed that
Samherji, one of Iceland’s largest
fishing conglomerates, allegedly
bribed government officials in
Namibia (52) and Angola (26) for
rights to massive fishing quotas.
The company established shell
companies in tax havens such
as the UAE (71), Mauritius (52),
Cyprus (58) and the Marshall
Islands, some of which were
allegedly used to launder the
proceeds of corrupt deals. Many
of the funds seem to have been
transferred through a Norwegian
state-owned bank, DNB.64
THE FISHROT FILES
bribery
illicit finances
Annex 121
SWEDEN
85/100
CHINA
41/100
VIETNAM
37/100
INDONESIA
40/100
KUWAIT
40/100
DJIBOUTI
30/100
CANADA
77/100
LIBYA
18/100
SWEDEN
85/100
GERMANY
80/100
DENMARK
87/100
ESTONIA
74/100
RUSSIA
28/100
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
25
In Canada (77), which drops
four points since last year, a
former executive of construction
company SNC-Lavalin was
convicted in December over
bribes the company paid in
Libya (18).
THE SNC-LAVALIN AFFAIR
Last year, Swedish telecoms giant,
Ericsson, agreed to pay over US$1
billion to settle a foreign bribery
case over its 16-year cash-forcontracts
campaign in China
(41), Djibouti (30), Kuwait (40),
Indonesia (40) and Vietnam (37).
This is the second largest fine
paid to US authorities.65
TELECOM BRIBERY
Following the money laundering
scandal at Danske Bank, the
largest bank in Denmark (87),
major banks like Swedbank in
Sweden (85) and Deutsche Bank
in Germany (80), were reportedly
investigated in 2019 for their role
in handling suspicious payments
from high-risk non-resident
clients, mostly from Russia (28),
through Estonia (74).
DANSKE BANK SCANDAL
bribery
bribery
illicit finances
Annex 121
METHODOLOGY
The Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI) aggregates data from a
number of different sources that
provide perceptions by businesspeople
and country experts of the
level of corruption in the public
sector. The following steps are
taken to calculate the CPI:
1. Select data sources. Each
data source used to construct
the CPI must fulfil the following
criteria to qualify as a valid
source:
+ Quantifies risks or
perceptions of corruption in
the public sector
+ Is based on a reliable and
valid methodology
+ Comes from a reputable
organisation
+ Allows for sufficient variation
of scores to distinguish
between countries
+ Ranks a substantial number
of countries
+ Considers only the
assessments of country
experts or businesspeople
+ Is regularly updated
The CPI 2019 is calculated using
13 different data sources from 12
different institutions that capture
perceptions of corruption within
the past two years.
2. Standardise data sources
to a scale of 0-100. This
standardisation is done by
subtracting the mean of each
source in the baseline year from
each country score, then dividing
by the standard deviation of that
source in the baseline year. This
subtraction and division using
the baseline year parameters
ensures that the CPI scores are
comparable year on year since
2012. After this procedure,
the standardised scores are
transformed to the CPI scale by
multiplying with the value of the
CPI standard deviation in 2012
(20) and adding the mean of CPI
in 2012 (45), so that the data set
fits the CPI’s 0-100 scale.
3. Calculate the average. For a
country or territory to be included
in the CPI, a minimum of three
sources must assess that country.
A country’s CPI score is then
calculated as the average of all
standardised scores available for
that country. Scores are rounded
to whole numbers.
4. Report the measure of
uncertainty. The CPI score is
accompanied by a standard error
and confidence interval. This
captures the variation across
the data sources available for a
country or territory.
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
26
Annex 121
ENDNOTES
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
27
1 Based on the variable Power
Distributed by social group
(v2pepwrsoc) in Varieties of Democracy,
https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/dataversion-
9/
2 Electoral Integrity Project,
Perceptions of US Electoral
Integrity, May 2019, https://www.
electoralintegrityproject.com/data
3 The data is taken from the
variable “v2eldonate” in the VDEM
dataset, which rates the disclosure
of campaign donations in national
election campaigns. The answers to
the question range from a scale of
0 for no disclosure requirements to
4 for comprehensive requirements
that are consistently observed and
enforced. For data visualization
purposes, categories 0 and 1 were
merged.
4 OSCE, Bosnia and Herzegovina
General Elections: ODIHR Election
Observation Mission Final Report, 2019,
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/
bih/389537
5 Kalinowski, T., Rhyu, S.Y. and
Croissant, A, South Korea Report:
Sustainable Governance Indicators
2019. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019,
https://www.sgi-network.org/2019/
South_Korea
6 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018
Country Report — Côte d’Ivoire.
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, https://
www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/
BTI/Downloads/Reports/2018/pdf/
BTI_2018_Cote_d_Ivoire.pdf
7 The data is taken from the
variable “v2dlconslt” in the VDEM
dataset, which rates the range of
consultation when policy changes
are being considered. The answers
to the question range from 0 for no
consultation to 5 for comprehensive
consultation exercises involving
all parts of the political spectrum
and other relevant actors (business
and civil society). For visualization
purposes the categories were merged
into three categories only, one for
consultation with groups close to the
government, one with political groups
not in the government and a last
category containing a broader range
of actors.
8 Freedom House, Freedom in the
World 2019: Nicaragua, February 2019,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2019/nicaragua
9 Freedom House, Freedom in the
World 2019: Ecuador, February 2019,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2019/ecuador
10 Freedom House, Freedom in the
World 2019: Turkey, February 2019,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2019/turkey
11 Transparency International,
25 corruption scandals that shook
the world, July 2019, https://www.
transparency.org/news/feature/25_
corruption_scandals
12 Deutsche Welle, Odebrecht bribed
across Latin America, December
2016, https://www.dw.com/en/
odebrecht-bribed-across-latinamerica/
a-36887600
13 Transparency International,
Global Corruption Barometer – Latin
America and the Caribbean, September
2019, https://www.transparency.
org/gcb10/latin-america-and-thecaribbean
14 Cámara De Diputados Del H.
Congreso De La Unión, Ley Orgánica
De La Fiscalía General De La República,
December 2018, http://www.
diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/
LOFGR_201218.pdf
15 Milken Institute Review,
Authoritarian Populism Loses Its Glow
in Nicaragua, July 2018, https://
www.milkenreview.org/articles/
authoritarian-populism-loses-its-glowin-
nicaragua
16 Thomas, Troy, Optimism
about fighting corruption in Guyana,
September 2019, https://voices.
transparency.org/optimism-aboutfighting-
corruption-in-guyanaf5307f402344
17 Pew Research Center. Public
Trust in Government: 1958-2019, April
2019, https://www.people-press.
org/2019/04/11/public-trust-ingovernment-
1958-2019/
18 The New York Times. Clash
Between Trump and House Democrats
Poses Threat to Constitutional Order,
May 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/05/07/us/politics/trumpdemocrats.
html
19 Open Secrets, Lobbying spending
reaches $3.4 billion in 2018, highest in
8 years, January 2019, https://www.
opensecrets.org/news/2019/01/
lobbying-spending-reaches-3-4-billionin-
18/
Annex 121
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
28
20 Fact Coalition, Incorporation
Transparency, https://thefactcoalition.
org/issues/incorporationtransparency
21 Bloomberg, Trump Team’s
Conflicts and Scandals: An Interactive
Guide, March 2019, https://www.
bloomberg.com/graphics/trumpadministration-
conflicts/
22 The New York Times. Trump
‘Ignored and Injured’ the National
Interest, Democrats Charge in
Impeachment Articles, December
2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/12/10/us/politics/trumpimpeachment-
articles.html
23 Politico. GOP Rep. Louie Gohmert
publicly identifies person purported
to be whistleblower, December
2019, https://www.politico.com/
news/2019/12/11/gohmertwhistleblower-
impeachment-083234
24 France, Guilherme, Brazil:
setbacks in the legal and institutional
anti-corruption frameworks.
Transparency International,
November 2019, https://www.
transparency.org/whatwedo/
publication/brazil_setbacks_in_
the_legal_and_institutional_anti_
corruption_frameworks
25 Martini, Maíra, Brazil’s Supreme
Court halts anti-money laundering
investigations, July 2019, https://
voices.transparency.org/the-role-offinancial-
intelligence-units-and-thefight-
against-corruption-in-brazile745f1c8e749
26 Folha de Sao Paulo, Dodge
compara STF a ‘tribunal de exceção’ e
vê inquérito das fake news como ilegal,
August 2019, https://www1.folha.
uol.com.br/poder/2019/08/dodgecompara-
stf-a-tribunal-de-excecaoe-
ve-inquerito-das-fake-news-comoilegal.
shtml
27 Freedom House, Regions: Asia-
Pacific, 2019, https://freedomhouse.
org/regions/asia-pacific
28 The Conversation, Australia’s
political lobbying regime is broken
and needs urgent reform, September
2018, https://theconversation.
com/australias-political-lobbyingregime-
is-broken-and-needs-urgentreform-
123003
29 Quartz, Here’s why India’s electoral
bonds make political funding even more
opaque, April 2019, https://qz.com/
india/1593577/modis-electoral-bondsmake-
2019-indian-election-fundingopaque/
30 Asia Times, End of an anticorruption
era in Indonesia, January
2020, https://www.asiatimes.
com/2020/01/article/end-of-an-anticorruption-
era-in-indonesia/
31 Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Jokowi 2.0:
Policy, Politics, and Prospects for
Reform, October 2019, https://www.
csis.org/analysis/jokowi-20-policypolitics-
and-prospects-reform
32 The Jakarta Post, Indonesia
has reasons for optimism despite
democratic setbacks, December
2019, https://www.thejakartapost.
com/news/2019/12/10/indonesiahas-
reasons-for-optimism-despitedemocratic-
setbacks.html
33 Brookings Institution, The
Anatomy Of Illiberal States: Assessing
And Responding To Democratic Decline
In Turkey And Central Europe, February
2019, https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2019/02/illiberalstates-
web.pdf
34 International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
The Global State of Democracy 2019,
November 2019, https://www.idea.int/
publications/catalogue/global-stateof-
democracy-2019
35 Freedom House, Freedom in
the World 2019: Uzbekistan, February
2019, https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/2019/
uzbekistan
36 OCCRP, Armenia Continues
Systemic Anti-Corruption Campaign,
July 2018, https://www.occrp.org/
en/27-ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/8395-
armenia-continues-systemic-anticorruption-
campaign
37 OECD, Anti-corruption reforms
in Armenia: 4th round of monitoring
of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action
Plan, July 2018, https://www.oecd.org/
corruption/acn/OECD-ACN-Armenia-
4th-Round-Monitoring-Report-July-
2018-ENG.pdf
38 Transparency International
Armenia, Statement on International
Anti-corruption Day, December 2019,
https://transparency.am/en/news/
view/2943
39 Financial Times, Kosovo ‘enslaved
from within’ by corruption, says
incoming PM, December 2019, https://
www.ft.com/content/ddc2f794-060e-
11ea-a984-fbbacad9e7dd
40 Al Jazeera, ‘New chapter’:
What a left-wing victory means for
Kosovo, October 2019, https://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/features/
chapter-left-wing-victory-meanskosovo-
191007084722337.html
41 Transparency International,
Global Corruption Barometer – Middle
East and North Africa 2019, December
2019, https://www.transparency.org/
gcb10/middle-east-and-north-africa
42 International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
The Global State of Democracy 2019,
November 2019, https://www.idea.int/
publications/catalogue/global-stateof-
democracy-2019
43 Independent Arabia, We are
headed towards a “mafia state”, May
2019, http://bit.ly/2sssRW8
44 Mosaique FM, Rahmani: These
are the reasons for the slow pace of the
recovery of looted funds, June 2019,
http://bit.ly/2FL8aaQ
45 Al-Quds-Al-Arabi, Was the
independence of the judicial council
achieved after the revolution?,
September 2019, http://bit.ly/30lsidi
46 The Guardian, Saudi Arabia
claims anti-corruption purge recouped
$100bn, January 2018, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/
anti-corruption-purge-nets-morethan-
100bn-saudi-arabia-claims
Annex 121
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019
29
47 Human Rights Watch, Saudi
Arabia: Clarify Status of ‘Corruption’
Detainees, February 2019, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/18/
saudi-arabia-clarify-status-corruptiondetainees
48 Quartz, Congo Brazzaville’s ‘first
son’ laundered $50 million through six
European countries – report, August
2019, https://qz.com/africa/1682083/
congo-brazzaville-president-sonaccused-
of-laundering-50m/
49 Freedom House, Freedom in
the World 2019: Republic of Congo,
February 2019, https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/2019/
congo-republic-brazzaville
50 Freedom House, Freedom in the
World 2019: Madagascar, February
2019, https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/2019/
madagascar
51 OCCRP, Over Half of Madagascar’s
MPs Accused of Corruption, May 2019,
https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/9765-
over-half-of-madagascar-s-mp-saccused-
of-corruption
52 Reuters, Angola hits ‘Princess’ dos
Santos with asset freeze, December
2019, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-angola-corruption/angolahits-
princess-dos-santos-with-assetfreeze-
idUSKBN1YZ0IB
53 Al Jazeera, Angola recovers more
than $5bn in stolen assets, December
2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2019/12/angola-recovers-5bnstolen-
assets-191217172830128.html
54 Reuters, Ghana suspends
seven high court judges over
corruption accusations, October
2015, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-ghana-judiciary/ghanasuspends-
seven-high-court-judgesover-
corruption-accusationsidUSKCN0S002U20151006
55 BBC News, Murder in Accra: The
life and death of Ahmed Hussein-Suale,
January 2019, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-47002878
56 Reuters, Italy parliament approves
corruption crackdown in win for 5-Star,
December 2018, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-italy-corruption-law/
italy-parliament-approves-corruptioncrackdown-
in-win-for-5-staridUSKBN1OH25B
57 OCCRP, Greece: New Government
Forms Anti-Graft Body, August 2018,
https://www.occrp.org/en/27-ccwatch/
cc-watch-briefs/10588-greece-newgovernment-
forms-anti-graft-body
58 Reuters, EU targets Poland,
Romania with defense of judicial
independence, April 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-eupoland-
judiciary/eu-targets-polandromania-
with-defense-of-judicialindependence-
idUSKCN1RF14V
59 Transparency International,
European commission confirms Czech
Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has conflict
of interest, June 2019, https://www.
transparency.org/news/pressrelease/
european_commission_confirms_
czech_prime_minister_andrej_babish_
has_conflic
60 The Guardian, Malta’s corruption
is not just in the heart of government,
it’s the entire body, December 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/dec/03/maltacorruption-
daphne-caruana-galiziamurder
61 Martini, Maíra, Why Danske Bank
Estonia appears in so many moneylaundering
scandals, August 2018,
https://voices.transparency.org/
why-danske-bank-estonia-appears-inso-
many-money-laundering-scandals-
424047fe987c
62 Brillaud, Laure and Martini,
Maíra, The case for an EU anti-money
laundering agency is clear: will the EU
take action?, December 2019, https://
voices.transparency.org/the-case-foran-
eu-anti-money-laundering-agencyis-
clear-will-the-eu-take-actiona12133d59896
63 Dell, Gillian and McDevitt,
Andrew, Exporting Corruption -
Progress Report 2018: Assessing
enforcement of the OECD antibribery
convention. Transparency
International, September 2018,
https://www.transparency.org/
whatwedo/publication/exporting_
corruption_2018
64 Stundin, An Icelandic fishing
company bribed officials in Namibia
and used Norway’s largest bank to
transfer 70 million dollars to a tax
haven, November 2019, https://
stundin.is/grein/9920/?sfns=mo
65 BBC News, Sweden’s Ericsson to
pay over $1bn to settle US corruption
probe, December 2019, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-
50695438
Annex 121
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Annex 121
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Annex 121
Annex 122
“Somalia corruption report”, Risk & Compliance Portal Powered by GAN, July 2020
Somalia Corruption Report
! LAST UPDATED: JULY 2020
Snapshot
Somalia ranks among the world’s most corrupt countries. Insecurity is also a major issue; the ongoing
instability greatly restricts business. Corrupt government officials tolerate illegal activities in return for
bribes. Dysfunctional institutions facilitate an environment of lawlessness, and the absence of any form
of regulatory framework hinders prospects of economic competitiveness. Business is based
on patronage networks, and tight monopolies dominate the market. Somalia’s Provisional
Constitution criminalizes several forms of corruption (including abuse of
office, embezzlement and bribery); however, implementation is non-existent. The governing elite is
continuously involved in allegations of embezzlement of public funds from the already meager Somalian
coffers. Finally, bribery is commonplace in all sectors, and procurement contracts frequently involve
corruption.
Quick Links RISK
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LOW MODERATELY
LOW
MODERATE MODERATELY
HIGH
HIGH
COUNTRY
RISK
REPORTS
""
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AUTOMATING
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Annex 122
Judicial System
Businesses face a high corruption risk when dealing with the courts. The
institution is subject to political interference and suffers from high levels
of corruption, rendering it ineffective (HRR 2015; FitW 2015). Civil courts
in Somalia are practically nonfunctional; a combination of traditional and
customary, sharia and formal law guide the institution and in some local
courts depend on dominant local clans for establishing authority (BTI
2016). Court orders are not respected by Somalian authorities (HRR
2015).
Police
Corruption is rife within the security apparatus. Impunity is widespread,
and authorities do not maintain effective control over the police force
(HRR 2015). In addition, the police are ineffective (HRR 2015). To stay
protected from crime, companies in Somalia are forced either to
cooperate with violent groups or to arm themselves against threats (BTI
2016).
The Somali National Army is the country’s most important security
institution. It suffers rampant corruption: Army leaders have
systematically inflated troop numbers to obtain greater funding.
Furthermore, family and business ties link officials responsible for
provisions and the companies contracted to provide the food rations
(worth USD 8 million per year) (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015). Cases of
corruption and misappropriation within the army led President Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud to order the replacement of the chief of the armed
forces in 2015 (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015).
Public Services
In 1991, Somalia’s state institutions witnessed a complete collapse, and
efforts to rebuild the country’s public administrations since have been
modest due to ongoing armed conflict and rampant corruption (BTI
2016). There are no legal or institutional frameworks regulating the
market in Somalia, thus market competition is absent and the economy is
controlled by patronage networks with close ties to the ruling elite (BTI
2016).
Land Administration
Judicial System "
Police "
Public Services "
Land Administration "
Tax Administration "
Customs Administration "
Public Procurement "
Natural Resources "
Legislation "
Civil Society "
Sources "
Annex 122
Somali authorities are incapable of protecting property rights (BTI 2016).
The construction boom the country is currently witnessing has further
fueled conflict as title deeds are either unavailable or forged (BTI 2016).
Forced evictions by both private and public actors, coupled with the
absence of land deeds and corruption, will most likely further exacerbate
land conflict in the future (BTI 2016). The country has no functioning land
registry (BTI 2016).
Tax Administration
The tax administration is absent in Somalia, and most businesses operate
in the informal sector and thus go untaxed (BTI 2016). The government
lacks the capacity both to collect taxes and to control the country’s
territory, parts of which are under the rule of rebel groups (BTI 2016). This
has allowed rebel leaders and warlords to establish their unique tax
collection system from traders and businessmen operating in areas under
their control (BTI 2016).
Customs Administration
Businesses are likely to face extensive corruption in the customs sector.
Bribery is common when clearing goods through the Mogadishu port
(Hiiran Online, Jan. 2015). Generally, the diversion of revenue from ports
is very common; for instance, revenue from the Mogadishu port totaled
more than USD 5.5 million per month during 2013 (to put this in
perspective, the Somali central bank in 2014 received an average of USD
4.6 million per month) (HRR 2014).
Trade in counterfeit goods is widespread at Somalia’s borders and has also
served as a source of financing for armed rebels such as Al-Shabab (BTI
2016).
Public Procurement
Public procurement in Somalia holds high corruption risks for business.
The majority of public tenders are treated as confidential (BTI 2016).
“Secret contracting,” where officials close public procurement deals in
complete absence of transparency and oversight, is a common practice
(HRR 2015). Reportedly, some regional entities have closed contracts with
oil companies independently from the government (BTI 2016).
Public funds are found to be frequently diverted and misappropriated
Annex 122
due to corruption (HRR 2015). In one major case, it was found that
approximately 80% of payment transfers made by the central bank of
Somalia was to private persons for non-business purposes (BTI 2016; HRR
2015). Government officials with close ties to the president also actively
used the central bank to control overseas recovered assets including cash
and gold held in banks during the Somalian civil war as well as government
property abroad (HRR 2015, HRR 2014). The bank’s governor resigned
after details of the case were revealed in 2013. His predecessor,
appointed by the President, also resigned weeks later due to heavy
political interference and corruption (BTI 2016). The case has triggered
the government to set up a Financial Governance Committee to restore
the trust of international donors. The committee is responsible for
controlling corruption and securing transparency in the handling of public
assets; however, only a small proportion of government contracts
are shared with the committee (BTI 2016).
Natural Resources
The natural resources industries are jeopardized by corruption and
insecurity. The sector is almost completely unregulated; the petroleum
industry is particularly problematic (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015).
Several members of the political elite have signed extractive industry
contracts with international companies in secret (BTI 2016). Furthermore,
growing hostility over resource-sharing between the federal government
and regional administrations has driven the latter to sign oil and gas
contracts independently of the federal government (UN Security Council,
Oct. 2015).
Licensing in the natural resources sector is also challenged by the absence
of a regulatory system and widespread corruption. International energy
companies have obtained oil exploration licenses from different local and
national authorities (BTI 2016). Evidence also suggests that the Somalian
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources has been transferring money
acquired from selling fishing licenses into a private ministerial bank
account in Djibouti (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015).
In one ongoing corruption case, the British company Soma Oil & Gas
Holdings Ltd. is being investigated by the UK Serious Fraud Office for
corruption in Somalia. The company allegedly made salary payments to
Somali oil officials totaling USD 500,000. The company claims that the
UN monitoring group has misunderstood the intention of the payments,
which were meant for funding a capacity-building program in Somalia
(Mail & Guardian Africa, Oct. 2015).
Legislation
Annex 122
The country’s legal framework relies on the Provisional Constitution,
which criminalizes abuse of office, bribery of national and foreign officials,
embezzlement and trading in influence. However, the government
does not implement anti-corruption laws effectively, and officials engage
in corruption with impunity (HRR 2015). Governance in Somalia is, to a
large extent, based on informal mechanisms and institutions, which are in
turn, based on patronage and clientelistic networks serving personal
interests and affiliations (BTI 2016). International funding has further
consolidated the current structure of government, and senior officials
are often involved in accusations of corruption and embezzlement of
foreign funds (BTI 2016). Neither appointed nor elected officials are
subject to financial disclosure laws (HRR 2015).
State-building is hampered by large-scale corruption and
misappropriation of public funds (BTI 2016). There is no developed
revenue system in Somalia. International funding and payments made at
sea and airports are the main sources of revenue for the country, but
there is no transparency in the collection or distribution of these funds
(BTI 2016). The country’s institutions are dysfunctional, and there are no
integrity mechanisms in place to curb corruption. Somalia has signed but
not yet ratified or acceded to the African Union Convention on
Combatting and Preventing Corruption. Somalia is not signatory to
the UN Convention against Corruption.
Civil Society
Freedoms of speech and press are protected under the Constitution, but
these rights are completely violated in practice; Somalia ranks among the
most dangerous countries in the world for journalists (HRR 2014; FotP
2015). Several journalists were killed both in 2013 and 2014 (BTI 2016).
Traditions of social engagement are strong in Somalia, and these have
further prospered since the onset of the Somalian civil war as the state’s
collapse made social network structures vital for survival (BTI 2016).
Furthermore, foreign funding has also encouraged the creation of
numerous NGOs (BTI 2016). Nonetheless, NGOs are not effectively
consulted by the government. Further, armed opposition groups such as
Al-Shabab undermine freedoms of association, and civil society activists
are often the victims of attacks (BTI 2016).
Sources
Annex 122
Annex 1
“2020 Ibrahim index of African governance, index report”, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020
30.2 64.9 32.7 18.5 59.5 31.0 81.2 76.2 52.4 35.1 16.2 18.5 100.0
45.1 66.7 45.3 36.5 74.1 52.8 66.5 66.7 76.1 47.2 25.6 44.0 59.2
18.1 100.0 18.1 28.6 69.4 46.1 87.5 11.2 58.3 63.9 11.1 52.6 100.0
22.0 80.3 22.3 30.6 33.3 22.6 45.4 22.4 31.2 22.9 10.5 27.3 50.0
18.9 99.2 27.7 58.9 23.6 87.5 48.7 44.9 49.0 57.4 14.6 28.7 32.6
38.4 59.2 26.0 42.3 56.7 60.2 63.8 84.9 57.6 59.6 24.1 44.7 58.6
27.4 71.4 26.2 35.7 60.7 63.1 66.7 100.0 56.0 59.5 21.4 42.5 50.0
46.3 31.9 50.1 36.9 60.9 63.4 80.1 73.5 54.8 43.9 13.1 38.0 84.5
49.0 100.0 33.3 71.2 59.7 59.8 78.7 86.2 59.4 45.2 17.9 49.2 77.8
25.0 70.8 0.0 50.5 62.5 65.0 12.5 64.5 75.0 62.0 37.5 47.4 12.5
44.6 21.9 20.3 17.1 39.7 50.0 80.9 100.0 42.6 87.2 30.8 46.7 68.0
50.4 73.6 44.1 42.3 66.1 55.0 72.8 68.5 57.4 50.7 30.2 47.2 76.2
87.4 77.4 81.2 57.6 90.8 53.5 85.3 76.2 59.6 56.3 56.2 55.6 89.4
98.7 51.9 99.8 41.8 98.7 45.8 100.0 83.0 53.6 47.6 85.1 58.8 100.0
88.8 92.2 84.3 41.0 92.6 26.9 93.8 83.1 26.0 20.1 6.3 38.9 100.0
99.8 85.1 99.5 49.9 99.9 82.5 99.8 91.2 92.9 85.0 68.6 79.2 100.0
49.8 66.9 40.7 67.1 73.8 76.8 68.5 70.6 43.5 73.2 32.2 67.1 71.9
99.7 93.3 81.8 70.7 89.2 59.5 64.6 87.8 81.8 67.9 89.0 65.3 75.2
48.8 75.0 39.9 75.0 64.7 29.6 76.4 41.5 59.0 44.2 24.8 24.1 88.5
36.3 75.7 50.9 34.7 70.9 58.2 87.5 68.7 69.8 41.5 32.4 52.7 93.5
1.6 69.3 39.4 25.5 47.6 68.4 67.4 64.6 65.8 45.7 1.8 52.1 98.2
65.8 73.7 29.6 35.6 47.4 39.3 75.8 36.2 50.3 21.1 21.1 31.9 81.5
69.1 90.2 56.3 42.7 89.4 66.5 68.5 78.7 64.6 41.1 33.3 50.3 100.0
62.8 91.8 31.1 47.8 58.3 64.1 67.9 91.4 44.2 73.8 28.7 79.1 67.6
57.4 53.2 32.0 22.1 74.7 52.8 91.3 72.4 59.1 26.0 31.5 50.2 90.2
26.9 82.2 29.2 34.6 52.0 48.0 65.9 44.3 53.4 45.3 15.6 35.6 68.4
30.2 64.9 32.7 18.5 59.5 31.0 81.2 76.2 52.4 35.1 16.2 18.5 100.0
45.1 66.7 45.3 36.5 74.1 52.8 66.5 66.7 76.1 47.2 25.6 44.0 59.2
18.1 100.0 18.1 28.6 69.4 46.1 87.5 11.2 58.3 63.9 11.1 52.6 100.0
22.0 80.3 22.3 30.6 33.3 22.6 45.4 22.4 31.2 22.9 10.5 27.3 50.0
18.9 99.2 27.7 58.9 23.6 87.5 48.7 44.9 49.0 57.4 14.6 28.7 32.6
38.4 59.2 26.0 42.3 56.7 60.2 63.8 84.9 57.6 59.6 24.1 44.7 58.6
27.4 71.4 26.2 35.7 60.7 63.1 66.7 100.0 56.0 59.5 21.4 42.5 50.0
46.3 31.9 50.1 36.9 60.9 63.4 80.1 73.5 54.8 43.9 13.1 38.0 84.5
49.0 100.0 33.3 71.2 59.7 59.8 78.7 86.2 59.4 45.2 17.9 49.2 77.8
25.0 70.8 0.0 50.5 62.5 65.0 12.5 64.5 75.0 62.0 37.5 47.4 12.5
44.6 21.9 20.3 17.1 39.7 50.0 80.9 100.0 42.6 87.2 30.8 46.7 68.0
65.8 73.7 29.6 35.6 47.4 39.3 75.8 36.2 50.3 21.1 21.1 31.9 81.5
69.1 90.2 56.3 42.7 89.4 66.5 68.5 78.7 64.6 41.1 33.3 50.3 100.0
62.8 91.8 31.1 47.8 58.3 64.1 67.9 91.4 44.2 73.8 28.7 79.1 67.6
57.4 53.2 32.0 22.1 74.7 52.8 91.3 72.4 59.1 26.0 31.5 50.2 90.2
26.9 82.2 29.2 34.6 52.0 48.0 65.9 44.3 53.4 45.3 15.6 35.6 68.4
30.2 64.9 32.7 18.5 59.5 31.0 81.2 76.2 52.4 35.1 16.2 18.5 100.0
2020 Ibrahim
Index of African
Governance
Index Report
MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION
_
Participation, Rights & Inclusion: deterioration over the
past decade, at twice the speed since 2015, drives the first
ever year-on-year decline at the overall governance level
All components decline over the decade, but trends differ
from 2015 onwards
More than half the countries follow a path of increasing
deterioration from 2015
• Participation: the most declined of the IIAG’s 16 subcategories
since 2015
• Rights: the second most declined IIAG sub-category
over the decade and since 2015
• Inclusion & Equality: bouncing back in the latest five
years within a decade of decline
• Gender: bouncing back in the latest five years and
highest scoring sub-category in Participation, Rights
& Inclusion in 2019
Security & Rule of Law: continued deterioration
over the past decade, albeit slower since 2015
Very diverse performances within the category
At country level: worrying trends for some of the
better performers
• Security & Safety: the 2019 best scoring yet most
declined IIAG sub-category
• Rule of Law & Justice: marginal progress over the
decade already under threat
• Accountability & Transparency: progress on hold for
the lowest scoring sub-category in 2019
• Anti-Corruption: accelerating improvement but still
the second lowest scoring IIAG sub-category
Human Development: slowing improvement since 2015
and first ever year-on-year decline mirror the trajectory
of Overall Governance in 2019
Deteriorating Social Protection, as well as slowing
improvement in Health and Education drive the slowdown
Human Development is the category where most countries
follow a path of slowing Improvement
• Health: still second highest scoring in 2019 and second
most improved IIAG sub-category over the decade, but
progress has slowed since 2015
• Education: progress has marginally slowed since 2015
36
36
36
38
39
41
43
48
48
48
50
51
53
54
58
58
58
60
62
Overall Governance: the first ever year-on-year decline
in 2019
Over the decade, while Human Development and Foundations
for Economic Opportunity lead the way, Security & Rule of Law
and Participation, Rights & Inclusion have stalled
The majority of countries have improved over the decade,
however almost half register a decline in 2019
Ranks are not a definite given: some high-ranking countries
follow a deteriorating path, while some low-ranking ones
feature among the largest improvers
Unbalanced governance progress: only eight countries
manage to improve in all four categories over the decade
Tell-tale correlations: besides balance, rule of law, justice,
inclusion and equality are the common denominators among
best performers
Spotlight: Regional discrepancies: Northern Africa is on
the up while Central Africa, the lowest scoring region, is
falling behind
Spotlight: What can the 2020 IIAG results tell us about
the impact of COVID-19 on Africa?
22
23
25
25
26
28
30
32
The 2020 IIAG findings
The IIAG in-depth review
A new framework and three main new features
1. The new IIAG framework encompasses additional
governance dimensions
2. A better-balanced structure and mainly clustered indicators
3. Africa’s citizens’ voices are more prominently highlighted
Spotlight: Data gaps: still a lot to be done
8
8
9
10
11
12
The IIAG’s in-depth review:
background and main changes
>
>
SECTION 01
SECTION 02
• Social Protection: concerning trends for the fourth lowest
scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019 and the only one in
Human Development to have declined since 2010
• Sustainable Environment: the only IIAG sub-category where
every single indicator improved over the whole decade
Foundations for Economic Opportunity: IIAG’s most
improved category since 2010
All sub-categories have improved over the decade, with
the largest progress in Infrastructure
All countries but three have improved over the decade
• Infrastructure: though still low scoring in 2019, it is
the best trending IIAG sub-category over the decade
• Business Environment: better access to financial
services drives progress
• Public Administration: almost at standstill as 31
countries have shown signs of deterioration since 2015
• Rural Sector: the best scoring sub-category in
Foundations for Economic Opportunity
64
66
70
70
71
72
73
74
75
Country list
Country Scorecards
Notes
84
86
140
Public Perception of Overall Governance: 2019 score
is the lowest of the decade
Public perceptions of governance have declined in most
countries over the decade and since 2015
All four sub-sections record the lowest scores of the decade
79
79
79
Citizens’ Voices
Annex
>
>
SECTION 03
The IIAG’s
in-depth review:
background
and main changes
>
SECTION 01
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
55.0
53.5
45.8
26.9
82.5
76.8
59.5
29.6
58.2
68.4
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
8
The IIAG in-depth review A new framework and three main
new features
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation defines governance as the
provision of political, social, economic and environmental
public goods and services that every citizen has the right to
expect from their government, and that a government has
the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.
Published since 2007, the Ibrahim Index of African
Governance (IIAG) assesses governance performance in 54
African countries over the latest available ten-year period.
It provides a framework and dashboard for any interested
audience to assess the delivery of public goods and services
and public policy outcomes in African countries.
The IIAG constitutes the most comprehensive dataset
measuring African governance, providing scores and trends
for African countries on a whole spectrum of thematic
governance dimensions, from security to justice, to rights
and economic opportunity, to health and environment.
The IIAG dataset and online and Excel data portals provide
average scores and trends at country level as well as for the
continent, African geographical regions or Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) or specific groups.
The first of its kind when launched dedicated to Africa
and governance, the IIAG remains one of the few, among
a growing proliferation of indices, solely focused on Africa,
encompassing governance in a broad sense.
Since 2007, both the data and governance landscapes
have evolved hugely. To take into account those changes,
a thorough review of the IIAG, the first of this depth since
its inception, was conducted between 2018 and 2020,
providing a completely re-worked framework for the next
iterations of the IIAG.
This comprehensive review updated the theoretical
framework and data for the IIAG, based on a review of the
most recent and relevant literature and data sources and
on consultations with the IIAG Advisory Council, the
Foundation’s Board, experts and practitioners, as well as
each of the IIAG data sources.
The increased availability of data has also strengthened the
robustness of IIAG indicators: nearly 90% of them are now
based on more than one source or variable as opposed to
less than half of the indicators in the 2018 IIAG, therefore
mitigating the ‘one source or variable bias’. Composite scores
constitute a key added value of the new IIAG dataset.
The 2018-2020 IIAG in-depth review:
• In-depth review of governancerelated
literature and data sources
• Consultations with Board members,
IIAG Advisory Council, experts and
practitioners
• Consultations with each of the IIAG
data sources
A new IIAG framework with three
main new features:
More dimensions covered –
reflecting the evolution of the
governance landscape
More data but clustered
indicators – for a more valid and
reliable measure of governance
A new section dedicated to
Citizens’ Voices – to give more
prominence to the end recipients
of governance
1
2
3
9
2020 IIAG: Index Report
1. The new IIAG framework encompasses
additional governance dimensions
As defined and covered by the IIAG, public governance
encompasses the ‘basket’ of political, social, economic and
environmental public goods and services that any 21st century
citizen is entitled to receive from their government, and that
any 21st century government is expected to deliver to its citizens.
Since the IIAG inception in 2007, the data and governance
landscapes have both significantly evolved, with a larger
debate on governance and better availability of data.
The definition of governance that has been chosen and confirmed
by MIF’s Board, aims at fully reflecting citizens’ expectations
towards their governments. In today’s world, these have largely
expanded, amplified by the 21st century’s multiplying challenges
and Africa’s specific young and urbanising demography to include
demands for political participation, solidarity, protection against
various criminal threats, jobs, business-enabling environments,
climate change mitigation and food security, to name a few.
As a result of this, while the first iterations of the IIAG were mainly focused on traditional public services, such as security or
education, the 2020 IIAG is now encompassing new areas such as environmental sustainability, digital rights, inequality mitigation
and social protection.
The updated IIAG framework includes three new sub-categories, Anti-Corruption, Inclusion & Equality and Sustainable Environment.
Meanwhile, thanks to shared efforts and strong advocacy, relevant data on Africa have slowly become more robust and available from
being concerningly scarce some ten years ago, resulting in a stronger IIAG.
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector
Public Procurement Procedures
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector
•
•
•
•
•
Anti-Corruption
•
•
•
•
•
Inclusion & Equality
Equal Political Power
Equal Political Representation
Equal Civil Liberties
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity
Equal Access to Public Services
•
•
•
•
•
Sustainable Environment
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability
Enforcement of Environmental Policies
Air Quality
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests
Land & Water Biodiversity
Inclusion of new or wider
IIAG dimensions:
• anti-corruption
• judicial processes
• inclusion and equality
• digital rights and access
• labour relations
• social protection
• environmental
sustainability
Africa’s young
and urbanising
demography
amplified citizens’
expectations
21st century challenges
+
=
Expanded
governance
landscape
The three new IIAG sub-categories
10
This has led to a strengthening of the IIAG indicators, mitigating the ‘one source or variable bias’ and providing a clearer, more
complete and more stable framework, as new data additions and changes will from now on mainly take place at sub-indicator or
sub-sub-indicator level. Composite scores constitute a key value added of the new IIAG dataset.
It is worth noting that the methodology used to calculate IIAG scores, initially built with the Kennedy School of Governance at Harvard
University, has remained unchanged. This has been thoroughly reviewed in search of better ways to calculate the IIAG confirming the
current methodology as the best possible to calculate a composite index like the IIAG.
2. A better-balanced structure and mainly
clustered indicators
A better-balanced structure: the 2020 extended review of
the IIAG led to a better balance among the different levels:
the number of sub-categories is now even, with four for each
category, and the number of underlying indicators has now
been set to four to six for each sub-category, with the majority
having five. While a marginal level of accepted, implicit
weighting still exists in the IIAG, these improvements have
minimised this and moved towards a more equal balance
of weight for each component.
90% of indicators are now clustered: in spite of an increase
in the number of sources, from 35 in the 2018 IIAG to 40 in
the 2020 IIAG, and in the number of variables collected from
sources, from 191 to 237, the number of indicators has been
reduced from 102 to 79, as the vast majority (nearly 90%) of
them are now clustered (see box on page 9 with examples of
clustered indicators). Clustered indicators provide the added
value of assessing a dimension either using similar variables
from different sources or different proxy variables from either
the same or different sources.
Wider data coverage
• more IIAG variables from source
• more IIAG sources
Fewer IIAG indicators
2018 IIAG 2020 IIAG
35 40
2018 IIAG 2020 IIAG
79
2018 IIAG 2020 IIAG
191 237
102
Stronger IIAG
indicators
as a measure
of governance
of IIAG indicators
are now clustered
to include more than
one single variable
compared to less
than 50% in the
2018 IIAG
90%
11
2020 IIAG: Index Report
3. Africa’s citizens’ voices are more prominently
highlighted
As citizens are the recipients of public leadership and governance,
citizens’ perceptions have been given a key importance by MIF
from the very beginning of the IIAG’s production. The assessment
of governance performance needs to be rooted in citizens’
perceptions to complement official and expert assessment data.
For the past ten years, MIF has been working with and supporting
Afrobarometer, the leading pan-African research institution
conducting public attitude surveys on the continent, as a key
source for the IIAG. As such, the new 2020 IIAG framework gives
it more prominence.
Formerly scattered across various levels in the IIAG, citizens’
assessments of various governance components are now
highlighted in a new, specific Citizens’ Voices section. Citizens’
Voices provides a comprehensive ‘reality check’ to complement
the IIAG results with citizens’ perceptions and satisfaction with
public services.
Citizens’ Voices mirrors the IIAG categories and provides public
perception data on the closest proxies to the IIAG measures,
from security and safety, to rights, participation and inclusion,
economic opportunities, health, education and social protection.
It will therefore become a key reference section of the IIAG,
allowing the IIAG results to be judged alongside the reality on the
ground as perceived by citizens. For the purpose of complementing
the IIAG assessment on governance delivery, Citizens’ Voices
scores do not contribute to the calculation of IIAG scores.
Single source or single
variable bias’ and
measurement errors
are minimised
A more stable framework
for future IIAG iterations:
data/conceptual updates
will most likely only impact
lower levels (sub- and
sub-sub-indicator)
‘
Property Rights: similar variables from different sources
Property Rights & Regulations - Bertelsmann Stiftung
Private Property Rights - World Justice Project
Right to Private Property - Varieties of Democracy
Absence of Forced Migration: different proxy variables
Absence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) -
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
Absence of Refugees - United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees
official and expert
assessment data
citizens’ perceptions
Assessment of
governance performance
A dedicated parallel index based on Afrobarometer data
• a ‘reality check’ to complement the IIAG results with
citizens’ perceptions and satisfaction with public services
• mirrors the IIAG categories and provides public
+ perception data on the closest proxies to the IIAG measures
=
This is also in line with the new MIF initiative launched in June to start a series of Now Generation Network Surveys to capture
and highlight the voices of Africa’s young people, who represent the vast majority of Africa’s population. Analyses of the
Citizens’ Voices section will in time be accompanied by results from the new Now Generation Network Surveys.
Examples of IIAG clustered indicators
12
Data gaps, that is the lack of indicators measuring certain
governance topics, remain a key challenge within Africa.
Even if indicators for specific topics exist, they often
only cover a limited number of African countries, or are
outdated. The background research and analysis carried
out by the Foundation for the IIAG in-depth review aimed
at mapping thematic pillars of governance to make sure the
IIAG framework reflects the current governance landscape
and the demands of African citizens of their state. On
the basis of this framework, an analysis of the existing
data covering these topics was conducted to identify the
most relevant data sources for assessing and measuring
the governance dimensions. This work resulted in a clear
overview of the existing data gaps, highlighting the
continued need to advocate on improving data availability
and coverage in key governance areas.
Among these areas are:
• Environment, and in particular the lack of
comparable data in climate change mitigation
and adaptation policies
• Capacity of the healthcare system, for instance
variables such as hospital bed density, hospital
density and medical doctors
• Education completion
• Continental integration
• Access to energy
• Organised crime
• Criminal events besides homicides
• Inequality and poverty
In addition to a continuous mapping of the most
relevant existing data sources for inclusion in the IIAG,
the Foundation will continue to fund projects aimed at
filling data gaps for key themes of governance as well
as strengthening the assessment of other issues already
covered by the IIAG dataset. The Foundation currently
supports four organisations that conduct large-scale African
data collection initiatives: Afrobarometer (Afrobarometer
Surveys), Global Integrity (Africa Integrity Indicators),
V-Dem Institute (Varieties of Democracy Project) and
the World Justice Project (WJP Rule of Law Index).
On a more general level, the Foundation has, since its
establishment, strongly advocated for civil registration
and vital statistics to be the fundamental basis of any
comprehensive public policy and effective public service
delivery, be it education, health, housing, employment,
justice, security or access to elections.
Data gaps: still a lot to be done
SPOTLIGHT
13
2020 IIAG: Index Report
14
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)
Citizens’ Voices
Public Perception of Security
& Rule of Law
Public Perception of Security & Safety
Public Perception of the Rule of Law
Public Perception of Accountability
Public Perception of Anti-Corruption
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF OVERALL GOVERNANCE
Public Perception of Participation,
Rights & Inclusion
Public Perception of Elections & Freedom
Public Perception of Inclusion & Equality
Public Perception of Women’s Leadership
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW
OVERALL GOVERNANCE
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION
•
•
•
•
Participation
Freedom of Association & Assembly
Political Pluralism
Civil Society Space
Democratic Elections
Rights
•
•
•
•
•
Personal Liberties
Freedom of Expression & Belief
Media Freedom
Digital Rights
Protection against Discrimination
Rule of Law & Justice
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law
Impartiality of the Judicial System
Judicial Processes
Equality before the Law
Law Enforcement
Property Rights
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Inclusion & Equality
Equal Political Power
Equal Political Representation
Equal Civil Liberties
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity
Equal Access to Public Services
Accountability & Transparency
Institutional Checks & Balances
Civic Checks & Balances
Absence of Undue Influence on Government
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information
Accessibility of Information
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Gender
Political Power & Representation of Women
Equal Civil Liberties for Women
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women
Equal Access to Public Services for Women
Laws on Violence against Women
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector
Public Procurement Procedures
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector
•
•
•
•
•
Anti-Corruption
•
•
•
•
•
Security & Safety
Absence of Armed Conflict
Absence of Violence against Civilians
Absence of Forced Migration
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour
Absence of Criminality
15
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Public Perception of Economic
Opportunity Foundations
Public Perception of Public Administration
Satisfaction with Economic Opportunities
Satisfaction with Infrastructure
•
•
•
•
•
•
Satisfaction with Health Provision
Satisfaction with Education Provision
Lived Poverty & Public Perception of Social
Protection
Public Perception of Human
Development
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
•
•
•
•
•
Civil Registration
Capacity of the Statistical System
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation
Budgetary & Financial Management
Professional Administration
Public Administration
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
•
•
•
•
•
•
Access to Healthcare
Access to Water & Sanitation
Control of Communicable Diseases
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality
Compliance with International Health Regulations
Health
Business Environment
Regional Integration
Trade Environment
Business & Competition Regulations
Access to Financial Services
Labour Relations
•
•
•
•
•
Equality in Education
Education Enrolment
Education Completion
Human Resources in Education
Education Quality
Education
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Infrastructure
Transport Network
Access to Energy
Mobile Communications
Digital Access
Social Protection
Social Safety Nets
Poverty Reduction Policies
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation
Access to Housing
Absence of Undernourishment
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Rural Sector
Rural Land & Water Access
Rural Market Access
Rural Sector Support
Rural Businesses & Organisations
•
•
•
•
•
Sustainable Environment
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability
Enforcement of Environmental Policies
Air Quality
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests
Land & Water Biodiversity
16
Reading the results
The 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) covers
ten years’ worth of data from 2010-2019 inclusive for 54 African
countries. The construction method provides vast amounts of data.
To construct the 2020 IIAG, the Foundation’s Research Team
collected 237 variables that measure governance concepts from
40 sources. These were combined to form 79 indicators, which
are organised under the IIAG’s key governance dimensions; the
16 sub-categories and four categories that make up the Overall
Governance score. Including all the data collected from source
and the calculations made expressly for the IIAG, there are a total
of 372 different measures of governance for any given country
or group in any given year across ten years. These are made
up of indicators that measure specific issues such as Executive
Compliance with the Rule of Law, which is one part of the broader
sub-category measure Rule of Law & Justice, which is in turn one
part of the overarching category measure Security & Rule of Law.
In total, there are more than 200,000 data points in the 2020 IIAG.
Scores, ranks, trends, structure & levels
IIAG results can be classified into three main types: score, rank
and trend.
All three types must be considered when studying the IIAG,
as each type of result gives context to the others. For example,
looking only at rank or score without considering the trends
overlooks the important trajectories that countries follow. In the
2020 IIAG for example, South Africa ranks in the top ten highest
scoring countries in 2019 (6th) with a score of 65.8. In the last ten
years, however, it also the joint eighth most deteriorated country
on the continent in Overall Governance, having declined by -0.9
in this period. In the same way that trends should be taken into
account when looking at scores and ranks, when looking at trends
it is important to take into account the level of score and rank.
Somalia, for example, shows the seventh largest improvement
over ten years (+5.7) and the eighth largest improvement over
five years (+2.6) in Overall Governance but still sits at the bottom
of the ranking table at 54th position.
To fully assess any country’s governance performance, it is vital
to drill-down beyond the broader measures such as the Overall
Governance score to take into account country performance
across the different governance dimensions encompassed by
the categories, sub-categories and indicators of the IIAG. These
are all essentially mini indexes in their own right and country
performance can vary across these dimensions. Using
Madagascar and Sudan as examples, while improving in all four
categories, the two countries have, however, declined in seven
and six sub-categories, respectively.
The benefit of the IIAG structure is that country or group
performance can be assessed holistically through the broader
measures, but users can also drill-down to assess performance
in specific governance issues.
Group averages
By averaging the scores of countries, the IIAG provides group
analysis for a variety of different group compositions. For this
report, key findings are often provided for ‘Africa’. These results
are the average of the scores of 54 African countries, at all levels
of the IIAG. Of course, Africa is a diverse continent with many
unique countries, and readers of this report are advised not to
over analyse the continental findings. This report focuses on
presenting the top-level findings of the 2020 IIAG for Africa as
well as other groups, such as regions. In-depth analysis of
countries and other groupings are available via our other
publications and tools on our website.
An objective and independent measure of African
governance
The IIAG is an objective exercise, to help further the conversation
on governance, to assess current and emerging trends, identify
areas to improve, and to highlight and learn from success. It does
not make policy prescriptions. It uses the same indicators for all
countries in order to produce comparable scores, regardless of the
size of their economies, population, geography or other external
factors. These are of course important and must be assessed
alongside the data, but the IIAG aims to provide an objective
dataset. Crucially, indicators measure outcomes of policy, and
not inputs.
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is not a primary data collector.
Data is collected from 40 independent sources. Please see the
Annex in this report for further information.
17
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Trend classifications
As the Index time-series covers ten years (from 2010-2019) the IIAG
provides important insights into country trajectories. Moreover,
assessing recent trends alongside long-term findings identifies
early signs of the direction and pace of country trajectories.
Whilst registering overall improvement over the decade, a country
can have, over the last five years:
• Increased its rate of improvement;
• Slowed its rate of improvement;
• Shown recent decline, thus demonstrating early
warning signs.
The resulting trend classifications are six: Increasing Improvement, Slowing Improvement, Warning Signs, Bouncing Back, Slowing
Deterioration or Increasing Deterioration. These classifications are applied to all measures in the IIAG and are used for groups as well
as countries. Depending on the size and direction of the annual average trends in these periods, countries and groups are assigned these
classifications, which are best explained as follows:
Please note there are instances where countries cannot be classified or show no change. A full overview of the calculation of all
classifications, including No Change and Not Classified are contained in the Notes section in the Annex.
Similarly, a country registering overall decline over the decade
can have, over the last five years:
• Increased its rate of decline;
• Slowed its rate of decline;
• Shown recent improvement, thus demonstrating hopeful
signs of reversing a negative trend.
To capture these ‘trends within trends’, the IIAG classifies
countries, regions and groups according to the direction and size
of their annual average trend in the recent five years, compared to
the direction and size of their annual average trend over the decade.
Annual Average Trend = Total change in score between years / Number of annual time periods
Score change between 2015-2019
Score change between 2010-2019
Annual time periods
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Classification Characteristic
Increasing Deterioration Decline over the last ten years, with the rate of decline increasing over the last 5 years
Slowing Deterioration Decline over the last ten years, but the rate of decline is slowing over the last 5 years
Warning Signs Progress (or no change) over the last ten years, but showing recent decline over the last 5 years
Bouncing Back Decline (or no change) over the last ten years, but showing recent progress over the last 5 years
Slowing Improvement Progress over the last ten years, with the rate of improvement slowing over the last 5 years
Increasing Improvement Progress over the last ten years, with the rate of improvement increasing over the last 5 years
The 2020 IIAG
findings
>
SECTION 02
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
55.0
53.5
45.8
26.9
82.5
76.8
59.5
29.6
58.2
68.4
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
>
Overall
Governance
•
•
•
•
Security & Safety
Rule of Law & Justice
Accountability & Transparency
Anti-Corruption
•
•
•
•
Participation
Rights
Inclusion & Equality
Gender
•
•
•
•
Public Administration
Business Environment
Infrastructure
Rural Sector
•
•
•
•
Health
Education
Social Protection
Sustainable Environment
Foundations for Economic Opportunity
Security & Rule of Law
Human Development
Participation, Rights & Inclusion
OVERALL GOVERNANCE
20
21
2020 IIAG: Index Report
* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data
for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.
CHANGE 2010-2019
Underlying categories
2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE/100.0
TREND CLASSIFICATION
+1.2
2019 Score | Change 2010-2019
48.8
Slowing Improvement
Security & Rule of Law 49.5 -0.7
Participation, Rights & Inclusion 46.2 -1.4
Foundations for Economic Opportunity 47.8 +4.1
Human Development 51.9 +3.0
TREND CLASSIFICATION NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Slowing Improvement 14
Increasing Deterioration 13
Increasing Improvement 12
Warning Signs 10
Bouncing Back 2
Slowing Deterioration 2
CHANGE 2010-2019
LARGEST IMPROVEMENT GAMBIA
+9.2
LARGEST DETERIORATION LIBYA
CHANGE 2010-2019 -5.5
1 Mauritius 77.2 -0.5
2 Cabo Verde 73.1 +0.2
3 Seychelles 72.3 +7.8
4 Tunisia 70.4 +8.2
5 Botswana 66.9 +0.8
6 South Africa 65.8 -0.9
7 Namibia 65.1 +3.4
8 Ghana 64.3 +0.1
9 Senegal 63.2 +3.3
10 Morocco 61.0 +5.3
11 Rwanda 60.5 +3.7
12 São Tomé and Príncipe 60.4 +2.8
13 Benin 58.6 +1.1
14 Kenya 58.5 +3.7
15 Algeria 56.2 +3.3
16 Gambia 55.9 +9.2
17 Burkina Faso 54.0 +1.0
18 Côte d'Ivoire 53.9 +9.0
19 Tanzania 53.0 +0.2
20 Lesotho 52.3 -0.5
21 Zambia 52.0 -0.8
22 Uganda 51.8 +0.7
23 Malawi 51.5 -1.3
24 Sierra Leone 51.0 +4.8
25 Togo 50.1 +4.8
26 Mozambique 49.0 -0.2
27 Liberia 47.9 +1.2
28 Niger 47.8 +0.4
29 Gabon 47.7 +1.0
30 Egypt 47.4 +0.5
31 Ethiopia 46.6 +6.7
31 Mali 46.6 -2.5
33 Zimbabwe 46.1 +7.4
34 Nigeria 45.5 -1.6
35 Madagascar 44.4 +1.7
36 Eswatini 43.8 +2.5
37 Cameroon 43.5 -0.6
38 Comoros 43.2 -2.6
39 Guinea 42.5 +1.3
40 Mauritania 41.6 +2.0
41 Guinea-Bissau 41.4 +2.8
42 Djibouti 41.3 +2.0
43 Angola 40.0 +5.4
44 Burundi 36.9 -3.6
45 Congo Republic 36.1 -0.2
46 Libya 35.2 -5.5
47 Chad 33.9 +3.7
48 Sudan 32.5 +2.5
49 DR Congo 31.7 -2.8
50 Central African Republic 30.7 -0.9
51 Equatorial Guinea 28.7 -0.3
52 Eritrea 25.8 -0.8
53 South Sudan* 20.7 .
54 Somalia 19.2 +5.7
AFRICAN AVERAGE 48.8 +1.2
RANK /54 2019 SCORE/100.0 CHANGE 2010-2019
DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)
Not available*
No change
Deteriorated
1
0
17
36 Improved
22
Overall Governance: the first ever year-on-year decline in 2019
With an African average score of 48.8, Overall Governance has improved by +1.2 points over the last decade (2010-2019).
However, the rate of progress has slowed since 2019, with the annual average trend between 2015 and 2019 (+0.05) being less than
half that for the decade (+0.13).
A further cause for concern is that in 2019 the African average governance score has declined for the first time over the decade, while
between 2010 and 2018 Overall Governance had either maintained or increased in score every year.
Africa: Overall Governance average score (2010-2019)
Score Overall Governance
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Year
0.0
100.0
50.0
46.0
48.0
52.0
47.6 47.9 48.0
48.7
47.6
48.0
48.6 48.8 49.0 48.8
African countries: Overall Governance scores (2019)
77.2
48.2
19.2
Score
Mauritius: highest scoring
country in 2019 (77.2)
Somalia: lowest scoring
country in 2019 (19.2)
Libya: most declined country
over 10-year period (-5.5)
Gambia: most improved country
over 10-year period (+9.2)
23
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Over the decade, while Human Development
and Foundations for Economic Opportunity lead
the way, Security & Rule of Law and Participation,
Rights & Inclusion have stalled
Progress in Overall Governance over the past decade has been
driven by improvements in the categories Foundations for
Economic Opportunity (+4.1) and Human Development (+3.0).
The biggest strides have been made in the sub-categories
Infrastructure and Health, complemented by improvements in
Environmental Sustainability.
However, in the same period, countries have shown concerning
declines in Participation, Rights & Inclusion (-1.4) and Security
& Rule of Law (-0.7).
Here, a deteriorating security situation and an increasingly
precarious environment for human rights and civic participation
are the primary drivers.
In 2019, Human Development is the highest scoring of the four categories at the African average level, while Participation, Rights &
Inclusion is the lowest scoring category with a difference in score of almost six points.
Three of the four sub-categories of both Participation, Rights & Inclusion and Security & Rule of Law sit in the lower half of the ranking
of the 16 IIAG sub-categories based on their 2019 scores, while the majority of the sub-categories of both Foundations for Economic
Opportunity and Human Development sit in the upper half.
Of the five highest scoring sub-categories, two belong to Human Development while two of the five lowest scoring sub-categories
belong to Security & Rule of Law.
Score
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Year
100.0
50.0
48.0
52.0
0.0
46.0
44.0
42.0
Security & Rule of Law Participation, Rights & Inclusion Foundations for Economic Opportunity Human Development
50.2
49.8
49.5
49.8 49.5
49.5 49.7
49.5 49.6 49.5
47.6 47.8
47.3
46.9
47.7 47.6 47.5
46.8 46.6
46.2
43.7
44.2
44.7
47.0
43.5
44.8
46.1
47.3 47.7 47.8
48.9
49.7
50.7
51.2
49.2
50.2
51.0
51.5
52.0 51.9
Africa: IIAG categories, average scores (2010-2019)
24
Current trends indicate the divergence in different areas of
governance may be set to increase. Foundations for Economic
Opportunity and Human Development have continued to
improve on average, though at a slowing rate in the last five
years, while during the same time period, Security & Rule of
Law has continued to deteriorate, albeit at a slower pace, and
Participation & Human Rights has declined at an accelerating rate.
All sub-categories of Participation, Rights & Inclusion have
declined over the past decade, while in contrast all sub-categories
of Foundations for Economic Opportunity have improved.
While Security & Rule of Law and Human Development have
each seen three of their four sub-categories improve over
the decade, the difference in the magnitude of improvement
is striking.
The improvement in the Health sub-category (+6.8), the most
improved sub-category of Human Development, is more than
six times larger than the improvement in Anti-Corruption (+1.1),
the most improved sub-category within Security & Rule of Law.
While the three Human Development sub-categories have
managed to sustain progress also over the past five years, the
only Security & Rule of Law sub-category to have done so is
Anti-Corruption.
Africa: IIAG sub-categories, average scores (2019)
Sub-category
Security & Safety
Health
Sustainable Environment
Rural Sector
Gender
Business Environment
Education
Public Administration
Inclusion & Equality
Rights
Rule of Law & Justice
Infrastructure
Social Protection
Participation
Anti-Corruption
Accountability & Transparency
Score
38.1
38.8
42.5
42.6
43.4
45.2
45.5
46.3
47.5
49.3
49.4
50.2
51.5
55.4
60.3
75.9
Security & Rule of Law Participation, Rights & Inclusion
Foundations for Economic Opportunity Human Development
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 100.0
Category
Foundations for
Economic Opportunity
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Human Development 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Security & Rule of Law 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Participation, Rights
& Inclusion
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 +2.5 +3.0 +3.5 +4.0 +4.5
+4.1
+1.7
+3.0
+0.9
-1.4
-1.3
-0.7
-0.2
Africa: IIAG categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
25
2020 IIAG: Index Report
The majority of countries have improved over
the decade, however almost half register a
decline in 2019
Encouragingly, 36 countries have seen an improvement in their
Overall Governance score since 2010, meaning that 61.2% of
Africa’s population lives in a country where Overall Governance
performance has progressed over the last decade.
Gambia is the biggest improver of all 54 countries (+9.2), driven
by large improvements in Accountability & Transparency and its
participatory environment.
Ranks are not a definite given: some highranking
countries follow a deteriorating path,
while some low-ranking ones feature among
the largest improvers
In Overall Governance, Mauritius maintains the top position in
2019 for the 10th consecutive year with a score of 77.2. Somalia,
meanwhile, remains bottom for the 10th consecutive year with
a score of 19.2.
However, the two top and bottom countries follow opposing
trajectories as the gap between them shrinks to its lowest over
the decade in 2019.
Côte d’Ivoire has also made notable improvements (+9.0)
thanks to strides in Infrastructure and Public Administration.
Libya (-5.5) has seen the largest deterioration, on the back of
a precarious security situation and weakened social protection.
However, in general, progress has not maintained its pace
between 2015 and 2019, with 14 countries registering
slowing improvement and as many as 25 countries declining
in the same period.
Between 2018 and 2019 over half of African countries have
seen their Overall Governance score decline.
Somalia’s Overall Governance score has increased by +5.7 since
2010 on the back of improved infrastructure and increased gender
equality, among other things. Since 2015 the rate of improvement
has even modestly accelerated.
Moving in the opposite direction, Mauritius’s Overall Governance
score declines at an increasing rate, driven by weakening social
protection and deteriorating human rights.
South Africa, ranked 6th, has declined over the decade with an
increased pace since 2015, while 5th placed Botswana has started
to show warning signs.
African countries: Overall Governance scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Mauritius
Cabo Verde
Seychelles
Tunisia
Botswana
South Africa
Namibia
Ghana
Senegal
Morocco
Rwanda
STP
Benin
Kenya
Algeria
Gambia
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
Tanzania
Lesotho
Zambia
Uganda
Malawi
Sierra Leone
Togo
Mozambique
Liberia
Niger
Gabon
Egypt
Ethiopia
Mali
Zimbabwe
Nigeria
Madagascar
Eswatini
Cameroon
Comoros
Guinea
Mauritania
Guinea-Bissau
Djibouti
Angola
Burundi
Congo Republic
Libya
Chad
Sudan
DR Congo
CAR
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
South Sudan
Somalia
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Burkina Faso: most deteriorated country
from 2018 to 2019 (-3.1)
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 12
Slowing Improvement 14
Bouncing Back 2
Warning Signs 10
Slowing Deterioration 2
Increasing Deterioration 13
Not Classified 1
Angola: 3rd most improved country
over 5-year period (+4.0) despite
being ranked 43rd
Overall Governance: scores have
declined in over half the African
countries between 2018 and 2019
26
At the same time, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe ranking 16th, 18th and 33rd respectively, feature among the five most improved countries
over the decade.
However, the trends showcased by these countries do not tell the full story. Although the gap between the top and bottom ranked
countries has been closing over the last decade, on average countries’ governance performances are more dispersed in 2019 than
they were a decade ago.
0.0
10.0
100.0
80.0
90.0
60.0
70.0
40.0
50.0
20.0
30.0
Year
African countries
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
African countries: Overall Governance scores (2010-2019)
Score
Difference 64.2 Difference 58.0
13.5
Mauritius 77.7 Mauritius
Somalia
Somalia
14.0
77.8
14.3
77.9
14.9
77.5
16.1
77.1
16.6
77.6
17.0
79.3
19.6
79.5
18.7
79.0
19.2
77.2
Unbalanced governance progress: only eight
countries manage to improve in all four
categories over the decade
Only eight countries have managed to improve in all four
categories over the decade: Angola, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire,
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Seychelles, Sudan and Togo.
Of these, Ethiopia is the only country to have improved in
all 16 sub-categories over the decade.
While improving in all four categories, Madagascar and
Sudan have however declined in seven and six sub-categories
respectively.
Over the past decade, 20 countries, hosting 41.9% of Africa’s
population, have made progress in both Human Development
and Foundations for Economic Opportunity but at the same
time also declined in both Security & Rule of Law and
Participation, Rights & Inclusion.
This growing divergence is worsening with the rate of
deterioration having accelerated for over half (29) the countries
in Participation, Rights & Inclusion, while 22 have shown
increasing improvement in Foundations for Economic Opportunity.
Of the countries that have seen their rate of deterioration
worsen in Participation, Rights & Inclusion since 2015, almost
80% (23 out of 29), hosting 50.9% of Africa’s population, have
simultaneously been improving in Foundations for Economic
Opportunity.
27
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Chad
Côte d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Eswatini
Ethiopia
Liberia
Madagascar
Mauritania
Morocco
Rwanda
São Tomé
and Príncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Togo
Zimbabwe
Improved in Foundations
for Economic Opportunity
and Human Development
Cabo Verde
Eritrea
Mauritius
Nigeria
South Africa
Declined in Security & Rule
of Law and Participation,
Rights & Inclusion
DR Congo
Egypt
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Comoros
Congo Republic
Selected African countries: Improved in Foundations for Economic Opportunity and Human Development & declined
in Security & Rule of Law and Participation, Rights & Inclusion (2010-2019)
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY
29 22
14
1
1
12
5
5
8
7
4
4
2
2
16
22
20
14
4
5
5
3
7
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
African countries: IIAG categories, number of countries per trend classification (2010-2019)
28
The most unbalanced performances are seen between Participation, Rights & Inclusion and Human Development: 21 countries have gaps
of 10.0 or higher between their scores for these two categories.
Tell-tale correlations: besides balance, rule of
law, justice, inclusion and equality are the
common denominators among best performers
Looking at the strength of correlations between IIAG indicators
and Overall Governance allows us to identify the common factors
between countries with the best governance performances.
Furthermore, it can also signal potential avenues to improve
Overall Governance capacity.
Of the 16 IIAG sub-categories, Rule of Law & Justice and Inclusion
& Equality show the strongest correlations with Overall
Governance both in 2019 and over the decade.Eight of the top
ten scoring countries in Overall Governance in 2019 also feature
in the top ten scoring countries in these two sub-categories.
The analysis therefore suggests that strong institutions, rule
of law, impartial and effective justice, as well as equality are
key dimensions for countries to set themselves on the path
towards sound governance.
Rule of Law & Justice assesses compliance with
the rule of law by the executive, impartiality of the
judicial system, judicial processes including access,
affordability and timeliness, equality before the
law, law enforcement, as well as property rights.
Inclusion & Equality assesses equality in the
distribution of political power, in political
representation, in civil liberties, in socioeconomic
opportunity, and in access to public services
across different strata of society.
0.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
Participation, Rights & Inclusion Human Development
Selected African countries: Participation, Rights & Inclusion and Human Development, scores (2019)
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Morocco
Sudan
Eritrea
Rwanda
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Eswatini
Zimbabwe
Cameroon
Gabon
Libya
Congo Republic
Burundi
Mauritania
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Madagascar
Algeria
Score
29
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Anti-Corruption, Business Environment and Accountability & Transparency also feature among the five most correlated sub-categories
with Overall Governance in 2019 and over the decade.
Both in 2019 and over the ten-year time series, the indicators showing the strongest relationships with high governance scores span
across the four IIAG categories, underlining the need for a balanced approach to governance. In this sense, the factors that are among the
most associated with high Overall Governance scores pertain to personal liberties, executive compliance with the law, judicial processes,
equal opportunities and rights, as well as budgetary management, statistical capacity, quality of education and environmental policies.
Overall Governance score
Score
0.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0
Rule of Law & Justice Inclusion & Equality
African countries: Overall Governance, Rule of Law & Justice and Inclusion & Equality, scores (2010-2019)
r for Overall Governance and Rule of Law & Justice sub-category = +0.95
r for Overall Governance and Inclusion & Equality sub-category = +0.90
African countries: correlations between Overall
Governance and 16 IIAG sub-categories (2019)
Sub-category r
Rule of Law & Justice +0.95
Inclusion & Equality +0.90
Anti-Corruption +0.89
Business Environment +0.87
Accountability & Transparency +0.87
Education +0.83
Rights +0.83
Public Administration +0.81
Gender +0.81
Health +0.79
Participation +0.79
Social Protection +0.78
Infrastructure +0.71
Security & Safety +0.68
Rural Sector +0.67
Sustainable Environment +0.65
r = strength of correlation (out of -/+ 1.00)
African countries: correlations between Overall
Governance and 16 IIAG sub-categories (2010-2019)
Sub-category r
r = strength of correlation (out of -/+ 1.00)
Rule of Law & Justice +0.95
Inclusion & Equality +0.90
Anti-Corruption +0.88
Accountability & Transparency +0.87
Business Environment +0.84
Rights +0.81
Education +0.81
Participation +0.80
Gender +0.79
Public Administration +0.79
Health +0.78
Social Protection +0.75
Infrastructure +0.67
Rural Sector +0.67
Security & Safety +0.66
Sustainable Environment +0.61
30
Of the five geographical regions, Southern Africa (53.3) is
on average the highest scoring at the Overall Governance
level for 2019, followed by Western Africa (53.1). Central
Africa is the lowest scoring region (38.8).
Central Africa is the only region to have on average
declined in Overall Governance over the last decade (-0.1).
Western Africa (+2.4) and Northern Africa (+2.3) are the
two most improved regions.
Libya is the only Northern African country to have
declined in Overall Governance.
While Western Africa scores the highest in the Security
& Rule of Law and Participation, Rights & Inclusion
categories, Northern Africa performs best in Foundations
for Economic Opportunity and Human Development. Central
Africa is the lowest scoring region in all four categories.
All five regions have improved in Foundations for
Economic Opportunity and Human Development over
the last ten years.
In Eastern and Southern Africa all countries improved in
Foundations for Economic Opportunity over this period.
South Africa is the only Southern African country to have
declined in Human Development over the ten-year period.
On the other hand, only Northern Africa has improved
in Participation, Rights & Inclusion, although the region
has seen a decline in the last five years.
Northern Africa and Western Africa are the only two
regions to have improved in Security & Rule of Law, but
only Northern Africa has been able to sustain progress
over the last five years.
Only three of the ten Southern Africa countries, Angola,
Eswatini and Zimbabwe, have improved in Security &
Rule of Law while Angola is the only one to have
improved in Participation, Rights & Inclusion.
Of the nine Central African countries, only Chad improved
in Participation, Rights & Inclusion.
Regional discrepancies: Northern Africa is on the up while Central Africa, the lowest scoring
region, is falling behind
SPOTLIGHT
Overall Governance: Africa geographical regions, trend classifications (2010-2019)
Western Africa
2019 Overall Governance
score: 53.1
Southern Africa
2019 Overall Governance
score: 53.3
Central Africa
2019 Overall Governance
score: 38.8
Northern Africa
2019 Overall Governance
score: 52.0
Eastern Africa
2019 Overall Governance
score: 46.2
Trend classification
Increasing Improvement
Slowing Improvement
Warning Signs
Increasing Deterioration
Bouncing Back
Slowing Deterioration
31
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Central Africa
2019 Score
Overall Governance 38.8
Security & Rule of Law 37.1
Participation, Rights & Inclusion 36.1
Foundations for Economic Opportunity 36.1
Human Development 46.1
Best scoring country: São Tomé and Príncipe 60.4
Worst scoring country: Equatorial Guinea 28.7
Northern Africa
2019 Score
Overall Governance 52.0
Security & Rule of Law 48.3
Participation, Rights & Inclusion 42.5
Foundations for Economic Opportunity 54.9
Human Development 62.3
Best scoring country: Tunisia 70.4
Worst scoring country: Libya 35.2
Western Africa
2019 Score
Overall Governance 53.1
Security & Rule of Law 56.4
Participation, Rights & Inclusion 54.6
Foundations for Economic Opportunity 50.0
Human Development 51.2
Best scoring country: Cabo Verde 73.1
Worst scoring country: Guinea-Bissau 41.4
Eastern Africa
2019 Score
Overall Governance 46.2
Security & Rule of Law 45.9
Participation, Rights & Inclusion 41.5
Foundations for Economic Opportunity 47.3
Human Development 50.2
Best scoring country: Mauritius 77.2
Worst scoring country: Somalia 19.2
Southern Africa
2019 Score
Overall Governance 53.3
Security & Rule of Law 56.0
Participation, Rights & Inclusion 51.3
Foundations for Economic Opportunity 51.4
Human Development 54.3
Best scoring country: Botswana 66.9
Worst scoring country: Angola 40.0
Trend classification
Increasing Improvement
Slowing Improvement
Bouncing Back
Warning Signs
Slowing Deterioration
Increasing Deterioration
32
The 2020 IIAG covers a ten-year period up to the end
of 2019, thus providing a comprehensive picture of the
continent’s main governance trends just before it was hit
by COVID-19. The 2020 Index can also help analyse which
pre-existing weaknesses may have been exacerbated by this
specific contingency and what constitutes a new threat.
As highlighted in MIF’s recent publications, as well as in
the first Now Generation Network (NGN) Survey,
COVID-19 is undoubtedly a major health challenge in
Africa, though maybe less so, at least for the time being,
than in other regions.
The pandemic has, however, brought to the fore gaps
in Africa’s health systems, while also triggering a major
economic crisis. Furthermore, it has contributed to a
declining democratic environment, increasing food
insecurity, as well as instability and violence, including
gender-based.
Participation, Rights & Inclusion: COVID-19 has had
an impact on democratic processes as some scheduled
elections have been postponed. Measures to contain the
virus have also been used to conceal interference with
ongoing election preparation and monitoring as well as
to restrict civic space. However, the 2020 IIAG shows
that the continent had been going through an erosion
of civil society space, participation and rights long
before COVID-19, and the pandemic has just worsened
an already alarming situation.
Security & Rule of Law: here too, COVID-19 hit the
continent while it was already experiencing a declining
security and safety landscape. The African average score
for the Security & Safety sub-category has been
deteriorating during both the last ten and five years, and
COVID-19 triggered increased repression in some countries
in order to implement lockdown rules. The heavy economic
and social impact of the pandemic could potentially lead
to increased domestic unrest.
Human Development: the response of governments in
terms of prevention measures has been swifter than in
other regions thanks to lessons learnt from previous
pandemics. However, the COVID-19 crisis put under the
spotlight gaps in health capacities across the continent.
The 2020 IIAG results confirm that progress in healthrelated
indicators, while on a positive path over the last
decade, has been slowing in the last five years.
Foundations for Economic Opportunity: the economic
impact of COVID-19 in Africa is dramatic and there is
limited capacity at national or regional levels to mitigate
its effects. The 2020 IIAG results show that the COVID-19
pandemic hit the continent while it was set on a positive
path of improvement both over the last ten and five
years. The economic impacts resulting from COVID-19
undoubtedly threaten this progress.
What can the 2020 IIAG results tell us about the impact of COVID-19 on Africa?
SPOTLIGHT
33
2020 IIAG: Index Report
>
Participation,
Rights & Inclusion
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION
•
•
•
•
Participation
Freedom of Association & Assembly
Political Pluralism
Civil Society Space
Democratic Elections
Rights
•
•
•
•
•
Personal Liberties
Freedom of Expression & Belief
Media Freedom
Digital Rights
Protection against Discrimination
•
•
•
•
•
Inclusion & Equality
Equal Political Power
Equal Political Representation
Equal Civil Liberties
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity
Equal Access to Public Services
•
•
•
•
•
Gender
Political Power & Representation of Women
Equal Civil Liberties for Women
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women
Equal Access to Public Services for Women
Laws on Violence against Women
34
35
2020 IIAG: Index Report
TREND CLASSIFICATION NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Increasing Deterioration 29
Increasing Improvement 7
Bouncing Back 5
Warning Signs 5
Slowing Deterioration 4
Slowing Improvement 3
CHANGE 2010-2019
LARGEST IMPROVEMENT GAMBIA
+19.5
LARGEST DETERIORATION BURUNDI
CHANGE 2010-2019 -11.0
1 Mauritius 77.8 -3.5
2 Cabo Verde 76.6 -0.2
3 Seychelles 75.3 +6.2
4 Tunisia 71.4 +17.6
5 Ghana 69.7 -2.9
6 Botswana 67.5 -0.1
7 South Africa 67.2 -0.6
8 Namibia 67.0 -1.8
9 São Tomé and Príncipe 66.6 -0.8
10 Senegal 64.3 -1.6
11 Benin 59.7 -6.2
12 Gambia 57.1 +19.5
13 Sierra Leone 56.8 -1.1
14 Burkina Faso 56.7 -3.5
15 Lesotho 55.9 -4.3
16 Liberia 54.9 -3.5
17 Côte d'Ivoire 54.2 +3.6
18 Mozambique 52.1 -5.1
19 Kenya 51.6 -0.6
20 Niger 49.5 -7.2
21 Zambia 48.9 -2.1
22 Madagascar 48.2 +1.1
22 Togo 48.2 +0.4
24 Guinea-Bissau 47.5 +5.1
24 Malawi 47.5 -7.1
26 Uganda 46.8 -1.8
27 Morocco 46.2 -2.8
28 Algeria 45.9 +0.3
29 Tanzania 45.5 -6.2
30 Gabon 44.6 -2.1
31 Rwanda 44.5 -2.4
32 Nigeria 43.6 -3.7
33 Comoros 43.5 -5.4
34 Mali 42.2 -7.6
35 Angola 39.3 +4.8
36 Guinea 38.3 -5.8
37 Cameroon 36.6 -5.2
38 Zimbabwe 36.0 -1.9
39 Central African Republic 35.6 -1.8
40 Mauritania 35.1 -2.1
41 Ethiopia 34.8 +6.3
42 Burundi 33.2 -11.0
43 Libya 32.3 +0.7
44 Eswatini 31.2 -2.0
45 DR Congo 31.1 -5.7
46 Congo Republic 30.6 -0.3
47 Chad 29.4 +2.1
48 Djibouti 29.2 +2.4
49 Egypt 23.8 -3.8
50 Somalia 23.1 +5.4
51 Sudan 22.5 +3.3
52 South Sudan* 20.9 .
53 Eritrea 17.1 -1.9
54 Equatorial Guinea 17.0 -4.1
AFRICAN AVERAGE 46.2 -1.4
RANK /54 2019 SCORE/100.0 CHANGE 2010-2019
DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)
Not available*
No change
Deteriorated
1
0
38
15 Improved
* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data
for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.
CHANGE 2010-2019
Underlying sub-categories
2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE/100.0
TREND CLASSIFICATION
-1.4
46.2
Increasing Deterioration
Participation 42.5 -2.2
Rights 45.5 -2.9
Inclusion & Equality 46.3 -0.5
Gender 50.2 -0.2
2019 Score | Change 2010-2019
36
Participation, Rights & Inclusion:
deterioration over the past decade, at
twice the speed since 2015, drives the
first ever year-on-year decline at the
overall governance level
With an African average score of 46.2 in 2019, Participation,
Rights & Inclusion is the lowest-scoring category (out of four)
of the IIAG.
The category has also experienced the largest deterioration
both between 2010 and 2019 (-1.4) and between 2015 and
2019 (-1.3). Concerningly, the pace of deterioration has more
than doubled since 2015, with an annual average trend of
-0.33 compared to -0.16 over the decade (2010-2019).
All components decline over the decade, but
trends differ from 2015 onwards
Of the four categories, Participation, Rights & Inclusion is the
only one where all four underlying sub-categories have followed
a negative trajectory since 2010: Rights (-2.9), Participation
(-2.2), Inclusion & Equality (-0.5) and Gender (-0.2).
More than half the countries follow a path of increasing deterioration from 2015
The Participation, Rights & Inclusion category raises the most concerns, with more than half (29) of African countries having followed a
negative trajectory in both the ten-year and five-year periods, and at an even faster pace over the latter.
The five highest scoring countries in 2019 are Mauritius (77.8), Cabo Verde (76.6), Seychelles (75.3), Tunisia (71.4) and Ghana (69.7). The
five lowest scoring countries are Somalia (23.1), Sudan (22.5), South Sudan (20.9), Eritrea (17.1) and Equatorial Guinea (17.0).
However, in the second part of the decade trajectories are
diverging. On the one hand, the pace of deterioration in both
Participation and Rights has worsened since 2015, and they
register the two largest deteriorations of the 16 IIAG subcategories,
-3.5 and -2.5, respectively.
Participation constitutes, on average, Africa’s third lowest
scoring sub-category in 2019, only behind Accountability &
Transparency and Anti-Corruption.
On the other hand, despite having declined over the decade,
Inclusion & Equality and Gender have started to bounce back,
having shown small improvements between 2015 and 2019.
Participation: 3rd lowest scoring IIAG subcategory/
largest IIAG sub-category deterioration
over 5-year period
Rights: 2nd largest IIAG sub-category deterioration
over 5-year period
Africa: Participation, Rights & Inclusion sub-categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Sub-category
Gender 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Inclusion &
Equality
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Participation 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Rights 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -3.8 -3.6 -3.4 -3.2 -3.0 -2.8 -2.6 -2.4 -2.2 -2.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4
-0.2
+0.2
-0.5
+0.1
-2.2
-3.5
-2.9
-2.5
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
37
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Of the ten best performing countries, only Seychelles has
managed to improve performance over the last ten years with
a faster pace in the second half of the decade. Tunisia has been
the only other top ten performer to improve over the decade,
however progress has slowed since 2015. Botswana, South Africa
and São Tomé and Príncipe are however bouncing back, having
followed a positive trajectory in the last five years.
More concerningly, half of the ten best performers in 2019 have
followed a trend of increasing deterioration over the decade.
When looking at the rest of the upper half of the ranking table,
between 11th ranked Benin and 27th ranked Morocco, nine more
countries have followed a trend of increasing deterioration
and three, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Togo, have shown
warning signs.
Gambia is the most improved country, both over the ten-year
and five-year periods, and is the only country in the upper
half of the ranking table besides Seychelles to have shown
increasing improvement.
Meanwhile, half of the ten worst performers have deteriorated
over the last ten years.
While deterioration in DR Congo, Congo Republic and Egypt
has taken place at a faster pace since 2015, Eritrea and
Equatorial Guinea have slowed their pace of decline over the
latest five years.
On the other hand, three of the ten lowest scoring countries,
Chad, Djibouti and Sudan have managed to increase their score
in the Participation, Rights & Inclusion category over the past
ten years, and at an increased pace over the latest five years.
Sudan and Djibouti have even been the sixth and seventh most
improved countries respectively over the latter period.
Somalia has also improved over the decade, experiencing the
fifth largest improvement. However, its progress has slowed
since 2015.
Looking at the full lower half of the ranking table, between
28th ranked Algeria and bottom ranked Equatorial Guinea, a
total of 18 countries have seen their scores deteriorate over
the ten-year period. Fifteen of them have even accelerated
their deterioration over the latest five years.
Angola and Ethiopia are the only countries showing increasing
improvement. Mauritania, though still declining over the tenyear
period, has bounced back strongly since 2015.
African countries: Participation, Rights & Inclusion scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Mauritius
Cabo Verde
Seychelles
Tunisia
Ghana
Botswana
South Africa
Namibia
STP
Senegal
Benin
Gambia
Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso
Lesotho
Liberia
Côte d'Ivoire
Mozambique
Kenya
Niger
Zambia
Togo
Madagascar
Malawi
Guinea-Bissau
Uganda
Morocco
Algeria
Tanzania
Gabon
Rwanda
Nigeria
Comoros
Mali
Angola
Guinea
Cameroon
Zimbabwe
CAR
Mauritania
Ethiopia
Burundi
Libya
Eswatini
DR Congo
Congo Republic
Chad
Djibouti
Egypt
Somalia
Sudan
South Sudan
Eritrea
Equatorial Guinea
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Increasing deterioration: largest
number of countries across all four
IIAG categories
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 7
Slowing Improvement 3
Bouncing Back 5
Warning Signs 5
Slowing Deterioration 4
Increasing Deterioration 29
Not Classified 1
Mauritius & Cabo Verde: despite ranking
1st and 2nd in 2019, both on a path of
increasing deterioration
38
Participation: the most declined of the IIAG’s 16
sub-categories since 2015
Participation is the third lowest scoring of the 16 IIAG subcategories
at the African average level in 2019.
Already the third most deteriorated sub-category over the
decade (-2.2), Participation has experienced the largest decline
since 2015 (-3.5). The pace of decline has also increased more
than three-fold in the latest five years, with an annual average
trend of -0.88 compared to -0.24 over the ten-year period.
This recent decline is driven by deterioration in all four
underlying indicators.
Firstly, African citizens are enjoying less freedom to associate
and assemble freely in 2019 compared to 2010, and the situation
has worsened at an even faster pace since 2015.
Compared to 2010, political parties are also less able to operate
freely and have less equitable access to state-owned media and
public financing campaigns. The speed of decline has been more
than five times as fast between 2015 and 2019 than over the
decade, with an annual average trend of -0.93 compared to -0.17.
Between 2015 and 2019, the largest indicator deterioration
is that of Civil Society Space. In this time, the rate of decline
(annual average trend of -1.15) has been almost twice that
for the decade (-0.63).
The drivers of this deterioration have been the increased
restrictions on civil society and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) to establish and operate freely, as well as the higher
levels of repression and persecution that they have faced.
Democratic Elections is the only Participation indicator to have
improved since 2010. However, the decline registered at the
African average level since 2015 constitutes a warning sign.
This negative trend has been driven by a decline in the integrity
of elections and the functioning of election monitoring bodies.
Freedom of Association & Assembly, Political
Pluralism, Civil Society Space: all feature
among 10 most declined IIAG indicators over
5-year period
Selected African countries: Participation, Rights & Inclusion,
5 most improved & 5 most deteriorated countries (2010-2019)
10-Year Trend
+20.0
+15.0
+10.0
+5.0
0.0
-5.0
-10.0
-15.0
Gambia
Tunisia
Ethiopia
Seychelles
Somalia
Tanzania
Benin
Malawi
Niger
Mali
Burundi
+19.5
-7.6
-6.2 -6.2
-7.1 -7.2
-11.0
+17.6
+6.2
+5.4
+6.3
Country
Selected African countries: Participation, Rights & Inclusion,
5 most improved & 5 most deteriorated countries (2015-2019)
5-Year Trend
+20.0
+15.0
+10.0
+5.0
0.0
-5.0
-10.0
-15.0
+21.9
-8.2
-6.7
-7.6 -7.6
-8.6
+6.4
+4.6 +4.5 +4.3
Gambia
Seychelles
Angola
Ethiopia
Mauritania
Mali
Tanzania
Benin
Malawi
Nigeria
Country
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
39
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Rights: the second most declined IIAG subcategory
over the decade and since 2015
With a 2019 African average score of 45.5, Rights is the
second lowest scoring sub-category within Participation,
Rights & Inclusion.
Among all 16 IIAG sub-categories, Rights is the second
most deteriorated over both the past ten (-2.9) and five
years (-2.5) with the pace of deterioration nearly doubling
in the latter period.
This concerning trajectory is driven by four of the five underlying
indicators which are on a trend of increasing deterioration.
The largest deteriorations both in the ten-year and five-year
period have been in the Digital Rights indicator. It is also the most
deteriorated of all 79 IIAG indicators at the African average level
over the latest five years.
The worrying decline of Digital Rights on the continent has
been mostly driven by increasingly high levels of government
censorship of both citizen-created and political content on
the internet.
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 10
Slowing Improvement 4
Bouncing Back 3
Warning Signs 9
Slowing Deterioration 3
Increasing Deterioration 24
Not Classified 1
Score
Country
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Participation scores & trend classifications (2019)
Cabo Verde
Tunisia
Mauritius
South Africa
Ghana
Namibia
STP
Botswana
Seychelles
Liberia
Senegal
Lesotho
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau
Benin
Madagascar
Gambia
Sierra Leone
Mozambique
Mali
Malawi
Niger
Morocco
Nigeria
Kenya
Togo
CAR
Gabon
Comoros
Algeria
Zambia
Tanzania
Mauritania
Ethiopia
Guinea
Rwanda
Angola
Chad
Libya
Uganda
Somalia
DR Congo
Congo Republic
Zimbabwe
Djibouti
Cameroon
South Sudan
Eswatini
Sudan
Equatorial Guinea
Egypt
Burundi
Eritrea
6 of the 10 countries showing
increasing improvement sit in lower
half of ranking table
Cabo Verde: despite ranking 1st
in 2019, on a path of increasing
deterioration
Africa: Participation indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Democratic Elections 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Political Pluralism 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Civil Society Space 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Freedom of Association
& Assembly
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -7.0 -6.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0
+4.6
-2.3
-1.5
-3.7
-5.7
-4.6
-6.1
-3.4
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
40
However, compared to ten years ago, African governments
have shut down domestic access to the internet and social
media platforms less frequently. The pace of improvement
in this area has even accelerated between 2015 and 2019.
The second largest deterioration both in the ten-year and
five-year periods has been registered in Media Freedom, with
a speed of deterioration that has also increased since 2015.
Government-led censorship and self-censorship by the media
are more rampant today than in 2010, and the decline in this
area has even accelerated since 2015.
Moreover, in the last decade and with a worsening decline in
the last five years, African media have had less freedom to be
critical of incumbent regimes and have become more biased in
their coverage of the opposition, representing a narrower array
of political perspectives.
On the other hand, the curtailment of the freedom enjoyed
by journalists has stopped since 2015, even if it has been on
a deteriorating path when looking at the full decade.
Since 2015, there has also been an increasing deterioration in
the Freedom of Expression & Belief indicator, mostly driven by a
decline in the freedom of expression enjoyed by Africa’s citizens.
On a positive note, the respect for academic freedom has been
on the rise on the continent both in the ten-year and five-year
periods, albeit at a slower pace in the latter.
Personal Liberties afforded to Africa’s citizens have been eroded
over the decade as well, and the deterioration has worsened
between 2015 and 2019. This is a result of an accelerating
decline in freedom of movement and the guarantee of personal
social freedoms.
Despite being the only improved indicator in the Rights subcategory
in both time periods, albeit at a slower pace since
2015, Protection against Discrimination (16.2) obtains the
lowest IIAG indicator score in 2019.
While protection against ethnic discrimination has improved
at a slower pace in the latest five years, progress in protection
against religious and sexual orientation based discrimination
has accelerated.
Digital Rights: 4th largest IIAG indicator
deterioration over 10-year period/ most
deteriorated over 5-year period
Protection against Discrimination: lowest IIAG
indicator score in 2019 (16.2)
Africa: Rights indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Protection against
Discrimination
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Personal Liberties 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Freedom of
Expression & Belief
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Media Freedom 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Digital Rights 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -8.0 -7.0 -6.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0
+5.0
+1.4
-2.9
-2.4
-4.0
-2.1
-4.8
-7.6
-6.4
-2.9
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
41
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Inclusion & Equality: bouncing back in the latest
five years within a decade of decline
With a 2019 score of 46.3, Inclusion & Equality has the second
highest sub-category score at the African average level in
Participation, Rights & Inclusion, behind Gender.
Inclusion & Equality has improved slightly since 2015 (+0.1),
starting to revert the deterioration experienced over the tenyear
period (-0.5).
This encouraging later trend is driven by growing equality in
socioeconomic opportunity and access to public services.
Even though the indicator Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity
has experienced a small deterioration over the decade, its score
has bounced back strongly since 2015 with an annual average
trend of +0.45 compared to -0.02 during the ten-year period.
This reflects increasing improvement in the equality of access
to state jobs and state business opportunities regardless of
income level, social group, or urban-rural location.
Moreover, while the Promotion of Socioeconomic Integration
of Youth has experienced a large decline since 2010, the
deterioration in this sub-indicator has stopped in the latest
five years.
Despite having made no progress over the decade, since 2015
there has been a small increase in the score obtained by the Equal
Access to Public Services indicator. While access to basic public
services in the latest five years has become more equal regardless
of income level or social group, further progress at the indicator
level has been hindered by increasing inequality in public service
access for rural dwellers compared to urban dwellers.
Concerningly, Equal Political Representation on the African
continent is worse than ten years ago, and the pace of decline
has even tripled between 2015 and 2019. The worsening trend
in the latest five years has been driven by an acceleration in the
deterioration of full political rights and electoral opportunities
granted to various segments of the population, including ethnic,
religious, and LGBT.
There has been no change in the Equal Political Power indicator
score over the decade, with decline even appearing between 2015
and 2019. This is mostly driven by an increasing deterioration in
the level of political power conferred to rural dwellers compared
to urban dwellers, as well as to sexual minorities.
In contrast, youth have enjoyed increasing levels of representation
in parliaments in both time periods, and the pace of improvement
in this area has more than doubled between 2015 and 2019.
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 8
Slowing Improvement 5
Bouncing Back 2
Warning Signs 4
Slowing Deterioration 5
Increasing Deterioration 29
Not Classified 1
Score
Country
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Rights scores & trend classifications (2019)
Cabo Verde
South Africa
Mauritius
Namibia
Seychelles
STP
Ghana
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Botswana
Tunisia
Malawi
Mozambique
Gambia
Côte d'Ivoire
Benin
Liberia
Lesotho
Kenya
Zambia
Burkina Faso
Togo
Madagascar
Guinea-Bissau
Niger
Mali
Tanzania
Uganda
Nigeria
Guinea
Comoros
Gabon
Angola
Morocco
Mauritania
CAR
Cameroon
Algeria
Congo Republic
Zimbabwe
DR Congo
Eswatini
Ethiopia
Chad
Rwanda
Djibouti
Libya
Somalia
Egypt
Burundi
Sudan
Equatorial Guinea
South Sudan
Eritrea
Increasing deterioration: largest
number of countries across all 16
sub-categories
Tunisia: most improved country
over 10-year period (+27.1), showing
warning signs over 5-year period (-0.1)
South Africa, Mauritius & Namibia:
3 of top 5 countries on path of
increasing deterioration
42
Civil liberties have also become less equal in both the ten-year and five-year periods, driven by an increasing deterioration in the civil
liberties enjoyed by the poor and by minority groups.
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 20
Slowing Improvement 5
Bouncing Back 5
Warning Signs 5
Slowing Deterioration 1
Increasing Deterioration 17
Not Classified 1
Score
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Inclusion & Equality scores & trend classifications (2019)
Increasing improvement: largest
number of countries across all 4
Participation, Rights & Inclusion
sub-categories
Tunisia: 2nd most improved country over
10-year period (+12.0), showing warning
signs over 5-year period (-0.2)
Mauritania: bouncing back from small
decline over 10-year period (-0.2) to 2nd most
improved country over 5-year period (+8.0)
Country
Mauritius
Seychelles
Tunisia
Botswana
Cabo Verde
Benin
Ghana
Senegal
Burkina Faso
South Africa
Gambia
Niger
Lesotho
Tanzania
STP
Sierra Leone
Namibia
Algeria
Uganda
Morocco
Comoros
Kenya
Zambia
Côte d'Ivoire
Togo
Mozambique
Liberia
Gabon
Nigeria
Libya
Mali
Rwanda
Burundi
Malawi
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea
Cameroon
Zimbabwe
Eswatini
Djibouti
Madagascar
Ethiopia
Egypt
DR Congo
Angola
Congo Republic
Eritrea
Mauritania
Sudan
CAR
Somalia
Chad
Equatorial Guinea
South Sudan
Libya: the only of the 5 most deteriorated
countries over 10-year period to slow its
rate of deterioration over 5-year period
Africa: Inclusion & Equality indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Equal Access to
Public Services
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equal Political Power 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equal Socioeconomic
Opportunity
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equal Political
Representation
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equal Civil Liberties 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0
0.0
+0.3
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
+1.8
-0.3
-2.4
-1.1
-0.4
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
43
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Gender: bouncing back in the latest five years
and highest scoring sub-category in Participation,
Rights & Inclusion in 2019
With a 2019 score of 50.2, Gender constitutes the best
performing sub-category within Participation, Rights & Inclusion.
Of the 16 IIAG sub-categories, it obtains the fifth largest score
in 2019 at the African average level.
Having achieved a small improvement since 2015 (+0.2), Gender
has almost reversed the deterioration shown over the decade,
with the speed of improvement in the last five years (annual
average trend of +0.05) more than twice the speed of its decline
over the ten years (-0.02).
The encouraging trend has been mostly driven by the indicators
Political Power & Representation of Women and Equal Access to
Public Services for Women.
Compared to ten years ago, access to political power and
representation for Africa’s women has increased, and the pace
of this improvement has nearly doubled between 2015 and 2019.
Women’s access to basic public services has also increased
both in the ten-year and five-year period and at a faster pace
between 2015 and 2019.
While the indicator Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women
has also followed a positive trajectory over the past ten years,
improvement has slowed in the latest five years.
Women’s access to state jobs and state business opportunities
has increased over the last ten years, with the pace of
improvement more than doubling between 2015 and 2019.
However, women’s equality in the workplace has declined
more recently, threatening to reverse progress made in equal
pay, opportunities and non-discrimination in the workforce
over the past decade.
In the latest five years, further progress in the Gender subcategory
has been prevented by a concerning deterioration in
Equal Civil Liberties for Women. This indicator has declined over
the decade, with the rate of deterioration increasing nearly
seven-fold since 2015.
Women’s civil society participation, increasing over the decade,
has deteriorated between 2015 and 2019.
The guarantee of civil liberties to Africa’s women, including
access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement,
and freedom from forced labour, has deteriorated in both time
periods, even if deterioration has slowed since 2015.
Laws on Violence against Women, assessing countries’ legal
frameworks for protection against sexual assault, rape,
domestic violence, or sexual harassment, is the fourth most
deteriorated IIAG indicator since 2015. Concerningly, the
indicator has also seen the largest deterioration over the
decade at the indicator level across the whole IIAG dataset.
Africa: Gender indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Political Power &
Representation of Women
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Socioeconomic
Opportunity for Women
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equal Access to Public
Services for Women
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equal Civil Liberties
for Women
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Laws on Violence
against Women
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -15.0 -14.0 -13.0 -12.0 -11.0 -10.0 -9.0 -8.0 -7.0 -6.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0
+5.1
+3.8
+4.2
+0.2
-3.2
+2.5
-0.4
-14.3
-4.5
-1.2
Laws on Violence against Women: largest IIAG indicator
deterioration over 10-year period/ 4th largest IIAG
indicator deterioration over 5 year-period
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
44
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 12
Slowing Improvement 9
Bouncing Back 5
Warning Signs 5
Slowing Deterioration 8
Increasing Deterioration 14
Not Classified 1
Score
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Gender scores & trend classifications (2019)
Slowing deterioration: 1 of 2 subcategories
across all 16 with largest
number of countries
Country
Seychelles
Rwanda
Mauritius
Cabo Verde
Burundi
Tunisia
Namibia
Botswana
STP
Ghana
Kenya
Senegal
Algeria
Benin
Zambia
Uganda
Sierra Leone
Gabon
Gambia
South Africa
Cameroon
Togo
Zimbabwe
Angola
Liberia
Burkina Faso
Madagascar
Côte d'Ivoire
Mozambique
Lesotho
Niger
Morocco
Malawi
Mauritania
Tanzania
Guinea-Bissau
CAR
Comoros
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Eswatini
Congo Republic
Guinea
DR Congo
Chad
South Sudan
Eritrea
Egypt
Sudan
Mali
Libya
Djibouti
Somalia
Equatorial Guinea
Kenya & Somalia: 2 most improved
countries over 10-year period (+11.4
and +11.5, respectively)
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana & South
Africa: 3 of 5 most deteriorated countries
over 10-year period (-14.3, -7.4 and
-7.1, respectively) have seen rate of
deterioration slow over 5-year period
45
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Security &
Rule of Law
> SECURITY & RULE OF LAW
Rule of Law & Justice
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law
Impartiality of the Judicial System
Judicial Processes
Equality before the Law
Law Enforcement
Property Rights
•
•
•
•
•
•
Accountability & Transparency
Institutional Checks & Balances
Civic Checks & Balances
Absence of Undue Influence on Government
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information
Accessibility of Information
•
•
•
•
•
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector
Public Procurement Procedures
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector
•
•
•
•
•
Anti-Corruption
•
•
•
•
•
Security & Safety
Absence of Armed Conflict
Absence of Violence against Civilians
Absence of Forced Migration
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour
Absence of Criminality
46
47
2020 IIAG: Index Report
TREND CLASSIFICATION NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Increasing Deterioration 22
Increasing Improvement 14
Bouncing Back 7
Warning Signs 5
Slowing Improvement 4
Slowing Deterioration 1
CHANGE 2010-2019
LARGEST IMPROVEMENT GAMBIA
+14.2
LARGEST DETERIORATION BURUNDI
CHANGE 2010-2019 -12.7
DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)
Not available*
No change
Deteriorated
1
1
29
23 Improved
1 Mauritius 79.5 -1.4
2 Cabo Verde 76.2 -2.1
3 Botswana 72.8 -5.1
4 Seychelles 72.4 +7.4
4 Tunisia 72.4 +13.4
6 Namibia 69.6 -2.0
7 Senegal 68.2 +3.8
8 South Africa 67.6 -2.3
9 São Tomé and Príncipe 67.5 0.0
10 Benin 66.1 +3.2
11 Ghana 66.0 -5.4
11 Rwanda 66.0 +0.5
13 Morocco 60.7 +4.9
14 Malawi 58.9 -1.4
15 Côte d'Ivoire 58.2 +8.8
16 Gambia 58.0 +14.2
17 Burkina Faso 57.4 +0.7
18 Kenya 56.3 -2.3
19 Sierra Leone 56.2 +4.0
19 Tanzania 56.2 -2.3
19 Zambia 56.2 -6.9
22 Liberia 54.9 +2.0
23 Lesotho 53.9 -4.1
24 Niger 52.7 -0.4
25 Togo 51.3 +2.0
26 Uganda 50.6 -3.8
27 Algeria 50.4 -0.4
28 Madagascar 49.9 +4.4
29 Guinea-Bissau 48.5 +8.0
30 Ethiopia 47.9 +5.2
31 Mozambique 47.1 -3.4
32 Zimbabwe 46.4 +6.9
33 Mali 45.1 -7.9
34 Nigeria 44.3 -3.2
35 Angola 44.1 +5.5
36 Eswatini 43.7 +2.9
37 Gabon 43.5 -3.2
38 Guinea 43.4 -1.7
39 Comoros 42.3 -11.1
40 Djibouti 41.3 -2.7
41 Mauritania 40.3 +6.7
42 Egypt 39.0 -3.6
43 Chad 37.5 +6.5
44 Cameroon 35.7 -5.5
45 Central African Republic 34.1 +2.4
46 Congo Republic 32.8 -5.4
47 Burundi 30.2 -12.7
48 Equatorial Guinea 29.1 +0.6
49 Sudan 27.4 +1.5
50 Libya 26.9 -5.3
51 Eritrea 23.7 -0.5
52 DR Congo 23.5 -9.4
53 South Sudan* 15.3 .
54 Somalia 13.8 -0.5
AFRICAN AVERAGE 49.5 -0.7
RANK /54 2019 SCORE/100.0 CHANGE 2010-2019
* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data
for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.
CHANGE 2010-2019
Underlying sub-categories
2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE/100.0
TREND CLASSIFICATION
-0.7
49.5
Slowing Deterioration
Security & Safety 75.9 -5.3
Rule of Law & Justice 45.2 +0.8
Accountability & Transparency 38.1 +0.8
Anti-Corruption 38.8 +1.1
2019 Score | Change 2010-2019
48
Security & Rule of Law: continued
deterioration over the past decade, albeit
slower since 2015
Though still the second highest scoring category (out of four)
in 2019, with an African average score of 49.5, Security & Rule
of Law is also one of the two categories that have deteriorated
over the last decade (2010-2019).
However, the deterioration has slowed over the last five years
(2015-2019), with an annual average trend of -0.05 compared
to -0.08 over the past ten years.
Very diverse performances within the category
This trend at category level is mainly led by the
performances of both the Security & Safety and the
Anti-Corruption sub-categories.
Since 2015 Security & Safety has slowed the speed of
decline registered at continental level over the decade,
and in 2019 it is the highest scoring sub-category out of
the 16 in the IIAG.
The African average score for Anti-Corruption has improved
over the decade, with progress even accelerating between
2015 and 2019. However, Anti-Corruption still constitutes
Africa’s second lowest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019.
Meanwhile, despite a positive trajectory over the decade,
both Rule of Law & Justice and Accountability & Transparency
have shown warning signs in the latest five years.
Progress in Accountability & Transparency has stalled,
leading it to become the IIAG’s lowest scoring sub-category
in 2019.
Rule of Law & Justice has even experienced a downturn
between 2015 and 2019.
At country level: worrying trends for some of the
better performers
The five best performing countries in 2019 are Mauritius (79.5),
Cabo Verde (76.2), Botswana (72.8), Seychelles (72.4) and Tunisia
(72.4). On the other hand, the five worst performing countries are
Libya (26.9), Eritrea (23.7), DR Congo (23.5), South Sudan (15.3)
and Somalia (13.8).
Concerningly, the majority of countries sitting in the upper half
of the ranking table are either on a trend of increasing
deterioration or have shown warning signs in the past five years.
Of the ten highest ranking countries, only two, Benin and
Seychelles, are on a path of increasing improvement, with progress
over the decade accelerating in the most recent five years.
Meanwhile, the three highest scoring countries have declined over
the decade, although Mauritius and Cabo Verde have reverted to
progress between 2015 and 2019, while Botswana has slowed
its decline in this period.
Namibia, the 6th highest scoring country, is facing increasing
deterioration while Senegal, ranking 7th, is showing warning signs.
Between 14th ranked Malawi and 27th ranked Algeria, only two
countries, Gambia and Sierra Leone, have not seen a decline in
their Security & Rule of Law score between 2015 and 2019.
Most of the ten worst scoring countries have declined over
the decade. Barring Zambia, ranking 19th, all of the five most
deteriorated countries over the last ten years are sitting in the
lower half of the ranking table.
Eleven of the 15 most deteriorated countries over the decade
have even increased their pace of deterioration over the last
five years. The four exceptions are Burundi, Egypt and Libya,
all bouncing back, and Botswana, which has been declining
at a slower rate.
Africa: Security & Rule of Law sub-categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Sub-category
Anti-Corruption 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Accountability
& Transparency
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Rule of Law & Justice 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Security & Safety 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -5.5 -5.0 -4.5 -4.0 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5
+1.1
+0.8
+0.8
0.0
+0.8
-0.4
-5.3
-1.3
Anti-Corruption: 2nd lowest scoring sub-category of the IIAG
Accountability & Transparency: lowest scoring sub-category
of the IIAG
Security & Safety: highest scoring sub-category of the IIAG
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
49
2020 IIAG: Index Report
However, some encouraging trends are worth noting among the low-ranking countries. Between 2015 and 2019, with the exception of
Gambia, the five most improved countries sit in the lower half of the ranking table, all of them have shown increasing improvement.
Despite being among the ten worst performers in 2019, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan have progressed over the
decade, at an increased pace over the last five years. Though still ranking 49th in 2019, Sudan is the second most improved country since 2015.
African countries: Security & Rule of Law scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Mauritius
Cabo Verde
Botswana
Seychelles
Tunisia
Namibia
Senegal
South Africa
STP
Benin
Ghana
Rwanda
Morocco
Malawi
Côte d’Ivoire
Gambia
Burkina Faso
Kenya
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Zambia
Liberia
Lesotho
Niger
Togo
Uganda
Algeria
Madagascar
Guinea-Bissau
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Mali
Nigeria
Angola
Eswatini
Gabon
Guinea
Comoros
Djibouti
Mauritania
Egypt
Chad
Cameroon
CAR
Congo Republic
Burundi
Equatorial Guinea
Sudan
Libya
Eritrea
DR Congo
South Sudan
Somalia
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Bouncing back: largest number
of countries across all 4
categories
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 14
Slowing Improvement 4
Bouncing Back 7
Warning Signs 5
Slowing Deterioration 1
Increasing Deterioration 22
Not Classified 1
Selected African countries: Security & Rule of Law, 5 most
improved & 5 most deteriorated countries (2010-2019)
10-Year Trend
+20.0
+15.0
+10.0
+5.0
0.0
-5.0
-10.0
-15.0
Gambia
Tunisia
Côte d’Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau
Seychelles
Zambia
Mali
DR Congo
Comoros
Burundi
+14.2
-11.1
-6.9
-7.9
-9.4
-12.7
+13.4
+8.0 +7.4
+8.8
Country
Selected African countries: Security & Rule of Law, 5 most
improved & 5 most deteriorated countries (2015-2019)
5-Year Trend
+20.0
+15.0
+10.0
+5.0
0.0
-5.0
-10.0
-15.0
+19.6
-9.0
-7.0 -7.1
-8.4
-9.2
+8.6
+6.8 +6.1
+7.1
Gambia
Sudan
Mauritania
Angola
Zimbabwe
Liberia
Cameroon
Zambia
Comoros
DR Congo
Country
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
50
Over the decade Absence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
and Absence of Refugees have deteriorated at similar rates,
however between 2015 and 2019, the former has been declining
almost eight times faster than the latter, with a five year annual
average trend of -0.38 compared to -0.05.
Albeit declining over the decade, Absence of Human Trafficking
& Forced Labour is the only indicator within the Security &
Safety sub-category that has reverted to a positive trajectory
in the more recent period.
This is driven by increased efforts of governments to meet the
minimum standards of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 for the elimination of human
trafficking and not by an actual reduction in the prevalence of
forced labour. The IIAG sub-indicator Absence of Forced Labour
has declined both over the last ten and the last five years,
although at a slower pace in the more recent period.
Absence of Criminality is the only indicator to have progressed
over the decade, but it has shown warning signs, with the rate
of homicides having risen again over the last five years.
Security & Safety: the 2019 best scoring yet
most declined IIAG sub-category
While Security & Safety is the highest scoring IIAG sub-category
at the African average level, it is also the sub-category that has
registered the largest decline over the last ten years (-5.3), even
though deterioration has slowed down in the latest five years.
This concerning negative trajectory has been driven by four of
the five underlying indicators.
Firstly, there has been an increase in the level of violence
against civilians by the government and by non-state actors,
to a larger extent by the former. While the pace of deterioration
in Absence of Non-State Actor Violence against Civilians has
slowed between 2015 and 2019, it has increased in Absence
of Government Violence against Civilians.
Compared to ten years ago, the continent is also exposed to
higher levels of state-based and non-state armed conflict, as
well as forced migration.
The deterioration in Absence of Armed Conflict and Absence of
Forced Migration has, however, slowed within the last five years.
Africa: Security & Safety indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Absence of Criminality 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Absence of Human
Trafficking & Forced Labour
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Absence of Forced
Migration
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Absence of Armed
Conflict
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Absence of Violence
against Civilians
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -12.0 -11.0 -10.0 -9.0 -8.0 -7.0 -6.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0
-11.7
-4.9
-9.1
-0.9
-2.9
-0.8
-2.6
+1.4
+0.3
-1.1
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
51
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Nevertheless, law enforcement on the continent remains an
area of concern as it is the lowest scoring indicator within the
Rule of Law & Justice sub-category and the ninth lowest scoring
of all 79 IIAG indicators.
Over the course of the decade, the continent has also seen
better compliance by the executive with the rule of law, as
reflected in the, albeit small, improvement when it comes to
lawful transfers of power. Improvement with regards to the
compliance with the constitution by the executive has even
accelerated over the last five years. However, the continent has
not seen more compliance by the executive with judicial decisions.
While judicial systems on the continent are on average more
impartial than ten years ago due to progress both in judicial
independence and the merit-based appointment of judges,
retreat in both over the last five years risks overturning the
progress made over the decade. This is one of the main drivers
of the sub-category’s decline between 2015 and 2019.
Rule of Law & Justice: marginal progress over
the decade already under threat
With an African average score of 45.2, Rule of Law & Justice
is the second highest scoring sub-category within Security &
Rule of Law, but the sixth lowest scoring among the 16 IIAG
sub-categories.
Despite having followed a positive trajectory over the last ten
years, the sub-category has deteriorated between 2015 and 2019.
With the pace of decline in the last five years (annual average
trend of -0.10) faster than the pace of improvement over the
decade (+0.09), Rule of Law & Justice has displayed warning
signs, potentially reversing the already small progress.
Progress has been driven most notably by improvements in
law enforcement, in particular by better police services, while
only marginal progress has been made on the functioning of the
criminal justice system.
Score
Country
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Nigeria: only country to show slowing
deterioration among 20 most declined
countries, with the rest having accelerated
their rate of deterioration over 5-year period
Côte d’Ivoire: has shown warning signs
despite being 1 of the 5 most improved
countries over 10-year period
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 8
Slowing Improvement 5
Bouncing Back 10
Warning Signs 2
Slowing Deterioration 4
Increasing Deterioration 24
Not Classified 1
African countries: Security & Safety scores & trend classifications (2019)
STP
Mauritius
Benin
Cabo Verde
Togo
Tunisia
Senegal
Morocco
Seychelles
Malawi
Algeria
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Ghana
Zambia
Botswana
Gabon
Namibia
Equatorial Guinea
Côte d'Ivoire
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Eswatini
Comoros
Gambia
Djibouti
Rwanda
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Guinea
Angola
Mozambique
Uganda
Ethiopia
Chad
Madagascar
Congo Republic
Niger
Mauritania
Lesotho
South Africa
Egypt
Cameroon
Eritrea
Mali
Burkina Faso
Sudan
Burundi
CAR
Libya
Nigeria
DR Congo
South Sudan
Somalia
52
There have been negative developments with regards to judicial processes on the continent and there is less equality and more
discrimination before the law. The deterioration of Judicial Processes is due to less access to and affordability of justice, due and fair
process being less of a guarantee, as well as more delays and less effectiveness in the enforcement of justice. However, within the last
five years, progress has been made in the access and affordability of justice, resulting in a small positive trajectory in Judicial Processes
between 2015 and 2019.
Property Rights has also deteriorated and has been following an increasing path of deterioration. The rate of decline has more than
tripled over the last five years with an annual average trend of -0.13 between 2010 and 2019 compared to annual average trend of -0.48
between 2015 and 2019.
Score
Country
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Of 21 countries that declined over the
decade, only 3 have not accelerated
their pace of deterioration over 5-
year period
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 13
Slowing Improvement 6
Bouncing Back 2
Warning Signs 11
Slowing Deterioration 2
Increasing Deterioration 18
No Change 1
Not Classified 1
African countries: Rule of Law & Justice scores & trend classifications (2019)
Cabo Verde
Seychelles
Mauritius
Botswana
South Africa
Namibia
Senegal
Ghana
Tunisia
Benin
STP
Rwanda
Lesotho
Morocco
Burkina Faso
Malawi
Gambia
Côte d'Ivoire
Kenya
Zambia
Algeria
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Niger
Nigeria
Liberia
Madagascar
Guinea-Bissau
Uganda
Togo
Gabon
Mozambique
Mali
Angola
Mauritania
Djibouti
Zimbabwe
Comoros
Egypt
Eswatini
Guinea
Ethiopia
Chad
CAR
Cameroon
Burundi
DR Congo
Libya
Sudan
Congo Republic
South Sudan
Equatorial Guinea
Somalia
Eritrea
Ghana: most declined over 10-year
period (-9.9) and 2nd most declined
over 5-year period (-9.3)
CAR, Sudan & South Sudan: 3 of the
10 lowest scoring countries among 10
largest improvers over 5-year period
Africa: Rule of Law & Justice indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Law Enforcement 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Impartiality of the
Judicial System
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Executive Compliance
with the Rule of Law
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Property Rights 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Judicial Processes 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equality before the Law 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 +2.5 +3.0 +3.5 +4.0 +4.5
+4.0
+0.6
+2.9
-2.6
+2.4
+1.4
-1.2
-1.9
-1.7
-1.8
0.0
+0.1
Rule of Law & Justice: magnitude of improvement
over 10-year period is 2nd smallest across all 10
sub-categories that have improved
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
53
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Little progress has been made in the sub-category over the decade, with a marginal increase in score of +0.8, the second smallest across
all ten sub-categories that have improved, and no further progress since 2015.
The small progress over the decade is most notably driven by
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information. At continental level,
progress has been made in budget transparency and disclosure
of assets held by politicians and public officials compared to ten
years ago. But in contrast, laws and judicial information have on
average become less public.
Checks and balances by citizens, particularly petitions and
complaint mechanisms, have improved both within the last ten
and the last five years, with the speed of progress accelerating in
the more recent time period.
Despite an improvement over the decade, Institutional Checks
& Balances has deteriorated over the last five years, with the rate
of decline between 2015 and 2019 (annual average trend of -0.23)
more than seven times the rate of improvement over the decade
(+0.03).
There are better legislative checks on the executive in 2019
than in 2010, however progress has slowed down in more
recent years. At the same time, in 2019 there are fewer working
separations of powers and fewer sanctions for misconduct than
ten years ago, with the pace of decline even having increased in
these areas in the last five years.
While civic checks and balances are improving,
institutional checks and balances on the continent
are on a concerning trajectory.
Accountability & Transparency: progress on hold for the lowest scoring sub-category in 2019
With an African average score of 38.1 in 2019, Accountability & Transparency is the lowest scoring of the 16 IIAG sub-categories. The low
score is driven by the two transparency-related indicators Accessibility of Information and Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information
which are the third and fourth lowest scoring indicators out of all 79 IIAG indicators.
Score
Civic Checks & Balances Institutional Checks Indicator
& Balances
Absence of Undue Influence
on Government
Disclosure of Financial
& Judicial Information
Accessibility of Information
Africa: Accountability & Transparency indicators, average scores (2019)
100.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
50.4
43.9 41.4
29.0 25.6
Africa: Accountability & Transparency indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Disclosure of Financial
& Judicial Information
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Civic Checks & Balances 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Absence of Undue
Influence on Government
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Institutional Checks
& Balances
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Accessibility
of Information
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 +2.5 +3.0 +3.5 +4.0
+3.4
+0.7
+0.9
+0.6
+0.3
-0.8
+0.3
-1.1
+0.1
-0.9
Accountability & Transparency: majority of
indicator improvements made were less than +1.0
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
54
Over the last five years, governments on the continent have become increasingly subject to undue influence, although to a lesser extent
than ten years ago. The rate of decline for Absence of Undue Influence on Government between 2015 and 2019 (annual average trend of
-0.20) is more than six times the rate of improvement over the decade (+0.03).
Accessibility of Information is the only indicator of the sub-category to have declined over the decade as information requests are of
lower quality and reliability, while there is less access to party financing information. But because access to public records, legislative
information and records of state-owned companies has improved over the decade and at a faster rate between 2015 and 2019,
Accessibility of Information has seen a small increase in score in the last five years.
Score
Country
5 of 10 highest scoring countries have
declined over 10-year period and 5 of 8
countries showing increasing improvement
sit in lower half of the ranking table
African countries: Accountability & Transparency scores & trend classifications (2019)
South Africa
Mauritius
Cabo Verde
Ghana
Botswana
Namibia
Tunisia
STP
Malawi
Seychelles
Liberia
Senegal
Burkina Faso
Benin
Kenya
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Zambia
Mali
Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire
Madagascar
Uganda
Gambia
Morocco
Rwanda
Niger
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
Guinea
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Ethiopia
Angola
Togo
Algeria
CAR
Cameroon
Chad
Gabon
Comoros
DR Congo
Egypt
Eswatini
Mauritania
Libya
Congo Republic
Burundi
Djibouti
South Sudan
Sudan
Equatorial Guinea
Somalia
Eritrea
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 8
Slowing Improvement 11
Bouncing Back 3
Warning Signs 8
Slowing Deterioration 5
Increasing Deterioration 17
No Change 1
Not Classified 1
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
100.0
80.0
While the pace of improvement for the latter has slowed in the
past five years, the former has increased its pace of progress
within this period.
The prevalence of corruption within legislative branches increased
again between 2015 and 2019, despite the improvement over
the decade. This has led to slower improvement in Absence of
Corruption in State Institutions in the more recent time period.
Both public sector theft and public sector bribery, including in
the police and military, have been reduced at continental average
level over the last decade with the positive trajectory picking up
speed between 2015 and 2019.
Despite increasing by a smaller magnitude than the indicators
on state institutions and public sector corruption and remaining
the second lowest scoring indicator of the sub-category, Anti-
Corruption Mechanisms has also followed a path of increasing
improvement in the last five years.
Anti-Corruption: accelerating improvement but
still the second lowest scoring IIAG sub-category
Anti-Corruption is the only sub-category of Security & Rule of Law
to have followed a positive trajectory both over the ten-year and
five-year period, with the pace of improvement even accelerating
within the last five years.
Nevertheless, with an African average score of 38.8 it remains
the second lowest scoring of the 16 IIAG sub-categories with
only Accountability & Transparency receiving a lower score.
The positive trajectory of the sub-category has most notably
been driven by reduced corruption in state institutions but
also in the public sector, as well as by strengthened anticorruption
mechanisms.
Levels of corruption have been reduced in all branches of
government with the greatest progress made on corruption within
executive powers, followed by corruption within judicial powers.
55
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Although corruption in the private sector is slightly more prevalent than ten years ago, progress has been made in the last five years with
the continent improving its average score for Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector between 2015 and 2019.
A concerning trend has emerged with regards to public procurement procedures. Procurement procedures have become less competitive
and sanctioning of companies that have violated the law is less rigorous than ten years ago, with the pace of decline having picked up
speed in the last five years. Public Procurement Procedures is the lowest scoring indicator constituting the Anti-Corruption sub-category
while also being the fifth lowest scoring indicator in the IIAG overall.
African countries: Anti-Corruption scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Rwanda
Mauritius
Tunisia
Seychelles
Botswana
Senegal
Cabo Verde
Namibia
Burkina Faso
Benin
Ethiopia
South Africa
Morocco
Gambia
STP
Côte d'Ivoire
Tanzania
Niger
Togo
Sierra Leone
Lesotho
Eswatini
Zambia
Kenya
Ghana
Algeria
Uganda
Malawi
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Madagascar
Mali
Egypt
Djibouti
Liberia
CAR
Cameroon
Nigeria
Comoros
Mauritania
Guinea
Sudan
Angola
Eritrea
Burundi
Gabon
Guinea-Bissau
Congo Republic
Chad
Libya
Equatorial Guinea
DR Congo
Somalia
South Sudan
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Increasing Improvement: 2nd largest
number of countries across all 16
sub-categories after Infrastructure
8 of 10 most improved countries over
10-year period have accelerated rate
of progress over 5-year period
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 24
Slowing Improvement 3
Bouncing Back 3
Warning Signs 6
Slowing Deterioration 3
Increasing Deterioration 14
Not Classified 1
Liberia: pace of decline over 5-year
period is more than 700 times pace
of decline over 10-year period
Africa: Anti-Corruption indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Absence of Corruption
in State Institutions
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Absence of Corruption
in the Public Sector
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Anti-Corruption
Mechanisms
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Absence of Corruption
in the Private Sector
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Public Procurement
Procedures
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 +2.5 +3.0 +3.5 +4.0 +4.5
+4.1
+1.5
+3.2
+2.2
+1.3
+1.4
-0.5
-2.5
-2.6
+1.9
Public Procurement Procedures: 5th lowest scoring IIAG indicator
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
Human
Development
> HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
•
•
•
•
•
•
Access to Healthcare
Access to Water & Sanitation
Control of Communicable Diseases
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality
Compliance with International Health Regulations
Health
Equality in Education
Education Enrolment
Education Completion
Human Resources in Education
Education Quality
Education
•
•
•
•
•
Social Protection
Social Safety Nets
Poverty Reduction Policies
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation
Access to Housing
Absence of Undernourishment
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Sustainable Environment
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability
Enforcement of Environmental Policies
Air Quality
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests
Land & Water Biodiversity
56
57
2020 IIAG: Index Report
TREND CLASSIFICATION NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Slowing Improvement 20
Increasing Improvement 14
Warning Signs 8
Slowing Deterioration 5
Increasing Deterioration 4
Bouncing Back 2
CHANGE 2010-2019
LARGEST IMPROVEMENT CÔTE D’IVOIRE
+12.1
LARGEST DETERIORATION LIBYA
CHANGE 2010-2019 -12.7
DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)
Not available*
No change
Deteriorated
1
0
11
42 Improved
1 Mauritius 75.5 -0.8
2 Seychelles 75.2 +8.3
3 Algeria 73.6 +4.6
4 Tunisia 71.8 -0.7
5 Botswana 68.5 +3.6
6 Cabo Verde 67.0 -0.1
7 Morocco 66.8 +8.2
8 Egypt 65.4 +3.6
9 South Africa 64.3 -0.7
10 Rwanda 64.0 +3.6
11 Gabon 61.0 +5.2
12 Namibia 60.9 +4.2
13 Ghana 60.7 +2.4
14 Kenya 59.4 +8.1
15 São Tomé and Príncipe 59.3 +4.7
16 Senegal 58.3 +5.7
17 Tanzania 57.8 +7.2
18 Togo 55.5 +9.9
19 Benin 55.0 +3.2
20 Uganda 54.9 +3.9
20 Zimbabwe 54.9 +5.3
22 Cameroon 54.4 +7.1
23 Ethiopia 54.0 +9.6
24 Malawi 53.6 +2.7
25 Zambia 52.7 +2.1
26 Côte d'Ivoire 52.4 +12.1
27 Gambia 51.4 -1.8
28 Burkina Faso 50.7 +5.4
29 Lesotho 50.4 +2.4
30 Mali 50.3 +2.2
31 Eswatini 50.1 +0.6
32 Djibouti 48.5 +1.2
33 Comoros 48.3 +4.9
34 Mauritania 48.1 +3.1
35 Libya 47.8 -12.7
36 Burundi 47.2 +6.3
37 Nigeria 46.5 -0.2
38 Congo Republic 46.0 +2.4
38 Niger 46.0 +6.3
40 Mozambique 45.7 +2.3
41 Sierra Leone 45.6 +11.2
42 Guinea 45.2 +6.7
43 Liberia 44.3 +2.8
44 Equatorial Guinea 43.7 -1.2
45 Sudan 42.7 +2.2
46 Angola 42.3 +5.8
47 DR Congo 40.3 +3.0
48 Guinea-Bissau 38.7 -1.2
49 Madagascar 37.4 +0.4
50 Eritrea 36.9 -1.4
51 Chad 35.1 +3.8
52 Central African Republic 27.5 -0.9
53 South Sudan* 26.5 .
54 Somalia 21.3 +6.7
AFRICAN AVERAGE 51.9 +3.0
RANK /54 2019 SCORE/100.0 CHANGE 2010-2019
* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data
for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.
CHANGE 2010-2019
Underlying sub-categories
2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE/100.0
TREND CLASSIFICATION
+3.0
51.9
Slowing Improvement
Health 60.3 +6.8
Education 49.3 +1.7
Social Protection 42.6 -0.3
Sustainable Environment 55.4 +3.8
2019 Score | Change 2010-2019
58
Human Development: slowing
improvement since 2015 and first ever
year-on-year decline mirror the trajectory
of Overall Governance in 2019
Human Development is the highest-scoring category (out of four)
in 2019, with an African average score of 51.9. It is one of only two
IIAG categories to have improved over the last ten (2010-2019)
and five (2015-2019) years. But improvement has slowed from
2015, with an annual average trend of +0.23 compared to +0.33
over the past ten years.
Mirroring the trajectory at the Overall Governance level, Human
Development registers the first year-on-year score decline in 2019
(51.9 compared to 52.0 in 2018).
Deteriorating Social Protection, as well as
slowing improvement in Health and Education
drive the slowdown
Performances within the category are mixed. Declining Social
Protection as well as slowing improvement in Health and, to a
lesser extent, Education, drive the slowdown at the category level.
Human Development is the category where most countries follow a path of slowing improvement
The slowing progress registered at the African average level is reflected in the trajectories of most countries. Of the four IIAG categories,
Human Development has the largest number of countries (20) that have improved at a slower pace since 2015.
The first year-on-year score decline is driven by fewer countries improving between 2018 and 2019 (26) than between 2017 and 2018 (40).
In 2019, the five highest scoring countries are Mauritius (75.5), Seychelles (75.2), Algeria (73.6), Tunisia (71.8) and Botswana (68.5). The
five lowest scoring countries are Eritrea (36.9), Chad (35.1), Central African Republic (27.5), South Sudan (26.5) and Somalia (21.3).
Social Protection, the lowest scoring sub-category in Human
Development, has deteriorated over the past decade, albeit at
a slower pace between 2015 and 2019.
While achieving the second largest improvement of the 16 IIAG
sub-categories over the decade (+6.8), Health has more than
halved its pace of improvement since 2015. However, it remains
the second highest scoring IIAG sub-category at the African
average level in 2019.
Similarly, even though Education has shown improvement
both in the ten-year and five-year period, progress has slowed
marginally in the latest five years.
Improvement has been achieved in Sustainable Environment
over the decade, and at an even faster pace since 2015, making
it the third highest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019.
Health: 2nd highest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019.
Sustainable Environment: 3rd highest scoring IIAG
sub-category in 2019
Africa: Human Development sub-categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Sub-category
Sustainable
Environment
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Health 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Education 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Social Protection 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 +2.5 +3.0 +3.5 +4.0 +4.5 +5.0 +5.5 +6.0 +6.5 +7.0
+1.7
+3.8
+1.5
+6.8
+0.7
+1.7
-0.1
-0.3
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
59
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Of the ten highest ranking countries in 2019, only Seychelles,
Algeria and Egypt have been on a path of increasing improvement,
with progress over the decade accelerating in the most recent
five years.
Meanwhile, Botswana, Morocco and Rwanda, though still
following a positive trajectory over the decade, have seen their
progress slow since 2015.
More worryingly, the four remaining of the ten best performers
have deteriorated over decade. While Tunisia has managed to
slow deterioration in the last five years, decline has worsened in
Mauritius and South Africa over the same period. Cabo Verde is
bouncing back, having improved between 2015 and 2019.
In the rest of the upper half of the ranking table, between 11th
ranked Gabon and 27th ranked Gambia, only three countries,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin and Malawi, have followed a path
of increasing improvement. Gambia is the only country to have
deteriorated since 2010, though at a slower pace in the second
half of the decade.
Out of the ten lowest scoring countries, only three have registered
a decline in the ten-year period. However, none of these have
increased their rate of deterioration in the latest five years.
Trend performance is diverse among the bottom ten countries.
Six of them have managed to increase their score over the
past ten years, but Sudan, DR Congo and Chad have exhibited
warning signs since 2015. Progress in Angola has slowed in the
latest five years, while Madagascar and Somalia have managed
to increase improvement.
In the lower half of the rankings table, between 28th ranked
Burkina Faso and 44th ranked Equatorial Guinea, 14 countries
have seen their scores increase over the ten-year period, six
of them at an even faster pace over the five-year period. Only
three countries have registered a decline over the decade. Of
these, Libya has managed to slow its deterioration in the latest
five years, while for Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea deterioration
has worsened.
Somalia: lowest scoring country in 2019 (21.3), but
increasing progress has led to 2nd largest improvement
over 5-year period (+5.3)
African countries: Human Development scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Mauritius
Seychelles
Algeria
Tunisia
Botswana
Cabo Verde
Morocco
Egypt
South Africa
Rwanda
Gabon
Namibia
Ghana
Kenya
STP
Senegal
Tanzania
Togo
Benin
Zimbabwe
Uganda
Cameroon
Ethiopia
Malawi
Zambia
Côte d'Ivoire
Gambia
Burkina Faso
Lesotho
Mali
Eswatini
Djibouti
Comoros
Mauritania
Libya
Burundi
Nigeria
Niger
Congo Republic
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Guinea
Liberia
Equatorial Guinea
Sudan
Angola
DR Congo
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Eritrea
Chad
CAR
South Sudan
Somalia
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Slowing improvement: largest
number of countries across all 4
IIAG categories
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 14
Slowing Improvement 20
Bouncing Back 2
Warning Signs 8
Slowing Deterioration 5
Increasing Deterioration 4
Not Classified 1
Côte d’Ivoire: most improved
over 10-year period (+12.1) but
improvement has been slowing
over 5-year period
60
Sierra Leone: ranking 41st in 2019, has experienced 2nd
largest improvement over 10-year period (+11.2) and
largest over 5-year period (+5.4)
Libya: has dropped more in rank (-26) than any other
country over 10-year period
Health: still second highest scoring in 2019 and
second most improved IIAG sub-category over
the decade, but progress has slowed since 2015
With an African average score of 60.3, Health is the second
highest scoring of the IIAG’s 16 sub-categories in 2019.
Health is also the second most improved IIAG sub-category
over the decade (+6.8), but only the fourth between 2015
and 2019 (+1.5).
Its pace of improvement has halved since 2015 with an
annua average trend of +0.38 compared to +0.76 over
the ten years.
This slowing progress in the latest five years has been driven
by all six underlying indicators, which have either been on a
path of slowing improvement or been registering warning signs.
Since 2015, Access to Healthcare on the continent has become
slightly more restricted, threatening to reverse the small
progress made over the decade. This discouraging later trend
is driven by increasing levels of out-of-pocket spending on
healthcare by Africa’s citizens between 2015 and 2019.
Likewise, even though it is the most improved indicator in the
Human Development category over the ten-year period, as well as
the third most improved of all the 79 IIAG indicators, progress in
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) has stalled
over the latest five years.
Control of Communicable Diseases is the second most improved
indicator in the category over the past decade, and the
most improved in the latest five years. However, its pace of
improvement has slowed since 2015.
The slackening trend has been driven by slower progress in
the provision of antiretroviral therapy to HIV-positive people,
especially among pregnant women, as well as in the fight
against malaria deaths.
On the other hand, child immunisation coverage against measles,
DPT and Hepatitis B has extended over the decade and
at an even faster pace over the latest five years.
Compared to ten years ago, there are fewer child and maternal
deaths on the continent. Even though the pace of improvement
in both these areas has slowed since 2015, Control of Child &
Maternal Mortality is still the third most improved indicator in
the category over both time periods.
Selected African countries: Human Development, 5 most
improved & 5 most deteriorated countries (2010-2019)
10-Year Trend
+14.0
+12.0
+6.0
+10.0
+4.0
+8.0
+2.0
0.0
-4.0
-6.0
-2.0
-8.0
-10.0
-12.0
-14.0
Côte d’Ivoire
Sierra Leone
Togo
Ethiopia
Seychelles
Eq. Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Eritrea
Gambia
Libya
-1.2 -1.2 -1.4 -1.8
-12.7
+12.1
+11.2
+9.6
+8.3
+9.9
Country
5-Year Trend
Selected African countries: Human Development, 5 most
improved & 5 most deteriorated countries (2015-2019)
+14.0
+12.0
+6.0
+10.0
+4.0
+8.0
+2.0
0.0
-4.0
-6.0
-2.0
-8.0
-10.0
-12.0
-14.0
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Seychelles
Egypt
Guinea
Libya
South Africa
Eswatini
Eq. Guinea
Congo Rep.
-2.3
-1.6 -1.6 -2.0
-3.7
+5.4 +5.3
+4.0
+3.3
+5.0
Country
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
61
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Compliance with International Health Regulations
(IHR): 3rd most improved IIAG indicator and most
improved in category over 10-year period
While there has been some improvement in the Control of Non-Communicable Diseases over the past decade, progress has slowed
marginally since 2015 in an area that is increasingly challenging for African health systems. This is mostly due to increasing levels of
metabolic risks.
Finally, access to water and sanitation for Africa’s citizens has increased both in the ten-year and five-year periods, albeit at a slower pace
in the latter. This has been driven by slower progress in extending the availability of drinking water, as well as handwashing and improved
sanitation facilities.
Africa: Health indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Compliance with International
Health Regulations (IHR)
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Control of Communicable
Diseases
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Control of Child &
Maternal Mortality
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Access to Water
& Sanitation
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Control of
Non-Communicable Diseases
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Access to Healthcare 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0 +10.0 +11.0 +12.0 +13.0 +14.0 +15.0 +16.0
+15.1
0.0
+11.3
+4.2
+9.5
+3.1
+3.9
+0.8
+0.4
+0.3
-0.1
+1.2
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
62
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 9
Slowing Improvement 30
Bouncing Back 1
Warning Signs 12
Slowing Deterioration 0
Increasing Deterioration 1
Not Classified 1
Score
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Health scores & trend classifications (2019)
Slowing improvement: largest
number of countries across all
16 sub-categories
Country
Seychelles
Cabo Verde
South Africa
Algeria
Mauritius
Botswana
Morocco
Rwanda
Libya
Tunisia
Namibia
Ghana
Tanzania
Egypt
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Eswatini
Zambia
Gabon
Ethiopia
Malawi
STP
Côte d'Ivoire
Senegal
Mozambique
Uganda
Djibouti
Mali
Lesotho
Niger
Togo
Angola
Comoros
Burkina Faso
Liberia
Burundi
Gambia
Eritrea
Mauritania
Benin
Cameroon
Sudan
DR Congo
Madagascar
Sierra Leone
Congo Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Nigeria
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Chad
CAR
South Sudan
Somalia
Tunisia: ranked 10th in 2019 but only
country to show increasing deterioration
in Health
Somalia: lowest scoring country in 2019 (34.0),
but 4th most improved country over 5-year
period (+5.1)
Sierra Leone: only country to feature among 5
largest improvers over both 10-year period (+21.6)
and 5-year period (+4.4)
Education: progress has marginally slowed
since 2015
With a 2019 score of 49.3, Education is the second lowest
scoring sub-category within Human Development at the African
average level.
Still the fourth most improved of the IIAG’s 16 sub-categories
over the past decade, Education has seen its progress slow slightly
since 2015, with an annual average trend of +0.18 between 2015
and 2019 compared to +0.19 over the ten-year period.
This slowing trajectory in the latest five years has been driven
by three of the five underlying indicators, three of them having
seen the pace of improvement slowing.
Firstly, although education enrolment rates have increased over
the decade, the pace of progress has reduced more than three-fold
since 2015, mostly due to an increasingly declining enrolment rate
in primary education, as well as an enrolment rate in pre-primary
education that has reverted to decline between 2015 and 2019.
Even though it is the second most improved indicator in the
sub-category over the last ten years, the pace of improvement
in Education Completion has nearly halved since 2015, due to
slowing improvement in both the completion rate of primary
education and the expected years of schooling throughout a
child’s life.
Similarly, despite being the seventh highest scoring IIAG indicator
in 2019 and the ninth most improved over the past decade, the
rate of progress in Human Resources in Education has slightly
slowed since 2015, driven by slower progress in increasing the
number of teachers per pupil in primary education. Despite this,
it is still the most improved Education indicator between 2015
and 2019.
63
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Compared to ten years ago, education quality on the African continent is lower. Education Quality is the seventh most deteriorated IIAG
indicator over the ten-year period. Although the speed of decline has slowed since 2015, it is still the second most deteriorated indicator
in the Human Development category between 2015 and 2019. Further deterioration has been prevented by the Education Alignment
with Market Needs sub-indicator, which is bouncing back, having registered an improvement since 2015 amidst a general deterioration
over the decade.
Human Resources in Education: 7th highest scoring IIAG
indicator and 9th most improved over 10-year period
Education Quality: 7th most deteriorated IIAG indicator
over 10-year period
Africa: Education indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Human Resources
in Education
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Education Completion 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Equality in Education 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Education Enrolment 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Education Quality 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -6.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0
+5.2
+2.1
+4.0
+1.0
+2.9
+1.4
+2.5
-5.3
-1.4
+0.3
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
64
Social Protection: concerning trends for the
fourth lowest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019
and the only one in Human Development to have
declined since 2010
Social Protection is the lowest scoring sub-category (42.6)
within Human Development and the fourth lowest scoring
of all the 16 IIAG sub-categories. It is the only Human
Development sub-category to have deteriorated over the
decade, although deterioration has slowed since 2015.
The main driver of this decline is the deteriorating effectiveness
of countries’ Poverty Reduction Policies. Although there seem to
be more and better policies and service delivery regarding access
to health and education, as well as better service delivery, there
also appear to be more socioeconomic barriers than ten years ago,
with larger parts of the population being excluded from society
due to poverty and inequality. The issue has become even more
prominent within the last five years as the rate of decline for
Poverty Reduction Policies between 2015 and 2019 (annual average
trend of -0.75) has more than doubled compared to the ten-year
period ( -0.31).
Africans also have less access to housing than ten years ago
with the problem having accelerated in the latest five years. The
annual average trend of decline for Access to Housing between
2015 and 2019 (-0.25) is more than ten times as high as that over
the decade (-0.02). While the proportion of the urban population
living in slums has on average been reduced, urban housing
has become less affordable. Housing constitutes a major area
of concern as the indicator Access to Housing (32.8) is one of
the ten lowest scoring indicators across the whole IIAG in 2019.
No improvement has been made over the decade in Social Safety
Nets, which also features among the ten lowest scoring of the 79
IIAG indicators. However, the indicator is the most improved of all
Social Protection indicators since 2015, reversing earlier declines
during the decade.
Progress, albeit small, has been made in Socioeconomic Inequality
Mitigation and the improvement has been nine times faster in
the latest five years, with an annual average trend of +0.20
compared to +0.02 between 2010 and 2019. Although public
expenditures and revenue recollection have become less
consistent with national poverty reduction priorities, African
countries have offset some of this by improving income equality.
The continent has made progress in eliminating undernourishment.
Absence of Undernourishment is the most improved indicator
in Social Protection over the decade. However, on average
the continent has followed a negative trajectory since 2015,
threatening to overturn the progress made. The annual average
decline over the last five years (-0.23) has been quicker than the
annual average progress over the decade (+0.19).
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 14
Slowing Improvement 13
Bouncing Back 4
Warning Signs 12
Slowing Deterioration 8
Increasing Deterioration 2
Not Classified 1
Score
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Education scores & trend classifications (2019)
Morocco: only country
among top 10 to follow path
of increasing improvement
Country
Mauritius
Seychelles
Algeria
Tunisia
Cabo Verde
Botswana
Morocco
Rwanda
Kenya
Ghana
Lesotho
Namibia
Togo
Egypt
Zimbabwe
South Africa
Benin
Gambia
Comoros
STP
Eswatini
Cameroon
Burundi
Tanzania
Gabon
Malawi
Zambia
Sierra Leone
Senegal
Liberia
Libya
Uganda
Côte d'Ivoire
DR Congo
Congo Republic
Djibouti
Mauritania
Mozambique
Ethiopia
Burkina Faso
Mali
Equatorial Guinea
Madagascar
Guinea
Nigeria
Angola
Guinea-Bissau
Niger
Sudan
Eritrea
Chad
South Sudan
CAR
Somalia
Somalia: bottom ranked in 2019, but
most improved country in Education over
5-year period
Tunisia & Botswana: among the 10 most
deteriorated countries over 10-year period,
despite ranking 4th and 6th, respectively
65
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Mauritius: most deteriorated over 10-year period
(-11.0) and 2nd most deteriorated over 5-year
period (-10.4), despite being ranked 2nd
Somalia & Eritrea: 3rd (+6.3) and 4th (+4.2) most
improved countries respectively over 5-year
period, despite being ranked 52nd and 50th
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 9
Slowing Improvement 9
Bouncing Back 8
Warning Signs 12
Slowing Deterioration 5
Increasing Deterioration 10
Not Classified 1
Score
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Social Protection scores & trend classifications (2019)
Warning Signs: out of the 10 most
improved countries over the 10-year
period 4 warning signs
Country
Algeria
Mauritius
Tunisia
Egypt
Seychelles
Morocco
Senegal
Cabo Verde
Ghana
Cameroon
Mali
Mauritania
STP
Kenya
South Africa
Nigeria
Rwanda
Gabon
Gambia
Benin
Côte d'Ivoire
Tanzania
Namibia
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Burkina Faso
Botswana
Uganda
Togo
Malawi
Niger
Guinea
Sierra Leone
Zimbabwe
Lesotho
Zambia
Burundi
Eswatini
Angola
Sudan
Congo Republic
Liberia
Equatorial Guinea
Libya
Mozambique
Comoros
Madagascar
Chad
DR Congo
Eritrea
Guinea-Bissau
Somalia
South Sudan
CAR
Libya: most declined country over 10-year
period (-25.3), dropping 33 places down the
ranks to 44th in 2019
Seychelles: most improved country
over both the 10-year (+15.7) and 5-year
period (+21.3)
Africa: Social Protection indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Absence of
Undernourishment
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Socioeconomic
Inequality Mitigation
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Social Safety Nets 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Access to Housing 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Poverty Reduction
Policies
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 +2.5
+1.7
-0.9
+0.2
+0.8
+0.0
+2.4
-0.2
-2.8
-3.0
-1.0
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
66
Sustainable Environment: the only IIAG subcategory
where every single indicator improved
over the whole decade
Sustainable Environment is the third best scoring sub-category
in 2019 (55.4). It is also the third most improved sub-category in
the IIAG over the decade (+3.8) and the second most improved in
the latest five years (+1.7), having marginally increased its pace of
progress in the latter period.
All underlying indicators of the sub-category have improved both
over the ten-year and five-year period. Sustainable Environment is
the only sub-category of the 16 in the IIAG to achieve this.
The continent has on average stepped up in promoting
environmental sustainability through policies and regulations
and has also become more rigorous in enforcing such policies,
having accelerated efforts over the last five years.
The continent has further seen progress with regards to air
quality, management of land and forests, as well as biodiversity.
On average over the last ten years most progress has been made
in improving air quality, including a reduction in household air
pollution. The annual average trend of improvement has
slightly slowed since 2015.
Both terrestrial biomes and marine areas are better protected
than ten years ago, although the rate of progress has almost
halved over the second half of the decade for Land & Water
Biodiversity, with an annual average trend of +0.25 between
2015 and 2019 compared to +0.49 over the decade.
The least progress has been made in the sustainable management
of land and forests. On average, countries have made progress
in the sustainability and diversification of agriculture. However,
primary forest loss has worsened over the last ten years.
Africa: Sustainable Environment indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Air Quality 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Land & Water
Biodiversity
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Enforcement of
Environmental Policies
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Promotion of Environmental
Sustainability
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Sustainable Management
of Land & Forests
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0
+8.9
+2.6
+4.4
+1.0
+4.2
+3.5
+1.6
+1.0
+1.8
+0.9
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
67
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Gabon: most improved over both 10-year (+18.5)
and 5-year period (+14.5), rising to 2nd best scoring
in 2019
Morocco: 2nd most improved over 10-year period
(+15.9), moving from lower half of the ranking
table in 2010 to top 10 in 2019
Equatorial Guinea: 2nd most declined country
over 10-year period (-7.2), dropping from top 10
in 2010 to lower half of ranking table in 2019
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 20
Slowing Improvement 17
Bouncing Back 1
Warning Signs 9
Slowing Deterioration 1
Increasing Deterioration 5
Not Classified 1
Score
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Sustainable Environment scores & trend classifications (2019)
Country
Botswana
Gabon
Seychelles
Rwanda
South Africa
Morocco
Tunisia
Uganda
STP
Egypt
Namibia
Ethiopia
Mauritius
Tanzania
Senegal
Togo
Benin
Burkina Faso
Zimbabwe
Algeria
Cabo Verde
Zambia
Cameroon
Kenya
Malawi
Niger
Congo Republic
Sudan
Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial Guinea
Ghana
Guinea
Comoros
Mozambique
Côte d'Ivoire
Chad
CAR
Mali
Nigeria
South Sudan
Lesotho
Mauritania
Gambia
Burundi
Djibouti
Eswatini
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Angola
Eritrea
Libya
DR Congo
Madagascar
Somalia
Libya: imost declined country over 10-year
period (-12.7), dropping from upper half of
ranking table in 2010 to bottom 10 in 2019
Mauritius: only IIAG sub-category
where it does not rank among
top 10
>
Foundations
for Economic
Opportunity
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
•
•
•
•
•
Civil Registration
Capacity of the Statistical System
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation
Budgetary & Financial Management
Professional Administration
Public Administration
Business Environment
Regional Integration
Trade Environment
Business & Competition Regulations
Access to Financial Services
Labour Relations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Infrastructure
Transport Network
Access to Energy
Mobile Communications
Digital Access
•
•
•
•
Rural Sector
Rural Land & Water Access
Rural Market Access
Rural Sector Support
Rural Businesses & Organisations
68
69
2020 IIAG: Index Report
TREND CLASSIFICATION NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Increasing Improvement 22
Slowing Improvement 16
Warning Signs 12
Bouncing Back 2
Increasing Deterioration 1
Slowing Deterioration 0
CHANGE 2010-2019
LARGEST IMPROVEMENT ZIMBABWE
+19.5
LARGEST DETERIORATION LIBYA
CHANGE 2010-2019 -4.4
1 Mauritius 76.0 +3.6
2 Cabo Verde 72.8 +3.5
3 Morocco 70.1 +10.9
4 Rwanda 67.6 +13.2
5 Kenya 66.7 +9.8
6 Tunisia 66.2 +2.7
7 Seychelles 66.1 +9.1
8 South Africa 64.1 +0.1
9 Namibia 62.7 +12.8
10 Senegal 61.9 +5.4
11 Egypt 61.6 +6.0
12 Ghana 60.9 +6.3
13 Botswana 58.8 +4.9
14 Gambia 57.0 +4.7
15 Uganda 55.0 +4.7
16 Algeria 54.7 +8.2
17 Benin 53.5 +4.1
18 Tanzania 52.7 +2.4
19 Burkina Faso 51.2 +1.3
20 Mozambique 51.1 +5.4
21 Côte d'Ivoire 50.8 +11.6
22 Eswatini 50.3 +8.7
22 Zambia 50.3 +4.0
24 Ethiopia 49.7 +5.6
25 Lesotho 49.0 +3.8
26 Mali 48.7 +3.1
27 São Tomé and Príncipe 48.1 +7.1
28 Nigeria 47.8 +1.0
29 Cameroon 47.2 +1.2
29 Zimbabwe 47.2 +19.5
31 Djibouti 46.3 +7.2
31 Malawi 46.3 +0.7
33 Togo 45.4 +6.8
34 Sierra Leone 45.3 +5.0
35 Mauritania 43.1 +0.6
36 Guinea 43.0 +6.0
36 Niger 43.0 +2.8
38 Madagascar 42.2 +0.7
39 Gabon 41.5 +3.9
40 Comoros 38.7 +1.3
41 Liberia 37.4 +3.2
41 Sudan 37.4 +3.1
43 Burundi 37.0 +3.0
44 Congo Republic 35.3 +2.6
45 Angola 34.3 +5.5
46 Libya 33.9 -4.4
47 Chad 33.5 +2.1
48 DR Congo 31.8 +0.9
49 Guinea-Bissau 30.9 -0.8
50 Central African Republic 25.5 -3.5
51 Eritrea 25.3 +0.3
52 Equatorial Guinea 25.0 +3.6
53 South Sudan* 19.9 .
54 Somalia 18.4 +10.8
AFRICAN AVERAGE 47.8 +4.1
RANK /54 2019 SCORE/100.0 CHANGE 2010-2019
DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)
Not available*
No change
Deteriorated
1
0
3
50 Improved
* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data
for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.
CHANGE 2010-2019
Underlying sub-categories
2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE/100.0
TREND CLASSIFICATION
+4.1
47.8
Slowing Improvement
Public Administration 47.5 +0.1
Business Environment 49.4 +1.7
Infrastructure 43.4 +12.8
Rural Sector 51.5 +1.4
2019 Score | Change 2010-2019
70
Foundations for Economic Opportunity:
IIAG’s most improved category since 2010
With an African average score of 47.8 in 2019, Foundations
for Economic Opportunity ranks third among the four IIAG
categories behind Human Development (51.9) and Security
& Rule of Law (49.5). Sizeable improvements over the decade
(2010-2019) mean it is no longer the lowest scoring category in
the IIAG as it was in 2010 and has since overtaken Participation,
Rights & Inclusion (46.2).
Foundations for Economic Opportunity is the most improved
category in the IIAG, with a score increase of +4.1 over the
ten-year period.
The overall rate of improvement in this category has almost
remained stable, although it has slowed very slightly in the last
five years (2015-2019) with an annual average trend of +0.46
for the decade dropping to +0.43. Nevertheless, it is still
improving at almost twice the rate of Human Development,
the next most improved category in this period (annual average
trend of +0.23).
All sub-categories have improved over the decade,
with the largest progress in Infrastructure
All of the four Foundations for Economic Opportunitie subcategories
have improved over the decade.
Infrastructure has been the main driver of improvement, with
the African average score increasing by +12.8 between 2010
and 2019, more than seven times any of the other three
sub-categories.
Improvements in Business Environment (+1.7) and Rural Sector
(+1.4) have been more modest, while the Public Administration
sub-category has almost stalled (+0.1).
*Trend classifications are not considered relevant for the 2020 IIAG Rural Sector sub-category analysis. As the latest data year available from source is 2015, all data points in 2016-2019 have had to be
estimated and five-year trends (2015-2019) are static. See methodological notes for more information.
Score 2010 Score change 2010-2019
Africa: Foundations for Economic Opportunity sub-categories,
average scores and score changes (2010-2019)
Score
+0.1 +1.7
+12.8
+1.4
Public
Administration
Business Infrastructure Rural Sector
Environment
100.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Sub-category
Africa: Foundations for Economic Opportunity
average score (2010-2019)
Score
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
100.0
48.0
47.0
46.0
45.0
44.0
43.0
0.0
Year
47.8
43.7
Africa: Foundations for Economic Opportunity sub-categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Sub-category
Infrastructure 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Business Environment 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Rural Sector* 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Public Administration 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -2.0 -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0 +10.0 +11.0 +12.0 +13.0 +14.0
+12.8
+6.1
+1.7
+1.6
+1.4
0.0
+0.1
-1.2
Infrastructure: most improved
sub-category of the IIAG
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
71
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Over the ten-year period, four of the IIAG’s five most improved indicators (out of 79) belong to the Foundations for Economic
Opportunitie category, three of which are sitting under Infrastructure.
All countries but three have improved over
the decade
In 2019, Mauritius (76.0) is the top scorer in Foundations for
Economic Opportunity, a position it has maintained over the
whole decade (2010-2019). Cabo Verde (72.8) is the next best
scorer in 2019, while Morocco (70.1), Rwanda (67.6) and Kenya
(66.7) make up the rest of the top five on the back of large
improvements over the decade.
Over the ten-year period, 50 countries have improved their
score, the most of any category. For 22 of them, the rate
of improvement has increased since 2015, again more than
in any other category.
Only Libya (-4.4), Central African Republic (-3.5) and Guinea-
Bissau (-0.8) have seen their scores decline. Libya is the only
country to have seen an increasing deterioration, with an annual
average trend of -0.49 over the ten years dropping to -0.89 over
the latest five years.
Zimbabwe is the most improved country over the decade, with
an increase of +19.5 between 2010 and 2019.
However, this positive trend remains fragile. Twelve countries
have already displayed warning signs, as their overall positive
trend for the decade has been jeopardised by a decline in the last
five years.
These warning signs are greatest in South Africa (-3.0), DR Congo
(-2.4) and Eritrea (-2.3), while even top scorer Mauritius has seen
its score drop in the last five years (-0.4).
African countries: Foundations of Economic Opportunity scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Mauritius
Cabo Verde
Morocco
Rwanda
Kenya
Tunisia
Seychelles
South Africa
Namibia
Senegal
Egypt
Ghana
Botswana
Gambia
Uganda
Algeria
Benin
Tanzania
Burkina Faso
Mozambique
Côte d'Ivoire
Eswatini
Zambia
Ethiopia
Lesotho
Mali
STP
Nigeria
Cameroon
Zimbabwe
Djibouti
Malawi
Togo
Sierra Leone
Mauritania
Guinea
Niger
Madagascar
Gabon
Comoros
Liberia
Sudan
Burundi
Congo Republic
Angola
Libya
Chad
DR Congo
Guinea-Bissau
CAR
Eritrea
Equatorial Guinea
South Sudan
Somalia
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Increasing Improvement: largest number
of countries across all 4 categories
Warning Signs: largest number of
countries across all 4 categories
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 22
Slowing Improvement 16
Bouncing Back 2
Warning Signs 12
Slowing Deterioration 0
Increasing Deterioration 1
Not Classified 1
Somalia: joint most improved over the
5-year period alongside Namibia, despite
being the lowest scorer
Africa: IIAG indicators, 5 most improved average scores (2010-2019)
Sub-category Indicator 2019 Score Change 2010-2019
Infrastructure Mobile Communications 57.8 +22.3
Infrastructure Digital Access 24.6 +18.4
Health Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) 56.7 +15.1
Business Environment Access to Financial Services 35.7 +13.0
Infrastructure Access to Energy 52.7 +12.3
72
infrastructure, but driven primarily by improvements in Mobile
Communications (+22.3) and Digital Access (+18.4).
The last decade has been characterised by the proliferation
of accessible and affordable mobile phones and internet, as well
as an increasing share of households with a computer and secure,
fast internet access. Nevertheless, there is still more progress to
be made with Digital Access remaining the second lowest scoring
indicator on the IIAG.
Some of the more conventional forms of infrastructure have
deteriorated, with a decline in the quality of air infrastructure
and in the performance of the postal service.
However, provision of energy has substantially improved, with
the share of Africans with access to electricity growing at an
increasing rate.
Infrastructure: though still low scoring in 2019,
it is the best trending IIAG sub-category over
the decade
Despite being the lowest scoring of the Foundations for Economic
Opportunity sub-categories, Infrastructure (+12.8) is the most
improved sub-category (out of 16) across the whole IIAG.
The African average annual trend over the past decade for
Instructure reaches +1.42, almost twice that of the IIAG’s
next most improved sub-category, Health (+0.76). The rate of
improvement has also accelerated over the last five years, with
an annual average trend of +1.53 between 2015 and 2019.
The underlying picture for this sub-category is, however,
more complicated than the numbers suggest, as the dramatic
improvements seen are not shared across all forms of
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 26
Slowing Improvement 24
Bouncing Back 0
Warning Signs 3
Slowing Deterioration 0
Increasing Deterioration 0
Not Classified 1
Score
Country
100.0
80.0
90.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
African countries: Infrastructure scores & trend classifications (2019)
Morocco
Mauritius
Tunisia
Egypt
Algeria
South Africa
Seychelles
Kenya
Cabo Verde
Botswana
Gabon
Ghana
Senegal
Côte d'Ivoire
Namibia
Nigeria
Eswatini
Gambia
Libya
Cameroon
Rwanda
Djibouti
Tanzania
Togo
Guinea
Comoros
Zimbabwe
STP
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Mali
Sudan
Zambia
Benin
Uganda
Lesotho
Angola
Congo Republic
Sierra Leone
Mozambique
Mauritania
Burundi
Liberia
Madagascar
Somalia
Burkina Faso
Malawi
CAR
DR Congo
Guinea-Bissau
Niger
Eritrea
Chad
South Sudan
Increasing Improvement: largest number
of countries across all 16 sub-categories
Infrastructure: only sub-category (excluding
Rural Sector) without any country showing
increasing or slowing deterioration
Kenya: most improved country over both
10-year (+35.9) and 5-year period (+18.5)
Morocco: improved over 10-year period
(+25.9) to move from 5th ranked to 1st. Records
highest score by an individual country across
all 4 Foundations for Economic Opportunity
sub-categories in 2019
Africa: Infrastructure indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Mobile Communications 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Digital Access 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Access to Energy 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Transport Network 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -4.0 -2.0 0.0 +2.0 +4.0 +6.0 +8.0 +10.0 +12.0 +14.0 +16.0 +18.0 +20.0 +22.0 +24.0
+22.3
+9.0
+18.4
+9.1
+12.3
+6.5
-2.9
-1.0
Mobile Communications: most improved IIAG indicator over 10-year period
Digital Access: most improved IIAG indicator over 5-year period
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
73
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Business Environment: better access to financial
services drives progress
Business Environment is the second most improved sub-category
in Foundations for Economic Opportunity and shares the place of
fourth most improved sub-category of the IIAG with Education,
the African average score having increased by +1.7 between
2010 and 2019.
Recent trends have shown further positive signs, with the rate of
improvement in the last five years (annual average trend of +0.40)
more than double that for the decade (+0.19).
The improvement has been largely driven by increased Access
to Financial Services (+13.0), namely bank accounts and digital
payment services.
Access to such services has improved over the ten-year period
and has expanded at an increasing rate in the last five years.
Improved efforts by governments to promote regional
integration and more efficient customs and border management
have also, to a lesser extent, contributed to the improving
Business Environment on the continent.
However, this positive trajectory for the decade masks
a concerning decline in the freedom of trade unions and
decreased cooperation in labour-employer relations.
Access to Financial Services while still low scoring, is
the fourth most improved indicator on the IIAG over the
decade and has improved at the third fastest rate of any
IIAG indicator since 2015 (annual average trend of +1.75).
This has mostly been driven by a surge in the Use
of Digital Payments since 2015 (+11.6)
Africa: Business Environment indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Access to Financial
Services
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trade Environment 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Regional Integration 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Business & Competition
Regulation
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Labour Relations 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -6.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 +1.0 +2.0 +3.0 +4.0 +5.0 +6.0 +7.0 +8.0 +9.0 +10.0 +11.0 +12.0 +13.0 +14.0
+13.0
+7.0
+3.0
+0.9
+2.8
+2.2
-1.3
-5.2
-0.8
+0.1
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
74
African countries: Business Environment scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Mauritius
Kenya
Namibia
Rwanda
Seychelles
Cabo Verde
South Africa
Uganda
Botswana
Ghana
Senegal
Burkina Faso
Benin
STP
Eswatini
Gambia
Tunisia
Morocco
Mozambique
Côte d'Ivoire
Zambia
Tanzania
Lesotho
Niger
Malawi
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Comoros
Togo
Egypt
Cameroon
Nigeria
Madagascar
Djibouti
Liberia
Chad
Gabon
Sierra Leone
Zimbabwe
Ethiopia
Algeria
Burundi
Mauritania
Libya
CAR
DR Congo
South Sudan
Angola
Sudan
Congo Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Somalia
Eritrea
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Mauritius: best scoring country with
an increasing rate of improvement,
but deteriorating in indicator Labour
Relations (-13.6) over 10-year period
Central African Republic & Comoros: the
2nd (-6.7) and 4th (-6.0) most deteriorated
countries over 10-year period but
bouncing back over 5-year period
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 20
Slowing Improvement 7
Bouncing Back 6
Warning Signs 7
Slowing Deterioration 6
Increasing Deterioration 6
No Change 1
Not Classified 1
The expansion in taxation capacity has been somewhat offset
by the shrinking capacity of national statistical systems, a
worrying trend given their importance in progressing towards the
Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063 . This trend,
compounded by worsening systems of financial management and
to a lesser extent civil registration, has led to the overall gains in
Public Administration for the decade being just above zero.
Over the last five years, Public Administration performance has
been noticeably deteriorating (-1.2), threatening progress made
over the decade.
Public Administration: almost at standstill as
31 countries have shown signs of deterioration
since 2015
Public Administration is the least improved of the Foundations
for Economic Opportunity sub-categories, with a small increase
of +0.1 over the decade.
Improvements over the decade have been largely driven by
greater taxation capacity and more efficient revenue mobilisation,
although a reversal of this trend in the last five years threatens
this progress.
Africa: Public Administration indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Indicator
Tax & Revenue
Mobilisation
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Professional
Administration
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Civil Registration 10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Capacity of the
Statistical System
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Budgetary & Financial
Management
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
Trend -3.0 -2.8 -2.6 -2.4 -2.2 -2.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 +1.2 +1.4
+1.2
-1.7
+0.2
-2.8
-0.1
+0.3
-0.3
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
Trend classification Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
75
2020 IIAG: Index Report
African countries: Public Administration scores & trend classifications (2019)
Score
Country
Cabo Verde
Rwanda
Senegal
Namibia
Ghana
Côte d'Ivoire
Benin
Ethiopia
Kenya
Mauritius
Sierra Leone
Malawi
Lesotho
Seychelles
Tunisia
Uganda
Burkina Faso
Gambia
Togo
Zambia
Botswana
South Africa
Mauritania
Mozambique
Morocco
Tanzania
Niger
Nigeria
Zimbabwe
STP
Mali
Djibouti
Liberia
Guinea
Algeria
Cameroon
Madagascar
Burundi
DR Congo
Egypt
Chad
Eswatini
Congo Republic
Sudan
CAR
Angola
Guinea-Bissau
Comoros
Eritrea
Gabon
Libya
South Sudan
Somalia
Equatorial Guinea
100.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
20.0
Increasing Deterioration: largest
number of countries across all 4
Foundations of Economic Opportunity
sub-categories
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 13
Slowing Improvement 6
Bouncing Back 3
Warning Signs 7
Slowing Deterioration 3
Increasing Deterioration 21
Not Classified 1
Côte d’Ivoire, Seychelles & Gambia:
3 largest improvers in Public Administration
(+16.1, +10.9 and +10.1, respectively) over
10-year period
Rural Sector*: the best scoring sub-category
in Foundations for Economic Opportunity
Rural Sector is the best scoring sub-category in Foundations
for Economic Opportunity and the IIAG’s fourth best scoring
sub-category overall, with an African average score of 51.5 in 2019.
Over the ten-year period it has improved by +1.4, largely driven
by increased access to rural land and water, as well as
an improved environment for the rural poor to collectively
organise and enter dialogue with the government.
Rural Sector’s overall sub-category score in 2019 would have
been higher if governments had better frameworks to support
the development of commercially based agricultural markets,
that are both equitable and accessible to small scale farmers.
The IIAG shows that African average performance in this area
lags behind other Rural Sector indicators in 2019.
Africa: Rural Sector indicators, average scores (2019)
Score
Rural Market
Access
Rural Businesses
& Organisations
Rural Sector
Support
Rural Land &
Water Access
100.0
60.0
40.0
50.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Indicator
54.7 54.3 52.4
44.8
*Trend classifications are not considered relevant for the 2020 IIAG Rural Sector sub-category
analysis. As the latest data year available from source is 2015, all data points in 2016-2019 have
had to be estimated and five-year trends (2015-2019) are static. See methodological notes for
more information.
Zimbabwe: most improved country over 10-year
period (+49.4), driven mostly by improved land and
water access for the rural poor
Citizens’ Voices
results
>
SECTION 03
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
55.0
53.5
45.8
26.9
82.5
76.8
59.5
29.6
58.2
68.4
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
78
Africa: Public Perception of Overall Governance average score (2010-2019)
Score
Public Perception of Overall Governance
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Year
0.0
100.0
50.0
49.5
48.0
49.0
48.5
51.0
50.5
50.8
50.6
50.2
49.9
50.8
50.0
50.5
49.6
49.8
The 2019 score is the lowest of the
decade, driven by deterioration in all four
sub-sections.
48.8
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF OVERALL GOVERNANCE
Public Perception of Security
& Rule of Law
Public Perception of Security
& Safety
Public Perception of the Rule
of Law
Public Perception of Accountability
Public Perception of Anti-
Corruption
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Public Perception of Participation,
Rights & Inclusion
Public Perception of Elections
& Freedom
Public Perception of Inclusion
& Equality
Public Perception of Women’s
Leadership
•
•
•
Satisfaction with Health Provision
Satisfaction with Education
Provision
Lived Poverty & Public Perception
of Social Protection
Public Perception of Human
Development
•
•
•
Public Perception of Economic
Opportunity Foundations
Public Perception of Public
Administration
Satisfaction with Economic
Opportunities
Satisfaction with Infrastructure
79
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Public perceptions of governance have declined
in most countries over the decade and since 2015
Between 2010 and 2019, Afrobarometer surveyed 39 African
countries at least once, providing a sample of public perceptions
for the equivalent of 86.8% of Africa’s total population. Of the 36
countries with multiple data points over the ten-year period, in
more than half (23) citizens are less satisfied with their country’s
governance performance than ten years ago. For 13 countries,
Public Perception of Overall Governance has been deteriorating at
an increasing rate since 2015.
All four sub-sections record the lowest scores
of the decade
For all four sub-sections, the 2019 African average scores are at
their lowest across the whole ten-year period.
The trajectory of Public Perception of Economic Opportunity
Foundations is of particular concern. While the decline over the
decade has been the smallest (-0.5) across all four sub-sections,
deterioration over the last five years has been the most dramatic,
at a rate of more than twelve-times that of the decade.
Progress in infrastructure stands out, as citizens are more
satisfied with their countries’ infrastructure than ten years ago.
However, since 2015, dissatisfaction with public administration
and economic opportunities is growing.
Public Perception of Human Development registers the second
largest decline over the decade with the rate of deterioration
more than doubling over the last five years. This trend is mainly
driven by growing dissatisfaction with countries’ health and
education provision.
Africa: Citizens’ Voices sub-sections, average scores and annual trends
(2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
Public Perception of Security & Rule of Law score
Public Perception of Participation, Rights & Inclusion score
Public Perception of Economic Opportunity score
Public Perception of Human Development score
Public Perception of Security & Rule of Law annual average trend (AAT)
Public Perception of Participation, Rights & Inclusion annual average trend (AAT)
Public Perception of Economic Opportunity annual average trend (AAT)
Public Perception of Human Development annual average trend (AAT)
Annual Average Trend
0.00
-0.10
-0.20
-0.30
-0.40
-0.50
-0.60
-0.70
-0.80
Score
0.0
100.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Year 10-year AAT 5-year AAT
-0.33
-0.23
-0.06
-0.24
-0.13
-0.18
-0.73
-0.60
56.8
50.0
42.4
46.2
58.9
53.0
42.9
48.4
Number of countries showing trend classification
Increasing Improvement 8
Slowing Improvement 1
Bouncing Back 4
Warning Signs 4
Slowing Deterioration 6
Increasing Deterioration 13
The African average score for Public Perception of Overall Governance (48.8) is the lowest registered over the decade (2010-2019).
The pace of deterioration has nearly doubled within the last five years (2015-2019), with an annual average trend of-0.43 between
2015 and 2019 compared to -0.22 over the ten-year period.
Public Perception of Overall Governance: 2019 score is the lowest of the decade
80
However, citizens experience less lived poverty and are more
satisfied with social protection than ten years ago.
Public Perception of Participation, Rights & Inclusion results
may appear rather counter-intuitive in light of the IIAG results.
The deterioration in Public Perception of Participation, Rights &
Inclusion has slowed since 2015, and it is the highest-scoring
sub-section in 2019.
This has mainly been driven by more favourable attitudes towards
women’s leadership and diversity, as well as a perceived decrease
in ethnic discrimination.
However, more concerningly, citizens consider elections to be less
free and fair and consider themselves less free to say what they
think compared to ten years ago. Public Perception of Elections &
Freedom is the most declined indicator within the Citizens’ Voices
section over both the decade and the last five years.
Public Perception of Security & Rule of Law is the most declined
sub-section over the decade. However, the decline over the last
five years has markedly slowed since 2015, and is the smallest of
all four sub-sections over this last period.
Public Perception of Security & Rule of Law is the only sub-section
to have seen all its indicators decline between 2010 and 2019,
with citizens believing accountability and rule of law to have
faded the most. While the perception of the rule of law has
improved between 2015 and 2019, citizens on average consider
the security and safety situation to have worsened over the last
five years.
Number of countries with
a deteriorated score
Number of countries with
an improved score
Number of countries with
no score change
Public Perception of Security
& Rule of Law
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
23
20
13
15
01
Public Perception of Participation,
Rights & Inclusion
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
20
17
16
15
04
Public Perception of Economic
Opportunity Foundations
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
18
23
18
12
01
Public Perception of Human
Development
10-Year Trend
5-Year Trend
20
20
16
15
01
African countries: Citizens’ Voices sub-sections, number of countries with a deteriorated score,
an improved score & no score change (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)
81
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Annex
>
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
55.0
53.5
45.8
26.9
82.5
76.8
59.5
29.6
58.2
68.4
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria Algeria
Republic of Angola Angola
Republic of Benin Benin
Republic of Botswana Botswana
Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Republic of Burundi Burundi
Republic of Cabo Verde Cabo Verde
Republic of Cameroon Cameroon
Central African Republic Central African Republic
Republic of Chad Chad
Union of the Comoros Comoros
Republic of the Congo Congo Republic
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of Congo DR Congo
>
Country
Scorecards
84
List of African countries
The left column in the following table lists the official names of
African countries as of September 2019, as outlined in the African
Union Handbook 2020. The abbreviations (right column) are the
names used in this report.
85
2020 IIAG: Index Report
Republic of Djibouti Djibouti
Arab Republic of Egypt Egypt
Republic of Equatorial Guinea Equatorial Guinea
State of Eritrea Eritrea
Kingdom of Eswatini Eswatini
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethiopia
Gabonese Republic Gabon
Republic of the Gambia Gambia
Republic of Ghana Ghana
Republic of Guinea Guinea
Republic of Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau
Republic of Kenya Kenya
Kingdom of Lesotho Lesotho
Republic of Liberia Liberia
Libya Libya
Republic of Madagascar Madagascar
Republic of Malawi Malawi
Republic of Mali Mali
Islamic Republic of Mauritania Mauritania
Republic of Mauritius Mauritius
Kingdom of Morocco Morocco
Republic of Mozambique Mozambique
Republic of Namibia Namibia
Republic of Niger Niger
Federal Republic of Nigeria Nigeria
Republic of Rwanda Rwanda
Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe São Tomé and Príncipe
Republic of Senegal Senegal
Republic of Seychelles Seychelles
Republic of Sierra Leone Sierra Leone
Federal Republic of Somalia Somalia
Republic of South Africa South Africa
Republic of South Sudan South Sudan
Republic of the Sudan Sudan
Togolese Republic Togo
Republic of Tunisia Tunisia
Republic of Uganda Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania Tanzania
Republic of Zambia Zambia
Republic of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe
86
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 50.4 27 -0.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 87.4 10 +4.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 98.7 31 +12.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 88.8 18 +4.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.8 9 +0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 49.8 35 -3.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 99.7 1 +8.9
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 48.8 21 -4.8
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 36.3 40 +0.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 1.6 52 -19.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 65.8 11 +3.2
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 69.1 9 -0.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 62.8 6 -4.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 57.4 24 -8.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 26.9 36 -1.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 30.2 38 -1.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 45.1 35 +2.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 18.1 33 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 22.0 36 +0.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 18.9 35 -11.9
ANTI-CORRUPTION 38.4 26 +0.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 27.4 33 0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 46.3 24 +3.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 49.0 17 +8.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 44.6 19 +16.7
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 45.9 28 +0.3
PARTICIPATION 34.4 31 +0.6
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 53.2 10 +2.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 19.2 48 -6.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 27.5 40 -5.8
RIGHTS 33.3 38 -5.4
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 58.3 15 +3.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 34.8 45 -4.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 45.0 36 -20.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 28.4 46 -5.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 54.9 18 -1.4
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 50.8 24 -4.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 39.6 33 -3.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 69.7 12 +3.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 55.7 19 -3.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 58.5 8 +1.1
GENDER 61.2 13 +7.6
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 51.6 26 +14.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 73.8 32 +2.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 59.0 15 +17.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 71.8 7 +3.4
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 73.6 3 +4.6
HEALTH 77.4 4 +5.2
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 51.9 23 -1.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 92.2 6 +1.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 85.1 16 +3.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 66.9 29 +2.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 93.3 8 +1.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 75.0 9 +24.5
EDUCATION 75.7 3 +5.9
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 69.3 10 +3.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 73.7 1 +8.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 90.2 2 +8.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 91.8 4 -0.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 53.2 17 +8.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 82.2 1 +6.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 64.9 4 +4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 66.7 6 0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 100.0 1 +2.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 80.3 2 +22.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 99.2 2 +4.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 59.2 19 +0.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 71.4 6 +14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 31.9 39 -10.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 100.0 1 +0.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 70.8 12 0.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 21.9 41 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
56.2 15th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+3.3
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 54.7 16 +8.2
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 46.1 35 -5.9
Civil Registration (GI) 100.0 1 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 31.6 42 -5.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 27.8 42 +7.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 25.0 37 -25.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 40.8 42 6.3
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 39.0 41 +9.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 51.1 33 +4.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) 38.1 13 +5.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 35.2 39 +5.7
INFRASTRUCTURE 77.3 5 +24.4
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 57.8 11 +5.8
Access to Energy (WB) 100.0 1 +1.2
Mobile Communications (ITU) 81.8 3 +33.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 69.5 6 +56.7
RURAL SECTOR . . -
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Market Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) . . -
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) . . -
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Algeria
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
87
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Angola 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 44.1 35 +5.5
SECURITY & SAFETY 81.2 31 -0.7
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.8 16 +0.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 84.3 29 -2.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.5 22 +10.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 40.7 43 -14.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 81.8 33 +2.8
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 39.9 34 +7.6
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 50.9 30 +12.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 39.4 27 +21.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 29.6 39 +2.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 56.3 20 +15.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 31.1 28 +3.6
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 32.0 44 -9.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 29.2 34 +6.2
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 32.7 34 +10.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 45.3 34 +13.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 18.1 33 -5.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 22.3 35 +8.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 27.7 25 +4.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 26.0 43 +8.8
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 26.2 34 +21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 50.1 21 +19.7
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 33.3 35 +8.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 0.0 48 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 20.3 43 -5.9
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 39.3 35 +4.8
PARTICIPATION 30.1 38 +8.4
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 35.1 29 -4.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 32.5 40 +11.7
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 27.7 39 +14.1
RIGHTS 41.7 33 +3.5
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 33.4 36 +1.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 51.0 35 -7.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 58.1 27 +19.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 57.7 27 -3.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 +8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 32.3 45 +2.3
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 20.6 50 +0.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 38.7 36 +4.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 40.1 44 +3.4
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 30.5 44 +1.8
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 31.5 34 +1.2
GENDER 53.0 24 +5.0
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 77.9 3 +10.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 79.4 25 +2.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 29.7 44 +12.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 52.7 20 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 42.3 46 +5.8
HEALTH 57.6 32 +10.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 41.8 33 -8.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 41.0 28 +6.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 49.9 52 +7.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 67.1 27 +4.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 70.7 30 +17.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 75.0 9 +34.6
EDUCATION 34.7 46 +1.7
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 25.5 50 +2.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 35.6 23 +2.7
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 42.7 37 +18.0
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 47.8 44 -6.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 22.1 43 -8.1
SOCIAL PROTECTION 34.6 39 +10.9
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 18.5 44 -7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 36.5 37 0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 28.6 45 0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 30.6 25 +12.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 58.9 21 +49.2
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 42.3 49 +0.3
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 35.7 43 -14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 36.9 36 -1.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 71.2 21 +17.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 50.5 41 -1.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 17.1 45 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
40.0 43rd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+5.4
TREND 2010-2019
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 34.3 45 +5.5
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 30.8 46 +4.5
Civil Registration (GI) 37.5 45 +25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 39.4 32 +7.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 17.7 50 -1.8
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 42.9 34 0.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 16.7 48 -8.3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 28.8 49 -2.0
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 25.6 51 +6.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 22.7 49 -5.4
Access to Financial Services (WB) 31.6 21 -11.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 35.1 40 +2.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 34.2 37 +7.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 32.0 33 -1.7
Access to Energy (WB) 40.8 34 +10.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 51.8 36 +11.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 12.2 29 +7.6
RURAL SECTOR 43.3 37 +12.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 54.9 26 +37.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 41.8 29 +16.8
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 42.1 39 -0.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 34.3 42 -3.9
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
88
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Benin
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 66.1 10 +3.2
SECURITY & SAFETY 90.8 3 -0.4
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 98.7 31 -1.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 92.6 12 -0.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.9 8 0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 73.8 2 -0.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 89.2 15 +0.6
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 64.7 10 +0.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 70.9 14 -6.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 47.6 19 -9.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 47.4 22 +4.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 89.4 4 +0.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 58.3 8 +9.8
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 74.7 10 +7.6
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 52.0 14 +0.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 59.5 16 -4.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 74.1 9 +6.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 69.4 14 -12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 33.3 21 +12.1
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 23.6 30 +3.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 56.7 10 +11.0
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 60.7 7 +8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 60.9 15 +17.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 59.7 11 +20.1
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 62.5 6 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 39.7 27 +8.8
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 59.7 11 -6.2
PARTICIPATION 55.8 16 -16.9
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -37.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 33.9 34 -17.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 82.4 10 -14.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 69.3 7 +1.5
RIGHTS 55.2 16 -12.0
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 59.2 14 +0.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 94.1 3 -2.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 54.5 31 -20.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 59.7 24 -36.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 68.7 6 +2.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 81.6 1 +7.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 53.3 16 -5.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 76.1 5 -4.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 66.2 14 +9.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 66.2 5 +6.8
GENDER 59.1 14 +1.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 53.1 25 +4.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 92.6 3 -2.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 61.3 14 -12.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 38.8 30 -0.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 +16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 55.0 19 +3.2
HEALTH 53.5 39 +0.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 45.8 28 +3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 26.9 47 +4.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 82.5 21 +13.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 76.8 10 +0.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 59.5 39 +8.5
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 29.6 48 -27.0
EDUCATION 58.2 15 +9.7
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 68.4 11 +9.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 39.3 16 +3.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 66.5 19 +15.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 64.1 35 +21.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 52.8 18 -1.3
SOCIAL PROTECTION 48.0 20 -2.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 31.0 25 -7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 52.8 16 -2.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 46.1 29 -8.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 22.6 35 +4.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 87.5 10 +3.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 60.2 17 +4.8
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 63.1 12 +7.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 63.4 8 -0.8
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 59.8 34 +10.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 65.0 18 +7.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 50.0 29 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
58.6 13th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+1.1
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 53.5 17 +4.1
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 60.7 6 +4.2
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 +12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 49.6 21 +5.3
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 47.9 19 -1.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 71.0 10 -5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 72.3 2 +9.9
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 60.9 11 +7.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) 75.0 8 +12.5
Trade Environment (WB) 64.7 14 +12.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 68.0 8 -0.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 33.5 20 +25.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 63.3 16 -14.3
INFRASTRUCTURE 37.5 34 +11.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 31.8 34 -3.7
Access to Energy (WB) 39.0 36 +7.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 68.7 16 +30.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 10.5 34 +9.4
RURAL SECTOR 55.0 22 -5.8
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 48.4 33 -1.8
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 -12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 58.3 21 -9.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 63.2 13 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
89
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Botswana 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 72.8 3 -5.1
SECURITY & SAFETY 85.3 16 -2.5
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 93.8 6 -6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.8 9 -0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 68.5 6 -4.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 64.6 49 -1.9
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 76.4 4 +0.1
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 87.5 4 +2.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 67.4 10 -12.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 75.8 5 +9.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 68.5 10 -8.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 67.9 3 +10.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 91.3 1 -0.6
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 65.9 5 -2.3
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 81.2 4 -5.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 66.5 15 -7.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 87.5 5 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 45.4 12 +3.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 48.7 8 -2.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 63.8 5 -15.4
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 66.7 3 -16.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 80.1 2 -1.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 78.7 4 -8.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 -50.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 80.9 3 -0.5 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 68.5 5 +3.6
HEALTH 76.2 5 +1.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 83.0 1 -4.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 83.1 8 +9.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 91.2 8 +8.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 70.6 23 -5.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 87.8 11 +5.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 41.5 41 -5.0
EDUCATION 68.7 6 -2.9
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 64.6 12 -4.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 36.2 21 +3.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 78.7 6 +1.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 91.4 5 -0.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 72.4 4 -13.9
SOCIAL PROTECTION 44.3 27 +7.8
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 76.2 3 +4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 66.7 6 +16.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 11.2 52 +9.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 22.4 36 +3.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 44.9 28 +5.6
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 84.9 1 +7.8
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 100.0 1 +14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 73.5 4 +14.8
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 86.2 10 +4.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 64.5 21 +5.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 100.0 1 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
66.9 5th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+0.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 67.5 6 -0.1
PARTICIPATION 71.2 8 +0.9
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 100.0 1 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 40.1 27 +10.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 80.7 11 -10.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 64.2 13 -8.8
RIGHTS 62.3 10 +0.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 66.4 10 +6.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 84.0 13 -0.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 63.7 15 -11.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 86.1 6 -2.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 11.1 25 +11.1
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 71.5 4 +3.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 62.6 6 -2.0
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 47.2 24 +5.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 76.1 5 +0.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 84.0 4 +1.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 87.6 3 +9.6
GENDER 65.1 7 -5.0
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 29.1 48 -1.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 90.1 8 +2.9
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 86.0 1 +7.0
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 95.2 2 +7.9
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -41.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 58.8 13 +4.9
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 55.4 21 -3.3
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 63.0 7 +2.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 33.7 39 -3.4
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 50.0 15 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 66.2 8 +4.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 84.8 2 +21.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 57.3 21 -9.1
Access to Financial Services (WB) 49.8 8 +8.0
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 72.7 6 -4.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 59.7 10 +21.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 53.8 12 -3.5
Access to Energy (WB) 63.3 20 +12.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 69.4 15 +28.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 52.3 10 +46.4
RURAL SECTOR 53.8 23 -2.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 65.9 17 +3.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 33.3 34 -8.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 54.9 26 -6.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 61.1 15 +2.5
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
90
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Burkina Faso
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 57.4 17 +0.7
SECURITY & SAFETY 59.6 46 -29.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 53.6 47 -46.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 26.0 48 -67.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 92.9 40 -7.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 43.5 41 -28.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 81.8 33 +1.0
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 59.0 15 +7.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 69.8 15 +8.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 65.8 11 +40.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 50.3 20 -4.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 64.6 15 +7.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 44.2 20 +8.8
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 59.1 21 -12.9
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 53.4 13 +20.5
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 52.4 20 +17.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 76.1 6 +16.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 58.3 17 +34.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 31.2 24 +26.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 49.0 7 +8.1
ANTI-CORRUPTION 57.6 8 +4.1
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 56.0 8 -3.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 54.8 18 +6.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 59.4 12 +18.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 75.0 2 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 42.6 21 -1.3 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 50.7 28 +5.4
HEALTH 56.3 34 +6.0
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 47.6 26 +0.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 20.1 49 +2.1
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 85.0 17 +17.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 73.2 16 -2.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 67.9 33 +15.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 44.2 37 +2.8
EDUCATION 41.5 39 +10.0
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 45.7 33 +11.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 21.1 41 +11.6
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 41.1 39 +20.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 73.8 24 +4.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 26.0 40 +1.5
SOCIAL PROTECTION 45.3 26 -1.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 35.1 18 +8.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 47.2 24 -1.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 63.9 14 +2.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 22.9 34 -15.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 57.4 23 +0.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 59.6 18 +6.8
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 59.5 15 +10.7
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 43.9 27 +4.9
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 45.2 45 +6.8
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 62.0 25 +10.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 87.2 8 +0.9
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
54.0 17th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+1.0
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 51.2 19 +1.3
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 56.5 17 -5.8
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 35.6 36 -0.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 44.3 26 -1.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 76.9 5 -14.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 50.7 13 -12.4
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 60.9 11 +9.9
Regional Integration (AfDB) 87.5 3 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 60.2 19 +4.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 68.0 8 +1.4
Access to Financial Services (WB) 35.7 18 +26.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 53.0 26 +17.9
INFRASTRUCTURE 25.1 46 +9.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 33.4 29 -0.8
Access to Energy (WB) 10.7 52 +1.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 46.7 41 +27.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 9.5 36 +8.1
RURAL SECTOR 62.2 12 -7.9
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 52.2 29 -10.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 62.5 6 -4.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 58.2 22 -15.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 75.7 3 -1.3
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 56.7 14 -3.5
PARTICIPATION 61.4 13 -4.8
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 62.5 11 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 66.0 5 -3.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 65.4 21 -20.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 51.6 20 -8.0
RIGHTS 50.8 21 -9.0
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 44.3 24 -6.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 82.1 14 -13.9
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 70.7 11 -2.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 48.7 33 -13.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 -8.4
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 62.1 9 -0.8
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 58.1 10 -0.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 50.2 21 +7.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 59.9 25 -13.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 83.3 5 +2.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 59.2 7 0.0
GENDER 52.5 26 +0.4
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 25.9 50 -22.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 90.8 5 -3.5
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 70.9 6 +19.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 49.9 23 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 +8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
91
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Burundi 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 30.2 47 -12.7
SECURITY & SAFETY 56.2 48 -26.4
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 85.1 42 -10.5
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 6.3 52 -66.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 68.6 49 -19.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 32.2 46 -36.7
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 89.0 16 +1.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 24.8 46 -8.2
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 32.4 45 -14.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 1.8 51 -10.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 21.1 49 -38.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 33.3 34 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 28.7 32 +12.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 31.5 45 +1.9
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 15.6 48 -15.7
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 16.2 48 -25.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 25.6 48 -15.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 11.1 41 -29.2
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 10.5 48 -0.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 14.6 39 -7.6
ANTI-CORRUPTION 24.1 45 -0.4
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 21.4 41 -4.8
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 13.1 52 -9.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 17.9 51 -1.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 30.8 34 +13.8
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
36.9 44th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-3.6
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 37.0 43 +3.0
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 41.6 38 -7.0
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 42.6 28 -1.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 38.5 36 +1.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 43.5 31 -20.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 33.6 29 -1.7
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 37.9 43 +2.3
Regional Integration (AfDB) 62.5 17 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 34.2 44 +0.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 52.6 30 +8.5
Access to Financial Services (WB) 6.2 39 -0.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 33.9 42 +2.9
INFRASTRUCTURE 27.2 42 +12.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 47.1 19 +17.2
Access to Energy (WB) 7.2 54 +5.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 52.8 34 +25.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 1.7 54 +1.6
RURAL SECTOR 41.4 39 +4.2
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 51.6 31 +11.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 25.0 42 +8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 44.8 37 -7.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 44.3 37 +4.6
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 33.2 42 -11.0
PARTICIPATION 6.7 53 -21.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 -37.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 2.2 52 -15.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 5.1 53 -27.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 19.4 48 -4.7
RIGHTS 20.3 49 -17.0
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 15.8 49 -9.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 37.5 43 -25.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 15.7 53 -33.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 24.2 48 -17.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 39.8 33 -8.7
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 32.0 39 -15.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 52.9 17 -16.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 34.9 47 -5.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 31.3 42 -6.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 47.7 15 0.0
GENDER 66.1 5 +3.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 66.0 6 +24.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 78.2 26 -1.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 45.0 31 -7.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 91.4 3 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 47.2 36 +6.3
HEALTH 55.6 36 +6.7
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 58.8 17 +2.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 38.9 32 +2.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 79.2 27 +8.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 67.1 27 +1.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 65.3 36 +15.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 24.1 53 +10.0
EDUCATION 52.7 23 +10.2
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 52.1 21 +11.6
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 31.9 27 +3.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 50.3 29 +10.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 79.1 16 +9.0
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 50.2 20 +16.1
SOCIAL PROTECTION 35.6 37 -1.6
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 18.5 44 -8.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 44.0 29 -1.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 52.6 23 -2.3
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 27.3 30 +5.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 44.7 43 +9.7
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 42.5 40 -4.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 38.0 35 +19.6
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 49.2 42 +9.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 47.4 47 +13.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 46.7 31 +10.8
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
92
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Cabo Verde
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 76.2 2 -2.1
SECURITY & SAFETY 89.4 4 -0.5
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 100.0 1 +6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 100.0 1 +0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 71.9 4 -0.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 75.2 43 -8.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 88.5 1 +6.3
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 93.5 2 -2.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 98.2 2 +7.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 81.5 3 -11.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 100.0 1 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 67.6 5 +38.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 90.2 2 +6.7
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 68.4 3 -9.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 100.0 1 +5.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 59.2 21 -26.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 100.0 1 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 50.0 4 -12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 32.6 20 -12.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 58.6 7 -5.0
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 50.0 13 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 84.5 1 +1.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 77.8 5 -4.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 68.0 6 -9.4 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 67.0 6 -0.1
HEALTH 80.5 2 +4.8
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 64.8 8 -6.9
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 76.7 9 +10.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 98.3 2 +18.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 82.1 3 -1.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 96.7 6 +2.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 64.2 22 +6.6
EDUCATION 70.1 5 +0.3
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 71.5 8 +3.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 54.6 5 +1.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 67.3 18 -9.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 93.2 3 +6.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 63.9 9 -0.5
SOCIAL PROTECTION 58.4 8 -8.8
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 58.3 8 +25.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 92.9 1 -7.1
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 60.0 18 -40.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 21.9 37 -15.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 59.2 20 -6.6
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 58.8 21 +3.2
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 71.4 6 0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 48.4 24 +17.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 93.0 7 +3.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 72.9 9 -4.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 8.4 50 +0.1
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
73.1 2nd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+0.2
TREND 2010-2019
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 76.6 2 -0.2
PARTICIPATION 83.6 1 -4.3
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 87.5 4 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 74.9 3 -2.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 92.5 4 -6.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 79.4 3 +3.3
RIGHTS 84.0 1 +3.8
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 84.3 2 -1.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 98.0 1 +0.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 84.8 1 -9.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 94.7 1 -0.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 58.3 2 +30.5
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 70.4 5 +4.7
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 68.2 5 -0.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 92.9 1 +24.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 78.9 4 -1.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 69.6 12 -0.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 42.4 19 +1.4
GENDER 68.2 4 -5.1
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 51.5 27 -22.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 88.4 12 +3.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 66.2 9 -1.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 66.7 10 +0.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) . . -
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 72.8 2 +3.5
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 73.0 1 -0.7
Civil Registration (GI) 100.0 1 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 59.2 11 -5.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 71.9 3 +16.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 71.4 9 -14.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 62.5 7 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 68.8 6 -0.9
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 74.3 4 +5.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 63.6 16 +3.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 68.6 12 -11.5
INFRASTRUCTURE 68.7 9 +18.9
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 49.2 16 -6.6
Access to Energy (WB) 93.3 7 +13.0
Mobile Communications (ITU) 70.7 12 +20.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 61.6 8 +49.1
RURAL SECTOR 80.6 2 -3.3
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 85.7 2 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 75.0 2 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 69.2 6 -13.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 92.5 2 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
93
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Cameroon 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 35.7 44 -5.5
SECURITY & SAFETY 61.3 43 -20.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 61.3 46 -38.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 11.5 51 -78.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 88.7 43 -10.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 56.1 23 +10.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 88.9 18 +12.9
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 25.6 45 -0.1
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 29.1 48 -6.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 7.3 48 +5.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 25.0 45 -4.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 13.2 45 -6.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 27.7 34 +9.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 51.5 31 +1.0
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 26.0 38 +1.6
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 31.9 35 +1.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 37.7 38 +3.7
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 18.1 33 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 19.9 38 +5.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 22.8 31 -2.3
ANTI-CORRUPTION 29.7 37 -3.3
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 26.2 34 -33.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 20.9 47 +5.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 18.6 50 +0.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 50.0 11 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 32.9 31 +11.6 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 54.4 22 +7.1
HEALTH 53.3 41 +7.2
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 16.8 49 +1.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 37.7 34 +0.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 75.4 33 +12.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 72.6 19 +4.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 60.2 38 +12.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 56.9 31 +11.4
EDUCATION 53.7 22 +8.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 56.6 18 +3.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 35.9 22 +3.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 57.4 25 +19.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 66.5 31 +14.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 52.0 19 -1.2
SOCIAL PROTECTION 52.3 10 +4.0
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 33.9 20 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 57.1 12 +3.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 43.1 34 +1.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 36.9 18 +7.2
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 90.3 8 +7.4
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 58.6 22 +9.6
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 58.7 17 +9.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 54.9 11 +18.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 70.9 24 +16.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 65.6 17 -3.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 42.6 32 +6.8
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
43.5 37th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.6
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 47.2 29 +1.2
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 44.4 36 0.0
Civil Registration (GI) 37.5 45 +12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 35.5 37 -5.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 51.5 14 +6.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 63.7 17 -0.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 33.9 27 -12.5
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 46.7 32 +1.3
Regional Integration (AfDB) 87.5 3 +6.2
Trade Environment (WB) 34.0 45 +7.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 56.1 25 +1.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) 30.8 22 +20.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 25.3 45 -29.6
INFRASTRUCTURE 44.4 20 +5.8
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 35.3 27 -10.1
Access to Energy (WB) 61.1 21 +9.8
Mobile Communications (ITU) 65.3 22 +10.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 16.0 25 +12.7
RURAL SECTOR 53.4 25 -2.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 55.5 23 -5.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 45.8 28 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 54.7 27 -2.9
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 57.5 22 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 36.6 37 -5.2
PARTICIPATION 20.7 47 -7.4
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 32.9 36 -5.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 30.1 42 -9.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 19.7 47 -2.3
RIGHTS 34.3 37 -14.2
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 22.5 44 -33.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 45.3 39 -9.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 42.9 42 -11.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 44.2 37 -33.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 16.7 18 +16.7
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 37.1 37 +2.3
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 42.2 32 +9.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 18.0 48 +1.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 55.2 28 -2.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 32.2 41 +2.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 37.7 29 0.0
GENDER 54.5 21 -1.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 48.8 31 +8.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 79.5 24 -3.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 50.4 24 +5.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 69.0 8 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
94
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Central African Republic
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 34.1 45 +2.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 54.1 49 -11.1
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 82.0 43 -9.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 70.6 37 +8.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 20.3 53 -34.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 45.3 40 -0.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 52.1 52 -20.1
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 26.3 44 +0.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 53.2 27 +6.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 47.4 20 +37.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 24.7 46 -4.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 -33.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 32.3 43 -4.1
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 26.4 37 +3.8
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 42.6 29 -4.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 37.6 39 -6.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 16.7 40 +11.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 25.0 30 +25.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 10.4 41 -6.3
ANTI-CORRUPTION 29.8 36 +16.7
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 31.0 29 +16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 41.4 28 +21.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 31.6 37 +12.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 20.0 44 +20.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
30.7 50th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.9
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 35.6 39 -1.8
PARTICIPATION 38.6 28 +6.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 42.7 25 +10.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 42.7 32 -10.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 56.5 18 +38.5
RIGHTS 36.1 36 -10.3
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 15.1 50 -9.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 24.8 50 -31.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 58.4 26 -2.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 74.0 14 -17.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 +8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 23.6 50 -5.8
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 56.1 11 +4.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 11.0 51 -22.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 37.1 46 +2.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 11.9 54 -0.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 2.1 54 -13.2
GENDER 43.9 37 +2.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 53.2 24 +2.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 58.8 41 -5.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 29.2 45 -4.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 3.4 54 -6.8
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 75.0 1 +25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 27.5 52 -0.9
HEALTH 35.4 52 +2.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 36.8 36 -1.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 27.2 46 -0.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 37.3 54 -4.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 49.6 48 +2.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 35.4 49 +17.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 26.1 51 -1.2
EDUCATION 12.6 53 -0.6
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 26.2 48 +4.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 15.0 45 +4.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 20.8 50 +4.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 1.3 48 +1.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 0.0 48 -16.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 9.6 54 -4.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 7.1 52 -8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 18.0 50 -2.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 11.4 51 -6.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 1.9 54 +0.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 52.2 36 -1.1
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 26.2 48 -13.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 11.0 54 +11.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 74.6 8 -1.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 97.0 5 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 25.5 50 -3.5
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 31.1 45 -6.7
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 23.1 48 -1.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 23.5 45 -1.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 37.6 36 -20.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 21.1 44 -10.8
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 34.5 46 -6.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) 50.0 25 -12.5
Trade Environment (WB) 48.8 34 -4.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 34.8 45 -3.1
Access to Financial Services (WB) 13.9 35 +11.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 25.0 46 -25.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 21.0 48 +17.2
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) . . -
Access to Energy (WB) 29.5 42 +23.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 31.4 51 +27.0
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 2.1 51 +0.9
RURAL SECTOR 15.3 50 -17.8
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 5.8 50 -45.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 12.5 49 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 25.6 49 -5.9
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 17.4 49 -20.2
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
95
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Chad 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 37.5 43 +6.5
SECURITY & SAFETY 77.3 35 -0.9
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 85.4 40 -13.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 75.9 34 -4.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 96.7 34 +4.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 46.0 39 +8.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 82.5 31 +1.9
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 26.5 43 +7.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 28.0 51 +10.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 6.2 49 -3.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 29.1 41 +8.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 50.4 11 +43.2
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 45.2 37 -11.2
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 24.6 39 +11.0
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 16.0 49 +0.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 19.9 51 +2.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 18.1 33 +5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 46.7 10 +38.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 22.2 32 +8.3
ANTI-CORRUPTION 21.6 47 +8.0
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 21.4 41 -4.8
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 14.3 51 +5.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 10.2 53 +5.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 50.0 11 +37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 12.0 52 -3.8 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 35.1 51 +3.8
HEALTH 39.2 51 +7.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 21.7 46 +6.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 6.7 54 -0.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 64.7 43 +8.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 75.4 15 -0.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 22.8 54 +13.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 43.9 38 +16.6
EDUCATION 24.4 51 +1.2
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 18.6 52 +4.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 11.8 48 +1.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 20.6 51 +9.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 48.6 43 +0.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 22.5 42 -10.2
SOCIAL PROTECTION 24.4 48 +4.6
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 22.6 37 -4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 37.0 35 +7.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 41.9 35 +7.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 15.3 43 +10.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 5.4 36 +1.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 52.2 36 +1.6
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 39.7 41 +4.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 39.5 31 -21.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 29.8 52 +13.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 83.7 4 +10.8
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 68.1 14 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
33.9 47th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+3.7
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 33.5 47 +2.1
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 39.6 41 -2.6
Civil Registration (GI) 87.5 4 +25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 22.9 49 -17.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 23.0 46 -2.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 43.5 31 -0.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 21.1 44 -17.7
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 43.3 37 +2.6
Regional Integration (AfDB) 68.8 10 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 38.7 42 -2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 36.0 43 -13.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) 14.1 34 +6.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 59.0 21 +16.5
INFRASTRUCTURE 16.0 53 +6.4
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 20.1 41 -4.9
Access to Energy (WB) 8.0 53 +5.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 32.6 50 +22.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 3.3 46 +2.7
RURAL SECTOR 35.0 42 +2.0
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 37.4 41 -1.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 33.3 34 +12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 37.5 44 +0.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 32.0 45 -4.1
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 29.4 47 +2.1
PARTICIPATION 28.7 39 +1.1
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 35.2 28 +14.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 43.6 31 +3.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 23.5 44 -0.6
RIGHTS 30.5 43 -5.3
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 18.6 45 -2.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 37.5 43 0.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 39.0 45 -17.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 40.7 40 -7.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 16.7 18 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 21.7 52 +3.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 15.0 54 +2.2
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 16.0 49 +4.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 27.5 54 -1.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 30.8 43 +2.2
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 19.3 45 +12.6
GENDER 36.7 45 +8.9
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 37.7 41 +15.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 61.4 40 -3.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 45.3 30 +18.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 14.1 50 +14.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
96
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Comoros
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 42.3 39 -11.1
SECURITY & SAFETY 82.2 24 -2.9
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 93.8 6 -6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 98.6 30 -0.4
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 32.7 45 -9.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 85.8 24 +1.9
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 36.5 38 -7.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 25.3 52 -16.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 14.7 43 -6.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 33.5 36 -21.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 66.7 11 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 78.6 7 -0.9
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 22.6 41 -20.2
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 11.0 51 -39.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 47.6 33 -4.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 50.0 24 -25.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 0.0 53 -19.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 4.2 43 -12.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 28.0 39 -13.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 12.5 47 -50.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 22.0 46 -12.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 32.8 36 -17.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 60.0 7 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
43.2 38th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-2.6
TREND 2010-2019
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 48.3 33 +4.9
HEALTH 57.1 33 +7.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 31.5 42 +11.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 50.8 23 -1.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 85.8 14 +17.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 64.9 31 -0.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 72.7 26 +9.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 36.7 43 +8.4
EDUCATION 56.7 19 +2.5
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 59.9 17 +8.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 30.8 28 -1.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 57.9 24 +3.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 78.4 18 -0.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) . . -
SOCIAL PROTECTION 25.7 46 +2.0
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 16.7 47 +8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 39.1 33 -6.5
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 26.9 47 +2.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 20.2 40 +4.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 53.9 33 +7.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 50.8 27 +19.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 70.8 25 +10.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 63.7 22 +1.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 30.1 38 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 38.7 40 +1.3
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 30.0 48 +2.7
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 31.4 43 +10.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 21.9 48 +1.4
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 33.2 37 +7.1
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 13.5 50 -5.9
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 49.4 29 -6.0
Regional Integration (AfDB) 37.5 33 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 65.0 13 +14.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 45.2 37 +11.3
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 50.0 28 -50.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 40.7 26 +6.2
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 19.6 42 -5.4
Access to Energy (WB) 81.1 11 +12.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 56.2 32 +14.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 6.1 44 +3.4
RURAL SECTOR 34.6 43 +2.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 40.1 39 +3.8
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 16.8 48 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 47.1 33 +3.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 34.3 42 +1.1
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 43.5 33 -5.4
PARTICIPATION 35.0 30 -22.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 -25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 21.1 47 -29.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 72.8 17 -1.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 21.0 46 -34.9
RIGHTS 44.2 31 -5.5
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 35.6 33 -4.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 59.7 31 -5.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 60.7 19 -11.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 56.5 29 -6.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 51.5 21 +1.2
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 55.3 15 +6.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 50.9 20 -0.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 67.9 14 -0.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 44.9 27 +4.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 38.5 27 -3.3
GENDER 43.3 38 +5.5
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 30.1 46 +18.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 56.5 42 +0.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 50.9 23 -2.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 35.9 35 +6.3
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) . . -
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
97
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Congo Republic 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 32.8 46 -5.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 76.2 37 -1.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 87.1 19 -6.7
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 91.7 41 -3.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 22.0 51 +0.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 80.1 38 +0.8
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 16.5 50 -1.3
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 29.2 47 +6.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 9.8 45 +6.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 13.2 52 -7.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 25.0 37 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 21.9 47 -13.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 16.9 47 -7.0
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 25.7 41 +2.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 28.1 45 -0.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 5.6 45 -12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 25.0 30 -25.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 21.6 47 -11.4
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 13.1 45 0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 19.9 48 -2.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 42.4 23 +7.5
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 -62.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 20.0 44 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
36.1 45th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.2
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 30.6 46 -0.3
PARTICIPATION 22.4 44 -10.3
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 24.1 43 -1.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 37.2 37 -24.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 15.8 50 -2.8
RIGHTS 32.9 39 -2.9
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 18.4 46 -4.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 62.5 28 0.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 43.5 40 +1.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 40.2 41 -2.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 -8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 27.2 46 +1.6
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 39.1 34 +9.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 20.1 47 -11.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 28.5 53 -5.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 20.1 50 +10.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 28.3 39 +5.2
GENDER 39.8 42 +10.1
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 39.4 39 +18.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 47.4 48 -10.9
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 48.5 26 +43.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 38.5 31 +16.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 46.0 38 +2.4
HEALTH 51.0 46 +6.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 35.1 38 +2.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 54.9 14 +4.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 57.9 50 +1.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 53.6 45 +3.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 74.5 23 +9.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 30.0 47 +15.9
EDUCATION 45.9 34 +4.8
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 62.2 14 +16.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 27.8 30 +2.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 56.7 26 +5.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 66.2 32 -0.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 16.7 46 0.0
SOCIAL PROTECTION 30.8 41 -2.5
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 18.5 44 -8.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 42.1 31 -5.5
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 30.0 44 +9.6
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 28.5 28 -23.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 34.9 31 +14.5
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 56.1 27 +0.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 28.6 45 -14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 72.1 19 +12.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 60.7 27 -2.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 63.0 15 +8.3
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 35.3 44 +2.6
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 37.4 43 +1.5
Civil Registration (GI) 37.5 45 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 25.4 47 -4.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 33.3 40 +1.4
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 57.1 24 +14.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 33.3 30 +8.3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 18.7 51 -9.6
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 32.0 46 +5.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 21.4 50 -7.2
Access to Financial Services (WB) 21.5 29 +13.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 0.0 50 -50.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 33.7 38 +6.9
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 14.6 45 -18.1
Access to Energy (WB) 67.2 15 +27.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 48.9 40 +15.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 4.0 45 +2.5
RURAL SECTOR 51.3 28 +11.7
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 53.2 28 +12.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 60.5 9 +27.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 45.2 36 +7.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 46.4 35 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
98
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Côte d’Ivoire
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 58.2 15 +8.8
SECURITY & SAFETY 84.4 20 +4.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 97.8 33 +0.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 86.5 24 +8.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 95.8 37 +3.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 65.3 12 +9.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 76.9 42 +3.0
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 54.2 18 +7.0
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 64.6 19 +6.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 28.4 34 -7.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 53.8 18 +1.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 63.8 16 +21.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 56.7 10 +17.7
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 57.8 23 +2.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 44.4 21 +14.2
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 36.8 31 +4.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 51.2 29 +4.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 58.3 17 +27.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 36.3 18 +16.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 39.7 14 +17.7
ANTI-CORRUPTION 49.9 16 +9.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 47.6 15 +26.2
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 50.8 20 +14.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 47.4 19 +15.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 62.5 6 -12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 41.2 23 +2.6 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 52.4 26 +12.1
HEALTH 62.5 23 +13.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 43.1 31 +19.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 42.3 27 +2.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 79.0 29 +10.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 68.9 25 +1.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 55.2 44 +11.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 86.5 5 +35.0
EDUCATION 47.1 33 +9.6
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 42.1 37 +15.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 26.8 31 +10.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 47.8 30 +15.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 79.6 15 +4.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 39.1 30 +1.4
SOCIAL PROTECTION 47.5 21 +13.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 42.3 14 +18.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 49.4 23 +20.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 59.2 19 +40.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 31.2 24 -20.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 55.6 25 +7.6
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 52.5 35 +12.3
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 52.4 25 +16.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 48.9 23 +27.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 56.9 37 +9.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 54.1 36 +8.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 50.3 26 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
53.9 18th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+9.0
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 50.8 21 +11.6
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 60.7 6 +16.1
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 +25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 43.9 26 +5.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 46.8 21 +4.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 78.2 3 +33.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 59.8 8 +12.7
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 56.9 20 +11.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) 68.8 10 +12.5
Trade Environment (WB) 60.6 18 +15.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 55.8 27 +15.4
Access to Financial Services (WB) 30.4 23 +5.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 68.7 11 +9.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 53.2 14 +18.2
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 49.1 17 +1.5
Access to Energy (WB) 65.6 16 +9.4
Mobile Communications (ITU) 78.5 7 +43.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 19.7 21 +18.5
RURAL SECTOR 32.4 45 +0.3
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 33.0 43 +3.6
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 31.3 40 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 34.6 47 -2.4
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 30.7 46 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 54.2 17 +3.6
PARTICIPATION 59.0 14 +8.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 62.6 8 +18.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 71.4 18 -6.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 64.6 12 +21.9
RIGHTS 57.6 15 +6.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 33.7 35 -6.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 74.9 18 +15.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 62.5 18 -3.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 75.0 12 -1.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 41.7 4 +25.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 48.3 24 +0.4
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 42.9 29 -21.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 41.6 29 +17.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 54.2 31 +4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 63.2 15 +0.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 39.4 26 +0.8
GENDER 51.9 28 -0.5
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 47.5 32 -7.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 78.1 27 +5.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 58.6 17 -0.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 50.5 22 +0.7
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
99
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - DR Congo 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 23.5 52 -9.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 37.5 52 -25.2
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 12.5 53 -74.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 0.0 54 -42.6
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 76.2 47 -10.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 24.8 50 0.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 74.1 45 +1.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 22.4 47 -4.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 35.2 43 -4.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 19.8 40 -19.1
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 22.5 47 -3.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 18.6 43 -2.6
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 20.8 44 +0.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 17.6 51 +3.0
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 21.7 42 -0.6
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 25.1 42 +0.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 37.3 40 +4.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 5.6 45 -18.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 18.8 39 +5.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 21.8 33 +4.6
ANTI-CORRUPTION 12.4 52 -7.5
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 4.8 50 0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 12.9 53 +1.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 18.8 49 +3.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 -37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 13.1 50 -5.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
31.7 49th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-2.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 31.8 48 +0.9
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 40.2 39 -2.5
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 -25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 34.6 40 +6.7
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 30.6 41 +5.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 46.4 30 +1.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 27.0 35 -0.7
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 33.2 47 -2.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) 43.8 28 -6.2
Trade Environment (WB) 25.3 52 -3.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 40.0 41 +9.0
Access to Financial Services (WB) 19.4 30 +11.1
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 37.6 37 -20.2
INFRASTRUCTURE 19.6 49 +11.1
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 23.5 39 +2.1
Access to Energy (WB) 15.5 49 +6.5
Mobile Communications (ITU) 36.8 47 +33.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 2.7 48 +2.4
RURAL SECTOR 34.1 44 -3.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 28.8 46 -8.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 29.3 41 +4.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 37.8 43 +4.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 40.4 40 -13.2
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 31.1 45 -5.7
PARTICIPATION 23.2 43 -12.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 -25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 29.8 39 +1.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 18.6 50 -15.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 31.8 32 -10.3
RIGHTS 31.6 41 -5.9
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 27.6 40 +14.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 55.8 34 -5.2
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 43.4 41 -10.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 22.7 49 -27.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 32.4 44 +1.7
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 42.4 31 +5.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 35.3 39 +3.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 45.3 39 -1.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 23.1 46 +1.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 16.1 49 +0.9
GENDER 37.4 44 -6.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 27.7 49 +3.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 75.0 29 -4.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 28.5 47 -15.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 30.9 39 +2.3
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 40.3 47 +3.0
HEALTH 51.5 43 +9.0
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 35.0 39 -2.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 22.9 48 +1.8
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 63.3 45 +17.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 64.4 32 -0.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 58.3 41 +11.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 64.9 21 +25.5
EDUCATION 45.9 34 +3.3
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 50.6 25 +8.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 26.0 33 +3.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 47.2 32 +5.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 82.5 11 +4.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 23.0 41 -5.3
SOCIAL PROTECTION 24.2 49 -2.6
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 8.3 50 -8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.5 40 +0.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 44.0 33 +6.1
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 11.1 49 -8.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 39.8 52 +2.4
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 32.5 44 +3.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 35.0 37 -10.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 46.9 44 +16.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 43.2 52 -1.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 41.2 33 +3.7
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
100
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Djibouti
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 41.3 40 -2.7
SECURITY & SAFETY 82.1 25 -2.7
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.8 16 +0.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 85.4 26 -7.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 95.5 39 -3.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 42.0 42 -4.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 88.0 20 +1.4
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 37.9 36 +3.3
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 29.5 46 +3.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 17.2 41 -10.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 68.1 9 +4.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 33.3 34 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 25.0 37 +25.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 54.3 28 -2.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 14.8 49 -7.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 20.4 44 +18.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 38.4 37 -27.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 11.1 41 -13.9
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 0.0 53 -12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 4.2 43 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 30.4 34 -4.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 9.5 49 +9.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 34.6 35 -2.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 35.4 34 -2.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 60.0 7 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
41.3 42nd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+2.0
TREND 2010-2019
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 29.2 48 +2.4
PARTICIPATION 21.0 46 +5.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 19.9 48 +7.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 39.8 35 +6.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 24.3 43 +6.6
RIGHTS 28.6 46 -0.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 26.3 41 -2.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 45.9 38 +0.6
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 17.7 52 -5.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 44.9 35 -4.5
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 +8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 35.5 40 +2.8
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 31.9 40 +3.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 36.9 38 +6.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 50.8 35 -1.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 33.9 37 +4.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 24.0 41 -0.1
GENDER 31.8 52 +2.3
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 50.8 28 +9.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 36.2 50 -1.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 31.0 42 +1.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 9.4 52 -0.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) . . -
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 48.5 32 +1.2
HEALTH 60.2 27 +2.3
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 47.5 27 -0.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 66.4 12 +2.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 73.9 35 +12.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 64.4 32 -2.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 76.3 19 +6.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 32.5 45 -5.9
EDUCATION 43.6 36 +2.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 47.6 30 -4.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 18.1 42 +6.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 30.9 47 +11.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 88.3 8 +4.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 33.3 35 -
SOCIAL PROTECTION 45.9 24 +4.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 49.4 9 +24.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 45.5 26 -14.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 46.5 28 +3.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 42.2 13 +5.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 44.3 45 -4.2
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 36.1 42 -27.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 84.5 11 +7.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 52.0 39 +0.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 4.6 51 +2.2
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 46.3 31 +7.2
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 46.6 32 +3.5
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 32.3 41 +7.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 46.5 22 -3.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 58.0 22 +5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 33.8 28 +7.5
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 44.3 35 -2.8
Regional Integration (AfDB) 62.5 17 +6.2
Trade Environment (WB) 54.9 25 +2.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 35.0 44 -19.5
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 25.0 46 0.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 43.4 22 +17.1
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 33.6 28 +5.7
Access to Energy (WB) 58.7 22 +4.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 44.0 43 +27.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 37.2 12 +30.6
RURAL SECTOR 50.9 29 +11.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 55.2 25 -0.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 +25.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 54.3 28 +9.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 43.9 38 +9.6
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
101
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Egypt 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 39.0 42 -3.6
SECURITY & SAFETY 68.0 42 -13.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 45.2 50 -54.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 48.5 44 -19.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.6 20 -0.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 51.9 28 +3.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 94.6 8 +3.2
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 35.9 39 -4.3
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 50.6 31 -2.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 14.9 42 -3.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 31.5 38 +4.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 29.8 39 -10.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 40.8 22 -5.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 47.6 35 -9.1
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 19.3 43 -4.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 28.5 40 -9.4
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 23.0 49 +1.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 5.6 45 -12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 32.2 23 -4.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 7.1 42 +4.3
ANTI-CORRUPTION 32.9 32 +7.8
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 39.3 25 +8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 35.4 34 +3.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 37.1 29 +12.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 0.0 48 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 53.0 13 +15.3 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 65.4 8 +3.6
HEALTH 68.3 14 +3.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 20.4 47 +2.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 98.6 3 +3.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 79.6 25 +2.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 17.7 54 -1.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 96.9 5 +2.8
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 96.4 1 +8.5
EDUCATION 60.1 14 +6.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 39.2 43 0.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 53.9 6 +7.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 80.5 5 +7.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 82.1 13 +7.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 45.0 25 +7.2
SOCIAL PROTECTION 67.5 4 +1.0
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 46.4 10 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.3 43 0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 67.8 7 -2.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 95.5 1 +6.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 94.4 4 +1.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 65.8 10 +4.2
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 42.9 39 0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 49.8 21 +15.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 83.8 12 +2.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 95.0 2 +2.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 57.8 17 +0.1
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
47.4 30th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+0.5
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 23.8 49 -3.8
PARTICIPATION 7.9 52 -12.4
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 -25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 8.0 51 -14.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 11.7 51 -11.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 11.9 51 +1.3
RIGHTS 20.3 49 -6.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 32.2 37 -0.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 17.2 52 -20.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 19.7 51 -15.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 32.2 44 +6.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 32.6 43 +1.7
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 30.1 43 +9.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 39.4 34 -1.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 40.4 43 -0.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 21.8 48 -2.2
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 31.2 35 +2.7
GENDER 34.3 48 +1.5
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 25.7 51 +11.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 52.9 45 +3.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 28.7 46 +17.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 39.5 29 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 61.6 11 +6.0
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 39.9 40 -0.3
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 -25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 59.5 9 -7.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 25.1 44 +5.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 25.0 37 +25.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 47.7 30 +6.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 51.2 30 +5.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 67.2 11 +9.4
Access to Financial Services (WB) 29.9 24 +22.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 42.7 34 -11.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 80.0 4 +15.7
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 72.2 3 +10.2
Access to Energy (WB) 100.0 1 +0.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 75.8 9 +5.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 72.1 5 +46.2
RURAL SECTOR 78.6 5 +1.6
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 88.5 1 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 62.5 6 -12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 90.3 2 +9.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 73.2 5 +9.6
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
102
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Equatorial Guinea
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 29.1 48 +0.6
SECURITY & SAFETY 84.5 19 -2.4
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 86.9 20 +2.7
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.8 9 +0.4
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 39.9 44 -15.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 95.7 5 +0.4
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 12.8 52 -2.3
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 11.6 54 -3.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 1.6 52 +0.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 28.8 42 +11.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 34.8 42 -22.6
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 6.2 52 +2.7
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 6.7 53 +1.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 8.6 52 +4.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 5.6 45 +5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 10.1 49 +1.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 13.0 51 +4.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 0.0 52 0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 19.3 49 +0.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 25.5 43 +2.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 0.0 48 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 20.0 44 +20.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
28.7 51st
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.3
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 17.0 54 -4.1
PARTICIPATION 12.5 51 +0.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 24.0 44 -6.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 9.7 52 +0.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 16.1 49 +8.5
RIGHTS 15.3 52 -3.6
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 17.0 47 -0.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 26.5 48 -6.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 20.9 50 +1.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 12.2 53 -12.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 20.2 53 +0.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 16.0 53 +6.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 4.1 52 -0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 44.4 41 +4.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 22.0 47 -6.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 14.6 50 +1.1
GENDER 20.2 54 -14.3
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 25.6 52 +9.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 33.8 52 +9.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 30.9 43 -13.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 10.5 51 -2.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 0.0 48 -75.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 43.7 44 -1.2
HEALTH 50.8 47 +7.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 30.3 44 +6.9
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 51.3 21 +3.0
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 55.0 51 -0.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 76.4 12 +1.0
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 65.7 35 +9.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 26.1 51 +26.1
EDUCATION 38.7 42 +0.3
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 63.1 13 +18.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 13.4 47 -7.7
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 27.9 48 -2.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 55.8 41 -1.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 33.3 35 -
SOCIAL PROTECTION 29.9 43 -5.5
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 22.6 37 -2.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 16.7 51 -
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 30.8 43 -0.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 49.4 10 -0.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 55.6 30 -7.2
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 28.6 45 -
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 83.3 13 +7.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 59.6 30 -1.9
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 51.0 25 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 25.0 52 +3.6
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 9.7 54 +7.0
Civil Registration (GI) 25.0 50 +25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 11.4 52 +3.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 2.3 53 -0.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 0.0 53 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 15.0 52 -5.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 30.8 47 -9.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 14.3 52 -
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 0.0 50 0.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 39.0 29 +12.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) . . -
Access to Energy (WB) 65.6 16 +0.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 40.4 46 +30.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 11.0 31 +6.2
RURAL SECTOR 36.2 40 -0.4
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 52.0 30 -0.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 25.0 42 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 41.2 41 +0.1
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 26.7 47 -1.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
103
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Eritrea 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 23.7 51 -0.5
SECURITY & SAFETY 60.5 44 -2.4
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 +0.5
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 75.0 35 -6.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 49.3 51 +0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 0.6 54 +0.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 77.5 41 -7.1
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 6.0 54 +3.3
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 14.0 53 +12.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 0.6 54 +0.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 6.3 54 +6.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 15.1 53 +1.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 4.1 54 +0.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 7.1 52 0.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 1.1 54 +0.7
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 0.0 50 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 12.5 42 0.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 24.2 44 -2.9
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 0.0 52 -9.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 40.6 30 +2.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 40.3 26 -7.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 0.0 48 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 40.0 24 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
25.8 52nd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 17.1 53 -1.9
PARTICIPATION 1.4 54 +1.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 0.7 54 +0.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 4.7 54 +4.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 0.1 54 0.0
RIGHTS 5.5 54 -1.9
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 12.6 51 -12.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 0.1 54 +0.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 2.2 54 +1.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 12.3 52 +0.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 26.9 47 -0.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 22.4 48 -6.0
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 0.0 54 0.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 55.8 27 +1.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 29.8 45 -0.2
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 26.7 40 +0.9
GENDER 34.7 47 -5.8
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 45.2 34 +2.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 30.9 53 -2.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 21.1 49 +1.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 51.3 21 +7.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -37.5
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 36.9 50 -1.4
HEALTH 54.4 38 +3.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 45.5 29 -9.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 18.2 51 +2.8
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 83.3 20 +9.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 57.3 40 +4.7
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 73.3 25 +7.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 48.8 36 +5.4
EDUCATION 28.8 50 -8.7
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 34.3 47 -4.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 16.3 44 -5.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 20.6 51 -11.2
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 72.6 26 -6.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 0.0 48 -16.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 23.2 50 -3.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 15.5 48 +1.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.4 42 -6.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 32.7 41 -18.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 11.0 50 +11.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 41.3 50 +2.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 25.4 49 0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 54.2 40 +15.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 71.3 11 -3.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 14.4 46 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 25.3 51 +0.3
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 22.3 49 -11.1
Civil Registration (GI) 12.5 53 -37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 5.3 54 -3.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 44.4 25 -4.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 29.0 39 -4.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 20.3 46 -6.7
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 12.4 54 +3.2
Regional Integration (AfDB) 25.0 35 +6.2
Trade Environment (WB) 18.4 54 +13.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 6.3 53 -7.1
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 0.0 50 0.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 16.3 52 +1.1
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 11.7 48 -11.3
Access to Energy (WB) 47.5 29 +10.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 3.9 54 +3.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 2.1 51 +1.7
RURAL SECTOR 50.3 30 +8.2
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 76.9 8 +7.7
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 41.8 29 +16.8
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 34.8 46 +6.1
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 47.9 32 +2.5
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
104
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Eswatini
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 43.7 36 +2.9
SECURITY & SAFETY 82.6 23 +10.2
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 90.0 15 +3.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.7 15 -0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 60.4 18 +44.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 62.8 50 +3.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 31.0 40 +1.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 52.6 28 +8.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 8.0 47 -3.1
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 43.9 26 -8.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 33.3 34 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 37.6 23 +6.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 10.4 54 +7.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 18.9 44 -1.8
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 18.6 46 -4.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 35.7 41 +8.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 0.0 50 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 36.2 19 +1.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 4.2 43 -13.9
ANTI-CORRUPTION 42.4 22 +1.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 42.9 23 -7.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 59.3 16 +1.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 23.6 45 -0.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 48.7 16 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
43.8 36th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+2.5
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 31.2 44 -2.0
PARTICIPATION 16.9 49 +4.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 1.3 53 +1.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 31.1 41 +1.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 22.7 45 +1.9
RIGHTS 31.4 42 -1.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 24.3 42 +4.8
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 47.8 37 -17.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 28.9 48 +7.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 56.1 30 0.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 36.2 38 -5.6
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 23.6 47 -0.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 26.0 46 -3.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 30.8 49 -17.4
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 60.8 17 -6.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 39.9 24 0.0
GENDER 40.2 41 -5.7
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 45.5 33 +12.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 53.0 44 -5.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 36.6 37 -23.0
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 41.1 28 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -12.5
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 50.1 31 +0.6
HEALTH 66.0 16 +11.9
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 60.8 12 +3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 51.0 22 +5.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 94.0 4 +14.7
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 45.2 49 +7.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 70.8 29 +11.8
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 74.4 11 +28.9
EDUCATION 55.2 21 +2.3
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 40.0 42 -2.6
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 40.8 15 +1.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 70.0 14 +8.2
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 83.0 10 +8.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 42.2 28 -4.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 35.2 38 -13.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 26.8 32 +10.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 16.7 51 -
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 15.4 50 0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 53.8 9 -28.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 63.3 19 -17.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 43.9 46 +1.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 28.6 45 -
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 51.2 19 +1.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 68.7 28 +21.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 46.5 48 -0.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 24.7 40 +1.2
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 50.3 22 +8.7
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 37.9 42 +5.4
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 28.9 46 +5.3
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 47.8 20 +16.5
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 25.0 37 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 60.3 15 -4.2
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 100.0 1 +0.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 36.8 42 -8.9
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 44.0 33 -4.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 47.4 17 +18.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 51.4 14 -3.3
Access to Energy (WB) 75.5 12 +32.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 36.5 49 +22.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 26.0 18 +20.5
RURAL SECTOR 55.5 20 +15.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 62.9 19 +29.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 +16.7
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 56.6 23 +2.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 52.5 26 +13.2
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
105
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Ethiopia 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 47.9 30 +5.2
SECURITY & SAFETY 78.3 34 +1.0
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 85.2 41 +5.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 72.3 36 +1.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 96.2 35 -2.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 51.4 31 -2.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 86.3 23 +2.3
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 29.7 42 +0.1
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 39.9 37 +9.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 27.1 36 -0.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 37.9 33 +6.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 25.5 41 -1.8
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 27.5 36 -5.6
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 20.1 48 -6.9
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 30.7 33 +8.7
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 31.4 36 +9.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 31.2 44 +7.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 11.1 41 -7.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 53.3 3 +33.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 26.2 27 -0.1
ANTI-CORRUPTION 53.1 11 +11.1
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 47.6 15 +21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 67.8 9 +10.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 54.9 15 +8.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 50.0 11 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 44.9 18 +3.2 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 54.0 23 +9.6
HEALTH 64.5 20 +17.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 53.7 21 +19.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 18.5 50 +9.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 79.2 27 +16.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 84.9 2 +3.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 71.9 28 +16.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 78.9 6 +39.5
EDUCATION 41.5 39 +1.0
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 42.5 36 +2.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 25.8 35 +7.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 33.5 45 +0.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 40.8 46 -1.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 65.1 8 -2.6
SOCIAL PROTECTION 45.5 25 +9.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 26.8 32 +12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 60.1 11 +12.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 66.5 11 -14.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 18.2 42 +6.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 56.1 24 +28.0
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 64.4 12 +10.3
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 57.1 18 +11.9
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 50.2 20 +16.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 70.8 25 +17.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 61.1 26 +6.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 82.8 12 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
46.6 31st
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+6.7
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 49.7 24 +5.6
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 60.6 8 +6.7
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 +25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 42.0 31 -22.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 48.3 18 +2.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 78.4 2 +7.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 59.1 9 +21.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 41.3 41 +3.9
Regional Integration (AfDB) 50.0 25 +12.5
Trade Environment (WB) 58.6 21 +12.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 56.8 23 -6.7
Access to Financial Services (WB) 24.1 27 +11.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 16.7 49 -10.6
INFRASTRUCTURE 38.8 30 +9.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 48.8 18 -14.3
Access to Energy (WB) 42.6 31 +12.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 54.5 33 +32.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 9.2 37 +8.2
RURAL SECTOR 58.3 17 +2.3
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 77.5 7 +18.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 +8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 64.4 11 -9.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 41.4 39 -8.3
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 34.8 41 +6.3
PARTICIPATION 33.2 35 +13.0
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 +25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 34.5 32 +6.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 44.1 30 +11.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 29.4 34 +9.7
RIGHTS 30.5 43 +6.3
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 23.9 43 +0.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 37.7 42 +3.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 56.9 28 +22.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 17.3 51 +4.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 16.7 18 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 33.8 42 +1.5
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 32.9 37 +4.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 56.3 13 +1.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 30.7 50 -6.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 32.7 39 +7.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 16.4 48 +0.2
GENDER 41.5 39 +4.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 67.7 5 +38.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 49.2 47 +4.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 20.9 50 -2.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 19.8 47 +4.8
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
106
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Gabon
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 43.5 37 -3.2
SECURITY & SAFETY 85.0 17 -0.1
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.7 20 -0.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 86.9 20 -6.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.6 20 -0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 54.6 25 +5.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 84.0 28 +1.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 41.6 31 -3.5
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 41.9 36 -5.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 25.6 37 -21.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 71.0 6 +4.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 33.3 34 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 21.4 43 -12.6
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 56.4 26 +14.6
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 23.9 40 -8.5
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 24.1 43 +13.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 71.8 10 -12.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 11.1 41 -13.9
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 12.5 42 -12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 -18.1
ANTI-CORRUPTION 23.7 46 -0.3
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 22.6 39 -2.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 24.1 43 +2.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 21.5 47 -5.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 37.6 28 +3.1
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
47.7 29th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+1.0
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 44.6 30 -2.1
PARTICIPATION 35.2 29 -1.9
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 33.8 35 -8.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 53.3 23 -8.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 28.8 36 +9.1
RIGHTS 42.1 32 -9.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 50.0 19 +1.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 62.5 28 -12.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 54.2 32 -10.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 43.6 38 -16.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 -8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 45.7 28 -3.8
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 55.6 13 -3.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 28.4 43 +5.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 58.9 26 -4.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 45.5 26 -14.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 40.1 22 -2.4
GENDER 55.6 18 +6.5
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 60.6 13 +2.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 84.6 17 +6.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 46.2 29 +11.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 61.6 12 +20.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 61.0 11 +5.2
HEALTH 65.2 19 +4.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 60.5 13 +0.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 74.5 11 +2.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 60.8 47 +11.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 63.2 34 +0.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 81.0 14 +8.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 51.2 34 +3.7
EDUCATION 51.7 25 +1.4
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 43.5 35 -6.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) . . -
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 73.2 10 +3.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) . . -
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 38.3 31 +7.1
SOCIAL PROTECTION 49.6 18 -3.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 38.1 15 -11.9
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 50.0 21 -
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 57.1 21 +12.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 38.6 16 -17.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 64.0 18 +1.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 77.5 2 +18.5
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 85.7 3 -
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 53.2 16 +14.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 90.8 9 +5.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 62.7 24 -0.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 94.9 7 +46.1
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 41.5 39 +3.9
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 21.3 50 -3.3
Civil Registration (GI) 25.0 50 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 18.0 51 -8.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 17.3 51 -4.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 25.0 37 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 42.6 38 +4.5
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 38.1 43 -6.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 43.0 40 +15.3
Access to Financial Services (WB) 51.8 6 +29.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 37.6 37 -20.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 58.4 11 +9.4
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 31.6 35 -1.7
Access to Energy (WB) 92.7 8 +0.8
Mobile Communications (ITU) 79.7 5 +14.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 29.5 16 +24.5
RURAL SECTOR 43.5 36 +4.9
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 47.5 36 -0.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 33.3 34 +8.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 46.8 34 +6.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 46.4 35 +5.4
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
107
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Gambia 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 58.0 16 +14.2
SECURITY & SAFETY 82.1 25 -4.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.4 24 -0.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 93.5 9 +6.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 85.8 44 -11.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 47.7 37 -20.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 84.2 27 +3.2
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 56.4 17 +16.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 83.9 5 +56.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 68.6 9 +61.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 50.8 19 -11.8
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 40.8 31 +7.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 30.2 29 -22.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 64.3 16 +10.2
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 42.9 24 +33.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 60.4 14 +58.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 49.7 30 +48.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 58.3 17 +58.3
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 11.9 45 -13.1
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 33.9 19 +17.2
ANTI-CORRUPTION 50.7 14 +11.0
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 22.6 39 -2.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 65.1 10 +19.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 59.2 13 +10.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 50.0 11 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 56.8 10 +2.7 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 51.4 27 -1.8
HEALTH 55.5 37 -2.0
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 61.7 10 +2.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 47.3 25 +0.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 76.1 31 +1.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 58.2 39 -1.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 63.5 37 +8.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 26.4 50 -23.1
EDUCATION 57.0 18 +2.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 71.9 7 +22.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 23.8 36 +3.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 46.0 33 +4.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 83.6 9 +7.0
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 59.8 12 -27.2
SOCIAL PROTECTION 48.5 19 -2.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 29.8 28 -11.9
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 45.4 27 -10.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 50.1 25 +1.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 41.2 14 +6.8
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 76.0 12 +3.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 44.7 43 -5.1
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 50.4 28 -7.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 38.9 32 -30.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 57.2 36 +6.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 65.0 18 +6.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 11.9 48 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
55.9 16th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+9.2
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 57.1 12 +19.5
PARTICIPATION 54.9 18 +30.6
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 47.4 16 +25.8
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 67.4 20 +42.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 67.4 9 +41.8
RIGHTS 58.5 14 +25.3
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 57.0 16 +17.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 69.7 23 +28.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 75.4 7 +46.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 90.3 4 +51.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 -16.7
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 59.6 11 +12.1
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 54.9 17 +13.5
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 63.5 10 +20.1
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 70.6 10 +8.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 70.8 11 +11.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 38.4 28 +6.4
GENDER 55.5 19 +10.3
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 54.1 21 +6.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 83.6 19 +4.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 44.5 32 +9.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 45.5 27 +13.9
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 +16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 57.0 14 +4.7
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 56.4 18 +10.1
Civil Registration (GI) 87.5 4 +12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 57.4 13 +28.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 41.0 33 +3.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 56.5 26 -2.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 39.5 25 +9.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 60.2 16 -3.3
Regional Integration (AfDB) 62.5 17 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 53.6 27 -6.7
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 55.8 27 -16.9
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 68.9 10 +10.3
INFRASTRUCTURE 46.9 18 +10.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 41.8 20 -6.6
Access to Energy (WB) 58.6 23 +13.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 75.6 10 +27.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 11.6 30 +7.9
RURAL SECTOR 64.4 7 +1.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 70.2 13 +9.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 58.0 13 -7.8
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 64.9 10 +0.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 64.4 8 +4.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
108
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Ghana
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 66.0 11 -5.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 86.4 14 -1.2
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 94.6 35 -4.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 82.3 31 -4.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.4 23 +0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 65.5 11 -6.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 90.0 13 +9.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 69.2 8 -9.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 80.8 8 +2.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 59.6 13 -37.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 64.1 14 -2.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 83.2 6 +2.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 50.2 12 -12.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 77.4 8 -10.6
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 68.3 4 -3.3
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 76.8 6 -5.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 80.9 3 -9.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 94.4 4 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 38.3 16 -4.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 50.9 5 +2.8
ANTI-CORRUPTION 40.0 25 -7.4
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 52.4 11 -4.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 47.9 23 +2.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 44.4 22 +0.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 30.4 35 -10.4 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 60.7 13 +2.4
HEALTH 68.9 12 +7.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 61.6 11 +1.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 54.0 16 +4.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 80.1 23 +12.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 66.5 30 -0.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 77.8 18 +8.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 73.4 12 +16.8
EDUCATION 62.2 10 +4.9
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 53.5 20 +6.9
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 51.5 8 +5.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 69.3 15 +6.0
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 67.4 29 +9.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 69.6 6 -2.6
SOCIAL PROTECTION 56.9 9 -4.0
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 38.1 15 -7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 69.7 4 -9.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 46.0 30 -12.1
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 41.1 15 +8.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 89.8 9 +0.5
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 54.7 31 +1.3
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 59.5 15 -6.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 54.8 12 +7.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 71.6 20 +10.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 47.5 46 -5.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 39.9 34 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
64.3 8th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+0.1
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 60.9 12 +6.3
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 62.8 5 +0.9
Civil Registration (GI) 37.5 45 +12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 65.0 6 +13.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 73.6 1 -15.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 73.9 7 -3.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 63.9 5 -2.6
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 63.5 10 +5.6
Regional Integration (AfDB) 75.0 8 +6.2
Trade Environment (WB) 54.8 26 +8.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 70.8 4 -11.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 53.5 5 +23.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 63.2 17 +1.7
INFRASTRUCTURE 56.6 12 +18.1
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 41.3 21 -4.6
Access to Energy (WB) 81.6 10 +18.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 66.5 20 +25.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 37.0 13 +32.4
RURAL SECTOR 60.8 14 +0.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 70.3 12 +20.6
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 58.3 10 -12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 62.3 15 -3.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 52.5 26 -2.5
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 69.7 5 -2.9
PARTICIPATION 77.5 5 +2.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 100.0 1 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 46.7 17 -3.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 87.5 8 -10.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 75.8 5 +10.2
RIGHTS 68.4 7 -9.5
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 79.9 3 -2.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 86.0 10 -0.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 63.7 15 -29.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 79.0 9 -16.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 68.5 7 +3.5
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 68.7 4 +5.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 52.9 17 -5.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 81.7 2 +4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 76.6 7 +1.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 62.5 6 +11.0
GENDER 64.6 10 -7.4
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 54.1 21 -2.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 85.0 15 -9.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 75.0 3 +0.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 83.9 5 +8.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -33.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
109
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Guinea 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 43.4 38 -1.7
SECURITY & SAFETY 81.3 30 -0.4
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.0 28 +0.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 81.2 32 -4.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 96.1 36 -1.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 47.3 38 +2.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 82.7 29 +0.4
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 30.0 41 -5.5
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 36.2 41 -0.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 10.6 44 -32.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 29.3 40 -2.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 47.7 28 +5.6
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 20.5 45 -1.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 35.7 41 -1.6
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 35.5 30 -1.6
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 30.4 37 +1.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 60.3 20 -2.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 45.8 25 +5.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 15.2 41 -0.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 25.9 28 -12.2
ANTI-CORRUPTION 26.7 41 +0.8
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 19.0 43 -3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 22.1 45 +3.3
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 30.3 39 +6.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 37.3 29 +22.6
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
42.5 39th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+1.3
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 43.0 36 +6.0
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 46.4 34 +3.0
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 37.8 33 -0.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 43.2 29 +10.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 58.0 22 +5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 30.5 31 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 53.2 26 +6.8
Regional Integration (AfDB) 68.8 10 -6.2
Trade Environment (WB) 50.9 31 +3.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 66.1 13 +17.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) 18.2 31 +15.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 62.2 19 +3.8
INFRASTRUCTURE 40.9 25 +19.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 49.9 15 +25.6
Access to Energy (WB) 41.6 33 +17.4
Mobile Communications (ITU) 62.2 26 +24.0
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 9.8 35 +9.0
RURAL SECTOR 31.4 47 -5.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 7.1 49 -10.8
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 25.0 42 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 34.9 45 -9.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 58.6 19 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 38.3 36 -5.8
PARTICIPATION 31.7 36 -6.8
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 34.9 31 -7.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 46.8 28 -20.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 32.4 30 +0.4
RIGHTS 45.6 30 -7.5
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 44.4 23 -3.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 71.5 22 -0.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 59.3 25 -9.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 52.5 31 -16.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 -8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 37.3 36 -1.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 20.1 51 -16.2
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 34.2 42 -0.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 52.4 33 -4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 33.9 37 +2.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 45.8 16 +9.7
GENDER 38.9 43 -6.6
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 38.3 40 -6.0
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 67.4 37 -1.9
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 34.1 39 -2.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 29.6 42 +15.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -37.5
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 45.2 42 +6.7
HEALTH 49.2 49 +11.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 19.3 48 +3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 37.0 35 +1.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 66.6 42 +6.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 62.9 35 -2.4
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 50.2 48 +11.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 59.1 27 +47.0
EDUCATION 37.4 44 +2.5
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 26.1 49 -2.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 23.7 37 +3.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 38.1 41 +4.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 61.5 38 -6.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 37.7 32 +13.8
SOCIAL PROTECTION 40.0 32 +4.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 29.8 28 +7.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 38.7 34 +1.6
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 64.3 12 +11.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 27.2 31 -3.9
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 54.1 32 +8.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 56.7 20 +20.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 53.4 15 +14.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 33.8 51 +13.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 74.8 7 -4.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 52.0 22 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
110
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Guinea-Bissau
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 48.5 29 +8.0
SECURITY & SAFETY 87.3 12 +4.2
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 99.7 4 +9.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 98.0 31 -0.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 56.9 22 +10.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 82.2 32 +2.2
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 44.3 28 -3.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 47.3 33 -11.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 46.4 21 +18.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 27.0 43 -5.8
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 66.7 11 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 25.0 37 -25.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 53.2 30 +3.5
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 40.8 28 +20.8
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 47.4 23 +20.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 85.9 2 +25.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 45.8 25 +45.8
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 25.0 30 +12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 21.6 47 +10.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 26.2 34 +26.2
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 22.9 44 +0.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 14.2 52 -0.1
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 20.0 44 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
41.4 41st
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+2.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 47.5 24 +5.1
PARTICIPATION 57.7 15 +13.0
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 50.0 13 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 43.6 23 +7.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 75.2 15 +3.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 62.0 16 +28.8
RIGHTS 50.3 23 +2.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 42.6 26 +2.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 75.5 17 +0.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 60.0 21 +0.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 73.6 15 +14.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 -8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 37.7 35 +2.8
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 29.7 44 +0.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 41.5 30 -0.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 61.1 23 +5.8
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 39.3 31 +7.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 16.9 46 0.0
GENDER 44.2 36 +2.6
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 43.8 36 +15.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 74.8 30 +3.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 57.8 18 +19.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 19.6 48 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 38.7 48 -1.2
HEALTH 43.8 50 +4.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 8.5 53 -22.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 34.2 39 +4.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 64.0 44 +8.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 50.1 46 +3.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 53.2 45 +15.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 53.0 33 +17.6
EDUCATION 32.1 47 -6.7
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 11.3 53 -27.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) . . -
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 51.8 28 +6.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) . . -
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 33.3 35 -
SOCIAL PROTECTION 23.0 51 -4.8
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 33.9 20 +8.9
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 25.0 48 -19.5
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 18.4 49 -15.2
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 14.6 46 +6.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 55.8 29 +2.2
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 43.3 37 -13.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 41.7 47 +16.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 52.2 38 -1.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 86.0 9 +7.6
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 30.9 49 -0.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 30.2 47 -4.3
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 +12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 30.6 44 +5.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 25.4 43 -10.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 29.0 39 -21.8
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 16.1 49 -6.7
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 52.5 27 -4.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) 43.8 28 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 47.7 35 +2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 43.6 39 -2.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 75.0 2 -25.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 19.4 50 +12.7
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) . . -
Access to Energy (WB) 25.6 44 +23.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 30.1 52 +13.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 2.4 49 +1.3
RURAL SECTOR 21.5 48 -6.9
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 11.0 48 -25.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 25.0 42 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 25.8 48 -2.4
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 24.3 48 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
111
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Kenya 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 56.3 18 -2.3
SECURITY & SAFETY 81.8 27 -1.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 88.5 38 -3.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 62.3 41 -13.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.1 25 +0.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 68.2 7 +7.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 90.6 12 -0.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 51.2 19 -0.5
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 57.1 25 -4.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 73.7 6 -19.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 37.1 34 +2.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 34.3 33 -11.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 48.4 16 +24.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 56.6 25 +6.2
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 51.6 15 -10.3
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 64.0 11 -1.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 69.5 11 +2.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 36.1 28 -16.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 47.8 8 -16.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 40.5 13 -19.2
ANTI-CORRUPTION 40.5 24 +3.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 47.6 15 -16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 41.0 29 +3.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 41.1 24 +13.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 35.5 30 +16.2 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 59.4 14 +8.1
HEALTH 66.2 15 +7.9
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 59.6 14 +4.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 40.2 30 +2.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 84.7 18 +33.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 76.6 11 +1.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 78.8 16 +8.5
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 57.3 29 -3.3
EDUCATION 62.3 9 +6.2
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 54.6 19 -6.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 38.7 18 +2.6
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 71.0 13 +3.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 74.8 23 +36.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 72.4 4 -5.5
SOCIAL PROTECTION 51.6 14 +8.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 45.2 12 +18.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 67.6 5 +10.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 64.1 13 +5.6
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 33.4 21 +5.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 47.7 27 +4.1
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 57.4 24 +9.5
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 56.0 22 0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 53.8 14 +14.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 72.8 18 +10.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 66.1 16 +21.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 38.2 37 +0.3
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
58.5 14th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+3.7
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 66.7 5 +9.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 60.2 9 -2.8
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 54.6 18 -6.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 59.1 7 -0.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 72.5 8 +7.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 64.8 4 -1.7
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 74.3 2 +8.4
Regional Integration (AfDB) 81.3 7 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 65.9 11 +10.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 72.3 3 +1.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 80.8 3 +14.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 71.3 8 +16.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 69.7 8 +35.9
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 68.5 4 +9.1
Access to Energy (WB) 73.9 13 +58.2
Mobile Communications (ITU) 77.3 8 +22.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 58.9 9 +54.1
RURAL SECTOR 62.6 11 -2.3
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 66.5 14 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 -8.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 69.2 6 -0.9
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 64.6 7 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 51.6 19 -0.6
PARTICIPATION 40.9 26 -8.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 56.0 9 +0.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 41.8 33 -9.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 28.4 38 -1.2
RIGHTS 54.3 19 -5.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 38.8 30 -3.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 67.7 25 -16.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 56.7 29 -23.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 72.0 16 -12.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 36.1 6 +27.8
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 49.7 22 +0.6
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 43.7 28 -10.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 47.6 23 -2.1
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 46.9 38 -2.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 72.7 10 +24.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 37.5 30 -5.9
GENDER 61.6 11 +11.4
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 53.4 23 +11.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 81.9 22 -2.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 63.5 12 +32.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 59.2 16 +7.3
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 +8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
112
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Lesotho
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 53.9 23 -4.1
SECURITY & SAFETY 70.6 40 -4.5
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.8 16 -0.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 93.5 9 -0.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 59.6 19 -0.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 0.0 54 -21.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 62.1 13 +1.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 74.5 13 +3.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 40.7 25 -4.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 69.6 8 -14.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 66.7 11 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 49.0 15 +29.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 72.3 12 -5.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 39.3 29 -2.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 60.0 15 +7.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 49.1 31 -2.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 41.7 27 -23.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 27.9 26 -5.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 18.1 36 +9.8
ANTI-CORRUPTION 43.4 21 -10.4
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 31.0 29 -29.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 65.1 10 +9.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 57.2 14 +13.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 -37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 51.4 14 -7.1 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 50.4 29 +2.4
HEALTH 58.4 29 +8.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 78.5 3 +3.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 35.2 37 +4.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 74.9 34 +13.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 42.4 52 +1.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 57.9 42 +8.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 61.7 26 +20.3
EDUCATION 61.2 11 +0.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 83.0 1 -1.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 40.9 14 +0.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 60.9 22 -2.2
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 77.9 19 +14.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 43.5 27 -10.4
SOCIAL PROTECTION 36.3 35 -10.9
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 31.0 25 -4.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 50.2 20 +0.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 33.1 40 +2.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 43.9 12 +0.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 23.2 32 -53.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 45.5 41 +11.8
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 43.3 37 -6.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 85.1 1 +55.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 48.6 43 +12.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 49.2 44 -1.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 1.4 53 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
52.3 20th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.5
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 49.0 25 +3.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 59.5 13 -10.0
Civil Registration (GI) 87.5 4 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 55.9 15 +2.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 72.1 2 -7.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 52.3 28 -18.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 29.7 32 -25.8
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 54.4 23 +3.6
Regional Integration (AfDB) 68.8 10 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 72.7 7 +7.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 52.5 31 +4.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 36.1 17 +16.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 42.0 35 -11.5
INFRASTRUCTURE 36.3 36 +18.8
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 12.5 47 -5.9
Access to Energy (WB) 44.7 30 +31.2
Mobile Communications (ITU) 68.6 17 +33.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 19.3 22 +16.7
RURAL SECTOR 45.9 35 +3.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 39.8 40 +7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 33.3 34 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 59.0 19 +2.4
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 51.4 28 +2.5
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 55.9 15 -4.3
PARTICIPATION 62.9 12 +2.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 62.5 11 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 46.1 19 -18.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 74.1 16 -7.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 69.0 8 +23.0
RIGHTS 54.7 17 -11.6
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 62.7 12 -5.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 86.6 8 -7.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 59.5 22 -4.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 64.8 20 -21.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 -19.4
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 57.8 13 -2.4
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 54.7 18 -14.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 74.7 5 +11.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 60.9 24 -7.8
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 59.0 18 +0.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 39.8 25 -0.8
GENDER 48.1 30 -5.9
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 49.7 29 -19.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 72.2 34 -6.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 64.0 10 +11.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 29.7 40 +0.8
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
113
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Liberia 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 54.9 22 +2.0
SECURITY & SAFETY 86.7 13 +1.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 +0.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 92.6 12 +2.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 97.7 33 +15.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 62.5 16 -11.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 80.9 36 +2.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 46.5 26 +0.8
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 63.4 20 -13.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 39.9 26 +1.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 38.9 32 -0.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 49.8 27 +5.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 22.7 41 +4.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 64.1 18 +8.5
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 56.0 11 +5.4
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 55.6 18 -7.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 74.3 8 +11.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 70.8 10 +18.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 41.6 14 +0.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 37.5 17 +3.3
ANTI-CORRUPTION 30.2 35 -0.1
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 47.6 15 +7.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 26.8 41 -2.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 36.2 33 -7.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 28.2 37 -8.9 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 44.3 43 +2.8
HEALTH 55.9 35 +12.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 30.3 44 +3.4
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 29.7 43 +3.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 70.4 41 +20.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 72.9 17 -1.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 56.9 43 +10.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 75.4 8 +38.0
EDUCATION 48.3 30 -2.2
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 44.7 34 +4.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 38.9 17 -12.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 41.3 38 -3.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 75.7 20 +11.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 40.8 29 -10.9
SOCIAL PROTECTION 30.3 42 -0.8
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 26.8 32 +12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 36.4 38 +4.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 62.7 17 -3.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 14.7 45 -4.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 10.7 35 -13.5
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 42.9 48 +1.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 56.7 20 +13.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 38.2 34 -9.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 59.1 35 +8.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 49.4 43 -2.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 11.1 49 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
47.9 27th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+1.2
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 37.4 41 +3.2
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 46.5 33 +7.0
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 +37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 43.6 27 +10.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 40.2 34 -3.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 60.9 19 +4.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 25.4 36 -13.4
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 43.9 36 -0.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) 56.3 22 +18.8
Trade Environment (WB) 23.7 53 -12.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 50.8 34 -8.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 22.8 28 +3.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 65.8 14 -3.7
INFRASTRUCTURE 26.8 43 +4.8
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 18.8 43 -19.8
Access to Energy (WB) 22.8 47 +21.7
Mobile Communications (ITU) 63.3 25 +15.6
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 2.4 49 +1.8
RURAL SECTOR 32.2 46 +1.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 28.3 47 -1.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 25.0 42 +0.7
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 42.9 38 +7.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 32.6 44 -0.4
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 54.9 16 -3.5
PARTICIPATION 65.9 10 -3.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 75.0 7 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 30.1 38 +0.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 95.3 1 -2.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 63.4 15 -0.2
RIGHTS 54.7 17 -7.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 67.2 9 -6.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 76.2 16 -1.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 69.6 12 -9.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 60.7 23 -21.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 46.1 27 +1.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 55.0 16 +2.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 74.5 6 +5.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 53.8 32 -7.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 37.6 35 +3.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 9.4 52 0.0
GENDER 52.7 25 -3.8
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 62.1 11 -5.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 91.1 4 +0.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 39.5 34 -13.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 45.8 26 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
114
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Libya
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 26.9 50 -5.3
SECURITY & SAFETY 52.4 50 -29.1
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 33.8 51 -66.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 37.0 45 -49.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 82.0 46 -11.8
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 11.6 52 -19.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 97.9 3 +1.6
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 20.8 48 +3.5
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 36.2 41 +15.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 38.3 29 +36.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 21.1 49 -0.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.4 46 -18.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 28.9 46 -12.2
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 18.4 46 +2.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 46.4 25 +20.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 32.9 43 +18.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 0.0 50 -12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 12.5 42 -12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 -4.2
ANTI-CORRUPTION 15.8 50 +2.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 13.1 45 +3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 34.0 36 +7.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 19.7 48 -0.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 0.0 48 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 12.3 51 +1.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
35.2 46th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-5.5
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 32.3 43 +0.7
PARTICIPATION 28.4 40 +7.8
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 -37.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 31.8 37 +27.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 40.8 34 +28.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 28.5 37 +13.4
RIGHTS 24.0 47 +2.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 16.3 48 -15.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 25.2 49 -8.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 44.9 37 +23.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 33.6 43 +10.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 44.3 30 -14.6
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 55.8 12 +12.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 38.7 36 -30.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 45.3 39 -16.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 39.2 32 -27.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 42.9 18 -10.8
GENDER 32.3 50 +7.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 41.6 38 +24.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 34.7 51 +12.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 22.3 48 +0.4
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 37.9 32 -9.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 +8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 47.8 35 -12.7
HEALTH 72.9 9 +2.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 51.7 24 -13.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 99.0 1 +4.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 81.1 22 +11.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 43.5 50 +1.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 98.7 1 +0.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 63.2 25 +9.7
EDUCATION 48.2 31 -15.3
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 51.9 23 -8.9
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) . . -
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 72.3 11 -10.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) . . -
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 20.3 45 -26.5
SOCIAL PROTECTION 29.1 44 -25.3
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 8.3 50 -50.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.3 43 -50.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 66.9 9 +0.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 8.1 52 -1.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 41.1 51 -12.7
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 14.3 51 -28.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 0.0 43 -34.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 93.9 6 -0.8
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 94.1 3 +0.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 3.2 52 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 33.9 46 -4.4
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 20.7 51 -11.5
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 19.7 50 -27.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 0.6 54 -6.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 0.0 53 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 34.8 45 -6.6
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 49.3 33 -4.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 26.7 47 -6.3
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 28.4 44 -9.3
INFRASTRUCTURE 46.2 19 +4.8
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 14.3 46 -17.8
Access to Energy (WB) 65.6 16 -15.0
Mobile Communications (ITU) 61.5 28 +17.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 43.6 11 +34.8
RURAL SECTOR . . -
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Market Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) . . -
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) . . -
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
115
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Madagascar 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 49.9 28 +4.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 76.7 36 -6.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 77.5 44 -21.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 69.6 39 -20.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 48.6 36 +6.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 87.7 21 +2.4
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 45.5 27 +2.2
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 59.9 23 +11.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 23.0 39 +15.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 40.2 30 -4.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 53.4 23 -4.9
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 31.9 27 -6.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 64.3 16 +1.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 44.2 22 +15.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 44.2 28 +12.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 63.8 17 +15.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 58.3 17 +52.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 24.0 33 -4.1
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 30.8 24 +3.6
ANTI-CORRUPTION 33.4 31 +6.4
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 64.3 4 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 29.7 40 +8.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 36.3 32 +10.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 24.1 40 -11.2 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 37.4 49 +0.4
HEALTH 51.3 44 +7.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 39.1 35 +4.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 36.8 36 +6.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 59.2 49 +6.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 55.4 42 +1.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 74.9 22 +9.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 42.1 40 +15.8
EDUCATION 37.6 43 -2.4
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 37.1 45 +4.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 38.5 19 +5.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 47.8 30 -1.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 31.0 47 -3.5
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 33.7 34 -16.0
SOCIAL PROTECTION 24.9 47 -7.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 22.6 37 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 41.7 32 -4.1
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 39.9 36 -10.2
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 20.6 39 +9.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 0.0 37 -29.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 35.8 53 +3.7
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 51.2 26 +3.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 29.3 40 +8.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 37.9 48 +10.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 41.4 54 -8.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 19.2 43 +4.2
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
44.4 35th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+1.7
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 42.2 38 +0.7
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 44.0 37 -3.1
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 34.9 39 +3.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 42.2 30 +4.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 43.5 31 -1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 24.6 43 -22.5
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 44.4 34 +4.4
Regional Integration (AfDB) 43.8 28 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 55.1 24 +0.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 54.0 29 +7.5
Access to Financial Services (WB) 11.9 37 +8.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 57.4 23 -1.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 26.5 44 +4.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 33.3 30 -10.8
Access to Energy (WB) 22.7 48 +8.7
Mobile Communications (ITU) 43.5 44 +12.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 6.6 43 +5.7
RURAL SECTOR 53.7 24 -2.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 62.9 19 +7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 33.3 34 -25.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 63.5 13 -5.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 55.0 23 +12.5
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 48.2 22 +1.1
PARTICIPATION 55.3 17 +10.3
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 51.2 12 +1.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 78.0 14 +0.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 54.5 19 +38.9
RIGHTS 50.3 23 -0.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 47.4 21 +17.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 72.4 20 +3.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 56.0 30 -2.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 76.0 10 -13.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 -8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 34.7 41 +0.2
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 31.9 40 +1.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 39.3 35 -2.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 49.6 36 -0.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 36.0 36 +2.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 16.7 47 -0.2
GENDER 52.3 27 -5.5
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 60.8 12 +10.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 83.8 18 -0.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 31.4 41 -12.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 35.5 36 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
116
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Malawi
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 58.9 14 -1.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 87.4 10 -2.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 86.8 22 -3.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 53.5 27 -10.7
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 97.0 4 +1.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 56.9 16 +1.5
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 67.2 18 +1.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 59.3 14 -3.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 57.1 16 +5.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 64.8 14 +6.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 30.2 29 -4.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 62.8 19 +4.0
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 56.9 9 +1.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 65.5 9 -2.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 64.2 16 -7.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 70.8 10 -5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 49.2 6 +18.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 34.5 18 +6.6
ANTI-CORRUPTION 34.3 28 -6.5
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 39.3 25 -13.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 37.0 33 -0.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 37.5 27 -1.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 32.8 32 -17.2 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 53.6 24 +2.7
HEALTH 64.1 21 +4.2
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 52.2 22 -5.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 39.7 31 +3.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 85.9 12 +20.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 75.5 14 -1.7
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 75.7 21 +16.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 55.7 32 -7.9
EDUCATION 51.6 26 +4.5
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 48.0 29 +4.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 41.4 12 +3.6
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 59.0 23 +9.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 62.5 37 +11.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 46.9 24 -6.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 41.7 30 +1.0
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 31.0 25 +8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 52.6 18 +0.1
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 48.2 27 -1.8
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 18.5 41 +2.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 58.4 22 -3.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 56.9 25 +1.1
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 48.8 32 +2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 27.8 41 -1.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 63.1 32 +9.8
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 44.7 51 -6.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 100.0 1 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
51.5 23rd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-1.3
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 46.3 31 +0.7
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 59.6 11 -8.5
Civil Registration (GI) 87.5 4 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 50.0 19 -12.7
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 58.8 8 +2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 59.5 20 +1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 42.2 22 -20.9
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 53.8 24 +5.5
Regional Integration (AfDB) 56.3 22 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 59.8 20 -0.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 56.7 24 +0.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 27.9 25 +14.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 68.5 13 +7.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 24.7 47 +7.7
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 27.0 38 -9.3
Access to Energy (WB) 14.5 50 +9.7
Mobile Communications (ITU) 50.1 37 +25.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 7.0 42 +4.4
RURAL SECTOR 47.1 33 -1.9
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 59.1 22 +3.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 33.3 34 -8.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 46.0 35 -6.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 50.0 29 +3.6
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 47.5 24 -7.1
PARTICIPATION 42.8 22 -17.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 50.0 13 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 27.3 42 -21.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 53.1 24 -33.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 41.0 24 -3.1
RIGHTS 62.1 11 -1.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 61.2 13 -2.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 85.1 12 +6.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 63.9 14 -5.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 66.8 18 -10.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 +5.5
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 39.6 34 -5.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 34.5 35 -11.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 44.3 27 +2.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 43.9 42 -8.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 38.8 33 -7.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 36.3 32 0.0
GENDER 45.3 33 -4.8
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 49.0 30 -12.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 54.3 43 -6.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 35.9 38 +3.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 37.5 33 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
117
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Mali 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 45.1 33 -7.9
SECURITY & SAFETY 60.2 45 -21.9
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 50.1 48 -47.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 32.1 46 -64.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 89.7 42 -6.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 50.7 33 +5.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 78.5 39 +3.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 40.0 33 -7.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 58.8 24 -18.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 39.0 28 -8.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 35.7 35 -1.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 30.5 38 +2.8
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 24.6 40 +1.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 51.2 32 -22.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 47.3 19 +0.2
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 44.6 27 -2.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 67.4 14 -12.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 58.3 17 +19.4
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 27.2 27 +5.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 39.1 16 -8.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 32.9 32 -1.9
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 31.0 29 -38.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 44.2 26 +17.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 40.9 25 +13.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 23.3 42 -3.1 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 50.3 30 +2.2
HEALTH 60.1 28 +5.7
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 58.6 18 +21.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 62.8 13 +9.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 70.7 40 +3.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 77.2 9 -0.7
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 51.7 46 +14.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 39.5 42 -15.0
EDUCATION 38.9 41 +7.9
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 52.1 21 +23.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 14.7 46 -2.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 26.0 49 -4.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 64.8 34 +17.5
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 36.9 33 +5.3
SOCIAL PROTECTION 52.1 11 -5.9
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 29.8 28 -15.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 34.4 39 -10.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 73.8 5 -5.2
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 29.0 26 -8.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 93.4 5 +9.2
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 50.2 38 +1.3
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 46.0 35 -3.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 44.8 26 +6.8
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 55.7 38 +4.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 64.7 20 -1.9
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 39.9 34 +1.2
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
46.6 31st
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-2.5
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 48.7 26 +3.1
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 47.3 31 -6.1
Civil Registration (GI) 25.0 50 -37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 42.3 30 +0.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 49.7 16 +1.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 78.2 3 +1.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 41.4 23 +4.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 52.3 28 -1.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) 68.8 10 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 58.2 22 +2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 56.1 25 -7.9
Access to Financial Services (WB) 27.4 26 +16.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 50.9 27 -25.8
INFRASTRUCTURE 38.3 31 +16.3
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 36.0 25 -0.2
Access to Energy (WB) 48.8 28 +24.1
Mobile Communications (ITU) 59.5 29 +33.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 8.8 38 +7.8
RURAL SECTOR 57.1 18 +4.2
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 53.8 27 +9.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 54.3 14 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 56.6 23 +4.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 63.6 9 +3.6
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 42.2 34 -7.6
PARTICIPATION 44.0 21 -17.6
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 46.6 18 -25.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 55.5 22 -12.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 36.4 27 -20.4
RIGHTS 48.7 26 -6.3
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 42.0 27 -7.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 71.8 21 +12.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 60.6 20 -13.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 60.8 22 -15.4
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 -8.4
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 43.6 31 -1.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 42.7 30 -21.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 40.5 32 +10.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 66.7 15 -1.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 44.4 28 +6.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 23.8 43 +1.2
GENDER 32.3 50 -5.7
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 44.6 35 -4.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 67.3 38 -3.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 20.9 50 -20.4
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 3.7 53 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
118
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Mauritania
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 40.3 41 +6.7
SECURITY & SAFETY 75.9 38 +3.3
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 +0.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 89.7 16 -0.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 84.6 45 +4.8
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 27.1 48 +11.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 78.1 40 +0.1
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 39.5 35 +12.6
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 44.9 34 +13.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 32.9 31 +19.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 39.2 31 -3.2
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 18.4 44 -1.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 57.0 9 +42.4
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 44.6 38 +5.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 18.5 45 +2.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 19.8 45 -2.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 27.9 46 +3.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 18.1 33 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 9.6 50 +8.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 17.3 37 +6.4
ANTI-CORRUPTION 27.4 40 +8.0
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 17.9 44 +3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 33.3 37 +5.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 23.1 46 +0.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 25.4 39 +6.2 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 48.1 34 +3.1
HEALTH 53.5 39 +8.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 35.0 39 +8.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 51.6 20 +11.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 79.9 24 +17.7
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 72.2 21 -0.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 51.3 47 +9.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 30.9 46 +4.6
EDUCATION 42.0 37 +0.9
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 37.1 45 -0.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 26.6 32 +5.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 45.5 34 +7.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 79.7 14 -3.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 21.0 44 -5.2
SOCIAL PROTECTION 51.8 12 +1.3
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 38.1 15 +4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 52.7 17 +2.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 77.5 3 +8.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 14.8 44 +2.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 76.0 12 -11.5
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 45.0 42 +1.4
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 55.2 23 +5.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 11.3 42 -6.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 79.4 15 +8.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 60.5 28 -0.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 18.6 44 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
41.6 40th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+2.0
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 43.1 35 +0.6
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 53.4 23 +2.5
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 44.1 25 +0.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 60.4 6 +13.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 71.0 10 +13.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 28.7 34 -1.8
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 37.2 44 -3.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) 50.0 25 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 52.2 28 +1.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 32.8 46 -6.2
Access to Financial Services (WB) 17.7 32 -0.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 33.1 43 -11.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 30.0 41 +7.2
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 20.8 40 -7.5
Access to Energy (WB) 42.2 32 +11.4
Mobile Communications (ITU) 49.3 39 +18.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 7.8 40 +6.1
RURAL SECTOR 51.8 26 -4.2
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 48.4 33 -11.2
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 47.6 32 -5.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 61.1 15 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 35.1 40 -2.1
PARTICIPATION 33.3 34 -2.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 27.6 40 -8.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 35.9 38 -7.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 44.7 23 +5.7
RIGHTS 36.7 35 -11.9
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 43.2 25 -3.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 41.5 40 -9.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 63.3 17 -12.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 27.2 47 -41.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 +8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 25.9 48 -0.2
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 20.9 49 +2.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 3.0 53 -20.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 48.7 37 +0.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 16.3 51 +9.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 40.8 21 +7.4
GENDER 44.5 34 +6.0
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 32.8 44 +7.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 68.3 36 +5.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 19.0 52 +15.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 77.1 6 +27.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
119
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Mauritius 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 79.5 1 -1.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 92.5 2 -4.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 93.8 6 0.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.7 15 -0.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 73.3 3 -24.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 95.7 5 +2.2
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 77.0 3 -0.3
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 80.5 9 -5.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 87.1 4 -6.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 67.5 10 -0.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 87.1 5 +0.9
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 59.6 7 +15.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 80.4 6 -5.4
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 75.2 2 +2.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 90.0 3 +1.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 78.3 5 -0.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 100.0 1 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 58.1 2 +12.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 49.6 6 +0.7
ANTI-CORRUPTION 73.1 2 -3.7
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 77.4 1 +3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 61.8 13 +8.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 74.4 6 -4.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 75.0 2 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 77.1 4 0.0 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 75.5 1 -0.8
HEALTH 76.2 5 +4.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 65.4 7 -2.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 98.8 2 +0.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 86.4 10 +6.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 38.1 53 +3.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 97.9 4 +0.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 70.4 15 +15.9
EDUCATION 84.3 1 +3.0
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 82.7 3 +3.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 67.7 2 +3.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 89.0 3 +4.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 97.5 1 +3.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 84.6 2 -0.9
SOCIAL PROTECTION 78.6 2 -11.0
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 87.5 2 -12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 83.3 2 -16.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 57.8 20 -0.3
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 71.4 4 -24.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 92.9 6 -1.5
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 63.0 13 +1.1
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 85.7 3 0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 67.8 7 +3.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 97.6 4 +1.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 50.2 42 -0.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 13.9 47 +0.6
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
77.2 1st
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.5
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 77.8 1 -3.5
PARTICIPATION 80.1 3 -0.9
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 100.0 1 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 49.2 15 -0.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 93.1 3 -1.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 78.2 4 -0.7
RIGHTS 72.3 3 -8.6
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 84.8 1 +1.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 93.6 4 -0.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 80.3 5 +0.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 69.6 17 -6.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 -38.9
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 84.0 1 -0.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 79.2 3 +11.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 77.6 3 -1.1
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 74.8 7 -7.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 90.7 2 -5.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 97.6 1 -2.4
GENDER 74.9 3 -3.4
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 63.1 10 +12.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 89.1 11 +5.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 73.1 5 +0.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 99.5 1 -0.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -33.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 76.0 1 +3.6
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 60.0 10 -1.4
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 77.4 1 -7.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 37.4 38 +2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 50.0 15 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 78.1 1 +2.6
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 74.3 4 +1.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 64.7 14 +3.5
Access to Financial Services (WB) 93.0 1 +19.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 80.3 1 -13.6
INFRASTRUCTURE 83.6 2 +13.3
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 78.0 1 -5.8
Access to Energy (WB) 97.4 6 -2.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 85.5 1 +14.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 73.5 4 +46.6
RURAL SECTOR 82.5 1 0.0
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 81.0 4 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 100.0 1 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 85.5 4 0.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 63.6 9 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
120
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Morocco
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 60.7 13 +4.9
SECURITY & SAFETY 88.2 7 -2.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.5 22 +0.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 89.2 17 +2.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.8 9 -0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 54.3 26 -15.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 98.5 2 -1.0
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 61.2 14 +10.7
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 69.2 16 +3.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 71.3 7 +36.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 56.7 17 +6.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 35.3 32 -3.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 67.7 4 +22.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 66.8 13 -2.5
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 42.1 25 +3.4
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 47.4 23 -2.7
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 47.9 32 -5.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 18.1 33 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 41.4 15 +14.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 55.6 2 +10.1
ANTI-CORRUPTION 51.4 13 +8.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 26.2 34 +16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 65.0 12 +1.3
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 54.8 16 +8.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 62.5 6 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 48.4 17 +3.6 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 66.8 7 +8.2
HEALTH 74.8 7 +8.3
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 39.7 34 +9.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 84.7 7 +10.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 91.3 7 +11.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 42.8 51 +3.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 95.3 7 +4.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 95.2 2 +11.4
EDUCATION 65.7 7 +8.5
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 47.6 30 +12.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 58.0 4 +15.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 76.3 7 +13.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 90.1 6 -0.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 56.4 14 +1.2
SOCIAL PROTECTION 58.6 6 +0.3
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 46.4 10 +12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.3 43 0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 44.4 32 +3.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 73.5 3 -17.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 95.4 3 +3.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 68.2 6 +15.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 71.4 6 +28.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 54.4 13 +7.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 94.7 5 +2.3
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 69.3 13 -1.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 51.1 24 +43.1
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
61.0 10th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+5.3
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 46.2 27 -2.8
PARTICIPATION 42.7 23 -6.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 66.0 5 -14.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 34.1 39 -0.7
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 33.2 29 +2.8
RIGHTS 41.2 34 +0.4
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 38.0 31 -7.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 48.4 36 -2.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 44.6 39 -4.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 58.5 25 -1.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 16.7 18 +16.7
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 53.8 20 -4.5
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 41.3 33 +0.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 34.3 41 -13.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 62.4 19 -4.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 74.7 8 -4.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 56.2 9 -0.2
GENDER 47.0 32 -1.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 31.6 45 -1.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 72.5 33 -5.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 46.3 28 +12.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 59.6 15 +5.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 70.1 3 +10.9
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 52.8 25 +1.9
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 67.9 4 +9.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 43.3 28 -2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 25.0 37 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 59.0 17 +2.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 68.6 9 -4.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 52.3 32 +2.4
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 56.0 24 +8.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 88.3 1 +25.9
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 73.1 2 +7.2
Access to Energy (WB) 100.0 1 +8.8
Mobile Communications (ITU) 81.6 4 +15.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 98.6 1 +72.6
RURAL SECTOR 80.4 3 +13.6
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 79.5 5 +9.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 62.5 6 +4.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 86.7 3 +13.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 92.9 1 +27.2
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
121
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Mozambique 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 47.1 31 -3.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 79.3 32 -7.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 93.6 37 -5.5
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 51.4 42 -32.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.1 25 -0.8
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 58.6 21 +2.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 93.7 9 -1.9
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 40.2 32 0.0
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 61.4 22 -2.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 29.5 33 +2.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 25.8 44 -1.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 59.5 18 +0.6
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 22.1 42 -1.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 42.8 39 +3.5
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 34.8 31 -11.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 33.5 32 -7.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 53.1 27 -1.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 34.7 30 -36.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 27.0 28 -3.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 25.4 29 -6.3
ANTI-CORRUPTION 34.1 29 +4.8
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 42.9 23 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 44.2 26 -5.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 31.5 38 -2.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 27.0 38 -5.5 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 45.7 40 +2.3
HEALTH 62.2 25 +15.7
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 69.3 6 +8.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 30.2 42 +12.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 72.4 39 +17.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 62.4 36 0.0
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 70.2 31 +15.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 68.6 18 +41.3
EDUCATION 41.6 38 0.0
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 42.0 38 +7.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 32.5 26 +5.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 36.7 42 -3.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 68.6 28 +14.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 28.3 39 -23.0
SOCIAL PROTECTION 26.1 45 -10.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 26.8 32 -7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 36.8 36 -12.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 32.3 42 -11.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 11.6 48 +1.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 23.2 32 -21.4
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 53.0 34 +3.7
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 63.1 12 +7.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 43.2 28 -2.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 55.2 39 +12.3
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 45.6 50 -2.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 57.8 17 +3.3
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
49.0 26th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.2
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 52.1 18 -5.1
PARTICIPATION 51.5 20 -2.1
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 50.0 13 +12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 50.2 14 -31.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 78.7 13 +17.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 27.1 41 -7.4
RIGHTS 60.2 13 -1.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 47.4 21 -5.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 61.2 30 -19.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 53.5 34 -7.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 94.2 2 -3.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 44.4 3 +27.7
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 46.2 26 -7.1
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 53.9 20 -0.5
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 45.4 25 -19.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 61.3 22 -2.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 39.8 30 -11.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 30.8 37 -0.7
GENDER 50.6 29 -9.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 55.7 17 +4.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 90.7 6 +4.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 53.2 21 +0.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 28.4 44 +2.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -58.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 51.1 20 +5.4
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 53.1 24 -0.3
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 +25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 36.1 35 -19.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 58.4 10 +2.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 66.6 14 -5.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 29.6 33 -4.3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 57.8 19 +1.9
Regional Integration (AfDB) 62.5 17 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 65.8 12 +14.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 44.9 38 -1.3
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 58.1 22 -5.2
INFRASTRUCTURE 30.1 40 +12.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 29.3 37 -0.9
Access to Energy (WB) 28.2 43 +13.7
Mobile Communications (ITU) 52.1 35 +29.6
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 11.0 31 +8.3
RURAL SECTOR 63.1 10 +7.2
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 66.2 15 +7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 58.3 10 +16.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 69.6 5 +5.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 58.6 19 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
122
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Namibia
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 69.6 6 -2.0
SECURITY & SAFETY 84.9 18 +0.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 +0.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 98.8 5 +5.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.7 15 +0.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 64.1 14 +1.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 62.0 51 -3.4
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 71.8 6 -0.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 76.3 12 -6.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 86.8 5 +2.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 64.2 13 -2.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 73.0 7 +1.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 49.9 14 +1.8
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 80.5 5 +0.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 64.0 6 -3.8
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 71.0 7 -8.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 78.7 4 -0.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 81.9 6 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 45.9 11 +3.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 42.3 9 -14.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 57.6 8 -4.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 44.0 21 -4.8
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 73.1 7 -3.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 64.3 9 -6.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 69.2 5 -8.6 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 60.9 12 +4.2
HEALTH 71.5 11 +4.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 59.5 15 -9.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 51.9 19 +3.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 78.9 30 +14.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 75.8 13 +1.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 84.9 12 +5.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 78.3 7 +12.6
EDUCATION 60.9 12 +4.4
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 48.3 28 -0.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 45.7 11 +9.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 74.4 9 +8.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 82.5 11 -3.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 53.5 15 +7.9
SOCIAL PROTECTION 46.5 23 +9.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 60.7 6 +4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.3 43 0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 2.4 53 +2.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 67.4 5 +4.8
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 68.9 17 +34.7
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 64.7 11 -1.2
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 57.1 18 -14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 69.1 6 -0.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 81.4 14 +8.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 58.8 33 +0.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 56.9 19 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
65.1 7th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+3.4
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 67.0 8 -1.8
PARTICIPATION 76.2 6 -2.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 75.0 7 -25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 68.0 4 +13.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 87.8 7 -10.2
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 73.8 6 +11.9
RIGHTS 71.9 4 -1.5
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 73.0 4 +0.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 85.2 11 +1.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 80.7 4 -12.9
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 87.1 5 +3.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 55.0 17 -4.6
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 51.3 23 -4.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 58.2 11 +0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 64.1 17 -8.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 53.4 20 -4.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 48.1 14 -5.5
GENDER 65.1 7 +1.7
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 55.3 19 +17.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 74.0 31 +1.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 62.4 13 -2.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 58.8 18 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 75.0 1 -8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 62.7 9 +12.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 63.3 4 +7.6
Civil Registration (GI) 100.0 1 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 49.0 22 +1.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 54.3 12 +3.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 50.0 15 +25.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 73.9 3 +17.8
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 62.5 17 +20.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 70.0 5 +11.3
Access to Financial Services (WB) 88.1 2 +29.4
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 75.0 2 +9.7
INFRASTRUCTURE 51.0 15 +13.1
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 67.3 6 -7.2
Access to Energy (WB) 51.9 26 +9.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 50.0 38 +22.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 34.7 14 +27.5
RURAL SECTOR . . -
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Market Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) . . -
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) . . -
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
123
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Niger 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 52.7 24 -0.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 75.9 38 -6.0
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 87.7 39 -11.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 51.1 43 -35.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 97.9 32 -1.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 62.2 17 +17.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 80.9 36 +2.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 47.1 23 +7.5
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 67.3 17 +6.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 28.0 35 -10.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 47.0 24 +6.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 53.2 24 +5.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 41.2 21 +28.7
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 46.1 36 +8.9
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 41.2 27 -3.2
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 60.5 13 -0.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 53.9 25 -5.2
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 58.3 17 -18.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 18.3 40 +6.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 14.9 38 +1.2
ANTI-CORRUPTION 46.6 18 +0.1
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 34.5 27 -13.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 48.2 22 +3.7
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 48.0 18 -2.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 62.5 6 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 40.0 24 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
47.8 28th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+0.4
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 43.0 36 +2.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 50.4 27 +0.4
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 50.0 19 +4.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 40.2 34 -0.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 63.9 16 -7.1
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 48.1 20 +17.6
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 53.8 24 +7.9
Regional Integration (AfDB) 68.8 10 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 45.6 36 -4.7
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 69.2 6 +3.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) 10.5 38 +9.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 75.0 2 +25.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 18.5 51 +5.5
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 15.0 44 -1.7
Access to Energy (WB) 14.1 51 +4.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 36.7 48 +11.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 8.2 39 +7.7
RURAL SECTOR 49.2 31 -2.7
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 36.8 42 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 50.9 29 -10.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 59.2 18 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 49.5 20 -7.2
PARTICIPATION 42.7 23 -19.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 52.5 11 -14.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 44.9 29 -45.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 36.0 28 +7.0
RIGHTS 49.3 25 -4.2
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 40.0 28 -4.6
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 67.0 26 -6.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 59.5 22 -16.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 38.5 42 -18.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 41.7 4 +25.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 58.5 12 -0.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 62.2 7 -1.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 45.0 26 +5.9
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 72.0 9 -4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 73.3 9 -4.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 40.0 23 0.0
GENDER 47.5 31 -3.9
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 29.8 47 -18.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 84.7 16 -1.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 69.4 8 +24.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 28.7 43 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 46.0 38 +6.3
HEALTH 58.2 30 +6.3
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 42.8 32 +8.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 17.2 52 +7.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 75.6 32 +6.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 82.0 4 -2.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 58.4 40 +18.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 73.3 13 -0.4
EDUCATION 29.2 48 +3.7
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 40.5 41 +5.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 10.4 49 +8.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 34.0 44 +26.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 60.9 39 +10.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 0.0 48 -33.3
SOCIAL PROTECTION 40.1 31 +1.5
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 22.6 37 -16.7
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 44.0 29 +3.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 72.0 6 +7.8
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 21.9 37 +11.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 56.4 26 +13.7
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 48.8 32 +2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 49.0 22 +17.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 43.9 46 +7.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 54.6 35 +7.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 85.5 10 +33.8
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
124
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Nigeria
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 44.3 34 -3.2
SECURITY & SAFETY 51.1 51 -24.7
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 8.3 54 -58.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 17.9 50 -30.6
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 95.6 38 +0.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 51.9 28 -37.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 81.8 33 +2.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 47.0 25 +4.1
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 44.6 35 +3.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 56.4 15 -5.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 42.9 27 +1.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 45.1 29 +1.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 34.9 25 +21.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 58.1 22 +3.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 49.5 16 +4.4
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 55.3 19 -10.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 61.4 18 +3.2
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 58.3 17 +27.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 30.3 25 +1.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 42.1 10 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 29.5 38 +3.3
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 47.6 15 +16.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 26.4 42 +5.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 29.8 40 +11.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 -12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 19.0 49 -3.9
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
45.5 34th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-1.6
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 47.8 28 +1.0
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 50.1 28 -2.5
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 55.9 15 -3.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 50.0 15 0.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 57.1 24 0.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 37.5 26 +4.2
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 45.5 33 +0.8
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 30.5 48 +0.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 58.9 18 +0.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) 38.6 12 +0.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 54.0 25 +1.2
INFRASTRUCTURE 48.4 16 +11.4
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 37.2 24 -5.2
Access to Energy (WB) 54.6 25 +8.8
Mobile Communications (ITU) 70.4 13 +20.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 31.2 15 +20.8
RURAL SECTOR 47.1 33 -5.9
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 50.8 32 +3.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 33.5 33 -29.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 49.0 31 -5.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 55.0 23 +7.8
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 43.6 32 -3.7
PARTICIPATION 42.5 25 -11.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 44.0 22 +3.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 49.9 26 -40.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 38.4 25 +5.3
RIGHTS 46.0 29 -4.6
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 49.9 20 -5.8
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 62.9 27 +2.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 51.8 35 -19.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 57.3 28 -7.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 +8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 44.7 29 +1.4
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 32.4 38 -4.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 48.2 22 +2.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 61.7 21 +2.8
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 46.5 25 +6.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 34.6 33 0.0
GENDER 41.1 40 -0.4
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 33.0 43 -3.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 76.7 28 -2.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 38.1 36 +12.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 33.0 38 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 46.5 37 -0.2
HEALTH 49.8 48 +4.9
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 11.9 50 -2.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 52.6 18 +6.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 61.3 46 +7.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 92.1 1 -2.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 31.0 51 +7.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 50.1 35 +12.7
EDUCATION 36.5 45 -8.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 46.7 32 +6.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 25.9 34 -0.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 44.6 35 +0.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) . . -
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 28.8 38 -21.1
SOCIAL PROTECTION 50.0 16 +0.3
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 33.9 20 +4.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 56.3 14 +10.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 48.3 26 0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 37.3 17 +0.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 74.2 16 -13.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 49.8 39 +2.1
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 50.0 29 +7.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 38.7 33 -0.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 67.5 29 +9.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 53.4 37 -6.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 39.2 36 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
125
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Rwanda 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 66.0 11 +0.5
SECURITY & SAFETY 81.8 27 -1.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 98.9 29 -0.7
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 85.7 25 +6.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 63.5 50 -15.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 67.7 8 -3.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 93.2 10 +3.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 62.8 12 +0.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 52.1 29 +4.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 41.3 23 +5.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 79.9 4 -0.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 59.2 19 -6.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 79.8 2 +3.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 64.5 15 -1.6
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 41.5 26 +1.0
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 37.7 30 -4.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 55.3 23 -4.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 18.1 33 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 43.2 13 +5.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 53.2 3 +7.9
ANTI-CORRUPTION 77.8 1 +1.9
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 69.0 2 +16.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 76.1 5 +15.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 87.6 1 -2.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 75.0 2 -12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 81.1 2 -7.6 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 64.0 10 +3.6
HEALTH 73.4 8 +9.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 74.0 4 -5.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 40.5 29 +4.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 96.5 3 +12.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 79.5 5 +0.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 84.3 13 +14.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 65.7 20 +31.4
EDUCATION 62.5 8 +5.4
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 75.4 5 +5.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 34.8 24 +0.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 63.7 21 +9.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 64.0 36 +5.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 74.6 3 +7.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 49.9 17 -2.6
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 45.2 12 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 70.6 3 +10.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 85.8 2 -8.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 32.2 22 +13.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 15.6 34 -29.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 70.3 4 +2.3
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 90.1 2 +17.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 79.6 2 -20.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 71.0 23 +11.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 59.4 31 +3.8
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 51.5 23 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
60.5 11th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+3.7
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 67.6 4 +13.2
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 72.7 2 +8.3
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 59.4 10 -7.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 61.2 5 +14.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 92.9 1 +14.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 87.5 1 +20.3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 73.8 4 +13.0
Regional Integration (AfDB) 100.0 1 +12.5
Trade Environment (WB) 70.2 8 +22.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 84.6 1 +11.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 43.2 10 +9.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 70.8 9 +8.3
INFRASTRUCTURE 44.4 20 +18.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 60.2 10 +2.0
Access to Energy (WB) 31.9 41 +26.1
Mobile Communications (ITU) 72.2 11 +34.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 13.2 28 +12.2
RURAL SECTOR 79.4 4 +12.7
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 84.9 3 +7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 66.8 3 +8.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 93.7 1 +19.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 72.1 6 +15.7
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 44.5 31 -2.4
PARTICIPATION 30.2 37 -5.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 35.0 30 -7.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 38.0 36 -3.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 47.9 21 +1.6
RIGHTS 29.1 45 -6.8
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 36.9 32 -14.8
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 32.4 46 -6.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 30.6 47 -1.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 29.0 45 -11.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 16.7 18 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 42.7 32 +3.6
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 33.6 36 +14.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 43.3 28 -1.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 62.4 19 +1.4
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 32.3 40 +4.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 41.8 20 -0.8
GENDER 76.1 2 -0.8
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 97.3 1 +11.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 94.8 2 -4.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 74.3 4 +13.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 63.9 11 +0.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
126
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - São Tomé and Príncipe
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 67.5 9 0.0
SECURITY & SAFETY 97.4 1 +0.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.8 9 +0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 98.8 1 +1.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 88.3 19 +1.9
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 63.8 11 -4.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 77.6 10 +0.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 37.5 30 -8.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 83.6 2 +2.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 100.0 1 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 -25.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 84.0 3 +0.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 58.4 8 -0.6
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 91.9 2 -0.7
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 60.6 19 -5.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 100.0 1 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 25.4 29 +8.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 13.9 40 -5.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 50.6 15 +4.8
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 12.5 47 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 76.9 4 +5.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 78.8 3 +6.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 60.0 7 0.0 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 59.3 15 +4.7
HEALTH 62.8 22 +1.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 70.3 5 +3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 53.3 17 +6.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 91.7 5 +1.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 56.5 41 -2.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 90.1 9 +5.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 15.1 54 -8.1
EDUCATION 55.6 20 +4.9
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 61.9 15 0.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 47.0 10 +13.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 69.1 16 +10.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 44.5 45 -4.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) . . -
SOCIAL PROTECTION 51.8 12 +8.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 33.3 24 +16.6
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 56.6 13 +0.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 66.6 10 -2.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 26.8 32 +19.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 75.8 14 +5.9
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 66.9 9 +4.8
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 63.5 11 +7.2
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 71.2 21 +9.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 82.9 5 +2.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 50.1 27 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
60.4 12th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+2.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 48.1 27 +7.1
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 49.4 30 +7.2
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 +37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 46.2 24 -4.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 38.4 37 -8.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 59.5 20 +1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 40.4 24 +9.9
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 60.7 14 +2.2
Regional Integration (AfDB) 43.8 28 +12.5
Trade Environment (WB) 66.5 10 +10.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 57.7 20 +11.3
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 75.0 2 -25.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 39.8 28 +13.7
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 0.6 49 +0.6
Access to Energy (WB) 69.8 14 +11.1
Mobile Communications (ITU) 70.0 14 +34.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 18.7 23 +8.7
RURAL SECTOR 42.6 38 +5.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 32.4 45 -2.7
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 37.5 32 +1.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 38.2 42 +6.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 62.1 14 +17.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 66.6 9 -0.8
PARTICIPATION 75.8 7 -6.6
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 87.5 4 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 64.4 7 -3.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 92.2 5 +0.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 59.1 17 -10.7
RIGHTS 70.7 5 +3.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 72.7 5 +5.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 95.5 2 -0.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 72.9 9 -0.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 84.4 7 -6.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 27.8 16 +19.5
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 55.2 15 -0.9
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 54.7 18 -8.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 76.5 4 +20.9
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 70.2 11 -0.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 43.2 29 -10.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 31.2 35 -7.2
GENDER 64.7 9 +0.6
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 63.8 9 -3.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 85.3 14 +4.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 50.0 25 -3.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 59.7 14 +5.7
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) . . -
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
127
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Senegal 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 68.2 7 +3.8
SECURITY & SAFETY 88.2 7 +4.1
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.8 16 +1.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 93.5 9 +3.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 98.9 28 +0.5
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 63.1 15 +13.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 85.6 25 +1.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 71.5 7 +5.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 82.2 6 -1.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 51.5 17 +11.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 65.1 12 +5.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 70.1 8 +3.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 85.5 1 +19.4
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 74.4 11 -6.0
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 53.8 12 +1.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 65.2 10 +6.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 51.9 28 -14.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 76.4 7 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 33.8 20 +17.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 41.5 11 -1.2
ANTI-CORRUPTION 59.5 6 +3.9
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 52.4 11 +21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 70.9 8 -0.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 70.4 7 +10.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 50.0 11 -12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 53.9 11 +1.5 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 58.3 16 +5.7
HEALTH 62.3 24 +6.9
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 44.7 30 +0.4
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 54.1 15 +6.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 83.5 19 +11.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 69.0 24 -3.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 79.0 15 +12.5
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 43.8 39 +14.5
EDUCATION 50.4 29 +8.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 76.7 4 +17.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 22.5 38 +4.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 36.6 43 +4.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 71.3 27 +16.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 44.8 26 -2.4
SOCIAL PROTECTION 58.6 6 +4.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 33.9 20 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 56.0 15 +6.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 63.4 16 +3.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 57.3 7 +9.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 82.4 11 +1.0
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 61.8 15 +3.4
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 65.9 10 +2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 55.5 10 +9.6
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 65.9 31 +4.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 67.2 15 +0.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 54.5 21 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
63.2 9th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+3.3
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 61.9 10 +5.4
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 67.0 3 +2.5
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 58.9 12 +7.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 57.1 11 -1.8
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 76.9 5 +5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 67.4 3 +13.4
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 60.9 11 +4.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) 87.5 3 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 51.9 29 -6.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 68.7 7 -5.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) 34.4 19 +26.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 62.0 20 +8.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 56.2 13 +16.1
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 62.6 7 +9.7
Access to Energy (WB) 65.5 19 +10.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 78.9 6 +30.0
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 17.8 24 +14.0
RURAL SECTOR 63.3 9 -1.7
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 55.5 23 -1.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 64.5 5 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 59.3 18 -11.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 74.0 4 +7.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 64.3 10 -1.6
PARTICIPATION 63.4 11 +1.9
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 50.0 13 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 43.4 24 +11.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 93.5 2 +4.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 66.6 10 +4.4
RIGHTS 67.4 8 +0.4
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 70.4 7 +5.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 87.6 6 -5.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 82.9 3 -4.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 79.7 8 -1.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 16.7 18 +8.4
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 65.0 8 -6.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 60.8 9 -6.0
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 57.4 12 -1.9
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 73.0 8 -8.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 78.6 6 -13.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 55.5 10 0.0
GENDER 61.4 12 -2.7
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 55.5 18 +12.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 86.3 13 -1.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 47.0 27 -8.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 68.2 9 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
128
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Seychelles
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 72.4 4 +7.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 87.6 9 -1.2
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.7 15 +0.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 65.8 9 +3.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 72.3 47 -10.8
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 78.7 2 +11.8
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 97.3 1 +16.4
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 95.8 3 +39.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 88.3 1 +9.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 100.0 1 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 37.3 24 +2.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 53.3 29 +3.0
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 56.4 10 +9.7
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 69.1 8 +7.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 56.2 22 +21.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 75.0 9 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 50.0 4 0.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 31.9 22 +19.4
ANTI-CORRUPTION 66.9 4 +9.3
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 50.0 13 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 77.4 3 +1.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 82.9 2 +2.1
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 86.8 1 +5.5
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
72.3 3rd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+7.8
TREND 2010-2019
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 75.3 3 +6.2
PARTICIPATION 70.9 9 +11.1
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 87.5 4 +25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 45.9 20 +9.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 86.9 9 +9.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 63.5 14 +1.0
RIGHTS 70.7 5 +10.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 62.9 11 +4.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 87.5 7 +12.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 75.9 6 +12.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 91.1 3 +2.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 36.1 6 +19.4
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 77.2 2 -1.3
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 52.4 22 -13.2
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 70.7 8 +0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 83.1 1 +3.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 91.2 1 +5.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 88.7 2 -2.3
GENDER 82.5 1 +5.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 65.9 7 +23.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 95.8 1 +2.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 81.1 2 -1.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 87.3 4 -3.9
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) . . -
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 66.1 7 +9.1
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 59.0 14 +10.9
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 70.0 2 +8.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 65.8 4 +10.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 50.0 15 +25.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 70.0 5 +13.3
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 77.3 3 +0.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 67.0 12 +16.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 65.7 15 +22.6
INFRASTRUCTURE 71.4 7 +11.7
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 52.7 13 -8.5
Access to Energy (WB) 100.0 1 +3.1
Mobile Communications (ITU) 66.3 21 +14.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 66.7 7 +37.2
RURAL SECTOR 64.1 8 +0.6
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 73.6 10 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 69.0 8 +2.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 63.6 9 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 75.2 2 +8.3
HEALTH 86.2 1 +12.4
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 80.9 2 +2.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 97.3 4 +1.0
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 99.3 1 -0.7
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 54.6 43 +2.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 98.6 2 0.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 86.8 4 +69.6
EDUCATION 81.0 2 +4.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 82.9 2 +0.9
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 52.1 7 +4.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 91.9 1 +4.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 89.8 7 -2.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 88.5 1 +13.9
SOCIAL PROTECTION 62.9 5 +15.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 100.0 1 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) . . -
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 34.1 38 0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 54.6 8 +47.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 70.7 3 +0.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) . . -
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 76.2 3 -14.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 98.9 3 +1.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 57.4 34 -0.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 50.1 27 +16.6
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
129
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Sierra Leone 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 56.2 19 +4.0
SECURITY & SAFETY 84.2 21 -0.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.3 25 -0.7
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 84.8 28 -5.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.2 24 +0.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 51.4 31 -13.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 86.4 22 +14.2
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 47.1 23 +7.1
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 56.3 26 +1.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 43.8 22 +30.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 45.8 25 +3.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 54.4 22 +5.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 32.0 26 +4.7
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 50.6 34 -2.2
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 49.4 17 +4.0
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 47.5 22 +8.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 68.3 12 +17.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 70.8 10 0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 20.8 37 -5.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 39.5 15 -0.6
ANTI-CORRUPTION 43.9 20 +5.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 64.3 4 0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 39.3 31 +5.7
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 36.6 31 +3.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 42.0 22 +6.4 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 45.6 41 +11.2
HEALTH 51.2 45 +21.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 34.3 41 +5.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 35.1 38 +7.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 72.7 37 +34.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 67.7 26 +2.4
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 28.2 53 +28.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 69.3 16 +51.1
EDUCATION 51.0 28 +9.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 49.2 27 +3.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 33.1 25 +1.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 56.4 27 +13.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 66.7 30 +10.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 49.6 23 +15.8
SOCIAL PROTECTION 36.8 33 +6.2
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 22.6 37 -7.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.5 40 -6.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 63.7 15 +3.8
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 24.3 33 +12.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 40.1 30 +29.4
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 43.4 47 +8.0
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 49.6 30 +6.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 40.9 29 +11.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 37.9 48 +20.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 59.4 31 -3.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 29.4 39 +5.4
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
51.0 24th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+4.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 45.3 34 +5.0
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 59.6 11 +8.0
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 56.1 14 +15.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 43.9 27 +14.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 66.6 14 -4.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 56.3 11 +13.3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 42.5 39 +0.2
Regional Integration (AfDB) 62.5 17 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 39.4 40 -3.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 50.8 34 -5.5
Access to Financial Services (WB) 13.9 35 +0.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 45.6 32 +9.4
INFRASTRUCTURE 31.2 39 +13.3
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 38.1 22 +7.2
Access to Energy (WB) 22.9 46 +15.2
Mobile Communications (ITU) 56.4 30 +26.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 7.4 41 +4.6
RURAL SECTOR 48.1 32 -1.4
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 42.7 37 +7.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 41.8 29 -8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 58.9 20 -4.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 48.9 30 -1.3
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 56.8 13 -1.1
PARTICIPATION 53.1 19 -7.6
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -50.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 40.9 26 +10.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 69.4 19 -9.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 64.7 11 +18.5
RIGHTS 63.2 9 +0.6
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 55.6 17 -4.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 86.3 9 -1.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 65.8 13 +1.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 75.1 11 -16.5
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 +25.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 55.1 16 +4.5
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 49.1 25 +5.5
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 70.3 9 +15.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 54.6 30 +6.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 48.9 22 -0.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 52.7 11 -4.6
GENDER 55.9 17 -1.9
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 36.8 42 -13.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 82.9 20 +6.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 64.0 10 -3.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 45.9 25 +0.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 0.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
130
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Somalia
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 13.8 54 -0.5
SECURITY & SAFETY 30.2 54 -6.4
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 16.7 52 +2.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 6.3 52 -21.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 9.2 54 -11.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 28.2 47 -2.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 90.8 11 +1.1
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 10.5 53 +2.7
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 32.9 44 +11.4
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 4.4 50 +0.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 8.2 53 +2.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 17.7 50 +1.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 5.8 53 -2.4
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 17.4 47 -9.7
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 4.9 53 -6.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 5.6 45 +5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 1.1 51 -1.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 8.8 53 +4.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 0.0 52 0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 16.4 50 +4.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 27.5 42 +16.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 0.0 48 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 0.0 53 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
19.2 54th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+5.7
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 23.1 50 +5.4
PARTICIPATION 24.7 42 +8.4
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 +25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 19.5 49 +1.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 28.9 43 -16.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 25.5 42 +24.9
RIGHTS 21.4 48 -0.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 2.5 54 -8.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 18.2 51 +1.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 39.7 44 -3.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 46.5 34 +6.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 22.1 51 +2.4
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 28.7 45 +4.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 28.2 44 +3.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 30.6 51 +3.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 14.7 52 +4.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 8.5 53 -2.7
GENDER 24.1 53 +11.5
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 21.9 54 +16.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 20.7 54 +1.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 12.9 54 +12.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 15.0 49 -6.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 +33.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 18.4 54 +10.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 15.7 53 +7.6
Civil Registration (GI) 12.5 53 +12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 5.9 53 +0.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 18.1 49 +5.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 30.3 38 +16.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 11.8 51 +3.5
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 13.2 53 +4.3
Regional Integration (AfDB) 6.3 37 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 43.2 38 +14.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 3.1 54 -3.6
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . -
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 0.0 50 0.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 26.3 45 +20.4
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) . . -
Access to Energy (WB) 32.5 40 +14.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 44.7 42 +44.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 1.8 53 +1.8
RURAL SECTOR . . -
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Market Access (IFAD) . . -
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) . . -
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) . . -
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 21.3 54 +6.7
HEALTH 34.0 54 +7.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 8.6 52 -7.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 29.2 44 +10.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 49.6 53 +10.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 54.3 44 +0.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 33.8 50 +17.8
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 28.6 49 +13.4
EDUCATION 10.7 54 +8.6
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 21.4 51 +17.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) . . -
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) . . -
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) . . -
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 0.0 48 0.0
SOCIAL PROTECTION 16.8 52 +5.4
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 0.0 54 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 19.9 49 +10.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 33.7 39 +10.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 13.8 47 +0.9
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 23.7 54 +5.1
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 9.9 53 0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 34.2 50 +15.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 50.8 40 +5.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 0.0 54 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
131
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - South Africa 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 67.6 8 -2.3
SECURITY & SAFETY 68.3 41 -5.5
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 98.9 29 -0.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 77.6 33 -6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 50.5 34 -9.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 14.5 53 -11.4
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 72.2 5 +1.5
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 82.1 7 -0.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 98.6 1 +14.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 70.8 7 +2.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 60.2 17 +3.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 45.6 19 -2.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 75.7 9 -8.5
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 77.1 1 +0.4
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 78.5 5 +3.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 87.4 1 +6.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 70.8 10 -5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 86.1 1 +6.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 62.7 1 -8.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 52.9 12 -5.5
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 61.9 6 -15.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 57.2 17 -3.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 44.7 21 -6.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 50.0 11 +12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 50.8 15 -14.8 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 64.3 9 -0.7
HEALTH 78.6 3 +8.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 58.9 16 -5.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 74.6 10 +3.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 79.4 26 +12.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 78.7 7 +5.0
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 89.7 10 +8.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 90.5 3 +24.8
EDUCATION 58.2 15 -0.7
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 40.9 40 -3.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 49.5 9 +3.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 75.3 8 +2.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 75.2 21 -1.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 49.8 22 -4.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 51.2 15 -10.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 64.9 4 -4.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 50.0 21 -16.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 0.0 54 -11.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 49.3 11 -15.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 91.8 7 -5.6
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 69.0 5 +0.4
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 85.7 3 0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 47.1 25 -1.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 93.0 7 +9.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 48.5 45 -7.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 70.9 13 +2.2
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
65.8 6th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.9
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 67.2 7 -0.6
PARTICIPATION 78.5 4 +7.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 75.0 7 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 77.3 2 +12.8
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 80.1 12 +12.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 81.4 2 +5.6
RIGHTS 74.4 2 -5.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 68.1 8 -4.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 91.2 5 -2.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 74.6 8 +3.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 74.5 13 -14.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 63.9 1 -8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 60.7 10 +2.1
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 79.9 2 +7.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 87.3 2 +5.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 64.1 17 -1.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 48.4 23 -0.8
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 23.9 42 0.0
GENDER 55.2 20 -7.1
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 78.0 2 +6.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 81.6 23 -3.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 40.4 33 -13.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 26.2 45 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 64.1 8 +0.1
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 53.7 22 -8.9
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 68.7 3 -3.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 58.6 9 +5.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 25.0 37 -25.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 66.6 7 -4.3
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 73.0 6 -1.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 80.3 2 -7.0
Access to Financial Services (WB) 74.9 4 +8.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 38.4 36 -17.9
INFRASTRUCTURE 75.2 6 +12.2
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 68.2 5 -10.7
Access to Energy (WB) 90.9 9 +8.7
Mobile Communications (ITU) 67.3 18 +16.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 74.4 3 +34.0
RURAL SECTOR 60.8 14 +1.3
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 62.6 21 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 58.3 10 +8.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 63.8 12 -6.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 58.6 19 +3.6
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
132
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - South Sudan
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
20.7 53rd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-7.8
TREND 2011-2019
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2011-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 15.3 53 -17.2
SECURITY & SAFETY 31.7 53 -41.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 47.4 49 -40.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 19.0 49 -54.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 20.9 52 -62.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 3.6 53 -26.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 67.7 48 -24.2
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 14.1 51 -10.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 29.0 49 -0.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 24.8 38 +17.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 14.2 51 -9.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 -66.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 16.7 52 -3.4
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 9.0 50 -7.5
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 13.1 50 -10.4
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 21.1 50 -4.2
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 0.0 50 -23.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 10.9 47 +0.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 6.2 54 -9.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 4.8 50 -8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 10.1 54 -23.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 3.8 54 -15.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 12.5 37 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 0.0 53 0.0
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2011-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 19.9 53 -4.6
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 19.6 52 -2.9
Civil Registration (GI) 37.5 45 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 30.2 45 -0.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 8.2 52 +4.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 16.2 41 -8.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 6.0 52 -9.2
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 30.0 48 -1.6
Regional Integration (AfDB) 25.0 35 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 28.2 50 0.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 17.0 51 -6.1
Access to Financial Services (WB) . . .
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 50.0 28 0.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 14.4 54 +9.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) . . .
Access to Energy (WB) 25.1 45 +23.7
Mobile Communications (ITU) 14.8 53 +2.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 3.2 47 +2.2
RURAL SECTOR 15.7 49 -23.6
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 33.0 43 -21.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 0.0 50 -25.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 20.0 50 -23.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 10.0 50 -24.3
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2011-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 26.5 53 -0.6
HEALTH 34.3 53 +0.2
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 1.6 54 +1.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 11.1 53 +3.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 59.5 48 +5.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 70.8 22 +1.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 29.2 52 -1.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 33.7 44 -8.7
EDUCATION 14.0 52 +0.9
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 8.0 54 +2.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 7.0 50 -5.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 2.7 53 -4.0
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 52.3 42 +11.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 0.0 48 0.0
SOCIAL PROTECTION 12.0 53 -1.5
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 11.3 49 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 9.4 53 -4.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 22.1 48 -5.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 5.1 53 +3.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . .
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 45.7 40 -2.0
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 12.7 52 -6.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . .
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 26.0 53 +2.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 60.1 29 -4.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 84.1 11 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2011-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 20.9 52 -9.1
PARTICIPATION 17.1 48 -5.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 21.3 46 +3.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 22.0 47 -11.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 0.3 53 -2.4
RIGHTS 13.2 53 -17.8
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 3.3 53 -19.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 12.5 53 -50.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 21.4 49 -17.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 12.0 54 -9.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 16.7 18 +8.4
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 17.3 54 -9.2
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 18.5 52 -1.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 12.9 50 -38.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 29.7 52 +9.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 13.9 53 -1.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 11.7 51 -13.1
GENDER 36.0 46 -3.6
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 25.2 53 +2.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 40.3 49 -9.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 32.0 40 -7.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 46.6 24 -0.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) . . .
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
133
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Sudan 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 27.4 49 +1.5
SECURITY & SAFETY 58.7 47 +3.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 76.5 45 +10.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 28.5 47 -27.6
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 72.1 48 +15.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 26.8 49 +19.7
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 89.8 14 +0.6
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 17.6 49 +6.2
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 37.4 38 +5.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 9.8 45 +7.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 22.2 48 +6.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 0.0 46 0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 0.0 47 0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 36.0 40 +17.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 6.8 51 -10.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 5.3 54 -11.4
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 27.9 46 -5.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 0.0 50 -18.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 0.7 52 -2.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 0.0 46 -12.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 26.5 42 +6.3
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 29.8 32 +16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 45.5 25 +7.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 37.1 29 +7.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 0.0 48 0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 20.0 44 0.0
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
32.5 48th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+2.5
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 37.4 41 +3.1
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 33.5 44 -1.2
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 -25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 35.5 37 +17.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 22.1 47 -6.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 42.0 35 +10.1
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 17.8 47 -1.6
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 22.8 50 -5.5
Regional Integration (AfDB) 43.8 28 -6.2
Trade Environment (WB) 28.6 49 +2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 26.2 48 -8.2
Access to Financial Services (WB) 15.6 33 +9.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 0.0 50 -25.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 38.3 31 +9.9
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 33.3 30 -0.3
Access to Energy (WB) 58.1 24 +20.1
Mobile Communications (ITU) 42.0 45 +8.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 20.0 20 +11.1
RURAL SECTOR 55.1 21 +9.2
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 63.8 18 +13.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 +12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 59.7 17 +11.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 47.0 34 -0.9
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 22.5 51 +3.3
PARTICIPATION 12.8 50 -0.3
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 0.0 47 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 22.2 45 +5.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 26.4 45 +5.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 2.4 52 -11.7
RIGHTS 20.0 51 +5.4
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 7.0 52 +4.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 31.1 47 +6.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 41.5 43 +12.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 20.5 50 +4.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 0.0 39 0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 24.4 49 0.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 23.8 46 +6.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 26.2 45 +0.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 32.2 48 +3.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 20.2 49 -11.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 19.7 44 0.0
GENDER 32.7 49 +7.9
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 43.7 37 +26.0
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 49.4 46 +1.5
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 15.5 53 -5.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 29.7 40 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 +16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 42.7 45 +2.2
HEALTH 52.2 42 +9.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 11.2 51 -6.9
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 38.6 33 +8.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 72.5 38 +4.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 49.8 47 +1.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 74.2 24 +9.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 66.9 19 +39.6
EDUCATION 29.1 49 -0.7
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 37.4 44 +6.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 28.8 29 +5.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 33.5 45 +2.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) . . -
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 16.7 46 -16.6
SOCIAL PROTECTION 33.4 40 +1.3
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 4.2 53 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 33.1 47 +3.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 46.0 30 -1.1
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 9.2 51 -20.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 74.7 15 +23.9
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 55.9 28 -1.7
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 15.5 50 -4.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) . . -
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 75.3 16 +11.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 77.2 6 -4.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 55.8 20 -9.7
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
134
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Tanzania
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 56.2 19 -2.3
SECURITY & SAFETY 84.1 22 -0.6
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.6 21 -0.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 83.8 30 -6.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 51.8 30 +3.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 85.0 26 -0.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 48.0 22 -6.1
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 77.0 11 +5.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 40.8 24 -13.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 40.5 29 -3.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 43.7 30 -25.2
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 29.4 31 -4.4
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 56.3 27 +4.4
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 45.0 20 -8.1
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 56.7 17 -14.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 54.8 24 -3.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 63.9 15 -12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 23.2 34 -10.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 26.3 26 +0.2
ANTI-CORRUPTION 47.8 17 +5.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 44.0 21 +4.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 61.4 14 +11.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 63.9 10 +18.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 25.0 26 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 44.5 20 +18.7 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 57.8 17 +7.2
HEALTH 68.6 13 +11.3
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 63.7 9 +6.4
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 47.7 24 +8.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 85.4 15 +29.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 78.2 8 -5.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 68.0 32 +10.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 68.8 17 +18.3
EDUCATION 52.5 24 +2.8
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 70.0 9 +20.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 22.3 39 -0.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 38.9 40 -16.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 73.0 25 +2.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 58.3 13 +8.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 47.5 21 +8.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 29.8 28 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 65.8 9 +5.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 67.3 8 +4.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 32.2 22 +13.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 42.6 29 +16.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 62.5 14 +6.5
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 49.6 30 +0.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 62.0 9 +18.6
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 66.7 30 +7.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 72.2 10 +3.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 61.9 16 +2.1
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
53 19th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+0.2
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 52.7 18 +2.4
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 52.4 26 -0.5
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 +12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 36.9 34 -18.4
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 41.9 32 -9.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 69.7 13 -1.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 63.2 6 +13.3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 54.5 22 +1.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) 87.5 3 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 43.1 39 +8.7
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 57.2 22 -3.9
Access to Financial Services (WB) 37.0 14 +7.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 47.8 31 -6.8
INFRASTRUCTURE 42.1 23 +15.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 60.7 8 +18.7
Access to Energy (WB) 32.8 39 +21.6
Mobile Communications (ITU) 64.4 23 +11.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 10.6 33 +8.8
RURAL SECTOR 61.9 13 -5.9
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 66.2 15 -15.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 +8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 67.7 9 -12.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 63.6 9 -3.5
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 45.5 29 -6.2
PARTICIPATION 33.5 33 -10.8
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 -25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 45.1 21 -1.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 28.8 44 -22.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 47.7 22 +5.5
RIGHTS 46.9 27 -13.0
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 35.4 34 -33.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 58.6 33 -15.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 44.8 38 -17.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 62.3 21 -23.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 +25.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 57.2 14 +3.8
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 52.6 21 +2.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 54.7 15 -12.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 68.7 13 +5.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 61.1 16 +24.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 48.9 13 -0.5
GENDER 44.3 35 -4.9
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 68.1 4 +3.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 69.7 35 -2.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 38.4 35 +7.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 20.4 46 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -33.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
135
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Togo 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 51.3 25 +2.0
SECURITY & SAFETY 88.9 5 +0.8
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.1 26 -0.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 92.1 14 +1.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.0 27 +2.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 71.7 5 -0.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 82.6 30 +1.3
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 43.4 30 -1.0
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 29.0 49 -2.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 32.7 32 -8.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 42.5 28 -8.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 50.3 26 +3.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 46.5 17 +11.2
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 59.2 20 -1.5
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 27.3 35 -0.7
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 29.9 39 -6.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 39.0 36 -11.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 36.1 28 +18.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 11.8 46 -5.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 19.8 34 +1.4
ANTI-CORRUPTION 45.5 19 +9.0
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 34.5 27 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 32.9 38 -4.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 44.9 20 +6.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 75.0 2 +37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 40.0 24 -20.0 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 55.5 18 +9.9
HEALTH 58.1 31 +15.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 31.0 43 +3.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 27.3 45 +5.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 85.9 12 +18.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 72.8 18 +0.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 67.3 34 +8.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 64.0 23 +53.9
EDUCATION 60.4 13 +7.4
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 74.1 6 +0.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 41.3 13 +5.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 71.8 12 +16.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 65.1 33 -1.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 50.0 21 +16.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION 42.0 29 +6.6
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 22.6 37 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 44.8 28 +8.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 52.6 23 +19.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 36.3 19 -4.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 53.6 26 +8.4
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 61.5 16 +10.4
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 54.0 24 +17.9
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 72.4 5 +9.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 63.0 33 +12.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 67.8 14 +12.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 50.0 29 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
50.1 25th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+4.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 45.4 33 +6.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 56.3 19 +6.6
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 -12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 55.6 17 +8.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 52.5 13 +12.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 56.5 26 -1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 54.6 12 +26.9
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 47.7 30 +5.1
Regional Integration (AfDB) 56.3 22 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 56.5 23 +1.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 64.1 15 +19.0
Access to Financial Services (WB) 36.7 16 +29.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 25.0 46 -25.0
INFRASTRUCTURE 41.9 24 +11.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 35.4 26 -34.1
Access to Energy (WB) 49.3 27 +21.5
Mobile Communications (ITU) 61.9 27 +36.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 21.2 19 +20.1
RURAL SECTOR 35.8 41 +4.8
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 40.7 38 +17.1
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 25.0 42 -5.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 41.7 40 +0.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 35.7 41 +6.7
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 48.2 22 +0.4
PARTICIPATION 40.2 27 +0.4
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 50.6 13 +14.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 47.8 27 -16.6
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 37.4 26 +3.3
RIGHTS 50.6 22 +1.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 39.9 29 +3.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 74.4 19 +1.6
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 72.6 10 +7.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 41.0 39 -20.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 25.0 17 +16.7
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 47.8 25 -2.2
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 55.5 14 +6.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 40.7 31 +3.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 55.1 29 -14.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 50.6 21 -5.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 37.0 31 -1.8
GENDER 54.4 22 +2.1
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 54.3 20 +8.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 82.0 21 +1.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 51.4 22 +13.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 59.2 16 +3.4
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -16.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
136
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Tunisia
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 72.4 4 +13.4
SECURITY & SAFETY 88.4 6 +0.5
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 94.1 36 -5.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 86.6 23 +2.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.8 9 +0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 65.7 10 +9.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 95.7 5 -3.1
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 68.1 9 +9.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 92.0 3 +43.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 68.8 8 +23.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 58.6 15 -2.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 55.8 21 -6.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 50.2 12 -7.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 83.1 4 +8.1
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 62.9 7 +30.8
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 63.3 12 +32.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 75.8 7 +31.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 76.4 7 +45.8
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 48.0 7 +33.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 51.2 4 +10.7
ANTI-CORRUPTION 70.1 3 +12.3
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 56.0 8 -8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 74.1 6 +36.3
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 66.5 8 +6.5
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 100.0 1 +50.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 53.8 12 -22.9 SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 71.8 4 -0.7
HEALTH 71.9 10 -1.6
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 50.8 25 -4.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 92.4 5 -0.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 73.9 35 +0.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 59.4 38 +0.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 98.1 3 +0.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 57.0 30 -5.6
EDUCATION 73.5 4 -4.8
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 60.3 16 -0.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 58.6 3 +1.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 86.1 4 +0.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 97.0 2 +0.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 65.7 7 -26.0
SOCIAL PROTECTION 73.9 3 +0.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 60.7 6 +4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 66.7 6 0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 75.0 4 +11.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 67.3 6 -17.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) 100.0 1 +2.6
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 68.0 7 +3.4
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 71.4 6 +14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 52.8 18 -11.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 99.7 2 +0.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 95.8 1 +6.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 20.2 42 +7.1
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
70.4 4th
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+8.2
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 71.4 4 +17.6
PARTICIPATION 82.6 2 +30.6
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 75.0 7 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 79.9 1 +27.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 88.4 6 +48.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 87.0 1 +46.8
RIGHTS 62.1 11 +27.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 72.6 6 +28.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 80.8 15 +18.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 83.1 2 +38.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 65.6 19 +42.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 +8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 75.3 3 +12.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 61.5 8 +23.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 72.0 7 +11.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 81.7 2 +9.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 88.5 3 +14.8
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 73.0 4 +1.7
GENDER 65.5 6 +0.5
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 56.9 16 +6.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 89.7 10 +14.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 70.1 7 +4.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 60.9 13 +2.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -25.0
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 66.2 6 +2.7
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 58.5 15 -2.1
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 67.1 5 -16.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 42.0 31 +8.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) . . -
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 50.0 15 0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 59.0 17 -0.2
Regional Integration (AfDB) . . -
Trade Environment (WB) 63.7 16 -0.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 63.2 17 -15.4
Access to Financial Services (WB) 37.0 14 +13.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 72.2 7 +1.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 82.1 3 +16.9
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 60.5 9 -15.5
Access to Energy (WB) 99.8 5 +0.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 81.9 2 +11.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 86.2 2 +71.5
RURAL SECTOR 65.2 6 -4.0
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 75.9 9 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 66.8 3 -16.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 63.0 14 +0.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 55.0 23 0.0
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
137
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Uganda 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 50.6 26 -3.8
SECURITY & SAFETY 78.9 33 -4.5
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 95.6 34 -0.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 66.9 40 -7.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 99.7 15 +1.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 58.8 20 -10.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 73.7 46 -5.2
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 43.8 29 -3.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 49.5 32 +2.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 65.7 12 +9.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 32.1 37 -4.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 22.5 42 -31.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 28.6 33 -10.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 64.6 14 +10.9
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 43.2 23 -2.6
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 45.1 26 -13.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 68.1 13 +2.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 23.6 31 -22.2
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 47.6 9 +12.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 31.8 23 +8.5
ANTI-CORRUPTION 36.5 27 -4.1
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 56.0 8 +8.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 37.9 32 +4.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 27.8 41 +3.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 -37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 23.4 41 +0.9
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
51.8 22nd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+0.7
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 55.0 15 +4.7
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 56.9 16 +2.8
Civil Registration (GI) 50.0 32 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 60.5 8 +9.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 44.9 24 +2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 71.0 10 0.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 58.0 10 +2.5
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 66.2 8 +1.7
Regional Integration (AfDB) 93.8 2 0.0
Trade Environment (WB) 64.6 15 -0.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 58.8 19 -8.2
Access to Financial Services (WB) 51.6 7 +16.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 62.4 18 +1.1
INFRASTRUCTURE 37.0 35 +13.3
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 38.1 22 -2.6
Access to Energy (WB) 40.2 35 +31.9
Mobile Communications (ITU) 56.3 31 +12.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 13.5 27 +11.9
RURAL SECTOR 60.0 16 +1.0
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 73.4 11 +11.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 55.4 25 -13.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 61.1 15 +6.1
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 46.8 26 -1.8
PARTICIPATION 28.2 41 -7.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 25.0 29 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 34.1 33 -4.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 23.4 46 -28.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 30.3 33 +2.3
RIGHTS 46.3 28 +5.8
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 29.9 38 -2.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 59.4 32 -8.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 59.4 24 +0.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 49.3 32 +5.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 +33.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 54.1 19 +3.4
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 44.8 26 +6.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 55.3 14 -6.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 50.9 34 -6.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 68.8 13 +18.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 51.0 12 +5.3
GENDER 58.4 15 -9.2
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 65.9 7 -5.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 90.0 9 -1.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 57.0 20 +1.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 54.2 19 +1.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 25.0 20 -41.7
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 54.9 20 +3.9
HEALTH 61.9 26 +9.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 36.8 36 -10.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 33.2 41 +8.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 88.7 9 +23.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 78.8 6 +0.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 75.8 20 +12.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 58.0 28 +22.6
EDUCATION 47.5 32 -0.6
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 51.9 23 -2.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 21.3 40 -6.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 43.8 36 -1.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 58.0 40 +8.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 62.3 10 -0.8
SOCIAL PROTECTION 43.0 28 +0.5
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 25.6 36 0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 61.6 10 -3.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 56.0 22 +0.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 28.6 27 +4.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 67.1 8 +6.0
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 63.1 12 -3.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 40.3 30 +15.9
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 73.9 17 +9.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 62.9 23 +8.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 95.2 6 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
138
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Zambia
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 56.2 19 -6.9
SECURITY & SAFETY 85.9 15 +3.1
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.5 22 -0.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 85.1 27 +4.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 100.0 1 0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 56.0 24 +0.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 89.0 16 +10.1
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 49.1 20 -7.2
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 62.2 21 -15.4
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 53.3 16 -4.1
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 48.4 21 -3.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 52.1 25 -1.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 27.6 35 -20.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 51.2 32 +1.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 47.7 18 -8.3
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 47.6 21 -11.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 53.5 26 -12.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 63.9 15 -12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 32.7 22 -2.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 40.6 12 -2.0
ANTI-CORRUPTION 41.9 23 -15.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 26.2 34 -21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 51.9 19 -10.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 37.2 28 -8.5
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 62.5 6 -25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 31.7 33 -12.9
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
52 21st
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
-0.8
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 50.3 22 +4.0
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 55.7 20 -3.1
Civil Registration (GI) 75.0 8 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 46.4 23 +1.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 49.2 17 +5.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 62.4 18 -8.6
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 45.5 21 -13.4
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 55.7 21 +2.0
Regional Integration (AfDB) 68.8 10 +6.3
Trade Environment (WB) 50.0 32 -3.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 68.0 8 +0.8
Access to Financial Services (WB) 42.6 11 +14.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 49.1 30 -8.7
INFRASTRUCTURE 38.1 33 +15.6
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 32.8 32 +1.9
Access to Energy (WB) 37.2 38 +18.5
Mobile Communications (ITU) 67.0 19 +28.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 15.4 26 +13.1
RURAL SECTOR 51.7 27 +1.4
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 47.8 35 0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 61.2 16 +3.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 47.9 32 +2.5
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 48.9 21 -2.1
PARTICIPATION 34.3 32 -12.1
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 37.5 17 -12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 17.3 50 -28.8
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 50.2 25 -1.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 32.0 31 -6.4
RIGHTS 53.5 20 -1.5
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 53.6 18 -2.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 68.8 24 -5.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 53.8 33 -18.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 58.0 26 +1.5
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 33.3 8 +16.6
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 49.4 23 -5.0
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 44.8 26 -4.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 51.9 19 -0.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 66.7 15 -5.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 38.1 34 -18.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 45.7 17 +4.3
GENDER 58.4 15 +10.0
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 59.8 14 +9.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 90.7 6 +1.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 57.2 19 +27.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 34.3 37 +20.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -8.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 52.7 25 +2.1
HEALTH 65.5 18 +5.1
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 58.6 18 +4.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 34.2 39 +3.0
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 86.3 11 +15.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 72.3 20 -1.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 78.1 17 +10.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 63.4 24 -2.3
EDUCATION 51.1 27 +0.3
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 41.9 39 -3.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 17.9 43 -3.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 63.9 20 -5.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 78.7 17 +11.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 53.3 16 +2.4
SOCIAL PROTECTION 35.7 36 +1.1
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 35.1 18 +5.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 52.1 19 -2.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 28.1 46 -2.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 27.6 29 +4.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 58.6 22 +1.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 48.8 32 +2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 33.9 38 -4.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 68.8 27 +10.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 41.6 53 +1.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 100.0 1 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
139
2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks & Trends - Zimbabwe 2020 IIAG: Index Report
SECURITY &
RULE OF LAW SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW 46.4 32 +6.9
SECURITY & SAFETY 81.5 29 +7.0
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP) 99.1 26 0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS) 70.4 38 +7.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR) 98.7 29 +2.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM) 64.8 13 +18.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO) 74.3 44 +7.0
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE 37.5 37 +4.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP) 37.0 39 +2.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM) 48.3 18 +0.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP) 47.2 23 +0.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP) 28.6 40 +3.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP) 46.1 18 +15.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 17.9 49 +6.7
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 32.4 32 +5.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 33.2 33 +1.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP) 35.6 42 +5.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH) 23.6 31 +5.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP) 37.4 17 +27.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP) 32.3 21 -10.9
ANTI-CORRUPTION 34.0 30 +9.6
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI) 46.4 20 +21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP) 32.4 39 +6.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP) 25.2 44 +2.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI) 37.5 17 +25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF) 28.6 36 -7.1
OVERALL
GOVERNANCE
46.1 33rd
2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54
+7.4
TREND 2010-2019
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 47.2 29 +19.5
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 49.8 29 +8.0
Civil Registration (GI) 62.5 20 0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB) 42.4 29 +6.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB) 45.9 23 +1.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB) 47.7 29 +21.6
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB) 50.3 14 +10.1
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 42.0 40 +4.2
Regional Integration (AfDB) 37.5 33 +12.5
Trade Environment (WB) 44.7 37 -12.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF) 45.5 36 +10.5
Access to Financial Services (WB) 47.5 9 +8.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF) 34.8 41 +2.4
INFRASTRUCTURE 40.0 27 +16.1
Transport Network (WEF/UPU) 30.4 36 -7.9
Access to Energy (WB) 38.5 37 +1.3
Mobile Communications (ITU) 64.2 24 +47.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB) 26.8 17 +23.5
RURAL SECTOR 56.9 19 +49.4
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD) 78.0 6 +67.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD) 50.0 15 +33.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD) 50.7 30 +48.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD) 48.9 30 +48.9
FOUNDATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION 36.0 38 -1.9
PARTICIPATION 22.0 45 -3.0
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI) 12.5 38 0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM) 27.4 41 -7.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM) 19.0 49 -12.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM) 29.3 35 +8.0
RIGHTS 31.9 40 -3.7
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 29.9 38 -2.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP) 40.3 41 -2.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF) 36.7 46 -13.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI) 44.5 36 -8.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI) 8.3 26 +8.3
INCLUSION & EQUALITY 36.2 38 +0.3
Equal Political Power (V-DEM) 30.4 42 +1.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM) 34.8 40 +0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM) 38.1 45 +5.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM) 47.6 24 -5.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM) 30.2 38 +0.1
GENDER 54.0 23 -1.1
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM) 58.1 15 +5.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM) 65.9 39 -3.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM) 58.8 16 +26.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM) 37.0 34 0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD) 50.0 3 -33.3
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS
& INCLUSION
TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY
Increasing Improvement Slowing Improvement Bouncing Back
Warning Signs Slowing Deterioration Increasing Deterioration
No Change Not Classified
SCORE/100
2019
RANK/54
2019
TREND
2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 54.9 20 +5.3
HEALTH 66.0 16 +11.7
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO) 54.5 20 +8.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF) 45.3 26 -2.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO) 91.7 5 +14.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME) 59.5 37 +6.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG) 72.7 26 +18.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO) 72.0 14 +24.5
EDUCATION 58.2 15 -4.6
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB) 50.2 26 -23.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO) 36.5 20 +1.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB) 67.6 17 +2.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO) 75.1 22 -1.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF) 61.6 11 -2.0
SOCIAL PROTECTION 36.4 34 +7.9
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI) 22.6 37 +3.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB) 47.0 25 +27.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World) 39.4 37 +19.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat) 36.3 19 -18.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO) . . -
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 59.2 19 +6.4
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB) 44.0 36 +17.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP) 53.2 16 +8.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME) 52.4 41 +18.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI) 46.5 48 -12.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia) 99.7 4 0.0
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
140
Synthesis of the methodology
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is a composite
index which gives a statistical measure of governance
performance in 54 African countries. Each IIAG dataset provides a
window of comparable data within a ten-year period. Governance
is defined by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation as the provision of the
political, social and economic public goods and services that every
citizen has the right to expect from their state, and that a state
has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.
The IIAG governance framework comprises of four categories:
Security & Rule of Law, Participation, Rights & Inclusion,
Foundations for Economic Opportunity and Human Development.
These categories are made up of 16 sub-categories, consisting
of 79 indicators. The 2020 IIAG is calculated using data from 40
independent African and global institutions.
A new IIAG dataset is released every two years. IIAG datasets are
not comparable between themselves, as each iteration covers
a different ten-year period, data are revised retrospectively,
and revision of the theoretical framework takes place between
iterations. Users of the Index should therefore always reference
the most recent version of the IIAG dataset.
For the first time, citizens’ assessments of various governance
dimensions are given more prominence as part of a new IIAG
section named Citizens’ Voices. All the data in this section is
sourced from Afrobarometer, the leading pan-African research
institution conducting public opinion surveys. This section mirrors
the IIAG framework and helps to contextualise the official and
expert assessment data in the IIAG with the reality on the ground
as perceived by citizens.
Nevertheless, Citizens’ Voices scores are not counted in the
calculation of IIAG scores. Caveats apply with regards to the
direct comparison of scores from the two datasets, as the
country samples differ (only 39 in the case of the new section)
and, while the Afrobarometer variables are the closest available
proxies, there is not always exact thematic overlap with the
IIAG measures.
Calculation stages
The following methodology is applied to calculate both the 2020
IIAG and Citizens’ Voices scores:
1. Variables that are consistent with the Foundation’s definition
of governance and meet specific standards of quality,
periodicity and country coverage are selected and missing
raw data values are estimated.
2. Raw data come on different scales from source. To be
compared and combined, data are transformed to a
standardised range of 0.0-100.0, where 100.0 is the best
possible score.
3. Once the 79 indicators have been transformed to a common
scale, a simple method of aggregation is applied to calculate
the scores. The Overall Governance score is the average of
the underlying category scores; the category scores are the
average of their underlying sub-categories; and the sub-categories
are the average of their constituent indicators.
Please visit our website for a full technical Index methodology:
mo.ibrahim.foundation.
For any other enquiries and clarifications please contact the
Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Research Team at
[email protected].
Notes
The 2020 IIAG covers a ten-year time period from 2010 to
2019. The full IIAG dataset, including underlying raw data and
normalised scores, as calculated for the express purposes of
the Index, is available online via the Foundation’s website.
In all 2020 IIAG publications and tables, default trends shown
are for the ten-year period (2010-2019). However, users of the
IIAG can carry out analysis of any other time periods by using
our online and offline (Excel) Data Portals, also available via
our website.
Country names in all IIAG resources, included in this report, are
the abbreviations used in the African Union (AU) Handbook 2020.
Furthermore, country ordering is based on the alphabetical order
of their official names as of 1 September 2019, also outlined in the
AU Handbook 2020.
Likewise, the list of countries pertaining to each regional group
and Regional Economic Community is sourced from the AU
Handbook 2020.
All figures on IIAG outputs are displayed to one decimal place.
The calculation method to arrive at these scores is as follows:
• Country scores are calculated on full-precision raw data values
(using the exact values as they are collected from source). All
scores are then rounded to one decimal place.
• Group averages are calculated on the rounded, one decimal
place country scores.
• Both trends over time and ranks are calculated on the scores
to one decimal place.
The exception to this are the annual average trend figures. These
are calculated on the rounded trends over time and displayed to
two decimal places.
The 2020 IIAG publications also explore the correlations between
different measures in the Index dataset. Correlation is a statistical
measure that describes the extent to which two variables are
associated. The correlation coefficient indicates the strength and
direction of the relationship between two variables. Correlation
Notes
141
2020 IIAG: Index Report
does not equal causation and users are advised to take care when
interpreting these statistics. Correlation coefficients shown in this
report are rounded to two decimal places.
The 2020 IIAG does not include data for South Sudan prior to
secession in 2011. Due to the lack of data, ten-year trends are not
available for this country. Since the country trend classifications
are based on a comparison of a country’s ten and five-year trends,
these are not provided for South Sudan.
The absence of South Sudan scores prior to 2011 means that
53 countries are ranked in 2010 and 54 countries are ranked in
2011 to 2019 inclusive. This should be taken into account when
looking at rank change over time. Similarly, averages calculated
for groups which include South Sudan exclude the country in presecession
years. All group averages, including Regional Economic
Communities, are calculated on their current group composition.
Data for Sudan prior to 2011 (Former Sudan) have been used in
the 2020 IIAG. Despite Sudan being a new country post-secession
of South Sudan, pre-2011 data for ‘Former Sudan’ are deemed a
suitable proxy for governance in Sudan.
Data for Morocco may or may not include Western Sahara
depending on the source.
While Algeria, Libya and Somalia have no underlying raw data
for all indicators in the Rural Sector sub-category (2010-2019),
Namibia only has data for the 2015 data year. As such, these
countries do not receive a score or rank. For these cases and any
years where a country does not receive a score or rank, this is
indicated by “.”.
As the latest data year available from source for the indicators
in the Rural Sector sub-category is 2015, all data points in 2016-
2019 have had to be estimated and five-year trends (2015-2019)
are static. While the data source for this sub-category, IFAD,
released new data in 2018, changes in the framework render the
latest scores non-comparable with previous data years. The IIAG
is awaiting for the release of a second comparable year of data
to be able to include the variables from their new framework.
As a result of all of this, trend classifications, which are based
on the comparison between the ten-year and five-year trends,
are not considered relevant for the 2020 IIAG Rural Sector subcategory
analysis.
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF) is aware that some sources
update their datasets after our documentation is sent to print.
IIAG raw data are correct as per the date “last accessed”, which
is stated for each variable in the 2020 IIAG Excel Data Portal as
well as in the Metadata file (both downloadable via our website).
Please see the Metadata for all information on all variables and
sources used in the 2020 IIAG.
Trend classification approach
The annual average trends for the ten and five-year periods are
calculated as follows:
• The annual average trend for the ten-year period (AAT10) is
the total change in score between 2010 and 2019, divided by
nine (the number of annual time periods experienced).
• The annual average trend for the five-year period (AAT5) is the
total change in score between 2015 and 2019, divided by four
(the number of annual time periods experienced).
Trend classifications are assigned based on the full precision of the
ten and five-year annual average trends. They are applied to all
measures in the IIAG. Depending on the size and direction of the
annual average trends in the ten and five-year periods, countries
and groups are assigned different trend classifications, which are
best explained as follows:
• Increasing Improvement: progress over the last ten years, with
the rate of improvement increasing in the latest five years.
• Slowing Improvement: progress over the last ten years, with
the rate of improvement slowing in the latest five years.
• Bouncing Back: decline (or no change) over the last ten years,
but showing progress in the latest five years.
• Warning Signs: progress (or no change) over the last ten years,
but showing decline in the latest five years.
• Slowing Deterioration: decline over the last ten years, but the
rate of decline is slowing in the latest five years.
• Increasing Deterioration: decline over the last ten years, with
the rate of decline increasing in the latest five years.
mo.ibrahim.foundation
@Mo_IbrahimFdn #IIAG
/MoIbrahimFoundation
moibrahimfoundation
30.2 64.9 32.7 18.5 59.5 31.0 81.2 76.2 52.4 35.1 16.2 18.5 100.0
45.1 66.7 45.3 36.5 74.1 52.8 66.5 66.7 76.1 47.2 25.6 44.0 59.2
18.1 100.0 18.1 28.6 69.4 46.1 87.5 11.2 58.3 63.9 11.1 52.6 100.0
22.0 80.3 22.3 30.6 33.3 22.6 45.4 22.4 31.2 22.9 10.5 27.3 50.0
18.9 99.2 27.7 58.9 23.6 87.5 48.7 44.9 49.0 57.4 14.6 28.7 32.6
38.4 59.2 26.0 42.3 56.7 60.2 63.8 84.9 57.6 59.6 24.1 44.7 58.6
27.4 71.4 26.2 35.7 60.7 63.1 66.7 100.0 56.0 59.5 21.4 42.5 50.0
46.3 31.9 50.1 36.9 60.9 63.4 80.1 73.5 54.8 43.9 13.1 38.0 84.5
49.0 100.0 33.3 71.2 59.7 59.8 78.7 86.2 59.4 45.2 17.9 49.2 77.8
25.0 70.8 0.0 50.5 62.5 65.0 12.5 64.5 75.0 62.0 37.5 47.4 12.5
44.6 21.9 20.3 17.1 39.7 50.0 80.9 100.0 42.6 87.2 30.8 46.7 68.0
50.4 73.6 44.1 42.3 66.1 55.0 72.8 68.5 57.4 50.7 30.2 47.2 76.2
87.4 77.4 81.2 57.6 90.8 53.5 85.3 76.2 59.6 56.3 56.2 55.6 89.4
98.7 51.9 99.8 41.8 98.7 45.8 100.0 83.0 53.6 47.6 85.1 58.8 100.0
88.8 92.2 84.3 41.0 92.6 26.9 93.8 83.1 26.0 20.1 6.3 38.9 100.0
99.8 85.1 99.5 49.9 99.9 82.5 99.8 91.2 92.9 85.0 68.6 79.2 100.0
49.8 66.9 40.7 67.1 73.8 76.8 68.5 70.6 43.5 73.2 32.2 67.1 71.9
99.7 93.3 81.8 70.7 89.2 59.5 64.6 87.8 81.8 67.9 89.0 65.3 75.2
48.8 75.0 39.9 75.0 64.7 29.6 76.4 41.5 59.0 44.2 24.8 24.1 88.5
36.3 75.7 50.9 34.7 70.9 58.2 87.5 68.7 69.8 41.5 32.4 52.7 93.5
1.6 69.3 39.4 25.5 47.6 68.4 67.4 64.6 65.8 45.7 1.8 52.1 98.2
65.8 73.7 29.6 35.6 47.4 39.3 75.8 36.2 50.3 21.1 21.1 31.9 81.5
69.1 90.2 56.3 42.7 89.4 66.5 68.5 78.7 64.6 41.1 33.3 50.3 100.0
62.8 91.8 31.1 47.8 58.3 64.1 67.9 91.4 44.2 73.8 28.7 79.1 67.6
57.4 53.2 32.0 22.1 74.7 52.8 91.3 72.4 59.1 26.0 31.5 50.2 90.2
26.9 82.2 29.2 34.6 52.0 48.0 65.9 44.3 53.4 45.3 15.6 35.6 68.4
30.2 64.9 32.7 18.5 59.5 31.0 81.2 76.2 52.4 35.1 16.2 18.5 100.0
45.1 66.7 45.3 36.5 74.1 52.8 66.5 66.7 76.1 47.2 25.6 44.0 59.2
18.1 100.0 18.1 28.6 69.4 46.1 87.5 11.2 58.3 63.9 11.1 52.6 100.0
22.0 80.3 22.3 30.6 33.3 22.6 45.4 22.4 31.2 22.9 10.5 27.3 50.0
18.9 99.2 27.7 58.9 23.6 87.5 48.7 44.9 49.0 57.4 14.6 28.7 32.6
38.4 59.2 26.0 42.3 56.7 60.2 63.8 84.9 57.6 59.6 24.1 44.7 58.6
27.4 71.4 26.2 35.7 60.7 63.1 66.7 100.0 56.0 59.5 21.4 42.5 50.0
46.3 31.9 50.1 36.9 60.9 63.4 80.1 73.5 54.8 43.9 13.1 38.0 84.5
49.0 100.0 33.3 71.2 59.7 59.8 78.7 86.2 59.4 45.2 17.9 49.2 77.8
25.0 70.8 0.0 50.5 62.5 65.0 12.5 64.5 75.0 62.0 37.5 47.4 12.5
44.6 21.9 20.3 17.1 39.7 50.0 80.9 100.0 42.6 87.2 30.8 46.7 68.0
65.8 73.7 29.6 35.6 47.4 39.3 75.8 36.2 50.3 21.1 21.1 31.9 81.5
69.1 90.2 56.3 42.7 89.4 66.5 68.5 78.7 64.6 41.1 33.3 50.3 100.0
62.8 91.8 31.1 47.8 58.3 64.1 67.9 91.4 44.2 73.8 28.7 79.1 67.6
57.4 53.2 32.0 22.1 74.7 52.8 91.3 72.4 59.1 26.0 31.5 50.2 90.2
26.9 82.2 29.2 34.6 52.0 48.0 65.9 44.3 53.4 45.3 15.6 35.6 68.4
30.2 64.9 32.7 18.5 59.5 31.0 81.2 76.2 52.4 35.1 16.2 18.5 100.0
Annex 124
“Press Release: Spectrum signs seismic data agreement to kick-start oil exploration
offshore Somalia”, Spectrum, 7 September 2015
Press Release
September 7th, 2015
Spectrum signs Seismic Data Agreement to Kick-Start Oil Exploration Offshore Somalia
OSLO, September 7th 2015 – Spectrum ASA entered into a Multi-client master co-operation agreement with the
federal government of Somalia during a signing ceremony on September 5th at the SYL Hotel, Mogadishu.
The agreement allows Spectrum to acquire approximately 28,000 km of long offset 2D seismic data offshore
south Somalia. The new acquisition has been specifically designed to complement 20,000 km of existing
seismic that was acquired in 2014. Spectrum has also been granted the marketing rights for this data.
Together, these seismic surveys will allow the in-depth study of hydrocarbon prospectivity offshore Somalia,
which lies in close proximity to major discoveries on the East African margin. Spectrum will use its global reach
to market both data sets and raise industry interest.
At the signing ceremony the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, His Excellency Mohamed Mukhtar
Ibrahim, said “This historic seismic data agreement will be the resumption of the exploration program of the
hydrocarbon reserves of our country, which will be a turning point for the economic development of our
nation.”
His Excellency Omar Abdirashid A. Sharmarke, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Somalia who
concluded the event stated “Seismic data can lead to good decision-making and a guided exploration strategy.”
For further information, please contact:
Graham Mayhew, EVP Multi-Client, Africa
Email: [email protected]
Tel: +44 1483 730201
Jan Schoolmeesters, COO
Email: [email protected]
Tel: +47 91 77 79 61
About Spectrum
Spectrum provides innovative Multi-Client seismic surveys and high-quality seismic imaging services to the global oil and gas
industry from offices in the Norway, UK, USA, Brazil, Egypt, Australia, Indonesia and Singapore. Spectrum designs, acquires
and processes seismic data to deliver high quality solutions through its dedicated and experienced workforce.
Spectrum holds the world’s largest library of Multi-Client 2D marine seismic data and a significant amount of 3D seismic. The
company’s strategy focuses on both the major, established hydrocarbon-producing regions of the world as well as key frontier
Annex 124
areas identified by our experienced team of geoscientists. The Spectrum library of Multi-Client data contains projects from
many of the foremost oil producing regions of the world. These include new acquisition, reprocessing and interpretation reports.
Annex 124
Annex 125
“Spectrum press statement on Somalia offshore round”, Garowe Online, 19 February 2019
Spectrum Press Statement on Somalia Offshore Round
PRESS RELEASES (/EN/NEWS/PRESS-RELEASES)
By SPECTRUM(HTTPS://WWW.GAROWEONLINE.COM/EN)
19.02.2019. 10:55
The Federal Government of Somalia hosted a successful promotion of the Somalia Offshore Round at the Somalia Oil and Gas Conference in
London on 7th February 2019. Spectrum Geo assisted the Somali Government in organizing the event.
Spectrum is a Multi-Client Seismic Services company that acquires, processes, and interprets seismic data at its own expense and
subsequently licenses the data to interested clients within the oil and gas industry.
The clients typically use such data to make their assessment of the hydrocarbon bearing potential of an area.
During 2015-2016, in preparation for the Offshore Round, Spectrum completed the acquisition and processing of 20,185 km of 2D long-offset
seismic data, under a co-operation agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia.
This program is promoted and data is licensed to oil and gas companies by Spectrum on behalf of the Government, with the Government
receiving part of the revenues.
The seismic data acquired separately in 2014 was also made available to the Federal Government of Somalia and Spectrum also licenses these
data to interested clients on behalf of the Government.
The Somalia Offshore Round event was hosted to enable interested parties to understand the Somalia Offshore potential from the seismic
data, along with the selection of blocks, the legal and fiscal terms, and the bidding conditions.
The organization of the Offshore Round, the terms and any awards of blocks are managed and decided by the Somali Government.
Somalia’s Offshore has significant hydrocarbon resource potential and this event marks the start of a process for the Federal Government of
Somalia to attract companies to explore and develop these resources in partnership with the Government.
Annex 125
Annex 126
“Senate declares London summit on Somalia o il ‘ unconstitutional’”,G aroweO nline,
6 February 2019
Senate declares London summit on Somalia Oil "unconstitutional"
SOMALIA (/EN/NEWS/SOMALIA)
By STAFF REPORTER, Garowe Online(HTTPS://WWW.GAROWEONLINE.COM/EN)
06.02.2019. 17:52
MOGADISHU, Somalia - The Senate has on Tuesday warned that upcoming London conference on Somalia oil could have “extremely
serious” consequences, as the country lacks petroleum law and related regulations, Garowe Online reports.
In a statement, seen by Garowe Online, the Upper House's national resource committee has termed the summit which is scheduled to kick off
set on Thursday, the 7th February "unconstitutional" and against the law of the Horn of Africa nation.
It said the parliament is yet to approve the petroleum law and the other regulations vital for the oil sector, investment, revenue, and
environmental protection as the country still remained fragile and recovering from decades of conflict.
"According to the article 44 of the constitution which clarifies the scheme of the resource sharing is still uncompleted and besides there is a
dispute between the regional states and the central Government," read the Senate's statement in part.
Wadajir, the main opposition party in Somalia called in the Federal Government to cease licensing of Somali oil until open and transparent
contracting systems, as well as revenue sharing agreements with the Federal Member States, are being implemented.
"The Federal government of Somalia has to stop the deals behind closed doors and open up how it awards contracts of oil deals," said the
political party in a statement sent the newsrooms Tuesday.
This makes the London conference unrealistic and uncertainty is looming as Somali petroleum authority, the national body that is in charge for
the managing of the oil projects is yet to be established by the UN-backed Federal Government in Mogadishu.
Therefore, any contract signed with the international oil companies in the absence of the relevant regulations and law will make the process
illegitimate, according to the Senate's national resource committee.
In an interview with BBC Somali service, the country's Petroleum Minister, Abdirashid Mohamed denied all allegations by the opposition that
the government is planning to sell oil blocks un auction during the forthcoming London conference.
Mohamed who is already in London, leading a large government delegation said the spectrum company, which holds the seismic data will
showcase possible locations in Somalia, where offshore oil reserves can be extracted in the future.
"The February 7th event in London is only to reveal the legal and regulatory framework and present the geological gained through insight 2D
seismic data," said the minister, adding that there will not be a licensing bid round to auction off offshore oil blocks.
Spectrum (https://www.spectrumgeo.com/press-release/somalia-announce-dates-for-fi…), the seismic data processing
company will cover the travel and accommodation costs for the Somali delegation during their stay in London.
Annex 126
The Union for peace and development [UPD] party, which is chaired by former Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said the country is
not ready for offshore oil blocks auction and called for a postponement of the London meeting.
Annex 126
Annex 127
“About to happen Somali petroleum corruption”, Somali Atlantic Council, 3 December 2020
About to happen Somali Petroleum Corruption
December 3, 2020
As Somalia is in the midst of intense political and a constitutional crisis ahead of the upcoming elections, there
are a reports linking very senior officials of the government to suspicious shady, corrupt deal of an oil licensing
in Turkey. This week, there are reliable reports that meetings are underway in Istanbul to sell up to eight oil
blocks, six to SomaOil and 2 to Liberty Petroleum, where by all the pre contract agreement are to be finalized.
Corruption occurs when both motivation and opportunity are present. Personal benefit motivates individuals to
be corrupt, but they depend on opportunity as well. Official bureaucrats may have vast discretionary powers
over natural resources. Opportunities for corrupt behaviour arise when decision-making accountability for these
people is low. National resource exploitation without good legal system is curse and takes down everything to
the benefit of view oligarch. Somalia is already listed among the most corrupted emerging oil and gas countries.
1 of 2
Annex 127
Ibrahim Ali Hussien the director of SPA and Petroleum Minister Abdirashid & NISA chief Fahad Yasin have
registered in Somalia-Qatar a joint venture between the three officials. Some Qatari businessmen have also
good shares in the company . The company is called AMAANA PETROLEUM.
The CEO of Somali Petroleum Authority Ibrahim Ali Hussein and regional director of Coastline Petroleum are in
this week meeting with CEO of an American company called Liberty Petroleum. The Somali officials intend to
sell two Blocks in Galmudug Coastline and six (where.....) to foreign company called in the Production Sharing
Agreement (PSA) to “the Coastline Petroleum.” The legality of the deal is in question for many reasons. Many
oil companies from Britain, Norway, and Qatar are previously accused of pressure and knowing the money they
paid to Somalia officials would be used for bribes.
It is alleged that the government officials had engineered the elections of the three regional states South West,
Galmudud and HirShabelle and all the three presidents installed over the regions for the purpose of this
contracts without the consent of local people. In at least two regions, the government used military power to
enforce its will. Subsequently, the federal government appointed loyal individuals with no proper accreditation
to the Board of the Somali Petroleum Agency (SPA).However, Puntland state refused to take part of the
formation of the board of SPA Board citing that proper procedures were not followed as agreed. The opposition
groups warned the federal government against involvement of itself in oil deals in election time and end of its
term.
The government chose to ignore the dissenting voices in the country striving to be democratic. Analyst say that
the officials who are rushing to sign this deals do not have legal authority from the regions they are claiming to
represent and the protocol of oil extraction rights is not there. The entire process is masterminded by self
interest group. The same shame scenario of SOMA Oil is likely to crop up once again if officials are not stopped
in time. Somalia, at this stage, does not want officials managing Somali oil and gas resources to appoint their
family members to the Somali Petroleum Authority board. The work of this important body should be
transparent and all inclusive.
It is not a secret that the discredited company SOMA Oil was renamed Coastline Exploration. The pubic can
not be fooled twice. Every body remembers very vividly the public objection to the major attempt to launch an
oil licensing round in London few years ago. Despite the efforts of the federal government to conceal this deal,
the Somali people will rise up again to stop the thieves looting public resources.
Foot note:
SPA officials appointed through nepotism
1 –Ibraahim Cali Xuseen (Guddoomiye),
2 -Caa’isho Cusmaan Axmed (Guddoomiye ku-xigeen)
3 –Ibraahim Axmed Leyte (Xubin),
4 –Cabdulqaadir Aadan Maxamuud (Xubin),
5 –Ibraahim Cabdulqaadir Maxamed, (Xubin),
6 –Axmed Xaaji Cabdi (Xubin),
7 –Cabdixaafid Cali Dirir (Xubin)
8 –Iyo Mahad Maxamed Sheekh Xasan (Xubin).
( Asha Osman Ahmed, representing Banadir Reginal Authority is a cousin of Fahad Yasin
Ibrahim Ahmed Layte representing Hirshabeele State is close friend to Somali Minister of Petroleum;
The regional director of Coastline Petroleum is a cousin of petroleum minister as well.
It’s in the public knowledge that the minister of petroleum hired his own daughter.)
2 of 2
Annex 127
Annex 128
“Government dissolves Benadir chamber of commerce over link to Al-Shabaab”, Radio
Dalsan, 26 January 2020
Home Africa
On J 26, 2020
Somalias miniser of commerce and indsr Abdllahi Hassan Ali has dissoled Benadir
regional chamber of commerce barel o das afer he leaders of he Chambers ere
arresed.
In a saemen, he miniser said his minisr ill soon sar he process o form leadership
for he chamber.
According o saemen, he direcie ill be effecie from oda.
The moe comes afer eecie direcor and he dep of he chamber arresed b he
Inelligence agenc las eek oer alleged links ih AlShabaab.
Annex 128
Annex 1
K. Lindskov Jacobsen and J. Høy-Carrasco, “Navigating changing currents -a
forward-looking evaluation of efforts to tackle maritime crime off the Horn of Africa”,
University of Copenhagen Centre for Military Studies, September 2018 (Extracts)
Navigating Changing Currents
A forward-looking evaluation of efforts to tackle
maritime crime off the Horn of Africa
Katja Lindskov Jacobsen
Julie Høy-Carrasco
September 2018
UNIVERS ITY OF COPENHAGEN
C E NTR E F OR MI L I TAR Y S TUDI E S
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page i
Masthead Navigating Changing Currents
The Centre for Military Studies (CMS) is a research centre at the Department
of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. The Centre undertakes
research on security and defence issues as well as military strategy. The United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime’s Global Maritime Crime Programme
(UNODC GMCP) has been working in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region to
strengthen the ability of criminal justice systems to address threats of maritime
crime through a multiplicity of activities since 2009.
In 2017, CMS established a partnership with UNODC GMCP. This
partnership was established to make use of UNODC’s unique access to primary
data on crime trends in the HoA region on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, CMS’ expertise in carrying out policy-relevant research to inform
security policy in complex and interconnected security environments.
The Government of Denmark has supported the GMCP since 2011 under
the Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP). After more than seven
years of programme delivery, the Royal Danish Embassy in Nairobi commissioned
the present report to conduct an evaluation of activities delivered under
the latest PSP (2015-2017) in view of counter-piracy objectives, but also
of trends in other types of maritime crime.
The purpose of this report is to inform Danish policies with regard to
combating maritime crime in the HoA region. It contains an analysis based
on academic research methodology. Its conclusions should not be understood
as a reflection of the views and opinions of the Danish Government,
the Danish Armed Forces, UNODC or any other authority.
Read more about CMS and its activities at http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/.
Authors:
Senior Researcher, Dr. Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, Centre for Military Studies
Programme Development Officer, MSc. Julie Høy-Carrasco, United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime
Acknowledgements:
In the making of this report, a number of people have offered extremely valuable
inputs and assistance at different stages. The authors would like to
thank all those interviewed and all those who helped carry out interviews,
workshop participants, colleagues at CMS, two anonymous reviewers, and
Professor Christian Bueger for their time and very helpful comments. Finally,
we are grateful for the assistance offered by Annemette Tønnov Rasmussen,
notably in the processing of interview data.
ISBN: 978-87-7393-826-3
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page ii
Table of contents
Abbreviations ................................................................................... 1
Executive Summary .......................................................................... 3
Introduction ...................................................................................... 8
Structure and Reader’s Guide .............................................................. 9
Terminology ........................................................................................ 9
Methodology .................................................................................... 10
Trend Analysis ................................................................................... 10
Evaluation ......................................................................................... 11
Scope ................................................................................................ 12
1. Section I: Current Trends in the Maritime Crime Complex
off the Horn of Africa .................................................................... 13
1.1 A Narrow View: Developments and Drivers ........................................ 15
Piracy off the coast of Somalia ........................................................... 15
Human Trafficking............................................................................. 19
Weapons Smuggling ......................................................................... 22
Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing ....................................... 25
Drugs Smuggling............................................................................... 28
Armed Violence at Sea ...................................................................... 33
1.2 A Broad View: Interlinkages, Dynamics, and Reflections..................... 36
Interlinkages and Dynamics ............................................................... 36
Reflections on the Maritime Crime Complex ...................................... 38
1.3 Section I: Conclusion ......................................................................... 42
2. Section II: Evaluation of Past Activities ........................................ 44
2.1 Support to Garowe and Hargeisa Prisons ........................................... 45
Background....................................................................................... 45
Evaluation Criteria ............................................................................. 46
Research Findings .............................................................................. 46
Evaluation ......................................................................................... 58
2.2 Support to Somali Maritime Law Enforcement Authorities ................. 62
Background....................................................................................... 62
Evaluation Criteria ............................................................................. 63
Research Findings .............................................................................. 64
Evaluation ......................................................................................... 72
2.3 Section II: Conclusion ........................................................................ 77
3. Section III: Looking Forward in Light of Past Programmes
and Present Trends......................................................................... 79
3.1 Summary of Findings from Looking at the Past and the Present ......... 79
3.2 Conclusion: Challenges and Recommendations ................................. 80
Preconditions and Contextual Factors ................................................ 81
Weaknesses, Deficiencies, and Gaps .................................................. 85
Annexes .......................................................................................... 90
Notes ............................................................................................... 96
Bibliography ................................................................................. 122
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 1
Abbreviations
AFRICOM United States Africa Command
AIS Automatic Identification System
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AS Al-Shabaab
AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
BAM Bab al/el-Mandeb Strait
BIMCO Baltic and International Maritime Council
BPMPU Bosasso Port and Maritime Police Unit
BPP Bosasso Port Police
CGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CMF Combined Maritime Forces
CMS Centre for Military Studies
DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies
DRC Danish Refugee Council
DT Detention and Transfer Programme
ENACT European Union Project: Enhancing Africa’s Response to Transnational
Organised Crime
EUCS EUCAP Somalia
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GI The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime
GMCP Global Maritime Crime Programme
GPS Global Positioning System
HoA Horn of Africa
HQ Headquarters
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IED Improvised Explosive Device
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
INTERTANKO International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IUU Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing
KMPU Kenyan Maritime Police Unit
MCP HoA Maritime Crime Programme for the Horn of Africa
MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MLE Maritime Law Enforcement
MPTF Multi Partner Trust Fund for Somalia
MPU Mogadishu Maritime Police Unit
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NM Nautical Miles
NMRs Nelson Mandela Rules
OBP Oceans Beyond Piracy
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 2
OECD-DAC Organization of Economic Development, Development Assistance
Committee
OEF One Earth Future Foundation
PAG Piracy Action Group
PEW PEW Charitable Trusts
PSMA Agreement on Port State Measures
PSP1 Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2011-2014
PSP2 Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2015-2018
RMIFC Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
SEMG Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
SLCG Somaliland Coastguard
SMRs UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
SMRSS Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SOPs Standard Operating Procedures
SRP Southern Route Partnership
TEPIDOIL Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, Doctrine and
concepts, Organisation, Infrastructure, Logistics
TiPSoM Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants
TNT Trinitrotoluene
UAE United Arab Emirates
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
VBSS Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure
VEO Violent Extremist Offenders
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
WBIED Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
WIO Western Indian Ocean
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 3
Executive Summary
This report is made up of three separate sections. Section 1 offers an analysis
of maritime crime trends off the Horn of Africa (HoA). Section 2 is an evaluation
of a set of past programmes aimed at countering maritime crime. Finally,
section 3 combines findings from sections 1 and 2 to make recommendations
on how to shape future engagements. The summary below highlights
key findings from each of the two analytical sections of the report and presents
the main challenges identified in section 3.
Section 1: Summary of findings of Trend Analysis
Since 2012, the problem of Somali piracy has been largely suppressed
through numerous concerted efforts by Somali, regional, and international
actors. A number of failed hijacking attempts in 2017 have been seen by
some as indicating that a resurgence of piracy may be on the horizon. Others,
however, argue that the integrity of the business model for piracy off
the coast of Somalia has been broken and that those who were once involved
in piracy have moved on to other ventures. Regardless of whether a
resurgence of Somali piracy is at hand, there are numerous other threats to
stabilisation in the HoA region emanating from the maritime domain.
This report looks specifically at developments and drivers of six types of
maritime crime and maritime insecurity, namely: Piracy, Trafficking in Persons
and Smuggling of Migrants (TiPSoM), Weapons Smuggling, Illegal Unregulated
and Unreported Fishing (IUU), Drugs Smuggling, and Armed Violence
at Sea. It is found that each of these forms of crime negatively impact
stability in the HoA region. We call this the maritime crime-stability nexus.
Criminal networks and terrorist groups in and around Somalia thrive in lawless
space, both on land and at sea. Compounding the problem is the fact
that maritime crime fuels the operations of these actors, which allows them
to grow in strength. This is, for example, seen in the case of arms smuggling
via maritime routes where many of the weapons reaching Somalia are likely
to end up in the hands of groups such as Al-Shabaab. Governance structures
and rule of law are thus at risk of being undermined, which invigorates
a spiral of insecurity.
Beyond individual forms of crime, this report also looks at the broader
crime complex at sea, which is characterised by interconnectivity between
different types of crime and dynamics, causing crime to reposition thematically
(into other types of criminal ventures) and/or to reposition geographically
when pressures of deterrence are exerted. These dynamics are referred
to as ballooning effects. By way of example, there is evidence that former piracy
action groups have moved into other types of crime as the piracy business
model came under pressure due to various measures of deterrence. The
mutually reinforcing effect of naval patrols, industry self-protection, and regional
prosecutions rendered piracy a dangerous and non-profitable business.
The advent of these new circumstances roughly coincided with the
rapid destabilisation of Yemen, which led to TiPSoM becoming a more profitable
and less risky business for former pirates, and others, to engage in. Indirect
linkages are also important to consider. Highlighted in this report is
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 4
particularly how smuggling of weapons, heroin, and other contraband such
as sugar and charcoal, finance terrorist groups in various locations ranging
from Afghanistan to Somalia – and, more recently, Mozambique.
Having looked at the broader crime complex at sea, the main conclusion
from section 1 is that it is not useful to tackle individual types of maritime
crime in isolation. Since the crime complex seen off the HoA is dynamic
and interconnected, interventions aimed at building stability through countering
maritime crime should be equally agile and/or comprehensive both in
terms of the types of crime being targeted and the geographical scope. Reflections
revolving around these notions round off section 1.
Section 2: Summary of findings of Evaluation
In section 2, focus is centred on specific interventions delivered by UNODC’s
Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) in Somalia from 2015-2017 with
funding from the Danish PSP. Two engagements related to corrections and
maritime law enforcement are evaluated against three parameters, namely
whether objectives have been met, with what impact, and whether the rationale
for them remains valid. This evaluation is based on findings from interviews
carried out with criminal justice actors who have received GMCP
support (recipient respondents) and counterparts from organisations involved
in related fields of work (peer respondents). Substantiation of conclusions
derived from interviews has been secured through triangulation of
findings through secondary sources such as parallel assessments, monitoring
reports, and reports from key actors working with criminal justice in Somalia.
In the area of corrections, UNODC GMCP was tasked with ensuring
that prison conditions for piracy prisoners transferred from third party states
to Somali prisons are humane and secure. As custodian to the ‘Nelson Mandela
Rules’ (NMRs), UNODC seeks to support Member States in attaining the
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs). Danish
support to the GMCP was targeted at Garowe and Hargeisa Prisons, which
both hold piracy prisoners transferred from Seychelles under the Piracy Prosecution
Model. Programme delivery focused on ensuring that basic conditions
of incarceration are humane and secure; that prison management follows
the basic principles enshrined in the NMRs, and that prisoners receive
training and support to bring about rehabilitation. In addition to material
support for training programmes, a key part of GMCP’s programme is the
placement of two embedded mentors in each of the two prisons. These
mentors work alongside staff on a day-to-day basis, deliver training programmes,
and continuously monitor conditions.
Concerning the objective of ensuring compliance with the NMRs, it
was found through our synthesis of primary and secondary data, that there
are concrete examples of positive change in behaviour among prison staff.
According to respondents, GMCP mentors have been an important contributing
factor in achieving this change. While many challenges remain in the
two prisons, statements by peer and recipient respondents suggest that
conditions are considered humane and secure. When analysing the impact
of GMCP’s support, several respondents refer to conditions in prisons where
UNODC is not present as a way of exploring the counterfactual question of
how conditions may have been had the programme not existed. The conclusion
is that detention standards in Hargeisa and Garowe Prisons are higher
than in other detention facilities in Somalia. This in turn, suggests that
standards achieved in Hargeisa and Garowe are to a large degree attributa-
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 5
ble to efforts of the GMCP. Again, respondents highlight that the presence
of the mentors contributed enormously to the level reached in the two prisons.
Finally, with regard to whether the rationale of the engagement remains
valid, a few points for consideration are put forward.
Firstly, with regard to basic conditions, it is important to recognise the
local context in which the programme is delivered when setting success criteria
for support to the prison sector. Considering the Somali context, expectations
for living standards for prison inmates should be compatible to the
living conditions of the general Somali public which are considerably low. In
terms of improvement of prison management, what might receive more attention
in future engagements is increased systematisation of administrative
procedures. Having a paper trail documenting the handling of complaints,
sanctions, and medical emergencies for example, could bring increased accountability.
This is, however, challenged by the fact that 80% of prison
staff are estimated to be illiterate. Exploring how technological solutions can
help overcome challenges related to written communication is suggested as
a way forward. Another possibility is to consider making more strategic use
of the vantage point of the mentors as intermediaries between the prison
sector and international community actors supporting Somali corrections.
Other areas which the programme might increase attention on relate to
prisoner radicalisation, conditions for minors, healthcare including mental
health in prisons, and risk of early release.
The second engagement considered in section 2 relates to UNODC
GMCP support to Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) units in three locations –
Berbera, Bosasso, and Mogadishu. This engagement has included delivery of
equipment, infrastructure, and embedded mentoring and training. The objective
of the project was for Somali MLE authorities to carry out operations
in line with basic principles on the use of force and firearms and the code of
conduct for law enforcement officials. According to these principles, operations
must at all times be carried out with respect to human rights and law
enforcement officials are obligated to “apply non-violent means before resorting
to the use of force and firearms.” At outcome level, the target was
for supported units to reach ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC). Thus,
UNODC GMCP’s role was to support skills development of officers and provide
equipment needed for this operational level to be reached while adhering
to the basic principles.
To ascertain whether the programme met this objective, the analysis
has been broken down into three parts. With regard to ‘patrol and control’,
the conclusion from data synthesis is that the units have moved from having
no capacity for at-sea operations to being at basic IOC level. Patrols are carried
out at regular intervals, though these differ from unit to unit. Patrols are
both routine and carried out in response to emergencies. There are also few
examples of patrols being intelligence-led, however, these could usefully be
stepped up. With regard to ‘adherence to basic law enforcement principles’,
none of the statements made by recipient respondents suggest any deliberate
application of these. This notion reverberates in statements from peer respondents.
Finally, with regard to the level of ‘deterrence’ of the three MLE
units supported, it was found that their presence did have some deterrent
effect albeit limited to a range of approximately 100 km for each of the
three units. In sum, the objective of the programme was met, though just
barely.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 6
Concerning the impact of GMCP’s support to MLE units, the perception is
that the progress made is attributable to two things: (1.) external support to
the units and, (2.) the leadership within each unit. With regard to the latter,
the most important factor in determining progress is perhaps the degree of
ambition and drive to orchestrate change within each unit. One example is
the Bosasso Port and Maritime Police Unit (BPMPU), which, when mentors
first arrived, was basically only tasked with port inspection. Through strong
leadership and engagement, officers in this unit have undergone professionalisation
and a resultant expansion of mandate. The Mogadishu Maritime
Police Unit (MPU) has, similarly, gone from being a small group of police officers
primarily tasked with life-saving at Lido Beach and port security, to taking
over some responsibilities related to security management around Mogadishu
International Airport from troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). This handover of responsibility from AMISOM to Somali
security forces is a noteworthy achievement as it is the first instance where
this has happened. On the contrary, lack of leadership and command vision
at an institutional level is regarded, across the board, as an important inhibiting
factor for progress in all MLE units supported.
Finally, looking at the rationale for the engagement, it seems that progress
achieved could easily be lost if the programme was to stop. GMCP’s
approach to supporting Somali MLE is characterised by gradual professionalisation
of a limited number of officers and procurement of equipment determined
by their level of proficiency. This approach is deemed appropriate.
Further to this point, while recipient and peer respondents highlight the
need for bigger boats, it is vital to be mindful of the risk of reliance on external
actors to assume maintenance responsibilities. Finally, it would be useful
if the programme was underpinned by a clearer strategy which sets realistic
targets in light of the unengaging political environment and limited time
frame.
The broader conclusion from the evaluation is that the objectives of
GMCP’s engagements under the Danish PSP have been met. The progress
made is, however, precarious and reversible. In terms of impact, one conclusion
to be drawn is that GMCP’s model of placing mentors with frontline
criminal justice actors is impactful. Looking forward, both the corrections
and MLE sector in Somalia would benefit from continued and perhaps more
comprehensive support. Future programming should, however, be designed
with an ultimate aim of self-sufficiency.
Section 3: Conclusion – Challenges and Recommendations
This final section builds on findings from sections 1 and 2 and serves as the
conclusion of the report. This approach is premised on the view that combining
an analysis of current trends and past delivery offers a useful platform
for making recommendations for future engagements. Focus is centred on
ten key challenges identified in the amalgamation of the two previous sections.
Five of these challenges relate to preconditions. These include:
1. Changing currents: As the maritime crime complex is dynamic, countermeasures
should be correspondingly flexible if they are to be effective
in navigating changing currents in maritime crime.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 7
2. Under-prioritisation of maritime security: Countering maritime crime is
not a top priority at government level in Somalia. This is a precondition
for maritime security efforts, which needs to be acknowledged.
3. Divergent visions for maritime governance: The prevalence of divergent
visions for how the Somali maritime domain is to be managed implies a
difficult balance to strike for donors.
4. Corruption as a fact of life: Corruption is an important precondition to
consider when formulating interventions to counter maritime crime; not
only does it have implications at programme level, it is also a factor that
contributes to shaping maritime crime trends.
5. Risk of misconduct in the Somali criminal justice system: Some degree of
misconduct is likely to occur within the Somali criminal justice sector.
Five challenges are related to weaknesses, deficiencies, and gaps. These are
as follows:
6. Weak state presence and ungoverned spaces: Ungoverned spaces at sea
and on land are exploited by criminal groups.
7. Impunity in the absence of legal finishes: A unifying factor for all types
of crime analysed, bar piracy, is the lack of ‘legal finish.’
8. Non-payment of salaries: Lack of sufficient finances in the criminal justice
sector does not only hamper efforts to establish functional institutions,
it also has security implications as trained security personnel may
join armed groups if they do not receive their salaries.
9. Lack of leadership and command structures: There is an imminent need
for well-educated middle and senior managers to take over once leadership
is handed over from an ageing senior command.
10. Insufficient coordination of programmes: Insufficient donor coordination
is an obstacle to gaining multiplier effects from the investments
made in criminal justice and maritime security endeavours in the region.
Each of the ten challenges comprises aspects that are within the remit of different
actors to address. Accordingly, the recommendations offered are divided
into the following three sub-categories to explicate which type of actor
they are addressed to: recommendations requiring Collective action, recommendations
targeted at individual Donors, and finally, recommendations
for Implementing agencies delivering programmes to counter maritime crime
off the HoA. Recommendations are thus presented for each of the ten challenges
described in section 3.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 8
Introduction
More than half a decade has passed since pirates last profited from hijacking
vessels off the coast of Somalia and holding crews hostage for ransom.
While the number of failed hijacking attempts in 2017 has been seen by
some as indicating that piracy action groups are testing the waters before
making a comeback, others are more careful to draw such conclusions. Regardless
of whether a resurgence of piracy is on the horizon, evidence suggests
that piracy has served as a gateway to other forms of maritime crime
for those who were once pirates. Moreover, there are numerous other
threats to stability in the HoA region emanating from the maritime domain,
including in the Southern Red Sea and wider Western Indian Ocean (WIO),
which merit equivalent if not greater attention than piracy.
Unprecedented seizures of heroin consignments on the southern maritime
smuggling route from the Makran Coast to East Africa indicate an increased
use of this region as a transit hub for the onward movement of narcotics
to consumer markets in Europe and America. Not only is this trade a
primary source of terrorist financing Afghanistan, the ramifications of this
trade are also felt in the detrimental increase in drug dependency in transshipment
countries along the East Africa coastline. In fact, according to
UNODC’s 2017 World Drug Report, the increase in heroin use in Africa is
among the sharpest globally. This is seen as a spill-over effect of heroin trafficking
along the Southern Route. Recently, heroin trade has even been
linked to the emergence of a new violent extremist movement in Mozambique.
With regard to threats at sea, the continued destabilisation of Yemen
and spill-over of conflict into the maritime domain, particularly around the
narrow passage of the Bab el-Mandeb (BAM) Strait, is perceived to represent
a greater threat to freedom of navigation and safety of seafarers than piracy.
These are but two examples of other types of maritime crime in the HoA region
which have clear nexuses to regional stability. One of the arguments
presented in the report is that, following a decade of counter-piracy efforts
off the HoA, it is important to ensure that the focus of future efforts is targeted
at current threats to stability deriving from the maritime domain and
these are by no means limited to piracy. As maritime crime threats off the
HoA are both interlinked and in constant flux, focus also needs to be raised
from individual threats to the broader maritime crime complex at sea and
the dynamics at play within this.
In addition to current maritime crime trends, the report looks at past
efforts aimed at addressing maritime crime threats. Assessment is made of
whether objectives have been met, with what impact, and whether the rationale
for engagements remain valid. The purpose of this exercise is to examine
whether activities carried out thus far remain pertinent in addressing
current maritime crime threats or whether adjustments may be warranted
given changes in the crime complex at sea. Report findings can help inform
decisions on future programme activities to address maritime crime threats
in the HoA region.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 9
With reference to the title of this report, the aim of the analyses provided
below is essentially to create a vantage point from which to better navigate
the changing currents of maritime crime off the HoA.
Structure and Reader’s Guide
It is useful to consider both the past and present when planning for the future.
In this report, past and present factors are therefore examined in the
context of a foreign assistance programme. As the Danish PSP is a continuous
engagement, which has so far run for seven years, the report commissioned
needed to look at how activities already delivered to target maritime
crime off the HoA have worked and what their current status is. The intention
of having these three components (i.e. past, present, and future) incorporated
into a single report is to establish a strong foundation for policymakers
to take informed decisions about future action. Following the line of
reasoning outlined above, the report is made up of three sections, with the
first two being entirely separate.
Section 1: Analysis of Present Maritime Crime Trends: This in-depth analysis
of current maritime crime trends around the HoA has been
carried out using sources of information uniquely available
through the GMCP as well as other supplementary sources of
information. The purpose of this exercise is to have a thoroughly
researched set of data on developments, drivers, interlinkages
and dynamics at play within the maritime crime complex off
the HoA, insofar as it affects stability in the region.
Section 2: Evaluation of Past Activities: This section offers an assessment
of whether GMCP activities in Somalia, that have been funded
under the Danish PSP to target maritime crime, have met the
Objectives, what Impact they have had, and whether the Rationale
for these activities remain valid.
Section 3: Recommendations for Future Action: In section 3, key Challenges
to current counter maritime crime efforts are identified
based on Past activities and Present maritime crime trends.
Recommendations for how international actors can confront
these challenges are also offered.
It is important to note that sections 1 and 2 are not directly connected. Each
section can easily be read in isolation if the reader is only interested in one of
the two. With regard to the distinctive model used in this report, however, it
is the combination of the (1) Trend Analysis and the (2) Evaluation that together
amounts to what CMS terms a (3) Forward Looking Evaluation: looking
at past activities in light of current trends in order to inform future activities.
Essentially, section 1 + section 2 = section 3. Thus, section 3 concludes
the report based on findings from sections 1 and 2.
Terminology
The term ‘maritime crime’ covers a broad range of activities, including (a)
crimes that use the sea to transport illicit cargo, (b) criminal exploitation of
resources at sea, (c) crimes that specifically target objects at sea, and (d)
crimes that use the sea as a dumpsite.1 It is important to appreciate the
breadth of criminal activities covered by the term ‘maritime crime’ in order
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 10
to discern how these can come to represent a threat to regional and international
security. The impact of maritime crime on stability is referred to as the
‘maritime crime-stability nexus’.
Methodology
CMS applies stringent quality assurance procedures which entail defined
standards for data collection and analysis, regular internal review throughout
the drafting process, and an external anonymous review (double blind peer
review) of the final report as a means of validating findings. These quality assurance
mechanisms have been applied throughout the process of data collection,
analysis, and drafting of this report and all sections have been subject
to internal and external review to ensure academic quality. While section
1 has been subject to an additional midway internal review and a validation
workshop with international specialists, data collected in section 2 has been
processed using quality assurance software.
As the Trend Analysis and the Evaluation are two distinct genres, we
distinguish between the methodological approaches applied in each of the
two sections.
Trend Analysis
To undertake a systematic analysis of current trends in maritime crime
around the HoA, we draw on information obtained from a mix of the following
primary and secondary sources.
Interviews and workshops: In part, the findings presented in this report are
based on data obtained through observations at expert workshops (ENACT
workshop in Nairobi, expert workshop in Copenhagen) and conferences
(SafeSeas Symposium, Nairobi), as well as on a total of 26 interviews with
various actors including pirate inmates, a former hostage, maritime police
units, actors collecting and recording data from various sources, international
experts and front line criminal justice actors.2 We have deliberately incorporated
views from a broad and diverse range of actors, including UN agencies,
multilateral actors, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), regional
actors, UNODC staff (in Somalia and elsewhere), front-line criminal justice
actors, as well as imprisoned pirates, former hostages, and others. To minimise
the risk of influencing interviewee responses, all interviews were kept
conversational in nature guided by only two, deliberately open-ended questions.
These two key questions were (1) “What upward- and downwardgoing
trends characterise maritime crime around the HoA and in the Western
Indian Ocean (WIO)?”, and (2) “What trends can be observed in terms
of interlinkages between different types of maritime crime in this region?”
Due to the sensitive nature of some of the issues addressed in this report,
the source of some statements will be kept anonymous.
Reports and statistics: Findings presented in this section are also based on
statistics from various sources on piracy attacks, heroin seizures, and migration
flows and on various reports including flash reports on incidents of maritime
crime from regional information centres, risk assessments from navy
coalitions and industry, workshop background documents, weekly and annual
reports from various UN bodies (the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), etc.) as well as
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 11
evaluations from several key actors, and more.3 Finally, a number of academic
publications, research articles and reports are used to offer important perspectives
on preceding developments of relevance.4 Thus the data upon
which this report is based, includes a wide range of both primary sources
(for example, reports with recordings of events based on information from
actors involved in handling them) and secondary sources (for example, reports
synthesising data from existing rather than original sources).
Having multiple sources of information enables substantiation of individual
statements through a process of cross verification. This methodological principle
is commonly known as data triangulation. The combination of primary
and secondary sources also allows for overall conclusions to be drawn on
key developments (reflected in numbers), whilst at the same time acknowledging
the importance of detail and contextual factors5 that are more likely
to be discovered in qualitative data.
What we present in section 1 is a synthesis of the information obtained
from the primary and secondary sources of information described above.
Key factors attended to in this synthesis are developments, drivers, interlinkages,
and dynamics of maritime crime and how these affect regional stability.
The reason for focusing on these particular factors is based on the view
that they are important when designing future engagements aimed at enhancing
maritime security off the HoA.
Evaluation
The methodological approach upon which the evaluation presented in section
2 is based on three main sources: the Organisation of Economic Cooperation
and Development Guidelines (OECD-DAC), UNODC’s Handbook for
Evaluation, and various academic sources.
According to the OECD-DAC Guidelines, evaluation is: “an assessment,
as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going or completed project,
programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to
determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency,
effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information
that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons
learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors”.6
This overall definition has guided the methodological approach taken
in section 2. More specifically, the evaluation examines whether objectives
have been met, with what impact, and whether the rationale of the engagements
remain valid. In terms of the approach taken to ensure that the
assessment is systematic and objective, the evaluation team has been made
up of members that are both external and internal to the programme being
evaluated. The internal component has enabled access to key stakeholders
to the programme being delivered. And the external component, namely
CMS, has ensured academic rigour in procedures related to data collection
and analysis as well as quality assurance of findings and conclusions. This is
in line with the approach taken in Participatory Evaluation7 in which “representatives
of agencies and stakeholders, including beneficiaries, work together
in designing, carrying out and interpreting an evaluation”.8
Crucially, in the process of carrying out this evaluation, the best efforts
have been made to draw in a wide array of perspectives in order to give as
nuanced a picture of programme delivery as possible. To that end, one of
the main methods used is Stakeholder Interviews based on interview guides
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 12
tailored to measure whether targets set for each activity have been met. To
assess this, interview guides were developed on the basis of original result
frameworks.9 The 22 interview respondents include two types of stakeholders
with different perspectives on programme activities depending on their
involvement and proximity:
1. Recipient Respondents: criminal justice actors who have received
programme support;
2. Peer Respondents: counterparts from organisations involved in related
fields of work, deliberately including organisations likely to
represent a diverse set of perspectives, including critical views.10
While interviews have been carried out on the principle of anonymity in order
to encourage open and honest responses, they have been audiorecorded
with a view to carry out an analysis of the interview data through
the qualitative data analysis software NVivo. This has, in turn, helped to ensure
consistency and methodological rigor in the analysis of interview data
which has been reviewed by two researchers independently of each other.
Findings from interviews have then been triangulated using secondary
sources of information, such as parallel assessments, monitoring reports, and
reports from key actors working with criminal justice in Somalia.
Therefore, linking the above cited definition with the methodological
approach just accounted for, and recalling that the purpose of the evaluation
is to inform future engagements aimed at countering maritime crime,
the evaluation contained in section 2 represents a structured assessment of
the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of ongoing activities,
with the aim of enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-
making process of donors, which seeks to institute learning and improvement.
Scope
With regard to section 1, the geographical focus is the HoA. With Somalia as
the epicentre, the study looks at threats in the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of
Aden, and further into the WIO insofar as they impact stability around the
HoA. It is important to underline that general references to Somalia and
separate references to Somaliland should not be interpreted as any form of
stance on statehood on the part of CMS.
The Evaluation carried out in section 2 looks specifically at activities delivered
by the GMCP under the second iteration of the PSP (PSP2), all of
which are within Somalia. This focus has been set by the Royal Danish Embassy
in Nairobi in connection with the commissioning of the report. It is important
to underline that no assessment of financial management will be
made as that rather belongs in an audit report.
Since the purpose of this report is to establish a platform for international
community actors to address maritime crime challenges as they affect
stability, recommendations are addressed to this segment specifically. This is
not to ignore the primary role of regional actors in securing their maritime
domain and mitigating threats to stability in the HoA region. However, while
ways in which regional actors can counteract maritime crime threats should
be explored further, it falls outside the scope of this report.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 13
Section I: Current Trends in
the Maritime Crime Complex
off the Horn of Africa
The maritime crime complex at sea is in constant flux, evolving according to
changing geo-political circumstances and adapting to overcome pressures
arising from deterrent measures. Given the nature of this complex, interventions
designed to help counter maritime crime in the HoA region should be
informed by a thorough consideration of both the developments and drivers
of individual types and of the broader interlinked drivers at play within the
complex. This section seeks to map out the maritime crime complex by taking
both a narrow view at individual crimes and a broad view at the dynamics
and links within it.
Focus and Structure
The first chapter in this section focuses narrowly on six types of maritime
crime and maritime insecurity off the HoA. These six segments relate to Piracy,
Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (TiPSoM), Weapons
Smuggling, Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU), Drugs Smuggling,
and Armed Violence at Sea. Since the focus of the report is on efforts
under the PSP, this section centres more strongly on Somalia than on other
countries in the HoA region. This focus is reflected in the order in which the
six types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity are presented – moving
from Somalia-centred crimes to threats that have a wider geographical
scope in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and into the WIO. The sequence should,
therefore, not be seen as indicative of the level or severity of the different
threats nor as a normative judgement of their respective importance or preferred
prioritisation.
Each of the six segments provides a brief status of recent developments
within the respective area of crime. Subsequently, an analysis is presented
of drivers behind each category viewed through the prism of (1) deterrents,
(2) criminal networks, and (3) enabling onshore factors. Finally,
each segment is concluded with an analysis of how it affects national and/or
regional stability, i.e. the maritime crime-stability nexus.
The second chapter in this section offers a broader picture of the overall
crime complex at sea, focusing on interlinkages between different forms
of maritime crime and insecurity and dynamics. With regard to dynamics,
the analysis is centred around the tendency of different types of crime to adjust
to changing conditions either by moving into new types of crime or by
relocating geographically. This dynamic is referred to as ‘ballooning’ effects.
It is important to recognise both ballooning effects and interlinkages between
the different types of maritime crime when seeking to formulate targeted
counter measures that go beyond pushing crimes into other areas, either
thematically or geographically.
1
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Considering the foregoing analysis of developments, drivers, interlinkages,
and dynamics, section 1 is rounded off with a chapter offering general reflections
on maritime crime trends. Finally, a brief conclusion closes section
1. These are therefore used in section 3 of this report to offer recommendations
on how international actors might improve future action to counter
maritime crime in the HoA region and further into the WIO.
Background
The political situation in Somalia is an important contextual factor for the
analysis of maritime crime presented below. Whilst progress towards stability
in Somalia is slow and at times difficult to appreciate, advances have been
made in the past decade. Peaceful elections in 2017 highlighted the steady
progress of the Federal Government to take hold in Somalia with power
transferred from one administration to another. Concerning progress towards
a safer Somalia, an interviewee noted how “in 2008, Mogadishu was
a war zone. Somalia in general was an extremely dangerous field of operation
and international actors working in Somalia faced lethal threats on a
daily basis. Today, this place has changed! Markets are bustling with people
and there is a real belief in change”.11
Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab (or the Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin)
continues to have control over certain parts of the country and a militant
group aligned to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has also
emerged in the Bari region of Puntland.12 State fragmentation and fragility
combined with drought, periodic severe flooding, and lack of viable livelihood
options also continue to prevent advances in stability from cementing
beyond a precarious stage. Major terrorist attacks in Mogadishu in 2017, for
example, showed continued strength and increased sophistication of Al-
Shabaab.13 In terms of maritime security, there is still very little capacity for
Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) in Somalia despite the implications that
maritime crime has for stability. Furthermore, and in view of the threat
posed by Al-Shabaab, neither piracy nor maritime security in a broader sense
is a significant political priority.
Figure 1:
Geographic focus: Southern Red
Sea, Gulf of Aden and Western Indian
Ocean
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 15
Looking further into the WIO, 639 incidents of maritime crime and maritime
safety were registered in 2017.14 Only 24 of these were cases of piracy and
armed robbery at sea.15 This demonstrates that whilst the suppression of piracy
has been successful, other types of maritime crime are rampant including
the types of crime addressed in this section. These criminal activities,
which together form the maritime crime complex off the HoA, thrive in the
absence of effective maritime governance and contribute to the perpetuation
of instability either directly or indirectly.
1.1 A Narrow View: Developments and Drivers
Piracy off the coast of Somalia
Successful suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia is evidenced by the
stark decline in attacks since 2012. As a number of unique factors were key
in paving the way for effective action to counter Somali piracy, an assessment
of the current threat of piracy must take account of these. They include:
(A) Interventions by the international community to tackle the problem
through naval patrols and support for the prosecution of Somalis suspected
of piracy in regional states.16 (B) The substantial engagement of the
maritime industry to tackle the problem through self-protection of vessels,
including development of and adherence to Best Management Practices,17
which was a deciding factor in making hijackings virtually impossible and
very dangerous. (C) Finally, the commitment of states in the region to suppress
piracy, including Somalia but also regional states that assumed the task
of prosecuting and incarcerating Somali nationals, which was key to ending
impunity for assailants and the practice of ‘catch and release’ of suspected
pirates by Navies.18 The adoption of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (and its
subsequent ‘Jeddah Amendment’)19 is also an indication of the commitment
of regional states to tackle the issue. Some factors may have been more influential
than others in deterring piracy. As illustrated in the figure below, it
is, however, the mutually reinforcing effect of (A), (B), and (C) that amounted
to an effective push to suppress Somali piracy, rendering the business a
high risk/low profit (and therefore unattractive) enterprise.
Figure 2:
Suppression of Piracy and Recent
Activity
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Status
Statistical data points towards an ‘uptick’ in piracy activity from the intermonsoon
season of 2016 onwards, primarily around Socotra Island off Puntland.
The 2017 State of Piracy Report from Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP)
notes that the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against
ships in East Africa has almost doubled compared to 2016.20 This comes after
five quiet years and coincides with the very public withdrawal of NATO
forces and the general reduction in naval presence off the coast of Somalia.
21 Several interviewees stressed that some of the recent incidents appear
to be ‘probing attacks’ carried out to ascertain the possibility of successful
hijackings.22 Another view is that some of the incidents in 2017 may have
been reprisal attacks or vendettas “by Somali fishermen directed against Iranian
fishermen accused of illegal fishing” and therefore wrongfully recorded
as piracy.23 These include the 2017 attacks on the Iranian fishing vessels FV
Sameer and the attack on the FV Surgya Macran – both about 40 NM off
Socotra. Others still speculate whether certain interests in exaggerating the
threat level encourage erroneous reporting of incidents. Finally, Yemen experts
have expressed concern that piracy could shift to the Yemeni coast,
observing that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) currently controls
50 percent of the coastline and many commercial vessels navigate close to
the coast. Since the attack on MT Leopard Sun on 22 February 2018, “several
analysts have heightened the threat of ‘piracy’ in the southern Somali
Basin”.24 As this incident took place far from the Somali coast, there is speculation
that the threat from piracy may not be limited to the coastal areas of
Somalia.25
The ambiguities implicit in the above highlight the notion that statistical
data should not be seen in isolation. Statistics should rather be considered
alongside an analysis of the drivers behind crime including enabling onshore
factors, composition and modus operandi of criminal networks, and
deterrents currently in place to counter the crime. As these factors are important
to consider to understand drivers of all categories of maritime crime
analysed in this section, an overview of these factors is provided for each of
the six segments below.
• Deterrents: The readiness of regional states to engage in counterpiracy
efforts, including support for prosecution of suspected pirates,
remains. Six suspects were, for example, handed over to Seychelles for
prosecution in November 2017. The international naval presence off
the coast of Somalia has, however, been reduced significantly. On
land, while some advances have been made in terms of raising operational
capabilities of Somali MLE, there is still no investigative capacity
to pursue criminal networks. Establishment of effective law enforcement
capacity is also challenged by the fact that salaries are both insufficient
and payment is irregular – a factor which inevitably opens up for
corrupt practices. Nevertheless, the fact that the three ‘founding fathers
of piracy’ (Afweyne, Boyah, and Garad) are no longer in business
for various reasons may have some deterrent effect.26 With regard to
industry self-protection, which has arguably been the most powerful
deterrent for piracy, some ships passing the coast of Somalia have become
lax in their application of Best Management Practices as they, for
example, sail closer to the Somali shore at lower speed. The attacks
seen in 2017 from Puntland is an example of ships carelessly passing
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 17
close to the Somali coast and pirates ‘testing the waters’ to see what
self-protection measures they would need to overcome in order to successfully
complete a hijacking.27 Ships do, however, seem to be maintaining
protection teams on board and that is a factor that remains decisive
in warding off attacks.28
• Criminal networks: Various attempts by pirates to hijack vessels off the
coast of Somalia in recent years are seen to confirm the notion that
while counter-piracy efforts were successful in suppressing piracy, not
all piracy networks were eradicated.29 While the ‘founding fathers of
piracy’ are out of the picture, multiple sources indicate that two main
Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) are still active in Somalia, although not exclusively
engaged in piracy.30 The first is the PAG based out of the Alula
district in the remote north-eastern part of Puntland around the villages
of Murcanyo and Dhurbo run by Issa Yuluh and Aragoste,31 who
profited greatly from past hijackings.32 The second PAG is run by Garfanje
out of Hobyo in Galmudug.33 Garfanje is an important regional
power broker who virtually controls the entire Galmudug coast. This
position makes him and many from his gang untouchable.34
Importantly, various sources suggest that PAGs do not limit
their activities to piracy. They are businessmen, gangsters, and ‘Swiss
army knife’ criminals35 who engage in various activities involving a
weapon and a boat, depending on which is the most profitable activity
of the day.
Finally, with regard to criminal networks, an attack on a Panama-
flagged container ship and a Seychelles-flagged fishing vessel in
November 201736 should be mentioned as it briefly raised two concerns.
37 Firstly, that a new PAG could be at play since the attack was
carried out with a departure point at Merca.38 Though piracy networks
operated in this area for a short period around 2005, piracy activity
here is a novelty. There seems to be no reason to think that Merca will
become a new piracy hotspot, however.39 The second concern was
whether there might be a link between pirates and Al-Shabaab since
Merca is known as an Al-Shabaab-controlled area. Again, there seems
to be no evidence of such a connection40 beyond the fact that PAGs
are subject to the same forms of taxation (zakat) as other business operators
in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas. Any deeper connection between
piracy groups and Al-Shabaab is seen as unlikely since they are
ideologically incompatible.41
• On-shore factors: Writing in 2011, Gjelsvik and Bjørgo note that “the
problem of piracy may be understood both as an outgrowth of the
war economy and an outcome of a weak or non-existent state power
and an inadequate police and coast guard”.42 As accounted for in the
introduction, advances have been made in terms of Somali Governance
since 2011 which has arguably effected a slight move away from a war
economy and strengthened state-level power projection (including at
sea). Tensions between the Federal Government and regional states
and consequent alienation of clans such as the Ali Suleiban clan still
limit the incorporation of certain sections of the country into the national
security architecture. Tensions are also reflected in the inability
of the National Security Council to formalise the organisational division
of responsibilities in the maritime sector as a whole. As these factors
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 18
remain influential, pockets of lawless spaces where PAGs can operate
freely still exist.
Also, the prevalent ‘Robin Hood’ narrative of pirates being a
force for protection against illegal fishing in Somali waters resonated
among coastal communities in the early days of piracy and, arguably,
militated against firmer action on the issue. It is important to note,
however, that, while pirates may initially have enjoyed the support of
coastal communities, this quickly faded. Rather than being a source of
positive community development, pirate money negatively impacted
communities bringing with it drugs, khat, and alcohol.43 Other conditions
that enabled piracy to thrive still exist, however. These include
lack of state control in isolated coastal areas, socio-economic disparity44,
and weak institutions. As stated by a convicted pirate who will
remain anonymous: “the international community has done a lot to
counter piracy but the measures taken will only have an effect in the
short term. Naval patrols, armed guards, and prosecutions is a great
short-term fix, but if you want to stop piracy in the future, you need
stability in Somalia itself, particularly political stability. The Harardhere
area, where piracy has always been very active, is not under government
control and pirates are still able to move around freely. Unless
the Government can extend its reach to these areas, piracy will always
be a problem for Somalia.”45
As is often the case, poverty and lack of licit employment opportunities
push people into criminal activities.46 Concerns have even
been raised in the past of law enforcement officers being tempted to
engage in piracy due to insufficient and irregular payment of salary.47
This is naturally an important on-shore factor which may have been
exacerbated by the persistent drought which has hit Somalia hard in
recent years. As another interviewed piracy prisoner stated, “the thing
that could have stopped me from becoming a pirate is employment
from the Government. If the Government creates more opportunity for
the youth, it would be a good measure to counter piracy.”48 It is important
to also acknowledge, however, that the reckless urge for adventure
is a common characteristic among youth anywhere. Gjelsvik
and Bjørgo further argue that the need for young Somali men to protect
their self-dignity and masculine reputation enhances the appeal of
criminal and armed groups.49 One piracy prisoner states that “the
young people that were attracted to piracy had bad habits – social vices
such as smoking, drinking, and chewing khat. Feeding these habits
was one of the main drivers for their going out to sea because they
wanted to get rich quick.”50 Another statement to that effect is the
point that “piracy was never something that was supported by the
family. It was something you would hide from your family – something
adventurous.”51 With ransom payments reaching upwards of USD 10
million, the attraction of engaging in piracy for youths with poor prospects
is plain.
Several interviewees also mentioned impunity for piracy kingpins
as a critical obstacle to effective counter-piracy efforts by the international
community. The explanation of this lack of redress is to be
found in the socio-political context in Somalia which is characterised by
inter-clan power negotiations. Both Garfanje and Yuluh have significant
political influence, which protects them from prosecution.52 Gar-
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fanje has been apprehended numerous times but always quickly released
again – once upon issuance of a diplomatic passport.53
Finally, another important on-shore factor is the threat posed
by Al-Shabaab, and the extent to which that threat, understandably,
means that fighting maritime crime – including but not limited to piracy
– is not a top priority at Government level. As stated at a Maritime
Crime Symposium in Nairobi, “Al-Shabaab kills our people, pirates
don’t”.54
Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus
The frequency of piracy attacks is now back to pre-2008 levels and attempted
hijackings have not been successful.55 Although the view that piracy can
easily flare up again has been put forward by numerous interviewees,56 there
are divergent views that challenge this position. Two main reasons why piracy
is not likely to return were put forward at a workshop in Copenhagen in
May 2018. One is that piracy kingpins have now invested in more legitimate
businesses and would not want to jeopardise those investments by reengaging
in piracy.57 Another reason is that ships have become such hard
targets that all other revenue streams would have to be turned off to make
the piracy model attractive again.58
Notwithstanding these different views, what seems to be clear is that
two PAGs still operate out of Puntland and Galmudug and they have the
funds, weapons, skiffs, and militia to carry out attacks if a genuine opportunity
to take a ship was to present itself. Looking forward, it is therefore
important to recognise that if measures of deterrence are relaxed by international
actors as well as by industry and if onshore conditions remain unchanged,
there could potentially be another upsurge in piracy. Also, although
these PAGs have not been able to hijack a ship, they are engaged in
other illicit activities which negatively impact stability in Somalia.
Human Trafficking
People have always moved between the African continent and the Saudi
Peninsula via the Gulf of Aden. Today, however, these flows form the foundation
of a big business of TiPSoM. Writing in 2011, Bahadur noted that:
“the stretch of the Gulf of Aden linking northern Somalia and Yemen is one
of the world’s busiest human smuggling routes.”59 Of all the maritime
crimes analysed in this chapter, TiPSoM is replete with the most horrific accounts
of cruelty and human suffering, which is both an effect and a driver
of instability.
Status
It is noteworthy that, despite armed conflict, humanitarian crisis, and extremely
high levels of violence, a significant number of migrants are still determined
to use the migration route through Yemen to Europe.60 In a
somewhat counter-intuitive way, it seems the conflict in Yemen has, on the
one hand, prompted more TiPSoM activities across the Gulf of Aden while at
the same time exacerbating the threats migrants face. Generally, there are
two61 migration groups:
1. North-bound: principally migrants from the HoA bound for wealthy
countries in the Gulf and Europe.62 The Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
refers to this as the Eastern Route63 between Somalia and Yemen. While
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 20
there are significantly more people being trafficked from the HoA to
Yemen, than the other way,64 International Organisation for Migration
(IOM) data shows a reduction in migration flows from Somalia to Yemen
from 111,500 in 201665 to around 87,000 in 2017.66 This is corroborated
by the DRC who note that, due to deportations from Yemen, “the
number of migrants arriving into Yemen from the HoA via the Red Sea,
the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden were slightly lower than in
2016”.67 Numbers might, however, rise again if political shifts in both
Eritrea and Ethiopia push more people to cross.68 Recently, there have
been reports that those trafficked to Yemen have – upon discovering
that ‘Yemen is impossible’ – decided to embark upon another journey
either to Egypt or to Sudan.69
2. South-bound: populations fleeing cholera epidemics, famine, and
armed conflict in Yemen. They primarily move via the ports of Aden and
Al-Mukallah.70 This group is predominantly made up of Somali migrants
living in Yemen who decided to return to Somalia due to insecurity in
Yemen and, to a lesser extent, Yemenis fleeing conflict.71 According to
the DRC, approximately 34,990 Somali refugee returnees and 10,776
Yemeni refugees and asylum seekers arrived in Somalia between 2014
and 2017. Notably, the migration flow from Yemen seems to have risen
in 2017 compared to 2016.72
While the number of migrants transiting through Yemen has fallen slightly in
2017, levels of abuse have increased with amplified levels of lawlessness in
Yemen.73 Indeed, the Head of UNODC GMCP has received reports from
both the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) of people being trafficked on fishing vessels in
extremely bad conditions – clearly against their will. Migrants from the HoA
in Yemen report having been kidnapped by criminals who were waiting for
them upon their arrival and who forced them to make phone calls to relatives
pressuring them to send money. There are also frequent reports of rape
and torture74 and the level of abuse seems to be determined according to
ethnic background.75 Correspondingly, Eritreans are increasingly using the
Eastern Route while Christians prefer to go through Sudan. 76 A newer trend
Figure 3:
Migration Routes in the HoA
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is that traffickers throw migrants overboard as they approach the Yemeni
coast.77 In August 2017, for example, 300 migrants were thrown overboard
within 24 hours. As explained by UNHCR, “migrants were forced by their
smuggler to jump overboard a few hundred meters away from the shore to
avoid a possible inspection by the Yemeni Coast Guard.”78 UNHCR has
launched the information campaign #DangerousCrossings to warn communities
in the HoA region of the dangers migrants face when traveling to
Yemen to deter migrants from making the journey across the Gulf of Aden.
• Deterrents: International navies patrolling in the Gulf of Aden and
around the BAM Strait tend to stay away from TiPSoM,79 although International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)80 obligations
have led to instances of rescue at sea.81 The Somaliland Coastguard
and the BPMPU are frequently required to respond in cases of
overloaded ships arriving from Yemen with dehydrated and famished
people on board. There have also been cases of capsizing for which
rescue at sea operations have been launched both from Somalia and
Yemen.82 In addition to search and rescue operations, there have been
arrests of smugglers – particularly in Puntland. 83 Since launch sites are
within reach of MLE authorities in Puntland, however, more effective
intervention should be possible.84 On the Yemeni side, as noted above,
there have been instances where migrants have been thrown overboard
as smugglers caught sight of the Coastguard. A concern in that
context is that efforts to build capacity of the Yemeni Coastguard
might inadvertently aggravate this problem.85
• Criminal networks: UNHCR describe the networks behind TiPSoM in
Yemen as “well-established, transnational smuggling and human trafficking
networks that actively promote their services to migrants and
profit from Yemen’s weakened governance“.86 As noted above, TiPSoM
is highly profitable. Indicative of how lucrative the business is, the
DRC estimates that Ethiopian migrants moving to Yemen via Somalia
pay traffickers up to USD 1,540 for the journey.87 Ethiopian and Somali
migrants most frequently cited prices between USD 100 and USD 250
for boat crossings to Yemen.88 Considering the volume of migrants
moving via this route, this journey generates significant sums of money
for smuggling networks. It is also worth noting that migrants tend to
pay upon arrival. This indicates the involvement of financiers, which
points towards an elevated level of organisation.89 An important reason
why numerous individuals are willing to travel to Yemen is that
smuggling operators convince migrants that the conflict has made
Yemen a ‘free run’,90 omitting information about the dangers they will
face upon arrival.91 On the Somali side, smuggling networks operate in
coastal areas using fibreglass boats that are small enough to enter
shallow waters (waist high) so that they can pick up people without
the direct scrutiny of port authorities.92
• On-shore factors: Key drivers of migration from Somalia to Yemen
stem from many of the same on-shore factors that drive piracy: insecurity,
political instability, humanitarian emergency caused by drought,
and lack of opportunities. In Bosasso, which is an important transit
point for migrants traveling to Yemen,93 local communities hold smugglers
in contempt. This is due to the drain of young men and women
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 22
who are persuaded to leave and the economic burden this imposes on
the families who have to sell property and borrow money to pay for
the journeys.94 As a last resort, families hand youths who are determined
to make the journey to corrections services in Somalia in order
to prevent them from leaving.95
Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus
Interviewees have raised two key concerns about the potential for a wider
impact of TiPSoM on regional stability: one relates to the significant sums of
money that criminals gain from being involved in the business of irregular
migration which is liable to build very powerful criminal syndicates. There is
a general lack of knowledge about what happens to this money but the notion
that the TiPSoM model is based on financiers is an indication that the
networks already have considerable strength and organisation. The second
concern relates to the lack of capacity to manage irregular migration in the
region as an ‘enabling on-shore factor’ for violent extremism. The fear is that
radicalised elements may take advantage of the lack of capacity in Somalia
and Yemen to register all cross-boundary movements and move undetected
on the same routes. Indeed, a number of interviewees noted the risk that
‘criminal elements’ may be able to move freely amid migrant flows as a key
concern when asked about trends in human trafficking in the HoA region.
A number of interviewees also connect human trafficking to other
types of maritime crime, notably weapons smuggling and piracy. We elaborate
on such linkages in the second chapter of this section.
Weapons Smuggling
Weapons smuggling was highlighted as a prevailing form of maritime crime
in numerous interviews carried out for this report.96 Generally, three types of
weapons smuggling can be distinguished: (a) weapons smuggling involving
organised criminal networks, (b) ‘ant trade’, which alludes to how some
weapons smuggling “is accomplished through numerous small-scale transfers”
97, and (c) weapons smuggling where state actors are involved.
Status
Yemen is, according to various observers, emerging as a “key trafficking
hub” for the smuggling of illegal weapons98 and, according to European Union
Capacity Building (EUCAP) Somalia, “it seems to be on the rise in the
waters off the coast of Somalia.” Weapons are generally smuggled via maritime
routes from the Makran Coast to Yemen and Somalia – with lighter
weapons going to Somalia and heavier weapons to Yemen.99 A Conflict Armament
Research report from 2016 points to the “existence of a weapons
pipeline extending from Iran to Yemen and Somalia, which involves the
transfer, by dhow, of significant quantities of Iranian-manufactured weapons
and weapons that plausibly derive from Iranian stockpiles”. 100
The conflict in Yemen has caused a heightened demand for weapons
and, as a result, illegal trafficking of weapons has intensified. Iranians seem
to be using dhow traffic to send weapons to the Houthi faction.101 The Conflict
Armament Research Group has established a match between weapons
seized at sea by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and weapons recovered in
Yemen by United Arab Emirates forces which is seen to confirm that weapons
enter Yemen via maritime routes.102
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 23
Conversely, Yemen is also a point of origin of maritime weapons smuggling,
particularly to Somalia.103 Some of the weapons smuggled are stolen from
weapons depots in Yemen that are easy to break into.104 The Somalia and
Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) estimates that one or two small-scale
shipments of weapons from Yemen arrive to Somalia by skiff every month105
with Puntland as the primary entry point.106 An important pull factor for this
trade is the demand for weapons from actors in Somalia, notably Al-
Shabaab. An attractive feature of light weapons smuggling as an occupation
is that only very limited equipment is needed – just a few speedboats.107 Also,
it seems that people smugglers optimise profits by investing their smuggling
fee in weapons in Yemen where they are then loaded onto their boats
on the journey back to Somalia and sold for considerable profit.108 Seizures
have also been made of much larger-scale consignments headed for Somalia
in contravention of the weapons embargo109. From May to June 2016, for
example, three small-arms shipments destined for Puntland were identified
as originating from the Yemini port Mukalla.110
Larger shipments of weapons also arrive in Somalia directly from the
Makran Coast in medium-sized dhows. Dhows reportedly trans-ship smaller
consignments to 12-18 feet, high-speed skiffs111 at seven points along the
Somali coastline: Maydh, Qandala, Alula, Xaafu, Eyl, Lebed, and Kismayo.112
Concerning heavier weapons, an Australian Navy frigate intercepted a dhow
carrying 2,197 weapons (including assault rifles and RPG-7-pattern rocket
launchers) in February 2016, apparently headed for Alula in Puntland.113 The
following month, a French frigate seized a similar amount of Iranianmanufactured
assault and sniper rifles114 on a dhow that “was spotted heading
toward Somalia” by a CMF helicopter.115
• Deterrents. The formulation of mandates is a critical issue for actors involved
in combatting weapons smuggling in the WIO region. While
CMF has a clear United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate to
enforce the weapons embargo and prevent weapons flowing into Somalia,
many of the nations that contribute to CMF interpret this mandate
restrictively, which means that they cannot address weapons
smuggling into Yemen. 116 Curtailing the availability of weapons in
Figure 4:
Weapon Smuggling Routes
in the HoA
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 24
Yemen,117 however, seems to be crucial to ensuring stability in the region.
The issue of restrictive mandates, therefore, unhelpfully limits the
deterrent effect that can be achieved through coalitions such as CMF
Task Force 150.
In September 2017, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF)
interdicted a skiff upon receipt of intelligence from EUNAVFOR’s maritime
patrol aircraft indicating that it was carrying a concealed consignment
of weapons. Although a successful operation in the sense
that it was launched in response to intelligence shared by EUNAVFOR,
the navigators of the skiff were not apprehended by the PMPF118 and,
according to the SEMG, the weapons were not properly seized and
may have ended up in the buyers’ hands after all.119 The reason for the
failure to enforce the weapons embargo is unclear, but it sends a problematic
message to smugglers that, even under the scrutiny of
EUNAVFOR and the SEMG, there are no legal repercussions for offenders.
The view that weapons seized should be cut in half in order to
make sure that they are not sold on was put forward at a workshop in
Copenhagen. Destruction of weapons is, however, not as simple as
ivory and drug incineration, as it is difficult to rule out that there may
be a legitimate owner. Adding confusion is the poor implementation
of the partial lifting of the weapons embargo and inconsistent notification
of consignments by the Federal Government to the SEMG, which
makes it difficult to determine whether or not arms shipments are legal.
120
• Criminal networks. There is a general lack of knowledge about the
criminal networks behind weapons smuggling as weapons are seized
at sea and little is known about who the senders on land are, at least
at the higher levels.121 Weapon smugglers use the same sorts of dhows
as drug traffickers and fishers, namely those manufactured by the Al
Mansoor Company in Iran.122 Research conducted by Conflict Armament
Research in 2016 suggested that two out of the three deliveries
that they analysed are likely to have been supplied with the complicity
of Iranian security forces.123 While small-scale weapons are usually destined
for Bosasso and Marrero where they enter the black market,
more sophisticated weapons are commonly destined for the coastal
districts of Qandala and Habbo. According to UNODC’s Programme
Officer in Bosasso, “both former pirates and veteran weapons traffickers
are engaged in arms trafficking sharing the same common motivational
denominator: profit”.
• On-shore factors: Lack of access to remote areas in Puntland is a deciding
enabling factor for the evolvement of Puntland as a weapons trafficking
hub. Also, as highlighted by Secure Fisheries, one of the facilitating
factors of weapons trade is the absence of designated landing
sites for fishing vessels along the Somali coast. In the absence of such
sites, fishing vessels land their catch in remote locations. Since weapons
are often smuggled in fishing boats, these landing sites lend themselves
to covertly bringing in other product such as weapons.124 As
stated in the 2017 Report of the SEMG, “weak governance of the fishing
sector and a lack of institutional capacity for more effective maritime
security, including the monitoring of perhaps more than
200 Iranian and Yemeni fishing dhows operating off the coast of Punt-
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land, exacerbates the risk of fishing dhows being used for illicit purposes,
including small arms trafficking.”125 On the Yemeni side, a
combination of corruption within the military and a strong tradition for
weapon ownership provides for both high supply and demand in the
weapons trade.
Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus
More effective deterrents are needed to combat illicit weapon trade around
the HoA as it has a very direct and damaging impact on security and development
in the region. Indeed, at a workshop in Copenhagen in May 2018,
it was suggested that this issue needs to be further ‘securitised’126, pointing
to the ramifications of the continued proliferation of weapons in the HoA
region, which are not properly recognised. It is, conversely, hard to see how
the issue could become further securitised as it is already subject to a Security-
Council imposed arms embargo with a dedicated monitoring group. Nevertheless,
the security implications of the weapons trade into Somalia are
unquestionable. These are for example evident in the development of Puntland
as a Somali hub for weapons smuggling as well as a hub of nascent ISIL
affiliates.127 The fact that numerous US drone strikes have been directed at
targets in Puntland underlines the gravity of the threats in this region.128 According
to findings in a 2017 Report by Stable Seas, the flow of illicit weapons
into Somalia also “arms Al-Shabaab and is a direct threat to the survival
of the Federal Government of Somalia.”129 The Report goes on to note that
“illicit arms trading in the Somali region amplifies threats to governance,
both within the Somali region and well beyond it.”130 It is with reference to
such effects that weapons seizures are considered to significantly contribute
to “the stabilisation of the region”,131 but sporadic interdictions at sea alone,
cannot solve the problem.
In the long run, it is important to widen the scope of counter arms
trafficking efforts to also include components required to manufacture Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs). Until now, bombs used by Al-Shabaab
have typically been armed with trinitrotoluene (TNT) scraped off old military
munitions at specific dump sites in Mogadishu.132 Once the availability of
TNT in this fashion runs out, it is likely that bombs will be made with chemicals
such as fertiliser. These bags of chemicals would come by sea and would
be much more difficult to identify than arms. They would, nevertheless, be
hugely destructive.133
Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing
To justify their attacks on foreign vessels, Somali pirates notoriously argued
that they defended Somali waters from foreign fishers that ruthlessly depleted
fish stocks and attacked Somali artisanal fishers.134 While this may have
been a sincere argument in the very early days of piracy, the applicability of
illegal foreign fishing135 as a justification for piracy ended when pirates began
to hijack containerships in international waters, as this was clearly not
aimed at deterring illegal fishing in Somalia.136 It would also be erroneous to
consider the problem of illegal fishing as one confined to Somalia. On the
contrary, IUU affects all states in the WIO and is perceived as one of the primary
threats facing the region along with heroin trafficking.137
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 26
Status
According to the Stimson Center, the profits from IUU fishing are valued at
an estimated USD 15.5 to USD 36.4 billion a year globally.138 Indian Ocean
states are generally heavily reliant on the blue economy with large parts of
their populations employed in industries that pertain to the oceans such as
industrial and artisanal fishing and coastal and marine tourism. Fish is also an
important food source in coastal communities. As large-scale IUU depletes
fish stocks and destroys marine life, the problem directly threatens the livelihoods
of whole population sections in the WIO.139 The Kenyan Maritime Police
Unit (KMPU) in Malindi noted that they were frequently required to respond
to cases of Tanzanian fishermen transgressing into Kenyan marine
protected areas. This trend was also noted by the Regional Maritime Information
Fusion Centre in Madagascar (RMIFC) as happening generally around
the Indian Ocean – perhaps as an indication that artisanal fishers are finding
it increasingly hard to survive off the fish stocks that remain in their traditional
fishing grounds. As put by the RMIFC, “unlike the cases of IUU fishing
observed between fishermen from neighbouring states, there are cases that
highlight the existence of organised illegal fishing. These fleets, particularly
trawlers, have a direct impact on the food resources on which traditional
fishermen depend.” By destroying the livelihoods of coastal communities,
large-scale IUU drives people into crime or – ultimately – migration.140 Indeed,
IUU fishing is linked to national and regional political instability and
growing insecurity.141
If we zoom in on the case of Somalia, IUU is a muddier issue, which
continues to be portrayed very differently by different actors.142 On the one
hand, illegal fishing is often raised as a serious problem which requires the
assistance of the international community. On the other hand, Government
action to manage fisheries does not reflect the notion that it is an issue of
primary importance.143 Because of the prevalent narrative of IUU in Somalia
as a justification for piracy, however, there is in the Somali context a security
nexus which gives the issue a different character than in other WIO states.
• Deterrents: According to the RMIFC, there is a “violent depredation of
the Somali population of marine resources by Iranian and Asian fishing
fleets, acting freely since Somali authorities have a limited ability to deploy
law enforcement assets”.144 In consequence, seven incidents, all
involving Iranian fishing vessels, were reported in 2017 of Somali fishermen
engaging in “IUU self-policing” – that is Somali fishermen that
use force to divert foreign vessels which they consider to be fishing illegally.
This practice can easily lead to retaliation and an ensuing escalation
of violence at sea that can inadvertently spin out of control.
These actions are also sometimes wrongly associated with piracy145 and
therefore contribute to distorting data on Somali piracy.
Taking a broader look at possible deterrents to IUU, new
measures have been developed. The introduction of FAO’s Port State
Measures Agreement (PSMA),146 which came into force in June 2016,
engages port authorities around the world to coordinate systematic
denial of port access to notorious IUU vessels. This means that they are
unable to land their catch and make a profit. Use of satellite-based
technology to track IUU fishing vessels also has the potential to expose
IUU vessels that hide behind flags of convenience and fake vessel
IDs.147 Even for vessels that do not appear on Maritime Domain Aware-
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 27
ness (MDA) monitoring equipment tracking the signals that vessels
transmit (which can be switched off), there is an increasing application
of satellite images148 in the detection of non-compliant vessels as well
as algorithms that layer both vessel signals and images to pin-point
suspicious activity.149
As with other types of maritime crime described in this report,
one of the great challenges with addressing IUU is the legal finish, or
lack thereof. In most states, IUU is treated with fines and penalties that
are far too lenient to make a dent in the business model of IUU operators.
Detaining vessels and crew, however, has severe implications for
profitability. Many organisations working to counter IUU, therefore,
propose the ‘multi door approach’150 – exploring every possible legal
venue for prosecution in order to keep vessels in port and ‘out of IUU
action’. This can be everything from detaining a vessel for tax evasion,
SOLAS infringements, or pollution – to more serious offences such as
forced labour. Fish-i-Africa, an NGO that organises a network between
eight states in Eastern Africa to combat IUU in the WIO, has been
working with this approach to increase prosecutions for IUU and associated
crimes with quite some success.151
In terms of at-sea operations at national level, it is clear that interdiction
at sea is a costly form of deterrence. A country such as Seychelles,
for example, has a population of ca 90,000, a landmass of
459 km2, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 1,374,000 km2. Despite
being a middle-income country, patrolling such a vast maritime
space is extremely challenging. For Somalia, having the longest coastline
in continental Africa, power projection at sea is currently limited to
‘ink spots’ around a few key ports. At-sea patrols to interdict IUU fishers
will probably never be a viable deterrent in and of itself in Somalia.
One approach to finding more effective deterrents has been to make
use of technology and work with regional partners in order to build
targeted and intelligence-led operations for more effective fishery inspections
and interdiction at sea.
• Criminal networks behind the most severe forms of IUU, namely largescale
IUU fishing, are highly organised transnational syndicates akin to
drug cartels.152 According to the Stimson Center, “illicit networks are
known to participate in IUU fishing, such as those linked to piracy and
terrorism, as well as trafficking in drugs, arms, and people. These
groups often co-opt workers in the legal fishing industry, use fishing
vessels to disguise operations, and take advantage of disenfranchised
fishers to facilitate their illicit business.”153 As drug syndicates, they
make use of document forgery, bribery, money laundering, high-level
fraud, as well as tax havens and complex shelf company structures that
conceal beneficiary owners.154
• On-Shore Factors: In the context of IUU, the important enabling factors
are found at sea. Generally, vast and anonymous ocean spaces are ideal
to carry out illicit activities with little risk of detection. Although most
large vessels are required to transmit two types of signals, the Vessel
Monitoring System (VMS) and the Automatic Identification System
(AIS), transponders can easily be switched off if there is a wish to ‘go
dark’. In addition, IUU fishers have a number of methods at hand to
conceal the identity of vessels, including use of flags of convenience
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 28
and manipulation of vessel IDs. Another factor which works in favour
of IUU fishers is the difficulty of proving whether a catch is either entirely,
or partially, caught illegally, unregulated, or misreported. An IUU
catch can, for example, be mixed, or ‘white washed’155, with legal
catches through trans-shipments at sea. Skilfully forged or duplicated
licences are also often used.
There are also more localised on-shore conditions that enable
IUU. Despite the economic importance of the blue economy and the
need for sustainable fisheries, corruption-related challenges seriously
obstruct efforts to effectively address IUU. In the context of Somalia,
the ambiguities related to issuance of inshore fishing licences is also an
important enabling onshore factor.156 Also with reference to Somalia,
the RMIFC notes that “the support of local authorities [make] the activity
semi-legal by delivering licences or simply tolerating it”.157
Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus
In relation to Somalia, efforts to analyse overall trends in IUU simply do not
add up to a coherent picture. What is found is rather a multitude of contradictory
views and information. In the absence of coherent evidence to support
a constructive debate on the issue, IUU is widely utilised to perpetuate
misconceptions to promote political agendas. This is particularly problematic
because of the perceived nexus between IUU and piracy and the security implications
of this incendiary narrative. More broadly, however, it is also regrettable
because fisheries are in reality one of very few renewable resources
that can generate revenue in Somalia and promote economic development.
Security issues aside, it must be underlined that IUU fishery is not a
problem that exclusively or even particularly affects Somalia. According to
the RMIFC, incidents of IUU reported in 2017 were comparable for Somalia,
Seychelles, and Comoros. There is, nonetheless, an urgent need to regulate
fisheries more effectively and end large scale IUU. The gravity of the issue
has in fact prompted a movement to have large scale IUU formally considered
a Transnational Organised Crime.158 Compounding the issue is the fact
that IUU is often associated with a range of other types of organised crime
including corruption, money laundering, fraud, smuggling of various contraband,
and exploitation of labour – in some cases amounting to slavery.
When IUU and Transnational Organised Crime coincide, it is popularly categorised
as “Fish Crime.”159
Drugs Smuggling
The primary focus for this segment is heroin smuggling as this trade has the
gravest implications for stability. Double dynamics of violent conflicts and
embargoes affect the routes along which drugs are smuggled. Whilst lowlevel
conflict and some degree of instability may facilitate drugs smuggling,
intense violent conflict may inversely impede drugs smuggling. With the
primary consumer markets for Afghan heroin being in Europe and Russia,
three routes have routinely been used to transport the product:
1. The Northern Route, through Russia. Access to Europe along this route
is obstructed by the EU trade embargo imposed as a result of the Crimea
conflict which entails thorough searches of all containers crossing
into Europe.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 29
2. The Balkan Route, crossing Iran and Turkey. Being on opposite sides of
the Syrian conflict, border security between these countries has been intensified.
3. The Southern Route, Afghan heroin is transported to the Makran Coast
from where it is shipped to the Indian Ocean island states and countries
along the East Africa coast where it is believed to be containerised and
shipped on to Europe.160
As conflicts and embargoes have effectively blocked the Northern and Balkan
routes, smugglers seem to have adapted accordingly, now using the
Southern Indian Ocean Route – also known as the ‘smack track’ and ‘hash
highway’ – as the primary smuggling corridor.161 According to RMIFC, heroin
trafficking is the number one maritime crime affecting countries in the WIO
region.
Status
High yields in poppy production between 2016 and 2017 have caused an
87% rise in heroin production.162 With a six-month processing time, this
heroin is now being trafficked – most likely on the Southern Route. In terms
of calculation of volume, the rule of thumb in drug enforcement is to assume
that about 15% of drugs trafficked on a given route are seized and
85% passes through to consumer markets. Due to poor enforcement capa-
Figure 5:
The Southern Indian Ocean Drug
Smuggling Route
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 30
bilities on the Eastern African coast, there are only very few significant seizures
on land. Conversely, enormous drugs seizures have been made at sea
by CMF both in 2017 and 2018 (see table). In late May 2018, the Combined
Task Force (CTF) 150 also seized “6.2 tonnes of hashish in two separate interdictions
in the space of two days”.163 What is difficult to determine is
whether the increase in the volume of drugs seized is an indication of successful
application of advanced methods of identifying shipments or simply
that more product is being moved on the route.164 The branding put on 1 kg
bags of heroin by producers are called drug stamps.165 These stamps are
monitored and used to track downstream movements of heroin. Drug
stamps on bags seized by CMF have, for example, been identified six months
after interception on streets in the UK. This data is used to extrapolate what
the volume getting past enforcement efforts at sea is likely to be. Recently,
CMF has noted a rise in heroin prices at street-level in the UK, which might
be seen as an indication that seizures have significantly lowered product
availability in consumer markets.166
Information from drug stamps is also used to track drugs ‘upstream’ to
investigate the criminal networks that own the stamps. Isotope testing is further
used to determine the geographic origin of the poppy used in a consignment,
as isotope values are strong indicators of where the poppy gum
was grown. Both isotope readings and drug stamps from CMF seizures suggest
that the origin of the heroin smuggled along the Southern Route is Taliban-
controlled areas in Afghanistan.167 As such, there is a link between terrorist-
financing and drugs smuggling.168
The volume of narcotics flowing to Eastern African states is detrimental
to the social fabric of the affected countries. Facilitators in trans-shipment
countries such as Kenya and Seychelles are often paid ‘in kind’ with product.
As their profit comes from selling heroin to local consumers, this ‘leaks’ heroin
into local markets.169 Secondary effects of this trade thus include the development
of consumer markets in trans-shipment countries like Pakistan,
Kenya, Mauritius, and Seychelles causing increased drug dependency.
Source: Wright170
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
(as of
June)
Figure 6:
CMF CTF-150 Heroin Seizures in
International Waters
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 31
• Deterrents: Maritime drugs smuggling in the Indian Ocean is a type of
crime characterised by a stark absence of effective deterrents. One obstacle
is the fact that not all international actors operating in the WIO –
and not even all nations contributing to CMF – have mandates, which
allow them to undertake counter-narcotics operations. Flag verification
boarding on commercial vessels are difficult to carry out and so the
targets for inspections are typically dhows, even though steel-hulled
vessels are also known to smuggle drugs (including the Al Noor, which
was seized in Kenya).171
Another form of deterrence which is currently under-exploited
is prosecution. There is currently no ‘legal finish’ to drug interdictions.
As in the early days of piracy, what is seen is a practice of ‘catch and
release’ – in most cases, interception simply results in drugs being
thrown overboard. The risk run by actors involved in heroin smuggling
is therefore too trivial to serve as an effective deterrent.172 Since only a
limited number of skippers are sufficiently skilled to navigate along the
long Southern Indian Ocean Route and also willing to take the risk involved
in the drugs trade,173 apprehending captains and seizing ships
seems to be one effective way to disrupt the business model of smuggling
networks.
• Criminal networks: As opposed to the criminal networks behind most
of the other maritime crimes presented in this chapter, the networks
behind drugs smuggling are “specialised purpose networks” that are
well-established at both exit and entry points of the trade.174 The type
of vessel most commonly intercepted by CMF is the traditional Iranian
dhow, typically produced by the Al Mansour ‘leasing’ company in
Iran.175 Important seizures have also involved other types of vessels including
container ships (for example, MSC IVANA)176 but these are rare.
177
Since Iranian dhows do not transmit signals that can be detected
by satellites, they are difficult to spot using MDA systems that track
VMS and AIS data. 178 As with weapons smuggling, drugs will often be
trans-shipped from dhows onto smaller boats at sea, which then carry
the product to shore, landing at concealed locations including border
areas. CMF reports of clusters of dhows loitering for several days
around handover points quite far out.179 Drug trafficking was highlighted
by the KMPU as a key challenge. Keeping shipments from
reaching the coast is nearly impossible as remote landing sites are out
of reach to the KMPU and because smugglers have far more powerful
engines that can outrun KMPU boats.180 The amount of heroin going
directly into Kenya and Tanzania seems to have gone down as a result
of counter-measures taken – particularly in Tanzania.181 This has stimulated
a repositioning of the trade to Mozambique.182
Although Mozambique has long been a transit point for narcotics
183 with a few key families of Asian descent controlling the
trade,184 recent involvement of Islamic extremists in this trade is a development
which is currently attracting growing concern.185 Islamist
militants, including individuals from the Mozambican Somali community
and Tanzanian nationals186, are now reported to be at the heart of
the heroin trade in Mocímboa da Praia in the northern district of Cabo
Delgado187 and around the port of Nacala where containers laden with
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drugs arrive.188 These militant groups allegedly get a cut of the profits
from the heroin trade in exchange for protecting shipments. A number
of affiliations to terrorist organisations have been proposed including
‘Mozambique Al-Shabaab’ (which are not to be associated with Al-
Shabaab in Somalia) and ‘Swahili Sunnah’.189 While the Mozambique
Government approach towards tackling heroin trafficking has been rather
relaxed so far,190 this might change with the escalation of violence
that comes with an incursion of violent extremists.191
Drugs trafficked through Mozambique ultimately end up in
South Africa, which is believed to be the primary location for the onward
movement of heroin to consumer markets – typically concealed
within shipments of bulk export products such as wine and oranges.192
Smugglers moving product in containers continuously find new ways
to conceal consignments. One example is the ‘rip on, rip off’ technique
where drugs are placed in containers without the knowledge of the
owner using forged seals.193 Anecdotally, there are reports of drug
parcels with Global Positioning System (GPS) transponders having been
dropped along the East Africa Coast and carried by ocean currents as
far as South Africa – effectively blindsiding deterrent efforts to interdict
trans-shipments at sea.194
While heroin is primarily landed along the East Africa coast and
on Indian Ocean islands, there are anecdotal accounts of heroin being
trans-shipped in coastal areas in Somalia and on Socotra Island. Suspicion
is that, rather than moving product across land, heroin is moved
on to Yemen from where it is trafficked on Red Sea routes to Egypt.
Given lack seizures, however, there is little evidence to corroborate
these statements. It is, nonetheless, an issue which merits further research.
195
• On-shore factors: There seems to be a geographic delineation for landbased
drugs smuggling which is, as mentioned above, determined by
the double dynamics of violent conflicts and embargoes. The conclusion
from all interviews is that Somalia as a corridor for drugs smuggling
seems non-existent.196 Three main reasons for this are emphasised.
Firstly, as opposed to sugar, the consumer market for heroin is
neither in Somalia nor in Kenya but rather in Europe. Moving product
over land from Somalia into Kenya, therefore, adds a superfluous
transit point to the journey. Secondly, the infrastructure required for
onward movement of drugs is not ideal in Somalia. On the contrary,
improved roads and ports in countries like Kenya are seen as a factor,
which, unintentionally, has made Kenya a more attractive point of
transit. Finally, Somalia is not used as a transit country because it is
deemed too unstable. Traffickers gravitate towards a ‘sweet spot’ in
terms of instability. An interviewee termed this the ‘Goldilocks rule’ as
the security climate for heroin smuggling can be neither too hot, nor
too cold – it has to be just right.197 The present complex political landscape
in Somalia simply means that there are too many security actors
one would have to bribe to ensure collaboration – unnecessary complications
considering other routes are open.198
The extent of political elite involvement and corruption associated
with the drugs trade is impossible to ignore as a crucial facilitating
factor for illicit trade to go unhindered at different points of entry. The
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relationship between corrupt state actors and drugs trafficking networks
can be characterised as symbiotic. An example of this is that
‘drug money’ paid to gain unhindered access to ports helps to fund
political campaigns.199 Such transactions create mutual dependency between
criminal networks and political elites, a relationship which is very
difficult to break. Whilst an increasing number of serious cases of drug
trafficking have been heard in the Court in Mombasa, no convictions
have yet been meted out.200 This has largely been attributed to the
protection afforded to persons involved in drug trade due to their influence
on the political elite.
Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus
The set-up of criminal networks and onshore factors work in harmony to
make drug-trafficking through Eastern Africa a profitable business, which is
further aided by the fact that there are hardly any effective measures of deterrence.
As terrorist networks seem to be involved in both production and
trafficking of heroin, there is no question that heroin trade is an important
source of terrorist financing – from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region to Eastern
Africa through the Southern Indian Ocean smuggling route. Corruption
associated with drug trafficking is also of great concern as this permeates
the state apparatus in affected states to the extent that it undermines the
checks and balances that are essential for democratic structures to function.
Compounded by the increasing rates of drug dependency, drug trafficking
can have serious implications for regional stability.
Armed Violence at Sea
In this segment, we shift the focus from the five above-mentioned types of
maritime crime to looking at a different category of maritime insecurity
which it is impossible to overlook when assessing current trends in insecurity
at sea, looking beyond the coast of Somalia. In short, we move from maritime
crime to Armed Violence at Sea. According to EUNAVFOR, “spill-over
effects of the Yemeni crisis into the maritime domain led to a deterioration
of the maritime security environment in the Southern Red Sea and the BAM
Strait”.201
Figure 7:
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait
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In fact, “industry is more concerned about Red Sea threats to maritime security
than they are about Somali piracy”.202 As insecurity around the BAM is
an emergent issue which is not yet fully understood by security actors operating
in the area, what is provided below is an overview of the issues rather
than an analysis of drivers. Therefore, in place of the analysis of deterrents,
criminal networks, and enabling on-shore factors used in previous segments,
we distinguish between three categories of violence at sea in this segment.
These categories are armed violence related to:
• Maritime activities of terrorist groups in Somalia
• Attacks by non-state actors on vessels around the BAM Strait
• Armed Conflict between Houthi forces and Saudi Coalition forces.
Maritime Activities of Terrorist Groups in Somalia
The SEMG considers Al-Shabaab to be the most immediate threat to peace
and security in Somalia.203 In 2016, Al-Shabaab carried out an attack on
Gaarcad, Puntland, with militants arriving by boat and taking over neighbouring
coastal villages.204 Although Puntland forces launched a counteroffensive
dubbed ‘Operation Thunder’ restoring control over the area, the
attack demonstrated the capabilities of Al-Shabaab to operate from the
sea.205 Since this attack resulted in major defeat and many casualties for the
group, the SEMG deems it highly unlikely that Al-Shabaab will attempt to
launch another sea operation in the future.206 In Kenya, however, according
to RMIFC, Al-Shabaab militants beheaded three fishermen in Lamu in August
2017, subsequently fleeing in skiffs towards Somali waters. 207 The
KMPU also report, on numerous occasions, having interdicted ‘foreign fighters’
attempting to enter Somalia from Kenya by sea to join Al-Shabaab.
These are mainly nationals of the Democratic Republic of Congo who, according
to the KMPU, are promised USD 1,000 per day to fight for Al-
Shabaab.208
Also, regarding terrorist activities in Somalia with maritime dimensions,
the ISIL-aligned faction in Puntland, which is reported to have grown significantly
in strength in 2017,209 allegedly owns skiffs and is known to receive
supplies by sea.210 With a current estimated capacity of 200 fighters of
mixed nationalities, SEMG assessed that the capability of the faction remains
limited but signalled that a potential influx of foreign fighters fleeing military
pressures in Iraq, Syria, and beyond, would present a significant threat to the
region.211 As such, the concern is that Somalia could become a new home
for ISIL as they are pushed out of Syria. Others, however, deem this unlikely
as the faction currently only has support from the Ali Suleiban clan, which is
not enough to establish a stronghold in Somalia. In addition, according
SEMG, there is no noteworthy funding currently directed at the faction. Yet,
it is something that the SEMG keeps an eye on.212
Attacks by Non-State Actors on Vessels around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
There has, particularly since the onset of conflict in Yemen, been a number
of incidents targeting civilian vessels passing through the narrow passage
between Djibouti and Yemen, called the BAM Strait, which seem to come
from non-state actors. Such attacks increased in 2018 and it is civilians from
small boats that have been the primary victims of these attacks with more
than 60 Somali migrants and fishing crew killed in 2017.213 The suspicion is
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that non-state actors, based out of Yemen, are trying to carry out a ‘spectacular
attack’ in the Strait. The main concern to vessels transiting the
Southern Red Sea is the risk of ‘exploding ships’. This risk can take two
forms. One is the use of water-borne IEDs which are rammed into vessels
transiting through the Strait.214 An example is the Galicia Spirit incident on
25 October 2017 where a small, allegedly remotely controlled skiff, laden
with explosives, reportedly attacked before exploding roughly 20 NM from
the vessel.215 The second is ‘suicide boats’ that are also laden with explosives
but manned by an attacker.216 These two types of attacks have also been
combined in the two separate incidents on 6 January 2018, 45 NM off the
port of Al Hudaydah in Yemen.217 They generally seem to have targeted the
stern of the ships, which is where safe rooms are located. This is where the
crew assemble when there are signs of a threat.218 While there is no conclusive
evidence on the source of the ‘exploding ships attacks’, they point to an
emerging maritime terror threat from non-state actors based out of Yemen.
Armed Conflict between Houthi Forces and Saudi Coalition Forces
The conflict between Houthi forces and Saudi Coalition forces has, on various
occasions, spilled into the maritime domain, particularly around the port
city of Mokha at the entrance to the BAM in Yemen. As stated at a Conference
in Nairobi in March 2018, there is “a continuous militarisation of the
Red Sea”. A maritime intelligence report from late 2017 finds that a worrying
development in the safety of shipping lanes in the Southern Red Sea is
“the deployment of sea mines by the Houthis” which, despite being “targeted
towards the Saudi coalition”, may nonetheless have an effect on civilian
vessels transiting close to the coastline.219 If such mines, which are essentially
indiscriminate, are not identified and removed by the Saudi forces, they
“will, in time, break free from their moorings and drift”.220 They can then
drift into any ship transiting the area.221 Secondly, there is also the concerning
use of missiles fired by Houthi rebels against Saudi military targets at sea
which have been used with much accuracy as regards targeting.222 In October
2016, for example, an anti-ship missile fired from the shore and, claimed
by Houthi rebels, damaged a United Arab Emirates (UEA) supply vessel. Further
highlighting the threat that conflict in Yemen may spill over into the
maritime domain was the attack on a World Food Programme (WFP) vessel
on 3 June 2018.223 The WFP vessel was attacked after having delivered a
shipment at Yemen’s Hodeidah Port.224 According to EUNAVFOR and CMF,
it is unlikely that this attack was piracy-related – rather they believe that it
most likely was related to the conflict in Yemen.
There is clearly a risk of collateral damage as armed conflict moves to
one of the narrowest and busiest shipping lanes in the world. The view that
failures to achieve effect will deter perpetrators from attempting attacks in
the future was contradicted at a workshop organised by CMS in Copenhagen.
Participants were rather convinced that, considering the potentially
dramatic effect of a large-scale incident at sea, Houthis will continue to try
and the different assailants are learning from each other’s failures. 225
EUNAVFOR also confirms that the risk for merchant vessels operating in the
area is increasing. Whilst it is considered unlikely that merchant vessels are
deliberately targeted, there is a risk of misidentification.226 Adding to this is
the assessment that “Yemen’s civil war shows no sign of abating.”227
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Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus
There is an escalation of violence at sea in one of the world’s busiest choke
points for maritime activities. Self-protection measures adopted for piracy
such as armed guards and safe havens will not be effective in mitigating the
risks associated with these attacks. Moreover, international navies can only
serve as a very limited source of recourse and as important providers of intelligence
to the shipping industry.228 Although there have been no large-scale
incidents to date, the escalation of violence currently seen could result in
everything from an environmental disaster to a mass casualty incident and
even a maritime security incident that triggers an international conflict.229
Noting the littoral states surrounding the BAM Strait (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti,
Yemen, and Somalia), it is clear that there is no regional capacity to manage
a large-scale incident at sea. Security surrounding the Strait has, correspondingly,
been at the top of the agenda in international fora such as the
deconfliction meetings of CMF and EUNAVFOR (SHADE) and more research
is underway by UNODC to map the concrete threat landscape.
1.2 A Broad View: Interlinkages, Dynamics, and Reflections
Whilst it is important to look at trends in maritime crime at an individual level
to understand the factors that drive them, it is equally important to look
at how different types of maritime crime are connected.230 Understanding
such interlinkages is particularly useful when contemplating how to effectively
counter one or more types of maritime crime. Another important notion
to appreciate when considering how to address maritime crime is the
dynamics at play within the maritime crime complex which is in constant
change due to the adaptability of criminal networks. If the business model
for a given crime is under pressure, criminal networks have a remarkable
ability to reposition either geographically or thematically to other types of
crime. We use the term ballooning effect to describe this dynamic of how
countermeasures that ‘push’ the problem (at one end of the balloon) may
unintentionally displace air (or criminal activity) to the other end of the balloon.
231
The importance of looking at the totality of transnational organised
crime was highlighted in both interviews and workshops.232 This means that
countermeasures that go beyond pushing a crime in a different direction (either
thematically or geographically) must take account of a fuller and more
detailed picture of how the crime scene at sea is interconnected and what
types of criminal network are behind the trade. As noted by an interviewee,
piracy can only be understood “by putting in perspective the interactions
with the other types of maritime activities, starting with IUU fishing and
smuggling activities by sea.”233
Therefore, based on the overview of developments and drivers for the
six types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity presented in the above
segments, we elaborate on how interlinkages and dynamics generated
through ballooning effects are visible if looking at the totality of maritime
crime off the HoA, or the maritime crime complex.
Interlinkages and Dynamics
We have introduced many key concepts and conditions in the above presentation
of five types of maritime crime and an additional type of maritime insecurity.
In essence, we have found that it is important to understand how
criminal networks behind maritime crime operate, and which on-shore fac-
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tors enable their operations in order to identify effective deterrents. Adding
to this picture, we now take a broader look at the maritime crime complex
off the HoA, looking at how crimes are interlinked and how dynamics of ballooning
have manifested themselves. These are seen in two main clusters
described below.
Piracy-TiPSoM-Weapons Smuggling-Terrorism
When looking at piracy in relation to broader trends in maritime crime – rather
than in isolation – it seems more correct to refer to those involved in
PAGs as ‘poly-criminals’ rather than just ‘pirates’. Arguably, the onset of conflict
in Yemen and drought in Somalia raised the demand for criminals with
navigation skills in Somalia. These developments coincided with the successful
suppression of Somali piracy, which rendered the business high risk/low
profit. So, whilst piracy was no longer a lucrative business, a big market for
TiPSoM emerged. Essentially, former pirate networks mobilised existing logistics,
manpower, and financial liquidity and ballooned into other smuggling
enterprises – TiPSoM being one of them.234 Adding to this, and as indicated
by the RMIFC, it makes no sense from a business perspective for a vessel
to carry out one leg of a journey with an empty hull.235 Boats ferrying
people between Somalia and Yemen appear to be following this logic of
profit maximisation as they have been seen to smuggle people to Yemen,
purchase weapons for their smuggling fee, and return to Somalia with
weapons as cargo which are then sold at great profit.236
On several occasions, the BPMPU has found consignments of small
arms on the same boats used to smuggle migrants north as they return from
Yemen. UNODC GMCP in Bosasso takes pictures of these arms shipments
which are sometimes hidden inside bags of rice, dates, and onions. Whilst
this may be no more than ‘ant-trade’ run strictly for business purposes, these
weapons usually end up in the hands of terrorists.237 As stated by UNODC
GMCP’s Programme Officer in Bosasso, “illegally smuggled weapons primarily
end up in the hands of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab assassinators
called Amniyat”. More directly, the pirate kingpin Issa Yuluh is said to have
been instrumental in supplying weapons to Al-Shabaab. The leader of the
ISIL-associated faction in Puntland, Abdiqadir Mu’min, whom Yuluh is related
to, also uses clan kinship to receive weapons supplies from Yemen
through the Yuluh PAG, or they simply use the PAG’s skiffs and dhows.238
Conversely, the SEMG is aware of weapons that formerly belonged to
Mu’min having changed hands to the Yuluh PAG in Alula after his faction
was driven out of Qandala in late 2016.239
Considering the breath of fresh air this trade blows into PAGs as well
as the complicity in the horrific practices of TiPSoM networks and the indirect
supply of weapons to terrorist networks, this crime cluster and the individuals
within it should not be overlooked as these types of maritime crimes
drive instability. A key ‘take-away’ for policy developers, therefore, is that –
if the aim is stabilisation – a wider focus that looks beyond piracy is required.
240
Smuggling-Terrorist Financing241
In addition to direct terror threats at sea outlined in the segment on Armed
Violence above, there are a number of smuggling activities at sea that are
more indirectly connected to terrorism, as revenue generated from these activities
finance terrorist networks from Afghanistan across to Eastern Africa.
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The linkages between maritime smuggling and terrorism are especially important
to consider in section 3 of this report, as the purpose of this report is
to identify types of maritime crimes that have implications for regional stability.
It is well established that illicit trade in sugar and charcoal is taxed by
Al-Shabaab and have, in effect, become an important source of terrorist financing.
In fiscal terms, sugar smuggling is estimated to generate a total of
USD 400 million per year, which is divided between businessmen, politicians,
local border authorities, and defence forces in Kenya and Al-Shabaab.242
With regard to charcoal, SEMG estimates that Al-Shabaab collects at least
USD 10 million annually by taxing consignments at key checkpoints.243 Although
charcoal trade between Somalia and the Gulf States is banned under
UNSC Resolution 2385 (2017),244 SEMG reports of poor implementation in
2017, pointing out that this has “facilitated Al-Shabaab financing and undermined
counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia.” Reasons for the poor implementation
of the embargo include challenges related to disposal of seized
charcoal shipments by international actors like EUNAVFOR or CMF.245 Firstly,
the product cannot be thrown overboard as is often done with drugs seized
at sea because charcoal floats. If the cargo is taken back to Somalia, Al-
Shabaab may benefit from being able to tax it yet again. If they transport it
on to markets in the Gulf, there is a risk that the navies may absurdly come
to facilitate the trade. Finally, destruction of the charcoal by incineration (as
is done with ivory) cannot be justified due to the environmental implications
this would have. One solution may be to distribute the charcoal to displaced
families in Somalia through AMISOM.246 The challenge of how to effectively
implement the charcoal ban continues to be a challenging question, particularly
for UNODC, which is charged by the UNSC with identifying solutions to
how the trade might be disrupted.247
In interviews, it was pointed out that to grasp the extent of Al-Shabaab
funding from illegal trade into and out of Somalia, it was unhelpful to focus
too narrowly on sugar and charcoal – Al-Shabaab does not. A one-off tax of
USD 1,000-2,000 is collected per truck of goods that arrive in Somalia by sea
destined for Kenya – regardless of content.248
Looking beyond Somalia to the heroin trade and the financing of terrorism
in Afghanistan, the strength of this link is evidenced by the fact that
one of the main tasks of CMF is to interdict heroin smugglers and deny the
use of the high seas to terrorist and illicit non-state actors. As former CTF
150 Commander, Commodore Mal Wise, stated in connection with a heroin
interdiction in March 2018: “We know that heroin seizures like today’s will
have a direct impact on the operations of terrorist organisations at distribution
points in East Africa. Removing heroin from circulation, reduces the
funding resources available for terrorists, which then reduces their ability to
inflict suffering on the communities in East Africa.”249
Reflections on the Maritime Crime Complex
It is clear when looking at the broader crime complex at sea, that it is not
useful to tackle individual types of maritime crime in isolation. As an interviewee
notes, “a narrow focus on piracy does not position the international
community well in terms of tackling the wide array of other threats present
in and around Somalia.”250 The full spectrum of crimes at sea must be taken
into account when designing future interventions aimed at countering maritime
crime.
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In section 3, the developments, drivers, interlinkages, and dynamics accounted
for in section 1 will be considered against the outcome of the Evaluation
of current Danish-funded interventions to counter maritime crime by
UNODC’s GMCP in Somalia (section 2). To round off this chapter, however,
we offer a few overall reflections engendered by the process of data collection
and analysis carried out in the course of this study of the maritime crime
complex off the HoA and beyond, which will also feed into conclusions in
section 3.
Clusters
Looking at the linkages between different forms of maritime crime presented
above, there is evidence that maritime criminal activity happens in clusters.
There is, for example, a link between maritime crime between Somalia
and Yemen. This includes weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and the
involvement of PAGs – all of which, in some form, support terrorist activities
and other sources of instability in the HoA region. A different set of linkages
appear between maritime crimes in the WIO where the most prominent
types are IUU and drugs smuggling, with the latter having linkages to terrorist
financing from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region to Eastern Africa. Another
cluster is violence around the BAM which involves a different set of actors,
including possibly AQAP and Houthi rebels who seem to have similar objectives
to carry out ‘spectacular attacks’ and who learn from each other’s mistakes.
This category demonstrates how maritime crime and violence at sea
represents “a diversification of the threat” in the WIO.251 Equal for all three
clusters, however, is that much of the criminal activity is enabled by dhow
traffic going between the Makran Coast and Eastern Africa and much of the
revenue generated from criminal enterprises feed terrorist groups.
Terminology
While military definitions exist on piracy and armed robbery at sea, a point
to be developed further in light of emerging types of maritime threats is that
there seems to be a need to introduce new categories of crime. Definitions
are, for example, needed to understand attacks on merchant shipping in the
Southern Red Sea whose origins are not piracy, but related to conflict and
terrorism.252 This is necessary in order to accurately reflect the nature of the
wide array of incidents recorded at sea in statistics and, as such, it is a prerequisite
for clearly understanding events unfolding in the maritime crime
complex. Accordingly, CMF and EUNAVFOR are currently working on a revised
template of military maritime security event definitions. This has led to
wider work being undertaken by OBP to address the absence of harmonisations
of global reporting standards and definitions in the three principle locations
of maritime insecurity: HoA, Gulf of Guinea, and South East Asia.253
The idea of developing additional definitions to reflect nuances in incidents
recorded might indeed also be useful to better understand trends in piracy
off the HoA – for example whether an incident is straightforward piracy or
actually retaliation for illegal fishing. If all attacks seen off Somalia are simply
labelled as piracy, statistics will not reflect the root of the challenge accurately.
Since the data is there, it would make sense to expand terminology so
that efforts to counter piracy make optimal use of the information at hand –
and in so doing, have better chance of being effective.
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Agility
Having acknowledged that ballooning enables criminal networks to persist
despite deterrents targeting their operations, it may be worthwhile for international
actors to draw a lesson on adaptability from their criminal counterparts.
One of the pitfalls of overly narrow mandates is the risk of fragmented
and ineffective responses to interconnected types of crime. While criminal
networks behind weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and piracy are interconnected,
for example, responders are blinkered to only focus on individual
forms of crime. Indeed, a reoccurring conclusion in the individual
crime segments above is that narrow mandates limit the effectiveness of actors
deterring maritime crime. Adding to this rigidity is the obstacle of accessing
areas where criminal activity is concentrated, which is key to fighting
maritime crime. Nevertheless, the most important areas are insecure and
therefore inaccessible to external actors. What emerges from this reflection
is the question of how external actors might seek to broaden their mandates
and access in order to respond to current and future threats as and where
they emerge and evolve? This is particularly important in light of the volatility
of the situation surrounding the BAM Strait, the continuous destabilisation
of Yemen, and continued insecurity and humanitarian emergency in Somalia
– all of which may potentially require quick and comprehensive action by international
actors in the near future.
Dhows
The vessels used to transport different types of illegal goods such as weapons
and drugs are Iranian dhows. Further, these are often involved in IUU
fishing in the WIO region.254 Rather than this being indicative of a connection
between the different forms of crime,255 it seems instead to be a question
of accessibility and convenience in the dhow market.256 Dhows involved
in maritime crime in the WIO are often manufactured by the Iranian Al Mansoor
Company based in Chabahar. They are known to customise dhows according
their buyers’ needs, including rigging hidden compartments and fitting
extra fuel tanks. The latter is required to make the long journey to the
Eastern African coast without having to refuel.257 While Al Mansoor dhows
cater to different types of criminals, this is not in itself indicative of these
crimes being linked, nor does it necessarily imply that the company is complicit
in criminal enterprises.258
However, since Al Mansoor dhows seem to be an instrumental part of
the logistical set-up for smuggling businesses, it may be worthwhile to explore
whether they might form part of the solution either through dialogue
with the company or the Government. The Southern Route Partnership
(SRP), which Iran is part of, may be a suitable forum to seek dialogue and
identify effective measures to counter heroin smuggling through Iran at a
regional level. Like other trans-shipment countries for narcotics, Iran struggles
with the crippling effects of drug dependency, which has grown explosively
in recent years.259 The Government has sought to address problems
with drug abuse including progressive drug treatment campaigns and attempts
to control the trade, which has led to numerous casualties among
police and gendarmerie officers. Given the national health hazard caused by
heroin trafficking at all points of trans-shipment, coming to terms with this
threat might be a common point around which cooperation can be rallied
regardless of political differences. Novel approaches may also be sought to
obstruct the use of the Indian Ocean as a smuggling highway. For example,
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information which could be useful in identifying suspicious vessels is related
to the extra-large fuel tanks rigged on smuggling dhows as they need to
make the long journey without docking to refuel. Since fuel is Governmentsubsidised,
there is a paper trail for the fuelling of dhows. Any form requesting
conspicuous quantities (upwards of 42,000 l.) could therefore be flagged
and information shared through the SRP network.
Counter-Intuitive Consequences
While stability, rule of law, and development are generally seen as being
forces for good, they may have counter-intuitive consequences. By way of
example, ENACT report that “the wide availability of good mobile telephone
coverage in north-east Mozambique since about 2015, makes this a sensible
model for the expansion of the heroin trade there.”260 As noted above, there
seems to be a geographic demarcation for land-based smuggling of heroin
which is drawn at the Kenya/Somalia border. All interviewees indicate that
there is no heroin smuggling in Somalia. The explanation for this deviation is
the ‘Goldilocks Rule’ according to which Somalia is currently too hot for
drugs smuggling. But what if the ‘temperature’ in Somalia was to change to
the ‘sweet spot’ that caters to drugs smuggling? Could a future scenario unfold
in which improvements to security and infrastructure in Somalia coupled
with effective measures to counter narcotics smuggling in other locations
around the WIO could lead the trade to balloon into Somalia? And what
would the societal effects be if a Somali heroin consumer market was to
emerge? Although this is by no means a scenario that will unfold tomorrow,
it might be worth for those monitoring trends in drug trafficking to remember
that joker in the pack.
Corruption Permeation
A common denominator for the types of maritime crime analysed in this section
is that they are all facilitated by corruption. Indeed, as stated by the
Head of UNODC GMCP, “arguably, if you are only running one UNODC
Programme in the region, it should be an anti-corruption project, because all
of these things lead back to corruption. Ironically, it is the one project we are
not running.” Whether piracy, human trafficking, IUU fishery, drugs, or
weapons smuggling – corruption is an indispensable element of the business
model. It also happens at all levels of society, from powerful political figures
seeking funding for political campaigns, government officials issuing illegal
fishing licences, security personnel taxing illicit goods, to the fork lift driver in
the port who accepts a bribe to look the other way. The conclusion that follows
from this reflection is that anti-corruption measures should have a
much more prominent place in counter maritime crime strategies than what
is currently the case.
Impunity
With regard to counter-piracy measures in Somalia, an important gap in efforts
is arrest and prosecution of known pirate kingpins such as Garfanje
and Yuluh. With their leaders at the helm, PAGs have ballooned into other
trades that have destabilising effects on the region such as TiPSoM and
weapons smuggling. The international community continues to push for the
prosecution of piracy kingpins.261 Nevertheless, while hundreds of pirate
‘foot soldiers’ have been successfully prosecuted and sentenced, only very
few kingpins have been tried. One of the challenges is, as accounted for
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 42
above, their status as important power brokers in Somalia, which shields
them from arrest by Somali law enforcement. With regard to prosecution
abroad, there have been only two such cases – both in Belgium. The case of
Afwayne gained much international attention as the kingpin was lured to
Belgium to participate in a fictional film project, upon which he was arrested
and charged for piracy offences along with an associate. It would be safe to
assume that remaining piracy kingpins learnt a lesson in resisting such allure
from that case, so it is doubtful that it could happen again. Therefore, with
little chance of obtaining successful prosecution of remaining piracy kingpins
in Somalia or abroad, it may be worthwhile to find other approaches to ‘removing
the air from the balloons’ of the criminal networks behind piracy in
order to end their destabilising influence on Somalia.
1.3 Section I: Conclusion
In the above, we have looked at specific developments in and drivers of
types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity that are prevalent around
the HoA. We have also looked at how each individual type of crime impacts
regional stability – their maritime crime-stability nexus. Finally, we have
looked at the broader maritime crime complex by mapping how different
forms of maritime crime are interlinked and how the dynamics of ballooning
are at play within the broader crime complex.
One key finding to be drawn from this analysis is that activities of maritime
crime operatives impact regional stability. This can, for example, be
seen in how maritime crime both enables operations of terrorist groups and
finances them. It is also evident that maritime crime fuels corruption, undermining
efforts to establish rule of law and, in some cases, negatively affecting
democratic governance structures more broadly. Piracy, Armed Violence
at Sea, and TiPSoM also directly threatens the lives of seafarers and
migrants. What can also be drawn from the above analysis is that the crime
complex seen off the HoA is dynamic and interconnected and so interventions
aimed at building stability though countering maritime crime and its
destabilising effects should take account of the full crime complex rather
than only individual parts of it (i.e. just piracy).
In section 2, we move from a wide perspective on different types of
maritime crime that currently prevail off the HoA and further into the WIO,
to a more specific analysis of past activities, delivered by UNODC GMCP in
Somalia with funding from the Government of Denmark. This analysis leads
to an Evaluation of whether these activities have met objectives, with what
impact, and whether the rationale for them remain valid.
As underlined in the introduction, this report was commissioned to
contain both an analysis of current trends and an evaluation of past activities
in order to establish a foundation on which to make decisions about future
engagements. Conclusions regarding present crime trends (section 1) and
lessons drawn from past activities evaluated in section 2 will be amalgamated
in section 3, highlighting challenges that are important to be mindful of
when formulating activities targeted at countering maritime crime and proposing
recommendations. It is important to thoroughly underline that the
analysis contained in section 2 does not derive from the conclusions made in
section 1. Section 2 should rather be seen as a distinct undertaking which
can be read in its own right.
The fact that section 2 zooms in on specific activities originally designed with
a narrow focus to counter piracy, may seem to strikingly contradict the con-
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 43
clusion just reached on the importance of raising focus from being narrowly
placed on individual crimes to encompassing the broader crime complex.
Nevertheless, while activities delivered may have been intended to counter
piracy, they have had more general application and so lessons drawn from
these past activities are likewise of more general application in section 3,
which looks at future engagements.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 96
Notes
1 See Katja Lindskov Jacobsen & Mark Winther. ‘Store Masker i Små Net:
Danske Bidrag til International Maritim Kriminalitetsbekæmpelse’. København:
Center for Militære Studier, 2018.
2 See annex A for overview of interviews conducted.
3 Obtained from a broad range of sources, including CMF, EUNAVFOR,
BIMCO, INTERTANKO, NGOs, the CGPCS, and UN agencies – including the
Security Council and the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG).
4 For example: from SafeSeas, the Stimson Center, DIIS, CMS, RUSI, and
Chatham House.
5 An example of this are narratives surrounding IUU fishing in Somali communities.
Another example are political factors which are not visible in statistical
data, but nonetheless can have powerful influence on whether and to what
degree a given issue is addressed (for example, the influence of powerful political
elites on the number of drug seizures).
6 OECD-DAC. ‘Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance’. Paris.
OECD,1991. p. 5.
7 With reference to Participatory Evaluation, Livingston Armytage acknowledges
that, “while this model directly conflicts with positivistic notions of
objectivity, detachment and impartiality, it has received much endorsement”,
especially among scholars who find that classic notions of neutrality
cannot be achieved. See Livingston Armytage, ‘Evaluating Aid: An Adolescent
Domain of Practice’. Evaluation, Vol. 17, no. 3 (2011): pp. 272-273.
8 OECD-DAC. ‘Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management’.
Paris: OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, 2002. p. 28.
9 See annex C.
10 Peer Respondents involve both organisations whose work relates very closely
to that of UNOCD and organisations that work in slightly different areas, but
whose perspectives are nonetheless valuable. They were asked for their
views on past and current conditions in places supported through the Programme
as well as how GMCP may have influenced change – with an explicit
request for critical views.
11 Interview O.
12 James Smith et al. ‘Letter Dated 2 November 2017 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907
(2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea Addressed to the President of the
Security Council’. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, November
2017. p. 6
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 97
13 Smith et al., 2017: p. 6: “Laboratory analysis of the blast revealed traces of
potassium nitrate, suggesting that Al-Shabaab may have begun to manufacture
home-made explosives.”
14 France Liaison Officer. ‘2017 Annual Report’, RMIFC, 2018.
15 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 4.
16 These interventions were possible because the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) of Somalia was open to receiving assistance in tackling the problem
and because the UN Security Council resolutions provided a mandate for
international actors to assume certain enforcement and prosecution functions
on behalf of the TFG.
17 Application of Best Management Practices (guidelines developed for ships
transiting through the High-Risk Area) was very effective in obstructing attempted
hijackings.
18 Regional states had a strong interest in engaging in efforts to suppress piracy,
as the problem negatively affected the blue economy in states like Kenya
and Seychelles.
19 The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) is an initiative of the International
Maritime Organisation originally to align regional efforts to counter piracy.
The Jeddah Amendment widened the remit of the DCoC to include other
maritime security threats. DCoC. ‘The Djibouti Code of Conduct’. International
Maritime Organization, 2015.
20 Maisie Piggeon et al. ‘The State of Maritime Piracy 2017 Report’, Oceans
Beyond Piracy, 2018.
21 Interview A.
22 Interviews: B; C; A.
23 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 7.
24 France Liaison Officer, 2018; Interview: D.
25 Interview: D.
26 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Stig Jarle Hansen:
Afweyne is in prison in Belgium, Garad is believed to have been killed, and
Boyah was briefly imprisoned in Bosasso after which he is said to have ‘retired’
from piracy.
27 Interview: B.
28 Interview: F.
29 Interviews: D; G; B; H.
30 Interview: G; I.
31 ‘The Lobster’, also known as Malable (honey man) Interview: I.
32 Interview: I: This PAG was behind the attack in February 2018.
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33 According to Interviewee H, there are indications that the Garfange Group
may have split into two separate groups due to a disagreement on how to
handle a group of Iranian hostages.
34 Interview: G: Despite having been arrested many times, it always ends with
the release of Garfange.
35 Also known as poly-criminals.
36 This attack resulted in the transfer of six suspects to Seychelles for prosecution.
37 Interview: J.
38 Interview: F; B; G.
39 Interview: G: conversations with suspects indicate they are simply fishermen
who saw an opportunity to try to take a ship but weren’t very good at it.
40 Interviewees stressed the need to distinguish between pirates and Al-
Shabaab; the motive that drive pirate activity is the prospect of financial
gain, which is different from Al-Shabaab’s focus on ideological objectives.
41 Interviews: H; G.
42 Magnus Gjelsvik et al. ‘Ex-Pirates in Somalia: Disengagement Processes and
Reintegration Programming’. University of Tromsø: Centre for Peace Studies,
2012. p. 5.
43 The unanimous conclusion from four interviews with convicted pirates as
well as an interview with UNODC Bosasso.
44 Peter Bauman and Sarah Hanssen. ‘Strategic Review of the Trust Fund to
Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia’.
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2016. p. 16.
45 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 1.
46 Gjelsvik et al., 2012: p. 7.
47 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this.
48 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 3.
49 Gjelsvik et al., 2012: p. 7
50 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 2.
51 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 1.
52 Interview: I.
53 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
54 SafeSeas. ‘SafeSeas High-Level Symposium on Maritime Capacity Building’.
Nairobi, 2018.
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55 Bauman et al., 2016; France Liaison Officer, 2018; ICC International Maritime
Bureau, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period
of 1January – 30 June 2018’, London, United Kingdom: ICC International
Maritime Bureau, July 2018.
56 Interviews: K; L; A; G.
57 There is anecdotal evidence that Issa Yuluh was involved in a major offensive
against ISIL in Qandala, which may indicate willingness to support the Puntland
Government and a wish to move into licit business. CMS Validation
Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
58 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
59 Jay Bahadur, The Pirates of Somalia, Pantheon Books, 2011.
60 Primarily to access Saudi Arabia and Europe.
61 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 40: The third largest migrant flow within the
WIO region runs between Obock in Djibouti and Aden in Yemen.
62 Danish Refugee Council and Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS)
‘RMMS Annual Trends and Analysis Summary 2017, East Africa and Yemen’,
RMMS, February 2018.
63 Danish Refugee Council et al., 2018.
64 Interview: M; According to the Annual Report of the RMIFC in Madagascar:
“Populations are either fleeing drought/lack of fish resources in Somalia or
fleeing war and cholera in devastated Yemen.” See France Liaison Officer,
2018: p. 15.
65 Deutsche Welle. ‘IOM: Smugglers “Deliberately Drowned” Migrants near
Yemen’, 10 August 2017.
66 International Organization for Migration. ‘Yemen 2018: Humanitarian Compendium’,
7 September 2018.
67 Danish Refugee Council et al., 2018.
68 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
69 Interview: M.
70 Interview: M.
71 Interview: I; N.
72 Danish Refugee Council et al., 2018. p. 2.
73 Interview: M.
74 According to interviewee M: “Survivors have provided UNHCR with accounts
of being shot at, suffering regular beatings, rapes of adults and children,
humiliation including being forcibly stripped, made to witness summary executions,
as well as denial of food.” UNHCR. ‘Fleeing Horn of Africa, New Arrivals
Find More Peril in Yemen’, 17 April 2018. See also Human Rights
Watch. ‘Yemen’s Torture Camps’. Human Rights Watch, 25 May 2014.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 100
75 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
76 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
77 Interview: M; see also Deutsche Welle, 2017: “Smugglers forced more than
120 migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia – most of them teenagers – off a
boat near the coast of Yemen on Wednesday, the International Organization
for Migration announced in a statement.”
78 France Liaison Officer, 2018, p. 38: “On 9 February, passengers on a migrant
ship bound for Yemen were once again forced by smugglers to go
overboard a few hundred yards away from the Yemeni shores. 25 people
have been missing since.”
79 According to statements made at SHADE, CMF will, for example, not include
TiPSoM (and IUU) in their mandate.
80 Obligations derived from the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea.
81 EUNAVFOR: CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
82 For example, on 6 June 2018, IOM reported to have provided assistance to
traumatised survivors of a capsized boat in Yemen. 46 migrants had
drowned in the incident and 16 were missing, presumed dead. See International
Organization for Migration, ‘IOM Saddened as Nearly 50 Migrants
Drown on Yemen’s Shores, Others Still missing’, 6 June 2018.
83 Interview: H.
84 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
85 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
86 International Organization for Migration. ‘Yemen 2018: (… ), 2018.
87 Danish Refugee Council, 2018.
88 Peter Tinti, ‘Migrant Smuggling Paths from the Horn of Africa to Yemen
and Saudi Arabia’. Institute for Security Studies, November 2017; France Liaison
Officer, 2018; Estimates by UNODC in Bosasso set the price lower. As
smugglers are now using bigger skiffs, which are faster and can carry more
than 130 people, they have lowered prices to USD 80-100 for Ethiopian migrants,
which is paid in addition to the USD 250 for the journey from
Wajaale at the Ethiopian border. Somalis pay USD 30-50 and prices range
according to kinship as those with family connections get better deals. This
is corroborated by the DRC who report that: “Somali migrants reported paying
significantly less than their Ethiopian counterparts, paying between USD
100 to USD 250 for part or all of their journey.” Danish Refugee Council,
2018, p. 2.
89 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
90 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
91 Interview: M.
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92 Interview: H.
93 Smuggling boats do not leave from Bosasso per se, but from areas within
the jurisdiction of Bosasso: Interview, UNODC Bosasso.
94 Interview: H.
95 This practice has frequently been seen by GMCP Mentors in Garowe and
Hargeisa Prisons.
96 Interviews: E; O; D; G.
97 May Channing, ‘Transnational Crime and the Developing World’. Global
Financial Integrity, March 2017. Also, sources in Kenya pointed to a case
where a consignment of AK47s were tied up in a sack and other interviewees
similarly referred to the prevalence of small arms in Somalia – not only in
the hands of criminals but as a broader challenge.
98 Curtis Bell and Ben Lawellin. ‘Stable Seas - Somali Waters’. One Earth Future,
2017. p. 20.
99 Interview: G.
100 Conflict Armament Research. ‘Maritime Interdictions of Weapon Supplies to
Somalia and Yemen’. Conflict Armament Research, November 2016: p. 4.
101 Interview: P.
102 Conflict Armament Research, 2016: p. 4.
103 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: The Puntland Government
reports of an increase in Iranian dhows transporting weapons to Puntland.
104 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, 2018.
105 Interview: G.
106 Smith et al., 2017: §103.
107 Interview: G; Stig Jarle Hansen at CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen,
May 2018.
108 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
109 UNSC. ‘Resolution 2244 (2015)’. United Nations Security Council, October
2015
110 Bell and Lawellin, 2017: pp. 20-21.
111 Interview: P.
112 Interview: Q; Bell and Lawellin, 2017: pp. 20-21.
113 Bell and Lawellin, 2017: p. 21.
114 Smith et al., 2017: §115.
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115 Including “AK47 assault rifles, machine guns and anti-tank weapons”,
Combined Maritime Forces. ‘French Ship Provence Seizes Large Weapons
Cache’, 28 March 2016.
116 SafeSeas, 2018.
117 Bell and Lawellin, 2017: p. 21.
118 Smith et al., 2017: §109: “The Police Force identified two individuals on
board the skiff as Dhofaye and Buruj Farah, but stated that they had evaded
capture by Puntland forces.”
119 Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, Presentation at Maritime Security
Conference, Copenhagen, 2 May 2018 (hosted by the Danish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, CMS and Danish Shipping).
120 Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, 2018.
121 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
122 Conflict Armament Research, 2016: p. 5.
123 Conflict Armament Research, 2016: p. 13.
124 Interview: R; Notion that weapons are concealed in fishing dhows was echoed
at Workshop in Copenhagen. May 2018.
125 Smith et al., 2017: §84.
126 A term coined by Ole Wæver in 1995 and connected to the “Copenhagen
School.”
127 Interview: O.
128 Interview: G.
129 Bell and Lawellin, 2017.
130 Bell and Lawellin, 2017.
131 Combined Maritime Forces, 2016.
132 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
133 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
134 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Stig Jarle Hansen.
135 It is important in a Somali context to note that the legislative framework
surrounding fisheries is incomplete.
136 There is, nonetheless, considerable convergence amongst different sources
that illegal fishing in Somali waters declined in the heyday of piracy. This was
not simply due to the risk of piracy attacks. According to Interviewee R, the
decline also coincided with the adoption of new strong measures by the EU
to ban entry of IUU fish to Europe. It is very difficult to disaggregate the exact
impact of either in the decline of IUU in Somalia. Much of Secure Fisheries’
information comes from word of mouth, as they do not monitor the
EEZ.
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137 Stimson defines IUU as follows in Casting a Wider Net:
ILLEGAL FISHING: Refers to fishing activities by a national or foreign vessel in
the waters of a country, or by flag-state vessels that are party to a Regional
Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO), in contravention of conservation
and management measures;
UNREPORTED FISHING: Refers to fishing activities that have either not been
reported or have been misreported to authorities. Unreported fishing is not
only fraudulent, but also undermines fisheries management by skewing the
accuracy of fish stock assessments upon which regulations are based;
UNREGULATED FISHING: Refers to fishing activities in areas without fisheries
management or conservation measures, including the high seas and areas
not managed by a RFMO. Fishing vessels without nationality or vessels of a
country not party to a RFMO are also considered to be participating in unregulated
fishing. See Amanda Shaver and Sally Yozell. ‘Casting a Wider
Net’. The Stimson Center, January 2018. .
138 Shaver and Yozell, 2018.
139 Safeseas, 2018.
140 Interview: S.
141 Shaver and Yozell, 2018.
142 As such, there are no clear legal provisions in place that define IUU offences.
It is therefore questionable whether one can even talk of Illegal fishing in
Somalia. Strictly speaking, it would therefore be more correct to refer to Unregulated
and Unreported fishing.
143 Smith et al., 2017: §86.
144 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 15.
145 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 20.
146 FAO. ‘Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA)’, 2018
147 Examples of such platforms are the US Navy’s SeaVision, PEW’s Eyes on the
Sea, and Google’s Global Fishing Watch.
148 UNODC GMCP has, for example, obtained images for interdiction through
EU’s Copernicus project: UNODC GMCP Video.
149 For example, Vulcan Inc.’s SkyLight.
150 Also called the “full force of the law” approach, UNODC. ‘Outcome of the
2nd International Symposium on Fisheries Crime, 10-11 October 2016’.
UNODC, 17 May 2017.
151 See Fish-i-Africa. ‘Fish-i-Africa’, 2018.
152 Cathy Haenlein. ‘Below the Surface’. Royal United Services Institute for Defence
and Security Studies, July 2017: “There is also evidence that much of
today’s IUU fishing activity takes place on an organised, systematic scale
across multiple jurisdictions.”
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153 Shaver and Yozell, 2018.
154 For example, the Greko Case: see Fish-i-Africa, 2018.
155 Term used by Fish-i-Africa.
156 See annex B for distinction between Inshore and Offshore Fisheries in Somalia.
157 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 21.
158 Haenlein, 2017: Recommendation 1: “Recognise large-scale IUU fishing as
transnational organised crime.”
159 For more information, see fishcrime.com.
160 Interview: P.
161 Interviews: F; P; A; Joana Wright, ‘Drug Trafficking Routes Proliferate
through Indian Ocean’. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2017.
162 UNODC. ‘Afghanistan Opium Survey, November 2017’. UNODC, 2017: p. 8.
163 Combined Maritime Forces, ‘Two Seizures in Two Days For
HMAS Warramunga, 25 May, 2018.
164 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
165 These are images depicting, for example, a crescent moon or a tree.
166 CMF at Maritime Security Conference, Copenhagen, 2 May 2018 (hosted by
the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CMS and Danish Shipping).
167 Interview: P: The Global Initiative (GI) also documents how ‘chemical signatures
of drugs’ point back to this area of origin; Joana Wright, ‘Drug Trafficking
on the Southern Route’, Southern Route Partnership Conference Paper,
November 2017: p. 2.
168 Such information can provide additional grounds for prosecution to the
charge of narcotics smuggling, although the science is not yet strong
enough to independently be accepted as evidence in court. Interview: P.
169 Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow, and Mark Shaw. ‘Tackling Heroin Trafficking
on the East Africa Coast’. ENACT Policy Brief Issue, June 2018: p. 3.
170 Chart credits to Joana Wright.
171 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018; Wright, 2017: p. 3.
172 Safeseas High-Level Symposium on Capacity Building for Maritime Security,
Nairobi, March 2018 http://www.safeseas.net/symposium/.
173 Interviews P; F.
174 Interview: A; Joana Wright, Drug trafficking routes proliferate through Indian
Ocean, 2017: p. 4.
175 These are also used for many other kinds of illicit activity, including IUU and
weapons smuggling.
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176 Notably, drugs are not directly shipped in containers from the Makran Coast
because containers that depart from this region are classified as high-risk in
Europe and subject to strict inspections. Drugs therefore need to pass
through less conspicuous ports before being containerised – Interview: P.
177 Information about volumes of narcotics trafficked in container ships is scarce
as boardings are rare. See France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 29.
178 Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS).
179 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018. ENACT similarly report
that: “After anchoring 20 km to 100 km off the African coast in international
waters, flotillas of small boats collect the drug consignments from the
dhows and ferry them to various beaches, coves or islands, or offload them
into small commercial harbours.” Haysom et al., 2018: p. 7.
180 There is suspicion that the hotel industry is involved in drug trade. Big hotels
have powerful boats that are used for deep-water fishing and other tourist
activities. These can go further out to sea than the vessels of the maritime
police and it is suspected that they meet drug traffickers at sea to receive
drug consignments. Tourists may be completely unaware of this activity.
There is a reluctance to inspect these vessels. The reason for this is twofold;
fear of deterring tourists from coming to Lamu; and the notion that hotels
tend to accuse the maritime police of harassing tourists when they have previously
made inspections, which resulted in officers being transferred to other
locations. Interview: T.
181 According to Interviewee F, maritime drug flows into Tanzania are now
assessed to be down to zero because of police efforts. This view was contested
at the CMS Validation Workshop held in Copenhagen in May 2018
where the view was that the trade had likely shifted form. Drugs still seem
to be containerised in Tanzania where port security is lax, especially in Zanzibar.
These may also be landed in Mozambique and come into Tanzania in
small boats or across land to feed the old trafficking routes.
182 Haysom et al., 2018, p. 12: “There is no verified figure as to how much
heroin enters Mozambique this way. However, several people observing the
trade along the east coast believe that the amount of heroin entering
Mozambique has increased lately as a result of CMF seizures in the waters
near Kenya and Tanzania, and the crackdown in Tanzania.”
183 Council of the European Union. ‘15457/12’. Brussels: Council of the European
Union, 29 October 2012.
184 Haysom et al., 2018: pp. 24-25.
185 Interview: F; Haysom et al., 2018: p. 30.
186 Allafrica. ‘Mozambique: Tanzanian Jihadists Will Be Tried in Mozambique’,
28 March 2018
187 Globalnyt. ‘Militante Islamister Slår Igen Til i Mozambique’, 5 June 2018.
188 Haysom et al., 2018: p.12
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189 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Adam Yussuf. ‘The Emergence of Violent
Extremism in Northern Mozambique’. Africa Center for Strategic Studies,
March 2018.
190 Interview: F.
191 According to Salvador Forquilha, João Pereira/Joseph Hanlon – Open University,
Milton Keynes. AIM, O Pais, BBC, Club of Mozambique (in Globalnyt,
2018), 50 people were killed during a Government attack on the town of
Mitumbate in December 2017 and more the 300 individuals have been arrested
in response to attacks on civilians by militant Islamists.
192 Interview: P: Another suspicion is that the Kenyan horticulture industry facilitates
smuggling of heroin. Flowers such as carnations and roses grown in
Naivasha are put into freezer containers and shipped on cargo flights to
markets in Europe before they fade. There is very little checking being done
on these containers.
193 Interview: U: Traffickers break into containers and place drugs along with a
forged seal. At the receiving end, other criminals enter the container, remove
the drugs and shut container using the forged seal. This is known as
the ‘rip on, rip off’ technique, and can be done in 5 min. at either end.
194 Recounted in sidelines of ENACT Expert Group Meeting, Nairobi, November
2017.
195 Joana Wright, ‘Analysis of Maritime Security Threats in the BAM’. UNODC,
2018 (not publicly available).
196 The views offered in interviews conducted for this report are contradicted in
a report by ENACT which finds that “sites in or near Ras Afun, Eyl, Obbia, El
Maan, Brava, Bosaso, Kismayo, Gobwen, Cape Guardafui, Garowe and
Barawa are used to offload heroin shipments. Kismayo is a major point for
consolidation, and then onward shipment, by road and boat, to Kenya, often
together with other contraband goods that are traded between the two
countries.” This black-market trade is allegedly controlled by the Kenya Defence
Forces and Somali allies, who tax the goods. Haysom et al., 2018: p.
8.
197 Interview: B.
198 Interview: G: Echoes statements made in other interviews reasoning that
there is simply no reason for drugs smuggling networks to take the added
risks of smuggling through Somalia when far simpler options are available
further down the coast. The number of security actors operating on the
route by which drugs would travel are many and each would pose an obstacle
– from Al-Shabaab to AMISOM to other local armed forces.
199 Haysom et al., 2018: p. 7: “Perhaps one of the most striking conclusions of
this study is the degree to which illicit and grey economies have been a
source of party-political funding in the various countries that are involved in
the coastal criminal economy.”
200 Interview: V.
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201 Safeseas, 2018.
202 Safeseas, 2018.
203 Smith et al., 2017: p. 6.
204 Smith et al., 2017: §35: “Investigations suggest that the Al-Shabaab attack
had been mounted to defeat the ISIL-aligned faction led by Mu’min in the
Bari Region.”
205 Smith et al., 2017: §33. “On 13 March 2016, an Al-Shabaab unit, the Khalid
ibn al-Walid brigade, consisting of between 350 and 400 fighters, conducted
an amphibious incursion into Puntland. Departing from Harardhere district
aboard five dhows, the fighters went ashore at two points on the Puntland
coast, near the towns of Garacad and Garmaal.”
206 Smith et al., 2017: §37.
207 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 43.
208 Interview: T. Interviewee W talked of a decline in terrorist offenders from
Somalia in Shimo la Tewa prison in Kenya since 2016, saying also that Somalia
has become more stable. Along similar lines, they noted that “locallybred”
terrorism has declined as local communities, to a much lesser extent,
condone offenders now that they have felt the implications of terrorist attacks
on a personal level.
209 Smith et al., 2017: p. 14.
210 Interview: G.
211 Interview: G; Smith et al., 2017: pp. 15-16.
212 Interview: G.
213 UNSC. ‘Yemen Monitoring Group Report, 2018’. United Nations Security
Council, 2018.
214 Risk Intelligence, closed workshop, May 2018.
215 Maritime Asset Security and Training. ‘Maritime Intelligence Report Series’,
Thremhall Park, UK: MAST 13 December 2017: p. 6.
216 Interview: D.
217 Two incidents on 6 January 2018, approx. 45 NM off the port of Al Hudaydah,
Yemen involved suspicious approaches towards two merchant ships by
two speed boats carrying armed personnel, and one unmanned boat. After
the merchant ships took evasive action, the speed boats broke off their approach.
The speed boats subsequently approached a tanker under escort
and the escort vessel engaged the speed boats and destroyed the unmanned
vessel. International Maritime Organization. ‘Interim Guidance on
Maritime Security in the Southern Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb’. International
Maritime Organization, 2018: p. 3.
218 Maritime Security Conference, Copenhagen, 2 May 2018 (hosted by Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CMS and Danish Shipping).
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 108
219 Combined Maritime Forces, and EUNAVFOR. “Industry Releasable Threat
Bulletin” by CMF and EUNAVFOR (Not Publicly Available)’. Combined Maritime
Forces, December 2017.
220 Maritime Asset Security and Training, 2017: p. 6.
221 As noted by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen: “The Houthis have also
deployed improvised sea mines in the Red Sea, which represent a hazard for
commercial shipping and sea lines of communication that could remain for
as long as 6 to 10 years, threatening imports to Yemen and access for humanitarian
assistance through the Red Sea ports.” Ahmed Himmiche et al.
‘Panel of Experts on Yemen, Letter to the President of the Security Council
(S/2018/68)’. UN, January 2018: p. 2.
222 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Having hit two ships
from the same company and restricting damage to Saudi ships, it seems targeting
techniques are sophisticated.
223 CMF and EUNAVFOR, 2017.
224 Reuters. ‘U.N. Aid Boat Attacked off Yemen: Port Authority’, 4 June 2018.
225 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Reference was made
to a speech by Houthi leader.
226 Interview: D.
227 Maritime Asset Security and Training, 2017: p 6
228 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
229 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
230 According to the France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 46, there are clear links
between the different types of maritime crime that the Centre reports on,
for example, between IUU, piracy, and smuggling.
231 See Jacobsen & Winther, 2018; Haysom et al., 2018.
232 Interview: L; A; F.
233 Interview: S.
234 Indeed, a number of interviews stressed that revenue generated from piracy
has been invested in weapons smuggling businesses, which supply terrorist
organisations including AS/ISIL in Somalia, for example, B; S; H.
235 Interview: S.
236 Interview: G.
237 Video UNODC, ‘The Horn of Africa Programme’, July 15, 2017: 5:50-6:56
238 Interview: H.
239 Interview: G.
240 Point made at the CMS Validation Workshop in Copenhagen, May 2018.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 109
241 Stig Jarle Hansen: There has been indications that Aragoste ‘Lobster’ Kingpin
is said to be involved in the heroin trade. CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen,
May 2018.
242 Jacob Rasmussen, ‘Sweet Secrets: Sugar Smuggling and State Formation in
the Kenya– Somalia Borderlands’. DIIS WORKING PAPER. Danish Institute for
International Studies, 2017: p. 8.
243 Smith et al. 2017: p. 7: “A conservative estimate suggests that Al-Shabaab
receives at least USD 10 million each year from the illicit charcoal trade.”
244 UNSC. ‘Resolution 2385’, November 2017, §26-31.
245 Interview: J.
246 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
247 UNSC, 2017, §31.
248 Interview: G; Smith et al., 2017: p. 14.
249 Combined Maritime Forces. ‘CMF Seizes 132KGS of Heroin in the Arabian
Sea’, 9 March 2018.
250 Interview: L.
251 CMF and EUNAVFOR, 2017.
252 France Liaison Officer, 2018.
253 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May, 2018: EUNAVFOR.
254 Interviews: G; B.
255 While smugglers that transport heroin along the Southern Route into Eastern
Africa may use similar Iranian dhows to weapons and/or people smugglers,
this does not prove that there is a link between the forms of criminality.
Interview: P.
256 While a skipper may use the same dhow to smuggle weapons and drugs,
this does not necessarily mean that there is a connection between the crimes
or networks behind them. It may rather be an indication that the criminal
networks use the same ‘postal service’ (the dhow skipper). Interview: P.
257 Interview: P.
258 Interview: P.
259 Bethan McKernan, ‘Number of Drug Addicts in Iran “Doubles” in Six Years’.
The Independent, 26 June 2017.
260 Haysom et al.: p. 13.
261 For example, through the Law Enforcement Task Force, which is a group
made up of UNODC, INTERPOL, and EUNAVFOR as well representation by
seven states which work to maintain focus on the need to prosecute a list of
11 individuals who were involved in piracy.
262 I.e. under PSP2.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 110
263 As both projects subject to this evaluation have run prior to the time frame
in focus and will continue to run beyond 2018, we are not looking at finite
projects. This can therefore also, to some degree, be seen as monitoring
whether the programme is on the right track to reach its objective(s) and
make recommendations for how the programme might improve.
264 The Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex, which was also supported under
PSP2, has been withdrawn from the scope of the evaluation by agreement
with the Royal Danish Embassy in Nairobi as the project is not complete and
therefore not yet fit for impact evaluation.
265 See chapter one for details on methodology.
266 Seychelles, Kenya and Mauritius.
267 Figures from UNODC GMCP Nairobi.
268 The UN Standard Minimum Rules, also known as the Nelson Mandela Rules,
describe the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The intention
is to set out contemporary and generally accepted standards for the
treatment of prisoners while acknowledging that deviations from the described
standards may occur, as not all countries may be capable of applying
all standards. The UN Standard Minimum Rules include standards for healthcare
services, how sanctions are carried out, and the management of prisoner
complaints to mention a few. UNODC. ‘United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules)
Adopted 17 Dec. 2015. A/RES/70/175’. UNODC, December 2015.
269 In addition, six piracy suspects transferred to Seychelles in November 2017
await trial. Kenya has, so far, not taken action to enter into prisoner transfer
agreements to allow for transfers of convicted piracy prisoners and the 12
piracy suspects tried in Mauritius were acquitted and repatriated.
270 See annex D.
271 UNODC, ‘United Nations Standard Minimum Rules (…)’, 2015.
272 UNODC, ‘United Nations Standard Minimum Rules (…)’, 2015, Preliminary
Observation 2 (§1): “In view of the great variety of legal, social, economic
and geographical conditions of the world, it is evident that not all of the
rules are capable of application in all places and at all times. They should,
however, serve to stimulate a constant endeavour to overcome practical difficulties
in the way of their application, in the knowledge that they represent,
as a whole, the minimum conditions which are accepted as suitable by
the United Nations.”
273 The SMRs were formulated to be flexible in order to fit different climatic and
cultural contexts. With regard to the latter, this means that while certain factors
such as having beds and privacy may be important for inmates in Country
A, inmates in Country B may have very different needs. In Somalia, the
norm is to sleep on mats on the floor rather than in beds. Also, with a
strong oral tradition and need for community engagement, being placed in
a private cell in Somalia would be perceived as punishment.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 111
274 Cases of cholera were, for example, seen in 2013 in Mogadishu Central
Prison as potable water sources were mixed with human waste.
275 Interview: Peer A.
276 Interview: Peer A.
277 Francesca Caonero, ‘Report of the International Monitoring Committee for
Hargeisa Prison’, UNODC GMCP, 22 March 2018: p. 7 (not public available).
278 Francesca Caonero, ‘Report of the International Monitoring Committee for
Garowe Prison’, UNODC GMCP, 21 March 2018: Recommendation no. 3
(not public available).
279 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 6.
280 Interview: Garowe A; C; D; Hargeisa C; D.
281 Interview: Hargeisa A; B; Corroborated in Report of the International Monitoring
Committee for Hargeisa Prison by Francesca Caonero, 22 March
2018: p. 5: “As for the radical prisoners, Hargeisa prison houses around 50
of them and they are all kept together without being separated according to
their risk.” (not public available).
282 Interview Hargeisa B.
283 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 6.
284 Interview Hargeisa B.
285 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 6.
286 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 32.
287 Interview: Peer A makes a comparison to conditions for juveniles in other
prisons in Somalia where conditions for juveniles are worse than in Hargeisa
and Garowe. The juvenile section in Mogadishu Central Prison seems to hold
only the ones that are clearly very young while others may be placed with
adults. Conditions in Bosasso are also giving cause for concern as children
are put in prison by their parents for misbehaving, which underlines the
need for separate facilities for juveniles.
288 Caonero, 22 March: p. 5.
289 Caonero, 22 March: p. 8.
290 Caonero, 21 March 2018: Recommendation no. 4.
291 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 8.
292 Interview: Peer B; A.
293 Interview: Peer C.
294 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 30.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 112
295 According to the Report of the International Monitoring Committee for
Garowe Prison, 21 March 2018: p. 5, national authorities stated that visits
take place on Fridays and that each detainee is allowed up to four visitors for
up to 30 minutes per visit. With regard to Hargeisa “all inmates are allowed
to receive visitors for about 10 minutes per person with a maximum of three
visitors at a time”.
296 Interview: Peer A.
297 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 7.
298 Interview: Hargeisa D.
299 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 9.
300 Interview: Peer A.
301 Interview: Peer D.
302 Interview: Garowe D.
303 Caonero, 21 March 2018: pp. 6-7.
304 Caonero, 22 March 2018: Recommendation no. 5.
305 Interview: Peer B; A.
306 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 6.
307 Caonero, 22 March 2018: annex A; UNODC, ‘GMCP Annual Report 2017’,
2018, p. 38.
308 Caonero, 22 March 2018: 22 March 2018.
309 Formal Letter from inmates with CMS for reference (not public available).
310 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 7.
311 See annex E.
312 “This prisoner died at Hargeisa prison, at approximately 2:45pm, on the
08/01/2018. He died of an illness for which he was sent to Hargeisa hospital,
as attested to by the physicians present at the time.” Letter from Prison
commander Hussein Abdullahi Du’aale to the High Court, Attorney General,
Head of prison affairs at the Custodial Corps, Head of prisons at the Ministry
of Justice, Commander-in-chief of Custodial corps, and the Minister of Justice,
January 9, 2018.
313 Penal Reform Forum, ‘UN Nelson Mandela Rules (revised SMR)’.
314 Formal correspondence from Detention and Transfer Programme Manager
(not public available).
315 Interview: Peer A,
316 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 10.
317 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 5.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 113
318 According to the Report of the International Monitoring Committee for
Hargeisa Prison, 22 March 2018: Recommendation no. 6, “Shackles are no
longer used in the prison and those who previously were shackled have
been able to enjoy lock out time in the yard under the supervision of prison
officers and the UNODC mentors. Restrainsts [read: Restraints] are used
when transporting prisoners from the prison to court”.
319 According to figures provided by the Somaliland Custodial Corps in the
Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison in
March 2018, the capacity of Hargeisa Prison is 460 inmates and the prison
currently holds 592.
320 UNODC, December 2015: Preliminary Observation 1.
321 Outcome A.2.1. Indicator.
322 Interview: Hargeisa C.
323 Interview: Peer C.
324 Interview: Garowe D.
325 Interview: Garowe D.
326 Interview: Peer D.
327 Interview: Peer C; A; B.
328 Interview: Peer A.
329 Interview: Peer C.
330 Interview: Peer C.
331 Interview: Garowe A.
332 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 7.
333 Interview: Peer A.
334 Interview: Hargeisa A.
335 Interview: Garowe A.
336 Interview: Garowe A.
337 Interview: Hargeisa A.
338 Funded by the UK Government.
339 Caonero, 22 March: p. 10.
340 Interview: Hargeisa A; C; Garowe C.
341 Interview: Hargeisa B.
342 Interview: Garowe D.
343 Interview: Garowe C.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 114
344 Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Garowe Prison, 21
March 2018: p. 7: “UNODC takes the view that the provision of full-time
teachers funded by UNODC is not sustainable. Therefore, alternative ways of
supporting the delivery of education in prison should be sought, including
fitting of libraries in the blocks and developing peer-studying mechanisms.”
Similarly, education programmes in Hargeisa have been discontinued according
to the Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa
Prison, 22 March 2018: p. 3: “provision of education will be provided
through fitting of libraries and establishment of peer-sutyding [read: studying]
groups to ensure sustainability.”
345 Interview: Hargeisa A.
346 The IMC raised the limitations to the number of inmates that can take part
in vocational training as an issue in their 2018 Report for Hargeisa and recommend
that vocational training be “expanded to cover a larger proportion
of the prison population, including the piracy convicts, to the extent possible.”
Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison,
22 March 2018: p. 6.
347 Interview: Peer D.
348 Interview: Hargeisa D.
349 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: pp. 31-32.
350 Interview: Garowe D.
351 Interview: Hargeisa A.
352 The objective is to “strengthen Somali agencies promoting the rule of law,
focused on prisons and justice” – the latter referring to Outcome A.1.1: Establishment
of the Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex.
353 Interview: Garowe D.
354 Interview: Garowe B; Hargeisa A; B; D.
355 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 8.
356 Interview: Peer D.
357 Interview: Peer C; Peer B: “Garowe is definitively much better than any other
prison in Somalia”; Peer A: “Facilities in Garowe are better than any I’ve ever
seen in Somalia.”
358 Interview: Peer B.
359 Interview: Peer C.
360 Interview: Peer B.
361 Interview: Peer C.
362 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 30: “support provided as part of counterpiracy
efforts has had positive ‘spill-overs’. For instance, the prison infrastructure
and reforms established has helped to address other issues, including
al-Shabaab and separate facility for minors.”
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 115
363 Interview: B.
364 Interview: Peer D.
365 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 31.
366 Interview: Garowe A.
367 For example, Peer A: “Transparency and oversight needs to be strengthened
and lack of data collection inside the prisons is a problem.”
368 The ‘paper trail’ in relation to the case of the deceased piracy prisoner outlined
in §7 of the section on Basic Conditions is, for example, ineffectual.
369 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 11.
370 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 30.
371 Interview: Garowe A.
372 The genuineness of the request for more ‘on-the-floor’ training by prison
staff should be seen in light of the fact that classroom training is usually preferred
simply due to the fact that a free meal is often provided.
373 Interview: Peer D.
374 Funded bilaterally from the overall reserve fund of the Peace and Stabilisation
Fund to cover unforeseen security-related costs in 2016. The disbursement
was made in USD 1,038,000 and two no-cost extensions were granted
allowing funds to be spent up to Dec. 2017.
375 The task of advancing the legislative framework for maritime law enforcement
was taken on by EUCAP NESTOR, now EUCAP Somalia.
376 Endorsed in 2013 by the FGS and regional states (including Somaliland) at
the Plenary meeting of the CGPCS (May); at the Somalia Conference in London
(May), and at the EU’s “New Deal for Somalia” Conference in Brussels
(Sep.). Also endorsed in UNSCR 2125.
377 Now the Bosasso Port and Maritime Police Unit.
378 As Galmudug was not supported under the Danish grant under PSP2, it was
not part of this evaluation. Outputs 3.3 and 3.4 are therefore not included
either. Output 3.5 of the result framework relates mainly to the construction
of the Bosasso HQ building, which was completed with the first contributions
to the programme from 2014-2015. We will therefore only look at
procurement under 3.5.
379 OHCHR. ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials’. Havana, August 1990.
380 While the MPU is made up of 60 Officers, GMCP has trained 81. The explanation
for this inconsistency is that some of the officers initially trained have
left the unit and new officers have taken their place. Also, some officers
have received training several times, for example from crewmanship to
coxwain to boat-handling.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 116
381 The MPU’s ad hoc Headquarters is shown in UNODC GMCP’s video at
02:01-02:47.
382 Interview: Peer E.
383 Output 3.1. Target.
384 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
385 Elica Barasa, ‘Report on The Somali Maritime Security Coordination Committee
Meeting’. UNODC, 9-10 July 2018: p. 13 (not public available).
386 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
387 Interview: Mog. MLE A.
388 Interview: Mog MLE A: “They are very good and give us very good support
for our operations. They help our boats for maintenance which we were
lacking. Train our people to do their duties in professional way.”
389 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
390 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
391 Interview: Peer E.
392 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
393 Interview: Mog. MLE A.
394 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
395 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
396 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
397 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
398 Interview: Mog. MLE A.
399 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
400 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 41: “The PMPF is not seen as legitimate by
the FGS or the international community and currently only receives support
from the UAE.” UAE support to the PMPF has been controversial and previously
mentioned in reports of the SEMG.
401 Partially funded by Denmark under PSP1.
402 Interview: Peer F.
403 Interview: Bosasso A – “restroom facility“.
404 Interview: Peer F.
405 Alula, or Caalula is a known piracy hub.
406 Interview: Bos. MLE A.
407 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
408 Barasa, 2018: p. 14.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 117
409 Interview: Bos. MLE B.
410 Interview: Bos. MLE A.
411 Interview: Bos. MLE C; point also echoed by Peer F.
412 Interview: Bos. MLE B.
413 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
414 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
415 Interview: Peer F.
416 Interview: Peer F.
417 Interview: Bos. MLE B.
418 Interview: Peer F.
419 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
420 Barasa, 2018: p. 8.
421 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
422 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
423 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
424 Interview: Ber. MLE A. Subsequent to the interview, the roof to the radio
operations room established through collaborative efforts by
UNODC/OBP/EUCAP collapsed destroying all the MDA equipment.
425 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
426 Interview: Peer F.
427 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
428 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
429 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
430 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
431 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
432 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
433 i.e. not counting the first years of programme delivery.
434 Barasa, 2018: p. 15.
435 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
436 Both Somaliland Coast Guard officers have 25+ years of experience and
know conditions both before and after UNODC got involved.
437 Interview: Ber MLE A notes that the SLCG does not have a helicopter.
438 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 118
439 Interview: Ber. MLE A. According to the report of the Maritime Security
Coordination Committee of July 2018, the Somaliland Coast Guard Law has
been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in April 2017 and is now awaiting
parliamentary debates and final enactment procedures at the House of
Commons.
440 Interview: Peer F; G; H.
441 Interview: Peer F.
442 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016. p. 41.
443 Interview: Ber. MLE A: 80%; Ber. MLE B: 50%.
444 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
445 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
446 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
447 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
448 Interview: Peer G.
449 Interview: Peer H; E.
450 Interview: Peer F.
451 Interview: Peer H; E.
452 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016. p. 40.
453 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 40: “There are neither communications nor
coordination between the stations in Barbera, Bosasso, Hobyo (not constructed),
Mogadishu, and Kismayo. The great need to reach the ports in between
remains unfilled. Police stations to stop sanctuaries for criminals and
to stop boats going to sea with bad intensions are also required as are a link
between the on land police and the coast guard and for policing in the
small, remote coastal communities.”
454 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 41: “The Puntland Maritime Police Force
(PMPF) has been described by some as the most capable in Somalia, with 8
bases in Puntland including in Eyl, observational capacity, and the ability to
mobilize and rescue ships.”
455 Interview: Peer H.
456 Interview: Peer H.
457 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. ‘Mid-Term Review Report, Danish
Peace and Stabilisation Programme Region Horn of Africa 2015-2018’. Copenhagen:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, August 2017: p. 13:
“The RT [review team] noted that there are seemingly no records of the operations
of the MPUs in Mogadishu, Bosasso and Berbera, and only anecdotal
evidence of operations was presented during the meeting the RT had
with UNODC.”
458 Interview: Peer H.
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459 Interview: Ber. MLE A; B.
460 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
461 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
462 Interview: Peer H.
463 Interview: Peer H; G.
464 Interview: Peer F.
465 Interview: Peer F.
466 Interview: Peer G.
467 Interview: Peer E.
468 Interview: Peer H.
469 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016. p. 41.
470 Interview: Peer H.
471 Stable Seas, ‘Five Ways Poor Maritime Security Fuels Rebels, Terrorists, and
Criminal Networks’, OEF Research, 12 January 2018: p. 12.
472 Interview: Peer H.
473 Interview: Peer H: Accordingly, gaps in Maritime Security identified by UNSOM
at the 2018 meeting of the Somali Maritime Security Coordination
Committee included: Delineation of roles and responsibilities of maritime
forces; Establish a Maritime Administration; Maritime governance and sharing
of resources agreement.
474 Interview: Peer H.
475 Interview: Peer F.
476 Interview: Peer H.
477 Interview: Peer H; G.
478 Interview: Peer F.
479 Interview: Peer H.
480 Interview: Peer F.
481 Interview: Peer H.
482 Interview: Peer F.
483 Interview: Peer F.
484 Interview: Peer F.
485 Interview: Peer H.
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486 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 48: “in addition to ensuring the completion
and sustainability of legacy programs, the TF should begin to focus on developing
Somalia’s Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) capacity to secure the
coastline in piracy-prone areas and address the governance issues required
for maritime security.”
487 Interview: Peer H.
488 Interview: Mog MLE A; Bos. MLE B; Ber. MLE A.
489 Interview: Peer F.
490 Interview: Peer H.
491 Interview: Ber. MLE A; Mog. MLE B; Bos. MLE B; Peer F.
492 Interview: Peer E: MPU officers sleep in “upturned steel ships”. These would
all be shut down for safety reasons according to European standards.
493 Interview: Mog MLE B.
494 Interview: Peer H.
495 Interview: Peer H.
496 Interview: J: “It is, however, essential that they are engaged in this forum to
work out technical aspects of the maritime domain.”
497 Interview: Peer H.
498 With regard to prison staff salaries, the Standard Minimum Rule 74, §3,
prescribes that “salaries shall be adequate to attract and retain suitable men
and women; employment benefits and conditions of service shall be favourable
in view of the exacting nature of the work.”
499 One of the donor strategies for addressing issues of salary payment of security
sector personnel has been to subsidise these through stipends. This has,
unfortunately, not always worked as intended. According to Interviewee G,
there is generally a significant misappropriation of funds and goods in Somalia
which is concerning. Stipends to security personnel are, for example, often
collected for all officers by a single senior official with no guarantees
that payment reaches individual officers. Attempts to improve these processes
through use of biometrics and mobile payment have been resisted.
500 In the context of the PSP, the term ‘risikovillighed’ is frequently used although
it is not well defined.
501 Bueger, Christian, and Timothy Edmunds. ‘Mastering Maritime Security:
Reflexive Capacity Building and the Western Indian Ocean Experience: A Best
Practice Toolkit’. Cardiff University and University of Bristol: Safe Seas, 2018.
502 Stable Seas, 2018.
503 As noted by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen: “The rule of law is deteriorating
rapidly across Yemen, regardless of who controls a particular territory.”
Himmiche et al., 2018: p. 2.
504 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: pp. 16-17.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 121
505 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 40: “international actors working on maritime
security are not properly coordinated in their efforts.”
506 A Review of the Somali Fisheries Law (Law No. 23 of November 30, 1985),
19 March, 2016.
507 Interview: B; R.
508 A Review of the Somali Fisheries Law, 2016: Art. 3 (b-c).
509 Interview: H.
510 Thai Trawlers flagged to Somalia were also recently involved in IUU in the
Maldives.
511 Fisheries Agreement reached at the NSC February 2018.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 122
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McKernan, Bethan. ‘Number of Drug Addicts in Iran “Doubles” in Six Years’.
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Shaver, Amanda, and Sally Yozell. ‘Casting a Wider Net’. The Stimson Center,
January 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/2FDE8DK.
Smith, James, Jay Bahadur, Charles Cater, Déirdre Clancy, Tapani Holopainen,
Nazanin Moshiri, and Richard Zabot. ‘Letter Dated 2 November
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at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/aitwr-7.pdf.
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Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 127
Interviews
Listed alphabetically by surname of the interviewer. Interviewees are anonymised.
Abdirizak, Jama. Garowe A. Garowe, 15 February 2018.
Abdirizak, Jama. Garowe B. Garowe, 15 February 2018.
Abdirizak, Jama. Garowe C. Garowe, 15 February 2018.
Abdirizak, Jama. Garowe D. Garowe, 15 February 2018
Abdirizak, Jama. Piracy Prisoner no. 4. Garowe, 11 April 2018.
Abdirizak, Jama. Piracy Prisoner no.3. Garowe, 11 April 2018.
Caonero, Francesca. Hargeisa A. Hargeisa, 10 January 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie. Interview A. Skype, 4 April 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie. Interview H. WhatsAppCall, 5 April 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie. Interview I. WhatsAppCall, 5 April 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie. Interview N. Skype, 22 March 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie. Peer B. Skype, 1 March 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview B. Skype, 18 January 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview C. Skype, 20 February 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview F. Skype, 19 March 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview G. Skype, 5 March 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview J. Skype, 21 November
2017.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview K. Brussels, 16 February
2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview L. Skype, 26 February 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview M. Skype, 21 February
2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview O. Skype, 9 February 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview P. Skype, 20 March 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview Q. Skype, 23 March 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview R. Skype, 18 January 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview S. Skype, 29 January 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview T. Mombasa, 15 November
2017.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview U. Mombasa, 15 November
2017.
Navigating Changing Currents · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen page 128
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview V. Mombasa, 15 November
2017.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Interview W. Mombasa, 15 November
2017.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Peer A. Skype, 8 March 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Peer C. Skype, 14 February 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Peer D. Skype, 15 January 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Peer E. Skype, 20 January 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Peer F. Skype, 17 January 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen. Peer G. Skype, 16 February 2018.
H-Carrasco, Julie, and Katja Jacobsen Peer H. Skype, 26 February 2018.
Jacobsen, Katja. Interview D. Telephone, 12 March 2018.
Karlson, Mathias, and Ahmed Said. Hargeisa C. Hargeisa, 16 January 2018.
Karlson, Mathias, and Ahmed Said. Hargeisa D, 16 January 2018.
Kulatunga, Anil. Ber. MLE A. Berbera, 24 May 2018.
Kulatunga, Anil. Ber. MLE B. Berbera, 24 May 2018.
Kulatunga, Anil. Bos. MLE C. Berbera, 2018 2018.
Kulatunga, Anil. Mog. MLE A. Mogadishu, 27 April 2018.
Kulatunga, Anil. Mog. MLE B. Mogadishu, 27 April 2018.
Rasmussen, Pernille. Hargeisa B. Hargeisa, 10 January 2018.
Said, Ahmed. Piracy Prisoner no. 1. Hargeisa, 11 April 2018.
Said, Ahmed. Piracy Prisoner no. 2. Hargeisa, 11 April 2018.
Surasena, Sarath, and Abdirizak Ahmed. Bos. MLE A. Bosasso, 3 July 2018.
Surasena, Sarath, and Abdirizak Ahmed. Bos. MLE B. Bosasso, 4 July 2018.
Annex 130
“Civilians in Kenya’s northeast targeted by both jihadists and the state”, The New
Humanitarian, 16 June 2020
Aid and Policy Conflict Environment and Disasters Migration About us
Home Africa
Con$ict News 16 June 2020
Civilians in Kenya’s
northeast targeted by
both jihadists and the
state
‘My husband was killed by al-Shabab; my
brother-in-law was killed by the securi!
forces. We are caught up between these
people.’
Mohammed Yusuf
Freelance journalist covering East Africa, and a regular IRIN
contributor
Security oCcers and residents assess the damage after suspected al-Shabab militants threw an explosive device at a
teacher’s house in Mandera county, 2018. (Stringer/REUTERS)
WAJIR, Kenya
On a stifling night in April, Ibrahim Abdi was si!ing outside his
home in Wajir, trying to catch a breeze a"er evening prayers, when
his Kenya Police Reserve unit came for him. #ey said a group of
al-Shabab jihadists had been spo!ed in a nearby village in the
remote northeastern region, close to the Somali border, and he
should get his gun and come with them.
Abdi’s wife remembers he was reluctant. He asked why he always had to prove his
loyalty by confronting the Somali-based insurgents, but he went nonetheless. The
next morning, Abdi was dead: killed in an ambush 15 kilometres from his home,
along with six other reservists in the eight-man unit.
Abdi was an unlikely member of the KPR, an auxiliary home guard that in the rest of
Kenya usually chases poachers. He was a relatively well-to-do shop owner – not
the economic proXle of a typical rough-and-ready recruit.
But Abdi, a Somali-speaking Kenyan, was struggling with a reputation problem. His
brother’s body had been found in a shallow grave two years earlier, and the
government alleged he had been al-Shabab. The suspicion in Wajir was that he had
been killed by the security forces. For Abdi, that meant a dangerous guilt by
relation.
“After more than two years of being branded an al-Shabab sympathiser, my
husband had no option but to try and do away with that tag,” said his widow, Nurio
Dubow. “To do that, he had to join the KPR. There was no other way he was going
to survive.”
Everyone’s a suspect
Like many people in Wajir, one of four Kenyan counties that share a border with
Somalia, Abdi had to walk a diCcult line between the authorities’ conviction that
there are al-Shabab cells among the Somali-speaking community, and the fear of
the cross-border insurgents who are indiscriminate in their attacks.
Read more ! How Kenya’s al-Shabab amnes" is a loaded gun
“The government thinks the community is supporting al-Shabab,” Otsieno
Namwaya, a researcher with Human Rights Watch, told The New Humanitarian.
“But the truth is most people are just scared of the government: some feel
frustrated that the government has not exactly supported them.”
At its most extreme, suspicion of a connection to the insurgents can be a death
sentence. A 2016 report by Human Rights Watch documented 34 cases of
disappearances and 11 deaths of people who were last seen in police custody or at
a military barracks – and those killings have continued, said Namwaya.
The police and army routinely deny they are involved, but the local community “has
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Annex 130
disappearances and 11 deaths of people who were last seen in police custody or at
a military barracks – and those killings have continued, said Namwaya.
The police and army routinely deny they are involved, but the local community “has
deplored the violence of the security forces for years”, said Meron Elias, a Horn of
Africa researcher at the International Crisis Group.
The experience of Abdi’s widow, Dubow, redects the pressure. “My husband was
killed by al-Shabab; my brother-in-law was killed by the security forces,” she told
TNH. “We are caught up between these people. Who will help us? I don’t know
where to turn.”
Al-Shabab has been a long-standing security threat in the border regions. That
danger increased after Kenya’s military intervention into Somalia in 2011, in
support of the government battling the puritanical Islamist movement.
Read more ! Gunned down in Mombasa – the clerics that have died
But there has also been a recent spike in attacks. In the Xve months between
December 2019 and April 2020, at least 38 people were killed in some 14 clashes
and incidents in the border counties of Garissa, Lamu, Mandera, and Wajir.
The dead have included security forces, government oCcials, and commuters killed
in gun and bomb attacks. In at least one bus ambush, al-Shabab separated the
passengers, sparing the locals and executing those from outside the region.
Kenya’s COVID-19 lockdown has reduced road movements, but the threat has not
disappeared. The latest clash – after a long pause – was on Sunday, when a police
reservist and two al-Shabab Xghters were killed in Mandera.
“The day-to-day life around the borderline is alertness,” Jacob Narengo, the Wajir
county commissioner, who oversees local security, told TNH. “It is a daily routine
for us to hunt and look for these al-Shabab Xghters because you cannot allow your
enemy to come to your camp or your house.”
Lives upended
The KPR, though poorly equipped, is an essential part of the government’s rural
security strategy – and its members have suffered as a result. “Lately, al-Shabab
has been targeting KPR and their families, to weaken security in the region,” said
Elias.
The jihadist violence has led to the near collapse of key government services,
including schools and health facilities, as public service workers – many hired from
outside the region – abandon their posts.
After an attack on a school in Garissa in January, which killed three male teachers,
with a fourth abducted, the Teachers Service Commission – a state body that
manages hiring and deployment – authorised the transfer of non-local teachers
out of the region.
The subsequent loss of staff has reportedly thrown 10,000 children out of school.
In defending her decision, TSC chief Nancy Macharia told a parliamentary
education committee that 42 teachers had died in the condict since 2014 – and
she felt compelled to prevent more deaths.
The security forces believe the local community often knows more than it reveals
about al-Shabab’s presence. After the Garissa school attack, Hillary Mutymbai, the
+ Timeline: Recent al-Shabab-linked violence in Kenya
TNH
Annex 130
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education committee that 42 teachers had died in the condict since 2014 – and
she felt compelled to prevent more deaths.
The security forces believe the local community often knows more than it reveals
about al-Shabab’s presence. After the Garissa school attack, Hillary Mutymbai, the
inspector general of police, told the parliamentary committee, “it is only the nonlocal
teachers who were not aware about [the imminence of ] that attack”.
Namwaya sees this as part of a pattern of oCcial suspicion that fuels resentment.
The tendency is for the security forces to “start blaming the local community”
instead of investigating “what really happened”, he said.
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Ahmed Ismail, a member of the Wajir County assembly, echoed that view. “As
government security forces tackle the insecurity in the region, there is a need for
the security forces to work and follow the law in dealing with the community,” he
told TNH.
But Narengo, the county commissioner, was unapologetic over what he sees as a
necessarily aggressive policy. “People can criticise the work of the security forces,
but we will do everything to secure our borders, protect our people and their
properties,” he said.
Al-Shabab has struck as far as the capital, Nairobi, to exact a price for Kenya’s
military intervention in Somalia – including the storming of Westgate Mall in 2013,
which killed at least 67 people, and a gun and bomb attack on the DusitD2 hotel
complex last year in which 21 people died. A raid on Garissa University in 2015
killed more than 140 students.
“Greater Somalia”
With the current wave of attacks, analysts suggest al-Shabab may be looking to
entrench itself in Kenya’s northeast, aiming to annex the region as part of a de
facto “Greater Somalia” – re-awakening an old Somali nationalist idea that
triggered a secessionist rebellion in the 1960s known as the Shifta war.
“Northern Kenya is increasingly looking like an area that al-Shabab seeks to
incorporate under its rule, rather than just using it is [as a rear base],” said Omar
Mahmood, senior Somalia analyst with the International Crisis Group.
“Our people are against al-Shabab because they target teachers
who educate our children, medics who provide health services to
our people.”
Elias, the Horn of Africa researcher, said the attacks against teachers and health
posts serve multiple purposes: “to drive out non-locals who work in the area,
isolate residents, and deepen grievances [over a lack of services]”.
But the tactic doesn't seem to be winning many friends. “Our people are against al-
Shabab because they target teachers who educate our children, medics who
provide health services to our people,” Ahmed Ismail Dugow, a member of Wajir’s
county assembly, told TNH.
“They are targeting these people who are very important in our daily lives,” he said.
“We cannot be happy with such people who are making our homes poor in all
aspects of life.”
But there’s also a heavy presence of Kenyan security agencies in the region,
including the police anti-terrorism unit, the army, and the intelligence services. And
when counter-insurgency action is indiscriminate and unlawful, it is counterproductive,
say the analysts.
“The government must make the community feel protected, and then they will
share what information they have,” said Namwaya. “They don’t want people like al-
Shabab destroying their security and community.”
my/oa/ag
Read more about: Kenya Somalia Con$ict Human rights
Annex 130
Annex 131
“Al Shabaab area of operations: October 2018”, Critical Threats, 5 October 2018
By James Barnett October 05, 2018
Al Shabaab Area of Operations:
October 2018
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Annex 131
Al Shabaab Area of Operations October 2018
Support Zone: area free of signi!cant enemy action that permits the e"ective logistics and
administrative support of forces.[1]
Attack Zone: area where units conduct o"ensive maneuvers.[2]
!e U.S. military intensi"ed direct action operations against al Shabaab, which has disrupted the
group’s o#ensive campaigns but has not changed where it operates. U.S. forces conducted over 50
airstrikes and accompanied Somali forces on dozens of counterterrorism raids targeting al Shabaab
camps and high-level commanders since March 30, 2017, when the U.S. administration declared
Somalia an area of active hostilities.[3] #e Somali National Army (SNA) has not held the terrain
captured from al Shabaab in joint operations with African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces,
however, which has limited the e"ectiveness of these e"orts.[4] Al Shabaab holds territory surrounding
the capital, Mogadishu, from which it coordinates complex attacks targeting the Somali Federal
Government.[5] Increased counterterrorism pressure may have reduced the overall volume of attacks in
Mogadishu, but the city is not yet secure.[6] Key al Shabaab sanctuaries persist in central Somalia,
especially in Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, and in southern Somalia in Bay, Gedo, and Middle and
Lower Jubba regions. Al Shabaab is able to project force from Somalia and safe havens along the eastern
border with Kenya to attack Kenyan security forces and so$ targets in Kenya’s Mandera, Wajir, Garissa,
and Lamu counties.[7] U.S.-backed counterterrorism e"orts will limit al Shabaab’s ability to conduct
major o"ensive campaigns, but are not su%cient to defeat the group. Al Shabaab will also reestablish its
presence in populated areas in Somalia should Somali security forces not back!ll AMISOM forces
during the planned drawdown beginning in February 2019.[8]
Characterizing al Shabaab’s regional operations:
Editor's Notes
Mogadishu: Al Shabaab’s sanctuaries in the outskirts of the capital allow it to conduct
occasional complex attacks on hard targets, like federal ministries.[9] #e group adapted to
security conditions by striking so$er targets like district o%ces.[10] U.S. and Somali
operations reduced the number of complex attacks beginning in November 2017. Al Shabaab’s
tempo of assassinations, small-arms ambushes, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks
remains unchanged.[11]
Southern Somali Coast (Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Jubba): #e SNA cleared al
Shabaab from positions along the coast between Mogadishu and Marka but have not held the
area.[12] Al Shabaab !xed SNA and AMISOM units near Kismayo by attacking forwarddeployed
units repeatedly, including a June 8 attack on a U.S. forward operating base in
Sanguni that killed a U.S. soldier.[13]
Central Somalia (Middle Shabelle and Hiraan): Al Shabaab has a support zone along most of
the Mogadishu-Beledweyne highway and conducts frequent attacks on SNA and AMISOM
forces along this axis.[14] U.S.- and AMISOM-backed SNA operations cleared al Shabaab
from positions north of Mogadishu, but SNA forces did not hold the areas.[15]
Southwestern Somalia (Gedo, Bay, and Bakool): Al Shabaab maintains its historical attack
zones around the regional capitals Garbaharey, Baidoa, and Hudur. It increased attacks on
Baidoa a$er seizing a nearby district in June.[16] Al Shabaab expanded its support zone along
the road between Luq and Dolow in Gedo near the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders, potentially
providing a base of operations for future attacks in Ethiopia’s Somali region.[17]
Eastern Kenya: Al Shabaab expanded its attack zones in rural Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa
counties in eastern Kenya. Al Shabaab’s campaign in these counties is an economy-of-force
e"ort. Al Shabaab has freedom of movement in the countryside, allowing it to intimidate
populations, which erodes public trust in the Kenyan government.[18]
Northern Kenyan coast: Al Shabaab maintains a base of operations in Boni Forest despite a
three-year Kenyan military operation to clear the area.[19] It uses this base to prepare attacks
in Lamu County and southern Garissa County. Al Shabaab’s IED campaign throughout the
Kenya-Somali border zone has weakened Kenyan security forces.[20]
Puntland: Al Shabaab conducts economy-of-force e"orts to retain its base in the Galgala
Mountains, which facilitates access to arms smuggling networks, by attacking Puntland forces
along the highway between the administrative capital of Garowe and the commercial hub of
Boosaaso.[21]
Somaliland: Al Shabaab likely conducted its !rst suicide attack to assassinate politicians in
Somaliland but did not claim the operation.[22]
View Citations
"Support Zone", Editor's Note, THE TOWN OF ELBUR IN CENTRAL SOMALIA IS MEANT TO BE INCLUDED IN A SUPPORT
ZONE IN THE MAP. AN UPDATE TO THE MAP IS FORTHCOMING ON THIS WEBSITE.
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“Jaysh al-Ayman: Kenyan unit of jihadi’s poses threat to homeland”, The African
Criminology Journal, 21 January 2019
The African Crime & Conflict Journal
Defence Research & Analysis| Terrorism| Counter -Terrorism| Intelligence|
Organised Crime| Geo-politics| – Africa
COUNTER TERRORISM
Jaysh al-Ayman: Kenyan Unit of Jihadi’s
Poses Threat to Homeland
Date: January 21, 2019 0 Comments
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After a series of deadly attacks, Jaysh al-Ayman, an elite al-Shabaab unit formed about five
years ago to carry out operations inside Kenya, has emerged as the deadliest terrorist cell in
the East African nation. Although it started life in Somalia, the al-Qaeda affiliate’s Kenya
wing portrays itself as a local movement and has set up bases in the Boni forest, an expanse
of woodland in Kenya’s coastal Lamu County, which extends to the border with Somalia. It
is from here the faction terrorizes villages and towns, and targets the police, the military
and other government institutions.
The faction is named after one of its top leaders, Maalim Ayman (a.k.a. Dobow Abdiaziz
Ali), an ethnic Somali from Mandera County. He was likely appointed to the role in the
hope that having a Kenyan in charge of what is effectively al-Shabaab’s Kenya wing would
ease tensions. Details about Ayman are scarce, and his current role within the group is
unclear. According to some reports, however, he continues to train the group’s fighters in
wilderness survival techniques.
A Bloody Beginning
The unit’s origins can be traced to the events on June 20, 2013, in Barawi, an ancient Somali
coastal town, where differences within al-Shabaab boiled over. Barawi had become al-
Shabaab’s operational headquarters after it was forced out of the port of Kismayu by the
Kenyan military—Kismayu had served as group’s headquarters since it was established in
2006. On June 20, Ahmed Abdi Godane, then al-Shabaab’s emir, was concerned that
members of the group’s shura council were accusing him of adopting a murderous strategy
that targeted civilians and were preparing to split away from the group.
Two years prior, in 2011, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had been
strengthened by Kenyan troops. Concerned with how to keep his group intact in the face of
an onslaught by a better-armed foe and desperate to reassert his authority, Godane ordered
the Amniyat, the group’s elite spy wing, to execute Ibrahim al-Afghani, a member of al-
Shabaab’s shura council. Other shura members, among them Mukhtar Robow and Shaykh
Dahir Aweys, were also targeted, but escaped and later defected to the Somali government.
In late 2013, following a strategy aimed at fighting a more effective asymmetrical war in
Somalia and its neighbors, Godane unveiled two new wings of al-Shabaab—Jaysh al- Usra,
which he directed at Ethiopia, and Jaysh al-Ayman, which would target Kenya, Uganda
and Tanzania.
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While Jaysh al-Usra failed to penetrate Ethiopia, Jaysh al-Ayman has seen success in Kenya.
So much so, in fact, that although Kenyan security agencies launched the Operation Linda
Boni (Operation “Protect Boni”) in 2015 to flush the militants out of the forest, the group
has remained highly elusive. The unit has become a major headache for the Kenyan
security services. Experts now question whether intelligence reports were ignored early on,
allowing the group to securely embed itself in the area.
Attacks in Kenya
Jaysh al-Ayman has played a leading role in many of the recent major terrorist attacks in
Kenya. Abdilatif Abubakar Ali, a commander with the group, is believed to have played a
key role in planning and executing the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack, which left 67
people dead.
In June 2014, 50 heavily armed militants targeted the Mpeketoni area, killing 48 people, all
non-Muslims, and killed another 29 in Hindi area, two weeks later. In June 2014, the
militants descended on Lamu County, massacring nearly 100 people.
In neighboring Pandanguo, another town in Lamu, the militants carried out a different type
of operation, putting away their guns and instead, since the area is predominantly Muslim,
hoarding people into a mosque and preaching to them, before looting drugs, nets and
mattresses from a nearby dispensary.
In April 2015, al-Shabaab gunmen, who security experts say were linked to the faction,
stormed Garissa University, killing 148 people, mainly Christian students, in the most
deadly attack in Kenya since the 1998 Nairobi U.S. embassy bombing by al-Qaeda, in which
more than 200 people were killed.
More recently, the faction was linked to the kidnapping of the late Mariam El-Maawy, a top
Kenyan government official who was abducted by militants along the Mokowe-Mpeketoni
road. El-Maawy was rescued by the Kenyan military and taken for treatment in South
Africa, but died of her wounds in hospital three months later.
Aside from these bloody, high-profile attacks, the group has planted Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) along parts of the lengthy and porous Kenya-Somali border and has killed
numerous civilians, policemen and soldiers.
Expanding Membership
Initially, Kenyans from the coastal region made-up the majority of Jaysh al-Ayman’. One of
Jaysh al-Ayman’s key commanders is Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi (a.k.a. Musa Muhajir), a
Kenyan from the coast city of Mombasa. Muhajir has been on the radar of the Kenyan
security services for some time, and the police say he is one of the militants responsible for
the Lamu attacks.
In recent years, the group has grown to include Muslim converts from some of Kenya’s
non-Muslim communities, as well as foreign fighters. Among the foreign jihadists known
to have joined the group was Malik Ali Jones, an American currently in jail in the United
States. Another key foreign fighter is Ahmed Muller, a German citizen who uses several
aliases, including Andreas Ahmad Khaled, Muller Martin Muller and Abu Nusaibah. The
42-year-old militant, who comes from Cochem, Germany, was allegedly seconded to al-
Shabaab by its al-Qaeda affiliate in Pakistan in 2011.
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Jones and Muller were identified after the killing of a British national, Thomas Evans,
during an attempted attack on an army camp in the Buare area. In that failed attack, more
than 10 al-Shabaab militants were killed while score of others fled with serious injuries. The
group’s commander, Issa Luqman Osman (a.k.a. “Shirwa”), was also killed.
The Counter Terrorism Operation Against Jaysh Al Ayman
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LAMU, Kenya—Tucked into the northeast end of the country’s coast, the Boni National
Reserve is a fairy-tale paradise, a resplendent ecosystem packed with elephantine baobab
trees and hydra-headed palms. This mix of riverine forest and swampy grassland is home
to some of the country’s largest herds of game, and to rare species like the wild dog, Somali
lion, and reticulated giraffe.
There are no rhinoceros left here, but Doza Diza, 66 years old, talks about seeing kifaru
often. The safari word for rhino has been re-purposed by the locals as a name for the
armor-plated Humvees whose machine-gun mounts recall the animal’s distinctive horn.
Tall, gaunt, and with a bad eye, Doza Diza wears a traditional Swahili sarong and a
Muslim skullcap. He describes himself as a former county councilor and crab fisherman.
These motorized rhino can be distinguished by color, he says. The dark green ones are
vehicles operated by the Kenya Defense Forces, KDF, he tells me. Those painted the color of
sand belong to the Americans.
Doza is an elder of his tribe, the Awer (also spelled Aweer). They are hunter-gatherers who
seek out honey by following birds, talk to crocodiles and hippos in tongues the beasts are
said to understand, and generally stick to their ancient way of life. The Awer are also
Muslims, which is highly unusual among the world’s few remaining stone-age peoples.
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They’ve long inhabited the Boni forest region, but slowly and surely their way of life is
being stripped from them. Subsistence hunting was banned in Kenya in the 1970s, so any
meat the Awer procure is illegal. And now the tribe is caught in the crossfire of the global
war on terror.
***
The area around the Boni National Reserve is one of many places in Africa where American
special forces personnel are deployed with little fanfare and, indeed, as secretly as
Washington’s representatives and proxies can manage. In this case the unit is involved in
training Kenyan soldiers on counter terrorism operations.
As The New York Times reported recently, the United States has been escalating the
“shadow war” inside Somalia with “the potential for the United States Army to be drawn
ever more deeply into a trouble country that so far has stymied all efforts to fix it.”
The Times, quoting unnamed “senior American military officials,” estimated that “about
200 to 300 American Special Operations troops work with soldiers from Somalia and other
African nations like Kenya and Uganda to carry out more than a half-dozen raids per
month.” And it outlined a program in which private contractors employed by the U.S. also
play a significant role.
But the shadow war inside the failed-state borders of Somalia is almost transparent
compared to the activities here on the ill-defined edge of that war. There is a long history of
countries on the fringes of conflict being sucked into war themselves, the most notable
example being Cambodia during the Vietnam debacle. Whether Washington will help
prevent such an outcome—or provoke it—is an open question.
Repeated and detailed queries to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) for clarification of the
American role here on the frontier between Kenya and Somalia were answered with a brief
response explaining why not even a background briefing was possible: “As these
operations are currently ongoing, and have elements of U.S. special forces assisting, we
cannot comment at this time due to operational security reasons.”
A major part of the mission those U.S. special forces are “assisting” in this part of the
continent is, in fact, to hunt down and kill members of the Somali group known as al-
Shabaab who threaten Kenya’s security and, through the group’s close relationship with al
Qaeda, are believed to threaten America’s as well.
The counterterror and counterinsurgency forces operating in the region would like the
Awer to help them track the Somali guerrillas and terrorists.
U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets), other Special Operations Forces of various stripes, State
Department officials, spies and commandos from countries with close ties to the United
States, including the Brits, Israelis, and Jordanians, have all deployed or trained in Kenya in
an undeclared if not unmentioned extension of the U.S.-backed Global War on Terror.
Kenya’s government and its international partners—the heavyweights being the U.S. and
the U.K.—are desperate to make this region safe for engineers, imported skilled workers,
and, tourists. But the current intense counterterror focus has been a slow build. While
significant progress has been made, for the moment, the expansive Boni forest remains an
active operations zone. Several police and soldiers have been killed after getting blown up
by IED’s.
Al-Shabaab released a recruitment video in 2015 boasting about the bountiful game in the
forest provided by Allah to sustain jihadi fighters.
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One ranch with a tourist concession that had been a haunt of jet-setters and celebrities
(Kristin Davis, one of the stars of Sex in the City, had been a guest) found itself converted
into a haven for al-Shabaab sympathizers in 2014. They stole food and medicine then
torched the facility’s guest huts.
There is a long and bloody history behind such incidents. In October 2011, Kenya sent
troops into Somalia. Since then al-Shabaab has carried out retaliatory hits on targets in
Kenya resulting in hundreds of deaths.
Kenyan officials believe that after the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi that killed at
least 70 people, and the relentless intelligence driven track and kill strategy adopted by
security forces, al-Shabaab recruits from the Kenya retreated from Kenya’s urban areas and
melted into the dense Boni forest—which sits on the coast, right on the country’s northsouth
border with Somalia and adjacent to what was once a Somali national park.
Officials say another massacre, the 2014 Mpeketoni attack, which left 48 dead, was staged
from within the forest, and that the Garissa University attack of 2015, which left at least 148
dead, was organized within the enormous Dadaab refugee camp nearby (which the
Kenyan government plans to shut down).
Jaysh al Ayman, the al-Shabaab cell in the forest, reportedly was comprised of some 300
fighters in 2015, spread out through sleeper cells in a few towns, units inside Boni Forest
and in camps in Somalia where it’s members receive training and logistics but its numbers
certainly vary.
Following the Westgate attack national and Western forces were in an all-out scramble to
protect Kenya from further cross-border terrorism. After the Garissa attack, The U.S. and
other Western nations decided to offer better assistance both overt and covert.
According to human rights groups, the counterinsurgency tactics that accompanied the
build-up of international assistance have featured mass police sweeps, arbitrary detentions,
disappearances, and executions targeting al-Shabaab suspects, recruiters, funders and
sympathizers.
During President Barack Obama’s visit to Kenya in July of 2015, he stepped into the fray,
allocating $100 million for the Kenya Defense Forces for weapons, materiel, and vehicles.
The allowance was a 163 percent increase in counterterrorism assistance over the previous
year. Among Kenya’s purchases: a Boeing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System —comprising
several drones and supporting infrastructure—at a price of $9.8 million. Each year for the
past decade or longer the Kenyan government has obtained security assistance from the
West.
The most recent installment—approved by the State Department and Trump’s
administration are light attack combat choppers designed for troop support and low, high
impact attacks targeting people on the ground for elimination
Obama’s theme was known as “the 3-D approach” to the region’s conflicts—defense,
diplomacy, and development. And in the two months following his historic visit to the land
of his father, Kenya’s government announced that a “multi-agency” security force had been
assembled to carry out counterterror measures against al-Shabaab.
The force consisted of paramilitary units within Kenya’s police, Kenya Defense Forces
special forces, and various state agencies, including the National Intelligence Service,
Military Intelligence, the Kenya Wildlife Service and Forest Service—all trained by Western
police units and special forces.
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***
On Sept. 11 of 2015, Kenya formally launched “Operation Linda Boni” (Linda Boni being
Swahili for “protect the Boni”). The goal set was to drive the Jaysh Al Ayman insurgents
from the forest.
The first stage of this effort was cordoning off the Boni forest as a collection of “no-go
zones,” and evacuation of residents in affected areas.
Security officials contend that Somali fighters have taken up residence, with their wives
and children, deep inside the Boni forest.
Doza Diza and other Awer leaders say that is true.
They say al-Shabaab has coerced them into providing shelter in mosques and schools,
logistical support, chiefly in the form of food and medicine, and have forced tribespeople to
track game for them.
Doza reports that guerrillas took his people’s food and issued warnings not to reveal their
whereabouts to Kenya security, “Otherwise, we’ll deal with you.” Aside from this, he notes,
the insurgents are polite to the locals.
Linda Boni has not only run long beyond its planned two-month timetable, it has extended
far beyond the forest and its region into much of northeast Kenya all the way to the Somali
border.
In the process it has become apparent that the KDF’s counterterror tactics involve more
than eradicating the al-Shabaab presence in the forest.
By the end of 2015, the KDF announced it was expanding its area of deployment into
neighboring counties along the Somali border and south some 200 miles, to the Tana River,
constructing additional police stations and military camps. The Baragoni camp on the
southern fringe of the Boni-Dodori National Reserve expanded its area to 800 acres of
ostensibly public land.
Kenya has started to build a 435-mile Western-funded security wall at the nation’s eastern
border. On a visit to Kenya last year, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a big fan
of walls in the Holy Land and in the U.S. as well, committed funds to the project. Kenya’s
President Uhuru Kenyatta reportedly has suggested building a terrorist-only prison facility.
JANUARY 2020 ATTACK BY JAYSH AL AYMAN
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1 U.S. Serviceperson, 2 Contractors Dead, 6 Planes Struck, Including Rare Spy Plane, In
Kenya Attack
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SOURCE: THE DRIVE
REPORT BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK
JANUARY 5, 2020
THE WAR ZONE
An attack on a military outpost in Kenya where U.S. troops are stationed, as well as its
associated airfield, has left a U.S. service member and two contractors dead and six aircraft
and helicopters damaged or destroyed. This includes a secretive U.S. military de Havilland
Dash-8 twin-engine turboprop configured for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions. The terrorists who carried out the raid also damaged or destroyed vehicles and
fuel tanks.
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Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda’s franchise in Somalia, carried out the attack on the base, known as
Camp Simba, and the nearby airfield, typically referred to simply as Manda Bay after the
nearby body of water of the same name, occurred in the early hours local time on Jan. 5,
2020.
The terrorists reportedly used a suicide car bomb to breach the main facility and also
stormed the airstrip, both of which are situated roughly 60 miles southwest of the Somali
border. One U.S. service member and two Department of Defense contractors died in the
attack, according to U.S. Africa Command , while another two U.S. military members were
injured and are, at the time of writing, in stable condition and being evacuated.
There is no word yet on any Kenyan casualties, but the country’s authorities have said that
at least eight Al Shabaab terrorists died in the ensuing skirmish. U.S. and Kenyan
authorities had earlier since issued statements that forces from both countries had
successfully repelled the attackers. “The attack on the compound today involved indirect
and small arms fire. After an initial penetration of the perimeter, Kenya Defense Forces and
U.S. Africa Command repelled the al-Shabaab attack,” AFRICOM’s statement read.
“Reports indicate that six contractor-operated civilian aircraft were damaged to some
degree.”
The full extent of the damage remains unclear. The Associated Press , citing an initial
Kenyan police report the outlet had seen, had reported that an unspecified U.S. “Cessna,”
as well as a Kenyan Cessna Grand Caravan , and two unknown U.S. helicopters, along with
various American vehicles had been destroyed.
Pictures that have emerged that show what appears to be the remains of a Beechcraft King
Air that was destroyed and burned out during the attack, as well as a pair of M-ATV mineresistant
vehicles that very likely belong to U.S. forces. This could be the aircraft that the
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Kenyan police report described as a U.S. “Cessna.”
Some reports have suggested that this could be a U.S. Air Force C-146A Wolfhound special
operations transport, but the tail section seen in the image notably lacks the “stinger” style
tail seen on that aircraft, along with other differences. In addition, AFRICOM has only said
so far that the destroyed and damaged aircraft were contractor-operated, which the
Wolfhounds are not.
Contractors do fly a mix of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters from the Manda Bay to
provide transport, casualty evacuation, and personnel recovery support to American forces
and their local partners in Kenya and neighboring Somalia, where U.S. special operations
forces and other troops are fighting Al Shabaab and training Somali personnel to do the
same. At least one contractor-operated Bell 412 helicopter is based there, which could be
among the U.S. helicopters that reportedly got destroyed in the raid.
Al Shabaab has released its own pictures from the attack, clearly showing a specially
configured de Havilland Dash-8 in front of what appears to be the burning fuel tanks. We
don’t know how severe the damage to the plane was, but one picture does show smoke
coming out of the cockpit and an Al Shabaab terrorist appearing to be putting or trying to
put something inside.
This U.S.-government owned, but contractor-operated Dash-8, a DHC-8-202 model,
belongs to a secretive fleet of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft known as SOCOM Tactical Airborne Multi-
Sensor Platforms, or STAMP. These aircraft are known to support shadowy Joint Special
Operations Command.
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At present, the STAMP fleet includes two DHC-8-202s, as well as three Beechcraft King
Airs. The paint scheme on the aircraft in the images Al Shabaab posted online, white with a
large blue cheatline with a smaller red one underneath, matches the Dash-8 that presently
carries the U.S. civil registration code N8200L. The other STAMP Dash-8, N8200R, has a
similar paint job, but with the colors of the cheatlines reversed. Satellite imagery showed
that U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command U-28A ISR aircraft and contractoroperated
Beechcraft King Airs were also regular visitors to Manda Bay.
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Whatever the final damage assessment is and how many aircraft and other assets Al
Shabaab succeeded in destroying or damaging, the attack is a particularly brazen statement
of the group’s very real ability to strike outside of Somalia. Kenya, which is a significant
member of the African Union-led operations targeting Al Shabaab in Somalia, has suffered
a number of attacks on both military and civilian targets on its own soil from the group in
recent years .
Just last year, the terrorist organization launched a major attack on an upscale Dusit D2
Hotel and associated business complex in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, killing 21 people and
wounding another 28. After that operation, Al Shabaab announced the beginning of a
campaign it dubbed “Al-Quds (Jerusalem) will never be Judaized,” a reference to a pledge
to ultimately eject Israel from the city of Jerusalem, a common refrain among Islamic
extremist groups. The Somalia terrorists said that the raid on Camp Simba and Manda Bay
was part of this same campaign. There is no indication that this is tied to the ongoing crisis
between the United States and Iran.
This also comes as the U.S. military has significantly expanded both facilities in recent
years, which coincided with U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to designate a swath
of southern Somalia as an “area of active hostilities” in 2017. This enabled the U.S. military
to dramatically increase its operations there and has led to a spike in airstrikes , including
using drones, on Al Shabaab targets since then. Aircraft flying from Manda Bay have been
providing important persistent surveillance capabilities over southern Somalia in support
of those operations.
U.S. forces first began operating from Camp Simba and Manda Bay more than 10 years ago,
with the U.S. Navy initially being responsible for overseeing operations at these facilities.
In addition to using the airstrip as a launch point for aerial reconnaissance over
neighboring Somalia, American forces have used the main base as a training base for both
Kenyan and Somali forces.
In 2017, overall responsibility for both sites passed to the U.S. Air Force, which established
the 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron to oversee day-to-day activities at Manda Bay.
In August 2019, this unit raised the American flag over the airfield, in a ceremony that
marked its transition to an “enduring” base, meaning the U.S. military now treats it as a
semi-permanent operating location.
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Despite this existing plan to continue operations at this site for the foreseeable future, Al
Shabaab’s attack has demonstrated a clear need for U.S. and Kenyan forces to reassess their
defensive posture going forward.
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Source: The Drive
2015 Attempted Attack on KDF Special Forces Camp
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Since the Westgate attack, the KDF base at Baragoni has grown from a temporary camp to a
permanent one, and by 2015 Kenya had deployed enough of its troops there with sufficient
transport to foil a Shabaab attack aimed at destroying the Baure camp, which is 36 miles
north of the Baragoni base.
In that action KDF Rangers killed 11 militants from the Jaysh Al Ayman unit, including an
British man named Thomas Evans who’d been dubbed “the White Beast” in U.K. tabloids.
The KDF paraded his corpse—along with others—in nearby Mpeketoni, where counter
terror operations are headquartered. The British press subsequently posted video that
appears to show the night time engagement filmed shortly before he died from a Kenyan
bullet
The reach of the Baragoni base the jihadis attempted to attack stretches far beyond a few
satellite camps.
International Recruits
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Final moments of the ‘White Beast’:
Thomas Evans was filming the firefight in against KDF when he was shot Revealing images
show him hugging fellow fanatics before the onslaught.
The incredible footage was discovered on the 25-year-old Briton’s corpse Evans converted
to Islam in 2010 and joined Somali terror group in 2011 Man from Buckinghamshire is one
of 50 British people to join Al-Shabaab
The shadows are lengthening in the bushland of northern Kenya as two cells of Al Qaeda
inspired Al Shabaab fighters come together for their final briefing in the hours before
launching a blood fuelled terror attack.
At their very heart is the heavily bearded British Muslim-convert Thomas Evans, a large
dagger tucked behind the ammunition pouches strapped to his chest.
The Briton from the small Buckinghamshire village of Wooburn Green – known as the
‘White Beast’ because of his brutality – is clearly relaxed and smiles as he embraces fellow
Islamist fighters who have crossed in groups from the Al Shabaab heartland of Somalia to
team up with Kenyan-based terrorists in preparation for their dawn operations.
Hours later the 25 year-old is dead, shot as he helped lead an assault on the Kenyan
Defence Force base – the first case of a British Islamist militant being killed on Kenyan soil.
The extraordinary pictures were found in a camera and series of videos discovered on the
body of Evans, the group’s second in command and cameraman, in the aftermath of the
5.45am attack at Baure, Lamu County, 11-days ago.
They provide a unique insight into the role of the Briton, who had changed his name to
Abdul Hakim, and is believed to have taken part in an atrocity on a nearby village a year
earlier that left 70 people dead.
Taken by Evans as he shouted instructions, they also show for the first time the final
seconds of his life – and the moment he is hit by the fatal bullet.
Dawn has barely broken as the fighters, illuminated only by gunfire and explosions, move
from the cover of the bush to launch their assault with Evans recording what Al Shabaab
hope will be another propaganda strike on the beleaguered military.
Annex 132
Hunched gunmen are captured blasting off bursts of automatic fire while incoming Kenyan
bullets pour-in towards the fighters.
Evans is recording the frantic, terrifying moments of attack immediately behind the
gunmen and would have made an easy target.
Suddenly, the footage stops as he is hit, collapsing to the ground as comrades desperately
try to drag him back into the bush.
He was one of at least 11 jihadis killed in the failed attack and five remarkable videos found
on Evans chronicle the hours of build-up to attack – and the Briton’s comfort in his role of
jihadist.
In one sequence of his photographs, a fighter is filmed making a crude roadside bomb,
packing explosives together and then squatting in the shade as he links together the wires
and the detonator.
Evans then captures two fighters skinning and gutting a gazelle they have shot for a meal
beside a thorn tree as a gunman, his head covered by the distinctive black and white
checked head scarf popular with fighters, rests his weapon on his right shoulder.
He then hands the camera to a colleagues who show Evans, wearing a brown T-shirt, blue
trousers and a camouflage cap – he is the only fighter wearing socks in his sandals, perhaps
a tiny ‘nod’ towards his background – listening among a group of some fighters as they are
briefed by a commander, who tells them: ‘The war starts now, we hear from their radio
channels that the Kenya are crying like babies, fear has struck in their hearts.
‘God has given Islam real lions that are feared.’
Evans, his cap reversed, sits cross-legged as men carry out final weapons’ check on the
arsenal laid out in front of them.
Distinctive black and white flags of Al Shabaab hang on wooden stakes. Several daggers
have been driven in to the dirt in a shaded clearing.
Significantly, a second white European with thick beard and dark hair hanging beyond his
muscled shoulders can be seen in many of the pictures with Evans.
He survived the attack and has been named as German, Andreas Martin Muller, alias Abu
Nusaybah, who has a £64,000 bounty on his head.
The body of Evans, who is one of at least 50 Britons suspected of operating with Al
Shabaab, has been buried in northern Kenya after formal identification was carried out
with DNA from his family.
An intelligence official in the Kenyan capital Nairobi described the former electrician as a
‘significant and totally integrated figure’ within the units of Al Shabaab operating in
northern Kenya during the last two years.
He is said to have taken part in the attack last year on the predominantly Christian town of
Mpeketoni last year in which 70 people were killed. Gunmen went from house to house
singling out Christians, shooting them in the head and chest in front of their families before
torching homes.
Evans has also been linked to the horrific attack on Garissa University College in north east
Kenya this April that left 147 people dead and over a hundred injured.
Gunmen took over 700 students hostage, freeing Muslims and killing those who identified
Annex 132
as Christians. Survivors of attacks by Evans are said to have told how he broke down doors
with an axe to find victims, and personally beheaded one man whose hands were tied
behind his back.
On previous attacks, most notably Mpeketoni, Al Shabaab is known to have taken
photographs and video for both propaganda and to use as part of their training camps.
Officials believe Evans was tasked with capturing the build-up and attack on Baure but, it
is understood, security forces had a tip-off and were waiting for the attack in which two
soldiers died.
The son of a devout Christian and Conservative party agent, Evans converted to Islam in
2010, aged 19, after splitting up with his girlfriend.
His mother Sally Evans said she believed he was radicalised after leaving a moderate local
mosque to attend a hard-line prayer centre.
Evans attempted to fly to Kenya in February 2011, when he was 21, but was stopped by
counter-terrorism police at Heathrow. He flew to Egypt in June, telling his family he was
going to learn Arabic and funding his travel through a car-boot sale.
Kenyan police revealed the following month he flew from Cairo, via Ethiopia, to Nairobi
where he was stopped by Kenyan authorities because his name was on a terror watchlist
provided by the UK. A police report said : ‘The subject indicated his motive of visit was to
spend Ramadan prayers in Kenya.’ Officers said that in his luggage they found a Koran,
sleeping bag, pair of boots and a black kanzu robe and perfume.
He was travelling with three friends and told officers, who sent him back to Egypt, that he
planned to stay at the Incas Hotel in Mombasa, at the time seen as a hotbed of radical
recruitment.
Transformed: Thomas Evans’ mother Sally (pictured) said she believed he was radicalised
after leaving a moderate local mosque to attend a hard-line prayer centre
She described her son as a ‘normal teenager’ who enjoyed visiting the pub on a Saturday
night. She said she was initially happy with his decision to convert to Islam as he had ‘done
one or two things that I was not proud of’.
He attempted to convert his mother and brother to Islam and refused to use the same
crockery as the rest of his family, resented music being played in her home and would not
enter the front room during Christmas.
Evans brought a friend, Donald Stewart-Whyte, a fellow Muslim convert, to the family
home. Stewart-Whyte was arrested in 2006 in connection with the liquid bomb plot to blow
up planes but was later cleared of any involvement.
Despite being prevented from travelling to Kenya by police, authorities failed to contact
Mrs Evans.
‘I wish that they had contacted us,’ she told MPs. ‘I know he was 21, but as his mother and
his brother, we could have helped them maybe, or if they had told us their concerns, we
could have acted on it. We could have worked with them to help save Thomas.’
His brother, Michael, said a ‘tipping point’ came when Evans went on a charity trip in 2010
to Palestine called Road to Hope, from which he returned angry with strong views against
the UK and US’s presence in the Middle East.
Annex 132
Mrs Evans phoned a helpline for people with concerns that their relatives or friends were
being radicalised but felt ignored because she was not a Muslim. When she learnt of the
death on June 14th, Mrs Evans said : ‘I just went numb. I couldn’t believe that was my son,
my little boy, my little babe who I loved.’
***
Swaleh Msellem, a Swahili resident of Lamu Island, manages a petrol station at the
Mokowe jetty a few kilometers across a channel on the mainland. Msellem, now 30, told me
how one morning he’d docked his boat at the jetty where at least a dozen non-uniformed
men, whom he claims were with the paramilitary wing of Kenya’s National Police Service,
had been waiting for him.
Someone pulled a hood over his head and tossed him into a vehicle. Familiar with the area
and its roads, he said he could tell he was driven some 40 kilometers away to the Baragoni
military base, where he was detained in a shipping container and interrogated aggressively
to extract information on who planned a deadly attack in the nearby village of Hindi, soon
after the Mpekatoni massacre. He denied any knowledge. The interrogators asked where
the weapons were that were used for the attacks. “Which weapons?” he answered.
The military intelligence officers continued to grill him, insisting he had information. He
said that during that detention he was driven from Baragoni to an area nearby. One
afternoon he complained of feeling ill. Guards took him outside to a pond where he
vomited. Through his loosened blindfold he was able to glimpse crocodiles on the berm of
the pond.
Why were crocodiles being kept inside a military base, he wondered.
Msellem said soldiers later threatened that he’d be fed to the crocodiles like others had
been if he didn’t cooperate. After two weeks he was transferred to the port town of
Mombasa, to the south, and held several months at the infamous Shimo La Tewa prison in
a wing reserved for terrorists. Msellem eventually was taken into court, where he was
acquitted of all murder and terror-related charges for lack of evidence (a wanted Al
shabaab militant had been in contact with him by phone leading police his way.)
When I interviewed Msellem, he was grimly philosophical. Although he did not see or talk
to any U.S. personnel, as far as he knew, he had no doubt they played some role behind the
scenes. “The Americans are very complicated, aren’t they? On the one hand they are
helping us by building roads, dispensaries, schools, but they also seem to want to kill”
For information from inside the Baragoni base, I spoke with a man who identified himself
as a Western-trained Kenyan Special Forces soldier serving with one of the SF battalions.
This soldier described to me the process of “enhanced interrogation”—used at Baragoni
military base. He confirmed that people were were going to pay up.”
Operation Linda Boni: Gains Against Jaysh Ayman Terrorists
In vast forest, the government has established a military camp; nine police stations fully
staffed with staff, the police stations hosts the anti-terrorism unit for profiling and
prosecution of suspected terrorists.
The government is in the process of establishing a permanent Kenya Wildlife Service camp
with paramilitary rangers and combat trained forest officers.
During the operations, camps have been discovered and several weapons recovered.
Annex 132
Security forces drawn from KDF army, General Service Unit and regular police operations
have been able to recover more than a tonne of food supplies, guns and ammunition,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and bomb-making materials in trenches.
Residents neighbouring the forest, Bondhei, Pandanguo, Witu and Pangani – which are in
Garissa and Tana River counties have been very collaborative with security apparatus and
have confirmed that security is sufficient.
Sources: Jamestown.org & Daily Beast News
© 2020 THE AFRICAN CRIME & CONFLICT JOURNAL
POWERED BY WORDPRESS.COM.
AL SHABAAB BONI FOREST COUNTER TERRORISM ELITE HINDI JAYSH AL AYMAN
UNIT KDF KENYA LAMU MILITARY MPEKETONI OPERATION SOMALIA TANA
RIVER TERRORIST ATTACK TERRORIST CELL
Annex 132
Annex 133
S. West, “Jaysh al-Ayman: a ‘local’ threat in Kenya”, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16
Issue: 8, The Jamestown Foundation, 23 April 2018
/
Kenyan security forces in the Boni Forest (Source: The Star [Kenya])
Jaysh al-Ayman: A ‘Local’ Threat in Kenya
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 8
By: Sunguta West (https://jamestown.org/analyst/sunguta-west/)
April 23, 2018 05:24 PM Age: 2 years
(https://jamestown.org/)
Search ..
Annex 133
/
After a series of deadly attacks, Jaysh al-Ayman, an elite al-Shabaab unit formed about five years
ago to carry out operations inside Kenya, has emerged as the deadliest terrorist cell in the East
African nation. Although it started life in Somalia, the al-Qaeda affiliate’s Kenya wing portrays itself
as a local movement and has set up bases in the Boni forest, an expanse of woodland in Kenya’s
coastal Lamu County, which extends to the border with Somalia. It is from here the faction
terrorizes villages and towns, and targets the police, the military and other government
institutions (Daily Nation (https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Dilemma-for-Garissa-herders-in-Boni-
Forest/1056-4066854-nu3wl2z/index.html), August 22, 2017).
The faction is named after one of its top leaders, Maalim Ayman (a.k.a. Dobow Abdiaziz Ali), an
ethnic Somali from Mandera County. [1] He was likely appointed to the role in the hope that
having a Kenyan in charge of what is effectively al-Shabaab’s Kenya wing would ease tensions.
Details about Ayman are scarce, and his current role within the group is unclear. According to
some reports, however, he continues to train the group’s fighters in wilderness survival techniques
(The Star, (https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/07/13/al-shabaab-unit-formed-to-cr…
c1166804) July 13, 2015).
A Bloody Beginning
The unit’s origins can be traced to the events on June 20, 2013, in Barawi, an ancient Somali
coastal town, where differences within al-Shabaab boiled over. Barawi had become al-Shabaab’s
operational headquarters after it was forced out of the port of Kismayu by the Kenyan military—
Kismayu had served as group’s headquarters since it was established in 2006 (The Standard,
(https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001248735/why-raids-are-a-caus…-
changes-face) July 23, 2017). On June 20, Ahmed Abdi Godane, then al-Shabaab’s emir,
was concerned that members of the group’s shura council were accusing him of adopting a
murderous strategy that targeted civilians and were preparing to split away from the group.
Two years prior, in 2011, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had been strengthened
by Kenyan troops. Concerned with how to keep his group intact in the face of an onslaught by a
better-armed foe and desperate to reassert his authority, Godane ordered the Amniyat, the
group’s elite spy wing, to execute Ibrahim al-Afghani, a member of al-Shabaab’s shura council.
Other shura members, among them Mukhtar Robow and Shaykh Dahir Aweys, were also targeted,
but escaped and later defected to the Somali government.
In late 2013, following a strategy aimed at fighting a more effective asymmetrical war in Somalia
and its neighbors, Godane unveiled two new wings of al-Shabaab—Jaysh al- Usra, which he
directed at Ethiopia, and Jaysh al-Ayman, which would target Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (The
Reporter, (https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/al-shabaab-no-longer-exclus…-
problem) August 20, 2016).
While Jaysh al-Usra failed to penetrate Ethiopia, Jaysh al-Ayman has seen success in Kenya. So
much so, in fact, that although Kenyan security agencies launched the Operation Linda Boni
(Operation “Protect Boni”) in 2015 to flush the militants out of the forest, it has met with only
limited success. The group has become a major headache for the Kenyan security services. Experts
Annex 133
/
now question whether intelligence reports were ignored early on, allowing the group to securely
embed itself in the area (Daily Nation, (https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Agencies--ignoredintelligence-
reports--on--Shabaab--/1056-4023478-12vodwo/index.html) July 20, 2017).
Attacks in Kenya
Jaysh al-Ayman has played a leading role in many of the recent major terrorist attacks in Kenya.
Abdilatif Abubakar Ali, a commander with the group, is believed to have played a key role in
planning and executing the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack, which left 67 people dead (The
Star, (https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/12/02/security-agents-say-missing-…-
al-shabaab_c1248503) December 2, 2015). In June 2014, 50 heavily armed militants
targeted the Mpeketoni area, killing 48 people, all non-Muslims, and killed another 29 in Hindi
area, two weeks later. In June 2014, the militants descended on Lamu County, massacring nearly
100 people Daily Nation, (https://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaabterroris…
1056-2349860-10elxgcz/index.html) June 16, 2014; Standard Digital
(https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000125005/gunmen-kill-48-in-mp…-
of-violence), June 17, 2014).
In neighboring Pandanguo, another town in Lamu, the militants carried out a different type of
operation, putting away their guns and instead, since the area is predominantly Muslim, hoarding
people into a mosque and preaching to them, before looting drugs, nets and mattresses from a
nearby dispensary (The Standard
(https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000127827/criminals-escape-wit…-
pandanguo-in-lamu/), July 11, 2014; The Standard,
(https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001248735/why-raids-are-a-caus…-
changes-face) July 23, 2017). In April 2015, al-Shabaab gunmen, who security experts say
were linked to the faction, stormed Garissa University, killing 148 people, mainly Christian
students, in the most deadly attack in Kenya since the 1998 Nairobi U.S. embassy bombing by al-
Qaeda, in which more than 200 people were killed.
More recently, the faction was linked to the kidnapping of the late Mariam El-Maawy, a top Kenyan
government official who was abducted by militants along the Mokowe-Mpeketoni road. El-Maawy
was rescued by the Kenyan military and taken for treatment in South Africa, but died of her
wounds in hospital three months later (The Standard,
(https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001255796/public-works-ps-mari…-
hospital-three-months-after-al-shabaab-attack) September 28, 2017).
Aside from these bloody, high-profile attacks, the group has planted Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs) along parts of the lengthy and porous Kenya-Somali border and has killed numerous
civilians, policemen and soldiers.
Expanding Membership
Initially, Kenyans from the coastal region made-up the majority of Jaysh al-Ayman’. One of Jaysh
al-Ayman’s key commanders is Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi (a.k.a. Musa Muhajir), a Kenyan from the
coast city of Mombasa (see Militant Leadership Monitor
Annex 133
/
(https://jamestown.org/program/overseeing-al-shabaabs-kenyan-resurgence-…-
al-ayman-commander-abdifatah-abubakar-abdi/), April 4). Muhajir has been on the radar of
the Kenyan security services for some time, and the police say he is one of the militants
responsible for the Lamu attacks (Daily Nation, (https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Security-agenciesblame--
new-outfit--for-terror-attacks-/1056-4016906-wpf3k7z/index.html) July 16, 2017; Daily
Nation (https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/List-of-men-wanted-for-terrorism/19509…-
format-xhtml-ccc5igz/index.html), March 4, 2015).
In recent years, the group has grown to include Muslim converts from some of Kenya’s non-
Muslim communities, as well as foreign fighters (The Standard,
(https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001248735/why-raids-are-a-caus…-
changes-face) July 23, 2017). Among the foreign jihadists known to have joined the
group was Malik Ali Jones, an American currently in jail in the United States. Another key foreign
fighter is Ahmed Muller, a German citizen who uses several aliases, including Andreas Ahmad
Khaled, Muller Martin Muller and Abu Nusaibah. The 42-year-old militant, who comes from
Cochem, Germany, was allegedly seconded to al-Shabaab by its al-Qaeda affiliate in Pakistan in
2011 (Daily Nation, (https://www.nation.co.ke/news/These-are-the-most-wanted-terrorsuspects/
1056-2758430-eedr8e/index.html) June 19, 2015; Citizen TV
(https://citizentv.co.ke/news/police-release-photos-of-botched-lamu-atta…),
June 20, 2015).
Jones and Muller were identified after the killing of a British national, Thomas Evans, during an
attempted attack on an army camp in the Buare area. In that failed attack, more than 10 al-
Shabaab militants were killed while score of others fled with serious injuries. The group’s
commander, Issa Luqman Osman (a.k.a. “Shirwa”), was also killed. Although there are indications
that a new leader has since emerged, it remains unclear exactly who has replaced him (The
Standard, (https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000165983/slain-al-shabaab-com…-
osman-was-a-graduate-from-uganda-says-family) June 17, 2015). Following the attack,
the government released photographs of 38 militants believed to have taken part, including one
of Muller.
Despite the efforts of the Kenyan security services, Jaysh al-Ayman continues to menace Kenyans
in the Boni forest, and that threat appears set to grow more potent. In a recent al-Shabaab video,
the group’s spokesman Sheikh Ali Mahmoud Rage is seen speaking to foreign fighters graduating
after attending a training camp in southern Somalia. In his speech, he calls on the Kenyan fighters
among their ranks to become an “army” to “conquer” Somalia’s neighbor.
NOTES
[1] There are several variations of the group’s names, often simply alternative spellings. It is
variously referred to as: Jeysh Ayman, Jaysh Ayman, Jaysh Ayman al-Shabaab, Jaysh la Imani or
Jaysh Ayman Majmo Ayman.
Annex 133
/
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Washington DC, 20005
PHONE: 202.483.8888 (tel:202.483.8888)
FAX: 202.483.8337
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© 2020 The Jamestown Foundation All rights reserved.
Terrorism-Monitor-April-23-2018.pdf (/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terrorism-Monitor-
April-23-2018.pdf?x59415)
Annex 133
Annex 1
“ACLED Resources: Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, political violence involving
Al Shaabab”, ACLED, 2020
ACLED RESOURCES: AL SHABAAB IN SOMALIA AND KENYA
On 28 December 2019, a truck bomb exploded in the Somali capital city of Mogadishu, reportedly killing more
than 80 people. Al Shabaab claimed the attack, which is believed to be the deadliest to hit Somalia in over two
years (ACLED, 10 January 2020; Al Jazeera, 30 December 2019). A week later, on 5 January 2020, the militants
launched a predawn assault on an airbase in Kenya used by both Kenyan and American forces, killing one US
soldier and two private contractors (The Washington Post, 5 January 2020). Despite a record number of
American airstrikes targeting the group in 2019 (The Washington Post, 15 January 2020), Al Shabaab appears to
be ramping up its operations. Since the US escalated its air campaign in 2017, Al Shabaab has perpetrated
almost 900 civilian targeting events in Somalia, resulting in estimates of nearly 2,000 fatalities.
ACLED tracks political violence in Somalia and Kenya in real-time, with data updated each week. Access the
latest data through our Data Export Tool and Curated Data Files. For more information on ACLED
methodology, see our General Guides and Methodology pages.
Find recent analysis of Al Shabaab activity in Somalia and Kenya below, as well as an interactive dashboard
displaying ACLED data on political violence involving Al Shabaab from 1 January 2010 to 4 January 2020.
Resilience: Al Shabaab Remains a Serious Threat – 11 February 2019
Not with a Whimper but with a Bang: Al Shabaab’s Resilience and International
E!orts Against the Rebels – 27 January 2019
Continued Con"ict: Updates on Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Somalia – 7 December 2018
Same Tune, New Key: Al Shabaab Adapts in the Face of Increased Military Pressure
– 17 November 2018
For media inquiries, please contact [email protected].
© 2020 Armed Con!ict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). All rights reserved.
Political Violence Involving
Al Shaabab
Data here includes all organized political violence (battles, explosions/remote violence, and violence against civilians)
All Organized Violent Events
© Mapbox © OSM
Country
(All)
Key Figures
Number of Events Targeting
Civilians
Reported Fatalities
.
Reported Civilian
Fatalities
Number of Organized
Violent Eventsjkml
Civilian Targeting Events
& Civilian Fatalities
Who is Al Shabaab engaging with?
Rebels
Clan militia
Political militia
Civilians
External forces
State forces
[One-sided events]
Events Targeting Civilians
© Mapbox © OSM
How are civilians targeted?
Sexual violence
Suicide bomb
Grenade
Shelling/artillery/missile attack
Abduction/forced disappearance
Remote explosive/landmine/IED
Attack
Date
January 1, 2010 January 4, 2020
Organized Violent Events
& Reported Fatalities
Sub-event type
(All)
Engagement type
(All)
Number of Events
1
100
200
300
355
Analysis Search
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Democracies Breed Violence:
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of AQAP in Yemen
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Annex 134
Annex 135
“Al-Shabaab five years after westgate: still a menace in East Africa”, Africa
Report No. 265, International Crisis Group, 21 September 2018
Headquarters
International Crisis Group
Avenue Louise 149 • 1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38
[email protected]
Preventing War. Shaping Peace.
Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate:
Still a Menace in East Africa
Africa Report N°265 | 21 September 2018
Annex 135
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
II. East Africa in Al-Shabaab’s Crosshairs ............................................................................ 3
A. Al-Shabaab’s Regional Strategy ................................................................................. 3
B. Westgate and After .................................................................................................... 6
III. Exploiting Grievances on the Kenyan Coast .................................................................... 8
IV. Northern Kenya’s Evolving Security Landscape .............................................................. 13
V. Tanzania: An Emerging Theatre ...................................................................................... 16
VI. Relative Quiet in Uganda ................................................................................................. 23
VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 26
APPENDICES
A. Al Shabaab in East Africa ................................................................................................. 28
B. Timeline: Al-Shabaab in East Africa ............................................................................... 29
C. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 30
D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2015 ................................................ 31
E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 33
Annex 135
Principal Findings
What's happening? Five years after an attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall,
Al-Shabaab appears committed to striking targets across East Africa. Security
crackdowns have blunted its capacity to stage regular assaults, but complacency
could roll back those gains, as could failure to engage with communities in which
the group recruits.
Why did it happen? Al-Shabaab aims to pressure regional governments to
withdraw troops from Somalia, where an African Union mission has been battling
the militants since 2007. The group also uses its attacks in East Africa to
raise its profile, seek new recruits and solicit funding.
Why does it matter? Despite losing territory in Somalia and cutting back recruitment
in Kenya under pressure from authorities, Al-Shabaab has adapted by
finding new areas of operation, including by building relationships with militants
in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique.
What should be done? Authorities should avoid blanket arrests and extrajudicial
killings, involve local leaders in efforts to tackle recruitment, while
taking steps to address broader grievances that Al-Shabaab taps into in its narrative,
including the political and economic exclusion of Muslim minorities in
East Africa.
Annex 135
International Crisis Group
Africa Report N°265 21 September 2018
Executive Summary
Five years ago, on 21 September 2013, four Al-Shabaab militants stormed the Westgate
Mall in Nairobi, killing 67 during the ensuing four-day siege and demonstrating
the movement’s reach outside Somalia. Kenyan authorities’ subsequent indiscriminate
crackdowns fuelled Muslim anger and accelerated militant recruitment. In 2015,
however, top officials switched approaches, better involving community leaders in
efforts against Al-Shabaab. The movement reacted by relocating operations, including
by forging closer ties with militants in Tanzania, parts of which saw more attacks.
Tanzanian authorities launched their own campaign, replicating some of Kenya’s
mistakes. Both countries’ track records suggest that blanket arrests and police brutality
consistently backfire. More effective is to combine steps that disrupt militant
recruitment with policies aimed at addressing the grievances their propaganda exploits,
notably Muslims’ political and economic marginalisation. In Uganda, too,
though Al-Shabaab has made no major inroads, security forces’ mistreatment of
Muslims risks creating problems where thus far few exist.
While Al-Shabaab remains focused on recapturing power and enforcing its variant
of Islamic law in Somalia, it has long operated elsewhere in East Africa. At first it
built networks to generate funds and recruits, largely refraining from attacks. That
changed in March 2007, after the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM), a regional force sent to prop up the body then recognised as the Somali
government. The group has repeatedly struck countries that had dispatched troops
to AMISOM.
After the highest-profile of these attacks, the Westgate siege, Kenyan authorities
squeezed militant networks, forcing some to relocate and adapt tactics. But by casting
a wide net, they also deepened frustration among Muslims at the state and aided
Al-Shabaab recruitment. Militant attacks escalated between 2013 and 2015, often
threatening to tip into wider ethnic or religious clashes. In mid-2015, a major attack
on Garissa University College prompted a shake-up in the security forces and a rethink.
Along Kenya’s coast, local officials spearheaded efforts against militancy,
involving communities in security provision. In the north east, another hotspot,
locals assumed prominent security sector slots. At the same time, Nairobi devolved
power and resources to local governments under the terms of a constitution adopted
in 2010, partly redressing the inequality and resentment of central government that
militants played on. Intelligence gathering improved, and though some police abuses
continue, the tempo of militant attacks slowed.
Al-Shabaab has, however, deepened its ties to Tanzanian militants. As early as
2011, parts of Tanzania had suffered sporadic killings of Christians, Muslim clerics,
police officers and ruling-party cadres. Officials at first blamed criminals, denying
Islamist militants were responsible. But stepped-up assaults since 2015 forced the
authorities to acknowledge the growing challenge. They, too, launched crackdowns.
Religious and political leaders in Tanzania contend that heavy-handed policing,
including extrajudicial killings, risks driving young people into militants’ arms and
fuelling intercommunal tension. Zanzibar’s protracted crisis, involving successive
Annex 135
Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa
Crisis Group Africa Report N°265, 21 September 2018 Page ii
contested elections, also has pushed youths toward militancy, as traditional leaders
who for years pursued reform peacefully lose credibility.
In Uganda, on the other hand, Al-Shabaab has struggled to gain traction – in
large part due to better integration of Somalis, and Muslims overall, into society.
No obvious ally for Al-Shabaab exists. This relatively good news story may not last,
however. Over recent years, Ugandan security forces have rounded up large numbers
of Muslims, creating a potential constituency. A new police chief pledges to end abuses
but is still unproven. If the authorities do not change course, they could prompt
disaffected youth to turn to militancy.
Al-Shabaab has not pulled off a major strike outside Somalia since Garissa. In
Kenya, its influence has waned even as the threat of attacks lingers; competition
among ethnic elites around elections poses a far graver threat to stability. In Tanzania,
where militant violence has been on the rise, it seems unlikely to expand into a fullblown
insurgency. But as regional and Western officials, as well as Al-Shabaab’s own
propaganda, suggest, the group is still plotting major attacks abroad. While its precise
links to local groups, which revolve mostly around personal ties among militants,
remain unclear, those links allow Al-Shabaab to project an image of regional potency.
In turn, local groups burnish their credentials by claiming affiliation with the
Somali movement and tying parochial struggles to a wider cause.
Given the diversity among the countries themselves, the fortunes of Muslims in
each and the different states’ varied experiences with Islamist militancy, there is no
one prescription for tackling the threat. Nor, in East Africa as elsewhere, does a single,
linear pathway toward militancy exist: recruits have ranged from law graduates
to recent converts to Islam to poor Muslim youths in rural and urban peripheries.
But there are lessons in Kenya’s shift in tack, however imperfect, after 2015. Put
simply, indiscriminate crackdowns make things worse. More effective policies include
giving local officials the lead, consulting with communities whose youth militants
attempt to lure into their ranks and appointing Muslims to top positions in the security
forces, while also taking steps to tackle underlying grievances. That lesson is a
valuable one for Tanzania. It also shows the dangers for Uganda of abusing its Muslim
population.
Al-Shabaab will likely remain a formidable force inside Somalia and a menace
outside it. Even were that to change, militancy in Kenya and Tanzania, which in places
predates Al Shabaab’s involvement, can be expected to endure as long as grievances
linger; indeed, it already possesses its own dynamics, as groups respond to local
conditions more than instruction from abroad. Al-Shabaab itself has proven adaptable,
slipping away as dragnets close in. East African states need to be equally quick
on their feet, fine-tuning security measures while crafting political and economic
policies that weaken militancy’s allure.
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 September 2018
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Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate:
Still a Menace in East Africa
I. Introduction
Al-Shabaab emerged around 2004 from Somalia’s state collapse and soon established
itself as a formidable insurgent movement.1 Though it has lost the Somali cities and
towns it held at the peak of is power, in 2010, the group still controls large swathes
of territory and raises considerable funds, particularly through local taxation and
extortion. It stages complex attacks in the Somali capital Mogadishu and prosecutes
a lethal asymmetric struggle against the 22,000-strong African Union mission
(AMISOM) and Somali government forces.2 Al-Shabaab is a formal al-Qaeda affiliate
– one of its most potent local branches – and has traditionally received ideological
support, expertise and training as well as, sometimes, money from the global movement,
particularly its Yemen branch.3 But the movement remains at its core a Somali
organisation, focused on recapturing power and establishing its variant of Islamic
law in Somalia.
Since about 2007, however, Al-Shabaab has expanded operations across East
Africa. At first it did so primarily to recruit fighters and mobilise funds for its struggle
at home. But as forces from other East African countries deployed into Somalia,
mostly as part of AMISOM, it stepped up strikes in those countries as well. Most
prominent was a 2013 complex attack on the Westgate Mall in an upmarket quarter
of the Kenyan capital Nairobi, which resulted in a four-day occupation of the mall,
67 deaths and considerable embarrassment for the Kenyan security forces. Since
then, Al-Shabaab has lost ground in Kenya, partly due to its own brutality and partly
1 Crisis Group Africa Report N°100, Somalia’s Islamists, 12 December 2005; Crisis Group Africa
Briefing N°74, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, 18 May 2010. For more detail on the origins of Islamism
in Somali society, see I. M. Lewis, Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-Based Society
(Lawrenceville, 1998).
2 Importers bringing goods into Somalia’s major ports and hoping to traverse Al-Shabaabcontrolled
areas will typically pay tax twice: first to government officials and second, typically at the
same rates, to Al-Shabaab fighters at checkpoints in areas outside government control. Most businessmen
regard Al-Shabaab as more financially competent and less corrupt than the central and
local authorities it opposes. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°99, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will
Be a Long War, 26 June 2014, p. 15. In cities nominally controlled by the government, including
Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab representatives levy “taxes” (in essence, protection money) upon businesses.
These revenues give the group annual income running into the tens of millions of dollars. Crisis
Group telephone interview, Mogadishu-based security official, February 2018; “Report of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015)”,
S/2016/919, 31 October 2016.
3 For details on Al-Shabaab’s relations with al-Qaeda, see Crisis Group Special Report N°1, Exploiting
Disorder: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, 14 March 2016. For an exploration of al-Qaeda’s ties
with earlier Islamist groups in Somalia, particularly al-Ittihaad al-Islami, some of whose members
were founders of Al-Shabaab, see Crisis Group Report, Somalia’s Islamists, op. cit. For more on this
topic, see Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist
Group (New York, 2013).
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due to the actions of Kenyan security forces. It has adapted and shown considerable
resilience, however, and still poses a threat to Kenya, while putting down roots in
parts of Tanzania, where militant violence is on the rise, and expanding its operations
in Mozambique.
This report provides a snapshot of Al-Shabaab in East Africa five years after the
Westgate Mall attack. Based on field research in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, it
builds on previous Crisis Group work on Islamist militancy worldwide.4 The next
section examines Al-Shabaab’s expansion beyond Somalia and the aftermath of the
Westgate attack. Subsequent sections look at the movement’s inroads into three areas
– the Kenyan coast, Kenya’s north east and Tanzania – where, often working with
local allies, it has enjoyed most success in recruiting and orchestrating attacks.
Section VI examines the relative success of another East African state, Uganda, in
containing Al-Shabaab since a July 2010 attack in the Ugandan capital Kampala, the
group’s first bombing outside Somalia. The report concludes with policy lessons
from the three East African states’ experiences in dealing with the menace.5
4 This work is condensed in Crisis Group Report, Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State, op. cit.
5 A wide range of Crisis Group work has examined Al-Shabaab’s activities inside Somalia, as well as
those of its predecessor al-Ittihaad al-Islami. See, for example, Crisis Group Report, Somalia’s
Islamists and Crisis Group Briefing, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, both op. cit. See also Crisis Group
Briefing, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, op. cit.
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II. East Africa in Al-Shabaab’s Crosshairs
A. Al-Shabaab’s Regional Strategy
Al-Shabaab was formed around 2004 by a small circle of militants, some of whom
had been members of previous Islamist movements including al-Ittihaad al-Islami.
The group initially served as the enforcement wing of the Ifka Halan Court, which was
part of the Islamic Courts Union. That Union, in turn, had imposed clan and Islamic
law and restored relative order to Mogadishu and much of south central Somalia
after defeating warlords that had held these areas since the central government’s collapse
in 1991.6 It was toppled by Ethiopian forces, which intervened to back the weak
Transitional Federal Government that took office with international approval in 2004
and lasted until 2012, when it was replaced by the Federal Government of Somalia.
Al-Shabaab’s armed struggle against Ethiopian “occupiers” between 2006 and 2009
garnered considerable support among Somalis, particularly in south central Somalia.
When the Ethiopians withdrew, AMISOM took over the role of protecting the internationally
backed government.
A combined force of Burundian and Ugandan troops under AMISOM and Somali
fighters drove Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu in August 2011.7 But while the movement
lost formal control of the city, it retains a heavy footprint there. It carries out regular
complex attacks, particularly on government targets, and its operatives continue to
extract protection money from businesses. The central government, while internationally
supported, remains weak, and relies on AMISOM to keep Al-Shabaab at bay.
If Al-Shabaab’s potency in Somalia has waxed and waned, so, too, has its influence
across East Africa. From about 2007 to 2012, the movement sought to establish
a presence across the region, often tapping into – and, in some cases, subsuming –
pre-existing militant networks. Its early goals focused on recruiting and funnelling
East African fighters into Somalia and mobilising resources.
State authorities, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania, largely ignored the group’s
activities, perceiving it as an external, rather than local, threat and primarily a challenge
for Western powers and Somalia.8 The Muslim Youth Centre, a group based in
Nairobi’s Majengo district which served as a recruitment and fundraising magnet for
Al-Shabaab, operated relatively openly.9 Its young members distributed DVDs espousing
militant jihad in mosques, and hundreds of them travelled to fight in Somalia.
Meanwhile, Kenyan clerics affiliated with Al-Shabaab, notably Sheikh Shariff Abubakar
“Makaburi”, visited Tanzania regularly to seek recruits and cultivate ties with
6 Crisis Group Briefing, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, op. cit., p. 5.
7 “Shabaab concede control of capital to Somalia covernment”, The New York Times, 6 August, 2011.
8 See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation, 25 January 2012.
9 See “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009)”, S/2011/433, 18 July 2011, pp. 140-179. The report describes the Muslim
Youth Centre’s ties with Al-Shabaab: “From its roots as an informal self-help group in the Majengo
area of Nairobi, the Centre was officially established in December 2008, and swiftly evolved from a
‘rights forum’ claiming to articulate the social, economic and religious grievances of impoverished
and disaffected young Muslims into one of the largest support networks for Al-Shabaab in Kenya”.
It notes that a few core fighters travelled to join Al-Shabaab as early as 2006 but that most went
after 2008.
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local militants.10 Al-Shabaab largely refrained from staging attacks in Kenya and
focused on recruitment, though by 2009 state authorities had grown sufficiently
alarmed by its influence that they began to craft responses. These included providing
military training to young Kenyans of Somali origin and to youths recruited from
Somalia’s Jubbaland, an area that borders Kenya, with a view to deploying them in
Somalia to act as a buffer against further Al-Shabaab expansion into Kenya.11
Al-Shabaab’s motives shifted after East African states deployed troops as part of
AMISOM. Ugandan forces were the first to arrive in 2007. In October 2011, Kenya
deployed forces, too; at first these troops operated outside AMISOM, but they joined
the body in July of the following year. According to Nairobi, this intervention was a
response to cross-border attacks directed at tourists in Kenya.12 It aimed to curtail
Al-Shabaab activity in the region of Somalia adjoining Kenya, to shield its northeastern
province along the two countries’ border and, eventually, ease its refugee
burden by creating conditions allowing Somalis to return home.13
Al-Shabaab responded to these deployments by staging large-scale attacks outside
Somalia. The deadliest included the July 2010 Kampala bombing, the siege of the
Westgate Mall, the June 2014 attack on a village in the Kenyan coastal area of Lamu,
which killed 48 people, and the April 2015 gun and grenade assault on Garissa University
College, which killed 148. Al-Shabaab also struck a nightclub in Djibouti in
March 2014, killing two foreign nationals, and attempted (but failed to carry out) a
suicide bombing in a football stadium in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Some
post-2013 attacks, including the Westgate strike, appear to have been orchestrated
by units dedicated to hitting targets outside Somalia.14 These units had been set up
10 Crisis Group interviews, Kenya and Tanzanian security officials, January to April 2018. See also,
Andre Le Sage, “The rising terrorist threat in Tanzania: domestic Islamist militancy and regional
threats”, Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, September 2014, p. 9.
10 “Ex-PM Lowassa undergoes grilling for four hours”, IPP Media, 28 June 2017.
11 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, 15 February
2012.
12 See Crisis Group Briefing N°102, Kenya: Al Shabaab – Closer to Home, 25 September 2014.
13 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, op. cit. At
the time, the Dadaab refugee complex was the biggest in the world, housing more than 400,000
refugees. About 100,000 Somali refugees have since returned home under a program jointly managed
by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Kenyan and Somali authorities. See “The
world’s largest refugee camp: what the future holds for Dadaab”, The Conversation, 12 December 2017.
14 Godane reportedly established two such units: one focused on attacks in Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda, and the other on Ethiopia. See the Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), 13 October 2014, p. 21. The report notes: “Not
since the prominence in the Horn of Africa of the former al-Qaeda in East Africa has the region
been besieged by a more determined, prolific and effective al-Qaeda-affiliated group than Al-Shabaab.
The sustained counter-terrorism pressure and successful overcoming of internal divisions have
forced the Al-Shabaab core to become more operationally audacious by placing greater emphasis on
exporting its violence beyond the borders of Somalia. Conversely, in the past year, Al-Shabaab’s
overt regional strategy has relied increasingly on its entrenched support base of Amniyat-like operatives
[Amniyat is Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing]. By the end of 2013, its regional strategy had become
apparent: a resurgent extremist group sufficiently assertive to fully align itself with and pursue
strategies adapted to transnational al-Qaeda operations, evident in its ability to conduct ‘complex
and spectacular’ large-scale attacks, such as that on the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, repre-
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Page 5
that year by Al-Shabaab’s then-emir, Ahmed Abdi “Godane”, in part because the
group’s efforts to use its principal Kenyan affiliate, Al-Hijra, to stage major attacks
had proved unsuccessful.
These strikes, according to the group’s own media output, aim to raise the costs
at home of regional states’ intervention in Somalia and pressure them to withdraw
their troops. A statement issued in April 2015, following the attack on Garissa University
College in Kenya, was typical:
Do not dream of security in your lands until security becomes a reality in the
Muslim lands, including the North Eastern province and the coast and until all
your forces withdraw from all Muslim lands. We will, by the permission of Allah,
stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim brothers until your government
ceases its oppression and until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan
occupation. And until then, Kenyan cities will run red with blood. And as we said,
this will be a long, gruesome war in which you, the Kenyan public, will be the first
casualties.15
Attacks also appear designed to raise the group’s profile. While they prompt greater
determination from regional governments to contain Al-Shabaab, and in that sense
narrow its manoeuvring room, they also serve to boost recruitment abroad and morale
of fighters in Somalia. In one of his last audio recordings before he was killed in a U.S.
drone strike, Emir Godane discussed the Westgate Mall attack in the context of what
he called jihadist victories in Afghanistan, Sinai and Syria. He enjoined Al-Shabaab
militants in Somalia to persevere as they, too, would prevail against “Christian invaders”
from Ethiopia and Kenya.16 The numbers of East African fighters deploying
to Somalia swelled from 2010 when it began staging attacks.17
The movement also uses attacks outside Somalia for fundraising. It portrays
them as evidence of its commitment to advancing the cause of the umma (Muslim
community) in a struggle against regional authorities it describes as kuffar (nonbelievers).
It distributes videos of attacks online, narrated in Arabic and often consenting
an evolution of operational tradecraft”. See also Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), “Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat”, March 2016.
15 “Garissa attack: burying Kenya’s hopes”, Al-Shabaab statement, 4 April 2015.
16 “Amiirka Al Shabaab, Axmed Godane oo ka hadlay weerarradii ugu dambeeyay” [Al-Shabaab’s
Emir, Ahmed Godane speaks on the latest attacks], Radio al-Furqan, 14 May 2014. Crisis Group
interview, Kenyan Muslim cleric, Nairobi, August 2018. The cleric, who has interviewed returnees
from the battlefield in Somalia, said the youths told him that they circulated videos of attacks carried
out outside Somalia, particularly along the Kenyan coast and in the Kenyan north east, to demonstrate
the strength of the group to would-be recruits. (In 2010, Al-Shabaab began to issue recruitment
videos in Kiswahili, a language widely spoken in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and to feature fighters
from across East Africa, citing the variety of nationalities as signalling its reach outside Somalia.
A November 2010 video titled “Message to the umma: and inspire the believers”, featured six
named foreign fighters, three from Kenya and one each from Ethiopia, Tanzania and Sudan. The
video was subtitled in both English and Kiswahili. Al-Shabaab’s media operation targets local
Somali-speaking and, increasingly, Swahili-, English- and Arabic- speaking audiences. Its media
arm, Al-Kataib, produces video content for English- and Arabic-speaking audiences. Crisis Group
Briefing, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, op. cit.
17 Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security officials and Western diplomats, January-April 2018.
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cluding with requests for funding. Some of the videos feature testimony from people
of several nationalities, intended as evidence of Al-Shabaab’s wide appeal.18
B. Westgate and After
The attack on the Westgate Mall was Al-Shabaab’s highest-profile attack outside
Somalia. Godane and his team appear to have deliberately chosen a target against
which a strike would generate considerable publicity.19 Opened in 2007 by an Israeli
businessman, the Westgate Mall was a popular destination for well-heeled Kenyans,
as well as diplomats and other expatriates residing in the upscale Westlands and
Gigiri neighbourhoods nearby. The 21 September 2013 attack on the mall by four
gunmen highlighted the poor coordination among Kenya’s security forces.
The militants, led by a Norwegian citizen of Somali origin, struck on a Saturday
morning when Westgate was packed with shoppers. Regular police responded first,
after reports of gunshots, assuming that a bank robbery was underway. They pulled
back upon realising the gravity of the assault. The elite General Service Unit (GSU)
then dispatched a squad, which might have quickly ended the attack had the army
not insisted on taking control of the operation. In the confusion, a soldier killed a
GSU officer, and the unit best trained to handle the emergency withdrew. The operation
dragged on for days, apparently after the attackers took hostages and barricaded
themselves in a strongroom in one of the mall’s banks, with Al-Shabaab communication
units celebrating a propaganda triumph.20
After the Westgate assault, Kenyan security forces cracked down indiscriminately
on Muslims and ethnic Somalis on the premise that many might be Al-Shabaab members.
In April 2014, for instance, Operation Usalama Watch rounded up thousands
of ethnic Somalis in Nairobi and elsewhere, deepening the anger among Somalis at
the state.21 Al-Shabaab took advantage by stepping up recruitment and staging more
attacks. Militants tried to instigate sectarian strife, including by shooting up churches,
while playing up the country’s ethnic differences. In particular, the group tried to
drive a deeper wedge between members of the Kikuyu and Luo communities, whose
elites have competed for power since independence in 1963. In its propaganda following
attacks, Al-Shabaab highlighted the government’s own attempts to blame the
rising violence on opposition leaders.22 The Kenyan tourism sector absorbed a major
18 In an undated video released by Al-Shabaab, “Final message of the Kampala attack warrior”, one
of the attackers claimed that none of the bombers was of “Somali lineage”, saying they were from
across the region and threatened further assaults on cities around East Africa. Uganda was the first
country to contribute troops to the African Union-backed campaign against Al-Shabaab in 2007.
19 See the Report of the Monitoring Group, op. cit. It concludes that the Westgate attack was “conceived
in Somalia, planned from a United Nations refugee camp and executed from Eastleigh in
Nairobi”. U.S. intelligence agencies blamed Godane’s inner circle for planning the operation. In
March 2015, Adan Garar, a member of Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing said to have been the attack’s
mastermind, was killed in a U.S. drone strike. “Top Al-Shabaab figure killed in U.S. drone strike,
Pentagon says”, CNN, 18 March 2015.
20 Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan and Western security officials, January-April 2018.
21 Crisis Group Commentary, “Losing Hearts and Minds in Kenya: The Crackdown on Somalis Will
Probably Backfire”, 16 April 2014.
22 See Crisis Group Briefing, Kenya: Al Shabaab – Closer to Home, op. cit. In an audio message
released in June 2014, Sheikh Mohammed Dulyadeyn, a senior Al-Shabaab commander said:
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blow, with an 11 per cent drop in tourist arrivals in 2013 compared to 2012.23 Attacks
on restaurants, churches, buses and security installations continued through most of
2013 and 2014.
When the Kenyan police and local authorities improved their tactics from 2015
onward, notably through enhanced community engagement and improved intelligence
gathering, Al-Shabaab adapted in several ways. First, it began recruiting fighters
– both to travel to Somalia and to carry out attacks within Kenya – in areas outside
previous hubs in Mombasa, Nairobi and northern Kenya, in particular in the country’s
west. Secondly, and particularly in western and central Kenya, it sought to convert
Christian youths, departing from its past focus on preying on anti-state sentiment
among Muslims.24 Lastly, militants evaded crackdowns along the Kenyan coast by
slipping into Tanzania, where ethnic and cultural ties enable them to assimilate.25
Despite the relative quiet in recent years – no attack has occurred in Nairobi or
Mombasa since 2014 and most recent Al-Shabaab activity is concentrated near the
Somalia border – Kenya remains more vulnerable to Al-Shabaab assaults than its
neighbours, largely because it shares a long border with Somalia, unlike Tanzania
and Uganda.26 In the five years after Westgate, Al-Shabaab has killed dozens of police
officers and soldiers deployed to patrol the Kenya-Somalia border.27 Most have
been killed in attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices in the counties of Lamu
and Mandera. Efforts by authorities to stop these assaults on security officers have
been less successful than those aimed at thwarting attacks in urban areas.
“Thank God Kenyan society is divided and facing ethnic clashes between the Kikuyu and the Luo ….
The opposition and the government are divided and [it] seems [they will] not come together soon
…. Kenya might also be divided along Christian and Muslim lines”. Kenyan politics is heavily identity-
based, with elites from the biggest five of the country’s 42 ethnic groups jockeying for political
power and with the winner-take-all competition for the presidency often yielding violence along
ethnic lines.
23 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, “Economic Survey 2014”, April 2014.
24 These recruits, who are encouraged not to change their names, are especially valued because they
can slip through intelligence dragnets more easily than those with obviously Muslim names. Crisis
Group interview, Western security analyst, Nairobi, March 2018. See Anneli Botha, “Radicalisation
in Kenya: recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council”, Institute for Security
Studies Paper no. 265 (September 2014), p. 10. The research indicates that some of the converts
from Christianity fall easily under Al-Shabaab’s sway because of their limited knowledge of Islam.
25 Crisis Group interview, security official, Kwale, Kenya, January 2018.
26 Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security officials and Western diplomats, January-April 2018.
27 See, “Al-Shabaab kills five Kenyan policemen who were out on patrol”, Reuters, 3 January 2018.
Kenya police say Al-Shabaab attacks along the border killed 63, mainly police officers, between
January 2017 and April 2018.
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III. Exploiting Grievances on the Kenyan Coast
The Kenyan coast has long been one of Al-Shabaab’s prime recruitment zones. The
group has carried out several attacks in the region, particularly in areas close to the
border with Somalia. Between 2012 and 2014, security crackdowns and increased
surveillance led militants and recruiters to relocate, particularly to Tanzania.28 They
did not, however, curtail Al-Shabaab’s activities and in many cases inflamed local
sentiment.29 That changed from 2015 onward, as greater consultation with coastal
Muslims, their involvement in security measures and a more prominent role for local
elected leaders and civil society helped drive down militant recruitment.30
At the time of independence in 1963, both Christian and Muslim coastal elites,
like those in the north east, supported a federal system granting substantial powers
of self-governance to regions and only loose integration with the central government
in the capital Nairobi.31 Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, ignored this demand
for autonomy and subsequently repealed a law granting greater power to localities.
The repeal provoked a crisis of state legitimacy along the coast, which was aggravated
over the years by economic grievances – triggered in particular by the fact that
elites from elsewhere in Kenya appropriated land from coastal communities – and
lingers in the form of strong anti-establishment sentiment.32 Separatists have staged
violent uprisings, notably during the 1997 general election and also in 2012 and
2014.33 Although Al-Shabaab has tapped into separatist recruitment networks, no
direct operational or ideological link exists between Al-Shabaab and outfits like the
principal separatist movement, the Mombasa Republican Council, despite Kenyan
officials’ efforts to conflate them.34
Starting in late 2011, Al-Shabaab recruited heavily on the coast, selling a core
message that “holy war” could help establish Islamic rule in “lost Muslim lands” and,
as a corollary, restore inhabitants’ social, political and economic rights.35 The group
sought partnerships with – and often then supplanted – pre-existing jihadist groups,
28 Crisis Group interview, academic specialising in Islamist militancy, Mombasa, January 2018. See
also Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°121, Kenya’s Coast: Devolution Disappointed, 13 July 2016.
29 Crisis Group interview, Muslim cleric based in Likoni (an area where Al-Shabaab recruitment
was notably high), Mombasa, January 2018.
30 Crisis Group interviews, civil society campaigner, community leaders and Muslim clerics, Mombasa,
January 2018.
31 Before British colonial rule, coastal cities and their immediate hinterland were loosely administered
by the Arab Omani sultan of Zanzibar. The British colonial protectorate leased this “ten-mile
strip” in 1895 and eventually merged it with Kenya. This bureaucratic history has provided the basis
for periodic claims to a special status and greater regional autonomy. Because the Omani sultan was
Muslim, it also underpins the sentiment that the coast is historical Muslim land. The agitation for
regional autonomy cut across Christian and Muslim lines, however, as well as Arabic- and Swahilispeaking
lines. The early nationalist Ronald Ngala, a Christian, led the movement. See Crisis Group
Briefing, Kenya’s Coast: Devolution Disappointed, op. cit.
32 See Karuti Kanyinga, “Struggles of access to land: The ‘squatter question’ in coastal Kenya”, Danish
Institute for International Studies, Working Paper 98, 7 June 1998.
33 “Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya”, Nairobi, 1999.
34 Botha, “Radicalisation in Kenya”, op. cit., p. 23.
35 Crisis Group interview, Muslim cleric, Mombasa, January 2018.
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including those that helped al-Qaeda launch a 2002 attack on an Israeli-owned hotel
in Malindi, a resort town 100km south of Mombasa that is popular with tourists.36
Al-Shabaab recruitment in the former Coast province was heaviest in littoral Mombasa,
Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu counties, and lighter in the large inland Tana River
county. In Kwale county, for example, security forces estimate that up to 150 youths
went to Somalia between 2012 and 2015, one of the highest numbers from any part
of Kenya.37
The motives of those travelling to Somalia varied. Jihadists appear to have preyed
upon pervasive anti-establishment sentiment and economic woes, including some of
the country’s worst poverty rates.38 They sold a vision in which new members would
receive training in Somalia and return to install “pure Islam” in place of what they
called an illegitimate Kenyan state.39 One recruit told Crisis Group that some who
travelled were tricked with offers of work or promised generous pay, which never
materialised.40 Many families have not heard from sons and nephews who left for
Somalia. There is tension between families who have lost children and those whose
kin led recruitment efforts.41
36 For more on jihadism in the region, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°95, Counter-Terrorism in
Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, 11 July 2005. One of the most important recruiting sergeants
for Al-Shabaab was Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a Kenyan cleric known for fiery sermons calling for the
toppling of secular authorities in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. From 2000 onward, Rogo
hosted one of al-Qaeda’s main Africa operatives, Fazul Abdulla Mohamed (blamed by U.S. and
Kenyan authorities for playing a key role in the 1998 embassy attacks and the 2002 Paradise Hotel
bombing), at his ancestral home on the remote island of Siyu on the Kenyan coast, near the border
with Somalia. Rogo, who was killed in a roadside shooting in August 2012, eventually became one
of Al-Shabaab’s most prominent ideologues and his CDs remain important recruitment tools deployed
by Al-Shabaab across Kiswahili-speaking communities in Kenya, Tanzania and northern
Mozambique. Crisis Group interviews, coastal Muslim clerics and Kenyan security officials, January-
April 2018.
37 Crisis Group interview, provincial administration official, Kwale, January 2018.
38 Crisis Group interview, local academic, Mombasa, January 2018.
39 Crisis Group interview, former Al-Shabaab fighter in Somalia, Kwale, January 2018.
40 Ibid. He said a cousin gulled him with a promise of construction work in Somalia that would pay
$500 per month. “Things were not what we expected” when he and his peers arrived in southern
Somalia. They ended up in a remote encampment with about 150 other youths from various parts of
Kenya and a large number of Somalis. The men in charge told them they would ensure that Islamic
law was imposed on all “Muslim land”, including in Somalia and parts of Kenya. Training was hard
and the Kenyans grew disillusioned, feeling they were being deployed as cannon fodder in battles
and suffering discrimination at the hands of ethnic Somalis. The Somalis accused Kenyans of having
joined Al-Shabaab to make money rather than to fight for Islam. Another grievance was “colourism”
within segments of Somali society, whereby lighter-skinned people mistreat and look down
upon those with darker complexions. After a few months, he and two other Kenyans escaped on
foot, travelling mainly by night and jumping onto trucks bearing goods to Kenya.
41 In 2015, residents staged a large demonstration to stop the burial of a suspected Al-Shabaab recruiter,
Ali Mwagaya, who was killed by the police at what they described as a recruitment camp.
Mwagaya was the main suspect in a series of killings of Al-Shabaab returnees, some of whom had
benefited from a program to help ex-militants, including with loans to buy motorbike taxis. Mwagaya’s
grandfather, Omar Munge, told Crisis Group that he dropped out of high school in his second year
and joined a group of Somali preachers who had shown up on what they called a proselytising mission.
He eventually travelled to a mosque in Kikambala in Malindi associated with the cleric Aboud
Rogo. Kenyan authorities have arrested several leaders from that mosque on charges of preaching
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Kenyan authorities on the coast, as in other parts of the country, have taken contradictory
approaches to tackling militancy. At first, the government largely turned a
blind eye as Al-Shabaab began to establish relations with local militants. But after a
spate of attacks in 2012, it launched a heavy-handed crackdown reportedly including
the assassination of religious leaders.42Police closed four mosques accused of being
associated with jihadist recruitment, though they were subsequently reopened under
new leadership.43 That approach, while successful in the short term, deepened Muslim
grievances against the state. But the state changed its approach again as of mid-
2015, after the Garissa attack triggered a national outcry and the replacement of
most of the security forces’ leadership. Since then, local police and officials from the
National Counter-Terrorism Centre have better engaged local leaders, consulting
with and involving them in efforts to tackle militancy, even if some abuses reportedly
continue.44
Local civic leaders cite the September 2015 appointment of a senior diplomat,
Martin Kimani, to head the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, as marking a shift
from heavy-handed policing to more collaborative approaches involving community
outreach.45 One human rights campaigner said:
Initially, the police saw us virtually as their enemies. But from 2015, they began
to engage us and we in turn could reach out to community members who are
suspicious of members of the security establishment. This changed dynamic resulted
in much better relations between the authorities and the community.46
jihad. Mwagaya became a key recruitment link in Kwale. “He was a polite young man but he
changed after going to Somalia”, Munge said. “He was accused of killing several motorbike operators
and that’s why other motorbike riders tried to stop his funeral and burn the casket. We eventually
prevailed on them to drop the protest but we still haven’t heard from his brother and sister who
went with him to Somalia”. Crisis Group interview, Kwale, January 2018.
42 “Kenya: Killings, disappearances by anti-terror police: donors should suspend support for abusive
units”, Human Rights Watch, 18 August 2014. Kenyan authorities did not respond to the Human
Rights Watch report but have repeatedly denied any role in the killing of Sheikh Rogo. Benedict
Kigen, the police chief in the town where Rogo was killed, told a task force formed to probe the
murder that the ammunition used in the hit was different from the type issued to Kenyan police.
The probe team, which an assistant commissioner of police headed, reported in August 2013 that it
was unable to identify the killers. It called for a public inquest but that, too, returned an inconclusive
verdict. See “Police deny role in Rogo killing”, Daily Nation, 4 September 2012; “Aboud Rogo
probe fails to find Rogo’s murderers”, The Star, 22 October 2015.
43 “Four shut Mombasa mosques to reopen Thursday”, Capital FM, 26 November 2014.
44 “Haki Africa demands probe into killings of al Shabaab returnees”, The Star, 28 February 2018.
While the number of extrajudicial killings has tailed off, human rights campaigners say the police
have not halted the practice entirely. In one case, an eighteen-year-old headed to a mosque to pray
was abducted by individuals whom human rights groups say were police officers. The youth was not
seen again, despite a court order that the police produce him in court, and human rights group fear
he is dead. “Mombasa judge orders the police to produce ‘abducted’ teenager”, Daily Nation, 26
June 2018. The police deny any involvement in the matter. A Kenyan security official told Crisis
Group that police were under instructions to follow the law but, tellingly, he claimed that they
sometimes responded in extralegal ways to Al-Shabaab operatives, “extending the war in Somalia
into Kenya while expecting to be covered by the Kenyan constitution”.
45 Crisis Group interviews, civil society campaigners, Mombasa, Kwale and Garissa, January-April 2018.
46 Crisis Group interview, prominent human rights campaigner, Mombasa, January 2018.
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Local Muslim clerics, academics and elected leaders say the more nuanced approach
has resulted in enhanced trust and cooperation between the public and state
authorities.47
Tellingly, Al-Shabaab recruitment has slowed since 2015. According to security
officials, militants have gone underground or moved to neighbouring countries,
particularly Tanzania.48 Security has also improved; reduced tensions led foreign
embassies to lift travel advisories for parts of the coast, including Mombasa, in June
2015.49
A number of factors appear to have contributed. First was the more sophisticated
security policy, including improved intelligence gathering and a reduction in extrajudicial
killings.50 Second was the engagement of local elected officials, alarmed by
the sharp decline in tourist revenue, with disaffected youth. This engagement included
extensive outreach to youth susceptible to militant recruitment as well as to militants
in hotspots such as Likoni and Majengo in Mombasa. It was undertaken by people
such as Mombasa county Governor Hassan Joho, who alongside other local officials
led an effort to persuade youths to resist militancy.51 In general, locally elected officials
enjoy greater credibility with youths at the grassroots than the security officers
posted from Nairobi. Families of children who had travelled to Somalia were also
roped in to persuade their sons to return. Third, prominent clerics stepped in to dissuade
youths from succumbing to Al-Shabaab’s ideology.52
A fourth factor relates to the devolution of power. The new system was introduced
in a constitution endorsed by referendum in 2010 and implemented after the 2013
local and presidential election, the first vote since the charter became law. The reform
has helped redress local grievances about social and economic exclusion that militants
exploited to recruit youths. The devolution system grants more power and a
defined portion of national resources to counties run by directly elected governors.
Local authorities, controlling millions of dollars in annual budgets, have proved better
able to tackle issues such as unemployment and service delivery. Devolution
likewise has reduced Muslim complaints about being governed from a remote,
Christian-dominated centre. To be sure, that sentiment, felt by large numbers of
coastal dwellers, only partly explains jihadist recruitment, which entices only a tiny
portion of those people. But it appears to have played a part in motivating some
young men to join Al-Shabaab and certainly features in the group’s outreach.
47 Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics, county government officials and academics, Mombasa,
January 2018.
48 Crisis Group interview, Kenyan security official, Mombasa, January 2018.
49 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Nairobi, March 2018. See, for example, Mombasa
Governor Ali Hassan Joho’s speech to a May 2016 meeting on counter-terrorism strategies in Antalya,
Turkey, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeDZ7slQY1c. He said he could not venture into
some mosques in the city that had been taken over by militant youths (particularly in the Majengo
area at the height of recruitment and attacks between 2013 and 2014) and then described successful
efforts to engage these young men.
50 Crisis Group interviews, community leaders, Mombasa, January 2018.
51 Crisis Group interviews, security, religious and political figures, Mombasa, January 2018. See
“Hassan Joho pill to counter radical Islam, crime and ailing economy”, Daily Nation, 9 May 2015.
52 Crisis Group interviews, community and religious leaders, Mombasa, January 2018.
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These relatively successful efforts illustrate – at least along the coast – that targeting,
without stigmatising, young people, providing them with alternative employment
and involving local leaders in such efforts, while at the same time addressing
the broader grievances that militants tap can disrupt Al-Shabaab’s recruitment and
diminish their appeal. In this light, further harnessing devolution’s potential to address
inequality could help, too.53 Nairobi should boost development budgets available to
neglected counties and offer local officials a greater role in security management.
National and county authorities should also fight the graft that limits the effectiveness
of decentralisation, including by prosecuting local officials suspected of embezzling
funds.54
53 Crisis Group interview, Hassan Mwakimako, associate professor of Islamic studies, Pwani University,
Mombasa, January 2018. Mwakimako said devolution had shifted the “focus of blame” from
a remote centre to local elites that now wield substantive power and manage resources. He said
“criticism of local authorities was not as harsh as it used to be of the national government”. Citizens
feel a greater sense of ownership over local government and appreciate efforts to redress longstanding
local grievances, including discrimination in employment.
54 See Crisis Group Briefing, Kenya’s Coast: Devolution Disappointed, op. cit.
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IV. Northern Kenya’s Evolving Security Landscape
Kenya’s vast former North Eastern province (now divided into three administrative
units known as counties) has been another key theatre of operations for Al-Shabaab,
with militants staging attacks and stepping up recruitment since Kenya deployed
troops into Somalia in October 2011. The region, which is settled by Kenyans of Somali
ethnicity, nearly all Muslim, shares characteristics with other jihadist recruitment
hotspots: a history of brutality perpetrated by unaccountable security forces, along
with official neglect and exclusion that nurtured anti-establishment sentiment and
calls for secession. Preachers in some Wahhabi mosques and madrasas who promise a
better life under “pure Islam” reportedly have been recruiting agents for Al-Shabaab.55
Recruits tend to be men between the ages of sixteen and 35.56
According to Kenyan security officials, between 2011 and 2015 Al-Shabaab relied
on local cells – still calling themselves Al-Shabaab (rather than al-Hijra, which had a
light footprint in northern Kenya) but seemingly functioning largely autonomously –
in the region. These cells conducted mainly small-scale attacks against soft targets
such as restaurants and churches.57
According to several officials, Al-Shabaab’s recruitment and popular support in
the north east have subsided since 2015, much as they have along the coast.58 The
drop-off is due partly to greater local anger at the group itself, particularly its disruption
of the local economy, destruction of communication infrastructure and targeting
of non-local teachers and health workers. But improved security arrangements
have helped, too. An important ingredient has been the deployment of local, Muslim,
ethnic Somali security officials to lead operations in the region. Several interlocutors
said this change has built trust in the security services, improving intelligence gathering.
59 Residents see locally rooted officers as more responsive to their concerns.60
One example is Mohamud Saleh, a former Kenyan ambassador to Saudi Arabia
and long-serving public administrator from the north east, who was appointed regional
commissioner in charge of all security forces deployed in the north east in 2015.
During Saleh’s three-year stint as regional commissioner (which ended in July 2018),
the number of attacks in the north east, particularly in the regional hub of Garissa and
also in Wajir and Mandera town, fell markedly, partly due to improved trust in the
55 Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security officials and civil society campaigners, Garissa and
Mandera, January-March 2018. See Crisis Group Briefing, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation,
op. cit.
56 Crisis Group interview, Muslim religious leader, Mandera, January 2018.
57 Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security official, Garissa, March 2018; senior security official,
Wajir, July 2018.
58 Crisis Group interviews, senior county official, Garissa, February 2018; security official, Garissa,
February 2018; civil society campaigner, Mandera, January 2018.
59 Crisis Group interviews, civil society activist, Garissa, February 2018; provincial administrator,
Garissa, February 2018.
60 Crisis Group interviews, civil society activists, Mandera, January 2018; community leaders,
Garissa, February-March 2018.
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security leadership.61 One community leader in Garissa said, “what you tell Saleh is
between you, him and God”.62 One activist said improved information-sharing with
authorities also flowed from the fact that top officials in the security forces no longer
stereotyped locals as Al-Shabaab sympathisers. “In the past, people would fear telling
security officials anything for fear of being accused of collusion with Al-Shabaab”,
he said.63
The north east’s new security leadership also recruited hundreds of locals into the
Kenya Police Reserve. This unit, established to assist the regular police, has deployed
to guard towns, villages, borders and vital installations such as telecommunication
masts, a favourite target of Al-Shabaab militants.64 Observers credit it with improving
security, particularly in Mandera, though reservists complain of low pay, inadequate
equipment and poor training.65
But Al-Shabaab is by no means a spent force in the north east. Sporadic assaults
on police stations and on “non-local” (mainly Christian) public servants, including
teachers, continue. Since 2015, the movement has reportedly directed attacks from
Somalia and dispatched its own men, a mix of Somali and Kenyan commanders, including
several from north-eastern Kenya, to carry out operations.66 These men are
concentrated close to the border, particularly in Mandera county, and in the vast
open-canopy Boni forest that straddles Garissa and Lamu county on the coast.67
Government and public service vehicles generally avoid these areas. Civilians in
Mandera also often take roundabout routes to bypass trouble spots. Some local administrators
(known as chiefs) from southern Garissa and eastern Mandera have fled for
fear of attacks. Al-Shabaab also targets communications infrastructure, forcing the
security forces to switch from cellular to more expensive satellite phones.
The movement also has reportedly turned to “illiterate cattle herders” as a source
of recruits, instead of the young men fresh out of high school or Islamic schools
(madrasas) who traditionally composed its primary recruitment pool.68 According to
local sources, minority clans that perceive themselves to be losers of devolution also
may be susceptible.69
Overall, devolution appears to have helped undercut support for Al-Shabaab in
the north east as it has along the coast. According to one activist, for example,
spreading power and resources to the local level has reduced the local grievances
61 Crisis Group interviews, community leaders, civil society campaigners and county administrators,
Garissa, January-May 2018. No major Al-Shabaab attack has occurred in Garissa since the assault
on Garissa University College in April 2015.
62 Crisis Group interview, community leader, Garissa, March 2018. After a three-year stint in Garissa,
Mohamud Saleh was transferred to Nairobi in July 2018 and replaced by another Kenyan Somali,
Mohammed Birik. “County commissioners moved in reshuffle”, Daily Nation, 3 July 2018.
63 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Garissa, March 2018.
64 Crisis Group interview, senior security official, Wajir, July 2018.
65 Crisis Group Briefing, Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security, op. cit. Crisis Group
interview, security analyst, Mandera, January 2018.
66 Crisis Group interview, Kenyan security official, Garissa, February 2018.
67 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Nairobi, March 2018.
68 Crisis Group interview, community elder, Garissa, February 2018.
69 Crisis Group interview, local journalist covering security issues, Mandera, January 2018; civil
society activist who works on counter-radicalisation initiatives, Garissa, March 2018.
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over economic and political exclusion that Al-Shabaab taps in its propaganda.70 But
devolution also has accentuated competition among clans for local government
posts, and there is some evidence that, as in Somalia, the movement has sought to
exploit resulting clan disputes.71
70 According to that activist, “devolution has greatly helped because it has reduced resentment at
the national government. Now, people hold the county governments directly responsible for improving
the local economy”. Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Garissa, March 2018.
71 Crisis Group Briefing, Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security, op. cit.
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V. Tanzania: An Emerging Theatre
Unlike in Kenya and Uganda, where militant attacks attract sustained attention,
violence perpetrated in Tanzania by Al-Shabaab and local militants, some of whom
appear to have ties to the Somali movement, has passed largely under the radar.
Coverage has been scant in part because, by regional standards, Tanzania is less
open to Western media than its neighbours; in part because attacks in Tanzania
since 2013 have hit mainly local not Western targets; and in part because local media
restrictions mean that editors self-censor to avoid state retribution. The authorities’
reluctance to admit that Tanzania has an Islamist militant violence problem – and
their initial insistence that attacks on its territory are attributable to “bandits” – is an
additional factor explaining the limited attention paid to the issue.72
Christians and Muslims have long co-existed peacefully in Tanzania.73 Political
mobilisation along religious lines was strongly discouraged under the socialist rule of
the country’s founding President Julius Nyerere between 1961 and 1985.74 Starting in
the early 1990s, with the advent of multi-party rule, the state eased restrictions against
politically inclined religious associations. By the late 1990s, a number of Muslim clerics
had begun to voice grievances over what they described as their co-religionists’
political and economic exclusion.75
Two groups were most prominent in campaigning against what they described as
marginalisation of Muslims by the state.76 These were Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislamu
(Community of Muslim Organisations), led by Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, and the
Uamsho (Awakening) movement, which campaigned for full independence for the
Muslim-majority archipelago of Zanzibar and the imposition of Islamic law there.77
72 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Dar es Salaam, January 2018. The diplomat said the
authorities’ hesitancy about the phenomenon of Islamist violence, particularly in the Pwani region,
made it harder to counter militancy because civil society and community leaders did not want to
undercut the official line that “bandits” were behind all attacks. Tanzanian authorities have gradually
changed tack but still do not candidly admit the scale of the problem. The diplomat speculated
that this stance could in part be an effort to protect the country’s vital tourism industry from the
negative publicity that Islamist militant violence generates.
73 No reliable statistics are available for the proportions of Christians and Muslims in Tanzania. The
authorities dropped the question of religious affiliation from the census in 1967, due to its political
sensitivity. A 2015 Pew Research Center survey found that 61 per cent of the population are Christian,
35 per cent are Muslim, 2 per cent practice traditional religions and 1 per cent are unaffiliated.
See “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050”, Pew Research
Center, 2 April 2015, p. 243.
74 See Martin B. Tetti, “What Went Wrong in Tanzania: How Religious Tension is Threatening
National Unity and Cohesion”, International Journal of Education and Research, vol. 2, no. 6
(June 2014).
75 Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics and academics, Dar es Salaam, January-April 2018.
76 The primary Muslim grievances relate to what they describe as domination of the state by Christian
officials, the priority given in the school system to Western-style education over Islamic education,
which is primarily dispensed through private initiatives, and the fact that Muslim-majority areas
are generally economically disadvantaged relative to Christian-dominated ones, a problem they
blame on state policy. Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics, Dar es Salaam, February 2018. See
Abdisaid Musse Ali-Koor, “Islamist Extremism in East Africa”, Africa Security Brief No. 32, Africa
Center for Strategic Studies, August 2016.
77 See Le Sage, op. cit.
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The authorities reacted harshly. Seven Uamsho clerics were detained in October
2012. They were charged in 2013 with terrorism and incitement of violence but have
been held without bail ever since. No further hearing has been scheduled on their
case.78 An opposition leader who called for their release or presentation in court in
June 2017 was himself questioned by the police after current President John Magufuli
criticised his stance.79 Sheikh Ponda was also arrested in October 2012 and charged
with incitement.80
In parallel to this political agitation, in 2011 Islamist militants began to target
ruling-party officials, local bureaucrats and police.81 Most violence was perpetrated
by domestic militants, including a network led by the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre
(commonly known as Ansar Sunni), an organisation that has cultivated ties with
Al-Shabaab.82 Authorities have conflated these militants’ actions with the more politically
inclined Muslim organisations and used the killings as a pretext for wider
crackdowns on groups that express political grievances but do not champion violence.
83 No evidence has been published or presented in court linking movements
like Jumuiya and Uamsho to the militants that perpetrate attacks.
Transnational militants have long tried to build relationships with their Tanzanian
counterparts. Investigations into the 1998 attack on the U.S. embassy in the Tanzanian
capital Dar es Salaam revealed that al-Qaeda relied on locals for logistical support.84
More recently, Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of the situation in Tanzania to forge
links with domestic militants.85 Leaders of Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate, Al-Hijra,
most prominently Sheikh Aboud Rogo and Sheikh Abubakar Shariff “Makaburi”
(both of whom were killed in roadside shootings in Kenya, Rogo in August 2012 and
Makaburi in April 2014, played especially important roles in building links between
78 See the U.S. State Department’s annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 15 August 2017.
79 “Ex-PM Lowassa undergoes grilling for four hours”, IPP Media, 28 June 2017.
80 See “Tanzanian Muslim cleric Ponda Issa Ponda arrested”, BBC, 17 October 2012.
81 See Le Sage, op. cit.
82 Crisis Group interviews, Tanzanian security officials, Dar es Salaam, February 2018. See “Report
of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244
(2012)”, 27 June 2012. The report noted that the Muslim Youth Centre engages in recruitment and
fundraising on behalf of Al-Shabaab and facilitates movement of fighters to Somalia and back to
Tanzania through Kenya.
83 Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomat, Tanzanian security analyst, Dar es Salaam, February
2018.
84 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York, 2007), p. 272.
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation named two Tanzanians, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and
Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, as participants in the attack.
85 The UN Monitoring Group report (2012), op. cit., notes the especially prominent role that the
fiery preaching of Sheikh Rogo played in luring recruits in Tanzania. Rogo, who was one of Al-
Shabaab’s most effective recruiting sergeants, propagated the message of overthrowing secular
states and imposing Islamic rule in their stead. His preaching remains a key part of Al-Shabaab
propaganda and his CDs have been distributed far outside Kenya, including in Tanzania and northern
Mozambique. Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan and Tanzanian security officials, Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam, January-April 2018.
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Tanzanian and foreign militants, including Al-Shabaab.86 For the Somali militant
group, ties with groups in Tanzania – a country that does not contribute troops to
AMISOM – offered, first, safe havens in which fighters could escape security crackdowns
in Kenya and, second, a new pool of disaffected youth from which it could
draw recruits.87 Recruitment has been most concentrated in the Pwani region, where
anti-state sentiment runs high.88
According to security officials, Tanzanians made up the second largest cohort of
foreigners – after Kenyans – who joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia between 2009 and
2012; several Tanzanians face trial in Kenya for trying to cross into its northern
neighbour.89 Officials in Dar es Salaam blame Tanzanian returnees from Somalia for
running training camps at home; police raids of some of these camps in recent years
have involved bloody battles with militants.90 Following the suspected extrajudicial
killings of Sheikh Shariff and several other clerics – for which the Kenyan police deny
responsibility – some of their supporters along the Kenyan coast also reportedly
moved south to Tanzania. There they linked up with militants, reportedly including
some close to Al Shabaab, who by then were present in the country, particularly in
the heavily forested areas of the Rufiji district of Pwani region, which at the time
were lightly patrolled.91 Tanzanian authorities say hundreds of children and youth
have disappeared from their family homes in Pwani region, particularly in Kibiti,
Mkuranga, Rufiji and Ikwiriri, and may have joined these networks.92
Militant attacks on churches, entertainment venues, Muslim clerics and priests
began slowly in 2013. At first, Tanzanian authorities denied that jihadists were
responsible. Local media largely toed the government line, ascribing the strikes to
“bandits”.93 Strikes ranged in scale and were spread out over a wide geographic arc.
In 2013, militants threw acid at two young British tourists and a Catholic clergyman,
and killed another elderly priest, all in Zanzibar.94 The next year, assailants hurled
crude home-made bombs into three churches in Arusha in north-eastern Tanzania,
killing at least three. Over the course of 2014-2015, militants stormed five police stations,
stealing dozens of guns and, in one July 2015 attack, killing four officers. The
increasing frequency of attacks, and particularly the spate of killings of police officers,
prompted the state to shift tack and recognise the threat.95
86 Rights groups blamed the police for the killings of Rogo, Shariff and several other Muslim clerics.
The police denied involvement. “Kenya: Killings, disappearances by anti-terror police”, Human
Rights Watch, op. cit. On these clerics’ role in forging cross-border ties, see Le Sage, op. cit., p. 12.
87 Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
88 Crisis Group interviews, Tanzanian security officials, religious and community leaders, Dar es
Salaam, February 2018.
89 Crisis Group interviews, senior Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018; Kenyan
security official, Nairobi, March 2018.
90 Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian MP, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
91 Crisis Group interview, regional security analyst, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
92 Jonathan Shana, then the Pwani regional commander of police, told a Kiswahili-language newspaper
that some of the children had been found but that others had been taken outside the country
to get military training under the cover of receiving religious education. “Watoto 1,300 waliopotea Kibiti
waanza kurejea” [Some of the missing 1,300 children in Kibiti return], Habari Leo, 14 December 2017.
93 “Bandits kill two in brazen attack on police station”, Tanzania Daily News, 7 September 2014.
94 See Le Sage, op. cit.
95 Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
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How many of these strikes are directly perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, rather than by
local militants with varying degrees of connection to it, is hard to assess. Indeed,
links between local militant groups and Al-Shabaab are often tenuous, based on personal
ties, particularly among individuals who fought or received training in Somalia
and returned home, or links to other groups, like al-Hijra, that are closer to the Somali
movement. It appears unlikely that Al-Shabaab’s leadership in Somalia exercises any
significant degree of control over local militant dynamics in Pwani. That said, the U.S.
State Department’s annual reports on counter-terrorism tend to pin at least larger
attacks on Al-Shabaab, an assessment with which Tanzanian officials concur.96
Since 2015, the pace of assaults has accelerated further. The coast, particularly in
the Tanga, Mtwara and Pwani regions, has been hit hardest. Militants have staged
attacks in the bigger towns, including Mwanza, Arusha and Dar es Salaam, and have
reportedly planted sleeper cells in Kigoma, Kondoa, Tanga and Morogoro.97 Kibiti
town, in Rufiji, has emerged as a focal point for a low-intensity conflict between militants
and the security forces. Since 2016, militants have abducted and beheaded
local leaders of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party in a campaign security officials
say is designed to sow fear and disrupt intelligence gathering.98 By May 2017,
the jihadists had killed at least 30 party members.99 Militants also killed a number of
Muslim clerics, including four hacked to death with machetes and axes in Mwanza in
May 2016.100 Police reported that the attackers said they were unhappy about crackdowns
on Muslims in the region and murdered clerics they perceived as co-opted by
the state.101
An April 2017 ambush that killed eight police officers just outside Kibiti particularly
shocked Tanzanians. The security services responded harshly, including with
what locals report has been a string of extrajudicial executions.102 That June, during
a visit to coastal towns, President Magufuli vowed that the militants would “see
fire”.103 He launched a “special operation” spearheaded by the military and the main
intelligence agency.104 Local leaders accused the security forces of strong-arm tac-
96 The U.S. State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism have noted increased Al-
Shabaab recruitment in Tanzania and labelled the attacks on police stations and mosques and
churches as terrorism. See, for example, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272229.htm#
TANZANIA. Tanzania’s foreign minister, Augustine Mahiga, also discussed the threat of Al-
Shabaab recruitment at a regional security meeting. “Dar aware and ready for any terrorist threat –
Mahiga”, Tanzania Daily News, 21 July 2016.
97 Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
98 Militants considered the ruling-party cadres to be spies. Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security
official, Dar es Salaam, 2018. He speculated that an additional militant motive may have been to
provoke authorities into targeting Muslims en masse so as to recruit more youths. He said Al-Shabaab
had done the same in Kenya.
99 “Another CCM cadre killed in Kibiti”, The Citizen, 14 May 2017.
100 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, op. cit.
101 “Tanzania mosque attack kills three”, BBC, 20 May 2016.
102 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and Muslim clerics, Dar es Salaam, February 2018. The diplomat
estimated that dozens of suspects had been killed and hundreds others were in detention
without trial, particularly along the coastal region.
103 Speech by Tanzanian President John Magufuli, video, YouTube, 20 June 2017, https://youtu.be/
1vPntMvEPX0.
104 Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
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tics.105 Local media report dozens of unidentified bodies washing up on Coco Beach
on the Indian Ocean and the banks of the Ruvu River.106 Muslim leaders complain
that police have arbitrarily arrested and disappeared many of their co-religionists,
especially young men, without firm evidence that they are militants.107 In May 2018,
an MP from the area told the legislature that 380 people had disappeared since the
crackdown began.108 Opposition parties complain that security agents have arrested
or killed their members under the guise of the counter-terrorist campaign.109 This
dangerous strategy could sharpen tensions.
Tanzanian authorities deny perpetrating abuses. In a press briefing on 15 January
2018, Tanzania’s inspector general of police, Simon Sirro, said the state had handled
militants in Kibiti, Rufiji and other areas “properly and within the bounds of the law”.
He said some of them had escaped to Mozambique and announced Tanzania had
signed a memorandum of understanding with Mozambican authorities to pursue the
militants there and prevent them from returning to wage further violence.110
Tanzanian Muslim leaders often cite neglect and maltreatment of Muslims, including
higher than average incarceration levels and alleged discrimination in employment,
by what they regard as a Christian-dominated state.111 As in Kenya, these
grievances in themselves do not explain why young people join militant groups,
given that large numbers of Muslims experience them but only a small proportion
take up arms. Still, they are an important backdrop to militants’ recruitment efforts
and feature prominently in their propaganda.112 The indiscriminate crackdown
against mainly male Muslim youths in the Pwani region appears certain to make
things worse. Local leaders and Muslims elsewhere in the country warn as much.113
According to one of the former: “Peace cannot be obtained by giving strength to the
105 “Where are the missing 380 people? Tanzanian MP asks government”,”The East African, 5 May
2018.
106 “Questions mount over dead bodies fished out of Ruvu River last week”, The Guardian, 13
December 2016. President Magufuli has become increasingly authoritarian, and media reporting is
heavily restricted. The Committee to Protect Journalists has criticised “an increase in hostility towards
the media in Tanzania, including newspaper shutdowns, hefty fines imposed on television
stations and the disappearance of an investigative journalist, Azory Gwanda, in November 2017”
since Magufuli came into office in November 2015. See “Tanzania forces forums, blogs and streaming
websites to comply with draconian regulations”, Committee to Protect Journalists, 12 June 2018.
107 Crisis Group interview, two leaders of Muslim organisations, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
108 “Where are the missing 380 people? Tanzanian MP asks government”, The East African, 5 May
2018. A diplomat estimated that in addition to those they reportedly killed, the authorities detained
at least 200 people without charge following the sweeps. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat,
Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
109 Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian opposition MP, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
110 See statement by Inspector-General of Police Simon Sirro, video (in Kiswahili), YouTube, 15
January 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDEFKTO9nB0&feature=youtu.be.
111 Crisis Group interviews, Muslim leaders, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Tanga, February 2018.
112 See Simeon Mesaki, “Religion and the State in Tanzania”, Cross-Cultural Communication, vol. 7,
no. 2, (2011). The article notes that Islamist groups take advantage of “perceptions that Muslims do
not benefit proportionally from Tanzanian development efforts” and claim to provide refuge to
people affected by emerging socio-economic problems (since the transition from socialism to a freemarket
system).
113 Crisis Group interviews, Muslim leaders in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, February 2018.
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army. You have to listen to the people and address their grievances, otherwise, you
will be pushing people to look for other means to express their discontent”.114
In Tanzania, militants have proven as adaptive as they have in Kenya. Much
as Kenyan militants fled to Tanzania between 2013 and 2015, so Tanzanian fighters
have escaped crackdowns by retreating to remote spaces. Principally, they have moved
from areas such as Tanga near the Kenyan border to densely forested Rufiji.115 Security
forces turned greater attention to the area from late 2016 onward.116 The arrival
of more troops appears, in turn, to have pushed some militants to move further south
and cross the Ruvuma River into northern Mozambique.117
The political crisis in Zanzibar also appears to have played into jihadists’ hands.
Political elites, mainly organised around the opposition Civic United Front, have
long peacefully sought greater autonomy for the archipelago, which entered a union
with its mainland neighbour Tanganyika to form the republic of Tanzania in 1964.
Controversial elections in Zanzibar in 1995, 2005 and 2010, which observers criticised
for lack of transparency and which the opposition claims to have won, contributed to
perceptions of disenfranchisement.118 In the most recent vote in 2015, troops disrupted
ballot counting and stopped election authorities from declaring a result. The
opposition boycotted the subsequent rerun.119
Local Zanzibar leaders complain that frustrated youth, in whose eyes traditional
elites increasingly lack credibility due to their failure to deliver change, are turning
in increasing numbers to militancy. One described a dispute between a prominent
sheikh and his two sons, who subsequently travelled to Somalia through Kenya:
Our young people are telling us: the only answer is jihad. They say “you think
praying five times a day and reading the Quran while agreeing to live under
an apostate government will help you get access to heaven? No. Jihad is the only
answer”.120
Aware of these intergenerational dynamics and the erosion of traditional leaders’
authority, militants – including some linked to Al-Shabaab – appeared to have
114 Crisis Group interview, political leader, Tanga, April 2018. More broadly, repeated studies show
that abuses by security forces can tip young people toward militancy. For a summary, see the landmark
study, “Journey to Extremism in Africa”, UN Development Programme, 2017.
115 Crisis Group interview, security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.
116 In March 2017, the most senior security official in the Pwani region ordered motorbike taxi drivers
to stop picking up passengers after 6pm, after reports that they were involved in ferrying fighters
from their hideouts in forests to villages where they attacked local officials. See “Rufiji, Kilwa in
paralysis as police pursue killers”, The Citizen, 23 May 2017.
117 See statement by Inspector-General of Police Simon Sirro, op. cit. The police chief said many militants
had fled to Mozambique to escape crackdowns in southern Tanzania. He said Tanzanian security
officials had signed an agreement with Mozambican authorities to jointly pursue the militants.
118 “Democracy, peace and and unity are at stake after annulled elections”, Washington Post,
1 November 2015.
119 “Zanzibar political rift widens after rerun standoff”, The East African, 14 February 2016.
120 Crisis Group interview, prominent Zanzibari community leader, Zanzibar, February 2018.
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stepped up recruitment drives, with the area producing some of the highest numbers
of new members joining groups fighting along the Tanzanian coast.121
The scale of Al-Shabaab’s recruitment and violence in Tanzania is lower than it
was in Kenya between 2013 and 2015 and, as yet, the country has seen no major attack
on civilians. The Dar es Salaam authorities should, nonetheless, be careful not
to respond to the threat in a manner that further strains social cohesion, alienates
more young Muslims and thus risks fuelling militancy. They could learn from Kenya’s
initial mistakes after Westgate and its subsequent shift in tack since about 2015.
While far from perfect, Kenya’s revised approach does appear to have improved relations
between the state – notably the local authorities – and communities targeted
by Al-Shabaab and thus undercut the militants’ ability to recruit.
In Tanzania, shifting tack would mean avoiding indiscriminate crackdowns,
which, if opposition leaders’ accounts of hundreds detained without trial or killed
are accurate, will only fuel anger. Instead, authorities should improve policing and
intelligence gathering, target interventions only at those genuinely suspected of involvement
in violence, consult Muslim communities themselves on what works best
to diminish the appeal of militancy among their youth and avoid collective punishment.
In particular, the government should avoid conflating non-violent movements,
whether on the mainland or in Zanzibar, or wider Muslims’ frustration, with militancy.
Over time, efforts to resolve Muslim grievances, particularly by improving access to
education and including more Muslims in the state bureaucracy, could improve relations
between them and the state and undercut the appeal of militancy, or at least show
that young Muslims do not need to take up arms to achieve their goals. In Zanzibar,
for example, resolving the political crisis is a priority, including introducing reforms
ahead of the 2020 elections.
121 Crisis Group interviews, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018; community
leader, Zanzibar, February 2018.
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VI. Relative Quiet in Uganda
Uganda has suffered fewer Al-Shabaab attacks than its neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania.
The group has not launched a successful assault in the country since coordinated
July 2010 bombings in Kampala killed 74. A number of factors account for the
relative calm. First, there is no obvious constituency among indigenous Muslims
from which militants can recruit. Muslims make up about 14 per cent of Uganda’s
population.122 Most are well integrated and inter-confessional relations are relatively
good, with inter-marriage between Christians and Muslims quite common.123Although
Muslims have similar grievances to their co-religionists in Kenya and Tanzania, notably
state neglect and lower access to formal education, Muslim elites in Uganda are
relatively successful in business; they dominate the hospitality and transport industries,
among other sectors. According to Hajj Nsereko Mutumba, spokesperson of
the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council: “We historically did not have sufficient access
to the education system but we focused on business and have done well”.124
A nominally Islamist local militant group, the Allied Democratic Forces-National
Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), has long challenged President
Yoweri Museveni’s government. But by 2002 concerted military action had largely
pushed the ADF-NALU out of Uganda, and few members remain in Kampala and
other cities.125 The group traditionally has not had ties to transnational jihadism,
though some Ugandan and Tanzanian officials report some limited cooperation between
it and Al-Shabaab and other regional militants over recent years.126 The
Ugandan government blames ADF-NALU militants sympathetic to Al-Shabaab for
the March 2015 killing of Joan Kagezi, the prosecutor leading the case against suspects
brought to trial in the July 2010 Kampala bombings.127
122 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, The National Population and Housing Census, 2014.
123 In a 2013 Pew survey, 66 per cent of Ugandan Muslims said their immediate family included
Christians; in Tanzania that percentage was 39. The survey did not include figures for Kenya. See
“The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society”, Pew Research Centre, 30 April 2013, p. 125.
124 Crisis Group interview, Hajj Nsereko Mutumba, Kampala, May 2018. Muslims in Uganda also
benefited from Idi Amin Dada’s presidency between 1971 and 1979. The strongman sought to remedy
the traditional dominance of the state by Catholics and Protestants, who had benefited from
state largesse, including free land, from the colonial and post-colonial governments. Amin stacked
many government positions with Muslims, helped Muslim associations form an umbrella organisation
and, when he expelled Ugandans of Asian origin, reallocated their former businesses substantially
to Muslims’ benefit. He also facilitated scholarships for thousands of young Muslims to study
abroad. Today, Muslims complain that subsequent governments have reverted to discriminating
against Muslims, particularly in allocation of slots in prominent positions within the executive and
the judiciary. Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan academics and Muslim leaders, Kampala, May
2018. See M. L. Pirouet, “Religion in Uganda under Amin”, Journal of Religion in Africa, vol. 11,
no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 12-29.
125 See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°93, Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion, 19
December 2012.
126 Crisis Group interview, security official, Kampala, May 2018; Western diplomat (citing a Tanzanian
politician), Nairobi, August 2018.
127 “Museveni vows to end terrorism”, Daily Monitor, 30 March 2017.
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Secondly, Uganda has better integrated its Somali population than neighbours
such as Kenya, thus making them less susceptible to militant recruitment.128 The
ethnic Somali population in Kampala is divided into two groups: those who have
lived in Uganda for decades, and speak local languages, and more recent arrivals.
The first cohort is well integrated and prominent in commerce, particularly in the
transportation and logistics businesses. The second is less well assimilated; donors
and local NGOs focus support on them.129 A likely third factor is the Ugandan security
forces’ close cooperation with Western intelligence agencies, which began soon
after the 2010 Kampala attack.130 Ugandan security officials assert that shared intelligence
helped thwart attacks, including a September 2014 plot to hit bars, a hotel
and a university.131
Despite this relative success, the Museveni administration’s policies and the security
forces’ practices could yet drive young Muslims toward militancy.132 Indiscriminate
arrests of Muslims every time a high-profile crime occurs are an acute source of
grievance. In 2012, amid a rising crime wave, Ugandan authorities rounded up dozens
of Muslims, creating significant resentment among their co-religionists.133 The same
has happened after other high-profile crimes, including the November 2016 shooting
of police Major Mohammed Kiggundu and the April 2018 killing of businesswoman
Susan Magara. Following a public outcry, the most prominent detention centre
where suspects were detained, the Nalufenya police station, was temporarily closed
in April 2018 and suspects transferred to other stations after pictures emerged of
several of them bearing serious wounds on their bodies, thought to be due to torture.134
128 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, community leaders and security analysts, Kampala, May 2018.
129 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kampala, May 2018. The diplomat noted that the
Ugandan security forces do not profile or target ethnic Somalis. He said there is no proven nexus
between migration and militant activity. But a growing worry is that many Somalis have been on
waiting lists for years hoping to be resettled to Western countries. As their frustration grows, they
could fall into the hands of human traffickers or be lured by criminal or militant networks.
130 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kampala, May 2018. Kenyan security agencies also
cooperate closely with Western intelligence agencies but the ties are uneven. Relations were particularly
frosty between 2010 and 2014, as the International Criminal Court pursued cases against six
prominent Kenyans for their alleged role in the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Intelligence cooperation
improved after wholesale changes to the leadership of the security agencies in mid-2015.
131 “Uganda forces discover suicide vests, explosive vests at suspected terror cell”, Wall Street Journal,
15 September 2014.
132 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kampala, May 2018. The diplomat said Uganda’s focus,
considering the relatively few jihadists in the country and the domestic goals of many nominally
Islamist groups opposing the government, should be on preventing jihadism rather than countering
it. The government’s indiscriminate campaigns, however, could create a “radicalisation problem
where there really wasn’t one”.
133 Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics, civil society campaigners and diplomats, Kampala, May
2018. Crisis Group Africa Report N°256, Uganda’s Slow Slide into Crisis, 21 November 2017, notes
that the Ugandan police force has become increasingly politicised and focuses more on regime
maintenance than fighting crime.
134 Inspector General of Police Martin Okoth Ochola has condemned the police’s reported use of
torture, including on Museveni’s political opponents, and said he will take steps to punish police
engaging in torture. “I have worked in CID (the Criminal Investigations Department) for over ten
years; I have been in the police for 30 years; so why should a police officer torture someone? Torture is
a criminal case and if we arrest you, we will take you to a criminal court”. Daily Monitor, 18 August 2018.
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Police chief Martin Okoth Ochola, who replaced the long-serving Kale Kayihura in
March 2018, promised to end the practice of torture in detention.135 According to
one cleric:
Too many Muslims are living with wounds on their bodies and in their hearts due
to the indiscriminate arrest and torture of Muslims. Every time a high-profile
killing occurs, Muslims shudder because we wonder who will be arrested next.
My young daughter keeps asking me if I will make it home because I have spoken
out about these endless arrests of Muslims. It is absurd that every high-profile
crime is followed by the arrest of Muslims. It seems like an attempt to label us as
undesirable citizens. This policy can be easily exploited by extremists unless the
authorities stop this.136
An unexplained spate of murders of Muslim clerics has heightened the alarm. Since
2012, a dozen imams have been killed across Uganda, usually by assailants on motorbikes.
137 The government has blamed intra-Muslim wrangling for the killings, an
explanation dismissed by clerics who blame the authorities.138
In sum, Uganda has done better than its neighbours in thwarting large-scale attacks,
related in part to intelligence cooperation with the West but also to its better
integration of Muslims, its amicable inter-confessional relations and its lack of a
ready constituency from which militants can draw support. In this sense, policies
that alienate Muslims are likely to prove self-defeating. In particular, authorities
should avoid scapegoating Muslims every time a prominent person is killed.
Al-Shabaab poses only a limited immediate danger to Uganda. Evidence of its ties
with the ADF-NALU is less clear than its unambiguous outreach to local militants in
Tanzania.139 The ADF-NALU remains a threat and could carry out attacks, but its
goal is primarily political: it aims to topple the government of President Museveni.140
Still, by failing to adopt nuanced security policies and by routinely stigmatising and
brutalising young Muslim men, the Ugandan authorities could push these youths into
the hands of militants.
135 See “Closing Nalufenya will not end torture in Uganda”, Daily Monitor, 12 April 2018. After images
of detainees bearing wounds indicative of torture circulated on social media and appeared in
the press in April 2017, Uganda’s State Minister for Internal Security Kania Obiga issued a statement
in parliament admitting that the police had flouted the law. He apologised for the torture of
suspects and said the state would launch an investigation. “Gov’t issues apology over torture victims”,
New Vision, 16 May 2017.
136 Crisis Group interviews, prominent Ugandan cleric and several Muslim community leaders,
Kampala, May 2018.
137 “Uganda, living in fear”, Al Jazeera, 22 February 2016.
138 Crisis Group interview, Muslim cleric, Kampala, May 2018. One possible explanation for the
government’s abiding suspicion of Muslims is geopolitics. In the 1980s, the Sudanese government
actively supported Islamist groups fighting against Museveni, including the ADF-NALU, as did
Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, apparently in response to Museveni’s backing for Sudanese and Congolese
rebels.
139 Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomats and Ugandan security analysts, Kampala, May 2018.
140 Crisis Group interview, Muslim clerics and security analysts, Kampala, May 2018.
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VII. Conclusion
For more than a decade, Al-Shabaab has operated across East Africa. It initially established
networks to raise funds and recruit and funnel fighters into Somalia. Then
it launched a series of often high-profile strikes against AMISOM troop contributors.
Over the past few years its tentacles have reached further afield, through ties to local
militants, to countries that do not send forces to Somalia.
The exact relationship between local militants and Al-Shabaab itself varies and is
often murky. Al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia are unlikely to exercise much control
over local allies, particularly in Tanzania; militants respond to parochial dynamics
more than to instruction from abroad. Where they exist, ties are based mostly on
personal relationships, often involving fighters returning from Somalia, or links to
other militants – like al-Hijra in Kenya – who are closer to counterparts in Somalia.
Indeed, the fluidity among East African militants reflects that among jihadists more
broadly. Most local groups are not formally part of Al-Shabaab, but by fighting under
its flag, or just claiming some connection, they can enhance their profile and associate
their local struggles with a wider cause. In turn, Al-Shabaab benefits by projecting an
image of regional influence.
The threat that Al-Shabaab and Islamist militancy more broadly poses to each
East African country also varies. In Kenya, the danger of violence tipping over into
ethnic and religious clashes was real when attacks were regular, but for now that
moment appears to have passed. Certainly, the bigger threat today to Kenya’s stability
emanates from ethnic elites’ winner-take-all competition for political office, especially
the presidency. That said, militants could still stage major attacks (U.S. and Kenyan
officials say attempts have been foiled by their intelligence and security services).
Such attacks would sap an economy that is reliant on tourism and foreign investment
in the services sector and thus could aggravate other sources of fragility and
friction.
Similarly, in Tanzania, it appears unlikely that today’s low-intensity violence
would escalate into a full-blown insurgency, in part due to the state’s intelligence
gathering and vast network of informants and the seriousness with which the authorities
now regard the threat.141 Militants can no longer operate with the relative freedom
they had some years ago. But the hardline approach that the state, under President
Magufuli, has adopted in response to Muslim mobilisation in general, and to militancy
in particular, has eroded intercommunal relations in a state traditionally regarded as
one of the more cohesive and inclusive countries in the region. Extrajudicial killings
of youths, with hundreds reported dead, will further inflame tensions.
As for Uganda, neither Al-Shabaab nor other militants have made serious inroads,
due in large part to the relatively smooth social integration of Somalis and Muslims
more broadly. But the past few years’ targeting of Muslims and the acute resentment
this has caused, could offer an opening to militants. It remains to be seen whether the
new police chief, who has taken the welcome step of recognising the force’s counterproductive
abuses under his predecessors, can turn a page.
141 Many informants are members of the ruling party, a legacy of socialism under the former president,
Nyerere.
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Given the diversity among the different countries’ experiences no one prescription
for tackling the threat exists. Nor, in East Africa as elsewhere, is there a single,
linear pathway toward militancy. That said, some lessons can be drawn from the
three countries’ experiences. Notably, in Kenya, the contrast between the approach
the authorities adopted in the aftermath of the Westgate attack and the course correction
after 2015 is striking. The initial crackdowns between 2013 and 2015 may
have squeezed militant networks, forcing some to relocate and Al-Shabaab to shift
tactics. But by deepening the anger among Somalis and Muslims more broadly at the
state, the crackdowns expanded the base from which militants could recruit. More
effective has been to give local elected officials the lead, consult regularly with communities
whose youth militant groups target for recruitment and appoint people
from those communities to top local positions in the security forces, combined with
measures aimed at tackling underlying grievances.
Clearly, serious shortcomings remain in Kenya. Reports of human rights abuses
are still frequent. Overall, though, the shift since 2015 has worked. Security officials
cite improved intelligence as relations between the state and inhabitants of the
coastal and north-eastern regions improve; better information then obviates the
need for the indiscriminate arrests that play into militants’ hands. That lesson is a
valuable one for Tanzania in particular, which may well be replicating Kenya’s mistakes
between 2013 and 2015. But it applies to Uganda, too, where crackdowns could
create a problem where thus far there is no substantial one.
Al-Shabaab is likely to remain a threat to East Africa. It is a formidable force in
its home country, where prospects for its defeat appear remote. Its leaders still see
benefits in extending operations across the region. Even were that to change, local
militancy would evolve and continue in some form; indeed, to some degree, it has
almost certainly already taken on its own dynamics and momentum in Tanzania.
Al-Shabaab has proven as resilient across parts of East Africa as in Somalia itself,
adapting when under pressure by relocating its operations and reorienting its recruitment.
East African authorities should show similar nimbleness, by combining cleverer
security measures aimed at disrupting the group’s operations and recruitment with
political and economic policies aimed at diminishing militancy’s allure.
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 September 2018
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Appendix A: Al Shabaab in East Africa
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Appendix B: Timeline: Al-Shabaab in East Africa
August 1998
Al-Qaeda stages its first major terror attack in
East Africa, bombing the U.S. embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
2006-2009
Al-Shabaab gains regional prominence by
waging war on the Ethiopian military in Somalia.
2009
Al-Shabaab seizes control of parts of
Mogadishu and Kismayo, a major port city in
Somalia. Control of the harbour allows Al-
Shabaab to accumulate huge revenues by
taxing imports arriving at the port.
July 2010
Coordinated bombings kill 74 people in the
Ugandan capital Kampala, marking Al-
Shabaab’s first major assault outside Somalia.
October 2011
Kenya sends troops into southern Somalia to
help fight Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab begins
staging attacks in Kenya.
October 2012
Kenyan defence forces drive Al-Shabaab
militants out of Kismayo.
September 2013
Four Al-Shabaab militants storm Nairobi’s
Westgate Mall, a symbol of Kenya’s emerging
middle class, and kill 67 people during a fourday
siege.
November 2013
Authorities arrest 69 people running an “Al-
Shabaab child indoctrination camp” for over 50
children aged four to thirteen in Tanga,
Tanzania.
April 2014
Kenyan security forces round up thousands of
ethnic Somalis in Nairobi, deepening existing
feelings of alienation and exclusion.
April 2015
Al-Shabaab launches assault on Garissa
University College in Kenya, killing 148, mainly
students. Public uproar pressures government
to change security chiefs, better engage with
youths targeted for Al-Shabaab recruitment and
improve intelligence gathering. Pace of attacks
in major Kenyan cities slows.
April 2017
Militants ambush and kill eight police officers
just outside Kibiti on the Tanzanian coast.
Security operations in Kenya increasingly force
Al-Shabaab to mobilise elsewhere. Its fighters
forge alliances with local Islamist groups in
Tanzania and northern Mozambique.
October 2017
Al-Shabaab truck bomb in Mogadishu kills at
least 587 people in the deadliest terror attack in
Somalia’s history.
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Crisis Group Program Report N°TK, TK Month 2018 Page 30
Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation,
with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or
close by countries or regions at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on
information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations
targeted at key international, regional and national decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes
CrisisWatch, a monthly early-warning bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in
up to 70 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.
Crisis Group’s reports are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on its website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy,
business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations
to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former UN Deputy
Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Lord
(Mark) Malloch-Brown.
Crisis Group’s President & CEO, Robert Malley, took up the post on 1 January 2018. Malley was formerly
Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director and most recently was a Special Assistant
to former U.S. President Barack Obama as well as Senior Adviser to the President for the Counter-ISIL
Campaign, and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf region. Previously,
he served as President Bill Clinton’s Special Assistant for Israeli-Palestinian Affairs.
Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices in seven other
locations: Bogotá, Dakar, Istanbul, Nairobi, London, New York, and Washington, DC. It has presences in
the following locations: Abuja, Algiers, Bangkok, Beirut, Caracas, Gaza City, Guatemala City, Hong Kong,
Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Juba, Mexico City, New Delhi, Rabat, Tbilisi, Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, and Yangon.
Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, foundations, and private
sources. Currently Crisis Group holds relationships with the following governmental departments and
agencies: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Global Affairs
Canada, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union Instrument contributing to Stability and
Peace, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, French Development Agency, French Ministry of Europe and
Foreign Affairs, Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid, Japanese International Cooperation Agency,
Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Emirati Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
Crisis Group also holds relationships with the following foundations: Carnegie Corporation of New York,
Elders Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Korea
Foundation, Oak Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Ploughshares Fund, Robert Bosch Stiftung,
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, UniKorea Foundation and Wellspring Philanthropic Fund.
September 2018
Annex 135
Report title – not longer than 75 characters
Crisis Group Program Report N°TK, TK Month 2018 Page 31
Appendix D: Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2015
Special Reports
Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State, Special Report N°1, 14 March 2016
(also available in Arabic and French).
Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to
Early Action, Special Report N°2, 22 June
2016.
Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight
against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid,
Special Report N°3, 22 March 2017.
Central Africa
Elections in Burundi: Moment of Truth, Africa
Report N°224, 17 April 2015 (also available in
French).
Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?, Africa
Report N°225, 5 May 2015.
Burundi: Peace Sacrificed?, Africa Briefing
N°111, 29 May 2015 (also available in
French).
Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism,
Africa Report N°229, 3 September 2015 (also
available in French).
Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence,
Africa Report N°230, 21 September
2015 (also available in French).
Chad: Between Ambition and Fragility, Africa
Report N°233, 30 March 2016 (also available
in French).
Burundi: anatomie du troisième mandat, Africa
Report N°235, 20 May 2016 (only available in
French).
Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland,
Africa Report N°239, 3 August 2016.
The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition
versus Reality, Africa Briefing N°122, 28
September 2016 (also available in French).
Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The “Street” and
Politics in DR Congo, Africa Briefing N°123,
13 October 2016.
Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram, Africa
Report N°241, 16 November 2016 (also available
in French).
Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military
Measures, Africa Report N°246, 8 March 2017
(also available in French).
Burundi: The Army in Crisis, Africa Report
N°247, 5 April 2017 (also available in French).
Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads,
Africa Report N°250, 2 August 2017
(also available in French).
Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic,
Africa Report N°253, 28 September 2017 (also
available in French).
Time to Reset African Union-European Union
Relations, Africa Report N°255, 17 October
2017 (also available in French).
Cameroon: A Worsening Anglophone Crisis
Calls for Strong Measures, Africa Briefing
N°130, 19 October 2017 (also available in
French).
Cameroon’s Far North: Reconstruction amid
Ongoing Conflict, Africa Briefing N°133, 25
October 2017 (also available in French).
Time for Concerted Action in DR Congo, Africa
Report N°257, 4 December 2017 (also available
in French).
Seven Priorities for the African Union in 2018,
Africa Briefing N°135, 17 January 2018 (also
available in French).
Electoral Poker in DR Congo, Africa Report
N°259, 4 April 2018 (also available in French).
Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How the Catholic
Church Can Promote Dialogue, Africa
Briefing N°138, 26 April 2018 (also available
in French).
Increasing the Stakes in DR Congo’s Electoral
Poker, Africa Briefing N°139, 8 June 2018 (also
available in French).
DR Congo: The Bemba Earthquake, Africa
Briefing N°140, 15 June 2018 (also available
in French).
Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the
Fight Against Boko Haram, Africa Report
N°263, 14 August 2018 (also available in
French).
Helping the Burundian People Cope with the
Economic Crisis, Africa Report N°264, 31 August
2018 (also available in French).
Horn of Africa
Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts,
Africa Report N°223, 29 January 2015.
Sudan: The Prospects for “National Dialogue”,
Africa Briefing N°108, 11 March 2015.
The Chaos in Darfur, Africa Briefing N°110, 22
April 2015.
South Sudan: Keeping Faith with the IGAD
Peace Process, Africa Report N°228, 27 July
2015.
Somaliland: The Strains of Success, Africa Briefing
N°113, 5 October 2015.
Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security,
Africa Briefing N°114, 17 November 2015.
Ethiopia: Governing the Faithful, Africa Briefing
N°117, 22 February 2016.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival,
Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016.
South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias,
Africa Report N°236, 25 May 2016.
Kenya’s Coast: Devolution Disappointed, Africa
Briefing N°121, 13 July 2016.
South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard,
Africa Report N°243, 20 December 2016.
Annex 135
Report title – not longer than 75 characters
Crisis Group Program Report N°TK, TK Month 2018 Page 32
Instruments of Pain (II): Conflict and Famine in
South Sudan, Africa Briefing N°124, 26 April
2017.
Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in
Somalia, Africa Briefing N°125, 9 May 2017.
Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in
North East Nigeria, Africa Briefing N°126, 18
May 2017.
Kenya’s Rift Valley: Old Wounds, Devolution’s
New Anxieties, Africa Report N°248, 30 May
2017.
Time to Repeal U.S. Sanctions on Sudan?, Africa
Briefing N°127, 22 June 2017.
A New Roadmap to Make U.S. Sudan Sanctions
Relief Work, Africa Briefing N°128, 29
September 2017.
How to Ensure a Credible, Peaceful Presidential
Vote in Kenya, Africa Briefing N°129,
2 October 2017.
Managing the Disruptive Aftermath of Somalia’s
Worst Terror Attack, Africa Briefing N°131, 20
October 2017.
An Election Delay Can Help Avert Kenya’s Crisis,
Africa Briefing N°132, 23 October 2017.
Uganda’s Slow Slide into Crisis, Africa Report
N°256, 21 November 2017.
After Kenya’s Leaders Reconcile, a Tough Path
Ahead, Africa Briefing N°136, 13 March 2018.
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Africa Report
N°260, 5 June 2018.
Averting War in Northern Somalia, Africa Briefing
N°141, 27 June 2018.
Southern Africa
Zimbabwe: Stranded in Stasis, Africa Briefing
N°118, 29 February 2016.
Zimbabwe’s “Military-assisted Transition” and
Prospects for Recovery, Africa Briefing N°134,
20 December 2017.
West Africa
Burkina Faso: Nine Months to Complete the
Transition, Africa Report N°222, 28 January
2015.
Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An
Opportunity Not to Be Missed, Africa Briefing
N°109, 19 March 2015 (only available in
French).
Mali: An Imposed Peace?, Africa Report N°226,
22 May 2015 (only available in French).
Burkina Faso: Meeting the October Target,
Africa Briefing N°112, 24 June 2015 (only
available in French).
The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm, Africa
Report N°227, 25 June 2015 (also available in
French).
Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the
Niger Delta, Africa Report N°231, 29
September 2015.
The Politics Behind the Ebola Crisis, Africa
Report N°232, 28 October 2015.
Mali: Peace from Below?, Africa Briefing N°115,
14 December 2015 (only available in French).
Burkina Faso: Transition, Act II, Africa Briefing
N°116, 7 January 2016 (only available in
French).
Implementing Peace and Security Architecture
(III): West Africa, Africa Report N°234, 14
April 2016 (also available in French).
Boko Haram on the Back Foot?, Africa Briefing
N°120, 4 May 2016 (also available in French).
Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform, Africa
Report N°237, 6 June 2016.
Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, Africa
Report N°238, 6 July 2016 (also available in
French).
Burkina Faso: Preserving the Religious Balance,
Africa Report N°240, 6 September 2016
(also available in French).
Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency,
Africa Report N°242, 5 December 2016
(also available in French).
Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups
Fighting Boko Haram, Africa Report N°244, 23
February 2017.
Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counterinsurgency,
Africa Report N°245, 27 February
2017 (also available in French).
The Politics of Islam in Mali: Separating Myth
from Reality, Africa Report N°249, 18 July
2017 (only available in French).
Double-edged Sword: Vigilantes in African
Counter-insurgencies, Africa Report N°251,
7 September 2017 (also available in French).
Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding
Deadly Conflict, Africa Report N°252, 19 September
2017.
The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina
Faso’s North, Africa Report N°254, 12 October
2017 (also available in French).
Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint
Force, Africa Report N°258, 12 December
2017 (also available in French).
Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren
in Nigeria, Africa Briefing N°137, 12
April 2017.
Frontière Niger-Mali : mettre l’outil militaire au
service d’une approche politique, Africa Report
N°261, 12 June 2018 (only available in
French).
Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder
Violence, Africa Report N°262, 26 July 2018.
Annex 135
Report title – not longer than 75 characters
Crisis Group Program Report N°TK, TK Month 2018 Page 33
Appendix E: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees
CHAIR
Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown
Former UN Deputy Secretary-General
and Administrator of the United
Nations Development Programme
PRESIDENT & CEO
Robert Malley
Former White House Coordinator
for the Middle East, North Africa and
the Gulf region
OTHER TRUSTEES
Fola Adeola
Founder and Chairman, FATE
Foundation
Hushang Ansary
Chairman, Parman Capital Group LLC;
Former Iranian Ambassador to the
U.S. and Minister of Finance and
Economic Affairs
Carl Bildt
Former Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister of Sweden
Emma Bonino
Former Foreign Minister of Italy and
European Commissioner for
Humanitarian Aid
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High
Commissioner to the UK and
Secretary General of the African
National Congress (ANC)
Maria Livanos Cattaui
Former Secretary General of the
International Chamber of Commerce
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied
Commander
Nathalie Delapalme
Executive Director and Board Member
at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation
Alexander Downer
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and
High Commissioner to the United
Kingdom of Australia
Sigmar Gabriel
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Vice Chancellor of Germany
Robert Fadel
Former Member of Parliament in
Lebanon; Owner and Board Member
of the ABC Group
Frank Giustra
President & CEO, Fiore Group
Hu Shuli
Editor-in-chief of Caixin Media;
Professor at Sun Yat-sen University
Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim
Foundation; Founder, Celtel
International
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Former President of Liberia
Yoriko Kawaguchi
Former Foreign Minister of Japan;
former Environment Minister
Wadah Khanfar
Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; former
Director General, Al Jazeera Network
Nasser al-Kidwa
Chairman of the Yasser Arafat
Foundation; Former UN Deputy
Mediator on Syria
Andrey Kortunov
Director General of the Russian
International Affairs Council
Ivan Krastev
Chairman of the Centre for Liberal
Strategies (Sofia); Founding Board
Member of European Council on
Foreign Relations
Ramtame Lamamra
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Algeria; Former Commissioner for
Peace and Security, African Union
Tzipi Livni
Former Foreign Minister and Vice
Prime Minister of Israel
Helge Lund
Former Chief Executive BG Group
(UK) and Statoil (Norway)
Shivshankar Menon
Former Foreign Secretary of India;
former National Security Adviser
Naz Modirzadeh
Director of the Harvard Law School
Program on International Law and
Armed Conflict
Saad Mohseni
Chairman and CEO of MOBY Group
Marty Natalegawa
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Indonesia, Permanent Representative
to the UN, and Ambassador to the UK
Ayo Obe
Chair of the Board of the Gorée
Institute (Senegal); Legal Practitioner
(Nigeria)
Thomas R. Pickering
Former U.S. Under Secretary of State
and Ambassador to the UN, Russia,
India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and
Nigeria
Ahmed Rashid
Author and Foreign Policy Journalist,
Pakistan
Wendy Sherman
Former U.S. Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs and Lead
Negotiator for the Iran Nuclear Deal
Alexander Soros
Deputy Chair of the Global Board,
Open Society Foundations
George Soros
Founder, Open Society Foundations
and Chair, Soros Fund Management
Pär Stenbäck
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and
of Education, Finland; Chairman of the
European Cultural Parliament
Jonas Gahr Støre
Leader of the Labour Party and Labour
Party Parliamentary Group; former
Foreign Minister of Norway
Jake Sullivan
Former Director of Policy Planning at
the U.S. Department of State, Deputy
Assistant to President Obama, and
National Security Advisor to Vice
President Biden
Lawrence H. Summers
Former Director of the U.S. National
Economic Council and Secretary of
the U.S. Treasury; President Emeritus
of Harvard University
Helle Thorning-Schmidt
CEO of Save the Children International;
former Prime Minister of Denmark
Wang Jisi
Member, Foreign Policy Advisory
Committee of the Chinese Foreign
Ministry; President, Institute of
International and Strategic Studies,
Peking University
Annex 135
Report title – not longer than 75 characters
Crisis Group Program Report N°TK, TK Month 2018 Page 34
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.
CORPORATE
BP
Shearman & Sterling LLP
Statoil (U.K.) Ltd.
White & Case LLP
INDIVIDUAL
(5) Anonymous
Scott Bessent
David Brown & Erika Franke
Herman De Bode
Stephen Robert
Luděk Sekyra
Alexander Soros
Ian R. Taylor
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Group’s efforts to prevent deadly conflict.
CORPORATE
Anonymous
APCO Worldwide Inc.
Atlas Copco AB
Chevron
Edelman UK
Eni
HSBC Holdings Plc
MetLife
Noble Energy
RBC Capital Markets
Shell
INDIVIDUAL
(3) Anonymous
Mark Bergman
Stanley Bergman & Edward
Bergman
David & Katherine Bradley
Eric Christiansen
Sam Englebardt
The Edelman Family Foundation
Seth & Jane Ginns
Ronald Glickman
David Harding
Geoffrey R. Hoguet &
Ana Luisa Ponti
Geoffrey Hsu
David Jannetti
Faisel Khan
Cleopatra Kitti
Michael & Jackie Lambert
Samantha Lasry
Leslie Lishon
Malcolm Hewitt Wiener
Foundation
The New York Community Trust –
Lise Strickler & Mark Gallogly
Charitable Fund
The Nommontu Foundation
Brian Paes-Braga
Kerry Propper
Duco Sickinghe
Nina K. Solarz
Clayton E. Swisher
Enzo Viscusi
AMBASSADOR COUNCIL
Rising stars from diverse fields who contribute their talents and expertise to support Crisis Group’s mission.
Amy Benziger
Tripp Callan
Kivanc Cubukcu
Matthew Devlin
Victoria Ergolavou
Noa Gafni
Christina Bache
Lynda Hammes
Jason Hesse
Dalí ten Hove
Lindsay Iversen
Azim Jamal
Arohi Jain
Christopher Louney
Matthew Magenheim
Madison Malloch-Brown
Megan McGill
Hamesh Mehta
Tara Opalinski
Perfecto Sanchez
Nidhi Sinha
Chloe Squires
Leeanne Su
Bobbi Thomason
AJ Twombly
Dillon Twombly
Annie Verderosa
Zachary Watling
Grant Webster
SENIOR ADVISERS
Former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called
on (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).
Martti Ahtisaari
Chairman Emeritus
George Mitchell
Chairman Emeritus
Gareth Evans
President Emeritus
Kenneth Adelman
Adnan Abu-Odeh
HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal
Celso Amorim
Óscar Arias
Richard Armitage
Diego Arria
Zainab Bangura
Nahum Barnea
Kim Beazley
Shlomo Ben-Ami
Christoph Bertram
Lakhdar Brahimi
Kim Campbell
Jorge Castañeda
Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Victor Chu
Mong Joon Chung
Sheila Coronel
Pat Cox
Gianfranco Dell’Alba
Jacques Delors
Alain Destexhe
Mou-Shih Ding
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Stanley Fischer
Carla Hills
Swanee Hunt
Wolfgang Ischinger
Wim Kok
Aleksander Kwasniewski
Ricardo Lagos
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Todung Mulya Lubis
Graça Machel
Jessica T. Mathews
Miklós Németh
Christine Ockrent
Timothy Ong
Roza Otunbayeva
Olara Otunnu
Lord (Christopher) Patten
Surin Pitsuwan
Fidel V. Ramos
Olympia Snowe
Javier Solana
Annex 135
Annex 136
“Al-Shabab kills 18 in surge of executions”, Voice of America News, 8 July 2019
Africa
Al-Shabab Kills 18 in Surge of
Executions
By Harun Maruf
July 08, 2019 11:15 AM
Somali militant group al-Shabab has executed 18 people since Wednesday, an
unprecedented rate of executions for the group, which is under pressure from
U.S. airstrikes.
Militants put to death four people in the southern town of Jamame on Sunday,
immediately after the judge in an al-Shabab court declared them guilty.
Firing squads shot and killed two men accused of being Somali government
soldiers and a woman accused of being a spy for Kenya. The militants
identified the woman as 20-year-old Iqra Abdi Aden.
Afterward, an 18-year-old man, Nur Bakar Jirow, was publicly stoned to death
for allegedly raping a 16-year-old girl. The man argued the sex was
consensual, but the judge said he deserved the death penalty because he was
married at the time.
Annex 136
On Saturday, al-Shabab firing squads killed three men accused of being Somali
government soldiers in the town of Kurtunwarey in the Lower Shabelle region.
In Buale town of the neighboring Middle Jubba region, the militants executed
a man accused of practicing sorcery.
On July 3 and 4, al-Shabab shot and killed 10 men in two separate executions
in Hagar and Salagle towns in southern Somalia. The group accused the men
of spying for the Somali government, Kenya and the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency.
All of the victims were convicted by militant courts, according to al-Shabab
affiliate media sites.
Al-Shabab courts do not allow lawyers to represent the defendants, and the
evidence largely relies on alleged confessions. Critics believe that al-Shabab’s
militias torture the accused to force the confessions.
The group did not give a reason for the surge in executions, but has been the
target of dozens of U.S. airstrikes over the past two and a half years. The
airstrikes are often ordered on the basis of ground-level intelligence collected
by Somali government sources.
In other violence, at least seven people were killed and 22 others were injured
in Mogadishu on Monday in two separate attacks, witnesses say.
The first attack took place near a civilian hospital when Mogadishu police
stopped a vehicle loaded with explosives. The driver refused to exit the
vehicle, forcing police to open fire. Moments later the vehicle exploded killing
two people and injuring 18 others.
Separately, a suspected militant vehicle attempted to pass through a security
checkpoint on a crowded road in Mogadishu. Security forces responded
killing two militants. A member of the police and two civilians were also killed
according to witnesses. Four others were injured in the attack.
Annex 136
By
Harun Maruf
Annex 136
Annex 137
“Al-Shabab executes two girl ‘spies’”, Al Jazeera, 28 October 2010
In Depth
Profile: Sharif
Ahmed
Timeline: Somalia
News
Al-Shabab executes two girl ‘spies’
Somali armed group publicly execute by firing squad two teenage girls
accused of spying “for the enemy”.
28 Oct 2010
Al-Shabab warn that
dozens of people
suspected of spying
‘face the same fate’ as
the two
executed girls [Reuters]
Al-Shabab fighters have publicly executed two teenage girls in the central Somali town of Beledweyne
on charges of spying, witnesses have said.
Hundreds of people watched as a firing squad arranged by the armed group shot the pair on
Wednesday, in the first known instance of such an execution of women accused of spying.
“These women were spying for the enemy and were arrested by mujahideen [holy warriors]” last
week, Sheikh Yusuf Ali Ugas, al-Shabab’s regional commander, told the crowd after the execution.
“After a long investigation, they confessed to their crimes,” he said, adding that dozens of other
people were held at Beledweyne police station on the same charges and faced the same fate.
“Anyone found to be involved in such crimes will meet the same fate and will be executed,” the
al-Shabab leader said.
‘Shocking’
Beledweyne, a town which lies near the Ethiopian border, witnessed heavy fighting between the
rebel group and pro-government forces earlier this month.
Ali, a resident of the town, said: “The group informed the population that a
punishment was going to be carried out in public on two women they
claimed had been found guilty of spying.
“I didn’t know they were planning to shoot them. The two girls were sitting
on the ground with their hands tied behind their back.
“Then a group of fighters covered their faces and shot them from behind.
“It was shocking, the girls were so young. They looked so desperate but nobody
could help them.”
Elders and residents gave conflicting information on the girls’ ages but both
of them were believed to be 17 or 18.
“Everyone was very sorry for the young girls who were killed in front of hundreds,”
Maryam Ahmed, another witness, said. “I couldn’t hold back my
News US Elections Features Economy Opinion Video More LIVE
BREAKING Polls open in New York and Virginia, marking the start of US Election Day
Annex 137
Inside Story:
What next for
Somalia
Video: Foreign
fighters ‘invade’
Somalia
Riz Khan: Somalia
– From bad to
worse
Restoring Somalia
A long road to stability
Al-Shabab: Somali
fighters undeterred
Somalia at a crossroads
Somaliland:
Africa’s isolated
state
“Everyone was very sorry for the young girls who were killed in front of hundreds,”
Maryam Ahmed, another witness, said. “I couldn’t hold back my
tears.”
“I’m worried for the dozens of other people who are currently in jail on similar
allegations,” she said.
Al-Shabab, listed as a terrorist organisation by the US, executed two men on
spying charges outside Mogadishu earlier this month.
Condemnation
Abdirahman Omar Osman, the central government’s information minister,
issued a statement condemning the execution of the girls.
“This execution is yet another human rights abuse committed by the criminals.
This act of killing innocent children does not have Islamic and humanitarian
justifications,” the statement said.
In a case that grabbed the world’s attention two years to the day before
Wednesday’s execution, a group of men stoned a woman to death in the
southern al-Shabab bastion of Kismayo after an Islamic court found her
guilty of adultery.
Al-Shabab have in recent years repeatedly executed men accused of spying
or murder and chopped off the hands of thieves.
The group – formerly the youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union, of which
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the current Somali president, was a top political
leader – controls three-quarters of Somalia.
It has been fighting to topple Somalia’s government and the African Union
force that protects the administration.
Somalia has had no effective government for 19 years and Western nations
and neighbours say the country is used as a shelter by fighters planning attacks
in East Africa and further afield.
SOURCE : NEWS AGENCIES
Annex 137
Annex 138
“Suspected al Shabaab militants behead four in Kenya’s Lamu county: official”,
Reuters, 6 September 2017
EMERGING MARKETS
SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 / 11:41 AM / UPDATED 3 YEARS AGO
Suspected al Shabaab militants behead four in Kenya's Lamu
County: official
By Joseph Akwiri
MOMBASA, Kenya (Reuters) - Suspected militants from the Somali group al Shabaab
beheaded four men in two different attacks in Lamu County on Kenya’s north coast on
Wednesday, authorities said, a month after 12 people were killed in similar incidents in the
region.
Lamu County Commissioner Gilbert Kitiyo said the attacks took place in Silini-Mashambani
early on Wednesday where three were killed, while in a separate incident in Bobo village one
person was killed.
Kitiyo said about 30 heavily-armed assailants went from house-to-house calling out victims
by name before pulling some out and slitting their throats.
“They were dressed in military gear and had AK-47 rifles. They beheaded four men before
fleeing into the forest. All the victims are men. Police have already arrived at the scene and
taken the bodies to the mortuary,” Kitiyo told Reuters by telephone.
He said the attackers surrounded all the victims’ houses making it difficult for them to
escape.
Abdiasis Abu Musab, al Shabaab’s spokesman for military operations, said the group was
behind the attack, and put the number of those killed at five, saying it had targeted non-
Muslims.
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Annex 138
In August, al Shabaab attackers killed four men in a similar manner while earlier in July, nine
men were slaughtered the same way in nearby villages.
After the latest attacks, protesters burned tyres on the roads on Wednesday morning in
complaint over insecurity. Riot police to fire teargas and rubber bullets to disperse them.
A government-imposed dusk-to-dawn curfew is in force in the area following past attacks.
The al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab aims to topple Somalia’s United Nations-backed government
and impose its own strict interpretation of Islam. They have intensified attacks in Kenya
since it sent troops into Somalia in 2011.
They have also claimed responsibility for a series of cross-border attacks in recent months,
including a spate of roadside bombings targeting security forces.
Editing by George Obulutsa and Toby Chopra
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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Annex 138
Annex 139
“Inside Kenya shopping mall, a house of horrors”, USA Today News, 27 September 2013
GARY STRAUSS USA TODAY
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Annex 139
Annex 140
“At al Shabaab’s mercy: woman narrates gang rapes, drug abuse at camps”, The Star,
23 November 2017
At al Shabaab's mercy: Woman narrates gang rapes, drug abuse at camps
by STAR REPORTER, @TheStarKenya
News
23 November 2017 - 15:00
Annex 140
Some of the items security agents found when they raided an al Shabaab hideout inside Boni Forest in Lamu, September 18, 2017. /COURTESY
Fauzia (not her real name), 25, looks aged beyond her years, probably from what she has had to endure in the last ve years.
At 16 years, she was already married with two children.
By her 18th birthday, Fauzia was already separated from her husband and needed to provide for her children.
Born in Majengo, Nairobi, Fauzia was forced to drop out of school after class eight as her parents were not able to cater for any
further education for her and her nine siblings.
She opted to wash clothes and do other household chores to earn a living.
After separating from her husband, it was harder to make ends meet and it is here that her maternal cousin from Lamu
convinced her to join al Shabaab where she would make money as an informant - the role generally prescribed for women
militants.
The promise of employment and source of income to maintain her and her children threw all reason out and Fauzia agreed to
join her cousin in Lamu, leaving her sons under the care of her mother.
Annex 140
Her cousin, who she referred to as just 'Dogo', took her to Boni Forest, a known al Shabaab hideout before she travelled by sea
to Somalia.
At the camp, Fauzia's duties were far from what Dogo had told her they would be.
In a glum tone, she describes her despondent life at the camp, that of daily abuse and mental torture,
"I was basically a prisoner, repeatedly sexually abused by up to six men at a time. Often we [all the women] were forced to use
drugs by al Shabaab, especially Bugizi. (Bugizi is a combination of heroin, marijuana and Rohypnol widely used by al Shabaab,
in combination with miraa).
She added: "If you were lucky, a commander would take you as a wife and that would stop other militants from raping you."
She noted it was obvious that only native Somalis became wives.
One of the items security agents found when they raided an al Shabaab hideout inside Boni Forest in Lamu, September 18, 2017.
/COURTESY
'Alcohol and drugs all night'
The women in the camp had to cook, wash clothes for the militants and undertake other household duties. Meanwhile, the
ghters frequently physically and sexually abused them. She recalls with tears how some militants would beat her if they did
not like something she cooked.
Unfortunately, this happened often for Fauzia as she was not familiar with cooking the injera that the militants liked to have
The sexual and physical violence was worse when the militants returned from engaging with the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM).
"They would drink and take drugs all day and night, whether to celebrate killing Somalia National Army and AMISOM soldiers
or mourn their own, and that’s when the gang rapes would take place."
Fauzia cannot count the number of times she was raped and forced to take contraceptives to avoid pregnancy. Rarely did the
rapist militants use condoms.
Other girls in the camp conceived but were usually given medication that would induce abortion. The girls that were 'married'
to the commanders were allowed to carry their pregnancies. Fauzia remembers that there were 15 children in the camp.
Her escape was facilitated by an older man who helped her on a day the captors went on a mission.
She says three friends she made at the camp were scared despite the fact that such missions took at least ve days.
Annex 140
After days of hiding in the bushes, she secured a series of lifts on boats bound for Kenya. On arrival, she found herself in the
hands of Kenya Security Forces who, after interrogations and medical check-ups, nally reunited her with her family.
One of the items security agents found when they raided an al Shabaab hideout inside Boni Forest in Lamu, September 18, 2017.
/COURTESY
Free but HIV+ and stigmatised
It has been a year since Fauzia's return. Sadly, she was found to be HIV positive during a medical examination. She is currently
on anti-retroviral drugs and is also being treated for tuberculosis.
Her poor health limits her ability to work. When she can, she continues to washing clothes. Since her return, her nancial
situation, a key driver behind her recruitment by al Shabaab in the rst place, remains as vague as ever.
Fauzia has been ostracised and stigmatised by her community. According to a government ocial in Nairobi, communities
often shun the wives, widows or children of men suspected to have been involved in terror activities. The same goes for women
recruited by al Shabaab.
The stigma Fauzia faces is made worse by the sexual abuse she endured. Muslim women who have had sex with men other than
their husbands - even if these relations are forced - are often shamed by their communities.
The psychological trauma Fauzia endured during her time with al Shabaab has been compounded further by the banishment
she has faced since her return.
Comprehensive counselling programmes are facilitated by the government for her and many other young women returnees
Fauzia is among other young girls and women who have been able to nd their way back to Kenya after being captives in al
Shabaab camps inside Somalia and Libya.
In August, three Kenyan girls - Firthoza AAhmed, Aisha Ashur and Tawqa Dahir - escaped from their captors in Libya and
made their way to Cairo in Egypt, where they sort help from the Kenyan embassy to be brought back home.
Fauzia’s account of events resonates with that of other female returnees interviewed earlier.
They all speak of sexual abuse by the militants and widespread abuse of drugs in the camps, drugs which female captives are
forced to take.
According to a Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit investigator, sexual violence against women is becoming common in al Shabaab
camps. They are recruited so ghters have sex with them and turn their focus from going back home.
Annex 140
Annex 11
J. Lind et al., “Tangled ties: Al-Shabaab and political volatility in Kenya”, Institute
of Development Studies, April 2015 (Extracts)
IDS EVIDENCE REPORT
No 130
Addressing and Mitigating Violence
Tangled Ties: Al-Shabaab and Political Volatility
in Kenya
Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom
April 2015
TANGLED TIES: AL-SHABAAB AND POLITICAL VOLATILITY IN KENYA
Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom
April 2015
This is an Open Access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are clearly credited.
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in April 2015
© Institute of Development Studies 2015
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338).
The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme
works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing
processes. This material has been developed under the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme.
The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not
necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies.
AG Level 2 Output ID: 74
1
Contents
Abbreviations 2
Acknowledgements 3
Executive summary 4
1 Introduction 6
2 Seeing like a state: review of Kenya’s relations with Somalia and its Somali
population 8
2.1 The North Eastern Province 8
2.2 Eastleigh 10
2.3 Ethnic Somali and Kenya’s politics 11
2.4 Devolution and local-national links 13
2.5 Summary 13
3 ‘Head in Eastleigh and tail in Somalia’: the threat of Al-Shabaab in Kenya 15
3.1 External stresses 15
3.2 Recent history of attacks 16
3.3 The home-grown threat 17
4 Security responses to the Al-Shabaab threat 22
4.1 Operation Linda Nchi 22
4.2 Operation Usalama Watch (and increased policing of Muslim communities) 25
4.3 Refugees: urban directive and policy of repatriation 29
4.4 Changes to security architecture and personnel 30
5 ‘Killing a mosquito with a hammer’… and other limitations of Kenya’s
security responses 33
6 Strengthening Kenya’s security 36
6.1 Redressing regional inequalities and historic marginalisation 36
6.2 Removing institutionalised discrimination of Kenya’s Somalis and Muslims 37
6.3 Mobilising political support for security sector and policing reforms 37
References 39
2
Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
ATPU Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit
CORD Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
DFA Department of Refugee Affairs
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICG International Crisis Group
ICU Islamic Courts Union
IPOA Independent Policing Oversight Authority
IPPG Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU Kenya African National Union
KDF Kenya Defence Forces
MP Member of Parliament
MRC Mombasa Republican Council
MYC Muslim Youth Centre
NAMLEF National Muslim Leaders Forum
NARC National Rainbow Coalition
NEP North Eastern Province
NFD Northern Frontier District
NIS National Intelligence Service
NSC National Security Council
ODM Orange Democratic Movement
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US United States
WDR World Development Report
3
Acknowledgements
A number of key informants offered their time to frankly and openly discuss the issues
covered in the report. We thank them for their contributions. We are also grateful for
comments received from participants who attended a seminar in November 2014 organised
with the Nairobi Forum and International Crisis Group, at which we presented the preliminary
findings of the study. Two anonymous reviewers offered substantial comments on an early
draft of the report; their comments and suggestions are gratefully acknowledged.
4
Executive summary
In recent years, a spate of attacks has destabilised a swathe of Kenya’s peripheral counties
as well as bringing terror to its capital, Nairobi. As violent insecurity spreads, it has fomented
fear and stoked ethnic and regional divisions, precipitating security crackdowns and roiling
the country’s infamously tumultuous politics. These developments belie sweeping
constitutional reforms that have taken place to address and prevent violence in Kenya. Since
Kenya stepped up its military involvement in Somalia in 2011, ostensibly to buffer the
country from violence wrought by Al-Shabaab – the Somalia-based jihadi organisation –
attacks have multiplied, ranging from the September 2013 siege of Nairobi’s Westgate
shopping centre, to village massacres, to the targeted killings of police and religious figures.
Yet Kenya’s government, while widening its military engagement in Somalia, was at first
slow to recognise and respond to the hand of Al-Shabaab in the country’s widening violent
insecurity since the start of its Somalia military operations.
This study adds to existing analyses of Kenya’s shifting political and security dynamics by
examining the role of external influences on its system of violence. Viewed from the
perspective of the state’s political and security establishments, Kenya’s peace and stability
are undermined by ‘external stresses’ from Somalia’s long-running state collapse and
conflict spillovers, as is evident from attacks attributed to Al-Shabaab as well as the
organisation’s business and recruiting activities in Kenya. This external stresses framework
has purchase in wider thinking on addressing and mitigating violence. The World
Development Report 2011 posits that the risk of conflict and violence arises from a range of
‘external stresses’ – including cross-border conflict spillovers, international terrorism and
criminal networks – interacting with ‘internal stresses’, such as low income levels, youth
unemployment, corruption and human rights abuses (World Bank 2011). Mitigating the
negative effects of external stresses requires, in the World Development Report’s analysis,
building ‘buffering institutions’ at the national level in the affected countries.
Since 2014, the Kenya Government has stepped up its security responses to the perceived
threat of Al-Shabaab. It has instigated police swoops in majority-Somali neighbourhoods,
tightened administrative controls of refugee populations, passed new security laws, and
given wide leeway to the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit, which some human rights observers
accuse of being involved in the extrajudicial killings of terror suspects. These responses
derive from a discourse and understanding that ‘sees’ outsiders, namely Somalis, as a
threat, both internally and with regard to conflict spillovers from Somalia. Rather than
adapting its security approach to an enemy with an advanced understanding of Kenya’s
political psychology and sociology, the state perpetuates an ‘others’ approach that treats
entire populations as somehow separate and threatening. However, far from strengthening
security, the centre’s security responses dovetail with an unseemly politicisation of
worsening violence, deepening entrenched ethnic and regional divides that structure and
frame Kenya’s system of violence.
The nature of Kenya’s security threat is, in fact, very different from how security agencies
seemingly conceptualise and respond to the problem. While Al-Shabaab remains one of the
greatest threats to regional stability and security, worsening violent insecurity in Kenya
suggests that the more important impact of the group has been to simply unmask the
country’s deep, structural divisions. Stirring anxiety and fear in Kenya is integral to how Al-
Shabaab seeks to advance its regional ambitions in the Horn of Africa. With minimal
resources, the organisation has crawled under the skin of Kenya’s domestic politics, deftly
picking at regional and ethnic divisions as well as exploiting the existence of longitudinal
continuities in how the centre relates toward the periphery. Deep-seated injustices and a
5
sense of marginalisation among Kenya’s many minority ethnic and religious groups have
provided fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to localise its jihad at Kenya’s margins. State security
responses that are seen to target Somalis and Muslims more widely play directly into Al-
Shabaab’s tactical approach to foment a violent insurgency at Kenya’s margins.
Patterns of violence in Kenya and calculations by Al-Shabaab bring into question the
adequacy of a paradigm that neatly separates between clearly distinguishable ‘internal’ and
‘external’ stresses. It is the entwining of the two, and their interconnectedness through
transnational actors and processes, that feeds into Kenya’s system of violence. While the
centre now recognises the interconnectedness between local and regional dynamics in
recent attacks, it has pursued a decidedly partisan and divisive approach that is likely to
generate further violence rather than strengthen security and stability.
The failings of the state’s security responses up to now can be seen through the centre’s
dogged adherence to a logic of externalising the threat. Nowhere is this clearer than in
Kenya’s continued military involvement in southern Somalia. Yet, withdrawing troops from
Somalia may not necessarily lead to fewer attacks, since Al-Shabaab has localised jihad
within Kenya. Rather, the security problem has morphed into one of needing to address
divisions within Kenya’s political and civil societies and regional imbalances in development.
The legitimate need to strengthen security, while providing support for state interventions
that are ostensibly for this purpose, contrasts with the counter-productive targeting of
Somalis and Muslims more generally, as well as security measures that impede a widerreaching
constitutional-based solution to worsening violence. Kenya’s security will only be
strengthened by the pursuit of interrelated political, governance and security reforms
addressing violence happening at the country’s margins and that have the greatest impacts
for its marginalised populations. The report concludes with the following recommendations
for macro-level political and policy actions:
Redressing regional inequalities and historic marginalisation by following the
moral intent of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution and sincerely implementing its provisions
to devolve powers and resources to new sub-national county governments
Removing institutionalised discrimination of Kenya’s Somalis and Muslims
through systematic reforms to un-do ‘hierarchies in citizenship’, thereby overcoming
the inherent limits of existing discrete counter-radicalisation efforts
Mobilising political support for security sector and policing reforms that aim to
reign-in abusive, predatory and corrupt practices as well as to promote accountability
to a citizenry in need of protection.
6
1 Introduction
Violence has often been close to Kenya’s politics and development. The post-election
violence following its disputed December 2007 general election results cast a light on
Kenya’s troubled internal divisions and worsening fragmentation along regional and ethnic
lines. The Kofi Annan-brokered agreement to end the violence, and subsequent
constitutional and legal reforms, sought to address and mitigate the threat of violence
happening in the future through devolution of power to new county-level administrations and
the more equitable distribution of public resources for development. Still, Kenya’s shaky
political settlement for the Rift Valley is steeped in deep political-ethnic divisions that
threaten renewed violence.
Elsewhere, in recent years, violence has flared in its peripheral northern counties including
Marsabit, Isiolo and Tana River, while sectarian tensions and unexplained attacks have
precipitated security crackdowns in Nairobi and Mombasa. These developments belie
sweeping reforms that have taken place to address and prevent violence in the country.
Scott-Villiers et al. (2014: 3) note that the adaptability of Kenya’s ‘system of violence’ is such
that ‘a positive change in reducing violence in one part of the system often seems to be
rapidly overwhelmed by the rule still operating undisturbed in other parts of the system’.
They explain that one reason why violence endures in Kenya is the very nature of its
kleptocratic politics, in which informal power extends outwards from elites at the centre
through a ‘rhizomatous’ network of administrators, police and security officials, criminal
bosses and other business interests at lower levels. Thus, far from being ‘settled’, violence
continues to shape governance structures and political relationships at multiple levels in
Kenya.
This study adds to existing analyses of Kenya’s politics and political settlement by examining
the role of external influences on its system of violence. While most studies dig deeply into
Kenya’s internal splits and the power of its informal networks to thwart the reforming power
of its domestic institutions, less is known about how these networks intersect with actors,
processes and flows that extend beyond its borders. Yet, the structuring of its social, political
and economic relations both at the centre and periphery, as well as the functioning of its
governance structures, depends in part on the power and wealth that different networks
accumulate through their many associations with these ‘external’ factors. For example,
Kenyan Somalis have been deeply involved in Somalia’s political society through clan
networks that span the Kenya-Somalia border, in turn affecting Somalia’s security and
events (Chau 2010). More than two decades of warfare and violence in Somalia, and
reconfigurations over time in the political economy of the conflict, have fed into Kenya’s
politics at the centre as well as periphery. Further, the presence of Somali refugees in Kenya
has also upturned politics in some parts of Kenya, particularly Mandera County in the
country’s north-east corner.
It follows that the strengthening of Kenya’s domestic institutions alone – either at the centre
or at new, devolved levels of governance – may not effectively address and mitigate a
situation of deeply entrenched, chronic violence. At a minimum, violence mitigation efforts in
Kenya must be cognisant of how its political rhizomes function through their connections with
actors, processes and flows at regional and global levels, as well as the ways in which these
ties both dampen and accentuate the propensity to violence in the system.
This report focuses on linkages between the regional conflict system centring on southern
Somalia and Kenya’s security and politics. It contributes to a growing number of works that
7
seek to understand the role of ‘external stresses’ in situations of violence and political
instability. The World Development Report 2011 (World Bank 2011) singles out a range of
‘external stresses’, including military invasion, external support for domestic rebels, crossborder
conflict spillovers, international terrorism and criminal networks, price shocks, and the
impacts of climate change. It posits that the risk of conflict and violence arises from these
stresses interacting with ‘internal stresses’ (low income levels, youth unemployment,
corruption, human rights abuses).
While spillovers from Somalia’s long conflict destabilise Kenya’s security and stability, the
enmeshing of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ stresses is, in fact, more complex than an external
stresses framing might suggest. Since Kenya stepped up its military involvement in Somalia
in 2011, ostensibly to buffer the country from attacks by the Somalia-based jihadi
organisation, Al-Shabaab, attacks have multiplied, ranging from the September 2013 siege
of Nairobi’s Westgate shopping centre, to village massacres, to the targeted killings of police
and religious figures. Kenya’s government, while widening its military engagement in
Somalia, was slow to recognise and respond to the hand of Al-Shabaab in the country’s
widening violent insecurity. However, since 2014, Kenya has stepped up security activities in
response to the threat of Al-Shabaab. It has instigated police swoops in majority-Somali
neighbourhoods, tightened administrative controls of refugee populations, passed new
security laws, and given wide leeway to the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU) that is
tasked with identifying and detaining terror suspects. These responses derive from a
discourse and understanding that ‘sees’ outsiders, namely Somalis and Muslims, as a threat,
both internally and with regard to conflict spillovers from Somalia. However, far from
strengthening security, these responses dovetail with an unseemly politicisation of
worsening violence, deepening entrenched ethnic and regional divides that structure and
frame Kenya’s system of violence.
Before considering patterns of recent violence and their associations with Al-Shabaab (in
Section 3), it is useful to review Kenya’s relations historically with Somalia and its Somali
population (Section 2). Section 4 details state security responses to the Al-Shabaab threat
and worsening violence, while Section 5 critically assesses the impacts of these within the
larger frame of Kenya’s divided politics. The report concludes with a number of reflections on
how to strengthen Kenya’s security (Section 6). While Al-Shabaab has succeeded in
fomenting fear within Kenya by skilfully picking at its political divisions, a way out of the
violence will need to redress the structures that perpetuate the country’s deep and widening
regional divisions.
15
3 ‘Head in Eastleigh and tail in Somalia’: the
threat of Al-Shabaab in Kenya
The social construction of Somalis as a threatening presence plays strongly into Nairobi’s
recent security assessments while justifying state responses to worsening violence. Viewed
from the perspective of Kenya’s political and security establishments, the country’s peace
and stability are undermined by ‘external stresses’ from Somalia’s long-running state
collapse and conflict spillovers, as is evident from attacks attributed to Al-Shabaab as well as
the group’s business and recruiting activities in Kenya. Announcing an imminent security
crackdown in Eastleigh in 2011 to flush out suspected Al-Shabaab members, then Assistant
Internal Security Minister Orwa Ojode remarked, ‘This is a big animal with its head in
Eastleigh, Nairobi and its tail in Somalia’ (Standard 2011). Strongly derided by Kenya’s
Somali leaders and politicians at the time, Ojode’s comments were widely publicised in
Kenya because they so transparently revealed the optic informing Nairobi’s approach to
reducing the spread of violent insecurity. This section examines more closely the logic
underlying Kenya’s security assessments, which have stayed remarkably unchanged over
the years. These are considered alongside examination of recent patterns of violence in the
country and problems of youth radicalisation.
3.1 External stresses
Protracted warfare and the breakdown of central state authority in Somalia is seen as a
significant destabilising ‘external stress’ on Kenya, and the cause of much of its recent
worsening violence. As described in Section 2, the construction of Somalis as an ‘outside’
threat to peace and stability has been a distinct characteristic of Kenya’s security thinking
over time. The ‘external stresses’ framework continues to function as a platform for
addressing violence in the country, as one of our respondents explained: ‘The Kenyan
government has been reluctant to say that the terror threat is home grown. Everyone wants
to externalise the problem’.13 Kenyan government officials have long ascribed attacks in the
country to a variety of outside forces rather than to radicalised domestic elements. Take, for
example, comments by John Sawe, Kenya’s former ambassador to Israel, following the
bombing in 2002 by militants of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and attempt to shoot down
an Israeli commercial plane: ‘There is no doubt in my mind that al-Qa’eda is behind this
attack, because we have no domestic problems, no terrorism in our country, and we have no
problem with our neighbours, no problem whatsoever’ (Botha 2014b: 3).
The ‘external stresses’ framework has purchase in wider thinking on addressing and
mitigating violence. As stated earlier, the World Development Report 2011 (World Bank
2011) explains that the risk of conflict and violence arises from the combination of interacting
‘external’ and ‘internal’ stresses. Mitigating the negative effects of external stresses requires,
in the World Development Report’s analysis, building ‘buffering institutions’ at the national
level in the affected countries – to enhance capabilities for coping with stress – and
enhancing cooperation with their regional neighbours: ‘Countries and subnational areas with
the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and
instability and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses’ (World Bank
2011: 7).
A weakness in this approach is its underlying premise that ‘internal’ and ‘external’ stresses
are somehow separate and distinct. However, Schultze-Kraft (2013: 8) shows that the issue
is not merely that internal and external stresses combine to generate stress but that they
13 Interview with Kenyan journalist, Nairobi, 2 July 2014.
16
‘actually relate to and reinforce one another, for they are interconnected through
transnational actors and processes’. Further, states are not only overwhelmed by these
transnational dynamics; rather, they actively shape these, as well: ‘powerful political and
military elites and their patronage-dependent constituencies are actively engaging in
processes of… globalisation, seeking to appropriate rents to maintain positions of power and
influence through patronage and clientelism’ (Schultze-Kraft 2014: 33). He shows that
interrelated internal, external and transnational actors drive these processes, which can
promote the interests of state and non-state groups both within and outside the country that
is thought to be stressed.
For example, Kenya’s military operation in southern Somalia under the auspices of the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), discussed below, has been dogged by reports
that it profits from the illicit trade in charcoal from Kismayo port in southern Somalia as well
as the trade in contraband sugar from Somalia into Kenya. Some speculate that Kenya’s
economic interests in becoming involved militarily in southern Somalia include buffering
Lamu on Kenya’s north coast, the locus of major infrastructural investment, to establish a
port facility and terminus for oil exports. It is also thought that Kenya seeks to strengthen its
claims over oil and gas deposits in a contested maritime zone off the coasts of Kenya and
Somalia (ICG 2012). Although conventional wisdom is that Kenya has been negatively
affected by spillovers from Somalia’s conflict, it has benefitted greatly through an influx of
Somali capital as well as the relocation of many of Somalia’s professional classes to Nairobi
and other large Kenyan cities, as well. Further, even before the latest episode of the conflict,
the economies of southern Somalia and Kenya were intricately bound through trades in
livestock, other agricultural products, charcoal and household goods – with significant
benefits of the trade accruing to Kenya-based wholesalers, retailers and transporters.
As detailed below, patterns of violence in Kenya bring into question the adequacy of the
World Development Report (WDR) paradigm that separates and distinguishes between
‘internal’ and ‘external’ stresses. It is the entwining of the two, and their interconnectedness
through transnational actors and processes, that feeds into Kenya’s system of violence.
3.2 Recent history of attacks
Insecurity has worsened appreciably as terrorist attacks have multiplied in recent years.
Interviews with a range of analysts, diplomatic and security officials, and human rights
advocates in June and July 2014 point to a deteriorating security situation growing out of
hand, an assessment underlined by the November 2014 massacres by Al-Shabaab in
Mandera:
The threat of Al-Shabaab in Kenya is real and worsening. Al-Shabaab were taken
back by the reaction to Westgate. It was four guys with guns and it hit the world
headlines for days… It gave them a huge profile and funding to launch more attacks
inside Kenya. They see there are holes in Kenya’s security apparatus and capability.
The context is one of huge and growing grievances in Coast, Nairobi and elsewhere.
They can train fighters in Somalia and launch attacks here. They can exploit these
tensions for their own gain.
(Interview with European security official, Nairobi, 30 June 2014)
I think we’ll see attacks here, attacks there. They [Al-Shabaab] want to keep the fear
up. They want to show that this government can’t control national security. But I think
there are Kenyan groups coming up who want to destabilise the state. So these
networks are working a bit more. I think when you have these high-profile killings of
Muslim clerics that it spreads discontent. It helps the groups to mobilise, whether it is
Al-Shabaab, splinter groups or sympathisers.
(Interview with human rights officials, Nairobi, 1 July 2014)
17
Terrorist violence in Kenya made international headlines when Al-Shabaab militants
attacked the upmarket Westgate shopping complex in Nairobi and killed 67 people. Yet,
even before the Westgate attack, dozens of attacks were recorded in cities, towns and
villages across Kenya, though mostly concentrated in north-eastern and coastal areas. For
example, in February 2009, suspected Al-Shabaab militias raided the Dadajabula police post
injuring scores of policemen and causing significant damage (The Star 2011a). In 2010,
militants struck a General Service Unit camp at Liboi injuring several paramilitary officers
(ibid.). In July 2011, Al-Shabaab planted mines and other explosive devices in Mandera town
targeting police and military personnel (ibid.). A spate of abductions of tourists and aid
workers in September and October 2011 precipitated Kenya’s military incursion into
southern Somalia, Operation Linda Nchi (or ‘Protect the Country’), as discussed in Section 4.
Although ostensibly launched to enhance domestic security, the scope, scale and audacity
of Al-Shabaab attacks have worsened since the Operation Linda Nchi invasion in 2011.
According to Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU), over 133 attacks occurred
between October 2011 and July 2014, killing 264 and injuring 923 (Standard 2014a). Attacks
have multiplied across the country, from bombed markets in Nairobi’s working class
neighbourhood of Gikomba, to exploding matatus [public minibuses] on the city’s Thika
superhighway, to village massacres. Since the Westgate siege, a series of larger attacks
and evidence of planned attacks attest to the expanding operational capabilities of militant
organisations.
In March 2014, a massive device made up of 130lb of explosives welded onto a vehicle’s
rear seats, enough to collapse a multi-storey building, was found in an impounded Toyota at
a Mombasa police compound after being discovered by foreign intelligence officials (Daily
Telegraph 2014). Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the June 2014 massacre in
Mpeketoni in Lamu County that left 60 dead. Weeks later, new raids on 5 July in Lamu and
Tana River Counties left over 20 dead. As before with the Mpeketoni attack, a heavily armed
group came during the night, striking the local police station, torching homes and
businesses, while targeting men on a killing spree that was rumoured to last for hours.
While Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for several attacks, the perpetrators of many of
these attacks are unknown. This includes the number of the Westgate attackers, which is
still unclear. Observers note that responsibility for the attacks can be divided between those
directed by Al-Shabaab’s command structure in Somalia, by terrorist cells in Kenya, and by
criminal organisations intent on exploiting the situation of insecurity in pursuit of political and
business agendas (Boru Halakhe 2014). Some respondents differentiated between
Al-Shabaab and extremists of various stripes who deploy the organisation’s violent tactics in
pursuit of a range of aims:
The Al-Shabaab threat level is high but this is mostly from Al-Shabaab sympathisers.
They are taking advantage of the current insecurity to cause mayhem… Note that I
call them sympathisers and not Al-Shabaab because I think they do not believe in the
ideology, only in the tactics they use.
(Interview with Kenyan government official, Nairobi, 7 July 2014)
The incidence of copy-cat attacks or vendetta veiled by other violence is an important
development that points to the enmeshing of Al-Shabaab with local politics. As explained
further below, the greatest threat from Al-Shabaab for Nairobi is how it entwines with and
provides a vehicle for Kenya’s own dissident actors.
3.3 The home-grown threat
What began as low-profile grenade attacks on common citizens and then assassinations
targeting police, religious and business figures, has morphed into a far more threatening
18
pattern of insecurity that is destabilising a wide area of Kenya’s north-eastern and coastal
counties. The trend of worsening attacks indicates an escalating campaign of violence
whose ultimate goals are unclear. Further, this violence is increasingly entwined with
Kenya’s deepening regional and ethnic divisions, throwing into question the effectiveness of
a strategy to contain ‘external stresses’ as a way of strengthening security. Security and
political analysts in Nairobi shared the following:
Kenya tells us, ‘fix Somalis and then you’ll fix our problems, get rid of Somali
refugees and you’ll fix our problems. We’ve gone into Somalia to do just that’. That
makes them deaf to growing internal dynamics. You could completely seal the border
and still have a significant threat in Kenya.
(Interview with European security official, Nairobi, 30 June 2014)
There are many reasons why insecurity has suddenly got much worse in Coast and
north-east province, but these have nothing to do with Somalia, but rather are to do
with contradictory internal policies in Kenya.
(Interview with political analysts, Nairobi, 3 July 2014)
As these quotes show, the situation in Somalia is marginal relative to other more important
drivers of violence in Kenya. These concern its domestic policies, politics and practices,
particularly as they relate to uneven development patterns and the treatment of Kenya’s
Muslim populations.
The appeal of extremism among young people is a significant threat to Kenya’s peace and
stability. While radicalisation is not a new phenomenon in Kenya, the challenge is widening
in a context of a resurgent Al-Shabaab that is actively cultivating associations with Kenyan
groups and individuals as part of its regional strategy. Al-Shabaab’s recruitment in Kenya
can be traced back to the group’s beginnings in 2006 following the demise of the Islamic
Courts Union, which briefly governed parts of southern Somalia before being removed from
power by United States-backed Ethiopian forces.14 The 2010 United Nations (UN) Monitoring
Group on Somalia report singles out the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) at Pumwani Riyadha
Mosque in Nairobi as a recruitment and training centre for would-be Al-Shabaab fighters (UN
2010). One of the MYC officials named in the UN report was picked to head Al-Shabaab’s
Kenya operations (Standard 2012a). The MYC later emerged as Al Hijra in 2012. It has
mobilised over 700 followers to fight in Somalia (Findlay 2014). Activist Salafi-jihadi clerics
have used websites and social media to spread their ideology among the Muslim faithful.
The magazine Gaidi Mtaani as well as videos such as ‘Mujahideen Moments’ feature
Swahili-speaking Kenyan militants who emphasise themes such as the humiliation suffered
by Muslims in Kenya, Christian ‘occupation’ of coastal land, revenge for the killing of
prominent preachers, and the liberating potential of violence (Prestholdt 2014). Kenyan and
foreign intelligence services have alleged associations between Salafi-jihadi clerics and
Al-Shabaab. Since 2012, a ‘“dirty-war” of tit-for-tat killings’ has escalated in the coastal
counties of Mombasa and Kilifi, but also in Nairobi (ICG 2014: 10), implicating Kenyan
security agencies in murderous, covert counter-terrorism operations, as explored below.
The June 2014 massacre in Mpeketoni in coastal Lamu County epitomises the evolving
dynamic of Kenya’s violent insecurity. Survivors and witnesses described the attackers as
being a mix of Somalis, Arabs, English-speaking and local (Mijikenda) people. Many of the
attackers spoke Kiswahili, with one local resident telling a Kenyan reporter: ‘These people
knew people by their names’ (Standard 2014b). Al-Shabaab is actively cultivating non-
Somali recruits as it expands its regional strategy in the Horn of Africa. Suspects in several
past attacks were from various parts of Kenya, including the central and western highlands.
For example, a July 2014 report of Kenya’s National Intelligence Service copied to all police
14 Interview with Kenyan Muslim leader, Nairobi, 4 July 2014.
19
stations in coastal counties identified Idris Kamau, a Kenyan of Kikuyu ethnicity, as the
mastermind of the spate of terror attacks in Lamu and Tana River Counties in June and July
(Standard 2014c). A report into the Westgate attack tabled by a Joint Parliamentary
Committee reported:
Certain segments of Kenya’s Muslim youth are becoming more and more at a risk of
radicalization and recruitment into extremist groups for various reasons. This is
visible because it is not Somali nationals behind most of the terrorist incidents
outside Somalia’s borders but Kenyan nationals. Though Somalia provides a safe
haven, training camps and opportunities for extremists to fight the ‘enemies of Islam’,
al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have executed attacks in the region by relying on Kenyan
youth assistance and support. The Government should therefore strive for strategies
that address the youth radicalization.
(Government of Kenya 2013b: 16)
While awareness is growing of the need to address the problem of young people being
drawn to extremist organisations, policy discussions tend to reify ‘radicalisation’, when in fact
it is a compound phenomenon with many disparate antecedents (Botha 2014a). Ideology is
part of the radicalisation story in Kenya. Observers trace the radicalisation of Kenya’s young
Muslims in part to the deepening influence of Wahabism, an orientation of Salafism that
informs much of the core theological outlook of jihadi groups such as Al Qaeda and Al-
Shabaab (ICG 2014: 8). Wahabi influences can be traced back to the 1970s but really took
root in Kenya throughout the 1990s through the work of Saudi-funded charitable
organisations such as al-Haramain and the Young Muslim Association, who laid a
foundational network of madrassas [Islamic religious schools] and orphanages in northern
Kenya and the Coast. Many madrassa graduates received scholarships to study in Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan, among other places, and they returned to Kenya where they set up
other madrassas and charities (ibid.). Matters came to a turn in 2006, when many madrassa
teachers and students travelled to Somalia to fight alongside the Islamic Courts Union.
Yet, more than ideology, our respondents emphasised uneven socioeconomic development
and historic marginalisation of some parts of Kenya, as significant drivers of radicalisation,
as the following quotes highlight:
In the past you had a few Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, such as grenade attacks.
Now it is tying into local grievances much more, organising more sophisticated
attacks and targeting upcountry people. It realises you can both mobilise support
locally by conducting those type of attacks using those types of grievances but you
do it by hitting people close to government [Kikuyu people] and in Lamu [hit tourism].
(Interview with political scientist, Nairobi, 10 July 2014)
Al-Shabaab thrives on vulnerable people. The Coast has been marginalised for some
time. In Coast, there are resources, but they have a marginalised population. So it is
ripe for Al-Shabaab to infiltrate and thrive on those factors. In Lamu there are
historical injustices. Mzee Kenyatta created an avenue for his own people to displace
the indigenous in Lamu. During the Kibaki era, the Kikuyu got an upper hand. They
got access to financial institutions and infrastructure. This has created a huge
division… With Al-Shabaab now coming across the border, and the injustices present
at the Coast, the resources that are available, people want a hand. Al-Shabaab is
recruiting off of Swahili land grievances, it is arming them, giving them an ideology
that ‘your land has been taken away’.
(Interview with Kenyan-Somali professional, Nairobi, 9 July 2014)
20
I think 50 per cent of attacks are carried out by local jihadi groups in northern Kenya
and the Coast. Al-Shabaab is basically instrumentalising grievances. Its work is much
easier, it realises. It doesn’t even need to use its own resources. This is a very
conducive territory for them to operate – to seek shelter, hide, and find individuals
who sympathise with their aim of destabilising the state.
(Interview with Kenyan journalist, Nairobi, 2 July 2014)
These views dovetail with the findings of recent research by Botha (2014a, 2014b) and ICG
(2014), as well as Anderson and McKnight (2014). They argue:
Al-Shabaab is likely to exploit the deeply rooted disaffection amongst the peoples of
the Kenya coast and north-east in gaining recruits to its banner. These affiliates may
only see Al-Shabaab’s black standard as a temporary flag of convenience, but that
may be enough to incubate and evolve an Al-Shabaab-led insurgency within Kenya.
(Anderson and McKnight 2014: 3)
Al-Shabaab’s skilful manipulation of historic injustices and socioeconomic inequities as well
as the treatment of minority groups mirrors the group’s political strategy in southern Somalia,
as our respondents explained:
Al-Shabaab has been able to persist in Somalia by manipulating clan tensions and
differences. That is how it is still there. It has become part of local reconciliation
dialogue because it plays on those tensions, and assists those groups who are
having problems. The tradeoff is that they support Al-Shabaab and provide new
recruits. So if it is true [that Al-Shabaab is playing off local grievances in Kenya], this
would mirror how the group operates in Somalia.
(Interview with human rights officials, Nairobi, 1 July 2014)
They want to exploit local grievances and show they are fighting with them [local
communities]. They did the same thing in Somalia. They said everyone is equal,
there is no majority or minority community. They said everyone is equal, that is what
our religion says. That is how people began to accept them... If it comes to the issue
of appointment to political offices, Al-Shabaab tries to take a mix from all groups, so
even those who were excluded can hold office. That is how they thrived and
expanded.
(Interview with Kenyan-Somali professional, Nairobi, 9 July 2014)
Al-Shabaab have used minority clans in Somalia and given them a voice. I wouldn’t
be surprised if they do this in northern Kenya.
(Interview with European donor agency official, Nairobi, 30 June 2014)
That far more complex dynamics are at play in recent violence than infiltration by
Al-Shabaab operatives came to the fore during the June and July 2014 attacks in Lamu and
Tana River Counties. Claiming responsibility for the first attack in Mpeketoni, Al-Shabaab
proved deft at weaving together local grievances as well as regional cleavages. A statement
explained why the insurgents raided Mpeketoni (a settlement scheme established in the
1960s for Gikuyu from the central highlands) – because ‘it was originally a Muslim town
before it was invaded and occupied by Christian settlers’ (Analo 2014), adding that the
attack was ‘revenge for the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia and the killing of Muslims’
(BBC News 2014a).
Weeks later, new raids on 5 July on the settlements of Hindi in Lamu and Gamba in Tana
River left over 20 dead. Less than a day after the raids, Deputy Inspector General of the
Police, Grace Kaindi, claimed in a press briefing that the outlawed Mombasa Republican
Council (MRC) was behind the attacks. This was despite a broadcast on an Al-Shabaab-
21
affiliated radio station which stated that it was responsible for the Hindi attack (no group
immediately came forward to claim responsibility for the Gamba attack). Explaining the
police thinking, Kaindi revealed that a board was placed at a road junction, with the following
message scrawled in chalk:
Raila Tosha (Raila is enough, the one who should lead)
MRC munalala (MRC is sleeping)
Waislamu Ardizenu (Muslims, it’s your land)
Sina nyakuliwa (Your land is being taken away)
Amkeni mupigane (Wake up and fight)
you invade Muslim county
and you want to stay in peace
Kick Christians out Coast
Uhuru down
The attacks in Lamu and Tana River – more than retribution for Kenya’s military operation in
southern Somalia – exposed Al-Shabaab’s efforts to square long-standing marginalisation
and historic injustices in Kenya’s coastal areas with the organisation’s regional jihadist
agenda. They revealed the ease with which Al-Shabaab could exploit simmering sectarian
divisions and local political disputes through providing arms, other tactical support, salaries
for fighters, as well as an ideological edifice on which to hang deeply held grievances.
Mounting evidence of an enmeshing of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ stresses raises the need for
more methodical and careful intelligence gathering. It also calls for a strategic rethink and
different methods to address and mitigate violence, as explored in the following sections.
39
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Scott-Villiers, P.; Ondicho, T.; Lubaale, G.; Ndung’u, D.; Kabala, N. and Oosterom, M. (2014)
Roots and Routes of Political Violence in Kenya’s Civil and Political Society: a Case Study of
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30 August
___ (2014b) ‘Kenyan Converts Return to Take Charge of Jihadist Killings’, 19 July
___ (2014c) ‘Police Unveil Names Behind Coast Killings’, 12 July
___ (2014d) ‘Why the Opposition Wants an Exit Strategy from Somalia’, 19 July
___ (2014e) ‘Uhuru Kenyatta: KDF will Stay in Somalia Until Job is Done’, 23 June
___ (2014f) ‘Joseph Ole Lenku and David Kimaiyo Put Brave Face, Vow to Nab Militiamen’,
23 November
___ (2014g) ‘Mombasa County Commissioner Nelson Marwa Accuses ODM Party to be
Behind Likoni Killings’, 26 July
___ (2012a) ‘Kenyan Takes Charge of Local Al-Shabaab wing’, Standard, 17 January
___ (2012b) ‘KDF Winds Up Operation Linda Nchi’, 17 March
___ (2011) ‘Minister says Eastleigh the Next Target in the Hunt for Al-Shabaab Militants’,
20 October
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http://allafrica.com/stories/201410130482.html (accessed 11 March 2015)
___ (2014b) ‘Illegal Visitors Still Held 4 Months Later’, 11 August
___ (2014c) ‘It’s Economic Sabotage, Claim Somalis’, 12 April
___ (2011a) ‘War with Al Shabaab and Kenya’s Jumbled Nationalism’, 22 October
___ (2011b) ‘Security Alert at Kenya’s Border Points, Says Saitoti’, 10 October
Sunday Nation (2014) ‘How Poverty and Search for Identity Drive Youth into Terrorism’,
10 August
Sunday Vision (2010) ‘Al-shabaab Warn of Fresh Terror Attacks’, 10 November
TJRC (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission) (2013) ‘Report of the Presidential
Special Action Committee to Address Specific Concerns of the Muslim Community in Regard
to Alleged Harassment and/or Discrimination in the Application/Enforcement of the Law’,
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Nairobi: TJRC, http://nisisikenya.com/wpcontent/
uploads/2013/06/TJRC_report_Volume_2C.pdf (accessed 31 March 2015)
45
UN (2014) Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council
Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), 13 October,
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726 (accessed 11 March 2015)
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Resolution 1853 (2008), 10 March, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91
(accessed 11 March 2015)
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High Commissioner for Refugees
Warah, R. (2014) ‘Eastleigh Crackdown Offers Major Opportunity for Bribe-taking and
Harassment by Police’, Sahan Journal, 16 April
World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development,
Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank
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the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa, Washington DC: World
Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16196 (accessed 11 March 2015)
Yusuf, M. (2014) ‘Prominent Muslim Cleric Killed in Kenya’, Voice of America News,
10 June, www.voanews.com/content/prominent-muslim-cleric-killed-in-kenya-/193333…
(accessed 12 March 2015)
Annex 142
“Extremists attack Kenya military base, 3 Americans killed”, AP News, 5 January 2020
NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) — Al-Shabab extremists overran a key military base used by U.S.
counterterror forces in Kenya before dawn Sunday, killing three American Department of
Defense personnel and destroying several U.S. aircraft and vehicles before they were
repelled, U.S. and Kenyan authorities said.
The attack on the Manda Bay Airfield was the al-Qaida-linked group’s first attack against
U.S. forces in the East African country, and the military called the security situation
“fluid” several hours after the assault.
Five attackers were killed, Kenyan military spokesman Paul Njuguna said.
Al-Shabab, based in neighboring Somalia, claimed responsibility for the assault.
One U.S. serviceman and two contractors with the U.S. Department of Defense were
killed in the fighting, according to a statement issued late Sunday by the U.S. Africa
Command, or Africom.
The attack on the compound “involved indirect and small arms fire. After an initial
penetration of the perimeter, Kenya Defense Forces and U.S. Africa Command repelled
the al-Shabaab attack,” said the AFRICOM statement. “Reports indicate that six
contractor-operated civilian aircraft were damaged to some degree. Manda Bay Airfield is
utilized by U.S. forces whose missions include providing training to our African partners,
responding to crises, and protecting U.S. interests in this strategically important area.”
Al-Shabab claimed that there were 17 U.S. casualties, nine Kenyan soldiers killed and
seven aircraft destroyed. The U.S. Africa Command dismissed the al-Shabab claims as
exaggerated and said U.S. and Kenyan forces repelled the attack.
Kenya is a key base for fighting al-Shabab, one of the world’s most resilient extremist
organizations. A large plume of black smoke rose above the airfield Sunday and residents
said a car bomb had exploded. Lamu county commissioner Irungu Macharia told The
Associated Press that five suspects were arrested and were being interrogated.
An internal Kenyan police report seen by the AP said two fixed-wing aircraft, a U.S.
Cessna and a Kenyan one, were destroyed along with two U.S. helicopters and multiple
U.S. vehicles at the military airstrip. The report said explosions were heard at around 5:30
a.m. from the direction of the airstrip.
The Kenya Civil Aviation Authority said the airstrip was closed for all operations.
The military’s Camp Simba in Lamu county, established more than a decade ago, has
under 100 U.S. personnel, according to Pentagon figures. U.S. forces at the adjoining
Manda Bay airfield train and give counterterror support to East African partners. A U.S.
flag-raising at the camp in August signaled its change “from tactical to enduring
operations,” the Air Force said at the time.
According to another internal Kenyan police report seen by the AP, dated Friday, a
villager that day said he had spotted 11 suspected al-Shabab members entering Lamu’s
Boni forest, which the extremists have used as a hideout. The report said Kenyan
authorities didn’t find them.
Al-Shabab has launched a number of attacks inside Kenya, including against civilian
buses, schools and shopping malls. The group has been the target of a growing number of
U.S. airstrikes inside Somalia during President Donald Trump’s administration.
The latest attack comes just over a week after an al-Shabab truck bomb in Somalia’s
capital killed at least 79 people and U.S. airstrikes killed seven al-Shabab fighters in
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Annex 142
U.S. airstrikes inside Somalia during President Donald Trump’s administration.
The latest attack comes just over a week after an al-Shabab truck bomb in Somalia’s
capital killed at least 79 people and U.S. airstrikes killed seven al-Shabab fighters in
response.
Last year, al-Shabab attacked a U.S. military base inside Somalia, Baledogle, that is used
to launch drone strikes but reportedly failed to make their way inside. The extremist
group also has carried out multiple attacks against Kenyan troops in the past in
retaliation for Kenya sending troops to Somalia to fight it.
This attack marks a significant escalation of al-Shabab’s campaign of attacks inside
Kenya, said analyst Andrew Franklin, a former U.S. Marine and longtime Kenya resident.
“Launching a deliberate assault of this type against a well-defended permanent base
occupied by (Kenya Defence Forces), contractors and U.S. military personnel required a
great deal of planning, rehearsals, logistics and operational capability,” he said. Previous
attacks against security forces have mainly been ambushes on Kenyan army or police
patrols.
The Sunday attack came days after a U.S. airstrike killed Iran’s top military commander
and Iran vowed retaliation, but al-Shabab is a Sunni Muslim group and there is no sign of
links to Shiite Iran or proxies.
“No, this attack was no way related to that incident” in the Middle East, an al-Shabab
spokesman told the AP on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
One analyst, Rashid Abdi, in Twitter posts discussing the attack, agreed, but added that
Kenyan security services have long been worried that Iran was trying to cultivate ties
with al-Shabab.
“Avowedly Wahhabist Al-Shabaab not natural ally of Shia Iran, hostile, even. But if
Kenyan claims true, AS attack may have been well-timed to signal to Iran it is open for
tactical alliances,” he wrote.
But a former member of the U.N. committee monitoring sanctions on Somalia, Jay
Bahadur, said in a tweet that “the attack is far more related to AS wanting a do over on
their spectacular failure at Baledogle four months ago.”
When asked whether the U.S. military was looking into any Iranian link to the attack, U.S.
Africa Command spokesman Col. Christopher Karns said only that “al-Shabab, affiliated
with al-Qaida, has their own agenda and have made clear their desire to attack U.S.
interests.”
The al-Shabab claim of responsibility said Sunday’s attack was part of its “Jerusalem will
never be Judaized” campaign, a rarely made reference that also was used after al-
Shabab’s deadly attack on a luxury mall complex in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, in January
2019.
Somalia’s government, which is fighting al-Shabab with the help of a multinational
African force, The Federal Republic of Somalia joins the rest of the world in condemning
the cowardly attack that targeted joint Kenyan and U.S forces based at Manda Bay
Airfield, Kenya earlier today.
___
Anna contributed from Johannesburg
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Annex 142
Annex 143
“3 Americans die in Shabab attack on Kenyan base”, The New York Times, 5 January 2020
https://nyti.ms/2SXbx6j
3 Americans Die in Shabab Attack on Kenyan Base
A service member and two contractors became the first American military-related deaths in Africa since 2018.
By Eric Schmitt and Thomas Gibbons-Neff
Jan. 5, 2020
WASHINGTON — A United States service member and two American military contractors died on Sunday in an
attack on a Kenyan military base that the Pentagon said was carried out by the Islamic extremist group the Shabab.
The attack at the military airstrip at Manda Bay, Kenya, early Sunday involved small-arms and other hostile fire,
according to a statement by the military’s Africa Command. Fighters from the Shabab, an East African terrorist
group affiliated with Al Qaeda, fought their way onto the base before Kenyan and American troops drove them back.
In the past several years, Manda Bay was used by Army Green Berets as an outstation where they both trained
Kenyan Rangers — who had their own training center there — and supervised them as they crossed over the border
into neighboring Somalia to fight the Shabab.
But recently, the Green Berets were replaced with units from both the Navy SEALs and Marine Special Operations
teams. According to military officials, the base has been problematic at best, with cross-border operations rarely
going ahead as planned, prompting American officials to consider ending their use of parts of the base altogether.
The deaths of the three Americans, whose identities were not made public pending notification of their families, were
the first United States military-related deaths in Africa since an Army Special Forces soldier, Staff Sgt. Alex Conrad,
died from wounds he received during a firefight with Shabab fighters in June 2018, at a small outpost near the town of
Jamaame, Somalia, about 200 miles southwest of Mogadishu, the capital.
The attack in Kenya comes about a week after an explosives-laden truck blew up at a busy intersection in
Mogadishu, killing at least 79 people, the latest sign of resurgent militant activity in a country plagued by an
enduring strain of violent extremism. Authorities believe that attack was also carried out by Shabab fighters.
American military officials said they assessed that the attack in Kenya was not related to soaring tensions between
the United States and Iran after an American drone strike last week that killed Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, one of
Iran’s top generals.
In Kenya, about 200 American soldiers, airmen, sailors and Marines, as well as about 100 Pentagon civilian
employees and contractors, are helping train and assist Kenyan forces, who are battling local cells of the Shabab.
American officials said that local Shabab fighters most likely carried out the attack on Sunday.
The Africa Command’s statement said that six contractor-operated civilian aircraft were damaged, but The
Associated Press, citing an internal Kenyan police report, said the damage was much more extensive, including two
American helicopters and multiple American vehicles at the airstrip. An American official said five Shabab fighters
were killed in the early-morning firefight.
“We will pursue those responsible for this attack and al-Shabab, who seeks to harm Americans and U.S. interests,”
Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, the head of the Africa Command, said in the statement. “We remain committed to
preventing al-Shabab from maintaining a safe haven to plan deadly attacks against the U.S. homeland, East African
and international partners.”
The Pentagon is weighing whether to sharply reduce or pull out several hundred American troops stationed in West
Africa as the first phase of a global reshuffling of United States forces. But Defense Department officials said it was
less likely that troops would be withdrawn from Somalia because — as the recent attacks by Shabab fighters
gruesomely underscore — security in the country remains fraught.
Annex 143
General Townsend is scheduled to testify to Congress later this month during annual hearings for each of the
Pentagon’s worldwide commands. He is expected to face tough questioning from lawmakers about the Pentagon’s
planning for the continent.
The Pentagon carried out 63 drone strikes in Somalia last year — almost all against Shabab militants, with a few
against a branch of the Islamic State. That compares with 47 strikes against the Shabab in 2018.
Annex 143
Annex 1
“Piracy and armed robbery against ships – report for the period 1 January – 31 December
2019”, ICC International Maritime Bureau, January 2020 (Extracts)
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
WARNING
The information contained in this document is for the internal use of the recipient only.
Unauthorised distribution of this document, and/or publication (including publication on a
Web site) by any means whatsoever is an infringement of the Bureau’s copyright.
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
inter
alia
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Definition of Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed-
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Armed robbery against ships” means any of the following acts:
.1 any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an
act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property
on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
.2 any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
OFF SOMALIA / GULF OF ADEN / RED SEA ATTACK FIGURES UPDATE
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY PRONE AREAS AND WARNINGS
All ships are advised to report all attacks and suspicious sightings to local Authorities, flag
state and to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre as per IMO Cir 1334.
Mariners are warned to be extra cautious and to take necessary precautionary measures when
transiting the following areas:
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Reporting of incidents
IMB Maritime Security Hotline
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
TRENDS
Annex 144
ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – 2019 Annual Report
Annex 144
A nnex 144
A nnex 144
Annex 1
K. Scott, “Prosecuting pirates: lessons learned and continuing challenges”, Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2014 (Extracts)
P E AC E T H ROUGH G OV E R NA NC E
F U T U R E
one earth
a Research Report by
Kenneth Scott
:
Kenneth Scott: Lecturer and consultant on international humanitarian
the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
January 1998 - September 2011; Assistant U.S. Attorney and Chief, Complex
Prosecutions Section, U.S. Department of Justice (1985-1997); J.D., cum
laude, Harvard Law School. At the ICTY, the author led teams of international
lawyers, investigators, military analysts, historians and others in successfully
investigating and litigating cases involving thirteen major war criminals,
including top political and military leaders. He also served for many years on
the Tribunal’s Committee on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, helping
shape the Tribunal’s litigation process and evidentiary rules.
The author thanks the One Earth Future Foundation and Oceans Beyond
Piracy, and in particular Jon Huggins and Jon Bellish, for their assistance and
support in preparing this paper.
Cover Images (Clockwise from top): “Somali Pirate Chief Mohammed Abdi Hassan” by Tony Karumba, Getty
Images; “VBSS team from USS Anzio” by Bryan Weyrs, US Navy - Flickr, CC BY 2.0; “Hargesia Prison” by Jim
Gray, Oceans Beyond Piracy
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The complete list of One Earth Future publications is available at oneearthfuture.org.
For more information on Oceans Beyond Piracy: oceansbeyondpiracy.org
i
Oceans Beyond Piracy is pleased to share with you this extensively researched report on prosecuting pirates
by Ken Scott, a top national and international prosecutor. We are particularly happy to present the report
to those of you who provided valuable information and insights during the many interviews with Ken over
the past months. Since most of the interviews and research were completed late last year, we wanted to note
several continuing developments:
Concerning the continuing important work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS):
group’s work will continue, but as a virtual forum of legal experts that will continue to support and
report to the Plenary. The forum can also meet on an ad-hoc basis, if and when needed.
concentrate law enforcement expertise in a dedicated, autonomous Task Force within this group.
UNODC has continued its vital work in assisting various prosecution efforts and building incarceration and
other capacity. UNODC recently completed and handed over operations of the new 500-bed Garowe Prison
to the President of Puntland, Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, to support the detention and trial of pirates.
The prison has accepted the initial transfer of eighteen Somalis who were convicted of piracy in the Seychelles
after their prosecution there.
RAPPICC continues its transition, shifting to a broader focus on transnational crime, with the help of its
member countries and other organizations and changing its name to “REFLECS-3,” or the Regional Fuel Law
Enforcement Center For Safety and Security at Sea, to better describe its mission.
Finally, we would be remiss not to mention the sad and tragic loss of two of our colleagues from UNODC,
Clément Gorrissen and Simon Davis, in Galkayo, Puntland. Clément and Simon were helping the Somali
a tragedy not only for their families, friends, and colleagues, but also for the Somali people who so desperately
need the sort of assistance that Clément and Simon were providing. We thank those who have sent their
condolences to the families and colleagues.
We invite and look forward to receiving your comments on this publication, and stand ready to participate in
and assist important continuing and future work on prosecuting pirate leaders.
Sincerely,
Ken Scott and Jon Huggins
Maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden, and in recent years, the Gulf of Guinea,
has continued to develop into an international crisis involving very large human and economic costs and
demanding the attention of States, international organizations, and industry around the world. A number
of international organizations or groups, such as the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia,
on Drugs and Organized Crime, and Europol, have taken active steps to improve cooperation and effective
pirates have been, or are being prosecuted in various parts of the world, almost all of them have been, or
are low-level skiff pirates, with the international community and only a few countries engaged in limited
piracy in East Africa and considers other reports and materials on questions dealing with the current
state of investigative and prosecution efforts related to piracy, as well as proposed future measures.
Most of those interviewed expressed serious concern about the lack of progress made in bringing pirate
international effort and cooperation, but that there has been too much fragmentation and duplication and
“too many different agendas” without a high-level coordinated approach targeting pirate kingpins. While
related tools continue to be problematic in important respects. There is also concern that ship owners,
insurance carriers, and private security companies are often uncooperative or even counterproductive
where investigations are concerned. And a substantial majority of those surveyed believe that there is no
countries.
In this report, international prosecutor Kenneth Scott recommends a more proactive, more focused, and
better-coordinated approach. Most maritime piracy is organized crime and requires more sophisticated law
enforcement approaches and techniques aimed at acquiring evidence against pirate kingpins, investors,
and money launderers. Piracy databases should be fully assessed and coordinated, and care should be
taken to eliminate duplicative efforts. Renewed and invigorated efforts must be made to develop and use
insider witnesses and various means of surveillance, and to locate and obtain what paper, digital, and
other documentation may exist. Information-sharing must be made simpler and easier, especially among
the military and intelligence communities and law enforcement.
Finally, Mr. Scott recommends an international judicial mechanism (dubbed “International Lite”) to direct
top-level investigations and prosecutions without developing a full international tribunal. Under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has broad latitude to customize an international
judicial mechanism to suit the needs of the counter-piracy community. An “international lite” mechanism
national judges with international support, and defense counsel appointed on an as-needed basis, aimed
at disrupting pirate networks and bringing their leaders to justice.
“[We note with] particular[ ] concern” that piracy off the Somali coast is “caused by lack
of lawful administration . . . which allows the ‘pirate command centres’ to operate without
hindrance” and “[we] strongly urge Governments to ‘take all necessary judicial, legislative
and law enforcement action’ to receive and prosecute or extradite suspected pirates and armed
robbers.” International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.1002 (25) (November
29, 2007).
“Countries that can do so should trace, track and freeze the assets of the backers of the pirates
. . . They deserve to be brought to justice and prevented from harming their country, its economy
and reputation. Impunity and lack of respect for human rights have no doubt encouraged
piracy.” Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, UN Special Representative for Somalia, December 11,
2008.
represents a major threat to international security. . . . We must follow the money! . . . [I]t is
in its joint law enforcement strategy against maritime piracy . . .” Speech by INTERPOL
Secretary-General Ronald K. Noble, January 19, 2010.
“As piracy has evolved into an organized transnational criminal enterprise, it is increasingly
its own to meet our longer term counter-piracy goals. Most pirates captured at sea are lowlevel
operatives. The harsh reality of life in Somalia ensures there are willing replacements
for pirates apprehended at sea. Prosecutions is one key to deterrence, but this must include
the prosecution of the masterminds and funders along with the gunmen.” Speech by U.S.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Thomas Kelly,
October 25, 2012.
“To date neither the Somali Government, the “Puntland” administration or any other local
or facilitators. The leadership of the principal piracy networks and their associates have
continued to enjoy freedom and impunity and have not been hindered in their travel or ability
to transfer funds.” Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea, S/2013/413 (July
12, 2013), at 22, para. 65.
“In the persisting absence of serious national and international efforts to investigate, prosecute
and facilitators will continue to operate with impunity.” Report of the Monitoring Group on
Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), at 8.
“Since the passage of time is affecting the quality and accessibility of testimonies and evidence,
the Monitoring Group reiterates the urgent need to establish a dedicated group of investigators
with the mandate to collect information, gather evidence and record testimonies relating to
on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), at 22, para. 67.
Since 2005, there has been growing consensus and frequently recurring calls in the international
prosecuted. There is broad recognition (at least in concept and rhetoric) that successfully prosecuting
the low-level skiff pirates, while part of the equation, will ultimately have limited impact on ending or
substantially reducing piracy, at least in terms of the law enforcement and prosecution components of
national and international counter-piracy efforts. Indeed, one of the four priorities of the Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for 2013 and beyond is “[t]o strengthen and focus law enforcement
efforts to disrupt pirate networks ashore, including by establishing effective information exchanges
among prosecutors, investigators and private industry . . .”1 Yet to date, with the exception of the
conviction of two pirate negotiators (which might be considered mid-level management) and the recent
arrest of pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan (better known as “Afweyne”) in Belgium, there have been
1,200 pirates have been, or are being prosecuted in various parts of the world (primarily in Somalia, 402;
Kenya, 164; Yemen, 129; and Seychelles, 124),2 almost none of them can be considered anything more
than low-level skiff pirates. Why is that the case, and what lessons can the international community and
or indeed dealing with other international and transnational crime?
In answering these questions, or at least in continuing a dialogue
to answer them, several things should be noted. First, modern
maritime piracy is a complex, multi-faceted problem and will
only be overcome by complex, multi-faceted solutions. There is
no doubt, for example, that an important part of the solution lies
in giving young men in the regions experiencing a high incidence
of piracy genuine alternatives to piracy as a means of livelihood.
There is also no question that capacity-building is important in
building and improving the law enforcement and criminal justice capacity in East Africa and Indian
Ocean States, in terms of training law enforcement, building courtrooms and prisons, and addressing the
various legal and logistical issues that arise in the context of cross-border transnational crime. This paper
does not dismiss the importance of these and other components of an overall counter-piracy strategy. But
conducting training programs and building good prisons are not the same as putting pirate kingpins on
or law enforcement part of the counter-piracy equation: what more effective role can law enforcement
and prosecutions play in creating a safe and sustainable rule-of-law environment for maritime commerce,
Second, the very substantial challenges and sustained effort required in investigating and prosecuting
any complex organizational crime are fully appreciated. This is true whether the crime involves massive
fraud at the highest levels of a corporation, public corruption in the upper echelons of government,
expertise, substantial resources, and sustained focus to investigate, charge, and prosecute. Looking at
one current example, the recent federal indictment of SAC Capital Advisors in the United States and the
Successfully prosecuting the
-
-
resulting guilty pleas culminated a four-year criminal investigation, which had already involved numerous
SAC employees pleading guilty to insider trading charges,3 which almost certainly occurred, at least in part,
as stepping stones in building a case against the company and its more senior management. The numerous
involving multiple jurisdictional lines, different national laws and systems, seriously limited (or even
even obstruct or otherwise hamper prosecution efforts. Still, to attempt to stop or substantially reduce piracy
by prosecuting only the lowest-level pirates would be like trying to stop (or appropriately punish) Enron by
small-time, lowest-level dealers.
The principal focus of this paper is to provide a “lessons learned” analysis of the law enforcement and
prosecution aspects of international and national counter-piracy efforts concerning maritime piracy occurring
off the east coast of Africa, and in particular the coast of Somalia, since approximately 2005, with a view to
improving these and other efforts against international and transnational crime in the future. It is not within the
scope of this paper to provide a full history of maritime piracy, in either its older or more contemporary forms,
which have been covered extensively and well in a number of publications.4 As background and overview,
however, and to provide a foundation, framework, and context for the survey results and the observations
and recommendations that follow, the paper relies on two principal sources: Robert Haywood and Roberta
Spivak, Maritime Piracy (Oxford: Routledge, 2012) (hereafter Maritime Piracy) and Danielle A. Zach, D.
Conor Seyle and Jens Vestergard Madsen, Burden-Sharing Multi-Level Governance: A Study of the Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (One Earth Future Foundation, 2013) (hereafter Burden-Sharing).
Following the Introduction and the Methodology section, this paper begins with a brief overview of modern
maritime piracy, followed by a discussion of law enforcement techniques and approaches used in investigating
and prosecuting complex organized crime. The core of the paper will set out the results of an extensive survey
Coast of Somalia; Thomas Winkler, the Chair of the Contact Group’s Working Group 2 during much of its
(UNODC); the international police and prosecution organizations INTERPOL, Europol, and Eurojust; U.S.
Somalia, Kenya, and Seychelles; the Seychelles Piracy Intelligence Center (SPIC); the Regional Anti-Piracy
Prosecution and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC); the International Maritime Organization;
the shipping organizations INTERTANKO and INTERCARGO; and two notable maritime piracy scholars,
Douglas Guilfoyle and Eugene Kontorovich.5
Finally, this paper takes into account the potential “Monday morning quarterbacking” involved in an effort
such as this one, as well as the old saying that “hindsight is 20-20.” Both of these observations may well
be true, but that is the nature of an after-action “lessons learned” project. Nothing in this paper is meant
the institutions, structures, policies, and processes involved in the counter-piracy effort. Generally, the reported
survey results are those which represent a consensus or majority view, or at least an important viewpoint or
observation shared by more than just one or two people. Preparation of the paper also included a review
of various available reports, documentation, literature, website material and similar information related
to the organizations, programs, and activities involved in recent counter-piracy operations.
The modern world is confronted by increasing transnational threats that require robust and timely
responses and repeatedly challenge the very capacity of States, individually or collectively, to address
them.6
dilemmas in a world system built on sovereign nation-States, with no supranational authority.7
Perhaps surprisingly, given that it was once considered virtually a thing of the past and a subject only
for Hollywood movies, maritime piracy is a prime example of such a threat. In the early 21st century,
the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau, ships and others engaging in
maritime commerce were attacked 293 times, 49 ships were hijacked, and 889 hostages were held in
2008. Perhaps not as surprisingly, given the combination of circumstances, a large part of this increase
in piracy was concentrated off the coast of Somalia, which for at least the last 20 years had been a failed
state with no functioning central government and endemic lawlessness, a place “divorced from . . . the
rule of law.”8
Maritime piracy today, on anything other than its smallest scale, is a form of organized crime, involving
and money launderers:9
As a transnational organized crime, Somali piracy entails more than armed youngsters at
sea in small boats attacking ships or providing armed protection aboard hijacked vessels.
The piracy business draws on a widespread network of facilitators internationally and
inside Somalia from multiple layers of society. In fact, pirates and their accomplices may be
bankers, telecommunications agents, businessmen of various kinds, politicians, clan elders,
translators or aid workers, all using their regular occupations or positions to facilitate one
or another network.10
Piracy today [is] an economy . . . which [has] taken on an industrial scope, thanks to
the rapid sophistication of its methods, organizational structures and resources. Pirate
behaviour -- the demand of high ransoms, use of advanced technologies and extreme talent
it functions quite well.11
By 2009, Somali pirates were responsible for more than half of the 406 worldwide incidents of piracy and
armed robbery at sea.12 By 2010, more than 1,000 seafarers were being held hostage and the New York
Times declared: “The Pirates are Winning!”13
National and international efforts to deal with modern maritime piracy date to at least 2001, with increasing
attention since 2005. In November 2001, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized
United Nations agency that works closely with the shipping industry, established a Code of Practice for the
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.14 In adopting the Code, the IMO
Assembly was “aware that, when arrests are made, some Governments are lacking the legislative framework
and adequate guidelines for investigation necessary to enable conviction and punishment of those involved
in acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships” and was “also convinced of the need for Governments to
co-operate and to take, as a matter of the highest priority, all necessary action to prevent and suppress any
acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships . . .”15 The IMO Assembly
urged all States, in particular coastal States, in affected regions to take all necessary and
appropriate measures to prevent and combat incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea,
including through regional co-operation, and to investigate or co-operate in the investigation
of such incidents wherever they occur and bring the alleged perpetrators to justice in
accordance with international law . . .16
In November 2004, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 59/24, urged States to cooperate with the IMO
in combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea and to undertake capacity-building efforts to deal with piracy.
In November 2005, IMO Assembly Resolution A.979(24) urged States to implement protective measures,
including issuing guidance to ships and sharing information with the IMO concerning piracy incidents. By
December 2006, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 61/222, called on States to confront the increasing
maritime threats through the adoption and harmonization of national laws and through the provision of
enforcement vessels. A year later, in December 2007, IMO Assembly Resolution A.1002(25) expressed
IMO’s “grave concern” with piracy and called for “the immediate establishment of appropriate measures to
protect ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia from piracy . . .” The Assembly noted with “particular[
] concern” that piracy off the Somali coast was “caused by lack of lawful administration and the inability of
allows the ‘pirate command
centres’ to operate without hindrance at many points along the coast of Somalia,” and called on States to “take
all necessary judicial, legislative and law enforcement action” to receive and prosecute or extradite suspected
pirates and armed robbers.17
Approximately six months later, in Resolution 1816 on June 2, 2008, the UN Security Council, exercising its
in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security . . .”18 In Resolution
might be considered extraordinary counter-piracy measures by UN member-states, including the use of armed
force on Somalia’s sovereign territory and in its territorial waters.19 Indeed, taking all of the circumstances
together, it is not an overstatement to call the piracy situation in and around the Horn of Africa a war. In fact,
“[s]uch is the threat of piracy [in that region] that the Joint War Committee of Insurers in London has declared
the waters off the coast of Somalia a war zone.”20
While the UN and IMO were adopting resolutions and taking some action,
the surge in maritime piracy was causing dramatic increases in the economic,
human, and other costs of piracy. The average ransom for a seized ship
and its crew increased from approximately $150,000 in 2005 to $5 million
in 2011.21 The ransoms for the MT Smyrni, which was released in early
2013, reportedly totaled $13 million.22 One body of research indicates that
an estimated $300 million in ransoms was paid to Somali pirates from 2008
during the same period.23 A more recent World Bank study, released on November 1, 2013, indicates that
between $339 million and $413 million was taken in pirate ransoms off the Horn of Africa between 2005
and 2012.24
impacts (such as increased insurance premiums) were between $7 billion and $12 billion in 2010, almost
$7 billion in 2011, and approximately $6 billion in 2012,25 with the World Bank more recently pegging
the global economic costs at $18 billion a year.26 The human costs have been equally sobering. As of
May 2012, 3,741 seafarers of 125 nationalities had been taken hostage by Somali pirates, with some of
the hostages held for as long as 1,178 days.27 Hostages are generally held in dire conditions, with limited
access to food, water, and medical care, and are often abused and sometimes tortured, with these tragic
impacts not including the pain and suffering and economic losses suffered by their families.28 In 2011
alone, 470 new hostages were added to the 645 that were being held at that time, and eight seafarers
died in pirate custody. This plainly unfortunate human impact is suffered disproportionately by those in
the developing world (from which 93% of all hostages are comprised), with 25% of hostage seafarers
coming from the Philippines and India.29
Organizational or organized crime can generally be described
as being larger-scale, systematic crime which, in its planning,
preparation, execution, and concealment, involves multiple
persons acting in an organized, often hierarchical way, ranging
from the most simple organizations to those which are as complex
as multinational business organizations—all of which describe
maritime piracy. In most (if not all) organized crime situations, the ultimate goal of law enforcement is
to prosecute and convict those in the top echelons of the organization—the kingpins, rather than the mere
Most, if not all, criminal investigations and prosecutions involve at least two questions: (1) was a crime
committed (and can it be proved in court, according to the standard of proof and rules of procedure
and evidence)? and (2) who committed, conspired, aided and abetted or is otherwise responsible for
might be stated as “Was Crime A committed at Location B on Date C?” Dealing with this question will
generally involve the proof of any jurisdictional or common elements, as well as the elements of that
particular crime. The second question is: “Having established that Crime A was committed, did Person
D commit, conspire to commit, or aid and abet the crime, or is he or she otherwise, on some legal basis,
relatively easy (or at least easier) to prove that a crime was committed—e.g., there may be little or no
a particular date, or that a ship was boarded at a particular grid reference and hostages taken. The more
executive to the cooked books, the national politician to the ethnic cleansing of a local minority village,
or a land-based pirate leader to an act of piracy 100 miles out at sea, where the executive, politician, or
pirate leader did not personally cook the books, torch the village, or seize the ship.
enforcement is to prosecute
In many such cases, two different types or categories of evidence will be needed in order to prosecute a
responders) or overhead imagery of a criminal event (by a satellite, drone, or aircraft) may prove that a crime
was committed (and even identify the physical perpetrators), but contribute little or nothing to proving the
responsibility of those at higher levels in the criminal chain of command. Using a war crimes example,
evidence given by a Muslim victim or a Serb foot solider in a Hague courtroom that a particular village
in Bosnia was attacked on a particular date was generally of little or no value in proving that Slobodan
Milosevic, at the highest political level, hundreds of miles away in Belgrade, was responsible and should
be punished for the attack. Photographic or video evidence of destroyed villages and exhumations of mass
graves, while often important as evidence proving that a crime was committed, usually provides few direct
links to higher-level perpetrators. To prosecute and convict the higher-level culprits—that is, to convict
the corporate executive, national politician, or pirate leader—a different or additional type of evidence is
necessary, often from different sources.
In discussing these matters as they relate to piracy, and concerning the pirate hierarchy or chain of command,
47 or rocket-propelled grenade who boards the attacked ship; (2) middle management—those who operate
higher up on the organizational chart, primarily on land, to facilitate and accomplish the pirate enterprise, such
The eyewitness testimony of victimized seafarers, combined with overhead video images, may well convict
the pirate foot soldiers apprehended by international navies at sea but provides no evidence for moving up
the chain of command. Audio recordings of a pirate ransom negotiator engaged in telephone conversations
with the ship’s owner or insurance carrier to negotiate a ransom may result in that negotiator going to jail, if
discussed below, lower-level evidence can provide the foundation for, or be a stepping stone to, additional
evidence and higher-level culprits.)
For these and other reasons, it is accepted law-enforcement wisdom that convicting higher-level criminals on
the basis of what prosecutors sometimes call a purely “historical case” (that is, from an entirely after-the-fact,
one or more of four investigative techniques or categories of evidence are usually needed, together with a
particular approach and organizational structure: (1) a proactive, top-down approach; (2) the development of
insider evidence; (3) the carrying out of an undercover investigation; (4) the use of various forms of electronic
or communication surveillance or interception; (5) the collection of contemporaneous documentary evidence,
especially from inside the criminal organization; and (6) the use of dedicated and focused units, adequately
resourced.
(1) Proactive Top-Down Investigations
Reactive approaches to criminal investigation typically attempt to build cases from the bottom up, based on
out who did it and how, and on what evidence the culprits can be convicted. A proactive top-down approach
is something quite different. In many situations involving organizational or organized crime, at least some
admissible evidence to prove their criminality in court. Based on such information or “intelligence,” proactive
investigations are focused from the top down, looking to build cases against the suspected criminal leaders,
consistent, of course, with due process, the rules of evidence, and procedure and ethical considerations.
(2) Insider Evidence
Insiders are past or present participants in the particular criminal
activity or organization being investigated. Insider evidence is
witness or testimonial evidence obtained from such participants.
While such evidence can be helpful at any level (in simplifying
the proof of the crime itself), it is especially valuable from middle
managers and higher-level insiders who can explain the structure and
how reports and information are communicated upward to persons higher in the organization. In climbing
the organizational ladder, foot soldier evidence may be essential or at least very helpful in charging and
convicting the lower-level or mid-level managers; lower-level managers and facilitators are important to
prosecuting middle managers; and middle managers and top lieutenants are almost always essential in
prosecuting and convicting the kingpins, especially in the absence of one or more of the other types of
leader him- or herself or internal documents directly or indirectly (with other evidence) incriminating the
criminal leader.
Insider witnesses were often the most important witnesses in cases at the International Criminal Tribunal for
superiors, while insiders (political or military) gave evidence concerning the internal conversations and
very closely with those “on their own side” or of their own ethnicity and were reluctant to give evidence
the links to and responsibility of higher-level culprits and indeed the very persons who, according to
There are various ways in which insider evidence might become available to law enforcement. First,
an innocent (or mostly innocent) person involved in the relevant organization or activity may discover
criminality (or a type or level of criminality) that he or she was previously unaware of and report his or
her information to the police or other authorities. Second, a person who may have knowingly engaged in
or assisted criminal activity in the past may have a change of heart and decide that he or she, rather than
continuing to participate in or assist the criminal activity, wants to assist law enforcement in discovering
and stopping it. Third, there is often, fortunately, little honor among thieves, and former partners in
crime may turn on each other for all sorts of reasons, like a disgruntled corporate employee who, in his
view, has been mistreated or let go after being what he thought was a loyal but not so innocent cog in
the criminal machinery. And fourth, and perhaps most common, an insider turns “state’s evidence” or
becomes a “Crown witness” when he or she is prosecuted or threatened with prosecution for his or her
own role in the crime and he or she hopes or seeks to obtain more lenient treatment in exchange for his or
her cooperation, which includes giving evidence against others, including Mr. Big. In law enforcement
30
(3) Undercover Investigation
enforcement agent or a person who is already inside the organization who agrees to stay inside (unbeknownst
to his conspirators or colleagues) as a way of obtaining evidence and as part of an arrangement with the
authorities. An undercover operation, of course, may require sophisticated and disciplined law enforcement
techniques and personnel, and especially in relation to violent crime, can be a dangerous activity. But again,
to acknowledge these realities is not to say that it cannot or should not be done.
(4) Electronic or Communication Surveillance or Interception
This important category of evidence includes all manner and means of intercepting or capturing communications,
messaging. A face-to-face conversation might be recorded by a party to the conversation “wearing a wire,”
and telephone and similar communications may be intercepted by means of wiretaps. Further, in this day
of satellites, drones, and similar technology, there may be a wide array of possibilities for monitoring and
intercepting communications. It goes without saying that capturing an incriminating communication in the
pirate leader’s own words is worth its weight in pirate treasure. Further, and lest there be misunderstandings,
the content of intercepted communications need not be expressly inculpatory, in the sense, for example,
that an explicit order was given to attack a ship or “kill all the hostages.” Less explicit communications
may prove important characteristics about organizational structures and processes, provide insights into
“command and control,” prove knowledge of important events or circumstances, or might even be as valuable
as physical evidence in proving the “known voice” of a particular pirate leader.31 Of course, depending on the
circumstances, the use of various intercept technology may need to comply with national and/or international
law, and the admission of such evidence in court must satisfy applicable evidentiary and procedural rules.
Investigators and prosecutors love to follow “the paper trail” (and also “the
money”) when and where such trails exist and can be discovered and obtained,
highly incriminating evidence. Among other things, documents are akin to
physical evidence in that they are generally prepared and communicated
contemporaneously with the events under investigation, and are not dependent on witness memory months
or even years after the events in question. Documentary evidence is especially valuable when it consists
of a criminal organization’s own documents (including correspondence and other communications, orders,
In effect, such items are the documentary version of insider evidence, in the form of documents rather than
insider testimony.32 Records of e-mails and texts (made available after the fact by service providers) cross
over from communication intercepts to documentary evidence. Apart from an organization’s own “inside”
documents, third-party documents can also be very important evidence; examples are bank records, police
and incident reports, reports by international monitors, etc. Documents may be obtained in any number of
ways; consensually (by those willing to turn them over voluntarily), or by subpoena, search warrants, and
other court orders.
prosecutors love to
(6) Dedicated, Adequately Resourced Units
Apart from or in addition to investigative techniques, most national law enforcement and prosecution
of crime that at any given time are afforded particular focus or priority, whether over a sustained period
of time (or even as a permanent form of organization) or a more limited temporal basis, and as distinct
from the more “usual” day-to-day or ordinary crime. In the United States at the Department of Justice,
drug task forces, counter-terrorism sections and a human rights and special prosecutions section. In the
transnational criminal organizations that otherwise appear untouchable,”33 including those engaging in
crime police team. History and experience have shown, in multiple national systems, that in order to
make a real dent in such areas of crime and criminal activity, substantial resources need to be organized
and dedicated on the basis of priority and directed in a focused, targeted way in conducting complex,
sophisticated, and longer-term investigations and prosecutions.
On December 16, 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in announcing that “the United States
intends to work with partners to create a Contact Group on Somali piracy,” told the UN Security Council
that the international response to piracy “has been less than the sum of its parts.” Expressing concern
about the impunity being enjoyed by pirates (and especially pirate leaders), Secretary Rice expressed
the hope that Security Council authorizations would allow States to “pursue pirates into their places of
operation on land,” [as] [h]istory has demonstrated again and again that maritime operations alone
.”34 On the same day, as part of Resolution 1851, the Security Council
established the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the “Contact Group” or “CGPCS”) as
a voluntary international mechanism intended to facilitate the collective efforts of States, international
organizations, industry, and nongovernmental organizations to address maritime piracy emanating from
Somalia as a threat to international peace and security, regional stability, and trade.35 Since January 14,
2009, the Contact Group has been a “coalition of the willing” based on the voluntary cooperation of more
than 60 countries and organizations. It has seen itself as a forum to facilitate discussion and coordination
of actions to suppress piracy as part of a broader international effort to “secure peace and stability in
Somalia.”36
capacity-building coordination and information sharing; 2. legal and judicial issues; 3. shipping industry
self-protection; [and] 4. messaging and public information efforts . . .”37 From the beginning, the Contact
Group recognized the need for “better operational information in order to address the problem of piracy”
and called on its members to contribute both information and surveillance assets to the collective effort.38
39 While Working Group 2 (concerning legal and judicial issues) has been considered one of the more
effective working groups and has tackled a number of legal issues from the beginning, for most of its life
to date it has focused primarily on the volume prosecution of the lowest-level pirates. The development of
another law-enforcement/prosecution group, more focused on higher-level prosecutions, did not evolve
until later and will be discussed in another part of this paper.
The Contact Group faces limitations similar to those of the UN and other international organizations in
that it has no police powers, no power to make binding decisions or enforce compliance, and its ability
to mobilize action is relatively weak.40 It is “organized volunteerism.”41 According to James Hughes, the
chair of Working Group 1, “[the Contact Group] is not so much a forcing mechanism; it’s a peer pressure
mechanism.”42
naming-and-praising) and perhaps to a lesser extent, “naming-and-shaming.”43
In further discussing the Contact Group in the course of this paper, it should be noted that the Contact
Group’s mandate and activities are broader than what might be considered law enforcement and prosecution,
as illustrated by the various working groups’ issue areas, and that these other areas are mostly beyond the
scope of this paper.
Soon after the Contact Group started its work in January 2009, a principal subject of discussion both there and
at the UN was whether the international community should establish, or support the establishment of, one or
more counter-piracy courts or judicial mechanisms other than, or in addition to, the general jurisdiction trial or
efforts. On April 27, 2010, the Security Council, by means of Resolution 1918, asked the UN Secretary-
General to present a report on possible options “to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons
responsible for acts of piracy . . . [including] options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with
international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal . . , taking into account the work of
the Contact Group . . .”44
The Secretary-General transmitted his report to the Security Council on July 26, 2010, setting out and
considering the advantages and disadvantages of seven options:
international tribunal; a regional tribunal; and a tribunal based in the national jurisdiction of a
tribunal established pursuant to a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations, or a ‘hybrid’ tribunal following the model of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, based on an agreement with
tribunal established through a multilateral agreement negotiated among the States of the
region, or the use of an existing court, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights, located in Arusha, Tanzania. It was noted that the time required to negotiate the
appropriate treaty basis for either of these options might be considerable. Under the third
or a special piracy chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State in the region. It
was recognized that the Somali court option would have the advantage of enabling Somalia
to play a direct part in the solution to prosecuting acts of piracy. However, the fractured
prosecutorial capacity, meant that this option may be unlikely to be viable at present.
10. The option of a specialized piracy chamber within the national jurisdiction of
international community, was considered to follow the precedent of the Bosnia War
Crimes Chamber. The Chair [of Working Group 2] noted in his conclusions of the
meeting in November 2009 that this would be the most feasible model, depending on
one or more regional States, including Somalia, being willing and able to undertake
prosecutions when it becomes possible.45
Overall, there was reasonably early recognition that neither
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague nor the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg,
nor the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPS)
in Tanzania, presented attractive or likely practicable options as a
counter-piracy judicial forum. Chief among the reasons was that
all of these bodies are treaty bodies and adding piracy to their jurisdictions would almost certainly involve
nor the ACHPS are criminal courts.46 Although “[m]any analysts believe[d] that in the absence of states’
ability to prosecute [such crimes], the most effective venue for piracy cases [would be] an international
court,” since “piracy is an act that directly affects global interests and is often committed in the global
commons,”47 the considering UN bodies and groups decided relatively early in the process that a Chapter
[options].”48 This paper will return to this decision following a brief account of the options that were
further considered, at least on paper or as continuing proposals.
Following a debate in the Security Council on August 25, 2010, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
commissioned a report by his Special Adviser on piracy, Jack Lang, which was submitted to the Security
Council on January 25, 2011.49 The Lang Report, noting “the urgent need to combat the impunity of
pirates”50 and observing that “[t]he lack of consensus in the Security Council over which solution to choose
mean[t] that the more radical options ha[d] been put to one side,”51 recommended “the establishment,
within eight months, of a court system comprising a specialized court in Puntland, a specialized court
in Somaliland and a specialized extraterritorial Somali court that could be located in Arusha, United
Republic of Tanzania,” possibly using the facilities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR).52
was approximately $25 million.53 Even early on, it was anticipated that each of these venues would
involve substantial international components, including funding, experts, and various other support, with
the extraterritorial court in Arusha in particular “act[ing] as a focal point for regional and international
support for the rule of law in Somalia . . .”54
The Lang Report was followed by another Security Council resolution (No. 1976) on April 11, 2011,
and another report of the Secretary-General on June 15, 2011,55 which essentially proposed capacitybuilding
in regional national courts and a specialized regional court, which might put more of its focus
Somaliland trial courts might be able to conduct piracy trials compliant with international standards by
approximately June 2014 focused only on the prosecution of “‘low-level’ suspects rather than on more
.”56 By contrast and of particular interest, the Secretary-
General’s report stated, in reference to a possible specialized extraterritorial court:
A key question would be whether the extraterritorial court should have jurisdiction to
prosecute large numbers of low-level perpetrators of acts of piracy, a more limited number
that information sharing,
planners of piracy by States, would be both a strategically effective and cost-effective
means of supplementing current prosecution efforts.57
The June 15 report reveals, therefore, a two-part piracy prosecution strategy: (1) building capacity to
prosecute low-level pirates in Somali and other regional State courts (whether general or specialized); and (2)
by a specialized extraterritorial court and/or States outside the region. In point of fact, and while all of these
discussions were continuing, none of the regional States, including Somalia, Kenya, and Seychelles, would
accept specialized piracy courts or an extraterritorial Somali court in their jurisdictions, with the exception
of Tanzania (which was willing to consider use of the ICTR facilities in Arusha as part of an extraterritorial
court).58
Ocean region have now handled a number of piracy cases, no international tribunal or hybrid court was
created, no extraterritorial Somali or regional court was established, and no specialized or dedicated courts
were set up in the regional systems.
The Law Enforcement and Prosecution Effort to Date—Low-Level Pirates:
Approximately 1,200 cases of piracy in East Africa have been
brought in various jurisdictions and have either been completed or
are in progress, with a substantial majority of these cases having been
brought between June 2009 and June 2012. Most were brought in the
East Africa/Indian Ocean region (including Yemen).59 The UNODC
has actively supported about 300 of these cases at an estimated cost of
approximately $30 million. With very limited exceptions, the cases
against East Africa’s pirates have focused on the lowest-level pirates,
with the highest-level pirates convicted to date being the pirate ransom
negotiators in United States v. Shibin and United States v. Ali. Apart from the recent arrest of Mohamed Abdi
While those outside law enforcement, and even outside a particular case or investigation, cannot know the
sensitive details of ongoing investigations or the content of sealed indictments or arrest warrants, available
public information and careful, non-compromising conversations have provided a substantial window into the
current state of play. The identities of some alleged or suspected pirate leaders and organizations are publicly
known, for instance,60 as are the existence of arrest warrants and INTERPOL “Red Notices” in some cases.61
focused, or sustained law enforcement or prosecution interest. A substantial number of those surveyed
-
-
indicated that the law enforcement component of counter-piracy efforts was slow to develop, with no real
interest in prosecution. In fact, the military dimension of counter-piracy efforts on Africa’s east coast
(involving various cooperating national navies, operating via NATO, the EU, or otherwise) developed
before, and largely independent of, any focused or deliberate law enforcement effort. The law enforcement/
prosecution effort that followed was largely an afterthought and was entirely reactive, in response to the
military interdiction of low-level pirates at sea and the sheer necessity of doing something with them.
The de facto law-enforcement regime that developed in these circumstances involved a three-part process
which has remained essentially the same ever since: (1) patrolling naval forces interdict suspected pirates
at sea, either during or after a pirate attack or attempted attack; (2) the apprehended suspected pirates,
after the disposal of their arms and the destruction of their skiff, are either released on shore (as part of
the catch-and-release practice), or, pursuant to transfer agreements, transported to regional States for
prosecution;62 and (3) if and when they are convicted, many of the pirates are transferred to Somalia to
serve their sentences. Thus, the international community’s law-enforcement model was, and remains, a
predominantly reactive, decentralized, horizontal model, involving a group of roughly equal national and
organizational peers, relying largely on regional States and consisting entirely of “volunteers,” with no
While the Contact Group, using or supporting the described reactive, horizontal, and largely regional
model, has been successful in dramatically increasing the number of low-level pirate prosecutions from
virtually zero to the approximately 1,200 mentioned above, a high percentage of interdicted pirates
still are not prosecuted.63 In short, even today, no particular country (with the possible exception of
Seychelles and perhaps Kenya) has any real appetite for prosecuting pirate cases unless there is a strong
virtually every pirate incident today still being “Is anyone interested in prosecuting this attack, or willing
to?” with the frequent answer being “No.”64 As one community participant put it (and this response was
repeated or paraphrased by many): “Someone has to open a case and very often no one is interested in,
or willing to do so.” While not employing the same words, many of those surveyed said that, in some
or in response to external pressures of one sort or another.65
Africa was a failure to train and equip the military interveners for required law enforcement procedures,
in terms of arrests, collecting evidence, and taking statements, although this situation appears to have
substantially improved. Another limiting factor concerning law enforcement efforts in the East Africa/
Indian Ocean region is that most national prosecutors and investigators are not trained for or experienced
in conducting complex, targeted, proactive investigations into organizational crime. As one community
participant stated, most regional or local prosecutors are only concerned with “the six poor bastards
standing in front of them.”
The natures of the prosecution cases and the evidence used in the vast majority of piracy prosecutions
to date, especially in the region, have been fairly basic and straightforward, largely based on eyewitness
apprehending military and/or law enforcement personnel). Photographs and other visual imagery obtained
in the course of the pirate incidents also are frequent parts of the prosecution cases. In the past several
years, aerial patrolling and surveillance technology in the region have improved to the point that there is
very often a complete video record of a pirate incident from beginning to end, including the apprehension of
there have been no pirate acquittals in Kenya due to lack of evidence.
Prosecution evidence has also included evidence collected as part of the crime scene investigation conducted
when an attacked or seized ship is released or otherwise recovered from pirate custody, and sometimes evidence
obtained from seized or recovered cell phones used by the pirates. Crime scene investigations have generally
improved but are still inconsistent in quality, depending on who conducts the investigation. INTERPOL
has improved crime scene investigations by acting as a central coordinator or facilitator, often working
closely with the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). The NCIS has a forward-operating base
in Bahrain and has largely become the crime scene investigator of choice or default, especially where no
national authority indicates an interest and/or capacity to intervene. It is generally considered that NCIS
conducts professional, effective investigations and has improved the quality of crime scene investigations.
In some situations where NCIS, for whatever reason, has not been available or called in, the crime scene
investigation has often involved cobbling together an ad hoc team from whatever available resources can be
assembled, with mixed results. Where both become involved, there is sometimes friction between national
law enforcement authorities and international investigators. When the crime scene investigation is conducted
by national authorities, there is often less chance that the information will be shared with other organizations
and agencies.
An important but perhaps overstated obstacle to prosecuting more pirates outside the region of East Africa,
and especially in Europe, is a concern that suspected pirates transported to European countries for prosecution
will seek asylum or otherwise remain in the country if their cases are dismissed or they are acquitted, or when
they are released from completed prison sentences or otherwise returned to the local nation’s population,
rather than their being repatriated to their home countries. One counter-piracy community member said
that this is the “deep, dark [but apparently open] secret”—no one wants the apprehended, processed, or
released pirates staying in their country. As noted, some observers believe that, at least legally, this concern
is overstated, but in the real world and whatever the legal niceties, governments may be reluctant to return
66 Putting aside the legal debate, European and other countries
might have a stronger argument on this point if large numbers of East African pirates were being prosecuted
impact on a country’s immigration issues seems fairly negligible and the expressed concern sounds more like
an excuse to not prosecute pirates.
and getting them to court, especially in national systems, including most common law countries, where live
in-court testimony is the general practice. Finding seafarer witnesses some months or years after the event
in question can be a serious challenge, and if they are found, the seafarer and his employer (which may or
not be the same shipping company as it was previously) may have little or no desire to appear (or to have
an employee appear) in a courtroom a thousand miles away. There is also a fairly common perception that
many seafarers are not treated particularly well by their employers or home countries before, during, or after
their involvement in a piracy incident,67 which further reduces any desire or incentive they may have to give
testimony in a distant courtroom.
The Law Enforcement and Prosecution Effort to Date—Pirate Leaders and Financiers:
A substantial number of counter-piracy participants, approaching (if not constituting) a consensus,
Abdi Hassan is a start in this direction. Community participants, including some of the senior and
most experienced leaders, assessed that international and national prosecution efforts have been “very
disappointing,” “pretty pathetic,” “modest to poor,” and “not a success story,” with a “paucity” of
higher-level prosecutions to date. In terms of such prosecutions, one senior participant stated that he is
“disappointed to see how little hands-on progress has been made,” while another said that the high costs
of counter-piracy efforts to date have been “disproportionate to the results achieved.” Still another
participant stated that there has been a “mismatch” of efforts: “There was a lot of emphasis on prosecuting
the skiff pirates rather than on disrupting pirate networks and going after higher-value targets. We focused
on the wrong population.” Another observer noted that the prosecution of low-level pirates to date was a
matter of “picking the low-hanging fruit,” which another said has been “a mistake.” “In dealing with the
urgency of pirates at sea, the international community took its eye off the ball, concerning the organized
crime dimension.” Consistent with these assessments, several community members stated that while the
reactive, horizontal approach has been successful in prosecuting a relatively large number of lower-level
pirates, that approach is limited and “can only take you so far.” In sum, “the international community
68
A few of those surveyed, while respectful of their colleagues, said that the
international community’s twin emphases on international development
programs (i.e., capacity-building) and naval patrolling is not really surprising,
as that is what most senior politicians, diplomats, and international organization
humanitarian relief) “know” and are comfortable with. Very few foreign
service personnel or humanitarian aid representatives have any background,
experience in, or knowledge about investigating and prosecuting sophisticated legal cases dealing with
complex organized crime, but they often have some experience or familiarity with drafting treaties,
providing international aid or sending in the marines. On the military side, given the lack of regional
capacity to do so, it was inevitable that national naval forces from outside the region would take on the
principal role in interdicting pirates at sea. And for the most part, military people did what military
people do (and are supposed to do). By contrast, law enforcement really became involved only when
skiff pirates were apprehended at sea and the navies began to ask the question, “What do we do with
them now?” which, in turn, actually reinforced the focus on prosecuting the lowest-level pirates, since
enforcement- and prosecution-oriented participants in the Contact Group’s working groups said that
they were surprised that the meetings (especially in the earlier days) were dominated by foreign service
personnel and international organization representatives who had little to contribute in terms of law
enforcement and criminal investigation or prosecution. Indeed, it is noteworthy that while the Contact
January 2009,69
until two-and-a-half years later, in July 2011,70 almost ten years after the IMO, in November 2001,
called for the prosecution of pirates “as a matter of the highest priority.”71
not implemented earlier based on the opposition of some States that had expressed concerns about the
feasibility of the group and about sharing sensitive information and intelligence,72 another important
-
issue addressed below. Evolution to a more law-enforcement/prosecution subgroup has continued, with
additional efforts to move forward with such a group having been made at working group meetings in
Copenhagen in April 2013.73
Even with the passage of time and the increasing recognition—at least in concept or rhetoric—that more
sophisticated, proactive efforts were, and are needed to build cases against pirate leaders, community
participants complained that policy- and decision-makers “don’t get it” (that is, most politicians and
diplomats have no real understanding of the investigative/prosecution effort that is required to make such
cases) and/or they “don’t fund it” (in terms of providing the necessary structure, tools, and resources to get
the job done).74 Senior decision-makers and donors must genuinely recognize that in building complex
leadership cases, evidence from victims and most of the lowest-level pirates, crime scene evidence, and even
video-recordings of the crime itself generally provide little or no evidence against pirate leaders. They must
then commit to supporting and funding more sustained, proactive, and sophisticated investigations.
While information from several of those surveyed suggests that there may
be (or may have been) approximately a dozen high-level pirate leaders or
of the counter-piracy community’s knowledge of the piracy organizations
today than was known several years ago, there are still substantial gaps
side, in terms of the movement and disposition of pirate proceeds.75 As one community leader put it, “there
are islands of good knowledge, with some missing links.” On the other hand, some community members
say that the pirate structures “are not particularly sophisticated or surprising, and most of the pirate leaders
are known.” Still others indicated fairly extensive knowledge of the pirate leaders, their networks, and the
distribution of ransoms, as set out, for example, in the Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant
to Security Council resolution 1853, S/2010/91 (March 10, 2010), at pages 35–43, and in the recent World
Bank Report, Pirate Trails, at pages 29–32.76 One community member observed that the real problem is
not a lack of information, but a lack of focus and organization: “What is needed is a coordinated approach
to building cases.”
Even assuming some level of understanding and political will in some State governments and international
the international, cross-jurisdictional nature of the underlying conduct and related behavior; (2) the lack of
action to assist investigations; (3) the existence of strong clan and tribal systems and powerful loyalties in
some regional countries; (4) worse yet, the existence of extensive corruption and inter-connecting complicit
77 and (5)
electronic, or other trails.
Despite this overall assessment, it should be noted that there have been, and are, in fact, a small number of
more extensive investigations targeting East African pirates and facilitators at some higher levels, primarily
involving (1) investigations based on ongoing, ad hoc cooperation involving U.S., European, and Seychelles
authorities, (2) the Belgian investigation leading to the October 2013 arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan; and
(3) an 18-month-long joint Dutch-German investigation assisted by Europol and Eurojust called “Nemesis,”78
One community mem-
which has recently ended due to a lack of funding, but with charges still expected. Indeed, nothing
in this paper is meant to imply that some higher-level pirates have not been investigated or charged,
although it remains true that, except for the arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan, none have been prosecuted
to date. The fact, however, that those criminal charges which have been brought and those arrest warrants
which have
Mohamed Abdi Hassan—who was arrested in Belgium, not Somalia—is itself an indication of important
shortcomings in the existing law enforcement apparatus or efforts to date, especially in terms of making
arrests in Somalia. Several higher-level community participants suggested rather forcefully that senior
and demand that action be taken: “Here’s an arrest warrant—what are you going to do about it?” Indeed,
hundreds of millions of dollars of international assistance should buy some cooperation. As for charged,
and coordination is needed in order to catch them when there is an opportunity to do so.
The Impact of Law Enforcement Efforts to Date:
Unfortunately, given the aforementioned circumstances and considerable challenges, and despite the
dedicated efforts of a number of individuals, law enforcement and criminal justice efforts to date have not
been a major factor in reducing maritime piracy on Africa’s east coast. Instead, a large number of those
surveyed agreed that, to the extent that there has been a substantial decline in successful pirate attacks
in East Africa, it is primarily due to three factors: (1) more effective international naval patrolling; (2)
fuller implementation of best practices and countermeasures on ships transiting the area;79 and (3) use of
private armed security. From the perspective of accountability, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea reported on July 12, 2013 that the principal pirate leaders and their associates continued to enjoy
impunity and had “not been hindered in their ability to travel or transfer funds.”80 Prosecuting pirate
The Use of More Proactive, Sophisticated Law Enforcement Methods:
To date, counter-piracy law enforcement has had only limited success, spread over several national
jurisdictions, in developing and using insider witnesses. Surveyed community participants, who were
appropriately discreet on this topic, either knew of no successful development or use of insider witnesses
to piracy, or were only aware of such insiders being developed in a very few instances.81 In these
instances, however (and again as very generally described), this small group of insiders seemed to have
provided valuable information and services, so efforts to develop them have been worthwhile. Altogether,
tried hard enough and long enough to develop this important source of frequently necessary and often
compelling evidence. One concern among some community members has been that developing suspected
or convicted pirates as cooperating witnesses—i.e., turning them into a “Crown witness” or “state’s
evidence”—is somehow unsavory or something not to be done. A number of people also indicated a
concern (or gave as a reason for the limited success in developing insider witnesses) that Somalia’s strong
the recommendations that follow.
To public knowledge, there have not been any undercover investigations into East Africa’s piracy (where
such an investigation might have become publicly known, for example, in the course of a subsequent
piracy prosecution). Of course, if there are any active, ongoing undercover investigations, those outside the
particular investigation would not expect to know about or comment on them.
Communication intercepts (“signal intelligence”) and other electronic
surveillance and monitoring, again with limited exceptions, have not been
successfully used in investigating and prosecuting piracy. Information
concerning wire or digital communications is generally of two sorts: (1)
information indicating the fact that communication took place and the
details of it—i.e., the date and time of the call (or other communication), the originating number of the call (and
its location), the number called (and its location), and the duration of the call (e.g., 15 minutes), all of which is
sometimes known as “metadata”; and (2) communication content—that is, what Caller A said to Called B and
what B said in return. Metadata can be very helpful investigative information and also important evidence, but
it is not the same as getting the communication’s content. Generally, metadata is easier to obtain, both legally
and otherwise, than content is. To date, to the extent that audio recordings of communication content have
been used in bringing indictments and prosecuting cases, these have been almost (if not entirely) consensual
recordings of ransom negotiation conversations, recorded on the consenting shipping or insurance company’s
end of the conversation.82 While such recordings are important (certainly as evidence against the negotiator),
they are not the sort of interceptions or surveillance (“wiretapping” or non-consensual third-party interception
of communications) that are likely to capture communication content involving or directly implicating the
(and many in the counter-piracy community believe that it has), it is likely being carried out by military forces
and/or the intelligence community and unfortunately, this information or evidence is rarely, if ever, shared
with law enforcement.83 One type of communication content that may be easier to obtain is text messages
and/or emails stored in recovered or seized pirate cellphones, depending on who takes possession of the
phones and whether they are made available.
Documentary evidence, especially from inside the criminal organization, can be highly important evidence.
transactions, and most of those surveyed considered there to be not a lot of documentary evidence “out there.”
Some documentary evidence has been recovered in the course of crime scene investigations on recovered
more akin to physical than documentary evidence, have probably been as important or more important than
primarily been prosecuted, with those being exactly the pirates least likely to put much on paper. At higher
levels, some recordkeeping and documentation must exist.
reactive and were approached from the bottom up, rather than the top down, and most investigations continue
to be pursued individually by distinct law enforcement organizations, rather than cooperatively. Again, to the
extent that almost all investigations and prosecutions to date have concerned only low-level pirates and have
been based on particular incident evidence, this is not surprising.
All of the more advanced law enforcement techniques and categories of evidence, except for the rare windfall,
require a serious sense and priority of mission, the necessary professional expertise, and mission leadership
exceptions, these elements have largely been missing and do not appear to exist at an institutional (rather
Legal and Jurisdictional Issues:
Most of those interviewed believe that despite the work of the past several years there continue to be
84 At
law enforcement efforts are not the core reasons why counter-piracy prosecutions, and especially those
85 An equal or more important issue, despite
the rhetoric, is whether modern piracy is truly taken seriously, in terms of the lack or inconsistency of
political will to address it fully, as well as the structures and approaches used in addressing it to date.
In terms of needed law or system reforms, the suggestions range from very fundamental changes
(including a substantially new “law of the sea,” at least in terms of maritime crime, and a new system for
86
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), and other international and national laws (and/or
regimes related to maritime crime and piracy) will likely agree that the juridical framework and procedures
for dealing with such crime can and should be substantially improved. Relevant questions include: What
is currently the accepted scope of universal jurisdiction in terms of piracy and related offenses, and how
does international law contemplate dealing with land-based pirate leaders and facilitators, if at all? Many
Apart from these broader issues, there are still serious challenges
to getting adequate piracy laws on the books of many countries.
The fact that the UN Secretary-General, in October 2013, was still
“encourag[ing] Somali authorities to [take the most basic steps
in passing] all relevant legislation to facilitate the prosecution of
individuals suspected of piracy”87 indicates woefully slow progress
since the repeated public declarations, now many years in the past, that piracy had to be fought urgently
as a top priority. And even where piracy laws are adopted, that does not mean that they will be seriously
implemented and enforced. Somalia does not have extradition treaties and is not a party to mutual legal
assistance arrangements. While this does not mean that indicted pirates may not be turned over, simply
on the basis of comity, or that various forms of assistance may not be provided by one means or another,
this state of affairs is nonetheless surprising since it concerns a failed State which has been in international
receivership for a number of years and involves a much-publicized area of allegedly serious international
crime.
One community member suggested developing a “universal MLAT” (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty)
process by which MLAT requests or orders would create a universal obligation to comply with them,
rather than there being a need for multiple individual requests and orders.
A serious issue raised by several community participants is that sentences in a number of countries that
have prosecuted pirates have been short. In Europe and Africa, a number of piracy sentences have been
-
88 While these sentences, once again, relate only to
low-level pirates, there are at least two serious issues arising from such sentences, apart from concern that
89 First, as discussed previously, when states
of spending substantial time, precious effort, and scarce resources to possibly obtain, when all is said and
States where any sort of plea negotiation may come into play (e.g., where an accused pirate might plead guilty
sentence, if the charged pirate goes to trial and is convicted, leaves little negotiating room or incentive for the
accused pirate to plead guilty.
While not dismissing any of these issues, and in looking at some of the more usual concerns (such as establishing
the identity and age of young piracy suspects), from the perspective of prosecuting higher-level land-based
pirates, there is probably less basis for genuine concern that these matters present major obstacles to serious
efforts to prosecute pirate leaders. One community member commented that jurisdiction is actually rarely an
issue, stating “there will almost always be jurisdiction somewhere, or in several places. It’s really a question
of the political will to prosecute these cases.”90
ways to bring cases, under international and/or national law, in one forum or another. Two exceptions, and
the inability and/or unwillingness of Somali authorities to execute arrest warrants against pirate leaders. If the
international community and its constituent states are serious about prosecuting pirate leaders rather than foot
Fragmentation, Duplication, Lack of Coordinated Focus:
Virtually everyone in the counter-piracy community agrees that an effective
there is broad consensus that current international and national counter-piracy
efforts are too fragmented, involve too much duplication and competition
(including for funding), and lack a coordinated focus and direction.91 Perhaps
not surprisingly, a number of community members indicated that “a lot of politics” are involved. “There are
too many different agendas,” “it’s all empire building,” and there are too many “turf issues.” “It’s your classic
international aid and development scenario.” “There is not always an appetite for advice.” “Too much talk,
not enough action.” One community leader stated clearly, “Unless there is better organization and focus, we
will not get to the pirate organizers, except by chance.” Another panel member said, “Someone has to make
[prosecuting pirate leaders] their mission, and it’s not happening now.”
As discussed, no effective law enforcement system approaches the investigation and prosecution of particularly
important and often complex crimes on a disparate, reactive, and bottom-up basis. There are, instead, dedicated,
specialized units dealing with such things as organized crime, terrorism, and complex white-collar crime. No
serious law enforcement effort leaves important, high-priority crimes to general-jurisdiction “catch-as-catchcan”
operations, and there is no reason to believe that such a disparate, reactive, catch-as-catch-can (or catchand-
release) effort will be any more successful at the international or transnational level, but that is essentially
what has been done. Counter-piracy participants said repeatedly that “there needs to be a centralized gatherer
of information” and “some central coordination.”92 One community member said, “What we really need is a
global strike force.”
areas.”93 Unlike the working groups formed in January 2009 to address four of the focus areas, however,
formed to address a coordination mechanism and no “counter-piracy coordination mechanism” was ever
established.
There is no single consistent or shared “standard operating procedure” for almost anything. Rules and
produce the full range of evidence in court.”94 There is a lack of consistency and transparency, resulting
lack of clarity surrounding the legal side of piracy stems from the confusion surrounding overlapping
jurisdictions. . . . This creates a vacuum of accountability and has often allowed pirates to be released
without standing trial or being held accountable for their crimes.”95
The shipping industry gives voice to these concerns in saying that what the industry would like is a
“one-stop shop” where it can provide information, bring questions, and provide assistance to one point of
contact with one set of rules and procedures. Some States have favored increased centralization, at least
in some respects, while others have been opposed. Some members suggest that decentralized efforts are
more “scalable” to different needs and levels of activity.
There have been problems with slow response times among fragmented authorities, especially in getting
the right information to the right people at the right time. One example concerns an opportunity to
arrest a higher-level piracy suspect who was moving internationally, an opportunity which was lost by
the time the necessary information could be obtained and law enforcement actions coordinated. On
the other hand, INTERPOL’s increased partnership with NCIS in terms of more effective crime scene
investigations has been a positive development.
orchestra as a metaphor, each instrument must have a score that is in harmony with the ensemble, while
the ensemble, in turn, must be led by a conductor.”96
Lang Report recommended that “[t]he Secretary-General, acting in close consultation with his Special
Representative for Somalia, should contemplate the establishment of an institutional structure to facilitate
the implementation of [Security Council resolutions] under the aegis of a high-level eminent personality
with vast United Nations experience.”97
Several community members expressed concern that many of the organizations and agencies involved
in counter-piracy work have never set foot in the region. Several community members commented that
and investigators talk about and the on-the-ground realities in the region—“Some of the prosecutors at
the meetings talk about sophisticated surveillance systems, when the guys in Kenya are worried whether
they have enough petrol to put their patrol boats to sea.”
The investigation and prosecution of pirate kingpins is also hindered by the rotation of engaged diplomatic
and military personnel, who are often assigned to a particular duty station or task for a relatively short period
of time and are then rotated to another location or different duties at about the time when they might be most
effective in their piracy work.
Information-Sharing:
There is an interesting juxtaposition of views here. On the one hand, a number of community members
commented that the counter-piracy law enforcement community is fairly small, somewhat tight-knit, and
enjoys the highest levels of cooperation that some of them have ever experienced in a multi-organizational
or international setting. At the same time, there was a widely-held view that information-sharing continues
to be problematic. A good measure of this appears to be due to the fragmentation and “turf” (or competition)
issues mentioned above.
their worst in the earliest phases of what may eventually become an investigation. The view was expressed
several times that “once a case is actually charged and in court, everyone pretty much knows about it and
there are rules and procedures for getting things done. But what do you do with information when you don’t
even have a suspect yet?” A cell phone is found or seized somewhere—what do you do with it? Who gets
the downloaded information? Who analyzes it? How do you connect the dots when you don’t yet know what
the dots are?
Counter-piracy community meetings for the purpose of sharing information
and discussing common issues and solutions seem to occur only at the
widest international level in the Contact Group’s working group meetings.
Apart from these, there appears to be primarily a continental European
group, with information exchange and coordination facilitated by Europol
and Eurojust, and a regional East Africa/Indian Ocean group which holds
meetings from time to time. As mentioned, counter-piracy community
members in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region feel that there is a disconnect between the European and
North American communities and what happens in the region and that the two groups need to engage in more
interaction. To date, UNODC appears to be the most effective in coordinating its work in Europe, based in
Vienna, with its work in Nairobi and the wider region. Still, many well-intentioned African representatives
return home from international conferences and meetings with no real authority or ability to do anything
better or different.
community about four larger and more challenging issues concerning the exchange of information: (1) the
strict European (and perhaps other national) laws on information protection and sharing; (2) the interface
(or lack thereof) between the military and intelligence communities, on one hand, and the law enforcement/
prosecution community on the other; (3) the “feeding,” management, and use of law enforcement databases;
and (4) obtaining full cooperation and information from the shipping and insurance industries.
enforcement and prosecution authorities. Some countries, such as Italy, have apparently been cut out of
satisfy European requirements. One leading community member believes that European laws,
information regimes, and judicial systems need to be substantially improved to make law enforcement-
transfer and use of evidence in multiple jurisdictions.
Law enforcement’s second major obstacle to obtaining helpful evidence and information involves
information-sharing between the military and intelligence communities and the law enforcement
community. There is knowledge, or “an educated guess,” on the law enforcement side, that military forces
and intelligence services in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region collect extensive information through
various forms of communication, imagery, and other surveillance and interception that would be helpful
to law enforcement authorities,98 but such information or evidence is never (or rarely) shared. There is
wide concern among those in law enforcement that too much military and intelligence information is
in their understanding that concerns about terrorism and other national and international security issues
may take precedence in many situations, but they nonetheless said they believe that much information is
ways that would not compromise other concerns.
military means” and that the challenges in the interface between and the information-sharing among the
military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities should have been foreseen and dealt with “at
the very beginning” by memoranda of understanding and other arrangements. The fact that they were
not is further evidence that law enforcement efforts were not integrated into the overall program from the
beginning and that they have been too much of a relatively late-developing, “add-on” feature. Through
persistent individual efforts, there has been limited success in breaking through the military/intelligence
years.
A third substantial issue regarding information-sharing and management
concerns law enforcement-oriented databases that have been or are
proposed to be used in connection with counter-piracy efforts. The principal
international piracy database that has been used in the past few years is
an INTERPOL database that was largely funded and built by the U.S.
government and then moved to INTERPOL’s Lyon, France headquarters.
Due to increased concerns about the database’s effective operation, its management was returned to
INTERPOL’s U.S. National Central Bureau in Washington, D.C. in mid-2013. A number of community
members expressed concerns about the consistent and timely entry of information into the database,
searches. Europol also operates a piracy database used primarily by EU states and about which there was
less discussion. With the establishment of the RAPPICC in Seychelles in March 2013, there have been
questions about the relationship or interaction between INTERPOL and its database and any database or
analytical tools that may be set up or used by RAPPICC. There is overall concern about the relationships
issues.
very often not the
The fourth major issue concerning information-sharing is addressed below in connection with the shipping
and insurance industries.
Before leaving the topic of information-sharing, it can never be forgotten that information and “intelligence”
are very often not the same as “evidence.” What prosecutors need in order to convict pirate kingpins is
evidence admissible in court, according to the requirements of national or international law and evidentiary
rules and procedures, which means that prosecutors are sometimes less impressed by “information.” Rumors
and what “everyone knows” are not evidence. Entering information into a database and sending intelligence is
the relatively easy part, and pushing the real evidentiary work down to the local prosecutor is not particularly
helpful. Information must be tested, developed and corroborated, and checked against applicable rules for
admissibility in court.
Information Synthesis and Analysis:
If information-sharing has been less than perfect, then information synthesis and analysis may be even more
serious issues. Sharing information is not productive unless someone does something with it as part of a
process of synthesizing and analyzing the information. One community member stated, “There needs to
be more joined-up thinking and less emphasis on individual turf.” A recurring query and concern from the
shipping industry has been, and continues to be: “Assuming that there is good cooperation and information
exchange between ship owners and law enforcement, what happens after all of our effort in collecting the
information?” And the next industry statement is usually: “We don’t see anything happen, so what’s the
point?”
Apart from a few individual prosecutors, investigators, and analysts working together on particular
investigations, either within a single national system or across national systems, there has not been, and does
not appear to be at the present time, an effective coordinated or centralized multi-national program or effort to
Shipping and Insurance Companies:
There is still widespread concern in the law enforcement community that ship owners, insurance carriers, and
private security companies are often uncooperative and even obstructive in the investigation and prosecution
of maritime piracy. Most shipping companies are eager to get on with business and get vessels that have been
“proprietary information” in order to block the sharing of information. There is a common perception that the
own commercial interests, since “inside information,” contacts, and insights translate into dollars, pounds,
and euros for them. There are, of course, exceptions, and some shipping companies are better than others, in
terms of their level of cooperation.
A particular aspect of reporting or information-sharing in which industry cooperation may actually be
declining is in the reporting of pirate attacks, especially unsuccessful attacks. Some community members
expressed concern that the shipping industry has become more reticent and less reliable about reporting
pirate attacks where the attacked vessels had private armed security onboard, based on concerns about
possible legal liability related to the use of force.99 One community participant said, “A lot of shipping
companies are not reporting armed personnel on their ships, even though they are supposed to.”
say that the shipping industry, in the earlier years of the recent bout with maritime piracy, had an “open
door” policy and only wanted rules and assurances about how industry information would be managed
and used. In the earlier years, they say, most law enforcement authorities did not show any interest in
these matters and the shipping industry ultimately turned to INTERPOL, in which they found a more
interested and willing partner. Shipping companies say they are concerned with the amount of time and
effort involved in assisting investigations, especially when they feel that often “nothing comes of it.” They
different law enforcement authorities. As mentioned above, what the shipping and insurance industries
would like is a “one-stop shop” where all of these matters can be handled or dealt with at one point of
contact.
As do all citizens (personal or corporate), the shipping, insurance, and security companies have an
important duty to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution
of crime, and ultimately, law enforcement and prosecutors, not the private companies, are in charge,
or should be. At the same time, the shipping companies have a reasonable interest in wanting to deal
business interests.
Regional Capacity and Enforcement:
There are two dynamics at work concerning the investigation and
prosecution of maritime piracy in national systems in the East Africa/
Indian Ocean region. Some members of the counter-piracy community
feel strongly that law enforcement efforts should emphasize and give
priority to regional domestic systems, while others believe that the
international community should not put so much of the counter-piracy
burden on regional systems, or at least not without very substantial
international support.100 Unfortunately, there is often little interest
investigate and prosecute piracy, especially pirate leaders who may be part of, or closely linked to and
protected by national elites. There are high levels of corruption in some of these countries, extending
into law enforcement itself, which further complicates or even compromises the capacity of these systems
to prosecute—or even to substantially assist with the prosecution of—pirate leaders.101 As mentioned
in another context, many regional representatives who attend international conferences and meetings
return home to national systems in which they have no real authority or ability to change or improve their
systems. In addition, each country has its own system, deals with its own particular issues, and attaches
varying levels of priority to counter-piracy efforts.102
A substantial majority of community members believe that there is no current or near-term capacity to
levels of priority to
leaders and investors. In fact, in its report Preliminary Observations on Responses to Organized Crime (2010),
the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa (ISS) assessed that there was no existing capacity in East
African/Indian Ocean States to tackle serious transnational organized crime: “[T]here is general consensus
that law enforcement agencies [in the region] do not have the required capacity . . . the personnel lack[ ] the
informed, not integrated, and not well resourced.”103 One observer said in February 2011 that the “restoration
of law and order in Somalia remains illusory.”104 An important counter-piracy leader put it strongly in saying
that “the international community needs a reality check” if they think pirate leaders can be prosecuted in
Somalia in the near future; “that’s at least ten years away.”
Kenya and Seychelles are the two regional States that have had the most success in prosecuting lower-level
pirates and they are generally the key law enforcement and judicial actors in the region. While Kenya has
sometimes been considered “the lead prosecutor of suspected pirates,”105
members expressed the view that the judicial process in Kenya, at least concerning piracy cases, has been
“challenging.” By at least 2009, Kenya had already become an important part of combined national and
international efforts to prosecute pirates in the region of East Africa. But in 2010, Kenya indicated on two
occasions that it was terminating its agreement with the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and other countries to accept suspected Somali pirates for prosecution, or would otherwise cease doing
so, on the grounds that the nation was bearing an excessive part of the counter-piracy burden and was not
106 After receiving international assurances of additional support, Kenya has
continued to accept transferred pirates for prosecution on an ad hoc basis. In November 2010, a Kenyan trial
court ruled in the case In re Mohamud Mohamed Hashi, et al., that Kenya had no jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes occurring outside Kenya’s territorial waters, which threw a substantial wrench in the counter-piracy
prosecution machinery.107 Fortunately, in October 2012, the Kenyan Court of Appeal in Nairobi reversed the
waters. A number of surveyed counter-piracy participants indicated that there is no prospect of prosecuting
On the other hand, and despite the ISS assessment, a number of community members believe that higher-level
pirates can be prosecuted in Seychelles, with substantial international assistance. The Seychelles islands’
piracy effort has been the most proactive in the region, with its own Seychelles Piracy Intelligence Centre
(SPIC) doing solid work. As discussed below, the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Coordination
Centre, a partnership involving the United Kingdom, Seychelles, The Netherlands, the United
closer, more effective working relationship. As of late 2013, RAPPICC was slated to become part of a new
Seychelles government agency called the Transnational Crime and Maritime Security Centre, with a broader
focus on transnational organized crime and maritime security, including piracy.
The other countries in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region which have had some training and/or experience
in prosecuting piracy cases include Mauritius and Tanzania. Mauritius is currently prosecuting 12 suspected
pirates apprehended by EU naval forces. Tanzania has agreed to take piracy cases and there has been some
training and other efforts there, but no prosecutions to date. As of December 2012, Yemen and India had
prosecuted (or were prosecuting) 129 and 119 piracy cases, respectively,108 but neither country was featured
in survey conversations in response to general questions concerning regional counter-piracy efforts and the
contributions by various countries.
Other National Counter-Piracy Efforts:
Outside the East Africa/Indian Ocean region, in Europe and North America, the most active law enforcement
and prosecution efforts, according to those surveyed, are in the United States, the Netherlands, Germany,
and Belgium, with other countries also making contributions. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom
and Denmark, do not prosecute any piracy cases in their national systems.
In the United States, maritime piracy policy is primarily set and implemented by the State Department
and the Department of Defense.109 The State Department’s capable Donna Hopkins, who is Coordinator
of the Counter Piracy and Maritime Security section in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, has
played a leading role together with other State Department personnel. In the Justice Department, piracy
cases are monitored by the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section, and are primarily
and the Southern District of New York. The principal investigative and prosecuting agencies are the United
U.S. has convicted the highest-level pirates to date—two pirate ransom negotiators—and is believed to
be engaged in ongoing investigations against possible pirate leaders. As mentioned elsewhere, NCIS,
investigations, working with or through INTERPOL.
work of prosecutor Henny Baan. In addition to prosecuting other piracy cases to date, the Netherlands
“Nemesis,” which is supported by Europol, Eurojust, and INTERPOL. Germany has also been involved
in other investigations. Belgium, Denmark, and Italy have also been active in investigating, prosecuting,
and/or supporting piracy cases, with the notable recent arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan in Belgium. In
Asia, Japan and South Korea have been the most active in prosecuting piracy cases.
The Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia:
Given its nature and circumstances, and faced with considerable limitations,
the CGPCS has been effective on a wide range of fronts. In its broadest
scope, it has succeeded in building and fostering an ongoing counter-piracy
community and providing a venue or vehicle for better communication
and information-sharing, which is no small accomplishment. On the law
enforcement/prosecution side, in particular with reference to Working Groups 2 and 5, it has succeeded
in improving and facilitating the prosecution of pirates interdicted at sea, substantially contributing to
the overall prosecution effort in connection with the approximate 1,200 prosecutions to date. Community
members believe that much of the Contact Group’s success has been due to its having a clear, shared goal
and its inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders, including industry and non-government organizations.
In the earliest days of the CGPCS, the law enforcement-related working groups suffered a common
phenomenon among international conferences and “states-parties” gatherings: being heavy on foreignservice
representatives and academics and light on criminal law practitioners. Working Group 2, however,
under its capable Chair, Danish Ambassador Thomas Winkler, took on an increasingly practical and pragmatic
character and its membership over time has evolved, with an increasing number of prosecutors and investigators.
At the same time, Working Group 2 was in basically the same situation as law enforcement generally; being
behind the curve and playing catch-up in a generally reactive mode: “The navies are apprehending pirates
“What do we do about underage pirates?” “What do we do about evidence collection?” etc. In response,
Working Group 2 and its members worked successfully to produce some guidance for investigations and
prosecutions, including a “prosecutor’s toolkit.” Working Group 2 must also be commended for its work,
with others, in putting transfer agreements in place that provide for the transfer of apprehended suspected
pirates to various national jurisdictions for prosecution, and for other agreements for transferring convicted
pirates from prosecuting jurisdictions (e.g., Seychelles) to Somalia for the purpose of serving their sentences.
Working Group 2 has also wrestled with the issue of private armed security on vessels.110 Working Group
5, with an evolving mandate to focus on pirate leaders and networks, was slow in getting established, and it
must be remembered that neither Working Group 2 nor Working Group 5 are operational—that is, they do not
themselves investigate or prosecute pirates, but at best only coordinate, share information, and encourage.
of becoming established as part of the existing groups or perhaps as a spin-off.
Several community members indicated that the principal value of the Contact Group has been in some of the
working groups, and that overall, most of the plenary sessions have added little value. During most periods,
there was no real direction from the plenary, and most of the plenary meetings quickly became routine and
provided few fresh ideas.111 One member summed this up by saying that most of the plenary meetings were
“little more than diplomats reading prepared statements.”
Of course, as mentioned, the Contact Group is essentially a volunteer
organization with limited ability to focus on and drive action. Like all
volunteer organizations, it is ultimately dependent on the goodwill and
contributions of its members, some of which are more effective than
others. As one community member stated, “you are dependent on the
states and other members, on people actually doing something.” While
“it is important not to overstate the extent to which naming and shaming have generated compliance” with
international programs and activities to improve counter-piracy efforts, such as improving national piracy
laws and implementation of best practices.112 A possible shortcoming of the Contact Group’s more informal
approach is the absence of a regular process for feedback or evaluation. Concerns have also been expressed
lessons learned to be carried forward.
UNODC:
piracy efforts, with some of those surveyed considering UNODC to have played the lead law enforcement
role, albeit in a capacity-building arena. UNODC’s counter-piracy work has involved three objectives: (1)
(mainly taken forward by [the UN Development Program], but with UNODC support).”113 UNODC is
widely considered successful in its regional capacity-building and in its support for the prosecution of
low-level pirates, with its counter-piracy budget growing from approximately $6 million several years
ago to $200 million in 2013. It has been helpful in drafting and implementing detainee and prisoner
transfer agreements, conducting regional training programs, providing funds for defense counsel for
suspected pirates, and facilitating the transportation of witnesses to regional court proceedings. Several
in the region, taking practical steps on the ground, and cutting through red tape. While UNODC believes
the prosecution of pirate leaders has not been a central part of its mission.
INTERPOL:
INTERPOL is an international intergovernmental organization which facilitates international police
cooperation. It is not an operational law enforcement agency and has no police powers of its own. It
also plugs knowledge gaps about pirate networks.”114 While its counter-piracy unit is small, INTERPOL
has played an important role as a conduit between law enforcement and the shipping industry and
in improving and coordinating crime scene investigations with NCIS. As discussed, however, the
INTERPOL database has been problematic. A number of those surveyed complained about the process
has substantially declined.” As a result, the database’s management was returned to Washington, D.C. in
July 2013, but resources for operating the system appear to remain limited.
INTERPOL has engaged in Evidence Exploitation Initiative (EVEXI) projects to “[provide] regional
investigators with an INTERPOL-supported procedure for intelligence gathering, evidence collection
and information sharing.”115116
time ago, with EVEXI-2 recently begun in collaboration with Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Mauritius,
and Tanzania. Prior to the establishment of RAPPICC, INTERPOL worked with authorities in Seychelles
(including the SPIC) to collect a variety of evidence, but most community members surveyed were not
familiar with any INTERPOL synthesis or analysis of counter-piracy information and evidence.
Europol and Eurojust:
Europol is an organization similar to INTERPOL, acting in a criminal intelligence, information-sharing,
and coordination role, obviously focused on the European Union. While it is not itself an operational law
enforcement body, it is more closely involved in investigations and investigation-related analysis and
support work than INTERPOL is, at least in the area of maritime piracy. Europol has an analytical group
dedicated to piracy, and operates and collects information for its own piracy database. For the past 18
months, it has provided active, hands-on support and analysis to the joint Dutch-German investigation
“Nemesis.” Eurojust, in turn, is the prosecution counterpart to Europol, facilitating cooperation between
European prosecution authorities. Eurojust facilitates an annual coordination meeting among its members
related to piracy prosecutions, and recently issued a monitoring report on piracy cases and best practices.
RAPPICC:
March 2013, pursuant to a Memoranda of Understanding between the UK and Seychelles. Other international
participants in and supporters of RAPPICC include Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States. Various
RAPPICC constitutional documents describe three objectives or functions: (1) “To catalyse and facilitate
the sharing and development of intelligence”; (2) “To support investigations and prosecutions”; and (3) “To
build capacity, competence and capabilities” in the Indian Ocean/East Africa region.117 Like INTERPOL
and Europol, RAPPICC has been, until recently, an intergovernmental information-sharing and coordination
body with no police powers of its own. The UK has seconded two prosecutors to RAPPICC who assist
and participate in piracy prosecutions in the courts of Seychelles. Apart from intelligence-gathering and
capacity-building, a principal concept behind RAPPICC is that it will integrate and coordinate international
and regional actors in assembling intelligence and evidentiary packages that will be provided to national law
enforcement authorities for further investigation and prosecution.118
consensus that an international focal point for synthesizing pirate information and evidence has not existed to
date and is clearly needed, the community largely considers RAPPICC to be a new unknown and has expressed
concerns about the possibility of additional duplication and fragmentation of counter-piracy efforts. As of
late September 2013, RAPPICC was transitioning from being an intergovernmental organization to being a
government agency of Seychelles, with a broader mandate which will still include piracy issues.
but also Kenya, Seychelles, and other regional states, lacked the naval, law enforcement, and judicial capacity
to deal with maritime crime in and around their territorial waters. In both Somalia and Nigeria, which has a
substantial history of maritime crime and where the highest incidence of maritime crime is now occurring,
“[c]rime and corruption on shore are rampant,” despite billions of dollars in past international aid, capacitybuilding,
and assistance.119 Despite or because of this, the international community, either deliberately or by
default, made a decision to base the counter-piracy law enforcement and prosecution effort primarily in the
general, non-specialized local courts in the national criminal justice systems of East Africa and the Indian
Ocean—even knowing that there was not, and would not be at any reasonable foreseeable time, any capacity
As UNODC’s
Alan Cole, one of the most effective actors in the counter-piracy community, has stated, the international
community’s “use of the Regional Prosecutions Model was adopted largely by default,” and it “cannot address
the apparent impunity of those who organize piracy.”120
While a number of important factors support capacity-building, such as nationbuilding
and regional security, capacity-building can be, and often is, expensive,
121
In fact, “[s]ome efforts, such as the major focus on making regional states
responsible for adjudicating the piratical activities of other neighboring states,
are not supported by maritime tradition, international treaty obligations, or even a reasonable expectation that
they can develop the capacity needed for an effective response.”122
1 Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia website, “About CGPCS, Mission,” http://www.thecgpcs.org/
about.do? action=mission (July 29, 2013) (hereafter “Contact Group website”) (emphasis added).
2 UNODC Piracy Programme, Issue 10 (December 2012), at 9-10.
3 “SAC Capital Pleads Guilty in Criminal Court,” Reuters, November 8, 2013; Press Release, United States Attorney’s
4 See, e.g., Roger Middleton, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars” (Chatham House
Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam
in the Horn of Africa
Pirates and Terrorists,” California Law Review 98 (2010); Douglas Guilfoyle, “Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and
Human Rights,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59 (2010); The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat,
Rebuilding a Nation (World Bank, 2013), hhtp://www.worldbank.org/africa/piratesofsomalia; Ved Nanda, “Maritime
Piracy: How Can International Law and Policy Address this Growing Global Menace?” (Denv. J. Int’l Law & Policy,
February 2011) (“Global Menace”); Kaija Hurlburt and D. Conor Seyle, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy, 2012
5 The interviews were conducted under the “Chatham House Rule,” which provides that those involved in a conversation
that of any other participant, may be revealed,” or at least not without further permission, “as an aid to free discussion.”
See the Chatham House website, www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/about-chatham-house.
6 Burden-Sharing, at 7.
7 Burden-Sharing, at 11.
8 Piracy Off the Somali Coast
9 See, e.g., Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment
Organized Crime (September 2013) (identifying maritime piracy as serious organized crime and, aside from foreign aid
and remittances, Somalia’s largest source of foreign exchange), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/
Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities Off the
Horn of Africa
Task Force], 2013) (“Pirate Trails”) at 2-3, 10-15, 47-50 (Somali piracy is carried out by criminal networks involving
Speech by U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Thomas Kelly,
October 25, 2012 (“As piracy has evolved into an organized transnational criminal enterprise, it is increasingly clear
term counter-piracy goals”); Pierre St. Helaire [Head of INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy Task Force], “Somali Piracy:
Following the Paper Trail” (June 2012) (organized pirate criminal networks include leaders, organizers organizers,
A. Shortland, The Business of Piracy in Somalia (2011), at 14-23, https://www.diw.de/ documents/ publikationen/73/
The Globalization of Crime, A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,
10 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), at 23, para. 68.
11 UN Press Statement, Press Conference by Special Advisor on Legal Issues Related to Somalia Piracy, January 25,
2011.
12 The Gulf of Aden, southeast of the Suez Canal, and the larger Somali Basin are strategically located where East meets
West, with more than 22,000 vessels transiting the area each year, carrying 8% of the world’s trade and 12% of the
total oil transported by sea. Global Menace, at 178.
13 Jeffrey Gettleman, “The Pirates Are Winning!,” New York Review of Books (September 14, 2010).
14 IMO Assembly Resolution A. 922(22) (November 2001). The IMO’s activities related to piracy date to at least 1983,
when the IMO Assembly adopted a resolution on measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
IMO Assembly Resolution A.545 (November 17, 1983).
15 International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.922(22) (November 29, 2001) (emphasis added).
16 International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.922(22) (November 29, 2001).
17 International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.1002(25) (November 29, 2007) (emphasis added).
18 UN Security Council Resolution 1816, S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). Participants at the June 2013 Tokyo International
Conference on African Development “agreed that resolving cross-border issues such as piracy [is] essential to achieving a
stable African continent.” Report of the Secretary General on the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at
Sea Off the Coast of Somalia, S/2013/623 (October 21, 2013) (“Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report”), para. 33.
most important and potentially empowering actions that the UN Security Council can take, the Security Council’s Chapter
Somalia’s sovereignty (despite the absence of a functioning government), require permission from Somalia’s Transitional
Federal Government in order for States to take actions on Somalia’s territory or in its territorial waters, and make it clear that
the Chapter VII authorizations apply only to Somalia and should not be interpreted as customary law. With these conditions
and limitations, the Chapter VII authorization did not in fact create any new legal rights or abilities for international actors
concerning Somali piracy. See Burden-Sharing, at 17; Maritime Piracy, at 73.
20 Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities Off the Horn of Africa (World Bank [together with
Pirate Trails”), at 39 (emphasis
added).
21 Burden-Sharing, at 8-9.
22 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 6.
23 Burden-Sharing, at 8-9.
24 Pirate Trails, at 1.
25 Burden-Sharing, at 8-9. See also The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2010 (One Earth Future Foundation, 2011) (“2010
Cost”); The Economic Cost of Piracy 2011 (One Earth Future Foundation, 2012) (“2011 Cost”); The Economic Cost of
Piracy 2012 (One Earth Future Foundation, 2013) (“2012 Cost”).
26 Pirate Trails, at 33. See also Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 6 (reporting, inter alia, that $63.5
million was spent in 2012 alone on the costs of “ransom delivery, vessel damage from time in captivity and the fees of
negotiators, consultants and attorneys, as well as the ransoms”).
27 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 29.
28 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 9.
29 Burden-Sharing, at 9.
30 Two important matters must be considered in dealing with insider evidence. First, proper care must always be taken
and diligence exercised in dealing with insiders, including the exercise of a healthy degree of skepticism in judging the
credibility of the person and his evidence, which may include assessing his motives in providing such evidence, looking
for corroborating evidence, etc. Dealing with such elements as rewards and other possible inducements “in exchange” for a
person’s evidence must also be handled with care. To urge and exercise caution, however, is not to say that it should not be
done, and in fact such evidence is developed and used in most criminal justice systems on virtually a daily basis. Second,
developing insider evidence, especially in connection with violent crime or in an overall violent or potentially violent
environment, may often require or raise the issue of witness protection. A potentially valuable insider witness will often
be reluctant to cooperate with authorities if he fears retaliation against himself or his family if or when his cooperation
the relocation of the witness and his family. That such a program may involve additional costs is no serious strike against
of witnesses requiring protection in any given case will likely be small, as even the testimony of two or three well-placed
31 Again, in the context of the Yugoslavia war crimes investigations, it was ultimately found that there were various military
intercept programs being employed by all sides and also other ways in which important meetings and conversations were
recorded, and many such intercepts and recordings became important ICTY evidence. It turned out, for instance,
and other senior Bosnian Croat political and military leaders, including, as an example, a conversation discussing
“providing proof that we are giving the orders there.” , No. IT-04-74-T, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecution Exh. P06831.
piece by piece, a document collection involving millions of pages, much of which became critical evidence in the
Praljak and others, where Praljak made the nationalist Croats’ territorial goals abundantly clear and informed all of
, No. IT-04-74-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecution
Exh. P11376.
33 Landelijk Parket
Do?” http//www.om.nl/onderwerpen/international-crimes/what-does-the/.
34 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Combating the Scourge of Piracy,” New York, New York, December 18, 2008;
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/12/113269.htm (emphasis added).
35 See generally the Contact Group website, at www.thecgpcs.org.
36 Contact Group website, About CGPCS; Burden-Sharing, at 19.
37 Burden-Sharing, at 11-12.
38 Burden-Sharing, at 28.
39 At the Contact Group’s request, the UN Secretary-General established an international piracy trust fund in January
2010. Established as a voluntary mechanism open to contributions from governments, industry, and others, the fund
seeks to “help defray expenses associated with the prosecution of suspected pirates and other activities related to
implementing contact group objectives.” Burden-Sharing, at 27. “By June 2010, the trust fund had approved seven
projects, six of which concerned strengthening prosecution in Seychelles, Kenya, Somaliland, and Puntland. The
seventh concerned strategic communications dissemination with local partners . . . By the end of 2012, the fund had
received $16.5 million [about the size of three pirate ransoms in 2011], and $12.12 million had been dispersed for a
total of 27 approved projects, all or virtually all of which relate to regional capacity-building and not to prosecuting
pirate leaders.” Burden-Sharing, at 27.
40 See generally Burden-Sharing, at 15, 29-30.
41 Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007).
42 Burden-Sharing, at 33.
43 Burden-Sharing, at 33.
44 Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons
Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para.
1.
45 Annex II, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), paras. 9-10.
46 Annex II, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), paras. 8-9; Burden-Sharing, at 23.
47 Maritime Piracy, at 100. See also Global Menace, at 206-07.
48 Burden Sharing, at 23.
49 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011).
50 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 118 (footnote omitted).
51 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 78.
52 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), Summary at 2; Report, paras. 122-23.
53 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), Summary at 3; Report, para. 135.
54 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 123.
55 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011).
56 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), para. 10 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
57 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), para. 96 (emphasis added).
58 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), paras. 9, 52-59; SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), paras. 18, 23, 45.
Opposition to a specialized piracy court in Puntland was apparently based in part on concerns regarding alleged connections
between the local Puntland authorities and pirate bosses. Burden-Sharing, at 23.
many of them were, or may have been, charged as various domestic crimes in territorial waters. See Penalties for Piracy,
years and are included here (and elsewhere) as piracy cases.
60 See, e.g., Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012):
Somalia (June 19, 2013), Annexes 3.1.c and 3.1.d; Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1853 (2010), at 35-43; “UK-Seychelles Partnership Sprouts RAPPICC,” http://www.neptunemarinetimessecurity.
61 See, e.g., “UK, US Pledge Added Support to RAPPICC,” http://maryvonnepoolseychelles.blogspot. com/2013/ 05.uk-uspledge-
added-support-rappicc.html (May 3, 2013) (“We have already issued four international warrants for the arrests of
several people”).
62 Some observers have raised questions whether these transfers-for-prosecution are legal. The UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea “only speaks of prosecution by the courts of the captor nations. Arguments have been made that UNCLOS does
not authorize such transfers, and the practice has raised some controversy. . . . Art. 105 of UNCLOS does not establish a
general universal jurisdiction, but rather one limited to the ‘jurisdiction of the state that carried out the seizure.’” Penalties
for Piracy, at 4 (footnotes omitted). The above practice has nonetheless been widely accepted and is considered standard
practice.
63 Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Security
Council document S/2011/30, January 25, 2011, at 13.
to prosecute and imprison those captured by the multinational forces.” Penalties for Piracy, at 2.
65 In terms of the number or volume of prosecutions, “African states have taken the primary responsibility . . . , followed
by Asian and Middle Eastern states, European states, and North America.” Burden-Sharing, at 30. One national law
enforcement system in Europe reported receiving approximately 150 pirate incident reports in recent years. For a variety of
prosecutions emerged from these reports.
66 “[The principle of] [n]on-refoulement [that is, not returning asylum seekers or refugees to places where their life or liberty
would be at risk] has made many Europeans hesitant about bringing pirates to their shores because they are afraid that once
their jail terms are over it will not be possible to send pirates home. There is no basis for this fear[,] as non-refoulement
does not apply to violent criminals -- there is no prohibition to return individuals convicted of serious crimes to their home
countries. In Europe, individuals convicted of piracy are neither subject to the rules of non-refoulement nor are they eligible
for asylum. This is not the case for those suspects found not guilty, however, and while there is no legal restriction, popular
sentiment will often not allow deportations regardless of the suspect’s innocence or guilt.” Maritime Piracy, at 67.
attention is paid to the well-being of seafarers in captivity and their families . . .” Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy
Report, para. 73 “In November 2012, the Board [of the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia] approved, on an exceptional basis, the Hostage Support Programme, to provide humanitarian assistance
to hostages.” Id., para. 29. “Security Council Resolution 1950 (2010) provides that seafarers must have an opportunity to
give evidence in criminal proceedings. Their security must be guaranteed during the trial in order to remove any fear
of reprisals.” Lang Report, para. 62. “Seafarers’ contracts could include clauses providing compensation for giving
evidence and enshrining the right to do so, which could be enforceable against the employer.” Id.
68 See Jon Huggins & Liza Kane-Hartnett, Somali Piracy - Are We at the End Game? (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2013)
(“End Game”), at 12.
69 Communique from the Contact Group’s First Plenary Session, January 14, 2009, available at the Contact Group’s
website, at http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=3.
70 Burden-Sharing, at 11-12.
71 International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.922(22) (November 29, 2001) (emphasis added).
72 Burden-Sharing, at 20.
73 The Secretary-General reported these efforts in his October 21, 2013 report: “Also in April, the Chairs of Working
Group 2 and Working Group 5 hosted, with INTERPOL, a special meeting of piracy prosecutors and investigators
intended to facilitate information-sharing among law enforcement agencies to target key piracy organizers and
Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 27.
74 As an example, INTERPOL fought hard, and successfully, to have language emphasizing the need to prosecute
75 As of early 2012, ‘no one ha[d] [yet been able to track the money . . .” Maritime Piracy, at 87. “Low-level pirates
typically receive a standard fee of between US$30,000 and US$75,000 (which would amount to about 0.01-0.25
bulk of the ransom, an estimated 30-75% of the total ransom payment depending on the Somali piracy business
model.” Pirate Trails, at 3.
76 As of late 2011, “[t]wo main networks were initially active, one to the north of Puntland and one to the south. Those
networks have apparently broken up, after the reinvestment by certain pirates of a proportion of the ransoms. About
10 instigators may be active currently, mostly in Puntland.” Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 95.
77 See footnote 86, infra.
78 See DefenceWeb, “German Dutch investigation team to combat piracy in Somali waters” (November 25, 2011), http://
to-combat-piracy-in-somali-waters.
79 “Best management practices,” in connection with counter-piracy, include increased vigilance, “vessel hardening”
techniques (such as secured stairs and passageways, the use of perimeter razor wire and water cannon or hoses, a
ship “citadel” or safe room (where a ship’s crew can take refuge pending naval or law enforcement intervention) and
enhanced bridge protection), re-routing (to avoid or minimize exposure to higher risk areas) and steaming at higher
speeds.
80 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), para. 65.
81 In the earlier part of East Africa’s counter-piracy efforts, the more basic types of information that most detained or
convicted low-level pirates could provide was more valuable in increasing law enforcement’s understanding of pirate
operations. However, as knowledge of piracy operations has increased, much of the more basic information is now
less valuable. In fact, many of the lowest-level or foot soldier pirates “talk” -- in the sense of being debriefed by law
enforcement, providing information, etc., but they often have little or no information about higher-level pirate leaders
82 In the law enforcement industry and body of law concerning communication interception, such interceptions are
considered “consensual” because at least one party to the conversation (here the ship owner or insurance company) is
aware of and has consented to the surveillance and recording. In many systems, including the U.S., no court order or
approval is needed for law enforcement-related consensual surveillance and recording.
83 Of course, various communication surveillance or interception activities may raise legal issues, and should be
considered and implemented with full attention to relevant legal requirements, ethical rules and rules of evidence.
84 See generally Douglas Guilfoyle, Treaty Jurisdiction over Pirates: A Compilation of Legal Texts with Introductory
Notes, prepared for the 3rd meeting of [Contact Group] Working Group 2 on legal Issues, Copenhagen, 26-27 August 2009.
85 The UN’s Lang Report, discussed infra, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), states at para. 48: “There is no lack of legal bases
allowing States to exercise universal jurisdiction. General international law provides for multiple forms of jurisdiction
repression of piracy to the fullest possible extent . . .”
86 An international registry operating through the UN or a UN body “could assume the responsibility for implementation and
enforcement of maritime standards and criminal investigation and prosecution” and the “funding for such a registry could
be obtained through [registration fees] . . .” Maritime Piracy, at 113. Such an authority could either prosecute cases in
national courts, applying international law, or in any international tribunal with jurisdiction, as might even be set up as part
of an overall scheme for regulation and law enforcement jurisdiction over maritime activity.
87 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 74.
88 See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties of Piracy (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012) (“Penalties for Piracy”). The
Secretary-General reported in October 2013 that globally, pirate sentences range from two to 24 years [apparently not
including life sentences] and that the average sentence is twelve years’ imprisonment. Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali
Piracy Report, para. 47. The problem with the average is the large overall range, and the average is skewed by heavy
89 See generally Penalties for Piracy, at 12-14, particularly at 12-13 (footnote omitted):
piratical earnings.
prospect of being released while still young. On the contrary, the differences in quality of life between Somalia and the
West mean that a prison in the latter is like a palace in the former. Interviews with pirates facing trial in the Netherlands
million dollars . . .”
90 See also Douglas Guilfoyle, “Prosecuting Pirates: The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Governance
and International Law,” Global Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February 2013), at 74 (footnote omitted): “Despite contrary reports,
law in prosecuting pirates. . . . The problems involved arise largely from a lack of national implementation and the ordinary
91 Both nationally and internationally, there has been “a patchwork of military and civilian institutions interfacing with
shipping, leading to issues of overlap and duplication.” Burden-Sharing, at 15. “The glaring institutional gaps pertaining
to information sharing, leadership, and coordination among relevant actors at the international level imposed serious
constraints on mounting an effective response. These gaps were compounded by existing gaps in enforcing compliance.”
Id. at 15.
provided valuable service in acting as a sort of “ringmaster” has not been replicated in the newer UN Assistance Mission in
Somalia (UNSOM) which replaced UNPOS.
93 Communique from the Contact Group’s First Plenary Session, January 14, 2009, available at the Contact Group’s website,
at http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=3.
94 End Game, at 8.
95 End Game, at 8.
96 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 145.
97 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 147 (emphasis added).
98 End Game, at 6 (describing the patrolling naval forces’ heavy reliance “on expensive intelligence and surveillance assets”);
at 7 (discussing military cooperation “to ensure optimal deployment of surveillance platforms”).
99 Burden-Sharing, at 28. Shipping companies have also voiced concern about information provided to or learned by law
enforcement authorities being used to their legal or commercial disadvantage. For example, an investigation might show
that an attacked vessel failed to follow best management practices or to deploy reasonable available countermeasures,
which might cause an insurance carrier to deny coverage.
other countries (by which it agreed to accept suspected Somali pirates for prosecution) in October 2010 on the grounds
but has continued to accept pirates for prosecution on an ad hoc basis. CNN, “Kenya Ends Agreement with EU to
Prosecute Suspected Somali Pirates” (October 4, 2010). “It is problematic to ask some States to keep up their efforts
when the burden is not shared.” Lang Report, para. 72.
101 “[T]he kingpins of piracy are well-connected elites within Somalia and abroad . . .” Burden-Sharing, at 10. “Somalia’s
prospects for stabilization and effective governance have fallen prey to political and commercial ‘elites’ who
appropriate, privatize and criminalize the core functions of the Somali state, enriching themselves while perpetuating
a political economy of state collapse.” Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security
further undermining efforts to establish a legitimate government.” Pirate Trails, at 28. “In Somalia, [the network of
Id. at 50.
102 Illustrating the possible differences in priorities, several community members voiced the view that should some of
the same persons who have been involved in maritime piracy move into other criminal enterprises perceived to have
a greater negative impact on a particular country’s economy, such as kidnapping tourists for ransom as opposed to
hijacking commercial vessels 50 miles at sea, some governments might be more motivated to investigate and prosecute
103 Institute for Security Studies, Preliminary Observations on Responses to Organized Crime (2010), available at http://
www.issafrica.org/uploads/21Apr2010OCML.pdf.
104 Global Menace, at 202.
105 BBC News Africa, “Q&A: What do you do with a captured pirate?” (January 25, 2011).
106 Jurist, “UN Announces Opening of New Kenya Courtroom for Piracy Trials” (June 25, 2010); Jurist, “UN Announces
$9.3 Million in Donations to Fund Piracy Courts” (June 15, 2010); CNN, “Kenya Ends Agreement with EU to Prosecute
Suspected Somali Pirates” (October 4, 2010).
107 Christian Science Monitor, “Landmark Kenya Ruling Could See Dozens of Somali Pirates Set Free” (Nov. 10, 2010).
108 UNODC, Counter Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, Issue 10
(December 2012), at 9-10.
109 President George W. Bush signed the U.S. policy on maritime piracy in 2007 and in December 2008, the U.S. National
Security Council issued a document titled Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan. See
Global Menace, at 197.
110 The use of what the shipping industry and counter-piracy community have come to call “Privately Contracted Armed
Security Personnel” (PCASP) has been controversial. While the use of private armed security on commercial vessels
initially encountered fairly extensive opposition, it has come to be more broadly accepted (or at least tolerated) as,
There are estimates that up to 60% of the ships transiting the East Africa/Indian Ocean region in the past few years
employ private armed security teams. The use of private armed security raises a number of issues concerning the
use of force, “professional” standards, accountability and legal liability, with the regulation of these matters, to date,
confused with uniformed military security teams which have been placed on some vessels, which are known as Vessel
Protection Detachments, or VPDs. Both practices, however, raise at least some similar issues concerning the use of
MT Enrica Lexie
Penal Code and the case is still pending. More recently, in October 2013, Indian authorities arrested the crew of a
the crew failed to produce documentation authorizing them to carry or transport weapons and ammunition in Indian
waters, with the resolution of this incident also still pending.
111 Burden-Sharing, at 38.
112 Burden-Sharing, at 34.
113 Evaluation of UNODC’s Counter Piracy Programme combating maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian
Ocean, Independent Evaluation Unit, June 2013 (XAMT72, XEAX20, XSSX11, SOMX54, MUSX55, XEAX67), at 6.
114 Burden-Sharing, at 32.
115 INTERPOL website, http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Maritime-piracy/Operational-support.
116 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para.11.
117 Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Seychelles (February 2012), RAPPICC Partnership Arrangement,
Annex A, RAPPICC Operating Model, at 1.
118 As stated in Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 54: “The Centre will develop regional expertise to track
UNODC is providing logistical and training support to the Centre. With the support of Norway, INTERPOL seconded an
119 Maritime Piracy, at 99-100. “Unlike the situation in Somalia, a government exists in Nigeria, but massive corruption at all
Piracy and kidnapping . . . [are] rampant.” Maritime Piracy, at 99.
(September 2013).
121 Maritime Piracy, at 107.
122 Maritime Piracy, at 122.
123 Maritime Piracy, at 67-68.
124 Maritime Piracy, at 110.
125 Annex III, SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), para. 4; SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), paras. 4, 17-21.
126 Annex III, SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), para. 4
127 SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), para. 20.
128 SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), para. 16.
129 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), paras. 30, 87.
130 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), paras. 42, 94. A detailed review of the proposed multi-year development
construction and equipment, requiring basic legislation, the construction of police stations and courtrooms, the recruitment
of an additional twelve prosecutors, etc., all of which required the extensive use of international experts and personnel. SG
Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), paras. 116-17.
131 SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), para. 13 (emphasis added).
132 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), Annex IV, para. 5 (emphasis added).
133 In his January 2012 report, the Secretary-General emphasized again the need for substantially greater “participation and/
or assistance by international judges, prosecutors and other legal professionals . . .” SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20,
2012), para. 126. See also Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 117
crucial to raise legal practices to the level of international standards”); para. 120 (“International support will be crucial
. . . [A]n internationally supported extraterritorial Somali court would be the vehicle for legal capacity-building by the
international community in Somalia”); para. 134 (“International support should help provide such new courts with all the
available expertise to enhance the expertise of judges, prosecutors and defence counsel”) (footnote omitted).
134 SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), paras. 43-47.
135 SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), para. 66.
136 Maritime Piracy, at 95.
137 Maritime Piracy, at 108.
138 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), at 22, para. 67 (emphasis added). Other observers
have noted: “With the number of successful attacks declining, the willingness of governments to improve coordination
is decreasing. It’s good that the number of crew taken is decreasing but it is reducing the pressure on governments to
will decrease. Burden-Sharing, at 38.
139 Maritime Piracy, at 106-07.
140 The international community has a responsibility to intervene where “serious harm” is being done to a state’s population
and “the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it.” International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) [ICISS],
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf, at XI.
141 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677 (January 12, 2009), at 9 (the
international community has a responsibility to take “decisive” action “when a State is manifestly failing to” protect
its population). In a real sense, the shipping and insurance industries have already applied a complementarity concept
self-help, in employing private armed security and other measures on ships passing through pirate areas.
142 While some major maritime states could perhaps do more to investigate and prosecute piracy, there is no reason to
believe that an even more diffuse, multiplicitous and fragmented counter-piracy effort would be productive.
143 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para 36.
144 As part of the prosecutions in the United States concerning the S/V Quest incident, the guilty pleas of eleven pirate
imprisonment. Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 46.
smuggling, etc.
146 See generally Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning
Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, S/2010/394 (July 26,
2010), Annex I, Existing Practice of the United Nations in Establishing and Participating in United Nations and
United Nations Assisted Tribunals, and the Experience of Other Relevant Judicial Mechanisms.
147 “Tribunal fatigue” is sometimes used as a shorthand reference to international community concerns that the various
international criminal courts and tribunals since 1993 have, in some assessments, been cumbersome, slow and
expensive.
148 Annex II, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 8. See also Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 78 (“Most
States believe that [an international tribunal] would not be well suited to the ordinary crime of piracy”).
149 2010 Cost, at 16; 2011 Cost, at 2; 2012 Cost, at 3.
pirate -- sixteen years’ imprisonment -- is exactly on par with the average sentences for crimes against humanity
and war crimes at the ICTY, East Timor and Kosovo tribunals, although less than the average sentence at the ICTR.
Penalties for Piracy, at 10.
151 SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 110.
152 SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 100.
153 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 7 (footnote omitted).
154 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 7.
155 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 8.
156 While it has potential ancillary jurisdiction over other, related attacks, the principal jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon is limited to the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the February 14, 2005 bombing
Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26,
2010), para. 11.
157 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 11; see also the Special Tribunal for Lebanon website, http://www.stl-tsl.org.
158 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 13.
159 See the ICTY Statute, Article 9; ICTR Statute, Article 8.
160 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 7 (footnote omitted). An international mechanism would likely defer to a national
prosecution where there was clear capacity in the national system to prosecute the particular case, but assert its primacy
concerning the prosecution of a pirate leader that might be initiated in a jurisdiction with doubtful capacity to handle the
case.
161 Indeed, while an international mechanism could handle some of the smaller- or medium-sized cases itself, such prosecutions
could also be coordinated with and conducted in national courts, where both appropriate and effective.
162 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 23.
163 Maritime Piracy, at 101.
164 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 28.
165 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 28. On the establishment of a Chapter VII mechanism, see generally SG Report,
S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), Summary at 4; para. 97.
166 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 28.
167 SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011), para. 10 (footnote omitted); paras. 94-96.
168 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 30; SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 99.
169 SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 99.
170 SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 99.
171 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 60.
172 See, e.g., ICTY Rules of Procedure & Evidence, Part Three, Section 6 (The Prosecutor), Part Four, Section 1 (Investigations),
Part Five, Section 1 (Indictments), Section 2 (Orders and Warrants), Section 3 (Preliminary Proceedings), etc.
173 SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), Summary at 4 (disadvantages may include higher costs) and para. 101 (an
international tribunal “not likely to be among the most cost-effective”); Burden-Sharing, at 23.
174 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea, S/2013/413 (July 12, 2013), at 22, para. 65.
175 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), at 8.
176 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), para. 66.
177 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), para. 67.
178 Maritime Piracy, at 108-09.
179 See, e.g., the ICTY Statute, Article 16 (The Prosecutor), Article 18 (Investigation and preparation of indictment); Article 19
(Review of the indictment); and Article 29 (Co-operation and judicial assistance).
180 See, e.g., the ICTY Statute, Article 27 (Enforcement of Sentences) and Article 28.
181 SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), para. 113 (h) (“UNDP and UNODC would assist with recruitment of the
necessary judges, prosecutors, police and other legal professionals, and recruit the necessary international experts, as set
out in the present report”).
182 SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012), para. 113 (e) (“The Security Council would encourage further donations to the
183 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 140.
184 2011 Economic Cost, at 1. Note that out of this approximate $6.6 billion, only $16 million was spent world-wide on
prosecutions and imprisonment. Id. at 2.
185 SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 98.
of the experience gained in the regional state courts in trying pirate cases. First, interviews with community members
who have been closely involved with piracy trials in the region indicate that such trials are generally straightforward
involved at an international mechanism, and indeed, nothing would foreclose a regional prosecutor becoming part
of the international mechanism’s prosecution team. And third, and perhaps most important, the trials of higher-level
pirate leaders at an international court would probably look considerably different than the trials of skiff pirates.
187 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 27.
188 SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), Summary at 4; Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 27 (“All States have
a legal obligation under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to cooperate with [the] ICTY and ICTR”).
189 The ICTY and ICTR require state cooperation and production of evidence not through mutual legal assistance treaties,
but pursuant to their respective statutes and rules. See ICTY Statute, Articles 1, 16, 18 and 29 (1. “States shall cooperate
. . . 2. States shall comply without undue delay . . .”); ICTR Statute, Articles 1, 15, 17 and 28.
190 See the ICTY Statute, Articles 19, 20, 27-29; ICTR Statute, 18, 19, 26-28. As stated in the Secretary-General’s July 2010
report, “[i]t would remain to be determined whether the international tribunal [would] enter into transfer agreements .
. . , or whether the Security Council would wish to determine [the matter of transfers] in its resolution under Chapter
VII.” SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 103.
191 Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 38; also SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 104.
192 This is not to argue that the various international criminal courts since 1993 (such as the ICTY, ICTR, etc.) are models
international proceedings, while remaining faithful to the core values and international standards of due process and
fair trial, but are topics for another paper.
193 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 147 (“The Secretary-General . . . should contemplate the establishment
of an institutional structure to facilitate the implementation of the Security Council resolution under the aegis of a
high-level eminent personality with vast United Nations experience”).
194 Penalties for Piracy, at 1.
195 See United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 554, 565 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“no single court can bring order to various
interpretations of [the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea] . . . Rather, enforcement actions against pirates and
criminal prosecutions . . . are left to individual countries, many of which have different penalties for the crime of
piracy ranging from three years to life in prison”), vacated and remanded, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012). “[O]ne
previously unappreciated advantage of a dedicated international piracy tribunal or chamber would be the elimination
of sentencing disparities.” Penalties for Piracy, at 15. “The disparity in sentencing raises the issue of equity among
defendants, particularly because the defendants are all engaged in similar conduct but their punishments depend on
where they happen to be tried.” Id. at 1.
196 World Bank, Pirate Trails, at 33.
197 Speech by U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Thomas Kelly,
October 25, 2012. In its report released on November 1, 2013, the World Bank states: “While the focus has been
proceeds of piracy are just as important in dealing with the problem.” Pirate Trails, at 34.
198 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Combating the Scourge of Piracy,” New York, New York, December 18, 2008;
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/12/113269.htm.
199 Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 145.
200 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 70.
201 End Game, at 2-3.
202 Burden-Sharing, at 8-9. The recent World Bank study, Pirate Trails, estimates considerably higher piracy economic
costs, of approximately $18 billion a year. Pirates Trails, at 33.
Pirate Trails,
which are “investing the most in militias are reported located in Puntland, where individual cases of operational cooperation
Id.
204 No. 1:11-cr-00106-1 (June 11, 2013).
205 Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 74.
206 Security Council Resolution 2077, S/Res/2077 (November 21, 2012).
Annex 146
“Situation Report – Kenya and the pest of piracy – a prospective partner for peace”,
Institute for Security Studies, 22 February 2012
Lisa Otto 1
SIT UATI ON R E P O R T • F e b ru a r y 2 0 1 2
Lisa Otto1 • 22 February 2012 • [email protected]
Situation report
Institute for Security Studies
Kenya and the
pest of piracy
a prospective partner
for peace
Maritime piracy is a problem that the world has
long been faced with – and one that has again
reared its ugly head more prominently with
the major upswing in pirate activities off the
coast of Somalia since the mid- to late 2000s.
The phenomenon has posed a multi-pronged
threat to global, economic, strategic and
security interests. Since 2008, members of the
international community have come together amid
mounting pressure to tackle the piracy menace.
Yet these efforts, which have mainly taken the
form of advocacy and naval deployment, have
not managed to adequately address the pest of
piracy. In fact, statistics and incident maps show that the
number of piracy attacks (both attempted and successful),
have continued to increase in 2010 and 20112 – pirates
have merely adapted themselves to the naval response,
revising their tactics accordingly. In essence, although the
percentage of successful attacks as a portion of attempted
attacks has dropped, maritime piracy is still a transnational
threat that is very real and that continues to wreak havoc
on the world’s shipping industry, as well as the global and
regional economies.
For Kenya, the threat of piracy is particularly perturbing,
with impacts and effects being felt throughout the country.
There are a number of reasons why piracy should be a
cause for concern to Kenya, and the same reasons should
in turn motivate the international community to engage
Kenya, and the region, as a crucial player in the counterpiracy
effort in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in
future. There has been a resounding call for greater action,
and Kenya is well placed, at least in theory, to be a key
partner in on-going efforts to prevent, curb and, with some
luck, eventually eliminate Somali piracy altogether.
This report, which is based primarily on field research,3
investigates the effects of piracy on Kenya; including the
costs that can be seen at the local level. It also evaluates the
counter-piracy efforts to date, considering specifically the
contributions that Kenya has made thereto. This is further
expanded by considering the ways in which Nairobi could
feed into the offensive against piracy more significantly and
robustly on the domestic, regional and global levels. The
report concludes with a number of recommendations that
encapsulate the varied approach that is needed to ensure a
triumph against the scourge of maritime piracy.
Setting the scene: Kenya and piracy
Kenya has only recently begun to acknowledge the
implications of Somali piracy on its security, strategic and
economic imperatives. With Somalia on its border, and
piracy on its doorstep, Kenya certainly has a vested interest
Annex 146
2 Kenya and the pest of piracy: a prospective partner for peace
I NSTIT U T E F O R S E C U R ITY ST U D I E S
in its neighbour’s state of affairs. Instability has plagued
Somalia for two decades, and stability and security in
this country would go a long way toward the protection
of Kenya’s interests. This is simple geopolitics. The piracy
off Africa’s east coast, which has arisen as a result of this
political upheaval in Somalia and the weakness of its state,
holds a litany of entangled consequences for Kenya.
The benefits to Kenya as a result of piracy are questionable:
the construction boom due to the investment of pirate
money in property in Kenya may conversely have caused
property prices to rise out of the reach of locals. There are
also converse reports on the reported improvement in the
local fishing industry, with piracy having warded off illegal
fishing trawlers. Overall, however, the country has been
suffering economically as a direct result of maritime piracy.
Figures calculated by Inchcape Shipping Services, based in
East Africa,4 estimate that the costs to the shipping industry
in Kenya alone are between US$ 300 million and US$ 400
million a year. The costs of both imports and exports have
risen dramatically due to a piracy surcharge that now has
to be added to shipping tariffs, since insurance companies
have had to inflate their prices to account for the risk
attached to traversing pirate-invested waters. For container
imports estimated at 330 000 teu (twenty-foot equivalent
units) for 2011, an additional US$ 200–300 is added to
costs as a piracy surcharge – thus amounting to an extra
expense nearing US$ 100 million. For dry bulk and liquid
cargoes, which are anticipated to average 13 million tons in
2012, the piracy surcharge raises costs by approximately
US$ 260 million. In the case of exports, this runs to US$
12,6 million.5
The cost to tourism, one of Kenya’s most important
industries, has also been particularly noteworthy. While
security concerns in general have curbed the influx of
tourists, this trend has been exacerbated by recent
kidnappings of tourists in the Lamu archipelago, the Kenyan
incursion into Somalia and two grenade attacks that took
place in Nairobi in October 2011. However, the negative
impacts to the tourism industry that can be linked directly
to piracy relate to the cruise liner business. In 2008 a total
of 35 cruise ships called at Kenyan ports, with hopes that
these numbers might rise to 50. Since then, the number of
The country has been
suffering economically as
a direct result of piracy
cruise liners operating in Kenyan waters has dwindled to
zero. With roughly US$ 300 000 worth of revenue generated
by each call by way of port duties, taxes, immigration,
tourist activities and shopping being lost, the Kenyan
economy is forfeiting an income of about US$ 15 million
a year.6 It can be further extrapolated, in the absence of
supplementary figures, that piracy is indirectly costing the
country’s tourism industry a good deal more than this.
In addition, costs often borne by the local consumer
must also be accounted for – a problem that is worsened
by high levels of unemployment and poverty in Kenya.
Food prices have risen dramatically, with some estimating
that commodities imported by sea are now 10 per cent
more expensive on average than they were the year before,
specifically due to the piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden and
Indian Ocean. This food price inflation has implications
for food security in Kenya and the region as a whole. The
fishing industry, which provides an important source of
protein to local communities, has also been under threat
due to piracy.7
Further to this, the risks and indeed also the costs that
are now associated with doing business in Kenya have
reduced the inflow of foreign currency as investors seek
safer destinations for their capital. Although piracy is not
the exclusive cause hereof, the reduction of foreign direct
investment in the country has tangible ramifications on the
economic well-being of Kenya.8
These indirect costs far outweigh those incurred directly
by piracy in the way of ransoms, which in 2010 brought
in an average of US$ 238 million for the piracy industry.9
Littoral states, particularly those situated adjacent to the
piracy precinct, are having to shoulder significant losses on
account of the phenomenon; and in East Africa, Kenya is
bearing a sizeable portion thereof.
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that a substantial
portion of the upper echelons of pirate gangs or operations
base themselves in Kenya.10 There has certainly been
a visible influx of money, often directed at the property
market in what some suggest is a bid to launder the
money. Bowden observes that, ‘indeed, many pirates are
investing in property … in neighbouring Kenya, thereby
fuelling a construction boom and turning suburbs in
Nairobi and Mombasa into Somali havens’.11 This also
has an inflationary effect on the market. Piracy’s financial
ties to Kenya, however, extend beyond property. There is
emerging evidence that some piracy ransoms may often
be negotiated by intermediaries in Mombasa and be paid
there too.12 While there are still groups operating from
within Somalia, Kenya is in a position to address the piracy
problem indirectly by seeking a domestic solution to tackle
the masterminds and bosses who manage operations at a
distance, from within its territory. This may be done through
a variety of options, including a disruption of the money
Annex 146
Lisa Otto 3
Annex 146
s i t U a t i O N R E P O R t • F E b R U a R y 2 0 1 2
flow, and a reduction in the opportunities available for the
organised crime in the country.
Aside from the geopolitical and cost-based grounds
for disquiet, Kenya’s position as one of the stronger and
more stable actors in the region places Nairobi in a position
where non-action or limited action cannot continue to
be an option. Indeed, all these factors make Kenya an
obvious partner for the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’
that is currently engaged in counter-piracy endeavours.
Not counting the various reasons why Kenya should be
involved in the bid to rid international waters of pirates, the
enlistment of a local actor or actors is no doubt crucial to
the success of such a bid.
Counter-piracy to date and
Kenya’s participation
Efforts to counter piracy off the north-east coast of Africa
have been largely characterised by advocacy at the
international level and combined foreign naval deployment,
while a smaller role has been played by bilateral
arrangements and regional organisations.
With regards to advocacy, the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) has been instrumental in putting the
problem of piracy on the international agenda. As put by
Onuoha,13 the IMO has ‘led the way in pushing the agenda
for addressing the security challenges at international fora’.
The resolution adopted by the IMO in 2005 in the wake of
a rising incidence of maritime piracy, brought the threat
that it poses to international security to the attention of the
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General. The issue was thus
brought to the UN Security Council (UNSC), and between
2005 and 2007 pressure mounted for the crime, with
particular reference to Somali piracy, to be recognised and
responded to.14 Finally, in 2008 a number of meetings were
held by the UNSC to discuss how the growing problem of
piracy could be addressed in order to restore international
peace and security. As a result, a series of resolutions
were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, calling
on member states to become actively involved in counterpiracy
efforts and to coordinate naval and military efforts
in collaboration with the Transitional Federal Government
in Somalia.15 Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1851 (2008)
sought to encourage regional cooperation and promote the
use of legal avenues of resolution.16
This led to a proliferation of combined naval operations
in the Gulf of Aden that sought to address the problem
by facilitating safe passage of vessels traversing those
waters – notably those carrying humanitarian aid – and by
being on hand to respond to distress calls and possible
pirate attacks. The key deployments in this regard include
the United States’ Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151),
the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s Operation Ocean Shield.
These deployments now operate under a wide remit, with
Operation Atalanta offering protection to vessels of the
World Food Programme, and attempting to thwart pirate
attacks and turn captured pirates over for prosecution.17
CTF-151 is dedicated to addressing piracy and operates in
the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, the Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean; while Operation Ocean Shield ‘provide(s) maritime
security in the region, but it also offers training to regional
countries in developing their own capacity to combat piracy
activities’18 – something Kenya could exploit.
It was hoped that the UN-brokered Djibouti Accords
between the Somali parties in 2008 – initiated by the UN
Special Representative Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah – would
culminate in political reconciliation, possibly leading to a
unity government, which could bring some much-desired
stability to the country.19 This is therefore also cited as one
of the efforts by the international community to address
piracy by way of bringing stability to Somalia.
It is not that Kenya has not been collaborating with the
international community with regard to the piracy problem;
in fact there are a few instances, as will be discussed
below, in which the country has made some contribution.
Unfortunately, however, these have borne very little fruit,
with efforts not ever really taking off and ultimately fizzling
out. Some analysts like Paul Wambua20 proffer that Kenya
has in fact done enough to contribute to counter-piracy
efforts, but that the international community has not met
Kenya halfway in support of these efforts; by for example,
providing adequate assistance in the project of prosecuting
pirates. Other non-government actors in Kenya disagree
with this assertion, suggesting rather that prosecution has
constituted the main thrust of its efforts.
While the international community might have been
more engaged, it did previously seek to interact with
Kenya on the issue of piracy, particularly with regard to the
prosecution of pirates. Following an increasing trend for
captured pirates to be released due to logistical concerns
related to bringing them to book, the United Kingdom
and Kenya signed a Memorandum of Understanding in
December 2008 to allow for the transfer of suspected
pirates to face trial in Kenya. The US followed suit, coming
to a similar agreement with Kenya in January 2009, thereby
making Kenya a ‘regional leader for disposition and legal
action [having] prosecuted pirates in 2006 after the US
ship, the USS Churchill, disrupted a vessel hijacking’.21
Kenya thus began holding piracy trials in 2009, but with
limited success.
There have been several suggestions from stakeholders
and experts alike that this approach should be replicated in
the region in a bid to increase the risk related to conducting
pirate activities. Nonetheless, it is evident that there are a
number of challenges within the realm of the law and its
enforcement that will need addressing in order for such
measures to be truly successful.
4 Kenya and the pest of piracy: a prospective partner for peace
I NSTIT U T E F O R S E C U R ITY ST U D I E S
These challenges have certainly hampered the success
of piracy trials in Kenya, which has been seen as an ideal
venue for the prosecution of pirates. Western states have
been reluctant to prosecute pirates on their home soil due
to concerns surrounding asylum. Five particular challenges
stand out, as elucidated by Wambua.
Firstly, the question of jurisdiction has been problematic
due to the substantial disparity between international and
domestic law in many cases, as well as the jurisdictional
quagmire that is borne of the capture of a pirate or pirates
in the various ocean zones delineated within law. Kenya has
seen several inconsistent court rulings in this regard, leaving
the matter at the Court of Appeal. As put by Petretto,22 ‘this
intersection between different geographical spaces and
national jurisdiction represents a great challenge in the fight
against piracy’.
Secondly, there are numerous challenges with regard
to Kenyan evidentiary requirements and the provision
hereof. Wambua calls it ‘an archaic law on evidence’,
which does not provide for evidence that is photographic
or video-based. Moreover, there is a lack of knowledge on
evidentiary requirements on the part of forces capturing
pirates, resulting in the accused being released due to
technicalities or a provision of evidence that falls outside of
the law. Stemming from this is another challenge: Kenyan
law requires witnesses to provide evidence in person, and
many people therefore decline to attend court due to the
time-consuming and cost-incurring implications this holds,
especially for seamen.
The fact that Kenyan courts are ill equipped also
hinders the legal process from being followed through.
Moreover, a deficiency in the training of legal officials such
as prosecutors and magistrates on the subject of piracy
constrains the efficiency of the courts. Indeed, as illustrated
by the last two points, the question of Kenyan capacity to
prosecute is of great concern.
Furthermore, the country’s recent incursion into
Somalia must also now be considered as playing a role in
addressing piracy, even if indirectly; however, stakeholders
and commentators differ on how substantial the impact on
piracy will be. Wambua suggests that a causal link can be
established between the incursion and a decline in pirate
activities; an occurrence that some conversely suggest
is attributable to the monsoon season, which results in a
piracy ‘low season’. Yet Wambua asserts that if Kenya can
successfully capture Kismayu and transfer areas that have
been occupied by Al Shabaab to Somalia’s Transitional
Federal Government, then piracy may well dwindle in
both frequency and magnitude, as there has been much
discussion surrounding possible links between pirates
and Al Shabaab. Other actors in Kenya, within both the
diplomatic community and the non-government sector,
propose that the effect will be more limited, despite the
potential of the incursion to be a game-changer; perhaps
resulting in the relocation of pirates in the short term if their
strongholds or freedom of movement are affected. What
is clear, however, is that an elimination of piracy can only
be brought on by sustained stability in Somalia. The most
solid contribution the Kenyan incursion can thus make with
regard to stifling piracy is improving stability in Somalia.
Certainly, the incursion has led to an increased naval
presence in the volatile upper region of Kenya’s coast on
the border with Somalia. This presence will have offered
some deterrence to piracy by hampering the movement of
pirates southwards into the Indian Ocean. Patrols now take
place on a constant basis, from both the sea and the air.
Members of the shipping industry assert that, for a country
with limited means, this is a positive development.23
Many stakeholders and commentators in Kenya seem to
agree that another impact the incursion has had on piracy
is that the nature of the phenomenon is being pushed into
evolution. Pirates’ tactics appear to be metamorphosing
in response to the additional challenges they now face on
land. There seems to be an increasing sense of desperation
that suggests that pirates will enter into arrangements
and practices that had not previously characterised them.
While this is as yet unproven, there is suspicion that Somali
pirates may diversify and increasingly engage in other
money-generating activities such as gunrunning and the
kidnapping of individuals, as well as holding entire vessels
to ransom as per their traditional operations. This follows on
suspicions that pirate groups might have been involved in
the kidnappings in Lamu, and that they may become more
amenable to cooperating with terrorist organisations.
Towards a more active
role for Kenya
Kenya is strategically placed, from both a geostrategic and
an interest-based perspective, to engage as a key actor
in the East African region with regards to the problem of
Somali piracy. As such, Kenya can generate consolidated
support on three levels by approaching the international
community to support Nairobi in various ways, which may
include measures to strengthen naval capacity, for example;
by reaching out regionally to bring forth a combined and
determined effort; and by acting domestically to enact
policy, for example, by sustaining a naval presence off the
coast with regular patrols. Such initiatives must be informed
The question of Kenyan
capacity to prosecute
is of great concern
Annex 146
Lisa Otto 5
SIT UATI ON R E P O R T • F e b ru a r y 2 0 1 2
by a reasoned, robust and resolute anti-piracy policy that
sets out the ways in which Kenya approaches and tackles
piracy. While efforts are on-going by Kenyan policy-makers
to develop such a policy, local commentators assert that
a final draft should not be expected for some time as
parliament has to consider a number of bills that carry
greater political priority ahead of the next set of elections in
the country, which are scheduled for the latter part of 2012.
Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Kenya has yet to
put together this policy, Nairobi must take into account the
wealth of information on counter-piracy measures, as well
as the thrust hereof. In particular, Kenya must appreciate
that a holistic counter-piracy approach that carries the
highest chance of success is one that acknowledges that
sea-based efforts alone are not enough. Indeed, the thrust
of opinion at present, which stems from observations
of Somali counter-piracy, is that a two-pronged tactic is
needed – piracy must be fought both on land and at sea.
Ideally Kenya should lobby the international community
to assist in a productive effort to rebuild the Somali state
and to reinforce stability there, considering also that Kenya
has illustrated a willingness to engage in land operations
by launching its military operations in Somalia in late
2011. Kenya should also inculcate this policy internally,
addressing the piracy problem by following and hindering
the flow of pirate money within the country, in order to find
and deal with pirate bosses who are based in and operate
from Kenya.
Concurrently, the onus should not be only on Kenya.
Rather, with an expression of Kenyan willingness – and
even regional willingness – the international community
too should continue to engage in multilateral and holistic
efforts to counter the piracy scourge. It is evident that
Kenya, having been previously enlisted by Western actors,
has been identified as an important and able player. The
international community should therefore ensure that
Kenya is involved to its fullest capacity in initiatives going
forward, and also endeavour to support the country in
terms of developing and building this capacity. It must be
noted that, with piracy presently being predominant on the
African continent, the inclusion of an African actor should
be considered an essential part of a global action plan that
seeks to tackle maritime piracy. To this end, the February
2012 international anti-piracy conference, co-hosted by
Kenya and the UN, is a good start.
Avenues for concrete action
Based on the arguments made by various stakeholders in
the counter-piracy context, it is clear that much can still be
done to improve the global fight against piracy. While there
are some suggestions that are cause for disagreement
between actors, a number of key recommendations can
be drawn from an appraisal of the contributions and views
of these actors and stakeholders. It is abundantly clear
that a sea-based approach will not suffice. Instead, a
multi-pronged strategy is needed to address piracy, on land
as well as at sea. It is in this regard where Kenya has the
potential to contribute.
This report, therefore, makes a number of
recommendations applicable in the general context, but
that refer in particular to Kenya:
Firstly, it is of the utmost importance that greater
cooperation be fostered at a regional level. Since there
will be challenges in producing buy-in from non-littoral
states in particular and generating consensus in terms of
policy and strategy at a continental level, it is more feasible
to institute this process at a regional level. Many regional
organisations are already actively working on maritime
security strategies, and this work should be encouraged
to continue within these communities and to be started in
others. The East African Community (EAC) will likely be a
good place for Kenya to start with regional engagement, as
the small number of states within the community allows for
a greater chance of garnering consensus in order to create
a goodwill coalition that can offer a legal avenue for tackling
piracy. The non-littoral states may then be motivated to buy
in, as their trade will also be affected by bad order at sea,
and Tanzania, being littoral, will have similar motivations
to those of Kenya. If these states can manage to uphold
the common good as an overarching goal, without petty
politics getting in the way, they will undoubtedly receive
support from members of the international community in
their endeavours. The UN is already involved in supporting
local and regional counter-piracy initiatives, as are several
Western states, and so a coordinated advance from
regional actors will be looked upon favourably. As illustrated
by recent UNSC Resolution 2015 (2011), there is support, at
least notionally, for a court in the region dealing with Somali
pirates.
Further to this, and in order to deal with previous failings
in this regard, a supranational court might be established
alongside a prison, arguably in Arusha. Here pirates may
be prosecuted on the basis of an EAC policy or strategy,
where the applicable law has been streamlined, and by
entering into multilateral agreements with states, particularly
those engaged in naval-based counter-piracy in the Gulf
of Aden and its surroundings. Such a measure would
offer relief from some of the many legal and jurisdictional
tribulations faced in the prosecution of pirates, as discussed
previously; although it would conceivably be limited by
the prolonged timeframe needed for its implementation.
The draft version of the East African Integrated Maritime
Strategy makes similar suggestions, and the adoption of
this document would be very helpful in this regard. Such
endeavours at streamlining these activities at a regional
level would definitely find favour with the many bodies and
states concerned with piracy, as similar suggestions have
Annex 146
6 Kenya and the pest of piracy: a prospective partner for peace
I NSTIT U T E F O R S E C U R ITY ST U D I E S
been made in the past. On this basis, arrangements that
expand the applicability of these mechanisms may be
sought, and financial assistance may be acquired to aid the
establishment and upkeep of these facilities. Again, Kenya
is well placed to initiate activities in this vein considering
that Western states have previously sought the prosecution
of pirates in this country with limited success. Such an
initiative may minimise Kenya’s responsibility by sharing
it with its neighbours, and by inviting the cooperation of
the international community, therefore allowing for greater
prospects of success.
Another avenue of concrete action is in peace-making
in Somalia, and efforts at this should be intensified with
a two-pronged approach: both military and political or
diplomatic. The rebuilding and strengthening of the Somali
state must be attempted, be it through the provision of a
clearer mandate for the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM) with Kenyan operations being brought in
line herewith, or through seeking to engage with all the
stakeholders, including Al Shabaab.24 This has merits on
the basis of not only countering piracy, but also increasing
stability and allowing for the operation of more functional
and effective state apparatus, which would have a drastic
impact on piracy. As it stands, pirates operate under
relatively low-risk conditions with comparatively high
rewards, knowing that they have a safe haven in Somalia
that allows them to escape the law.25 With institutions
in a working order there could be a greater capacity for
patrolling and policing in general and the prosecution and
incarceration of pirates in particular; especially since the
location of pirate bases are common knowledge. Disrupting
pirate strongholds will be one way in which pirates can be
stopped before the crime is committed. Such a rebuilding
exercise would be, without doubt, a mammoth task, but
perhaps Kenya’s incursion into Somalia is a first step in
this regard. Moreover, it is imperative that current missions
providing humanitarian, political and other assistance in
Somalia be supported and reinforced. Further, it has been
suggested that funding allocated to naval deployments in
the Gulf of Aden might be redirected to such purposes.
If, for example, naval activities are minimised during the
piracy low season, the funds saved could be put toward
establishing a rebuilding effort in Somalia or supporting one
that exists, in an indirect bid to address the piracy problem.
A fourth avenue for Kenya to fight piracy is through
following the money trail in the country. It is well established
that ransom money makes its way into Kenya and that
operations are often run, at least in part, from within Kenya.
As established by Rotberg, ‘the battle against piracy will be
assisted when we know precisely where the money goes,
who controls the sources of financing, and who receives
the profits’.26 This may even allow for the establishment
of already suspected financial links between pirate and
terrorist groups which, if further investigated, could expand
the remit of counter-piracy and counter-terrorist forces. As
such, advanced money laundering laws should be in place:
funds suspected to be associated with piracy followed and
assets seized as a way through which to impede impunity.27
This is particularly important in Kenya due to the roots pirate
gangs have there, and as such the scope and mandate of
its anti-money laundering unit must be amended. Some
Western states may thus be approached for access to their
expertise on this particular point.
Kenya can begin more consolidated efforts once a
policy on maritime piracy has been drawn up. However,
the country cannot do this alone and would need to seek
support from the international community. With Kenya’s
important geostrategic location, it is in a position to lobby
concerned actors for assistance with greater engagement
in maritime security issues like piracy.
There will surely be challenges in implementing these
recommendations, not least of which being the issue of will,
followed by questions on finances and capacity issues. The
latter issues have a better likelihood of being addressed if
the former is present. Furthermore, Somali piracy is a fluid
operation subject to evolution. As pirates become more
desperate, they will change their tactics and amend their
relationships, as has been suggested herein. Any counterpiracy
initiatives must be prepared for this eventuality, and
it is therefore crucial that countries and joint operations
share information.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that piracy has a negative impact on
both Kenya’s government and its people. Kenya can play
a greater and more valuable role in the counter-piracy
domain, and is the best-placed prospective partner of
the international community for peace in the East African
region. Indeed, both Kenya and the international community
should step up to the plate, taking a proactive stance in
seeking partnerships that will thwart bad order at sea and
promote practices and initiatives that will restore peace to
global waters. If Kenya can summon the necessary political
will to pursue such concise and coordinated measures to
tackle piracy, then the concerns regarding finances and
capacity can be attended to by the international community.
This is where the ‘coalition of the willing’ will need to come
on board and fulfil commitments toward assisting the
development of African mechanisms for fighting piracy.
What is needed on the part of Kenya is a clear appreciation
of the costs of piracy to the country, the region and also the
globe; and a determination to use its political, economic
and geostrategic positioning to address the pest of piracy
in earnest.
Annex 146
Lisa Otto 7
SIT UATI ON R E P O R T • F e b ru a r y 2 0 1 2
Notes
1 Lisa Otto currently works as a researcher at the
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in
Johannesburg. At the time she completed this paper, she
was working as a research intern in the African Conflict
Prevention Programme of the ISS in Pretoria. The author
wishes to acknowledge the input and suggestions made
by Dr. Emmanuel Kisiangani, Cpt. Johan Potgieter and Dr
Issaka K. Souaré of the ISS, as well as the anonymous
external reviewer for their comments and suggestions that
helped to improve the quality of the paper.
2 International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre,
http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracy-reporting-centre/imblive-
piracy-map-2010. (accessed 22 November 2011).
3 The author conducted field research in Kenya (Nairobi
and Mombasa) in November 2011, engaging with various
stakeholders across the board. Her interactions and
conversations with these stakeholders have informed this
report to a large extent. However, in an effort to ensure
the confidentiality of the individuals with whom she
engaged, explicit reference may not necessarily be made to
these individuals.
4 Figures elucidated in email correspondence between
Inchcape Shipping Services and the Kenya Maritime
Authority, as provided by the latter.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 L Otto, Benefits of buccaneering: The political economy
of maritime piracy in Somalia and Kenya, African Security
Review 20 (4) (2011), 45–50.
8 Otto, Benefits of buccaneering.
9 A Bowden, K Hurlburt, E Aloyo, C Marts and A Lee, The
Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy, One Earth Future
Working Paper, 2010.
10 This had been hinted at by Murphy as well as by
individuals interviewed during the field research that
informed this report.
www.issafrica.org
This publication was made possible by the government of Finland. In addition, the ISS receives
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11 Bowden, The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy.
12 M Murphy, Small boats, weak states, dirty money: piracy
and maritime terrorism in the modern world, London: Hurst,
2009.
13 F.C Onuoha, Sea piracy and maritime security in the Horn
of Africa: the Somali Coast and Gulf of Aden in perspective,
African Security Review 18(3) (2009).
14 Onuoha, Sea Piracy and maritime security.
15 J Gibson, Maritime security and international law in Africa,
African Security Review 18(3) (2009).
16 B Wilson, Naval diplomacy and maritime security in the
Western Indian Ocean, Strategic Analysis 33(4) (2009).
17 S Baniela, Piracy at sea: Somalia an area of great concern,
The Journal of Navigation 63 (2010).
18 NATO, 2011, http://www.nato.int/ (accessed 22 November
2011).
19 Reliefweb, 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int (accessed 22
November 2011).
20 All references to Prof Paul Wambua emanate from personal
correspondence with him on this topic in November 2011.
21 Wilson, Naval diplomacy and maritime security in the
Western Indian Ocean.
22 K Petretto, Piracy as a problem in international politics, in
Piracy and Maritime Security: Regional characteristics and
political, military, legal and economic implications, SWP
Research Paper, Berlin, 2011.
23 As discussed with Inchcape Shipping Services in
Mombasa.
24 Jakkie Cilliers, Henri Boshoff and Festus B. Aboagye,
Somalia: the intervention dilemma, ISS Policy Brief Nr 20,
August 2010.
25 Otto, Benefits of buccaneering.
26 R Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with
Recommendations for Action, World Peace Foundation,
2010.
27 Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy.
Annex 146
Annex 147
“Fetching them on the beaches - tourist abductions from Kenyan resorts mark the
expansion of Somali piracy”, The Economist, 8 October 2011
Today Weekly edition Menu Subscribe
Oct 8th 2011 edition
Middle East &
Africa
MOMBASA
Kenya and piracy
Fetching them on the beaches
Tourist abductions from Kenyan resorts mark the expansion of Somali
piracy
ON OCTOBER 1st a disabled French woman was dragged from her home
on Kenya's northern coast by pirates and taken by speedboat to Somalia.
The kidnapping was even more shocking to residents and visitors than the
killing of a British publisher and the kidnapping of his deaf wife, also by
pirates, three weeks earlier. That attack took place at an isolated spot closer to
the Somali border. But the French woman was snatched near the town of
Lamu, a haven for foreign tourists.
The attacks are a blow to Kenya's economy, which earns over $800m a year
from tourism. Many of its half a million visitors come from Britain, so a
headline in the Daily Mail, a British newspaper, was damaging: “Kenya is a
treacherous place—and it's getting worse”. The country had hoped for a record
year. Not any more.
Growing numbers of tourists from China and elsewhere in Asia, together with
the lure of a weak currency, could revive tourism next year. But the
kidnappings highlight a longer-term problem: having a failed state as a
neighbour. Kenya had turned its back on Somalia and hoped for the best. That
is no longer enough. Its border is porous. The Kiunga post, just across from Ras
Kamboni, a Somali town near the border, is undermanned. The mangrove
swamps on the other side are home to training camps for the Shabab, a Somali
militant group close to al-Qaeda that controls swathes of southern and central
Somalia. Kenyan soldiers patrolling at the other end of the border have
recently been snatched by them.
The French captive was apparently taken ashore at Ras Kamboni and driven to
the southern Somali port of Kismayo, a Shabab stronghold. That raises
suspicions that she is being used as a shield against American drone attacks on
the Shabab, which have increased. Mediators have had trouble locating the
British captive; she may have been sold to pirate gangs in central Somalia. If
ransoms are paid, as they have been before, more kidnappings are likely.
Payments for the release of ships nabbed off Somalia's coast have risen from
$100,000 to $2m-plus.
Many Kenyans accept that robust action is required. Yet cross-border military
intervention is unlikely and would probably be counterproductive. In the
meantime, the growing operational range of the pirates and their ties to
jihadists mean that tourists may be at risk of capture ever farther down the
coast.
Annex 147
Annex 148
“Feared Shabab exploit Somali banking and invest in real estate, U.N. says”, The New
York Times, 11 October 2020
https://nyti.ms/3nDshMQ
Feared Shabab Exploit Somali Banking and Invest in Real Estate, U.N. Says
Despite sanctions, Shabab militants have found ways to extort, move and invest money using Somaliaʼs banking system, a
United Nations panel says.
By Abdi Latif Dahir
Oct. 11, 2020
NAIROBI, Kenya — The Shabab, the Somalia-based militant group that is Al Qaeda’s most powerful ally in Africa, is not
only collecting millions of dollars in tariffs and payoffs but moving the money through local banks and even investing it in
real estate and businesses, according to a new United Nations Security Council report.
The report describes how the Shabab, known for suicide attacks and a severe interpretation of Islam that bans music and
other pleasures, have diversified their funding streams. Although financial dealings with the Shabab are prohibited under
Security Council sanctions, the report said the group had found ways to expand from strictly cash transactions into
utilizing bank accounts and electronic mobile services to save, transfer and invest money.
A Security Council panel of experts that monitors Somalia produced the report, which has not yet been made public. The
New York Times obtained an advance copy.
The Shabab’s deadly attacks have wreaked havoc in Somalia and across East Africa. The group sustains an estimated
4,000 fighters, and expands its power, by collecting money from around south and central Somalia, including in the capital,
Mogadishu, the report said.
The group charges vehicles transporting goods, demands that businesses pay a monthly fee and forcibly collects zakat, the
annual alms that observant Muslims are expected to pay.
The Shabab also have penetrated Mogadishu’s port, blackmailing importers to pay a levy on goods, the report said. In all
the cases the report documented, business owners paid up, citing threats and violence if they refused.
The report found evidence that Shabab operatives had stored and transferred the money through accounts operated by
Salaam Somali Bank, a leading bank in Somalia.
Men convicted of complicity in the Shabab’s 2013 attack on a mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The
Shabab have found new ways to make and invest money in their home base, Somalia, a
United Nations panel says. Brian Inganga/Associated Press
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In response, the bank said that it had never “opened an account for a sanctioned individual or entity” and that it had taken
unspecified actions against suspicious accounts, but it did not rule out the possibility that the Shabab had found
surreptitious ways to use the bank. The country’s finance minister also acknowledged the Shabab’s ability to exploit the
banking system and called the group’s financiers “very cunning.”
The report comes just a few months before crucial elections in Somalia, a strategically located country in the Horn of
Africa that has endured cycles of dysfunction and mayhem for decades. It also is contending with the coronavirus
pandemic, swarms of locusts that are destroying crops and floods that have displaced hundreds of thousands of people.
The Shabab pose a growing threat to Somalia and the region, even though the group has lost territory in the past five
years, suffered high-level defections and been degraded by sustained American airstrikes.
The report is especially damning for the Somali government, which is backed by the United States and the United Nations.
They have insisted that Somalia take steps to modernize its banking so that groups like the Shabab that are under sanction
cannot exploit the system’s weaknesses.
“Al-Shabab’s use of formal banking systems enables the immediate transfer and distribution of large amounts, including in
areas it no longer directly controls, eliminating the risk of physically transporting cash across hostile territory,” the report
said.
The Security Council’s experts on Somalia, a six-member panel based in Nairobi, are responsible for monitoring
compliance with sanctions imposed on Somalia. The panel undertook the same work on Eritrea, another Horn of Africa
country, until 2018, when sanctions there were lifted after Eritrea mended relations with neighboring Ethiopia.
In past years, the panel’s reports have examined topics such as how food aid in Somalia was redirected by corrupt
contractors and how the Shabab’s bomb-making operations became sophisticated.
But the focus this year has largely been on the Shabab’s sources and movement of funds.
During the reporting period, from last December to this August, the report’s authors found evidence that the Shabab had
generated about $13 million in revenue. This included an estimated $2.4 million from checkpoints in the Lower Juba region
in southern Somalia and $5.8 million from charging businesses in the southern port city of Kismayo. The report includes
redacted copies of receipts for these transactions.
Two bank accounts associated with the Shabab — paid into by retailers, shipping agencies and car dealerships —
generated more than $3 million.
The report linked the transfers to the Salaam Somali Bank. In two separate accounts reviewed by the panel of experts —
one receiving port duties, the other alms collection — the panel found large cash deposits and frequent transfers that
exceeded the $10,000 limit that would have required the bank to report them.
In one of the accounts, $1.7 million was transferred entirely in 87 transactions, with one person receiving $310,000.
The wreckage of a car after a bomb exploded in Mogadishu in January. Feisal
Omar/Reuters
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Over a 48-hour period in May, more than $322,000 was transferred from these two accounts to a third bank account, the
report said, showing “an institutional link between the accounts and an organized approach to the distribution of funds.”
The panel of experts recorded a total of 128 transactions that would have warranted disclosure to Somalia’s Financial
Reporting Center, which investigates suspicious financial activities.
A review of the accounts “revealed no obvious legitimate outgoings or expenditures,” the report said.
In a statement, a Salaam spokesman said the bank had taken “appropriate actions against numerous accounts” believed
linked to “suspicious activity.” The bank also said the United Nations had reached out to it about the panel’s investigation
but that since the bank had not “received the details of these accounts” it was “unable to determine whether the
appropriate action has been taken against these accounts.”
After decades of war, Somalia has achieved a modicum of peace, as it looks to build functioning public institutions. This
includes oversight of financial outlets like banks and the passage of laws against money laundering and terrorism
financing.
But enforcement by the weak Somali government remains inadequate, hindered by many obstacles, including the lack of
widespread proof of legal identity. The U.N. report noted how identity documents used to open the Shabab’s bank accounts
had been acquired just days before. A recent study also showed how the country’s informal hawala system of money
transfer underpinned the sale and trade of illicit arms.
In an interview, Somalia’s finance minister, Abdirahman Beileh, acknowledged the Shabab’s pervasive use of domestic
financial systems.
“We are meeting with the banks and informing them of the danger they are in,” he said in an interview from Mogadishu.
Calling the Shabab a “mafia,” he said that whenever the authorities closed one loophole, the group figured out another way
to move money. “These are people who are very smart and very cunning,” he said.
The report also described the Shabab’s well-organized financial system, with regular audits to prevent losses. Besides
spending on intelligence and military expenditures, the group has invested tens of thousands of dollars in property and
business enterprises in Mogadishu’s bustling Bakara Market, which sells a wide range of goods and is the country’s
biggest open-air bazaar.
The findings prove how the Shabab are embedded deep into Somali society, said Rashid Abdi, an analyst and researcher
who specializes in the Horn of Africa.
“It’s no longer an insurgency but an economic power,” Mr. Abdi said in a telephone interview. “It’s a shadow state that’s
out-taxing the government even in areas it doesn’t control.” The Shabab, he said, are becoming a “much more entrenched,
resilient and deep-rooted organization that doesn’t have to rely on might or military force to stay relevant.”
A market in Mogadishu. According to the report, the group charges vehicles transporting
goods and demands that businesses pay a monthly fee. Lokman Ilhan/Anadolu Agency, via
Getty Images
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Volume VI - Annexes 103-148