Annex 77
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2111 (2013), S/2014/726, 13 October 2014 (Extracts)
United Nations S/2014/726
Security Council Distr.: General
13 October 2014
Original: English
14-60683 (E) 141014
*1460683*
Letter dated 10 October 2014 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
President of the Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with
paragraph 28 of Security Council resolution 2111 (2013), I have the honour to
transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and
the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and
issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Oh Joon
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
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Letter dated 19 September 2014 from the members of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
We have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Somalia of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, in accordance with paragraph 28 of
Security Council resolution 2111 (2013).
(Signed) Jarat Chopra
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
(Signed) Nicholas Argeros
Finance expert
(Signed) Zeina Awad
Transport expert
(Signed) Déirdre Clancy
Humanitarian expert
(Signed) Joakim Gundel
Arms expert
(Signed) Dinesh Mahtani
Finance expert
(Signed) Jörg Roofthooft
Maritime expert
(Signed) Babatunde Taiwo
Armed groups expert
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Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia
Contents
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. Local threats to peace and security in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
E. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
III. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A. Arms embargo modifications for the Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B. Arms networks connected to the Federal Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
C. Arms deliveries to Puntland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
D. Delivery of detonator cords to north-eastern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
E. Somaliland oil protection unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
F. Delivery of military-type vehicles and weapons to Jubaland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A. Denial of access and attacks on aid workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
V. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. Targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B. Sexual and gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
C. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
D. Forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
VI. Violations of the ban on charcoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A. Methodology of investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B. Charcoal production, transportation and stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C. Charcoal export trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
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D. Charcoal imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
E. Charcoal warehousing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
F. Falsified customs documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
G. Role of transporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
VII. Obstruction of the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A. Government of Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B. Federal Government of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
VIII. Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
IX. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Annexes*
Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.1. Al-Shabaab areas of control in southern and central Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.2. Photograph of Abdullahi Mohamed Ahmed “Arabey”** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.3. Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu: tactics, techniques and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.4. Al-Shabaab in Puntland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.1. Al-Shabaab in Kenya: declaring Kenya a “war zone”
2.2. Operational impasse: Al-Shabaab in Ethiopia
2.3. “Misdirection”: Al-Shabaab in Djibouti
3. Local threats to peace and security in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1. Threats to peace and security in the Sool region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2. Threats to peace and security in Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4. Piracy and kidnap for ransom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.1. Registered armed attacks and disruptions since October 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2. Photographs of pirate leader and financier Mohamed Osman “Gafanje” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3. Pirate facilitator Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4. Photographs of protests against pirate arrests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.5. Photographs of pirate leader and financier Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.6. Central Air Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.7. Pirate finances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
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5. Misappropriation of public financial resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.1. Illustrative overview of contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
5.2. Contracting for the recovery of public overseas assets of the Federal Republic of
Somalia** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
6.1. Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with modifications of the arms
embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
6.2. Leakage of Somali National Army rifles into arms markets in Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
6.3. Analysis of Djiboutian-supplied ammunition in Mogadishu arms markets . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
6.4. Diversion of arms by political networks connected to the Federal Government of
Somalia** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
6.5. Arms deliveries to Puntland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
6.6. Smuggling of improvised explosive device equipment and associated smuggling
networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
6.7. Analysis of the proposed oil protection unit for Somaliland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
6.8. Delivery of military-type vehicles and weapons to Jubaland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
7. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
7.1. Denial of access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
7.2. Selected practices constituting humanitarian obstruction in Puntland** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
7.3. Operation of the Special Protection Units in Somaliland and Puntland** . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
7.4. Temporary seizure of humanitarian supplies by the Ethiopian National Defence
Forces** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
7.5. Attacks on humanitarian aid workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
7.6. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
7.7. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance: measures to enhance
compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
8. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
8.1. Targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
8.2. Targeting of civilians in villages around Jowhar, Middle Shabelle Dhexe, and in Taleex,
Sool, November 2013** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
8.3. Sexual and gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
8.4. Sexual and gender-based violence allegations involving African Union Mission in
Somalia personnel** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
8.5. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
8.6. Forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
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9. Violations of the ban on charcoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
9.1. Charcoal production, transportation and stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
9.2. Cases of known charcoal imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
9.3. Charcoal warehousing in the United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
9.4. Systematic use of falsified shipping manifests and certificates of origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
9.5 Charcoal transporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and are being issued without
formal editing.
** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
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Summary
Following the end of the transition in Somalia in the middle of 2012, the
election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President and the establishment of the
Federal Government of Somalia presented an opportunity for another kind of
leadership and basis for engagement by Member States. The new configuration has
received the greatest international political and financial commitment in two
decades, since the withdrawal of United Nations forces in 1995. As previously noted
by the Monitoring Group, however, a genuine end of transition necessitated a
change, both in individual leadership and in the system of government that had
previously undermined the State-building enterprise through misappropriation of
public goods and security sector fiefdoms. While control over financial flows and
security institutions was previously divided between several principal power holders,
the new President inherited a system in which he controlled neither, leading to the
development of coping mechanisms to obtain external funds and arrange security
relations inside and outside of the Government.
A year after the Group’s previous report (S/2013/413), international investment
at the political level and some reform efforts have not altered the underlying
dynamics of the government system, which are largely a continuation of earlier
transitional arrangements, in terms of both a lack of transparency of and
accountability for public resources and clan-based interests dominating security
forces and logistics. Meanwhile, the deepening reliance on financial and security
coping mechanisms, partly owing to vested interests and partly for political survival,
has produced lines of control parallel to the formal institutions of government with
which the international community is engaging. Consequently, the decline of popular
support for the current political configuration to the levels from before the end of the
transition, and increasing clan-based instability in the capital and elsewhere, threaten
to undermine the Federal Government, the prospects of reinforcing State institutions
and the peace and security of Somalia.
Notwithstanding continual increases in troop strength and financial support for
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), tangible gains of the continuing
offensive (Operation Eagle) and international assistance to the Somali security sector,
accompanied by the easing of the arms embargo, Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
(Al-Shabaab) remains the principal threat to peace and security in Somalia and
throughout the Horn of Africa. In the past, the growth of Al-Shabaab was either due
to or measured against the weakness of the central Government and its security
forces. While it has not been able to retain its military strength and posture of 2009 -
2010, however, Al-Shabaab has evolved in qualitative terms, possibly owing to
several factors, including the violent but pragmatic purge of its dissenting senior
ranks in 2013, the ability of Mukhtar Ali al-Zubayr (Ahmed Godane) before his
death to consolidate his authority without any evident challenge and the resulting
dominance of the more extremist cadre of the group, which has drawn on support
from its affiliates in East Africa. Consequently, Al-Shabaab has managed to maintain
an effective and violent footprint in Mogadishu and demonstrated its operational
reach beyond the capital by adopting an apparent economy of effort strategy. It has
generated fatal attacks throughout southern and central Somalia, while inspiring and
coordinating attacks against the country’s neighbours.
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Indeed, not since the prominence in the Horn of Africa of the former Al -Qaida
in East Africa has the region been besieged by a more determined, prolific and
effective Al-Qaida-affiliated group as Al-Shabaab. The sustained counter-terrorism
pressure and successful overcoming of internal divisions have forced the Al-Shabaab
core to become more operationally audacious by placing greater emphasis on
exporting its violence beyond the borders of Somalia. Conversely, in the past year,
Al-Shabaab’s overt regional strategy has relied increasingly on its entrenched
support base of Amniyat-like operatives. By the end of 2013, its regional strategy
had become apparent: a resurgent extremist group sufficiently assertive to fully align
itself with and pursue strategies adapted to transnational Al-Qaida operations,
evident in its ability to conduct “complex and spectacular” large-scale attacks, such
as that on the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, representing an evolution of
operational tradecraft.
At the local level in Somalia, idiosyncratic factors combine in various locations
to constitute broader threats to peace and security. In the Sool region of north-eastern
Somaliland, for example, Somaliland forces have clashed with Puntland forces and
militias loyal to Khatumo, a political organization based in the Dhulbahante clan that
is pursuing the creation of a regional state within Somalia and separation from
Somaliland. The region is particularly prone to conflict, given the competing claims
by Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo over oil-rich territory there and political
infighting among the Dhulbahante, who are divided in loyalty between Puntland,
Khatumo and Somaliland. This state of affairs has led to the militarization of the
area, in particular since November 2013, and links in some cases to Al-Shabaab and
in others to the Federal Government. In addition, clan-based political violence broke
out and sharply escalated from 2013 to the present in Lower Shabelle and Middle
Shabelle. The fighting has involved clan militias of the Biyamal (Dir) and Habar
Gedir (Hawiye) in Lower Shabelle and the Abgaal (Hawiye) and Shiidle
(Bantu/Jareer) in Middle Shabelle and led to attacks on civilian settlements
amounting to gross violations of human rights and, in some cases, international
humanitarian law. The complexity of the situation entails a combination of the
alleged role of senior army officers and soldiers in the violence, leakages of arms to
clan-based militias, use of misappropriated resources to fuel the conflict, business
interests in capturing land and other resources and political agendas seeking to
influence the federal state-formation process. The conflict risks spilling over to other
regions and complicates the continuing campaign against Al-Shabaab.
Somali piracy remains at a low point. While piracy may be largely contained,
however, many of its underlying causes continue to exist and it remains a threat to
peace, security and stability. Given the persistence of piracy networks and their
business patterns, pirate operations can easily resume, even on a large scale, if
circumstances at sea again become favourable. In addition, unlike those pirates who
have been arrested and prosecuted worldwide, most of the principal organizers,
financiers and facilitators of this transnational organized crime have gone
undisturbed and unpunished. Consequently, pirates are currently benefitting from an
environment of impunity that allows them to invest in new forms of business, both
legal and illegal, launder their proceeds and gain further profit. Investigations into
the finances of pirates and former pirates have revealed large sums of money
circulating inside and outside Somalia, financial dealings with Somali politicians,
money-laundering overseas and various bank accounts of pirate leaders, financiers
and facilitators held in Somalia and elsewhere, several holding close to $1 million.
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A change in political circumstance with the establishment of the Federal
Government in 2012 notwithstanding, underlying corruption as a system of
governance has not yet fundamentally changed and, in some cases, arguably has
worsened. In its investigations, the Monitoring Group has consistently found patterns
of misappropriation with diversion rates of between 70 and 80 per cent. The
indications are that diverted funds are used for partisan agendas that constitute
threats to peace and security. Significant steps have been taken to reform the
financial management architecture in the Federal Government and need to broaden in
scope and deepen in effect with international assistance. As yet, the reality of
financial flows in the Government has not been altered or transformed from the
earlier transitional period, in particular in terms of accountability and transparency.
Notably, the phenomenon of “secret contracting” has become a way of doing
business for the Federal Government since at least mid-2013 and creates the
opportunity for misappropriation. Contracts regarding national public assets affecting
the public interest have been signed by government officials but kept highly
confidential — from the Somali population, the parliament and, until now,
international donors. Abuse of the legitimacy of the Federal Government to enter into
contracts that operate in the same way as private contracts outside the institutions of
government has effectively created a parallel system of finances beyond and much
greater than the realm of public financial management.
Meanwhile, the past year has not entailed ideal conditions for fundamental
reform of the Central Bank, with successive changes of the Governor. Following its
previous report (S/2013/413), in which it described the system of fadlan payments
from the Bank to private individuals or to public officials for private purposes, th e
Monitoring Group reviewed the accounts of the Bank and found that the rate of such
withdrawals remained largely between 70 and 75 per cent. The intentions of the
current Governor to reduce the scale of the fadlan system notwithstanding, he has
found that expenditure is outside his control. Funds are not withdrawn from the Bank
against line items in the national budget, meaning that the Governor does not know
the actual purpose of the withdrawals. Nevertheless, he has introduced a system of
payment vouchers to better reconcile the accounts of the Bank with the Office of the
Accountant General. At Mogadishu port, large container vessels began regular
shipping to and from the port in mid-2013. They are less subject than smaller vessels
to weather patterns, meaning that the regularity of large-scale shipping has increased
revenue at the port and the income generated has become more consistent on a
monthly basis. Consequently, by the latter half of 2013, the average monthly revenue
at the port had increased to in excess of $5.5 million in customs duties alone, not
including port fees and additional charges on tax-exempt imports. The average
monthly deposit in the Bank from the port since mid-2013 has totalled $4.6 million,
however. At present, the Group estimates that at least 30 to 35 per cent of monthly
port revenue cannot be accounted for, which is largely a continuation of the previous
year’s rate of diversion.
With the creation by the Security Council of an exemption to the arms embargo
for the Federal Government, the Federal Government in turn incurred a
corresponding set of obligations in terms of notifying the Committee of deliveries for
the security sector and reporting to the Council on the structure of the government
security forces and on weapons management. While the reports of the Federal
Government to the Council are still not comprehensive and do not strictly fulfil the
requirements of relevant resolutions, they nevertheless reflect improvement over
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time. Since the introduction of the exemption, the number of various types of arms
that have been delivered or are expected to be delivered to the Federal Government
pursuant to formal notifications to the Committee now exceeds 13,000, with some
5.5 million rounds of different types of ammunition. Some of the weapons and
ammunition have been diverted to arms markets in Mogadishu. Overall, given the
anomalies, inaccuracies or lack of notifications to the Committee, the Federal
Government has not imported weapons into Somalia in full compliance with its
obligations. In addition, the Monitoring Group has identified other violations of the
arms embargo, including the diversion of weapons to arms networks connected to the
Federal Government, arms deliveries to Puntland, the delivery of detonator cords to
north-eastern Somalia and the delivery of military-type vehicles to Jubaland. The
Group also remains concerned about compliance by Somaliland with Council
resolutions in its plans to establish an oil protection unit.
Humanitarian access in many parts of Somalia remained fragile. Although
physical access became possible throughout a larger territory, with the United
Nations and non-governmental organizations establishing a presence in new
locations, the quality and sustainability of that access degraded in many places owing
to a combination of intensified conflict, increased displacement and deteriorating
security, in particular exacerbated by the joint national army and AMISOM offensive
against Al-Shabaab. In urban centres “recovered” as a result of the offensive,
government control continued to be limited to a confined area, with supply lines
greatly vulnerable to attack, including as Al-Shabaab violently besieged recovered
towns. The provision of assistance to rural areas remained particularly difficult.
While the total amount of humanitarian assistance available for distribution in
Somalia has declined, the announcement of the “New Deal” in late 2013 spurred
efforts to create and control new sites for resource capture and had a knock-on effect
on the humanitarian context. Enhanced investigations into humanitarian diversion
and its impact, including by the Monitoring Group, compelled United Nations
entities, non-governmental organizations and donors to increase their due diligence
and monitoring and develop new risk management tools. However, the realities of
uneven quality of access, continuing insecurity and fluidity of authority, coupled
with persistent remote management practices, saw continued diversion of
humanitarian assistance by State actors (including the security forces) non-State
armed actors (including Al-Shabaab), staff of humanitarian agencies, private
contractors and criminal entities.
Growing insecurity and new cycles of conflict created an environment within
which violations of applicable international law involving the targeting of civilians,
in addition to violations of the prohibition on gender-based violence, recruitment and
use of children and forced displacement, were committed throughout the country, but
in particular in southern and central Somalia. Those responsible included members of
all parties to the conflicts, including Al-Shabaab and its affiliates, AMISOM and its
strategic partners, the national armed forces, the security forces of regional
administrations and their allies, armed actors associated with the various regional,
subregional and local administrations and clan militias. Minority communities and
vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons, children, young men and
women and girls, were more likely to be exposed to violations.
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To date, the scale of the international trade in Somali charcoal is largely
consistent with the period 2012-2013. The transnational business architecture for the
trade remains in place and continues to adapt to ensure large-scale profit. The supply
chain entails a complex picture of collusion and collaboration by traders,
transporters, brokers, wholesalers and individuals involved in manufacturing false
paperwork in order to facilitate systematic violations of the ban on Somali charcoal .
On the basis of shipments documented and estimates of additional shipments,
upwards of 1 million bags of charcoal have been exported each month from
Kismayo, in addition to those exported from Al-Shabaab-controlled Barawe and
other smaller ports. The overall international market value of the charcoal exported
in 2013 and 2014 can be estimated to be in excess of $250 million, but could be
much more given that the Monitoring Group may not have identified all shipments.
Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continues to benefit from the revenue generated, on a scale
greater than when it controlled Kismayo, at charcoal production sites, from
checkpoints along trucking routes and from exports, in particular at Kismayo and
Barawe, all of which to date have been uninterrupted by the military offensive
against the group.
The Monitoring Group continues to be confronted with efforts to obstruct its
work, especially by means of targeting either the investigations or the credibility and
reputation of individual members of the Group. In particular, the Government of
Kenya prevented one of the Group’s experts from remaining at his duty station, while
vested interests in the name of the Federal Government sought to undermine
individual members and prevent the Group as a whole from fulfi lling its mandate. In
addition, under the current precarious conditions, the spoilers identified by the Group
threaten to undermine legitimate authority in the country and international assistance
efforts. To better secure the gains made to date, the Group believes that such
individuals violating relevant Security Council resolutions should be designated for
targeted measures with the least possible delay. To this end, it proposes several new
additions to the sanctions list established in accordance with Security Council
resolution 1844 (2008).
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I. Introduction
A. Mandate
1. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is contained in
paragraph 27 of Security Council resolution 2111 (2013), adopted on 24 July 2013,
and paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012). Additional tasks were assigned to the
Group under resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2142 (2014).
2. Pursuant to paragraph 27 of resolution 2111 (2013) and paragraph 13 (l) of
resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group provided the Security Council,
through the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea, with a midterm briefing on 27 March 2014. The
Group also submitted monthly progress reports to the Committee throughout its
mandate.
3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group
travelled to Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France,
Germany, India, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda,
the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America. In Somalia, members of the Group were
able to undertake regular visits to Mogadishu, Hargeysa and Garowe, but much of
the south of the country remained inaccessible.
4. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following
experts: Jarat Chopra (Coordinator), Nicholas Argeros (finance), Zeina Awad
(transport), Déirdre Clancy (humanitarian), Joakim Gundel (arms), Dinesh Mahtani
(finance), Jörg Roofthooft (maritime) and Babatunde Taiwo (armed groups). The
last-mentioned expert remained outside Kenya as from September 2013.
B. Methodology
5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous
reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the mandate under
review. The Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports (most
recently, S/2013/413 and S/2013/440). The methodology used for the present report
is as follows:
(a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where
possible;
(b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of
events, where possible;
(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing
knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant
expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with
regard to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources;
(e) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary
evidence in support of the information collected.
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6. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access
to those involved in violations by way of individuals with direct knowledge or who
know people with direct knowledge about details of violations. On some occasions,
the Group was able to witness first-hand active violations.
7. The Monitoring Group interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant
information, including government officials and representatives of diplomatic
missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. Members of the Group met
various government officials, including the President and ministers, and
representatives of security agencies. The Group also met or communicated with
officials from the Puntland and Somaliland Administrations, represent atives of
political and armed groups, defectors and members of business communities and
Somali civil society.
8. In conformity with guidance provided by the Committee, the Monitoring
Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in
its final report. However, General Assembly resolutions on the control and
limitation of documentation, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265,
necessitated the extensive use of annexes, preventing much of the substance from
being translated. In addition, regulations exclude the insertion of maps, photographs
and charts in the main report. The Group provided relevant material to the
Committee on an ongoing basis throughout its mandate.
9. In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on information sensitivity,
classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6), the Monitoring Group has submitted
to the Committee, together with the present report, several strictly confidential
annexes containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper
functioning of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third
parties or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations. Those annexes will not
be issued as a document of the Security Council.
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability
of Somalia1
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
Threat
10. Since the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2013/413), Harakaat
al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) remains the principal threat to peace and
security in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. Its inability to retain its
__________________
1 By paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1844 (2008), the Security Council prohibited acts that
threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia. By paragraph 43 (a) of resolution 2093
(2013), the Council included among the prohibited acts those that threatened the peace and
reconciliation process in Somalia or threatened the Federal Government or AMISOM by force.
By paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011), the Council expanded the scope of prohibited acts to
include the misappropriation of public financial resources, which the Council reiterated in
paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012). In addition, by paragraph 25 of resolution 2111
(2013), the Council reiterated its willingness to take action against individuals involved in the
misappropriation of public resources.
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military strength and posture of 2009-2010 notwithstanding,2 its threat continues to
reverberate, generating fatal attacks throughout southern and central Somalia while
inspiring and coordinating attacks against neighbouring countries.3
11. Similarly, Al-Shabaab has continued to demonstrate its violent operational
reach beyond Mogadishu, where it has enhanced its capacity by adopting an
apparent economy of effort strategy.4 The strategy has also involved Al-Shabaab
maintaining an effective and violent footprint in the capital, its widely publicized
withdrawal in August 2011 notwithstanding.
12. As in the past, its attacks have been calculated, coordinated and part of a
strategic campaign involving a sustained asymmetrical conflict. Its tactics include
improvised explosives (person-borne, vehicle-borne and radio-controlled), mortar
shelling, grenade and hit-and-run attacks and frequent ambushes in “recovered”
locations such as Baidoa, Beledweyne and Kismayo (see a map of Al-Shabaab’s
operational presence in Somalia in annex 1.1).5 The attacks have targeted, among
others, civilians, parliamentarians, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
forces, United Nations staff and government institutions, including repeated
“spectacular” attacks against the presidential palace, a key target of Al-Shabaab
operations in Mogadishu during the current mandate (see the section on improvised
explosive devices and infiltration in annex 1.3).
13. Organizationally, while Al-Shabaab appears to have aligned itself closer to the
Al-Qaida transnational agenda, devoting considerable operational efforts to attacks
beyond the borders of Somalia, it has also repositioned itself to adopt a more
tactically violent approach to its campaign within the country, as illustrated by its
activities in locations such as Mogadishu. Three possible factors explain this shift.
14. First is the aftermath of Al-Shabaab’s violent but equally pragmatic purge of
its dissenting senior ranks in 2013 (see an image of “Arabey”, one of the few
surviving senior Al-Shabaab dissenters, in strictly confidential annex 1.2).6 Second,
the outcome of the purge suggested that Mukhtar Ali al-Zubayr (Ahmed Godane),
before his demise in September 2014, had been able to consolidate his authority
over Al-Shabaab without any outward display of discontent or challenge. 7 Third, the
__________________
2 From 2009 to 2010, Al-Shabaab was the most dominant actor in Somalia in terms of its
territorial presence and military capacity.
3 The Monitoring Group’s assessment is that Al-Shabaab has demonstrated during the current
mandate that it has now become a transnational threat. See the Horn of Africa case study in
strictly confidential annex 2.
4 The Monitoring Group believes that this is a significant demonstration of Al -Shabaab’s
organizational capacity.
5 See BBC News, “Somali African Union Beledweyne base hit by bomb attack”, 19 November
2013. Available from www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24998892.
6 This included the killing in 2013 of Sheikh Abu Bakr Zaylai (al-Afghani Ibrahim Mee’aad), Abu
Hamid Hashi Olhayi (Sheikh Burhan) and Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki (Omar Hammami) and the
reported detention of several other members. The Monitoring Group believes that the level of
internal divisions in the lead-up to the summer of 2013 had become unsustainable and a direct
challenge to the authority of Ahmed Godane. It also believes that, as far back as early 2013,
decisions, at least among some of the internationalist-leaning cadre of Al-Shabaab, had been
made to neutralize a number of senior dissenters.
7 The Monitoring Group is unaware of any credible information suggesting that Ahmed Godane
had been facing a significant challenge from within the senior ranks of Al -Shabaab. On 27 July
2014, however, unconfirmed media reports suggested that he might have survived an
assassination attempt in Baraawe.
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purge appears to have given dominance to the more extremist cadre of Al -Shabaab,
particularly, drawing on support from affiliates,8 including Al-Hijra, and other
senior East African commanders based in Somalia.9
External pressure
15. Strategically, Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its flexibility, especially in
southern Somalia. Consequently, the group has adjusted where necessary to address
the fluidity of its operational environment. Likewise, external pressure, including
periodic lethal action from Member States,10 the AMISOM military surge and, to a
degree, engagements by the armed forces, have all pressured Al-Shabaab into
further adjusting its tactics and methods, albeit with varying outcomes.
16. The use and threat of lethal action such as intelligence-led air strikes conducted by
Member States have deprived Al-Shabaab of senior commanders, notably Ibrahim Ali
Abdi “Anta Anta” and Ahmed Abdulkadir “Sahal Iskudhuq”,11 and possibly contributed
to the choreographed “public defection” of Sheikh Maxamed Sayid “Atom”. 12 More
symbolically, following a five-year, intelligence-driven operation by the United States
in Somalia, Al-Shabaab’s “Emir”, Ahmed Godane, was killed in a drone strike on
1 September 2014.13 The Monitoring Group’s assessment is that strategic strikes have
in general resulted in short-term gains, but significantly failed to diminish
Al-Shabaab’s operational capacity. There is no current evidence that they have the
potential to “degrade and destroy” Al-Shabaab.14 While the recent removal of Ahmed
Godane from the battlefield represents a significant achievement for AMISOM and
the Federal Government in their efforts to defeat Al-Shabaab, the departure of such an
important figure does not mark the end of Al-Shabaab or its capabilities.
__________________
8 The Monitoring Group assesses that Ahmed Godane enjoyed the support not only of affiliates
such as Somalia-based Al-Hijra fighters, but also a growing number of new recruits based in
Mombasa, Kenya, and the United Republic of Tanzania.
9 In March 2014, the new transnational-looking Al-Shabaab received a public sign of approval
from the East African foreign fighters contingent. During an oath of allegiance in the form of a
video message entitled “Mujahideen moments 3”, an ascending senior Kenyan commander from
Mombasa, Abu Salim al-Muhajir, can be seen reaffirming the commitment of East Africa to
international jihad and to Ahmed Godane.
10 Credible evidence continues to suggest that Member States, including Ethiopia, Kenya and the
United States, have conducted lethal counter-terrorism operations inside Somalia against
Al-Shabaab.
11 See Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Somalia: reported US covert actions 2001-2014”,
22 February 2012. Available from www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/22/get-the-datasomalias-
hidden-war/.
12 On 7 June 2014, the Ministry of Information of Somalia announced that “Atom” had agreed to
defect from Al-Shabaab (see https://madmimi.com/p/c40ee4?fe=1&pact=23142609746). The
Monitoring Group notes that, following the takeover of Al-Shabaab North East by “Yasin
Kilwe” in January 2012, “Atom” began to lose significance and had probably defected well in
advance of his so-called “public defection” in 2014. In addition, credible but uncorroborated
information strongly indicates that “Atom”, in spite of the travel ban imposed upon him by the
Security Council, may have been facilitated to travel internationally frequently.
13 See a Department of Defense press release at www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?
ReleaseID=16924.
14 In addition, there is no credible evidence (politically or operationally) to date to suggest that
either the Federal Government of Somalia or AMISOM has been able to strategically exploit
such actions.
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Potential implications of Ahmed Godane’s death
On 6 September 2014, Al-Shabaab announced that it had appointed
Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah as the group’s new “Emir”.a According to
credible information,b he had served as a close adviser and member of the
hard-line inner circle of the former “Emir”.c The Monitoring Group is
currently following events within Al-Shabaab to assess the medium-term to
long-term implications of Ahmed Godane’s death.
On the basis of current evidence, especially Al-Shabaab’s operational
evolutiond and information received, the indications are that, in the short
term, the death of Ahmed Godane is unlikely to alter the insecurity
trajectories in and beyond Somalia significantly,e in particular the group’s
ability to carry out violence in Mogadishu.f
Early indications of Al-Shabaab’s determination and potential future
direction have been a series of operations since the death of Ahmed
Godane. They have included an ambush against officials of the Federal
Government in Caag Mareer (Hiraan region),g a vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device attack targeting an AMISOM convoy in Afgoyeh and the
assassination of a senior National Intelligence and Security Agency official
in Mogadishu.i Likewise, evidence strongly indicates that Al-Shabaab was
in the final stages of carrying out an attack against Uganda following the
disruption of an Al-Shabaab cell, during which a suicide vest and
explosives were reportedly recovered.j
In terms of Al-Shabaab’s cohesion, however, the Monitoring Group
is aware of credible reports suggesting factional rivalries to the
appointment of Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah. If accurate, the potential
strains of emerging factions within Al-Shabaab are likely to become more
visible and, potentially, afford an opportunity for the Federal Government
to exploit, albeit not permanently paralyse, Al-Shabaab.k
a This information was conveyed using Al-Shabaab’s authorized Twitter account at
https://twitter.com/s7bhijratain/status/50830184, which has since been disabled.
b E-mail correspondence with AMISOM security officials from 2 to 7 September
2014 and a briefing by a regional intelligence official on 8 September 2014.
c Credible information suggests that the new leader is known as “Ahmed Diriye”
and “Mahad Umar Abdikarim”.
d The Monitoring Group has used the operational timeline of June 2013 to July
2014 as part of its judgement of Al-Shabaab’s operational evolution.
e As part of its assessment, the Monitoring Group has taken into consideration the
fact that Ahmed Godane was unlikely to be involved in day-to-day operational
decision-making and that the commanders with day-to-day operational
responsibility continue to retain the freedom to implement the “Emir’s intent”
(a course of action and method for accomplishing and prosecuting violent jihad
both in and beyond Somalia).
f Likewise, the Monitoring Group assesses that the death of Ahmed Godane will
not affect the capability of Al-Shabaab to carry out regional attacks within the
coming three to six months (including the ability of the Al-Shabaab core to
instigate and incite regional affiliates).
g Confidential United Nations and non-governmental organization report dated
7 September 2014.
h Confidential United Nations and non-governmental organization report dated
8 September 2014.
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i Reuters, “Somali Islamists kill national security officer; Al Shabaab claim
responsibility”, 13 September 2014. Available from www.hiiraan.com/news4/
2014/Sept/56331/somali_islamists_kill_national_security_officer_al_shabaab_clai
m_responsibility.aspx#sthash.aFWBSga4.dpbs.
j See Risdel Kasasira and Albert Tumwine, “How al-Shabaab entered Uganda”,
Daily Monitor, 16 September 2014. Available from www.monitor.co.ug/News/
National/How-al-Shabaab-entered-Uganda/-/688334/2453730/-/3u3m4xz/-/
index.html. The Monitoring Group is aware of claims by Al-Shabaab denying
the disruption in Kampala. See also Somalicurrent, “Al Shabaab denies
Ugandan officials foiled planned attack”, 15 September 2014. Available from
www.somalicurrent.com/2014/09/15/al-shabaab-denies-ugandan-officialsfoi…-
planned-attack/.
k The Monitoring Group is also following credible reports that have linked a
number of senior Al-Shabaab commanders to a potential oath of allegiance to
Islamic State. On 6 September 2014, Al-Shabaab and its new leader
reconfirmed their oath of allegiance to Al-Qaida.
17. Accordingly, during the reporting period, high-profile commanders, including
Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir “Ikrima”, Mohamed Sultan Sandhere “Ukash” and
Yusuf Dheeq “Ishmaaciil”,15 who have all been linked to high-profile “complex”
attacks in 2013 and 2014,16 enjoy operational freedom to plan and direct attacks from
their base in Barawe in Somalia.17 Paradoxically, foreign counter-terrorism operations
(intelligence-led air strikes) in Somalia have also been adeptly exploited by
Al-Shabaab for its own propaganda purposes. This was clearly illustrated in October
2013 after the failed attempt to kill or capture “Ikrima”18 and more recently in August
2014 when Al-Shabaab’s media wing, Al-Kataib, released a documentary-style
reconstruction of the abortive French-United States military raid on Bulo Marer on
11 January 2013.19
__________________
15 According to sensitive reporting received by the Monitoring Group in September 2014, and
corroborated by a regional intelligence service, Yusuf Dheeq “Ishmaaciil” is reportedly
Al-Shabaab’s chief Amniyat in charge of external operations.
16 Unconfirmed information has linked “Ukash” to two regional attacks.
17 The Monitoring Group believes that the use of intelligence-led air strikes against Al-Shabaab in
Somalia gives rise to short-term gains, unlike counter-terrorism operations against core
Al-Qaida, which have, for the most part, denied operatives, in particular senior leaders and
commanders, sanctuaries, thus keeping them “on the run”. This would appear not to be the case
in Somalia with regard to Al-Shabaab leaders. By and large, Al-Shabaab’s senior leadership
remains intact and able to move freely within the country. An example is the unconfirmed
reported visit of Al-Shabaab’s Governor for Banadir, “Ali Jabal”, attending a Koranic
competition in Mogadishu (see http://dalsanradio.com/articles/7197/Senior-Alshabaab-Member-
Takes-Part-a-Quran-Quiz-in-Mogadishu). The Group notes that the Federal Government has
denied this claim by Al-Shabaab.
18 On 7 October 2013, an Al-Shabaab member, “Saqr Quarish”, gave an alleged first-hand account
of the counter-terrorism operation in Barawe to capture “Ikrima”. His account was posted on his
Twitter account, which later turned up in several jihad forums. For the account, see
http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/jihadist-gives-alleged-acco…-
barawe.html.
19 The video is available from http://sitemultimedia.org/video/SITE_Shabaab_Failed_French_
Raid.mp4.
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Operation Eagle
18. Meanwhile, offensive action by AMISOM, supported by the national armed
forces, has seen Al-Shabaab cede more territory in Somalia during the current
reporting period (see the map of areas captured from Al-Shabaab as at July 2014 in
annex 1.1). Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2124 (2013),20 a
military campaign under Operation Eagle was launched in March 2014 with the
objective of degrading Al-Shabaab’s capacity to control strategic locations in Somalia.21
The current cessation in military operations notwithstanding,22 Operation Eagle
appears to have made tangible gains,23 including capturing areas from Al-Shabaab in
Bakool, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiiraan and Lower Shabelle (see S/2014/330).
19. Both AMISOM and the national armed forces have, however, had to contend
with regular attacks by Al-Shabaab in the recovered locations, highlighting the scope
of the group’s infiltration. An example of this was on 13 March 2014, following the
capture by AMISOM of Buulobarde in the Hiiraan region. Less than a week later,
Al-Shabaab carried out a “complex” attack against a makeshift AMISOM base in
Buulobarde on 18 March 2014, killing two AMISOM soldiers and a number of
national armed forces personnel.24
20. The Monitoring Group believes that Operation Eagle’s “success” should also
be linked to unwillingness on the part of Al-Shabaab to engage the allied forces
militarily and to tactically opt to cede territory without resistance. This would suggest
that Al-Shabaab intends to focus its efforts on intelligence gathering, infiltration and
asymmetrical attacks, as seen during the current mandate, in strategic locations such
as Mogadishu and sanctuaries such as Puntland and Somaliland.
21. Annex 1.3 provides a description of the tactics, techniques and procedures of
Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu.
22. Annex 1.4 provides a description of the presence of Al-Shabaab in Puntland.
B. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat
23. Not since the prominence in the Horn of Africa of the former Al -Qaida in East
Africa25 has the region been besieged by a more determined, prolific and effective
__________________
20 By its resolution 2124 (2013), the Security Council requested the African Union to increase the
AMISOM force strength from 17,731 to 22,126.
21 The Monitoring Group notes that, while Operation Eagle’s objectives have been achieved to an
extent, evidence continues to indicate that Al-Shabaab retains the capacity to strike at will
within the “recovered” locations deemed as strategic. An example was its assassination of the
Interim Juba Administration intelligence officer, Isse Kambano, in February 2014 (see
www.keydmedia.net/en/news/article/somalia_senior_security_officer_shot_… ).
22 As at the time of writing, there had been no resumption of military operations against
Al-Shabaab.
23 While Operation Eagle has achieved gains militarily, according to the AMISOM Joint Operation
Information-Sharing Forum, there continues to be serious challenges with regard to stabilization
across “liberated” areas.
24 See BBC News, “Somalia’s al-Shabab attacks army hotel in Bulo-burde”, 18 March 2014.
Available from www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26626335.
25 Al-Qaida in East Africa has evolved over several generations since its arrival in the Horn of
Africa in the early 1990s and has arguably had three generations: 1991-1996, 1996-2002 and
2002-2011.
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Al-Qaida-affiliated group as Al-Shabaab.26 Likewise, since the Monitoring Group’s
previous report (S/2013/413), strictly confidential annex 2.1), Al-Shabaab has
demonstrated its resilience in emerging from a fractious state in late 2012 to
mid-2013, caused by leadership and operational disputes, while enduring a series of
kinetic counter-terrorism campaigns by regional and foreign intelligence services. 27
24. The sustained counter-terrorism pressure and successful overcoming of
internal divisions have forced the Al-Shabaab core to become more operationally
audacious by placing greater emphasis on exporting its violence beyond the borders
of Somalia.28 Conversely, in the past year, Al-Shabaab’s overt regional strategy has
relied increasingly on its entrenched support-base of Amniyat-like operatives,29
especially in Djibouti and Ethiopia, and, to an extent, affiliates, 30 including Al-Hijra
in Kenya, to conduct terrorist attacks in the region.31
25. By the end of 2013, Al-Shabaab’s regional strategy had become apparent: a
resurgent extremist group sufficiently assertive to fully align itself with and pursue
strategies adapted to transnational Al-Qaida operations. Evidence of this is visibly
manifested in the “Badru Nairobi Operation”, commonly known as the Westgate
shopping mall attack of September 2013. The operation,32 conceived in Somalia,
planned from a United Nations refugee camp and executed from Eastleigh in
Nairobi,33 signalled the widely anticipated operational shift. It marked a departure
from “soft targets” to “complex and spectacular” large-scale attacks beyond
Somalia,34 drawing on, where practical, a combination of Al-Hijra resources (in
Kenya) at the peripheral level and the operational discipline of Al -Shabaab core
__________________
26 For a number of years, Al-Qaida in East Africa enjoyed operational success in the Horn of
Africa. The Monitoring Group assesses that Al-Shabaab is beginning to enjoy the same
operational success regionally in East Africa. See “The future of Al-Qaeda”, available from
www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/394.pdf.
27 From 2012 to 2013, open-source intelligence and sensitive reporting have shown that
international actors, including the United States and the United Kingdom, and regional allies,
such as States members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, have focused
efforts to counter Al-Shabaab’s activities.
28 Contradicting his seemingly isolationist policies to date, Ahmed Godane, in his Ramadan audio
address, released on 30 June 2013, stated that “the mujahid must know that our war against the
kafir is borderless and not constrained to some geographical regions or any specific land” and
that “the mujahid must comprehend that our jihad is a global jihad that gives support to every
oppressed Muslim in every corner of the globe”. The Monitoring Group believes that the
statement was a potential indicator of Al-Shabaab’s intention, following the purge in mid-2013,
to redouble its regional operations.
29 Evidence suggests that some of those individuals include Somalis living outside Somalia, such
as diplomats, journalists and community activists.
30 During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group encountered severe operational difficulties in
investigating Al-Hijra in Kenya and regionally owing to national security concerns on the part of
the Government of Kenya. The United Nations and the Government are currently in discussions
on resolving the situation.
31 The Monitoring Group is increasingly concerned by the foreign link to Al -Hijra, in particular its
foreign financiers.
32 See Al-Shabaab, “Was the Badru Nairobi Operation a cowardly act”, Gaidi Mtaani. Available
from https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/gaidi-mtaani-issue-4.pdf.
33 The Monitoring Group remains extremely concerned at the use of United Nations camps as safe
havens and staging grounds for Al-Shabaab operations. Since its mandate in 2010, it has
observed an increased Al-Shabaab presence, exploiting such camps for terror activities.
34 Historically, Al-Shabaab’s operational models and tactics, techniques and procedures have
always been tried and tested in Somalia before being exported to the region.
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Amniyat-like operatives on the other.35 On a psychological level, the operation has
dispelled the latent belief within Kenya, which appeared to be borne out of a series
of failed aspirational plots by affiliates such as Al-Hijra, that “complex and
spectacular” attacks were impossible.36
26. In 2014, Al-Shabaab’s newfound operational tempo in Kenya continued with a
series of symbolic attacks and attempted plots, including a partially constructed
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, successfully infiltrated from Somalia.
The device was reportedly destined for a major attack in Mombasa (see strictly
confidential annex 2.1).37 Demonstrating its operational philosophy of fomenting
fear in Kenya, Al-Shabaab planted an improvised explosive device inside Jomo
Kenyatta International Airport on 16 January 2014. The symbolic attac k was linked
to a Nairobi-based Somali diplomat, Ilyas Yussuf Warsame, and five others.38 By
mid-2014, the accumulation of Al-Shabaab attacks inside Kenya and the potency of
its threat appeared to have resulted in the group achieving part of its objective: to
create anxiety in Kenya. The response based on credible intelligence has led a
number of Western embassies in Kenya to issue travel advisories and others to
reduce staffing levels.39
27. In Ethiopia, Al-Shabaab’s meticulous and incremental planning to carry out
violent attacks involved the reassigning of Amniyat-like operatives from Kenya,
Somalia, Somaliland and possibly Yemen to Addis Ababa in the form of the “Bole
Rwanda cell”.40 This included an Al-Shabaab operative assuming the identity of a
United Nations worker and another using his membership of the Puntland security
forces and patronage from the Puntland authorities to conspire against Ethiopia. The
plot, if executed as planned, would almost certainly have resulted in Al -Shabaab
breaking its long operational deadlock inside Addis Ababa.41 Owing to enhanced
security, however, in the final hours leading up to an attack that would have caused
mass casualties, Al-Shabaab was compelled to abort a “complex and spectacular”
attack on 13 October 2013, less than a month after the Westgate shopping mall
attack.42
__________________
35 In its previous report (S/2013/413), the Monitoring Group described Al-Shabaab’s intention to
shift from “soft targets” to “complex and spectacular” attacks.
36 Credible information obtained by the Monitoring Group in relation to several senior Al -Hijra
members, including Abubakar Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi” and a direct Twitter message by Abu
Mansour Al-Amriki, revealed frustrations at the inability to carry out a major attack in Kenya
coordinated and executed by Kenyans.
37 Incomplete evidence suggests that, unlike previous years, Al-Shabaab core operatives have
predominantly carried out attacks inside Kenya in 2014.
38 The Third Secretary of the Embassy of Somalia in Nairobi, Ilyas Yussuf Warsame, was arrested
on 23 January 2014 in connection with that and other attacks. The Monitoring Group notes that
he has denied being a member of Al-Shabaab or being involved in the attack (see
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kenya-4-men-charged-court-airport-bombing).
39 BBC News, “Travel firms suspend flights to Mombasa after FCO warning”, 16 May 2014.
Available from www.bbc.com/news/uk-27434902.
40 Exploitation of Al-Shabaab’s Ethiopian “Bole Rwanda cell” e-mail accounts and financial
records by the Monitoring Group reveals the cell’s contacts with Yemen and an operational tier
linked to Yemen described by multiple independent sources as an Al-Qaida affiliate.
41 The Monitoring Group has been briefed in detail on three previous credible Al-Shabaab plots to
attack Addis Ababa.
42 See “Two die in a bomb blast in Addis Ababa”, Addis Standard, 14 October 2013. Available
from http://addisstandard.com/two-die-in-a-bomb-attack-in-addis-ababa.
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28. Similarly, in 2014, credible information gathered on Al-Shabaab further
reinforces its operational scope and discipline in planning attacks in the Horn of
Africa. The Al-Shabaab core can coordinate and conduct successful attacks
throughout the Horn, in addition to retaining the operational capability to specifically
target Westerners in Djibouti and Kenya, among other countries.43 Meanwhile,
sensitive information acquired by the Monitoring Group strongly indicates that
Al-Shabaab may have “misdirected” regional and foreign intelligence services in
relation to its target (La Chaumière restaurant) in Djibouti on 24 May 2014.44 This
trait demonstrates the same level of operational tradecraft observed during the
planning stages of the “Badru Nairobi Operation” (see strictly confidential annex 2.1).
29. Strictly confidential annex 2.1 provides a description of Al-Shabaab’s regional
operations in Kenya.
30. Strictly confidential annex 2.2 provides a description of Al-Shabaab’s regional
operations in Ethiopia.
31. Strictly confidential annex 2.3 provides a description of Al-Shabaab’s regional
operations in Djibouti.
C. Local threats to peace and security in Somalia
Threats to peace and security in the Sool region
32. The Monitoring Group has followed events closely in the Sool region of northeastern
Somaliland, where Somaliland forces have clashed with Puntland forces and
militias loyal to Khatumo, a political organization based in the Dhulbahante clan
that is pursuing the creation of a regional state within Somalia and separation from
Somaliland.
33. The region is particularly prone to conflict, given the competing claims by
Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo over oil-rich territory there and political
infighting among the Dhulbahante, who are divided in loyalty between Puntland,
Khatumo and Somaliland. The conflicts have also resulted in attacks on civilians
and population displacements (see annex 8.2).
34. The Monitoring Group is concerned by the steady militarization of Sool,
especially since November 2013. Notably, the Khatumo movement has cultivated
political support from the Federal Government, which does not recognize the claims
of Somaliland to oil rich-territory, but after January 2014 has also warmed relations
with the Government of Puntland.
35. While the Monitoring Group is concerned by apparent links between Khatumo
and Al-Shabaab, it has also noted the potential risks posed by plans drafted by the
Government of Somaliland to deploy an oil protection unit in oil-rich territory in
__________________
43 See Voice of America, “Deadly blast in Djibouti”, 24 May 2014. Available from
www.voanews.com/content/deadly-attack-in-djibouti/1921950.html. The Monitoring Group
assesses that one of the reasons for selecting the Westgate shopping mall as a target was the high
number of Westerners frequenting it daily. Credible evidence also suggests that Mombasa is a
high-risk area for Westerners.
44 Information acquired “indirectly” from a senior Djiboutian diplomatic official in May 2014
suggests that electronic surveillance pointed the intelligence services i n the wrong direction.
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Sool (see annex 3.1 on deteriorating security conditions in Sool and annex 6.7 on
plans by the Somaliland authorities for an oil protection unit).
Threats to peace and security in Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle
36. In Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle, clan-based political violence broke
out and sharply escalated from 2013 to the present. The fighting has involved clan
militia of the Biyamal (Dir) and Habar Gedir (Hawiye) in Lower Shabelle and the
Abgaal (Hawiye) and Shiidle (Bantu/Jareer) in Middle Shabelle, revenge killings
and attacks on civilian settlements amounting to gross violations of human rights
and, in some cases, international humanitarian law. The complexity of the situation,
for example in Lower Shabelle, entails a combination of the alleged role of senior
army officers and soldiers in the violence, leakages of arms to clan-based militias,
use of misappropriated resources to fuel the conflict, business interests in capturing
land and other resources and political agendas seeking to influence the federal state -
formation process. The conflict risks spilling over to other regions, including the
capital region of Banadir (Mogadishu) and Bay region (Baidoa), and complicates the
continuing campaign against Al-Shabaab.
37. See annex 3.2 for an overview of rising tensions in Lower Shabelle and Middle
Shabelle.
D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom
Overview
38. Somali piracy remains at a low point. The most recent hijacking of a highvalue
merchant vessel dates back to May 2012 (that of the Greek-owned and Greekoperated
crude oil tanker Smyrni). While piracy may be largely contained, however,
many of its underlying causes continue to exist. In addition, unlike those pirates
who have been arrested and prosecuted worldwide, most of the principal organizers,
financiers and facilitators of this transnational organized crime have gone
undisturbed and unpunished.
39. With only 15 attacks registered in 2013, including two hijackings, and similar
statistics until mid-2014, Somali piracy has diminished and reverted to a level
comparable to 2006,45 although with notable differences between conditions on land
and at sea.
40. Between July and December 2006, the rising phenomenon of Somali piracy
suffered a serious setback when the Union of Islamic Courts, a political force driven
by ideology and religion, significantly clamped down on pirates in areas in which it
assumed control, notably pirate safe havens such as Hobyo and Harardhere. The
change of political landscape, with leaders in southern and central Somalia having
little interest in pirate revenue, resulted in a significant decrease in the number of
attacks and hijackings in comparison with 2005.46 Nevertheless, increasing patrols
__________________
45 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and armed robbery
against ships: report for the period 1 January-31 December 2013” (London, January 2014).
46 In 2006, the International Maritime Bureau registered 20 attacks, including five hijackings,
which represented a decrease of 60 and 66 per cent, respectively, in comparison with 2005
(50 attacks, including 15 hijackings).
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by international naval forces notwithstanding, pirates remained relatively successful
in 2006, with 1 in 4 attacks resulting in the hijacking of a vessel. 47
41. With the Union of Islamic Courts ousted by 2007, piracy activity in southern
and central Somalia resumed and rapidly became successful again.48 Unopposed on
land, pirates increased and expanded their activities at sea to a point where, in 2009
and 2010, a vessel was pirated on average every week.49 In 2011, however, their
success began to diminish with the increasing use of armed private maritime
security companies aboard vessels, until such time in 2012 when pirates were no
longer able to hijack a vessel, except unprotected and less-valuable targets such as
dhows and fishing trawlers.
42. The consistent inability of pirates to hijack high-value targets has ultimately
led to a withdrawal of investment by financiers and a reduction in operations,
resulting in a much lower hijacking rate.50
43. Somali piracy has not, however, been completely eradicated and remains a
threat to peace, security and stability. Armed attacks by pirate action groups are still
occasionally reported. During the first half of 2014, at least two pirated dhows
carrying charcoal were freed by naval coalition forces (see annex 4.1 for a list of
registered armed attacks and disruptions since October 2013).
44. Information and communications data seized from arrested pirates also
revealed associations with earlier hijacking cases and well-known individuals, such
as pirate leaders Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”, Abdullahi Mohamed Jama
“Farahow”51 and pirate negotiator Abdishakur Mohamud Mohamed “Fred”,52
indicating that existing pirate networks are continuing to test the waters to assess the
viability and possibility of reviving the once highly profitable piracy business (see
annex 4.2 for photographs of “Gafanje”).53
45. In addition, at least 42 hostages remain in captivity on land. On 11 March 2014,
Kenyan law enforcement authorities confirmed the kidnapping by Somali pirates of
__________________
47 In 2006, there were five hijacked vessels registered: two dhows, a fishing trawler, a general
cargo vessel and a product tanker.
48 In 2007, the International Maritime Bureau registered 47 attacks, including 12 hijackings, an
increase of 135 and 140 per cent, respectively, in comparison with 2006.
49 In 2009, the International Maritime Bureau registered 217 attacks, including 47 hijackings. In
2010, the numbers rose to 219 attacks and 49 hijackings.
50 In 2013, the International Maritime Bureau registered 15 attacks, including two hijackings,
which represents a hijacking succes rate of 13.3 per cent, the lowest since 2005.
51 Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” is a renowned leader of the Hobyo-Harardhere piracy
network who has been involved in tens of hijacking and abduction cases between 2008 and the
present, including the abduction of a United States/German journalist, Michael Scott Moore. On
18 August 2014, “Gafanje” was reportedly captured and arrested by the security forces of the
Federal Government of Somalia following a raid on his house in Mogadishu, but released again
a month later following an alleged bribe payment of $200,000. Abdullahi Mohamed Jama
“Farahow” is a pirate leader originally from Barawe who has reportedly been involved in the
hijacking of a South African yacht, Choizil. He is also connected to the hijackings of three other
vessels: Pompeii (2009), Hansa Stavanger (2009) and York (2010).
52 “Fred” was a pirate negotiator for the hijacked vessel Rak Afrikana (2010). He is linked to pirate
kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne” and in direct contact with several pirate financiers
and pirate leaders, such as Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” and Abdirahman Abdullahi
Haji “Suhufi” (see further S/2013/413, strictly confidential annex 4.6).
53 Information and communications data extracted in connection with the disruption and arrests of
two pirate groups in November 2013 and January 2014.
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two Kenyan engineers in Mogadishu on 12 January. They had reportedly been held in
Harardhere before being moved to a location in the vicinity of Hobyo. 54
46. Given the persistence of piracy networks and their business patterns, pirate
operations can easily resume, even on a large scale, if circumstances at sea again
become favourable.
Somali responses to international arrests of pirates
47. On 12 October 2013, the Belgian authorities arrested the renowned pirate
kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne” upon his arrival in Brussels for his
involvement in the hijacking in 2009 of the Belgian stone carrier Pompeii. His
business partner and former “President” of the self-declared autonomous region of
Himan and Heeb, Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim-Aden “Tiiceey”, was arrested with
him and is accused of facilitating ransom payments and other activities on behalf of
Somali pirates (see annex 4.3).
48. The exceptional arrest and detention of the pirate leader and his accomplice
caused much misunderstanding among the Somali population, in particular in Himan
and Heeb, where both men were operating. Several protest marches were held in the
capital, Adado, in October and November 2013, with tens to hundreds of people,
often women and children, holding posters with Afweyne’s picture and asking for
him to be freed, stating that he was not a pirate, but a businessman (see annex 4.4
for photographs).
49. Religious men and individuals with disabilities who attended a rally held in
Adado on 23 November 2013 to protest against the “unlawful” arrests stated that
individuals with disabilities throughout Himan and Heeb, who had greatly benefitted
from Afweyne’s generosity, were suffering and called for the immediate and
unconditional release of the two men.55
50. Similarly, family, friends and supporters of Tiiceey rejected his arrest,
criticized the allegations made against him and voiced their demand for his
immediate release on social media, through petitions and television interviews and
during organized meetings in his hometown of Minneapolis, United States.
51. Such protests and criticism illustrate that piracy is considered more a source of
revenue than a wrongful activity in Somalia. Many regard Afweyne, although
responsible for dozens of hijackings, killings and inhuman suffering, to be a
benefactor of the community rather than a criminal. There is local indifference to
the fact that he acquired his wealth and power by shrewdly exploiting an
environment of lawlessness, poverty and corruption.
52. Having facilitated and pardoned pirate leaders in the past, local and central
authorities in Somalia in no way counter the distorted image of pirates and piracy.
When the arrests of Afweyne and Tiiceey were made public, government officials
remained silent, except for those who spoke out publicly to criticize the arrest s.
__________________
54 The remaining hostages as at 7 July 2014 include those from the FV Prantalay (12, including
4 from Thailand), the MV Asphalt Venture (7 from India) and the FV Naham 3 (11 from China,
5 from the Philippines, 5 from Indonesia, 4 from Cambodia and 3 from Viet Nam), in addition to
Michael Scott Moore and two civil engineers from Kenya.
55 See www.goboladaradio.com/?p=19902.
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53. Speaking to the local media in Mogadishu on 16 October 2013, the Deputy
Chair of the Internal Affairs Committee of the parliament, Dahir Amin Jesow,
condemned the arrest of Afweyne.56 He accused the Government of Belgium of
violating the diplomatic immunity of Afweyne who, he said, was a “government
official” contributing to the restoration of security in the country and the
demobilization of Somali pirates. He further said that Afweyne was holding a
political position in the Government and described his arrest as unlawful. He also
described the arrest as a humiliation, given that it was conducted without previously
notifying the Government.57
54. During an interview on 7 June 2014 with a Somali-language website, the
official spokesperson of Himan and Heeb, Arays Mohamed Haji,58 was asked to
give an update on the incarceration of Tiiceey and Afweyne in Belgium. He made
the following remarks:
The prominent and famous businessman from Himan and Heeb [Afweyne] and
the former Himan and Heeb President [Tiiceey] are still held in detention in
Belgium. They have not yet been tried for any crime and therefore remain
innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. Since their detention, the Himan
and Heeb regional government has spared no efforts, legally and
diplomatically, to secure the release of the two men. We still call for their
release. They are not criminals. If they had committed any crime, they would
have already been proved guilty and convicted. We call for their release. They
are highly respected elders and prominent politicians. They are illegally being
held in detention. We still call for their release.59
55. In addition, Afweyne’s own criminal network has forcibly, although not
publicly, reacted to his arrest. In November 2013, the Monitoring Group was
informed that Afweyne’s son, pirate leader Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi (see annex 4.5
for photographs), had announced a reward of $500,000 among the Hawiye/Habar
Gedir clan for kidnapping a Belgian to be used to negotiate the release of his father. 60
56. In the same context, multiple reports have indicated that, early in June 2014,
well-armed pirates belonging to groups under the control of Mohamed Osman
Mohamed “Gafanje” and Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi were organizing themselves in
the coastal towns of Hobyo and Ceel Huur61 in preparation for a sea operation
__________________
56 Dahir Amin Jesow is a member of the Hawiye/Gaaljecel/Cifaaf Abdi subclan from the Hiraan
region. In March 2014, he, accompanied by an elder of the Hawiye/Gaaljecel clan, Ugaas
Abdirahman Ugaas Abdullahi, attended a Gaaljecel clan meeting held in The Hague, the
Netherlands, in the presence of clan members from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Both men are believed to hold foreign passports (issued
by the United Kingdom and New Zealand, respectively). See www.radiowehel.com/2014/03/10/
ugaaska-beesha-gaaljecel-xildhibaan-jeesow-oo-lagu-soo-dhaweeyay-holland-sawirro/.
57 See www.raxanreeb.com/2013/10/xildhbaan-daahir-amiin-jeesow-oo-sharci-daro-…-
maxamed/.
58 Arays Mohamed Haji is a member of the Somali diaspora in London. He was appointed as
spokesperson in February 2014, replacing Mohamed Omar Hagafey, another member of the
Somali diaspora in London.
59 See http://raasnews.com/dhageyso-xaalka-tiiceeye-iyo-afweyne-xaguu-ku-dambe….
60 Information obtained independently from law enforcement and military sources.
61 The coastal town of Ceel Huur is located some 57 km north-east of Xarardheere and 50 km
south-west of Hobyo (5°0'24" N, 48°16'9" E).
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intended to hijack a merchant vessel, again to use as leverage to negotiate the
release of Afweyne.62
57. There is no doubt that Afweyne will continue to enjoy the support of the
Hawiye/Habar Gedir clan in general and his Saleebaan subclan in particular, given
that it is becoming increasingly clear that many have previously benefited from his
pirate activities.
Impunity and diversification of pirate finances
58. In its 2012 (S/2012/544) and 2013 (S/2013/413) reports, the Monitoring Group
emphasized the absence of United Nations sanctions against and prosecution of
identified pirate leaders, financiers and facilitators and the impunity and immunity
that they therefore continued to enjoy. Sanctions may, however, be the only and last
means of leverage to persuade the Federal Government and other Member States
(where some pirates reside, travel or hold bank accounts) to take action.
59. In the meantime, with piracy rates down for three successive years, pirates are
currently benefitting from an environment of impunity that allows them to invest in
new forms of business, both legal and illegal, to launder their proceeds and gain
further profit.
60. As such, and further to documented cases of pirate leaders turning to
unlicensed fishing operations in Somali waters as a new source of revenue (see
S/2013/413, annex 3.1), the Monitoring Group continues to identify former pirates
actively involved in other business activities, including arms trafficking, the airline
industry, renewable energy technology, car export and import and the fishing
industry (see annex 4.6 for a case study on Central Air Aviation).
61. Preliminary investigations into the finances of pirates and former pirates have
revealed significant sums of money circulating inside and outside Somalia, financial
dealings with Somali politicians, money-laundering in Dubai, United Arab Emirates,
and various bank accounts of pirate leaders, financiers and facilitators held in
Somalia and Djibouti, several holding close to $1 million (see annex 4.7 for an
overview of pirate finances).
E. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption
62. Further to its previous reports (S/2012/544 and S/2013/413), the Monitoring
Group continued to investigate past and present acts of corruption that undermine
public institutions through the diversion of national financial flows and revenue of
national assets in Somalia. In its investigations, the Group has considered that the
misappropriation of public resources entails the elements of intent, capability and
opportunity and conduct. Overall, the Group has observed the perpetuation of
conventional patterns of diversion by holders of public office and civil servants with
access to national resources or by gatekeepers of government offices, who have
continued the basic practices of the Transitional Federal Government. The Group
has also, however, identified novel and yet more sophisticated strategies for the
__________________
62 Information obtained from a military naval source and independently confirmed by the
Monitoring Group through a Somali source on the ground with direct access to Hobyo-
Harardhere pirate groups.
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misappropriation of government funds. The Group remains concerned about acts
that threaten to capture the public financial management environment in Somalia
and undermine international efforts to achieve greater transparency and
accountability of Somali finances.
63. The Monitoring Group previously noted that, under the transitional federal
institutions, the systematic misappropriation, embezzlement and outright theft of
public resources had essentially become a system of governance (S/2012/544,
para. 15), undermining the prospects of stabilization and perpetuating a political
economy of State collapse. A change in political circumstance with the
establishment of the Federal Government in 2012 notwithstanding, underlying
corruption as a system of governance has not yet fundamentally changed and, in
some cases, the situation arguably has worsened, especially the phenomenon of
“secret contracting”. The Group has noted that there is a prevalent argument with
regard to Somalia that a degree of diversion is inevitable or even acceptable as part
of the State-formation process and the exercise of power under the prevailing
conditions. This argument is not only inconsistent with the scale of irregular
financial flows, but also disregards the importance of corruption to the chronic
insecurity of Somalia.63 In its investigations, the Group has consistently found
patterns of misappropriation with diversion rates of between 70 and 80 per cent. The
indications are that diverted funds are used for partisan agendas that constitute
threats to peace and security.64
64. The Federal Government has publicized the efforts under way to reform public
financial institutions and management. For example, a new board of directors of the
Central Bank was selected and approved by the Cabinet on 24 April 2014, but is
awaiting parliamentary approval. Following a search process, a new auditor general
was appointed on 13 February 2014. A new accountant general identified, however,
declined the position. A procurement amendment bill was approved by the Council of
Ministers on 22 May 2014 and an audit bill was approved in June 2014, but both are
awaiting parliamentary assent. A ministerial order was published in February requiring
the use by all government agencies of the Treasury Single Account and of the Somali
Financial Management Information System.65 Those are important steps in reforming
the financial management architecture and need to broaden in scope and deepen in
effect with international assistance, because the reality of financial flows in the
Government has yet to be altered or transformed from the period of the Transitional
Federal Government, in particular in terms of accountability and transparency.
65. As the Monitoring Group has repeatedly concluded, the goal of building an
effective and legitimate security sector, in addition to civilian State institutions, as a
step towards the stabilization of Somalia will be consistently confounded until the
__________________
63 In a recent report, the Working Group on Corruption and Security warns specifically against
such arguments, given that the sidelining of corruption in favour of narrow security agendas
tends to undermine the latter objectives. See Working Group on Corruption and Security,
“Corruption: the unrecognized threat to international security” (Washington, D.C., Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 2014). Available from http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/corruption_and_security.pdf.
64 The figures are consistent with the period of the Transitional Federal Government. See “World
Bank summary of financial diagnostic assessment of ‘audit investigative financial report
2009-10’”, 30 May 2012. Available from http://wardheernews.com/World_Bank/World_Bank_
Summary_of_FDA.pdf.
65 Second periodic report of the Financial Governance Committee, issued in June 2014.
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broader issues of public corruption are meaningfully addressed. In this regard, the
Group recommends that the Committee act as rapidly as possible with regard to
individuals and entities proposed for designation by the Group in cases of
misappropriation of public finances, and in particular individuals and entities in the
private sector responsible for instrumentalizing such corruption.
Phenomenon of “secret contracting”
66. The Monitoring Group is particularly concerned about the phenomenon of
“secret contracting”, which has become a way of doing business for the Federal
Government since at least mid-2013 and creates the opportunity for
misappropriation. Contracts regarding national public assets affecting the public
interest have been signed by government officials but kept highly confidential —
from the Somali population, the parliament and, until now, international donors.
Neither the process of signing the contracts nor their implementation, including the
transparency and accountability of their revenue streams, is subject to public
scrutiny or parliamentary oversight. While the Transitional Federal Government
regularly entered into contracts of one kind or another, the political recognition
accorded to the Federal Government has enabled it to enter into contracts of
considerably greater value than could the Transitional Federal Government. One
particular contract alone constitutes a value greater than the national budget. Abuse
of the legitimacy of the Federal Government to enter into contracts that operate in
the same way as private contracts outside the institutions of government has
effectively created a parallel system of finances beyond and much greater than the
realm of public financial management.
67. None of the contracts regarding national assets entered into in the name of the
Federal Government have to date been officially published. Some have been shared
for review by the Financial Governance Committee, which includes representatives
of the Federal Government and international financial institutions. The Financial
Governance Committee confidentially reviewed seven contracts for seismic data
processing and marketing, Mogadishu port development and operations, Mogadishu
airport development and operations, Mogadishu container port operations, oil and
gas exploration and development, the construction of offshore patrol vessels and
fisheries management and protection. According to the Financial Governance
Committee, “the confidential reviews have established that all of the contracts/
concessions reviewed suffer from two important omissions: lack of clear [Federal
Government of Somalia] specifications/[terms of reference], and the absence of any
competitive tendering process”.65 Another significant problem is that the secrecy of
contracts creates mistrust and uncertainty in the various regions of Somalia in terms
of sharing of natural resources, which will be exacerbated with the prospects of oil
contracts, marine resources and other potential mineral extraction from Somali soil.
This can have detrimental effects, not least for the process of federalization. Other
problems, given the secrecy of the contracts, are simply knowing how many there
are, obtaining copies of them and determining who is actually involved and how.
Sources have informed the Monitoring Group that dozens of contracts have been
signed.66 For an overview of several contracts, see annex 5.1.
__________________
66 One senior official asserted in June 2014 that between 25 and 30 contracts had been signed in
the preceding six months.
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68. In this context, the Monitoring Group obtained documentary evidence that
demonstrates that individuals close to the presidency are conspiring to take private
control of recovered overseas assets, which should be under the fiduciary control of
the Central Bank upon recovery. The effort was undertaken pursuant to a contract
signed in July 2013 between the Federal Government and the United States law firm
of Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy and Ecker, P.A., and led to the resignation of
Yussur Abrar as Governor of the Bank. Her successor, Bashir Issa Ali, revoked the
power of attorney associated with the contract on 13 May 2014 and terminated the
contract itself on 14 July. The Group further investigated one of the key individuals
involved in the overseas recovery effort, Musa Haji Mohamed “Ganjab”, who has
past connections to Al-Shabaab and was involved in the diversion of official army
weapons stocks (see strictly confidential annex 6.4).
69. A full case study of the contract with the United States firm appears in strictly
confidential annex 5.2 as an illustration of the approach and methods of “secret
contracting”, although each such contract has its own unique narrative.
Central Bank of Somalia
70. The period from 2013 to 2014 has not entailed ideal conditions for fundamental
reform of the Central Bank, with the Governor resigning on 13 September 2013, the
replacement resigning on 30 October and an interim governor being appointed for
90 days and confirmed only on 24 April 2014. In its previous report ( S/2013/413,
annex 5.2), the Monitoring Group described the system of fadlan payments from the
Bank to private individuals or to public officials for private purposes, which the
Group found in 2011 amounted to 87 per cent of all withdrawals and in 2012 to
76 per cent. Those figures declined to 72 per cent following the establishment of the
Federal Government. The Group has reviewed the accounts of the Bank since its
previous report and estimates that the rate of fadlan payments to individuals from the
Bank remains largely between 70 and 75 per cent. Notably, however, following the
publication of the Group’s previous report in July 2013, the names of all individuals
receiving payments in the Bank’s accounts were replaced with coded numbers to
obscure the identity of the recipients. It is unclear who holds the master code list
with the names against the numbers.
71. The independence of the Central Bank has relied less on the institutional
structures in place or not in place than on the personality and integrity of individual
governors. This factor has been and continues to be key in government efforts to
recover overseas assets described in strictly confidential annex 5.2. The intentions
of the current Governor to reduce the scale of the fadlan system notwithstanding, he
has found that expenditure is outside his control. He has sought to introduce a
system in which funds are withdrawn based on payment vouchers signed by the
Minister of Finance and the Accountant General, in aid of reconciling Bank
accounts with the Office of the Accountant General. Funds are not withdrawn from
the Bank against line items in the national budget, however, meaning that the
Governor does not know the actual purpose of the withdrawals. Furthermore, the
Bank has no mandate to control and oversee how government institutions spend
dispensed funds, which is formally the task of the Auditor General and the
Parliamentary Financial Committee, although they are inadequately empowered.
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Mogadishu port
72. Income generated from the port of Mogadishu has conventionally constituted
the largest internal revenue stream for the central Government, aside from bilateral
donations from other Governments that may or may not be deposited in the Central
Bank. Port revenue, whether customs or port fees, has, however, historically been
diverted at the source through various practices that persist today. While control
over diversion at the port has taken various forms over the years, invariably the port
manager or deputy manager is a key figure.
73. In mid-2013, large container vessels began regular shipping to and from the
port. They are less subject than smaller vessels to weather patterns, meaning that the
regularity of large-scale shipping has increased revenue at the port and the income
generated has become more consistent on a monthly basis. Consequently, by the
latter half of 2013, the average monthly revenue at the port had increased from
approximately $3.8 million to in excess of $5.5 million in customs duties alone, not
including port fees and additional charges on tax-exempt imports. The average
monthly deposit in the Central Bank from the port since mid-2013 has totalled
$4.6 million, however. While deposits of port revenue into the Bank increased
generally, they are proportionally less than the increase in shipping at the port,
indicating a comparable or possibly higher rate of diversion. At present, the
Monitoring Group estimates that at least 30 to 35 per cent of monthly port revenue
cannot be accounted for, which is largely a continuation of the previous year ’s rate
of diversion.
III. Violations of the arms embargo67
A. Arms embargo modifications for the Federal Government
74. The Security Council modified the arms embargo on Somalia in resolutions
2093 (2013), 2111 (2013) and 2142 (2014), effectively exempting the Federal
Government from seeking the Committee’s approval for arm deliveries destined for
its security forces. In turn, the Federal Government incurred a corresponding set of
obligations. It assumed the primary responsibility to notify the Committee with
specific details, for its information at least five days in advance, of any deliveries of
weapons or military equipment or the provision of assistance intended solely for the
government security forces. In addition, it was obliged to report to the Council
every six months on the structure of its security forces, the infrastructure in place to
ensure the safe management and distribution of military equipment and the
procedures and codes of conduct in place for the management and distribution of
weapons. Notably, the Council decided that weapons or military equipment sold or
supplied solely for the development of the security forces must not be resold to,
transferred to or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the
service of the security forces.
__________________
67 In paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1844 (2008), the Security Council prohibited acts that violated
the general and complete arms embargo imposed by the Council in paragraph 5 of resolution
733 (1992). In paragraph 43 (b) of resolution 2093 (2013), it temporarily amended the scope of
that prohibition.
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75. In its resolution 2142 (2014), the Security Council increased the reporting
obligations of the Federal Government, given that the requirements under the partial
suspension of the arms embargo had not been fully met. The Council stressed that
any decision to continue or end the partial suspension of the embargo on the Federal
Government would be taken in the light of the thoroughness of the Federal
Government’s implementation of its requirements. Meanwhile, the Council
requested the Secretary-General to provide options and recommendations on the
assistance needs of the Federal Government in order for it to show tangible progress
in complying with the terms of the partial suspension of the embargo. Following an
assessment mission in March 2014, the Secretary-General responded on 3 April
2014 (see S/2014/243) and a presidential statement was issued on 22 May
(S/PRST/2014/9).
76. An assessment of compliance by the Federal Government with the modified
requirements of the arms embargo appears in annex 6.1. Between 2013 and 2014,
the Federal Government submitted four reports to the Security Council. While still
not comprehensive and strictly fulfilling the scope of the requirements of relevant
resolutions, the reports nevertheless reflected improvement over time, in particular
as a result of support provided by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
(UNSOM) and its international consultants.
77. Since the adoption of resolution 2093 (2013), the number of various types of
arms that have been delivered or are expected to be delivered to the Federal
Government pursuant to formal notifications to the Committee now exceeds 13,000,
with some 5.5 million rounds of different types of ammunition. Some of the weapons
and ammunition have been diverted to arms markets in Mogadishu (see annexes 6.2
and 6.3). Overall, given the anomalies and inaccuracies of notifications to the
Committee, the diversion of notified weapons, the delivery of weapons exceeding
what has been notified, partial notifications, non-notifications, persistently late
advance notifications or the lack of post-delivery notifications, especially following
the adoption of resolution 2142 (2014), the Federal Government has not imported
weapons into Somalia in full compliance with its obligations pursuant to the
modification of the arms embargo by the Security Council.
B. Arms networks connected to the Federal Government
78. In its letter of 6 February 2014 to the Committee (S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/
OC.8), the Monitoring Group referred to clan-based networks within the
government security forces, notably from the main Hawiye subclans, the Abgaal and
Habar Gedir, which have had privileged access to official weapons stocks. Sources
within the army have informed the Group that two brigades in particular, 1 and 3,
which are Abgaal and Habar Gedir brigades traditionally based in Jowhar and
Afgoye, received large amounts of weapons from official stockpiles amid escalating
clan conflict in Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle.68 Areas around Jowhar and
__________________
68 Two army logistics officers reported to the Monitoring Group on 26 November 2013 in
Mogadishu that Brigade 3 elements and associated Habar Gidir militiamen were driving Biimaal
clans off their land in Lower Shabelle, while Brigade 1 militiamen were doing the same to Bantu
tribes in Middle Shabelle. Both officers reported that the two brigades received preferential
access to army logistics. The information was corroborated by a foreign military intelligence
official and a Somali intelligence official in December 2013.
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Afgoye were the epicentre of serious clan-based violence, land conflicts and human
rights abuses between November 2013 and May 2014, with Abgaal militias clashing
with Bantu militias and Habar Gedir clashing with the minority Biyamal and
associated militias. As clan conflicts have unfolded in those areas, the Group has
observed increasingly complex and fluid relations between the army and armed
actors in Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and the Hiraan region. Amid sporadic
cooperation between Habar Gedir and Abgaal units, militias that have not been
defined by the Federal Government as part of the security forces have acted in
concert with the army (see annex 3.2 for a case study on threats to peace and
security in Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle).
79. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group has obtained evidence implicating Musa
Haji Mohamed “Ganjab”, who acted as an adviser to the President, Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud, and who is a member of his Abgaal/Waesle subclan, in the leakage of
weaponry to Al-Shabaab and other forces beyond the army. Musa “Ganjab”, a
prominent Somali businessman, has in the past acted as a logistical facilitator for
Al-Shabaab. In 2013 and 2014, he has been a key figure in the President ’s efforts to
recover overseas financial assets (see annex 5.2), but has also maintained
relationships with key individuals in the security sector, notably the army chief of
logistics, Colonel Abdullahi Moalim Nur, the former Minister of the Interior and
National Security, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, the President of Galmudug, Abdi
Hassan Awale “Qeybdiid”, and a former warlord, Abdi Nur Siad “Abdi Wal”
(previously reported by the Monitoring Group in S/2013/413 as a threat to peace and
security). Musa “Ganjab” has introduced himself to individuals in the private
security industry as acting on behalf of the Federal Government and its efforts to
equip and train military forces. He is also responsible for setting up an armed
private security company operating in Mogadishu.
80. For a full case study on Musa “Ganjab”, his activities and his connections to
Al-Shabaab and others, see strictly confidential annex 6.4.
C. Arms deliveries to Puntland
81. The Monitoring Group has documented the importation of weapons,
ammunition and other military items by the former Puntland authorities early in
October 2013 in the absence of due notification to the Committee. On 8 October
2013, an Ilyushin-18 aircraft with registration number TT-WAK, leased by Honesty
Air Cargo, a Somali-operated airline based in the United Arab Emirates, was found
delivering items from Yemen in excess of those notified to the Committee, in
addition to items not notified to the Committee, including assault rifles, light and
heavy machine guns and ammunition, in violation of resolution 2111 (2013). More
details are provided in the case study in annex 6.5.
D. Delivery of detonator cords to north-eastern Somalia
82. Between June 2013 and the end of May 2014, the Monitoring Group counted
at least 237 incidents in which improvised explosive devices were used in southern
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and central Somalia, killing at least 244 people and injuring an additional 402. 69
The scale of attacks has been intensifying over the past few years, with an
increasing number of strikes against high-value targets. Such attacks have tended to
be limited in scale in Somaliland and Puntland, with only 13 strikes documented
between 2011 and August 2013 in Puntland, according to a report by the Puntland
police for 2013.
83. The Monitoring Group previously reported on a large shipment of weapons
that had been supplied from Yemen to a location close to Qandala, north-eastern
Somalia, in October 2012 (see S/2013/413). The arms cache included 220 RPG-7
rockets, 304 PG-7 boosters, 230 hand-grenade detonators, a 73 mm cannon, 137 kg
of TNT, two bags of ammonium nitrate, five rolls of red detonating cord and
500 electric detonators (C-DET), making it one of the largest seizures of an illegal
arms cache on record in Somalia in recent years.
84. The Monitoring Group has documented the continued delivery of C-DET
electric detonators to Qandala during the course of 2013, and their deployment in a
number of recent improvised explosive device cases throughout Somalia, suggesting
that the supply lines for important explosive triggering material remain open.
85. The purchaser of the C-DET electric detonators and red detonator cords found
in the Qandala shipment in October 2012 has been identified as Anwar Saleh
Kodais, a Yemeni individual with close ties to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula. He has also been connected to individuals identified in the
previous report of the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 3.1), in which
reference was made to a criminal network of pirate leaders, illegal fishers and
Al-Shabaab agents involved in trafficking in the Gulf of Aden. Information obtained
by the Group confirms that Al-Shabaab continues to obtain weapons and component
materials for improvised explosive devices from this network (see the case study in
annex 6.6).
E. Somaliland oil protection unit
86. The Government of Somaliland has commissioned Assaye Risk, a private
security company based in the United Kingdom, to develop a blueprint for an oil
protection unit of roughly 580 people in number that would act as a dedicated
defensive force to mitigate security threats against seismic operations conducted by
oil companies. The blueprint has been paid for by Genel Energy, which in
September 2013 temporarily suspended operations in Somaliland citing a
“deteriorating security situation”.
87. The Monitoring Group previously reported on the security risks posed by
conflicting claims over oil licences between the Federal Government and regional
administrations, recommending that the Security Council recommend that the
Somali authorities avoid signing contracts with oil and gas companies until
appropriate constitutional, legislative, fiscal and regulatory provisions had been
clarified and agreed to by the Federal Government and its regional authorities
(S/2013/413, para. 176 (b)). Meanwhile, commercial actors are proceeding with
activity in the oil and gas sector and are likely to attract security threats as their
__________________
69 Statistics drawn from a confidential database of recorded improvised explosive device attacks
compiled with the assistance of a law enforcement agency.
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commercial activities expand. The Monitoring Group therefore maintains its
position that commercial activity in the sector is expected to trigger conflict unless a
joint international and Somali approach to management of natural resources can
resolve conflicting claims.
88. Indeed, the formation of an oil protection unit without recourse to transparent
processes carries attendant risks, which could exacerbate security conditions in
Somaliland in a context in which minority clan interests have challenged the
legitimacy of the oil licensing decisions of the Government of Somaliland, to the
benefit of Al-Shabaab. In this context, the Group has raised the issue of the oil
protection unit both with the Committee and the Government of Somaliland to
ensure adherence to best practices and that the unit is not established in violation of
Security Council resolutions.70 The Group wishes to acknowledge the cooperation
of Assaye Risk, which has provided information as requested by the Group openly
and transparently.
89. An analysis of options for the creation of the oil protection unit appears in
annex 6.7.
F. Delivery of military-type vehicles and weapons to Jubaland
90. Between April and June 2014, the Interim Juba Administration imported to
Kismayo 40 Toyota Land Cruisers (four-wheel-drive pickups) shipped from the
United Arab Emirates and paid for by funds from customs duties on charcoal
exports. The procurement and import of the vehicles are believed to have been
facilitated by a charcoal trader affiliated to Al-Shabaab, Ali Naaji, in collaboration
with the Kismayo port manager, Abdullahi Dubad Shil “Hadun”, and the deputy port
manager, Yusuf Gamadid. The vehicles were subsequently painted with camouflage
colours and equipped with heavy machine guns. In addition, the Monitoring Group
received information that the Interim Juba Administration had imported 3,000 light
weapons, 30 heavy weapons and military uniforms and communication equipment.
Annex 6.8 provides photographs of the vehicles transformed into “technicals”.
IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance71
91. The environment within which humanitarian assistance was distributed and
accessed during the past year was characterized by proliferating humanitarian
interventions and actors across a greater physical territory, against a backdrop of
oscillating centres of power, deepening political divides, new cycles of conflict and
__________________
70 Paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013) states that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not
apply to “supplies of weapons or military equipment and technical assistance or training by
Member States or international, regional and subregional organizations intended solely for the
purposes of helping develop Somali security sector institutions, in the absence of a negative
decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification of any such
assistance from the supplying State, international, regional or subregi onal organization”.
71 In paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1844 (2008), the Security Council prohibited acts that
obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia or access to, or distribution of,
humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The Monitoring Group interprets the provision to include
the diversion of assistance away from its intended beneficiaries, whether to the advantage of an
armed group or simply for the purpose of profit.
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Annex 5
Misappropriation of public financial resources
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Annex 5.1
Illustrative overview of contracts
Oil and Gas sector
1. In its previous report (S/2013/413 annex 5.5), the Monitoring Group described
some of the risks associated with increasing commercial activity in the oil and gas
sector in Somalia without a resolution to constitutional and legal disputes
surrounding the control of natural resources. It also highlighted transparency and
accountability issues in the key Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) petroleum
institutions that would govern capacity building and regulation, notably the Somali
Petroleum Corporation and the Somali Petroleum Agency (SPA). During the course
of 2013 and 2014, the FGS has nonetheless continued to engage in private
negotiations with oil and gas companies and other corporations, resulting in a
number of secret contracts and cooperation agreements that in due course are likely
to exacerbate legal tensions and ownership disputes and stunt the transparent
development of Somalia’s oil and gas sectors.
Soma Oil and Gas
2. In August 2013, Soma Oil and Gas Exploration, a United Kingdom-registered
company created in 2013 and chaired by the former leader of the United Kingdom
Conservative Party, Lord Michael Howard, announced an agreement on 6 August
2013 signed with the FGS to conduct seismic surveys in Somalia’s territorial waters
and to collate and process historic seismic data, which would be placed into a data
room controlled by the FGS. In return, Soma Oil would receive the right to apply
for up to 12 oil licenses covering a maximum of 60,000 square kilometres of
territory in Somalia.1
3. The contract has never been made public, nor was it approved by the Federal
Parliament of Somalia although it was ratified by the Council of Ministers on
3 October 2013. Those involved in the architecture of the deal included
Dr. Abdullahi Haider, special advisor to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud,
and Jay Park, a Canadian lawyer who is managing partner of Petroleum Regimes’
Advisory and Park Energy Law.2 At a signing ceremony, Jay Park was accompanied
by Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, the then Minister of Natural Resources. 3
4. On 3 February 2014, the company announced it had signed a seismic contract
with Seabird Exploration to cover 20,000 square kilometres of seismic data off the
coast of Somalia. On 6 June 2014, the company announced it had completed
20,500 square kilometres of seismic data acquisition and that processing of the data
would run until late 2014.
__________________
1 Announcement on 6 August 2013 of the Oil and Gas Agreement Signed with Somalia and Soma
presentation entitled Unlocking Somalia’s Potential, 29-30 April 2014.
2 Four separate industry sources interviewed on 26 September 2013 and 12 April 2014. A former
advisor to President Hassan Sheikh on oil matters also stated he had been informed by FGS
energy ministry officials that Jay Park and Abdullahi Haider were the key architects of the deal
on the FGS side.
3 See http://som.horseedmedia.net/2013/08/somalia-federal-government-signs-oi…-
with-soma-oil-gas-exploration-limited/. The former minister has been working as a
consultant advisor to the Presidency following his departure from the FGS ministerial cabinet.
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5. On 6 August 2014, Robert Shepherd and Philip Wolfe, Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Financial Officer of Soma Oil and Gas Exploration Limited wrote to the
Monitoring Group to explain how they had managed the security arrangements for
the Seabird operations. They stated that Soma had “contracted Peace Business
Group, a licensed Somali security sector company to provide armed Somali
personnel” and that “each seismic vessel was supported and protected by four
support vessels and international and Somali security personnel on such support
vessels”. They stated that only Somali personnel held arms within the 12 nautical
mile limit, and “internationally operated firearms remained outside the 12 nautical
mile limit”.4
Mubadala
6. On 17 July 2014, Mubadala, the sovereign investment fund of the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) announced a cooperation agreement with the FGS aimed at
“sharing knowledge, increasing the strength of the Somalia Ministry and its staff,
and over time, developing upstream opportunities in Somalia”. 5
7. Given the institutional lack of capacity of Somali petroleum institutions,
notably the SPA, the Monitoring Group is concerned that conflicts of interest could
result from the provision of technical capabilities by corporate entities that are also
seeking to secure oil acreage. If Mubadala’s provision of “capacity” is not
channelled into a transparently run SPA, which is responsible for managing a
cadastre of licenses through a process of transparent auctions, the risk is that such
“capacity” would serve to empower informal decision makers within the system
who also may have a vested interest in parceling out licenses to favoured companies
in secret deals. Seismic data, in particular, should be completely controlled by the
SPA in a secure data room so that all companies eventually bidding for licenses
would have equal opportunities to access data in a regulatory environment free from
insider dealing.
8. In this regard, notably even at this stage the Minister of Petroleum and Natural
Resources, Daud Mohamed Omar, has often been excluded from strategic decisions
made by others who exert broader informal leverage over the decision making
process related to oil licensing.6
Shell, ExxonMobil and BP
9. On 13 June 2014, Minister Omar visited the headquarters of Shell in The
Hague, Netherlands. Shell was originally awarded a concession for five oil blocks
(M3-M7) in Somalia in 1988, after which Mobil Exploration (now a unit of
ExxonMobil) joined in as a 50 per cent partner (see S/2013/413, annex 5.5.b, for a
map of where concessions lie). The companies have now begun discussions with the
Ministry to convert the existing concessions, which have been under force majeure
__________________
4 Security for Seabird Exploration’s activities was provided by Solace Global Maritime (based in
the United Kingdom) and Salama Fikira International (registered in Mauritius).
5 See announcement made on 17 July 2014 on http://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadalapetroleum-
signs-cooperation-agreement-somalia.
6 Diplomatic source dealing with oil sector stated that the Minister had frequently complained
about this problem, 5 May 2014. A Somali source known to the Minister also stated the same on
24 July 2014.
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since 1990, to a Production Sharing Agreement, as called for by the 2008 Petroleum
Law.7
10. While the negotiations with Shell and Exxon were widely publicized, the
Monitoring Group is nonetheless concerned that such negotiations are premature
and could spark conflict, especially since they have not been conducted in
consultation with regional authorities who may be affected. Indeed, M5 is licensed
over offshore territory claimed by Puntland. Just days after the announcement by
Shell on the new discussions, Puntland’s Director General of the Ministry of
Mineral Resources and Petroleum, Issa Mohamoud Farah, rejected the legality of
the negotiations, stating that “The Federal Government of Somalia does not govern
over Puntland and all accords should be postponed until all states agree on how to
share the country’s natural resources”.8 The 2008 Petroleum Law, which directly
contradicts constitutional provisions giving regional authorities rights to control the
licensing of their natural resources, is also yet to be approved by the Federal
Parliament.
11. On 4 August 2014, President Mohamud was reported as saying that the FGS
was also in renegotiations with BP.9 As previously shown by the Monitoring Group
(S/2013/413, annex 5.5), BP’s prior concessions in Somalia clash with current
concessions licensed out by the Somaliland authorities.
Turksom
12. The Monitoring Group has received documentation concerning efforts by
Musa Haji Mohamed “Ganjab”10 and Abdullahi Haider to operate a joint Turkish —
Somali company known as “Turksom” that would be involved in building and
operating a fuel distribution business and securing Turkish investments in Somalia.
13. On 25 November 2011, Musa Ganjab e-mailed a document purporting to be a
proposal letter from Turksom, thanking the Government of Turkey for its support
and requesting the company to be appointed as sole representative of all of Turkey’s
economic interests in Somalia. The letter stated that the company was registered in
both Turkey and Somalia, although the phone numbers provided for its Somalia
office are Ugandan numbers. The letter also stated that the company would be able
“to provide effective security to each and every project that Turkey Government and
private business are planning to implement in Somalia” (see annex 5.2.a for a copy
of the letter).
14. By 2012, Turksom was incorporated and in discussions with another Somali
company, Hass Petroleum, a leading oil marketing company in East Africa
originally founded by a group of Dhulbahante businessmen from Sool region in
northeastern Somalia. In an e-mail to Ganjab on 30 October 2012 entitled
“Memorandum of Understanding Between Turksom & Hass Petroleum (K) Ltd”, a
director at Hass Petroleum discussed a joint venture for the rehabilitation of petrol
__________________
7 Joint Statement by the Federal Republic of Somalia and Shell, 13 July 2014.
8 See “Puntland rejects oil deal with Shell and ExxonMobil”, 22 June 2014, at
http://www.africareview.com/Business---Finance/Puntland-rejects-oil-dea…-
ExxonMobil/-/979184/2357968/-/f9fklwz/-/index.html.
9 See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-04/somalia-sees-oil-results-this-…-
wooed.html.
10 See annex 6.4 for Ganjab’s relations to arms embargo violations and Al-Shabaab, and annex 5.2
for his role in the recovery of Somali overseas assets.
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stations in Mogadishu and for construction of a fuel depot and port infrastructure
with Turksom. The director requested clarification from Ganjab on how he would
like his shareholding to be structured within the joint venture. The e -mail was
accompanied by an attachment signed by Ganjab as CEO and Adbullahi Haider as
Director General of Turksom Somalia Inc (see annex 5.2.b for a copy of the
attachment).
15. On 6 September 2013, Ganjab received an e-mail from the address
[email protected] entitled “Oil Depo and security project Financing”
stating (unofficial translation from the Somali language as follows):
Haji Musa,
After greetings. You must have been busy yesterday. I have given your phone
number to a guy in the UK called Ahmed who is the representative of a
security company based in America (FLORIDA). Please contact them and
negotiate as they are ready.
Mr. Mike Deegan is back from Dubai. Him and Mr Deylaf has not met …
please let me know when you are ready for a conference call.
Thank you
Abdulhamid
16. Independently, the Monitoring Group has been informed that Ganjab has been
in discussions with Mohamed Deylaaf, a businessman previously named by the
Group in the context of diversion of food aid, including to Al -Shabaab
(S/2010/91).11 Deylaaf is known to have interests in the downstream fuel sector.12
The Monitoring Group has also obtained documentation that Turksom Security
Company was officially registered as an approved private security company with the
Ministry of Interior in 2013 (see annex 5.2.c), although it is not clear to what extent
this company operated and how it obtained its weaponry.
Fisheries protection and management
17. On 25 July 2013, the FGS signed a letter of appointment nominating a
company called Somalia FishGuard Limited as the sole agent and representative of
the FGS with exclusive rights to undertake the patrol, protection, management and
development of fisheries in Somalia’s waters, including in the Exclusive Economic
Zone. The contract was signed by the then Minister of Natural Resources, Abdirizak
Omar Mohamed. The company is obliged to provide and operate vessels for
fisheries protection, including through the establishment and training of a Somalia
Fisheries Protection Force, as well as prepare the provision of fishing regulations
and the management of the licensing and regulatory infrastructure of the
Government pertaining to fisheries. In return, the FGS would be obliged to provide
the company access to state infrastructure and ports and “permission to carry light
and medium sized weapons and ammunition consistent with the FPF requirements to
exercise its obligations under this contract subject to UN Security Council
resolutions”. The company would also receive military style uniforms and be
__________________
11 Information received by three independent Somali businessmen in Mogadishu familiar with
Ganjab’s businesses, interviewed in December 2013.
12 Somali company CEO and UN contractor who has provided services to Deylaaf, February 2014,
and a Somali source with knowledge of Deylaaf ’s business affairs, May 2014.
Annex 77
S/2014/726
196/461 14-60683
conferred with the necessary authority to detain and arrest vessels fishing illegally
in Somali waters. The Monitoring Group has been informed that FishGuard would
retain 51 percent of all revenues13 derived from licensing fees, although the figures
have been deliberately blacked out in the copy of the contract obtained by the
Monitoring Group (see annex 5.2.d for a copy of the FishGuard letter of
appointment).
18. On 27 July 2013, two days after the contract was signed, Ganjab received an
e-mail from Abdi Amalo (who the Monitoring Group has investigated for conspiracy
to divert overseas assets in strictly confidential annex 5.2, which was entitled
“Info”. The text of the e-mail simply reads as follows:
Xaaji Musa,
Let’s talk brother
http://companycheck.co.uk/company/04958710/FISHGUARD-MARINE-LIMITED
19. In April 2014, representatives of Somalia Fishguard Limited accompanied by
President Mohamud and Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Mohamed
Olow Barow, were in Brussels to attend a fisheries meeting with Europêche and
Federpesca at the Headquarters of the European Commission. The representatives
included Chairman David Walker, Director John Church, William Oswald and
Christopher Brooke.14
20. The Monitoring Group has been informed that Somalia Fishguard Limited has
been in discussions with Saladin Security Ltd, a UK private security company,
whose representatives were introduced to President Mohamud in Mogadishu by
Abdullahi Haider (the business partner of Ganjab in Turksom, and a presidential
advisor on oil and gas) in mid May or June 2013.15 The company has operations in
Mogadishu and is the private security contractor for Kilimanjaro Capital, a private
equity firm which has farmed into an oil block awarded by the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) in 2008 to a private company, and which partly falls in
Al-Shabaab territory.16
National Theatre
21. The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of a draft contract between the
Ministry of Public Works and Reconstruction, Marine and Transport, Ports and
Energy and Sinohydro Corporation Ltd for the reconstruction of the National
Theatre in Mogadishu for a sum of USD 31 million. This contract was transmitted
by Musa Ganjab to Jeremy Schulman of the U.S. law firm of Shulman Rogers on
23 November 2013 (see annex 5.2 for investigation into the diversion of overseas
assets by Ganjab and Shulman Rogers). It is not clear whether any financial
transactions related to this contract have taken place, as no major rehabilitation
works on the National Theatre have taken place in 2013 and 2014.
__________________
13 Information obtained from a fisheries advisor to the FGS on 5 May 2014.
14 Correspondence obtained by the Monitoring Group with a list prepared by Ahmed Mohamed
Iman, Director General of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, dated 1 April 2014.
Christopher Brooke is the brother of Alan Henry Brooke, the 3rd Viscount Brookeborough, a
member of the United Kingdom House of Lords.
15 Information obtained from advisor to the FGS, 6 May 2014, and from private security source,
10 June 2014.
16 See http://www.saladin-security.com/the-companies.php and http://www.marketwired.com/
press-release/kilimanjaro-signs-somalia-security-memorandum-gxg-kcap-1909408.htm.
Annex 77
S/2014/726
14-60683 197/461
UNSOA
22. The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence that service contracts issued by
the United Nations Support Office for African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA)
may have been issued to companies associated with Ganjab.
23. On 26 June 2013, Nurta Sheikh Mohamud, the sister of President Mohamud
wrote to Ganjab, forwarding a memo issued by UNSOA to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation dated 20 June 2013. The memo informed the
ministry of a two day business seminar to be held by UNSOA with the purpose of
raising awareness among the Somalia business community on how to win contracts
as vendors to the United Nations.
24. In the e-mail, the President’s sister draws the attention to Ganjab to the memo
and informs him that she has set up a conglomerate known as the Trust Group of
Companies, for the express purpose of bidding for UN contracts. She requests a
meeting with Ganjab to discuss the matter further.
25. While UNSOA has not registered any contracts to any company referred to as
Trust or Trust Group, as a matter of due diligence and risk management, the
Monitoring Group would recommend a full audit of all its contracts to determine
whether there are any companies in which Ganjab has an interest, given the
evidence pertaining to Ganjab’s other illicit activities documented in strictly
confidential annex 5.2 and strictly confidential annex 6.4.
Annex 77
S/2014/726
198/461 14-60683
Annex 5.1.a
Turksom correspondence
Date:
Our ref:
Subject: Formal request
His Excellency
TurkSom would like to take this opportunity to thank the Turkey Government’s
brotherly assistance to Somali people in its most difficult time.
In an extremely volatile security situation it is difficult to engage the Somali people
and stimulate the war torn economy and above all liaising with the public authoritie s
without an effective link capable to transform promises and commitments into
action.
TurkSom will fill that gap by enabling the Turkey Government to interact with
efficiency with both the Somali governmental institutions and private individuals in
achieving its noble aims. TurkSom is also able to provide effective security to each
and every project that Turkey Government and private business are planning to
implement in Somalia.
To that extent, TurkSom is kindly requesting being appointed as the sole
representative of Turkey’s economic interests in the Somali Republic.
TurkSom has a solid and successful business foundation that relies on its
international experiences and partner organizations’ capabilities to deliver on our
joint ventures. We have a pool of highly qualified technical and professional staff to
ensure effective completion of our contractual obligations.
TurkSom is committed to community development through it social responsibility
arm by devoting a percentage of profit to social causes.
TurkSom is registered both in Somalia and in Turkey.
Sincerely yours,
Halil Altuntas, Director
Annex 77
S/2014/726
14-60683 199/461
Annex 5.1.b
Turksom and Hass Petroleum Memorandum of Understanding
Annex 77
S/2014/726
200/461 14-60683
Annex 77
S/2014/726
14-60683 201/461
Annex 5.1.c
Turksom Security Company registered by the Federal Government
of Somalia Ministry of Interior
Annex 77
S/2014/726
202/461 14-60683
Annex 5.1.d
FishGuard Letter of Appointment
Annex 77
S/2014/726
14-60683 203/461
Annex 77
Annex 78
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2111 (2013), Annex 6.4, S/2014/726, 13 October 2014
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 6.4: Diversion of arms by political networks connected to the
Federal Government of Somalia (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
1. The Monitoring Group obtained information that Musa Haji Mohamed 'Ganjab',
who has served as an influential advisor to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has been
involved in the systematic diversion of weapons and ammunition from Somali National
Army (SNA) stockpiles, and providing logistical support to Al-Shabaab.
2.
past and present connections to Al-Shabaab, his involvement i a weapons deal 1 volving
Al-Shabaab, and his relationship with key individuals withim t e Federal G0v~mment of
Somalia (FGS), including President Mohamud, SNA chief o 1 gistics Colonel Abdullahi
of Somalia, and his implication in a number of secre
annex 5.1 and annex 5.2.
3.
4.
was on_ce shareholder, and which is now a prominent trading and construction company
in Mogadishu bidding for Government contracts). 4
1 Also see http: //ga ja .corn/partners.html, last accessed on 16 July 2014.
2 Interviews with two former Somali Government officials who personally knew Ganjab, 12 December
2013, and 14 April 2014. Confirmed by a member of President Mohamud's family and sub-clan member,
12 December 2013.
3 Testimony provided by arms dealers in Mogadishu, February to April 2014, corroborated by two former
Somali Government officials who personally knew Ganjab, 12 December 2013 and 14 April 2014.
Information also provided by Somali intelligence source known to Ganjab and visiting Mogadishu in
November 2013.
4 Interview with United Nations contractor with knowledge of Al Khayrat, February 2014, and a member of
Wardhere's sub-clan, May 2014.
113
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
"My brothers, after greetings from us Harakatul Shabaab al Mujahideen, we are hereby
requesting the assistance that you have promised us during the last meeting that took
place in Malaysia. During that meeting you informed us that you will support us with
medicine of various types that we badly need, and which we were expecting to receive
yesterday 7.10.10. The elders [odayaasha?] representative Mr. Nagu informed us to send
an email to you. We therefore send this email to inform you that we still need the promise
from the - government5, and we are still waiting to receive thi .support. Please
be informed that we are in a heavy fighting and many governmen nas as flia us w at our
need is, which we have not responded to yet. The reason we contact you is tlra we feel
that you are our brothers who fought with us and has an idea about who th ene~ is.. We
want you to know the support you give us today will be recorded in history in t e near
future we will sit down together, face to face, the ame way you have negotiated
Artan according to the news that reached us. Wi i l invite you to a peaceful Mogadishu
Ali Muhammad Hussein Ali
Mujahideen
othing
b al Mujahideen
arakatul Shabaab al
As we stated befar , as we ere informed oz Artan, the 'respectable' elders from
- accomptmied by R ·i use, a businessman acting as representative of the
sent the following email in English to a
contact:
5 The Monitoring Group has redacted this Government in order to guarantee confidentiality in discussing
this matter directly with the Government itself. In 2010, Ganjab received a letter from the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting his appointment as an honorary
consul in this unnamed country. The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of this letter, which is archived
at the United Nations.
114
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
After the greetings, we from Harakatul shabaabul mujahidin hereby wish to appeal to
you to facilitate the assistance that you promised us in our last meeting in Malaysia. In
this meeting your side promised us with assistance with regards to medical facilities
including medicines and related items. We are in dire need of this assistance at this time
difficult times and time and again we are requested by the people on the ground to do
something as a matter of utmost Urgency.
We therefore appeal to you to send us the assistance you promised u as. and as we all
know that we are fighting our enemies from different front au we ne 'd he from
- as we believe that your country is a true friend if Somalia and e believe
that our relationship in this trying times will grow stronger and the test ~~
reveal who our true friends are.
enemies and you
all the angles.
2.
affairs. - Harakatul shabaabul
ssein (ali Jabal)-Chairman Banadir province-harakatul
We are aware from our brother Artan that your delegates and haji musa came to visit
mogadisho and we sincely believe Haji musa is the true representative of Somali people
in - and we have confidence in his ability to mediate between us.
115
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Please consider our plight and if possible include ambulances so that we may help our
injured people in mogadisho.
Thank you. "
5. Ganjab had already written to the same contact on 5 October 2010, providing him
an extensive list of required medicines that had been forwarded to him from another
contact (see annex 6.4.c for a list of required medicines as laid ou 'n the email). The
emails of 8 October 2010 demonstrate that Ganjab was an inte e iary for Al-S abaab
agents involved in the procurement of medical supplies at a ti e, around Oct0ber 2010,
when Al-Shabaab were sustaining serious battlefield casualties in Mogadis . .
6.
namud to the Somali Presidency in
heikh Mohamud and to Colonel Abdullahi Moalim
8. Ganjab was invited by a Johannesburg-based security
company to meet a wel own businessman in South Africa's private security industry.
During the me ting, Ganjab informed the individual in question that he was looking to
channel 'secret' military support to the Somali Government and that he was acting on
6 Three former Somali Government officials have provided information on Ganjab's frequent appearance
within the Somali Presidency and his involvement in day-to-day Presidency and SNA meetings related to
security. A member of the President's family has also confirmed Ganjab's regular appearance at Villa
Somalia. The Monitoring Group has obtained email communication between Ganjab and President
Mohamud's sister which are discussed in annex 5.1 related to secret contracting.
7 All communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group ..
116
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
behalf of the President, Minister of Interior and Minister of Defence. Ganjab enquired
about the type of training and equipment that the individual could supply Somalia, and
mentioned he was interested in training and equipping units in guerilla warfare. The
individual, who was aware of the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia, informed
Ganjab that he would require official FGS end-user certificates for any weapons supplied
and that he would need to vet the forces to be trained. 8 Ganjab informed the individual
that he would invite the individual to Somalia to discuss the matters further. Following
the meeting, Ganjab emailed the individual on 22 December 2012 stating:
"I am sorry for the dilly of the appointment with the president minster [ sicy o interior
and minister of defence of Somalia federal government. I have seen all of ', e different
days and time and they agree to receive you first 10 days of 2013. "9
9.
10.
al is in contact with a South African number, which in tum is in
8 Interview with eyewitness at the meeting, 17 June 2014. Corroborated by source in South Africa who was
aware of the themes discussed at the meeting, 5 July 2014.
9 The contents of the email were confirmed by the South African businessman.
10 Two SNA officers working with SNA logistics confirmed Ganjab and Guled have closely coordinated
the import of weapons shipments during the period of August 2013 to September 2013. A source within the
SNA in Mogadishu independently reported on 24 February 2014 that Ganjab has helped manage funds for
the procurement of weapons from Yemen, coordinated by Guled.
11 All communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group.
12 Information gathered in February 2014 from arms markets in Mogadishu.
117
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
contact with the Somali mobile number operated by Ganjab. Abdi Wal has also
communicated with the same number in China that in tum is in contact with Ganjab and
Guled, as well as a U.S.A. number, two UAE numbers, and a Norwegian number that are
also in contact with Guled. 13 In August 2014, Somali media reported that FGS forces
were in hot pursuit of Abdi Wal in Mogadishu as part of efforts to seize illegal arms
caches in the city. 14
12. The cooperation between Abgaal and Habar Gedir networks in the security
services is typified by an arms deal involving Gan jab, an Abgaal p,;l-Shabaao lead .rand a
top Habar Gedir politician/former warlord. On 27 October 2013, following the Clelivery
of weapons from Yemen to Mogadishu by aircraft (see anne 6.1), Ganj emai ed his
brother Abukar Ganjab at [email protected] 15, laying out plans to divide up an arms
consignment delivered to the port of Adale 16 betw ,en Al-Sha:baab commander SH~i
Yusuf Isse "Kabukatukade" (Abgaal/Waesle) and the President of Galmudug, bdi
rd).
inshallah. I ordered · ost of th weapons from emen, and they will be there, inshallah,
Sheikh Fiidow and Sheikh Yusuf
attack on Baraawe because even if the
power is at taken away r.om Ahmed Ma 'alim Faqi the attack would have taken place
-sure that Saadd is sidelined Please, take on this
responsibility, and need you to hand over all the documents related the weapons transfers
to me, inshallah.
13 All communicati data in possession of the Monitoring Group.
14 http://allafrica.com7stories/201408181350.html
15 This is the same email address that Ganjab contacted in respect of a transfer of funds related to Haden
Global Services, a company involved in the recovery of overseas financial assets for the FGS
16 An Al-Shabaab stronghold on the coast of Somalia, about 150 kilometres northeast of Mogadishu. It is
not clear from the email correspondence whether the weapons were delivered by maritime vessel from
Yemen directly to Adale, or whether at least some of the stock was offloaded from aircraft in Mogadishu
and then subsequently transferred to Adale. However, the Monitoring Group has obtained military
intelligence reporting, dated 20 October 2012, mentioning Kabukatukade's presence at Adale, and his
reception there of Yemeni explosives experts who arrived by maritime vessel from Yemen.
118
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
13. The day before on 26 October 2013, Abdiaziz Hassan Giyaajo Amalo, a business
associate who has incorporated a company involving Ganjab as part of the overseas
assets recovery effort detailed in annex 5.2, wrote to Ganjab with the subject heading of
'Hubkii cadale' (Adale weapons). The email, originally sent in Somali, is unofficially
translated as follows:
"The weapons heading to Adale have left. Therefore be aware that two of the heavy guns
between him and the President can be finalized.
Thanks Abdiaziz"
14. Both Ganjab
15.
17 Somali spelling of igh caliber ZU anti aircraft weapons.
18 Information received from military intelligence source, 13 November 2013, and corroborated by a source
of who is regularly in contact with Kabukatukade, 17 November 2013. A third source, from the Abgaal,
who is also in contact with Kabukatukade's clan network, further confirmed the information, 26 November
2013.
19 Two independent eyewitnesses in Galkacyo reported seeing these weapons on 18 November 2013 and 19
November 2013. Another eyewitness observed the arrival of the weapons.
20 Information provided by security source, 14 March 2014, and two independent Somali sources in
Galmudug, 14 February 2014.
119
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
machine guns and 23 mm ZU anti-aircraft autocannons. 21 The import of 23 mm weapons
by the FGS is prohibited under resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), unless
expressly authorized by the Committee. 22
16. Qeybdiid's phone number has been in communication with the same Chinese
number that has communicated directly with Ganjab, Guled and Abdi Wal. He has
communicated with a United Kingdom number as well as a Kenyan number of
individuals also in contact with Ganjab. He has also communicated with a Somali
number, a Saudi Arabian number, a UAE number, four U.S. umber , four United
Kingdom numbers, a Netherlands number and two Norwegian numbei::s also in
communication with Guled. 23
21 Photographs sourced from http://www.hobyoradio.com/2,13,20143.html, last accessed 17 July 2014.
22 Import of guns, howitzers, and cannons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, as well as ammunition and
components specially designed for these, require an advance approval by the Committee on a case by-case
basis. See annex ofresolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013) and paragraph 7 ofresolution 2011 (2013).
23 All communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group.
120
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 6.4.a: Curriculum vitae dated 2009 and photograph of Musa
Haji Mohamed 'Ganjab' (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Musa HajiMohamed
Personal
Information
Current
Businesses
121
~ Date of Birth: 1957 - 02 - 01
~
~ Nationality: Canadian
~ Marital status: Married
~ Digital Net Gabon - F
From 1999 - 2007
Export of Fruit and Vegetables to Qatar, Doha and
United Arab Emirates
NORTH KING TRANSPORT (1987-1990)
Transportation for World Food Program to Sudan
~ INTER-TRADE GABON (1990-1994)
Export and Import of Food
~ TELKOM SERVICE-Gabon (1994-1999)
Provide the Service of Telephone, Fax and International
calls
Annex 78
Education
Languages
122
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
~ TERTIARY EDUCATION
University of Romania
From- 1979- 1984
~ SECONDARY EDUCATION
Madrasah Allah
From 1973 - 1977
~ PRIMARY EDUCATION
Jamal Abdi Nass er
Completed 1973
~ English
~ Arabic
~ French
~
~
Annex 78
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28 FEB 2012 ~
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P000194739SOM6301019M1202281N0000217463<<<68 r<'l
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Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 6.4.c: List of medicines forwarded by Musa Haji Mohamed
'Ganjab' for purchase (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Kenya Shillings United States Dollars
1KES=0.0123762 USD 1USD=80.8000 KES
Kenya Shillings United States DoUars
1 KES = 0.0123762 USD 1 USD = 80.80tJO KES
Kenya Shillings United States ollars
1KES=0.0123762 USD 1 US' = 80 8000 KES
Description
Quantity
1. AMO~YCILLIN
1
2. A 0 E INJ lG NETT
1
3.
1
4 . CHte~ HENIOO
1
5. GRISO ~ BS 500M
1
6. PEN V TABS OOO'S
1
2.78
2.22
APS 250MG 1 OOO'S
17.94
16.69
17.32
7. HISTARGAN SYR 60NL
1 2.10
8. HEMATON -S- SYP 250ML
1 3.75
9. BENZATHINE PENCILLIN INJ 2.4MEGA
124
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2.16
10. LOSEC TABS 20MG 14S
21.2
11. LOSEC TABS 40MG 7'S
1 17.3
12. QUININE INJ 600MG/2ML
1 2.11
13. FANSIDER TABS 50/25MG 150'S
1 37.9
14. OGMACLAVE TABS 625MG 14'S
1 9.22
15. ARTEFAN TABS 20/120MG 24'S
1 2.97
16. ATENOLOL TABS BP 50MG 28,S
1 2.97
17. AZILIDE TABS 500MG 3'S
1 6.59
18. AZICLAR TABS 250MG 20'S
1 10.22
19. CEMET TABS 400MG lOO'S
1 5.97
125
Annex 78
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 6.4.d: Pictures of Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid's troops with
mounted 12. 7 mm machine guns and 23 mm anti-aircraft autocannons
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
126
Annex 78
Annex 7
Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia to the UN Security Council,
S/2019/858, 1 November 2019 (Extracts)
United Nations S/2019/858*
Security Council Distr.: General
1 November 2019
Original: English
19-16960* (E) 141119
*1916960*
Letter dated 1 November 2019 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)
concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the
Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)
concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 54 of Security Council
resolution 2444 (2018), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the
Panel of Experts on Somalia.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and
the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and
issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia
* Reissued for technical reasons on 14 November 2019.
S/2019/858
2/161 19-16960
Letter dated 27 September 2019 from the Panel of Experts on
Somalia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee
pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia
In accordance with paragraph 54 of Security Council resolution 2444 (2018),
we have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on
Somalia.
(Signed) Jay Bahadur
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on Somalia
(Signed) Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker
Humanitarian expert
(Signed) Nazanine Moshiri
Armed groups expert
(Signed) Brian O’Sullivan
Armed groups/natural resources expert
(Signed) Matthew Rosbottom
Finance expert
(Signed) Richard Zabot
Arms expert
S/2019/858
19-16960 3/161
Summary
During the first reporting period of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, the use by
Al-Shabaab of improvised explosive devices reached its greatest extent in Somali
history, with a year-on-year increase of approximately one third. Post-blast chemical
analyses obtained by the Panel provided definitive evidence for the first time that
Al-Shabaab had been manufacturing its own home-made explosives since at least July
2017, and likely before then. Al-Shabaab previously relied on military grade
explosives, obtained principally from explosive remnants of war and munitions
captured from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to construct
improvised explosive devices; the manufacture of home-made explosives means that
the group may now have access to far more readily available inputs for the construction
of such devices.
Nor is money a limiting factor for Al-Shabaab. A report of the Monitoring Group
on Somalia and Eritrea in 2018 (S/2018/1002) highlighted the efficiency, geographical
diversity, predictability and ruthlessness of Al-Shabaab’s mafia-style “taxation”
system in southern and central Somalia. During the reporting period, the Panel
identified a new trend in the expansion of Al-Shabaab’s revenue generation, namely
the taxation of imports into Mogadishu port. Al-Shabaab’s ongoing ability to generate
revenues in areas the group does not physically control explains, to a degree, its
resilience in the face of increased security operations by the Federal Government of
Somalia and airstrikes by the United States of America. Its ability to provide basic
services, such as access to judicial recourse, may account for some of Al-Shabaab’s
ongoing appeal in areas of Somalia where State institutions do not reach.
In 2019, Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of Federal Government institutions reached as
high as the Benadir Regional Administration when, on 24 July, an Al-Shabaab suicide
bomber detonated herself at its headquarters in Mogadishu. The Mayor of Mogadishu,
Abdirahman Omar Osman “Yarisow”, and at least nine others, were killed. It later
emerged that the suicide bomber, as well as an accomplice, had both been employees
of the Benadir Regional Administration under falsified identities.
Al-Shabaab also remains a potent threat to regional peace and security. On
15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab carried out its first major attack in the Kenyan capital of
Nairobi since 2013, in an assault on the DusitD2 Hotel complex that left 21 people
dead. The DusitD2 operation was notable for the wide discretion and autonomy given
to the Kenyan cell leader, including the selection of the target. The Panel’s
investigation into the attack also revealed an expansive and well-resourced Al-Shabaab
network in the region aimed at kidnapping foreign nationals.
Towards the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019, Al-Shabaab and the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia engaged in an armed struggle,
within both the ISIL faction’s heartland in Puntland and in Mogadishu. In Puntland,
the faction underwent a violent change of leadership towards the end of 2018, and
subsequently began a concerted campaign to extort “taxes” from Puntland-based
businesses, employing tactics similar to those of Al-Shabaab. Most significantly, and
for the first time since its establishment in 2015, the ISIL faction in Somalia was linked
to a planned terror attack in another country. In December 2018, Italian authorit ies
arrested a Somali national, Omar Moshin Ibrahim, in Bari, Italy, in connection with an
ISIL plot to bomb St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome on 25 December, Christmas Day.
Investigations by the Panel, with assistance from the Government of Italy, have
uncovered connections between Ibrahim and ISIL elements in Somalia, Kenya and
Libya.
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A deterioration in relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the
federal member states during the reporting period represented a further threat to
stability in Somalia. Tensions between the centre and the regions were exacerbated by
attempts by the Federal Government to direct the outcomes of federal member state
electoral processes in Jubbaland, Puntland and, most notably, in South-West State in
December 2018. The decision by the Federal Government to arrest a South-West State
presidential candidate, Mukhtar Robow, in the run-up to the electoral process resulted
in widespread protests in Baidoa in December 2018, during which 15 civilians were
killed by regional security forces. The electoral process was also marred by
accusations of bribery, with members of the South-West State regional Parliament
receiving between $20,000 and $30,000 to elect a preferred candidate. The Panel also
obtained evidence that, prior to the South-West State election, several hundred
thousand dollars were transferred to a South-West State cabinet official by a Federal
Government financial clerk.
The breakdown in dialogue between the Federal Government and federal member
states on key security matters also had an impact on the implementation of the
country’s National Security Architecture as well as the Transition Plan, which aims for
the handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces by
2021. However, some initial goals of the Transition Plan have been achieved, such as
the Somali National Army capturing the Lower Shabelle towns of Sabiid, Anole,
Barire, and Awdheegle from Al-Shabaab – with assistance from AMISOM and the
United States military – during the period from April to August 2019.
A further development on the path to preparing Federal Government security
forces to assume responsibilities from AMISOM was the biometric registration of the
entire Somali National Army, the first phase of which the Federal Government
announced it had completed by March 2019. However, three case studies conducted
by the Panel of the registration of hundreds of Somali National Army soldiers in
Baidoa and Mogadishu concluded that fewer than half of those who appeared on Army
registration documents obtained by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in
2017 and 2018 were captured in the biometric registration of 2019. Moreover, fewer
than one fifth of Somali National Army sector 60 soldiers who had been issued Federal
Government-marked weapons in late 2017 appeared on the 2019 biometric registration
roll, raising questions as to why the Federal Government of Somalia had provided arms
to individuals who were no longer considered members of the security forces one year
later. The Panel was unable to determine the whereabouts of the former soldiers or of
the weapons in their possession.
The Federal Government made significant progress in the field of pu blic
financial management, having completed three staff-monitored programmes of the
International Monetary Fund, a series of technical benchmarks aimed at improving
domestic revenue generation and, eventually, enabling debt relief and access to
international borrowing markets. Among potential revenue streams highlighted by the
programmes was the direct collection of air navigation charges, a responsibility
assumed by the Federal Government following the handover from the International
Civil Aviation Organization in June 2019. An investigation by the Panel uncovered
financial irregularities within the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority
in relation to the collection of existing air navigation arrears, in which the Authority
wrote off a $5.8 million debt owed by Jubba Airways Limited without collecting the
funds from the airline.
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The Panel noted an improvement in some aspects of the Federal Government ’s
compliance with the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo during the
reporting period. Five of the seven notifications submitted by the Federal Government
to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) met Council
requirements. However, the Federal Government’s reporting to the Committee on the
structure and composition of its security forces pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution
2182 (2014) has been inconsistent and incomplete. The Panel has also continued to
document Federal Government arms and ammunition in the illicit sphere – including
38 weapons found in the possession of black-market dealers in Mogadishu and
Baidoa – and in the possession of Al-Shabaab.
While supplies of military materiel to the Federal Government are subject to
stringent notification requirements, regional administrations in Somalia have routinely
received arms and ammunition in circumvention of the arms embargo. During the
reporting period, the Panel viewed hundreds of documents detailing the systematic
supply of weapons and ammunition by the Ethiopian State-owned Metals and
Engineering Corporation to every regional administration in Somalia over the course
of the preceding decade. While the Security Council, in paragraph 11 (a) of its
resolution 2111 (2013), allows Member States to supply materiel to “Somalia security
institutions” other than the Federal Government of Somalia, subject to the
Committee’s approval, the Government of Ethiopia has not once availed itself of that
mechanism.
Given the prominence of the improvised explosive device as Al-Shabaab’s
weapon of choice, the arms embargo should be simplified and updated to reflect the
modalities of modern counter-insurgency warfare, for example by seeking to restrict
Al-Shabaab’s access to chemical precursors and other components it uses to construct
improvised explosive devices. The potential threat to peace, security and stability in
Somalia through the unregulated import of explosive materials was exemplified by the
May 2019 import into Bosaso, Puntland, of 180 tons of ammonium nitrate/fuel oil and
other explosives intended for the construction of the port of Garacad. The high risk of
the diversion of such materials in Somalia led the Committee to request in April 2019
that the Panel urgently recommend technical guidelines to ensure that such items are
safely stored and accounted for in the future.
Al-Shabaab was once again responsible for the largest number of attacks against
civilians in violation of international humanitarian law, which were conce ntrated in
Mogadishu and other areas of southern and central Somalia. The militant group
employed improvised explosive devices to kill and injure civilians in internally
displaced persons camps, restaurants, marketplaces, shopping centres, government
offices and hotels. Al-Shabaab also continued its campaign of targeting government
officials and parliamentarians, as well as delegates who had been invo lved in the
federal electoral process in 2016. Particularly in Bay region, Al-Shabaab also forcibly
recruited and abducted hundreds of children – some as young as 8 years old – for
enrolment in the group’s madrasa system. The Panel has also noted a new and worrying
trend of humanitarian workers being targeted by Al-Shabaab in Gedo region, including
the practice of kidnapping local aid workers for ransom.
Federal Government and federal member state police and military actors also
committed violations against civilians. For instance, on 31 December 2018 the Somali
National Army summarily executed six men suspected of being affiliated with
Al-Shabaab in the town of Bardera, Gedo region. In Puntland, the Panel investigated
acts of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment by the Puntland Security Force,
a United States-trained and -supported counter-terrorism unit based in Bosaso. In
addition, the Panel identified several areas of concern regarding the prosecution of
terrorism cases, including those of children, through Puntland’s military courts, such
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as the use of confessions extracted under torture, lengthy pretrial detention, decisions
issued without explanation, arbitrary sentences and limited rights to appeal.
Sexual- and gender-based violence remained a persistent issue during the
reporting period. The prolonged conflict in Somalia has left government inst itutions
with little capacity to record instances of, conduct investigations into and prosecute
the perpetrators of sexual violence. Many cases are handled through interventions by
clan elders, where women – who make up the majority of survivors – do not participate
in the negotiations, nor are they typically given a share of any funds paid in
compensation.
Since August 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, and
subsequently the Panel of Experts, have not documented any charcoal exports from
Somalia in violation of the Security Council ban, in contrast with exports totalling
approximately 3 million bags (75,000 tons) during the previous reporting period. A
clampdown on charcoal imports by Member States, including the United Arab
Emirates, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Oman and Kuwait, has forced charcoal
traffickers into a hiatus, owing to the need to generate new forms of falsified
paperwork and arrange alternative ports for the shipment of the charcoal. However,
domestic production of charcoal is ongoing: stockpiles at Kismayo and Buur Gaabo
stood at 600,000 to 900,000 bags at the time of writing, with a wholesale industry
value of approximately $30 to $45 million.
The last recorded major export of charcoal from Somalia occurred in August
2018 when a cargo vessel transported 190,000 bags (4,750 tons) of charcoal from
Kismayo to Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq. The Somali charcoal shipment was rebagged
and trans-shipped from Iraq to neighbouring Member States throughout 2019. While
charcoal exports from Somalia have temporarily ceased, the international criminal
networks involved in the trade remain active. The Panel has also learned that Kha wr
al-Zubayr port may be used in the future as a transit hub for large shipments of charcoal
transported by commercial cargo vessels, rather than by the typical Indian Ocean
dhows.
The primary rationale behind the introduction of the Security Council ba n on
charcoal in resolution 2036 (2012) was to curtail Al-Shabaab revenue. During the
reporting period, Al-Shabaab increased its attacks on traders transporting charcoal
from production sites inland to export points in Somalia, where historically the group
had levied “taxes” on such shipments. Although Al-Shabaab may still generate some
limited income from the charcoal trade, the group maintains a highly diversified
revenue base from the “taxation” of virtually all trade in the south of the country. Were
exports of Somali charcoal to cease entirely, Al-Shabaab’s ability to wage its
insurgency is unlikely to be significantly affected. The Panel of Experts has therefore
recommended that the Council carry out a review of the charcoal ban, with a view to
assessing its continued appropriateness.
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Contents
Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Explosives intended for commercial use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
D. Federal-regional relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
E. Public financial management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
F. Oil and gas sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
G. Maritime piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
III. Arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A. Compliance of the Federal Government of Somalia with obligations under the partial
lifting of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Member State compliance with the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C. Illicit flow of weapons into Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
V. Violations of international humanitarian law involving the targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A. Al-Shabaab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B. Federal and federal member state actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
C. African Union Mission in Somalia and other international actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
VI. Violations of the charcoal ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A. Production, transport and stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B. Illicit export, import and trans-shipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C. Criminal networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
D. Implementation of the ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
VII. State and non-State cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
VIII. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A. Threats to peace, security and stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B. Arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
C. Charcoal ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
D. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Annexes* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
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I. Introduction
A. Mandate
1. The Panel of Experts on Somalia is the successor to the Monitoring Group on
Somalia and Eritrea, the mandate of which was terminated by the Security Council
on 16 December 2018 pursuant to paragraph 10 of its resolution 2444 (2018). In
paragraph 11 of the same resolution, the Council established the Panel of Experts and
decided that the Panel’s mandate shall include the tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of
resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013),
paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and
paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018) as they relate to Somalia.
2. In accordance with paragraph 54 of resolution 2444 (2018), the Panel of Experts
provided the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)
concerning Somalia with a midterm update on 10 May 2019. The Panel also submitted
monthly progress updates to the Committee throughout its mandate.
3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Panel of Experts travelled
to Canada, Ethiopia, France, Italy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mauritius, the
Netherlands, Qatar, Seychelles, Somalia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of
Tanzania and the United States of America. The Panel’s travel within Somalia was
restricted by the Federal Government of Somalia from March 2019 onward, and its
members were only able to travel to Berbera, Bosaso, Garowe and Hargeisa during
February 2019.
4. The Panel of Experts was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts:
Jay Bahadur (coordinator), Mohamed Babiker (humanitarian), Nazanine Moshiri
(armed groups), Brian O’Sullivan (armed groups/natural resources), Matthew
Rosbottom (finance) and Richard Zabot (arms).
B. Methodology
5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the reports of
the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea apply to work conducted by the Panel
of Experts during the period under review, as follows:
(a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where
possible;
(b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events,
where possible;
(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing
knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgment of the relevant
expert of the Panel of Experts and the collective assessment of the Panel with regard
to the credibility of information and the reliability of so urces;
(e) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary
evidence in support of the information collected;
(f) Analysing satellite imagery, where applicable.
6. The Panel of Experts made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain ac cess to
those involved in violations of the sanctions measures by way of individuals who had
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direct knowledge or who knew people who had direct knowledge about details of
violations.
7. The Panel interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant informati on,
including government officials and representatives of diplomatic missions, civil
society organizations and aid agencies. The Panel also met and communicated with
officials from regional administrations, representatives of political and armed groups,
and members of business communities and Somali civil society.
8. In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on information sensitivity,
classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6), the Panel of Experts has submitted to
the Committee, together with the present report, several strictly confidential annexes
containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper functioning
of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third parties or may
violate the Organization’s legal obligations. Those annexes will not be issued as a
document of the Security Council.
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability
of Somalia
A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin
9. The extremist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) remains
the most immediate threat to peace and security in Somalia. A significant escalation
of United States airstrikes targeting Al-Shabaab militants and leaders during the
reporting period has contributed to keeping the group off-balance and preventing the
massing of large numbers of fighters but has had little effect on its ability to launch
regular asymmetric attacks throughout Somalia. Al-Shabaab also remains capable of
carrying out occasional conventional attacks against both Federal Government of
Somalia and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, such as its ambush
of the Burundian contingent of AMISOM at Balad on 29 July 2019.
10. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab carried out an unprecedented number
of improvised explosive device attacks. Definitive evidence that Al -Shabaab is
manufacturing its own explosives (see “Use of improvised explosive devices by
Al-Shabaab”, below) means that the group now has at its disposal a readily available
supply of improvised explosive device inputs. Al-Shabaab’s modus operandi remains
the deployment of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device to breach the
perimeter of a target, followed by an assault by up to half a dozen gunmen.
Al-Shabaab’s stated policy is to target hotels and restaurants frequented by Federal
Government officials, though the majority of the group’s victims comprise other
civilians.
11. As noted in multiple reports of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,
Al-Shabaab has also infiltrated Federal Government of Somalia institutions. 1 On
24 July 2019, at 16:55 UTC+3, a female Al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated herself
at the Benadir Regional Administration headquarters in Mogadishu. The attack killed
at least 10 people, including the Mayor of Mogadishu, Abdirahman Omar Osman
“Yarisow”, and three district commissioners. It later emerged that the suicide bomber
had been employed at the Benadir Regional Administration since May 2018, under an
assumed identity. 2 An accomplice, also an employee of the Benadir Regional
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1 See, most recently, S/2018/1002, annexes 2.2 and 4.2 (strictly confidential).
2 Harun Maruf, “Mogadishu mayor targeted by female bomber”, Voice of America, 9 August 2019.
Available at www.voanews.com/africa/mogadishu-mayor-targeted-female-bomber.
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Administration using a false name, had yet to be apprehended as of the time of
writing.
12. Al-Shabaab’s ability to generate domestic revenues through the “taxation” of
all aspects of the Somali economy is undiminished, and has likely expanded during
the reporting period, with preliminary evidence indicating that the group has begun
taxing imports into Mogadishu port (see “Al-Shabaab financing”, below). The group
also continues to take advantage of virtually unregulated mobile money and domestic
banking services to collect and transfer revenues throughout the country. While the
operationalization of the Federal Government’s Financial Reporting Center in
November 2018 represented a positive step in countering terrorism financing within
Somalia, compliance by domestic financial institutions must be further strengthened
(see section VIII, below).
13. The assault by Al-Shabaab on 15 January 2019 on a commercial business
complex in Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel illustrates the danger the group
continues to pose to regional peace and security. Al-Shabaab also carried out an
unprecedented number of improvised explosive device and other attacks across the
Kenya-Somalia border in June and July 2019, possibly in an effort to exploit strained
relations between the two countries.
Extent of Al-Shabaab control within Somalia
14. Since the cessation of major AMISOM offensive operations in July 2015, the
scope of Al-Shabaab’s territorial control in Somalia has remained largely unchanged.
While AMISOM and the Somali National Army hold the majority of urban centres,
Al-Shabaab maintains direct control or influence over vast swathes of the hinterland
and is able to cut off main supply routes and effectively isolate AMISOM- and
government-controlled pockets.
15. Al-Shabaab’s zones of influence can be broadly divided into three categories:
territory directly administered by the group, where Al-Shabaab serves as the de facto
government; territory where it maintains a significant military presence; and areas the
group does not control but where it is nonetheless able to levy “taxes”.
Areas administered by Al-Shabaab
16. Al-Shabaab remains in administrative control of most of the Juba Valley,
including the major urban centres of Bu’ale, Sakow and the Al-Shabaab “capital” of
Jilib. Qunyo Barrow, in Lower Juba, is the headquarters of Al-Shabaab’s finance
department, and likely contains a significant proportion of the group ’s physical cash
reserves. The group also administers areas of Lower Shabelle, centred around the
town of Sablale, and maintains the majority of its training camps in the forested area
around Bulo Fulay, Bay region, where it routinely carries out graduation ceremonies
for new recruits.
Areas of significant Al-Shabaab military presence
17. Al-Shabaab maintains a significant military presence, but does not administer,
large swathes of territory centred around Harardhere, in Mudug region, and Adan
Yabal, in Middle Shabelle region. In addition, the group is waging an active
insurgency based in the Golis Mountains of Puntland, 30 km south-west of Bosaso,
as well as in parts of Gedo region, around the town of El Adde.
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Al-Shabaab taxation catchment
18. Al-Shabaab functions as a shadow government even in areas that it does not
physically control, collecting “taxes” and providing some basic services. As detailed
in a report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2018 ( S/2018/1002,
annex 2.4), Al-Shabaab routinely taxes trade, livestock and agricultural production
through a series of checkpoints throughout central and southern Somalia, enforcing
compliance through the threat of violence.
19. Annex 1.1 to the present document contains a map illustrating Al-Shabaab’s
varying degrees of control within Somalia.
Use of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab
20. For the first time, the Panel obtained definitive evidence that Al -Shabaab has
been manufacturing home-made explosives since at least 20 July 2017.3 Post-blast
laboratory analyses, carried out by the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and provided to the Panel, have established
that Al-Shabaab has carried out at least 11 improvised explosive device attacks in
Somalia using home-made explosives. The analyses found evidence of mixtures of
nitroglycerin, a highly sensitive explosive; potassium nitrate, which is used as an
oxidizer; and charcoal, a fuel element.4 The confirmed use of home-made explosives
by Al-Shabaab represents a diversification of Al-Shabaab’s improvised explosive
device construction methods, which have traditionally utilized military-grade
explosives, obtained principally from explosive remnants of war, captured AMISOM
munitions and illicit transfers from Yemen.5
21. Information received by the Panel from a range of explosive ordnance disposal
experts suggests a probable connection between the development of home -made
explosives by Al-Shabaab and the increased frequency of improvised explosive
device attacks in Somalia in recent years.6 From July 2018 to July 2019, Al-Shabaab
carried out 548 improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia, compared with 413
over the corresponding period the previous year, an increase of 32 per cent.7 There
was also a 36 per cent increase in improvised explosive device incidents in Benadir
region, which includes Mogadishu, over the same period (see annex 1.2). 8
22. Al-Shabaab’s use of home-made explosives also appears to be geographically
diverse within Somalia. Explosive ordnance disposal experts have noted the presence
of home-made explosives in Jubbaland in smaller devices, as well as in a twin vehicleborne
improvised explosive device attack against the Somali National Army,
Ethiopian National Defence Forces and United States forces in Bar Sanguni (40 km
north of Kismayo) on 19 January 2019. Initial reports from the 12 July 2019 complex
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3 A laboratory analysis of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device seized at Elasha Biyaha on
20 July 2017 confirmed the presence of nitroglycerin, potassium nitrate and a component
consistent with charcoal.
4 Oxidizers, when combined with an appropriate ratio of fuel, provide a chemical source of oxygen
for an improvised explosive device (see S/2018/1002, paras. 66–69).
5 The most common military-grade explosives used in improvised explosive device attacks in
Somalia are 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) and cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX).
6 There were 491 improvised explosive device-related incidents in Somalia in 2018, compared
with 402 in 2017 and 295 in 2016. As of the time of writing, 544 improvised explosive device -
related incidents are projected to occur by the end of 2019.
7 UNMAS Somalia statistics, 2016–2019.
8 From July 2018 to July 2019, Al-Shabaab carried out 137 improvised explosive device attacks in
Benadir, compared with 101 incidents over the same period the previous year.
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attack at the Medina Hotel in Kismayo also indicated the use of home-made
explosives.9
23. Although Al-Shabaab’s use of home-made explosives is a significant
development, the group also continues to use military-grade explosives in many of its
improvised explosive device attacks. 10 On 9 November 2018, for instance,
Al-Shabaab used military-grade explosives to attack the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu
(see “Sahafi Hotel attack”, below), which resulted in the deaths of at least 50 people.
Supply of improvised explosive device components to Somalia
24. In paragraph 29 of its resolution 2444 (2018), the Security Council decided that
the Panel of Experts would continue the investigations started by the Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea related to the export to Somalia of chemicals used in
the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. In consultation with explosive
ordnance disposal experts and chemists, the Panel compiled a list of chemicals and
other common components that could be used by Al-Shabaab to construct improvised
explosive devices and that might yield the laboratory analysis results described
above.11 The Panel contacted shipping companies that routinely conduct transits to
major Somali ports, as well as relevant Member States, requesting information on
consignments containing potential improvised explosive device inputs. So far, the
Panel has not received any practicable information from those inquiries.
25. On 5 April 2019, Federal Government security forces recovered empty bottles
of nitric acid from an underground Al-Shabaab hideout near Elasha Biyaha, a suburb
of Mogadishu (see annex 1.2). Nitric acid can be mixed with sulfuric acid and
glycerine to produce nitroglycerin, which has been detected in multiple laboratory
analyses of Al-Shabaab home-made explosives. Explosive ordnance specialists
consulted by the Panel have indicated that there is no legitimate industrial demand
for concentrated nitric acid in Somalia.12
26. The Panel also documented the availability of two types of fertilizer con taining
potassium in Kismayo and Mogadishu, in July and August 2019 (see annex 1.2).
However, the potassium content of the documented fertilizers (5 per cent and 10 per
cent) fell below the 40 per cent threshold required to be suitable for improvised
explosive device construction.13
Australian seizure
27. On 25 June 2019, the Australian Navy vessel HMAS Ballarat seized 697 bags
of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, as well as approximately 475,000 rounds of small
arms ammunition, from a stateless dhow in the Arabian Sea.14 Additional information
received by the Panel from the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) indicated
__________________
9 UNMAS Somalia Significant Activity Report, 22 July 2019.
10 Interviews with explosive ordnance disposal experts in Nairobi and Mogadishu, December 2018
to August 2019.
11 The inquiries focused on the transport of ammonium and potassium nitrate fertilizer, potassium
chlorate, sodium chlorate, nitroglycerin, glycerine, acetone, magnesium, nitric acid, aluminium
paste or powder, detonators, detonating cord and ammonium nitrate/fuel oil.
12 Interview with an analyst from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 15 August 2019, and
interview with a business intelligence researcher, 20 August 2019.
13 Interview with an explosive ordnance disposal specialist, 12 August 2019.
14 Royal Australian Navy (@Australian_Navy), “The frigate #HMASBallarat conducted a boarding
of a dhow in the Arabian Sea”, 28 June 2019, available at https://twitter.com/Australian_Navy/
status/1144492250098888705.
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that the seizure had taken place proximate to the coast of Oman, suggesting that
northern Somalia was a possible destination of the dhow. 15
Sahafi Hotel attack
28. On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu. 16 Five gunmen then
assaulted the compound, dressed in what appeared to be newly issued Somali security
forces uniforms and matching berets.17 At least 50 people were killed and 100 injured
in the attack, making it the deadliest since attack on 14 October 2017, which killed
almost 600 (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.2).
29. In addition, an AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the gunmen had
markings consistent with materiel imported in July 2017 by the Federal Government
of Somalia.18 At least two unexploded hand grenades captured from the gunmen bore
markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab
in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in March 2018 (see
annexes 1.3 and 2.6).19
Al-Shabaab financing
30. A 2018 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea found that
Al-Shabaab derived its revenue from a variety of domestic sources, primarily taxation
on transiting vehicles and goods, agricultural taxation, business extortion and forced
zakat (alms) levies (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.4). Throughout the reporting period,
the Panel found that Al-Shabaab continued to employ a system of extortion across
southern and central Somalia, despite specific targeting of Al-Shabaab checkpoints
by international forces.20
31. In 2019, the Panel’s investigations established that Al-Shabaab further expanded
its revenue base by incorporating the systematic taxation of goods imported into
Mogadishu port. According to the Panel’s interviews with members of Mogadishu’s
business community, Al-Shabaab has infiltrated Mogadishu’s port institutions as well
as commercial shipping agents operating in the city.21 Consequently, Al-Shabaab has
obtained access to cargo manifests, which detail the nature, value and ownership of
imported goods.22 From 1 to 7 April 2019, Al-Shabaab contacted business owners in
Mogadishu, informing them that all imports into Mogadishu port would from that
__________________
15 The Panel sent correspondence to the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations on
2 July 2019 requesting further information and an opportunity to inspect the seizure, but has not
yet received a response.
16 Al-Shabaab had previously attacked the Sahafi Hotel on 1 November 2015, killing at least 24
civilians and injuring 30 others.
17 For information on previous instances of Somali security forces uniforms used by Al-Shabaab in
attacks in Somalia, see S/2018/1002, paras. 29–33.
18 Consignment from China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 201 8).
19 See also S/2018/1002, paras. 47–49. Both hand grenades bear the factory marking 349,
corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation. The grenades captured by
Ugandan forces were manufactured in 1980, while those captured in the Sahafi Hotel attack were
manufactured in 1979.
20 On 25 June 2019, United States Africa Command announced they had conducted targeted
airstrikes in Qunyo Barrow, previously identified by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea as the centre of Al-Shabaab’s finance department (S/2018/1002, annex 2.4). See United
States Africa Command, “U.S. airstrike targets al-Shabaab in support of the Federal Government
of Somalia”, press release, 27 June 2019. Available at www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/
31992/u-s-airstrike-targets-al-shabaab-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia.
21 Interviews with five businesses based in Mogadishu, July and August 2019.
22 Interview with an international trading company that exports dried food from the Gulf
Cooperation Council region to Mogadishu, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 26 June 2019.
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point on be subject to Al-Shabaab taxation. 23 Al-Shabaab further demanded that
Mogadishu businesses declare all imports to the group’s finance department prior to
import, warning that all declarations would be corroborated by cross-referencing
cargo manifests.24
32. As an example, in late July 2019, a business entity based in a Gulf Cooperation
Council country imported several thousand tons of building materials into Mogadishu
port. In early August 2019, Al-Shabaab contacted the business’s representative in
Mogadishu by telephone, ordering him to immediately present himself at
Al-Shabaab’s court at Mubarak, Lower Shabelle region.25 Upon arrival at the court,
Al-Shabaab presented the representative with the cargo manifest from Mogadishu
port, which highlighted the company’s consignments during the calendar year.
Al-Shabaab demanded that the agent make a payment in excess of $70,000 in taxes
to the group. They further warned the agent that tax payments on future shipments
should be made in advance. Following consultation with the company’s management,
the agent made the payment using an inter-account transfer with a Somali banking
institution.26 Al-Shabaab provided a receipt to the company for the transaction, a copy
of which is contained in annex 1.4 (strictly confidential).
Al-Shabaab’s justice system
33. In addition to its ability to raise taxes, Al-Shabaab also provides some basic
services typically associated with government, even in areas it does not physically
control. In an environment where State institutions are limited or in some cases absent
entirely, Al-Shabaab’s provision of rudimentary courts and access to judicial
recourse – and the group’s ability to enforce its judgments through the threat of
violence – may account for its appeal among certain segments of the population.
34. Al-Shabaab justice is often sought in relation to disputes over land ownership,
most notably in Mogadishu. As State justice is often costly, protracted and
unpredictable, concerned parties often initiate dialogue with Al-Shabaab and request
the group’s mediation in issues related to conflict over land ownership.27 Al-Shabaab
justice officials interview neighbours and other witnesses and call both the plaintiff
and respondent to the group’s court at Tortoroow, near Afgoye, in order to render
judgment. The Panel has obtained a copy of an Al-Shabaab summons to a respondent
in a land dispute case (see annex 1.5).
35. Al-Shabaab’s justice mechanisms may have appeal for disadvantaged groups
who have limited or no access to State justice institutions. For instance, in the absence
of functioning family courts in rural areas, Al-Shabaab offers some women their only
opportunity for financial compensation from ex-husbands and male relatives. 28
Notebooks recovered from deceased Al-Shabaab officials in 2018 in Bay region
contained examples of Al-Shabaab judicial rulings on a diverse range of topics,
including divorce and child support, theft, possession of weapons and the sale of
livestock. Annex 1.5 contains documentation related to Al-Shabaab justice mechanisms.
__________________
23 Interviews with five businesses based in Mogadishu, July and August 2019. See also S/2019/570,
para. 39.
24 Interviews with five businesses based in Mogadishu, July and August 2019.
25 Interview with an international trading company that exports dried food from the Gulf
Cooperation Council region to Mogadishu, in Dubai, 26 June 2019.
26 Ibid.
27 From January to April 2019, the Panel carried out four telephone interviews with individuals
based in Mogadishu who engaged Al-Shabaab to find resolutions to land ownership issues.
28 International Crisis Group, “Women and Al-Shabaab’s insurgency”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing
No. 145, 27 June 2019. Available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-
women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency.
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Regional operations
DusitD2 attack in Nairobi
36. On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab militants attacked a commercial business
complex in Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel. The attack began at approximately
15:25 UTC+3, commencing with a detonation of a suicide bomber. Four gunmen then
proceeded to storm the compound using AK-pattern rifles and grenades, targeting
people within the DusitD2 Hotel and surrounding businesses.
37. The attack resulted in 21 victims, as well as the 4 gunmen. The date of the attack
was significant, coinciding with the third anniversary of Al-Shabaab’s deadliest
attack on AMISOM forces, when on 15 January 2016 militants overran a Kenyan
Defence Forces AMISOM base at El Adde, Somalia, resulting in the deaths of
approximately 150 Kenyan Defence Forces soldiers (S/2016/919, paras. 15–20).
38. In a detailed statement released the day after the attack, Al-Shabaab announced
that the operation – codenamed Al-Qudsu Lan Tuhawwad (“Jerusalem will never be
Judaized”) – had targeted “western and Zionist interests worldwide and in support of
our Muslim families in Palestine”. The rhetoric was atypical for Al-Shabaab, which
in the past has justified its attacks against foreign actors, such as AMISOM troopcontributing
countries, based upon their presence on Somali soil. Al -Shabaab’s pivot
towards a focus on Western targets and the “liberation” of Jerusalem may be viewed
in the context of the militant group’s ongoing competition within Somalia with ISIL,
whose ideology has traditionally been more globalist than that of Al -Shabaab.
39. Almost one year prior to the DusitD2 attack, an Al-Shabaab vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device operation, likely scheduled to take place on the seco nd
anniversary of the El Adde incident, was disrupted by Kenyan security forces in
Merti, Isiolo County, Kenya (S/2018/1002, paras. 75–81). Evidence reviewed by the
Panel indicates a likely overlap between the networks involved in the Merti and
DusitD2 plots, including a financing middleman based in Mandera, Kenya (see
“Financing of the attack”, below), as well as a Type 56-2 rifle used by one of the
DusitD2 gunmen.
Attacking team
40. The Al-Shabaab attacking team consisted of four gunmen as well as a suicide
bomber, Mahir Khalid Riziki. Riziki was the only long-standing member of
Al-Shabaab, having been known to Kenyan police due to his involvement in attacks
along the Kenyan coast.29
41. The leader and operator of the cell’s safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi, Ali
Salim Gichunge, was born in 1995 in Isiolo, Kenya. Unusually for a Kenyan operative
within Al-Shabaab, Gichunge was given wide discretion and autonomy over the
particulars of the plot – including the selection of the target – rather than being
directly overseen from within Somalia. The three additional gunmen consisted of
Osman Ibrahim Gedi, a Kenyan national; Siyat Omar Abdi, a refugee from Dadaab
camp in Kenya; and an unknown Somali national who travelled from the Dadaab
refugee camp. Each of the attackers were found to be in possession of multiple
identification documents, some of which were genuine, and others which had been
obtained through corruption or were entirely manufactured.
__________________
29 In 2014, Riziki was a member of an assassination cell tasked by Al-Shabaab to kill security
personnel in the coastal region, and in October 2014 he was involved in the killing of a police
officer at the Royal Court Hotel in Mombasa. Confidential police report seen by the Pan el of
Experts, March 2019.
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42. In order to mislead law enforcement, members of the attacking cell travelled
separately and came together in Nairobi only two days prior to the attack. One day
before the attack the selection of the target had yet to be finalized, with members of
the cell conducting reconnaissance at an alternative location in northern Nairobi.
Financing of the attack
43. A key financing link between Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the attacking cell in
Kenya was Abdi Ali Mohamed, a Kenyan national based in Mandera. Mohamed
subsequently used three phone numbers to send almost K Sh 700,000 ($7,000) –
typically structured in transfers of K Sh 70,000 ($700) – to cell leader Ali Salim
Gichunge, using M-PESA, the principal mobile phone money service in Kenya. One
of Mohamed’s phone numbers had also been used in early 2018 to transfer funds to
Abdimajit Adan, an Al-Shabaab operative arrested by Kenyan security forces in
February 2018 in connection with a planned vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device attack in Nairobi (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3), indicating an overlap in the
planning of the two operations. A conservative estimate of the total cost of the
DusitD2 operation was between $45,000 and $50,000 (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly
confidential)).
Type 56-2 rifle
44. The serial number and additional markings on the weapon used by one of the
DusitD2 gunmen indicate the strong likelihood that the rifle was part of a consignment
of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the Federal Government of Somalia from the
Government of Ethiopia in 2013 immediately following the partial lifting of the arms
embargo.30 The Al-Shabaab operatives arrested by Kenyan police in February 2018
were found in possession of four Type 56-2 rifles that had also formed part of the
2013 consignment (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3).
45. Annex 1.6 contains a detailed case study of the DusitD2 attack.
Additional Al-Shabaab networks in East Africa
46. Evidence gathered from the DusitD2 investigation revealed the existence of
additional Al-Shabaab cells in the region, connected through at least t wo cell
coordinators located in the Al-Shabaab stronghold of Jilib. 31 Electronic
communications, conducted for the most part in fluent English, indicated evidence of
planned operations to kidnap foreign nationals in the area around Naivasha and
Nakuru, Kenya, in February 2019; the plots were successfully foiled by the Kenyan
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit.32 Local cell leaders (“emirs”) were required to submit
monthly reports to Jilib on the cell’s activities.
47. The Jilib-based cell coordinators provided funds to operatives in Kenya and the
United Republic of Tanzania upon request, with the emir of each cell required to
submit a list of estimated expenditures, including a monthly salary of $700 for each
operative. Upon the receipt of a request, the coordinator would instruct Al-Shabaab’s
finance department to transfer funds to a phone number provided by the operative,
using M-PESA mobile money. Financial requests were readily forthcoming and rarely
questioned; in one case, a cell coordinator provided $6,000 – including $1,000 to pay
for a wedding – to a sleeper agent in the United Republic of Tanzania in order to
establish a bakery in Dar es Salaam and obtain Tanzanian identification documents.
On the occasions when cell coordinators rejected operatives’ requests, it was due to
__________________
30 The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.
31 Identified by international security agencies through their Internet Protocol addresses.
32 Interview with international security source, June 2019.
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operational concerns rather than the amount requested. For instance, a cell
coordinator rejected an operative’s request to purchase a Toyota Surf four-wheeldrive
vehicle because such a vehicle would not fit his cover profile as a universit y
student.
48. Based on analyses of the communications, the Panel estimates that Al-Shabaab
operatives in Somalia transferred approximately $100,000 to four cells based in East
Africa from March 2018 to February 2019.
49. See annex 1.7 (strictly confidential) for a detailed account of Al-Shabaab
operations in East Africa.
Recruitment within Kenya
50. Electronic communications between the cell coordinators in Jilib and their field
operatives also provided a unique insight into Al-Shabaab’s recruitment techniques
within Kenya. Operatives in Kenya on several occasions suggested possible recruits,
individuals usually known to them through criminal associations. In one instance, an
operative suggested recruiting “AH”, a Kenyan national of non-Somali ethnicity with
whom he had conducted past robberies. The Jilib-based cell coordinator facilitated
the travel of “AH” to Somalia at El Wak in December 2018, where “AH” underwent
training in Gedo region for only 24 days before returning to Kenya in January 2019.
51. The case of “AH” was typical in terms of the route taken by Kenyan recruits to
reach Somalia – through Al-Shabaab’s preferred transit point at El Wak – as well as
the conduct of his training in Gedo region. In other facets, however, the case
represents a newly observed dimension of Al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy,
whereby the possession of criminal skills, including knowledge of evading law
enforcement, are privileged over ideology or affiliation with certain mosques or
religious networks.
Cross-border attacks into Kenya
52. During the reporting period Al-Shabaab stepped up hit-and-run and improvised
explosive device attacks along the Somalia-Kenya border, particularly during the
months of June and July 2019, which saw a total of 30 incidents. The geographical
scope of the attacks ranged from the northernmost border point with Somalia, at
Mandera, Kenya, to the southern border in Lamu County, spanning almost 700 km.
53. The most serious cross-border incident occurred on 15 June 2019 in Konton,
Wajir County, Kenya, when eight Kenyan police officers were killed and several
others injured by an improvised explosive device. The attack occurred just one day
after three Kenyan police reservists were kidnapped, also in the Konton area.
54. The increased frequency of Al-Shabaab’s attacks into Kenya may be a result of
heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries (see “Maritime border
dispute with Kenya”, below) which the militant group may be seeking to exploit.
55. Annex 1.8 contains additional information on Al-Shabaab’s cross-border attacks
into Kenya.
B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction
56. In 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that the ISIL
faction based in the Bari region of Puntland, headed by Abdulqader Mu’min, had
entered a period of retrenchment and reorganization, and also detailed the emergence
of an ISIL assassination network based in Mogadishu and Afgoye (S/2018/1002,
paras. 93–97). During the reporting period the Panel of Experts noted a violent
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upheaval in the faction’s leadership, and an apparently concerted effort by the group
to build a revenue base using extortion tactics against businesses and individuals
similar to those employed by Al-Shabaab. An internal assessment by the United
States-trained Puntland Security Force, obtained by the Panel in late November 2018,
estimated that the group may comprise as many as 340 militants, which, if accurate,
would represent a significant increase from the Monitoring Group’s previous estimate
of up to 200 fighters (S/2017/924, para. 32).
Leadership struggle
57. The end of 2018 saw a violent leadership contest between Abdirashid Luqmaan
and ISIL deputy leader Mahad Moalim33 and his supporters, principally Mohamed
Ahmed Qahiye34 and Abdihakim Dhuqub.35 On 13 October, Moalim was found shot
dead in Mogadishu’s Hodan district. Around 18 November, Qahiye received an
amnesty from the then President of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gass”, and
thereafter left Puntland for Ethiopia in fear for his safety. 36 On 14 April 2019,
Abdihakim Dhuqub was killed by a United States airstrike in the vicinity of the town
of Xiriiro in north-east Puntland.37
58. Following the purge, Abdirashid Luqmaan (Darod/Leelkase) emerged as the de
facto leader of the ISIL faction, although Abdulqader Mu’min maintains his role as
the group’s emir and spiritual head. Luqmaan is likely the same individual identified
in the final report of 2017 of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea report as
Abdiqani “Luqmaan” (Darod/Leelkase), the head of ISIL military operations (see
S/2017/924, annex 2.2). Unconfirmed intelligence from an internal report of the
Puntland Security Force indicates that Luqmaan is between 40 and 48 years of age
and had been a religious leader within Al-Shabaab in Galkayo before defecting to the
ISIL faction in 2015.
Conflict with Al-Shabaab in Bari region
59. In December 2018, fighting broke out between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab
in Bari region for the first time since early 2016, centred on crucial water sources in
the mountainous areas of Bari region (see annex 1.9). Intense conflict between the
ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab had been ongoing since November 2018, when both
groups appear to have begun competing to extort businesses in Mogadishu and
Puntland. Eleven employees of Hormuud Somalia Inc., the largest telecommunications
company in Somalia, were killed during November 2018 in Mogadishu by gunmen
reportedly affiliated with ISIL and Al-Shabaab.
__________________
33 On 27 February 2018, the United States Department of State announced the sanctioning of
Mahad Moalim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
34 Mohamed Ahmed Qahiye was reportedly the mastermind of the 8 February 2017 attack on the
International Village Hotel in Bosaso (see S/2017/924, annex 2.4).
35 In final report of 2017 of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (see S/2017/924,
annex 2.2), Abdihakim Dhuqub was described as a senior ISIL leader and former member of the
Al-Shabaab insurgency in Puntland’s Golis Mountains.
36 Information provided by current and former senior Puntland intelligence officials, as well as an
internal intelligence report of the Puntland Security Force. On 8 August 2019, the Panel received
information from an eyewitness who claimed to have located Qahiye, as well as a second former
ISIL fighter, in the Bole neighbourhood of Addis Ababa. See also Harun Maruf, “Under pressure,
IS militants in Somalia look to Ethiopia”, Voice of America, 19 August 2019, available at
www.voanews.com/africa/under-pressure-militants-somalia-look-ethiopia, and Salem Solomon,
“Ethiopian military captures suspected IS members”, Voice of America, 12 September 2019,
available at www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopian-military-captures-suspected-members.
37 United States Africa Command, “U.S. confirms airstrike against ISIS-Somalia’s Abdulhakim
Dhuqub”, press release, 15 April 2019. Available at www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/
31765/u-s-confirms-airstrike-against-isis-somalias-abdulhakim-dhuqub.
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Financing of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction
60. After the ISIL faction emerged in October 2015, investigations by the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea concluded that the financial resources at
the group’s disposal were minimal, and that it was unlikely to have received
significant support from outside of Somalia; interviews with former ISIL members
suggested that the group was barely capable of paying its own personnel (S/2017/924,
paras. 36–42). However, during the reporting period, the faction launched efforts to
generate domestic revenues, using extortion methods similar to those of Al-Shabaab.
In October 2018, for instance, the ISIL faction successfully extorted the Puntland -
based telecommunications company Amtel into making a payment totalling several
hundred thousand dollars. Employees of other companies in Puntland were
assassinated in August and November 2018 after they reportedly refused to accede to
the ISIL faction’s “taxation” demands. Annex 1.9 contains further information on the
ISIL faction’s attempts to create a revenue base in Puntland.
Plot to attack the Vatican
61. On 17 December 2018, Somali national and ISIL affiliate Omar Moshin
Ibrahim, also known as Anas Khalil, was arrested in Bari, Italy, in connection with a
planned attack on the Vatican and other targets in Italy, to coincide with the Christmas
celebrations on December 25. While the plot was rudimentary and had little chance
of success, the Panel’s investigations, assisted by Italian authorities, revealed links
between “Anas Khalil” and prominent ISIL operatives in Somaliland, Puntland, Libya
and Kenya. The Vatican plot represents the first instance in which ISIL elements in
Somalia were directly linked to an attempted terrorist attack outside the country.
Omar Moshin Ibrahim
62. Omar Moshin Ibrahim, also known as Anas Khalil, was born in Qardho,
Puntland, in October 1998. He entered Italy at the end of 2016 through Sicily, on
humanitarian grounds.38 Prior to his arrival in Italy, “Anas Khalil” lived in Nairobi
and subsequently travelled to Libya in 2016, where he received training for the b etter
part of a year. In Libya, “Anas Khalil” was affiliated with Abu Ayman Al Kinye, an
ISIL officer reportedly responsible for “logistics and immigration”39 whose nom de
guerre suggests a Kenyan connection.
63. “Anas Khalil” was domiciled in Bari, in southern Italy, from March 2017 to
December 2018. During his time in Italy, he maintained communication with ISIL
affiliates in Somalia and Kenya. However, intercepted communications indicate that
“Anas Khalil” devised the plan to plant a bomb in St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome on
25 December, Christmas Day, of his own accord and was not directly tasked by ISIL
operatives outside the country. Following those communications, Italian authorities
arrested “Anas Khalil” as a pre-emptive measure before the plot could be further
developed.
Affiliates in Somalia and Kenya
64. Stored in “Anas Khalil’s” mobile phone contacts was an entry corresponding to
Abdullahi Mohamud Yusuf (also known as Abu Hatim, Mad Mullah and Majerteni),
a Puntland-born global ISIL recruiter and facilitator who was arrested and imprisoned
in Somaliland in 2018. Upon his arrest Yusuf was found with documents outlining the
__________________
38 Profile of Omar Moshin Ibrahim provided to the Panel by Italian authorities in June 2019 .
39 Ibid.
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overall strategy of ISIL for expansion in East Africa. 40 According to information
received from Somaliland authorities, Yusuf had visited 12 countries across Africa
and the Middle East, including South Africa, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Kenya.41 In addition, in 2015 Yusuf was located in Libya, where he worked in the
ISIL “immigration department”.42 He also reportedly previously fought with ISIL
forces near Tikrit, Iraq.43 While initially affiliated with the leader of the ISIL faction
in Puntland, Abdulqader Mu’min, Yusuf later broke with Mu’min over their divergent
visions for ISIL in East Africa.44
65. Another frequent contact of “Anas Khalil” was his brother based in Somaliland,
Abdirauf Omar Ibrahim (also known as Abdirashid Khalil, Abdirauf Khalil and Big
Debro), who as of the time of writing was also imprisoned in Hargeisa on terrorism
charges, but was scheduled to be released in December 2019.
66. See annex 1.10 (strictly confidential) for a link chart of the ISIL plot.
C. Explosives intended for commercial use
MV Oriental Queen
67. On 10 March 2019, the United Republic of Tanzania-flagged general cargo
vessel MV Oriental Queen (IMO No. 8200797) departed the port of Mersin, Turkey,
transporting 180 tons of explosives, including 165 tons of ammonium nitrate/fuel oil,
as well as detonators. The explosives were offloaded at Bosaso port on 17 May and
subsequently transported to a storage site in the village of Jariiban, located
approximately 65 km north-west of the littoral town of Garacad, Puntland. The
explosives were intended to be used for blasting related to the construction of a port
in Garacad, as well as the corresponding road to the capital of Puntland, Garowe.
68. In a letter dated 28 March 2019 addressed to the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), the Panel expressed concern that the
materiel contained in the consignment could be diverted for the construction of
improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab or the ISIL faction based in Puntland,
and requested the Committee’s guidance. The Committee subsequently determined
that explosives intended for commercial use fell outside the scope of the arms
embargo but shared the Panel’s view that the shipment represented a threat to peace,
security and stability in Somalia.
69. There is currently no requirement under the arms embargo regime for transfers
of commercial explosives to Somalia to be notified to the Committee. Accordingly,
the Panel of Experts recommends that future deliveries of commercial explosives be
subject to, at minimum, a notification for the Committee’s information, and that
Member States exercise vigilance over entities under their jurisdiction that supply
commercial explosives to Somalia (see section VIII, below).
__________________
40 Meetings with Somaliland security agencies and political officials in Hargeisa, 11 and
13 February 2019. The Panel of Experts sent correspondence to Somaliland on 14 June 2019
requesting copies of these strategy documents but did not receive a response.
41 Dossier on Abdullahi Mohamud Yusuf provided to the Panel of Experts in February 2019.
42 Profile of Omar Moshin Ibrahim provided to the Panel by Italian authorities in June 2019.
43 Ibid.
44 Interviews with Somaliland security official, 11 February 2019, and a member of a Western
security agency, 30 July 2019.
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D. Federal-regional relations
70. During the reporting period, political relations between the Federal Government
of Somalia and the federal member states deteriorated. Federal-regional tensions also
highlighted the absence of appropriate constitutional mechanisms that clearly
delineate the respective roles of Federal Government and federal member state
authorities in regional electoral processes.
South-West State electoral process
71. In late 2018, the regional presidential electoral process in South-West State was
marred by multiple postponements, resignations, allegations of excessive interference
by the Federal Government and a deterioration in the security environment that
resulted in the killing of 15 civilians.
72. In November and December 2018, the South-West State electoral process was
postponed on three separate occasions owing to the resignation of the original South-
West State electoral committee, the withdrawal of key candidates and a lack of
consensus on the eligibility of presidential candidates.45 The majority of candidates
accused the Federal Government of providing political and financial support to its
preferred nominee, Abdiaziz Mohamed “Laftagareen”.46
Candidacy of Mukhtar Robow
73. On 4 October 2018, Mukhtar Robow, a former deputy leader of Al-Shabaab who
had defected from the group in August 2017, announced his candidacy for the So uth-
West State presidency.47 In response, the Federal Government Ministry of Security
declared Robow ineligible to run, stating that he had yet to fulfil unspecified
preconditions that would allow him to apply for political office. 48
74. On 30 November 2018, an aircraft landed in Baidoa carrying 130 armed Federal
Government police officers from Mogadishu. The South-West State Minister for
Security, Hassan Hussein Elay, defended the deployment, stating that additional
security was required for the electoral process.49
75. On 13 December 2018, Mukhtar Robow was invited by South-West State
officials to attend a meeting at the South-West State Presidential Palace in the
AMISOM-protected area in Baidoa. Upon his arrival, Somali security forces,
supported by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, detained him. 50 During his
arrest, a number of armed individuals loyal to Robow opened fire on Ethiopian
National Defence Forces soldiers within the protected compound, resulting in
casualties on both sides.51 Robow was flown to Mogadishu under the supervision of
the National Intelligence and Security Agency of the Federal Government, where he
remains as of the time of writing. The role of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces
__________________
45 Interview with South-West State Members of Parliament and members of the South-West State
electoral committee in Nairobi, 12 February 2019.
46 Ibid.
47 Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia Government blocks ex-militant from seeking political office,
Voice of America, 5 October 2018. Available at www.voanews.com/a/somalia-governmentblocks-
ex-militant-seeking-political-office/4601493.html.
48 Ibid.
49 Interview with United Nations official in Nairobi, 10 December 2018.
50 AMISOM denied any involvement in the arrest of Mukhtar Robow. The Panel carried out
interviews by telephone with several South-West State parliamentarians and local citizens who
reported the involvement of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces in the arr est. However, the
Panel has yet to interview Mukhtar Robow due to his ongoing detention in Mogadishu.
51 Interview with four South-West State Members of Parliament in Nairobi, 12 February 2019.
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in the arrest of Robow has the potential to inflame anti-Ethiopian sentiment among
local communities in the region, who were previously known to share information on
Al-Shabaab movements with them.52
Killing of demonstrators
76. Following the detention of Mukhtar Robow, from 13 to 15 December 2018
Federal Government and regional Somali security forces responded to public protests
in Baidoa with lethal force, resulting in 15 civilian deaths. One day prior to the
outbreak of demonstrations, the South-West State Police Commissioner, Colonel
Mahat Abdirahman, had advocated for the use of lethal force against demonstrators.53
In August 2019, Colonel Abdirahman was appointed as the head of the Custodial
Corps of the Federal Government.
77. On 5 January 2019, South-West State authorities appointed a fact-finding
committee to investigate the killings of the demonstrators.54 The committee issued its
findings in February 2019, acknowledging the deaths of four individuals, but failed
to identify the perpetrators involved.55 Conversely, the Panel verified the names of
15 civilian victims.56
Financial payments
78. Financial payments to South-West State regional Members of Parliament were
a significant factor in influencing the outcome of the regional electoral process. 57 The
Panel received multiple reports indicating that 82 South-West State Members of
Parliament were flown to Mogadishu in early November 2018 to receive an initial
payment of approximately $5,000 each, in exchange for their support for particular
presidential candidates.58 Interviews conducted with South-West State Members of
Parliament confirmed that they were offered a further $20,000 to $30,000 to support
specific candidates upon the successful conclusion of the electoral process. 59
79. Furthermore, significant payments were made to senior South-West State
officials in the weeks preceding the election. The Panel has reviewed financial
information demonstrating that a prominent South-West State Minister received
transfers totalling several hundred thousand dollars prior to the election. The
__________________
52 Interview with an Ethiopian security official in Addis Ababa, 3 April 2019. In the aftermath of
the South-West State elections, on 18 January 2019 Al-Shabaab ambushed an Ethiopian National
Defence Forces convoy travelling near Baidoa. Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed 60 soldiers,
although this figure could not be independently verified.
53 In a video released in December 2018, Colonel Abdirahman threatened to “shoot people in the
ass” and stated to the interviewer that “the law even allows us to kill you”. See Harun Maruf
(@HarunMaruf), “Video: Gen Mahad Abdirahman Aden the former Baidoa police chief”,
24 August 2019 (video in Somali), available at https://twitter.com/harunmaruf/status/
1165333569977425925?s=12.
54 Letter from the Office of the President of South-West State, 5 January 2019.
55 Assessment report of the South-West State fact-finding committee on the demonstrations in
Baidoa, 13–15 December 2018.
56 Interviews with individuals and members of South-West State political parties in Nairobi,
28 March 2019; confidential report on killings of civilians in Baidoa provided by Somali civil
society actors, 28 March 2019.
57 Interview with multiple South-West State Members of Parliament in Nairobi between December
2018 and March 2019, and interview with two South-West State presidential candidates in
Nairobi in March 2019.
58 Ibid.
59 Interviews with two South-West State presidential candidates and several South-West State
Members of Parliament in Nairobi, 12 March 2019.
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payments to the Minister were made by three individuals based in Mogadishu, one of
whom the Panel identified as a financial clerk in a senior Federal Government office. 60
80. On 19 December 2018, the South-West State presidential electoral process
concluded with the regional Parliament voting to elect the candidate backed by the
Federal Government, Abdiaziz Mohamed “Laftagareen”.
Puntland electoral process
81. The Puntland election was also marred by reports of the bribery of Members of
Parliament, as well as the manipulation of their initial selection process. In one case,
the Panel received evidence that a prospective Member of Parliament was offered
$15,000 to turn down the appointment in favour of another individual who supported
a specific presidential candidate. In addition, candidates reportedly made payments
to Members of Parliament ranging from $30,000 to $70,000 in order to secure votes. 61
82. The Puntland electoral process was also subject to accusations of attempted
interference by the Federal Government. For instance, a Member of the Upper House
of the Federal Parliament alleged that the Federal Government had attempted to
influence the outcome of the Puntland election by financially supporting candidates
allied with the Federal Government.62 However, such attempts do not appear to have
successfully affected the outcome of the process. On 9 January 2019, the Puntland
Parliament elected Said Abdullahi Mohamed “Deni” to the presidency of Puntland,
who assumed the role from Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gass” in a peaceful transition of
power.
Jubbaland electoral process
83. In July and August 2019, the Jubbaland presidential electoral process in
Kismayo was characterized by heightened political tensions among the Federal
Government, the Jubbaland administration and local opposition stakeholders. As
observed in the South-West State and Puntland regional electoral processes, diverging
interpretations of the Somali Provisional Constitution over the role of the Federal
Government in regional electoral processes were central to political discord. On
12 July, the charged political climate was exploited by Al-Shabaab, who carried out
a complex attack at the Medina Hotel in Kismayo, resulting in at least 26 fatalities
and more than 50 injured, the first attack of its kind in the city.
84. On 4 July 2019, the Jubbaland Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission announced that representatives of Jubbaland’s traditional elders would
appoint 75 Members of Parliament to elect the regional President. The Federal
Government and some local stakeholders expressed concerns over the opaqueness of
the selection of elders, and on 6 July the Federal Government issued a statement that
the process would require the approval of its Ministry of the Interior and Federal
Affairs. In response, Jubbaland authorities accused the Federal Government of
attempting to unduly influence the outcome, and on 25 July banned Federal
Government officials from travelling to Jubbaland until the conclusion of the process.
85. The political environment in Kismayo was further strained by tensions between
Kenya and Ethiopia over the support by Kenya for incumbent President of Jubbaland,
__________________
60 Details of these transfers are on file with the Secretariat.
61 Accounts of widespread bribery of Ministers of Parliament and other irregularities during the
Puntland election were provided to the Panel by two presidential candidates, a former Puntl and
intelligence officer and members of civil society in January and February 2019.
62 Garowe Online, “Somalia is not headed to the right direction, says Senator”, 26 April 2019.
Available at www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-is-not-headed-to-the-righ…-
says-senator.
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Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe”, and the perceived backing by Ethiopia of the
Federal Government of Somalia. On 19 August 2019, Jubbaland authorities forcibly
prevented the landing of an aircraft carrying Ethiopian representatives at Kismayo
airport, resulting in an armed standoff between Kenyan and Ethiopian troops at the
airport.63
86. On 22 August 2019, Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe” was declared President
of Jubbaland by the Jubbaland Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. 64
On the same day, an opposition-led shadow parliament elected a Federal Government
of Somalia Member of Parliament, Abdirashid Mohamed Hiddig, as Pr esident.65 Also
on 22 August, the Federal Government of Somalia rejected the outcomes of both
electoral processes.
Security sector
87. Security sector reforms during the reporting period were focused on the
implementation of the Transition Plan for Somalia, adopted in April 2018, which
envisions the handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali
security forces by 2021, coinciding with the withdrawal of AMISOM.
88. While some initial goals of the Transition Plan have been achieved, the mediumterm
goals of clearing and securing the main supply routes have yet to be completed.
Senior AMISOM officials expressed to the Panel that Federal Government forces
“were not playing their part well” and had routinely failed to fill vacuums left by
AMISOM, citing the strategic town of Leego, Bay region, as well as the lack of
adequate holding forces by the Federal Government of Somalia to secure the main
supply routes.66
89. Moreover, AMISOM, in a regional operational readiness assessment conducted
from March 2018 to January 2019, concluded that there were more than 20,000
federal member state forces that did not fall under Federal Gover nment command and
control structures. In its report, AMISOM further stated that although regional forces
had received some training, they were not paid regularly and lacked basic equipment
and vehicles. The successful integration of federal member state forces into the
National Security Architecture will be vital to enable the planned drawdown of
AMISON. The Panel of Experts currently assesses that it is unlikely that the
envisaged AMISOM withdrawal will be possible by 2021.
Transition Plan and drawdown of the African Union Mission in Somalia
90. On 16 February 2019, AMISOM military commanders reached a consensus
regarding the operational activities to be conducted under the aegis of the concept of
operations for 2018–2021, which had been previously approved on 26 November
2018 and endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on
9 February 2019.67
__________________
63 Jubbaland forces parked their vehicles on the Kismayo Airport runway to prevent the aircraft
from landing.
64 Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe” received 56 votes out of a total of 74.
65 A third presidential candidate, Abdinasir Seerar, also subsequently declared himself President of
Jubbaland.
66 Interviews with senior AMISOM officials in Addis Ababa, 2 April 2019.
67 AMISOM, “AMISOM commanders reach a consensus on military operations”, press release,
16 February 2019. Available at http://amisom-au.org/2019/02/amisom-commanders-reach-aconsensus-
on-military-operations/.
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91. In accordance with the concept of operations, AMISOM has continued its
withdrawals and handovers to Somali security forces over the cour se of the reporting
period:
(a) A military academy in Mogadishu was handed over to the Federal
Government on 28 February 2019. The 500 Burundian troops stationed there were
relocated: 200 were moved to Maslah, 20 km east of Mogadishu, and 300 to Jowhar
and forward operating bases in sector 5;
(b) In February 2019, approximately 1,000 Burundian troops stationed in
HirShabelle began their scheduled repatriation, pursuant to the requirements of
paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2431 (2018). The withdrawal was
completed by 5 April 2019.
Capture of Lower Shabelle villages by the Danab battalion
92. From May to August 2019, AMISOM and the Somali National Army, supported
by United States special forces, launched an offensive to capture strategic villages in
Lower Shabelle controlled by Al-Shabaab. Security operations successfully
recaptured the villages of Barire, Sabiid, Anole and Awdheegle, all located within
50 km of Mogadishu. The operations represented a significant development for
ensuring the security of Mogadishu, as the captured locations were waypoints on a
key transport corridor used by Al-Shabaab to move fighters and improvised explosive
devices into Mogadishu. However, on 14 August, Al-Shabaab carried out a
coordinated attack on the Awdheegle forward operating base, using three vehicle -
borne improvised explosive devices, mortars and gunmen.68 The attack was repelled
by AMISOM and Somali National Army forces, but the base remains vulnerab le due
to the ongoing presence of Al-Shabaab in the nearby town of Mubarak, which was
previously identified as an area for improvised explosive device construction for
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices entering Mogadishu. The long-term
success of the Lower Shabelle security operations will be contingent on the ability of
the Federal Government to provide effective holding forces, governance and the
supply of services to local residents.69
Integration of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a forces into the Somali National Army
93. In the last week of June 2019, the Federal Government announced that a major
faction of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) – an Ethiopian-backed militant Sufi group
established in 1991, and a potent counterweight to Al-Shabaab – would be integrated
into the federal security forces. The integration of ASWJ into the federal structures
represented an important step in Somali forces assuming security responsibilities
from AMISOM. The successful integration of ASWJ forces will depend on the
Federal Government accommodating the group’s demands for power and resources
without affecting the ability of ASWJ to counter Al-Shabaab or alienating other
political factions in Galmudug.
Biometric registration of the Somali National Army
94. According to documentation provided by the Federal Government to the
Committee, it completed the first phase of the biometric registration of the Somali
National Army by the end of March 2019 – a positive step towards security sector
__________________
68 The vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices were plated with armour, similar to those used
by Al-Shabaab on 19 January 2019 in Bar Sanguni, Lower Juba.
69 Al-Shabaab has warned residents of Barire not to return to the area. Interview with source in
Mogadishu, 13 August 2019, and a confidential security report, August 2019.
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reform and ensuring the payment of salaries.70 The Panel independently obtained a
Somali National Army payroll document containing 15,962 registered soldiers as of
February 2019. However, it is unclear to what degree the current composition of the
Army reflects those previously considered to be members of the Army by the Federal
Government. The Panel of Experts conducted three case studies of Somali Natio nal
Army registration, in sector 60, sector 12 April and General Gordon military base,
which concluded that fewer than one half (315 of 678) of Somali National Army
soldiers whose names appeared in logbooks from 2017 and 2018 were captured in the
biometric registration process of 2019. Whether the discrepancy is due to defections,
demobilizations, deaths, injuries or soldiers who have yet to be registered by the
Army, is unclear.
95. Annex 1.12 contains the Panel’s three cases studies of the biometric registration
of the Somali National Army.
E. Public financial management
Collection of air navigation charges
96. By May 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia had made significant
progress in public financial management by completing three staff-monitored
programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – a series of technical
benchmarks related to broadening the Federal Government’s domestic tax base. One
revenue stream highlighted by the programmes was the direct collection of air
navigation charges, a responsibility assumed by the Federal Government following
the handover from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in June 2019.
However, an investigation by the Panel revealed previous financial irregularities
within the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority in relation to the
collection of air navigation charges, in which the Authority wrote off a $5.8 million
debt owed by Jubba Airways Limited without collecting the funds from the airline.
Background
97. Soon after the collapse of the Government of Somalia in 1991, ICAO assumed
responsibility for the management of the country’s airspace in a 1994 agreement.
According to ICAO guidelines, all aircraft transiting through Somali airspace were
required to pay $275 per flight in air navigation charges. In 1995, ICAO signed an
agreement with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to collect those air
navigation charges on behalf of Somalia and deposit all revenues into an ICAO -
managed trust fund account, which was utilized to fund and support the safe operation
of Somalia airspace. According to IATA, approximately $112 million was collected
from August 2008 to July 2019 and transferred to the ICAO trust fund. 71
98. Following the international recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia
in 2012, preparations were begun to transfer control of Somali airspace from ICAO
to the Federal Government, as well as to transfer the $6.5 million balance remaining
in the ICAO trust fund. The handover was completed through an agreement signed in
June 2019 between ICAO, IATA and the Federal Government of Somalia.
__________________
70 Federal Government of Somalia periodic report to the Security Council submitted pursuant to
paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018), 19 March 2019.
71 Letter from IATA to the Panel of Experts, 8 August 2019. According to IATA, no financial
records dated prior to August 2008 are available.
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Historical uses of the International Civil Aviation Organization trust fund by the
Federal Government of Somalia
99. Prior to the handover of the ICAO trust fund in 2019, ICAO transferred funds
to Federal Government-designated bank accounts upon request to fund specific
projects. While the Federal Government has utilized the trust fund for several
legitimate projects, there have been incidents of irregular use. For instance, on
29 May 2014, ICAO transferred $350,000 to a money transfer bureau account based
in Djibouti, provided by the Federal Government of Somalia, purportedly to carry out
a series of training sessions for staff of the Somali Civil Aviation and M eteorological
Authority in Mogadishu. ICAO was doubtful that the funds were ever allocated to
training for the staff of the Authority, and it referred the case for internal investigation.72
100. In 2015, a Federal Government delegation headed by the then Federal
Government Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation travelled to ICAO headquarters
in Montreal to request the withdrawal of $150,000 from the trust fund.73 The transfer
request could not be completed because the delegation had designated a private b ank
account to receive the funds. 74 The delegation then requested that the funds be
provided in cash, which ICAO was also unable to accommodate.75
Air navigation fees owed by Somali airlines
101. A previous ICAO internal audit noted that airlines based in Somalia or owned
by Somali nationals routinely refused to pay the $275 per flight for air navigation
charges.76 As at 31 July 2019, the total owed to IATA in air navigation charges was
$25.5 million.77 Over $20 million of that debt was owed by airlines registered in
Somalia or owned by Somali nationals. The largest arrears have accrued to Bluebird
Aviation Ltd., which owed $5.2 million as of July 2019.78
Clearing of Jubba Airways debt
102. Prior to February 2018, the largest single air navigation debt – at $5.8 million –
was owed by Jubba Airways Limited, whose Chief Executive Officer is also a
Member of Parliament of the Federal Government. In a December 2017 letter, the
then Director General of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority
informed ICAO and IATA that Jubba Airways Limited had “settled all the invoices
pertaining to air navigation charges with [the Authority]”.79 Internal accounts for
February 2018, obtained by the Panel, show that Jubba Airway’s $5.8 million debt
had been cleared from the accounts. However, according to the Minister for Transport
and Aviation of the Federal Government, neither Jubba Airways nor any other
Somalia-based airline has directly settled its navigation debt with the Authority or
__________________
72 From 29 to 31 May 2019 the Panel conducted a series of interviews with senior ICAO
representatives in Montreal. During a review of investigations carried out by ICAO into the
matter, an ICAO representative who approved the transfer of $350,000 later quipped tha t “the
money is for their Mercedes”.
73 Interviews with ICAO staff in Montreal, 29–31 May 2019.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 ICAO, “Financial audit of Som/03/016 and Som/95/901 (Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for
Somalia)”, 6 April 2011.
77 “Open items report summary – as of 31 July 2019”, provided by IATA to the Panel of Experts on
8 August 2019.
78 Ibid.
79 Letter from Yusuf Abdi Abdulle, Director General of the Somali Civil Aviation and
Meteorological Authority, to the ICAO project coordinator in Moga dishu, 12 December 2017.
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any other Federal Government institution.80 Jubba Airways did not provide the Panel
with the requested proof of payment.81
Designation of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority account to
receive air navigation fees
103. On 27 June 2019, ICAO, IATA and the Minister for Transport and Aviation of
the Federal Government signed an agreement terminating the role of I CAO in the
collection of air navigation charges. The agreement designated the account of the
Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority (account No. 1040) at the Central
Bank of Somalia to receive future air navigation charges. 82 According to Federal
Government financial management standards – as well as IMF staff-monitored
programme benchmarks – that revenue should have been channelled through the
Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank. The Minister for Transport and Civil
Aviation stated that, notwithstanding the contractual text, future collection of airspace
navigation charges would accrue directly to the Treasury Single Account. 83
104. Subsequent to the June 2019 agreement, ICAO remitted the $6.5 million balance
remaining in the ICAO trust fund to the Federal Government of Somalia; the account
of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority (account No. 1040) was
used to receive the funds.84
105. Annex 1.13 contains supporting documentation pertaining to collection of air
navigation charges and the writing off of the Jubba Airways debt.
F. Oil and gas sector
Maritime border dispute with Kenya
106. Since August 2014, a maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia,
concerning an area in the Indian Ocean of over 100,000 km2, has been pending before
the International Court of Justice.85 On 7 February 2019, the Federal Government of
Somalia, in partnership with Spectrum Geo (now TGS), a seismic oil data company,
hosted a petroleum conference in London that aimed to present the results of the
seismic study completed offshore Somalia in 2016. One week later, the Government
of Kenya temporarily recalled its ambassador to Somalia, claiming that the Federal
Government of Somalia had auctioned off oil and gas blocks located within the
Kenyan exclusive economic zone at the conference. The conference, however,
focused on the presentation of data unrelated to the disputed area, and no auctions or
bidding processes related to oil blocks occurred. Nonetheless, the ongoing maritim e
dispute has fuelled tensions between Kenya and the Federal Government of Somalia,
__________________
80 Interview with the Federal Government of Somalia Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation,
Mohamed Abdullahi Salat, 12 September 2019.
81 Interview with Jubba Airways Chief Executive Officer Said Nur Qailie in Nairobi, 23 Aug ust 2019.
82 In its past reporting, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea highlighted the use of
dedicated Federal Government ministry accounts to bypass the Treasury Single Account, thereby
avoiding oversight of revenues by Federal Government fisca l authorities (see, for example,
S/2015/801, annex 3.3).
83 Interview with Mohamed Abdullahi Salat, 12 September 2019.
84 Email from ICAO representative, 24 September 2019.
85 Kenya contends that the maritime border should extend parallel to the line of latitude (located
between 1 and 2 degrees south) from its land border with Somalia. The Federal Governm ent’s
position is that the maritime border of Somalia should extend from the coast in a south -east
direction, as an extension of the Somalia land border.
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creating a potential space for Al-Shabaab to exploit,86 as well as possible divisions
between Kenya and other AMISOM troop-contributing countries more supportive of
the Federal Government of Somalia. Positive relations between the two countries are
crucial to regional security, particularly in relation to Al-Shabaab operations across
their shared border (see “Cross-border attacks into Kenya”, above).
G. Maritime piracy
107. There was one successful act of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia during
the reporting period. On 19 April 2019, the Yemen-flagged dhow Al Ahzam was seized
by armed pirates in the vicinity of Adale, north of Mogadishu. The dhow was
subsequently used as a mother ship to conduct unsuccessful pirate attacks on the
fishing vessels Adria, Txori Argi and Shin Shuen Far 889 on 21 April.
108. On 23 April, forces from the counter-piracy EUNAVFOR mission intercepted
and boarded the Al Ahzam. Five pirates, three of whom had been wounded by gunfire,
were transferred to Seychelles for prosecution. According to EUNAVFOR, one of the
captured pirates had previously been prosecuted in Seychelles for involvement in the
attempted hijacking of the fishing vessel Galerna III on 18 November 2017
(S/2018/1002, para. 135) but had subsequently been released on a legal technicality.87
Subsequent biometric evidence received from the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL) confirmed that a pirate arrested following the hijacking
of the Al Ahzam in April 2019, Mohamed Dahir Wehliye, had been previously
detained in 2017 in connection with the attempted hijackings of the Galerna III as
well as the Panama-flagged merchant vessel Ever Dynamic88 (see annex 1.14 for
additional details).
III. Arms embargo
A. Compliance of the Federal Government of Somalia with
obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo
109. During the current reporting period, the compliance of the Federal Government
of Somalia with the Security Council’s notification requirements improved, with five
of the seven notifications received by the Committee meeting the Federal
Government’s obligations pursuant to the partial lifting of the arms embargo.
110. However, the Federal Government’s refusal to grant access to its military
storage facilities during the current reporting period impaired the ability of the Panel
of Experts to adequately monitor the Federal Government’s overall compliance with
the terms of the partial lifting. However, pursuant to the Security Council ’s request
in paragraph 32 of its resolution 2444 (2018), from 22 to 28 June 2019, a technical
assessment mission was conducted by the Secretary-General to Nairobi and Mogadishu
to undertake a review aimed at improving implementation of the arms embargo. The
assessment team received access from the Federal Government to military storage
facilities. While acknowledging internal coordination issues as a contributing factor
in past instances of missed or late notifications, the Federal Government conveyed to
__________________
86 In an audio message released on 19 September 2019, Al-Shabaab leader Ahmad Umar urged
Somalis to confront Kenya over its attempts to annex “large swathes of land before attempting to
occupy our ocean”.
87 Interview with EUNAVFOR personnel in Nairobi, 30 April 2019.
88 Information received from INTERPOL, Maritime Security Sub-Directorate, June 2019.
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Annex 1.1: Extent of Al-Shabaab’s territorial control
Figure 1: Map showing Al-Shabaab-administered areas, areas of significant Al-Shabaab
military presence, and Al-Shabaab’s taxation catchment.
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Annex 1.6: DusitD2 attack in Nairobi
On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab militants attacked a commercial business complex in
Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel. The attack began at 15:28 local time (12:28
UTC+3), with a detonation of a suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki. Four gunmen – Ali Salim
Gichunge, Osman Ibrahim Gedi, Siyat Omar Abdi, and an unknown individual – then
proceeded to attack the compound using AK-pattern rifles and grenades, targeting people
within the DusitD2 hotel and surrounding shops.
The attack resulted in 21 civilian deaths, as well as the four gunmen. Al-Shabaab dubbed
the operation Al-Qudsu Lan Tuhawwad (“Jerusalem will never be Judaized”) and stated
that it had targeted “western and Zionist interests worldwide and in support of our Muslim
families in Palestine”21 (see figure 1, below). This rhetoric was atypical for Al-Shabaab,
which typically justifies its attacks based on the presence of foreign troops in Somalia. The
DusitD2 attack was the most significant operation carried out by Al-Shabaab in a regional
Member State since the Garissa University College massacre of April 2015 (see
S/2015/801, annex 4.2).
The DusitD2 attack was carried out on a significant date, coinciding with the third
anniverary of Al-Shabaab’s overrunning of a Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) base in El
Adde, Gedo region. In 2018, Kenyan police had disrupted a similar attempt when they
intercepted a VBIED destined for Nairobi near Merti, Isiolo County (see S/2018/1002,
annex 2.3); the operation had likely been originally been planned to coincide with the
second anniversary of the El Adde attack. The Panel’s investigations have revealed links
between the organization of the two operations, including a common financier based in
Mandera, Kenya (see annex 1.6.1(strictly confidential)) and the identical origin of a Type
56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below). It is
likely that Al-Shabaab learned lessons from the failure of the Merti plot and adapted their
tactics in order to carry out the successful DusitD2 operation (see “Comparison with the
2018 failed Merti VBIED plot”, below).
Figure 1: Decreased Al-Shabaab attacker shown wearing a headband with the word
“Jerusalem” ( القدس ) in Arabic.
Condensed timeline of the plot
21 Al-Shabaab statement available at https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-media-unitpresents-
detailed-report-on-nairobi-attack-suggests-that-attack-bears-message-to-jerusalem.html
(subscription required).
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2015: Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge travels to Somalia.
March 2018: Facilitators in Jilib, Somalia, organize a fake ID for Siyat Omar Abdi.
c. April 2018: Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru establish a safehouse at Guango
Estate, on the northern outskirts of Nairobi.
15 Dec. 2018: Unknown attacker travels to Eastleigh, Nairobi from Dadaab refugee
camp.
2 Jan. 2019: Osman Gedi Ibrahim travels to Roysambu area of Nairobi from Danaba,
north-east Kenya.
5 Jan. 2019: Siyat Omar Abdi travels to Nairobi, Eastleigh from Dadaab refugee
camp.
10 Jan. 2019: Osman Gedi Ibrahim moves to the safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi.
11 Jan. 2019: Suicide bomber Mahir Khalid Riziki travels to the Nairobi safehouse
from Somalia through El Wak, north-east Kenya.
13 Jan. 2019: Siyat Omar Abdi and the Unknown Attacker move to the safehouse.
14 Jan. 2019: Entire cell assembles at the safehouse on the day prior to the attack.
15 Jan. 2019: Day of the attack
15:14 (UTC+3): Suicide bomber Mahir Riziki arrives at the DusitD2 complex. Between
15:14 and 15:25 he exchanges six calls with Ali Salim Gichunge
averaging 30 seconds each.22
15:21: The four suicide gunmen Ali Salim Gichunge, Siyat Abdi Omar, Osman
Gedi Ibrahim and the unidentified Somali attacker arrive in a Toyota
Ractis, registration KCN340E. They change into black outfits.
15:28: Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret Garden restaurant.
15:32: The four gunmen walk into the Dusit complex and begin throwing
grenades and firing indiscriminately.23
c. 15:37: Kenyan security forces arrive at the scene.
16 Jan., 08:00: The four gunmen have been neutralized and the complex cleared, 16
hours after the commencement of the attack.
22 Confidential communications seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019. This was Riziki’s first
and only visit to DusitD2, likely indicating that he required specific instructions from Gichunge regarding
the layout of the complex.
23 CCTV footage seen by the Panel of Experts indicated that the delay between the detonation of the
suicide bomber and the arrival of the four gunmen was due to the latter’s purchase of credit for their
mobile phones, likely to enable them to stream footage and contact others in the likely event of a
prolonged siege once security forces arrived.
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Figure 2: CCTV footage of Ali Salim Gichunge and Siyat Omar Abdi entering the DusitD2
complex.
The safehouse
A bungalow in Guango Estate, Muchatha, on the outskirts of Nairobi – a middle-class
Kenyan estate where rentals are approximately KES 40,000 ($400) per month – served as
the safehouse for the attack. Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru
established the safehouse approximately nine months prior to the attack. Mobile phone
tower data analyzed by the Panel showed that other members of the cell stayed at the
bungalow sporadically in the lead up to the attack, with all of the attackers coming together
at the house the night prior.
Police recovered phones, a laptop, flash disks, SIM cards, and an Internet router from the
safehouse. Evidence extracted from these devices revealed communications between Ali
Salim Gichunge and a cell coordinator based the Al-Shabaab ‘capital’ of Jilib, in Middle
Juba region. Electronic communications also revealed that the Al-Shabaab coordinator in
Jilib had arranged for the manufacture of a falsified secondary school identity card for one
of the non-Kenyan attackers, Dadaab refugee camp resident Siyat Omar Abdi.24
24 The falsified document identified Siyat Omar Abdi as a student at Arabia Boys Secondary School,
located in Mandera, 2 km from the Kenya-Somalia border. The school was attacked by Al-Shabaab in
October 2018, resulting in the deaths of two non-Muslim teachers. Lynet Igadwah, “Al-Shabaab kills 2
teachers in Mandera school attack”, Business Daily, 10 October 2018. Available at
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/counties/Al-Shabaab-kills-2-te…
4003142-4800422-kxtqsvz/index.html.
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Figure 3: Falsified school ID arranged for Siyat Omar Abdi by an Al-Shabaab cell
coordinator in Jilib.
Extractions from the devices of the DusitD2 attackers also revealed the existence of a
broader Al-Shabaab network in East Africa, details of which are available in annex 1.7
(strictly confidential).
The attacking team
In mid-December, the unknown attacker of Somali origin traveled from Dadaab, and was
hidden in the predomininately Somali neighbourhood Eastleigh, Nairobi.
In early January 2019, three additional members of the cell made their way to Nairobi from
different locations and following two different routes, two utilizing the A2 highway from
Moyale and the third the A3 highway from Garissa. The suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki,
departed for Nairobi on 11 January 2019, four days prior to the attack. As with plots of a
similar nature, the members of the attacking team came together as late as possible in order
to avoid being compromised by the security forces; the full team met together for the first
time on 14 January 2019, and stayed together at the safehouse that evening. Ali Salim
Gichunge and with his wife Violet Wanjiru were based in the safehouse throughout the
preparations for the attack.
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Figure 4: Movements of the Al-Shabaab cell in the lead up to the 15 January 2019 attack.
Mahir Khalid Riziki
Mahir Khalid Riziki, born on 5 February 1993, was the longest
serving member of Al-Shabaab in the attack group and was
designated as the suicide bomber. Aged 25 at the time of the
attack, Riziki was born raised in the Majengo area of Mombasa.25
Ramadhan Hamisi Kufungwa, a well-known Kenyan Al-Shabaab
recruiter now located in Somalia, recruited Riziki at Musa
Mosque in early 2014.26 Musa Mosque has long been associated
with radicalization, recruitment for Al-Shabaab, and religious
violence.27
25 Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, June 2019.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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In 2014, Riziki formed part of an assassination cell tasked by Al-Shabaab to assassinate
security personnel in the coast region. In October 2014, Riziki was involved in the killing
of a police officer at Royal Court Hotel in Mombasa.28 He fled to Tanzania in November
2014 after being placed on Kenya’s most wanted list with a KSH 2,000,000 ($20,000)
bounty on his head. In early 2015, Riziki contacted family members in Mombasa to inform
them that he had relocated to Somalia where he was undergoing training by Al-Shabaab.29
Riziki crossed the border from Somalia to Kenya through El Wak on 11 January 2019. He
activated a Kenyan phone registered in the name of “Hibo Ahmed” that same morning,
immediately placing a call to Somalia. At 18:21, Riziki placed his first call to Ali Salim
Gichunge, arriving at the safehouse in the outskirts of Nairobi later in the evening. Except
for his Somali contact and Gichunge, Riziki placed calls to only one other number from
the time he entered Kenya until his death four days later, thereby limiting his exposure to
Kenyan security forces.
On the day of the attack, Riziki departed the safehouse via taxi at approximately 14:15.
Between 12:54 and the time of his death, he exchanged 11 phone calls with Gichunge,
including a final 91-second call at 15:25.30 At 15:28, while standing outside to Secret
Garden restaurant within the DusitD2 complex, Riziki detonated himself.
Figure 5: CCTV footage of the moment Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret
Garden restaurant at 15:28.
28 The team to which Mahir Riziki belonged was headed by Ismael Mohamed Shosi, also known as
Ismael Mmanga, a former resident of Bondeni, Mombasa County. Shosi was killed by security agencies
on 27 September 2016 at his hideout in Mwandoni after he resisted arrest. Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.
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Ali Salim Gichunge
The cell leader, Ali Salim Gichunge, was born in 1992 in Isiolo.
In 2015, his mother reported that he had travelled to Somalia. His
sister indicated that he also travelled to Somalia in 2017 through
Lamu.31 Based on analysis of his mobile phone data, Gichunge
acted as the coordinator and organizer while Gedi, the other
Kenyan national in the attack group, served as Gichunge’s
lieutenant. Gichunge was highly conscious of the security of
communications; for instance, he never contacted Somalia by
phone – only using Facebook – turned his phone off when he
travelled to meet associates, and spoke to Riziki only on a
dedicated phone line.
Ali Salim Gichunge was an ideal recruit for Al-Shabaab; he was the son of a retired military
officer, embracing of Western culture, and did not fit the profile of an extremist.
Osman Ibrahim Gedi
Osman Ibrahim Gedi was a Kenyan national born in 1992. On 2
January 2019, he registered a new Kenyan mobile phone in
Danaba, in north-east Kenya, in the name of “Abdikadir Mohamud
Sabdow”. He arrived in Nairobi early on 4 January, and Gichunge
and Gedi travelled together to the safehouse on the evening of 10
January 2019. Gedi visited the Dusit complex twice in the week
prior to the attack.
Analysis of Gedi’s mobile phone communications did not show
any contacts with Somalia.
Kenyan investigators recovered a Tanzanian driver’s license from Gedi’s body.
Investigations by the Panel indicated that the license was genuine and had been registered
in Moshi, Tanzania.32 However, the biographical details provided in the application proved
to be false, and the fingerprint used to obtain the license did not match Gedi’s.33
31 Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019.
32 The license was registered in the Tanzanian Revenue Authority database.
33 Interview with Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, May 2019.
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Figure 6: Tanzanian license issued to Osman Ibrahim Gedi under the name “Abduli Salim
Ally”.
Siyat Omar Abdi
Siyat Omar Abdi was born in 1992 in Dagahaley, one of the Dadaab
refugee camps. Abdi activated a new Kenyan phone on 4 January
2019 in preparation for the attack and travelled to Nairobi from
Dagahaley the next day. The phone immediately placed a call to
Somalia after its activation, and Abdi continued to contact numbers
in Somalia until 14 January 2019, when the phone was last used. On
13 January 2019, Abdi moved to the Gichunges’ safehouse on the
outskirts of Nairobi, where he stayed until the attack.34
The Panel obtained a Dadaab camp identification and ration card
number attributed to Abdi through his fingerprint; however, World
Food Programme and UNHCR officials in Dadaab stated that there
was no record of Abdi in their databases.
Unknown gunman of Somali origin
An unknown member of the attacking team, presumed to be
of Somali origin, activated a new Kenyan mobile phone in
Dagahaley, Dadaab refugee camp, on 15 December 2018. On
17 December 2018 he travelled from Dagahaley to Eastleigh,
a predominantly Somali neighbourhood in Nairobi. The
journey lasted eight hours, which due to the duration
suggested that it was undertaken in a private vehicle rather
than with public transportation. He was hidden in Eastleigh
Nairobi until 12 January 2019, when he was in contact with
Gedi and subsequently moved to the Nairobi safehouse on 13
January.35 He spoke no English or Kiswahili, which likely
34 Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.
35 Ibid.
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was the rationale for concealing him in Eastleigh for a month, where he was unlikely to
arouse suspicion.
Violet Wanjiru, also known as Kemunto and Khadija
Violet Wanjiru was married to the cell leader Ali Salim
Gichunge in 2016. Wanjiru primary role was in assisting
Gichunge with the management of the safehouse. Wanjiru
was unaware of the suicidal nature of the impending attack,
and she believed that Gichunge would later flee to Somalia to
join her.
Wanjiru’s inside knowledge of the Al-Shabaab cell meant it
was vital to Al-Shabaab that she not be arrested. She moved
from the Nairobi safehouse on 11 January 2019 and travelled
through Wajir and El Wak to Mandera along the B9 highway,
arriving in Mandera on the evening of the same day. She
remained in Mandera until 14 January, and then crossed into Somalia. Throughout this
journey she was aided by Yusuf Ali Adan, a Mandera-based Al-Shabaab operative, with
whom she communicated on a newly activated phone line. Wanjiru was housed in the
border region in a safehouse under Al-Shabaab control for a number of weeks before being
moved further into Al-Shabaab territory and into isolation to observe Iddah, a period of
waiting following the death of a husband. As of this writing she remains in Somalia, with
her exact whereabouts unknown.
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Figure 7: Violet Wanjiru’s escape route to Somalia.
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Figure 8: The DusitD2 operation.
Comparison with the 2018 failed Merti VBIED plot
On 15 February 2018, Kenyan police on a routine patrol in Merti Division, Isiolo County,
witnessed a vehicle stopped by the side of the road.36 When police approached the vehicle,
an occupant shot at the officers, who then returned fire, killing Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a.
“Sa’ad”. Four individuals attempted to flee the scene and two were arrested, Abdimajit
Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne; two others escaped capture. The vehicle, a
2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek, had been converted into a vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (VBIED) containing approximately 100 kg of explosives.
36 A detailed account of the failed Merti VBIED plot is presented in annex 2.3 of the Somalia and Eritrea
Monitoring Group’s 2018 report (S/2018/1002).
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Also discovered in the vehicle were 5 Type 56-2 AK-pattern assault rifles, 36 magazines
of ammunition, 36 unprimed F1 grenades and their firing pins, 3 knives, and an Al-
Shabaab flag. The operation appeared to have been patterned after the modus operandi of
Al-Shabaab complex attacks in Somalia, whereby a VBIED would have been used to
breach the perimeter of an unknown target, followed by a wave of ‘suicide gunmen’. In
this case, the number of rifles recovered from the vehicle most likely point to the possibility
of five suicide gunmen.
The Merti plot was orchestrated by an Al-Shabaab operative based in Jilib, known only as
“Dere” (“tall”), who personally conveyed instructions to Abdimajit Hasan Adan and
Mohammed Osman Nanne. “Dere” also either personally provided cash to the two
operatives or arranged for large instalments of up to $9,000 to be sent to them from Somalia
via hawala transfer.
The Merti attack had likely been intended to take place in Nairobi on 15 January 2018, to
coincide with the second anniversary of Al-Shabaab’s killing of 150 soldiers at a KDF base
in El Adde, Gedo region. However, the Al-Shabaab operatives experienced a number of
delays in the execution of the plot, including a mechanical failure that forced them to
abandon an initial VBIED and construct a second device.
There are two indications that the Merti and DusitD2 plots involved a cross-over in Al-
Shabaab planning networks. First, a financier of the DusitD2 plot based in Mandera,
Kenya, had previously transferred funds to Abdimajit Hasan Adan (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly
confidential)); in addition, a Type 56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen
originated in the same arms consignment delivered to the FGS in 2013 as four rifles
recovered from the Merti plotters (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below). It is likely that the
DusitD2 cell adapted their behaviour in response to the shortcomings of the Merti
operation.
Adaptations in the DusitD2 operation
The DusitD2 operation appeared to have been refined in response to the failure of the Merti
plot in 2018 in several significant ways. First, rather than constructing a VBIED, the
DusitD2 attackers employed a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED). The
PBIED was easier to conceal and did not risk the mechanical risks inherent with a vehicle
loaded with explosives undertaking the 800 km journey from the Kenya-Somalia border to
Nairobi. Instead of using the same route as the Merti VBIED, the DusitD2 attackers altered
their route from northern Kenya to Nairobi, bypassing the area where the Merti VBIED
had been intercepted by Kenyan police (see figure 9, below).
Second, the Al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia used a financial intermediary based in
Mandera, Kenya, to transfer funds to the operations cell in Nairobi. The transfers were
completed through cash and M-PESA mobile money, which has a transfer limit of KES
70,000 ($700). The operatives likely chose this method of transfer because it is not closely
monitored by the Kenyan security forces like hawala money transfers (see annex 1.6.1
(strictly confidential)).
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Finally, the leader of the DusitD2 cell, Kenyan national Salim Ali Gichunge, was given
wide autonomy with respect to the target and the plan of attack.37 Unlike the cell leader of
the Merti plot, Gichunge did not communicate directly with individuals based in Somalia,
reducing the likelihood of detection.38
Figure 9: GPS track of the Merti VBIED vehicle (number plate KBM200D), which was
intercepted by Kenyan police stopped at the roadside on 15 February 2018. The DusitD2
plotters took a different route to Nairobi.
37 Up to one day prior to the DusitD2 attack, the Al-Shabaab cell was continuing to scout possible
alternative targets.
38 Additionally, due to the possibility of his presence compromising the operation, Gichunge used a
dedicated mobile phone line to contact Mahir Riziki, who was already known to the Kenyan security
services.
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Type 56-2 rifle
A Type 56-2 rifle recovered from one of the deceased attackers, bearing serial number
412222, provides further indication of a link between the DusitD2 and Merti plots. The
serial number and factory marking likely indicates that the weapon originated in a
consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of
Ethiopia in July 2013, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.39 In 2013, the
Government of Ethiopia provided the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) with
a partial list of 2,500 serial numbers of weapons included in the consignment. While the
serial number 412222 does not itself appear in this partial list obtained by the SEMG, 13
other Type 56-2 rifles with serial numbers beginning with the sequence “4122” are present,
indicating that the rifle’ serial number was likely contained amongst the 1,000 not provided
by Ethiopia.
The Al-Shabaab operatives arrested by Kenyan police in connection with the Merti plot
were found in possession of four Type 56-2 rifles that had also formed part of the 2013
consignment (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3).
Figures 10 and 11: One of the Type 56-2 rifle recovered from the Merti plotters in February
2018 (left) and a Type 56-2 (serial number 412222) used in the DusitD2 attack (right).
Annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential) provides additional details on the financing of the
DusitD2 operation.
39 The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.
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Annex 1.8: Kenya-Somalia border incidents
From June to July 2019, cross-border attacks by Al-Shabaab into Kenya increased in
frequency, possibly due to heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries,
which Al-Shabaab may be seeking to exploit. This increased frequency of incidents
followed a statement released by Al-Shabaab through its Shahada propaganda agency in
June 2019, in which the group claimed to have mobilized “an army of fighters” from within
the Muslim population of Kenya.40 It refers to the closing of the Kenya-Somalia border in
Lamu County by the Kenyan Authorities in early June.41 The full statement reads:
Observers also see that the closure of the Kenyan-Somali border will not work to
reduce the frequency of attacks, as the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement has
succeeded in establishing an army of fighters from the Kenyan population itself,
who believe in the same objectives as the Movement and fight for issues they
believe to be just, at a time of persistent grievances and assaults by the Kenyan
government on the rights of Muslims in the country, and the corruption rampant
in the joints of the Kenyan government, in marginalizing Muslims and depriving
them of their rights.42
The geographical scope of these attacks ranged from the northern-most border point with
Somalia, at Mandera, to the southern border in Lamu, a distance spanning almost 700
kilometres.
Table 1: Al-Shabaab cross-border incidents, April-May and June-July 2019
Type of Incident June/July 2019 April/May 2019 June/July 2019
IED 3 19
Firefight 0 3
Movement of Al-Shabaab fighters/weapons 6 2
Kidnap or attempted kidnap 2 4
Attack on telecommunications infrastructure 1 2
Total 12 30
In April and May 2019, the Panel recorded four separate incidents of Al-Shabaab
movements along the Kenya-Somalia border in preparation for the offensive. For example,
on 21 April 2019 in Hulugho, Garissa County, a group of approximately 30 armed
individuals gathered east of Elkambere. The group had eight vehicles (three cars, two
40 Al-Shabaab statement available from https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-claims-twocar-
bombings-in-mogadishu-killing-31-boasts-multiple-attacks-in-kenya-in-2-days.html (subscription
required).
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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battlewagons, and three motorbikes) and were armed with assorted weapons and carrying
bags suspected to contain IED materials.43
Figure 1: Map showing approximate location of cross-border attacks, June-July 2019.
43 Confidential international agency security reports, April and May 2019. Reports also stated that on 23
April 2019 in Wajir County, a group of Al-Shabaab fighters armed with rifles and rocket-propelled
grenades were seen between Khorof Harar and Kotulo. They were also carrying bags suspected to contain
IED materials and ammunition.
Annex 80
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2111 (2013), Annex 2.1, S/2014/726, 13 October 2014
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.1: Al-Shabaab in Kenya: Declaring Kenya a "war zone"
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
The 'Badru Nairobi Operation': The Westgate Mall attack
Note on Westgate Mall attack case study: Due to maintenance of international human
rights standards, protection of human sources, protection of information collection
methods and ongoing legal proceedings, and national security concerns where deemed
appropriate and necessary, the Monitoring Group has not disclo ed am of sources
endeavoured to share the necessary information
Nations Member States.
1.
however, turned ear to our repeated warnings and continued to massacre
uslims in Somalia . . . by Lana, air and sea, #Kenyan forces invaded our
Muslim countKJ>, killing hu rea-s of Mi shms in the process and displacing thousands
in
2. 1 September 2014, in what appears to be an attempt to reaffirm
the operation l and ifoological ties between Al-Shabaab and Al-Hijra, a Somalia-based
Al-Hijra fighte , Wahome Tajir Ali 'Abu Jafar', issued a Kiswahili Nasheed (Jihad
1 See Kenya Parliament report of the joint committee on administration and national security; and defence
and foreign relations on the inquiry into the Westgate terrorist attack, and other terror attacks in Mandera in
north-eastern and Kilifi in the coastal region, December 2013.
2 See annex 2.1.a for schematics of Westgate Mall.
3 Since the Westgate Mall attack on 21 September 2013, Al-Shabaab's official Twitter handle has been
suspended. However, the Monitoring Group can authoritatively confirm this Twitter handle was the official
Al-Shabaab handle.
5
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
song). 4 The Nasheed, released via Al-Shabaab's official Twitter handle was in support of
the Westgate Mall attack that would ultimately claim over 67 deaths and 200 injured
persons.5
United States ' 'Saahibul Hijratain ' and Kenya 's 'Abu Zinnirah ' at a post-Westgate rally
in Barawe6
3.
4 The Monitor<ing Group ha previously mentioned Wahome Tajir Ali 'Abu Jafar' in its previous reports
dating back to 2Q I a 20 12. For an audio of Wahome's Nasheed in support of the Westgate Mall attack
see, https://soundc a.com/hsm-press-office/nipeni-silaha-yangu.
5 See annex 2.1.b for the official timeline of the Westgate Mall events from 21 - 24 September 2013.
6 'Saahibul Hijratain' (Cabdullahi Ahmed Faraax) is a 'popular' Al-Shabaab 'Amir' from the United States
and 'Abu Zinnirah' (Ahmed Iman Ali) is the Kenyan Al-Hijra Amir in Somalia.
7 Empirical evidence would suggest that both NIS and DMI had enjoyed considerable operational success
in disrupting Al-Shabaab attacks.
8 The Monitoring Group is aware of one 'redirection operation' involving a potential Al-Shabaab regional
flot.
The Monitoring Group has extensively reported on Al-Shabaab and its regional affiliates' plots from July
2011 (S/2011 /433) to July 2013 (S/2013/544).
6
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
many of which have been disrupted by the Kenya security agencies but equally served as
potential intelligence indicators and warnings pointing to the 'Badru Nairobi Operation'.
4. As far back as 2011, Al-Shabaab appears to have identified the Westgate Mall as
a potential target. 10 This was probably in response to "Operation Linda Mpaka", 11 a
Kenya Defence Force (KDF) covert operation inside Somalia before the publicly
declared "Operation Linda Nchi" in October 2011. 12 Similarly, series of public
declarations by Al-Shabaab core leaders and a senior Kenyan 'Amir', the Amir of AlHijra
in Somalia, all provided strong indications of the group's
an attack inside Kenya comparable to the 'Badru Operation '.
5. An example of such a credible warning was on 7 Jan
'Abu Zinnirah'. In a video warning from S malia, is ecture "But if they se
6. eclarations amount to propaganda,
and offer little or o intelligenoe warning Malue mformation acquired by the Monitoring
Group and routinely shared with two branches of the Kenya security apparatus, including
the nti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATBU) in 2012 is suggestive of Al-Shabaab's
determination ·o conduct a major attack in Kenya. 15 Credible information from this
period confirms that senior Al-Shabaab commanders through Al-Hijra commanders were
So -ha with associates in Nairobi concerning potential
10 See page 34 enya Parli ment report of the joint committee on administration and national security; and
defence and foreign r~lations on the inquiry into the Westgate terrorist attack, and other terror attacks in
Mandera in the no heastem and Kilifi in the coastal regions, December 2013.
11 Restricted Directorate of Military Intelligence document detailing "Operation Linda Mpaka" obtained by
the Monitoring Group in 2011.
12 Al-Shabaab's Kiswahili magazine 'Gaidi Mtaani' issue#4 provides lengthy justification for the Westgate
attack.
13 https://twitter.com/#!/HSMPress/status/155614676087087104
14 http://azelin.files .wordpress.com/2012/04/gaidi-mtaani-issue-l .pdf
15 During successive mandates, information deemed vital to the Government of Kenya's national security
has been shared on a timely basis as part of the principle of"duty to warn", and in accordance with
international human rights standards.
7
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
plots/attacks. 16 The Monitoring Group can also confirm that some of these Nairobi-based
associates were targets of electronic surveillance by one regional intelligence service and
possibly at least two foreign intelligence services operationally active in the Hom of
Africa. On 30 March 2012, at about 8:00 pm, a known senior Al-Shabaab commander
"Ibrahim" called a 'Nairobi associate' asking for a security assessment of Nairobi.
"Ibrahim" called again days later to request specific operational information on
Westlands such as its size, population and level of security. 17
7. The Monitoring Group is also aware of another potentia indicator and wa ing in
relation to possible useable intelligence pointing to the Wes gate Mall attack \his was
the suspicious but equally circumstantial activity of"M", a own Al-Sha ,aab/Al-Hijralinked
female logistician. 18 In 2013, "M" played a periRheral and liaison role in a
8. The
16 Credible and corroborated information provided to the Monitoring Group by a source directly in contact
with Al-Shabaab commander i 2012.
17 Informatio i relation t('.) He Al-Shabaab commander "Ibrahim" has partly been discussed in
S/2012/544, stn I con 1dential annex 3.1. In April 2012, corroborating information by a Government
official in relation t hone calls from Somalia to an Al-Shabaab 'Nairobi associate' was provided to the
Monitoring Group.
18 Credible and corroborating information suggests "M" may have peripheral links to Al-Qaida-affiliates
due to her family ties.
19 From late November 2012 through to March 2013, the Monitoring Group was able to collect and monitor
real-time information on this plot of which some has been provided in a previous report.
20 See annex 2.1.c for captured image of the Facebook chat.
21 The Monitoring Group is aware of reports suggesting the Westgate Mall attack was carried out by a
"breakaway faction" of Al-Shabaab. To date, the Monitoring Group has not received sufficient information
or evidence corroborating this hypothesis.
8
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operational planners in Somalia, Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir 'lkrima' and Sultan
Mohamed Sandhere 'Uk.ash', have been linked to the attack. 22 Investigations based on a
known email selector of Abdukadir Mohamed 'lkrima', 23 which has now been
deactivated, however failed to reveal any links to the Westgate attack or known
conspirators.24 In July 2014, two phone selectors of Sultan Mohamed Sandhere 'Uk.ash'
and one strongly believed to be of his sibling, a known businessman, were also obtained
and investigations into potential phone links with the known Westgate Mall attackers and
associates are in its preliminary phase. 25
9. Analysis of the recruitment for the Westgate Mall attack strongly suggests that
operatives were selected from at least three tiers of Al-Sha aab's operaf-0na pr sence
(see diagram below for known individuals linked to the preP.aration of the West gate Mall
attack and known attackers), including:
•
22 The Monito ing Group· -!so investigating reports of"Ukash's" links to the 13 October 2013 failed AlShabaab
attack in 'itdcli A:baba based on a single source sensitive reporting.
23 In 2013 , the Mon'toring Group shared this email with a regional Member State and confirms the email
account was active at that time.
24 Investigations did however reveal links to 'Ikrima' and a known Al-Hijra associate based in Huruma,
Nairobi who had previously been in Somalia alongside Al-Shabaab and Al-Hijra.
25 The Monitoring Group has shared Sultan Mohamed Sandhere 'Ukash's' phone selectors with a relevant
Member State for exploitation.
26 The Monitoring Group uses the term 'infantry cell' to describe the Al-Shabaab attacker inside the Mall
during the siege. Regarding the "potentially other unidentified operatives'', the Monitoring Group has
received credible reporting concerning their existence but is currently waiting for images should they exist
of them in the Westgate Mall.
9
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10
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
.. Images ofk nown members of the 'infantry cell' -
""' - .- Mohamed llauaa Dbubulow
~. . t ~
Khatab Al Kelle
Umar Al Mogadisb
Omar Nabhan
• A facilitation cell drawn from Al-Shabaab's 'safe haven' in Kakuma UNHCR
refugee camp. This included Mohamed Abdi Noor, Siyad Salat Ahmed, and
Liban Abdulle Omar.
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Mohamed Abdi Noor27
10. The Monitoring Group believes a key feature o t e Westgate Mall attack
recruitment, or at least what is generally acknowl dged, is f e demonstration o A -
Shabaab's ability to coordinate. This is especia1lx in terms 0£ recruiting substantial
numbers of operatives in two locations: Somalia an enya. ikewise, the rec ,itment
for the attack reveals an observance of disciplined F decraft, effeeti e enoug to avoid
11.
27 Key W estg te Mall attao acilitator.
28 Since 2010, th Monitoring has had unique access to credible information on Al-Hijra operations and
collaborations with -Shabaab core. This has included real-time information on financial activities,
including money transfers, email communications and social media activity.
29 During investigations in 2012 and 2013, the Monitoring Group was able to learn more about tradecraft of
returning Somalia-based Al-Hijra fighters, including Al-Qaida-affiliates, such as Jermaine John Grant.
30 See leaked Kenya NIS document highlighting intelligence challenges on collection of credible
information on Al-Shabaab.
31 The plot involved Abdimajid Yassin Mohamed and Omar Abdi Adan attempting to carry out suicide
attacks. A briefing by a regional intelligence official familiar with the disruption indicates their phone
numbers were used to geo-locate their movements and lead them to the suicide vests. See also annex 2.1.d
for images of captured items.
11
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
detected and monitored in advance to disrupt the attack, those identified with 'Nairobi
Badru Operation' were aptly able to avoid detection until after the attack had begun.
13. Crucial to Al-Shabaab's tradecraft in preparation for the Westgate attack was its
exploitation of the lax procedures in obtaining mobile phone lines in Kenya in 2013.32
This included targeting mobile operators such as Safaricom among others. 33 To date, the
Monitoring Group has been able to identify at least 8 Kenya-issued mobile numbers and a
network of potentially Somalia-linked numbers. 34 These numbers a e either assessed to
be associated with the 'infantry attackers' (who were inside the all fr 21 -
24 September 2013) or part of the support/facilitation tier
attack.
•
•
eing registered under
• all registered with the Mpesa money
15. indicates that some of the Al-Shabaab
32 See http: //www. th -star.co.ke/news/article-13 8788/mobile-ceos-reject-blame-westgate-attack
33 The Monitoring Group regrets despite official request for assistance on 10 June 2014 it has not received
formal cooperation form Safaricom.
34 The Monitoring Group is in possession of a number of potentially Westgate-linked numbers. Where it is
confident that a particular number is definitely linked to the attack, the number has been shared with a
relevant and concerned Member State for corroboration and exploitation purposes and to assist the Group's
ongoing investigation.
35 Sensitive reporting indicates some attackers in the Westgate Mall had turned off their mobile phones by
23 September 2013.
36 Information accessed from a mobile phone operator and corroborated by a Member State.
12
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16. According to CCTV images released by Kenyan Police, and corroborated by an
Argoforestry employee, Abdikadir Haret was one of two operatives who had purchased
the Mitsubishi Lancer vehicle (registration number KAS 575X), used by the attackers on
21 September 2013. 37 However, in an attempt to probably conceal his role in the
Westgate conspiracy, Abdikadir Haret had frequently 'borrowed' the handsets of his coconspirators
Adan Abdikadir Adan and Nuh Nur Hilowe to make (operational) calls, 38
but seemingly unaware of the possibility of being connected via sharing the IMEi
(International Mobile Station Equipment Identity). 39
17.
The Monitoring Group is moderately confident that the purchase of the vehicle
two weeks before the 'a tack date' was an operational decision. This effectively provided
the attackers (all three tiers) sufficient time during what would have been the 'operational
planning' pfla e to conduct surveillance, rehearse and identify potential secure routes to
Westgate Mall on 21 September 2013 from Eastleigh in Nairobi. So far, the Monitoring
Group has not seen any evidence that suggests the infantry cell of the attackers had any
37 See http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Cash-deposit-linked-to-mall-attack-/-/ 105 6/223 2468/-/13 9qjkt//
index.html
38 During their interrogation on 13 October 2013, both Adan Abdikadir Adan and Nuh Nur Hilowe denied
any involvement in the Westgate Mall attack but admitted to loaning their handsets to Abdikadir Haret
Mohamed.
13
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
compromising exposure during the planning of the attack that would potentially make
them visible to the security services.
Analytical links to Somalia
19. As mentioned above, the Monitoring Group has been unable to substantiate
claims whether the senior Al-Shabaab commanders 'lkrima' and 'Ukash' were
coordinators of the Westgate Mall attack. However, information reeeiv:ed indicates at
least one of the 'infantry attackers' "X" (from inside the mall , ana potentially nother
attacker "B", believed to have carried out surveillance two hours prior to the attac ,40 had
both placed calls to Somalia and potentially to Al-Shabaab commander r inked
individuals. Between the attackers "X" and "B", the Monitoring Group has identifiea 8
Somalia-linked numbers of which it has also bee able to associate 6 Somalia-15 setl
individuals to these numbers. 41
Attacker "X"
20.
activated his m bile number in Eastleigh. He later proceeded to Westgate Mall, arriving
sometime after 12 pm. Interviews by the Monitoring Group, also corroborated by a
40 Based on the geo-location of the phone and timings, the Monitoring Group places an analytical
assessment of low to moderate confidence that this unknown attacker was carrying out surveillance on the
Westgate Mall on 21 September2013 prior to the attack.
41 In March 2014, the Monitoring Group shared a selected batch of numbers with a senior Somali National
Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) official for exploitation and assistance. However, since then and
following repeated requests for feedback, there has been no response.
14
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
mobile phone operator, suggest the 'infantry attacker' "X'', before switching off his
phone on 23 September 2013 (from inside the mall), had made a number of calls to
Somalia. From the numbers called, 42 5 have been identified as of potential interest, thus
warranting a joint Monitoring Group investigation with relevant and concerned Member
States. Among the numbers called by the 'infantry attacker' "X" (from inside the mall)
were +252 615 565 006, +252 618 955 550, and +252 615 814 400. The Monitoring
Group's investigation into the above numbers strongly indicates they are associated to the
following Somalia-based individuals below43 :
• Golis Osman Arab, a 'known' businessman in Moga,f shu and Beledwey,ne, has
been associated with the mobile number: +252 615 5 5 006.44
• Maxamuud Axmed Aadan and Maxamed
• Maryan Sheikh Mohamudrashid has bee
+252 615 814 400.
21.
links
22.
42 The Monitoring Qmup shared some these number with relevant and concerned Member States and
intends to securely archive remaining numbers with the United Nations.
43 The Monitoring Group is aware that it is common practice for mobile numbers to be shared in Somalia.
44 Also known to use the name Golos Osman Arab.
45 Maryan Sheikh's financial transactions indicate links to Finland, Kenya and the United Kingdom until 4
May2014.
46 Due to ongoing investigations, the Monitoring Group has not released the mobile numbers for Nur Farah
Mohamed and Saadaq Yusuf Shiino but has shared them with relevant and concerned Member States.
47 The Monitoring Group has noted a suspicious pattern of financial transfers from Nur Farah Mohamed to
Golis Osman Arab.
15
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Sample of funds transmitted from Jalalaqsi to Golis Osman Arab48
Senders' City Date Amount
JALALAQSI xxx $2,700.00
JALALAQSI xxx $1,300.00
JALALAQSI xxx $900.00
JALALAQSI xxx $998.00
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI xxx
JALALAQSI $3 ,000.00
Attacker "B"
48 The Monitoring Group has archived the full financial records of Golis Osman Arab with the United
Nations.
49 Due to ongoing investigations, the Monitoring Group has not released dates.
16
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
23. Working on the basis of a 'partial' CDR (Call Data Report) and incomplete
information acquired from a mobile phone operator, so the Monitoring Group's
assessment is that attacker "B" was likely to be from the support/facilitation tier, and
likely to have conducted surveillance for the attack hours before the deployment of the
main 'infantry attackers' who arrived in the KAS 575X registered vehicle. 51
24. Further, evidence indicates that attacker "B" activated his mobile number at 3 pm
on 17 September 2013 and was later geo-located at Westgate Mall, arrivi g at 10 am on
• Abdulkadir Mohamed Baadi has been assoc'ated with the mobile number +252
612 229 999 .
•
The probabilitx of the ame Somali-linked numbers (+252 618 955 550 and two
o her um5ers withheld D¥ the . onitoring Group) receiving calls from attackers "X" and
"B", wh<=> appear to have a ived at Westgate Mall separately and placed separate calls to
each other and to Soma ia, not being connected to the plot/attack remains low.
50 The Monitoring Qmup regrets that a number of East African mobile phone operators have refused to
formally assist its investigations with regards to CDR reports and geo-location on potential mobile phone
numbers of interest.
51 The Monitoring Group notes attacker "B" was geo-located at Westgate around 10 am. If accurate, this
would have given attacker "B" sufficient time to conduct surveillance.
52 The Monitoring Group has identified no less than 15 Somalia-linked numbers to attacker "B".
53 Due to ongoing legal and other investigations, the Monitoring Group has decided not to publish these two
numbers. It has however, shared the numbers with a relevant and concerned Member State.
54 The Monitoring Group notes Abdullahi Aden received a large sum ofUSD 6986 within Somalia on 8
September 2013 from a Hassan Husein.
17
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
26. Similarly, the Monitoring Group is unable to discount the possibility of Golis
Osman and Nur Farah Mohamed, the Jalalaqsi-based individual, either not being
members of Al-Shabaab or being affiliates. Furthermore, in depth analysis ofNur Farah's
financial records between 2010 and July 2014 suggests potential links to Al-Shabaab.55
This has included peculiar patterns of receiving and transmitting substantial amounts of
funds from and to Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia over a long period. 56 A key
concern, also, remains how Nur Farah Mohamed was able to use fou
to his name "Nur Farah Mohamed") for receiving and transmittinwla-rg-e ~fu nas ac oss Al-
Shabaab strongholds. 57
Analysis
27.
strategy.
28. continue m the fore seeable
estgate Mall attack. Early indicators of
arch 2014, with the 'Changamwe
55 Analysis ofNur Farah's transactions indicate that where substantial amounts of funds have been sent
from an Al-Shabaab stronghol , no identification was held by the financial institution. Monitoring Group
queries have otmfirmed in. 0st cases due to security reasons financial institutions do not ask for
identification in -Sh:aoaa strongholds. In June 2013 , the Monitoring Group observed a similar practice
of funds being sen to a senior Al-Shabaab commander in Barawe. It can confirm that no identification was
required and that the Al-Shabaab commander has used an assumed name to receive funds.
56 The Monitoring Group's assessment on Nur Farah has taken into account his banking transactions with
two financial institutions. Nur Farah Mohamed's financial records have been archived with the United
Nations.
57 Nur Farah Mohamed from Jalalaqsi also uses the following aliases: Cabdi Xusen Axmad, Nuur Farax
Qobay, Nur Madobe, and Nuur Madoow.
58 The Monitoring Group assesses with low confidence that the Westgate Mall attack was a sign of
"desperation' . Rather, it was evidence of its determination following a series of disruptions of attempted
"complex" attacks against Kenya, in particular.
18
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
29. The Monitoring Group believes Al-Shabaab's operational tempo since the end of
2013 is an indicator of its regional force projection, and determination to build on the
Westgate Mall attack in Kenya. A plot by Al-Shabaab that would appear to demonstrate
this determination is the 'Changamwe incident' in Mombasa during March 2014.59
30. On 11 March 2014, Isaak Noor Ibrahim and Abdiaziz Abdulahi Abdi, two AlShabaab
operatives, went to pick up a vehicle (Toyota Surf registration number: KAN
410 E) parked at the Baragwo parking yard in Mombasa. The veh'icle according to
multiple credible sources, was destined for an unknown Al-Shabaao opera fon, p,ossibly
in Mombasa as part of an advance stage plot. Arriving at , lie parking yard, the two
operatives were immediately apprehended by Kenyan security agents following an
intelligence services to disrupt a potential complex
31.
a
59 See http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000107257 /shocking-cache-of-terror-arsenalfound-
in-mombasa
60 Unconfirmed information suggests two W estem Member States led the operation.
61 Interpol Purple Notice, Control No.: P-189/04-2014.
19
Annex 80
32.
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Images of Toyota Surf, cylinders laden with TNT,
and fused Noika found in Baragwo yard
foreign security officials was the o
care. 63
33.
is ow ·ncreasingl)'.: becoming standard feature of regional plots, as considered also by
Al-Shabaab-'s 'Bole Rwanoa cell' in Addis Ababa in October 2013 (see annex 2.2 on AlShabaab
in Ethiopia).
62 Information provided to the Monitoring Group by law enforcement official in March 2014.
63 So far, the Monitoring Group has been unable to trace "Abdi Gurhan".
64 Monitoring Group briefing by a East African independent security analyst familiar with Al-Shabaab
counter-terrorism operations, July 2014.
20
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.1.a: Westgate Mall schematics (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
irst flo-or
Car park entrance
M ·, zf
1ro I
21
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.1.b: Official Westgate Mall attack timeline (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)
Saturday - September 21, 2013
Approximately 12:30 hours
• The four male terrorists driving a silver Mitsubishi Lancer four- ao0r sedan pull up
outside the mall's main pedestrian entrance.
• As the four terrorists exit their vehicle, they throw three hand grenade . one onto
•
•
•
the outdoor dining patio of the Art Cafe just to the left of the mai
two at the security booth located outside of the parking garage .
12:32 hours -
•
• inutes of the attack, Terrorist # 1, who had entered the main
gunfire with an
unidentifieii first responder and receives a wound to his left leg.
13:00 hours -
22
• Responding police officers outside the mall are attempting to establish a
perimeter, deal with the hundreds of people fleeing the location and assess what is
going on inside the mall.
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
13:30 hours -
• All four terrorists join up inside the Nakumatt Super Market store. While inside
the store they locate and shoot numerous people who are attempting to hide.
13:50 hours -
• Kenyan Police Service's Inspector General (Commissione
14:15 hours-
• The Kenyan Police Service's General Se~· ,e Uni -
Company (GSU-RC) has assembled at the scene. The GSU-RC is a highly tra , ed
15:00 hours -
•
• arket, Terrorist# 4 shoots a victim who
16:00 hours -
ander. In the ensuing confusion both the police and military
19:00 hours -
• CCTV shows that all four terrorists are in a storeroom located in the rear of the
first floor of the N akumatt Super Market.
23
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
• During the several hours the terrorists spend in the storeroom they appear
extremely relaxed. They treat the wound that Terrorist# 1 had sustained to his left
lower leg. They also eat and pray. At one point, three of the terrorist put down
their weapons and only one terrorist has a weapon in his hands.
• At an unknown time, Terrorist #1 is observed on the CCTV footage leaving the
storage room in the direction of the exit to the Nakumatt's loading dock.
Authorities believe that he was possibly checking for a means of escape. Terrorist
# 1 does not re-appear for the remainder of any of the CCTV footage.
Sunday - September 22, 2013
00:54 hours -
•
the inside of the storeroom. This is the last
Sunday - September 22, 2orn
10:00 hours -
•
06:45 hours -
• A large explosion is heard inside the mall.
11 :00 hours -
24
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
• The electrical power and CCTV feed from the mall is cut.
12:45 hours -
• Gunshots and explosions are heard coming from the mall throughout the day.
Dark clouds of smoke appear at the rear of the mall.
13:25 hours -
• Four more large explosions occur at the mall.
19:00 hours -
•
• Smoke coming from the rear of the Westgat
•
•
15: 10 hours -
11
1830 ours -
25
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.1.c: Image of captured Facebook chat (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)
You have been silent, in
26
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.1.d: Images of captured items from Al-Shabaab's September
2012 Nairobi PBIED plot (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
27
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.2: Operational impasse: Al-Shabaab in Ethiopia (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)
35. Despite previous attempts to carry out attacks in Addis Ababa, Al-Shabaab
continues to experience an operational deadlock. However, in 2013, the extremist group
almost succeeded in breaking the deadlock when its 'Bole Rwanda cell' was forced to
abort a twin person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED) attack during the World
Cup qualifying football match between Ethiopia and Nigeria on 13 ctober 2013. The
plot, if executed as originally planned certainly would hav€ caused mass civilians
casualties. 65 Analysis of the plot planning sheds light on A - habaab's operat10nal and
organisational capacities.
Addis Ababa 'Bole Rwanda cell' and
65 From January 2014 through to August 2014, the Monitoring Group was given access to the arrested
members of the 'Bole Rwanda cell'. During this period, it conducted several interviews with the cell
members, who have in some cases provided partial and credible information that the Monitoring Group
used to further its investigations. Where the Monitoring Group has uncovered vital information relating to
national security issues, it has shared this with the concerned Member State.
66 From top to bottom: Cabdi Keynadiid Axmed; Qaalid Maxamuud Sabal 'Maqtal'; Mohamed Ahmed
Shire 'Arab'; Mohamed Ali Mohamed 'Dhegaweyne'; Anas Osman Mohamed Mohamed Abdulrahman
Mohamed Osman 'Siidow'; Mohamed Abdullahi Muhidin 'Joon'; Mohamed Aweis Mudey 'Boqorka
Bartahama'; and Hassan Abdullahi
28
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Background to the plot: recruitment and planning
Recruitment
36. Planning for the operation appears to have begun as a result of operational
difficulties faced by Al-Shabaab as far back as 2009,67 and probably while the group was
trying to establish an operational footprint in Addis Ababa to match its presence in
Nairobi. As a result, the final planning for the October 2013 plot seemed to have
phases. Part of the initial recruitment and eventual planni
Mohamed Abdulrahman Mohamed Osman 'Siidow' and
'Dhegaweyne' to Addis Ababa. 68 Among their initia
37.
ere responsible for conducting routine
67 ccording to testimonies prnvided b some 'Bole Rwanda cell' members, Al-Shabaab had experienced
diffomlties in eGruifing in dd1s Ababa around 2009. Some individuals sent to Addis Ababa had simply
disappeared while others had OJ! ted to remain inactive.
68 Prior to being dispatched to . ddis Ababa, 'Siidow' was an Al-Shabaab member stationed in the Deyniile
district in Mo · adishu, wh".le 'Dhegaweyne' had been a member ofHizbul Islam before joining Al-Shabaab
in 2009.
69 According to inf0 ation provided to the Monitoring Group by a law enforcement official and
corroborated by accessing 'Siidow's' email account, 'Siidow' set up an 'entertainment studio' which had
been used to store explosives, and 'Dhegaweyne' formed close ties with the Somali Embassy in Addis
Ababa.
70 Mohamed Aweis Mudey' Boqorka Bartahama' was a respected Somali journalist who had 'fled'
Mogadishu after the Shamo Hotel attack on 3 December 2009 by Al-Shabaab.
71 According to 'Maqtal's' testimony to the Monitoring Group, he had previously been an Islamic Courts
Union (ICU) member in Mogadishu before joining Al-Shabaab as an information collection officer with
postings in Mogadishu and Galkayo. Monitoring Group interview with 'Maqtal', 1 March 2014.
72 Monitoring Group interview with 'Maqtal', 1 March 2014.
29
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
From left to right images of 'Maqtal' and Boqorka Bartahama
JA~Huu1:uYAOOA OOMA.ALIYA,,.,. . ~),...,...so AU REP\J8UC - P so"
QAALI D M~A,,l'UD SA~AL
SURCER ABDI 80TAAN
SOllALl
01 J AN 1985
-09 DE-C 2011 - 09 DH l016
P<SO MAXAMUUD<SAHAL<<QAALIO<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
P001427223SOM8501019M1612099<<<<<<<<<<<<<<04
38. Evidence also
39 .
•
and bio data, plus a
January 2011, from Omar Wardere to 'Siidow' at 12:40 pm,
including an attachment of Ethiopian passport pages (N254815) and passport
ith Seid Esmail Abdhakim. 76
73 Emails from 'Siidow's email account, including other email accounts linked to 'Siidow', which have
been shared with the concerned Member State for further investigation.
74 The Monitoring Group has received corroborating information of 'Siidow's' travels to Somalia and is
currently investigating claims by a regional intelligence service that "Cabdisalan Maxamed Shaaciye" is an
Al-Shabaab commander. The Monitoring Group has also provided the email selector of"Cabdisalan
Maxamed Shaaciye" to the concerned Member State.
75 'Siidow' claimed that emails were not his but from customers visiting his studio. Monitoring Group
interview with 'Siidow', 9 July 2014.
30
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
• Email dated 21 February 2011 from "Yemen Aden" to 'Siidow' at 3:10 pm, with
4 attachments, including Yemeni identification and passport associated to Maxed
Saalax Maxed. 77
40. By 2013, the 'Bole Rwanda cell' had emerged from its embryonic state of two, to
a functioning cell of at least four members in part through adopting plausible operational
covers: a respectable business person ('Siidow'), an establishedjoumalis and community
leader ('Boqorka') and a Somali embassy 'fixer' ('Dhegaweyne'). owever, in . rder to
plan an attack, preferably in 2013 or early 2014, 78 Al-Shalfaab dispatched Mohamed
Abdullahi
Ababa.
41.
42.
76 Ace rding a earch via he ISCES system (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation
System), Seid Esmail AbdhaK:i has frequently traveled to Kenya, UAE, Uganda, and Somaliland.
77 Financial records ofMaxed Saalax Maxed indicate that he had regularly sent large amounts during 2012,
and in one instance a sum e> USD 300 to 'Siidow'.
78 Information attribute to the arrested cell members during their interrogation suggests they had planned
to carry out attack in Addis Ababa no later than early 2014.
79 During an interview with 'Siidow' on 9 July 2014, he claimed 'Joon' was his former pupil at a Quranic
School in Mogadishu.
80 During an interview with the Ethiopian authorities, 'Joon' is reported to have admitted to traveling to
Ethiopia in 2010 to obtain official Ethiopian documents, including a passport In February 2014, the
Monitoring Group examined these documents.
81 The Monitoring Group has shared this phone selector with the concerned Member State for further
assistance and highlighted a particular pattern of calls leading up to 13 October 2013.
82 During an interview with 'Arab' he admitted to entering Ethiopia illegally through Hargeisa. Checks with
Somaliland immigration authorities indicate no record of 'Arab' entering or exiting through their borders.
31
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Although three months earlier 'Arab', a resident of Nairobi and (active) Al-Shabaab
member, had bribed his way through Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 21 May
2013 to board the Ethiopian flight ET 802 to Addis Ababa en route to Djibouti, via the
ET 306 flight (see annex 2.2.a for a copy of 'Arab's stamped passport). 83 On landing in
Djibouti, 'Arab' was deported back to Ethiopia and then to Kenya for immigration
irregularities, where on the 23 May 2013 he was returned to Bossasso by the Kenyan
authorities. 84
44. A testimony provided by 'Maqtal' and corroborated by 'f\rab' himself c nfirms
that 'Arab' had previously traveled from Nairobi to Ethiopia in 2010 and 2011 via the
Moyale Kenyan border. 85 'Arab' however, claims these isits were no ~1-Sh baabrelated,
86 a claim disputed by 'Maqtal' who described in detail 'Arab's' Al-Shabaab li s
and operations inside Kenya, 87 including his link to the 'Badru Nairobi Operatiott'
(Westgate Mall attack). According to 'Maqtal', ' rab' had conducted surveillance on he
Westgate Mall. 88 The above claim concerning '
onito n Groups not tha its checks ~i PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Eval ation System) have not recorded' ab' e tering Kenya on 27 March 2013 as noted from his passport
page provided by Djibouti authorities It also otes that 'Arab' had been allowed to pass through Kenya
irμin!gra tion without a alid visa to enter ~ibouti. See annex 2.2.a for a copy of ' Arab's' stamped passport.
84\rnformation provided to the onito ·ng Group by the Djiboutian authorities in May 2014 and
corro orated h,¥ 'Afa 's' financ·a1 and (Kenyan) mobile phone records.
85 Monitoring Group interviews with 'Maqtal' and 'Arab' on 19 April 2014 and 24 May 2014 respectively.
During the interview 'Maqta ' also a family relative to 'Arab', claimed 'Arab's visits to Addis Ababa were
in relation to in 1ltrating -1-Shabaab operatives from Nairobi.
86 'Arab' claims e haCI trnveled to Addis Ababa in 2010 and 2011 as part of his visa application process to
the United States.
87 During an interview with 'Maqtal', he claimed 'Arab' was linked to a senior Al-Shabaab commander in
Galkayo. This information appears linked to unconfirmed information claiming 'Arab' was linked to
Khalid Jama Nur an Al-Shabaab commander and IED smuggler. Where the Monitoring Group is inclined
to find 'Maqtal's' claim credible is his own description and account of Al-Shabaab activities in Galkayo.
88 The Monitoring Group is currently assessing 'Maqtal's' Westgate claim and has shared this information
with the concerned and relevant Member States. It also notes that other cell members have claimed 'Arab'
was linked to other Al-Shabaab regional plots, which so far have not been corroborated.
89 According to a regional intelligence service in May 2014, 'Arab' had been a person of interest since
2010.
32
Annex 80
45.
46.
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Image of Mohamed Ahmed Shire 'Arab', Puntland Security Force official and AlShabaab
'Aminyat'
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... .,,,.,,., r-Y. f'HMM
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official 1€tters were sent to Pre ident Abdiweli of Puntland to discuss 'Arab's' unusual
relationship witn the PSF, and to request access to three individuals who could potentially
90 The Monito ing Group . as confirmed that 'Arab' is related to Asad Osman Abdullahi, a PSF official.
91 The Monitorih <Jroup !fas used rudimentary means to exploit 'Arab's' email accounts and evidence
strongly suggests p sswords have been changed and contents of some accounts deleted.
92 In an email exchange with the office of former President Faroole of Puntland on 29 June 2014, his senior
advisor "OS" initially denied any knowledge of 'Arab's' relationship with PSF and did not seek his release,
but later claimed he was aware President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali had been seeking 'Arab's' release.
93 The Monitoring Group has confirmed from sources inside Puntland authorities that the letter referenced:
OM/MOS/DDR/PL/0697/2013 dated 21December2013 to the Ethiopian Government is authentic. The
letter has been archived with the United Nations.
94 According to the letter issued on behalf of 'Arab' by the Puntland authorities, 'Arab' was on medical
leave from August 2013, but during an interview with 'Arab' on 24 May 2014, he claimed he had entered
Ethiopia in July 2013 to visit his girlfriend. When asked ifhe was ever sick during 2014, he replied "no".
33
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
assist investigations into the October 2013 plot. 95 This included a senior PSF official who
may have acted as a conduit for Al-Shabaab to transmit funds to 'Arab' in Nairobi and
Addis Ababa. 96 The Monitoring Group regrets that the Puntland authorities, in particular,
President Abdiweli have consistently refused to cooperate with its investigation in
relation to 'Arab's' involvement in the October 2013 failed attack. 97
Planning
47. By August 2013, the 'Bole Rwanda cell's' plan for an att cK: had progressed and
was heightened by the arrival of the would-be suicide bomber,s, Cabdi Keynadiict Axmed
and Hassan Abdullahi, who had also transported explos · iVes from So , alia 98 While
information on how and when they arrived is currently be~ng assessed, 99 a working
assumption is that Hassan Abdullahi arrived betwee March an . July 2013, 100 and Cabcli
Keynadiid Axmed in July 2013 through Hargejsa in Soma iland. 101 The a15ove
assumption appears to be substantiated by a testi ny given b he landlord of ' , aqtal',
who confirmed that in August 2013, "Cabdi", 102 'Arab' and 'Maqtal' wer all living in
the same accommodation, 103 a claim also corrobu ated by "Maqtal' and 'Arab' during
. , 104 separate mterv1ews.
ay 2014, the Monitoring G up sent letters to the President of Puntland requesting
cooperation with its investigations,
96 The Monitoring Group has accessed h financial records of' Arab' and confirm he had received funds
frnm Somalia and elsewhere, Investiga ions are ongoing into the source of these funds which all seem to be
trans rred vi amily mem ers.
97 In May 2014, a senior Puntila d official briefed the Monitoring Group on the current President of
Puntland's determination to secure 'Arab's' release, despite being advised otherwise,
98 Credible in rmation indi ates "Cabdi" had traveled via Somaliland into Ethiopia,
99 Information pF vide 'Maqtal' claims 'Arab' had arrived with "Cabdi" via Somaliland, In an
interview 'Arab' aam'itted to traveling illegally through Hargesia,
100 The Monitoring Group bases this on the financial records of"Hassan" in Addis Ababa,
101 Credible information strongly suggests transiting through Hargeisa, a favoured route by Al-Shabaab
operatives,
102 Credible information suggests "Hassan" the second suicide bomber had initially lived with 'Siidow'.
103 The Monitoring Group is aware that the landlord Ms. 'Berhane' was subsequently sentenced for
providing accommodation to aliens without the required documentation and local administration vetting.
104 During the Monitoring Group's interview with 'Arab', he admitted to sharing a house with "Cabdi" but
denied knowledge of"Cabdi's" intention to carry out a suicide attack or ever contacting "Cabdi" via phone,
The Monitoring Group can confirm several calls were made between "Cabdi" and 'Arab',
34
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Image of Cabdi Keynadiid Axmed 'Suicide bomber 1 '
48. The Monitoring Group has learned from official sources, also corrob
by 'Maqtal' and sources familiar with the plot, that the cell ll.ad focused on monitoring
high profile targets with the aim of attracting wide media attention. Some of the ta"Igets
included: the Sheraton Hotel, Dembel Mall, Bole Rublic Hall, Friendship Building the
qtal'
49.
Uncorrob0rate informatio suggests that two months before October 2013,
ab ha assumed ove all c ordination of the cell and the impending attack. Cell
member_s :were require to report to 'Arab', according to 'Maqtal' and 'Joon', ' 06 who had
decided by September 2(i) 13 that the target would be the Addis Ababa "Friendship
Building". However, ollowing a meeting of the cell members at ' Siidow's'
'entertainmen studio', 107 the cell was informed by 'Arab' that the target would be the
upcoming Ethio~rn - Nigeria football match on 13 October 2013, and that the attack
would be carried out by "Cabdi" and "Hassan".
105 While there appears to be supporting evidence concerning the cell's 'plans' to attack embassies in
general, the Monitoring Group's assessment is that the U.S. embassy as a target would likely be more
aspirational taking into consideration the choice of other targets identified.
106 While the Monitoring Group assesses 'Maqtal' to be credible in terms of the information provided, it is
currently assessing the credibility of' Joon'.
107 The Monitoring Group assesses the meeting to have taken place between 7 and 9 October 2013.
35
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
51. On 11 October 2013, the would-be suicide bombers contacted 'Joon' to retrieve
the explosives secured in 'Siidow's' 'studio', but were told to return later while 'Joon'
had cleared the handover with 'Siidow'. Hours later, according to 'Maqtal', TNT
explosives concealed in a laptop bag were handed over into his and the would-be suicide
bombers' care. 108 'Maqtal's' account of the explosives handover would also appear to be
accordant with a testimony attributed to 'Joon '.
52. The analysis of a CDR (Call Data Report) report for the
October 2013 seems to confirm these claims. A CDR report };fas been accesse by the
Monitoring Group as part of mapping phone linkages of known cell membe s and
possible peripheral associates. Preliminary findings based o a: rudimentary techll · ue, 109
add to the credibility of the above claims. On 11 0 tober, foom his mobile number ,._251
935 - 'Joon' called 'Siidow' on his number +251 9rn-at 11 am, hich
appears to corroborate 'Maqtal's' testimony that ' Sii ow' had also called 'Joon' oack to
confirm the handover of explosives at 3: 31 pm. 11 0
(a) Phone call patterns111
53.
y "Cabdi" and "Hassan" to two
10 On the 4 July 2014, the
the exQlosion on 13 October 0 3, their account of items found at the premises of the explosion, including
a laptop and laptop bag, is cons«stent with 'Maqtal's and two other cell member's testimony regarding the
laptop and laptop bag.
109 The Moniteirjng Grou regrets that in most cases, Member States have declined to assist its investigation
by mapping pote ial :A--C.Shabaab phone selectors. In this case the Monitoring Group has adopted a 'pen
and ruler method' to etermine relationships between the cell members.
11° Call Data Report for 'Joon' and 'Siidow' relating to calls made during the months of September and
October 2013.
111 Strong indications are that some individuals linked to the 'Bole Rwanda cell' and failed attack of 13
October 2013 are still at large. These individuals are currently being monitored. As a result, the Monitoring
Group is unable to reveal certain phone numbers in order not to jeopardize ongoing investigations.
112 Clear evidence indicates cell members had used multiple mobile numbers and in most cases numbers
registered in false names.
113 The Monitoring Group notes that some cell members have denied contacting each other, despite phone
records proving otherwise.
36
Annex 80
55 .
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
• The Somalia number +252 617 030 541 placing 6 calls to "Cabdi" on his number
+251 923 - in September 2013.
• "Cabdi" using his number +251 923 -placing 1 call to +252 617 030 541
in September 2013.
• The Somalia number +252 617 030 541 placing 33 calls o "Cabdi" on his
number: +251 923 -in October 2013.
• "Cabdi" using his number +251 923 - placing 7 calls to +252 617 030
541 in October 2013.
• The Somalia number +252 617 030 540 ,· {icing 24 calls to "Hassan" on
number +251 936-in October 2013.
• "Hassan" using his number + 251 93 6
540 in October 2013.
•
114 CDR report for 13 October 2013 detailing calls made by "Cabdi" and "Hassan".
37
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Calls from Somalia to Suicide bomber 1 ("Cabdi'') on 13 October 2013115
Calling Number Called Number Date/Start Time Duration
+252 617 030 541 +251 923 2013-10-13 - 224
13:41:29
+252 617 030 541 +251 923 2013-10-13 - 71
10:44:15
+252 617 030 541 +251 923 2013-10-13 -
07:45 :12
+252 617 030 541 +251 923
Calling Number
+252 617 030 540
+252 617 030 540
+252 617 030 540
+252 617 030 540 11
+252 617 030 540 17
90
Funding
57. The Monitoring Group can conclude that the 'Bole Rwanda cell' had multiple
layers of funding streams. This is based on information exploited from the explosion
115 CDR report for October 2013.
116 CDR report for October 2013.
117 CDR reports for months of September and October 2013 relating to the Somalia numbers.
38
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
scene, 118 which includes among others: testimonies by arrested cell members,
examination of email accounts and exploiting associated mobile numbers. According to
some of the cell members, funds were transmitted via MTOs (Money Transfer
Organisations) from Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and derived from Al-Shabaab-affiliated
businesses in Ethiopia.
58. Following the failed attack, a number of items were retrieved from the scene,
including transaction receipts of a known Somalia MTO. The rece"pts on inspection
clearly confirm both "Cabdi" and "Hassan" had financial li s to the Neth rlands,
Norway, and Somalia (see copy of one the MTO receipts elow). Likewise, further
investigations by the Monitoring Group have discovered botli "Cabdi" and "Ha san" not
only used variations of their names but also used designate numbers for receiving funds
via Somalia MTOs. 119
Bole Mechacl Branch. BL
Phone 194 Fa>< : NA
flEDAtfEO
12/1012013 07.21
I :!II 11120 lJ IJ7: ,i 7
I) I }. "'\
information obtained fro a Somaliland mobile operator and Somalia MTO confirms
"Cabdi", o e of the sui iae bombers, had also received funds from two names linked and
believed to B€ used by "Khaalid Cabdi": "Canab Cabdi Faraax" and Cabdi Axmed
118 Items retrieved from the scene include among others sim cards, receipts, laptop and laptop bag.
119 During the course of the mandate, the Monitoring Group has identified and confirmed the phone
selectors for the cell members. In many cases, cell members used of more than one number and for
different purposes.
120 The Monitoring Group has identified at least four numbers associated with Cabdi Keynadiid Axmed
("Mukthar Abdi Ahmed").
121 The Monitoring Group notes during witness statements taken by the Ethiopian security agencies, Hindo
Haji Abubakar, a neighbour to "Cabdi" and his 'helper' claimed he had a Somaliland accent.
39
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Ducaale". 122 Based on MTO records, "Cabdi" had received 5 transfers in the name of
"Mukthar Abdi Ahmed" since his deployment by Al-Shabaab to Addis Ababa in July
2013." 123
Image of Khaalid Cabdi Axmed'
60.
Group can confirm "Khaalid Cabdi Axmed" has been
months.124
61.
62.
s such, on 19 August 2013, funds were transmitted
122 The Monitoring Group's w rking assumption is that "Khaalid Cabdi" has exploited his access to the
numbers of Cabdi Axmed,Ducaale and "Canab Cabdi Faraax. In addition, the Monitoring Group is in
possession of bot "K:lfaahd Cabdi Axmed's" CDR reports and MTO records/transactions for his number
and that of his parents ("Canab Cabdi Faraax" and Cabdi Axmed Ducaale").
123 Information accessed from a Somalia MTO based in Addis Ababa.
124 In March 2013, the Monitoring Group provided the name and photo of"Khaalid Cabdi Axmed" to two
regional intelligence services as part of an RFI (Request for Information). In July 2014, the Monitoring
Group has been informed that "Khaalid Cabdi Axmed" has long been suspected of being a member of AlShabaab
by a regional intelligence service.
1250n 17 September 2013, Luul Abdi Ahmed transferred USD 100 to the name "Mukthar Abdi Ahmed".
126 The Monitoring Group has detected two instances of this pattern.
127 On 19 August Luul had transmitted USD 350 to "Canab Cabdi Faraax" (using "Khaalid Cabdi's"
number +252 634 - of which USD 200 was routed to the suicide bomber "Cabdi" in Addis Ababa.
40
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Image of Luu/ Abdi Ahmed
90 7835
A ED
L UL A
2
15
PRNORAHMED<<LUUL<ABDI<<<<<<<<<<<~
90478351<1SOM8808 132F15012
63.
preliminary evidence
The Monit0r:ing Group bereves the 'Bole Rwanda cell' was one of many AlShal5aab
cells to have OJS1erate in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia in general. The group's
failed attempt to carry out an attack less than a moth after the Westgate attack was as a
result of a number of factors, in particular the following two:
• Enhanced and visible security in Addis Ababa on 13 October 2013 strongly acted
as a deterrent and forced the suicide bombers to abort their attack.
128 The Monitoring Group is currently investigating the relationship between "Hassan" the suicide bomber
and "Abdullahi Adow Ahmed".
129 A CDR reports has associated "Hassan" to two main numbers: +251 936 - and +251 935
1'1!!onitoring Group notes the number +251912638 716 has received funds from Norwegian national
named Mohamed Adem Mohamed.
41
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
• Operationally, the 'Bole Rwanda cell' made a key blunder with regards to the
final target selection. Evidence based on credible testimonies, indicates the cell
continuously changed the final target seeking to attract the maximum international
coverage (possibly as in the Westgate Mall). This inevitably forced the cell to
carry out an attack on the one-day maximum security would be guaranteed in
Addis Ababa.
65. As a result of collected and exploited information, indioations are t at a umber
of other cell members and peripheral associates linked to the failed October 2013 attack
are possibly at large and planning further attacks. The lilEelihood of a rthe AlShabaab
plot against Ethiopia is expected to exploit the use of Somalila d. ~s
demonstrated by the 'Bole Rwanda cell' and the Djibouti attack i May 2014, Somali anCl
42
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.2.a: Image of Mohamed Ahmed Shire's 'stamped' passport
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
43
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.2.b: Items retrieved from the explosion scene on 13 October
2013 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
44
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 2.3: 'Misdirection': Al-Sbabaab in Djibouti (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)
66. In May 2014, Al-Shabaab demonstrated again its violent capability in
destabilizing the region with its campaign of attacks beyond Somalia. More significantly,
Al-Shabaab's attacks showed the group's ability to inspire, instigate and organise its
affiliates in one regional theatre, 131 as witnessed with the attacks of 3 and 4 of May 2014
in Kenya (see below members of Al-Shabaab's 'May cell'), ile simultaneously
coordinating a "spectacular and surprise" attack in another, such as Djibouti. 132
Al-Shabaab 'May cell '133
67. On 24 May 2 1 , at around 8 pm two Somalis, a male and female, arriving in a
suddenly entered the popular expatriate restaurant, 134 La
68. Found at the seen , were bodies of the attackers, the female inside the restaurant
and the male on the terr ce, both believed to have carried out a Person-Borne Improvised
131 On 3 May 2014, two Al-Shabaab affiliates in Mombasa, Ahmed Abdalla 'Tares' and Nassir Abdalla Ali 'Skanda',
reportedly carried out an JED attack against the Nyali Reef Hotel in Mombasa. A day later, on 4 May 2014, an AlShabaab
affiliate from Huruma in Nairobi, Warque Jedele Sar, and an accomplice, "Omar", carried out a twin JED
attack against two passenger buses in Nairobi.
132 http:/ /www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/16 /nairobi-deadly-explosions-british-tourists-evacuated.
133 Credible evidence suggests Warque Jedele Sar and his accomplice "Omar" had recently returned from
Somalia in March 2014.
134 Credible information suggests the Nissan Navara pick-up had five passengers, including a male suspect who
fled the scene after lobbing a grenade.
13s http://www.voanews.com/content/deadly-attack-in-djibouti/1921950.html.
45
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Explosive Device (PBIED) attack. Located near the body of the male bomber were a 9-
volt battery, wires, several metal ball bearings, six unexploded hand grenades, and a
backpack partially damaged by the explosion and containing an automatic pistol with its
magazine. 136 Unconfirmed information suggests the pistol had stamped on its breech the
serial number 609712. 137 In addition, another magazine loaded with 9-mm bullets was
found at the scene, together with a green handbag believed to belong to the female
attacker, which contained among other items, Thioril 25mg, a known tranquilizer
prescribed for schizophrenia. 138
69. Three days later Al-Shabaab through its official spokesperson, Sheikh
claimed responsibility for the attack, declaring:
We [Al-Shabaab} targeted the French specificall] {at th
Central Africa, where they committed heinous cri
Recruitment
70.
Isse, both recruited from
136 Images of the explosion scene shared itb the Monitoring Group indicate the male bomber may have used a
grenade before blowing hi self up.
137 The Monitoring Group has requested images of the pistol and information on its tracing from the Djibouti
authorities, however, to date no ~esponse has been received from the Djibouti authorities.
138 According to a regional intel · gence official, there have been previous cases in which Al-Shabaab has used
mentally unsta le individuals to carry out suicide attacks in Somalia. The Monitoring Group has no evidence
apart from the T 'oril to suggest the female bomber may have been mentally unstable.
139 See also https:f'/ e~siteintelgroup.com/jihadist-News/shabaab-claims-bombings-in-djibouti-calls-frenchprimary-
target-in-attack.html
140 National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) of Somalia has provided the Monitoring Group the name of
Hodan Mohamed Ali. The Monitoring Group is confident in its assessment that Hodan Mohamed Isse was
recruited by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu based on a profile provided NISA.
141 The Monitoring Group has received information relating to four suspected senior Al-Shabaab commanders
being linked to the coordination of the 24 May 2014 attack, including evidence of two known commanders. From
the two, the Monitoring Group is moderately confident of a link to the bombers.
142 The Monitoring Group is in possession of phone selectors believed to belong to those linked to the attack in
Djibouti on 24 May 2014. Due to ongoing investigations, the Monitoring Group considers the publication of these
numbers inappropriate.
46
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Image of the suicide bombers from left to right,
Musa Roble Hirad and Hodan Mohamed Isse
-
71. In addition to the suicide bombers,
following individuals are linked to La Chaumeire restaurant attack:
Bar awe
• An Al-Shabaab commander known as Ism e
• Sultan Mohamed Sandhere "Ukash" (see below
and Abdalla Madhiban).
Borame
•
•
•
Planning
143 Credible information suggests "Suldan" was arrested in July 2014.
144 The Monitoring Group has identified a phone selector for "X" and is currently attempting to identify the
user(s) in Ethiopia.
145 The Monitoring Group is aware of financial links between Ahmed Ali Mohamed Duale, an Al-Shabaab
facilitator, and Abdirahman Ibrahim Cumar 'Abdalla Madhiban'.
47
Annex 80
72.
73.
74.
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
From left to right, facilitators Abdirahman Ibrahim Cumar 'Abdalla Madhiban '
and Hassan Aden Haroosh 'Suldan'
with credible
to correspond :with h€ ti ing of Al-Shabaab's video message/documentary, released to
'Jihad' chat rooms on 14 May 2014, 150 titled: "Muslims in Bangui and Mombasa: A Tale
146 Information acquired 'indirectly' from a senior Djibouti diplomatic official in May 2014.
147 Information attributed to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) of Somalia in May 2014 and
July 2014 indicates "Hodan Mohamed Ali left Mogadishu two weeks before the" attack.
148 The Monitoring Group has obtained details of Hodan Mohamed's financial records dating back to 2012.
Records are archived with the United Nations.
149 The Monitoring Group has compiled a phone matrix of the Djibouti suspects, including the two suicide
bombers. The matrix has been shared with a concerned Member State.
1so The Monitoring Group notes the video release by the Al-Shabaab 'Amir' was two days before another twin
attack by suspected Al-Shabaab affiliates in Kenya on 16 May 2014. See also http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-
27443474.
48
Annex 80
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
of Tragedy", in which the Al-Shabaab leader, Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, made several
references to the French, noting:
The French forces began disarming the Muslims [in Central Africa Republic} then the
Christian militias completed the mission by killing, plundering and displacing
Muslims ... all this was done with the blessing and approval of the Frenchforces. 151
75. Although the Monitoring Group's investigations are in its preliminary phase, a
partial CDR (Call Data Report) accessed indicates a link betwee t ale 6lmber (Musa
Roble) and a co-conspirator based in Hargeisa. Analysis of the usa Roble's Somali land
mobile number: +252 633 609 - shows a link o an individu kno n as
Abdirahman Ibrahim Cumar 'Abdalla Madhiban', whose number is: +252 633 Sfl.5
- . 152 Credible information suggests that 'Abd lla Madhiban' is a known Hargesia
associate of the senior Al-Shabaab commander " kash", rep,orted to have a link to the
'Badru Nairobi Operation ' (Westgate attack). 15
76.
77.
153 The Monitoring Group has requested assistance from the Somaliland authorities regarding a full CDR report
of Abdalla Madhiban's' mobile numbers, including calls made on 24 May 2014.
154 Monitoring Group email to Somaliland intelligence service dated 30 and 31 July 2014.
155 The Monitoring Group is aware the Djibouti official may have been related to the male bomber.
156 The Monitoring Group has requested on 1August2014 Djibouti authorities to assist the Monitoring Group
with a CDR report on 'Abdo's' Djibouti mobile number.
1s1 The Monitoring Group is aware of a senior commander named "Anwar in Barawe but unable to confirm if this
is the same commander.
15a The Monitoring Group has obtained copies of these videos, which have been archived with the United
Nations.
49
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UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
78. The Monitoring Group believes the La Chaumeire restaurant attack, like Westgate
Mall attack, exemplifies the discipline in organization of Al-Shabaab's external
operations in the Hom of Africa. 159 Further, the attack has demonstrated Al-Shabaab's
force projection with regards to multiple regional Member States, specifically beyond
Kenya.
79. The Monitoring Group also assesses, the operational tempo between January and
May 2014 in which Al-Shabaab relentlessly focused on Keny, was perhaps misleading
and strategic. 160 The result of which underscores the difficult~ of diffusing an:Cl etecting
Al-Shabaab's regional operations by regional and foreign intelligence services. Lastly,
1s9 Sensitive reporting notes the Djibouti attack was planned with a great degree of precision.
160 The Monitoring Group has accessed an email dated 21May2014, which was sent from Ahmad Iman Ali to an
associate, and in which he claimed that: "[ ... ] the Kenyans were terrified, saying the West had credible
intelligence that an attack will occur, that's why they evacuated their own .... Kenyans are ignorant even unaware
that Sheikh [Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr] gave out the video which made the West to start panicking thinking that there
was going to be another slaughtering like what happened in Uganda, because Sheikh spoke and it happened."
50
Annex 80
Annex 81
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2060 (2012), Annex 2.1, S/2013/413, 12 July 2013
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
2
ANNEX 2.1: Al Hijra (formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre)
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Overview
1. Since the last Monitoring Group’s report of July 2012 (S/2012/544), Al Hijra
(formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre), like its ally in Somalia Al-Shabaab, has
experienced dramatic setbacks, thereby impeding Al-Shabaab’s external threat within the
region of East Africa and casting doubt on the strategic-operational link between the two
extremist groups since their merger on 10 January 2012.1 Conversely, as Al-Shabaab suffered
military reverses in Somalia, across the border its Kenyan arm, Al Hijra, also began to suffer
misfortunes ranging from unexplained killings and disappearances to continuous arrest raids
(mainly “catch and release”), as well as successive disruption operations under the “Al-
Shabaab/East Africa Al-Qaida Disruption Initiative”.2 These incidents included the
unexplained killing on 27 August 2012 of Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed, Al Hijra’s
ideological leader, and the unexplained disappearances of several active Kenya-based
members, including one of its ‘Amir’s’, ‘Musa Osodo’ (Sylvester Opiyo), and senior
individuals such as Jeremiah Okumu and Steven Mwanzi Osaka, a.k.a. ‘Duda Black’ and
‘Duda Brown’ respectively (see chart below on unexplained killings and disappearances).3
2. Towards the end of 2012, with the fractious state of Al-Shabaab and its loss of
Kismayo, a known Al-Hijra zone of operation in Somalia, Al Hijra’s setbacks became more
evident. The group’s ability to recruit and radicalise new recruits to be sent to join Al-
Shabaab in Somalia was weakened. In addition, its operational ability to prosecute its
declared “war” inside Kenya on behalf of Al-Shabaab by dispatching fighters from Somalia
started to diminish, as clearly expressed by Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’, an Al Hijra fighter
returning from Somalia:
…the brothers [Al Hijra] have developed cold feet because of the way things are
being handled. But us [Al Hijra Tanzania cell] if we have to develop something or do
something [attacks] that can take [kill] more than ten people. If I had the power
myself I would be keeping these things [weapons] in the slums. At times you would
get the boys who are ready to act.4
3. Setbacks notwithstanding, Al Hijra, like its ally Al-Shabaab in Somalia, continues to
focus on remaining a credible threat to peace and security both in Somalia and beyond.
Strengthening its ties to the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) in Tanzania for
1S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1. Growing evidence, both credible testimonies from serving and
former Al Hijra fighters and documents reportedly by senior Al-Shabaab figures such Ibrahim al-Afghani, have
all indicated that Al-Shabaab’s external operations were expected focusing on exploiting its strong ties with
extremist groups both in Kenya and Tanzania. See also
www.sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/12/fe… annex 2.1.a for a
summary of Ibrahim al-Afghani’s letter to Al-Qaida.
2 The Monitoring Group is aware of a U.S. Government-funded initiative called “Al-Shabaab/East Africa Al-
Qaida Disruption Initiative” to assist East Africa security services combat terrorism.
3 http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterror…-
20130403.pdf.
4 Confidential audio recording of Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’ at a Tanga safe house, dated 26 February 2013
and archived with the United Nations.
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operational purposes,5 as part of Al-Shabaab’s external campaign, appears to have become a
priority for Al Hijra.6 This also includes establishing strong logistical links to Al-Shabaab
affiliates in Burundi and Rwanda.7
4. Evidence also that suggests Al-Shabaab’s regional ally Al Hijra may be attempting to
forge relationships with other Salafi-jihadi groups beyond Africa. Preliminary indications are
that Al Hijra has conducted a liaison mission to Syria in 2013.8 On 30 May 2013 at 2:10pm,
an Al Hijra member “Abu S” confirmed to be in Syria communicated to a member in Kenya
claiming: “we are only here [Syria] for a short while. We are waiting for word from our Amir
for the next cause of action.”9 The Monitoring Group is aware as alluded to in a previous
report that these types of liaison missions have been conducted by Al-Shabaab in the past.10
In or about 2010 up to including April 2011, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame had conducted a
similar liaison mission on behalf of Al-Shabaab to Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP).11
5. While the lingering influence and leadership of Al Hijra’s Somalia-based ‘Amir’ and
Al-Shabaab’s representative in Kenya, Ahmad Iman Ali, had inspired a wave of grenade and
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) attacks across Kenya, almost exclusively against the
local population, this has had marginal success, in spite of repeated calls from both Al-
Shabaab and Ahmad Iman in Somalia for sustained attacks in the region, particularly in
Kenya.12
6. Probably, as a result of its marginal operational success and the nearly kinetic
counter-terrorism approach of the Kenyan security services since the latter part of 2012, Al
Hijra in partnership with its Tanzanian ally, AMYC, have sought operational direction and
guidance from individuals with former ties to Al-Qaida East Africa and self-styled Al-Qaidaaffiliated
individuals, including UK national Jermaine John Grant and Abubakar Shariff
Ahmed ‘Makaburi’.13 Designated by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea and United States Department of
Treasury, OFAC Sanctions List in 2012 for his support to Al-Shabaab, ‘Makaburi’s growing
influence over Al Hijra represents a determination to redirect the group’s manpower and
resources by shifting its operational focus from “soft targets” to conducting complex large-
5 Evidence also suggests linkages between Al Hijra members and a loose-knit Tanzanian extremist group known
as “Uamusho”.
6 Between February and March 2013, the Monitoring Group noticed an increase in Tanzanians, including two
AMYC members, attempting to cross into Somalia through Kenya. See annex 2.1.b for a profile of Tanzanians
recruited to join Al-Shabaab in Somalia between February and March 2013.
7The Monitoring Group has received corroborating information that strongly suggests Al-Shabaab affiliates in
Burundi and Rwanda are in contact with Al Hijra associates linked to the Al-Qaida affiliated Jermaine Grant.
8 From 26 May 2013 through to 30 May 2013, the Monitoring Group has been able to audit a Facebook account
of “Abu S”; accessed a 1:16 second audio telephone conversation between “Abu S” and a Kenyan-based Al
Hijra member and verified “Abu S’s” Syrian number.
9 Monitoring Group auditing of “Abu S” Facebook private messaging conversations with “HI” at 2:14pm on 30
May 2013 archived with the United Nations.
10 See S/2012/544, p. 16.
11 http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-…-
a-senior-terrorist-leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-Al-Qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula-forproviding-
material-support-to-both-terrorist-organizations
12 https://soundcloud.com/swali-mohamed/brother-ahmad-iman-the.
13 In an interview with Kenya security services at Nyali police station in Mombasa on 19 and 20 December
2011, Jermaine John Grant admitted to being a member of Al-Qaida and not Al-Shabaab.
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scale attacks in Kenya on behalf of Al-Shabaab.14 While still confined in prison, Jermaine
John Grant has successfully and remotely provided assistance to ongoing plots involving both
Al Hijra and ‘Makaburi’.
Unexplained killings and disappearances15
Co-opting of Al Hijra: Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’
Obscure leadership
7. The Monitoring Group has confirmed that in or about July 2012, Al Hijra, with the
support of ‘Mzee’ Mwai Abass, a key Al-Shabaab financier and recruiter in Kenya mentioned
in the previous Monitoring Group report,16 and with the approval of Ahmad Iman in Somalia,
together with officials from the Pumwami Riyadha Mosque Committee (PRMC), secretly
appointed Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’ as the new ‘Amir’ to oversee Al Hijra’s Kenyan affairs.17
In particular, he was to ensure material support was being provided to returning Somaliabased
Al Hijra fighters sent by Al-Shabaab to carry out attacks against the Kenyan state.
8. According to sources with direct knowledge of ‘Carragher’s’ appointment18 the
unexplained disappearances of senior Al Hijra members and the obvious anxiety over
14 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10748.doc.htm.
15 These unexplained killings and disappearances represent some of the most significant in terms of dismantling
Al Hijra’s ability to act violently on behalf of Al-Shabaab in Kenya.
16S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
17 Following the mysterious killing of Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi ‘Ruta’ on 17 March 2013, ‘Carragher’
reportedly resigned as the Nairobi-based ‘Amir’.
18 During an audio recording of two Al Hijra members in Mombasa on 4 April 2013, archived with the United
Nations, the members can be heard discussing the secret appointment of Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’.
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unexplained “assassinations”, including the public abduction of ‘Amir’ ‘Musa Osodo’, was a
major factor in ‘Carragher’s’ secret appointment. The Monitoring Group has learnt that other
reasons for ‘Carragher’s’ appointment include drawing the attention of security services away
from Al Hijra as Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan arm, and avoiding incidents similar to the one
involving former ‘Amir’ ‘Osodo’, who human rights organisations claim was abducted on 23
May 2012 along with Al Hijra member Jacob Musyoka.19 According to multiple
corroborating sources, ‘Osodo’, a suspect in a number of terrorist-related incidents, and
Musyoka had previously provided a safe haven and posted bail for Bikumbi Hassan Mukulu,
the son of Jamil Mukulu, the rebel leader of the Ugandan-led Islamist group active around
North Kivu, the Allied Democratic Forces.20
Image of Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’
9. While the rationale for appointing the Muslim ‘revertee’ (convert) ‘Carragher’, a
questionable journalist” working for the Dutch-run African Slum Journal in Nairobi, seemed
pragmatic to officials in PRMC and Al Hijra elders, such as ‘Mzee’ Mwai Abass, other
individuals closely linked to Al Hijra, notably ‘Makaburi’ (a.k.a. “Buda”, a.k.a. “Abu”),
began to express their growing reservations.
10. Between 10 and 19 October 2012, the Monitoring Group closely observed the visit to
Mombasa of two Al Hijra members, “Hassan O” and “Salim Mandevu”, to consult with
‘Makaburi’, a close associate of the late Aboud Rogo Mohammed on the state of Al Hijra’s
support to Al-Shabaab in Kenya and to deliberate on new ways of supporting Al-Shabaab
operations in Kenya and Somalia.21 A confidential source present during the meetings with
‘Makaburi’ on 12 and 15 October 2012 at Masjid Musa, described ‘Makaburi’s’ counsel to
19S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex. See also
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterror…-
20130403.pdf.
20 Confidential audio recording of “Ishak” (Bikumbi Hassan Mukulu) and “HO”, dated 25 December 2011 and
archived with the United Nations. See also Group of Experts final report on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (S/2012/843), p. 30.
21 On 23 June 2012, the Monitoring Group was given access to “Salim Mandevu’s” mobile phones (+254 727
210 781 and +254 707 245 281), from which it was clear he had been in regular contact with Somalia-based Al
Hijra fighters on numbers +252 618 597 605 and +252 618 468 335. The Monitoring Group believes the Al-
Shabaab Kenyan member ‘Mwalim Khalid’ had used one of these numbers while he was in Somalia.
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the participants, including a senior Mombasa-based Al Hijra member known to the
Monitoring Group as “Rashid”.22
11. During the meetings, ‘Makaburi’ advised the two visiting Al Hijra members about the
ineffective use of grenades and expressed his concerns about the secret appointment of
‘Carragher’ as the ‘Amir’.23 According to ‘Makaburi’, as described to the Monitoring Group
by an Al Hijra member present, ‘Carragher’ appeared to be less active than his predecessor,
‘Osodo’, especially his ‘Da’wa’ (proselytization) activities. ‘Makaburi’ said that he would
discuss ‘Carragher’s’ replacement with the PRMC.24
Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’
Image of Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’
12. In its previous report (S/2012/544),25 the Monitoring Group alluded to ‘Makaburi’s’
own description of his allegiance to Al-Shabaab and pledge to continue his recruitment drives
in Kenya on behalf of the Somali armed group.26 However, since ‘Makaburi’s’ designation
and listing by the United States Department of Treasury and United Nations Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and
Eritrea in 2012,27 he still represents a sustained threat to peace and security in Somalia and
the broader region of East Africa.
13. On 5 September 2012, ‘Makaburi’ was detained for allegedly inciting young
Muslims, mainly from his Mtwapa madrassa and Masjid Musa, to violent demonstration
following the unexplained killing of his associate, Aboud Rogo Mohamed.28 Credible
22 Monitoring Group interview with an Al Hijra member present during the 12 and 15 October 2012 meetings
with ‘Makaburi’, dated 22 October 2012.
23 The Monitoring Group is aware that the meetings also focused on the ineffectiveness of grenade attacks and
the importance of considering martyrdom operations.
24 The Monitoring Group is aware of a close relationship between the PRMC and ‘Makaburi’, in particular with
his close associate ‘Mzee’ Mwai Abass, also a member of PRMC.
25S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
26Confidential audio recording (111205_004) of Aboud Rogo private meeting, including ‘Makaburi’ in Nyeri,
dated 7 December 2011 and archived with the United Nations.
27 http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1630.aspx.
28 During an interrogation in September 2012, ‘Makaburi’ claimed he had opened a madrassa in Mtwapa in
2011 with the late Aboud Rogo Mohamed.
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information also suggests that following Aboud Rogo’s death, ‘Makaburi’ contacted senior
Al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia for assistance in carrying out attacks in Kenya as reprisals.29
14. The Monitoring Group strongly believes that ‘Makaburi’, together with Ahmad Iman,
the Al Hijra ‘Amir’ based in Somalia, and other senior Al-Shabaab leaders, have encouraged
and facilitated Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters to return to Kenya to launch attacks on behalf
of Al-Shabaab. On 26 February 2013, Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’, speaking while hiding at a
safe house in Tanzania, illustrates an example of ‘Makaburi’s’ role in attacks in Kenya:
There were these other boys [Somalia-based Al Hijra returning fighters] who had
come back [from Somalia] and Buda [Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi] had to put
them on standby first but the boys were ready to act. But I knew the problem with
Buda [‘Makaburi’] was cash. You know putting all of us [Somalia-based Al Hijra
returning fighters] in one place with no money might create problems. Buda
[‘Makaburi] with his plans is always good…30
15. Since the latter part of 2012, ‘Makaburi’ has sought to reorganize in stealth his
activities on behalf and in support of Al-Shabaab, principally aimed at “action” in Kenya.
Increasing evidence suggests Al-Shabaab-related activities; including radicalization and
recruitment have progressed to actively planning large-scale attacks. ‘Makaburi’ has sought
to now reengaging key regional Al-Shabaab allies, in particularly Al Hijra in Kenya and to a
lesser extent members of the AMYC, and the loose extremist group commonly known as
“Uamusho” both in Tanzania.31 The Monitoring Group has also obtained evidence that
suggests since the unexplained killing of Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohamed in August 2012,
‘Makaburi’ and other East Africans have been attempting to gain more autonomy and act
independently from Al-Shabaab in terms of operational planning.32
16. Such evidence continues to suggest that ‘Makaburi’s’ allegiance remains with Al-
Shabaab in terms of its violent ideology and being able to recruit non-Somali East Africans
(from Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) to fight for Al-Shabaab. At the same time
‘Makaburi’ appears to be exploiting the growing and public disaffection in the ranks of the
foreign fighters in Al-Shabaab, in particular among East Africans. Preliminary evidence also
suggests a number of senior East African fighters that identify more with the Al-Qaida cause,
have been encouraged to return to the region to continue ‘Jihad’. Similarly, the Monitoring
Group has received testimonies from serving Al Hijra members describing ‘Makaburi’s’
apparent frustration with the coordination of non-Somali East African fighters who have
returned to the region on behalf of Al-Shabaab. As explained, returning Al Hijra fighters
from Somalia and other non-Somali fighters once back in Kenya are to receive operational
guidance from ‘Kenyan Amirs’ such as ‘Makaburi’ rather than waiting for “instructions”
from Ahmad Iman and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.33 This would strongly indicate that Kenyan
Al-Shabaab members are now willing to seek greater autonomy in carrying out attacks.
29Interview with a Nairobi-based intelligence official, 4 September 2012 and archived with the United Nations.
30 Confidential audio recording of Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’, “Rashid” and other dated 26 February 2013
archived with the United Nations.
31 During the current mandate the Monitoring Group has received various reports suggesting the strengthening
of ties between Al Hijra members and their counterparts in Tanzania, both the AMYC and the Zanzibar group.
32 During a meeting with “Abdinassir”, a close associate of ‘Makaburi’, and a female Al Hijra courier on 12
April 2013, “Abdinassir” expressed ‘Makaburi’s’ desire to operate more independently of Al-Shabaab and
Ahmad Iman in Somalia.
33 On 17 December 2013, the Monitoring Group learnt of Thabit’s command and control still being based in
Somalia.
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17. Over the course of the mandate, the Monitoring Group has observed disputes between
a number of Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia, in particular those detained in Shimo la
Tewa prison and ‘Makaburi’. These were over operational directions and accumulation and
distribution of weapons. According to ‘Makaburi’, the Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters are
still allegedly receiving instructions from Al-Shabaab inside Somalia. ‘Makaburi’s’ apparent
desire to seek more operational autonomy from Al-Shabaab has also been captured in a series
of audio recordings by close associates of ‘Makaburi’, including a key Al Hijra figure
Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’. Publicly, ‘Chacha’ acts as a legal representative dealing
with Al-Shabaab-related cases. In reality his legal profession has masked his support for Al-
Shabaab operations through Al Hijra in Kenya. In offering guidance on ‘Jihad’ in Kenya he
recommended a new plan for ‘Makaburi’:
…now Buda [Abubakar Shariff Ahmed] should go for plan B because things seem not
to be going our way. He should think of other options. People need to think of
something especially holding a serious meeting between us [Kenya-based Al Hijra
members], Buda [Abubakar Shariff Ahmed] and the rest, I mean the brothers from the
other side [Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters]. We need to let them know that we know
our place [Kenya] better than them. They [Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters] need to
know they have been away for long time thus a lot of changes has taken place since
then. That’s why you find the brothers making a lot of blunders because there is no
coordination. If something is not done, I don’t know.34
18. Using his long-standing association with the group’s Somalia-based fighters, in
particular his continued contact with Ahmad Iman in Somalia,35 ‘Makaburi’ has been able to
sustain albeit small operational cells, which increasingly extend into Tanzania as a support
sanctuary. The Monitoring Group remains concern that in spite of individuals such Abubakar
Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’ being designated the Security Council he is still able to offer
direct support to Al-Shabaab through Al Hijra.
Operational shift: From “soft targets” to “complex and spectacular” plots
19. Despite Al Hijra’s public declaration - through its ‘Amir’ Ahmad Iman in Somalia -
for its members to carry out violent attacks on behalf of Al-Shabaab in Kenya,36 a number of
explanations have been advanced by observers in response to the wave of grenade and IED
attacks that began to plague Kenya in the latter part of 2011. One dominant explanation has
been that grenade attacks were acts by a minority of ‘self-starting’ or ‘home-grown’ violent
extremists inspired by Al-Shabaab.37
20. However, the Monitoring Group has confirmed that from 24 October 201138 up to and
including in or about November 2012, Al Hijra fighters from Somalia with the support of
their Kenya-based members, including officials of PRMC, have been responsible for a series
of grenade and IED attacks in Kenya as part of Al-Shabaab’s campaign within the region.
34 Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 21 April 2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
35 During a meeting on 5 April 2013, ‘Makaburi’ admitted to two Al Hijra couriers that he was still in contact
with Ahmad Iman in Somalia.
36 https://twitter.com/#!/HSMPress/status/155614676087087104.
37 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0529/Nairobi-blast-Could-hav….
38 http://www.voanews.com/content/two-explosions-in-kenyas-capital-1-dead-….
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This disturbing trend is indicative of Al-Shabaab’s capability to internationalize its violent
extremism through its regional affiliates.
“Soft targets”
21. While the full extent of Al-Hijra’s grenade and IED campaign is still unknown and
under investigation, the Monitoring Group has received corroborating information, including
admissions by Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters and confidential audio recordings of members
involved in attacks, to satisfactorily assess Al-Hijra’s role in attacks against Kenya.39 In most
cases, the returning Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters have opted to focus their attacks against
“soft targets”, such as local bars, churches and bus terminals.
39Multiple interviews with law enforcement officials and access to confidential Al Hijra reporting from September
2012 to May 2013.
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Individuals linked to Al Hijra “soft target” attacks
22. In or about January 2012, Thabit Jamaldin Yahya ‘Bobby’, an Al Hijra Somalia-based
fighter recruited from Kibera in Nairobi returned back to Kenya with the purpose of carrying
out terrorist attacks.40 Thabit had claimed he was inspired into ‘Jihad’ by watching and
listening to the lectures of the UK extremist Omar Trevor Brooks ‘Abu Izzadeen’ the
spokesman of the UK banned Al Ghurabaa.41 The Monitoring Group believes Thabit and a
group of possibly five other Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters left Kismayo in December
2011.42 Before being dispatched from Kismayo to Kenya on behalf of Al-Shabaab,43 Thabit
disclosed to a close associate of Ahmad Iman that:
40 The Monitoring Group understands from multiple sources, both former and existing Al Hijra members, that
Kibera slums in Nairobi prior to 2011 was a key recruiting ground for Al Hijra members seeking to join Al-
Shabaab.
41 At 12:16pm on 14 November 2012, an Al Hijra courier sent the following phone message to another member
in relation to Thabit: “…ubey [Thabit] needs a phone with memory card installed with Abu Izzadeen’s lectures:
1. ‘Those who shake the empires’; 2. ‘Carrying the deen’; and 3. ‘The sharp vision of the Muwahid’…those
lectures inspired him to become what he is [‘Mujahideen’].” The Monitoring Group can confirm that in
November 2012, Thabit received a phone installed with video lectures of Abu Izzadeen, which was widely
shared and viewed among other Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab inmates in Shimo la Tewa prison.
42 Restricted intelligence report obtained by the Monitoring Group in 2012.
43During an interrogation by security services on 6 July 2012, Thabit admits to being dispatched from Kismayo
to Kenya. The Monitoring Groups notes however that Thabit’s interrogation notes provided to the Monitoring
Group by a close associate of Thabit’s legal representative were not signed or authenticated by Thabit.
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…before I came [back to Kenya] Ahmad [Ahmad Iman] was sent to talk to me. He
talked to me for like 2hours. I didn’t understand because I didn’t know I would be
sent back here. After sometime the Amniyat [Al-Shabaab intelligence] came for me,
trained me and after that I was not to trust even Ahmad [Ahmad Iman]. I was to trust
only my Amir and the people under me.44
23. Prior to and after Thabit’s arrest on 15 May 2012, according,45 Thabit had been
directly involved in at least two attacks and provided material support and resources,
including advice, on other attacks for Al-Shabaab in Kenya.46
24. Before Thabit’s arrest for his involvement in the Bella Vista grenade attack in
Mombasa, in which he and two others killed a security guard he had been provided with
operational support by Kenya-based Al-Hijra members.47 Such support, in Thabit’s own
words, would allow him “to open up Kenya”.48 In Nairobi, Thabit was provided with secure
accommodation by a senior Al Hijra member, Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi commonly known as
‘Ruta’, who had previously fought alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia but returned to Kenya in
or about 2010. Kassim Kassim Jembe provided additional support in Mombasa and was
subsequently arrested but later release for his role in the Bella Vista attack.49
25. On 24 December 2012 at 21:24pm from Shimo la Tewa prison in Mombasa, during a
regular ‘secure phone’ contact with a confidential source on the issue of procuring
explosives, Thabit inquired if the confidential source would consider working with ‘Ruta’ on
plots for Al-Shabaab and alluded:
When I came back [from Somalia] I went to that brother [‘Ruta’] in Majengo. He is
the only one who knew I was around [from Somalia] and he never let me down.50
26. The purpose of Thabit being accommodated by ‘Ruta’ in Nairobi, as described by a
confidential source familiar with ‘Ruta’s’ activities, was to ensure that attacks on behalf of
Al-Shabaab would run smoothly in Kenya.51 In January 2013, while observing a relocation of
an Al Hijra cell from Kenya to a safe house in Tanzania, ‘Ruta’ claimed that Al Hijra
44 Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussionmat 21:30pm, dated 12 December 2012 and archived
with the United Nations.
45Confidential source (close associate and fellow conspirator) meeting with Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi ‘Ruta’ in
Mwanza, Tanzania, 18 January 2013.
46 The Monitoring Group has received conclusive evidence that while in prison Thabit has been coordinating a
number of plots on behalf of Al-Shabaab.
47 Unclassified FBI laboratory reports (Case ID No: 1631-NI-211) on items found at the scene of the attack,
including grenade safety pins and a magazine accessed by the Monitoring Group through a confidential source
close to Thabit’s legal representative, suggest the attack involved more than one person (Thabit).
48Close associate of Ahmad Iman: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 18:29pm, dated 30 December 2012 and
archived with the United Nations.
49 In a private discussion on 26 February in Mombasa, Kassim Jembe disclosed to a confidential source his role
in the Bella Vista attack. According to Kassim Jembe, his task was to arrange a safe house for Thabit and raise
funds for Al Hijra members who had been arrested. See also, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWZ4027u_Zs.
50 Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion from 20:07pm to 21: 24pm, dated 24 December 2012
and archived with the United Nations.
51‘Ruta’ is one of a number of Al Hijra members who have been mysteriously killed. Prior to his killing on 17
March 2013 in Nairobi, he was facing terrorism-related charges for an alleged grenade attack in Uhuru Park in
Nairobi in June 2010. See also, http://jihadology.net/category/countries/tanzania/.
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members were responsible for the March 2012 grenade attack at the Machakos Country bus
terminus, resulting in 7 deaths and an estimated 42 others injured.52
27. On 18 January 2013, ‘Ruta’ met with a key Al Hijra female courier, “R”, from 11am
to 7pm at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, to discuss the logistics of moving the Al
Hijra cell to a more secure safe house in the coastal town of Tanga. According to “R’s”
account of her discussion with ‘Ruta’, ‘Ruta’ described his secret role in supporting Al-
Shabaab in Kenya since his departure from Somalia, including the Machakos attack, which
he claimed was carried out by Thabit, ‘Ruta’ himself and others.53 In ‘Ruta’s attempt to
convince “R” of his involvement in the Machakos attack, ‘Ruta’ described how Thabit had
accidently dropped his passport at the scene of the attack and was unsure if the security
services were aware of this vital clue.54
28. During the course of its current mandate, the Monitoring Group has also learnt of new
and corroborating details of Al-Hijra’s activities outside Nairobi and Mombasa, in particular
in Kenya’s northeastern province of Garissa. Traditionally, Garissa has been a predominantly
Somali-Al-Shabaab area of operation due its proximity to the refugee camps in Dadaab. On 6
September 2012, a Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter and key Al-Shabaab ‘financier’ with
access to U.S. and South African funding (see paragraphs 114 to 140 below on Financiers,
Facilitators and Active Contributors), Ashraf Yassin Abdurrahman ‘Migdad’, also recruited
from Kibera, was arrested along Thika Road on the ‘City to City’ bus from Garissa en route
to Nairobi.55
29. Prior to departing Garissa, multiple sources have told the Monitoring Group that
‘Migdad’ together with Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’, who had also recently returned from
Somalia in or about August 2012 to carry out attacks for Al-Shabaab, had stayed at the house
of a female Al-Shabaab/Al Hijra courier named “Famia” ‘Faiza Mustapha’.56 Hours of audio
information, including recordings of “Famia” in Nairobi and Mombasa, and of ‘Mwarabu’ in
Tanzania (Mwanza and Tanga), corroborates reports that while in Garissa ‘Migdad’ and
possibly ‘Mwarabu’ and others had carried out attacks.57
30. On 4 April 2013 in Mombasa, hours before a debriefing of “Famia” and another
female courier by ‘Makaburi’ on a recently disrupted terrorist attack, “Famia” described in
detail her role in assisting both returning Al Hijra fighters from Somalia and members en
route to Somalia to fight alongside Al-Shabaab. In the audio, “Famia” described herself as
running a “guesthouse” for Al-Shabaab.58 Similarly, in a separate audio, ‘Mwarabu’ provides
an account of how ‘Migdad’ had carried out an attack in Garissa, describing how ‘Migdad’
52Monitoring Group interviews in Mwanza, Tanzania, January 2013.
53 The Monitoring Group is aware that the Kenyan police have yet to charge or name any suspect(s) for the 10
March 2012 grenade attack at the Machakos terminus.
54Based on the Monitoring Group’s understanding of Al Hijra cells, in particular, dispatched fighters from
Somalia to Kenya during the period from late 2011 to early 2012, the groups access to grenades and other
materials made it operationally possible to carry out attacks such as the Machakos incident.
55The Monitoring Group understands that ‘Migdad’ was arrested with a female Somali courier with close links
to Al Hijra members both in Somalia and Kenya known as “Diramu Waristu Guyole” (a.k.a. “Madina”) and
another female.
56 Information received by the Monitoring Group suggests ‘Migdad’ and ‘Mwarabu’ did not arrive back in
Kenya from Somalia on 1 September 2012, as claimed by ‘Migdad’ during his interrogation.
57During ‘Migdad’s’ interrogation with security services, ‘Migdad’ had admitted to having undergone explosive
training in the use of IEDs and grenades while in Somalia.
58Confidential audio recording (QFMTG1) of Famia private meeting with ‘others’ in Mombasa, dated 4 April
2013 and archived with the United Nations.
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had left “Famia’s” house one day and came back “sweating” demanding ‘Mwarabu’ turn on
the television for information on his attack.59
31. In addition to these attacks in Kenya by Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia, the
Monitoring Group has attempted to verify other similar claims by the group. One example is
the grenade attack at the God House of Miracle Church in Ngara, Nairobi, on 29 April
2012.60 Information obtained both directly and indirectly from Al Hijra members with
knowledge of the attack suggests Tuwa Ibrahim Jibril ‘Tafawa’, a Somalia-based Al Hijra
fighter who is believed to have returned back from Somalia in or about January 2012, was
responsible.61
32. On 19 January 2013, ‘Ruta’, whom the Monitoring Group considers most likely to
have had direct and advance knowledge of returning Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters’
operations in Nairobi and Mombasa, described to an Al Hijra female courier ‘Tafawa’s
attempts to flee the scene of the 29 April 2012Church attack.62
33. Recently, since ‘Tafawa’s’ release from Shimo la Tewa prison, he has been tasked
with continuing attacks as disclosed by Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’ who claimed:
…he [Tafawa] was summoned by their Amir as soon as he got out [from prison]. He
was told that since he is out they [Tafawa’s cell] can now start the work [Jihad]. He
said he could not because he wants to start collecting [weapons]. Okay, if it is because
of Ahmad [Ahmad Iman] I understand. He also wanted very much to be able to get
some weapons with those boys but I think he got it [weapons] using other means.63
34. On 4 June 2013, audio information received indirectly from “Ali Salim” a close
associate of Jermaine Grant and Thabit describes ‘Tafawa’s’ most recent attack in Nairobi.
According to “Ali”:
…There was an incident in Kinyako area [Korogocho, Nairobi] where they [‘Tafawa’
and his cell] took their weapons [police weapons]. Everyone in Majengo [Nairobi] is
aware of the incident. They [police] were hit badly. So I have been telling everyone
they should be alert because of this issue.64
35. Since two other members who took part in this attack are known criminals, it would
appear that it was a crime-related rather than terrorism-related attack.65
“Complex and spectacular” plots
59Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’ private meeting with ‘others’ in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19
January 2013 and archived with the United Nations.
60 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17885476.
61http://www.nation.co.ke/News/DPP-links-suspects-to-terrorist-group---/-….
62Female Al Hijra courier meeting with ‘Ruta’ in Mwanza, 19 January 2013.
63Audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’ and other dated 31 May 2013 archived with the United
Nations
64 Audio recording of “Ali Salim” and other dated 4 June 2013, describing ‘Tafawa’s’ reported attack in Nairobi and
archived with the United Nations.
65 Turning to crime is a known trend among Al Hijra fighters who have returned from Somalia. During the audio of
“Ali Salim” on 4 June 2013, he describes Al Hijra’s criminal activities in collusion with Kenya police. See also
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000084967&story_title=thugs-…
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36. In November 2012, following successive Al Hijra setbacks, the Monitoring Group
was briefed by a serving Kenya-based Al Hijra member who described how Al Hijra planned
to reverse its setbacks. As described to the Monitoring Group at the time, the individuals
initially central to the plan were: ‘Thabit’, who was still plotting attacks in Kenya from inside
prison and had claimed: “I still work under HSM; they [Al-Shabaab] sent me here [Kenya]
and I did my best,”66(referring to his previous terrorists attacks); another Kenya-based
member of Al Hijra, also in prison at the time with ‘Thabit, named “Ali Salim”; and the Al-
Qaida-affiliated Jermaine Grant linked to plotting terrorist attacks in Mombasa in December
2011.
37. However, while observing a meeting in Mombasa between an Al Hijra female courier
and ‘Makaburi’ on 8 November 2012, the Monitoring Group learnt that in fact ‘Makaburi’
had claimed to be playing a significant role in coordinating overall direction and guidance in
an attempt to reverse the fortunes of Al Hijra and Al-Shabaab in Kenya. According to the Al
Hijra courier “R”, ‘Makaburi’ claimed he had personally instructed Al Hijra members,
particularly fighters returning from Somalia, to cease their grenade attacks. The rationale was
that ‘Makaburi’ had decided first that the grenade attacks against Kenya on behalf of Al-
Shabaab or “Haraka” were ineffective, and second that Kenya deserved a “big bang”.67
Individuals linked to Al Hijra “complex and spectacular” plots
38. Following the November 2012 meeting, the Monitoring Group closely monitored the
sequence of unfolding events and collected information and gathered evidence that
overwhelmingly suggests that Al Hijra in Kenya, as directed by ‘Makaburi’ for Al-Shabaab,
is consolidating its access to small arms (see box below for information on known Al Hijra
arms custodians) and plotting complex and spectacular attacks in the region. Al Hijra has
66 Close Ahmad Iman associate: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 18:31pm dated 30 December 2012 and archived
with the United Nations.
67 Monitoring Group interview with Al Hijra courier, 15 November 2012.
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publicly merged with Al-Shabaab, and in Kenya currently possesses a sizeable collection of
small arms from handguns to shot guns and grenades that have been judiciously distributed in
most cases between Nairobi and Mombasa.68
39. Over the course of its current mandate, the Monitoring Group has been able to
identify a number of Al Hijra members, both Kenya-based and fighters returning from
Somalia, who have previously been and in some cases still are tasked with the safekeeping of
weapons.
“Safe keepers”
Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi ‘Ruta’ (Deceased)69
On 30 December 2012, following instructions from ‘Makaburi’ for the consolidation of
Al Hijra weapons, a number of hand grenades and possibly firearms were to be delivered
by ‘Ruta’ for a transfer to Mombasa.70 ‘Ruta’ represented one of the group’s key
custodians of weapons and other materials.71
Around 8:25pm on 31 December 2012, ‘Ruta’ had delivered two hand grenades to Al
Hijra courier “R” in Nairobi.72 The next day on 1 January 2013 at 18:09pm, Thabit acting
as ‘Makaburi’s’ interlocutor had received information from a close associate of Ahmad
Iman, the Somalia-based Al Hijra ‘Amir’, that the hand grenades had been delivered and
were awaiting transfer to Mombasa.73
In a desperate attempt to transport the grenades to Mombasa, on 2 January 2013, Thabit
had arranged for a “transporter” tasked with travelling from Mombasa to collect the
grenades. He noted to a fellow Al Hijra member:
have your sister call the transporter on +254 711 113 701. Send him MPESA
[mobile money transfer] for transport. He will leave Mombasa in the morning [to
Nairobi].74
Again on 5 January 2013, in a follow-up communication, this time with “R”, which was a
coded message intended for ‘Makaburi’, Thabit requested:
tell Chacha [Andrew Mwita] I’ve found the eggs [grenades] and we now want to
68 The Monitoring Group also understands that at some point during 2012, a female Al Hijra member in Garissa
stored IED components.
69 On 17 March 2013, ‘Ruta’ was killed under unexplained circumstances while in ‘Angola’ toilets in Majengo,
Nairobi. It was suggested that two unknown assailants shot ‘Ruta’ in the back of the head.
70 Monitoring Group SMS communication with source with direct knowledge of ‘Ruta’s’ activities, 30
December 2012.
71 Monitoring Group debriefing of key Al Hijra member in Mwanza and Tanga (Tanzania), from December
2012 through February 2013.
72 On 31 December 2012, the Monitoring Group was sent images of the grenades transferred by ‘Ruta’.
73 Close Ahmad Iman associate: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 18:09pm, dated 1 January 2013 and
archived with the United Nations.
74 Close Ahmad Iman associate: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 18:46pm, dated 2 January 2013 and
archived with the United Nations.
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complete the kids [firearms]. Tell him to pass the message to my guy and my guy
will inform the headmaster [‘Makaburi’].75
Early in the morning of 6 January 2013, the “transporter”, Wendo Idi Zuberi, boarded a
bus from Mombasa and arrived in Nairobi at 17:30pm. Waiting for Wendo at the bus
terminus in Nairobi was an Al Hijra associate known to the Monitoring Group as “ID”,
who had been tasked to provide logistical support during Wendo’s operation to pick up
and transport the grenades back to Mombasa. During Wendo’s operation he stayed in
room 406 at the Kap Guest House, Nairobi.76
Image of Wendo Idi Zuberi ‘Transporter’
Between 5 January and on or about 7 January 2013, the Monitoring Group believes
‘Makaburi’ had already been apprised of the progress of the grenades since Chacha
Andrew Mvita ‘Chacha’, a close associate of Al Hijra in terms of its legal
representations, during a meeting with an Al Hijra member disclosed that he [‘Chacha’]
was present at a shura (meeting) where ‘Makaburi’ had discussed the grenades being
transported from Nairobi.
On 8 January 2013, the Monitoring Group was briefed on an earlier meeting that took
place between Wendo (grenade ‘transporter’) and “R” (Al Hijra courier) in relation to
handing over the grenades. Details of the meeting corroborate information that
‘Makaburi’ had and continues to act on behalf of Al-Shabaab to consolidated weapons.
According to Wendo’s account to “R”, he had previously been tasked to keep
ammunition for Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia, and that following the killing of
Aboud Rogo, Al Hijra operations on behalf of Al-Shabaab in Kenya appeared to be in
disarray but that ‘Makaburi’ “is trying to bring things back to normal.”77
In the morning of 12 January 2013 at around 10am, the “transporter” Wendo met again
with “ID”, this time to pick up the grenades, securely wrapped and disguised in a green
T-shirt and placed in a black backpack. Wendo then proceeded to board a Mombasabound
‘Parrot line’ bus with registration KBS 411K. The Monitoring Group understands
Wendo was apprehended in Mombasa. Wendo, following his arrest and interrogation by
security services, admitted his links to Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab associates, including
Khubeib Aboud Rogo, the son of the late Aboud Rogo Mohamed, who had at the time
had recently returned from fighting alongside Al-Shabaab.78
75 Thabit coded message sent to “R”, dated 5 January 2013.
76See annex 2.1.c for Wendo’s hotel receipt.
77 Al Hijra member “R” meeting with Wendo “Transporter” at Prestige Shopping Mall, Nairobi, 8 January 2013.
78 Monitoring Group briefing by law enforcement official, January 2013.
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(Grenades delivered by ‘Ruta’ and transported by Wendo Idi Zuberi)
The attempt described above to transfer grenades to Makaburi was part of a large
consignment that ‘Ruta’ was reported to have had.79 Multiple sources, including
confessions from fellow Al-Hijra members, including Thabit and ‘Makaburi’ himself,
have indicated that ‘Ruta’ before his killing on 17 March 2013, had about ten grenades
and about five guns.80
On 18 March 2018, following the killing of ‘Ruta’, four Al Hijra members, led by
“Famia” ‘Faiza Mustapha’ and including “Ali Salim”, on the instructions of ‘Makaburi
attempted to retrieve ‘Ruta’s arms cache from a secure location in Nairobi. The weapons
were to be transferred to Mombasa for use by ‘Makaburi’ in his support of Al-Shabaab.81
“Suleiman” (a.k.a. ‘Reagan’)
The Monitoring Group has confirmed that a former Somalia-based fighter, “Suleiman”
‘Reagan’, now an active Nairobi-based Al Hijra member and former close associate of
‘Ruta’, is also in possession of a number of small arms for Al Hijra activities in support
of Al-Shabaab in Kenya. “Suleiman” is believed to have returned from Somalia between
2010 and in or about mid 2011.
According a confidential source with direct access to ‘Ruta’ and “Suleiman”, “Suleiman”
had been given custody of five handguns and an unknown number of grenades for Al-
Hijra, but in 2012 had loaned the firearms out to criminal networks in Nairobi. “Ali
Salim” claimed to ‘Makaburi’s’ associate that: “…It was found on Thika road. Yes, the
guys on Thika road had fired it.”82 On 21 April 2013, the Monitoring Group received
information describing a meeting between “Suleiman” and a fellow Al Hijra member on
20 April 2013, concerning reports of Al Hijra arms in his custody. During the meeting,
“Suleiman” was seeking assistance to convince ‘Makaburi’ that his stock of Al Hijra
arms had been stolen during a burglary, which the Monitoring Group finds unlikely.
The Monitoring Group is also aware of reports that strongly suggest “Suleiman” had met
a close associate of ‘Makaburi’ named “Abdinassir” on 13 April 2013 to discuss
transporting “Suleiman’s” firearms to Mombasa. On 13 April 2013, two separate audio
recordings, demonstrated that “Abdinassir’s” presence in Nairobi was to collect and
arrange for Al Hijra’s arms (mainly handguns), including from “Suleiman”, to be
transferred to ‘Makaburi’.83
79 Al Hijra member “R” meeting with ‘Makaburi in Mombasa, 4 April 2013.
80 Al Hijra member visit to Thabit at Shimo la Tewa prison, 5 April 2013.
81Monitoring Group source with direct knowledge of ‘Makaburi’s’ operations, 20 March 2013.
82Audio recordings of “Abdinassir”, “Ali Juma Salim”, “Juma” and other, 12 April 2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
83 Audio recordings of “Abdinassir”, “Ali Juma Salim”, “Juma” and other, dated 12 April 2013 and archived
with the United Nations.
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“Baje”84
On 27 February 2013, during a meeting at a safe house in Tanga, Tanzania, an Al Hijra
member named “Rashid”, a senior Al Hijra member, briefed a key Al Hijra courier, who
had travelled from Kenya, on how to access his arms cache that was to be transferred to
‘Makaburi’ in Mombasa. “Rashid” had repeatedly travelled to Somalia to fight alongside
Al-Shabaab and has close links to senior Al-Shabaab members, including foreign fighters
affiliated with Al-Qaida.85 One such foreign fighter was Majengo recruit Titus Nabiswa
‘Mwalim Khalid’, whom the Monitoring Group believes to be more of an Al-Hijra/Al-
Shabaab fighter in spite of his reported Al-Qaida links.86
The Al Hijra courier was instructed to contact two individuals named “Hamisi” and
“Star” who would in turn contact “Baje”. “Baje”, is reportedly in possession of
“Rashid’s” arms in Mombasa. While “Baje’s” identity is currently unknown, “Star” and
“Hamisi” appear to be the same person. The Monitoring Group believes that this person
is Said Hamisi Mohamed ‘Star’, an individual who had previously fought alongside the
Islamic Courts Union and linked to the former Al-Qaida East Africa operative Fazul
Abdallah Mohamed.87
Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’
On 27 January 2013, on the instructions of ‘Makaburi’, ‘Ruta’ travelled to Mombasa to
discuss the initial stages of a plot by ‘Makaburi’ and Al Hijra, together with an unknown
Somali-Al-Shabaab group, to disrupt the Kenyan elections in March 2013.88 On his return
from Mombasa on 28 January 2013, ‘Ruta’ provided an update to a female Al Hijra
member who was to take a peripheral role in the March 2013 plot. According to
information received by the Monitoring Group, corroborated by multiple independent
sources, including law enforcement officials and current Al Hijra members, ‘Makaburi’,
over a number of months had been procuring and depositing weapons at an unknown
“safe house” in Mombasa as part of his plans to carry out attacks on behalf of Al-
Shabaab.89
This information also appears to corroborate ‘Makaburi’s’ reported accumulation of
weapons on behalf of Al Hijra and in support of Al-Shabaab and his claims that he has at
least nine sacks of grenades and firearms. In a meeting between two female Al Hijra
84 In or about August 2012, including up to September 2012, KDF apprehended two Somalia-based Al Hijra
members, “Baje” and Swaleh Mohamed (reported to be a relative of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan), at Dhobley. They
were subsequently handed over to the Kenyan courts in April 2013. The Monitoring Group notes that the “Baje”
in Mombasa and the “Baje” apprehended by KDF are two different individuals.
85 During an interview with “Rashid’s” mother in March 2011, the Monitoring Group was informed that
“Rashid” had recently returned from Somalia.
86 Prior to Mwalim Khalid’s killing in October 2012, “Rashid” claimed he had accommodated ‘Mwalim’ in
Mombasa. See also http://www.google.co.uk/#hl=en&sclient=psyab&
q=Titus+Nabiswa+majengo+nairobi&oq=Titus+Nabiswa+majengo+nairobi&gs_l.
87http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDg…%
2F%2Fwww.communication.go.ke%2Fdocuments%2FDocument1.doc&ei=zfV0UeyUC_CS7AbR…
g=AFQjCNEmpVw9bfQIYjojk_EkZYTUMwLSpQ&bvm=bv.45512109,d.ZGU.
88 Monitoring Group telephone communications with source with intimate knowledge of ‘Makaburi’s’
operations, 26 to 28 January 2013.
89 Meeting between ‘Ruta’ and a female Al Hijra member with direct knowledge of ‘Makaburi’s’ operational
plans, 29 January 2013.
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couriers and ‘Makaburi’ on 4 and 5 April 2013 in Mombasa, a source present and with
direct operational knowledge of ‘Makaburi’s’ plots provided details of his weapons “safe
house” in Mombasa. According to testimony from this meeting provided to the
Monitoring Group and corroborated by serving Al Hijra members, including law
enforcement officials, ‘Makaburi’ claimed he had been paying rent at a secret location in
Mombasa and storing away weapons. ‘Makaburi’ is reported to have told the female
couriers that the “safe house” was his “bank account.”90
The Monitoring Group has recently learnt that in ‘Makaburi’s’ effort to launch attacks in
Kenya on behalf of Al-Shabaab with the support of Al Hijra, in or about February 2013,
he had made contact with an individual closely linked to the Mombasa Republican
Council (MRC). MRC is a Kenyan secessionist movement that has used violence in
advocating its political ambitions and reportedly encouraged members of its youth wing
to consider training in Somalia.91 On 23 February 2013, during a meeting with ‘Ruta’ and
another Al Hijra member in Mombasa, ‘Makaburi described how he had personally
negotiated the purchase of AK-47s from an MRC arms broker at a cost of 700 USD
(60,000 Kenya Shillings) per rifle.92
At present, the Monitoring Group has continued to observe persistent attempts by
‘Makaburi’ to accumulate weapons. Audio recordings of the visit of ‘Makaburi’s’
associate “Abdinassir” to Majengo (Nairobi) between 12 and 13 April 2013 is illustrative
of ‘Makaburi’s’ strong determination to renew attacks in Kenya. “Abdinassir” described
his meeting with Amadi Ali (a.k.a. Abu Farid) ‘Cortez’,93 a Somalia-based Al Hijra
fighter who had returned back to Kenya in July 2012:
So he [Amadi Ali ‘Cortez’] told me to plan my trip to Coast [Mombasa] and when
I get back we will see if he gives it [handgun] to me. He also said that its not a
good place [Majengo] for me because the guys are normally there. He has a
suspicion that things are really being watched in that area. And he didn’t want his
name [‘Cortez’] mentioned…94
40. Despite Al Hijra’s setbacks, it continues to have operational aspirations. Particularly,
its Somalia-based fighters have continued to push for and pursue spectacular attacks not only
in Kenya but the region as a whole. Some of these Somalia-based fighters, according to
independent and corroborating sources, have been under electronic surveillance in Somalia
due to their connections with non-African foreign fighters.95
90Monitoring Group interview with Al Hijra member present at the 4 and 5 April 2013 meeting with ‘Makaburi’
in Mombasa, 10 April 2013.
91 During the course of the mandate the Monitoring Group received unconfirmed reports of MRC youths’
cooperation with Mombasa-based Al Hijra members.
92 The Monitoring Group understands that ‘Makaburi’ was unable to eventually purchase the weapons due to
MRC offering a higher price.
93 The Monitoring Group understands following ‘Cortez’s’ dispatch to Kenya in July 2012, he was apprehended
in possession of a handgun by the security services on 14 December 2012 in Mombasa.
94 Audio recordings of “Abdinassir”, “Ali Juma Salim” and “Juma”, dated 12 April 2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
95 Monitoring Group interview intelligence official tasked with targeting Al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia dated
11 June 2012.
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41. On 7 October 2011, a Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter based in lower Juba at the time,
was researching on the internet tourist attractions in East Africa and U.S. interests in Kenya,
in addition to seeking information on sodium, hydrogen and isotopes. It is the assessment of
the Monitoring Group that the above attempts by this particular fighter is consistent with
several of Al Hijra’s aspirational plots. These include, a reportedly abortive suicide plot
(PBIED); a plot to attack the Parliament of Kenya, and unconfirmed reports of a plot against
former President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of Kenya.
Elgiva Bwire Oliacha ‘Mohammed Seif’: Martyrdom or Da’wa?
42. On 24 October 2011, in less than 24 hours, two separate grenade attacks were carried
out in Nairobi.96 Initially, Al-Shabaab was not suspected due to the mode and target of attack,
and especially in the absence of a claim of responsibility.97 However, a day after the attacks
on 25 October 2011, Kenya police announced they had arrested Elgiva Bwire Oliacha
‘Mohammed Seif’ and seized 12 grenades, an AK-47 assault rifle, four revolvers and a submachine
gun.98 On 28 October 2011, after admitting to the attacks and being sentenced to life
in prison, ‘Mohammed Seif’ stated he was a member of Al-Shabaab.99 Since the Kampala
bombings of July 2010, Al-Shabaab has not been able to successfully carry a complex attack
against Somalia’s regional neighbours. However, strong evidence suggests like the Kampala
bombings in which non-Somalis (Kenyans) were used indigenous Kenyans continue to be a
preferred choice by Al-Shabaab for conducting potential suicide operations outside Somalia
as the case of Elgiva Bwire Oliacha ‘Mohammed Seif’ suggests.
Media file image of Elgiva Bwire Oliacha ‘Mohammed Seif’
43. The Monitoring Group has received information that if accurate would imply that
‘Mohammed Seif’s’ real intention in October 2011 was much more disturbing than attacking
“soft targets” in Kenya. Information from multiple sources indicates that ‘Mohammed Seif’
may have considered becoming a martyr for Al-Shabaab. Testimonies from current and
former Al Hijra members, a statement from a captured Al Hijra fighter returning from
Somalia to Kenya, and an audio recording of a key Al Hijra facilitator of material support and
resources, altogether substantiate the probability that ‘Mohammed Seif’s’ return to Kenya
was part of a plot to carry out a suicide attack.
96 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15425447
97 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/88…-
Nairobi-pub-as-al-Shabaab-Somali-operation-intensifies.html
98 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YL8tlTvS58
99‘Mohammed Seif’’s association with Al Hijra dates back as far as 2009, when he reportedly attended a lecture
titled “Role of the Youth in Da’wah” delivered to Al Hijra (MYC at the time) by Sheikh Ali Bahero on 10
October 2009.See also MYC Symposium CD filmed by O I Video productions in association with Muslim
Youth Center, Martib Center.
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44. On 20 October 2011, five days before his arrest, ‘Mohammed Seif’ attended the
Mushujaa Day celebrations at Nyayo Stadium in Nairobi, along with possibly between three
to five other Al-Hijra members. Audio recordings about the event suggest what may have
been ‘Mohammed Seif’s’ real intention. Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi ‘Ruta’, speaking to two Al
Hijra fighters in Mwanza in Tanzania on 19 January 2013, at a meeting arranged to discuss
the logistics of moving two Al Hijra fighters from one safe house to another in Tanzania,
recalled his last meeting with ‘Mohammed Seif’:
…He [‘Mohammed Seif’] was in a Gormahia Jersey [Kenyan football club]. The
other brothers rushed outside upon seeing what was happening. He also left the venue
immediately after he had a brief chat with the mother. He never talked to the other
brothers but he called them when he was already in the house. How the mother got the
information on him I don’t know. Upon discussing with the brothers and explaining to
them about what had happened, he decided that he should continue with Da’wa
instead of the Jihad. He and the other brothers decided that they would wait further
instructions from Abu Zubeyr.100 You know before that, he [‘Mohammed Seif’] had
undertaken some tasks here and there. The other brothers thought that he was now
ready for Shahada because of the way he had handled the tasks.101
45. ‘Ruta’ then described how he had parted with ‘Mohammed Seif’, probably hours
before his arrest, claiming:
We [‘Ruta’ and ‘Mohammed Seif’] met and left each other around midnight. I left
him looking for a place to spend the night. The following day we hired a taxi and
escorted him to Coast Bus stage. As usual, he was carrying a rucksack, which
contained the cargo. Some of the brothers were of the idea that the cargo be opened
and others were refusing. The issue generated a lot of disagreement among the
brothers. He was to travel to coast. Upon our arrival he alighted and we left. He was
arrested around 5:00am because we left one another around midnight. I remember the
first time, we escorted to him to coast to board a bus using a taxi.102
46. The Monitoring Group believes that ‘Ruta’ was one of a few individuals who would
have known ‘Mohammed Seif’s’ main operational intent. A view also supported by “Rashid”
a former Al-Shabaab fighter when he alludes ‘Mohammed Seif’s’ possible suicide attack
attempt by praising him that: “the last time Bwire [‘Mohammed Seif’] outsmarted them
[Kenyan security services] even though it looked like the security was tight during the
Mushujaa day.”103
47. In addition, audio recordings of ‘Ruta’ accessed by the Monitoring Group also
substantiate his account of ‘Mohamed Seif’ noting that:
100 The Monitoring Group understand the “Abu Zubeyr” in this context is not the Al-Shabaab leader but most
likely a Somalia-based ‘Amir’ who is also a “trainer”, as described in an audio recording accessed by the
Monitoring Group of a discussion of between ‘Mwarabu’ and others in Tanga on 26 February 2013.
101 Audio recording of ‘Ruta’ at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19 January 2013 and archived
with the United Nations.
102 Audio recording of ‘Ruta’ at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19 January 2013 and archived
with the United Nations.
103 Audio recording of “Rashid” at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 20 January 2013 and
archived with the United Nations.
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…When Bwire [‘Mohammed Seif’] came back he had to check on the package. The
brother had to be informed about him since he didn’t know about him [‘Mohammed
Seif’]. So he went to him and “Black” [“Duda Black”] was called by the brother.
“Black” was skeptical about the brother who had accompanied “Taz” [Hussein Abbas
Nderitu]. He told “Taz” I know that you have come to with someone to spy on me.
Bwire had gone with “Taz” together to check on that package and that’s why he was
worried who “Taz” was. So upon his arrival, he immediately accepted to undertake
the tasks. He did a few works here and there before his own mother set him up.104
48. On 13 November 2012, following the disruption of another potential large-scale
terrorist attack in Mombasa and elsewhere involving Al Hijra members, security services
arrested and interrogated Khubeib Aboud Rogo, the son of the late ideological leader of Al
Hijra. During his interrogation, Khubeib Rogo claimed that Al-Shabaab had sent at least six
suicide bombers to Kenya.105 This testimony, albeit obtained under interrogation, is
corroborated by another Al Hijra fighter returning from Somalia who was arrested on 6
September 2012, and who confirmed that ‘Mohammed Seif’ had been dispatched by Al-
Shabaab as a suicide bomber.106
Plots against the State: President, Prime Minister and Parliament
49. Al-Shabaab aspirations to violently overthrow the Kenya state predate the Kenya
Defence Forces official incursion into Somalia in 2011. In an audio from Somalia by Al
Hijra’s ‘Amir’ Ahmad Iman in December 2010, he warned the Kenyan government against
its covert intervention under “Operation Linda Mpaka” 107 in stating that:
…thinking with a man who says, “strap the bombs on me and let me blow myself up
in the Parliament building of Kenya, let not anyone survive. Even Kibaki and his
group of thieves, let them perish. I say strap the bombs and let no one survive and let
Allah bless those brave ones who will attain paradise.108
50. The Monitoring Group has received uncorroborated claims that during 2012 Al
Hijra/Al-Shabaab members conspiring with ‘Makaburi’ may have instigated plots against
Kenya’s former President and Prime Minister. From December 2012 to 1 March 2013, the
Monitoring Group closely monitored the movements of a number of Al Hijra fighters
retreating from Kenya to regroup in Tanzania and close to the Ugandan border. One such
fighter was “Rashid”, who had assumed the Tanzanian name of “Jacob Mtunzi Rwakatale”.
51. Information received from a credible confidential source that had direct access to
“Rashid” and who was responsible for the welfare and logistics of the group fleeing Kenya in
Tanzania has described to the Monitoring Group “Rashid’s” claims. On 24 January 2013,
during a field mission to Tanzania, the Monitoring Group was briefed on a discussion in
104 Audio recording of ‘Ruta’ at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19 January 2013 and archived
with the United Nations.
105 While on remand in Shimo la Tewa prison in November 2012, the Monitoring Group had indirect access to
Khubeib Aboud Rogo in terms of information leading up to his arrest. Some of Khubeib Rogo’s audio
information has been archived with the United Nations.
106 Monitoring Group interview with law enforcement official, 24 November 2012.
107 Restricted Directorate of Military Intelligence document detailing “Operation Linda Mpaka” obtained by the
Monitoring Group in 2011.
108 Muslim Youth Centre, “Unyonge Katika Ummah Wa Kiislamu part 2”, accessed at
http://www.archive.org/details/UnyongeKatikaUmmahWaKiislamu2
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which “Rashid” casually referred to his operations. According to “Rashid’s” account, at an
unspecified date but probably in the Monitoring Group’s estimate between June 2012 and no
later than 27 October 2012, he had been instructed by a senior Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab member
named Titus Nabiswa ‘Mwalim Khalid’ to travel to Nyeri for the purpose of carrying out
“surveillance” on the then President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki.109Multiple independent sources
have described ‘Mwalim Khalid’ as an explosives expert and “operational planner” who had
dispatched tens of Al Hijra fighters from Somalia to carry out attacks in Kenya before his
killing in October 2012.
52. As part of the “surveillance operation”, “Rashid” described spending two weeks
during frequent visits to Nyeri attempting to identify the president’s routine and reporting
back to ‘Mwalim Khalid’ and ‘Makaburi’. “Rashid” further claimed that after the completion
of his trips to Nyeri he was due to return, armed with grenades, with a small unnamed cell
from Mombasa.
53. In addition to the President, former Prime Minister Raila Odinga also appears to have
been the focus of ‘Mwalim Khalid’ and ‘Makaburi’. “Rashid” claims he was responsible for
carrying out “surveillance” on the Prime Minister while in Nairobi.110
54. During the course of its current mandate, the Monitoring Group has obtained
sufficient information substantiating the threat that ‘Mwalim Khalid’ represented in terms of
his intent and capability as a Kenyan Al-Shabaab ‘Amir’. This has included information from
officials knowledgeable about Al-Shabaab’s threat capability in Kenya and the region, and
testimonies from Al Hijra members, including audio recordings of a current Al Hijra fighter’s
assessment of ‘Mwalim Khalid’. In addition, the Monitoring Group also notes that while
some Al Hijra fighters had fled Somalia due to a lack of support and disaffection with Al-
Shabaab, ‘Mwalim Khalid’s’ return was more than likely based on operational necessity and
his convictions in extending Al-Shabaab’s ‘Jihad’ to Kenya. The Monitoring Group also
notes the ‘assessment/opinion’ of Abu Mansour Al-Amriki on ‘Mwalim Khalid’s’ return to
Kenya: In a private message via social media to an Al Hijra member at 14:05pm on 13
January 2013, Al-Amriki claimed that ‘Mwalim Khalid’ had fled Al-Shabaab and Somalia
due to disaffection.111
55. In or about June 2012, according to multiple sources, ‘Mwalim Khalid’ dispatched a
group of Somalia-based Al-Hijra fighters to Kenya as part of Al-Shabaab’s operations to
destabilize the country. ‘Mwalim Khalid’s various plans included a plot to attack the
Parliament of Kenya, according to a confidential source that had initial knowledge of it.112
Key to the plot was a parliament worker, Ali Abdulmajid ‘Ali Bodie’, mentioned in a
previous Monitoring Group report (S/2011/433)113 and a long-time serving official of the
PRMC. The Monitoring Group understands that ‘Mwalim Khalid’ attempted to persuade Ali
109 Interview with source with direct responsibility for logistics for Al Hijra in Tanga, Tanzania, 24 January
2013.
110 The Monitoring Group was informed during a meeting on 24 January 2013 in Tanga that “Rashid” had
claimed the former Prime Minister had at times traveled in Nairobi without his security detail.
111 Abu Mansour Al-Amriki – Al Hijra member private message dated 13 January 2013 at 2:05pm, accessed by
the Monitoring Group.
112 In December 2011, under interrogation by the Kenyan security services, the Al-Qaida-affiliated Jermaine
John Grant claimed Al-Shabaab was planning to attack a number of targets in Kenya, including the Parliament
of Kenya.
113S/2011/433, pages 140 – 147.
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Abdulmajid to assist with the plot.114 Information about the parliament plot was also
corroborated during a meeting in Tanga on 23 January 2013 in which “Rashid” alluded to
being aware of it.115 “Rashid” had fled Kenya to Tanzania in part for having accommodated
‘Mwalim Khalid’ on his arrival back from Somalia in or about the summer of 2012.116
56. On 28 October 2012, while travelling from Nairobi to Mombasa, most probably to
coordinate further attacks in Mombasa, ‘Mwalim Khalid’ was intercepted at Mariakani, less
than an hour from Mombasa. Photographic evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group
indicates that ‘Mwalim Khalid’ was in possession of a small arms cache.117
57. Following his interception, ‘Mwalim Khalid’ led security services to an associate,
Omar Faraj, hiding in Mombasa. This led, according to media reports, to a shootout that
resulted in both ‘Mwalim Khalid’ and Omar Faraj being killed by the security services.118
58. Information received by the Monitoring Group suggests that after the killing of
‘Mwalim Khalid’ and his failed parliament plot, Al Hijra was forced to rethink its operations,
particularly in Mombasa. Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’119
expressed the group’s pragmatism succinctly during a discussion at a safe house in Mwanza,
Tanzania, acknowledging:
…we had planned everything. We were ready even before that. When Titus [‘Mwalim
Khalid’] was got [killed], it ruined our plans. But we didn’t loose our morale. We
started planning afresh.120
59. Almost a month later in November 2012, Kenyan security services again disrupted a
plot involving Al Hijra members, including Khubeib Rogo, who had recently returned from
Somalia, and Swaleh Abdulmajid, who in 2010 was arrested for attempting to travel to
Somalia to join Al-Shabaab with UK national Michael Olumide Adebolajo.121 Information
received by the Monitoring Group and corroborated by serving members of Al Hijra,
including indirect information accessed from Al Hijra members in Shimo la Tewa prison in
November 2012, strongly suggests that the group had planned simultaneous attacks against
114 The Monitoring Group has received uncorroborated information that suggests Tuwa Ibrahim Jibril ‘Tafawa’
was involved in the Kenya parliament plot.
115 Interview with source with direct responsibility for logistics for Al Hijra in Tanga, Tanzania, 24 January
2013.
116 The Monitoring is aware that Nairobi-based Al Hijra member “Abdi Mohamed” was central to the initials
plans to deliberate on the regrouping of Al Hijra members/fighters to Tanzania.
117See annex 2.1.d.for Images of arms cache retrieved from Mwalim Khalid
118 http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-93162/terror-suspects-killed-mom…
119 The Monitoring Group has received information from various credible sources that suggests Somalia-based
Al Hijra fighter returning to Kenya ‘Mwarabu’ was a senior member of ‘Mwalim Khalid’s’ group active in
Mombasa in 2012.
120 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu, ‘Ruta’ and other in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19 January 2013
and archived with the United Nations.
121 The Monitoring Group is aware that the individual claiming to be Michael Olumide Adebolajo was carrying
a British passport (309276663).
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multiple targets.122 The Monitoring Group believes these targets may have included a church,
a police station in Mombasa and other public facilities.123
Mujahid Abu Hamza (Michael Olumide Adebolajo): Peripheral linkages
Media images of Adebolajo in May 2013 and arrested in Kenya, November 2010
On 22 May 2013, Michael Olumide Adebolajo who has since changed his name to
“Mujahid Abu Hamza” along with Michael Adebowale carried out a violent attack
against an off-duty British serviceman, Drummer Lee Rigby, in London as the soldier
was leaving his army barracks. According to video footage of Adebolajo after the
incident, Adebolajo claimed his motivation for carrying out the attack was inspired by the
British Government’s “injustice” against Muslims around world.124
In 2010, Adebolajo came to the attention of the Monitoring Group for his peripheral links
to Al-Shabaab and individuals connected to Al Hijra (then called the Muslim Youth
Centre).125 While the Monitoring Group has received no evidence to conclude that
Adebolajo was ever a member of Al Hijra or Al-Shabaab, his attempt to travel Somalia in
2010 and seek assistance from individuals linked to Al Hijra, including Aboud Rogo
Mohamed, was indicative of his desire to become a member of Al-Shabaab.126
(Passport copy of Michael Olumide Adebolajo)
Information received by both serving and former members of Al Hijra suggests that
122 The Monitoring Group was aware of credible reports circulating within Al Hijra circles during November
2012 that suggested Khubeib Rogo had returned from Somalia to avenge his father’s death. The Monitoring
Group also understands that Khubeib Rogo alluded to seeking revenge on behalf of his father during his
interrogation by the security services.
123 In December 2012, the Monitoring Group received a briefing from a law enforcement official on the possible
targets of the November 2012 plot involving Khubeib Rogo and Swaleh Abdulmajid.
124 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/23/woolwich-attack-soldier-lee-ri….
125http://terrorfreesomalia.blogspot.com/2010/11/laban-walloga-nation-rela….
126 British media reports have linked Michael Olumide the banned Al Majaroun linked to British cleric Anjem
Choudary. See also http://www.thescottishsun.co.uk/scotsol/homepage/4940294/Cleric-Killer-…-
wont-nick-him.html.
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during 2010 a large number of indigenous Kenyans had travelled to join Al-Shabaab in
Somalia as part of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) contingent under the command of
Ahmad Iman.127 The Monitoring Group understands these included members of Al Hijra
linked to Aboud Rogo Mohamed’s Mombasa madrassa and a number of youths from
Ukunda in Mombasa.128
On 21 November 2010, a group of six individuals, including five Kenyans, four of whom
had been students at Aboud Rogo Mohamed’s madrassa, and a British national were
arrested in Kizingitini village on the island of Pate in Kenya.129 The Monitoring Group
can confirm that the British national among the group was Michael Olumide Adebolajo,
the attacker of the London incident on 22 May 2013 along with his Kenyan associate
Swaleh Abdulmajid.130 Abdulmajid is the son-in-law of the late Aboud Rogo Mohamed
and a Mombasa-based Al Hijra member and a close associate of the Al-Qaida affiliated
Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’, who was allegedly planning simultaneous attacks in
Mombasa and Nairobi, which reportedly resulted in security activities at the Jomo
Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) in November 2012.131
During Michael Adebolajo’s interrogation by the Kenyan security services between 21 to
23 November 2010, Adebolajo claimed he had met the four members of Aboud Rogo’s
madrassa, including Abdulmajid, on a bus for the first time. Adebolajo’s movements
from his arrival in Nairobi at 6:25am on 21 October 2010 to his departure to Mombasa,
which resulted in him meeting up with Abdulmajid and other members of Aboud Rogo’s
madrassa is still unclear to the Monitoring Group and being investigated. However,
testimony from one member of the group, “Badi”, and corroborated in part by other
members strongly suggests Adebolajo had contributed funds to hiring a speedboat to
travel to the villages of Faza and Kizingitini on the Pate island en route to Somalia.132
Despite Adebolajo and his Kenyan accomplices denying attempting to cross into Somalia
to join Al-Shabaab, testimony attributed to Abdulmajid in 2010 and reviewing by the
Monitoring Group in 2011 of his Facebook account, “Khattab Mujahid” strongly suggests
Adebolajo and others were highly likely heading to Somalia to join the armed group.133
In addition, the Monitoring Group is aware that at the time of Adebolajo’s arrest, his
accomplice Abdulmajid’s password for his Facebook account was “alshabaab”,
suggestive of his ideological affiliation.
127 In January 2011, the Monitoring Group worked in consultation with an independent organization focusing on
Islamic radicalization that claimed at the time to be providing advice to the Kenyan authorities radicalization
and recruitment.
128 A testimony attributed to Khubeib Aboud Rogo the son of the late Al Hijra ideological leader claims he was
part of a wave of indigenous Kenyans that traveled to Somalia in 2010 to join Al-Shabaab under MYC wing.
Khubeib returned from Somalia in August 2012.
129 The Monitoring Group has received credible uncorroborated information that the sixth individual “M” was a
police source.
130 Information accessed from PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System)
records indicates Adebolajo passed through Kenya immigration at 6:25am on 21 October 2010 and exited
Kenya at 8:59pm on 24 November 2010.
131 In a testimony attributed to Swaleh Abdulmajid in November 2013 and corroborated by Al Hijra members,
Abdulmajid claimed to be an associate of the Al Qaida affiliated Fuad Abubakar Manswab. The Monitoring
Group is aware that Abdulmajid was responsible for passing on operational coded messages from Khubeib Rogo
to Fuad Abubakar Manswab.
132 Confidential report relating to suspect Al-Shabaab recruits dated 2010 archived with the United Nations.
133 In February 2011, the Monitoring Group was able to audit Swaleh Abdulmajid’s Facebook account.
However, his account appears to have since been compromised and in use by an unknown person(s).
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Following investigations by the Kenyan security services of the group linked to Aboud
Rogo, including Adebolajo they were charged under section 43 of the Kenyan penal code
while Adebolajo was deported back to the United Kingdom leaving Kenya at 20:59pm on
24 November 2010.134
60. The Monitoring Group has recently learnt that the plot to launch simultaneous attacks
in Mombasa on 19 November 2012 had also involved ‘Mwarabu’ and likely his associate
Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’,135 who identifies more with the cause of Al-Qaida.136 In
describing events leading up to the disruption, ‘Mwarabu’ claims:
…Mohamed [Khubeib Rogo] went to tell his sister and when I left they started
monitoring. There were other guys who had some stuff that could have been of good
assistance to us. They were supposed to give us the stuff. Their problem was the time
line. Abu [Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’] then wondered why it should take us
three years planning. Mohamed said what was there was not sufficient but we can
utilize. Jande had gone for the wedding. I decided to call him and he told me that he
had already left the wedding venue and he was in town. 137
61. He further describes, after hearing about the disruption from his “boys”,138 that:
When Bilal was arrested in Mombasa, my boys informed me that I should stay away
because the police had raided their house. I moved the whole night until around 5am
when the area was clam. The following day I travelled to Nairobi for a safe house.139
Crime and extremism: Al Hijra assassination attempt and explosives procurement
62. Perhaps due to the stress of reverses and more likely out of fear of the Kenyan
security services uncovering their safe havens and plots, Al Hijra members, together with
Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’, considered retreating from Kenya and regrouping in
Tanzania, or in a worst case scenario, travelling to Mali to join the newly emerging ‘Jihad’
front.140 Information received by the Monitoring Group from a credible confidential source
with direct access to the Al Hijra Nairobi-based ‘Amir’, Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’, described a
plausible explanation for the decision to retreat from Kenya. According to ‘Carragher’, the
successive disruption of operations by Kenyan security services and the arrests and
unexplained disappearances and killings that followed, had divided Al Hijra fighters
returning from Somalia and their Kenya-based associates into three groups. A first group of
134 The Monitoring Group understands that section 43 of the Kenyan penal code relates to “security for keeping
the peace and for maintaining good behavior”.
135 The Monitoring Group is aware that testimonies from Swaleh Abdulmajid and Khubeib Rogo both linked
Fuad Abubakar Manswab to the planned Mombasa attacks of November 2012.
136 While ‘Fuad’ had worked on a number of plots with ‘Makaburi’ and Al Hijra members, individuals,
including ‘Makaburi’, viewed ‘Fuad’ more as Al-Qaida than “Haraka” (Al-Shabaab).
137 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu, ‘Ruta’ and other in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19 January 2013
and archived with the United Nations.
138Following the disruption and arrest on 13 November 2012 of some of the suspects linked to the simultaneous
planned attacks for a possible 19 November 2012 attack in Mombasa and elsewhere, the Monitoring Group was
briefed by a law enforcement official on the identity of the suspects in which “Bilal” was named.
139 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu, ‘Ruta’ and other in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19 January 2013
and archived with the United Nations.
140Uncorroborated information suggests that the Al-Qaida-affiliated ‘Fuad’ had proposed the suggestion of
joining the ‘Jihad’ in Mali.
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Al Hijra members had become fearful of the Kenyan government’s kinetic counter-terrorism
pushback against Al-Shabaab activities in Kenya and had essentially given up on carrying out
attacks. A second group was still committed to prosecuting Al-Shabaab’s “war” against
Kenya but lacked logistical funds to sustain itself.141A third group was still determined to act
on behalf of Al-Shabaab regardless of its current state but pragmatically opted to regroup
outside Kenya. The sentiments of the second and third group are clearly expressed by
Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter ‘Mwarabu’, who at the time was wanted by Kenyan security
services for plots to attack Kenya in December 2011:
If only these rich guys [financial sponsors] could give us [Al Hijra] the resource I
would go on hitting [attacking]. Me at one point I would have a squad of 30 men to
train. I’m telling you I would give these guys thorough training. Cortez [Amadi Ali
(a.k.a. Abu Farid)] would undertake such a mission. If they could only provide the
resource such as vehicle – then let them complain if my missions will fail. I have told
the boys I was not afraid and my photos are out there and if you want to set me up,
then they should go ahead. I have been trained on weapon handling and assembling
and assassination. This was now my mission to give them a good training on the
same.142
63. In spite of the serious attempts and preparations by some Al Hijra fighters to retreat,
in Mombasa and Kamiti on the outskirts of Nairobi, ‘Makaburi’ and a group of others,
including the Al-Qaida affiliated Jermaine John Grant,143 Thabit Jamaldin Yahya ‘Bobby’
and Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi ‘Ruta’ continued to meticulously prepare new plots to attack
Kenya on behalf of Al-Shabaab.
64. Since November 2012, the Monitoring Group was regularly briefed, indirectly by Al
Hijra members in prison in Mombasa and serving Al Hijra members based in Nairobi, on two
separate but interlinked plots that were largely directed by ‘Makaburi’ and monitored from
Somalia by Ahmad Iman,144 the Al Hijra ‘Amir’ and Al-Shabaab’s official representative for
Kenya. The plots included a plan to assassinate a Kenyan Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU)
investigating officer for a number of Al-Shabaab-related trials in Mombasa, including the
case of Thabit Jamaldin Yahya ‘Bobby’, and a plan to procure explosives in Tanzania for
transportation to Kenya for an attack initially scheduled around the time of the Kenyan
elections.145 The above plots mark a higher level of planning and coordination between Al-
Shabaab in Somalia and it regional affiliates both in Kenya and Tanzania in planning to carry
out violent attacks and may signify a new alarming trend.
Officer “X”: The ATPU Plot
141 Audio recordings accessed by the Monitoring Group of a Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter returning to Kenya
indicates that towards the latter part of 2012, there were frantic attempts to seek funding for Kenya-based
operations by Al-Shabaab/Al Hijra planner “Mwalim Khalid” before his killing in October 2012.
142Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu,’ at a safe house in Tanga, Tanzania, dated 26 February 2013 and
archived with the United Nations.
143 The Monitoring Group’s understanding of Jermaine John Grant, like his associate ‘Fuad, is that he identifies
more with the cause of Al-Qaida than with Al-Shabaab.
144 Information suggests that ‘Makaburi’ has used “Umm Sahl” (Omar Awadh’s wife) to communicate with
Ahmad Iman in Somalia.
145 The Monitoring Group is aware that during this period there were indications that some Al Hijra members,
including Jermaine Grant, were planning to escape from Shimo la Tewa prison.
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65. The Monitoring Group was aware for some time from multiple sources and audio
recordings that Al Hijra members considered Kenyan ATPU officers as legitimate targets.
‘Ruta’, who claimed to have kept a log of vehicle registration numbers of ATPU officers,
stated:
…do you know what? I was thinking about ATPU [Anti-Terrorism Police Unit]. If
two or three officers could have been killed we [Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab] could be in a
better place. There is one officer called Bwonya who is an investigation officer in our
case he has been away for six months.146
66. On 16 October 2012, Thabit and his close associate Jermaine Grant, while in remand
at Shimo la Tewa prison in Mombasa, telephoned a female Al Hijra member in Nairobi.147
The initial discussion centred on ‘Jihad’ and the possibility of female members travelling to
Somalia, but a series of subsequent visits to Shimo la Tewa prison became the basis for the
initial planning stages of a plot to assassinate an ATPU officer known to the Monitoring
Group as officer “X”.148
67. On 16 November 2012, the trusted Al Hijra courier “R” described a meeting she had
with Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, the trusted “legal representative” of Al Hijra with
access to Ahmad Iman in Somalia.149 According to ”R”, ‘Chacha’ briefed her on her next
visit to Mombasa, where she would be meeting Thabit.150‘Chacha’ informed “R” that he had
made arrangements for her to meet and discuss with Thabit in private in court, and that she
would need to bring a notebook to take down instructions. Similarly, “R” claimed she was
briefed on her possibly meeting Jermaine Grant in court or in prison, if it could be
arranged.151
68. A week later on 21 November 2012, “R” and ‘Chacha’ met with Thabit.152The
Monitoring Group has obtained the original “instruction notes” of this meeting, during which
Thabit and ‘Chacha’ informed “R” that ‘Makaburi’ had requested the assistance of Al Hijra
in procuring 3 ‘kids’ (firearms).153 The firearms would be used in an operation that would
later be explained to “R” and other Al Hijra members. In order to begin communicating
146Audio recording of ‘Ruta’ at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, dated 19 January 2013 and archived
with the United Nations.
147 Monitoring Group understands that both Thabit and Grant had used the mobile number +254 707 632 428
from Shimo la Tewa prison in Mombasa, Kenya. The Monitoring Group also understands that Jermaine Grant
had used another mobile number, +254 700 801 025, from either Kamiti Maximum or Shimo la Tewa prison.
148 The Monitoring has decided it would be inappropriate to name the ATPU officer in question and has
therefore not named the officer.
149 The Monitoring Group is aware that ‘Chacha’ has indirect access to Ahmad Iman in Somalia through a
female logistician known by the Monitoring Group to identify more with Al-Qaida due to her husband’s former
links to suspected Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) members. The woman’s husband was also alleged
to have been involved in the 2010 Kampala bombings in Uganda.
150 From October 2012 to date, “R” has had regular, indirect and direct, access to Thabit.
151 The Monitoring Group’s understanding of “R’s” instructions regarding Jermaine Grant were that she would
meet him in order to pass on a message and update him on the ATPU plot. “R” was also instructed that when
meeting Grant to carry along a Kenyan Daily Nation newspaper.
152 The Monitoring Group understands that unnamed court officials had assisted in the facilitation of this
meeting.
153 See annex 2.1.e for “notes”.
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“securely” with Thabit and others in Shimo la Tewa prison, as well as ‘Makaburi’s’
interlocutors,154 “R” was give the following set of codes:
a e i o u m k b p l w
7 3 9 5 1 2 # 8 6 * 4
F G H I J K L M N O
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
69. On returning to Nairobi on 22 November 2012, “R” received a coded message from
Thabit on behalf of ‘Makaburi’ that read:
1*3 7t61 727d43 which in Kiswahili meant: Ule ATPU amhadwe and (roughly) in
English: that ATPU [Anti-Terror Police Unit officer] should be finished [killed].155
70. According to “R”, days later Thabit called from Shimo la Tewa prison requesting her
to contact a close associate named “Jah Rule”, who would be able to facilitate the 3 ‘kids’
(firearms) to be used in ‘Makaburi’s’ operation to assassinate officer “X”. Information
received by the Monitoring Group suggests that “Jah Rule”156 is a member of the Nairobi
criminal fraternity and not a member of Al-Shabaab or Al Hijra.157According to “R” and
confirmed by ‘Makaburi’, during a subsequent operational meeting in Mombasa,158 once “Jah
Rule” had facilitated the firearms, they would either be transferred to ‘Makaburi’ in
Mombasa by “R” or another person known to the Monitoring Group as “Jembe”.159
71. In a bid to receive an update on his operation and brief some of his co-conspirators, in
or about 8 December 2012,160‘Makaburi’ asked Chacha’ to facilitate a meeting with “R” in
Mombasa that would coincide with Thabit and Jermaine Grant’s next court date.161By this
time, “Jembe”, one of the designated “transporters” of the firearms, had already received “Jah
Rule’s” contact details that had identified the firearms for ‘Makaburi’.162
72. On 17 December 2012 in Mombasa, ‘Makaburi’ met with some of his coconspirators,
including, “R”, ‘Chacha’ and “Jembe” to offer his thoughts and guidance on
the plot.163 The plot to assassinate officer “X” was indeed his plan and not as some believed
154 Throughout the mandate the Monitoring Group has observed ‘Makaburi’ develop complex communication
methods between himself and Al Hijra.
155 Coded message received, 22 November 2012.
156 The Monitoring Group is aware “Jah Rule” had used the mobile number +254 721 511 003 during the
months of November and December 2012 before his “disappearance”.
157 Briefing by law enforcement official, December 2012.
158On 20 December the Monitoring Group had the opportunity to receive a briefing from “R” on her operational
meeting with ‘Makaburi’ on 16 December 2012 in Mombasa.
159The Monitoring Group is aware “Jembe” had used the mobile number +254 752 221 959 during the months
of November 2012 to January 2013.
160 The Monitoring Group was aware that, around 4 December 2012, there appeared to be a sense of urgency for
the plotters to meet ‘Makaburi’ and for Jermaine Grant to meet with “R” who was supposed to carry a
newspaper along to the meeting.
161 The Monitoring Group understands that Jermaine Grant’s court date was listed around 18 December 2012.
162 According to information received from a source directly involved in the plot, “Jah Rule” was currently in
the process of identifying the firearms for ‘Makaburi’.
163The Monitoring Group is aware that in addition to Thabit Jamaldin Yahya ‘Bobby’ and Jermaine Grant both
in prison being involved in the plot, Thabit had alluded to another cell to “R” but who are unknown.
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Thabit’s.164 ‘Makaburi’ reminded the co-conspirators that Thabit was in Shimo la Tewa
prison and therefore his operational capacity was limited. Concerning the transport of the
firearms, ‘Makaburi’ noted for operational reasons he had changed his mind on the
designated “transporter” of the arms to Mombasa. The Monitoring Group believes that on
reflection the conspicuousness of “Jembe”165 would draw unwanted attention if he were to
travel to Kiberia in Nairobi to pick up 3 firearms and then transport them to Mombasa.166
Plus, in spite of “R” being a trusted and experienced Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab courier, her
unfamiliarity with firearms, like other Kenya-based female couriers, would be a disadvantage
combined with a security risk that ‘Makaburi’ was most likely unwilling to undertake.
73. According to ‘Makaburi’ during the meeting, officer “X’s” house in Mombasa had
been identified and was under surveillance but noted that the officer’s pattern of movements
had changed, indicating officer “X” may have been aware of a plot against him.167
74. As the planning progressed into January 2013, a sense of urgency became apparent
when Thabit and ‘Makaburi’ opted to pursue a “plan B” in terms of procuring the 3 firearms
required for the assassination. “Jah Rule” had become unreachable during this period.
However, on 1 January 2013 at 17:59, Thabit from prison contacted a female Al Hijra
member, who has regular access to Ahmad Iman in Somalia via phone, and informed her that
an alternative plan was being pursued with another local criminal known as “Doctor”, stating:
“if it works we will go with the Doctor.”168
75. On 12 January 2013 at 7:30pm, “R” met with “Doctor” who informed her he had
identified 3 firearms (Ceska’s) but would need to finalize the cost.169 However, on the same
day at 9:32pm, Thabit on behalf of ‘Makaburi had opted to entrust the logistics of the
operation to ‘Ruta’, who was now assigned to assist “R”. In his telephone call, Thabit noted
that: “Roots [‘Ruta’] will help her [“R”] out and Ali [“Ali Juma Salim”] will talk with the
“Doctor.”170 The Monitoring Group believes the operational decision to include ‘Ruta’ at this
stage was more likely connected to ‘Ruta’s’ meeting in Mombasa with ‘Makaburi’. On 27
January 2013, ‘Ruta’ had met ‘Makaburi’ who had tasked ‘Ruta’ to return to Nairobi to
procure a consignment of AK-47s to be used in another, related plot that appears to have had
the backing of Al-Shabaab. By 6 February 2013, ‘Ruta’, during a meeting on the logistics of
the weapons that would have by now been procured from Garissa, could be heard in an audio
recording accessed by the Monitoring Group that despite his current court case he: “will
164 The Monitoring Group is aware that many Al Hijra members based in Kenya are of the view that Thabit acts
independently of ‘Makaburi’ due to his reported chain of command being in Somalia. Despite this
uncorroborated assertion, Thabit at 18:33 pm on 30 December 2012, in a ‘secure phone’ discussion archived
with the United Nations noted: “I work with you [close Ahmad Iman associate] and I work with Buda
[Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’].
165 “Jembe” as described to the Monitoring Group is of European extraction.
166 According to sources with direct knowledge of “Jembe’s” activities, he is reported to be a known person to
the security services.
167 The Monitoring Group is currently investigating claims that ‘Makaburi’ and ‘Mwalim Khalid’ prior to his
killing had mapped out locations and residences of a number of ATPU officers stationed in Mombasa.
168 Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 17:59 pm, dated 1January 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
169 According to “R”, the “Doctor” is also known in Majengo as “Salim”. The Monitoring Group understands
“Salim” had used the mobile number +254 728 662 275 during January to February 2013.
170Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 21:32 pm dated 12January 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
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continue with his activities [acting on behalf of Al-Shabaab] whether they [Government of
Kenya] like it or not.”171
76. On 23 February 2013, in a meeting in Mombasa to discuss a related and more daring
plot to transfer explosives into Kenya by ‘Makaburi’ and Al Hijra members, ‘Makaburi’ met
with both “R” and ‘Ruta’. Information received by the Monitoring Group by a confidential
source present at the meeting describes ‘Makaburi’s’ update on the ATPU plot. ‘Makaburi’
still intended to continue with the plot and had been looking for someone to execute the plan,
but he had also discovered that officer “X” had recently moved to a new a residence.
77. The Monitoring Group has learnt that a week later in March 2013, days before the
Kenya elections on 4 March 2013, the Tanzanian security services in cooperation with their
Kenyan counterparts disrupted an operation by Al Hijra fighters and ‘Makaburi’ to transfer
explosives into Kenya. It is the Monitoring Group’s assessment that this disruption of the
explosives plot in addition to ‘Makaburi’s’ claim of not being able to immediately find
someone to execute his assassination plot may have led to Al Hijra and ‘Makaburi’ aborting
the plan to assassinate officer “X”. Al Hijra’s brazen attempt to move beyond “soft targets” to
actively demonstrating its ability to carry out Al-Shabaab styled assassinations in the region
continues to remain a worrying trend by the affiliate.
Transferring explosives from Tanzania
78. In early 2013, Tanzanian security services in partnership with the Kenyan security
services disrupted a conspiracy to transport explosives into Kenya that would have been used
in a potential terrorist attack against the Kenyan state. The plot was essentially authorized and
directed by ‘Makaburi’, with the support of Thabit and, remotely, Jermaine Grant. It also
included a multi-layered number of Al Hijra members and also had the backing and
foreknowledge of Al-Shabaab through Al Hijra ‘Amir’ Ahmad Iman and other unknown Al-
Shabaab associates.
Background: couriers, procurers and facilitators
Image of Abdallah Kilume (Al-Shabaab/Al Hijra courier)
171 Confidential audio recording of ‘Ruta’ dated 6 February 2013 archived with the United Nations.
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79. Procuring explosives for terrorist purposes had always been an essential part of Al-
Hijra and ‘Makaburi’s plans as part of Al-Shabaab’s spectacular and large-scale plots against
Kenya. However, a confluence of circumstances occurred in or around November 2012 that
resulted in ‘Makaburi’ and Al Hijra actively seeking to procure explosives from Tanzania for
the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities in Kenya in or around March 2013.172
Circumstances, such as the reactivation of Al Hijra couriers (“Mizigos”), the arrest of a
Somali-Tanzanian at the Kenyan border and the pragmatic decision of reportedly Al-Qaidaaffiliated
‘Fuad’ and Al Hijra members to regroup in Tanzania, together led to an attempt to
procure explosives.
80. In its previous report,173 the Monitoring Group described the operational and logistical
role of mainly female Al Hijra couriers’ in supporting both Al Hijra fighters in Somalia and
Al-Shabaab members.174 Following the successful operation in Tanzania of transporting a bag
full of various operational contents to Kenya,175 which was handed over by the Al-Qaidaaffiliated
Emrah Erdogan (a.k.a Salahuddin al-Kurdi) to an Al Hijra courier,176some members
of the couriers’ cell adopted a low profile. This was due to the arrests of two Al Hijra
couriers, Abdallah Mwasike Kilume and Asha Ramadhan Musaand, and an Al-Shabaab
courier named “Diramu Waristu Guyole” (a.k.a. “Madina”), who had been mentioned in a
previous Monitoring Group report.177 Both Abdallah and Asha had previously transported
IED components for Al-Shabaab and Al Hijra to Garissa.178
“Famia”: Profile of an Al-Shabaab/Al Hijra courier
Image of “Famia” Copy of “Famia’s” operational identification
“Famia” Mustapha Hussien is a trusted and experienced female courier for Al-Shabaab/Al
172 Multiple reporting from various credible sources has suggested that both Al Hijra and ‘Makaburi have been
seeking explosives for terrorist attacks.
173 S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex.
174 While a role predominantly carried out by females, the Monitoring Group has identified a number of male
couriers.
175S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
176 http://humor.somaliradis.com/turkish-islamist-from-germany-arrested-in-…
177S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
178 Interview with Al Hijra member with direct knowledge of Abdalla’s activities prior to his arrest dated 14
February 2012.See annex 2.1.f on IED assembling components seized from “Dalla”.
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Hijra. Her role is similar to another well known but former Al-Shabaab courier known to the
Monitoring Group as “Pinkie” (a.k.a. “Firdaus”).179According to an audio recording accessed
by the Monitoring Group, “Famia” is known to use the operational name “Faiza Mustapha
Hussein”:180
Even my phone seems to be getting me into trouble I am going to discard it. Once my
new identification card comes out with the name Faiza Mustapha I’ll get rid of that
phone because I can get caught. People are being caught because of their identity. I’m
getting all plus even a passport.181
The Monitoring Group can also confirm that her operational identity not only includes the
name “Faiza Mustapha Hussein”,182 but also entails the use of Kenyan passport number
A112662, which replaced passport number A520278,183 and national identification number:
27809887, both belonging to her deceased sister.184 A former resident of Majengo in Nairobi
who later moved to Garissa for operational reasons, “Famia” is currently functioning in
Mombasa providing support ranging from funding to offering safe havens for members of Al-
Shabaab and Al Hijra.185
On 7 June 2012, Al-Shabaab/Al Hijra courier “R” returned to Nairobi after picking up a
package destined for Somalia from the Al-Qaida-affiliated Emrah Erdogan in Dar es Saalam.
Between at least in or about July 2012, leading up to about September 2012, the package
handed to “R” containing operations items for another Al Qaida affiliated Egyptian known as
“Hakim” had reached its destination in Somalia.186 The Monitoring Group has recently
discovered that the package delivered by Erdogan in Tanzania on 6 June 2012 was
subsequently transported to Somalia by another Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab female courier.187 Audio
recordings accessed by the Monitoring Group of a discussion between “Famia” and another
courier on 4 April 2013 in Mombasa clearly indicates that she had travelled to an unknown
destination in Somalia from Garissa to deliver the package to a person “Famia” claims to be a
stranger.188 “Famia”, according to a confidential source familiar with the Erdogan package and
also corroborated in part by “Famia” herself, has travelled to Somalia on operations more than
once:
179 Information received indirectly from Thabit but corroborated by ‘Ruta’ suggests that “Pinkie” is the daughter
of a serving Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) official.
180 The Monitoring Group is aware that “Famia” is reportedly currently looking for a new operational passport.
181 Confidential audio recording of “Famia”, ‘Ruta’ and other, dated 17 March 2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
182 “Phaiza” is used as a variation of “Faiza” in “Famia’s” operational passport.
183 The Monitoring Group is aware that as at May 2013, “Famia” had been using Kenyan mobile number +
254715119901 which had been registered under the name of Faiza Mustapha using Kenyan passport number
A112662.
184 The Monitoring Group has been unable to ascertain the date of death of “Famia’s” late sister “Faiza
Mustapha Hussien.
185 Recently, the Monitoring Group has observed “Famia” residing concurrently in Nairobi for short periods of
time.
186 Emrah Erdogan’s package had included various operational components including an Egyptian passport,
NGO stickers and items most likely to be used in assembling an IED.
187 The Monitoring Group can confirm the bag with operational contents from Emrah Erdogan was handed over
from Abdallah Mwasike Kilume to “Famia”.
188 Confidential audio recording of “Famia” and other, dated 4 April 2013 and archived with the United Nations.
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…we had to go through an even worse route. In fact that day we were almost 8km
more to enter Somalia. I was actually deported there. I’m normally so scared of getting
arrested.189
In or about September or October 2012, “Famia” relinquished her accommodation in
Mombasa to be used as a “safe house” for Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia. The
Monitoring Group understand by “Famia’s” own admission that the Al Qaida East Africaaffiliated
‘Fuad’ had stayed at her accommodation.190
“Famia’s” provision of a “safe house” predates her support in Mombasa. In early September
2012 she had secretly accommodated Al Hijra fighters Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’ and Ashraf
Yassin Abdurrahman ‘Migdad’ in Garissa and facilitated their release from a brief detention
by paying a 200 USD (15,000 Kenyan Shillings) bribe to Garissa police.191
“Famia’s” strong determination in supporting ‘Jihad’ and her role as a cross-border courier for
Al-Shabaab and Al Hijra has earned her the respect of fellow Kenyans fighting in Somalia. In
2012 “Famia” claimed that ‘Migdad’ had offered her a special assignment:
…he had told me something and gone straight to the point. He told me, Famia? You
are very hardworking and you support Jihad and I agreed with him and then he asked
me if I was ready to carry out an assassination. I told him I would think about it…he
went on to say this time they need a female to carry out the new job that’s coming up.
So he asked me to look for another female who can help me carry out the job. He said
we will be sending you things that you will just be putting in a drink. That one you
need not worry because Allah will forgive you for that.192
Series of audio recordings obtained by the Monitoring Group of “Famia” are consistent with
independent testimonies of her source of funding that continues to be channelled to Al Hijra
members and other extremists. Based on “Famia’s” admission to a fellow Al Hijra courier, the
Monitoring Group is confident that not only has “Famia” but also her UK-based parents
knowingly funded Al Hijra and Al-Shabaab members.193 Through Famia from her UK-based
parents, both Al Hijra and Al-Shabaab have apparently received funds from the United
Kingdom.194 According to a credible source familiar with “Famia’s” activities, her father,
Mustapha Hussien, a Kenya passport holder (A191623),195 and mother, Fatuma Gulam, also a
Kenyan passport holder (A349219), both using UK mobile numbers +447448 596 377 and
+447405 121 730, have also funded ‘Makaburi’ to transport new recruits to Somalia.196
189 Confidential audio recording of “Famia”, ‘Ruta’ and other, dated 17 March 2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
190 Confidential audio recording of “Famia” and other, dated 4 April 2013 and archived with the United Nations.
191 During his interrogation by security services, Ashraf Yassin Abdurrahman ‘Migdad’ admitted to “Famia”
accommodating both him and Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’.
192 Confidential audio recording of “Famia” and other, dated 4 April 2013 and archived with the United Nations.
193 The Monitoring Group is currently attempting to confirm the residency status of “Famia’s” parents in the
United Kingdom.
194 The Monitoring Group is currently attempting to verify if Mustapha Hussien still has any contacts with his
former associate Ahmad Iman.
195 The Monitoring Group is aware the passport may have expired.
196 Interview, Nairobi, 13 April 2013. In April 2013, the Monitoring Group accessed the immigration file of
Faiza Mustapha Hussien, which also contained the passport details of her parents (Mustapha Hussein and
Fatuma Gulam). While conducting a PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation
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81. In November 2012, Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’, the Nairobi-based Al Hijra ‘Amir’, met
with a trusted Al Hijra courier to update her on the details of an upcoming Al Hijra – PRMC
meeting that would require the assistance of the Al Hijra couriers. The Monitoring Group has
since learnt that the meeting concerned an Al Hijra fighter returning from Somalia by the
name of “Nurudin”197 that was killed with another person in Mombasa and new measures of
assisting the Somalia-based returning fighters.198
82. Subsequently on 4 December 2012, ‘Carragher’, acting on behalf Al Hijra and
PRMC, and ‘Ruta’ again met with the same member of the courier cell. Following an
explanation of the state of the Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia, which ‘Carragher’
claimed to be around thirty currently divided into three groups,199 the courier was informed
that one of the groups would need to be relocated to secure safe houses, preferably in
Tanzania.200
83. On 8 December 2012, the courier met with ‘Carragher’ and ‘Ruta’ who were both
delivering a message from PRMC that it had decided to contribute to the regrouping of the Al
Hijra fighters in Tanzania but on the condition that ‘Ruta’ be assigned to the couriers. The
courier was also told to expect seven returning fighters to be relocated to Tanzania. Details
and identities of the returning fighters had remained unknown until 13 December 2012, when
it was disclosed that some of the fighters included Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’,201 Ali
Masadiq ‘Masadiq’, “Budalangi” and the Al-Qaida-affiliated ‘Fuad’.
84. Around this time while Al Hijra and the PRMC were in the process of attempting to
identify and transport Al Hijra fighters to Tanzania, Thabit on behalf of ‘Makaburi’ was
independently inquiring about the possibility of locating a “safe house” in Tanzania. In a
discussion that initially began over two days between Thabit in Shimo la Tewa prison and a
close associate of Ahmad Iman from 3 to 5 December 2012, Thabit asks: “How well do you
know Tanzania?” while stating through a coded message:
43 7*s5 n33d t5 81y x6*5x9vs fr2 th37 which translates into: We also need to buy
xploxivs [explosives].202
85. By the end of the initial discussion, Thabit was requesting a “safe house” or as he put
it: “do you know what a safe house is…bait ul amni in Arabic”203 in Tanzania and asking for
a: “isolated big [house] with a compound somewhere police don’t patrol and the last place
System) search in May 2013 on Mustapha Hussien and Fatuma Gulam, Mustapha’s passport search conflicts
with the current records for an individual named “Mary Magiri Mungai” while Fatuma’s passport shows no
trace within PISCES.
197 The Monitoring Group is aware that “Nurudin” was the ‘adopted brother’ of ‘Carragher’ the Nairobi-based
Al Hijra ‘Amir’.
198Monitoring Group interviews in Nairobi, November 2013.
199Kenya National Intelligence Service (NIS) in November 2012 estimated around 100 fighters had returned to
Kenya in support of Al-Shabaab.
200The Monitoring Group was informed that a key condition was that the group must travel through the Isebania
border to Tanzania. Monitoring Group interview with Al Hijra courier, 4 December 2013.
201 The Monitoring Group notes that on 13 December 2012, the Al Hijra courier was informed that the group
included an “Arab” who later turned out to be Athman Ahmed.
202Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 19:14 pm, dated 4December 2012 and archived with
the United Nations.
203Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 18:54pm, dated 5 December 2012 and archived with
the United Nations.
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they will search when looking for a lion [Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab member].”204 However,
unbeknownst to most Al Hijra members, and only a select few in Shimo la Tewa prison, and
most likely ‘Makaburi’, were aware of a potential facilitator, a Somali-Tanzanian who
claimed to have access to explosives in Tanzania.
Yusuf Hussein Hassan: Facilitator or ‘businessman’?
Probably on 28 January 2012, according to South African immigration records, Yussuf
Hussein Hassan a Somali-Tanzanian travelled to South Africa using a valid Tanzanian
passport (AB283396) expiring in 2018. However, in an attempt to depart South Africa on
13 September 2012, Yussuf visited the Tanzanian High Commission in Pretoria to apply
for an emergency travel document claiming his passport (AB283396) was lost.205 After
being issued with a travel document (AB09325872) valid for travel in East and Southern
Africa for one year, Yussuf departed for Mombasa, Kenya. Departing South Africa on 17
September 2012 and travelling through Zambia and Dar es Salaam, Yussuf arrived at
Lunga Lunga border, Kenya, on 21 September 2012.
The Monitoring Group has learnt following an interview with Yussuf that while in transit
in Tanga, a town in Tanzania approximately one hour to the Kenyan border, he had made
several calls to a family friend named Mzungu Kadzungu Mwamunga ‘Mohamed’.
According to Yussuf, but later denied by ‘Mohamed’, he had made prior arrangements to
meet ‘Mohamed’ at the Kenyan immigration border control at Lunga Lunga in order to
find him a local hotel before departing to Mombasa the following day.
Interviews with Kenyan immigration officials in addition to PISCES (Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System) records confirm that Yussuf
was cleared by immigration using his travel document (AB09325872) and did not
disclose his valid passport. However, during a routine check at the custom baggage hall,
204Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 18:58pm, dated 5 December 2012 and archived with
the United Nations.
205 See annex 2.1.g for copy of Yussuf’s temporary travel document.
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custom officials found secreted away in Yussuf’s luggage a bulletproof vest and two
woollen mask hoods, as well as his valid passport (AB283396).206
During Yussuf’s interrogation by the security services he claimed the bulletproof vest had
been transported from South Africa for Mzungu Kadzungu Mwamunga ‘Mohamed’, a
claim that ‘Mohamed’ has since denied during an interview with the Monitoring
Group.207
It is the Monitoring Group’s assessment that during Yussuf’s interrogation he had given
false statements, a fact he later admitted to the Monitoring Group, claiming he had done
so out of fear.208 Yussuf had, however, accurately declared he had previously worked in a
Tanzanite mine own by his parents in Mererani in Tanzania.209
It is still unclear and whether it was intentional to allow Yussuf to congregate with Al
Hijra and Somali pirates in Shimo la Tewa prison during his time in prison between 24
September 2012 and 10 December 2012. Yussuf however, began to conspire or at worse,
entertain the financial prospect of procuring explosives from either his family-run
Tanzanite quarry or exploiting his knowledge of the mining sector in Tanzania.210
86. The Monitoring Group is still attempting to ascertain the actual details of what was
agreed upon prior to Yussuf Hussein Hassan’s departure from Shimo la Tewa prison with
Thabit on behalf of ‘Makaburi’. However, Thabit, in a message to a female Al Hijra member,
asks: “…remember the brother from Tanzania [Yussuf Hussein Hassan] who was here
[Shimo la Tewa prison] you said you knew his wife. How well do you know her?”211 Later in
the conversation, Thabit makes clear his intention and probably what had been agreed prior
with Yussuf before his departure from Shimo la Tewa prison: “I’m trying to find a way to get
the fireworks [explosives]. He [Yussuf Hussein Hassan] said his mum has a mine.”212
Regrouping in Tanzania: From Mwanza to Tanga
87. On 13 December 2012, the Monitoring Group was briefed on a meeting between a
member of the Al Hijra courier cell and a close associate of ‘Carragher’ (Al Hijra Nairobibased
‘Amir’). The seven Al Hijra fighters had decided to depart for Tanzania. According to
‘Carragher’s’ explanation, the female couriers had delayed in identifying a safe house in
Tanzania. As a result, ‘Ruta’ had been tasked with the responsibility of escorting the seven
fighters across the Isebania border into Tanzania to Mwanza.213
88. The female courier was informed that Mwanza would only be a temporary stopover
for the Al Hijra fighters and that it was still expected that both the courier cell and PRMC
206 See annex 2.1.h for bullet proof vest found in Yussuf’s luggage.
207 Interviews with Mzungu Kadzungu Mwamunga ‘Mohamed’ in Ukunda, 11 October 2012.
208 The Monitoring Group through law enforcement and intelligence sources in South Africa has not been able
to substantiate the majority of Yussuf’s claims made in his statement about his residence in South Africa.
209 Interviews with Yussuf Hussein Hassan in Shimo la Tewa prison, 11 to 12 October 2012.
210 From 11 October to November 2012, the Monitoring Group received regular briefings by individuals privy to
Yussuf’s deliberations with Al Hijra members on procuring explosives from Tanzania.
211Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 19:34pm, dated 1 January 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
212 Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 19:425pm, dated 1 January 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
213 Interview with Al Hijra courier, 13 December 2012.
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would play a role in moving the group onwards to a new safe house. As part of the
preparation for this, the female Al Hijra courier was asked for her national identification
number and mobile number. As explained to the Monitoring Group, a U.S.-based Al Hijra
financier would be transmitting funds from the U.S. to the courier for the upkeep of the
fighters who were in Mwanza.214
214 Interview with Al Hijra courier, 13 December 2012.
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Image of the Al Qaida-affiliated ‘Fuad’ Image of ‘Masadiq’
89. On 15 December 2012, in anticipation of funds being sent from the U.S. financier,
‘Ruta’ met with a member of the Al Hijra courier cell. During the meeting they discussed a
joint planned trip to Mwanza to begin transferring the Al Hijra fighters to a new safe house
that the Monitoring Group understands had been arranged in Tanga. In addition, a bag had
been retrieved by ‘Ruta’ and was to be transported to Tanzania by the courier for the
Mwanza-based Al Hijra fighters.
90. Information received by the Monitoring Group on 15 December 2012 described the
minute-by-minute unpacking of the bag by ‘Ruta’. According to the courier and corroborated
by the real time updates and a photo of the bag provided to the Monitoring Group at the time,
from 3:15pm to 6:45pm, ‘Ruta’ both unpacked the bag and rearranged its contents. Some of
the contents of the bag included a laptop, cables and wires, a small bag of batteries, a number
of small key fob remotes, and a bag of documents. The Monitoring Group’s assessment of
some the items are that they could be used in the assembling of IEDs for attacks in Kenya.215
91. By early January 2013, ‘Ruta’ had traveled back to Mwanza along with cash provided
by the PRMC for the upkeep of the Al Hijra group regrouping in Tanzania. Arriving back in
Nairobi in or about 8 January 2013 after departing Mwanza on 6 January 2013, ‘Ruta’ and
the female couriers started to plan another joint trip to Mwanza for 17 January 2013.216
92. During a field trip to Mwanza from 17 to 20 January 2013, the Monitoring Group
closely observed Al Hijra fighters plan their onward trip to Tanga. According to an Al Hijra
member directly involved in the planning for Tanga, the couriers were informed that out of
the seven fighters only two had remained behind in Mwanza. The Monitoring Group is also
aware that those that had left the Mwanza safe house included Al Hijra logistics individual
Ali Masadiq ‘Masadiq’ and the Al Qaida East Africa-affiliated ‘Fuad’.
93. On 20 January 2013, two days before transporting the remaining two Al Hijra
fighters, Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’ and “Rashid” to Tanga, the Al Hijra members began to
deliberate potential security concerns, with ‘Ruta’ cautioning the group that:
Again we have to be very cautious because anything can happen like the issue of
vehicle search and other security-related issues.217
215 Monitoring Group minute-by-minute communication with Al Hijra courier from 3:15pm to 6:45pm on 15
December 2012.
216 The Monitoring Group is aware that ‘Ruta’ departed for Mwanza on 16 January 2013 as part of a security
precaution not to be seen travelling with the Al Hijra female couriers.
217Confidential audio recording of ‘Ruta’, ‘Mwarabu’, “Rashid” and other, dated 20 January 2013 and archived
with the United Nations.
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94. Probably as a security measure and means to conceal their real identity, the
Monitoring Group has learnt that from December 2012, including in or about 20 January
2013, the remaining two Al Hijra fighters “Rashid” and Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’ had
sought the assistance of AMYC members in Tanzania in procuring two birth certificates in
the names of “Jacob Mtunzi Rwakatale” and “Mwiru Abeid” respectively.218 The Monitoring
Group also believes that identifying Tanga as a safe haven for the Al Hijra fighters was in
part due to the long association between Al Hijra and AMYC, strengthened by the late Aboud
Rogo Mohamed and ‘Makaburi’.219
95. Arriving at the safe house in Tanga on 22 January 2013, the two Al Hijra fighters
“Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ began the process of looking for additional identification
documentation,220 including travel documents and voter registration cards.221 During this
same period both “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ began to deliberate with the couriers on a request
that ultimately became an urgent task for two Al Hijra fighters and unknown members of
AMYC.
96. On 24 January 2013, during a field mission to Tanga, the Monitoring Group received
information that Thabit on behalf of ‘Makaburi’ had requested “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ to
assist with the procurement of explosives. While the Monitoring Group is unclear when this
request was made, it believes the request was most likely made between 7 January 2013 and
in or about 14 January 2013.222 According to a confidential source involved in the planning of
the Tanga safe house, during a meeting both “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ claimed procuring
explosives for ‘Makaburi’ was indeed possible in Tanga but would be easier if they could
locate the Al-Qaida-affiliated ‘Fuad’.223 Alternatively, both “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ would
locate a Tanga-based Tanzanian Al-Shabaab associate of ‘Fuad’ who could also procure
explosives from Tanga.224
218 In its previous mandate, the Monitoring Group reported on AMYC and its links to Al Hijra (MYC). See also
S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
219 Various audio recordings accessed by the Monitoring Group and corroborating testimonies suggests the Al
Hijra fighters had received support from former Tanzanian fighters who had return back to Mwanza and
Tanzania. Based on the Monitoring Group’s understanding of Mwanza and Tanga these individuals are
assessed more than likely to be AMYC members.
220 See annex 2.1.j for travel documents and birth certificates.
221 See annex 2.1.j for travel documents and birth certificates.
222 The Monitoring Group has made this assessment based on analysis of an Al Hijra courier and Thabit’s
‘secure phone’ discussions and testimonies.
223 The Monitoring Group is aware of this from reports attributed to Fuad Abubakar Manswab’s legal
representative Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’.
224 Testimonies received by the Monitoring Group during January and February 2013 suggests that the unknown
Tanzanian Al-Shabaab member had previous fought alongside Al-Shabaab with a number of Al-Hijra fighters.
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Packaged explosives and detonation cord
97. On 25 January 2013, a serving member of AMYC in Tanga informed the Monitoring
Group that certain AMYC members had access to explosives. On 26 January 2013, the
Monitoring Group was able to carry out a preliminary inspection of what the AMYC member
claimed to be explosives and a detonation cord. During the preliminary inspection of the item
purported to be explosives, the Monitoring Group observed the following characteristics:
chemical smell, sticky and sweaty, with a weight of approximately 6 to 7 kilograms. The
Monitoring Group has since learnt that the item was indeed explosives but a specific type
normally used in mining and known as “packaged explosives”.225
98. As plans progressed, “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ in Tanga began to search for
explosives. Meanwhile in Kenya Thabit, who had routinely passed on messages from prison
for ‘Makaburi’, had his regular telephone communications disrupted.226 On 15 February
2013, a female courier received a message from the Al Hijra fighters in Tanga confirming
they had found and met the Tanzanian Al-Shabaab member associated with ‘Fuad’, the Al-
Qaida-affiliated associate of ‘Makaburi’. According to the courier, “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’
had also identified explosives that would then need to be transported back to ‘Makaburi’ in
Kenya.227
99. The Monitoring Group understands that throughout the initial planning stages of the
operation to transport explosives into Kenya there had been no substantive discussions on
potential targets or the use of the explosives until 16 February 2013, at least to the knowledge
of the Al Hijra female courier cell. However, the Monitoring Group is aware that ‘Chacha’,
the Al Hijra legal representative, appears to have had foreknowledge of potential targets.
100. In addition to his possible knowledge of targets in Kenya, ‘Chacha’ had also been
receiving bomb-making instructions from Jermaine Grant during their meetings to be passed
on to ‘Makaburi.228As mentioned above, the Monitoring Group believes that the plan to
225 In its previous mandate, the Monitoring Group described AMYC’s links to the fishing community in Tanga.
Evidence suggests that the fishing community in Tanga has available access to packaged explosives used in
mining that is also illegally used in fishing. See also S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
226 The Monitoring Group believes Thabit’s last ‘secure phone’ communication from prison was at 19: 29pm on
24 January 2013.
227 Interview with Al Hijra courier, 15 February 2013.
228 Monitoring Group briefing on Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’ by Al Hijra courier, 16 February 2013.
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transport explosives into Kenya involved Jermaine Grant remotely through his regular access
to Al Hijra members in Shimo la Tewa and his legal representative.229
Jermaine John Grant: ‘Bomb instructor’
Jermaine John Grant is a UK national who admittedly identifies himself more with the
Al-Qaida cause than Al-Shabaab like a number of other UK nationals currently fighting
in Somalia.230 In or about 2011, the Monitoring Group believes Grant returned from
Somalia with a number of other foreign fighters mainly from East Africa. Uncorroborated
information accessed from Abu Mansour Al-Amriki, the U.S. national foreign fighter in
Al-Shabaab, suggests Grant may have also returned to Kenya along with other Al-Qaida
East Africa associates when he claimed: “the Jamaican [Jermaine Grant] caught in
Mombasa was also angry and left with Fazul’s crew [Fazul Abdallah Mohamed
associates]…”231 However, the Monitoring Group’s assessment is that in spite of claims
that Grant had left due to being disillusioned, he had more than likely returned to carry
out attacks in Kenya on behalf of Al-Shabaab with the support of other affiliates (See
annex 2.1.b for more information on Jermaine Grant’s reported associates in Burundi).
On 20 December 2011, Grant was arrested in Mombasa with his close associate Fuad
Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’, who also reportedly identifies with the Al-Qaida cause.232
Both Grant and ‘Fuad’ were charged for being in possession of bomb-making materials,
including electric switches, small batteries and bottles of chemicals (hydrogen peroxide
and ammonium nitrate).233
The Monitoring Group has learnt that during Grant’s interrogation by the Kenyan
security services on 25 December 2011, he admitted to having been in Somalia and
claimed he was a member of Al-Qaida and not Al-Shabaab. While Grant continues to
deny being in the possession of bomb-making materials, the Monitoring Group is aware
through law enforcement sources, corroborated by testimonies of currently serving Al
229 The Monitoring Group has been made aware of “procedures” to maintain contact between Jermaine John
Grant and Al Hijra fighter Thabit Jamaldin Yahya ‘Bobby’ during Grant’s stay at Shimo la Tewa prison for his
court appearances.
230 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8403/8403.pdf.
231 Abu Mansour Al-Amriki – Al Hijra member private message dated 13 January 2013 at 2:05pm accessed by
the Monitoring Group.
232 According to a western intelligence official, Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’ is assessed to have operational
links to a known Al-Qaida East Africa individual known to the Monitoring Group as “Kassim”.
233 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/13/british-man-charged-bomb-ke….
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Hijra members that Grant and others were probably in the advanced stages of an attack in
December 2011.234 During his interrogation he alluded to the fact that Al-Shabaab was at
the time planning attacks in Kenya against specific targets, including the United Nations
Office in Nairobi (UNON), the Kenyan Parliament and other security installations.235
Since being detained in December 2011, periodically in Kamiti Maximum prison in
Nairobi and Shimo la Tewa prison in Mombasa, Grant has continued to engage with Al
Hijra members both in detention and outside to conspire on behalf and in support of Al-
Shabaab.236 In March 2013, a close Al-Shabaab associate of Thabit Yahya Jamaldin
‘Bobby’ and Grant, known to the Monitoring Group as “Rash” (a.k.a. “Rashid”), sent the
following new “secure” codes to an Al Hijra member for communicating with individuals
such as Grant from Shimo la Tewa prison:
b c w m t a e i o u
9 5 7 * # 6 4 8 10 2
G H I J K L M N O P
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
On 5 May 2013 at 7:46pm, “Rash” using the mobile number +254770621355 from prison
sent an SMS to the above female Al Hijra member with the following coded message in
relation to Grant: “gnggoghgil”. The Monitoring Group has confirmed this is Grant’s
mobile number (+254 700 801 025) in prison and is identical to the same number sent by
Thabit to another Al Hijra member at 9:53pm on 22 December 2012:
“+254700801025…Grants Mpesa. He [Jermaine John Grant] will be offline, just send
[Mpesa] he will received when he manages to find a phone [handset] and pray for him
ukhty, its very tough for him.”237
On 16 February 2013, in an audio recording of Grant’s legal representative Andrew
Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’ with a female Al Hijra courier, ‘Chacha’ describes what appears
to be his ongoing discussions with Grant on bomb-making:
That’s why I was saying the plans needs to be put in place before. Because the
moment you have thought of something [a plot] then that’s the right time to do
something. I was talking to the Mzungu [Jermaine John Grant] on the same and
he was telling me that he already had a mortar and the main bomb was
somewhere else. It needed only a switch like an aerial. When they [Jermaine John
Grant and Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’] were arrested they [Anti-terrorism
police unit] only found with them a few materials which cannot even make a
bomb and they have been charged with being in possession of explosives which in
real sense its not. So he [Jermaine John Grant] was telling me that if they had
234Interview with law enforcement official, 13 December 2012.
235Confidential security document archived with the United Nations that details potential terrorist targets in
Nairobi for planned attacks during December 2011.
236Interviews and access to Thabit Jamaldin Yahya’s ‘secure phone’ discussions archived with the United
Nations.
237 Confidential source: Thabit ‘secure phone’ discussion at 9:53 pm. dated 22 December 2012and archived with
the United Nations.
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been found with all the components then they would have been properly charged.
I went and did my own research through the internet and that even the materials
that are used to make nail polish remover can also be used. The guy [Jermaine
John Grant] was seated and he wanted to take me through the whole process.
Then I thought now this issue has to be started from scratch by taking notes
because the wardens [prison wardens] again would listen to our conversation. The
guy has stated categorically he doesn’t want to be repatriated back to England. I
had even approached the shopkeeper [Amar also known as “Banda”] to see if he
could get a link with the Amir [Ahmad Iman] inside. The man tried but he didn’t
succeed. The goodness is that he had already given out an assignment. He had
sent for ten men to be trained on something specifically about the mortar. This
mortar would be used to propel a bomb. An expert would have determined a
distance the mortar could fire targeting a specific location in Kenya, like Kenya
Breweries where the Kenyan economy is really invested. This would have
brought down the Kenya economy and the entire Kenya Breweries plant down.238
The Monitoring Group has also learnt that in addition to providing bomb-making
instructions to ‘Makaburi’ through ‘Chacha’, Grant also conspired with his associate,
Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’, together with ‘Chacha’ to secure his release from
prison.239 The plan as described by ‘Chacha’ to an Al Hijra member would involve Grant
and ‘Fuad’ through a senior Kenyan lawyer known as “Mbugua” [Mureithi] deceiving the
Court that the Kenyan security services had abducted ‘Fuad’ due to his suspected links to
Al-Shabaab.240 In an audio recording accessed by the Monitoring Group, ‘Chacha’ offers
an insight into their plan to secure the release of Grant:
What we [Grant, ‘Chacha’, and ‘Fuad’] had planned on Fuad [Fuad Abubakar
Manswab] disappearing. We were to act if he had been kidnapped or hijacked [by
the Kenyan security services]. Someone was to call the mother saying that he
[Fuad] had been shoved into a Probox registration number KPQ…the other
numbers she couldn’t remember. Then from my side [‘Chacha’] we would have
rushed to the police to report the incident. The story of surety would have been
238 Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 16 February 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
239 The Monitoring Group is aware of another plan to secure the forceful release of Jermaine John Grant and Al
Hijra members from prison. See also http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2292668/Kenyan-court-moves-
Jermaine-Grants-trial-high-security-prison-foil-Samantha-Lewthwaite-plot.html.
240The Monitoring Group is aware of that many Al-Shabaab and Al Hijra members believe that elements close
to Kenyan security services had played a role in the unexplained killing of Aboud Rogo Mohamed and others.
The Monitoring Group has also received a detailed “assessment” on why at the time ‘Chacha’ and others were
confident that their plan to secure Grant’s release and implicate the security services would have worked,
although the Monitoring Group doubts this. According to ‘Chacha’ and other senior Al Hijra members, the
Kenyan courts would not have been in a position to successfully prosecute Grant in the absence of ‘Fuad’,
provided if it was viewed and accepted ‘Fuad’ had been abducted by elements close the Kenyan security
services. A similar case and theory put forward to the Monitoring Group involved three former Somalia-based
Al Hijra fighters who had returned to Kenya: Jeremiah Okumu, Steven Mwanzi Osaka (a.k.a. ‘Duda Black’ and
‘Duda Brown’ respectively) and Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi ‘Ruta’, who had all been linked and charged with the
grenade attacks at Uhuru Park in June 2010. However, while on trial in 2012 the ‘Dudas’ (Black and Brown)
disappeared, although they were widely believed to have been “abducted” without any evidence. As a result,
according to ‘Chacha’, the prosecution in the case of ‘Ruta’ was due to drop his charges, also speculated as one
reason for ‘Ruta’s’ unexplained killing on 17 March 2013. The Monitoring Group notes that during its past and
current investigations into Al-Shabaab-Al Hijra activities in the region, it has not received conclusive or
incontrovertible evidence to corroborate the view of Al-Shabaab and Al Hijra that elements close to the Kenyan
security services were involved in abductions, disappearances and extrajudicial killings.
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covered. When I had called Mombasa no one had done it and it was too late to do
anything. If this happened I would have stepped aside then “Mbugua”[Mureithi]
would come in to act for the Mzungu [Jermaine John Grant]. This was our
strategy so that “Mbugua” [Mureithi]
would raise the issue of Fuad’s disappearance. He would have applied to the
Court for Fuad to be produced by the Government [Government of Kenya].241
101. Information received by the Monitoring Group on 16 February 2013, following a
meeting with an Al Hijra female courier, suggests Al Hijra legal representative ‘Chacha’ was
fully briefed on the explosives expected from Tanzania and possibly the operational time
frame. In fact, as described to the Monitoring Group and corroborated by an audio recording,
‘Chacha’ had already been suggesting possible means of storing the explosives once they
arrived from Tanzania:
If these things [explosives] could be found then be assembled in different specific
locations. For example if it is Mombasa they need to look for a storekeeper who can
be trusted with it preferably a place like Mtwapa [Mombasa]. If it’s Kisumu the same
thing should be applied. This is what I advised them [Al Hijra members]. So that
when you want to go on Amal you don’t need to carry bags containing these things.
One has to ensure that you have you clothes and other personal needs in these
locations. That way it would be easier to move from point A to B lightly.242
102. In demonstrating that he had been kept abreast of developments, ‘Chacha’ enquired:
“so Tanga is ready”, in reference to the explosives to be transported into Kenya, and then
went on to say:
Has the survey [surveillance on targets] been conducted already or they [Al Hijra and
‘Makaburi’] are only waiting until 4 March 2013. Things could be tight if they are not
a head of time. You see Buda [Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’] had proposed a
very good idea. You know in Kibarni [railway bridge crossing in Mombasa] there is
place where a train crosses above the road beneath it some hide underneath and plant
a device there so that when the train is passing that will be right moment to act. The
wagons will come down landing on the road thus causing a major blocking from
coming in or going out of Mombasa. If this happens I am telling you the country’s
economy in Mombasa would have been paralyzed. This will look big and the whole
world will be watching. The problem now with Buda [‘Makaburi’] is these boys
[Somalia-based Al Hijra returning fighters], whenever they are given the idea, they
will always say they are waiting orders from their Amirs [in Somalia]. It reached a
point where Buda [‘Makaburi’] got angry and asked them if they can’t act, then they
should give him the tools and they will see for themselves that Amirs are also in
Kenya.243
241 Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 21 April2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
242Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 16 February 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
243Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 16 February 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
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Image of Kibarni railway bridge crossing, Mombasa
103. By 21 February 2013, the female Al Hijra couriers had travelled to Mombasa ahead of
two key meetings, en route to Tanga to facilitate the transportation of the explosives into
Kenya. The first meeting was to receive a briefing from ‘Makaburi’ and then to visit Shimo la
Tewa prison to meet Thabit. Both meetings focused on the explosives expected from Tanga.
104. On 23 February 2013, a female courier accompanied by Kassim Kassim Jembe, the
Al Hijra logistics individual operating from Mombasa, visited Thabit. During the meeting,
Thabit was briefed on the status of the explosives being acquired through the Al Hijra
fighters regrouping in Tanga. The Monitoring Group confirmed again, that according to
Thabit the explosives being procured in Tanzania were intended for Al Hijra but specifically
for ‘Makaburi’.244 Earlier on the same day, ‘Ruta’ together with a female courier had met
with ‘Makaburi’ for a detailed briefing on the logistics of transporting the explosives. Based
on the account of a trusted Al Hijra courier present at the meeting, ‘Makaburi’s confirmed
again that he was to receive and keep the explosives albeit through an intermediary.
105. According to the Al Hijra courier “R”, who had been designated to transport the
explosives into Kenya from Tanzania, ‘Makaburi’ had given the following guidance. “R” was
under no circumstances to transport the explosives from Tanzania but to only travel to Tanga
and verify that the explosive were ready. Upon verifying, the explosives were ready and that
the Al Hijra fighters together with the unnamed Tanzanian Al-Shabaab member had agreed
on how to transport the explosives across into Kenya, “R” would return to Kenya. In the
event the explosives crossed into Kenya, “R” would then coordinate its delivery, not to
‘Makaburi’ personally, but to an individual named “Abdinassir”. As mentioned above, the
Monitoring Group is aware that “Abdinassir” is a close associate of ‘Makaburi’ and is
employed as his security guard in Mombasa.245
Disruption
106. By 25 February 2013, the female couriers had arrived in Tanga and immediately on
26 February 2013 began cross briefing with the Al Hijra fighters at the safe house on
transporting ‘Makaburi’s’ explosives into Kenya. According to information received from a
courier present at the briefing, notes that the Al Hijra fighters had explained that while the
244 Interview in Mombasa with female courier, 21 February 2013.
245Interview in Mombasa with female courier, 21 February 2013.
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explosives had been identified, the facilitator (Tanzanian Al-Shabaab member) would not yet
meet the couriers to discuss its logistics. According to the courier, the unnamed Tanzanian
Al-Shabaab member would initially use an intermediary, thereby providing him the
opportunity to assess the female couriers and their bonafide credentials. The Monitoring
Group’s assessment is that this was probably a security precaution.246
107. A three-hour audio recording of a discussion on 26 February 2013 at the safe house
unambiguously reflects the confidence of Al Hijra fighters “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ that the
explosives would successfully be transported to Kenya. In spite of concerns of ‘Mwarabu’
and “Rashid” that Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia may not be able to penetrate
Kenya during the elections, TNT could be found for an attack. If unable to obtain TNT from
Tanga, the Al Hijra fighters claimed during the audio recording that ‘Makaburi’ would have
to resort to a consignment in Mombasa that was mostly like hidden.247 In emphasizing this,
‘Mwarabu’ urged: “the TNT has to be there [in Kenya] my sister. Unless we get the one in
Mtwapa [Mombasa]” while adding that: “TNT can be found here [in Tanga]. The problem
will now be how to cross over with it [into Kenya].”248
108. By 26 February 2013, it was still unclear how the TNT explosives would be
transported into Kenya. The Al Hijra fighters began to deliberate on possible methods,
including the use of a “boda boda” operator (bicycle taxi) to cross the Tanzanian border.249
But when questioned on its safety by a courier, ‘Mwarabu’ noted confidently that:
It cannot [explode] unless you make a call. We will show you how to connect then
you can test it and see for yourself if it blows up. We can even improvise using the
thermo flask. It will look like you are carrying tea no one will suspect.250
109. However, in Kenya on 25 February 2013 at 5:52pm, ‘Chacha’ had already sent a
private message via Facebook to a female Al Hijra member in Kiswahili informing the Al
Hijra couriers not to attempt transporting the explosives, warning:
You tell the sister to be more careful and if she has anything [explosives] let
somebody else carry. If you tell her about Buda [Abubakar Shariff Ahmed
‘Makaburi’] she will understand these people [security services] want to kill. Buda
[Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’] going for interrogation. In short, they are
watching him [‘Makaburi’]! And I’m very sure about it. 251
110. On 28 February 2013, still determined to transport the explosives into Kenya, the Al
Hijra fighters met the couriers to provide an update from the Tanzanian Al-Shabaab member
246The Monitoring Group’s understanding of the unnamed Tanzanian Al-Shabaab member is that he had
previously been in Somalia and was also an expert in handling explosives. Monitoring Group interviews in
Tanga from 25 to 26 February 2013.
247 Uncorroborated reports suggest this consignment of explosives hidden away in Mombasa may be linked to
the Al Qaida affiliated Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’.
248Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, ”Rashid” and other, dated 26 February 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
249 The Monitoring Group is investigating a similar attempt to use a ‘boda boda’ operator to smuggle explosives
from Uganda.
250 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, ”Rashid” and other, dated 26 February 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
251 Facebook message sent from ‘Chacha to female Al Hijra member on Buda and Al Hijra couriers dated 25
February 2013. The Monitoring Group has translated the original message into English.
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on the logistics of transporting the explosives. According to ‘Mwarabu’ and “Rashid”, the
Tanzania Al-Shabaab facilitator of the explosives had instructed the couriers to travel back to
Kenya and advise ‘Makaburi’ that once he had crossed into Kenya via the Taita border
crossing, he would contact the couriers to coordinate its delivery.252 In the evening of 1
March 2013, while the Al Hijra couriers were heading back to Kenya following a stopover in
Mombasa, Tanzanian security services raided the Al Hijra safe house and arrested seven
individuals, including “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’.253
Post-disruption
111. The Monitoring Group understands that during the interrogation of the Al-Hijra
fighters and AMYC members, both “Rashid” and ‘Mwarabu’ admitted to having trained in
Somalia and being tasked with procuring explosives but denied having any explosives in their
possession.254However, probably unconnected, on 22 March 2013, Kenyan security services
discovered a consignment of “packaged explosives” buried underground in Kwale
(Mombasa) close to the Tanzanian border. The explosives as per its packaging had been
manufactured for African Explosives Limited based in Modderfontein, Johannesburg, South
Africa and were a similar type of packaged explosives inspected by the Monitoring Group in
Tanga on 26 January 2013.255 While the Monitoring Group has received no evidence to
suggest members of AMYC or Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab fighters had smuggled packaged
explosives into Kenya, it remains concerned that such lethal materials may be unregulated in
Tanzania and in the hands of extremists.
252 Interview in Tanga, 28 February 2013.
253 Interviews with law enforcement official, March 2013
254Interviews with law enforcement official, March 2013.
255http://www.aelminingservices.com.
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Packaged explosives found in Kwale, Mombasa
112. In addition, the Monitoring Group has attempted to substantiate reported intentions of
‘Makaburi’, through his associates in Tanzania, to acquire a mine for the purposes of
accessing explosives.256 Similarly, the Monitoring Group has investigated any persisting links
between Yussuf Hussein Hassan and Al Hijra members for the purposes of acquiring
explosives. On 30 March 2013, the Monitoring Group definitively confirmed that Yussuf’s
mother is the owner of a mine named “Dada Kisho” in Arusha, and that the mine is currently
for sale.257 Testimony received from Yussuf’s mother, Ms. Aisha Duale, regarding her son’s
activities, while not suggesting any overt links to extremism or known extremist groups, does
suggest he is an unscrupulous ‘businessman’.258
113. In order to assess the threat posed by groups such as AMYC and possibly Al Hijra
members having access to packaged explosives, the Monitoring Group has sought expert
opinions on the use of this type of explosive and its potential for terrorist purposes.
According to one expert, while any type of explosive can be used for terrorist purposes,
packaged explosives have a very short shelf life and its explosive velocity is slower
(~3,000m/s) than most other readily available explosives currently in use, such as TNT
(~7,000m/s), rendering it not optimal for terrorist purposes.259 Al Hijra’s attempt to transport
explosives into Kenya represents the ease in which senior Al-Shabaab commanders such
Ahmad Iman can coordinate and support attacks from their base in Somalia.
256Female Al Hijra member with direct knowledge of ‘Makaburi’s’ operations meeting with ‘Makaburi’ in
Mombasa on 4 and 5 April 2013.
257 There is no evidence to suggest that ‘Makaburi’ intends to purchase the “Dada Kisho” mine but evidence
suggests he is aware of it being for sale.
258 Interview with Aisha Duale in Arusha, 30 March 2013. During the with Ms. Aisha Duale, she expressed her
concern at Yussuf links to his Somali cousins in South Africa but refused to go into details.
259Monitoring Group email correspondence with United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) official,
18 April 2013.
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Financiers, facilitators and active contributors
Known individuals linked to funding Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab
114. Over the years, Al Hijra members in Kenya and its Somalia-based fighters have
proven adept at mobilizing resources to support Al-Shabaab activities in Somalia and
operations in the region. As detailed in the previous Monitoring Group report,260 the
clandestine role of the PRMC continues to provide the group, in particular its Somalia-based
fighters returning to Kenya, with financial support. In some cases this support has been
earmarked for aiding attacks on behalf of Al-Shabaab. During the course of its current
mandate the Monitoring Group has observed a change in attitude between PRMC and Al
Hijra as a result of the new Kenya Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012).261 However,
information and evidence suggests that funding of Al Hijra activities on behalf of Al-Shabaab
still exists.
115. Evidence and information received by the Monitoring Group also suggests that in
addition to its traditional funding source through PRMC, Al Hijra has received overseas
financial contributions, including from South Africa, the United Kingdom, U.S., and Yemen.
Similarly, perhaps due to its operational setbacks, Al Hijra has at times benefitted from a
growing number of ‘goodwill donations’ from individuals such as ‘Makaburi’, ‘Chacha’ and
others for the sole purposes of carrying out attacks on behalf of Al-Shabaab.262
260S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
261 http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Kibaki-assents-to-anti-terrorism-bill/-/10…
262 The Monitoring Group is aware from accessing in some cases audio recordings that the following individuals
have also donated funds to Al Hijra: Mzee Mohamed Fundi and Zaina Fundi (Al-Hijra elder and PRMC
Trustee); Kassim Kassim Jembe; and “Pinkie” also know as “Firdaus” (reported to be a serving KDF official’s
daughter).
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PRMC Funding
116. Despite its public and robust denial of funding or assisting with recruitment activities
for Al-Shabaab, PRMC has continued to view its support of Al-Shabaab through Al Hijra as a
collective obligation towards ‘Jihad’.263On 31 July 2012, Abdallah Mwasike Kilume “Dalla”,
a known Al-Shabaab/Al Hijra courier and PRMC worker mentioned in a previous Monitoring
Group report, was arrested in Nairobi after leaving the offices of DHL where he had picked
up a package sent from China.264 The Monitoring Group has learnt that the package contained
civilian use items, including car key alarms and laser guide rangers, items that are commonly
used as components in assembling IEDs and weapons in Somalia and Kenya by Al-
Shabaab.265
117. During “Dalla’s” interrogation by the security services, he claimed he had been asked
to receive the package by Henry Saidi Irangu “Baba”, a Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter.
Email correspondence and phone communications throughout July 2012 confirm “Baba” had
indeed been “Dalla’s” handler in respect to the packages sent from China. While “Dalla’s”
account to the security services is accurate in part, the Monitoring Group is aware that from
at least in or about October 2011 up to and including 3 August 2012, “Dalla” had been
receiving packages containing for the most part civilian use items used in assembling IEDs
for use both in Kenya and Somalia. In this period, “Dalla” had successfully transported IED
components from its storage place at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque to Garissa for its
distribution, including to Somalia to be used in attacks by Al-Shabaab.
118. In January 2013, former Somalia-based fighter Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’, also the
step-son of “Dalla”, confirmed that at least three to four packages containing IED
components had been received, when he asked in reference to “Dalla’s” activities: “Do you
remember the consignment that was intercepted? It belonged to the Egyptian guy
[“Hakim”]…he managed to send three to four cargoes [IED components from China].”266 In
addition to this, the Monitoring Group has identified and accessed a number of operational
emails used by Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters in which one account details the DHL
tracking history for items sent from China to Kenya and another includes correspondence on
updates on the packages with IED components being sent from China.267
119. On 7 October 2012, following the passage of the Kenya Prevention of Terrorism Act
(2012), Mahmoud Karega Ng’ang’a, the former PRMC accountant, tendered his resignation.
In his resignation letter, among other issues, he cites his reason for resigning as financial
irregularities and alludes to the Monitoring Group’s allegations that PRMC had been
involved in recruiting and financing Al-Shabaab.268 During a detailed interview on 13
December 2012, Mahmoud Karega described PRMC’s funding activities of Al Hijra and
attempts to conceal their funding both to Al-Hijra members in Kenya and fighters in
Somalia.269
263Interviews with former Al Hijra members and former PRMC officials, September 2012 and December 2012.
264S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
265 Evidence indicates these items are mainly procured from China on the pretext of civilian use.
266 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, ‘Ruta’ and other, dated 19January 2013 at the Hotel La Kairo in
Mwanza, Tanzania, and archived with the United Nations.
267The Monitoring Group has identified seven email accounts previously used by Somalia-based Al Hijra
fighters, including an email account mentioned in audios archived with the United Nations. See annex 2.1.k for
sample of tracking history.
268 See annex 2.1.l for Mahmoud Karega’s resignation letter.
269 Monitoring Group interview with Mahmoud Karega, 13 December 2012.
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120. The Monitoring Group has also learnt of the collusion of PRMC and Al Hijra’s
Nairobi-based ‘Amir’ Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’ to support Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters sent
back to Kenya by Ahmad Iman and Al-Shabaab to carry out violent attacks. ‘Carragher’ has
with the financial support of PRMC rented accommodation and made available provisions for
the upkeep of returning fighters while on operations.270 However, during an interview with
‘Carragher’ on 20 March 2013 at the offices of the Dutch-run African Slum Journal in
Nairobi and in the presence of an independent observer, the Nairobi-based ‘Amir’ told the
Monitoring Group he was never a member of MYC (Al Hijra), noting: “MYC is dead.”271
Despite denying being a member of MYC (Al Hijra) or having any links to Al-Shabaabrelated
activities, ‘Carragher’ admitted during the interview to being ‘on the Committee’
(PRMC) and attending the MYC – PRMC shura of 28 February 2012. The shura in question
was, as reported in the Monitoring Group’s previous report, a meeting scheduled in part to
reorganize MYC and change its name to Al Hijra for funding purposes.272 ‘Carragher’, during
the meeting, also denied financially supporting Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters returning to
Kenya, such as Tuwa Ibrahim Jibril ‘Tafawa’ while on operations in Kenya, but admitted to
meeting ‘Tafawa’ and his cell by chance at a football match.273
121. The Monitoring Group has also received testimony from a close associate of
‘Carragher’ who had regular contact with him for operational purposes throughout November
2012 and through to 18 March 2013. According to the testimony, ‘Carragher’ had been
assisting returning fighters with funds accessed from PRMC. On 31 December 2013 or no
later than 2 January 2013, ‘Ruta’ travelled to an Al Hijra safe house in Mwanza, Tanzania,
accommodating ‘Fuad’ the Al Qaida affiliate and other Al Hijra fighters. Prior to his
departure, ‘Ruta’ had been provided with 350 USD (28,000Kenyan Shillings) of which 100
USD (8000 Kenyan Shillings) was contributed from PRMC and handed over to the Nairobibased
‘Amir’ for ‘Ruta’.274
Foreign funding
Dr. Ali Omar Salim
122. In addition to international funding received from the United Kingdom via “Famia”
Mustapha Hussien and from her UK-based parents, the Monitoring Group has received
credible information that strongly suggests Al Hijra members and fighters in Somalia have
received large sums, in some cases providing members around 5000 USD at a time, from
Yemen and undisclosed amounts from the U.S275. The funding appears to have been brokered
by Dr. Ali Omar Salim, a respected Majengo resident known for his charity to Muslim causes
270 On 10 April 2013, the Monitoring Group contacted the Dutch office of African Slum Journal via email
requesting a meeting to discuss Issa Mugai’s ‘Carragher’s relationship with Al Hijra and Al-Shabaab. To date
there has been no response the Monitoring Group request.
271 Monitoring Group interview with Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’ in the presence of an independent witness on 20
March 2013.
272 On 28 February 2012, MYC and PRMC met to discuss the reorganization and funding of MYC. During the
meeting, PRMC agreed to continue funding MYC on condition it changed its name. Confidential audio
recordings of MYC-PRMC meeting, dated 28 February 2012 and archived with the United Nations.
273Monitoring Group interview with Issa Mugai ‘Carragher’ in the presence of an independent witness on 20
March 2013.
274 Interview with an Al Hijra member familiar with ‘Carragher’ operational activities from November 2012 to
18 March 2013.
275 Multiple sources have confirmed Al Hijra’s funding from the U.S. and Yemen.
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and who had been acquitted in April 2012 for allegations of supporting and funding Al-
Shabaab.276 Dr. Ali Omar is the proprietor of Afwan Medical Centre, an entity previously
described as a funder of MYC (Al Hijra),277 and also mentioned in an AMISOM confidential
report..278
Image of Hassan Omondi Owiti ‘Fast n Furious’
123. Recently, evidence strongly suggests that Dr. Ali Omar had colluded with his lawyer
‘Chacha’ to financially support and provide a safe haven for Hassan Omondi Owiti
‘Budalangi’ (also known as ‘Fast and Furious’). ‘Budalangi’ mentioned in a previous report
had returned from Somalia in 2012 to carry out attacks as part of Al-Shabaab’s regional
plans.279 On 19 May 2013, Kenyan security services and corroborated by an Al Hijra press
release claimed an Al-Shabaab member had been killed following a gunfight in Nairobi.280
Audio recording accessed, describes ‘Chacha’ admitting to his and Dr. Ali Omar’s role in
supporting ‘Budalangi’ while he had been in hiding from the Kenyan authorities.281
Media image of Dr Ali Omar Salim
124. On 13 December 2012, the Monitoring Group received information from a trusted Al
Hijra courier who was approached and informed by the Nairobi-based ‘Amir’ ‘Carragher’
and ‘Ruta’ to provide Al Hijra with her national identification number and mobile number.
As described to the courier, she would be receiving funds from an individual in the U.S.
276http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-20522/doctors-not-shabaab-member….
277S/2011/433, pages 140-147.
278 1st AMISOM – TFG Information Sharing Meeting, Kampala, Uganda, 19 to 21 July 2011.
279S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 3.1.
280 http://news.siteintelgroup.com/component/customproperties/tag/Countries-
281 Audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha and other dated 31 May 2013, archived with the United Nations.
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During a later discussion in January 2013, ‘Ruta’ described how he receives funds from the
financiers or “sponsors” as he called them, in particularly the “sponsor” in Yemen.
According to ‘Ruta’, he would normally contact the Yemeni person, a medical doctor, via
email and Facebook. Based on audio recording accessed by the Monitoring Group of ‘Ruta’
and another Al Hijra member on 19 February 2012, in a discussion that focused in part on
operational and information security, ‘Ruta’ claimed he normally uses: “those two accounts
[email accounts], one for the brother in Yemen and this other one…I used to communicate
with Thabit before he got arrested.“282 Once the funds were sent through to Nairobi, ‘Ruta’
claimed he would then transmit them to Ahmad Iman the Al Hijra ‘Amir’ in Somalia. During
the same discussion, it became apparent that ‘Ruta’ and the “sponsor” in Yemen have a
dedicated email account for their funding activities albeit one that ‘Ruta’ fears could be
traced by the security services:
No, the one [email communication] I received from him [Yemeni “sponsor”] are from
a totally different account that only share with him and no one else. Unless I transfer
that account as well. But I’m not sure they [security services] will be able to track it
down. That’s another reason why I wanted to close them because I don’t know which
account they are tracking.283
125. ‘Ruta’s’ account of receiving funds from Yemen and the U.S. appears to be
corroborated by Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’. In an audio recording, ‘Mwarabu’ clearly
acknowledges the existence of the Yemeni financier sending funds to Somalia through ‘Ruta’
when he recalled his own approach to the Yemeni financier:
Do you know what Nurudin had arrived and no vehicle was there to collect them.
Also Mahad and his group had arrived from Tanzania. Some were supposed to travel
to South B [Nairobi] and I had no cash to facilitate their travel. I asked Gitau even if
he doesn’t have cash he should borrow cash elsewhere and we sort out the issue later.
During this time I was undergoing a lot of financial crisis. My child was sick and I
could not be able to raised money. I approached the Yemen guy and the other two to
support us financially but efforts were fruitless.284
126. As explained to the Monitoring Group by a confidential source familiar with ‘Ruta’s’
activities, and also alluded to by ‘Ruta’ during an audio recording on 20 January 2013, he had
been “blocked” from the Yemeni financier.285 ‘Ruta’ had been “blocked” over suspicions that
he had become compromised by an apparent relationship with the Kenyan security services.
As at the time of writing, the Monitoring Group is aware and continues to monitor attempts to
reactivate the funding from Yemen and the U.S. According to ‘Chacha’ who is liaising with
Dr. Ali Omar on the Yemen and U.S. funds, the Afwan Medical proprietor has become more
cautious, noting about the Yemen financier:
282 Confidential audio recording of ‘Ruta’ and other ,dated 19 February 2013 and archived with the United
Nations.
283 Confidential audio recording of ‘Ruta’ and other, dated 19 February 2013 and archived with the United
Nations.
284 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, ‘Ruta’ and other, dated 19 January 2013 at the Hotel La Kairo in
Mwanza, Tanzania, and archived with the United Nations.
285 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, ‘Ruta’, “Rashid” and other, dated 20 January 2013 at the Hotel
La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, and archived with the United Nations.
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You know when this things cropped up, the Arab in Yemen got the news. So I think
the support could have gone down…I will dig into it more –I will keep you
updated.286
127. The Monitoring has also identified two bank account numbers that have been set up to
deposit the funds before being dispersed between Kenya and Somalia.287
128. Finally, while unclear but still suggestive of possible funding linkages to Saudi
Arabia, during the audio recording of 19 February 2013, ‘Ruta’ described how he had set up a
new Facebook account and bought a new phone/simcard to call a contact known as “Msafiri”
in Saudi Arabia, and expressed his concern that the phone line might be traced and monitored
or as he claimed: “because of the stuff we were discussing I also need to close that
account.”288
Phoebe Nyakerario Siteki
129. The Monitoring Group has learnt that Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters like their
counterparts in Al-Shabaab have also been able to exploit and mobilize resources from the
diaspora. One such case the Monitoring Group is currently investigating in order to establish
the extent of the funding to Al Hijra fighters in Somalia is the alleged role of Phoebe
Nyakerario Siteki.289
130. Phoebe Siteki (born 2 February 1978) is a Nubian from Kenya who is believed
currently resides in Minnesota in the U.S., but may have lived elsewhere in the U.S., and
currently holds two Kenyan passports, including number A526559 issued in Kenya.290
Phoebe is also believed to be the step-relative to Ashraf Yassin Abdurrahman ‘Migdad, a
former Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter who until in or about August 2012 was stationed in
Kismayo before returning to Kenya on the instructions of Al-Shabaab and his Kenyan ‘Amir’
Mwalim Khalid (a.k.a. Titus Nabiswa) to carry out attacks,291 including assassinations in
support of Al-Shabaab.292
131. While fighting alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia from at least January 2010 to August
2012, the Monitoring Group strongly believes that ‘Migdad’ had on at least one occasion
received funds from his step-relative Phoebe Siteki in the U.S. In addition, information
received from a confidential source corroborated by audio recordings of Athman Ahmed
‘Mwarabu’ a former Somalia-based Al Hijra fighter, indicates that ‘Migdad’ may have used a
286 Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 21 April 2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
287 The Monitoring Group is currently monitoring the account numbers and as such, is unable to publish the
accounts numbers until confirmation of international funds have been deposited for the use of Al-Shabaab and
Al Hijra fighters in Somalia.
288 Confidential audio recording of ‘Ruta’ and other, dated 19 February 2013 and archived with the United
Nations.
289A confidential report archived with the United Nations suggests Phoebe Siteki and possibly other members of
her family may have sent money to ‘Migdad’ and Al Hijra in Somalia.
290 The Monitoring Group has been unable to confirm Phoebe Siteki’s immigration status in the U.S. , however,
information suggests Phoebe Siteki has recently acquired a new Kenyan passport from the Embassy of Kenya in
the U.S.
291Interview with law enforcement official, September 2012.
292 An audio recording of “Famia”, dated 4 April 2013 and archived with the United Nations, that suggests part
of ‘Migdad’s’ plans in returning to Kenya involved assassinations plots.
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joint operational email account ([email protected]),293 as well as six other email
accounts known to the Monitoring Group, including [email protected], to
communicate with Phoebe Siteki’s email [email protected] or Facebook account.294
132. Preliminary investigations by the Monitoring Group also suggest that Phoebe Siteki
may have at one point or another used the U.S. mobile number +1952 221 9128 to transmit
funds through Dahabshiil to Somalia during 2012, as indicated by Dahabshiil records.295 The
Monitoring Group continues to investigate this case.
Funds from South Africa
133. The Monitoring Group has also learned that ‘Migdad’ while in Somalia may have
received funds for Al Hijra fighters and Al Shabaab from a financier in South Africa, who
may have also been a member of Al-Shabaab in Somalia at one point. Corroborating
independent sources, including an alleged admission from ‘Migdad’ during his interrogation
strongly indicates that during March 2012, a financier based in South Africa had sent Al Hijra
and Al Shabaab through Dahabshiil a sum of 20,000 USD.296 The Monitoring Group is
currently analysing ‘Migdad’’s email accounts and a suspected email account of the South
African financier.
‘Goodwill contributors’
134. During the course of its current mandate, the Monitoring Group has learnt of the
financial contributions and fund-raising attempts by Al Hijra associates, such as ‘Makaburi’
and ‘Chacha’. These contributions and fund-raising activities have been principally designed
to sustain Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters while on operations in Kenya. This includes in at
least one case, though is believed to be on more than one occasion, an attempt to bribe a
Kenyan High Court Judge by Al Hijra with the support of ‘Makaburi’.
Contributions from Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’
135. The full extent of ‘Makaburi’s’ financial contributions to Al Hijra members in Kenya
and its fighters in Somalia is still unclear and is currently being investigated by the
Monitoring Group. However, audio evidence based on recordings of Al Hijra fighters at a
safe house in Tanzania offers an insight into ‘Makaburi’s’ determination to financially
support Al-Shabaab activities in Kenya and Somalia. On 26 February 2013, during a
discussion that centred on the difficulties experienced by Al Hijra fighters in Somalia and
fighters sent back to Kenya on operations,297 Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’ criticized the Al
Hijra Somalia-based ‘Amir’ Ahmad Iman:
293 During the audio recording dated 19 January 2013, Athman Ahmed ‘Mwarabu’ can be clearly heard
mentioning the email [email protected] that he had shared with other Al Hijra fighters in
Somalia.
294 The Monitoring Group is aware that among the many Facebook profiles used by ‘Migdad’, he also had
access to the Facebook profile name “Dias Ramo”.
295 The Monitoring Group notes that records obtained from Dahabshiil do not indicate Phoebe Siteki’s name but
the name “Abdiaziz Mohamed as the sender.
296 Confidential document archived with the United Nations.
297 Multiple testimonies from Al Hijra returning fighters suggests financing their operations as part of Al-
Shabaab in Somalia has been difficult at times. Fighters have often had to result to pleading for funds from
associates in Kenya.
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The problem with Ahmad [Ahmad Iman] is that he doesn’t act to the problems that
we are undergoing. Somebody like Abu [Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’]
promised to be sending 50K (700 USD) every month and he honoured his promises.
He went to the extent to rent house for the boys [Al Hijra].298
136. In addition, ‘Makaburi’, according a confidential source familiar with his operations
in Kenya, has jointly fund-raised with ‘Chacha’ to secure the release of detained Somaliabased
Al Hijra fighters in Kenyan jails with the purpose encouraging them to return back to
carrying out violent attacks once released. Financial contributions from the likes of
‘Makaburi’ and others is likely to mean Al-Shabaab will continue to rely more on regional
affiliates to self-fund their operations.
Fund-raising by Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’
Passport copy of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’
137. Over the course of three mandates, the Monitoring Group has been able to gain a
better understanding of the growing importance of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’ to Al
Hijra. While publicly ‘Chacha’ acts as the lone legal representative on Al-Shabaab-related
cases, mostly representing Al Hijra members, the Monitoring Group considers ‘Chacha’s’
actions and support to Al Hijra and other Al-Shabaab affiliates eligible for designation for
targeted measures by the Sanctions Committee.
138. The Monitoring Group has accessed an audio recording of Al Hijra fighters in which
they described ‘Chacha’s role in contributing financially to sustain ‘Jihad’ in Kenya on behalf
of Al-Shabaab. During the audio recording, the fighters explained how ‘Chacha’ has
supported ‘Jihad’ in Kenya with operational funds for the then Al-Shabaab/Al Hijra ‘Amir’
‘Mwalim Khalid’ (a.k.a. Titus Nabiswa). Prior to ‘Mwalim Khalid’s’ killing in October 2012,
he had been responsible for commanding and planning attacks in Kenya on behalf of Al-
Shabaab. In the audio, ‘Mwarabu’ recounts to his fellow Al Hijra fighter “Rashid” that:
298 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, “Rashid” and other, dated 26February 2013 at a Tanga,
Tanzania, safe house archived with the United Nations.
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You remember the two brothers that were gunned down, one in Nairobi and one in
Coast [Mombasa]. Even Teacher [‘Mwalim Khalid’] was in a rush looking for funds.
You can even ask Chacha and he will tell you how Teacher [‘Mwalim Khalid’] had
been chasing them around. Though one might not know how Chacha is but he had
given out till he is finished.299
139. In response, “Rashid” notes that: “at times he [‘Chacha’] could be financing food and
accommodation.”300
140. In an attempt to enhance operations in Mombasa and possibly regionally in
Tanzania,301Al Hijra and ‘Makaburi’ had planned to secure the release of Thabit Jamaldin
Yahya ‘Bobby’ from Shimo la Tewa prison.302Central to this plan was ‘Chacha’. According
to a confidential Al Hijra source with direct knowledge of ‘Chacha’s’ activities, ‘Chacha’ has
in the past been able to secure the release of Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters and other
members by fund-raising to bribe members of the Kenyan judiciary. As explained to the
Monitoring Group, bribes are normally offered to members of the judiciary to reduce and
grant bail for detained suspected Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab members.
Hon. Mr. Justice Martin Muya Mati
On 2 February 2013, the Monitoring Group was briefed on a discussion and plan which if
accurate suggests that Justice Martin Muya Mati, a Kenyan High Court Judge based in
Mombasa had agreed to grant Thabit a reduced bail on condition of a bribe from
‘Chacha’ acting on behalf of Al-Hijra and ‘Makaburi’.303
As described by a confidential Al Hijra source familiar with ‘Chacha’s activities,
‘Chacha’ had informed the confidential source that Justice Martin Muya had agreed to
reduce Thabit’s bail bond provided that Al Hijra could raise 1800 USD (150,000 Kenyan
Shillings). According to ‘Chacha’, Al Hijra did not have to raise the full amount but
299 Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, “Rashid” and other, dated 26 February 2013 at a Tanga,
Tanzania, safe house archived with the United Nations.
300Confidential audio recording of ‘Mwarabu’, “Rashid” and other, dated 26 February 2013 at a Tanga,
Tanzania, safe house archived with the United Nations.
301 The Monitoring Group is aware from accessing ‘secure phone’ discussions of Thabit Jamaldin Yahya
‘Bobby’ from Shimo la Tewa prison archived with the United Nations that he had planned to relocate to
Tanzania if his release was secured.
302The Monitoring Group notes and assesses that Thabit’s serious leg injuries would have most definitely
hindered him operationally even if he were able to flee to Tanzania.
303 Information received by the Monitoring Group by a close associate of ‘Chacha’ suggests his relationship
with Justice Martin Muya dates back a number of years.
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could contribute whatever funds they could, as it was expected that ‘Makaburi’ and
others in Mombasa would also contribute to the funds.
The Monitoring Group understands that the significance of securing Thabit’s release was
based on ‘Makaburi’s’ belief that if Thabit were released from prison, he would be able,
albeit consigned to using crutches, to motivate, incite and provide operational guidance to
other Al Hijra fighters that had been dispatched from Somalia. In an audio recording,
‘Chacha’ refers to Thabit as a good leader that had shown proficiency in gathering
intelligence, and in spite of being in Shimo la Tewa prison, had managed to oversee the
procurement and transfer of weapons.304
On 16 February 2013, ‘Chacha’ returned to meet the female Al Hijra member after
learning that Al Hijra had managed to secure 480 USD (40,000 Kenyan Shillings) and
asked:
If the cash could be raised to hundred thousand though I believe the fifty thousand
on top of that could be their cut and the remaining for their boss [Justice Martin
Muya]. If motor vehicle logbooks could be found with the value of five hundred
thousand each would be better. I believe the bond could be brought down to one
million and always these Judges will never one surety. He will have to give two
sureties just to be sure that he [Thabit] will attend court. But if Babu [‘Ruta’] can
meet with Buda [‘Makaburi’] and explain about the possibility of the bond
reduction things could be easier because Buda [‘Makaburi’] might be able to
convince the Mombasa Muslims and the possibility of the amount to be raised.
Even the other case concerning Fuad [Fuad Abubakar Manswab ‘Fuad’] the
money has been changing hands and the Judge has softened his stand.305
During the same meeting ‘Chacha’ claimed he would soon provide his own contribution
towards Justice Martin Muya’s funds. Four days later, ‘Chacha’, at 3:57pm on 20
February 2013, received an Mpesa mobile money transfer via Safaricom for 480 USD
(40,000 Kenyan Shillings) towards Justice Martin Muya’s bribe. By 1 March 2013,
Thabit’s funds for facilitating his release were complete when a Mombasa-based Al Hijra
member, Kassim Kassim Jembe, gave 1200 USD (100,000 Kenyan Shillings) to a female
Al Hijra courier who was instructed to call ‘Chacha’ to confirm the funds were available
for collection.306
On 3 March 2013 in Nairobi, days before ‘Chacha’ was set to travel to Mombasa in what
the Monitoring Group believes to be an attempt to bribe Justice Martin Muya, he again
met the Al Hijra member who informed him that the funds contributed in Mombasa
would be waiting for him on his arrival in Mombasa. According to an audio recording, it
appears that ‘Chacha’ was more than likely colluding with Justice Martin Muya’s front
office, possibly including his secretary and others when he claimed he would need to
contact the Judge’s secretary before 6 March 2013. Similarly, ‘Chacha alluded to others
working possibly in the Judge’s office being involved in the conspiracy to release Thabit:
304 Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 16 February 2013 and archived with
the United Nations.
305 Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 16 February 2013 and archived with the
United Nations.
306 Interview with Al Hijra courier, 5 March 2013.
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You know with the court matters we have to take our chance but so far there’s
been no incident that has risen where money has disappeared and the work wasn’t
done. Even when I hand it over personally, I remind them how I have people who
don’t understand. You don’t know them, however, they will deal with me. The
only time these issues got me into trouble is when some guy promised to get me
the people who normally accept 10%. We paid money which mind you is nonrefundable
then the guy disappeared. I was under so much pressure. But these
things come and pass. The Court is like that. After that case, we had someone
inside that place [Court]. I had to call him again to see if they are still psyched up
and still in the deal.307
At the time of writing, Thabit was still in prison. However, on 21 April 2013, the
Monitoring Group received information following a meeting between an Al Hijra
member and ‘Chacha’ that strongly suggests that Justice Martin Muya may have received
a sum of 1800 USD as a bribe to reduce the bail bond for Thabit.308
307 Confidential audio recording of Andrew Mwita Chacha ‘Chacha’, dated 3 March 2013 and archived with the United
Nations.
308 Interview with Al Hijra courier,21 April 2013.
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Annex 2.1.a: Summary of Ibrahim al-Afghani letter to Al-Qaida
mentioning Kenya and Tanzania (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
1. The Somalia-based Islamic World Issues Study Center (IWISC) released a message
attributed to a prominent figure in the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement and the jihadist
movement in general, speaking out against Shabaab leader Mukhtar Abu al-Zubeir and
appealing to Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri for intervention.
2. The 15-page document was allegedly written by Abu Bakr al-Zayla'i and was issued
on jihadist forums on April 6, 2013. Omar Hammami (AKA Abu Mansour al-Amriki) posted
about the release on his Twitter account, identifying Zayla'i as "Ibrahim al-Afghani," the
Shabaab's former "governor" of Kismayo in Lower Juba region of Somalia, and a "key
founder" of the group. In the text, Zayla'i corroborated some of the issues raised by
Hammami against the Shabaab leader, such as his holding people in secret prisons, putting
individuals with little expertise in commanding positions in battles, squandering the group's
gains, and mistreating foreign fighters.
3. IWISC provided excerpts from the document in the introduction, including, for
example: "If we were afraid before of the theft of the fruits of jihad by outside hands, we
have seen today a reality that suggests to us that a domestic deviation might lead to the fruits
of empowerment falling into oblivion, and Allah is the Helper." Zayla'i also wrote: "The
spirit of jihad receded, the abilities of innovation and production were destroyed, and the
wheel of progress retreated, and all of that is due to the removal of the leaders of jihad and
the scholars from the arena of influence, staying away from the method of consultation as a
way to administer the rudder of affairs inside the Movement."
4. Following is a translation of the introduction:
In the Name of Allah, the most Gracious and Merciful
Peace and prayer be upon our master and prophet, Muhammad, and upon his family and all
his Companions and those who followed them in goodness until the Day of Judgment.
Brothers in tawhid [monotheism] in the East and the West: Peace be upon you, and Allah's
mercy and blessings.
Islamic World Issues Study Center
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Presents:
An Urgent and Open Message from the Mujahid Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Zayla'i, may Allah
Preserve Him, to our Sheikh and Emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, may Allah Preserve Him
Indeed, I am the Naked Warner
{Note: The title is a reference to a Hadith by the Prophet Muhammad: "My example and the
example of what I have been sent with is that of a man who came to some people and said, 'O
people! I have seen the enemy's army with my own eyes, and I am the naked warner." The
naked warned indicates someone who takes off his clothes to wave to his people and warn
them of impending danger.}
In this message...
Our Sheikh and Emir... There is no time left to wait, nor is there room for patience... So,
hasten, hasten... Things have reached a level where talking doesn't work, and it is not suitable
under any circumstance to just watch and wait for what comes in the horizon. We are in a
dark tunnel in which only the All-Knowledgeable King knows what is hidden for us, and
Allah is the Helper and in Him we trust.
- It is the complaint of the silent majority from the various segments of the mujahideen and
the rest of the Muslims from the elites of the country and the wise ones, and the scholars,
preachers, and everyone who can deliver their words to you.
- If we were afraid before of the theft of the fruits of jihad by outside hands, we have seen
today a reality that suggests to us that a domestic deviation might lead to the fruits of
empowerment falling into oblivion, and Allah is the Helper.
- Because we were partners in jihad and we were never for one day partners in oppression,
and bringing the right of the oppressed from the oppressor is a duty.
- We have seen a significant decline from the gains of the mujahideen, where under the
Movement's administration for the past 4 years, there were 10 provinces with great human
resources and sympathy from our Muslim people, and unparalleled tribal support.
- The spirit of jihad receded, the abilities of innovation and production were destroyed, and
the wheel of progress retreated, and all of that is due to the removal of the leaders of jihad
and the scholars from the arena of influence, staying away from the method of consultation as
a way to administer the rudder of affairs inside the Movement.
- Regarding military operations, negative results are more than the positive on Islam, as a
result of distancing people of expertise, and the scholars, and most of the experienced leaders
from influencing the conduct of operations.
- Agitating the junior mujahideen who possess good intentions and pure natures, as we think
of them and Allah knows them best, against the leaders and the scholars inside the
Movement, to the point that some of them threatened liquidation, and Allah is the Helper.
- Regarding the secret prisons belonging to the Emir, people who enter them will be like lost
ones, and people who come out of them are like newborns, and they are varied and many and
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the scholars and the leaders aren't allowed to visit and supervise them. What is happening in
terms of violations of the prisoners' rights there makes the hair of the children turn gray,
things that the Shariah or the religion didn't command, and Allah is the Helper. The scholars
ordered to open their gates for supervision, but there were no listening ears.
- The Emir is practicing a filthy war against everyone who submits to the command of
Shariah and advises him and others, by practicing all kinds of pressures that one can imagine,
from sowing false rumors to maiming someone's image to giving monies in plenty.
- The policy of excess by the Emir is his methodology, and he exceeds in using and wasting
the resources of the Ummah without supervision and accountability. The state of the
mujahideen doesn't please friends or others far way, for he spends from the resources in
excess for his targets and gives drops to our mujahideen brothers, to the point that we feel
sorry for their state.
- He didn't receive the emigrants, and some of them fled to many of the outside areas from
the torture of the Emir and his entourage.
- The brothers in Kenya and Tanzania don't need money or equipment, they just need some
expertise, but the Emir didn't do it, unfortunately.
- The names and terms weren't safe, either. The names that were added to the emigrants are
such as, prison of the immigrants, and the field here means limiting the brothers' activities
and movements, and the front became an extra punishment to the brother by the Emir's judge.
{Link to download PDF}
Islamic World Issues Study Center
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Annex 2.1.b: Summary of East Africans recruited to join Al-Shabaab
in Somalia in March 2013 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
1. Despite Al-Shabaab’s military setbacks and the difficulties encountered by new
recruits who attempt to cross into Somalia to fight alongside it, the Monitoring Group has
observed an increase in non-Somali East Africans attempting to cross into Somalia
through the popular route of Kiunga in Kenya to join the Somali armed group.
Adinan Mudrikat Suedi
2. On 11 March 2013, Adinan Mudrikat Suedi (22 years old), a Tanzanian who had
frequented the Masjid Raufu Mosque in Dar es Salaam, was arrested in Kiunga en route
to Somalia. According to reports attributed to Adinan and accessed by the Monitoring
Group, he had departed Dar es Salaam in Tanzania on 6 March 2013, entering Kenya
through the Lunga-Lunga border crossing. The Monitoring Group understands Adinan
then traveled from Mombasa onto Malindi where Adinan claimed he boarded a boat to
the island of Lamu before finally walking from Lamu to the island of Hindi, and then
travelling by road to Kiunga. The Monitoring Group has also learnt that Adinan had
admitted wanting to travel to Kismayo to look for a job and had claimed he had a contact
person there.
Rajab Omar Hemedi Suleiman et al
3. On 24 March 2013, Rajab Omar Hemedi Suleiman (19 years old) and three other
Tanzanians namely: Juma Sadiki Juma Budu (15 years old); Nasir Hassan Ramadhan (15
years old) and Hamisi Ramadhan Hamisi (14 years old) were arrested in Kiunga shortly
after arriving from Lamu en route to their final destination in Somalia. According to
reports attributed to each of the four new recruits and also accessed by the Monitoring
Group, they had all frequented the Kiwalani madrassa in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
4. Departing Mombasa on 20 March 2013, Rajab Omar and his group claimed they
had spent four days in Lamu while preparing to travel to Kiunga as part of their purported
missionary work (Tabligh). The Monitoring Group has learnt that the group had a
Tanzanian mobile telephone number of an unknown person believed to be from
Korogwe, a small town known known for its recruitment for Al-Shabaab in Tanzania,
and not a Somalia number as claimed by the authorities in Kenya.
Dearsoul Hamisi and Abubakar Omari
Dearsoul Hamisi Abubakar Omari
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5. On 26 March 2013, Dearsoul Hamisi (21 years old) and Abubakar Omari (19
years old), two Tanzanians affiliated to the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) in
Tanga, were arrested in Kiunga attempting to travel to Somalia. In statements from both,
Dearsoul and Abubakar claimed they had departed from the village of Yombo in the
Temeke district of Tanzania on 22 March 2013. Arriving in Kenya on 22 March 2013,
through the Lunga-Lunga border crossing, they were issued with a two-week visa
(expiring on 6 April 2013).
6. According to Dearsoul and Abubakar, they departed Mombasa on 25 March 2013,
arriving in Lamu the same day, when they soon departed to Kiunga on 26 March 2013.
Despite Dearsoul and Abubakar denying having any affiliation to Al-Shabaab, found in
their possession was a laptop and memory card. According to reports, the laptop had
saved on it Google map direction: “Tanzania – Somalia” while the memory card had
reported ‘Jihad’ materials.
Mahmoud Ndiritiro
7. In addition to a sizeable number of Tanzanians seeking to join Al-Shabaab since
its dramatic setbacks, the Monitoring Group has received credible reports of Burundian
nationals being recruited into Al-Shabaab.
8. On 24 March 2013, Mahmoud Ndiritiro (22 years old) was arrested in Kiunga
walking along the beach towards Somalia. In a statement attributed to Mahmoud and
accessed by the Monitoring Group, he had claimed he was recruited in January 2013 at
the Iqra Mosque in Bujumbura in Burundi. The Monitoring Group also understands
Mahmoud had departed Burundi on 13 March 2013 arriving in Kigoma, where he
boarded a bus to Tanzania before departing on 16 March 2013 to Kenya. Arriving in
Kenya on 17 March 2013, Mahmoud then proceeded to Mombasa to stay with a relative
before leaving on 23 March 2013 for Lamu and arriving there on 24 March 2013, and
then proceeding on to Kiunga the same day.
9. According to Mahmoud, he was travelling to Somalia to meet a person named
“Sheikh Shariff”. Found in his possession was a mobile telephone with an outbox
message in Arabic: “an uqatila nasi”, roughly translated to mean: “to kill the people” and
the names of the Somali towns of Hudur and Baidoa.
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10. On 22 May 2013, the Monitoring Group received credible information that
indicates Mahmoud appears to have links to Al Hijra member Thabit Jamaldin Yahya
‘Bobby’ and the Al-Qaida affiliated Jermaine John Grant, both in detention.
Mskiti wa Barabara ya Tano Bujumbura (5th Avenue Mosque, Bujumbura)
11. According to multiple independent sources, including indirect information
accessed from Thabit based in Shimo la Tewa prison in Mombasa, Mahmoud Ndiritiro,
since his arrest by the security services, has periodically been detained in Shimo la Tewa
prison and at the Airport Police station while waiting to be repatriated to Burundi. During
this time, the Monitoring Group has discovered, again from indirect accessed to Thabit
and Grant, that Mahmoud has been able to interact with both individuals on potential
operations involving Al-Shabaab affiliates in Burundi.1
12. Information received from a close associate of Thabit’s describes an ongoing plan
by Thabit and Grant, with the assistance of Mahmoud, to procure grenades from
individuals affiliated to Al-Shabaab at the Mskiti wa Barabara ya Tano Bujumbura (5th
Avenue Mosque, Bujumbura) in Burundi. According to the same close associate of
Thabit familiar with his activities, both Thabit and Grant had arranged for an Al Hijra
courier to travel to Burundi to meet the two Al-Shabaab affiliates at the 5th Avenue
Mosque, when Thabit noted:
I have a number for Baba Ayman, you call from a payphone. You say you want to
speak o Mama Ayman and then tell her your name is Zainab…Mahmoud sent
you. You tell her Mahmoud was arrested [in Kenya] then you ask them if you
could go to Burundi or they could come [Kenya]…don’t talk about the jugs
[grenades] over the phone, they speak Swahili and French.2
13. The Monitoring Group can also confirm that at 00:20 am on 23 May 2013, Thabit
had provided a Burundi mobile number for “Baba and Mama Ayman” at the 5th Avenue
Mosque to a close female Al Hijra associate.3 On 26 May 2013, the Monitoring Group
was briefed on a ‘secure telephone’ discussion between Thabit and a member of Al
Hijra’s courier cell. According to the member, Grant and Thabit were insisting that the Al
Hijra courier cell expedite the contacts with the Al-Shabaab affiliates in Burundi. On the
same day the Monitoring Group observed a telephone call from a member of the courier
cell to the Al-Shabaab affiliate in Burundi, “Baba Ayman”, on the number provided by
Thabit and Grant.
14. During the telephone call, as observed by the Monitoring Group from 9:29 am to
9:34 am, the courier cell member spoke to “Baba Ayman” under the assumed name
1 The Monitoring Group is aware that Grant has recently changed his Kenya-based prison mobile number
to +254 728 980203. This was communicated to an Al Hijra associate of Grant’s at 12:32 pm on 16 May
2013 using the codes: “gniopogig”.
2 Close associate of Thabit ‘familiar with his activities ‘secure phone’ discussion via Nimbuzz mobile
messenger from 00:09 am to 00:10 am, dated 23 May 2013 and archived with the United Nations.
3 The Monitoring Group is currently attempting to investigate the Burundi mobile number via CDR (Call
Data Report) analysis and thereby unable to publish the mobile number.
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“Zainab”, informing him she had been referred by Mahmoud Ndiritiro.4 The courier then
proceeded to ask “Baba Ayman” if he was aware of the “Mizigo” (package) to be
collected and if he would travel to Kenya or the courier would visit Burundi to discuss
the logistics of handing over the ‘jugs’ (grenades). Based on the discussion, “Baba
Ayman” agreed to travel to Mombasa to begin discussions on the logistics of the
handover of the grenades.
15. By 10:40 am on the above same day, “Baba Ayman” had placed a follow-up
‘missed call’ to the Al Hijra courier member and at 11:10 am the courier had confirmed
that “Baba Ayman” was preparing his travel to Mombasa to discuss the logistics of the
‘jugs’ from Burundi into Kenya for the use of Thabit and Grant.5 According to the
courier, “Baba Ayman” claimed: “I’ve tried calling your other number but no one is
answering. I’m arranging my travel as soon as am in Mombasa I’ll call you.”6
16. On 4 June 2013, the Al Hijra courier received a message from Shimo la Tewa
prison informing her that Thabit had finalized the modalities with Mama Ayman.7 This
has been confirmed by Baba Ayman in Burundi during a phone call with Al Hijra
courier.8 According to him, his wife had discussed the “Mizigo” (grenades) issue with
someone, advising the courier to call back for further instructions.
4 According to the Al Hijra courier, “Baba Ayman” confirmed he knew Mahmoud Ndiritiro and had asked
if Mahmoud was in any difficulty in detention.
5 The Monitoring Group’s assessment is that the ‘jugs’ are to be handed over to another cell in Mombasa
closely linked to Abubakar Shariff Ahmed ‘Makaburi’.
6 Telephone call between “Baba Ayman” and Al Hijra courier at 11:10, on 26 May 2013.
7 Telephone call from Thabit and Grant associate “Rash” in prison to Al Hijra courier on 4 June 2013.
8 Al Hijra courier telephone call to Baba Ayman in Burundi at 13:04pm on 4 June 2013.
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Annex 2.1.c: Copies of hotel receipt for Wendo Idi Zuberi (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.d: Images of arms cache retrieved from Mwalim Khalid
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.e: Copies of “instruction notes” and “secure codes” provided
by Thabit to Al Hijra couriers (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.f: Images of IED assembling components seized from Al
Hijra courier Abdallah Kilume (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.g: Copy of Yussuf Hussein Hassan’s temporary travel
document (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.h: Image of bulletproof vest found in Yussuf Hussein
Hassan’s luggage (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.i: Images of Al Hijra safe house in Tanga, Tanzania
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.j: Copies of Al Hijra fighters assumed identities used in
Tanzania (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.k: Sample copy of Somalia-based Al Hijra DHL tracking
information on IEDs assembling parts from China (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 2.1.l: Copy of letter of resignation of PRMC official Mahmoud
Karega (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Mahmoud Karega Ng’ang’a
P.O. Box 8790-00300
Mail: [email protected], [email protected]
NAIROBI.
7TH OCTOBER, 2012
ATTN:
The Chairman
Pumwani Riadha Mosque Committee
P.O. Box 38714-00600
NAIROBI.
Dear Sir,
RE: RESIGNATION
Assalam ‘Alaikum Warahmatullah Wabarakatuh?
It’s my hope and prayer that you’re in the best of health and faith. I thank Allah for granting me the
opportunity to serve in the management committee of Riadha; also I thank the management committee and
the Society at large for the time we’ve spent together in search for lasting solutions to the Socio-economic
challenges affecting the Muslim Community in Majengo and Pumwani at large. This was indeed a great
honor.
I wish to draw your attention to the above subject. Since the time I joined the Committee, I’ve tried to the
best of my personal and professional ability to emphasize of the significance of having sound financial
management policies and procedures in place. We started off well by having the various sub-committees
about a year ago, with mandate and modalities of how each of them was expected to run. Somewhere along
the way in the beginning of 2012, things changed and one of the key sub-committees (i.e. Finance &
Administration) was disbanded and a new one reconstituted only for the decision to be ratified in a
committee meeting on the basis that it did not deliver on its mandate. After disbandment I forwarded a
budget template to the treasury for the whole year subject to review in a full committee meeting and
hopefully its subsequent implementation, to-date nobody in the executive has ever bothered himself about
it.
Today, we’re in the fourth quarter of this financial year. More than fifteen months ago, I prepared a finance
policy manual for purposes of professionalism in the way the affairs of the Society are conducted. It is yet
to be implemented. Additionally, I carried out an internal audit of the Society’s affairs under the direction
of the committee for the first quarter ending 31st March. I compiled a report and as usual nothing was done
about it till today. Key issues in the report related to controls and procedures, fraud, format of presentation,
legal and statutory requirements specifically V.A.T, P.A.Y.E, N.S.S.F and N.H.I.F just to name but a few.
A report by a U.N monitoring group published last year alleged that the mosque was involved in
recruitment and financing of Al-Shabaab militia group activities in Somalia. My question is; How do we
clean up the Society’s name if we are not transparent in our dealings and what happens if today we’re
called upon by the government to disclose our financial dealings knowing very well that we don’t pay taxes
to the government? I recall one day when I was explaining about statutory deductions to the committee, I
was ignored and the secretary added that he’ll consult the Society’s lawyer on whether to comply or not.
On the basis of the above facts, I find it honorable to resign from being a member of Pumwani Riadha
Mosque Committee. I’d prefer to serve the community at a lower level out of the committee. I’ll be
available for the next one month Insha’Allah to respond to any queries relating to any assignment I have
ever done for the Society. I wish all the committee members well in their endeavours. However, I apologize
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if I have ever wronged anyone of all of you either at personal level or collectively because am human.
Personally, I have no grudge against anybody. Once again I thank Allah for bringing us together; I thank all
of you also for the time we spent together in this noble work of steering our societal affairs.
May Allah guide us all, AMEEN.
Sincerely Yours,
Bro. Mahmoud Karega Ng’ang’a
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Annex 8
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2060 (2012), S/2013/413, 12 July 2013 (Extracts)
United Nations S/2013/413
Security Council Distr.: General
12 July 2013
Original: English
13-36185 (E) 150713
*1336185*
Letter dated 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the
Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with
paragraph 13 (m) of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), I have the honour to
transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter,
together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the
Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Kim Sook
Chairman
Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea
S/2013/413
2 13-36185
Letter dated 19 June 2013 from the members of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
We have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, in accordance with paragraph 13 (m) of
Security Council resolution 2060 (2012).
(Signed) Jarat Chopra
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
(Signed) Jeanine Lee Brudenell
Finance Expert
(Signed) Emmanuel Deisser
Arms Expert
(Signed) Aurélien Llorca
Transport Expert
(Signed) Dinesh Mahtani
Finance Expert
(Signed) Jörg Roofthooft
Maritime Expert
(Signed) Babatunde Taiwo
Armed Groups Expert
(Signed) Kristèle Younès
Humanitarian Expert
S/2013/413
13-36185 3
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia
Contents
Page
Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C. Spoiler networks in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
E. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
III. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A. Arms shipments to Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B. Foreign military operations in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. Non-compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
D. Private security companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A. Denial of access and attacks on aid workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C. Best practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
V. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A. Attacks on civilians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B. Gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. Child soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D. Forcible displacement or confinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
VI. Violations of the ban on charcoal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
VII. Obstruction of the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
VIII. Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
IX. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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Annexes*
1. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.1. Al-Shabaab areas of control and influence, and security incidents related to Al-Shabaab. . 48
1.2. Al-Shabaab structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.3. Al-Shabaab recruitment and training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.4. Foreign fighters with Al-Shabaab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.5. Al-Shabaab tactics, techniques and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1.6. Al-Shabaab media strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.7. Case study: Al-Shabaab in “Puntland” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.1. Al Hijra (formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3. Spoiler networks in Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.1. Spoiler networks in northern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.2. Spoiler networks in central Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.3. Spoiler networks in southern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.4. Spoiler networks and the Somali security services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4. Piracy and kidnap for ransom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.1. Fleeing pirates after a failed attack (2 April 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.2. President of Somalia letter of 28 February 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.3. Ship Security Certificate (Mogadishu) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.4. Pirate financier** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.5. Pirate negotiator** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.6. Pirate negotiator** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.7. Pirate facilitator**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.8. Pirate facilitator**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.9. Pirate negotiator** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.10. Pirate network linkages** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5. Misappropriation of public financial resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.1. Corruption during the 2012 end of transition process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2. Public financial mismanagement and corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.3. Passport production, corruption and fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.4. Mogadishu port revenue diversion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.5. Somalia’s petroleum sector: threats to peace and security and corruption risks . . . . . . . . 241
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6. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
6.1. Arms shipments to Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
6.2. Non-compliant States and organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
6.3. Private security companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
7. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
7.1. Denial of access and attacks on aid workers**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
7.2. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
8. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
8.1. Attacks on civilians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
8.2. Gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
9. Violations of the ban on charcoal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
9.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
9.2. Somali charcoal exportation and trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
9.3. Vessels that have exported charcoal from Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.
** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
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Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
ENDF Ethiopian National Defence Forces
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
KDF Kenya Defence Forces
MSF Médecins san Frontières
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
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Summary
The end of transition in Somalia in summer 2012, though fragile and flawed,
nevertheless led to the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President and
presented an opportunity for a new kind of leadership in the country. However, a
genuine end of transition necessitated both a change in individual leadership as well
as a change in the system of government that in the past had undermined the Statebuilding
enterprise through misappropriation of public goods and security sector
fiefdoms. While control over financial flows and security institutions was divided
between several principal power holders in the past, the new President inherited a
system in which he controlled neither. While struggling to extend his reach into
government in Mogadishu as well as into the country generally, he has had to
develop coping mechanisms to obtain external funds and arrange security relations
inside and outside of Government. These limitations at the centre of the Federal
Government, the realignment of networks of influence in and around it and more
broadly in Somalia, as well as events in past months, notably in “Jubaland”, threaten
to undermine the Federal Government of Somalia and the current peace and
reconciliation process in the country.
Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab has suffered conventional military setbacks,
particularly in urban centres, including the loss of Kismaayo, as the forces of
AMISOM and the Somali National Army expanded their areas of territorial control.
However, Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin continues to control most of southern
and central Somalia and has shifted its strategic posture to asymmetrical warfare in
both urban centres and the countryside. The military strength of Al-Shabaab, with an
approximately 5,000-strong force, remains arguably intact in terms of operational
readiness, chain of command, discipline and communication capabilities. By
avoiding direct military confrontation, it has preserved the core of its fighting force
and resources. Given its structure, internal dissension has had no impact on
Al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct operations. The leadership of Ahmed Godane has
been kept largely unchallenged, in part by strengthening the role and resources of
Amniyat, Al-Shabaab’s “secret service”, which is structured along the lines of a
clandestine organization within the organization with the intention of surviving any
kind of dissolution of Al-Shabaab. At present, Al-Shabaab remains the principal
threat to peace and security in Somalia.
The merger between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in 2012 appears largely
symbolic. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a regional and international threat through
its affiliates. Notably, in Kenya, Al Hijra (formerly the Muslim Youth Centre) and its
financier, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee, have suffered setbacks from
disruptions of Al Hijra’s operations by international and regional security services, as
well as unexplained killings and disappearances of its members. However, Al Hijra is
striving to regain the initiative, in part through its fighters in Somalia returning to
conduct new and more complex operations and through strengthening its ties to other
groups in the region. In this context, the self-styled Al-Qaida affiliate, Abubakar
Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi”, designated for targeted measures by the Committee in
August 2012, is increasingly asserting his influence over Al Hijra.
More broadly in Somalia, several spoiler networks have emerged. In northern
Somalia, with the general decline of pirate activity a network of individuals,
including known pirate leaders, is engaged in providing private security for
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unlicensed fishing vessels in Somali waters and is connected to weapons smuggling
and Al-Shabaab networks in north-eastern Somalia. In the east-central region of
Galmudug, a “former” Mogadishu warlord, Abdi Hassan Awale “Qeybdiid”, has
returned to prominence by appropriating political power and instigating clan conflict,
thereby undermining the Federal Government and threatening security in the
northern region of “Puntland”. In southern Somalia, two core groups of spoilers are
either aligned against or in favour of the Federal Government. Sheikh Ahmed
Mohamed Islam “Madobe” and his Ras Kamboni forces, with Kenyan support, have
established their own military presence in Kismaayo in opposition to the central
Government, while a group of Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Ayr warlords and their allies in
the Darod/Marehan network of Barre Adan Shire “Hiiraale” are acting as proxies for
the central Government, but pursing their own individual and clan-based agendas.
Both spoiler groups have interests that intersect with those of Al-Shabaab.
With the decline in the number of pirate incidents, organized criminal networks
and individuals are diversifying their financial interests by undertaking different
ventures, including providing armed protection aboard vessels involved in regional
trade or fishing activities. While piracy may be contained at sea, the various pirate
networks remain active. In the persisting absence of serious national and
international efforts to investigate, prosecute or sanction those responsible for
organizing Somali piracy, the leaders, financiers, negotiators and facilitators will
continue to operate with impunity. Of particular concern in this context are the steps
taken by the Federal Government towards a policy of amnesty.
Despite the change in leadership in Mogadishu, the misappropriation of public
resources continues in line with past practices. The campaign financing structure of
the 2012 elections recycled funds derived from external and internal sources to
distort the political system. Notably, public financial management efforts to redirect
Government revenues to the Central Bank proved to be serving a flawed objective.
On average, some 80 per cent of withdrawals from the Central Bank are made for
private purposes and not for the running of Government, representing a patronage
system and a set of social relations that defy the institutionalization of the State. In
this context, the fiduciary agency managed by PricewaterhouseCoopers was reduced
to a transfer agent that could not ensure accountability of funds once they reached
the Government of Somalia. Indeed, of 16.9 million transferred by
PricewaterhouseCoopers to the Central Bank, US$ 12 million could not be traced.
Key to these irregularities has been the current Governor of the Central Bank,
Abdusalam Omer. In addition, the production of the national passport continues to be
fraught with fraud and corruption, undermining the integrity of the national travel
document. While more customs and port fee revenues from Mogadishu port have
been deposited into the Central Bank, they are proportionally less than the increase
in shipping traffic, and a monthly average of at least 33 per cent cannot be accounted
for. At present, the emergence of significant oil interests in Somalia and the region
risks exacerbating political tensions in Somalia, undermining coordination between
federal and regional administrations and threatening peace and security in the
country.
Despite the relaxation of the arms embargo for the Federal Government of
Somalia, a variety of violations persist. The patterns of arms shipments to Somalia
remain similar to those of previous years, with smuggling networks able to exploit a
number of small ports around the coast of Somalia and supply routes between the
northern and southern parts of the country. In addition, concerns over command and
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control within AMISOM and Kenyan forces, as well as support to Somali proxies by
the Government of Ethiopia outside any exemption, remain unresolved issues.
Generally, there has been an improvement by Member States in complying with
procedures of the arms embargo, although the Federal Government has yet to fulfil
its obligations under the revised regime. The activities of private security companies
continue to grow, at times in violation of the arms embargo.
Despite improved access in certain areas of the country, access to vulnerable
civilians remains a challenge for the humanitarian community, and all parties in
Somalia continue to obstruct the provision of humanitarian assistance. Al-Shabaab
maintained and expanded its ban on most aid agencies in areas under its control,
while all actors in Somalia subjected humanitarian organizations to taxation, illegal
roadblocks, intimidation and extortion. Moreover, as a consequence of both remote
management by aid agencies in Nairobi and the culture of “gatekeepers”, diversion
of humanitarian assistance by third parties, as well as by staff and partners of aid
organizations, continues to undermine international efforts.
Throughout Somalia, all parties to the conflict continue to violate international
humanitarian law and human rights standards. Military operations and guerrilla
warfare across the country caused significant harm to civilians. In 2012 in
Mogadishu, some 6,680 civilian casualties suffered weapons-related injuries, many
of them from improvised explosive devices deployed by Al-Shabaab. Data collected
by human rights and humanitarian agencies demonstrate that pro-Government forces
have also caused civilian casualties as a result of aerial attacks and naval and ground
engagement. Meanwhile, gender-based violence remains an endemic phenomenon.
By November 2012, Kenyan forces, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe and his Ras
Kamboni forces had unilaterally begun exporting charcoal from Kismaayo in flagrant
violation of the Security Council ban and the instructions of the President of
Somalia. Thereafter, approximately 1 million sacks of charcoal have been exported
from Kismaayo each month, in addition to exports from Al-Shabaab-controlled
Barawe and other smaller ports. Overall, the charcoal exports have increased by
140 per cent in comparison to previous years. The charcoal business architecture and
trade networks remain intact, with Al-Shabaab maintaining a central role and
continuing to benefit significantly.
As a result of its investigations, particularly those with financial implications
for spoilers in Somalia, the Monitoring Group has experienced increasing obstruction
of its work, including targeted killings, threats and intimidation of its alleged
sources. In addition, as Somalia proceeds on its precarious path to peace and
reconciliation, the various spoilers identified by the Monitoring Group threaten to
undermine legitimate authority in the country as well as international assistance
efforts. To better secure the gains made to date, the Monitoring Group believes that
such individuals violating relevant Security Council resolutions should be designated
for targeted measures with the least possible delay. To this end, it proposes several
new additions to the sanctions lists established in accordance with Security Council
resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009).
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I. Introduction
A. Mandate
1. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is contained in
paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), adopted on 25 July 2012.
Additional tasks were assigned to the Monitoring Group under resolution 2093
(2013).
2. Pursuant to paragraph 13 (l) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group
provided the Security Council, through its Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, a midterm briefing on
15 February 2013. The Monitoring Group also submitted monthly progress reports
to the Committee throughout the period of its mandate.
3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group
travelled to Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Switzerland, Sweden, the United
Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Yemen and
Zambia. In Somalia, members of the Monitoring Group were able to undertake
multiple visits to Mogadishu, Garowe, Bosasso and Kismaayo, but much of the
south of the country remained inaccessible.
4. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following
experts: Jarat Chopra (Coordinator), Jeanine Lee Brudenell (finance), Emmanuel
Deisser (arms), Aurélien Llorca (transport), Dinesh Mahtani (finance), Jörg
Roofthooft (maritime), Babatunde Taiwo (armed groups) and Kristèle Younès
(humanitarian).
B. Methodology
5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous
reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the mandate under
review. The Monitoring Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous
reports (most recently, S/2012/544 of 13 July 2012). The methodology used for the
current report is as follows:
(a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where
possible;
(b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of
events, where possible;
(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing
knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant
expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with
respect to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources; and
(e) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary
evidence in support of the information collected.
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6. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access
to those involved in violations by way of individuals who have direct knowledge or
who know people who have direct knowledge about details of violations. On certain
occasions, the Monitoring Group was able to witness first-hand active violations.
7. The Monitoring Group interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant
information, including government officials and representatives from diplomatic
missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. Members of the Monitoring
Group met with a variety of officials of the Federal Government of Somalia,
including the President, Prime Minister and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Finance and Planning, among others, and security agencies. The Monitoring Group
also met or communicated with officials from the “Puntland” and “Somaliland”
administrations, representatives of other political and armed groups, defectors and
members of business communities and Somali civil society.
8. In conformity with guidance provided by the Committee, the Monitoring
Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in
its final report. However, General Assembly resolutions on the control and
limitation of documentation, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265,
necessitated the extensive use of annexes, preventing much of the substance from
being translated. In addition, regulations exclude the insertion of maps, photographs
and charts in the main report.
9. In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin entitled “Information
sensitivity, classification and handling” (ST/SGB/2007/6) of 12 February 2007, the
Monitoring Group has submitted to the Security Council Committee on Somalia and
Eritrea, together with the present report, several strictly confidential annexes
containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper
functioning of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third
parties or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations. These annexes will not
be issued as a document of the Security Council.
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability
of Somalia1
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
10. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) remains the principal threat
to peace and security in Somalia. During the reporting period, the organization has
claimed responsibility for hundreds of assassinations and attacks involving
improvised explosive devices of different types (person-borne, vehicle-borne,
suicide vehicle-borne, radio-controlled, and victim-operated), ambushes, mortar
shelling, grenades and hit-and-run tactics. Al-Shabaab is also responsible for
continuous violations of the arms embargo on Somalia and the ban on the export of
charcoal (see annexes 6 and 9 to the present report).
__________________
1 By paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1844 (2008), the Security Council prohibited acts that threaten
the peace, security or stability of Somalia. By paragraph 43 (a) of resolution 2093 (2013), the
Council included among the prohibited acts those that threaten the peace and reconciliation
process in Somalia or threaten the Federal Government of Somalia or AMISOM by force. By
paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011), the Council expanded the scope of prohibited acts to
include the misappropriation of public financial resources.
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11. Al-Shabaab’s operations have targeted AMISOM forces, United Nations staff
and premises, members of the security sector institutions of the Government of
Somalia and “Puntland” and, to a lesser extent, other regional entities, but also
Somali journalists, elders, politicians, judges, businessmen and civil society
activists. These operations have caused hundreds of civilian casualties, including
women and children and foreigners.
12. At present, Al-Shabaab remains in control of most of southern and central
Somalia, including the entire region of Middle Juba, most of Hiran, Bay and Bakol
regions and sizeable parts of Galgadud and Lower and Middle Shabelle regions.
Multiple factors explain the resilience of Al-Shabaab, including longstanding
support from some major clans, the capacity to provide a stable environment for
business, livestock farming and agricultural production and the ability to represent
for local elders a credible alternative to regional warlordism or to Mogadishu-based
institutions, still perceived as a source of instability, violence and corruption.
13. The Monitoring Group considers, on the basis of its analysis of confidential
intelligence reports, that the military strength of Al-Shabaab, with an approximately
5,000-strong force, remains arguably intact in terms of operational readiness, chain
of command, discipline and communication capabilities, in spite of its alleged
financial constraints and the loss of control of the port city of Kismaayo in the
Lower Juba region of Somalia. However, it is not clear if the merger with Al-Qaida
on 9 February 2012 had merely a symbolic impact on the organization or enhanced
its expertise and resources. Although the current Al-Qaida leader, Ayman
Al-Zawahiri, expressed his support for Al-Shabaab operations in Somalia once again
in an audio message of 7 November 2012 and in video footage on 6 April 2013, the
organization remains largely self-sufficient. In particular, links to Al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula, as described in the previous report of the Monitoring Group,
remained more institutional than operational.2
14. The Monitoring Group also understands that Al-Shabaab has compiled and
hidden in arms caches important stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions,
proportionately distributed all over southern and central Somalia, awaiting the
withdrawal of international forces to conduct a multiple-front offensive against the
Federal Government of Somalia and its allied militias, and regional administrations.
15. Following the departure of ENDF and its proxies from El Bur, in the Galgadud
region, and Hudur, in the Bakol region, Al-Shabaab captured these towns on 11 June
2012 and 17 March 2013, respectively. These takeovers illustrate not only the
inability of the Federal Government of Somalia and its associated militias to control
any ground without international support, but also the capacity of Al-Shabaab to
readily recover lost territory.
16. Al-Shabaab has not launched any major attacks against AMISOM or forces of
the Federal Government since the “Ramadan offensive” in August-September 2010,
and almost systematically avoids direct military confrontation, even in towns of
strategic importance such as Kismaayo. Consequently, Al-Shabaab has preserved the
core of its fighting force and resources, devoting only a part of its capacities and
manpower to asymmetrical warfare.
__________________
2 See S/2012/544, annex 2.2, para. 12.
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17. Furthermore, internal dissensions have had no impact on the ability of
Al-Shabaab to conduct operations in Somalia. Disagreements over power sharing
and resources, which invariably cause tensions among the top leaders, are dealt with
at the highest level of the shura (council). A broad sense of unity is maintained in
the organization by calls to arms to maintain constant pressure on AMISOM, federal
and regional security forces and their allied militias, and by employing guerrillatype
tactics, techniques and procedures. Nevertheless, a scenario in which the
Al-Shabaab military structure dissolves into its component factions cannot be ruled
out.
18. In this context, Ahmed Godane’s leadership of Al-Shabaab remains largely
unchallenged. He has reportedly strengthened his direct control of the Amniyat,
known as the “secret service” of Al-Shabaab. Financial and technical resources are
increasingly concentrated in the Amniyat and it commands the attention of Godane,
who seems to be neglecting the military apparatus and its leaders, possibly as a
result of public disagreements over strategy and objectives. Amniyat functions
mostly independently from the rest of Al-Shabaab, through its own chain of
command, logistics network and financial resources. It therefore has the capacity to
operate discretely, gather intelligence and strike effectively throughout Somalia,
specifically in areas under AMISOM/Federal Government of Somalia control,
spreading fear even within Al-Shabaab.
19. However, Godane is facing a new wave of public discontent from within the
shura. On 29 April 2013, a fatwa was published online, allegedly instigated by
Mukhtar Robow, Hassan Dahir Aweys, Ibrahim “Al-Afghani”, Zubair “Al-Muhajir”
and Mo'alim Burhan, condemning attempts to assassinate Omar Hammami, a.k.a.
“Abu Mansour Al-Amriki”, and declaring that “there is no obedience to the Emir if
it is an act of disobedience to Allah”.3
20. Some of these leaders, represented by Robow and Aweys, are considered to be
part of the nationalistic wing of Al-Shabaab, yet they confronted Godane in defence
of “Al-Amriki”, today still the main public figure of the international jihadist
movement in Somalia. Therefore, to interpret divisions within Al-Shabaab in binary
terms — between nationalists and internationalists — is misleading and simplistic.
Al-Shabaab has always had a primarily national focus and its internal situation is
quite complex.
21. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group had access to a wide range of
sources on Al-Shabaab, including confidential daily intelligence reports, classified
analytical reports and confidential security reports from international organizations
and non-governmental and private actors. In particular, the Monitoring Group
interviewed Al-Shabaab defectors and prisoners in Somalia, who provided first-hand
testimonies about the organization, its structure and modus operandi.
22. Annex 1.1 includes two maps depicting the evolution of Al-Shabaab’s areas of
influence and control in southern and central Somalia between 30 August 2012 and
6 May 2013, and a breakdown of security incidents related to Al-Shabaab activity in
Somalia.
__________________
3 “Fatwa regarding the attempt to assassinate Abu Mansour al-Amriki”, accessed at
http://aljahad.com/vb/index.php on 30 April 2013. Reportedly, “Al Afghani” and Sheikh Aweys
have also individually and publicly criticized Godane’s leadership, in a letter to Ayman
al-Zawahiri on 10 April 2013 and an audio message on the situation in Somalia on 17 May 2013.
S/2013/413
14 13-36185
23. Annex 1.2 outlines the three main components of Al-Shabaab’s structure: first,
its political body, the shura; second, its military component, which is on the
defensive but still significant; and third, its clandestine service, the Amniyat, which
is increasingly responsible for the acts threatening peace, security and stability in
the areas under the control of AMISOM and Government of Somalia security forces,
their allied militias and regional administrations.
24. Annex 1.3 describes the recruitment and training capacities of Al-Shabaab.
25. Annex 1.4 assesses the current status of foreign fighters within the
organization, and the tension between Al-Shabaab’s public image in the jihadist
community and the reality of isolation experienced by foreign fighters who join the
organization in Somalia.
26. Annex 1.5 documents the tactics, techniques and procedures of Al-Shabaab.
27. Annex 1.6 presents the media strategy of Al-Shabaab.
28. Annex 1.7 includes a case study of the presence and operations of Al-Shabaab in
“Puntland”, where it constitutes the main challenge to peace, security and stability.
B. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat
29. Since the previous report of the Monitoring Group (S/2012/544), issued in July
2012, Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre, has suffered
significant setbacks, as has its ally Al-Shabaab. The setbacks experienced by
Al Hijra have impeded the threat capacity of Al-Shabaab in East Africa and affected
the strategic-operational link between the two groups.4 While Al-Shabaab
experienced military reverses in Somalia, across the border in Kenya, Al Hijra
members were plagued by unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous “catch
and release” arrest raids and operational disruptions under the “Al-Shabaab/East
Africa Al-Qaida Disruption Initiative”.5 For instance, on 27 August 2012, the
ideological leader of Al Hijra, Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed, was inexplicably
killed in Mombasa, Kenya, a month after the Committee designated him for targeted
measures.6 In addition, active Al Hijra members who have disappeared include one
of its “Amirs”, Sylvester Opiyo (a.k.a. “Musa Osodo”), in May 2012 and senior
figures such as Jeremiah Onyango Okumu and Steven Mwanzia Osaka (a.k.a. “Duda
Black” and “Duda Brown”, respectively) in June 2012.7
__________________
4 S/2012/544, annex 3.1 (strictly confidential). Credible testimonies from serving and former
Al Hijra fighters and documents attributed to senior Al-Shabaab figures, such as Ibrahim
al-Afghani, have indicated that Al-Shabaab expected to exploit its strong ties with extremist
groups in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania to facilitate its external operations. See
also www.sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/12/fe….
5 The Monitoring Group is aware of an initiative funded by the Government of the United States,
called “Al-Shabaab/East Africa Al-Qaida Disruption Initiative” whose purpose is to assist East
African security services in combating terrorism.
6 While the extent of his involvement remains unclear, Aboud Rogo seems linked to the United
Kingdom national Michael Olumide Adebolajo, who is accused of killing a British service
officer on 22 May 2013.
7 www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-hum…-
uganda-20130403.pdf. Credible evidence suggests that Al Hijra members who have
disappeared or been inexplicably killed were indirectly linked to attacks or assisted in the
recruitment of non-Somali Kenyans to join Al-Shabaab.
S/2013/413
13-36185 15
30. Towards the end of 2012, Al Hijra’s difficulties became more evident and were
compounded by the fractious state of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its loss of
Kismaayo, a known Al Hijra area of operation. Not only was Al Hijra’s ability to
radicalize and recruit new fighters to be sent to Somalia weakened, but its
operational ability to pursue its declared war inside Kenya on behalf and in support
of Al-Shabaab declined. One Al Hijra fighter claimed that a number of his fellow
combatants returning to Kenya had become anxious about the lack of effective
coordination between Al-Shabaab and Al Hijra’s “Amir” based in Somalia, Ahmad
Iman Ali.8
31. Despite the setbacks, Al Hijra, like Al-Shabaab, is striving to remain a credible
threat to peace and security both in Somalia and outside. As an operational priority,
it is strengthening its ties to the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in the United Republic
of Tanzania9 as part of Al-Shabaab’s broader external campaign. It is also
establishing strong logistical links to Al-Shabaab affiliates in Rwanda and
Burundi.10
32. The lingering influence and leadership of Ahmad Iman, also Al-Shabaab’s
representative for Kenya, inspired a wave of attacks by grenade and improvised
explosive device across Kenya, mostly against the local population. While this
approach has had marginal success, both Al-Shabaab and Ahmad Iman have
repeatedly called from Somalia for sustained attacks in the region and particularly in
Kenya.11
33. Probably owing to its limited success and the rather kinetic approach to
counter-terrorism taken by the Kenyan security services, Al Hijra, in partnership
with the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in the United Republic of Tanzania, has sought
operational direction and guidance since the latter part of 2012 from individuals
with former ties to Al-Qaida in East Africa and self-styled Al-Qaida affiliates,
including Abubakar Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi” and United Kingdom national
Jermaine John Grant.12 “Makaburi” has exerted a growing influence over Al Hijra
and is determined to redirect the group’s resources and manpower from hitting “soft
targets” to conducting complex, large-scale attacks in Kenya on behalf and in
support of Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, Jermaine John Grant, confined in prison, has
effectively provided assistance, albeit remotely, to ongoing plots involving both
Al Hijra and “Makaburi”.
34. Over the years, Al Hijra in Kenya and its Somalia-based fighters have proven
adept at mobilizing resources for Al-Shabaab activities in Somalia and the region.
As detailed previously by the Monitoring Group,13 the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque
Committee has played a clandestine role and continues to provide financial support
to Al Hijra, particularly its fighters returning from Somalia to Kenya. In some cases,
__________________
8 Confidential report dated 20 January 2013 describing, inter alia, the experiences of Al Hijra
fighters based in Somalia, archived with the United Nations.
9 Evidence also suggests linkages between Al Hijra and a loose-knit Tanzanian extremist group
known as “Uamusho”.
10 The Monitoring Group has received corroborating information that indicates that Al-Shabaab
affiliates in Rwanda and Burundi are in contact with some Al Hijra members and associates in
Kenya.
11 https://soundcloud.com/swali-mohamed/brother-ahmad-iman-the.
12 During an interview with Kenyan security services in Mombasa on 19 and 25 December 2011,
Jermaine John Grant admitted to being a member of Al-Qaida and not Al-Shabaab.
13 S/2012/544, annex 3.1 (strictly confidential).
S/2013/413
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this support has been earmarked for attacks on behalf and in support of Al-Shabaab.
During the mandate, a change was observed in attitude between the Pumwani
Riyadha Mosque Committee and Al Hijra as a result of the new Kenya Prevention of
Terrorism Act (2012).14 However, information and evidence suggests that funding of
Al Hijra activities on behalf Al-Shabaab persists.
35. In addition to the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee as its conventional
source of funding, Al Hijra seems to have benefitted from an increasing number of
“goodwill donations” from “Makaburi” and other key contributors from the Muslim
community in Kenya to carry out attacks on behalf of Al-Shabaab.15 In addition,
Al Hijra has received similar financial assistance from overseas.
36. Despite its public and firm denial of funding or assisting recruitment for
Al-Shabaab, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee continues to view its support
of Al-Shabaab through Al Hijra as a religious obligation.16 On 31 July 2012, a
Committee worker was arrested in Nairobi after collecting a package sent from
China at the offices of DHL. The package contained civilian-use items, including
car key alarms and laser range finders, which are commonly used in the assembly of
improvised explosive devices.17 Such items are stored in the offices of the Pumwani
Riyadha Mosque Committee located at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque before being
distributed, including to Somalia for Al-Shabaab attacks. In October 2012,
following passage of the Kenya Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012), a Committee
official employed at the Kenyan Parliament, Ali Abdulmajid (a.k.a. Ali Bodie),
began to encourage and advise the Committee on ways and means of concealing its
support to Al-Shabaab through Al Hijra.18
37. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group has learned of the collusion between the
Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee and Al Hijra’s Nairobi-based “Amir”, Issa
Mugai “Carragher”, in supporting Al Hijra fighters sent back from Somalia to
Kenya by Ahmad Iman and Al-Shabaab to conduct violent attacks. “Carragher”, a
“journalist” with the Dutch-run African Slum Journal in Nairobi, provided material
support to these fighters with the financial assistance of the Pumwani Riyadha
Mosque Committee.19
38. During an interview on 20 March 2013, “Carragher” denied to the Monitoring
Group that he had ever been a member of MYC (Al Hijra) and claimed that the
“MYC is dead.”20 However, “Carragher” did admit to being “on the Committee”
and attending the MYC-Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee shura (meeting) of
28 February 2012. This shura had been arranged to consider the reorganization of
__________________
14 www.nation.co.ke/News/Kibaki-assents-to-anti-terrorism-bill/-/1056/1532….
15 The Monitoring Group is aware that “Mzee” Mohamed Fundi, an Al Hijra elder, and Zaina
Fundi, a trustee of the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee, have also donated funds to
Al Hijra.
16 Interviews with former Al Hijra members and officials of the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque
Committee, September-December 2012.
17 Evidence indicates that these components are mainly procured from China as civilian-use items.
18 Interview with confidential source inside the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee with
knowledge of its daily activities, 15 December 2012.
19 On 10 April 2013, the Monitoring Group sent an e-mail to the Netherlands office of African
Slum Journal requesting a meeting to discuss the relationship of Issa Mugai “Carragher” with
Al Hijra and Al-Shabaab. No response was forthcoming.
20 Monitoring Group interview with Issa Mugai “Carragher” in the presence of an independent
observer, 20 March 2013.
S/2013/413
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the Muslim Youth Centre, in which the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee
agreed to continue funding the Centre on condition that it change its name as a
security precaution. Furthermore, “Carragher” denied to the Monitoring Group any
involvement in Al-Shabaab-related activities, including supporting fighters returning
from Somalia to Kenya. When asked about one such case in which Tuwa Ibrahim
Jibril “Tafawa” received assistance during an operation in Kenya, “Carragher”
conceded that he had met “Tafawa” and members of his cell by chance at a football
match.21
39. A detailed assessment of Al Hijra activities on behalf and in support of
Al-Shabaab is included in annex 3.1 to the present report (strictly confidential).
C. Spoiler networks in Somalia
40. The Monitoring Group has identified various spoiler networks in northern,
central and southern Somalia, as well as in connection with the Somali security
services. Webs of association among pirates, prominent businessmen, warlords and
Government officials often intersect with Al-Shabaab networks. The activities of
these spoilers are subverting the efforts of the Federal Government leaders, regional
authorities and their partners to restore functional, stable government in Somalia.
Northern Somalia
41. With the decline of pirate activity generally, in northern Somalia a number of
criminal networks are reverting to prior, familiar patterns of illicit behaviour,
including armed protection of fishing activities and illegal fishing, arms trafficking,
human trafficking and even trans-shipping of narcotics. As the Monitoring Group
has repeatedly noted in prior reports, such networks have penetrated and distorted
Government institutions in northern Somalia, but have also emerged as distinct
networks of their own, which continue to benefit from statelessness and the war
economy and represent a threat to peace and security in Somalia.
42. The Monitoring Group has identified a network of individuals, including
known pirate leaders, who are engaged in providing private security for unlicensed
fishing vessels in Somali waters and are connected to weapons smuggling and
Al-Shabaab networks in north-eastern Somalia. This overall network is organized
principally along two separate but connected clan networks, and facilitated by a web
of prominent Somali businessmen operating enterprises out of “Puntland”,
“Somaliland” and a number of Gulf States, with connections to Iranian
businessmen.
43. Cases documented by the Monitoring Group demonstrate the regression of the
piracy business network back towards the criminal activity of illegal fishing, which
has also been reported to facilitate other forms of contraband, including weapons
smuggling. Clan connections between illegal fishing networks and Al-Shabaab in
north-eastern Somalia provide opportunities for the Al-Shabaab leadership there to
obtain a steady flow of weapons and explosives, particularly originating from
criminal networks in Yemen (see annex 3.1).
__________________
21 Ibid.
S/2013/413
18 13-36185
Central Somalia
44. Under the pretext of restoring political stability and security in the east-central
region of “Galmudug”, a “former” Mogadishu warlord, Abdi Hassan Awale
“Qeybdiid”, has returned to prominence by appropriating political power and
instigating clan conflict. In addition, the increasing instability in “Galmudug”
continues to subvert the leadership of the Federal Government in Mogadishu and
represents a potential threat to peace and security in “Puntland”.
45. The inability of “Galmudug” to reach a political settlement between its two
contending “presidents” and the absence of effective governance has resulted in clan
militias fighting over such issues as taxation at illegal checkpoints. In some cases,
suspected members of Al-Shabaab have exploited these checkpoints in order to
transit the area during movements between southern and northern Somalia (see
annex 3.2).
Southern Somalia
46. Narrow clan and individual interests are overriding attempts by the Federal
Government to reconcile warring factions, break up Al-Shabaab and extend a
balanced authority over regional administrations. In particular, there are two core
groups of spoilers in southern Somalia, one aligned against the Federal Government
and one largely aligned in favour of it. The key spoiler in opposition to the Federal
Government is Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe”. Spoilers broadly aligned
with the Federal Government include Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Ayr warlords and their
allies in the Darod/Marehan network of Barre Hiiraale. Each of these spoiler groups
has interests that intersect with those of Al-Shabaab.
47. Since late September 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia has
encountered considerable resistance from the Ras Kamboni forces of Sheikh Ahmed
Mohamed Islam “Madobe”, who helped oust Al-Shabaab from Kismaayo and then
established his own political and armed presence in the area with Kenyan military
support. The refusal of Ras Kamboni to integrate into official Somali security
services has rightly led the Federal Government to regard Ras Kamboni as a spoiler
clan militia operating outside the purview of the national Constitution, and therefore
constituting a threat to peace and security.
48. The second group of spoilers in southern Somalia is subverting the efforts of
the Federal Government leadership and its partners to extend the reach of
Government authority and stabilize the country, particularly in Kismaayo. This
group includes former warlords and militia leaders who have benefited from years
of statelessness and the war economy. Some have co-opted, or been co-opted by
Government officials for personal or political gain, while others appear to have
connections to Al-Shabaab. In addition, members of this spoiler network have
retained private weapons stocks and applied undue pressure on the Federal
Government to obtain preferential treatment in the distribution of arms and logistics
supplies. Other members of the network have promoted clan agendas in their
opposition to the formation of a regional administration in Jubaland and exploited
links to Al-Shabaab in support of a military build up around Kismaayo (see
annex 3.3).
S/2013/413
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49. The relations of the Federal Government of Somalia with such individuals
have coincided with negotiations, in part facilitated by Qatar, between the
Government and elements of Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab that are related to this
spoiler network. Negotiating with actors related to listed entities such as Hizbul
Islam and Al-Shabaab may contradict Security Council decisions to designate and
prohibit support for them. Moreover, even if the Security Council broadly support
Federal Government of Somalia attempts at co-opting and pacifying former warring
parties as part of a programme of reconciliation, the Monitoring Group is concerned
that individual spoilers in this particular network of former warring parties are using
the platform of closer relations with the Federal Government to pursue narrow
individual interests that already appear to be contributing to threats to peace and
security in the southern regions of Somalia.
50. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group has obtained evidence of Eritrean support
to this spoiler network. Eritrea has established direct relations with key individuals
who act as agents of Asmara’s influence rather than in support of Federal
Government institutions. The net effect of Eritrea’s engagement is to undermine the
processes of Government decision-making, subvert cohesion and disrupt the Federal
Government’s relations both internally and externally (see annex 3.3 to the present
report, and the Eritrea report of the Monitoring Group (S/2013/ )).
Spoiler networks and the Somali security services
51. The Monitoring Group has received consistent information from a number of
sources within the Government of Somalia and its security services relating to the
use of Al-Shabaab agents by officials and former officials of the Government. In
addition, the Monitoring Group has received information relating to the infiltration
of Al-Shabaab networks into the National Intelligence and Security Agency of
Somalia (see annex 3.4).
D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom
Overview
52. For the past decade, the Monitoring Group has reported extensively on Somali
piracy.22 It has mapped how piracy grew out of a kind of protection racket in
response to illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping, and evolved into a moneydriven,
clan-based, transnational organized crime, constituting a threat to global
shipping. It has described the factors that made Somalia an ideal context for the
growth of piracy and identified some of the individuals who exploited and
benefitted from the phenomenon, both in and outside Somalia.23 It has profiled
networks and pirate groups, and explained their operational model and ingredients
for success. While it has reported on the worldwide counter-piracy initiatives and
efforts to curb the global threat, it has also highlighted the inability and even
unwillingness of the Somali leadership and the international community to hold
__________________
22 See the reports of the Monitoring Group at www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml.
23 The long absence of a central government, the high level of corruption embedded in all layers
of society, the struggle against the extremist and terrorist movement Al-Shabaab, the harsh
environment, the lack of viable education and employment opportunities and the dominance
of a clan-based society are all elements that contributed to Somalia becoming an ideal place
for the growth and expansion of Somali piracy in its current form.
S/2013/413
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accountable those responsible for organizing, financing and facilitating this
multimillion-dollar business.24
53. Today, it appears that the heyday of Somali piracy may be over. During 2012,
the number of successful attacks by Somali pirates continued to decline, with 14
registered hijackings.25 This trend, already apparent in 2011, can largely be
attributed to the increasing use of private maritime security companies on board
merchant vessels and the ability of international naval forces to contain the
operational environment.26 Also, the number of incidents of attempted attacks
decreased dramatically from 237 to 75, a nearly 70 per cent drop in comparison to
the record year of 2011.27 In the first quarter of 2013, the trend has continued, with
only five incidents registered, including the hijacking of a Yemeni dhow.28
54. In 2012, Somali pirates extorted and received an estimated US$ 31.75 million
in ransom payouts.29 Today, one merchant vessel, six fishing vessels or dhows and
at least 60 individuals remain held by Somali pirates, both on land and at sea.30
55. While pirate operations have declined in number and become smaller in
scale,31 they have not come to an end entirely. Attacks are still occasionally
reported, such as on 2 April 2013 when the Sierra Leone-flagged general cargo
vessel Alpha Kirawira was attacked some 13 nautical miles south of Barawe. Eight
armed men in a white-coloured skiff powered by two Yamaha Enduro outboard
engines chased and fired at the merchant ship. The security team on board
responded by firing several warning shots. The pirates subsequently aborted the
attack32 (see annex 4.1).
56. Unable to hijack merchant vessels and incapable of sustaining the long-term,
highly successful piracy business model that generated millions of dollars extorted
from shipowners over the past eight years, Harardhere pirate kingpins Mohamed
Abdi Hassan “Afweyne” and Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” have denounced
__________________
24 Since 2005, according to the World Bank, 149 ships have reportedly been held for ransom, for
an estimated total of US$ 315 million to US$ 385 million. In addition, the World Bank has
stated that piracy has cost a yearly average of US$ 18 billion to world trade.
See www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Somalia/pirates….
pdf.
25 The 14 hijackings include 9 dhows/fishing vessels.
26 Improvements in the implementation of best management practices by the shipping industry and
more effective international counter-piracy naval operations, including the disruption of pirate
logistics on land, have also greatly contributed to the decreasing success rate of Somali pirates.
27 www.icc-ccs.org/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-and-wes…-
says-imb.
28 The Yemeni dhow Nader was hijacked on 8 March 2013. The crew and Somali security team on
board were released but the vessel remains in pirate custody. Another dhow, the Saad1, was
briefly hijacked on 28 March 2013, but was rescued by the Turkish naval vessel Gökova.
29 See http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ecop2012twopager_1.pdf.
30 All are held exclusively in the hands of pirates belonging to the Hobyo-Harardhere pirate
network. They include 54 remaining crew members of the hijacked vessels Prantalay 12 (4),
Asphalt Venture (7), Albedo (15) and Naham 3 (28), 5 aid workers (2 MSF and 3 International
Aid Services) and 1 journalist.
31 Up to early May 2013, there were no attacks registered beyond 400 nautical miles off the coast
of Somalia.
32 On 5 June 2013, naval forces also confirmed the hijacking of the Indian-flagged dhow Shahe
Faize Noori some 96 nautical miles north-east of Bosasso. The vessel and crew were safely
released on the same day.
S/2013/413
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piracy and claimed to have quit the business. On 9 January 2013, they appeared in a
press conference in Adado organized by the self-proclaimed “President” of the
Himan and Heeb region, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey”.33
57. Following the press conference, on 19 January 2013, a small delegation of
Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leaders, including Afweyne, his son and Gafanje,
reportedly travelled by air from Adado to Mogadishu to meet with senior officials of
the Federal Government of Somalia. Their aim was to negotiate and explore the
possibility of an agreement entailing amnesty and immunity in exchange for what
was rumoured to be the immediate release of all hostages, in addition to other
incentives. Subsequently, an agreement and attempt to release hostages in return for
an alleged payment of US$ 2 million from the Federal Government failed. Reported
misappropriation of the funds and disagreement among pirate groups resulted in
fierce fighting in Galkaayo, during which one pirate negotiator was killed on or
about 17 February 2013.34
58. On 28 February 2013, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud issued an official
letter indicating that the Federal Government of Somalia had conducted “indirect”
negotiations with the pirates through “the elders” and confirmed his intention to
offer an amnesty for “young” pirates, without further specifics. The letter also
mentioned that “negotiations” were still at an early stage, but that the intended
agreement would not apply to the pirate “kingpins” (see annex 4.2).
59. The Monitoring Group is concerned about the lack of transparency of these
ongoing negotiations and by the vagueness and simplified terms of the President’s
letter. The steps described by the President could lead towards a general policy of
amnesty for Somali piracy. It is an oversimplification to limit a complex transnational
organized crime to “kingpins” and “young boys”, even if it is a strategy for bringing
accountability, prosecution and punishment to bear in a difficult situation.
60. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group has followed closely developments in
“Puntland” and noted that the Puntland Maritime Police Force has increasingly
intervened in maritime-related incidents.35 This included the rescue of 22 crew
members on board the stranded merchant vessel Iceberg 1, which had been held in
pirate custody for almost three years.36 While the owner of the vessel claims that the
operation had been staged following a financial agreement between the Government
of Yemen, the “Puntland” administration and the pirates holding the vessel, he has
not substantiated these allegations. However, it remains unclear what motivated the
Puntland Maritime Police Force to intervene particularly in December 2012, while
the vessel had been stranded less than one nautical mile off the shore since
November 2011, and why the Force has not intervened in other hijacking cases.37
__________________
33 www.qubanaha.com/2013/01/09/hogaamiyiye-maxamed-cabdi-afweyne-iyo-koxdi…-
soomaaliya-oo-ku-wadhaaqay-in-ay-ka-baxeen-howlihii-burcadbadeednimadasawiro/.
34 Information obtained from a reliable regional law enforcement source, 20 February 2013, and a
Western diplomat based in Nairobi, 20 February 2013.
35 http://dunidaonline.com/index.php?id=8065; www.raxanreeb.com/2013/04/ciidamadda-baddapuntland-
pmpf-oo-gacan-kusoo-dhigay-kalluumeysato-u-dhalatay-dalka-iiraansawirrodhageyso/.
36 The Ro-Ro cargo vessel Iceberg 1 (IMO 7429102) and its 25-member crew was hijacked on
29 March 2010.
37 These include the hijacked maritime tankers Royal Grace (2 March 2012) and the Smyrni
(10 May 2012).
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61. The “Puntland” piracy network capitalized on the last ships it held when it
released the maritime tankers Royal Grace and Smyrni on 8 and 10 March 2013,
respectively.38
62. Meanwhile, the apparent trend in kidnap for ransom, which increased in
September 2011 with the involvement of Somali pirates, has not continued and
incidents are infrequently registered. For example, following the kidnapping by
pirates of American journalist Michael Moore Scott on 6 January 2012 in
“Galmudug”, several international aidorers were abducted in two separate
incidents. On 29 June 2012, four Norwegian Refugee Council workers were
kidnapped in Dadaab, Kenya, but rescued four days later. On 11 July 2012, three
International Aid Services workers were kidnapped in Galkaayo and remain held by
Somali pirates (see also annexes 7.1 and 8.1).
Diversification of pirate interests
63. While the decline in reported incidents gives the impression that the piracy
business is exhausted, in fact the organized criminal networks and individuals that
proved successful in one context are diversifying their financial interests by
undertaking different ventures. As described in annex 3.1, networks are adapting to
other opportunities, if not actually some of the original precursors to piracy. In this
regard, piracy on the high seas may be currently contained, but the networks or
individuals that have controlled piracy can easily shift away from or back to piracy
in pursuit of prospective returns on investments that can result from the relaxation
of private security measures and the withdrawal of international naval forces.
64. Consequently, the Monitoring Group has followed the increasing use of
unregulated and untrained Somali security guards to provide armed protection
aboard vessels involved in regional trade and/or fishing activities, in potential
violation of the arms embargo. For example, in Mogadishu, local authorities, such
as the Mogadishu Port Authority (harbour master’s office) and the police, are in
control of this business. They provide the guards, the weapons and the licences.
Shipping companies are charged US$ 500 per armed guard per month and are
provided with one-year licences (see annex 4.3). In “Puntland”, the enterprise is
controlled by private businessmen and linked to illicit maritime activities such as
smuggling, illegal fishing and piracy (see annex 3.1), posing a potential threat to
regional safety and security.
Judicial challenges
65. To date neither the Somali Government, the “Puntland” administration or any
other local authority has seriously prosecuted and jailed any senior pirate leaders,
financiers, negotiators or facilitators. The leadership of the principal piracy
networks and their associates have continued to enjoy freedom and impunity and
have not been hindered in their travel or ability to transfer funds.
66. Working Group 5 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia has
repeatedly called for coordinated international efforts to identify and disrupt the
financial networks of pirate leaders and their investors. However, investigative and
judicial responses have been far too limited if existing at all. The lack of political
will stems from limited financial resources, jurisdictional barriers, differing national
__________________
38 Both vessels were released after a ransom drop of an undisclosed amount.
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interests and agendas and even domestic electoral motivations. Consequently,
cooperation between national law enforcement agencies investigating some Somali
piracy cases remains poor and is hampered by distrust and competition as much as
by judicial restrictions.
67. The continuing decrease in the number of high-profile hijackings will probably
weaken any resolve to investigate and prosecute the pirate leadership, in Somalia
and abroad, as already indicated by the February 2013 letter of the President of
Somalia (see para. 58 above). This, in addition to the perpetual hold on proposed
listings of pirate leaders in the Committee, will inevitably lead to impunity for those
who made the most profit from and bear the greatest responsibility for an
international crime, and who are now pursuing alternative organized criminal
activities. Since the passage of time is affecting the quality and accessibility of
testimonies and evidence, the Monitoring Group reiterates the urgent need to
establish a dedicated group of investigators with the mandate to collect information,
gather evidence and record testimonies relating to acts of Somali piracy, including
especially the identification of pirate leaders, financiers, negotiators, facilitators,
support networks and beneficiaries.
Pirates and facilitators on Facebook
68. As a transnational organized crime, Somali piracy entails more than armed
youngsters at sea in small boats attacking ships or providing armed protection
aboard hijacked vessels. The piracy business draws on a widespread network of
facilitators internationally and inside Somalia from multiple layers of society. In
fact, pirates and their accomplices may be bankers, telecommunications agents,
businessmen of various kinds, politicians, clan elders, translators or aid workers, all
using their regular occupations or positions to facilitate one or another network.
69. Investigations have confirmed that these myriad facilitators are interlinked
through various communication channels and employ social network services, such
as Facebook.39 Six profiles of individual cases are included in parts of annex 4
which have been designated as strictly confidential in order to protect possible
prosecutions.
E. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption
70. Despite the change in leadership in Mogadishu and the good-faith efforts of
the Minister of Finance, Mohamud Hassan Suleiman, the misappropriation of public
resources continues according to past practices and patterns. The system inherited
by the new Government is in many ways beyond its control, while at times political
decisions and appointments have exacerbated conditions of corruption. Ferocious
competition for control of Government at the end of the transition process in the
summer of 2012 entailed approaches to campaign financing that took the
management of finances outside the public system or contributed to mismanagement
through it (see annex 5.1).
__________________
39 Despite repeated official correspondence addressed to Facebook Inc., it has never responded to
Monitoring Group requests to discuss information on Facebook accounts belonging to
individuals involved in hijackings and hostage-taking.
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71. Notably, the efforts of donors to encourage the deposit of Government
revenues in the Central Bank proved served a flawed, if technically correct,
objective. On average, at least 80 per cent of withdrawals from the Central Bank are
made for private purposes and not for the running of Government, representing a
patronage system and a set of social relations that defy the institutionalization of the
state. The system of fadlan (please) in which key leaders authorize individual
payments from public funds is fundamental to the distribution of resources within
the sphere of Government and contradicts national budgets or structured spending
for official bodies. It is not a system that can be changed easily given the breadth of
interests at stake at the centre of power and has simply become the way of doing
Government business. However, without a legitimate repository for internal and
external revenue, efforts to build an effective public financial management system
will be undermined. In this context, the fiduciary agency managed by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and intended to serve as a model, was reduced to a
transfer agent that could not ensure accountability for funds once they reached the
Government of Somalia. Key to irregularities has been the current Governor of the
Central Bank, Abdusalam Omer. Indeed, of the US$ 16.9 million transferred by
PricewaterhouseCoopers to the Central Bank, US$ 12 million could not be traced
(see annex 5.2).
Passport production, corruption and fraud
72. An in-depth investigation into the fraudulent practices associated with the
production of Somali passports was presented in the previous report of the
Monitoring Group (see S/2012/544, paras. 18-21 and annex 1.2). Since that time, the
same practices have continued to undermine the integrity of the Somali passport as a
legitimate travel document. Corruption still revolves around the ePassport, with
inflated fees charged by private businesses appointed to issue passports in places
where Somalia does not have an embassy or consulate. The ePassport programme
continues to be controlled by Ambassador Abdulkadir Sheikhey Al-Hatimi, Consul
General of the Federal Government of Somalia in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The
revenues generated from the issuance of passports remain unaccounted for. In the
past, not one dollar reached the Central Bank. In the first three months of 2013, the
Ministry of Immigration, still headed by General Abdullahi Gaafow Mohamud, did
make some deposits in the Central Bank, but did not indicate if these were from
passports, visas or another source of income. Regardless, the amount deposited
constitutes only 4 per cent of the estimated revenue from the issuance of passports
alone.
73. In addition, the security and accuracy of Somali passports remains an issue,
especially in the absence of biometric data or a reliable database to account for who
has already received a passport. Individuals have been able to obtain multiple
passports by using false names. Non-citizens of Somalia have also been issued with
passports. The existing system can be exploited for illicit or criminal activity (see
annex 5.3).
Mogadishu port
74. Income generated from the port of Mogadishu constitutes the largest internal
revenue stream for the central Government, aside from bilateral donations from
other Governments. However, port revenues, either customs or port fees, have
historically been diverted at the source through a variety of practices that continue
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today. While control over diversion at the port has taken different forms over the
years, invariably the port manager is a key figure. Between September 2010 and
July 2012, Sayid Ali Moalim Abdulle served as the port manager, and continues to
exert influence through the deputy port manager, Ahmed Abdi Kariye (a.k.a. Ahmed
Qorqor). The Monitoring Group has documented at least one case in which Sayid
Ali diverted US$ 3,415,840 from humanitarian shipments during the Somali famine
in 2011.
75. Based on analysis of activity at Mogadishu port, the monthly revenue potential
from import customs alone is in excess of US$ 3.8 million per month. However, the
average monthly deposit in the Central Bank from the port between August 2012
and March 2013 was US$ 2.7 million in total. While deposits of port revenues into
the Central Bank increased generally, they are proportionally less than the increase
in shipping at Mogadishu port, possibly indicating a higher rate of diversion. At
present, at least 33 per cent of monthly port revenues cannot be accounted for (see
annex 5.4).
Petroleum sector
76. The Monitoring Group has gathered information on growing commercial
interest in Somalia’s oil and gas sector and has identified a number of conflicts of
interest that could constitute threats to peace and security as well as exacerbate the
risks of corruption.
77. There is currently growing hostility between the Federal Government of
Somalia and regional administrations that have signed oil deals independently of the
Government. Divergence between the 2008 petroleum law — which is invoked by
Federal Government petroleum officials — and Somalia’s Constitution is exacerbating
this hostility. The Monitoring Group has identified potential flashpoints between
regional authorities with self-declared administrations and local armed forces,
notably in the areas of Sool and Sanag, between “Somaliland”, “Puntland” and the
self-declared Khatumo State. In addition, oil industry activity in “Galmudug” occurs
in a context of political instability and strong clan rivalries over natural resources in
the Mudug region. A territorial dispute between Somalia and Kenya, given the
existing conflict over power-sharing in “Jubaland”, could also represent a possible
threat to peace and security.
78. In addition, there is a potential conflict of interest between Norway’s oil
concerns and its support for the establishment of an exclusive economic zone that
would almost certainly lead to a modification in Somalia’s maritime boundary in
favour of Kenya. Serious limitations in the management of the Somali Petroleum
Company and the Somali Petroleum Authority require urgent capacity development
in order to safeguard their integrity and transparency and to mitigate their possible
capture by private interests.
79. In the absence of clear constitutional agreements between federal and regional
governments and the introduction of best-practice transparency mechanisms for the
management of signature fees and royalties and taxes on future oil production, oil
companies should cease and desist negotiations with Somali authorities or risk
fuelling non-transparent practices and political disagreements that could exacerbate
clan conflict and constitute threats to peace and security (see annex 5.5 and para. 176
below).
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Annex 2
Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat
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Annex 2.1: Al Hijra (formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre)
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)∗
__________________
∗ The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
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Annex 3
Spoiler networks in Somalia
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Annex 3.1: Spoiler networks in northern Somalia
Illegal fishing, private security operations and weapons smuggling
1. Following the decline in pirate hijackings of merchant vessels since 2012, pirate leaders
have turned towards unlicensed fishing operations in Somali waters as a source of revenue.
2. Puntland officials estimate that tens of thousands of tonnes of illegal catch has been
fished from Puntland’s coastline between 2012 and 2013 by hundreds of illegal fishing vessels.
The vessels are predominantly Iranian and Yemeni owned and all use Somali armed security.1
The Monitoring Group has inspected at least four forged fishing licenses registered between
May and October 2012 that have been confiscated from unlicensed Iranian vessels by
international naval forces (see annex 3.1.a). Local fishermen from different communities along
the Puntland coast between Las Qoray and Hafun have confirmed that the private security
teams on board such vessels are normally provided from pools of demobilized Somali pirates
and coordinated by a ring of pirate leaders and associated businessmen operating in Puntland,
Somaliland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Yemen and Iran. The security teams
assist the vessels to cast nets several kilometres long and often open fire on unprotected
fishermen in order to drive out competition. The prize is often lucrative and includes large reef
and open water catch, notably tuna.2
3. The Monitoring Group has received several unconfirmed reports that some of the illegal
fishing vessels are also being used as cover for weapons smuggling. While the Monitoring
Group has been unable to verify any particular vessel that has been used for both illegal fishing
and weapons smuggling, it has nonetheless established other connections between the illegal
fishing networks and networks involved in the arms trade and connected to Al-Shabaab in
northeastern Somalia.
4. The Monitoring Group has received several reports of the traffic of narcotics and
humans aboard vessels being used for illegal fishing, but has not received any specific evidence
or firsthand testimony to that effect.
__________________
1 Puntland officials estimate up to 180 illegal Iranian, and up to 300 illegal Yemeni vessels are
fishing Puntland waters, but also allege a small number of Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean vessels,
as well as some European-owned vessels, are engaged in illegal fishing. International naval sources
corroborate the prevalence of Iranian and Yemeni vessels amongst unlicensed vessels. On 23 April
2013, Puntland authorities detained five Iranian vessels fishing illegally off the coast of Somalia,
and arrested approximately 80 Iranian crewmembers and 12 armed Somali security guards.
Interviews with: fishing community leaders on 8 December 2012, Puntland Presidency official on
15 December 2012 and Puntland fisheries Ministry on 8 April 2013.
2 Interviews with 6 separate fishing community leaders, 8 December 2012. Local fishermen reported
up to 30 incidents of private security teams firing on unprotected fishermen, crushing their nets and
ramming their skiffs between September and December 2012.
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The Qandala — Hafun network
5. This network operates between the coastal towns of Qandala and Hafun in northeast
Puntland, an area that is a known hub for piracy and arms smuggling (see annex 3.1.b for map).
6. The two principal ringleaders of the illicit fishing and security operations in this area are
pirate leaders Isse Mohamoud Yusuf ‘Yullux’ and Mohammed Mussa Saeed ‘Aargoosto’ (see
annex 3.1.c for profiles). Both men are from the Darod / Majerteen / Ali Saleebaan clan of
Sheikh Abdulqaadir Muumin, who is the ideological leader of Al-Shabaab Northeast3, and both
men originally come from Qandala in the province of Bari, where Puntland authorities seized a
major weapons cache in October 2012 (see annex 6.1 for more specific details on this case).
7. Aargoosto recruits unemployed youth, including former pirates, for the private security
operations, sourcing manpower from his strongholds of Qandala, Alula and Hafun at $50 a
head per voyage.4 Yullux acts as an investor and broker in the illegal fishing enterprises, which
are coordinated by Shahdon Ali Yare, a former fisheries and ports Minister from Puntland
acting as a principal broker for Iranian businessmen and issuing fraudulent Puntland fishing
licenses. Yullux also uses his offshore piracy network to interdict fishing vessels that are not
protected by private security operations and has released a vessel on Yare’s orders on at least
one occasion.5
8. Telephone records of Yullux and Aargoosto indicate that they have both been in contact
with the same telephone numbers in Oman, Yemen and Kenya, and both are in contact with
several numbers in the UAE that are also in direct contact with Yare. In turn, Yare has been in
direct telephone communication with at least three Iranian numbers and a satellite telephone
used on board an Iranian vessel, the ‘Arshia’, which has been fishing illegally in Puntland’s
waters.6
9. In addition, a known collaborator of Yare’s network, Musa Mirre Ali, is a signatory on a
fraudulent fishing license inspected by the Monitoring Group (see photo 2 in annex 3.1.a). The
Monitoring Group has also identified a Dubai-based businessman, Abdirizak Barre, acting as a
broker between Yare and Iranian businessmen and has obtained evidence of telephone
__________________
3 See Annex 1.6. and also S/2012/544, Annex 2.3 for more details on Muumin.
4 Information on Aargoosto provided by fishing community elders from Qandala, Alula and Hafun,
and an eyewitness who saw Aargoosto recruiting youth at Alula.
5 Information on Isse Yullux provided by Puntland authorities and international naval intelligence.
Information on Shahdon Ali Yare provided by one of his business associates, international naval
intelligence, and fishing community elders. Fishing community elders have provided testimony that
Aargoosto was arrested in 2008 or 2009 and transferred to an Iranian prison before being eventually
released. Following his release a group of Iranian businessmen provided him with instructions to
carry out private security operations for Iranian fishing vessels, and allocated 20 per cent of future
profits for these operations. One UAE-based businessman with connections to Iran and himself
involved in the illegal fishing business confirmed to the Monitoring Group that the pirate networks
take 20 per cent of profits from illegal fishing, while the Iranian businessmen take 80 per cent.
Iranian fishing vessels deliver their catch to Iran, Yemen and Oman.
6 Information on the ‘Arshia’ and other Iranian vessels collected by international naval forces and
Puntland authorities.
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communications between Barre and Yare, as well as separate communications between Barre
and Aargoosto.7
10. The operations of Aargoosto and Yullux appear to intersect with Al-Shabaab networks.
Puntland authorities allege that Yullux donates funds to Abdulqaadir Muumin8, and that he
invests in weapons smuggling operations coordinated by Abdirahkim Dhuqub (also Majerteen /
Ali Saleebaan), a known weapons trafficker for Al-Shabaab who is based in Qandala (see
annex 3.1.c for Dhuqub’s profile). The Puntland authorities also allege that Yullux signed an
agreement in March 2013 with a Majerteen / Ali Saleebaan Al-Shabaab leader, Abdikarim
Ahmed Ibrahim, to share piracy ransom fees for a vessel hidden in Aargoosto’s stronghold of
Alula. Ibrahim was also allegedly responsible for the October 2012 weapons delivery to
Qandala mentioned above.
11. International naval sources have reported to the Monitoring Group that Aargoosto and
Dhuqub are co-investors in a number of commercial enterprises and factories in Puntland. The
close relationship between Aargoosto and Dhuqub is also substantiated by Puntland authorities
who report that Aargoosto and Dhuqub collaborated in the ambush of Puntland armed forces in
March 2011, near Hul Anod, where several Puntland soldiers were killed.
12. A link analysis chart of the Qandala – Hafun network appears at Annex 3.1.d.
The Las Qoray network
13. Illegal fishing networks are also operating in the Las Qoray area of northwestern
Puntland (see annex 3.1.b for map), and are coordinated by a number of businessmen operating
in Puntland, Somaliland and Dubai, and who have connections to Oman and Yemen. The Las
Qoray network has ties to the Qandala-Hafun network and also appears to have connections to
an arms smuggling ring with connections to Al-Shabaab in northeastern Somalia.
14. The Monitoring Group has identified one of the key individuals involved in
coordinating the security details provided to illegal Iranian fishing vessels off the coast of Las
Qoray as Yusuf Aalim Osman, a Bosaso-based businessman from the same Darod / Warsengeli
/ Dubeys sub-clan as Yassiin Khalid Osman (a.k.a. Yasiin ‘Kilwe’), the military commander of
Al-Shabaab in northeastern Somalia.9
15. Yusuf Aalim Osman personally supervises the security for at least 40 Iranian fishing
vessels operating in the Las Qoray area.10 He travels frequently to Salalah in Oman where he is
__________________
7 Two Dubai-based Somali businessmen and a Dubai-based businessman involved in the illegal
fishing trade all confirm Barre’s role in coordinating Shahdon’s operations.
8 The Monitoring Group interviewed Muna Abdule, the wife of Muumin in Boosaaso prison on
24 January 2013. She was apprehended by Puntland authorities after visiting Muumin in an isolated
part of Bari region of northern Puntland, and was reportedly carrying 40,000 USD in cash, given to
her by Muumin.
9 See Annex 1.6.; also see S/2012/544, Annex 2.3.
10 Interview with Las Qoray-based fishing community elders, 8 December 2012.
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known to coordinate activities with Ali Saleebaan clan businessmen connected to the Qandala-
Hafun network, and to Aden, Yemen, where he is part of a soap exporting business controlled
by Warsengeli / Dubeys businessmen.11 Aalim’s business partner in Dubai is Abdullahi Ahmed
Mohamed, the manager of Najmat Alkhair General Trading L.L.C, a company that acts as a
cover for private security operations and the supply of fishing vessels from Oman (see
annex 3.1.e).12
16. Close connections exist between the Qandala-Hafun network and the Las Qoray
network. Telephone records indicate that Yusuf Aalim Osman is in direct contact with
telephone numbers in Oman, which in turn are directly in contact with pirate leaders Yullux and
Aargoosto. The Monitoring Group dialled one of the Omani numbers in the Dubai office of
Abdullahi Ahmed Mohamed, who then admitted the number’s owner is an “agent broker” for
himself and Yusuf Aalim Osman.13
17. Aalim has also been in direct telephone contact with at least three Omani numbers and a
Yemeni number, which in turn are in direct contact with Abdi Khayre Mohamed, another
Warsengeli / Dubeys businessman, who has been named in a previous Monitoring Group report
for his role in smuggling weapons for Al-Shabaab in northeastern Somalia.14 Since 2010, Abdi
Khayre Mohamed has relocated much of his business activities to Berbera, in Somaliland.15 In
addition, Aalim’s business partner, Abdullahi Ahmed Mohamed, is in direct telephone contact
with Musa Jama Delef, a Warsengeli / Dubeys militia commander of Sanag province who has
doubled as an official for the Somaliland security services16 and who has close connections to
Al-Shabaab networks in the Golis mountains, as explained below.
18. Abdi Khayre Mohamed has cultivated relations with Iranian businessmen involved in
the illegal fishing trade. One eyewitness present at the Juba Hotel in Bosaso during the course
of 2011 reported the presence of an Iranian businessman, known as “Mohammad”, who had
arrived in Bosaso on a maritime vessel in mid 2011.17 Puntland authorities questioned the man,
whose name according to his identity documents was Gol Mohammad Nosratzehi (see
annex 3.1.f).
19. On the same occasion, another eyewitness confirmed that Nosratzehi introduced himself
as an associate of both Abdi Khayre Mohamed and Shahdon Ali Yare. Nosratzehi explained that
__________________
11 Interviews with Dubai-based Somali businessman associated with Aalim, 17 December 2012, and
Puntland-based businessman associated with Aalim, 26 February 2013.
12 Abdullahi Ahmed Mohamed confirmed that he is a business partner of Aalim in person to the
Monitoring Group on 7 March 2013. Two other Somali businessmen based in Dubai, and associated
with Abdullahi Ahmed Mohamed, also confirmed the same information.
13 Call made on 11 March 2013.
14 See S/2012/544, Annex 2.3, paragraph 11.
15 A Somali business associate of Abdi Khayre Mohamed confirmed he met him in Berbera in
January 2012 and that he has been based there for three years.
16 Recent information obtained by the Monitoring Group suggests that Somaliland authorities have
relieved Delef of his official functions.
17 Interview with Juba Hotel resident, 26 February 2013.
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he was in Bosaso to coordinate commercial fishing activities. The eyewitness at the Juba Hotel
also confirmed he saw Nosratzehi meeting Mohamed Aydiid Jaama, the Deputy Chairman of
the Bosaso Chamber of Commerce, who has already been identified by the Monitoring Group
as an arms broker for Mohamed Sa’iid ‘Atom’, the former commander of Al-Shabaab in
northeastern Somalia, as well as for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).18
20. The Monitoring Group has received reports of the involvement of Mohamed Aydiid
Jaama in at least one recent weapons delivery through to Erigavo, in the Sanag province of
northern Somalia. According to eyewitness testimony, a skiff operated by Yemeni and Eritrean
crewmembers landed in early January 2013 in the beach port of Hiis and offloaded large
amounts of ammunition and PKM machine guns. This information has been independently
corroborated by a confidential source in Somaliland.19 According to one of the loaders, on the
instructions of Mohamed Aydiid Jaama, the cargo was transferred to Erigavo, where Musa
Jama Delef received it at a safe house. According to Al-Shabaab defectors’ testimonies, Erigavo
is a key weapons trading hub from where Al-Shabaab in northeastern Somalia sources its
weapons.20 In addition, a close confidant of Mohamed Sa’iid ‘Atom’ has confirmed that Delef
used to be close to Atom during the armed struggle in the Golis mountain range.21 A Somali
weapons dealer who has traded in northeastern Somalia has also confirmed that Abdi Khayre
Mohamed is still involved in weapons trading, and smuggles weapons cargoes to northern
Somalia on dhows carrying soap exported from Yemen.22
21. A link analysis chart of the Las Qoray network appears at Annex 3.1.g. In addition, a
link analysis chart of the relationship between the Qandala – Hafun and Las Qoray networks
appears at Annex 3.1.h.
__________________
18 Interview with eyewitness, 27 February 2013. Also see S/2012/544, annex 2.3.
19 Information received on 2 April 2013.
20 Interview with defector, 23 January 2013.
21 Interview, 24 January 2013.
22 Interview, Mogadishu, 15 November 2012.
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Annex 3.1.a: Samples of illegal fishing licences used by Iranian vessels
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Annex 3.1.b: Map of northern Somalia
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Annex 3.1.c: Profiles of Mohammed Mussa Saeed ‘Aargoosto’,
Isse Mohamoud Yusuf ‘Yullux’ and Abdirahkim Dhuqub.
Mohammed Mussa Saeed ‘Aargoosto’
Profile: Born in Qandala and from the Darod / Majerteen / Ali Saleebaan clan, Aargoosto is
believed to be between the age of 35 and 40 years old. He is one of Puntland’s major pirate
investors. A former businessman trading lobster between Hafun and Garad, he turned to piracy
in 2007 and was part of pirate attack teams before becoming an investor. Aargoosto is building
a house in the South C neighbourhood of Nairobi, Kenya. Naval intelligence sources believe
him to be involved in drug trafficking, using fishing vessels for which he is responsible for
providing protection. Some sources have informed the Monitoring Group that he is involved in
smuggling of migrants and foreign fighters between Somalia and Yemen, as well as weapons.
Involvement in Piracy: Aargoosto has been involved in the successful hijacking of the ‘Golden
Blessing’ (28 June 2012), ‘Marida Marguerite’ (8 May 2010), ‘Samho Dream’ (4 April 2010)
and ‘Golden Nori’ (28 October 2007).
Isse Mohamoud Yusuf ‘Yullux’
Profile: Isse Mohamoud Yusuf ‘Yullux’, born in 1963 and raised in Qandala, is from the
Darod / Majerteen / Ali Saleebaan clan. He owned a small restaurant at the Isse Village, an area
near to Hafun District where his clan lives. With revenues from the restaurant he started to
trade in khat. He then joined pirate rings as a hijacker and as an investor in 2008. He is now a
major pirate leader, possesses six ‘technicals’ and commands 50 men. He travels to Mogadishu
on a regular basis and operates between Alula and Hul Anod.
Involvement in piracy: On 24 May 2008, Yullux and other investors are believed to have
financed the capture of the Dutch/Danish vessel ‘Amiya Scan’, which was hijacked off the
coast of Somalia and held at the coastal town of Eyl. The vessel was released with all of its
crew on 24 June 2008, after a ransom 2,800,000 USD was paid. Isse Yullux received 30 per
cent of the total amount. On 20 July 2008, he and other investors financed the capture off the
Somali coast of the Panama bulk carrier vessel ‘Stella Maris’ and held the ship with
21 crewmembers at Eyl. The vessel was released along with the crew on 26 September 2008
after a ransom of 2,000,000 USD was paid. Again, he received 30 per cent of the total amount.
On 2 June 2009, he and other investors financed the capture of the Egyptian cargo ship ‘Blue
Star’ and held the vessel with 28 crewmembers at the coastal town of Hafun. The vessel was
released along with the crewmembers on board on 5 March 2009, after a ransom of 1,780,000
USD was paid. On this occasion, he received 50 per cent of the total amount. On 3 March
2010, he and other investors financed the capture of the Saudi oil tanker ‘Al-Nisr Al Saudi’ off
the coast of Somalia with 13 crewmembers on board. The vessel was held at the coastal town of
Bargal and released on 7 December 2010, after a ransom of 7,000,000 USD was paid. Again, he
received 50 per cent of the total amount. As of the middle of 2012, Isse Yullux and his team
hijacked the ‘Royal Grace’ and ‘Smyrni’ tankers, which have been anchored between Bargal
and Hafun.
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Abdirahkim Dhuqub
Profile: Dhuqub is widely known to be a military operator for Al-Shabaab and involved in
infiltrating weapons stocks into northeastern Somalia. He took part in the 2008 fighting against
Ethiopia during the battle of Mogadishu. His is based in Qandala coastal town, around which
would be also located training facilities for the security section (Amniyat) of Al-Shabaab North
East. Dhuqub travels regularly from Qandala to Hul Anod.
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Annex 3.1.d: The Qandala — Hafun network
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Annex 3.1.e: Corporate records of Najmat Alkhair General Trading L.L.C
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112 13-36185
Annex 3.1.f: Identity snapshot of Gol Mohammad Nosratzehi
S/2013/413
13-36185 113
Annex 3.1.g: The Las Qoray network
S/2013/413
114 13-36185
Annex 3.1.h: Connections between Qandala — Hafun and
Las Qoray networks
Annex 8
“Th e Pirat es of Somali a: Endin g th e Threa t, Rebuildin g a Nation ”, Th e Wor ld Bank,
2013 (Extracts)
THE PIRATES
of SOMALIA
Ending the Threat,
Rebuilding a Nation
The World Bank
Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa
Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA:
Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation
The World Bank
Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa
To read the full report please visit:
http://www.worldbank.org/africa/piratesofsomalia.
© 2013 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
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This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. Note
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The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect
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Photo credits: © AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Map of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xx
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
Human, Economic, and Global Security Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii
The Business Model of Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiv
Reshaping the Policy Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv
Chapter 1: Overview and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Piracy in Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Part I: A Local Threat with Global Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Part II: Understanding Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Part III: Reshaping the Policy Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PART I: A LOCAL THREAT WITH GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 13
Chapter 2: A Significant “Tax” on World Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Sea Shipping Lanes: Defining Exposure to Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Estimating the Cost of Somali Piracy: A US$18 Billion Question? . . . . . 22
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Annex 2.A: Conceptual and Econometric Framework . . . . . . . . . . 30
iv | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
Chapter 3: The Fear Factor: Impact of Somali Piracy on Regional Tourism . . . 35
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Tourism to Affected Regions: Context, Facts, and Trends . . . . . . . . 36
Anecdotal Evidence of a Negative Link between Piracy and Tourism . . . 37
Beyond Anecdotes: Quantifying the Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Seychelles: Trouble in Paradise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Annex 3.A: Countries Included in Each Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Annex 3.B: Methodology and Quantitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Annex 3.C: Tourism Patterns of South Asian Countries within Range
of Somali Piracy Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Chapter 4: Impact on Fisheries: Where it all Started . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Piracy and Fisheries in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Production and Trade Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Quantitative Results: A Significant Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Decline in Exports after the Onset of Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Decline in Production: A Tale of Two Oceans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Was Stock Depletion Real? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Annex 4.A: Miscellaneous Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Annex 4.B: Export Analysis and Seychelles Case Study . . . . . . . . . . 67
Annex 4.C: Tuna Catch Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Chapter 5: Piracy, Insurgency, and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Current Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
From Conflict to Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
The Role of Subclan Affiliations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Potential for Increased Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Conclusion: Looking Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
TABLE OF CONTENTS | v
PART II: UNDERSTANDING SOMALI PIRACY . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Chapter 6: Characterizing Somali Piracy: Facts and Analysis . . . . . . . . . 85
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
The Fundamentals of Somali Pirate Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Preparing for Pirate Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Attack Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Hijacking and Ransoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Annex 6.A: Determinants of a Pirate Hijacking Attempt and its Success . 101
Annex 6.B: Determinants of Ransom Payments . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Annex 6.C: Attack Distance and Prior Success Rate . . . . . . . . . . 105
Chapter 7: Splitting the Pie: The Distribution of Ransom Proceeds . . . . . 107
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A New Look at the Business Model of Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . 108
A Historical Detour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
The Importance of Coastal Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Beyond Pirates, Boats, and Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Estimating the Distribution of Ransom Proceeds . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Manpower and Market Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Financial Resources and Market Interest Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Political Capital and Residual Rents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
How Political Capital Collects its Rents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Annex 7.A: A Brief History of Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Annex 7.B: An Occupational Choice Model of Pirate Labor Supply . . . 127
Annex 7.C: A Model of Portfolio Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Chapter 8: The Political Economy of Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Understanding Anchorage Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
The Gradual Erosion of Clan Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Conflict and Power in Somalia’s Recent History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A Political Economy Model of Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
How Pirates Secure Stakeholder Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Explaining Variations over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Southern Somalia: The Early Days of Piracy in Kismayo . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
vi | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
Somaliland: The Overarching Goal of Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Puntland: Piracy Responding to Local Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Central Somalia: Piracy Responding to Conflict Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
PART III: RESHAPING THE POLICY DIALOGUE . . . . . . . . . . .155
Chapter 9: Review and Evaluation of Current Policies . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Curbing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Antipiracy at Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Law Enforcement Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Socioeconomic Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Assessing Policy Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Increasing the Risk of Death and Detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Increasing the Opportunity Cost of Becoming a Pirate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Lowering the Chances of Successful Hijackings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Chapter 10: A Paradigm Shift to Eradicate Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . . 173
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
A Political Contract for the Eradication of Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Political Representation and Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
State-Building as a Prerequisite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
An Incentive-Compatible Political Resolution of Piracy . . . . . . . . 177
Compensating for Loss of Piracy Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Containing Individual Spoilers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
The Role of the International Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Finance (and Firepower) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Appendix Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
TABLE OF CONTENTS | vii
List of Tables
Table 2.1: Share of World Trade Affected by Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 2.2: Shares of World Trade, by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 2.3: Shares of Trade Affected by Piracy, by Region . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 2.4: Proportional Increase in Shipping Distance to Avoid Piracy,
by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 2.5: Shares of Trade Affected by Piracy, by Income Group . . . . . 21
Table 2.6: Proportional Increase in Shipping Distance to Avoid Piracy, by
Income Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 2.A.1: Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table 2.A.2: Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table 3.1: Countries Affected by Somali Piracy, by Region . . . . . . . 36
Table 3.2: Descriptive Tourism Statistics by Region . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table 3.A.1: Countries by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 3.B.1: Annual Tourist Arrivals to Piracy-Affected Countries: DID
Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Table 3.B.2: Annual Tourist Arrivals by Sending Region: DID Estimates . . . 52
Table 4.A.1: Outputs of the Fishing Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Table 4.A.2: Trade Data Coverage for Countries Exposed to Piracy . . . . 66
Table 4.B.1: Difference-in-Difference Effects, Main Table . . . . . . . . . 67
Table 4.B.2: Exports by Destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Table 4.B.3: Export by Destination, Seychelles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Table 4.B.4: Robustness Check, Starting Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Table 4.B.5: Export of Fishery Products vs. Other Exports . . . . . . . . . 69
Table 4.C.1: Tuna Catch, Main Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Table 4.C.2: Tuna Catches by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 4.C.3: Overfishing Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Table 6.A.1: Determinants of Successful Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Table 6.A.2: Determinants of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Table 6.B.1: Determinants of Ransom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Table 6.C.1: Distance and Prior Success Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Table 7.1: Piracy Start-up Capital Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Table 7.2: Total Cost of Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Table 7.3: Labor Cost per Successful Pirate Operation . . . . . . . . . 116
Table 9.1: Impact of Policies on the Piracy Business Model . . . . . . 163
List of Figures
Figure 1: Piracy in Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii
Figure 2: Reported Somali Piracy Incidents (2000–2012) . . . . . . . xxiii
Figure 3: Anchorage Locations of Hijacked Ships . . . . . . . . . . xxiv
Figure 1.1: Piracy in Numbers (2000–2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Figure 1.2: Location of Reported Somali Piracy Incidents (2000–2012) . . . .3
Figure 1.3: Somali Piracy and Media Coverage (2004–2011) . . . . . . . .4
Figure 2.1: Shipping Route Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
viii | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
Figure 2.2: International Trade, Affected and Unaffected Routes . . . . . . 23
Figure 2.3: Trade Volumes by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Figure 2.4: Estimated Annual Cost of Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 3.1: Total Visitor Arrivals by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 3.2: Annual Visitors to SSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure 3.3: Annual Visitors to MENA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 3.4: Tourists Arriving in Sub- Saharan Coastal Countries by Water . . 39
Figure 3.5: Tourists Arriving by Water to MENA Coastal Countries . . . . 40
Figure 3.6: Annual Tourist Expenditures, SSA Countries . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 3.7: Annual Tourist Expenditures, MENA Countries . . . . . . . . 41
Figure 3.8: Origin of Visitors to SSA Countries Affected by Somali Piracy,
1995–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Figure 3.9: Origin of Visitors to MENA Countries Affected
by Somali Piracy, 1995–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Figure 3.10: Origin of Visitors to SSA Countries Affected by Somali Piracy . 42
Figure 3.11: Origin of Visitors to MENA Countries Affected
by Somali Piracy, 1995–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Figure 3.12: Average Number of Visitors (log) to Piracy- Affected Countries,
1995–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Figure 3.13: Average Number of Visitors (log) to SSA Piracy- Affected
Countries from OECD Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 3.14: Average Number of Visitors (log) to SSA Piracy- Affected
Countries from Europe, North America, SSA, and
East Asia and the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure 3.15: Average Number of Visitors (log) to SSA Piracy- Affected
Countries, West African Countries, and Elsewhere in Africa . . 46
Figure 3.16: Arrivals and Visitor Spending, Seychelles and the Maldives . . . 46
Figure 3.17: Percentage of Visitors to Seychelles by Region of Residence . . 47
Figure 3.18: Arrivals of Visitors by Mode of Transport . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Figure 3.B.1: Tourism Trends of Treatment and Control Groups . . . . . . . 50
Figure 3.C.1: India’s Share of South Asia Tourist Expenditure and Arrivals . . 53
Figure 3.C.2: Annual Visitors to South Asian Countries . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 3.C.3: Tourist Expenditure in South Asian Countries . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 3.C.4: Tourist Arrivals by Mode of Transport, India and Pakistan . . . 55
Figure 4.1: Exports of Fishing Products, Piracy-Affected and Non-affected
Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 4.2: Total Annual Tuna Catch, Western and Eastern Indian Ocean . . 61
Figure B4.1.1: Seychelles Exports: Fish and Little Else . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 5.1: AIS Tracking of MV Albedo November 2010–March 2013 . . . 75
Figure B5.2.1: Pirates, al-Shabaab and Financial Flows . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Figure 6.1: The Geography of Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Figure 6.2: Attack Pattern by Monsoon Season . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Figure 6.3: Anchorage Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Figure 6.4: Negotiation Time (median) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
TABLE OF CONTENTS | ix
Figure 6.5: Ransom Amounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Figure 7.B.1: Flow of Returns for a Potential Pirate . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Figure 7.B.2: Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Figure 7.C.1: Flow of Investment in Piracy Industry . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Figure 7.C.2: Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Figure 8.1: Number of Vessels Held per Anchorage 2005–12 . . . . . . 136
Figure 8.2: Political Economy Model of Somali Piracy . . . . . . . . . 143
Figure 8.3: Number of Vessels Held per Anchorage 2005–12,
Yearly Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Figure 9.1: Payment Distribution by Death/Detention Rate . . . . . . . 165
Figure 9.2: Payment Distribution by Wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Figure 9.3: Pirate Activities in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Figure 9.4: Payment Distribution by Success Rate . . . . . . . . . . . 167
List of Boxes
Box 4.1: Seychelles Case Study: Piracy a Serious Threat to Output and Jobs . 62
Box 5.1: Subclan Dynamics: The Case of the Saleeban . . . . . . . . . . 76
Box 5.2: Hawala Companies and Pirate- Insurgent Cooperation . . . . . . 77
Box 6.1: Piracy Typologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Box 6.2: Weather Conditions and the Probability of Attacks . . . . . . . 93
Box 6.3: What Predicts the Ransom Amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Box 10.1: The Afghan Experience: Throwing Billions of Dollars at
a Problem Does not Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Box 10.2: A Promising Solution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
xi
FOREWORD
Until recently, piracy off the Horn of Africa seemed to be prospering, unfettered by the efforts
of the international community. Somalia, a country in chaos after years of civil war,
was unable to slow the growth of this criminal industry.
Recent events suggest that 2013 may be a year of opportunity. The number of piracy
incidents has been falling since 2012, thanks in part to mobilization of international naval
forces and the adoption by the shipping industry of best practices to fend off pirate attacks.
Meanwhile, Somalia has a new administration. Along with the daunting tasks it faces of
rebuilding the state and putting the country back onto the track of prosperity and growth
come tremendous opportunities.
This report, “The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation,” shows
that it is in the international community’s common interest to find a resolution to Somali
piracy, and more generally to help the government of Somalia to rebuild the country. Its
findings reinforce the case for action. The costs imposed by Somali pirates on the global
economy are so high that international mobilization to eradicate piracy off the Horn of
Africa not only has global security benefits, it also makes ample economic sense.
However, Somalia cannot buy its way out of piracy; nor can the international community
rely solely on its law enforcement agencies to defeat pirates, whether at sea or on land.
As the report shows, the solution to Somali piracy is first and foremost political. Pirates rely
on onshore support to conduct negotiations and to secure safe access to coastal territories.
In turn, politically powerful figures capture large portions of the profits associated with piracy.
Any solution therefore will involve forging a political contract with local stakeholders—
a shift in attention, in other words, from the perpetrators to the enablers of piracy.
This report affirms that, beyond its firepower and financial resources, the international
community can and should assist Somalia with generating knowledge—knowledge of how
local power dynamics shape the rules for resource-sharing, how they drive clan and subclan
relationships, and ultimately how they determine national political stability—to find
solutions to the piracy problem. The report exemplifies the value of using rigorous analytical
tools to address some of the pressing problems of Africa.
xii | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
Collectively we have learned from our successes and failures, such as the opium poppy
eradication programs in Afghanistan, the oil revenue distribution arrangements in the
Niger delta, and the coastal resource management policies in the Philippines. Collectively,
we can help the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia to build institutions that
crowd in rather than crowd out positive change.
Kaushik C. Basu Makhtar Diop
Chief Economist and Senior Vice-President Vice-President
Development Economics Africa Region
World Bank World Bank
xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
“The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation” was prepared by a team
led by Quy-Toan Do and comprising Jean-Baptiste Blanc, Aurélien Kruse, Trung Dang Le,
Andrei A. Levchenko, Lin Ma, Farley Mesko, Claudia Ruiz, and Anja Shortland.
The work was sponsored by the Office of the Chief Economist of the Regional Vice-
Presidency for Africa (AFRCE) and cosponsored by the Seychelles Country Management
Unit of the Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa (AFCS4) and its Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management Unit (AFTP2). The team gratefully acknowledges financial support
from the Research Support Budget of the Development Economics Vice-Presidency
(DEC).
The work was conducted under the much-appreciated general guidance of Shantayanan
Devarajan, Haleh Bridi, Bella Bird, and Humberto Lopez. For helpful comments we
also thank Ian Bannon, Thorsten Bargfrede, Andrew Beath, Jarat Chopra, Louise Cottar,
Jishnu Das, David Evans, Wolfgang Fengler, Louise Fox, Abderrahim Fraji, Clément Gorrissen,
Joakim Gundel, Phil Hay, Bert Hofman, Aurélien Llorca, Alexandre Marc, Roland
Marchal, Michaela McRee, Hannah Messerli, Ian Mills, Anand Rajaram, Hugh Riddell,
Sawkut Rojid, Jorg Roofthooft, Sandor Sipos, Federico Varese, Xavier Vincent, Puteri Watson,
Stuart Yikona, Paolo Zacchia, colleagues in AFRCE, the Center on Conflict, Security
and Development in Nairobi (OPSFN), participants in the Decision Meeting in
Washington D.C. (USA), and the two peer reviewers, Phil Keefer and Gary Milante. The
team also gained much insight from consultations in Garoowe (Puntland State of Somalia)
and Nairobi (Kenya).
The team is particularly grateful to Cyrus Mody of the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB) for making available the dataset on piracy-related incidents compiled and maintained
by the IMB Piracy Reporting Center. Clément Gorrissen, consultant to the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), helped with construction of the joint UNODC–WB dataset
on ransom payments and anchorage locations. The Center for Advanced Defense Studies
(C4ADS) generously shared its database on primary actors in the Somali piracy business.
The assistance from Bruno Bonansea of the Map Design Unit of the World Bank (GSDPM)
for the construction of the maps featured in this report is also gratefully acknowledged. The
xiv | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
team also thanks Laura Muñoz of the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) for access
to its database; Alejandro Anganuzzi and Miguel Herrera of the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC) for facilitating access to the catch and effort database; and Kim Baugh
and Chris Elvidge of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
for compiling and sharing data on night-time light emissions from Somalia. Thanks also to
members of the Youth Organization Against Piracy (YOAP) in Garoowe and to all Somalia-
based contacts for the time they spent answering questions. Particular thanks go to the
Global Center on Conflict Security and Development, which hosted the internal and external
consultation workshops in Nairobi.
The dissemination and roll-out of the report was organized by a team led by Bella
Bird, Haleh Bridi, Shantayanan Devarajan, and Phil Hay and comprising Beatrice Berman,
Mapi Buitano, Herbert Francisco Curry Arceo, Quy-Toan Do, Elena Gex, Alexandre Hery,
Nathalie Lenoble, Polly Means, Kristina Nwazota, Keneth Omondi, Anne Sengès, Hedy
Sladovich, Aby Toure, and Jane Zhang in Washington D.C., USA; Janerose Lubisia, Ian
Mills, Keziah Muthembwa, Hugh Riddell, Nancy Visavilwa, and Peter Warutere in Nairobi,
Kenya; Khurshid Noorwalla and Sawkut Rojid in Port Louis, Mauritius; and Mayra Arvioti,
Rossella Della Monica, Veronique Jacobs, and Sandor Sipos in Brussels, Belgium.
Finally, the team is grateful to Keneth Omondi for outstanding administrative support
and to Anne Grant for editing, the Word Express for design and typesetting, and Adam
Broadfoot and the Printing, Graphics, and Multimedia Department of the World Bank for
printing this publication.
xv
CONTRIBUTORS
Jean-Baptiste Blanc, managing director of CloudBreak Consulting, is a lawyer admitted
to the Hauts-de-Seine bar in France. He has worked in 23 countries in West, East, and
Central Africa, with a focus on governance, private sector development, and regulation and
has a personal interest in conflict-affected and fragile countries. From 2000 to 2009, he was
an attorney at Fidal/KPMG, where he advised small and medium enterprises, global companies,
and public institutions on legal matters and operational strategies. He holds a master’s
degree in public administration (MPA) from Harvard University and a master’s in law
(LLM) from Montpellier University.
Quy-Toan Do is a senior economist in the research department and the Office of the
Chief Economist of the Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa of the World Bank, which he
joined in 2002. He previously studied determinants and impacts of armed conflicts in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Nepal, and Vietnam. He received his MA in mathematics and economics
from École Polytechnique and the Toulouse School of Economics and his PhD in
economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Aurélien Kruse, currently an economist with the World Bank office in Kathmandu, was
previously country economist for Somalia. He has worked extensively in Kenya, Burundi,
Comoros, and Madagascar, with a special focus on fragile and conflict situations. He holds
an MPA from Harvard University. His research has centered on fiscal decentralization.
Trung Dang Le is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Economics, University of
Copenhagen, where he is doing research on development economics. He holds a PhD in
economics from that university. His research interests cover applied microeconomics and
econometrics in such areas as economics of disasters, household economics, labor economics,
and economic development.
xvi | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
Andrei Levchenko, who has a PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, is assistant professor of economics at the University of Michigan, where he has
taught since 2008, and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Before going to Michigan, he was an economist in the Research Department of the
International Monetary Fund and visiting assistant professor at the University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business. His research concerns the interactions between globalization,
economic development, and macroeconomics.
Lin Ma is a PhD candidate in economics at the University of Michigan, where he has
studied since 2009. Previously he earned a master’s degree in economics from the University
of Pittsburgh. His research concerns trade, income inequality, and macroeconomics.
Farley Mesko is chief operating officer, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, a nonprofit
research organization dedicated to understanding the security implications of active and
emerging conflicts around the world. He is also a member of the board of directors of
Aragti Relief and Development Organization, a Mogadishu nonprofit dedicated to grassroots
capacity building and development. Having traveled extensively in Somalia, he has
written on clan dynamics, governance, and reconstruction there. He studied natural resource
economics and policy at Bowdoin College.
Claudia Ruiz is an economist in the World Bank research department, having joined the
Bank in 2011. Her studies in applied microeconomics are directed to understanding how
access to finance affects the welfare of individuals and the role of financial services in promoting
economic development. She holds a PhD in economics from UCLA.
Anja Shortland, who holds an MSc and a PhD in international relations from the London
School of Economics (LSE), is associate professor of economics at Brunel University,
U.K. She previously taught at Leicester and Oxford Universities, the School of Oriental
and African Studies, and LSE. Her main research interest is in the economics of security,
specifically piracy, insurgencies, and conflict dynamics. Her work, which has received wide
media coverage, has been published in the Journal of Development Economics, Oxford Economic
Papers, Economica, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Strategic Studies, Global Policy, and the
European Journal of Political Economy.
xvii
ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
AIS Automated Information System
AFCS4 Seychelles Country Management Unit of the Regional Vice-Presidency
for Africa
AFRCE Office of the Chief Economist of the Regional Vice-Presidency for
Africa
AFTP2 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit of the Regional
Vice-Presidency for Africa
ARS Alternative Remittance Services
ASWJ Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AU African Union
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BMP Best Management Practices
CEPII Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CRRA Constant Relative Risk Aversion
CTF-151 Combined Maritime Task Forces 151
CGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMTRADE Commodity Trade Statistics Database
DCCTF Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund
DEC Development Economics Vice-Presidency
DID Difference-in-Difference
DPLD Disruption of Pirate Logistic Dumps
DWT Dead Weight Tonnage
EAC East African Community
EAP East Asia and Pacific
xviii | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
EC DG TRADE European Commission Directorate General for Trade
ECA Europe and Central Asia
EEAS European External Action Service
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ESA-IO Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean
EU European Union
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GPS Global Positioning Systems
GSDPM General Services Department Printing & Multimedia
HHPN Hobyo-Harardheere Piracy Network
HRA High Risk Area
HS-6 6-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
(COMTRADE)
ICU Islamic Courts Union
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMB International Maritime Bureau
IMO International Maritime Organization
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
IOC Indian Ocean Commission
IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
ISCs Information Sharing Centers
ITC International Trade Center
ITF International Transport Workers’ Federation
K&R Kidnap and Ransom
LAC Latin America and Carribean
LAS League of Arab States
LLAR Low level armed robbery
MCH Major criminal hijack
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MLAAR Medium level armed assault and robbery
MSA Maritime Situational Awareness
MSC HOA Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa
MV Motor Vessel
NA North America
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OBP Oceans Beyond Piracy
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPSFN Center on Conflict, Security and Development, Nairobi
PIU Project Implementation Unit
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS | xix
PPN Puntland Piracy Network
PMPF Puntland Maritime Police Force
RAPPICC Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination
Centre
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy & Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia
RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenades
SA South Asia
SADC Southern African Development Community
SHADE Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SEMG Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
SNM Somali National Movement
SUA Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(Convention)
SUV Sport Utility Vehicle
TFG Transitional Federal Government
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization
VDP Vessel Protection Detachments
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Program
YOAP Youth Organization Against Piracy
xx | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
MAP OF SOMALIA
Eyl
Burao
Aden
Xuddur
Ceerigaabo
Dhuusa
Mareeb
Baydhabo
Beledweyne
Jawhar
Bosasso
Garbahaarey
Bu'aale
MOGADISHU
SEYCHELLES
K E N Y A
E T H I O P I A
DJIBOUTI
ERITREA
OMAN
R E P . O F
Y E M E N
Bandarbeyla
Bargaal
Caluula
Laasqoray
Garacad
Harardheere
Kismayo
Gaalkacyo
Laascaanood
Taleex
Garoowe
Hargeysa
SANAA
DJIBOUTI
I N D I A N
O C E A N
R e d Se a
G u l f o f A d e n
42° E 45° E
15° N
12° N
9° N
6° N
3° N
3° S
0°
15° N
12° N
9° N
6° N
3° N
3° S
0°
48° E 51° E 54° E
42° E 48° E
51° E 54° E
45° E
IBRD 39780
JANUARY 2013
GSDPM Map Design Unit
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
NATIONAL CAPITAL
MAIN CITIES/TOWNS
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
xxi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Context
Somali piracy attacks surged between 2005 and 2011. Although maritime piracy is as old
as seaborne trade, and currently pirates also prey on ships in the Straits of Malacca and the
waters of Southeast Asia, the Caribbean seas, and the Gulf of Guinea, what is unique about
Somali pirates is the high frequency of attacks. Figure 1.a plots the number of reported incidents
since 2000 in various regions. Piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia rose dramatically
after 2005 and reached a high of 243 in 2011 but then plunged in 2012 to 63
reported attacks and 15 hijackings as of September.
Somali pirates almost exclusively attack vessels to hold cargos and crews hostage and
negotiate their release in exchange for ransom. Figure 1.b shows the patterns of hijackings
globally since 2005, further illuminating how Somali piracy is unique. Since the first
known Somali hijacking in April 2005, 149 ships have reportedly been ransomed for an estimated
total of US$315–US$385 million. Finally, the large number of Somali incidents is
matched by the remarkably wide catchment area, deep into the high seas well beyond Somalia’s
territorial waters (see Figure 2).
The international community has mobilized to combat the surge of piracy off the
Horn of Africa. Over 40 countries are involved in military counter-piracy operations, in a
national capacity or through three coalitions: the European Union Naval Force Somalia
through Operation Atalanta, the Standing Naval Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) through Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 151.
Since 2008, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has adopted 13 resolutions to support
counter-piracy action off the Horn of Africa. Beyond the UN, the European Union
(EU), the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States, and NATO have all moved to
fight piracy off the Horn. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia was established by a
UN Security Council resolution in 2003 to document violations of the arms embargo; its
mandate has since expanded to monitoring piracy. The Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia was established in 2009, pursuant to UN resolution 1851, to facilitate coordination
of the 60 countries and 20 international organizations working to prevent
xxii | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
piracy. Several other institutional, national, and regional initiatives, such as the Djibouti
Code of Conduct, the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination
Centre, and the Indian Ocean Commission Anti-Piracy partnership program, complement
the international mobilization.
Why another report on Somali piracy, and how can it inform the debate? While the
recent drop in pirate attacks has been attributed to counter-piracy policies, whether they
will continue to be suppressed is a major question. This study therefore conducted two
types of analysis to inform the policy dialogue and shape, or reshape, the debate on prospects
for long-term eradication of piracy off the Horn of Africa:
1. It assessed the global human and economic costs and security risks of piracy, thereby
quantifying the global benefits of a piracy-free Somalia.
2. It analyzed the piracy business model and the factors that allow it to thrive.
Taken together, the findings constitute the knowledge base for design of policy responses.
Human, Economic, and Global Security Costs
The scale, geographic scope, and violence of Somali piracy operations have created public
concern throughout the world. As many as 3,741 crewmembers of 125 different nationalities
have fallen prey to these pirates, with detention periods as long as 1,178 days.
FIGURE 1: PIRACY IN NUMBERS
Number of Attacks
Year
0
50
100
150
200
250
2001
2002
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009
2011
2012
2000
2005
2010
Number of Hijacks
Year
0
10
20
30
40
50
2001
2002
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009
2011
2012
2000
2005
2010
Somalia West Africa Others Indonesia Caribbean
a. Number of reported piracy incidents b. Number of reported piracy hijacks
Sources: IMB 2012; UNODC–WB 2012.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | xxiii
Reportedly, 82 to 97 seafarers have died either
during the attacks, in detention after poor treatment,
or during rescue operations.
Beyond the human tragedy, although certainly
in part because of it, Somali piracy has
imposed significant global costs, particularly on
nearby economies. Increased insurance premiums,
expenditures for on-board security measures,
and rerouting or cancellation of shipments
are among the many channels through which
pirates have affected the world economy. To
evaluate the global cost, this report analyzes
changes in world trade patterns that coincided
with and might be explained by the onset of
Somali piracy. Compared to pairs of countries
that trade through other sea routes, all other
things being equal trading partners for which
the shortest shipping route goes through the
Arabian Sea saw a drop of 7.4 percent in the
value of their yearly trade—the same effect as
would result from imposing an additional 1.1
percent ad valorem tax on all shipments through
the zone where Somali pirates operate (see
Figure 2). Considering Somali piracy as an increased
cost of trade translates into an estimated
US$18 billion yearly loss to the world economy—
an amount that dwarfs the estimated
US$53 million average annual ransom payment
since 2005.
Piracy has not only imposed a hidden tax on world trade generally, it has severely affected
the economic activities of neighboring countries. Since 2006 East African countries
have seen a marked decline in tourist arrivals and fishing yields. In the booming tourism
sector, spending in East Africa since the surge in pirate activities has grown 25 percent
more slowly than in other sub-Saharan African countries. The growth slowdown is mostly
attributable to fewer visits from citizens of member countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), who are now 8.6 percent less likely
to choose East African countries as vacation destinations. Similarly, exports of fish products
from piracy-affected countries compared to other regions have dropped by 23.8 percent
since 2006, in part due to falling production. Total catches of tuna in the Western Indian
Ocean have declined by 26.8 percent as vessels relocated to safer fishing grounds.
The actual and potential links between pirates and Islamist insurgents are another
source of global concern. This report evaluates the nexus between pirates and terrorist organizations.
While Somali piracy seems unlikely to morph into a politically motivated
criminal organization, the analysis does not rule out the possibility of individual initiatives
FIGURE 2: REPORTED SOMALI PIRACY INCIDENTS
(2000–2012)
INDIA
LANKA
MALDIVES
MAURITIUS
MADAGASCAR
SEYCHELLES
COMOROS
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAWI
TANZANIA
UGANDA KENYA
SOMALIA
ETHIOPIA
SUDAN
DJIBOUTI
ERITREA
UNITED
ARAB EMI.
SAUDI
ARABIA
QATAR
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
ISLAMIC REP.
OF IRAN
JORDAN
IRAQ
REP.
ISRAEL
REP. OF
YEMEN
Mayotte
(Fr.)
Réunion (Fr.)
OMAN
I N D I A N
O C E A N
R ed Se a
Gu lf of A d en
40° E 50° E
30° N
20° N
10° N
0°
10° S
20° S
30° N
20° N
10° N
0°
10° S
20° S
60° E 70° E 80° E
40° E 50° E 60° E
70° E 80° E
IBRD 39707
FEBRUARY 2013
GSDPM Map Design Unit
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
HIJACKS
ATTEMPED/BOARDED/FIRED UPON
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
Sources: IMB 2012; UNODC–WB 2012.
xxiv | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
in that direction. Nonetheless, the potential scope and actual extent of mutually beneficial
cooperation between pirates and some members of the Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab
is significant; because it might contribute to instability in Somalia, the possibility of
enhanced cooperation between pirates and al-Shabaab is a threat to global security.
The Business Model of Somali Piracy
The Somali pirate business model relies heavily on onshore support infrastructure to conduct
ransom negotiations. Generically a pirate operation consists of armed offshore operations
with onshore support that provides shelter for returning pirates and access to markets for stolen
goods and for the goods, services, and manpower needed for pirate attacks. Because Somali
piracy is largely a hijack-for-ransom enterprise, its onshore operations also require
reliable sources of food, water, energy, and especially khat—a leafy narcotic—for the militiamen
in charge of guarding hijacked ships throughout
the ransom negotiation process. Somali
pirates therefore need, explicitly or implicitly, to
be granted access to the coast and obtain protection
against both national and international law
enforcement and competing criminal groups.
The spatial distribution of anchorage locations
of hijacked vessels along the Somali shoreline
(see Figure 3) reflects the ability of pirates to
win support from, among many others, government
officials, businessmen, clan elders and
members, militia and religious leaders, and members
of local communities. In these places, pirates
have been able to use a mixture of financial inducements
and physical coercion to obtain access
to the coast for extended periods of time.
Financial inducements may take the form
of an “anchorage” or “development” fee, such as
the Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab charges
for use of territory under its control in Central
Somalia, or of a bribe paid to a government official
in Puntland for not interfering in piracy
business. More indirectly, suppliers of food and
khat, militiamen, and providers who can move
and launder ransom proceeds can charge pirates
significant markups on their goods and services.
Finally, politically powerful local figures capture
large portions of the profits through direct involvement
in piracy. It is estimated that commanders
and instigators in the Somali piracy
FIGURE 3: ANCHORAGE LOCATIONS OF
HIJACKED SHIPS
Burao
Aden
Gaalkacyo
Xuddur
Ceerigaabo
Dhuusa
Mareeb
Beledweyne
MOGADISHU
SEYCHELLES
K E N Y A
E T H I O P I A
DJIBOUTI
ERITREA
OMAN
R E P . O F
Y E M E N
Baydhabo
Harardheere
Jawhar
Hobyo
Eyl
Bosasso
Taleex
Laascaanood Garoowe
Garbahaarey
Bu'aale
Hargeysa
SANAA
DJIBOUTI
Somaliland
Khatumo
Puntland
Central Somalia
I N D I A N
O C E A N
Re d Sea
Gulf o f A de n
42° E 45° E
15° N
12° N
9° N
6° N
3° N
3° S
0°
15° N
12° N
9° N
6° N
3° N
3° S
0°
48° E 51° E 54° E
42° E 48° E
51° E 54° E
45° E
IBRD 39832
FEBRUARY 2013
GSDPM Map Design Unit
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
ANCHORAGE LOCATIONS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
MAIN CITIES/TOWNS
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
Sources: IMB 2012; UNODC–WB 2012.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | xxv
business split 70 to 86 percent of piracy proceeds with these stakeholders, without the support
of whom anchorage of hijacked boats would not be feasible.
Understanding Somali piracy requires acknowledging that the distribution of power
among stakeholders is rooted in a long and rich history centered on the clan. Clan and
subclan affiliation is a major organizing factor in Somali society. Political power was traditionally
vested in clan leaders, yet throughout Somalia’s modern history internal and external
forces have conspired to challenge their authority. Formal entities, from colonial
rulers to the successive national governments and regional administrations, have concentrated
power at the expense of local governance institutions; and powerful businessmen, pirates,
warlords, and insurgent groups compete with traditional leaders for effective political
control. At stake is the distribution of resources—such as the proceeds from piracy. Recognizing
the geographical heterogeneity and time variability of these interactions and the
central role of clan and subclan affiliations is a prerequisite to explaining why a hijacked
ship is anchored in a given place at a given time; it is therefore integral to the design of policies
to durably eradicate piracy.
Reshaping the Policy Dialogue
The dramatic discrepancy between the revenues pirates enjoy and piracy’s global cost offers
a powerful rationale for the international community to support the administration of
the Federal Republic of Somalia.
Current and proposed onshore or offshore policies for curbing Somali piracy are either
ineffective or unsustainable. Such onshore interventions as local economic development
or law enforcement initiatives aim at discouraging young Somalis from becoming
pirates. They do so by increasing the cost of foregoing alternative livelihoods or by promising
lengthy prison terms in case of capture. However, the response of the piracy industry
will likely be to offer higher compensation so as to neutralize the intended deterrence. This
can easily be done without significantly affecting profitability, given how pervasive poverty
is in the communities recruits are typically drawn from. And while offshore initiatives
such as navy patrols and onboard security are believed to explain why piracy plunged in
2011 and 2012 (see Figure 1), these are only effective as long as they remain in place: they
would have to be permanent to prevent any resurgence of piracy. Because of their high
cost, in the long run they may simply be unsustainable.
Given the business model of Somali piracy, effective and sustainable interventions over
the long term will require shifting focus from the perpetrators to the enablers of piracy.
Negotiating an end to piracy with the latter requires that they have a legitimate representative
to defend their interests and that they be held accountable to the government and its
partners for progress in eradicating piracy. Such representation of a diffuse group of individuals
and communities whose interactions with one another go well beyond the realm
of piracy implies that the long-term solution to piracy off the Horn of Africa cannot be dissociated
from construction of a Somali state that is viable at both central and local levels. This
report does not advocate a particular structure of federalism or decentralization; it simply
opens up the topic for discussion on the basis of new evidence.
xxvi | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
As it engages with the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the international
community should acknowledge the complexity and volatility of local politics. Piracy
can thrive in selected safe havens along Somalia’s coastline because pirates are able to
navigate the local political economy landscape, selectively using financial inducements and
physical coercion to create an environment in which to operate that is safe and secure.
Similarly, the Somali government and its partners will need to understand the idiosyncratic
realities of Somalia’s local politics so that they can be addressed with an appropriate mix
of development assistance and law enforcement initiatives; these are necessary to change
the incentives of stakeholders from condoning to condemning piracy. Recognizing what
is needed to overcome local political economy constraints is a prerequisite not only to
ending the threat of piracy, but also—and much more fundamentally—to rebuilding the
Somali state.
1
OVERVIEW AND 1
METHODOLOGY
The “enemies of all mankind” are still roaming the seas off the Horn of Africa. Since
January 2005, pirates from Somalia have carried out 1,068 attacks. Of these, 218 resulted
in successful hijackings with abduction of at least 3,741 crewmembers of 125 different
nationalities, and payment of US$315million–US$385 million in ransoms. Between
82 and 97 non-Somali seafarers are believed to have died in attacks, detention, or rescue
operations.
The rise of piracy off the Horn of Africa has mobilized extensive international resistance.
More than 40 countries are involved in military counter-piracy operations in a national
capacity or through three naval coalitions: the European Union Naval Force
Somalia (EUNAVFOR-Atalanta), the Standing Naval Group of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) through Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 151.
The navies have been granted an exceptional right to operate in Somali sovereign waters
and coastal land to fight pirates.
Since 2008 the United Nations (UN) Security Council has adopted 13 resolutions related
to counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa. Most notably, these have reduced barriers
to prosecution by member states, facilitated international cooperation, and highlighted the
need to address the underlying causes of Somali piracy. Beyond the UN, the European
Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States (LAS), and NATO have
all moved to fight piracy off the Horn.
In 2003 the Security Council set up the Monitoring Group on Somalia to investigate
violation of the arms embargo; its mandate now also encompasses Somali piracy. In 2009
the UN also established a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),
pursuant to UN resolution 1851, to facilitate coordination of the work of 60 countries and
20 international organizations to prevent piracy. Their work is complemented by other institutional,
national, and regional initiatives, such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the
Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC), and
the Indian Ocean Commission Anti-Piracy partnership program.
2 | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
The central objective of this report is to understand how the piracy industry in Somalia
works and why it has flourished practically unfettered, despite international anti-piracy
activity, for such a long time. The ultimate goal is to propose policy directions that would
help the international community to find a cost-effective long-term solution to a local organized
crime problem that has international economic and security repercussions.
This report has three parts: Part I evaluates the global implications of Somali piracy. To
better understand it, and therefore combat it, Part II investigates its core characteristics. Finally,
Part III reviews efforts to curb piracy to date and proposes new policy directions.
Piracy in Numbers
The analysis in the report relies heavily on detailed data collected by the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB). The IMB Piracy Reporting Center collects information on maritime
incidents across the globe. A wide array of attributes is recorded for each incident,
such as location, date, boat, and crewmember characteristics (crew size and member nationalities),
boat type, tonnage, and flag as well as the circumstances of the incident. Although
not all incidents are reported and the extent of under-reporting may have changed
as awareness increased, the IMB has the most comprehensive public database on piracy.
The IMB data suggest that the magnitude and suddenness of Somali piracy set it apart
from most other forms of contemporaneous piracy. Somali piracy (see Figure 1.1.a) represented
7.5 percent of attacks reported worldwide in 2002; by 2005 its share had more than
tripled to 23 percent, and by 2011 it had reached 55.6 percent. In the last four years, one
of every two vessels that reported a piracy-related incident had been attacked off the Horn
FIGURE 1.1: PIRACY IN NUMBERS (2000–2012)
Number of Attacks
Year
0
50
100
150
200
250
2001
2002
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009
2011
2012
2000
2005
2010
Number of Hijacks
Year
0
10
20
30
40
50
2001
2002
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009
2011
2012
2000
2005
2010
Somalia West Africa Others Indonesia Caribbean
a. Number of reported piracy incidents b. Number of reported piracy hijacks
Sources: IMB 2012; UNODC–WB 2012.
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY | 3
of Africa. Over the last decade, no other maritime area, even the Malacca Strait, had suffered
so much.
Somali piracy is distinguished by the speed of its growth. Figure 1.1.a illustrates that
between 2006 and 2009, the number of attacks off the Horn reached an average annual
growth rate of 87 percent, though it has since stagnated. Meanwhile, the number of successful
hijackings in other areas held steady or plunged. The trend for the number of successful
hijackings (Figure 1.1.b) tracks the increase in the number of attacks: In 2004
pirates conducted only one successful hijacking off the coast of Somalia; in 2010 there
were 50. Attacks in Somalia peaked in 2011, dropping by about 70.1 percent in the first
three quarters of 2012; the number of actual hijackings peaked in 2010, dropping by 38
percent in 2011 and by another 51.6 percent in 2012. The slide in attacks after 2011 and
hijackings after 2010 has often been attributed to increasing international navy mobilization
and growing adoption by the shipping industry of best management practices.
The magnitude of piracy off the coast of Somalia is also noteworthy for the extent of
the geographical area affected. Worldwide, most piracy takes place close to shore or in narrow
nearby shipping lanes
(Murphy 2009). Yet between
2000 and 2011 Somali pirates
traveled considerable distances
to find prey. Attacks attributed
to Somali pirates (both red and
blue in Figure 1.2) extend far
from land, deep into the western
Indian Ocean (in red are attacks
that led successfully to
hijacking). The pirate hunting
ground stretches from the Red
Sea to the Gulf of Oman in the
north, from the Mozambique
Channel to the Maldives in the
south, and along Indian territorial
waters in the east. In 2007,
the farthest pirate attack took
place 800 km from Eyl, the
original pirate hub on the Somali
coast. The distance then
extended to 1,410 km in 2008,
2,030 km in 2009, and 3,655
km in 2010 before regressing to
2,200 km in 2011. Elsewhere in
the world most incidents of
maritime crime occur in major
ports and their associated anchorages.
FIGURE 1.2: LOCATION OF REPORTED SOMALI
PIRACY INCIDENTS (2000–2012)
INDIA
LANKA
MALDIVES
MAURITIUS
MADAGASCAR
SEYCHELLES
COMOROS
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAWI
TANZANIA
UGANDA KENYA
SOMALIA
ETHIOPIA
SUDAN
DJIBOUTI
ERITREA
UNITED
ARAB EMI.
SAUDI
ARABIA
QATAR
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
ISLAMIC REP.
OF IRAN
JORDAN
IRAQ
REP.
ISRAEL
REP. OF
YEMEN
Mayotte
(Fr.)
Réunion (Fr.)
OMAN
I N D I A N
O C E A N
R ed Sea
Gulf of A d en
40° E 50° E
30° N
20° N
10° N
0°
10° S
20° S
30° N
20° N
10° N
0°
10° S
20° S
60° E 70° E 80° E
40° E 50° E 60° E
70° E 80° E
IBRD 39707
FEBRUARY 2013
GSDPM Map Design Unit
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
HIJACKS
ATTEMPED/BOARDED/FIRED UPON
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
Sources: IMB 2012; UNODC–WB 2012.
4 | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
Piracy off the Horn of Africa is remarkable not only for its scale and geographic scope
but also for its violence. It is targeted almost exclusively to hijacking a vessel either for ransom
or for use as a mother ship from which to launch attacks on other vessels. Ultimately,
the business objective of Somali piracy is to exchange the captured crew and cargo for
money. As Figure 1.1.B illustrates, between 2005 and 2011 Somali pirates hijacked 80 percent
of the vessels seized worldwide. At the peak, 96 percent of worldwide hijackings were
taking place off the Horn of Africa. As of May 2012, an estimated 3,741 crewmembers
from 125 different nations had become the victims of Somali pirates, with some being detained
as long as 1,178 days—more than three years. So far, 82 to 97 seafarers are believed
to have died, directly or indirectly, as a result of hijackings (Compass Risk Management
2012; Foreign Affairs Committee 2012; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2012). As for the pirates,
the few who ventured to give an estimate put the number of casualties anywhere between
300 and 500.1 These figures are certainly lower-bound estimates, since none account for
those who die at sea without ever engaging in an attack due to rough weather or exhaustion
of food or fuel (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2012).
Part I: A Local Threat with Global Implications
The three chapters in Part I look at the economic consequences of Somali piracy. To assess
its economic impact, it was necessary to observe how it has affected trade flows, tourist visits,
and fishing yields. All first three chapters had to deal with similar methodological challenges,
such as (1) determining the date when Somali piracy became salient to economic
actors; (2) identifying countries considered to be “affected by piracy”; and (3) accounting
for factors other than piracy that may have had a bearing on the observed outcomes.
The first step is to determine when the
surge in Somali piracy began. While pirate attacks
off the coast of Somalia go as far back as
the 1980s, the first reported hijacking, of the
Motor Vessel (MV) Feisty Gas, took place in
April 2005 (IMB 2012). That date matters to
this report for two related reasons: (1) it marks
the beginning of the piracy-for-ransom model
that is the main cause of economic disruption
throughout the globe; and (2) it corresponds to
the beginning of international awareness, as reflected
in media reports, that piracy is a serious
threat. Figure 1.3 plots the number of attacks
over time and overlays the number of news articles
published in the English-speaking media
outlets covered by Factiva between January
2004 and December 2011 that contained the
words “Somalia” and “pirates.” Media attention
started in earnest in November 2005 with the
FIGURE 1.3: SOMALI PIRACY AND MEDIA COVERAGE
(2004–2011)
0 0
News articles Boat hijackings
Number of news articles
Number of boat hijackings
5
10
15
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Sources: IMB 2012; Factiva Dow Jones 2012.
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY | 5
release after ransom payment of the MV Panagia and the unsuccessful attack on the luxury
cruise liner MV Seabourn Spirit. From then on, press coverage seems to have tracked
hijackings closely. For the purpose of assessing its impact, this analysis therefore takes 2006
as the starting point of Somali piracy.
The next step is to identify the Somali pirate catchment area to determine which
countries were and are directly affected by piracy. The catchment area has been progressively
expanding from close to the Somali shore deep into the southwestern Indian Ocean.
This report is not able to exploit that dynamic component, partly because expansion of the
catchment area is in part driven by how economic systems adapted to the piracy threat; it
therefore defines as the Affected Region the countries of Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Mozambique,
Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen in addition
to Pakistan and the countries of the Persian Gulf.
Finally, econometric analysis makes it possible to isolate the specific effect of piracy
from that of other factors that could also have affected economic outcomes. In particular,
the dramatic growth in East Africa—despite the 2007–08 post-election crisis in Kenya,
Madagascar’s 2009 political crisis, and the 2008 global financial crisis, soon followed
by the 2008–2009 trade collapse—sets the region apart from the rest of the world. Thus,
the impact of piracy is less to translate into a drop in economic activity than into relatively
slower growth. How much slower? Answering that question is the main methodological
challenge that the first three chapters in Part I attempt to address. The crux of
the exercise is to identify countries or sectors that can reasonably be considered unaffected
by piracy and use those as a benchmark against which the performance of affected
countries or sectors is gauged. How robust the measurement of impact is to the choice
of benchmark will help assess how confident it is reasonable to be about the proposed
cost estimates.
Chapter 2 investigates the likely disruption to trade from, to, or transiting the piracyaffected
region. This chapter relies on analysis of bilateral trade data compiled by the UN
Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE 2012) database. Compared to pairs of countries
that trade through other sea routes, all other things being equal trading partners for
which the shortest sea route is through the Affected Region saw the value of their bilateral
trade drop by 7.4 percent. This suggests that the impact of piracy on world trade is
equivalent to the effect of a hypothetical 1.1 percent ad valorem tax on all bilateral goods
traded through the Gulf of Aden. Given that goods worth US$1.62 trillion transited
through the Affected Region in 2010, the global cost of piracy that year is estimated to
have been US$18 billion (±US$6 billion). If piracy is allowed to continue disrupting global
trade, annual costs can be expected to be in the same range.
Next the report zeroes in on two industries that are especially important for countries
of the southwestern Indian Ocean: tourism (Chapter 3) and fisheries (Chapter 4). It appears
from the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) database on arrivals (UNWTO
2012) that piracy has been discouraging tourists from OECD countries from visiting
the Affected Region. Although overall arrivals increased, particularly from other countries
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), tourism revenues fell because OECD tourists tend to spend
more than SSA tourists. The fisheries sector has been similarly disrupted: exports of fishrelated
products from the Affected Region dropped by about 23.8 percent, partly because,
6 | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
according to analyses of data from the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, catches in the
southwestern Indian Ocean fell by about 26.8 percent (IOTC 2012).
Chapter 5 discusses whether it is plausible to link piracy and terrorism. Analyzing the
history of conflict and cooperation between pirates and Islamic insurgents in Central Somalia,
it shows that in recent years benefits from cooperation have risen for both sides, and
there is detailed evidence that pirates pay al-Shabaab militias to tolerate ransom operations
in Harardheere. However, cooperation has been individual rather than institutional. While
cooperation might be closer in the future, transition of pirate activities to maritime terrorism
is unlikely. First, since al Shabaab’s legitimacy is founded on governing according to
Sharia principles, piracy is a problematic source of funding. More importantly, the Somali
piracy business model centers on the ability of pirates to anchor ships safely along the
coastline, which does not confer a comparative advantage for launching terrorist attacks in
the high seas. Nonetheless, successful individual pirates may well use their wealth to finance
terrorist activities in Somalia, or anywhere else in the world.
Part II: Understanding Somali Piracy
To combat piracy based on more comprehensive information, Part II analyzes quantitative
and qualitative information from a variety of sources. The IMB (2012) database contains a
wealth of data that make it possible to unveil noteworthy statistical patterns concerning attacks
and hijackings attributed to Somali pirates. The IMB database was augmented with
additional information on ransom payments from the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), EUNVAFOR, law firms, law enforcement agencies, and open source data, resulting
in the joint UN Office of Drugs and Crime–World Bank dataset on ransom
payments to pirates (henceforth UNODC–WB 2012). Information from news articles,
policy reports, and scholarly articles was used to document and support the quantitative
and qualitative assumptions. Finally, extensive interviews of individuals in Somalia and focus
groups conducted in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, and Garoowe, the capital of
Puntland, support the arguments in this report.
The analytical approach consists of characterizing the combination of “factors of production”
that defines Somali piracy. The analysis distinguishes three broad categories that
make a piracy operation feasible: manpower, financial resources, and political capital.
Manpower is the most visible input. It refers first to crewmembers who sail boats toward
their prey, attack and board ships, and redirect captured vessels to the Somali coast for ransom
negotiations. There are also pirate militia and others who guard hijacked ships during
the negotiations. The time pirate commanders and instigators spend to organize missions and
coordinate ransom negotiators and guards is also considered to relate to piracy manpower.
Money finances expenditures from the time a pirate crew leaves the shore through
keeping the hijacked boat anchored off the Somali shore until its release. From the purchase
of motor boats equipped with powerful engines to the procurement of weapons
(AK47s and ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, etc.) and navigation and communication
instruments, financial resources contribute decisively to piracy. Investors also finance
food, energy, drinking water, and khat (a leafy narcotic) for the guards during negotiations.
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY | 7
Finally, political capital, though less visible, is a defining feature of Somali piracy. While
recruiting crewmembers and mobilizing financial resources for an illegal activity like piracy
requires access to networks of would-be pirates and financiers, political capital is instrumental
in allowing pirates to anchor hijacked boats for not just months but sometimes
years (IMB 2012). The ability to create an enabling environment by inducing officials, militia
commanders, religious leaders, members of local communities, clan representatives,
and others to condone piracy is the third factor of production in Somali piracy operations.
Manpower, financial resources, and political capital are not necessarily separable. This
conceptualization is flexible enough to allow individuals to contribute in many different
ways to the piracy business model. For example, commanders who invest their own cash,
organize crews and missions, and also sway politicians and local leaders to condone piracy
are contributing all three factors at once. Similarly, crewmembers, guards, and militias, because
they are often drawn from a powerful clan or other politically influential entity,
bring, beyond their labor inputs, political support to the piracy business from their own social
networks.
The proposed trichotomy, which defines the business model, makes it possible to assess
how market forces and policies affect the sustainability of the piracy business model. The returns
to manpower are responsive to market wages, and the returns on cash are responsive
to market interest rates. The adopted methodology makes it possible to determine quantitatively
the average share of ransom proceeds that end up being paid for each of the three
factors of production. This lays the foundation for assessing the effectiveness and sustainability
of policies for eradicating Somali piracy by evaluating how much they affect the returns
accruing to each factor.
Opening Part II, Chapter 6 combines analysis of IMB (2012) and UNODC–WB
(2012) data with qualitative information obtained from open sources and from on-theground
interviews to produce a description of a typical Somali pirate operation. Acknowledging
that pirate operations differ from one another and have over time become ever
more sophisticated, the constant and exclusive goal of pirates has been to hijack vessels,
cargos, and crews and negotiate their release in exchange for ransom. The analysis documents
the formidable growth in attacks since 2005 and its stagnation and drop since 2011,
as well as the erosion of the hijacking success rate in recent years as the international community
stepped up anti-piracy efforts. Noteworthy patterns emerge: (1) The area of operation
expanded after 2005 in response to the counter-piracy measures, the pirates having
learned from previous attacks, successful and unsuccessful. (2) The characteristics of the target
and the place of attack predict the chance of success; the size of the ship, the nationality
of crewmembers, and the number of ships held concomitantly by pirates predicts the
ransom amount. Analysis of determinants of ransom amounts makes it possible to impute
unknown ransom values and estimate the total amount of ransoms paid as between US$315
million and US$385 million.
Chapter 7 defines and identifies Somali piracy’s factors of production and estimates returns
to each. Manpower, financial resources, and access to land are central to any piracy
operation. This chapter highlights the importance of political capital, which is needed to
build local stakeholder willingness to provide secure anchorage and supply lines for ships
while ransoms are negotiated. The returns on manpower and cash merely exceed the
8 | THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION
risk-adjusted market rate because these factors are likely to be in abundant supply. By contrast,
only a few anchorages can provide pirates with long-term security and a reliable supply
infrastructure, making access to land, acquired by mobilizing political capital, the
scarcest factor. Therefore, people with political capital (individuals or groups who can veto
pirate use of an anchorage) will capture the residual of ransom payments after labor and
capital have been paid a risk-adjusted return. After carefully calibrating the returns to labor
and capital that compensate participants for the high risks involved in pirate ventures, it
was found that up to 86 percent of ransom proceeds go to remunerate individuals, inside
and outside the industry, whose political and social connections allow Somali piracy
to thrive.
Chapter 8 delves into the political economy of Somali piracy. The Somali pirate business
model is critically dependent on secure and sometimes long-term anchorage for captured
ships (IMB 2012). Chapter 8 examines the complex local power dynamics that
determine whether pirates can obtain safe and reliable access to these anchorages. It starts
with the observation that captured ships are anchored in only a few locations along the Somali
shoreline and all those locations are not necessarily always active. It thus postulates the
geographical heterogeneity and time variability of stakeholder interactions embedded in a
rich history centered on the clan.
Part III: Reshaping the Policy Dialogue
Finally, the report brings together the findings of Parts I and II. Assessing the global costs
of piracy, Part I makes the case for international support for Somali government efforts to
eradicate piracy. Part II analyzes the Somali piracy business model and identifies its “bottlenecks”—
the areas where policy actions could be most effective and the challenges lying
ahead.
Chapter 9 begins Part III with a review of current and proposed policies using the analytical
lens presented in Part II. Most policies fall into one of two categories. Some increase
the cost to young Somalis of becoming pirate crewmembers by either providing
alternative livelihoods or ensuring that those who are captured are prosecuted and imprisoned.
Others increase the risk in attacking. Whether navies escort ships or armed guards
are more regularly on board, these interventions aim to lower the probability that a pirate
attack will become a hijacking, and therefore act as a deterrent in the first place. The first
type of intervention at best translates into increased wages for pirates without affecting the
profitability of the overall business model. The second, while potentially more effective at
curbing piracy and often associated with the plunge in reported incidents in 2012 (SEMG
2012; IMB 2012), is characterized by the need for constant naval pressure and ship-owner
investment in on-board security, which raises concerns about its sustainability.
Chapter 10 argues that the dramatic discrepancy between the revenues the pirates enjoy
and piracy’s global cost offers a powerful rationale for the international community to
support the administration of the Federal Republic of Somalia. It further proposes a paradigm
shift in the approach to eradicating Somali piracy. Because the “market” interventions
to increase either the opportunity cost of becoming a pirate or the risk of failure of
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY | 9
a pirate operation are either ineffective or unsustainable, the alternative is a political resolution
targeting the enablers rather than the perpetrators of piracy. The discussion in this
chapter is articulated in terms of the need for formalized and accountable local governance
institutions and for an incentivized path toward a piracy-free Somalia. Involvement of the
international community in support of the new government of the Federal Republic of
Somalia can be structured around building partnerships, generating knowledge, and providing
finance. The chapter further draws attention to the lessons learned as here reported
and how these can be applied.
Annex 84
UN Security Council Resolution 2500 (2019), S/RES/2500, 4 December 2019
United Nations S/RES/2500 (2019)
Security Council Distr.: General
4 December 2019
19-20888 (E)
*1920888*
Resolution 2500 (2019)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 8678th meeting, on
4 December 2019
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia,
especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846
(2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015
(2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015), 2316
(2016), 2383 (2017) and 2442 (2018) as well as the Statements of its President
(S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/867), as requested by
resolution 2442 (2018), on the implementation of that resolution and on th e situation
with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia ’s sovereign rights in
accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources,
including fisheries,
Noting that joint counter-piracy efforts have resulted in a steady decline in pirate
attacks as well as in hijackings since 2011, with no successful ship hijackings for
ransom reported off the coast of Somalia since March 2017 however, recognizing the
ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses, noting the letter
of 22 November 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission
of Somalia to the United Nations requesting international assistance to counter piracy
off its coast, and recalling reports of the Secretary General and communiqués of the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which continue to
illustrate that piracy off the coast of Somalia has been repressed but not eradicated,
and commending countries and organizations that have deployed naval counter-piracy
missions in the region to suppress piracy and protect ships transiting through the
waters off the coast of Somalia and the region,
Reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Natio ns
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“The Convention”), sets out
the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried
out, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,
Recognizing the need and commending the efforts of States, including in
particular States in the region, to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured
Annex 84
S/RES/2500 (2019)
2/7 19-20888
at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations,
including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy including those who
plan, organize, facilitate or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and reiterating
its concern over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing
justice, or released prematurely, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons
responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia
undermines anti-piracy efforts,
Welcoming the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force
(LETF) to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates and facilitators, and
international efforts to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia,
through the LETF and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate enterprise,
as exemplified by INTERPOL’s Global Database on Maritime Piracy, further
commending the Padang Communique and Maritime Cooperation Declaration
adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the operationalization of
the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (RMIFC) in Madagascar and
emphasizing the need for States and international organizations to further enhance
international efforts in this regard,
Welcoming efforts by the CGPCS, the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the
Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC), the financing mechanism
provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Combating Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund), and donors to strengthen regional judici al and law
enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates as well as
those associated with facilitating piracy and to incarcerate those convicted consistent
with applicable international human rights law, noting with appreciation the
assistance and capacity-building provided by UNODC Global Maritime Crime
Programme, the Trust Fund, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the
funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, and the European Union Capacity Building
Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia), and recognizing the need for all engaged
international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,
Commending the efforts of the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR)
Operation ATALANTA and EUCAP Somalia, Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined
Task Force 151 (CMF), the counter piracy activities of the African Union onshore in
Somalia and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali
authorities to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through th e waters off
the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
Initiative (SHADE), and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval
counter-piracy missions in the region,
Commending the 31 States and some 26 Non-State organizations that met at the
22nd Plenary Session of the CGPCS in June 2019 and agreed to a revised orientation
and strategic review of the CGPCS, praised the increasi ng involvement of the States
of the region with the establishment of an architecture that includes agreements to
establish dedicated regional centres in Madagascar and Seychelles, called upon
deployers to maintain their presence off the coast of Somalia, c ommended a
reinforced role of the Virtual Legal Forum, of the LETF and the MSCC, called for
increased participation of the shipping industry, and endorsed the offer of the
Republic of Kenya to take over the Chair of the CGPCS in 2020,
Underlining the importance of cooperation between the Federal Government of
Somalia and the Federal Member States in the development of a coast guard in
Somalia, noting with appreciation the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping
industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and
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recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast
of Somalia, and welcoming the approval of the fifth version of the Best Management
Practices to deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden,
Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea (BMP5) by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee,
Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostagetaking,
including offences contained within the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, and expressing serious concern at the inhumane conditions
hostages face in captivity, calling for the immediate release of all remaining hostages,
and noting the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of
hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,
Welcoming the readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia and Feder al
Member States to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted
suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to
Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable
international law, including international human rights law, to serve the full terms of
their sentences, but expresses serious concern regarding the premature release by
“Somaliland” of 19 convicted prisoners returned from Seychelles to Somalia and
reiterates that sentences served must be those passed by the courts of the prosecuting
states and that any proposal to vary the sentences must be in conformity with the 2011
Transfer Agreement with the Seychelles, consistent with applicable international law,
including international human rights law,
Expressing serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing (IUU) in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), recognizing that IUU
fishing can contribute to destabilization among coastal communi ties, and noting the
complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, welcoming Somalia’s
accession to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ’s Agreement on Port State
Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing, and the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia towards the
development of a legal regime for the distribution and enforcement of fishing licences
Remaining concerned that three Iranian seafarers from the FV Siraj remain as
hostages inside Somalia in appalling conditions, and welcoming the work of
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN), the Maritime
Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP), and the CGPCS Piracy
Survivors Family Fund (PSFF) in providing supp ort to victims of piracy and their
families, and recognizing the need to continue supporting these initiatives and
contributions to funds,
Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State
institutions, economic and social de velopment, and respect for human rights and the
rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further emphasizing that
Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali
authorities of the Somali Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, Somali National
Army, and Somali Police Force,
Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor
exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
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2. While noting improvements in Somalia, recognizes that piracy exacerbates
instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cas h that fuels additional
crime, corruption, and terrorism;
3. Stresses the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress
piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community in
collaboration with Somali authorities and other r elevant actors, and encourages
Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight against
piracy and armed robbery at sea, without impeding the exercise of high seas freedoms
or other navigational rights and freedoms by ships of an y State, consistent with
international law, as reflected in UNCLOS;
4. Underlines the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, welcomes the recent
launch of the Department of Somali Maritime Administration, and encourages the
FGS to hold a National Maritime Coordination Committee (NMCC) meeting;
5. Recognizes the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who
plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit fro m pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, and to
develop the capacity of Somali authorities to investigate and prosecute such persons,
and the capacity of Somalia’s Financial Intelligence Unit to identify illicit financial
activity and support the prosecution of pirate financiers, and urges States, working in
conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt legislation to facilitate
prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. Calls upon the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to
have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and
prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and
suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. Calls upon the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice
those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and ca lls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at
the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary -General, to
strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses
that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with
applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and deve lop a
corresponding legal architecture as part of its efforts to target money laundering and
financial support structures on which piracy networks survive;
9. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held
hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all
relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate
release;
10. Calls upon States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage
taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
11. Recognizes the need for States, international and regional organizations,
and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti -piracy
law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective arrest, prosecution of
suspected, and imprisonment of convicted pirates and key figures of criminal
networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and
profit from piracy operations, and keeps under review the po ssibility of applying
targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or
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illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out
in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013), and calls upon all States to cooperate fully
with the Panel of Experts on Somalia, including on information -sharing regarding
possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
12. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do
so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by
deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and
logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats,
vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting such use;
13. Highlights the importance of coordination among States and international
organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in
cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, encourages the full
participation of Somalia in all coordination efforts and urges continued support of
these efforts;
14. Decides that, for a further period of 12 months from the date of this
resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2442
(2018) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali
authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to
the Secretary-General;
15. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or
obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing
customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been
renewed in response to the 22 November 2019 letter conveying the request of Somali
authorities;
16. Decides that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of
resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution
1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply
to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined
for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and sub -regional
organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14 above, as most
recently reaffirmed by OP 19(b) of resolution 2498 (2019);
17. Calls upon all States to take appropriate actions under their existing
domestic law, or develop legislative processes, to prevent the illicit financing of acts
of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds;
18. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States
of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other
States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to
cooperate in determining jurisdiction, to criminalize piracy under their domestic law,
and to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those
convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and
financiers ashore, decides to keep these matters under review, including, as
appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti -piracy courts in Somalia with
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substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015
(2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
19. Further calls upon all States to cooperate in the investigation and
prosecution of all persons responsible for or associated with acts of pira cy and armed
robbery off the coast of Somalia, including international criminal networks involved
in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack,
consistent with applicable international law including internationa l human rights law;
to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial
process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and
logistics assistance with respect to persons under their juris diction and control, such
as victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under
this resolution;
20. Urges all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land -
based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children from
exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
21. Urges all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the global
piracy database, through appropriate channels;
22. Welcomes the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme’s continued
work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that individuals
suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are imprisoned in a manner
consistent with applicable international law, including interna tional human rights law,
and welcomes the work of international and regional organizations to strengthen the
capacity of financial intelligence units in Somalia and neighbouring states;
23. Recognizes the successful prosecution of piracy cases by Seychell es and
implores regional authorities to honour transfer agreements;
24. Urges States parties to The Convention and the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA
Convention) and its protocols to imp lement fully their relevant obligations under
these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the
UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial
capacity for the successful prosecution of persons susp ected of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
25. Acknowledges the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO
on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in
collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to
develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and
advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of
Somalia, and further urges States to make thei r citizens and vessels available for
forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately
following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from
captivity;
26. Welcomes and encourages efforts by flag States and port States to further
consider the development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including,
where applicable, developing regulations for the use of privately contracted armed
security personnel (PCASP) on board ships, aime d at preventing and suppressing
piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including through the
IMO and ISO;
27. Invites the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and
suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery aga inst ships, in coordination, in
particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry,
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and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO ’s role concerning privately
contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high -risk areas;
28. Notes the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by
sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta,
and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
29. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within
eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this
resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia, including voluntary reports by cooperating States and regional
organizations;
30. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as appropriate,
renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for additional periods
upon the request of Somali authority;
31. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security
Council resolution 2060 (2012), Annexes 4.4-4.10, S/2013/413, 12 July 2013
UN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
85
Annex 4.4: Pirate financier and brother of Dahabshiil agent in
Harardheere, Somalia – Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’, an important financier in Somalia with links to the
United Kingdom involved in facilitating transfers of extorted funds through a local money
transfer company, in which his brother holds a key position. This individual maintains close
ties to all important pirate leaders in a network, including a pirate facilitator who over three
years has received 1 million USD on his local bank account.
1. In December 2010, the Monitoring Group was informed that Abdullahi ‘Buundo’ was
involved in activities related to Somali piracy.1 Abdullahi ‘Buundo’,2 born in Harardheere, is
a businessman from the Ayr-Absiye clan. He initially provided loans to pirates but later was
directly involved as a pirate investor. By December 2010, he had already invested in two
successful operations, including the hijacking of the general cargo vessel ‘Rak Afrikana’ and
a ‘Greek vessel’, which was later identified as the Greek-operated LPG tanker ‘York’.3
2. During November 2011, the same source identified Buundo’s number to be +252
615999029 and confirmed his involvement in the hijacking of the Singaporean-flagged and
operated chemical/oil products tanker ‘Gemini’. This information was later confirmed and
corroborated by independent findings of the Monitoring Group.4 Buundo’s role as a pirate
financier was also established in the hijacking of the Panamanian-flagged and UAE-operated
bulk carrier ‘Orna’, and the prolonged detention of South Korean (4), Syrian (5) and Sri
Lankan (1) seafarers, which were kept and transferred on land after the release of their
respective vessels ‘Gemini’ and ‘Orna’. Buundo’s name and phone number were also found
stored on a mobile telephone of a Somali pirate belonging to a Pirate Action Group (PAG)
that was disrupted by naval forces in 2011.
3. In the early morning of 27 October 2010, the Greek ship operator of the hijacked LPG
tanker ‘York’ received a phone call from the ship’s Captain, using Somali mobile number
+252 615999029, which was later identified as belonging to pirate financier Abdullahi
‘Buundo’. The call took place shortly after the pirates anchored the ship off Harardheere and
informed the shipping company about the hijacking and, under the circumstances, the good
condition of the crew.
1 Information obtained by a reliable source with close ties to the Hobyo-Harardheere piracy network.
2 The nickname ‘Buundo’ means ‘bridge’.
3 The LPG tanker ‘York’ (IMO 9220421) and its 17 crewmembers were hijacked on 23 October 2010 and held
off Harardheere and Hobyo until their release on 9 March 2011. The general cargo vessel ‘Rak Afrikana’ (IMO
8200553) and its 26 crewmembers were hijacked on 11 April 2010 and held off Harardheere until their release
on 9 March 2011.
4 Corroborating information obtained from the ship owner and operator of the ‘Orna’, 18 December 2012, and
‘Gemini’, 15 January 2013, and debriefings of crewmembers of the Orna, 21 March 2012.
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Hijacked LPG tanker ‘York’ accompanied by two pirate skiffs
and one pirate mother vessel, the hijacked fishing vessel ‘Golden Wave’5
4. Buundo’s number showed up again in the ‘York’ hijacking between 1 and 6 January
2011, when the vessel was at sea being used as a pirate mother ship. Buundo’s number was
called 10 times from the ship’s satellite phone. During one of these calls, a pirate named Ali
Odey Jama explained to ‘Abdi Yare’ that he had a thumb injury, that 3 fishing vessels had
been hijacked, of which one escaped, and that they were towing a big boat with cranes and
drill machines, later identified as the Belgian owned barge ‘DN127’. He also told ‘Yare’ that
‘Musharaf’ and ‘Bile’ escorted the booty. The conversation further revealed that ‘Abdi Yare’
was in Mogadishu visiting his wife ‘Saara’, but would return to the anchorage during the
afternoon. The content of the telephone conversation implies that ‘Abdi Yare’ was either
using Buundo’s number, or that the pirate on board the ‘York knew Buundo by that name.
5. In the ‘York’ case, Abdullahi ‘Buundo’ was in direct communications with pirate
kingpins Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ and Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’, and
with pirate facilitator Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale (see Annex 4.8). Buundo also has a broad
range of international contacts, and communicates extensively with individuals in Kenya,
Yemen and the United Kingdom. In this context, the unidentified telephone number +44
2070971997 (UK) is noteworthy, as the number appears in records related to several other
individuals involved in Somali piracy, including pirate leaders and financiers Abdirahman
Abdullahi Haji ‘Suhufi’ and Mahamed Said Jimale. While unidentified, the number is
connected to an individual named ‘Maqi’.6
6. In the ‘Gemini’ case, pirate negotiator ‘Ali Nurdin’ concluded the ransom negotiations
for the release of the four South Korean hostages. To communicate with the ship operator of
the ‘Gemini’, Ali used two mobile telephones, including the aforementioned number
belonging to Abdullahi ‘Buundo’.
7. Information provided by the ship owner and operator of the ‘Orna’ and ‘Gemini’, and
interviews of the released ‘Orna’ crewmembers, have revealed and confirmed Buundo’s full
name to be ‘Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane’, brother of Mohamed Mohamud Kulane, the
Dahabshiil agent in Harardheere.
5 Picture taken on 23 October 2010. The Kenyan-flagged fishing vessel ‘Golden Wave’, hijacked on 9 October
2010 and released on 9 February 2011, was used as a mother vessel during its captivity.
6 The Monitoring Group has identified at least 3 other UK numbers that are in communication with both
Abdullahi ‘Buundo’ and Mohamed Said Jimale.
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Picture of Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane,
a.k.a. pirate investor ‘Buundo’7
8. Crewmembers that were held and transferred on land by two rival pirate groups after
the release of the bulk carrier ‘Orna’ refer to ‘Buundo’ as a pirate leader.8 He is said to be a
businessman living in Mogadishu, with a wife and four daughters and owns two supermarkets
in Harardheere. Additionally, he is believed to have a second wife in Harardheere that is or
was pregnant.9 The crewmembers also stated that ‘Buundo’ and his group were responsible
for the hijacking of the ‘Gemini’ and negotiated ransom payments of 4.5 million USD for the
release of the vessel and 2.5 million USD for the release of the remaining South Korean
crewmembers. Additionally, ‘Buundo’ owned shares in the hijacked vessel ‘Beluga Project’.10
9. According to the crewmembers, a white vehicle with a 50 calibre weapon attached to
its roof (‘technical’), which was patrolling during the ‘Gemini’ ransom delivery, belongs to
‘Buundo’, along with three silver-coloured Toyota Land Cruisers bearing license numbers
AB5623, AB6068 and AB3230. The vehicle AB3230 is said to be ‘Buundo’s personal vehicle
that he uses to drive from Harardheere to Mogadishu.
10. Crewmembers also testified that ‘Buundo’s father has three wives and that his mother
has an older son, who is the manager of the ‘Dahabshill Bank – Harardheere Branch’, and
named Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud Kulane. ‘Buundo’ is believed to have a Dahabshiil bank
account in the name of ‘Dahabshill Logistic and Services’, to which he receives money
extorted from ship owners. However, ‘Buundo’ insists that payees do not make reference to
the nature of the money being transferred, but instead refers to the transfer as ‘money for
repairs’.
7 Picture of Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’ obtained through confidential source.
8 The bulk carrier ‘Orna’ was released from pirate custody on 19 October 2012 with only 13 out of 19
crewmembers. Prior to the release of the ‘Orna’, six crewmembers (5 Syrians and 1 Sri Lankan) were taken
ashore by rival pirates and divided into two groups. The two groups were separately taken to different locations
subject to further negotiations. They were eventually all freed in January 2013.
9 Buundo is described as a black male, short, bald-headed, large bellied, with round eyes and teeth that stick out
of his mouth. Two of his daughters are studying in the U.S.A.
10 Crewmembers are believed to refer to the general cargo vessel ‘Beluga Nomination’ (IMO 9356402), hijacked
by Somali pirates on 22 January 2011 with the assistance of pirate mother ship ‘Golden Wave’ (as in the ‘York’
hijacking), held off Hobyo and Harardheere, and released on 13 April 2011 after a reported ransom payment of 5
million USD).
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11. In the same context, the Monitoring Group obtained concrete evidence of an
approximately 30,000 USD payment connected to ‘Buundo’,11 transferred from Nairobi to the
Dahabshiil bank account of ‘Dini Spare Parts’ in Harardheere. The money was extorted from
a victim shipping company and sent to the acting pirate negotiator as an incentive for ensuring
a smooth release and completion of the hijacking case.12
12. The Dahabshiil account of ‘Dini Spare Parts’ belongs to an unknown individual
named ‘Ahmed Mohamud Aweis’.13 Aweis is registered on Facebook under the name of
Abdilahi Hashi, but does not reveal further personal details. Between April 2010 and January
2013, a total of some 1 million USD was transferred onto Aweis’ account in Harardheere.
Further investigations are ongoing.
Ahmed Mohamud Aweis
13. Further information reveals that most of ‘Buundo’s financial contacts also have
relationships with individuals involved in piracy,14 raising the suspicion in turn of their
involvement in the business. This includes ‘Buundo’s brother, Mohamed Mohamud Kulane,
the manager/agent of the Dahabshiil Bank in Harardheere.15
14. Pirate facilitator Ahmed Mohamud Aweis has extensive contact with individuals in
Zambia, Kenya and the UAE, but also has international contacts in the United Kingdom,
Sudan, China, Ethiopia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Finland, Yemen and São Tomé and
Príncipe.16
15. Crewmembers of the ‘Orna’ have testified that they believe ‘Buundo’ was transporting
2 million USD in one of the Land Cruisers that was accompanying them en-route to
Mogadishu, and that ‘Buundo’ has some relationship or ties with a Government official, given
the ease with which they were released to the General at the Somalia National Security
Association. They also report that ‘Buundo’ features in the photos that were taken by the
Somalia National Security Association during the release of the hostages to the Somali
Government.
11 Information obtained from the relevant ship operator, 15 January and 25 March 2013).
12 All the details of this transfer have been obtained and are in the possession of the Monitoring Group.
13 Further identification information is in the possession of the Monitoring Group.
14 The names of the financial contacts and their connections with individuals involved in piracy are in the
possession of the Monitoring Group.
15 Information obtained from a reliable source identified by the Monitoring Group, 31 January and 24 March
2013.
16 The landline that Ahmed Mohamud Aweis is in contact with in São Tomé and Príncipe is also in contact with
pirate negotiators Ali Hassan (see Annex 4.5), Abdishakuur Mohamud Mohamed (see Annex 4.9), Bashir Bi’ir
Jareer, and pirate financier Fathi Osman Kahaye.
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16. Before the ‘Orna’ crewmembers were released, Ali Nurdin, the last pirate negotiator,
and ‘Buundo’, enquired about the cost of a large fishing boat in Sri Lanka, which they
intended to buy for fishing during the on-season and transporting goods to the UAE in the offseason.
‘Buundo’ asked the Sri Lankan Electrical Officer if he could help them buy a boat
once he got home, which the latter agreed to.17
17. In order to drive the first three crewmembers from Harardheere to Mogadishu and
release them to the Somali Government, the pirates requested the owner of the ‘Orna’ to send
500 USD to cover the fuel costs. To ensure a swift transfer of the money, the pirates urged the
ship owner to contact a specific UAE mobile telephone number of an individual named
Ahmed Marouf or Ahmed Maroufi from the money transfer company ‘Ladan Express’ in
Dubai. Following the pirates’ instructions, the money was immediately transferred on 1
January 2013, a public holiday. Ladan Express employee Abdurahman Seid Keyre made the
transfer,18 and sent the money to ‘Abdullahi Abdi Farah’ indicating two Somali phone
numbers attributed to renowned Hobyo-Harardheere pirate negotiators ‘Mohamud Hassan
Jimaale’ (Kilo’) and ‘Adullahi Bi’ir Jareer’ (a.k.a. ‘Abdullahi Faarah Bi’ir Qarey’, ‘Abdi’ and
‘Jabril’).19
Ladan Express Receipt Voucher of 500 USD transferred to Somali pirates on 1 January 2013
17 Information obtained from debriefing of crew members, 21 March 2013.
18 Known on Facebook as Abdirahman Said Kheyre and connected to several individuals belonging to the Himan
and Heeb Administration, including self-declared President and pirate facilitator Abdullahi Mohamed Adan
‘Tiiceey’.
19 Mohamed Hassan Jimaale (kilo), a.k.a. Mohamed Hussein.
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Picture featuring the three last remaining Syrian crewmembers of
the hijacked bulk carrier ‘Orna’ in Mogadishu after being released
by Somali pirates to the Somali Government on 12 January 2013
18. The Monitoring Group also received information about a businessman and pirate
investor named ‘Adullahi Kulmiye’, sometimes referred to as Kulane. This individual is said
to be from Dhusamareeb,20 to belong to the Ayr clan, to have British nationality and to have
lived in Sheffield, United Kingdom. Kulmiye or Kulane is believed to have invested in a
business for manufacturing boats and has imported some pirate paraphernalia from London in
the past, such as life jackets, goggles, night vision goggles and GPS devises. He lives in
Harardheere and invested in a pirate operation in February 2010, involving a PAG of 14
pirates who were eventually disrupted and arrested by the French Navy. In April 2010, he
allegedly received a 400,000 USD share of a ransom payment.21
19. Given some similarities with pirate investor ‘Buundo’, in both name and location, the
Monitoring Group conducted a preliminary investigation and discovered that until 2011, an
individual named ‘Abdi M. Kulane’ has lived in a two-floor town house at 8 Carwood Grove,
Sheffield, South Yorkshire, S4 7FE. In addition, it has been established that in 2009 one of
‘Buundo’s contacts, involved in the Hobyo-Harardheere piracy network, received a
communication from an email address registered as ‘Cabdulaahi Kulane’, which was sent
from the United Kingdom. The originator of that communication, who can be assumed to be
‘Buundo’, links to a Facebook Page of one ‘Abdullahi Kulane’ that reveals no further
information.
20 Dhuusamarreeb, Galguduud, is located between Belet Weyne and Galkaayo
21 Information obtained on 4 October 2012 from a confidential report on pirate investors by Dr. Stig Jarle Hansen.
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8 Carwood Grove, Sheffield, South Yorkshire, S4 7FE
20. The address ‘8 Carwood Grove, Sheffield’ has a Facebook Page where it is registered
as a company.
21. The Monitoring Group recommends that the remaining linkages between the address,
name, communications and email accounts be further investigated in order to determine
whether Abdullahi Kulmiye/Kulane and Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’ are one and
the same person, whether ‘Buundo’ has previously lived in the United Kingdom or travelled
there, and/or if he is a UK passport holder, as indicated by the source.
Facebook Pages of ‘Abdullahi Kulane’ and ‘8 carwood grove, sheffield’
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Annex 4.5: Pirate negotiator and ex-District Commissioner of Harardheere
– Abdisalam Sheikh Ahmed Khaliif (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Abdisalam Sheikh Ahmed Khaliif, a respected elder with a prominent position in his local
community has requested support and funding from the international community to help
eradicate hunger and piracy, but who is in fact a pirate negotiator connected to other
individuals in a network. He has been quoted in the media on several occasions providing
inside information on specific hijacking cases.
1. On 16 November 2009 at approximately 09:42 UTC,1 Kiribati-flagged chemical tanker
‘Theresa VIII’ (IMO 8105923) was attacked and hijacked by a 12-man armed group of
Somali pirates in the south Somali Basin, some 180 nautical miles North West of the
Seychelles.2 The armed pirates boarded the vessel, took hostage all 28 North Korean
crewmembers and sailed the tanker to the pirate-infested coastal town of Hobyo, central
Somalia. It remained anchored there until its release on 16 March 2010, when a negotiated
ransom payment of allegedly 2-3 million USD was airdropped in the vicinity of the tanker.3
2. The ransom payment was brokered by ‘Mr. Jack’, a Somali elder negotiating on behalf
of the pirate group holding the vessel. On 3 March 2010, when the hijacking case was close to
finalization, Jack sent an email to the ship-operator of the ‘Theresa VIII’ regarding some final
financial and logistical arrangements for the upcoming release of the vessel.4 The content of
the email confirms Jack’s role as a pirate negotiator, and identifies as an associate or a
facilitator of the pirates an individual named ‘Dr. Saed’ based in Nairobi, Kenya.5 In addition,
the email identifies and displays the registrant of the Hotmail address as being ‘Cabdisalaan
Khaliif’, indicating that Jack and Cabdisalaan Khaliif are probably one and the same person.
Email dated 3 March 2010 from Somali pirate negotiator Jack a.k.a. ‘Cabdisalaan Khaliff’
to Raffles Shipmanagement Services PTE LTD in Singapore,
the ship-operator of the hijacked chemical tanker ‘Theresa VIII’
3. Further documentary evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group confirms this
assumption. It indicates that pirate negotiator ‘Jack’ is in fact Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed, the
ex District Commissioner of the pirate-infested town of Harardheere and found to be related
1 Universal Time Coordinate (UTC). Primary time standard by which the world regulates clocks and time
2 http://eunavfor.eu/hijack-of-north-korean-crew/.
3 The ransom drop was conducted on 16 March 2010 at 04:44 UTC. The vessel sailed to Mombasa afterwards.
4 Email obtained from Raffles Shipmanagement Services PTE LTD.
5 Identified as Dr. Saed Hassan Duale, Somali national from Harardheere.
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to pirate facilitators Dr. Saed Hassan Duale and his brother Abukar Sheikh, based in Nairobi
and Harardheere respectively.6 In particular, Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale played an
important role in the past four years in assisting and facilitating pirate groups active in the
Hobyo-Harardheere Pirate Network (see annex 4.8).
4. Jack a.k.a. Cabdisalaam Khaliif Ahmed operates or used to operate two Gmail and one
Hotmail address to communicate.7 The Hotmail account was used during the ransom
negotiations for the release of the ‘Theresa VIII, as shown in the email above sent to the ship
operator.
5. An email sent in May 2011 by Cabdisalaan Khaliif to his cousins, Dr. Saed and Abukar
Hassan, included a letter that Cabdisalaan wrote in his capacity as District Commissioner.8
The letter addressed to UNICEF Nairobi requests urgent humanitarian assistance in
Harardheere and recommends the use of Horn Anabhuti Development Initiatives (HADI), a
local organization and alleged WFP implementing partner. His cousin Dr. Saed Duale served
as a Program Officer for HADI from April 2009 until October 2011. Cabdisalaan signed the
letter indicating his mobile phone number and Hotmail address, which were the same as those
used by pirate negotiator ‘Jack’ during the ransom negotiations for the release of the ‘Theresa
VIII’.
Excerpt from a May 2011 letter sent by Harardheere District Commissioner
Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed to UNICEF Nairobi, Kenya, indicating the mobile
number called by pirates on board the ‘MV Theresa VIII’ and the email address
used to conduct ransom negotiations on behalf of the pirates
6. Another letter requesting local humanitarian assistance was sent by Cabdisalaan Khaliif
in October 2011 to humanitarian organizations UNICEF, UNOCHA and WASH (copied to
HADI). The letter signed by Cabdisalaan in his capacity as District Commissioner indicates
his two Gmail addresses and again the same mobile phone number.
6 Cabdisalaam Khaliif Ahhmed is the maternal uncle of the brothers Saed and Abukar Hassan Duale.
7 [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected].
8 Letter dated 16 April 2011 with Ref. 0103/DC/11.
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Excerpt from an October 2011 letter sent by Harardheere District
Commissioner Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed to UNICEF, UNOCHA, WASH
(copied to HADI) indicating the mobile number called by pirates on board the
‘MV Theresa VIII’
7. Further information obtained by the Monitoring Group confirms and substantiates that
Cabdisalaan Khaliif’s mobile number, the same as indicated on both letters sent to UNICEF,
was called by pirates on board the hijacked vessel ‘Theresa VIII’, as registered and shown in
the ship’s satellite phone log of 25 December 2009. On that date at 10:21:56 UTC, the phone
log displays a 2 minute phone call from the ship to a mobile number identical to the one
belonging to the Harardheere District Commissioner, with the exception of the area code,
which Nation-Link Telecom subsequently changed from (50) to (699). These facts prove that
ex-Harardheere District Commissioner Cabdisalaan Ahmed Khaliif was in fact Mr. Jack,
negotiating a ransom payment on behalf of the pirate group holding the ‘Theresa VIII’.
Excerpt from satellite phone log of the hijacked vessel ‘Theresa VIII’ showing
the Somali numbers called by pirates on board of the vessel, including the
number of Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed9
8. In January 2007, contrary to his later involvement in facilitating activities of piracy and
negotiating a ransom payment, District Commissioner Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed was cited
in a Somalinet.com article in which he dismissed that residents in Harardheere would be
supportive of the pirates.10 Later that year in November 2007, he even sent an official letter to
the U.S.A. Ambassador to Kenya, requesting support for the local police and marine forces
and income-generation programmes for the local community to combat piracy. The letterhead
again indicates Cabdisalaan’s Hotmail address as later used by pirate negotiator ‘Jack’.
9 Analysis of the satellite phone log revealed that pirates on board the ‘MV Theresa VIII’ were in contact with
senior pirate leaders in the Hobyo-Harardheere pirate network, including pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan
‘Afweyne’.
10 http://www.somalinet.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=18&t=85576.
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Excerpt from a 2007 letter sent by Harardheere District Commissioner
Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed to the U.S.A. Ambassador to Kenya indicating
the email address used by pirate negotiator ‘Jack’ in 2009
9. Also in 2008 and 2009, Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed was cited as a ‘local elder’ in news
articles of the Associated Press, commenting and providing inside information about specific
hijacking cases, such as the ones involving the merchant vessels ‘Sirius Star’ and ‘Sea
Horse’.11
10. The Monitoring Group has found no evidence of Cabdisalaan Khaliif’s direct
involvement in hijacking and/or abduction cases other than the ‘Theresa VIII’. However, late
on Sunday 6 January 2013, NATO and EU naval forces jointly disrupted a whaler and a skiff,
with 12 armed Somali men on board suspected of attacking the merchant vessel MSC
‘Jasmine’ on 5 January 2013.12 In searching for pirate paraphernalia, the naval forces found a
life jacket on board of the whaler belonging to a previously hijacked container vessel, the
‘MSC Panama’.13 Hidden in a small ‘onion’ bag they also discovered a SIM card with a
Somali telephone number in the contact list, stored under the name of ‘Cabdi Salaan’. The
number, different from Cabdisalaan’s ‘official’ mobile number, previously appeared in two
separate hijacking cases of the merchant vessels ‘Rim’ and ‘Theresa VIII’. In both cases the
number was found saved on an abandoned SIM card, stored under the names ‘negotiator’
(‘Rim’) and ‘Jack’ (‘Theresa VIII’).
11. During the ransom negotiations of the ‘Theresa VIII’, ‘Jack’ often used the ship’s
satellite phone to communicate with the shipping company. However, he is believed to have
11 http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2008/nov/8734/pirates_move_saudi_supertank…;
http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2009/04/21/pirates_att…
ment/#.
12 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-09441690-0AF20253/natolive/news_93813.htm.
13 ‘MSC Panama’ was hijacked on 10 December 2010, 80 nautical miles East of Dar es Salaam, by Somali
pirates belonging to the Hobyo-Harardheere network, and released on 6 September 2011 after an alleged ransom
payment of 7 million USD. The vessel was held off Hobyo.
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also used two mobile telephone numbers separate from his official number, as well as the
number stored on the recovered SIM cards.14 The Monitoring Group has been informed that
one of these numbers was in contact with Tahlil Hashi a.k.a. Jamac Weyne, a well-known
Hobyo-Harardheere pirate commander who was once recruited by Mohamed Abdi Hassan
‘Afweyne’, and believed to be responsible for the seizure of the ‘Theresa VIII’. In this
context, the Monitoring Group obtained a notable email communication sent by Dr. Saed
Hassan Duale one day after the hijacking of the ‘Theresa VIII’ and addressed to his brother
Abukar and his uncle Cabdisalaan. In the email Dr. Saed refers to a BBC news article
covering the hijacking of the ‘Theresa VIII’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8363922.stm)
and mentions the following:
‘jamac weyne markabkiisa’, meaning: ‘this is Jamac Weyne’s (Tahlil Hashi) ship’.
12. At the very end of the ‘Theresa VIII’ ransom negotiations, ‘Jack’ requested an
additional ‘mediation’ fee for himself to be wired to a bank account in Dubai, but the ship
operator of the ‘Theresa VIII’ refused. Instead a separate sum of money was included in the
ransom bag for Jack’s benefit. The ship operator believed that Jack was an older man with a
family, as he often heard children playing in the background when talking to him on the
telephone. He spoke understandable but broken English.
13. Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed is found to be in contact with pirate investors and
facilitators Mohamed Said Jimale, Mohamed Mohamud Kulane (brother of Abdullahi
Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’), Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji ‘Suhufi’, Abukar Moalim Hassan,
and Nasro Hersi Qarey, the wife of pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’.
14. Cabdisalaan Khaliif Ahmed became District Commissioner after the Ethiopian
intervention in Somalia in December 2006, which ousted the Islamic Courts Union from
Harardheere.15 He fled Harardheere sometime late in 2011, following clan rivalry and the
return of Al-Shabaab to the area. Cabdisalaan is rumoured to be currently living in Mogadishu
and is also referred to as Abdisalam Sheikh Ahmed.
15. Cabdisalaan Khaliif has been registered on Facebook since 5 March 2010, but does not
disclose any public information.
14 Also, the ship operator claimed that Jack was using four numbers, including one iridium satellite mobile
number.
15 The Islamic Court Union (ICU) had been in control of Harardheere since August 2006.
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Annex 4.6: Pirate negotiator and asylum seeker in Norway – Galad Adan
Tahlil (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Galad Adan Tahlil, a young Somali with refugee status in Norway has been involved in
ransom negotiations and has close ties to renowned pirate negotiator ‘Abdullahi Jareer’ and
some of his associates, as well as to Himan and Heeb region ‘President’, ‘Tiiceey’.
1. The excerpts below of two emails sent in July 2011 by Somali pirate negotiator ‘Ali’
to the owner of the UAE-operated bulk carrier MV ‘Orna’ show another attempt by a Hobyo-
Harardheere pirate group, led by pirate leader Hussein ‘Jiis’, to extort a ransom payment for
the release of the hijacked vessel and its 19 crewmembers.1 At the time the emails were sent,
the vessel and crew were already in pirate custody for six months.2 A first attempt to reach an
agreement negotiated by renowned pirate negotiator ‘Abdullahi Jareer’ failed. According to
the owner of the ‘Orna’, ‘Ali’ succeeded Jareer as negotiator in May 2011.
Excerpts of two emails sent by pirate negotiator ‘Ali’ a.k.a. Galad Adan Tahlil to the owner of
the hijacked bulk carrier MV ‘Orna’
2. As negotiations with the ship owner failed, ‘Ali’ was in turn replaced or succeeded by
pirate negotiator ‘Ahmed’, an employee of Indian Ocean Consultant Company headed by UK
national Mahad Mohamuud Nuur.3 According to the ship owner, both negotiators seemed to
be acquainted or in contact, since the ransom fee of 200,000 USD initially requested by ‘Ali’,
was the same as that requested by pirate negotiator ‘Ahmed’.
1 Hussein Jiis, a.k.a. Mohamed Osman Hussein, was involved in the abduction of two Spanish MSF aid workers
in October 2011 from Dadaab, Kenya.
2 Panamanian-flagged bulk carrier MV ‘Orna’ (IMO 8312162) and its 19 crewmembers were hijacked on 20
December 2010.
3 Known as Mahad Nuur or Nasser, he is the Director-General of a Mogadishu-based company called Indian
Ocean Consultants, involved in ransom negotiations on behalf of Hobyo-Harardheere pirate groups.
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3. Galad Adan’s Hotmail account connects on Facebook to Galad Adan Tahlil from
Mogadishu,4 Banaadir, Somalia, born on 11 March 1987, and residing in Trondheim,
Norway.5 He displays pictures of himself, his wife and possible daughter. One of the pictures
shows Galad Adan Tahlil standing in front of the Opera House in Oslo, Norway. Galad does
not show on his Facebook Page to whom he is connected.
4. On Facebook Galad Adan Tahlil shows great interest in football. On 20 January 2012,
he left the message below on the Facebook Page of UK Premiere League football player
‘Steven Gerrard’. Notably, the words he chose for addressing the player (‘hello buddy’) are
identical to the way he addressed the ship owner of the ‘Orna’ in his email of 24 July 2011.
A Facebook message sent by Galad Adan Tahlil to Premiere League
football player Steven Gerrard
5. During his negotiations, ‘Ali’ is said to have used two telephone numbers to
communicate. One of these numbers shares the same contacts in the U.S.A., United Kingdom
and Saudi-Arabia with the telephone number used by pirate negotiator Abdullahi Jareer,
indicating a connection between the two negotiators. This suspicion may be reinforced by
Galad’s Facebook contacts and communications with two of Abdullahi Jareer’s accomplices
in different hijacking cases, Mohamed Abdi Olad and Abdullahi Mohammed Isse.6
4 http://www.facebook.com/galad.adantahlil?fref=ts.
5 Previously indicated on Facebook to be residing in Hammar, Norway.
6 Both Abdullahi Mohammed Isse and Mohamed Abdi Olad (born 28 February 1968) have been involved in
facilitating extortion of side payments from ship owners (for the MV ‘Pompei’, MV ‘Khaliq’, and four South
Korean crewmembers of the MV ‘Gemini’) in cooperation with pirate negotiator Abdullahi Jareer.
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Contacts and communications with renowned Hobyo-Harardheere pirate negotiator
Abdullahi Jareer’s accomplices Mohamed Abdi Olad and Abdullahi Mohamed Isse 7
6. Galad Adan Tahlil is also ‘friends’ on Facebook with an individual registered as
Mahat Nor’, also known as Mahad Nuur, who’s email address, [email protected],
appeared in an email thread of 24 January 2012 as the recipient of a piracy ransom and release
agreement for the hijacked vessel ‘Orna’, in which Galad had also acted as a negotiator. The
agreement signed by ‘Hussein or Hassan Jiis’, the pirate commander holding the ‘Orna’
included a 50,000 USD goodwill payment to be provided upfront to ‘Nasser’ and a 200,000
USD negotiation fee for the mediators, as initially requested by Galad Adan Tahlil during his
negotiations with the ship owner. ‘Nasser’ was identified in the previous report of the
Monitoring Group (S/2012/544) as UK national and passport holder ‘Mahad Mahamuud
Nuur’, Director-General of Indian Ocean Consultant Company, who received the 50,000 USD
in cash directly from the ship owner during a public meeting in Dubai on 25 January 2012
(see annex 4.7).
7. According to Norwegian authorities, Galad Adan Tahlil is a Somali national, born on
11 March 1987, who travelled to Norway via Ethiopia and Sweden in December 2011. He has
obtained the status of asylum seeker in Norway, but went missing from his address in January
2013. He allegedly has a wife and four children in Mogadishu, Somalia.
8. Using his Somali mobile number indicated on the second email he sent to the ship
owner, Galad Adan Tahlil has been found to be in contact with at least six Norwegian
telephone numbers, of which two have been in regular contact with several Somali mobile
numbers used by Somali pirates. Of particular note is a communication in November 2012,
during which Galad’s number in Norway is in contact with a Somali mobile number attributed
to the aforementioned renowned Hobyo-Harardheere pirate negotiator Abdullahi Jareer. Other
telephone calls made by the two Norwegian numbers of Galad Adan Tahlil indicated
communications with both identified and unidentified individuals believed to be involved in
Somali piracy in connection with the hijacking of the merchant vessels ‘Beluga Nomination’
and ‘Savina Caylyn’, and the fishing vessel ‘Naham 3’. Some of the individuals identified are
known as Abdiweli Ciise Ibrahim, Ali Abdulqadir and ‘Abditon’. The Monitoring Group has
7 Abdullahi Mohammed Isse is registered on Facebook as Abdillaahi Esse.
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requested Norwegian authorities for further identification of the two Norwegian telephone
numbers and is awaiting their reply.
9. The same Somali telephone number of Galad Adan Tahlil was found stored on a
mobile phone (associated name: ‘Galad’) of the self-declared President of Himan and Heeb
region and U.S.A. national Mohamed Abdullahi Adan ‘Tiiceey’, known for his close contacts
with Galmudug pirates and expensive interventions to ‘facilitate’ the safe release of hostages
in pirate custody. ‘Tiiceey’ is also ‘friends’ with Galad Adan Tahlil on Facebook, as well with
other individuals involved in Somali piracy.
Galad Adan Tahlil in front of the Opera House in Oslo, Norway, uploaded on his
Facebook Page on 12 September 2012
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Annex 4.7: Pirate facilitator and shareholder of Delta Chauffeurs Limited,
London, United Kingdom – Abdirahim Ahmed Ali (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)
Abdirahim Ahmed Ali, a British national and shareholder of a taxi company in London is a
facilitator of pirate negotiations and linked to several important pirate negotiators.
1. In its previous report (S/2012/544), the Monitoring Group identified a United
Kingdom citizen and passport holder, Mahamad Mammuud Nuur, as the Director-General of
a Mogadishu-based private company called ‘Indian Ocean Consultants Co.’ (IOC),1 a criminal
organization involved in ransom negotiations on behalf of Somali pirates. The report also
provided additional information on two websites used by the company and made brief
reference to its associates, one of which named himself ‘Ali Hasan’.2 Further investigations
have identified Abdirahim Ahmed Ali, to be another British citizen and passport holder
involved in ‘Indian Ocean Consultant Co.’ and a close accomplice of IOC-negotiator Ali
Hassan.
2. The first time that the name Ali Hasan appeared in connection with Indian Ocean
Consultants was at the end of 2010, when a law firm employed by the ship owner of the
hijacked general cargo vessel ‘Rak Afrikana’ received the following email (excerpt):
3. In this email communication, Ali Hasan represented himself as a ‘freelance’ mediator
based in Somalia with the full authority to negotiate on behalf of the pirates. Ali Hassan
called the law firm several times to get into direct contact with the owners of the ‘Rak
Afrikana’. When calling the law firm, he used Somali telephone number +252 618 605479,
although he indicated another mobile number in his email: +252 699 548601. A UK lawyer
who briefly spoke to Ali Hasan on the telephone mentioned that he had an “East End London
accent”.3
4. Eventually, Ali Hasan managed to reach the owner directly, by telephone and email,
and attempted to manoeuvre himself into the ongoing negotiations. During his
communications with the owner, he emphatically claimed to know the pirates, to be from the
same clan and to have had several meetings with them. He also stated that the most important
individuals responsible for holding the vessel were in Harardheere and not on board of the
1 Also known as Indian Ocean Consultants, it is located at Dabka Building Maka, Al Mukarama Road.
2 Since the Monitoring Group’s last report (S/2012/544), Mahad Mahamuud Nuur’s Indian Ocean Consultant
Company has remained active in the piracy business and was also found to be involved in the ‘MY Choizil’
(October 2010-June 2013) and ‘FV Naham 3’ (March 2012-to date) hijacking and abduction cases.
3 Information and evidence obtained from the ship owner of the ‘Rak Afrikana’.
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ship. His offer to mediate between the shipping company and the pirates was nevertheless
rejected as the ship owner decided to continue his negotiations with pirate negotiator ‘Fred’
(see annex 4.9).
Excerpt from an email communication sent by Ali Hasan to the ship owner
5. Both Somali telephone numbers used by Ali Hasan in the ‘Rak Afrikana’ hijacking
turn out to be in direct contact with Abukar and Abdurahman Moalim Hassan,4 pirate
investors in contact with a number of pirate leaders, commanders, negotiators, renowned
pirate investor Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’ (see Annex 4.4) and pirate facilitator
Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale (see Annex 4.8).
6. The email Ali Hasan sent to the ‘Rak Afrikana’ owners originated from IP address
41.212.35.226, which is traced back to ‘Dahir Dholayare’, an internet subscriber in
Harardheere who purchased and registered an internet connection in Nairobi, Kenya, under
the name ‘Cyber Café’. Notably, the internet connection appears to be managed and operated
by the Nation Link station manager in Harardheere, identified as pirate facilitator Abukar
Sheikh Hassan Duale (see Annex 4.8). Also, some of the emails sent by pirate negotiator
‘Fred’ in the ‘Rak Afrikana’ originated from that IP address (see Annex 4.9).
7. Dahir Dholayare’s email addresses, telephone number and two Facebook accounts
indicate that his full name is Dahir Hassan Guled, and the registrant of a domain name called
‘harardherehospital.com’. Communication data show that he is also in contact with the pirate
investor Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’ (see Annex 4.4) and pirate facilitator Abukar
Sheikh Hassan Duale (see Annex 4.8), who is registered as a ‘friend’ on Dahir’s Facebook
account and vice versa. Dahir Hassan Guled has two registered Skype accounts in his name,
one in the U.S.A. and one in Nairobi, Kenya.
Originating IP address 41.212.35.226 for email
sent by Ali Hasan to the ship owner of the ‘Rak Afrikana’
8. On 29 November 2010, prior to Ali Hasan’s involvement in the ‘Rak Afrikana’
hijacking, a Somali individual also named ‘Ali Hasan’ attempted to intervene in the ongoing
4 The Monitoring Group is unaware of any family relationship between the two individuals.
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negotiations of the ‘York’ hijacking by making a telephone call to the shipping company in
Greece. The call was made with a Somali mobile number other than the ones used by Ali
Hasan in the ‘Rak Afrikana’ case. Because the attempted involvement was unsuccessful, it
could not be determined if the individual calling the shipping company was in fact the same
Ali Hasan as the one connected to Indian Ocean Consultants Company.5
9. Ali Hasan did represent the pirates during negotiations in the ‘Gemini’ hijacking case,
between 30 April and 12 October 2011.6 During that time, he was regularly in contact with
the ship operators by telephone and email. In addition to the same Hotmail account used in
the ‘Rak Afrikana’ case, he also used a Gmail address with reference to Indian Ocean
Consultants. Again, he introduced a new Somali mobile which is in direct contact with the
Director-General of Indian Ocean Consultants Company, previously identified by the
Monitoring Group as Mahad Mahamuud Nuur (S/2012/544).7
10. The Somali mobile numbers connecting Ali Hasan and Mahad Nuur are registered
under the names of ‘Hassan Farah Afrah’ (Ali Hasan) and ‘Abdullahi Ahmed Hassan’
(Mahad Nuur). Notably, both numbers are in contact with some of the same individuals, such
as chief pirate investor and chairman of a pirate investment company Tahlil Mohamed
Guled.8 Ali Hassan’s number was also used in the abduction case of freelance journalist and
dual German/U.S.A. national Michael Scott Moore, who received permission to use the
mobile telephone number to make a call outside Somalia on 1 August 2012.
11. The phone number that Ali Hasan used in the ‘Gemini’ hijacking, appears to be in
communication with a landline in São Tomé and Príncipe,9 which is also in contact with other
important individuals in the Hobyo-Harardheere piracy network, such as pirate negotiators
Abdishakuur Mohamud Mohamed (see Annex 4.9) and Bashir Bi’ir Jareer,10 pirate financier
Fathi Osman Kahaye,11 and pirate facilitator/financier Ahmed Mohamud Aweis (see Annex
4.4).12
12. During five months of negotiations, Ali Hasan sent six emails to the shipping
company discussing several issues related to the hijacking of the vessel and its crew,
including expenses and payment of a mediation fee, payment of ransom for the vessel and
crew, release of South Korean crewmembers in exchange for Somali pirates imprisoned in
South Korea, and payment details about other hijacking cases.13
5 Information obtained from a European law enforcement source, 14 April 2013.
6 Ali Hassan was also actively negotiating in the ‘Asphalt Venture’ hijacking (28 September 2010-15 April
2011). Comparison of voice records confirm the likelihood that pirate negotiator Ali Hassan of the ‘Rak
Afrikana’, ‘Asphalt Venture’ and ‘Gemini’ cases are one and the same person.
7 The number is also in contact with pirate financier Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’ (see Annex 4.4) and
has a number of international contacts, including in the UK, Kenya, UAE, Yemen, South Africa and the U.S.A.
8 Tahlil Mohamed Guled’s name features on a list obtained by the Monitoring Group of pirate investors
connected to a pirate investment group or company.
9 São Tomé and Príncipe is an oil-rich island nation located at the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa, where maritime
piracy has grown into a thriving business over the past few years.
10 A.k.a. Bashir Farah Bi’ir Qarey, who was involved in the Spanish MSF abductions and is the cousin of
renowned pirate negotiator Abdullahi Bi’ir Jareer who has been involved in many hijacking and abduction cases.
11 Fathi Osman Kahaye was involved in several hijacking cases and is an associate of pirate kingpin Mohamed
Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’.
12 Ahmed Mohamud Aweis was involved in the ‘Gemini’ hijacking and is an associate of pirate negotiator Ali
Nurdin and pirate financier Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’.
13 All emails in the possession of the Monitoring Group.
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13. Three out of the six emails that Ali Hasan sent to the operators of the ‘Gemini’
originated from the same IP address linked to his ‘Rak Afrikana’ intervention and owned by
Dahir Hassan Guled, who is in contact with pirate investor ‘Buundo’.14
14. Ali Hasan did not finalise the negotiations for the ‘Gemini’. After his last
communication on 12 October 2011, a Somali individual named ‘Adam’ took over his role as
pirate negotiator and brokered the ransom payment for the release of the vessel and its crew.
15. Voice recordings obtained by the Monitoring Group of Ali Hasan’s negotiations in the
‘Rak Afrikana’, ‘Asphalt Venture’ and ‘Gemini’ hijackings confirm his “East End London
accent” and the likelihood that it is the same person in each case. During a telephone
conversation on 1 June 2011 with the owners of the ‘Asphalt Venture’, Ali Hasan confirmed
that he was also negotiating in the ‘Orna’ hijacking, which the Monitoring Group managed to
corroborate through the personal phone records of the owner of the ‘Orna’. These indicate
communications in June 2011 with the same Somali number that Ali Hasan used in the
‘Gemini’ case. However, in the ‘Orna’ case, the negotiator using that number was calling
himself ‘Ahmed’, communicated with the ship owner from the Indian Ocean Consultant
Company email address [email protected], and was found to be in direct
telephone and email contact with the Director-General of Indian Ocean Consultant Company,
Mahad Mahamuud Nuur. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that Ali Hasan and Ahmed (Hirsi)
are one and the same person, although independent sources have previously confirmed to the
Monitoring Group that Ali Hasan (a.k.a. Ali Hersi) and Ahmed Hersi are both brothers
working for Indian Ocean Consultant Company, as previously reported by the Monitoring
Group.15
16. During the first stage of negotiations in the ‘Gemini’ case, when Ali Hasan was still
the negotiator, there were periodic calls from the pirates to the families of the crewmembers,
who were instructed by the shipping company to ignore them. After the release of the vessel
and crew on 30 November 2011, four South Korean crewmembers were held back in
retaliation for the successful January 2011 raid by the South Korean Navy on a group of
Somali pirates that had hijacked the South Korean chemical/oil products tanker ‘Samho
Jewelry’, in which eight pirates were killed and all crewmembers were rescued.16
Negotiations therefore continued and during the period between January and November 2012,
the frequency of calls to the South Korean families increased. By August 2012, the families of
the four crewmembers had lost patience and the shipping company could no longer prevent
them from answering the pirates’ calls. These sometimes terrifying, threatening and
misleading telephone calls to the families caused much anxiety and fear and added pressure
on the already difficult but ongoing negotiations. In some cases, family members were told on
the telephone that their beloved one had died. One of those calls was made on 7 June 2012 to
Mr. Lee Geon Ir’s son-in-law from Somali telephone number +252 699778588.17 This same
number appeared in the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) abduction case in early 2012, when
an individual named Ali Hasan, using an indianoceanconsultant.net email address, attempted
to get involved in the negotiations.18
14 IP.41.212.35.226
15 Monitoring Group report S/2012/544.
16 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/21/south-korea-rescue-somali-p….
17 Information obtained from the ship owner of the ‘Gemini’, 16 April 2013.
18 Information obtained from a confidential source with close ties to the Hobyo-Harardheere piracy network
indicates that Ali Hassan’s mobile number used in the ‘Gemini’ case was also used by a negotiator in the MSF
abduction calling himself ‘Hassan Masaro’.
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17. Coincidentally, as reported previously by the Monitoring Group,19 a picture of one of
the Spanish MSF hostages in custody of Somali pirates was portrayed on the website
‘indianoceanconsultants.org’ on Friday 2 March 2012. The message accompanying the
picture was signed by pirate negotiator Ali Hasan, calling himself Hassan Ahmed, as shown
in the following excerpt from the website:
18. The website indianoceanconsultants.org was created on 6 November 2011 by ‘Ali
Hassan’ of Cawaale Printing and Technology, H. Wadaag Street, 2521 Mohadishu, Somalia.
Ali Hassan registered the website with his email address ‘[email protected]’ and
mobile phone number +252 15504040. The website is no longer active.
19. The email address ‘[email protected]’ can be traced back to a webpage of what
seems to be a religious website called ‘nuuruliimaan.com’, which displays the names and
contact details of three male Somali individuals in Mogadishu, Somalia, Ohio, U.S.A. and
London, United Kingdom. One of the three individuals named ‘Hasan Sheikh Ahmed Ali’,
with an address in Mogadishu, appears to be connected to ‘Cawaale Printing and
Technology’, and the email address [email protected].20
20. Also, the nuuruliimaan.com website seems to be registered by Ali Hassan of Cawaale
Printing, with the same email address ([email protected]), but in this case with
indicating the address and contact details of the London, United Kingdom-based individual
displayed on the nuuruliimaan.com webpage as: ‘Abdirahim Ahmed-Nur Ali’ - Somali
Hosting Company - Weymouth Road, Middlesex, Hayes, UB4 8NG, London, UK - phone
number +44 75644076721 - email address [email protected].22
19 Monitoring Group report S/2012/544.
20 http://www.nuuruliimaan.com/xiriir.htm.
21 This is an incomplete number and should be +44 7956440767.
22 Registrant’s (Ali Hassan) contacts of nuuruliimaan.com are displayed as: 63 Weymouth Road, London,
London UB4 8NG, GB – Tel and Fax number +44 7956440767.
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21. More website and domain names are registered by Ali Hassan indicating the email
address [email protected] in connection to Somali Hosting Company,23 and all show
either the aforementioned addresses in London or in Mogadishu. In some cases, the
registration details even show the address in London in connection to the phone number in
Somalia (+252 15504040).
Excerpt of a webpage on the website
nuuruliimaan.com displaying three Somali
individuals in Mogadishu, Ohio and London
22. Further investigation indicates that the abovementioned individual, Abdirahim
Ahmed-Nur Ali, his email address, telephone number and address in the UK, all connect to a
company registered in the United Kingdom under the name ‘Delta Chauffeurs Limited’ with a
currently registered office at Suite 4 Warren Court, 293-295 Euston Road, London, United
Kingdom NW1 3AA.24
23. The website of the company ‘deltachauffeurs.com’ mentions the same address on
Euston Road in London, with contact number +44 (0) 2073833038.
23 Such as ASOJ.org (Associated Somali Journalists), biladaye.com, soomaaliagalbeed.com, bashiir.com,
somaliagroexport.com and cawaale.com.
24 Incorporated on 1 June 2007 with company registration number 06265874.
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Delta Chauffeurs Ltd. Facebook Page
24. The contact details of the registrant of deltachauffeurs.com are indicated as Delta
Chauffeurs, Abdirahim Ali, [email protected], +44 7956440767, Middlesex, Hayes
UB4 8NG, London, London 44, GB, also previously the registered company address of Delta
Chauffeurs Limited at the time of incorporation in 2007.25
25. United Kingdom Government company records of April 2013 show two individuals
with official positions in Delta Chauffeurs Limited. Both are British citizens of Somali
descent with the following names:
- Mr. Sabrie, Saed Hassan (Director and shareholder)
- Mr. Ali, Abdirahim (Secretary and shareholder)
London office of Delta Chauffeurs Limited
(February 2013)
26. On Facebook, Ibrahim Ali is known as ‘Abdirahim Ahmed’ and likes ‘Delta Airport
Transfers’, which links to the same website and appears to be serving as a subsidiary of Delta
Chauffeurs Limited. While it is not registered as a company, Delta Airport Transfers has been
registered as a website since 8 October 2010. The website displays the same contact number
(+44 7956440767) and address as on the Delta Chauffeurs Limited website and is registered
by ‘Abdi Ali’ of Delta Chauffeurs Limited with contact details +44 2076373401,
[email protected], 9 Great Russell Street, London, London WC1B 3NH, GB.
25 The full address in corporate records is 63 Weymouth Road, Hayes, Middlesex, United Kingdom, UB4 8NG
(1 June 2007).
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27. It has been established that the UK mobile number +44 7956440767 of Abdirahim Ali
is in direct contact with at least two Somali mobile number used by Indian Ocean Consultants
pirate negotiator ‘Ali Hasan’ and with a Somali mobile number used by renowned Hobyo-
Harardheere pirate negotiator Abdullahi Jareer, involved in many hijacking cases. One of Ali
Hasan’s mobile numbers in contact with Abdirahim Ali has been used to register the website
indianoceanconsultants.org. Ali Hasan and Abdullahi Jareer are both also in contact with the
unidentified UK mobile number +44 7424628218.
28. Adirahim Ali, secretary and shareholder of Delta Chauffeurs Limited based in
London, involved in facilitating activities of maritime piracy and abduction, including
extortion, illegal detention, abuse, torture and killing of seafarers and other victims, has been
definitively identified by the Monitoring Group as Abdirahim Ahmed Ali, born 21 May 1964,
British national and passport holder.
Passport details and picture of pirate facilitator Abdirahim Ahmed Ali
29. The Monitoring Group has obtained a pirate agreement dated 27 September 2011,
containing a list with names of pirate investors connected to a pirate investment group or
company, and conditions and instructions for payout of allotted shares. The agreement was
sent by the aforementioned email address [email protected] to Harardheere Nation
Link Director and pirate facilitator Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale (see Annex 4.8), who has
also been found to be in direct contact with members of Indian Ocean Consultants Company.
30. One of Abdirahim’s Facebook contacts is Jamaal Kamal, from London and living in
Mogadishu. He posted the picture below of stacks of USD and other currency. One person
who responds “LIKING” the picture is ‘Abdiraham Ahmed’.
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Picture of a stack of US dollars ‘liked’ by Abdirahim Ahmed on Facebook
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Annex 4.8: Pirate facilitator and Director of Nation Link Harardheere –
Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale, a station manager of a Somali telecommunications provider
with a bank account in the United Kingdom is linked to several key pirate leaders, financiers
and negotiators and facilitates pirate negotiations. He has been found in possession of official
communications between the Governments of Somalia and Spain regarding a request to
extradite two pirates jailed in Madrid.
1. On 1 January 2011, the ocean going tug and supply vessel ‘Tiba Folk’, towing Belgian
barge ‘DN127’, was en route to Port Victoria, Seychelles, and sailing at position 03°56’N,
059°3’3E,1 when it was attacked by 12 armed Somali pirates in two skiffs at approximately
0800 UTC.
2. The three-man armed security team on board the ‘Tiba Folk’ returned fire and
managed to repel the attack, but the pirates continued to follow the vessel from a distance. At
around 2015 UTC the same day, the pirates initiated a second attack, this time making use of
the hijacked LPG tanker and pirate mother vessel ‘York’.2 The attack lasted for more than one
hour, during which the crew of the ‘Tiba Folk’ decided to cut loose the barge they were
towing in order to increase speed. Having successfully escaped, a few hours later the vessel
was reported to be safe.
3. When the pirate’s mother ship ‘York’ returned to its anchorage at Harardheere on 3
January 2011, it was reportedly towing the abandoned barge ‘DN127’, which the pirates had
managed to secure after the attack on the ‘Tiba Folk’.3 On 7 January 2011, the ‘York’ and the
‘DN127’ were both confirmed anchored off Harardheere.
Barge ‘DN127’ towed by hijacked tanker ‘York’ to Harardheere anchorage
1 Indian Ocean, some 732 nautical miles East of Harardheere, Somalia, and 681 nautical miles north of
Seychelles.
2 The LPG tanker ‘York’ (IMO 9220421) and its 17 crewmembers were hijacked on 23 October 2010 and held
off Harardheere and Hobyo until their release on 9 March 2011.
3 Confirmed on 3 and 4 January 2011 by the owner of the ‘DN127’, who noticed the barge moving towards
Somalia.
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4. Ransom negotiations for the release of the ‘York’ ended on 23 February 2011,
following a written 4.5 million USD ‘agreement’ sent by the shipping company to email
address [email protected], provided by negotiator ‘Ali’.
5. In addition to the agreed ransom, ‘Ali’ managed to extort an additional 20,000 USD
‘negotiation fee’ from the Greek owner. Half of this sum was by agreement to be airdropped
with the ransom package, and the other half ‘Ali’ instructed was to be given to a receptionist
of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya.
6. On 28 February 2011, the pirates sent a picture of the barge ‘DN127’ to the owner of
the ‘York’, as there was a discussion about whether the barge could remain attached to the
vessel after its release. The picture was sent from the email address
[email protected],4 provided by pirate negotiator ‘Ali’. Eventually, the ‘York’ owner
refused to take the barge along due to security reasons.
7. Following the airdrop, which included the 4.5 million USD ransom payment and the
10,000 USD negotiation fee stashed in a ‘medical kit’, the ‘York’ was released on 9 March
2011. The same day, the pirates moved the barge ‘DN127’ and attached it to the hijacked
vessel ‘Savina Caylyn’, also anchored off Harardheere.5
Email containing the 4.5 million USD ‘agreement’for the release of
the hijacked LPG tanker ‘York’sent by the ship-owner to pirate
negotiator ‘Ali’ ([email protected])
8. A settlement with the owner of the barge ‘DN127’ was reached on 25 March 2011 and
concluded with a written release agreement, indicating a ransom payment of 750,000 USD.
The agreement was sent by the owner to email address [email protected], as provided
by ‘Hatem’ or ‘Hassan’, who was identified to be the same person as negotiator ‘Ali’ in the
‘York’ hijacking.6
9. Before releasing the barge, which was due to be retrieved by a tug and a private armed
security team on 29 March 2011, Hatem (a.k.a. Ali) succeeded again to extort an additional
‘negotiation fee’ for himself. After turning down an immediate payment of 10,000 USD, the
owner agreed to pay 5000 USD upfront and 5000 USD after the release of the barge. The
upfront payment was, as requested by Hatem, handed over by a private security company to a
4 Email address is registered under the name of Cadceed Yare.
5 Crude oil products tanker ‘Savina Caylyn’ (IMO 9489285) and its 22 crewmembers were hijacked by Somali
pirates on 8 February 2011 and released on 21 December 2011, following a ransom payment.
6 Confirmed by comparison of voice recordings.
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‘Dr. Saed’ in Nairobi, Kenya, on 28 March 2011. To contact Dr. Saed the owner was given
the mobile number +254 717403000.7
Picture of stolen barge ‘DN127’ attached to the
hijacked LPG tanker ‘York’ at Harardheere
anchorage (28 February 2011)8
Excerpt of the ‘DN127’ release agreement sent to the email of pirate negotiator ‘Ali’
([email protected])
10. At the very same time, the pirate negotiating the release of the ‘York’ and ‘DN127’
was also negotiating for the hijacked container vessel ‘MSC Panama’, as indicated by email
communications of March and April 2011. The communications also indicate that the
‘commander’ of the pirates holding the ‘MSC Panama’ was called ‘Jamaac’.
11. While using the same email address [email protected], ‘Ali’ or ‘Hatem’
instead used the name ‘Mussa’ in his dealings with the ship owner. The ‘MSC Panama’ was
released on 7 September 2011, but it remains unclear whether ‘Mussa’ concluded the
negotiations or how much ransom was paid to the pirates, as London law firm Holman
Fenwick and Willan, as representatives of the Miami-based owner of the ‘MSC Panama’,
refused to cooperate with the Monitoring Group’s investigation.
7 The money was given to Dr. Saed in Village Market shopping centre, Gigiri, Nairobi. Dr. Saed is identified by
the Monitoring Group as Dr. Saed Sheikh Hassan Duale, brother of Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale.
8 Picture taken by the pirates and sent to the owner of the ‘York’.
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Email sent by the ship owner of the ‘MSC Panama’ to pirate
negotiator Mussa ([email protected])
12. Investigations conducted by the Monitoring Group reveal that the email address
[email protected], used by pirate negotiators ‘Ali’ and ‘Mussa’ in the ‘York’,
‘DN127’ and ‘MSC Panama’ hijackings, belongs to the Harardheere branch Director of the
Somali telecommunications company ‘Nation Link Telecom’, ‘Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale’,
who also uses the name ‘Abdullahi Ahmed Isse Duale’.
13. Abukar, allegedly born in Mogadishu in 1970, is the brother of pirate facilitator Dr.
Saed Hassan Duale and cousin of ex-Harardheere District Commissioner and pirate negotiator
Abdisalan Khalif Ahmed (see annex 4.5). All three individuals are ‘friends’ on Facebook.
Picture of Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale
14. In addition to the hijackings of the ‘York’, ‘DN127’ and ‘MSC Panama’, Abukar was
involved in the 2008 hijackings of the ‘Stella Maris’, ‘Captain Stephanos’, ‘Faina’, and
‘Sirius’, and the 2009 hijacking of the ‘Thai Union’.
15. Abukar is also found to be in direct contact with pirate leaders and investors Mohamed
Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’, Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’, Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane
‘Buundo’ (see annex 4.4) and many others active in the Hobyo-Harardheere Piracy Network,
for which he has facilitated various communication services. For example, the fax number of
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his office at NationLink Harardheere that was provided by Abukar in the ‘York’ hijacking
was also used by pirate kingpin Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ in the ‘Ariana’
hijacking, in which Abukar’s brother Saed was reportedly involved as well. He also created an
email address for an organization called ‘Somali Marine Security Harardheere’, believed to be
involved in piracy, and includes members such as Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ and ‘Tahlil Hashi’.
16. The communications sent by Abukar with his email address [email protected]
originate from IP address 41.212.35.226, which is likely linked to the internet connection of
Abukar’s Nation Link office in Harardheere. Both pirate negotiators Ali Hassan (see annex
4.7) and Cabdishakuur Mohamed Mohamud (see annex 4.9) have used this internet
connection to send emails related to ransom negotiations. Monitoring Group investigations
have traced Abukar’s IP address to an internet registrant in Nairobi named Dahir Dholayare,
a.k.a. Dahir Hassan Guled, who registered the internet connection for a ‘cyber café’ in
Harardheere. Dahir is found to be in direct contact with Abukar and his telephone number and
email address link to the registration of a domain name called Harardherehospital.com. A lab
technician working at Harardhere Hospital, Noor Hussein Duale, believed to be Dr. Saed
Hassan Duale’s wife, uses Abukar’s email address and Saed’s Somali telephone number as
her contact details. The telephone number is linked to the 2 May 2009 hijacking of the bulk
carrier ‘Ariana’. Dahir Hassan Guled is registered on Facebook and has two Skype accounts,
one in Mogadishu and one in the U.S.A.
17. The second email address used in the ‘York’ hijacking, [email protected],
registered under the name of Mohamed Hassan Jimale, was found to be in contact with ‘Cabdi
Xafiid Ali’, a piracy suspect involved in the hijacking of the UAE-operated bulk carrier
‘Orna’ and also connected to members of Indian Ocean Consultant Company. On 24 January
2012, Cabdi Xafiid Ali forwarded an email containing the release agreement of the ‘Orna’ to
‘Ahmed’, the acting pirate negotiator of the ‘Orna’ and a member of Indian Ocean
Consultants Company. Ahmed sent the agreement to the ‘Orna’ owner via email address
[email protected].
18. Also, Abukar himself appears to be directly linked to members of Indian Ocean
Consultant Company, as indicated by telephone and email communications. On 7 December
2011, he received an email from [email protected] mentioning ‘Waa Email
tijaabo ah oo kaaga yimid Group-kaada’, meaning ‘This is a test email from your group’. The
email was sent from Abukar’s own office.
19. Moreover, Abukar has also been in contact with the email address
[email protected], used by ‘Ali Hassan’ to register the website
‘indianoceanconsultants.org’ and linked to Abdirahim Ali, a British passport holder and
shareholder of the London taxi company ‘Deltachauffeurs’ (see annex 4.7). One of the
communications sent from this address contained a pirate investor’s agreement indicating a
division of shares. The email was signed by ‘Hassan Ahmed Ali’ and included the same
phone number used to register the indianoceanconsultants.org website.
20. Abukar was in regular contact with one representative of DEH Relief Somalia,
Mohamed Tooyo, who presents himself on Facebook as the ‘Program Coordinator’ of the
Mogadishu-based NGO.9 Tooyo sent Abukar DEH invoices and reports for fieldwork they
undertook for WFP and UNICEF in Hobyo. A ‘profile’ letter of DEH detailing general and
organizational information of the company mentions the name ‘Mohamed Abdi Haji Hassan’
9 http://dehrelief.org.
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as the ‘Project Manager’ of the organization.10 DEH claims to have an office in Nairobi but is
not registered in Kenya as a company.
21. Given the strong similarity to the name of pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan
‘Afweyne’, the location where DEH operates, the fact that Abukar is in direct contact with
Afweyne and that both mobile numbers of the Project Manager are in contact with pirate
investor Abukar Moalim Hassan, acquainted with pirate investor Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane
‘Buundo’ (see annex 4.4), raises suspicion about the identity of the Project Manager. While
Mohamed Tooyo appears to be using one of the mobile numbers of the Program Manager, it
is unclear whether they are the same person.
22. On Facebook, Mohamed Tooyo is linked to several individuals known to be associated
with activities of Somali piracy,11 including Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale and his brother
Saed. He ‘likes’ the Facebook Page ‘Free Abdiwali Somali Teen Coast Guard in US
Custody’, attributed to Abdiwali Abdiqadir Muse, sentenced to 33 years in prison in February
2011 for his involvement in the hijacking of the U.S.A.-flagged container vessel ‘Maersk
Alabama’ in April 2009.12
23. In order to obtain clarity about the true identity of the Program Manager of DEH, the
Monitoring Group approached both Country Directors of WFP and UNICEF who were not
able to provide the information requested and in fact told the Monitoring Group that it was not
their responsibility to find out the identity of the persons with whom they are working. They
referred the Monitoring Group to the ‘Risk Management Unit’ of the UN Country Team in
Nairobi for further enquiries, but more than one month after a written request for information,
the Monitoring Group was told by the Risk Management Unit that no other information is
currently available.13
24. On several occasions, Abukar expressed interest in the fate of young sea pirates that
have gone out to sea to hijack merchant vessels, especially when they are connected to the
Hobyo-Harardheere Piracy Network. On 12 January 2009, Abukar was quoted in a BBC news
article as the ‘uncle’ of a pirate who washed ashore with 153,000 USD in a plastic bag in his
pocket, the share of a ransom he was paid for his involvement in the hijacking of the Saudi
Arabian supertanker ‘Sirius Star’, released on 9 January 2009 following a ransom payment of
allegedly 3 million USD.14
25. In December 2011, Abukar communicated with his brother Saed and uncle
Cabdisalaam Khaliif Ahmed (see annex 4.5) about the detention of seven pirates in Malaysia,
arrested at sea by Malaysian naval forces on 20 January 2011 after the attempted hijacking of
the maritime tanker ‘Bunga Laurel’ and fire fight with a Malaysian armed forces team on
board of the tanker.
26. On 12 November 2009, Mohamed Dhunkal Hersi sent Abukar, who appears to be a
close relative, two official letters from the Somali and Spanish Embassy in Nairobi, both
dated 8 November 2009. The letters pertain to a request for extradition of two Somali pirates
10 In a subsequent ‘profile’ letter of DEH, the position of Project manager no longer exists. The mobile number
of Mohamed Abi Haji Hassan is still indicated but attributed to the ‘Exective Director’ ‘Mohamed Yusuf’.
11 Mohamed Tooyo is also connected to Mohamed Dhunkal Hersi, who is closely associated to individuals
involved in Somali piracy (see below).
12 http://www.aolnews.com/2011/02/16/somali-teen-pirate-sentenced-to-33-ye….
13 On 30 May 2013, the Risk Management Unit provided the Monitoring Group with a confidential Company
Risk Profile, which assesses DEH to pose an overall risk of ‘high’ to the United Nations.
14 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7824353.stm.
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jailed in Madrid after their arrest on 3 October 2009 by the Spanish Navy in relation to their
involvement in the hijacking of the Spanish fishing vessel ‘Alakrana’ on 2 October 2009.15
27. The letter from the Somali Embassy, with reference ESR/1142/09, does not indicate
the name of the author, but mentions that the extradition is required “in order to follow and
complete the ongoing investigations”. The two prisoners were never extradited.
Excerpt of a letter sent on 8 November 2009 by the Somali
Embassy to the Spanish Embassy in Nairobi
Excerpt of a letter dated 8 November 2009 from the Ambassador
of Spain addressed to the Prime Minister of Somalia, Omar
Abdurashid Sharmarke
28. The sender of the letter, Mohamed Dhunkal Hersi is unknown to the Monitoring
Group but according to his Facebook Page appears to have a connection to the Somali
Embassy in Nairobi through Ambassador Mohamed Ali Americo. He is well connected to the
Himan and Heeb Adado administration of Mohamed Abdullahi Aden ‘Tiiceey’ and has a
wide range of Somali contacts within various news agencies. He is also in contact with several
15 Cabdiweli Cabdullahi and Raageggesey Hassan Haji.
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individuals associated with Somali piracy, including pirate negotiator and facilitator Mahad
M. Nuur of Indian Ocean Consultant Company, involved in many hijacking and abduction
cases. The fact that diplomatic correspondence are accessible to individuals involved in
Somali piracy four days after transmission, is representative of the pirates’ wide network of
facilitators in all layers of society.
29. Abukar has many international contacts and communicates with individuals in
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sweden, the Netherlands, UAE, Uganda, United Kingdom, U.S.A.,
Yemen and Zambia. His Facebook Page indicates a telephone number in Sweden, where he is
in contact with a woman named Ana Ibrahim. Also, his son Mahamad possibly resides in
Sweden. In the United Kingdom, both pirate investor Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane ‘Buundo’
(see annex 4.4) and Abukar call the same mobile number +44 7903384502. Abukar is
believed to have a UK bank account with a Somali money transfer company that has been
identified.16
16 The name of the money transfer company is known to the Monitoring Group.
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Annex 4.9: Pirate negotiator – Abdishakuur Mohamud Mohamed ‘Fred’
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Abdishakuur Mohamud Mohamed ‘Fred’, a pirate negotiator with relatives in the United
Kingdom is linked to pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’. He is also in direct
contact with several pirate financiers and pirate leaders Mohamed Osman Mohamed
‘Gafanje’ and Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji ‘Suhufi’.
30. During the early hours of 11 April 2010, general cargo vessel ‘Rak Afrikana’ and its
26 crewmembers were hijacked by a PAG of 10 armed Somali pirates some 260 nautical
miles west of the Seychelles. The Captain was ordered to sail the vessel to Harardheere,
Somalia, where it arrived at anchorage on 15 April. Shortly after anchoring, a small group of
Somali pirate leaders boarded the vessel, including pirate negotiator ‘Fred’ or ‘Abdishakuur’,
pirate commander Abdulrazak or ‘Niki’, and chairman ‘Bashir’.1
31. Negotiations commenced on 17 April 2010, following a 7 million USD demand from
the pirates for the release of the vessel and crew. Thereafter, ‘Fred’ was frequently on board
of the ‘Rak Afrikana’, occasionally accompanied by members of the pirate ‘committee’. He
used the name ‘Fred’ in his communications with the shipping company but was named
‘Abdishakuur’ when speaking to other Somali’s by telephone. Fred spoke ‘reasonably’ well in
English.2
32. Fred was described as dark brown skinned, fat with a big tummy, broad shouldered
and between 1 m 75-80 cm tall. He had a round face with a fine line of beard and moustache.
When he came on board of the vessel he was dressed like the average Somali pirate but
usually carried a plastic bag with him containing denim trousers, a t-shirt and white sports
shoes. He looked around 35 years of age.3
Computerized sketch produced by crewmembers of the ‘Rak Afrikana’ with indication of a
65-70% resemblance with pirate negotiator ‘Fred’
1 Information obtained from the ship owner of the Rak Afrikana, 1 April 2011.
2 Information obtained from the ship owner of the Rak Afrikana, 1 April 2011.
3 Description provided by crewmembers of the ‘Rak Afrikana’.
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33. Fred used two mobile numbers and one personal email address to communicate with
the ship owner, but also used other communication platforms such as SMS and MSN
Messenger Service.4
34. During the entire period of the hijacking, Fred sent about eight emails to the ship
owner, all from the same email address. In his first email to the ship owner, ‘Fred’ conveyed
an ominous message from the pirate commander, which included threats to kill and torture the
crew. In a following email he displayed his two mobile numbers on which the ship owner
could reach him.
Excerpts of the first and second email sent by pirate negotiator ‘Fred’ to the ship
owner of the hijacked vessel ‘Rak Afrikana’
35. According to the ship owner, Fred was an accomplished negotiator, despite his limited
language skills. During the long-lasting and difficult negotiations he employed a wide range
of tactics to increase pressure on the ship owner, such as threats to the ship, cargo and crew,
forcing the crew to call and pressure their families, changing the communicator and
communication methodology, silence, contacting the media, and raising expectations with an
alleged agreement. Fred is believed to be more than only a translator, but a principal member
of the ‘committee’ and an investor in the piracy business. At the end of the negotiations, and
even after the ransom agreement with the pirates was signed, Fred kept requesting a personal
commission for his services as an ‘intermediary’, which he never received.
36. The 25 crewmembers of the ‘Rak Afrikana’ were eventually released late on 8 March
2011, after an agreed ransom payment of 1,931,000 USD was airdropped. Only after the
pirates had left the vessel did it become apparent that one crewmember, the Tanzanian cook,
had tragically died on 3 March. His death is believed to relate to the stage-management of
three mock executions in late January, involving the ship’s Captain who suffered a minor
stroke. After witnessing the ‘executions’, the cook refused to eat, which caused his health to
rapidly deteriorate. He was buried at sea on 4 March. Also, the Indian Captain never
recovered from the ordeal and died one month after the release of the vessel in a hospital in
India. He became the second fatality of the pirates’ atrocities.5
37. Both the email address and one of the telephone numbers that Fred used to during the
negotiations with the ship owner are found registered on a website called
4 According to the owner, one of Fred’s friends on MSN was a young man from the Netherlands named
‘Maajid’.
5 Information obtained from the ship owner of the ‘Rak Afrikana’, 27 April 2013.
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simplyexplained.com, set up to answer people’s questions. Experts in their field may register
on the site to answer questions. Pirate negotiator Fred registered himself as an expert in
‘intimate relationships’.6 Fred’s name on the website is registered as ‘Shaka Mohamud’. His
profile mentions that he is a cameraman with a small studio.7
Excerpt from ‘simplyexplained.com’ displaying
Fred’s personal contact details as used during the
‘Rak Afrikana’ negotiations
38. Fred’s profile also appears on Faniq.com, an interactive, San Francisco-based sports
website.8 His Wall Page on the website shows that he has registered himself as ‘bulsho11 -
A/shakuur M.’, names that refer to both his email address and alleged real name.9 According
to the Wall page, ‘Bulsho11’ is not active on the website but does indicate to be following one
other member, ‘kiin2004 – Samira Z.’. In contrast to bulsho11, kiin2004 shows more activity
on the website.10 She also ‘follows’ 13 other members of the website, including bulsho11. All
the members followed by kiin2004 seem to be individuals of Somali descent.
39. Fred’s personal email account was registered in 2002 under the name of Cabdishakuur
Maxamud Maxamed, and provides the alternative email address [email protected],
indicating a personal relationship between himself and kiin2004 a.k.a. ‘Samira Z’ of
Faniq.com.11
40. Samira Z. is registered on Facebook under the name of Kiin Talshe. She indicates to
be in a relationship and to have two daughters and a son. On Skype she is registered under the
name of ‘Jaakuliin.ali’ and indicates to be living in London, United Kingdom. She displays
pictures of herself and presumably her children on both Facebook and Skype.
41. Given the aforementioned elements, it can be assumed that they are family members
or close relatives of ‘Fred’, possibly even his wife and children. Consequently, the possibility
exists that Abdishakuur Mohamud Mohamed is either residing in the United Kingdom, or has
6 Fred posted one question on the website: “How can I last longer than 1 hour in sexual meeting?”.
7 http://simplyexplained.com/expert_profile.asp?id=25857.
8 http://www.faniq.com/profile.php?id=604387.
9 Further investigation indicates that members of Faniq.com are registered and displayed on the website with the
front name section of their email address and an additional username of choice.
10 She indicates interest in the Birmingham Southern Panthers, an American football team representing
Birmingham-Southern College (BSC) in Birmingham, Alabama.
11 Information obtained from a US law enforcement source, 14 May 2012.
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travelled there in the past.12
Samira Z. a.k.a. Kiin Talshe a.k.a. Jaakuliin Ali. Possible family member (wife) of pirate
negotiator ‘Fred’,a.k.a. Abdishakuur Mohamud Mohamed
42. Since 31 May 2012, Fred is also registered on Facebook, under his name
Cabdishakuur Mohamud, and shares a common ‘friend’ with Kiin Talshe named ‘Ruun
Talshe Ali’ from Stockholm, Sweden. On Skype Fred manages two accounts, one in
Mogadishu, Somalia, and one in Torino, Italy.
Facebook account of pirate negotiator Fred
43. Fred has many contacts abroad and communicates with individuals from Bulgaria,13
Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Norway, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,14
Singapore, Somalia, South-Africa, Sudan, UAE, UK, U.S.A. and Yemen. In Malaysia, he has
been in telephone contact with Farah Roble, who was in contact with pirate kingpin Mohamed
12 According to the owner of the ‘Rak Afrikana’, UKMTO (UK Maritime Trade Operations based in Dubai)
seemed to believe or know that ‘Fred’ was from Hackney, London.
13 Number connected to the hijacking of the bulk carrier ‘Rosalia D’Amato’ (2011-2012).
14 The numbers in the Seychelles that Fred has been in communication with are also in contact with Somali
numbers used by other senior individuals in the Hobyo-Harardheere network, such as pirate negotiator Abdullahi
Bi’ir Jareer, pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’, pirate leader Fathi Osman Kahaye, pirate
leader Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji ‘Suhufi’ and pirate negotiator and ex-District Commissioner from
Harardheere, Abdisalaan Khalif Ahmed.
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Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ when he travelled to Kuala Lumpur in March 2012 holding a
diplomatic passport.15
44. The landline that Fred is in contact with in São Tomé and Príncipe16 is also in contact
with pirate negotiators Ali Hassan (see annex 4.5) and Bashir Bi’ir Jareer,17 pirate financier
Fathi Osman Kahaye and pirate facilitator Ahmed Mohamud Aweis,18 the latter who is
connected to pirate negotiator Ali Nurdin and pirate financier Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane
(see annex 4.4).19
45. On 19 January 2013, the same day pirate kingpins Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’
and Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ flew from Adado to Mogadishu to conduct
negotiations with representatives of the FGS, a São Toméan national of Somali descent also
travelled to Mogadishu by air from Galkayo.20
46. In Somalia, Fred communicates with various important and senior pirate leaders and
financiers in the Hobyo-Harardheere pirate network, such as Mohamed Osman Mohamed
‘Gafanje’, Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji ‘Suhufi’, Abukar Moalim Hassan, Mohamed Said
Jimale, and others.21
47. Fred’s mobile number has also been in contact with Somali pirates on board the
Liberian flagged container carrier ‘MSC Panama’ that was hijacked on 10 December 2010
approximately 80 nautical miles East of the Tanzanian-Mozambique border and subsequently
held off Harardheere and Hobyo.22 In December 2010, pirates on board the hijacked ‘MSC
Panama’ called Fred’s number five times on his mobile phone, using the ship’s satellite
phone. During one of the conversations, a pirate named ‘Darman’ said to ‘Abdishakur’ that
Khalif Dhore is on land with the whiskey ‘and that ‘Abdullahi Jareer’ wants to negotiate a
new cooperation agreement.23 At the time of the call, Darman was at sea with the vessel, in
the vicinity of Harardheere. The content of further conversations with Abdishakur and other
pirates, registered on 23 December, indicate that Abdishakur was also involved in another
hijacking case and that the vessels ‘MSC Panama’ and ‘Rak Afrikana’ were probably held by
the same pirate group.24 In an attempt to obtain more information about the hijacking case and
the individual(s) negotiating on behalf of the pirate group holding the ‘MSC Panama’, the
Monitoring Group contacted the ship operator based in Miami, U.S.A., who expressed a
desire to accommodate the Monitoring Group’s work but referred to his lawyers in London to
provide the information requested. Unfortunately, despite a meeting in London and several
15 Information obtained from a European military source.
16 São Tomé and Príncipe is an oil-rich island nation located at the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa, where maritime
piracy has grown into a thriving business over the past few years.
17 A.k.a. Bashir Farah Bi’ir Qarey, was involved in the Spanish MSF abductions and is the cousin of renowned
pirate negotiator Abdullahi Bi’ir Jareer, who has been involved in many hijacking cases.
18 Fathi Osman Kahaye is acquainted with pirate kingpin Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ and has
invested in several cases of hijacking (such as the MV ‘Polar’, MV ‘Samho Dream’, and FV ‘Shiu Fu N°1’) and
hostage taking (such as the crew of the ‘Leopard’).
19 In 2012, Ahmed Mohamud Aweis received from a ship owner a side payment of 26,733 USD on his bank
account in Harardheere, extorted by pirate negotiator Ali Nurdin.
20 The full name of the São Toméan national is known to the Monitoring Group.
21 Information obtained from a European law enforcement authority.
22 The hijacked ‘MSC Panama’ (IMO 8902125) was released on 7 September 2011, reportedly following a
ransom payment of around 7 million USD.
23 Telephone call made on 13 December 2010. Abdullahi Bi’ir Jareer (a.k.a. Abdullahi Farah Bi’ir Qarey) is a
renowned Hobyo-Harardheere pirate negotiator involved in many hijacking cases.
24 Information obtained from a European military source.
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email communications, the law firm was unwilling to provide the Monitoring Group with the
necessary information to conduct further investigations.25
48. During eleven months of ransom negotiations for the release of the hijacked ‘Rak
Afrikana’, Fred sent eight emails to the ship owner, of which the first six originated from one
specific IP address.26 The IP address was traced to a Satellite-Internet provider in Nairobi,
Kenya, who identified the end user of the IP address as one of their clients named
Abdirahman Abdullahi ‘Suhufi’, with a physical address in Harardheere, Somalia, and mobile
phone number +252 215979908. According to the Satellite-Internet provider, one of their
clients, ‘Duraan Dohen’, with Internet connection in Mogadishu, Somalia, introduced
‘Suhufi’ to the company, registered his internet subscription and covered the subscription fees
for the first three months. ‘Suhufi’ was said to have subscribed to a ‘small Internet package’,
paying 1200 USD for the satellite dish and a 250 USD monthly subscription fee that was
transferred via a Somali money transfer company.27
49. Further investigations and enquiries identified Abdirahman Abdullahi ‘Suhufi’ as
Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji ‘Suhufi’, renowned pirate leader and investor in the Hobyo-
Harardheere piracy network and involved in many hijacking and abduction cases.28 The
identification of Suhufi as the owner of the internet connection confirmed the previously
indicated connection or relationship with Fred, a.k.a. Abdishakuur Mohamud Mohamed.
50. Suhufi’s friend or acquaintance, Duraan Dohen, is known on Facebook as Duraan
Mohamed Hussein. His email address can be traced to the website http://hoase.com and a
telecommunications company called ‘Nazri Telecommunications Hoase Inc.’, providing
telephone and internet services in Somalia and with an address in Mogadishu at Bakaaraha
Main Road #21. Contact details for the company include the email [email protected] and
Duran Goray at +252 615508889 / +1 6143644040 / [email protected].
25 The Miami-based ship operator of the ‘MSC Panama’, Ship Management Services Inc., was represented by
London law firm Holman Fenwick Willan.
26 IP 41.138.248.80. Information obtained from the ship owner of the ‘Rak Afrikana’.
27 The satellite dish was shipped to Harardheere, Somalia, and installed by a technician of the Satellite-Internet
provider.
28 Suhufi or Suxufi means journalist. Pirate leader and investor from the Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Eyr clan, believed
to be coming from Merca and reportedly involved in several hijacking and abduction cases such as the ‘Jahan’
(2009-2010), ‘Asphalt Venture’ (2010-2011), ‘Samho Jewelry’ (2011), Danish Demining Group (2011-2012)
and the Spanish MSF workers (2011-to date).
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End-User Service Agreement of the internet subscription of Hobyo-Harardheere
pirate leader ‘Suhufi’ arranged in Nairobi by his friend or acquaintance Duraan
Mohamed Hussein (photo)29
51. Not much is known about Duraan and Nazri Telecommunications. The website
hoase.com closed down in 2012 and the domain name was resold. The U.S.A. landline
number indicated on the website was connected to an address and a small apartment in
Colombus, Ohio. According to the FBI, the number had been in contact with ‘someone they
should not have been’.30
52. The Home Page of Duraan’s website hoase.com made a reference to 'Horn of Africa
Services’ (HOAS), a Seattle-based non-profit organization providing assistance and a wide
range of services to East African immigrants, refugees and communities in the U.S.A.,
including helping prospective individuals prepare for U.S.A. naturalization testing. Two
Somalis are serving on the Board of Directors of HOAS, Mr. Abubaker Ali (President) and
Abdulahi Jama. The latter is also known as Abdullahi Jama Amir, now a 72-year old father of
eight and a naturalized U.S.A. citizen, indicted in 2001 but later acquitted in 2004 of
conspiring to lie on immigration documents for Mohdar Abdullah, a man who would later be
held as a material witness in the probe of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Jama is also
a board member of 'One America', formerly called 'Hate Free Zone'.31 The possible
relationship between HOAS and Duraan Mohamed Hussein remains unclear.
53. The last two emails pirate negotiator Fred sent to the ship owner of the ‘Rak Afrikana’
can be traced to another IP address, the internet connection of which was also used by pirate
negotiator Ali Hassan (see annex 4.7) 32 and is believed to be managed and operated by
Nation Link station manager in Harardheere, pirate facilitator Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale
(see annex 4.8). 33
29 Picture retrieved from the individual’s Skype account.
30 The US landline number is attributed to an individual named Nur Mohamed Jama.
31 http://weareoneamerica.org/board/abdullahi-jama.
32 IP 41.212.35.226 linked to email communications sent by pirate negotiator Ali Hassan in both the ‘Rak
Afrikana’ and the ‘Gemini’ case.
33 Nation Link station manager in Harardheere Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale was involved in the ransom
negotiations for the hijacked ‘York’, ‘DN127’ and ‘MSC Panama’.
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Annex 4.10: Pirate network linkages (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 85
Annex 86
Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, S/2015/776, 12 October 2015
United Nations S/2015/776
Security Council Distr.: General
12 October 2015
Original: English
15-16737 (E) 191015
*1516737*
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect
to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 31 of Security Council
resolution 2184 (2014), in which the Council requested me to report on the
implementation of that resolution and on the situation with re spect to piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.
2. The report covers major developments since my previous report, of 16 October
2014 (S/2014/740), until 11 October 2015. The assessment and obs ervations herein
are based on information provided by Member States and regional organizations, in
conformity with paragraph 30 of resolution 2184 (2014). Information was provided
by Germany, India, Japan, Latvia, Serbia, Turkey and the United Kingdom of G reat
Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as by the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United Nations system, the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Monitoring Group on Somalia
and Eritrea were also consulted.
II. Main developments and trends regarding piracy off the
coast of Somalia
3. It has been more than two years since a large commercial vessel has been
hijacked and held for ransom by Somali pirates. Following the trend in 2013, the
total number of incidents caused by pirates based in Somalia continued to fall, from
20 in 2013 to 12 during the reporting period, according to figures provided by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). This represents a significant decrease
from the 78 reported in 2007, when Somalia-based piracy was prevalent, and the
237 ships targeted by Somali pirates in 2011. The total number of seafarers from
large commercial vessels who are being held hostage by Somali pirates currently
stands at 26, compared to 37 in October 2014.
4. The positive overall trend notwithstanding, credible reports suggest that
commercial ships remain a target of Somali pirates. In most cases, ships were
successful in preventing attacks through vigilance, situational awareness an d an
assertive response, in accordance with the Best Management Practices for
Protection against Somalia-based Piracy. Combined threat assessments by the
European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), NATO and the Combined Maritime
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Forces with regard to the threat of piracy, in terms of capability, intent and
opportunity, suggest that the continued suppression of piracy is reliant on the
maintenance of collective response mechanisms by Member States, regional actors
and the United Nations system. In addition, it is stressed in the assessments that root
causes, such as a fragile economy, the lack of alternative livelihoods and weak
governance structures, continue to require the attention of the Federal Government
of Somalia, with support from the international commun ity.
5. Smaller vessels remain vulnerable. Figures for 2014 from the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) show that there were 18 pirate attacks on
fishing vessels and two dhows were held. In addition, in early 2015, 37 Iranian
fishermen aboard two fishing vessels, the Siraj and the Jaber, were seized by pirates
after allegations of illegal fishing activities. The Jaber subsequently escaped with
its crew; 19 hostages continue to be held, however.
6. There is evidence of a complex relationship between piracy and illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing. The Secure Fisheries programme, in its report
of 16 September 2015, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) noted a marked increase in reports of such fishing by foreign vessels
off the coast of Somalia, reflecting the perceived reduction in the threat of piracy in
the area. Noting the upturn in attacks on fishing vessels close to the Somali coast
since the beginning of 2015, it was noted by Secure Fisheries and FAO that local
frustration with such activities may be contributing to a reappearance of coastal
community support for piracy.
7. It also remains clear that despite a marked reduction in the commission of
piracy attacks, the criminal networks behind such acts have not been defeated.
During the reporting period, crime trends indicated that the Indian Ocean was
increasingly exploited by criminal organizations to engage in seaborne transnational
criminal activities, including trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, drug
trafficking, illegal fishing and wildlife and forestry crime. Such activities leverage
the existing resources and expertise of criminal syndicates, including pirate and
terrorist networks, and take ad vantage of normative vacuums in the regulation of
international and territorial waters and maritime law -enforcement capacities to
further illicit activities.
III. Hostage release and support efforts
8. In February 2015, four Thai nationals from the fishing vessel Prantalay 12
were released and repatriated. All crews held hostage had been mistreated; some of
the hostages released had suffered torture and ill -treatment during captivity and will
require significant aftercare.
9. Twenty-six crew members of the fishing vessel Naham 3 have remained in
captivity since 2012. As noted above, 19 fishermen from the Siraj were taken
hostage on 26 March 2015. In addition, a pirate group has been holding two Kenyan
citizens taken hostage on land in 2014. The Hostag e Support Programme, which is
funded by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia, constantly monitors the conditions of individuals held in
captivity, provides medical support, and engages in dialogue with both government
counterparts and pirate groups to advocate and secure the release of such
individuals. UNODC and partners continue to support efforts to achieve the
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objective of zero ships and zero seafarers in the hands of Somali pirates, adopted by
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
IV. Development of counter-piracy efforts in Somalia
A. Legal and policy frameworks
10. The reporting period saw notable progress by the Federal Government of
Somalia in developing relevant legal, policy and coordination frameworks to
address the threat of piracy. With support from the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and EUNAVFOR, the Federal Government
completed a draft coastguard law, which was submitted to the Council of Mini sters
for subsequent approval by Parliament. IMO also provided the Ministry of Ports and
Marine Transport of the Federal Government with draft guidelines for the
establishment of a maritime administration department, with the goal of enabling
Somalia to diligently undertake its flag, port and coastal State responsibilities.
11. Further to discussions with international partners within the framework of the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, steps were taken to ensure proper
management and coordination among Somali federal and regional authorities
regarding the exploitation of maritime resources. At a meeting held on 7 July 2015,
representatives of the relevant entities agreed to operationalize a maritime security
coordination committee to facilitate cooperation between the national maritime
coordination committee of the Federal Government of Somalia, the Somali regional
maritime coordination committees (including the Puntland and Galmudug
administrations, the Interim Jubba Administration and ot her current and future
regional administrations) and “Somaliland”. The committee is expected to serve as
an important mechanism for information -sharing and cooperation to optimize the
implementation of counter-piracy and maritime security capacity-building
programmes.
12. Coordination between the Somali authorities and international partners was
further institutionalized within the framework of the Somali Compact. With the
support of UNSOM, a Somali navy and coastguard working group was established
in alignment with Priority 4 (maritime strategy) of Peace and State -building Goal 2
(Security) of the Compact. This coordination, which brings together the Federal
Government of Somalia and international partners, is aimed at advising and
assisting the Ministry of Defence in developing its maritime security forces.
B. Capacity-building
13. Numerous international partners contributed to building the capacity of the
Federal Government of Somalia and the interim regional administrations to fully
exercise law-enforcement powers in coastal areas. In this regard, financial support
from Germany, the United Kingdom and other Member States to INTERPOL, the
European Union civilian mission, EUCAP Nestor, which assists host countries in
building self-sustaining capacity on counter-piracy, maritime governance and
security, and United Nations programmes an d projects, notably the UNODC
Maritime Crime Programme, helped to strengthen the capacity of prosecution
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authorities and maritime security entities, build a maritime administration, and
promote livelihood development in Somalia.
14. In addition, on 16 October 2014, 61 Somali cadets from the coastguard and
port police graduated from a seven-week training course in Djibouti. The UNODC
Maritime Crime Programme provided maritime law-enforcement and engineering
mentors, who delivered on-the-job training and mentoring within the Somali
maritime police and coastguard units.
15. UNODC continued to build the capacity of maritime law -enforcement
authorities in Somaliland, Puntland and southern and central Somalia. Prison
operations were supported through the provision of food, health-care services and
medicines and other procurement activities, while Custodial Corps staff received
training on security and information management. In collaboration with UNODC,
prison mentors routinely reviewed security conditions to reduc e the risk of escape or
mistreatment, particularly with respect to prisoners transferred under the Piracy
Prisoner Transfer Programme and other high -risk offenders.
16. In Mogadishu, the UNODC mentoring programme focused on building the
maritime and policing skills of the maritime unit of the Somali police force. During
the reporting period, 22 officers received advanced training and 20 new recruits
received initial training. The first group of trainees is supporting maritime forces of
the African Union Mission in Somalia (Uganda People’s Defence Forces) in
patrolling the waters off Mogadishu International Airport. On land, UNODC
continued its multi-year programme of training, procurement and construction work
at the Mogadishu prison and court complex, whic h is set to be a unique facility in
southern and central Somalia that will provide a secure environment for trials of
high-risk prisoners such as pirates, terrorists and former combatants. During the
reporting period, construction work was undertaken to ex pand the prison’s secure
area and thus reduce overcrowding. Training was delivered to 75 custodial officers
and uniforms were issued to 350 officers, with a view to improving security and
professionalism. The project will continue until the end of 2016.
17. In Puntland, UNODC supported the port police through the provision of
equipment and the construction of the port police headquarters, which will serve as
a training and operations planning centre. Work commenced in 2015 and will
continue throughout 2016. In Galmudug, the police station in south Gaalkacyo was
refurbished as part of the UNODC programme, with a view to building the capacity
of law-enforcement authorities based there that are responsible for conducting
investigations into piracy and other mar itime crime. The activities were funded by
the Trust Fund and will be completed in 2015.
18. In Somaliland, the same programme provided six boats and trained five teams
of eight officers on vessel handling and boarding tactics, safety of life at sea and t he
use of force. In addition, UNODC provided three intensive training courses to
existing boat crews, and 15 senior officers received dedicated training on
operational readiness and standard operating procedures. Such training and
mentoring efforts have led to 51 interdictions of illegal fishing vessels by
“Somaliland” authorities since December 2014, including the interception of an
illegal consignment of weapons, the rescue of the crew aboard a burning ship, and
the provision of support for the safe passa ge of refugees and Somali returnees
fleeing the conflict in Yemen.
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19. The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea within the Office of
Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, with the support of UNSOM, conducted two
training activities, one for officials of the Federal Government of Somalia and the
interim regional administrations and one for parliamentarians, which were financed
through the Trust Fund. The objective was to build the knowledge and capacity of
Somali legislators and technical officials regarding the rights and duties of States in
the maritime zones set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
including in relation to the repression of piracy. From May to September 2015, the
Division also provided one Federal Governmen t official with specialized training on
issues relating to ocean affairs and the law of the sea, which was funded through a
special strategic fellowship award from the United Nations -Nippon Foundation of
Japan Fellowship Programme.
20. Noting the link between illegal fishing and piracy, FAO facilitated capacity -
building and training of fisheries observers and inspectors in order to build the
capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia to effectively monitor, control and
exercise surveillance of its waters, ensure that national and international fishing
vessels comply with local and international regulations, and collect fisheries data. A
small team of officials from the Federal Government and the interim regional
administrations received fisheries manageme nt training in the United Republic of
Tanzania. FAO also provided technical support to Somalia in meeting its obligations
as a Contracting Party of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.
C. Tackling root causes of piracy
21. The underlying factors enabling piracy include a fragile economy, the lack of
alternative livelihoods, insecurity and weak governance structures. Efforts to
address these issues are continuing within the framework of the Somali Compact for
peacebuilding and State-building. The latest developments are reflected in my
reports on Somalia of 11 September ( S/2015/702), 12 May (S/2015/331) and
23 January 2015 (S/2015/51).
22. During the reporting period, FAO provided technical and legal support for the
establishment of a federal Somali fisheries authority under the Ministry of Fisheries
and Marine Resources. This would enable Somalia to benefit from revenue
generated by licences issued to foreign-flagged fishing vessels and to effectively
exercise surveillance of its waters, with the potential to curtail illegal fishing and
associated community support for such activity.
23. Meanwhile, with support from the Trus t Fund, FAO provided technical
assistance to Somalia in building a registration scheme enabling Governments,
non-governmental organizations and international naval missions to confirm the
identities of fishermen and thereby protect their livelihoods. More than
4,500 fishermen in Puntland were registered and 3,500 identification cards were
distributed. Similarly, 700 fishermen have been registered by the Galmudug and
Jubba interim regional administrations.
24. FAO also supported rehabilitation and construct ion initiatives for improving
access to markets for fishermen in Mogadishu, Kismayo, the towns of Eyl and
Boosaaso in Puntland and the port of Berbera in Somaliland, and introduced two
new vessel designs to help fishermen to increase their catches. Local c apacity to
build the new vessels in Boosaaso and Berbera will be fully established by the end
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of 2015. Following successful pilot projects to produce value -added sundried tuna
in Boosaaso and Mogadishu during the reporting period, FAO initiated plans to
extend the work to fishing communities and communities of internally displaced
persons in coastal areas, which it hopes will make a major contribution to food
security and employment.
25. The deployment in Puntland early in November 2015 of 25 fish aggregat ing
devices to collect fish, which are on contract to FAO, should underpin related efforts
to improve coastal livelihoods without increasing competition or conflict within
coastal communities, and may stimulate youth employment in such communities.
V. International cooperation
A. Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
26. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia held its seventeenth
plenary session in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on 28 October 2014 and its
eighteenth plenary session in New York on 8 July 2015. It endorsed the offer of the
Government of Seychelles to chair the Contact Group during 2016.
27. At the eighteenth plenary session, in addition to receiving updates and
presentations from the Federal Government of Somalia and FAO, participants
discussed the scope of the high-risk area, the eastern limit of which had been
extended in 2011 from longitude 65° east to longitude 78° east in response to the
rise in incidents of piracy. Many Member States with coastlines bord ering the Indian
Ocean, including India, Oman and Pakistan, and other Member States in the Horn of
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia, called for the revision of the
coordinates of the high-risk area, since no incidents of piracy east of longitud e 65°
east have been reported in the past three years. In particular, India highlighted
adverse consequences arising from the continued extension of the high -risk area,
including the rerouting of merchant vessels closer to the coast of India, excessive
false alarms that could undermine the military effort, the presence of “floating
armouries” and armed guards without proper regulation in India’s maritime zones
and adjacent waters, and the increased cost of shipping owing to higher insurance
charges. In the light of these concerns, the Contact Group called upon the insurance
and maritime industries to take the steps necessary for a substantive review of the
high-risk area within three months and report back to the Chair, while noting that a
consideration of revision did not imply reduced vigilance or disengagement. On
2 October 2015, representatives of the insurance and maritime industries agreed to
revise the limits of the high-risk area, which will significantly reduce the areas at
sea deemed to be at high risk of piracy.
28. The working groups of the Contact Group also continued their work. At its
meeting of 7 July 2015, the Working Group on Capacity -Building welcomed the
agreement by the Federal Government of Somalia, “Somaliland”, Puntland and the
interim regional administrations to operationalize the Maritime Security
Coordination Committee, noting that emphasis should be placed on implementing
the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy. It took note of the agreement
between representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia, “Somaliland”,
Puntland and the interim regional administrations that, once established, the
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Coordination Committee should in due course assume the role and functions of the
Working Group.
29. The Working Group on Disrupting Pirate Networks Ashore observed that
pirate leaders and financiers based in Somalia are enjoying de facto impunity there.
They are neither arrested, prosecuted nor extradited, and can often invest the illegal
proceeds of piracy in other trades, both legal and illegal, or move them abroad.
30. The Working Group on Maritime Counter-Piracy and Mitigation Operations
reported on the work of the technical subgroup on maritime situational awareness,
which had stated that the current maritime situational awareness framework and its
associated system architecture must be sustained. Meanwhile, regional stakeholders
have started to form a maritime situational awareness organization that will combine
the action of existing centres with a regional network of information -sharing and
fusion centres. A joint maritime communications initiative for Somalia is being
developed by UNODC, EUCAP Nestor and Oceans Beyond Piracy, which will
provide initial operating capability for Somalia and its regions.
31. A law enforcement task force was formed in 2014 in recognition of the need to
bring together law enforcement partners from around the world to coordinate
investigations into and share information on land -based Somali pirate leaders. In
October 2014, the task force identified pirate leaders against whom investigators
and prosecutors would work by sharing information, advising one another on
strategy and best practices and carrying out investigations. Meanwhile, the Legal
Forum of the Contact Group discussed and adopted its missio n as a platform for the
study, analysis and discussion of legal matters relating to piracy issues.
B. Trust Fund to Support the Initiatives of States Countering Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia
32. As at 30 June 2015, the total balance of the Trust F und stood at $1.8 million.
Since December 2012, the Trust Fund has received a total of $12.7 million from
17 donors.
33. On 28 October 2014, the Board of the Trust Fund convened in Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, for its sixteenth meeting, chaired by the Dep artment of Political
Affairs. The Board approved three projects submitted by FAO and UNODC, which
amounted to $900,000. The two FAO projects approved by the Board provide
biometric-based database systems for fishermen and vessels to the Ministry of
Fisheries and Marine Resources, the ports of Galmudug and the Ministry of
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Interim Jubba Administration. The
UNODC project is designed to equip 80 at-risk young people in Boosaaso with
livelihood skills, thereby deterring them from involvement in piracy and violent
activities and contributing to the economic development of their communities.
34. On 7 July 2015, the Board of the Trust Fund at its seventeenth meeting
reviewed a total of five new projects for funding, three of which were approved for
a total amount of $808,487. The projects were (a) a request by UNODC for an ad
hoc replenishment of $200,000; (b) a UNODC project on detention and transfer in
the areas of Garoowe, Puntland, and Hargeisa, Somaliland; and (c) a p roject by IMO
on support to maritime governance in Somalia. It was further agreed that (a) gender
analysis should be included in the development of all future project proposals; and
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(b) steps should be taken to increase links between the Trust Fund and the Somali
Compact to ensure complementarity between projects supported under the Trust
Fund and the goals of the Compact, as well as with the United Nations
Multi-Partner Trust Fund established within the framework of the Compact. The
representative of Somalia stressed the need for the Federal Government of Somalia
to be fully consulted on projects.
C. Cooperation on piracy-related prosecutions
35. The United Nations, Member States and regional organizations continue to
support Somalia and other States in the region in their efforts to prosecute suspected
pirates and punish convicted pirates, including onshore facilitators and financiers,
consistent with applicable international human rights law. The UNODC Maritime
Crime Programme in particular continues to support States in the region that are
prosecuting piracy.
36. To date, naval forces operating in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian
Ocean have detained a total of 323 suspected pirates, of whom 164 have been tried
in Kenya, 147 in Seychelles and 12 in Mauritius. EUNAVFOR detained 155 of the
suspected pirates, while others were detained by international naval forces operating
under NATO Operation Ocean Shield or by the Combined Maritime Forces. The
Seychelles coastguard detained 41 suspected pirates. A total of 48 men have been
transferred for trial in Seychelles. On 13 March 2015, the Supreme Court of
Seychelles returned a guilty verdict agains t nine pirates handed over by Denmark in
November 2013. Eight adult defendants received sentences of 14 years each, while
the juvenile defendant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
37. Judgements in two cases were delivered by the Seychelles Court of Appeal on
28 August 2015. In the case of seven Somali men detained by EUNAVFOR in
February 2013, the Court of Appeal found that insufficient consideration had been
accorded to the defence at the trial before the Supreme Court of Seychelles, and
quashed their convictions. In the case of six Somali men detained by the navy of the
Netherlands in August 2012, an appeal was made by one of the men for the court’s
consideration and the remaining five sentences were reduced from 24 to 12 years.
EUNAVFOR continues to support the prosecution in one further trial in Seychelles,
including assistance with the location and attendance of witnesses.
38. In June 2015, the Supreme Court of Mauritius heard the prosecution appeal in
the case of 12 suspected pirates acquitt ed by the Intermediate Court in November
2014. It is anticipated that the Supreme Court will provide its judgement in 2015.
39. Five suspected pirates remain on remand in Seychelles. The UNODC Maritime
Crime Programme supported regional prosecution efforts through the provision of
interpretation services, support to prosecutors, travel of witnesses and video
evidence facilities for witnesses.
40. To alleviate the burden on prosecuting and detaining States while promoting
closer ties with families and countr ies of origin, the UNODC Maritime Crime
Programme facilitated the transfer and repatriation of Somalis convicted or
acquitted of acts of piracy. During the reporting period, the Programme carried out
two post-sentence repatriations and five repatriations o f acquitted Somali men from
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Seychelles, and six post-sentence repatriations from Kenya. As piracy trials
progress, more repatriations and transfers are expected in the final quarter of 2015.
41. Prosecutions and court procedures also continued in Germany, with
cooperation between the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection and
law-enforcement and military authorities.
42. There were no transfers of prisoners by UNODC during the period under
review.
D. Naval activities off the coast of Somalia
43. International naval missions from the European Union, NATO and the
Combined Maritime Forces, in addition to counter -piracy missions of several
Member States, including China, Colombia, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), the
Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, continued to ensure security at sea
by protecting merchant vessels and deterring pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden and
the Indian Ocean, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2184
(2014).
44. The European Union Naval Force operation Atalanta continued to deter and
disrupt piracy off the coast of Somalia. It comprises up to five warships, three
maritime patrol aircraft and more than 1,000 personnel, and includes contributions
from Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It has to date provided
complete protection to World Food Programme shipping , as well as to vessels
supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia, such that no ship operating for
either organization has been attacked by pirates since the beginning of the operation
in 2008. In December 2014, the European Union extended the operat ion for a
further two years until December 2016, with a revised mandate to support other
European Union missions and instruments in Somalia, as a secondary task, upon
request and within its means and capacities, as part of the European Union’s
comprehensive approach to Somalia.
45. NATO Operation Ocean Shield also continued to make a significant
contribution to the international response to piracy off the Horn of Africa by
deploying up to four vessels and, at times, maritime patrol aircraft. As decided by
the North Atlantic Council, the operation will continue until the end of 2016 with a
focused presence in the Indian Ocean during the inter -monsoon periods, when the
risk of possible pirate attacks is at its highest. Operation Ocean Shield continues to
coordinate its activities at the tactical level with other counter -piracy stakeholders.
In 2015, Australia participated in the operation for a limited period, and Colombia
has been supporting the operation since 14 September. The NATO Shipping Centre
in the United Kingdom has continued to support merchant shipping in the high -risk
area of the Indian Ocean by providing timely information. NATO continues to chair
coordination meetings of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction mechanism on a
rotational basis with the Combined Maritime Forces and EUNAVFOR.
46. The counter-piracy efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces in the Gulf of
Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Somali Basin and the Red Sea are
managed by Combined Task Force 151, which is one of thre e task forces of the
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Combined Maritime Forces with the objective of disrupting piracy and armed
robbery at sea. Combined Task Force 151 works in close cooperation with the
European Union and NATO and maintains a consistent air and sea presence, with a
variable force flow of vessels, aircraft and personnel from contributing States.
During the reporting period, it was under the command of New Zealand, Thailand,
Pakistan and Japan, and is currently under the command of Turkey.
47. The naval forces of Turkey have been participating in both Combined Task
Force 151 and NATO Operation Ocean Shield. The Indian Navy continues to
conduct anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Japan is also continuing its
anti-piracy operations through the deployment of Maritime Sel f-Defence Force
destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft in the Gulf of Aden.
E. International capacity-building
48. In addition to the many capacity-building activities in support of Somalia
already listed, the IMO programme for implementation of th e Code of Conduct
concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden continues to deliver results in the four thematic
areas of information-sharing, training, national legislation and capaci ty-building. To
date, more than 60 training courses have been delivered under the programme,
benefiting more than 1,000 trainees, with more courses scheduled. The establishment
of the information-sharing network and the enhancement of maritime domain
awareness in the region were noted as significant achievements.
F. Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean rim
49. To address the evolving nature of the maritime threats in the Indian Ocean and
their transnational links, the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime has emerged
as a regional network among Indian Ocean States to tackle broader maritime crime.
It is supported by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the engagement of
which in the implementation of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014) is also part
of new efforts to disrupt maritime crime originating in the region. The Forum was
welcomed at the African Union Extraordinary Summit on Maritime Safety and
Security in February 2015 and at the Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice.
VI. International legal and judicial issues, including human
rights considerations
50. Pursuant to resolutions 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011) and 2020 (2011), in which
the Security Council called upon States to criminalize piracy under their domestic
law, some Member States reported progress in enacting the requisite national
legislation. Latvia reported that it continues to work on improvements in its national
laws to enhance the safety of ships, shipping companies, ports and port installations,
and to recognize maritime and shipping organizations at the national level. Germany
reported that it has provisions in its national legislation to tackle piracy and
exercises jurisdiction in accordance with the principle of universal jurisdiction in
cases in which the crime of an attack on maritime traffic has been committed.
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51. A key outstanding issue is the regulation of sea-based private security
contractors and their activities in counter -piracy operations. In particular, the use of
force and possible detention of pirates by such contractors may affect the
international regulatory framework governing private security companies. The
matter was discussed during the fourth session, held from 27 April to 1 May 2015,
of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of
elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and
oversight of the activities of private military and security companies.
52. The IMO Maritime Safety Committee held its ninety -fifth session from 3 to
12 June 2015, at which it approved revised interim recommendations for flag States
regarding the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in
the high-risk area (see annex to MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.3). In accordance with the
revised interim recommendations, if the use of such personnel is determined to be
an appropriate and lawful measure, the flag States are recommended to establish a
policy that ensures that private maritime security companies employing such
personnel on board ships hold valid accredited certification to Ships and Marine
Technology — Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies providing
privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships (ISO 28007-1:2015),
the objective of which is to improve sector -specific security and human rights, or
meet applicable national requirements.
53. In line with its monitoring obligations, UNODC continued to support six -
monthly visits by the International Monitoring Committee, an independent
mechanism based on an agreement between UNODC and the Somali authorities, to
prisons holding prisoners transferred und er the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme
to ensure that conditions remain secure and humane and that minimum detention
standards are upheld, in accordance with international human rights law.
VII. Observations
54. I welcome the continuing decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia. This
sustained trend is a tribute to extraordinary and innovative international cooperation
to address a threat to our shared peace and security. I commend the Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the inter national naval forces for their work.
The continuing decrease in piracy is due in no small measure to their efforts,
support and coordination.
55. I welcome the substantial gains made by Somalia and its efforts to develop and
coordinate maritime governance mechanisms. I note with appreciation that the
Somali coastguard took up its operational duty station at the entrance of Mogadishu
seaport in October 2014, after 23 years. I also encourage the convening of the
Maritime Security Coordination Committee at the earliest opportunity, which will
bring all of the necessary parties together to establish Somali maritime governance
and prioritize the maritime security forces. The United Nations stands ready to
support the Federal Government of Somalia on this front.
56. The multinational forces’ combined threat assessments suggest that —
provided the collective response mechanisms are maintained — piracy will continue
to be suppressed successfully off the coast of Somalia, even if the intent or
capability are never entirely eliminated. In this regard, I note the key challenges
highlighted by the Combined Maritime Forces, NATO and the European Union
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Naval Force, which include the variable force flow of vessels, aircraft and personnel
of the three multinational naval operations; weaknesses in the regional capacity for
arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates; the root causes of piracy, such as a
fragile economy, including high youth unemployment, linkages to illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing and weak governance structures; the need to
strengthen regional and national capacity, including by addressing identified gaps;
the unstable situation in Yemen, the implications of which are not yet fully
understood but have the potential to profoundly affect the region; and the ongoing
discussions on the transition of military operations beyond 2016.
57. I remain concerned that, without the continued support prov ided by the
international naval presence and the self-protection measures adopted by the
shipping industry, large-scale piracy may return. While capacity-building efforts
ashore are under way, they have yet to produce lasting and sustainable effects. I cal l
upon the international community to increase its support to Somali efforts in the
areas of governance, the rule of law and economic development to tackle the root
causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Although the Trust Fund to Support the
Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and its partners have
been tackling some root causes, including livelihoods for at -risk young people, more
needs to be done on a systematic and larger scale, in coordination with the Somali
Compact.
58. In addition, I call upon the international community to cooperate in halting
foreign illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Somali exclusive
economic zone through the sharing of information, the regulation of foreign fishing
vessels, and support to the Somali authorities in developing a licensing regime for
foreign vessels. This has the potential to generate much -needed revenue, which
could be invested in tackling the root causes of piracy.
59. The importance of following a complete judicial process, which involves
support to the region to carry out the arrest, detention, prosecution, trial and
conviction of pirates in compliance with human rights, is crucial to breaking the
“catch and release” cycle of impunity. To enable this, a clear legal framework
governing maritime security must be in place throughout Somalia. In this regard, the
commitments made by the Federal Government of Somalia, the interim regional
administrations and the “Somaliland” authorities to enact appropriate legislation to
enable governance and policing of the maritime domain are very welcome.
60. The international community should continue to support the efforts of the
Somali authorities to prosecute and punish individuals suspected of piracy in
compliance with international human rights law. Adherence to international human
rights standards is fundamental in tackling not only maritime piracy but also larger
threats to international peace and security. I welcome efforts by States to ensure that
suspects are given a fair trial and that their conditions of imprisonment are humane
and secure.
61. I also welcome Seychelles taking on a leadership role as the next Chair of the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. I further welcome the initiative
of Seychelles of commencing the first trial before the country’s newly established
court for piracy and maritime crime. Funding for the facility was obtained through
an exemplary collaboration between UNODC, the Governments of the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom and the Tr ust Fund.
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62. In addition to efforts towards the prosecution and sentencing of pirates, it is
important to coordinate international efforts that target the financing, money -
laundering and support structures on which the piracy networks survive. It is
therefore important to continue international support for the work of the law
enforcement task force of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. It
is also important that the Federal Government of Somalia implements international
standards, including by becoming a State party to the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, strengthening its law enforcement capacity,
and enhancing collaboration with other countries, including on extradition
agreements.
63. Pirate criminal enterprises are often also involved in other organized criminal
activities, such as human trafficking and the drug trade. The Indian Ocean Forum on
Maritime Crime, which involves more than 20 coastal States, from South Africa in
the west to Australia in the east, is the type of regional body that is needed to tackle
wider maritime criminality.
64. I applaud the continued programmatic support of stakeholders to regional
organizations of Eastern and Southern Africa, including the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development and the Indian Ocean Commission, to combat maritime
crime in the Indian Ocean. Such support remains critical to strengthening the
capacity of the region to respond to maritime crime.
65. I reiterate my call for the immediate and unconditional release of all innocent
seafarers held hostage in Somalia so that they can be reunited with their families. I
call upon the Somali authorities and all relevant stakeholders to re double their
efforts to secure the immediate release of the hostages. Meanwhile, I encourage
Governments, industry and humanitarian organizations to help to alleviate the
suffering of piracy survivors and their families, including by contributing to the
Piracy Survivor Family Fund of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia.
66. The activities to support development, governance and the rule of law in
Somalia are the final “hard laps” that must be run if we are to secure sustained
victory against piracy. Only through such efforts can we reach the bedrock that will
underpin the elimination of piracy as a threat, namely, a peaceful and stable
Somalia. Sustained international cooperation and the support of naval forces must
also continue to further suppress organized criminal networks that target merchant
vessels. The United Nations remains committed to continuing its support to the
efforts of the people and Federal Government of Somalia to eliminate the scourge of
piracy.
Annex 86
Annex 8
“Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the
Horn of Africa”, The World Bank, 2013 (Extracts)
A W O R L D B A N K S T U D Y
Pirate Trails
TRACKING THE I L L ICIT FINANCIAL
FLOWS FROM PIRATE ACTIVITIES OFF
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
81232
Pirate Trails
Pirate Trails
Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate
Activities off the Horn of Africa
Washington, D.C.
A WORLD BANK STUDY
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7
© 2013 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
Some rights reserved
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Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: World Bank. 2013. Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial
Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa. A World Bank Study. Washington, DC: World Bank.
doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7.
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ISBN (paper): 978-0-8213-9963-7
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DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data has been requested.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7 v
Acknowledgments ix
Contributors xiii
Abbreviations xvii
Executive Summary 1
Somali Piracy: Criminal Networks 2
Main Recommendations 4
Section I Introduction 7
Chapter 1 “I Am a Pirate” 9
Why This Study? 9
Pirate Financiers and Pirates 10
The Pirates Talk… 11
Key Terms Used in the Study 12
Outline of the Study 14
Notes 14
Chapter 2 The Context for This Study 17
Audience 17
Methodological Framework 17
Notes 23
Chapter 3 Background on Piracy 25
Origins of Somali Piracy 25
Current Situation in Somalia 25
Somali Piracy: A Gateway out of Poverty 27
Criminal Influence on the Economy 29
Somali Pirate Networks 29
The Somali Piracy Business Model 30
Somali Piracy: Problems and Responses 32
Notes 34
Contents
vi Contents
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7
Section II Understanding the Financial Flows 37
Chapter 4 Ransoms 39
Starting Point: Law Firms Negotiating Ransoms 39
How Much Money Are We Talking About? 40
Explaining the “Peak” of 2011 and the Decrease in 2012 42
Notes 44
Chapter 5 Distributing the Proceeds 45
Low-Level Pirates—“Foot Soldiers” 45
Monies Flowing to Local Communities 46
The Lions’ Share: How Do Financiers Invest and Benefit
from Piracy? 47
The Artisanal Scheme 47
The Cooperative Scheme 47
The Individualistic Scheme 48
How to Get the Cash inside Somalia to Prepare an
Operation 48
Financiers Abroad 49
Notes 50
Chapter 6 How Are the Proceeds Moved? 51
Financial Wire Transfers 51
Trade-Based Money Laundering 53
Misuse of Money or Value Transfer Services (MVTS) 54
Cross-Border Cash Smuggling 55
Looking Forward: New Trends in Moving Money to and
from Somalia 56
Notes 57
Chapter 7 How Do Pirate Financiers Invest Their Proceeds? 59
Overview of Reported Pirate Financiers’ Investments
within Somalia 59
Investments in Legitimate Business Activities 61
Pirate Financiers Using Their Proceeds for Other Criminal
Activities 62
Pirate Financiers Engaging in Smuggling and Trafficking 66
Notes 67
Chapter 8 Khat and Real Estate 71
Khat 71
Khat Trade in Kenya 71
Piracy and Khat 72
Contents vii
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The Real Estate Market 73
Piracy Financial Flows and Real Estate 73
Suspicion of Ransom Payments in the Real Estate Sector 74
Notes 75
Section III Conclusion 77
Chapter 9 Main Findings and Recommendations for Policy
Engagement 79
Main Recommendations 81
Appendix A Human Trafficking Case Studies 85
Appendix B Khat Business 87
Appendix C Real Estate Boom 91
Glossary 95
Bibliography 101
Box
1.1 Interviews with Two Pirates 11
Figures
ES.1 Financial Flows of Proceeds of Piracy 1
II.1 Following the Money 38
4.1 Ships Successfully Hijacked 41
4.2 Evolution of Ransoms: Annual Amounts Collected by Somali
Pirates in Ransom for Vessels and/or Crews Kidnapped
between 2005 and 2012 42
4.3 Average Amount of Ransom Payments 43
4.4 Stocks and Flows of Ships Held and Released 44
5.1 False Invoicing to Finance Pirate Operations 49
6.1 Overinvoicing Scheme without an Intermediary 53
6.2 Overinvoicing Scheme with an Intermediary 54
7.1 Number of Investors Engaging in Activity 61
7.2 Number of Pirate Financiers Engaging in Activity North
and South of Galkayo 63
B.1 Money Flows and the Distribution Network Associated
with Khat 87
viii Contents
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Maps
I.1 Map of Somalia 8
2.1 Regional Map 19
3.1 Evolution of the Main Pirate Networks until Today 31
7.1 Reported Locations of Pirate Financiers’ Assets in
Eastern Africa 60
Table
C.1 Credit to Private Sector (with Focus on Real Estate Sector) 92
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7 ix
This study, Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the
Horn of Africa, has been, in all aspects, a collaborative endeavor among three diverse
organizations—the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Its
fruition was made possible through the expertise and contribution of many talented
individuals.
This study was written by Stuart Yikona (Task Team Leader, Financial Market
Integrity Service Line, World Bank),1 Kevin M. Stephenson (Egmont Group
Secretariat), Julian Casal (Latin America Region, World Bank), Francisca
Maryanne U. Fernando (Financial Market Integrity Service Line, World Bank),
Clément Gorrissen and David Lamair (both of the UNODC Global Programme
against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism
[GPML]),2 and George Lenny Kisaka (INTERPOL).
We would like to express our gratitude to the Government of Norway, the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, and the Government
of the Netherlands for their generous financial support.
We are especially grateful to Bella Bird (Country Director, Somalia), Jean
Pesme (Manager, Financial Market Integrity Service Line, Financial and Private
Sector Development Network, and Coordinator, Stolen Asset Recovery [StAR]
Initiative), Jennifer Bramlette (Programme Manager and Senior Advisor, Global
Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of
Terrorism, UNODC, and a peer reviewer), Pierre St Hilarie (Assistant Director,
Maritime Piracy Task Force, INTERPOL, and a peer reviewer), Stephen Platt
(Stephen Platt & Associates LLP), and Anja Korenblik, (Programme Management
Officer, Studies and Threat Analysis Section, UNODC) for their support and
guidance on the project.
The invaluable support received from Quy-Toan Do (Senior Economist,
World Bank, a peer reviewer) and Lin Ma (PhD Candidate, University of
Acknowledgments
1. Stuart Yikona took over the leadership of the project from Kevin Stephenson following Stephenson’s
departure from the World Bank in September 2012.
2. Clément Gorrissen conducted the UNODC scoping field research in November 2011, which also fed
into the information used for this joint report.
x Acknowledgments
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7
Michigan) in developing and analyzing the joint UNODC–World Bank dataset
on ransom payments sets an encouraging precedent in terms of genuine, efficient,
and constructive cooperation on data collecting and analyzing between two international
organizations. We are also grateful to Cyrus Mody of the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) for making available the dataset on piracy-related incidents
compiled and maintained by the Piracy Reporting Center of the IMB;
Louise Bosetti (Associate Expert, UNODC) for her very helpful comments on
the joint UNODC–World Bank database; and Kristina Kuttnig and Deniz
Mermerci from the UNODC Studies and Threat Analysis Section for their support
in drafting the maps for this study. We also acknowledge the support provided
by BridgeWing Solution GmBH of Zurich.
Heartfelt thanks are extended to our peer reviewers including Bernard
Harborne and Michael Olavi Engman (both of the World Bank) and Per
Gullestrap (Clipper Shipping). Each of the peer reviewers has brought a unique
body of knowledge as well as distinct expertise in providing valuable insight that
has strengthened the analysis in this study. We are indebted to them for their
content suggestions including, most importantly, on the recommendations on
how to address the monitoring and interdiction of illicit flows from pirate activities
off the coast of Somalia.
The authors also benefited from helpful and insightful comments from
Abdallah Abdallah (Africa Development Bank); Abdillahi Ismael (State University
of Djibouti); Simon Marshall (Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence
Coordinating Center); Jeanette Hauch, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, Matthias Mayr,
Thilasoni Benjamin Musuku, Consolate K. Rusagara, Francesco Strobbe, Jack
Titsworth, Emiko Todoroki, Carlos Leonardo Vincente, Cari Votava, Simon
Christopher Walley, Emile van der Does de Willebois, Ji Won, and Yee Man Yu
(all of the World Bank); and Andrew Weinschenck (U.S. Department of State),
for which we are grateful.
Our gratitude is also extended to Working Group 5 of the Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which gave us the mandate to undertake this
study. Their support throughout this process has culminated in the publication of
this report.
Our appreciation goes to the Governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the
Seychelles, and Somalia (Puntland and Federal authorities) for their cooperation
and assistance during our visits to their respective countries. In particular, we
would like to thank the agencies visited including the ministries of finance,
foreign affairs, home affairs (internal security), the police, central banks, financial
intelligence units, port authorities, private sector players, the diplomatic community,
and the customs and revenue authorities.
The stellar work of our editor, Diane Stamm, is greatly appreciated. Special
thanks are extended to Michael Geller for his support in the administration of the
project. The support of Abdia Mohamed and Cindy Fisher of the World Bank
Group’s Publishing and Knowledge Division is appreciated.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7 xi
Finally, we would like to extend our appreciation to our colleagues in the
communications team for their guidance in the publication and launch of this
study: Mary Elizabeth Donaldson, Nicole Frost, Richard Miron, Xenia Zia
Morales, and Liudmila Uvarova (all of the World Bank).
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report are
entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the
World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent, or those
of the United Nations, the Secretariat of the United Nations, or its member states
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area of its authorities,
or those of INTERPOL and its member states.
We hope this report contributes to an understanding of the problem of piracy
off the Horn of Africa and of the illicit financial flows that result from these
activities. There is still much work to be done in addressing these phenomena.
Stuart Makanka Yikona
Task Team Leader
Financial Market Integrity Service Line
The World Bank
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Julian Casal is an operations officer in the Development Effectiveness Unit in
the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank. Prior to joining
the Bank, Julian worked as an economist with the U.S. Treasury Department,
where he was responsible for monitoring macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial
matters in a portfolio of countries in Central and Southeast Asia. Julian received
a master’s degree in development and government from Georgetown University
and a bachelor’s degree in Latin American studies and economics from McGill
University.
Francisca Maryanne Udeshika Fernando is a junior professional associate for the
Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, a joint initiative of the World Bank and
the United Nations Organization on Drugs and Crime, and with the Financial
Market Integrity Service Line of the World Bank. Hailing from the Seychelles, an
island nation that is greatly affected by piracy in the region, she has had work
experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Seychelles on issues relating
to Somali piracy and her master’s thesis focused on the issue of Somalia piracy
for the Seychelles. She received her master of laws from the University of
Toronto and her bachelor of laws from the London School of Economics and
Political Science, where she was the Jones Markham Scholar. She is called to the
Bar of England and Wales.
Clément Gorrissen is a consultant with the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC). In his current position, he helps coordinate and develop the
UNODC activities in the Horn of Africa, with a specific focus on money or value
transfer services. Prior to joining UNODC in 2010, he worked with the Bureau
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) in Geneva and then with UNDP Somalia. He graduated
from Science-Po Lille, receiving his master’s degree on Conflict Analysis and
Peace Building following a master’s thesis titled “ The Conflict in Western Sahara,
Conflicting Interests and Conflicting Identities.’’ He is currently pursuing a PhD
on financial flows in conflict-affected zones with the VU University of
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
George Lenny Kisaka is a regional specialized officer at the INTERPOL Regional
Bureau of Eastern Africa in Nairobi. He is in charge of the Economic and
Contributors
xiv Contributors
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Financial Crimes coordination and police cooperation in 13 INTERPOL member
countries in the region, including Somalia. In his current position, he is responsible
for law enforcement initiatives in combating transnational crimes in the field
of corruption, illicit trade, counterfeit currency, money laundering, terrorism
financing, payment card frauds, and other new payment methods. He is also a
member of the INTERPOL Maritime Piracy Task Force. Prior to joining
INTERPOL, he worked at the Central Bank of Kenya as a Bank Fraud Detective
in the area of financial intelligence and investigation for 10 years. He has a bachelor
of education degree from Moi University, Kenya.
David Lamair is a United Nations Organization on Drugs and Crime adviser in
the Eastern Africa Regional Office in Nairobi and is responsible for the areas of
anti-money laundering and piracy financial flows. For most of the last decade he
worked for the European Police Force in The Netherlands, where he was an intelligence
analyst and carried out analytical and coordination roles in support of
international investigations of organized crime. Prior to joining the European
Police Force, he worked for five years as an intelligence analyst for the Belgian
Federal Police and was a marketing research professor at a local training institute.
He received his master’s degree in business administration from the European
University College, Brussels.
Kevin Mark Stephenson is a senior financial sector specialist, Financial Market
Integrity Service Line of the Financial and Private Sector Vice Presidency of the
World Bank, and is currently serving as the executive secretary of the Egmont
Group of Financial Intelligence Units. He worked for the U.S. government serving
as a special agent, Department of Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, and served as
an attaché in American embassies in Skopje, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia; Berlin, Germany; and New Delhi, India; he investigated money laundering,
terrorist financing, drug smuggling, fraud, cyber-crimes, general smuggling,
and other criminal offenses. He also served as the director of the Financial
Intelligence Centre for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, combating money laundering and terrorism financing. He served as the
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste anti-corruption advisor to the
East Timor prime minister, advocating for transparency, accountability, and combating
corruption. He received his master’s degree from the University of
Tennessee.
Stuart Makanka Yikona is a senior financial sector specialist in the Financial
Market Integrity Service Line of the Financial and Private Sector Vice Presidency
of the World Bank. Prior to joining the World Bank in June 2005, he worked as a
consulting counsel with the Legal Department of the International Monetary
Fund from 2001–05. In his current position, he advises client countries on issues
related to combating financial crimes such as corruption and the laundering of
proceeds of crimes; delivering capacity building programs to strengthen client
countries’ capacity to combat financial crimes; and most recently, pursuing
research on the impact of ill-gotten money on the economy. He coauthored the
Contributors xv
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report on Ill-gotten Money and the Economy, Experiences from Malawi and Namibia
(2011). He received his master of laws from the University of London and completed
his doctor of juridical science (SJD) in banking law at the University of
Virginia Law School with ‘‘Insiders and Insider Abuse in Banking Institutions in
the United States and Zambia.’’
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AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AML anti-money laundering
CBK Central Bank of Kenya
CDD customer due diligence
CFT combating the financing of terrorism
CGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
ESAAMG Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group
EU European Union
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force (also known as Operation Atalanta)
FATF Financial Action Task Force (on money laundering)
FIU financial intelligence unit
GDP gross domestic product
HHN Hobyo-Xarardheere Network
ICC International Chamber of Commerce
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMB International Maritime Bureau
IMB PRC International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre
IMF International Monetary Fund
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
KRA Kenya Revenue Authority
KYC know your customer
MENAFATF Middle East and Northern Africa Financial Action Task Force
ML money laundering
MVTS money or value transfer services
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO nongovernmental organization
OC organized crime
Abbreviations
xviii Abbreviations
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control (in the United States)
PAG pirate action group
PIN personal identification number
PIRI Prime International Residential Index
RAPPICC Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution Intelligence Coordination
Centre
RPGs rocket-propelled grenades
SDN List Specially Designated Nationals List
SIM subscriber identity module
TF terrorist financing
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA United States of America
WB World Bank
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It is estimated that US$339 million to US$413 million was claimed in ransoms
between April 2005 and December 2012 for pirate acts off the Horn of Africa.
Twenty-first century piracy in this region has developed as a violent criminal act,
which not only affects the victims but also has an impact on the region and the
global economy.
This study on tracking the financial flows from proceeds of piracy attempts to
follow what happens to the ransom monies. Figure ES.1 graphically summarizes
this analysis of the flow of proceeds of piracy from the moment a ransom is paid.
Executive Summary
Ransom
An estimated of US$339 million to US$413 million was
claimed in ransoms during April 2005–December 2012
Pirates
Understanding the
piracy network and
money flows
Low-level
pirates
Pirate financiers
The main beneficiaries from proceeds of piracy;
those who have invested in piracy operations
Local
communities
Investments
Legitimate businesses
For example,
khat, hotels, transport,
petroleum, real estate
Acts of piracy
Including taking hostage of
vessels, cargo, and/or crew
and other persons
Ransom
negotiations
Criminal activities
For example,
human trafficking,
warlord activities
Figure ES.1 Financial Flows of Proceeds of Piracy
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At the top of the hierarchy displayed in figure ES.1 is “Ransom.” Once
received, the money filters down through the “system” to fund the activities of
pirates and pirate financiers, which include acts of piracy, and various other criminal
and business activities, including buying into the khat trade and human trafficking.
Specifically, the ransom is distributed among the relevant stakeholders—
the pirates involved with the capture of the ship (the pirate action group); the
local community that has provided services to the pirates; and the pirate financiers
who, having invested in the pirate operation, will receive the bulk of the
ransom monies. The ransom monies are then moved through and around Somalia
and the region, and invested in other sectors of the region’s economy and also
reinvested back into the Somali piracy business model. In that regard, piracy is
sustained and reinforced through the proceeds of piracy.
While a significant focus by the international community has been on dealing
with piracy through counterpiracy operations that include naval, air, and military
operations, this study attempts to understand the illicit financial flows from the
proceeds of piracy.
The study was conducted through a collaborative effort of the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), and the World Bank. Its focus is on financial flows and
how such flows can be monitored by relevant law enforcement agencies. It
complements another study done exclusively by the World Bank (referenced in
this study as the World Bank Report) that assesses the economic costs of piracy
off the coast of Somalia.
Using financial and economic data, and garnering evidence from interviews
with relevant stakeholders who are or have been involved with piracy and other
regional actors, the study attempts to assess how the proceeds are moved, invested,
and used. Country visits were made to the region and outside the region to
meet and talk with stakeholders including Somali pirates, law enforcement and
military officials, regional government officials, financial analysts, central bank
officials, commercial banking officials, money remitters, revenue agencies, and
others such as real estate agents, and farmers and dealers in the khat business. The
information learned in these interviews was combined with analysis of several
open and closed sources and documents that are referenced throughout this study.
In conducting research of this nature, it was recognized that necessary data
might not be available and that, even if available, might be difficult to obtain or
even unreliable. As a consequence of this challenge, the team made a special effort
to obtain information from all available, credible, open sources, and to engage as
many stakeholders as possible. The data collected are sufficient to conduct credible
analysis, but important gaps still remain and more critical research is necessary.
Somali Piracy: Criminal Networks
The evolution of Somali piracy networks can be broken down into three periods:
pre-2008, 2008 to the end of 2010, and 2010 to the present. These three periods
can be roughly associated to (a) the development of piracy from an amateurs’
Executive Summary 3
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business to an organized activity, (b) the development of new competitors in the
pirate business, and (c) piracy involving organized networks with members operating
in different countries. Increased pressure from maritime forces and reduced
success at sea has pushed these networks to move along the coast and become
increasingly organized.
The study assesses the Somali piracy business models based on the different
methods of financing and sharing the proceeds of a piracy operation, from the
artisanal and individualistic scheme, involving a limited number of actors, to the
more sophisticated cooperative scheme involving several shareholders and an
organized chain of command.
Distributing the Proceeds
Negotiations for ransoms and the payment of the ransoms are usually shrouded
in secrecy. Once received, it is payday for the pirates, the financiers of the pirate
operation, and the local community who provide services to the pirates. Lowlevel
pirates typically receive a standard fee of between US$30,000 and
US$75,000 (which would amount to about 0.01–0.025 percent of an average
ransom payment). They report using the monies to buy khat, alcohol, and expensive
cars. The pirate financiers who invested in the piracy operations receive the
bulk of the ransom, an estimated 30–75 percent of the total ransom payment
depending on the Somali piracy business model.
Moving the Proceeds
Upon receipt, the ransom payments can be moved by financial transfer. In particular,
Djibouti, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates have been identified as
three of the main transit points for financial operations leaving and entering
Somalia. A greater portion of the ransom payments is invested locally than
expected. It appears that most of the money is typically moved by cross-border
cash smuggling, made easy by the high porosity of the regional borders and
trade-based money laundering. There are also concerns that the services of
money or value transfer services (MVTS) are also being misused to move monies
outside of Somalia, and the sector needs support to cope with such abuses of its
services.
Investing the Proceeds of Piracy
In order to launder proceeds, financiers can buy into legitimate business interests.
The study does a deeper dive analysis of two sectors, in particular—the khat
industry and the real estate market. Given the lucrative nature of the khat trade,
which is a predominantly cash-based business, the culture of khat chewing in
Somalia, and control that Somalis have over the distribution network of the khat
trade, there is evidence suggesting that pirates are increasingly buying into this
network.
The perception on the ground would also suggest that pirates invest heavily
in real estate in the region. However, the findings of the study could not point at
precise estates or precise buildings into which ransom payments had been
4 Executive Summary
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invested. To that extent, there is little to no information available to support
allegations of a causal link between piracy and increased real estate prices in
some countries in the region. Further research is needed to understand who and
what are the drivers of the real estate boom in the region.
Other legitimate businesses in trade (for example, trade in petroleum), transportation,
and the services industry (for example, restaurants and hotels), also
offer viable opportunities for the pirates to invest the proceeds from piracy.
A greater concern is how ransom money may be fueling other criminal activities,
apart from piracy, in the region. Some pirate financiers are engaging in
human trafficking, including migrant smuggling, and investing in militias and
military capacities on land in Somalia. It would be a challenge to prove each and
every such allegation, and most reports received by the team are subject to a
confidential attribution, due to the secrecy of ongoing investigations. However,
the fact that proceeds from piracy are being used to perpetuate other criminal
activities is concerning for the development and stability of the region as a whole,
and deserves increased attention from local and international stakeholders.
The number of ships still being used as mother ships is very limited, and no
fishing vessels were being held at anchorage by Somali pirates at the time of
finalizing this study. Furthermore, the naval operations in the region are increasingly
costly, and it is important to consider alternative measures to combatting
the piracy problem to include monitoring of financial flows.
Against this background, we offer five key recommendations for consideration
by practitioners (on an operational level) and policy makers, including those in
the donor community. These actions would significantly contribute to mitigating
the risks associated with the financial flows from piracy within the region and
beyond.
Main Recommendations
Regional Cooperation and Collaboration
There is need for a strong commitment by countries in the region to work
together to monitor financial flows from criminal activities, including acts of
piracy. They should adopt policies and procedures that encourage cooperation,
collaboration, and information sharing among all competent authorities within
countries and across the region. These countries should adopt and implement
comprehensive strategic plans targeting the proceeds of crime and provide sufficient
resources and training to the competent authorities to trace, interdict,
freeze, seize, and ultimately confiscate the proceeds of crime. To improve the
capacity of the competent authorities in the region to combat the illicit flows
from piracy, experienced jurisdictions should provide assistance and training.
Moreover, it is important to enhance the level of trust and communication
among competent authorities across borders, so that intelligence and other data
can be shared in real time and in order to improve multiagency coordination.
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Dealing with Cross-Border Cash Smuggling
A large part of the ransom money procured by pirates is moved in cash by air,
land, or sea. Therefore, improving the capacity of countries in the Horn of Africa
to adequately target, interdict, seize, and ultimately confiscate illegal cross-border
cash smuggling is paramount to any strategy aimed at tackling the issue of financial
flows linked to piracy. Ways in which to do this include developing and
enhancing channels to exchange information between customs and border
authorities, and improving human, material, and technological capacities, for
example, through investing in new technology and developing proper interdiction
techniques.
Strengthen Money or Value Transfer Service (MVTS) Providers against
Criminal Abuses
Development of an appropriate and proportional oversight framework of Somali
MVTS operations in Somalia, and improving cooperation and information sharing
with law enforcement agencies in countries where they operate will enable
authorities to promote a safe and transparent sector and protect them from
abuse, while promoting financial inclusion. The oversight framework needs to be
proportionate to Somalia’s situation, because overregulation would hinder the
critical role MVTS play in Somali society. Discussions between Somali MVTS
and the Somali Government should serve as a basis to ensure a right balance is
being struck in that respect. Such seed work will be paramount to the future
development of a proper Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism regulatory and enforcement regime framework for Somalia.
Oversight of MVTS operations within each country in the region; self-regulation
by MVTS themselves; and risk-based, tailored solutions to protect MVTS from
abuse are all the more relevant in the region, given the importance of remittances
from a development perspective. The ultimate goal should be to allow and
help these actors to take a more risk-based approach in the conduct of their
activities, thereby ensuring that the activities take place in a legal, transparent,
competitive, and respectable environment that takes account of both the private
sector’s and its clients’ interests, and the needs of law enforcement agencies.
Increase Monitoring of Production and Trade in Khat in Kenya and Beyond
The lack of transparency of the khat business in Kenya makes the business susceptible
to abuse by criminal networks. Developing an appropriate monitoring
mechanism by Kenya would assist the authorities in understanding the financial
flows from acts of piracy into the khat industry. The regulatory framework for
the khat trade in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somaliland can serve as a benchmark
for Kenya.
Enhance Data Collection and Monitoring of the Real Estate Sector in
Countries in the Region
Better data collection on financing of real estate transactions will enable countries
in the region to know and understand the various financing methods in the
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purchase of real estate. It will be critical to have a proper classification of the
sources of financing real estate, proper due diligence of parties to transactions,
promotion of the use of the banking system when engaging in real estate transactions,
and in so doing, the authorities may be better able to monitor the financial
inflows and outflows in the real estate sector.
Such monitoring will enable the authorities and the public to avoid making
assumptions that are not backed by accurate estimates of financial flows into the
sector, that is, what flows are attributable to dirty money such as proceeds of
piracy.
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Introduction
SEC TION I
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Source: © United Nations. Used with permission; further permission required for re-use.
Map I.1 Map of Somalia
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“It is not written on the bills if the money is haram [illegal] or not.”1
It is estimated that US$339 million to US$413 million was claimed in ransoms
for pirate acts off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa between April
2005 and December 2012. Piracy is a crime, and often a very violent crime,
which has implications not only for its victims but which also affects the international
shipping and trade routes in the area and, consequently, the regional and
global economy.
This study, by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Bank,
attempts to understand the illicit financial flows from these piracy activities off
the Coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa. It complements the study conducted
exclusively by the World Bank that looks at the economic costs of piracy
(referred to in this study as the World Bank Report).
Why This Study?
Up until now, little attention has been paid to tracking and disrupting the financial
flows from piracy. There has been significant focus on securing the ships that
pass through Somali waters and, where apprehended, prosecuting and incarcerating
the captured pirates. The global community has not been successful in
taking collective action to track, detect, disrupt, and confiscate the proceeds of
piracy.
In that vein, the primary objective of this study is to add to the existing
knowledge about piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and, more specifically,
the illicit financial flows it generates. The focus is on the structure of the flows
and, more important, on helping to design appropriate responses to address the
problem in a holistic manner. The study sought to identify the flow of funds
through the piracy operational chain, and through analysis of financial and economic
data on how the proceeds of piracy are used and are moved through and
out of the region and the destinations of these proceeds.
CHAPTER 1
“I Am a Pirate”
10 “I Am a Pirate”
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The study considers areas of vulnerability, from legislative and operational
perspectives, within the concerned jurisdictions’ framework to combat dirty
money as it relates to the flows of illicit proceeds generated by piracy. Moreover,
the study identifies where collective action (particularly at the regional level)
would be critical to having a meaningful impact, including identifying opportunities
for strategic collaboration, and possible platforms for regional cooperation to
build the capacity of relevant public sector agencies to monitor these financial
flows.
Pirate Financiers and Pirates
Modern-day Somali pirates are organized into groups, mainly along clan lines,
and operate as criminal units. The patterns of operation and organization of these
groups vary, but most are armed with rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47, and
tracking devices. The pirates hijack and hold hostage vessels, cargos, and crews in
exchange for ransoms.
Pirates engage in criminal acts for the money—money that is then typically
spent on alcohol, khat,2 and prostitutes. Proceeds from piracy are also reinvested
into the financing of future pirate operations and may support the purchase of
real estate, investment in the khat trade, and other business investments and
ventures. Somali piracy has evolved into a transnational model—from smallscale,
locally executed and funded operations into a transnational network with
flows of funds, operatives, and resources coming from abroad and proceeds flowing
elsewhere.
As stated by U.S. Attorney Neil MacBride in a 2012 case concerning the
Somali pirate negotiator Mohammad Saaili Shibin3:
I think this case explodes the myth … that pirates are some kind of romantic
swashbuckling characters from Hollywood summer movies. This case showed that
pirates are brutal, greedy, reckless, desperate criminals who will kidnap, torture and
ultimately kill hostages in pursuit of their financial greed.
During the research for this study, the team interviewed over 30 individuals
involved in piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. The primary focus of the
interviews was to discover where the money went after ransoms were paid.
Even though many of the pirates interviewed were not mid- or high-level pirate
financiers, but mainly crewmen who were sent out on the high seas to hunt and
hijack ships, many were paid ransoms, many spent ransom money, and many had
information about what the pirate financiers did with the larger ransom
payments.
To protect the identities and safety of these pirates, this study does not use
their names or provide specific details that might jeopardize their safety. Of the
30-odd pirates interviewed by the team, three convicted pirates distinguished
themselves as the most accessible and cooperative and were willing to be interviewed
by the team over two days.
“I Am a Pirate” 11
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The Pirates Talk…
Their stories were similar. They were all born and raised in Somalia and had
never traveled outside the country of Somalia except for their adventures on the
high seas. They got involved in piracy for one simple reason: money. They made
no excuses; it was their decision to become pirates. They had never truly experienced
safety or security, and the political and economic situation in Somalia
provided little opportunity for people to find sustainable employment. Although
many of the pirates felt they had very limited opportunities, they clearly stated
that becoming a pirate was their choice, and a bad choice, at that.
Box 1.1 captures the experiences of two of the pirates who spoke with the
team. Although these are the comments of only two pirates, they echo a common
refrain expressed by other pirates; that is, that they got involved with piracy
activities because they were attracted by the money offered to and spent on
them.
Box 1.1 Interviews with Two Pirates
Pirate 1
“I was an unemployed, occasional fisherman and someone approached me. Had I been involved
in a decent job at that time, I would have never got close to that. The man promised me money
and khat. He explained how he got his wealth. The man was my cousin. He was a successful pirate
and was accompanied by an investor. He brought me from Mogadishu to Bossaaso by car.
“They took care of me in Bossaaso. I used to get everything on my cousin’s name—khat, comfort…
I lived that life for two to three weeks. I was living like a Minister. The financier brought a car
and took us to Garacad. We stayed there for two months. We were living like vampires: only at
night. Sleeping the whole day, chewing khat the rest of the time … they were awaiting on another
boat.
“It was in January this year. Then we went at sea, and got arrested by a British vessel. Somehow
it was an escape. For two weeks, the only things I could see were the sky, the sea, the sky, the sea.
And I was telling myself: ‘What was I thinking?!’ When I saw the Brits, I was happy…”
Pirate 2
“I was a fisherman in Mogadishu. It used to be a fairly good business, but it became difficult and
unsafe over time. In 2005, I reached Xarardheere where piracy had started. I tried my best not to be
a pirate. My friends and I used to help each other, borrow from each other, and lend money to each
other.
“I struggled… as times got more and more difficult. But as my friends turned to piracy, they
started to refuse lending me money. They were saying: We are working to get that money. Why
don’t you do the same?”
“With piracy everything became more and more expensive… A liter of fuel was already
US$100. So just try and imagine how much a liter of milk was. Then the diaspora would send less
money to families and clans with pirates among them. So the others could not catch up. And my
Mom was still sick. I couldn’t feed my family properly. That’s when I eventually joined piracy.”
12 “I Am a Pirate”
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Key Terms Used in the Study
The glossary provides definitions of the terms used in this study, but here we
define several of the key terms:
Piracy. The definition of piracy used in this study is the same as the one used
in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 1982. Under that convention, Piracy consists of any of the following
acts:
Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
1. On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft.
2. Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State.
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. The Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) brings together all international
actors, governmental and nongovernmental, willing to engage in fighting
piracy off the coast of Somalia. The CGPCS was established pursuant to the
United Nations Security Council 1851 (2008) on January 14, 2009. The
CGPCS is divided into the following five Working Groups:
1. Working Group 1, chaired by the United Kingdom, is in charge of naval
coordination.
2. Working Group 2, chaired by Denmark, is in charge of legal issues.
3. Working Group 3, chaired by the Republic of Korea, is in charge of making
the liaison between governments and the private sector.
4. Working Group 4 is chaired by Egypt and focuses on public campaigns,
raising awareness about the problems and danger of piracy.
5. Working Group 5 is chaired by Italy and is in charge of tackling the issue
of illicit financial flows related to piracy. Established in late 2011 following
the plenary session of the CGPCS, it is the last Working Group created.
Pirate. A pirate is a person who is said to have committed any acts that constitute
an act of piracy (as defined above). For the purpose of this study, the focus is
on “Somali pirates,” that is, Somali piracy mainly occurring off the coast of
Somalia and the Horn of Africa. The focus of this study is on the “pirate” who
is engaged in such acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of
Africa. These are acts, committed in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman
by individuals whose land base is on the coast of Somalia or in the Somali
hinterland.
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Pirate Financiers. Pirate financiers (also referred to as “investors” in this study)
are persons who invest in pirate activities. They are the focus of this study,
since they receive the bulk of ransom payments, which are then moved in and
out of Somalia and invested into other activities and businesses. Under
UNCLOS, they can be charged with piracy for “inciting or intentionally facilitating
illegal acts of violence and detention directed against ship, aircraft,
persons or property on the high seas.”
Fragile State or Situation. While there is no general consensus on the definition
of a “fragile state,” the term generally denotes those periods when states or
institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations
between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making
them vulnerable to violence. For the purpose of this study, and in general,
Somalia is considered a fragile state.
Financial Flows. For the purpose of this study, financial flows include the money
that flows primarily through remitters, cross-border movement, mobile banking,
wire transfers, and Money or Value Transfer Services (MVTS), as well as
informal flows through bulk cash smuggling and other illicit (underground)
money remitters.
Khat. Khat (also commonly referenced to as qat, qaad, gat, jaad, tchat, and
miraa) is a small leafy plant. Among communities in the Horn of Africa, the
Arabian Peninsula, and in particular in Somalia, the chewing of khat is a social
custom dating back many thousands of years. The khat trade in this region is
worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year.
Money Laundering (ML). Money laundering is the process by which proceeds from
a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit origins. Most countries
subscribe to the legal definition of money laundering as found in the United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (1988) (Vienna Convention) and the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) (Palermo Convention).4
The Somali Piracy Business Model. This study analyzes the Somali piracy business
model through the criminal networks and the way pirates manage and
move their proceeds. These various piracy networks have their own historical
developments and are ever evolving “organizations.” The study highlights
three dominant models of financing an operation and sharing the proceeds—
which one could call “business models” for ease of reference, namely (a) the
“artisanal” scheme, (b) the “cooperative” scheme, and (c) the individualistic
scheme (Do et al. 2013),5 all of which will be explained in detail in the
upcoming chapters.
The Team. Refers to the project team that conducted this study, comprising staff
from the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Bank.
World Bank Report. Refers to a World Bank report on the economic aspects of
piracy titled, “Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation”
(World Bank 2013). The report shows that it is in the international community’s
common interest to find a resolution to Somali piracy and help the
14 “I Am a Pirate”
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Government of Somalia rebuild the country. The costs imposed by Somali
pirates on the global economy are so high that international mobilization to
eradicate piracy off the Horn of Africa not only has global security benefits,
but also makes good economic sense.
Outline of the Study
The rest of this study is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 describes the context and audience for the study; explains the
study’s methodological framework, including information on what data sources
were available; and identifies the challenges in undertaking the study. Chapter 3
provides background on the issues of pirate activities off the coast of Somalia
and the Horn of Africa, and defines the problem of piracy and its origins. Section
II then focuses on understanding the financial flows with respect to piracy activities.
Chapter 4 looks at the ransoms paid to pirates, starting with negotiations of
the ransoms and the volume of money involved. Then chapter 5 focuses on the
distribution of proceeds from piracy to the various actors involved in supporting
or carrying out pirate activities. Chapter 6 explores the ways in which proceeds
are moved in and out of Somalia. Chapter 7 looks at how the financiers invest
their proceeds. Following this analysis, chapter 8 focuses specifically on investment
by piracy financiers in the khat business and real estate. In the final section
III, chapter 9 of the study concludes with suggested areas for policy and operational
engagement within the region and beyond.
Notes
1. Inmate interviewed by the team in Mombasa on August 7, 2012. The man was then
awaiting trial on charges of piracy.
2. Khat is a small, leafy plant chewed to induce stimulation. Chewing khat is a social
custom that dates back many thousands of years in this region of the Horn of Africa.
Today, the khat trade is worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year. This study looks
at the illicit financial flows of piracy through the khat trade, the details of which are
described in chapter 8 of this report.
3. This refers to the case of Mohammad Saaili Shibin, who was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to a dozen life sentences (New York Times 2012). (For the court record of
the case, see Case No. 2:11-cr-00033: USA v. Shibin, http://www.plainsite.org/flashlight/
case.html?id=1689934Shibin, Case 2:11-cr-00033-RGD-DEM Document 91
Filed April 27, 2012.)
4. “The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from
any [drug trafficking] offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such offense
or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property
or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offense or
offenses to evade the legal consequences of his actions; The concealment or disguise of
the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership
of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offense or offenses
or from an act of participation in such an offense or offenses, and; the acquisition,
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possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt that such property was
derived from an offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such offense …
or offenses” (Palermo Convention).
5. This World Bank Report on the economic aspects of piracy is offering a reduced form
for the business model of pirate operations, in order to suggest an alternative business
model for coastal areas. In this respect, the analysis developed uses analytical tools from
economic theories in order to offer an alternative economic model. The approach
taken by the present study adds another angle, since the analysis is focusing on the
organized crime aspect of piracy. As explained in this report, the various networks
operating have their own historical developments and are ever evolving “organizations.”
Consequently, by differentiating the various networks the analysis developed, this
study is able to go to a more micro level, identifying three models of financing an
operation and sharing the proceeds—which one could call “business models” for ease
of reference.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7 59
Overview of Reported Pirate Financiers’ Investments within Somalia
The vast majority of the pirate financiers identified by the team are located
inside Somalia. Their profiles vary and include former police and military officers,
khat dealers, former fishermen, former businessmen or civil servants, and
successful pirates-turned financiers. Some financiers are also located abroad, as
explained below.
The following analysis is based on data collected for this report, but it is anticipated
that reporting, as it stands, is incomplete to the extent that there is no way
of knowing whether the sample is representative of the totality of investments
or not. More research needs to be conducted by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, to gather a more precise accounting of these assets, especially
assets located outside of Somalia. Using available data, this section presents a
preliminary outline of the main features that can be deduced about Somali
pirate financiers. Keeping in mind the different networks and their evolution in
time, as presented earlier in this study,1 the following analysis also presents the
evolution of these investments in order to try to understand the impact and
potential developments of pirate networks in Somalia.
Two analyses were developed based on the dataset on pirate financiers presented
in the methodological framework section of this report. The first focuses
on the sample of 59 financiers2 spreading across Somalia. The second analysis
allows for a more dynamic approach, comparing investments made by pirate
financiers active south of Galkayo and investments made by pirate financiers
active north of Galkayo.
The map presented in map 7.1 shows the main reported locations of pirate
financiers’ assets in Eastern Africa and, principally, inside Somalia. The intensity
of colors used for each location reflects the number of assets reported—a darkercolored
circle corresponds to a higher number of assets that were reported to the
team as belonging to or working for pirate financiers.3
CHAPTER 7
How Do Pirate Financiers Invest Their
Proceeds?
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Data show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, many investments are actually
made within Somalia. This does not mean, however, that the majority of the
money is laundered or reinvested inside Somalia. In this precise case, it should be
clear that the discrepancy between the number of assets identified inside Somalia
and the number of assets identified outside is due to a lack of reporting to the
team by concerned states, or by stakeholders with knowledge of such assets outside
of Somalia. Therefore, the data reproduced are only the data available.
Several factors can explain the unwillingness of some actors to share information,
primarily the confidentiality of ongoing investigations.
What the following map shows, however, is that criminal proceeds invested in
Somalia are not limited to a single region. Furthermore, some actors possess a
substantial number of assets inside Somalia, reinforcing concerns over a criminal
influence on the economy especially at a time when peace and security start
returning to Somalia, further allowing economic growth to develop.4
An unexpected result is that the area where pirates most commonly invest
money seems to be the development of militias or political influence.5 After this
Sudan
Ethiopia
SOMALIA
Djibouti
Laasqoray Timirshe
Bargaal
Xafuun
Qardo
Garowe
Galkayo
Guri-el
Adado
Nairobi
Qoryoley
Hobyo
Xarardheere
Alifuuto
Afgoye Corridor
Mogadishu
Janale
Baraawe
Kismaayo
Mombasa
KENYA
Uganda
Rwanda
Burundi
0
Note:The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries.
The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.
200
1–2
3–5
6–8
9–10
11–23
Number of pirate
financiers’ assets
(all categories included)
reported
400 km
Democratic
Republic
of the Congo
United Republic
of Tanzania
Garacad
Bossaaso Qandala
SOUTH SUDAN
Juba
Map 7.1 Reported Locations of Pirate Financiers’ Assets in Eastern Africa
Source: UNODC 2012. © United Nations. Used with permission; further permission required for re-use.
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the
United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic
of South Sudan has not yet been determined.
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item come “traditional” sectors for money laundering, such as hotels, restaurants,
and real estate. It is also striking to see that, beyond investing in their own operations,
some pirate financiers also provide other financial services, as accountants,
as advisors, or by the provision of loans. Thirteen pirate financiers are reportedly
providing such services, showing quite a degree of education and sophistication
in the way they conduct their business and manage their proceeds (UNODC
2012). At a time when the political process in Mogadishu is showing encouraging
signs of progress,6 the potential development of a well-organized and heavily
armed criminal network, fueled by the proceeds from piracy, and potentially
mingling7 with insurgent groups active in the region (Garowe Online 2012a;
Mubarak 2011), cannot be overlooked.
Investments in Legitimate Business Activities
Proceeds from piracy can be laundered through direct investments in legitimate
businesses, including real estate. Such investments concern businesses as far away
as Europe and Eastern Africa and Asia,8 ranging from small retail stores, restaurants,
and gas stations (UNODC 2012) to joint ventures or even factories.9 Piracy
is no exception.
As shown in figure 7.1, the third most commonly reported area of investment
by pirate financiers is the transport business. Specifically, the primary type of
“transports” rented by financiers in the studied sample is supplying boats for
pirate attacks (UNODC 2012). The dataset also shows that some pirates choose
to invest in truck companies. These investments in transport and logistics can
easily be explained by a need to supply logistics for pirate operations.
Various smuggling 4
7
10
11
12
13
15
18
19
Import/export
Khat business
Farming activities and/or retail and selling of food products
Various businesses or factories (in Somalia or abroad)
Financial or accountant services for others
Transport
Hotel/restaurants/other real estate
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Development of militia/political influence
Number of investors
Figure 7.1 Number of Investors Engaging in Activity
Source: UNODC 2012.
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Among the 15 financiers investing in various transport services, at least four of
them invested their proceeds in the oil business, supplying fuel to pirates
(UNODC 2012). There seems to be a wider interest of the Somali community
in the oil business within East Africa. In Kenya, the petroleum market is a free
entry and exit market, mostly controlled by the Kenyan Energy Board.10
According to experts from the Kenyan Revenue Authority, interviewed by the
team in Nairobi, Somalis began entering this market in 2007, at the wholesale,
distribution, and transportation levels. However, no information has been gathered
or reported thus far that would indicate links between the oil supplied by
pirate financiers inside Somalia and members of the diaspora running such
businesses.
Some pirates have started to offer their services as consultants or experts on
piracy (United Nations 2012a), negotiators for victims or shipping companies,
and providers of other services, including proof-of-life interviews. Material
obtained by the UNODC during this study demonstrates that these “companies”
openly advertise their services, sending invoices, advertising their services or even
contacting victims of hijackings directly. Their members are former pirates, members
of the diaspora, and facilitators, or even have ties with militias (United
Nations 2012a).
Other companies with suspected ties to former pirates11 focus on security
aboard vessels. Somali maritime security companies have long existed independently
from piracy (Bahadur 2011). They seem to provide their services to
smaller embarkation such as small cargo or fishing dhows owned by companies
that do not have the means to hire a professional private security company, or
even to contract an insurer. As one informed individual put it, “We have seen at
least one Yemeni fishing vessel with three Somali crew members. When we asked
the other crew members who they were, one of them advised us that they were
private security.”12
However, the formal ties between these companies and pirate financiers, and
whether proceeds from piracy were used to set up such companies, need further
substantiation and research.
Pirate Financiers Using Their Proceeds for Other Criminal Activities
The latest developments of pirate operations indicate a growing activity of
financiers and pirate leaders operating north of Galkayo (UNODC-WB 2012).
This evolution raises concerns about the different investment patterns and
criminal activities of these networks. Reports showing an increased link with
insurgent groups pushed from the south of Somalia to the north were shared
with the team.13 Also, networks located north of Galkayo tend to more easily
mingle with other criminals, especially pirate networks operating in the area of
Bargaal (UNODC 2012). In addition, as developed in the coming section, these
networks are also investing more heavily in militias and military capacities on
land.
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Networks Investing in Land-Based Militias: Dynamic Analysis of Investments
by Financiers Operating South of Galkayo Compared to Investments by
Financiers Operating North of Galkayo
As shown in figure 7.2, financiers operating north of Galkayo are more inclined
to invest in militias and political influence than financiers operating south of
Galkayo; 7 financiers have reportedly made such investment in the South compared
to 12 in the North. This development can be explained by two factors. The
first is that these networks experienced confrontation from local communities, as
evidenced in the port city of Eyl, whose residents chased pirates out of the city.14
Therefore, pirate financiers with their own militia have more influence over communities
that might attempt to reject them. A second explanation of increased
military activities on land is the involvement of pirate operators in kidnapping for
ransom on land. At the time of drafting this report, the most recent kidnapping
on land within Somalia had taken place in Bacadweyne, 45 kilometers north of
Galkayo, on July 11, 2011, when three Kenyan aid workers of the International
Aid Service were kidnapped.
However, kidnappings on land are not limited to pirate networks operating
north of Galkayo. In the Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011), the Monitoring Group
identifies several members of the Hobyo-Xarardheere networks allegedly
involved in kidnapping in the Somali hinterland: Ahmed Garfanje, Afweyne,
Ahmed Sanaag, Hussein Jiis, Suhuffi and Abdiqadir Mohamed Abdi. Concerns
over the expansion of pirate activities on land were already expressed at the
political level when the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, in its
Number of pirate financiers
Number of pirate financiers operating north of Galkayo
Number of pirate financiers operating south of Galkayo
0
1
2
2
4
5
5
4
6
6
6
7
7
7
12
12
13
Farming activities and/or retail and selling of food products 10
Import/export
Transport
Various smuggling
Hotel/restaurants/other real estate
Financial or accountant services for others
Khat business
Various business or factories (in Somalia or abroad)
Development of militia/political influence
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0
Figure 7.2 Number of Pirate Financiers Engaging in Activity North and South of Galkayo
Source: UNODC 2012.
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communiqué released at its twelfth plenary meeting in New York, raised “concern
over the potential expansion of criminal activities on land, in particular the
kidnapping of humanitarian workers and civilians, by networks involved in
piracy.”15
While the international community is trying to build on the momentum
boosting the political process in Mogadishu following the adoption of the Federal
Constitution and the successful election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud,
attention should be paid to these developing criminal networks on land. If these
networks, fueled by proceeds from piracy, are not targeted and their financial
capacities disrupted, they may well represent a threat to international staff entering
and working in Somalia. Furthermore, the networks investing the most in
militias are reportedly located in Puntland, where individual cases of operational
cooperation between pirate financiers and Al-Shabaab were reported to the
team.16 The subsequent risk is the increasing destabilization of Puntland by these
networks (Garowe Online 2012b; Mubarak 2011), thereby jeopardizing all the
improvements gained in the South since the beginning of 2012.
Case Study: Ciise Yulux, Piracy, Khat, and Interclan Conflicts in
Puntland
As early as 2009, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia confirmed
that “Ransoms from piracy and kidnapping [had] been used to finance arms
embargo violations” (Garowe Online 2012a; Mubarak 2011). During an interview
with Government of Puntland officials in Garowe, concern was expressed
about relations between pirates and the insurgent group Al-Shabaab.17 As mentioned
above, of the sample of 59 financiers studied for this report, 19 were said
to use their proceeds to develop militias or political influence, with 12 reportedly
operating in Puntland (North of Galkayo).
The case of Ciise Yulux18 illustrates how proceeds from piracy can represent
a threat to the stability and security of Somalia. Ciise Yulux is a member of the
Majerteen/Cali Saleebaan subclan. He has been a pirate since at least 2007. He
is originally from Rakoraaxa, near Gardo in the Bari region.19 Ciise Yulux is
known to have been involved in piracy attacks against the MV Buccaneer, the
MV Leila, the MV Eleni P, the MV Dover, and the SY ING Kalundborg,20 and
was allegedly involved in the following cases:21 MV Amiya Scan, MV Stella
Maris, MV Blue Star, MV Al-Nisr Al Saud, MV Buccaneer, MV Thor Star, MV
Golden Blessing, MV Motivator, CEC MV Future, MV Theresa Viii, MV Talca,
and EMS River. It is estimated that altogether these cases generated US$49.62
million in ransoms of which Ciise Yulux would have collected at least US$5.65
million (UNODC 2012). Reportedly, Ciise Yulux is also engaged in the khat
business in the Bari region (UNODC 2012).
Following the Buccaneer case, a fight between Ciise Yulux and one of his main
partners, Omar Hassan Osman (also known as Baqalayo), ensued. Baqalayo is
allegedly the son of a pirate called Hanano from Warsengeli/Reer Haaji, who
used to operate in Laasqoray in 2009 (UN 2010). While dividing the ransom
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proceeds received from the attack against the MV Bucaneer, the pirates began
fighting and one of Yulux’s followers was killed (Micalessin Gian 2009).
Following the fight, Baqalayo’s subclan refused to pay the blood debt to the Cali
Saleebaan subclan.22
This started an interclan fight, which reportedly prompted Baqalayo to import
weapons to Somalia, and Baqalayo and Yulux also reportedly attempted to kill
each other on several occasions.23 In November 2009, Puntland Police Forces
arrested Baqalayo. He is currently serving a 15-year sentence in the prison of
Bossaaso (UN 2010).
Clan fighting related to the Cali Saleebaan subclan in the region of Gardo
continued to spread to other subclans, to include the Ali Jibrahil subclan. On July
27, 2011, the main leaders of the Cali Saleebaan subclan met in Dubai, the
United Arab Emirates, and officially withdrew their support from the Puntland
Government (Dharoor.com 2011). On July 30, 2011, the Puntland Government
stated it was “fed up” with clan fighting and deployed 1,200 soldiers around
Ufeyn (Abdi 2011). However, despite this first intervention, the Puntland
President had to engage in another mediation effort in March 2012, with clan
leaders in Gardo—capital of the Bari region, where Ufeyn and Rakoraaxa are
located (Garowe Online 2012d)—in order to resolve the ongoing crisis.
Deteriorating security and government instability related to interclan fighting
are not the only by-products of piracy and the proceeds gained through piracy
ransom payments. Ciise Yulux reportedly commands a force of around 50 militiamen
(UNODC 2012), possesses several Technicals (pick-up cars equipped
with mounted automatic weapons), and is now operating from Caalula and Hul
Anod (UNODC 2012). This is a conservative assessment, since open sources
estimate that “Yulux runs a militia of around 70 men on land and sea. Another
50 reserves are based in Timishre. They operate about seven Toyota technical, 50
AKs, 20 PKM’s, 11 RPGs and around seven Dshka’s” (Pelton 2012). According
to credible sources,24 in the first quarter of 2012, Yulux was providing money and
equipment to fighters linked to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
Al-Shabaab, transiting to the Republic of Yemen.25
Yulux’s cooperation with Al-Shabaab must be differentiated from other
known pirate financial arrangements between pirates and the militant group.
Pirates based in the Hobyo-Xarardheere network,26 and other pirates operating
in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, are paying a “development tax” (various names
are given in the existing literature) (Mubarak 2011; UN 2011a; and interview of
the team with Minister Rage in Garowe, Puntland, April 2012) to Al-Shabaab in
order to access the port. Protection money is also paid and occasional cooperation
can occur in the form of access to equipment and/or weaponry (UNODC
2011a). However, no strategic cooperation has been observed for these networks.
27 In the case of Ciise Yulux, however, reporting indicates a direct involvement
of Yulux during Al-Shabaab operations, facilitating movements of alleged
jihad fighters.28 There is, in this respect, a clear threat of operational cooperation29
between some senior Al-Shabaab figures and financiers of piracy, when the
same person does not already conduct both activities.30
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While this last concern was made pretty clear to the team by some senior
officials in Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa, they could not be further
substantiated.
The case of Ciise Yulux shows the multiple influences that pirate monies have
over the stability and political environment of Somalia, beyond ongoing allegations
of corruption. In this case, a single pirate leader is using his criminal proceeds
to (a) invest in the khat business, (b) build up his own capacities as a
warlord, (c) fuel clan rivalries in Somalia, and (d) provide operational support to
Al-Shabaab.
Pirate Financiers Engaging in Smuggling and Trafficking
As shown in figure 7.1, at least four pirate financiers are reportedly engaging in
various smuggling activities. Of these, at least two are engaging in human trafficking
and/or migrant smuggling. One case was reported where the same PAG
hijacked a vessel after having dropped people on the Yemeni coast and while on
its way back to Somalia.31 Analyzing operational links between pirates and
migrant smugglers may require further research, since the information is scarce
beyond reports of skiffs simultaneously carrying out several crimes. For instance,
the team also interviewed a convicted pirate, in Kenya, who acknowledged that,
before engaging in piracy, he had served as liaison between Puntland and the
Republic of Yemen, smuggling migrants on his way to the Republic of Yemen and
bringing weapons to Somalia on his return. According to Chris Horwood, coordinator
of the Regional Mixed Migrations Secretariat,32 which monitors flows of
migrants between the Republic of Yemen and the Horn of Africa, proceeds generated
annually by smugglers operating from Bossaaso to the Republic of Yemen
amount to approximately US$3 million per year,33 which is what pirates received
on average for each successfully hijacked vessel and released for ransom between
2005 and 2012 (UNODC-WB 2012).34
The risks for smugglers at the foot-soldier level are lower than for pirates, since
the risk of death is lower and the duration of an operation drops from weeks or
months to 8 to 15 hours.35 In addition, each skiff from Bossaaso to the Republic
of Yemen makes approximately US$9,000, and there are fewer actors sharing the
proceeds (no militia ashore, no catering services, and so forth).36 Foot soldiers of
piracy (especially if they own their skiffs) could therefore find some interest in
turning to migrant smuggling. Indeed, while a pirate foot soldier will potentially
make between US$30,000 and US$75,000, at best, after a successful mission,
(which can take up to several months, or a year by the time the ransom is paid),
a smuggler foot soldier can hope to share proceeds of US$9,000 among a smaller
number of people (himself and his sponsor) in a single journey to the Republic
of Yemen.
As explained in the first section of chapter 5 of this report, pirates spend their
proceeds not only on khat, cars, and alcohol but also on trafficked girls and sex
workers or even sex slaves. In several interviews, the team was informed that girls
as young as 14 were being trafficked for “pirate consumption.” While it was also
How Do Pirate Financiers Invest Their Proceeds? 67
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7
reported that some women would engage of their own free will with pirates,
several cases were reported to the team of young girls being trafficked to forcibly
work as sex slaves (see detailed case studies in appendix A).
Pirate financiers spend their proceeds on a wide range of activities, both legitimate
and criminal, including on trafficked and smuggled human beings and on
buying weapons, alcohol, khat, alcohol, real estate, and companies. It is striking,
however, how sophisticated and cunning some of these investments may be.
Engaging in counterpiracy is probably the boldest of all, but most concerning is
the fact that pirate financiers have now evolved to the point where they are not
only the most successful criminals at sea but also some of the most powerful
actors on land, thanks to their weaponry and economic influence.
The following chapter provides an in-depth analysis of two sectors to which
the proceeds of piracy are reportedly flowing, and which have ties to other countries
in the region: khat and real estate.
Notes
1. See chapter 3, section on “Somali Pirate Networks.”
2. See chapter 2, Methodological Framework, UNODC dataset on pirate financiers.
3. See chapter 2, Methodological Framework, UNODC dataset on pirate financiers. By
asset is meant the number of buildings, real estate, or other businesses in a given
location.
4. See chapter 3 section on “Criminal Influence on the Economy.”
5. This breakdown of pirate financiers’ expenditures does not conflict with the breakdown
presented in the World Bank Report (2013); the present analysis focuses solely
on the investments made by pirate financiers (representing 30–50 percent of the total
amount paid in ransom), while the World Bank Report analysis focuses on the total
amount paid in ransom, therefore aggregating the figures that are broken down in the
present analysis.
6. See chapter 3 section on Current Situation in Somalia.
7. Interviews of the team with Puntland Officials in Garowe, Puntland, April 8–9, 2012.
8. Interview with the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Seychelles on Saturday August
9, 2012.
9. Interviews of the team with Puntland Officials in Garowe, Puntland, April 8–9, 2012.
10. Interview with the Kenyan Revenue Authority, May 31, 2012.
11. Interview of the team with Rear-Admiral Jean-Baptise Dupuis, then Commander of
the European Union Naval Force, Djibouti, June 3, 2012.
12. Interview of the team with Rear-Admiral Jean-Baptise Dupuis, then Commander of
the European Union Naval Force, Djibouti, June 3, 2012.
13. Interviews of the team with Puntland Officials in Garowe, Puntland, April 8–9, 2012.
14. UNODC interviews in Bossaaso, October 2011.
15. Communiqué (accessed November 18, 2012), http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.
do?action=plenarySub&seq=21.
16. Interviews of the team with Puntland officials in Garowe, Puntland, April 8–9, 2012.
68 How Do Pirate Financiers Invest Their Proceeds?
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7
17. Interviews in April 2012.
18. Also known as Isse Mohamoud Yusuf, Isse Yuluh, Isse Yulux, Esse Yuluh, Esse Yulux,
and Issa Yuhluw.
19. UNODC interviews in Puntland.
20. UNODC correspondence with a Western security source, July 2012.
21. UNODC communication with a Western security source.
22. UNODC interviews in Puntland.
23. Ibid.
24. Interviews of the team with Puntland officials in Garowe, Puntland, April 8–9, 2012.
25. Even though Ciise Yulux is mingling with Al-Shabaab, the whole Cali Saleeban subclan
should not be associated with Al-Shabaab. A declaration of Cali Saleeban elders
in the United Arab Emirates, whereby they officially withdrew their support to the
Puntland Government, did not mention anything that would point toward religious
conservatism; it actually accuses the Puntland Government of having failed to promote
gender equality, for instance. Also, despite the tensions between the Cali
Saleebaan subclan and the Government of Puntland, Minister of Finance Dr. Farah Ali
Jama, who is a member of the Cali Saleebaan, has never had to leave his functions as
minister. In addition, several officials (including the Minister of Fisheries, the Minister
of Peace-Keeping, and the Leader of the Bari region) attended a meeting of the Cali
Saleebaan in Bossaaso, in late June 2012. This meeting was held at the Panorama
Hotel in Bossaaso with about 200 participants who came for the introduction of a
newly elected Sultan in the Cali Saleeban, Sultan Maxamuud Xasan Cumar, who
assumed his functions on behalf of the seven-year-old son of the deceased Sultan Ciise
Xasan Cumar. See http://horseedmedia.net/2012/06/15/suldaanka-beesha-biciidyahan-
cali-saleebaan-oo-boosaaso-lagu-caleema-saaray-sawiro/ (accessed July 24, 2012,
and November 7, 2012).
26. As defined by the June 2011 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010) to the United Nations Security
Council
27. In that sense, the team shares the assessment made by the UNSEMG in their June
2011 report.
28. Interviews of the team with Puntland officials in Garowe, Puntland, April 8–9, 2012
29. See also Do et al. (2013).
30. Interviews of the team with Puntland officials in Garowe, Puntland, April 8–9, 2012,
confirmed by other confidential sources.
31. Communication with a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution Intelligence Coordination
Centre (RAPPICC) analyst on March 11, 2013. (The group seemed to have taken
migrants across the Gulf of Aden in a whaler-type vessel that was towing a second
empty skiff. They dropped the migrants off near the Yemeni coast then returned to
the Puntland coast. They encountered the PRAMONI in the International
Recommended Transit Corridor and made an opportunistic and successful attack. The
PRAMONI was hijacked on January 1, 2010, in position 12 31N 047 17E and was
released on February 26, 2010. For the majority of its period of captivity it was held
at Eyl.)
32. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat is funded by the European Commission
with additional support from the Swiss Development Cooperation, the International
Organisation for Migration, and the British government.
How Do Pirate Financiers Invest Their Proceeds? 69
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7
33. The business taking irregular migrants to the Republic of Yemen was worth at least
US$16 million in 2011 and 2012—US$3 million from Bossaaso and US$13 million
from Djibouti (UNODC Communication with Chris Horwood, January 16, 2013).
34. The exact average is US$ 3.06 million.
35. Communication with Chris Horwood, January 16, 2013.
36. Communication with Chris Horwood, January 16, 2013.
Annex 88
“Global Maritime Crime Programme: Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea”, UN
Office on Drugs and Crime, available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/piracy/
horn-of-africa.html (last accessed: 21 December 2020)
Unied
Naion O D C
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Annex 88
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Annex 88
HOME | CONTACTS | FRAD ALERT | LEGAL NOTICE
Annex 88
Annex 8
“Transnational organised crime in eastern Africa: a threat assessment”, UN Office
on Drugs and Crime, September 2013 (Extracts)
TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME
IN EASTERN AFRICA:
A Threat Assessment
September 2013
Transnational Organized Crime in
Eastern Africa:
A Threat Assessment
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna
Copyright © 2013, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for
educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the copyright
holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UNODC
would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication
as a source.
Acknowledgements
This study was conducted under the responsibility of the UNODC Regional
Office for Eastern Africa (ROEA), Division for Operations (DO), with research
support of the UNODC Studies and Threat Analysis Section (STAS), Division
for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA).
Research
UNODC Nairobi: Joanna Wright (Consultant)
UNODC Headquarters: Louise Bosetti, Jenna Dawson-Faber, Ted Leggett,
Thomas Pietschmann
Graphic design, mapping support, and desktop publishing
Anja Korenblik, Suzanne Kunnen, Kristina Kuttnig, Deniz Mermerci
Supervision
Aldo Lale-Demoz (Director, DO)
Loide Lungameni (Representative, ROEA),
Thibault Le Pichon (Chief, STAS)
The preparation of this report would not have been possible without the data
and information reported by governments to UNODC and other international
organizations. UNODC is particularly thankful to government and law
enforcement officials met in the region while undertaking research.
The study benefited from the valuable input of many UNODC staff members
– at headquarters and field offices – who reviewed various sections of this
report. The research team also gratefully acknowledges the information, advice
and comments provided by a large range of officials and experts.
The preparation of the report benefited from the financial contribution of the
Government of Sweden as part of their support to the UNODC's Regional
Programme on Promoting the Rule of Law and Human Security in Eastern
Africa.
DISCLAIMERS
This report has not been formally edited.
The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies
of UNODC, Member States, or contributory organizations, and neither do
they imply any endorsement.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication
do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of
UNODC or the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status
of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Cover pictures © UN Photolibrary, Maersk Line/cc-by-sa-2.0
Website: www.unodc.org
iii
Contents
Key Findings 1
Executive summary 3
Introduction 7
Smuggling of Migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia to Yemen and Saudi Arabia 11
Heroin trafficking from South-West Asia to Eastern Africa 19
Trafficking of Ivory from Eastern Africa to Asia 27
Piracy off the coast of Somalia 35
Implications for interventions 45
1
Transnational organized crime in Eastern Africa is a
product of both illicit markets that span continents and
an underlying weakness in the rule of law.
Due to conflict and poverty, Eastern Africa produces
a large and vulnerable stream of smuggled migrants,
who are abused and exploited at multiple stages of their
journey.
More than 100,000 people paid smugglers to transport
them across the Gulf of Aden or Red Sea to Yemen in
2012, generating an income for the boatmen of over
US$1 million.
Around 80,000 of these migrants attempted to cross
Yemen to Saudi Arabia, but many of these were waylaid
by smugglers and subjected to a range of abuses, including
confinement, beatings, extortion and rape.
Despite the large numbers, the flow of migrants is concentrated,
with most embarking from two port areas
(Obock, Djibouti and Boosaaso, Somalia) where interventions
could be addressed.
Heroin has been trafficked to and through Eastern Africa
since at least the 1980s, but a series of recent large
seizures suggests that this flow has increased.
Some air couriering has been noted, but it appears the
great bulk of the heroin is being transported by dhow
from the Makran Coast, an area that spans Iran and
Pakistan.
The local market is estimated to consume at least 2.5
tons of pure heroin per year, worth some US$160 million
in local markets. The volumes trafficked to the
region appear to be much larger, as much as 22 tons,
suggesting substantial transhipment. Eastern Africa is a
known transit area for heroin destined for South Africa
and West Africa.
Given the prevalence of blood borne disease and known
injection drug use, the spread of heroin throughout the
region must be carefully monitored and addressed.
Recent research indicates that the rate of poaching in
Eastern Africa has increased, rising to levels that could
threaten the local elephant population.
The bulk of the large ivory shipments from Africa to
Asia appears to pass through the container ports of Kenya
and the United Republic of Tanzania, where interventions
could be addressed.
It is estimated that between 5,600 and 15,400 elephants
are poached in Eastern Africa annually, producing between
56 and 154 metric tons of illicit ivory, of which
two-thirds (37 tons) is destined for Asia, worth around
US$30 million in 2011.
Somali pirates brought in an estimated US$150 million
in 2011, which is equivalent to almost 15% of Somalia’s
GDP.
Effective intervention has forced pirates to range ever
further from the coast to attain their targets: in 2005,
the average successful pirate attack was 109 km from the
Somali coast; in 2012, it was 746 km. Ships have also
become more effective at defending themselves.
The increase in risk associated with protracted expeditions
and international countermeasures have contributed
to a decline in piracy: in April of 2009 alone, pirates
hijacked 16 ships, but after April 2011, they averaged
less than one per month. There were no successful hijackings
for ransom in the Somali area of operations in
the first half of 2013.
Key Findings
3
Executive Summary
Given the size and diversity of the region of Eastern Africa,
any discussion of crime problems is necessarily selective.
This report focuses on four major issues:
migrant smuggling from Ethiopia and Somalia to
Yemen and Saudi Arabia;
heroin trafficking from South-West Asia to
Eastern Africa;
ivory trafficking through Eastern Africa to Asia;
Somali maritime piracy.
These four are very different sorts of activities, but all have
emerged in the region due to a common vulnerability. Most
of the population of Eastern Africa is poor, and their governments
have limited capacity to deter cross-border criminality.
Poverty and weak governance also increase the
potential for corruption, rendering Eastern Africa a relatively
attractive region to traffic from, though, and to. Until
the rule of law is firmly established in the region, these
crimes and others like them are likely to continue.
Migrant smuggling
Irregular migrants are vulnerable to abuse wherever they are
found, but those from Eastern Africa appear to be especially
so. Driven by poverty and political instability, they seek a
better life in countries where international protection or
work can be found, and pay smugglers to help them achieve
that objective. Migrant smuggling is illegal, and so is conducted
clandestinely. This combination of factors – poverty,
secrecy, displacement – leaves the smuggled migrants subject
to many forms of predation, including robbery, rape,
extortion, and human trafficking.
People migrate from Eastern Africa to many parts of the
world, but one of the closest destinations is actually one of
the most hazardous to approach: the Arabian Peninsula.
Separated from the Horn of Africa by a relatively narrow
strip of water, it is the clear choice for those without the
resources to travel further. Since few migrants can cross the
water on their own, almost all pay smugglers to move
between continents. There are at least two major flows of
migrants from Eastern Africa to the Arabian Peninsula:
from Somalia and Ethiopia.
Most Somalis only travel as far as the coast of Yemen, where
they can seek asylum, and some 10,000 to 30,000 people
join more than 200,000 of their countrymen by making
this journey every year. More recently, a rapidly growing
number of migrants, mostly from Ethiopia, has emerged,
rising to almost 85,000 people in 2012. Mostly unskilled
laborers and domestic workers seeking employment, many
of these people attempt to travel across Yemen, often with
very few resources. Yemen, a poor country that has experienced
instability and fragmentation in recent years, does
not have the capacity to protect these migrants. Criminals
can prey on this flow with impunity, taking the little that
they have and extorting ransoms from their relations for
their release.
The smuggled migrants are exposed to abuse at all stages of
their journey, but especially during the maritime passage
and increasingly during their time in Yemen. There are two
primary embarkation points for the sea journey: Boosaaso,
in Puntland (Somalia), on the coast of the Gulf of Aden;
and Obock, in Djibouti, south of the Bab al Mandab.
Migrants embarking from both of these points have
described suffering violence at the hands of their smugglers,
including sexual assault, robbery, beatings, and being
thrown overboard before reaching shore.
On arrival in Yemen, most of the Somalis report to the
refugee camps, but for those migrants who continue, the
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
4
abuses increase. They are met by other smugglers, many of
who have relationships with the boatmen, who insist on
“helping” them continue with their journey. The true intent
of many of these smugglers is to extort ransoms from relations.
Migrants are beaten and raped until the ransom is
paid. A very similar situation is seen among Eritrean
migrants crossing the Sudan.
Since the migrants and their relations are poor, the total
amount taken from each by smugglers is small, but their
numbers (over 100,000 in 2012) make up for this, especially
as the number of boatmen and extortionists appears
to be limited. The boatmen alone made an estimated
US$1 million in 2012.
Heroin
Heroin has been present in Eastern Africa for at least three
decades, and dealers from Eastern Africa have been associated
with the heroin trade in South Africa since the mid-
1990s. It has long been suspected that Eastern Africa served
as a transit area, and air couriers have been detected on
many occasions. Until recently, however, very little heroin
had ever been seized in the region.
In 2010, that began to change. A series of larger seizures
were made indicating that large volumes of Afghan heroin
were entering the region by sea from Iran and Pakistan.
Between 2010 and 2012, more heroin was seized than in
the previous 20 years. In the first five months of 2013,
more heroin had been seized than in the previous two years.
It was not that the number of seizures were increasing, but
those that were being made were far larger than ever before.
The major seizures in 2013 were all made at sea by international
forces, so it remains unclear whether this increase in
seizures is indicative of an increase in flow or an increase in
the detection rate. Data on the state of local demand is
poor. Eastern Africa is a known transit area for heroin destined
for South Africa, but there have been no indications
of sudden increase in demand in this well-monitored
market. South Africa is a known transit country for drugs
destined for Europe, however. Eastern Africa has also been
noted as a transit area for heroin destined for West Africa,
where there are anecdotal indications of an increase in
demand. West Africa is also a transit area for Europe.
It appears that the primary method of trafficking is dhows,
the modern version of the traditional sailing craft. They
depart from the Makran Coast, a strip of desert coastline
that crosses from Pakistan to Iran along the coast of the
Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Air couriering also
takes place, apparently coordinated by Tanzanian traffickers,
many of who have spent time in South West Asia.
Locations of large heroin seizures, 2010-2013
Data on the extent of heroin use in the region are scarce
and contradictory, but those that do exist suggest a market
for 2.5 tons of pure heroin per year, worth some US$160
million. The volumes trafficked to the region appear to be
much larger, as much as 22 tons, suggesting considerable
transhipment.
Ivory
Demand for ivory in Asia has fuelled a rising rate of poaching
in Eastern Africa, undermining the sustainability of the
Tanga
Lindi
Mombasa
Dar es Salaam
0 50 100 km
Heroin seizures (kg)
2010
2012
2011
2013
Zanzibar
TANZANIA
KENYA
50
95
67
102
179
211
194
317
500
Number of smuggled migrants arriving in
Yemen by nationality
17,785
33,019
32,988
18,855
27,350
23,086
14,151
44,814
84,446
75,804
34,527
17,072
11,747
11,575
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Migrants arriving in Yemen
Somali Non-Somali
Source: UNHCR
5
Executive Summary
local elephant population. In addition, most of the illicit
ivory trafficked from Africa passes through the ports of
Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania. Both as source
and transit areas, then, these two countries are key.
Global breakdown of ivory seized in very
large seizures (>800 kg) by country or region
of export, 2009-2011
Source: Elephant Trade Information System
While much of the poaching encountered in Eastern Africa
in the past may have been opportunistic, it appears that a
growing share is the work of dedicated poaching expeditions.
Some of these expeditions cross borders and involve
non-state armed groups, particularly Somali gangs. Expatriate
Chinese resident in Eastern Africa comprise some of the
most important middlemen. Although they have taken
measures to address the illicit trade, Thailand and China
remain two of the most important destinations.
Very large shipments, involving the ivory of tens or even
hundreds of elephants, are regularly encountered, suggesting
a well-developed and well-resourced distribution
network. But small quantities are also encountered, demonstrating
a parallel “ant” trade. Due to the bulk of the product,
most major seizures are made from shipping containers,
while individual tusks are sometimes chopped into suitcasesized
chunks and processed ivory may be carried on commercial
air flights.
It is estimated that between 5,600 and 15,400 elephants are
poached in Eastern Africa annually, producing between 56
and 154 metric tons of illicit ivory. Based on the known
destination of ivory seized, about two-thirds of the global
ivory market is located in Asia. Two-thirds of 56 tons is 37
tons. At US$850 per kilogram at destination, this flow
would be worth around US$30 million in 2011.
Piracy
Due to its strategic position along the Gulf of Aden (over
42,000 vessels transit the area each year), piracy has a long
history in Somalia, but the current wave of successful
hijackings began only in 2005. Somali pirates brought in
an estimated US$150 million in 2011, which is equivalent
to almost 15% of Somalia’s GDP. Aside from aid and remittances,
piracy quickly became the largest source of foreign
exchange in the country.
But international action to protect this vital maritime channel
has been strong, and piracy has become more difficult,
with pirates roaming hundreds of miles from the Somali
shore to find their prey. In 2005, the average successful
pirate attack was 109 km from the Somali coast; in 2012,
it was 746 km. The increase in risk associated with these
protracted expeditions and international countermeasures
has contributed to a decline in the popularity of piracy. In
April of 2009 alone, pirates hijacked 16 ships, but after
April 2011, they averaged less than one per month. There
were no successful hijackings for ransom in the Somali area
of operations in the first half of 2013, although several vessels
remained in pirate hands from previous attacks.
Number of successful Somali hijackings
attributed to Somali pirates
14
5
13
42
50
31
15
48
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Number of successful hijackings Source: UNODC-WB database
In addition, the ransom negotiation process has become
increasingly protracted as pirates demanded larger and
larger ransoms. By January 2011, the Somali pirates were
holding some 28 vessels and nearly 600 crewmembers. This
has increased costs for the pirates, who are responsible for
maintaining the hostages. And in 2012, for the first time,
pirates began to see a downturn in their average ransom per
vessel.
The core pirates were estimated to number between 1,500
and 3,000 at the beginning of 2012. They are usually adult
men, often former fishermen or soldiers, and their operations
vary greatly in sophistication. Hostages have described
some pirates who board as being very familiar with the
particulars of the ship, suggesting the vessel was chosen in
advance. But naval observers have also described pirate vessels
“fishing” for targets in the busiest shipping lanes. Pirates
have even tried to attack naval patrol ships, clearly indicating
a lack of advance planning.
Uganda
3%
Southern
Africa
10%
West Africa
4%
Central Africa
2% Kenya
27%
Tanzania
37%
Unknown
17%
Number of successful hijackings
6
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
Despite the recent reduction in activity, piracy remains one
of the most profitable activities in a country where legal
alternatives may be hard to find. Based purely on attacks
where the ransom payment was known, pirates earned at
least US$36 million in 2012. If ransom values were inferred
in cases where they were not known, the figure would be as
high as US$40 million. Preventing piracy from returning to
former levels will require constant vigilance offshore and
the promotion of sustainable development onshore.
Implications
Eastern Africa’s transnational organized crime problems are
driven by two distinct dynamics: illicit markets and weakness
in the rule of law. Each of these dynamics must be
addressed.
The illicit markets that affect Eastern Africa often originate
or terminate on other continents. As a result, purely local
interventions are inadequate to resolve the underlying
problem. Optimally, these markets should be evaluated and
strategically addressed at a global level, but to protect Eastern
Africa, local law enforcement must also be strengthened.
For example, it appears that most of the heroin entering
Eastern Africa is on its way to somewhere else. Indeed,
Eastern Africa’s heroin problem is likely rooted in its use as
a transit area. To stop the heroin flow, the most potent
interventions could be found in countries hosting the
supply or in those hosting the demand. But to protect Eastern
Africa, it must be made less attractive as a transit area.
To do this, the rule of law in the region must be strengthened.
This is no small task, and is inextricably bound to the
long-term objective of developing the region. Fortunately,
it is not necessary to improve governance across the board
to have substantial impact on trafficking. Interventions in
key areas, such as support to front line law enforcement, or
container and border control, could greatly reduce Eastern
Africa’s attraction to smugglers. Anti-corruption measures
are also essential to creating a genuine deterrent.
Average number of days between successful
Somali hijackings and payment of a ransom,
by year of release
38
103
80 72
103
152
177
265
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: UNODC-WB database
Annual per vessel average of ransom
payments made to Somali pirates
0.4
0.1
1.2 1.4
2.2
3.7
5
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
US$ millions
Source: UNODC-WB database
Number of days
7
Introduction
This report focuses on transnational organized crime affecting
the area covered by the UNODC Regional Office for
Eastern Africa (ROEA):
Burundi,
the Comoros,
Djibouti,
Eritrea,
Ethiopia,
Kenya,
Madagascar,
Mauritius,
Rwanda,
the Seychelles,
the Republic of Somalia,
the United Republic of Tanzania, and
Uganda.
This region contains countries of several distinct subregions,
including the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Djibouti); the Great Lakes region (Rwanda,
Burundi, and Uganda); the Swahili Coast (Kenya and the
United Republic of Tanzania); and the Indian Ocean
Islands (Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, and Mauritius).
These sub-regions are commonly associated due to underlying
historical, cultural, or geographic similarities between
the countries they contain.
For example, the countries of the Horn of Africa have faced
disruption due to persistent conflict and periodic drought.
Most of its people speak Cushitic or Semitic languages, and
cross-border ethnic groups are common. The Somali, for
example, comprise the majority of the population in Djibouti
and a significant minority in Ethiopia; the Afar are
found in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti; and the Tigray in
Eritrea and Ethiopia. Similar commonalities are found in
the other sub-regions.
In general, the countries of the Horn of Africa are the poorest,
followed by those in the Great Lakes, the Swahili Coast,
and the Indian Ocean Islands (with the exception of Madagascar,
which remains poor). Most countries in the region
are experiencing positive economic growth, but most are
growing off a very low base. Economic gains may not be
distributed evenly through the population, with rural areas
being particularly under-developed and vulnerable to
shocks, especially those related to agricultural production
or global commodities markets. In most countries, the
majority of the population lives in these rural areas.
Such a large and heterogeneous area encompasses a very
large number of crime problems, and so this study was
necessarily selective in the issues it could highlight. It is not
intended to be comprehensive, but rather to focus on some
of the largest and best-documented transnational crime
problems. While crimes such as cattle rustling may be most
relevant to the rural people who comprise the majority of
the population, this report focuses on issues that are inherently
transnational in nature. Cross-border smuggling of
common goods to avoid taxation (foodstuffs, tobacco,
alcohol, khat, petrol, and other consumables), which
appears to be widespread, is also not covered in this report.
For the purposes of brevity and clarity, flows unique to
particular countries are not explored in this report. Transnational
flows affecting some of these countries (Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi) were discussed in a 2011 assessment of
transnational organized crime in Central Africa,1 which
1 UNODC, Organized Crime and Instability in Central Africa: A Threat Assessment,
October 2011.
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
8
focused on the Great Lakes region. This work is not repeated
in the present report.
Instead, this report looks particularly at some of the illicit
markets concentrated along the coasts. Most of the countries
of Eastern Africa are poor and the coast, with its major
container ports and numerous harbours, provides opportunities
to interact with wealthier markets abroad, as a source
and as a transit region. This interaction can lead to the
development of domestic illicit markets.
Four of the largest markets are examined in detail, with
reference made to a half-dozen more. These four markets
pose different sorts of threats, but all are transnational, and
sufficiently large to have a regional impact. Criminals based
in Eastern Africa profit from the transnational movement
of:
migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia to Yemen and
Saudi Arabia
heroin from South-West Asia to Eastern Africa
ivory from Eastern Africa and across the continent
to Asia
hostages and hijacked vessels from national and international
waters to the coast of Somalia (maritime piracy)
These flows do not represent all the transnational organized
crime problems affecting the region. Migrants are also
smuggled, for example, from the region to Southern Africa.
The impact of fraudulent medicines is also a serious issue
and firearms trafficking occurs in the area. But these four
were deemed to be the most significant flows in terms of
volumes and impact on which reliable information is available.
Other issues are often discussed in boxes in the main
flow chapters.
All four of these markets involve maritime transport. As a
result, ports, both major and minor, are key to the illicit
flows, as are the owners and operators of the maritime craft
involved. Many markets operate with the collusion of corrupt
officials, who ensure that the law is not enforced.
These corrupt officials are key to understanding the vulnerability
of Eastern Africa to organized crime. In a world
where containerized shipment has rendered the most
roundabout shipping routes commercially viable, traffickers
are attracted to ports where controls are weak or where
officials can be bribed. For many of the world’s major illicit
flows, Eastern Africa is thankfully remote. But, as the 2006
seizure of close to a ton of cocaine in Kenya demonstrates,
this may make little difference to traffickers attracted more
by a low risk of interception than logistic efficiency.
Transnational organized crime takes place in a context of
domestic organized crime and related violent crime, including
offences such as murder, extortion, and robbery. These
offences demand immediate response and sap the resources
of national law enforcement agencies. As a result, illicit
flows that mostly transit the region may be given secondary
priority.
Measuring the extent of domestic organized crime is difficult.
Recorded crime data tends to be unreliable, since the
worst affected people are often those least likely to report
their victimization to the police, and the police are least
likely to collect these data where they are thinnest on the
ground. Given the lack of resources in most countries in
Eastern Africa, this problem is especially acute in the region.
In addition, recorded crime data are only an indirect indicator
of organized crime, since most trafficking is only
detected when countries invest resources in detecting it.
Even murder figures, generally regarded as the most accurate
due to the fact that a high share are captured in the
official records, are often dubious in the region. For example,
making use of the public health data, Somalia emerges
as the country with the lowest murder rate in Eastern
Africa. That said, these data indicate serious murder rates
in several of the most populous countries in the region. If
calculated on a population-weighted basis, Eastern Africa’s
violence levels are second only to Southern Africa’s on the
continent.
In Eastern Africa, as in many parts of the world, the line
between criminal and political violence can be thin. Of
particular concern is the involvement of non-state armed
groups in local illicit markets, or even transnational trafficking.
The admixture of ideological and acquisitive motivations
can produce particularly intractable criminal
groups, who profit (or, at least, make a living) off continued
conflict. There are a number of examples in Eastern Africa.
In addition, the relative attraction of Eastern Africa as a
transit area is a product of corruption. The countries of
Eastern Africa are well aware of this challenge, which is
both a product of and a contributor to the lack of public
sector capacity, particularly law enforcement capacity.
Thus, the trafficking flows examined are symptomatic of
deeper governance issues. Addressing these flows requires
two distinct sets of interventions.
Figure 1: GDP per capita adjusted for
purchasing power parity in 2011
11,711
8,755
808
532
487
583
482
357
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Seychelles
Mauritius
Kenya
Tanzania
Uganda
Rwanda
Eritrea
Ethiopia
US$
Source: World Bank
Introduction
9
On the one hand, international efforts are required to
reduce the international illicit flows. Understanding the
optimal point of insertion for these efforts requires an
understanding of the entire trafficking chain. While the
countries of Eastern Africa must play their role, it may be
that the key intervention required to reduce trafficking of a
commodity in the region lies in other parts of the world. To
protect a vulnerable region, the international community
should do what it can to insulate Eastern Africa from these
trans-regional flows.
At the same time, governance must be strengthened within
the region, reducing its vulnerability to both international
and domestic organized crime. Even if the present flows
were addressed through international efforts, it is likely that
new ones would emerge, as they have in West Africa, until
this underlying weakness is reduced.
Figure 2: Share of the population residing in urban areas in 2010
77
53
42
37
32 31 28 26 24 21 19 17 15
11
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Djibouti
Seychelles
Mauritius
Somalia
Madagascar
Mozambique
Comoros
Tanzania
Kenya
Eritrea
Rwanda
Ethiopia
Uganda
Burundi
Percent urban
Source: UN Population Division
Figure 3: Murders per 100,000 in 2008, based on public health sources
36
25 25
22
20
18 17
12
8
4 3 2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Uganda
Ethiopia
UR Tanzania
Burundi
Kenya
Eritrea
Rwanda
Comoros
Madagascar
Mauritius
Djibouti
Somalia
Murders per 100,000
Source: WHO
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
10
2 S/PRST/2012/28, Statement by the President of the Security Council.
3 http://www.councilofnations.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti
cle&id=221%3Akenyan-poaching-crisis&catid=45%3A2012&Itemid=140
4 S/2012/544, 2012 Report on Somalia of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring
Group, para. 36, 37.
5 S/2012/544, 2012 Report on Somalia of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring
Group, para. 30.
6 See, for example, the authorization to investigate issued by the International
Criminal Court (ICC-01/09-19): http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc854287.pdf
Non-state armed groups
Many non-state armed groups are born of local rebellions, and so are intensely focused on local affairs. They raise
funds by taxing all economic activity, licit and illicit, in the areas they control. These areas are effectively outside the
control of the state, and so are attractive to transnational traffickers who wish to avoid contact with law enforcement
authorities. But the relationship between the armed groups and the trafficking tends to be limited to taxation.
Eastern Africa contains several groups that challenge this model, however. The Lord’s Resistance Army, for example,
originated as a regional and ethnic uprising. It has abandoned its nation of origin (Uganda), and, in the process,
seems to have abandoned the notion of territorial control altogether, spreading through vulnerable rural areas across
four nations. Although it traditionally funds itself through looting, it has recently been accused of involvement in
the ivory trade.2 Since its modus vivendi is based on nomadism, its ability to maintain long-term involvement in any
given illicit market is questionable.
Al Shabaab has engaged in international political violence, including the bombing of nightclubs in Uganda in 2010,
and affiliated itself to Al Qaeda in 2012. After seizing control of the southern port town of Kismaayo, the group
began to tax the charcoal trade to the Arabian peninsula, until it lost control of the city due to Kenyan military action
in October 2012. Members of Al Shabaab have been linked to ivory poaching in Kenya,3 and to a Tanzanian Islamist
group reportedly linked to heroin trafficking.4 They have also allegedly taxed pirates working from the ports they
control, which is worrisome given the group’s recent movement into Puntland.5
The Mungiki cult is a different type of group altogether. Banned as an organized crime group in 2010, Mungiki was
framed as a Kikuyu self-defense and cultural movement, but it became involved as a political tool in the violence
surrounding the 2007 Kenyan national elections.6 There is little evidence of its involvement in transnational activities,
but it acted like a street gang in the areas it controlled, demanding protection money from local businesses and
transportation services.
35
Piracy off the coast of Somalia
Somalia has been in a state of perpetual conflict since the
ouster of dictator Siad Barre in 1991. In addition to twentytwo
years of conflict, Somalia has experienced five major
droughts since 2000,111 catastrophes for a country where
the majority of the population is reliant on livestock herding
and agriculture. Combined, conflict and drought gave
Somalia the lowest GDP per capita in the world in 2011.112
In contrast, it is estimated that pirates brought in some
US$150 million in 2011,113 which would be equivalent to
almost 15% of Somalia’s GDP.114 Aside from aid and
remittances,115 piracy has become the largest source of foreign
exchange in the country.
Due to its strategic position along the Gulf of Aden, piracy
has a long history in Somalia, but the current wave of successful
hijackings began only in 2005. Today, some 42,500
vessels transit the high-risk area each year.116 While it may
seem inevitable that some in this heavily armed and fragmented
country would take advantage of its location along
111 EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.
be - Université catholique de Louvain - Brussels – Belgium.
112 Nominal GDP, as per United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts
Main Aggregates Database. See: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasic-
Fast.asp
113 UNODC-WB database.
114 At current prices, Somalia’s GDP in 2011 was just over US$1 billion.
(Source: United Nations Statistics Division).
115 Somalia received just under US$500 million in international assistance in
2010. See: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/somalia
UNDP has estimated remittances to Somalia at US$2.3 billion. See: http://
www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Arab%20States/
HDR-Somalia-2012-E.pdf
116 Numbers provided by the International Maritime Bureau. The industry, in
its Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy,
defines the "high-risk area" as “an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of
Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78 °E” that covers much of the Indian
Ocean.
one of the most heavily trafficked waterways in the world,
the local discourse on piracy frames it as an essentially
defensive measure.
According to the local narrative, the practice started after a
tsunami washed toxic waste containers onto local beaches
in 2005, confirming rumours that other countries had been
using Somalia’s un-policed waters as a dumping ground.117
In addition, Somali fishermen had been encountering
unauthorized trawlers in their traditional seas since the
mid-1990s.118 Since the fragmented central state had little
capacity to guard Somalia’s 3300 kilometres of coast, the
fishermen decided to take matters into their own hands,
seizing foreign ships and demanding compensation (“fines”)
for their return. In some instances, local authorities
endorsed or supported these actions, forging links between
the pirates and local government.119 It appears that some
militiamen were trained by local authorities and private
security companies to act as “coast guards”, a term still
associated with some pirate groups.120
Whatever the truth of this narrative, it is deeply etched in
the Somali consciousness, and has allowed piracy to be
portrayed as a kind of redistributive activity. The pirates
cannot operate without considerable public support,
117 UN Security Council, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General
on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 25 January 2011,
S/2011/30. The question of whether this dumping took place or affected
piracy was later questioned in S/2011/661. Nonetheless, the connection
remains robust in local discourse.
118 A university study estimated that half the 2002 catch off Somalia was taken
by foreign-flagged vessels. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization said
in 2005 that around 700 trawlers with foreign flags were involved. See: UN
Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of Somali
natural resources and waters, 25 October 2011, S/2011/661, available at:
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/661.
119 UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1630 (2005), 4 May 2006, S/2006/229, para. 80.
120 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
36
because they are reliant on supplies from the mainland
during the long ransom negotiation process. But the justification
wears thin when ships are attacked thousands of
miles from the Somali coast, or when the victims are pensioners
sailing pleasure craft near the Seychelles. Only a
small fraction of the vessels held for ransom today are fishing
vessels, and there is evidence that pirate groups are
“licensing” foreign vessels to transit or fish in Somali
waters.121 Declining public support may be one reason why
piracy attacks have fallen dramatically since April 2011.
Another factor leading to the decline is increased risk for
pirates. The promulgation of “Best Management Practices”
for responding to piracy has surely played a role in vessels
escaping pirate attacks.122 The high value ships have moved
away from the coast, forcing pirates to travel much further
before finding their targets.123 In 2005, the average successful
pirate attack was 109 km from the Somali coast; in
2012, it was 746 km.124 Combined with the increased
defensive capacities of vessels and the rise of private armed
security onboard,125 the extended range has meant that a
growing number of pirates are lost at sea.126 Interviews with
121 UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
submitted in accordance with Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), 18 July
2011, S/2011/433, para.118.
122 Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia based Piracy,
version 4, August 2011, available at: http://www.mschoa.org/docs/publicdocuments/
bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf
123 In February 2009, a corridor between Somalia and Yemen within international
waters -the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)- was
established to ensure the safety of vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden.
124 Calculations based on UNODC-WB database.
125 This increase in the use of private onboard security forces can be traced back
to 2011, when a series of guidance and recommendations were provided by
different organizations (e.g. the International Maritime Organization, several
shipping industry associations and insurance companies, the US Department
of State) on the use of Private Armed Security Personnel (PCASP).
126 Although estimating the number of pirates lost is a highly speculative
venture, various sources have placed the number at around 300 in 2010 (see
former pirates have indicated that this risk provides a strong
deterrent.127
Ransom negotiations have also become more protracted,
requiring investors to support the pirates and their hostages
for many months before seeing a return, if indeed they see
any at all. For example, the MV Iceberg was hijacked on 29
March 2010 and liberated by the Puntland authorities on
23 December 2012 – in this case, it seems that pirates
invested nearly two years in a vessel that never paid off. In
2005, hostages were held for 38 days on average, but by
2010, it increased to 152 days.128 This growing cost was
formerly offset by the continual growth in ransom payments,
but in 2012, the average ransom actually declined
by 20%.129 As the proceeds of piracy have driven up the
cost of everything in the communities where the pirates
reside, extended negotiations have seriously undercut the
return on investment.130 Since investors get paid first, and
S/2011/30). If the total pool is 1500-3000 pirates, this represents a 10% to
20% attrition rate, which would most likely provide a significant deterrent.
127 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
128 UNODC-WB database. Pirates have claimed that the cost of maintaining
hostage crews runs into the tens of thousands of dollars per day (See: Do,
Quy-Toan, Jean-Baptiste Blanc, Aurélien Kruse, Trung Dang Le, Andrei A.
Levchenko, Lin Ma, Farley Mesko, Michaela McRee, Claudia Ruiz Ortega,
and Anja Shortland, The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a
Nation, World Bank, Washington, DC., 2013). Two hundred hostages (199
men and one woman) from pirated vessels were being held in Somalia in
December 2011. From December 2008 to December 2011, 2317 “merchant
seamen” have been held hostage. See: EUNAVFOR, “Merchant ship crews
held hostage in Somalia”, 20 December 2011, available at: http://eunavfor.
eu/merchant-ship-crews-held-hostage-in-somalia/
The majority of hostages are from countries in Asia, and persons from 47
countries were held hostage in 2011. See: International Maritime Bureau and
Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy in, 22 June2012, p. 7.
129 UNODC-WB database.
130 Stuart Yikona, Clément Gorrissen, George Kisaka, Kevin Stephenson, David
Lamair and Francisca Fernando, Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial
Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa, UNODC, WB, and INTERPOL,
2013.
Figure 19: Number of successful hijackings
attributed to Somali pirates
Source: UNODC-WB database
Figure 20: Average number of days between
successful Somali hijackings and
payment of a ransom, by year of
release
Source: UNODC-WB database
38
103
80 72
103
152
177
265
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Number of days
14
5
13
42
50
31
15
48
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Number of Number of ssuucccceesssfsuflu hl ihjaicjakicnkgisngs
Piracy off the coast of Somalia
37
pirate expenses during negotiation are deducted from their
share, some pirates may wind up barely breaking even.131
A final factor in the recent decline of piracy is the increased
aggressiveness of international enforcement. In the past, the
international community was dependent on the national
and local authorities to take action against the pirates.
Despite all the capacity challenges they face, the local
authorities appear to have been remarkably effective in
deterring piracy in large swathes of the country. Since most
of the recent attacks have been concentrated around the
southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, one might assume
that the pirates would encamp in Somaliland or northern
Puntland. In fact, most of the hijacked ships have been
anchored some 1000 km away, in remote coastal areas of
southern Puntland and Galguduud. While the reasons
remain obscure, it appears that Somali pirates would rather
travel an additional 2000 km round-trip than face the
authorities in the north of the country.
Even if fully dedicated to the task, the local authorities lack
resources: according to the African Development Bank,
annual revenues of the Puntland region for all purposes in
2009 were estimated at US$16 million, a fraction of the
estimated US$57.16 million to US$84.42 million garnered
in ransom payments that year.132 Recent operations by
international forces, such as the European Union Naval
Force (EUNAVFOR), on Somali soil may be having an
impact, although the decline of piracy appears to have
begun about one year before the first of these operations.
In March 2012, the mandate of the European Union Naval
Force operation (“Atalanta”) was extended “to include
Somali coastal territory and internal waters”.133 An air
attack against pirate suppliers in a coastal area was carried
out by the European forces (EUNAVFOR) almost immediately
afterwards.134 However, it can be difficult to distinguish
pirates from fishermen from the air, and there are
concerns that misdirected attacks could increase the sense
of international persecution that lies at the root of piracy.
But combined with other factors, the threat of direct retributive
action by international forces may be providing an
additional deterrent.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, piracy has lost much of its
attraction. A rising number of would-be pirates never make
a profit or never return.135 As international attention has
intensified, it has become more difficult for the pirates to
operate openly. Unless the character of piracy changes (by,
for example, taking on a political dimension) or international
attention wanes, this trend is likely to continue.
While maritime hijackings for ransom are on the rise in
other parts of the world, there is hope they will fade in
Eastern Africa.
131 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
132 UNODC-WB database.
133 Statement from EUNAVFOR on Friday 23 March 2012, following a decision
by the Council of the European Union (Council Decision 2012/174/
CFSP of 23 March 2012).
134 EUNAVFOR, “EU naval force delivers blow against Somali pirates on shoreline”,
15 May 2012, available at: http://eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-deliversblow-
against-somali-pirates-on-shoreline/
135 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
Map 5: Location of pirate attacks attributed
to Somali pirates and anchorage
points in 2008, 2010 and 2012
Source: UNODC-WB database
# #
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2012
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
38
What is the nature of this market?
Despite its remarkable linguistic and ethnic homogeneity,
Somalia is divided along clan lines, and the country has
fragmented into areas where local government is more powerful
than the national one. Three distinct sub-regions have
emerged:
Somaliland
Puntland
South-Central Somalia, including the recently recognized
state of Galmuduug.
The former two areas have developed their own governance
structures, although the seat of the national government lies
in the latter. The area with the best access to the Gulf of
Aden is Somaliland, but piracy attacks launched from this
area are relatively rare. The best-known piracy centres are in
southern Puntland (Eyl, Hobyo and Harardheere) and
South Central Somalia (Galguduud), both situated on the
east coast of Somalia. Freelance attacks also occur from the
coast of northern Puntland, which abuts the Gulf of
Aden.137 Between 2008 and 2011, only 7% of the hijacked
ships were anchored north of Eyl.138
The area subject to pirate predation has expanded considerably
over time. Greater geographic reach was necessary as
ships were warned to avoid the Somali coast, and international
maritime patrols made attacks in the Gulf of Aden
136 The “low estimate” represents just those cases where the ransom is known;
the “high estimate” included cases where a ransom is known to have been
paid, but the exact amount is unclear. These values were estimated based on a
range of factors, from the type and tonnage of the ship to the identity of the
ransom negotiator.
137 UNODC-WB database.
138 UNODC-WB database.
harder to carry out. Greater geographic reach was possible
due to the adoption of “mother ships”: larger craft, such as
fishing boats and dhows, rented or hijacked in advance,
from which the pirates can launch their attack skiffs.139
In 2005 and 2006, most of the successful attacks were concentrated
near the coast of Puntland and Galguduud.
Attempts were made in the Gulf of Aden, but most were
unsuccessful. In 2007, successful attacks were evenly split
between the Puntland coast and the Gulf of Aden, with
attempts ranging further from Somali shores. In 2008, the
Gulf of Aden was the site of most of the successful attacks,
and 2009 continued this focus, adding wide-ranging attacks
139 UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea,
18 July 2011, S/2011/433, para. 89.
Figure 21: Total annual ransoms paid to
Somali pirates136
Source: UNODC-WB database
Figure 22: Annual per vessel average of
ransom payments made to Somali
pirates
Source: UNODC-WB database
Figure 23: Anchorage sites for vessels hijacked
by Somali pirates, 2005-2012
Source: UNODC-WB database
1.57
0.39
2.36
20.2
57.16
69.7
36.35
151.1
2
1.03
7.05
32.68
84.42
89.86
155.67
40.39
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Low estimate High estimate
0.4
0.1
1.2 1.4
2.2
3.7
5
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
US$ millions
Around
Garacad, 65
Around Eyl,
54
Others south of
Eyl, 4
North of Eyl, 38
Hobyo/
Harardhere,
88
0.4
0.1
1.2 1.4
2.2
3.7
5
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
US$ millions
Piracy off the coast of Somalia
39
Map 6: Piracy incidents attributed to Somali pirates, 2005-2009
Source: UNODC based on information from UNODC-WB database
across the Indian Ocean. By 2011, the success rate in the
Gulf of Aden had dropped again, this time due to international
enforcement and target hardening. There were very
few succesful attacks close to Somali shores, because most
of the prime targets were avoiding this area entirely – most
were made in the Arabian Sea. Last year saw a general
decline in piracy attempts, with the few successes near the
tip of the Arabian Peninsula. 140
The use of mother ships also extended the temporal reach
of the pirates. With skiffs alone, the piracy season was constrained
to seasons when sea conditions were favourable,
140 The information presented in this paragraph is based on the 2012 UNODCWB
joint dataset.
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
UGANDA
ERITREA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA
DJIBOUTI
COMOROS
!(!(
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!( All other attempts
2005
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
UGANDA
ERITREA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA
DJIBOUTI
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2006
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
UGANDA
ERITREA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA
UNITED
ARAB
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!( All other attempts
2007
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
UGANDA
ERITREA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA
DJIBOUTI
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2008
INDIA
SAUDI ARABIA
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
PAKISTAN
SOMALIA
YEMEN
MOZAMBIQUE
OMAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN
UGANDA
ERITREA
UNITED
REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA
UNITED
ARAB
EMIRATES
DJIBOUTI
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!( All other attempts
2009
Source: UNODC based on information from UNODC-WB database
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
40
with few attacks being registered outside these periods.
From 2011, with the widespread adoption of mother ships,
these patterns changed, and pirates began to attack at virtually
any time of the year.
Despite these innovations, a variety of factors have made
piracy more difficult. After April 2011, the number of successful
attacks dropped dramatically. In April of 2009
alone, pirates hijacked 16 ships, but after April 2011, they
have averaged less than one per month.141 Increased enforcement
also made piracy more dangerous. In 2011, the International
Maritime Bureau counted 111 pirate deaths, of
which 70% were killed by national navies, 27% in clashes
between pirates, and 2% by the Puntland Security Forces.
142
This reduction in the rate at which new hostage vessels were
acquired was accompanied by an increase in the amount of
time taken to negotiate each new ransom. The reasons for
this increase are unclear, but may have to do with a growth
in the amounts demanded, a decline in the willingness of
the ship-owners to pay out, and the interests of a powerful
class of professional ransom negotiators. Whatever the case,
by January 2011, the Somali pirates were holding some 28
vessels and nearly 600 crewmembers.143 The costs associated
with guarding and maintaining these hostage ships
and crew represent a cost to the pirates, to be deducted
from their eventual takings. Teamed with a declining rate
of success in pirate attacks, the profitability of piracy
141 UNODC-WB database.
142 IMB and Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy in 2011,
22 June 2012, p.13.
143 EUNAVFOR.
Map 7: Piracy incidents attributed to Somali pirates, 2010-2012
Source: UNODC based on information from UNODC-WB database
INDIA
SUDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
PAKISTAN
SOMALIA
YEMEN
MOZAMBIQUE
OMAN
MADAGASCAR
ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF
IRAN
IRAQ
ERITREA
UNITED
REPUBLIC
OF
TANZANIA
MALAWI
JORDAN AFGHANISTAN
UNITED
ARAB
EMIRATES
DJIBOUTI
KUWAIT
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QATAR
COMOROS
BAHRAIN
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INDIA
SAUDI ARABIA
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
PAKISTAN
SOMALIA
YEMEN
MOZAMBIQUE
OMAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN
ERITREA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA
SRI LANKA
UNITED
ARAB
EMIRATES
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QATAR
COMOROS
BAHRAIN
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2011
INDIA
SAUDI ARABIA
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
PAKISTAN
SOMALIA
YEMEN
MOZAMBIQUE
OMAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN
ERITREA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA
SRI LANKA
UNITED
ARAB
EMIRATES
DJIBOUTI
QATAR
COMOROS
BAHRAIN
SEYCHELLES
!(
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#* Successful hijackings
!( All other attempts
2010 2012
Source: UNODC based on information from UNODC-WB database
41
declined after 2010. Perhaps most significantly, investors
could no longer bank on sure returns.
How is the piracy conducted?
There is no central piracy command authority in Somalia.
The decision to launch an attack may emerge from the collusion
of a range of actors, including professional pirate
groups, their community sponsors, and their sources of
finance, some of which may be based overseas. An agreement
is drawn up between these parties, specifying the
allocation of risks and rewards. It appears that although
some pirate crews have a degree of continuity, many
planned hijackings are handled on a project basis. Once the
project is complete, the ransom is distributed and the structures
dissolve, to be resurrected at a later date if circumstances
merit.
In addition to the pre-financed attacks, there also appear to
be some freelance pirate crews, who attack on their own
behalf without elaborate backing. The barriers to launching
an attack are low - in theory, anyone able to commandeer
a few skiffs and hijack a mother ship can participate. But
the process of retaining hostages and negotiating a ransom
is complicated, especially in a country where conditions are
as unpredictable as Somalia. Freelance pirates with a successful
catch must then market their hostages to financiers
and community structures willing to sponsor them during
the negotiation process.
It remains unclear to what extent particular vessels are targeted.
Hostages have described pirates who board very
familiar with the particulars of the ship, suggesting the
vessel was chosen in advance. But naval observers have also
described pirate vessels “fishing” for targets in the major
shipping lanes. Pirates have even tried to attack naval patrol
ships, clearly indicating a lack of advance planning.144 It
seems likely that both types of attack – planned and opportunistic
– take place, although the share of each is unknown.
The most notorious pirate communities are located in the
isolated fishing villages of southern Puntland and the province
immediately to its south: Galguduud. The UN Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea refers to the group
operating in the northern part of this strip as the Puntland
Piracy Network, home to such notorious pirates as Isse
Yulux and Abdullahi Farah. To the south, there is a group
known as the Hoboyo-Xarardheere network, which has
included Mohamed Garfanje and Mohamed Abdi Hassan,
also known as “Afweyne” (Big Mouth). The groups and
their leaders are subject to change. For example, Afweyne,
who was responsible for some of the most spectacular pirate
attacks (including the Saudi supertanker Sirius Star and the
weapons bearing MV Faina), has recently announced his
retirement from piracy.
The mechanics of taking a ship are relatively simple. Pirates
use the same sorts of vessels as those used by local fishermen:
small skiffs that serve as attack craft, and larger vessels,
such as dhows, to cover distance. To acquire mother
ships, pirates can recruit local fishermen, rent their craft, or
hijack them.
The skiffs are rough open craft of around seven to 10
meters in length. Today, they are typically equipped with
new Yamaha outboard motors from Yemen.145 Unlike fishing
boats, they carry narrow homemade ladders and grap-
144 Five attacks against naval vessels were recorded in 2010. See: S/2011/433,
para. 90.
145 UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), 10 March 2010, S/2010/91, Annex
II.
Figure 24: Recorded Somali pirate attacks and successful hijackings by month,
January 2009-May 2012
Source: EUNAVFOR
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
09-Jan
09-Mar
09-May
09-Jul
09-Sep
09-Nov
10-Jan
10-Mar
10-May
10-Jul
10-Sep
10-Nov
11-Jan
11-Mar
11-May
11-Jul
11-Sep
11-Nov
12-Jan
12-Mar
12-May
Successful attacks All attacks
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
42
pling hooks for engaging and boarding target vessels.146
Some include extra fuel tanks, but there have been anecdotes
of pirates carrying only enough fuel for the outward
leg of their journey, relying on a successful hijacking to
return home alive.147
Although fishermen are also sometimes armed (especially in
areas plagued by pirates), certain weapons are strong indicators
of criminal intent. Pirates typically carry AK-pattern
assault rifles, or PKM light machine guns, many left over
from armouries looted after the fall of the Barre regime.148
Some also bear rocket propelled grenade launchers, a
weapon unlikely to be used by fishermen. Naval versions of
the Somali “technical” (vehicles mounted with 12.7mm
heavy machine guns) have been detected.149
These skiffs are loaded on, or towed behind, mother ships,
which can be any larger ship the pirates have acquired,
including previously hijacked merchant vessels. These
mother ships allow the pirates to travel farther and in more
difficult conditions than would be possible with skiffs
alone. Since the crew of a hijacked mother ship may be
retained under duress, the use of mother ships makes international
intervention difficult, because it can be difficult to
distinguish the pirates from their captives. Mother ships
may even be traded between pirate groups.150
146 UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,
18 July 2011, S/2011/433, para. 94,
147 S/2011/30, para. 17.
148 Weapons seized from pirates arrested in connection with the attempted
hijacking of the Moscow University, for example, were heavily rusted and
showing their age. Leftover Soviet imports are still used throughout the
country. See Small Arms Survey, ‘Chapter 10: Surveying the Battlefield: Illicit
Arms in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia’. SAS Yearbook 2012, Geneva: SAS.
149 UNODC correspondence with experts in the field.
150 A fee of around $100,000 was agreed for the use of an Iranian flagged fishing
vessel, the Jahan, which had been taken by pirates who then left to take
An attack group will typically involve two or three skiffs
with four to seven crewmembers each. The use of multiple
skiffs allows the pirates to attack from different directions
and corral the target if it attempts to flee. The pirates will
initially attempt to board unnoticed, but will threaten with
weapons if detected. The amount of violence used by
Somali pirates is generally moderate compared to pirate
attacks in the Far East or in West Africa, but it is reported
to have increased in recent years, in particular against hostages.
151 As one observer notes, in the early years, pirates
would use only one or two rocket-propelled grenade rounds.
By 2011, this had increased to six to 10 or even more.152
It appears that few pirates have the skills to operate a
modern vessel, so they are reliant on the captive crew to
navigate to Somali waters. Crews have defeated pirate
attacks by simply retreating to the ship’s citadel and waiting
for the pirates to leave.153 Once in Somali waters, the hostages
may be kept on board their ship, consolidated with
other hostages on a different vessel, or taken ashore for
holding as negotiations are conducted.154 Reports of abuse
of hostages appear to be on the increase.
another vessel. The agreement appeared to have taken place in 2010, and the
second pirate group would make the payment only if they received a ransom
from hijacking a vessel (Source: UNODC interview with a NATO officer,
April 2011).
151 While the number of hostages held by Somali pirates decreased in 2011,
there was an increase in the number of hostage deaths, with 35 killed. The
majority of these deaths occurred during rescue or escape attempts, with
a smaller number killed by pirates or dying from disease or malnutrition
while in captivity. See: IMB and Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Human Cost of
Somali Piracy in 2011, p. 8. In addition, there have been reports of torture
of crewmembers, such the case of the MV Marida Marguerite in 2010. See:
S/2011/433 para. 95.
152 UNODC background document, The Illicit Financial Flows linked to Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia, May 2011.
153 UNODC-WB database.
154 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 27 April
2011, p.11
Figure 25: Successful Somali pirate attacks and the number of ships held by pirates by month,
January 2009-May 2012
Source: EUNAVFOR
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
09-Jan
09-Mar
09-May
09-Jul
09-Sep
09-Nov
10-Jan
10-Mar
10-May
10-Jul
10-Sep
10-Nov
11-Jan
11-Mar
11-May
11-Jul
11-Sep
11-Nov
12-Jan
12-Mar
12-May
Successful attacks Number of ships held
43
Ransoms are typically paid in cash (US 100-dollar bills)
usually strapped to palettes and dropped at designated
areas. The airdrop is carried out by “vessel owners or operators,
or their insurance companies, many of whom have
contracts with negotiators and crisis management
consultancies”.155
156 This cash can be used to purchase khat
from Somali dealers resident in Kenya. The planes bringing
khat may return with cash derived from ransom payments.
157 A similar procedure may be used to purchase
other commodities for local distribution, allowing financiers
based in Somalia to enjoy their profits locally.
While this exchange can be viewed as “money laundering”,
it provides a vehicle for pirates to transition to legitimate
business. Some pirates came from the khat trade158 and it
provides one of the few industries where comparable
incomes can be derived.
Who is conducting the piracy?
Piracy requires the collusion of a range of actors, of which
the pirate foot soldiers are just one component. These
include:
Financiers
Seamen
Chandlers and other suppliers
Shore-based security structures
Negotiators
A successful pirate hijacking, including the negotiation
process, can involve considerable investment. In addition to
155 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
156 UK Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee - Tenth Report, Piracy off the coast
of Somalia, December 2011, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/1318/131802.htm
157 UNODC, WB, and INTERPOL joint report (2013), op. cit.
158 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
the outlay in hardware (properly equipped skiffs, mother
ship, fuel, weapons, ammunition), provision must be made
for the upkeep of both the hostages and the crew during the
negotiations.159 Hostages must be fed and guarded by a
proportionate number of pirates for periods that may
exceed a year.160 Failure to invest in sufficient guards could
lead to the hostages being freed by foreign forces or being
stolen by rival organizations. Pirates must also maintain
sufficient land-based security presence to ensure they are
taken seriously by local power structures, or they must have
these structures represented among their investors.161
162 Without
protection, it would be difficult to retain cash ransoms
of millions of dollars.
For planned hijackings, some investors buy shares, which
are typically sold in US$10,000 blocks.163 The average initial
outlay for a hijacking is said to be around US$50,000,164
and investors expect a 20-fold return on their shares,165 so
a minimum payoff required to satisfy shareholders is one
million US dollars, or one-third of a three million dollar
ransom. Investors are often former pirates, other Somalis
with sufficient resources to risk US$10,000, or members of
the diaspora. Relatives or other small groups can pool
resources to launch an ad-hoc attack, but then will need to
market their catch to more sophisticated groups for the
negotiation process. Investors need some coercive power
over the pirates, because they will claim at least 30% of the
final take.166
159 World Bank (2013), op. cit.
160 World Bank (2013). op.c it.
161 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
162 World Bank (2013). op. cit.
163 S/2011/433
164 World Bank (2013), op.c it.
165 S/2011/433
166 UNODC, WB, and INTERPOL joint report (2013), op. cit.
Figure 26: Prior professions of 56 Somali
pirates surveyed in 2012
Source: UNODC survey155
Figure 27: Age of entry into piracy of 60 Somali
pirates surveyed in 2012
Source: UNODC survey
Soldier, 7 Fisherman, 14
Khat sales, 4
Business , 3
Unemployed,
20
1
34
20
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
10-20 20-30 30-40 40+
Number of pirates dd
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA
44
The pirates themselves are generally paid a share of the
ransom, and the take for an ordinary pirate is typically in
the low tens of thousands of dollars (US$30,000 to
US$60,000).167 The leader of the group is usually paid a
double share. Additional shares may be paid for special
contributions, such as bringing a personal firearm or ladder,
or boarding the target vessel first.168 During the negotiations,
which may last a year or more, these men live on
credit, with their consumption subtracted from their final
share of the profits. As a result, when the ransom is finally
paid, some pirates are scarcely better off than they had been
before the venture.
The core pirates were estimated to number between 1,500
and 3,000 at the beginning of 2012.169 They come from a
range of backgrounds, but, for reasons discussed above, the
single most prominent appears to be fishing, particularly in
northern Puntland. Soldiers, who often go unpaid for
extended periods in Somalia, are also prominently represented.
Most pirates come from the coastal areas of Puntland,
but some pirates appear to have migrated from the
interior of the country for the purpose of engaging in
piracy, often due to a connection to someone living near
the pirate camps.170 Inland nomads are more prominent in
the southern parts of the piracy coastal strip.
There appears to be a strong bias towards adult males in the
recruitment process. Younger males are recruited for supporting
roles, but are not common among the pirate attack
crews. This may be due to the fact that a limited number
of men can participate, and experience is valued. Females
have also been recruited, mainly as cooks, sex workers, or
to care for the hostages. In one survey of 60 pirates, 90%
were men who entered piracy between the ages of 20 and
39.171 Only 14% of the Somali population falls into this
demographic category.172 It would therefore be wrong to
interpret piracy as a matter of delinquency. It appears to be
a livelihood choice for adult males faced with less attractive
alternatives.
The pirates involved in the attack often provide the core
security for the hostages once they are brought ashore, but
the use of dedicated guards has also been noted. These are
generally employees, paid a fixed wage rather than a share
of the ransom.
The professional negotiators are typically well-educated,
often resident in the diaspora, and receive their fee off the
top, which may be as much as 5% of the total ransom.173
The best of these are seen in multiple negotiations. Some
may have formerly been pirates themselves.
167 Ibid.
168 World Bank (2013), op. cit.
169 UK Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee - Tenth Report, Piracy off the coast
of Somalia, December 2011.
170 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
171 UNODC, Causes of piracy and links to organized crime, 2013.
172 According to the 2010 revision of the UN Population database, there were
1.273 million men aged 20-40 in 2010, out of a population of 9.331 million.
Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision.
173 UNODC background document, The Illicit Financial Flows linked to Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia, May 2011.
Those providing goods and services to the pirates at inflated
rates greatly benefit from the trade with relatively little risk.
The prices pirates are able to pay have inflated the costs of
virtually every scarce commodity in the coastal areas where
they operate.174 This buying power has ensured that goods
are moved from all over the region for the pirates to consume.
Service providers have also capitalized on the temporary
largess of the crew awaiting ransom. Sex workers have
migrated or been trafficked from other countries in the
region to provide services to pirate crews.175
How big is piracy?
The UN International Maritime Organization (IMO)
maintains meticulous records of all confirmed pirate
attacks. As with all recorded crime statistics, there may be
some degree of under-capture, particularly regarding the
hijacking of smaller craft used for mother ships, and concerning
vessels operating out of countries that do not report
to the international authorities. With regard to registered
vessels, it is unlikely that many major cases escape the attention
of the IMO.
These statistics clearly show the growth of Somali piracy
between 2005 and 2011, and its decline since. In 2012,
there were just 15 successful attacks, close to 2005 levels
(14). There were no successful hijackings for ransom in the
Somali area of operations in the first half of 2013.
UNODC and the World Bank recently developed a joint
dataset on ransom payments using sources from the International
Maritime Bureau, the International Maritime
Organization and EUNAVFOR. Information was gathered
on 149 ransom payments over a total of 198 cases between
2005 and 2011. For the 49 cases where a ransom was
known to have been paid but the amount was unknown,
UNODC and the World Bank used a number of factors to
create an estimate, including variables such as the identity
of the negotiator and the value of the vessel seized.
Based on these figures, a low estimate (based only on cases
where the ransom is known) and a high estimate (including
the imputed values) were generated. The amount of money
paid out in any given year does not correspond to the
number of ships hijacked in that year, however, because
many negotiations span at least one calendar year. In other
words, although there were only 15 successful hijackings in
2012, pirates were still receiving ransoms from ships
hijacked in previous years. Based purely on attacks where
the ransom payment was known, pirates earned at least
US$36 million in 2012. If ransoms were inferred in cases
where they were not known, the figure would be as high as
US$40 million.
174 UNODC, WB, and INTERPOL joint report (2013), op. cit.
175 UNODC, WB, and INTERPOL joint report (2013), op. cit.
Annex 90
Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, S/2011/30, 24 January 2011 (Extracts)
United Nations S/2011/30
Security Council Distr.: General
25 January 2011
Original: English
11-20621 (E) 020211
*1120621*
Letter dated 24 January 2011 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council
I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 25 August 2010 (S/2010/451) by
which I informed members of the Security Council that I intended to appoint Mr. Jack
Lang as my Special Adviser on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia
and that I would be asking him to identify any additional steps that could be taken to
achieve and sustain substantive results in prosecuting piracy.
In that regard, I wish to inform the members of the Security Council that
Mr. Lang has submitted to me a report (see annex).
I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the
attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) BAN Ki-moon
S/2011/30
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Annex to the letter dated 24 January 2011 from the
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council
[Original: French]
Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal
Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
Summary: A plan in 25 proposals
This report was requested by the Secretary-General as a result of the
debate held in the Security Council on 25 August 2010. Its purpose is to identify
any additional steps that can be taken to assist States in the region, as well as other
States, to prosecute and imprison persons who engage in piracy, and explore the
willingness of States in the region to serve as potential hosts for any of the options
for potential new judicial mechanisms.
Assessment of the threat reveals a serious situation. There has been no
decline in piracy since its resurgence off the coast of Somalia in 2007. In 2010 the
violence escalated, the periods of detention became lengthier, the modus operandi
became more sophisticated and the area of attacks extended farther to the south (as
far as Mozambique) and east in the Indian Ocean. The pirate economy, which has its
epicentre in Puntland, is having a destabilizing effect on Somalia and the entire
region owing to rising prices, insecurity of energy supplies and loss of revenue.
While world seaborne trade appears to be handling the threat better thanks to naval
operations, which play a crucial role in providing security, the number of victims is
nevertheless rising, with 1,900 persons taken hostage since the end of 2008. In the
long term, the entire world economy could be affected.
There are numerous gaps in the counter-piracy effort. It will be successful
only when a series of converging measures are put in place to address all of its
component parts. That effort should be sustained and steps should be taken on two
fronts that make up the two primary areas of focus of this report: the enhancement of
measures currently being implemented and the urgent application of new measures.
The enhancement of existing measures relates, in the first instance to the
operational component. In order to implement self-protection measures more
broadly within the shipping community, international certification for compliance
with certain best practices is proposed, with a provision for notification of the flag
State in the event of non-compliance. To enhance the effectiveness of naval
operations, more frequent monitoring of the coastline and information-sharing with
regional authorities in Somaliland and Puntland are recommended.
The enhancement of existing measures also covers the jurisdictional and
correctional component.
First, judicial obstacles should be removed. Prosecutions can fail because
certain prerequisites have not been met. To ensure that apprehended individuals can
be tried, all States must see to it that they have a robust body of law and must make
adjustments, as necessary, in both substantive and procedural terms.
S/2011/30
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With respect to substance, the proposal is to encourage all States:
– to criminalize piracy as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea; and
– to establish universal jurisdiction for acts of piracy.
In terms of procedure, a legal framework for apprehension at sea that complies
with international human rights law and is compatible with operational constraints is
often lacking and could easily be adopted by States participating in the counterpiracy
effort. Three further proposals would help facilitate the gathering of evidence
and its admissibility in court: to develop an international model case report, make it
possible to conduct prosecutions for intent to commit an act of piracy and encourage
victims to testify.
States in the region should also be given appropriate support to increase the
number of transfer agreements so that alleged perpetrators can be transferred,
initially for trial and then for imprisonment.
Second, the obstacles posed by the lack of correctional capacity will be
overcome only by bolstering international assistance to the States in the region.
Third, to overcome the political obstacles to the prosecution of suspected
pirates, a general mobilization of States to bring pirates to trial will be necessary.
New measures to enhance the effectiveness of counter-piracy efforts and
successfully prosecute alleged pirates will be crucial. The recommended solution is
to implement, on an extremely urgent basis, a comprehensive multidimensional
plan targeting Puntland and Somaliland and comprising three components —
economic, security and jurisdictional/correctional — that would be brought to
bear simultaneously.
The economic component is aimed at developing activities that cannot thrive
in an environment of piracy, safeguarding the sovereignty of Somali authorities over
their territory and regulating service activities to ensure that their development does
not spark an increase in piracy. There are several priority sectors: port and fishery
operations, livestock exports and the regulated development of telecommunications
services.
The security component must help to build the capacity of Somali authorities
to secure their territory using their sovereign forces. Police units should be
re-established in areas of lawlessness and a land-based coastguard support function
should be developed.
It is also necessary to strike at the source of piracy networks by going after the
persons behind them, who have been clearly identified but take refuge in areas where
they are protected. To that end, the forensic capacities of States in the region must be
enhanced, evidence must be made more readily admissible in court and individual
sanctions must be imposed on the masterminds.
With respect to the jurisdictional and correctional component, the report
favours the establishment, within eight months, of a court system comprising a
specialized court in Puntland, a specialized court in Somaliland and a specialized
extraterritorial Somali court that could be located in Arusha, United Republic of
Tanzania. The specialized court in Puntland and the extraterritorial Somali court are
priorities, given the possibility of granting them universal jurisdiction.
S/2011/30
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The correctional capacities of Puntland and Somaliland would be strengthened
by the immediate construction of two prisons, one in Somaliland and one in
Puntland, each with the capacity to hold 500 prisoners and with protected status to
allow for international monitoring. The first spaces in these prisons would become
available in eight months. A third prison should be built soon afterwards in Puntland.
The total cost of this component for three years is estimated to be less than
$25 million.
There are several sources of funding for the counter-piracy effort: the budget of
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); a fund established by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO); and the Trust Fund of the Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which should remain focused on judicial and
correctional capacity-building in States in the East African and Indian Ocean region
that are prosecuting alleged pirates.
The current funding needs remain far lower than the overall cost of piracy,
which amounts to several hundred million dollars when the costs of insurance,
security measures, naval operations and loss of revenue in key sectors of the region’s
economies are taken into account, not to mention the incalculable damage caused to
victims, including the loss of human life.
The funds required to finance the proposed plan could be raised through a highlevel
donor conference.
The United Nations has a key role to play in facilitating and coordinating the
international community’s scaled up efforts to combat piracy off the coast of
Somalia, and in mobilizing States and international organizations to take action to
that end. Of the 25 proposals presented in this report, those associated with the
Security Council, pursuant to its resolution 1918 (2010), could be set out in a new
resolution. The Secretary-General, in close consultation with his Special
Representative for Somalia, should contemplate the establishment of an institutional
structure to facilitate the implementation of that resolution, under the aegis of a highlevel
eminent personality with vast United Nations experience.
S/2011/30
11-20621 5
Contents
Page
Summary: A plan in 25 proposals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Mandate of the Special Adviser and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Piracy off the coast of Somalia, a symptom with growing regional implications . . . . . . . 12
1. Emergence of a piracy industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Genesis of the phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Persistence of the phenomenon, spurred by impunity of pirates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Industrialization of the phenomenon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Destabilizing political, economic and social impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Impact on Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Impact on the region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Impact on international maritime trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Impact on victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
I. Improving on current solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. Operational component of counter-piracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Extending the scope of self-protection measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2. Maintaining, strengthening and adapting naval operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. Jurisdictional and correctional component of counter-piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Overcoming legal obstacles to the prosecution of piracy suspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Reform of substantive domestic law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Reform of procedural domestic law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Proliferation of transfer agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Overcoming capacity constraints on the prosecution of piracy suspects . . . . . . . . . . 26
3. Overcoming the political obstacles to the prosecution of suspected pirates . . . . . . . 27
II. Apply new solutions urgently. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A. Preventing acts of piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Economic and social component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2. Security component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Coastal monitoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Paralyse and terminate the activities of the instigators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
S/2011/30
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B. Suppressing acts of piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Legal component. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2. Correctional component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3. Jurisdictional component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Annex 1: Map of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Annex 2: List of individuals consulted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
S/2011/30
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Abbreviations
AFP Agence France-Presse
AIS Automatic Identification System
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
BMP Best Management Practices
CGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CMF Combined Monitoring Forces
CTF151 Combined Taskforce 151
EEZ exclusive economic zone
EU European Union
EUNAVFOR European Naval Forces (Operation “Atalanta”)
EUROPOL European Police Office
GDP Gross domestic product
GPS Global Positioning System
GT2 Working Group 2 (which focuses on legal aspects of piracy)
ICU Internal Control Unit
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMO International Maritime Organization
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
IRTC Internationally recognized transit corridor
MSC-HOA Maritime Security Centre — Horn of Africa
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SPU Special Police Unit
SUA Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation
TFG Transitional Federal Government
UK-MTO UK Maritime Trade Operations
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
S/2011/30
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UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
USD United States dollars
WFP World Food Programme
S/2011/30
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Introduction
A. Mandate of the Special Adviser and methodology
Mandate
1. This report is submitted as part of the process initiated by the Security Council
on 27 April 2010 under its resolution 1918 (2010) with a view to “furthering the aim
of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia”.
2. As the first step, the Security Council, noting in its resolution 1918 (2010) the
failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea,
requested the Secretary-General to report on possible options to address the
problem. Subsequently, in his report of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/394),1 the Secretary-
General presented seven options with an exhaustive analysis of their advantages and
disadvantages “in the light of general considerations that apply”, prior to the
political consultation phase. The report provides essential food for thought, given
the quality of the legal analysis it contains.
3. On 25 August 2010, following its deliberations on the aforementioned report,
the Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s intention to appoint a
Special Adviser on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia
(Presidential Statement S/PRST/2010/16). Upon making the appointment on
26 August 2010, the Secretary-General requested me, in particular, to identify any
additional steps that can be taken to assist States in the region, as well as other
States, to prosecute and imprison persons who engage in piracy, and explore the
willingness of States in the region to serve as potential hosts for any of the options
for potential new judicial mechanisms set out in [his] report (...) to the Council.
4. While there is consensus on the need to end the impunity of pirates, views are
divided among the principal States engaging in counter-piracy on the methods that
should be implemented to achieve that goal. Two radically diverse options have
been proposed: the creation of an international criminal tribunal on one hand, and on
the other, strengthening the capacities of States in the region without creating an
additional mechanism. Various mechanisms between these two extremes have been
suggested. No option is perfect: each has advantages and disadvantages. Given this
background, my mandate prompted me to undertake numerous political and legal
consultations in order to seek an effective solution which States would generally
endorse.
Methodology
5. I made two visits to the region to consult with the highest authorities of
Somalia as well as the authorities of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius,
__________________
1 Report of the Secretary-General on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and
imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with
international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding
imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals, and the
time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results (S/2010/394).
S/2011/30
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Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania. I also conducted high-level
meetings with authorities in China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, Oman, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America. In addition, I consulted senior officials from
international organizations concerned with the issue (INTERPOL and several United
Nations agencies: the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)) and regional organizations (the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), the African Union and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)),
as well as the European Union and the naval commands of the coalitions conducting
operations in the area. I met with Judge Yussuf, a Somali judge at the International
Court of Justice, in his personal capacity, and with many legal experts and experts on
Somalia. Lastly, I met with several private-sector stakeholders: shipowners, insurers
and an association for the protection of the rights of employees of shipping lines.
6. The authorities of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) were
consulted on several occasions, as were regional authorities in Somaliland and
Puntland. My visit to Somalia played a decisive role in my thinking on the issue. In
addition to meeting with local authorities, including President Silanyo in Somaliland
and President Farole in Puntland, I had an opportunity to visit several courts and
prisons in Hargeysa and Garoowe. I also spoke with pirates (suspected and
convicted) who had been transferred to the Kenyan authorities, at Shimo la Tewa
prison in Mombasa.
7. The ongoing collaboration with Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, was highly constructive. From
Nairobi, we travelled together to Addis Ababa, Djibouti, Mauritius and New York. I
also felt that it was essential to have Ambassador Thomas Winkler, Chairman of the
Legal Working Group of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(CGPCS) accompany me on my visit to Somalia, which enabled us to cooperate more
closely. I travelled to Copenhagen twice, the first time on 3 September, a few days
after my appointment, and the second time for the meeting of the Legal Working
Group held on 3 November, during which the participating States considered my
preliminary findings. Lastly, I am especially indebted to Ms. Patricia O’Brien, Under-
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel, and to Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe,
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for our exchanges of views and the
invaluable support they provided to ensure the successful discharge of my mandate.*
8. I came away from these various consultations with the feeling that it was
extremely urgent to:
– deploy effective counter-piracy mechanisms before the professionalization,
spread and escalation of piracy reaches a point of no return;
* I wish to extend my warm thanks to my collaborator, Ms. Camille Petit, Adviser on Foreign
Affairs, for her outstanding work, without which these consultations, analyses and proposals
and the drafting of this report would not have been possible. I also wish to thank Ms. Rachel
Gasser and Mr. Vincent Astoux, who accompanied me on some of my visits, particularly to East
Africa, and from whose expertise on the region I benefited enormously.
S/2011/30
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– establish continuity between the operational component of counter-piracy and
its jurisdictional/correctional component, before the marines become
discouraged;
– tackle the destabilizing factors inherent in piracy before their repercussions on
the entire region become irremediable;
– adopt a new vision in order to focus not only on countering the symptom but
also on vigorously tackling the underlying causes of piracy and purposefully
promoting the economic development of Somaliland and Puntland.
9. Accordingly, this report places the jurisdictional and correctional aspects of the
solution within the framework of a comprehensive multidimensional approach aimed
at strengthening each link in the chain of measures to combat, prevent and
suppress piracy. To counter the impunity of pirates, there must be no weak link in
that chain.
10. The criteria that have guided me in seeking solutions take into account the
goals of respect for human rights, effectiveness, efficiency and consistency with
United Nations policy on Somalia. The advantages and disadvantages of each option
can thus be evaluated according to the following four criteria:
– The effectiveness of the arrangement, which translates into successful
prosecutions of persons suspected of planning or committing an act of piracy
and who have been apprehended either through naval operations or, on land,
through police investigations;
– Respect for international human rights law, which requires, at the judicial level,
a judgement rendered by an independent and impartial court within a reasonable
time and with due protection of defendants’ rights and, at the correctional level,
conditions of detention that meet international standards, provisions for social
reintegration and criminal punishment that excludes the death penalty;
– The need for a solution that helps to strengthen the rule of law in Somalia
while respecting the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;
– Efficiency in terms of costs and the time required to establish the mechanism
and put it into operation.
11. Given the seriousness of the situation, further to the Secretary-General’s
report of 27 October 2010 (S/2010/556) and my introductory remarks, I set out
below the analysis of piracy off the coast of Somalia that guided my thinking on the
issue and the crafting of my recommendations.
S/2011/30
12 11-20621
B. Piracy off the coast of Somalia, a symptom with growing
regional implications
1. Emergence of a piracy industry
Genesis of the phenomenon
12. One of the reasons advanced for the large-scale development of piracy2 off the
coast of Somalia is the need for the Somali population to protect its territorial waters
and marine resources against illegal fishing, uncontrolled degassing and dumping of
toxic waste by foreign vessels. As early as 1997, a United Nations assessment
mission led by Mr. Mahdi Gedi Qayad had warned the international community
about the consequences of such practices and had recommended that a mechanism
should be established for monitoring and protecting Somali’s territorial waters. The
absence of State structures capable of protecting the country’s marine resources and
combating the criminal practices of the pirates led to the resurgence of piracy,
especially starting in 2005, in the aftermath of the tsunami which devastated the
Puntland coastline between Hafun and Garacad, ruined 18,000 households, and
revealed the scale of toxic waste which had been dumped off the Somali coast.3
13. Although the nexus between piracy, on the one hand, and illegal fishing and toxic
waste, on the other, continues to be invoked without having been proven to date, piracy
has in essence become an organized, lucrative and attractive criminal activity undertaken
for heinous ends. The extension of acts of piracy further away from the Somali coast
shows that those acts have nothing to do with a desire to protect national interests.
Persistence of the phenomenon, spurred by impunity of pirates
14. The threat has persisted since 2007. Given the intensity of the violence and the
increasingly longer periods of detention, it cannot be said that the phenomenon is
being brought under control; on the contrary, the fear is that the number of victims
who die from natural causes, accident or execution4 might increase. The success rate
__________________
2 In the rest of the report, the term “piracy” will be used in a broad sense to include piracy
in the strict sense of the word (on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State) and armed robbery at sea. Subject to the foregoing, piracy will be understood as set
forth in article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that:
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any
act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or
a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or
property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in
the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).”
3 Rapid Environmental Desk Assessment Somalia, UNEP, March 2005.
4 Data provided by the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR). These figures differ
considerably from those produced by the International Maritime Bureau of Kuala Lumpur
(which tabulates attacks reported by the maritime community with a risk of underestimation)
and the International Maritime Organization (which has a broader definition of a hijacked
vessel: a ship whose crew members take refuge in the citadel, which is then abandoned by the
pirates or is rescued by a military force will be considered by the International Maritime
Organization as hijacked, then freed, whereas EU NAVFOR will classify the incident as an
“aborted attack”, because the pirates could not “take control of the vessel” when the crew
members were in the citadel).
S/2011/30
11-20621 13
of attacks seems to have levelled off at a figure that does not go below about 25 per
cent (26.6 per cent in 2010)5. Some cases of repeat offending have been identified,
where the pirates apprehended had already been released on previous occasions for
lack of a host State to prosecute them. Thus, more than 90 per cent of the pirates
apprehended by States patrolling the seas will be released without being
prosecuted.6 The impunity resulting from such “catch and release” practices tends to
make the risk-reward ratio for the pirates negligible and to encourage piracy. This
highly attractive criminal activity is perceived as a virtually foolproof way of
getting rich.
Industrialization of the phenomenon
15. Three trends can be observed in the evolution of the phenomenon:
– Escalation, considering the ever-growing number of pirates who today even
hail from the hinterland7 (currently totalling at least 1,500, according to the
Transitional Federal Government8);
– Intensification of the violence of attacks (first weapons of choice are AK-47
automatic assault rifles and RPG-7 rocket launchers);
– Sophistication of the modus operandi (increasing use of “mother ships” to
backstop attack skiffs, global positioning satellites (GPS), Automatic
Identification System (AIS) data, satellite telephones and counterfeit detectors;
organization of refuelling at sea of captured ships for the trip to Somalia).
More than their equipment, it is primarily the organizational capacity of the
pirates that is bolstered during attacks at sea, on land or at the home port,
owing to the logistical support provided in the negotiation of ransoms and the
holding of hostages. The pirates now have the ability to manage a large
number of captures over a long period of time, thus ensuring that they have
regular income throughout the year, even during the monsoon seasons.
2. Destabilizing political, economic and social impacts
Impact on Somalia
A piracy-driven economy
16. With the industrialization of the phenomenon and especially the emergence of
new professions (intermediaries, negotiators, and interpreters), the Somali
population is increasingly dependent on piracy. The economy, which basically
depends on export of livestock (camels, sheep) to the Gulf countries, remittances
from the diaspora and port operations, is gradually relying on support for the pirates
by entire villages, now with the approval of some clan chiefs and even some
members of the diaspora. The risk of reaching a point of no return is emerging, with
the creation of a veritable mafia, piracy-driven economy and the deep disintegration
of Somali society, which is built on fragile local arrangements.
__________________
5 In 2010, of the 173 vessels attacked, 46 were hijacked (defined as vessels which have been
taken over by pirates).
6 Data communicated by EU NAVFOR.
7 The United Nations Development Programme found that some of the pirates were from pastoral,
inland populations, not only coastal populations.
8 Estimate presented at the African Union seminar on maritime safety and security, Addis Ababa,
6-7 April 2010.
S/2011/30
14 11-20621
17. Meanwhile, growing insecurity caused by piracy is depriving the north of
Somalia of possible job-creating investments (port operations, fishing and
development of public infrastructure). The sponsors are exploiting a population
which has no professional prospects. Some pirates operate far from the coast. As
they do not always have enough fuel for their return, their survival sometimes
depends on the success of their attacks. According to the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 200 to 300 pirates have not returned from their
expeditions since the resurgence of the phenomenon and their families are being
abused by the instigators who lie to them and say that the pirates have settled in
Europe or elsewhere. Piracy is also one of the main obstacles to the delivery of food
aid, the lifeline for more than 2 million Somalis or about 27 per cent of the
population.9 The World Food Programme (WFP) is relying more and more on very
costly air deliveries.10 The need to escort vessels, although indispensable, also
places a heavy burden on WFP logistics. Lastly, members of the diaspora themselves
are penalized because their income is under suspicion and scrutiny.
18. The piracy-driven economy is gradually overtaking the traditional economy,
owing to the development of activities on land in support of the pirates, the lack of
job-creating investments in a context of widespread insecurity, and the destructive
effect of piracy on Somali society which creates a vicious circle.
Puntland, epicentre of piracy
19. Piracy attacks are launched from two major locations: Puntland, home of the
vast majority of the pirates, and the centre-south of Somalia, from Xarardheere to
Kismayo, which has since September 2010 seen a recent and worrying trend as
launching stations for attacks have moved to the south of Somalia, an area marked
by the absence of governance (and the presence of Al-Shabaab).
20. Nonetheless, Puntland remains the epicentre of piracy. Most of the ports where
ships dock during ransom negotiations are located between Hobyo and Garacad
(eastern coast of Puntland), as well as in Xabo (northern coast of Puntland). This
stems from two centrifugal movements: the capture of Xarardheere by Hizbul Islam
in April 2010, which led to a relative retreat to the north, between Hobyo and
Garacad;11 and the counter-piracy actions of the Puntland authorities against the Eyl
base, which drove the pirates further south towards Garacad. Consequently,
Puntland remains the main area of refuge for the pirates, despite its declared
commitment to eradicate piracy from its soil.
21. Somaliland, which is determined to tackle piracy courageously, in order to
ensure, inter alia, the unimpeded development of the port of Berbera, has (limited)
police and coast guard capacities. While this region seems relatively unaffected by
the phenomenon, it is still not safe from the threat, especially in less controlled
areas on the border with Puntland.
__________________
9 Report of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, submitted
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) (S/2010/580).
10 Source: WFP.
11 Hobyo (and Xarardheere) are located in the Galmudug region, which is clamouring for greater
autonomy yet remains close to Puntland, and recognizes, as Puntland does, the authority of the
Transitional Federal Government (GFT).
S/2011/30
11-20621 15
Piracy and clan structure
22. Piracy has a destructive effect on the clan structure of Somali society. Young
pirates who have acquired wealth are now challenging the authority of the Elders
and their private militias are competing with loyalist security forces. In Garacad, the
Elders oppose the pirates and make the population aware of the harmful effects of
piracy (alcohol, prostitution), which are contrary to Islamic teaching. The authorities
in Garowe say that they rely on clan chiefs in conducting awareness campaigns
among the population in order to discourage any would-be pirates. It is the Elders
who reportedly obtained the release of the Puntland Minister of Maritime Transport,
Ports and Counter-Piracy, who was kidnapped by pirates during a communication
operation.12 Other clan chiefs prefer to side with (rather than alienate) the pirates
and even support them (in order to share in their revenues).
Piracy and local authorities
23. The pirates also destabilize the authority of local governments by putting them
in a quandary: they either support the pirates and become compromised,13 or oppose
the pirates and lose readily available resources. According to the African
Development Bank, annual revenues of the Puntland region for 2009 were estimated
at $16 million,14 while revenues from piracy were estimated at $82 million for the
same year, according to the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia. The
reshuffling of the local Government of Puntland in March 2010 and the
implementation of counter-piracy measures by the Puntland authorities are to be
commended. The Government of Puntland affirms that it is now committed to
tackling piracy. Apart from pressure from the international community, internal
pressures are also being exerted on some sub-clans and traditional chiefs (Elders)
opposed to piracy. The struggle against piracy, it seems, is also a struggle for power.
Pirates and Islamist insurgents
24. While a major alliance between the pirates and Al-Shabaab has not yet
materialized, local complicities have been noted. Officially, the insurgents (of
Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam) are opposed to piracy, a crime which is severely
punished by the sharia. Following the resurgence of piracy in 2005, there was a lull
in 2006, when the country was run by the Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu for
one year. Today, the relocation of the pirates to the south of Somalia in areas
controlled by Al-Shabaab suggests that there are ad hoc agreements guaranteeing
tranquillity for the pirates in return for a portion of their ransom money (which
could reportedly reach 30 per cent).15 Such passive collusion, for example in the
region of Kismayo, further destabilizes Somalia by facilitating the recruitment of
insurgent militias as well as the weapons trade in violation of the embargo.
__________________
12 Source: Puntland regional authorities.
13 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008)
(S/2010/91).
14 African Development Bank, Somalia — summary report, 18 May 2010. According to the same
source, revenues for Somaliland in 2009 were $22 million.
15 Information communicated in the course of several discussions; it needs to be confirmed.
S/2011/30
16 11-20621
Impact on the region
More States affected
25. Besides Somalia, the entire region is affected by the scourge of piracy. The
area of operation corresponds to an ever-expanding triangle, stretching from Yemen
and Oman to Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania, and even to
Mozambique. More and more, the pirates are using hijacked vessels as “mother
ships” to carry out other attacks further off from the coast, at less than 200 miles
from India and 120 miles from Maldives (May 2010). They do not hesitate to use
captured crew members as shields to challenge naval forces. As pointed out by the
President of the United Republic of Tanzania, 26 attacks took place off the
Tanzanian coast between 25 September and 18 December 2010. The shift of attacks
to the south and east of the Indian Ocean reflects the pirates’ ability to constantly
adapt in order to bypass the security corridor established by naval forces. In the
south, the pirates now set up base along the coast of Somalia before heading
towards Mwatara (the United Republic of Tanzania) or dispersing into the vast
expanse of the Indian Ocean, cruising critical shipping lanes.
Loss of income, increase in prices and insecurity of energy supplies
26. From an economic standpoint, piracy has a dangerous negative impact on the
major economic sectors of the region, notably tourism and fishery (4 per cent drop
in GDP in Seychelles in 1990,16 90 per cent of which was from these two sectors).
Local business is also affected by the increase in commodity prices, coupled with
the impact of insurance premiums on the final consumer, not only in Kenya and the
United Republic of Tanzania, but also in landlocked countries serviced by the East
African coastline (Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia,
Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia). Port operations, maritime traffic and
imports have declined across the Horn of Africa, with an attendant risk for energy
supplies to East African countries. In fact, only three vessels supply gas to Comoros,
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania. Hijacking
any of those vessels would have a major impact on gas supplies to those countries.
Any attack on a vessel carrying hazardous materials could also affect the
environment.
Replacement of illegal activities with legal activities
27. The entire region has not only suffered from the negative economic effects of
piracy, but also witnessed a gradual increase in illegal activities connected with piracy
(money-laundering, destabilization of the real estate sector, trafficking of weapons and
migrants), which are, to some extent, replacing legal activities. Some States of the
region fear that logistical bases would be set up in their territory (Kenya, Seychelles
and the United Republic of Tanzania), and even that their populations would find new
outlets.
__________________
16 Speech by President Michel at the symposium on piracy held in Victoria in July 2010. The
Seychelles President had also referred to a 50 per cent increase in insurance premiums, a 30 per
cent drop in revenues from fishing operations, and additional expenses of 2.3 million euros for
counter-piracy patrols and surveillance.
S/2011/30
11-20621 17
Impact on international maritime trade
28. Naval operations have helped secure the Gulf of Aden; 33 vessels have been
hijacked by pirates in that region since the establishment of the Internationally
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) and the Maritime Security Centre — Horn
of Africa (MSC-HOA) in early 2009.17 Yet, between 22,000 and 25,000 vessels
transit through the Suez Canal each year. Every day, 3.3 million barrels of oil are
transported through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, representing 30 per cent of the
world’s oil supply.18 As a result, free movement along these critical shipping lanes
remains of major economic importance for the entire international community.
Insurance premiums are said to have quadrupled for passage through the zone,
which is classified as a war zone. However, these increased premiums have not yet
had an impact on energy prices in Europe,19 nor have they led to the re-routing of
traffic through the Cape of Good Hope. Only a few shipping companies have used
that route instead of the Suez Canal, because of the ensuing delays (rounding the
African continent would add 10 days to shipping times and increase fuel costs by
US$800,000 to US$2.7 million, depending on the size of the vessel).
Impact on victims
29. As of 31 December 2010, pirates held 612 people and 26 vessels hostage.
Nearly 250 additional hostages have been taken since the resumption of piracy
operations in the fall of 2010, following the monsoon season. In all, since
12 December 2008 (a period of two years), pirates have held close to 1,90020 people
and 105 vessels21 off the coast of Somalia.
30. As a result of growing pressure by the instigators of piracy, the remoteness of
areas of operation, and the increase in ransoms sought, the level of violence
involved during attacks, detention and ransom negotiation tends to be higher. With
the steady increase in ransoms demanded, the average period of detention is also
growing, now standing at 120 days22 (11 months in the case of the Chandler
couple). Some traumatized victims prefer not to testify about the psychological
torture and mock executions which they endured. Lastly, crew members used as
human shields and slaves to the pirates seem sometimes to be forgotten by their
employer, the ship owner and the insurer.
31. Efforts to bring the phenomenon under control are complicated by the extreme
seriousness of the situation and developments in piracy operations since October 2010
(establishment of logistical bases in the south of Somalia controlled by Al-Shabaab;
shift of areas of operation to the east and the south close to the Kenyan, Tanzanian
and Seychelles shorelines threatening energy supplies to East Africa; stagnation and
even increase in the success rate of attacks; violence against victims). The
__________________
17 Source: EU NAVFOR.
18 Source: IMO.
19 Following the capture of the Sirius Star, a Saudi oil tanker, the price of a barrel of oil was
reported to have increased by one dollar, without any clear cause-and-effect relationship being
established.
20 The exact number is reportedly 1,890, but may not be reliable, as it is based on, among other
things, statements from the companies.
21 Source: EU NAVFOR. This figure reflects the number of boats for which ransom payments were
being negotiated, to the knowledge of the naval forces. Certain dhows hijacked for exclusively
logistical purposes or for use as “mother ships” may not be included in this total.
22 Source: EU NAVFOR.
S/2011/30
18 11-20621
international community is involved in a sprint with the pirates and it must respond
more effectively.
32. The counter-piracy effort has many weaknesses. It can only succeed if a
series of convergent measures are taken to address the different links of the
chain. Action is thus required on two fronts:
– Keeping up the effort and reinforcing the solutions currently being
implemented;
– Applying new solutions urgently.
I. Improving on current solutions
A. Operational component of counter-piracy
33. At the operational level, two types of measure are essential:
– Merchant ships must protect themselves by systematically implementing best
management practices;
– Naval operations should be conducted in order to escort vulnerable ships,
discourage and thwart attacks, and arrest the pirates with a view to possible
prosecution.
1. Extending the scope of self-protection measures
34. The best management practices defined by the maritime community and
disseminated in particular by IMO remain the best tool for protection against acts of
piracy. They include passive protection measures to discourage attacks, and
defensive measures to counter the pirates in the event of an attack. Ships that
comply with the best management practices can more easily thwart attacks or hold
out until naval forces respond, thereby avoiding capture. The European Union has
played a central coordinating role: in February 2009, it established the Maritime
Security Centre — Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), which is linked in particular with
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO).23
– The first best management practice is advance registration with MSCHOA,
which assesses the ship’s vulnerability (e.g. speed lower than 15 knots, a
minimum freeboard lesser than 5 metres, reduced manoeuvrability, weak or
defective propulsion), and registration with UKMTO on arrival in the zone.
MSCHOA then organizes group transit convoys adapted to the ship’s
vulnerability and travelling in a monitored zone, depending on the available
naval capacity.
– The other best management practices include advance staff training and
installation of a citadel, razor wire and additional non-lethal defensive
measures, depending on the characteristics of the ship and the needs identified
by the ship’s master.
__________________
23 UK-MTO is based in Dubai.
Annex 9
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to the UN Security
Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia, S/2015/801, 19 October 2015 (Submission
of the full document corresponding to Annex 23 of Somalia’s Reply)
Ued Na S/2015/801
Securit Council D.: Geea
19 Ocbe 2015
Oa: E
15-16012 (E) 201015
*1516012*
Letter dated 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the
Security Council
O beaf f e Sec Cc Cee a e 751
(1992) ad 1907 (2009) cce Saa ad Eea, ad accdace
aaa 47 f Sec Cc e 2182 (2014), I ae e
a ee e e Saa f e M G Saa ad
Eea.
I cec, e Cee d aecae f e ee ee,
ee e eced e, ee b e ae f e ebe f
e Sec Cc ad ed a a dce f e Cc.
(Signed) Rafae Da Rae Carreo
Ca
Sec Cc Cee a
e 751 (1992) ad 1907 (2009)
cce Saa ad Eea
S/2015/801
2/322 15-16012
Letter dated 22 September 2015 from the members of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair
of the Securit Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
We ae e a ee e e fc Saa f e
M G Saa ad Eea accdace aaa 47 f
Sec Cc e 2182 (2014).
(Signed) Ce Trajber
Cda
M G Saa ad Eea
(Signed) Nca Argeros
Face ee
(Signed) Zea Aad
Ta ee
(Signed) Ja Bahadur
Aed ee
(Signed) Bda Chetreanu
Face ee
(Signed) Dde Clanc
Haaa ee
(Signed) Jae Smith
Rea ee
S/2015/801
15-16012 3/322
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia
Ce
Page
Sa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Spoiler politics and the capture of State resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C. Public financial management and misappropriation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
D. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
E. Piracy and kidnap for ransom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
III. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A. Denial of humanitarian access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B. Attacks on humanitarian workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
IV. Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A. Targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B. Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and
forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
V. Arms embargo regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with the conditions of the partial
lifting of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B. Obligations of Member States and regional and international organizations . . . . . . . . . . . 40
C. Standing exemptions from the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
D. Documentation of captured weaponry and military equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
E. Implementation of paragraphs 10 and 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
F. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
VI. Violations of the ban on charcoal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A. Production and export of charcoal in southern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
B. Maritime interdiction and vessel tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
C. Falsified documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
S/2015/801
4/322 15-16012
VII. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
VIII. Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
IX. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A. Threats to peace and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B. Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
C. Arms embargo regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
D. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
E. Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
F. Violations of the ban on charcoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
G. Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Aee*
Saa
1. Spoiler politics and the capture of State resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.1. Formation of Interim Galmudug Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.2. Bribery of Federal Members of Parliament** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2. Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.1. Sale of fishing licences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2. The Al Amal and Poseidon, and the assault on the Auditor General . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.3. C aa f Saa ae ace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4. Hijackings of the Iranian dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber by pirates linked to
Maed Oa Maed Gafae** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.5. Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3. Public financial management and misappropriation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.1. Somali National Army financial management and misappropriation** . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.2. Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.3. Misappropriation of funds for Mogadishu port rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.4. Illegal agreement relating to the taxation of khat imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.1. Mogadishu hotel attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.2. Garissa University College attack** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.3. Failed January 2015 Al-Shabaab plot in Djibouti** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
__________________
* Te aee ae be ccaed e aae f b ad fa ed.
** Aee 1.2, 2.4, 3.1, 4.2.e, 4.3, 6.1.a, 6.2.b ad 6.3.b ae bee cded e ee
dce becae e ae c cfdea.
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4.4. Al-Shabaab and heroin trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
5. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.1. Denial of humanitarian access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5.2. Bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct access . . . . . . . 212
5.3. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
6. Violations of international law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
6.1. Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians** . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
6.2. The situation of the Wagosha/Bantu community in Al-Shabaab-held areas of
Lower and Middle Jubba** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
6.3. Commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians
in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, December 2013-2015** . . . . . . . . . 241
6.4. Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed
conflict and forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
7. Arms embargo regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
7.1. Management of weapons, ammunition and military equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
7.2. Compliance with the exemption framework and with notification requirements
under the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
7.3. Federal Government of Somalia compliance with reporting requirements under the
arms embargo partial lift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
7.4. Military equipment captured during offensive operations by AMISOM and Federal
Government of Somalia security forces: implementation of paragraph 6 of
resolution 2182 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
7.5. Enhancing compliance: international assistance to the Federal Government of
Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
7.6. Implementation of, and recommendations related to, modifications of the arms
embargo stipulated in resolution 2182 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
8. Violations of the charcoal ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
8.1. Charcoal stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
8.2. Kismayo charcoal operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
8.3. MSV Raj Milan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
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Summar
Mc a caed ce Pede Haa Se Mad a eeced
Pede f e Fedea Gee f Saa ae 2012. S f e
Afca U M Saa (AMISOM) eabed fca ea a
be ade aa Haaaa a-Sabaab a-Maad (A-Sabaab). Tee e
e ea ada ae bee eabed, ea a e fedea a f
Saa a cee. A e e ae da e a, ee, e
e f ca, be ad ca e cae Sae ece
ae eeed. Te f ee ece b e e ee e
deee f a ce ca aaee, ad eae dee e
a a ade aa A-Sabaab. Caa ee a ee
Saa ca ee e e -e a f Sae-bd e e
-e cae f Sae ece. Te fae d , a Saa ee e e
ae f a 2016, ee a fca ea e -e eace,
ec ad ab f Saa. A ee A-Sabaab aea cea abe
e e fae f e cdae c, eab ca
ada, de ec ad bd bc .
C e ad acce Saa ad ad ae ece ee ceed
befe e cae f e Sae 1991. A-Sabaab adae e e
c f e ad cea Saa, e, bded a dee ed
eca cfc e ad ad ae ece. A -Sabaab f e
e face f a defea, ad e abece f abe aeae ca
ada ace, ae eed e e-eeece f eca
cfc a f e ad cea Saa. A-Sabaab a eeaed
cfc adaae. Te eaece f ea deee eca
cfc e ad, ae ad e aa ece e eae e abe
e f Saad ad Pad dee e eed f ceee
aace ca-ee ece-a aeee.
Te 2012 Pa C ad fedeaa ce ae
ed e e eed f aa ece-a aeee. Te f
Saa ea ad ae ea b ae cae ee a fca
ea a fae ee. Maaed effece b ebe ad effece
, e a ece ea d cbe e ee f
Saa ec ad e. Te M G ea
Sa O & Ga Hd Ld., c eeaed a Sa Gee ffca
acceed ae f e ca de e e f a caac-bd
ae, a deaed a c d e e. Te ccef
eea f ee caac-bd ae d be a eee
f e deee f e eace ec Saa.
Te ad dece ac ff e ca f Saa ce 2012 a bee e
e f eea eff ad eae. Te eed ee f ae
eade e ece cae f Iaa f d ee a a ede,
ee, a e cd ad a aed e e f ac ae ea.
We e ea ed b ac eca ee ea , e M
G cceed a ea, eed ad eaed f b fe
ee a e-eab e cfc dac ca f ce a
cbed e e f ac a decade a. Te dece ac a fed b
a ceae e eea ae ee ee e e fee
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15-16012 7/322
ec ad de ae ec ece. A dec ad eaa aaee
f Saa ae ece a , e ac f ea ad e
e ec ceae a e ce f e f fedea ad ea ffca
aca e ae f f cece eeb fe c.
Me bad, c ce dee eff ebd effece
Saa. Te fac a e ce f a debae b
e e dec-a bd f e Fedea Gee f Saa e
He f e Pee a be feced ca ae ebe
deae e ee c c ede e fae ce f Saeb
d. Cedabe eff ae bee ade e e ce f e adae
ee faca ea ad ee e e. We e
M G c a ed ce, effece adde
e ee f aa Saa ee eac ef eed
bed Saa faca . Te ac f effece ca e e
e bde f e Sa Naa A a eabed e f ec
aa, cd f de ae. Te b ec afca f
c aa e eed f a ceee aac
ee ef. Pede Haa Se Mad acee
9 Seebe 2015 f ee faca ef e ec ec a
ece f e ce.
Te ab f e ec fce defed e Sa ee f A -Sabaab
a bee eed d adae. Te ccef ea f eea e
eade aea ae de e de A-Sabaab ce ad caac
deabe e e. A-Sabaab f f acc, cd e e
cea aac a ae b AMISOM ad e Sa Naa
A cae f dee cce, aca e e c e AMISOM
bde ad caee f Sa Naa A ae. A -Sabaab
aa a ab ada ca ccace ad e eaee
e ec ad eace acece. I e face f aed adace aa e
ad ae d, e ca da, bcade eea e f
eac e beaed a, ad a e ec eece
ffce eaeed deaed befe aa. A a adace
ce, AMISOM, e Sa Naa A ad aed fce ae eced ,
ea e bae cea eabe aac. Te e -e ac f e
a aac AMISOM , c a e Lee (26 Je 2015) ad Jaae
(1 Seebe 2015), a e be f aecaed.
Rae a eae A-Sabaab, e ea dacee f e
f a ba cee Saa a ed fe ead e bade
H f Afca e. N-eae Kea a eed a aa e
aac e e ce f e adae. A-Sabaab ce be abe e
eae e acc deaa ac, a deaed aac
Gaa Ue A 2015. Tee eed f a ea cdaed
aac e ea ed b A-Sabaab ad e fdaea a f
e H f Afca.
Te aa f f e a eba dced Sec C c
e 2093 (2013) a ed, e aa, b e eed ee e
caac f Sa dec fce cf e a ea ed b
A-Sabaab. Te M G ce ecee e a c fce
ea -eed d . We e G ca e effece e
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e f a aea ee Saa eae, ea abe
accae ae ee c a aea be dbed aae ,
deed, c eed. I aca, e adad f e e
c, e ad ce f Fedea Gee ec fce ce
fa fa f e Cc eee. W e eeece f e ea
ada, ad a cea be f b aa ad fe ec
fce ee Saa, cea a def c ec
fce ae ebe a aea de e Sec Cc a
eba, ad c e ba e cee c.
Ta a f e ec fce ee Saa ae beeed ae aeed
ca ee a a debeae acc f a, ece f ca ecc
a dae e f fce fe ceae e eed f e
aae e. Pca, ecca ad ca ecded ce
ce eeece dae a f eaa aaa a,
efec e dee-ed afca f Sa ce. A-Sabaab ced e
ee a aa ca a d e ce f e
adae aca ead e fced ece f cde. A e
ae e, e abe f aaed ce b a-A-Sabaab fce
de a effece ece f e ad aeae e ce
f e ee Sae. Te ae dacee f ee d e adae
ee caed b e fced ec f e be f ea daced ad
ce f ba cee Saa.
Haaa acce eaed eee fae, aca a A -Sabaab
bcaded e ad e. Eff b ce ae c -
ad eac beef f aaa ea ced e ab
f ea b a e ab afe ac dffee e f c. Te
be f ea aa ad aac aaa e e, 10
aaa e be ed ad 17 ed f Jaa J 2015 ae.
Redced bde, e c f ea a a e f acce ca, e
eed ae eeed ec ad de a added e ee
cace ece.
Te eaa ade Sa caca ce a e ca
ec ad a caed. Sce e ece f e c f Baae
Le Sabee Ocbe 2014, A-Sabaab e c a a e
e. F e ae f a ffca e caca edae
f e cae f Baae, e M G beee a e ade
Baae a ceaed. A e ade ce fe , A -Sabaab ea
ae f ce deed f a bee fca edced. Ea 2015, fa
eee f caca ed ae b A-Sabaab ace bc ad
de f f e ade e. A f Mebe Sae
ad aa aa ae a ceaed e b f e ade,
ceeae eed b caca-e ee ad defca ad
ac, cbed e c e f fae dcea, ae added
e caee f e a Sa caca ed b Mebe Sae.
Eaee e Fedea Gee f Saa ed aed
d e ce f adae. Te M G eceed
e ea f deaed fca f ec ad faca
ae. Te G fad c ad ee ea e
Gee.
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I. Introduction
A. Mandate
1. Te adae f e M G Saa ad Eea caed
aaa 46 f Sec Cc e 2182 (2014), aded 24 Ocbe
2014, ad aaa 13 f e 2060 (2012). Adda a ee aed
e G de e 2093 (2013) ad 2142 (2014).
2. Pa aaa 46 f e 2182 (2014) ad aaa 13 () f
e 2060 (2012), e M G ded e Sec Cc,
e Cee a e 751 (1992) ad 1 907 (2009)
cce Saa ad Eea, a de bef 8 A 2015. Te G
a bed e e e Cee adae.
3. I e ce f e ea, ebe f e M G
aeed Baa, Be, Caada, Db, Ea, Face, Leba,
Maaa, Na, Oa, Qaa, Secee, Sae, Saa, S Afca,
Sede, Sead, Te, e Ued Aab Eae, e Ued Kd f
Gea Ba ad Ne Iead ad e Ued Sae f Aeca. I Saa,
ebe f e G ee abe deae ea Mad, Haea
ad Gae, ad ce Ka.
4. Te M G a baed Nab ad ced e f
ee: Ce Tabe (Cda), Nca Ae (face), Zea Aad
(a), Dde Cac (aaa), Jae S (ea), Bda Ceea
(face) ad Ja Baad (aed ).
B. Methodolog
5. Te edea adad ad efca cee ed e e
e f e M G a cdced d e adae de
ee. Te G eaffed ed a e e. Te
ed ed f e ee e a f:
(a) Cec fa ee ad c f e ce,
ee be;
(b) Cec fa f ce f-ad ede f
ee, ee be;
(c) Idef cec ae f fa ad ca
e ede e fa ad ee ed;
(d) C fac e eee ad dee f e eea
ee f e M G ad e cece aee f e G
ead e cedb f fa ad e eab f ce;
(e) Oba ca, ac, ad, de ad/ dcea
edece f e fa ceced.
6. Te M G ade a debeae ad eac eff a acce
e ed a b a f dda dec ede
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ee dec ede ab dea f a. O e cca,
e G a abe e f-ad ace a.
7. Te M G eeed a de ae f ce eea
fa, cd ee ffca ad eeeae f dac
, c ce aa ad ad aece. Mebe f e G e
a ee ffca, cd e Pede ad e, ad
eeeae f ec aece. Te G a e ccaed
ffca f e Pad ad Saad ada, eeeae f
ca ad aed , defec ad ebe f be ce ad
Sa c ce.
8. I cf dace ded b e Cee, e M
G edeaed cde a c f e e ad edece a be
fa e. Hee, Geea Aeb e e c ad
a f dcea, aca e 52/214, 53/208 ad 59/265,
eceaed e eee e f aee, ee c f e bace f
be aaed. I add, ea ecde e e f a, a
ad ca e a e. Te G ded eea aea e
Cee a ba adae.
9. I accdace e Secea-Geea be fa e,
cafca ad ad (ST/SGB/2007/6), e M G a bed
e Cee, ee e ee e, eea c cfdea
aee ca fa e dce a be deea e e
fc f e Ued Na e efae ad afe f aff d
ae a ae e Oaa ea ba. Te aee
be ed a a dce f e Sec Cc.
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia
A. Spoiler politics and the capture of State resources
10. Haaaa a-Sabaab a-Maad (A-Sabaab) ce ee a
eee ea eace ad ec Saa ad e H f Afca.
Te ee ea ed b A-Sabaab e e, ad e
e-eeece f eca cfc e ad cea Saa, ee,
cea ed e ab f e Fedea Gee f Saa, e
Fedea Paae f Saa ad e e ea ada fe
ecca ce ad aae ca cee ad effece
adde edec c.
11. Sfca ea adace aa A-Sabaab b e Afca U
M Saa (AMISOM), e Sa Naa A ad e e
aed fce ce e ed f e a ae bee aced b e
ea f e caac f e Fedea Gee f Saa e e
ea ada aa ec ad ffe a aeae f f
eace. W caac aa ec, dee ed
eca cfc ae e-ee. A A-Sabaab cede e, e
a ced e e e-eeece f eca cfc ec
a ca aaed a.
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12. F a a Saa ca ad be ee, e cae ad
ec f Sae ece ba cee f e ae ecedece e e
cda f a effece f f eace ad e ea f bc
ece. Te ce fc -e a eae e -e cce f a
fae ca ce. W eae ce a Saa e
be e ca ce, e ade ce e ed f e a a be
eeed, e ceaed eca cfc ad cea a ace f
a fdaea f ce ffe aeae a ab.
Federaliation
13. Te fedeaa ce aab eee e fca ca
deee e ad cea Saa ce e cae f e Sae 1991.
F e a decade f cae, ee a fedea e a
bd be a fdabe caee, ad e a d ecea, ad ,
cea. Te caab f e dda ead e ce f
fedeaa ad e ce e ce aeed f e ed
f e a ee eae f c cea a be effece aaed
ad cfc ed.
Iei Jbba Adiiai
14. I A 2013, e Fedea Gee f Saa ad e cce b
acce e fa f e Ie Jbba Ada, c ca a
e Ged, Mdde Jba ad Le Jba Re de e eade f Aed
Madbe (Maed Zbe/Oade/Dad). Te eb ce Kea
ad Ea aed a eae e e ce a e Fedea Gee f
Saa, Ea a cfeece f e Ieeea A
Deee a eed e Add Ababa Aeee f Seebe 2013, c
cceeded e e f cca beee e Ie Jbba
Ada ad e Fedea Gee f Saa. Maea (Dad)
ce e f e a fedea ebe Sae, aca Ged
Re, ee ae ecded f fa ce ad a c ae ae
ed e e ea ada. A c e f ca dace
ce beee e Oade ad Maea ca, a eae ee
e e cd e D ad Mfe ca, a e a Sa Ba
ce ae effece bee deed f e ce.
15. I Ma 2015 e Ie Jbba Ada eabed a Rea Aeb
f 75 eeeae. Aed Madbe ada, c ed e ce, a
edae acced f aa e D ad Mfe ca b ae
aeae e Maea e aa Oade dace. Fedea Gee f
Saa Mebe f Paae decaed e e ce b ad a
e f cfdece aa e Rea Aeb, e ae fa,
e beee ada Ka, Mad, Bada ad Gae.1 I
A 2015, ea afe e Add Ababa Aeee ad e e,
__________________
1 Te D- ad Mfe-daed Ie S-We Ada a ced
e aaa f D ad Mfe ca e Ie Jbba Ada Rea
Aeb e e ada f e Maeeee (Dad)-daed Pad Sae f
Saa acced e Fedea Gee f Saa ad e Fedea Paae f Saa f
efe ea affa.
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e Jbba Rea Aeb ed f e e-ae f Aed Madbe.
Ha eced ae e, ea Seebe 2015 Aed Madbe aeed
ee ad ece e Rea Aeb.
16. I A ad Seebe 2015, eff ee de a b a ae f
aed fce f AMISOM ece e e
f e c f A-Sabaab. I aeca a ba cee c a
Badee, f e ea f A-Sabaab, ce fce ae ceed
adae c. Fe , Gabaae, a da afe aae
ecc dffeece e ca Maea-daed ada Ged
Re, 8 A 2015 e Ie Jbba Ada fed e e ad
e ca eade f A a-Sa a-Jaaa, Maed Abd Ka,
dea ad e f a cfe b ca ce f e Ea
Naa Defece Fce.
Iei Sh-We Adiiai
17. Te fa f e Ie S-We Ada 2014 a
cced fca f e Fedea Gee f Saa. Te
ce a e de a befe e ffca bea e aca
ac ad ae, dded ca beee e a cae Ba,
Ba ad Le Sabee Re, ad e cde Ged, Mdde Jbba
ad Le Jbba a e. W aace f e Fedea Gee f Saa,
e f e fe eea eeed c de e eade
f e fe Face Me ad Seae f Paae f e Taa
Fedea Gee, Saf Haa Se Ada, Nebe 2014. Saf Haa
a bee acced f e fed ada, a be,
Maed Abd Madee a e ade, ad ee, Ma ed
Abda Ma, a Sae Me f Pedec.2
Iei Gadg Adiiai
18. Ha faed ead e cee Ka ad Bada, e Fedea
Gee f Saa aed a fa e ace e e eabe f e
Ie Gad Ada, c ca cae Gaadd ad
Md Re.3 I A 2014, e M f Ie Affa ad Fedea
eabed a ecca cee ad aed eec ca eeeae
acae a ecca cfeece ad Sae fa ce, ad ae
eec ebe f a Rea Aeb. Te G eceed e e f
efeece e eec f e Ca f e ecca cee b e
ead ca aca, Da Jadd ad Aa Se, e fe
ec e eec f efeed caddae, Ha Ia Iba Yae.
Te eec f e ca eeeae ad bee e ebe f e
Rea Aeb a a aed b aea f efeece b e
a aede e ce.4
__________________
2 Madee ad eed a ede f e SW3 ca befe ad e be e a
eee SW6 a baed ad e Ie S-We Ada a eabed.
3 I ea cea ee e Ie Gad Ada ca e f Md
Re.
4 Te M G a eeed dcea dea e de f aca
ebe f e ecca cee e eec f ca eeeae ad ebe f e
ea aeb.
S/2015/801
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19. A a ef fac f e ca ce f A a-Sa
a-Jaaa ed e Sae fa ce f e e, ca a e
a e a Cea Re Sae Fa Aeee a
e eae eeeae f A a-Sa a-Jaaa. Cfc beee A
a-Sa a-Jaaa ad e Sa Naa A eed ad ad e
f Ge e Gaadd Re ae 2014. Te Sae fa ce
bee ced e ee f A a-Sa a-Jaaa ad,
J 2014, f a ce aed b aea f e b ad e
f ca ae a, eed e eec f Abda Ged a
e a f Pede Haa Se Mad a ede f e e
ea ada. Te debae e e e ee f e a Gad
fedea ebe Sae a feed e Pad ad eaeed e-e
cfc e f Saa fae e. Mee, a f Seebe 2015, a
fac f A a-Sa a-Jaaa ea c f e Gaadd,
cd e e ea ada decaed caa, Daaeb .5
20. Ae 1.1 de dea e fa f e Ie Gad
Ada.
Federal Parliament otes for cash
21. Mebe f e He f e Pee f e Fedea Paae ae aed
eee e cece, ee ad cae e f e Fedea
Gee f Saa, ad ee ad ad ea. Te Fedea
Paae e e a e Saa ca deee
aed ee deede e e ad deedece f ebe.
Te M G a dceed e eee abe f e ee
f Mebe f e Fedea Paae. We a ae abed
Paae, aca e f cfdece aa a Pe M e,
fca be f Mebe f Paae e e e e e
bdde. Te acce f e f ca eaed a a e f be
a eeed ce e ed f e a, aed ca e aeace f
Mebe f Paae ad eae e a efe. Be ed
ee e ee f ee Pede Haa Se Mad e.
Me bad, bae f fece ae f Paae beee e ead
ca-e aca: Da Jadd, aed e Pede, ad Aa
Se, .
22. Sc cfdea ae 1.2 de dea e eaece f bbe f
Mebe f Paae.
Independent commissions
23. Te deede c adaed b e 2012 Pa C
ee deed de e ce f fedeaa ad e cda
f -a ca aaee. If eabed ad accd
e ce f e Pa C, e c d ae added
eac e ca ce f e ed f e a, ad eed a
e ade f a e e fedea ada 2016.
__________________
5 Te Gad de a bee aded b e Fedea Gee f Saa e
cea f a e ea ada ca Ha ad Mdde Sabee Re.
S/2015/801
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24. I ee ea, ad e e ce f aaea e, Mebe f
Paae ae ccef eabed f f e e deede
c adaed b e 2012 Pa C. Te Pa
C Ree ad Ieea C, c f fe ebe,
a eabed Ma 2014, a 20 e Fedea Gee f
Saa e. We a a aed f be bad eeeae ad
ced f cee dda, e caee f ace a ee
c ade aae. O 5 Ma 2015, e C Ca, Aa Gee
De, eed f e C, c a eea ac f a e
e ce f e c ad a ac f fd f e C. 6
25. Te Bdae ad Fedea C a fa eabed 6 J
2015, da afe e eabe f e d e ea ada
Gad, a e beee ada Adad ad Gae e e
e bde f e a fedea ebe Sae ee . Te Naa
Ideede Eeca C a eabed e ae da. Tee ee
ae, a aaea cee aced a e Paae ad e Fedea
Gee f Saa ad aeed a eea eec baed ea ffae
d be ed 2016, c e e f ece ad ca . 7
26. Te ed eff ade b b e Fedea Gee ad e Fedea
Paae f Saa eab ad ee a deede bde
e a ac f ee a dae ad e e e f e
Sa ee, de e eac f e ce ad a
cce ab e ce b c e e fedea ee be
eabed 2016.
Conclusions
27. Te M G a e aed f e ea ea eace,
ec ad ab ed b e e Saa ( S/2013/413). Te
G a decbed e ae b e ca ad be ee cae
Sae ece e fedeaa ce ae ee deaed ace
bced ecca eff. Iead f ee f e d ef b
A-Sabaab f ea ce aa e , eff ea fced
ec a ba cee. Te fae f b e Fedea Gee
ad e Fedea Paae f Saa eab c-eeded aead
f e e a ae 2016 a ac f a e c e
ee f e fe ede e f e a. A ee A-Sabaab e
a e ec a a abaded b e fedeaa ad
Sae-bd ce. Eff ee e eaee f e aede
e ca ce e - e 2016 eec ae e
ca ce, ad b d eae b e fae a ade ece
ea ad e -e eace, ec ad ab f Saa.
__________________
6 A ffca aa f Aa Gee De ea ee ed fe e
M G.
7 See Maed Se N, Saa ca a eec e Pede a e,
Bloomberg Business, 30 J 2015. Aaabe f ://.bbe.c/e/ace/
2015-07-29/aa-ca-a--eec-e-ede--a-ba.
S/2015/801
15-16012 15/322
B. Natural resources
28. Cfc e Sa e aca e ad cea
Saa a eed ad acce fee ad ad ae ece.
Hca, c cfc ae eded e da, ada aa
ad a e ca aa eae, fe aed aca ad
a-aa ce. Te eece f a , f e, ada
de A-Sabaab e ad cea Saa ae bded eca
cfc e ad ad ae ece. Te ea f A -Sabaab a a e
a a e a ceaed a e ac, ee e Fedea
Gee f Saa e fed e ea ada
ffce abe f , e ebd effece ca ada caabe
f aa ec. Tee a bee a aed ceae eca cfc
ce e ed f e a 2012, ed b ca ad eaa ac
a e ea f A-Sabaab ae a aacea f e eace ad ec f
Saa ad e bade H f Afca e.
29. Cce, ee a bee a fca ceae eaa ee
aa ece Saa. Pae cae ae bee eae ace e
dee f A-Sabaab ad e a f a e ea f eae ca, de
e a e ae f ea f Saa ea ad ae ece. A
ec aeee ed Sa O & Ga Hd Ld. A
2013 b a ed decade f fce aee cd decaed b
cae e ad cea Saa. Te cac ed Saa -
Fad Ld. a aed e a f a eeed ea e fee
ec. Te f ee Saa ea ad ae ece a
bee aced b eff eab effece ea f e aaee ad
a f ece ea e ad fe fedea ebe Sae, a
e cce e e ec f a e ae f ece cfc e H
f Afca.
Intercommunal conflict oer land and ater resources
30. I Saad, a eaed eae caed b A -Sabaab ad
a eced a deee f ab ce e d-1990, ad de eee
e ead cae f cfc. Te G ecded a ea 45 cde eaed
ad de beee Seebe 2014 ad A 2015 e e caed b
Saad. Lad-eaed cfc eed e bed e bed S ad
Saaa Re, e Saad ae ee a ee f
eae adde e be. Te cea ed f ea ece
c aea, ed b aeca f e ceca ae f ad,
dcae e ea be a a be faced e ad cea Saa
e ce cfc ae ae ece.
31. Sadc e-Maeeee (Ha/Dad) cae ae ced Pad
e b ba ad a ad. I e Md Re a
de e c f e Ie Gad Ada e beee
Maea (Dad) ad Habe Ged (Hae) b-ca e ad e eed
cfc ae 2014 ad aa ea 2015 ad ad e f Saa
ea e Ea bde. Lad-eaed cfc Mdde Sabee Re beee
e da Abaa (Hae) ca ad Sde (Ba) ce
aea ae bee eeded b a-Abaa cae 2015. Sce e G
S/2015/801
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e e (S/2014/726) eca cfc Le Sabee Re,
a a f e Ie S-We Ada, a ced ad
fe f aba dee a ecca eff. I Ha, Haade
a, ed b e Sa Naa A, ae aced f ece aac e
ae f Kabae ad Def de Bee Wee a ae eae
dace e Se fa c f e ad a e fee ba f e
Sabee Re (ee ae 6.3.a ad c cfdea ae 6.3.b) .
32. I Mdde Jba ed b A-Sabaab e-ca cfc
beee Dbaae (Ha/Dad), Aaa (Oade/Dad) ad Sea
(Hae) ca e aead be ea 2015. A-Sabaab ae
ecce e ce Bae ee ae ccef, e
eae eca ea e aea aead f e Jba
Cd ffee ed b AMISOM ad aed a-A-Sabaab fce. Te Jba
Vae, e e e eace f e Sabee Re, a bee e cee f fece
cea e ad ce befe cae f e Sa Sae 1991. 8 Te
M G cceed a, f e ea f A -Sabaab f e
e, ca aaed ce ffe a e ad f a
e ce f fee aca ad f ceca ea
a e e eace f e Jba Re.
The re-emergence of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
33. Te M G debed Je Te f e Fd ad Ace
Oaa f e Ued Na ded ea Haea, Saad,
29 A 2015 e ca d f f b e eeed be
f ea, eed ad eaed f Saa ae.
34. A 3,300 , e cae f Saa e e cea Afca. Te
c 200 aca e ece ecc e dce ad ae
eed f d, ca b a f ece, c a a,
ad eea deea f ad cacea ece. Ta adaae f e ed
ae eace caab f e Fedea Gee f Saa, a
fe ee f Sa ae cae f ea a a ad e
Fedea Gee f Saa Fee La, ee cece
fed dce, ad e daa a Sa a. 9
35. Iea, eed ad eaed f eee a fca ea
eace ad ec Saa. Iea f fee ced a a cb
fac e eeece f ac Saa a ea a e d -1990, a fe
ee cae cfc ca fee, bea e
ac a ea.10 Te dac e Sa ac 2007 ed a
ced deceae fe f ee ea Saa
__________________
8 Caee Beea ad Lee V. Caae, ed., The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The
War Behind the War (Ld, Haa Pb, 1996).
9 Fedea M f Fee ad Mae Rece ad e, Re eed ea,
eed ad eaed f ace e ece ecc e f Saa, ae
eeed a e 19 e f e Ida Ocea Ta C, ed Ba, Rebc f
Kea, f 27 A 1 Ma 2015, ad dafed b e Fd ad Ace O aa f
e Ued Na (FAO) beaf f e Fedea Gee f Saa.
10 See, f eae, Ja Baad, The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World (Ne Y,
Pae B, 2011).
S/2015/801
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ece ecc e.11 Hee, e a d ae ac a e
ca f Saa ce 2012 a eed fe fee e f e
Sa ba.12 Te e dac f cfc beee ea, eed ad
eaed f ee ad ca fee ad a a cee
e-eeed, aca cea Saa.
36. I e cae f e f d Aresh, e Gad Ca Gad aeed
120 f Hb 1 A 2015.13 Afe e ae, e ceebe ad a
caa aceded a e ad bee f ea. Gad ae
aeed e ee a $100,000 fe c a ad ad e ee eeaed b
16 A 2015.14 O 23 A 2015 e Iaa-faed d Al Momen a eed
ff Qadaa, Pad, b b Sa ec deace, ad
bee eeaed cde. O 13 Ma 2015, e Iaa d Sudis
eeeced ecaca fae ad a ad ea Mae cea Saa. T e
d 14 ceebe ee eed caed b A-Sabaab; e fae
ea a e e f .15
37. Te M G cceed a e e f fe fee Sa
ae, f ce e ee ad eed aed ec deace,
eee a ea e eace, ec ad ab f Saa. Sc acce
eae ead cfc ca fee ad cca f
fe, b a a e a ae ee f ca ce a
a c cbed e e f Sa ac e a a decade a.
Continuing priatiation of Somalias maritime space
38. Te M G cceed ab e c eaece f ae
ae ec f Saa ee ae ca ae
de Ca Gad ad/ c ece. I a be f cae, c ae
ec cae ae a bee aed b ca ae e f
cece ad aa Saa ae ece, c ce, a a ,
a cfc f ee. Oe c ca, Saa Fad Ld., a ed
e M G e e (S/2014/726, ae 5.1). Te M
G e cce a Saa a acce f e ae cae
e da e f e f cece ad aa ae ec ed
a ea eace ad ab. Sc cae ae eed fe ce , ee
e f d fe f ee aed ad, aa ead
ea cfc ca fee ad caa ce.
39. D e adae, ae cae Sa Sec Sece Ld.
ad A Saad Rece Ld. ae eeed aeee Pad
ad Saad, eece, de ece ea e fee ec.
Tee cac ae dced ae 2.3.
__________________
11 Fedea M f Fee ad Mae Rece ad e, Re eed ea,
eed ad eaed f ace e ece ecc e f Saa
(ee fe 10).
12 Ibd.
13 Ibd.
14 M G ee a FAO ffca Nab, 21 Ma 2015.
15 Ifa f e Eea U Naa Fce, eceed b e-a b e M G,
28 Ma 2015.
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Potential corruption in the sale of fishing licences
40. I e f 2014, e M G ced eae ac f
c a deed bc e de f aa
faca f, e e eea f cea ae f
de b de f bc ffce ad c ea acce aa
ece b aeeee f ee ffce (S/2014/726, aa. 62). I
, e G a defed e c ae f f cec e fe ce a
a aee f Fedea Gee f Saa ad e Sa ffca
aae bc ece.
41. Te G a fd edece f e ae f f cece, b b Fedea
Gee f Saa ad Pad ffca, cdced de e eee-
ae aaa f e Sae. F ace, ce Ma 2015 e Fedea
Gee f Saa M f Fee ad Mae Rece a bee
cece Cee e ad e ceed a ae
ea ba acc Db,16 cae f e ea de f
Feba 2014 e a Fedea Gee f Saa aece cae
eee e Tea Se Acc a e Cea Ba f Saa
(S/2014/726, aa. 64). Te G ed e dea f ba acc e
Fedea Gee f Saa M f Face 18 J 2015. 17
42. Te G a baed a daf aeee beee e Fedea Ge e f
Saa M f Fee ad Mae Rece ad Da Da
Eee G, a aa f ca baed La, Ca. Te
aeee a Da Da a ee-ea ece aa f
Saa ece ecc e, ad a e ca b
aed ec bad f ee ad fe ffce Saa,
c d e ce a a f e a eba. Te daf aeee
e Da Da Eee G e ae 2.1.e.
Fishing essel A Aa and the assault on the Federal Goernment of Somalia
Auditor General
43. O 15 Jaa 2015, e Yee-eeed f cae ee Al Amal
eeed Mad f e Sa fa, eed de efe. Te
Ad Geea f e Fedea Gee f Saa, N Jae Faa,
cdced a ec f e Al Amal, ad deeed a a f ea.
A Faa aeed d e ee, a eeaed 15 Jaa 2015
de c ccace ad deaed Mad .
44. I a ee c bced ca eda, 18 Jaa 2015 e Ad
Geea a eeed f ee ffce a Va Saa ad eed
aaed b e cd ad. Faa d e M G a e
beeed ac eaed e Al Amal ad b e aac, ad a e
ad ce ed ea ea, eed ad eaed f becae
e feaed f afe.18
__________________
16 Ce f Fedea Gee f Saa cece ed b e M ad eace
ae eeed ae 2.1.b ad c.
17 E-a daed 18 J 2015 f e M G e Fedea Gee f Saa
Me f Face, Maed Ade Iba.
18 M G ee N Faa Nab, 21 Mac 2015.
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45. A cee acc f e Al Amal ace, a e a e aa e
Ad Geea, eeed ae 2.2.
The etracties sector
46. I 2013 e (S/2013/413) e G dced e ea eace ad
ec ed b e eace ec Saa. Te G ed e
f c e ec, da aca ae e c f e
Saa Pee Ca ad e Sa Pee A
deede bde adaed b e Sa Gee 2008 Pee La b
e be eabed a ab fc . I 2014 e, e G
aa ed e ac f aaec e ad a ec, da
aca ae a ea cac baed b Sa O & Ga Hd
Ld. (Sa), a Ld-baed eace ea ca caed
26 A 2013 ad caed b e fe eade f e Ued Kd
Ceae Pa, Mcae Had (S/2014/726, ae 5.1).
47. I Ma 2013, e e-Me f Naa Rece,19 Abda Oa
Maed, aed a e Fedea Gee f Saa d a e
ae e a ace befe ee aeee ad a
cae.20 Tee ae, 6 A 2013, Sa ed a ec
aeee e Fedea Gee f Saa M f Pee ad
Mea Rece, e ca e cdc a ec e ff
Saa e ad cea ca. Te cac a ae e ca e
bee e 12 ffe ad a bc f c,
a 60,000 2. Te dde acee f e aeee cae a a c
b e ad a d ad e Saa dac c. 21
Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.
48. O 28 J 2015, e M G bed a cfdea
cca22 e Cee dea Sa ace Saa
ced a f aaa 2 f e 2002 (2011) ad aaa 2 (c)
f e 2060 (2012), b de Sa bc
c. Te cca decbed be Je 2014 Sa a
ade eac aff ffca e Fedea Gee f Saa
M f Pee ad Mea Rece cd e Dec Geea,
De Dec Geea, ad e e c ea de e ace f a
-caed caac-bd aeee.
__________________
19 Te M f Naa Rece a f cce e Jaa 2014, e
f c a e M f Pee ad Mea Rece.
20 Kaa Ma, Saa: e fe, The Financial Times, 13 Ma 2013.
21 Baed e M G ee ad a ee, a e a da
baed Ld ad Nab. Sa bef - a a ca, e a f a
de bc Sa a ce d, e fac a e Fedea Gee f
Saa ad eceed a ea e e ffe b a a, ad e Fedea Gee f
Saa e bc ce efa f ad a dea abe
ee ace, ee a ced e G a a feae f e Sa dea.
22 S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31.
S/2015/801
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49. Te G a deeed a ee caac-bd fd, c ad
aed $490,000 b 28 Ma 2015,23 ee e a f a d aaee
deed ec e ec aeee f e c f e Faca
Geace Cee. Fee, ffca Sa a ee dec
ed bee ea e e daf dc -a aeee
beee Sa ad e M, eee a cfc f ee.
50. Ude e caac-bd aeee, e ca a ade ae a
Fedea Gee f Saa edea ad a ade, Abda Hade
Maed, e ca aceded ad eeeed e Fedea
Gee e ea ad e ec aeee a a
ed A 2013.24 Ye f e a f e G
cca e Cee, Sa ed a e eeae ca a
dda ad b e ca a, , a fece e dec
a a ceca aeee f e beef f Sa.25 Te ca,
eefe, ead e M G d ea, ad
ade accae bc aee ea e caac-bd aeee ce
e G fd ad bece .
51. Te M G f cae d f Sa O & Ga Hd Ld.,
baed ae e aea eeed e G cca f 28 J
2015 e Cee, aea ae 2.5.
Circumention of the Federal Goernment of Somalia Treasur Single Account
52. Le e e ed e G ce e, e M f
Pee ad Mea Rece a ade e ae dee bc
faca aaee Saa b cae eee de e Tea
Se Acc a e Cea Ba. F ace, e Dec Geea, Faa Abd
Haa, deced Sa afe caac-bd fd a ae acc
ed b e M a e Ieaa Ba f Saa (IBS), c Haa
efeed a e-a Sa a e effce a e cea ba.26 Sa
eeced ead afe e fd e M acc a e Cea Ba.
53. Hee, e G a eaed f a ea e ace c e M
ccef deed bc eee IBS acc. O 16 Ma 2015, CGG
a ca ebe f a ae e ae f Saa ec daa
e Fedea Gee f Saa afeed a $633,866.69 ae e
M IBS acc (a cfa cefcae f e M IBS acc
ded ae 2.5.).
__________________
23 Sa a afeed $100,000 e M 18 Decebe 2014 be ed ad e
cc f a daa eded e e daa ceced d Sa ec e. I
cca daed 28 J 2015 e Cee Ca, e M G ed a
e ad bee ade ad e cc f daa , b ad e deee
a ad aed ee fd. Te G a ce baed Cea Ba f Saa
ecd a b d-Mac 2015 e fd ee e e M ba acc.
24 Lee daed 1 J 2015 f Sa e M G (S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4).
25 Sa O & Ga Hd Ld., Ree e Ued Na Saa ad Eea M
G ce caac-bd aeee, 3 A 2015. Aaabe f
.aada.c/ee--ed-a/.
26 E-a daed 29 Je 2014 f Faa Abd Haa Sa cef eece Rbe Sead
ad cef faca ffce P Wfe.
S/2015/801
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54. Dec eee ad e Tea Se Acc a ceaed
acc e c e Fedea Gee f Saa M f Face a
e a e effec f Fedea Gee f Saa e
e-ee caabe f be caed b dda ebe f e
Gee, eeb fe c ad cfc.
Absence of a resource-sharing frameork
55. I 2013 e (S/2013/413, aa. 79), e M G ed
e ac f ca aeee ece-a beee e Fedea
Gee f Saa ad Saa ea ada a a ea eace
ad ec. Te G beed a beee e Fedea
Gee f Saa ad ea ada a ad ed ad a
dea deede f e Fedea Gee (bd., aa. 77). Dee e
c abece f a ca ece-a fae, b e Fedea
Gee f Saa ad e ea ada ce ee cac
dc, ad aeee, eaa ad a cae.27
56. M ece, 5 Seebe 2015 e Fedea Gee f Saa
ed a aeee e Nea ca Sec ASA, a e
cdc a ec daa e eca 28,000 2 f ffe
e cea ad e Saa. O 1 Seebe 2015, e Pad
Pee Mea Aec ad e H-baed ION Geca Ca
a aced e ad ed a aeee a e ca ace
8,000 2 f ec daa ce e ee Saa Pad ffe a.28
Federal Government of Somalia licensing of oil blocks in Somaliland and Puntland
57. Te M G e cceed a, e ce ce f
eace ad ec, e Fedea Gee f Saa M f Pee ad
Mea Rece ae ecece ea e a
CcP C. e e-c a cce caed Saad
ad Pad.29 CcP e-1991 cce cde bc a S
ad Saaa, adae e a ae ace ded beee Saad
ad Pad, a e a e ef-decaed ea Sae f Ka.
58. Te G a ee a e-a daed 25 A 2014 f e Dec f
Ea a e M, Abdad Aba He,30 Ka Lac, a
aae a CcP. Te e-a efe a ee ed Wa,
D.C., 8 A 2014 e M ad Lac, ad ae e a e
M deeed e-1991 cac North and North-east
Somalia [ea added]. Te e f e e N Saa efe
__________________
27 Ieaa ad a cae c e Fedea Gee f Saa a
cdced ece dc cde: Aed Pee C., Aa C, BGP Ic.,
CcP C., Kaa Caa, M Ieaa, Mbadaa Pee, Ne Ae
Ld., Ra Dc Se c, Scbee Ld., Sec Ge Ld., ad Ta S.A.
28 Sec ASA, Sec ec daa aeee c-a ea ffe
Saa, e eeae, 7 Seebe 2015. Aaabe f ://.ece.c/-
ce/ad/FINAL-NEW-2015-09-07-Saa-Daa-Dea-Aced.df.
29 Le e a, Cc Ic. decaed fce aee 1991 ad eded ea
Saa. Cc Ic. ad P Pee C. eed 2002 f CcP C.
30 Abdad Aba He a a e c ea ad de Sa caac-bd
aeee. He eceed $39,000 f Sa beee Ma 2014 ad A 2015.
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Saad, ad N-ea Saa efe Pad, eea a
dead f Fedea ea ea bde. Te M eac
CcP a ae e G cce a e abece f a
ece-a aeee cea deea e e f e Fedea
Gee ad e ea ada e ea eaa
cae Saa aed dcab ea e fe
ca e ad cfc. U c a ca aaee eaced,
eaa cae c a Sa ce ae adaae f
a ee ac , faabe dea
dda be Gee ae a deede cac bde.
59. I ce, e M G ce e e Sec
Cc e a a ad a aeee Saa,
c e a e Fedea Gee f Saa a eabed abe
eae e ec, a aed e c 2008 Pee La.
C. Public financial management and misappropriation
60. Te M G a ced de ee bc faca
aaee. Ab ae ae bee dced, b e eea f
ee ae ea . D caed b e ea f e
e ad e cabe e a f ea a deaed ef. Te
aae eed b e ae eaed aa f
bc face eeae a ce f c Sa c. 31
Budget
61. B e 2015 Bde Aa Ac e Sa Gee eded
e [] ece. Dee ab decaa, e 2015 bde
eaed de e e Me f Face, He Abd Haae, a ea
deede ede f bdea f a ce ebe f e
Oaa f Iac Cea (OIC).32 Te M G a deeed
a e de-dee f eea ef Sa Naa A ad
f eea .
62. We fced ee e bde d-2015 e ac f dee f
OIC ebe c ede, a e eac bde a eaed
eae dce Gee eede. Te 2015 bdea c a
ed e fa f a eea bde ae cee aed
e eaa f e 2016 fedea bde. Hee, a e Fedea Gee f
Saa ee a ea f a ad ee bc face , ade
a eaed a f eee cec ad ee eede e
bece cea dffc.
__________________
31 Te M G aae f cae ccef b aa a bc ffca
f ac f aa ce e ed f e a 2012.
32 Te M G a fed b a e ade e Pede 1 Seebe 2015
a e Fedea Gee f Saa ad ced ede f $124 f e Aab
Leae, $40 f Te ad $18 f Qaa, e f c ee deeed.
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Federal institutions and instruments
63. We e M G e a e Cea Ba f Sa a a ade
fca eff e accab ad a aec, ea effece
a Saa a faca ea ad e bd. A fca
f Gee eee ce ba e Tea Se Acc.
Fd acaed ee e, deae ad aece ce
be da f e Cea Ba ca, e accab
eeafe. Te de f haala afe cae ea eaed b e
Cea Ba, ede eace f eabe eea fea ab e
e e-ade ad e fac f e.33 O-daed faca
ea f e 1960 ea fce b eeed. A daf b
a d ae eaed fe ee Saa a da b e
Gee Decebe 2014 afe a ecd ead Paae. Daf
ea eab e Offce f e Obda a ed d b Paae
J 2013 ad a bee eed ce.34 Te Pbc Pcee,
Cce ad Da Ac a aed b e Cabe f Me Ma 2014
b a e e f aa aa b Paae. A e e f ,
ea eab e A-C C ad e be abed.
64. Te Faca Geace Cee a eabed d-2014 a
e e ea Sae ae ece ad bc cce. Te Sec
Cc e 2182 (2014) ecaed e Fedea Gee f Saa
e e Cee effece. We e Faca Geace Cee a
ed be a ef ad bd a e deae effece e. A
e e f , dcebe ac ad bee ae f e cac
eeed 2014.35 A cace a ee e,
deae ad aece e Faca Geace Cee ,
e e ae ced ba e Cee e ea
a bc cac.36 I de ae deae aaec,
bc ffca ae ade efeece e Faca Geace Cee e
dc aeee c ae fac bee eeed b e Cee. 37
65. I Nebe 2014, e M f Face ffca aced e Sa
Faca Maaee Ifa Se deed ee Gee ce
__________________
33 F e A-Sabaab aac Gaa Ue A 2015, e Gee f Kea
baed a haala cae f afe fd f a ee .
34 Te Offce f e Obda, adaed e 2012 Pa C, a eded
eae ca f abe f e b bc ffca.
35 Te M G a fed b e Fedea Gee f Saa Me f F ace
Seebe 2015 a ac ee cac d be ae .
36 Eae cde e aeee beee Pe Ge Med ad e M f
Cece ad Id f -e a aace; e aeee e cec f
a aa beee 2011 ad Je 2015; ad e aeee beee e Sa Naa
A ad e ca d a (ee c cfdea ae 3.1).
37 A e eeae ed 12 A 2015 b e M f Pee ad Mea Rece
ee e M G e caac-bd aeee efe e
Faca Geace Cee a a dea f e M ce
aaec. Te M G eceed cfa f e Cee a e
caac-bd aeee ad bee ee eeed b aed . Te M
G a beee a e ea f e ce f e Faca Geace Cee
ee f e a ec aeee a ed ea Sa O & Ga
ead caac-bd aeee.
S/2015/801
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ad eede ea e. Ieea f e e Gee
e, deae ad aece . If effece ed b
Gee e, e e eee a a deee.
66. Te e-eaee f e Ieaa Mea Fd (IMF) afe e a
25 ea a a a deee f Saa. Te IMF T Fd f
Caac Deee a ece ae e e e eed f effece
caac-bd ae, aca e aed aa
e Fedea Gee face ad dee e eace ec.
Misappropriation in the securit sector38
67. Fe cae ae e ea ed b faca aaee ad
aa eace, ec ad ab Saa e a c
e Fedea Gee ec . Te Sa Naa A
b fa e ae ec Saa. Effece aaee f fce
ad face a f e ea a aa A-Sabaab ae be eeed
ad f be cae f e Sae f e deae f AMISOM fce a
e e fe be eeed. O eee bde a, e
Fedea Gee f Saa a ed a e aae f Sa Naa
A 2015.39
68. Edece ceced b e M G deae a ac f
dead ad cda beee f e Fedea
Gee f Saa ead e eae eee, e ae f e
Sa Naa A. Te ce e, ce ad c f e a
a ea cea. Edece ceced b e G dcae a e a
eac a eaca faed e be de ece eae
fd f aae ad a. Fa ad be e beee e ebe
f e a e Sa Naa A ed, ad e ca
d d fd a a ad f $8 eac ea
a e a e cfc f ee. Te a ece e f ca f
ae, dc ac f accab eae, ad abece f a deede
e a ef e a eade fee e Gee eee a e
eee f de ad ce ec.
69. Te ee f aa ad e Sa Naa A
a deed d cfdece e Fedea Gee f Saa, c a
aceded e a f e a. Te G ea Sa
Naa A aa ee ed b e Naa Sec Ade
Offce, a e a e M f Face A ad Seebe 2015. Te
eacee f Geea Da Ada E a e Cef f e Aed Fce
3 Seebe 2015 eeeed a e e ad ef. Te acee b
Pede Haa Se Mad 9 Seebe 2015 c e Fedea
Gee f Saa ceee ef e ec ec a
eca ad cedabe deee.40
__________________
38 F a ceee a f aa e Sa Naa A, ee c
cfdea ae 3.1.
39 A f J 2015, Jaa aa a ad bee dbed.
40 Te Pede: We ae ced bae ec ec ef, Offce f e Sa
Pede, e eeae, 9 Seebe 2015.
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The Nairobi Embass
70. Pe e ae deaed aa Saa fe
ebae (ee, f eae, S/2012/544, aa. 18-21 ad S/2013/413, aa. 72-73).
Te M G cceed b edece f e eae cc
a e Sa Eba Nab, de fe Abaad Maed A N
Aec.41 Beee Jaa 2014 ad A 2015, e Eba ceced
$960,836 fee f e 7,500 Sa a ad eeec a e
dce.42 D e ae ed, $486,258 a eed e M f
e Ie acc a e Cea Ba Mad, ea $474,578
acced f.43 Te G a cceed ab a da f $1 f
e Gee f Ca 2013, f c $479,314 a eed e Cea
Ba, ad e ea $517,686 aeed ad ea fee e Nab -baed
a f Iba, Iac & Ca (ee ae 3.2).
71. Accd a fe Sa da, 10 da e Abaad
deae f e Eba, a ea f fa ec eca ee
caed ee ee fa f e ffce ce, e ad
ce f dcea ee eaca deed.44 Te M G
ecaed b e dec f e e Sa Abaad Kea, Jaa Haa,
ffce 4 A 2015, cdc a deede ad f e
Eba acc ad a a faca dce (ee ae 3.2).
Mogadishu port rehabilitation funds
72. I 1993, Ued Na eaceeee aed c e Mad
de ee aaa acce Saa. Peaceee fce f UNITAF
(Ued Ta Fce) aaed e cec f fee beaf f e S a
Gee 1995, e e ed e fd e a fd aaed b
e Ued Na Deee Pae (UNDP) Saa ad e Wd Fd
Pae (WFP). I J 1997, e fd, a $1,003,930, ee afeed
a aaed e b UNDP Saa, c e aec deaed ad
a Mad P eaba ec.
73. O 17 Mac 2014, e e-Me f P ad Mae Ta, Yf
Ma A Baad, eeed a UNDP Saa e e fd
e M. Afe ea ca, UNDP Saa aeed afe e
fd e cd a a e be ed e Fedea Gee f
Saa Tea Se Acc.45
__________________
41 Aec a ecaed Mad A 2015, a eed a Abaad Kea
ce 2004.
42 Aca ae eed a a cbed fee f $130 ad K S 2,000 (aae $20)
acc ed a e bac f Taaa Ba Nab.
43 Te Nab Eba acaed $49,200 f e M f Fe Affa acc a e
Cea Ba ee ae ce eaa c. Accd e Me f Face a
e fd ceced b ebae d be afeed e Cea Ba, e Se
Tea Acc.
44 Accd e fe Sa da, e ea a caed dae e ce.
45 T ce d c a M f Face dece f Feba 2014 c
eed a Gee eee be deed e Tea Se Acc a e Cea
Ba f Saa.
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74. I Seebe 2014, UNDP Saa afeed eaba fd,
c b e aed e $1.8 , acced ee. Hee,
ead f e Tea Se Acc, a aeed, e fd ee afeed
a Mad P acc a e Cea Ba f Saa ( CBS), acc
N. 1035. F 13 20 Seebe 2014, A aed e daa f
a $1.7 ca f CBS acc N. 1035 a e ee f
e eaba fd.
75. Te M G a ce baed edece e a A ad
e e-Dec Geea f e M f P ad Mae Ta, Abda
A N, e aaed e fd.46 A deaed acc f
aa f bc faca ece eeed ae 3.3.
Khat taation
76. Te M G cceed b e eece Je 2015 f a
ea aeee beee e M f Face ad e Sa ca ADCO
e e aa f e acc bace a. Te aeee eed a
baa fa ae ceced b e Fedea Gee f Saa e
f a Saa, ad ca be eeed a -cace
aaa 38 f e 2182 (2014), c e Sec Cc caed f
aae ad accabe bc faca aaee, a e a f Fedea
Gee f Saa eee be caeed e aa bde.
77. Te M G ecaed b e dec f e Ae Geea
f Saa eae e ea aede ad e f ae ad e
a aff ee (ee ae 3.4).
D. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
Current status
78. A ed e M G e e, Haaaa a-Sabaab
a-Maad ea a a ea eace ad ec Saa, a e
a a a deab fce e Ea Afca e (S/2014/726, aa. 10). A
a ea, e ce cede e e face f a adace b
AMISOM-Sa Naa A fce ad e aec ae, efe
eea e cde ad bee c ff e e
ecaed aea. Te a ce ea a a aaa
aa, aca fc e ea aa eb Kea.
79. F e dea f A-Sabaab e, Ma A a-Zba (Aed
Gdae) a de e b e Ued Sae 1 Seebe 2014, A -Sabaab
eeced a cce Aad Ua Ab Ubada (a..a. Aed De;
a..a. Maad Oa Abda), e Cee deaed f aeed
ac 24 Seebe 2014. Ab Ubada a de ee ae bee a
ce caddae, e acac a Gdae ad e acceabe
eae deae eee f A-Sabaab, a ea e e
__________________
46 Baed ee f fe e M ffca, e Ge f e Cea Ba f
Saa ad a Saa a-c aa.
S/2015/801
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b cce.47 Ab Ubada a ced e ed f decea
A-Sabaab, ee ca eade ad cade eae deede,
ee e aea f eee a ad ada.48
80. Te c e f ea ac b Mebe Sae a ed e
aaa f eea f A-Sabaab e eade d e ce adae.
M abe a e ae e 29 Decebe 2014 ad 31 Jaa
2015 f Abda Ta, a Aa eae, ad Yf Dee Iaac,
decbed e M G e e a A -Sabaab cef Aa
cae f eea ea (S/2014/726, fe 15). Te G a eceed
fa a Dee a e baed a be e eec aed
b Saad ec ece.49 A d -a ebe f A-Sabaab,
Ade Gaa, a ed a de e 13 Mac 2015. Gaa ad bee ed
e Weae a aac Nab (Bad Nab Oea)
21 Seebe 2013 ad, e ece, a faed e Add Ababa
Ocbe 2014.50
81. Hee, a ed e M G e e, e aeed
a ae eed -e a b ae deaded deed
A-Sabaab eaa caac ca aec aac ad, cea,
cea aa a ae. A e ea eece ce d
e M G a e a f A-Sabaab a dde
aaee ee e ad deca ced a e a
abe eace aaaed eade eae.50
82. A-Sabaab ce ca fee ce aac
Mad, ca e a cba f ece-be ed
ee dece fed b e dee f cde e. D e
ce adae, A-Sabaab a daed a efeece f ae e,
eeca e feeed b Fedea Gee f Saa ad fe
ee ffca. Te abe f e e aac cde: Jaeea He
(26 J 2015);51 Maa a-Maaa (27 Mac 2015); Cea He (20 Feba
2015); ad SYL He (22 Jaa 2015). Ae 4.1 eae e ae f
Mad e b A-Sabaab.
83. A-Sabaab e eae, b ad de Mad, fee
ca e aac e ded Sa Naa A e
ee a f. Te G beee e de aaab ad
c f a f, de a a ac f e f , be a
deeed ea eace ad ec Saa (ee ae 7.1).
__________________
47 F ace, Maad Maed A Kaae, e ad-e cade f e Aaa,
A-Sabaab ea ec ad ce-eece , a Gdae e cce.
Kaae a eeaed caeed Ab Ubada eade, e ea e
e e e; f ace, 19 Ma 2015 fce a Ab Ubada caed
Kaae e ea Jb, e e dea f e fe.
48 Ma Bde, Te dece ad fa f A-Sabaab? T aa (Saa, 2015).
49 M G ee a e ea eece ffca, 14 Mac 2015.
50 Ifa ded e M G b a ea eece ce, 7 A 2015.
51 D e Jaeea e aac, A-Sabaab eed e ae c bb Saa ce
e bb b e 4 Ocbe 2011 f a ea ce f e Taa Fedea
Gee Mad, c ed e a 150 Sa de.
S/2015/801
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84. Te Fedea Gee f Saa ce defec f
A-Sabaab ebe a edece f e d aea ad
caabe, aca e -ee defec Jaa 2015 f Zaae
Aed Ia He, A-Sabaab ae ead f a eece. Te ae
f acabe eece baed f debef dbf, ee. Te
G beee a He a deed A-Sabaab f a ea
defec, ad a e Fedea Gee f Saa eece ffca d e
G a He ad ded daed ad bacd fa. 52
85. Te G a ce fed e ec f a A-Sabaab deca
eaa eae ad e Iac Sae Ia ad e Lea (ISIL).
Ideed, Feba 2015 a ea f ISIL, Ha a-Ba, bc ed
Ab Ubada decae A-Sabaab a e aa.53 Tee e
edece a A-Sabaab be c ISIL acc, ea e a
f ce f e eda . F ace, a de eeaed b A -Sabaab
eda Mac 2015, dec dda be fced e cea
be ed d, bea db eebace ISIL eec de. 54
Hee, e M G a fd edece f eaa faca
beee ISIL ad A-Sabaab.
Tactics
86. O 19 J 2015, ce f AMISOM, a e a Ea Naa
Defece Fce, Kea Defece Fce ad Sa Naa A bea e
ae ae e a ffee aa A-Sabaab Oea Jbba
Cd. Te aed fce ced edae a, ca a ea
A-Sabaab d, Badee ad D. A-Sabaab dd dec
caee e eeed ffee, efe, a e a, acca da
e cde ad bee c ff e e ecaed aea.
87. Te M G e cce a e ecaed aea ae
bee edced aed ad, e ea f A-Sabaab abe ad
ed ee dece ede e b ad e (ee
ae 5.1 f a acc f aaa bc b A-Sabaab). Te
e a ce de eee A-Sabaab, a e eabe
cec eac f a ece.
Aack iia age
88. Dee A-Sabaab ac f a eace Oea Jbba Cd,
e a deaed a aed f acc, ece ad cede
b e f-cae aac a ae, f c a ae
abaed ce da f Mad 2011.
__________________
52 M G ee Mad, 19 Mac 2015.
53 Ha a-Ba, Saa e ad f Kafa: eae be Saa,
24 Feba 2015. Aaabe f ://aae.fe.de.c/2015/03/ba.df.
See a Cae Hee, ISIL c a-Sabab a a-Qaeda e fade aa, Al Jaeera,
23 Mac 2015. Aaabe f .aaeea.c/de/feae/2015/03/-ee-ea-
afca-fe-d-150322130940108..
54 Jad, de eed I eebace 2, ed 24 Mac 2015. Aaabe f
://ad.e/2015/03/24/a-aab-eda-ee-a-e-de-eae-f-
%E1%B8%A5aaa-a-abab-a-ad--eebace-2 (acceed 11 Seebe 2015).
S/2015/801
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89. A-Sabaab cce eea e ea ffed Mad
Ieaa A cd 25 Decebe 2014 ad bee feaded
e M G e e (S/2014/726, ae 1.3), c ed
A-Sabaab fa f e Mad Ieaa A. We e
AMISOM de, ca ad a cac ee ed, caae cd ae
bee cdeab e ad e aace eaced e a ae, e ffce
e. Te M G a baed edece a a de ae f
fed defca bade faca acce e Mad Ieaa
A ca be caed a Baaa Mae f $20 $40.
90. O 11 Je 2015, e a 100 A-Sabaab fe abed a Ea
Naa Defece Fce c ec ca cac dee e f
AMISOM f Mad Bada e aea f Jaeec, 90 -e f
Mad. F e Ea Naa Defece Fce ab, A -Sabaab
aced e eece f a eca bade aed aac AMISOM fce,
dbbed e Se Ab Zbe , f fe e. Te M
G ee cde a be a aada-eaed, ae a
eaa ace, a .
91. O 26 Je 2015, f a a beac f e eee b cde
bbe, e a 100 A-Sabaab fe ea a AMISOM bae Lee,
e e dea f e a 50 Bda de. Me ece,
1 Seebe 2015, A-Sabaab a caed a a aa a AMISOM
bae Jaae, a cca dab a bde befe e aa de c
ff a aee f eea.55 A accae dea f AMISOM de a e be
eabed, a eda ce ae eed be e de.
Sources of reenue
92. W ae caca dc ad ee dec a a ce f
eee f A-Sabaab, e a bece cea ea e ea
f a fd. I aca, e ee e aa (akat) f fa e
Jbba ae, e f e a ea aea e c aa ea
c.56 E f be e, ee e bee ae ae a
ad ee caed aea ca ced b A-Sabaab , a
ce a fca ce f e eee.57 Ee Mad,
bee ce a ae A-Sabaab ad e Fedea
Gee.58
__________________
55 Fea Oa ad Abd Se, Ia a aac Afca U bae e
Saa, Ree, 1 Seebe 2015. Aaabe f .ee.c/ace/2015/09/01/-
aa-aac-dUSKCN0R12PT20150901.
56 A e Fedea Gee f Saa eece ffca d e M G
19 Mac 2015 a A-Sabaab aed aae $9.5 f ae Jbba ae
fa 2014. See ae 6.2.a ad c cfdea ae 6.2.b f e fa
e e b A-Sabaab.
57 Dead f ec e ae fee ade b e eae, ad e ae
ade be e. A deede Saa aa baed e Ued Sae
ceed Ocbe 2014 a, Ka, ee e e ae a ec
e A-Sabaab.
58 Hd Teecca e a ca Saa a a ce ae
e Fedea Gee f Saa.
S/2015/801
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93. Te c aff ee f e Gee f Kea ecae a ba
c ade a ad e bac fdff ed d-fee e
f Ka. F Ka, a aed Kea e bde
, cd e Dbe-Lb c.59 A-Sabaab a cec a
ad f Ka, a c caed a f ab $1,000 eac. 60
F e Dbe-Lb bde c, c f e a ae e
Dadaab efee ca befe a a e ea b f Gaa, e
ad eae ae Nab. Oce a eeed Kea, c f e
a caed b ca bee ad eacaed de e bad.
94. I e M G e ed 2011, a eaed a
A-Sabaab eeaed beee $400,000 ad $800,000 eee ff e a
ade (S/2011/433, ae 3.1). Accd ea ea cdced
2015, e M G eae e fe be baa e. A e
cea f eee ea f caca dece, A -Sabaab aa f e
c a ade a eeace. Te cec beee A -Sabaab ad
a cae e fe Kea d e G ce adae.
F A-Sabaab aac a Gaa Ue Cee, e Gee f
Kea ed a cfdea f 30 dda e Gee caed ee
eaed a ad e acc ad accd bee fe (ee
c cfdea ae 4.2.e). Te Kea ec fce aced a
cacd e a ade e Dadaab efee ca, ad e M
G a bece aae f a a ceaed e Kea Naa
Ieece Sece f a e; d-A 2015, e aeed
d-ee e e Dadaab ca.61 Te M G c
eae A-Sabaab eee ea f e a ade.
95. Te bea f e cfc e Sa Aab Rebc 2011, a e a
ed a efcee eae a ada e e, a
ed Ea Afca ae e ace e affc f
Afaa Ee.62 Te M G a bece aae f a be
cec beee A-Sabaab ad e Ea Afca d ade, e
MV Amin Dara, a ee ca ad f 800 f e eceed
15 J 2014 b Kea ae ad bee deed a a bc ea
eece. T fa baed f a ea ec aec, e
M G a eabed a e e affce bad MV Amin
Dara ee cac a Dba-baed bea be
A-Sabaab. Te cae f e MV Amin Dara eeed ae 4.4.
__________________
59 Oe bde c cde Df ad Kb.
60 Dae Jc, Kea ae a e fd Sa a, Ree, 21 Je
2015. Aaabe f .ee.c/ace/2015/06/21/-ea-ec-aa--
dUSKBN0P105320150621. Te $1,000 a cfed b e M G
ee 18 ad 19 Je 2015 dda Dadaab faa a . A
caca e, c de ecee a ece a a A-Sabaab , c
ee e a adda cec be bec dbe aa.
61 Ibd. Te ae f e e ee cbaed b e M G ee a
ea eece ce ad ede f Dadaab Je 2015. A a e f e Kea
cacd, e ce f a 50 ac f a e $44, a ceae f $10 f
a ee.
62 Te ac ac: Ea Afca Sae ae be deed b e , The
Economist, 17 Jaa 2015. Aaabe f .ec.c/e/dde-ea-adaf
ca/21639560-ea-afca-ae-ae-be-deed-e--ac-ac.
S/2015/801
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Al-Shabaab Northeast
96. Te M G ce f cce e A-Sabaab
Nea ec e Gaaa a, 30 -e f
Ba, Pad. I e e, e M G ed a ceaed
eece ad ee a A-Sabaab Nea a (S/2014/726,
ae 1.4). A A-Sabaab ce cede e e ad cea
Saa, e M G eec e e f e Gaaa ec
ceae a fee a ead , ee ee a e f cca
e Yee ad A-Qada e Aaba Pea. Cee, e
M G e eee cce e ee deea f e
ec ee b Yee ad Pad, c e ae cae a bee
feed a b ca deaed abe aa ae e ec
fce. I aca, e ac Feba 2015 b e Pede f Pad,
Abde Maed A, f e ec fce ffca, cd e ead
f e Pad Ieece Sece, a ceaed a aa f beee e
Pede ad ec fce.
97. Ea Ocbe 2014, Pad fce aced a eeed ffee e
Gaaa , ed b aea ecaace f a Wee Mebe Sae.
Afe a a, e ffee aea ae aed. Accd fa
ded Ocbe 2014 b a Pad a e d, ee fce
ced Gaaa ad e ae e d . 63 Te
M G a eceed cfed b cedbe fa a e
A-Sabaab eade Fad Maed Kaaf Se a ee e Gaaa
aea d-Mac 2015 de eab a e bae ca aac
Pad.64
Al-Shabaab as a regional threat
98. D e ee adae, A-Sabaab a ced a
aaa eed e aa. Te ea ea efec
A-Sabaab ca ea a, ae ca aac e e f
f AMISOM -cb ce. Kea, aca, a e be
eeca eabe, ae e ad bde a ae
Saa.65 Sce Je 2014, A-Sabaab e ea ae caed e
e f e a 300 ee Kea, eae a e be ed b e
Mad e e ae ed.
99. A-Sabaab a aced a ee f dead aac Kea d e
adae. W e a f 10 da, e caed dead aac ea
Madea, aac 28 b aee 23 Nebe 2013, fed b
36 a e 2 Decebe. A-Sabaab fca aac Kea
ace 2 A 2015, e fe e ed e ca f Gaa
Ue Cee, caed 150 f e Kea -Saa bde. Afe a ad-
ff a f e da, Kea eca fce ed e d ee e
__________________
63 T acc a cbaed b a ecd Pad a, a Ocbe 2014.
64 Ifa ded b a e ea eece ffca, 14 Mac 2015.
65 Tee bad deede A-Sabaab eae a e Kea-Saa bde,
ced Gaa, Madea ad La ce Kea. Te d f e, ca ef
e Je Aa bade, baed e B fe ad a ea efed ea
e e ce f e M G adae.
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aace ad ae de ae, b befe 148 ee, de,
ad bee ed. I e afea f e aace, e Gee f Kea
aced e aed f e aac be Maed Mad Gaadeee
(a..a. K), a Gaa ae ad fe Qac eace.66 Gaadeee a
eeed a a eade ebe f c-bde aac Kea b
a b a a e ae e ea e
Saad, Db ad Ea. F ace, cfed fa ded
e M G e a Gaadeee aced a e cda f a
faed Jaa 2015 aac Mee Sae Db, e aea f e c
ca La Cae eaa, c a e ae f a ccef A-Sabaab
cde bb Ma 2014 (ee S/2014/726, c cfdea ae 2.3).
100. A acc f e Gaa Ue Cee e aac ded
ae 4.2.
101. Ae 4.3 (c cfdea) decbe e faed A-Sabaab f
Jaa 2015 Db.
102. I a ed, A-Sabaab a be e cc Kea bde
f eeded ed. O 19 Ma 2015, A-Sabaab a eeed
ae Gaa C, adde ae f eea ad a e
e Gee f Kea Kea ec ece. 67 Oe ee
ae, a eeed Yb ae, ea e Dadaab efee ca, ad eeaed
e eae ceae Kea fce.68
103. Dee e fae f e Be Rada ce ac a aac d e
Wd C afe Add Ababa 2013 (ee S/2014/726, c cfdea
ae 2.2), A-Sabaab a ced eff e a e Ea caa. O
14 Ocbe 2014, e Ued Sae Eba Add Ababa ed a a f a
e A-Sabaab ae e cea Be aea f e c. Accd
fa ded e M G, aae 20 A-Sabaab
eae ad bee e Add Ababa ee dc ca e
b ef Ea afe e a f e Ued Sae; e f e a
ed ae e-ee Kea.69
E. Pirac and kidnap for ransom
Oerie
104. Sce 2012, ac Saa a deced ec. Te a ac f
a -ae eca ee, e Gee-aaed ae MT Smrni, dae
Ma 2012. Te a edc ac ce ea 2010 a bee de
a e dee f ae aed ec ea bad ceca
__________________
66 Te M G aae f e bae cec beee Gaadeee ad
e Gaa Ue aac; accd ea ec ce eeed b e
G, Gaadeee ad bee cac b be e a ca ec ffce
eced f a caed eace f e aac ea.
67 Cfdea eece e, 15 Je 2015.
68 Ibd. Ucfed fa baed e f ae ee e a
Gaadeee a ae ea deeed e ece.
69 M G ee ea eece ffca, 7 A 2015.
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ee, e eea f be aaee acce b e ae d
ad e eece f eaa aa fce ee e e.
105. D e adae, ae ac eaed a a ebb. Te ee
be aced ce e G e adae ee e Iaa f d
FV Siraj ad FV Jaber, c ee eed ff e ca f cea Saa
22 Mac 2015. Te M G a aceaed e dda ebe
be Maed Oa Maed Gafae, a e- ae eade e
ace ae bee decbed dea e G e e
(S/2013/413 ad S/2014/726). A deaed acc f e ac f e FV Siraj
ad e FV Jaber ded ae 2.4 (c cfdea).
106. Te G e dae a e Fedea Gee f Saa
a e ae ad ca ec aa ae eade, a e G a
eceded a e. I aca, e G cceed a Gafae
ce ca ac ea cee , ee ee
e acce -ee Fedea Gee f Saa ca Mad
(ee c cfdea ae 2.4.b).
107. We e ea ed b ac eca ee ea , e G
cceed a ea f b fe ee, c fee de ae
aed ec ea bad, a ead e ecea f a dac f cfc
ca Sa ce a cbed e e f ac a decade a.
Ta ea dced dea e G dc f ea, eed ad
eaed f ad ae ec.
III. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
108. I aaa 31 f e 2232 (2015), e Sec Cc eeaed
dead a a ae a ad facae f, afe ad deed acce f e
e dee f ad e eed ac Saa. A e aaa
f a fe a a 15 adae e f Saa, e a f
a acce eaed eee fae, aca a a e a-A-Sabaab
ffee bea J 2015.70 Me bad, e ceae e e ad cae
f cfc Saa, ee e f e be f ac ed, e
ea ad ed ed e aee eed, affeced a aec f
aaa acce, f e afe ad ec f aaa e e
ab aa e deedece ad ea f aaa ac. O
31 A 2015, f e baa Fd Sec ad N Aee f
Saa f e Fd ad Ace Oaa f e Ued Na, a
aced a e be f ee faced a fd c eeec
Saa ad ceaed b 17 e ce, f 731,000 855,000 ,
d f ee ea daced e.71
__________________
70 See, e aa, Offce f e Cda f Haaa Affa Saa ffce, 2015
Haaa Ree Pa Saa dea e (ce Jaa J e
2015). See a e ae NGO Safe Pae Saa acce a, 10 Feba 2015.
71 Offce f e Cda f Haaa Affa, Saa: cca fd ad
a e, e eeae, 31 A 2015.
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A. Denial of humanitarian access72
109. Te e caee aaa acce defed b e M G
e e (S/2014/726) ced ede aaa ea
a ee ae cae, ecea e ce ea b aaa
ae. Te cded bcade a e ad aec b
A-Sabaab, bce ea ad aa b fedea ad ea
ee ffca ad e ced ca f ad.
110. W acce eea e eceed a a ece f ae e
cfc ae a, A-Sabaab e efced bcade b
aaa e ad ceca ade, ad ae ca ad
de d. Dee eff de eeec aaa b a
ee be, ace fd ec eaded a aea.73 I aea f
a, A-Sabaab eed a aaa ace ad eee
eced e ee c e a cd ee aace de. 74 I e
ce f e ceaed aa ad aa f e ee, ee
a edece f A-Sabaab deeeed c f, ad dace f, e
aaa c. I e aea a efeced, e aa, eff
dee ca eade ad ceae c f aaa ea
e Aa, A-Sabaab ad-e ea ec aaa, ea
affec b e ec f aaa e ad e ab eae
ced acce.
111. I e e, e M G decbed e ea f
e fedea acece ad ceaed e ae f beacac ede,
eee ee ad de. Te ede ad ccaed ad
ee cee eeed aaa acce (S/2014/726, aa. 93).
D e ce adae, dd e acce ef, b e be
f ae c e aaa c a eed eae e:
add e e ea ada, a ada
de e fa fedeaa ce aeed ae adae
eac.75 Eff b ce ae c- ad eac beef f
aaa ea ced e ab f ea , e
e ea ce f -eea aa (NGO), b a e
ab afe ac dffee e f c.76
__________________
72 Dea f aaa acce bc e fee aae e dee f aaa
aace e eed, a e a cde debeae aac aa aaa e.
73 Me a a ea afe e A-Sabaab bcade bea Mac 2014 Hd ad a a e
e e e ae f e A-Sabaab ffee a de a, ba ace a ae
ee e cca a 32.7 e ce, a aa eefd ceae eee ace
a ae ce Je 2015. Offce f e Cda f Haaa Affa,
Haaa Be, J 2015 (ed 20 A 2015).
74 See ae 6.2.a ad c cfdea ae 6.2.b.
75 I e ce f ac aaa acce, e cded e ef -decaed Ka Sae
S ad Saaa ad e A a-Sa a-Jaaa-baced ada decaed 1 J
2015 Daaeeb.
76 D 2014, e aaa c ecded 76 cde eaed adae ad
beacac ede ad efeece eaa dae. B e ed f e f
ee f 2015, e be f cde ad aead eaced 51. Iee Ued
Na ad -eea aa ce, Nab, A 2015.
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112. Te be f aed ac, b Sa ad fe, eaed e
cfc aa A-Sabaab cbed e cda f a ec ae a
acceace ad ea aac ead aaa acce. T ade
cae e ca f ad ad aa e ce f dc
e ccaed. Icde f bc f aaa ad b Sa ad
eaa a fce ad aed ee eed. 77
113. See ae 5.1 f a ee f e a caee aaa acce.
114. See ae 5.2 e e f beacac ede ad e f ffca
e bc aaa acce.
B. Attacks on humanitarian orkers
115. Aa e bacd f a e ae ad ece ce ea, ea
aa ad aac aaa e e d e ce adae.
Fee aaa ad e ee ed beee Jaa ad A 2015
ae, 80 ec cde eaed aaa ea ecded e
ae ed.78
116. A-Sabaab cdced a ee f dec ad dec aac Ued Na
aece, cd a fc cde aac a Ued Na Cde Fd
aff b Gae a ed , cd f Ued Na aff, ad ed
fe e 20 A 2015.79 Te aac Gae aed e ca f
ecaa ec b A-Sabaab aa b e Ued Na ad eaa
aa.80 A fe ae, Ab Ubada Ed eae decbed e
f e ece cd a e dece eaa aece ad
aa ead e ce ad a [c] a e M
a a e f e eee f Aa.81 Ee e Gae aac,
ea e ad acca aa b Pad ad
Saad, ced e ceaed eece ad ac f A-Sabaab ad
__________________
77 A e Saa C-Secfc Haaa C-Ma Cda Gdee f
Haaa Ac Eaee AMISOM e ea c -a
cda Saa ee aced Nebe 2014, dea ad eea
ee . Tee ce eca f e aaa c e
beace f e Gdee bed Fedea Gee f Saa ec fce ad
AMISOM.
78 I ca, d 2014, 75 e cde ed e dea f 11 ee ad e abd c ad
ae f e a 20 aff. Ifa ded b Ued Na ad -eea
aa ce A ad Seebe 2015.
79 Te cded a aac a Ued Na c 3 Decebe 2014 de e Mad
Ieaa A ad a aac e Jaeea Paace He, c ed 15, cd
2 Ued Na d-a cac, a e a daaed e Ued Na c
cd ad e cd f ee -eea aa.
80 A ed dce S/2014/726, a ee f aee ad aac 2013 ad 2014 ad a
cea defed e Ued Na (ad aaa aece e bad) a eae
ae f e . Tee e dca a edca ace a be cdeed a
aca ae.
81 Ed ee e M Ua f e Mad Se Ab Ubeda Aad Oa. Tee
e e a A-Sabaab a be aca ae edca ace, baed a
be f deee, c a e aa aee f 20 Decebe 2014 efe
a deca a, e aac Gaa Ue 2 A 2015 (ee ae 4.2) ad e
aac e M f He Edca ad Ce Mad 14 A 2015.
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e f e eace f Ued Na aa, ad ed ece
f eae ec f aaa ea e -ea.82
117. I add e ca f dec a ea e ecd af f
2015, e eab f aaa aece a eacebaed b e eed
eae f acce a be f ce a ad ca
ae. Icde e e f fce d aaa ea
de aaa ee ecded eec ee fce,
fce acaed ea ae, ca a ad eaa fce.
C. Diersion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance
118. De ce be a c eee f e aaa be
de Saa, cdced a ae f eca, cd bde
aa, e, e aface f ece ad ef. Te
M G beed a ae ad eea f de a
defed e e, a ec f ac a f aff a
d eadae ca ee ffca, cac ad ca NGO.
Refec e aec decbed a e, e ea a f
aaa ad aaabe ced aa e bacd f a eaed
3 ee eed f eea aaa Saa. 83 Te
c f aaa ea a a e f acce ec ad e eed
ae eeed ec a added e ee cace ece.
119. A ed b e M G e e, e eeece f
e ae e acece f e fedea Sae a ed e ee
c, de a ca f eac, de cd be aced ( S/2014/726,
ae 7.1). Te caee becae e ace 2015 a b e ea Sae
ee ad a ada ee f a ceed fedeaa
ce ce f ccef a eee-ee acce, a
cea e ae f c (ee ae 5.2).
120. A e ae e, ad a a eabe ef b a e a a
ca ad f cfc. Te G eceed cedbe fa
a e aaa ac abed aaa ce ad ed
aaa e f ca da ce, cd e e f
ece. I e ce, e aeace f cea NGO aca
a/Sa Naa A a a e ece e aaa
c ad deed acceed a e ce f acce.
121. Te ab f e aaa c ae e eaee
f ad aa, c eaced d e fae f 2011,
facaed e eea f e e. Neeee, d e ce adae
e aaa c aed e e ed 2014 b b
c acede e cae f de ad eac aaee
ad de ee eca. I Jaa 2015, f eae, a NGO fca
a aed e R Maaee U f e Ued Na c
__________________
82 Caee e ada ad aaee f e eca ec a ceae
e eab f aaa ac f effece aded.
83 Of e $853 eeed f e C Haaa Fd 2015, 33 e ce ad
bee ded b e ed f J 2015.
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ea, e eaced cea beee e NGO ad e Ued Na
aaa ce. Te dee-ed fdaea f e e a
eeae de, ee, ea be aced.
122. See ae 5.3 f a e deaed ee f de ad aa
f aaa aace, cd eae edce de.
IV. Violations of international la inoling the targeting
of ciilians
123. W a ceae e be ad ae f fe ad aa fce, a
aed ac ced ae ca, ee a a debeae acc f a
e dae e f fce.84 Pca, ecca ad ca
ecded ce ced eeece e a f a, c
efec a dee-ed afca f Sa ce, acceaed b e
ae c e ece.
A. Targeting of ciilians
124. Te be ad ce f aed ac Saa, e aed e
aa A-Sabaab, dced a f f cad a c ad
e e accab, de e ec f ca. 85 Te a
cee eed b e fce, ae e ae ce f e -ca
ea a a be f ec f Sa Naa A ad
AMISOM ee, ceaed a fee d f e ce.
125. A b e f aa A-Sabaab ad e a
de c efed, a aa ca e, b de
ea ad acc a eed ae ca ad a caae. 86
Meae, e -Sae ac ed aed ece ae eee
e ead fedea acece. A-Sabaab ed, ad a ee
eeaed b, e ac, f a beef.
126. A decbed dce S/2014/726, e ca ad a eade f
e fedea e a a ed e ca ee e dee
f Fedea Gee f Saa ec fce ad ae ca f.
Vece aa ca b e fce f e ea ada, c a e
__________________
84 Te ebe ed ebe f a ae e cfc, cd A -Sabaab ad
affae, AMISOM ad aec ae, e Sa Naa A, e ec fce f
e ea ada ad e ae, ad ca a.
85 Aa dced b e Aed Cfc Lca ad Ee Daa Pec f e M
G beee Jaa ad J 2015, f eae, dcae a e a eea f
a-ca ece ee defed aed . (Te aee de cae ee
c ca ae ed a a e f cfc beee aed ac.) Daf cfc
aa f Saa, Aed Cfc Lca ad Ee Daa Pec, A 2015.
86 A e abe ee f e ee aa ca deced e f f
2015, f e cecee f a e a-A-Sabaab ffee, e f J
eed a 50 e ce ceae. A-Sabaab a ebe f e eae be f faae
caed b a-ca ece. Ibd.
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Ie Jbba Ada, add e ee, c a A a -Sa
a-Jaaa, ae ae c e e a a dceed. 87
127. Ieaa fce b ad bed e aed AMISOM
be a ced ece aa ca. W eec AMISOM,
eadca ad f ad ca e ce f ee
ed ee dece ad eade aac ee eed. 88 Aea f
, ea ad ede-baed ece ad e a aa ca b
e Ea L ce ee a eceed b e G, aca Ba,
Ba, Gaadd ad Ha.
128. See ae 6.1 f a ee f e c f a f eaa
a e ae f ca.
129. See ae 6.1.a (c cfdea) f fa e ccace f
e ae f ebe f e Saaa a.
130. See ae 6.2.a ad c cfdea ae 6.2.b f dea f a f
eaa a ad e a f e Ba/Waa c aea f
Le ad Mdde Jbba ed b A-Sabaab.
131. See ae 6.3.a ad c cfdea ae 6.3.b f dea aac
e ae f Kabae ad Def Ha.
B. Seual and gender-based iolence, recruitment and use of children
in armed conflict and forced displacement
132. Ae 6.4 ca ae f e a ed e c f
a ea ee ee aea f e adae, add adde
deee b acce ad e ea fae a ed ee
a ad eace cace e ac ee.
V. Arms embargo regime
A. Compliance b the Federal Goernment of Somalia ith the
conditions of the partial lifting of the arms embargo
133. Te aa f f e a eba Saa, dced e
2093 (2013), a eeded e 2182 (2014) 30 Ocbe 2015. I
eeed e Fedea Gee f Saa f ee cae-b-cae aa
f e Cee ea f ec fce. Ude e e f e
aa f f e a eba, e Fedea Gee f Saa eed
b e Cee adace fca f e dee f ea
__________________
87 I Feba 2015, f eae, ca ee ed ad ed e A a -Sa a-Jaaa
aaced ad aed c f Ge f e Fedea Gee f Saa. See, e aa,
Ha R Wac, Dace: e e c Saa ca, 19 Feba 2015.
Aaabe f ../e/2015/02/19/dace-e-c-aa-ca.
88 Accd e Aed Cfc Lca ad Ee Daa Pec, a AMISOM a
eed ed 10 cde f a-ca ece, e a f eed faae
ee a e e f a fce. Daf cfc aa f Saa, Aed Cfc
Lca ad Ee Daa Pec, A 2015.
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a ee e f adce, aace a ee
ec fce. I add, e Fedea Gee f Saa bed b
baa e e Sec Cc dea e ce f ec fce
ad e face ad cede ace ee afe aaee ad
db f ea ad a ee. Te Cc a eeaed
eed a ca f e aa f ce e Gee
eea f e eee (e 2182 (2014), ee eaba
aaa).
134. Te M G beed abe e ead e b
f fca ad ea ad a aaee de cdeab e
eff ad ee f e Offce f e Naa Sec Ade. Te a,
a ad ee f adace fca ed ead. Ffe f
-dee cfa ba, ee, eaed ee.89 Te
cecee f e a ad ea f Fedea Gee f Saa
ad f ea ed b ae ec cae eeeed e
fca deee. Sfca a ea, ee, e ac f
ea ad ee, aca afe e a db e ec
fce. I ead, eaa aace ea eeded ae e
ceee ea ad a aaee ec deeed b e
Fedea Gee f Saa.
135. Re f e Fedea Gee f Saa a aaa 9 f
e 2182 (2014) ee aed e. Hee, e G cceed
a, dee e eff e e ec ce f e Fedea Gee
f Saa e e, e Gee a ded a cea ce f
e c ad e f ec fce, cd aed a. I
aca, e Sa Naa A eade a eaca fae
e be f e .90
136. Te aa f f e a eba a aed, e aa, e e
Fedea Gee f Saa dee ad e ec fce cf
A-Sabaab. Daa ceced f adace fca e Cee dcae
a Gee ec fce ee eeced ae eceed e a 17,500
ea ad a 9 d f a ce e aa f f e
a eba.91 Te M G, ee, ce ecee e a
Fedea Gee f Saa ec fce ea -eed cf
A-Sabaab effece. Te ac f fa e db f ed
ea e G ab ae ee e ae be ed
aae ad effece.
__________________
89 Te Fedea Gee f Saa a aded a e adda eed -dee
cfa ad fa, abe bed e, be aed e
Cee afe e faa f e ee e.
90 See c cfdea ae 3.1.
91 Ta fe de cde e cdeabe be f ea aead ed Fedea
Gee f Saa c, cca Saa deeed de e fa fca
cede. Pe f a ea, f eae, fe a cd f ece e
ec ece.
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B. Obligations of Member States and regional and
international organiations
137. O a be f cca, Mebe Sae ad eaa aa
d ec ec de e Fedea Gee
f Saa ae faed aae f e Cee f e f
ea a ee ad ecca aace a a
aaa 11 (a) f e 2111 (2013). I e ace, ca be abed
cf ead e ce f aaa 11 (a), cd c ec
ac ad eec f c aee ad aace ae. Te deee
f aae ea ec ce de e cad f e Fedea
Gee f Saa ee caef cdea ad eae Cee
e, ad a e ece dead f e ce f Sa ec ec
eed ee.92
C. Standing eemptions from the arms embargo
138. Te Sec Cc aed eea ad ee f e a
eba a a e f cea aee ecfc ee ad f
aca e.93 A a e eabe e ea f
AMISOM, e Eea U Ta M Saa, e Ued Na
Aace M Saa (UNSOM), AMISOM aec ae ad e,
a ceae a bd e Cee e f a f. Idca
a e f e aed fce ed e ece a-A-Sabaab ffee
dd eae f de e AMISOM cce f ea ee a
cce.
D. Documentation of captured eaponr and militar equipment
139. Pa aaa 6 f Sec Cc e 2182 (2014), Fedea
Gee f Saa ec fce ad AMISOM ae eed dce ad
ee a a ee caed d ffee ea ad facae
ec b e G befe edb dec. Te Fedea
Gee f Saa ded e G fa f cace f
ea ad e a aee eed ad eceed a e
defca ad ac f caed ea. Dee e ace f dece
ec cade, AMISOM a abe dce ad facae e afe
f fa ee ad a eeed fe adce ad aace f e
G. Effece eea f aaa 6 f e e ee e
Fedea Gee f Saa ad AMISOM aee a ebe. 94
T-cb ce d dec e AMISOM ce c
dece ed b fce eadae. Te Cc cd cde ead
__________________
92 See aaa 10 () f e dee f e Cee f e cdc f a
cdaed, eed ad aded b e Cee 30 Mac 2010, 30 Ma 2013,
27 Nebe 2013 ad 25 Mac 2014.
93 F dea, ee ae 7.2.
94 T cde e dcea, ea, ac ad aa f caed ea ad
e aee a aae, a afe cede e ebe e, a fae f e
ae ad da f e aee eaed afeed, ad a c f f e
M G f e ee.
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c e e ae f e fce eaed e cfc A-Sabaab
ee bed e eac f AMISOM ad Fedea Gee f Saa
ec fce.
E. Implementation of paragraphs 10 and 15 of resolution 2182 (2014)
140. I aaa 10 f e 2182 (2014), e Cc eeed e Fedea
Gee f Saa ad e M G ee fae a
a de f a ee e a eba f ea bad
ee eaed ceca ac Sa ea ae ad Sa
. D e adae, e Fedea Gee f Saa ad e G
aed ea e e a ad ade b e Cc.
141. I aaa 15 f e 2182 (2014), e Cc aed Mebe
Sae, de cea ccace, edc ee beeed be ca
ea ad a ee Sa ea ae ad e ea.
Te M G a fed f a a-eaed edc d
e adae.
F. Violations of the arms embargo
142. Va f e a eba ce be ced Saa, ee
e ea ae aed db f ea f Fedea
Gee f Saa c ea . Te ee f ea
ea f a bee eacebaed b e ae ceaed b e cfc Yee
ad ceaed aa a f Saa e e ce f e adae.
143. Ae 7.1 de a ee f deee ea ea ad
a aaee Saa, cd a a cd f e aa f
f e a eba.
144. Ae 7.2 de a aee f cace fca ba
b e Fedea Gee f Saa, Mebe Sae ad eaa
aa de e a eba ad e aa f eef.
145. Ae 7.3 de a aa f cace b e Fedea Gee f
Saa e eee de e aa f f e a eba.
146. Ae 7.4 dea cace b e Fedea Gee f Saa ad
AMISOM ba ea caed ea ad a ee.
147. Ae 7.5 de a aee f e eea f aaa 10 ad
15 f e 2182 (2014).
148. Ae 7.6 de dea eaa aace e Fedea
Gee f Saa eace cace.
VI. Violations of the ban on charcoal
149. D adae, e M G a dceed e c
e f caca f e Saa. Te eea f e ba, e
dacee f A-Sabaab f e e a e e ca f Saa
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f Baae Kab e Kea bde ad e eeece f e ca
ad be aaee e e ae a affeced e ca ec f
e ade. Te cae effec a bee a ea edc e f caca
f e Saa ad a dece e eee aed f e ade b
A-Sabaab.
A. Production and eport of charcoal in southern Somalia
150. I e edae afea f e ece f Baae, Le Sabee, f
A-Sabaab ea Ocbe 2014, ebe f e caeae ada,
ee e Sa Naa A ad e Uada Pee Defece Fce
ce f AMISOM, eed e cecee f e f caca
ced e c. Saee ae ae a e e e ad dee
f c ad e eece f e d dced ad aa ca ae
Nebe, e ac ceaed.95 O 23 Nebe, ca ee ad ec
ffca ee aeed ad ae Mad. Sce ae Nebe, edece
ceced b e G, cd ea daed aee ae ad aea
eace f e c ad ce, e a caca ade Baae
ad e d aea a ed.
151. Pdc ce e Le ad Mdde Jbba e, e fe
ae de e a f e Ie Jbba Ada ad e ae
ea ae de e c f A-Sabaab. A e ac c
e ade ad e Ka ea ae caed ce e G
e e (ee S/2014/726, ae 9.1), e cede ae caed. Te
c cea ce, aed adace e ad ead f e a e
cee f e c ad cea e f a deea e c, e
ed. Saee ae e cea e f e c e ce ad
dd e f e ce.96 Caca ae aded ee
a Ka b ead aded b ad a Aae beac a f
ba ad e aded aa ae d e ba aea. 97 Te ce
fca e effce b ca be ded edae effec, ea e
edece f e ade. Saee ae e a fca ea f e
ea f e f B Gaab, aae 125 -e f
Ka, ea 2015, cdeabe ce ad deed ca d
ee Seebe 2015. Te M G a e bee abe cf
c e ade ad e B Gaab.
152. A-Sabaab ea e ad eee f e caca ade a edced
ce f a e e.98 Bee e eed ae aed a
e e e e f caca ad aaed e A -Sabaab,
cd A Naa ad Haa Maed Yf Abaa (ee S/2014/726,
aa. 141-143), ae eed ae aaed e dace e ade e
e ce f e adae. Edece ceced b e M G, ee,
__________________
95 See ae 8.1 f aee ae f Baae.
96 See ae 8.1 f aee ae f Ka.
97 See ae 8.2 f a a dea ad cede Ka.
98 A-Sabaab a fd e e cae Kda, aae 100 -e
f Ka, a eceed b AMISOM Mac 2015, afe c a caca -eaed
ac beeed ae ceaed.
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e a e e beee e c e ade Ka ad eee
f A-Sabaab Le ad Mdde Jbba ae bee aed e e a ea. I
Jaa 2015, e A-Sabaab ffca ae eed ae caed f e ce
f caca dc e Le ad Mdde Jbba. I e f ,
caca dce ee aeed b e , ad a f e fd ca
caca a e a e ee eeced ad e ece bed
a e ca. D a ed, e ee fced e ae
b-e ece ad bac ad ad deec b A-Sabaab e
a e. Ucfed e dcae a a aeee e
db f aa ceced f caca a e e e fe a a e
Aed Madbe ed A-Sabaab ae f e ceed ea 2015
eaa f e fa f e Jbba Rea Aeb A ad Ma
2015. Te d f fd de A-Sabaab ed e bcade
caca e c, c a a a ea e fca ea f
ea B Gaab.99
153. We e M G a eceed e f e Fedea
Gee f Saa ea e caca ade e
Saa, aae eff ae bee ade b ee e Ie Jbba
Ada ca ce f AMISOM ee e e ba,
e G ae a b ce be ace eaed ad
f f e ade.
B. Maritime interdiction and essel tracking
154. O 7 Ma 2014, e Cee ed eea aace ce N. 1,
c caed eceda edc f caca f Saa
a Sec Cc e 2036 (2012), 2060 (2012) ad 2111 (2013).
I aaa 15 f e 2182 (2014), e Cc aed, f a ed
f 12 , Mebe Sae, ac aa a aa
aa ae, ec ee a e ad eaabe d beee
ee ca caca f Saa a f e ba. Uae f ac
e e ed edc f ee beeed ca caca a
b a, e e ce f e adae, eed a ecebe de ee effec
e abece f a ccef ad-baed aace e eea f e
ba caca. Ieece aed b e Cbed Mae Fce e
M G ed e ccef ece f e MSV Raj Milan (MMSI
419956307) a P Rad Dba, Ued Aab Eae, f
Ued Aab Eae ae.100 Te e f e da f eed caca, e
abece f ea f-, ad e dffce def a Sae
acce deed ae, ee, aeed a eff eaae
ae edc. M e eac beee e aa fce ad e
__________________
99 Oba eabe edece A-Sabaab eaee e caca ade e
Saa a cea cae e e ce f e adae. W ed acce
Ka ad acce e d e, e M G a ae ea
cec ee f a ca ce. Ca ad cfc e ded
b ca ce, fe aed be ee baed ca aed, ade efca f
fac eabe. Te acc f A-Sabaab aa e e Ie Jbba
Ada ad c ea e ca be ee baed e
cbaed ee.
100 See ae 8.3 f dea e ece f e MSV Raj Milan.
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ee ca caca ea cca f a effece eea f e
caca ba.
155. Te f ee beeed be ca caca a bee
ccaed b eff ad deec. Decea e f aac
defca e ae b e d ca ca ad f e
Saa ede be e ee f ee
dedcaed ac fae.101 Te ab f b ca ce ad ad
eece ce a ea def ee ae e eac ae
a ca def feae a e. W a fa,
be ece ee be ca caca f Saa e e
eac e f ad.
C. Falsified documentation
156. U aa a P Rad, e MSV Raj Milan a fd be e
f dcea e a ca ad aed f e C. Te
eae e f fafed dce f caca ca a deaed e
M G e e (ee S/2014/726, ae 9.4). W e
caee def ee b ad ad a ea ad ac ee b
ea f aac defca e a, d e ce adae
e M G ef e ee f fafed dcea b
c-efeec Mebe Sae ad e daa.102
157. Accd daa aed b e M f Fe Affa f e Ued Aab
Eae, e a 142 f caca ee ed f Saa
2011 (96 e ce f a ) ad a 122 (79 e ce f a
) e f ea, e e ba a ed.103 I 2013 ad 2014 e
daa a caca a ed f Saa.
158. Accd e ae daa, f caca f Kea e f
175,000 2012 e a 80 2013 ad 12 2014.
159. I f caca f e C e f e 2011, 2012 ad 2013
e a 12 2014. Te M G e eed cfa f
e f e C e Ued Aab Eae b dd ecee a ee.
160. I f caca f Db e f e 2011 a 13
2012, e a 22 2013 ad a 41 2014. Te
M G e Db ae 21 Ma 2014 ad a
fed caeca a caca a eed f Db a c .
161. A def ad ac ee a Sa caca
cea dffc, cea Mebe Sae cea eae.
Te aae edec e f fafed dcea ca be addeed
f Mebe Sae, c eabe c-efeec f e ad
__________________
101 Te M G ed e eece f e ace ad d dced a
Dba a ad aed aac defca e a ce 2014.
102 Sce 2014, e M G a cfed fafed dcea ca f
caca f Sa f e C, Db ad Kea.
103 Te ba cae effec e ad b e Cc f e 2036 (2012)
22 Feba 2012.
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daa ad e e M G eae fca
dceace ad e dda ad ee ebe f e.
VII. State and non-State cooperation ith the Monitoring Group
162. I e ce f adae, e M G eceed eca
f e Fedea Gee f Saa ad eeeae f
. Te G ed ea ad e dc a be f ee
e fca , e Naa Sec Ade e Pede f
Saa, Abdaa Se Ia, ad e Me f Face, Maed Ade
Iba. Te Me f e Ie ad Fedea Affa, Abdaa Maed
He Odaa, ad e Cea Ba Ge, Ba Ia, a ed
ea d e G bae ad deaed ee
ee f fa.
163. I ea ead e A-Sabaab ea, e G eceed
ed cea f e Gee f Kea ad ec ece. Te
M G e ee ee ea e adae.
164. Te M G a ed eac e Saad ae.
Cac ee eabed e Dec f Ieece e f
ea eaed e A-Sabaab ea. Te Saad M f Fe
Affa eeed e G cea ad ad e-a ecae e G
e cea f a ec .
165. Ued Aab Eae ae eded ffca cedece a
ea ba ad facaed e ec f e MSV Raj Milan P Rad.
Hee, eeaed ee f dcea, eed eae e
ee f fae dcea ed e caca ade, ee ed. Te
cc ad fd f e ffca ea f Ued Aab Eae
ae e MSV Raj Milan ad cee ae e be aed e
G.
166. Te ae f Baa, E, Ka, Leba, Oa, Qaa, Sad
Aaba ad e Ued Rebc f Taaa ae eded e G
ffca ee f daa e a f caca e eece
ee, a dffc f e G ae e /e e f
caca a f Saa e ce ad def ae a
ee ca ea Sa caca ae adaae f ad defca
ad ac.
167. F a Mca, e Oa ae cfed e ca
f e bcade f e f Sa caca de dc e
ae eded e G ffca cedece ad dd de e
G c dcea a aeed d e .
168. D adae, e M G beefed f e cea
aaa aece ad Ued Na ee, e bdae f
e ba f cfdea c ad e eed aa e afe
ad ec f ec.
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VIII. Sanctions list
169. O 11 Decebe 2014, e Peae Reeeae f Saa e Ued
Na bed a ee de Maed Sad (a a A),
ad bee ed 12 A 2010 f ea ac a eae e eace,
ec ab f Saa. He ad aced 7 Je 2014 a e a
ea A-Sabaab a eff ecae Gdae c e e ad ad
edeed e Fedea Gee Mad. O 19 Decebe 2014, e
Cee aed e de f Maed Sad A f e ac .
170. Pa aaa 27 f e 2111 (2013) ad aaa 13 () f
e 2060 (2012), e M G ce efe ad dae
fa e daf f e dda ad ee a eae ac
decbed aaa 1 f e 2111 (2013).
IX. Recommendations
A. Threats to peace and securit
171. Te M G eced:
(a) Ta e Sec Cc cde f aeed eae a dda
ae e ca, faca a ece aae
dee e fedeaa ce ad/ e fc eeca ce
2016 f ef-a, a e faca ad ace e;
(b) Ta, ead Sa bc ece, e Sec Cc e
e Fedea Gee f Saa:
() T eae ad deae ec, ee aae, f
dda ad ee fd ae bee eaed e aa f
faca ece a f e ac ee, ee a cdc
a ce a a f acabe aa a;
() T ae fa eeaed b ee e aae
eae bde e Mebe Sae, ee ee ae eaabe
d beee a aa f e Sae ( e ee
ffce cec e dc) ae acaed e
aa f faca ece Saa;
(c) Ta e Sec Cc, e e e Saa ac
ee, ece ea, eed ad eaed f b fe ee
e c ece ecc e a a ea eace ad ec
Saa ad cde c ac e cea f aeed eae;
(d) Ta e Sec Cc cde eca e Fedea Gee
f Saa ee faca b:
() Eac e ea e f e Cea Ba f Saa;
() U e Fedea Paae eede e eae ce
ead e Pbc Pcee, Cce ad Da Ac;
S/2015/801
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(e) Ta e Sec Cc, e e Saa, e a
a ad a aeee Saa e Fedea Gee f
Saa ceae abe ad deede ce bde, a aed e 2008
Pee La, ad a ca ece-a fae beee e
fedea ad ea ae ace;
(f) Ta e Sec Cc e Mebe Sae e
ceee ae f ec ec ef aced b e Offce f e
Pede f e Fedea Gee f Saa 9 Seebe 2015, e
dee f faca ad ecca aace e ec ec e
ba f c adeece e ce deae e acee.
B. Pirac
172. Te M G eced a e Sec Cc ce
ecae e Fedea Gee f Saa def, ae ad ece a
dda , f e a decade, ae bee ed a ad
faca ac f ac.
C. Arms embargo regime
173. Te M G eced:
(a) Ta e Sec Cc, e ce f aee f cace
b e Fedea Gee f Saa e e f e aa f f e
a eba:
() Ue e Fedea Gee f Saa e cace
e ba e Cc, aca e f f ad
accae fa e ce, c, e ad d f
ec fce, cd e a f ea ad a fce;
() Ree e Fedea Gee f Saa, e ce f
cace fca ba e Cee ea
f a ad a, e e ee ad ce f -dee
ad -db cfa e Cee, eca a c
cca a be bed f a eea fa
aaabe;
() Ree e Fedea Gee f Saa, e f
eaa ae ad a fed e fae, cdc a baee
e f a ee, a ad a e e f e
Fedea Gee f Saa ec fce, aeed aa e
eece e, eed ad , de a Mebe Sae
d e aeed aace de e aa f f e a
eba, bd e deee f e Gade ad daf Heea
a, eced b e Cc e 2232 (2015);
() Ree Mebe Sae a edae ba eff f e
Fedea Gee f Saa eab a efca ea, a
e eeed b e Cc;
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(b) Ta e Sec Cc ee Mebe Sae a e Fedea
Gee f Saa e aaee ad f ea
ad a f aed ee, cd e f
e deee f a ceee ea ad a aaee
ae bd ce acce ad ae ad e eac -
e e, cd da e eee bec ea f fce
be cdced b e Ued Na ad e ea cad e aead e;
(c) Ta e Sec Cc, e e e Saa ac
ee, e Mebe Sae ad eaa, ea ad bea aa
ee a e ae f cace aaa 11 (a) f e 2111
(2013) e cde e f ea, a ee ecca
aace a eded e f e e f e dee Sa
ec ec e a e ec fce f e Fedea Gee;
(d) Ta e Sec Cc, e e e Saa ac
ee, eae e eed f AMISOM ad e Sa Naa A f
c e ba de aaa 6 f e 2182 (2014) ad a
cde eed e ba a ae Saa, de
ee e ceee, aae aaee ad da f c aee
ad facae ac ad aa, c ee A-Sabaab ea ad
cae;
(e) Ta e Sec Cc ee e aa e aaa 15
f e 2182 (2014) ad ee e Cee e a eea
aace ce a de dace Mebe Sae e fae f
cdc ae edc f ea ad e aee bed b e
a eba;
(f) Ta e Sec Cc, e ce f effece f
cace aaa 10 (c) f e 2111 (2013) b e M
G, ee AMISOM ad aec ae caf eece e,
ebe ad e f cad eec ea cdced de
e Afca U aec cce cea ad cda AMISOM.
D. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
174. Te M G eced:
(a) Ta e Sec Cc ee AMISOM ad e aaa
c ce e e f eea f e Saa C -
Secfc Haaa C-Ma Cda Gdee, cd eed
e dea f e ce e aed ac ea Saa;
(b) Ta e Sec Cc e e Fedea Gee f Saa,
AMISOM ad aec ae, ad a e aed ac ea Saa
ae e ae e ac ca f a ea, cd
cea a eab ee f aaa ac dee ad e
feed f ee a e;
(c) Ta e Sec Cc, e e Saa, ed a
ae e cfc ad a e ae Saa a e ea,
aa ad deedece f aaa ac be eeced ad
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eed, cd a a cca eee f afead e afe ad ec f
aaa ee ad ea, ad, ead, a d be
ecaed ceae e aca f fd f ced aaa
aace, deaced f aba Sae-bd aeda.
E. Violations of international humanitarian la inoling the
targeting of ciilians
175. Te M G eced:
(a) Ta e Sec Cc ee e Fedea Gee f Saa
b eace ad ee f caac bd ca e f e Fedea
Gee f Saa ec fce, add e ea
ad ec f e ca ad a eade cad eb
f a f eaa aaa a;
(b) Ta e Sec Cc ee Mebe Sae eaced
caac f e UNSOM a ec, aca a ceae
ea eece ad ab ef ebe de e Ued
Na a de dece c Ued Na -Ued
Na ec fce ead , e aa, cdc aee ad
cace a e be f fce ece ad aace
f Ued Na ee ead;
(c) Ta e Sec Cc ee e Offce f e Ued Na H
Ce f Ha R e Fedea Gee f Saa
ad eea Ued Na aece a e e a f
acabe eaa a ced b a ae e cfc Saa, a
ecea ec dee f a aae ad ceee
aa ce ae;
(d) Ta e Sec Cc, e e Saa, eae
e ba f a Mebe Sae ee a e fce adee c
eaa a a ea cdced Saa, ee de
e AMISOM cce f ea, cd ea ad ec
ee c ae beace f eaa aaa a;
(e) Ta e Sec Cc e ee e Fedea Gee f
Saa ee aa a ad ce ea fced ec,
cd dea ea ad ec f e ae e a
e ce f c ea;
(f) Ta e Sec Cc ee e Afca U, AMISOM ad
ce a cbe AMISOM :
() Ecae cea ad eaee b a ae, aca
ce, e ece eabed AMISOM Ca Caa
Tac, Aa ad Ree Ce, de ee a e daa ad
aa eeaed ae eaed f ea ad cbe a
deceae ca caae ad e; cdea d a be e
e eabe f a c fd cea f ca
caae f AMISOM e Ce;
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() Ee ea ad aae f deaed fa b
-cb ce eae ae a e aa ee
eae, ece ad a ad ca ee ebe f
e c f a aa ca e ce f e dee;
() Iedae ee e eceda f e Afca U
deede ea ea eabed eae aea f ea
ea ad abe b AMISOM ee.
F. Violations of the ban on charcoal
176. Te M G eced:
(a) Ta e Sec Cc ee Mebe Sae ae ac
accdace e aa a aa cae defed b e
M G a fae dcea ad de e M G,
a ae ba, dcea eaed ad e f caca;
(b) Ta e Sec Cc, e e Saa, ad
feace f cace aaa 18 ad 20 f e 2111 (2013),
ee AMISOM ad ce a cbe AMISOM ae ace
e ad a e Sa ae ee e e f
caca ad, ead, e e Cc c ac
f e ad f e e e;
(c) Ta e Sec Cc cde ec eca ad
a Mebe Sae ee ee ca Sa caca e
Mad .
G. Sanctions list
177. Te M G eced a e Cee ceed dea
deae f aeed eae:
(a) K ae ad e acae defed b e M G
Mebe Sae beee 2009 ad 2015;
(b) Idda ad ee ebe f e aa f bc
ece, cd dda ad ee e ae ec;
(c) Idda ed e de f ea f ffca
ee ce;
(d) Idda ad ee, cd e, ee ad ae,
ed e ad f Sa caca.
Annex 92
UN Security Council Resolution 2442 (2018), S/RES/2442, 6 November 2018
United Nations S/RES/2442 (2018)
Security Council Distr.: General
6 November 2018
18-18704 (E)
*1818704*
Resolution 2442 (2018)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 8391st meeting, on
6 November 2018
The Security Council,
Recognizing that 2018 marks the 10th anniversary of resolution 1816 on the
situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and
recalling its previous resolutions concerning the si tuation in Somalia, especially
resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851
(2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020
(2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015) and 2316 (2016) and
2383 (2017) as well as the Statements of its President (S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August
2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/903), as requested by
resolution 2383 (2017), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation
with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia ’s sovereign rights in
accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources,
including fisheries,
Noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations, the
maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted in a
steady decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, with no successful
ship hijackings reported off the coast of Somalia since March 2017 however,
recognizing the ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses
to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the
region, to the safety of seafarers and other persons, to international navigation and
the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to other ships, including fishing vessels
operating in conformity with international law, commending countries that have
deployed naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin to dissuade piracy
networks from carrying out acts of piracy,
Welcoming the reinstatement of the Somali Maritime Security Coordination
Committee (MSCC) meeting held from 9 to 10 July 2018 between the Federal
Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and international partners which
called for enhanced cooperation in strengthening Somalia ’s maritime security as a
key priority for both the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States
and urged the National Security Council to agree on a delineation of roles of the
Annex 92
S/RES/2442 (2018)
2/9 18-18704
Somali maritime forces, as required by the Transition Plan and recognizing the
importance of engaging in transition planning,
Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Na tions
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“The Convention”), sets out
the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering piracy
and armed robbery at sea,
Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at
sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations,
including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize,
facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and reiterating its concern
over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice,
reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti -piracy efforts,
Noting with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic
legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their
capture has hindered more robust international action against pirates off the coast of
Somalia, which has led to pirates in many cases being released without facing justice,
regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and
reiterating that, consistent with the provisions of The Convention concerning the
repression of piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) provides for parties
to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons
responsible for, or suspected of seizing, or exercising control over, a ship by force or
threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation,
Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of So malia, noting the several
requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its
coast, including the letter of 25 October 2018, from the Permanent Representative of
the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the appreciation
of Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their
willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations to
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as king member
states and international organizations to support the Federal Government of Somalia
in its efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its Exclusive
Economic Zone, and requesting that the provisions of resolution 2383 (2017) be
renewed for an additional 12 months,
Welcoming the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and regional
partners in the 21st plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS) in Nairobi, Kenya, 11–13 July 2018, co-hosted by the Indian Ocean
Commission under the Chairmanship of Mauritius,
Recognizing the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force to
facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates, and the intentions of the Regional
Capacity Building Working Group to identify regional priorities and coo rdination of
capacity-building activities and regional responsibilities,
Noting the progress made to enhance Somali capacity building through the
National Maritime Coordination Committee (NMCC) to assess maritime priorities
between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States,
Welcoming the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of
States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen
regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in
accordance with applicable international human rights law, noting with appreciation
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the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Maritime Crime Programme, and being determined to continue efforts to en sure that
pirates are held accountable,
Commending the efforts of the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR)
Operation ATALANTA and EUCAP Somalia, Combined Maritime Forces ’ Combined
Task Force 151, the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshor e in Somalia
and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali authorities
and each other to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters
off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian
Federation, which have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region,
Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing
under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection
detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), and to
allow charters that favour arrangements that make use of such measures, while urging
States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international law,
Welcoming and encouraging the capacity-building efforts in the region made by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the
Trust Fund and the European Union’s activities under the EU Capacity Building
Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) which assists Somalia in strengthening its
maritime security capacity in order to enable it to e nforce maritime law more
effectively, and recognizing the need for all engaged international and regional
organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,
Supporting the development of a coastguard at the federal level and coastguard
police at the Federal Member State level, noting with appreciation the efforts made
by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best
management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress
piracy attacks off the coast of Somal ia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and in relevant
parts of the Indian Ocean that are still within the High Risk Area and recognizing the
work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, noting the efforts of the International
Organization for Standardization, which has developed industry standards of training
and certification for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing PCASP
on board ships in high-risk areas, and further welcoming the European Union ’s
EUCAP Somalia, which is working to develop the maritime security capacities of
Somalia,
Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection,
preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the ongoing work
of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the importance of
enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings to prosecut e acts of
piracy,
Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and
hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and
continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and securi ty of
civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, and welcoming international efforts to
coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law
Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate
enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL’s Global Database on Maritime Piracy, and
commending the establishment of the Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC)
in Madagascar, the sister centre of the Regional Centre for Operational Coordination
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(RCOC) in Seychelles following the signing of the Regional Agreement for the
Setting up of a Regional Maritime Information Exchange and Sharing Mechanism in
the Western Indian Ocean by Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Union of Comoros and
Seychelles , including the establishment of the Piracy Prosecution Readiness Plan
which, under the auspices of UNODC and in partnership with EU NAVFOR, will
further develop the region’s capacity to conduct piracy prosecutions,
Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapp ing and hostagetaking,
including offences contained within the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, strongly condemning the continuing practice of hostage -taking
by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, expressing serious concern at the
inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, recognizing the adverse impact on
their families, calling for the immediate release of all remaining hostages, and noting
the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage -taking
and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,
Commending Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania, for their efforts to
prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts, and noting with appreciation the
assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund, and
other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS, to
support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the
region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution
elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with
applicable international human rights law, and emphasizing the need for States and
international organizations to further en hance international efforts in this regard,
Welcoming the readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal
Member States to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted
suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to
Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable
international law, including international human rights law, and acknowledging the
return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to serve
their sentences in Somalia, and noting that the sentences served must be those passed
by the courts of the prosecuting states and that any proposal to vary the sentences
must be in conformity with the 2011 Transfer Agreement with the Seychelles,
Welcoming the work of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee
(MSCC), the central mechanism for developing capability and identifying and
channelling support, as highlighted at the London Somalia Conference in May 2017,
and encouraging the Somali national and regional administrations to take increasing
responsibility for counter-piracy initiatives,
Expressing serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing (IUU) in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and noting the complex
relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, recognizing that IUU fishing accounts
for millions of dollars in lost revenue for Somalia each year, and can contribute to
destabilization among coastal communities,
Noting Somalia’s accession to the FAO’s Agreement on Port State Measures to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
recognizing the projects supported by FAO and UNODC aimed at enhancing
Somalia’s capacity to combat such activities, and stressing the need for States and
international organizations to further intensify their support to the Federal
Government of Somalia, at its request, in enhancing Somalia ’s capacity to combat
such activities,
Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Federal Governme nt of Somalia towards
the development of a legal regime for the distribution of fishing licences, commending
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in this regard the implementation of a component of the EU -funded Programme to
Promote Regional Maritime Security (CCAP) with FAO aims to promote proper and
transparent licensed and regulated fishing with regional states, and encouraging
further efforts in this regard, with the support of the international community,
Recalling the reports of the Secretary General which illustrate the seriousness
of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful
guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on specialized
anti-piracy courts,
Remaining concerned that four-Iranian seafarers from the FV Siraj remain as
hostages inside Somalia in appalling conditions, and welcoming the work of
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) and Maritime
Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP) in the provision of post trauma
intervention and financial support to victims of piracy and their families; as well as
the CGPCS Piracy Survivors Family Fund (PSFF), which provides funds for the
survivors of Somali piracy, and for their families, to provide a range of support during
and after captivity and recognizing the need to continue supporting these initiatives
and contributions to funds,
Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of public
information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight the best
practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,
Noting efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trus t
Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors
to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and
prosecute suspected pirates and to incarcerate convicted pirates consistent with
applicable international human rights law,
Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden, noting the operations of information-sharing centres in, Kenya, and
Tanzania, recognizing the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate
regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to
patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected
pirates,
Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State
institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the
rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further emphasizing that
Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali
authorities of the Somali Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, Somali National
Army, and Somali Police Force,
Welcoming the Padang Communique and Maritime Cooperation Declaration
adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at its 15th Council of Ministers
meeting, which call upon members to support and strengthen cooperation to address
maritime challenges including piracy and illegal trafficking of drugs,
Welcoming the publication in June 2018 by BIMCO, International Chamber of
Shipping, International Group of Protection & Indemnity Clu bs, Intertanko, The Oil
Companies International Marine Forum and others, of version 5 of Best Management
Practices to deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden,
Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea (BMP5), acknowledging that the i nformation and
guidance contained within helps to reduce the risks to mariners and seafarers engaged
in their lawful occupations,
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Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextri cably linked, and stressing the need to
continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress
piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,
Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor
exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
2. While noting improvements in Somalia, recognizes that piracy exacerbates
instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional
crime, corruption, and terrorism;
3. Stresses the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress
piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community in
collaboration with Somali authorities and other relevant actors;
4. Underlines the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, encourages the
approval by the Parliament of the draft coast guard law which the Somali authorities,
with the support of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia have
submitted to the Council of Ministers and urges the Somali authorities, to continue
their work to pass a comprehensive set of anti -piracy and maritime laws without
further delay and establish security forces with clear roles and jurisdictions to enforce
these laws and to continue to develop, with international support as appropriate, the
capacity of Somali courts to investigate and prosecut e persons responsible for acts of
piracy and armed robbery, including key figures of criminal networks involved in
piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks;
5. Recognizes the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who
plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, urges States,
working in conjunction with relevant international organizatio ns, to adopt legislation
to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. Calls upon the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to
have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and
prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and
suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. Calls upon the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice
those who are using Somali territory to p lan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at
the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary -General, to
strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses
that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with
applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. Calls upon States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage
taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
9. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held
hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all
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relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate
release;
10. Welcomes the initiative of the Seychelles authorities to establish a court
for piracy and maritime crime and further welcomes the successful prosecution of
piracy cases by this body;
11. Recognizes the need for States, international and regional organizations,
and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti -piracy
law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of suspected,
and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and prosecution
of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate,
or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps und er review the
possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan,
organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet
the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013), and calls upon
all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, including
on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal
ban;
12. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do
so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by
deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and
logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats,
vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting such use;
13. Highlights the importance of coordination among States and international
organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in
cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, and urges continued
support of these efforts;
14. Encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali
authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role
of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, and decides that, for a further period of 13 months from the date of this
resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2383
(2017) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali
authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to
the Secretary-General;
15. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or
obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing
customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been
renewed in response to the 25 October 2018 letter conveying the request of Somali
authorities;
16. Decides that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of
resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution
1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply
to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined
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for the sole use of Member States, international, regio nal, and subregional
organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14 above;
17. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the
activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 14 do not h ave
the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships
of any third State;
18. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States
of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy an d armed robbery, and other
States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to
cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and prosecution of all
persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia,
including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize,
facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent with applicable
international law including international human rights law, to ensure that all pirates
handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process, and to render
assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with
respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control , such as victims, witnesses, and
persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;
19. Calls upon all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and to
favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonmen t of those
convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and
financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international law, including international
human rights law, and decides to keep these matters under review, includ ing, as
appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti -piracy courts in Somalia with
substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015
(2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
20. Welcomes, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme ’s
continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that
individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and th ose convicted are imprisoned in
a manner consistent with international law, including international human rights law;
21. Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as par t of its efforts to
target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks
survive;
22. Urges all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic
law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the la undering of its proceeds;
23. Urges States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further
investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of
Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
24. Urges all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land -
based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children from
exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
25. Urges all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the global
piracy database, through appropriate channels;
26. Commends the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO -funded
Djibouti Code of Conduct and urges both state and non -State actors affected by piracy,
most notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;
27. Urges States parties to The Convention and the SUA Convention to
implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary
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international law and to cooperate with the UNODC , IMO, and other States and
international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of
persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
28. Acknowledges the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO
on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in
collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to
develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and
advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of
Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for
forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately
following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from
captivity;
29. Encourages flag States and port States to further consider the development
of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where applicable,
developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at preventing and
suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including
through the IMO and ISO;
30. Invites the IMO to continue its contributions to the preventio n and
suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in
particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry,
and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO ’s role concerning privately
contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high -risk areas;
31. Notes the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by
sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta,
and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
32. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali
authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary -General in nine months
of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided in
paragraph 14 above and further requests all States contributing through the CGPCS
to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States
in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction
and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
33. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within
twelve months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this
resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia;
34. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as appropriate,
renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for addit ional periods
upon the request of Somali authority;
35. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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UN Security Council Resolution 2383 (2017), S/RES/2383, 7 November 2017
United Nations S/RES/2383 (2017)
Security Council Distr.: General
7 November 2017
17-19731 (E)
*1719731*
Resolution 2383 (2017)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 8088th meeting, on
7 November 2017
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia,
especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846
(2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015
(2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012) 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015), and 2316
(2016) as well as the Statement of its President ( S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August
2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/859), as requested by
resolution 2316 (2016), on the implementation of that resolution and on the
situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s sovereign rights in
accordance with international law, with respect to off shore natural resources,
including fisheries,
Noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations,
the maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted
in a steady decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, and expressing
concern about the recent piracy incidents that occurred during 2017 and by the
ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses to the prompt,
safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the region, to the
safety of seafarers and other persons, to international navigation and the safety of
commercial maritime routes, and to other ships, including fishing vessels operating
in conformity with international law, commending Chinese and Indian naval forces
for thwarting an attack on the OS -35, Chinese operations soldiers for capturing
three pirates, and Chinese and European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) for
preventing an attack on MV Al Heera, and further commending countries that have
deployed naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin to dissuade piracy
networks from carrying out acts of piracy,
Supporting the outcome of the London Somalia Conference held on 11 May
2017, and the commitment of the Federal Government and Federal Member States
of Somalia to developing their maritime security capabilities,
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Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“The Convention”), sets
out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering
piracy and armed robbery at sea,
Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured
at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates pirac y operations,
including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize,
facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and reiterating its concern
over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing j ustice,
reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti -piracy efforts,
Welcoming the successful prosecution of piracy cases in Belgium, India,
Mauritius, and the Seychelles during the past year, while noting with concern that
the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and
prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture has hindered more robust
international action against pirates off the coast of Somalia, which has led to pirates
in many cases being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is
sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and reiterating that, consistent with the
provisions of The Convention concerning the repression of piracy, the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (“SUA Convention”) provides for parties to create criminal offences,
establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for, or suspected of
seizing, or exercising control over, a ship by force or threat thereof, or any other
form of intimidation,
Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, noting the several
requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its
coast, including the letter of 2 November 2017, from the Permanent Representative
of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the
appreciation of Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance,
expressing their willingness to consider working with other States and regional
organizations to combat piracy and armed robber y at sea off the coast of Somalia,
asking member states and international organizations to support the Federal
Government of Somalia in its efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing in its Exclusive Economic Zone, and requesting that the provisions of
resolution 2316 (2016) be renewed for an additional 12 months,
Welcoming the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and
regional partners in the 20th plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in Mauritius July 5 –7, 2017, co-hosted by the Indian
Ocean Commission under the Chairmanship of the Republic of the Seychelles,
Recognizing the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force t o
facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates, and the intentions of the Regional
Capacity Building Working Group to identify regional priorities and coordination of
capacity-building activities and regional responsibilities,
Welcoming the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of
States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen
regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in
accordance with applicable international human rights law, noting with appreciation
the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Maritime Crime Programme, and being determined to continue efforts to ensure that
pirates are held accountable,
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Commending the efforts of the EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA,
Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, the counter -piracy activities
of the African Union onshore in Somalia and the naval activities of the Southern
Africa Development Community, and other States acting in a national capacity in
cooperation with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to protect
ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of
individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counter -
piracy missions in the region,
Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing
under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection
detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), an d to
allow charters that favour arrangements that make use of such measures, while
urging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international
law,
Welcoming and encouraging the capacity-building efforts in the region made
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of
Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union’s activities under the EU Capacity
Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) which assists Somalia in
strengthening its maritime security ca pacity in order to enable it to enforce maritime
law more effectively, and recognizing the need for all engaged international and
regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,
Supporting the development of a coastguard at the federal level and coastguard
police at the Federal Member State level, noting with appreciation the efforts made
by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best
management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress
piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and in
relevant parts of the Indian Ocean that are still within the High Risk Area and
recognizing the work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, noting the efforts of
the International Organization for Standardization, which has developed industry
standards of training and certification for Private Maritime Security Companies
when providing PCASP on board ships in high -risk areas, and further welcoming
the European Union’s EUCAP Somalia, which is working to develop the maritime
security capacities of Somalia,
Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection,
preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the ongoing work
of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the importance of
enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings to prosecute acts of
piracy,
Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and
hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and
continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of
civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, a nd welcoming international efforts
to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law
Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate
enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL’s Global Database on Maritime Piracy,
and commending the establishment of the Regional Centre for Operational
Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles on 1 July 2017, which will operate alongside its
sister centre, and appreciating the establishment of the Regional Maritime
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Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar, including the establishment of
the Piracy Prosecution Readiness Plan which, under the auspices of UNODC and in
partnership with EU NAVFOR, will further develop the region’s capacity to conduct
piracy prosecutions,
Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage -
taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, strongly condemning the continuing practice of hostage-taking
by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, expressing serious concern at the
inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, recognizing the adverse impact on
their families, calling for the immediate release of all remaining hostages, and
noting the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of
hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,
Commending Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Seychelles, for their efforts to
prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts , and noting with appreciation the
assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund,
and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS,
to support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the
region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution
elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with
applicable international human rights law, and emphasizing the need for States and
international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,
Welcoming the readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal
Member States to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted
suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to
Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable
international law, including international human rights law, and acknowledging the
return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to
serve their sentences in Somalia,
Welcoming the work of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee
(MSCC), the central mechanism for developing capability and identifying and
channelling support, as highlighted at the London Somalia Conference in May 2017,
and encouraging the Somali national and regional administrations to take increasing
responsibility for counter-piracy initiatives,
Expressing serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing (IUU) in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and noting the
complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, recognizing that IUU fishing
accounts for millions of dollars in lost revenue for Somalia each year, and can
contribute to destabilization among coastal communities,
Noting Somalia’s accession to the FAO’s Agreement on Port State Measures to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
recognizing the projects supported by FAO and UNODC aimed at enhancing the
Somalia’s capacity to combat such activities, and stressing the need for States and
international organizations to further intensify their support to the Federal
Government of Somalia, at its request, in enhancing S omalia’s capacity to combat
such activities,
Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia
towards the development of a legal regime for the distribution of fishing licences,
commending in this regard the implementation of a compone nt of the EU-funded
Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (CCAP) with FAO aims to
promote proper and transparent licensed and regulated fishing with regional states,
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and encouraging further efforts in this regard, with the support of the internat ional
community,
Recalling the reports of the Secretary General which illustrate the seriousness
of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful
guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on special ized
anti-piracy courts,
Commending the Hostage Support Partnership (HSP) for the release of
26 seafarers in 2016, but remaining concerned that eight Iranian seafarers from the
FV Siraj remain as hostages inside Somalia in appalling conditions, and welcoming
the work of International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) and
Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP) in the provision of
post trauma intervention and financial support to victims of piracy and their
families; as well as the CGPCS Piracy Survivors Family Fund (PSFF), which
provides funds for the survivors of Somali piracy, and for their families, to provide
a range of support during and after captivity and recognizing the need to continue
supporting these initiatives and contributions to funds,
Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of
public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight
the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,
Noting efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trust
Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors
to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and
prosecute suspected pirates and to inc arcerate convicted pirates consistent with
applicable international human rights law,
Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden, noting the operations of information-sharing centres in Yemen, Kenya, and
Tanzania, recognizing the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate
regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to
patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected
pirates,
Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of
State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights
and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of
piracy and armed robber y at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further emphasizing
that Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali
authorities of the Somali Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, Somali National
Army, and Somali Police Force,
Welcoming the Padang Communique and Maritime Cooperation Declaration
adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at its 15th Council of
Ministers meeting, which call upon members to support and strengthen cooperation
to address maritime challenges including piracy and illegal trafficking of drugs,
Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextricably linked, and stressing the need to
continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress
piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,
Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important
factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat
to international peace and security in the region,
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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
2. While noting improvements in Somalia, recognizes that piracy
exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that
fuels additional crime, corruption, and terrorism;
3. Stresses the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress
piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community;
4. Underlines the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the
fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, welcomes the
draft coast guard law which the Somali authorities, with the support of the European
Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia have
submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval by Parliament and urges the
Somali authorities, to continue their work to pass a comprehensive set of anti -piracy
and maritime laws without further delay and establish security forces with clear
roles and jurisdictions to enforce these laws and to continue to develop, with
international support as appropriate, the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and
prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery, including key
figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or
illicitly finance or profit from such attacks;
5. Recognizes the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who
plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, urges
States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt
legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. Calls upon the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to
have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and
prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and
suppress acts of piracy and armed robbe ry at sea;
7. Calls upon the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice
those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia , at
the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary -General, to
strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses
that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with
applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. Calls upon States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of
hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
9. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held
hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all
relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate
release;
10. Welcomes the initiative of the Seychelles authorities to establish a court
for piracy and maritime crime and further welcomes the successful prosecution of
piracy cases by this body;
11. Recognizes the need for States, international and regional organizations,
and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti -piracy
law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of
suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and
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prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan,
organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps
under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or
entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy
operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093
(2013), and calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea
Monitoring Group, including on information -sharing regarding possible violations
of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
12. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do
so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by
deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and
logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats,
vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting such use;
13. Highlights the importance of coordination among States and international
organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS t o facilitate such coordination in
cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, and urges continued
support of these efforts;
14. Encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali
authorities in the fight against piracy and ar med robbery at sea, notes the primary
role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia, and decides that, for a further period of 12 months from the
date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of
resolution 2316 (2016) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating
with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali
authorities to the Secretary-General;
15. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or
obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establis hing
customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been
renewed in response to the 2 November 2017 letter conveying the request of Somali
authorities;
16. Decides that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of
resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of
resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does
not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of
assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and
subregional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14
above;
17. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the
activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 14 do not have
the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships
of any third State;
18. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States,
States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery,
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and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national
legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and
prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the
coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who
plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent
with applicable international law including international human rights law, to ensure
that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process,
and to render assistance by, among other actions, pr oviding disposition and logistics
assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as
victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under
this resolution;
19. Calls upon all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and
to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those
convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and
financiers ashore, consistent with applicable internatio nal law, including
international human rights law, and decides to keep these matters under review,
including, as appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti -piracy courts in
Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in
resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in
this regard;
20. Welcomes, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme’s
continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure
that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are
imprisoned in a manner consistent with international law, including international
human rights law;
21. Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as part of its efforts to
target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks
survive;
22. Urges all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic
law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its
proceeds;
23. Urges States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further
investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of
Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
24. Urges all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land -
based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women a nd children
from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
25. Urges all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the
global piracy database, through appropriate channels;
26. Commends the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO -funded
Djibouti Code of Conduct and urges both state and non -State actors affected by
piracy, most notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;
27. Urges States parties to The Convention and the SUA Convention to
implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary
international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and
international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution
of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
28. Acknowledges the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO
on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in
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collaboration with the shipping and insurance industrie s and the IMO, to continue to
develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and
advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of
Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessel s available for
forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately
following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from
captivity;
29. Encourages flag States and port States to further consi der the
development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where
applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at
preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative
process, including through the IMO and ISO;
30. Invites the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and
suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in
particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry,
and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO’s role concerning privately
contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high -risk areas;
31. Notes the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by
sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta,
and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
32. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali
authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General in nine months
of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided
in paragraph 14 above and further requests all States contributing through the
CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the co ast of Somalia, including Somalia and
other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish
jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
33. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within
eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this
resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia;
34. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as
appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for
additional periods upon the request of Somali authority;
35. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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UN Security Council Resolution 2316 (2016), S/RES/2316, 9 November 2016
United Nations S/RES/2316 (2016)
Security Council Distr.: General
9 November 2016
16-19685 (E)
*1619685*
Resolution 2316 (2016)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 7805th meeting, on
9 November 2016
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia,
especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846
(2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015
(2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012) 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), and 2246 (2015) as
well as the Statement of its President ( S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and
(S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/843), as requested by
resolution 2246 (2015), on the implementation of that resolution and on the
situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, politic al
independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia ’s sovereign rights in
accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources,
including fisheries,
Noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizatio ns,
the maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted
in a steady decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, and continuing
to be gravely concerned by the ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed
robbery at sea poses to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid
to Somalia and the region, to the safety of seafarers and other persons, to
international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to other
ships, including fishing vessels operating in conformity with international law,
Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 ( “The Convention”), sets
out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering
piracy and armed robbery at sea,
Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured
at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations,
including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize,
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facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and reiterating its concern
over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice,
reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti -piracy efforts,
Noting with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic
legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their
capture has hindered more robust international action against pirates off the coast of
Somalia, which has led to pirates being released without facing justice, regardless of
whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and reiterating that,
consistent with the provisions of The Convention concerning the repression of
piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation ( “SUA Convention”) provides for parties to create
criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible
for, or suspected of seizing, or exercising control over, a ship by force or threat
thereof, or any other form of intimidation,
Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, noting the several
requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its
coast, including the letter of 24 October 2016, from the Chargé d ’affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the appreciation of
Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their
willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations to
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, asking member
states and international organizations to support the Federal Government of Somalia
in its efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its Exclusive
Economic Zone, and requesting that the provisions of resolution 2246 (2015) be
renewed for an additional twelve months,
Welcoming the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and
regional partners in the 19th plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), hosted by the Seychelles in Victoria, Seychelles, May
31-June 3, 2016,
Recognizing the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force to
facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates, and of the Working Group on
Capacity Building of the CGPCS to coordinate judicial, penal, and maritime
capacity-building efforts to enable regional states to better t ackle piracy,
Welcoming the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of
States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen
regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in
accordance with applicable international human rights law, noting with appreciation
the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Maritime Crime Programme, and being determined to continue efforts to ensure that
pirates are held accountable,
Commending the efforts of the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation
ATALANTA, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Ocean Shield,
Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, the counter-piracy activities
of the African Union onshore in Somalia and the naval activities of the Southern
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Africa Development Community, and other States acting in a national capacity in
cooperation with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to protect
ships transiting through the wate rs off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of
individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan,
Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counterpiracy
missions in the region,
Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing
under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection
detachments and privately contracte d armed security personnel (PCASP), and to
allow charters that favour arrangements that make use of such measures, while
urging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international
law,
Noting that HRA boundaries are set and defi ned by the insurance and maritime
industry, and have been redefined in December 2015,
Welcoming the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the
Trust Fund and the European Union’s activities under the EU Mission on Regional
Maritime Capacity in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), which is working with
the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen its criminal justice system, and
recognizing the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to
coordinate and cooperate fully,
Supporting the development of a coastal police force, noting with appreciation
the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update
guidance, best management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to
prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the Gulf
of Aden, and in relevant parts of the Indian Ocean that are still within the High Risk
Area and recognizing the work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, noting the
efforts of the International Organization for Standardization, which has developed
industry standards of training and certification for Private Maritime Security
Companies when providing PCASP on board ships in high -risk areas, and further
welcoming the European Union’s EUCAP Nestor, which is working to develop the
maritime security capacities of Somalia,
Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection,
preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the ongoing work
of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the importance of
enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal p roceedings to prosecute acts of
piracy,
Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and
hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and
continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of
civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, and welcoming international efforts
to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law
Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate
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enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL’s Global Database on Maritime Piracy,
and taking note of the ongoing efforts of the Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement
Centre for Safety and Security at Sea, hosted by Seychelles to combat piracy and
transnational organized crime,
Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage -
taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, strongly condemning the continuing practice of hostage-taking
by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, expressing serious concern at the
inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, recognizing the adverse impact on
their families, calling for the immediate release of all hostages, and noting the
importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage -taking
and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,
Commending Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Seychelles, for their efforts to
prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts, and noting with appreciation the
assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund,
and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS,
to support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the
region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution
elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with
applicable international human rights law, and emphasizing the need for States and
international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,
Welcoming the readiness of the national and regional administrations of
Somalia to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted
suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to
Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable
international law, including international human rights law, and acknowledging the
return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to
serve their sentences in Somalia,
Welcoming the work of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee
(MSCC), as an important mechanism of information sharing, and encouraging the
Somali national and regional administrations to take increasing responsibility for
counter-piracy initiatives,
Expressing serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing (IUU) in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zo ne (EEZ), and noting the
complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, recognizing that IUU fishing
accounts for millions of dollars in lost revenue for Somalia each year, and can
contribute to destabilization among coastal communities,
Noting Somalia’s accession to the FAO’s Agreement on Port State Measures to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
recognizing the projects supported by FAO and UNODC aimed at enhancing the
Somalia’s capacity to combat such activities, and stressing the need for States and
international organizations to further intensify their support to the Federal
Government of Somalia, at its request, in enhancing Somalia ’s capacity to combat
such activities,
Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia
towards the development of a legal regime for the distribution of fishing licenses,
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and encouraging further efforts in this regard, with the support of the international
community,
Recalling the reports of the Secretary-General which illustrate the seriousness
of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful
guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on specialized
anti-piracy courts,
Stressing the need for States to consider possible methods to assist the
seafarers who are victims of pirates, and welcoming in this regard the efforts of the
“Hostage Support Programme” and the Piracy Survivor Family Fund launched at the
2014 CGPCS to provide support to hostages during t heir release and return home, as
well as to their families throughout the hostage situation,
Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of
public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight
the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,
Noting efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trust
Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors
to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacit y to investigate, arrest, and
prosecute suspected pirates and to incarcerate convicted pirates consistent with
applicable international human rights law,
Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden, noting the operations of information-sharing centres in Yemen, Kenya, and
Tanzania, recognizing the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate
regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to
patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected
pirates,
Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of
State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights
and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further emphasizing
that Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali
authorities of the Somali National Army and Somali Police Force,
Welcoming the Padang Communique and Maritime Cooperation Declaration
adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at its 15th Council of
Ministers meeting, which call upon members to support and strengthen cooperation
to address maritime challenges including piracy and illegal trafficking of drugs, and
welcoming Somalia’s October 2016 signing of the IORA charter to formally become
a member State, thereby strengthening Somalia ’s cooperation with its neighbours on
maritime safety and security,
Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextricably linked, and stressing the need to
continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress
piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,
Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important
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6/10 16-19685
factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat
to international peace and securit y in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
2. While noting improvements in Somalia, recognizes that piracy
exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that
fuels additional crime and corruption;
3. Stresses the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress
piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the inter national community;
4. Underlines the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the
fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, welcomes the
draft coast guard law which the Somali authorities, with the support of the European
Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Nestor have
submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval by Parliament and urges the
Somali authorities, to continue their work to pass a comprehensive set of anti -piracy
and maritime laws without further delay and establish security forces with clear
roles and jurisdictions to enforce these laws and to continue to develop, with
international support as appropriate, the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and
prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery, including key
figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or
illicitly finance or profit from such attacks;
5. Recognizes the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who
plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, urges
States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt
legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. Calls upon the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to
have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and
prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and
suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. Calls upon the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice
those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilita te, or undertake criminal acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at
the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary -General, to
strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including re gional authorities and, stresses
that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with
applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. Calls upon States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the is sue of
hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
9. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held
hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all
relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate
release;
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10. Welcomes the initiative of the Seychelles authorities to establish a court
for piracy and maritime crime and further welcomes the successful prosecution of
piracy cases by this body;
11. Recognizes the need for States, international and regional organizations,
and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti -piracy
law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of
suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and
prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan,
organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps
under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or
entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy
operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093
(2013), and calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the S omalia and Eritrea
Monitoring Group, including on information -sharing regarding possible violations
of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
12. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do
so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by
deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and
logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats,
vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting such use;
13. Highlights the importance of coordination among States and international
organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in
cooperation with the IMO, flag States, a nd Somali authorities, and urges continued
support of these efforts;
14. Encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali
authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary
role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia, and decides that, for a further period of twelve months from
the date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of
resolution 2246 (2015) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating
with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali
authorities to the Secretary-General;
15. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or
responsibilities of Member States under international l aw, including any rights or
obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing
customary international law; and affirms further that such authori zations have been
renewed based on the receipt of the 24 October 2016 letter conveying the consent of
Somali authorities;
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16. Decides that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of
resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of
resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does
not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of
assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and
subregional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14
above;
17. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the
activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 14 do not have
the practical effect of denying or impai ring the right of innocent passage to the ships
of any third State;
18. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States,
States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery,
and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national
legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and
prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the
coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who
plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent
with applicable international law including international human rights law, to ensure
that all pirates handed over to j udicial authorities are subject to a judicial process,
and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics
assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as
victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under
this resolution;
19. Calls upon all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and
to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those
convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and
financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international law, including
international human rights law, and decides to keep these matters under review,
including, as appropriate, the establishment of sp ecialized anti-piracy courts in
Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in
resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in
this regard;
20. Welcomes, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme ’s
continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure
that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are
imprisoned in a manner consistent with international law, including international
human rights law;
21. Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as part of its efforts to
target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks
survive;
22. Urges all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic
law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its
proceeds;
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23. Urges States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further
investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of
Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
24. Urges all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land -
based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children
from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
25. Urges all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the
global piracy database, through appropriate channels;
26. Commends the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO -funded
Djibouti Code of Conduct and urges both state and non -State actors affected by
piracy, most notably the international shipping community, to contribut e to them;
27. Urges States parties to The Convention and the SUA Convention to
implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary
international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and
international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution
of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
28. Acknowledges the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO
on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in
collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to
develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and
advisories to take when under attack or when s ailing in the waters off the coast of
Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for
forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately
following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from
captivity;
29. Encourages flag States and port States to further consider the
development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where
applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at
preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative
process, including through the IMO and ISO;
30. Invites the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and
suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in
particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry,
and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO ’s role concerning privately
contracted armed security personnel on board sh ips in high-risk areas;
31. Notes the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by
sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta,
and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
32. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali
authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary -General in nine months
of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided
in paragraph 14 above and further requests all States contributing through the
CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and
other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish
jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
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33. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within
eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this
resolution and on the situation with respect t o piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia;
34. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as
appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for
additional periods upon the request of Somali auth ority;
35. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 94
Annex 9
Letter from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
President of the Security Council, S/2017/924, 2 November 2017 (Extracts)
United Nations S/2017/924
Security Council Distr.: General
2 November 2017
Original: English
17-17136 (E) 071117
*1717136*
Letter dated 2 November 2017 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
President of the Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with
paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), I have the honour to
transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and
the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and
issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Kairat Umarov
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
S/2017/924
2/161 17-17136
Letter dated 2 November 2017 from the Monitoring Group on
Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
In accordance with paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016),
we have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea.
(Signed) James Smith
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
(Signed) Jay Bahadur
Armed groups expert
(Signed) Charles Cater
Natural resources expert
(Signed) Déirdre Clancy
Humanitarian expert
(Signed) Tapani Holopainen
Finance expert
(Signed) Nazanine Moshiri
Arms expert
(Signed) Richard Zabot
Arms expert
S/2017/924
17-17136 3/161
Contents
Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C. Intercommunal conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
D. Public financial management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
E. Resource governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
F. Resurgence of piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
G. Electoral misconduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
III. Arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A. Illicit flow of weapons into Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Federal Government compliance with obligations under the partial lifting of the arms
embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C. Other Somali security sector institutions: compliance with the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . 35
D. Establishment of a United Arab Emirates military base in Berbera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
E. Military equipment captured during offensive operations by the African Union Mission
in Somalia and Federal Government security forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
F. Security sector reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. Al-Shabaab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B. Bureaucratic obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
C. Major supply routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
D. Diversion of humanitarian aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
E. Attacks on humanitarian workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
F. Manipulation of aid to exclude marginalized communities and fuel conflict . . . . . . . . . . 42
V. Violations of international humanitarian law involving targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B. Federal and regional forces, clan militias and other criminal elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
C. African Union Mission in Somalia and international forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
D. Child recruitment and use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
VI. Violations of the charcoal ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A. Production, transport and stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B. Illicit export of charcoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
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C. Paperwork and criminal networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
D. Implementation of the charcoal ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
VII. Correction to the previous report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant
to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015) (S/2016/919) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
VIII. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea . . . . . . . . 49
IX. Implementation of targeted sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A. Threats to peace and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B. Arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
C. International humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
D. Charcoal ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
E. Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
F. Disassociation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Annexes*
1.1: Al-Shabaab procurement of weapons following attacks on AMISO M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.2: Al-Shabaab use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) * . . 56
1.3: 2 January 2017 VBIED attack in Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.4: Puntland IED seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.5: Al-Shabaab financing in Bay and Bakool regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.1: ISIL occupation of Qandala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.2: Leadership of the ISIL faction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3: Mobile phone analysis of Abbas Mahamoud Yusuf and the ISIL faction (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.4: ISIL attack on International Village Hotel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5: May 2017 ISIL suicide bombing in Bosaso (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1: Galkayo conflict: 7 October to 18 November 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1: Currency management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2: Abdullahi Mohamed Nor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.1: CADG Engineering Pte. (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1: Berbera port payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2: Fishing governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3: Oil governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4: Strategic Natural Resource Management & Consultants Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.1: The Abdikarim Salah Mohamed a.k.a. Aw Koombe network and the hijacking of the Aris 13
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
S/2017/924
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7.1: Puntland arms smuggling networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.1.1: Puntland interdiction of arms from Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.2: Maritime seizure of arms in March 2016 by FS Provence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.2.1: Belarus sights (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.1: Halane Central Armoury inspections, 26 April and 29 August 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8.2: Registration and distribution procedures at Halane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.3: Review of paperwork related to ammunition distribution from Halane (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
8.4: Review of paperwork related to a shipment of weapons and ammunition from Djibouti
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8.5: Diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
9.1: Establishment of a United Arab Emirates military base in Berbera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
10.1: Marginalized communities and humanitarian access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
10.2: Involvement of a Lower Shabelle NGO in inter-clan conflict (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
11.1: Destruction of Shiidle villages near Balad, Middle Shabelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
11.2: Child recruitment and use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
11.3: Update: Abdirashid Hassan Abdinur — obstruction of humanitarian assistance and targeting
of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
11.3.1: Update: Abdirashid Hassan Abdinur (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . 145
11.4: ACLED statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
12.1: Charcoal stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
12.2.1: Selected cases of sanctions implementation — Bahrain (November 2016) . . . . . . . . 150
12.2.2: Selected cases of sanctions implementation — United Arab Emirates and Djibouti
(November 2016–March 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
12.2.3: Selected cases of sanctions implementation — Kuwait (April 2017–May 2017) . . . 156
12.2.4: Selected cases of sanctions implementation — United Arab Emirates (June 2017–
August 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
12.2.5: Charcoal dhows at Port Al Hamriya anchorage, Dubai, UAE (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
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Summary
After a prolonged and problematic electoral process, a new president of the
Federal Government of Somalia, Abdullahi Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo”, was
selected by Members of Parliament in Mogadishu on 8 February 2017. A new Prime
Minister, Hassan Ali Khaire, and cabinet were appointed by late March. Throug hout
its first six months in office, the administration has faced multiple challenges.
Relations between the Federal Government and the country’s regional
administrations have been strained by the Government’s apparent backtracking on
commitments to devolve power to the regions under a new national security
architecture and by a continuing lack of consensus regarding aspects of resource
governance. Meanwhile, regional administrations have continued negotiating
unilaterally with foreign entities regarding ports, military installations and natural
resources.
These strains were exacerbated by growing tensions among members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council. As various Member States in the region were compelled
to take sides in the Gulf crisis of June 2017, the Farmaajo administration has found
itself increasingly isolated by its decision to remain neutral. Regional
administrations, numerous Members of Parliament and parts of the influential
Mogadishu business community have openly opposed this stance.
Meanwhile, the militant group Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
(Al-Shabaab) continues to pose the most immediate threat to peace and security in
Somalia. Over the course of the mandate, little if any progress has been made to
mitigate that threat. Al-Shabaab maintains control over a large proportion of rural
territory, and remains in control of certain urban centres in southern and central
Somalia. On 2 January 2017, in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab detonated what was likely
the largest improvised explosive device in the group’s history. Laboratory analysis of
the blast revealed traces of potassium nitrate, suggesting that Al -Shabaab may have
begun to manufacture home-made explosives.
Al-Shabaab’s presence in Puntland, in north-east Somalia, has expanded,
exacerbating the challenges faced by authorities in the region. Concurrently, the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction, largely confined to Bari region in
north-east Puntland, has grown in numbers and is attracting an increasingly broad
range of recruits. The ISIL faction briefly took control of the town of Qandala, on the
north coast of Puntland, and carried out its first suicide attack, in Bosaso. While its
capacity has remained limited, an influx of foreign fighters fleeing military pressure
in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and elsewhere could present a significant threat to
the region.
The Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea remains concerned by the
continuing flow of illicit weapons into Somalia, particularly by way of the north
coast of Puntland. Limited access inhibits the Group’s ability to verify the frequency
and volume of deliveries, but evidence collected suggests a rate of approximately
one shipment of weapons a month into Puntland alone, arriving predominantly from
Yemen.
Meanwhile, the Federal Government called repeatedly for the complete lifting
of the arms embargo despite its inability to fully comply with its current obligations
under the partial lift. There have been multiple non-notified or partially notified
consignments of weapons supplied to both the Federal Government and the regional
administrations over the past two years. Despite modest improvements, flaws in
weapons and ammunition management on the part of the Federal Government
remain, particularly with respect to the distribution and tracking of materiel. Given
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the vulnerability of the system to diversion, and the threat this poses to peace and
security, particularly amid ongoing tensions between the centre and periphery, the
Monitoring Group recommends no further easing of the arms embargo.
Despite limited improvements in public financial management, federal
institutions remain incapable of addressing pervasive corruption. Mechanisms
established to review Government contracts have continued to be circumvented, and
the lack of transparency regarding company ownership leaves all Government
contracts open to concerns of nepotism. Government ministries continue to bypass
the Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank of Somalia, avoiding oversight of
their revenues by the Federal Government’s fiscal authorities. The misappropriation
and misuse of public land in Mogadishu is ongoing, despite pledges from the
previous administration to address the problem. The printing of counterfeit Somali
currency in Puntland continues to undermine economic stability and has prompted
outbreaks of civil unrest.
Al-Shabaab was responsible for the greatest number of civilian causalities
during the mandate, as a result of large-scale attacks on civilian targets and the
imposition of violent punishments on individuals and communities. Intercommunal
conflict, often exacerbated by the involvement of national and regional forces and
Al-Shabaab, caused significant civilian harm. Long-running tensions in Galkayo and
Lower Shabelle escalated into open armed conflict, resulting in the displacement of
more than 180,000 civilians. In June, Al-Shabaab also began an aggressive campaign
of child recruitment, forcing hundreds of children into the group’s madrasa system.
Following the declaration of a pre-famine alert in February, Al-Shabaab’s
continued ban on humanitarian operations and violent blockades of Government -held
areas resulted in the displacement of more than 800,000 civilians. As the drought
response scaled up, extortion at illegal checkpoints on major supply routes, often
manned by national and/or regional administration forces, added to the overall costs
of aid delivery. Local humanitarian workers also faced increased danger of abduction
and the destruction and looting of supplies by Al-Shabaab. Efforts by both
international humanitarian partners and Somali community organizations prevented
Somalia from slipping into another famine.
Finally, the overall magnitude of illicit exports of charcoal from southern
Somalia remains similar to previous levels. In contrast to much of 2015 and 2016,
when Al-Shabaab intermittently banned the charcoal trade in areas under its control,
the group has resumed systematic taxation of charcoal at checkpoints between
stockpiles and the ports at Buur Gaabo and Kismayo. A conservative estimate suggests
that Al-Shabaab receives at least $10 million each year from the illicit charcoal trade.
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, continues to be the primary export destination as well as
a hub for criminal networks that violate the charcoal ban with near impunity. With the
notable exception of Kuwait, implementation of the charcoal ban has been poor,
particularly by the Interim Jubba Administration and the African Union Mission in
Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates among importing countries. A lack of
commitment with regard to the consistent implementation of sanctions, and in some
cases a conspicuously deliberate failure to comply with the charcoal ban, facilitates
Al-Shabaab financing and undermines counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia.
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I. Introduction
A. Mandate
1. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, as set out in
paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), and added to in
paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014),
was renewed in paragraph 38 of resolution 2317 (2016).
2. Pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 2317 (2016) and paragraph 13 (l) of
resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group provided the Security Council,
through the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and
1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, with a midterm update on 21 April
2017. The Group also submitted monthly progress updates to the Committee
throughout its mandate.
3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group
travelled to Bahrain, Belgium, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, India, Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Qatar, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, the
Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
4. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following
experts: James Smith (Coordinator), Jay Bahadur (armed groups), Charles Cater
(natural resources), Déirdre Clancy (humanitarian), Tapani Holopainen (finance),
Nazanine Moshiri (arms) and Richard Zabot (arms).
B. Methodology
5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous
reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the mandate under
review. The Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports. The
methodology used for the present report is as follows:
(a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources,
where possible;
(b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of
events, where possible;
(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing
existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgment of the relevant
expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with
regard to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources;
(e) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary
evidence in support of the information collected;
(f) Analysing satellite imagery where applicable.
6. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access
to those involved in violations of the sanctions measures by way of individuals who
had direct knowledge or who knew people who had direct knowledge about details
of violations. On some occasions, the Group itself witnessed active violations.
7. The Monitoring Group interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant
information, including government officials and representatives of diplomatic
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missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. Members of the Group also
met or communicated with officials from the Puntland, Somaliland and interim
regional administrations, representatives of political and armed groups, defectors
and members of business communities and Somali civil society.
8. In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on information sensitivity,
classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6), the Monitoring Group has submitted
to the Committee, together with the present report, several strictly confidential
annexes containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper
functioning of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third
parties or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations. Those annexes will not
be issued as a document of the Security Council.
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
9. The militant group Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) remains
the most immediate threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia. Major
offensive operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and t he
Somali National Army against Al-Shabaab have stalled since July 2015, which
marked the last phase of Operation Juba Corridor. Consequently, the group remains
in control of much of the Juba Valley, including the towns of Jilib, Jamame and
Bu’ale, allowing the group to maintain taxation on farms in the area, a major source
of its revenue. Even around urban centres throughout southern and central Somalia
occupied by national or regional security forces and/or AMISOM, Al -Shabaab
continues to maintain control over the countryside and major supply routes,
enabling the group to cut off provisions to large segments of the population.
10. In March 2017, the United States issued a directive classifying large swathes
of southern Somalia as a war zone, allowing the expansion of ground and air combat
operations. Between June and mid-September, the United States carried out
9 publicly acknowledged aerial strikes in Somalia, compared with 13 throughout the
entirety of 2016. The strikes resulted in the confirmed deaths o f at least three
mid- to high-level Al-Shabaab commanders.1 However, as noted in previous
Monitoring Group reports (see S/2016/919, para. 11), the erosion of Al-Shabaab’s
leadership has historically has had little effect on the group’s ability to carry out
both asymmetric and conventional attacks within Somalia. The principal targets of
its operations remain AMISOM peacekeepers and officials belonging to the Federal
Government of Somalia or regional administrations, whom Al-Shabaab considers to
be apostates.
__________________
1 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Somalia: reported US actions 2017 database. Available from
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-covert…
(accessed 19 September 2017).
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Domestic and regional operations
11. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out regular complex attacks in Mogadishu,
typically by deploying a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device followed by an
assault by four to five so-called suicide gunmen, against hotels and restaurants
frequented by Federal Government officials and members of the security forces.
Since the beginning of the current mandate, the group has carried out three such
attacks in Mogadishu: on Dayah Hotel on 25 January 2017, at Café Italian on 8 May
and on Posh Hotel and the adjacent Pizza House restaurant on 14 June. At least
77 people were killed.
12. In addition, on 2 January 2017, Al-Shabaab detonated a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device at a National Intelligence and Security Agency
checkpoint at the Medina Gate of the Adan Abdulle International Airport complex in
Mogadishu. Estimated at as much as 1,200 kg TNT equivalence, it was likely the
largest explosive device by weight ever employed by the group (see annex 1.3).2
13. Al-Shabaab also continues to present an occasional conventional military
threat to AMISOM and national/regional security forces. On 27 January, Al -Shabaab
fighters stormed a Kenyan Defence Forces base at Kulbiyow, which straddles the
border between Kenya and the Lower Juba region in Somalia, resulting in the deaths
of at least 67 Kenyan Defence Forces soldiers. It was the first large -scale
conventional assault against an AMISOM troop-contributing country base since a
failed attack on an Ethiopian National Defence Forces contingent at Halgan, Hiran
region, on 9 June 2016 (see S/2016/919, para. 23).
14. Conversely, Al-Shabaab’s transborder terror operations remained at an ebb,
with the group failing to carry out a significant attack outside of Somalia. However,
the Al-Shabaab-linked Jaysh Ayman insurgency remains active in the Boni forest of
Kenya, and continues to carry out frequent attacks within Lamu County, Kenya,
targeting the Kenyan military, police and civilians. In May 2017, Kenyan officials
announced that police had arrested at least 33 members of Al -Shabaab within
Kenya, foiling two major planned terror attacks, since the beginning of the counterterrorism
operation Linda Boni in December 2016.3
Al-Shabaab North-East in Puntland
15. The Monitoring Group has reported extensively on the Al -Shabaab North-East
insurgency against the Puntland authorities in the Golis mountains, noting its
concern that Puntland served as a potential haven for Al -Shabaab militants fleeing
military pressure in southern and central Somalia, as well as a conduit between
Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (see, e.g., S/2016/919,
paras. 30–32 and annex 1.3). In its 2016 report, the Monitoring Group reported the
strength of the insurgency to be between 70 and 100 fighters (see S/2016/919,
para. 31). However, indications are that the group has grown significantly in
__________________
2 Interviews with improvised explosive device experts, Mogadishu, 8 February 2017, as well as an
independent explosives engineer who conducted an analysis of the blast scene based on satellite
imagery and crater dimensions, taking the mean of values assessed using three separate
methodologies. A United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) operations officer in
Mogadishu, however, estimated the explosive mass of the vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device to be between 200 kg and 500 kg TNT equivalence. Email to the Monitoring Group on
14 September 2017.
3 Galgalo Bocha, “Official: police foiled planned Jamhuri Day Shabaab attack”, Daily Nation,
18 May 2017. Available from www.nation.co.ke/counties/tana-river/33-suspected-Shabaabterrorists-
arrested/3444928-3931876-iyplcyz/index.html.
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numbers during 2017, perhaps in response to the growing presence of the rival
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Puntland’s Bari region.4
Attack on Afurur and Puntland’s “catch-and-release” policy
16. At dawn on 8 June 2017, Al-Shabaab launched its deadliest conventional
military attack ever in Puntland, overrunning the Afurur military base and killing
approximately 60 Darawish (Puntland regular forces) soldiers. The incident marked
the first major armed clash between Puntland forces and the Al-Shabaab North-East
insurgency in the Golis mountains since Puntland’s major offensive of October
2014, which captured Galgala from the militants. Afurur, situated approximately
30 km south-west of the town of Galgala, had once served as a key waypoint along
Al-Shabaab’s southern supply route into the Golis mountains, but had been occupied
by Puntland forces since June 2015.
17. One of the leaders of the Afurur operation was Abdullahi Abdi Haji, also
known as Mursal Madobe, a member of Al-Shabaab since 2006 (see S/2016/919,
annex 1.5 (strictly confidential)). As detailed in the Monitoring Grou p’s report of
2016, Puntland authorities had arrested Haji in August 2015, but subsequently
released him as part of a general amnesty granted to outwardly repentant
Al-Shabaab members by President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gass” (ibid.). Haji’s
release was an example of the Puntland administration’s policy of “catch-andrelease”
with regard to Al-Shabaab suspects, which has been documented by the
Monitoring Group since 2014 (see S/2014/726, annex 1.4, and S/2016/919,
annex 1.5 (strictly confidential)).
18. On 26 July, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced the
capture of Abdirisak Hussein Tahlil and four other Al-Shabaab militants in a joint
security operation with Somali forces near Galkayo, accusing Tahlil of “facilitating
the use of improvised explosive devices in Somalia”.5 According to mainstream
United States media, Tahlil was a lawful resident of the United States between 2006
and 2009.6 Tahlil had been previously apprehended by the Puntland Intelligence
Agency in Garowe in November 2012 with explosive materials in his vehicle, and
subsequently sentenced to death. However, he was released on 18 December 2013
on the orders of Puntland President Gass, along with Tahlil’s associate Mohamed
Nur Aden, who had been arrested in connection with the same plot. 7
Al-Shabaab procurement of weapons following attacks on the African Union
Mission in Somalia
19. In 2015 and 2016, the Monitoring Group reported its concerns about the
vulnerability of AMISOM and Somali National Army forward operating bases to
Al-Shabaab attack (see S/2016/919, para. 14, and S/2015/801, para. 91). Major
attacks on AMISOM forces occurred in El Adde, in Gedo region, on 15 January
2016; Leego, in Bay region, on 26 June 2015; and Janale, in Lower Shabelle region,
on 1 September 2015.
__________________
4 The Monitoring Group interviewed four members of the Al-Shabaab North-East insurgency
movement in Bosaso Central Prison on 6 and 7 June 2017; while these interviews indicated the
existence of multiple teams of approximately 30 fighters in the Golis mountains, none of the
interview subjects were able to provide an estimate of the size of the movement as a whole.
5 Farah Abdi Warsameh (Associated Press), “Suspected Al-Shabab associate captured in U.S.-
Somali raid”, CBS News, 26 July 2017. Available from www.cbsnews.com/news/al-shababsuspected-
associate-captured-in-us-somali-raid/.
6 Ibid.
7 The Monitoring Group’s final report of 2013 includes details of Tahlil’s and Nur’s arrests. See
S/2013/413, annex 1.7.a.
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20. Since October 2016, there have been more than a dozen attacks of varying
intensity on AMISOM bases. The most significant assault during the present
mandate took place on 27 January 2017 against a Kenyan Defence Forces forward
operating base at Kulbiyow, on the Kenya-Somalia border. Still images and video
footage from Al-Shabaab’s media arm, Al-Kataib, as well as from Kenyan media
sources, appear to confirm that militants captured weapons, ammunition and
vehicles.8 Among the items of significance seized by Al-Shabaab were an
OTO-Melara Mod 56 105 mm howitzer, a WZ-551 armoured personnel carrier, at
least one 81 mm mortar launcher and a M240B heavy machine gun.
21. One of the consequences of such attacks is Al-Shabaab’s ability to capture
mortars for use in its frequent attacks on the Federal Government and AMISOM. 9
Since 2009, Al-Shabaab has largely employed 82 mm and 60 mm mortars. However,
the Monitoring Group has obtained evidence of at least one attack by Al -Shabaab
employing heavier 120 mm mortars, on 23 April 2017 against a joint Ugandan -
Somali National Army base at Baledogle, representing a new and significant threat
to peace and security in Somalia. The mortar had likely been captured during the
Al-Shabaab attack on the AMISOM Burundian contingent at Leego.10
22. In September 2016, the Interim South-West Administration and AMISOM
forces in Gofgadud Burey, Bay region, captured a DZT -02 40 mm thermobaric
rocket-propelled grenade launcher from Al-Shabaab, which had likely also been
obtained by the group during its assault on Leego.11
23. See annex 1.1 for more information on Al-Shabaab procurement of weapons
following attacks on AMISOM.
Al-Shabaab use of improvised explosive devices
24. During the present mandate, Al-Shabaab has introduced at least one new
method of improvised explosive device construction. The payload of the explosives
employed has also increased; for instance, as noted above, on 2 January 2017 the
militant group detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices with a TNT
equivalence of as much as 1,200 kg.12
25. In 2016, the Monitoring Group reported on the unconfirmed use of home-made
explosives in improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab (see S/2016/919,
annex 7.1). In June 2017, the Monitoring Group received laboratory analyses from
the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Explosive Device
Analytical Center on improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia between
__________________
8 Conway Waddington, “The Kulbiyow attack uncovered”, Africa Defence Review, 22 March
2017. Available from www.africandefence.net/analysis-of-competing-claims-about-the-january-
2017-al-shabaab-attack-on-the-kdf-base-at-kulbiyow/.
9 According to information from a senior security adviser to AMISOM via email on 24 July 2017,
there were 12 attacks using mortar shells between January and June 2017 in Mogadishu.
According to a Somalia researcher based in Mogadishu, there were approximately 17 mortar
attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in 2016, which seems to indicate that the total
number of mortar attacks in the capital may increase this year. Email from a United Nations
security adviser, 20 August 2017.
10 Communication via SMS with a senior AMISOM adviser, 19 July 2017.
11 Email from a UNMAS operations officer, 31 July 2017. Thermobaric rounds are far more
destructive than standard RPG rounds, as they are highly explosive, incendiary and fragment on
impact.
12 Interviews with multiple explosive ordinance disposal specialists in Somalia during this mandate,
who had carried out post-blast analyses of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.
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2 February 2016 and 2 January 2017.13 Six of the reports confirmed the presence of
the oxidizer potassium nitrate, commonly used as a fertilizer in some countries, in at
least six major vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks or improvised
explosive device seizures since 2016.14 At least three improvised explosive devices
also contained traces of sodium chlorate and potassium chlorate, used to enhance
the effectiveness of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.15
26. The presence of these compounds represents a possible diversification of
Al-Shabaab’s traditional use of military-grade explosives harvested from remnants
of war munitions, or, more recently, captured munitions from AMISOM bases, for
improvised explosive device construction. The potential use of home -made
explosives by Al-Shabaab would allow the group to rely less on the process of
harvesting explosives from munitions, which is slow and laborious. 16 Al-Shabaab is
therefore likely to continue attempts to procure oxidizers through fertilizers and/or
other common industrial products, which would allow the militant group to increase
the frequency and explosive weight of its improvised explosive devices.
27. The Monitoring Group also investigated two seizures of improvised explosive
device components by security forces in Puntland on 26 April and 30 May 2017.
Among the key components of the improvised explosive devices reaching Puntland
and other parts of Somalia were electric detonators. Many of these detonators were
manufactured by a commercial company, C-DET Explosive Industries, based in
India.17 See annex 1.2 (strictly confidential) for more information on Al-Shabaab’s
sourcing of improvised explosive device components, and evolving technologies.
Al-Shabaab financing
28. Over the course of the present mandate, Al-Shabaab continued to impose
taxation on the business community in Somalia (see also S/2016/919, annex 1.6, and
S/2015/801, para. 92). Interviews conducted by the Monitoring Group indicate that,
in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab monthly taxation varied from $10 paid by market traders
to as much as $70,000 paid by major companies.18 Federal Government security
agencies issued a letter on 23 July 2017 warning the business community against
supporting Al-Shabaab financially. Given the limited capacity of Federal
Government and security agencies to monitor payments to Al -Shabaab, however, the
__________________
13 The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Centre has emphasized that the presence of oxidizers
such as potassium nitrate in the lab analyses does not provide conclusive evidence that
Al-Shabaab manufactured home-made explosives.
14 Although pure potassium nitrate is not commonly used as an agricultural fertilizer in Somalia,
the Monitoring Group has evidence of at least one company which exports pure potassium nitrate
fertilizer in bulk to Yemen. Oxidizers, like potassium nitrate, provide the necessary oxygen
which, when combined with fuel, enhances an explosion. It is not yet clear how Al -Shabaab is
procuring potassium nitrate. Email from a UNMAS operations officer, 24 August 2017;
telephone interview with a Mogadishu-based forensics specialist, 8 August 2017.
15 Potassium chlorate can be used in the manufacture of matches and propellants, industries which
currently have no presence in Somalia. Sodium chlorate is a common commercial component in
the manufacture of herbicides, fireworks, welding supplies and chemical oxygen generators. It is
not yet clear how Al-Shabaab is procuring potassium chlorate or sodium chlorate.
16 Interview with various improvised explosive device specialists. Mogadishu, June to August 2017.
In a telephone interview on 3 September 2017, an explosive ordnance disposal specialist
informed the Monitoring Group that 500 kg of munitions must be harvested to yield an e xplosive
content of 100 kg.
17 See S/2014/726, annex 6.6, for an earlier case study involving C-DET detonators smuggled by
Al-Shabaab into Puntland through Yemen.
18 Interviews with a counter-terrorism analyst, Nairobi, 7 March 2017; a business owner,
Mogadishu, 4 July 2017; and a law enforcement officer specializing on financing of Al -Shabaab,
London, 31 March 2017.
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warning is unlikely to have a significant impact on Al-Shabaab’s ability to collect
taxation from the business community.
29. During the previous mandate, the Monitoring Group noted Al-Shabaab’s
increasing reliance on financing from the taxation of agricultural production,
livestock and trade (see S/2016/919, para. 83 and annex 1.8).19 Annex 1.5 presents
an assessment of Al-Shabaab taxation on livestock and agricultural markets in the
Bay and Bakool regions.
30. Al-Shabaab also continues to tax goods at checkpoints along major supply
routes, particularly imports and exports along routes to major ports, including goods
destined for Kenya. Large trucks are usually taxed $1,000, with receipts issued by
Al-Shabaab to prevent double taxation at subsequent checkpoints. 20
31. Al-Shabaab justifies taxation of agricultural production and livestock as zakat,
a customary religious tax on wealth and property typically collected on an annual
basis. The group’s efforts to collect zakat have become increasingly aggressive in
terms of the quantity of goods confiscated, the frequency of collection and the
coercive methods employed.21
B. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia
32. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction loyal to Sheikh
Abdulqader Mu’min, estimated in the Monitoring Group’s report of 2016 to number
not more than a few dozen (see S/2016/919, para. 28), has grown significantly in
strength, and may, at the time of writing, consist of as many as 200 fighters. 22
33. In October 2016, the ISIL faction captured the town of Qandala in Puntland’s
Bari region, declaring it the seat of the so-called Islamic Caliphate in Somalia. In
late November, a combination of Puntland ground and sea forces, supported by
United States military advisers, mounted an offensive that succeeded in retaking the
town on 7 December after several armed engagements. However, the ISIL presence
remains prevalent in the surrounding countryside: mobile phone location data of
ISIL members indicates frequent activity around the mobile phone tower at
Afbashaashin, approximately 50 km south-east of Qandala.23
34. While the ISIL faction has not engaged in any large-scale conventional
confrontations with Puntland forces since the recapture of Qandala, it routinely
carries out asymmetric attacks. The group showed signs of increasing tactical
capabilities during its first attack targeting a hotel, when two gunmen stormed the
International Village Hotel in Bosaso, the economic capital of Puntland, at dawn on
8 February 2017 (see annex 2.4). On 23 May, the group carried out its first suicide
attack, detonating a person-borne improvised explosive device at a police
__________________
19 In para. 21 of its resolution 2317 (2016), the Security Council requested further reporting from
the Monitoring Group on this issue.
20 Interviews with a former Al-Shabaab financial officer, Baidoa, 30 August 2017; an intelligence
officer specializing in Al-Shabaab financing, Baidoa, 2 August 2017; and a consultant, Kismayo,
14 June 2017.
21 Interview with a former Al-Shabaab financial officer, Baidoa, 30 August 2017, and a Somali
businessman, Mogadishu, 4 July 2017; interviews with elders and community members in Lower
Shabelle and Middle Juba regions.
22 Based on Monitoring Group interviews with 10 defected and captured ISIL fighters being held at
Bosaso Central Prison, as well as with intelligence and security sources familiar with Puntland,
April 2017. Most of the fighters interviewed b y the Group had left ISIL in December 2016, and
therefore the information they provided was current up to that time.
23 Afbashaashin’s role as a hub of ISIL operations, particularly prior to March 2017, was
corroborated by a senior Puntland intelligence official on 13 April 2017.
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checkpoint near Juba Hotel in Bosaso, killing 5 people and wounding at least
12 others (see annex 2.5 (strictly confidential)). According to Puntland authorities,
ISIL leader Abdirahman Fahiye Isse Mohamud (Darod/Harti/Deshishe), also known
as Ahmed Adan, Khalid, Yaquub, and Burane, was the primary coordinator of the
attack.24
35. While the threat of ISIL to the Puntland administration is not currently
existential, the administration’s weak control over Bari region renders it a potential
haven for foreign ISIL fighters. An influx of experienced foreign fighters would risk
overwhelming Puntland’s infrequently paid and demoralized security forces.
Connections to the wider organization
36. While the Monitoring Group has yet to find strong evidence to suggest that
Mu’min’s faction has operational links to the broader ISIL network, records for a
confirmed phone number previously used by Mu’min demonstrated repeated contact
with a Yemeni phone number selector in April and May 2016 (see S/2016/919,
annex 1.2). A regional intelligence source identified the user of the selector as
Khalil Dheere, a former member of Al-Shabaab who left the group and relocated to
Yemen in 2013. Dheere’s reported current role is as an intermediary between
Mu’min and senior ISIL leaders in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, though the
exact nature of this contact is unclear.
37. Former members of the ISIL faction who defected from the group in December
2016 reported that the leaders of the group received orders, as well as financing
through hawala money transfers, from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. One
former member stated that he had witnessed leaders of the group, including
Abdulqader Mu’min and Ahmed Adan, use the encryption software TrueCrypt to
communicate with ISIL leadership in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic using voice
recordings. However, the Monitoring Group was not able to independently verify
these claims.
Recruitment
38. The ISIL faction has demonstrated increasingly sophisticated recruitment
methods, largely targeted at disaffected members of Al-Shabaab in southern
Somalia. For instance, two former ISIL fighters interviewed by the Monitoring
Group reported that they had received airplane tickets from Mogadishu to Galkayo,
which enabled them to avoid the numerous armed checkpoints that road travel from
southern Somalia to Puntland would have entailed. As a result of more proactive
recruitment, the ISIL faction has moved beyond a movement dominated by the
Darod/Majeerteen/Ali Saleeban sub-clan, and its fighters now represent a crosssection
of clans from across Somalia.
39. ISIL, as a globalist caliphate movement, presents more natural appea l to
foreign terrorist fighters than Al-Shabaab, whose immediate aims are limited to the
expulsion of non-Muslims from Somalia and the establishment of a State governed
by Islamic law. However, the ISIL faction in Bari region has hitherto attracted a
limited number of foreign fighters. Among these is a Sudanese national sanctioned
by the United States Department of the Treasury, Suhayl Salim Abd El -Rahman,
also known as Abu Faris. In July 2012, Abd El-Rahman was put on the Specially
Designated National and Blocked Persons List by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control of the United States Department of the Treasury for his role in facilitating
__________________
24 Interview with a senior Puntland security official, 18 August 2017.
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the entry of foreign fighters into Somalia on behalf of Al -Shabaab.25 One former
ISIL fighter interviewed by the Monitoring Group, who had defected from the
faction in December 2016, identified Abd El-Rahman as his immediate superior in
the group. Two additional former militants reported the presence of an Arabic -
speaking Sudanese foreign fighter, though they recalled him using the name
“Bilal”.26
40. In addition, one former fighter interviewed by the Monitoring Group claimed
to be a Kenyan national, although the Group was unable to examine his identity
documents, while another militant, aged 17, claimed to have been born i n Kuwait.27
Two interviewees also reported the presence in the group of a Djiboutian national
known only as “Abtidoon”, who died in the fighting with Puntland forces during the
recapture of Qandala.28
Payroll
41. Monitoring Group interviews with former ISIL fighters revealed the salaries
paid to members of the group to be extremely modest or even non -existent. Former
fighters reported that unmarried ISIL militants received no salary at all, 29 while
married militants received $50 per month plus an additio nal $10-$20 for each child,
depending on the child’s age.30 These salary payments would result in an estimated
ISIL payroll of between $3,000 and $9,000 each month, or $36,000 to $108,000
annually.31 Such a low payroll enables the ISIL leadership to fund its insurgency on
a limited budget, likely without having to rely on external financial support.
However, the lack of salaries for low-ranking fighters also renders it probable that
the ISIL factions will face frequent defections, a problem similarly affectin g
Al-Shabaab.
42. Additional information on the ISIL faction, including a detailed description of
the group’s leadership, is provided in annex 2.2.
C. Intercommunal conflict
43. During the past two mandates, the complexity of two long-running
intercommunal conflicts, in Lower Shabelle and in Galkayo, has increased as
broader regional, federal and/or international dynamics have evolved. Both
conflicts, in which Al-Shabaab has become increasingly embedded, continue to
represent a threat to broader peace and security and the long-term stability of
Somalia.
__________________
25 See United States Department of the Treasury, “Treasury targets regional actors fueling violence
and instability in Somalia”, press release, 5 July 2012. Available from www.treasury.gov/presscenter/
press-releases/Pages/tg1630.aspx. Suhayl Salim Abd El-Rahman was an associate of the
designated individual Aboud Rogo Mohammed (SOi.011) on the 1844 sanctions list, a radical
Kenyan cleric who was gunned down by unknown assailants in Mombasa in August 2012.
26 Interviews with former ISIL fighters, Bosaso, 11 and 12 April 2017.
27 Both individuals had been members of Al-Shabaab in Somalia prior to joining the ISIL faction.
28 A former Puntland intelligence officer told the Monitoring Group on 7 March 2017 that a
Djiboutian foreign fighter in ISIL had died at the hands of Puntland forces. According to the two
former fighters interviewed by the Monitoring Group, “Abtidoon” was familiar with the
construction and use of improvised explosive devices. Both reported that Puntland security
forces had shown them a photograph of Abtidoon’s dead body.
29 One unmarried former ISIL fighter claimed that he would receive approximately $20 per month
for mobile phone credit.
30 Interviews with former ISIL fighters, Bosaso, 11 and 12 April 2017.
31 Based on a low range estimate of 120 fighters in the group, 40 per cent of whom are married, an d
a high range estimate of 200 fighters, 60 per cent of whom are married.
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Lower Shabelle
44. Since 2014, the Monitoring Group has documented how entrenched
intercommunal conflict in Lower Shabelle, particularly among the Haber Gedir,
Biimaal and Digil clans, was complicated by the comparative dominance of the
Haber Gedir clan in local and federal political and security structures, and
increasingly by the involvement of Al-Shabaab. Under President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud, the extension of State power in Lower Shabelle, and by extension
international support, was allied with Haber Gedir networks. Not only did elements
of the Hawiye-dominated Somali National Army participate in large-scale attacks on
Biimaal and Digil communities in Lower Shabelle but, on some occasions, it did so
in joint operations with Al-Shabaab (see S/2016/919, annex 6.1). At the same time,
Al-Shabaab was also building alliances with local communities in opposition to the
Government, presenting itself as a protector from an illegitimate and predatory
State.32
45. By late 2016, Al-Shabaab’s allegiances in the region were more firmly
established. Spurred by Al-Shabaab’s temporary takeover of Marka in February
2016, supported to various degrees by Haber Gedir militia and elements of the
Somali National Army, the Biimaal switched their allegiance to AMISOM and
anti-Al-Shabaab forces (see S/2016/919, annex 7.5). Haber Gedir networks in the
region turned to Al-Shabaab and consolidated their alliance. By October 2016,
Al-Shabaab had commenced large-scale burning and looting of Biimaal villages,
escalating its attacks in May 2017.33 In August, open conflict erupted between
Biimaal and Haber Gedir militias and Al-Shabaab over control of Marka (see also
annex 10.2 (strictly confidential)).
Galkayo
46. The root of the conflict in Galkayo is the long-running tension between rival
clans, primarily Darod/Majeerteen and Hawiye/Haber Gedir, which was tempered
for more than 20 years by an agreement brokered in 1993. The culmination of the
federalization process in 2015, however, introduced new actors to the dynamic, and
raised the stakes: “former clan-dominated areas evolved into clan-based states that
now compete no longer just for access to pasture, water and other local resources,
but also for claims to territory, political legitimacy and the control of national
assets”.34
47. The two phases of open conflict in Galkayo in 2015 and 2016 saw heavily
militarized administrations, the Interim Galmudug Administration and Puntland,
facing off against each other alongside allied clan militias and elements of national
security forces. The failure of repeated negotiations between the two sides enabled
Al-Shabaab to insert itself as an active spoiler, further exacerbating mistrust
between the parties and contributing directly to the violence. Al -Shabaab benefitted
from its engagement, increasing its presence and influence in Puntland and
Galmudug and consolidating control of elements of regional political and military
structures. Meanwhile the leadership of the Interim Galmudug Administration and
Puntland, which had twice entered into the conflict in one year, suffered no censure.
__________________
32 During the mandate, Al-Shabaab’s court in Afgoye continued to be the go-to jurisdiction for
many with respect to land disputes, even in Mogadishu.
33 For further information, see Human Rights Watch, “Somalia: Al-Shabab forces burn villages”,
26 July 2017. Available from www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/26/somalia-al-shabab-forces-burnvillages.
34 Interpeace and Peace and Development Research Centre Galkayo “Conflict assessment”,
December 2016 to March 2017.
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48. Annex 3.1 describes the origins and drivers of the Galkayo conflict, its impact
on civilians and the steps under way to mitigate further violence.
Other intercommunal tensions
49. Since the creation of Puntland, and later the emergence in 2012 of the self -
declared Khatumo State, rival claims over control of Sool and Sanaag and parts of
Togdheer (often referred to as Cayn) have given rise to frequent but low -level armed
conflict between Puntland, Somaliland and Khatumo forces and contributed to the
underdevelopment of the region.35 Despite armed clashes and political manoeuvring,
including an agreement in June 2017 between a faction of Khatumo and Somaliland
that was rejected by Khatumo elders, open conflict was avoided.36 In mid-August
2017, however, with the Somaliland election preparations under way, Puntland
moved its troops into Sool region, and Dhulbahante militias launched attacks on
election-related targets.37 Meanwhile, the Monitoring Group received reports of
Al-Shabaab’s increasing presence in parts of Sool, particularly in Las Anod, and
Sanaag, escalating in the wake of Al-Shabaab’s attack on Afurur.38
50. In Herale district, Galgadud region, in July 2017, at least 27 people were killed
and more than 13,800 displaced when Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a dispatched troops to
Herale town prior to a planned visit by Interim Galmudug Administration President
Ahmed Duale Gelle “Haaf” to the area.39 By late August the conflict had intensified
with battles taking place in the outskirts of Dhusamareb between Ahlu Sunna wal
Jama’a and Interim Galmudug Administration forces, reportedly exacerbated by
elements of Somali National Army sector 21 and National Intelligence and Security
Agency forces based in Adado.
D. Public financial management
Overview of developments
51. Over the course of the present mandate, modest progress has been made in
public financial management at the federal level.40
__________________
35 These are areas primarily inhabited by the Dhulbahante. See also S/2016/919, annex 7.4,
para. 38.
36 The June 2017 agreement caused stand-offs between militias supporting the Somaliland accord
and those supporting the rival Dhulbahante Liberation Front. See “The Guurti of Khatumo State
of Somalia’s position on talks with Somaliland, press release, 17 June 2017. Available from
www.somalilandsun.com/images/PDF/THE_GUURTI_OF_KHATUMO_STATE_OF_SOMALIA…
POSITION_ON_TALKS_WITH_SOMALILAND.pdf.
37 On 12 August, militia forces attacked Halin polling station, injuring three civilians, and a
Somaliland solider was killed defending a convoy transporting voter cards in Holhol. Email from
United Nations staff member, 14 August 2017.
38 Monitoring Group telephone interview with recent visitor to Las Anod, 30 July 2017; series of
emails from United Nations staff members, January to August 2017.
39 Email report from Mudug-based humanitarian worker to Monitoring Group, 7 August 2017. Two
days before the clashes Interim Galmudug Administration President Ahmed Duale Gelle “Haaf”
had met with Herale elders in Abudwaq and promised to visit the town to discuss development
and cooperation support.
40 On 11 July 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a press release following the
completion of its second review under the Staff-Monitored Program for Somalia, welcoming “the
authorities’ continued commitments to policy and reform implementation … [and] continued
progress on currency reform and plans to revive the financial sector”. International Monetary
Fund, “IMF management completes the second review under the Staff-Monitored Program for
Somalia and IMF Managing Director approves a New Staff-Monitored Program”, press release,
11 July 2017. Available from www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/11/Somalia-
Second-and-Final-Review-Under-the-Staff-Monitored-Program-and-Request-for-a-New-45065.
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52. On 10 August, the Public Financial Management Bill was approved by the
Federal Government Cabinet and was, at the time of writing, awaiting parliamentary
approval. On 21 August, the National Communications Act was approved by the
upper house of Parliament. The above-mentioned policies remain, however, either
un- or underimplemented, or simply unenforceable in the current political and
economic climate.41
53. The mandate of the Financial Governance Committee, an oversight body first
established in mid-2014 with representation from various international institutions,
was extended by the Federal Government on 15 June 2017 until June 2018.
54. The Somali Financial Management Information System, established in late
2015 to facilitate the automation and integration of public financial management
processes, is used for the Treasury Single Account, but remains un - or underused by
most individual ministries, departments and agencies and the Benadir Regional
Administration. As such, while information on Treasury Single Account transactions
is relatively detailed, information on ministry, department and agency transactions
and Benadir Regional Administration transactions, mostly still ma de in cash,
remains extremely limited.42
55. Revenue collection remains a key challenge facing the Federal Government,
which remains dependent on meagre resources primarily generated in Mogadishu.
Private companies tasked with collecting taxation on behalf of the Federal
Government in 2016 operated with mixed results (see the discussion on Smart
General Services, Ltd., below) until their contracts were cancelled in a letter signed
by the Ministry of Finance on 29 July 2017.
Currency management
56. The Monitoring Group reported its concerns regarding the unregulated
printing of the Somali shilling in its previous report (see S/2016/919, annex 4.1).
Over the course of the present mandate, the Group has continued to document the
unregulated printing of 1,000 Somali shilling notes by the State Bank of Puntland in
Bosaso, with the involvement of the Puntland authorities. During the current
mandate, the distribution of counterfeit currency and the corresponding i nflation
and civil unrest intensified and spread from Puntland into Hiran region and
Somaliland. The local authorities in Puntland have both denied printing currency
and blamed Al-Shabaab for the consequences. The countermeasures taken by the
local authorities include the introduction of fixed exchange rates and mass
detentions of currency brokers.
57. See annex 4.1 for further information on the impact of the unregulated printing
of Somali currency.
Public contracts and concessions
58. Over the course of the mandate, the Monitoring Group has continued to seek
information on various public contracts and concessions. In response to
__________________
41 The value of certain measures also remains questionable. Key elements of the National
Communications Act, which has been negotiated and ultimately undermined by successive
parliamentarians and representatives of the telecommunications sector since 2004, were removed
before the Bill was passed. The Public Financial Management Bill in its current form permits the
Federal Government to seek international loans of up to $200 million without parliamentary
approval.
42 Somali Financial Management System records for the Benadir Regional Administration
demonstrate the expenditure of $7,905,126.35 in 2016 with the same description, Khidmada
Maamulka Gobalka Banaadir $15%, for all transactions ranging from $67,707.35 to
$335,140.20.
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correspondence seeking information on several Federal Government contracts and
the ownership of various companies, the Federal Government stated on 5 September
2017 that it was apparent that it had inherited contracts from the previous
administration that were opaque in terms of how contracts were issued and lacked
data on the ownership of companies, and included other issues such as a lack of
effectiveness or value for money.43
59. At the federal level, the Monitoring Group relayed its particular concerns to
the Federal Government regarding contracts and agreements with two companies, as
described below.
Bukhari Logistics East Africa
60. According to reports received by the Monitoring Group, Bukhari Logistics
East Africa was contracted by the Federal Government to provide rations to its
Custodial Corps.44 The contract was awarded without review by the Financial
Governance Committee or Interim National Procurement Board. According to the
Central Bank of Somalia Treasury Single Account records, between November 2016
and January 2017, approximately $740,000 was transferred to an account at Salaam
Somali Bank held by Bukhari Logistics East Africa, indicating an annual transfer of
approximately $3 million.45
61. The Monitoring Group sought information regarding Bukhari Logistics East
Africa, including details of the contract and ownership of the company, from the
current Federal Government on 31 July 2017. In its response, dated 18 August, the
Federal Government informed the Group that the Ministry of Finance was not aware
of any contracts with Bukhari Logistics East Africa, and would appreciate further
information from the Group in order to enable the Ministry to look into the issue
further.46
62. The Monitoring Group shared available information with the Federal
Government through correspondence on 23 August. At the time of writing, the
Group had not received any further information on the company’s ownership or its
contract with the Federal Government.
Smart General Services, Ltd.
63. In September 2015, the Ministry of Finance contracted Smart General
Services, Ltd., to collect road taxes and vehicle registration fees on behalf o f the
Federal Government. Despite a standing Government directive that all State revenue
be routed to the Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank of Somalia, the taxes
and fees generated by Smart General Services were deposited into a private account
at Salaam Somali Bank in Mogadishu.47 As such, Smart General Services provides
an example of a parallel revenue collection system, using private bank accounts, or
unofficial accounts within the Central Bank of Somalia, in order to circumvent the
oversight of the Ministry of Finance.
64. In accordance with the terms of the original agreement between the Ministry
of Finance and Smart General Services, 60 per cent of all revenues generated by the
__________________
43 Federal Government letter to the Monitoring Group, 5 September 2017. It is also apparent,
however, that as of mid-August the Ministry of Finance was not aware of public contracts that
had been previously reviewed by the Financial Governance Committee, a body chaired by the
Minister for Finance.
44 Interview with an international consultant working with the Federal Government, 16 May 2017.
45 Central Bank of Somalia Treasury Single Account statements on file with the Secretariat.
46 Federal Government letter to the Monitoring Group, 18 August 2017.
47 Account details and statements on file with the Secretariat.
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company were to accrue to the Federal Government.48 The net revenue, once the
company had deducted its 40 per cent share, was intended to be transferred from
Salaam Somali Bank to the Treasury Single Account every 15 days. 49 However,
financial statements from the company’s account at Salaam Somali Bank, obtained
by the Monitoring Group, demonstrate that only $62,648 (4.2 per cent) of the
$1,481,695 generated by Smart General Services from August 2016 to May 2017
was ever transferred to the Treasury Single Account. Moreover, revenue was
transferred inconsistently50 and with irregularities.51
65. The Monitoring Group observed further irregularities in the accounting,
including a $275,000 withdrawal on 19 October 2016 that was itemized simply as
maal galin (“investment”). In addition, over 40 per cent of the revenue of Smart
General Services ($600,187) was paid directly to Kulmiye General Services, a
Mogadishu-based construction company managed by Abdulkadir Abukar Omar
“Adaani”, the son and business associate of former World Food Programme
contractor Abukar Omar “Adaani”, whose role in destabilizing Somalia has been
documented in numerous Group reports.52 These funds were ostensibly in payment
for the construction of roads in Mogadishu by Kulmiye General Services pursuant to
a contract with the Benadir Regional Administration, which had been awarded
without due process.53
66. The Monitoring Group sought clarification on the ownership of both Smart
General Services and Kulmiye General Services from the Federal Government but
received insufficient details to determine the true ownership of either company. The
Monitoring Group also requested confirmation of the roads constructed by Kulmiye
General Services but did not receive a response to this request.
67. On 29 July 2017, the Ministry of Finance cancelled the contract held by Smart
General Services through a decree forbidding private companies from collecting
revenue on behalf of the Federal Government.
Misappropriation of public land in and around the Mogadishu airport complex
68. The Monitoring Group has continued to investigate the appropriation of public
land in Mogadishu since it reported on the issue in 2016 (see S/2016/919,
paras. 79–80 and annex 4.6). On 31 July 2017, the Group sent official
correspondence to the Federal Government requesting copies of lease agreements
between the Government and 22 companies operating within the greater airport
compound in Mogadishu. In a reply dated 18 August, the Federal Government stated
that only two of these companies, SKA International Group and RA International
__________________
48 The Smart General Services, Ltd., agreement is summarized in annex 4.3.a of the Monitoring
Group’s report of 2016 (S/2016/919), which also provides copies of the first and last pages of the
contract.
49 Interview with a former senior official at the Federal Government Ministry of Finance, 25 July
2017.
50 For instance, all transfers of revenue to the Treasury Single Account took place from August to
December 2016; no funds were transferred in 2017.
51 For instance, on 8 December 2016, the Salaam Somali Bank account statement indicated that
$26,000 had been transferred to the Central Bank of Somalia; however, records show receipt of
only $14,000.
52 For references to Abukar “Adaani’s” activities, see S/2010/91, para. 239 (diversion of WFP food
aid); S/2006/913, paras. 12 and 143 (financing of the Union of Islamic Courts; establis hment of
training facilities and arms shipments); S/2006/229, para. 136 (fighting over El Ma’an port);
S/2005/625, para. 18 and annex I (armed support of opposition and arms purchases); S/2005/153,
para. 29 (arms shipments to opposition groups); S/2004/604, paras. 76–77 and 100 (funding
armed groups and facilitating conflict).
53 Interview with a former senior official at the Federal Government Ministry of Finance, 25 July
2017.
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FZE, currently pay rent to the Central Bank of Somalia. The Federal Government
acknowledged that public lands are being contracted out by “localized entities”
without due process, further arguing that the practice may become a thre at to peace,
security and stability.54
69. During the present mandate, the Monitoring Group has identified two cases of
the potential misuse of public land involving Abdullahi Mohamed Nor, the former
Federal Government State Minister for Finance and a current Member of
Parliament.55 In February 2013, Nor secured access to 344 hectares of seaside public
land adjacent to the airport complex for the construction of a private luxury hotel.
Pursuant to a request by the Prime Minister on 10 August 2017, the Benadir
Regional Administration requested Nor to cease construction and produce
documentation demonstrating his rights to the plot.56 The Federal Government told
the Group that Nor refused to cooperate.57 According to multiple Federal
Government officials, Nor has mobilized elements of the Somali National Army,
particularly a senior commander who is a close relative, to forcibly defend his claim
to the plot.58 Nor denied using Somali National Army soldiers to assert his rights to
the land, and has accused the Benadir Regional Administration of attempting to
unlawfully use police and National Intelligence and Security Agency officers to
effect a takeover of the plot.59
70. In addition, in 2016, Nor’s company, East Africa Brothers Company, solicited
payoffs totalling at least $250,000 from the Singapore-based CADG Engineering
Pte., Ltd., in exchange for gaining that company access to a plot of land within the
airport complex. At the time of writing, rent on the plot continues to be paid directly
to the Federal Government’s Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation,
circumventing the oversight of Federal Government fiscal authorities.
71. These two case studies are presented in their entirety in annex 4.2.
72. In its letter of 18 August, the Federal Government stated that the Public
Properties Commission, established by former Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke in
July 2016 to collect data on unlawfully appropriated public land, had not convened
since 2016 and furthermore had “not been effective”. However, the Federal
Government has also affirmed that it considers the management of public lands to
be a “priority”, and expressed its willingness to cooperate with the Monitoring
Group and other international bodies, including the Financial Governance
Committee, to clarify the status of land within the airport complex.60
Security sector financial reform and continuing misappropriation
73. Over the past two mandates, the Monitoring Group has reported its concerns
regarding misappropriation within the Somali National Army (see S/2015/801,
annex 3.1 (strictly confidential), and S/2016/919, annex 2). Over the course of the
current mandate, international attention to financial reform within the se curity
sector has grown, with constructive engagement from the World Bank, the
Department for International Development of the United Kingdom and the Norway -
__________________
54 Federal Government letter to the Monitoring Group, 18 August 2017.
55 Nor currently serves as the Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee on Budget, Finance,
Planning, International Cooperation and Financial Oversight of Public Institutions.
56 Federal Government letter to the Monitoring Group, 18 August 2017.
57 Ibid.
58 Interview with a senior Benadir Regional Administration official, 18 September 2017; a second
Benadir Regional Administration official, 6 September 2017; and a former cabinet minister,
Nairobi, 25 July 2017.
59 Interview with Abdullahi Mohamed Nor, Nairobi, 14 September 2017.
60 Ibid.
S/2017/924
17-17136 23/161
based company Abyrint, particularly with regard to the Army’s payroll. Progress
within the Army, however, was limited, and Army officials continued to obstruct
reform efforts.61
74. In the six-month period between September 2016 and March 2017, a total of
$14,249,591 was withdrawn, in cash, from two separate accounts held by the Somali
National Army at the Central Bank of Somalia. The Monitoring Group requested
documentation demonstrating the use of these funds through formal correspondence
on 31 July and again on 22 August but, at the time of writing, had not received a
comprehensive response on the matter.62
75. In April 2017, President Farmaajo appointed General Mohamed Hussein
Garabey to replace Brigadier General Abdullahi Moalim Nur as the Head of
Logistics.63 According to an internal Somali National Army report dated 11 May
2017, based on the findings of a newly established Army financial commission, and
reviewed by the Monitoring Group, Abdullahi Moalim Nur and Colonel Mohamed
Hussein Nur, his deputy, were found to have illegally taken funds allocated to the
Army.64 The report stated that the mismanagement of Army funds, particularly funds
allocated to rations, had been occurring for an extended period.
76. The Monitoring Group continues to have concerns regarding payments to
private companies for the provision of rations.65 In October 2016, bids for a tender
to supply rations to the Somali National Army were reviewed by an evaluation
committee appointed by the Ministry of Finance, with Mohamed Hussein Nur
serving as chair. The previously contracted company, Agetco General Trading and
Clearance, Ltd., won the tender, having offered the lowest bid. The involvement of
Mohamed Hussein Nur as chair of the tender process, given his previously
documented involvement with Agetco General Trading and Clearance and the recent
findings of the Somali National Army financial commission, calls the legitimacy of
the process into question.66
77. In May 2017, the Somali National Army cancelled the rations contract with
Agetco General Trading and Clearance and awarded it to Kasram Trading Company,
LLC, an entity one-third owned by former State Minister for Finance, and current
Member of Parliament, Abdullahi Mohamed Nor (see paras. 69 and 70 above). The
tendering process for the contract was highly irregular, involving four companies,
three of which were owned in part by Nor.67 At the time of writing, it was unclear
__________________
61 Monitoring Group interviews with Members of Parliament and representatives from international
agencies, June to August 2017.
62 According to internal Somali National Army documentation, the Army also manages another
private account at Salaam Somali Bank which the Monitoring Group was not previously aware
of. Documentation on file with the Secretariat.
63 The Monitoring Group reported its concerns regarding the involvement of Abdullahi Moalim Nur
and Mohamed Hussein Nur in the Logistics Department in S/2016/919, annexes 2.2 and 2.4.
64 The documents allege that Abdullahi Moalim Nur and Mohamed Hussein Nur illegally took
$32,574 and $4,043, respectively. Based on evidence gathered over the past three mandates, the
Monitoring Group believes that these sums represent a small fraction of the total sums
embezzled by these individuals. While the document called for Mohamed Hussein Nur to spend
10 days in a military prison and return the funds, Abdullahi Moalim Nur was only called on to
return the funds. Documentation on file with the Secretariat.
65 The Monitoring Group reported its concerns regarding the company contracted to provide rations
to the Somali National Army in S/2015/801, annex 3.1 (strictly confidential), and S/2016/919,
annex 2.4.
66 Agetco General Trading and Clearance bank statements on file with the Secretariat demonstrate
that Mohamed Hussein Nur made significant withdrawals from the company account.
67 The companies were Kasram Trading Company, Sahal Enterprise, Ltd., Fulcrum and Wadajir
Company. Nor is a part-owner of Kasram Trading Company, Sahal Enterprise and Fulcrum. The
Monitoring Group has yet to determine the ownership of Wadajir Company.
S/2017/924
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whether Kasram Trading Company had already assumed responsibility for the
provision of rations. The Federal Government informed the Monitoring Group that
the tender had been annulled and the matter referred to the Attorney General.
78. See annex 4.2 for additional details on Kasram Trading Company.
E. Resource governance
79. The Monitoring Group remains concerned that ongoing disputes among the
Federal Government, federal states and interim administrations, including a lack of
agreement regarding fundamental aspects of resource governance such as political
authority and resource sharing, continue to pose a threat to peace and security in
Somalia.
Ports
80. Ports have long represented the primary source of government revenue in
Somalia. The Minister for Ports and Marine Transport, Mariam Aweis, has asserted
that all seaports in Somalia are public assets owned by the Federal Republic of
Somalia and that all concession agreements for ports are subject to the review,
approval and endorsement of the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport under the
authority of the Federal Government.68 When regional governments, without prior
consultation with the Federal Government, conclude agreements with foreign
partners for joint ventures to develop and manage ports, their actions demonstrate a
conflicting interpretation of political authority.
81. On 9 August 2016, the lower house of the Somaliland Parliament approved the
granting of a 30-year concession to develop and manage the port of Berbera to
Dubai Ports World FZE (DP World); and on 12 February 2017, both houses of the
Somaliland Parliament also approved the construction of a United Arab Emirates
military base at Berbera. In addition to the implications for the arms embargo (see
below), these two votes have raised concerns regarding corruption and the potential
misappropriation of public financial resources (see annex 5.1).
82. The Monitoring Group remains concerned that disputes between the Federal
Government and the regions over the control of ports and their associated revenue
could further undermine stability in Somalia.69
Natural resources
83. As with the management of ports, natural resource governance can be at least
partly understood within the context of an incomplete federal State formation
process in Somalia. Disagreements between the Federal Government and regional
governments, particularly with regard to who has the power to authorize commercial
operations and determine how natural resource revenue should be shared, remain
common within both the fishing sector and the oil and gas sector. The potential
consequences of weak natural resource governance are substantial, and include the
misappropriation of public resources, the hindering of political and economic
development and armed conflict.
__________________
68 Email communication from Mariam Aweis, Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, 7 August 2017.
69 On 27 July 2017, the Puntland Parliament approved the granting of a 30-year concession to
P&O Ports for the management and development of the port of Bosaso. On 8 June 2017, Sharif
Hassan Sheikh Aden, President of the Interim South-West Administration, also announced a new
project by First Hectares Capital, based in the United Arab Emirates; the Frontier Services
Group, Ltd., based in Hong Kong, China; and the locally based South West Somalia Services
Company involving, inter alia, the construction of a free zone and seaport at Barawe.
S/2017/924
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Fishing
84. Weak governance of the fishing sector and the prevalence of illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing continue to pose a threat to peace and security in
Somalia. At a macro level, weak fishing governance and widespread illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing entail a substantial loss of State revenue, which
could have otherwise been generated from licensing fees and taxes. There are also
preliminary indications that financing links may exist between illegal, unreport ed
and unregulated fishing and piracy networks in Puntland.70 In addition, weak
governance of the fishing sector and a lack of institutional capacity for more
effective maritime security, including the monitoring of perhaps more than
200 Iranian and Yemeni fishing dhows operating off the coast of Puntland,
exacerbates the risk of fishing dhows being used for illicit purposes, including small
arms trafficking.71
85. Weak governance includes the inconsistent implementation of agreements and
enforcement of laws. In late February 2017, Puntland licensed seven Thai-owned,
Djibouti-flagged trawlers to operate off the coast of Puntland for three months,
collecting $700,000 in licensing fees.72 This violated the Somali Fisheries Law
(2014), which created a protection zone for coastal fisherman within 24 nautical
miles of the coast and prohibits trawling within the waters of the Federal Republic
of Somalia.73 According to monitoring by the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), the trawlers also did not adhere to an exclusion zone that
prohibited fishing within six nautical miles of the shoreline that had been agreed
upon with Puntland.74 In a letter dated 9 March to the Puntland Ministry of
Fisheries, the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources o f the Federal
Government objected to the licensing and operation of the trawlers (see annex 5.2).
On 4 May, in a letter to the Department of Fisheries of Thailand, the Ministry of
Fisheries and Marine Resources requested that Thailand deny port entry to
MV Chotchainavee 35 for unloading, as it had engaged in illegal unreported, and
unregulated fishing in Somali waters (ibid.). For reasons that remain unclear to the
Monitoring Group, in a second letter to Thailand dispatched shortly thereafter, the
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources retracted its request.
86. Meanwhile, from 5 to 7 May 2017, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, an
intergovernmental organization established under the auspices of FAO for the
purpose of managing tuna and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean and adjacent
seas, hosted negotiations in Victoria among representatives of the Federal
Government and five regional administrations regarding tuna licensing within the
exclusive economic zone of Somalia. On 7 May, it appeared that an a greement had
been reached as the representatives of five regional administrations signed the
Interim Agreement on Issuance of Licenses for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the
Somali EEZ. However, the representatives of the Federal Government, the Deputy
Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources and the Deputy Minister for Finance,
failed to sign (ibid.). This apparently came as a surprise to the signatories as well as
to observers from the international community, as the main contentious issues
during the negotiations either had been resolved in favour of the Federal
Government — for example, depositing licensing revenue in the Central Bank of
Somalia — or had been deferred — for example, creating a formula for the sharing
__________________
70 Interview with a development agency fishing expert, Nairobi, 14 July 2017.
71 Estimate of the number of Iranian and Yemeni fishing dhows operating off the coast of Puntland
as of December 2016 provided by United Nations agency fishing expert, 17 July 2017.
72 Monitoring Group meeting with Puntland authorities, Garowe, 7 June 2017.
73 Federal Republic of Somalia, Somali Fishery Law, No. 23, of 30 November 1985, arts. 3 (c) and
33 (1).
74 FAO mapping data shared with Monitoring Group, 6 March 2017.
S/2017/924
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of revenue from tuna fishing licenses. The failure of the Federal Government to sign
the agreement represents a lost opportunity to generate revenue while also
regulating tuna fishing in the range of 50 to 200 nautical miles from the country’s
shoreline.
Extractive industries
87. The Monitoring Group remains concerned that weak governance of the
extractive industries continues to pose a threat to peace and security in Somalia,
particularly within a context of ongoing armed conflict, substantial corruption and
the absence of an adequate legal framework and sufficient institutional capacity.
Border areas with overlapping concessions, such as between Puntland and
Somaliland, pose a risk to stability (see S/2014/726, annex 6.7). In the absence of
increased fiscal transparency and greater financial accountability, the extractives
industries would also likely exacerbate the misappropriation of public resources in
Somalia (see annex 5.4).
88. The Monitoring Group continues to monitor the country’s legal framework and
institutional capacity with respect to the extractive industries, particularly the oil
and gas sector (see annex 5.3). Positive developments include the drafting of a
model production-sharing agreement with the assistance of the African Legal
Support Facility hosted by the African Development Bank and the revision by the
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources of the model production -sharing
agreement to incorporate Financial Governance Committee recommendations; and,
with the assistance of two World Bank consultants, the revision of the Petroleum
Law (2008) to be submitted for consideration by Parliament in 2017 as a new law.
However, while an interim petroleum-sharing agreement was bilaterally negotiated
with two interim administrations in 2016, there has been little progress towards an
overall resource-sharing agreement among the Federal Government and the regional
governments.75 Likewise, the central registry of oil concessions that the Ministry
has committed to compiling remains incomplete, and at the time of writing it was
not clear whether the Financial Governance Committee’s recommendations
regarding natural resource revenue management would be incorporated into the
Public Financial Management Bill.76 Lastly, the technical capacity of the Ministry
does not appear to have improved despite substantial personnel needs having been
identified under the previous Minister, while a functioning Somali Petroleum
Authority and Somali National Oil Company, which are required under the
Petroleum Law (2008), have yet to be established.
89. Meanwhile, although there have not yet been any confirmed new oil deals
under the current administration, the available evidence suggests that the Federal
Government prioritizes renewing negotiations with companies. The annual work
plan for 2017 of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources includes:
$377,000 for a hydrocarbon “road show”, bid rounds and the awarding of contracts
based on the offshore seismic data collected by Spectrum ASA (see S/2016/919,
para. 85 and annex 5.1); and $300,000 for negotiations with Royal Dutch Shell
PLC, ExxonMobil, Soma Oil & Gas and PetroQuest (Liberty); with another
$100,000 allocated for executing awarding ceremonies.77 In a letter to the
__________________
75 Bilateral agreements were reached with the Interim Galmudug Administration and the Interim
South-West Administration.
76 The recommendations concern principles for natural resource revenue management, including
where funds are held, how they are disbursed and how they are saved. See Financial Governance
Committee, “FGC advisory note: strengthening the draft Public Financial Management Bill”,
May 2017.
77 Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, “Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
2017 annual work plan”.
S/2017/924
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Monitoring Group dated 18 August 2017, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Resources confirmed its intent to hold direct negotiations with Royal Dutch Shell
PLC, ExxonMobil, Soma Oil & Gas and PetroQuest (Liberty), as well as plans to
open some offshore blocks for bidding during 2018. The Group remains concerned
that the Federal Government lacks the regulatory framework and institutional
capacity to effectively govern the extractive industries and mitigate the risk of
conflict.
F. Resurgence of piracy
90. On 13 March 2017, Aris 13, a United Arab Emirates-owned vessel fuel tanker
en route from Djibouti to Mogadishu, was hijacked by pirates in the gap between
Socotra and the Somalia mainland, the first hijacking of an international merc hant
vessel off the coast of Somalia since 2012. Following a firefight on 16 March
between the pirates and the Puntland Maritime Police Force, negotiations were held
among the pirates, local elders and Puntland authorities, resulting in the release of
the tanker.
91. On 1 April, Al Kausar, an Indian-owned, Indian-flagged dhow en route from
Dubai to Kismayo, was hijacked, also in the Socotra gap.78 The 10 Indian crew
members on board Al Kausar were taken hostage and subsequently freed by Somali
security forces on 12 April. On 3 April, Salama 1, a Pakistani-owned cargo vessel,
was hijacked off the coast of central Somalia and an unknown number of crew
members were taken hostage.
92. On 8 April, pirates hijacked the OS 35, a Lebanese-owned, Tuvalu-flagged
cargo vessel. The vessel was rescued by international naval forces from China and
India the following day. During the rescue operation, Chinese forces took captive
three pirates, including Abdikarim Salah Mohamed, also known as Aw Koombe, the
leader of the hijackers. Mohamed, based out of the littoral town of Alula, was also
the leader of the pirate gang that had hijacked the Aris 13. The Chinese Navy
subsequently transferred Mohamed to Puntland authorities, and he is currently being
held at Bosaso Central Prison.
Network of Abdikarim Salah Mohamed, also known as Aw Koombe, and the
hijacking of the Aris 13
93. The pirate leader Abdikarim Salah Mohamed, also known as Aw Koombe, and
two previously unknown associates, Mohamoud Mahad Yusuf and Sadam Abdullahi
Mohamed Yusuf, were captured by the Chinese Navy during the rescue of the cargo
vessel OS 35 on 9 April 2017 and turned over to Puntland authorities. Mohamed had
also led the pirate group responsible for hijacking the fuel tanker Aris 13 on
13 March.79 Both pirate gangs operated from around the town of Alula, located on
the north-east tip of Puntland; since the recapture of Qandala from ISIL by Puntland
forces in December 2016, the Alula area has emerged as a natural hub for pirate
__________________
78 At a meeting with the Directorate General of Shipping in Mumbai, India, on 2 May 2017, the
authorities confirmed that Al Kausar was the same Indian-flagged dhow previously identified by
the Monitoring Group as violating the ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia
(see S/2016/919, annex 9.5).
79 When the Monitoring Group interviewed Mohamed on 7 June 2017 in Bosaso Central Prison, he
denied involvement in the Aris 13 hijacking. However, a Group source in Bosaso related that
Mohamed had admitted his leadership role in the pirate group responsible, and h is involvement
was corroborated by mobile phone location data obtained by the Group.
S/2017/924
28/161 17-17136
operations, as Alula is the only major settlement between Qandala and Bargal, both
of which are garrisoned by Puntland troops.80
94. In addition to Aw Koombe and his two associates, call records from the
satellite phone on-board the Aris 13 reveal communications with two Puntlandbased
mobile phones following the hijacking of the vessel on 13 March, which the
Monitoring Group believes belong to members of Aw Koombe’s network.
95. Annex 6.1 (strictly confidential) provides additional information on the
Aris 13 hijacking and a link analysis of the Aw Koombe pirate network.
G. Electoral misconduct
96. The Monitoring Group received numerous reports of electoral malpractice
throughout the electoral process, beginning with the parliamentary selection process
and continuing until the presidential elections in February 2017.81
97. The electoral process demonstrated the continuing drive among the elite to
capture or maintain control over State resources in Somalia at the expense of peace
and security. A report prepared by the European Union Election Expert Mission
described the transition as “a political negotiation led by the [National Leadership
Forum]82 who designed the process, appointed the ad hoc bodies for its
implementation, equipped them with no tools to enforce the rules agreed up on, and
overruled their decisions”.83
Parliamentary electoral process
98. The Monitoring Group documented multiple instances of attempts to
manipulate the outcome of the parliamentary electoral process, 84 including:
(a) The gatekeeping of regional electoral processes by State Indirect
Election Implementation Teams;
(b) Fraudulent alterations to lists of electoral colleges;
(c) The bribery of clan elders and members of electoral colleges;
(d) The threat and use of violence aimed at candidates, clan elders and
members of electoral colleges.
99. The Independent Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanism, established in late
September 2016 following pressure from the international community, received
98 formal complaints. An internal report of the Mechanism, compiled on
__________________
80 Following the loss of the natural ports at Qandala (Khooriga) owing to its recapture by Puntland
forces, Alula area also appears to have become a hub for arms smuggling in Puntland
(see annex 2.1).
81 The Monitoring Group reported its concerns regarding the electoral framework in S/2016/919,
annex 3.2.
82 The National Leadership Forum comprised the President, Prime Minist er, Deputy Prime Minister
and Speaker of Parliament of the Federal Government and the presidents of the regional states of
Jubaland, South-West, Galmudug and Puntland. The newly selected president of the HirShabelle
administration joined the Forum in October 2016.
83 European Union, “Somalia 2016-2017 limited election process: EU election expert mission —
final report”, 16 February 2017. Available from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/
eu_eem_somalia_final_report.pdf. This report provides a comprehensive summary of the
weaknesses of the electoral process and recommendations.
84 A summary of these attempts was provided in the Monitoring Group’s monthly update to the
Committee of January 2017.
S/2017/924
17-17136 29/161
21 November, summarized 39 specific cases.85 It subsequently annulled the
outcomes for 11 seats on 14 December. On 27 December, however, the National
Leadership Forum overruled the Mechanism, ordering re-elections in just five of
these cases, in which all suspended candidates were permitted to enter and
subsequently emerged victorious for a second time.
Presidential election
100. The Monitoring Group received reports from multiple independent sources
regarding the exchange of large sums of money between certain presidential
candidates and Members of Parliament in the period immediately preceding the
presidential elections of 8 February 2017.
101. Several of the presidential candidates, including the incumbent President and
Prime Minister at the time, were alleged to have offered up to $50,000 to various
Members of Parliament to vote in their favour.86
102. Certain Member States also actively attempted to influence the outcome of the
presidential election. Of these, the United Arab Emirates was the most overt,
frequently summoning leaders of regional administrations to attend meetings where
they were given cash to persuade their regional Members of Parliament to vote for
that country’s preferred candidate.87
III. Arms embargo
A. Illicit flow of weapons into Somalia
Puntland arms smuggling networks
103. The region of Puntland remained the primary entry point for illicit flows of
weapons into Somalia. Over the past two mandates, the Monitoring Group has
identified two channels of arms smuggling into Puntland: larger shipments
transported by medium-size ocean-going dhows, originating from the Makran coast
of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and smaller, more frequent shipments sourced from
Yemen and typically delivered by skiffs capable of making the journey in a single
day.88
104. While the Monitoring Group received evidence of arms arriving along the
Puntland coast from Qandala to Alula at a rate of approximately one shipment a
month, lack of access and security conditions have precluded the Group from
corroborating many of these cases. However, the Monitoring Group was able to
gather evidence of three shipments into Puntland, one originating in the Islamic
Republic of Iran and two in Yemen, including a shipment destined for ISIL in
Puntland’s Bari region.
__________________
85 Internal Independent Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanism report on file with the Secretariat.
86 Monitoring Group interviews with representatives of the diplomatic community and international
institutions, current and former Federal Government officials and presidential candidates,
Mogadishu and Nairobi, between December 2016 and April 2017.
87 Ibid. The United Arab Emirates is alleged to have supported, at least until the latter stages of the
contest, the former prime minister’s bid for the presidency.
88 Between September 2015 and March 2016, four ocean-going dhows carrying arms to Somalia
from the Makran coast of the Islamic Republic of Iran were intercepted by international naval
forces. Smaller-scale arms shipments from Yemen have been documented in multiple past reports
of the Monitoring Group, including S/2014/726, annex 6.6.
Annex 96
“Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: The Republic of Kenya”, UN FAO, 2016,
available at: http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/KEN/en (last accessed: 21 December 2020)
Main lae
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200 naical mile ac
FAO Fihing Aea cde
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Fd and Agicle Oganiain f he Unied Nain
f a d ih hge Fiheie Diiion
Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles
The Republic of Kena
Pa I O a a a
1. C bief
2. Geeal gegahic ad ecic idica
3. FAO Fiheie aiic
Pa II Naa (2016)
4. Pdci ec
Maie b-ec
Ilad b-ec
Aacle b-ec - NASO
Receaial b-ec
5. P-hae ec
Fih iliai
Fih ake
6. Sci-ecic cibi f he fihe ec
Rle f fiheie i he aial ec
Tade
Fd eci
Ele
Ral deele
7. Ted, ie ad deele
Cai ad iie
Gee ad -gee ec licie ad
deele aegie
Reeach, edcai ad aiig
Feig aid
8. Iiial faek
9. Legal faek
Regial ad ieaial legal faek
10. Aee
11. Refeece
Aa a
12. FAO Theaic daa bae
13. Pblicai
14. Meeig & Ne achie
1000
500
The bdae ad ae h ad he dega ed h a d
he ee f a haee he a f FAO
cceg he ega a f a c, e, c aea f
ahe, cceg he dea f fe ad bdae.
Dahed e a eee aae bde e f hch hee
a e be f ageee.
Annex 96
Par I Oerie and main indicaor
Pa I f he Fihe ad Aace C Pfie i cied ig he --dae ifai
aaiabe f he FAO C bief ad Saiic gae a he ie f bicai. The C
Bief ad he FAO Fiheie Saiic ided i Pa I a, hee, hae bee eaed a diffee
ie, hich d eai a iciecie.
Contr brief
Peaed: Feba 2015
Ce ided b FAO
Kea fiheie ad aacle ec cibe aiael 0.54 ece he c GDP (2013). Fih
ci ha bee decliig f a de 6.0 kg/ca i 2000 4.5 kg/ca i 2011. The ale f fih e a
ab USD 62.9 illi i 2012, ab 5 ie geae ha he USD 12.3 illi i fih i. I 2013, ad 129
300 ele deied hei lielihd f fihig ad fih faig aciiie (icldig 48 300 i ilad ae, 13 100 i
caal ae fihig ad ad 67 900 i fih faig).
Tal fihe ad aacle dci i 2013 aed 186 700 e, ih 83 ece cig f ilad cae
fiheie (f hich Lake Vicia cibed ab 90 ece). Cache f Nile ech - he gh ad ail
eed fih ecie eil declied de efihig afe he 2000 eak a 110 000 e b ice 2007
abilied ad a aeage f 45 000 e e ea. Maie cae fiheie dce le ha 9 000 e e ea,
caaiel ch le ha eighbig cie.
Fehae aacle deele i Kea i he e illei i eakable, eeciall i 20092010, akig
Kea e f he fa gig aj dce i Sb-Sahaa Afica. F he aal dci f ab 1 000 e
i 20012006, he hae f faed fih leaed e 4 000 e i 20072009. I a aiide fih faig a
caaig lached b gee i 2009, he al aea f fih d a iceaed f 220 ha 468 ha b bildig 7
760 e fih d. Tgehe ih he ied eed l ad ceig he aec, i lead a hike i
faed fih dci eachig 23 501 e i 2013, e ha f ie f he dci i 2009. The ai ecie
dced i 2013 a Nile ilaia (75 ece), flled b Afica cafih, c ca ad aib . Maicle
i e aciced ceciall, deie i eial deaed b ial.
The Gee i lkig i a f ig aacle ad ig ced fih dc f fd elief ga i
de ehace aial fd eci.
The ai ie i he cae fiheie ec i e f ecaaci i Lake Vicia ad he f eeliai
(iceaig cflic, efihig, ad fallig ice) ha acca i. Thi ie i beig addeed i ceai ih
eighbig cie hgh he Lake Vicia Fiheie Ogaiai (LVFO), ad hgh he Regial Pla f Aci
f he Maagee f Fihig Caaci i Lake Vicia ha a ageed i Mach 2007.
I he aie ec, e ie i he cl f feig flag eel ha ae fihig a i he Eclie Ecic Ze
ad hee illegal, eed ad eglaed (IUU) fihig i k cc.
Kea i Pa he 1982 UN Cei he La f he Sea ice Mach 1989 ad he 1995 UN Fih Sck
Ageee ice Jl 2004. Kea iged he P Sae Meae Ageee i Nebe 2010.
Kea i a Mebe f he Ciee f Ilad Fiheie f Afica (CIFA), a fdig Mebe f Aacle Nek
f Afica (ANAF), a Mebe f he FAO Idia Ocea Ta Cii (IOTC) ad a Mebe f he FAO Sh We
Idia Ocea Cii f Fiheie (SWIOFC).
Annex 96
M Ra F B
Ciee Ilad Fiheie ad Aacle f Afica (CIFAA)
Idia Ocea Ta Cii (IOTC)
Ieaial Whalig Cii (IWC)
Lake Vicia Fiheie Ogaiai (LVFO)
She Idia Ocea Fiheie Cii (SWIOFC)
General geographic and economic indicators
Table 1 Kenya -General Geographic and Economic Data
Sce
Ilad ae aea 18 029 k KNBS: .kb..ke
Maie ae aea (icldig he EEZ) 142 400 k
Shelf aea 19 120 k UNEP (1998) **
Legh f cieal calie 640 k UNEP (1998) **
GDP a chae' ale (2014)
KES 5 358 billi
USD 61.1 billi*
KNBS: .kb..ke
GDP e caia (2014)
KES 124 710
USD 1 422*
KNBS: .kb..ke
Agiclal GDP (2014)
KES 1 464 billi
USD 16.7 billi*
27.3 % f aial GDP
KNBS: .kb..ke
Fiheie GDP (2014)
KES 40.4 billi
USD 461 illi*
0.8 % f aial GDP
KNBS: .kb..ke
*calclaed ih UN echage ae
** UNEP (1998):
h://gidaibi.e.g/ch/EAFDce/Kea/Eae_Afica_Ala_f_Caal_Rece_Kea.df
Soce
C aea 50 30 k FAOSTAT. 2013
Lad aea 5 140 k FAOSTAT. 2013
Annex 96
Soce
Ilad ae aea 11 230 k Ced. 2013
Plai - E. & Pj. 50.03 illi FAOSTAT. 2018
Eclie Ecic Ze (EEZ) aea 114 33 k VLIZ
GDP (ce US$) 0 illi Wld Bak. 2018
GDP e caia (ce US$) 1 11 US$ Wld Bak. 2018
Agicle, fe, ad fihig, ale added 34.1 % f GDP Wld Bak. 2018
FAO Fisheries statistics
Annex 96
Par II Narraie Udad 2016
Pa II f he Fihe ad Aace C Pfie ide eea ifai ha i baed
aia ad he ce ad ha i aid a he ie f ciai (ee dae ea abe). Refeece
hee ce ae ided a fa a ibe.
Prodction sector
The Reblic f Kea, ih a al lad face aea f ab 580 000k2, i aide he ea. I i ibed ih
e aaic ece f iee eclgical ale idicaie f a dcie ad alable ece. I highl
gegahic ad cliaic egi ce a i f he Idia Ocea calie, a, elad, a a f Lake Vicia
hich i he lage fehae lake i Afica ad ecd lage lake i he ld, ad a lage ie. I aied
habia, icldig he dee ceaic ae, h a ich bilgical diei.
A ie feae f Kea ich heiage i i e 600 kilee f calie he Idia Ocea, ih dcie
ece, hich la a highl igifica le i he ecic ad cial ellbeig f he ele. A diicie eaak
f he calie i he al ci figig cal eef hich eche aallel he ca. Thi calie cie
12 aical ile f eiial ae ad a 200-aical ile Eclie Ecic Ze (EEZ) ih a al aea f 142 400
k2.Kea ha ia, ell-defied ad ell-deeled aie ad fehae fiheie. The aie fiheie ca be
claified i bec: he caal aiaal fihe, ad he Eclie Ecic Ze (EEZ) fihe. A baic
feae f he caal fihe i he lagel biece ad aiaal ae f he fihe h eae all caf elled
b id ail ad aal addle. The EEZ fihe, he he had, i chaaceied b dia-ae fihig eel
hich eli age ecie ail ih e-eie ad lg-lie.
The ai aiable ield f Kea aie ad caal ae i beee 150 000 ad 300 000 eic e,
hile he ce dci leel i l ab 9 000 eic e e a. Kea i f he Lake Vicia bai
ha ab 307 fih ladig beache hile he aie calie ha 141 fih ladig ie. Lake Vicia, hich Kea (6%)
hae ih eighbig Ugada (43%) ad Taaia (51%), i ich i fih diei, ad f i al fih dci), 35%
i laded he Kea i f he lake. The Lake cie diae Kea fih dci, a geae ai f
hich i geeall deied f ilad cae fiheie. The blk f he al fih ladig ce f i i f he
lake hich, ih e ha 90% f al aial cach, adiiall h he c lage fihe. I 2006 he lake
dced 143 900 eic e f fih, hile Lake Tkaa ad caal ad aie ae dced 4 560 eic e
ad 6 960 eic e eeciel. The al aie cae dci f 2013 ad a 8 980 e, a agai 154
200 e f ilad ae f he ae eid. O a aial fih cach cibi leel, Lake Vicia dce 92%
f al ladig; aie cae fiheie, ab 4%; ilad lake ad ie, 3%; hile aacle cibe he
eaiig 1%.Hee, he Lake Vicia fihe i cel a ik, a ck aiclal f Nile ech (Lae iic)
ad Nile ilaia (Oechi iic), face a gea hea f cllae, hgh he lae ecie ehibi high aal
edcie caaci de faable cdii. Thee e f fih faig ae aciced i Kea: a-ae fih
cle, baicall ilig Nile ilaia, Afica cafih ad c ca; cld ai fih cle i hich i
faed; ad caal al-ae faig hich age ai aie ecie, bh fi-ad hell-fih. Fih-hldig e
i e iclde eahe ccee d, high dei lehlee (HDPE)-lied eahe d, cage, acea ad
eal ak. Kea aacle eial ad a 1.14 illi hecae f faig aea ih caaci dce 11
illi e f fih h ell e 750 billi Kea hillig (ab USD 7.3 billi) e a.Kea ha a
hiig eceaial fihe, ih a lage aie f fih ecie cle he. I i a efeed deiai f -fihig
i h agel, ll ad cba-die i he c caal ad dee ae.
Marine b-ecor
Annex 96
Cach fie
The Kea calie i ich i fih ecie. Secie cagh i Kea aie ae ca be caegied a deeal,
elagic, hak ad a, cacea, llc ad dee ea/big-gae fih. Fihig i ail aiaal, biece ad
ihe. The Kea aie ae h a lage aie f fih ecie, icldig fifihe: elagic, ch a kigfih,
baacda, lle, eefih, caalla jack, lile ackeel, baacda, ilkfih, ailfih, bi, a, dlhi ad
ied elagic; deeal ecie, ch a abbifih, ae, ck cd, caege, afih, ge, ic fih,
ge, e, blackki, gafih, eake ad ied deeal; cacea ad ieebae, ch a a, lbe,
cab, ad ea-ccbe, ec; ad llc, ch a id ad c. Ohe fih ecie elied i he ae ae he
afih (Leca aigiei), he c-f-h afih (Acahae aci), a eel (Maeidae),
daelfihe (Abdefdf aa), A. ah), acahida (A. ieg), cadial fih, ae, agelfih,
ci fih, ec.
Ohe fifih ecie iclde ee, ad ck cd. Deee ae he elagic ecie ch a a, eel, ad
lle.
Fac affecig aie fih ladig i Kea iclde ide, he eahe ae, fihig gea ad caf, ad
cial ad ecic cideai. Deeal fih ecie ediae e elagic i he cache.
Kea i ihi he ich a bel f he We Idia Ocea hee ab 25% f he ld a i haeed. I
cgiace f hi, he Kea Maie ad Fiheie Reeach Iie (KMFRI) i 2012 efeced la e he e-
aellie ai ideif fihig e i de eable fihe iceae fih cach.
Ladig ie
Thee ee a al f 197 ladig ie i Kea aie ad caal ae i 2014.
The aj fihig aea ae he legh f Kiga calie ad La ilad i he Nh, Taa Rie h, Ngaa Ba
ad Malidi aea, icldig he ffhe Nh Kea Bak ad Shii, Vaga, Fi Ilad ad cal eef aea he
She bde.
Thiee aj fihig gd ei i La, icldig: Ddi, Faa, Lag, , Mada, Madi, Pae ad Shela.
Maj fih ladig ie icldig Kiii, Je, Mag, Mabi, Malidi ag he ae lcaed ihi he Malidi-
Ugaa ba aea hile ladig ie ihi he Mbaa-Kilifi aea iclde Nali, Maakai, Reef, Keaa, Maia,
Maa, Kaaai Bei,Viig, Kijagai, Ki, Kilifi ad Waa. See aj ie (Chale,
Mgai,Maaa, Mlei, Maee, Tadeid ad Tii) fall ihi he Diai-Chale aea hilef aj fih
ladig ie (Vaga, Shii Mabei ad Gai) ae iaed ihi heFi-Shiai ba aea.
Fihig acice/e
Diffee e f gea ad caf ae deled b fihe ad he eliai f he fih ece. The eel iclde
cae, ied ba, ailba (dh), igge cae (galaa), ad e fihig ba (aha). Bil ihad
gh ea ad e fihig age, dh ad galaa ae eied ih hak e, dife ad gille. Fihig i
cae, he he had, el beach eie, ca-e, dif lg-lie, e gille, fih ad baicade a.
Maj gea ed b he aiaal fihe iclde: gille, eie e, ca-e, lg-lie, had-lie, ea, lea (bake
a), i (baicade) ad aa (ei). Chachacha, hich i a adiial gea ed cach half beak, i ilied i
Vaga.
Annex 96
Kea aie fiheie, beig ail aiaal ad biece, ae deake l f all, -ied ba
ch a igge, dh ad laked ige. A a el f he bi liiai i fihig caf echlg, fihig
eff i ail caied ihi he eef ad i hadl deake ide he eiial ae.
Gille, aiaal eie, had-lie, llig lie, ael e, ha, hked- ad ied-ick, fece- ad bake-
a, ad b lie ae ed i he fihe, hile ae ed hae lbe i La, Malidi ad Kale aea.
Medi-ied ale ad de echlgical fihig eie icldig a eie, ae eled f idial
a fihig. Rig e ae al ed eli ffhe fih ece fa i he EEZ.
Se 6 500 fihe eaed 1 800 aiaal fihig caf i Kea aie ad caal ae i 2010. A a el f he
ae f hee caf, he lack acce ffhe ad dee-ea fiheie ad h lad all cache, i he eighbhd f
7 000 e aall, eeeig ab 4% f he al aial fih cach. B hile he ihe fihe a elied
b he lcal aiaal fihe, he ffhe dia ae ee ageed b Dia Wae Fihig Nai (DWFN) ih a
aj fc he a (kijack, ellfi ad bigee). Feig fihig flee ae ahied eae i Kea EEZ
i accdace ih he Regial ad Ieaial Ageee ad Ceai ii f he Naial Ocea ad
Fiheie Plic hich ae, ie aia, The Gee ill cie ga fihig igh he dia Wae
Fihig Nai fih i i Eclie Ecic Ze (EEZ) akig i acc he ae f he ck ad ecic
e.
A al f 2 913 fihig caf ee aciel ed i he aie cae fihe i 2014. Of hee, dg cae ee he
eale, accig f 47.9%; Dh ih fla a e ed (Maha) 22.1%; Hi 10.8%; Da 9%; Ngaaa(
igge ba ied a e ed) 5.7%; Mi 3.1%; Sf ad af 1.4%.
Mai ece
Kea aie fiheie ca be claified i bec: he caal aiaal fihe, ad he Eclie Ecic
Ze (EEZ) fihe. A baic feae f he caal fihe i he lagel biece ad aiaal ae f he fihe h
eae all caf elled b id ail ad aal addle. Thi fihe ail age cacea, llc, ck
cd, beche-de-e, d hak fi, aie hell, lie ad e ad he ea dc. The EEZ fihe, he he
had, i chaaceied b dia-ae fihig eel hich ail el e-eie ad lg lie i he eliai f
a.
Kea caal ad aie eie h eaie ece diei. The ca, ecaig bh he ieidal
ad b-idal aea, ide fifih ad hellfih, bh f hich ae cagh ihe ad ffhe. Of he eiaed 19
120k cieal helf aea, e 10 994k ae cideed alable.
Ab 163 eef- ad eef-elaed ecie f 37 failie ae k ei i he Kea, e f he
dia f hich ae he hbi ee (Lehi haak), ble abled afih (Leca aigiei), d
ae (Lja fifea), hie-ed abbi fih (Siga ), k ee (Lehi ahea) ad he
e ee (L. iia).
The ai aiable ield f Kea aie ad caal ae i eiaed a beee 150 000 ad 300 000 eic
e. Hee, ial haeig f hee ece i hideed b ifacal liiai ad iaiae fihig
caf ad gea. Aiaal fihe ail eic hei eai he cieal helf becae he ae ill-eied i
e f caf ad eie fih i he dee ea.Iceaigl ageed f hei high ieal ad eeal ake ice
ae lbe, cab ad c, all f hich hae al aaced he aei f eafd caie ad lcal biee.
The cab fihe hie ail i Mbaa, Malidi, Kilifi ad Waa, ad i e acie i Ngei-Maeei aea,
eeciall dig he eak i ea he he dc feche ch highe ice. Lbe ae l cagh beee
Ocbe ad Mach a he Nh Ea M eid. The fihe i aacie lcal eeee h egage he
eice f killed die-fihe f hi e. I addii lcal fihe f ad he Kea calie, a
iga fihe f Peba Ilad i Taaia fih lbe. F he idial hi fihe, he igle fihig gd f
cecial iace i lcaed i he Uga Ba a he h f Rie Taa ad i e f Ea Afica lage The
age hi ecie iclde Peae idic, Meaeae ce, P.d, P.eica ad P. jaica.
Annex 96
Maagee aied ai fiheie
Maa
I a bid dee Illegal, Ueglaed ad Ueed (IUU) fihig, ad bee aage he aie ad caal fiheie
f Kea, he Mii f Fiheie Deele ha a ie f aagee bjecie ad gae, hich iclde:
Deele ad eie f fiheie aagee la ad hae aegie
Peci ad ehabiliai f ciical fih habia
Fih haeig igh adiiai hgh fiheie liceig, eiig ad aehi ageee
Miig fihig eface hgh a elabae fiheie aiic gae icldig ale-baed e,
fae e ad adiiaie daa ce
Peci f edageed, heaeed ad eced aie ecie f fihig aciiie ch a le, aie
aal ad leable hak ecie
Ec.
The hi fihe i cel he l ec ih a aagee la, The Pa Fihe Maagee Pla, Legal
ice 20 f 2010, ih aagee la f he he fiheie e be da.
Maa a a a aa
The Mii f Fiheie Deele aage all cae fihe aciiie. The aagee eae cel i
lace ile iig, cl ad eillace (MSC), fiheie deele, aaial, iee, ad aiical
daa clleci, ec.
The Mii ha ileeed eae e efihig b edcig he be f fihig ba ageig ceai
ecie. Highlighig i gal e fiheie aagee be acice, Kea i 2014 eablihed he Agicle,
Fiheie ad Fd Ahi ih bjecie icldig eei f he cllae f he all-cale fihig bec.
Inland b-ecor
Kea ha e 580 000 k al lad face aea, f hich ilad ae ce 13 400 ae kilee. I ha a
eaal ad eeial ie, f hich e i he ee Idia Ocea bai. Of hee, he aj eeial
ie ae Taa Rie ad Sabaki Rie. Taa Rie, echig aiael 850k i legh ih a cache aea f 95
000k, i he lge ie. I egla eleihe i acclihed b a be f ibaie ih headae
M Kea. Befe daiig i he cea, Taa Rie f a bach ha gie ie Taa Dela, hich i a cle
f idal ceek, fld lai, caal lake ad age a, all ceig a aea f ab 1 300k. Taa i flled,
i legh, b he Sabaki Rie, al k ail i i lad eche a Ahi ad Galaa, ih a al legh f
650k ad a cache aea f 70 000k. Sei-eeial ad eaal ie, ch a he Mache, Kbei, Tal,
Ni, Uba, Raii ,Machea ad Vi, all e i he Idia Ocea ca. Ad f all ea ae M Mk,
Tal, Siae, Kbei, ec.
A be f lake ae fd i he Kea caal egi, eeciall i he Taa Dela. Lake Bilia ad Lake Shakabb
ae ch lake, b i ae ad ea f he ai eade f Rie Taa. Se alle lake hich al
hab fih ece ae Zia la Chakaba, Zia la Taa, Zia la Makii ad Zia la Nd. Ad i he Kiliaja aea
ae lage lake, Jie ad Chala.
Hee, f he fiheie i f ie, he aj aal lake ae Lake Tkaa (6 405 k) ad Lake Vicia
ec (3 755 k). The ia f he alle lake ae Lake Baig ad Lake Naiaha.
Annex 96
Lake Vicia (a 68 000 k, Afica lage lake, he ld lage ical lake ad he ld ecd lage
fehae lake i a haed lake ih bai cie f Kea (6%), Ugada (45%) ad Taaia (49%).
Cach fie
Kea ilad ae ciig cld ad a fehae a abdace f aaic ece. Se f he
edia fehae fih ecie ae Aee, Bag, Bab, Black ba, Caia, Raieba ad Labe. Ohe
ae Hachi, Lae iic, M, Pe, Schibe ad Sdi. The e ae ilaia, , ca, eel,
Cihai, Hdc ad Diichd iic.
Fehae fih ladig hae ala bee highe ha he f he aie ae f Kea. Lake Vicia (Kea
i) ha ala had he lage fihe, dcig ab 90% f fih i he c. The lake al fih dci a
143 900 eic e i 2006, 111 370 e i 2008 ad 108 900 e i 2009.
Nile ech (Lae iic) i he bai f Lake Vicia all-ia fihe id ad f he backbe f he
eai f f he fihe ad he aia ad biee h age i f bh deic ad e ake.
Oe ecie f aj ecic ad cecial iace i he ee-bii diiie edeic ile ciid
Raieba ageaea (k ail a ea, kee dagaa) hich e i hge hal ad ae ageed
f bh ha ci ad f aial feed dci.
Secie dia i ecific aj ilad ae bdie ae a fll:
La Va: Alee, Bag, Bab, Claia, Raiebla, Halchi, Labe, Lae ilic, M,
Pe, Schilbe, Sdi, ad Tilaia.
La Taa: Black ba, cafih, ad Tiaia ii.
La Ba: Tilaia, Pe, Claia ad Bab.
Taa R Da: Tilaia, C ca, Claia, Bab, Labe, eel, ad M.
Ladig ie
The Kea i f he Lake Vicia bai ha ab 307 fih ladig beache. The lake he f Ki, Kiii ad
Ha Ba ae ia fih ladig ie ha hadle lage aiie f fih. S al ae he he f Lake Bilia,
Shakabab, Kglla, Kibii, Dida Waede, Haakia, Ma ad Keaa.
Fihig acice/e
Annex 96
The Lake Vicia fihe i lagel aiaal ad biece, elig ail gille, eie e, lglie ad a. T
dae, addle-eed caf ae edial i e i he fihe. Oe clace fihig ehd he lake i he e
f eie e ad ligh aaci b e f ee la. The ile ciid Raieba ageea, eeciall, i cagh
b ligh aaci dig he igh. Talig i baed i he lake b a ac f la. Dif-eig (ebea) i al fe
ed he lake.
Mai ece
The Kea i f Lake Vicia adiiall ha he lage fihe i he c, ih a 2006 al fih dci f
143 900 e. Thi cach ai declied 111 370 e i 2008, ad fhe 108 900 e i 2009. The lake
44 263 fihe eaig ligh ad all-cale gea ad caf cie he lage fihig ci i Kea. Lake
Naiaha, Lake Baig, Lake Jie, Lake Chala ad Rie Taa ae he aj fiheie i he c.Kea a f
Lake Vicia h a liecie fihe ciig f bh idige ad idced ecie. The edeic ecie
iclde cichlid ad e ha 20 geea f -cichlid ecie, icldig M, cafih, ciid ad lgfih. The
idced ecie iclde Nile ech ad Nile ilaia, bh f hich baiall cibed i iceaig he aal fih
dci i he 1980 ad 1990. Wih a high fih ecie diei, Lake Vicia h beee 170 350 fih ecie,
he hee f cecial iace f hich ae he Nile ech (Lae iic), he ile ciid dagaa
'ea(Raieba ageea) ad he Nile ilaia (gege), all f hich hae ieal ccece i he lake. I he
a fe ea, hee hee hae cied ab 58 ece, 30 ece ad 10 ece eeciel f he al fih laded
he lake.The ai aiable ield f Nile ech i he Kea i f Lake Vicia ha bee eiaed a 39
200 e hile ha f dagaa i 86 000 e. The gh f he fiheal-baed aial feed id dig he a
fe ea ha eled i a ecedeed dead f dagaa, he ecd ceciall dia fih ecie i he
lake.The Nile ech (Lae iic) i he dia ecie i he lake ad ideed i he eie fiheie f Kea, ad i
ceed f fille f bh ieal ad eeal ake. I i he bai f he lake fiheie a he ia
id ad dei he aiaal ad biece lifele f he lake iaia e. Hachi ecie (lcall
called fl), hgh l i ale, i al i abdace i he lake. Thee a a ha gh i he Lake Vicia fih
dci ill 1990 he cach declie e i. Thi ealie iceae i dci a babl he el f eeial
iceae i he Nile ech (Lae iic) bia. Oe he a fe ea, hee, hee ha bee a ead declie i
fih diei ad hae a a el f iceae i fihig eff, aiig f cecialiai. The heaeig cllae
f he Nile ech ad Nile ilaia fihe i de he eeliai f he fihe, e f illegal gea ad eeciall f
all eh gille, ad idiciiae fihig acice ad a-age fihig ehd, hich hae bee eale i
Lake Vicia. Illaiel, he aeage eh ie f gill e ed i he lake fih Nile ech edced f 12 iche i
1981 6 iche i 1996, ad hi a hae deceaed fhe ice he.Ceel, fih dci f Lake Vicia
leed f 200 000 eic e i 1999 ab 114 000 eic e i 2008.
Ag he fih ecie f Lake Shakabab ad Kglla ae Oechi abic (Baabaa), Sdi
abeiei (Chklae), M . (Paa), Caia abic (Pi), Labe gegii (Bde),
Pee ahibi (Kag), ad Agia abic (Mkga).
Maagee aied ai fiheie
The Ilad ad Rieie Diii f he Mii f Fiheie Deele ide f he eliai, iliai,
aagee, deele ad ceai f he fiheie ece i Kea lake, ie ad da. Se aegie
hich he gee alie ee aiable iliai f ilad ad ieie fihe ece iclde
Pi f c-aagee f fiheie ece
Cl f fihig eff : Fae e (fiheie ce)-geeaed e ae ci
Adi f a ece aach fiheie aagee
Segheig f efcee f fiheie legilai
Ehacee f fih ck i aal e
A fiheie c-aagee e i i lace hgh he eablihe f he Beach Maagee Ui (BMU) hich
Annex 96
ae eible f fihe-eig, iig, eci, akeig ad deele f ladig ie i aehi ih he
gee ad he deele ae.
The Kea Bea f Sadad ha iied fih ceig ali aace eae f bh ieal ad eeal
ake. Sic ali cl cede ch a he Haad Aali Ciical Cl Pi (HACCP) ae i fce i all
fih ceig la gaaee he ali f Kea fih ad fih dc. Ieaial be acice ae eled
a all age f fih dci, hadlig, ceig, ackagig, age ad diibi.
Fihig ciie
Lake Vicia h he lage fihig ci i Kea; i ha 44 263 fihe. Fih cie a aj ei ce
f ch ciie.
Aqaclre b-ecor
Aacle ha gea eial i Kea gie i e aaic ece. The c ha e 1.14 illi hecae
eial aea iable f fih faig ih caaci dce e 11 illi eic e f fih h 750 billi
Kea hillig (ab USD 7.3 billi).
The Gee i f aacle i Kea aed i 1921 he he clial adiiai idced ,
c ca ad black ba i he c ae ih he igial ie f ehacig eceaial fihig. Theeafe,
cliai f hee ecie, ad lae f ilaia ad Afica cafih, ceced.
Tilaia faig eaded aidl i he 1960 a a el f he Gee i f al fih faig hgh he
Ea Me Fih caaig hich gae bih eeal all d, eeciall i he Ceal ad Wee ice.
Hee, becae f ifficie eei eice, hage f ali fih eed, ad echical kill eeciall
ag eei eel, he be f dcie d deceaed hal i he 1970. B i a il he id-
1990 ha a eeed iee i fih faig deeled a a el f he eai f a gee fih fa,
ieie aiig f fiheie eei ke ad eablihe f eeach gae.
Ude he hae f he gee Fih Faig Eeie ad Pdcii Pgae (FFEPP) f beee 2008
ad 2011, a al f 3.84 billi Kea hillig (USD 37.3 illi) ee allcaed f he cci f a al be
f 28 200 fih d i 160 ciecie, 3 hall ell i each ciec, cci f 80 ii fih ceig
ad age la, chae f d lie, fih eed ad leea feed.
Kea aacle e addle he ec f all-cale eeie (-cecial) ieie lcle
f Nile ilaia ad Afica cafih i eahe d, ak, acea ad cage, ad f cle f aib . Fih
faig i aciced i all Kea ice ece he Nh-Eae Pice ad Naibi aea.
Aacle ha ecded eed gh i Kea i ece ea. Thi gh i eideced b he high dead f
leea feed ad eed f Nile ilaia ad Afica cafih, ad ha cced a a el f gh i hacheie ad
fiacial iee i he ec. The c aacle dci eal dbled beee 2010 ad 2012 f 12
000 eic e ab 22 000 eic e, accdig he Naial Aacle Reeach Deele ad
Taiig Cee. Thi i babl a a el f cedig gh i hacheie, ad ha ad caial iee
i he ec.
Seekig fhe b al fih dci 11 illi e i ie f he didlig fih ck i lake ad he
ae bdie, he Kea Gee aed hifig fc fih faig i de iceae fd eci ad b
blic eee.
Aacle i Kea ca be caegied i caegie, h:
Maie aacle ad
Annex 96
Feh ae cle
Thgh Kea ha a lg calie hich bde he Idia Ocea, ad heefe ha gea eial f aicle, hi
i e alae i ch deele a he ece eai lagel ed. Kea aicle acii ha f e
ie cied f he adiial backih ae d ad aiaal hi ad e cle, hile e eae f
ieie hi cle i aciced alg he ca. B 1998 ieie hi cliai had bee de eeieai,
j a hee a a eeieal e fa a Gai. Ideed, eial f e faig ei f he calie,
ee a hee i ibili f eliig aie algae a a ccial ei ce.
Thee e f aie fih faig acii cld be achieed he Kea calie, i, (i) d cle i cleaed
age lad behid he age; (ii) ei cle (cage ad af) i heleed aea f adeae
deh; ad (iii) ack cle i he hall ieidal e.
Feh ae aacle diae fih faig i Kea ad a be claified i:
Cldae cle, ilig he cliai f aib (Ochch ki) i highlad aea, ad
Wa ae cle, ilig he cliai f Tiaie fihe, he Afica cafih (Caia gaiei), c
ca (Ci cai) ad a aie f aeal fihe i l lad egi f he c
Fehae cle e aailable i Kea iclde ei-ieie cliai f Nile ilaia (Oechi iic)
ad Afica cafih (Caia gaiei) i aic, eahe d; ad ieie cle f i acea. Tilaia ad
cafih, beig a-ae ecie, ae cled i he ical fehae ag-cliaic e hile , beig a
idced cld ae fih, ef ell i he cle ae f high alide egi.
I 2009 Kea had a al f 6 328 fih fae h faed 9 116 eahe d ceig a al f 275.37 hecae.
Thee fige hed a eakable iee f he ei ea al f 4 742 h ked 7 530 d
alig a aea f 227.79 ha. I 2009, 331 da ih a aea f 547 hecae ad 161 ak/ace ih a al aea f 2.3
hecae ee al faed. The g al lad aea ed f aacle i 2009, heefe, a ab 825 hecae, a
caed 728 hecae ed he ei ea.
A al aacle dci f 4 890 e a ecded i 2009, f hich he blk (3 424 e, eeeig eal
70% a f ilaia ecie. Thi a flled b Claia (1 047 e), C Ca (373 e) ad (51 e).
Black ba, Ki ca ad Gldfih ee al cliaed, hgh a e all cale.
The iceae i lad aea laced de ae f fih faig i likel a diec el f he Gee Ecic
Sil Pgae (ESP) f he 2009/2010 Fiacial Yea. The iceae cld al be aibable he dilacee f
biece fih fae ih allhlde d b eege cecial fih fae ig lage d ih
cee highe ield. Ude he Pgae aied a iig ii ad ceaig e 120 000 ele ad
ice-geeaig iie, e 40 000 fih d hae bee cced i 140 ciecie a a eiaed c
f 1.12 billi Kea hillig (USD 10.88 illi). The Ecic Sil Pgae eled i baial iceae i
aacle dci beee 2010 ad 2013.
The Gee f Kea ha ice 2002 idced eae b he aacle id a a aeg
ceae f he decliig ck f cae fiheie. Gee aacle faciliie iclde he Sagaa Fih
Fa (f a ae ecie), he Kigaj T Fa (f cld ae ecie) ad he Ngeii Pa Fa (a il
aicle jec). I he ea 2009, Sagaa Aacle Cee dced 448 359 figelig f Tilaia, Cafih,
Gldfih ad Sdfih hile Kigaj T Hache dced 53 993 figelig.
A a he ea 2013 he gee had cced e 3 000 fih d all e he c de i Ecic
Sil Pgae. M f he d hae, hee, efed bel eecai a a el f fac icldig
iadeac ad high c f i, ad lack f echical eeie.
Me ifai a: Naa Aa S O (NASO)
Recreaional b-ecor
Annex 96
Kea i eed f e f he be dee-ea fihig i he ld. Shii, Waa, Mbaa, Peba, ad Lake
Vicia ffe eceaial fihig iie ih a lage aie f fih ecie cle he.
Peba Chael ad Lake Vicia ae ag he fie -fihig lace. Al a Heig a ff Malidi Ilad,
i-egie dee-ae fihig ba ake eceaial fihe fih billfih i i Nebe Mach ie ea, ee
a ailfih (k lcall a li li) ad Mali (ied, ble, ad black) fe e ihe i hal i he h f
Ag.
Fihig ff he ca f Kea i geed b he i : Ki (Shea M) blig f lae Mach
il Nebe, ad Kakai (Nhea M) hich a id-Decebe. M iiig agle Kea ae
age ailfih hile he ali, bi, kijack a, hbill eafih ad badbill dfih ae al age
ecie.
The h f Ail Ag ake he be -fihig eid, he eahe beig iclee he e f he ea.
Offhe ba ail e hk ad lie, hile i he-baed eceaial fihig, llig, difig ad iig ae
eled.
All alg Kea calie ae liig cal eef hich cc a cal fla, lag, eef laf ad a a figig eef
cliig he hall a f he cieal helf, ae i lcai hee ie ifl ceae cdii f l alii
ad high bidi hich ihibi cal gh. Thee hae a iee ale i aacig i. The calie ad he
caal lake, a ell a beig ia ce f fih ei, ae al ia f eceaial aciiie.
I 1968 Kea ieeed he eablihe f aie eced aea i Afica. Thee aea ee ceaed cee cal
eef hich alg f he c ca ad hich f a bidiei h ecd l he ical
aife. Thee ae f Maie Naial Pak, a Malidi, Waa, Kiie ad Mbaa, ih a al aea f 54k.
Al, hee ae fie Maie Naial Reee, lcaed a Malidi, Waa, Mgi, Mbaa ad Kiga, ih a al
aea f 706k. While fihig i all hibied i he Pak, fihig ig adiial ehd i eied ihi he
bdaie f he eee.
The Malidi-Waa aea ee he be k eef ad i a f he Maie Naial Reee ad he Maie
Naial Pak, he lae f hich ae a cle f figig eef, chael, ilad, ffhe eef, ad, cla, eaga
ead ad ilaed cal head. The hle aea f he Naial Reee ad he Naial Pak ae deigaed a a
Bihee Reee. Se fih g all aciaed ih cal ad ae fd hee iclde he a fih
(Lecai aigiei), he c-f-h afih (Acahae aci), a eel (Maeidae), daelfihe
(Abdefdf aa, A. aha), acahida (A.ieg), cadial fih, ae, agelfih, ci fih, ec.
Post-harest sector
Fih iliaion
Uil ab 35 ea ag, al all fih cagh i Kea ae a ced feh lcall. The fi fih ceig
facie ee e ad Lake Vicia i eal 1980, h aig he a f fih e he ae eid. Oe he
a 35 ea, heefe, he fihig id ha gadall eled f a deic ci-ieed id a
e-ieed id ih ale-added ceig beig alied. The Lake Vicia fihe ha dege eed
cecial afai e he ea ad i diaed b fih-ceig la fded b ieaial agecie
hich ai a ig fih e deeled cie.
P-cae, feh fih i aed b fihe ig fihig eel. A ladig ie, he fih deied f idial
Annex 96
ceig i acked i efigeaed ck ad ed he ceig fac. While f he e fih i feighed
b ai i eciall-deiged caie, he egligible i ea f lcal ci ed i eake
chai ia ad aai.
The deic-ake fih i all acked i ice laced i lhee bag ad he heaed i adiial bake f
aai. Oeigh a e ae e fe ha ed ce ch fih Naibi ad Mbaa.
Lbe ae all ke alie il aai eihe he eeal ake b ad he lcal ake f Malidi,
Kilifi, Mbaa Naibi. Pceed fih, icldig died Nile ech, ilaia ad dagaa, a ell a dee-fied Nile
ech ae aed b ad ai ieal ba ake.
Fih ea f he deic ake i ld feh, died ceed f ci. The ecelle hic-cheical
aliie f he Nile ech ede i fille, eihe chilled fe, eed cecial iee. I b-dc f
ki ad cale al ke i a ia id dealig hee ad he b-dc.
Kea ha ileeed he Eea Ui ali adad f all fih dc deied f he ieaial ake.
Kea ha 25 fih ceig la ih a al caaci f 25 e a ea.U ladig Raieba ageea (dagaa,
ea, kee) ae ld feh ad adiiall ead ga, ld e, a, i e lace, de eleaed
ack, f dig i he . Thi ce all ake beee e ad hee da, deedig he eahe, dig
hich eid he fih ae ccaiall ed f ifi. B becae bee cache ae ade dig he ai ea,
-dig fe el i l-ali died dc. Dig aifall, he fih ae eihe ake id ceed i he
dig ie ih aali laic heeig. P-dig, he fih ae acked i ack f aai he ake. The
ei ali dc aac a highe ake ice ad ae ageed a ha ci hile he le-ali
dc ae ld f chicke feed.
Pie aie ec dc iclde bigee, clefih, fih il, lbe, c, a, hak ad hak fi,
dfih, a li ad caed a, all f hich ae ageed a bh he lcal ad ieaial ake. Waachi
Maie Ld, Shik, Ta Afica ad Sea Hae ae he aj a ceig facie i Kea ha e a li
he Eea Ui ake.
I 2012 he Kea gee ieed 240 illi Kea hillig (USD 2.3 illi) i bildig f fih cld age
la a Rg, Iei, Te ad Labi. Thi a ea accd fih fae age faciliie f hei dc i
akeig.
Fih marke
Kea fih ake ce claifie ade accdig hei age ake: ieal ieaial ake. F he
lcal ake, fih i lagel ld feh hile he eeal ake ile high ali adad dig hadlig,
ceig ad age f Nile ech fille, a, c, clefih ad lbe. E ake ae all he EU
cie f Ial, he Nehelad, Gea, Belgi, Pgal, Sai, C, Mala, Face ad Plad; he Fa Ea
cie f Jaa, Hg Kg, Sigae, Malaia ad Chia; he Middle Ea cie f Iael ih a high dead f
Nile ech ad, a ch lee ee, he Uied Aab Eiae (UAE). The Uied Sae f Aeica (USA),
Veeela, Clbia ad Cba al i e aiie f Kea fih, j a e eified b egligible a
ae eed eighbig Afica cie.
A al f 18 506 e f Kea fih ad fih dc ee eed i 2009. Fih ad fih dc eed iclded
Nile ech fille, fih a, c, hak, dfih, cab ad fih ki. E f Nile ech acced f 87.4% f
al fih e ad 84.73% f he al fih e eaig. E f fih a k 5.6% f al e ai ad
11.3% f al ea ale, hile c cibed 2.4% i ai ad 3.2% f ea ale. Accig f 4
420 e, eeeig 45% f he al Nile ech e, Iael a he efeed c f deiai f hi
ecie.
Nile ech i he eable ecie f he Kea ae. Naibi i he lage deic fih ake ad eai
he efeed deiai f fih laded a Lake Vicia, Naiaha, he aie calie ad ee Taa Rie Da.
Gikba ad Ci Make ae he ai fih ake i Naibi. Ceal ad Eae Pice ae he ia
Annex 96
deic ake; he b fih f he Taa Rie Da fih fae. Fih f Lake Tkaa, Naiaha ad ee Lake
Vicia al fe ae deied f he ake f he Rif Valle Pice.
Socio-economic contribtion of the fisher sector
Role of fiherie in he naional econom
The fihe ece f Kea cibe he aial ec hgh feig echage eaig, ele
geeai, fd eci ad al deele.Of Kea 2014 eiaed lai f 44.9 illi, he
fiheie ec ide ele 2 illi ad lielihd f a lea 2.3 illiele. The ec al big i
alable feig echage he gee, eaig e 0.5% f he G Deic Pdc e a.
Fhe, he hiig i id baed he cal eef i he ia fihig f Malidi ad La i he
La Achielag aac eee he ec. Thee ae cel e 1.6 illi i iiig Kea ee ea
a aeciable eceage f h ae aaced b he eceaial fihig.
Trade
The Nile ech i he ceciall- ia ecie i he e ade, cibig ab 90 ece i bh
le ad ea ale f Kea al fih e. Eable Nile ech dc iclde he fille, fih a, ad
he ged, headle hle fih. Maie fih dc ch a cacea (a, lbe ad cab), llc (c
ad id) ae al eed, j a he aie fih, fehae cafih, ad all aiie f lie aeal fih ae
deied f he ieaial ake.
Ieaial fih ade aed i he eal 1980 ih he eablihe f he Nile ech ceig id.
Kea al fih e f 2007, 2008 ad 2009 ee 31 376 e, 29 575 e ad 18 506 e eeciel,
eeeig 13.4%, 13.3% ad 7.8% f al aal cach, leaig beee 70% ad e 90% f lcal ci
ihi hee eid.
Food ecri
A igifica i f Kea al fih cach cae he ei eed f he lcal lai. I 2007, 2008 ad
2009, 86.6%, 86.7% ad 92.2% f all fih cagh f Kea ae ee lef f deic ci, h
cibig he fd eci f he ele. Kea e caia fih ci a laced a 5kg i 2011, ad
eaied he ae i 2014.
The cibi f fih eall ei iake i l a 7.6% ad hi i aibable he fac ha a Kea d
eglal ce fih f hiical clal ea. Hee, Kea fihig ciie deed heail fih a
a ich ce f ei.
Egagig lagel i biece fihig, fihe all ake a f hei cach hei failie, fied ad elaie f
fd. Thi i f he cach i lcall k a kie. Hee, he eailig declie f Lake Vicia aal
fih ck diecl heae fd eci ad ice f lielihd f lakeide ciie.
Annex 96
Emplomen
The fiheie ec geeae ele f e ha 2 000 000 Kea hgh fihig, gea ad caf eai, fih
ceig ad diibi, ad he elaed aciiie.
A a 2008, 80 000 ele ee diecl egaged a fihe ad fih fae hile he ec ided lielihd f ab
2.3 illi Kea ail iled i fih ceig ad ade.
A al f 41 912 fihe ee aciel egaged i he Kea fiheie i 2010, hile i 2011 cae fihe diecl
eled 62 232 fihe. Ad i 2014, a al f 12 915 fihe aiciaed aciel i he aie cae fihe ale.
Rral deelopmen
Fiheie ad aacle la a igifica le i he deele ad abiliai f Kea al ciie, bh
caal ad iaia. The cbied ec ide ele ad ice lage be f e ad e, ad
fd ad cial chei eie failie.
The ia id i he iaia diic f Lake Vicia i agabl fiheie, ih all i aificai f fih
caig, ceig, akeig, diibi ad he acilla eice. Thi id, he bai i he all-bii
Nile ech, dei he aiaal ad biece lifele f he egi.
Ciie liig alg Kea lake ad calie beefi fhe i e f fd eci, a all-cale fihig i
eeial hei eall hehld ellbeig, idig bh ice ad ie-ich fd.
Trends, isses and deelopment
Conrain and opporniie
Fac hich igifical diiih fih ad cal dcii, ecie iche ad diei f he eie Kea
calie ae il deii f ie daiig agiclal lad, idial ad deic effle, ad dichage f
ake affic. Reef f ide he deigaed aie eee ae fe degaded ad k aiie f hell ad
cal ae fe haeed f Shii, La ad Kiga aea.
Thgh Kea EEZ addle he cideabl ich a bel f he Sh We Idia Ocea (SWIO), eliai f he
ece i haeed b ifacal liiai ad iaiae fihig caf ad eie. Aiaal fihe lagel
eic hei eai he cieal helf becae he ae ell-eied i e f gea ad caf fih i he
dee ea.
Lack f iig ad eillace caaci i he ai cae f illegal fihig i Kea dia ae. Sall-cale
iga fihe f Taaia al ce f he h dig he h-ea ad age e alable ecie
ch a hak, Caagidae, Lehiidae ad Sigaidae.
Kea lack caaci i he aciiie f he dia-ae fihig flee eaig ihi i EEZ. I aiall
egieed fihig flee eaig i i dee-ae i all, ad a a el f hi ad he lae, dia-ae fihig
flee eaig ihi i EEZ lad e ha 20 000 e ide he c.
Annex 96
Goernmen and non-goernmen ecor policie and deelopmen raegie
Kea 2014-2017 Naial Nii Aci Pla ecgie fiheie a e f he aj ec ha cibe he
gal f he aial ii ageda. Al, Vii 2030, i lg-e deele blei, ecgie he cibi
f he fiheie ec ad afig he c i a idialiig iddle-ice ai.
The Gee f Kea ha lached i fi ee Ta Fiheie Deele ad Maagee Saeg, heeb
ig i ake i he USD 4 bill glbal a fiheie id. The Saeg hich f 2013 2018 ld bild
effecie geace e f he aie fiheie ec b idig iiial faek ee cliace ih
elea aial la ad ieaial adad ad ageee. I ai g he c lagel dedeeled
a l chai ha ha diea fihig eel caable f gig bed 20 aical ile i deakig a
fihig. B dig, Kea a fihe ld af i dcie ad aiable de, ceciall-ieed
caal ad ceaic fiheie ih diec iie iac ele, ealh ceai, ied ce ad feig
echage eaig.
The Kea Gee ad he FAO (Fd ad Agicle Ogaiai f he Uied Nai) hae i lace he Ble
Gh Iiiaie (BGI), hich i aied a helig elec aea f he caal egi deel fiheie ad aacle.
The Iiiaie i a FAO flaghi aeg ih he bjecie f ig e dcie, aiable ad
ciecicall eible fiheie ad aacle. BGI, i Kea cae, ai adde aicle hich i
eel laggig behid he fehae cle e, ad i be ileeed hgh he Ece Aach
Aacle (EAA). I hi eec, FAO ha deeled jec h a al f USD 1 illi, ael I S
f Fd Seci ad Nii, Pe Alleiai ad Healh Ocea ad I S f Ileeai f
Maicle i Kea Wihi a Ece Aach.
Reearch, edcaion and raining
Reeach
Kea Maie ad Fiheie Reeach Iie (KMFRI) i he Sae Cai dedicaed cdcig eeach,
ceig all he Kea ae ad he iaia aea icldig Kea EEZ i he Idia Ocea.
KMFRI ad he Wildlife Ceai Scie (WCS) ecel deeled a e bake fih a ih ecae ga
edce fih b-cach b allig jeile ad -age fih ecie ecae hile iceaig ice. B eablig e
deied fih ecae, he a iiie he iac f fihig caal eef e ad hel fihig ciie
b fi.The aj Gee Aacle Reeach Iii ae:
Sagaa Fih Fa a Sagaa, Kiiaga Diic, Ceal Pice.
Kigaj T Fa a Sagaa, Nei Diic, Ceal Pice.
Mi Uiei, Deae f Fiheie, Elde, Uai Gih Diic, Rif Valle Pice.
Kea Maie ad Fiheie Reeach Iie, Mbaa Diic, Ca Pice.
Vai Kea ieiie hich ffe degee i fiheie ad allied field al cdc eeach i fiheie.
Edcai ad aiig
Bel ae e Kea ieiie ha ffe acadeic gae i fiheie ad elaed field
S/N. U Uaa
Pa
Gaa
Pa R
1. Uiei
f Naibi
B.Sc. Fiheie
ad
Aacle
M.Sc. Fih
Sciece ://..a./_a_
Annex 96
2. Keaa
Uiei
M.Sc.
Fiheie
Sciece
h://.k.ac.ke/ide.h/acadeic/acadeic-
gae/ae-gae-a-
3 Ege
Uiei
B.Sc. Alied
Aaic
Sciece
h://.ege.ac.ke/ide.h/Sa-f-
Pgae/a-f-gae.hl
4 Mae
Uiei
M.Sc.
Aaic
Sciece
h://ae.ac.ke/ide/ide.h?
i=c_ce&ie=aicle&id=114&Ieid=150
5
Techical
Uiei
f
Mbaa
B.Sc. Maie
Rece
Maagee
h://..ac.ke/gae/degee
6 Pai
Uiei
B.Sc. Maie
Bilg &
Fiheie
PhD
Fiheie
h://..ac.ke/ide.h/acadeic/2015-09-03-06-24-
19/degadae
7 Kiii
Uiei
B.Sc. Alied
Aaic Sciece
M.Sc.
Fiheie ad
Aacle;
PhD
Fiheie ad
Aacle
h://.kiiiiei.ac.ke/ide.h?
i=c_ce&ie=aicle&id=117&caid=33&Ieid=101,
h://.kiiiiei.ac.ke/ide.h?
i=c_ce&ie=aicle&id=162&caid=34&Ieid=101
8
Sh-
Eae
Kea
Uiei
B.Sc. Fiheie
Maagee &
Aacle
Techlg
h://.ek.ac.ke/ide.h/acadeic/acadeic-ga
9 Mi
Uiei
MSc ad
PhD
Fiheie
ih i
i
Accle
FAO Fiheie ad Aacle -Naial Aacle Sec
Oeie -Kea
h://.fa.g/fihe/cec/a_kea/e
I addii, he Ragi Iie f Adaced Techlg, Ki ai aacle feial ad he Kea Wildlife
Taiig Iie, Naiaha ffe a dila i Aacle.
Foreign aid
Kea i i a ke aehi ih he Aacle ad Fiheie Cllabaie Reeach S Pga, k a
AaFih CRSP, fded b he U.S. Agec f Ieaial Deele (USAID). The Pga ha bee helig
ie Kea aacle ice 1997.
Instittional frameork
Kea ha a fll-fledged Mii f Fiheie Deele hich i he eible iii f he adiiai f
fiheie ad aacle, icldig efcee f fiheie eglai, cllecig ad eig aiic, liceig, fih
ali aace ad cl f i ad e, ad he elaed aciiie.
Annex 96
The Maie Naial Pak ad he Maie Naial Reee ae all adiieed b he Kea Wildlife Seice.
The Kea Fih Pce ad Ee Aciai (AFIPEK), a aebl f fih idie hich hae aded elf-
egla echai ee ha aiabili i adheed ag i ebe-facie, cllabae ih elea
gee agecie fe blic ecgii ad f he fiheie ec, e high ali fih ad fih
dc ad adcae f he effecie aagee f ilad aie fih ece.
Ohe aj akehlde i he fiheie ec ae he i fachied aa-h lcaed a Fla, Nabb, ad
Bkii hig cee ihi Saia; ad Ahe, Kai ad Obch i Nakach Diic eeciel. Thee le ae
ieded delie a ide age f affdable fiheie ad aacle dc ad eice, icldig he ii f
i ad echical adice.
Legal frameork
Regional and inernaional legal frameork
Kea i Pa he Lake Vicia Fiheie Ogaiai (LVFO) fed hgh a cei hich a iged i 1994
b he hee Ea Afica Ci (EAC) Pae Sae f Kea, Ugada ad Taaia haig Lake Vicia. I i
al a iga a egial ad ieaial cei, cl ad ageee ha cai licie ad
gidelie f aagee f fiheie ece.
Al, he fllig Regial Fihe Bdie eae i Kea:
The Idia Ocea Ta Cii (IOTC)
The Sh We Idia Ocea Fiheie Cii (SWIOFC), ad
The Idia Ocea Cii (IOC)
I addii, he C Make f Eae ad She Afica (COMESA) hich Kea belg ha a aeg
fiheie.
The aj ae ha eglae ad ge all fiheie aciiie i Kea iclde he Fiheie Ac (Ca 378) f 1989,
ad he Fiheie Reglai (1991). Hee, a e Fiheie Bill i i Paliae aaiig aage.The Naial Ocea
ad Fiheie Plic (2008) aiclae ceheie lic aee ad gidelie f fiheie eglai.
Me ifai a: FAOLEX a aaa
Annees
Annex 96
Fige 13 Kea Ma hig aj ae bdie, eee, ak, ec
Annex 96
Fige 14 Kea Ma hig fih ladig ie ad he caal feae ihi he Nh Ca. (Sce: Mba,
Eael Kakde. Rhde Uiei (2012). A Aee f he Kea Caal Aiaal Fihe ad Ilicai
f he Idci f FAD. M.Sc. hei. h://.ceadc.g/biea/hadle/1834/6844/kf0252.df?
eece=1
Annex 96
Fige 15 Kea Ma hig fih ladig ie ad he caal feae. (Sce: Mba, Eael Kakde.
Rhde Uiei (2012). A Aee f he Kea Caal Aiaal Fihe ad Ilicai f he Idci
f FAD. M.Sc. hei. h://.ceadc.g/biea/hadle/1834/6844/kf0252.df?eece=1
Fige 16 Kea Ma hig fih ladig ie ad he caal feae ( Sce: ) Mba, Eael Kakde.
Rhde Uiei (2012). A Aee f he Kea Caal Aiaal Fihe ad Ilicai f he Idci
f FAD. M.Sc. hei. h://.ceadc.g/biea/hadle/1834/6844/kf0252.df?eece=1
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Annex 96
J G Maia, P G Mbhia, J Nggi, B Ol, P Oia, S M Wagia, E G Kai, T Maih ad G O Oii (2014). Iflece
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Mae Uiei, Kea h://ae.ac.ke/ide/ide.h?i=c_ce&ie=aicle&id=114&Ieid=150.
Mba, Eael Kakde. Rhde Uiei (2012). A Aee f he Kea Caal Aiaal Fihe ad
Ilicai f he Idci f FAD. M.Sc. hei.
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Ngi Chale C, Ba Jae R., Ol Behel O. (2007) A Ne Gide Fih Faig i Kea. Oeg Sae
Uiei, USA. h://.kili.g.ke/fiheie/-ce/lad/2015/05/A-Sile-Gide--Fih-Faig-i-
Kea.df h://c.e/ece/a-e-gide--fih-faig-i-kea/ .
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Oie, M.J. (2011). Fihe Vale Chai Aali Backgd Re Kea
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Reblic f Kea, Mii f Fiheie Deele (2008). Naial Ocea ad Fiheie Plic,
2008..kili.g.ke/fiheie/-ce/lad/2015/05/Naial-Ocea-ad-Fiheie-Plic .
Reblic f Kea, Mii f Fiheie Deele (2015). Uh call f aage f fiheie bill
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Annex 96
The Fih Sie (2011) Aa Sh Iceae Ral Aacle Deele
h://.hefihie.c/fihe/14196/aa-h-iceae-al-aacle-deele/.
The Fih Sie (2009) Big Fih Fa Pla Eege i Kea h://.hefihie.c/fihe/10627/big-fih-fa-
la-eege-i-kea/.
The Fih Sie (2015). Ble Gh Iiiaie Deel Kea Aacle, Fiheie.
The Fih Sie (2013) Cllabai Bild Me Saiable Fih Ta f Afica
h://.hefihie.c/fihe/21496/cllabai-bild-e-aiable-fih-a-f-afica/.
The Fih Sie (2013) High Aacle Peial i Kea Sae h://.hefihie.c/fihe/21319/higha
acle-eial-i-kea-ae/.
The Fih Sie (2012). Kefi Iceae Ca Fihig S h://.hefihie.c/fihe/17972/kefi--
iceae-ca-fihig-/.
The Fih Sie (2009) Kea Fih Pice Hike: Vicia R L h://.hefihie.c/fihe/8983/kea-fih-
ice-hike-icia--l/ .
The Fih Sie (2009) Ne Feed Pcl T B Fih Faig h://.hefihie.c/fihe/11458/e-feed-
cl--b-fih-faig/ .
UNEP (1998). Eae Afica Ala f Caal Rece Kea
h://gidaibi.e.g/ch/EAFDce/Kea/Eae_Afica_Ala_f_Caal_Rece_Kea.df.
Uiei f Naibi, Kea h://.bi.ac.ke/_gae_e.
Uied Sae Agec f Ieaial Deele (USAID) (2015). The Iace f Wild Fiheie f Lcal Fd
Seci: Keah://al.e/g/fab/gaea-ece/he-iace-f-ild-fiheie-f-lcal-fd-
eci-kea/a_dlad/file .
Wld Wide Fd (2014). Kea lache aeg iceae ake i lcaie a fiheie
idh://f.ada.g/h_e_ae/f_ffice/kea/e/?234957/Kea-lache-aeg--iceae-akei
-lcaie-a-fiheie-id .
Annex 96
Addiional informaion
FAO Thematic data bases
FAO C Pfile
Maie Rece e (FIRMS)
Baacda - Sechelle
Biale - Kea
Biale - Taaia
Bed ge - Sechelle (Mahe Plaea)
Ca fih - Taaia
Cbia - Taaia
Cab - Kea
Ci jbfih - Sechelle (Mahe Plaea)
Clefih ad Sid - Taaia
Deeal ece - Kea
Deeal hak - Taaia
Ee ed ae - Sechelle (Mahe Plaea)
Fla fih - Taaia
Gee jbfih - Sechelle (Mahe Plaea)
Idia ackeel - Sechelle
Kaakaa - Sechelle
Mlle, Baacda ad Milkfih - Kea
Oc ad Sid - Kea
Oc - Sechelle (Gaiic Ilad)
Oc - Taaia
Pelagic hak - Taaia
Peaeid hi - Taaia
Pa - Ugaa ba
Ra - Taaia
Reef fihe - Taaia
Rck ad i lbe - Kea
Sea ccbe - Kea
Sea ccbe - Sechelle (Mahe ad Adiae ck)
Sea ccbe - Taaia
Shak ad Ra - Kea
Shak - Sechelle ihe (Mahe Plaea, Aiae, Oe Ilad)
Shak - Sechelle ffhe
Shell - Taaia
Sheake ief - Sechelle
Sall elagic - Kea
Sall elagic - Taaia
Sae cab - Sechelle (Mahe laea)
Si ad ck lbe - Sechelle
Si ad ck lbe - Salia
Si ad ck lbe - Taaia
Teallie - Sechelle
T- ed ae - Sechelle (Mahe Plaea)
Fihe e (FIRMS)
Idia cea : B lglie deeae lgail ed ae fihe - high ea : 2009
Wld : Dee-ea fiheie : 2009
Wld : Glbal Ta Fiheie : 2009
Annex 96
Naial Aacle Sec Oeie (NASO)
FAOLEX legilaie daabae
Daabae Idci f Aaic Secie
Regial Fihe Bdie (RFB)
Ciee Ilad Fiheie ad Aacle f Afica (CIFAA)
Idia Ocea Ta Cii (IOTC)
Ieaial Whalig Cii (IWC)
Lake Vicia Fiheie Ogaiai (LVFO)
She Idia Ocea Fiheie Cii (SWIOFC)
FAO Fihig Veel Fide (FVF)
Pa
Li f elea FAO blicai
M & N a
Meeig achie
Ne achie
Annex 96
Annex 97
“Regional State of the Coast Report: Western Indian Ocean, Social and Economic Impacts
of Capture Fisheries and Mariculture”, UN Environment Programme, 2016
Annex 97
23
Social and Economic
Impacts of Capture Fisheries
and Mariculture
Jacob Ochiewo
p Improvised flshmarket al landing site, lnhaca Island, Mozambique.© Jose Paula.
INTRODUCTION
Several counrrics of rhc SW Indian Ocean are classified as
Least Developed Countries (LOC) by the ·or, and
have a low Human Ocvclopmcnr Index (I-IOI) (lj ·op
2014). High levels of povcrry and rapid population growth
is pervasive, and in coasral communities along the mainland
(Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya), Madagascar and on
small islands (Comoros, Seychelles, Mauritius) caprure
fisheries are integral to food security (see Chapter 21) and
the functioning of social and economic systems. In recent
years, mariculturc initiatives have rnken root in some areas,
such as seaweed farming in Zanzibar, buc at a regional scale
ic is still in an early developrnt:ntal phase (see Chapter 22).
Fish is rich in essential nutrients for human health (in
particular iron, iodine, zinc, calcium, vitamins A and B),
and is especially important in the diets of infants, children
and pregnant women (Sacia 2011). On a worldwide scale,
per copito fish consumption continues co rise - up from 10
kg in che 1960s co more than 19 kg in 2012, driven by
higher demand from a growing populacion, rising incomes,
and more efficienr discriburion channels (FAO 2014). However,
the opposite trend is apparent in the SW I ndian
Ocean, where j>l'r cnpi1r1 fish consumption is the lowesc in
che world, and declining. A decrease in fish availabiliry in
coastal waters, increasing povcrry levels, and a rapid
increase in human population size can partially explain the
decline in fish consumption in this region. Another factor is
that some species with a higher economic value (namely
tuna, prawns and lobsccrs) arc exported, and these species
are therefore scarce on local markers, or are prohibirively
expensive (fAO 2014).
Environmental degradation caused l>y fishing and
mariculrure accivicies (sec Chapccrs 21 and 22) can reduce
porenrial harvests and food security, affect economic
growth and reduce the quality of life in coastal communicies.
Domescic sewage and agriculrnral waste runoff,
chemical contaminancs and microbial run-off increase rhe
risk of disease (sec refere nces in European Marine Board
2013). Food safccy systems for fish produces, such as
Standard San icary Operation Processes (SSOP) and I Iazard
Analys is Critical Control Poin t (I l/\CCP) programmes
have been developed in some SW Indian Ocean countries,
mainly co comply with export rcg11lations of foreign
markers. For insrancc, the European Union (EU) requires
established risk management processes char comply with
regulacions on food safety and quality control. These
measures may safeguard large 1)rod11ccrs against rhc
impaccs of changes co inccrnarional trading srandards, but
ignore small-scale producers rhar deliver to loc-Jl markets
(Satia 2011 ).
This chapcer focuses on chc social and economic
impacrs of capcurc fisheries and mariculture on coastal
communities, their scale and significance for employment.
role in social structure, and their contribucions to livelihoods.
Western Indian Ocean 305
I
Annex 97
SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF CAPTURE FISHERIES
Scale of capture fisheries
Trends in capture fisheries have been described in detail in
Chapter 21. Estimating the scale of the fish eries sector is
nororiously complex, because it employs both fish ers and a
large number of people involved in related activi ties, such
as fish processing, distribution and marketing. Enumeration
is particularly difficult at the community level, where
these ac tivities are largely informal. Consequently there
are many different estimates of the numbers of artisanal
fishers per country and regionally. The acrual numbers arc
difficu lt co discern because of the highly dynamic namre of
fishing ac tivities and data collection limitations. The numbers
of fis hers can va ry seasonally and between years. Fishers
often have more than one occupation (for instance
fishing and farming) and may switch between them
depending on opportunity and perceived gain. Furthermore,
women and chi ldren also participate in gathering
marine organisms in the intertidal zone, but are not generally
counted as fishers. Estimating the number of fishers
based 01i the 1i1.1mber of fishing licenses issued also h:1s
limications because licensing requirements rend co be
weakly enforced. Even where fisheries censuses are conducted,
the above constraints can lead to cons id era ble
underestimations of the arrisanal fisheries sector. Estimates
for the comparatively smaller industrial fisheries sector
rend to be more accurate than for the arrisanal secror,
400000
350000
351000
300000
250000 228000
200000
150000
100000
70000
because the number of fishing units and employment is
more consistent (van der Else and others, 2005).
Some estimates of the numbers of fishers by country
and their relative importance are as follows (see Figure
23. 1):
• Comoros (population est. 850 000 in 2008): There are
127 coastal villages around three habitable volcanic islands.
In 2012 and 2013, traditional fisheries comprised 3 961
small wooden boats and 7 922 fishers, catching mainly
demersal fishes. Arrisanal fisheries , catching mostly mnas,
comprised an additional I 794 boats and 4 062 fishe rs. Fishing
is seasonal, declining during the 'kusi' period of strong
SE monsoon winds (June-August), and increasing during
the ' kashkasi' period of weak N\V monsoon winds (December-
April) (Mahamoud 2013).
• i'vladagascar (population est. 21 million in 2011 ):
Madagascar has a coastline of 5 600 km, and the maritime
fisheries sect0r is structured into traditional fisheries (on
foot or using dugout canoes), arrisanal fisheries (motorised
boats with engines <50 hp) and industrial fisheries (mainly
shrimp trawl, with engines >50 hp). Industrial prawn fish eries
had 35 vessels in 2013-2014 and about 4 SOO fishers.
Estimates of arcisanal fishers (including traditional) are 55
000-70 OOO fishers, using 8 OOO boats (with engine) and
roughly 22 OOO canoes (Soumy 2006; vVIOFish 2013).
• Mauritius (population est. 1.3 million in 2010): Mauritius
(I 864 km2) is surrounded by 150 km of fringing reef
and small outer islands at Rodrigues, St Brandon and
50000 27000
12000 12000 2500 2000
0
Figu e Number of commercial fishers per country, including artisanal and industrial sectors.
306 Regional S101e of 1he Coos1 Report
Annex 97
Fisherman scouring intertidal reef in southern Madagascar.© Johan Groeneveld.
Agalega. Fisheries provide employment ro about 12 OOO
people (full-rime fishers and employees in processing, for
example freezing, salting, smoking, canning and ancillary
services). There are about 4 OOO arrisanal fishers using >2
OOO boats, and 700 industrial fishers us ing 15 boats. Recreational
fishing lands a low volume of fish, compared to the
other sectors, but 24 OOO fishers using >I OOO boats was
reporced by Jehangeer (2006). Produccion is insufficienc to
cover local demand for fish prod ucrs.
• Seyche lles (population esr. 88 300 in 2012): Seychelles
is an archipelago of 115 tropical islands spread over
1 374 million km2 of ocean, and is classified as a high-middle-
income country. Fishe ries are the economic mainstay,
contributing more ro GDP than tourism. Fish products
contribute 90 per cent of all exports. Around 80 per cent of
the tuna catch in the Western Indian Ocean is landed or
rrans -shipped in the Seychelles, where one of the largest
tuna can neries in rhe world is the main employer of locals.
Consequently, the Seychelles economy depends heavily
on the cannery, which in turn depends on the EU export
marker. T he industrial fleet is foreign owned, comprising
purse seiners and longline rs. In 2011-2014, licenses were
given to 48 purse seiners and >200 longliners, from the EU,
Taiwan, China and Japan. lot all vessels were active (Martin
20 11 ). Arrisanal and semi-industrial fishing employs
about 1 800 local fis he rs using 417 licensed small boats, and
mosc of the catch is consumed locally.
• Mozambique (population est. 25.7 million in 2015;
www.ine.gov.mz): The fishing sector makes up abou t 1.4
per cent of GDP and has grown by ea. 13.4 per cent per
year between 1997 and 201 1, through diversification of the
species caught. According co the 2012 arrisanal fisheries
census, 351 OOO people are e mployed, of which approximately
90 per cent are arcisanal fis he rs or involved with fish
processing and marketing. Small-scale fisheries are crucial
to rural economies, but face pressures from illegal and
overfishing, habitat degradation and climate change effects
(Benkensrein 20 13). Industrial fishing by Mozambican
Wesrern Indian Ocean 307
I
Annex 97
companies and joint ventures between the state, Japanese
and Spanish companies is focused on catching prawns.
Fis hing ports, sroragc, boatyards and workshops arc located
in lvlapuro, Beira, Quelimane, Nacala and Angoche . Prawns
are the principal export produc t, but other exports are
spiny lobster, langoustine and fish (www.mbendi.com).
• Ke nya (population esr. 42 million in 2011 ): Fish production
is dominated by freshwater fish from lakes (96 per
cent of approx. 150 OOO tonnes pe r year), with ma rine fish
contributingonly4 percent, averaging around 8 800 tonnes.
Marine fisheries arc divided inro ind ustrial, a rtisanal and
recreational fis hing secto rs, and togethe r they employ
around 27 OOO people in sea and shore-based activities.
T he ar tisanal seccor employs over 13 700 fishe rs (Department
of Fisheries 20 12), and these fishe rs remain mainly
within or near the fringing coral reef. Limited industrial
BOX 23.1 RESOURCE USER CONFLICT IN KENYA
Boats in Malindi at sunrise.© Xiaojun Deng.
An arti sanal fishery has been active in Malindi Ungwana Bay
for hundreds of years, and presently comprises about 3 SOO
fishers and 600 traditional boats that fish in nearshore waters.
These fishers compete for finfish and prawn catches with a
commercial trawl fishery, active since the 1970s. Trawling
takes place close to the coast (within 5 nautical miles, in contravention
of the fisheries act) because most prawns occur in
shallow waters near river mouths. This brings them into
di rect conflict with artisanal fishers, when trawling damages
artisanal fishing gears, or when retained fish bycatch competes
with artisanal catches on local markets. The artisanal
fishery targets some of the finfish species caught and discarded
overboard by trawlers - these catches include juvenile
fish considered to be too small or of low economic value.
Therefore artisanal fishers attributed declining catches to the
effects of traw ling, albeit without direct scientific evidence.
Trawling was banned in Malindi Ungwana Bay in 2006, and
artisanal catches increased roughly two years after the trawl
ban took effect. The trawl fishery resumed in 2011 , subject to
a Prawn Fishery Management Plan (2010). The plan restricts
the fleet to four trawlers that may only operate during daytime,
further than 3 nautical miles from the coast, and it
includes a closed fishing season between November and
March.
308 Regional S101e of 1he Coos1 Report
Annex 97
prawn trawling in Malindi-Ungwana Bay has resulted in days of fis hing. Shore angling efforc is high near urban
confticr berween arrisanal and rrawl fishers (see Box 23. 1). areas, and annual carches range berween 2SO and 600
Offshore resources in rhe Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) connes. Ar leasr 10 OOO recreational boar fishers underrake
are exploited by Disrant Waters Fishing Nations (DWFN) over 30 OOO recreational boar launches per year, reporting
through a licensing system (FAO 2007a). Essenrial legisla- annual catches of between 400 and 470 ronnes l)er year.
rive components are in place, bur governance in rhe off- Many anglers fish in borh marine and esruarine environshore
sector is limired co collecring licensing fees, wirhour mencs (Everett 2014).
adequate enforcement.
• Tanzania (populacion esc. Sl million in 2014).
Marine fis hing is concencrared near rhe mainland s hore,
wirhin rhe fringing reef and near escuaries such as che
Rufiji delca, and in cerricorial wacers around Zanzibar,
Pemba aud Mafia islands. Arcisanal fishers land >90 per
cenc of che cacch, eh rough fooc-fishing and gleaning in che
ince rcidal or using dugout canoes, or dhow-cype planked
boacs (FAO 2007b). Many foot-fishers are women and
chi ldren. Coascal fisheries are essencially unrescricced,
although licenses are cheorecically required (Groeneveld
and orhers, 2014). Some species are exporced, fo r instance
occopus. Various escimaces place che number of fishers
becween 3S OOO (2009 frame survey), and 228 OOO
(WIOFish 2013). Industrial fisheries include a prawn
trawl fishery (presently suspended) and ftee cs of foreign
longliners and purse seiners chac cargec runa and cuna-like
specit:s under license in EEZ wacers. Recreacional fish eries
are res cricced co the rourism seccor.
• Sourh Africa (KwaZulu lacal province, which forms
cbe souchwescern boundary of che SW Indian Ocean; popu
lacion esc. 10 million in 2012): The coastline is exposed
wich few bays and inlecs, and fisheries are Jess exrensive
chan furcher north. Twenry-chree communities are presently
involved in subsistence and arcisanal fishing, wich
approximacely 2 SOO people parcicipacing in five fisheries:
estuarine fish craps (Kosi Bay); marine and esruarine rod
and line fishing; marine rocky and sandy shore invercebrate
harvesting (mainly brown mussels); estuarine sand
and mud prawn harvesting (bait harwscing); and traditional
spear fishing (handhe ld spears, ac Kosi Bay) (Everecc
2014, Goble and others, 2014). Together, these fisheries
produce;;d abouc lSO ro1111es of food in 2010. Oyscer-gachering
in the intertidal, beach seine -neccing, induscrial
crawling for crustaceans, and a line fis hery from ski boars
form che commercial sector. Between 1999 and 2008, an
average of 3 800 co S SOO people purchased rec reational
penn ies to harvesc lobster, mussels and ocher marine
invercebraces. Recreational shore angling comprised SS
OOO parcicipancs in 2009, and a colleccive 800 OOO angler
Role in social structure
Social scruccure is defined as a system of geographically
d ispersed rules and practices char influence che actions and
outcomes of large numbers of social accors. T he imporcance
of capcure fis heries in coascal communicies as a source of
food and economic accivicy makes it a major decerminanc
of social scruccure. Key actors are che fishers, mainly men in
che forma l fishing seccors. Women, and somecimes children,
p lay a significant role in colleccing seashells, sea
cucumber and octopus in che incercidal for a few hours each
day, usually during low spring rides, using hands and sticks
or rods Uiddawi and Ohman 2002). T hey also use mosquico
nets close co the shore to catch shrimps and small fis hes. In
addition co collecting marine produces, women play a
prominen t role in che processing and marketing of fish
(J iddawi and Ohman 2002; Ochiewo 2004). The 2012 arc isanal
fisheries frame survey estimaces chat about 18 per
cenc of che fishers are women. Ocher industries char support
fishing are artisans char make and repair boars and fishing
gear.
~1lidd l eme n and craders play an important role in che
arcisanal fishery, by providing oppommicies for fishermen
who cannot afford to buy the ir own gear or vessels (Jiddawi
and Ohman 2002; Ochiewo and ochers, 2010). Middlemen
usually own gear (seine or gill necs) or vessels (dhows or
boars wich e ngines), which chey renc to fishe rs. T he money
obtained from che catch is cypically d ivide.cl into three
parts: one for the middleman, one for boat and gear main tenance,
and one for all fis hermen on the boac, regardless of
their number. Traders chen distribute the fish inland. Conseque
ncly che fishermen themselves receive che smallest
re cum.
Fisher migracions along the East African coasc is cencuries
old, and illuscrares social adaptation ro a complex e nvironment
(Fulanda and others, 2009; WIOlvlSA 201 l)(see
Box 23.2). Migrations are e icher temporary or permanent,
and paccerns vary cremt:ndously, boch wichin and across
country borders, and from a few days co several months or
years. Drivers are a search for beccer catches and increased
Wesrern Indian Ocean 309
I
Annex 97
income. Fisher migrations are seasonal, and associated with
social and economic challenges at home and host destinations.
Contribution to livelihoods
To illustrate the dependence on marine resources, an estimated
50 per cent of Mozambicans rely primarily on fish
for protein intake. In Tanzania, up to 70 per cent of protein
intake may comprise fish from freshwater or marine origin.
Population densities along the coast are high (>50 per cent
of 21 million people in Madagascar; >20 per cent of 51 million
people in Tanzania), and many of them are intimately
linked co the sea for food security and jobs. Although precise
data are lacking, surveys suggest that 400 OOO to 700
OOO fishers engaged in marine fishing in the region between
2004 and 2013 (van der Elst and others, 2005, WIOFish
2013), and considering that there is a dependency ratio of
about 7: 1 (UNEP 200 I), th is means that almost 5 million
people are directly dependent on fishing for their livelihood.
Dependence on fisheries va ries among countries,
and is highest in Mozambique, Tanzania and Madagascar,
a1id lower in easrern Sourh Africa, where rhe economy is
more diverse.
Economic benefits and contribution to GDP
On a world scale, fish production generally contributes 0.5
- 2.5 per cent of GDP (Bene and Heck 2005). However,
the contribution can be much higher in developing countries,
where fisheries play a more central role in economic
development, poverty reduction and food security (often>
5 per cent of GDP in many west African countries; Bene
and Heck 2005). ivlost assessments measure only the value
of fish production, but if processing, trade and services are
added (these mostly fall in other sectoral accounts), the
overall contribution of fisheries can be much higher (WorldFish
Center 2011). Estimates of the contribution of capture
fisheries to GDP (without any value adding) show
exceptionally high contributions for small island srates (30
per cent for Seychelles and 15 per cent for Comoros) and
above the world average for Mozambique (4 per cent) and
Tanzania (2.7 per cent). Contributions to GDP were much
lower for ivladagascar ( 1.4 per cent), Souch Africa (l per
cent) and Kenya (0.5 per cent).
Fisheries governance
Fisheries co-management and the development of comanagement
institu tions is a promising trend in the SW
Indian Ocean region. Beach i'vlanagemenc Units (BMU)
have recently been established in Kenya and Tanzania to
co-manage fisheries within a system with broader srakeholder
participation (Oluoch and others, 2009, Japp 2012).
Each BMU has jurisdiction over a geographical area that
consciruces a fish-land ing point, which it manages jointly
with fisheries department officia ls. BMUs are empowered
co levy fees against members for services provided, for dayto-
day expenses. Although a clear addition co the social
structure of fish ing communities, it is not yet clear whether
BMUs will succeed over the long term. In i'vlozambique,
co-management rakes place through Community Fishing
Councils (CCPs).
At the international level, SW Indian Ocean countries
are signacories to many fisheries agreements, such as the
J 982 U I Convenrion of the Law of the Sea; 1995 FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; 2000 UN Millennium
Declaration and l'vlillennium Development Goals;
2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Susrainable Development
and Plan of Implementation; 2005 Rome Declaration
on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing; and
the FAO Ecosys rcm Approach to Fisheries (EAF). Unfortunately,
most countries do not have the capacity or infrastructure
to effectively implement the administrative and
enforcement tasks brought by these agreements. Mose
governance issues, at national and regional levels, are
explained in Chapter 33 and policy analyses in Chapter 34
of chis report.
SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF MARICULTURE
Scale, role in social structure and contribution
to livelihoods
Contrary co the global trend in which aquaculture production
outstrips that from capture fisheries (FAO 2014), capture
fisheries still dominate production in the SW Indian
Ocean, with low dependence on mariculru re. An exception
is seaweed fa rming in Zanzibar, where the scale, role in
social strucrure, and contributions ro livelihoods is subsrantial.
The seaweed sector in Zanzibar has grown continuously
since the early 1990s, and now extends over 80
villages, where 23 OOO people are involved, of which 90 per
cent are women.
About 30 per cent of chose directly employed on
prawn farms in Madagascar are women who work in the
post-harvest operations or administration (FAO 2006).
Small-scale seaweed farming in southern Kenya employs
310 Regional S101e of 1he Coos1 Report
Annex 97
BOX 23.2 . MIGRANT FISHERS - ADAPTING TO A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
Fishing boats wait ing for the t ide in northern Zanzibar, Tanzania.© Jose Paula.
From time immemorial, migrant fishers along the coast of populations, placing pressure on village infrastructure and
East Africa have followed fish movements, to increase catches social fu nctioning, through competing for fi sh resources and
and income. These fishers often cross geopolitical borders, market share. Although migrant fishers save part of their
and their movements are highly va riable, the duration rang- earnings to send home, they may also boost host economies
ing from a few days to several years. Migrations are seasonal, through increased clientele for food stuffs, accommodation,
mostly in synchrony with the milder sea conditions of the provision of social amenities, and increased revenues for
North East Monsoon, when sea travel in wooden boats is eas- Beach Management Units (BMUs) from fish levies, especially
ier. Fisher migrations can be seen as a social adaptation to a
complex envi ronment of fluctuating resource availability.
Migratbns have social and economic impl ications for both
home and host destinations. Most migrants are young men,
leaving behind wives and children. They tend to increase host
mainly wome n. Over half of rhe sea cucumber farmers
supporred by Blue Venrures in i\iladagascar are women;
they use the income to help pay for their ch ildren's school
fees and supplement their family's d ier (www.bluevenrures.
o rg). Mariculrure rherefore conrribures co empowering
women as owners of farms, or as importanr accors in
the fisheries value chain and marke ting; in this way they
participate in societal decision-making (Hechr and others,
2006, Wakibia and orhers, 2011).
C hapter 22 showed thar mariculrure of most species
in the SW Indian Ocean have not progressed pasr t he
p ilot phase over the past two decades, and apart from the
examples above, ir only conrribures li rrle co livelihoods
and economic acriv iry. T he lack of growrh occurred in
spite of technically successful pilot resulrs, and apparen
rly s ui table environmenral condirions for expansion,
s uch as suirable land and warm prod ucrive warers
rhroughour rhe year. Presumably rhe consrrainrs imposed
in Kenya. On the down side, local fishers may complain that
fish markets are flo oded with cheap fish, thus reducing the
value of their own fish catch. Fisher migrations may in futu re
be affected by shifting fish distribution patterns caused by
climate change.
by rhe remoreness of rhe region, d isrance from markers,
and absence of infras rrucrure and rechnological s ki lls
were initia lly underestimated. These constraints need to
be overcome before mariculture can expand in scale and
economic impact on a more susrainable basis. F urthermore,
full developmenr of mariculrure in rhe SW Indian
Ocean will require effective governance and strong support
from governmenrs and NGOs (Troell and others,
2011 ).
Marketing and export
The success of ma riculturc depends heavily on the availabiliry
of markers fo r its produces as well as availabiliry of
inpurs such as q uali ry fish seed, feed and warer. Produces
are generally perishable and require ice plants, cold storage
and suirable transport facilities co ensure their quality
ar rhe poinr of sale. These requ ireme nrs res tricr fa rms co
the viciniry of urban cenrers. An exception is seaweed,
Wesrern Indian Ocean 311
I
Annex 97
which can be sold and exported dry.
The seaweed harvest in Zanzibar is dried and sold co
buyers (midd lemen) who deal d irecrly wich processing
companies in the US, F rance, Denmark and Spain (Msuya
2009). The buyers have a monopoly and set low prices for
seaweed. Farmers can scockpile dry seaweed co increase
the price by resrricring supply, but villages depend
strongly on the income . Value -add ing in Zanzibar through
processing has often been mentioned as an option to
increase the income from seaweed farming.
The principal fish marketing information services in
the region are INFOPECHE (lnrergovernmenral Organization
for Marketing Information and Cooperation Services
for Fishery Products in Africa) and COMESA
(Common l\llarket for Eastern and Southern Africa).
These organizations publish a directory of fish importers
and exporters annually. Stringent export requirements
make small-sca le producers less competitive. To overcome
potential marketing hurdles, producer associations
can be formed to assist farmers with technical and marke
ting aspects. One such example is provided by the
communiry-based cu lrure of sea cucumbers in f\fadagascar,
where an established network of business and
research partners provide assured access to markets,
hatchery technology and supply, and technical expertise
(see Chapter 22; www.bluevenrures.org).
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314 Regional S101e of lhe Coos/ Repofl
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Annex 98
“Leveraging the Blue Economy for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth”, UN Development
Programme Policy Briefs, UN Development Programme, 2018
1
Policy Brief
Leveraging the Blue Economy for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth1
Summary
The blue economy has a great potential to contribute to higher and faster GDP growth in Kenya. Innovation and
growth in the coastal, marine and maritime sector could deliver food, energy, transport, among other products and
services and serve as a foundation for sustainable development in Kenya. Diversifying the country’s economy
beyond land-based activities and along its coastal, marine and maritime sector is critical to achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and delivering smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. This is especially
important in the context of the accelerated growth that the country is experiencing without any concomitant
reduction in poverty. This policy brief aims to raise awareness of the importance of the blue economy to Kenya. It
does this by defining the blue economy and its components to show how Kenya can leverage the blue economy’s
forward and backward linkages with the various sectors of the economy. The policy brief provides reflections on
the necessary policies that should be implemented to leverage the blue economy for sustainable development and
inclusive growth in Kenya and Eastern Africa region. It also serves as a building block for further development of
policies to support the blue economy in the region.
1. Introduction2
The potential linkages between the blue economy, sustainable development and economic growth is
recognized in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. SDG target 14.7 focuses on enhancing the
economic benefits to Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from the
sustainable use of marine resources, including through the sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture,
and tourism. SIDS have been at the forefront of the blue economy advocacy, recognizing that oceans have a
key role to play in humanity’s future and that the blue economy offers an approach to sustainable development
better suited to their circumstances, constraints and challenges.
1This policy brief is an output of the Strategic Policy Advisory Unit (SPAU) in the UNDP Kenya Country Office. The Unit focuses on
upstream policy interventions in the areas of human development, pro-poor policy analysis, Agenda 2030 for Sustainable
Development. It also supports the national and county governments in the design and implementation of evidence-based national
development plans, county integrated development plans and other relevant policy instruments.
The views expressed in this policy brief are those of the SPAU, and do not represent the views of UNDP, the United Nations or any of
its affiliate organizations
For more information, please contact the Unit at the following email: [email protected]
2This policy brief is an input to Sustainable Blue Economy Conference that will be hosted jointly by Kenya and Canada in Kenya, 26-
28 November 2018.
Issue No: 6/2018 April 2018
A vehicle to articulate development issues and foster dialogue
Annex 98
2
The blue economy integrates an innovative approach to the economic exploitation of the resources of oceans,
lakes, rivers and other bodies of water. The concept seeks to promote economic growth, social inclusion, and
preservation or improvement of livelihoods while at the same time ensuring environmental sustainability. At
its core, it refers to the decoupling of socioeconomic development through oceans-related sectors and
activities from environmental and ecosystems degradation. 3 The East Asian Seas (EAS) Congress (2012)
defined the blue economy as:4
… a sustainable ocean-based economic model that is largely dependent on coastal and marine
ecosystems and resources, but one that employs environmentally-sound and innovative
infrastructure, technologies and practices, including institutional and financing arrangements, for
meeting the goals of: (a) sustainable and inclusive development; (b) protecting the coasts and
oceans, and reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities; (c) addressing water, energy
and food security; (d) protecting the health, livelihoods and welfare of the people in the coastal
zone; and (e) fostering an ecosystem-based climate change mitigation and adaptation measures.
Ebarvina (2016) notes that for many in the public and business sectors, the linkage between the blue economy,
economic growth, and ocean and coastal resource conservation should be clarified by highlighting the
following:
i. The blue economy encompasses all economic activities with a direct dependence on the ocean or coastal
and marine resources. These include economic activities that are (a) ocean-based, and (b) oceanrelated.
Ocean-based activities include those that are undertaken in the ocean (e.g., fisheries and
aquaculture, offshore oil and gas, mining, ocean energy, desalination, shipping/marine transportation,
marine tourism, marine construction). Ocean related activities use products from the ocean (e.g.,
seafood processing, marine biotechnology, chemicals, salt, etc.); and produce products and services for
the ocean and ocean-based activities (e.g., ship building and repair, ports, tourist resorts,
communication, maritime insurance and law, maritime technical services, etc.).
ii. The blue economy also includes marine education and research as well as activities of the public sector
agencies with direct coastal and ocean responsibilities (e.g., national defense, coast guard, marine
environmental protection, etc.).
iii. The ocean generates economic values that are not usually quantified, such as habitat for fish and marine
life, carbon sequestration, shoreline protection, waste recycling and storing, and ocean processes that
influence climate and biodiversity.
iv. New activities are also evolving over the recent years, such as desalination, marine biotechnologies,
ocean energy, and seabed mining. There are also innovations in activities that aim to protect ocean
health, such as ballast water and invasive species management, waste-to-energy, wastewater
treatment systems with low footprint, etc. These activities should be included and measured in the
ocean economy accounts. Ecotourism, eco-ports, and eco-ships aim to make these industries more
environmentally sound, while ocean energy offers low carbon and renewable energy source. These
innovations and emerging markets offer opportunities for investments and business, further
contributing to blue economy development
3 UNCTAD 2014; UN DESA 2014.
4 See https://www.icriforum.org/meeting/east-asian-seas-eas-congress-2012 and quoted in Elbarvina (2016).
Annex 98
3
This policy brief aims to raise awareness of the importance of the blue economy to Kenya. It does this by defining
the blue economy and its components to show how Kenya can leverage the blue economy’s forward and
backward linkages with the various sectors of the economy. It provides reflections on the necessary policies
that should be implemented to leverage the blue economy for sustainable development and inclusive growth
in Kenya and Eastern Africa region. It also serves as a building block for further development of policies to
support the blue economy in the region.
2. Defining the Blue Economy
The term “blue economy” has been used in diverse ways. However, it is understood to comprise of a range of
economic sectors and related policies that together determine whether the use of oceanic resources is
sustainable. The “blue economy” concept seeks to promote economic growth, social inclusion, and the
preservation or improvement of livelihoods while at the same time ensuring environmental sustainability of
the oceans and coastal areas. It is regarded as the decoupling of socio-economic activities and development
from environmental degradation and optimizing the benefits which may be derived from marine resources.
The blue economy entails the use of sea and the use of its resources for sustainable economic development. It
draws from scientific findings that ocean resources are limited and that the health of the oceans has declined
drastically due to anthropogenic activities. These changes are already being profoundly felt, affecting human
well-being and societies, and the impacts are likely to be amplified in the future due to population growth.
An important challenge of the blue economy is thus to understand and better manage the many aspects of
ocean sustainability, ranging from sustainable fisheries to ecosystem health to pollution. Another significant
issue emanating from SIDS as they turn to better manage their blue economies is the realization that the
sustainable management of ocean resources requires collaboration of likeminded Member States and the
public and private sector.
The blue economy conceptualizes oceans as ‘development spaces’ where spatial planning integrates
conservation, sustainable use, oil and mineral wealth extraction, bio-prospecting, sustainable energy
production and marine transport. The blue economy paradigm constitutes a sustainable development
framework for developing countries that addresses equity in access to development of and the sharing of
benefits from marine resources; offering scope for re-investment in human development.
3. The Blue Economy Components
The blue economy has diverse components, including established traditional ocean industries such as fisheries,
tourism, and maritime transport, but also new and emerging activities, such as offshore renewable energy,
aquaculture, seabed extractive activities, and marine biotechnology and bioprospecting.5 A number of services
provided by ocean ecosystems, and for which markets do not exist, also contribute significantly to economic
and other human activity such as carbon sequestration, coastal protection, waste disposal and the existence of
biodiversity. The mix of oceanic activities varies in each country, depending on their unique national
circumstances and the national vision adopted to reflect its own conception of a blue economy. The World
Bank (2017) highlights that in order to qualify as components of the blue economy, activities need to (as
illustrated by Table 1.1):
• Provide social and economic benefits for current and future generations.
• Restore, protect, and maintain the diversity, productivity, resilience, core functions, and intrinsic value
of marine ecosystems.
5 World Bank, 2017.
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• Be based on clean technologies, renewable energy, and circular material flows that will reduce waste
and promote recycling of materials.
Table 1:1: The Components of the Blue Economy
Type of Activity Ocean Service Industry Drivers of Growth
Harvesting of living
resources
Sea food Fisheries Food security
Aquaculture Demand for protein
Marine
biotechnology
Pharmaceuticals,
chemicals
Research and Development for
healthcare and industry
Extraction of nonliving
resources,
generation of new
resources
Minerals Seabed mining Demand for minerals
Energy Oil and gas Demand for alternative energy
Renewables sources
Fresh water Desalination Demand for fresh water
Commerce and trade
in and around the
oceans
Transport and trade Shipping Growth in seaborne trade;
Port infrastructure International regulations
and services
Tourism and
recreation
Tourism Growth of global tourism
Coastal
Development
Coastal urbanization
Domestic regulations
Response to ocean
health challenges
Ocean monitoring
and surveillance
Technology and R&D R&D in ocean technologies
Carbon
Sequestration
Blue Carbon Growth in coastal and ocean
protection and conservation
activities
Coastal Protection Habitat protection
and restoration
Waste Disposal Assimilation of
nutrients and wastes
Source: World Bank, April 2016
As shown by Table 1.1, contribution of marine and freshwater ecosystems includes (World Bank, 2016:2):
i. Food security, nutrition and health: Fish contributes over 16 percent of the animal protein consumed
by the world’s population and 6.5 percent of all protein consumed, with 1 billion people relying on this
source of protein. Fish is also a particularly critical source of nutrition. Even in small quantities, provision
of fish can be effective in addressing food and nutritional security among the poor and vulnerable
populations around the globe.
ii. Livelihoods: The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that fishers, fish farmers and
those supplying services and goods to related industries assure the livelihoods of as many as 660–820
million people worldwide. In addition, women play a critical role in fishery supply chains – it is estimated
that women account for 15 percent of people directly engaged in fisheries and up to 90 percent of jobs
in secondary activities (particularly in fish processing, whether in the formal or informal sector). Oceans
and coasts also form the foundation for extensive employment in tourism - one of the top five industries
in most small island states.
iii. Mitigation of climate change: Oceans constitute a major sink for anthropogenic emissions, absorbing
25 percent of the extra CO2 added to Earth's atmosphere by burning fossil fuels. ‘Blue carbon’ sinks like
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mangrove forests, sea grass beds and other vegetated ocean habitats are up to five times as effective
as tropical forests at sequestering carbon.
iv. Homes and shelter: Roughly 40 percent of the world’s population lives within 100 kilometers of the
coast. Healthy coastal ecosystems provide protection from natural hazards, coastal erosion and rising
sea levels particularly in SIDS and low-lying, exposed delta regions.
v. Sustainable economic growth: Many developing coastal and island nations depend on tourism and
fisheries for a significant part of their gross domestic product and public revenues. Aquaculture is
projected to continue to grow rapidly and if done sustainably, can serve as a major source of food and a
cornerstone of the blue economy. Advances in seaweed production hold promise for replacing fishmeal
and animal feeds with plant materials produced with less pollution. Tourism, and particularly naturebased
tourism, also provides an important path towards the sustainable development of marine and
coastal ecosystems. Coastal tourism is a key component of small island state economies. The value of
nature-based tourism is expected to increase over time as the supply of pristine natural assets declines
while demand, which seems impervious to economic shocks, increases with rising GDPs.
vi. Trade: Seafood is the most highly valued internationally traded food commodity in the world, with 36
percent of all fish produced exported in 2013-2014. At US$139 billion in 2013, the export value of fish is
more than double that of the next most traded commodity – soybeans. More than half of the fish trade
originated from the waters of developing countries.
4. Leveraging the Blue Economy for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Kenya
To achieve strong and sustainable economic growth, Kenya is diversifying her sources of growth by prioritizing
the blue economy. As already noted, the activities of the blue economy include harvesting of living resources
such as sea food and marine biotechnology, extraction of non-living resources (seabed mining), and generation
of untapped resources (energy and fresh water). To date, Kenya has only focused on fisheries both for domestic
and export markets.
Fisheries account for only about 0.5 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and generate employment
for over two million Kenyans through fishing, boat building, equipment repair, fish processing, and other
ancillary activities. The estimated annual economic value of goods and services in the marine and coastal
ecosystem of the blue economy in the Western Indian Ocean is over US$22 billion with Kenya’s share slightly
over US$4.4 billion (20%) with the tourism sector taking the lion’s share of over US$4.1 billion, according to the
Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) estimates. Marine fishing had an annual fish potential of 350,000 metric
tonnes in 2013 worth Ksh90 billion (KMA) yet the region only yielded a paltry 9,134 metric tonnes worth Ksh2.3
billion. Therefore, the full economic potential of marine resources has not been exploited, yet Kenya has a
maritime territory of 230,000 square kilometers and a distance of 200 nautical miles offshore.
Leveraging the blue economy for sustainable development and inclusive growth in the Eastern Africa region
faces challenges of illegal and unregulated fishing, piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, illicit trade
in crude oil, arms, drug and human trafficking and smuggling of contraband goods. Other challenges are
degradation of marine ecosystems through discharge of oil, the dumping of toxic waste, illegal sand harvesting
and the destruction of coral reefs and coastal forests. Furthermore, Kenya is confronted with piracy in the
Indian Ocean, illegal fishing and border disputes, the dispute with Somalia over the maritime boundary. The
dispute is on a potentially lucrative triangular stretch of 100,000 square kilometers offshore territory that is
about 370 kilometers from the coastline, believed to be home to huge oil and gas deposits (Wairimu and
Khainga, 2017).
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The foregoing suggests that for Kenya to leverage the blue economy for sustainable development and inclusive,
thorough feasibility studies need to be conducted to quantify the opportunities of the blue economy and
maximize returns from investments in the sector. The findings of these studies would assist in exploring the
potential for public-private partnerships in areas such as research, product development, concept
development, exchange of intellectual property, and financial and human resources development. At the same
time, it is important for the country to learn from other countries in the Indian Ocean Region such as India,
Mauritius, Seychelles, Bangladesh, Thailand, and South Africa that have taken steps to promote the blue
economy bearing of course that the best approach to promote and develop the blue economy is to adopt a ‘Sub-
Regional Approach’ initiating development cooperation with likeminded Member States to identify common
interests within the blue economy drawing on country’s legislative framework, the Fisheries Management and
Development Act of 2016.
The Fisheries Management and Development Act 2016 provides for the conservation, management and
development of fisheries and other aquatic resources to enhance the livelihood of communities that depend
on fishing. It gives guidance on the import and export trade of fish and fish products, fish quality and safety
among other provisions that support sustainable utilization of marine products in Kenya.
The country should also put in place a blue economy conducive fiscal and regulatory environment that would
encourage investment in local ship building, repair and maintenance, attract registration of ships in the country
and discourage export of maritime services such as insurance and container cleaning.6
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Sustainable development implies that economic development is both inclusive and environmentally sound,
and to be undertaken in a manner that does not deplete the natural resources that societies depend on in the
long-term. The need to balance the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable
development in relation to oceans is a key component of the blue economy. It is a difficult balance to reach in
practice, given that the fundamental nature of the oceans often renders the use of these resources open to all
who can access them, eventually resulting in overexploitation and degradation. At the same time, oceans are
subject to several externalities such as habitat loss and pollution, often from land-based activities. Because of
the combination of these two factors: (i) overexploitation of ocean resources due to conditions of open access
and (ii) externalities such as pollution and habitat loss, the oceans are underachieving their true potential in
terms of livelihoods, food security and human health, and broad economic growth for many of the world’s
coastal and island states. According to FAO estimates, approximately 57 percent of fish stocks are fully
exploited and another 30 percent are over-exploited, depleted or recovering. Fish stocks are further exploited
by illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, responsible for roughly 11 to 26 million tonnes of fish catches
annually, or US$10-22 billion in unlawful or undocumented revenue (quoted in World Bank, 2016).
The foregoing suggests that for countries that can make the institutional reforms needed to reduce open
access to ocean resources and provide secure incentives for users to take a long-term stake in these resources,
there is significant potential for the oceans to contribute much more to broad-based economic growth – i.e., a
blue economy. At the same time, there are growing examples of institutional reforms and regulatory
frameworks that can provide incentives to reduce the threat that externalities like habitat loss and pollution
pose to the blue economy. Essentially, because the oceans provide a wide range of goods and services that
6 For instance, country loses Ksh 17 billion annually in marine insurance as Kenya largely imports through Cost Insurance Freight (CIF).
This results in the country seeking services from foreign firms in the exporting countries.
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depend on the health of the underlying natural systems, returns from investments in healthier oceans is a good
proposition.
Coastal and island countries that can introduce such reforms can capture some of these vast economic
opportunities that healthier oceans offer:
i. Provision of seafood from capture fisheries;
ii. Provision of seafood from aquaculture;
iii. Tourism and recreation; and
iv. Marine biotechnology.
In addition to these economic opportunities captured directly by ocean users and stakeholders, healthy oceans
provide several public goods that have significant values for economies, such as protection from natural
hazards, cultural values associated with oceans, and carbon storage.
References
Abdullahel, B., (2017). “Our Oceans and the Blue Economy: Opportunities and Challenges, 10th International
Conference on Marine Technology,” Available at
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705817332447
Attri, V. N., (2016). “An Emerging New Development Paradigm of the Blue Economy in Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA) A Policy Framework for the Future, Available at http://www.iora.net/media/23839/the-blueeconomy-
and-iora-2016.pdf
Ebarvina, M. C. M, (2016). “Economic Assessment of Oceans for Sustainable Blue Economy Development,”
Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 2, Issue. 2 [2016], Art. 7.
Economist Intelligence Unit, (2015). The Blue Economy, Growth, Opportunity and a Sustainable Ocean
economy; A Briefing Paper for the World Ocean Summit, Available at https://www.eiu.com
Hoegh-Guldberg, O., (2015). Reviving the Ocean Economy: the Case for Action – 2015, Available at
https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/790/files/original/Rev…
res.pdf?1429717323
Republic of Kenya, (2016). Fisheries Management and Development Act, 2016, Republic of Kenya, Nairobi.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), (2014). Blue Economy Concept Paper,
United Nations, New York.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), (2017) Mapping the Linkages Between
Oceans and Other Sustainable Development Goals: A Preliminary Exploration, DESA Working Paper No. 149,
Available at https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/working-paper/wp149
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (2014). The Oceans Economy: Opportunities
and Challenges for Small Island Developing States (SIDS), United Nations, Geneva.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). (2016). The Blue Economy, Available at
www.uneca.org
Wairimu, E., and Khainga D., (2017). “Kenya’s Agenda in Developing the Blue Economy,” Available at
http://kippra.or.ke/kenyas-agenda-in-developing-the-blue-economy/
World Bank, (2016). Blue Economy Development Framework - Growing the Blue Economy to Combat Poverty and
Accelerate Prosperity, Available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/446441473349079068/AMCOECC-Blue-
Economy-Development-Framework.pdf
World Bank, (2017; The Potential of the Blue Economy: Increasing Long-term Benefits of the Sustainable Use of
Marine Resources for Small Island Developing States and Coastal Least Developed Countries, Available at
www.worldbank.org
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Annex 99
“International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing”, UN FAO, 2001
INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION
TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE
ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND
UNREGULATED FISHING
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Photo credit: Mr Austin Jones, Director of the Surveillance Operations
Coordinating Unit, Banjul, The Gambia
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INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION
TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE
ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND
UNREGULATED FISHING
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Rome, 2001
Annex 99
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this
information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever
on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city
or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or
boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers,
whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have
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ISBN 978-92-5-104601-2
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© FAO 2001
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PREPARATION OF THIS DOCUMENT
This document contains the text of the International Plan of Action to Prevent,
Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU).
The IPOA-IUU was developed as a voluntary instrument, within the framework
of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, in response to a call from the
Twenty-third Session of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI). A draft text for an
IPOA-IUU was elaborated at an Expert Consultation in Sydney, Australia, in
May 2000. This document formed the basis for negotiations at Technical
Consultations that were held at FAO Headquarters, Rome, in October 2000 and
February 2001. The IPOA-IUU was adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth
Session of COFI on 2 March 2001 and endorsed by the Hundred and Twentieth
Session of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001.
The Governments of Australia, Canada and the European Commission
contributed financially to the preparatory activities leading to the development of
the IPOA-IUU.
FAO.
International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing.
Rome, FAO. 2001. 24p.
ABSTRACT
The IPOA-IUU is a voluntary instrument that applies to all States and
entities and to all fishers. Following the IPOA's introduction, the nature and
scope of IUU fishing is addressed. This is followed by the IPOA's objective
and principles and the implementation of measures to prevent, deter and
eliminate IUU fishing. These measures focus on all State responsibilities,
flag State responsibilities, coastal State measures, port State measures,
internationally agreed market-related measures, research and regional
fisheries management organizations. Special requirements of developing
countries are then considered, followed by reporting requirements and the
role of FAO.
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CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF IUU FISHING AND
THE INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION 2
III. OBJECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES 4
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES TO PREVENT,
DETER AND ELIMINATE IUU FISHING 5
V. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 23
VI. REPORTING 23
VII. ROLE OF FAO 24
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. In the context of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and
its overall objective of sustainable fisheries, the issue of illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishing in world fisheries is of serious and increasing
concern. IUU fishing undermines efforts to conserve and manage fish stocks in
all capture fisheries. When confronted with IUU fishing, national and regional
fisheries management organizations can fail to achieve management goals. This
situation leads to the loss of both short and long-term social and economic
opportunities and to negative effects on food security and environmental
protection. IUU fishing can lead to the collapse of a fishery or seriously impair
efforts to rebuild stocks that have already been depleted. Existing international
instruments addressing IUU fishing have not been effective due to a lack of
political will, priority, capacity and resources to ratify or accede to and
implement them.
2. The Twenty-third Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries
(COFI) in February 1999 addressed the need to prevent, deter and eliminate
IUU fishing. The Committee was concerned about information presented
indicating increases in IUU fishing, including fishing vessels flying “flags of
convenience”. Shortly afterwards, an FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries in
March 1999 declared that, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of
States under international law, FAO “will develop a global plan of action to
deal effectively with all forms of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing
including fishing vessels flying “flags of convenience” through coordinated
efforts by States, FAO, relevant regional fisheries management bodies and
other relevant international agencies such as the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), as provided in Article IV of the Code of Conduct. The
Government of Australia, in cooperation with FAO, organized an Expert
Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Sydney,
Australia, from 15 to 19 May 2000. Subsequently, an FAO Technical
Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing was held in Rome
from 2 to 6 October 2000 and a further Technical Consultation was held in
Rome from 22 to 23 February 2001. The draft International Plan of Action to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing was
adopted by the Consultation on 23 February 2001 with a request that the report
be submitted to the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI for consideration and
eventual adoption. COFI approved the International Plan of Action, by
consensus, on 2 March 2001. In doing so, the Committee urged all Members to
take the necessary steps to effectively implement the International Plan of
Action.
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II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF IUU FISHING AND THE
INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION
3. In this document:
3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities:
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the
jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or in
contravention of its laws and regulations;
3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to
a relevant regional fisheries management organization but operate in
contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted
by that organization and by which the States are bound, or relevant
provisions of the applicable international law; or
3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations,
including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant
regional fisheries management organization.
3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the
relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and
regulations; or
3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional
fisheries management organization which have not been reported or
have been misreported, in contravention of the reporting procedures of
that organization.
3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries
management organization that are conducted by vessels without
nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to that
organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent
with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of
that organization; or
3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no
applicable conservation or management measures and where such
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fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State
responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under
international law.
3.4 Notwithstanding paragraph 3.3, certain unregulated fishing may take
place in a manner which is not in violation of applicable international law, and
may not require the application of measures envisaged under the International
Plan of Action`(IPOA).
4. The IPOA is voluntary. It has been elaborated within the framework
of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries as envisaged by Article
2 (d).
5. The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, in particular
Articles 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, and 3.2 applies to the interpretation and application of this
IPOA and its relationship with other international instruments. The IPOA is also
directed as appropriate towards fishing entities as referred to in the Code of
Conduct. The IPOA responds to fisheries specific issues and nothing in it
prejudices the positions of States in other fora.
6. In this document:
(a) the reference to States includes regional economic integration
organizations in matters within their competence;
(b) the term "regional" includes sub-regional, as appropriate;
(c) the term "regional fisheries management organization" means an
intergovernmental fisheries organization or arrangement, as
appropriate, that has the competence to establish fishery
conservation and management measures;
(d) the term “conservation and management measures” means
measures to conserve one or more species of living marine
resources that are adopted and applied consistent with the
relevant rules of international law;
(e) the term “1982 UN Convention” refers to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982;
(f) the term “1993 FAO Compliance Agreement” refers to the
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels
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on the High Seas, approved by the FAO Conference on
24 November 1993.
(g) the term “1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement” refers to the
Agreement for the Implementation of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; and
(h) the term “Code of Conduct” refers to the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries.
7. This document is a further commitment by all States to implement the
Code of Conduct.
III. OBJECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES
8. The objective of the IPOA is to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU
fishing by providing all States with comprehensive, effective and transparent
measures by which to act, including through appropriate regional fisheries
management organizations established in accordance with international law.
9. The IPOA to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing incorporates
the following principles and strategies. Due consideration should be given to the
special requirements of developing countries in accordance with Article 5 of the
Code of Conduct.
9.1 Participation and coordination: To be fully effective, the IPOA should
be implemented by all States either directly, in cooperation with other States, or
indirectly through relevant regional fisheries management organizations or
through FAO and other appropriate international organizations. An important
element in successful implementation will be close and effective coordination
and consultation, and the sharing of information to reduce the incidence of IUU
fishing, among States and relevant regional and global organizations. The full
participation of stakeholders in combating IUU fishing, including industry,
fishing communities, and non-governmental organizations, should be
encouraged.
9.2 Phased implementation: Measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU
fishing should be based on the earliest possible phased implementation of
national plans of action, and regional and global action in accordance with the
IPOA.
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9.3 Comprehensive and integrated approach: Measures to prevent, deter
and eliminate IUU fishing should address factors affecting all capture fisheries.
In taking such an approach, States should embrace measures building on the
primary responsibility of the flag State and using all available jurisdiction in
accordance with international law, including port State measures, coastal State
measures, market-related measures and measures to ensure that nationals do not
support or engage in IUU fishing. States are encouraged to use all these
measures, where appropriate, and to cooperate in order to ensure that measures
are applied in an integrated manner. The action plan should address all
economic, social and environmental impacts of IUU fishing .
9.4 Conservation: Measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing
should be consistent with the conservation and long-term sustainable use of fish
stocks and the protection of the environment.
9.5 Transparency: The IPOA should be implemented in a transparent
manner in accordance with Article 6.13 of the Code of Conduct.
9.6 Non-discrimination: The IPOA should be developed and applied
without discrimination in form or in fact against any State or its fishing vessels.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES TO PREVENT, DETER
AND ELIMINATE IUU FISHING
ALL STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
International Instruments
10. States should give full effect to relevant norms of international law, in
particular as reflected in the 1982 UN Convention, in order to prevent, deter and
eliminate IUU fishing.
11. States are encouraged, as a matter of priority, to ratify, accept or
accede to, as appropriate, the 1982 UN Convention, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement and the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement. Those States that have
not ratified, accepted or acceded to these relevant international instruments
should not act in a manner inconsistent with these instruments.
12. States should implement fully and effectively all relevant
international fisheries instruments which they have ratified, accepted or acceded
to.
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13. Nothing in the IPOA affects, or should be interpreted as affecting, the
rights and obligations of States under international law. Nothing in the IPOA
affects, or should be interpreted as affecting, the rights and obligations
contained in the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the 1993 FAO
Compliance Agreement, for States parties to those instruments.
14. States should fully and effectively implement the Code of Conduct
and its associated International Plans of Action.
15. States whose nationals fish on the high seas in fisheries not regulated
by a relevant regional fisheries management organization should fully
implement their obligations under Part VII of the 1982 UN Convention to take
measures with respect to their nationals as may be necessary for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas.
National Legislation
Legislation
16. National legislation should address in an effective manner all aspects
of IUU fishing.
17. National legislation should address, inter alia, evidentiary standards
and admissibility including, as appropriate, the use of electronic evidence and
new technologies.
State Control over Nationals
18. In the light of relevant provisions of the 1982 UN Convention, and
without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the flag State on the high seas,
each State should, to the greatest extent possible, take measures or cooperate to
ensure that nationals subject to their jurisdiction do not support or engage in
IUU fishing. All States should cooperate to identify those nationals who are the
operators or beneficial owners of vessels involved in IUU fishing.
19. States should discourage their nationals from flagging fishing vessels
under the jurisdiction of a State that does not meet its flag State responsibilities.
Vessels without Nationality
20. States should take measures consistent with international law in
relation to vessels without nationality on the high seas involved in IUU fishing.
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Sanctions
21. States should ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and, to
the greatest extent possible, nationals under its jurisdiction are of sufficient
severity to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and to deprive
offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing. This may include the
adoption of a civil sanction regime based on an administrative penalty scheme.
States should ensure the consistent and transparent application of sanctions.
Non Cooperating States
22. All possible steps should be taken, consistent with international law,
to prevent, deter and eliminate the activities of non-cooperating States to a
relevant regional fisheries management organization which engage in IUU
fishing.
Economic Incentives
23. States should, to the exent possible in their national law, avoid
conferring economic support, including subsidies, to companies, vessels or
persons that are involved in IUU fishing.
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
24. States should undertake comprehensive and effective monitoring,
control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing from its commencement, through the
point of landing, to final destination, including by:
24.1 developing and implementing schemes for access to waters and
resources, including authorization schemes for vessels;
24.2 maintaining records of all vessels and their current owners and
operators authorized to undertake fishing subject to their jurisdiction;
24.3 implementing, where appropriate, a vessel monitoring system (VMS),
in accordance with the relevant national, regional or international standards,
including the requirement for vessels under their jurisdiction to carry VMS on
board;
24.4 implementing, where appropriate, observer programmes in accordance
with relevant national, regional or international standards, including the
requirement for vessels under their jurisdiction to carry observers on board;
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24.5 providing training and education to all persons involved in MCS
operations;
24.6 planning, funding and undertaking MCS operations in a manner that
will maximize their ability to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing;
24.7 promoting industry knowledge and understanding of the need for, and
their cooperative participation in, MCS activities to prevent, deter and eliminate
IUU fishing;
24.8 promoting knowledge and understanding of MCS issues within
national judicial systems;
24.9 establishing and maintaining systems for the acquisition, storage and
dissemination of MCS data, taking into account applicable confidentiality
requirements;
24.10 ensuring effective implementation of national and, where appropriate,
internationally agreed boarding and inspection regimes consistent with
international law, recognizing the rights and obligations of masters and of
inspection officers, and noting that such regimes are provided for in certain
international agreements, such as the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and only
apply to the parties to those agreements.
National Plans of Action
25. States should develop and implement, as soon as possible but not
later than three years after the adoption of the IPOA, national plans of action to
further achieve the objectives of the IPOA and give full effect to its provisions
as an integral part of their fisheries management programmes and budgets.
These plans should also include, as appropriate, actions to implement initiatives
adopted by relevant regional fisheries management organizations to prevent,
deter and eliminate IUU fishing. In doing so, States should encourage the full
participation and engagement of all interested stakeholders, including industry,
fishing communities and non-governmental organizations.
26. At least every four years after the adoption of their national plans of
action, States should review the implementation of these plans for the purpose
of identifying cost-effective strategies to increase their effectiveness and to take
into account their reporting obligations to FAO under Part VI of the IPOA.
27. States should ensure that national efforts to prevent, deter and
eliminate IUU fishing are internally coordinated.
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Cooperation between States
28. States should coordinate their activities and cooperate directly, and as
appropriate through relevant regional fisheries management organizations, in
preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing. In particular, States should:
28.1 exchange data or information, preferably in standardized format, from
records of vessels authorized by them to fish, in a manner consistent with any
applicable confidentiality requirements;
28.2 cooperate in effective acquisition, management and verification of all
relevant data and information from fishing;
28.3 allow and enable their respective MCS practitioners or enforcement
personnel to cooperate in the investigation of IUU fishing, and to this end States
should collect and maintain data and information relating to such fishing;
28.4 cooperate in transferring expertise and technology;
28.5 cooperate to make policies and measures compatible;
28.6 develop cooperative mechanisms that allow, inter alia, rapid
responses to IUU fishing; and
28.7 cooperate in monitoring, control and surveillance, including through
international agreements.
29. In the light of Article VI of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement,
flag States should make available to FAO and, as appropriate, to other States
and relevant regional or international organizations, information about vessels
deleted from their records or whose authorization to fish has been cancelled and
to the extent possible, the reasons therefor.
30. In order to facilitate cooperation and exchange of information, each
State and regional or international organization should nominate and publicize
initial formal contact points.
31. Flag States should consider entering into agreements or arrangements
with other States and otherwise cooperate for the enforcement of applicable
laws and conservation and management measures or provisions adopted at a
national, regional or global level.
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Publicity
32. States should publicize widely, including through cooperation with
other States, full details of IUU fishing and actions taken to eliminate it, in a
manner consistent with any applicable confidentiality requirements.
Technical Capacity and Resources
33. States should endeavour to make available the technical capacity and
resources which are needed to implement the IPOA. This should include, where
appropriate, the establishment of special funds at the national, regional or global
level. In this respect, international cooperation should play an important role.
FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
Fishing Vessel Registration
34. States should ensure that fishing vessels entitled to fly their flag do
not engage in or support IUU fishing.
35. A flag State should ensure, before it registers a fishing vessel, that it
can exercise its responsibility to ensure that the vessel does not engage in IUU
fishing.
36. Flag States should avoid flagging vessels with a history of noncompliance
except where:
36.1 the ownership of the vessel has subsequently changed and the new
owner has provided sufficient evidence demonstrating that the previous owner or
operator has no further legal, beneficial or financial interest in, or control of, the
vessel; or
36.2 having taken into account all relevant facts, the flag State determines
that flagging the vessel would not result in IUU fishing.
37. All States involved in a chartering arrangement, including flag States
and other States that accept such an arrangement, should, within the limits of
their respective jurisdictions, take measures to ensure that chartered vessels do
not engage in IUU fishing.
38. Flag States should deter vessels from reflagging for the purposes of
non-compliance with conservation and management measures or provisions
adopted at a national, regional or global level. To the extent practicable, the
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actions and standards flag States adopt should be uniform to avoid creating
incentives for vessel owners to reflag their vessels to other States.
39. States should take all practicable steps, including denial to a vessel of
an authorization to fish and the entitlement to fly that State’s flag, to prevent
“flag hopping”; that is to say, the practice of repeated and rapid changes of a
vessel’s flag for the purposes of circumventing conservation and management
measures or provisions adopted at a national, regional or global level or of
facilitating non-compliance with such measures or provisions.
40. Although the functions of registration of a vessel and issuing of an
authorization to fish are separate, flag States should consider conducting these
functions in a manner which ensures each gives appropriate consideration to the
other. Flag States should ensure appropriate links between the operation of their
vessel registers and the record those States keep of their fishing vessels. Where
such functions are not undertaken by one agency, States should ensure sufficient
cooperation and information sharing between the agencies responsible for those
functions.
41. A Flag State should consider making its decision to register a fishing
vessel conditional upon its being prepared to provide to the vessel an
authorization to fish in waters under its jurisdiction, or on the high seas, or
conditional upon an authorization to fish being issued by a coastal State to the
vessel when it is under the control of that flag State.
Record of Fishing Vessels
42. Each flag State should maintain a record of fishing vessels entitled to
fly its flag. Each flag State's record of fishing vessels should include, for vessels
authorized to fish on the high seas, all the information set out in paragraphs 1
and 2 of Article VI of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, and may also
include, inter alia:
42.1 the previous names, if any and if known;
42.2 name, address and nationality of the natural or legal person in whose
name the vessel is registered ;
42.3 name, street address, mailing address and nationality of the natural or
legal persons responsible for managing the operations of the vessel;
42.4 name, street address, mailing address and nationality of natural or
legal persons with beneficial ownership of the vessel;
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42.5 name and ownership history of the vessel, and, where this is known,
the history of non-compliance by that vessel, in accordance with national laws,
with conservation and management measures or provisions adopted at a national,
regional or global level; and
42.6 vessel dimensions, and where appropriate, a photograph, taken at the
time of registration or at the conclusion of any more recent structural alterations,
showing a side profile view of the vessel.
43. Flag States may also require the inclusion of the information in
paragraph 42 in their record of fishing vessels that are not authorized to fish on
the high seas.
Authorization to Fish
44. States should adopt measures to ensure that no vessel be allowed to
fish unless so authorized, in a manner consistent with international law for the
high seas , in particular the rights and duties set out in articles 116 and 117 of
the 1982 UN Convention, or in conformity with national legislation within areas
of national jurisdiction.
45. A flag State should ensure that each of the vessels entitled to fly its
flag fishing in waters outside its sovereignty or jurisdiction holds a valid
authorization to fish issued by that flag State. Where a coastal State issues an
authorization to fish to a vessel, that coastal State should ensure that no fishing
in its waters occurs without an authorization to fish issued by the flag State of
the vessel.
46. Vessels should have an authorization to fish and where required carry
it on board. Each State’s authorization should include, but need not be limited
to:
46.1 the name of the vessel, and, where appropriate, the natural or legal
person authorized to fish;
46.2 the areas, scope and duration of the authorization to fish; and
46.3 the species, fishing gear authorized, and where appropriate, other
applicable management measures.
47. Conditions under which an authorization is issued may also include,
where required:
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47.1 vessel monitoring systems;
47.2 catch reporting conditions, such as:
47.2.1 time series of catch and effort statistics by vessel;
47.2.2 total catch in number, nominal weight, or both, by species
(both target and non-target) as is appropriate to each fishery period
(nominal weight is defined as the live weight equivalent of the catch);
47.2.3 discard statistics, including estimates where necessary, reported
as number or nominal weight by species, as is appropriate to each
fishery;
47.2.4 effort statistics appropriate to each fishing method; and
47.2.5 fishing location, date and time fished and other statistics on
fishing operations.
47.3 reporting and other conditions for transshipping, where transshipping
is permitted;
47.4 observer coverage;
47.5 maintenance of fishing and related log books;
47.6 navigational equipment to ensure compliance with boundaries and in
relation to restricted areas;
47.7 compliance with applicable international conventions and national
laws and regulations in relation to maritime safety, protection of the marine
environment, and conservation and management measures or provisions adopted
at a national, regional or global level;
47.8 marking of its fishing vessels in accordance with internationally
recognized standards, such as the FAO Standard Specification and Guidelines for
the Marking and Identification of Fishing Vessels. Vessels’ fishing gear should
similarly be marked in accordance with internationally recognized standards;
47.9 where appropriate, compliance with other aspects of fisheries
arrangements applicable to the flag State; and
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47.10 the vessel having a unique, internationally recognized identification
number, wherever possible, that enables it to be identified regardles of changes
in registration or name over time.
48. Flag States should ensure that their fishing, transport and support
vessels do not support or engage in IUU fishing. To this end, flag States should
ensure that none of their vessels re-supply fishing vessels engaged in such
activities or transship fish to or from these vessels. This paragraph is without
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action, as necessary, for humanitarian
purposes, including the safety of crew members.
49. Flag States should ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, all of
their fishing, transport and support vessels involved in transshipment at sea have
a prior authorization to transship issued by the flag State, and report to the
national fisheries administration or other designated institution:
49.1 the date and location of all of their transshipments of fish at sea;
49.2 the weight by species and catch area of the catch transshipped;
49.3 the name, registration, flag and other information related to the
identification of the vessels involved in the transshipment; and
49.4 the port of landing of the transshipped catch.
50. Flag States should make information from catch and transshipment
reports available, aggregated according to areas and species, in a full, timely and
regular manner and, as appropriate, to relevant national, regional and
international organizations, including FAO, taking into account applicable
confidentiality requirements.
COASTAL STATE MEASURES
51. In the exercise of the sovereign rights of coastal States for exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources under their
jurisdiction, in conformity with the 1982 UN Convention and international law,
each coastal State should implement measures to prevent, deter and eliminate
IUU fishing in the exclusive economic zone. Among the measures which the
coastal State should consider, consistent with national legislation and
international law, and to the extent practicable and appropriate, are:
51.1 effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities in
the exclusive economic zone;
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51.2 cooperation and exchange of information with other States, where
appropriate, including neighbouring coastal States and with regional fisheries
management organizations;
51.3 to ensure that no vessel undertakes fishing activities within its waters
without a valid authorization to fish issued by that coastal State;
51.4 to ensure that an authorization to fish is issued only if the vessel
concerned is entered on a record of vessels;
51.5 to ensure that each vessel fishing in its waters maintains a logbook
recording its fishing activities where appropriate;
51.6 to ensure that at-sea transshipment and processing of fish and fish
products in coastal State waters are authorized by that coastal State, or conducted
in conformity with appropriate management regulations;
51.7 regulation of fishing access to its waters in a manner which will help
to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing; and
51.8 avoiding licensing a vessel to fish in its waters if that particular vessel
has a history of IUU fishing, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 36.
PORT STATE MEASURES
52. States should use measures, in accordance with international law, for
port State control of fishing vessels in order to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU
fishing. Such measures should be implemented in a fair, transparent and nondiscriminatory
manner.
53. When used in paragraphs 52 to 64, port access means admission for
foreign fishing vessels to ports or offshore terminals for the purpose of, inter
alia, refuelling, re-supplying, transshipping and landing, without prejudice to
the sovereignty of a coastal State in accordance with its national law and article
25.2 of the 1982 UN Convention and other relevant international law.
54. Notwithstanding paragraphs 52, 53 and 55; a vessel should be
provided port access, in accordance with international law, for reasons of force
majeure or distress or for rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in
danger or distress.
55. Prior to allowing a vessel port access, States should require fishing
vessels and vessels involved in fishing related activities seeking permission to
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enter their ports to provide reasonable advance notice of their entry into port, a
copy of their authorization to fish, details of their fishing trip and quantities of
fish on board, with due regard to confidentiality requirements, in order to
ascertain whether the vessel may have engaged in, or supported, IUU fishing.
56. Where a port State has clear evidence that a vessel having been
granted access to its ports has engaged in IUU fishing activity, the port State
should not allow the vessel to land or transship fish in its ports, and should
report the matter to the flag State of the vessel.
57. States should publicize ports to which foreign flagged vessels may be
permitted admission and should ensure that these ports have the capacity to
conduct inspections.
58. In the exercise of their right to inspect fishing vessels, port States
should collect the following information and remit it to the flag State and, where
appropriate, the relevant regional fisheries management organization:
58.1 the flag State of the vessel and identification details;
58.2 name, nationality, and qualifications of the master and the fishing
master;
58.3 fishing gear;
58.4 catch on board, including origin, species, form, and quantity;
58.5 where appropriate, other information required by relevant regional
fisheries management organizations or other international agreements; and
58.6 total landed and transshipped catch.
59. If, in the course of an inspection, it is found that there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that the vessel has engaged in or supported IUU fishing in
areas beyond the jurisdiction of the port State, the port State should, in addition
to any other actions it may take consistent with international law, immediately
report the matter to the flag State of the vessel and, where appropriate, the
relevant coastal States and regional fisheries management organization. The port
State may take other action with the consent of, or upon the request of, the flag
State.
60. In applying paragraphs 58 and 59, States should safeguard the
confidentiality of information collected, in accordance with their national laws.
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61. States should establish and publicize a national strategy and
procedures for port State control of vessels involved in fishing and related
activities, including training, technical support, qualification requirements and
general operating guidelines for port State control officers. States should also
consider capacity-building needs in the development and implementation of this
strategy.
62. States should cooperate, as appropriate, bilaterally, multilaterally and
within relevant regional fisheries management organizations, to develop
compatible measures for port State control of fishing vessels. Such measures
should deal with the information to be collected by port States, procedures for
information collection, and measures for dealing with suspected infringements
by the vessel of measures adopted under these national, regional or international
systems.
63. States should consider developing within relevant regional fisheries
management organizations port State measures building on the presumption that
fishing vessels entitled to fly the flag of States not parties to a regional fisheries
management organization and which have not agreed to cooperate with that
regional fisheries management organization, which are identified as being
engaged in fishing activities in the area of that particular organization, may be
engaging in IUU fishing. Such port State measures may prohibit landings and
transshipment of catch unless the identified vessel can establish that the catch
was taken in a manner consistent with those conservation and management
measures. The identification of the vessels by the regional fisheries
management organization should be made through agreed procedures in a fair,
transparent and non-discriminatory manner.
64. States should enhance cooperation, including by the flow of relevant
information, among and between relevant regional fisheries management
organizations and States on port State controls.
INTERNATIONALLY AGREED MARKET–RELATED MEASURES
65. The measures in paragraphs 66 to 76 are to be implemented in a
manner which recognizes the right of States to trade in fish and fishery products
harvested in a sustainable manner and should be interpreted and applied in
accordance with the principles, rights and obligations established in the World
Trade Organisation, and implemented in a fair, transparent and nondiscriminatory
manner.
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66. States should take all steps necessary, consistent with international
law, to prevent fish caught by vessels identified by the relevant regional
fisheries management organization to have been engaged in IUU fishing being
traded or imported into their territories. The identification of the vessels by the
regional fisheries management organization should be made through agreed
procedures in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. Trade-related
measures should be adopted and implemented in accordance with international
law, including principles, rights and obligations established in WTO
Agreements, and implemented in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory
manner. Trade-related measures should only be used in exceptional
circumstances, where other measures have proven unsuccessful to prevent, deter
and eliminate IUU fishing, and only after prior consultation with interested
States. Unilateral trade-related measures should be avoided.
67. States should ensure that measures on international trade in fish and
fishery products are transparent, based on scientific evidence, where applicable,
and are in accordance with internationally agreed rules.
68. States should cooperate, including through relevant global and
regional fisheries management organizations, to adopt appropriate multilaterally
agreed trade-related measures, consistent with the WTO, that may be necessary
to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing for specific fish stocks or species.
Multilateral trade-related measures envisaged in regional fisheries management
organizations may be used to support cooperative efforts to ensure that trade in
specific fish and fish products does not in any way encourage IUU fishing or
otherwise undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management
measures which are consistent with the 1982 UN Convention.
69. Trade-related measures to reduce or eliminate trade in fish and fish
products derived from IUU fishing could include the adoption of multilateral
catch documentation and certification requirements, as well as other appropriate
multilaterally-agreed measures such as import and export controls or
prohibitions. Such measures should be adopted in a fair, transparent and nondiscriminatory
manner. When such measures are adopted, States should support
their consistent and effective implementation.
70. Stock or species-specific trade-related measures may be necessary to
reduce or eliminate the economic incentive for vessels to engage in IUU fishing.
71. States should take steps to improve the transparency of their markets
to allow the traceability of fish or fish products.
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72. States, when requested by an interested State, should assist any State
in deterring trade in fish and fish products illegally harvested in its jurisdiction.
Assistance should be given in accordance with terms agreed by both States and
fully respecting the jurisdiction of the State requesting assistance.
73. States should take measures to ensure that their importers,
transshippers, buyers, consumers, equipment suppliers, bankers, insurers, other
services suppliers and the public are aware of the detrimental effects of doing
business with vessels identified as engaged in IUU fishing, whether by the State
under whose jurisdiction the vessel is operating or by the relevant regional
fisheries management organizations in accordance with its agreed procedures,
and should consider measures to deter such business. Such measures could
include, to the extent possible under national law, legislation that makes it a
violation to conduct such business or to trade in fish or fish products derived
from IUU fishing. All identifications of vessels engaged in IUU fishing should
be made in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.
74. States should take measures to ensure that their fishers are aware of
the detrimental effects of doing business with importers, transshippers, buyers,
consumers, equipment suppliers, bankers, insurers and other services suppliers
identified as doing business with vessels identified as engaged in IUU fishing,
whether by the State under whose jurisdiction the vessel is operating or by the
relevant regional fisheries management organization in accordance with its
agreed procedures, and should consider measures to deter such business. Such
measures could include, to the extent possible under national law, legislation
that makes it a violation to conduct such business or to trade in fish or fish
products derived from IUU fishing. All identifications of vessels engaged in
IUU fishing should be made in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory
manner.
75. States should work towards using the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System for fish and fisheries products in order to help
promote the implementation of the IPOA.
76. Certification and documentation requirements should be standardized
to the extent feasible, and electronic schemes developed where possible, to
ensure their effectiveness, reduce opportunities for fraud, and avoid unnecessary
burdens on trade.
RESEARCH
77. States should encourage scientific research on methods of identifying
fish species from samples of processed products. FAO should facilitate the
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establishment of a network of databases of genetic and other markers used to
identify fish species from processed product, including the ability to identify the
stock of origin where possible.
REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
78. States should ensure compliance with and enforcement of policies
and measures having a bearing on IUU fishing which are adopted by any
relevant regional fisheries management organization and by which they are
bound. States should cooperate in the establishment of such organizations in
regions where none currently exist.
79. As the cooperation of all relevant States is important for the success
of measures taken by relevant regional fisheries management organizations to
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, States which are not members of a
relevant regional fisheries management organization are not discharged from
their obligation to cooperate, in accordance with their international obligations,
with that regional fisheries management organization. To that end, States
should give effect to their duty to cooperate by agreeing to apply the
conservation and management measures established by that regional fisheries
management organization, or by adopting measures consistent with those
conservation and management measures, and should ensure that vessels entitled
to fly their flag do not undermine such measures.
80. States, acting through relevant regional fisheries management
organizations, should take action to strengthen and develop innovative ways, in
conformity with international law, to prevent. deter, and eliminate IUU fishing.
Consideration should be given to including the following measures:
80.1 institutional strengthening, as appropriate, of relevant regional
fisheries management organizations with a view to enhancing their capacity to
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing;
80.2 development of compliance measures in conformity with international
law;
80.3 development and implementation of comprehensive arrangements for
mandatory reporting;
80.4 establishment of and cooperation in the exchange of information on
vessels engaged in or supporting IUU fishing;
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80.5 development and maintenance of records of vessels fishing in the area
of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization,
including both those authorized to fish and those engaged in or supporting IUU
fishing;
80.6 development of methods of compiling and using trade information to
monitor IUU fishing;
80.7 development of MCS, including promoting for implementation by its
members in their respective jurisdictions, unless otherwise provided for in an
international agreement, real time catch and vessel monitoring systems, other
new technologies, monitoring of landings, port control, and inspections and
regulation of transshipment, as appropriate;
80.8 development within a regional fisheries management organization,
where appropriate, of boarding and inspection regimes consistent with
international law, recognizing the rights and obligations of masters and
inspection officers;
80.9 development of observer programmes;
80.10 where appropriate, market-related measures in accordance with the
IPOA;
80.11 definition of circumstances in which vessels will be presumed to have
engaged in or to have supported IUU fishing;
80.12 development of education and public awareness programmes;
80.13 development of action plans; and
80.14 where agreed by their members, examination of chartering
arrangements, if there is concern that these may result in IUU fishing.
81. States, acting through relevant regional fisheries management
organizations, should compile and make available on a timely basis, and at least
on an annual basis, to other regional fisheries management organizations and to
FAO, information relevant to the prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU
fishing, including:
81.1 estimates of the extent, magnitude and character of IUU activities in
the area of competence of the regional fisheries management organization;
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81.2 details of measures taken to deter, prevent and eliminate IUU fishing;
81.3 records of vessels authorized to fish, as appropriate; and
81.4 records of vessels engaged in IUU fishing.
82. Objectives of institutional and policy strengthening in relevant
regional fisheries management organizations in relation to IUU fishing should
include enabling regional fisheries management organizations to:
82.1 determine policy objectives regarding IUU fishing, both for internal
purposes and co-ordination with other regional fisheries management
organizations;
82.2 strengthen institutional mechanisms as appropriate, including
mandate, functions, finance, decision making, reporting or information
requirements and enforcement schemes, for the optimum implementation of
policies in relation to IUU fishing;
82.3 regularize coordination with institutional mechanisms of other
regional fisheries management organizations as far as possible in relation to IUU
fishing, in particular information, enforcement and trade aspects; and
82.4 ensure timely and effective implementation of policies and measures
internally, and in cooperation with other regional fisheries management
organizations and relevant regional and international organizations.
83. States, acting through relevant regional fisheries management
organizations, should encourage non-contracting parties with a real interest in
the fishery concerned to join those organizations and to participate fully in their
work. Where this is not possible, the regional fisheries management
organizations should encourage and facilitate the participation and cooperation
of non-contracting parties, in accordance with applicable international
agreements and international law, in the conservation and management of the
relevant fisheries resources and in the implementation of measures adopted by
the relevant organizations. Regional fisheries management organizations should
address the issue of access to the resource in order to foster cooperation and
enhance sustainability in the fishery, in accordance with international law.
States, acting through relevant regional fisheries mangement organizations,
should also assist, as necessary, non-contracting parties in the implementation of
paragraphs 78 and 79 of the IPOA.
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84. When a State fails to ensure that fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag,
or, to the greatest extent possible, its nationals, do not engage in IUU fishing
activities that affect the fish stocks covered by a relevant regional fisheries
management organization, the member States, acting through the organization,
should draw the problem to the attention of that State. If the problem is not
rectified, members of the organization may agree to adopt appropriate measures,
through agreed procedures, in accordance with international law.
V. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
85. States, with the support of FAO and relevant international financial
institutions and mechanisms, where appropriate, should cooperate to support
training and capacity building and consider providing financial, technical and
other assistance to developing countries, including in particular the least
developed among them and small island developing States, so that they can
more fully meet their commitments under the IPOA and obligations under
international law, including their duties as flag States and port States. Such
assistance should be directed in particular to help such States in the
development and implementation of national plans of action in accordance with
paragraph 25.
86. States, with the support of FAO and relevant international financial
institutions and mechanisms, where appropriate, should cooperate to enable:
86.1 review and revision of national legislation and regional regulatory
frameworks;
86.2 the improvement and harmonization of fisheries and related data
collection;
86.3 the strengthening of regional institutions; and
86.4 the strengthening and enhancement of integrated MCS systems,
including satellite monitoring systems.
VI. REPORTING
87. States and regional fisheries management organizations should report
to FAO on progress with the elaboration and implementation of their plans to
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing as part of their biennial reporting to
FAO on the Code of Conduct. These reports should be published by FAO in a
timely manner.
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VII. ROLE OF FAO
88. FAO will, as and to the extent directed by its Conference, collect all
relevant information and data that might serve as a basis for further analysis
aimed at identifying factors and causes contributing to IUU fishing such as,
inter alia, a lack of input and output management controls, unsustainable fishery
management methods and subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing.
89. FAO will, as and to the extent directed by its Conference, support
development and implementation of national and regional plans to prevent, deter
and eliminate IUU fishing through specific, in-country technical assistance
projects with Regular Programme funds and through the use of extra-budgetary
funds made available to the Organization for this purpose.
90. FAO should, in collaboration with other relevant international
organizations, in particular IMO, further investigate the issue of IUU fishing.
91. FAO should convene an Expert Consultation on the implementation
of paragraph 76 of the IPOA.
92. FAO should investigate the benefits of establishing and maintaining
regional and global databases, including but not limited to, information as
provided for in Article VI of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement.
93. The FAO Committee on Fisheries will, based on a detailed analysis
by the Secretariat, biennially evaluate the progress towards the implementation
of the IPOA.
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The IPOA-IUU is a voluntary instrument that applies to all States and
Y1224EN/7/05.16
ISBN 978-92-5-104601-2
9 789251 046012
Annex 99
Annex 100
“UN agency urges implementation of accord to tackle illegal fishing”, UN News, 12 July 2016
UN News (/en/)
FAO/Sia Kambou Offloading tuna in Côte d’Ivoire at Abidjan’s main port.
UN agency urges implementation of accord to tackle
illegal
Volume V - Annexes 77-102