IN THE NAME OF GOD
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY,
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND CONSULAR RIGHTS
(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
VOLUME II
24 May 2019
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART III – U.S. EXECUTIVE ACTS
Annex 20
U.S. Department of Treasury, Resource Center, Webpage
“Iran Sanctions”
p. 1
Annex 21
U.S. Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part
561
p. 15
Annex 22
U.S. Department of Treasury, “Revised Guidance on Entities
Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in Property
Are Blocked”, 13 August 2014
p. 51
Annex 23 U.S. Secretary of State, “Waivers Determinations and
Findings”, 18 October 2015
p. 55
Annex 24
U.S. Department of State, “Guidance Relating to the Lifting of
Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action on Implementation Day”, 16 January 2016
p. 63
Annex 25
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, General License H,
16 January 2016, revoked as of 27 June 2018
p. 117
Annex 26
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, Statement of licensing
policy for activities related to the export or re-export to Iran of
commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services,
16 January 2016, revoked as of 8 May 2018
p. 123
Annex 27
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, Final Rule amending the
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 21 January
2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 3330
p. 127
Annex 28
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, “Frequently Asked
Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S Sanctions
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on
Implementation Day”, 16 January 2016, updated 15 December
2016
p. 133
Annex 29
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, General License I,
24 March 2016, revoked as of 27 June 2018
p. 139
Annex 30
U.S. President, “Remarks by President Trump on Iran
Strategy”, 13 October 2017
p. 143
Annex 31
U.S. President, “Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and
Taking Additional Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence
and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon”, Presidential
Memorandum, 8 May 2018
p. 155
Annex 32
U.S. President, “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action”, 8 May 2018
p. 163
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Annex 33 U.S. Department of State, “After the Deal: A New Iran
Strategy”, 21 May 2018
p. 173
Annex 34
U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with an Iran Diplomacy
Update”, Special Briefing, 2 July 2018
p. 189
Annex 35
U.S. President, Executive Order 13846, 6 August 2018,
83 Fed. Reg. 38939
p. 197
Annex 36
U.S. Department of State, “Senior Administration Officials
Previewing Iran Sanctions”, Special Briefing, 6 August 2018
p. 211
Annex 37
U.S. President, “Statement from the President on the
Reimposition of United States Sanctions with Respect to
Iran”, 6 August 2018
p. 221
Annex 38
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, “Frequently Asked
Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant
to the May 8, 2018 National Security Presidential
Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA)”, 8 May 2018, updated on 6 August 2018
p. 227
Annex 39
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks to the Media”, 3 October
2018
p. 241
Annex 40
U.S. President, Presidential Determination No. 2019-04,
31 October 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 57673
p. 249
Annex 41
U.S. President, “Statement by the President regarding the
Reimposition of Nuclear-Related Sanctions on Iran”,
2 November 2018
p. 253
Annex 42
U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on Iran Sanctions”,
Special Briefing, 2 November 2018
p. 259
Annex 43 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with special
representative for Iran Brian Hook”, Special Briefing,
2 November 2018
p. 269
Annex 44
U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing”,
7 November 2018
p. 281
Annex 45
U.S. Department of State, “The Iranian Regime’s Transfer of
Arms to Proxy Groups and Ongoing Missile Development”,
Special Briefing, 29 November 2018
p. 303
Annex 46
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs, “Comprehensive Iran Fact Sheet”, 18 December 2018
p. 315
Annex 47
U.S. Department of State, “Interview with Martha MacCallum
of Fox News”, 23 January 2019
p. 321
Annex 48
U.S. President, “President Donald J. Trump’s State of the
Union Address”, 5 February 2019
p. 329
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Annex 49
U.S. National Security Council, “A Look at the U.S. Strategy
for Iran”, 13 February 2019
p. 351
Annex 50
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, “OFAC FAQs: Iran
Sanctions”, as of 31 March 2019
p. 357
Annex 51
U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing,
2 April 2019
p. 403
Annex 52
U.S. Department of State, “Decision on Imports of Iranian
Oil”, Press Statement, 22 April 2019
p. 425
Annex 53
U.S. President, “Executive Order on Imposing Sanctions with
respect to the Iron, Steel, Aluminum, and Copper Sectors of
Iran”, 8 May 2019
p. 429
PART IV – DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES AND STATEMENTS
Annex 54 Official statement of I.R. Iran in reaction to the 8 May
decision of the United States, IRNA, 11 May 2018
p. 439
Annex 55
Iran’s Foreign Minister, “Zarif’s Response to Pompeo’s 12
demands”, Iran Daily, 20 June 2018
p. 445
Annex 56
Letter from the Agent of the United States to the International
Court of Justice, 27 July 2018
p. 465
Annex 57
Diplomatic Note from the U.S. Department of State to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of I.R. Iran, 3 October 2018
p. 469
Annex 58
Note verbale No. 4969583 from I.R. Iran to the Government
of the United States, 6 November 2018
p. 473
Annex 59
Diplomatic Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of I.R.
Iran to the U.S. Department of State, 13 November 2018
p. 477
Annex 60
Letter from the Agent of I.R. Iran to the Agent of the United
States, 10 December 2018
p. 481
Annex 61
Letter from the Agent of I.R. Iran to the International Court of
Justice, 19 February 2019
p. 485
Annex 62
Letter from the Agent of the United States to the International
Court of Justice, 12 March 2019
p. 493
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Annex 20
U.S. Department of Treasury, Resource Center, Webpage “Iran Sanctions”
Last consulted on: 9 April 2019
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Iran Sanctions
November 4, 2018 marked the final day of the 180-day wind-down
period following the President's May 8, 2018 announcement to
cease the United States' participation in the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA). On November 5, 2018, the United States
fully re-imposed the sanctions on Iran that had been lifted or
waived under the JCPOA. These are the toughest U.S. sanctions
ever imposed on Iran, and will target critical sectors of Iran's
economy, such as the energy, shipping and shipbuilding, and
financial sectors. The United States is engaged in a campaign of
maximum financial pressure on the Iranian regime and intends to
enforce aggressively these sanctions that have come back into
effect.
On November 5, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) posted to its website
additional frequently asked questions (FAQs) that provide
guidance on the sanctions that have been re-imposed. In addition,
OFAC amended FAQ 256 and FAQ 417, and archived outdated
FAQs.
As part of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, in its largest ever
single-day action targeting the Iranian regime, OFAC sanctioned
more than 700 individuals, entities, aircraft, and vessels on
November 5, 2018. This action was a critical part of the re
imposition of the remaining U.S. sanctions that were lifted or
waived in connection with the JCPOA. For more information on
this action, click here.
Additionally, on November 5, 2018, OFAC moved persons
identified as meeting the definition of the terms "Government of
Iran" or an "Iranian financial institution" from the List of Persons
Blocked Solely Pursuant to E.O. 13599 (the "E.O. 13599 List") to
the SDN List and removed the E.O. 13599 List from its website.
Finally, OFAC also amended the Iranian Transactions Sanctions
Regulations (ITSR), effective November 5, 2018 to, among other
things, reflect the re-imposition of sanctions pursuant to certain
sections of Executive Order 13846 and technical changes that
remove references to the E.O. 13599 List.
Archived Iran-related Material
New Iran-related Legislation:
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA) introduces additional sanctions with regard to Iran.
Please visit the link below for more information.
• Information on Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act
Important Advisories and Information
OFAC issues advisories to the public on important issues related
to the Iran sanctions, while these documents may focus on specific
industries and activities they should be reviewed by any party
interested in OFAC compliance.
• List of Medical Devices Requiring Specific Authorization
• Global Advisory to the Maritime Industry Regarding the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
• Advisory on the Presentation of Fraudulent Shipping
Documents
• Advisory on the Use of Exchange Houses and Trading
Companies to Evade U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran
Graphics of Iran-related Economic Activity
• IRGC's Financial Lifeline (October 2o18)
• Mahan Air Designations-June 2o17 to June 2018
• Chart of Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-OF) Currency Exchange Network (English Version)
• Chart of Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-OE) Currency Exchange Network (Farsi Version)
Frequently Asked Questions
OFAC has compiled hundreds of frequently asked questions
(FAQs) about its sanctions programs and related policies. The
links below send the user to Iran sanctions-related frequently
asked questions.
• List oflran-related FAQs.
List of Foreign Sanctions Evaders (FSE)
On May 1, 2012, the President signed Executive Order 13608,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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"Prohibiting Certain Transactions With and Suspending Entry Into
the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders With Respect to
Iran and Syria." This Executive Order strengthens Treasury's
ability to address behavior by foreign individuals and entities
determined to have violated, attempted to violate, conspired to
violate, or caused a violation of U.S. sanctions on Syria or Iran.
• Foreign Sanctions Evaders List Page
List of CISADA and NDAA Prohibitions or Conditions
As of March 14, 2019, the List of Foreign Financial Institutions
Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account
Sanctions (the "CAPTA List") includes one foreign financial
institution subject to correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions. Prior to March 14, 2019, this entity was on OFAC's Part
561 List. The Part 561 List that formerly appeared on this page has
been eliminated in favor of the new CAPTA List.
• Changes to the Part 561 List (PDF)
• Changes to the Part 561 List (Text)
• Archive of Changes to the Part 561 List
Non-SDN Iranian Sanctions Act (NS-ISA) List
On October 9, 2012, the President signed Executive Order (E.O.)
13628, which provides for, among other things, the
implementation of certain sanctions set forth in the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA). Section 1 of
E.O. 13628 provides that the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to
authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA), shall take action to implement certain sanctions set
forth in Section 6 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended
(ISA), when the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary
of the Treasury imposes such sanctions on a person pursuant to
provisions of ISA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as amended, or the
TRA. Section 6 of ISA includes both blocking and non-blocking
sanctions. Click here for additional information on the NS-ISA List.
• Changes to the Non-SDN Iranian Sanctions Act List (PDF) -
(2016)
• Changes to the Non-SDN Iranian Sanctions Act List (Text)
(2016)
• Archive of Changes to the NS-ISA List
Specific Guidance on the Iran Sanctions
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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OFAC offers guidance on a variety of subjects related to the Iran
sanctions. Most of this guidance is specific in nature. General
guidance on the Iran sanctions can be found in the Sanctions
Brochures section at the top of this page.
• Guidance on the Sale of Food, Agricultural Commodities,
Medicine. and Medical Devices by Non-U.S. Persons to Iran
• Industry Guidance on Shah Deniz Consortium
• Clarifying Guidance on Humanitarian Assistance and Related
Exports to the Iranian People
• Clarifying Guidance on Humanitarian Assistance and Related
Exports to the Iranian People (translated into several
languages by the U.S. State Department)
• Interpretive Guidance And Statement of Licensing Policy on
Internet Freedom in Iran
• Treasury Department Reaffirms Commitment to Fostering
Internet Freedom and Supporting the Iranian People
• Guidance on the Donations of Food and Medicine to Iran and
the Non-Specified Areas of Sudan
• Guidance on Sponsorship of Conference by the Government
of Iran or Iranian persons
• Guidance on Transshipments to Iran
• Are U-Turn payments for Iran still permitted?
• CISADA: The New US. Sanctions on Iran
o French translated version of CISADA: The New
Sanctions on Iran - Resume analytique de la Loi sur la
responsabilite, le desengagement et les sanctions
generates contre l'Iran
o Spanish translated version of CISADA: The New
Sanctions on Iran - Hoja de datos: Ley Integral de
Sanciones, Rendici~n de Cuentas y Desinversi6n contra
Iran
o Russian translated version of CISADA: The New
Sanctions on Iran - CIpaBKa: 3aKOH 0
BCeOeMJIIOIIIMXCaHKIIHHX B OTHOIeHH Hpaa,
IpHBJIeeHHH K OTBOTCTBOHHOCTH H JIMBeCTHDOBaHHH
o Arabic translated version of CISADA: The New
Sanctions on Iran - s's:Jjl)»! =- au'M
Isl)' » »=illy {-l=)'3
Interpretive Guidance
OFAC issues interpretive guidance on specific issues related to the
sanctions programs it administers. These interpretations of OFAC
policy are sometimes published in response to a public request for
guidance or may be released proactively by OFAC in order to
address a complex topic.
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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• Guidance on the Provision of Certain Services Relating to the
Requirements of U.S. Sanctions Laws
• Guidance on Certain Publishing Activities
• Interpretive Guidance And Statement of Licensing Policy on
Internet Freedom in Iran
• Substantive Enhancement of Information (Iran)
• Guidance on Internet Connectivity (Iran)
• Exports /Aircraft Safety (Iran)
• Equipment to manufacture goods which may be sold to Iran
• Internet Access to Informational Materials (Iran)
• Export of Services - Surveys & Interviews (Iran)
• Iran: Travel Exemption
• Posting oflnformation from Iran on Website
• Index of All Published Interpretative Guidance
Applying for a Specific OFAC License
It may be in your and the U.S. government's interest to authorize
particular economic activity related to Iran. Certain activities
related to Iran may be allowed if they are licensed by OFAC. Visit
the link below to apply for an OFAC license.
• Apply for an OFAC License Online - Authorization from
OFAC to engage in a transaction that otherwise would be
prohibited.
• Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (TSRA) Program Information and TSRA License
Application Process - Guidance and licensing information for
exports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical
devices
Guidance on OFAC Licensing Policy
Certain activities related to Iran may be allowed if they are licensed
by OFAC. Below OFAC has issued guidance and statements on
specific licensing policies as they relate to Iran.
• Licenses for Legal Fees and Costs - Guidance on the Release
of Limited Amounts of Blocked Funds for Payment of Legal
Fees and Costs Incurred in Challenging the Blocking of U.S.
Persons in Administrative or Civil Proceedings
• Entities Owned By Blocked Persons - Guidance On Entities
Owned By Persons Whose Property And Interests In Property
Are Blocked
• Statement of Licensing Policy related to the support of
democracy and human rights in Iran and academic and
cultural exchange programs
• Statement Of Licensing Procedure on support of human
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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rights-. humanitarian-. and democracy related activities with
respect to Iran
Archived Statements of Licensing Policy
• Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the
Export or Re- Export to Iran of Commercial Passenger
Aircraft and Related Parts and Services
General Licenses
OFAC issues general licenses in order to authorize activities that
would otherwise be prohibited with regard to Iran. General
licenses allow all US persons to engage in the activity described in
the general license without needing to apply for a specific license.
• Iran General License (No. J-1)- Authorizing the
Reexportation of Certain Civil Aircraft to Iran on Temporary
Sojourn and Related Transactions (Amended 12/15/2016)
• Iran General License (No. G)- Certain Academic Exchanges
and the Exportation or Importation of Certain Educational
Services Authorized
• Iran General License (No. F) -Authorizing Certain Services in
Support of Professional and Amateur Sports Activities and
Exchanges Involving the United States and Iran
• Iran General License (No. E)- Authorizing Certain Services
in Support of Nongovernmental Organizations' Activities in
Iran
• Iran General License (No, D-1)- General License with
Respect to Certain Services, Software, and Hardware Incident
to Personal Communications.
• List of Medical Devices Requring Specific Authorization
• Iran General License - Authorizing the Exportation or
Reexportation of Food Items
• Iran General License - Authorizing the Exportation or
Reexportation of Replacement Parts for Certain Medical
Devices- Authorizing the Exportation or Reexportation of
Replacement Parts for Certain Medical Devices
• Iran General License - Related to Consular Funds Transfers
and to the Transportation of Human Remains
• Iran General License Related to Personal Communication
Services - Exportation of certain services and software over
the internet
• Iran General License (No. 2) - Authorizing U.S. persons who
are employees or contractors of six international
organizations to perform transactions for the conduct of the
official business of those organizations in or involving Iran
• Archive of Revoked and Expired General Licenses
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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Executive Orders, Statutes, Rules and Regulations
Relating to Iran
The Iran sanctions program represents the implementation of
multiple legal authorities. Some of these authorities are in the
form of executive orders issued by the President. Other authorities
are public laws (statutes) passed by The Congress.
These authorities are further codified by OFAC in its regulations
which are published the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). Modifications to these regulations are posted
in the Federal Register. In addition to all of these authorities,
OFAC may also implement United Nations Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCRs) with regard to Iran.
Executive Orders
• 13846- Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect To Iran
• 13608- Prohibiting Certain Transactions With and
Suspending Entry Into the United States of Foreign Sanctions
Evaders With Respect to Iran and Syria (Effective Date- May
1, 2012)
• 13606 - Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the
United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave
Human Rights Abuses by the Governments oflran and Syria
via Information Technology (Effective Date - April 23, 2012)
• 13599- Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and
Iranian Financial Institutions (Effective Date - February 6,
2012)
• 13553 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to
Serious Human Rights Abuses By The Government of Iran
and Taking Certain Other Actions (Effective Date
September 29, 2010)
• 13059 - Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to
Iran (Effective Date - August 20, 1997)
• 12959- Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to
Iran (Effective Date - May 7, 1995)
• 12957- Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the
Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources (Effective Date
- March 16, 1995)
• 12613- Prohibiting Imports From Iran (Effective Date
October 29, 1987)
• 12294 - Suspension of Litigation Against Iran (Effective Date
- February 26, 1981)
• 12284 - Restrictions on the Transfer of Property of the
Former Shah of Iran (Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
• 12283 - Non-Prosecution of Claims of Hostages and for
Actions at the United States Embassy and Elsewhere
(Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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• 12282- Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions
Involving Iran (Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
• 12281 - Direction To Transfer Certain Iranian Government
Assets (Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
• 12280 - Direction To Transfer Iranian Government Financial
Assets Held By Non-Banking Institutions (Effective Date
January 23, 1981)
• 12279- Direction To Transfer Iranian Govt. Assets Held By
Domestic Banks (Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
• 12278- Direction To Transfer Iranian Government Assets
Overseas (Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
• 12277- Direction To Transfer Iranian Government Assets
(Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
• 12276- Direction Relating to Establishment of Escrow
Accounts (Effective Date - January 23, 1981)
• 12211- Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran (Effective
Date - April 17, 1980)
• 12205- Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran (Effective
Date - April 17, 1980)
• 12170- Blocking Iranian Government Property (Effective
Date - November 14, 1979)
Statutes
• Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), 18 US.C.& 2332d
• Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2o10, Public Law 111-195. As Amended
Through Public Law 112-239. Enacted January 2, 2013
• Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), Public Law 115-44
• Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA)
(Public Law 112-239)
• International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEP A), 50
US.C. && 1701-1706
• Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended, 50 U.S.C. & 1701
note
• International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 (ISDCA), 22 U.S.C. S 2349aa-9
• Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 0f 2012
H.R. 1905(Public Law 112-158)
• Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, As Amended Through Public
Law 115-91, Enacted December 12, 2017
• National Emergencies Act (NEA), 50 US,C && 1601-1651
• Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (TSRA), 22 US.C &S 7201-7211
Code of Federal Regulations
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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• 31CFR Part 535- Iranian Assets Control Regulations
• 31CFR Part 560- Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations
• 31CFR Part 561- Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations
• 31CFR Part562- Iranian Human Rights Abuses Sanctions
Regulations
Federal Register Notices
• FR Notice - Amendment for the List of Foreign Financial
Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable
Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List)
• 83FR 55269-18 - Amendment of the Iranian Transactions
and Sanctions Regulations
• 83FR30335-18- Amendment to the Iranian Transactions
and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 ("ITSR")
• 81 FR94254-16- Changes to the Iran TSRA regulations and
definition of Iranian-origin goods
• 79FR 18990-14 - Final Rule Amending the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations by expanding an
existing general license that authorizes the exportation or
reexportation of food to individuals and entities in Iran to
include the broader category of agricultural commodities.
• 78 FR 16403-13 - Amendment to the Iranian Financial
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 561 (the "IFSR"), to
implement sections 503 and 504 of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (the "TRA")
and certain provisions of Executive Order 13622
• 77FR 75845-12 - Publication of Final Rule Amending the
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part
560
• 77FR66918-12- Amendments to the Iranian Financial
Sanctions Regulations to implement sections 214 through 216
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012
• 77FR64666-12-31 CFR Part 560 - Iranian Transactions
Regulations; Final Rule
• 77FR16170-12- Amendment to the Iranian Transactions
Regulations to redefine the term "entity owned or controlled
by the Government of Iran" to substantially conform to the
definition in the amended Iranian Financial Sanctions
Regulations
• 77FR 11724-12- Amendment to the Iranian Financial
Sanctions Regulations: Implementing subsection 1245(d) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
("NDAA")
• 76FR63197-11- Iranian Transactions Regulations
Amendments to authorize certain consular funds transfers
and the transportation of human remains
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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• 76FR63191-11 - Iranian Transactions Regulations
Amendments to authorize the exportation or reexportation of
food items
• 76FR 7695-11 - Iranian Transactions Regulations
regulations with respect to Iran to implement Executive
Order 13553
• 75 FR59611-10- Iranian Transactions Regulations
Amendment to remove general licenses authorizing the
importation of, and dealings in, certain foodstuffs and
carpets of Iranian origin and related services
• 75 FR 49836-10 - Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations
New regulations to implement the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
• 75 FR 34630-10 - Amendment to the Iranian Transactions
Regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations to expand the
scope of Appendix A to Part 560 to encompass any person
determined by OFAC to be the Government oflran
• 75FR 10997-10- Amendments to authorize certain types of
exportation
• 74 FR61030-09- An interim final rule which makes
technical changes to certain sections of the Sudanese
Sanctions Regulations and the Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 31 CFR parts 538 and 560
• 74FR 36397-09 - Allows U.S. banks to continue operating
the accounts of U.S. persons who are temporarily in Iran
• 73FR 73788-08- Final rule amending the Iranian
Transactions Regulations to expand the scope of Appendix A
• 73FR66541-08 - Revoking an authorization previously
granted to U.S. depository institutions to process U-turn
transfers
• 72 FR15831-07- Amendment to the Iranian Transactions
Regulations related to the movement of specific goods via
diplomatic pouch
• 72FR 12980-07- Clarification of Policy with Respect to the
Process for Issuing Certain TSRA Licenses
• 71FR 53569-06 -Treasury Cuts Iran's Bank Saderat Off
From U.S. Financial System
• 71FR 48795-06- Official Activities of Certain U.S.
Organizations
• 71FR29251-06 - Revisions to IEEPA made by the
Combating Terrorism Financing Act 0f 2005
• 70 FR 15761-05 - Administrative Collection of Civil Penalties
• 70 FR 15583-05- Broker-dealer amendment to ITR.
• 69 FR 75468-04 - General License for Publishing Activities
• 68 FR11741-03- Authorization of Certain Humanitarian
Activities by Nongovernmental Organizations in Iraq and
Iran
• 68 FR9744-03 - Correction to 68 FR 8077 - Payments to
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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Persons Who Hold Certain Categories of Judgments Against
Cuba or Iran
• 68FR8077-03- Payments to Persons Who Hold Certain
Categories of Judgments Against Cuba or Iran
• 67FR 75897-02- Payments to Persons Who Hold Certain
Categories of Judgments Against Cuba or Iran
• 66FR38553-01- Amendments to the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations
• 66 FR36683-01 - Exports of Agricultural Products,
Medicines, and Medical Devices to Cuba, Sudan, Libya, and
Iran; Cuba Travel-Related Transactions
• 65 FR 70382-00 - Payments to Persons Who Hold Certain
Categories of Judgments Against Cuba or Iranooo Payments
to Persons Who Hold Certain Categories of Judgments
Against Cuba or Iran
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
• 2231 - Endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (20
July 2015)
The provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696
(2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835
(2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015) have been
terminated subject to re-imposition in the event of
significant non-performance of JCPOA commitments.
• 1929 - Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (9 June 2010)
• 1803 - Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (3 March 2008)
• 1747- Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (24 March 2007)
• 1737- Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (23 December 2006)
• 1696- Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (31 July 2006)
• 461- Reaffirming resolution 457 (1979) in all its aspects (31
December 1979)
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran…
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Annex 21
U.S. Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 561
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PART 561--IRANIAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
REGULATIONS
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Proximity
Contents
Subpart A-Relation of This Part to Other Laws and Regulations
Search History
Search Tips
5561.101 Relation of this partto other laws and regulations.
Subpart 8-Prohibitions
Corrections
5561.201 CISADA-based sanctions on certain foreign financial institutions.
§561.202 Prohibitions on persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions.
Latest Updates
User Info
FAQs
5561.203 NDAA-based sanctions on certain foreign financial institutions.
5561.204 Additional petroleum-related sanctions on certain foreign financial
institutions.
5561.205 Evasions; attempts; causing violations; conspiracies.
Subpart C-General Definitions
Agency List
Incorporation
By Reference
Related
Resources
5561.301 Effective date.
$561.302 UNSC Resolution 1737.
$561.303 UNSC Resolution 1747.
5561.304 UNSC Resolution 1803.
§561.305 UNSC Resolution 1929.
§561.306 Correspondent account.
§561.307 Payable-through account.
§561.308 Foreign financial institution.
5561.309 U.S. financial institution.
The Code of
Federal
5561.310 Money laundering.
5561.311 Agent.
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Regulations
(CFR) annual
edition is the
codification of
the general and
§S61.312 Act of international terrorism.
§S61.313 Financial services.
5561.314 Knowingly.
5561.315 Person.
permanent
5561.316 Entity.
5561.317 Money service businesses.
5561.318 Petroleum.
5561.319 Petroleum products.
5561.320
rules published
in the Federal
Register by the
departments
and agencies of
the Federal
Iranian financial institution.
Government
produced by the
Office of the
Federal Register
(OFR) and the
Government
5561.321 Government of Iran.
5561.322 Entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
5561.323 Foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the government of a
foreign country.
5561.324 Designated Iranian financial institution.
5561.325 Financial transaction.
5561.326 Privately owned foreign financial institution.
5561.327 Agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices.
5561.328 Reduce significantly, significantly reduced, and significant reduction.
§561.329
Publishing
Office.
Iran.
5561.330 Petrochemical products.
Subpart D-lnterpretations
Download the
Code of Federal
Regulations in
XML.
5561.401 Reference to amended sections.
5561.402 Effect of amendment.
5561.403 Facilitation of certain efforts, activities, or transactions by foreign financial
institutions.
5561.404 Significant transaction or transactions; significant financial services;
significant financial transaction.
Download the
Electronic Code
of Federal
Regulations in
XML.
5561.405 Entities owned by a person whose property and interests in property are
blocked.
5561.406 Country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution.
5561.407 Conducting or facilitating a financial transaction with the Central Bank of
Monthly Title
Iran or a designated Iranian financial institution.
and Part user
viewing data for
5561.408 Goods or services originating in a country.
Subpart E-Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of Licensing Policy
the e-CFR is
available for
download in
CSV format.
5561.501 General and specific licensing procedures.
5561.502 Effect of license or authorization.
5561.503 Exclusion from licenses.
5561.504 Transactions related to closing a correspondent account or payable-through
Parallel Table of
Authorities and
Rules for the
Code of Federal
Regulations and
the United
States Code
Text I PDF
account.
Subpart F-Reports
§561.601 Records and reports.
Subpart G-Penalties
Find, review,
and submit
5561.701 Penalties.
5561.702 Pre-Penalty Notice; settlement.
5561.703 Penalty imposition.
5561.704 Administrative collection; referral to United States Department of Justice.
Subpart H-Procedures
comments on
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Federal rules
that are open
for comment
5561.801 Procedures.
5561.802 Delegation by the Secretary of the Treasury.
5561.803 Consultations.
Subpart I-Paperwork Reduction Act
and published
in the Federal
Register using
Regulations.gov.
5561.901 Paperwork Reduction Act notice.
Purchase
individual CFR
titles from the
U.S.
Government
Authority: 3 U.s.C. 301; 31 U.5.C. 321(b); 50 U.5.C.1601-1651, 1701-1706; Pub. L.101-
410, 104 Stat. 890 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Pub. L. 110-96, 121 Stat. 1011 (50 U.S.C. 1705
note); Pub. L. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (22 U.S.C. 8501-8551 ); Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat.
1298 (22 U.S.C. 8513a); Pub. L. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (22 U.S.C. 8701-8795); E.O.
12957, 60 FR 14615, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 332; E.O. 13553, 75 FR 60567, 3 CFR, 2010
Comp., p. 253; E.O. 13599, 77 FR 6659, 3 CFR, 2012 Comp., p. 215; E.O. 13622, 77 FR
45897, 3 CFR, 2012 Comp., p. 290; E.O. 13628, 77 FR 62139, 3 CFR, 2012 Comp., p. 314.
Online
Bookstore.
Source: 77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012, unless otherwise noted.
Find issues of
the CFR
(including issues
prior to 1996) at
a local Federal
depository
library.
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Subpart A-Relation of This Part to Other Laws and
Regulations
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[A1]
5561.101 Relation of this part to other laws and
regulations.
This part is separate from, and independent of, the other parts of this chapter, with the
exception of part 501 of this chapter, the record keeping and reporting requirements
and license application and other procedures of which apply to this part. Actions taken
pursuant to part 501 of this chapter with respect to the prohibitions contained in this
part or the conditions imposed pursuant to this part are considered actions taken
pursuant to this part. Differing foreign policy and national security circumstances may
result in differing interpretations of similar language among the parts of this chapter.
No license or authorization contained in or issued pursuant to those other parts
authorizes any transaction prohibited by this part. No license or authorization
contained in or issued pursuant to any other provision of law or regulation authorizes
any transaction prohibited by this part. No license or authorization contained in or
issued pursuant to this part relieves the involved parties from complying with any other
applicable laws or regulations.
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Subpart B-Prohibitions
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5561.201 CISADA-based sanctions on certain foreign
financial institutions.
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Upon a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that a foreign financial institution
knowingly engages in one or more of the activities described in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (a)(6) of this section, attempts or conspires to facilitate or participate in one or
more of such activities, or is owned or controlled by a foreign financial institution that
the Secretary finds knowingly engages in one or more of such activities, consistent with
the Secretary of the Treasury's authorities under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501-8551)
("CISADA"), as amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-158), either the Secretary of the Treasury will impose one or more
strict conditions, as set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, on the opening or
maintaining of a correspondent account or a payable-through account in the United
States for that foreign financial institution, or, as set forth in paragraph (c) of this
section, the Secretary of the Treasury will prohibit a U.S. financial institution from
opening or maintaining a correspondent account or a payable-through account in the
United States for that foreign financial institution. The name of the foreign financial
institution and the relevant prohibition or strict condition(s) will be added to the List of
Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through
Account Sanctions (CAPTA List) on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site
(www.treasury.gov/ofac) and published in the Federal Register.
(a) A foreign financial institution engages in an activity described in this paragraph if, in
any location or currency, the foreign financial institution knowingly:
(1) Facilitates the efforts of the Government of Iran (including efforts of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its agents or affiliates)-
(i) To acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction; or
(ii) To provide support for organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations
under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) or
support for acts of international terrorism, as defined in §561.312 of this part;
(2) Facilitates the activities of-
(i) A person subject to financial sanctions pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, or 1929, or any other resolution adopted by the Security
Council that imposes sanctions with respect to Iran; or
(ii) A person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a
person described in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section;
Note to paragraph (a)(2) of 5561.201: Persons subject to financial sanctions pursuant
to the United Nations Security Council resolutions listed in 5561.201(a)(2) include
individuals and entities listed in the Annex to UNSC Resolution 1737, Annex I of UNSC
Resolution 1747, Annexes I and Ill of UNSC Resolution 1803, and Annexes I, II, and Ill of
UNSC Resolution 1929; and individuals and entities designated by the Security Council
or by the Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1737 (the "Committee")
as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems; and individuals and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of
those so listed or designated; and entities owned or controlled by those so listed or
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designated; and individuals and entities determined by the Security Council or the
Committee to have assisted listed or designated individuals or entities in evading
sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, UNSC Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, or
1929.
(3) Engages in money laundering to carry out an activity described in paragraphs (a)(1)
or (2) of this section;
(4) Facilitates efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian financial
institution to carry out an activity described in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section;
(5) Facilitates a significant transaction or transactions or provides significant financial
services for-
(i) Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its agents or affiliates whose
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) ("IEEPA"); or
(ii) A person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to parts
544 or 594 of this chapter in connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction or Iran's support for
international terrorism; or
Note to paragraph (a)(5) of §561.201: The names of persons whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to IEEPA are published in the Federal
Register and incorporated into the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the "SDN List"). The SDN List is
accessible through the following page on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web
site: www.treasury.gov/sdn. Additional information pertaining to the SDN List can be
found in appendix A to this chapter. Agents or affiliates of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps ("IRGC") whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
IEEPA are identified by a special reference to the "IRGC" at the end of their entries on
the SDN List, in addition to the reference to the regulatory part of this chapter
pursuant to which their property and interests in property are blocked. For example,
an affiliate of the IRGC whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part
544, will have the tags "[NPWMD[IRGC]" at the end of its entry on the SDN List. Persons
whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to parts 544 or 594 of
this chapter in connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction or Iran's support for international
terrorism also are identified by the tag "[IFSR]" in addition to the tag referencing part
544 or part 594, as the case may be, located at the end of their entries on the SDN List
(e.g. [NPWMD][IFSR] or [SDGT][IFSR]). In addition, see $561.405 concerning entities that
may not be listed on the SDN List but whose property and interests in property are
nevertheless blocked.
(6) Facilitates, or participates or assists in, an activity described in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (a)(5) of this section, including by acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or as
an intermediary for, or otherwise assisting, another person with respect to the activity.
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(b) The Secretary of the Treasury may impose one or more strict conditions on the
opening or maintaining by a U.S. financial institution of a correspondent account or a
payable-through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution that the
Secretary finds engages in one or more of the activities described in paragraph (a) of
this section. Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, a U.S. financial
institution shall not open or maintain a correspondent account or payable-through
account in the United States in a manner that is inconsistent with any strict condition
imposed and in effect pursuant to this paragraph. Such conditions may include, but are
not limited to, the following:
(1) Prohibiting or restricting any provision of trade finance through the correspondent
account or payable-through account of the foreign financial institution;
(2) Restricting the transactions that may be processed through the correspondent
account or payable-through account of the foreign financial institution to certain types
of transactions, such as personal remittances;
(3) Placing monetary limits on, or limiting the volume of, the transactions that may be
processed through the correspondent account or payable-through account of the
foreign financial institution;
(4) Requiring pre-approval from the U.S. financial institution for all transactions
processed through the correspondent account or payable-through account of the
foreign financial institution; or
(5) Prohibiting or restricting the processing of foreign exchange transactions through
the correspondent account or payable-through account of the foreign financial
institution.
Note to paragraph (b) of §561.201: The name of the foreign financial institution,
together with the actual strict condition or conditions to be imposed, will be added to
the CAPT A List on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site
(www.treasury.gov/ofac), and published in the Federal Register.
(c) If the Secretary of the Treasury does not impose one or more strict conditions,
pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, on the opening or maintaining of a
correspondent account or a payable-through account in the United States for a foreign
financial institution that the Secretary finds engages in one or more of the activities
described in paragraph (a) of this section, the Secretary, consistent with CISADA, will
prohibit the opening or maintaining by a U.S. financial institution of a correspondent
account or a payable-through account in the United States for that foreign financial
institution. Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, a U.S. financial
institution shall not open or maintain a correspondent account or a payable-through
account in the United States for a foreign financial institution for which the opening or
maintaining of such an account is prohibited pursuant to this paragraph.
Note to paragraph (c) of §561.201: The names of foreign financial institutions for which
the opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or a payable-through account
in the United States is prohibited will be listed on the CAPTA List on the Office of
Foreign Assets Control's Web site (www.treasury.gov/ofac), and published in the
Federal Register.
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Note to 5561.201: The CAPT A List will specify whether U.S. financial institutions are
required to:
(1) Impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining of a correspondent account
or a payable-through account for a particular foreign financial institution pursuant to
paragraph (b) of this section;
(2) Prohibit the opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or a payable
through account for a particular foreign financial institution pursuant to paragraph (c)
of this section;
(3) Prohibit the opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or a payable
through account for a particular foreign financial institution pursuant to §S61.203(a)(1)
and (a)(2(i); or
(4) Prohibit the opening of a correspondent account or a payable-through account and
impose strict conditions on maintaining a preexisting correspondent account or a
payable-through account for a particular foreign financial institution pursuant to
§S61.203(a)(1) and (a)(2)(ii). Where applicable, the CAPT A List also will specify the strict
condition or conditions to be imposed on the correspondent account or the payable
through account.
[77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012 as amended at 77 FR 66919, Nov. 8, 2012; 84 FR 9457, Mar.
15, 2019]
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5561.202 Prohibitions on persons owned or controlled
by U.S. financial institutions.
Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, any person that is owned or
controlled by a U.S. financial institution is prohibited from knowingly engaging in any
transaction with or benefitting Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its
agents or affiliates whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (SO U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) ("IEEPA").
Note 1 to 5561.202: The names of persons whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to IEEPA are published in the Federal Register and incorporated
into the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List (the "SDN List"). The SDN List is accessible through the following page on
the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site: www.treasury.gov/sdn. Additional
information pertaining to the SDN List can be found in appendix A to this chapter.
Agents or affiliates of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC") whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to IEEPA are identified by a special
reference to the "IRGC" at the end of their entries on the SDN List, in addition to the
reference to the regulatory part of this chapter pursuant to which their property and
interests in property are blocked. For example, an affiliate of the IRGC whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 544, will have the tag "[NPWMD]
[IRGC]" at the end of its entry on the SDN List. In addition, see 5561.405 concerning
entities that may not be listed on the SDN List but whose property and interests in
property are nevertheless blocked.
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Note 2 to §561.202:A U.S. financial institution is subject to the civil penalties provided
for in section 206(b) of IEEPA if any person that it owns or controls violates the
prohibition set forth in this section and the U.S. financial institution knew or should
have known of such violation. See §561.701 (a)(2).
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5561.203 NDAA-based sanctions on certain foreign
financial institutions.
(a) Imposition of sanctions. Subject to the limitations, exceptions, and conditions set
forth in paragraphs (d) through (k) of this section, upon a determination by the
Secretary of the Treasury that a foreign financial institution has knowingly conducted
or facilitated any significant financial transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or a
designated Iranian financial institution, consistent with section 1245 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81) (22 U.S.C. 8513a) (the
"2012 NDAA"), as amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-158) (22 U.S.C. 8701-8795) (the "TRA"), the Secretary of the Treasury:
(1) Will prohibit U.S. financial institutions from opening a correspondent account or a
payable-through account in the United States for the foreign financial institution with
respect to which the determination has been made; and either
(2)(i) Will prohibit U.S. financial institutions from maintaining a correspondent account
or a payable-through account in the United States for the foreign financial institution
with respect to which the determination has been made; or
(ii) Will impose one or more strict conditions on the maintaining of any correspondent
account or payable-through account that had been opened in the United States for the
foreign financial institution prior to the Secretary of the Treasury's determination with
respect to the foreign financial institution.
Note 1 to paragraph (a) 0f 5561.203: The names of designated Iranian financial
institutions are identified on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
List (the "SDN List") on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site with the tag
"[NDAA]" at the end of their entries, in addition to the reference to the regulatory part
of this chapter pursuant to which their property and interests in property are blocked.
The SDN List is accessible through the following page on the Office of Foreign Assets
Control's Web site: www.treasury.gov/sdn.
Note 2 to paragraph (a) of 5561.203: The name of any foreign financial institution with
respect to which a determination has been made pursuant to this paragraph (a), along
with the relevant sanctions to be imposed (prohibition(s) and/or strict condition(s)), will
be added to the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account
or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List), which is maintained on the Office
of Foreign Assets Control's Web site (www.treasury.gov/ofac), and published in the
Federal Register.
(b) Strict conditions. The strict conditions that might be imposed on the maintaining of
a pre-existing correspondent account or payable-through account for a foreign
financial institution pursuant to paragraph (a)2)ii) of this section include, but are not
limited to, the following:
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(1) Prohibiting or restricting any provision of trade finance through the correspondent
account or payable-through account of the foreign financial institution;
(2) Restricting the transactions that may be processed through the correspondent
account or payable-through account of the foreign financial institution to certain types
of transactions, such as personal remittances;
(3) Placing monetary limits on, or limiting the volume of, the transactions that may be
processed through the correspondent account or payable-through account of the
foreign financial institution;
(4) Requiring pre-approval from the U.S. financial institution for all transactions
processed through the correspondent account or payable-through account of the
foreign financial institution; or
(5) Prohibiting or restricting the processing of foreign exchange transactions through
the correspondent account or payable-through account of the foreign financial
institution.
(c) Prohibitions. (1) Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, a U.S. financial
institution shall not open a correspondent account or payable-through account in the
United States for a foreign financial institution for which the opening of such an
account is prohibited pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(2) Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, a U.S. financial institution shall
not maintain a correspondent account or payable-through account in the United States
for a foreign financial institution for which the maintaining of such an account is
prohibited pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section.
(3) Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, a U.S. financial institution shall
not maintain a correspondent account or payable-through account in the United States
for a foreign financial institution in a manner that is inconsistent with any strict
condition imposed and in effect pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section.
(d) Privately owned foreign financial institutions. (1) Subject to the exceptions set forth
in paragraphs (g) and (i) through (k) of this section, sanctions may be imposed pursuant
to paragraph (a) of this section beginning on February 29, 2012, with respect to any
significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a privately owned foreign
financial institution that is not for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products
from Iran.
(2) Subject to the exceptions and conditions set forth in paragraphs (h) through (k) of
this section, sanctions may be imposed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section with
respect to any significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a privately
owned foreign financial institution on or after June 28, 2012, for the purchase of
petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
(e) Government-owned or-controlled foreign financial institutions, excluding foreign
central banks. (1) Subject to the exceptions and conditions set forth in paragraphs (h)
through (k) of this section, sanctions may be imposed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this
section with respect to any significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a
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foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the government of a foreign
country, excluding a central bank of a foreign country, on or after June 28, 2012, for the
sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran.
(2) Subject to the exceptions and conditions set forth in paragraphs (g) and (i) through
(k) of this section, sanctions may be imposed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section
with respect to any significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a
foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the government of a foreign
country, excluding a central bank of a foreign country, on or after February 6, 2013,
that is not for the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from
Iran.
(f) Foreign central banks. Subject to the exceptions and conditions set forth in
paragraphs (h) through (k) of this section, sanctions may be imposed pursuant to
paragraph (a) of this section on a central bank of a foreign country only insofar as it
engages in a financial transaction for the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum
products to or from Iran conducted or facilitated on or after June 28, 2012.
(g) Sanctions will not be imposed under paragraph (a) of this section with respect to
any foreign financial institution for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale
of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.
(h) The Secretary of the Treasury may impose sanctions pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section with respect to any significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated
by a foreign financial institution on or after June 28, 2012, for the purchase of
petroleum or petroleum products from Iran only if the President determines, not later
than March 30, 2012, and every 180 days thereafter, that there is a sufficient supply of
petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit a
significant reduction in petroleum and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or
through foreign financial institutions. Such successive sufficiency determinations by
the President shall render subject to sanctions under paragraph (a) of this section
those financial transactions conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution
for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran during each successive
180-day period beginning 90 days after the President's determination.
Note to paragraph (h) of §561.203: Under Section 1245(d)(4)(B) of the 2012 NDAA, the
President is to make a determination, not later than March 30, 2012, and every 180
days thereafter, of whether the price and supply of petroleum and petroleum products
produced in countries other than Iran is sufficient to permit purchasers of petroleum
and petroleum products from Iran to reduce significantly their purchases from Iran.
This determination is to be based on reports on the availability and price of petroleum
and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran that, pursuant to
section 1245(0d)(4)(A) of the 2012 NDAA, the Administrator of the Energy Information
Administration, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
State, and the Director of National Intelligence, was to submit to Congress beginning
not later than February 29, 2012, and every 60 days thereafter. Beginning September 1,
2012, pursuant to section 1245(d)(4)(A) of the 2012 NDAA, as amended by section
503(b) of the TRA, the report of the Administrator of the Energy Information
Administration is to be submitted to Congress not later than October 25, 2012, and the
last Thursday of every other month thereafter.
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(i) Sanctions will not be imposed under paragraph (a) of this section with respect to a
financial transaction described in paragraph (j) of this section that is conducted or
facilitated by a foreign financial institution if, for the 180-day period during which the
financial transaction is conducted or facilitated, the Secretary of State has determined
and reported to Congress:
(1) That the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution has
significantly reduced its crude oil purchases from Iran, thus qualifying for a "significant
reduction exception" for the 180-day period during which the financial transaction is
conducted or facilitated; or
(2) That the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution has
received a significant reduction exception described in this paragraph in a previous
period and, after receiving the exception, has reduced its crude oil purchases from Iran
to zero during a subsequent 180-day reporting period.
Note to paragraph (i) 0f 5561.203: The Secretary of State is to determine whether a
country qualifies for the "significant reduction exception" and report such
determination to Congress not later than 90 days after the date on which the President
makes the initial determination referenced in paragraph (h) of this section, and every
180 days thereafter. Accordingly, a significant reduction exception covers a period of
180 days.
(j) A financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution is
described in this paragraph (j) if:
(1) The financial transaction is only for trade in goods or services that either originate
in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution and are
exported and sold directly to Iran or originate in Iran and are exported and sold
directly to the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution;
(2) Any funds owed to the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial
institution as a result of such trade are paid to:
(i) Individuals who are citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the country with
primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution; or
(ii) Entities organized under the laws of the country with primary jurisdiction over the
foreign financial institution that are not the Government of Iran, as defined in
5561.321;
(3) Any funds owed to Iran as a result of such trade are subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in paragraph (k) of this section; and
(4) Funds owed as a result of such trade are not credited to an account held at any
financial institution whose name appears on the List of Foreign Financial Institutions
Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPT A List),
which is maintained on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site
(www. treasury .gov I of ac).
(k) In order for a transaction to qualify for the significant reduction exception from the
sanctions imposed under paragraph (a) of this section described in paragraph (), all
funds owed to Iran as a result of a trade transaction described in paragraph ()(1) of
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this section must be subject to the following conditions and restrictions:
(1) The funds must be credited to an account held at a foreign financial institution that
conducted or facilitated the trade transaction described in paragraph ()1) of this
section;
(2) The funds must be credited to an account held in the country with primary
jurisdiction over that foreign financial institution;
(3) The funds must be credited to an account held in the name of the Central Bank of
Iran, the Iranian party to the trade transaction, or an Iranian financial institution that is
not a designated Iranian financial institution;
(4) Payments from the funds may be made only in the manner and to the persons
specified in paragraph (k(5) of this section for amounts owed to such persons for the
direct exportation and sale to Iran of goods or services originating in the country with
primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution holding the funds (but see
Note 2 to 5561.203);
(5) Payments from the funds for the goods or services exported and sold to Iran, as
described in paragraph (k)(4) of this section, may be made only by check payable to or
to the order of, or by transfer to an account at a foreign financial institution in the
country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution holding the funds
that is held in the name of:
(i) Individuals who are citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the country with
primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution holding the funds; or
(ii) Entities that are organized under the laws of that country;
(6) The funds may not be withdrawn in cash, remitted to Iran or paid to anyone that is
the Government of Iran, as defined in §561.321, or credited to an account held at a
financial institution whose name appears on the CAPT A List (see paragraph ()(4) of this
section); and
(7) Other than in payment for goods or services exported and sold to Iran as set forth
in paragraphs (k)(4) through (k)(6) of this section, the funds may be transferred from
the initial account described in paragraphs (k)(1) through (k)(3) of this section only to
another account that is held at the same foreign financial institution, located in the
country with primary jurisdiction over that foreign financial institution, and subject to
the following conditions and restrictions:
(i) The account must be a separate, special purpose account holding only funds owed
to Iran as a result of trade transactions that qualify for the significant reduction
exception described in paragraph (i) of this section and that are conducted or
facilitated by the foreign financial institution holding the account; and
(ii) The conditions and restrictions on the funds owed to Iran set forth in paragraphs (k)
(1) through (k)(6) of this section apply in full to the account described in this paragraph,
except that the account must be held only in the name of the Central Bank of Iran or
an Iranian financial institution that is not a designated Iranian financial institution.
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Note to paragraphs () and (k) of §561.203: See §561.408 for a provision interpreting
the phrases goods or services originating in the country with primary jurisdiction over
the foreign financial institution and goods or services originating in Iran.
Note 1 to 5561.203: The sanctions regime described in 5561.203 is separate from the
sanctions regimes described in 55561.201 and 561.204 and applies in addition to, and
independently of, the sanctions regimes imposed under 55561.201 and 561.204.
Note 2 to §561.203: Paragraph (g) of this section excepts transactions for the sale of
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran from the
imposition of sanctions under paragraph (a) of this section. Therefore, funds owed to
Iran as a result of a trade transaction described in paragraph (j)(1) of this section may
be used for the purchase and export to Iran of agricultural commodities, food,
medicine, or medical devices regardless of the country from which such goods are
purchased and regardless of where such goods originate, and payment from the funds
for such goods may be made to exporters in countries other than the country with
primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution holding the funds.
[77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 16405, Mar. 15, 2013; 84 FR 9457,
Mar. 15, 2019]
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5561.204 Additional petroleum-related sanctions on
certain foreign financial institutions.
(a) Imposition of sanctions. Subject to the limitations, exceptions, and conditions set
forth in paragraphs (d) through (f) of this section, upon a determination by the
Secretary of the Treasury that a foreign financial institution has knowingly engaged in
one or more of the activities described in paragraph (b) of this section, the Secretary of
the Treasury may:
(1) Prohibit U.S. financial institutions from opening a correspondent account or a
payable-through account in the United States for the foreign financial institution with
respect to which the determination has been made; and either
(2)() Prohibit U.S. financial institutions from maintaining a correspondent account or a
payable-through account in the United States for the foreign financial institution with
respect to which the determination has been made; or
(ii} Impose one or more strict conditions on the maintaining of any correspondent
account or payable-through account that had been opened in the United States for the
foreign financial institution prior to the Secretary of the Treasury's determination with
respect to the foreign financial institution.
Note 1 to paragraph (a) of 5561.204: The name of any foreign financial institution with
respect to which a determination has been made pursuant to this paragraph (a), along
with the relevant sanctions to be imposed (prohibition(s) and/or strict condition(s)), will
be added to the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account
or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List), which is maintained on the Office
of Foreign Assets Control's Web site (www.treasury.gov/ofac), and published in the
Federal Register.
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Note 2 to paragraph (a) of §561.204: See 5561.203(b) for examples of strict conditions
that might be imposed, pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section, on the
maintaining of a pre-existing correspondent account or payable-through account for a
foreign financial institution with respect to which the Secretary of the Treasury's
determination has been made.
(b) Sanctionable activity. A foreign financial institution engages in an activity described
in this paragraph if it knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant financial
transaction:
(1) With the National Iranian Oil Company ("NIOC"), the Naftiran lntertrade Company
("NICO"), or any entity owned or controlled by, or operating for or on behalf of, NIOC or
NICO, except for a sale or provision to any of the foregoing of the products described
in section 5(a)(3)A)(i) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701
note), as amended, provided that the fair market value of such products is lower than
the applicable dollar threshold specified in that provision;
Note to paragraph (b)(1) of §561.204: As of March 15, 2013, the products described in
section 5(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701
note), as amended, are refined petroleum products, and for the fair market value of
such products to be lower than the applicable dollar threshold specified in that
provision the products sold or provided to NIOC, NICO, or any entity owned or
controlled by, or operating for or on behalf of, NIOC or NICO, must have a fair market
value of less than $1,000,000, and, during a 12-month period, an aggregate fair market
value of less than $5,000,000.
(2) For the purchase or acquisition of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran; or
(3) For the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran.
(c) Prohibitions. (1) A U.S. financial institution shall not open a correspondent account
or payable-through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution for
which the opening of such an account is prohibited pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this
section.
(2) A U.S. financial institution shall not maintain a correspondent account or payable
through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution for which the
maintaining of such an account is prohibited pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this
section.
(3) A U.S. financial institution shall not maintain a correspondent account or payable
through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution in a manner that
is inconsistent with any strict condition imposed and in effect pursuant to paragraph (a)
(2)(ii) of this section.
(4) The prohibitions in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(3) of this section apply except to the
extent transactions are authorized by regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that
may be issued pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contracts entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of the prohibition.
(d) Exempt activity. Sanctions will not be imposed under paragraph (a) of this section
with respect to any foreign financial institution for:
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(1) Conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities,
food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or when the underlying transaction has been
authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control pursuant to any part of this chapter
V;or
(2) Conducting or facilitating a transaction involving a natural gas development and
pipeline project initiated prior to July 31, 2012, to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe
and Turkey in furtherance of a production sharing agreement or license awarded by a
sovereign government other than the Government of Iran before July 31, 2012.
Note to paragraph (d)(2) of §561.204: The natural gas development and pipeline
project referred to in this paragraph is the project to develop the Shah Deniz natural
gas field in Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea and related pipeline projects to bring
the gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey.
(e) The Secretary of the Treasury may impose sanctions pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section with respect to any significant financial transaction described in
paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section only if the President makes the successive
determinations that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products
from countries other than Iran described in paragraph (h) of §561.203.
(f) Sanctions will not be imposed under paragraph (a) of this section with respect to any
significant financial transaction described in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section
that is conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution if:
(1) For the 180-day period during which the financial transaction is conducted or
facilitated, the Secretary of State has determined and reported to Congress:
() That the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution has
significantly reduced its crude oil purchases from Iran, thus qualifying for the
"significant reduction exception" for the 180-day period during which the financial
transaction is conducted or facilitated; or
(ii) That the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution has
received a significant reduction exception described in this paragraph in a previous
period, and, after receiving the exception, has reduced its crude oil purchases from
Iran to zero during a subsequent 180-day reporting period; and
(2) The transaction satisfies the conditions and restrictions set forth in paragraphs (j)
and (k) of §561.203.
Note to paragraph (f) of §561.204: The Secretary of State is to determine whether a
country qualifies for the "significant reduction exception" and report such
determination to Congress not later than 90 days after the date on which the President
makes the initial determination referenced in paragraph (h) of this section, and every
180 days thereafter. Accordingly, a significant reduction exception covers a period of
180 days.
Note to §561.204: The sanctions regime described in this section is separate from the
sanctions regimes described in §§561.201 and 561.203 and applies in addition to, and
independently of, the sanctions regimes imposed under 55561.201 and 561.203.
[78 FR 16407, Mar. 15, 2013, as amended at 84 FR 9457, Mar. 15, 2019]
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§561.205 Evasions; attempts; causing violations;
conspiracies.
(a) Any transaction on or after the effective date that evades or avoids, has the purpose
of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the
prohibitions set forth in this part is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this part is
prohibited.
[78 FR 16408, Mar. 15, 2013]
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Subpart C-General Definitions
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5561.301 Effective date.
(a) The effective date of a prohibition or condition imposed pursuant to 55561.201,
561.203, or 561.204 on the opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or a
payable-through account in the United States by a U.S. financial institution for a
particular foreign financial institution is the earlier of the date the U.S. financial
institution receives actual or constructive notice of such prohibition or condition.
(b) The effective date of the prohibition contained in §561.202 with respect to Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and any of its agents or affiliates whose property
and interests in property are blocked as of August 16, 2010, is August 16, 2010.
(c) The effective date of the prohibition contained in 5561.202 with respect to an agent
or affiliate of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps whose property and interests in
property become blocked after August 16, 2010, is the earlier of the date of actual or
constructive notice that such person's property and interests in property are blocked.
[77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 16408, Mar. 15, 2013]
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5561.302 UNSC Resolution 1737.
The term UNSC Resolution 1737 means United Nations Security Council Resolution
1737, adopted December 23, 2006.
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5561.303 UNSC Resolution 1747.
The term UNSC Resolution 1747 means United Nations Security Council Resolution
1747, adopted March 24, 2007.
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5561.304 UNSC Resolution 1803.
The term UNSC Resolution 1803 means United Nations Security Council Resolution
1803, adopted March 3, 2008.
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5561.305 UNSC Resolution 1929.
The term UNSC Resolution 1929 means United Nations Security Council Resolution
1929, adopted June 9, 2010.
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5561.306 Correspondent account.
The term correspondent account means an account established by a U.S. financial
institution for a foreign financial institution to receive deposits from, or to make
payments on behalf of, the foreign financial institution, or to handle other financial
transactions related to such foreign financial institution.
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5561.307 Payable-through account.
The term payable-through account means a correspondent account maintained by a
U.S. financial institution for a foreign financial institution by means of which the foreign
financial institution permits its customers to engage, either directly or through a
subaccount, in banking activities usual in connection with the business of banking in
the United States.
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5561.308 Foreign financial institution.
The term foreign financial institution means any foreign entity that is engaged in the
business of accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring, holding, or brokering
loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities, commodity
futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. It
includes but is not limited to depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money
service businesses, trust companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures
and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants,
securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies,
employee benefit plans, dealers in precious metals, stones, or jewels, and holding
companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing. The term does not include
the international financial institutions identified in 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2), the International
Fund for Agricultural Development, the North American Development Bank, or any
other international financial institution so notified by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
[77 FR 66920, Nov. 8, 2012]
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5561.309 U.S. financial institution.
The term U.S. financial institution means any U.S. entity that is engaged in the business
of accepting deposits. making, granting, transferring, holding, or brokering loans or
credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities, commodity futures or
options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. It includes
but is not limited to depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money service
businesses, trust companies, insurance companies, securities brokers and dealers,
commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign
exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations,
investment companies, employee benefit plans, and U.S. holding companies, U.S.
affiliates, or U.S. subsidiaries of any of the foregoing. This term includes those
branches, offices, and agencies of foreign financial institutions that are located in the
United States, but not such institutions' foreign branches, offices, or agencies.
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5561.310 Money laundering.
The term money laundering means engaging in deceptive practices to obscure the
nature of transactions involving the movement of illicit cash or illicit cash equivalent
proceeds into, out of, or through a country, or into, out of, or through a financial
institution, such that the transactions are made to appear legitimate.
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5561.311 Agent.
The term agent includes an entity established by a person for purposes of conducting
transactions on behalf of the person in order to conceal the identity of the person.
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§561.312 Act of international terrorism.
The term act of international terrorism has the same definition as that provided under
section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note). As of February 27,
2012, the term act of international terrorism means an act which is violent or
dangerous to human life and that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any state or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or any state and which appears to be intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
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5561.313 Financial services.
The term financial services includes loans, transfers, accounts, insurance, investments,
securities, guarantees, foreign exchange, letters of credit, and commodity futures or
options.
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§561.314 Knowingly.
The term knowingly, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a
person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance,
or the resu It.
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5561.315 Person.
The term person means an individual or entity.
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5561.316 Entity.
The term entity means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or
other organization.
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§561.317 Money service businesses.
The term money service businesses means any agent, agency, branch, or office of any
person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an organized business
concern, in one or more of the capacities listed in 31 CFR 103.11(uu)(1) through (5). The
term does not include a bank or a person registered with, and regulated or examined
by, the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.
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5561.318 Petroleum.
The term petroleum (also known as crude oil) means a mixture of hydrocarbons that
exists in liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs and remains liquid at
atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating facilities.
[78 FR 16408, Mar. 15, 2013]
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5561.319 Petroleum products.
The term petroleum products includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum gases,
pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type
jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks. special
naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and
miscellaneous products obtained from the processing of crude oil (including lease
condensate), natural gas, and other hydrocarbon compounds. The term does not
include natural gas, liquefied natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum
fuels.
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§561.320
Iranian financial institution.
The term Iranian financial institution means any entity (including foreign branches),
wherever located, organized under the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, or
owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, or in Iran, or owned or controlled by
any of the foregoing, that is engaged in the business of accepting deposits, making,
granting, transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling
foreign exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers
and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. It includes but is not limited to depository
institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies,
insurance companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options
brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants, securities and
commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, employee
benefit plans, dealers in precious metals, stones, or jewels, and holding companies,
affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing.
[77 FR 66920, Nov. 8, 2012]
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5561.321 Government of Iran.
The term Government of Iran includes:
(a) The state and the Government of Iran, as well as any political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof;
(b) Any entity owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the foregoing;
(c) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, or to the extent that
there is reasonable cause to believe that such person is, or has been, acting or
purporting to act directly or indirectly on behalf of any of the foregoing; and
(d) Any person or entity identified by the Secretary of the Treasury to be the
Government of Iran under 31 CFR part 560.
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5561.322 Entity owned or controlled by the
Government of Iran.
The phrase entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran means any entity,
including a financial institution, in which the Government of Iran owns a 50 percent or
greater interest or a controlling interest, and any entity, including a financial institution,
which is otherwise controlled by that government.
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5561.323 Foreign financial institution owned or
controlled by the government of a foreign country.
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The phrase foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the government of a
foreign country means any foreign financial institution, including a central bank of a
foreign country, in which a government of a foreign country owns a 50 percent or
greater interest and any foreign financial institution which is otherwise controlled by a
government of a foreign country.
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5561.324 Designated Iranian financial institution.
The term designated Iranian financial institution means any Iranian financial institution
whose property and interests in property are blocked by the Department of the
Treasury pursuant to any part of this chapter or any Executive order issued pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and whose
name is listed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List on the
Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site, except for any Iranian financial institution
whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive
Order 13599 of February 5, 2012.
Note to §561.324: Facilitating significant transactions or providing significant financial
services for a financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to parts 544 or 594 of this chapter in connection with Iran's proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction or
Iran's support for international terrorism has, since the enactment of CISADA on July 1,
2010, constituted an activity that could subject a foreign financial institution to
prohibitions or strict conditions on correspondent accounts or payable-through
accounts in the United States. See §561.201.
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§561.325 Financial transaction.
The term financial transaction means any transfer of value involving a financial
institution.
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5561.326 Privately owned foreign financial institution.
The phrase privately owned foreign financial institution means any foreign financial
institution that is not owned or controlled by the government of a foreign country.
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$561.327 Agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and
medical devices.
(a) The term agricultural commodities means:
(1) Products not listed on the Commerce Control List in the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR part 774, supplement no. 1, that fall within the term "agricultural
commodity'' as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.5.C.
5602); and
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(2) Products not listed on the Commerce Control List in the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR part 774, supplement no. 1, that are intended for ultimate use in
Iran as:
(i) Food for humans (including raw, processed, and packaged foods; live animals;
vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or
animals (including animal feeds);
(ii) Seeds for food crops;
(iii) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or
(iv) Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen)
for the production of food animals.
(b) The term food means items that are intended to be consumed by and provide
nutrition to humans or animals in Iran, including vitamins and minerals, food additives
and supplements, and bottled drinking water, and seeds that germinate into items that
are intended to be consumed by and provide nutrition to humans or animals in Iran.
For purposes of this definition, the term food does not include:
(1) Alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, gum, or fertilizer; and
(2) The following excluded food items: castor beans, castor bean seeds, raw eggs,
fertilized eggs (other than fish and shrimp roe), dried egg albumin, live animals,
Rosary/Jequirity peas, non-food-grade gelatin powder, and peptones and their
derivatives.
(c) The term medicine has the same meaning given the term "drug" in section 201 of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321) but does not include any item
listed on the Commerce Control List in the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR
part 774, supplement no. 1 (excluding items classified as EAR 99).
(Gd) The term medical devices has the meaning given the term "device" in section 201 of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321) but does not include any item
listed on the Commerce Control List in the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR
part 774, supplement no. 1 (excluding items classified as EAR 99).
[77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 16408, Mar. 15, 2013]
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§561.328 Reduce significantly, significantly reduced,
and significant reduction.
The terms reduce significantly, significantly reduced, and significant reduction, used
with respect to purchases from Iran of petroleum and petroleum products, include a
reduction in such purchases in terms of price or volume toward a complete cessation
of such purchases.
[78 FR 16408, Mar. 15, 2013]
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§561.329
Iran.
The term Iran means the Government of Iran and the territory of Iran and any other
territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf,
over which the Government of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction,
provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over
the area or derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to
international arrangements.
[78 FR 16408, Mar. 15, 2013]
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§561.330 Petrochemical products.
The term petrochemical products includes any aromatic, olefin, and synthesis gas, and
any of their derivatives, including ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene,
xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea.
[78 FR 16409, Mar. 15, 2013]
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Subpart D-lnterpretations
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5561.401 Reference to amended sections.
Except as otherwise specified, reference to any provision in or appendix to this part or
chapter or to any regulation, ruling, order, instruction, directive, or license issued
pursuant to this part refers to the same as currently amended.
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5561.402 Effect of amendment.
Unless otherwise specifically provided, any amendment, modification, or revocation of
any provision in or appendix to this part or chapter or of any order, regulation, ruling,
instruction, or license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control does not affect any
act done or omitted, or any civil or criminal proceeding commenced or pending, prior
to such amendment, modification, or revocation. All penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities
under any such order, regulation, ruling, instruction, or license continue and may be
enforced as if such amendment, modification, or revocation had not been made.
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5561.403 Facilitation of certain efforts, activities, or
transactions by foreign financial institutions.
For purposes of §§561.201, 561.203, and 561.204, the termfacilitate or facilitated used
with respect to certain efforts, activities, or transactions refers to the provision of
assistance by a foreign financial institution for those efforts, activities, or transactions,
including, but not limited to, the provision of currency, financial instruments, securities,
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or any other transmission of value; purchasing; selling; transporting; swapping;
brokering; financing; approving; guaranteeing; or the provision of other services of any
kind; or the provision of personnel; or the provision of software, technology, or goods
of any kind.
[78 FR 16409, Mar. 15, 2013]
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5561.404 Significant transaction or transactions;
significant financial services; significant financial
transaction.
In determining, for purposes of paragraph (a)(5) of §561.201, whether a transaction is
significant, whether transactions are significant, or whether financial services are
significant, or, for purposes of paragraph (a) of 5561.203 and paragraph (b) of
5561.204, whether a financial transaction is significant, the Secretary of the Treasury
may consider the totality of the facts and circumstances. As a general matter, the
Secretary may consider some or all of the following factors:
(a) Size, number, and frequency. The size, number, and frequency of transactions,
financial services, or financial transactions performed over a period of time, including
whether the transactions, financial services, or financial transactions are increasing or
decreasing over time and the rate of increase or decrease.
(b) Nature. The nature of the transaction(s), financial services, or financial transaction,
including the type, complexity, and commercial purpose of the transaction(s), financial
services, or financial transaction.
(c) Level of Awareness; Pattern of Conduct.(1) Whether the transaction(s), financial
services, or financial transaction is performed with the involvement or approval of
management or only by clerical personnel; and (2) Whether the transaction(s), financial
services, or financial transaction is part of a pattern of conduct or the result of a
business development strategy.
(d) Nexus. The proximity between the foreign financial institution engaging in the
transaction(s) or providing the financial services and a blocked person described in
paragraph (a)(5) of §561.201, or between the foreign financial institution conducting or
facilitating the financial transaction described in paragraph (a) of 5561.203 and the
Central Bank of Iran or a designated Iranian financial institution, as defined in
5561.324, or between the foreign financial institution conducting or facilitating the
financial transaction described in paragraph (b) of §561.204 and the National Iranian
Oil Company ("NIOC"), the Naftiran lntertrade Company ("NICO"), any entity owned or
controlled by, or operating for or on behalf of, NIOC or NICO, or the activities described
in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of that section. For example, a transaction or financial
service in which a foreign financial institution provides brokerage or clearing services
to, or maintains an account or makes payments for, a blocked person described in
paragraph (a)(5) of 5561.201, the Central Bank of Iran, a designated Iranian financial
institution, NIOC, or NICO in a direct customer relationship generally would be of
greater significance than a transaction or financial service a foreign financial institution
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conducts for or provides to a blocked person described in paragraph (a)(5) of §561.201,
the Central Bank of Iran, a designated Iranian financial institution, NIOC, or NICO
indirectly or in a tertiary relationship.
(e) Impact. The impact of the transaction(s) or financial services on the objectives of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as
amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 ('TRA"), or
of the financial transaction on the objectives of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended by TRA, or of the financial transaction on the
objectives of Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012, including:
(1) The economic or other benefit conferred or attempted to be conferred on a blocked
person described in paragraph (a)(5) of §561.201, on the Central Bank of Iran or a
designated Iranian financial institution, or on NIOC, NICO, any entity owned or
controlled by, or operating for or on behalf of, NIOC or NICO, or any person engaged in
the activities described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of §561.204;
(2) Whether and how the transaction(s), financial services, or financial transaction
contributes to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for
such weapons, to support for international terrorism, to the suppression of human
rights, to an increase in Iran's crude oil revenues, or to connecting the Central Bank of
Iran or a designated Iranian financial institution to the international financial system;
and
(3) Whether the transaction(s), financial services, or financial transaction supports
humanitarian activity or involves the payment of basic expenses as specified in and
authorized pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1737 or the payment of extraordinary
expenses that have been authorized by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant
to UNSC Resolution 1737, or the payment for the sale of food, medicine, or medical
devices to Iran.
(f) Deceptive practices: Whether the transaction(s), financial services, or financial
transaction involves an attempt to obscure or conceal the actual parties or true nature
of the transaction(s), financial services, or financial transaction or to evade sanctions;
for example, whether the transaction enabled the Central Bank of Iran to facilitate the
evasion of sanctions by a blocked person described in 5561.201(a)(5) or a designated
Iranian financial institution, as defined in 5561.324.
(g) Central Bank of Iran Reserves, Settlement Services, Foreign Currency Exchanges,
and Official Development Assistance Repayment: Other factors involved in making a
determination of whether a transaction(s), financial service, or financial transaction is
significant are whether the transaction solely involves the passive holding of Central
Bank of Iran reserves by a foreign financial institution; whether the Central Bank of
Iran's role is limited to providing settlement services or foreign currency exchanges in
transactions between a non-designated Iranian financial institution and a foreign
financial institution; and whether the transaction involves only the repayment of official
development assistance by the Central Bank of Iran or the transfer of funds required
as a condition of Iran's membership in an international financial institution.
(h) Other relevant factors. Such other factors that the Secretary deems relevant on a
case-by-case basis in determining the significance of a transaction(s), financial services,
or financial transaction.
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[77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 16409, Mar. 15, 2013]
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§561.405 Entities owned by a person whose property
and interests in property are blocked.
A person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) has an interest
in all property and interests in property of an entity in which it owns, directly or
indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest. The property and interests in property of
such an entity, therefore, are blocked, and such an entity is a person whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), regardless of whether the entity itself is
listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List.
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§561.406 Country with primary jurisdiction over the
foreign financial institution.
For purposes of §561.203(i) and 5561.204(0), a country includes any jurisdiction that has
its own central bank or contains a separate financial sector authority, and a foreign
financial institution (including its foreign branches outside of the United States) is
under a country's primary jurisdiction if the foreign financial institution is organized
under the laws of the country or any jurisdiction within that country.
[78 FR 16409, Mar. 15, 2013]
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5561.407 Conducting or facilitating a financial
transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or a designated
Iranian financial institution.
A foreign financial institution conducts or facilitates a financial transaction with the
Central Bank of Iran or a designated Iranian financial institution if it maintains an
account for such entities or engages in a financial transaction directly or indirectly with
such entities.
Note to 5561.407: See §561.404 for factors that may be considered in determining
whether a financial transaction is significant, as required for the imposition of certain
sanctions pursuant to this part.
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5561.408 Goods or services originating in a country.
(a) Goods originating in a country are goods that have been grown, produced,
manufactured, extracted, or processed, and goods that have been substantially
transformed, in the country.
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(b) Services originating in a country are services performed in that country or services
performed in the country to which the services are being exported by a citizen,
national, or permanent resident of the country from which the services originate who
is ordinarily resident in that country.
(c) For purposes of this part, services originating in a country do not include the
brokering of transactions for the sale and exportation of goods or services not
originating in that country.
[78 FR 16409, Mar. 15, 2013]
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Subpart E-Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of
Licensing Policy
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5561.501 General and specific licensing procedures.
For provisions relating to licensing procedures, see part 501, subpart E of this chapter.
Licensing actions taken pursuant to part 501 of this chapter with respect to the
prohibitions contained in this part or conditions imposed pursuant to this part are
considered actions taken pursuant to this part.
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5561.502 Effect of license or authorization.
(a) No license or other authorization contained in this part, or otherwise issued by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, authorizes or validates any transaction effected prior
to the issuance of such license or other authorization, unless specifically provided in
such license or authorization.
(b) No regulation, ruling, instruction, or license authorizes any transaction prohibited
under this part unless the regulation, ruling, instruction, or license is issued by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control and specifically refers to this part. No regulation, ruling,
instruction, or license referring to this part shall be deemed to authorize any
transaction prohibited by any other part of this chapter unless the regulation, ruling,
instruction, or license specifically refers to such part.
(c) Any regulation, ruling, instruction, or license authorizing any transaction otherwise
prohibited under this part has the effect of removing a prohibition contained in this
part from the transaction, but only to the extent specifically stated by its terms. Unless
the regulation, ruling, instruction, or license otherwise specifies, such an authorization
does not create any right, duty, obligation, claim, or interest in, or with respect to, any
property which would not otherwise exist under ordinary principles of law.
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§561.503 Exclusion from licenses.
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The Office of Foreign Assets Control reserves the right to exclude any person, property,
or transaction from the operation of any license or from the privileges conferred by
any license. The Office of Foreign Assets Control also reserves the right to restrict the
applicability of any license to particular persons, property, transactions, or classes
thereof. Such actions are binding upon actual or constructive notice of the exclusions
or restrictions.
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§561.504 Transactions related to closing a
correspondent account or payable-through account.
(a) During the 10-day period beginning on the effective date of the prohibition in
§561.201 (c), §561.203(c)(2), or §561.204(c)(2) on the maintaining of a correspondent
account or a payable-through account for a foreign financial institution whose name is
added to the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or
Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List), which is maintained on the Office of
Foreign Assets Control's Web site (www.treasury.gov/ofac), U.S. financial institutions
that maintain correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for the foreign
financial institution are authorized to:
(1) Process only those transactions through the account, or permit the foreign financial
institution to execute only those transactions through the account, that are for the
purpose of, and necessary for, closing the account; and
(2) Transfer the funds remaining in the correspondent account or the payable-through
account to an account of the foreign financial institution located outside of the United
States and close the correspondent account or the payable-through account.
(b) A report must be filed with the Office of Foreign Assets Control within 30 days of the
closure of an account, providing full details on the closing of each correspondent
account or payable-through account maintained by a U.S. financial institution for a
foreign financial institution whose name is added to the CAPTA List, maintained on the
Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site (www.treasury.gov/ofac). Such report must
include complete information on the closing of the account and on all transactions
processed or executed through the account pursuant to this section, including the
account outside of the United States to which funds remaining in the account were
transferred. Reports should be addressed to the attention of the Sanctions,
Compliance & Evaluations Division, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department
of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20220.
(c) Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis to authorize transactions by
a U.S. financial institution with respect to a correspondent account or a payable
through account maintained by the U.S. financial institution for a foreign financial
institution whose name is added to the CAPTA List, that are outside the scope of the
transactions authorized in paragraph (a) of this section and/or that occur beyond the
10-day period authorized in that paragraph. License applications should be filed in
conformance with §501.801 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations, 31
CFR part 501.
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(d) Nothing in this section authorizes the opening of a correspondent account or a
payable-through account for a foreign financial institution whose name appears on the
CAPTA List.
Note to 5561.504: This section does not authorize a U.S. financial institution to unblock
property or interests in property, or to engage in any transaction or dealing in property
or interests in property, blocked pursuant to any other part of this chapter, in the
process of closing a correspondent account or a payable-through account for a foreign
financial institution whose name has been added to the CAPTA List, maintained on the
Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site (www.treasury.gov/ofac). See §561.101.
[77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 16409, Mar. 15, 2013; 84 FR 9457,
Mar. 15, 2019]
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Subpart F-Reports
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5561.601 Records and reports.
For provisions relating to required records and reports, see part 501, subpart C, of this
chapter.
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Subpart G-Penalties
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5561.701 Penalties.
(a) Civil Penalties. (1) As set forth in section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-195) (22 U.5.C. 8501-8551)
("CISADA") and section 1245(g)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81)(22 U.S.C. 8513a) ("2012 NDAA"), a civil penalty not to exceed
the amount set forth in section 206(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1705(b)) may be imposed on any person who violates, attempts
to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition contained in
§561.201 or §561.203 or of any order, regulation, or license set forth in or issued
pursuant to this part concerning such prohibitions.
(2) As set forth in section 104(d) of CISADA, a civil penalty not to exceed the amount set
forth in section 206(b) of IEEPA may be imposed on a U.S. financial institution if:
(i) A person owned or controlled by the U.S. financial institution violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of the prohibition in 5561.202 or of
any order, regulation, or license set forth in or issued pursuant to this part concerning
such prohibition; and
(ii) The U.S. financial institution knew or should have known that the person violated,
attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of such prohibition.
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(3) Pursuant to section 206 of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1705), which is applicable to violations of
the provisions of any license, ruling, regulation, order, directive, or instruction issued by
or pursuant to the direction or authorization of the Secretary of the Treasury under
IEEPA, a civil penalty not to exceed the amount set forth in section 206(b) of IEEPA may
be imposed on any person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of any prohibition contained in §561.204 or of any order, regulation,
or license set forth in or issued pursuant to this part concerning such prohibition.
Note to paragraph (a): The applicable maximum civil penalty per violation of IEEPA is
the greater of $295,141 or an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction that
is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is imposed.
(b) Criminal Penalty. (1) As set forth in section 104(c) of CISADA and section 1245(g)(2)
of the 2012 NDAA, a person who willfully commits, willfully attempts to commit, or
willfully conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of a violation of any
prohibition contained in 55561.201 or 561.203 shall, upon conviction, be fined not
more than $1,000,000, or if a natural person, be imprisoned for not more than 20
years, or both.
(2) Pursuant to section 206 of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1705), a person who willfully commits,
willfully attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the
commission of a violation of any prohibition contained in §561.204 or of any order,
regulation, or license set forth in or issued pursuant to this part concerning such
prohibition may, upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000, or if a natural
person, be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.
(c) Adjustments to penalty amounts. (1) The civil penalties provided in IEEPA are subject
to adjustment pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990
(Pub. L. 101-410, as amended, 28 U.5.C. 2461 note).
(2) The criminal penalties provided in IEEPA are subject to adjustment pursuant to 18
u.s.c. 3571.
(d) Attention is also directed to 18 U.S.C. 1001, which provides that "whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; makes any materially false, fictitious,
or fraudulent statement or representation; or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry" shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned, or
both.
(e) Violations of this part may also be subject to relevant provisions of other applicable
laws.
[77 FR 11726, Feb. 27, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 16410, Mar. 15, 2013; 81 FR 43076,
July 1, 2016; 82 FR 10438, Feb. 10, 2017; 83 FR 11879, Mar. 19, 2018]
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§561.702 Pre-Penalty Notice; settlement.
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(a) When required. If the Office of Foreign Assets Control has reason to believe that
there has occurred a violation of any provision of this part or a violation of the
provisions of any license, ruling, regulation, order, direction, or instruction issued by or
pursuant to the direction or authorization of the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to
this part or otherwise under IEEPA and determines that a civil monetary penalty may
be warranted, the Office of Foreign Assets Control may issue a Pre-Penalty Notice
informing the alleged violator of the agency's intent to impose a monetary penalty. A
Pre-Penalty Notice shall be in writing. The Pre-Penalty Notice may be issued whether or
not another agency has taken any action with respect to the matter. For a description
of the contents of a Pre-Penalty Notice, see appendix A to part 501 of this chapter.
(b)(1) Right to respond. An alleged violator has the right to respond to a Pre-Penalty
Notice by making a written presentation to the Office of Foreign Assets Control. For a
description of the information that should be included in such a response, see
appendix A to part 501 of this chapter.
(2) Deadline for response. A response to a Pre-Penalty Notice must be made within 30
days of the date of service of the Pre-Penalty Notice. The failure to submit a response
within the applicable time period set forth in this paragraph shall be deemed to be a
waiver of the right to respond.
(i) Computation of time for response.A response to a Pre-Penalty Notice must be
postmarked or date-stamped by the U.S. Postal Service (or foreign postal service, if
mailed abroad) or courier service provider (if transmitted to the Office of Foreign
Assets Control by courier) on or before the 30th day after the postmark date on the
envelope in which the Pre-Penalty Notice was mailed. If the Pre-Penalty Notice was
personally delivered by a non-U.S. Postal Service agent authorized by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, a response must be postmarked or date-stamped on or before
the 30th day after the date of delivery.
(ii) Extensions of time for response. If a due date falls on a federal holiday or weekend,
that due date is extended to include the following business day. Any other extensions
of time will be granted, at the discretion of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, only
upon specific request to the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
(3) Form and method of response.A response to a Pre-Penalty Notice need not be in
any particular form, but it must be typewritten and signed by the alleged violator or a
representative thereof, must contain information sufficient to indicate that it is in
response to the Pre-Penalty Notice, and must include the Office of Foreign Assets
Control identification number listed on the Pre-Penalty Notice. A copy of the written
response may be sent by facsimile, but the original also must be sent to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control Enforcement Division by mail or courier and must be
postmarked or date-stamped in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
(c) Settlement. Settlement discussion may be initiated by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, the alleged violator, or the alleged violator's authorized representative. For a
description of practices with respect to settlement, see appendix A to part 501 of this
chapter.
(d) Guidelines. Guidelines for the imposition or settlement of civil penalties by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control are contained in appendix A to part 501 of this
chapter.
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(e) Representation. A representative of the alleged violator may act on behalf of the
alleged violator, but any oral communication with the Office of Foreign Assets Control
prior to a written submission regarding the specific allegations contained in the Pre
Penalty Notice must be preceded by a written letter of representation, unless the Pre
Penalty Notice was served upon the alleged violator in care of the representative.
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5561.703 Penalty imposition.
If, after considering any timely written response to the Pre-Penalty Notice and any
relevant facts, the Office of Foreign Assets Control determines that there was a
violation by the alleged violator named in the Pre-Penalty Notice and that a civil
monetary penalty is appropriate, the Office of Foreign Assets Control may issue a
Penalty Notice to the violator containing a determination of the violation and the
imposition of the monetary penalty. For additional details concerning issuance of a
Penalty Notice, see appendix A to part 501 of this chapter. The issuance of the Penalty
Notice shall constitute final agency action. The violator has the right to seek judicial
review of that final agency action in federal district court.
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§561.704 Administrative collection; referral to United
States Department of Justice.
In the event that the violator does not pay the penalty imposed pursuant to this part,
the matter may be referred for administrative collection measures by the Department
of the Treasury or to the United States Department of Justice for appropriate action to
recover the penalty in a civil suit in a federal district court.
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Subpart H-Procedures
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5561.801 Procedures.
For license application procedures and procedures relating to amendments,
modifications, or revocations of licenses; administrative decisions; rulemaking; and
requests for documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts (5
U.S.C. 552 and 552a), see part 501, subpart E, of this chapter.
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5561.802 Delegation by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Any action that the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to take pursuant to
subsections 104(c), (d), (h), or (i), or section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501-8551 ), as
amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Pub. L.
112-158) (22 U.S.C. 8701-8795), pursuant to section 8 of Executive Order 13553 of
September 28, 2010 (75 FR 60567, October 1, 2010), pursuant to section 10 of Executive
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Order 13599 of February 5, 2012 (77 FR 6659, February 8, 2012), pursuant to sections 1
and 12 of Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012 (77 FR 45897, August 2, 2012), or
pursuant to section 16 of Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012 (77 FR 62139,
October 12, 2012), and any action of the Secretary of the Treasury described in this
part, may be taken by the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control or by any
other person to whom the Secretary of the Treasury has delegated authority so to act.
[78 FR 16410, Mar. 5, 2013]
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5561.803 Consultations.
In implementing sections 104 and 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-195)(22 U.5.C. 8501-8551 ), as
amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Pub. L.
112-158) (22 U.S.C. 8701-8795), the Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with the
Secretary of State and may, in the sole discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury,
consult with such other agencies and departments and such other interested parties as
the Secretary considers appropriate.
[78 FR 16410, Mar.15, 2013]
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Subpart I-Paperwork Reduction Act
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5561.901 Paperwork Reduction Act notice.
For approval by the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) under the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.5.C. 3507) of the information collections relating to the
record keeping and reporting requirements of §561.601, licensing procedures
(including those pursuant to statements of licensing policy), and other procedures, see
§501.901 of this chapter. The information collection in 5561.504(b) has been approved
by 0MB and assigned control number 1505-0243. An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless
it displays a valid control number assigned by 0MB.
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Need assistance?
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Annex 22
U.S. Department of Treasury, “Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons
Whose Property and Interests in Property Are Blocked”, 13 August 2014
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
August 13, 2014
REVISED GUIDANCE ON ENTITIES OWNED BY PERSONS WHOSE PROPERTY
AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY ARE BLOCKED
This guidance responds to inquiries received by the Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) relating to the status of entities owned by individuals or entities
designated under Executive orders and regulations administered by OFAC. This document sets
forth new guidance with respect to entities owned 50 percent or more in the aggregate by more
than one blocked person.
Property blocked pursuant to an Executive order or regulations administered by OFAC is broadly
defined to include any property or interest in property, tangible or intangible, including present,
future or contingent interests. A property interest subject to blocking includes interests of any
nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.
Persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to an Executive order or
regulations administered by OFAC (blocked persons) are considered to have an interest in all
property and interests in property of an entity in which such blocked persons own, whether
individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest.
Consequently, any entity owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by
one or more blocked persons is itself considered to be a blocked person. The property and
interests in property of such an entity are blocked regardless of whether the entity itself is listed
in the annex to an Executive order or otherwise placed on OFAC's list of Specially Designated
Nationals (SDNs"). Accordingly, a U.S. person generally may not engage in any transactions
with such an entity, unless authorized by OFAC. In certain OFAC sanctions programs (e.g.,
Cuba and Sudan), there is a broader category of entities whose property and interests in property
are blocked based on, for example, ownership or control.
U.S. persons are advised to act with caution when considering a transaction with a non-blocked
entity in which one or more blocked persons has a significant ownership interest that is less than
50 percent or which one or more blocked persons may control by means other than a majority
ownership interest. Such entities may be the subject of future designation or enforcement action
by OFAC. Furthermore, a U.S. person may not procure goods, services, or technology from, or
engage in transactions with, a blocked person directly or indirectly (including through a third
party intermediary).
OFAC will incorporate this guidance as it issues regulations implementing new sanctions
programs. In addition, OFAC expects to amend regulations implementing existing sanctions
programs to reflect this guidance.
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Annex 23
U.S. Secretary of State, “Waivers Determinations and Findings”, 18 October 2015
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- 56 -
Waiver Determinations and Findings
Acting under the authorities vested in me as Secretary of State, including
through the applicable delegations of authority, I hereby make the following
determinations and certifications:
Pursuant to Sections 1244(i), 1245(g), 1246(e), and 1247(f) of the Iran
Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (subtitle D of title XII of
Public Law 112-239, 22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.) (IFCA), I determine that it is
vital to the national security of the United States to waive the imposition of
sanctions under the following provisions, to the extent necessary to
implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including the
U.S. commitments with respect to sanctions described in Sections 17.1-17.2
and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, effective as provided in the last
paragraph below:
1. Section 1244( c )( 1) of IFCA
I
for:
a. transactions by non-U.S. persons; and
b. transactions by U.S. persons for the sale of commercial
passenger aircraft and spare parts and components for such
aircraft, and associated services to Iran as described in Section
5.1.1 of Annex II to the JCPOA, provided that OFAC has
issued any required licenses;
excluding any transactions involving persons on OFAC's list of Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
3
(hereinafter the SDN List);
1
Pursuant to section 1244(c)(2)(C)(iii) oflFCA, the relevant sanction in Section 1244(c)(I) continues not to apply,
by its tenns, in the case of Iranian financial institutions that have not been designated for the imposition of sanctions
in connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, support for international terrorism, or abuses of human rights (as described in section 1244(c)(3)).
For purposes of the waivers set forth herein, the tenn "transactions by non-U.S. persons" includes transactions by
non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person ("U.S.-owned or controlled foreign entities") to the
extent U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities are authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of
the Department of the Treasury to engage in such transactions.
3
On Implementation Day of the JCPOA, individuals and entities identified in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the
JCPOA will be removed from the SDN List and, as appropriate, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List and/or the Non
SON Iran Sanctions Act List. For transactions with individuals or entities that have been removed from the SON
List but that remain blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599, this waiver applies only if and to the extent
necessary to implement the JCPOA, including the U.S. commitments with respect to sanctions described in Sections
17.1-17.2 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
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-2
2. Section 1244(d) ofIFCA for transactions by non-U.S. persons,
excluding any transactions involving persons on the SDN List;
3. Section 1244(h)(2) ofIFCA for transactions by foreign financial
institutions, excluding any transactions involving persons on the SDN List;
4. Sections 1245(a)(l )(A) ofIFCA for transactions by non-U.S. persons,
excluding any transactions involving persons on the SDN List;
5. Sections 1245(a)(l)(B) ofIFCA for transactions by non-U.S. persons,
excluding any transactions involving persons on the SON List;
6. Section 1245(a)(l)(C) ofIFCA for transactions by non-U.S. persons
for the sale, supply, or transfer directly or indirectly to or from Iran of
materials described in Section 1245(d), and for associated services, with
respect to materials that are:
(a)
to be used in connection with the energy, shipping, or
shipbuilding sector of Iran, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise
supplied to an end user in one or more such sectors;
(b) sold, supplied, or transferred to any individual or entity blocked
solely pursuant to E.O. 13599, or resold, retransferred, or
otherwise supplied to such an individual or entity; and
(c) determined pursuant to Section 1245(e)(3) to be used as
described in that section, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise
supplied for use in the nuclear program of Iran;
excluding transactions involving: (i) persons on the SDN List; (ii) the sale,
supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) that have not
been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to
paragraph 16 ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and
Section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which the procurement
channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in
section 1245( d) if the material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly, for use in
connection with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran;
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-3-
7. Section 1245(c) ofIFCA for transactions by non-U.S. persons that are
within the scope of the waivers under Section 1245(a)(l) ofIFCA as
described in paragraphs 4-6 above, excluding any transactions involving
persons on the SON List;
8. Section 1246(a)(l)(A) ofIFCA
for the provision of underwriting
services or insurance or reinsurance by non-U.S. persons in connection
with activities involving Iran that are described in Sections 17 .1-17 .2
and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, excluding any transactions
involving persons on the SON List;
4
9. Section 1246(a)(l)(B)(i) ofIFCA for the provision of underwriting
services or insurance or reinsurance by non-U.S. persons, excluding any
transactions involving persons on the SON List;
10. Section 1246(a)(l)(B)(ii) ofIFCA for the provision of underwriting
services or insurance or reinsurance by non-U.S. persons for transactions
that are within the scope of the waivers under section 1245(a)(l)(B) and
(C) ofIFCA as described in paragraphs 5-6 above, excluding any
transactions involving persons on the SON List;
11.Section 1246(a)(l )(C) ofIFCA for the provision of underwriting
services or insurance or reinsurance by non-U.S. persons to or for any
individual or entity blocked solely pursuant to E.0. 13599, excluding
any transactions involving persons on the SON List;
12. Section 1246(a) ofIFCA for the provision of underwriting services or
insurance or reinsurance by U.S. persons for the sale of commercial
passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran as described in
Section 5.1.1 of Annex II of the JCPOA, provided that OFAC has issued
any required licenses, excluding any transactions involving persons on
the SON List; and
Pursuant to section 1246(a)(l)(C) oflFCA, the relevant sanction in section 1246(a)(l) continues not to apply, by
its tenns, in the case of Iranian financial institutions that have not been designated for the imposition of sanctions in
connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, support for international terrorism, or abuses of human rights (as described in section 1246(b)).
- 59 -
-4
13.Section 1247(a) ofIFCA
to the extent required for transactions by
foreign financial institutions, excluding any transactions involving
persons on the SDN List.
5
Pursuant to section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY 2012 (Public Law 112-81 }, as amended, I determine that it is in the
national security interest of the United States to waive the imposition of
sanctions under Section 1245( d)( 1) to the extent necessary to implement the
JCPOA, including the U.S. commitments with respect to sanctions described
in Sections 1 7 .1-1 7 .2 and 17 .5 of Annex V of the J CPOA, for transactions
by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran, excluding any
transactions involving persons on the SDN List, effective as provided in the
last paragraph below.
Pursuant to sections 212(d)(l) and 213(b)(l) of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of2012 (Public Law 112-158) (TRA) and
section 4(c)(l)(A) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172,
50 U.S.C. 1701 note) (ISA), I find that it is vital to the national security
interests of the United States to issue waivers regarding the application of
sanctions under the following provisions for individuals and entities that
engage in or propose to engage in the activities described in (1)-(3) below,
effective as provided in the last paragraph below:
1. Section 212(a) of the TRA for transactions by non-U.S. nationals in
cases where the transactions are for activities described in Sections
4.2.1, 4.3, and 4.4 of Annex II of the JCPOA and do not involve
persons on the SDN List.
2. Section 213(a) of the TRA for transactions by non-U.S. nationals in
cases where the transactions are for activities described in Section
4.1.5 and 4.1.7 of Annex II of the JCPOA and do not involve persons
on the SDN List.
3. Section 5(a) ofISA for transactions by non-U.S. nationals in cases
where the transactions are for activities described in Sections 4.2.1,
? Pursuant to section 1247(a) ofIFCA, the relevant sanction in section 1247(a) still continues not to apply, by its
terms, in the case of Iranian financial institutions that have not been designated for the imposition of sanctions in
connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, support for international terrorism, or abuses of human rights (as described in section 1247(b)).
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-5
4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, and 4.3.6 of Annex II of the JCPOA and do not
involve persons on the SDN List.
The waivers and findings set forth above shall take effect upon confirmation
by the Secretary of State that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related
measures specified in Sections 15 .1-15 .11 of Annex V of the JCPOA as
verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
0CT 18 2015
Date
- 61 -
- 62 -
Annex 24
U.S. Department of State, “Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions
Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Implementation Day”,
16 January 2016
- 63 -
- 64 -
Please note that on May 8, 2018, the President announced his decision to cease
the United States' participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), and to begin re-imposing the U.S. nuclear-related sanctions that
were lifted to effectuate the JCPOA sanctions relief, following a wind-down
period. This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist
persons in determining which activities were consistent with the JCPOA
sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16, 2016 through May 8, 2018.
Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury have issued
additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the
wind-down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this
document and guidance issued by the Department of State or the Department
of the Treasury on or after May 8, 2018, the later-issued guidance should be
treated as governing.
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE LIFTING OF CERTAIN U.S.
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF
ACTION ON IMPLEMENTATION DAY
Background
4
I. General Notes
6
ll. Nuclear-related Secondary Sanctions
7
A. Financial and Banking-related Sanctions
7
B. Sanctions Related to Insurance
14
C. Sanctions Related to Iran's Energy and Petrochemical Sectors
17
D. Sanctions Related to Iran's Shipping and Shipbuilding Sectors and Port Operators22
E. Sanctions Related to Gold and Other Precious Metals
25
F. Sanctions Related to Software and Metals
28
G Sanctions Related to the Automotive Sector
3 I
Ill. Sanctions List Removals..
.
33
A. Non-applicability of certain secondary sanctions authorities
34
B. Continued blocking under E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR
35
IV. Other Trade Measures
36
A. Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Reexport to Iran
of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (SLP)
37
B. General License Authorizing Activities by Non-U.S. Persons that are Owned or
Controlled by a U.S. Person
38
C. General License Authorizing the Importation of Iranian-Origin Carpets and
Foodstuffs..
. ..... 39
V. Termination of Executive Orders..
.
40
VT. Waivers..
.42
A. IFCA
43
B. NOAA 2012
46
C. TRA..
.
46
D. ISA .
47
VII. Key U.S. Legal Authorities That Remain in Place After Implementation Day
47
A. Trade Sanctions
47
B. Designation Authorities and Blocking Sanctions
48
C. Correspondent and Payable-through Account Sanctions
50
D. Menu-based Sanctions
51
2
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
E. Non-Proliferation Sanctions
52
F. Terrorism List Sanctions
52
This document is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. Please see particularly
the legally binding provisions cited below governing the sanctions. This document does not
supplement or modify the statutory authorities, Executive orders, or regulations.
3
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
Background
On July 14, 2015, the PS+ I (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. The JCPOA
builds on the foundation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) of November 24, 2013, and the
political framework announced in Lausanne on April 2, 2015
On January 16, 2016, upon confirmation by the Secretary of State that the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) had verified that Iran had implemented the nuclear-related measures
described in sections 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the United States lifted the U.S
nuclear-related sanctions described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA.'
Consequently, January 16, 2016 is the day referred to as "Implementation Day" in paragraph
34.iii of the Main Text of the JCPOA. The US. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) has updated its website to notify the public of certain steps the United
States has taken to fulfill Implementation Day sanctions commitments.
As set out in sections 4.1 to 4.7 of Annex II and section 17.1 to 17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA,
the United States government (USG) has lifted nuclear-related secondary sanctions' on: Iran's
financial, banking, energy, petrochemical, shipping, shipbuilding, and automotive sectors; Iran's
port operators; the provision of insurance, re-insurance and underwriting services in connection
with activities that are consistent with the JCPOA; Tran's trade in gold and other precious metals;
trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
certain software in connection with activities that are consistent with the JCPOA; and the
provision of associated services for each of the categories above. As set out in section 4.8.1 of
Annex II and section 17.3 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the USG also removed the individuals and
entities listed in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA from OFAC's List of Specially
' Upon reaching Implementation Day, the EU gave effect to its commitment to lift sanctions as set out in section 16
of Annex V of the JCPOA. In addition, the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)
1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, and 2224 were tenninated (subject to re-imposition in the event of significant
nonperformance by Iran of JCPOA commitments), although certain restrictions related to nuclear-, conventional
arms-. and ballistic missile-related activities will be applied under UNSCR 2231 of July 20, 2015, which endorsed
the JCPOA.
On Implementation Day, the Joint Plan of Action of November 24, 2013, as extended (POA), ceased to be in
effect, and the temporary suspension of certain sanctions under that arrangement was superseded by the relevant
sanctions lifting provided as part of the JCPOA.
Secondary sanctions generally are directed toward non-U.S. persons for specified conduct involving Iran that
occurs entirely outside of U.S. jurisdiction and does not involve U.S. persons.
4
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SON List), Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE
List), and/or Non-SON Iran Sanctions Act List (NS-ISA List), as appropriate.
In addition, as set out in section 5 of Annex lJ and section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, on
Implementation Day, the USG took steps to: (i) allow for the export, reexport, sale, lease or
transfer of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran for exclusively
civil, commercial passenger aviation end-use; (ii) license non-U.S. entities that are owned or
controlled by a U.S. person (U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities") to engage in activities
that are consistent with the JCPOA and applicable U.S. laws and regulations; and (iii) license the
importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios
and caviar. With the exception of the three categories of activities described above, none of the
sanctions-related commitments outlined in this guidance apply to U.S. persons, and U.S. persons,
including U.S. companies, continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions or
dealings with Iran and the Government of Iran unless such activities are exempt from regulation
or authorized by OFAC.'
To implement the commitments under sections 17.1 to17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the USG:
(i) issued, on Adoption Day,waivers of relevant statutory sanctions authorities, which became
effective on Implementation Day; (ii) removed, on Implementation Day, the individuals and
entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex 11 of the JCPOA from the SDN List, FSE List, and/or
NS-ISA List, as appropriate; (iii) issued, on Implementation Day, an Executive order (E.O.) that
revoked E.O.s 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and sections 5-7 and 15 ofEO 13628; and (iv)
issued, on Implementation Day, a Statement of Licensing Policy and two general licenses.
After Implementation Day, the next major milestone in the JCPOA is Transition Day. Transition
Day will occur 8 years from Adoption Day or upon a report from the Director General of the
IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in
Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. As set out in section 21 of Annex V of
the JCPOA, on Transition Day, the USG will seek to terminate, or modify to effectuate the
termination of, relevant statutory provisions set forth in sections 4.1 to 4.7 and 4.9 of Annex II
and will remove the individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 4 to Annex II of the JCPOA
4
In addition, non-U.S. persons continue to be prohibited from knowingly engaging in conduct that seeks to evade
U.S. restrictions on transactions or dealings with lran or that causes the export of goods or services from the United
States to Iran. See section VII.A. I.
5
"Adoption Day" under the JCPOA, which occurred on October 18, 2015, is the day on which the JCPOA became
effective and the participants in the JCPO A began to make the necessary preparations to implement their JCPOA
commitments.
5
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
from the SON List and/or FSE List." The USG will issue additional guidance related to these
commitments prior to Transition Day.
For additional information, please see section A of OFAC Frequently Asked_Questions Rel@ting
to the Lifting of Certain US, Sanctions Under the I(PoA_on Implementation Day (CPO4
EHOs)
This guidance document is organized into seven sections. Section I contains introductory notes
regarding the sanctions lifting under the JCPOA. Section II reviews the various nuclear-related
secondary sanctions that were lifted on Implementation Day, explains how those sanctions were
lifted, and describes the effect of the sanctions lifting. Section III addresses the sanctions list
removals that occurred on Implementation Day, and what it means for parties engaging in
transactions or activities with individuals and entities that were removed from the relevant
sanctions lists. Section IV describes other U.S. commitments under the JCPOA, including
commitments with respect to (i) exports of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and
services for commercial passenger aviation, (ii) the ability of U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign
entities to engage in activities that are consistent with the JCPOA and U.S. law, and (iii) imports
of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs into the United States. Section V addresses the U.S.
commitment to terminate four E.O.s and part ofa fifth. Section VI provides an overview of the
waiver determinations and findings with respect to certain statutory sanctions issued to
implement U.S. Implementation Day sanctions commitments under the JCPOA. Finally, Section
VII provides a list of key legal authorities that are outside the scope of the JCPOA and that
remain in place after Implementation Day.
I. General Notes
In reviewing the JCPOA and this guidance, members of the regulated public should be aware of
the following:
• The sanctions-related commitments described in the JCPOA are directed towards non
U.S. persons, and except for the commitments described in section 5 of Annex II of the
JCPOA, do not apply to U.S. persons."
This commitment does not impact the USG's ability under relevant statutes and E.O.s to remove persons from the
relevant sanctions lists prior to Transition Day if the circumstances warrant.
For the purpose of this guidance, the term non-U.S. person" means any individual or entity excluding any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States. This definition of "non
U.S. person therefore includes U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities. However, U.S.-owned or -controlled
6
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
• The sanctions commitments described in the JCPO,A and this guidance do not apply to
transactions that involve persons who remain or are placed on the SDN List.
Transactions involving such persons remain sanctionable after Implementation Day.
• The USG commitment to lift sanctions described in the JCPOA is without prejudice to
sanctions that may apply under legal provisions not included within the scope of section
4 of Annex II of the JCPOA. As further detailed in section VII below, the USG retains the
authority to continue imposing sanctions under authorities not included within the scope
of section 4 of Annex II, including those used to address Iran's: support for terrorism,
support for persons involved in human rights abuses in Syria or for the Government of
Syria, support for persons threatening the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, human
rights abuses, and ballistic missile program.
9
n. Nuclear-related Secondary Sanctions
To effectuate the lifting of the nuclear-related secondary sanctions set out in sections 4.1 to 4. 7 of
Annex II and sections 17.1 to 17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA, on Implementation Day, the USG
took the steps set out below.
A. Financial and Banking-related Sanctions
Commitment:
Section 4.1 of Annex II and section 17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA provide for the lifting, on
Implementation Day, of secondary sanctions that apply to non-U.S. persons who engage in
certain financial and banking activities related to Iran. In particular, beginning on
Implementation Day, the following activities by non-U.S. persons are no longer sanctionable:
foreign entities are eligible to participate in transactions or activities subject to the sanctions lifting under the JCPOA
only to the extent that the transactions or activities are exempt from regulation or authorized by OFAC.
The term "United States person" or "U.S. person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity
organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches). or any person in the United States. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.314.
9
For example. a transaction involving lran that would be sanctionable under an authority that is not lifted pursuant
to the JCPOA (e.g., a U.S. sanctions authority relating to Yemen or Syria) remains sanctionable under that other
authority after Implementation Day
7
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
• Financial and banking transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to
Annex II of the JCPOA, including: the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other specified
Iranian financial institutions; the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Naftiran
lntertrade Company (NICO), the National Iranian Tanker Company (NlTC), and other
specified individuals and entities identified as the Government of Iran by OFAC; and
certain designated individuals and entities that were removed from the SDN List on
Implementation Day (see section 4. 1.1 of Annex II of the JCPOA);
• Transactions involving the Iranian rial or maintaining funds or accounts outside of Iran
denominated in the Iranian rial (see section 4.1.2 of Annex II of the JCPOA),
• Providing U.S. bank notes to the Government of Iran (see section 4.1.3 of Annex II of the
JCPOA),
• The purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt,
including governmental bonds (see section 4.1.5 of Annex 11 of the JCPOA);
• Providing specialized financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial
institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex 11 of the JCPOA (see section 4.1.6 of Annex
II of the JCPOA); and
• The provision of associated services"" for each of the categories above (see section 4.1.7
of Annex II of the JCPOA)
In addition, the USG has removed bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad,
including limitations on their transfer (see section 4.1.4 of Annex 11 of the JCPOA)
Implementation;
To effectuate the lifting of these sanctions on Implementation Day, the USG has, in addition to
removing certain individuals and entities from the SDN List, FSE List, and NS-ISA List as
described in section III below, taken the following steps:
""For purposes of the JCPOA and this guidance, the USG interprets the term "associated services"to mean any
service - including technical assistance, insurance, re-insurance, brokering, transportation, or financial service -
necessary and ordinarily incident to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to the
JCPOA. U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or-controlled foreign entities remain prohibited from providing associated
services in connection with transactions or activities within the scope of the sanctions lifting under the JCPOA,
unless the transactions or activities are exempt from regulation or authorized by OFAC. U.S.-owned or -controlled
foreign entities may provide such associated services to the extent the transactions or activities are within the scope
of the general license described in Section IV.B, below.
8
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
I. Correspondent or Payable-Through Account Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of correspondent or payable-through account sanctions
under: section 1245(d)(I) of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal
Year 2012, as amended (NDAA 2012)
(for significant financial transactions by
foreign financial institutions (FFIs)' with the CBI)'; section 1244(d)(2) of the
Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) (for significant
financial transactions by FFIs for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of
significant goods or services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or
shipbuilding sectors oflran, including NIOC, NITC, and the Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)); section 1244(h)(2) ofIFCA (for financial
transactions by FF Is for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of natural
11
'' Sections 1245(d)03) and 1245(d)69(C) Of NDAA 2012, which clarify the scope of the sanction under section
1245(d)(I), are without effect when the sanction under 1245(d)(D) is waived.
For purposes of this guidance. and as defined in 561,308 of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations. 31 C.FR.
part 561 (IFSR), the term foreign financial institution" or FFT means any foreign entity that is engaged in the
business of accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing
or selling foreign exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as
principal or agent. It includes but is not limited to depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money service
businesses, trust companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers,
forward contract and foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations,
investment companies, employee benefit plans. dealers in precious metals. stones, or jewels, and holding companies,
affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing.
13
Section l 245(d)( I) of NDAA 2012 further provides for correspondent or payable-through account sanctions for
significant transactions by FFIs with Iranian financial institutions designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (designated Iranian
financial institutions"). As noted in section VI below. the waiver of section 1245(d)() of NDAA 2012 issued by the
Secretary of State covers transactions by FFIs with the CBI but not with designated Iranian financial institutions.
Iranian financial institutions identified as persons whose property and interests in property are blocked solely
pursuant to E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. 31 C.FR. part
560 (ITSR), are not designated Iranian financial institutions. and section 1245(d)(I) of ND AA 2012 does not, by its
tenns. apply to transactions with such financial institutions. Pursuant to the U.S. commitment described in section
4.8.1 of Annex II of the JCPOA, the United States removed the designations of Iranian financial institutions listed in
Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA on Implementation Day (though these institutions remain blocked pursuant
to E.O. 13599 and section 560.21l of the ITSR); as a result, these Iranian financial institutions were removed from
the SDN List. Following Implementation Day, the sanction under section I 245(d)( 1) of NDAA 2012 only applies to
significant financial transactions by FFIs with Iranian financial institutions on the SDN List, including those
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.FR. part 594(GTSR). or
E.O. 13382 and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544
(WMDPSR). As of January 16, 2016, the following Iranian financial institutions are designated pursuant to E.O.
13224 and the GTSR or E.O. 13382 and the WMDPSR: Ansar Bank, Bank Saderat, Bank Saderat PLC, and Mehr
Bank.
9
- 73 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
gas)'; section I 24S(c) of IFCA (for significant financial transactions by FF ls for
the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of precious metals or specified
materials (graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal,
and software for integrating industrial processes) that are within the scope of the
waivers under section 124S(a)(l) ofrFCA, as described in section VI below); and
section 1247(a) of IFCA.'
b. Revoked:" E.O. 13622, including the correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under section (I )(a), as amended by section 16 of E.O. 13645 (for FF ls
that conduct or facilitate transactions: with NIOC or NICO; for the purchase,
acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from
Iran; or for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petrochemical products from Iran); and E.O. 13645, including the correspondent
or payable-through account sanctions under section I (a) (for FFls engaging in
significant transactions related to the Iranian rial and maintaining significant
funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran denominated in the Iranian rial) and
subsection 3(a)(i) (for significant transactions by FF ls on behalf of any Iranian
person on the SON List or any other person included on the SON List whose
property and interests in
property
are blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) of
E.O. 13645 or E.O. 13599).
7
'By its terms, section 1244(h)02) 0of IFCA subjects FFIs to all sanctions available under section 1244 with respect
to the sale, supply, or transfer of natural gas to or from Imn, including correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under section 1244(d)02). blocking sanctions under section 1244(c)( I), and menu-based sanctions under
section 1244(d)(l), unless bilateral trade lim.itations on Iranian revenues generated by such transactions are applied.
To avoid repetition, and because it explicitly applies to FFIs. section 1244(h)02) is discussed in this section focusing
on correspondent or payable-through account sanctions and is not repeated in the following sections focusing on
blocking sanctions and menu-based sanctions.
'Afer Implementation Day, it continues to be sanctionable under section 1247(a) of IFCA for FFIs to knowingly
facilitate a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian person on the SDN List. The relevant sanction
in section 1247(a) of IFC A continues not to apply, by its terms, in the case of Iranian financial institutions blocked
solely pursuant to E.0. 13599. In addition, pursuant to the commitment in section 4.8.I of Annex II of the JCPOA
and as described in section IHI. below, on Implementation Day, such Iranian financial institutions were removed from
the SON List. As a result of these removals, after Implementation Day. the references in sections l244(c)(l),
1246(a)( 1). and 1247(a) of IFCA to Iranian financial institutions that have not been designated for the imposition of
sanctions are no longer relevant and therefore are not further discussed in this guidance.
" Revoking the specified E.O.s and E.O. provisions as further detailed in section V below has the effect of
terminating the sanctions under the relevant E.O. or E.O. provision, as appropriate.
'Notwithstanding the revocation of E.O. 13645, section 1247(a) of IFCA remains in place and it continues to be
sanctionable for FFls to knowingly facilitate a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian person on
the SDN List.
10
- 74 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
c. Committed to refrain from imposing sanctions under section 561.203(a) of the
lranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.ER. part 561 (IFSR), for
transactions by FF ls with the CBI that are consistent with the waiver of section
1245(d)(l) of NDAA 2012
2. Blocking Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of blocking sanctions under section 1244(c)(I) of IFCA"
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide significant financial,
material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person determined to be
part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or to operate a port in
Iran, or Iranian individuals or entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the
1CP0A)."
b. Committed to refrain from imposing discretionary blocking sanctions under
section 220(c) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(TRA) on non-US. persons who knowingly and directly provide specialized
financial messaging services to, or knowingly enable or facilitate direct or indirect
access to such messaging services for, the CBI or any Iranian financial institution
not included on the SDN List."
c. Revoked: E.O. 13622, including the blocking sanctions under section 5(a) (with
respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NTOC,
NICO, or the CBI, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious
pursuant to section I 244(c)(2)(C)(iii) of IFCA, the relevant sanction in I 244(c)( I) of IFCA continues not to apply,
by its terms, in the case of Iranian financial institutions blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599
" After Implementation Day, it continues to be sanctionable under section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA for non-U.S. persons
to knowingly provide significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in
support of any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of any Iranian person on the SDN List.
-" After Implementation Day, it continues to be sanctionable under section 220 of the TRA for non-U.S. persons to
knowingly and directly provide specialized financial messaging services to. or knowingly enable or facilitate direct
or indirect access to such messaging services for, any Iranian financial institution designated pursuant to E.0. 13382
Or E.0. 13224 in connection with, respectively, Iran's proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery or Iran's
support for international terrorism. In addition, persons providing, or enabling access to, such services for
individuals or entities on the SON List that are designated pursuant to E.0. 13382 or E.0. 13224 could themselves
be designated under those authorities.
II
- 75 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
metals by the Government of Iran); and E.O. 13645, including the blocking
sanctions under section l(a) (for FFis engaging in significant transactions related
to the Iranian rial or maintaining significant funds or accounts outside the territory
of Iran denominated in the Iranian rial) and subsection 2(a)(i) (with respect to
persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any Iranian
person included on the SDN List or any other person included on the SDN List
whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection
2(a)Ki) of E.O. 13645 0or E.O. 13599)
3. Menu-based Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of menu-based sanctions under: section 213(a) of the TRA
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who purchase, subscribe to, or facilitate the
issuance of sovereign debt of the Government of Iran, including governmental
bonds); section 1244(d)( I) of IFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who
knowingly sell, supply, or transfer to or from Iran significant goods or services
used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran,
includingNIOC, NITC, and IRISL); sections 1245(a)(l)(A) and
1245(a)(1 )(C)(i)(ll) of IFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who sell, supply,
or transfer to or from Iran precious metals or specified materials (graphite, raw or
semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for
integrating industrial processes), subject to certain limitations as described in
section Vl.A.6 below); and section 1246(a) of IFCA
(for non-U.S. persons who
provide underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with
activities involving Iran that are described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and 17.5 of
Annex V of the JCPOA, or to or for any individual or entity whose property and
interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599).
23
-' Notwithstanding the revocation of E.O. 13645, section 1244(c)(D(A) remains in place and it continues to be
sanctionable for non-U.S. persons to knowingly provide significant financial, material. technological, or other
support to, or goods or services in support of any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of any Iranian
person on the SON List.
certain sanctions authorities, including the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended (ISA), prescribe a menu of
sanctions that the USG may impose in response to certain conduct specified in the authority. For the purposes of
this guidance. such sanctions are tenned "menu-based sanctions."
-'pursuant to section 1246(a)(D(C) of IFCA, the relevant sanction in 1246(a)( 1) continues not to apply, by its terms,
in the case of Iranian financial institutions blocked solely pursuant to E.0. 13599.
12
- 76 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
b. Revoked E.O. 13622, including the menu-based sanctions under section 2(a)(i)
(iii), as amended by section 16 ofE.O. 13645 (for persons engaging in significant
transactions for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical products from Iran and
successor entities of such non-U.S. persons)
Sanctions under CISADA Section 10-l(c)(2)(E)(ii)(I). Finally, as described in section Ill below,
correspondent and payable-through account sanctions under section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)(l) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010, as amended (CISADA) (for FFIs
that knowingly facilitate a significant transaction or transactions or provide significant financial
services for a person whose property or interests in property are blocked in connection with
Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of delivery) will no longer apply to such transactions
or services for Iranian financial institutions included on Attachment 3 to Annex II of the
JCPOA.'
See section Ill for an overview of the sanctions list removals that occurred on Implementation
Day and section VI for an overview of the waiver determinations and findings issued in
connection with the JCPOA.
Effects of the lifting of the financial and banking-related sanctions:
As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in sections 4.1.1 to 4. 1.7 of Annex II and section
17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA and described in this section, beginning on Implementation Day
such sanctions, including sanctions on associated services, do not apply to non-U.S. persons who
engage in activities, including financial and banking transactions, with the Government of Iran,
the CBI, Iranian financial institutions, and other Iranian persons specified in Attachment 3 to
Annex II of the JCPOA, including the provision of loans, transfers, accounts (including the
opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable-through accounts at non-U.S. financial
institutions), investments, securities, guarantees, foreign exchange (including Iranian rial-related
'Following Implementation Day, section IO4(c)Q2(E)(ii)(I) of CISADA continues to apply to FFIs that knowingly
facilitate a significant transaction or transactions or provide significant financial services for a person whose
property or interests in property are blocked in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of
delivery. In addition, after Implementation Day, correspondent and payable-through account sanctions under section
104(c)(2)(E)(ii)0I) of CISADA continue to apply to FF!s that knowingly facilitate a significant transaction or
transactions or provide significant financial services for a person whose property or interests in property are blocked
in connection with Iran's support for international terrorism
-'For the purposes of the lifting of sanctions set out in sections 4.LI to 4.L.7 of Annex II and section 17.I of Annex
V of the JCPOA, the effects described for non-U.S. financial institutions extend to the activities outside of U.S.
jurisdiction of international financial institutions. including those identified in 22 U.S.C. $ 262r(0)02).
13
- 77 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
transactions), letters of credit and commodity futures or options, the provision of specialized
financial messaging services and facilitation of direct or indirect access thereto, the purchase or
acquisition by the GO! of U.S. bank notes, and the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the
issuance of Iranian sovereign debt.
For additional information on the financial and banking-related sanctions lifting discussed in
this subsection, please see section C of the JCPOA EAOs.
B. Sanctions Related to Insurance
Commitment:
Section 4.2 of Annex II and section 17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA provide for the lifting, on
Implementation Day, of secondary sanctions that apply to non-U.S. persons who provide
underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with the
JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex ll of
the JCPOA.
Implementation;
To effectuate the lifting of these sanctions on Implementation Day, the USG, in addition to
removing certain individuals and entities from the SON List, FSE List, and NS-ISA List as
described in section Ill below, took the following steps:
I. Correspondent or Payable-Through Account Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of correspondent or payable-through account sanctions
under: section I 245(d)(I) of ND AA 2012 (for significant financial transactions by
FFIs with the CBI; section 1244(d)(2) of IFCA (for significant financial
transactions by FFIs for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Tran of significant
goods or services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding
-" Non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions (including
the CBI) not appearing on the SDN List will not be exposed to sanctions as a result of those Iranian financial
institutions engaging in transactions or banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including
financial institutions, on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conduct
or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships with the Iranian
individuals and entities. including financial institutions. on the SDN List.
- see supra note H
14
- 78 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
sectors of Iran, including NIOC, NITC, and IRISL); and section 1247(a) of
IFCA."
b. Revoked E.O. 13645, including the correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under subsection 3(a)(i) (for significant transactions by FFls on behalf
of any Iranian person on the SDN List or any other person included on the SDN
List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection
2(a)() of E.O. 13645 or E.O. 13599).
c. Committed to refrain from imposing sanctions under sections 56 I .203(a) of the
[ranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31CER. part 561 (IFSR), for
transactions by FF ls with the CBI that are consistent with the waiver of section
1245(d)(l) of NDAA 2012.
2. Blocking Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of blocking sanctions under section 1244(c)(I) of IFCA"
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide significant financial,
material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person determined to be
part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of lran or to operate a port in
[ran, or Iranian individuals or entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the
JCPOA)"
b. Revoked: EO. 13622, including the blocking sanctions under section 5(a) (with
respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC,
NICO, or the CBI, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious
metals by the Government of lran); and E.O. 13645, including the blocking
sanctions under subsection 2(a)(i) (with respect to persons who have materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of, any Iranian person included on the SDN
List or any other person included on the SDN List whose property and interests in
See supra note 15
- gee supra note 17.
see supra note 18.
See supra note 19.
15
- 79 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
property are blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) of E.O. 13645 or E.O.
13599)
3. Menu-based Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of menu-based sanctions under: section 5(a)(7) of ISA
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who own, operate, or control, or insure a vessel
used to transport crude oil from Iran to another country); section 212(a) of the
TRA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide underwriting
services or insurance or reinsurance for NIOC, NITC, or a successor entity to
either company, in cases where the transactions are for activities described in
sections 4.2.1, 4.3, and 4.4 of Annex II of the JCPOA); section 1244(d)(1) of
IFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly sell, supply, or transfer to
or from Iran significant goods or services used in connection with the energy,
shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran, includingNIOC, NITC, and IRISL); and
section 1246(a) of IFCA
(for non-U.S. persons who provide underwriting
services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with activities involving Iran that
are described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, or to or
for any individual or entity whose property and interests in property are blocked
solely pursuant to E.O. 13599)
33
See section lll for an overview of the sanctions list removals that occurred on Implementation
Day and section VI for an overview of the waiver determinations and findings issued in
connection with the JCPOA.
Effects of the lifting of sanctions related to insurance services:
As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in section 4.2 of Annex II and section 17.1 of
Annex V of the JCPOA and described in this section, beginning on Implementation Day such
sanctions, including sanctions on associated services, do not apply to non-U.S. persons who
provide underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent
with the JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to
Annex II of the JCPOA, including underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in
connection with activities in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, for NIOC or
see supra note 21
see supra note 23.
16
- 80 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
NITC, or for vessels that transport crude oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum, and
petrochemical products to or from lran.
For additional information on the insurance-related sanctions lifting discussed in this
subsection, please see section D of the J€PO,A4 EAOs,
C. Sanctions Related to Iran's Energy and Petrochemical Sectors
Commitment:
Section 4.3 of Annex II and section 17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA provide for the lifting, on
Implementation Day, of secondary sanctions that apply to non-U.S. persons who engage in
certain activities related to the energy sector of Iran. In particular, beginning on Implementation
Day, the following activities by non-U.S. persons are no longer sanctionable:
• Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information,
technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas, and petrochemical
sectors (see section 4.3.2 of Annex II of the JCPOA);
• The purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical
products and natural gas from Iran (see section 4.3.3 of Annex II of the JCPOA);
• The export, sale, or provision of relined petroleum products and petrochemical products
to lran (see section 4.3.4 of Annex II of the JCPOA);
• Transactions with Iran's energy sector, including with NIOC, NICO, and NITC (see
section 4.3.5 of Annex II of the JCPOA); and
• The provision of associated services for each of the categories above (see section 4.3 .6 of
Annex ll of the JCPOA).
In addition, the United States has ceased efforts to reduce Tran's crude oil sales, including
limitations on the quantities oflranian crude oil sold and the nations that can purchase Iranian
crude oil, and has lifted sanctions on the provision of associated services (see sections 4.3.1 and
4.3.60of Annex II of the JCPOA).
' As a result of the cessation of efforts to reduce Iranian crude oil sales, including the waiver of section 1245(d)(1)
of NDAA 2012 and the revocation of E.O. 13622, the bilateral trade limitations set forth in sections 56 L.203() and
(k) of the IFSR no longer apply.
17
- 81 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
Implementation;
To effectuate the lifting of these sanctions on lmplementation Day, the USG, in addition to
removing certain individuals and entities from the SDN List, FSE List, and NS-ISA List as
described in section !TI below, took the following steps:
I. Correspondent or Payable-Through Account Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of correspondent or payable-through account sanctions
under: section 1245(d)(1) of NDAA 2012 (for significant financial transactions by
FFIs with the CBI); section 1244(d)X2) of IFCA (for significant financial
transactions by FF ls for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of significant
goods or services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding
sectors of Iran, including NIOC, NITC, and IRJSL); section I 244(h)(2) of IFCA
(for financial transactions by FF!s for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran
of natural gas)"; section 1245(c) of IFCA (for significant financial transactions
by FF ls for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of precious metals or
specified materials (graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and
steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes) that are within the
scope of the waivers under section I 245(a)( I) of IFCA, as described in section Vl
below); and section 1247(a) of IFCA.
37
b. Revoked: E.O. 13622, including the correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under section l(a), as amended by section 16 of E.O 13645 (for FF!s
that conduct or facilitate transactions: with NlOC or NICO; for the purchase,
acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from
Iran; or for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petrochemical products from Iran); and E.O. 13645, including the correspondent
or payable-through account sanctions under section 3(a)(i) (for significant
transactions by FFls on behalf of any Iranian person on the SDN List or any other
person included on the SDN List whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a(i) of E.0. 13645 or E.0. 13599)
•see supra note IH
" see supra note 14.
" see supra note 15.
" gee supra note 17.
18
- 82 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
c. Committed to refrain from imposing sanctions under sections 56 1.203(a) of the
IFSR for transactions by FF ls with the CBI that are consistent with the waiver of
section 1245(d)(I) of ND AA 2012.
2. Blocking Sanctions
a. Waived the imposition of blocking sanctions under section 1244(c)(I) of IFCA"
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide significant financial,
material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person determined to be
part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or to operate a port in
Iran, or Iranian individuals or entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the
JCPOA)"
b. Revoked: E.O. 13622, including the blocking sanctions under section 5(a) (with
respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC,
NICO, or the CBI, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious
metals by the Government oflran); and E.O. 13645, including the blocking
sanctions under section 2(a)(i) (with respect to persons who have materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of, any Iranian person included on the SDN
List or any other person included on the SDN List whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) of E.O. 13645 or E.O.
13599)."
3. Menu-based Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of menu-based sanctions under:
1. Section 5(a) of ISA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who: make
investments above specified thresholds that could directly and
significantly contribute to the maintenance or enhancement oflran's
ability to develop petroleum resources; knowingly sell, lease, or provide to
" gee supra note 18.
" See supra note 19
" See supra note 21
19
- 83 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
Iran goods, services, technology, information, or support that could
directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or enhancement of
lran's domestic production of refined petroleum products; sell or provide
to Iran refined petroleum products or sell, lease, or provide to Iran goods,
services, technology, information, or support that could directly and
significantly contribute to the enhancement oflran's ability to import
refined petroleum products; knowingly participate in certain joint ventures
for the development of petroleum resources outside of Iran; knowingly
sell, lease, or provide to Iran goods, services, technology, information, or
support that could directly and significantly contribute to the maintenance
or enhancement of lran's ability to develop petroleum resources located in
Iran or domestic production of refined petrochemical products; knowingly
sell, lease, or provide to Iran goods, services, technology, or support that
could directly and significantly contribute to the maintenance or expansion
oflran's domestic production of petrochemical products; own, operate, or
control, or insure a vessel used to transport crude oil from lran to another
country; or own, operate, or control a vessel used in a manner that
conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products
transported on the vessel);
11. Section 212(a) of the TRA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who
knowingly provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for
NIOC, NTTC, or a successor entity to either company, in cases where the
transactions are for activities described in sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 of
Annex 11 of the JCPOA);
iii. Section 1244(d)(I) ofIFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who
knowingly sell, supply, or transfer to or from lran significant goods or
services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding
sectors oflran, including NJOC, NTTC, and IRISL);
iv. Section I 245(a)( I) of IFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who sell,
supply, or transfer to or from lran precious metals or specified materials
(graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal,
and software for integrating industrial processes), subject to certain
limitations as described in section VI below); and
20
- 84 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
v. Section 1246(a) of IFCA' (for non-U.S. persons who provide
underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with
activities involving Iran that are described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and
17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, or to or for any individual or entity whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O.
13599).
b. Revoked: E.O. 13574, including section I (providing implementation authority for
certain menu-based sanctions under ISA); E.O. 13590, including section I
(providing for menu-based sanctions with respect to persons who knowingly sell,
lease, or provide to Iran goods, services, technology, or support that could directly
and significantly contribute to the maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic
production of petrochemical products); E.O. 13622, including section 2(a)(i)-(iii),
as amended by section 16 ofE.O. 13645 (for persons engaging in significant
transactions for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical products from lran and
successor entities of such non-U.S. persons); and section 5 ofE.O. 13628
(providing for menu-based sanctions with respect to persons who knowingly,
between July I, 2010, and August I 0, 2012: sold, leased, or provided to Iran
goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and
significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of lran 's domestic production
of refined petroleum products; sold or provided to Iran refined petroleum
products; or sold, leased, or provided to Iran goods, services, technology,
information, or support that could directly and significantly contribute to the
enhancement of Iran's ability to import refined petroleum products).
See section llI for an overview of the sanctions list removals that occurred on Implementation
Day and section VI for an overview of the waiver determinations and findings issued in
connection with the JCPOA.
Effects of the lifting of sanctions on the energy nd petrochemical sectors:
As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6 of Annex II and section
17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA and described in this section, beginning on Implementation Day
such sanctions, including sanctions on associated services, do not apply to non-U.S. persons
who: (i) are part of the energy sector of Iran; (ii) purchase, acquire, sell, transport, or market
see supra note 23.
21
- 85 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
petroleum, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products,
or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from lran; (iii) provide to lran support,
investment (including through joint ventures), goods, services (including financial services), and
technology that can be used in connection with Iran's energy sector, the development of its
petroleum resources, and its domestic production of refined petroleum products and
petrochemical products; or (iv) engage in activities with Iran's energy sector, including NIOC,
NITC, and NICO.
For additional information on the energy and petrochemical sector-related sanctions lifting
discussed in this subsection, please see section B of the JPoA_E4Os.
D. Sanctions Related to Iran's Shipping and Shipbuilding Sectors and Port
Operators
Commitment:
Section 4.4 of Annex LI and section 17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA provide for the lifting, on
Implementation Day, of secondary sanctions that apply to non-U.S. persons with respect to Iran's
shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators. In particular, beginning on Irrplementation
Day, the following activities by non-U.S. persons are no longer sanctionable:
• Transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators, including
IRISL, South Shipping Line, and NITC, and the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas" (see
section 4.4.1 of Annex II of the JCPOA); and
• The provision of associated services for the categories above (see section 4.4.2 of Annex
II of the JCPOA).
Implementation:
To effectuate the lifting of these sanctions on Implementation Day, the USG, in addition to
removing certain individuals and entities from the SON List, FSE List, and NS-ISA List as
described in section Ill below, took the following steps:
"As stated in the JCPOA, this commitment is based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being
controlled by a person on the SON List. For additional information on the operations of Bandar Abbas, please see
ICPOA FAQ E.2.
22
- 86 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
I. Correspondent or Payable-Through Account Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of correspondent or payable-through account sanctions
under: section 1245(d)(I) of NDAA 2012 (for significant financial transactions by
FFIs with the CBI)"; section 1244(d)(2) of IFCA (for significant financial
transactions by FFIs for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from [ran of significant
goods or services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding
sectors of Iran, including NIOC, NITC, and IRISL); section I 245(c) of IFCA (for
significant financial transactions by FF!s for the sale, supply, or transfer to or
from Iran of precious metals or specified materials (graphite, raw or semi-finished
metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial
processes) that are within the scope of the waivers under section 1245(a)(1) of
IFCA, as described in section VI below); and section 1247(a) of IFCA.'
b. Revoked E.O. 13645, including the correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under subsection 3(a)(i) (for significant transactions by FF ls on behalf
of any Iranian person on the SDN List or any other person included on the SDN
List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection
2(a)() of E.O. 13645 or E.O. 13599).
c. Committed to refrain from imposing sanctions under section 56 I .203(a) of the
IFSR for transactions by FF!s with the CBI that are consistent with the waiver of
section l245(d)(l)ofNDAA2012.
2. Blocking Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of blocking sanctions under section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA"
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide significant financial,
material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person determined to be
part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or to operate a port in
"See supra note IH.
see supra note 15.
" see supra note 17.
See supra note 18.
23
- 87 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
Iran, or Iranian individuals or entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex 11 of the
1CPOA)."
b. Revoked: E.O. 13622, including the blocking sanctions under section 5(a) (with
respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC,
NICO, or the CBI, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious
metals by the Government of Iran); and E.O. 13645, including the blocking
sanctions under subsection 2(a)(i) (with respect to persons who have materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of, any Iranian person included on the SDN
List or any other person included on the SON List whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) of E.O. 13645 or E.O.
13599)."
3. Menu-based Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of menu-based sanctions under: section 2 I 2(a) of the TRA
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide underwriting services
or insurance or reinsurance for NIOC, NITC, or a successor entity to either
company, in cases where the transactions are for activities described in section 4.4
of Annex II of the JCPOA); section 1244(d)(1) of IFCA (with respect to non-U.S
persons who knowingly sell, supply, or transfer to or from Iran significant goods
or services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors
of Iran, including NIOC, NITC, and IRJSL); sections 1245(a)(l)(B),
1245(a)(l)(C)(i)(l)-(ll) and 1245(a)(l)(C)(ii)(l)-(JJ) ofIFCA (with respect to non
U.S. persons who sell, supply, or transfer to or from Iran specified materials
(graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
software for integrating industrial processes), subject to certain limitations as
described in section VI below); and section 1246(a) of IFCA" (for non-U.S.
persons who provide underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in
connection with activities involving Iran that are described in sections 17.1 to
17.2 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, or to or for any individual or entity
whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O.
13599)
see supra note I9.
gee supra note 21
" see supra note 23.
24
- 88 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
See section Ul for an overview of the sanctions list removals that occurred on Implementation
Day and section VI for an overview of the waiver determinations and findings issued in
connection with the JCPOA.
Effects of the lifting of the sanctions related to [rans shipping and shipbuilding sectors and
port operators:
As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2 of Annex n and 17.1 of
Annex V of the JCPOA and described in this section, beginning on Implementation Day such
sanctions, including sanctions on associated services, do not apply to non-U.S. persons who are
part of the shipping or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or who: own, operate, control, or insure a
vessel used to transport crude oil, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products),
petrochemical products, or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; operate a
port in Iran, engage in activities with, or provide financial services and other goods and services
used in connection with, the shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran
(including the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas'), including port services, such as bunkering
and inspection, classification, and financing, and the sale, leasing, and provision of vessels to
Iran, including to IRISL, NITC, and South Shipping Line or their affiliates.
For additional information on the sanctions lifting related to Iran s shipping and shipping
sectors and port operators discussed in this subsection, please see section E of the JCPO,4E4Os.
E. Sanctions Related to Gold and Other Precious Metals
Commitment:
Section 4.5 of Annex ll and section 17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA provide for the lifting, on
Implementation Day, of secondary sanctions that apply to non-U.S. persons with respect to Iran's
trade in gold and other precious metals and the provision of associated services for such trade.
Implementation:
To effectuate the lifting of these sanctions on lmplementation Day, the USG, in addition to
removing certain individuals and entities from the SON List, FSE List, and NS-ISA List as
described in section III below, took the following steps:
"see supra note 43.
25
- 89 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
I. Correspondent or Payable-Through Account Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of correspondent or payable-through account sanctions
under: section 1245(d)(1) 0of NDAA 2012 (for significant financial transactions by
FF!s with the CB); section 124S(c) ofIFCA (for significant financial
transactions by FFIs for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of precious
metals); and section 1247(a) of rFCA.
3
b. Revoked E.O. 13645, including the correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under subsection 3(a)(i) (for significant transactions by FF!s on behalf
of any Iranian person on the SDN List or any other person included on the SDN
List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection
2(a)() of E.0. 13645 or E.0. 13599)
c. Committed to refrain from imposing sanctions under section 561.203(a) of the
IFSR for transactions by FF ls with the CBI that are consistent with the waiver of
section 1245(d)(l) of NDAA 2012.
2. Blocking Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of blocking sanctions under section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide significant financial,
material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person determined to be
part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors ofiran or to operate a port in
Iran, or Iranian individuals or entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex IT of the
1CPO0A)."
b. Revoked: E.0. 13622, including the blocking sanctions under section 5(a) (with
respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC,
• see supra note 9.
" see supra note 15.
"see supra note 17.
"· gee supra note 18.
" see supra note 19.
26
- 90 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
NICO, or the CBI, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious
metals by the Government of Iran); and E.O. 13645, including subsection 2(a)(i)
(with respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in
support of, any Iranian person included on the SON List or any other person
included on the SDN List whose property and interests in
property
are blocked
pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) ofE.O. 13645 orE.O. 13599)°
3. Menu-based Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of menu-based sanctions under: section I 245(a)(J )(A) of
IFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who sell, supply, or transfer to or from
Iran precious metals); and section 1246(a) of IFCA
5
(for non-U.S. persons who
provide underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with
activities involving Iran that are described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and 17.5 of
Annex V of the JCPOA, or to or for any individual or entity whose property and
interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599).
See section III for an overview of the sanctions list removals that occurred on Implementation
Day and section VI for an overview of the waiver determinations and findings issued in
connection with the JCPOA.
Effects of the lifting of sanctions related to gold and other precious met@ls:
As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in section 4.5 of Annex II and section 17.1 of
Annex V of the JCPOA and described in this section, beginning on Implementation Day such
sanctions, including sanctions on associated services, do not apply to non-U.S. persons who sell,
supply, export, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, gold and other precious metals,
or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing, including
any security, insurance, and transportation.
For additional information on the sanctions lifting related to Iran s trade in gold and other
precious metals discussed in this subsection, please see section F of the JCPOA FA Os.
" see supra note 21
see supra note 23.
27
- 91 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
F. Sanctions Related to Software and Metals
Commitment:
Section 4.6 of Annex 11 and section 17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA provide for the lifting, on
Implementation Day, of secondary sanctions that apply to non-U.S. persons with respect to trade
with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software
for integrating industrial processes, in connection with activities consistent with the JCPOA,
including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex ll of the JCPOA
and the provision of associated services for each of the categories above.
Implementation;
To effectuate the lifting of these sanctions on Implementation Day, the USG, in addition to
removing certain individuals and entities from the SON List, FSE List, and NS-ISA List as
described in section lII below, took the following steps:
I. Correspondent and Payable-Through Account Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of correspondent or payable-through account sanctions
under: section 1245(d)(1) of NDAA 2012 (for significant financial transactions by
FFJs with the CBI);
9
section 1244(d)(2) ofIFCA (for significant financial
transactions by FF!s for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of significant
goods or services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding
sectors of Iran, including with NIOC, NITC, and IRISL); section 1245(c) of IFCA
(for significant financial transactions by FFJs for the sale, supply, or transfer to or
from Iran of specified materials (graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as
aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes) that
are within the scope of the waivers under section 1245(a)(1) of IFCA, as
described in section VI below); and section 1247(a) of IF€A"
b. Revoked E.O. I 3645, including the correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under subsection 3(a)(i) (for significant transactions by FF!s on behalf
of any Iranian person on the SON List or any other person included on the SON
" see supra note IH.
60
See supra ootc 15.
28
- 92 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection
2(a)(i) ofE.O. 13645 or E.O. 13599).61
c. Committed to refrain from imposing sanctions under section 56 I .203(a) of the
IFSR for transactions by FFls with the CBI that are consistent with the waiver of
section 1245(d)(I) ofNDAA 2012.
2. Blocking Sanctions
a. Waived the imposition of blocking sanctions under IFCA section I 244(c)(I )
62
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide significant financial,
material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person determined to be
part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or to operate a port in
Iran, or Iranian individuals or entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the
JCPOA).
63
b. Revoked E.O. 13622, including the blocking sanctions under section 5(a) (with
respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC,
NICO, or the CBI, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious
metals by the Government oflran); and E.O. 13645, including the blocking
sanctions under subsection 2(a)(i) (with respect to persons who have materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of, any Iranian person included on the SDN
List or any other person included on the SDN List whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) ofE.O. 13645 orE.O.
13599)."
3. Menu-based Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of menu-based sanctions under: section 1244(d)(1) of
IFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly sell, supply, or transfer to
see supra note 17.
See supra note 18.
See supra note 19
See supra note 21
29
- 93 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
or from lran significant goods or services used in connection with the energy,
shipping, or shipbuilding sectors oflran, including with NlOC, NITC, and
IRISL); section I 245(a)( I )(B)-(C) of IFCA (with respect to non-U.S. persons who
sell, supply, or transfer to or from Iran specified materials (graphite, raw or semi
finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating
industrial processes), subject to certain limitations as described in section VI
below); section 1246(a) of IFCA"(for non-U.S. persons who provide
underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with activities
involving Iran that are described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and 17.5 of Annex V of
the JCPOA, or to or for any individual or entity whose property and interests in
property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599).
See section Ill for an overview of the sanctions list removals that occurred on Implementation
Day and section VI for an overview of the waiver determinations and findings issued in
connection with the JCPOA
Effects of the lifting of sanctions relating to software and metals:
As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in section 4.6 of Annex II and sections 17. I to
17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA and described in this section, beginning on Implementation Day
such sanctions, including sanctions on associated services, do not apply to non-U.S. persons who
sell, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as
aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, to or from Iran in
connection with activities consistent with the JCPOA, including trade with individuals and
entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA, and the sale, supply, or transfer of
such materials to the energy, petrochemical, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors oflran, and
Iranian ports, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing,
including insurance and reinsurance.
For additional information on the sanctions lifting related to Iran s trade in software and metals
discussed in this subsection, please see section G of the JCPOA_FAQs,
See supra note 23.
30
- 94 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
G. Sanctions Related to the Automotive Sector
Commitment:
Section 4. 7 of Annex 11 and section 17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA provide for the lifting, on
Implementation Day, of secondary sanctions that apply to non-U.S. persons with respect to the
sale, supply, or transfer of goods or services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector and
the provision of associated services for such activity.
Implementation;
To effectuate the lifting of these sanctions on Implementation Day, the USG, in addition to
removing certain individuals and entities from the SDN List, FSE List, and NS-ISA List as
described in section III below, took the following steps:
I. Correspondent or Payable-Through Account Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of correspondent or payable-through account sanctions
under: section 1245(d)(1) of NDAA 2012 (for significant financial transactions by
FFIs with the CBI)"; section 1245(c) of IFCA (for significant financial
transactions by FF!s for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of precious
metals or specified materials (graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as
aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes) that
are within the scope of the waivers under section 1245(a)(I) of IFCA, as
described in section VI below); and section 1247(a) of IFCA."
b. Revoked E.O. 13645, including the correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions under subsection 3(a)(i) (for significant transactions by Ffls on behalf
of any Iranian person on the SON List or any other person included on the SON
List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection
2(a)(i) ofEO 13645 orEO. 13599) and subsection 3(a)(ii) (for significant
transactions by FFIs for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of significant goods or
services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran).
8
See supra ootc 11.
See supra note 15.
gee supra note 17.
31
- 95 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
c. Committed to refrain from imposing sanctions under section 56 L.203(a) of the
IFSR for transactions by FF ls with the CBI that are consistent with the waiver of
section 1245(d)(I) of ND AA 2012.
2. Blocking Sanctions:
a. Waived the imposition of blocking sanctions under section 1244(c)(I) of IFCA"
(with respect to non-U.S. persons who knowingly provide significant financial,
material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of a person determined to be
part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or to operate a port in
Iran, or Iranian individuals or entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the
1CPOA)."
b. Revoked: E.O. 13622, including the blocking sanctions under section 5(a) (with
respect to persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC,
NICO, or the CBI, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious
metals by the Government oflran); and E.O. 13645, including the blocking
sanctions under subsection 2(a)(i) (with respect to persons who have materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of, any Iranian person included on the SDN
List or any other person included on the SDN List whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) of E.O. 13645 or E.O.
13599).
3. Menu-based Sanctions
a. Waived the imposition of menu-based sanctions under: sections I 245(a)( I )(B),
1245(a){l){C)(i){IT), and 1245(a)(l)(C)(ii)(II) ofIFCA (with respect to non-U.S.
persons who sell, supply, or transfer to or from Iran specified materials (graphite,
raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for
integrating industrial processes), subject to certain limitations as described in
69
See supra note 18
" gee supra note 19
See supra note 21
32
- 96 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
section VI below); and section 1246(a) of rFCA
(for non-U.S. persons who
provide underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with
activities involving lran that are described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and 17.5 of
Annex V of the JCPOA, or to or for any individual or entity whose property and
interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599).
72
b. Revoked E.O. 13645, including the menu-based sanctions under section 5 (for
non-U.S. persons engaging in significant transactions for the sale, supply, or
transfer to Iran of significant goods or services used in connection with the
automotive sector of Iran).
See section IHI for an overview of the sanctions list removals that occurred on Implementation
Day and section VI for an overview of the waiver determinations and findings issued in
connection with the JCPOA
Effects of the lifting of sanctions related_to the automotive sector:
As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in section 4. 7 of Annex II and section 17. I of
Annex V of the JCPOAand described in this section, beginning on Implementation Day such
sanctions, including sanctions on associated services, do not apply to non-U.S. persons who
conduct or facilitate financial or other transactions for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of
goods and services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran.
For additional information on the sanctions lifting related to Iran is automotive sector discussed
in this subsection, please see section H of the IP9A_FAQs,
Ill. Sanctions List Removals
In addition to the measures described above, to implement its commitments under the JCPOA,
on Implementation Day, the USG removed the individuals and entities specified in Attachment 3
to Annex Tl of the JCPOA from the SDN List, FSE List, and/or NS-ISA List, as appropriate.
73
See Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA for the list of individuals and entities that were
removed from these lists on Implementation Day. OFAC published information regarding its
see supra note 23.
The underlying authorities for the sanctions listings removed on Implementation Day pursuant to section 4.8.I of
Annex II and section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA include: section 5(a) of ISA, section 212(a) of the TRA.
sections 1244(c) and 1244(d)(I) of IFCA, E.0. 13382, E.O. 13608, E.O. 13622. and E.0. 13645.
33
- 97 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
actions to give effect to these removals on its website on Implementation Day, and will
subsequently publish a notice of the removal actions in the Federal Register"
A. Non-applicability of certain secondary sanctions authorities
As a result of these removals, beginning on Implementation Day, non-U.S. persons are no longer
subject to secondary sanctions for engaging in transactions with the individuals and entities set
out in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA, including the CBI and other Iranian financial
institutions, provided that the transactions do not involve conduct described in sections Yfl.B-C
below or individuals or entities who remain or are placed on the SON List. Those individuals
and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA that were previously designated
for sanctions have had those designations removed.'In addition, all individuals and entities
listed in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA were removed from the SON List and/or, where
applicable, the FSE List and the NS-ISA List." As a result of these actions, the following
statutory sanctions authorities will no longer apply to transactions with these individuals and
entities:
• Section 10-l(c)(2)(E)(ii)(]) ojCISADA (correspondent or payable-through account
sanctions with respect to FFls that knowingly facilitate a significant transaction or
transactions or provide significant financial services for a person whose property or
interests in property are blocked in connection with Iran's proliferation ofWMD or their
means of delivery)"
'To give effect to these removals, the Department of State took separate actions to remove the legal basis for the
listings of certain other individuals and entities, and will publish notice of such actions in the Federal Register.
These actions include waiving the imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons sanctioned pursuant to
sections I 244(c)( I) and 1244(d)( I) of IFCA. See sections VI.A. I and VI.A.2 below. As a result of these actions, all
sanctions measures that were selected by the Secretary of State when he took the actions resulting in the listings
were lifted.
As noted with respect to NIOC's determination under section 312 of the TRA in Annex II of the JCPOA, removal
of persons from the SON List includes resolution of related designations and determinations. The U.S. Department
of the Treasury has now detennined that NIOC is no longer an agent or affiliate of the IRGC.
" Notwithstanding the removal of these listings, persons meeting the definition of the terms "Government of Iran
or "Iranian financial institution" remain persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR. See section 111.B below.
Following Implementation Day, section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)(T) of CIS AD A continues to apply to FFIs that knowingly
facilitate a significant transaction or transactions or provide significant financial services for a person whose
property or interests in property remain blocked in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of
delivery. In addition, section IO4(c)Q2)(E)(ii)(II) of CISAD A continues to apply to FFIs that knowingly facilitate a
significant transaction or transactions or provide significant financial services for a person whose property or
34
- 98 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
• Section 1245() of NDAA 2012 (correspondent or payable-through account sanctions for
significant financial transactions by FFls with a designated Iranian financial institution);
• Section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA (blocking sanctions with respect to persons who knowingly
provide significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods or
services in support of any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of any
Iranian person on the SON List, other than an Iranian financial institution whose property
and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599),
• Section l 246(a)(J)(B)(iii)(l) of IFCA (menu-based sanctions with respect to persons who
knowingly provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance to or for any person
designated for the imposition of sanctions in connection with Iran's proliferation of
WMD or their means of delivery);" and
• Section 1247(a) of IFCA (correspondent or payable-through account sanctions with
respect to FF ls that knowingly facilitate a significant financial transaction on behalf of
any Iranian person on the SON List, other than an Iranian financial institution whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.0. 13599)
B. Con tinned blocking under E.O. 13599 and section 560.2ll of the ITSR
Further, even after Implementation Day, individuals and entities meeting the definition of the
Government of Iran or an Iranian financial institution, as those terms are defined in sections
560.304 and 560.324 of the ITSR, remain persons whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR. As a result, U.S. persons
continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings with these
individuals and entities unless such transactions or dealings are exempt from regulation or
authorized by OFAC. U.S. persons also continue to have an obligation to block the property and
interests in property are blocked in connection with lran's support for international terrorism. Persons falling into
these two categories are identified on the SDN List with the [IFSR]" program tag.
Following Implementation Day, section 1246(a)(D)(B(iii)(I) of IFCA continues to apply to persons who
knowingly provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance to or for any person who remains designated
for the imposition of sanctions under IEEPA in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of
delivery. In addition, section 1246(a)( (B(iii)II) of IFCA continues to apply to persons who knowingly provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance to or for any person designated for the imposition of sanctions
under IEEPA in connection with Iran's support for international terrorism. Persons falling into these two categories
are identified on the SDN List with the [IFSR] program tag
35
- 99 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
interests in property of all individuals and entities that meet the definition of the Government of
lran or an Iranian financial institution, regardless of whether the individual or entity has been
identified by OFAC as meeting those definitions. Individuals and entities that have been
previously identified by OFAC as meeting the definition of the Government of Iran or an Iranian
financial institution are marked with an asterisk in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA.
Following Implementation Day, these individuals and entities continue to meet the relevant
definitions and continue to be persons whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to E.0. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR" To assist U.S. persons in meeting
their primary sanctions obligations under the ITSR with respect to these persons, OFAC has
made available on its website a list of persons identified as blocked solely pursuant to E.O
13599 (E.0. 13599 List).
Please be advised that, under the [TSR, U.S. persons continue to have an obligation to block the
property and interests in property of individuals and entities listed in Attachment 3 to Annex II of
the CPO,A that do not have an asterisk next to their name and are not included on the E.O.
13599 List if such persons meet the definition of either the Government of Iran or an Iranian
financial institution as set forth in section 560.304 or 560.324 of the ITSR, respectively.
Non-U.S. persons will not be subject to secondary sanctions for engaging in transactions with the
individuals and entities listed on the E.0. 13599 List, provided that the transactions do not
involve conduct described in sections Vll.B-C below or individuals or entities who remain or are
placed on the SON List. See section llJ.A above.
For additional information on the sanctions list removals discussed in this section, please see
section I of the JCPOAF4Os.
IV. Other Trade Measures
Commitment:
Pursuant to section 5 of Annex II and section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the USG
committed to license three categories of activity that would otherwise be prohibited under the
"e the extent a person identified as meeting the definition of the term "Government of Iran" or "Iranian financial
institution is also designated pursuant to one or more other authorities in addition to E.O. 13599, that person
continues to be listed on the SON List with the "[IRAN]" identifying tag, as well as identifying tags for any other
relevant sanctions program(s).
36
- 100 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
ITSR, provided that relevant transactions do not involve individuals or entities on the SON List
and are otherwise consistent with applicable U.S. laws and regulations."
Implementation;
To fulfill these commitments, OFAC has issued: (i) a Statement of Licensing Policy (SLP)
allowing for the case-by-case licensing of the export, reexport, sale, lease, or transfer to lran of
commercial passenger aircraft, spare parts and components for such aircraft, and associated
services, all for exclusively commercial passenger aviation; (ii) a general license authorizing
U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to engage in certain activity with Iran that is consistent
with the JCPOA; and (iii) a general license authorizing the importation into the United States of
Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar.
A. Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Reexport
to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services
(SLP)
OFAC has issued a SLP, effective on Implementation Day, which establishes a favorable
licensing policy regime through which U.S. persons and, where there is a nexus to U.S
jurisdiction, non-U.S. persons may request specific authorization from OFAC to engage in
transactions for the (i) export, reexport, sale, lease or transfer to lran of commercial passenger
aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end use, (ii) export, reexport, sale, lease or transfer to Iran
of spare parts and components for commercial passenger aircraft; and (iii) provision of
associated services, including warranty, maintenance, and repair services and safety-related
inspections, for all the foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used exclusively
for commercial passenger aviation." Any export, reexport, or transfer of U.S. export-controlled
items must be consistent with U.S. legal requirements, including those under the Iran-Iraq Arms
Non-Proliferation Act and section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. In addition, exports or
reexports to individuals and entities listed on the Department of Commerce's Denied Persons
List and, in some cases, the Entity List will require separate authorization from the Department
of Commerce.
"These laws include, but are not limited to, the Export Administration Act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, and the lran-lraq Anns Non-Proliferation Act.
Licenses issued under the SLP in furtherance of the U.S. commitment in section 5.LI of Annex II of the JCPOA
will include appropriate conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods,
or services are re-sold or retransferred to, any person on the SDN list
37
- 101 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
Please note that, should the United States determine that aircraft, goods, or services licensed for
export, reexport, sale, lease, or transfer to Iran under the SLP have been used for purposes other
than exclusively for commercial passenger aviation, or have been re-sold or re-transferred to
persons on the SDN List, the United States would view this as grounds to cease performing its
commitments under Section 5.1.I of Annex II of the CPO,A in whole or in part. See section
5. I.I. of Annex II of the JCPOA.
For additional information on the SLP discussed in this subsection, please see section.J of the
JCPOAFAOs.
B. General License Authorizing Activities by Non-U.S. Persons that are Owned
or Controlled by a U.S. Person
OFAC has issued General License H: Authorizing Certain Transactions Relating to Foreign
Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person (GL H). effective on Implementation
Day, authorizing U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to engage in certain transactions
involving lran that would otherwise be prohibited by section 560.215 of the ITSR. GL H does
not authorize U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to engage in any transactions involving:
(I) the direct or indirect exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or services from the
United States (without separate authorization from OFAC); (2) any transfer of funds to, from, or
through the U.S. financial system; (3) any individual or entity on the SON List or any activity
that would be prohibited by non-Iran sanctions administered by OFAC if engaged in by a U.S.
person or in the United States; (4) any individual or entity identified on the FSE List, (5) unless
authorized by the U.S. Department of Commerce, activity prohibited by, or requiring a license
under, part 744 of the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) or a person whose export
privileges have been denied pursuant to part 764 or 766 of the EAR; (6) any military,
paramilitary, intelligence, or law enforcement entity of the Government of Iran, or any officials,
agents, or affiliates thereof; (7) any activity that is sanctionable under E.O. 12938 or 13382
(relating to Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,
including ballistic missiles); E.O. 13224 (relating to international terrorism); E.O. 13572 or
13582 (relating to Syria); E.O. 13611 (relating to Yemen); orE.O. 13553 or 13606, or section 2
or 3 ofE.O. 13628 (relating to Iran's commission of human rights abuses against its citizens);
and (8) any nuclear activity involving Iran that is subject to the procurement channel established
pursuant to paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231 (2015) and section 6 of Annex IV of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 and that has not been approved through the
procurement channel process.
In addition, GL H authorizes U.S. persons to engage in certain activities otherwise prohibited by
the ITSR, namely, activities related to the establishment or alteration of corporate policies and
38
- 102 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
procedures to the extent necessary to allow U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to engage
in transactions involving Iran that are authorized under GL H, and making available to foreign
entities they own or control certain automated and globally integrated business support systems.
Please be advised, however, that with the exception of activities authorized in GL H, the
prohibition on facilitation by United States persons under section 560.208 of the ITSR will
remain in effect.
For additional information on GL H, please see section K of the JCPO4 EAOs.
C. General License Authorizing the Importation of Iranian-Origin Carpets and
Foodstuffs
OFAC has issued a regulatory amendment to the lTSR, effective upon publication in the Federal
Register, to authorize the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and
foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar. This authorization covers: (i) carpets and other
textile floor coverings and carpets used as wall hangings that are classified under chapter 57 or
heading 9706.00.0060 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS),
and
(ii) foodstuffs intended for human consumption that are classified under chapters 2-23 of the
HTS" Carpets and foodstuffs authorized for importation pursuant to the general license are still
subject to all other laws and regulations applicable to goods imported into the United States,
including generally applicable laws and regulations administered by other departments and
agencies, such as the Departments of Agriculture or Commerce, the Food and Drug
Administration, or Customs and Border Protection.
82
In addition, under an accompanying provision, U.S. depository institutions are authorized to
process letters of credit for payments for Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, and U.S. persons
are authorized to act as brokers for the purchase or sale of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs
authorized to be imported into the United States under the general license.
OFAC's publication of this general license as an amendment to the ITSR fulfills the requirements
of section 103(d)(2)(A) of CISADA. In addition, the Secretary of State's submission to the
appropriate congressional committees of a certification in writing that it is in the national interest
of the United States to provide an exception to the prohibition on the importation of Iranian-
Items that are classified under heading 9706.00.0060 ( Antiques of an age exceeding one hundred years/Other")
that are not carpets and other textile wall coverings or carpets used as wall hangings are not authorized for
importation into the United States by general license.
ems that are classified in chapters 2-23 of the HTS that are not foodstuffs intended for human consumption are
not authorized for importation into the United States by this general license.
39
- 103 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
origin goods to the extent required to implement the sanctions relief described in section 5.1.3 of
Annex 11 of the JCPOA and a report describing the reasons for this exception fulfills the
requirements of section I 03(d)(2)(B) of CISADA.
For additional information on the general license for carpets and foodstuffs, please see section L
of the I€P@A_EA@s,
V, Termination of Executive Orders
To effectuate the lifting of sanctions set out in sections 4.1 to 4.7 of Annex 11 of the JCPOA and
described in section II of this Guidance, the United States committed in section 4 of Annex II and
section 17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA to terminate E.O.s 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and
sections 5-7 and 15 ofE.O. 13628. To fulfill this commitment, on Implementation Day, the
President issued an E.O. (the "Termination E.O.") revoking" the following:
(i)
E.O. 13574 (providing implementation authority for certain menu-based sanctions set
forth in ISA);
(ii) E.O. 13590 (providing for menu-based sanctions with respect to persons who
knowingly sell, lease or provide to Iran goods, services, technology, or support that
could directly and significantly contribute to the maintenance or expansion of Iran's
domestic production of petrochemical products);
(iii) E.O. 13622 (providing for sanctions on FFls that knowingly facilitate significant
financial transactions with NIOC or NICO, or for the purchase or acquisition of
petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran; sanctions on
persons who knowingly engage in significant transactions for the purchase or
acquisition of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran;
and sanctions on persons that have provided material support to NIOC, NICO, or the
CBI, or for the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious metals by the
Government of Iran);
(iv) E.O. 13645 (providing for sanctions relating to: the purchase or sale of the Iranian rial
(or contracts whose value is based on the Iranian rial); significant holdings of the
Iranian rial outside oflran; Iran's automotive sector; and persons that have provided
material support to any Iranian person on the SDN List or any other person included
"gee supra note 16.
40
- 104 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
on the SON List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
subsection 2(a)(i) ofE.O. 13645 or E.O. 13599 (other than an lranian depository
institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to
E.O. 13599)), and
(v) Sections 5-7 and 15 of E.O. 13628 (providing for: (I) menu-based sanctions with
respect to persons who knowingly, between July I, 20 I 0, and August I 0, 2012: sold,
leased, or provided to Iran goods, services, technology, infonnation, or support that
could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of Iran's
domestic production of refined petroleum products; sold or provided to Iran refined
petroleum products; or sold, leased, or provided to Iran goods, services, technology,
infonnation, or support that could directly and significantly contribute to the
enhancement of Iran's ability to import refined petroleum products and (2) certain
amendments to subsections l(c)(iii), l(d), and 2(b)(ii) ofE.O 13622).
The Tennination E.O. also continues in effect implementation provisions for aspects of certain
statutory sanctions that are outside the scope of the U.S. commitment to lift nuclear-related
sanctions under the JCPOA.
Except as noted above, the Termination E.O. does not affect: () the national emergency declared
in E.O. 12957, which shall remain in place, (ii) any E.O. issued in furtherance of that national
emergency other than E.O.s 13574, 13590, 13622, 13628, and 13645, or (iii) the Iranian Assets
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 535. Further, the revocation ofE.O.s 13574, 13590, 13622,
and 13645 and sections 5-7 and 15 ofE.O. 13628 will not affect any enforcement action pending
'These provisions relate to the implementation of certain statutory authorities that are outside the scope of U.S.
commitments with respect to sanctions described in sections 4.I to 4.8 and 5 of Annex II and sections 17.1 t0 17.3
and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA. Specifically, they provide for the implementation of aspects of the following
sections of IFC A that are outside the scope of the U.S. commitments: 1244(0)(1(A), 1244(d)()(A), 1245(a)(1). and
1246(a). The implementing provisions related to section 1244(c)(1)(A) only apply to the extent sanctions are
imposed with respect to transactions or activities that are outside the scope of the JCPO A. specifically, providing
significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods and services in support of any activity or
transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of persons described in section l 244(c)(2)(C)(iii) of IFCA (i.e., Iranian
persons on the SDN List). The implementing provisions related to sections 1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1), and 1246(a)
of IFCA only apply to the extent sanctions are imposed with respect to transactions or activities that arc outside the
scope of the JCPOA, as reflected in waiver determinations as to those sections issued by the Secretary of State to
give effect to sanctions commitments described in sections 17.1 t0 17.3 and 17.5 of Annex Vof the JCPOA
(including any transactions or activities involving persons on the SON List), and any renewals thereof. The
implementing provisions related to section 1249 of IFCA only apply to the extent sanctions are imposed with respect
to transactions or activities that are described in that section of IFCA, which are outside the scope of the JCPOA.
41
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
or taken prior to the effective date of the Termination E.O., or any action or proceeding based on
any act committed prior to the date of the Termination E.O.
86
For additional information on the Termination E.O., please see J@PO,A_EA4Os A.8 and A.9.
VI. Waivers
Commitment:
Pursuant to the U.S. commitment in section 11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, on Adoption Day, the
Secretary of State issued waiver determinations and made findings with respect to certain
statutory sanctions provisions set out in section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA.
By their terms,
these waivers and findings were contingent in nature; they only took effect upon confirmation by
the Secretary of State that Iran had implemented the nuclear-related measures specified in
sections 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, as verified by the IAEA (ie., upon
Implementation Day)."
87
The pending enforcement actions referenced herein are independent of actions to impose sanctions under the
terminated E.O.s. such as designation or identification actions that result in the blocking of a person's property or
interests in property. To the extent an ongoing investigation of a non-U.S. person relates to activity within the scope
of the secondary sanctions lifted on Implementation Day. including sanctions imposed pursuant to the tenninated
E.Os, the U.S. government will not sanction the non-U.S. persons under those authorities following Implementation
Day. The enforcement actions referenced herein relate to apparent violations of the prohibitions set out in the
terminated E.O.s and relevant implementing regulations, and may result in civil or criminal penalties for the
apparent violator. On Implementation Day, the prohibitions under the relevant E.O.s were terminated, which means
that there would be no new violations arising from the prohibitions under these E.O.s after Implementation Day. To
the extent there are investigations of apparent violations that relate to activities that occurred prior to
Implementation Day, such apparent violations will be analyzed in light of the laws and regulations that were in place
at the time of the underlying activities, consistent with U.S. law and longstanding practice. As with all OFAC
enforcement actions, any response to an apparent violation under the terminated E.O.s that relates to activities
occurring prior to Implementation Day will be analyzed and acted upon consistent with the framework established in
OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines. See Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. part 50 I. The framework set
out in the Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provides for the consideration of a series of general factors
in determining an appropriate enforcement response to an apparent violation
"see 80Fed_ Reg 67470(November2, 2015)
pursuant to the relevant statutes, several of the waiver determinations and findings are in effect for a specified
duration (generally 120 or 180 days). To keep in effect U.S. commitments with respect to sanctions set out in
sections 17.1 to 17.3 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA. the Secretary of State will renew waiver determinations
and findings, as necessary, and expects to publish notice of such renewals in the Federal Register.
42
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
These waivers and findings, effective on January 16, 2016, waive the imposition of sanctions
under specified provisions ofNDAA 2012 and IFCA and find it is vital to the national security
interests of the United States to issue waivers regarding the application of sanctions under
specified provisions of ISA and the TRA, all with respect to certain transactions and activities by
non-U.S. persons" involving Iran, as set forth in section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA and
described in section II above. In addition, the waiver determination under sections I 244(c)( I)
and I 246(a) of IFCA waives the imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions by U.S.
persons for the export, reexport, sale, lease, or transfer of commercial passenger aircraft and
related parts and services to Iran exclusively for commercial passenger aviation as set forth in
section 5.1.1 of the JCPOA, provided that OFAC has issued any required licenses.
Implementation;
To implement the U.S. commitments with respect to sanctions described in sections 17.1 to 17.3
and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, effective Implementation Day, the USG is waiving the
(i) sanctions under IFCA and NDAA 2012 and (ii) application of sanctions under TRA and ISA,
to the extent necessary to implement the JCPOA and excluding any transactions involving
persons on OFAC's SDN List:
A. IFCA
I. Sec/ion 12././(c)(J) - to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons (and, in
the case of commercial passenger aviation activities described in section JV.A above, U.S.
persons, provided that OFAC has issued any required licenses) on behalf of, or for the
benefit of: (i) a person determined to be part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding
sectors of Iran, (ii) a person determined to operate a port in Iran; or (iii) Iranian
individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA."
pr purposes of the waivers and findings issued on Adoption Day and renewed as necessary, the term
transactions by non-U.S. persons" includes transactions by U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to the extent
U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities are authorized by OFAC to engage in such transactions, including
pursuant to the general license described in section IVB above.
" 0yn Implementation Day, the Secretary of State waived the imposition of sanctions under section 1244(0(I) of
IFCA on persons previously detennined to meet the criteria set forth in section I 244(c)(2)(A) of IFCA. See supra
note 88.
43
- 107 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
2. Section 1244(d) - to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for the sale,
supply, or transfer to or from lran of goods or services used in connection with the
energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran, including NIOC, NITC, and IRISL,"
3. Section 1244(h)02) - to the extent required for Ffls to conduct or facilitate transactions
for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of natural gas;
4. Section I 245{a)(J)(A)- to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for
the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of precious metals;
5. Section 1245(a)(1)()- to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for the
sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of materials described in section 1245(d) of lFCA
(graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for
integrating industrial processes) determined to be (i) used by Iran as a medium for barter
swap, or any other exchange or transaction or (ii) listed as assets of the Government of
Iran for purposes of the national balance sheet of lran;9
2
6. Section I 2./5(a)(J)(C) - to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for
the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of materials described in section I 24S(d) of
IFCA (graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
software for integrating industrial processes) if the material is () to be used in connection
with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran, or resold, retransferred, or
otherwise supplied to an end user in one or more such sectors; (ii) sold, supplied, or
transferred to any individual or entity blocked solely pursuant to E.O.13599, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied to such an individual or entity; or (iii) determined
pursuant to section 124S(e)(3) oflFCA to be used as described in that section, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied for use in the nuclear program of Iran, provided that
the transactions do not involve:
" On implementation Day, the Secretary of State waived the imposition of sanctions under section 1244(d)(1) of
IFCA on a person previously determined to meet the criteria set forth in that section. See supra note 88.
92
Pursuant to section I 245(e)(I) of IFCA. the President is required to report to Congress whether Iran is using any
of the materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA as assets of the Government of Iran for purposes of the
national balance sheet of Iran. The responsibility for this report has been delegated to the Secretary of State. The
report is published in the Federal Register. To date, there has been no determination that the GOI is using any of the
materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA in this manner, but persons should continue referring to any updated
reports issued pursuant to section I 245(e)(I) of IFCA.
44
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
(a) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) that have
not been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to paragraph
16 of UNSCR 2231 and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which
the procurement channel applies; or
(b) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section I 245(d) if the
material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise
supplied directly or indirectly, for use in connection with the military or ballistic
missile program of Iran;"
7. Section L24(c) - to the extent required for FFIs to conduct or facilitate transactions that
are within the scope of the waivers under section 1245(a){l) of IFCA, as described in
sections VIA.4-VLA.6 above;
8. Sec/ions 12./6(a)(J)(A) - to the extent required for non-US. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance in connection with activities involving
Iran that are within the scope of the JCPOA (as described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and
17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA);
9. Section 1246(a)(1)(B)(i) to the extent required for non-U.S. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance with respect to, or for the benefit of,
any activity in the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors oflran for which sanctions
are imposed under IFCA;
10. Section 1246(a)(1)(B)() - to the extent required for non-U.S. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for transactions that are within the
scope of the waivers under section 1245(a)(l )(B) and (C) of IFCA as described in
paragraphs VLA.5-Vl.A.6 above;
IL. Section 1246(a)(1)(C) to the extent required for non-U.S. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance with respect to or for any Iranian
person whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O
13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR, including Iranian individuals and entities set
forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA;
pursuant to section 1245(e)(D) of IFCA, the President is required to report to Congress whether Iran is using any
of the materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA in connection with the nuclear, military, or ballistic missile
programs of Iran. The responsibility for this report has been delegated to the Secretary of State. The report is
published in the Federal Register.
45
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
12. Section 1246(a) - to the extent required for U.S. persons to provide underwriting services
or insurance or reinsurance in connection with commercial passenger aviation activities
described in section IV.A above, provided that OFAC has issued any required licenses;
and
13. Section 1247(a) - to the extent required for FFIs to facilitate transactions on behalf of
Iranian individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA;
B. NDAA 2012
I. Section 1245(d(1) -- to the extent necessary to implement the JCPOA, including for FFls
to conduct or facilitate transactions with the CBI covered by the U.S. commitments with
respect to sanctions described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA"
C. TRA
L. Section 212(a) - to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for the
provision of underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for NIOC, NITC, or a
successor entity to either company, in cases where the transactions are for activities
described in sections 4.2.1, 4.3, and 4.4 of Annex II of the JCPOA;
2. Section 2 /3(a) - to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for the
purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of sovereign debt of the
Government of lran or debt or equity of an entity owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran, in cases where the transactions are for activities described in section 4.1.5 and
4.1.7 of Annex II of the JCPOA; and
" gee supra note H
The waiver provision under section 4(c) of ISA, which is invoked by sections 212(d) and 213(b) of the TRA, as
well as section 5(a) of ISA, refers to waiving as to a national of a country." As a result, the waiver determinations
and findings issued by the Secretary of State on Adoption Day use the term "non-U.S. nationals" in connection with
sections 212(a) and 213(a) of the TRA and section 5(a) of ISA. For purposes of implementing U.S. commitments
under the JCPOA with respect to these sections of the TRA. the term non-U.S. nationals" has the same meaning as
non-U.S. persons." Therefore. this guidance uses the term "non-U.S. persons" in describing the relevant waivers.
46
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
D. ISA
I. ISA section 5(a) - to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons related to:
(i) the development of petroleum resources of Iran; (ii) the production of refined
petroleum products in Iran; (iii) the exportation of refined petroleum products to Iran;
(iv) joint ventures with Iran relating to the development of petroleum resources outside of
[ran; (v) support for the development of petroleum resources and refined petroleum
products in Iran; (vi) the development and purchase of petrochemical products from Iran;
(vii) the transportation of crude oil from Iran; or (viii) the ownership, operation, or
control of a vessel used in a manner that conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil or
refined petroleum products transported on the vessel, in cases where the transactions are
for activities described in sections 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, and 4.3.6 of Annex II of the
JCPOA
Vil. Key U.S. Legal Authorities That Remain in Place After Implementation Day
A number of U.S. legal authorities that are outside the scope of the JCPOA and are directed
toward, or have been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to, Iran remain in place after
Implementation Day. A non-exhaustive list of such authorities is set out below:
A. Trade Sanctions
I. 'frade Embargo: The US. domestic trade embargo imposed on Iran under the
national emergency declared in E.O. 12957, as implemented through the ITSR,
also referred to as U.S. primary sanctions, remains in place following
Implementation Day. Pursuant to the ITSR and with limited exceptions," U.S.
persons, as defined in section 560.314 of the TTSR, continue to be broadly
prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings directly or indirectly with
Iran or its government. In addition, non-U.S. persons continue to be prohibited
from knowingly engaging in conduct that seeks to evade US. restrictions on
transactions or dealings with Iran or that causes the export of goods or services
from the United States to Iran.
·These exceptions include the three categories of activity the United States has committed to license pursuant to
section 5 of Annex II of the JCPOA. as well as activities that are exempt from regulation or authorized under the
ITSR. See section IV above and sections J. K, and L of the JCPoA_EI@s for further details.
47
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
Please note that, under the I[SR, the clearing of transactions involving Iran
through the US. financial system, including foreign branches of U.S. financial
institutions continues to be prohibited.
2. Export Controls: U.S. controls on the exportation or reexportation of goods,
technology, and services to [ran imposed pursuant to the ITSR, including sections
560.204 and 560.205, as well as the Export Administration Regulations, I 5 C. F.R.
parts 730-774 (EAR), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR
parts 120-130 (ITAR), remain in place. Pursuant to these authorities and unless
exempt from regulation or authorized under the relevant regulations, the
exportation or reexportation by a U.S. person or from the United States to Iran or
the Government of Iran, as well as the reexportation by non-U.S. persons of items
that contain 10 percent or more U.S.-controlled content with knowledge or reason
to know that the reexportation is intended specifically to Iran or the Government
of Iran, generally requires a license.
B. Designation Authorities and Blocking Sanctions
In addition, the United States retains a number of authorities that are directed toward, or have
been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to Iran. Generally, these authorities provide for
the imposition of blocking sanctions on persons meeting certain criteria or engaging in specified
conduct, as well as their support networks.
Designation authorities:
The activities targeted by these authorities include:
1. Support for terrorism: E.O. 13224 (blocking property and prohibiting transactions
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism);
2. Irani human rights@buses:
• E.O.s 13553 and 13628 (implementing sections 105, 105A, and 105B of
CISADA (related to persons who are responsible for or complicit in
human rights abuses committed against the citizens ofTran; transfers of
goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran; and persons who engage in
censorship or similar activities with respect to Iran)); and
48
- 112 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
• E.O. 13606 (relating to the provision of information technology used to
further serious human rights abuses);
3. Proliferation of MD and_their means of delivery, including ballistic missiles:
E.Os 12938 and 13382,
4. Support for persons involved in human rights abuses in Syria or for the
Government of Sri@: E.Os 13572 and 13582;
5. Support for persons threatening the pece, seCrity, or stability of emen: E.O
13611,
6. Transactions or activities described in section ]244c((A)of IE@A_if the
transaction inyolyes_any person on_the_SDN list_(other than_an Iranian financial
institution whose property and interests in property are_blocked_solely pursuant to
E.O. /3599): Section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA;
7. Diversion of goods intended for the people of [ran; CISADA 105C, as added by
section 1249 of IFCA (relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural
commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of
lran, or the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of such goods);
8. Knowingly and directly providing specialized financial messaging services to, or
knowinghy enabling or facilitating director indirect access to such messaging
services for a financial, institution whose property or interests in property are
blocked_in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of
delivery, or Iran's support for international terrorism; Section 220 of the TRA:"
9. Officials, agents, and affiliates of the IRGC: Section 301 of the TRA" (providing
for the designation of officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC); and
10.Foreign sanctions evaders. E.O. 13608 (authorizing the imposition of prohibitions
on transactions or dealings by U.S. persons involving persons determined to have:
(i) violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of
The United States has committed not to apply the sanctions under section 220 of the TRA with respect to the CBI
or any financial institution listed in Attaclunent 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA
98
Section 302(b)02) of the TRA further provides for discretionary blocking of persons dctcnnincd to meet the
criteria set out in section 302(a). See section VII.D.1 below.
49
- 113 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran or Syria (including sanctions imposed under
counter-proliferation or counter-terrorism authorities); or (ii) facilitated deceptive
transactions for or on behalf of any person subject to U.S. sanctions concerning
Iran or Syria).
99
Blocking authorities:
The persons targeted by these authorities include:
I. The_Government of hrqn and_Iranian_]in@nei@l Institutions: E.O. 13599, section
217(a) of the TRA, section 560.211 of the ITSR; and
2. [slamice Republic of [ran Broadcasting and its president under section [@(c)of
CISADA: Section 1248 of!FCA
C. Correspondent and Payable-through Account Sanctions
After Implementation Day, FFis may be subject to correspondent or payable-through account
secondary sanctions for:
I. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction with designated Iranian
financial institutions that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1245(d)
of ND AA 2012);
2. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian
persons that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1247(a) of IFCA),
3. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction or providing significant
financial services for any other person on the SDN List with the "[IFSR]"
identifying tag (i.e., the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and any of its
designated officials, agents, or affiliates; individuals and entities designated
pursuant to E.O. 13382 in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their
means of delivery; and individuals and entities designated pursuant to E.O. I 3224
in connection with Iran's support for international terrorism) (section l04(c)(2)(E)
of CISADA);
9') E.O. 13608 is not a blocking authority. However. U.S. persons arc prohibited from engaging in transactions or
dealings with persons sanctioned under this authority.
50
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
4. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or
transfer to or from lran of significant goods and services used in connection with
the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of lran where the transactions
involve persons who remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1244(d)(2) of
IFCA); or
5. Knowingly conducting or facilitating a significant financial transaction for the
sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals
such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes
that have been determined pursuant to section I 24S(e)(3) ofIFCA to be used as
described in that section if the transactions involve (i) persons on the SON List;
(ii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 124S(d) of IFCA
that have not been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to
paragraph 16 ofUNSCR 2231 and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases
in which the procurement channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of
materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or
transferred, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly,
for use in connection with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section
124S(c) ofIFCA).
D. Menu-based Sanctions
After Implementation Day, menu-based secondary sanctions continue to attach to:
1. Persons who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or services in support of: the IRGC or any of
its officials, agents, or affiliates blocked pursuant to IEEPA; persons that engage
in significant transactions with (i) any of the foregoing or (ii) persons subject to
financial sanctions pursuant to the UNSCRs that impose sanctions with respect to
Iran, or a person acting for or on behalf of, or owned or controlled by, such person
(section 302(a) of the TRA);
2. Non-U.S. persons who engage in transactions or activities described in sections
1244(d)(1) and 1246(a) of IFCA if the transactions involve persons on the SON
List; and
3. Non-U.S. persons who sell, supply, or transfer directly or indirectly to or from
lran graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
software for integrating industrial processes that have been determined pursuant
51
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This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
January 16, 2016
to section 1245(e)(3) oflFCA to be used as described in that section if the
transactions involve (i) persons on the SDN List; (ii) the sale, supply, or transfer
of materials described in section I 245(d) of IFCA that have not been approved by
the procurement channel established pursuant to paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231
and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which the procurement
channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in
section I 245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly, for use in connection
with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section 1245(a) of IFCA)
E. Non-Proliferation Sanctions
On Transition Day, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to
terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the nuclear proliferation-related statutory
sanctions set forth in paragraph 4.9 of Annex II of the JCPOA, including sanctions under the
Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related
commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with
the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. The JCPOA does not address the application of a number of generally
applicable non-proliferation statutes related to transfers of proliferation-sensitive equipment and
technology, or statutes that provide for sanctions for activities that would be outside the scope of
the JCPOA.
F. Terrorism List Sanctions
Iran remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under relevant laws (section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act; section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act; and section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act), and the JCPOA does not alter that designation. A number of different
sanctions laws and restrictions are keyed to this designation, including restrictions on foreign
assistance (22USC.$ 2371), a ban on defense exports and sales (22 US.C. $ 2780), controls on
exports of certain sensitive technology and dual-use items (50 U.S.C. App. § 2405), and various
financial and other restrictions.
52
- 116 -
Annex 25
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, General License H, 16 January 2016, revoked as
of 27 June 2018
- 117 -
- 118 -
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions eo
C
3Ceraso
Do
�
GENERAL LICENSE H
Authorizing Certain Transactions Relating to (
Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States
Pn �
ll�
�a
�led
States
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c), an entity owned or co�
r
- 119 -
t
�
person and established or maintained outside the United States (aU.
ne or -controlled
foreign entity") is authorized to engage in transactions, directly or ind ect, wi
the
Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of t�er�m t of Iran that
would otherwise be prohibited by 31 CF.R. § 560.215. �
\
Note I to paragraph (a): This general license does
to� rize the reexportation from
.V
a third country of any goods, technology, or services pr
ib�3 C.F.R. § 560.205.
Note 2 to paragraph (a): For purposes of
license, an entity is "owned or
controlled" by a United States person if the Unit
n: (1) holds a 50 percent or
greater equity interest by vote or value in the enti
) holds a majority of seats on the board of
directors of the entity; or (3) otherwise contro�
a
c ns, policies, or personnel decisions of
the entity. See 31 CF.R. $ 560.314 for a defi'ition f the term United States person, which
includes foreign branches of an entity organize
er the laws of the United States or any
jurisdiction within the United States. �
(b) A United States
person;GhRed
to engage in the following activities that would
otherwise be prohibited by 3, E.R. k5so.
(I) activities related t
ablishment or alteration of operating policies and
procedures of a United St4tee smerry or a U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity, to the extent
necessary to allow�
.-
, or -controlled foreign entity to engage in transactions
U
authorized in para
r
1d
(2) ae..$, fake available to those foreign entities that the U.S. person owns or
an�
controls
�
and globally integrated computer, accounting, email,
•
telecomm
·
ns, or other business support system, platform, database, application, or server
necessapy store, collect, transmit, generate, or otherwise process documents or information
rel ted3actions authorized in paragraph (a).
te I to paragraph (b)(2): For purposes of this subsection, the term "automated" refers
to a
puter, accounting, email, telecommunications, or other business support system,
platform, database, application, or server that operates passively and without human intervention
to facilitate the flow of data between and among the United States person and its owned or
controlled foreign entities.
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2): For purposes of this subsection, the term "globally
integrated" refers to a computer, accounting, email, telecommunications, or other business�
support system, platform, database, application, or server that is available to, and in genera
by, the United States person's global organization, including the United States person a�s �
owned or controlled foreign entities.
t
y
o�
Note 3 to paragraph (b)(2): Paragraph (b)(2) does not authorize the use
automated computer, accounting, email, telecommunications, or other
busin��tem,
platform, database, application, or server in connection with any transfer of ds
·,
;om, or
through a United States depository institution or a United States-regist�
d b ker
ealer in
- 120 -
u
s
r
secuntes.
Note to paragraph (b): See 31 C.F.R. § 560.208 for prohf,t;
on cilitation by
United States persons, which remain in effect, with the exceptio�
a
c · v· · es authorized in
paragraph (b ).
{
-
\
(c) Paragraph (a) of this general license does no�
t� sactions involving:
(I) The exportation, reexportation, sale, or pp dir tly or indirectly, from the United
States of any goods, technology, or services proh it d by
.F.R. § 560.204, without separate
authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets C ol (OF AC);
2) Any transfer of funds to, ton, %~
«Ca.,%ate sates depository institution ora
United states-registered broker or dealer hr ~.Jud.
(3) Any person on OFAC's 1�
s
·
�aJly
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
(SDN List), or any activity that wou
l ibited by any part of chapter V of 31 C.F.R. other
than part 560 if engaged in b�
tes person or in the United States;
te
ni
(4) Any person identi do
e List of Foreign Sanctions Evaders pursuant to Executive
Order 13608;
(5) Any a
· nvovmg any item (including information) subject to the Export
Administration R�
, 15 C.F.R. parts 730-774 (EAR), that is prohibited by, or otherwise
l
requires a licens un. art 744 of the EAR; or participation in any transaction involving a
person whose
4xp
fivileges have been denied pursuant to part 764 or 766 of the EAR,
without aufig{ion from the Department of Commerce;
;/ ,~;teary, paramilitary, intelligence, or law enforcement entity of the Government
[~,J'jit eeital, agent, or amiiate thereof;
h
7) Any activity that is sanctionable under Executive Order 12938 or 13382 (relating to
Iran' proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including
ballistic missiles); Executive Order 13224 (relating to international terrorism); Executive Order
13572 or 13582 (relating to Syria); Executive Order 13611 (relating to Yemen); or Executive
2
Order 13553 or 13606, or section 2 or 3 of Executive Order 13628 (relating to Iran's commission
of human rights abuses against its citizens); or
(8) Any nuclear activity involving Iran that is subject to the procurement channel
a,
established pursuant to paragraph 16 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 22
(2015) and Section 6 of Annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 1#@g015'
and that has not been approved through that procurement channel process.
ey
Unite'R�n
(d) This general license does not authorize any transaction by a
prohibited by my p,rt of chapter V of 31 C.F.R. mhmhm "'" 5�
V
hie
JoE�Sm1t�
Acting Dir
r
Office
off�
ts Control
Dated: January 16, 2016
$
5
5
>
38
i
<
3
- 121 -
- 122 -
Annex 26
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, Statement of licensing policy for activities
related to the export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related
parts and services, 16 January 2016, revoked as of 8 May 2018
- 123 -
- 124 -
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
31 C.F.R. Part 560
STATEMENT OF LICENSING POLICY FOR ACTIVITIES RELATED
TN_2)
EXPORT OR RE-EXPORT TO IRAN OF COMMERCIAL PASSENGF-4RCRAFT
AND RELATED PARTS AND SERICES
Consistent with U.S. foreign policy and the United States' commi �spect to
sanctions reflected in Section 5.1.1 of Annex II to the Joint Com
[~uh p1an of Action
of July 14, 2015 (JCPOA), the following Statement of Licensi'
stablishes a
favorable licensing policy under which U.S. and non-U.S. p
s ay request specific
authorization from OFAC to engage in transactions fo
e commercial passenger
aircraft and related parts and services to Iran, provj·
ansactions do not involve
any person on OFAC's Specially Designated Nati a\sand Blocked Persons List ("SDN
Lr.
G
As of Implementation Day of the JCPOA,
s��nses
may be issued on a case-by-case
basis to authorize U.S. persons and, where th
is nexus to U.S. jurisdiction, non-U.S. persons
to (I) export, re-export, sell, lease, or
�
to an commercial passenger aircraft for
- 125 -
r
exclusively civil aviation end-use, (2)
re-export, sell, lease, or transfer to Iran spare parts
and components for commercial pas9get
:raft, and (3) provide associated services,
including warranty, maintenB:
,
afi�air services and safety-related inspections, for all the
foregoing, provided that licer
items and services are used exclusively for commercial
passenger aviation.
Applications for
·
lli:es
pursuant to this Statement of Licensing Policy may be
submitted online at
"
.treas
. tov/resource-center/sanctions/Pares/licensin .as x or
alternatively by 6a,Sf ourier, pursuant to section 501.801 of the Reporting, Procedures and
Penalties Regt~ligs&, 31 C.F.R. Part 501, to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S.
Departmett~be Treasury, Treasury Annex, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 2062_An: Iran Commercial Passenger Aviation. Please provide complete details of all
.KG/for which authorization is sought, including U.S. Department of Commerce Export
lassification Numbers (ECCNs) for all goods and technology subject to the U.S. Export
tration Regulations (EAR) to be exported or re-exported to Iran.
Note 1: Specific license applications will be evaluated in light of the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act and any other relevant statutes, as appropriate.
Note 2: Licenses issued pursuant to the Statement of Licensing Policy will include appropriate
conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or
services are re-sold or re-transferred to, any person on the SON List.
Note 3: Exports or reexports to individuals and entities listed on the Department of Commerce's
Denied Persons List and, in some cases, the Entity List will require separate authorization from
the Department of Commerce. The Denied Persons List may be accessed at
h
://www.bis.doc. «ov/index. h / lie - uidance/lists-of- arties-of-concem/denied-
and the Entity List may be accessed at h
://www.bis.doc.ov/index. h / licv-s id e/1
of-parties-of-concern/entity-list. Applicants seeking to engage in transactions
�l
uire
separate authorization from the Department of Commerce should submit an app
II to 1t
when submitting an application to OFAC pursuant to the Statement of Lice�·
application to OFAC should also identify any individuals or entities that
rte gijfe rise to a
requirement for a separate authorization from the Department of Co�\
; the
.
�
<:::, ,.,,.,, 16, 2016
9
O
%°
0°'
8"
°
- 126 -
Annex 27
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, Final Rule amending the Iranian Transactions
and Sanctions Regulations, 21 January 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 3330
- 127 -
- 128 -
°
5
3330
Federal Register/ Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016/Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Control), Office of the General Counsel,
tel.: 202-622-2410.
Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010, as amended, (Pub. L. 111--195) (22
Office of Foreign Assets Control
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
U.S.C. 8501-8551) (CISADA). In
addition, to fulfill the requirements of
31 CFR Part 560 and Appendix A to
Chapter V
Electronic and Facsimile Availability
This document and additional
information concerning OPAC are
available from OFAC's Web site
section 103(d)(2)(B) of CISADA, the
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations
AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.
(www.treasury.gov/ofac). Certain general
information pertaining to OFAC's
sanctions programs also is available via
facsimile through a 24-hour fax-on
demand service, tel.: 202--622--0077.
SUMMARY: 'The Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) is amending the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
(ITSR) to implement certain United
States Government (USG) commitments
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) reached on July 14,
2015 between the P5+1 (China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States), the European
Union (EU), and Iran. In particular,
Secretary of State is submitting to the
appropriate congressional committees a
certification in writing that it is in the
national interest of the United States to
provide an exception to the prohibition
on the importation of Iranian-origin
goods to the extent required to
implement the sanctions commitment
described in section 5.1.3 of Annex II of
the JCPOA and a report describing the
reasons for this exception,
Section 560.534(a) authorizes the
importation into the United States of
lranian-origin foodstuffs intended for
human consumption that are classified
under chapters 2--23 of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTS). Items that are classified in
chapters 2--23 of the HTS that are not
foodstuffs intended for human
consumption are not authorized for
importation into the United States by
this section, This section also authorizes
Background
On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States), the
European Union (EU), and Iran reached
a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) to ensure that Iran's nuclear
program is exclusively peaceful. The
JCPOA provides that the United States
Government (USG) will undertake the
sanctions-related commitments
described in sections 17.1 t0 17.4 of
Annex V of the JCPOA once the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has verified that Iran has
implemented key nuclear-related
commitments described in the JCPOA.
The date for this sanctions lifting is
referred to as "Implementation Day" in
the JCPOA. In addition, the JCPOA
provides that, on Implementation Day,
the USG will license certain activities
involving Iran as described in section 5
of Annex II and section 17.5 of Annex
OFAC is adding to the ITSR general
licenses authorizing the importation
into the United States of, and dealings
in, certain Iranian-origin foodstuffs and
carpets and related transactions to
implement the USG commitment set out
in section 5.1.3 of Annex II and section
17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA. In
addition, to reflect the USG's
implementation of its commitment set
out in section 4 of Annex II and section
17.4 0f Annex V of the JCPOA to
terminate Executive Order 13622 of July
30, 2012, OF AC is removing regulatory
provisions that implemented the
blocking sanctions in sections 5 and 6
of Executive Order 13622, OFAC is also
making certain technical and
conforming changes to its regulations to
reflect the implementation of the USG
commitment set out in section 4.8.1 of
Annex II and section 17.3 of Annex V
the importation into the United States of
V of the JCPOA. OFAC is now amending
the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), to
implement the USG's commitment
pursuant to the JCPOA to license the
importation into the United States of
Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs,
including pistachios and caviar, and to
make certain technical and conforming
changes to reflect the implementation of
other USG JCPOA commitments on
lmplementation Day, as set forth below.
of the JCPOA to remove the individuals
and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to
Annex II of the JCPOA from OFAC's
Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List, the Foreign
Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non
SON Iran Sanctions Act List, as
appropriate, on Implementation Day of
Importation of Certain Foodstuffs and
Carpets
To implement the USG commitment
the JCPOA.
DATES: Effective: January 21, 2016
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The
Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control: Assistant
Director for Licensing, tel.: 202-622--
2480, Assistant Director for Regulatory
Affairs, tel.: 202--622-4855, Assistant
Director for Sanctions Compliance &
set out in section 5.1.3 of Annex II and
section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA
to license the importation into the
United States of Iranian-origin carpets
and foodstuffs, including pistachios and
caviar, OFAC is adding S 560.534 t0 the
ITSR to authorize by general license the
importation into the United States of,
and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin
foodstuffs and carpets from Iran or a
third country. OFAC's publication of
this general license as an amendment to
the ITSR fulfills the requirements of
Evaluation, tel.: 202--622--2490; or the
Department of the Treasury's Office of
the Chief Counsel (Foreign Assets
section 103(d)(2)(A) of the
Iranian-origin carpets and other textile
floor coverings and carpels used as wall
hangings that are classified under
chapter 57 or heading 9706.00.0060 of
the HTS. Items that are classified under
heading 9706.00.0060 (Antiques of an
age exceeding one hundred years/
Other") that are not carpets and other
textile wall coverings or carpets used as
wall hangings are not authorized for
importation into the United States by
this section.
Section 560.534(b) authorizes U.S.
persons, wherever located, to engage in
transactions or dealings in or related to
such Iranian-origin foodstuffs and
carpets, provided that such transactions
or dealings do not involve or relate Lo
goods, technology, or services for
exportation, reexportation, sale, or
supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran,
the Government of Iran, an Iranian
financial institution, or any other person
whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to
$560.211 of the ITSR, other than
services described in $ 560.405
(Transactions ordinarily incident to a
licensed transaction authorized") and
transfers of funds described in $ 560.516
(Transfers of funds involving Iran").
Section 560.534(c) clarifies that
$560.534(a)--(b) does not authorize the
importation into the United States of
goods that are under seizure or
detention by the Department of
Homeland Security, or of goods for
which forfeiture proceedings have
commenced or of goods that have been
forfeited to the U.S. Government.
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
- 129 -
Federal Register/ Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016/Rules and Regulations
3331
Section 560.534(d) clarifies that nothing
in § 560.534 authorizes the debiting or
crediting oflranian accounts, as defined
in § 560.320.
Transactions ordinarily incident to
the transactions authorized in§ 560.534
and necessary to give effect thereto also
are authorized as set forth in § 560.405.
OF AC is amending § 560.405 by
inserting new paragraph (f), which
clarifies that the scope of authorized
incidental transactions does not include
letter of credit services relating to
transactions authorized in § 560.534.
Those letter of credit services that are
authorized are set forth separately in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of§ 560.535,
which OF AC is also adding to the ITSR.
Please see§§ 560.405(b) and 560.516
regarding transfers of funds in
connection with licensed activities.
Brokering services relating to
transactions authorized by this final rule
also are authorized. See $ 560.535(c).
Pursuant to its Implementation Day
adding a new note to § 560.324 of the
ITSR, and revising a note to appendix A
to 31 CFR chapter V.
commitment set out in section 4 of
Annex II and section 17.4 of Annex V
of the JCPOA, the United States
Government has revoked E.O. 13622.
Accordingly, OFAC is amending
§ 560.211 of the ITSR by removing
paragraph (c)(2) and the Note to
paragraph (c)(2), which implemented
sections 5 and 6 ofE.O. 13622,
respectively.
Public Participation
Because the amendment of the ITSR
Technical and Conforming Changes
OF AC is also making certain technical
involves a foreign affairs function, the
provisions of Executive Order 12866
and the Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of proposed
rulemaking, opportunity for public
participation, and delay in effective date
are inapplicable. Because no notice of
proposed rulemaking is required for this
rule, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601-612) does not apply.
Executive Order 13622
On July 30, 2012, the President,
invoking the authority of, inter alia, the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
(IEEPA), issued Executive Order (E.O.)
13622. Section 5 ofE.O. 13622 blocked
"all property and interests in property
that are in the United States, that
hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of' any U.S.
person, including any foreign branch, of
any person determined by the Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, to have materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological
support for, or goods or services in
support of, the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC), the Naftiran
Intertrade Company (NICO), or the
Central Bank of Iran, or the purchase or
acquisition of U.S. bank notes or
precious metals by the Government of
Iran. Section 6 ofE.O. 13622 provided
that subsection 5(a) ofE.O. 13622,
among other specified provisions, shall
not apply with respect to any person for
conducting or facilitating a transaction
involving a natural gas development
and pipeline project initiated prior to
July 31, 2012, to bring gas from
Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey in
furtherance of a production sharing
agreement or license awarded by a
sovereign government other than the
Government of Iran. On December 26,
2012, OFAC published a final rule in
the Federal Register (77 FR 75845) that,
and conforming changes to 31 CFR
chapter V to reflect the implementation
of the USG commitment set out in
section 4.8.1 of Annex II and section
17.3 of Annex V of the JCPOA. Pursuant
to that commitment, on Implementation
Day, OFAC is removing individuals and
entities identified in Attachment 3 to
Annex II of the JCPOA from the
Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the
Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or
the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, as
appropriate. The individuals and
entities being removed from the SDN
List include persons that OF AC has
previously identified as blocked
pursuant to E.O. 13599 of February 5,
2012 ("Blocking Property of the
Government Iran and Iranian Financial
Institutions") because they meet the
definition of the terms "Government of
Iran" or "Iranian financial institution."
These individuals and entities are
marked with an asterisk in Attachment
3 to Annex II of the JCPOA. Non-U.S.
persons will no longer be subject to
secondary sanctions, including under
relevant provisions of the Iran Freedom
and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
and other applicable authorities, for
engaging in transactions or activities
with these individuals and entities,
provided that the transactions do not
include conduct that remains
sanctionable or individuals or entities
that remain on the SDN List. However,
these individuals and entities being
removed from the SDN List remain
persons whose property and interests in
property that are in the U.S., or that are
or come within the possession or
control of any U.S. person, are blocked
pursuant to E.O. 13599. While OFAC is
removing these persons from the SDN
List on Implementation Day, they will
now be included on a "List of Persons
Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to
Executive Order 13599 (E.O. 13599
List), which OF AC is making available
on its Web site: www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Pages/13599 _list.aspx. To reflect these
changes, OF AC is revising notes in
§§ 560.211 and 560.304 of the ITSR,
Paperwork Reduction Act
The collections of information related
to the ITSR are contained in 31 CFR part
501 (the "Reporting, Procedures and
Penalties Regulations"). Pursuant to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507), those collections of
information have been approved by the
Office of Management and Budget under
control number 1505-0164. An agency
may not conduct or sponsor, and a
person is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless the
collection of information displays a
valid control number.
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 560 and
Appendix A to Chapter V
Administrative practice and
procedure, Banks, Banking, Carpet,
Foodstuffs, Iran, Letters of credit.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control amends 31 CFR chapter Vas
follows:
PART 560-IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS
AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS
■ 1. The authority citation for part 560
is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 3 U.S.C. 301; 18 U.S.C. 2339B,
2332d; 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9; 22 U.S.C. 7201-
7211; 31 U.S.C. 321(b); 50 U.S.C. 1601-1651,
1701-1706; Public Law 101-410, 104 Stat.
890 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Public Law 110-
96, 121 Stat. 1011 (50 U.S.C. 1705 note);
Public Law 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (22
U.S.C. 8501--8551); Public Law 112--81, 125
Stat. 1298 (22 U.S.C. 8513a); Public Law 112--
158, 126 Stat. 1214 (22 U.S.C. 8701-8795):
E.O. 12613, 52 FR 41940, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp..
p. 256: E.O. 12957, 60 FR 14615, 3 CFR, 1995
Comp., p. 332; E.O. 12959, 60 FR 24757.3
CFR, 1995 Comp.. p. 356; E.O. 13059, 62 FR
44531, 3 CFR, 1997 Comp.. p. 217; E.O.
13599, 77 FR 6659, 3 CFR, 2012 Comp.. p.
215: E.O. 13628, 77 FR 62139. 3 CFR, 2012
Comp., p. 314.
inter alia, implemented sections 5 and
6 ofE.O. 13622 by amending§ 560.211
of the ITSR to add paragraph (c)(2) and
a corresponding note.
- 130 -
3332
Federal Register/ Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016/Rules and Regulations
Subpart 8-Prohibitions
Register and incorporated into the E.O.
13599 List or the SDN List, as appropriate,
with the identifier "[BPI-IRAN]."
2. Amend $ 560.211 by removing the
Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to
Executive Order 13599(E.O. 13599 List).
The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the
following page on OFAC's Web site:
word "or" from the end of paragraph
(c)(1), removing and reserving paragraph
(c)(2), removing the note to paragraph
(c)(2), and revising notes 1 and 2 to
paragraphs (a) through (c) to read as
follows:
Subpart C-General Definitions
■ 3. Amend§ 560.304 by revising Note
1 to § 560.304 to read as follows:
§ 560.211 Prohibited transactions
involving blocked property.
§ 560.304 Government of Iran.
Note 1 to $ 560.304: The names of persons
Note 1 to paragraphs (a) through (cl of
that the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OF AC) has determined fall within this
definition are published in the Federal
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Programs/Pages/13599 list.aspx. Second, the
names of persons identified as blocked
pursuant to E.O. 13599 and $560.211 who
are also blocked pursuant to one or more
other parts of this chapter are incorporated
into OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) with the
identifier "[IRAN]" as well as the relevant
identifier(s) for the other sanctions
program(s) pursuant to which the persons'
property and interests in property are
blocked. The SDN List is accessible through
the following page on OFAC's Web site:
$ 560.211: The names of persons identified
by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OF AC) as blocked solely pursuant to
Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012
("Blocking Property of the Government Iran
and Iranian Financial Institutions") (E.O.
13599) because they meet the definition of
the terms "Government of Iran" or "Iranian
financial institution," whose property and
interests in property therefore are blocked
pursuant to this section, are published in the
Federal Register and incorporated into the
"List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely
Pursuant to Executive Order 13599)(E.O.
13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is accessible
through the following page on OF AC's Web
site: www.treasmy.gov/resource-centerl
sanctions/Programs/Pages/13599 list.aspx.
The names of persons identified as blocked
or designated for blocking pursuant to both
this part and one or more other parts of this
chapter are published in the Federal Register
Register and incorporated into one of two
lists maintained by OF AC. First, the names
of persons identified as blocked solely
pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of
February 5, 2012 (Blocking Property of the
Government Iran and Iranian Financial
Institutions") (E.O. 13599) and $ 560.211
because they meet the definition of the term
"Government of Iran" are incorporated into
the "List of Persons Identified as Blocked
Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599")
(E.O. 13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is
accessible through the following page on
OFAC's Web site: www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/
13599_list.aspx. Second, the names of
persons identified as blocked pursuant to
E.O. 13599 and§ 560.211 who are also
blocked pursuant to one or more other parts
of this chapter are incorporated into OF AC's
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List (SDN List) with the identifier
"[IRAN]" as well as the relevant identifier(s)
for the other sanctions program(s) pursuant
to which the persons' property and interests
in property are blocked. The SDN List is
accessible through the following page on the
OFAC's Web site: www.treasury.gov/sdn.
www.treasury.gov/sdn. However, the
property and interests in property of persons
falling within the definition of the term
Iranian financial institution are blocked
pursuant to $ 560.211 regardless of whether
the names of such persons are published in
the Federal Register or incorporated into the
E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List.
Note 2 to $ 560.324: Section 501.807 of this
chapter describes the procedures to be
followed by persons seeking administrative
reconsideration of OF AC's determination that
they fall within the definition of the term
Iranian financial institution.
Subpart D-lnterpretations
■ 5. Amend§ 560.405 by removing the
word "and" at the end of paragraph (d),
removing the period at the end of
paragraph (e) and adding "; and" in its
place, and adding paragraph (f) to read
as follows:
and incorporated into OFAC's Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
List (SDN List) with the identifier "[IRAN]"
as well as the relevant identifier(s) for the
other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which
the persons' property and interests in
property are blocked. The SDN List is
accessible through the following page on
OFAC's Web site: www.treasury.gov/sdn.
§ 560.405 Transactions ordinarily incident
to a licensed transaction authorized.
However, the property and interests in
property of persons falling within the
definition of the term Government of Iran are
blocked pursuant to $ 560.211 regardless of
whether the names of such persons are
published in the Federal Register or
incorporated into the E.O. 13599 List or the
SDN List.
Additional information pertaining to the E.O.
13599 List and the SDN List can be found in
appendix A to this chapter. See $ 560.425
concerning entities that may not be listed on
the E.O. 13599 List or on the SDN List but
whose property and interests in property are
nevertheless blocked pursuant to this section.
E.O. 13599 blocks the property and interests
in property of the Government of Iran and
Iranian financial institutions as defined in
§§ 560.304 and 560.324, respectively. The
property and interests in property of persons
falling within the definition of the terms
(f) Letter of credit services relating to
transactions authorized in § 560.534.
See § 560.535(a).
Subpart E-Licenses, Authorizations,
and Statements of Licensing Policy
■ 6. Add § 560. 534 to subpart E to read
as follows:
■ 4. Section 560.324 is amended by
adding Notes 1 and 2 to§ 560.324 to
read as follows:
§ 560.534
Importation into the United
Government of Iran and Iranian financial
institution are blocked pursuant to this
section regardless of whether the names of
such persons are published in the Federal
Register or incorporated into the E.O. 13599
List or the SDN List.
§ 560.324
Iranian financial institution.
States of, and dealings in, certain
foodstuffs and carpets authorized.
(a) The importation into the United
Note 1 to $ 560.324: The names of persons
Note 2 to paragraphs (a) through (c) of
$ 560.211: The International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706),
in section 203 (50 U.S.C. 1702), authorizes
the blocking of property and interests in
States, from Iran or a third country, of
the following goods of Iranian origin is
authorized:
(1) Foodstuffs intended for human
consumption that are classified under
chapters 2-23 of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States;
(2) Carpets and other textile floor
coverings and carpets used as wall
hangings that are classified under
chapter 57 or heading 9706.00.0060 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States.
property of a person during the pendency of
an investigation. The names of persons
whose property and interests in property are
blocked pending investigation pursuant to
this section also are published in the Federal
that the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OF AC) has determined fall within this
definition are published in the Federal
Register and incorporated into one of two
lists maintained by the OF AC. First, the
names of persons identified as blocked solely
pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of
February 5, 2012 ("Blocking Property of the
Government Iran and Iranian Financial
Institutions") (E.O. 13599) and $ 560.211
because they meet the definition of the term
"Iranian financial institution" are
incorporated into the "List of Persons
- 131 -
Federal Register/ Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016/Rules and Regulations
3333
(b) United States persons, wherever
countries, other than purchases from
the Government of Iran or certain other
blocked persons. United States
depository institutions are authorized to
issue, advise, negotiate, or confirm
letters of credit to pay for transactions
in or related to Iranian-origin goods
described in § 560.534(a) and located in
a third-country, other than purchases
from the Government of Iran, an Iranian
financial institution, or any other person
whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to
$ 560.211, provided that such letters of
credit are not issued, advised,
negotiated, paid, or confirmed by the
Government of Iran, an Iranian financial
institution, or any other person whose
property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to $560.211.
(c) Brokering. United States persons,
wherever located, are authorized to act
as brokers for the purchase or sale of the
categories of Iranian-origin goods
described in $560.534(a), provided that
the goods are not for exportation,
reexportation, sale, or supply, directly
or indirectly, to Iran, the Government of
Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or
any other person whose property and
interests in property are blocked
pursuant to $ 560.211.
(d) Iranian accounts. Nothing in this
section authorizes debits or credits to
Iranian accounts, as defined in
§ 560.320.
8. The SDN List includes the names of
located, are authorized to engage in
transactions or dealings in or related to
the categories of Iranian-origin goods
described in paragraph (a) of this
section, provided that the transaction or
dealing does not involve or relate to
goods, technology, or services for
exportation, reexportation, sale, or
supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran,
the Government of Iran, an Iranian
financial institution, or any other person
whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to
§ 560. 211, other than services described
in § 560.405 ("Transactions ordinarily
incident to a licensed transaction
authorized") and transfers of funds
described in§ 560.516 ("Transfers of
funds involving Iran").
(c) This general license does not
authorize the importation into the
United States of goods that are under
seizure or detention by the Department
of Homeland Security, as of January 21,
2016, pursuant to Customs regulations
or other applicable provisions of law,
until any applicable penalties, charges,
duties, or other conditions are satisfied.
This general license does not authorize
the importation into the United States of
goods for which forfeiture proceedings
have commenced or of goods that have
been forfeited to the U.S. Government,
other than through U.S. Customs and
Border Protection disposition, including
by selling at auction.
(d) Iranian accounts. Nothing in this
section authorizes debits or credits to
Iranian accounts, as defined in
§ 560.320.
persons determined to be the Government of
Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any
other person whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to $560.211 of
the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), only
when the property and interests in property
of such persons are also blocked pursuant to
one or more other parts of this chapter. The
SDN List entries for such persons include the
identifier " [IRAN]" as well as the relevant
identifier(s) for the other sanctions
program(s) pursuant to which the persons'
property and interests in property are
blocked. The names of persons identified as
blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order
13599 of February 5, 2012 (Blocking
Property of the Government Iran and Iranian
Financial Institutions") (E.O. 13599) and
§ 560.211 of the ITSR because they meet the
definition of the terms Government of Iran or
Iranian financial institution under the ITSR
are incorporated into the "List of Persons
Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to
Executive Order 13599" (E.O. 13599 List).
The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the
following page on the Office of Foreign
Assets Control's Web site: www.treasury.gov/
resource-centerlsanctions!Programs!Pagesl
13599 list.aspx. U.S. persons are advised to
review 31 CFR part 560 prior to engaging in
Note to $ 560.535: See §§ 560.304 and
transactions involving persons included on
the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List with the
identifier " [IRAN]." Moreover, the
prohibitions set forth in the ITSR, and the
compliance obligations, with respect to
persons who fall within the definition of the
terms Government of Iran or Iranian
financial institution set forth in §§ 560.304
and 560.324 of the IT'SR, respectively, apply
regardless of whether such persons are
identified on the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN
List.
560.313 for information relating to
individuals and entities that are included
within the definition of the term Government
of Iran and§ 560.324 regarding entities
included within the definition of the term
■ 7. Add $ 560.535 to subpart E to read
as follows:
Iranian financial institution. See § 560.516
for information relating to authorized
transfers to Iran by U.S. depository
institutions relating to licensed transactions.
John E. Smith,
Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
§ 560.535 Letters of credit and brokering
services relating to certain foodstuffs and
carpets.
[FR Doc. 2016-01227 Filed 1-19-16; 4:15 pm]
(a) Purchases from Iran or the
Appendix A to Chapter V-[Amended]
BILLING CODE 4810-AL--P
Government of Iran or certain other
blocked persons. United States
depository institutions are authorized to
issue letters of credit in favor of a
beneficiary in Iran, the Government of
Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or
any other person whose property and
interests in property are blocked
pursuant to § 560.211 t0 pay for
purchases from Iran or the Government
of Iran of the categories of Iranian-origin
goods described in $560.534(a),
provided that such letters of credit are
not advised, negotiated, paid, or
confirmed by the Government of Iran,
an Iranian financial institution, or any
other person whose property and
interests in property are blocked
pursuant to $ 560.211.
8. The authority citation for appendix
A to chapter V is revised to read as
follows:
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Authority: 3 U.S.C. 301; 8 U.S.C. 1182,
1189; 18 U.S.C. 2339 B; 21 U.S.C. 1901-1908;
22 U.S.C. 287 c; 31 U.S.C. 321(b); 50 U.S.C.
App. 1-44; Public Law 110--286, 122 Stat.
2632 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); Public Law 111-
195, 124 Stat. 1312 (22 U.S.C. 8501-8551);
Public Law 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (22 U.S.C.
8513a): Public Law 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214
(22 U.S.C. 8701-8795); Public Law 112-208,
126 Stat. 1502; Public Law 113-278, 128 Stat.
3011 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 165
[Docket No. USCG--2016--0019]
Security Zones; Annual Events in the
Captain of the Port Detroit Zone-North
American International Auto Show,
Detroit River, Detroit Ml
■ 9. Revise note 8 t0 appendix A to
chapter V to read as follows:
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.
ACTION: Notice of enforcement of
regulation.
Appendix A to Chapter V-Information
Pertaining to the Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons List
(b) Transactions or dealings in
SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce
a security zone associated with the
North American International Auto
Iranian-origin goods located in third
- 132 -
Annex 28
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, “Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the
Lifting of Certain U.S Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) on Implementation Day”, 16 January 2016, updated 15 December 2016
Excerpts: pp. 1-2; pp. 30-31
- 133 -
- 134 -
Please note that on May 8, 2018, the President announced his decision to cease
the United States' participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), and to begin re-imposing the U.S. nuclear-related sanctions that
were lifted to effectuate the JCPOA sanctions relief, following a wind-down
period. This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist
persons in determining which activities were consistent with the JCPOA
sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16, 2016 through May 8, 2018.
Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury have issued
additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the
wind-down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this
document and guidance issued by the Department of State or the Department
of the Treasury on or after May 8, 2018, the later-issued guidance should be
treated as governing.
- 135 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
Issued on January 16, 2016
Last Updated on December 15, 2016
This document is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. Please see particularly
the legally binding provisions cited below governing the sanctions. This document does not
supplement or modify the statutory authorities, Executive orders, or regulations.
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day1
A. GENERAL QUESTIONS
A. 1. What is Implementation Day? When does the lifting of sanctions under the JCPOA
go into effect?
Implementation Day, which is January 16, 2016, marks the day on which the
International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) verified that Iran implemented its nuclear
related commitments described in sections 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
Simultaneous with the IAEA verification, the European Union (EU) and United States
took the actions necessary to lift sanctions as set out in sections 16 and 17, respectively,
of Annex V of the JCPOA. Following confirmation by the Secretary of State that the
IAEA verified that Iran met its commitments, the Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated its website to notify the public that the U.S.
sanctions commitments described in section 17 of Annex V of the JCPOA have been
implemented. [01-16-201 6]
A. 2. What sanctions were lifted 011 Implementation Day? What activities involving
Iran are covered by the lifting of sanctions 011 Implementation Day?
On Implementation Day, the United States lifted the nuclear-related "secondary
sanctions" described in sections 4.1-4.7 of Annex II and 17.1-17.2 of Annex V of the
JCPOA and detailed below. Secondary sanctions generally are directed toward non-U.S.
persons' for specified conduct involving Iran that occurs entirely outside of U.S
jurisdiction.
' For additional information regarding the subjects covered in these Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), please see
the Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain US. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Place of Action
on Implementation Day (Guidance Document) issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S.
Department of State.
For the purpose of these FAQs. the term "non-U.S. person means any individual or entity excluding any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
2
- 136 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
Issued on January 16, 2016
Last Updated on December 15, 2016
H. AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR
H. 1. The JCPOA provides that the United States will lift secondary sanctions on the sale,
supply, or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive
sector. Does this mean that non-U.S. persons can sell to Iran goods and services
used in connection with the automotive sector?
Yes. Under the JPOA, U.S. sanctions on the sale, supply, or transfer by non-U.S. persons
of goods and services used in connection with lran 's automotive sector were temporarily
suspended. On Implementation Day, pursuant to its commitment under sections 4.7 of
Annex 11 and 17.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the United States lifted secondary
sanctions on the direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of goods or services
used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran, including the provision of
associated services. As a result, beginning on Implementation Day, non-U.S. persons are
no longer subject to sanctions for engaging in such activities or transactions provided that
they do not involve persons on the SDN List or conduct described in FAQ A.3ii-iii. See
FAQs 310, 31l, 316, and 317 for a discussion of Iran's automotive sector" and goods
and services associated with Iran's automotive sector. [01-16-2016]
H. 2. Can U.S. auto manufacturers export or reexport U.S.-origin finished vehicles or
U.S.-origin auto parts to lran?
No. U.S. persons as defined in section 560.314 of the ITSR, including U.S. auto
manufacturers, continue to be generally prohibited from the exportation, reexportation,
sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States of any goods, technology, or
services to Iran's automotive sector or the Government of Iran. [01-16-2016]
H. 3. Can non-U.S. persons reexport U.S.-origin finished vehicles or U.S.-origin auto
parts to Iran?
Non-US. persons continue to be prohibited from reexporting from a third country to Iran,
directly or indirectly, any goods, technology, or services that have been exported from the
United States if they know or have reason to know that the reexportation is intended
specifically for Iran or the Government of Iran and the items are controlled for export
from the United States to Iran. Additionally, non-US. persons - including U.S.-owned
or -controlled foreign entities (see FAQ K.2) - continue to be prohibited from reexporting
to Iran or the Government of Iran items containing IO percent or more U.S.-controlled
30
- 137 -
This document remains available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining
which activities were consistent with the JCPOA sanctions lifting, as in effect from January 16,
2016 through May 8, 2018. Please note that the Departments of State and of the Treasury
have issued additional guidance regarding activities that may be undertaken during the wind
down periods. To the extent there are discrepancies between this document and guidance
issued by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing.
Issued on January 16, 2016
Last Updated on December 15, 2016
content if undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that the reexportation is
intended specifically for Iran or the Government of Iran. See also FAQ M.9. Additional
export controls administered by the Department of Commerce may also apply. [01-16
2016]
I. DESIGN A TJONS AND OTHER SANCTIONS LISTINGS
I. I. The JCPOA provides that the United States will remove certain individuals and
entities from the SDN List on implementation Day. What did this entail? What is
the effect on those removed from the SDN List and what happens to those remaining
on the SDN List?
Pursuant to U.S. commitments under sections 4.8.1 of Annex II and 17.3 of Annex V of
the JCPOA, on implementation Day, the individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3
to Annex 11 were removed from the SDN List, FSE List, and/or NS-ISA List. Non-U.S.
persons are no longer subject to secondary sanctions for engaging in transactions with the
over 400 individuals and entities removed from the SDN List on Implementation Day,
provided that the transactions do not otherwise involve persons that remain or are placed
on the SDN List or conduct described in FAQ A.3.ii-iii. For more information on
individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II who are marked with an
asterisk because they have been identified previously by OFAC as meeting the definition
of the term "Government of Iran" or "Iranian financial institution," see FAQ 1.3.
After Implementation Day, lranian and ]ran-related persons on the SDN List remain
subject to secondary sanctions (see FAQ A.6), and secondary sanctions continue to attach
to transactions involving such persons, even if the underlying activity is one for which
sanctions have been lifted under the JCPOA. [01-16-2016]
I. 2. What is the E.O. 13599 List and how should U.S. persons treat individuals and
entities on this list?
To assist U.S. persons in meeting their obligations under the ITSR, OFAC has made
available on its website a List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to
Executive Order 13599 (E.O. 13599 List). The purpose of this list is to clarify that,
regardless of their removal from the SDN List, persons that OFAC previously identified
as meeting the definition of the Government of Iran or an Iranian financial institution
continue to meet those definitions and continue to be persons whose property and
31
- 138 -
Annex 29
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, General License I, 24 March 2016, revoked as
of 27 June 2018
- 139 -
- 140 -
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.c. 20220
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
•
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
31 C.F.R. Part 560
GENERAL LICENSE
$N
Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Negotiation of, and Enc:').
t�
Contingent Contracts for Activities Eligible for Authorization Under
- 141 -
l
a
t of
Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to I� of o mcrcial
Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Sc�\
(a) U.S. persons are authorized to enter into, and to engag � tra�tions ordinarily
incident to the negotiation of and entry into, contracts for activitJ�
ig I for authorization
under the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Relate�
I Ex
I or Re-export to Iran
o
of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Se{vi
ovided that the
performance of any such contract is made expressly co�
e upo he issuance of a specific
·
license by the Office of Foreign Assets Control authorifing
(vities to be performed
("contingent contracts").
Note to paragraph (a) of General License F: purposes of this general license, the
term "contingent contracts" includes
executor��executory
proforma invoices,
agreements in principle, executory offers capa of ceptance such as bids or proposals in
response to public tenders, binding memoranda o derstanding, or any other similar agreement.
(b) This general license
does��ze
any transactions or dealings with any person
whose property and interests in prop
locked pursuant to any part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V
��
other than pan 560
Q-i- �
d
Andrea Gacki
Acting Director
Office of Foreign Assets Control
9
e°
- 142 -
Annex 30
U.S. President, “Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy”, 13 October 2017
- 143 -
- 144 -
REMARKS
Remarks by President Trump on Iran
Strategy
NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENSE
Issued on: October 13, 2017
* * *
Diplomatic Reception Room
12:53 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. My fellow Americans: As President of
the United States, my highest obligation is to ensure the safety and security
of the American people.
History has shown that the longer we ignore a threat, the more dangerous
that threat becomes. For this reason, upon taking office, I've ordered a
complete strategic review of our policy toward the rogue regime in Iran. That
review is now complete.
Today, I am announcing our strategy, along with several major steps we are
taking to confront the Iranian regime's hostile actions and to ensure that Iran
never, and I mean never, acquires a nuclear weapon.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump…
- 145 -
Our policy is based on a clear-eyed assessment of the Iranian dictatorship, its
sponsorship of terrorism, and its continuing aggression in the Middle East
and all around the world.
Iran is under the control of a fanatical regime that seized power in 1979 and
forced a proud people to submit to its extremist rule. This radical regime has
raided the wealth of one of the world's oldest and most vibrant nations, and
spread death, destruction, and chaos all around the globe.
Beginning in 1979, agents of the Iranian regime illegally seized the U.S.
embassy in Tehran and held more than 60 Americans hostage during the 444
days of the crisis. The Iranian-backed terrorist group Hezbollah twice
bombed our embassy in Lebanon - once in 1983 and again in 1984. Another
Iranian-supported bombing killed 241 Americans service members they
were, in their barracks in Beirut in 1983.
In 1996, the regime directed another bombing of American military housing
in Saudi Arabia, murdering 19 Americans in cold blood.
Iranian proxies provided training to operatives who were later involved in al
Qaeda's bombing of the American embassies in Kenya, Tanzania, and two
years later, killing 224 people, and wounding more than 4,000 others.
The regime harbored high-level terrorists in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,
including Osama bin Laden's son. In Iraq and Afghanistan, groups supported
by Iran have killed hundreds of American military personnel.
The Iranian dictatorship's aggression continues to this day. The regime
remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and provides
assistance to al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist
networks. It develops, deploys, and proliferates missiles that threaten
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump…
- 146 -
American troops and our allies. It harasses American ships and threatens
freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf and in the Red Sea. It imprisons
Americans on false charges. And it launches cyberattacks against our critical
infrastructure, financial system, and military.
The United States is far from the only target of the Iranian dictatorship's long
campaign of bloodshed. The regime violently suppresses its own citizens; it
shot unarmed student protestors in the street during the Green Revolution.
This regime has fueled sectarian violence in Iraq, and vicious civil wars in
Yemen and Syria. In Syria, the Iranian regime has supported the atrocities of
Bashar al-Assad's regime and condoned Assad's use of chemical weapons
against helpless civilians, including many, many children.
Given the regime's murderous past and present, we should not take lightly its
sinister vision for the future. The regime's two favorite chants are "Death to
America" and "Death to Israel."
Realizing the gravity of the situation, the United States and the United
Nations Security Council sought, over many years, to stop Iran's pursuit of
nuclear weapons with a wide array of strong economic sanctions.
But the previous administration lifted these sanctions, just before what
would have been the total collapse of the Iranian regime, through the deeply
controversial 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. This deal is known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA.
As I have said many times, the Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one
sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. The same mindset
that produced this deal is responsible for years of terrible trade deals that
have sacrificed so many millions of jobs in our country to the benefit of other
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump…
- 147 -
countries. We need negotiators who will much more strongly represent
America's interest.
The nuclear deal threw Iran's dictatorship a political and economic lifeline,
providing urgently needed relief from the intense domestic pressure the
sanctions had created. It also gave the regime an immediate financial boost
and over $100 billion dollars its government could use to fund terrorism.
The regime also received a massive cash settlement of $1.7 billion from the
United States, a large portion of which was physically loaded onto an
airplane and flown into Iran. Just imagine the sight of those huge piles of
money being hauled off by the Iranians waiting at the airport for the cash. I
wonder where all that money went.
Worst of all, the deal allows Iran to continue developing certain elements of
its nuclear program. And importantly, in just a few years, as key restrictions
disappear, Iran can sprint towards a rapid nuclear weapons breakout. In
other words, we got weak inspections in exchange for no more than a purely
short-term and temporary delay in Iran's path to nuclear weapons.
What is the purpose of a deal that, at best, only delays Iran's nuclear
capability for a short period of time? This, as President of the United States, is
unacceptable. In other countries, they think in terms of 100-year intervals,
not just a few years at a time.
The saddest part of the deal for the United States is that all of the money was
paid up front, which is unheard of, rather than at the end of the deal when
they have shown they've played by the rules. But what's done is done, and
that's why we are where we are.
Iranian regime has committed multiple violations of the agreement. For
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example, on two separate occasions, they have exceeded the limit of 130
metric tons of heavy water. Until recently, the Iranian regime has also failed
to meet our expectations in its operation of advanced centrifuges.
The Iranian regime has also intimidated international inspectors into not
using the full inspection authorities that the agreement calls for.
Iranian officials and military leaders have repeatedly claimed they will not
allow inspectors onto military sites, even though the international
community suspects some of those sites were part of Iran's clandestine
nuclear weapons program.
There are also many people who believe that Iran is dealing with North
Korea. I am going to instruct our intelligence agencies to do a thorough
analysis and report back their findings beyond what they have already
reviewed.
By its own terms, the Iran Deal was supposed to contribute to "regional and
international peace and security." And yet, while the United States adheres to
our commitment under the deal, the Iranian regime continues to fuel conflict,
terror, and turmoil throughout the Middle East and beyond. Importantly, Iran
is not living up to the spirit of the deal.
So today, in recognition of the increasing menace posed by Iran, and after
extensive consultations with our allies, I am announcing a new strategy to
address the full range of Iran's destructive actions.
First, we will work with our allies to counter the regime's destabilizing activity
and support for terrorist proxies in the region.
Second, we will place additional sanctions on the regime to block their
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financing of terror.
Third, we will address the regime's proliferation of missiles and weapons that
threaten its neighbors, global trade, and freedom of navigation.
And finally, we will deny the regime all paths to a nuclear weapon.
Today, I am also announcing several major steps my administration is taking
in pursuit of this strategy.
The execution of our strategy begins with the long-overdue step of imposing
tough sanctions on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The
Revolutionary Guard is the Iranian Supreme Leader's corrupt personal terror
force and militia. It has hijacked large portions of Iran's economy and seized
massive religious endowments to fund war and terror abroad. This includes
arming the Syrian dictator, supplying proxies and partners with missiles and
weapons to attack civilians in the region, and even plotting to bomb a
popular restaurant right here in Washington, D.C.
I am authorizing the Treasury Department to further sanction the entire
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for its support for terrorism and to apply
sanctions to its officials, agents, and affiliates. I urge our allies to join us in
taking strong actions to curb Iran's continued dangerous and destabilizing
behavior, including thorough sanctions outside the Iran Deal that target the
regime's ballistic missile program, in support for terrorism, and all of its
destructive activities, of which there are many.
Finally, on the grave matter of Iran's nuclear program: Since the signing of the
nuclear agreement, the regime's dangerous aggression has only escalated. At
the same time, it has received massive sanctions relief while continuing to
develop its missiles program. Iran has also entered into lucrative business
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contracts with other parties to the agreement.
When the agreement was finalized in 2015, Congress passed the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act to ensure that Congress's voice would be heard on the
deal. Among other conditions, this law requires the President, or his
designee, to certify that the suspension of sanctions under the deal is
"appropriate and proportionate" to measure - and other measures taken by
Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program. Based on the factual record I have
put forward, I am announcing today that we cannot and will not make this
certification.
We will not continue down a path whose predictable conclusion is more
violence, more terror, and the very real threat of Iran's nuclear breakout.
That is why I am directing my administration to work closely with Congress
and our allies to address the deal's many serious flaws so that the Iranian
regime can never threaten the world with nuclear weapons. These include
the deal's sunset clauses that, in just a few years, will eliminate key
restrictions on Iran's nuclear program.
The flaws in the deal also include insufficient enforcement and near total
silence on Iran's missile programs. Congress has already begun the work to
address these problems. Key House and Senate leaders are drafting
legislation that would amend the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act to
strengthen enforcement, prevent Iran from developing an inter- - this is so
totally important an intercontinental ballistic missile, and make all
restrictions on Iran's nuclear activity permanent under U.S. law. So
important. I support these initiatives.
However, in the event we are not able to reach a solution working with
Congress and our allies, then the agreement will be terminated. It is under
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continuous review, and our participation can be cancelled by me, as
President, at any time.
As we have seen in North Korea, the longer we ignore a threat, the worse that
threat becomes. It is why we are determined that the world's leading sponsor
of terrorism will never obtain nuclear weapons.
In this effort, we stand in total solidarity with the Iranian regime's longest
suffering victims: its own people. The citizens of Iran have paid a heavy price
for the violence and extremism of their leaders. The Iranian people long to
and they just are longing, to reclaim their country's proud history, its culture,
its civilization, its cooperation with its neighbors.
We hope that these new measures directed at the Iranian dictatorship will
compel the government to reevaluate its pursuit of terror at the expense of
its people.
We hope that our actions today will help bring about a future of peace,
stability, and prosperity in the Middle East -- a future where sovereign
nations respect each other and their own citizens.
We pray for a future where young children -American and Iranian, Muslim,
Christian, and Jewish -can grow up in a world free from violence, hatred,
and terror.
And, until that blessed day comes, we will do what we must to keep America
safe.
Thank you, God bless you, and God bless America. Thank you.
END
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1:11P.M. EDT
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Annex 31
U.S. President, “Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional
Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear
Weapon”, Presidential Memorandum, 8 May 2018
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mffR
PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDA
Ceasing U.S. Participation in the
JCPOA and Taking Additional
Action to Counter Iran's Malign
Influence and Deny Iran All Paths
to a Nuclear Weapon
FOREIGN POLICY
Issued on: May 8, 2018
* * *
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF
STAFF
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
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THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC
POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
SUBJECT: Ceasing United States Participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action and Taking Additional Action to Counter Iran's Malign Influence and Deny
Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon
As President, my highest priority is to ensure the safety and security of the United
States and the American people. Since its inception in 1979 as a revolutionary
theocracy, the Islamic Republic of Iran has declared its hostility to the United
States and its allies and partners. Iran remains the world's leading state sponsor of
terrorism, and provides assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, al-Qa'ida,
and other terrorist networks. Iran also continues to fuel sectarian violence in Iraq,
and support vicious civil wars in Yemen and Syria. It commits grievous human
rights abuses, and arbitrarily detains foreigners, including United States citizens,
on spurious charges without due process of law.
There is no doubt that Iran previously attempted to bolster its revolutionary aims
through the pursuit of nuclear weapons and that Iran's uranium enrichment
program continues to give it the capability to reconstitute its weapons-grade
uranium program if it so chooses. As President, I have approved an integrated
strategy for Iran that includes the strategic objective of denying Iran all paths to a
nuclear weapon.
The preceding administration attempted to meet the threat of Iran's pursuit of
nuclear capabilities through United States participation in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action {JCPOA) on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA
lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran and provided it with other significant
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benefits in exchange for its temporary commitments to constrain its uranium
enrichment program and to not conduct work related to nuclear fuel reprocessing,
the two critical pathways to acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material. Some
believed the JCPOA would moderate Iran's behavior. Since the JCPOA's inception,
however, Iran has only escalated its destabilizing activities in the surrounding
region. Iranian or Iran-backed forces have gone on the march in Syria, Iraq, and
Yemen, and continue to control parts of Lebanon and Gaza. Meanwhile, Iran has
publicly declared it would deny the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
access to military sites in direct conflict with the Additional Protocol to its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.
In 2016, Iran also twice
violated the JCPOA's heavy water stockpile limits. This behavior is unacceptable,
especially for a regime known to have pursued nuclear weapons in violation of its
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Iran's behavior threatens the national interest of the United States. On October 13,
2017, consistent with certification procedures stipulated in the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act, I determined that I was unable to certify that the
suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the JCPOA was appropriate
and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with
respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program. On January 12, 2018, I outlined
two possible paths forward -the JCPOA's disastrous flaws would be fixed by May
12, 2018, or, failing that, the United States would cease participation in the
agreement. I made clear that this was a last chance, and that absent an
understanding to fix the JCPOA, the United States would not continue to
implement it.
That understanding has not materialized, and I am today making good on my
pledge to end the participation of the United States in the JCPOA. I do not believe
that continuing to provide JCPOA-related sanctions relief to Iran is in the national
interest of the United States, and I will not affirm what I know to be false. Further, I
have determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to re-impose
sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA as expeditiously as
possible.
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Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear
weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; that Iran's network and campaign
of regional aggression be neutralized; to disrupt, degrade, or deny the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps and its surrogates access to the resources that sustain
their destabilizing activities; and to counter Iran's aggressive development of
missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities. The
United States will continue to pursue these aims and the objectives contained in
the Iran strategy that I announced on October 13, 2017, adjusting the ways and
means to achieve them as required.
Sec. 2. Ending United States Participation in the JCPOA. The Secretary of State
shall, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of
Energy, take all appropriate steps to cease the participation of the United States in
theJCPOA.
Sec. 3. Restoring United States Sanctions. The Secretary of State and the
Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately begin taking steps to re-impose all
United States sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA, including
those under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act of 2012. These steps
shall be accomplished as expeditiously as possible, and in no case later than 180
days from the date of this memorandum. The Secretary of State and the Secretary
of the Treasury shall coordinate, as appropriate, on steps needed to achieve this
aim. They shall, for example, coordinate with respect to preparing any
recommended executive actions, including appropriate documents to re-impose
sanctions lifted by Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016; preparing to re-list
persons removed, in connection with the JCPOA, from any relevant sanctions lists,
as appropriate; revising relevant sanctions regulations; issuing limited waivers
during the wind-down period, as appropriate; and preparing guidance necessary
to educate United States and non-United States business communities on the
scope of prohibited and sanctionable activity and the need to unwind any such
dealings with Iranian persons. Those steps should be accomplished in a manner
that, to the extent reasonably practicable, shifts the financial burden of unwinding
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any transaction or course of dealing primarily onto Iran or the Iranian
counterparty.
Sec. 4. Preparing for Regional Contingencies. The Secretary of Defense and heads
of any other relevant agencies shall prepare to meet, swiftly and decisively, all
possible modes of Iranian aggression against the United States, our allies, and our
partners. The Department of Defense shall ensure that the United States develops
and retains the means to stop Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon
and related delivery systems.
Sec. 5. Monitoring Iran's Nuclear Conduct and Consultation with Allies and
Partners. Agencies shall take appropriate steps to enable the United States to
continue to monitor Iran's nuclear conduct. I am open to consultations with allies
and partners on future international agreements to counter the full range of Iran's
threats, including the nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missile
threats, and the heads of agencies shall advise me, as appropriate, regarding
opportunities for such consultations.
Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to
impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the
head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law
and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the
United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or
agents, or any other person.
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DONALD J. TRUMP
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Annex 32
U.S. President, “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action”, 8 May 2018
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- 164 -
mMfm
REMARKS
Remarks by President Trump on the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
- FOREIGN POLICY
Issued on: May 8, 2018
* * *
Diplomatic Reception Room
2:13 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans: Today, I want to update the world on
our efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The Iranian regime is the leading state sponsor of terror. It exports
dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports
terrorist proxies and militias such as Hezbollah, Ha mas, the Taliban, and al
Qaeda.
Over the years, Iran and its proxies have bombed American embassies and
military installations, murdered hundreds of American servicemembers, and
kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured American citizens. The Iranian regime
has funded its long reign of chaos and terror by plundering the wealth of its
own people.
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No action taken by the regime has been more dangerous than its pursuit of
nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.
In 2015, the previous administration joined with other nations in a deal
regarding Iran's nuclear program. This agreement was known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA.
In theory, the so-called "Iran deal" was supposed to protect the United States
and our allies from the lunacy of an Iranian nuclear bomb, a weapon that will
only endanger the survival of the Iranian regime. In fact, the deal allowed
Iran to continue enriching uranium and, overtime, reach the brink of a
nuclear breakout.
The deal lifted crippling economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for very
weak limits on the regime's nuclear activity, and no limits at all on its other
malign behavior, including its sinister activities in Syria, Yemen, and other
places all around the world.
In other words, at the point when the United States had maximum leverage,
this disastrous deal gave this regime -and it's a regime of great terror
many billions of dollars, some of it in actual cash a great embarrassment to
me as a citizen and to all citizens of the United States.
A constructive deal could easily have been struck at the time, but it wasn't.
At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction that a murderous regime
desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program.
Today, we have definitive proof that this Iranian promise was a lie. Last
week, Israel published intelligence documents long concealed by Iran,
conclusively showing the Iranian regime and its history of pursuing nuclear
weapons.
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The fact is this was a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever
been made. It didn't bring calm, it didn't bring peace, and it never will.
In the years since the deal was reached, Iran's military budget has grown by
almost 40 percent, while its economy is doing very badly. After the sanctions
were lifted, the dictatorship used its new funds to build nuclear-capable
missiles, support terrorism, and cause havoc throughout the Middle East and
beyond.
The agreement was so poorly negotiated that even if Iran fully complies, the
regime can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a short period of
time. The deal's sunset provisions are totally unacceptable. If I allowed this
deal to stand, there would soon be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
Everyone would want their weapons ready by the time Iran had theirs.
Making matters worse, the deal's inspection provisions lack adequate
mechanisms to prevent, detect, and punish cheating, and don't even have
the unqualified right to inspect many important locations, including military
facilities.
Not only does the deal fail to halt Iran's nuclear ambitions, but it also fails to
address the regime's development of ballistic missiles that could deliver
nuclear warheads.
Finally, the deal does nothing to constrain Iran's destabilizing activities,
including its support for terrorism. Since the agreement, Iran's bloody
ambitions have grown only more brazen.
In light of these glaring flaws, I announced last October that the Iran deal
must either be renegotiated or terminated.
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Three months later, on January 12th, I repeated these conditions. I made
clear that if the deal could not be fixed, the United States would no longer be
a party to the agreement.
Over the past few months, we have engaged extensively with our allies and
partners around the world, including France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom. We have also consulted with our friends from across the Middle
East. We are unified in our understanding of the threat and in our conviction
that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon.
After these consultations, it is clear to me that we cannot prevent an Iranian
nuclear bomb under the decaying and rotten structure of the current
agreement.
The Iran deal is defective at its core. lfwe do nothing, we know exactly what
will happen. In just a short period of time, the world's leading state sponsor
of terror will be on the cusp of acquiring the world's most dangerous
weapons.
Therefore, I am announcing today that the United States will withdraw from
the Iran nuclear deal.
In a few moments, I will sign a presidential memorandum to begin reinstating
U.S. nuclear sanctions on the Iranian regime. We will be instituting the
highest level of economic sanction. Any nation that helps Iran in its quest for
nuclear weapons could also be strongly sanctioned by the United States.
America will not be held hostage to nuclear blackmail. We will not allow
American cities to be threatened with destruction. And we will not allow a
regime that chants "Death to America" to gain access to the most deadly
weapons on Earth.
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Today's action sends a critical message: The United States no longer makes
empty threats. When I make promises, I keep them. In fact, at this very
moment, Secretary Pompeo is on his way to North Korea in preparation for
my upcoming meeting with Kim Jong-un. Plans are being made.
Relationships are building. Hopefully, a deal will happen and, with the help
of China, South Korea, and Japan, a future of great prosperity and security
can be achieved for everyone.
As we exit the Iran deal, we will be working with our allies to find a real,
comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. This will
include efforts to eliminate the threat of Iran's ballistic missile program; to
stop its terrorist activities worldwide; and to block its menacing activity
across the Middle East. In the meantime, powerful sanctions will go into full
effect. If the regime continues its nuclear aspirations, it will have bigger
problems than it has ever had before.
Finally, I want to deliver a message to the long-suffering people of Iran: The
people of America stand with you. It has now been almost 40 years since this
dictatorship seized power and took a proud nation hostage. Most of Iran's 80
million citizens have sadly never known an Iran that prospered in peace with
its neighbors and commanded the admiration of the world.
But the future of Iran belongs to its people. They are the rightful heirs to a
rich culture and an ancient land. And they deserve a nation that does justice
to their dreams, honor to their history, and glory to God.
Iran's leaders will naturally say that they refuse to negotiate a new deal; they
refuse. And that's fine. I'd probably say the same thing if I was in their
position. But the fact is they are going to want to make a new and lasting
deal, one that benefits all of Iran and the Iranian people. When they do, I am
ready, willing, and able.
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Great things can happen for Iran, and great things can happen for the peace
and stability that we all want in the Middle East.
There has been enough suffering, death, and destruction. Let it end now.
Thank you. God bless you. Thank you.
(The presidential memorandum is signed.)
Q Mr. President, how does this make America safer? How does this make
America safer?
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. This will make America much safer.
Thank you very much.
Q
Is Secretary Pompeo bringing the detainees home?
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Secretary Pompeo is, right now, going to North
Korea. He will be there very shortly in a matter of virtual - probably an hour.
He's got meetings set up. We have our meeting scheduled. We have our
meeting set. The location is picked -the time and the date. Everything is
picked. And we look forward to having a very great success.
We think relationships are building with North Korea. We'll see how it all
works out. Maybe it will, maybe it won't. But it can be a great thing for North
Korea, South Korea, Japan and the entire world. We hope it all works out.
Thank you very much.
Q Are the Americans being freed?
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Q Are the Americans coming home, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: We'll all soon be finding out. We will soon be finding out. It
would be a great thing if they are. We'll soon be finding out. Thank you very
much.
END
2:25 P.M. EDT
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- 172 -
Annex 33
U.S. Department of State, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy”, 21 May 2018
- 173 -
- 174 -
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy
Remarks
Mike Pompeo
Secretary of State
The Heritage Foundation
Washington, DC
May21,2018
MS JAMES: Good morning. (Applause.) Welcome to the Heritage Foundation. My name is Kay
James and I have the honor of being the president here. II is a pleasure and honor to welcome our
distinguished guest, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, back to Heritage. Yes, I said back. Some of
you may remember that then-Congressman Pompeo spoke here on September 9th, 2015. His
presence was appreciated, as his topic was timely. It was entitled "A Pathway Forward: An Alternative
to the Flawed Iran Nuclear Deal." And now we have the great pleasure of being with our friend in his
new role as Secretary of State for the United States of America. It's not just a pleasure having him
here; it's truly an honor that he chose Heritage as the site for his first public address as Secretary.
Our scholars here are dedicated to advancing individual freedom and national security, and his presence
here is a wonderful affirmation of the positive impact that their work is having. And so to Secretary Pompeo,
I'd like to say thank you.
Now, I imagine all who are in this room and watching on line know a great deal about Secretary Pompeo, but
please allow me to provide just a few highlights from his extraordinary career. Secretary Pompeo graduated
first in his class at the United States military academy at West Point, and then served as a cavalry officer
patrolling the Iron Curtain before the fall of the Berlin Wall. He also served with the 2nd Squadron, 7th
Cavalry in the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division. After leaving active duty, he attended and graduated from
Harvard Law School where he served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review. He then had a successful
private sector career, founding and serving as CEO of Thayer Aerospace and then becoming president of
Sentry International.
Secretary Pompeo's public service began when he was elected representative of Kansas's 4th
Congressional District, and his distinguished tenure on the Hill included service on the House Intelligence
Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the House Select Benghazi Committee. Recognizing
the Secretary's many talents, President Trump tapped him as director of the CIA, where he served from
January 2017 to April 2018. And now, of course, he is our Secretary of State, having been sworn in just three
and a half weeks ago.
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05/282301.htm
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Last but, of course, never least, Secretary Pompeo is married to Susan Pompeo and has one son, Nick.
Secretary Pompeo, on behalf of the board of trustees, the staff, and all of the friends of the Heritage
Foundation, welcome back to home. (Applause.)
SECRETARY POMPEO: Well, good morning, everyone. I first want to thank the Heritage Foundation and its
president, Kay Coles James. Thank you for hosting me today. First as a private citizen and then as a member
of Congress, and even today, the Heritage Foundation has shaped my thinking on matters of the world and
public policy issues. I'm grateful for that excellent work.
And thanks for reminding me I can't talk about anything else but what we're talking about today. (Laughter.)
Three years on. But it's an honor to be here.
Two weeks ago, President Trump terminated the United States participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action, more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal.
President Trump withdrew from the deal for a simple reason: it failed to guarantee the safety of the American
people from the risk created by the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
No more. No more wealth creation for Iranian kleptocrats. No more acceptance of missiles landing in Riyadh
and in the Golan Heights. No more cost-free expansions of Iranian power. No more.
The JCPOA put the world at risk because of its fatal flaws.
And they're worth recounting at some length today, if only for the purpose of ensuring that subsequent
arrangements do not repeat them.
For example, the weak sunset provisions of the JCPOA merely delayed the inevitable nuclear weapons
capability of the Iranian regime.
After the countdown clock ran out on the deal's sunset provisions, Iran would be free for a quick sprint to the
bomb, setting off a potentially catastrophic arms race in the region. Indeed, the very brevity of the delay in the
Iranian nuclear program itself incentivized Middle Eastern proliferation.
Moreover, as we have seen from Israel's recent remarkable intelligence operation, Iran has lied for years
about having had a nuclear weapons program. Iran entered into the JCPOA in bad faith. It is worth noting
that even today, the regime continues to lie.
Just last month, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif told a Sunday morning news show, "We never wanted to
produce a bomb."
This claim -- this claim would be laughable if not for the willful deception behind it. Not only did the AMAD
Program exist; the Iranians took great care -- though, as we can see now, not enough care -- to protect, hide,
and preserve the work of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi and his gang of nuclear scientists.
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The JCPOA had additional shortcomings as well.
The mechanisms for inspecting and verifying Iran's compliance with the deal were simply not strong enough.
The deal did nothing to address Iran's continuing development of ballistic and cruise missiles, which could
deliver nuclear warheads.
The JCPOA permitted the Iranian regime to use the money from the JCPOA to boost the economic fortunes
of a struggling people, but the regime's leaders refused to do so.
Instead, the government spent its newfound treasure fueling proxy wars across the Middle East and lining the
pockets of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hizballah, Ha mas, and the Houthis.
Remember: Iran advanced its march across the Middle East during the JCPOA. Qasem Soleimani has been
playing with house money that has become blood money. Wealth created by the West has fueled his
campaigns.
Strategically, the Obama administration made a bet that the deal would spur Iran to stop its rogue state
actions and conform to international norms.
That bet was a loser with massive repercussions for all of the people living in the Middle East.
The idea of the JCPOA as a strategic pillar of stability in the Middle East was captured perfectly by John
Kerry when he said, quote, "I know the Middle East that is on fire ... is going to be more manageable with this
deal," end of quote.
Query whether the Middle East is more manageable today than it was when they embarked on the JCPOA.
Lebanon is an even more comfortable home for Hizballah today than it was when we embarked on the
JCPOA. Hizballah is now armed to the teeth by Iran and has its sights set on Israel.
Thanks to Iran, Hizballah provides the ground forces for the military expedition in Syria. The IRGC, too, has
continued to pump thousands of fighters into Syria to prop up the murderous Assad regime and help make
that country 71,000 square miles of kill zone.
Iran perpetuates a conflict that has displaced more than 6 million Syrians inside the --6 million Syrians and
caused over 5 million to seek refuge outside of its borders.
These refugees include foreign fighters who have crossed into Europe and threatened terrorist attacks in
those countries.
In Iraq, Iran sponsored Shia militia groups and terrorists to infiltrate and undermine the Iraqi Security Forces
and jeopardize Iraq's sovereignty - all of this during the JCPOA.
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In Yemen, Iran's support for the Houthi militia fuels a conflict that continues to starve the Yemeni people and
hold them under the threat of terror.
The IRGC has also given Houthi missiles to attack civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and to
threaten international shipping in the Red Sea.
And in Afghanistan, Iran's support to the Taliban in the form of weapons and funding leads to further violence
and hinders peace and stability for the Afghan people.
Today, the Iranian Qods Force conducts covert assassination operations in the heart of Europe.
We should remember, too, that during the JCPOA Iran continues to hold Americans hostage: Baquer
Namazi, Siamak Namazi, Xiyue Wang, and Bob Levinson, who has been missing for over 11 years.
I will note for the American people, you should know we are working diligently to bring each American
missing wrongfully detained in Iran home.
The list continues. Iran continues to be, during the JCPOA, the world's largest sponsor of terror. It continues
to serve as sanctuary for al-Qaida, as it has done since 9/11, and remains unwilling to bring to justice senior
al-Qaida members residing in Tehran.
Today we ask the Iranian people: Is this what you want your country to be known for, for being a co
conspirator with Hizballah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaida? The United States believe you deserve better.
And I have an additional point for the Iranian people to ponder. Here in the West, President Rouhani and
Foreign Minister Zarif are often held apart from the regime's unwise terrorist and malign behavior. They are
treated somehow differently.
The West says, "Boy, if only they could control Ayatollah Khamenei and Qasem Soleimani then things would
be great." Yet, Rouhani and Zarif are your elected leaders. Are they not the most responsible for your
economic struggles? Are these two not responsible for wasting Iranian lives throughout the Middle East?
It's worth the Iranian people considering, because instead of helping their own citizens, the regime continues
to seek a corridor stretching from Iran's borders to the shores of the Mediterranean. Iran wants this corridor
to transport fighters and an advanced weapons system to Israel's doorsteps. Indeed in recent months, the
IRGC has flown an armed drone into Israeli airspace and launched salvos of rockets into the Golan Heights
from Syria. Our steadfast ally has asserted the sovereign right of self-defense in response, a stance the
United States will continue to unequivocally support.
So the bet -- the bet that the JCPOA would increase Middle East stability was a bad one for America, for
Europe, for the Middle East, and indeed for the entire world. It is clear that the JCPOA has not ended Iran's
nuclear ambitions, nor did it deter its quest for a regional hegemony. Iran's leaders saw the deal as the
starting gun for the march across the Middle East.
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So, the path forward. America's commitment to the Iran strategy President Trump laid down in October
remains. It will now be executed outside of the JCPOA.
We'll continue to work with allies to counter the regime's destabilizing activities in the region, block their
financing of terror, and address Iran's proliferation of missiles and other advanced weapons systems that
threaten peace and stability. We will also ensure Iran has no path to a nuclear weapon -- not now, not ever.
Following our withdrawal from the JCPOA, President Trump has asked me to achieve these goals on Iran.
We'll pursue those goals along several lines of effort.
First, we will apply unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime. The leaders in Tehran will have
no doubt about our seriousness.
Thanks to our colleagues at the Department of Treasury, sanctions are going back in full effect and new ones
are coming. Last week we imposed sanctions on the head of Iran's central bank and other entities that were
funneling money to the IRGC Qods Force. They were also providing money to Hizballah and other terrorist
organizations. The Iranian regime should know that this is just the beginning.
This sting of sanctions will be painful if the regime does not change its course from the unacceptable and
unproductive path it has chosen to one that rejoins the league of nations. These will indeed end up being the
strongest sanctions in history when we are complete.
The regime has been fighting all over the Middle East for years. After our sanctions come in force, it will be
battling to keep its economy alive.
Iran will be forced to make a choice: either fight to keep its economy off life support at home or keep
squandering precious wealth on fights abroad. It will not have the resources to do both.
Second, I will work closely with the Department of Defense and our regional allies to deter Iranian
aggression.
We will ensure freedom of navigation on the waters in the region. We will work to prevent and counteract any
Iranian malign cyber activity. We will track down Iranian operatives and their Hizballah proxies operating
around the world and we will crush them. Iran will never again have carte blanche to dominate the Middle
East.
And I'd remind the leadership in Iran what President Trump said: If they restart their nuclear program, it will
mean bigger problems - bigger problems than they'd ever had before.
Third, we will also advocate tirelessly for the Iranian people. The regime must improve how it treats its
citizens. It must protect the human rights of every Iranian. It must cease wasting Iran's wealth abroad.
We ask that our international partners continue to add their voice to ours in condemning Iran's treatment of its
own citizens.
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The protests -- the protests of the past few months show that the Iranian people are deeply frustrated with
their own government's failures.
The Iranian economy is struggling as a result of bad Iranian decisions. Workers aren't getting paid, strikes
are a daily occurrence, and the rial is plummeting. Youth unemployment is at a staggering 25 percent.
Government mismanagement of Iran's natural resources has led to severe droughts and other environmental
crises as well.
Look, these problems are compounded by enormous corruption inside of Iran, and the Iranian people can
smell it. The protests last winter showed that many are angry at the regime that keeps for itself what the
regime steals from its people.
And Iranians too are angry at a regime elite that commits hundreds of millions of dollars to military operations
and terrorist groups abroad while the Iranian people cry out for a simple life with jobs and opportunity and
with liberty.
The Iranian regime's response to the protests has only exposed the country's leadership is running scared.
Thousands have been jailed arbitrarily, and at least dozens have been killed.
As seen from the hijab protests, the brutal men of the regime seem to be particularly terrified by Iranian
women who are demanding their rights. As human beings with inherent dignity and inalienable rights, the
women of Iran deserve the same freedoms that the men of Iran possess.
But this is all on top of a well-documented terror and torture that the regime has inflicted for decades on
those who dissent from the regime's ideology.
The Iranian regime is going to ultimately have to look itself in the mirror. The Iranian people, especially its
youth, are increasingly eager for economic, political, and social change.
The United States stands with those longing for a country of economic opportunity, government transparency,
fairness, and greater liberty.
We hope, indeed we expect, that the Iranian regime will come to its senses and support -- not suppress -- the
aspirations of its own citizens.
We're open to new steps with not only our allies and partners, but with Iran as well. But only if Iran is willing
to make major changes.
As President Trump said two weeks ago, he is ready, willing, and able to negotiate a new deal. But the deal
is not the objective. Our goal is to protect the American people.
Any new agreement will make sure Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon, and will deter the regime's malign
behavior in a way that the JCPOA never could. We will not repeat the mistakes of past administrations, and
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we will not renegotiate the JCPOA itself. The Iranian wave of destruction in the region in just the last few
years is proof that Iran's nuclear aspirations cannot be separated from the overall security picture.
So what should it be? We must begin to define what it is that we demand from Iran.
First, Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and
permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
Second, Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy
water reactor.
Third, Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.
Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear
capable missile systems.
Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on
spurious charges.
Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and
reintegration of Shia militias.
Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work towards a peaceful political settlement in
Yemen.
Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.
Iran, too, must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease
harboring senior al-Qaida leaders.
Iran, too, must end the IRG Qods Force's support for terrorists and militant partners around the world.
And too, Iran must end its threatening behavior against its neighbors -- many of whom are U.S. allies. This
certainly includes its threats to destroy Israel, and its firing of missiles into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. It also includes threats to international shipping and destructive - and destructive cyberattacks.
That list is pretty long, but if you take a look at it, these are 12 very basic requirements. The length of the list
is simply a scope of the malign behavior of Iran. We didn't create the list, they did.
From my conversations with European friends, I know that they broadly share these same views of what the
Iranian regime must do to gain acceptance in the international community. I ask that America's allies join us
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in calling for the Iranian Government to act more responsibly.
In exchange for major changes in Iran, the United States is prepared to take actions which will benefit the
Iranian people. These areas of action include a number of things.
First, once this is achieved, we're prepared to end the principal components of every one of our sanctions
against the regime. We're happy at that point to re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relationships with
Iran. And we're prepared to admit@ Iran to have advanced technology. If Iran makes this fundamental
strategic shift, we, too, are prepared to support the modernization and reintegration of the Iranian economy
into the international economic system.
But relief from our efforts will come only when we see tangible, demonstrated, and sustained shifts in
Tehran's policies. We acknowledge Iran's right to defend its people. But not its actions which jeopardize
world's citizens.
Also, in contrast to the previous administration, we want to include Congress as a partner in this process. We
want our efforts to have broad support with the American people and endure beyond the Trump
Administration. A treaty would be our preferred way to go.
Unlike the JCPOA, which was broadly rejected across both sides of the aisle, an agreement that President
Trump proposes would surely garner this type of widespread support from our elected leaders and the
American people.
In the strategy we laid out today, we want the support of our most important allies and partners in the region
and around the globe. Certainly our European friends, but much more than that.
I want the Australians, the Bahrainis, the Egyptians, the Indians, the Japanese, the Jordanians, the Kuwaitis,
the Omanis, the Qataris, the Saudi Arabians, South Korea, the UAE, and many, many others worldwide to
join in this effort against the Islamic Republic of Iran. I know that those countries share the same goals. They
understand the challenge the same way that America does. Indeed, we welcome any nation which is sick
and tired of the nuclear threats, the terrorism, the missile proliferation, and the brutality of a regime which is
at odds with world peace, a country that continues to inflict chaos on innocent people.
Indeed, while to some the changes in Iranian behavior we seek may seem unrealistic, we should recall that
what we are pursuing was the global consensus before the JCPOA.
For example, in 2012, President Obama said, quote, "The deal we'll accept is [that] they end their nuclear
program," end of quote. That didn't happen. In 2006, the PS voted at the Security Council for Iran to
immediately suspend all enrichment activities. That didn't happen.
In 2013, the French foreign minister said he was wary of being sucked into a, quote, "con game," end of
quote, over allowing Iran to continue uranium enrichment.
In 2015, John Kerry said, quote, "We don't recognize the right to enrich," end of quote. Yet the Iranians are
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enriching even as we sit here today.
So we're not asking anything other than that Iranian behavior be consistent with global norms, global norms
widely recognized before the JCPOA. And we want to eliminate their capacity to threaten our world with
those nuclear activities.
With respect to its nuclear activities, why would we allow Iran more capability than we have permitted the
United Arab Emirates and that we're asking for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? We understand that our
reimposition of sanctions and the coming pressure campaign on the Iranian regime will pose financial and
economic difficulties for a number of our friends. Indeed, it imposes economic challenges to America as well.
These are markets our businesses would love to sell into as well. And we want to hear their concerns.
But we will hold those doing prohibited business in Iran to account. Over the coming weeks, we will send
teams of specialists to countries around the world to further explain administration policy, to discuss the
implications of sanctions we imposition, and to listen.
I know. I've spent a great deal of time with our allies in my first three weeks. I know that they may decide to
try and keep their old nuclear deal going with Tehran. That is certainly their decision to make. They know
where we stand.
Next year marks the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Republic -- Revolution in Iran. At this milestone, we have
to ask: What has the Iranian Revolution given to the Iranian people? The regime reaps a harvest of suffering
and death in the Middle East at the expense of its own citizens. Iran's economy is stagnant and without
direction and about to get worse. Its young people are withering under the weight of frustrated ambitions.
They are longing to pursue the freedoms and opportunities of the 21st century.
Iran's leaders can change all of this if they choose to do so. Ali Khamenei has been supreme leader since
1989. He will not live forever, nor will the Iranian people abide the rigid rules of tyrants forever. For two
generations, the Iranian regime has exacted a heavy toll on its own people and the world. The hard grip of
repression is all that millions of Iranians have ever known.
Now is the time for the supreme leader and the Iranian regime to summon the courage to do something
historically beneficial for its own people, for this ancient and proud nation.
As for the United States, our eyes are clear as to the nature of this regime, but our ears are open to what
may be possible. Unlike the previous administration, we are looking for outcomes that benefit the Iranian
people, not just the regime.
If anyone, especially the leaders of Iran, doubts the President's sincerity or his vision, let them look at our
diplomacy with North Korea. Our willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un underscores the Trump
administration's commitment to diplomacy to help solve the greatest challenges, even with our staunchest
adversaries. But that willingness, that willingness has been accompanied by a painful pressure campaign
that reflects our commitment to resolve this challenge forever.
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To the ayatollah, to President Rouhani, and to other Iranian leaders: understand that your current activities
will be met with steely resolve.
My final message today is, in fact, to the Iranian people. I want to repeat President Trump's words from
October. President Trump said that, "We stand in total solidarity with the Iranian regime's longest-suffering
victims: its own people. The citizens of Iran have paid a heavy price for the violence and extremism of their
leaders. The Iranian people long to reclaim their country's proud history, its culture, its civilization, and its
cooperation with its neighbors."
It is America's hope that our labors toward peace and security will bear fruit for the long-suffering people of
Iran. We long to see them prosper and flourish as in past decades and, indeed, as never before.
Today, the United States of America is proud to take a new course towards that objective.
Thank you. (Applause.)
MS JAMES: Thank you so very much. Bold, concise, unambiguous. We appreciate you taking this forum
here at the Heritage Foundation to deliver that message. Looking at -- and you listed during your speech
several of our allies and friends and partners, many of whom are angry, some disappointed. How are you
going to bring them on board? How are you going to use your best diplomatic skills to bring them along with
us?
SECRETARY POMPEO: These strategic changes in the world come together when countries decide on an
objective that is shared, and that always begins with a shared interest and values. I spent the first couple of
weeks of my time as Secretary of State working to try to see if there wasn't a way to fix the deal. I spoke with
my European counterparts. I traveled there. In my 13th hour as Secretary of State I was on the ground in
Brussels speaking with my European counterparts. We couldn't get it done. We couldn't reach agreement
there.
The United States intends to work hard at the diplomatic piece of working alongside all of our partners. We
focus on the Europeans, but there are scores of countries around the world who share our concerns and are
equally threatened by the Iranian regime. It's that shared interest, it's the value set which will ultimately drive,
I believe, a global response to this -- to the world's largest state sponsor of terror. I'm convinced it can take
place. My team is going to work diligently to do that. We're going to do so in the context of trying to address
the concerns of all of our partners, and I am convinced that over a period of time there will be a broad
recognition that the strategy that President Trump has laid out is the right one that will put Iran in a place
where it will one day rejoin civilization in the way that we all hope that it will.
MS JAMES: It's clear through your comments this morning that you truly want tough sanctions. And I think
that there is some remaining concern about how are you going to deal with the nuclear concerns. Can you
speak to that for just a bit? And let me say to our audience, by the way, that I wish we had more time with the
Secretary this morning, and there will be an abrupt and a hard stop because we have to get him out to the
CIA and -- for the swearing-in ceremony, and we don't want you late for that.
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So talk to us about -
SECRETARY POMPEO: I got to go back one more time.
MS JAMES: One more time. (Laughter.)
SECRETARY POMPEO: Look, the nuclear file is imperative. It presents the largest, most severe threat for
sure. The JCPOA fell short. It was a delay. Our aim is to get that permanently fixed. I mentioned quickly, right,
we ask our other Middle Eastern partners to do hard things. We put a 123 agreement in front of them and
say, "This is what you have to do." And they say, "Hey, the Iranians enrich." That's reasonable. That seems to
me a reasonable point.
Well, our demands on Iran aren't unreasonable. Give up your program. End it. Should they choose to go
back, should they begin to enrich, we're fully prepared to respond to that as well. I'm certainly not going to
share with you today precisely what our response will be. But we watch them talk. We've heard them say - I
hope that they'll make a different decision, that they'll choose a different path. We welcome them taking a
path that other nations in the region are beginning to take as well.
MS JAMES: Well, can you explain for us the sanctions structure and how you intend to target the Iranian
regime without hurting our European friends?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Well, any time sanctions are put in place, countries have to give up economic
activity. So the Americans have given up economic activity now for an awfully long time, and I'll concede
there are American companies who would love to do business with the Islamic Republic of Iran. There's a
huge market there. It's a big, vibrant, wonderful peoples. But everyone is going to have to participate in this.
Every country is going to have to understand that we cannot continue to create wealth for Qasem Soleimani.
Right, that's what this is. At the end of the day, this money has flowed to him. The economics have permitted
them to run roughshod across the Middle East. Our effort is to strangle his economic capacity to do harm to
the Middle East and to the world. Nuclear programs aren't cheap. To the extent we are effective at making it
more difficult on the Iranian regime, we will reduce their capacity to continue to build out their nuclear weapon
system as well.
MS JAMES: You've laid out a very, very bold plan this morning. Do you have a timeframe for getting all this
done?
SECRETARY POMPEO: So the sanctions are back in place and are winding down over the next 100 and
what, 55 days? There are -- there's lots more work in place. It is a effort across all of government. We are
working certainly diplomatically in the lead, but Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, each of
us has the same mission from President Trump. I can't put a timeline on it. But at the end of the day, the
Iranian people will decide the timeline. At the end of the day, the Iranian people will get to make a choice
about their leadership. If they make the decision quickly, that would be wonderful. If they choose not to do so,
we will stay hard at this until we achieve the outcomes that I set forward today.
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- 185 -
MS JAMES: Well, Mr. Secretary, again, on behalf of the Heritage Foundation and the scholars here who
have been working on these issues for a very long time, we want to thank you. Again, it was a bold vision -
clear, concise, unambiguous -- and we want to congratulate you and the President, and we wish you
Godspeed.
I am going to ask you to remain seated while the Secretary exits. I have about eight more questions here, but
SECRETARY POMPEO: For another day.
MS JAMES: For another day.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you all very much for being here.
MS JAMES: Thank you so much. (Applause.)
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Annex 34
U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with an Iran Diplomacy Update”, Special
Briefing, 2 July 2018
- 189 -
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U.S. Department of State
(
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/07/283669.htm
Special Briefing
Brian Hook
Director of Policy Planning
Press Briefing Room
Washington, DC
July 2, 2018
MS NAUERT: Welcome to all of you, and thanks for coming in. I know a lot of you have an
interest in what we're doing with regard to Iran and our diplomatic efforts going forward. So
keeping that in mind, we asked Brian Hook, our director of policy planning, to come down
and give you a few minutes' briefing on where things stand right now.
So I'll welcome Brian Hook. I'll call on you take a few questions and then we'll go on about
our day, and I'll see you tomorrow at our briefing then. Brian, go right ahead.
MR HOOK: Thank you, Heather. Good morning.
QUESTION: Morning.
MR HOOK: I'd like to update you on the progress we're making to advance the President's
Iran policy. It has been almost two months since President Trump announced our
withdrawal from the Iran deal and a little over one month since Secretary Pompeo laid out a
roadmap for achieving a better deal.
The Secretary outlined a clear and compelling vision for a better future for the Iranian
people. This future can only be realized, though, if Iran meets 12 demands to become a
normal country. Normal countries don't terrorize other nations, proliferate missiles, and
impoverish their own people.
As Secretary Pompeo has said, this new strategy is not about changing the regime, it is
about changing the behavior of the leadership in Iran to comport with what the Iranian
people really want them to do. A key part of our strategy is a campaign of maximum
economic and diplomatic pressure. The first part of our sanctions will snap back on August
4th[1]. These sanctions will include targeting Iran's automotive sector, trade in gold, and
other key metals. Our remaining sanctions will snap back on November 6th[2]. These
sanctions will include targeting Iran's energy sector and petroleum-related transactions and
transactions with the Central Bank of Iran.
1/6
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After leaving the deal, Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Mnuchin decided to create joint
teams of senior officials to visit every region of the world. These teams were launched on
June 4th and have already visited 13 countries in Europe and East Asia. Our diplomatic
teams from State and Treasury are bringing with them a message of cooperation and
coordination. Many countries around the world share our interests in countering terrorism,
halting the proliferation of missiles, and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East.
We want to work with these countries to build a strong global effort.
At each stop, the teams from Treasury and State explain the full snapback of our sanctions
and warn governments and the private sector of the risks of continuing to do business with
Iran. More than 50 international firms have already announced their intent to leave the
Iranian market, particularly in the energy and financial sectors.
We have been clear with countries and companies around the world that we are bringing
severe economic pressure on Iran until the regime changes its destabilizing policies. In the
coming days, Treasury Under Secretary Mandelker and I will lead a delegation to the Gulf
as our global diplomatic efforts continue.
As I mentioned earlier on the energy front, sanctions are set to be re-imposed on
November 4th. Our focus is on getting as many countries importing Iranian crude down to
zero as soon as possible. We are also working with oil market participants, including
producers and consumers, to ensure market stability. Banking sanctions will also snap
back on November 4th, and we will be aggressively enforcing these provisions to lock up
Iran's assets overseas and deny the Iranian regime access to its hard currency.
Our sanctions do not now, nor have they ever, targeted humanitarian goods. Our sanctions
pressure the Iranian regime into changing its behavior and they do not target the Iranian
people. The United States does not sanction the export of food or medicine to Iran.
In addition to building a campaign of strong economic pressure, Secretary Pompeo has
also made it a priority to stand with the Iranian people, who are the longest-suffering victims
of the Iranian regime. The average Iranian today is struggling to afford basics like water,
bread, and eggs. At the same time, the Iranian regime is squandering millions of dollars on
violent misadventures abroad. These serve no purpose other than to prolong pain and
suffering of men, women, and children in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East.
Iran's economy is getting worse. Foreign direct investment is falling, and the rial hit an all
time high against the dollar last week. On June 28th, the rial was trading at 85,000 to the
dollar on the unofficial market. That is twice the official exchange rate of 42,500. The initial
windfall the regime received after the Iran deal never benefited the Iranian people. The
Iranian economy is too distorted by corruption and the IRGC's pervasive presence in most
key sectors. Rather than create an economy that works for the Iranian people, the regime
refuses to meet standard international banking practices. Iran accordingly remains on the
blacklist for failing to prevent money laundering and terror financing.
Supreme Leader Khamenei seems all too aware that economic reform would expose just
how much his economy facilitates war, terrorism, and crime. Since the President's May 8th
announcement, the United States has designated two Iranian financial networks that
support terrorism. One network involved a currency exchange scheme going through the
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UAE, and we worked very closely and very well with the Emirati Government to shut it
down. The other network involved the Iranian central bank governor and an Iraqi bank. It is
no wonder that international banks and firms refuse to enter the Iranian financial system.
The Iranian people are rightly frustrated with the regime, and they are expressing their
frustration in nationwide protests and in smaller acts of defiance throughout the country. As
the regime continues to crack down on these legitimate calls for reform in Tehran,
Khorramshahr, and elsewhere with more repression and even greater violence, the United
States stands with the Iranian people. Since withdrawing from the Iran deal, the United
States has sanctioned 53 individuals and entities for human rights abuses, proliferation
activities, or acts of terrorism, and we will continue to do so. We designated Sadeq Larijani,
the head of the judiciary, which demonstrates that we will target those responsible for
human rights abuses at the highest levels of the Iranian Government. A people with as rich
a history and as deep a culture as the Iranian people deserve a government that treats
them with dignity.
Lastly, I will be traveling to Europe at the end of this week for meetings with the political
directors from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and that will continue very close
consultations we've had with the Europeans. The Secretary is in regular touch with his E3
counterparts, with governments around the world to discuss the way forward on Iran, and
that will continue in the coming weeks. Happy to take any questions. I think Heather's going
to-
MS NAUERT: Yeah. Start with - we'll start with AP. That's our tradition here. Go right
ahead.
QUESTION: Thanks for this briefing. We heard the President Sunday warn the U.S.'s
European allies of sanctions should they continue trade with Iran. I'm just wondering, was
that the tenor of your discussions with the U.S.'s European allies on your recent trip to
Europe, and have you heard back from any of those allies in response to the President's
words yesterday?
MR HOOK: Well, we will not hesitate to take action when we see sanctionable activity, and
that is consistent with our policy of economic and diplomatic isolation against Iran. We do
work --as I said, these road shows of Treasury and State officials, they've been to Europe.
They haven't been to all of Europe, but they've been to part of Europe, been to Asia. Those
will continue. But our teams at Treasury are in very close consultation, we're in close
consultation with not just Europe but with all countries who are affected by the re-imposition
of our sanctions.
MS NAUERT: Lesley from Reuters.
QUESTION: Yes. Hello, Brian.
MR HOOK: Hi, Lesley.
QUESTION: I was wondering, the President also said over the weekend that he had asked
King Salman of Saudi Arabia to -- that he'd increase -to increase oil production by 2 million
barrels. Can you please give us --have the Saudis agreed to that, number one? Number
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two, what do you think the market reaction is going to be to that? Would it press down
push down prices and will it make up for the shortage coming up? And number two, is that
2 million barrels per day?
MR HOOK: Well, I'd refer you to the White House for a specific readout on the Saudi
reaction to the phone call the President had with the king. Our goal - with respect to the
energy sanctions, our goal is to increase pressure on the Iranian regime by reducing to
zero its revenue from crude oil sales. Now, we are working to minimize disruptions to the
global market, but we are confident that there is sufficient global spare oil production
capacity.
MS NAUERT: Next one, Dave from AFP.
QUESTION: Thank you. Thanks, Brian.
MR HOOK: Dave.
QUESTION: India and I believe Turkey have explicitly said that they will continue to import
Iranian oil. Can you be precise about the kind of consequences they will face or their
corporations and banks will face if they do this?
MR HOOK: We are not looking to grant licenses or waivers, because doing so would
substantially reduce pressure on Iran. And this is a campaign of imposing pressure. And so
we are not looking to grant licenses or waivers broadly on the re-imposition of sanctions,
because we believe pressure is critical to achieve our national security objectives.
We are prepared to work with countries that are reducing their imports on a case-by-case
basis. But as with our other sanctions, we are not looking to grant waivers or licenses.
MS NAUERT: I'm sorry, I forgot your name.
QUESTION: Alicia.
MS NAUERT: Alicia Rose, go ahead.
QUESTION: Sure. Thank you so much. You -- on the cutting crude oil from Iran, which
countries have already agreed to cut oil imports from Iran, and what has been the reaction
from countries in your discussions?
MR HOOK: Well, the - I gave a statistic earlier about the number of countries that have
announced that. I can get you a specific number, or a more specific description later.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MS NAUERT: Nike from VOA.
QUESTION: Thank you so much, Heather. If I may, I would like to ask about the diplomatic
efforts to bring China on board after U.S. ended JCPOA. Because China is a signatory of
JCPOA, and the Government of China had expressed opposition of U.S. position to
withdraw from JCPOA. What do you say to the Chinese Government? And would Chinese
companies that continue to do business with Iran or buy oil from Iran be subject to U.S.
sanctions? Thank you.
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MR HOOK: Our diplomacy has been focused around mostly consultations with Europe,
France, and Germany. Those are our allies. And so we work very closely with allies. We
in Secretary Pompeo's speech that he gave about a month ago, he listed all of the
countries that we want to work with. We believe that China and Russia and the other
countries who are part of the Iran deal are tired of the terrorism that Iran is causing. They
don't support the proliferation of missiles around the Middle East. They don't support just
how -- this vast proxy network of terrorism.
And so we believe that most countries around the world share our goals. If you go through
the list of the 12 objectives that Secretary Pompeo outlined, those objectives were a global
consensus prior to the Iran deal. And so you've seen China vote repeatedly in a number of
UN Security Council resolutions, and those resolutions stated objectives that are perfectly
consistent with the 12 objectives that Secretary Pompeo laid out.
And so when we sit down with countries, we are beginning from a position of broad
agreement on wanting to deter Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East and its
support for terrorism. No one supports Iran's terrorism in the world except perhaps Assad.
And so we feel like we have enormous agreement with countries around the world on what
we need to do to deter Iran's violence.
MS NAUERT: Michelle -- Michelle --
QUESTION: You mentioned the waivers, case-by-case -
MS NAUERT: We've got to move on. Sorry. Two questions left. Michelle, go right ahead.
QUESTION: Well, it doesn't sound like there's enormous agreement in Europe as to how to
go about this. And you mentioned that you're not looking to grant waivers, but does that
mean that you're not ruling them out as well? And also, with Rouhani in Europe now, what
do you expect will be accomplished in that? I mean, do you think that -- that and the goal of
moving forward with the sanctions on Europeans, is that just solidifying opposition to the
way the U.S. is going about this?
MR HOOK: President Rouhani, as you've seen reported in the press, will be visiting
Switzerland and Austria as part of their ongoing efforts to work with the Europeans. It is
interesting that he will be traveling to Vienna. This is -- this month of July is the 29th
anniversary that Iranian operatives, using diplomatic cover, assassinated the head of an
Iranian Kurdish dissident group and two others. And so we will be, in the near term,
reminding people of Iran and the violence that they have -a lot of their attacks,
assassinations, bombings, cyber attacks, kidnapping, hostage-takings, hijackings, small
arms attacks, from 1979 to 2018, and we will be discussing that in every region of the
world.
And so when you have somebody like Rouhani going to Europe to try to bring the
Europeans, it's a very sad history of violence that Iran has committed against Europe since
1979. And it's important for Europeans to remember the kind of regime that they're dealing
with.
MS NAUERT: And -
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QUESTION: And you're not ruling out waivers, did you say?
MS NAUERT: Michelle, we've got to go. Final question, Nadia.
QUESTION: Thank you, Heather. As you just mentioned, a significant component of the
Iran strategy is to counter its activities in the region. Have you seen any change since the
withdrawal from the agreement, especially the support for the Assad regime or their
activities in Yemen?
MR HOOK: Well, if you look at Iran and Syria, and Iran and Yemen, they are backing all the
wrong people. And by backing them, that has contributed to enormous suffering and
violence in the region. When you --we've put out a number of statements that summarize
what Iran has been doing in Syria. They have been backing -- these Iranian-backed forces
are perpetuating the Assad regime's brutality against the Syrian people, and it's inciting
instability that spills into neighboring countries. And so this is the expansionist sort of policy
that Iran has been pursuing, and a lot of the money that they received under the Iran deal
has been used to fund these activities that has destabilized the Middle East, especially in
Syria and Yemen.
MS NAUERT: Thank you everybody, we've got to go. Thanks, Brian.
MR HOOK: Thanks.
ill The following is on the record to Brian Hook: The first part of our sanctions will snap
back on August 6. These sanctions will include targeting Iran's automotive sector, trade in
gold, and other key metals. The remaining sanctions will snap back on November 4. These
sanctions will include targeting Iran's energy sector and petroleum-based transactions, and
transactions with the Central Bank of Iran.
[2] The following is on the record to Brian Hook: The first part of our sanctions will snap
back on August 6. These sanctions will include targeting Iran's automotive sector, trade in
gold, and other key metals. The remaining sanctions will snap back on November 4. These
sanctions will include targeting Iran's energy sector and petroleum-based transactions, and
transactions with the Central Bank of Iran.
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Annex 35
U.S. President, Executive Order 13846, 6 August 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 38939
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- 198 -
38939
Presidential Documents
Federal Register
Vol. 83. No. 152
Tuesday, August 7, 2018
Title 3-
Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018
The President
Reim posing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emer
gencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended (ISA), the Com
prehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub
lic Law 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), as amended (CISADA), the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112
158) (TRAJ, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (subtitle
D of title XII of Public Law 112-239) (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.) (IFCA),
section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C.
1182(1)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, in order to take
additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive
Order 12957 of March 15, 1995,
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, in light
of my decision on May 8, 2018, to cease tho participation of the United
States in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 (JCPOA),
and to re-impose all sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the
JCPOA as expeditiously as possible and in no case later than 180 days
from May 8, 2018, as outlined in the National Security Presidential Memo
randum--11 of May 8, 2018 (Ceasing United States Participation in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and Taking Additional Action to Counter
Iran's Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon),
and to advance the goal of applying financial pressure on the Iranian regime
in pursuit of a comprehensive and lasting solution to the full range of
the threats posed by Iran, including Iran's proliferation and development
of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities,
its network and campaign of regional aggression, its support for terrorist
groups, and the malign activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
and its surrogates, hereby order as follows:
Section 1. Blocking Sanctions Relating to Support for the Government of
Iran's Purchase or Acquisition of U.S. Bank Notes or Precious Metals; Certain
Iranian Persons; and Iran's Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors and
Port Operators. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the measures
described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that:
(i) on or after August 7, 2018, the person has materially assisted, sponsored,
or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods
or services in support of, the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes
or precious metals by the Government of Iran;
(ii) on or after November 5, 2018, the person has materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services in support of, the National Iranian Oil Company
(NlOC), Naftiran lntertrade Company (NICO), or the Central Bank of Iran;
(iii) on or after November 5, 2018, the person has materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of:
{A) any Iranian person included on the list of Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets
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Federal Register/ Vol. 83, No. 152 / Tuesday, August 7, 2018 /Presidential Documents
Control (SDN List) (other than an Iranian depository institution whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive
Order 13599 of February 5, 2012); or
(Bl any other person included on the SDN List whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a) of this section
or Executive Order 13599 ( other than an Iranian depository institution
whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant
to Executive Order 13599); or
(iv) pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance
with the terms of such delegation, sanctions shall be imposed on such
person pursuant to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA because the person:
(A) is part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran;
(Bl operates a port in Iran; or
(Cl knowingly provides significant financial, material, technological, or
other support to, or goods or services in support of any activity or trans
action on behalf of a person determined under section 1244(0)(2)(A) of
IFCA to be a part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of
Iran; a person determined under section 1244(0)(2)(B) of IFCA to operate
a port in Iran; or an Iranian person included on the SDN List (other
than a person described in section 1244(c)(3) of IFCA).
(b) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
in accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsections (a)(i)-(a)(iv) of this section, all property and interests in property
that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United
States person of such person are blocked and may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
(cl The prohibitions in subsection (bl of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 2. Correspondent and Payable-Through Account Sanctions Relating to
Iran's Automotive Sector; Certain Iranian Persons; and Trade in Iranian
Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Petrochemical Products. (a) The Sec
retary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby
authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions described
in subsection (bl of this section upon determining that the foreign financial
institution has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial
transaction:
(i) on or after August 7, 2018, for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran
of significant goods or services used in connection with the automotive
sector of Iran;
(ii) on or after November 5, 2018, on behalf of any Iranian person included
on the SDN List (other than an Iranian depository institution whose prop
erty and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive
Order 13599) or any other person included on the SDN List whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection l(a) of this
order or Executive Order 13599 (other than an Iranian depository institution
whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant
to Executive Order 13599);
(iii) on or after November 5, 2018, with NIOC or NICO, except for a
sale or provision to NIOC or NICO of the products described in section
5(a)(3)(A)() of ISA provided that the fair market value of such products
is lower than the applicable dollar threshold specified in that provision;
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38941
(iv) on or after November 5, 2018, for the purchase, acquisition, sale,
transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran;
or
(v) on or after November 5, 2018, for the purchase, acquisition, sale,
transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet any of
the criteria set forth in subsections (a)(i)--(a)(v) of this section, the Secretary
of the Treasury may prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict
conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent
account or a payable-through account by such foreign financial institution.
(c) Subsections (a)(ii)--(a)(iv) of this section shall apply with respect to
a significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign finan
cial institution for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from
Iran only if:
(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of sub
section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112-81) (2012 NDAA) (22 U.S.C. 8513a) that there
is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from countries
other than Iran to permit a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum
and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial
institutions; and
(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the
2012 NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of
that subsection does not apply.
(d) Subsection (a)(ii) of this section shall not apply with respect to a
significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial
institution for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of natural gas
only if the financial transaction is solely for trade between the country
with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution and Iran,
and any funds owed to Iran as a result of such trade are credited to an
account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign
financial institution.
(e) Subsections (a)(ii)-(a)(v) of this section shall not apply with respect
to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the provision
(including any sale) of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical
devices to Iran.
(f) The prohibitions in subsection (bl of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 3. "Menu-based" Sanctions Relating to Iran's Automotive Sector and
Trade in Iranian Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Petrochemical Products.
(a) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
United States Trade Representative, and with the President of the Export
Import Bank, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and other agencies and officials as appropriate, is hereby authorized
to impose on a person any of the sanctions described in section 4 or
5 of this order upon determining that the person:
(i) on or after August 7, 2018, knowingly engaged in a significant trans
action for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of significant goods or
services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran;
(ii) on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaged in a significant
transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petroleum or petroleum products from Iran;
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(iii) on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaged in a significant
transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petrochemical products from Iran;
(iv) is a successor entity to a person determined by the Secretary of
State in accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set
forth in subsections (a)(i)--(a)(iii) of this section;
(v) owns or controls a person determined by the Secretary of State in
accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsections (a)(i)-(a)(iii) of this section, and had knowledge that the person
engaged in the activities referred to in those subsections; or
(vi) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control
with, a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with
this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in subsections (a)(i)-
(a)(iii) of this section, and knowingly participated in the activities referred
to in those subsections.
(b) Subsection (a)(ii) of this section shall apply with respect to a person
only if:
(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of sub
section 1245(d) of the 2012 NDAA that there is a sufficient supply of
petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit
a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products
purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions; and
(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the
2012 NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of
that subsection does not apply.
Sec. 4. Agency Implementation Authorities for "Menu-based" Sanctions.
When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section 3
of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the criteria described
in subsections (a)(i)-(a)vi) of that section and has selected any of the sanc
tions set forth below to impose on that person, the heads of relevant agencies,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, as appropriate, shall take the
following actions where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by
the Secretary of State:
(a) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States
shall deny approval of the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension
of credit, or participation in an extension of credit in connection with
the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person;
(b) agencies shall not issue any specific license or grant any other specific
permission or authority under any statute or regulation that requires the
prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition
for the export or reexport of goods or technology to the sanctioned person;
(c) with respect to a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(i) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall take
such actions as they deem appropriate, including denying designation,
or terminating the continuation of any prior designation of, the sanctioned
person as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments;
or
(ii) agencies shall prevent the sanctioned person from serving as an agent
of the United States Government or serving as a repository for United
States Government funds;
(d) agencies shall not procure, or enter into a contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person;
(e) the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien that the Secretary
of State determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder
with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person; or
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38943
(fl the heads of the relevant agencies, as appropriate, shall impose on
the principal executive officer or officers, or persons performing similar
functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned person the sanctions
described in subsections (a)-(e) of this section, as selected by the Secretary
of State.
(g) The prohibitions in subsections (a)-(f) of this section apply except
to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 5. Additional Implementation Authorities for "Menu-based" Sanctions.
(a) When the President, or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance
with the terms of such delegation, has determined that sanctions described
in section 6(a) of ISA shall be imposed on a person pursuant to ISA,
CISADA, TRA, or IFCA and has selected one or more of the sanctions
set forth below to impose on that person or when the Secretary of State,
in accordance with the terms of section 3 of this order, has determined
that a person meets any of the criteria described in subsections (a)(i)-
(a)(vi) of that section and has selected one or more of the sanctions set
forth below to impose on that person, the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions
where necessary to implement the sanctions selected and maintained by
the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of the Treasury:
(i) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans
or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities;
(ii) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person
has any interest;
(iii) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institu
tions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that
such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;
(iv) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person of
the sanctioned person, and provide that such property and interests in
property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise
dealt in;
(v) prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person;
(vi) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly
or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person; or
(vii) impose on the principal executive officer or officers, or persons
performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned
person the sanctions described in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(vi) of this section,
as selected by the President or Secretary of State or the Secretary of
the Treasury, as appropriate.
(bl The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
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Sec. 6. Sanctions Relating to the Iranian Rial. (a) The Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized
to impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions described in sub
section (bl of this section upon determining that the foreign financial institu
tion has, on or after August 7, 2018:
(i) knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction related
to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials or a derivative, swap, future,
forward, or other similar contract whose value is based on the exchange
rate of the Iranian rial; or
(ii) maintained significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran
denominated in the Iranian rial.
(bl With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet the criteria
set forth in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of the
Treasury may:
(i) prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the
maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable
through account by such foreign financial institution; or
(ii) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person of
such foreign financial institution, and provide that such property and
interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn,
or otherwise dealt in.
(cl The prohibitions in subsection (bl of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 7. Sanctions with Respect to the Diversion of Goods Intended for the
People of Iran, the Transfer of Goods or Technologies to Iran that are
Likely to be Used to Commit Human Rights Abuses, and Censorship. (a)
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation
of the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the
measures described in subsection (bl of this section upon determining that
the person:
(i) has engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities
relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural commodities,
food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of Iran;
(ii) has engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities
relating to the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of
goods described in subsection (a)(i) of this section;
(iii) has knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, transferred, or facilitated
the transfer of, goods or technologies to Iran, any entity organized under
the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government
of Iran, or any national of Iran, for use in or with respect to Iran, that
are likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities, or by any other person on behalf of the Government
of Iran or any of such agencies or instrumentalities, to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran;
(iv) has knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, provided services, includ
ing services relating to hardware, software, or specialized information
or professional consulting, engineering, or support services, with respect
to goods or technologies that have been transferred to Iran and that are
likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, or by any other person on behalf of the Government
of Iran or any of such agencies or instrumentalities, to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran;
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(v) has engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran
on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit
access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support
of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an
entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam
or restrict an international signal;
(vi) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,
the activities described in subsections (a)(i)--(a)(v) of this section or any
person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this section; or
(vii) is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for
or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.
(b) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
in accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsections (a)(i)--(a)(vii) of this section, all property and interests in property
that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United
States person of such person are blocked and may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 8. Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person and Estab
lished or Maintained Outside the United States. (a) No entity owned or
controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside
the United States may knowingly engage in any transaction, directly or
indirectly, with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdic
tion of the Government of Iran, if that transaction would be prohibited
by Executive Order 12957, Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, Executive
Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, Executive Order 13599, or sections 1
or 15 of this order, or any regulation issued pursuant to the foregoing,
if the transaction were engaged in by a United States person or in the
United States.
(b) Penalties assessed for violations of the prohibition in subsection (a)
of this section, and any related violations of section 15 of this order may
be assessed against the United States person that owns or controls the
entity that engaged in the prohibited transaction.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply, except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition, except to the extent provided in subsection 20(c)
of this order.
Sec. 9. Revoking and Superseding Prior Executive Orders. The following
Executive Orders are revoked and superseded:
(a) Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012 (Authorizing the Implementa
tion of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran);
and
(b) Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016 (Revocation of Executive
Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645 With Respect to Iran, Amendment
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of Executive Order 13628 With Respect to Iran, and Provision of Implementa
tion Authorities for Aspects of Certain Statutory Sanctions Outside the Scope
of U.S. Commitments Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of
July 14, 2015).
Sec. 10. Natural Gas Project Exception. Subsections 1(a), 2(a)(ii)-(a)(v),
3(a)(ii)-(a)(iii), and, with respect to a person determined by the Secretary
of State in accordance with section 3 to meet the criteria of 3(a)(ii)--(iii),
3(a)(iv)-(vi) of this order shall not apply with respect to any person for
conducting or facilitating a transaction involving a project described in
subsection (a) of section 603 of TRA to which the exception under that
section applies.
Sec. 11. Donations. I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2)
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of
the types of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit
of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such
donations as provided by subsections 1(b), 5(a)(iv), 6(b)(ii), and 7(b) of
this order.
Sec. 12. Prohibitions. The prohibitions in subsections l(b), 5(a)(iv), 6(b)(ii),
and 7(b) of this order include:
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to this order; and
(bl the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
from any such person.
Sec. 13. Entry into the United States. The unrestricted immigrant and non
immigrant entry into the United States of aliens determined to meet one
or more of the criteria in subsections 1(a), 3(a), and 7(a) of this order
would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and the entry
of such persons into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants,
is hereby suspended. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered
by section 1 of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry
of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and Inter
national Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions).
Sec. 14. General Authorities. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, includ
ing adopting rules and regulations, to employ all powers granted to me
by IEEPA and sections 6(a)(6), 6(a)(7), 6(a)(8), 6(a)(9), 6(a)(11), and 6(a)(12)
of ISA, and to employ all powers granted to the United States Government
by section 6(a)(3) of ISA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this order, other than the purposes described in sections 3, 4, and 13
of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable
law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury.
All agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within
their authority to implement this order.
Sec. 15. Evasion and Conspiracy. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids,
has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts
to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order or in Executive
Order 12957, Executive Order 12959, Executive Order 13059, or Executive
Order 13599 is prohibited.
(bl Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth
in this order or in Executive Order 12957, Executive Order 12959, Executive
Order 13059, or Executive Order 13599 is prohibited.
Sec. 16. Definitions. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "automotive sector of Iran" means the manufacturing or
assembling in Iran of light and heavy vehicles including passenger cars,
trucks, buses, minibuses, pick-up trucks, and motorcycles, as well as original
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equipment manufacturing and after-market parts manufacturing relating to
such vehicles;
(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(c) the term "financial institution" includes (i) a depository institution
(as defined in section 3(c)(l) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) (12
U.S.C. 1813(c)(1)), including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined
in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978) (12 U.S.C.
3101(7)); (ii) a credit union; (iii) a securities firm, including a broker or
dealer; (iv) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter;
and (v) any other company that provides financial services;
(d) the term "foreign financial institution" means any foreign entity that
is engaged in the business of accepting deposits, making, granting, transfer
ring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign
exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers
and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. It includes, but is not limited
to, depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses,
trust companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures and op
tions brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants,
securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment
companies, employee benefit plans, dealers in precious metals, stones, or
jewels, and holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the fore
going. The term does not include the international financial institutions
identified in 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2), the International Fund for Agricultural
Development, the North American Development Bank, or any other inter
national financial institution so notified by the Secretary of the Treasury;
(e) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central
Bank of Iran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or
on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
(f) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of
Iran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Iran claims sov
ereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government
of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives
a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrange
ments;
(g) the term "Iranian depository institution" means any entity (including
foreign branches), wherever located, organized under the laws of Iran or
any jurisdiction within Iran, or owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran, or in Iran, or owned or controlled by any of the foregoing, that
is engaged primarily in the business of banking (for example, banks, savings
banks, savings associations, credit unions, trust companies, and bank holding
companies);
(h) the term "Iranian person" means an individual who is a citizen or
national of Iran or an entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran;
(i) the terms "knowledge" and "knowingly," with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result, mean that a person has actual knowledge, or
should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result;
(j) the terms "Naftiran Intertrade Company" and "NICO" mean the Naftiran
Intertrade Company Ltd. and any entity owned or controlled by, or operating
for or on behalf of, the Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd.;
(k) the terms "National Iranian Oil Company" and "NIOC" mean the
National Iranian Oil Company and any entity owned or controlled by, or
operating for or on behalf of, the National Iranian Oil Company;
(1) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
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(m) the term "petrochemical products" includes any aromatic, olefin, and
synthesis gas, and any of their derivatives, including ethylene, propylene,
butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea;
(n) the term "petroleum" (also known as crude oil) means a mixture
of hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs
and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface
separating facilities;
(o) the term "petroleum products" includes unfinished oils, liquefied petro
leum gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type
jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel
oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum
coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous products obtained from
the processing of: crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and
other hydrocarbon compounds. The term does not include natural gas, lique
fied natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels;
(p) the term "sanctioned person" means a person that the President,
or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to authority
delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of such delega
tion, has determined is a person on whom sanctions described in section
6(a) of ISA shall be imposed pursuant to ISA, CISADA, TRA, or IFCA,
and on whom the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of
the Treasury has imposed any of the sanctions in section 6(a) of ISA or
a person on whom the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms
of section 3 of this order, has decided to impose sanctions pursuant to
section 3 of this order;
(q) the term "subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran" means
a person organized under the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran,
ordinarily resident in Iran, or in Iran, or owned or controlled by any of
the foregoing;
(r) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institu
tion as defined in subsection (c) of this section (including its foreign branches)
organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within
the United States or located in the United States; and
(s) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States.
Sec. 17. Notice. For those persons whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence
in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds
or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures
to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual.
I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be
no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to subsections
l(b), 5(a)(iv), 6(b)(ii), and 7(b) of this order.
Sec. 18. Delegation to Implement Section 104A of CISADA. The Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby author
ized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and
to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA, as may be necessary to
carry out section 104A of CISADA (22 U.S.C. 8513b). The Secretary of
the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these
functions within the Department of the Treasury.
Sec. 19. Rights. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity
by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
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Sec. 20. Effect on Actions or Proceedings, Blocked Property, and Regulations,
Orders, Directives, and Licenses. (al Pursuant to section 202 of the NEA
(50 U.S.C. 1622), the revocation of Executive Orders 13716 and 13628 as
set forth in section 9 of this order, shall not affect any action taken or
proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined as of the effective
date of this order, or any action or proceeding based on any act committed
prior to the effective date of this order, or any rights or duties that matured
or penalties that were incurred prior to the effective date of this order.
(bl Except to the extent provided in statutes or regulations, orders, direc
tives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwith
standing any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior
to the effective date of this order, the following are blocked and may not
be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: all property
and interests in property that were blocked pursuant to Executive Order
13628 and remained blocked immediately prior to the effective date of
this order.
(cl Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, all regulations, orders,
directives, or licenses that were issued pursuant to Executive Order 13628
and remained in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this order
are hereby authorized to remain in effect-subject to their existing terms
and conditions-pursuant to this order, which continues in effect certain
sanctions set forth in Executive Order 13628.
Sec. 21. Relationship to Algiers Accords. The measures taken pursuant to
this order are in response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring
after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely
as a response to those later actions.
Sec. 22. Effective Date. This order is effective 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
time on August 7, 2018.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 6, 2018.
[FR Doc. 2018--17068
Filed 8-6-18; 2:00 pm]
Billing code 3295--F8--P
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Annex 36
U.S. Department of State, “Senior Administration Officials Previewing Iran
Sanctions”, Special Briefing, 6 August 2018
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Senior Administration Officials Previewing Iran Sanctions
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Senior Administration Officials Previewing Iran Sanctions
Special Briefing
Via Teleconference
August 6, 2018
MODERATOR: Good morning, thank you. Good morning to everyone and thank you for joining us this morning for a call on the
Iran sanctions. Just want to remind everyone that this call is on background and attribution is to a senior administration official. But
I'd also like to note that the information shared on this call is embargoed until 10:30 this morning. That is an update to the
information provided in the earlier advisory, so I'll just say it again: The contents of this call are embargoed until 10:30 in the
morning.
The speakers joining us today are -we have five. We have (Senior Administration Official One]. We have (Senior Administration
Official Two]. We have [Senior Administration Official Three]; [Senior Administration Official Four]; and [Senior Administration
Official Five].
I'll now turn it over to [Senior Adrrinistration Official One], who will open our call.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Great, thank you, [Moderator]. And thank you all for joining us today. I just have
some very brief opening remarks. I just want to point out that what's happening today is part of a big coordinated campaign of
pressuring Tehran that President Trump put in place from day one of his administration. We've -- looking at the region from Yemen
to Syria to Gaza, the Iranian regime is using the resources they had gotten from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to spread
human misery across the region instead of investing it in their people at home. We can have no further illusions about their intent.
And so facing this reality 90 days ago, the President took historic action to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA and put an
end to the fiction that that deal would block Tehran from getting a nuclear weapon. Now, at that time we were warned by experts
from the EU, even from my alma mater of the University of Pennsylvania -very sad -- that the threat of unilateral sanctions from
the United States would not be an effective tool. But three months out, we have a very different picture in front of us. The riyal is
tanking, unemployment in Iran is rising, and there are widespread protests over social issues and labor unrest.
I thought from the Secretary of State's speech at the Reagan Library one of the most telling facts that he presented was that you
would get twice the salary as a fighter for Hizballah in Syria or Lebanon than you would to be a firefighter in Tehran, if you got paid
at all. And we see fires burn (inaudible) city unchecked.
The next 90 days will see increased economic pressure, culminating in the reimposition of petroleum sector sanctions in
November, and this will have an exponential effect on Iran's already fragile economy.
The President has been very clear none of this needs to happen. He will meet with the Iranian leadership at any time to discuss a
real comprehensive deal that will contain their regional ambitions, will end their malign behavior, and deny them any path to a
nuclear weapon. The Iranian people should not suffer because of their regime's hegemonic regional ambitions.
I'd just like to conclude by thanking my interagency colleagues for their strong work on this effort. It's really been a terrific example
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of the administration pulling together. And I'll turn it over to you, [Senior Administration Official Two].
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO: Thanks very much. I think as we see the Iranian protests continue now in some
number of days, we hope that the Iranian regime will think seriously about the consequences of their behavior is having on their
own people. We do stand with the Iranian people, who are longing for a country of economic opportunity, transparency, fairness,
and greater liberty. As Iran expends enormous resources on its foreign adventurism, its people are becoming increasingly
frustrated, and we are seeing this frustration expressed in protests across the country.
We are deeply concerned about reports of Iranian regime's violence against unarmed citizens. The United States supports the
Iranian people's right to peacefully protest against corruption and oppression without fear of reprisal.
And two other points. The regime's systematic mismanagement of its economy and its decision to prioritize a revolutionary agenda
over the welfare of the Iranian people has put Iran into a long-term economic tailspin. Widespread government corruption and
extensive intervention in the economy by the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps make doing business in Iran a losing proposition.
Foreign direct investors in Iran never know whether they are facilitating commerce or terrorism.
I'd also point out that Iran obviously had a windfall from the Iran nuclear deal. Its increased oil revenues were a consequence of the
nuclear deal. Those revenues could have gone to improve the lives of the Iranian people; instead, terrorists, dictators, proxy
militias, and the regime's own cronies benefitted the most.
And now, I'm happy to turn it over to [Senior Administration Official Three].
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE: Thank you, [Senior Administration Official Three]. So today, I want to briefly
describe the actions that we're taking today. The President has issued a new Iran executive order to reimpose sanctions relating to
Iran, as you know. On May 8th, the President issued a national security presidential memorandum which directed the secretaries of
Treasury and State and others to take a number of actions. And today's announcement is just the next step in implementing the
President's decision.
Specifically, we are reimposing sanctions on Iran that had been lifted under the JCPOA. The snapback of these sanctions, again,
supports the President's decision to impose significant financial pressure on the Iranian regime, to continue to counter Iran's blatant
and ongoing malign activities, and then ultimately to seek a new agreement that addresses the totality of the Iranian threat.
During the period of the JCPOA, the Iranian regime demonstrated time and time again that it had no intentions to cease its state
support for terrorism, foreign proxies, and other malign activities. Iran, as has already been stated, has continued to promote
ruthless regimes, destabilize the region, and abuse the human rights of its own people. As our sanctions have been exposing to
fund their illicit activities and to evade sanctions, Iran has systematically exploited the global financial system, and willfully deceived
countries, companies, and financial institutions around the globe.
This administration intends to fully enforce our sanctions as they come back into effect in order to impose economic pressure on
the Iranian regime to stop its destabilizing activity, and ultimately chart a new path that will lead to prosperity for the Iranian people.
Specifically, the new Iran EO reimposes relevant provisions of five Iran sanctions executive orders that were revoked or amended
in January 16, 2016 in two phases. The first wind-down period ends at midnight tonight, at which relevant -- at which point relevant
sanctions will be reimposed.
At 12:01 a.m. tomorrow, August 7, 2018, sanctions will come back into full effect on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar bank
notes by the Government of Iran; Iran's trade in gold and precious metals; the sale or transfer to or from Iran of graphite and
metals, such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes; certain transactions related to the
Iranian rial; certain transactions related to the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; and Iran's automotive sector.
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Wind-down authorizations will no longer be valid after August 6th, with respect to the importation into the United States of Iranian
origin carpets and food stuffs, and transactions related to the purchase of commercial passenger aircraft will be prohibited. After
the 180-day wind-down period ends on November 4, 2018, the U.S. Government will reimpose the remaining sanctions that have
been -- had been previously lifted under the JCPOA.
The final round of snapback sanctions, as articulated in the executive order, will include the reimposition of sanctions on Iran's oil
exports and energy sector, financial institutions conducting transactions with the Central Bank of Iran, as well as sanctions related
to Iran's port operators and shipping and ship-building sectors, and sanctions on the provision of insurance and financial
messaging services.
Today's executive order and the snapback of sanctions on Iran, again, is part of the President's broader strategy to apply
unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime. We are intent on cutting off the regime's access to resources that they
have systematically used to finance terror, fund weapons proliferation, and threaten peace and stability in the region. Again, our
actions will continue to severely limit the ability of Iran, which, as you know, is the largest state sponsor of terror, to gain funding to
continue to finance its wide range of malign behavior.
Under this administration, OFAC has issued 17 rounds of sanctions designating 145 I ran-related persons. This includes six rounds
just since the President's decision in May, including actions relating to the finance of the Qods Force and Hizballah, its ballistic
missile program, the Iranian aviation sector, the government's -- the regime's use of front and shell companies and other deceptive
means to gain access to currency for the Qods Force, including in complicity with the Central Bank of Iran. We are fully committed
to rigorously enforcing our sanctions and ensuring that Iran has no path to a nuclear weapon. This economic pressure campaign is
central to our efforts to gain -- to ensure that they change course.
I will just also mention that in addition to the executive order we're going to be publishing a number of FAQs that will provide
answers to specific technical questions.
Thank you.
MODERATOR: All right, thank you very much. We'll now go to our first question.
OPERATOR: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Once again, if you wish to ask a question, please press 1 at this time, and we ask
that you limit yourself to one question. Our first question is from Michael Gordon with Wall Street Journal. Please, go ahead.
QUESTION: Right, thank you. When the previous administration imposed sanctions against Iran prior to the JCPOA, they had
broad international support. In this case, the United States has withdrawn from the agreement but other -- Europe and Russia and
China continue to endorse it. China is a large consumer of Iranian oil and does a lot of trade with them. How do you propose to
elicit China's cooperation? And if you fail to do so, aren't your sanctions going to be weaker than the ones the Obama
administration imposed?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE: So of course, as I'm sure [Senior Administration Official Two] will tell you, we
are likewise working to build a global coalition to counter Iran's malign activity. What I can tell you very specifically is that we have
made it very clear that we're going to aggressively enforce this executive order and the other authorities that we have pursuant to
statute. We will work with countries around the world to do so. But make no mistake about it, we are very intent on using these
authorities. We will use them aggressively. And as [Senior Administration Official Three] already mentioned, we are already seeing
a very substantial impact.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah, Michael, I would just follow up on that and say if the sanctions were not
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going to be effective, I don't think you would have seen the trajectory of Iran's economy over the last 90 days. I mean, it would have
been the opposite if China were going to rescue them and somehow make this into a big success.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE: And of course, in the last 90 days we have seen company after company after
company announce that they are getting out, so there's no question that this pressure is already working.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, this is [Senior Administration Official Two]. We -- the point of our sanctions
pressure, this economic pressure campaign, is to deny the regime the financial resources that it needs to finance terrorism and its
nuclear missile programs and other dangerous activity around the Middle East. And we're very pleased that nearly 100
international firms have announced their intent to leave the Iranian market, particularly in the energy and the finance sectors.
We have had -- State and Treasury officials have been traveling around the world to various regions to coordinate with countries.
That includes China. And so far, we have visited more than 20 countries, and that work will continue for the balance of the year.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll go to the next question now.
OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Susannah George with AP. Please, go ahead.
QUESTION: Hi there, thanks so much for doing this call. I want to ask specifically about this announcement from the EU that they
will protect European firms from the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran, specifically this blocking statute that will take effect
when sanctions are reimposed at midnight. Do you expect that this could weaken U.S. sanctions? Have you responded to this in
any way? Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE: Look, so I think with respect to the EU blocking the statute, really what you
need to look at is what companies and -- the messages that companies and financial institutions are sending, which is that (a) they
have I think a deep appreciation for what's going on in Iran for the fact that it's very difficult and complicated to know who you're
doing business with in Iran. Are you doing business with the IRGC, the Qods Force? As we've -- as has been exposed in our
actions in the last 90 days, we've taken a couple of actions which expose the Central Bank of Iran's complicity in helping to fund
terror. Companies and banks, including central banks, understand that very well. They are taking note and as (Senior
Administration Official Two] mentioned, they are getting out. So we're not -- we are -- this is not something that we're particularly
concerned by.
MODERATOR: All right, we'll go to the next question now.
OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Lesley Wroughton with Reuters. Please go ahead.
QUESTION: Yes, good morning. If you bear with me, just a couple of questions. One is do you- what kind of economic impact in
dollar terms do you believe these initial sanctions will have on the Iranian economy? And number two, is there a danger perhaps
that the Iranians might blame the worsening conditions on foreigners rather than on the regime?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: In terms of your second question, I think of course they will blame foreigners.
They've been doing this for almost 40 years now; it's their modus operandi. But I think you could see the Iranian people start to see
through that, that they know that this is the regime's policies. They also know about the President's offer to meet with their
leadership, and they'd like to take him up on that offer to see what the United States has to offer. So I think doing - saying we can't
do something because a rogue regime will blame foreigners, I don't think is a very effective policy for us.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE: Yeah and I would add - I mean, as also -- as [Senior Administration Official
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Senior Administration Officials Previewing Iran Sanctions
Two] also mentioned, look, the Iranian people have been protesting for some time. They were protesting well before the President's
decision and they were very specifically protesting about the corruption in their government, the misuse of funds which have not
gone to the Iranian people. It's gone to fund regional proxies, it's gone of course to fund terrorism and terrorist groups. That's what
they've been protesting about for quite some time, and the extraordinary thing about these protests is that these people, the Iranian
people, have -- understand that when they protest in Iran, unfortunately they do so at the risk to their own lives. They're thrown in
prison and all kinds of terrible things happen to them when they are thrown in prison, as our sanctions actions have likewise
exposed in recent months. But they are so fed up with their government, that they have made the decision that they have to protest
against the Iranian regime's ongoing economic and other policies.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: And I do think it's particularly meaningful that they're protesting against the
expenditures in Syria, the expenditures in Gaza very specifically. And so that's what they're blaming.
MODERATOR: All right, we'll go on to the next question now.
OPERATOR: And our next question is from Carol Morello with Washington Post. Please go ahead.
QUESTION: Hi. Are you or are you not calling for the Iranian people to do something to bring about regime change in Iran?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Well, I'll defer to [Senior Administration Official Two], but I mean our stated policy
has not been regime change, it has been to modify the Iranian regime's behavior in the ways that I outlined in my opening remarks.
SENIOR STATE DEPARMTENT OFFICAL TWO: Yeah, Carol, I would add to that: We have been -- what we're noticing is that so
many of the things that the protesters are demanding are very similar to the things that the United States and other nations in the
world are demanding. And we have been consistent saying that if Iran will start behaving like a normal country, there are a number
of benefits that will follow from that. But for as long as Iran continues to export revolution around the Middle East and to destabilize
the region and to rob its people to fund these foreign -- to fund all the Shia militias and fund Assad and to fund other dictators in the
region. For as long as that's going on, I think you're going to see the Iranian people continually frustrated, and we support their
claims. We think that they have valid complaints against the regime, that many of them are our complaints. And so we would like to
see a change in the regime's behavior, and I think the Iranian people are looking for the same thing.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll go on to the next question.
OPERATOR: Thank you. And our next question is from Eli Lake with Bloomberg. Please, go ahead.
QUESTION: Hi. Thanks so much for doing this. Are you going to sanction the entire IRIB, their broadcasting arm?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: The IRIB is already sanctioned, and I have no comment beyond that.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll go to the next question now, please.
OPERATOR: Next question is from Meghan Gordon with S&P Global Platts. Please, go ahead.
QUESTION: Yeah, hi. Thanks for taking questions. You've said that you're not granting any broad waivers to the oil sanctions that
snap back in November. Have you approved any request allowing limited trades or specific deals to continue after that point, and
have you made a decision on Japan's request to continue importing Iranian oil?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: [Senior Administration Official Two], do you want to take that question?
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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO: Well, we don't -- we don't disclose private deliberations with other governments
over these things. As we've said, we - our goal is to get the import of Iranian oil to zero. We are not looking to grant exemptions or
waivers, but we do and are glad to discuss requests and look at requests on a case-by-case basis. But beyond that, we don't
comment on it.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll go on to the next question.
OPERATOR: And our next question is from Andrea Mitchell with NBC, MSNBC. Please, go ahead.
QUESTION: Hi there. I'm trying to understand -- to better understand the disconnect between the President's wanting to meet with
Rouhani any time, any place, and these sanctions. How does that -- do you think that the pressure could lead to a meeting or
should lead to a meeting? What would -- what would be the purpose of a meeting given all your objections to this regime and your
- the comments today certainly seem to be encouraging the people of Iran to rise up against their leaders. Isn't that really what
you're doing here?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Well, Andrea, I think --I mean, this is completely consistent with what the
President has done with other meetings with what you might refer to as less friendly regimes from North Korea to Russia, which is
not to give a lot of sanction -- any sanctions relief in advance of a meeting to make very clear that the United States will keep the
maximum pressure on these regimes until our goals are achieved. And in standing with the Iranian people, I think we're just -we're
just standing up for basic human rights, human dignity, and for the economic opportunity they deserve.
MODERATOR: We'll go on to the next question.
OPERATOR: And that's from Nick Schifrin with PBS News. Please, go ahead.
QUESTION: Hi, everyone. Thanks for taking this. [Senior Administration Official One], you said that the President will meet with
the Iranian leadership at any time to discuss a comprehensive deal. Just trying to understand -- trying to confirm that there are no
preconditions at all for that meeting given what Secretary of State Pompeo said that -- or suggested that the Iranian regime would
have to make some concessions or changes before that. And either to you or to [Senior Administration Official Two] perhaps, do
you believe or are you expecting the Iranian economy to collapse under the weights of these sanctions and the ones that will be -
that will come back in a few months? Thanks.
SENOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Well, I actually didn't say it. The President said that he'd meet. I just repeated what
he said. And I think I would defer to [Senior Administration Official Two] on the Secretary of State's comments, but what he was
saying there is he is not going to give up anything in advance of the meeting, that there are no preconditions. And so I think that's
really -- really the point.
QUESTION: Just a few -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Oh, and in terms of economic collapse, I'll hand that over to [Senior Administration
Official Three]. Do we expect the Iranian economy to collapse?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE: Look, I mean, I'm not going to make any predictions about what's going to
happen to the Iranian economy other than to say that we are very intent on using these finance -- these financial sanctions to great
economic leverage. And -- look, again, the Iranian economy was already on a downward spiral before the President made his
decision, and that's as a result of the policies that the Iranians have espoused for quite some time. But there's no question that
these financial sanctions are going to continue to bring significant financial pressure against the world's largest state sponsor of
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terror.
MODERATOR: All right, we'll go on to the last question now.
OPERATOR: And we'll go to Bahman Kalbasi with BBC News. Please go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you for taking this question. Are you saying that U.S. Government will have no responsibility in the misery they
will bring these sanctions on ordinary Iranians? Because you do talk about human rights and human dignity, and among these
sanctions are the fact that Iran will not be getting, for instance, commercial airlines -- new planes for its commercial airline. So - so
far we have had thousands of the Iranians dying in airline accidents throughout the years, and this sanction will make it impossible
for them to buy new ones. Is there not a responsibility here for U.S. Government to look out for the people that it says it wants to
support to lessen their misery, while in reality it is actually increasing it?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Absolutely not. I think the blame for the situation is perfectly clear. It lies with the
Iranian regime that has systematically destroyed that beautiful country over the last four decades.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah this is [Senior Administration Official Two]. In terms of- I'll let [Senior
Administration Official Three] speak to --a little bit more the commercial aviation. The problem is that Iran does not use its
commercial aviation for commercial purposes. It uses its commercial aviation to carry people and weapons into the gray zone to
help advance the goals of the Shia militias and proxies operating around the region. And so, the burden of responsibility is on Iran
to use its commercial aviation for commercial aviation purposes.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE: Yeah I would just echo what [Senior State Administration Two] just said. Look,
what we know is that Iran systematically uses its aviation sector, including Mahan Air and a number of other airlines that we have
designated to continue to further its malign activity. I mean, you see these airlines like Mahan traveling back and forth repeatedly to
places like Syria to support the Assad regime and the brutal activities that it's undertaken. So really the pressure is on the regime to
stop engaging in this systematic malign behavior that's destabilizing the region, that's victimizing its own people and that's posing a
threat to some of our closest allies and partners.
MODERATOR: All right, well that will conclude our call this morning. I thank everyone for taking part, for the calling in and to our
speakers for taking the time. Just to remind everyone that we -- that this is on background to a senior administration official. The
contents of the call are -- will remain under embargo until 10:30 this morning, eastern time. Thank you everyone; have an enjoyable
day.
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Senior Administration Officials Previewing Iran Sanctions
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Annex 37
U.S. President, “Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States
Sanctions with Respect to Iran”, 6 August 2018
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mMfm
STATEMENTS & RELEASES
Statement from the President on the
Reimposition of United States Sanctions
with Respect to Iran
- FOREIGN POLICY
Issued on: August 6, 2018
* * *
Today, the United States is taking action to reimpose nuclear-related
sanctions with respect to Iran that were lifted in connection with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 (the "JCPOA"). These actions
include reimposing sanctions on Iran's automotive sector and on its trade in
gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions related to the Iranian rial.
These measures will take effect on August 7, 2018.
All remaining United States nuclear-related sanctions will resume effective
November 5, 2018. These include sanctions targeting Iran's energy sector,
including petroleum-related transactions, as well as transactions by foreign
financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran.
The United States is fully committed to enforcing all of our sanctions, and we
will work closely with nations conducting business with Iran to ensure
complete compliance. Individuals or entities that fail to wind down activities
with Iran risk severe consequences.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-rei…
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I am pleased that many international firms have already announced their
intent to leave the Iranian market, and several countries have indicated that
they will reduce or end imports of Iranian crude oil. We urge all nations to
take such steps to make clear that the Iranian regime faces a choice: either
change its threatening, destabilizing behavior and reintegrate with the global
economy, or continue down a path of economic isolation.
My actions today- including my signing of an Executive Order entitled
"Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran" - are consistent with
National Security Presidential Memorandum-11 of May 8, 2018, announcing
the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA.
The JCPOA, a horrible, one-sided deal, failed to achieve the fundamental
objective of blocking all paths to an Iranian nuclear bomb, and it threw a
lifeline of cash to a murderous dictatorship that has continued to spread
bloodshed, violence, and chaos.
Since the deal was reached, Iran's aggression has only increased. The regime
has used the windfall of newly accessible funds it received under the JCPOA
to build nuclear-capable missiles, fund terrorism, and fuel conflict across the
Middle East and beyond.
To this day, Iran threatens the United States and our allies, undermines the
international financial system, and supports terrorism and militant proxies
around the world.
By exiting the JCPOA, the United States is able to protect its national security
by applying maximum economic pressure on the Iranian regime. To date, my
Administration has issued 17 rounds of Iran-related sanctions, designating
145 companies and individuals. Since my announcement on May 8
withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA, my Administration has
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-rei…
- 224 -
sanctioned 38 Iran-related targets in six separate actions. Reimposition of
nuclear-related sanctions through today's actions further intensifies pressure
on Tehran to change its conduct.
As we continue applying maximum economic pressure on the Iranian regime,
I remain open to reaching a more comprehensive deal that addresses the full
range of the regime's malign activities, including its ballistic missile program
and its support for terrorism. The United States welcomes the partnership of
likeminded nations in these efforts.
The United States continues to stand with the long-suffering Iranian people,
who are the rightful heirs to Iran's rich heritage and the real victims of the
regime's policies. We look forward to the day when the people of Iran, and all
people across the region, can prosper together in safety and peace.
President Donald J. Trump signs an Executive Order in Bedminster, New
Jersey, entitled "Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran." (Official
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-rei…
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White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-rei…
- 226 -
Annex 38
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the
Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018 National Security
Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA)”, 8 May 2018, updated on 6 August 2018
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
This document is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. Please see particularly
the legally binding provisions cited below governing the sanctions. This document does not
supplement or modify the statutory authorities, Executive orders, or regulations.
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the
Ma 8, 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
1. GENERAL QUESTIONS
1.1. Effective May 8, 2018, what sanctions snap back into place?
On May 8, 2018, the President announced his decision to cease the United States'
participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and to begin re
imposing, following a wind-down period, the U.S. nuclear-related sanctions that were
lifted to effectuate the JCPOA sanctions relief In conjunction with this announcement,
the President issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) directing the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare immediately for the re
imposition of all of the U.S. sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA, to
be accomplished as expeditiously as possible and in no case later than 180 days from the
date of the NSPM.
To implement the President's direction, the Departments of State and of the Treasury will
take steps necessary to establish a 90-day and a 180-day wind-down period for activities
involving Iran that were consistent with the U.S. sanctions relief provided for under the
JCPOA. FAQs 1.2. and 1.3. below set out in further detail which sanctions will be re
imposed in which time frame.
Pursuant to the NSPM, the State Department revoked certain statutory waivers issued to
implement the JCPOA sanctions relief, issued the necessary statutory sanctions waivers
to provide for a wind-down period, and plans to take appropriate action to keep such
waivers in place for the duration of the relevant wind-down periods. Following
November 4, 2018, OFAC expects that all the U.S. nuclear-related sanctions that had
been lifted under the JCPOA will be re-imposed and in full effect.
Persons engaging in activity undertaken pursuant to the U.S. sanctions relief provided for
in the JCPOA should take the steps necessary to wind down those activities by either
August 6, 2018, or November 4, 2018, as applicable, to avoid exposure to sanctions or an
enforcement action under U.S. law. [05-08-2018]
1.2. Which sanctions will be re-imposed after the 90-day wind-down period ending
on August 6, 2018?
After the 90-day wind down period ends on August 6, 2018, the U.S. government will re
impose the following sanctions that were lifted pursuant to the JCPOA, including
sanctions on associated services related to the activities below:
1. Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the
Government of Iran;
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Last Updated on August 6, 2018
11. Sanctions on Iran's trade in gold or precious metals;
iii. Sanctions on the direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of
graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
software for integrating industrial processes;
iv. Sanctions on significant transactions related to the purchase or sale oflranian
rials, or the maintenance of significant funds or accounts outside the territory of
Iran denominated in the Iranian rial;
v. Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of
Iranian sovereign debt; and
vi. Sanctions on Iran's automotive sector.
In addition, following the 90-day wind-down period that ends on August 6, 2018, the
U.S. government will revoke the following JCPOA-related authorizations under U.S.
primary sanctions regarding Iran:
1. The importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs
and certain related financial transactions pursuant to general licenses under the
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F .R. part 560 (ITSR);
11. Activities undertaken pursuant to specific licenses issued in connection with the
Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to
Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (JCPOA
SLP); and
111. Activities undertaken pursuant to General License I relating to contingent
contracts for activities eligible for authorization under the JCPOA SLP.
Persons engaging in the activities listed above undertaken pursuant to the U.S. sanctions
relief provided for in the JCPOA should take the steps necessary to wind down those
activities by August 6, 2018, to avoid exposure to sanctions or an enforcement action
under U.S. law. (See FAQ 2.1. below for a description of activities that would not be
prohibited or sanctionable during the wind-down period). [05-08-2018]
1.3. Which sanctions will be re-imposed after the 180-day wind-down period ending
on November 4, 2018?
Following the 180-day wind-down period ending on November 4, 2018, the U.S.
government will re-impose the following sanctions that were lifted pursuant to the
JCPOA, including sanctions on associated services related to the activities below:
1. Sanctions on Iran's port operators, and shipping and shipbuilding sectors,
including on the Islamic Republic oflran Shipping Lines (IRISL), South Shipping
Line Iran, or their affiliates;
11. Sanctions on petroleum-related transactions with, among others, the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National
Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum
products, or petrochemical products from Iran;
2
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
111. Sanctions on transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank
of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions under Section 1245 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (ND AA);
iv. Sanctions on the provision of specialized financial messaging services to the
Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions described in Section
I 04(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive lran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 20 I 0
(CISADA),
v. Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
and
vi. Sanctions on Iran's energy sector.
In addition, effective November 5, 2018, the U.S. government will revoke the
authorization for U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to wind down certain
activities with the Government of Iran or persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
Government oflran that were previously authorized pursuant to General License H. (See
FAQ 4.4. below)
Furthermore, no later than November 5, 2018, the U.S. government will re-impose, as
appropriate, the sanctions that applied to persons removed from the List of Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SON List) and/or other lists maintained by
the US. government on January 16, 2016.
Persons engaging in the activity listed above undertaken pursuant to the U.S. sanctions
relief provided for in the JCPOA should take the steps necessary to wind down those
activities by November 4, 2018, to avoid exposure to sanctions or an enforcement action
under U.S. law. (See FAQ 2.1. below for a description of activities that would not be
prohibited or sanctionable during the wind-down period.) [05-08-2018]
1.4. Are the sanctions lifted via Executive Order 13716 reinstated as of August 7,
2018?
Executive Order of August 6, 2018, "Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to
Iran" (the"New Iran E.O.") reimposes relevant provisions ofE.O.s 13574, 13590, 13622,
and I 3645 that were revoked by E.O. 13716 at the end of the applicable wind-down
period (i.e., on or after August 7, 2018, or on or after November 5, 2018, depending on
the activity involved). In addition, to provide clarity and consolidate relevant authorities
into a single document, the New Iran E.O. revokes E.O.s 13716 and I 3628 and continues
in effect certain sanctions authorities provided for in those E.O.s. [08-06-2018]
1.5. Do the FAQs and Guidance posted on OFAC's website relating to the JCPOA
sanctions relief remain in effect?
As noted above, the President has directed the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury to
re-impose U.S. sanctions that were lifted or waived to effectuate the JCPOA sanctions
relief as set out in sections II, Ill, IV, and V of the Guidance Document at the end of the
3
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
applicable wind-down period. Furthermore, although the sanctions waivers described in
section VI of the Guidance Document are no longer in place, they have been replaced
with waivers that will allow for the orderly wind-down of activities as specified above.
Persons engaging in activity undertaken pursuant to the U.S. sanctions relief provided for
in the JCPOA should take the steps necessary to wind down their activities between May
8, 20 I 8 and August 6, 20 I 8, or between May 8, 20 I 8 and November 4, 2018, as
applicable, to avoid exposure to sanctions or an enforcement action under U.S. law. The
JCPOA Guidance and JCPOA FAQs issued on January 16, 2016, as amended, remain
available on OFAC's website only to assist persons in determining which activities were
not sanctionable or prohibited between January 16, 2016 and May 8, 2018, and to
determine how best to wind down such activity. To the extent there are inconsistencies
between the JCPOA FAQs, including guidance on wind-down, and other guidance
provided by the Department of State or the Department of the Treasury on or after May 8,
2018, the later-issued guidance should be treated as governing [05-08-2018]
2. WIND-DOWN
2.1. How long is the wind-down period and what types of activities are allowed?
The U.S. government has a past practice of working with U.S. or third-country
companies to minimize the impact of sanctions on the legitimate activities of those
parties undertaken prior to the imposition of sanctions.
To implement the May 8, 2018 NSPM, the Departments of State and of the Treasury will
establish a 90-day and a 180-day wind-down period, as applicable, for activities
involving Cran that were consistent with the U.S. sanctions lifting under the JCPOA. (See
FAQs 1.2. and L3. above for a list of activities subject to the 90- day or 180-day wind
down period.)
Consistent with this guidance from the President, the Department of State has revoked
certain statutory waivers issued to implement the JCPOA sanctions relief, issued the
necessary sanctions waivers to provide for an appropriate wind-down period, and plans to
take appropriate action to keep such waivers in place for the duration of the relevant
wind-down period, i.e., until August 6, 2018, or November 4, 2018, depending on the
activity. Non-U.S., non-Iranian persons are advised to use these time periods to wind
down their activities with or involving Iran that will become sanctionable at the end of
the applicable wind-down period.
In the event that a non-U.S, non-Iranian person is owed payment after the conclusion of
the wind-down period on August 6, 2018, or November 4, 2018, as applicable, for goods
or services fully provided or delivered to an Iranian counterparty prior to August 6, 2018,
or November 4, 2018, as applicable, pursuant to a written contract or written agreement
entered into prior to May 8, 2018, and such activities were consistent with U.S. sanctions
in effect at the time of delivery or provision, the U.S. government would allow the non
U.S., non-Iranian person to receive payment for those goods or services according to the
terms of the written contract or written agreement. Similarly, if a non-U.S., non-Iranian
4
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
person is owed repayment after August 6, 2018, or November 4, 2018, as applicable, for
loans or credits extended to an Iranian counterparty prior to the end of the 90-day or 180-
day wind-down period, as applicable, provided that such loans or credits were extended
pursuant to a written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018, and
such activities were consistent with U.S. sanctions in effect at the time the loans or
credits were extended, the U.S. government would allow the non-U.S., non-Iranian
person to receive repayment of the related debt or obligation according to the terms of the
written contract or written agreement. This allowance is designed for non-U.S., non
Iranian parties to be made whole for debts and obligations owed or due to them for goods
or services fully provided or delivered or loans or credit extended to an Iranian party
prior to the end of the 90-day or 180-day wind-down period, as applicable. Any
payments would need to be consistent with U.S. sanctions, including that payments could
not involve U.S. persons or the U.S. financial system, unless the transactions are exempt
from regulation or authorized by OF AC.
Consistent with the conditions described above, OFAC will take steps to allow U.S.
persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities until August 6, 2018, or
November 4, 2018, as applicable, to wind down operations in or business involving Iran
conducted pursuant to an OF AC authorization, and to receive payments according to the
terms of the written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018, for
goods or services fully provided or delivered pursuant to an OF AC authorization. As
soon as administratively feasible, OF AC intends, via Federal Register publication, to
replace General License H, General License I, and the general licenses set forth at 31
C.F.R. §§ 560.534 and 560.535 (relating to trade in Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs)
with more narrowly scoped authorizations to allow U.S. persons and, as appropriate,
U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities, to engage in all transactions ordinarily
incident and necessary to wind down activities that were previously authorized pursuant
to General License H, General License I, or the general licenses set forth at 31 C.F.R.
§§ 560.534 and 560.535 and to receive payments according to the terms of the written
contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018, for goods or services
fully provided or delivered pursuant to an OF AC authorization.
The provision or delivery of additional goods or services and/or the extension of
additional loans or credits to an Iranian counterparty after August 6, 2018, or November
4, 2018, as applicable, including pursuant to written contracts or written agreements
entered into prior to May 8, 2018, may result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions unless
such activities are exempt from regulation, authorized by OFAC, or otherwise not
sanctionable.
The U.S. government would evaluate matters falling outside the above parameters on a
case-by-case basis.
See FAQs 1.2. and 1.3. above for a list of activities subject to the 90-day or 180-day
wind-down period. [05-08-2018]
5
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2.2. Can I engage in new activity involving Iran if the activity will not extend
beyond the end of the relevant wind-down period?
At the end of the wind-down periods, the State Department does not expect to issue
further broad waivers of relevant statutory authorities, and OF AC plans to revoke the
general and specific licenses issued in connection with the sanctions relief provided under
the JCPOA that may remain in effect as of that time. (See FAQs 4.1.-4.5. for more
details on the wind-down approach for general and specific licenses.) Prior to August 6,
2018, or November 4, 2018, as applicable, persons engaging in activity consistent with
the U.S. sanctions relief specified in the JCPOA should take the steps necessary to wind
down operations by that date to avoid exposure to sanctions or an enforcement action
when the applicable wind-down period ends. When considering a potential enforcement
or sanctions action with respect to activities engaged in after August 6, 2018, or
November 4, 2018, as applicable, OFAC will evaluate efforts and steps taken to wind
down activities and will assess whether any new business was entered into involving Iran
during the applicable wind-down period. [05-08-2018]
2.3 U oder what circumstances are goods or services considered "fully provided or
delivered" prior to the expiration of the relevant wind-down period, as
referenced in FAQ 2.1 above?
OF AC looks to the industry standard to determine whether particular goods or services
are considered fully provided or delivered prior to the expiration of the relevant wind
down period. As a general matter, goods or services will be considered fully provided or
delivered when the party providing or delivering the goods or services has performed all
the actions and satisfied all the obligations necessary to be eligible for payment or other
agreed-to compensation. With respect to goods exported to or from Iran, at a minimum,
title to the goods must have transferred to the relevant party. [08-06-2018]
2.4 Can I, as a non-U.S., non-Iranian person, receive payments after the relevant
wind-down period ends for goods or services that were fully provided or
delivered during the relevant wind-down period pursuant to contracts entered
into prior to May 8, 2018?
Yes, subject to the conditions set out below and in FAQ 2.1 above, non-U.S., non-Iranian
persons may receive payment after the end of the relevant wind-down period for goods or
services fully provided or delivered to an Iranian counterparty prior to expiration of the
relevant wind-down period (see FAQ 2.3 above). In particular, the goods or services
must have been fully provided or delivered prior to the end of the applicable wind-down
period pursuant to a written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8,
2018; the relevant activities must have been consistent with U.S. sanctions in effect at the
time of delivery or provision, including that the activities did not involve persons on the
SDN List at the time of the transaction; and any payments must be consistent with U.S.
sanctions, including that payments can not involve U.S. persons or the U.S. financial
6
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
system, unless the transactions are exempt from regulation or authorized by OF AC. [08-
06-2018]
2.5 Can I, as a U.S. person or U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity, receive
payments after the relevant wind-down period ends for goods or services that were
fully provided or delivered during the relevant wind-down period under an OFAC
wind-down authorization and pursuant to a contract entered into prior to May 8,
2018?
The wind-down authorizations allow U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign
entities to receive payments for activities conducted pursuant to such wind-down
authorizations only during their validity periods. For example, a U.S.-owned Or
controlled foreign entity may receive payment through 11 :59 p.m. eastern standard time
on November 4, 2018 for Iran-related activities undertaken pursuant to section 560.537 of
the ITSR (winding down of transactions relating to U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign
entities).
Any payment following the end of the relevant wind-down period for activities
undertaken pursuant to a wind-down authorization, including from an Iranian
counterparty, would require specific authorization from OF AC. OF AC will evaluate
such requests for specific licenses on a case-by-case basis.
Any request for a specific license should provide sufficient details for OF AC to evaluate
the application, including: whether the relevant transactions complied with U.S.
sanctions as in effect at the time of the transactions; whether the activities were
performed under a written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8,
2018; and why the applicant was unable to receive the payment for which authorization is
sought prior to the end of the relevant wind-down period. OFAC will generally deny
requests to receive payment for activities that were not authorized under the relevant
wind-down authorizations or that were not undertaken pursuant to a written contract or
written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018. [08-06-2018]
7
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
2.6 Can I enter into a new contract or engage in new business activity during the
relevant wind-down period that is in furtherance of a contract entered into prior to
May 8 and is ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of Iran-related
business? For example, is it sanctionable if a new purchase order is entered into
during the wind-down period if such business is contemplated under a Master
Services Agreement entered into prior to May 8?
Provided that the new contract or business is in furtherance of, a written contract or
written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018, and is necessary and ordinarily
incident to the wind down of activities under the pre-May 8, 2018 written contract or
written agreement, generally, OFAC would not consider entering into such new contracts
during the relevant wind-down period to be sanctionable as new business. OFAC will
evaluate matters falling outside these parameters on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the activity is sanctionable or violates OF AC regulations. [08-06-2018)
2.7
Is it sanctionable for non-U.S., non-Iranian persons to engage in transactions
related to the provision of humanitarian and consumer goods to J ran?
The U.S. maintains broad authorizations and exceptions under U.S. sanctions that allow
for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices to Iran by
U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons. Broadly speaking, transactions for the sale of
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran are not sanctionable
unless they involve certain persons on the SDN List, including designated Iranian
financial institutions or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or otherwise
sanctionable conduct. Additional guidance relating to these authorizations and
exceptions can be found on the OFAC website here [hyperlink to
https//wwwtreasury gov /resource-
center/sanction s/Programs'Documents/iran guidance med pdf] and here [hyperlink to
https [lwww_treasury gov /resource-
center/sancti on s/Programs/Docum ents/hum exp iran pdf]
Transactions by non-U.S. persons related to the export to Iran of consumer goods that do
not fall within these exceptions, but are not expressly targeted by U.S. sanctions should
not involve persons on the SDN List, including designated Iranian financial institutions
or the IRGC. In addition, such transactions should not involve U.S. persons or transit the
U.S. financial system, unless the activities and/or transactions are exempt from regulation
or authorized by OFAC. [08-06-2018]
8
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
3. SANCTIONS LISTINGS
3.1. Will the persons that were placed on the List of Persons Identified as Blocked
Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599 (E.O. 13599 List) on JCPOA
Implementation Day (January 16, 2016) be put back on the SON List?
No later than November 5, 2018, OFAC expects to move persons identified as meeting
the definition of the terms "Government of Iran" or "lranian financial institution" from
the List of Persons Blocked Solely Pursuant to E.O. 13599 (the "E.O. 13599 List") to the
SON List. OFAC will not add these persons to the SON List on May 8, 2018, to allow
for the orderly wind down by non-U.S., non-Iranian persons of activities that had been
undertaken prior to May 8, 2018, consistent with the U.S. sanctions relief provided for
under the JCPOA involving persons on the E.O. 13599 List. The Government oflran and
Iranian financial institutions remain persons whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR, and U.S. persons
continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealing with the
Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions. Beginning on November 5, 2018,
activities with most persons moved from the E.O. 13599 List to the SON List will be
subject to secondary sanctions. Such persons will have a notation of"Additional
Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions" in their SDN List entry.
The United States has and continues to enforce multiple authorities that target a range of
Iranian malign activity outside of Iran's nuclear program, including Iran's support for
terrorism, ballistic missile program, human rights abuses, and destabilizing activity in the
region. Treasury will continue to target aggressively anyone who engages in such
sanctionable activity, regardless of whether the individual or entity was removed from the
SDN List on Implementation Day. [05-08-2018]
3.2. As of May 8, 2018, do secondary sanctions attach to the persons that were
removed from the SON List and/or other OFAC sanctions lists on
Implementation Day?
No. However, no later than November 5, 2018, OFAC will re-impose, as appropriate, the
sanctions that applied to persons removed from the SDN List and/or other lists
maintained by OFAC on January 16, 2016. Depending on the authority or authorities
pursuant to which these actions to re-list are taken, there may be secondary sanctions
exposure for parties that engage in certain activities with these persons after their re
listing. Persons subject to secondary sanctions will have a notation of " Additional
Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions" in their SDN List entry.
Transactions conducted during the wind-down periods involving persons removed from
the SDN List on January 16, 2016 could be sanctionable to the extent they are outside the
scope of the wind-down waivers issued by the State Department or involve persons on
the SDN List or conduct described in JCPOA FAQ A.3.ii-iii. OFAC recommends that a
person conducting activities in Iran or with Iranian persons during the wind-down periods
exercise due diligence sufficient to ensure that it is not knowingly engaging in
9
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
transactions with persons on the SDN List or in activities that would be sanctionable
under authorities targeting Iran's malign activities.
The United States has and continues to enforce multiple authorities that target a range of
Iranian malign activity outside of Iran's nuclear program, including Iran's support for
terrorism, ballistic missile program, human rights abuses, and destabilizing activity in the
region. Treasury will continue to target aggressively anyone who engages in such
sanctionable activity, regardless of whether the individual or entity was removed from the
SDN List on Implementation Day. [05-08-2018]
4. LICENSING
4.1. Will OFAC continue to consider license applications under the Statement of
Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of
Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (JCPOA SLP)?
No. Following the issuance of the May 8, 2018 NSPM, OFAC rescinded the JCPOA
SLP and will no longer evaluate applications under the JCPOA SLP. OFAC will still
consider applications, however, under the safety of flight statement of licensing policy
found in 31 C.F.R. § 560.528. [05-08-2018]
4.2. Does OFAC anticipate revoking specific licenses issued under the JCPOA
SLP?
Yes. To the extent they have not yet expired, OFAC expects to revoke the specific
licenses issued pursuant to the JCPOA SLP and issue authorizations to provide for a
wind-down period that will end on August 6, 2018. License applications that were
submitted to OFAC pursuant to the JCPOA SLP but for which no license has been issued
will be returned without action. Applicants may resubmit their applications for
consideration under the safety of flight statement oflicensing policy found in 31 C.F.R.
$ 560.528. [05-08-2018]
4.3. Is General License I(GLI still in effect?
Following the issuance of the May 8, 2018 NSPM, OF AC removed from its website, and
will no longer evaluate applications under, the JCPOA SLP. At that time, OFAC
announced its intention to revoke, as soon as is administratively feasible, GL I, which
authorized U.S. persons to enter into, and to engage in transactions that are ordinarily
incident to the negotiation of and entry into, contingent contracts for activities eligible for
authorization under the JCPOA SLP. OFAC also announced its intention to publish in
the Federal Register a revised authorization for the wind-down of activities authorized
pursuant to GL I. The wind-down of those activities authorized pursuant to GL I must be
completed by August 6, 20 I 8.
OFAC has revoked GL I and issued a wind-down general license that authorizes, through
August 6, 2018, the wind down of activities involving Iran that were previously
IO
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
authorized pursuant to GL I. This wind-down general license will appear at 31 CE.R.
$ 560.536. [05-08-2018; updated on 06-27-20 I8]
4.4. Is General License H (GL H) still in effect during the wind-down period?
Following the issuance of the May 8, 2018 NSPM, OFAC announced its intention to
revoke GL H, which authorized U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to engage in
certain activities involving Iran, as soon as is administratively feasible. OFAC also
announced its intention to issue a revised authorization for the wind down of activities
involving Iran authorized pursuant to GL H. The wind-down of those activities
authorized pursuant to GL H must be completed by November 4, 2018. Any activities by
U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities that continue after the wind-down period
concludes on November 4, 2018, in violation of the ITSR may be subject to enforcement
actions by OFAC. In considering what potential enforcement or sanctions actions to take
with respectto activities engaged in after November 4, 2018, OFAC will take into
account the efforts to wind down activities involving Iran prior to that date.
OFAC has revoked GL Hand issued a wind-down general license that authorizes,
through November 4, 2018, the wind down of activities involving Iran that were
previously authorized pursuant to GL H. This wind-down general license will appear at
3 I C.F.R § 560.537. (05-08-2018; updated on 06-27-2018]
4.5. Can I continue to import Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs after May 8,
2018?
Following the issuance of the May 8, 2018 NSPM, OF AC announced its intention to
amend the general licenses at 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.534 (authorizing the importation into the
United States of, and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs) and
560.535 (authorizing certain related letters of credit and brokering services) as soon as is
administratively feasible in order to narrow the scope of those general licenses to
authorize the wind-down of activities by August 6, 2018, that were undertaken consistent
with the sanctions relief provided for in the JCPOA. Any activities by U.S. persons or
U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities that continue after the wind-down period
concludes on August 6, 2018, in violation of the ITSR may be subject to enforcement
actions by OFAC. In considering what potential enforcement or sanctions actions to take
with respect to activities engaged in after August 6, 2018, OFAC will take into account
the efforts to wind-down activities involving Iran prior to that date.
OFAC has amended the ITSR to narrow the scope of the general licenses at 31 C.F.R.
§§ 560.534 and 560.535 to authorize the wind down, through August 6, 2018, of
activities that were previously authorized under those general licenses. [05-08-2018
updated on 06-27-2018]
11
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Issued on May 8, 2018
Last Updated on August 6, 2018
5. OTHER
5.1. Will the United States resume efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales?
Yes. The sanctions lifted under section 1245(d) of the NDAA will be re-imposed
following a 180-day wind-down period, and the United States will again pursue efforts to
reduce Iran's sales of crude oil under the NDAA during and following that period. For
more information about NDAA sanctions, see Topic NDAA (Section 1245 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012) [05-08-2018]
5.2. How and when will significant reduction exceptions be determined?
The State Department will evaluate and make determinations with respect to significant
reduction exceptions provided for in section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the NDAA at the end of the
180-day wind-down period. Countries seeking such exceptions are advised to reduce
their volume of crude oil purchases from Iran during this wind-down period. Consistent
with past practice, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, would make
such determinations following a process of rigorous due diligence. For the initial set of
such determinations, the State Department intends to consider relevant evidence in
assessing each country's efforts to reduce the volume of crude oil imported from Iran
during the 180-day wind-down period, including the quantity and percentage of the
reduction in purchases of Iranian crude oil, the termination of contracts for future
delivery of Iranian crude oil, and other actions that demonstrate a commitment to
decrease substantially such purchases. The State Department expects to engage in
consultations with countries currently purchasing Iranian crude oil during the 180-day
wind-down period. [05-08-2018]
12
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Annex 39
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks to the Media”, 3 October 2018
- 241 -
- 242 -
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Remarks to the Media
Remarks
Michael R. Pompeo
Secretary of State
Press Briefing Room
Washington, DC
October 3, 2018
SECRETARY POMPEO: Good morning, everyone. I want to update you on three issues, four if you
want to count the -- my upcoming trip to Asia, including North Korea.
First, the situation in Iraq; the second, a statement about the ruling this morning from the International Court
of Justice; and finally, I want to talk about my effort to put America's diplomatic corps back on the field.
To the situation in Iraq, Iran is the origin of the current threat to Americans in Iraq. It is to blame for the
attacks against our mission in Basra and our embassy in Baghdad. Our intelligence in this regard is solid. We
can see the hand of the ayatollah and his henchmen supporting these attacks on the United States.
On Friday, I ordered the temporary relocation of U.S. Government personnel from our consulate general in
Basra. I also warned the Iranian Government that we will hold it directly responsible for any harm to
Americans or our diplomatic facilities, whether perpetrated by Iranian forces or by associated proxies or
elements of those militias.
These latest destabilizing acts in Iraq are attempts by the Iranian regime to push back on our efforts to
constrain its malign behavior. Clearly, they see our comprehensive pressure campaign as serious and
succeeding, and we must be prepared for them to continue their attempts to hit back, especially after our full
sanctions are re-imposed on the 4th of November.
The United States will continue to stand with the people of Iraq as they chart a future based on Iraqi interest,
not those dictated by Iran. Even with the temporary relocation of our staff, we are supporting the delivery of
clean water to the 750,000 residents in Basra.
Now let me turn to the ICJ ruling from today. I'm announcing that the United States is terminating the 1955
Treaty of Amity with Iran. This is a decision, frankly, that is 39 years overdue. In July, Iran brought a meritless
case in the International Court of Justice alleging violations of the Treaty of Amity. Iran seeks to challenge the
United States decision to cease participation in the Iran nuclear deal and to re-impose the sanctions that
were lifted as a part of that deal. Iran is attempting to interfere with the sovereign rights of the United States
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286417.htm
- 243 -
to take lawful actions necessary to protect our national security. And Iran is abusing the ICJ for political and
propaganda purposes and their case, as you can see from the decision, lacked merit.
Given Iran's history of terrorism, ballistic missile activity, and other malign behaviors, Iran's claims under the
treaty are absurd. The court's ruling today was a defeat for Iran. It rightly rejected all of Iran's baseless
requests. The court denied Iran's attempt to secure broad measures to interfere with U.S. sanctions and
rightly noted Iran's history of noncompliance with its international obligations under the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
With regard to the aspects of the court's order focusing on potential humanitarian issues, we have been
clear: Existing exceptions, authorizations, and licensing policies for humanitarian-related transactions and
safety of flight will remain in effect. The United States has been actively engaged on these issues without
regard to any proceeding before the ICJ. We're working closely with the Department of the Treasury to
ensure that certain humanitarian-related transactions involving Iran can and will continue.
That said, we're disappointed that the court failed to recognize it has no jurisdiction to issue any order
relating to these sanctions measures with the United States, which is doing its work on Iran to protect its own
essential security interests.
In light of how Iran has hypocritically and groundlessly abused the ICJ as a forum for attacking the United
States, I am therefore announcing today that the United States is terminating the Treaty of Amity with Iran. I
hope that Iran's leaders will come to recognize that the only way to secure a bright future for its country is by
ceasing their campaign of terror and destruction around the world.
The third item, putting the diplomatic team from the United States Department of State back on the field: I
want to talk about the fact that there are 65 nominees now sitting with the United States Senate. That's over
a quarter of all the senior-level confirmable positions that the United States Department of State is tasked
with using to achieve its diplomatic outcomes. And I want every single American to know that what Senator
Menendez and members of the Senate are doing to hold back American diplomacy rests squarely on their
shoulders.
Both Republicans and Democrats agree that a fully staffed State Department is critical to American national
security. Indeed, when I was before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Menendez told me,
quote, "The problem is we have an emaciated State Department under this administration," end of quote.
Well, we've now done our part to fix that. He now needs to do his, and the Senate needs to do its part.
These candidates are quality candidates. They are not sitting on the Senate floor because of objections with
respect to their quality, their professionalism, or their excellence and their ability to deliver American foreign
policy. Wave after wave of these extremely qualified nominees have been sent to the United States Senate.
Let me give a few examples: John Richmond. He's been stuck for 85 days while we try to make necessary
progress on combating human trafficking, a priority for this administration and a shared priority of Senator
Menendez. We have Kim Breier, the President's nominee to head up Western Hemisphere Affairs, stuck for
204 days while the crisis in Venezuela and Central America continues to rage. David Schenker, the
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286417.htm
- 244 -
President's nominee to lead the Bureau of Near East Affairs, is held up while the humanitarian crisis
continues and while Iran continues to undermine peace and stability throughout the Middle East.
Russia is seeking to prey on our elections, but Ellen McCarthy, a 30-year veteran of the Intelligence
Community and the President's choice to head the Bureau of Intelligence and Research sits on the Senate
floor.
As American forces are engaged against terrorists around the world, Clarke Cooper, an experienced military
professional designated to lead the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs waits for the Foreign Relations
Committee to act on his nomination.
You should know that as a former member, I completely appreciate the Senate's advice and consent role and
their duty to conduct oversight. And I understand their need to be fair and honest brokers. But that's not what
is being engaged in. We need these people. What's happening is unprecedented. We have members of the
United States Senate who -- for whom partisanship has now driven delay and obstruction of getting America's
diplomatic corps into every corner of the world.
It will impact our operations, our ability. We don't have a COO, the under secretary for management now
coming on two years with no one filling that position, and enormous, complex operations keeping our
diplomats safe around the world don't have a senior leader to manage those operations. There are real,
direct impacts of not having these people confirmed and I implore the United States Senate to take these
quality, talented people and allow them to do what it is they have agreed to do on behalf of the United States.
And with that, I'm happy to take a couple questions.
MS NAUERT: (Inaudible). We'll start with Lesley from Reuters.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, does the ruling of the World Court, does that have any
practical impact on what the U.S. is -- on U.S. sanctions, number one? And number two, what other -- what
assurances can you give that this will not impact any humanitarian aid? Because the Court actually said that
it was not enough, that the U.S. - that the U.S.'s assurances were not adequate.
SECRETARY POMPEO: The United States has been very clear: We will continue to make sure that we are
providing humanitarian assistance in a way that delivers for the people we have spoken very clearly about,
the Iranian people. We care deeply about them. We will make sure that we continue to afford the flexibility so
that that assistance can be needed.
Having said that, the choices that are being made inside of Iran today -to use money to foment terror around
the world, to launch ballistic missiles into airports throughout the Middle East, to arm proxy militias in Iraq and
in Syria and in Lebanon -- those are dollars that the Iranian leadership is squandering. They could be
providing humanitarian assistance to their own people but have chosen instead a different path, a path of
revolutionary effort around the world showing utter disregard for the humanitarian needs of their own people.
MS NAUERT: Nick Kalman from Fox.
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286417.htm
- 245 -
QUESTION: I wanted to ask about North Korea, Mr. Secretary. The North Koreans have a new commentary
saying the end-of-war declaration issue should've been resolved half a century ago in light of your trip
coming up. Will it be resolved this weekend? And if not, what would be the reasoning against offering this?
SECRETARY POMPEO: So I'm not going to comment on the progress of the negotiations on the end-of-war
declaration or any other items, only to say this: I'm very happy to be going back to get another chance to
continue to advance the commitment that Chairman Kim and President Trump made back in Singapore in the
second week of June. I'm optimistic that we'll come away from that with better understandings, deeper
progress, and a plan forward not only for the summit between the two leaders, but for us to continue the
efforts to build out a pathway for denuclearization.
MS NAUERT: Next question, Michel from Al Hurra.
QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Mr. Secretary, Russia has delivered today S-300 systems to Syria. You said in
the past that it's a serious escalation. Are you planning to take any measures in this regard? And my second
question on Iraq. Any comment on the election of Barham Salih as the president and the designation of Adel
Abdul Mahdi as the prime minister?
SECRETARY POMPEO: So I've had a chance to speak with the new speaker of the house and the new
president. I've not had a chance to speak with the new -- the president designee as of yet. I hope to do so.
And I am equally hopeful that they will follow through on the commitments that they made when we spoke.
These are people that we know pretty well. They've been around the Iraqi Government scene for some time,
and what we talked about was building out an Iraqi Government that was an Iraqi Government of national
unity that was interested in the welfare and future good fortunes for the Iraqi people, not controlled by the
Islamic Republic of Iran. It's something that was a shared set of objectives, and I'm very, very hopeful that we
can continue to work with the Iraqi people and the soon-to-be-completed, formed new Iraqi Government to
deliver against that.
Your first question was about the S-300. I'm certainly not going to comment on our intention on how we will
address that, but my comments before were true. Having the Russians deliver the S-300 into Syria presents
greater risk to all of those in the affected areas and to stability in the Middle East. We consider this a very
serious escalation.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MS NAUERT: Last question. Kylie from CBS News.
QUESTION: Hi, Secretary. Question. Can you explain to us a little bit the practical reality of the U.S.
terminating the amity with Iran, and just how we'll see that play out? And then secondly, just because we're
going to North Korea, is there any timeframe for what the U.S. wants to achieve given that last week we
heard President Trump say that they're not -- the U.S. is not playing a time game, but you said that you want
rapid denuclearization of North Korea completed by January 2021?
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286417.htm
- 246 -
SECRETARY POMPEO: Those are entirely consistent with each other. We want it fast, but we're not going
to play the time game. My comment about 2021 was not mine. I repeated it, but it was a comment that had
been made by the leaders who'd had their inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang. They'd talked about 2021
when they were gathered there, and so I was simply reiterating this as a timeline that they were potentially
prepared to agree to.
President Trump's comments are exactly right. This is a long-term problem. This has been outstanding for
decades. We've made more progress than has been made in an awfully long time. And importantly, we've
done so in a condition which continues to give us the opportunity to achieve the final goal, that is the
economic sanctions continue to remain in place, the core proposition; the thing which will give us the capacity
to deliver denuclearization isn't changing. If you heard the comments at the UN Security Council, complete
unanimity about the need for those to stay in place.
The Russians and the Chinese had some ideas about how we might begin to think about a time when it
would be appropriate to reduce them, but to a country, they were supportive of maintaining the UN Security
Council resolutions and the sanctions that underlay them. That is a-that is a global commitment that I'm not
sure there's many issues in the world you can find such unanimity. And so my efforts this week will be one
more step along the way towards achieving what the UN Security Council has directed the North Koreans to
do.
QUESTION: And the practical fallout from pulling out of the treaty?
SECRETARY POMPEO: We'll see what the practical fallout is. The Iranians have been ignoring it for an
awfully long time. We ought to have pulled out of it decades ago. Today marked a useful point with the
decision that was made this morning from the ICJ. This marked a useful point for us to demonstrate the
absolute absurdity of the Treaty of Amity between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
MS NAUERT: Thank you, everybody. We have to go now.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thanks, everyone.
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The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for
information from the U.S. State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or
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Note: documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) require Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher to view, down
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Annex 40
U.S. President, Presidential Determination No. 2019-04, 31 October 2018,
83 Fed. Reg. 57673
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- 250 -
Federal Register/ Vol. 83, No, 222/Friday, November 16, 2018/Presidential Documents
57673
Presidential Documents
Presidential Determination No. 2019--04 of October 31, 2018
Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 1245(d)(4)(B)
and (Cl of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012
Memorandum for the Secretary of Stale[,] the Secretary of the Treasury[,
and] the Secretary of Energy
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States, after carefully considering the reports submitted
to the Congress by the Energy Information Administration, including the
report submitted in August 2018, and other relevant factors such as global
economic conditions, increased oil production by certain countries, the global
level of spare petroleum production capacity, and the availability of strategic
reserves, I determine, pursuant to section 1245(d)(4)(B) and (C) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112--81, and
consistent with prior determinations, that there is a sufficient supply of
petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit
a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products
purchased from Tran by or through foreign financial institutions.
I will continue to monitor this situation closely.
The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to publish this determina
tion in the Federal Register.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 31, 2018
[FR DO. 2018--25157
Filed 11--15--18; 845 am]
Billing code 4710-10-
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Annex 41
U.S. President, “Statement by the President regarding the Reimposition of NuclearRelated
Sanctions
on
Iran”,
2
November
2018
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- 254 -
mMfm
STATEMENTS & RELEASES
Statement by the President Regarding
the Reimposition of Nuclear- Related
Sanctions on Iran
- FOREIGN POLICY
Issued on: November 2, 2018
* * *
In May, I announced that the United States would withdraw from the horrible,
one-sided Iran nuclear deal.
This agreement failed in its fundamental objective, which was to
permanently block all paths to an Iranian nuclear bomb, and it did nothing to
address the regime's malign actions across the Middle East and beyond.
Since the disastrous nuclear deal was reached, Iran's military budget has
grown by nearly 40 percent. The regime has poured billions of dollars into
regional conflicts, accelerated its missile development and proliferation, and
repeatedly lied about its nuclear ambitions.
On Monday, November 5, the termination of United States participation in
the Iran nuclear deal will be complete. The last set of sanctions lifted under
the terrible nuclear deal will come back into force, including powerful
sanctions on Iran's energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, and sanctions
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-reg…
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targeting transactions with the Central Bank of Iran and sanctioned Iranian
banks.
Our objective is to force the regime into a clear choice: either abandon its
destructive behavior or continue down the path toward economic disaster.
The sanctions will target revenues the Iranian regime uses to fund its nuclear
program and its development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, fuel
regional conflict, support terrorism, and enrich its leaders.
These measures, along with 19 rounds of sanctions designations since
January 2017, represent the toughest sanctions the United States has ever
levied against Iran-and they are already having devastating effect on the
Iranian economy.
Over the past year, the Iranian rial has lost about 70 percent of its value, and
Iran's economy is sliding into recession. Iran's inflation rate has nearly
quadrupled since May of this year, reaching almost 37 percent in October.
More than 100 companies have decided to cease doing business with Iran,
and we expect that number to grow. Governments and businesses should
ask themselves whether continuing to deal with Iran is worth the risk.
Finally, I want to be clear that United States actions are aimed at the regime
and its threatening behavior-not at the long-suffering Iranian people. For
this reason, we reiterate today that the sale of food, medicine, medical
devices, and agricultural commodities to Iran has long been, and remains,
exempt from the sanctions.
We call on the regime to abandon its nuclear ambitions, change its
destructive behavior, respect the rights of its people, and return in good faith
to the negotiating table. We seek cooperation from our allies and partners in
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this effort.
The United States remains open to reaching a new, more comprehensive deal
with Iran that forever blocks its path to a nuclear weapon, addresses the
entire range of its malign actions, and is worthy of the Iranian people.
Until then, our historic sanctions will remain in full force.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-reg…
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Annex 42
U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on Iran Sanctions”, Special Briefing,
2 November 2018
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U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Briefing on Iran Sanctions
Special Briefing
Michael R. Pompeo
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin
Via Teleconference
November 2, 2018
MS NAUERT: Thank you, sir. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to today's on-the-record call on the
Iran snapback sanctions. We're pleased to have with us Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of
the Treasury Steve Mnuchin. They will each have brief remarks at the top and then take several of your
questions. We'll start first with Secretary Pompeo.
Secretary, please, go ahead.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you, Heather. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining the call.
Earlier this year, President Trump withdrew from the fatally flawed nuclear deal and implemented a new
campaign aimed at fundamentally altering the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This part of the
campaign about which we're speaking today is simple. It is aimed at depriving the regime of the revenues
that it uses to spread death and destruction around the world. Our ultimate aim is to compel Iran to
permanently abandon its well-documented outlaw activities and behave as a normal country.
Today, Secretary Mnuchin and I will discuss one of the many lines of effort to achieve these fundamental
changes in the Iranian regime's behavior as directed by the President. While important, these economic
sanctions are just a part of the U.S. Government's total effort to change the behavior of the Ayatollah
Khamenei, Qasem Soleimani, and the Iranian regime.
On November 5th, the United States will reimpose sanctions that were lifted as part of the nuclear deal on
Iran's energy, ship building, shipping, and banking sectors. These sanctions hit at the core areas of Iran's
economy. They are necessary to spur changes we seek on the part of the regime.
In order to maximize the effect of the President's pressure campaign, we have worked closely with other
countries to cut off Iranian oil exports as much as possible. We expect to issue some temporary allotments
to eight jurisdictions, but only because they have demonstrated significant reductions in their crude oil and
cooperation on many other fronts and have made important moves towards getting to zero crude oil
importation. These negotiations are still ongoing. Two of the jurisdictions will completely end imports as part
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/11/287090.htm
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of their agreements. The other six will import at greatly reduced levels.
Let me put this in context for you. The Obama administration issued SREs to 20 countries multiple times
between 2012 and 2015. We will have issued, if our negotiations are completed, eight and have made it
clear that they are temporary. Not only did we decide to grant many fewer exemptions, but we demanded
much more serious concessions from these jurisdictions before agreeing to allow them to temporarily
continue to import Iranian crude oil. These concessions are critical to ensure that we increase our maximum
pressure campaign and accelerate towards zero.
Our laser-focused approach is succeeding in keeping prices stable with a benchmark Brent price right about
where it was in May of 2018 when we withdrew from the JCPOA. Not only is this good for American
consumers and the world economy, it also ensures that Iran is not able to increase its revenue from oil as its
exports plummet. We will, we expect, have reduced Iranian crude oil exports by more than 1 million barrels
even before these sanctions go into effect.
This massive reduction since May of last year is three to five times more than what many analysts were
projecting when President Trump announced our withdrawal from the deal back in May. We exceeded our
expectations for one simple reason: Maximum pressure means maximum pressure.
The State Department closed the Obama era condensate loophole which allowed countries to continue
importing condensate from Iran even while sanctions were in place. This loophole allowed millions of dollars
to continue to flow to the regime.
This administration is treating condensate the same as crude since the regime makes no distinction
between the two when it decides to spend its oil revenue on unlawful ballistic missiles, terrorism,
cyberattacks, and other destabilizing activities like the assassination plot Denmark disclosed this past week.
And starting today, I ran will have zero oil revenue to spend on any of these things. Let me say that again.
Zero. One hundred percent of the revenue that Iran receives from the sale of crude oil will be held in foreign
accounts and can be used by Iran only for humanitarian trade or bilateral trade in nonsanctioned goods and
services.
These new sanctions will accelerate the highly successful effects of our sanctions that have already
occurred. The maximum pressure we imposed has caused the rial to drop dramatically, Rouhani's cabinet is
in disarray, and the Iranian people are raising their voices even louder against a corrupt and hypocritical
regime.
On that note, our actions today are targeted at the regime, not the people of Iran, who have suffered
grievously under this regime. It's why we have and will maintain many humanitarian exemptions to our
sanctions including food, agriculture commodities, medicine, and medical devices.
I will now turn the call over to Secretary Mnuchin.
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SECRETARY MNUCHIN: Thank you very much. Since the beginning of the Trump administration, the
Treasury Department has been committed to putting a stop to Iran's destabilizing activities across the world.
We've engaged a massive economic pressure campaign against Iran, which remains the world's largest
state sponsor of terrorism. To date, we have issued 19 rounds of sanctions on I ran, designating 168 targets
as part of our maximum pressure campaign. We have gone after the financial networks that the Iranian
regime uses to fuel its terrorist proxies and Hizballah and Hamas, to fund the Houthis in Yemen, and to
support the brutal Assad regime in Syria.
The 180-day wind-down period ends at 11 :59 p.m. Eastern Standard lime on Sunday November 4th. As of
Monday November 5th, the final round of snapback sanctions will be enforced on Iran's energy, shipping,
shipbuilding, and financial sectors. As part of this action on Monday, the Treasury Department will add more
than 700 names to our list of blocked entities. This includes hundreds of targets previously granted
sanctions relief under the JCPOA, as well as more than 300 new designations. This is substantially more
than we ever have previously done. Sanctions lifted under the terms of Iran's nuclear deal will be reimposed
on individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft that touch numerous segments of Iran's economy. This will
include Iran's energy sector and financial sectors. We are sending a very clear message with our maximum
pressure campaign that the U.S. intends to aggressively enforce our sanctions. Any financial institution,
company, or individual who evades our sanctions risks losing access to the U.S. financial system and the
ability to do business with the United States or U.S. companies. We are intent on ensuring that global funds
stop flowing to the coffers of the Iranian regime.
I want to make a couple of comments on the SWIFT messaging systems since I've received lots of
questions about this over the last few weeks. So I'd like to make four points. Number one, SWIFT is no
different than any other entity. Number two, we have advised SWIFT the Treasury will aggressively use its
authorities as necessary to continue intense economic pressure on the Iranian regime, and that SWIFT
would be subject to U.S. sanctions if it provides financial messaging services to certain designated Iranian
financial institutions. Number three, we have advised SWIFT that is must disconnect any Iranian financial
institution that we designate as soon as technologically feasible to avoid sanctions exposure. Number four,
just as was done before, humanitarian transactions to nondesignated entities will be allowed to use the
SWIFT messaging system as they have done before, but banks must be very careful that these are not
disguised transactions or they could be subject to certain sanctions. Thank you very much.
MS NAUERT: Thank you, sirs. Why don't we go ahead, take our first question. We'll go to Matt Lee with the
Associated Press. Matt, go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you, Heather. Both -- either or both of you, on SWIFT, there are a lot of complaints
among the President's allies in Congress that this does not go far enough, and that without designating
without going after SWIFT harder for these messaging transactions, that it allows a serious loophole. I
understand Secretary Mnuchin's four points on it, but how will you address this criticism? Because it's
already coming even before this announcement today.
SECRETARY MNUCHIN: Okay, well let me -- Secretary Mnuchin - let me make some comments. First of
all, I think there's been a lot of fueled misinformation as it relates to SWIFT and what we're doing with
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SWIFT. So that's why I want to be very clear. So one, okay, I think there was information that SWIFT would
not be subject to sanctions. That's not the case. SWIFT will be subject to sanctions. Number two, as I said,
that -- could be subject to sanctions, excuse me. Number two, it is our intent that they cut off designated
entities as was done before. And again, I think there's misinformation that they cut off everybody last time.
Again, they did allow for certain entities to do humanitarian transactions consistent with what's allowed
under our sanctions. There are exceptions for humanitarian sanctions, but I want to very clear, people need
to be careful that those are real humanitarian -- those are real humanitarian transactions. So again, I would
just say I-- hopefully this will clarify the misinformation that's out there.
MS NAUERT: Next question, we'll go to Nick Wadhams from Bloomberg.
QUESTION: Hi. I had a question about the oil sanctions going into effect. Will those include -- or will there
be exceptions granted for non humanitarian transactions such as consumer goods, as were allowed last
time, or will Iran only be allowed -- or will Iran only be allowed to spend revenue that it gains through -- on
humanitarian items? And then second, if you're giving eight waivers and two jurisdictions are already cutting
imports to zero, what's the point of giving them -- those two jurisdictions waivers? Thanks.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Nick, this is Mike Pompeo. With respect to your first point, you'll see the details on
Monday. There are nonhumanitarian goods that we included in there, but they're small. They're ones that
you would've already seen in the exemptions that were granted under the direction of the President.
Second, some of these will take a few months to get to zero. So by November 5th they won't be there.
That's the purpose of those exemptions, to give them a little bit longer to wind down. Weeks.
MS NAUERT: Pardon me?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Weeks longer to wind down.
MS NAUERT: Next question, Mike Warren from the Weekly Standard.
QUESTION: Hi, gentlemen, thank you. I want to follow-up on Matt's questions about SWIFT. Secretary
Mnuchin, you said that certain financial institutions in Iran will be cut off from SWIFT. Could you explain
exactly which financial institutions, or maybe the financial institutions described in a Treasury FAQ, the
Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2) blah blah blah -
could you be more specific about which institutions? And how can -- how can the United States Government
be confident in SWIFT's ability to monitor transactions using SWIFT that they - I imagine there are
numerous of these transactions going on daily. How can the United States Government be confident that
those are not transactions that are funding the bad actions that the government says is -- they are trying to
stop?
SECRETARY MNUCHIN: So again, let me comment on the first issue, which -- that the list of banks, which
will be substantially longer than last time, will be coming out over the weekend. And as it relates to
monitoring transactions, again, financial institutions have liability for any transactions that go through SWIFT
or any other mechanisms. I'm being told the list will come out on Monday. And again, it's our expectation
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that that will be implemented as soon as technologically feasible.
MS NAUERT: Okay, thank you. Next question goes to Elise Labatt from CNN.
QUESTION: Thank you. The question is for both secretaries, but maybe from a different angle. Could you
address the workaround that the Europeans are trying to institute to avoid U.S. banks, maybe using their
own central banks or electronic transactions? For Secretary Mnuchin, how much revenue do you think this
would give the Iranians, and how seriously are you taking that in terms of a financial component?
And then Secretary Pompeo, could you talk about once these sanctions go into effect and if the Europeans
do try to institute this workaround, what the diplomatic implications for relations with European allies? Thank
you.
SECRETARY MNUCHIN: I'll comment on the Special Purpose Vehicle. I have no expectation that there
will be any transactions that are significant that go through a Special Purpose Vehicle based upon what I've
seen. But when the details come out of some Special Purpose Vehicle, if there are sanctions -- if there are
transactions that go through there that have the intent of evading our sanctions, we will aggressively pursue
our remedies.
SECRETARY POMPEO: And let me take the second part of that. We've been working closely with the
Europeans on this set of issues. We're very confident that our sanctions will be incredibly effective. And
frankly, I can prove that already. As I stated, the Iranian economy today is already feeling the effects of this.
It's already feeling the effects of this effort not because the sanctions have snapped back- that won't occur
until -- on Monday -- but because the world and Iran knew this was coming. And so European entities of any
scale that are doing business with the United States of America have already ceased their conduct with
Iran. There may be an exception to that, but there has been an enormous departure of European
businesses.
So whatever it may be that the EU is proposing, the folks who have risk -- financial risk, business risk,
operation risk --have already made their decision about the effectiveness of the sanctions that will be
reimposed this coming week.
MS NAUERT: Our next question goes to Michele Kelemen with NPR.
QUESTION: Yeah, hi, thank you. One quick question that - just technically, which of the eight countries are
getting these waivers? And then secondly, for Secretary Pompeo, you said in one of your interviews this
week that the U.S. wants to restore democracy in Iran. Is that one of the goals of this campaign? And if so,
how do you make sure that these sanctions aren't going to hurt average Iranians who, as you point out, are
suffering under this corrupt regime?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes, thanks for the question. The President's policy is very clear: We are looking
to change the Iranian leadership's behavior. I laid out the 12 things we've asked them to do; that is the goal
not only of what we're speaking about this morning -- and please don't lose sight, we're talking about a set
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of sanctions that will be reimposed on Monday. The administration's efforts to change Iranian behavior are
far broader, far deeper, there are many other lines of effort. We're simply focused on this line of effort today
because of the significance of November 5th.
My comments about restoring democracy are completely consistent with what we have described before.
We're counting on the Iranian people to have the opportunity and we are working towards allowing the
Iranian people to have the opportunity to have the government they want, a government that doesn't take
wealth from their country and spend it on malign activity around the world. I mean, this is a regime that is
conducting a assassination campaign inside of Europe today, murdering not Iranian citizens in those
countries, but folks who live, reside, and are citizens of those European countries. These are the behaviors
we're trying to change, and our every effort is aimed at giving the Iranian people the opportunity to have the
government that they not only want but deserve.
MS NAUERT: Next question: Josh Rogin, Washington Post.
QUESTION: Thank you so much for your time. Thanks for your service. I'd like to ask you about the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran. My understanding is that you waived secondary sanctions on foreign firms that
do business with that organization, mostly Russian and Chinese firms that are involved in the Arak and
Fordow facilities. Why did you make that decision, and why are you letting Arak and Fordow continue? And
are there plans to change that in the future? Thank you.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thanks, thanks for the question. We are not allowing the continued work to
develop nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems in Arak and Fordow. We will provide on Monday a
complete explanation of what we're going to do with the continued efforts to prevent those facilities from
doing the things that put the world at risk through proliferation, and we'll give you all the detail. It's a long
and complex answer, but we're happy to provide it to you on Monday morning.
MS NAUERT: Final question to Arshad with Reuters, please.
QUESTION: Two things. One, exactly how many financial institutions are going to be redesignated, i.e. put
back on the SON list on Monday? Previously I believe the number was close to or slightly above 30. You
said it would be substantially more. How many is it going to be?
Secondly, you pointedly said that you were granting the exceptions to eight jurisdictions. Is one of those
jurisdictions the European Union, thereby covering a much larger group of countries, i.e. 28 EU member
states?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Steven, you want to go first?
SECRETARY MNUCHIN: I'll answer the first part. So the bank list will come out on Monday. Again, it will
be more than last time, and again, we may continue to add banks to that in the future. But the original list
will come out on Monday and we'll carefully monitor situations to add on more banks as needed.
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- 266 -
SECRETARY POMPEO: The second part of your question, we will provide the list of the eight jurisdictions
on Monday. The EU will not be receiving an SRE.
MS NAUERT: The final question, Carol Morello, Washington Post.
QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. Say in the past, the Iranians have blended their oil with foreign oil to
evade sanctions, and there have already been reports that they are turning off the ID tags on their tankers.
So what in particular are you going to be doing to track their attempts to evade these sanctions?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thanks for the question. Make no mistake about it, the Iranians will do everything
they can to circumvent these sanctions -- that's unsurprising to me. They'll turn off ships, they'll try and do it
through private vessels, they'll try and find third parties that don't interact with the United States to provide
insurance mechanisms. The list of Iranian efforts to circumvent these sanctions is long. You should all
recognize there's a reason for that. These sanctions are far tougher than the sanctions that have ever been
imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran. That is why they are so desperate to find ways to circumvent it.
And I won't speak to our efforts to counter those circumvention efforts. There are many, they are varied, and
make no mistake: The United States is fully prepared to do all that we can to prevent Iran from
circumventing not only the crude oil sanctions and the financial sanctions, but all of the designations and all
of the other sanctions that are being reimposed this coming Monday and those that are already in place.
SECRETARY MNUCHIN: And I would just add to that that anybody that does facilitate those transactions
will be subject to sanctions and will be added to the list.
MS NAUERT: Secretary Pompeo, Secretary Mnuchin, thank you so much for joining us. Everyone, thanks
for joining the call. Have a great day. We'll be putting out a transcript shortly.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you all.
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The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for
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External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or
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Annex 43
U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with special representative for Iran Brian Hook”,
Special Briefing, 2 November 2018
- 269 -
- 270 -
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Briefing With Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook
Special Briefing
Brian Hook
Special Representative for Iran
Press Correspondent's Room
Washington, DC
November 2, 2018
MR HOOK: I'm happy to take questions. And you've heard the Secretary talk. I just (inaudible).
QUESTION: What are the eight countries?
MR HOOK: Huh?
QUESTION: What are the eight countries?
QUESTION: What are the eight countries?
MR HOOK: Monday. Monday.
QUESTION: Can you at least say what are the two that said that they will cut to zero since it seems the
negotiations with them are over?
MR HOOK: It'II -- it's all going to be announced on Monday.
QUESTION: But why do all of this today if there's so little detail available today?
MR HOOK: There was a lot of detail today. There was a full briefing by both secretaries. So --
QUESTION: There was not a lot of detail.
MR HOOK: The sanctions go back into effect on Monday. This was a preview today.
QUESTION: Can I ask, though, similar to the question Arshad asked on the -- using the word jurisdiction
instead of country, can we assume that a certain island that begins with "T" is the reason that you're using
jurisdiction instead of country? Or is that -
- 271 -
MR HOOK: I think -
QUESTION: Taiwan. I'II-
QUESTION: Could jurisdiction mean more than one government, or does it mean one government?
MR HOOK: Is this what Secretary Mnuchin said?
QUESTION: He said --no, Pompeo.
QUESTION: Both, both. Pompeo - both of them said --
QUESTION: They used the word jurisdictions.
QUESTION: -- jurisdiction not country, which is why -l mean, it's a technical point, but I'm just - and I get
I can understand that you don't want to give the names.
MR HOOK: I don't know all of them. I don't know.
QUESTION: But are all of the eight countries?
QUESTION: Single governments?
QUESTION: Countries?
MR HOOK: Yes.
QUESTION: Yes countries or yes governments?
MR HOOK: They are -- they are --
QUESTION: If Taiwan is among them, that would be a reason to -
MR HOOK: I get it. They're nations. They're nations.
QUESTION: Okay. So Taiwan is not.
MR HOOK: I'm not going to say what it's not. I'm saying that eight nations.
QUESTION: Can I get a clarification on the SREs?
MR HOOK: Yeah.
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QUESTION: Yesterday you said the waiver is granted for a six-month period and then re-evaluated.
MR HOOK: That's by statute.
QUESTION: Right. And then the Secretary said it will take them weeks longer to wind down. Is that all
encompassing for the eight that are being granted or just -
MR HOOK: No, he was -- there he was talking about two of the countries that will receive an SRE are going
to be given a little extra time, weeks of time, to get to zero.
QUESTION: But they -- if they can still -- the waiver is for six months still by statute?
MR HOOK: But operationally it's only relevant for the first few weeks of the -- but by law, when we give an
SRE, it's for 180 days.
QUESTION: Right.
MR HOOK: And that's under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, NOAA. And so it's a 180-day
SRE. It doesn't matter whether they go to - I mean, it's -- each country is different. In two of the countries,
they will be getting to zero before the expiration of the SRE.
QUESTION: Can you talk about kind of the broader efforts on trying to get Iran to behave like a normal
regime? I mean, does that include kind of the Twitter messaging or social media messaging, or is it
something more than that, more concrete about supporting opposition groups or protestors?
QUESTION: Is it more than just Twitter messages? Is there something - is the U.S. doing something to kind
of promote protestors?
MR HOOK: The Iranian regime has historically not come to the negotiating table absent significant
economic and diplomatic pressure. The reimposition of our sanctions are designed to do two things: deny
the regime the revenue it needs to fund violent wars abroad, and also to change the cost-benefit analysis in
our favor so that Iran decides to come back to the negotiating table.
The Ayatollah Khamenei has said that require hostility with the United States, which is the kind of thing that
you expect to hear from a revolutionary regime. We have been very clear. Secretary Pompeo has been very
clear that we have an ear open to what is possible. We very much want to begin work on a new and better
deal to replace the insufficient Iran nuclear deal that the President left in May, and our campaign of
maximum economic pressure is a critical tactic to achieve that goal.
QUESTION: But he's also talking about restoring democracy.
MR HOOK: The President, the Secretary of State, the Vice President, at all levels of the administration,
have stood with the Iranian people and their aspirations for a better way of life. The Iranian people want a
- 273 -
more representative government, a government that does not rob them blind, that supports their human
rights, their economic rights, their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly. These are all rights that the
United States wants for the Iranian people. We think they deserve a much better way of life, and Secretary
Pompeo has repeatedly made remarks addressed to the Iranian people in support of their demands for
reforms from this regime.
QUESTION: How - I want to ask the question that Gardiner asked yesterday about the Khashoggi murder
and the war in Yemen and how any of that is playing into this. I mean, how can you, on the one hand, focus
so much on Iran's human rights record while not doing enough to pressure the Saudis on some of the same
very issues?
MR HOOK: We do not share interests or values with the Iranian regime. We have asked Saudi Arabia to
increase the production of oil while we take off Iranian oil from the market, and Saudi Arabia has been very
helpful to ensure an adequately supplied oil market during this period where we have seen dramatic
reductions in the import of Iranian crude as part of our maximum economic pressure campaign. The Saudi
Government has successfully insulated oil from broader political issues, and that has been helpful in the
broader context of our pressure campaign.
QUESTION: Well, just to be devil's advocate here, I understand the shared interests that you have with the
Saudis on Iran. But what shared interests, what shared values does the U.S. have with the Saudis -- respect
for human rights?
MR HOOK: I can only speak to how the Saudis have helped our Iran strategy. The President gave a speech
in Riyadh on his first trip overseas as president, where he called upon our Sunni Arab partners to increase
their capabilities to reverse Iranian hegemony so that our Arab partners can shoulder more of the burden in
the Middle East. And we have enjoyed a great deal of cooperation from Gulf countries and beyond to isolate
Iran and to apply as much economic pressure as possible so that they don't have the money they need to
destabilize the Middle East.
QUESTION: How is this escrow account that he talked about going to work, and how do you make sure that
the Iranians are going to get basic needs fulfilled -- medicine, food?
MR HOOK: The escrow accounts that are being created for those nations that need to continue importing
Iranian oil deny Iran hard currency, and it denies Iran any revenue from oil sales. Any time Iran sells oil, that
money goes into an escrow account in the importing nation's bank, and Iran has to spend down that credit.
We strongly encourage those nations to ensure that Iran spends that money on humanitarian purchases to
benefit the Iranian people. The longest-suffering victims of the Iranian regime are the Iranian people. This
regime uses fake companies disguised as humanitarian organizations to divert purchases that should go to
food, medicine, and medical devices, and they use that to enrich the regime and support revolutionary
activities overseas.
QUESTION: So you're counting on countries like China to make sure that they don't use money for those
things?
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MR HOOK: The United States will be monitoring these escrow accounts very closely. Unlike in prior
administrations, we will ensure that the money is not spent on illicit activities, that there isn't any leakage in
these escrow accounts, and we will work closely with countries to encourage the purchase and -- the sale
and purchase of humanitarian goods to benefit the Iranian people. Our sanctions regime has very clear
exceptions for the sale of food, medicine, and medical devices.
QUESTION: So how does the travel ban fit into the U.S. support for Iranian people?
MR HOOK: Because the Iranian regime is the largest sponsor of terrorism in the world, we have a restrictive
visa policy. And that policy is driven by the terrorism of the regime. It is not driven by a desire to restrict the
average Iranian people. The problem we have IS --
QUESTION: But it does.
MR HOOK: But that is the problem of the regime. If the regime would stop funding terrorism and open up its
economy so that we can see where the money goes, it would create a much better environment for us to be
granting visas.
QUESTION: So for the countries that you say need to keep importing oil, do you foresee issuing these
exemptions over and over again? Are you going to put an upper limit on how many times they'll be
renewed?
MR HOOK: Our goal remains getting countries to zero imports of Iranian oil. In 2019, our projections are
that oil supply will exceed demand, and that creates a much better atmosphere for us to bring remaining
nations to zero as quickly as possible.
QUESTION: So you're not putting an upper limit on how -- for how -- how many times these exemptions will
be renewed at this point?
MR HOOK: We are not looking to grant additional SREs at the end of the 180-day period. We are being
very careful to advance our maximum economic pressure campaign without increasing the price of oil. Next
year we anticipate a stronger oil supply coming online, and that will allow us to accelerate the path to zero.
QUESTION: And are you -- how many Iranian banks will be cut off from SWIFT? I mean, the administration
is saying more than prior, but can you give a number?
MR HOOK: That will be announced by Secretary Mnuchin on Monday.
QUESTION: He did say, though, on this subject -- he was very precise in his language. He said "certain
designated Iranian financial institutions." That does not categorically mean all. So is it possible that either,
one, don't redesignate all of the banks that had previously been designated; and two, is it possible that some
designated bank, because he used the word "certain designated," would not be required to disconnect?
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MR HOOK: I'm not going to interpret what "certain" means beyond saying that he will announce all the
banks on Monday.
QUESTION: The 20-20 countries import 80 percent of Iran's oil, as I understood -- stand. Are those eight
countries, any of them, among those 20--the eight countries receiving the SREs?
MR HOOK: That there's a small group of -- that there's a -- there is a relatively small number of countries
that make up the lion's share of the import of Iranian crude.
QUESTION: And are any of them getting exemptions?
MR HOOK: I'm not going to get ahead of the Secretary's announcement on Monday.
QUESTION: Can you offer a little clarity on the response about non-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation? Will
waivers be granted in that -
MR HOOK: The Secretary addressed that this morning, and it'll be announced on Monday.
QUESTION: On the humanitarian transaction, Europeans have expressed concern in the past weeks that
even though there were exemptions to humanitarian goods and services, the financials mechanism were not
safe enough, that you have to clarify what are the means by which the countries and entities can do those
kind of transactions. Do you think that what you announced today clarifies this and that it's safe to do
humanitarian transactions with I ran?
MR HOOK: The Iranian regime has a history of creating front companies to divert the distribution of
humanitarian goods. Financial institutions around the world know of Iran's history of deceiving banks on the
sale of humanitarian goods. The burden is on Iran to open up its dark economy so that banks around the
world have more confidence that when they facilitate humanitarian transactions that the humanitarian goods
will reach the Iranian people.
The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance in the world. Every sanctions regime we
have makes exceptions for food, medicine, and medical devices. That is, we have done our part; the Iranian
regime needs to do its part by making those transactions possible in an open and transparent financial
system.
QUESTION: Sounds like there's not very many safe ways of trade -- like, for pharmaceutical companies and
medical companies.
MR HOOK: The Iranian regime makes it very difficult to facilitate the sale of humanitarian goods and
services.
QUESTION: The Europeans says that the fear is that even if you sell humanitarian goods to Iran, you will
be target by U.S. sanctions, so they addressing this to you and not to Iran.
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MR HOOK: Say that again?
QUESTION: The European countries say that companies fear that if they sell those goods to Iran, they will
be targeted by U.S. sanctions. So they ask you to say what are the safe channels to do that.
MR HOOK: The burden is not on the United States to identify the safe channels. The burden is on the
Iranian regime to create a financial system that complies with international banking standards to facilitate the
sale and provision of humanitarian goods and assistance.
QUESTION: Right, but I think that the point is that they are looking for some kind of, like, assurance -
QUESTION: Guidance from OFAC.
QUESTION: Guidance.
MR HOOK: We have been - OFAC has given very clear guidance over many years -
QUESTION: That's not what the Europeans say.
MR HOOK: We have done our part to permit the sale of humanitarian goods to Iran. That is our part. That is
our role. Iran has a role to make these transactions possible. Banks do not have confidence in Iran's banking
system- often don't have confidence in Iran's banking system to facilitate those transactions. That's Iran's
problem; it is not our problem.
QUESTION: But banks do not have confidence, the companies do not have confidence in Iran banks
because they are subject to American sanctions from now on.
MR HOOK: That's not true.
QUESTION: That's what the Europeans say. I'm just -
MR HOOK: I'm giving you the answer.
QUESTION: We were expecting the list. (Laughter.)
MR HOOK: But he told you it was coming Monday.
QUESTION: Why is it that -- and when you say Monday, this isn't going to be at literally 12:01 Monday
morning, is it? Or I mean --
MR HOOK: No. The Secretary will announce it on Monday, and then it will be published in the Federal
Register.
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QUESTION: Okay, but he'll announce it --what, do you have any -- like, I just want it for personal planning
purposes.
MODERATOR: About 8:30 in the morning.
QUESTION: 8:30 Monday morning and not beforehand. So in other words, I-- at 12:01 Monday morning,
they go into effect -
MR HOOK: Yes.
QUESTION: -- but there won't be a -like, is something going to go up on the Treasury website at 12:01? I
mean, I'm just trying to figure out -
MR HOOK: I don't know about that. For our part, on the SREs and anything else will be announced on
Monday. I don't -- Treasury may have a different way where at 12:01 they have to --
QUESTION: So you guys aren't planning on saying who the eight are at 12:01.
MR HOOK: No. No. No.
QUESTION: But presumably these eight are aware that - right, they've been told that they're okay to -
because they're all coming out of the woodwork now, the Turks, the Italians, the South Koreans, the Indians,
the --they are.
MR HOOK: I think you've answered your own question.
QUESTION: Well, I just want to make sure no one's lying.
MR HOOK: Oh. We'll announce it on Monday.
QUESTION: And so will we see sanctions on the countries that aren't getting these things on Monday?
MR HOOK: We expect -- well, we have already seen enormous pre-compliance with the reimposition of our
sanctions because corporations around the world are rightly choosing to sell goods and services in the
United States over the Iranian market if given the choice.
QUESTION: But I mean, weren't we going to see sanctions on big countries that aren't -- that don't get
these waivers? Are you going to -- sanctions announced on Monday?
MR HOOK: We expect nations around the world to comply with sanctions because it's in their interest, and it
promotes our broader national security objectives to address a significant and expanding threat to peace
and security.
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Okay.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR HOOK: All right, thank you.
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Annex 44
U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing”, 7 November 2018
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U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Department Press Briefing - November 7, 2018
Robert Palladino
Deputy Spokesperson
Department Press Briefing
Washington, DC
November 7, 2018
(//video.state.gov/detail/video/5858967141001/2autoStart=true)
TRANSCRIPT:
2:37 p.m. EDT
MR PALLADINO: Welcome, everyone. Thanks for coming. We're going to start at the top today with
our Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook. He has some opening remarks, then he'd be happy
to take a few questions from you all. Please, Brian, come on up.
MR HOOK: Hello. Good to see you.
QUESTION: Wonderful to see you.
MR HOOK: Thank you, Matt.
QUESTION: As usual.
MR HOOK: Now that our sanctions on the Iranian regime have been reimposed, we want to alert nations of
the risk of doing business with Iran's shipping sector. If Iranian tankers make calls to your ports or transit
through your waterways, this comes at great risk. The United States urges you to consider the advisory we
are issuing today.
The sanctions that were reimposed on Monday include sanctions on Iran's port operators as well as its
energy shipping and shipbuilding sectors. We placed on our sanctions list Iran's national maritime carrier, the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and its oil transport giant, the National Iranian Tanker Company.
These sanctions are critical to our maximum pressure campaign. Iran's energy sector accounts for up to 80
percent of the country's income from exports. The regime uses this revenue to support its terrorist militias,
fund missile proliferation, and sustain its revolutionary exploits that destabilize the Middle East.
We have also reimposed sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, and re-insurance.
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/11/287201.htm
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Knowingly providing these services to sanctioned Iranian shipping companies will result in the imposition of
U.S. sanctions. As Iran's maritime carriers and vessels are redesignated and lose access to insurance on the
international market, they are likely to turn to self-insurance. We suspect they will use Iranian insurance
providers such as Kish P&I. Should there be an accident involving an Iranian tanker, there is simply no way
these Iranian insurance companies can cover the loss.
This is especially important for Iran's crude oil tankers, which are usually insured for amounts of $1 billion or
more. Oil spills and accidents involving tankers are extremely costly. The immediate costs associated with
response and cleanup can range from hundreds of millions of dollars to billions of dollars. When litigation
costs and penalties are added, the total liability is even greater. But the costs of these accidents extend well
beyond the initial response and cleanup. Tanker spills can imperil fishing and maritime industries for
generations, harm tourism, and create irreversible economic and environmental costs on communities and
ecosystems.
From the Suez Canal to the Strait of Malacca and all chokepoints in between, Iranian tankers are now a
floating liability. Countries, ports, and canal operators, and private firms should know they will be likely
responsible for the costs of an accident involving a self-insured Iranian tanker.
We sincerely hope there will be no accidents, but accidents are a very real possibility given Iran's record.
Only 10 months ago in January, an oil tanker managed by the National Iranian Tanker Company collided with
a vessel in the East China Sea. The tanker was carrying one million barrels of condensate. The tanker
burned for one week and then sank. The collision led to the largest release of condensate ever and caused
an oil spill the size of the city of Paris. As the cleanup continues, the liability for this will be in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. Iranian insurance companies only covered a small portion of that vessel's liability. The
majority of the tanker's value is covered by international insurers.
Now that our sanctions are back in place, these international insurers will no longer be in the risky business
of covering Iran's tankers. Self-insured Iranian tankers are a risk to the ports that permit them to dock, the
canals that allow them to transit, and the boats that cross their path. This exposes the entire maritime
shipping network to immense liability.
If entities continue to do business with Iran's tankers, they may assume that Iranian insurers can and will
absorb the full liability associated with the accident. This is a fantasy. There is little to gain by taking on so
much risk for so little return. Just as concerning, entities who allow self-insured Iranian tankers to transit
through their canals or dock in their ports may be facilitating Iran's illicit activity.
Iran has supported the Assad regime in Syria by regularly shipping millions of barrels of Iranian crude to the
country. Those entities who permit the transit of Iranian tankers may very well be enabling this activity. I have
described very serious liability concerns, but all nations should also be aware of the safety standards and
practices of Iran's oil tankers.
There are increasing reports that Iranian tankers are switching off their AIS transponders at sea. These
transponders are safety devices used for collision avoidance and navigation. They enable ships to see other
ships and to communicate with coastal authorities. Under international maritime law, vessels have been
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/11/287201.htm
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required since 2004 to use them to broadcast their identity and location. Based on credible data, we now
know that up to a dozen Iranian tankers have recently disabled their maritime transponders and have
effectively gone dark. We should not be surprised that an outlaw regime also violates basic maritime law.
Turning off these transponders makes tankers harder to track and is a tactic that Iran has used in the past to
evade sanctions. In 2012, a majority of vessels in the National Iranian Tanker Company's fleet turned off their
transponders in the run-up to the imposition of U.S. oil-related sanctions. This tactic is a maritime security
threat. These transponders are designed to maximize visibility at sea and turning them off only increases risk
of accidents and injuries.
Self-insured Iranian tankers engaging in unsafe behavior with many tons of crude oil onboard is courting
environmental and financial disaster. Our strong message to any entity considering doing business with these
Iranian tankers is to rethink your decision. Protect your port, protect your business, and promote maritime
safety.
Happy to take any questions. Matt.
QUESTION: Just on this whole shipping thing, just to be devil's advocate here for a second, why should
people not look at this and say that this is an admission or an acknowledgment that the sanctions are going
to make international maritime -- international shipping more dangerous?
MR HOOK: Well, the burden is on Iran to make it safe. We're not the one turning off the -- the transponders.
QUESTION: No, but you're the one sanctioning - you're the one making it impossible or difficult for them to
get insurance, aren't you?
MR HOOK: I think you're misplacing the burden of compliance on the United States.
QUESTION: Well, but -
MR HOOK: Iran has tankers. Maritime law requires them to keep their transponders on. They're turning them
off to evade our sanctions.
QUESTION: Okay. And then just one other thing. I wanted to go back to a question I asked you on Friday -
MR HOOK: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- and this is the -- it's going to sound awfully nerdy and technical, but I just want to make sure
that -- so I asked why Treasury Secretary Mnuchin used the word "jurisdictions" and not "countries," and I
said - suggested it might be because Taiwan would be one of the countries getting an exemption and you
said no, I get it, nations. And then the Secretary, when he made his announcement on Monday, included
Taiwan as among the eight countries -
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/11/287201.htm
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MR HOOK: Right.
QUESTION: -- he specifically said. Does this mean that at least the two of you, Brian Hook and Secretary
Pompeo, regard Taiwan as a country? Or is this just kind of the slip of the tongue? Have you heard from the
Chinese about it?
MR HOOK: No. Our policy has not changed. The United States remains committed to the U.S. "one China"
policy, the three joint communiques, and our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act.
QUESTION: So why call it a country and court the ire of the Chinese?
MR HOOK: The SRE that we have granted to Taiwan is relevant to Taiwan's economy, and anything else
you may have heard, whatever you've interpreted, nothing has changed on our policy.
QUESTION: Okay, thank you.
MR HOOK: Michele from NPR.
QUESTION: Thanks. Is the -- the allotments, the waivers -- how much oil are these countries allowed to
export during this time? Is there a cap on it? And then also, can you explain how you plan to monitor the
escrows in the weeks and months ahead?
MR HOOK: I can't get into specific volumes because that's confidential. It's a bilateral agreement that was
reached in each of the SREs. We do -
QUESTION: But there is a cap on each one?
MR HOOK: In order to be eligible for an SRE, a country needs to show a significant reduction. And so we
are going to be continuing our path to zero. As you heard the President say today, and I think a couple of
days ago, we want -- we have been able to take off 1 million barrels from Iran's exports, and we have actually
brought down the price of oil. It was at $7 4 a barrel when the President announced he was out of the deal;
we then took off a million barrels of oil, and Brent is now at 72, roughly 72.
We have been very careful about applying maximum economic pressure without lifting the price of oil, and
we've done that successfully. I'd just remind you that the Obama administration granted 20 SREs, 20 SREs
to 20 countries over a period of many years. We have granted eight. Two of those eight countries have
stopped importing Iranian crude. And if you look at all the countries that were importing Iranian crude prior to
when the President left the deal in May, 20 of those countries are now at zero. And so 80 percent of this
regime's revenue comes from oil exports. We are very serious about denying Iran the revenue it needs to
destabilize the Middle East and fund missile proliferation and all the other malign behaviors it engages in.
Nick.
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QUESTION: Brian, the ship you mentioned that sunk off the East China Sea was among those targeted for
sanctions in the announcement that came out Monday. Why was that, and what does that say about the
accuracy of that list of 700 entities that you put forward?
MR HOOK: Well, just because a ship is at the bottom of the sea doesn't mean that it still doesn't have
economic consequences. There's still payments on the books. And so that ship, just because it sank doesn't
mean that its financial lifecycle has come to an end. And so we're very serious about going after all of these
energy, the way they move their ships, the oil itself. And so that's why we did that.
Laurie.
QUESTION: Hi. Kurdistan 24.
MR HOOK: Yeah.
QUESTION: The Iraqi prime minister just said that Iraq is not part of the U.S. sanctions against Iran, and it
wants a balanced relationship with the U.S. and Iran. What's your comment on that? And is Iraq in
compliance with the sanctions so far?
MR HOOK: Well, Iraq was a -We granted Iraq a waiver to allow it to continue to pay for its electricity imports
from Iran. We are confident that this will help Iraq limit electricity shortages in the south. Iraq is a friend and a
partner, and we are committed to its stability and prosperity.
QUESTION: And is it in compliance, as far as you know?
MR HOOK: We are very pleased with how we are working with the Iraqis.
Lesley.
QUESTION: Brian, since you don't -- you can't reveal the details of those exceptions that you've made with
eight of these countries, can you at least give us some kind of idea as to how much those countries can
import from Iran during this time? And also, what level of oil -- what level of -- what reductions are you
seeking from all of these at the end of the six-month period?
MR HOOK: I can't tell you what our target is. We do have a target.
QUESTION: You do have one?
MR HOOK: Yeah, we do have a target. And -
QUESTION: Is it zero?
MR HOOK: Well, our - yes. I mean, we have a goal to get to zero. As I said, we have an adequately
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/11/287201.htm
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supplied oil market. We have to ensure that we advance our national security objectives while we do not
injure our economic interests. If we were to increase the price of oil, it would be bad for American consumers,
it would be bad for the global economy, and it would give an advantage to Iran. Now, we foresee in 2019 that
we will have more supply than demand, and that puts us in a much better position to bring countries -- all
countries importing Iranian crude to zero. So that's our target.
During the next six months, we are going to be monitoring our diplomatic progress and the price of oil to
ensure that we have calibrated this the right way.
Francesco.
QUESTION: So -
QUESTION: But, Brian, why don't you want to give those figures? I mean, if it's not a transparent -- this all
feels rather opaque.
MR HOOK: Well, I told you the figure; it's zero. That is the figure.
QUESTION: It's never going to go down to zero.
MR HOOK: And so oil is a very fluid market. We have done a very good job of increasing oil production. So
we have taken off a million barrels of oil, and during that same period the United States increased production
by 1.7 million barrels and we increased exports by a million. The Saudis played a very helpful role, and the
Saudi energy minister, Khalid al-Falih, was very good at increasing production during that period. We've been
very pleased with oil producers increasing their capacity to ensure a well-supplied and stable oil market.
So during this period, while we have taken off a million barrels, we have not lifted the price of oil. And that is
not by accident; it is through very careful and calibrated diplomacy led by the Secretary and the President.
QUESTION: So does that mean that some SRE can be renewed after the six-month period?
MR HOOK: We are not looking to grant any exemptions or waivers from our sanctions regime. We have
looked at this in terms of we do want to achieve maximum pressure without harming friends or allies, and we
do not want to lift the price of oil. So there are a number of variables that go into these things, and we have
calibrated them very well so far.
QUESTION: So those variables -
MR HOOK: Abbie?
QUESTION: Have you received assurances from countries like China and India that they are going to go
down to zero by the end of six months?
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/11/287201.htm
- 288 -
MR HOOK: We have -we have been working with a number of countries and I think that we either have
concluded all of our SREs - there are no more than eight, and as I said, two of those have already stopped
importing, and the rest we have reached agreement with.
Yes.
QUESTION: Can you tell us which two have stopped importing?
MR HOOK: I can't.
Nick.
QUESTION: To go back to Michelle's question, Brian. So if you won't tell us exactly how this is going to work
or what number you're trying to get to, can you talk about your confidence in knowing the money that goes
into these bank accounts and the monitoring that the jurisdictions do? As you know, the jurisdictions, the U.S.
relies on those jurisdictions to do that monitoring. Turkey was a real problem last time. Why do you have
confidence that Turkey will somehow do better than it did before the JCPOA?
MR HOOK: Well, I think you've seen a lot of pre-compliance with our sanctions over the last six months.
You've seen a number -- you've seen over a hundred corporations announce prior to November that they are
leaving the Iranian market or they're canceling planned investments. On the oil side, we have seen the vast
majority of refiners announce that they're out. I think this is a much different environment with our sanctions. I
think the world knows that the President and his Secretary of State are very serious about maximum
economic pressure. And that will apply to the escrow accounts. One of the advantages of these SREs is that
it denies Iran the revenue from its oil sales. They do not get paid in hard currency. This is a regime that is
facing a liquidity crisis. And so now these escrow accounts, even those countries who are still importing
Iranian oil, Iran does not get the revenue. They only - it stays in an escrow and then they spend down that
amount to import goods from that country that was importing their oil.
The Treasury Department monitors the escrow accounts. Secretary Mnuchin, Under Secretary Mandelker,
Marshall Billingsley are very focused on ensuring that these escrow accounts are never used for illicit goods,
and we will police these very aggressively.
QUESTION: But as you know, Turkey was subject to criminal action last time for evading sanctions. Do you
include Turkey on this list because you have confidence that they'll do something different or they've
promised something different, or is this a political decision to include Turkey?
MR HOOK: Well, we have -- Turkey is one of the countries. I had very good meetings with my counterparts in
Turkey and we are confident that we have reached an understanding in terms of the next six months.
QUESTION: Brian, ifwe could -
QUESTION: On Turkey?
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MR HOOK: Just one more question.
QUESTION: On Turkey? The president of Turkey, I don't know if you know, he said that, "We will not obey
such sanctions." He announced that he's not going to follow the sanctions. And he said also that he sees this
move by Washington as, quote, "violating the global balance," end quote. What is your answer on this?
MR HOOK: President Trump received this same question this morning, and I would refer you to his answer.
Thanks very much.
MR PALLADINO: Thanks, Brian.
MR HOOK: Thank you.
MR PALLADINO: Right through that door. There we go. Perfect. All right. A couple of things for the top.
Today the United States Agency for International Development and the Vietnamese ministry of national
defense announced the completion of environmental remediation of the dioxin Agent Orange at Danang
Airport. This historic six-year cleanup effort represents our long-standing commitment to addressing the
legacy of the Vietnam War, improving the lives of the people of Vietnam and of future generations. Working
side by side with Vietnamese counterparts, we have advanced our strategic partnership and promoted
goodwill between our two peoples. The United States Agency for International Development will now turn our
attention to implementing the commitment of the United States toward remediation of Agent Orange at the
Bien Hoa Airport.
And secondly, the United States is concerned by the verdict sentencing Ali Salman to life in prison in Bahrain.
We've closely followed this case against the former parliamentarian and secretary general of the AI-Wefaq
political society, including a previous acquittal on these same charges on June 21st. We understand the
verdict may be subject to further appeals. The United States will continue to engage regularly with the
Government of Bahrain on a range of shared interests, including the importance of safeguarding fundamental
freedoms and human rights.
And with that, I'd be happy to take a few questions. Matt, Associated Press, please.
QUESTION: Water is good? Thirsty?
MR PALLADINO: The water is good.
QUESTION: No glass today?
MR PALLADINO: No glass. They forgot my glass. No they didn't. I stand -
QUESTION: For your on-camera debut.
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MR PALLADINO: -- corrected. Let me get my glass, Matt. How's that? Perfect.
QUESTION: There you go.
MR PALLADINO: All right.
QUESTION: Nice, very nice.
MR PALLADINO: Okay, good.
QUESTION: State Department logo on it, too. Very nice.
MR PALLADINO: It does.
QUESTION: I want to ask you about North Korea and the talks that have been postponed that were
supposed to be tomorrow. First, logistically, why did you guys see fit to announce this at one minute past
midnight?
MR PALLADINO: So you're referring to the spokesperson's statement that went out last night, and for those
who haven't seen it, it announced that Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's meeting with officials from the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, scheduled for this week in New York, will now take place at a later
date. We will reconvene when our respective schedules permit. Ongoing conversations continue to take
place. The United States remains focused on fulfilling the commitments agreed to by President Trump and
Chairman Kim at the Singapore Summit in June. As to the timing, as soon as the information that we had
was confirmed, we decided to release it as early as possible.
QUESTION: What is the reason for the postponement? I understand it says in the statement that you'll set it
up again once the schedules permit, but why is it not happening tomorrow as planned and is it - and is there
a rescheduled date for it?
MR PALLADINO: Well, to the latter question, we have nothing to announce at this time. To the previous
question, schedules change. Schedules change all the time, in fact. Sometimes we make these things public.
Sometimes, as our schedules change, they're not public. This is a case, we're dealing with purely a
scheduling issue, and it's as simple as that.
QUESTION: Well, I mean, scheduling issue can encompass a lot of things. Whose schedule was the
problem here as far - I mean, the President when he was asked about this said something about travel, but
the travel that he and the Secretary are going to -- are making to Paris doesn't begin until after this meeting
would've happened. Is it that kind of scheduling problem or is the problem is scheduling as in the North
Koreans want your sanctions lifted now as opposed to later, and you guys want them to make another
concession? They want a step-by-step -- is that the scheduling that's the issue or is it personal schedules?
MR PALLADINO: Timing, timing. This has to do with timing as a matter -- we're talking about scheduling.
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And I'll leave it at that.
QUESTION: What, Kim Yong-chol couldn't make it to -
MR PALLADINO: I'm not going to go into details on our discussions with the North Koreans regarding this.
QUESTION: If this is purely a scheduling issues, if it's just about schedules, why is that secret information?
Why not just say Kim Yong-chol's schedule didn't work out or Pompeo had something else he needed to do?
Like, why is this so difficult?
MR PALLADINO: We're not going to go beyond the fact that this is purely a matter of our ability to schedule
this. It's as simple as that. There's nothing additional to provide here. President spoke on this earlier today as
well and he's talked about this before. We're not in a rush. We're going to get this right.
More on North Korea?
QUESTION: Yes.
QUESTION: North Korea.
MR PALLADINO: All right, let's go to the front. Lesley.
QUESTION: The optics of this, it appears that last-minute changes at a time when the North Koreans have
said they want some of the sanctions lifted, appears that this has run into trouble and that the talks between
the two sides have run into trouble. Would that be true?
MR PALLADINO: Not at all. We're actually -- we're in a pretty good place right now. We are confident going
forward. Scheduling issues can happen, and -- but that's okay. We're not going to be driven into artificial
timelines. President's been clear we're not going to -- we don't need to rush this. We are going to continue to
make progress.
QUESTION: Robert, a follow-up?
MR PALLADINO: North Korea -- let's go to Francesco in the front.
QUESTION: How -- how soon do you plan to reschedule this meeting if you have to plan a summit between
the President and Kim Jong-un for early 2019? How soon?
MR PALLADINO: Nothing to announce right now. We would like -- the President had a very good meeting
with Chairman Kim not that long ago, just in June, and he very much looks forward to his next meeting. So
we're going to continue to work towards that.
QUESTION: But the last time that the President canceled a meeting, it was when Secretary Pompeo was
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supposed to go there in Pyongyang at the end of August. He said that there were not enough progress to
continue talking. And is there some kind of reason like this this time Or -
MR PALLADINO: I'll say it one more time: This is purely a matter of scheduling, and we will reschedule.
Please. Let's go to Fox, please. Rich, go.
QUESTION: So the Secretary divulged a few weeks ago that there is an agreement from Chairman Kim that
the denuclearization process would conclude by January of 2021. Is there a concern, if timing is no object,
that that will be missed, or is that a hard deadline?
MR PALLADINO: We're not going to be driven into artificial deadlines. This is something that the Secretary
has said. We're going to continue to make progress, and that's the direction that this will continue to be
pushing.
QUESTION: Is 2021 or a goal or a deadline or what? I mean, it's the Secretary who floated that or divulged
it.
MR PALLADINO: Right, let's not - let's -- we shouldn't confuse the objective, which is the final, fully verified
denuclearization of the Korean -- of North Korea with the pace at which these types of meetings will take
place.
Please. Go to CNN in the front.
QUESTION: If the Secretary is talking about -- thank you, yeah. If the Secretary is talking about 2021 as
being possible and he's saying he thinks that they can denuclearize within that amount of time, how is this
not a rush? How is there not some time pressure on it?
MR PALLADINO: We've come quite far in a very short amount of time. This -- the meeting in Singapore, the
summit between Chairman Kim and President Trump, was a very strong first step, and we are making
progress and we're going to continue focusing on that. A lot has happened since that time that we can take
confidence in, from the cessation of missile tests to nuclear testing to the return of the remains of American
heroes, the return of American citizens. And we're going to continue working forward and pushing forward on
this. Thank you.
More on North Korea? Let's - right here, please. ABC.
QUESTION: One of the things on the agenda that the Secretary intended to discuss was U.S. inspectors
being let into these sites. Are you still confident, given that this meeting has been postponed, that inspectors
will be let into these sites?
MR PALLADINO: We're confident. This is a matter of scheduling. Everything else is -- remains completely
on track.
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Please. North Korea?
QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you, Robert.
MR PALLADINO: Good. Thank you.
QUESTION: When September 19th, President Moon and Kim Jong-un meeting in Pyongyang, and Kim
Jong-un already noticed that they will not give any nuclear list to United States. So how the - do you still
believe North Korea will be FFVD?
MR PALLADINO: I'm sorry, that I believe North Korea will what?
QUESTION: FFVD, like finally and fully verified denuclearization.
MR PALLADINO: That's something that the -- Chairman Kim agreed to at the summit in Singapore, and we
very much look forward to Chairman Kim honoring his handshake with the President and meeting those
regards.
QUESTION: Did not give any list for the denuclearization -
MR PALLADINO: I'm not going to get ahead of negotiations that are taking place, but I will say that we are in
regular contact with North Korea and that's not going to change. Please, let's -
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: One more North Korea? Okay.
QUESTION: Robert, I'm just -- how do you balance the President and apparently now the Secretary's
expression that there will not be any artificial timelines, you won't be pressured into setting those timelines
against the fact that it's obviously in North Korea's interest to have this process go on for as long as
possible? And as you saw from the Security Council, the desire for sanctions, for strict sanctions
enforcement, is clearly crumbling.
MR PALLADINO: Sanctions remain in place, and those are the world sanctions that are -- remain in place.
Sanctions are what brought us to what is possible at this point and what is possible is, with the
denuclearization of North Korea, truly a brighter future for the North Korean people. That's something that
we're going to continue to pursue.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: That's - let -- let's move on.
QUESTION: Hold on.
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QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: You said that --I think if I heard you correctly -- this might have something to do with scheduling.
And then -- that you said that everything else remains completely on track. Doesn't that answer suggest that
this -- that these meetings aren't on track? Doesn't that response suggest that there's a problem here?
MR PALLADINO: We are - we have a scheduling matter that we are going to move on from and reschedule.
And it's - there's nothing beyond that at this point. Our talks are ongoing, our conversations with the North
Koreans, and we're going to continue to drive forward. Please.
QUESTION: So you're saying things are going well then, with the North Koreans in these negotiations?
MR PALLADINO: We are - we have ongoing conversations with the North Koreans. We will be rescheduling
when schedules allow. Next topic, let's go - what do we got?
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: Yemen?
MR PALLADINO: Yemen? Let's go to Yemen in the back, please.
QUESTION: The fighting around Hodedah seems to be picking up with -- and UNICEF and MSF and all
these aid groups who are saying children are at risk at these hospitals. And I wonder what's happened to the
U.S. call for a ceasefire.
MR PALLADINO: The -- well, I would start by saying we closely are following the developments that are
taking place in Hodedah. As the Secretary said, we've been urging all parties to come to the table, and to
recognize that there's no military victory that can be achieved in Yemen. And we continue to call for a
cessation of hostilities and for all parties to support United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in finding a
peaceful solution to the conflict.
QUESTION: So have there been any phone call? I mean, when you say they're calling for that, can you talk
about any meetings, any phone calls, any urgency to that?
MR PALLADINO: We are in daily contact with the special envoy. We -- and we've got -- we are in contact
with a wide range of Yemeni interlocutors aS well as international partners throughout the Middle East. We'll
remain in touch.
QUESTION: Robert -
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: More in Yemen? Let's go right here, please.
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QUESTION: Would you call on the Saudi coalition to halt this offensive that they seem to now be bearing
down on in Hodedah?
MR PALLADINO: We've called for a cessation of hostilities. That would include -as our statement
previously said, both Houthi missiles directed at Sauda Arbia and the United Arab Emirates. Please, next
question.
QUESTION: Last week, you also said that now was -- the timing was right for this cessations of hostilities,
this ceasefire to begin. You said that was based on conversations with both sides. Have you had a
miscommunication then, with the Saud-led coalition, that they're now beginning this offensive?
MR PALLADINO: Timing - our assessment remains the same. We are in contact with the relevant parties
and we're going to continue to watch this closely.
QUESTION: Robert, can I move on to the Palestinian -
MR PALLADINO: Yes. Let -- can we keep Yemen? Yemen? More Yemen?
QUESTION: Right here?
MR PALLADINO: Go -- Yemen.
QUESTION: Yeah. I'm just -- to put a finer point on that, I mean, did the coalition -- the Saudi coalition that
the U.S. supports coordinate with or tell you in advance that they were going to increase fighting around
Hudaydah or did they just ignore the Secretary's call?
MR PALLADINO: We've been clear with Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni officials at every level that the
destruction of critical infrastructure or destruction of the delivery of vital (inaudible) aid and commercial goods
is unacceptable, and we are in close contact with our partners.
QUESTION: Saudi Arabia?
QUESTION: Can I just ask one follow-up?
MR PALLADINO: Yes.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on that, because you're not really answering the question, I mean, the
Secretary of State issued a very explicit statement with the Secretary of Defense saying it was time for this to
end and it's not ending. Do you see that as a slap in the face, and what are you going to do about it?
MR PALLADINO: November was the month that we have called for and that is what the special envoy is
pursuing. We continue to call for a cessation of hostilities. That is a cessation of hostilities and vigorous
resumption of a political track. That is the way forward. That's how we are going to ease this humanitarian
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crisis. The United States' message remains we need to end this conflict and replace this conflict with
compromise, and that's all I have on this topic for today.
QUESTION: On Yemen?
MR PALLADINO: More on Yemen?
QUESTION: Yemen, please, just one thing. So since the call for - to -- for a cessation of hostilities, have you
seen any reduction in hostilities?
MR PALLADINO: I don't - I'm not going to characterize actions on the ground. Our position remains
remains, has not changed. We are closely coordinating and urging a cessation of hostilities and a resumption
of the political track and we will continue to push forward in that regard.
Change of topic?
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: I have nothing more on Yemen today, guys. Nothing more.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: On Iran?
MR PALLADINO: Nothing.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: So are you confident that at the end of this 30-day period, there will be a cessation of
hostilities?
MR PALLADINO: We believe the timing is right right now, yes, SO -
QUESTION: Change of topic?
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: Okay.
QUESTION: Could I just (inaudible)?
MR PALLADINO: Right back here, please.
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QUESTION: Thank you. Moscow announced recently it would host a meeting on November 9th on
Afghanistan, and I'm wondering if you got an invitation and if any American officials will participate.
And also my second question: The administration informed the Congress that Russia hasn't complied with
requirements on the chemical arms act and I'm wondering, what will be the next steps? Is there any decision
already on sanctions? Can you walk us through this process? Thank you.
MR PALLADINO: Okay. Regarding the first half of your question about meetings in Moscow, the United
States believes that all countries should support direct dialogue between the Government of Afghanistan and
the Taliban to reach an end to the war. And we've been clear that no government, including Russia, can be a
substitute for the Afghan Government in direct negotiations with the Taliban.
Regarding an American representative, I can tell you that in coordination with the Afghan Government, the
United States embassy in Moscow will send a representative to the working level to observe the discussions,
and the United States stands ready to work with all interested parties to support and facilitate a peace
process.
Regarding your second question, can you repeat it, please?
QUESTION: Yeah, sure.
MR PALLADINO: Sure.
QUESTION: So the administration informed the Congress that Russia has not complied with their
requirements of the chemical and biological weapons warfare elimination act. And can you walk us through
this process? What will be next? Is there any decision on sanctions already? And what will happen? Are
there consultations or how will it go? Thank you.
MR PALLADINO: Right, okay. So we made a determination against the Russian Government over its use of
Novichok nerve agent against Sergei and Yulia Skripal back on August 6th. Under the act, the chemical
biological weapons act, the Russian Government had until yesterday, November 6th, to take steps to meet
the conditions required under the act. Yesterday -by yesterday, it had not done so, so we followed what was
required under the act and we informed the Congress that we were unable to certify that the Russian
Federation was in compliance. And so what- as we move forward we will be proceeding with our statutory
requirements. I'll leave it at that.
QUESTION: I have a question on the Palestinian -
MR PALLADINO: Is there anything else on Russia?
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: Russia?
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QUESTION: When do you expect to impose those additional sanctions? Is there a time -- specific timeline
under the statutory guidelines?
MR PALLADINO: The process takes time and we want to get sanctions right. We need to carefully consider
the impact that sanctions have on U.S. national security interests, and I'll leave it at that. But this is
something that we take seriously.
QUESTION: Robert, on -
MR PALLADINO: More on Russia?
QUESTION: On Russia.
QUESTION: On Russia.
MR PALLADINO: On Russia. Francesco.
QUESTION: Yeah. Some congressmen expressed regret that you weren't ready with the plan for immediate
sanctions once a determination was made since you had 90 days to know what were the consequence of the
sanctions on national security and so on. And they said that this kind look as hesitation towards Russia. Do
you - are you going to act quickly to answer those concerns?
MR PALLADINO: We are -- we're going to -- we want to get the sanctions right. It's important that we do so.
Sanctions require - so that's a process that takes time. As far as the law goes, the law is pretty clear that
under the statute, our obligation by yesterday was to inform the Congress, and we met the requirements of
the law.
QUESTION: Robert, can I --
MR PALLADINO: Anything else on Russia?
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: Please.
QUESTION: As part of the law, one of the stipulations is the President shall either downgrade or suspend
diplomatic relations. Is suspending diplomatic relations one of the sanctions that's being considered?
MR PALLADINO: We will follow the - what's required under the act itself. We intend to do that. As far as
what will be considered and what will be imposed, that's - that -- I'm not going to be able to preview future
sanctions in that regard.
Last question on - any more on Russia?
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QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: Is it correct -
QUESTION: Can I ask a question on -
MR PALLADINO: Russia?
QUESTION: -- on the Palestinian-Israeli issue?
QUESTION: Yes.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: Is it correct -- is it correct that there's no timeline for this consultation period?
MR PALLADINO: There -- that is correct.
QUESTION: So in other words, it could last until 20 - it could last as long as the North Korea
denuclearization process or even longer?
MR PALLADINO: Matt, at a time and a place that we so choose, we will -- after we have worked this out, we
will move forward. So let -
QUESTION: Yeah, but there's no statutory deadline for you to act. Right?
MR PALLADINO: Yeah, but we will move forward.
QUESTION: But doesn't it -
MR PALLADINO: We are unaware of a statutory deadline. Okay?
QUESTION: Doesn't this avoid the impact, though, when you're telling a country if you don't do this within
this period of time, here comes the next much tougher tranche of sanctions? And now you say, well, there's
no timeline. We need to get it right. The process takes time. Doesn't that take away the intended bite of the
law?
MR PALLADINO: We don't intend to preview when, but the "when" will come when we are ready and -
because we're going to get it right. And that's all I have on that.
Last -- final question.
QUESTION: An easy question, how is that, on the topic of Israeli --
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MR PALLADINO: Oh, Said. Please, Said.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: Okay. So-
MR PALLADINO: Never easy.
QUESTION: Two quick questions. Prime Minister Netanyahu told Israeli radio that the occupation was
"baloney," to quote him. And he says the powerful can get away with anything, referring to settlements and
grasping of land and demolitions of homes in the West Bank and so on. Do you agree with his assessment
that occupation is baloney?
MR PALLADINO: I would refer you to the prime minister for more information on his reported comments.
Okay?
QUESTION: What is your position on the occupied West Bank? I mean, the last few months have been like
free for all for the Israelis to grasp whatever lands, build more settlements, and demolish more homes, and
so on. And what is your position on the occupied land? After all, Mr. Greenblatt was just there. I don't know
whether he met with any Palestinians, but could you tell us your position on these issues?
MR PALLADINO: Our policy has not changed. Do you have another question?
QUESTION: I'd like to ask you about your comment that this "the 'when' will come when we are ready."
MR PALLADINO: Sanctions take time. How about the -- yeah, sanctions take time to get them right.
QUESTION: The "when" will come when we are ready?
MR PALLADINO: All right. I'll work on my phrasing. (Laughter.) Guys.
QUESTION: But Robert, what about the Congo question?
MR PALLADINO: That's it, guys. Thank you.
(The briefing was concluded at 3:23 p.m.)
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Annex 45
U.S. Department of State, “The Iranian Regime’s Transfer of Arms to Proxy Groups
and Ongoing Missile Development”, Special Briefing, 29 November 2018
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U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
The Iranian Regime's Transfer of Arms to Proxy Groups
and Ongoing Missile Development
Special Briefing
Brian Hook
Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State and Special Representative for Iran
Joint Base Anacostia - Bolling
Washington, DC
November 29, 2018
MODERATOR: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for waiting. Your excellencies,
members of the diplomatic corps, and members of the press, we're very pleased to welcome Special
Representative Hook, who will be briefing today on the Iran Materiel Display. We will have brief
remarks followed by questions. This event is on the record for the press. Let me turn it over to Special
Representative Hook for his remarks. Thank you.
MR HOOK: Good morning, and thank you all for coming. I want to thank Secretary Mattis and the men and
women of our armed forces for their brave service to our nation and for making this display possible. I want to
recognize members of the diplomatic corps from several countries, including South Korea, Japan, Israel, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and
Afghanistan.
I want to also extend a special welcome to His Excellency Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE ambassador; to
Ambassador Ron Dermer of Israel; and to His Excellency Ambassador Shaikh Abdullah bin Rashed Al
Khalifa of Bahrain. The United States deeply values our partnerships with the UAE and Bahrain and Israel,
and I thank all of you for coming today.
In December of last year, UN Ambassador Nikki Haley stood here to highlight the dangers posed by Iran's
dangerous proliferation of missiles across the Middle East. She highlighted how Iran was illegally providing
weapons to Houthi militants in Yemen. It was a clear violation of UN resolutions then, and it remains so today.
She also spoke of the threat these weapons pose to peace and security and to the innocent civilians caught
in the crossfire.
Today, the United States is unveiling new evidence of Iran's ongoing missile proliferation. The Iranian threat
is growing and we are accumulating risk of escalation in the region if we fail to act. In the time since
Ambassador Haley's remarks, Iran's support of the Houthi militants has deepened. Its backing of terrorist
activities across the world has increased, and its efforts to undermine regional stability have expanded.
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The inventory in this display has expanded since December. This is a function of Iran's relentless
commitment to put more weapons into the hands of even more of its proxies, regardless of the suffering. Iran
has been prohibited by several UN resolutions from exporting arms for a decade. These restrictions were in
place starting in 2006 under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and 17 4 7, which I helped to negotiate. The
prohibitions have continued since 2015 under UN Resolution 2231. This display and the items we have
added to it reveal an outlaw regime exporting arms as it pleases.
Today we are unveiling Iran's Sayyad 2C surface-to-air missile, which you see behind me. This missile was
designed and manufactured in Iran, and the writing in Farsi on its side translates as "the hunter missile." The
conspicuous Farsi markings is Iran's way of saying they don't mind being caught violating UN resolutions.
The Sayyad 2C is one of two identical systems interdicted by Saudi Arabia in Yemen earlier this year. The
Iranians wanted to deliver this to the Houthis, who would have used it to target coalition aircraft up to 46
miles away. Given the Houthis' reckless use of other advanced weapons provided by the Iranians, these
missiles pose a clear and present danger to civil aviation in the region.
We are also unveiling anti-tank guided missiles. On display in front of me are two of the three types of anti
tank guided missiles that Iran produces and transfers: the Toophan and the Tosan. One of the Toophan
rockets that is newly added was seized in an arms cache aboard a dhow in the Arabian Sea. The other was
found by Saudi Arabia during a raid in Yemen.
The Tosan rocket on display is also new, and is one of five that were seized in a stockpile by Saudi forces in
Yemen. These missiles enhance the Houthis' capabilities and further intensify the conflict in Yemen.
Fajr rockets have also been added to the display and are located next the anti-tank guided missiles. These
weapons were recovered in Helmand, near Kandahar Air Field, by the Afghan National Army from the
Taliban. Iran has been providing materiel support to the Taliban since at least 2007. These same rockets
have been used by Hamas in the past.
To my left is a new unmanned aerial system: the Shahed 123. We have debris from a Shahed which was
recovered by coalition forces in Afghanistan after it crashed, as well as Shahed components that were
interdicted in Yemen in early 2018. This missile system is primarily designed to conduct covert
reconnaissance and surveillance missions, potentially putting American and coalition forces at risk. There are
several new small arms of Iranian origin included here, such as sniper rifles, RPGs, AK variants, and hand
grenades. These have been provided to us by Bahrain. Iran gave these weapons to Shia militant groups to
carry out attacks against the government. I would like to thank Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Hahmed Al
Khalifa for his commitment to exposing the Iranian regime's activities.
In 2016, senior Iran Revolutionary Guard commander Saeed Qassimi publicly called Bahrain an Iranian
province and said Iran is a base, quote, "for the support of revolution in Bahrain." In a microcosm, this is
exactly how Iran destabilizes the Middle East. But the United States stands with Bahrain to protect its
sovereignty, and we will continue to work together to identify and intercept arms shipments in the region. This
ongoing collaboration with Bahrain, which is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, is critical to the safety of the region.
I want to also highlight the recovered pieces of an Iranian Qiam missile fired by the Houthis into Saudi
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Arabia, which Ambassador Haley unveiled last December. The missile's intended target was the civilian
airport in Riyadh, a G20 airport through which tens of thousands of people travel each day. Imagine a missile
of this size and power hitting a civilian aircraft or terminal one at the airport.
The new weapons we are disclosing today illustrate the scale of Iran's destructive role across the region. The
same kind of rockets here today could tomorrow land in a public market in Kabul or an international airport.
As the Bahraini victims of attacks carried out with some of the weapons here could tell you, the Iranian
regime uses arms to export revolution, prolong crises, and inflict death and suffering. The tools of Tehran's
foreign policy are here before you today. Tehran is intent on increasing the lethality and reach of these
weapons to deepen its presence throughout the region.
This is why it is especially important that we get the de-escalation of conflicts in places like Yemen right.
Secretaries Pompeo and Mattis have called for a ceasefire in Yemen, and the United States is committed to
the efforts led by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Iran has no legitimate interest in Yemen, other than to
expand its sphere of influence and to create a Shia corridor of control. Although Iran's role in Yemen has
been underreported by the media, there is no question Iran has intensified the humanitarian catastrophe and
prolonged the conflict. Iran has been funding, arming, and training the Houthis, which has allowed them to
continue to fight well beyond what would have made any sense at all.
The United States and our coalition partners have provided billions in aid to the Yemenis, while Iran has
provided nothing but weapons and fighters. Just today Houthi rebels fired missiles into Saudi Arabia. This
strike is an example of the destabilizing agenda the Houthis are pursuing in partnership with Iran. They act in
this way even as UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths is exerting maximum effort with our full support to bring
the parties together for talks.
In the months ahead, we must be careful not to affirm Iran's role as a legitimate political actor in Yemen. The
clerics in Tehran will exploit any opening to gain a foothold in Yemen, a place where it has no business being
in to begin with. Historically, there has not been a religious connection between Iran's Twelver Shiites and
Yemen's Houthis, who are Fiver Shiites. In fact, Iran's religious authorities have long been dismissive of the
Fiver Shiites.
Just imagine what Yemen would look like in the future with an entrenched and enduring Iranian presence. We
already know how this movie ends, and we cannot watch a new version of Lebanese Hizballah slowly
emerge in the Arabian Peninsula. Since the end of 2006, Iran has supplied Hizballah with thousands of
precision rockets, missiles, and small arms. It now has more than 100,000 rockets or missiles in its stockpile.
If Iran were allowed to operate with similar freedom in Yemen, we can expect the Lebanization of Yemen.
The Houthis have launched Iranian-origin missiles at Riyadh, with an estimated range of 560 miles. Iran has
funded the Houthis with hundreds of millions of dollars since the conflict broke out. With Iran's ongoing help,
the Houthi threat will grow as their capabilities steadily expand.
Iran could use such newfound influence as a power broker and arms dealer to threaten our allies and
partners in the region and unravel the stability that we have worked so hard to achieve in the Gulf. It could
also create challenges in the Bab al-Man dab Strait in much the same way Tehran leverages its proximity to
the Strait of Hormuz. An estimated 4.5 million barrels of oil per day transits through the Bab al-Mandab, while
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about 17 million barrels a day flow through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has threatened repeatedly over many
years to close the Strait of Hormuz. Give Iran a free hand in Yemen and it can threaten to close both straits
and commit acts of maritime aggression with impunity. Just as we must constrain Iranian expansion in Syria,
the Golan Heights, and in Iraq, we must also prevent Iran from entrenching itself in Yemen.
I want to now highlight the Iranian regime's investment in missile testing and development. It is increasing.
The regime's pace of missile launches did not diminish after implementation of the Iran nuclear deal in
January of 2016. Iran has conducted numerous ballistic missile launches and space launches since this time
as it continues to prioritize missile development as a tool of revolution. We assess that in January of 2017,
Iran launched a medium-range missile, believed to be the Khorramshahr. It can carry a payload of more than
500 kilograms and could be used to carry nuclear warheads. Its suspected range is over 1,200 miles, which
is far enough to target some European capitals. Iran's ongoing missile development puts Europe in its range.
Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the region, with more than 10 ballistic missile systems either in its
inventory or under development. Any environment where Iran is able to operate freely can become a forward
deployed missile base for such systems and for many other kinds of weapons that you see here today. This
threatens Israel and other partners, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Just this month, rockets rained down on Israel from territory controlled by Iran's Palestinian partner Hamas.
In Lebanon, we have evidence that Iran is helping Hizballah build missile production facilities. In Iraq,
credible reports indicate that Iran is transferring ballistic missiles to Shia militia groups. This comes as these
militias carried out highly provocative attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and Basra in
September, which we know that Iran did nothing to stop.
Iran is also dumping cash and forces into conflict zones to support its proxies from the Levant to the Arabian
Peninsula. It has extended $4.6 billion in lines of credit to the Assad regime, provided more than $100 million
to Palestinian groups including Ha mas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and manages as many as 10,000 Shia
fighters in Syria, some of whom are children as young as 12 years old.
As the world strives toward peace and security in the Middle East, we are working to reverse advances made
by Iran and its proxies over the last several years. In fact, we are using the full scope of our sanctions
authorities to inflict real costs on Iran. In July of 2017, we sanctioned 18 key individuals and entities for
supporting Iran's ballistic missile program. In January, the U.S. designated four additional entities. In May, we
designated five Iranians for providing missile expertise to the Houthis. These individuals were also
responsible for transferring weapons to Yemen on behalf of the Qods Force.
While we are sanctioning Iran's missile activity and weapons transfers, our economic pressure is much
broader. Earlier this month, the United States reimposed the remaining sanctions that were lifted by the Iran
deal. This is the largest ever single-day action targeting the Iranian regime. Our sanctions went back into
place on more than 700 individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft. This sanctions campaign puts us in a much
stronger position to be confronting the same threats that I have described to you today. Our maximum
pressure campaign will continue until Iran - the Iranian regime -- decides to change its destructive policies.
The regime can change its policies, or it can continue to watch its economy crumble.
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For 39 years, the Iranian regime has shaped events in the region through illegal weapons transfers, proxies,
and terror --a deadly trifecta. President Trump has made it clear that the United States will no longer tolerate
the status quo. We seek a new and comprehensive deal with Iran that addresses the full range of Iran's
destructive activities in the region. As Secretary Pompeo said in his speech announcing our new strategy in
May, Iran must stop testing and proliferating missiles, stop launching and developing nuclear-capable
missiles, and stop supporting militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. Iran needs to start
behaving like a normal country and surrender its title as the world's number one sponsor of terrorism.
As the special representative for Iran, I have met with partners and allies across the globe to share the
concerns that I have shared today and explain the purposes of our pressure campaign. Most of the countries
I meet with share our assessment of the Iranian threat, and I invite any who remain on the fence to visit this
weapons display to see the evidence for themselves. Delegations from nearly 70 countries have already
visited here, and we welcome more.
Despite this clear evidence, not all countries are convinced of the need to take action. Too many remain on
the sidelines, arguing that now is not the time to pressure the regime. But this approach has enabled -- and
will continue to enable -- Tehran to expand its presence in the region and become a more destructive force in
the Middle East, to say nothing of Europe. The current international environment has created unacceptably
low expectations for the regime in Tehran. If, as some people argue, the demands of the United States for the
Iranian regime seem too many, it is because Iran's malign activities are too numerous. If our demands seem
too unrealistic, it is because the world's expectations are too low. We cannot simply admire the Iranian threat
any longer.
The United States has a positive vision for the Middle East, where every state retains the right to defend
itself. But no outlaw regime, like the one in Tehran, can freely undermine the sovereignty of other nations.
This is not foreign policy; it is state-sponsored, revolutionary terrorism. The Middle East will be best served
when an Iranian Government respects the rule of law, abides by fundamental standards and commitments,
and rejects terrorism.
It is now up to the supreme leader to do something out of character and act in the interests of the Iranian
people. Is it better to remain isolated from the world as an international pariah or to benefit and prosper from
inclusion in the international community? It should not be a difficult choice. There is nothing noble about
driving a great and proud nation into the ground.
The Iranian people have a rich legacy and a culture dating back to Cyrus the Great, and they deserve a
government that represents their interests and not just the interests of their corrupt leaders. This room could
just as easily been used to display the artifacts from Persian history or renowned contemporary artists from
Iran, but instead we see only missiles, rockets, and small arms. The clerical regime in Iran has chosen this
path, but the Iranian people are not destined to follow it. If Tehran changes its policies, a better future awaits
the Iranian people.
History shows us clearly that America has no permanent enemies. Throughout our history, enemies torn
apart by conflict often become the best allies united in peace, as Japan and others can attest. We hope for
the same future with the Iranian people. The choice is now for their government to make. Thank you.
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MODERATOR: Thank you very much. We have time for a few questions. May I ask please that you wait for
a microphone, that you state your name and outlet, and please - so that we can get as many questions as
possible - limit to one question. And I'll also say that if you have very technical questions about the
equipment, we may take those for later. And we'll start with Reuters please.
QUESTION: ldrees Ali from Reuters. One of the missiles that you mentioned here was launched five days
after Ambassador Haley gave her presentation last year. What benefit do you think there is of showing these
weapons publicly, and how do you respond to critics who say this is simply a political stunt and propaganda
that actually increases tensions in the region?
MR HOOK: I haven't heard anybody say this is a political stunt. This is simply putting out in broad daylight
Iran's missiles and small arms and rockets and UAVs and drones. That missile right there landed right next to
Riyadh's international airport, and it's very important for nations to see with their own eyes that this is a grave
and escalating threat. We are one missile attack away from a regional conflict. These missiles -- we've been
very lucky -- for the most part have not hit their intended target. But luck is not a strategy, and the
international community needs to do more to get after the proliferation of Iran's missiles.
The Iran nuclear deal has created a climate where so long as Iran is in compliance with a nonproliferation
deal of modest gains and temporary benefits, that so long as Iran is in compliance with this deal, somehow
they're in compliance with all sorts of international norms and standards.
The fact of the matter is, is that during the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran has expanded its
threats to peace and security in almost every category: terrorism, terror finance, cyber attacks, maritime
aggression, human rights violations. And so we are now out of the deal and it gives us a great deal of
freedom and leverage to address the entire range of Iran's threats to peace and security.
And so our pressure campaign that the President and the Secretary have put in place really yield two very,
very concrete benefits: One, it will starve the regime of the revenue it needs to destabilize the Middle East
and terrorize other nations. We need to starve these militias of funding. The other thing it does is it creates
pressure on the regime to come back to the negotiating table so that we can get a new and better deal that
doesn't just address the nuclear threat that Iran presents, but also addresses the entire range: the terrorism,
the nuclear threat, the cyber aggression, maritime aggression, the entire range. And we are very confident
that we have the right strategy with the right diplomacy in place.
MODERATOR: Nadia, please.
QUESTION: Thank you. Nadia Bilbassy with Al Arabiya. Now that you're showing us an expanded evidence
of Iran involvement, what mechanism do you have to stop these weapons from reaching proxies, in particular
the Houthis in Yemen? And what leverage do you have on allied countries like Iraq, for example? You just
said that there's weapons that goes through to the Shiite militias in Iraq, and Iraq is a close ally of the United
States.
MR HOOK: Right.
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QUESTION: Thank you.
MR HOOK: Now that our sanctions are back in place, the President and the Secretary of State will be
resolutely focused on sanctions enforcement, and we are doing everything we can to deter and discover
sanctions evasion. All of our diplomatic posts in the region, especially in the Middle East and in Europe, are
putting in place strategies to detect and to prevent sanctions evasion, and that includes the missile
proliferation, the missile shipments that you described.
It also is very much going after the money. Eighty percent of Iran's revenue comes from oil exports. We have
taken over a million barrels of oil off of Iran's export list and many more barrels will be coming off very soon.
And so we have - our maximum economic pressure campaign is focused on the economics. We also need to
be restoring deterrents. This display today helps educate people on this clear and present threat that we
face. And we urge all nations, especially the European Union, to move missile sanctions through the
European Union so that we can start managing the risk of a regional conflict through missile proliferation.
MODERATOR: Let me take VOA, please.
QUESTION: Hi, I'm with the VOA, Farhad Pouladi, Persian Service. Two questions: First of all, are there
more actions coming in the way towards the Iranian authorities to stop their malign activities? If you can go
briefly over that, whether they are from Treasury or from the Pentagon. And what leverage do you have to
convince others to join the campaign of maximum pressure against Iran? Thank you.
MR HOOK: Well, on the first question, we never give advance notice on our sanctions. That's something
which is held very closely until they're announced. What I can say is that since we have reimposed our
sanctions on November 5th, we have already done two rounds of designations targeting individuals and
entities who are trying to evade sanctions, and that we worked very closely with Secretary Mnuchin at
Treasury on these efforts. And so yes, there will be more sanctions. We have already done two rounds just
since we've restored the sanctions lifted under the Iran nuclear deal.
In terms of leverage, I think we've been very successful so far with putting in place an economic pressure
that is going to drive the Iranian economy into a place that's going to really force the regime to decide: Is the
cost-benefit of their revolutionary behavior in their favor? Our policy in the Middle East is to reverse the
balance of power in favor of our friends and our partners. Iran has had a really good run over many years,
partly enabled by the cover that the Iran nuclear deal provided.
And so I think now we are in a much better position with our regional partners, with the United States. We
have had enormous cooperation from European companies. Over 100 major firms have announced that they
are ending business in Iran and, if given the choice between doing business in the United States and doing
business in Iran, it's the fastest decision you'll ever make as an executive. And so we have been very
pleased with the progress we've made so far on our sanctions.
MODERATOR: Let me take AFP, and then I will take one last over here.
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QUESTION: Thank you. Tom Watkins, AFP. Can you explain a little bit about the timing of today's
presentation? Why now, why today? As you know, there's obviously been a tremendous amount of criticism
in the media recently about Saudi Arabia. Is this to try and sort of shift the narrative a bit, or can you just talk
about why you're doing this again? Thank you.
MR HOOK: Well, we're doing it again because our inventory has expanded. That's just the nature of this
regime. As this regime continues its aggressive and revolutionary foreign policy, we interdict more and more
equipment. And so at some point, we hope to have this room no longer build its inventory. We need to reduce
the inventory here. And so it's just a function of Iran's campaign to export arms in violation of UN embargoes
across the Middle East.
In terms of the timing, it's -- there isn't anything tied to what's happening in Saudi Arabia. The Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense testified yesterday before Congress, had a very fulsome discussion
about Saudi Arabia. Secretary Pompeo published an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal yesterday explaining
our policy. And so today, of course it's related. Many of the missiles here were interdicted by Saudi Arabia,
which illustrates just how much of a threat it's under and how much of a threat UAE and Bahrain and Israel
are under because of these kinds of weapons, whether it's in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen. And we need
to get serious about going after this stuff.
MODERATOR: So our last question is Al Hurra.
QUESTION: Hisham Bourar, Al Hurra TV. First I have a question, but I want to follow up on the AFP question
first. To what extent the vote yesterday in the Senate to sort of stop the support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen
hurt your efforts to curb these Iranian activities?
And my question is: You spoke about the risk accumulating if you fail to act. What would that look like? Would
it look like a military strike at some point? And given that you have tried the sanctions and the maximum
pressure, could anything short of a military strike against Iran stop Iran from continuing its proliferation?
MR HOOK: On the first question about Yemen, abandoning Yemen right now would do immense damage to
U.S. national security interests and to those of our partners in the Middle East. Right now in Yemen we are
carrying out three vital missions. We are trying to assist the coalition in fighting Iranian-backed Houthi
fighters, we are decapitating al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and we are promoting Americans - we are
protecting Americans who are working in Saudi Arabia or transiting the strategic waterways around Yemen.
We definitely want to bolster the conditions for peace in Yemen. We have a number of goals which I would
describe as working in parallel tracks. Secretary Mattis has talked about the need to build capacity of
legitimate Yemeni security forces. We need to strengthen the defensive capabilities of our regional partners.
We need to support our partners' right to defend themselves against Houthi attacks supported by the Iranian
regime. And at the same time, we are calling for an urgent end to the fighting, and we hope that all parties
will attend the consultations next month in Sweden under the good offices of UN Special Representative
Martin Griffiths.
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What was the second part of your question?
QUESTION: The other question, you spoke about, if the risk is actually accumulating if you fail to act..
MODERATOR: Please wait for the mic, sir.
QUESTION: ...would that take the form of a military strike? Is it -- is the - going to war with Iran an option
given that the sanctions and the maximum pressure policies have failed so far to curb Iran and to stop it from
smuggling weapons to these militias?
MR HOOK: After the Shia militia attacks on our diplomatic facilities in Basra and Baghdad, the President put
out a statement that promised swift and decisive action if any of our diplomatic facilities or diplomats are
attacked or injured. And so we have been very clear with the Iranian regime that we will not hesitate to use
military force when our interests are threatened. I think they understand that. I think they understand that very
clearly.
I think right now, while we have the military option on the table, our preference is to use all of the tools
at our disposal diplomatically. And as I said earlier, being out of the Iran deal has given us a great deal of
diplomatic freedom to address the full range of Iran's threats.
And so we are working very closely with partners around the world. We have had road show teams from
State and Treasury that have visited I think almost 40 countries now, and that's helping to explain our
sanctions regime and its purposes. And we've been very pleased with the progress that we've made so far.
There's a lot of work that remains to be done, and one of the messages that we've been consistently
delivering is that preserving the Iran nuclear deal cannot come at the expense of regional stability, and just
because Iran is in compliance with the deal does not mean that everything else is fine. And as we see here
today and the missile here behind me, this is a grave and escalating threat that we must do more to address.
Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Thank you. That is the conclusion of our press conference. I want to thank Special
Representative Hook and also want to thank the Department of Defense and our hosts here at Joint Base
Anacostia-Bolling. If I could ask the media please to hold your seats for a moment, we're going to have some
instructions for you, and then we can allow the dip corps to depart. Thank you.
BUSINESS ({BUSINESS)
Commercial_and_Business Affairs Office(http//www state qo/elebcba/index_htm)
Key_Officers of_Foreign Service Posts (http//www.state gov/documents/organization/111812pdf
Office of Global Partnerships (http://www.state.gov/s/partnershipsD
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/sdbu/index.html
CAREERS ({CAREERS)
Civil Service Officer (https://careers.state.gov/work/civil-serviceD
Consular Fellows Program (https://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-service/consular-fellows)
Foreign Service Officer (https//careers_state qov/work/foreign-service/officer/)
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/11/28766L.htm
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The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for
information from the U.S. State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or
privacy policies contained therein.
Note: documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) require Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher to view, down
load Adobe Acrobat Reader (http://get.adobe.com/reader/}.
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/11/28766L.htm
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Annex 46
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, “Comprehensive
Iran Fact Sheet”, 18 December 2018
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Comprehensive Iran Fact Sheet
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Comprehensive Iran Fact Sheet
Fact Sheet
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS
December 18, 2018
IRAN HAS INCREASINGLY DESTABILIZED THE MIDDLE EAST: This regime has used the benefits it received as a
result of sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to build ballistic missiles. support
terrorists and terrorism, steal critical resources from its own people and wreak havoc throughout the Middle East
and beyond. Our European Union partners have assured us the JCPOA will not be used to stop action against Iran's
malign behavior.
Instead of focusing on the well-being of its population, and using its economic resources to build a more stable, secure,
and prosperous Iran, the regime has:
Spent in excess of $16 billion propping up the Assad regime and supporting its other partners and proxies in Syria, Iraq,
and Yemen since 2012;
Provided terror group Lebanese Hizballah with approximately $700 million every year; and
Provided approximately $100 million a year to terror groups including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Since the implementation of the JCPOA, Iran's military budget has grown by 37%-a rate far higher than the overall
budget growth or the economic growth during the same period.
Iran has exploited the international financial system, including by running an extensive, large-scale currency exchange
network that procured and transferred millions of dollars to the IRGC-Qods Force in order to support its malign regional
activities and facilitate the hostile activities of regional proxy groups.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) economic corruption is widespread. The IRGC and its affiliated
companies in Iran extort bribes, intimidate competition, and suppress genuine economic growth in Iran.
PROTECTING AMERICA: The United States will act to deny Iranian leadership the resources, wealth, funds, and
capacity to continue to foment terrorism around the world and to deny the people inside of Iran the freedoms that
they so richly deserve. The re-imposition of pre-JCPOA sanctions is only the beginning of the most aggressive
sanctions campaign in history.
MAXIMUM ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO SUPPORT A BRIGHTER GLOBAL FUTURE: Most of Iran's 80 million citizens
have never known an Iran that prospered in peace with its neighbors and commanded the admiration of the world.
Nevertheless, the United States believes that the future of Iran belongs to its people. They are the rightful heirs to
a rich culture and an ancient land.
Our sanctions are designed to bring the Iranian regime back to the negotiating table as quickly as possible. The Iranian
regime has used the proceeds generated by the sectors that we have targeted with our sanctions to engage in a range of
malign activities, including systematic human rights abuses, promoting regional instability, facilitating proliferation
activities, and lining the pockets of corrupt regime officials at the expense of the Iranian people.
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Comprehensive Iran Fact Sheet
The United States maintains broad authorizations and exceptions under U.S. sanctions that allow for the sale of
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices to Iran from the United States or by U.S. persons or U.S.
--owned or --controlled foreign entities. U.S. sanctions laws provide similar allowances for sales of food, agricultural
commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Iran by non-U.S. persons.
Iran's increased oil revenues could have gone towards improving the lives of the Iranian people, instead they went to
terrorists, dictators, and proxy militias.
We hear the cries of the Iranian people..."The people are paupers while the mullahs live like gods," and our message is
simple: we hear you, and we are with you.
An important goal of U.S. Iran sanctions is to curtail the Iranian regime's ability to engage in malign activities, and to
encourage the regime to change its behavior. Our demands of the Iranian regime are not unreasonable, and are, in fact,
very simple:
Iran must stop its proliferation-sensitive nuclear programs;
Iran must end unjust detention of American and foreign citizens; and
Iran must stop its threatening behavior against its neighbors and its support for terrorism.
In return for these actions, the United States would be willing to enter into a formal treaty with Iran to end the principal
components of our sanctions against the regime. We would be willing to re-establish full diplomatic and commercial
relationships with Iran, and we would be prepared to allow Iran to have advanced technology. Moreover, we would be
prepared to support the modernization and reintegration of the Iranian economy into the international economic system.
For additional information on Iran sanctions, please visit the following:
U.S. Department of State Office of Sanctions Policy and Implementation (https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/in
dex.htm)
U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions
[Programs/pages/iran.asp)
BUSINESS (!BUSINESS)
Commercial and Business Affairs Office {http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/index.htm)
Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts {http://www.state.gov/documents/orqanization/111812.pdQ
Office of Global Partnerships {http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/)
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization {http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/sdbu/index.htm)
CAREERS (!CAREERS)
Civil Service Officer {https://careers.state.gov/work/civil-serviceQ
Consular Fellows Program {https://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-service/consular-fellows)
Foreign Service Officer {https://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-service/officer0
Foreign Service Specialist (https:1/careers.state.gov/work/foreign-service/specialistl)
International Organizations (http://iocareers.state.gov/Main/Home)
Student Programs (https:1/careers.state.gov/intern/student-programs/)
USAJobs: Working for America (http://www.usajobs.gov/)
EDUCATION &EXCHANGES(IYOUTHANDEDUCA[ION)
Diplomatic History (http://history state gov)
Discover Diplomacy {http://diplomacy.state.gov/discoverdiplomacyQ
Exchange Visitor Program{http://j1visa.state.gov)
Fulbright Program {http://eca.state.gov/fulbright)
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2018/288155.hum
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Comprehensive Iran Fact Sheet
The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S.
State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies
contained therein.
Note: documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) require Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher to view, download_Adobe_Acrobat
Reader (http://get.adobe.com/reader/).
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Annex 47
U.S. Department of State, “Interview with Martha MacCallum of Fox News”,
23 January 2019
- 321 -
- 322 -
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Interview With Martha Maccallum of Fox News
Interview
Michael R. Pompeo
Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, DC
January 23, 2019
QUESTION: You said new winds are blowing in the world and they're positive. You pointed to the Brexit
example and also to President Trump. Nations matter, borders matter. One headline said, "Mike Pompeo
drops an anti-globalist stink bomb ... with a smile."
SECRETARY POMPEO: (Laughter.) Well, I did smile. Martha, it's good to be with you. What I did was try to
explain to those who were sitting there in Davos why it is that America has been an enormous force for
good over these two years of the Trump administration, how our policies make not only America safer but
the whole world, and contribute to economic growth and wealth creation and freedom all around the world.
Those were the things I talked about -- the importance of the nation-state as the fundamental building block
for national security and, frankly, for stability in regions as well.
It can sometimes seem disruptive. It can sometimes seem like America is acting in ways that are causing
trouble, but these fundamental premises that the -- that were built out over 70 years ago need to be
re looked, and that's what President Trump is driving.
QUESTION: That, obviously, brings to mind NATO and a report the other day that the President had said to
top national security officials that he didn't necessarily see the point anymore of NATO. Do you agree?
SECRETARY POMPEO: This administration has done more good for NATO than the previous several
administrations combined. The increased resources available for Secretary General Stoltenberg and for
NATO partners around the world are significantly greater, approaching now $100 billion greater than they
would have been absent the pressure that President Trump put on. He did that for American national
security. That is, we want NATO to be stronger to protect America. But importantly, European nations now
are more firmly protected as well.
QUESTION: So it sounds like you think it was a waste of time that the House yesterday went through the
process of passing a bill that would reject any effort that the President might make to withdraw from NATO.
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SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah. That's silly.
QUESTION: You look at people like General Mattis and Brett McGurk, who on their way out really made an
effort to point out their concerns about the President's adherence to alliances or his confidence in these
alliances going forward. And you talk about how the dynamic needs to change - 70 years later, we're in a
different world.
SECRETARY POMPEO: President Trump knows that America can't go it alone. We need partners. We've
built out coalitions of dozens and dozens of countries to defeat ISIS. We've built an enormous coalition to
put pressure on North Korea, to protect not only the United States but Japan, South Korea, and the whole
region.
President Trump understands that strong nations will have alliances that work on behalf of their countries
and all countries, and so that's what we're trying to do not only with NATO but with every organization
around the world. Is it working? Is it delivering security for the American people? If it is, we'll reinforce, and
where it's not we'll work to make it better.
This President is committed to ensuring that we have security for the American people, and by that we'll
also make sure that the world is safer as well.
QUESTION: But there are some people who ask the question about Article 5. If Montenegro is attacked,
should young men and women from the United States fight to defend Montenegro? What's the answer to
that?
SECRETARY POMPEO: The answer is coalitions can work when every member of the coalition is doing
their fair share. That's how these relationships have worked for an awfully long time. And unfortunately,
some countries took a vacation for 20 years and thought that the threats from Russia or from Asia or from
all the places in the Middle East and terrorism -- they weren't doing what they needed to do to protect their
countries. Our urging is this: every country needs to make sure it's contributing enough to make sure that
their country is secure, and when they do, America will be with them to support their efforts.
QUESTION: So yes, American soldiers would go to defend Montenegro, if needed?
SECRETARY POMPEO: I'm not going to get into hypotheticals about what might happen or how a certain
scenario might unfold, but make no mistake about it: America has always been there when there were
important American and global interests at stake.
QUESTION: With regard to the decision to leave Syria - and it's a gradual decision, is what we're seeing
play out -- two new attacks over the -- one attempted and four killed last week in Syria. How long is the
commitment there?
SECRETARY POMPEO: I was with the President over- when our Americans were returned on this past
Saturday. It's always difficult to be with those families. These are patriots. These are great Americans who
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sacrificed their life to help keep America safe. President Trump understands that and respects that
commitment. And so in Syria, President Trump has made a tactical decision. We're going to withdraw our
2,000 uniformed military personnel from that country, but make no mistake about it: the defeat of the
caliphate, the ISIS caliphate in Syria, is almost complete. We're going to stay there till it's done. This threat
from radical Islamic terrorism is a global threat, and America will posture itself in a way to ensure that we're
doing all that we can to protect the American people from that threat.
QUESTION: So not on the ground, bombing from a distance -- is that the way you see it in the future?
SECRETARY POMPEO: I think what President Trump will do is he'll -- we'll look at each situation and make
the best decision on how to approach it. If it requires American forces to be someplace, we'll do that.
President Trump very much wants to end these long, drawn-out -- 17 years now in Afghanistan. He says
let's find a way to achieve the ends to protect Americans from the threat from radical Islamic terrorism, but
let's see if we can do it in a way that is sustainable and makes sense.
QUESTION: What do you say to those like Brett McGurk, who I mentioned before, who say that no one's
happier than Russia and Iran when they hear the news that the United States is pulling out of Syria, and
likely in the near-term future out of Afghanistan as well?
SECRETARY POMPEO: It's a great question. Let's talk about happiness in Iran and Russia. What is
Russia seeing from the Trump administration? Hundreds of sanctions, an enormous military buildup by the
United States of America, a missile posture --a missile defense review that makes sure that America will be
capable of defending itself not only next year but 20 years from now. I assure you that none of these things
sat well with Vladimir Putin.
Let's talk about Iran. Do you think they're happy that the largest set of sanctions ever emplaced on an
economy -- that is likely to fall into recession by the spring of this year -- makes the Iranians happy? To see
the global coalition against Iran that has been put in place -- not only Arab countries, but countries from Asia
and Africa will join us in February in Warsaw for a ministerial that will address Middle East stability and Iran.
I don't think for one moment those two countries believe they're in a better place today with the Trump
administration than they were with Barack Obama and John Kerry in charge of this country.
QUESTION: So John Kerry, former Secretary of State, was in Davos. He was asked what advice he would
give to President Trump.
[A video was played.]
SECRETARY POMPEO: I must tell you, we don't pay much attention to the advice that Secretary Kerry's
providing to our administration. We're doing our best to clean up the failures that occurred on his watch.
QUESTION: With regard to pulling out of Syria and Afghanistan -- that's the plan as well, right, to pull out of
Afghanistan?
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SECRETARY POMPEO: I'm not going to comment on the future plans and intentions in any of those
places. The President will make those announcements when the time is right.
QUESTION: So what do you say to those who look back at Bush doctrine, that it's better to fight them there
than fight them here? That was the post-9/11 -
SECRETARY POMPEO: Well, Martha, we are. But we are. We are. We took down a caliphate that grew in
the previous administration. You remember, Martha. You remember the pictures of people kneeling on
beaches and people in cages on fire. This is the space, this is the real estate that ISIS built out prior to the
time that the Trump administration came into office. And we literally are in the last set of square kilometers
in Syria. We're done in Iraq with the real estate; we took back Mosul. We still have work to do. ISIS and the
threat from terrorism remains, to be sure. But we made enormous progress, and we did it there.
QUESTION: You're a former military man. What do you say to those who look at the Kurds who fought
alongside us, who don't want to be abandoned there and who feel very vulnerable if we leave their side?
SECRETARY POMPEO: I think the President was very clear about his expectation with how the Kurds will
need to be treated after the time that the U.S. military personnel depart. We understand the work that they
did alongside of us. It was enormously important and good work, and we're going to ensure that the Kurds
have a proper place in Syria after our departure.
QUESTION: And you think that Turkey will abide by that?
SECRETARY POMPEO: I've had lots of conversations. I think we have a way forward.
QUESTION: North Korea. Some look at North Korea and remember the meeting, the first meeting that the
President had with Kim Jong-un - shaking hands, President came back, he said no doubt in his mind that
the denuclearization process was underway and that it would absolutely happen. Now there are reports that
there's a new top-secret missile base, and perhaps 19 new missiles that we can't identify the locations of. Is
that progress?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Let me start by saying the American people should be -- should rest assured that
the United States understands deeply what's taking place in North Korea. Sometimes things pop in press
reports and folks act like it's news. The American people should understand that the United States
Intelligence Community and our security apparatus knows full well what activities are taking place and,
frankly, which ones aren't.
With respect to the negotiation -
QUESTION: Are you saying that those are not taking place?
SECRETARY POMPEO: I just want the American people to understand that the United States Intelligence
Community is fully aware of what's going on in North Korea and those things which are not. I don't comment
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on U.S. intelligence substantively.
Second, with respect to the negotiations, President Trump and I have both, for the -- from the very
beginning, from the first time I went to North Korea as the CIA director, understand that this is going to be a
process that is going to take some time. First step: stopping their testing of their missile program. Second
step: stopping their nuclear tests. Those still continue. There's been real progress made. There are many
conversations going on. Chairman Kim continues to assure the President of the United States he is intent
on denuclearization, and I hope that at the end of February, when the two leaders get together, we can
make a substantial step along the way.
QUESTION: Quick question for you on Kansas politics. A lot of speculation out there that you might
consider running for Pat Roberts' seat. There were reports that you spent some time over the weekend with
Republican strategist Ward Baker to discuss that possibility, and that Mitch McConnell is urging you to run.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Lots of folks have reached out to me and suggested I ought to do that. I have
suggested to them that I have a very full plate as Secretary of State, and I intend to keep doing this so long
as President Trump will commit to it.
QUESTION: So no intention to get involved in the Senate race in Kansas?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Martha, every day I'm trying to make sure that I'm doing what President Trump
wants me to do to keep America safe. That's my singular focus.
QUESTION: Is Mitch McConnell trying to change your mind about that? I know that Kris Kobach, who lost
the governor's race there, is considered a possibility to run for that seat.
SECRETARY POMPEO: I spoke to Senator McConnell once. He asked me if I'd think about it, and I told
him I appreciated the phone call.
QUESTION: Would you support Kris Kobach if he decides to run in that seat?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Martha, I'm so far out of politics. I think it might even be a federal violation if I
answered that question, so I'm going to just say I appreciate your interest.
QUESTION: Secretary Pompeo, thank you very much.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you, Martha.
QUESTION: Great to be with you today.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Wonderful to be with you as well.
QUESTION: Thanks for your time.
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Annex 48
U.S. President, “President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address”,
5 February 2019
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President Donald J. Trump's State of the Union Address IT. ..
https ://www. w hitehouse. gov /briefings-statements/president-...
REMARKS
President Donald J. Trump's State of the
Union Address
Issued on: February 5, 2019
* * *
Remarks as prepared for delivery
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
Madam Speaker, Mr. Vice President, Members of Congress, the First Lady of
the United States, and my fellow Americans:
We meet tonight at a moment of unlimited potential. As we begin a new
Congress, I stand here ready to work with you to achieve historic
breakthroughs for all Americans.
Millions of our fellow citizens are watching us now, gathered in this great
chamber, hoping that we will govern not as two parties but as one Nation.
The agenda I will lay out this evening is not a Republican agenda or a
Democrat agenda. It is the agenda of the American people.
Many of us campaigned on the same core promises: to defend American
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jobs and demand fair trade for American workers; to rebuild and revitalize
our Nation's infrastructure; to reduce the price of healthcare and
prescription drugs; to create an immigration system that is safe, lawful,
modern and secure; and to pursue a foreign policy that puts America's
interests first.
There is a new opportunity in American politics, if only we have the courage
to seize it. Victory is not winning for our party. Victory is winning for our
country.
This year, America will recognize two important anniversaries that show us
the majesty of America's mission, and the power of American pride.
In June, we mark 75 years since the start of what General Dwight D.
Eisenhower called the Great Crusade the Allied liberation of Europe in
World War II. On D-Day, June 6, 1944, 15,000 young American men jumped
from the sky, and 60,000 more stormed in from the sea, to save our
civilization from tyranny. Here with us tonight are three of those heroes:
Private First Class Joseph Reilly, Staff Sergeant Irving Locker, and Sergeant
Herman Zeitchik. Gentlemen, we salute you.
In 2019, we also celebrate 50 years since brave young pilots flew a quarter of
a million miles through space to plant the American flag on the face of the
moon. Half a century later, we are joined by one of the Apollo 11 astronauts
who planted that flag: Buzz Aldrin. This year, American astronauts will go
back to space on American rockets.
In the 20th century, America saved freedom, transformed science, and
redefined the middle class standard of living for the entire world to see.
Now, we must step boldly and bravely into the next chapter of this great
American adventure, and we must create a new standard of living for the
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21st century. An amazing quality of life for all of our citizens is within our
reach.
We can make our communities safer, our families stronger, our culture richer,
our faith deeper, and our middle class bigger and more prosperous than ever
before.
But we must reject the politics of revenge, resistance, and retribution - and
embrace the boundless potential of cooperation, compromise, and the
common good.
Together, we can break decades of political stalemate. We can bridge old
divisions, heal old wounds, build new coalitions, forge new solutions, and
unlock the extraordinary promise of America's future. The decision is ours to
make.
We must choose between greatness or gridlock, results or resistance, vision
or vengeance, incredible progress or pointless destruction.
Tonight, I ask you to choose greatness.
Over the last 2 years, my Administration has moved with urgency and
historic speed to confront problems neglected by leaders of both parties
over many decades.
In just over 2 years since the election, we have launched an unprecedented
economic boom - a boom that has rarely been seen before. We have
created 5.3 million new jobs and importantly added 600,000 new
manufacturing jobs - something which almost everyone said was
impossible to do, but the fact is, we are just getting started.
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Wages are rising at the fastest pace in decades, and growing for blue collar
workers, who I promised to fight for, faster than anyone else. Nearly 5
million Americans have been lifted off food stamps. The United States
economy is growing almost twice as fast today as when I took office, and we
are considered far and away the hottest economy anywhere in the world.
Unemployment has reached the lowest rate in half a century. African
American, Hispanic-American and Asian-American unemployment have all
reached their lowest levels ever recorded. Unemployment for Americans
with disabilities has also reached an all-time low. More people are working
now than at any time in our history-- 157 million.
We passed a massive tax cut for working families and doubled the child tax
credit.
We virtually ended the estate, or death, tax on small businesses, ranches,
and family farms.
We eliminated the very unpopular Obamacare individual mandate penalty
and to give critically ill patients access to life-saving cures, we passed right to
try.
My Administration has cut more regulations in a short time than any other
administration during its entire tenure. Companies are coming back to our
country in large numbers thanks to historic reductions in taxes and
regulations.
We have unleashed a revolution in American energy-the United States is
now the number one producer of oil and natural gas in the world. And now,
for the first time in 65 years, we are a net exporter of energy.
After 24 months of rapid progress, our economy is the envy of the world, our
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military is the most powerful on earth, and America is winning each and
every day. Members of Congress: the State of our Union is strong. Our
country is vibrant and our economy is thriving like never before.
On Friday, it was announced that we added another 304,000 jobs last month
alone - almost double what was expected. An economic miracle is taking
place in the United States -and the only thing that can stop it are foolish
wars, politics, or ridiculous partisan investigations.
If there is going to be peace and legislation, there cannot be war and
investigation. It just doesn't work that way!
We must be united at home to defeat our adversaries abroad.
This new era of cooperation can start with finally confirming the more than
300 highly qualified nominees who are still stuck in the Senate - some after
years of waiting. The Senate has failed to act on these nominations, which is
unfair to the nominees and to our country.
Now is the time for bipartisan action. Believe it or not, we have already
proven that it is possible.
In the last Congress, both parties came together to pass unprecedented
legislation to confront the opioid crisis, a sweeping new Farm Bill, historic VA
reforms, and after four decades of rejection, we passed VA Accountability so
we can finally terminate those who mistreat our wonderful veterans.
And just weeks ago, both parties united for groundbreaking criminal justice
reform. Last year, I heard through friends the story of Alice Johnson. I was
deeply moved. In 1997, Alice was sentenced to life in prison as a first-time
non-violent drug offender. Over the next two decades, she became a prison
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minister, inspiring others to choose a better path. She had a big impact on
that prison population -and far beyond.
Alice's story underscores the disparities and unfairness that can exist in
criminal sentencing- and the need to remedy this injustice. She served
almost 22 years and had expected to be in prison for the rest of her life.
In June, I commuted Alice's sentence and she is here with us tonight.
Alice, thank you for reminding us that we always have the power to shape
our own destiny.
When I saw Alice's beautiful family greet her at the prison gates, hugging and
kissing and crying and laughing, I knew I did the right thing.
Inspired by stories like Alice's, my Administration worked closely with
members of both parties to sign the First Step Act into law. This legislation
reformed sentencing laws that have wrongly and disproportionately harmed
the African-American community. The First Step Act gives non-violent
offenders the chance to re-enter society as productive, law-abiding citizens.
Now, States across the country are following our lead. America is a Nation
that believes in redemption.
We are also joined tonight by Matthew Charles from Tennessee. In 1996, at
age 30, Matthew was sentenced to 35 years for selling drugs and related
offenses. Over the next two decades, he completed more than 30 Bible
studies, became a law clerk, and mentored fellow inmates. Now, Matthew is
the very first person to be released from prison under the First Step Act.
Matthew, on behalf of all Americans: welcome home.
As we have seen, when we are united, we can make astonishing strides for
our country. Now, Republicans and Democrats must join forces again to
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confront an urgent national crisis.
The Congress has 10 days left to pass a bill that will fund our Government,
protect our homeland, and secure our southern border.
Now is the time for the Congress to show the world that America is
committed to ending illegal immigration and putting the ruthless coyotes,
cartels, drug dealers, and human traffickers out of business.
As we speak, large, organized caravans are on the march to the United
States. We have just heard that Mexican cities, in order to remove the illegal
immigrants from their communities, are getting trucks and buses to bring
them up to our country in areas where there is little border protection. I
have ordered another 3,750 troops to our southern border to prepare for the
tremendous onslaught.
This is a moral issue. The lawless state of our southern border is a threat to
the safety, security, and financial well-being of all Americans. We have a
moral duty to create an immigration system that protects the lives and jobs
of our citizens. This includes our obligation to the millions of immigrants
living here today, who followed the rules and respected our laws. Legal
immigrants enrich our Nation and strengthen our society in countless ways.
I want people to come into our country, but they have to come in legally.
Tonight, I am asking you to defend our very dangerous southern border out
of love and devotion to our fellow citizens and to our country.
No issue better illustrates the divide between America's working class and
America's political class than illegal immigration. Wealthy politicians and
donors push for open borders while living their lives behind walls and gates
and guards.
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Meanwhile, working class Americans are left to pay the price for mass illegal
migration - reduced jobs, lower wages, overburdened schools and
hospitals, increased crime, and a depleted social safety net.
Tolerance for illegal immigration is not compassionate -it is cruel. One in
three women is sexually assaulted on the long journey north. Smugglers use
migrant children as human pawns to exploit our laws and gain access to our
country.
Human traffickers and sex traffickers take advantage of the wide open areas
between our ports of entry to smuggle thousands of young girls and women
into the United States and to sell them into prostitution and modern-day
slavery.
Tens of thousands of innocent Americans are killed by lethal drugs that cross
our border and flood into our cities -- including meth, heroin, cocaine, and
fentanyl.
The savage gang, MS-13, now operates in 20 different American States, and
they almost all come through our southern border. Just yesterday, an MS-13
gang member was taken into custody for a fatal shooting on a subway
platform in New York City. We are removing these gang members by the
thousands, but until we secure our border they're going to keep streaming
back in.
Year after year, countless Americans are murdered by criminal illegal aliens.
I've gotten to know many wonderful Angel Moms, Dads, and families - no
one should ever have to suffer the horrible heartache they have endured.
Here tonight is Debra Bissell. Just three weeks ago, Debra's parents, Gerald
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and Sharon, were burglarized and shot to death in their Reno, Nevada, home
by an illegal alien. They were in their eighties and are survived by four
children, 11 grandchildren, and 20 great-grandchildren. Also here tonight
are Gerald and Sharon's granddaughter, Heather, and great-granddaughter,
Madison.
To Debra, Heather, Madison, please stand: few can understand your pain.
But I will never forget, and I will fight for the memory of Gerald and Sharon,
that it should never happen again.
Not one more American life should be lost because our Nation failed to
control its very dangerous border.
In the last 2 years, our brave ICE officers made 266,000 arrests of criminal
aliens, including those charged or convicted of nearly 100,000 assaults,
30,000 sex crimes, and 4,000 killings.
We are joined tonight by one of those law enforcement heroes: ICE Special
Agent Elvin Hernandez. When Elvin was a boy, he and his family legally
immigrated to the United States from the Dominican Republic. At the age of
eight, Elvin told his dad he wanted to become a Special Agent. Today, he
leads investigations into the scourge of international sex trafficking. Elvin
says: "If I can make sure these young girls get their justice, I've done my
job." Thanks to his work and that of his colleagues, more than 300 women
and girls have been rescued from horror and more than 1,500 sadistic
traffickers have been put behind bars in the last year.
Special Agent Hernandez, please stand: We will always support the brave
men and women of Law Enforcement - and I pledge to you tonight that we
will never abolish our heroes from ICE.
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My Administration has sent to the Congress a commonsense proposal to end
the crisis on our southern border.
It includes humanitarian assistance, more law enforcement, drug detection
at our ports, closing loopholes that enable child smuggling, and plans for a
new physical barrier, or wall, to secure the vast areas between our ports of
entry.
In the past, most of the people in this room voted for a wall -- but the
proper wall never got built. I'll get it built.
This is a smart, strategic, see-through steel barrier- not just a simple
concrete wall. It will be deployed in the areas identified by border agents as
having the greatest need, and as these agents will tell you, where walls go
up, illegal crossings go way down.
San Diego used to have the most illegal border crossings in the country. In
response, and at the request of San Diego residents and political leaders, a
strong security wall was put in place. This powerful barrier almost
completely ended illegal crossings.
The border city of El Paso, Texas, used to have extremely high rates of violent
crime- one of the highest in the country, and considered one of our
Nation's most dangerous cities. Now, with a powerful barrier in place, El
Paso is one of our safest cities.
Simply put, walls work and walls save lives. So let's work together,
compromise, and reach a deal that will truly make America safe.
As we work to defend our people's safety, we must also ensure our economic
resurgence continues at a rapid pace.
No one has benefitted more from our thriving economy than women, who
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have filled 58 percent of the new jobs created in the last year. All Americans
can be proud that we have more women in the workforce than ever before -
and exactly one century after the Congress passed the Constitutional
amendment giving women the right to vote, we also have more women
serving in the Congress than ever before.
As part of our commitment to improving opportunity for women
everywhere, this Thursday we are launching the first ever Government-wide
initiative focused on economic empowerment for women in developing
countries.
To build on our incredible economic success, one priority is paramount
reversing decades of calamitous trade policies.
We are now making it clear to China that after years of targeting our
industries, and stealing our intellectual property, the theft of American jobs
and wealth has come to an end.
Therefore, we recently imposed tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods -
and now our Treasury is receiving billions of dollars a month from a country
that never gave us a dime. But I don't blame China for taking advantage of
us - I blame our leaders and representatives for allowing this travesty to
happen. I have great respect for President Xi, and we are now working on a
new trade deal with China. But it must include real, structural change to end
unfair trade practices, reduce our chronic trade deficit, and protect American
jobs.
Another historic trade blunder was the catastrophe known as NAFTA.
I have met the men and women of Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana,
New Hampshire, and many other States whose dreams were shattered by
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NAFTA. For years, politicians promised them they would negotiate for a
better deal. But no one ever tried -- until now.
Our new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement- or USMCA -- will replace NAFTA
and deliver for American workers: bringing back our manufacturing jobs,
expanding American agriculture, protecting intellectual property, and
ensuring that more cars are proudly stamped with four beautiful words:
made in the USA.
Tonight, I am also asking you to pass the United States Reciprocal Trade Act,
so that if another country places an unfair tariff on an American product, we
can charge them the exact same tariff on the same product that they sell to
us.
Both parties should be able to unite for a great rebuilding of America's
crumbling infrastructure.
I know that the Congress is eager to pass an infrastructure bill -- and I am
eager to work with you on legislation to deliver new and important
infrastructure investment, including investments in the cutting edge
industries of the future. This is not an option. This is a necessity.
The next major priority for me, and for all of us, should be to lower the cost
of healthcare and prescription drugs -- and to protect patients with pre
existing conditions.
Already, as a result of my Administration's efforts, in 2018 drug prices
experienced their single largest decline in 46 years.
But we must do more. It is unacceptable that Americans pay vastly more
than people in other countries for the exact same drugs, often made in the
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exact same place. This is wrong, unfair, and together we can stop it.
I am asking the Congress to pass legislation that finally takes on the problem
of global freeloading and delivers fairness and price transparency for
American patients. We should also require drug companies, insurance
companies, and hospitals to disclose real prices to foster competition and
bring costs down.
No force in history has done more to advance the human condition than
American freedom. In recent years we have made remarkable progress in
the fight against HIV and AIDS. Scientific breakthroughs have brought a
once-distant dream within reach. My budget will ask Democrats and
Republicans to make the needed commitment to eliminate the HIV epidemic
in the United States within 10 years. Together, we will defeat AIDS
in America.
Tonight, I am also asking you to join me in another fight that all Americans
can get behind: the fight against childhood cancer.
Joining Melania in the gallery this evening is a very brave 10-year-old girl,
Grace Eline. Every birthday since she was 4, Grace asked her friends to
donate to St. Jude Children's Research Hospital. She did not know that one
day she might be a patient herself. Last year, Grace was diagnosed with
brain cancer.
Immediately, she began radiation treatment. At the same
time, she rallied her community and raised more than $40,000 for the fight
against cancer. When Grace completed treatment last fall, her doctors and
nurses cheered with tears in their eyes as she hung up a poster that read:
"Last Day of Cherne." Grace -you are an inspiration to us all.
Many childhood cancers have not seen new therapies in decades. My budget
will ask the Congress for $500 million over the next 10 years to fund this
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critical life-saving research.
To help support working parents, the time has come to pass school choice
for America's children. I am also proud to be the first President to include in
my budget a plan for nationwide paid family leave So that every new
parent has the chance to bond with their newborn child.
There could be no greater contrast to the beautiful image of a mother
holding her infant child than the chilling displays our Nation saw in recent
days. Lawmakers in New York cheered with delight upon the passage of
legislation that would allow a baby to be ripped from the mother's womb
moments before birth. These are living, feeling, beautiful babies who will
never get the chance to share their love and dreams with the world. And
then, we had the case of the Governor of Virginia where he basically stated
he would execute a baby after birth.
To defend the dignity of every person, I am asking the Congress to pass
legislation to prohibit the late-term abortion of children who can feel pain in
the mother's womb.
Let us work together to build a culture that cherishes innocent life. And let
us reaffirm a fundamental truth: all children -- born and unborn -are made
in the holy image of God.
The final part of my agenda is to protect America's National Security.
Over the last 2 years, we have begun to fully rebuild the United States
Military- with $700 billion last year and $716 billion this year. We are also
getting other nations to pay their fair share. For years, the United States was
being treated very unfairly by NATO -- but now we have secured a
$100 billion increase in defense spending from NATO allies.
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As part of our military build-up, the United States is developing a state-of
the-art Missile Defense System.
Under my Administration, we will never apologize for advancing America's
interests.
For example, decades ago the United States entered into a treaty with Russia
in which we agreed to limit and reduce our missile capabilities. While we
followed the agreement to the letter, Russia repeatedly violated its terms.
That is why I announced that the United States is officially withdrawing from
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty.
Perhaps we can negotiate a different agreement, adding China and others, or
perhaps we can't --- in which case, we will outspend and out-innovate all
others by far.
As part of a bold new diplomacy, we continue our historic push for peace on
the Korean Peninsula. Our hostages have come home, nuclear testing has
stopped, and there has not been a missile launch in 15 months. If I had not
been elected President of the United States, we would right now, in my
opinion, be in a major war with North Korea with potentially millions of
people killed. Much work remains to be done, but my relationship with Kim
Jong Un is a good one. And Chairman Kim and I will meet again on February
27 and 28 in Vietnam.
Two weeks ago, the United States officially recognized the legitimate
government of Venezuela, and its new interim President, Juan Guaido.
We stand with the Venezuelan people in their noble quest for freedom and
we condemn the brutality of the Maduro regime, whose socialist policies
have turned that nation from being the wealthiest in South America into a
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state of abject poverty and despair.
Here, in the United States, we are alarmed by new calls to adopt socialism in
our country. America was founded on liberty and independence -- not
government coercion, domination, and control. We are born free, and we
will stay free. Tonight, we renew our resolve that America will never be a
socialist country.
One of the most complex set of challenges we face is in the Middle East.
Our approach is based on principled realism -not discredited theories that
have failed for decades to yield progress. For this reason, my Administration
recognized the true capital of Israel - and proudly opened the American
Embassy in Jerusalem.
Our brave troops have now been fighting in the Middle East for almost 19
years. In Afghanistan and Iraq, nearly 7,000 American heroes have given
their lives. More than 52,000 Americans have been badly wounded. We have
spent more than $7 trillion in the Middle East.
As a candidate for President, I pledged a new approach. Great nations do
not fight endless wars.
When I took office, ISIS controlled more than 20,000 square miles in Iraq and
Syria. Today, we have liberated virtually all of that territory from the grip of
these bloodthirsty killers.
Now, as we work with our allies to destroy the remnants of ISIS, it is time to
give our brave warriors in Syria a warm welcome home.
I have also accelerated our negotiations to reach a political settlement in
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Afghanistan. Our troops have fought with unmatched valor- and thanks to
their bravery, we are now able to pursue a political solution to this long and
bloody conflict.
In Afghanistan, my Administration is holding constructive talks with a
number of Afghan groups, including the Taliban. As we make progress in
these negotiations, we will be able to reduce our troop presence and focus
on counter-terrorism. We do not know whether we will achieve an
agreement- but we do know that after two decades of war, the hour has
come to at least try for peace.
Above all, friend and foe alike must never doubt this Nation's power and will
to defend our people. Eighteen years ago, terrorists attacked the USS Cole -
and last month American forces killed one of the leaders of the attack.
We are honored to be joined tonight by Tom Wibberley, whose son, Navy
Seaman Craig Wibberley, was one of the 17 sailors we tragically lost. Tom:
we vow to always remember the heroes of the USS Cole.
My Administration has acted decisively to confront the world's leading state
sponsor of terror: the radical regime in Iran.
To ensure this corrupt dictatorship never acquires nuclear weapons, I
withdrew the United States from the disastrous Iran nuclear deal. And last
fall, we put in place the toughest sanctions ever imposed on a country.
We will not avert our eyes from a regime that chants death to America and
threatens genocide against the Jewish people. We must never ignore the
vile poison of anti-Semitism, or those who spread its venomous creed. With
one voice, we must confront this hatred anywhere and everywhere it occurs.
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Just months ago, 11 Jewish-Americans were viciously murdered in an anti
semitic attack on the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. SWAT Officer
Timothy Matson raced into the gunfire and was shot seven times chasing
down the killer. Timothy has just had his 12th surgery -but he made the
trip to be here with us tonight. Officer Matson: we are forever grateful for
your courage in the face of evil.
Tonight, we are also joined by Pittsburgh survivor Judah Samet. He arrived
at the synagogue as the massacre began. But not only did Judah narrowly
escape death last fall - more than seven decades ago, he narrowly survived
the Nazi concentration camps. Today is Judah's 81st birthday. Judah says
he can still remember the exact moment, nearly 75 years ago, after 10
months in a concentration camp, when he and his family were put on a train,
and told they were going to another camp. Suddenly the train screeched to
a halt. A soldier appeared. Judah's family braced for the worst. Then, his
father cried out with joy: "It's the Americans."
A second Holocaust survivor who is here tonight, Joshua Kaufman, was a
prisoner at Dachau Concentration Camp. He remembers watching through a
hole in the wall of a cattle car as American soldiers rolled in with tanks. "To
me," Joshua recalls, "the American soldiers were proof that God exists, and
they came down from the sky."
I began this evening by honoring three soldiers who fought on D-Day in the
Second World War. One of them was Herman Zeitchik. But there is more to
Herman's story. A year after he stormed the beaches of Normandy, Herman
was one of those American soldiers who helped liberate Dachau. He was one
of the Americans who helped rescue Joshua from that hell on earth. Almost
75 years later, Herman and Joshua are both together in the gallery tonight
seated side-by-side, here in the home of American freedom. Herman and
Joshua: your presence this evening honors and uplifts our entire Nation.
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When American soldiers set out beneath the dark skies over the English
Channel in the early hours of D-Day, 1944, they were just young men of 18
and 19, hurtling on fragile landing craft toward the most momentous battle
in the history of war.
They did not know if they would survive the hour. They did not know if they
would grow old. But they knew that America had to prevail. Their cause was
this Nation, and generations yet unborn.
Why did they do it? They did it for America - they did it for us.
Everything that has come since - our triumph over communism, our giant
leaps of science and discovery, our unrivaled progress toward equality and
justice - all of it is possible thanks to the blood and tears and courage and
vision of the Americans who came before.
Think of this Capitol - think of this very chamber, where lawmakers before
you voted to end slavery, to build the railroads and the highways, to defeat
fascism, to secure civil rights, to face down an evil empire.
Here tonight, we have legislators from across this magnificent republic. You
have come from the rocky shores of Maine and the volcanic peaks of Hawaii;
from the snowy woods of Wisconsin and the red deserts of Arizona; from the
green farms of Kentucky and the golden beaches of California. Together, we
represent the most extraordinary Nation in all of history.
What will we do with this moment? How will we be remembered?
I ask the men and women of this Congress: Look at the opportunities before
us! Our most thrilling achievements are still ahead. Our most exciting
journeys still await. Our biggest victories are still to come. We have not yet
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begun to dream.
We must choose whether we are defined by our differences - or whether we
dare to transcend them.
We must choose whether we will squander our inheritance or whether we
will proudly declare that we are Americans. We do the incredible. We defy
the impossible. We conquer the unknown.
This is the time to re-ignite the American imagination. This is the time to
search for the tallest summit, and set our sights on the brightest star. This is
the time to rekindle the bonds of love and loyalty and memory that link us
together as citizens, as neighbors, as patriots.
This is our future -our fate - and our choice to make. I am asking you to
choose greatness.
No matter the trials we face, no matter the challenges to come, we must go
forward together.
We must keep America first in our hearts. We must keep freedom alive in our
souls. And we must always keep faith in America's destiny- that one
Nation, under God, must be the hope and the promise and the light and the
glory among all the nations of the world!
Thank you. God Bless You, God Bless America, and good night!
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Annex 49
U.S. National Security Council, “A Look at the U.S. Strategy for Iran”,
13 February 2019
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mMfm
- FOREIGN POLICY
A Look at the U.S. Strategy for Iran
February 13, 2019
5 minute read
%
g National Security Council
t
By: Victoria Coates
Senior Director for the Middle East
The core objective of President Trump's Iran Strategy is the systemic change
in the Islamic Republic's hostile and destabilizing actions, including blocking
all paths to a nuclear weapon and exporting terrorism. Under the President's
direction, we have prioritized the maximum pressure campaign placing
unprecedented stress on Iran's economy, forcing Tehran to make increasingly
difficult choices. As the Islamic Republic marks its 40th anniversary it is
appropriate to assess how this strategy is proceeding, and how we will
continue to implement President Trump's guidance in the coming year.
The nine months since the President's decision to exit the misguided, one
sided Iran nuclear deal have given us considerable insight into the impact of
re-imposing the sanctions relaxed under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) while also applying new sanctions. Predictions that unilateral
U.S. sanctions would weaken and isolate America as the rest of the globe
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pursued instead do business with Iran have proven false; conversely, Iran has
found itself increasingly alone and bereft of the anticipated influx of foreign
investment that was to save its moribund economy. As Iran continues to
target Europe as well as its regional neighbors with nefarious disinformation
campaigns in addition to cyber and attempted terrorist attacks, their
governments should decide to re-impose sanctions, adding materially to
Iran's economic pain. This combined pressure would accelerate Iran's return
to the negotiating table under circumstances highly-favorable to the United
States and responsible nations around the world. As President Rouhani
himself admitted, Iran will move into a period of unprecedented stress on its
economy in the second quarter of 2019. We want this pressure to be decisive
and we are supplementing sanctions with broader efforts to increase the cost
of Iran's destructive and destabilizing policies to an intolerable level as the
President Trump's strategy requires.
Iran's malign behavior in the region is a direct and significant threat to the
United States' economic and strategic interests and to the American people,
and risks triggering a wider conflict. Not only does Iran threaten the Straits of
Hormuz, but through its Houthi proxies, Tehran is also trying to establish a
beach head on Yemen's coastline, which would represent an unprecedented
capacity to threaten two of the world's great shipping lanes simultaneously.
In Syria, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) members
along with Hizballah and other proxies have been wreaking havoc for years
as they attempt to prop up the murderous Assad regime so they can use Syria
to threaten Israel, while at the same time exploiting Lebanon for illicit
financial gain, to advance their terrorist agendas and expand their regional
political influence. In Iraq, Shi'a Popular Mobilization Forces trained and
equipped by the IRGC-QF are attempting to infiltrate Iraq's nascent political
process in imitation of Hizballah. And in Iran, the regime continues to use
hostage-taking as a tool of state policy, in violation of international laws and
norms. Robert Levinson, Siamak Namazi, and Xiyue Wang are wrongfully
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detained in Iran, as are numerous other American and Western citizens. This
shameful and barbaric practice must end, and Iran must return Americans
and other innocent civilians at once.
There is more we can do to roll back Iran's activities within its borders and in
the region. We can continue to encourage warmer ties between Iraq and the
Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We have already made
substantial progress aligning Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) in support of the President's Iran Strategy. Increasingly
overt Israeli cooperation with a range of Arab countries across the economic
and security sectors benefits them all. We must seize every opportunity to
make this collaboration the "new normal" to the benefit of all involved.
While engaged in this campaign we must remain vigilant to ensure this
violent and unpredictable regime does not acquire a nuclear weapon and the
capability to deliver it. Thanks to the Israeli revelation of Iran's secret nuclear
archive, we know their protestations that their nuclear program has always
been peaceful are flat lies. We will redouble our efforts to expose and disrupt
Iran's illicit procurement networks and prevent Iran's import of dual-use and
proliferation sensitive items. We will also hold accountable those
governments that allow Iran and its agents to use their territories to
purchase, finance, or transfer items that support their nuclear and missile
programs.
The 40\ anniversary of the Islamic Revolution brings into sharp focus the
regime's failure to provide the radical change from entrenched corruption
promised in 1979, as well as the dismal future prospects for Iran if it
continues on the current path. Popular criticism of Tehran for economic
mismanagement continues to resonate, and taboos surrounding public
discussion of the Supreme Leader's succession process continue to erode.
Our key message to the Iranian people, the long-suffering victims of the
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regime, should be loud and clear: Forty years from now, your outlook can be
radically different. We saw this trajectory in the 20\ century when the
imperialist powers who ignited World War II took a different path and are
now some of our greatest democratic allies and economic partners. Iran's
leadership could and should choose such a path to a brighter future for the
Iranian people.
Victoria Coates is Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the
Middle East.
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Annex 50
U.S. Department of Treasury, OFAC, “OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions”, as of
31 March 2019
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Resou rec Center
OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions
OFAC FAQ Index General Questions Sanctions
Sanctions Lists
lran Sanctions Other Sanctions
Compliance
and Files
Programs
Search OFAC FAOs Using Treasury Recommendations:
Example: Where is OFAC's Country List?
Search
Skip to the Following Topics:
Comprehensive lran Sanctions. Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)
Treasury CISADA Findings Against Bank of Kunlun
e Executive Order 13599 (Blocking Property of the Government of lran and ranian Financial Institutions)
NDAA (Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012)
Executive Order 13606 (the GHRAMITY E.0.)
Foreign Sanctions Evaders (FSE) Executive Order (Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United States of Foreign Sanctions
Evaders with Respect to ran and Syria)
Executive Order 13622. "Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran"
• Determination Pursuant to Section 312 of the lran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
Section 4 of Executive Order "Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the lran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Aet of 2012
and Additional Sanctions with Respect to lran"
e Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and the Statement of Licensing Procedure on Support Of Human Rights-, Humanitarian- and Democracy-
Related Activities With Respect to lr%e
Implementation of Section 504 of the lran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
lran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (FCA)
Genera Licenses (GL) for Agricultural Commodities. Medicine, and Medical Devices in the ranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
Extension of Temporary Sanctions Relief to implement the Joint plan of Action between the p5 + 1 and the Islamic Republic of lran
lranian General License with Respect to Certain Services. Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (Iranian General License D1)
Payments or the Facilitation of Payments to lranian Civil Aviation Authorities for Over fights of lran or Emergency Landing in Iran
e Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Adoption Day
Provision of Routine Goods and Services by non-US. persons to Diplomatic Missions of the Government of ran
The Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day
Additional lran-related Questions From Financial Institutions
Amendments to General Licenses for the Exportation or Reexportation of Agricultural Commodities. Medicine, and Medical Devices to lran
Amendment to the Definition of Iranian-origin goods" or "goods of lranian origin" in the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) Section 105
Guidance Related to Humanitarian Assistance with Regard to the November 12, 2017 Earthquake in lran
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Executive Order 13846 0f August 6, 2018, Reimposing Certain Sanctions Wth Respect to lran"
CISADA (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
of 2010)
Print this topic
149. What activities by foreign financial institutions can subject them to CISADA sanctions?
As described in the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, the sanctionable activities of a foreign financial institution are:
• Facilitating the efforts of the Government of Iran (GOI) to acquire or develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or
delivery systems for MD or to provide support for terrorist organizations or acts of international terrorism;
• Facilitating the activities of a person subject to financial sanctions pursuant lo UNSCRs 1737
,1747
, 1803
, or
1929
,or any other Security Council resolution that imposes sanctions with respect to Iran;
• Engaging in money laundering, or facilitating efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian financial institution, to
carry out either of the facilitating activities described above; of
• Facilitating a significant transaction or transactions or providing significant financial services for: (i) the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its agents or affiliates whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), or (ii) a financial institution whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to IEE A in connection with Iran's proliferation of MD, Iran's proliferation of
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pag...
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delivery systems for VVMD, or Iran's support for international terrorism.
150. Where can I find a list of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) affiliates and Iran-linked financial institutions
"blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)"?
The list of blocked IRGC affiliates and blocked Iran-linked financial institutions is dynamic and is based on the identity of
"designated" persons, which refers both to natural persons (i.e., individuals) and legal persons (such as corporations and other
entities). The most recent list of designated persons -- which includes most, but not all, blocked entities• - can be found at
wwww.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx. The listings of designated IRGC entities will be
followed by the tag [IRGC]; those of designated Iran-linked financial institutions will have the tag (IFSR).
Under Department of the Treasury regulations, designated persons are those that are named on the list. All interests in
property of such persons are blocked, and such persons are considered to have an interest in all property and enti
ies in which
they own, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater i
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n
t
terest. As a result, such property and entities are also blocked, even if
they do not themselves appear on the list.
151. How do the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) define "U.S. financial institutions"?
The Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) define U.S. financial institutions" to include: depository institutions, banks,
savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, insurance companies, securities brokers and dealers,
commodities exchanges, clearing corporations. investment companies, employee benefit plans. and U.S. holding companies,
U.S. affiliates, or U.S. subsidiaries of any of these entities. Covered institutions include those branches, offices, and agencies
of foreign financial institutions that are located in the United Slates.
152. How do the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) define "foreign financial institutions"?
The Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) define "foreign financial institutions" to include foreign depository
institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodities
exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans, and holding companies, affiliates, or
subsidiaries of any of these entities.
153. How do the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) define the term "knowingly"?
The term "knowingly"as used in the IFSR means that a person has actual knowledge or should have known of specific
conduct, a circumstance, or a result. In other words, the IFSR could be implicated if the Treasury Department finds that a
foreign financial institution knew or should have known that it engaged in one or more of the sanctionable activities.
154. How does the Treasury Department determine whether a transaction or financial service is "significant" for
purposes of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR)?
As set out in the IFSR, in determining whether a transaction or financial service is "significant," the Treasury Department may
consider: (1) the size, number, frequency, and nature of the transaction(s); (2) the level of awareness of management of the
transaction(s) and whether or not the transaction(s) are a part of a pattern of conduct; (3) the nexus between the foreign
financial institution involved in the transaction(s) and a blocked Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps individual or entity or
blocked Iran-linked financial institution; (4) the impact of the transaction(s) on the goals of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA)
;(5) whether the transaction(s) involved any deceptive practices; and (6)
other factors the Treasury Department deems relevant on a case-by-case basis.
155. When are the prohibitions and strict conditions on foreign financial institutions' correspondent accounts or
payable-through accounts in the United States effective?
A finding by the Treasury Department that a foreign financial institution knowingly engages in one or more of the sanctionable
activities is necessary before the Treasury Department can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in
the United States of correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for that foreign financial institution.
156. How will U.S. and foreign financial institutions know that the Treasury Department has made such a finding?
As a general matter, the Treasury Department will reach out to foreign financial institutions to inquire about their conduct before
making a finding. If the Treasury Department decides to impose strict condition(s), the Treasury Department will issue an order
or a regulation that sets out the strict condition(s) to be imposed on the U.S. correspondent accounts or U.S. payable-through
accounts of the relevant foreign financial institution and publish the order or regulation in the Federal Register. The Federal
Register is available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/. If the Treasury Department decides to prohibit the opening or maintaining of U.S.
correspondent accounts or U.S. payable-through accounts for a foreign financial institution, the Treasury Department will add
the name of the foreign financial institution and publish it to the part 561 list
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157. How will the Treasury Department enforce the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) with respect to U.S.
entities?
Any U.S. person who violates the correspondent account provisions of the IFSR may be subject to civil penalties of up to the
greater of $250,000 or twice the transaction value, and criminal penalties for willful violations of up to $1 million and 20 years in
prison. A U.S. financial institution may be subject to civil penalties of up to the greater of $250,000 or twice the transaction
value, if any person that it owns or controls violates the IFSR prohibition on engaging in any transaction with or benefitting the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or any of its agents or affiliates whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), and if the U.S. financial institution knew or
should have known that the person violated the IFSR.
158. Can the application of any part(s) of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) be waived by the
Department of the Treasury?
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA) provides for a waiver of the sanctions
under the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that a waiver is
necessary to the national interest of the United States.
159. Where can I find the text of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations?
The text of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) can be found at: www.treasury.gov/resource-center
/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ fr75_49836.pdf.
Executive Order 13599 (Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and
Iranian Financial Institutions)
Print this topic
On February 5, 2012, the President signed Executive Order 13599
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-81 ("NDAA
to implement section 1245(c) of the National Defense
") and lo take additional steps with respect to Iran.
Effective as of 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on February 6, 2012, the order blocks all property and interests in property of
the Government of Iran Qncluding the Central Bank of Iran), all Iranian financial institutions, and all persons determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Stale, to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or
purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to the order. [02-06-2012]
160. Section 1 of E.O. 13599 blocks all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, including the
Central Bank of ran, and of all Iranian financial institutions, that are in the United States, that come within the United
States, or that come within the possession or control of U.S. persons (including overseas branches). Can you provide
further clarification about this provision of E.O. 13599?
E.0. 13599
requires U.S. persons to block (i.e., freeze) all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran,
including the Central Bank of Iran, and of all Iranian financial institutions, which also includes the Central Bank of Iran. This
means that all individuals and entities that meet the definition of "Government of lran" (GOI") as defined by section 7(d) of the
new E.O. as well as all Iranian financial institutions (whether or not they meet the definition of the GOI) are now blocked.
Previously, under the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.FR. part 560 (the ITR"), financial institutions and other U.S.
persons were prohibited from engaging in transactions with the GOI. Under those prior rules, U.S. financial institutions
receiving instructions to execute transactions involving these entities were not required to block the transactions, but were
instead required to reject those instructions rather than carry them out, unless the transactions were exempt, authorized, or not
prohibited by OFAC. The Executive Order defines an "Iranian financial institution" as a financial institution organized under the
laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran (including foreign branches), any financial institution in Iran, any financial institution,
wherever located, owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, and any financial institution, wherever located, owned or
controlled by any of the aforementioned entities.
As a result, transactions involving entities bearing the (IRAN] tag on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons (SDN List") will now need to be blocked unless exempt or authorized by OFAC. Going forward, the (IRAN]
tag will connote that a person or entity meets the definition of the term GOl" or "Iranian Financial Institution". OFAC will
continue to update the SON List and may add, delete, or edit entries as appropriate.
E.0. 13599 blocks the property and interests in property of any individual or entity that comes within its definition of the term
Government of Iran" regardless of whether it is listed on the SDN List, and similarly it blocks the property and interests in
property of all Iranian financial institutions as defined in the order regardless of whether the Iranian financial institution is listed
on the SDN List.
E.0. 13599 builds upon the prohibitions in the [TR, which remain in effect.
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Please note. pursuant to OFAC guidance, even when an entity does not itself appear on the SON List or otherwise meet the
definition of the GOI or an Iranian financial institution, the property and interests in property of that entity are blocked if the
enlity is owned, directly or indirectly, 50% or more by a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
lo an Executive Order or regulations administered by OFAC. [02-06-2012]
161. If all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran, and of all
Iranian financial institutions are blocked, can I conduct transactions involving the Government of Iran that have been
previously authorized by OFAC?
Generally yes. Under new General License A, almost all transactions that are aulhorized under existing general licenses
issued pursuant lo the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR) or under existing OFAC specific licenses will conlinue to be
authorized under the authority of E.O. 13599
.However, transactions previously authorized under one existing ITR general
license are not authorized pursuant to E.0. 13599. Specifically, the closing of accounts of the Government of Iran or an Iranian
financial institution and the lump sum transfer of the balances to an account outside of the United States, which is authorized
by sections 560.517(a)(3) & (b)(2) of the ITR, is not authorized by General License A, and, therefore, those transactions are
prohibited by E.O. 13599 and the accounts must be blocked. In addition, General License A does not authorize any payments
from blocked funds or debits lo blocked accounts, with a limited exception for payments from funds or debits to accounts
blocked under the Iranian Assets Control Regulations (the hostage crisis blocking program that began in 1979) that are
authorized by specific licenses issued by OFAC.
New General License B authorizes U.S. depository institutions and U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities to process
noncommercial, personal remittances, to or from Iran, or for or on behalf of individuals ordinarily resident in Iran who are not
included in the term "Government of lran", provided that such funds transactions are not made by, lo, or through a financial
institution blocked pursuant lo the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544 (the
"MDPS"), or the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594 (the GTSR"), or a person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to any other part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V, or any Executive order, except an Iranian
financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599.
Transactions not previously authorized by OFAC that involve property or interests in property of the Government of Iran,
including the Central Bank of Iran, or of Iranian financial institutions must be blocked. [02-06-2012]
162. Are U.S. persons still required to comply with the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR)?
Yes. E.O. 13599 builds upon the prohibitions of the ITR, and the prohibitions of the ITR remain in effect. [02-06-2012]
163. What are the differences and similarities between E.0. 13599 and the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR)?
The ITRprohibit prohibit virtually all direct or indirect transactions involving Iran or the Government of Iran by U.S. persons or
with a nexus to the United States, unless otherwise authorized by OFAC or exempted by statute, but they do not contain
blocking provisions. E.O. 13599
requires U.S. persons to block all property and interests in property of the Government of
Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran, and of Iranian financial institutions, which also includes the Central Bank of Iran, unless
it relates to a transaction that is exempted by statute or authorized by OFAC.
To illustrate the difference between how a transaction would be treated under the ITR and the new E.O., imagine a commercial
wire transfer being processed through the U.S. financial system by order of a third-country, non-U.S. company for credit to a
third-country financial institution in favor of a correspondent account ii maintains for an Iranian financial institution. The
transaction is not exempt or authorized by a general or specific license, and the Iranian bank is not blocked pursuant to the
GTSR or the WMDPSR. Previously, under the ITR, any U.S. financial institution handling the transaction would have needed to
reject the payment because allowing ii to be processed would constitute a prohibited exportation of services to lran. With the
new E.O. in place, the U.S. financial institution would be required to block ("freeze") that transaction. [02-06-2012]
164. The Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR) authorize U.S. depository institutions and U.S. registered brokers or
dealers in securities to process transfers of funds to or from Iran if the transfer is a non-commercial, personal
remittance. Are U.S. depository institutions and U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities still authorized to
process such payments to or from a Government of Iran-owned bank that is not otherwise designated pursuant to
another part of 31 C.FR. Chapter V?
General License B under E.O. 13599 authorizes U.S. depository institutions and U.S. registered brokers or dealers in
securities to process noncommercial, personal remittances to or from Iran provided that the payment is not made by, to, or
through a financial institution designated by OFAC under the WMDPSR, or the GTSR, or a person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to any other part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V, or any Executive order, except an Iranian
financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599. Exempt or authorized
transactions to or from Iran may also be processed subject to the above conditions.
Such transactions must be processed through a third country, as U.S. banks are prohibited from operating correspondent
accounts for Iranian banks. The transactions may involve the use of blocked Iranian financial institutions as long as the Iranian
financial institution is blocked solely pursuant lo E.0.13599 (and not pursuant to any other Executive order or part of 31 C.F.R.
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chapter V) and there is a third-country, non-U.S. financial institution as an intermediary between the U.S. financial institution
and the Iranian financial institution. [02-06-2012]
165. To what extent are U.S. persons expected to conduct enhanced due diligence to determine If transactions contain
a Government of Iran interest?
E.O. 13599
requires U.S. persons to block all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, unless otherwise
exempt or authorized by OFAC.
Please contact the OFAC Hotline at 202-622-2490 or 1-800-540-6322, or by email at [email protected], for
guidance regarding entities that you suspect are owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that do not appear on the SON
list. As a general matter, OFAC expects financial institutions to conduct due diligence on their own direct customers (including,
for example, their ownership structure) lo confirm that those customers are not persons whose property and interests in
property are blocked.
With regard to other types of transactions where a financial institution is acting solely as an intermediary and fails to block
transactions involving a sanctions target, OFAC will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the bank's
processing of the transaction lo determine what, if any, regulatory response is appropriate. [02-06-2012)
166. OFAC's SON List contains a list of entities identified by OFAC as being the Government of Iran. Should U.S.
persons now block the property and interests in property of those entities?
Yes, U.S. persons should now block the property and interests in property of the Government of Iran entities appearing on the
SON list, unless OFAC has authorized the underlying transaction or the transaction is exempt. [02-06-2012]
167. OFAC has granted my company a license under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (TSRA") and the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR). Can I continue to conduct the licensed
transaction?
Under General license A issued pursuant to E.O. 13599
, transactions authorized under existing specific licenses issued
pursuant to TSRA and the ITR are authorized under E.O. 13599 until the specific license expires, per the terms of the license.
[02-06-2012]
168. OFAC has issued me a (non-TSRA) specific license related to Iran, or the Government of Iran. Can I continue to
conduct the licensed transactions?
Under General License A issued pursuant to E.O. 13599
, transactions authorized by (non-TSRA) specific licenses issued
prior to the issuance of E.O. 13599 and issued pursuant lo any part of 31 C.F.R. chapterV are also authorized under E.O.
13599. As set forth in General License A. in most cases these new authorizations under E.O. 13599 are in effect until
theexpiration date of the individual specific license, or, if the specific license has no expiration date, until April 6, 2012.
[02-06-2012]
NOAA (Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012)
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On December 31, 2011, the President signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law
112-81 (NDAA
"). Section 1245 of this statute requires the President to block the property and interests in property subject
to U.S. jurisdiction of all Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran ("CBI'). II also aims to reduce Iranian oil
revenues and discourage transactions with the CBI by providing for sanclions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly
conducl or facilitate certain significant financial transactions with the CBI. Although the sanctions on foreign financial
institutions authorized by section 1245 are similar to the financial sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)) f'CISADA'') (i.e., prohibiting and/or imposing strict
conditions on opening or maintaining correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States), there are
differences in the scope and operation of the two statutes. [02-14-2012]
169. What is the NOAA?
On December 31, 2011, the President signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NOAA
). Section 1245 of the
NOAA requires the President to block the property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of all Iranian financial
institutions, including the Central Bank of ran (CBI). It also aims to reduce Iranian oil revenues and discourage transactions
with the CBI by providing for sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate certain significant
financial transactions with the CBI. [02-14-2012]
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170. What activities can trigger sanctions on a foreign financial institution under the NOAA?
For private financial institutions, the Act mandates that the President sanction those institutions that are found to knowingly
conduct or facilitate any significant transactions with a U.S.-designated Iranian financial institution or with the Central Bank of
Iran (CBI) -- whether for the purchase of petroleum or otherwise -- unless the transaction is for the sale of food, medicine, or
medical devices to Iran. For all transactions with the CBI other than petroleum purchases, this provision takes effect on
February 29, 2012,ie., 60 days after the enactment of the Act. The liming of the petroleum purchase sanctions is discussed
immediately below.
Private financial institutions and all other foreign financial institutions- including central banks or foreign slate-owned or
-controlled banks -- potentially face sanctions under the NOAA
if they knowingly conduct or facilitate significant financial
transactions for the purchase of Iranian petroleum or petroleum products with a U.S.-designated Iranian financial institution or
with the CBI after the provision takes effect as early as June 28, 2012,i.e., 180 days after enactment. This NDAA provision
may be held in abeyance beyond June 28, 2012, depending on the President's determination on the availability and price of
alternative supplies. Foreign central and foreign state-owned or -controlled banks are also subject to these sanctions if the
transactions are for the sale of petroleum or petroleum products to Iran and they occur after June 28, 2012.
All foreign financial institutions, including private and state-owned institutions, remain subject to section 104(c) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA), which calls for sanctions on foreign financial
institutions that are found lo have knowingly engaged in facilitating significant transactions for specific Iranian-linked individuals
and entities. [02-14-2012]
respective of the timeframes set forth in the NDAA, any foreign financial instituti
n that knowingly facilitates significant
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o
transactions with any U. S.-designated Iranian financial institution would still be subject to CI SADA.
171. Does the NOAA (National Defense Authorization Act) repeal or amend Section 104(c) of CISADA (the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act)?
No. Any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates significant transactions or provides significant financial services for
a U.S.-designated. Iranian-linked financial institution can be sanctioned under section 104(c) of CISADA and section
561.201 of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR") even if those transactions are not sanctionable under section
1245(d) of the NDAA
.Though the NOAA imposes sanctions on foreign financial institutions similar to financial sanctions
under CISADA and the IFSR (i.e., prohibiting and/or imposing strict conditions on opening or maintaining correspondent
accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States), there are differences in the scope and operation of the statutes.
[02-14-2012]
172. How does Executive Order 13599, "Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial
Institutions," and the blocking of all Iranian financial institutions affect the financial sanctions provisions in CISADA?
Do CISADA sanctions now apply to financial transactions with any Iranian financial institution?
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA) applies to transactions with only those
Iranian financial institutions that are designated in connection with Iran's MD or terrorism activities and are denoted on
OFAC's List of Specialty Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (the SON list) with the [IFSR] tag. While E.O. 13599
does block the property of all Iranian financial institutions, that action is not grounded in the authorities that relate to
counterproliferation or counterterrorism, and therefore does not implicate Cl SADA. [02-14-2012]
173. Are there any exceptions to the sanctions provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)?
Yes. The NOAA
includes an exception that prohibits the President from imposing sanctions "with respect to any person for
conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran." [02-14-2012]
174. What are definitions for the following NOAA terms: "significant financial transaction," "knowingly," "owned or
controlled by the government of a foreign country," "food, medicine, and medical devices," "foreign financial
institution," "Iranian financial institution," "significantly reduced," and "whether the price and supply of petroleum
and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran is sufficient?
"significant financial transaction"
The Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR), which implement section 104(c) of the Comprehensive lran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA), identify factors to be used in determining what is significant (as it relates to
transactions) in 31 C.F.R § 561.404, which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to consider the "totality of the facts and
circumstances" while providing a list of seven broad factors that can play a role in the determination, including: (1) the size,
number, and frequency of transactions; (2) the nature of the transaction(s); (3) the level of awareness of management and
whether the transaction(s) are part of a pattern of conduct; (4) the nexus between the transaction(s) and a blocked person; (5)
the impact of the transaction(s) on statutory objectives; (6) whether the transaction(s) involve deceptive practices; and (7) such
other factors that the Secretary deems relevant on a case-by-case basis. Treasury anticipates closely modeling the definition of
"significant" for National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA
) purposes on the IFSR.
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We anticipate utilizing a broad definition of "financial transaction" that encompasses "any transfer of value involving a financial
institution." The term "transaction" includes, but is not limited to, the following:
+ The holding of nostro, vostro, or loro accounts for or with the Central Bank of Iran or designated banks, such as Bank
Melli Iran and/or Bank Saderat lran, including any of their branches or subsidiaries worldwide (collectively the "Listed
Parties");
• The provision of trade finance and/or letter of credit services for or with Listed Parties;
, The provision of guarantees or similar instruments for or with Listed Parties;
• The provision of investment products or instruments for listed Parties and/or the participation with Listed Parties in
investments;
+ The receipt or origination of wire transfers on behalf of or involving Listed Parties;
• The acceptance of commercial paper (both retail and wholesale) drawn on Listed Parties, and the clearance of such
paper (including, but not limited lo, checks and similar drafts);
, The receipt or origination of ACH or ATM transactions with Listed Parties; and/or
• Any other transactions for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Listed Parties and/or with Listed Parties serving as
correspondents, respondents, or beneficiaries. That would include transactions where the Listed Parties do not appear on
the face of lhe transaction but where the transaction is undertaken with knowledge of the involvement of a Listed Party
based on a relationship that exists through a third party such as a money exchange or trading house.
knowingly"
The IFSR defines "knowingly" with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, to mean that an entity or individual had
actual knowledge, or should have known, about the conduct, the circumstance, or the result. 31 C.FR. § 561.314. Treasury
anticipates closely modeling the definition of this term on the IFSR.
"owned or controlled by the government of a foreign country"
The Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR") define "an entity owned or oontrolled by the Government of Iran" in section
560.313. Borrowing from that definition, a financial institution "owned or controlled by the government of a foreign country"
would be deemed to include a financial institution in which a foreign government owns a 50% or greater interest or which is
otherwise controlled by a foreign government. Treasury anticipates closely modeling the definition of this term under the
NOAA on the ITR definition.
"food, medicine, and medical devices"
"Food": The October 2011 general license for the ITR and the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR") authorizing certain
food exports to Iran and Sudan defines "food" as "items that are intended to be oonsumed by and provide nutrition to humans
or animals in ran -- including vitamins and minerals, food additives and supplements, and bottled drinking water -- and seeds
that germinate into items that are intended to be consumed by and provide nutrition to humans or animals in Iran." The
regulations also specify that food does not include alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, gum, or fertilizer. Treasury anticipates
closely modeling the definition of this term under the NOAA on this license definition.
"Medicine": ITR section 560.530(e)(2) states that: "For the purposes of this part, the term medicine has the same meaning
given the term 'drug' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321) but does not include any item
listed on the Commerce Control List in the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR part 774, supplement no. 1 (excluding
items classified as EAR 99)." Similarly, under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Act ('TSRA), 22 U.S.C. 7201 (5), 'lt]he
term 'medicine' has the meaning given the term "drug" in section 321 of title 21." Treasury anticipates closely modeling the
definition of this term under the NOAA on the ITR and TSRA.
Medical Devices": ITR section 560.530(e)(3) states that: "For the purposes of this part, the term medical device has the
meaning given the term 'device' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 US.C.$321) but does not
include any item listed on the Commerce Control List in the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR part 774, supplement
no. 1 (excluding items classified as EAR 99)." Similarly, under TSRA, 22 U.S.C. 7201 (4), "(!]he term "medical device" has the
meaning given the term 'device' in section 321 of title 21." Treasury anticipates closely modeling the definition of this term
under the NOAA on the ITR and TSRA.
"foreign financial institution"
"Foreign financial institution" is defined in section 1245 of the NDAA with reference to section 104() 0f CISADA (22 U.S.C.
$ 8513()). As further defined in the IF SR, a "foreign financial institution" is "any foreign entity that is engaged in the business of
accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign
exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. II
includes but is not limited to depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies,
securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange
merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans, and
holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing." 31 C.FR. $ 561.308. It does not include the international
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financial institutions identified in 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2), the International Fund for Agricultural Development, or the North
American Development Bank." 31 C.F.R. § 561.308. Treasury anticipates closely modeling the definition of this term under the
NOAA on the IFSR.
"Iranian financial institution"
This term is defined in E.O. 13599 as: "a financial institution organized under the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran
(including foreign branches), any financial institution in Iran, any financial institution, wherever located, owned or controlled by
the Government of Iran, and any financial institution, wherever located, owned or controlled by any of the foregoing." Such
financial institutions include, but are not limited to, any foreign entity that is engaged in the business of accepting deposits,
making, granting, transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities, or
commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. It includes but is not limited to
depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, insurance companies, securities
brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants,
securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans, and holding
companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing.
"significantly reduced"
The Secretary of Stale, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National
Intelligence, will make determinations as to whether any country has significantly reduced the volume of Iranian crude oil
purchases. Any determinations will be preceded by a process of rigorous due diligence. The Secretary of State intends to
consider relevant evidence in assessing each country's efforts to reduce the volume of crude oil imported from Iran, including
the quantity and percentage of the reduction in purchases of Iranian crude oil over the relevant period, termination of contracts
for future delivery of Iranian crude oil, and other actions that demonstrate a commitment lo substantially decrease such
purchases.
"whether the price and supply of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran is
sufficient"
The President will make a determination, based on the reports required by subparagraph (A) of Section 1245(d)(4) of the
NDAA
,as to whether the price and supply of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran is
sufficient to permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to reduce significantly in volume their purchases
from Iran. [02-14-2012]
175. What is the scope of "petroleum products" under the law?
As defined by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), petroleum products include unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum
gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel
oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas,
and miscellaneous products obtained from the processing of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and other
hydrocarbon compounds. In keeping with the EIA's standard definition, petroleum products do not include natural gas, liquefied
natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels. [02-14-2012]
176. If oil is being provided as payment for an outstanding debt, is such a transfer considered a "financial
transaction"?
If a transfer involves a financial institution it would likely be considered a financial transaction. [02-14-2012]
177. If the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) is involved in providing settlement services for a transaction, or is otherwise
acting solely as an intermediary in a transaction between a non-designated Iranian bank and a foreign financial
institution, is the foreign financial institution deemed to be engaging in a transaction with the CBI?
Section 1245 targets any significant transactions "with" the CBI; a transaction involving the CBI in an intermediary role would
likely be viewed as a transaction "with" the CBI. [02-14-2012]
178. Are barter trades involving the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) considered "financial transactions" under Section
12452
If a transfer involves a financial institution ii would likely be considered a financial transaction. [02-14-2012]
179. Does the definition of "significant financial transaction" exclude the passive holding of Central Bank of Iran (CBI)
reserves? Is the U.S. willing to give assurances that this will not be a basis for sanctions?
This will be a case-by-case determination and will require specifics on what "passive holding" entails. As a general matter, we
would likely not view lhe holding of reserves as sanctionable in the following circumstances: the accounts are frozen or
restricted, under which the CBI would be allowed to maintain accounts that it had already opened as of December 31, 2011,
but would otherwise be unable to direct the disposition of those funds, with ordinary commercial interest payments and routine
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roll-overs of time deposits under pre-existing instructions being the only new transactions. [02-14-2012]
180. Are payments made under contracts existing prior to the date of enactment of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NOAA) statute (December 31, 2011) exempted from the definition of "significant transactions"?
No general exception will be provided for payments arising out of pre-existing contracts. The assessment of whether such
payments are "significant" will be done on a case-by-case basis in line with the criteria discussed in FAQ #174. [02-14-2012]
181. Will the U.S. refrain from sanctioning foreign financial institutions that receive funds from the Central Bank of
Iran (CBI) to repay loans? What If these loans were granted for projects that might be subject to the food, medicine,
and medical device exemptions under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)?
As noted, no general exception will be provided for payments arising out of pre-existing contracts. The assessment of whether
such payments are "significant" will be done on a case-by-case basis in line with the criteria discussed in FAQ #174. Regarding
payments for food, medicine, and medical devices, the NDAA does not allow sanctions based on transactions for the sale
of food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran. Payments related to the export of broader humanitarian items would be dealt with
in our analysis of what constitutes a "significant financial transaction" and would be considered on a case-by-case basis.
[02-14-2012]
182. Is there a difference between entities that have been designated by the United States Government for illicit
conduct, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for terrorism, and those that are being
blocked under E.O. 13599? How can I tell which entities appear on the Specially Designated National (SDN) List for
which reasons?
Both blocked and designated entities appear on the SON List.
"Blocked" persons, in the context of E.O. 13599
,appear on the SON List due to the United States Government's
identification of these entities as the Government of Iran and/or as an Iranian financial institution. Such entities are identified on
the SON List with the tag [IRAN]. For example, Bank Keshavarzi is a Government of Iran owned Iranian financial institution and
is identified with the (IRAN) tag. Additionally, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a non-financial institution that has
been identified as the Government of Iran and bears the (IRAN] tag.
"Designated" persons appear on the SON List due to the United States Government's having determined that they meet the
criteria set forth in any of a number of other Executive Orders concerning, for example, assisting Iran's weapons of mass
deslruclion development, or aiding international terrorism and designating them for such activities. Such entities are identified
on the SON List with various lags other than (IRANJ, such as [NPVVMD] or [SDGT]. For example, Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines is listed as: "IRISL [NP\MD]."
Note that many entries on the SON List have more than one tag. For example: Bank Saderat Iran has three tags: (SDGT],
indicating that it has been sanctioned for providing services to terrorism; [IRAN], indicating that it is the Government of Iran;
and [IF SR], referring to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations to signal to third country financial institutions that engage
with entities with this tag that they risk sanctions under CISADA. [02-14-2012]
Executive Order 13606 (the GHRAVITY E.O.)
Print this topic
On April 22, 2012, the President signed Executive Order 13606 Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the
United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via
Information Technology (the "GHRAVITY E.O."). Effective 12.01 a.m. eastern daylight lime on April 23, 2012, the GHRAVITY
E.O. blocks all property and interests in property of persons listed in its Annex, and all persons determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation of the Secretary of Stale, to meet the criteria in the order.
[04-23-2012]
183. Why did the President issue the GHRAVITY E.O.?
The GHRAVITY E.O.
follows prior Executive orders issued by the President in response to the commission of human rights
abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria. With the GHRAVITY E.O., the President recognized that the commission of
serious human rights abuses against the people of Iran and Syria by their governments, facilitated by computer and network
disruption, monitoring, and tracking by those governments, threatens the national security and foreign policy of the United
Stales. The GHRAVITY E.O. targets this activity in order to deter and disrupt such abuses. [04-23-2012]
184. What does the GHRAVITY E.O. do?
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The GHRAVITY E.O. blocks (i.e., freezes) the property and interests in property of, among others, any person determined
by the Secretary or the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation of the Secretary or State, (1) to have operated,
or to have directed the operation of, information and communications technology that facilitates computer or network
disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the
Government or Iran or the Govemmenl or Syria; or (2) to have sold, leased, or otherwise provided, directly or indirectly, goods,
services, or technology to Iran or Syria likely to be used to facilitate such activities.
U.S. persons in possession or property or interests in property belonging to persons listed in the Annex to the GHRAVITY E.O.,
or designated in the future by Treasury under the E.O., are obligated to block the property and report the blocking to OFAC
within 10 days or blocking. Entities that are 50% or more owned by persons blocked by the GHRAVITY E.O. are also blocked,
regardless of whether such entities appear on the Annex or OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons (SDN list"). [04-23-2012]
185. What type of activities does the GHRAVITY E.O. target?
The GHRAVITY E.O.
targets the provision and use of information and communications technology to facilitate computer or
network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the
Government of Iran or the Government of Syria. It is not intended to block exports of technology that enable the Syrian and
Iranian people to freely communicate among themselves and with the outside world.
"Information and communications technology" means any hardware, software, or other product or service primarily intended to
fulfill or enable the function of information processing and communication by electronic means, including transmission and
display, including via the Internet. [04-23-2012]
186. How do I know that a person has been designated under the GHRAVITY E.O.?
Persons designated under the GHRAVITY E.O. appear on the publicly available Specially Designated Nationals List (SON
list) bearing the [HRIT] tag. U.S. persons are obligated to block property involving the persons bearing the tag [HRIT] on the
SON list, unless the transaction is exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC. [04-23-2012]
187. Does the GHRAVITY E.O. prohibit me from exporting technology to companies that do business with Iran or
Syria?
This E.O. does not generally prohibit transactions involving persons that do business with Iran or Syria, unless the person has
been designated pursuant to this order. You should consult with the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS) regarding exports to companies that do business with Syria. [04-23-2012]
188. If I am a non-U.S. company that exports information and communications technology to Iran or Syria, will I be
designated under the GHRAVITY E.O.?
The measures in this order are designed primarily to address the need to prevent entities located in whole or in part in Iran and
Syria from facilitating or committing serious human rights abuses. These measures are not designed to prevent the provision of
information and communications technology necessary to enable the Iranian and Syrian people to freely communicate with
each other and the outside world. That said, those providing communications technology to Iran or Syria that has the potential
to facilitate computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking should exercise great caution given Iran and Syria's use of
this technology to assist in the commission of serious human rights abuses. [04-23-2012]
189. Would I need authorization from OFAC or BIS if I wanted to export goods or technology to persons blocked under
the GHRAVITY E.O.?
Yes. For more information regarding exports of goods or technology to persons blocked under the GHRAVITY E.O.
contact OFAC or BIS. [04-23-2012]
please
190. Are existing licenses issued by the U.S. Government involving persons designated under the GHRAVITY E.O. still
valid?
U.S. persons who have been issued licenses involving persons designated under the GHRAVITY E.O.
the issuing agency regarding the validity of their licenses. [04-23-2012]
should check with
FSE Executive Order (Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending
Entry into the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with Respect to Iran
and Syria)
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191. What does Executive Order 13608 Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United
States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with Respect to Iran and Syria" do?
This Executive Order gives Treasury new authorities. First, ii strengthens Treasury's ability lo address behavior by foreign
individuals and entities determined to have violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of U.S.
sanctions on Syria or Iran. This E.O. also gives Treasury the authority to impose sanctions on foreign persons who have
facilitated deceptive transactions for or on behalf of persons subject to U.S. sanctions.
Transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States involving persons sanctioned under this authority are prohibited,
effectively cutting the listed persons off from the U.S. marketplace and financial system. By cutting off access to the U.S.
marketplace and financial system to such sanctions evaders, Executive Order 13608 provides Treasury with a powerful tool to
prevent and deter such behavior and to hold such persons accountable and to convince them to change their behavior. Publicly
identifying such persons will also allow U.S. persons to avoid unwittingly engaging in transactions with identified foreign
persons that may expose U.S. persons to the risk of sanctions violations. [05-01-2012]
192. Why was this authority needed?
Executive Order 13608 expands Treasury's ability to address the behavior of foreign persons determined to have violated
or attempted lo violate U.S. sanctions on Syria or Iran, or to have facilitated deceptive transactions on behalf of persons
subject lo those sanctions, where the foreign person had no physical, financial, or other presence in the United States and did
not submit to U.S. administrative proceedings. Treasury may use this authority where ii appears that a foreign person violated
U.S. sanctions on Iran or Syria but may not meet criteria for designation under existing Executive Orders. Executive Order
13608 will provide a means through which Treasury can limit the risk to U.S. commercial and financial systems posed by
foreign persons determined to have violated U.S. sanctions on Iran or Syria, or to have engaged in deceptive transactions for
or on behalf of persons subject to U.S. sanctions on Iran or Syria.
Such a listing under Executive Order 13608 also provides Treasury with the capability to put the world on notice as to such
foreign persons' activity and the risk of similar future activity. Such identification will help prevent U.S. persons from unwittingly
engaging in transactions with foreign persons that may pose a risk of sanctions violations. [05-01-2012]
193. What are the repercussions of an individual or entity being identified under Executive Order 13608?
If an individual or entity is made subject to sanctions under this authority, U.S. persons generally may no longer provide to or
procure from such individual or entity any goods, services, or technology. From a practical standpoint, ii means that the
sanctioned individual or entity will be cut off from the U.S. commercial and financial systems. [05-01-2012]
194. Are U.S. persons required to block the property of individuals and entities identified under Executive Order
13608?
No. Identifications or listings under Executive Order 13608 do not block any assets. However, aU.S. person may not
provide or procure goods or services, including financial services, or technology to or from a listed person without authorization
from OFAC, unless the transaction is otherwise exempt from regulation under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act
(e.g., certain travel-related transactions). [05-01-2012]
336. How do I know whether a person is identified under E.O. 13608?
Please refer to the Foreign Sanctions Evaders (FSE) List. [02-06-2014]
195.1 am a financial institution. What do I do if t receive a wire transfer involving a listed party?
AU.S. financial institution must reject any wire transfer involving a listed person and file a report with OFAC within 10 days.
[05-01-2012]
196. I am a financial institution and I hold an account for a listed person. What do I do with the funds?
The account is not blocked; however, it is restricted and you cannot allow it to be operated without authorization from OFAC
[05-01-2012]
197. What are U.S. persons obligated to do with property of a person listed under Executive Order 13608?
Properly of a listed person is not blocked, but U.S. persons must have authorization from OFAC to provide or procure such
property lo or from a listed person, or to provide or procure services to or from a listed person in connection with such property.
Additionally, wire transfers involving the assets of an Executive Order 13608-listed person must be rejected. [05-01-2012]
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198. May a U.S. person deal with an Executive Order 13608-listed person so long as the dealing does not Involve Iran
or Syria?
No. U.S. persons are prohibited from all transactions or dealings described in Executive Order 13608
with persons listed
under Executive Order 13608, unless authorized by OFAC or where the transaction is otherwise exempt from regulation under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
.[05-01-2012]
199. How is an identification or listing under Executive Order 13608 different from a designation?
Like a designation, a U.S. person is prohibited, unless authorized by OFAC or if the underlying transaction is exempt from
regulation under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
, from dealing with an identified or listed person. Unlike
a blocking designation, the property and the interests in property of a person listed under Executive Order 13608 are not
blocked, [05-01-2012]
200. How is this different from lists maintained by the Department of Commerce?
Treasury's authority under Executive Order 13608
has some similarities to Commerce's authority under the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR"). Commerce may impose denial orders on persons (both foreign and U.S.) who have
committed violations of the EAR or present an imminent risk of committing a violation. These individuals or organizations are
listed on Commerce's Denied Persons List. It is prohibited to deal with Denied Persons in any export transaction involving
items (commodities, software, and technology) subject lo the EAR. Treasury's authority under Executive Order 13608
complements Commerce's authority by addressing at least two types of sanctions violations that are outside the scope of the
EAR. Specifically, Treasury may prohibit the provision of services (in addition to goods and technology) to or from identified or
listed persons and Treasury may prohibit transactions or dealings involving goods and technology that are not subject to the
EAR. However, unlike Commerce's authority, Treasury's authority to sanction or list an individual or entity under Executive
Order 13608 may be implemented only with respect to foreign individuals or entities. [05-01-2012]
201. May a U.S. person deal with a person listed under Executive Order 13608 in a transaction that was previously
licensed by OFAC?
No. U.S. persons cannot have any dealings with a person identified or listed under this Executive Order absent specific
authorization from OFAC pursuant to the Executive Order 13608
, unless the transaction is exempt from regulation under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
.[05-01-2012]
202. What if the transaction is already underway?
If a transaction is underway al the lime of a listing, a U.S. person must cease dealing with the listed person and the U.S.
person is prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings in or related to any goods, services, or technology to or from the
listed person, unless the transaction is exempt under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
, or until such lime
that OFAC authorizes the transactions pursuant to the Executive Order 13608
.Additionally, if the transaction underway
involves a wire transfer, a U.S. financial institution must reject it and file a report with OFAC within 10 days.
Like all of its programs, OFAC has the authority under Executive Order 13608 to license transactions that are consistent with
U.S. foreign policy. [05-01-2012]
203. Can a U.S. person use a listed person to facilitate personal remittances to or from Iran or Syria?
No. Without specific authorization from OFAC, U.S. persons cannot use a listed person to process personal remittances.
[05-01-2012]
204. Will Treasury pursue an enforcement action before identifying or listing a person pursuant to Executive Order
13608?
The authorities granted under this Executive Order are in addition to current authorities that Treasury has to pursue an
enforcement action for violations of U.S. law, and Treasury is not required to pursue a civil enforcement action prior to
identifying or listing a person pursuant to Executive Order 13608. [05-01-2012]
Treasury CISADA Findings Against Bank of Kunlun
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207. What were the criteria for this finding? How many other institutions were you looking at and why did you decide
to take action against Bank of Kunlun?
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Based on information made available to the Treasury Depar1ment, the Depar1ment has found that China's Bank of Kunlun has
knowingly facilitated significant transactions for various Iranian-linked banks designated by the United Slates under our WMD
or terrorism authorities.
Upon finding that Bank of Kunlun was knowingly engaged in these activities that are sanctionable under the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(Cl SADA), the Secretary of the Treasury has prohibited
U.S. banks from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States for Bank of
Kunlun -- effectively cutting off Bank of Kunlun's direct access to the U.S. financial system.
Since CISADA was signed into law in July 2010, Treasury has engaged with over 120 financial institutions and bank regulators
in more than 60 countries all over the world lo brief them on the financial provisions of CISADA, and, in cases where we had
specific concerns, has shared information about those concerns.
This global engagement campaign has proven highly successful, as we have seen the overwhelming majority of financial
institutions with which we have engaged change their business practices- even close any correspondent accounts with U.S.
designated Iranian banks- to ensure that their access to the U.S. financial system is not put at risk.
The July 31, 2012 action against Bank of Kunlun was in response to its ongoing relationships with U.S.-designated Iranian
banks.
Note: The Treasury Department had also made a CISADA finding against Iraq's Elaf Islamic Bank on July 31, 2012. On May
17, 2013, Elaf Islamic Bank was delisted and its name was removed from the Par1561 List
.[05-17-2013]
208. How are you defining "significant" transactions and financial services?
In determining whether transactions or financial services are significant, the Secretary of the Treasury may consider a number
of factors related to the transactions or services, including, but not limited to: size, number, and frequency; type, complexity and
commercial purpose; the level of awareness or involvement by the bank's management; whether the activity or payment
illustrates a pattern of practice or is an isolated event; the ultimate economic benefit conferred upon the designated person(s);
and whether the transactions involved the use of deceptive financial practices to obscure the identities of the parties involved.
Bank of Kunlun
Bank of Kunlun has provided hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of services to U.S. designated Iranian banks. These
financial services include maintaining accounts, transferring payments, and serving as the paying bank for letters of credit
opened by U.S. designated Iranian banks. The facilitation of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars worth of transactions with U.S.
designated Iranian banks over the past year is significant.
In 2012, after Treasury designated Bank Tejarat, Bank of Kunlun transferred hundreds of payments totaling approximately $100
million dollars for accounts it holds for Bank Tejarat and made a payment for an IRGC affiliate pursuant to a letter of credit
opened by Bank Teja rat, [05-17-2013]
209. What happens to the correspondent and payable-through accounts held by Bank of Kunlun in the United States?
To our knowledge, Bank of Kunlun does not currently hold correspondent accountswith U.S. financial institutions.
The July 31, 2012 action prohibits financial institutions in the United States from opening or maintaining correspondent or
payable-through accountsfor Bank of Kunlun. [05-17-2013]
210. What are the consequences for a U.S. financial institution that maintains or opens a new correspondent or
payable-through account for Bank of Kunlun?
A U.S. financial institution that maintains or opens a correspondent or payable-through account for Bank of Kunlun is subject
to civil penalties in the amount of up to $250,000 or twice the value of the transaction, whichever is greater.
Criminal penalties of up to $1 million can be imposed for willful violations, and individuals who willfully violate the prohibition
can face up to 20 years in prison. [05-17-2013]
211. If a foreign financial institution continues to do business with Bank of Kunlun, could that lead to a CISAOA
finding against the other institution?
Any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates significant transactionson behalf of designated Iranian banks
whether directly or indirectly- may face Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA)
sanctions. OFAC defines "knowingly" in this context as meaning the financial institution knew or should have known of the
conduct, circumstance, or result. Bank of Kunlun has demonstrated its willingness to move hundreds of millions dollars on
behalf of designated Iranian banks. Accordingly, we would expect heightened due diligence in any dealings with Bank of
Kunlun. [05-17-2013]
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212. Does this finding affect Bank of Kunlun's branches or subsidiaries around the world? Does this finding affect any
holding companies?
The prohibitions implemented as a result of today's action apply to Bank of Kunlun and all of its offices, around the world.
[05-17-2013]
213. Are United States financial institutions that do not hold correspondent or payable-through accounts for Bank of
Kunlun required to block or reject transactions that otherwise involve Bank of Kunlun?
No. U.S. financial institutions are not required to block or reject financial or trade transactions that involve Bank of Kunlun.
That said, we would expect heightened due diligence in any dealings with Bank of Kunlun given its demonstrated willingness lo
facilitate transactions on behalf of Iranian banks designated by well over a dozen countries worldwide. [05-17-2013]
214. What is the licensing process for U.S. financial institutions that need to conduct transactions in order to close
correspondent or payable-through accounts with a foreign financial institution sanctioned pursuant to the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA)?
Treasury regulations provide a 10-day period in which U.S. financial institutions are authorized to engage in the transactions
necessary to close an affected account. If a U.S. financial institution that is in the process of closing an affected account seeks
to engage in transactions beyond those already authorized, Treasury may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis.
[05-17-2013]
215. What is the difference, in practical effect, between this and a designation under one of your other authorities, like
E.O. 13382?
The July 31, 2012 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA) finding prohibits the
opening or maintaining of correspondent accounts or payable-through accounlsin the United Stales for Bank of Kunlun. This
action does not require the immediate freezing of any assets that Bank of Kunlun may hold within U.S. jurisdiction.
[05-17-2013]
Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012, "Authorizing Additional Sanctions
With Respect to Iran"
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E.O. 13622 was revoked by E.O. 13716 of January 16, 2016. Please be advised that certain provisions of E.O. 13622 have
been incorporated into E.O.13846 of August 6, 2018, "Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran". FAQs relating
to E.O. 13846 can be found here. FAQs relating to E.O. 13622 have been archived and can be found here. [08-06-2018]
[08-06-2018]
Determination Pursuant to Section 312 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act (TER)
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Section 312 of the lran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) requires the Secretary of the
Treasury, no later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of TRA, to determine whether the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) is an agent or affiliate of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), and to report to Congress on these determinations and the reasons for them. On September 24, 2012, the Department
of the Treasury made a determination that NIOC is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC. Based on the information currently
available, Treasury is not able to determine at this lime whether NITC is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC.
233. Isn't the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) already subject to sanctions?
Yes. Executive Order 13622 provides for sanctions on foreign financial institutions found to have knowingly conducted or
facilitated significant financial transactions with NIOC (except for sales of refined petroleum products to NIOC that fall below
the dollar threshold that could trigger sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act
). Executive Order 13622 also provides
authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property and interests in property of persons determined to have
materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of,
NIOC (as well as other specified entities). Note, however, that these sanctions are not applicable to certain transactions related
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to the Shah Deniz pipeline project, in which NIOC has a minority stake, under Executive Order 13622. In addition, NIOC was
already blocked as an entity of the Government of Iran under E.O. 13599
, which was issued pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), as amended, among other authorities. Nevertheless, as described
below, the determination that NIOC is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC carries consequences.
234. What is the effect of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) determination? Are there CISADA implications?
As a result of this the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
(TRA) section 312 determination, NIOC now is
also a person described under section 104(0)(2)(E)(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (CISADA) as an agent or affiliate of the IRGC whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to
IEEPA
. This means that foreign financial institutions determined to knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide
significant financial services for NIOC are exposed to CISADA sanctions, including prohibitions or the imposition of strict
conditions on the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United Stales.
In addition, section 302 of TRA requires sanctions on foreign persons determined to have knowingly provided certain material
support to, or engaged in significant transactions with, the IRGC or its officials, agents, or affiliates whose property or interest in
property are blocked. Consequently, foreign persons that knowingly engage in significant transactions with NIOC after the
September 24, 2012 determination could be exposed to sanctions.
An IRGC" identifier will be added to NIOC's entry on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List available on
OFAC's website.
As noted below, the potential application of sanctions under section 104(c)(2)(E)() of CISADA and section 302 of TRA is
affected by whether the country with primary jurisdiction has received a significant reduction exception from the Secretary of
Stale.
235. What are the implications for petroleum purchase transactions involving NIOC by financial institutions and
entities in countries that have received a significant reduction exception from the Secretary of State?
Significant transactions, financial services, or material support involving National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) for the purchase
of Iranian petroleum or petroleum products by a foreign financial institution or entity based in a country that has received a
significant reduction exception from the Secretary of State do not carry potential sanctions consequences -- under the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA), sections 302 and 312 of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
(TRA), section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012
(NDAA), or sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order 13622
.Sections 302 and 312 of TRA authorize the President not
to impose sanctions for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran if an exception under subsection 1245(d)
(4)(0) of the NOAA applies to the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution al the time of the
transactions or the provision of services. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any significant transaction for other sanctioned entities
(such as Iranian designated banks or other persons described in section 104(c)(2)(E) of CISADA) may result in sanctions,
regardless of whether the transaction is for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products and involves NIOC.
236. Does the determination regarding the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) mean that there is no affiliation
between NITC and the IRGC?
This statement means only that, based on the currently available information, Treasury is not able to determine at this time that
NITC is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC.
237. How does the effect of this determination compare to the effect of section 1(a) of Executive Order 13622 as to
transactions with National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)?
The effect of the determination is similar to the effect of Executive Order 13622 section 1(a), which provides for prohibitions
on the opening of and prohibitions or strict conditions on maintaining correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in
the United States for foreign financial institutions determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, to have knowingly conducted or facilitated significant financial transactions with NIOC. Executive Order
13622 likewise contains an exception that covers transactions with NIOC conducted or facilitated by foreign financial
inslitutions based in NDAA-excepted jurisdictions. A significant difference between these authorities is that the National
Defense Authorization Act
(NOAA) exception in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
(TRA) section
312 is limited to transactions or financial services for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
Section 4 of Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012, "Authorizing the
Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions with Respect to
Iran"
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E.0. 13628 was amended by E.0. 13716 of January 16, 2016 and revoked by E.0.13846 of August 6, 2018, "Reimposing
Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran". Please be advised that section 8 of E.O. 13846 continues in effect the sanctions
previously contained in section 4 of E.O. 13628 and expands them to cover activity sanctionable under E.O 13846. FAQs
relating to E.O. 13846 can be found here. FAQs relating to Section 4 of E.O. 13628 have been archived and can be found
here. [08-06-2018]
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and the Statement of
Licensing Procedure on Support Of Human Rights-, Humanitarian-, and
Democracy-Related Activities With Respect to Iran
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The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC") issued a final rule in the Federal Register on October 22, 2012, changing the
heading of the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (the "ITR"), to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.FR. part 560 (the ITSR"), and amending the renamed ITSR to implement Executive Order (E.0.")
13599
(other than section 11) and sections 1245(c) and (d)(1)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012
(the "NDAA"). These new regulations implement the blocking of the Government of Iran and all Iranian financial
institutions pursuant to E.O. 13599 and the NOAA.
OFAC is adding numerous new sections to the ITSR, including prohibitions, definitions, interprelations, and licensing
provisions. OFAC also is revising many existing sections of the ITSR in order to take account of the new government-wide
blocking as well as the blocking of all Iranian financial institutions. Due to the extensive nature of these and other amendments
described below, OFAC is reissuing the ITSR in their entirety.
In addition, OFAC is publishing on the Iran section of its Web site a Statement of Licensing Procedure on Support of Human
Rights-, Humanitarian-, and Democracy-Related Activities with Respect to Iran. The Statement of Licensing Procedure reflects
procedures established pursuant to the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (the "TRA), which was
signed into law by the President on August 10, 2012.
241. What are the major changes that the Iranian Transaction and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) implement in
superseding the Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR)?
The ITSR block the property and interests in property of the Government of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions that come
within the possession or control of any U.S. person, including any foreign branch, and prohibit all U.S. persons from dealing
with any property interests whatsoever, present, future, or contingent, of persons identified as already blocked pursuant to
E.O. 13599 and the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA).
OFAC is adding section 560.211 t0 the ITSR to implement the blocking prohibitions set forth in E.O. 13599 and the NOAA. New
sections 560.212 through 560.214 are being added to set forth certain consequences and requirements that stem from the
blocking prohibitions, including, inter alia, the requirement to hold blocked funds in interest-bearing accounts. New paragraphs
(e) and (f) are being added to section 560.210 t0 incorporate two exemptions from the blocking prohibitions that are set forth in
E.0. 13599. These exemptions concern the official business of the Federal Government and the property and interests in
property of the Government of Iran that were blocked pursuant to Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979.
[10-22-2012]
242. The ITSR includes revisions to the ITR pertaining to the transfer of funds to or from Iran. Accordingly, how may I
transfer funds to or from Iran that arise from, and are ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to, an underlying
transaction that is authorized under the ITSR?
The Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations(ITSR) authorize United States depository institutions to process transfers
of funds to or from Iran, or for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran , if the transfer arises
from, and is ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to, an underlying transaction that has been authorized by a specific
or general license issued pursuant to, or set forth in, the ITSR and does not involve debiting or crediting an Iranian account.
See 31 CF 560.516(a).
In addition, the ITSR authorize United States registered brokers or dealers in securities lo process transfers of funds to or from
Iran, or for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran, if the transfer arises from, and is ordinarily
incident and necessary to give effect to, an underlying transaction that has been authorized by a specific or general license
issued pursuant lo, or set forth in, the ITSR and does not involve debiting or crediting an Iranian account. See 31 CFR
560.516(b).
The authorizations set forth in section 560.516 of the ITSR do not allow a U.S. person who is authorized to engage in the
underlying transaction to deal directly with money service businesses (MSBs) or hawalas, wherever localed. However. these
authorizations do not preclude United States depository institutions or United Slates registered brokers or dealers in securities
from engaging or dealing with third-country MSBs or havwalas in the processing of the authorized transfers pursuant to section
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560.516 of the ITSR. [10-22-2012]
243. How can I send personal remittances to or from Iran under the Iranian Transaction and Sanctions Regulations
(IT SR)?
The ITSR authorize the transfer of funds that are noncommercial and personal in nature to or from Iran or for or on behalf of an
individual ordinarily resident in Iran, other than an individual whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to S
560.211, subject to certain restrictions and limitations. See 31 CFR 560.550. Such transfers must be processed by a United
States depository institution or a United States registered broker or dealer in securities and not by any other US. person. The
personal remittances general license does not permit a U.S. person to deal directly with money service businesses (MSBs) or
hawalas, wherever located. However, this general license does not preclude United States depository institutions or United
States registered brokers or dealers in securities from engaging or dealing with third-country MSBs or havwalas in the
processing of the authorized transfers pursuant to section 560.550 of the ITSR.
The hand-carrying of certain noncommercial, personal remittances is also authorized, provided that the individual who is a U.S.
person is hand-carrying the funds on his or her behalf, but not on behalf of another person. See 31 CFR 560.550. [10-22-2012]
244. What effect will the Iranian Transaction and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) have on Iranian-Americans and the
people of Iran?
The ITSR include several general licenses that newly authorize, or continue to authorize, activities that are otherwise prohibited
by the regulations. Categories of activities affected by these changes include, among other things, visa-related transactions,
journalistic activities in Iran, the sale of real property in Iran and the transfer of related proceeds to the United States,
educational activities (including certain exchange programs), participation in conferences, and the exportation and
reexportation of medicine and basic medical supplies to ran. [10-22-2012]
245. What does the Statement of Licensing Procedure on Support of Human Rights-, Humanitarian-, and Democracy
Related Activities with Respect to Iran do?
The Statement of Licensing Procedure reflects procedures established pursuant to section 413 of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act
(the TRA). These procedures stipulate that, as of the effective dale of the TRA, license
determinations for complete requests for authorization under this policy shall be made not later than 90 days after receipt by
OFAC, with certain exceptions. The Statement of Licensing Policy applies to applications submitted by the following categories
of U.S. persons seeking to engage in certain human rights-, humanitarian-, and democracy-related activities with respect to
Iran: (1) entities receiving funds from the Department of Slate lo engage in the proposed activity; (2) the Broadcasting Board of
Governors; and (3) other appropriate agencies of the United States Government. The ITSR also include separate statements
of licensing policy related to the sharing of information over the Internet in Iran and the support of democracy and human rights
in Iran and academic and cultural exchange programs. [10-22-2012]
Implementation of Section 504 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 (the TRA)
Print this topic
On August 10, 2012, the President signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human RightsAcl of 2012, Public
Law 112-158 (TRA). Section 504 of the TRA amends section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-81
(NDAA"), which the President signed into law on December 31, 2011. The section
504 amendments to the NOAA took effect February 6, 2013. Amendments to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations,
31C.FR. part 561 (the IFSR") were published on March 15, 2013, to implement sections 503 and 504 of the TRA" and
certain provisions of Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012. Although Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016
revoked Executive Order 13622, the relevant provisions of Executive Order 13622 were reimposed by Executive Order 13846
of August 6, 2018.
254. What does section 504 of the TRA do?
Pursuant to the restrictions already in place under the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), foreign financial
institutions ("FF1e") face restrictions on, or loss of, correspondent and payable-through account access in the United States if
they knowingly engage in significant financial transactions with the Central Bank of Iran ('CBI") or a designated Iranian financial
institution, unless an NOAA exception, such as the significant reduction exception, applies. The NOAA significant reduction
exception applies if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and other agencies, has
determined that the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI has significantly reduced its purchases of Iranian crude oil
during a specified period of time.
Effective February 6, 2013, section 504 amends the NOAA in several ways. Most importantly, it narrows the NDAA's significant
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reduction exception to (a) exempt from sanctions only transactions that conduct or facilitate bilateral trade in goods or
services between the country granted the exception and Iran, and (b) require that funds owed to Iran as a result of the bilateral
trade be credited to an account located in the country granted the exception and not be repatriated to Iran. In addition,
it
(i) eliminates the distinction between state-owned or -controlled FFIs (not_including foreign central banks) and private FFls,
thereby expanding the scope of sanctionable transactions for state-owned or -controlled FFls with the CBI or designated
Iranian financial institutions; and
(i) clarifies that countries that have reduced their Iranian crude oil purchases to zero may continue to receive the significant
reduction exception.
The sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran (the "Humanitarian Exception") is no! impacted
by section 504 of the TRA.
The purchase or acquisition of petrochemicals from Iran remain sanctionable activities and are not subject to the significant
reduction exception. [2-6-2013]
255. Do the section 504 modifications of the TRA restrict any other dealings with Iran?
Yes, the section 504 modifications also narrow the scope of transactions excepted from certain sanctions available under
E.O. 13622
.Accordingly, foreign financial institutions (FFls) in countries that are determined by the Secretary of State to
have significantly reduced their purchases of Iranian crude oil pursuant to the NOAA
, that knowingly conduct significant
financial transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC"), the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO"), or otherwise
for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran, are only eligible for the significant reduction exception if the
FFls adhere to the bilateral trade restrictions, credit the funds to an account in the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI,
and do not repatriate the funds to Iran.
Example 1: A FFI in a country which has received a significant reduction exception and with primary jurisdiction over the FFI
may facilitate a transaction enabling an oil refinery in that country to purchase crude oil from Iran without having exposure to
U.S. correspondent account sanctions, so long as the transaction meets section 504's bilateral trade requirements, the funds
are credited to an account in the FFI in the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI, and the funds are not repatriated to
Iran.
Example 2: If, however, a FFI in a country which has received a significant reduction exception facilitates a third country's
crude oil purchase -- even a third country with a significant reduction exception -- from Iran, the FF] would have exposure to
sanctions because the transaction was not solely for the FFl host country's purchase of crude oil from Iran. [2-6-2013]
256. What transactions are impacted by section 504 of the TRA as it amends section 1245 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NOAA) for Fiscal Year 2012?
Significant financial transactions knowingly conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution (FFI) with the Central Bank
of Iran (CBI) on or after November 5, 2018 or with a designated Iranian financial institution may be subject to sanctions under
the National Defense Authorization Act
(NOAA) and section 561.203 of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR),
31C.FR. Part 561, unless --
() the country that has primary jurisdiction over the FFI conducting or facilitating such significant financial transactions has
received a significant reduction exception under section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the NOAA; and
(ii) the significant financial transaction is for bilateral trade only, and any funds owed lo Iran as a result of such trade are
credited to an account at the FFI in the country that has primary jurisdiction over the FFI and are not repatriated to Iran.
However, any FFI that knowingly facilitates significant transactions or provides significant financial services for persons
designated in connection with Iran's support for international terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
pursuant to E.O.s 13224 or 13382 can be sanctioned under section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions
Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 ('CISADA') and section 561.201 of the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations
(IFSR) even if those transactions are not sanctionable under section 1245(d) of the NOAA, section 561.203 of the IFSR
sections 1244 and 1247 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, and Executive Order 13846 for countries
that receive an SRE. [11-05-2018]
These do not include sales relating to the Humanitarian Exception
257. To which jurisdictions does the significant reduction exception apply (section 504 of the TRA)?
As of February 6, 2013, 20 jurisdictions have been granted a 180-day significant reduction exception.
The following jurisdictions received their 180-day significant reduction exception to the National Defense
Authorization Act
(NOAA) sanctions on September 14, 2012: Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
The following jurisdictions received their 180-day significant reduction exception to NDAA sanctions on December 7, 2012:
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China, India, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Turkey. [2-6-2013]
258. What is meant by the TRA section 504's requirement that bilateral trade consist of trade in goods and services
between the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution (FFI) and Iran?
OFAC interprets bilateral trade between Iran and the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI to mean trade in only those
goods or services originating in (e.g., produced in or substantially transformed in) --
() the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI conducting or facilitating the transaction, or
(ii) Iran (for purposes of the import of Iranian-origin goods or services by the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI),
and the trade in services cannot include brokering transactions involving goods or services from or to third countries.
Furthermore, the goods or services must be exported and sold directly to either the country with primary jurisdiction over the
FF] (in the case of Iranian-origin goods or services), or lran (in the case of goods or services originating in the country with
primary jurisdiction over the FFI).
The Humanitarian Exception is not impacted by section 504's bilateral trade limitations (see FAQ 265). [2-6-2013]
259. What can a foreign financial institution (FFI) do with the funds resulting from the import of Iranian-origin goods or
services once the funds are credited to an account? Can funds be transferred to other accounts?
Section 504 of the TRA
requires that, in order for a sanctionable transaction to fall within the bounds of the significant
reduction exception, any funds owed to Iran as a result of the bilateral trade transaction must be credited to an "account
located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the [FFI)." For purposes of implementing this requirement, OFAC interprets
the "account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the [FFl]" to be an account in the country with primary
jurisdiction over the FFI, and at the same FFI that facilitated the transaction for the importation of goods or services from Iran.
Once the funds are deposited in the FFI, they can be
(i) used to pay for a purchase by Iran of goods or services originating in the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI which
are exported and sold directly to Iran, or for the Humanitarian Exception (see Figure 1); or
(ii) transferred to a SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT (see FAQ 260) within that same FFI, in the country with primary
jurisdiction over the FFI, where the funds may be later debited to purchase goods or services originating in the country with
primary jurisdiction over the FFI which are exported and sold directly to Iran, or for the Humanitarian Exception (see Figure 2)
The funds may not be repatriated to lran. [2-6-2013]
Figure I: Direct Model
Subject to the NDAA ad E.0. 13622 ($1)
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Figure 2: Special Purpose Account Model
Subject to the NDAA ad E.0. 13622 ($1
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•
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-
FUNDS
RECIPIENT
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260. What is a SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT for purposes of the National Defenese Authorization Act's (NCAA)
significant reduction exception?
A SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT is an account set up with conditions and safeguards that require the account to be used
only for bilateral trade in goods or services between Iran and the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI, and for sales
made under the Humanitarian Exception (see FAQ 265). Funds paid as a result of bilateral trade under the NDAA's significant
reduction exception may be transferred to a SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT, so long as the account is at the same FFI that
facilitated or conducted the original transaction, in the country with primary jurisdiction over the FF\. [2-6-2013]
261. Are there any circumstances in which funds can be transferred to third-country financial institutions?
Transfers on or after February 6, 2013, of funds deposited in the RECIPIENT ACCOUNT or the SPECIAL PURPOSE
ACCOUNT to third-country financial institutions are not covered by the National Defense Authorization Act's (NOAA
significant reduction exception, and create exposure to sanctions for FFls conducting or facilitating such transfers, unless the
transfer is to pay a third-country exporter for sales made pursuant to the Humanitarian Exception (see FAQ 265). [2-6-2013]
262. Can funds be withdrawn from the RECIPIENT ACCOUNT or a SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT?
In order for the National Defense Authorization Act's (NOAA
) significant reduction exception to apply on or after February 6,
2013, funds withdrawn from the RECIPIENT ACCOUNT or SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT at the FFI may only be used to
pay for bilateral trade or purchases relating to the Humanitarian Exception. Cash withdrawals from the RECIPIENT ACCOUNT
or SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT would be deemed to fall outside of the scope of bilateral trade and would expose the FFI to
sanctions. Bank checks written on the account may be used only to pay for bilateral trade or purchases relating to the
Humanitarian Exception, and are subject to further restrictions set out in FAQ 263 below. [2-6-2013]
263. Who can receive payments from funds credited to a RECIPIENT ACCOUNT or SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT?
In order for the National Defense Authorization Act's (NOAA
) significant reduction exception to apply on or after February 6,
2013, the person receiving payment (e.g., the manufacturer or service provider) for goods or services being exported to Iran
must be
() a citizen, national, or permanent resident of the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI maintaining the accounts
containing the bilateral trade funds: or
(ii) an entity organized under the laws of the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI maintaining such accounts.
Furthermore, the person receiving such payment may not be -
(i) the Government of Iran (as defined in 31 CFR Part 561.321) (GOI"); or
(ii) a financial institution that appears on the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Part 561
on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site (www.treasury.gov/ofac). [2-6-2013]
, which is maintained
The term Government of Iran" as defined in 31 CFR Part 561.321 includes: (a) The state and the Govemment of Iran, as well
as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof; (b) Any entity owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
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n
g; (c) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable cause to
believe that such person is, or has been, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly on behalf of any of the foregoing, and
(d) Any person or entity identified by the Secretary of the Treasury to be the Government of Iran under 31 CF Part 560.
264. Can funds be remitted to Iran or the Government of Iran (GOI) without exposure to sanctions?
No. If funds from the RECIPIENT ACCOUNT or the SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT are remitted, directly or indirectly, to Iran,
or paid to any person that is the GOI, the FFI would be exposed to sanctions. [2-6-2013]
265. Can the funds be used for sales made under the Humanitarian Exception?
The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2012
(NOAA) generally exempts from sanctions sales made under
the Humanitarian Exception (i.e., the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices from third countries
to Iran). Funds deposited in the RECIPIENT ACCOUNT or the SPECIAL PURPOSE ACCOUNT can be used to pay for sales
made pursuant lo the Humanitarian Exception. [2-6-2013]
314. Can an exporter of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices get paid out of a Central Bank of
Iran (CBI) account at a foreign financial institution (FFI) in a country with a significant reduction exception, even
though the exporter is located In a third-country? Can the third-country exporter's bank handle this transaction?
Yes. So long as the transaction does not involve a designated individual or entity, banks on the Part 561 List located on
OFAC's website (http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/561 list.pdf ), or otherwise proscribed conduct, such transactions
are not sanctionable under U.S. law. Furthermore, there is no requirement under U.S. law that agricultural commodities, food,
medicine, or medical devices be routed through the country with the significant reduction exception.
Such a payment mechanism is not the exclusive mechanism for the purchase of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or
medical devices under U.S. law. Other options include receiving payment from a third-country account of the CBI or a non
designated Iranian financial institution.
The Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations describe the exception for transactions relating to
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices in 31 CFR $ 561.203(g) and Note 2 to 51 CFR $ 561.203.
Additional information and clarifying guidance about humanitarian assistance and related exports to the Iranian people can be
found at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/hu… exp_iran.pdf
[6-2013]
266. Does the November 8, 2012 designation of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) under E.O. 13382 impact the
scope of permissible transactions by foreign financial institutions (FFls) in significantly reducing countries?
Yes. On September 24, 2012, NIOC was identified as an agent or affiliate of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC")
under section 312 of the TRA
, and designated on November 8, 2012, under E.O. 13382 for providing services and support
to the IRGC. Accordingly, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA) applies to
transactions with NIOC. As a result of these additional sanctions against NIOC, only transactions solely for the purchase of
petroleum or petroleum products from NIOC will fall within the scope of the significant reduction exception. A FFI in a
significantly reducing country that is found to knowingly conduct or facilitate other types of significant transactions with NIOC
(i.e., transactions unrelated to the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran) would face exposure to CISADA
sanctions.
Example 3: If a FFI in a country with a significant reduction exception facilitates a transaction enabling a company in that
country to purchase drilling equipment from NIOC, the FFI risks restrictions on, or loss of, correspondent and payable-through
account access in the United States, because the transaction was not solely for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum
products from Iran. [2-6-2013)
267. What are definitions for the following NDAA terms: "significant financial transaction," "knowingly," "food,
medicine, and medical devices," "foreign financial institution," and "country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI,"?
These definitions are set out in 31 CFR Pant 561. [2-6-2013]
Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA)
Print this topic
Certain statutory provisions of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) were previously implemented
through E.O. 13645 of June 3, 2013, which was revoked by E.O. 13716 of January 16, 2016. E.O. 13716, which also
carried forward certain IFCA implementation authorities, was revoked by E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018, "Reimposing
Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran". Please be advised that certain provisions of E.O. 13645, including IFCA
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implementalion authorities, have been incorporated into the New E.O. FAQs relating to E.O. 13846 can be found here. FAQs
relating to E.O. 13645 have been archived and can be found here.[08-06-18]
General Questions (Print)
313. What is the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA)?
IFCA was signed into law on January 2, 2013, as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, and
provides for several new sanctions related to Iran. IFCA authorizes broad sanctions on: certain activities related lo Iran's
energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors; the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of precious and certain other metals,
graphite, coal, and industrial software; the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance to activities and
persons targeted by U.S. sanctions against ran; financial transactions involving sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities; and
persons involved in the diversion of goods intended for the Iranian people. Most of the IFCA provisions target conduct
occurring on or after July 1, 2013
The U.S. Department of the Treasury will be issuing regulations to implement certain provisions in IFCA. In addition, the U.S.
Department of State expecls to adopt an interpretation of IFCA similar to that set forth below. (06-03-13]
289. How will the following Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) terms be interpreted: "Iran,"
"knowingly," "significant," and "transfer"?
As a general matter, we intend to rely, where applicable, on definitions of terms previously included in Treasury regulations.
"Iran"
The Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 561) (IFSR) define "Iran" as the Government of Iran and the territory
of Iran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, over which the
Government of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government of lran exercises partial
or total de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international
arrangements. (31 CFR § 561.329)
"knowingly"
The IFSR define "knowingly" with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, to mean that a person has actual knowledge,
or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result. (31 CFR $ 561.314)
"significant"
As a general matter, in determining for purposes of IFCA and relevant Executive orders whether transactions, financial
transactions, or financial services are significant, the Department of the Treasury will rely on the interpretation set out in
$561.404 of the IFSR. The IFSR provide that the Department of the Treasury may consider the totality of the facts and
circumstances set forth a list of broad factors that can play a role in the determination whether transactions, financial services,
and financial transactions are significant, including: (a) the size, number, and frequency of the transactions, financial services,
or financial transactions; (b) the natureof the transactions, financial services, or financial transactions, including their type,
complexity, and commercial purpose; (c) the level of awareness of management and whether the transactions are part of a
pattern of conduct; (d) the nexus of the transactions, financial services, and financial transactions and bkx:ked persons; (e) the
impact of the transactions, financial services, and financial transactions on statutory objectives; (f) whether the transactions,
financial services, and financial transactions involve deceptive practices; (g) whether the transactions solely involve the passive
holdings of Central Bank of Iran (CBI) reserves or repayment by the CBI of official development assistance or the transfer of
funds required as a condition of Iran's membership in an international financial institution; and (h) other relevant factors that the
Secretary of the Treasury deems relevant. We anticipate adopting a similar approach to interpreting the term "significant" as it
applies to goods or services. (31 C.F.R. $561.404)
"transfer"
We anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define "transfer" to include import, transshipment, export, or reexport,
whether direct or indirect. [08--06-18]
290. Are payments or deliveries that are made on or after July 1, 2013, for contracts that existed prior to July 1, 2013,
exempted from IFCA provisions?
There is no general exception for payments, sales, deliveries, or transfers arising out of contracts entered into prior to July 1,
2013, on or after which date certain activities become sanctionable under IFCA
. The assessment of whether such
payments are "significant" or result in the transfer of "significant goods or services" or "significant financial support" will be done
on a case-by-case basis in line with the criteria discussed above. [06-03-13]
292. What are the implications of IFCA on the provision of humanitarian goods to the people of Iran?
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IFCA generally excepts from sanctions transactions for the sale or agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical
devices to lran, as set out in more detail in Q&As 297 and 304.[08-06-18]
Sanctions Relating to Iran's Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors (Print)
293. What will the "energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran" mean for the purposes of IFCA?
We anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define "energy sector of Iran" to include activities involving the exploration,
extraction, production, refinement, or liquefaction of petroleum, natural gas, or petroleum products in Iran. (See also discussion
of activities involving natural gas in Q&A 297.)
We anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define "shipping sector of Iran" to include activities involving the
transportation of goods by seagoing vessels, including oil tankers and cargo vessels, flying the flag of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, or owned, controlled, chartered, or operated directly or indirectly by the Government of Iran.
We anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define "shipbuilding sector of Iran" to include activities involving the
construction or seagoing vessels, including oil tankers and cargo vessels, in ran. [08-06-18]
294. How will I know if someone is part of Iran's energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors or is a port operator in Iran?
Persons determined to be part of Iran's energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors. or a port operator in Iran for purposes
of IFCA section 1244(c) will be identified as such on the SDN List. Knowingly providing certain significant support to
persons determined to be part of Iran's energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors, or a port operator in Iran will have exposure to
sanctions, unless the transaction is excepted (see also Q&A 297). [06-03-13]
295. What are goods or services used in connection with Iran's energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors for purposes
of IFCA section 1244(d)(3)?
We anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define goods and services used in connection with Iran's energy, shipping
and shipbuilding sectors to include:
a. Energy Sector: In the case of Iran's energy sector, goods or services that contribute lo,
• Iran's ability to develop its domestic petroleum resources;
• The maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic production of petroleum products; and
• Iran's ability to import or export petroleum or petroleum products.
b. Shipping Sector: In the case of Iran's shipping sector,
• The provision of crude and product tankers to Iran;
• The provision of registry, flagging, or classification services of any kind;
, The supervision of and participation in the repair of ships and their parts;
.The inspection, testing, and certification of marine equipment materials and components;
,The carrying out of surveys, inspections, audits and visits, and the issuance, renewal or endorsement of the relevant
certificates and documents of compliance, as they relate to ships and shipping; and
• Any other goods or services relating to the maintenance, supply, bunkering, and docking of vessels flying the flag of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, or owned, controlled, chartered, or operated directly or indirectly by, or for or on behalf of the
Government of Iran (GOI) or an Iranian person.
c. Shipbuilding Sector: In the case of Iran's shipbuilding sector,
, The building and refit of vessels;
, The provision or refit of items such as (i) steam turbines and their parts for marine propulsions, (ii) marine propulsion
engines and parts used solely or principally with them, (iii) other gas turbines for marine propulsion, (iv) ship or boat
propellers and blades, and (v) direction finding compasses and other navigational instruments and appliances solely for
the maritime industry;
• Other goods used in connection with building and propulsion of vessels; and
• Technical assistance and training relating to, and financing of, the building, maintenance or re-fitting of vessels.
Sections 1244()(1) and (2) of IFCA make sanctionable certain transactions for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran
of such goods and services if they are significant goods or services used in connection with Iran's energy, shipping, or
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shipbuilding sectors. (See Q&A 289 above for an interpretation of "significant.") The provision of goods or services identified
above could be sanctionable regardless of whether any person involved in the transaction has been determined to be part of
Iran's energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors. (06-03-13]
296. Will payment for bunkering of third-country ships carrying non-sanctionable goods to or from Iran be subject to
sanctions?
If a non-Iranian vessel is transporting non-sanctionable goods to or from Iran, bunkering in a third country will not be subject to
sanctions provided that no other sanctionable activity is involved. [06-03-13]
297. Are there any exceptions to the sanctions provisions of section 1244 of IFCA?
The following transactions are excepted from the provisions of section 1244 of IFCA
a. Transactions for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or for the provision of
humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran.
b. The export of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran to a country with a significant reduction exception under section
1245(d)(4)(D)(i) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
(NOAA 2012).
c. A significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution (FFI), provided that a significant
reduction exception under 1245(d)(4)(D)(i) of NDAA 2012 applies to the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI and the
financial transaction is for trade in goods or services (i) between lran and the country with primary jurisdiction over the FF] and
(ii) not otherwise subject to sanctions under the law of the United States, and any funds owed to Iran as a result of the trade
are credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI. We anticipate the implementation of
these trade requirements to be similar to the trade requirements set forth in the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR),
in particular 31 CFR $561.203() and 31 CFR $561.203()
d. The sale, supply, or transfer of natural gas to or from Iran. IFCA section 1244, however, does set out sanctions that may
apply to FFls that conduct or facilitate a transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer of natural gas to or from Iran unless the
financial transaction is for trade in goods or services () between Iran and the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI and
(ii) not otherwise subject to sanctions under the law of the United States, and any funds owed to Iran as a result of the trade
are credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the FFI. We anticipate the implementation of
these trade requirements to be similar to the trade requirements set forth in the IFSR, in particular 31 CFR $561.203() and 31
CFR $561.203()
e. Certain activities relating to the pipeline project to supply natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe
and Turkey. [08-06-18]
315. Will routine payments or fees be subject to sanctions if they are made to a person determined to be a port
operator in Iran and if the vessel is carrying non-sanctioned goods?
Any company involved in loading or unloading cargo in Iran should exercise great caution to avoid engaging in transactions
with entities designated by the United States, including the Tidewater Middle East Co. which was designated for its involvement
in Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, to the extent that a shipping company transacts with port
operators in Iran that have been identified as such under IFCA but not otherwise designated, and as long as such
payments are limited strictly to routine fees including port dues, docking fees, or cargo handling fees, paid for the loading and
unloading of non-sanctioned goods at Iranian ports, we anticipate that such transactions would not be considered significant
transactions for the purposes of IFCA. Non-routine and/or large payments or fees that materially exceed standard industry
rates could expose a person lo sanctions. Furthermore, providing any port operator in Iran with any significant financial,
material, technological, or other support could expose a person to sanctions. [08-06-18]
Sanctions Relating to the Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Certain Materials to or from Iran (relating to IFCA) (Print)
[FCA provides for sanctions involving the sale, supply, or transfer of certain materials to or from Iran.
298. For purposes of IFCA, what materials are considered graphite, raw or semi-finished metals?
For purposes of IFCA
,we anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define graphite, raw or semi-finished metals
described in section 1245(d) of IFCA to include steels; aluminum metal and its alloys; base metals of single or complex borides
of titanium; beryllium metal and its alloys; boron metal and its alloys; cobalt metal and its alloys; copper infiltrated tungsten
metal; copper-beryllium metal; germanium metal and its alloys; graphites; hastelloy; inconel; magnesium metal and its alloys;
molybdenum metal and its alloys; neptunium-237 metal and its alloys; nickel metal and its alloys; nickel aluminide metals;
niobium metal and its alloys; niobium-titanium filaments; plutonium metal and its alloys; porous nickel metal; silver infiltrated
tungsten metal; tantalum metal and its alloys; tellurium metal and its alloys; titanium aluminide metals; titanium metal and its
alloys; tungsten metal, tungsten carbide metal, and their alloys; uranium titanium alloy metals; and zirconium metal and its
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alloys and compounds. [06-03-13]
299. For purposes of IFCA, what are considered precious metals?
For purposes of IFCA
,we anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define the term "precious metals" to include
silver (including silver plated with gold or platinum, unwrought or in semi-manufactured forms, or in powder form); gold
(including gold plated with platinum, unwrought or in semi-manufactured forms, or in powder form); base metals or silver, clad
with gold, not further worked than semi-manufactured; platinum, unwrought or in semi-manufactured forms, or in powder form;
iridium; osmium; palladium; rhodium; ruthenium; base metals, silver or gold, clad with platinum, not further worked than semi
manufactured; waste and scrap of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metals, other waste and scrap containing
precious metal or precious-metal compounds, of a kind used principally for the recovery of precious metal. [06-03-13]
300. For purposes of sanctions under section 1245, how will I know which sectors are controlled by Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps?
Pursuant to delegated authority, the Secretary of Slate issues periodic reports pursuant to section 1245(e) of IFCA with respect
to which sectors of the Iranian economy are controlled directly or indirectly by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC). Given the opaque business environment in Iran and the significant role that the IRGC plays in the Iranian economy,
OFAC recommends that a person considering business in Iran or with Iranian persons conduct due diligence sufficient to
ensure that ii is not knowingly engaging in transactions with the IRGC, or its officials, agents, or affiliates. [08-06-18]
301. How will the determination be made as to whether materials are used in a manner that would make them subject
to sanctions under section 1245 of 1FCA?
A FFI, prior to conducting or facilitating a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of the
materials listed in 1245(d) - as described in part in Q&A 298-- will need to undertake due diligence to ensure that the
transaction does not involve the materials being sold, supplied, or transferred, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran for
sanctionable uses under section 1245. Pursuant to delegated authority, the Secretary of State issues periodic reports pursuant
to section 1245(e) of IFCA, which contains determinations on which materials identified in section 1245(d) are used by Iran as
a medium for swap or barter, are listed as assets on the national balance sheet of Iran, or are used in connection with the
nuclear, military, or ballistic missile programs of Iran. (08-06-18]
302. Are there any exceptions to section 1245 of IFCA?
A person will not be subject to sanctions under section 1245 of IFCA
if a determination is made by the Department of the
Treasury or the Department of Slate, as appropriate, that the person has established and enforced official policies, procedures,
and controls to ensure that the person does not sell, supply, or transfer to or from Iran, or facilitate or conduct a significant
financial transaction to sell supply, or transfer to or from Iran, materials listed in section 1245 as sanctioned under section 1245.
The Department of the Treasury or the Department of State, as appropriate, will make this determination on a case by case
basis as part of an investigation or enforcement action by the relevant Department. (06-03-13]
Sanctions Relating to Insurance, Reinsurance, or Underwriting (relating to IFCA) (Print)
303. Which insurance, reinsurance, or underwriting activities are potentially subject to sanctions under IFCA's section
1246(a)(1)?
A number of insurance activities are subject lo sanctions under IFCA
, including providing insurance, reinsurance, or
underwriting services to persons on the SON List sanctioned for activities with respect to Iran. (06-03-13]
304. Are there exceptions to insuring, reinsuring, or underwriting sanctioned activities?
Yes. lFCA
includes the following exceptions to insuring, reinsuring, or underwriting sanctioned activities.
a. Transactions for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or for the provision of
humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran can be insured, reinsured, or underwritten.
b. A person that provides insurance. reinsurance, or underwriting services to sanctioned activity, if a determination is made by
the Department of the Treasury or the Department of State, as appropriate, that the person has established and enforced
official policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that the person does not underwrite or enter into a contract to provide
insurance or reinsurance for activities targeted under section 1246 of IFCA. The Department of the Treasury or the Department
of State, as appropriate, will make this determination on a case by case basis as part of an investigation or enforcement action
by the relevant Department. [06-03-13]
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Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013, "Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran
Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions with Respect to Iran"
E.O. 13645 was revoked by E.0. 13716 of January 16, 2016. Please be advised that certain provisions of E.0. 13645 have
been incorporated into E.0. 13846 of August 6, 2018, "Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to lran". FAQs relating
to E.0. 13846 can be found here. FAQs relating lo E.O. 13645 have been archived and can be found here.
General Licenses (GL) for Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, and Medical
Devices in the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
Print this topic
318. Does the GL for medical devices authorize the exportation or reexportation of all medical devices?
No. The GL for medical devices appearing at section 560.530(a)(3)() of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
(ITSR) authorizes covered persons, as defined in section 560.530(e)(4), to export or reexport to Iran medical devices as
defined in section 560.530(e)(3) of the ITSR, except for items on the List of Medical Devices Requiring Specific
Authorization
, which is maintained on OFAC's website. This list will be published in the Federal Register, as will any
changes to the list. [12-22-16]
319. Does the GL for medical devices authorize the exportation or reexportation of these items to all entities in Iran?
No. While the GL under section 560.530(a)(3)() of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) authorizes
exports or reexports or certain medical devices to most entities in Iran, ii does not authorize exports or reexports to military,
intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers, nor does it authorize exports or reexports to persons whose property
and interests in property are blocked under any of the programs administered by OFAC, except for persons whose property
and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 and the ITSR. When engaging in activities
pursuant to this GL, exporters and reexporters are expected to undertake due diligence regarding all parties to the
transactions, just as they would when acting pursuant to a specific license issued by OFAC. [12-22-16]
361. What items and persons are excluded from the agricultural commodities general license in the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR)?
The specified items excluded from the scope of the agricultural commodities general license are: castor beans, castor bean
seeds, certified pathogen-free eggs (unfertilized or fertilized), dried egg albumin, live animals (excluding live cattle, shrimp, and
shrimp eggs), embryos (excluding cattle embryos), Rosary/Jequirity peas, non-food-grade gelatin powder, peptones and their
derivatives, super absorbent polymers, western red cedar, and all fertilizers.
The persons excluded from the scope of the agricultural commodities general license are Iranian military, intelligence, or law
enforcement purchasers or importers. In addition, the agricultural commodities general license does not authorize exports or
reexports to persons whose property and interests in property are blocked under any of the programs administered by OFAC,
except for persons whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant lo Executive Order 13599 and the
ITSR.
Exports or reexports involving the excluded items or excluded persons discussed above continue to require the level of review
afforded by specific licensing and therefore are not authorized by the agricultural commodities general license. [12-22-16]
362. Is the exportation or reexportation of non-U.S.-origin agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices by a
U.S. person to Iran authorized?
Yes. The definitions of the terms "agricultural commodities," "medicine," and "medical device" used in the relevant general
licenses in the
ITSR include, in the case of items subject to Commerce's Export Administration Regulations(EAR), items Iha!
are designated as EAR99 and, in the case of items not subject to the EAR, items that would be designated as EAR99 if they
were located in the United States. For example, under the agricultural commodities general license, a company located in the
United States would be authorized to arrange for the exportation from a third country to Iran of agricultural commodities
produced in the third country if those commodities would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States,
provided that all conditions of the general license are otherwise satisfied. [12-22-16]
363. Is the exportation or reexportation by non-U.S. persons of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical
devices that are subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to Iran authorized?
Yes. A non-U.S. person may export or reexport agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Iran under the
relevant general licenses in the ITSR, provided that the items are subject to Commerce's Export Administration
Regulations(EAR) and all conditions of the relevant general license are otherwise satisfied. For example, a non-U.S. person
would be authorized under the medicine and medical devices general license to arrange for the exportation or reexportation to
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Iran of EAR99 medicines localed in the United States or a third country.
In addition, an entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States (a "U.S.
owned or -controlled foreign entity") may export or reexport agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran
under the relevant general licenses in the ITSR (Including both items subject to the EAR and items not subject to the EAR),
provided that all conditions of the relevant general license are otherwise satisfied. For example, a U.S.-owned or -controlled
foreign entity would be authorized under the medicine and medical devices general license to arrange for the reexport to Iran of
EAR99 medicines, as well as the export to Iran of medicines not subject to the EAR (e.g., medicines produced outside the U.S.
by a non-U.S. person with no controlled U.S. content) that would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in lhe United
States. [12-22-16]
364. Who can apply for a specific license if an export or reexport to Iran is not authorized by general license?
If an export or reexport is not authorized by general license, any U.S. person, or non-U.S. person exporting items subject
to Commerce's Export Administration Regulations EAR and designated as EAR99, wherever located, or U.S.-owned or
-controlled foreign entity may apply for a specific license. For example, a U.S.-owned or-controlled foreign entity may apply for
a specific license for the export or reexport to Iran of agricultural commodities excluded from the scope of the agricultural
commodities general license, such as live animals. [12-22-16]
365. What is authorized with respect to brokerage services related to exports or reexports of agricultural
commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Iran?
U.S. persons continue to be authorized to provide brokerage services on behalf of U.S. persons for the sale and exportation or
reexportation by U.S. persons of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran, provided that the sale and
exportation or reexportation itself is authorized by either general or specific license. [4-7-2014]
366. Do I still need to come in to OFAC for a specific license to export certain types of agricultural commodities to
Iran?
OFAC will no longer issue specific licenses for exports or reexports that are covered by the agricultural commodities general
license in the ITSR.
However, a small number of specified agricultural commodities and certain persons are excluded from the agricultural
commodities general license and continue to require the level of review afforded by specific licensing. As a result, persons
seeking authorization for the exportation or reexportation to Iran of castor beans, castor bean seeds, certified pathogen-free
eggs (unfertilized or fertilized), dried egg albumin, live animals (excluding live cattle, shrimp, and shrimp eggs), embryos
(excluding cattle embryos), Rosary/Jequirity peas, non-food-grade gelatin powder, peptones and their derivatives, super
absorbent polymers, western red cedar, or alt fertilizers, or for the exportation or reexportation of any agricultural commodities
to Iranian military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers, must still apply for a specific license from OFAC.
The agricultural commodities general license in the ITSR also does not authorize exports or reexports to persons whose
property and interests in property are blocked under any of the programs administered by OFAC, except for persons whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 and the ITSR. [12-22-16]
367. What is the definition of a "bioactive peptide"?
For purposes of the relevant exclusion from the agricultural commodities general license in the Iranian Transactions and
Sanctions Regulations(TS), the term "bioactive peptide" means an item that must be less than 50 amino acids in length and
bioactive (antioxidant, antiallergic, antimicrobial, antithrombotic, antiatherogenic, hypoglycaemic, anti-inflammatory, antitumor,
cytostatic, immuno suppressive properties, or hepatoproleclive properties.) [4-7-2014]
Amendments to the General Licenses for the Exportation or Reexportation of
Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, and Medical Devices to Iran
Print this topic
482. What key changes did the December 23, 2016 regulatory amendment to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations (ITSR) make relating to the exportation and reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and
medical devices to Iran?
The amendment primarily expands the scope of medical devices that can be exported or reexported to Iran without specific
authorization. It authorizes the exportation or reexportation to Iran of all items meeting the definition of the term "medical
device" as defined in section 560.530(e)(3) of the ITSR, except for certain excluded persons as well as certain medical devices
that are excluded from the authorization and published on the List of Medical Devices Requiring Specific Authorization. The
exportation and reexportalion of items on the List of Medical Devices Requiring Specific Authorization or to excluded persons
requires a specific license from OFAC. The amendment also adds shrimp and shrimp eggs to the list of agricultural
commodities that may be exported to Iran without specific authorization, other than to certain excluded persons.
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In addition, the amendment authorizes covered persons to provide training, other than to certain excluded persons, necessary
and ordinarily incident to the safe and effective use of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices exported or
reexported pursuant to section 560.530 of the ITSR. II also authorizes the importation into the United States of certain U.S.
origin agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that were previously exported or reexported to Iran pursuant to
the authorizations in section 560.530 of the ITSR and that are broken, defective, or non-operational, or are connected to
product recalls, adverse events, or other safety concerns. Additionally, the amendment authorizes the exportation or
reexportation to Iran, and storage within Iran for future use, of a limited number of replacement parts for certain medical
devices previously exported or reexported to Iran pursuant lo an OFAC license lo replace broken or non-operational
components or where ii is ordinarily incident and necessary to proper preventative maintenance of the medical device, and the
exportation or reexportation of software and services related to the operation, maintenance, and repair of medical devices.
[12-22-16]
483. How does an exporter determine which medical devices need to be specifically licensed by OFAC for exportation
or reexportation to Iran?
An exporter should refer to the List of Medical Devices Requiring Specific Authorization
, which is maintained on OFAC's
website, www.treasury.gov/ofac, on the Iran Sanctions page. An exporter must obtain a specific license from OFAC to export or
reexport any medical device on that list to Iran. An exporter must also obtain a specific license for exports to excluded persons
as defined in section 560.530(a)(3)(iv) of the ITSR. [12-22-16]
484. What types of training activities are considered to be necessary and ordinarily incident to the safe and effective
use of medicine and medical devices?
OFAC considers training activities including the dissemination of product information on the intended use of the device;
comparisons of other devices and options; and the manufacturer's instructions for use, labeling, warning, contraindications,
storage, and maintenance of the medicine or device to be necessary and ordinarily incident to the safe and effective use of
medicines and medical devices. Other examples include training health care professionals to use medical devices safely in
order to achieve the desired patient outcome, training on procedures for cleaning and inspecting devices regularly to ensure
they are functioning correctly, ongoing training and periodic testing to ensure users stay competent, and training on procedures
for adverse events or device failure. [12-22-16]
Licenses Authorizing Exports of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, and Medical Devices
For information regarding licenses authorizing exports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran and
Sudan pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), please see the following topic.
Amendment to the Definition of "Iranian-origin goods" or "goods of Iranian origin" in the Iranian Transactions and
Sanctions Regulations (ITSR)
Print this topic
485. What key changes did the December 23, 2016 regulatory amendment to the Iranian Trade and Sanctions
Regulations (ITSR) make to the definition of "Iranian-origin goods" or "goods of Iranian origin"?
OFAC amended section 560.306 of the ITSR to clarify that the terms "goods of Iranian origin" and "Iranian-origin goods" do not
include the following categories of goods, provided that such goods were not grown, produced, manufactured, extracted, or
processed in ran: () goods exported or reexported to Iran under an authorization issued pursuant to the ITSR (e.g., a medical
device or a personal communications device exported or reexported to Iran pursuant to a general or specific license issued
pursuant to the ITSR) and that subsequently have been reexported from and are located outside of Iran, or (IQ goods
transported on a vessel or aircraft that passed though Iranian territorial waters or stopped at a port or place in Iran en route to a
destination outside of Iran and that have not otherwise come into contact with ran. [12-22-16]
486. What is an example of goods otherwise coming into contact with Iran?
Goods have come into contact with Iran, if, for example, they are removed from a port or airport in Iran or are processed
through Iranian customs, or if they transit Iran by truck or train en route to a destination outside of ran. [12-22-16]
487. Are goods that are unloaded from a ship in an Iranian port, put on a truck, and driven out of the boundaries of the
port or place of unloading considered to be Iranian-origin goods?
Yes. These goods have otherwise come in contact with Iran and thus do not fall within the carve-out to the definition of Iranian
origin goods or goods of Iranian-origin at section 560.306 (b)(2) of the
ITSR . However, if these goods are being exported or
reexported to Iran under an authorization issued pursuant to the ITSR and they subsequently are reexported from and are
located outside of Iran, they would fall within the carve-out to the definition of Iranian-origin goods or goods of Iranian-origin at
section 560.306(b)(1) of the ITSR. [12-22-16]
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488. Are goods that are unloaded from a ship In an Iranian port, moved within the boundaries of the port, and loaded
onto a second ship en route to a destination outside of Iran, without ever leaving the port considered to be Iranian
origin goods?
No, provided that they have not otherwise come in contact with Iran. (12-22-16]
Iranian General License D-1
Print this topic
On May 30, 2013, the Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the Departments of State and Commerce, issued
General License D (GL D") authorizing the export and reexport to lran of certain hardware, software, and services incident to
personal communications. On February 7, 2014, the Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the Departments of State
and Commerce, issued amended Iranian General License D-1 (GLD-1)
, which clarifies certain aspects of GLD and adds
certain new authorizations. Effective February 7, 2014, GLD-1 replaces and supersedes in its entirety GLD.
General Questions (Print)
337. What are key changes made by amended General License D-1?
First, GLD-1 expands the authorization in GL D to permit the exportation, reexportation, or provision, directly or indirectly,
to lran of certain personal communications software, hardware, and related services subject to Commerce's Export
Administration Regulations, 15C.FR. parts 730 through 774 (EAR") (rather than just the exportation or reexportation from the
United States or by a U.S. person of such software, hardware, and services). See GL D-1, paragraphs (a)(2)() & (a)03). For
purposes of GL D-1, the term "provision" could include, for example, an in-country transfer of covered software or hardware.
The general license now authorizes, for example, a non-U.S. person located outside the United States to export certain
hardware and software subject to the EAR to Iran. See FAQ #341.
Second, GL D-1 adds new authorizations for the exportation, reexportation, or provision, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person
located outside the United States to Iran of certain software and hardware not subject to the EAR. See GLD-1
, paragraphs
(a)(2)(i0 & (a)(3). The general license now authorizes, for example, a U.S. company to export to Iran, from a location outside
the United States, certain hardware or software that is not subject to the EAR (including foreign-origin hardware or software
containing less than a de minimis amount of U.S. controlled content). See FAQ #342.
Third, a new Note has been added to paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) clarifying that the authorization in those paragraphs includes
the exportation, reexportation, or provision, directly or indirectly, of the authorized items by an individual leaving the United
States for Iran. GL D-1 also adds a new authorization for the importation by an individual into the United States of certain
hardware and software previously exported by the individual to Iran pursuant to other provisions of GLD-1 or 31 C.F.R. §
560.540. See GLD-1
, paragraph (a)(5). The general license now authorizes, for example, an individual to carry a
smartphone that falls within the scope of the GL D-1 authorization while traveling to and from Iran. See FAQ #343.
Finally, to further ensure that the sanctions on Iran do not have an unintended chilling effect on the willingness of companies to
make available certain publicly available, no cost personal communications tools to persons in that country, GL D-1 adds a new
authorization related to the potential recipients of certain publicly available, no cost services and software. See GL D-1
paragraph (a)(6).
Notwithstanding these changes, nothing in this general license relieves an exporter from compliance with the export license
requirements of another Federal agency. [02-07-2014]
338. With respect to GL D-1 authorizations in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2), what services and software are covered?
Qualifying services or software must be "incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet." In addition,
qualifying software under paragraph (a)(2) must meet the stated export control-related criteria. Both paragraphs provide an
illustrative but not exhaustive list of the types of services that are authorized: "instant messaging, chat and email, social
networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging." See FA #344 and OFAC's Interpretive Guidance
and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran (March 20, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/internet_freedom.pdf.
Qualifying services or software need not be specifically listed in the Annex in order to be authorized by paragraphs (a)(1) or
(a)(2), provided that they otherwise meet the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2). [(02-07-2014]
339. With respect to GL D-1 authorization in paragraph (a)(3), do exporters need to make a determination as to
whether an export of an item or service listed in the Annex to GLD-1is "incident to personal communications"2
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No. The Annex lists software, hardware, and related services determined to be "incident to personal communications" for
purposes of the authorization in paragraph (a)(3) of GLD-1 [02-07-2014]
340. What should I do if I am unsure whether an item or service is covered by GLD-1?
If you require assistance interpreting the authorizations contained in GLD-1 and how they apply to your situation, please
contact OFAC's Licensing Division online at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/licensing.aspx, by phone
at 202-622-2480, or by email at [email protected]. [02-07-2014]
341. May a non-U.S. person export, reexport, or provide to Iran hardware and software that Is subject to Commerce's
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) pursuant to GLD-1?
Yes, for purposes of the authorities administered by OFAC, amendments made by GLD-1 authorize the exportation,
reexportation, of provision of certain hardware and software subject to the EAR by non-U.S. persons outside the United States.
See GLD-1
paragraphs (a)(2)0) & (a)(3). For example, a non-U.S. person manufacturer of smartphones that are (a)
subject to the EAR because they contain more than a de minimis amount of U.S. controlled content and (b) within the scope of
the GL D-1 authorization may export the smartphones from its third-country manufacturing facility directly or indirectly to Iran.
See FA0 #337. [02-07-2014]
342. Does GL D-1 authorize U.S. persons located outside the United States to export or reexport to Iran certain
specified hardware or software that is not subject to Commerce's Export Administration Regulations (EAR)?
Yes. Amendments made by GL D-1 authorize the exportation, reexportation, or provision to Iran by U.S. persons located
outside of the United States of certain specified hardware and software items that are not subject lo the EAR. See GLD-1
paragraphs (a)(2)(i) & (a)63). GL D-1 also extends this authorization to an entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and
established or maintained outside the United States ("a U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity"), subject to the conditions set
forth in 31 C.F.R. § 560.556. See GLD-1
, Note 2 to paragraph (a). Under these amendments, for example, an overseas
branch of a U.S. company or a US.-owned or -controlled foreign entity may export to Iran, from a location outside the United
States, certain hardware or software that is not subject lo the EAR (including foreign-origin hardware or software containing
less than a de minimis amount of U.S. controlled content) if the hardware or software is within the scope of the GLD-1
authorization. These amendments also authorize the exportation, reexportation, or provision of certain fee-based software that
is not subject to the EAR because it is described in section 734.3(b) of the EAR. See FAQ #337. Section 734.3(b) of the EAR
describes "publicly available" software for purposes of those regulations. [02-07-2014]
343. Does GL D-1 authorize the exportation to Iran and importation into the United States of personal communication
devices by persons travelling from the United States to Iran and back to the United States?
Yes. As amended, GL D-1 authorizes both the exportation, reexportation, or provision lo Iran and the importation into the
United States by an individual entering the United Slates directly or indirectly from Iran, of software authorized by 31C.FR. $
560.540 paragraph (a)(2) and software and hardware authorized by paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)63) of GL D-1, provided that the
items were previously exported, reexported, or provided by the individual to Iran. See GLD-1
,paragraph (a)(5) and the
Nole to paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3). See FAQ #337. [02-07-2014]
344. How do the authorizations in paragraphs (a)(1 ), (a)(2), and (a)(6) of GL D-1 compare to the previously existing
general license in 31 C.F.R. § 560.540 authorizing certain services and software incident to Internet-based
communications?
The general license in $ 560.540 authorizes the exportation from the United Stales or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to
persons in Iran of no-cost services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet and no-cost software
necessary to enable such services. Please also see OFAC's Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on
Internet Freedom in Iran March 20, 2012) See http://wwww.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents
/inlernet_freedom.pdf. Paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of GL D-1 go beyond§ 560.540 by. among other things, authorizing
fee-based services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet.
In addition, to further ensure that the sanctions on Iran do not have an unintended chilling effect on the willingness of
companies to make available certain publicly available, no cost personal communications tools to persons in Iran, pursuant to
paragraph (a)(6) of GLD-1, the exportation, reexportation, or provision to the Government of Iran of certain publicly available,
no-cost services and software described in $ 560.540(a) or categories (6) through (11) of the Annex to GLD-1 is authorized.
U.S. persons continue generally to be prohibited from exporting goods and services to persons whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to any part of 31 C.FR. chapter V, other than Govemmenl of lran end-users blocked solely
pursuant to Executive Order 13599
.See GL D-1
paragraph (b)(2). Prohibited end-users include Iranian persons whose
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to OFAC authorities relating to VVMD proliferation, terrorism, and
human rights abuses. In addition, GL D-1 does not authorize any action or activity involving any item (including information)
subject to Commerce's Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that is prohibited by, or otherwise requires a license under,
pant 774 of the EAR or participation in any transaction involving a person whose export privileges have been denied pursuant
to part 764 0r 766 of the EAR, without authorization from the Department of Commerce [02-07-2014]
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345. How can U.S. companies arrange for payment from Iran for exports authorized under GLD-1?
In general, the payment requirements under GLD-1
are the same as for all other general licenses under the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR"). Section 560.516 of the ITSR authorizes U.S. depository institutions to
process transfers of funds to or from Iran, or for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran, if the
transfer arises from, and is ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to, an underlying transaction that has been
authorized by a specific or general license issued pursuant to the ITSR and does not involve debiting or crediting an Iranian
account. 31 C.FR. $ 560.516(a). [02-07-2014]
346. What kind of due diligence is required for the exportation of fee-based services, software, or hardware authorized
by GLD-1?
Due diligence programs should be tailored to the particular risks encountered by exporters. As a general matter, companies
selling fee-based services, software, or hardware authorized by GLD-1
should undertake reasonable, risk-based measures
designed lo ensure that they do not export their products lo persons whose property and interests in properly are blocked
pursuant to any sanctions program administered by OFAC, regardless of whether the Government of Iran or other end-user
appears on OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (or any of OFAC's other sanctions lists).
[02-07-2014]
347. Are there any restrictions as to the use of the Farsi language in authorized advertising or software?
U.S. sanctions on Iran do not impose any restrictions as to the use of the Farsi language. [02-07-2014]
348. May U.S. persons employ agents in Iran to facilitate sales, create or fund a physical sales presence on the ground
in Iran, or utilize Iranian commercial marketing services in furtherance of exports authorized under GLD-1?
No. GLD-1 does not authorize the employment of persons in Iran to facilitate sales, the maintenance of a physical sales
presence in Iran, or the utilization of Iranian marketing services. However, certain copy-ready advertising materials are exempt
from the prohibitions of the ITSR to the extent they qualify as information or informational materials pursuant to 31C.FR §
560.210(0). [02-07-20 14]
Specific Software, Hardware, and Services Covered by General License D-1 for Iran
For additional information regarding specific software, hardware, and services in Iran, please see the following topic.
Payments or the Facilitation of Payments to Iranian Civil Aviation Authorities for Overflights of Iran or Landing in Iran
Print this topic
417. Are payments or the facilitation of payments not involving U.S. persons to Iranian civil aviation authorities for
overflights of Iran or landing in Iran by aircraft that are owned by a non-U.S. person and registered outside the United
States sanctionable under U.S. law?
No. Provided that the relevant transactions do not involve the U.S. financial system or persons on the Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDNList), payments of charges for services rendered by the Government of Iran in
connection with the overflight of lran or landing in Iran of aircraft owned by a non-U.S. person and registered outside the United
Stales are not subject lo sanctions under U.S. law. The involvement of persons on the SON List, including Iranian financial
institutions or airlines designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224
exposure for participants to such transactions.
or Executive Order 13382
, would create sanctions
U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities cannot participate in transactions related to the payment of
overflight or landing fees lo the Government of Iran, nor can such transactions transit the U.S. financial system, unless the
transactions fall within the scope of 31 C.FR. $ 560 52 or a specific license issued by OFAC and the payments in connection
with such authorized transactions are consistent with 31 C.FR. $ 560_516. [11-05-2018]
Provision of Routine Goods and Services by non-U.S. persons to Diplomatic Missions of the Government of Iran
Print this topic
455. Is the provision of routine goods and services by non-U.S. persons to diplomatic missions of the Government of
Iran located outside the United States sanctionable under U.S. law?
The provision of goods and services for the conduct of the official business of the diplomatic missions of the Government of
Iran located outside the United Stales or for the personal use of the employees of the missions, including financial services
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such as the opening of a bank account, by anon-U.S. person would not be sanctionable under U.S. law, provided that such
goods and services do not involve persons on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (other than
any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Iran listed solely pursuant lo Executive Order
13599 or any Iranian depository institution listed solely pursuant to Executory Order 13599) or other activities that would be
sanctionable under U.S. law.
Further, the provision of goods and services to the diplomatic missions of the Government of Iran outside the United States
cannot involve U.S. persons or U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities, or the provision to the Government of Iran of goods,
technology, or services subject to the prohibitions of 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204-205, nor can related transactions transit the U.S.
financial system, unless the activities and/or transactions are authorized by OFAC. [10-22-2015]
Additional Iran-related Questions From Financial Institutions
Print this topic
37. My bank operates accounts for individuals living in Iran. OFAC has told us that these accounts cannot be
operated. Does this mean that the accounts are blocked?
No, the accounts are restricted. The Iranian sanctions prohibit the export of goods or services to Iran. By operating an account
for an individual or company in Iran, the bank would be exporting services to that person or entity in violation of the Iranian
Transactions Regulations. The accounts, however, are not blocked. The account holder can close the account and have the
funds transferred to his or her account outside the United States. [09-10-02]
38. Are U-Turn payments for Iran still permitted?
No, as of November 10, 2008 U-Turn payments are no longer allowed, [11-10-08]
118. I have a client that is in Iran to visit a relative. Do I need to restrict the account?
No. As long as you are satisfied that the client is not ordinarily resident in IRAN, then the account does not need to be
restricted. [07-28-09]
54. I have an account with a W-8 showing an address in Iran. Is the account automatically restricted?
In the absence of information proving to your satisfaction that the account holder is not in Iran, you should consider the account
restricted based on the W-8 filing. [06-24-05]
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) Section 105
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533. What are the requirements of CAATSA section 105 related to the imposition of sanctions on the IRGC, and how
are those requirements being implemented?
On August 2, 2017, the President signed into law the "Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act" (Public Law
115-44) (CAATSA
), which, among other things, imposes new sanctions on Iran. Section 105 of CAATSA requires the
imposition of sanctions applicable pursuant to the global terrorism Executive Order 13224 on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps QRGC) and foreign persons that are officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC. Consistent with that requirement of
CAATSA, OFAC designated the IRGC on October 13, 2017, pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing support to the IRGC-Qods
Force, which previously had been designated for its support to various terrorist groups. In addition, effective October 31, 2017,
OFAC amended the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.FR. part 594, lo block the property and interests in property
of foreign persons that have been identified by OFAC as officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC. [10/30/2017]
534. Before October 13, 2017, wasn't the IRGC already subject to sanctions? What's different about applying
terrorism-related sanctions to the IRGC and foreign persons that are officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC?
Before October 13, 2017, the IRGC was blocked under Executive Order 13382
(relating to VVMD proliferation), 13553
(relating to Iranian human rights abuses), and 13606
(relating to Iranian and Syrian human rights abuses via information
technology), and persons who engaged in certain activity involving the IRGC were already subject to secondary sanctions.
OFAC's October 13, 2017 action designating the IRGC under E.O. 13224
(relating to counlerterrorism) and OFAC's
October 31, 2017 action under the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.FR. part 594 (GTSR), to block the property
and interests in property of foreign persons that have been identified by OFAC as officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC
carry additional consequences that limit certain activities with respect to the IRGC and foreign persons identified by OFAC as
officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC. Certain exemptions available under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (EEPA) relating to personal communications, humanitarian donations, information or informational materials,
and travel do not apply to transactions with persons designated under E.O. 13224 or otherwise blocked pursuant to the GTSR,
which include the IRGC and foreign persons that have been identified by OFAC as officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC.
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[10/30/2017)
535. Is the IRGC now a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)?
No. The Department of State has not designated the IRGC as an FTO. [10/13/2017]
Guidance Related to Humanitarian Assistance with Regard to the
November 12, 2017 Earthquake in Iran
Print this topic
549. In light of the recent earthquake in Iran, how can I help the Iranian people while making sure to abide by U.S.
sanctions?
In light of the tragic earthquake in Iran, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) would like to
highlight some of the ways in which Americans can provide humanitarian assistance to the Iranian people, consistent with the
ran-related sanctions administered by OFAC.
General License E
,issued by OFAC in 2013 pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31CF.R.
part 560 (ITSR), authorizes nongovernmental organizations to export services to Iran in support of activities related to
humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs in Iran, including the provision of relief services related to natural disasters,
the provision of donated health-related services, and the distribution of donated articles (such as food, clothing, and medicine)
intended lo be used lo relieve human suffering in Iran. In addition, nongovernmental organizations are authorized to transfer
up to $500,000 per year in support of these activities, subject to certain conditions, including reporting requirements.
U.S. individuals may raise funds outside of Iran in support of relief services provided by nongovernmental organizations
pursuant to General License E
,and may make financial donations to such nongovernmental organizations in support of
authorized activities. General License E does not, however, authorize U.S. individuals lo transfer financial donations directly to
Iran or nongovernmental organizations in Iran or to organize disaster relief services in Iran such as fire, rescue, or medical
services. U.S. persons interested in doing so should consider working through a nongovernmental organization in order to
conduct such activity.
In addition, donations of articles such as food, clothing, and medicine intended to be used to relieve human suffering are
exempt from the sanctions on trade between the United States and Iran, as long as the donations are not being sent to the
Government of Iran or any Iranian individual or entity on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SON
List).
Finally, U.S financial institutions are authorized to process noncommercial, personal remittances to Iran, which may include a
personal transfer of funds from the United States to Iran to assist a friend or family member, provided that the transfer complies
with the requirements of sections 560.516 and 560.550 of the ITSR. [11-17-2017]
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Executive Order of August 6, 2018,
"Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran"
Print this topic
597. What is the purpose of Executive Order (E.O) of August 6, 2018, "Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to
lran"2
In accordance with his May 8, 2018 decision to cease the United States' participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) and to reimpose all of the U.S. sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA, the President issued
E.O. 13846 on August 6, 2018 t0 reimpose relevant provisions of E.O. 13574 of May 23, 2011;E.0. 13590 of November
20, 2011; E.O. 13622 of July 30, 2012; and E.O. 13645 of June 3, 2013, that had been revoked by E.O. 13716 of January 16,
2016. Consistent with guidance issued by the Department of the Treasury on May 8, 2018
, E.O. 13846 reimposes
specified sanctions relating to lran following relevant wind-down periods, i.e., on or after August 7, 2018 or November 5, 2018,
depending on the activity involved. In addition, to provide clarity and consolidate relevant authorities into a single E.O., E.O.
13846 revokes E.O.s 13716 and 13628 and continues in effect sanctions authorities provided for in those E.O.s. E.O. 13846
also broadens the scope of certain provisions contained in those E.O.s, as outlined in FAQ 601 below. [08-06-2018]
598. What does E.O. 13846 do?
E.O. 13846
reimposes relevant blocking sanctions, correspondent and payable-through account sanctions, and menu-
based sanctions previously provided for in E.O.s 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, which were revoked by E.O. 13716, and
continues in effect sanctions authorities provided for in E.O.s 13628 and 13716. As incorporated into E.O. 13846, these
measures include implementing authority for and additional tools related to: the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended
(ISA)
,the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, as amended (CISADA)
, the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA)
,and the Iran Freedom Counter-Proliferation Act of
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2012 (FCA)
(see FAQ 605). As a general matter, E.0. 13846 incorporates exceptions to these sanctions, including for
transactions for the provision or agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran, to the same extent such
exceptions applied under the prior E.O.s. E.0. 13846 also broadens the scope of certain provisions contained in those E.O.s,
as outlined in FAQ 601 below.
Section 1 of E.O. 13846 authorizes blocking sanctions on persons determined:
i. On or after August 7, 2018, to have provided material support for, or goods or services in support of, the purchase or
acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious metals by the Government of Iran (GOI) (subsection 1(a)(Q);
ii. On or after November 5, 2018, to have provided material support for, or goods or services in support of, the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), or the Central Bank of lran (CBI) (subsection
1(a)0i));
iii. On or after November 5, 2018, to have provided material support for, or goods or services in support of:
a. Any Iranian person on the List of Specialty Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SON List) (other than an
Iranian depository institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599)
(subsection 1(a)(ii)(A)); or
b. Any other person on the SON List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection
1(a) of E.O. 13846 or E.O. 13599 (other than an Iranian depository institution whose property and interests in
property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599) (subsection 1(a)(ii)(B)); or
iv. Pursuant to the relevant statutory authorities in IFCA, to be:
a. Part of Iran's energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors (subsection 1(a)(iv)(A));
b. A port operator in Iran (subsection 1(a)(iv)(B)); or
c. A person that knowingly provides significant support to a person determined to be part of Iran's energy, shipping,
or shipbuilding sectors, a port operator in Iran, or an Iranian person included on the SON List (other than a person
described in section 1244(c)(3) 0f IFCA)) (subsection 1(a)(iv)(C)).
Section 2 of E.O. 13846 authorizes correspondent and payable-through account sanctions on foreign financial institutions
(FFls) determined to have knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction:
i. On or after August 7, 2018, for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of significant goods or services used in connection with
Iran's automotive sector (subsection 2(a)(i));
ii. On or after November 5, 2018, on behalf of an Iranian person on SON List (other than an Iranian depository institution whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599) or any other person on the SON List whose
property is blocked pursuant to subsection 1(a) of E.O. 13846 or E.O. 13599 (other than an Iranian depository institution whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599) (subsection 2(a)(ii));
iii. On or after November 5, 2018, with NIOC or NICO, except for the sale or provision to NIOC or NICO of the products
descnbed in section 5(a)(3)(A)() of ISA provided that the fair market value of such products is lower than the applicable dollar
threshold specified in that provision (subsection 2(a)(ii));
iv. On or after November 5, 2018, for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum
products from lran (subsection 2(a)(iv)); and
v. On or after November 5, 2018, for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from
Iran (subsection 2(a)(v)).
Section 3 of E.O. 13846 authorizes menu-based sanctions on persons determined to:
i. Have knowingly engaged, on or after August 7, 2018, in a significant transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of
significant goods or services used in connection with ran's automotive sector (subsection 3(a)());
ii. Have knowingly engaged, on or after November 5, 2018, in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale,
transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran (subsection 3(a)(i));
iii. Have knowingly engaged, on or after November 5, 2018, in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale,
transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran (subsection 3(a)(ii)); or
iv. Be a successor entity to a person determined to meet any of the criteria set out in subsections 3(a)()-(a)(ii) of E.O.
13846 (subsection 3(a)(iv)); or
v. Own or control a person determined to meet any of the criteria set out in subsections 3(a)()-(a)(ii) of E.O.13846 and lo have
had knowledge that the person engaged in the activities referred to in the relevant subsection (subsection 3(a)(v)); or
vi. Be owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, a person determined to meet any of the criteria set
out in sections 3(a)()-3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846, and knowingly engaged in the activities referred to in the relevant subsection
(subsection 3(a)(vi)).
Section 4 of E.O. 13846 provides authority for the heads of relevant agencies of the U.S. government to implement the menu
based sanctions provided for in section 3.
Section 5 of E.O. 13846 provides authority for the Treasury Department to implement the menu-based sanctions provided for in
ISA, CISADA, TRA, IFCA, and section 3 of E.O. 13846
Section 6 of E.O. 13846 authorizes correspondent or payable-through account sanctions or blocking sanctions on FFls that are
determined to have, on or after August 7, 2018: (a) knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction related to the
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purchase or sale of Iranian rials or a derivative, swap, future, forward, or other similar contract whose value is based on the
exchange rate of the Iranian rial (subsection 6(a)()); or (b) maintained significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran
denominated in the Iranian rial (subsection 6(a)(ii)).
Section 7 of E.O. 13846 carries forward sections 2 and 3 of E.O. 13628 and subsection 3(c) of E.O. 13716 (see FAQ 602
below) by providing for blocking sanctions on persons determined to:
i. Have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities relating lo the diversion of goods, including
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of Iran (subsection 7(a)());
ii. Have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities relating to the misappropriation of proceeds from
the sale or resale of goods described in subsection 7(a)(1) of E.O. 13846 (subsection 7(a)(i));
iii. Have knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, transferred or facilitated the transfer of, goods or technologies lo Iran, any
entity organized under the laws of Iran, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the GOI, or any national of Iran for use in or
with respect lo Iran, that are likely to be used by the GOI or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or by any person on behalf
of the GOI or any such agencies or instrumentalities, to commit serious human rights abuses against the people or Iran
(subsection 7(a)(in));
iv. Have knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, provided services, including services relating to hardware, software, or
specialized information or professional consulting, engineering, or support services with respect to goods or technologies that
have been transferred to Iran and that are likely to be used by the GOI or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or by any
person on behalf of the GOI or any such agencies or instrumentalities, to commit serious human rights abuses against the
people of Iran (subsection 7(a)(iv));
v. Have engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to ran, on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize
the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access lo print or broadcast media, including
the facilitation or support of intentional frequency manipulation by the GOI or an entity owned or controlled by the GOI that
would jam or restrict an international signal (subsection 7(a)(v));
vi. Have materially assisted or provided other support for activities listed in subsections 7(a)(i)-(a)(v) of E.O.13846 (subsection
7(a)6vi)); or
vii. Be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant section 7 of E.O. 13846 (subsection 7(a)(vii)).
Section 8 of E.O. 13846 continues in effect the sanctions previously contained in section 4 of E.O. 13628, which prohibit an
entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States (a "U.S.-owned or
-controlled foreign entity") from knowingly engaging in any transaction, directly or indirectly, with the GOl or any person subject
to the jurisdiction of the GOI, if that transaction would be prohibited by specified authorities if engaged in by a U.S. person or in
the United States (see FAQs 621-623 below)
Section 9 of E.O. 13846 provides that it revokes and supersedes E.O.s 13628 and 13716 (see FAQ 602 below).
Sections 10-22 of E.O. 13846 contain exceptions, definitions, and other implementing provisions related to the sanctions in the
E.O. [08-06-2018]
599. When does E.O. 13846 become effective?
E.O. 13846
is effective at 12.01 a.m. eastern daylight time (Eon on August 7,2018. However, certain sanctions set out in
E.O. 13846 apply only to activities that take place on or after November 5, 2018, as set out in FAQ 598 above and in the
relevant provisions of E.0. 13846.
E.O. 13846 is being issued to coincide with the end of the 90-day wind down period which started on May 8, 2018
.The last
day of the 90-day wind-down period is August 6, 2018, and, as announced on May 8, 2018, certain sanctions previously lifted
under the JCPOA will be reimposed on August 7, 2018, including sanctions set out in E.O. 13846 (see FAQ 598 above).
[08-06-2018]
600. Why does subsection 1(a)(lv) of E.O. 13846
take effect before November 5, 2018?
Subsection 1(a)(iv) authorizes blocking sanctions pursuant to section 1244(0)(1)(A) of IFCA on persons determined to: (A) be
part of the energy, shipping, shipbuilding sectors of Iran; (8) operate a port in Iran; or (C) knowingly provide significant support
to certain other persons sanctioned pursuant to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA or an Iranian person on the SON List. Consistent
with the guidance issued by the U.S. Department or the Treasury on May 8, 2018, the relevant sanctions in section 1244(c)
(1)(A) of IFCA are waived through November 4, 2018 to provide a wind-down period for activities involving Iran that were
consistent with the U.S. sanctions relief provided for under the JCPOA. However, the sanctions provided for in section 1244(0)
(1)(A) of IFCA targeting significant support lo Iranian persons on the SON List remained in effect even when the JCPOA
sanctions relief was in effect. To the extent activities within the scope of section 1244(0)(1)(A) of IFCA involve persons on the
SON List or otherwise sanctionable conduct, persons engaging in such activities could be exposed to sanctions under
subsection 1(a)(iv) of E.O. 13846 prior to November 5, 2018. [08-06-2018]
601. Does E.O. 13846 expand the scope of sanctions that were in effect prior to January 16, 2016 (Implementation Day
of the JCPOA )?
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Yes. E.0. 13846 broadens the scope of the sanctions that were in effect prior to January 16, 2016 and provides for greater
consistency in the administration of Iran-related sanctions provisions. These added measures are as follows:
i. Subsection 1(a)(i)(B): Providing new authority for blocking sanctions on persons determined, on or after November 5, 2018,
to have provided material support for, or goods and services in support of, persons blocked for:
a. Providing material support for, or goods and services in support of, the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or
precious metals by the GOI (i.e., persons designated pursuant to subsection 1(a)(i));
b. Providing material support for, or goods and services in support of, NIOC, NICO, or CBI (i.e., persons designated pursuant
to subsection 1(a)(11)); or
c. Being part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran or knowingly providing significant
support to certain other persons blocked pursuant to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA or to an Iranian person on the SON List
(i.e., persons blocked pursuant to subsection 1(a)(iv) for meeting the criteria of section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA).
ii. Subsection 2(a)(i): Providing new authority for correspondent and payable-through account sanctions on FFls determined to
have, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction on behalf of the
persons blocked under the new authorities in subsection 1(a)(iii)() described above (i.e., any person blocked pursuant to
subsections 1(a)(), 1(a)(ii), or 1(a)(iv) and included on the SDN List).
iii. Sections 4 and 5: Expanding the menu of sanctions available to impose on persons determined to have, on or after
November 5, 2018, knowingly engaged in certain significant transactions relating to petroleum, petroleum products, or
petrochemicals from Iran (i.e., persons determined to meet the criteria in subsections 3(a)(ii)-(a)(ii) or to be a derivative thereof
pursuant to subsections 3(a)(iv)-(a)(vi)) by authorizing the imposition of:
a. Visa restrictions on corporate officers, principals, or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned person (subsection (4)(e));
b. Any of the sanctions from the menu set forth in subsections 4(a)-(e) on principal executive officers of a sanctioned person
(subsection 4(0));
c. Prohibitions on U.S. persons investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned
person (subsection 5(a)(v)); or
d. Any of the sanctions from the menu set forth in subsections 5(a)(i)-(a)(vi) on principal executive officers of a sanctioned
person (subsection 5(a)(vii))
iv. Section 8: Expanding the prohibition on U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities previously contained in section 4 of E.O.
13628 (see FAQs 621-623) by prohibiting transactions with persons blocked for:
a. Providing material support for, or goods and services in support of, Iranian persons on the SON List and certain other
designated persons (i.e., persons designated pursuant to subsection 1(a)(ii)); or
b. Being part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran or knowingly providing significant
support to certain other persons blocked pursuant to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of lFCA or to an Iranian person on the SON List
(i.e., persons blocked pursuant to subsection 1(a)(iv) for meeting the criteria of section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA). [08-06-2018]
602. Why does E.O. 13846 revoke E.O. 13716 and E.0. 13628?
To provide clarity and consolidate relevant authorities into a single document. E.O. 13846
revokes E.O.s 13716 and 13628,
and continues in effect relevant provisions from those two revoked E.O.s. Provisions of E.O. 13846 that carry forward relevant
provisions of E.O.s 13628 and 13716 include:
• Section 7, which consolidates into a single section designation authorities targeting corruption or other activities relating to the
diversion of goods intended for the people of lran, the transfer of goods or technologies to ran that are likely to be used by the
GOI or any of its agencies or instrumentalities to commit serious human rights abuses against the people of Iran or the
provision of certain services with respect to such goods or technologies, and persons engaged censorship in Iran (these
provisions previously appeared in sections 2 and 3 of E.O. 13628 and section 8 of E.O. 13645, which was carried forward by
subsection 3(c) of E.0. 13716), and
• Section 8 extends certain prohibitions applicable to U.S. persons under OFAC-adminislered Iran sanctions to U.S.-owned or
-controlled foreign entities and provides for civil penalties on the U.S. parent for any violations of such prohibitions to the same
extent that they would apply to a U.S. person for the same conduct, consistent with section 218 of the TRA
was formerly contained in section 4 of E.O. 13628). [08-06-2018]
(this provision
603. Do persons who were designated pursuant to E.O. 13628 of October 9, 2012, Authorizing the Implementation of
Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional
Sanctions With Respect to Iran," continue to be subject to sanctions following the issuance of E.O. 13846?2
Yes. OFAC is taking action under section 7 of E.O. 13846
to continue in effect the designations of persons who were
designated pursuant to E.O. 13628 at the time of the issuance of E.O, 13846 U.S. persons must continue to block the property
and interests in property of these individuals and entities, and non-U.S. persons should be aware of the sanctions risk
associated with these persons. [08-06-2018]
604. Why do the sanctions set out in E.O.s 13574 and 13590 not appear in E.O. 13846?
The Treasury Department implementation authorities set out in section 1 of E.O. 13574 for "menu-based" sanctions under ISA
have been superseded by the implementation authorities for "menu-based" sanctions under a broader range of authorities that
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include ISA
,CISADA
, TRA
, and IFCA
, and section 3 of E.O. 13846
As a result, section 1 of E.O. 13574 is not
included verbatim in E.0. 13846.
The sanctions set out in section 1 of E.O. 13590- relating to development of petroleum resources in Iran and Iran's domestic
production of petrochemical products-were incorporated into subsections 5(a)(5)-(a)(6) of ISA by a statutory amendment set
forth in section 201 of the TRA. As a result, the sanctions previously set forth in section 1 of E.O. 13590 are not included in
E.O. 13846, but remain in place pursuant to statutory authorities. Implementation authorities for the sanctions in subsections
5(a)(5)-(a)(6) of ISA are delegated to the appropriate agency heads through the Presidential Memorandum of October 9, 2012,
or through section 5 of E.O. 13846. [08-06-2018]
605. How does E.O. 13846 relate to various Iran-related statutes?
E.O. 13846
implements provisions of, and provides additional tools related lo, ISA
, CISADA
,TRA
, and IFCA
that were contained in the prior E.O.s. These include:
i. Invoking the President's authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to supplement statutory
authorities in IFCAwith prohibitions or restrictions on the importation of goods;
ii. Continuing to implement the statutory requirements of sections 105A and 105B of CISADA, as added by sections 402 and
403 of TRA, by providing authority to block the property and interests in property and suspend the entry into the United States
of persons determined to have engaged in the transfer of goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used by the GOI or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities to commit serious human rights abuses against the people of Iran or the provision of
services with respect to such goods or technology after they are transferred lo Iran, and persons determined to have engaged
in censorship in Iran; and
iii. Continuing to implement the statutory requirements of section 105C of CISADA, as added by section 1249 of IFCA, by
providing authority to block the property and interests in property and suspend the entry into the United States of persons
determined to have engaged in corruption or other activities relating to the diversion of goods intended for the Iranian people or
the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of such goods. [08-06-2018]
606. What activity will become sanctionable on or after August 7, 2018 under E.O. 13846 or other authorities?
After the 90-day wind-down period ends on August 6, 2018, the following sanctions come into effect, including under provisions
of E.O.13846 and relevant statutory authorities:
i. Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the GOI (see, e.g., subsection 1(a)() of E.O. 13846);
ii. Sanctions on Iran's trade in gold or precious metals (see, e.g., subsection 1 (a)(i) of E.O. 13846 and subsection 1245(a)(1)(A)
of IFCA );
iii. Sanctions on the direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such as
aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes (see, e.g., section 5 of E.O. 13846 and subsections
1245(a)(1)(B)-(a)(1)(C) and (c) of IFCA);
iv. Sanctions on significant transactions related to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, or the maintenance of significant funds
or accounts outside the territory of Iran denominated in the Iranian rial (see, e.g., section 6 of E.O. 13846);
v. Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt (see, e.g., section 5 of
E.O. 13846 and subsection 213(a) of TRA); and
vi. Sanctions on lran's automotive sector (see, e.g., subsections 2(a)() and 3(a)() 0f E.O. 13846). [08-06-2018]
607. What activity will become sanctionable on or after November 5, 2018 under E.O. 13846 or other authorities?
After the 180-day wind-down period ends on November 4, 2018, the following sanctions come into effect, including under
provisions of E.O.13846 and relevant statutory authorities:
i. Sanctions on Iran's port operators, and shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including on the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines (IRISL). South Shipping Line Iran, or their affiliates (see, e.g., subsection 1(a)(iv) and section 5 of E.O. 13846 and section
1244(c)(1) of IFCA);
ii. Sanctions on petroleum-related transactions with, among others, NIOC, NICO, and the National Iranian Tanker Company
(NITC), including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran (see, e.g., subsections
1(a)(ii), 1 (a)(iv), 2(a)(iii)-(a)(v), and 3(a)(ii)-(a)(iii) and sections 4 and 5 of E.0. 13846);
iii. Sanctions on transactions by FFls with the CBI and designated Iranian financial institutions under section 1245 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012 (NDAA 2012) (see, e.g .. section 5 of E.O. 13846, section 1245 of NDAA 2012,
and subsection 1247(a) of IFCA);
iv. Sanctions on the provision of specialized financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial institutions described
in subsection 104(c)(2)(E)(i) of Ct SADA (see, e.g., section 5 of E.O. 13846, section 220 of TRA, and subsection 1244(c)(1) of
IFCA);
v. Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance (see, e.g., section 5 of E.O. 13846, section
5(a)(7) of ISA, subsections 211 (a) and 212(a) of TRA, and subsections 1246(a) and 1247(a) of IFCA); and
vi. Sanctions on Iran's energy sector (see, e.g., subsection 1(a)(iv) and section 5 of E.O. 13846, subsection 5(a) of ISA, section
212(a) of TRA, and sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a), and 1247(a) of IFCA). [08-06-2018]
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Sanctions Relating to Transactions Involving the Iranian Rial
608. What transactions involving the Iranian rial are sanctionable under E.O. 13846?
Section 6 of E.0. 13846
reimposes the sanctions previously contained in section 1 of E.O. 13645 with respect to
transactions involving the Iranian rial. FFls risk correspondent and payable-through account sanctions and blocking sanctions if
they, on or after August 7, 2018, () knowingly conduct or facilitate any significant transaction related to the purchase or sale of
Iranian rials or a derivative, swap, future, forward, or other similar contract whose value is based on the exchange rate of the
Iranian rial, or (ii) maintain significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran denominated in the Iranian rial.
(08-06-2018]
Sanctions Relating to Iran's Automotive Sector
609. What does E.O. 13846 do with respect to the sanctions on Iran's automotive sector?
E.O. 13846
reimposes the sanctions previously contained in subsections 3(a)(i) and section 5 of E.O. 13645 by authorizing
the imposition of correspondent and payable-through account sanctions (subsection 2(a)(i)) of E.O. 13846) and menu-based
sanctions (subsection 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13846) for certain transactions, on or after August 7, 2018, for the sale, supply, or transfer
to Iran of significant goods or services used in connection with lran's automotive sector. [08-06-2018]
61 o. What is considered Iran's automotive sector for purposes of E.O. 13846?
E.O. 13846 defines the automotive sector of Iran as the manufacturing or assembling in Iran of light and heavy vehicles
including passenger cars, trucks, buses, minibuses, pick-up trucks, and motorcycles, as well as original equipment
manufacturing and after-market parts manufacturing relating to such vehicles. [08-06-2018]
611. What are goods or services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector for purposes of E.O. 13846?
E.O. 13846
reimposes sanctions on certain transactions on or after August 7, 2018, for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran
of "significant" goods or services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran. (See FAQ 289 for an interpretation of
the term "significant.")
We anticipate that forthcoming regulations will define "goods or services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran"
to include goods or services that contribute to (i) lran's ability to research, develop, manufacture, and assemble light and heavy
vehicles, and (ii) the manufacturing or assembling of original equipment and after-market parts used in Iran's automotive
industry. [08-06-2018)
612. Is the sale, supply, or transfer of finished vehicles or "auto kits" to Iran sanctionable under the New E.O.2
E.O. 13846 does not make sanctionable the export of finished vehicles to Iran if no further assembly or manufacturing is
required. As such, exporting fully assembled and finished vehicles to Iran for sale would not be sanctionable, so long as the
transaction is consistent with U.S. sanctions, including that it does not involve a sanctioned person.
In contrast, "auto kits" (or "knock-down kits") exported to Iran for assembly in ran would be considered goods or services used
in connection with the automotive sector of Iran and the export of such kits to Iran would be sanctionable if the transaction is
"significant." (See FAQ 289 for an interpretation of the term "significant.") [08-06-2018]
613. Is the sale, supply, or transfer of goods or services for the maintenance of finished vehicles sanctionable under
E.O. 13846?
Goods or services for the maintenance of finished vehicles exported to Iran would generally not be considered "significant
goods or services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran" for the purposes of E.O. 13846
, and the provision
of such goods or services would generally not be sanctionable. However, the export, sale, or distribution of goods (e.g., auto
parts and accessories) or services that would contribute to Iran's ability to manufacture or assemble vehicles, or manufacture
original equipment and after-market parts in Iran, could create exposure to sanctions. Persons exporting parts and services to
Iran for the maintenance or upkeep of finished automobiles, and FFls facilitating such exports, should exercise caution to
ensure that the parts or services are not diverted for the manufacturing or assembly of vehicles in Iran or the manufacturing of
original equipment or after-market parts in Iran, and are used only for maintenance and upkeep. [08-06-2018]
Sanctions on Petroleum-related Transactions
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614. What does E.O. 13846 do with respect to Iran's energy, petroleum, and petrochemical sectors?
E.O. 13846
reimposes sanctions previously set out in E.O.s 13622, 13628, and 13645 with respect to the Iranian energy,
petroleum, and petrochemical sectors. As such, subsections 1(a)(ii) and (2)(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 authorize blocking sanctions
and correspondent or payable-through account sanctions on persons providing material support for, or goods or services lo,
NIOC or NICO. Separately, subsection 2(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 authorizes the imposition of correspondent or payable-through
account sanctions on an FFI determined to have knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction with
NIOC or NICO (except for sales of refined petroleum products to NIOC or NICO that are below the dollar threshold that could
trigger sanctions under section 5(a)(3)()(i) of ISA). Subsections 2(a)(iv)-(a)(v) provide authority to impose sanctions on FFls
determined to have knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or
marketing of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemicals from Iran, with the aim of deterring Iran or any other country or
institution from establishing workaround payment mechanisms for the purchase of Iranian oil to circumvent the NDAA 2012 oil
sanctions. Subsections 3(a)(ii)-(a)(ii) provide authority to impose menu-based sanctions or persons determined to have
engaged in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum
products from Iran. Furthermore, persons that sell, supply, or transfer to or from Iran significant goods or services used in
connection with Iran's energy sector are exposed to menu-based sanctions pursuant to subsection 1244(d) of IFCA and
section 5 of E.O. 13846 The existing exception rules under NDAA 2012 apply to these sanctions. Thus, countries that are
determined by the Secretary of State to have significantly reduced their purchases of Iranian crude oil will be excepted from
these measures as well. (See FAQS 169-182 relating to the NDAA 2012 sanctions.)
The provisions in E.O. 13846 reimposing these sanctions come into effect beginning on November 5, 2018. [08-06-2018]
615. Does E.O. 13846 mean that Iran's trade partners should no longer buy petroleum products from Iran? How will
this affect exports of Iranian oil?
These measures, which apply to transactions occurring on or after November 5, 2018, establish a key element of the
comprehensive Iran sanctions framework by deterring work-around financial transactions involving NIOC or NICO that were not
being captured under the sanctions previously implemented against the CBI al the time E.O. 13622 was issued. Iranian trade
partners can continue to buy petroleum and petroleum products from Iran without risking sanctions under E.O. 13846
if they
receive a significant reduction exception under relevant provisions of the NDAA 2012 for the relevant period. However, E.O.
13846 provides authority to sanction, on or after November 5, 2018, the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products and
significant dealings with NIOC or NICO by persons in jurisdictions that do not have a significant reduction exception. In
addition, IFCA provides for sanctions on persons determined to be part of the energy sector of Iran, or to sell, supply, or
transfer to or from Iran significant goods or services used in connection with the energy sector of Iran, provided the person is
not in a jurisdiction that has received a significant reduction exception. (See FAQs 293-297 relating to IFCA.) [08-06-2018]
616. Can countries that receive a significant reduction exception under NOAA 2012 purchase oil through NIOC and
NICO without facing sanctions?
All property and interests in property of NIOC and NICO subject to U.S. jurisdiction are already blocked pursuant to E.O.
13599
, and U.S. persons are prohibited from all dealings with these entities. E.O. 13846
reestablishes the authority
previously contained in E.O. 13622 t0 sanction Ffls that, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly conduct or facilitate any
significant transaction with NIOC or NICO. Financial institutions in jurisdictions that have received a significant reduction
exception are not subject to these sanctions for transactions with NIOC and NICO for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum
products from Iran while the exception applies. In addition, IFCA provides for sanctions on persons that knowingly provide
significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any activity or transaction on
behalf of or for the benefit of an Iranian person on the SON List (other than non-designated Iranian financial institutions),
provided the person is not in a jurisdiction that has received a significant reduction exception. (See FAQs 293-297 relating to
IFCA.) [08-06-2018]
617. E.O. 13846 targets transactions between foreign financial institutions and NIOC and NICO. What about a NIOC or
NICO subsidiary? Are transactions with those entities also sanctionable under this E.O.?
Yes. As in E.0. 13622, E.0. 13846 defines N10C and NICO to include any entity owned or controlled by, or operating for or
on behalf of, NIOC and NICO. [08-06-2018]
618. Does E.O. 13846 make sanctionable activities related to the pipeline project to supply natural gas from the Shah
Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey, given that NICO reportedly has a 10 percent stake In the project?
No. Section 10 of E.O. 13846 maintains the exceptions previously provided for in E.O. 13622 and E.O. 13645, as well as in
subsection 603(a) of the TRA and section 1254 of IFCA, for the pipeline project to supply natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas
field in Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey. [08-06-2018]
619. Are barter arrangements or other non-cash trade transactions Involving petroleum, petroleum products, or
petrochemical products originating from Iran sanctionable under the terms of E.O. 13846?
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Yes. To the extent a financial institution is involved, that financial institution could be sanctioned under E.0. 13846
for a
barter arrangement, on or after November 5, 2018, related to the purchase or acquisition of petroleum, petroleum products, or
petrochemical products from Iran. In addition, barter transactions knowingly conducted with NIOC, NICO, or the CBI also could
result in sanctions - regardless of whether a financial institution is involved --to the extent that those transactions constitute
material support for, or services to, NIOC, NICO, or the CBI. [08-06-2018]
620. What are the definitions of "petroleum products" and "petrochemical products"?
The term "petroleum products," as defined in section 16(0) Of E.0. 13846
,includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum
gases, penlanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel
oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas,
and miscellaneous products obtained from the processing of: crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and other
hydrocarbon compounds. The term does not include natural gas, liquefied natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non
petroleum fuels.
The term "petrochemical products," as defined in section 16(m) of E.O. 13846, includes any aromatic, olefin, and synthesis
gas, and any of their derivatives, including ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and
urea. [08-06-2018]
U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities
621. What is the prohibition on U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities, and how does it work?
Consistent with Section 218 of TRA
, section 8 of E.O. 13846 continues in effect the sanctions previously contained in
section 4 of E.O. 13628 and expands them to cover activity sanctionable under E.O. 13846 (see FAQ 601). This provision
prohibits a U.S.-owned or-controlled foreign entity from knowingly engaging in any transaction, directly or indirectly, with the
GOI, or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the GOI, if that transaction would be prohibited by certain Executive orders
prohibiting trade and other dealings with, and investment in, Iran and blocking the GOI and Iranian financial institutions, or any
regulation issued pursuant to the foregoing (Including the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560
(ITSR)), if the transaction were engaged in by a United States person or in the United States. Civil penalties for the U.S.-owned
or -controlled foreign entity's violation of Section 8, attempted violation, conspiracy to violate, or causing of a violation shall
apply to the U.S. person that owns or controls such entity to the same extent that they would apply lo a U.S. person for the
same conduct.
Section 20(c) of E.O. 13846 contains a savings clause that continues in effect under E.O. 13846 regulations, orders, directives,
and licenses that were issued pursuant lo E.O. 13628 and remained in effect immediately prior to the date of E.O. 13846
Pursuant to this authority, section 560.215 of the ITSR, which implemented section 4 of 13628, and licenses issued pursuant to
E.0. 13628 that were valid as of the date of E.0. 13846 remain in effect, subject to their existing terms and conditions. Such
terms and conditions include the expiration date of the license. [08-06-2018]
622. Are U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities covered under OFAC general licenses andfor permitted to apply for
specific licenses from OFAC?
To the extent a transaction is exempt from the prohibitions of the ITSR, E.0. 13599
, or section 1 or 15 of E.O. 13846
, or
is authorized by a general license issued pursuant to these authorities if engaged in by aU.S. person, it would not be
prohibited for a U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity (as defined above) to engage in the transaction, provided that it
satisfies all the conditions and requirements of the exemption or general license. Similarly, if the transaction is one for which a
U.S. person might apply for a specific license- for example, under OFAC's statement of licensing policy for certain targeted
educational, cultural, and sports exchange programs that are designed to directly benefit the Iranian people set forth at section
560.545 of the ITSR --a U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity or the U.S. person that owns or controls the entity may apply
for a specific license for the U.S.-owned or-controlled foreign entity to engage in the transaction. Note: whether a U.S. parent
company's specific license covers transactions by its owned or controlled foreign entity that are otherwise prohibited by section
8 of E.0. 13846 will depend on the terms of that license and the scope of the authorized activities.
Pursuant to subsection 20(c) of E.0. 13846, section 560.556 of the ITSR, which extends general licenses available under the
ITSR to U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities, remains in effect. [08-06-2018]
623. Is there a wind-down or safe harbor provision for Section a of E.O. 13846?
No. Section 8 of E.O. 13846 continues in effect the prohibition previously contained in section 4 of E.0. 13628, which
consistent with subsection 218(d) of the TRA provided that civil penalties would not apply if a U.S. person that owns or
controls the foreign entity divested or terminated its business with the U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity not later than
February 6, 2013. Because the relevant prohibition came into effect more than five years ago and a wind-down period was
provided at that lime, Section 8 of E.O. 13846 does not include such a wind-down authorization.
Please note, however, that section 560.537 of the ITSR authorizes -through 11.59 p.m. EST on November 4, 2018 -- all
transactions and activities ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of activities that had been authorized under the
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now-revoked Iran General License H. To the extent a U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity or a U.S. person is engaging in
wind-down activities pursuant to section 560.537 of the ITSR, those activities should be completed prior to the general license's
expiration at 11 :59 p.m. EST on November 4, 2018. [08-06-2018]
Sanctions Relating to the Provision of Material Assistance to Certain Persons
624. What are the implications of subsection 1(a)(III) of E.O. 13846?
Subsection 1(a)(in) of E.0. 13846 provides authority to block the property and interests in property of persons determined,
on or after November 5, 2018, to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support
for, or goods or services to or in support of: (A) Iranian persons included on the SON List or (8) any other persons included on
the SON Lisi whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13599 or subsection 1(a) of
E.O. 13846 (in both cases excluding Iranian depository institutions whose property and interests in property are blocked solely
pursuant to Executive Order 13599). Certain activities relating lo the pipeline project to supply natural gas from the Shah Deniz
gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey are excepted from this provision.
In implementing this provision, the United Stales Government will take appropriate steps to avoid, among other things, undue
impacts on the access of the people of Iran to humanitarian items, telecommunications, and other basic services. [08-06-18]
Frequently Asked Questions Related to the "Snap-back" of Iranian sanctions in November, 2018
630. ls the provision or delivery of goods or services to an Iranian counterparty after November 4, 2018 allowed?
The wind-down period has ended and the United States intends to fully enforce the sanctions that have come back into effect The provision or delivery
of goods or services and/or the extension of additional loans or credits to an Iranian counterparty after November 4, 2018 - even pursuant to written
contracts or written agreements entered into prior to May 8, 2018 -- may result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions unless such activities are exempt from
regulation, authorized by OFAC, or otherwise not sanctionable
The United States maintains authorizations and exceptions under U.S sanctions that allow for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and
medical devices to lran by US. persons and non-U.S persons. However, these authorizations and exceptions do not apply to transactions involving
persons on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) that have been designated in connection with Iran's support
for international terrorism or prolferation of weapons of mass destruction, including designated Iranian financial institutions or the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC), or activity that is subject to other sanctions (see FAQ 637). [11.05-2018]
631. I was not able to receive payment for goods or services fully provided or delivered prior to the end of the wind-down period. How shoo Id
I proceed?
In the event that a non-US.,non-Iranian person is owed payment after the conclusion of the wind-down period on August 6, 2018, or November 4,2018
as applicable, for goods or services fully provided or delivered to an Iranian counterparty prior to August 6, 2018, or November 4, 2018, as applicable,
pursuant to a written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8,2018, and such activities were consistent with US. sanctions in effect at
the time of delivery or provision, the U.S government would allow the non-US, non-Iranian person to receive payment for those goods or services
according to the terms of the written contract or written agreement Similarly, f a non-U.S., non-Iranian person is owed repayment after August 6 2018
or November 4, 2018, as applicable, for loans or credits extended to an Iranian counter party prior to the end of the 90-day or 180- day wind-down period,
as applicable, provided that such loans or credits were extended pursuant to a written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018
and such activities were consistent with US sanctions in effect at the time the loans or credits were extended, the US government would allow the
non-US,non-Iranian person to receive repayment of the related debt or obligation according to the terms of the written contract or written agreement
This allowance is designed for non-U.S, non-Iranian parties to be made whole for debts and obligations owed or due to them for goods or services fuly
provided or delivered or loans or credit extended to an Iranian party prior to the end of the 90-day or 180-day wind-down period, as applicable. Any
payments would need to be consistent with US sanctions, including that payments could not involve US. persons or the U.S financial system, unless
the transactions are exempt from regulation or authorized by OFAC (see FAQ 634 and FAQ 636)
The US government would evaluate matters falling outside the above parameters on a case-by-case basis.
[11.052018]
632. Will the U.S. government provide assurances beyond the guidance described in 631 and 634 that receipt of payment by non-U.S., non
Iranian persons is not sanctionable?
OFAC encourages non-U.S., non-Iranian persons to rely on the guidance provided in FAQs 631 and 634. Non-US., non-Iranian persons can seek
guidance from OFAC or the State Department, as appropriate, prior to the receipt of payment, f they would like to confirm that the payments would meet
the criteria set forth in FAQ 631 and FAQ 634 and would not be subject to U.S sanctions [11-05-2018]
633. Under what circumstances are goods or services considered "fully provided or delivered" prior to the expiration of the relevant wind
down period, as referenced in FA 631 above?
OFAC looks to the industry standard to determine whether particular goods or services are considered fully provided or delivered prior to the expiration
of the relevant wind-down period.As a general matter, goods or services will be considered fully provided or delivered when the party providing or
delivering the goods or services has performed all the actions and satisfied all the obligations necessary to be eligible for payment or other agreed-to
compensation. With respect to goods exported to or from lran, at a minimum, title to the goods must have transferred to the relevant party [08.06.2018]
634. Can I, as a non-U.S., non-Iranian person, receive payments after the relevant wind-down period ends for goods or services that were fully
provided or delivered during the relevant wind-down period pursuant to contracts entered into prior to May 8, 2018?
Yes, subject to the conditions set out below and in FA 631 above, non-US., non-Iranian persons may receive payment after the end of the relevant
wind-down period for goods or services fully provided or delivered to an Iranian counterparty prior to expiration of the relevant wind-down period (see
FAQ 633 above)
In particular, the goods or services must have been fully provided or delivered prior to the end of the applicable wind-down peniod
pursuant to a written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018 the relevant activities must have been consistent with US
sanctions in effect at the time of delivery or provision, including that the activities did not involve persons on the SDN List at the time of the transaction,
and any payments must be consistent with US sanctions, including that payments can not involve U.S persons or the U.S financial system, unless the
transactions are exempt from regulation or authorized by OFAC (see FAQ 631 and FAQ 636). [11-05-2018]
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635. Can I, as a U.S. person or U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity, receive payments after the relevant wind-down period ends for goods
or services that were fully provided or delivered during the relevant wind-down period under an OFAC wind-down authorization and pursuant
to a contract entered into prior to May 8, 2018?
The wind-down authorizations allow US persons and US.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to receive payments for activities conducted pursuant to
such wind-down authorizations only during their validity periods. For example, a U.S-owned or -controlled foreign entity may receive payment through
1159pm eastern standard time on November 4, 2018 for Iran-related activities undertaken pursuant to section 500.537 of the Iranian Transactions and
Sanctions Regulations (IT SR') (winding down of transactions relating to U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities)
Any payment following the end of the relevant wind-down period for activities undertaken pursuant to a wind-down authorization, including from an
Iranian counterparty, would require specific authorization from OFAC OFAC will evaluate such requests for specific licenses on a case-by-case basis
Any request for a specific license should provide sufficient details for OFAC to evaluate the application, including. whether the relevant transactions
complied with US sanctions as in effect at the time of the transactions, whether the activities were performed under a written contract or written
agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018 and why the applicant was unable to receive the payment for which author ation is sought prior to the end
of the relevant wind-down period OFAC will generally deny requests to receive payment for activities that were not authorized under the relevant wind
down authorizations or that were not undertaken pursuant to a written contract or written agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018
As requited by 31 C FR section 501.801(b), applicants should identify the names of all parties who are concerned with or interested in the proposed
transaction To facilitate OFAC's review the request should also include a description of the efforts that were undertaken to collect the payment during
the relevant wind-down period and be accompanied by supporting documentation, including relevant contracts, invoices, and shipping documents
OFAC encourages applicants to submit applications online (link available here), [11-05-2018]
636. Can I receive payment for activities undertaken during the wind-down period if the payment involves a person that has been added to the
SON List, including a person that was previously on the List of Persons Blocked Solely Pursuant to E.O. 13599 (the "E.O. 13599 List") but is
now designated under another authority?
The United States intends to fully enforce the sanctions that apply to persons that were previously on the E.0. 13599 List but that are now designated
under another authority
US persons and U.S-owned or -controlled foreign entities generally would require an OFAC authorization to receive any payment involving an SDN,
regardless of whether they were previously on the E .0 13599 List OFAC will evaluate requests for such authorization on a case-by-case basis,
including whether payments are for goods or services fully provided or delivered during the wind-down period pursuant to an OFAC wind-down
authorization (see FAQ 635)
Non-U.S. persons, including foreign financial institutions, could be subject to sanctions for knowingly engaging in certain significant transactions
involving an Iranian person on the SON List - other than a non-designated Iranian financial institution -- or a person designated in connection with Iran's
support for international terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including a person that was previously on the E.0. 13599 List but is
now designated under another authority Such persons will have a notation of Additional Sanctions Information -- Subject to Secondary Sanctions" in
their SDN List entry in addition to the tag for the other sanctions program(s) (e.g., the [SDGT] tag, the [IRAN-HR] tag, or the [NP\MMD] tag for
persons designated under E.0. 13224,E 0. 13553, 0r E0. 13382)
Non-US, non-Iranian persons seeking to receive payment for activities undertaken during the wind-down period that involves a person added to the
SON List should seek guidance from OFAC or the State Department, as appropriate (see FAQ 634).
[11-05-2018]
637. ls it sanctionable for non-U.S., non-Iranian persons to engage in transactions related to the provision of humanitarian and consumer
goods to Iran?
The United States maintains broad authorizations and exceptions under US. sanctions that allow for the sale of agricultural commodities, food,
medicine, and medical devices to ran from the United States or by U.S persons or U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities. U.S sanctions laws
provide similar allowances for sales of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran by non-U.S. persons. Broadly speaking
transactions for the sale of agnicultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran are not sanctionable unless they involve persons on the
SDN List that have been designated in connection with lran's support for international terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including
designated Iranian financial institutions or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or activity that is subject to other sanctions. Additional
guidance relating to these authorizations and exceptions can be found on the OFAC website here
and here
Transactions by non-US. persons related to the export to lran of consumer goods that do not fall within these exceptions, but are not expressly targeted
by US sanctions, should not involve certain persons on the SDN List, including the Central Bank of Iran or a designated Iranian financial institution,
unless an exception under Section 1245()(4)(D) of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012) applies, or the IRGC
In
addition, such transactions should not involve US persons or transit the U.S. financial system, unless the activities and/or transactions are exempt from
regulation or authorized by OFAC. [11-05-2018]
638. What happened to the E.O. 13599 List?
The E0. 13599 List was created to clarify that, regardless of their removal from the SDN List on January 16, 2016, persons that OFAC had previously
identified as meeting the definition of the terms Government of Iran" or "Iranian financial institution" still met those definitions and continued to be
persons whose property and interests in property were blocked pursuant to E.0. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR. On November 5, 2018, OFAC
moved persons identified on the E.0. 13599 List to the SDN List and removed the E.0. 13599 List from its website
Beginning on November 5, 2018, significant transactions with persons moved from the E.0. 13599 List to the SDN List, other than non-designated
Iranian financial institutions, could be subject to secondary sanctions, unless an exception applies, such as the exception relating to transactions for the
sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to lran, or the significant reduction exception under Section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the
NDAA 2012 Persons subject to secondary sanctions will have a notation of Additional Sanctions Information -- Subject to Secondary Sanctions" in the
SDN List entry In addition, effective November 5, 2018, OFAC has amended the ITSR to replace references to the E.0. 13599 List with references to
the SON List
Some persons moved to the SON List from the E.O. 13599 List also have been designated under additional authorities and, therefore, have received
new unique identification numbers (UIDs) when added to the SON List Users of OFAC's sanctions list data may wish to reference the following
mapping table
to see how these specific records were added back onto the SDN list [11-05-2018]
639. Why are some persons that had been blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599 now designated pursuant to other authorities, such as E.O
13224 and E.O. 133827
OFAC designated multiple Iranian financial institutions and other persons previously blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599 under E.0. 13224 (relating to
counterterrorism), E O 13382 (relating to MD proliferation), and E O. 13553 (relating to serious human nights abuses by the Government of Iran) on
October 16, 2018, and November 5, 2018. These included persons that had been removed from the SDN List on January 16, 2016. As new information
became available, OF AC determined that these persons met one or more of the criteria for designation under OFAC's other designation authorities
Relatedly, a number of persons that were previously designated pursuant to E O. 13382 and were removed from the SDN List on January 16, 2016 were
relisted on the SON List on November 5 2018 as persons identified as meeting the definitions of the Government of lran" or an Iranian financial
institution" pursuant to E O 13599. [11-05-2018]
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640. What does the November 5, 2018 amendment to the ITSR do?
This regulatory amendment does two things. First, it amends the ITSR to reflect the re-imposition of IT SR-related sanctions lifted under the JCPOA,
including sanctions pursuant to certain sections of E.0 13846 and the relisting on the SDN List of persons included on the E.0. 13599 List More
specifically this rule reinstates the regulatory provisions implementing the blocking authorities that were previously in sections 5 and 6 of E 0 13622
and now are in sections 1 and 10 of EO. 13846. Section 500.211(c) of the ITSR will now implement blocking of the property and interests in property of
any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to have () on or after August 7, 2018, materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the purchase or acquisition of U.S
bank notes or precious metals by the Government of lran, or (i) on or after November 5, 2018, materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Naftiran Intertrade Company
(NICO), or the Central Bank of Iran. Additionally, this rule removes references to the E.0. 13599 List to reflect OFAC's separate action removing the
E0 13599List from its website and relisting on the SDN List the persons that were previously listed on the E.0. 13599 List
Second, the rule amends an existing general license in the ITSRR to allow individual US. persons to engage in transactions necessary to sell certain
personal property in lran (which was acquired before becoming a U.S person or which was inherited from persons in Iran) and to transfer the proceeds
of those sales to the United States Section 500.543 of the ITSR currently authorizes individual U.S persons to engage in transactions necessary for
the sale of real property in Iran and the transfer of related proceeds to the United States, subject to a number of conditions and imitations. Authorized
transactions include engaging the services of any persons in Iran necessary for the sale, such as an attorney, funds agent, or real estate broker,
provided such person is not a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V, other than persons
whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 as the Government of Iran. OFAC is amending section
560 543 of the ITSR to authorize the sale of personal property in Iran and the transfer of related proceeds to the United States, subject to the same
conditions and limitations applicable to sales of real property
Section 560 543 of the ITSR, as amended, does not authorize transactions that would be prohibited by a different sanctions program administered by
OFAC, such as transactions with SDNs designated under E.O 13224 or E.O. 13382 (OFAC's counterterrorism or counter proliferation authorities)
(11-05-2018]
641.If a country with primary jurisdiction over a foreign financial institution did not receive a significant reduction exception (SRE) under
section 1245(d)(4)(DJ of the NDAA 2012, can funds currently held at the foreign financial institution in that country on behalf of the Central
Bank of Iran be used to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran?
Yes. Transactions for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to ran involving the Central Bank of Iran are excepted
from the relevant sanctions under section 1245(d)(2) 0f the NDAA 2012 and sections 561.203 and 561.204 of the Iranian Financial Sanctions
Regulations (31 CFR Part 561) (IFS), regardless of whether the country has received an SRE
In addition, funds held on behalf of a non-designated
Iranian financial institution at a foreign financial institution generally would not be subject to U.S. secondary sanctions and could be used to facilitate
humanitarian trade. [11-05-2018]
642. Is the provision of certain associated services relating to the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran by persons in a
country that has been granted a SRE sanctionable?
Many US sanctions related to Iran include an exception for countries that have received a SRE under section 1245()(4)(D) of the NDAA 2012 (see
https //wwtreasury gov/resource-center/fags/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran aspx#tra_504 for additional information regarding the implementation of the
SRE and sanctionable transactions) To the extent the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran and the processing of the related financial
transactions meet the requirements set out in section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the NDAA 2012 the services used to import the petroleum from Iran including
services provided by the shipping sector of Iran and Iranian port operators would not be sanctionable pursuant to the ran Freedom and Counter
Proliferation Act of 2012 (FCA), provided that Iranian entities that are involved in such transactions are not designated in connection with lran's support
for international terrorism, or its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.(see https://wwwtreasury gov/resource-center
ffaas/Sanctions/Pagesfaq_iran aspx#fca for additional information). [11.05-2018]
643. ls payment of Iran-related insurance or reinsurance claims made on or after November 5, 2018 sanctionable if the claim arises from an
incident that occurred prior to November 5, 2018?
Payment of Iran-related insurance or reinsurance claims arising from incidents that occurred prior to November 5, 2018 could create sanctions exposure
for non-US persons to the extent such payment involves a person designated in connection with lran's proliferation of MD or support for international
terrorism, or an Iranian person on the SDN List, other than a non-designated Iranian financial institution, or if the underlying activity involved such
persons or was otherwise sanctionable at the time it occurred
US persons continue to be generally prohibited under the [TSR from exporting goods, services, or technology directly or indirectly to lran, including
participating in the payment of claims to or for the benefit of Iran or any persons blocked under the ITSR, or for the transportation of Iranian-origin oil,
unless exempt or specifically authorized by OFAC In addition, after November 4, 2018, to the extent a claim payment involves a U.S.-owned or
-controlled foreign entity, the payment of such claim would be prohibited and would require an authorization from OFAC prior to payment
See FAQ 102 and FAQ 103 for additional information relating to U.S. person involvement in global insurance policies and FAQ 303 and FAQ 304 for
additional information on secondary sanctions, and exceptions to these sanctions, such as the humanitarian exception, relating to insurance,
reinsurance, or underwriting activities relating to lran. [11.05-2018]
644. Is an entity that is owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States (a U.S.-owned or
-controlled foreign entity") required to apply restrictions akin to blocking on the property or interests in property of persons subject to
section 560.211 of the 1TSR?
Yes. Under section 500.215 of the TTSR, U.S -owned or -controlled foreign entities are prohibited from knowingly engaging in any transaction, directly or
indirectly,with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that would be prohibited by the TSR if engaged
in by aUS person or in the United States. Section 500.211 of the ITSR separately prohibits transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing, and dealing in
any property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, any Iranian financial institution, and any other persons whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to the ITSR, unless exempt or authorized by OFAC
In light of these prohibitions, U.S -owned or -controlled foreign entities are required to apply restrictions akin to blocking on any property or interests in
property of persons subject to section 560.211 of the ITSR to ensure that such property and interests in property are not transferred, paid, exported,
withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. This requirement applies both with respect to a person whose property and interests in property are blocked solely
pursuant to the ITSR and a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the ITSR and another authority (e.g, when a
person is included on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons with the "[IRAN]" tag, as well as a tag for another sanctions
program, such as the terrorism tag ([SDGT]), nuclear proliferation tag ([NMD]), or human rights tag ( [IRAN-TRA] or "RAN-HR]))
Section 500.215(b)(1) of the ITSR deems an entity to be owned or controlled by aUS. person f the U.S person holds a 50 percent or greater equity
interest by vote or value in the entty, holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity, or otherwise controls the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity [11-05-2018]
645. How will the re-imposition of sanctions on November 5, 2018 impact the provision of specialized financial messaging services to Iranian
financial institutions?
Following the re-imposition of US sanctions on November 5, 2018, sanctions that had previously been lifted or waived as part of U.S. commitments
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under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will come back into effect in their entirety, including sanctions on the provision of specialized
financial messaging services to certain Iranian financial institutions
As of November 5, 2018, sanctions on the provision of specialized financial messaging services set forth in section 220 of the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights At of 2012 (TRA) snap back in full. This authority provides for sanctions on specialized financial messaging services to the Central
Bank of Iran or Iranian financial institutions designated in connection with Iran's support for terrorism or its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(MD) and MD delivery systems, as set out in subsection 104(c)(2)(E)(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010 (CISADA) (see section 220 of the TRA) Such Iranian financial institutions are listed on the SDN List and carry the [IFSR] tag
Furthermore, knowingly providing significant financial, material, technological, or other support to Iranian persons on the SDN List, other than Iranian
financial institutions blocked solely pursuant to E.0 13599 and listed on the SDN List with only the [IRAN]" tag, is sanctionable for persons in countries
that have not received a significant reduction exception (see subsection 1244(0)(1) of IFCA)
To avoid potential sanctions exposure, providers of specialized financial messaging services should discontinue the provision of such services to the
Central Bank of lran and any Iranian financial institutions designated in connection with Iran's MD proliferation, support for terrorism, or human rights
abuses The Central Bank of Iran and such designated Iranian financial institutions will have Subject to Secondary Sanctions" listed in the
Identifications" feature in their entry on the SDN List
Given that the US government will continue to apply maximum financial pressure on the Iranian regime, including potential additional designations of
Iranian financial institutions, the SON List should be consulted regularly to determine which Iranian financial institutions have been designated
(11-05-2018]
Retum to the OFAC FA Index
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Annex 51
U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, 2 April 2019
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Department Press Briefing - April 2, 2019
(@ state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2019/04/290841.htm
Robert Palladino
Deputy Spokesperson
Department Press Briefing
Washington, DC
April 2, 2019
TRANSCRIPT:
2:51 p.m. EDT
MR PALLADINO: Good afternoon. Sorry for the slightly later than expected start. Today we
have a special guest with us, Special Representative for Iran and Senior Advisor to the
Secretary of State Brian Hook. Brian has some remarks at the top that he'd like to make, and
then will be able to take a few of your questions. Please.
MR HOOK: Thanks. Good afternoon. Today we are providing an update on the President's
Iran strategy. I will highlight the effects we are seeing on the Iranian regime and its allies and
proxies in the Middle East. This briefing comes at a time when Iran is facing severe flooding.
At least 45 people have died in the past two weeks after heavy rains, with flooding affecting
at least 23 of Iran's 31 provinces. The Secretary issued a statement earlier today extending
his condolences and offering assistance, and I extend my condolences as well.
Since taking office, the administration has designated over 970 Iranian entities and
individuals. The sanctions announced last week against front companies supporting the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran's ministry of defense were the 26th round of
American sanctions. Our sanctions have targeted a range of threats, especially Iran's support
of terrorism, missile proliferation, its nuclear program, human rights abuses, and others.
As part of this pressure, we have sanctioned more than 70 Iran-linked financial institutions
and their foreign and domestic subsidiaries. The SWIFT financial messaging system matched
many of these designations and disconnected every sanctioned bank in Iran. In November,
SWIFT even disconnected the Central Bank of Iran from its system. We have targeted Iran's
illicit oil shipping networks, which enrich the brutal Assad regime and terrorist partners like
Hizballah. We are taking unprecedented steps to deepen our cooperation with allies and
partners to confront Iranian-backed terrorism and aggression. Joint teams from the
departments of State and Treasury have now visited more than 50 countries around the
world to brief on our new policy and warn of the dangers and reputational risks of doing
business with Iran. Almost one year after the United States ended its participation in the Iran
nuclear deal, and five months after the full reimposition of our sanctions, it is clear that our
actions are restricting Iran's cash flow. They are constraining its ability to operate freely in the
region.
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Our oil sanctions have taken approximately 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil exports off the
market since May of 2018. This has denied the regime access to well over $10 billion in
revenue. That is a loss of at least $30 million a day, and this is only with respect to the oil.
Iran would otherwise use this money to support its destructive and destabilizing activities.
Because of our efforts, the regime now has less money to spend on its support of terrorism,
missile proliferation, and on its long list of proxies. In November, we granted eight waivers,
oil waivers to avoid a spike in the price of oil. I can confirm today that three of those
importers are now at zero. That brings us to a total of 23 importers that once were
purchasers of Iranian crude that are now at zero. With oil prices actually lower than they
were when we announced our sanctions, and global oil - and global production stable, we
are on the fast track to zeroing out all purchases of Iranian crude.
More than 100 major corporations withdrew from business in Iran. Companies like Total and
Siemens have exited the Iranian market, taking with them billions of dollars in investment.
Since the IRGC controls up to half of Iran's economy, this lack of investment means less
money for the Quds Force and Iran's network of proxies. Our sanctions are draining Iran's
support to its proxies, and for the first time in a very long time, they have less access to
revenue to spread terror and militancy. In March, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese
Hizballah, publicly appealed for donations for the first time ever. He has been forced to
undertake unprecedented austerity measures. There are reports that some Hizballah
fighters are receiving half of their pay, and that others are only being paid $200 a month.
Other Hizballah employees report receiving 60 percent of their normal monthly salaries.
A new analysis released last month by the Washington Institute corroborates these findings.
Hizballah has closed almost a thousand offices and paused hiring of new personnel. The
report further concludes that Hizballah itself attributes this belt-tightening to U.S. sanctions
on Iran, which has historically provided the group with $700 million annually. That is 70
percent of Hizballah's entire budget.
Hizballah is not alone in feeling the strain of American sanctions. Iranian proxies in Syria and
elsewhere are experiencing a lack of funding from Tehran. Fighters are going unpaid, and
the services they once relied upon are drying up. Last week The New York Times quoted a Shia
fighter in Syria who said that, quote, "The golden days are gone and will never return. Iran
doesn't have enough money to give us."
We are working with our allies and partners to make this the new norm. We have acted with
them to disrupt Iran's illicit oil shipping operations. When we identified ships smuggling illicit
Iranian oil for the Quds Force to support Hizballah and the Assad regime, Secretary Pompeo
dispatched diplomatic teams to work with our allies and partners to help prevent it. We have
been working with countries on almost every continent to identify vessels of concern and
disrupt their operations. More than 7S vessels involved in illicit activity have been denied the
flags that they need to sail.
Panama issued a presidential decree to pull registration and de-flag Iranian vessels.
Countries like Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone have exercised great diligence to
disrupt these schemes and deny criminal Iranian entities access to flag registries, insurance,
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and classification. We thank each of these nations for their work.
America has not acted alone to counter Iran's malign behavior. Our European partners
pushed back against Iran after a foiled bomb plot in Paris, and thwarted an assassination
attempt in Denmark. In January, the European Union sanctioned Iran's ministry of
intelligence and security and two of its agents for their roles in these activities. The EU's
recent Foreign Affairs Council passed conclusions in February that called out its ballistic
Iran's ballistic missile program. It also opposed Iran's malign activity in Europe, as well as its
ongoing role in regional conflicts. Many European countries, including the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Albania, and Serbia have acted to address the
threat of Iranian terrorism on their own soil, whether by recalling ambassadors, expelling
Iranian diplomats, eliminating visa-free travel, or denying landing rights to Mahan Air, as
Germany recently did. All of these activities were undertaken after the U.S. exited the Iran
nuclear deal, undercutting the narrative that the U.S. is alone in countering Iran's threats to
international peace and security.
We are also working with our allies and partners to oppose Iran's ballistic missile program.
The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have repeatedly highlighted
Iran's defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which calls upon Iran not to
undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. We relayed our strong concerns to the UN secretary-general following
Iran's launch of a medium range ballistic missile in December, and its attempted satellite
launches in January and February.
Just last week, the UK, France, and Germany wrote to the secretary-general again,
underscoring their concerns with Iran's recent missile launches. We are confident that our
shared assessment of the threat from Iran will continue to translate into even more shared
action.
Our sanctions are laying bare this regime's mismanagement and lack of transparency.
Shortly after the President exited the Iran nuclear deal, Foreign Minister Zarif bragged that
Iran would, quote, "thrive" under U.S. sanctions. His optimism was misplaced. A few months
later, the supreme leader said that the regime is under, quote, "unprecedented pressure,"
end quote. President Rouhani has since said Iran faces its, quote, "most severe economic
crisis in 40 years."
This economic crisis is largely of the regime's own making, because it has prioritized
expanding the revolution abroad over sound economics at home. Living conditions have
barely rebounded to pre-revolution levels. For most Iranians, the promises of the revolution
never materialized. This is why the hashtag #40yearsoffailure was a popular hashtag inside
Iran during the regime's 40th anniversary. Today there are reports that indicate Iran's
economy is in recession. The rial has lost two-thirds of its value, the IMF predicts Iran's
economy will contract by as much as 3.6 percent in 2019, and inflation hit a record 40
percent in November, with inflation for goods at 60 percent. It is likely to be much higher
than that today, but it is difficult to know because the Central Bank of Iran stopped publicly
reporting inflation back in December. What is the CBI hiding?
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More than 70 percent of the Iranian public see the economy as bad or very bad, and 60
percent say it is getting worse. The Iranian people know whom to blame for reduced wages,
lost savings, and a reduction in their purchasing power. A 2018 poll conducted by lranPoll
found that nearly two-thirds of Iranians blamed the regime for mismanagement and
corruption and for the country's economic woes. Less than a third blamed sanctions or
international pressure for the current state of affairs.
This has not stopped Iran's leaders from deflecting blame for their own corruption and
mismanagement, but the Iranian people know that their government's policies are the root
cause of Iran's worsening economy. There are already whispers throughout the Iranian
medical community that the regime is hoarding drugs and other medical products that they
can then sell at marked-up prices for profit. The Iranian people view their government with
such skepticism because the regime has lost all credibility.
I've discussed at length how our pressure is depriving the Iranian regime of the resources it
needs to sustain its tactical operations. I want to close briefly by discussing the broader
strategic implications this has for the region. As we increase pressure, we are creating new
opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East.
First, our pressure is aimed at reversing Iran's strategic gains. From roughly 2007 through
2016, Iran was able for a variety of reasons to deepen its support of proxies and entrench
itself in regional conflicts without facing negative consequences. Iran does this by letting its
proxies do the dying for them in regional wars. The proxies also give the regime plausible
deniability, a 40-year fiction this administration refuses to honor. Since taking office, but
especially in the last 11 months, this administration has countered Iran's grand strategy. We
are imposing costs on the regime for behaving as an outlaw expansionist regime. The regime
is weaker today than when we took office two years ago. Its proxies are also weaker. Unless
the regime demonstrates a change in policy and behavior, the financial challenges facing
Tehran will mount.
Second, as we expose the regime's corruption, economic mismanagement, human rights
abuses, arbitrary detention of dual nationals, environmental destruction, and more, we are
making the case to countries in the region that Iran is neither a model to emulate nor a
partner to follow. Wherever it goes, conflict, misery, and suffering follow. Here are a few
examples.
President Rouhani recently visited Iraq, where he seeks to bring - which he seeks to bring
under Iranian control. We ask the Iraqi people to consider this: Given how Rouhani treats his
own people, just imagine how he will treat you.
The effects of Iran's meddling had been felt most sharply by the region's innocent civilians.
Men, women, and children are casualties of Iran's dangerous expansionism almost every
day.
In Yemen, Iran has helped fuel a humanitarian catastrophe by backing the Houthis. Its
support has prolonged the conflict well beyond what makes any sense at all.
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In Syria, Iran has (inaudible) and abetted Assad's brutal war machine as that machine has
killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions of civilians. Under the cover of the
Syrian war, the IRGC is now trying to plant military roots in Syria and establish a new
strategic base to threaten Syria's neighbors such as Israel.
In Lebanon, the Iranian regime's obsession with using Hizballah to provoke conflict with
Lebanon's neighbors threatens the safety of the Lebanese people. IRGC backing enables
Hizballah to use murder, terrorism, and corruption to intimidate other Lebanese parties and
communities.
In Iraq, I can announce today, based on declassified U.S. military reports, that Iran is
responsible for the deaths of at least 608 American service members. This accounts for 17
percent of all deaths of U.S. personnel in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. This death toll is in addition
to the many thousands of Iraqis killed by the IRGC's proxies.
Third, rolling back Iran's power projection will make it easier to address other regional
challenges. Many intellectuals and diplomats over the years have argued that without
progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there can be no progress on other conflicts. This
has been referred to by some as linkage - the idea that resolving peace between Israel and
the Palestinians was necessary to resolve other flash points.
However, the Middle East of today challenges this theory of linkage. In fact, what we are
seeing more and more is a kind of reverse linkage; addressing the threats posed by Iran is a
precursor to helping resolve other conflicts.
When we look at the challenges in the region, from the peace process to conflicts in Syria
and Yemen, to violence in Bahrain and Iraq, Iran's operations lie at or very near the heart of
the problem. It supports Palestinian terror groups like Hamas that undermine the
aspirations of the Palestinian people. It exports missiles and terrorist know-how to the
Houthis in Yemen, who in turn threaten neighboring countries. It threatens the war - it
perpetuates the war in Syria by propping up the Assad regime. Nowhere in the region are
peace and prosperity compatible with Iranian influence and support.
The Islamic Republic is linked to these crises in a way that compounds suffering and prevents
peace and stability from getting a better footing. Iran can no longer be allowed to play the
role of chief spoiler. Our pressure is making it harder than ever before for them to do that.
Secretary Pompeo will continue to use all the tools at our disposal to press the regime to
change its destructive policies for the benefit of peace in the region and for the sake of its
own people, who are the longest-suffering victims of this regime.
As we have done from the start, we will continue to call on all nations to join us in restoring
the basic demands on Iran to behave like a peaceful nation. This include - this includes
ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons, stop testing and proliferating ballistic missiles, stop
sponsoring terrorist proxies, and halt the arbitrary detention of dual citizens.
As Secretary Pompeo has said, we are prepared to end the principal components of every
one of our sanctions against the regime. We are happy to re-establish full diplomatic and
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commercial ties with Iran. If Iran makes a fundamental shift, as outlined in the Secretary's 12
demands, a lot of good things can happen between the people of Iran and the people of the
United States. That includes supporting the modernization and reintegration of the Iranian
economy into the international economic system.
Glad to take a few questions. Matt.
QUESTION: Thank you. Are you going to be making an abridged version of this available?
MR HOOK: There will be a fact sheet released after this.
QUESTION: Okay. Thanks. Two things real quick. One, on the money, the 10 billion denied
for destructive activities, is it not also the case that no matter how small the amount that Iran
might spend, that 10 billion that you've taken away from them could also have been used for
things like infrastructure or for disaster relief if
MR HOOK: Iran had that opportunity back in 2013.
QUESTION: Well, right. But it's 2019 n0w -
MR HOOK: Right. But -
QUESTION: -- and they're suffering from floods. So that
MR HOOK: They are suffering from floods because Iran has prioritized its expansionist
foreign policy over things like emergency preparedness and water management. I released a
video a few weeks ago, before the flooding occurred, talking about how Iran has destroyed
its environment. The regime has destroyed its environment, and it has mismanaged its water
resources, and it goes through these cycles of drought and flooding.
When this regime came to power, there were about seven ancient dams and 12 modern
dams. Over the course of the last 40 years, this regime has built 600 dams. That is just water
malpractice, water management malpractice.
QUESTION: Okay. But, I mean, natural disasters happen everywhere. They happen here too.
It's not -
MR HOOK: And so they have prioritized all of this - they have prioritized this consistently.
People are still recovering from the earthquake in 2017.
QUESTION: Can I- then just the last one briefly. You said on the oil waivers - so you said
three of the eight that were -- three of the eight are no longer necessary, the ones - the
original ones?
MR HOOK: No, I said that three of the eight have gone to zero.
QUESTION: Right. Well, so they don't need waivers then, right? So there's five left?
MR HOOK: That's correct.
QUESTION: There is - there are some people, quite a few actually, who make the argument
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that you should not give any more waivers, that everything should go to zero, zero means
zero, maximum pressure.
MR HOOK: Right.
QUESTION: That concerns about the market and the supply are compensated for or made
up for by the Saudis willingness to expand production to cover any - so do you intend to not
give any more - to extend - to not extend any of the waivers? Or is that still an open
possibility?
MR HOOK: Well, we're still currently under the existing waivers that expire on May 2nd.
There will be an announcement on that in due course. We are not looking to grant any
exceptions to our campaign of maximum economic pressure. As I've said in my remarks and
I've said in other forum, fora, that in 2018 we had a very tight and fragile oil market and the
President did not want to lift the price of oil. We very, I think, carefully and correctly
calibrated balancing our national security and economic objectives. 2019 is a much better
picture in global oil markets. We forecast more supply than demand. And that creates much
better conditions for us to accelerate our path to zero.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR HOOK: Rich.
QUESTION: Thanks, Brian. So if you've taken off a million and a half a day, you're somewhere
south of a million barrels a day? That's where -
MR HOOK: Yeah, approximately. Yeah.
QUESTION: Is there a point - and I know the intent is to get to zero, but is there a point that
the administration sees as a real tipping point that - is it half a million barrels or somewhere
in between that really begins to drive the economic ramifications?
MR HOOK: Well, we already are - we're doing that now at our current levels. So we have
reached that goal of affecting Iran's - disrupting and making it harder for Iran to sustain its
foreign policy. So we're - this briefing was to talk about the impact. I often get this question
what kind of impact are you seeing? - so I thought it'd be useful to provide a comprehensive
briefing on what we're seeing and what others are seeing. And we're just getting started.
Michele.
QUESTION: Thank you. Since Secretary Pompeo is hosting this event on captive Americans
this afternoon, I wonder if you can tell us if there's been any new effort by the administration
to open up a humanitarian dialogue with Iran on the cases of Americans held there in Iran or
if you're considering anything punitive, specific sanctions to pressure Iran to release these
people.
MR HOOK: Well, I'd refer you to - I don't want to get in Robert O'Brien's lane. I can tell you
that when I did - this was back when the United States was in the Iran nuclear deal and I
attended the last meeting of the joint commission that the United States participated in. I
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requested a meeting with Iran's deputy foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, and I presented him
the names of all the Americans who are being arbitrarily detained. I asked for their release,
asked for an update on their condition, and suggested that we do some sort of - that we start
opening the channel. Robert O'Brien has picked that up, and so we are - he's going to be
having some events this afternoon. I'm happy to put Robert in touch with you to give you a
more detailed answer.
Nick.
QUESTION: Brian, just two quick ones, one on the oil waivers. So if conditions on May 2nd
are what they are today, would you say that conditions are right to bring that to zero? And
then second, on the 608 American service members you identified as Iran having been
responsible for their deaths, is that - could you us give more detail on that? What was that
classified information that was declassified? And you mentioned 2003 to 2011, so is that
that's the date frame, time frame for those Americans?
MR HOOK: Yes. That's a Department of Defense statistic. I'm happy to give you more details
on it but wanted to release that number.
QUESTION: And on the waivers?
MR HOOK: I already answered the waiver question.
QUESTION: But not - I mean, if today, given the - what you mentioned about the oil market
and the fact that it seems to be well supplied and oil prices are relatively low, would you feel
comfortable bringing waivers to zero?
MR HOOK: We - because 2019 we forecast more supply than demand, there are better
market conditions for us to accelerate our path to zero. We are not looking to grant any
waivers or exceptions to our sanctions regime.
Last question for Abbie.
QUESTION: Thank you. You went through a lot of the economic impact of what you're seeing
one year after from the sanctions. But what changes in behavior have you seen from Iran as
far as their malign activities throughout the world that you have been pointing out for the
last year?
MR HOOK: Well, that's what we wanted to highlight today. To some extent I feel like don't
take my word for it; the Iranian regime is admitting it at the supreme leader level, the
presidential - the level of the president. You've seen the leader of Hizballah make a public
appeal for donations. You're seeing reporting in the New York Times front page on Friday last
week chronicling how the combination of Iran's financial mismanagement plus American
sanctions are impeding Iran's ability to fund its proxies and allies at the levels that they are
accustomed to. And since Iran does supply Hizballah with 70 percent of its revenue, it is
quite significant when you have the leader of Hizballah making a public appeal for money.
He's obviously not getting as much as he needs to execute his objectives because, as he's
attributed to, American sanctions.
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So we think it's very much interest - in the interest of the Iranian people to join this effort of
pressure, because we are seeing the results. And there were a lot of people who, when we
got out of the deal, who were saying, "Oh, America alone, can you do this? This is going to be
very hard without everybody joining you." And I think that that has now been proven wrong.
We're only five months into the re-imposition of our sanctions, and we are now already
seeing these effects that are being reported by others, not by us.
And so we think, as I said, we share the same threat assessment with so many - with our -
with countries in the Middle East, with our European partners. When we were in Warsaw, we
saw there - one nice consequence of Iran's foreign policy is that it has brought together
Arabs and Israelis in a way that we had not thought possible. And so you saw they have this
common threat of Iran's foreign policy, its revolutionary foreign policy, and it is a very urgent
matter. And so I remember Prime Minister Netanyahu saying in Warsaw when you see the
Arabs and the Israelis agreeing as strongly as they do, you need to pay attention to that.
Something very important is happening, and we're seeing it. We've been seeing it for a while,
and I just wanted to give you an update on what we're seeing on the ground. Thank you.
MR PALLADINO: All right. Thanks, Brian.
MR HOOK: Thanks.
MR PALLADINO: All right. Hi, everyone.
Something for the top: The United States is deeply concerned by the Government of
Burundi's decision to extend indefinitely the suspension of broadcasts by the Voice of
America and to revoke the operating license of the British Broadcasting Corporation. This
decision raises serious concerns for the freedom of expression enshrined in article 31 of
Burundi's constitution as well as for Burundi's international human rights obligations. We call
on the government to rescind its decision, and we urge the Government of Burundi to allow
all journalists to operate in an environment free from intimidation. A free and independent
media is indispensable to a vibrant, functioning democracy and to free and fair elections in
2020.
With that, I'd be happy to take some questions.
QUESTION: You sound subdued for some reason.
MR PALLADINO: Ah, do you want me to sing more, maybe, perhaps?
QUESTION: No. No, you just seemed a little subdued. Can I ask you-
MR PALLADINO: No, I- don't read into my- okay, I'll be more casual. Go ahead, Matt, please.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Can I ask you a - one logistical question before getting into - and that is - the
logistical question is: Why is the Secretary not going to the G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting?
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MR PALLADINO: The Secretary has full faith in Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan and
his ability to advance America's national security interests at the G7 Foreign Ministers
Meeting. In fact, the deputy secretary has previously represented the United States at the G7
Foreign Ministers Meeting, and as you know, beginning today, the Secretary will host all
NATO allies for a two-day NATO ministerial. Transatlantic alliances are stronger than ever,
and in that same spirit, he'll be sending the deputy secretary.
QUESTION: Right. Well, except that the time that Deputy Secretary Sullivan attended the G7,
he was actually the acting secretary of state; he wasn't the - I mean he was the deputy but
was also acting secretary of state. I'm just -I mean, was there some reason that - does he
have some kind of a conflict? Why - what's the -
MR PALLADINO: I have nothing to announce on the Secretary's future schedule at this time.
QUESTION: Okay. Can I ask you about the decision - the President's decision on aid to the
Northern Triangle countries, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras? I'm curious to know
what kind of decision-making process or planning went into this, and how much money is
actually going to be affected. It seems to me - the President went on at length about this in
his meeting with the NATO secretary general, and he said that he understood what the
money was for. But this administration has made a big play- a big push for countries that
receive U.S. assistance to agree with or vote with it at the United Nations, et cetera. Both
Honduras and Guatemala have signed on to the Lima Group consensus on Interim President
Guaido in Venezuela. Guatemala has moved its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, following the
U.S. lead. So what kind of message does this send if they do what you ask them to and then
you go ahead and take away money that was supposed to be going to alieve the very
problem that you say they're being punished for?
MR PALLADINO: Right. To answer your question on money, at the Secretary's instruction, we
are carrying out the President's direction to end foreign assistance programs for the
Northern Triangle. The President's direction to end foreign assistance programs impacts
approximately $450 million in Fiscal Year 2018 allocations. And the State Department along
with the United States Agency for International Development currently are evaluating the
impact on Fiscal Year 2017 funds. When we have further details to provide on that process
moving forward, we'll be sure to let you know.
Regarding the decision itself, the President has made clear that the decision is aimed at
securing United States borders and protecting American citizens, and that's something that
the Secretary of State is now pursuing. The President has determined that these programs
have not effectively prevented illegal immigration from coming to the United States, and
they've not achieved the desired results. We - political will and strong partnership are critical
to ensuring the success of any foreign assistance program, and that's something that is true
in this regard as well.
QUESTION: How much of this money actually goes to the governments and how much is
actually distributed by USAID to NGOs and other groups, civil society groups?
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MR PALLADINO: Yeah, I don't have a line item breakdown on distribution. I have the top line
Fiscal Year 2018 method. But -
QUESTION: I mean, I think the overwhelming majority of this goes to nongovernmental
organizations that are involved in - that run programs designed to reduce the threat. So
exactly how is not spending this money or not sending this money securing the U.S. border
and protecting Americans?
MR PALLADINO: Well it's clearly- it's not succeeded in stemming this flow.
QUESTION: Okay, so We -
MR PALLADINO: And we have a crisis situation.
QUESTION: Right.
MR PALLADINO: As the Secretary said, the numbers don't lie.
QUESTION: Okay. But -
MR PALLADINO: That must be addressed.
QUESTION: Okay -
MR PALLADINO: And the President has been clear repeatedly that this was something that
he was considering, and he's made it clear that foreign assistance should be in support of
America's national interests. And our national interests here are quite prioritized, and that is
the crisis that we are facing along our border is a national security issue, and that's what
we're addressing.
QUESTION: So obviously the - there is some alternative plan in place, other than just taking
this money away, right?
MR PALLADINO: I have nothing further to announce today on future United States
Government actions.
QUESTION: So you're just telling us that there's no - there's no - you- no one has an idea
about how it can be better done or what would work?
MR PALLADINO: I didn't say that. What I said is I have nothing to announce today on future
actions. Please.
QUESTION: Follow-up on that?
MR PALLADINO: Go ahead, Lesley.
QUESTION: Robert, as far as I understand, the State Department has to notify Congress of its
decision to suspend this aid. Have you done that? And then what happens? Is there a period
of time in which you then move forward? Can you just run us through the process, please?
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MR PALLADINO: Right. The State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development intend to consult with and notify the Congress regarding the planned
reprogramming of funds, and that will be consistent with all applicable requirements.
QUESTION: When will that happen?
MR PALLADINO: We are engaging Congress.
QUESTION: You are engaging?
MR PALLADINO: We are engaging Congress.
QUESTION: So currently the State Department is talking about this plan with Congress?
MR PALLADINO: We are engaging the Congress, and we intend to pursue additional
consultations with, and eventually the notification too.
QUESTION: And on the amount, you mentioned you have at least one number, because
there have been a number of different amounts reported out there, because some of it
might be Fiscal Year '17 money that could have been spent or wasn't spent. Can you break it
down as much as you can?
MR PALLADINO: I can't at this point. The process is complicated. And that said, when we
have those numbers and further details, we will be able to provide them at that point.
QUESTION: But the number that you have is what? You said you have a-
MR PALLADINO: Fiscal Year 2018, we're able to provide a specific number and that's $450
million.
QUESTION: Robert?
QUESTION: Iran?
QUESTION: More on aid?
QUESTION: More on aid?
QUESTION: Aid?
MR PALLADINO: Let's go to CBS, please.
QUESTION: Thank you. Can you - more of explaining, but can you say - I understand it's
reprogramming- but what the authority is that you're using to do this? Is it just
reprogramming, or does it have to do with the clause in the appropriations bill that gives the
Secretary oversight for foreign aid to these three countries specifically?
My other question is, obviously, most foreign aid goes through State and USAID but not all of
it. There's over 20 government agencies that deal with foreign aid in some form. Will this
apply to all that aid, and will this apply to programs for the Millennium Challenge
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Corporation, which have hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of programs in those three
countries?
MR PALLADINO: I don't have any specifics on the second part of your question. Regarding
the first part, the funds will be reprogrammed consistent with all applicable requirements
regarding congressional consultation and notification. Beyond that, I don't have anything
further.
QUESTION: Taiwan?
QUESTION: Turkey?
QUESTION: I have one more on -
MR PALLADINO: One more? Go ahead, Abbie, please.
QUESTION: As I understand it, the law works as such that Congress has to approve that
reprogramming. Given the congressional reaction so far, it seems they're not supportive of
withdrawing that foreign assistance generally. If Congress insists that the reprogramming
that is suggested is not something they support, is the State Department willing to see that
money go back to Congress and not be spent?
MR PALLADINO: I don't want to engage in a hypothetical, but what I would say is that the
President's decision is clear, and the Secretary of State has ordered us to march forward.
We're going to continue to do that, and we intend to consult with and notify Congress as is
appropriate.
QUESTION: On the breakdown?
MR PALLADINO: Last one. This is the last one on this subject. I don't have much more. Go
ahead.
QUESTION: Can you please talk a little bit about what the President sees as the motivation
for those three countries? Does he believe that those Northern Triangle countries are
insufficiently committed to the idea of stopping these migrant flows, that they want to stop
them, that they have - but have not been able to? And what do they say in their
conversations when the U.S. Government asks why they've been unable to stop these
migrant flows?
MR PALLADINO: I don't have anything to report on what they're saying to the White House, if
I understand your question correctly here.
QUESTION: Well, I mean, I would assume that some of those conversations would happen
through the State Department as well or through the embassies. Were you - when the
President made that threat some time ago to stop aid, there would have then been some
sort of conversation where they would say, listen - I mean, do you have a sense of their
intent? Do you believe that they have shown insufficient commitment to the work of
stopping these migrant flows?
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MR PALLADINO: What I would say is we need these countries to continue making the tough
reforms that are necessary. I'll stop there. Let's move on.
Go ahead, Laurie. Please.
QUESTION: Venezuela's foreign minister visited Ankara yesterday, and he was - and he
reiterated Turkey's support, quote, "in all fields for Venezuela," to quote the Turkish foreign
minister. What is your comment on that?
MR PALLADINO: I don't actually have anything on that, Laurie, and I am going to have to get
back to you. Go ahead.
QUESTION: Okay. I've got another - I have another one.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: Go ahead, please.
QUESTION: Turkey's ruling party is contesting the elections that it -
MR PALLADINO: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- lost, apparently, in Istanbul and Ankara. And do you have any concerns that
that contest by the AKP, that challenge by the AKP to the election results, could undermine
their integrity?
MR PALLADINO: We're aware of those reports.
I would say that free and fair elections are
essential for any democracy, and this means acceptance of legitimate election results are
essential. And we expect nothing less from Turkey, which has a long, proud tradition in this
respect.
QUESTION: Robert -
MR PALLADINO: And to go back to your first question, sometimes our organization is
lacking, Laurie. I do have a response to your question, and I apologize.
Regarding the visit itself,
I would say that we call on all other governments to recognize
Interim President Juan Guaido and to take steps to prevent Maduro from further stealing
Venezuela's wealth. Additionally, we urge the international community to hold Maduro and
other corrupt actors accountable and to take appropriate actions to end the theft of
Venezuela's assets and prevent the travel of Maduro's cronies. Thanks.
QUESTION: And that would include the roughly $2 billion that Turkey imported from - of
gold that Turkey imported from Venezuela last year?
MR PALLADINO: I don't have anything specific on that specific transaction, but the general
principle remains.
Go ahead, Said, please.
QUESTION: Yes, thank you, Robert. Ambassador Dennis Ross, a former official in many
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administrations, Republican and Democrat, along with his colleague, David Makovsky, wrote
a lengthy article in The Washington Post, where they're saying that your Golan policy basically
invites the Israeli right wing to annex the West Bank and that you ought to do - make a
declaration. Will you make a declaration that the West Bank is occupied territory and is not
to be tampered with by whoever - any group that may annex it?
MR PALLADINO: I --
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on his article?
MR PALLADINO: I haven't read his article, but I can say I'm not going to speak about
hypotheticals, and our policy on the West Bank has not changed.
QUESTION: But Ambassador Ross was probably - was more involved with this process than
probably any other official in town, has a long history. He knows what he's talking about. He's
saying that next it will be the right-wing groups annexing part of the West Bank. Would you
perhaps preemptively- I don't know, maybe you can say that you should not do this?
MR PALLADINO: Yeah, not going to speak about hypotheticals. I would just say this
administration is firmly committed to pursuing a comprehensive peace between the Israelis
and the Palestinians, and I have nothing further on this topic.
Go ahead, Shaun, please.
QUESTION: Can we move on to Iran for a bit?
MR PALLADINO:To Iran?
QUESTION: To Iran.
MR PALLADINO: Oh, there wasn't enough at the beginning.
QUESTION: There wasn't enough. (Inaudible.)
MR PALLADINO: Okay, please. (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: Well, one question -
QUESTION: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.) I didn't quite get what Brian was saying.
QUESTION: Well, one part specifically, regarding the Secretary's-
MR PALLADINO: Really? Okay. Okay. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Regarding the Secretary's-
QUESTION: You don't like Iran, right? That's the -
MR PALLADINO: Please, go ahead, Shaun. Okay.
QUESTION: Regarding the Secretary's statement this morning about the aid - or about the
floods -
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MR PALLADINO: Right.
QUESTION: -- he mentioned that the United States was willing to contribute via the Red
Crescent. The head of the Iranian Red Crescent is saying that because of the U.S. sanctions,
because of the regulations on SWIFT, that the Iranian Red Crescent side actually can't reach
funding from the umbrella organization. Iran has also said that helicopters, spare parts in
particular, that they don't have access to those. Is the U.S. willing to address those specific
concerns in terms of aid? Does the U.S. have a concern that its sanctions overall could be
hurting the relief effort?
MR PALLADINO: I guess I would echo what Special Representative Hook said earlier, that the
floods demonstrate the level of Iranian regime's mismanagement in urban planning and in
emergency preparedness. Furthermore, I would say the United States stands ready to assist
and to contribute to the International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent
Societies, which would then direct the money through the Iranian Red Crescent for relief. We
stand ready to do that. And I'd point out that we remain the largest donor of humanitarian
assistance in the world, and every sanctions regime that we have made makes exceptions for
food, for medicine, and for medical devices. I would also point out that the - this Iranian
regime has a history of creating front companies to divert the distribution of humanitarian
goods. And financial institutions around the world know of this track record, they know this
history of deceiving banks when it comes - when it comes - regards to the sale of
humanitarian goods.
So the burden is on Iran here to open up its dark economy so that banks around the world
have more confidence that when they facilitate a humanitarian transaction, that the
humanitarian goods will actually reach the people. And the regime makes it very difficult to
facilitate humanitarian goods and services. I'll stop there.
QUESTION: NATO?
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: Robert,
is it the administration's position that all natural disasters everywhere
are caused by that government's mismanagement of natural - of emergency preparedness
and water management?
MR PALLADINO: Absolutely not. Brian Hook spoke earlier -
QUESTION: Only Iran.
MR PALLADINO: No, please. Brian Hook spoke specifically earlier about the environmental
degradation that has been wreaked across the Iranian regime.
QUESTION: Right. No doubt, but natural disasters happen everywhere, including in this
country.
MR PALLADINO: And of course. And our --
QUESTION: And it's not always the fault of mismanagement.
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MR PALLADINO: And we would never insist that they are. And we have offered our
condolences, because at the end of the day here we are extremely sympathetic for the
victims of this recent flood. And I'll stop there. Please.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: Let's - I'm going to go to CNN. Go ahead.
QUESTION: Okay. So since burden-sharing is on the agenda again, can we expect to hear the
same kinds of statements from the administration strongly urging or hounding NATO allies
to contribute more, or would you say that given the progress that has been made, the
administration is now satisfied with who's on track and who's not?
MR PALLADINO: I don't want to get ahead of the ministerials that are coming, but burden
sharing is definitely a priority for this administration. And where we're on track, we're on
track; where we're not on track, you can expect there to be further discussion encouraging
more progress on this regard.
QUESTION: How many countries - in the State Department's view, how many countries meet
the 2 percent GDP contribution to their defense?
MR PALLADINO: I don't have all the facts in front of me on the statistics in that regard, so I
don't want to misspeak at this point.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO: Let me go to Cindy, please.
QUESTION: Thank you. With the summit about to get underway, how big an issue - the
tensions with Turkey over their purchase of the missile defense system from Russia, and
what are you hearing from other - do other countries, NATO allies, support the U.S. position
on this?
MR PALLADINO: I guess I'd say at the top, if we're talking about NATO in general, this is an
old organization that certainly has had challenges previously, things that we've had to work
through. It's a pretty resilient organization, and we are - it's the most successful alliance
probably in the history of the world, for that matter, and it's something that we continue to
take - that remains at the core of our national security and it's something that's being
prioritized - will continue to be a priority for the United States.
Regarding the specific sales that you're referencing in regards to Turkey, we've been - no
surprise here - we've been pretty clear on these issues for some time right now, and
specifically the procurement of the S-400 would put Turkey's continued participation in the
14-nation F-35 program at risk. So what you saw yesterday was the Department of Defense
announcement that, as discussions on this matter continue, it would be taking prudent steps
to protect the shared investments made by the United States and our allies, including
Turkey, in these critical defense technologies. And DOD announced that pending an
unequivocal Turkish decision to forgo delivery of the S-400, deliveries and activities with the
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stand-up of the Turkey F-35 operational capability have been suspended and secondary
sources of supply for Turkish produced parts are in development. That was the
announcement that they made yesterday.
So again, this is not new. This is something we've spoken about a lot from this - from the
State Department, and here we are.
QUESTION: Are you hearing from other NATO allies about what - how they see this - these
this dispute or -
MR PALLADINO: Nothing to disclose from the podium. We'll be taking a look at all kinds of
issues that impact NATO's readiness this week.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: Robert,
it's the same topic.
MR PALLADINO: Okay, let's stay on topic. Go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you. So Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu is arriving in
Washington for the summit, and he's expected to meet his American counterpart, Secretary
Pompeo. Are they going to talk about this issue, F-35s, and do you know - can you say
anything -
MR PALLADINO: I don't have any bilateral meetings to announce today to talk about, but - I'll
leave it at that. Please, go ahead.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PALLADINO:Janne, please.
QUESTION: Thank you. North Korea. North - yesterday, Secretary Pompeo mentioned
optimistically about the U.S.-North Korea talks. Are there any signal that North Korea will
resume its summit again?
MR PALLADINO: The Secretary yesterday was basically making clear again that the United
States is ready to proceed and nothing further beyond that. I wouldn't read any more into it.
Our efforts are ongoing. All right.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: One more. If South Korean Government suggested a top-down style for the U.S.
North Korea talk, will the U.S. accept it?
MR PALLADINO: We're in close coordination with our allies - Republic of Korea, as well as
Japan - and all future actions are something that we do in close coordination.
Go ahead. Let's go to NHK. Ben, go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you, Robert. I have two quick questions. The first one is: Could I get a
reaction to these two Chinese jets that flew into Taiwan airspace? Taiwan characterized it as
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reckless and provocative. Do you agree with that characterization?
And then my second question is on Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Government is currently
considering revising legislation to allow extradition of criminals to Chinese authorities. Do
you have any comment or concern about that?
MR PALLADINO: I haven't seen that specific - or I'll say we're aware of that legislation, and
we're going to follow related developments to it closely. I don't have anything further at this
point.
Regarding Taiwan, we note Ambassador Bolton's tweet yesterday. And I would add to that
that the United States opposes unilateral actions by any party that are aimed at altering the
status quo, including anything related to force or coercion. And such unilateral efforts are
harmful and do not contribute to regional stability, and they undermine the framework that
has enabled peace and stability and development for decades. Beijing should stop its
coercive efforts and resume dialogue with the democratically elected administration on
Taiwan.
And I'll stop there. Please.
QUESTION: Wouldn't that - wouldn't you say that that policy extends beyond the Taiwan
Strait to other places?
MR PALLADINO: I need more specifics. I don't understand the question.
QUESTION: Well, you said the U.S. opposes unilateral actions that affect the status quo. And
I'm just wondering, that applies there in the - to the Taiwan Strait, but does it apply
elsewhere, say, perhaps the Middle East, where this administration has taken numerous
unilateral steps that affect the status quo. And if you apply the same principle, you would, in
fact, oppose the steps the administration has taken. Is that not correct?
MR PALLADINO: We - yeah, we've got different fact scenarios and we've got - that we're
dealing with, different actors in the region, and we take - we take the world as we find it.
We're not looking for - go ahead, Michel, please.
QUESTION: Do you have a comment on the resignation of the Algerian president after 20
years in power?
MR PALLADINO: Yeah, I saw that that was just - just broke. I mean,
I'm aware of that. I don't
have any specific reaction other than we continue - the United States - questions about how
to navigate this transition in Algeria, that is for the Algerian people to decide. And beyond
that I don't have anything further at this point.
QUESTION: Robert, India?
MR PALLADINO: Okay, let's go to India, please. Tejinder.
QUESTION: Yes. Do you have any official reaction to India's anti-satellite missile test? As the
NASA chief has said, it has called it a terrible, terrible thing to create.
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MR PALLADINO: Yeah, we - I think we spoke a little bit about this last week. But as we've said
previously, we have a strong strategic partnership with India, and we will continue to pursue
shared interests in space, in scientific and technical cooperation with India, and that includes
collaboration on safety and security in space.
Now, the issue of space debris, that is an important concern for the United States, and I
would say that we took note of the Indian Government's statements that the test was
designed to address space debris issues. And I'll stop there. And-
QUESTION: Are you-
MR PALLADINO: Okay, go ahead, Tejinder, please. We need to wrap this up. Go ahead.
QUESTION: Are you sending any kind of any election monitors to the - this general elections
in India from (inaudible)?
MR PALLADINO: I'm not aware of anything in that regard. Guys, I'm sorry, but we have to go.
I gotta go, gotta go.
QUESTION: (Inaudible). Has Heather Nauert officially - has she ended her role in the State
Department officially now?
MR PALLADINO: Heather no longer works for the State Department. She's been a great
colleague. Thanks.
(The briefing was concluded at 3:50 p.m.)
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Annex 52
U.S. Department of State, “Decision on Imports of Iranian Oil”, Press Statement,
22 April 2019
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Decision on Imports of Iranian Oil
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Decision on Imports of Iranian Oil
Press Statement
Michael R. Pompeo
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
April 22, 2019
Today we are announcing the United States will not issue any additional Significant Reduction Exceptions to existing importers of
Iranian oil. The Trump Administration has taken Iran's oil exports to historic lows, and we are dramatically accelerating our
pressure campaign in a calibrated way that meets our national security objectives while maintaining well supplied global oil
markets. We stand by our allies and partners as they transition away from Iranian crude to other alternatives. We have had
extensive and productive discussions with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other major producers to ease this
transition and ensure sufficient supply. This, in addition to increasing U.S. production, underscores our confidence that energy
markets will remain well supplied.
Today's announcement builds on the already significant successes of our pressure campaign. We will continue to apply maximum
pressure on the Iranian regime until its leaders change their destructive behavior, respect the rights of the Iranian people, and
return to the negotiating table.
BUSINESS (!BUSINESS)
Commercial and Business Affairs Office {http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/index.htm)
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https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/04/291272.htm
I of 2
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Decision on Imports of Iranian Oil
The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S.
State Department.
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Annex 53
U.S. President, “Executive Order on Imposing Sanctions with respect to the Iron,
Steel, Aluminum, and Copper Sectors of Iran”, 8 May 2019
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Executive Order on Imposing Sanctions with Respect to the Iron, Steel, ... https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-imposi...
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Executive Order on Imposing
Sanctions with Respect to the Iron,
Steel, Aluminum, and Copper
Sectors of Iran
FOREIGN POLICY
Issued on: May 8, 2019
* * *
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et
seq.), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952(8U.S.C. 1182(f)),
and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the
United States of America, find that:
It remains the policy of the United States to deny Iran all paths to both a nuclear
weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and to counter the totality of Iran's
malign influence in the Middle East. It is also the policy of the United States to deny
the Iranian government revenue, including revenue derived from the export of
products from Iran's iron, steel, aluminum, and copper sectors, that may be used to
provide funding and support for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorist groups and networks, campaigns of regional aggression, and military
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expansion.
In light of these findings and in order to take further steps with respect to the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, and to supplement
the authorities provided in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
(subtitle D of title XII of Public Law 112-239), I hereby order:
Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are
blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State:
(i) to be operating in the iron, steel, aluminum, or copper sector of Iran, or to be a
person that owns, controls, or operates an entity that is part of the iron, steel,
aluminum, or copper sector of Iran;
(ii) to have knowingly engaged, on or after the date of this order, in a significant
transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of significant goods or services
used in connection with the iron, steel, aluminum, or copper sectors of Iran;
(iii) to have knowingly engaged, on or after the date of this order, in a significant
transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of iron, iron
products, aluminum, aluminum products, steel, steel products, copper, or copper
products from Iran;
(iv) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or services in support of any person whose
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or
(v) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on
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behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this section.
(b) The prohibitions in this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or
in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted
before the date of this order.
Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions
described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that the foreign financial
institution has, on or after the date of this order, knowingly conducted or facilitated
any significant financial transaction:
(i) for the sale, supply, or transfer to I ran of significant goods or services used in
connection with the iron, steel, aluminum, or copper sectors of Iran;
(ii) for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of iron, iron products,
aluminum, aluminum products, steel, steel products, copper, or copper products
from Iran; or
(iii) for or on behalf of any person whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to this order.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsection (a)(i) through (a)(iii) of this section, the Secretary of the Treasury may
prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on maintaining, in the
United States of a correspondent account or payable-through account by such foreign
financial institution.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to the extent
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provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be
issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any
license or permit granted before the date of this order.
Sec. 3. I hereby determine that the making of donations of the types of articles
specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b){2)) by, to, or for the benefit of
any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared
in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by this
section.
Sec. 4. The prohibitions in section 1 of this order include:
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or
for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to subsection (a) of that section; and
(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any
such person.
Sec. 5. The unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of
aliens determined to meet one or more of the criteria in subsection 1(a) of this order
would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and the entry of such
persons into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, is therefore hereby
suspended. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of
Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United
Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers
Act Sanctions).
Sec. 6. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or
avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth
in this order is prohibited.
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(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is
prohibited.
Sec. 7. Nothing in this order shall apply to transactions for the conduct of the official
business of the Federal Government or the United Nations (including its specialized
agencies, programmes, funds, and related organizations) by employees, grantees, or
contractors thereof.
Sec. 8. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(b) the term "foreign financial institution" means any foreign entity that is engaged in
the business of accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring, holding, or
brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities,
commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as
principal or agent. It includes, but is not limited to, depository institutions, banks,
savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, securities brokers and
dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and
foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing
corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans, dealers in precious
metals, stones, or jewels, and holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of
the foregoing. The term does not include the international financial institutions
identified in 22 U.s.C. 262r(c)(2), the International Fund for Agricultural Development,
the North American Development Bank, or any other international financial
institution so notified by the Secretary of the Treasury;
(c) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any political
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Iran,
and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government
of Iran;
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(d) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of Iran and any
other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf, over which the Government of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or
jurisdiction, provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total de facto
control over the area or derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant
to international arrangements;
(e) the term "knowingly," with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means
that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result;
(f) the term "person" means an individual or entity; and
(g) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent
resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United
States.
Sec. 9. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States,
I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously,
prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would
render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to
be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957,
there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to section 1
of th is order.
Sec.10. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is
hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and
to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to
implement this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable
law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury. All
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agencies shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this
order.
Sec. 11. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head
thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to
budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the
availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States,
its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.
Sec. 12. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to actions of the
Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and
are intended solely as a response to those later actions.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 8, 2019.
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Annex 54
Official statement of I.R. Iran in reaction to the 8 May decision of the United States,
IRNA, 11 May 2018
- 439 -
- 440 -
Iranian Gov't slams US walkaway from JCPOA
irna.ir/en/News/82912204.
Tehran, May 11, IRNA- The Iranian Government in a statement
denounced US unilateral withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal also known as
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
US President Donald Trump announced on Tuesday that Washington would pull out of
Iran nuclear deal and reinstate nuclear sanctions on Iran.
This is while most world powers including Russia, China, and European Union have
repeatedly stressed that keeping the deal is in the interest of world peace and security.
The full text of the Iranian government's statement which was released by Foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on his Twitter account is as follows:
The unlawful withdrawal of the U.S. President from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action ("JCPOA") is but the final of long and persistent violations of this accord on the
part of the United States, and especially since the coming into office of its new extremist
Administration.
Mr. Trump's absurd insults against the great Iranian nation indicates the extent of his
ignorance and folly. Moreover, his baseless charges against the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in fact befits a regime which has through its interventions
dragged the Middle East into chaos and ignited terrorism and extremism; whose Zionist
ally is engaged in unprecedented cruelty, violations of human rights and aggression; and
whose regional clients gave birth to and nurtured terrorist groups, which Mr. Trump in a
ridiculous claim linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is regrettable that this kind of
individual now governs the civilized and peaceful American people.
Ever since his election campaign, Mr. Trump has declared his hatred of the JCPOA, an
accord recognized as a victory of diplomacy by the international community. Since taking
office, Mr. Trump has not only made explicit and official statements against the
agreement in violation of its provisions, but has in practice also failed to implement U.S.
practical - and not merely formal commitments under the JCPOA.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has recorded these violations in numerous letters to the Joint
Commission convened under the ]CPOA, outlining the current U.S. Administration's bad
faith and continuous violations of the accord. Thus Mr. Trump's latest action is not a new
development but simply means the end of the obstructionist presence of the United
States as a participant in the JCPOA.
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The JCPOA is a multilateral accord adopted unanimously in a United Nations Security
Council resolution, which in contrast with the claims of Mr. Trump, is not merely an
agreement of his predecessor whose implementation can be ignored by a succeeding
U.S. Administration.
This action on the part of the U.S. President is not limited to the JCPOA. Indeed, violations
of law and breaking of commitments have become a pattern under the current U.S.
Administration, going from the Paris Climate Accord to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It
was only due to the global consensus on the JCPOA and the accord's inner strength that
it took the United States Government sixteen months to explicitly and officially pull out.
Beyond further damaging the credibility of the United States on the world stage, the U.S.
withdrawal from the JCPOA has put into question the foundation of international
relations in today's world, the credibility of accords entered into with the U.S.- whether
bilaterally or multilaterally- and also put the present system of international law in
serious danger.
Unlike the U.S., the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to its international obligations
and sees the upholding of such commitments as a fundamental religious principle and
an incontrovertible norm which underpins international law. So far, Iran's fulfilment of all
its commitments under the JCPOA has been verified by the only internationally
recognized authority, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency, and repeatedly
acknowledged by all parties to the JCPOA, including the U.S. As such, unfounded claims
and ludicrous propaganda shows have no value or credibility within the JCPOA, especially
since the International Atomic Energy Agency, following the accusations made by Trump
and his accomplices, has again reiterated that Iran is abiding by its commitments under
the accord.
Iran, as a country that has remained committed to its legal obligations, will pursue the
U.S. Government's decision to withdraw from the ]CPOA as provided by the mechanisms
and provisions of the accord, and if the U.S. withdrawal is not fully compensated and the
full interests of the Iranian people are not met and guaranteed - as stated in the accord
and as outlined by Iran's Leader on 9 May- it will exercise its legal right to take whatever
reciprocal measures it deems expedient. Other parties to the JCPOA, and especially its
three European signatories, must take necessary action to safeguard the accord and to
implement their commitments - which they proved incapable of fully performing even
while the U.S. was nominally a party to the deal, due to the obstructions by the Trump
Administration - and to proceed from giving pledges to taking practical action without
any preconditions.
None of the provisions or timeframes within the JCPOA, which were the subject of twelve
years of negotiations, are negotiable in any manner. The U.S., which has through its
meddling and erroneous policies ignited extremism, terrorism, destruction, war and child
killing in our region, is in no position to issue any diktat about the Islamic Republic of
Iran's lawful presence within its own region nor its effective support for the peoples of
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Syria and Iraq in their endeavor to fight extremists. The U.S. and its allies, which through
their support for the regime of Saddam Hussein, including equipping it with chemical
weapons and the most advanced military equipment while blocking Iran's access to any
means of defense victimized the Iranian people for eight years, and currently turning our
region into a powder keg through their sale of hundreds of billions of dollars of useless
advanced weaponry devouring the financial resources of the region, are in no position to
impose restrictions on the Islamic Republic of Iran's lawful means of defense, including
defensive ballistic missiles which have been designed to carry conventional weapons
based on the bitter experiences of the war with the regime of Saddam Hussein. Indeed,
such efforts explicitly violate the principles of international law, and the Islamic Republic
of Iran's legitimate right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
As announced by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 8 May, the Foreign
Minister has been tasked with the duty of taking the necessary measures to obtain
required guarantees from the remaining parties to the JCPOA as well as Iran's other
economic partners, and to immediately report the results of this mission. Meanwhile, the
President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has been tasked with taking all
necessary steps in preparation for Iran to pursue industrial-scale enrichment without any
restrictions, using the results of the latest research and development of Iran's brave
nuclear scientists.
The people of Iran will with calm and confidence continue their path towards progress
and development and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has foreseen all
necessary measures to facilitate this under any circumstance.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a secure and powerful state, which derives its security
and economic development from within, relying on the prudent participation and
resilience of its brave and civilized people, seeks constructive and dignified engagement
with the world, and as shown by its implementation of the JCPOA despite the United
States' continuous violations, is a trustworthy and committed partner for all who are
prepared to cooperate on the basis of shared interests and mutual respect.
9376**1396
Follow us on Twitter @lrnaEnglish
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Annex 55
Iran’s Foreign Minister, “Zarif’s Response to Pompeo’s 12 demands”, Iran Daily,
20 June 2018
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Zarif's Response to Pompeo's 12
demands
Following is the response of Iran's
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad
Zarif to the US Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo's 12 demands from Iran. On
May 21, Pompeo set 12 conditions for
Iran to follow in order for the United
States to agree to a new nuclear deal
with Tehran.
By Mohammad J avad Zarif
Iran's Foreign Minister
Following the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate
Accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the
third multilateral agreement that the current United States
administration has withdrawn from.
The administration has also put in jeopardy other multilateral
arrangements such as NAFTA, the global trade system, and parts of
the United Nations system, thus inflicting considerable damage to
multilateralism, and the prospects for resolving disputes through
diplomacy.
The announcement on 8 May 2018 of United States' withdrawal
from the JCPOA and the unilateral and unlawful re-imposition of
nuclear sanctions
1
-- a decision opposed by majority of the
American people? -- was the culmination of a series of violations of
the terms of the accord by this administration, in spite of the fact
that the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the sole
competent international authority had repeatedly verified Iran's
compliance with its commitments under the accord.3 The US
decision was rejected by the international community and even its
closest allies, including the European Union, Britain5, France
and Germany.
On 21 May 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in a baseless
and insulting statement, issued a number of demands of and
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threats against Iran? in brazen contravention of international law,
well-established international norms, and civilized behavior. His
statement reflected a desperate reaction by the US administration
to the overwhelming opposition of the international community to
the persistent efforts by the White House to kill the JCPOA, and
the ensuing Washington's isolation. Mr. Pompeo, in his statement,
attempted to justify the US' withdrawal from the JCPOA and divert
international public opinion from the unlawful behavior of the
United States and its outright violation of UN Security Council
Resolution 2231; a resolution drafted and proposed by the US
itself and adopted unanimously by the Council. Mr. Pompeo's 12
preconditions for Iran to follow are especially preposterous as the
US administration itself is increasingly isolated internationally due
to its effort to undermine diplomacy and multilateralism.
It comes as no surprise that the statement and the one made by the
US president on Iran were either ignored or received negatively by
the international community, including by friends and allies of the
United States. Only a small handful of US client states in our
region welcomed it. 9
I seriously doubt that had the US Secretary of State even had a
slight knowledge of Iran's history and culture and the Iranian
people's struggle for independence and freedom, and had he
known that Iran's political system-in contrast to those of the
American allies in the region-is based on a popular revolution and
the people's will, would he have delivered such an outlandish
statement. He should, however, know that ending foreign
intervention in Iran's domestic affairs, which culminated in the 25
year period following the US-orchestrated coup in 1953, had always
been one of the Iranian people's main demands since well before
the Islamic Revolution. He should also be aware that in the past 40
years the Iranian people have heroically resisted and foiled
aggressions and pressures by the US, including its coup attempts,
military interventions, support of the aggressor in an eight-year
war, imposition of unilateral, extraterritorial and even multilateral
sanctions, and even going as far as shooting down an Iranian
passenger plane in the Persian Gulf in 1988. "Never forget" is our
mantra, too.
The Islamic Republic of Iran derives its strength and stability from
the brave and peace-loving Iranian people; a people who, while
seeking constructive interaction with the world on the basis of
mutual respect, are ready to resist bullying and extortions and
defend in unison their country's independence and honor. History
bears testimony to the fact that those who staged aggression
against this age-old land, such as Saddam and his regime's
supporters, all met an ignominious fate, while Iran has proudly and
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vibrantly continued its path towards a better and brighter future.
It is regrettable that in the past one-and-a-half years, US foreign
policy if we can call it that!-including its policy towards Iran
has been predicated on flawed assumptions and illusions-if not
actual delusions. The US President and his Secretary of State have
persistently made baseless and provocative allegations against Iran
that constitute blatant intervention in Iran's domestic affairs,
unlawful threats against a UN Member State, and violations of the
United States' international obligations under the UN Charter, the
1955 Treaty', and the 1981 Algiers Accords'. While rejecting these
fictitious allegations, I would like to draw the attention of US
policymakers to some aspects of their nation's current foreign
policy that are detrimental to the entire international community:
1. Impulsive and illogical decisions and behavior of the US
President-and efforts by his subordinates to find some
justification to persuade a reluctant domestic and foreign
audience-have already surfaced as the main feature of the
decision-making process in Washington over the past 17
months. This process, coupled with ill-conceived and hasty
explanations to justify outcomes, usually lead to
contradictory statements and actions. As an example, in his
role as CIA Director, Mike Pompeo once in a Congressional
hearing emphatically stated: "Iran has not violated its
commitments'3." Later, and following the US President's
decision to withdraw from the accord, now Secretary of State
Pompeo in his statement on May 21 emphatically stated that
"Iran has violated its commitments
1
4 ."
2. It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that some aspects of US
foreign policy have been put up for auction-far beyond the
routine lobbying practices. It is, for instance, unprecedented
that a US president should choose the very country he had
called "fanatic and a supporter of terrorism5 during his
election campaign as the destination for his first foreign visit
as president16,
or to publicly make aspects of his foreign
policy positions contingent on the purchase by one or another
country of arms and other items from the United States.7 It
has also been reported that in some other cases, mostly
illegitimate financial interests have been the main basis for
the formulation of mind-bogglingly ill-conceived US policy
positions.1
3. Contempt for international law and attempts to undermine
the rule of law in international relations have been among the
main features of the current administration's foreign policy.
To the extent, according to media reports, that the US
negotiators in the G7 Summit were even insisting on deleting
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the phrase "our commitment to promote the rules-based
international order.9 This destructive approach began by
showing contempt for the fundamental principle of pacta
sunt servanda, which is arguably the oldest principle of
international law. The US withdrawal from some
international agreements and undermining others, coupled
with efforts to weaken international organizations, are
examples of destructive moves so far by the US government,
which have unfortunately darkened the outlook for the
international order. Obviously, the continuation of such
policies can endanger the stability of the international
community, turning the US into a rogue state and an
international outlaw.20
4. Predicating decisions on illusions is another aspect of this
administration's foreign policy. This has been especially
evident with respect to West Asia. The illegal and provocative
decision regarding Al-Quds al-Sharif, blind support for the
cruel atrocities committed by the Zionist regime against
Gazans, and aerial and missile attacks against Syria are some
of the more brazen aspects of such an unprincipled foreign
policy.
The statement made by Mr. Pompeo on May 21 was the
culmination of a delusional US approach to our region. Ironically,
the US Secretary of State tried to set preconditions for negotiations
and agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran at a time when the
international community is doubtful about the possibility or utility
of negotiation or agreement with the US on any issue. How can the
US government expect to be viewed or treated as a reliable party to
another round of serious negotiations following its unilateral and
unwarranted withdrawal from an agreement which was the result
of hundreds of hours of arduous bilateral and multilateral
negotiations, in which the highest ranking US foreign affairs
official participated, and which was submitted to the Security
Council by the US and adopted unanimously as an international
commitment under Article 25 of the Charter?
Recent statements and actions by the US president, including
reneging on his agreement with the G7?' while in the air flying
back from the summit, are other examples of his erratic behavior.
His remarks immediately following his meeting with the leader of
the DPRK regarding his possible change of mind in 6 months are
indicative of what the world is facing-an irrational and dangerous
US administration. Does the US Secretary of State really expect
Iran to negotiate with a government whose president says: "I may
stand before you in six months and say, 'Hey, I was wrong. I don't
know if I'll ever admit that, but I'll find some kind of an excuse222
Can such a government really set preconditions for Iran? Isn't it
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actually confusing the plaintiff for the defendant? Mr. Pompeo has
forgotten that it is the US government that needs to prove the
credibility of its words and legitimacy of its signature, and not the
party that has complied with its international obligations and sticks
to its word. In fact, the truth is that all US administrations in the
past 70 years should be held accountable for their disregard for
international law, and their violations of bilateral and multilateral
agreements with Iran. A short list of the rightful demands of the
Iranian people from the US government could include the
following:
1. The US government must respect Iran's independence and
national sovereignty and assure Iran that it will end its
intervention in Iran's domestic affairs in accordance with
international law in general, and the 1981 Algiers Accords3
in particular.
2. The United States must abandon its policy of resorting to the
threat or use of force -- which constitute a breach of the
preemptory norms of international law and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations -as an option in the conduct
of its foreign affairs with or against the Islamic Republic of
Iran and other States.
3. The US government should respect the State immunity of the
government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
2
4 which is a
fundamental principle of international law, and, while
rescinding previous arbitrary and unlawful financial
judgments, it should refrain from executing them in the US
and extraterritorially.
4. The US government should openly acknowledge its
unwarranted and unlawful actions against the people of Iran
over the past decades, including inter alia the following, take
remedial measures to compensate the people of Iran for the
damages incurred, and provide verifiable assurances that it
will cease and desist from such illegal measures and refrain
from ever repeating them:
1. Its role in the 1953 coup
25 that led to the overthrow of Iran's
lawful and democratically-elected government and the
subsequent 25 years of dictatorship in Iran;26
2. Unlawful blocking, seizure and confiscation of tens of billions
of dollars of assets of the Iranian people after the Islamic
Revolution7, or under various baseless pretexts28
in recent
years;39
3. Direct military aggression against Iran in April 19803, which
was a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Iran;
4. Provision of massive military and intelligence assistance to
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the Iraqi dictator3
1 during the eight-year war he imposed on
the Iranian people3
2
inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars
of damages on Iran and its people;
5. Responsibility in the enormous suffering that Iranians have
incurred over the past three decades as a result of the use by
Saddam of chemical weapons, whose ingredients were
provided33 by the US34 and some other Western countries;35
6. The shooting down of an Iran Air passenger plane by the USS
Vincennes in July 1988-a flagrant crime that led to the
murder of 290 innocent passengers and crew8, and the
subsequent awarding of a medal to the captain of the ship37
rather than punishing him for his war crime;
7. Repeated attacks against Iran's oil platforms in the Persian
Gulf3? in the spring of 1988;
8. Repeated and unwarranted insults against the Iranian people
by calling the entire nation "an outlaw and rogue nation"39 or
"a terrorist nation4 and by including Iran in the so-called
"axis of evil:"41
'
9. Unlawful and unreasonable establishment of a bigoted list of
the nationals of some Islamic countries, including Iranians,
prohibiting their entry into the US.4? The Iranians are among
the most successful, educated and law-abiding immigrants in
the US and have done great service to American society. They
are now prohibited from seeing their loved ones, including
even their aging grandparents;
10. Harboring and providing safe haven to anti-Iranian saboteurs
in the USA, who openly incite blind violence against Iranian
civilians, 43 and supporting criminal gangs and militias and
terrorist organizations, 44 some of which were listed for years
as terrorist groups by the US and later removed from the list
following intense lobbying by those who have received money
from them.5 Some of those lobbyists" now occupy high
ranking positions in the Trump administration;
11. Support provided to Mossad47 for the multiple terrorist
assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists;4
12. Sabotage of Iran's nuclear peaceful program through cyber
attacks;49
13. Fabrication of fake documents59 to deceive the international
community over Iran's peaceful nuclear program and to
create an unnecessary crisis5.
5. The United States government must cease its persistent
economic aggression against the Iranian people which has
continued over the past four decades; nullify the cruel and
extensive primary and extraterritorial sanctions, rescind
hundreds of legislations and executive orders" aimed at
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disrupting Iran's normal development which are in flagrant
contravention of international law53 and have been
universally condemned,5 and compensate the Iranian
people for the enormous damages to the Iranian economy
and its people.
6. The US government should immediately cease its violations
and breaches of the JCP0A55, which have caused hundreds of
billions of dollars in direct and indirect damages for
disrupting trade with and foreign investment in Iran,
compensate Iranian people for these damages and commit to
implement unconditionally and verifiably all of its obligations
under the accord, and refrain (in accordance with the
JCPOA) from any policy or action to adversely affect the
normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran.
7. The US government should release all Iranians and non
Iranians who are detained under cruel conditions in the US
under fabricated charges°' related to the alleged violation of
sanctions57, or apprehended in other countries following
unlawful pressure by the US government for extradition, and
compensate for the damage inflicted on them. These include
pregnant women,5? the elderly and people suffering from
serious health problems; some of whom have even lost their
lives in prison.5
8. The US government should acknowledge the consequences of
its invasions and interventions in the region, including in
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region, and
withdraw its forces from and stop interfering in the region.
9. The US government should cease policies and behavior that
have led to the creation of the vicious DAESH terrorist group
and other extremist organizations, and compel its regional
allies to verifiably stop providing financial and political
support and armaments to extremist groups in West Asia and
the world92,
10. The US government should stop providing arms and military
equipment to the aggressors-who are murdering thousands
of innocent Yemeni civilians and destroying the country93
and cease its participation in these attacks.4 It should
compel its allies to end their aggression against Yemen and
compensate for the enormous damage done to that country.
11. The US government should stop its unlimited and
unconditional support for the Zionist regime· in line with its
obligations under international law; condemn its policy of
apartheid and gross violations of human rights, and support
the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to
self-determination and the establishment of an independent
Palestinian State with Al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital.
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12. The US government should stop selling hundreds of billions
oflethal-not beautiful-military equipment every year to
regions in crisis, especially West Asia, 7 and instead of
turning these regions into powder kegs68
it should allow the
enormous amount of money spent on arms to serve as
funding for development and combating poverty. Only a
fraction of the money paid by US arms customers could
alleviate hunger and abject poverty, provide for potable, clean
water, and combat diseases throughout the globe."9
13. The US government should stop opposing the efforts by the
international community for the past five decades to establish
a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East.7 It should compel the Zionist regime-with its history
of aggression and occupation-to de-nuclearize, thus
neutralizing the gravest real threat to regional and
international peace and security, which emanates from the
most destructive arms in the hands of the most
warmongering regime in our time.
14. The US government should stop increasingly relying on
nuclear weapons and the doctrines of using nuclear weapons
to counter conventional threats7
1
-a policy that is in flagrant
contravention of its commitment under Article VI of the Non
Proliferation Treaty, the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice,7 the 1995 NPT Review Conference
Declaration, and UN Security Council Resolution 984. The
US should comply with its moral, legal and security
obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament, which is a
near unanimous demand of all United Nations Member
States, and virtually all people across the globe, including
even former US Secretaries of State.73 As the only State that
is stamped with the shame of ever using nuclear weapons
itself, it is incumbent on the US to relieve humanity from the
nightmare of a global nuclear holocaust, and give up on the
illusion of security based on "mutually assured destruction"
(MAD).
15. The US government should once and for all commit itself to
respect the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements
must be kept), which is the most fundamental principle of
international law and a foundation for civilized relations
among peoples, and discard in practice the dangerous
doctrine which views international law and international
organizations as merely "a tool in the US toolbox"74.
The aforementioned US policies are examples of what has resulted
in Iranians distrusting the American government. They are also
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among underlying causes of injustice, violence, terrorism, war and
insecurity in West Asia. These policies will bring about nothing but
a heavy toll in human lives and material assets75 for different
regions of the world, and isolation for the US in world public
opinion7. The only ones benefitting are and will be lethal arms
manufacturers. If the US government summons the courage to
renounce these policies in words and deeds, its global isolation will
end and a new image of the US will emerge in the world, including
in Iran, paving the path to joint efforts for security, stability, and
inclusive sustainable development.
I admit that regrettably, it is not realistic to harbor a hope for such
a change in US behavior. Thus, at the global level the Islamic
Republic of Iran has for years promoted inclusion, multilateralism,
dialogue, respect for the rule oflaw and nuclear disarmament
through initiatives such as Dialogue among Civilizations77 and
WAVE (World Against Violence and Extremism)7, and
participated actively in international efforts to achieve nuclear
disarmament7 and a rule-based international system'O. We have
also presented practical proposals and engaged in serious
diplomatic efforts to end regional conflicts in Syria81 and Yemen82
through diplomacy from the earliest stages of these unfortunate
conflicts, sadly, to the deaf ears of the United States that continues
to support aggressors and terrorists in every conflict in our region.
And following the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran
has earnestly engaged with the remaining JCPOA Participants
(EU/E3+2) in a good faith effort to salvage this unique global
diplomatic achievement3. We continue to do so as of this writing.
Nationally, Iran has ensured its security and stability in the past
four decades on the basis of its inherent domestic capabilities and
its reliance on the great Iranian people, not on any foreign power's
benevolence or patronage. Despite foreign pressure and while
expending comparatively the least amount in the region on
armaments+, it has become stronger, more stable and more
advanced by the day.
And regionally, in contrast to the US and its foreign policy, Iran-in
accordance with its constitution5 neither seeks to dominate nor
will it ever submit to domination. It believes that the era of regional
and global hegemony has long passed, and any effort by any power
to achieve it is futile." Instead of yielding to foreign domination or
trying to dominate others, countries in our region should seek to
create a stronger, more prosperous and more stable region.7 We
in Iran view our security and stability as inseparable from those of
our neighbors.8 We have a common history and culture as well as
indivisible opportunities and challenges, and can only enjoy
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security and stability at home, if and only if our neighbors enjoy
internal and international stability and security. We expect other
regional countries to adopt a similar approach, and instead of
insisting on the failed experiment of "trying to purchase or
outsource security, "9 concentrate on dialogue, mutual
understanding, confidence building, and cooperation with
neighbors.
The Islamic Republic of Iran views the establishment of a
"Regional Dialogue Forum" in the Persian Gulf as the best means
to resolve regional crises and create a stronger region.99 We can
begin adopting confidence-building measures to bring regional
countries closer to each other on the basis of such principles as the
sovereign equality of states, non-resort to the threat or use of force,
peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for territorial integrity of
other States, inviolability of international boundaries, non
intervention in domestic affairs of others, and respect for the right
of peoples to self-determination. By fostering common
understanding about threats and opportunities at the regional and
global levels, we can move towards achieving a non-aggression pact
and creating common mechanisms for regional cooperation. We
firmly believe that we, regionally-as the inheritors of the richest
civilizations the world has ever known-should stand tall and can
solve our own problems amongst ourselves and secure a better
future for all of our children without outside interference and
patronage, both of which come at a heavy cost to our collective
dignity as well as our future development.
Endnotes:
1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-u-s
participation-jcpoa-taking-additional-action-counter-irans
malign-influence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-weapon/
2
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/08/polities/poll-iran
agreement/index.html
3
IAEA in its report of 24 May, IAEA has concluded that
"continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at the
nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear
material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by Iran under its
Safeguards Agreement" and "since Implementation Day, the
Agency has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by
Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA."
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea
reports
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters
4
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
- 456 -
homepage/44238/remarks-hrvp-mogherini-statement-us
president-trump-regarding-iran-nuclear-deal-jcpoa en
5
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement
from-prime-minister-may-chancellor-merkel-and-president
macron-following-president-trumps-statement-on-iran
6
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy
/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/events/article/jcpoa-joint
statement-by-france-the-united-kingdom-and-germany-08-05-18
7
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05
[282301.htm
8 The Security Council in the Resolution 2231 (2015) has
urged the full implementation of the JCPOA and has called upon
all UN Member States, including the United States to "refrain from
actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the
JCPOA".
9
http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-iran-deal
announcement-could-leave-us-isolated-and-allies-trouble-916023
10 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp
/2018/05/21/pompeos-iran-strategy-speech-lacked-a-real-strategy
[?utm term=.97895765934
11 According to Treaty of Amity of 1955, the United States is
obliged not to impose sanctions against Iran and Iranians peoples.
For instance, Article IV of this Treaty is obliging the United States
"at all times accord fair and equitable treatment to the Iranian
nationals and companies" and "refrain from applying unreasonable
or discriminatory measures that would impair Iranians legally
acquired rights and interests". Furthermore, Article Xis
prescribing that "Between the territories of the United States and
Iran "shall be freedom of commerce and navigation."
12
In the Algeria Declaration of 1981, "The United States
pledged that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United
States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or
militarily, in Iran's internal affairs."
13 https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/nomination
041218
14 https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05
[282301.htm
15 https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript
third-2o16-presidential-debate-230063
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
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16 https://lobelog.com/how-the-saudis-took-donald-trump
for-a-ride/
17 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements
[remarks-president-trump-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman
kingdom-saudi-arabia-bilateral-meeting/, https://www.rt.com
[news/421890-peanuts-mbs-trump-video/ and
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/trump-humiliated-saudi
crown-prince-while-boasting-about-arms-sales-1.5938561
18 https://theintercept.com/2018/03/02/jared-kushner-real
estate-qatar-blockade/ and https://www.vanityfair.com
[news/2o18/03/did-jared-kushner-punish-qatar-because-it
wouldnt-lend-his-family-money
19 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gz-summit
communique-text/the-charlevoix-g7-summit-communique
idUSKCN1.J5107
20 https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/donald
trump-s-america-has-just-become-a-rogue-nation-20180509
p4zebu.html
21 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44427660
and https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/10/donald
trump-throws-g-7-disarray-tweets-leaves/
22 http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/391774-
trump-if-i-was-wrong-about-kim-ill-find-some-kind-of-an-excuse,
and https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/trump
interview-north-korea-w521433
23 http://www.iuset.net/General%20Documents/1-
General%20Declaration%E2%80%8E.pdf
24 http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/143/judgments
25 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/aug/19/cia
admits-role-1953-iranian-coup
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/# ftn1
26 https://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/16/world/secrets
history-cia-iran-special-report-plot-convulsed-iran-53-79.html
27 According to Points II and III of Algeria Declaration of 1981,
the United States is committed to return all Iranians Assets.
28 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf
/14-770 906b.pdf
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
- 458 -
29 https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu
/egi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2243&context=californialawreview
30 https://www.britannica.com/event/Operation-Eagle-Claw
31 https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/us-secretly
gave-aid-to-iraq-early-in-its-war-against-iran.html,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/12
(3o/us-had-key-role-in-iraq-buildup
/133€eC74-3816-4652-9bd8-118699d6f8/2n0redirect=on&
utm term=.6beooo53e094 and https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/United States support for Iraq during the Iran
%E2%680%93Iraq_ War. Also according to PBS Frontline, Saddam
was recruited by the CIA while in Cairo in the 1950s. According to
United Press International, he was used by the United States to
plan a coup against General Abdulkarim Qassim. His collaboration
with the United States after assuming power in 1979 has been
widely documented. See Richard Sale "Exclusive: Saddam key in
early CIA plot," United Press International, 4 October 2003,
http://www.upi.com/archive/viewhp?archive=1&
Story[D=20030410-070214-65571
32 https://1997-2001state.gov/statements
/2ooo/000317.html
33 https://glasgow.rl.talis.com/items/684B064F-2507
AE89-0568-56D8F164C550.html
34 http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-features-40431691
35 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files
prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/
36 https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Air-flight-655
37 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics
/1990/04/23/2-vincennes-officers-get-medals/cf383fo2-05ce
435b-9086-5d61de569ed8/?utm term=.e6c9789813e6
38 The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations, in its Judgment of 2003 found that
"the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil
platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified
as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of
the United States of America under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of
the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights
between the United States of America and Iran, as interpreted in
the light of international law on the use of force."
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
- 459 -
39 http://articles.latimes.com/1987-09-28/news/mn
6980 1 weinberger
40 https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-
calls-iran-a-terrorist-nation-like-few-others/2017/10
/13/810b8214-b025-11e7-9b93
b97043e57a22 video.html?utm term=.33c4c2ad3feb
41 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov
[news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html
42 https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us
visas/tourism-visit/visa-waiver-program.html
43 http://www.socialist.ca/node/3550
44 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/monographs/2OO9/RAND MG871.pdf
45 http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/30/bolton-iran-mek
terrorism-trump/
46 https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11
/giuliani-mek-terrorist-group-money-bolton-iran-214479,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWYnNhow4s; Also in,
http://nototerrorism-cults.com/en/?p=1436
47 https://www.politico.eu/article/netanyahu-israel
assassinate-iranian-scientists-hatched-a-secret-plan/
48 https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran/Israel-behind-
assassinations-of-Iran-nuclear-scientists-Yaalon-hints-411473
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/05/israel
assassination-iranian-scientists-217223
49 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
[us-israel-developed-computer-virus-to-slow-iranian-nuclear
efforts-officials-say/2012/06/19
lgJQA6xBPoVstoryhtml?noredirect=on&
utm term=.54301€957813; Also in: https://www.nytimes.com
[2o12/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of
cyberattacks-against-iran.html
50 https://www.nytimes.com/2o15/o1/27/us/polities/cia
officer-in-leak-case-jeffrey-sterling-is-convicted-of-espionage.html
51 http://justworldbooks.com/books-by-title/manufactured
crisis/
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
- 460 -
52 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions
/Programs/pages/iran.aspx
53 https: //treaties.un.org/Pages
[showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280142196
54 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
[LexUriServdo?uri=CELEX:31996R2271:EN:HTML
55 See UN. Documents A/72/869 and $/2018/453
56 https://www.theblaze.com/news/2o14/01/13/former-u-s
defense-contractor-arrested-for-attempting-to-ship-sensitive
information-to-iran; Also in: https://www.justice.gov/usao
sdny/pr/dual-iranian-american-citizen-sentenced-25-years
prison -conspiring-and-attempting
57 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/world/middleeast
/ahmad-sheikhzadeh-iranian-prosecution.html
58 http://ifpnews.com/exclusive/iran-perusing-situation
iranian-woman-detained-australia-official/
59 http://globalnation.inquirer.net/109665/wanted-iranian
dies-in-n bi-custody
60 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/opinion
/o8zarif.html
61 https
: //www.globalpolicy.org/humanitarian-issues-in
iraq/consequences-of-the-war-and-occupation-of-iraq.html; Also
in: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/worst-effect-of
us-afghan b 5474805.html?guccounter=1; And
62 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle
east/isis-us-saudi-arabia-arms-fighters-jihadis-military-capability
enhanced-weapons-syria-terrorism-a8112076.html and
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-irag
arms/arms-supplied-by-u-s-saudi-ended-up-with-islamic-state
researchers-say-idUSKBN1E82EQ
63 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews
/wp/2o17/11/o9/saudi-arabias-arms-deals-are-buying-the-wests
silence-over-yemen-allege-activists/?utm term=.7bf6b323a98b
64 https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/lets-admit-it-the-u-s
is-at-war-in-yemen-too/
65 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/42-times-us-has
used-its-veto-power-against-un-resolutions-israel-942194703
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
- 461 -
66 https://www.sipriorg/news/press-release/2018/asia-and
middle-east-lead-rising-trend-arms-imports-us-exports-grow
significantly-says-sipri
67 https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/06/08
[revealed-trump-s-11o-billion-weapons-list-for-the-saudis/
68
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/opinion/us-saudi
arabia-arms-deal-iran.html
69 http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/news/2o14/facebook
meme-iraq-war-dollars-could-have-ended-world-hunger-30-years
70 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2o15/may
[23/netanyahu-thanks-us-blocking-middle-east-nuclear-arms-ban
71 https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1
/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF
72 The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of
1996 expressly stated that "The legal import of that [disarmament]
obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the
obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result
- nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - by adopting a particular
course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the
matter in good faith." http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related
/95/095-19960708-ADV-O1-00-EN.pdf
73 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636
74 US Department of State: http: //usinfo.state.gov
[mena/Archive/2006/Mar/06-846555.html
75 http://www.utrikesmagasinet.se/kronikor/2017/november
[hans-blix-from-an-isolated-iran-to-an-isolated-us/ and
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2o18/jan/o5/russia-us-iran
un-emergency-session
76 https://news.gallup.com/poll/225761/world-approval
leadership-drops-new-low.aspx
77 A/Res/56/6
78 A/Res/70/109
79 See for instance "Impermissibility of the Use or Threat of
Use of Nuclear Weapons," Iranian Journal oflnternational Affairs,
Volume VIII, No. 1, 1996 and https://www.theguardian.com
(commentisfree/2o15/jul/31/iran-nuclear-deal-israel-vienna
treaty-middle-east-wmd
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
- 462 -
So See for instance International Law as a Language for
International Relations, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1996.)
81 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2o15/dec
[18/syria-islam-syrians-peace
82 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-
iran/iran-submits-four-point-yemen-peace-plan-to-united
nations-idUSKBNON823820150417
83 https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/video/eu-hr
mogherini-meets-mfas-of-the-e3-and-iran-1abbf
84 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-share-of-
G DP .pdf and https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
85 Article 152: The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of
Iran is based on the rejection of any kind of domination, both its
exercise and submission to it; ... http://www.wipo.int/edocs
[lexdocs/laws/en/ir/iroo1en.pdf
86 https://aawsat.com/home/article/10372
87 https://www.ft.com/content/cob6bc36
fead-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
88 http://assafir.com/Article/1/434785
89 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive
(2o17/10/iran-persian-gulf-jcpoa/542421/
90 https://www.ft.com/content/cob6bc36
fead-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/217019.html
- 463 -
- 464 -
Annex 56
Letter from the Agent of the United States to the International Court of Justice,
27 July 2018
- 465 -
- 466 -
United States Departmeut of State
Washington. D.C. 20520
July 27, 2018
Sir,
I write in reference to your letters regarding the proceedings recently instituted by the Islamic
Republic of Iran in the case concerning Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America).
The United States wishes to inform the Court without delay that the United States strongly
objects to Iran's Application on a number of grounds, and considers that the Court manifestly
lacks jurisdiction in respect of this case. All the elements of Iran's Application and Request for
Provisional Measures arise from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ("JCPOA). The
JCPOA does not have an International Court Justice compromissory clause. The matters of
which Iran complains are also outside the scope of the Treaty of Amity ("Treaty") and beyond
the limited jurisdictional grant provided by Article XXI(2), read in conjunction with Article
XX(), of the Treaty.
The Court accordingly lacks even the prima facie jurisdiction in respect of this matter that is a
necessary precondition for any Order of provisional measures.
Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.
/
i
er
tewstead
Legal Ac
2r
Mr. Philippe Couvreur
- Registrar,
International Court of Justice,
Peace Palace,
The Hague
- 467 -
- 468 -
Annex 57
Diplomatic Note from the U.S. Department of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of I.R. Iran, 3 October 2018
- 469 -
- 470 -
W
I
/
?
I
,l ..
The U.S. Department of State refers the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamnie
Republic of ran to the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the
United States of America and rain, signed t Tehran on August 15, 19$5 (the Treaty").
The policies and actions of the Govement of the lslamie Republic of Irn against
reaional and lnt(:mational pence and security. Including Its r)la!erlul, fln11nclel, and other support
)
tor acceke ane 6ts a.i aeons cans ~f sues pons, ofticiifs, ind ppery, es wel
as Uled Sties partners and intersts, have produced a situation which is incompatible with
normal commercial and consular relations under a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and
Consular Rights and wth the peace and friendship which provided the bsis on which the partles
consented to be bound by the Treaty.
Accordingly, in accordanec with Article XXIll, pargraph 3 of the Treaty nnd with its
rights in light of the fundamental change in circumstances which has occurred with regard to
those existlng at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, the United States hereby gives notice of
the tenination of the Treaty,
Washington, October 3, 2018.
4?
DIPLOMATIC NOTE
- 471 -
- 472 -
Annex 58
Note verbale No. 4969583 from I.R. Iran to the Government of the United States,
6 November 2018
- 473 -
- 474 -
Unofficial Translation
Note Verbale:4969583- 06/11/2018
Recalling its messages addressed to the Government of the United States
contained in Note Verbale 381/289/4870056 dated 8 May 2018 concerning the re
imposition of economic and financial sanctions which had been previously lifted
under the JCPOA, the Islamic Republic of Iran, once again declares its strong
protest to the re-imposition of the second round of unilateral and illegal sanctions
of the Government of the United States dated 4 November 2018 and strongly
condemns this illegal act.
u
The Islamic Republic oflran believes, as stated earlier, that the US unilateral
sanctions against Iran constitute violation of United States' contractual and
international obligations and a manifest breach of the provisions of UN Security
Council Resolution 2231 and US obligations arising from the 1955 Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the two countries and
are contrary to the recognized principles enshrined in the UN Charter as accepted
by the community of nations including sovereign equality of States, non
intervention in internal affairs of UN Member States and freedom of commerce
and navigation. Furthermore, it is recalled that the US illegal measures are in
violation of the Order of provisional measures as issued by the International Court
of Justice on 3 October 2018. Wrongful measures of the United States entail as
such, in their entirety, its international responsibility.
Based on the above, the Islamic Republic of Iran requests the United States
to immediately take all measures necessary to cease the said wrongful acts and
eliminate any consequences arisen thereof, and to further compensate any ensuing
damages and losses.
Clearly, the Islamic Republic of Iran preserves its right to legally pursue the
wrongful acts committed by the Government of the United States in according with
the applicable rules international law and legally binding instruments.
- 475 -
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- 476 -
Annex 59
Diplomatic Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of I.R. Iran to the
U.S. Department of State, 13 November 2018
- 477 -
- 478 -
Unofficial Translation
The Diplomatic Note No. ....
The Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran
The Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its
complements to the embassy of Switzerland (Foreign Interest Section) in Tehran
and respectfully states that, it would be appreciated to convey the message of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, in response to the Diplomatic Note dated October 3,
2018 of the US Department of State, as follows;
"The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while rejecting, the baseless
allegations of the Govemment of theUnited States against the policies and
measures taken by Iran with regard to the regional and international peace and
security; declares
that, within the framework of its fundamental policies, it has
always pursued regional cooperationwith a view to preserving stability and
security of the region andwithout intervention by transregional f
rcesand, contrary
- 479 -
o
to the belligerent and interventionist policies of the United States which have
produced negative, destructive and chronic effects on the region, Iran has always
pursued friendly relations and interactions with its neighbors.
Regardless of the situation governing the relations between the two countries
and the persistent belligerent and illegal measures of the United States against the
people and government of the Islamic Republic oflran, it is necessary to stress that
"The Treaty of Amity of 1955, economic relations, and consular rights" between
the two countries comprises of certain arrangements in support of the rights of
economic and commercial activities of nationals and companies of the parties and
as well as freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the
parties; and since the entry into force of the treaty, commercial relations between
the nationals, companies and territories of the parties have persisted for decades
and during past years.
Thus, recurrent violationsof the provisions of the Treaty of Amity of1955by
the United States on groundless pretexts donot create any right for the United
States to refrain from implementing the provisions thereof;it is also a clear
indication of legal irresponsibility of the United States and its disregard forits
international obligations. On the other hand, the shift in the position of the United
States vis-a-visits obligations under the 1955 Treaty of Amity under false pretexts
and contrary to the principles of international law in no way prejudices the already
acquired rights of the Iranian government, nationals and companies as well as the
legal claims made against the United States in accordance with the said treaty.
Furthermore, any measures taken by the United States to impose sanctions
against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through the implementation of the
second phase of the re-imposed sanctions on 4 November 2018 violates paragraph
102 of the Provisional Measures as ordered by the International Court of Justice on
3 October 2018 and therefore entails international responsibility of the United
States.
Recalling its messages addressed to the Government of the United States
contained in Note VerbaleNo. 381/289/4870056 dated 11 June 2018,Note No,
381/210/4875065 dated 19 June 2018, and NoteNo. 4969583 dated 6 November
2018 to the embassy of Switzerland in Tehran (Interest Section of the United
States); the Islamic Republic of Iranonce gain emphasizes that the illegal and
unilateral decisionsand measuresof the United States on dates May 8, and
November 4, 2018 to re-impose economic and financial sanctions against the I.R.
of Iran, which had been previously lifted under the JCPOA, are in violation of
international and treaty obligations of the United States including those under the
1955 Treaty of Amity and highlights that this wrongful act entails its international
responsibility.
In the light of the above, it isimperative and mandatory that the United
States immediately takes all necessary measures in order to cease its wrongful acts
and makes full reparation for the injury caused. Clearly, the Islamic Republic of
Iran preserves its right to legally pursue such wrongful acts committed by the
United Statesin accordance with the applicable rules of international law and
legally binding instruments."
- 480 -
Annex 60
Letter from the Agent of I.R. Iran to the Agent of the United States,
10 December 2018
- 481 -
- 482 -
AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
THE HA GUE
IN THE NAME OF GOD
I0 December 2018
Ms. Jennifer G. Newstead
Agent of the United States
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20502
U.S.A.
Case concerning Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)
Dear Ms. Newstead,
I refer to the Court's Order of 3 October 2018 in the above case.
Regrettably, since the date of the above Order, and notwithstanding the clear dispositif,
the USA has on 5 November 2018 imposed a raft of further sanctions targeting Iran and
Iranian companies and nationals, as summarized in the OFAC Press Release dated 5
November 2018 available at https://home,treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm541. Iran
is convinced that the imposition of these sanctions is in breach of the 1955 Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (the Treaty of Amity) that of course
will in due course fall for determination by the Court in the context of the above case.
Moreover, and notwithstanding the Court's Order of 3 October 2018 and in particular
paragraphs 88-100 and the dispositif, Iran notes with grcat concern that no specific steps
have been or are being taken by the USA to ensure the removal of "any impediments"
to the free export to Iran of the goods, equipment and services set out at paragraph I of
the dispositif, and the same applies with respect to the USA's obligations under
paragraph 2 of the dispositif to ensure that licenses etc are granted and that payments
and other transfers of funds are not subject to "any restriction".
Address: De Werf 15, 4 Floor, 2544 EH The Hague -The Netherlands Tel:+70 3298155 --70 3293418 Fax: +70 3296567
- 483 -
On the contrary, the situation has only been aggravated by the unprecedented tranche of
sanctions imposed on 5 November 2018, and yet it appears that the USA is doing
nothing by way of compliance with the Court's Order. Indeed, the view expressed by
US officials appears to be that it is sufficient that humanitarian goods are exempt from
the sanctions (see Briefing with Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, 2
November 2018),
which is simply political rhetoric. This is obviously unacceptable
and real action required on the part of US officials for the purpose of compliance with
the Court's Order.
1
Iran's concerns are not limited to the matters covered at paragraphs 1() and (ii) of the
dispositif to the Court's Order, but also extend to the matters under paragraph I(iii). Iran
notes with alarm that, rather than removing impediments to the sale of spare parts and
equipment or services necessary for safety of Iranian civil aviation, the USA has added
Iran Air, the national airline of Iran, and 67 aircraft operated by Iran Air to the SDN list.
Moreover, the OFAC Press Release of 5 November 2018 makes no mention of the
exceptions in respect of the sale of spare parts and equipment and services for the safety
of Iranian aviation while, as a practical matter, Iran notes that Iran Air is being impeded
in its ability to refuel its aircraft at European airports, which impacts adversely on the
safety of its flights.
The USA is therefore requested to inform Iran as a matter of urgency of the specific
steps that it is taking to ensure compliance with the Court's Order of3 October.
Agent for the Islamic Republic of Iran
'htps://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/11/287095.htm.
2
- 484 -
Annex 61
Letter from the Agent of I.R. Iran to the International Court of Justice,
19 February 2019
- 485 -
- 486 -
AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE !SLAMIC REPUBLIC OF /RAN
The Hague
IN THE NAME OF GOD
I 9 February 2019
His Excellency,
Mr. Philippe Couvreur
Registrar
International Court of Justice
Peace Palace
The Hague
Re: Case concerning Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)
Dear Registrar,
I have the honour to transmit on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran the enclosed letter to
the President of the Court, H.E. Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, respectfully requesting the Court
to exercise its power under Article 78 of the Rules of Court to call on the USA to explain, as
a matter of urgency, the specific steps that have been and are being taken to implement the
Court's Order of 3 October.
In accordance with Article 50(1) of the Rules of Court, I hereby certify that the documents
annexed to Iran's request are true and accurate copies of the original documents. Pursuant to
Article SI (3) of the Rules of Court, I farther certify that the English translations of those
documents are accuratc.
Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.
(____
zno»)
+
Mohsen Mohebi
Agent for the ovemment of the Islamic
Republic of Iran
Address: De Werf 15, 4 Floor. 2544 EH Te Hague-The Netherland Tel:+70 3298155- 70 3293418 Fax +70 3296567
.
i
- 487 -
AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IAN
The Hague
IN THE NAME OF GOO
19 February 201 9
H.E. Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf
President
International Court of Justice
Peace Palace
The Hague
Re: Case concerning Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)
Mr. President,
I have the honour to communicate on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran"), a
request that, in light of the failure of the USA to respond to ( or even acknowledge) Iran's
communications, and in the interests of the sound administration of justice, the Court exercise
its authority, under Article 78 of the Rules, to call on the USA to explain, as a matter of
urgency, the specific steps that have been and are being taken to implement the Court's Order
of 3 October 2018 in the above case.
In the dispostif of its Order of 3 October 2018, the Court ordered as follows:
"(!) The United States of America, in accordance with its obligations under the 1955
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, shall remove, by means
of its choosing, any impediments arising from the measures announced on 8 May
20 I 8 to the free exportation to the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran of
(i) medicines and medical devices;
(ii) foodstuffs and agricultural commodities; and
(iii) spare parts, equipment and associated services (including warranty,
maintenance, repair services and inspections) necessary for the safety of civil
aviation;
(2) The United States of America shall ensure that licences and necessary
authorizations are granted and that payments and other transfers of funds are not
Address: De Werf15, 4 Foor, 2544 EH Te Hague-The Netherlands Tel.: +70 3298155 - 70 3293418 Fa±: +70 3296567
- 488 -
subject to any restriction in so far as they relate to the goods and services referred to
in point (1 );
(3) Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the
dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve."
Paragraphs l and 2 of this dispositif are of course binding on the USA as a matter of
international law, paragraph 3 is binding on both Parties, and any question of alleged breach
is a matter for the merits.
As the Court stated in plain terms at paragraph 89 of its Order, "it has become difficult if not
impossible for Iran, Iranian companies and nationals to engage in international financial
transactions that would allow them to purchase items not covered, in principle, by the
measures, such as foodstuffs, medical supplies and medical equipment".
On 10 December 2018, and in circumstances where Iran is not aware of any steps having
been taken by the USA to comply with the Court's Order, the Agent of Iran wrote to the
Agent of the USA, requesting that the USA "inform Iran as a matter of urgency of the
specific steps that it is taking to ensure compliance with the Court's Order of 3 October. A
copy of that letter is enclosed as Annex 1. To date, the USA has failed to respond to Iran's
letter and has not even acknowledged its receipt.
Meanwhile, and of serious concern to Iran, the view expressed publicly by senior US officials
is that it is sufficient that humanitarian goods are formally exempt from the sanctions (see
Briefing with Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, 2 November 2018).' Iran also
notes that the document titled "Clarifying Guidance: Humanitarian Assistance and Related
Exports to the Iranian People" was last updated on 6 February 2013, i.c. more than 6 years
2
ago.
In light of the USA's failure to engage with Iran, and the fact that Iran cannot obtain such
information through other means, Iran has no other choice than to seek the assistance of the
Court. Iran hereby respectfully requests that the Court exercise its authority under Article 78
to call upon the USA to inform the Court and Iran, as a matter of urgency, as to the specific
steps which have been or are being taken by the USA to implement paragraphs (I )(i), (ii),
(iii) and (2) of the dispositif of the Court's Order of 3 October 2018.3
.
There are two reasons why it is appropriate for the Court to exercise of its discretion under
Article 78 as now requested.
- First, if certain steps have been taken by the USA, albeit without Iran's knowledge, it
is essential that such be communicated to Iran so that Iran and Iranian nationals and
companies can understand precisely how use can be made of such steps so as to
enable the purchase of items such as foodstuffs, medical supplies and medical
equipment.
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/'11/287095.htmn.
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs'documents/h… exp_iran.pdf.
Pursuant to Article 78 of the Rules, "The Court may request information from the parties on any matter
connected with the implementation of any provisional measures it has indicated."
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Second, developments following 3 October 201 8 demonstrate that Iranian nationals
and companies are not aware of, and have not had access to, any steps which have
been or are being taken by the USA to implement the Court's Order.
The absence of available information regarding any steps which have been or are being taken
by the USA with respect to medicines and medical devices, foodstuffs and agricultural
commodities is also evident from the following:
First, there is an inescapable reality that the import of medicines and medical devices,
foodstuffs and agricultural products continues to fall drastically, as reflected in the
data collated on the UN Comtradc Database.
4
Second, on 2 November 2018, the Ambassador of France in Washington, M. Araud,
is reported as having said:
"Of course humanitarian goods are not sanctioned. But the fact is the banks
are so terrified of sanctions that they don't want to do anything with Iran. It
means that in a few months, there is a strong risk that there will be a shortage
of medicine in Iran ifwe don't do something positive... You really need to be
more positive and to say how to do it [enable bank payments with respect to
humanitarian goods]. If you don't say how to do it, the banks will not do it. So
we arc waiting for a technical answer ... As for humanitarian issues we have
not actually received an answer [from the US Administration]."
Third, on 21 December 2018, 14 Members of Congress wrote to the U.S Secretary of
State, referring to the Court's Order and requesting that information be provided on
the steps taken to mitigate the humanitarian impact of the U.S. measures." In that
letter, the Members of Congress stated:
"We write to express our concern and to seek answers regarding the
humanitarian impact that recently imposed U.S. sanctions are having on the
Iranian people and on the efforts being undertaken by this Administration to
ensure these sanctions do not target innocent Iranians. Successive U.S.
administrations have sought to differentiate between the Iranian people and
the Iranian government and have recognized that it serves U.S. national
interests to seek positive relations with the people of Iran. However, in a
November 7 interview with BBC Persian on the efficacy of humanitarian
exemptions under Iran sanctions, you said that Iran's leaders have 'to make a
decision that they want their people to eat.' Such rhetoric suggests that it may
indeed be the intent of these sanctions to inflict collective punishment against
ordinary Iranians rather than to target these measures against Iran's
government."
The absence of available information extends to steps (if any) which have been or are being
taken by the USA to implement the Court's Order with respect to civil aviation. For example:
4
See the UN Comtrade Database at https://comtrade.un.org.
https;//www.theguardian.com/world/2018/noy/02/iran-sanctions-us-european-humani….
6
A copy of the letter is available at https://www.niacouncil.org'letter-pompeo-iran-sanctions-humanitarian
exemptions/.
3
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The US OFAC Press Release of 5 November 2018 makes no mention of the
exceptions in respect of the sale of spare parts and equipment and services for the
safety of Iranian aviation.
- Numerous foreign companies have considered it necessary in light of the US
sanctions to cease cooperation with Iran airlines (including Iran Air) and terminated
existing contracts for the supply of goods (including fuel) and services (including on-
airport fuelling outside Iran and training services).
'
The matters addressed in the dispositif to the Order of 3 October 20 I 8 are critical to the
health, safety and wellbeing of Iran and its people. Iran has sought to find out from the USA
what steps have been taken by the USA in compliance with the Order, so that Iran and its
people can seek to some extent to reduce the severe harm that is currently being suffered
through ensuring that use is made of whatever measures the USA has taken to meet its
compliance obligations.
The USA has not troubled to respond to Iran's request for information, and it is plain that it is
not just Iran, but the other concerned actors also, who do not know and who need to know
what steps the USA has taken. Meanwhile, the situation as described by the Court in its Order
(para. 89) has only deteriorated. In these circumstances, Iran respectfully requests that the
Court exercise its authority under Article 78 of the Rules to call upon the USA - which of
course has all the requisite information - to inform the Court and Iran as to the specific steps
which have been or are being taken by the USA to implement each sub-paragraph of the
dispositif in the Court's Order of 3 October 2018.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.
Agent for the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran
4
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Annex 62
Letter from the Agent of the United States to the International Court of Justice, 12
March 2019
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 12, 2019
Sir,
I write in reference to your letter of February 19, 2019 (No. 151821) regarding the case
concerning Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights transmitting a letter of the same date from the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
President of the Coun. By your letter, you invite the United States to present its views in
response to the correspondence from Iran's Agent. For the reasons described in this letter, the
United States believes Iran's request to the Court is entirely unfounded.
The United States remains mindful of the Court's Order of October 3, 2018 ("Order"). Since
that date, as Iran itself acknowledges, the United States has repeatedly reiterated publicly that our
sanctions are not intended to, and do not, target humanitarian-related transactions. Indeed, there
are a range of exceptions and authorizations under U.S. law applicable to humanitarian-related
transactions involving Iran, as well as a licensing policy with respect to the exportation or re
exportation to Iran of goods, services, and technology for the safety of civil aviation and the safe
operation of U.S.-origin commercial passenger aircraft.
With respect to transactions involving U.S. persons or U.S.-origin goods or services, the United
States has issued and maintains general licenses broadly authorizing the exportation of
medicines, medical devices, agricultural commodities, and foodstuffs to Iran, including certain
related software and services as well as related financial transactions. These general licenses arc
applicable to transactions by U.S. persons or for exports or reexports ofU.S.-origin items by
non-U.S. persons, where the transaction meets the criteria in the license. For transactions that
come fully within the scope of the applicable general license, there is no requirement to apply for
further authorization to conduct the transaction. In addition, of course, the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (Of AC) responds to inquiries that it receives from
those who are considering engaging in transactions with Iran regarding the scope of existing
general authorizations, both orally and in writing, and has done so regularly with respect to
humanitarian-related transactions since this Court's Order. Moreover, OFAC has, in certain
circumstances, issued specific licenses for transactions for items that do not fully satisfy the
conditions of the applicable general license. Similarly, with respect to transactions that do not
involve U.S. persons or U.S.-origin goods or services, there are explicit exceptions or
exemptions in U.S. sanctions laws and regulatory authorities that enable foreign persons to
engage in transactions for the export to Iran of medicines, medical devices, agricultural
commodities, and foodstuffs without the need for further U.S. government approval or action.
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The United States has issued detailed public guidance on these areas. OFAC maintains guidance
on its website, reissued on November 5, 2018, in relevant part, stating, "The United States
maintains broad authorizations and exceptions under U.S. sanctions that allow for the sale of
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices to Iran from the United States or
by U.S. persons or U.S.-owned or-controlled foreign entities. U.S. sanctions laws provide
similar allowances for sales of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to
Iran by non-U.S. persons." See OFAC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 637. Moreover, this
guidance refers the public to two additional, detailed documents regarding (I) the sale to Iran of
food, agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical devices by non-U.S. persons, and (2)
humanitarian assistance and related exports to the Iranian people. The latter document clearly
states that "under U.S. law, the sale and export of nearly all types of food and medicine to Iran
are broadly authorized, and require no specific license or special authorization... The sale and
export of basic medical supplies are likewise broadly authorized. Other types of humanitarian
exports may be authorized pursuant to a specific license." The former of these documents
specifically notes that the U.S. maintains broad authorizations and exceptions that allow for the
sale of food, medicine, and medical devices by U.S. persons or from the United States to Iran.
U.S. sanctions laws provide similar allowances for sales of food, agricultural commodities,
medicine, and medical devices to Iran by non-U.S. persons." With respect to civil aviation
safety, the applicable regulatory framework under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560, is publicly available and accessible by reference on OFAC's
website, which reflects that it is current as of February 2019. See 31 C.F.R. 560.528 at
https://www.ecfr govVcgi-bin/text-idx?SID=95f148a3da0a 7c0 12728461151576e58&mc=true
&node=se313.560 1528&rgn=diy8. The case-by-case review process established by this
licensing policy allows for a careful evaluation of each case, which can involve aviation-related
goods, technology, or software that are dual use items, and whether those items are in fact
necessary for their claimed purpose and that the intended end-use relates to civil aviation safety.
The United States understands that Iranian entities are indeed purchasing and importing a variety
of humanitarian-related goods and services that come within the scope of the Court's Order and
that are covered by these exceptions and authorizations. However, there is no basis for Iran to
expect that the United States would have particular information regarding purchases of non-U.S.
origin goods or services that are exempt from U.S. sanctions measures. Finally, while the United
States is not able to provide specific information on particular license applications, which contain
non-public, business sensitive information, the United States has indeed issued specific licenses
since October 3, 2018 authorizing certain transactions for humanitarian-related items.
The United States must also reiterate that in addition to the fact that the U.S. Government does
not control the decisions of private commercial actors as a general matter, there are many reasons
that individuals and entities may be unwilling to engage in transactions with Iranian entities,
even with respect to humanitarian-related goods or services. The responsibility for these
conditions lies with the Iranian regime. These reasons include, for example, the fact that Iran is
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, the lack of transparency in the Iranian economy,
corruption, and reputational risk of engaging in transactions that may directly or indirectly
support the Iranian regime, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its
proxies because true ownership of Iranian entities is often obscured or obfuscated. For example,
in November 2018, OFAC exposed an illicit international network that the Iranian regime was
2
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using to convert oil into funds directly handed off to the regime's terrorist proxy groups. At the
center of the scheme was a purported phannaceutical company which was used to mask these
payments. Similarly, multiple Central Bank of Iran (CBI) officials have been sanctioned for
facilitating the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars to support terrorism. The United
States does not control these other factors that may cause individuals and entities to be unwilling
to do business with Iran.
The letter from the Iranian Agent presents Iran's request to the Court in the context oflran's
asserted inability to obtain information about humanitarian needs and civil aviation safety
licensing and related applications, suggesting that Iran therefore has no other choice but to seek
the assistance of the Court. This assertion is baseless. As noted above, for transactions that are
subject to exemptions or general authorizations, there would be no need for parties lo submit to
the United States any request for authorization, and therefore there would be no request for the
United States to act upon. For civil aviation-related transactions or humanitarian-related exports
coming within the scope of the Court's Order for which specific authorization may be necessary,
Iranian entities would, we expect, be aware through their commercial counterparts of the status
of pending requests for such authorization. Iran's failure to particularize any transaction-specific
impediments and restrictions by the United States that it alleges come within the scope of the
Court's Order suggests that its letter to the Court is simply the start of an ill-founded attempt to
re-open the Court's Order.
The United States appreciates the Court's consideration of this response. Accept, Sir, the
assurances of my highest consideration.
Mr. Philippe Couvreur
Registrar,
International Court of Justice,
Peace Palace
The Hague
J
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Volume III - Annexes 63-120