Volume II - Annexes

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ______________________________________________________________ INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (THE STATE OF QATAR v. THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES) WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE STATE OF QATAR CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ANNEXES 1-21, 272-A VOLUME II 30 AUGUST 2019

VOLUME II
ANNEXES 1 - 21, 272-A
State of Qatar Government Documents and Statements
Annex 1 Letter from Abdullah Saad Al-Buainain, Director of the Department of Nationality and Travel Documents, Qatar Ministry of Interior, to the Director of Public Security, Statistics of Qataris Born in the State of Qatar and Abroad (15 July 2019) (with certified translation)
United Nations Documents
Annex 2 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, First Session, Summary Record of Fifth Meeting, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.5 (27 November 1947)
Annex 3 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1218
(2 October 1963)
Annex 4 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1301
(12 October 1965)
Annex 5 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1302
(13 October 1965)
Annex 6 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1312
(20 October 1965)
Annex 7 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, document HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (10 November 1989)
Annex 8 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights, document E/C.12/GC/29 (2 July 2009)
CERD Committee Documents and Proceedings
Annex 9 CERD Committee, Summary Record of the Two Hundred and Twelfth Meeting, document CERD/C/SR.212 (20 August 1974)
Annex 10 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 29 on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention (Descent), Sixty-first Session (2002)
International Organization Documents
Annex 11 International Labour Conference, Discrimination in the field of employment and occupation, 40th session, Geneva, 1957,
Report VII(1)
Annex 12 International Labour Conference, Discrimination in the field of employment and occupation, 42nd session, Geneva, 1958,
Report IV(2)
Books, Articles, and News Articles
Annex 13 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 158–172
Annex 14 P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary
(Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 484–502
Annex 15 P. Palchetti, “Responsibility for breach of provisional measures of the ICJ: between protection of the rights of the parties and respect for the judicial function”, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 100 (2017)
Annex 16 J. Gambrell, “Emirati diplomat to AP: ‘Nothing to negotiate’ with Qatar”, Associated Press (7 June 2017),
https://apnews.com/3a69bad153e24102a4dd23a6111613ab
Annex 17 “Qatar condemns Saudi refusal to negotiate over demands”, BBC (28 June 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40428947
Annex 18 N. Al Wasmi, “UAE and Saudi put pressure on Qatar ahead of demands deadline”, The National (28 June 2017),
https://www.thenational.ae/world/uae-and-saudi-put-pressure-on-qatar-ah…
Annex 19 O. Dörr & K. Schmalenbach, eds., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, 2018),
pp. 559–624
Annex 20 A. Zimmerman et al., eds., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University, 2019), pp. 712–798, 963–1006, 1135–1202, 1617–1650
Other Documents
Annex 21 Chambers Dictionary, Definition of “national”,
https://chambers.co.uk
Annex 272-A Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee, dated 21 August 2019 (with certified translation), and
Exhibit A

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Letter from Abdullah Saad Al-Buainain, Director of the Department of Nationality and Travel Documents, Qatar Ministry of Interior, to the Director of Public Security, Statistics of Qataris Born in the State of Qatar and Abroad (15 July 2019) (with certified translation)

Tel.: +974 44890888 – Fax: +974 44863158/+974 44873932 – P.O. Box: 122 – Doha, Qatar Ministry of Interior Department of Nationality & Travel Documents No.: N D/00/688 [Department Seal] Ministry of Interior Department of Nationality & Travel Documents Date: 11/12/1440H Corresponding to: 7/15/2019G To: The Esteemed Director of Public Security Greetings, Re: Statistics on Qataris born in the State of Qatar and Abroad Please note the statistics on Qatari citizens born in the State of Qatar and abroad are taken from the automated system and are valid up to 6/27/2019, are as follows: Place of Birth Percentage Inside Qatar 87.39% Outside Qatar 12.61% This is for your information, please review. Sincerely, [QR code] Brig. Gen. [signature] Abdullah Saad Al‐Buainain Director, Department of Nationality & Travel Documents
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United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, First Session, Summary Record of Fifth Meeting,
document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.5 (27 November 1947)

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United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Third Committee,
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United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee,
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United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee,
document A/C.3/SR.1302 (13 October 1965)

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United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee,
document A/C.3/SR.1312 (20 October 1965)

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Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18:
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Annex 8
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination
in economic, social and cultural rights,
document E/C.12/GC/29 (2 July 2009)

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Annex 9
CERD Committee, Summary Record of the Two Hundred and Twelfth Meeting, document CERD/C/SR.212
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CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 29 on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention (Descent),
Sixty-first Session (2002)

1Sixty-firstsession(2002)GeneralrecommendationXXIXonarticle1,paragraph1,oftheConvention(Descent)TheCommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscrimination,RecallingthetermsoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsaccordingtowhichallhumanbeingsarebornfreeandequalindignityandrightsandareentitledtotherightsandfreedomsthereinwithoutdistinctionofanykind,includingrace,colour,sex,language,religion,socialorigin,birthorotherstatus,RecallingalsothetermsoftheViennaDeclarationandProgrammeofActionoftheWorldConferenceonHumanRightsaccordingtowhichitisthedutyofStates,regardlessofpolitical,economicandculturalsystem,topromoteandprotectallhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms,ReaffirmingitsgeneralrecommendationXXVIIIinwhichtheCommitteeexpresseswholeheartedsupportfortheDurbanDeclarationandProgrammeofActionoftheWorldConferenceagainstRacism,RacialDiscrimination,XenophobiaandRelatedIntolerance,ReaffirmingalsothecondemnationofdiscriminationagainstpersonsofAsianandAfricandescentandindigenousandotherformsofdescentintheDurbanDeclarationandProgrammeofAction,BasingitsactionontheprovisionsoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationwhichseekstoeliminatediscriminationbasedonrace,colour,descent,ornationalorethnicorigin,ConfirmingtheconsistentviewoftheCommitteethattheterm“descent”inarticle1,paragraph1,theConventiondoesnotsolelyreferto“race”andhasameaningandapplicationwhichcomplementtheotherprohibitedgroundsofdiscrimination,Stronglyreaffirmingthatdiscriminationbasedon“descent”includesdiscriminationagainstmembersofcommunitiesbasedonformsofsocialstratificationsuchascasteandanalogoussystemsofinheritedstatuswhichnullifyorimpairtheirequalenjoymentofhumanrights,NotingthattheexistenceofsuchdiscriminationhasbecomeevidentfromtheCommittee’sexaminationofreportsofanumberofStatespartiestotheConvention,Havingorganizedathematicdiscussionondescent-baseddiscriminationandreceivedthecontributionsofmembersoftheCommittee,aswellascontributionsfromsomeGovernmentsandmembersofotherUnitedNationsbodies,notablyexpertsoftheSub-CommissionforthePromotionandProtectionofHumanRights,Havingreceivedcontributionsfromagreatnumberofconcernednon-governmentalorganizationsandindividuals,orallyandthroughwritteninformation,providingtheCommitteewithfurtherevidenceoftheextentandpersistenceofdescent-baseddiscriminationindifferentregionsoftheworld,Concludingthatfresheffortsneedtobemadeaswellasexistingeffortsintensifiedatthelevelofdomesticlawandpracticetoeliminatethescourgeofdescent-baseddiscriminationandempowercommunitiesaffectedbyit,
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2CommendingtheeffortsofthoseStatesthathavetakenmeasurestoeliminatedescent-baseddiscriminationandremedyitsconsequences,StronglyencouragingthoseaffectedStatesthathaveyettorecognizeandaddressthisphenomenontotakestepstodoso,RecallingthepositivespiritinwhichthedialoguesbetweentheCommitteeandGovernmentshavebeenconductedonthequestionofdescent-baseddiscriminationandanticipatingfurthersuchconstructivedialogues,Attachingthehighestimportancetoitsongoingworkincombatingallformsofdescent-baseddiscrimination,Stronglycondemningdescent-baseddiscrimination,suchasdiscriminationonthebasisofcasteandanalogoussystemsofinheritedstatus,asaviolationoftheConvention,RecommendsthattheStatesparties,asappropriatefortheirparticularcircumstances,adoptsomeorallofthefollowingmeasures:1.Measuresofageneralnature(a)Stepstoidentifythosedescent-basedcommunitiesundertheirjurisdictionwhosufferfromdiscrimination,especiallyonthebasisofcasteandanalogoussystemsofinheritedstatus,andwhoseexistencemayberecognizedonthebasisofvariousfactorsincludingsomeorallofthefollowing:inabilityorrestrictedabilitytoalterinheritedstatus;sociallyenforcedrestrictionsonmarriageoutsidethecommunity;privateandpublicsegregation,includinginhousingandeducation,accesstopublicspaces,placesofworshipandpublicsourcesoffoodandwater;limitationoffreedomtorenounceinheritedoccupationsordegradingorhazardouswork;subjectiontodebtbondage;subjectiontodehumanizingdiscoursesreferringtopollutionoruntouchability;andgeneralizedlackofrespectfortheirhumandignityandequality;(b)Considertheincorporationofanexplicitprohibitionofdescent-baseddiscriminationinthenationalconstitution;(c)ReviewandenactoramendlegislationinordertooutlawallformsofdiscriminationbasedondescentinaccordancewiththeConvention;(d)Resolutelyimplementlegislationandothermeasuresalreadyinforce;(e)Formulateandputintoactionacomprehensivenationalstrategywiththeparticipationofmembersofaffectedcommunities,includingspecialmeasuresinaccordancewitharticles1and2oftheConvention,inordertoeliminatediscriminationagainstmembersofdescent-basedgroups;(f)Adoptspecialmeasuresinfavourofdescent-basedgroupsandcommunitiesinordertoensuretheirenjoymentofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms,inparticularconcerningaccesstopublicfunctions,employmentandeducation;(g)Establishstatutorymechanisms,throughthestrengtheningofexistinginstitutionsorthecreationofspecializedinstitutions,topromoterespectfortheequalhumanrightsofmembersofdescent-basedcommunities;
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3(h)Educatethegeneralpublicontheimportanceofaffirmativeactionprogrammestoaddressthesituationofvictimsofdescent-baseddiscrimination;(i)Encouragedialoguebetweenmembersofdescent-basedcommunitiesandmembersofothersocialgroups;(j)Conductperiodicsurveysontherealityofdescent-baseddiscriminationandprovidedisaggregatedinformationintheirreportstotheCommitteeonthegeographicaldistributionandeconomicandsocialconditionsofdescent-basedcommunities,includingagenderperspective;2.Multiplediscriminationagainstwomenmembersofdescent-basedcommunities(k)Takeintoaccount,inallprogrammesandprojectsplannedandimplementedandinmeasuresadopted,thesituationofwomenmembersofthecommunities,asvictimsofmultiplediscrimination,sexualexploitationandforcedprostitution;(l)Takeallmeasuresnecessaryinordertoeliminatemultiplediscriminationincludingdescent-baseddiscriminationagainstwomen,particularlyintheareasofpersonalsecurity,employmentandeducation;(m)Providedisaggregateddataforthesituationofwomenaffectedbydescent-baseddiscrimination;3.Segregation(n)Monitorandreportontrendswhichgiverisetothesegregationofdescent-basedcommunitiesandworkfortheeradicationofthenegativeconsequencesresultingfromsuchsegregation;(o)Undertaketoprevent,prohibitandeliminatepracticesofsegregationdirectedagainstmembersofdescent-basedcommunitiesincludinginhousing,educationandemployment;(p)Secureforeveryonetherightofaccessonanequalandnon-discriminatorybasistoanyplaceorserviceintendedforusebythegeneralpublic;(q)Takestepstopromotemixedcommunitiesinwhichmembersofaffectedcommunitiesareintegratedwithotherelementsofsocietyandensurethatservicestosuchsettlementsareaccessibleonanequalbasisforall;4.DisseminationofhatespeechincludingthroughthemassmediaandtheInternet(r)Takemeasuresagainstanydisseminationofideasofcastesuperiorityandinferiorityorwhichattempttojustifyviolence,hatredordiscriminationagainstdescent-basedcommunities;(s)Takestrictmeasuresagainstanyincitementtodiscriminationorviolenceagainstthecommunities,includingthroughtheInternet;(t)Takemeasurestoraiseawarenessamongmediaprofessionalsofthenatureandincidenceofdescent-baseddiscrimination;
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45.Administrationofjustice(u)Takethenecessarystepstosecureequalaccesstothejusticesystemforallmembersofdescent-basedcommunities,includingbyprovidinglegalaid,facilitatingofgroupclaimsandencouragingnon-governmentalorganizationstodefendcommunityrights;(v)Ensure,whererelevant,thatjudicialdecisionsandofficialactionstaketheprohibitionofdescent-baseddiscriminationfullyintoaccount;(w)Ensuretheprosecutionofpersonswhocommitcrimesagainstmembersofdescent-basedcommunitiesandtheprovisionofadequatecompensationforthevictimsofsuchcrimes;(x)Encouragetherecruitmentofmembersofdescent-basedcommunitiesintothepoliceandotherlawenforcementagencies;(y)Organizetrainingprogrammesforpublicofficialsandlawenforcementagencieswithaviewtopreventinginjusticesbasedonprejudiceagainstdescent-basedcommunities;(z)Encourageandfacilitateconstructivedialoguebetweenthepoliceandotherlawenforcementagenciesandmembersofthecommunities;6.Civilandpoliticalrights(aa)Ensurethatauthoritiesatalllevelsinthecountryconcernedinvolvemembersofdescent-basedcommunitiesindecisionswhichaffectthem;(bb)Takespecialandconcretemeasurestoguaranteetomembersofdescent-basedcommunitiestherighttoparticipateinelections,tovoteandstandforelectiononthebasisofequalanduniversalsuffrage,andtohaveduerepresentationinGovernmentandlegislativebodies;(cc)Promoteawarenessamongmembersofthecommunitiesoftheimportanceoftheiractiveparticipationinpublicandpoliticallife,andeliminateobstaclestosuchparticipation;(dd)Organizetrainingprogrammestoimprovethepoliticalpolicy-makingandpublicadministrationskillsofpublicofficialsandpoliticalrepresentativeswhobelongtodescent-basedcommunities;(ee)Takestepstoidentifyareaspronetodescent-basedviolenceinordertopreventtherecurrenceofsuchviolence;(ff)Takeresolutemeasurestosecurerightsofmarriageformembersofdescent-basedcommunitieswhowishtomarryoutsidethecommunity;7.Economicandsocialrights(gg)Elaborate,adoptandimplementplansandprogrammesofeconomicandsocialdevelopmentonanequalandnon-discriminatorybasis;(hh)Takesubstantialandeffectivemeasurestoeradicatepovertyamongdescent-basedcommunitiesandcombattheirsocialexclusionormarginalization;
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5(ii)Workwithintergovernmentalorganizations,includinginternationalfinancialinstitutions,toensurethatdevelopmentorassistanceprojectswhichtheysupporttakeintoaccounttheeconomicandsocialsituationofmembersofdescent-basedcommunities;(jj)Takespecialmeasurestopromotetheemploymentofmembersofaffectedcommunitiesinthepublicandprivatesectors;(kk)Developorrefinelegislationandpracticespecificallyprohibitingalldiscriminatorypracticesbasedondescentinemploymentandthelabourmarket;(ll)Takemeasuresagainstpublicbodies,privatecompaniesandotherassociationsthatinvestigatethedescentbackgroundofapplicantsforemployment;(mm)Takemeasuresagainstdiscriminatorypracticesoflocalauthoritiesorprivateownerswithregardtoresidenceandaccesstoadequatehousingformembersofaffectedcommunities;(nn)Ensureequalaccesstohealthcareandsocialsecurityservicesformembersofdescent-basedcommunities;(oo)Involveaffectedcommunitiesindesigningandimplementinghealthprogrammesandprojects;(pp)Takemeasurestoaddressthespecialvulnerabilityofchildrenofdescent-basedcommunitiestoexploitativechildlabour;(qq)Takeresolutemeasurestoeliminatedebtbondageanddegradingconditionsoflabourassociatedwithdescent-baseddiscrimination;8.Righttoeducation(rr)Ensurethatpublicandprivateeducationsystemsincludechildrenofallcommunitiesanddonotexcludeanychildrenonthebasisofdescent;(ss)Reduceschooldrop-outratesforchildrenofallcommunities,inparticularforchildrenofaffectedcommunities,withspecialattentiontothesituationofgirls;(tt)Combatdiscriminationbypublicorprivatebodiesandanyharassmentofstudentswhoaremembersofdescent-basedcommunities;(uu)Takenecessarymeasuresincooperationwithcivilsocietytoeducatethepopulationasawholeinaspiritofnon-discriminationandrespectforthecommunitiessubjecttodescent-baseddiscrimination;(vv)Reviewalllanguageintextbookswhichconveysstereotypedordemeaningimages,references,namesoropinionsconcerningdescent-basedcommunitiesandreplaceitbyimages,references,namesandopinionswhichconveythemessageoftheinherentdignityofallhumanbeingsandtheirequalityofhumanrights.
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International Labour Conference, Discrimination in the field of employment and occupation, 40th session, Geneva, 1957, Report VII(1)

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International Labour Conference, Discrimination in the field of employment and occupation, 42nd session,
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Annex 13
H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Frederick A. Praeger, 1958),
pp. 158–172

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Annex 14
P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination:
A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016),
pp. 484–502

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20. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination A Summits), Reflection A. General On 26 November 2015, the Committee on the. Elimination of Racial Discrimination hosted a commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Convention, one of many such events likely to mark the passage of time.' Sessions were held on lessons learned and good practices, and on current challenges and ways forward. Invited panellists made their presentations, and engaged in summary dialogue with States parties and other stake-holders. Participants signalled their support for the principles of the Convention and the work of the Committee. The event, as the session titles suggest, looked back on the history of the Conv9tion—and at the forty-five years'of the operation of the Committee—attempting also to understand the challenges emanating from the early twenty-first-century environment as the principal guide to future developments. The Convention transmits and further defines the humanitarian message of the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and stands secure in the firmament of UN human rights instruments. The principles of the Convention are widely accepted as representing conduct prohibited by customary international law and even, at least in gross or systematic forms, jus cogens.2 I See 'Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of CERD': <http://www2.ohchr.org/englishh (November/December 2015). 2 See Opinion of Judge Tanaka, South-West Africa cases, ICJ Rep 1966, pp. 3, 293: 'the norm of non-discrimination or non-separation on the basis of race has become a rule of customary international law'. The treatment of racial discrimination throughout the canon of human rights in the age of the UN Charter and the UDHR, including Article 55 and 56 of the Charter, Articles 2 and 7 of the UDHR, and the placement of the prohibition in the Covenants on Human Rights is treated as cementing the claim. According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, a State violates international law when 'as a matter of policy, it practices, encourages, or condones any of the following... (f) systematic racial discrimination': I Restatement, para. 702 (1987). For academic support for the claim that racial discrimination—and nor only systematic racial discrimination—is prohibited under customary international law, see W.A. McKean, Equality and Discrimina-tion under International Law (Clarendon Press, 1983), Chapters XIV and XV; for Meron, 'respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race' is `by now accepted into the corpus of customary international law': T. Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination', AJIL 79 (1985), 283-318, 283; E. Schwelb, 'The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter', AJIL 66 (1971), 337-51, 351; P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights ofMinorities (Clarendon Press, 1991), Chapters 35-7 [henceforth Rights of Minorities]. With regard to jus cogens—peremptory norms of general international law under Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT—the International Law Commission lists the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid as among the most frequently cited candidates for jus cogens status: ILC Report of the Study group on the Fragmentation of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), para. 374; Brownlie argues that the 'least controversial examples' of jus cogens were provided by the prohibition on genocide, and discrimination based on race, religion, and sex: I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 513; see also McKean, Equality and Non-Discrirnination, p. 283, for a critique, see Thornberry, Rights of Minorities, pp. 326-8. In the estimation of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the prohibition of racial discrimination 'is a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted': Statement on Racial Discrimination and Measures THORNBERRY
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Adoption of the Convention 485 Beyond the general statements condemning racial discrimination and supporting the work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention was described by more than one participant as a living instrument,3 an appreciation endorsed in the practice of the Committee. The biological tenor of 'living instrument' suggests an organism making responsive adaptations to changes in the ecosystem in which it operates and contributing to such changes. As has been intimated at many points in the present study, the environment of the 1960s differs in key respects from the present, while the Convention remains as it was, unamended.4 The result has been an evolution in the interpretation and application of the text by the Committee through taking positions that have, for the most part, have not elicited reactions from States parties. 'Convergence' between the opinions of the Committee and States parties is not, however, a given, but rather, in light of the limited 'powers' of the Committee, a desideratum achievable only through ongoing, persistent, and patient dialogues The content and form of the State-Committee dialogues have moved through a series of phases, not sharply defined, the results of which are analysed in earlier chapters and summarily recalled here. B. The Adoption of the Convention Following the adoption of the Convention, the air was filled with talk of landmarks and resounding victories, of 'hymns of reconciliation',6 but also with cautious assessments. The stirring remarks of Verret, the representative of Haiti, quoted in Chapter 2, included a less stirring reference to the fledgling Convention as only 'reasonably reassuring'.7 Delivering a peroration that ranged from Magna Carta through the human rights documents of the French and American revolutions to the Universal Declaration of to Combat Terrorism, A/57/18, pp. 106-7, para. 4. See also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v Spain) ICJ Rep 1970, 3, which referred to obligations erga omnes in contemporary international law, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination'. For a general treatment, see E. de Wet, Its Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes', in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 541-61; A. Bianchi, 'Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens', EJIL 19 (2008), 491-508. 3 Hagan v Australia, CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003), para. 7.3; for further comment, see Chapter 5; also G. Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and its Legitimacy': <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021836> (2012). 4 See in particular, Chapters 3, 5, and 10. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards was established in 2006 to advance the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, with a mandate to `elaborate, as a matter of priority and necessity, complementary standards in the form of either a convention or additional protocol(s) to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination': Human Rights Council decision 3/103, 8 December 2006. No additional protocols or other comparable texts have emerged, despite a wealth of discussion on issues regarding race, religion, xenophobia, etc, see A/HRC/AC.1/2/2, 26 August 2009, prepared by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Committee, for a summary of submissions received; a succinct account of the work referred to here is included in S. Berry, `Bringing Muslim Minorities within the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination—Square Peg in a Round Hole?', Human Rights Law Review 11 (2011), 433-50, 436-9. 5 For challenges from States parties with regard to, eg, the Committee's interpretation of the criterion of `descent', see Chapter 6; themaintenance of reservations to key norms of the Convention—such as Article 4—is a further example of `non-convergence', see Chapter 18; the Committee constantly urges narrowing or withdrawal of such reservations. 6 Verret, the representative of Haiti: A/PV/1406, paras 79-87. 7 Verret, ibid. THORNBERRY
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486 CERD: A Summary Reflection Human Rights, Lamprey, the representative of Ghana, expressed a mixture of disillusion and satisfaction with the emergence of the Convention, stating that many delegates had hoped for better 'but realism dictated that we take an 'infant step', adding that it 'was Santayana who remarked that he who does not know the past is doomed to repeat it. In taking this first step in providing the nations of the world with a multilateral treaty ... capable of enforcement, we have demonstrated our capacity not to forget.'s That delegates should express a great variety of sentiments, with some hesitating to confine themselves to merely optimistic conclusions regarding the instrument adopted and its future prospects, ,is not altogether surprising. The Convention emerged in the midst of a conflicted process of decolonization. Sensitivities about newly won sovereignties were at their sharpest, while peoples were still struggling to gain their freedom. By the mid-1960s, the full effects of General Assembly resolution1514 (XV) had still not become fully apparent,9 and apart-heid appeared solid and embedded. The Convention was treated by some delegates as a protraction of decolonization and anti-apartheid struggles, by others as a protraction of the Cold War.'° The anti-colonial stance of many drafting contributions is notable, becoming more pronounced as the drafting moved from the body of experts in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the political bodies of the United Nations—the Human Rights Commission and (principally) the Third Commit-tee of the General Assembly, as well as the Plenary of the Assembly. The anti-colonial positions centred on the principle of self-determination, the unity of newly independent States and colonial territories, and the intrinsic connection between racial discrimination, colonialism, and apartheid." The disconnect between the focus on 'externalities' such as the principle of self-determination,12 and the development of 'introvert' norms on the treatment of ethnic and racial groups, was resolved for many delegates by imagining that racial discrimination occurred only or primarily in (Western) colonial systems, and under apartheid.13 Any such 'resolution' of tensions sits uneasily with the language of the Convention. The definition of discrimination in Article 1 and the import of the substantive articles of the 8 ibid., paras 93 and 94. 9 The United Nations had 122 members in 1965, compared to its current (2015) membership of 193; for a chronology of the growth of membership and the 'surges' occasioned by the decolonization of Western Empires, the ending of the USSR and Yugoslavia, see the listing at: <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml&gt;; see also, inter alia, General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December, 1965, The Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted on the day before the adoetion of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See Chapters 3, 5, and 11 in particular. I I See Chapter 5 on the Convention's Title and Preamble. 12 The paradigm case of self-determination in the mid-1960s was the achievement of independence from the yoke of the colonial powers, as expressed the 'Colonial Declaration', General Assembly 1514 (XV) of 1960: see discussions in Chapters 5 and 13. For a classic treatment, see A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995); also N. Ghanea and A. Xanthaki (eds), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005); C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993). Concepts of 'internal' self-determination were at most in statu nascendi; self-determination of indigenous peoples was a very distant prospect: ILO Convention 107 of 1957 on the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries did not envisage self-determination for such 'populations', nor it may be added, does the later Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which does not address the matter, but leaves it to the wider UN framework. For CERD's stance on self-determination, see Chapters 5 and 13 in particular. 13 Or on account of segregation practices in the US. THORNBERRY
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External Developments 487 Convention present an unrestricted prospectus in political terms. The rhetoric of some of those who participated in drafting the Convention, suggesting political or geographical limitations on its scope, did not match the reality of what they had agreed. The confident assertions of limitations did not lead to the eclipse of alternative drafting inputs that emphasized the potential ubiquity of racial discrimination, while the inclusion of a specific reference to apartheid and the exclusion of an equivalent on anti-Semitism did not prospectively confine the Convention to a unidirectional anti-colonial path. The drafting of an article on apartheid—then a contemporary State policy—was much to be expected, while anti-Semitism is clearly within the boundaries of racial discrimination, of which it remains a paradigmatic example,14 a 'light sleeper', easily awoken and aroused into action.15 C. External Developments Any purported identification of racial discrimination with specific political systems did not survive serious examination by the Committee, and fractured over the life of the Convention, which has, in the succeeding half-century, been witness to geopolitical changes and game-changing mutations in the framework of human rights. Developments in the overall rights matrix include the emergence of the Covenants on Human Rights, of a sister instrument to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and a raft of UN 'core' treaties, along with key regional human rights developments, notably those in Africa, the Americas, the Arab world—the Americas and Europe having paved the way earlier with the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The holding of world conferences on human rights and on racial discrimination and related forms of intolerance has also affected the work of the Committee, with current concluding observations of CERD consistently rehearsing the mantra of the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, and recommending States parties to give effect to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action of 2001 and the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference in 2009.16 The work of 14 Concluding observations of the Committee continue to evoke the spectre of anti-Semitism: on Belgium, CERD/C/BEL/CO/16-19, para. 10; Moldova, CERD/C/MDA/CO/8-9, para. 10; Monaco, CERD/C/MCO/ CO/6, para.10; Poland, CERD/C/POL/CO/19, para 7, and CERD/C/POL/CO/20-21, para. 14. The last observation, which recalled 'the tragic experience of the Jewish community in Poland' and 'its virtual extermination' in the period of the Second World War was the subject of a vigorous rebuttal by Poland, underlining that this 'was neither orchestrated nor executed by the Polish authorities', that 'between 1939 and 1945 Poland was occupied by the foreign powers, namely Nazi Germany and Soviet Union': A/69/18, Annex VII B. See also concluding observations on Slovakia, CERD/C/SYK/C0/6-8, para 12; Yemen, CERD/VC/ YEM/CO/17-18, para. 16; see also GR 35, para. 6, includes hate speech of an anti-semitic and Islamophobic nature under the rubric of racist hate speech. 15 A Very Light Sleeper;• The Persistence and Dangers ofAnti-Semitism (Runnymede Trust, 1994), available at: <http://www.runnymedetrustorg/uploads/publications/pdfs/AVeryLightSleepe…;; the phrase 'a light sleeper' appears in C.C. O'Brien, The Siege: The Saga ofisrael and Anti-Semitism (Faber and Faber, 1986). 16 The Committee's endorsement of the Durban process, recalled through many concluding observations and the inclusion of a chapter on Durban and Durban Review 'follow-up' in annual reports to the General Assembly, finds initial expression in GR 28 on the Follow-up to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, A/57/18, ch. XI, E; see also GR 33, Follow-up to the Durban Review Conference, A/64/18, Annex VIII; Statement on the Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary Of the Adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, A/66/18, ch. X. THORNBERRY
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488 CERD: A Summary Reflection the Committee is increasingly integrated with UN and regional human rights mechan-isms and procedures. In the' reporting and early warning procedures in particular, members of the Committee are systematically informed of developments in related human rights bodies and mechanisms, including the universal periodic review (UPR), which shed light on the reports of States parties.17 The decolonization phase gradually petered out with the collapse of the Western empires. Apartheid took longer to dismantle, and eventually South Africa became a `normal' member of the family of the United Nations and a State party to the Convention—its first repcirt was examined by the Committee in 2006.18 The ending of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia were further key 'external' events associated with the inauguration of a phase of 'identity politics', associated with the emergence of group-based instruments or individual provisions therein, validating the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, including Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 of 1989, the United Nations Declaration on Minorities (UNDM) 1992, the UNDRIP 2007, as well as the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in 1995, are among instruments the principles of which have helped to shape the application of the Convention.19 The application of the Convention has also responded to developments in the field of migration through a multiplicity of concluding observations and general recommendations on non-citizens and refugees; the Committee is increasingly aware of human rights issues stemming from migration. The passage of geopolitical events and the growth of complementary human rights standards continue to influence the application of the Convention. That events and standards impact on the interpretation of human rights conventions is not a truth confined to CERD. Human rights bodies characteristically borrow concepts that did not originate with their constituent instruments and build the insights they derive from the reception activity into their normative frame; bodies also export concepts into the broader stream of human rights. On the other hand, as noted particularly in Chapter 15, ICERD is a relatively porous instrument in its delineation of protected rights that does not, with a few exceptions, define its terms with great precision.2° The structure of Article 5 best demonstrates the ICERD characteristic of being open-textured in that many of the rights it explicitly seeks to protect are normative sketches derived largely from the UDHR, compounded together without expressions of limits or provision for derogation and in practice receptive to the importation of unlisted rights. The construction of ICERD raises difficult questions regarding the employment of interpretative techniques and the assign-ment of boundaries to a human rights instrument conceived as a discrete entity; the development of `intersectionalities' has the capacity to stretch the boundaries farther. • 17 See Chapter 6. 18 CERD/C/461/Add.3; referred to in Chapter 10. 19 See in particular, Chapters 6, 13, 14, and 15. 20 The provisions of Articles 2 and 4 constitute something of an exception, and it may also be argued that the definition of racial discrimination in Article 1 is also relatively precise. The 'porosity' attaches principally to the listing of rights in Article 5, and the general provisions of Artides 6 and 7. TH 0 RNB ERRY
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Emblematic Developments 489 D. Emblematic Developments in the Life of the Convention I. Approach to Interpretation As Sinclair noted, there 'are few topics in international law which have given rise to such extensive doctrinal dispute as the topic of treaty interpretation',21 a caution that applies equally or a fortiori to the interpretation of human rights treaties,22 which 'presents itself to many as an insoluble Gordian knot'.23 The basic scheme of interpretation of treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is well known. Articles 31-33 of the VCLT combine analytical literalism, intention of the parties, and teleology in a synthesis that is commonly taken to represent customary international law.24 The basic rule in Article 31(1) states that a treaty should be interpreted 'in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to their terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'. 'Context' includes, inter alia, the preamble and annexes,25 and the role of subsequent practice is also accounted for;26 the travaux are deemed to have a supplementary role where other routes to a conclusion deliver only ambiguities or manifestly absurd or unreasonable conclusions.27 There is also a significant body of opinion that stresses the special qualities of human rights interpretation in light of their protective, vertical, and sovereignty-challenging nature, and their moral dimension.28 The wide use of abstract terms is another feature of human rights conventions. To these general qualities of human rights may be added the complex growth of 'categories' of rights, the increased gravity and pervasiveness of human rights discourse,29 its strands integrated into networks of interdependence and indivisibility, capable of reaching down to the capillaries of society.3° All of which reflections on the character, substance, and context in which human rights treaties operate, suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach to their interpretation is unlikely to assist the process of divining results or explaining them retrospectively. 21 I. Sindair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, 1973), p. 69, who also, ibid., quotes Julius Stone for the suggestion that interpretatiogis an exercise in ex post facto rationalization of a conclusion reached on other grounds or as a cover for judicial creativity: 'Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation', Sydney Law Review 1 (1955), 344-68. 22 On interpretation of human rights treaties, see G. Letsas, A Theo?), of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007); B. Schlagen 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by Treaty Bodies' [henceforth 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation'], in H. Keller and G. Ulfitein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 261-319; J. Tobin, 'Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpreta-tion', Harvard Human Rights journal 23 (2010), 1-50. 23 Schlagen 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation', p. 263. 24 See the brief summary of the principles of interpretation in general international law in M. Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 932-8. 25 Article 31(2). 26 Article 31(3) provides: There shall be taken into account, together with the context (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.' 27 Article 32. 28 Schlagen 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation', pp. 263-6. 25 See in general S. Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010). 30 In the case of ICERD, generating concern with 'everyday discrimination': T. Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact: Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and the Response Thereto in Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) Chapter 8. THORNBERRY
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490 CERD: A Summary Reflection With regard to ICERD, while interpretation that takes the text at face value represents the first principle of interpretation, it may not carry the interpreter very far. ICERD was drafted swiftly, in part on the basis of political and diplomatic compromises in addition to expert input, and does not consistently exhibit the virtues of coherence and consistency throughout its text.31 In order to read the convention in contemporary contexts, the whole 'race' vocabulary stands to be interrogated, explained, and put to work, together with broad signifiers such as 'discrimination', 'segregation', 'dignity', 'equality', 'public', and a lexicon of qualifiers such as 'nullify or impair', 'appropriate', 'effective',' adequate', etc. Analysis of a technical nature—etymology, syntax, parsing of terms, juxtaposing articles, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs—is undeniably important and necessary, even if it may not supply immediate answers to all questions: reason has short wings.32 The Committee's approach was expressed in concise form in response to Israel's contention that its duties under the Convention did not extend to the Occupied Territories: 'The Committee recommends that the State party review its approach and interpret its obligations under the Convention in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context, and in the light of its object and purpose.'33 The broadest characterization of the interpretative approach employed by the Committee appears from General Recommendation (GR) 32 on special measures: The Convention ... is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society. This approach makes it imperative to read its text in a context-sensitive manner. The context ... includes, in addition to the full text of the Convention including its title, preamble and operative articles, the range of universal human rights standards ... Context-sensitive interpretation also includes taking into account the particular circumstances of States parties without prejudice to the universal quality of the norms of the Convention. The nature of the Convention and the broad scope of the Convention's provisions imply that, while the conscientious application of Convention principles will produce variations in outcome among States parties, such variations must be fully justified in the light of the principles of the Convention.34 In terms of interpretative techniques, and so as not `to elevate formalism over substance',35 the Committee has arrived at distinctive stances weighted towards the aims and objectives of the Convention, utilizing the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties and an emphasis on evolving practice, together with markedly less emphasis on the travaux pre'paratoires,36 a positional contrast with the importance given to the travaux by the ICJ in Georgia v Russian Federation to the interpretation of Article 22.37 ICERD stands as a key articulation of the meaning of human rights in the UN Charter, takes its place among the core international human rights conventions, and is a prime mover in the human rights system. Interpretative practice should not be understood as a 31 See Chapters 5, 6, 13, and 16 in particular. 32 From Dante, Paradiso, Canto II: 'poi dietro ai sensi, vedi the la ragione ha corte Pali'; English translation by H.W. Longfellow, available online at: <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Divine_Comedy/Paradiso/ Canto_II>. 33 CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, para. 32. 34 GR 32, para. 5. 33L.R, v Slovakia, CERD/C/66/D/31/2003 (2005), para. 10.7. 36 References to the travaux make occasional appearances nonetheless: for example in GR 32 on special measures, para. 24; P.S.N. v Denmark, CERD/C/71/D/36/2006 (2007), para. 6.3, discussed in the present work under Article 4. 32 Discussed in Chapter 19. THORNBERRY
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Emblematic Developments 491 matter only of importation of concepts from 'outside', as if the Convention were simply parasitic on systemic developments elsewhere or a straight derivation therefrom. In light of the principle of the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, practice under the Convention enlarges the understanding of the human rights addressed in its remit.38 II. Procedures The developments in the procedures of the Committee, discussed principally in Chapter 4, have resulted in a remarkable broadening in the scope of its work. As noted, the ebb and flow of its procedures parallels changes in the external context of the Convention. While the decolonization procedure under Article 15 has for some time been treated as largely formulaic, and the inter-State procedure inoperative or dormant, the procedures under Article 9 have developed significantly to become the mainstay of the Convention, including the early warning and urgent action procedure. The last-named procedure also shows the influence of identity politics in that, over decades, the focus has shifted significantly towards the protection of specific groups of peoples in Convention practice, though events on the grand scale affecting whole nations continue to be addressed. Massive ethnic conflicts in Africa and the former Yugoslavia have provoked responses by-the Committee through, inter alia, the issuance of statements and recom-mendations,39 and the adoption of a declaration on the prevention of genocide.4° Article 9 procedures enjoy a constantly increasing level of input from civil society, to which the Committee has steadily become more receptive since the caution of the Cold War era. The optional communications procedure under Article 14, on the other hand, has not made the impact that might have been expected in terms of the number of States parties `opting in', despite constant urging by the Committee. Residues of the reluctance shown in the drafting stages towards a supranational monitoring body with sharp edges may still inhibit the acceptance of the communications procedure. Perhaps especially for States in the vanguard of the decolonization movement, the fact that the procedure may lead to findings of violations of the Convention as opposed to the more dialogic approaches and expressions of concern under Article 9 is another possible factor in controlling its uptake, as is the existence of alternative `judicialized' complaints procedures, both global and regional.41 It remains to be seen whether the Article 14 procedure will gain greater momentum.42 38 See Chapter 15. 39 Examples include the 1999 Statement on Africa that subsumed earlier statements on Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, and Sudan: A/54/18, ch. II; the report was notable for a raft of statements on crises including Decisions 1(54) on Yugoslavia; 3(54) on Rwanda; 4(54) and 3(55) on the DRC; 5(54) on Sudan, and 1(55) on Kosovo. Among other examples see Decision 1(62) on Cote D'Ivoire, A58/18, ch. II; Decision 2(66) on Darfur, A/60/18, ch. II; Decision 1(76) on Nigeria, A165/18, ch. II, and 1(77) on Kyrgyzstan, ibid. See also Decision 1(85) on Iraq, A/70/18, ch. II. 40 A/60/18, ch. XL 41 See S.M. Garcia and B. Cali (eds), The Legalization of International Law: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human Rights Law (Routiedge, 2006), R. Hirschl, `The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts': <hrtp://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138008>; P. Sands, `Devel-opments in Geopolitics—The End(s) of Judicialization': <http://vvww.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/news-and-events/events/2015 fesil-2015-en/video-and-streamingl final-lecture.html> 42' T. van Boven, `CERD and Article 14: The Unfulfilled Promise', in G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B. Ramcharan, and A. De Zayas, International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Muller (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), pp. 153-66. THORNBERRY
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492 CERD: A Summary Reflection III. Discrimination As regards the concept of racial discrimination, the fundamental definitional statement in Article 1 of the Convention has undergone a distinctive practical evolution. The appli-cation of the non-discrimination standard has moved outwards from anti-colonial para-digms, from claims of 'no discrimination here' and approaches to negative equality, towards an understanding of the range of human rights to be protected from discrimin-ation that accepts and recognizes the multi-ethnic and multicultural character of States.43 The expansion of the modalities of discrimination—from the intention/effect coupling in Article 1 of the Convention, towards direct and indirect discrimination, and structural or institutional discrimination, etc—is a notable development.44 Allied with the treatment of the Convention as an instrument that expresses 'positive' obligations not confined to `special measures', the expansion of the modalities of anti-discrimination policy places heavy legislative and policy burdens on States parties, obligated to move in an increasingly interventionist direction. Critics have also pointed to the temptations of 'conceptual inflation' whereby differences in, for example, educational or employment attainments or outcomes are characteristically attributed to discrimination45 (though not necessarily unfairly),46 a temptation that may converge particularly on indirect and structural discrimination, where the facts of discrimination are disconnected from motivation. On the other hand, the expanding palette of discrimination encourages the growth of proactive approaches by States parties to tackle racial discrimination with renewed vigour. The Committee's explorations and complex recommendations on the many modalities of discrimination motivate mindful reflection on the negative possibilities flowing from legal and institutional practices that were crafted with limited awareness of their discriminatory potential. As may be gathered from the analyses in Chapter 6, the Committee has not fully elaborated its understanding of the discrimination terminology currently employed, nor exhaustively refined the scope and limits of discrimination. Concepts of discrimin-ation and equality have nonetheless been stretched and amplified in Committee practice, with the elimination of de facto discrimination and de facto equality in the enjoyinent of human rights granted pride of place among the elevating goals of the Convention. Discussions of discrimination characteristically focus on the use of comparators to measure advantage and disadvantage. Equally, analyses of discrimination by the Com-mittee may function in the context of comparators applied or insinuated in practical contexts, notably through the communications procedure under Article 14. However, taking the Convention as a whole—the range of its procedures and the breadth of the substantive norms—the Committee is generally less concerned with comparative treat-ment of groups than with group oppression as such. When ethnic and other groups within the purview of the Convention groups are targeted, neglected, forcibly segregated, have 43 See particularly Chapters 13 and 14. For a short commentary on the Committee's stance on multicul-turalism, see P. Thomberry, 'Multiculturalism, Minority Rights, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)', in D. Thurer and Z. Kgdzia (eds), Managing Diversity, Protection of Minorities in International Law (Schukhess, 2009), pp. 79-94. 44 See Chapter 6. 45 M. Bell, Racism and Equality in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 12, citing R. Miles and M. Brown, Racism (2nd edn, Routledge, 2003), p• 58. 46 Lack of proportional representation of ethnic groups in government, or the police, or employment, may be a sign that something is wrong and needs investigating: S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 181. THORNBERRY
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Emblematic Developments 493 their languages and cultures suppressed, their economies marginalized, their defenders imprisoned or killed, their lands and waters despoiled, their place in the nation 'erased' to the point of physical displacement or even elimination, the notion of comparison adds little or nothing to the analysis of their plight: equality concerns equality in the enjoyment of rights, not equality in deprivation. Much of Convention practice is about 'discrimin-ation' in this profound, larger sense. This is discrimination as group-directed oppression or violence, which takes cases over and beyond filigreed distinctions between one individual or group and another.47 While even 'racial discrimination' may be an inad-equate term to capture the grosser violations of human rights, the targeting of groups noted in CERD practice is properly brought under the rubric of racial discrimination as a necessary baseline description. Stripping away racial contexts and reading oppressive conduct as a violation of human rights simpliciter is to misread the character of the activity and misread the necessary remedies.48 Racial discrimination in the Convention is directed at individuals on account of their actual or purported membership of ethnic and other groups and is also directed at groups as such; it encompasses both large-scale oppression and smaller scale disadvantage, and all the gradations in between. N. Grounds of Discrimination Regarding the grounds of discrimination, it is notable that the concept of 'race', broadly accepted by many among the drafters of the Convention and deeply embedded in the Convention as a whole, is under challenge from (some) States parties, while the Com-mittee's application of the ground of 'descent' is resisted strongly by other States,49 particularly India and Japan. The ground of 'national origin', on the other hand, heavily contested in the drafting, is more generally accepted as a partner concept to ethnic origin. The listing of national and ethnic origin among the grounds has, despite the ambiguities attaching to 'national', facilitated the shift in focus from race and colour to ethnicity and ethnic minorities—Vandenhole observes that CERD treats discrimination against minor-ities as a specific theme, 'regardless of which prohibited grounds are involved'.50 The substantive Convention basis for this ethnicization of discrimination is extensive: 'ethnic origin' is referred to in the preamble and Articles 1, 4, and 5, while Article 7 refers to `ethnical groups', to which it may be recalled that the dominant application of 'national origin' in the Convention relates to ethnicity rather than citizenship. In light of the practical emphasis on self-identification, the focus on ethnicity need not imply a reifica-tion of cultures and works against cultural determinism—where persons are assigned to 47 'The oppression of violence consists not only in direct victimization, but in the daily knowledge shared by all members of oppressed groups that they are liable to violation, solely on account of their group identity': I.M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990), Chapter 2 'Five Faces of Oppression', p. 62. 48 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has sometimes shown reluctance to engage the issue of discrimination through invoking Article 14 of the ECHR, preferring to base its judgments on individual substantive norms: for a short critique, see J. Goldston, 'The Struggle thr Roma Rights: Arguments that have Worked', Human Rights Quarterly 32/2 (2010), 311-25, at 321-5. The analysis in the present chapter is not designed to endorse such an approach, but merely to highlight that race-based 'discrimination' functions up to the level of gross violations of human rights, even if other legal terminology also contributes to shaping the legal categorization of discriminatory conduct. 4Y See discussion in Chapter 6. 5° W. Vandenhole, Non-Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Intersentia, 2005), p. 95. THORNBERRY
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494 CERD: A Summary Reflection membership of an ethnic group irrespective of their consent." As noted earlier,52 translated into the vocabulary of racism, ICERD is significantly and even predominantly concerned with what may be termed 'cultural' or 'difference' racism: 'racial discrimin-ation' subsumes and transcends discrimination based on `race'.53 The serious engagement by the Committee with the grounds of discrimination argues against treating the Convention into a straightforward equality instrument, that is, if the conceptual difference between the two ideal types is taken to mean that, while an anti-discrimination paradigm implies that what is not prohibited is allowed, an equality text mandates equality subject to exceptions. The continuing attention paid to the grounds of discrimination weighs against describing ICERD simply as an equality-based text, even as the grounds lose some of their purchase in cases of indirect, structural, or institutional discrimination, when group-based discrimination is alluded to without specification of any ground, and the scope of the equality norms expressed in the Convention is constantly expanded. On the other hand, any assumption that non-discrimination is associated with formal equality and an equality text with positive action do not work well in the case of ICERD: the demand for positive action runs through the text as a whole and is expressed in the settled practice of the Committee. V. Intersectionality Challenged As observed in earlier chapters, the understanding of the grounds of discrimination has been enlarged through the use of the conceptual device of `intersectionality'.54 The concept is forcefully expressed in relation to gender, less so in regard to religion, while other potential identity 'intersections' have been observed but hardly developed. In the case of religion, apart from questioning the appropriateness of the intersection metaphor in cases where 'religion' and 'ethnicity' are largely coterminous,55 the 'split' at the United 51 In this last respect, CERD aligns the Convention with the principle of non-compulsion expressed in Article 3(2) of the UNDM: 'No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minority as the consequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights set forth in the present Declaration', commentary by P. Thornberry, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations, and an Update', in A. Rosas and A. Phillips (eds), Universal Minority Rights (Abo Akademi, 1995), pp. 13-76; and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities: 'Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice', commentary by H.J. Heintze, in M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities in Europe, A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 107-37. 52 Chapter 5. 53 'While biological racism in the antipathy, exclusion and unequal treatment of people on the basis of their physical appearance or other imputed physical differences ... cultural racism builds on biological racism a further discourse which evokes cultural differences from and alleged... "civilized" norm to vilify, maginalize or demand cultural assimilation': T. Modood, "'Difference": Cultural Racism and Anti-Racism', in B. Boxill (ed.), Race and Racism (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 238-56, p. 239. Also E. Balibar, 'Is there a: Neo-Racismr, in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (Verso, 1991), 17-28; J. Blaut, The Theory of Cultural Racism', Antipode 23 (1992), 289-99; R. Miles and M. Brown, Racism; A. Giddens and P. Sutton, Sociology (7th edn, Polity Press, 2013), Chapter 16, 'Race, Ethnicity and Migration'. Bell comments that one of `the limitations in the culturalist vision of racism is its emphasis on individual prejudice as a cause of racism ... a behavioural aberration which should fade away with the passage of time': Bell, Racism and Equality in the European Union, pp. 10-11. This is not the meaning intended here, bearing in mind the attention paid by CERD to 'structural' and other manifestations of racism and racial discrimination: see Chapter 6; see also Chapter 5. 54 See particularly Chapters 6 and 13. 55 See Chapter 13. THORNBERRY
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Emblematic Developments 495 Nations between work on religious discrimination and work on race remains influential.56 While there is evidence of more liberal CERD practice in course of development through the recognition of hybrid terms such as 'ethno-religious' in GR 35 and elsewhere, practice on the race/religion intersection reflects caution with regard to the boundaries of the Convention and the mandate of the Committee. With regard to intersectionality, a fundamental challenge to the modus operandi of the Committee with respect to inter-sectionality emerges from comment by the Holy See. In unequivocal terms, the Holy See reported its views on treaty interpretation to the Committee in an `originalise spirit, concentrating on understandings of the Convention at the time of drafting, signalling that Committee proposals that add new terminology or create new obligations depart from the original spirit of the CERD and would constitute an unforeseen and fundamental change of circumstances, which in turn, would have the effect of 'radically' transforming the extent of the Holy See's obligations still to be performed under the treaty within the meaning of Article 62 (1) (b), VCLT the Holy See would, as a result, be permitted to invoke such a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for 'terminating or withdrawing' from the treaty or ... 'suspending the operation of the same'.57 At first glance, the interpretation of the Convention by the Holy See appears to depart fundamentally from the evolutionary approach taken by the Cominittee, devoted to malting the Convention an effective presence in light of the ambitious goals that characterize the title and preamble. Where the State party sees 'radical change of circum-stances', the Committee sees necessary adaptation in response to situations that did not present themselves to the drafters.58 The import of the statement by the Holy See is, 56 See Chapter 3 for the divergence in UN work, see, among other commentaries, N. Lerner, 'Freedom of Expression and Advocacy of Group Hatred: Incitement to Hate Crimes and Religious Hatred', Religion and Human Rights 5 (2010), 137-45. 57 CERD/C/VAT/16-23, para. 3. Article 62(1) of the VCLT provides that 'a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty . . . and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed'. The ICJ stated that for change of circumstances to be invoked, it should 'have resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations to be petformed' [and] 'must have increased the burden of the obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the performance essentially different from that originally undertaken': Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland), ICJ Rep 4 [1973], para. 43. Article 65 VCLT sets out procedural requirements for the application of the doctrine. Commenting on Article 65, Fitzmaurice observes that it signals a shift from 'subjective auto-interpretation to the possibility of a more objective legal ruling': M. Fitzmaurice, 'Exceptional Circumstances and Treaty Commitments', in D. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 605-33, p. 623. 58 In the sphere of human rights, the most outstanding example of the use of 'radical change of circum-stances' was applied to the post-First World War engagements on the treatment of minorities by the Study of the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/367, undertaken by the UN Secretariat in 1950, which concluded that between 1939 and 1947 circumstances as a whole changed to such an extent that, generally speaking, the system should be considered as having ceased to exist; the view was based not on ordinary causes of extinction such as implicit abrogation or population transfers and movements, but in effect on the clausula rebus sic stantibus: fundamental change of circumstances. For comment on the Study, see P. Thomberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon Press, 1991) Chapters 4 and 9; N. Feinberg, The Legal Validity of the Undertakings regarding Minorities and the Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus, Studies in Law, Scripta Hierosolymitana 5 (1958), 95-131; S. Rosenne, 'Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Minority Treaties: An Afterword', Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 12 (1982), 330-3. Even in the face of the momentous changes indicated in the study, the use of the concept of Rebus Sic Stantibus by the UN Secretariat was strongly criticized by the authors cited above. In the present case, the position of the Holy See is difficult to THORNBERRY
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496 CERD: A Summary Reflection however, perhaps narrower in that it relates primarily to the insertion of gender inter-sectionality into the discourse of the Committee, rather than `intersectionality' in gen-eral;59 this appears to be the only 'innovation' specifically at issue, a position that somewhat undercuts the generality of the objections. The Holy See has not attached a reservation to ICERD.6° The contemporary stress on intersectionality also prompts questions on the limits of the individual human rights instruments in addressing the complexities of personal and group identity. The application of the grounds of discrimination tends, on one perspec-tive, towards a fragmentation of identity into 'essentialized' categories. International human rights law, however, places considerable stress on self-definition to mitigate an assumed 'essentialization' and avoid cultural determinism. While access to categories of rights may assist in the 'construction' of specific identifications, the categories have also served to empower oppressed and neglected groups by focusing attention on their particular grievances through culture-sensitive perspectives. In the case of CERD and other human rights bodies, the characteristics alluded to in the list of grounds have been transmuted in practice into a spectrum of identifiable groups, uncovering the human faces of abstract 'victims';61 thus the 'universal' becomes particularized. VI. The Non-Citizen 'Gap' Integrated into the general understanding of discrimination in the Convention, the ungenerous Article 1(2) on citizens and non-citizens has, on the basis of assertive interpretation by the Committee, been largely deprived of a determining role in limiting the enjoyment of equality and freedom from discrimination to the citizenry of States parties. Constitutions and other legal provisions that sharply distinguish the human rights of citizens from those of non-citizens in any but the narrowest political spheres are treated as matters of concern by the Committee, and rectification of the legal situation under scrutiny will inevitably be recommended.62 While the need expressed during the drafting of the Convention by the representatives of new sovereignties to build up loyal, citizen-based bureaucratic structures may have abated over time,63 citizen/non-citizen distinctions in public service continue to resonate in State practice, notably along with distinctions in the fields of citizenship and employment—two areas which have significant gender dimensions. The citizen/non-citizen gap in human rights protection has been appreciably narrowed but reconcile with the fact that CERD issues 'proposals of a non-binding nature' under Article 9(2), 'which could not create new obligations': remarks by CERD member Vazquez, CERD/C/SFL2394, para. 10; also comments by members Bossuyt, Kemal, and Diaconu, ibid., paras 34, 37, and 40; the points are adverted to in the concluding observations of the Committee, CERD/C/VAT/CO/16-23, paras 6 and 7. 59 CERD/C/VAT/16-23, para. 5(a). In discussions with the Committee, the Holy See explained that it 'was less concerned about the idea of intersectionality per se than it was about the possibility that an admission of that concept could pave the way for . .. other concepts that it would find unacceptable': CERD/C/SR/2395, para, 5. With regard to intersectionality between race and religion, the view of the Holy See was that this 'should probably be addressed on a case-by-case basis so that religion would become a force for ... equality': CERD/C/ SR.2395, para. 40. 60 The Holy See 'was concerned that enlarging the scope of the Convention could interfere with... work under other international human rights instruments or entail the addition of substantive obligations that had not been accepted by States parties': CERD/C/SR.2395, para. 5. The delegation placed considerable emphasis on one 'intersection': that between racism and poverty. 61 See Chapter 15. 62 See particularly Chapters 7 and 13. 63 See Chapters 3, 6, 7, and 13. TH 0 RNB ERRY
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Emblematic Developments 497 not closed. If current migration crises are taken as a guide to likely future developments, Committee concern with migration and non-citizens appears destined to increase in the foreseeable future.64 VII. On Legal Infrastructures The Committee's insistence on the potential ubiquity of racial discrimination has meant that all reporting States are, without exception, expected to have the necessary legislation and policy structures in place. The Committee has recalled the need for legislation against racial discrimination to be as specific and comprehensive as possible throughout the branches of law, criminal, civil, and administrative law, with the burden of proof in civil cases adjusted to advance the possibility of taking claims to a successful conclusion.65 As noted principally in connection with Articles 2 and 6, the Committee sets forth requirements on the necessary infrastructures to support the application of the primary rules, including rules on 'reparation or satisfaction', in the various legislative branches.66 Further, the absence of cases on racial discrimination, is not treated as evidence of an enviable situation in the State party concerned but rather as evidence of a defective implementation of the necessary rules, whether because of lack of confidence in the judiciary, or inadequate publicity accorded to the cases, or limited public awareness of discrimination and how to counter it. Adjustments to legislation are persistently called for by the Committee, and in this respect, it would appear that intentional or direct discriminatory legislation on the part of the State is much rarer than at the time of drafting.67 The focus of discriminatory activity across the span of States is therefore as likely to concern responsibility for the acts of individuals as that for the actions of organs of State. In the case of applications of Article 2, the concentration on private bodies is a notable feature of practice, including private bodies acting extraterritorially.68 The most dramatic change of focus from public to private (the 'privatization' of racial discrimin-ation) relates to Article 3, for which, as GR 19 makes clear, State-sponsored segregation is treated as less of a contemporary challenge than segregation resulting from the acts of private bodies.69 At the same time, allegations of 'apartheid'—the most egregious form of State-directed segregation—are treated with reserve by the Comtnittee.70 VIII. On Criminal Law In the legislative and judicial structures promoted by the Committee, it occasionally appears as if the treatment of racial discrimination as a matter of criminal law represented a summum bonum in the normative legal spectrum. The preference for the use of criminal law as the ideal correctional instrument in the field of racial discrimination reached a kind 64 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Statement on Current Migrant Crises, A/70/18, Chapter II. 6 See Chapters 8 and 16. 66 Chapter 16. 67 A change doubtless stimulated by the continual pressing of States parties by the Committee on the basic question of anti-discrimination legislation, as well as the efforts of the raft of human rights bodies addressing `race' as a ground of discrimination within their constituent instruments. 68 Chapters 8 and 10. 69 Discussed in Chapter 10; see also Chapter 5. 70 See Chapter 10. THORNBERRY
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498 CERD: A Summary Reflection of apogee in the Committee's treatment of Article 4, as represented in GR 15.71 The declaration of offences 'punishable by law' required by the article has been interpreted almost exclusively as signifying the declaration (creation) of criminal offences, to be effectively applied in practice. Addressing hate speech though the medium of criminal law in relation to serious matters of incitement or violence is of course entirely appropri-ate; however, to elevate the model of Article 4 to the status of paragon in addressing the gamut of racial discrimination is to exaggerate. It is characteristic of the fresh thinking in GR 35 that, while the criminal mode is firmly anchored in the normative arsenal of the Convention, and is elaborated with appropriate precision, counter-speech and education are also allotted prominent roles in the methodological repertoire for combating racist hate speech, and the use of criminal law advocated for only the more serious cases. As with hate speech, so also with the application of the Convention as a whole, witnessing a gradual movement towards recognizing a stronger role for education on the Convention and human rights, and on the need for inter-ethnic understanding, tolerance, and friendship, in anti-discrimination strategies. As indicated in Chapter 17, the full potential of Article 7 beyond its role in combating hate speech has still to be explored. IX. Culture and Collective Rights As noted particularly in Chapters 14 and 15, the understanding of rights in Committee practice has become increasingly embedded in cultural understandings, a feature of human rights law that leads one author to write of the `culturalization' of human rights, signifying, inter alia, that the practice is not confined to CERD but reaches out to the full spectrum of human rights bodies, as well as other bodies, including those concerned with the application of humanitarian, environmental, and trade law.72 Sensitivity in CERD practice to culture extends to multiple aspects of its work, commencing with the definition of racial discrimination, understood as open to cultural contexts and the notion of human dignity; in cultural understandings of special measures; in the concepts of segregation and separation; in justice process and reparations; in cultural and other contexts in the matter of racist hate speech; in the interpretation and application of civil and political, economic, social, and cultural rights; in the field of self-determination; and in the basic notions of human rights education and disseminating the message of the Convention under the inspiration of Article 7. The cultural vision in the application of rights represents a distance travelled from the period of drafting the Convention and the distance understood by many delegates between the protection of minorities and the prevention of discrimination.73 The Committee has been receptive to currents deriving from parallel instruments devised for the protection of identifiable groups as well as a notable contributor to the `culturalise stream of discourse. Its cultural applications of the Convention include but are not confined to concerns with indigenous peoples, but extend to its treatment of the rights of ethnic and other minorities, Afro-descendant peoples, and non-citizens, in principle to any group that potentially comes under the protective embrace of the Convention. 71 Discussed in Chapter 11. 72 F. Lenzerini, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2008); see also Chayter 5. 7j Se in particular Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6. THORNBERRY
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Emblematic Developments 499 Although the cultural interpretation of Convention principles is not exclusively con-cerned with questions of collective and individual rights, issues regarding the relationship between these evocations of human rights have surfaced in practice. Parallel with its exploration of cultural nuances in the rights and obligations under the Convention, CERD has made its own contribution to the widening of the vision of the Convention concerning collective rights.74 The term 'collective rights' is ambiguous in that it conceals a distinction between rights invested in individuals to be exercised collectively, such as language, religion, and 'culture', and rights invested in the community as such. In addition to calls through a series of concluding observations to respect and protect the collective rights of indigenous peoples,75 GR 23 is clear in its affirmation that the provisions of the Convention apply to the peoples,76 including their rights to 'control, use, etc, their communal lands, territories, and resources.77 The language of the recom-mendation differentiates individual rights—rights of members—from the collective rights of indigenous peoples; both are to be respected. Elsewhere the Committee has referred to `communal ownership' or the rights of a named people, including `Saami rights'.78 In general, it may be said that in addition to the question of inter-individual equality, a characteristic concern of the Convention is with what MacNaughton terms 'bloc' equal-ity'79 or bloc discrimination, in the sense that the invocation of discrimination and equality is not simply inter-individual but is strongly linked to particular groups. Rights conflicts in the context of ICERD and elsewhere are not necessarily confined to tensions between individual and collective rights—recall the strained relationship in the Convention between proscribed 'hate speech' (Article 4) and the validation of freedom of opinion and expression (Article 5).8° However, as with the claims of 'culture' more generally, the endorsement of collective rights, particularly in the 'harder' sense of the group as the primary holder of rights, has clear potential to raise challenges regarding the protection of individual rights. In the case of Fiji, the State party was invited to explain how the enjoyment of indigenous rights affected the enjoyment of rights by others in the State, bearing in mind the dominant position enjoyed by the indigenous majority. Referring to ILO Convention 169, on which the questions of some CERD Committee members were based, the representative of Fiji expressed awareness that the term 'peoples' under that Convention was not to be interpreted in a manner that would undermine the rights of individuals.81 Endorsement of the UNDRIP raises its own questions on the 74 From a vast literature, see P. Jones, 'Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples' Rights', HRQ 21 (1999), 80-107; M. JovartoviC, Collective Rights: A Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and 'Recognizing Minority Identities Through Collective Rights', HRQ 27 (2005), 625-51; W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, 1995), Chapter 3; W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press, 2005); C. Tavani, Collective Rights and the Cultural Identity of the Roma: A Case Study of Italy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, esp. Chapter 4 'Individual v Collective Rights'; P. Thomberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights. (Manchester University Press, 2002). 75 See particularly Chapters 13 and 14, 7° GR 23, paras 1 and 2. 77 Ibid., para. 5. 78 P. Thornberry, 'Integrating the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into CERD Practice', in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 61-91, p. 88 [henceforth Indigenous Peoples in CERD Practice]. 79 G. MacNaughton, 'Untangling Equality and Non-Discrimination to Promote the Right to Health Care for All', Health and Human Rights 11.2. (2009), 47-63. 80 See Chapters 11 and 13. 81 CERD/C/SR/1850, para. 3. THORNBERRY
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500 CERD: A Summary Reflection individual/collective rights relationship, including that stemming from Article 35, accord-ing to which 'indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their communities'; this and other puzzles supplement larger questions regarding the relationship between self-determination, collective rights, and individual rights.82 X. Cultural Practices Addo writes regarding CERD that an apparent bias in the Committee towards upholding rather than challenging minority cultural practices may lead to cases where 'opportunities to address harms within minority culture can easily be overlooked or missed'.83 On the other hand, over-concentration on intra-group, 'internal' discrimination has a downside in that highlighting negative practices in minority communities may go in tandem with neglecting similar practices in the population at large, as well as potentially contributing to the denigration of groups under the protection of the Convention. Challenges to cultural practices are part of the standard Committee repertoire and characteristically attempt to tread a line between rejection of the harm while avoiding the stigmatization of whole communities." In this respect, the dialogic, educational approach of the Committee under Article 9 may serve purposes of accommodation or reconciliation rather better than the 'quasi-judicial' approach under Article 14. In one example, practices 'within some ethnic groups, particularly regarding inheritance and early marriage', elicited a recom-mendation to take account in public policies 'of the need to address discriminatory customs, primarily through education and other culturally sensitive strategies'.85 In normative terms, the oft-cited participation and community self-determination rights should also play a role in attempting to resolve contradictions of principle. In order to meet the challenge of potential tensions stemming from its simultaneous endorsements of individual and collective rights, CERD may need to sharpen its conceptual tools through the elaboration of a general recommendation or by other means.86 In particular, the raft of CERD practice on the rights of women, in tandem with the practice of sister bodies such as CEDAW, can materially assist in developing such a recommendation, though the issues involved are wider and go to the heart of the human rights enterprise.87 82 Discussion by Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples in CERD Practice, pp. 86-8. 83 M. Addo, 'Practice of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies in the Reconciliation of Cultural Diversity with Universal Respect for Human Rights', Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2010), 601-64; at 654,658. 84 Conceptual tools suggested to distinguishing the limits of cultural interventions include that between external and internal protections of ethnic groups: that groups require external protections from oppression from the outside world but individuals in such groups require internal protections, W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, 1995); that human rights interventions should protect the 'core values' of communities and not attempt to export 'complete ways of life or conceptions of the good': A Hurrell, 'Power, Principles and Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a Deeply Divided World', in T. Dunne and N.J. Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 277-302, pp. 281-2; that rights have been presented to many communities 'according to a cultural scheme extraneous to that of the communities concerned, which were therefore unable to perceive them properly and translate them into practice', resulting in 'the artificial imposition of rules which could not find concrete application within many human societies' hence the need for rights to be 'culturally adjustable in light of the different needs of diverse human communities': Lenzerini, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law, pp. 245-6; see also P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, Chapter 17. 85 Concluding observations on the Lao People's Democratic Republic, CERD/C/LAO/CO/16-18, para. 15. 86 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples in CERD Practice, p. 85. 87 See discussion in Chapter 14 of the Committee's approach to customs particularly as they affect women. THORNBERRY
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Coda 501 The text of the Convention is compatible with the endorsement of both particularism and universalism, of collective and individual visions of rights. Oscillation between endorsement of individual rights and endorsement of collective rights is not unique to CERD. A universal vision of rights is necessarily plural, open to a variety of cultural contributions. In this sense the principle of non-discrimination may serve as an anti-fragmentation device that treats communities within the States parties as equal in dignity, without hierarchy or condescension. The task of the Committee and the States parties should be to seek a productive synthesis between the two polarities, guided by the text and teleology of the Convention. E. Coda The adoption of the Convention in 1965 represented the outcome of a series of inter-connected developments since the UN Charter that gave explicit legal grounding to norms of a humanitarian character and to expediting the disappearance of colonialism along with its integral racial manifestations. The text, carrying to fruition the ethic of the Declaration on Racial Discrimination by means of a legally binding instrument, provided a fresh normative and institutional synthesis that combined universal human rights with the rejection of theories of racial superiority, but not entirely of the infrastructure of racial differentiation—the work of UNESCO in 'deconstructing' race was subjected to diver-gent interpretations by delegates.88 The Declaration and the Convention stood, and con-tinue to stand, as Janus-faced statements looking backwards at the hopeful demise of an era of racial discrimination, and projecting forward to concerted international action against it.89 Through the Convention, the United Nations reinvigorated its human rights mission. ICERD was the first of the UN 'core' human rights treaties, and inaugurated an international monitoring body—the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination—designed to move the instrument from complacent 'virtue signalling' towards its practical application in the service of humanity.9° The present and previous chapters have endeavoured to appraise the principal con-ceptual and practical developments in the life of the Convention over the half-century. The primary focus has been on the work of the Committee on, the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the body charged by the international community with the task of monitoring its progress, though critical observations by States parties are also accounted for, including resistances to Committee stances, and obdurate refusals to 'converge' with its views. The present work is not as such a history of the Convention, and while transitions in the understanding and application of the Convention are accounted for, heavy emphasis is placed on more recent developments as the principal guide to the form and content of future State—Committee dialogues. The distinctive rights culture devel-oped by the Committee over the course of time has inspired many, and made an enormous contribution to the solidification of principle that brands racial discrimination as unacceptable State practice. Racial discrimination by design is now regarded as 88 See discussion in Chapter 3. 89 Janus-faced, not as hypocritical or deceitful, but in the image of a god (Janus) that looks both ways, to the future and the past, to beginning, passages, and endings. 9° Virtue signalling refers to activities intended to indicate a person's virtuousness to an audience: chap:// www.collinsdictionary.com/submission/16361/virtue%20signalling&gt;, a concept that can be extended appro-priately to States and governments. THORNBERRY
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502 CERD: A Summary Reflection indefensible, while discrimination through accident or negligence is treated as culpable. A finding of racial discrimination merits the full weight of moral opprobrium from the international community. The work of the Committee, in conjunction with other human rights organizations, and with States and civil society, has profiled the relevant legal and moral baselines with an impressive clarity of principle, even if the finer details are open to contestation and reconstruction. The chapters have also outlined a broad range of conceptual and practical challenges in the field of racial discrimination on the basis of an article by article analysis of the principal strands of ICERD. The tasks mandated by the Convention to the States parties are immense. Despite the switch in emphasis in current crises away from ethnicity to the clashes of civilizations and religious intolerance and worse,91 the archive of practice distilled in the chapters of the present work should sufficiently demonstrate the continu-ing force of ethnic identification, inter-ethnic rivalry, competition, and hostility in human affairs, and oppression on the basis of ethnic affiliation. In this sense the Convention appears to pit Gramscian optimism of the will against pessimism of the intellect,92 as to which Banton's characterization of the promise of the Convention to eliminate racial discrimination as a noble lie may be recalled.93 However, history also demonstrates possibilities of living together on the basis of tolerance and friendship, of mutuality of respect and inter-ethnic harmony. Embedding the prohibition of racial discrimination in State constitutions, laws, plans, and policies makes a further contribution to peaceful possibilities, even if law and planning, etc, are first steps, if more than the 'infant step' glimpsed by Lamptey on the adoption of ICERD. The World is Everything that is the Case If racial discrimination is unlikely to be eliminated for all, it can be eliminated for some; its prohibition can make a difference in reaching down to the capillaries of human existence, recognizing and restoring dignity, helping to repair damaged human beings.94 Prohibition of reprehensible forms of conduct is important but not enough, nor is anti-discrimination a complete policy, however far-reaching. Besides the effective implementation of norma-tive promises accounted for in the present work, anti-discrimination is only one strategy, and one in largely negative mode—a via negativa—that constructs a binary of victim and perpetrator, and even in some instances an unhelpful culture of blame. In an ideal theatre of human rights, the rights would be sustained for all and enjoyed on an equal basis without the need for victims and a spectrum of oppressors. Anti-discrimination in this sense is a beginning, a methodological step towards an egalitarian future of multicultural self-assurance that seeks to remove impediments to the full enjoyment of rights. While the anti-discrimination ethic is in itself less than salvation, it nonetheless addresses the truth of what is the case, and traces an upward path towards a better, more dignified ordering of human affairs. 91 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon and Schuster, 1996); P. Thornberry, 'Minority and Indigenous Rights at "the End of History"', Ethnicities 2 (2002), 515-37. 92 A. Gramsci, Letter from Prison, 19 December 1929: see W.J. Morgan, The Pedagogical Politics of Antonio Gramsci—"Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will"', International Journal of Lifelong Education 6 (2006), 295-308. 93 M. Banton, International Action against Racial Discrimination (Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 50 and 305. 94 Derek Mahon, Tractatus', New Collected Poems (The Gallery Press, 2012), after Wittgenstein. THORNBERRY
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Annex 15
P. Palchetti, “Responsibility for breach of provisional measures of the ICJ: between protection of the rights
of the parties and respect for the judicial function”,
Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 100 (2017)

Milano3•3Giuffrè3EditoreRIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALEAnno3C3Fasc.313-32017ISSN30035-6158Paolo3PalchettiRESPONSIBILITY FOR BREACH OFPROVISIONAL MEASURES OF THEICJ: BETWEEN PROTECTION OFTHE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES ANDRESPECT FOR THE JUDICIALFUNCTIONEstratto
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RESPONSIBILITYFORBREACHOFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ:BETWEENPROTECTIONOFTHERIGHTSOFTHEPARTIESANDRESPECTFORTHEJUDICIALFUNCTIONSUMMARY:1.Introduction.—2.TheCourt’spowertodeterminenon-complianceonitsownmotion.—3.TheCourt’spowertodeterminenon-complianceintheabsenceofjurisdictiononthemerits.—4.Theresponsibilityofanon-complyingpartytowardstheotherparty.—5.TheCourt’spowertoimposesanctionsagainstanon-complyingparty.—6.Concludingremarks.1.WhenaStatepartytoadisputebeforetheInternationalCourtofJusticebreachesprovisionalmeasures,itsconductamountstoaninternationallywrongfulact.TheconsequencesthatarisebyvirtueofthiswrongfulconductinvolveinthefirstplacetherelationsbetweentheStatepartyresponsibleforthebreachandtheotherStateparty—orStatesparty—tothecase.Asprovisionalmeasuresaretaken“topreservetherespectiverightsofeitherparty”(1),abreachofsuchmeasuresbyonepartymayberegardedasaffectingtherightsoftheotherparty(2).Theinjuredpartywouldthereforebeentitledtoinvokeresponsibilityforsuchconduct.However,itseemsreductivetoregardlackofcompliancewithprovisionalmeasuresasamatterexclusivelyaffectingtherightsandinterestsofthecontendingparties.TheCourtitselfhasaninterestinensuringrespectforprovisionalmeasures.Inordertojustifyitscon-clusionthatprovisionalmeasureshavebindingforce,theCourtnotedthat“[t]hecontextinwhichArticle41hastobeseenwithintheStatuteistopreventtheCourtfrombeinghamperedintheexerciseofitsfunctionsbecausetherespectiverightsofthepartiestoadisputebefore(1)AccordingtoArticle41oftheStatute,“[t]heCourtshallhavethepowertoindicate,ifitconsidersthatcircumstancessorequire,anyprovisionalmeasureswhichoughttobetakentopreservetherespectiverightsofeitherparty”.(2)AssuggestedbyGUGGENHEIM,Lesmesuresconservatoiresdanslaprocédurearbitraleetjudiciaire,Recueildescours,vol.40(1932-II),p.115,apartyhasa“droitd’exigerl’exécutiondesmesuresconservatoires”.Rivistadidirittointernazionale-1/2017
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theCourtarenotpreserved”(3).Failuretocomplywithobligationslaiddowninprovisionalmeasuresnotonlyoffendsagainsttheauthor-ityoftheCourt;itunderminestheeffectiveadministrationofjusticeinaparticularcase.ToborrowfromtheCourt’slanguageinUnitedStatesDiplomaticandConsularStaffinTehran,suchconduct“isofakindcalculatedtounderminerespectforthejudicialprocessininternationalrelations”(4).ItmightbearguedthatinthejudicialprocessbeforetheCourtthe“institutionaldimension”canhardlybedisentangledfromthe“inter-statedimension”andthatthefactthattheinjuredpartyisofferedthepossibilityofinvokingtheresponsibilityoftheotherpartyisinitselfanadequateandsufficientmeansforvindicatingtheCourt’sinstitutionalinterestinensuringrespectforthejudicialprocess(5).Nodoubt,thereismeritinthisview.Theapplicationofthegeneralregimeofrespon-sibilitytotherelationsbetweenthepartiesmayberegardedasbothasanctionandadeterrent.Inthisrespect,bycontributingtotheeffectivenessoftheCourt’spowertoindicateprovisionalmeasures,itperformsawiderfunctionthanthatofsimplyrestoringthelegalrelationsbetweentheparties.Yet,itmaybeaskedwhether,inadditiontotheinterstatedynamicsbasedonthegeneralregimeofresponsibility,thereisalsoscopeforamoreproactiveroleoftheCourtitselfinrespondingtobreachesofprovisionalmeasures.Twoissuesappeartobeparticularlysignificantinthisrespect.ThefirstconcernstheCourt’spowertodeterminelackofcompliancewithprovisionalmeasuresirrespectiveoftheclaimsoftheparties.WhilethegeneralrulesonStateresponsibilityleavetotheinjuredpartytherighttoinvokeresponsi-bility,thequestioniswhethertheCourtmaydeterminebyitsowninitiativewhetherprovisionalmeasureshavebeencompliedwith,possiblyalsointheabsenceofjurisdictiononthemeritsofthedispute.Theotherissuerelatestotheconsequencesofabreachofprovisionalmeasures.Inparticular,onemayaskwhetherthelegalconsequences(3)I.C.J.Reports,2001,p.503,para.102(italicsadded).(4)I.C.J.Reports,1980,p.43,para.93.Interestingly,incensuringtheUnitedStates’conduct,theCourtalsonotedthatsuchconductamountedtoabreachoftheprovisionalmeasuresindicatedintheorderof15December1979.(5)Onthisdualdimensioninherentintheregimeofresponsibilityforbreachofprovisionalmeasures,seeMENDELSON,StateResponsibilityforBreachofInterimProtec-tionOrdersoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,in:IssuesofStateResponsibilitybeforeInternationalJudicialInstitutions(FitzmauriceandSarooshi,eds),Oxford,2004,p.42,andMAROTTI,“Plausibilità”deidirittieautonomiadelregimediresponsabilitànellarecentegiurisprudenzadellaCorteinternazionaledigiustiziaintemadimisurecautelari,Rivista,vol.97(2014),pp.777-778.RESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH6
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providedunderthegeneralrulesonStateresponsibilityexhausttherangeoflegalconsequencesavailableagainsttheresponsibleparty.Itisonthesetwoissues—theCourt’spowertodeterminenon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasuresandthelegalconsequencesstemmingfromnon-compliance—thatthenextparagraphswillfocus.BytakingstockoftheCourt’scaselawaftertheLaGrandjudgment,thepurposeis,morecomprehensively,toidentifythemainfeaturesofthelegalregimeofresponsibilityforbreachesofprovisionalmeasures.2.Thequestionofnon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasuresisgenerallybroughttotheCourt’sattentionattherequestofoneoftheparties.Inparticular,inallcasessincetheLaGrandjudgmentinwhichtheCourthasaddressednon-compliance,thisissuewasraisedbyapartythroughaspecificclaimincludedinitssubmissions.Thispracticeshouldnotbetakenasimplyingthatanindependentjudicialactionwouldnotbeadmissible.Thefactthatthepartieshavenotincludedtheissueofnon-complianceintheirsubmissionswouldnotpreventtheCourtfromaddressingitonitsownmotion.WhilethejurisdictionoftheCourtonthemeritsofthedisputeislimitedbytheneultrapetitarule,thisruledoesnotapplyinrelationtoprovisionalmeasures(6).Inthisarea,considerationsbasedontheneedtoprotecttheeffectivenessandintegrityofthejudicialfunctionpleadinfavourofagreaterroleoftheCourt.Significantly,thepoweroftheCourttoindicateprovisionalmeasuresunderArticle41oftheStatuteisnotdependentuponarequestfromoneoftheparties.Moreover,Article75,para.1,oftheRulesprovidesthattheCourt“mayatanytimedecidetoexaminepropriomotuwhetherthecircumstancesofthecaserequiretheindi-cationofprovisionalmeasures”;Article75,para.2,addsthat“theCourtmayindicatemeasuresthatareinwholeorinpartotherthanthoserequested”.ItissubmittedthatthesameconsiderationsofeffectivenessandintegrityofthejudicialfunctioncomeintoplayinrelationtotheCourt’spowertodetermineaparty’sbreachofprovi-sionalmeasures(7).Thisthemoresoifoneconsidersthatprovisional(6)AsobservedbyD’ARGENT,Jugeoupolicier:lesmesuresconservatoiresdansl’affaireduTempledePréahVihear,Annuairefrançaisdedroitint.,vol.57(2011),p.161,“ainsiquelerappellel’article75durèglement,lecontentieuxdel’urgencen’estpasrégiparleprincipedispositifquidominelecontentieuxsurlefondencasdedifférendausensdel’article36dustatut”.SeealsoKOLB,GeneralPrinciplesofProceduralLaw,in:TheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice:ACommentary(Zimmermann,TomuschatandOellers-Frahm,eds),2nded.,Oxford,2012,p.899.(7)ThisviewhasbeendefendedbysomeJudges.AccordingtoJudgeCançadoTrindade“contemporaryinternationaltribunalshave,inmyunderstanding,aninher-OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ7
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measuresareindicatedwhilethecaseispendingbeforetheCourt:itseemsquitereasonablethattheCourt,whenitisseizedofacase,isalsoempoweredtodeterminewhetherthepartiesarecomplyingwithbindingordersindicatingprovisionalmeasures(8).Sofar,theCourthasnottakenapositiononthepossibilityofraisingpropriomotutheissueofnon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures.InitsjudgmentinLaGrand,theCourtemphasizedtheimportanceofaparty’sclaimforindemnificationasaconditionfortheCourttoruleuponsuchissue.Inparticular,itrefrainedfromconsid-eringwhetherGermanyhadtherighttobeindemnifiedbynotingthat,whileGermanyhadaskedtheCourttoascertainthebreachofprovi-sionalmeasures,ithadnotincludedaclaimforindemnificationinitssubmissions(9).TheCourt’srefusaltoaddresstheissueofindemnifi-cationcanhardlybetakenasadenialofitspowertodeterminepropriomotuaparty’slackofcompliancewithprovisionalmeasures.Adis-tinctionistobedrawnbetweentheCourt’spowertodetermineaparty’srighttoobtainredressanditspowertodeterminenon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures.Itisforthepartyseekingredresstoincludeaclaimforreparationinitssubmissions(10).Intheentpowerorfacultétoorderprovisionalmeasuresofprotection,wheneverneeded,andtodetermine,exofficio,theoccurrenceofabreachofprovisionalmeasures,withitslegalconsequences”.SeehisseparateopinionattachedtotheCourt’sjudgmentinthejoinedcasesofCertainActivitiesCarriedoutbyNicaraguaintheBorderAreaandConstructionofaRoadinCostaRicaalongtheSanJuanRiver,para.36.AccordingtoJudgeadhocVerhoeven,sincenon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures“isineffectachallengetotheauthorityoftheCourt”,itis“understandablethattheCourtshouldcondemn,evenpropriomotuwhereappropriate,violationsoforderedmeasuresevidencedbyactswithinitscognizance”.I.C.J.Reports,2005,p.358.SeealsoKOLB,TheInternationalCourtofJustice,2012,p.649.Foracontraryview,seeROSENNE,TheLawandPracticeoftheInternationalCourt,1920-2005,TheHague,p.206(“non-compliancewithadecisionindicatingprovisionalmeasuresofprotection,althoughitselfaninternationallywrongfulactoccasioningtheinternationalresponsibilityoftherecalcitrantState,doesnotenabletheCourttoimposesanctionspropriomotu”).(8)Itmightbeobjectedthat,sinceArticle76oftheRulesprovidesthattheCourtmayrevokeormodifyprovisionalmeasures“attherequestofaparty”,thesamerestrictionwouldapplytotheCourt’spowertodeterminenon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures.However,itseemsexcessivetoinferfromthisprovisionamoregenerallimitation.Moreover,asnotedbyGAJA,RequestingtheICJtoRevokeorModifyProvisionalMeasures,TheLawandPracticeofInternationalCourtsandTribunals,vol.14(2015),pp.2-3,despitetheletterofArticle76,“theCourtmustbeconsideredtobeentitledalsotomodifyorrevokeonitsownmotionthemeasuresithasindicated”.(9)I.C.J.Reports,2001,p.508,para.116.(10)Withregardtothepossibilitythatarequestofindemnificationissubmittedbytherespondentparty,theCourthasclarifiedthat“thequestionofcompliancebybothPartieswiththeprovisionalmeasuresindicatedinthiscasemaybeconsideredbytheCourtintheprincipalproceedings,irrespectiveofwhetherornottherespondentStateraisedthatissuebywayofacounter-claim”.Seetheorderof18April2013inRESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH8
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absenceofsuchclaim,theneultrapetitaruleseemstopreventtheCourtfromrulingupontheparty’srighttobeindemnified(11).Bycontrast,suchruledoesnotlimittheCourt’scompetencetodeterminepropriomotuaparty’snon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures.Admittedly,whenconfrontedwiththepossibilityofraisingtheissueofnon-compliancepropriomotu,theCourtrefrainedfrommak-ingsuchstep.InArmedActivitiesintheTerritoryoftheCongo(DRCv.Uganda),whileprovisionalmeasureshadbeenaddressedtobothparties,onlytheDRCaskedtheCourttoascertainthatUgandahadbreachedsuchmeasures.InitsjudgmenttheCourt,afterfindingthatUgandahadnotcompliedwithsuchmeasures,tookcaretostressthatitsfindingonUganda’snon-compliancewas“withoutprejudicetothequestionastowhethertheDRCdidnotalsofailtocomplywiththeprovisionalmeasuresindicatedbytheCourt”(12).This“withoutprejudice”statementisratherunfortunate.InsteadofalludingtothepossibilitythattheDRCitselfcouldhavebreachedtheprovisionalmeasures,theCourtshouldhaveaddresseddirectlysuchissueinitsjudgment(13).OneofdifficultiesthattheCourtmayfaceinraisingpropriomotuthequestionofnon-complianceisthatofprovingthatabreachhadoccurredwithouttheassistanceoftheparties.Theassessmentofaparty’scompliancemayrequireanin-depthinvestigationofcomplexfactualsituations.InLandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeria,theCourtdidnotupholdCameroon’sclaimthatNigeriahadbreachedprovisionalmeasures,findingthatCameroonhadnotputforwardevidencedemonstratingNigeria’slackofcompliance.TheCourtplacedparticularemphasisontheparties’dutiesinthisrespect;itobservedthat“inthepresentcaseitisforCameroontoshowthatNigeriaactedinviolationoftheprovisionalmeasuresindicatedintheOrderof15March1996”(14).Thisstatementmustbereadincontext.thejoinedcasesCertainActivitiesCarriedOutbyNicaraguaintheBorderAreaandConstructionofaRoadinCostaRicaalongtheSanJuanRiver,I.C.J.Reports,2013,p.215,para.40.Onthepossibleimplicationsofthisstatement,seeMAROTTI,op.cit.,p.785.(11)SeeOELLERSFRAHM,Article41,in:TheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice:ACommentary(Zimmermann,TomuschatandOellers-Frahm,eds),2nded.,Oxford,2012,p.1068.(12)I.C.J.Reports,2005,p.259,para.265.(13)Inhisdissentingopinion,JudgeadhocKatekamaintainedthattheDRChadcommittedgraveviolationsofhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlawamountingtoabreachoftheprovisionalmeasuresindicatedbytheCourt.I.C.J.Reports,2005,p.379,para.61.(14)I.C.J.Reports,2002,p.453,para.321.OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ9
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Itisclearthatthepartiesbeartheburdenofprovingtheirclaims.Atthesametime,however,theCourtisfreetorelyonfactswithinitsownknowledgeinordertoruleuponthequestionofcompliancewithprovisionalmeasures(15).Forthedeterminationoftherelevantfacts,theCourtmayalsoaskfortheparties’assistance,forinstancebyaddressingquestionsfromthebench(16).ShouldtheCourtfindthatapartyfailedtocomplywithprovi-sionalmeasures,theproblemmayberaisedwhethersuchfindingistobereportedintheoperativepartofthejudgmentorinitsreasons.ThepracticeoftheCourtafterLaGrandhasbeentoincludesuchfindingintheoperativepart(17).Aswehaveseen,thispracticereferstocaseswheretheCourtwascalledupontogiveananswertoaspecificclaimincludedinthesubmissionofoneoftheparties.ThereisnoreasonwhythesamesolutionshouldnotbefollowedalsoincaseswheretheCourtraisestheissueofcompliancewithprovisionalmeasuresonitsownmotion.Thefactthattheissueisnotraisedbythepartiesintheirsubmissionshouldnotprecludethispossibility,astheCourtenjoysacertaindiscretioninformulatingtheoperativepart(18).Byrecordingaparty’snon-complianceintheoperativepart,theCourtwouldputgreateremphasisonitsfinding;itwouldalsoallowindividualjudgestoexpresstheirviewsonthisissue(19).3.AstheCourthasrepeatedlystated,theindicationofprovi-sionalmeasuresisnotconditionaluponthepriordeterminationoftheCourt’sjurisdictionoverthecase.Itissufficientthattherequesting(15)InArmedActivitiesintheTerritoryoftheCongo(DRCv.Uganda)theCourtnotedthat“theDRCputforwardnospecificevidencedemonstrating”abreachoftheprovisionalmeasures.However,theCourt,byrelyingonotherfindingsmadeinthejudgment,wasabletoconcludethatUgandahadnotcompliedwithitsobligationsundertheprovisionalmeasures.I.C.J.Reports,2005,pp.258-259,para.264.(16)OntheimportanceofthispracticeincaseswheretheCourtraisesissuesexofficio,seeFORLATI,TheInternationalCourtofJustice.AnArbitralTribunaloraJudicialBody?,Heidelberg,2014,p.162.(17)InthecaselawpriortoLaGrandtheCourthadsometimesincludedareferencetoaparty’snon-complianceinthereasons.Foranoverview,seeSTEIN,Contempt,CrisisandtheCourt:TheWorldCourtandtheHostageRescueAttempt,AmericanJournalofInt.Law,vol.76(1982),p.528.(18)SeeBROWN,Article59,in:TheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice:ACommentary(Zimmermann,TomuschatandOellers-Frahm,eds),2nded.,Oxford,2012,p.1431.(19)FortheimplicationsofaddressingacertainfindingintheoperativepartratherthaninthereasonsseethedeclarationofJudgeGaja,annexedtotheCourt’sorderof7December2016inImmunitiesandcriminalproceedings(EquatorialGuineav.France).RESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH10
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partyshowstheexistenceofaprimafaciejurisdiction.If,afterhavingindicatedprovisionalmeasures,theCourtfindsthatithasnojurisdic-tion,thequestionarisesastowhethertheCourtwouldinanycasebeempoweredtodecideuponaparty’slackofcompliancewithsuchmeasures.TheCourthasnotyettakenaclearviewonthisquestion.InitsjudgmentinLaGranditobservedthat“[w]heretheCourthasjuris-dictiontodecideacase,italsohasjurisdictiontodealwithsubmissionsrequestingittodeterminethatanorderindicatingmeasureswhichseekstopreservetherightsofthePartiestothisdisputehasnotbeencompliedwith”(20).ThisappearstosuggestthatthebasisoftheCourt’sjurisdictiontodeterminenon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasuresisthesamebasisuponwhichtheCourtreliesforexercisingitsjurisdictionoverthemeritsofthedispute.Ifthisisthecase,itwouldfollowthat,iftheCourtdoesnothavejurisdictiontoadjudicateacase,itwouldalsolackjurisdictiontodecideuponaparty’snon-compliance.Inasubsequentjudgment,however,theCourtseemstohavetakenadifferentview.InRequestforInterpretationoftheAvenaJudgment,althoughontheprincipalissueitfoundthattherewasnodisputebetweentheparties,itdeterminedthattheUnitedStateshadbreacheditsobligationsundertheprovisionalmeasures.Byaunanimousvote,itincludeditsfindingonthisissueintheoperativepartofitsjudgment.AccordingtotheCourt,“[t]heCourt’scompetenceunderArticle60necessarilyentailsitsincidentaljurisdictiontomakefindingsaboutallegedbreachesoftheOrderindicatingprovisionalmeasures”,and“[t]hatisstillsoevenwhentheCourtdecides,uponexaminationoftheRequestforinterpretation,[...]nottoexerciseitsjurisdictiontoproceedunderArticle60”(21).SinceArticle60oftheStatuteprovidesjurisdictiononlyondisputesovertheinterpretationofajudgment,itisnoteworthythattheCourt,whiledecidingnottoexerciseitsjurisdic-tiontointerprettheAvenajudgment,relieduponitsincidentaljuris-dictionforrulingupontheUnitedStates’non-compliancewithprovi-sionalmeasures.BythisdecisiontheCourtappearstorecognizethatitsincidentaljurisdiction,evenifbasedonlyonaprimafacieassessmentofitsjurisdictiononthemeritsofthedispute,issufficienttojustifyitspowertodeterminenon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures(22).(20)I.C.J.Reports,2001,p.484,para.45.(21)I.C.J.Reports,2008,p.19,para.51.(22)AccordingtoTHIRLWAY,TheInternationalCourtofJustice1989-2009:AttheHeartoftheDisputeSettlementSystem?,NetherlandsInt.LawReview,vol.57(2010),OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ11
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FollowingtheCourt’sapproachinRequestforInterpretationoftheAvenaJudgment,itissubmittedthattheCourt’sjurisdictiontomakefindingsaboutbreachesofprovisionalmeasuresistoberegardedasbeingimplicitinitsincidentaljurisdictiontoindicatesuchmeasuresunderArticle41oftheStatute(23).Thisviewreliesonthedistinctionbetweenjurisdictioninrelationtoprovisionalmeasures,whichisbasedonArticle41oftheStatute,andjurisdictionoverthemeritsofthedispute,whichisbasedontheconsentoftheparties.Article41wouldnotonlyjustifytheCourt’spowertoindicatebindingprovisionalmeasures;itwouldalsoprovideabasisfortheCourt’spowertodeterminenon-compliancewithsuchmeasures.Asprovisionalmea-suresproduceeffectsuntiltheprincipaljudicialproceedingsareter-minated,theCourtwouldbeempoweredtoincludeafindingofnon-complianceinthejudgmentestablishingitslackofjurisdictionorthenon-admissibilityoftheclaim.Itisonlywiththatjudgmentthatprovisionalmeasuresceasetobeoperative(24).WhilethisapproachisbasedonawideinterpretationoftheCourt’spowerunderArticle41,therearesoundreasonssupportingit.ThebreachofabindingorderoftheCourtcausesdamagetotheauthorityoftheCourtirrespectiveofwhethertheCourtcouldlaterfindthatithasnojurisdictionoverthecase.IftheCourtweredeniedthepossibilityofcensoringsuchconductbyincludingafindingofnon-complianceinitsjudgment,therewouldbenoresponseagainstthenon-complyingState.Itwouldbetantamounttoconsideringthatprovisionalmeasuresceasetoproduceeffectretroactively,fromthemomenttheywereindicated,and,asaconsequence,thatnowrongfulacthadbeencommitted.Suchasolutionriskstounderminetheeffec-p.385,theindicationthatoneshoulddrawfromthisprecedentisthatprovisionalmeasures“mustbecompliedwith,atleastduringthecurrencyoftheproceedings,eveniftheclaimonthemeritsturnsouttobeunsubstantiated,andevenifitprovesthattheCourthasinfactnojurisdictionoverthemerits”.ThisviewissharedbyLEE-IWAMOTO,TheRepercussionsoftheLaGrandJudgment:RecentICJJurisprudenceonProvisionalMeasures,JapaneseYearbookofInt.Law,vol.55(2012),p.258,andbyTRANCHANT,L’arrêtrenduparlaCourinternationaledeJusticesurlaDemandeeninterprétationdel’arrêtAvena(Mexiquec.États-Unisd’Amérique),Annuairefrançaisdedroitint.,vol.55(2009),p.216.(23)Forthisview,seeMENDELSON,op.cit.,p.45,andTRANCHANT,op.cit.,p.217.ContraTHIRLWAY,TheLawandProcedureoftheInternationalCourtofJustice1960-1989(PartTwelve),BritishYearbookofInt.Law,vol.72(2001),p.124.(24)SeeAnglo-IranianOilCompanyCase,I.C.J.Reports,1952,p.114.RESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH12
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tivenessofprovisionalmeasurespendingtheCourt’sjudgmentonjurisdictionandadmissibility(25).WhiletheCourt’sjurisdictiontomakefindingsofnon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasuresmaybebasedonArticle41,itismoredoubtfulwhetherthepowergrantedbyArticle41alsoprovidesjurisdictiontoruleoverclaimsforreparationfornon-complianceputforwardbyaparty(26).Whenapartyinvokestheresponsibilityoftheotherpartyforbreachesofprovisionalmeasures,itsclaimsareanintegralpartofthedisputethattheCourtiscalledupontoadjudicate.LackofjurisdictionoverthemeritsofthedisputeseemstopreventtheCourtfromrulingupontheseclaims.Thislimitationwouldalsoalleviatetheconcernabouttheriskofunderminingtheprincipleofconsensualjurisdiction.ThisprinciplepreventstheCourtfromrulinguponadispute,andassessingtherespectiveclaimsoftheparties,intheabsenceofspecificconsent.ItdoesnotpreventtheCourtfromassessingtheparties’conductinthejudicialprocess.4.Theprimaryconsequenceofabreachofprovisionalmeasuresisthepossibilityfortheinjuredpartytoclaimtheresponsibilityofthenon-complyingparty.SuchresponsibilityentailsinthefirstplacethattheinjuredpartymayasktheCourttoascertainitsrighttoobtainreparationfortheinjurysuffered.Itismoredoubtfulwhetheritalsoentailstheentitlementtotakecountermeasuresagainsttheresponsibleparty.Resorttocountermeasuresappearstobescarcelycompatiblewiththeprinciple—frequentlyreassertedbytheCourtalsothroughtheindicationofprovisionalmeasures—accordingtowhich“thepartiestoacasemust[...]notallowanystepofanykindtobetakenwhichmightaggravateorextendthedispute”(27).Moreover,Article52,(25)Onthisrisk,seeLEONHARDSEN,TrialsofOrdealintheInternationalCourtofJustice:WhyStatesSeekProvisionalMeasureswhennon-ComplianceIstoBeExpected,JournalofInt.DisputeSettlement,vol.5(2014),p.322.(26)SeealsoD’ARGENT,op.cit.,p.160,note74,andTRANCHANT,op.cit.,p.217.(27)ElectricityCompanyofSofiaandBulgaria,SeriesA/B,No.79,p.199.AccordingtoOELLERSFRAHM,op.cit.,p.1068,itis“questionablewhetherStatesmaytakereprisalsalthoughadmissibleundergeneralinternationallaw,becausethismaycontravenethedutiesofapartypendentelite”.SeealsoFROWEIN,ProvisionalMeasuresbytheInternationalCourtofJustice-TheLaGrandCase,ZeitschriftfürausländischesöffentlichesRechtundVölkerrecht,vol.62(2002),p.60.ForanexaminationoftheCourt’spracticewithregardtotheindicationofnon-aggravationmeasures,seePALCHETTI,ThePoweroftheInternationalCourtofJusticetoIndicateProvisionalMeasurestoPreventtheAggravationofaDispute,LeidenJournalofInt.Law,2008,pp.623-642.OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ13
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paragraph3,oftheArticlesonStateresponsibilityprovidesthatcountermeasuresmaynotbetakenif“thedisputeispendingbeforeacourtortribunalwhichhastheauthoritytomakedecisionsbindingontheparties”.Itistobenoted,however,thattheArticlesdonotruleoutentirelythepossibilityofresortingtocountermeasureinthiskindofsituation.Article52,paragraph4,specifiesthat“[p]aragraph3doesnotapplyiftheresponsibleStatefailstoimplementthedisputesettlementproceduresingoodfaith”.Initscommentary,theInterna-tionalLawCommissionrefersto“non-compliancewithaprovisionalmeasuresorder”asagroundjustifyingthenon-applicationofthislimitationtothetakingofcountermeasures(28).Ifonefollowsthisview,itcannotbeexcludedthat,undercertaincircumstances,theinjuredpartyisentitledtoresorttocountermeasures(29).Therealissuethenbecomesthatofdeterminingtheconditionsunderwhichresorttocountermeasuresmayberegardedasbeingjustified.Inthisrespect,tworemarksareinorder.First,failuretocomplywithprovisionalmeasuresdoesnot,assuch,giverisetotheentitlementtotakecountermeasures;whatmattersisthelackofgoodfaithofapartyincomplyingwiththedisputesettlementprocedure,anelementwhichmustbeassessedbytakingintoaccountmorecomprehensivelytheconductoftheresponsiblepartyduringtheproceedings.Moreover,thedeterminationofthebreachofprovisionalmeasurescannotbeleftentirelytothesubjectiveassessmentofaparty;beforereactingunilat-erally,theinjuredpartyshouldatleastbringtheissueofnon-compliancetotheCourt,forinstancethroughanewrequestforprovisionalmeasures.Asregardsreparationfortheinjurycausedbythebreachofprovisionalmeasures,theonlyformofreparationsofargrantedisadeclarationofnon-complianceincludedintheoperativepartofthejudgment.TheCourttreatedthisdeclarationasaformofsatisfactionforthenon-materialinjurysufferedonthisaccount(30).Whenthe(28)YearbookoftheInternationalLawCommission,2001,vol.II(PartTwo),p.137.(29)STEIN,op.cit.,p.517,arguedthat“aprohibitiononcountermeasureseveninthefaceofdisregardofaninterimmeasuresorderwouldimposesogrosslyunfairaburdenonanapplicantstatethatresorttojudicialremedieswoulditselfbediscour-aged”.(30)See,forinstance,ApplicationoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide(BosniaandHerzegovinav.SerbiaandMontene-gro),I.C.J.Reports,2007,p.236,para.469:“TheCourtwillhoweverincludeintheoperativeclauseofthepresentJudgment,bywayofsatisfaction,adeclarationthattheRespondenthasfailedtocomplywiththeCourt’sOrdersindicatingprovisionalmeasures”.SeealsothejudgmentinthejoinedcasesCertainactivitiescarriedoutbyRESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH14
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breachofprovisionalmeasurescausesmaterialharm,theinjuredpartyhastherighttorestitutionorcompensation(31).Inafewcases,requestsforcompensationhadalsobeenadvanced.Whileinprinciplerecog-nizingthepossibilityofawardingsuchformofreparation,theCourt,fordifferentreasons,invariablyrejectedtheserequests.Incasesofmaterialharm,itmayattimesbedifficulttoseparatethedamagesensuingfromthebreachofprovisionalmeasuresandthoseensuingfromthebreachofthesubstantiveobligationsonthemerits.Thisisso,inparticular,when,asitfrequentlyhappens(32),theobligationsundertheprovisionalmeasureshavesubstantiallythesamecontentastheobligationstobeexaminedinthejudgmentonthemerits.InitsjudgmentinBosniangenocide,theCourtwasconfrontedwithasituationofthiskind.InaddressingarequestforcompensationrelatingtoSerbia’sbreachofprovisionalmeasures,itapproachedthematterbyconsideringthat,“forpurposesofreparation,theRespon-dent’snon-compliancewiththeprovisionalmeasuresorderedisanaspectof,ormergeswith,itsbreachesofthesubstantiveobligationsofpreventionandpunishmentlaiduponitbytheConvention”(33).Thisapproachappearstobejustified.Inthissituation,iftheinjuredpartyreceivescompensationforthematerialharmcausedbythebreachofthesubstantiveobligation,itwouldbeinappropriatetoawardcom-pensationalsoforthebreachofprovisionalmeasures.Theinjuredpartywouldotherwiseobtaindoublerecovery.Ithasbeennotedthatthis“merging”approachreducesthesignificancetobeattachedtothebindingeffectofprovisionalmea-sures:ifdamagesareawardedonlyinrespecttothebreachofthesubstantiveobligationsconsideredonthemerits,itwouldmakelittleNicaraguaintheborderareaandConstructionofaroadinCostaRicaalongtheSanJuanriver,para.139:“ThedeclarationbytheCourtthatNicaraguabreachedtheterritorialsovereigntyofCostaRicabyexcavatingthreecañosandestablishingamilitarypresenceinthedisputedterritoryprovidesadequatesatisfactionforthenon-materialinjurysufferedonthisaccount.ThesameappliestothedeclarationofthebreachoftheobligationsundertheCourt’sOrderof8March2011onprovisionalmeasures”.(31)AsnotedbyMAROTTI,op.cit.,p.778,thepossibilityofawardingrestitutionappearshighlyunlikely.(32)Foranoverview,seeEISEMANN,QuelquesobservationssurlesmesuresconservatoiresindiquéesparlaCourdeLaHaye,in:InternationalCourtsandtheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw.EssaysinHonourofTullioTreves(Boschieroetal.,eds),TheHague,2013,p.121ss.(33)I.C.J.Reports,2007,p.236,para.469.TheCourtalsoobservedthat“thequestionofcompensationfortheinjurycausedtotheApplicantbytheRespondent’sbreachofaspectsoftheOrdersindicatingprovisionalmeasuresmergeswiththequestionofcompensationfortheinjurysufferedfromtheviolationofthecorrespond-ingobligationsundertheGenocideConvention”.Ibid.,p.231,para.458.OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ15
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differencethatprovisionalmeasureshadbeendisregarded(34).Admit-tedly,ifoneattachesimportanceexclusivelytothepossibilityofobtainingcompensation,theconsequencesflowingfromthebreachofprovisionalmeasuresappeartobelimitedinthiskindofcases.However,theremaybeotherconsequences.Inparticular,itcannotbeexcludedthatsuchbreachmayindirectlyhaveanimpactontheamountofcompensationtobeawardedforthebreachofthesubstan-tiveobligationsonthemerit.Abreachofprovisionalmeasuresmayrevealwilfulintentorgrossnegligence,whichtheCourtmaytakeintoaccountwhenassessingtheextentofthereparationtobedueforthebreachofthesubstantiveobligations(35).Indeed,asobservedbytheInternationalLawCommission,thequantificationoftheamountofcompensationdepends,interalia,on“anevaluationoftherespectivebehaviouroftheparties”(36).TheCourtitselfappearstotakeintoaccounttheconductofthepartiesduringthejudicialproceedingsforthepurposesofassessingtheamountofcompensation.Initsjudge-mentinLaGrand,whenconsideringtheconsequencesstemmingfromtheUnitedStates’breachoftheprovisionalmeasures,theCourtrecognizedthat“theUnitedStateswasundergreattimepressureinthiscase,duetothecircumstancesinwhichGermanyhadinstitutedtheproceedings”,findingthatitwouldhavetakenthisfactorintoconsid-eration“hadGermany’ssubmissionincludedaclaimforindemnifica-tion”(37).Apartfromitsimpactontheamountofcompensationtobeawarded,non-compliancewithprovisionalmeasuresmayalsoberel-evantforassessingwhetherotherconsequencesareappropriate,suchas,forinstance,theofferingofassurancesandguaranteesofnon-repetition(38).(34)MENDELSON,op.cit.,p.52;LEE-IWAMOTO,op.cit.,p.256.(35)Thispossibleimplicationofthebreachofprovisionalmeasureswashigh-lightedbyBARILE,OsservazionisullaindicazionedimisurecautelarineiprocedimentidavantiallaCorteinternazionaledigiustizia,Comunicazioniestudi,vol.4(1952),p.154,andbyVILLANI,IntemadiindicazionedimisurecautelaridapartedellaCorteinternazionaledigiustizia,Rivista,vol.57(1974),pp.676-677.Similarly,LAUTERPACHT,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLawbytheInternationalCourt,Cambridge,1957,p.254,observedthat“apartydisregardinganOrderindicatingprovisionalmeasuresactsatitsperilandthattheOrdermustberegardedatleastasawarningestoppingapartyfromdenyingknowledgeofanyprobableconsequencesofitsaction”.(36)YearbookoftheInternationalLawCommission,2001,vol.II(PartTwo),p.100.(37)I.C.J.Reports,2001,p.508,para.116.(38)SeethejudgmentinthejoinedcasesCertainactivitiescarriedoutbyNicaraguaintheborderareaandConstructionofaroadinCostaRicaalongtheSanJuanriver,para.141.RESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH16
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Incaseofnon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures,thenon-complyingpartyremainsunderadutytoprovidereparationevenifitultimatelyprevailsonthemerits.However,itmaybeexpectedthattheCourtwilltakethiscircumstanceintoaccountwhenconsideringtheformandextentofreparation.Thisthemoresowhentherightsthattheprovisionalmeasuresaimedatprotectingwerelaterdiscoveredtobenon-existent.Whenthenon-complyingpartyisawardedcompen-sationfortheinjurycausedbythebreachofthesubstantiveobligationsonthemerits,theCourtmayconsiderto“merge”theopposingclaimsoftheparties.Inparticular,itmayassesswhether,bynotcomplyingwiththeprovisionalmeasures,thepartymayhavemateriallycontrib-utedtothedamageitsuffered(39).5.ThepartywhichbreachesprovisionalmeasuresmightfaceadverseconsequencesoutsidethesphereofStateresponsibility.Inparticular,beingtheguardianofitsjudicialintegrity,theCourtitselfmayhaveaninterestinsanctioningtheconductofthenon-complyingparty,irrespectiveoftheclaimforreparationoftheinjuredparty.TheStatuteofferslittleintermsofmeasuresavailabletotheCourttoprotectthejudicialprocessagainsttheharmfulconductofthecontendingStates.IntheabsenceofanexplicitbasisintheStatute,thepossibilityoflevyingpenaltiesorawardingpunitivedamagesistoberuledout(40).IthasbeensuggestedthatincaseofgravebreachesofprovisionalmeasuresbytheapplicantState,withholdingthejudgmentcouldbeanappropriateremedy(41).Inprinciple,aresponseofthiskindwouldnotbeprecludedtotheCourt.Particularlywhenthebreachofprovisionalmeasuresseriouslyunderminestheorderlyad-ministrationofjusticeinthecase,theCourtmightfindthatjudicialproprietyrequiresittorefrainfromexercisingitsjurisdictionovertheclaimsoftheapplicant.AsitobservedinitsjudgmentinNorthernCameroons,“[i]ftheCourtissatisfied,whateverthenatureoftherelief(39)Article39oftheArticlesonStateresponsibilityprovidesthat“[i]nthedeterminationofreparation,accountshallbetakenofthecontributiontotheinjurybywilfulornegligentactionoromissionoftheinjuredStateorofanypersonorentityinrelationtowhomreparationissought”.(40)SeeMENDELSON,op.cit.,p.42.However,accordingtoSCHACHTER,Interna-tionallawintheoryandpractice:generalcourseinpublicinternationallaw,Recueildescours,vol.178(1982),p.223,theCourthastheauthoritytolevydamagesagainstthenon-complyingState.SeealsoSTEIN,op.cit.,p.527.AccordingtoKOLB,op.cit.,p.649,“[f]romthelegalpointofview,it[theCourt]wouldevenhavetherighttorequirereparationtobemadetotheCourtitself”.(41)SCHACHTER,op.cit.,p.223.OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ17
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claimed,thattoadjudicateonthemeritsofanApplicationwouldbeinconsistentwithitsjudicialfunction,itshouldrefusetodoso”(42).However,whileitcannotbeexcludedthatthebreachofprovisionalmeasuresmaygiverisetoanissueofpropriety,thiscouldberegardedasapossibleremedyonlyinveryexceptionalcircumstances.Inprin-ciple,theneedtosanctionthenon-complyingpartyshouldnotdiverttheCourtfromitsprimaryfunction,namelytodecidethedisputeinaccordancewithinternationallaw.Moreover,evenifadmissible,thisformofsanctionappearsoflittlepracticalutility,ifoneconsidersthatnormallyitistherespondentpartywhobreachesprovisionalmeasures:inthiscase,itwouldmakenosensefortheCourtnottoexerciseitsjurisdictionasthiswouldonlyaffecttheapplicantparty.Asithasalreadybeenmentioned,initscaselawafterLaGrandtheordinaryremedyforbreachesofprovisionalmeasureshastakentheformofafindingofnon-compliancerecordedintheoperativepartofthejudgment.Thisremedyseemstohaveadualfunction.Ontheonehand,itamountstoaformofreparation,bywayofsatisfaction,forthenon-materialinjurycausedtotheotherparty.Ontheotherhand,italsoexpressestheCourt’scensureofthenon-complyingconductandmaythereforeberegardedasaformofsanctionfortheharmcausedtothejudicialprocess.ThisalsojustifiesthattheCourtmaymakesuchfindingirrespectiveofanyspecificrequesttothateffectbytheinjuredparty.Afindingofnon-compliancerecordedintheoperativepartofthejudgmentmayappearasarathermildresponsetoabreachofprovi-sionalmeasures.Toacertainextent,thisreflectstheparticularenvi-ronmentinwhichtheCourtoperates.ForaCourtwhosejurisdictionisbasedontheconsentofthepartiesandwhosejudgmentsarenotbackedbyeffectivemechanismsofenforcement,inmostcasesitwouldbedifficulttogobeyondexpressingitscensureofthenon-complyingconduct.Moreover,theeffectivenessofthissanctionshouldnotbeunderestimated,asitinflictssignificantreputationalcostsonthere-sponsibleparty(43).(42)I.C.J.Reports,1963,p.37.(43)SeeSTEIN,op.cit.,p.524,whomaintainedthat“[i]nacontextwhererectitudeistheprimaryvalueatstake,censurebytheCourtisasignificantsanction”.SeealsoLEONHARDSEN,op.cit.,p.325ff.ContraZYBERY,ProvisionalMeasuresoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeinArmedConflictSituations,LeidenJournalofInt.Law,vol.23(2010),p.581,whomaintainedthatafindingofnon-compliance“doesnotseemtoaddressproperlythedamagecausedtotheCourt’sownstandingbyalackofcompliancewithitsprovisionalmeasuresorders”.However,thisauthordoesnotindicatewhatremedytheCourtshouldordertoaddressthedamagetoitsauthority,RESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH18
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InitsjudgmentinthejoinedcasesCertainactivitiescarriedoutbyNicaraguaintheborderareaandConstructionofaroadinCostaRicaalongtheSanJuanriver,theCourtobservedthat“[t]hejudgmentonthemeritsistheappropriateplacefortheCourttoassesscompliancewiththeprovisionalmeasures”(44).Whenabreachofprovisionalmeasuresoccursatanearlystageoftheproceedings,asignificantlengthoftimemaypassbetweenthebreachandthefinaldeterminationoftheCourt.Pendingtheprincipalproceedings,theCourtcouldaddressasituationofnon-compliancebymeansofaneworderonprovisionalmeasures(45).ThisiswhattheCourtdidinCertainactivitiescarriedoutbyNicaraguaintheborderarea.Initsorderonprovisionalmeasuresof22November2013,theCourt,whilenotstatingitexpressly,recognizedthatNicaragua’sconductwasnotincompliancewiththeprovisionalmeasuresindicatedinitsorderof8March2011.Afindingofnon-compliancemadeattheprovisionalmeasuresstage,whileinprinciple“onlyinstrumentalinensuringtheprotectionoftherightsofthePartiesduringthejudicialproceed-ings”(46),mayservethepurposeofwarningtheresponsiblepartyofthelegalconsequencesstemmingfromitsconduct.Itmayalsojustifytheadoptionofamoreseveresanctionatthestageofthemeritsshouldthepartypersistinitsconduct.Amongthesemoreseveresanctions,theimpositionofcosts,orpartofcosts,relatingtotheproceedingsshouldbetakenintoconsid-eration(47).TheStatutedoesnotruleoutthepossibilityofusingtheawardofcostsasaformofsanctionagainstthenon-complyingparty.Article64providesthatthegeneralrule,accordingtowhicheachpartyshallbearitsowncosts,istobeapplied“[u]nlessotherwisedecidedbylimitinghimselftoindicatemeasuresthattheCourtshouldindicatetorepairtheharmcausedbythenon-complyingpartytotheotherparty.(44)Para.126ofthejudgment.(45)FortheviewthattheCourt,pendingtheprincipaljudicialproceedings,shouldproceedpromptly,andevenpropriomotutoassesscompliancewithprovisionalmeasuresbymeansofanotherorderofprovisionalmeasures,seeJudgeCançadoTrindade,separateopinionattachedtotheCourt’sjudgmentinthejoinedcasesofCertainActivitiesCarriedoutbyNicaraguaintheBorderAreaandoftheConstructionofaRoadinCostaRicaalongtheSanJuanRiver,paras34-46.AccordingtoLANDO,CompliancewithProvisionalMeasuresIndicatedbytheInternationalCourtofJustice,JournalofInt.DisputeSettlement,vol.8(2017)(forthcoming),theCourtshouldconsidertocreateanexpediteprocedurethroughwhichitcouldestablishnon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasuresbywayofadecisionhavingtheformofajudgment.(46)Para.126ofthejudgment.(47)Inthepast,thispossibilitywasadvocatedbysomecommentators.SeeforinstanceBARILE,op.cit.,p.154.OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ19
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theCourt”.IntheabovementionedjoinedcasesbetweenCostaRicaandNicaragua,CostaRicaincludedinitssubmissionarequestaimedatimposingonNicaraguaallcostsandexpensesincurredbyCostaRicainrequestingandobtainingtheorderonprovisionalmeasuresof22November2013.Significantly,CostaRicajustifieditsrequestbyrelyingontheexistenceofacausallinkbetweenNicaragua’sfailuretocomplywiththeprovisionalmeasuresindicatedin2011andtheincidentalproceedingswhichledtothe2013order.“[T]akingintoaccounttheoverallcircumstancesofthecase”,theCourtfoundthat“anawardofcosts[...]wouldnotbeappropriate”(48).Inajointdeclaration,fourjudgesheldtheviewthatthe“exceptionalcircumstances”ofthecasewarrantedtheexercisebytheCourtofitspowerunderArticle64oftheStatute.Inparticular,theyemphasizedthatthecostsincurredbyCostaRica“wereadirectconsequenceofNicaragua’sbreachoftheobliga-tionsimposedbythe2011Order”(49).Inthecontextofaninterstatedispute,theawardofthecostsoftheproceedingsmayhaveadverseimplications,asitmayhindertheacceptanceofthefinaljudgment,aswellasitsimplementation,bytheaffectedparty.Forthisreason,itseemsjustifiedtoconfinethismeasureonlytoseriouscasesofnon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures.Thisdoesnotmeanthatitshouldberesortedtoonlywhennon-compliancehasledtheinjuredpartytorequestnewprovisionalmeasures.Morebroadly,thereseemtobenoreasonsforrequiringacausallinkbetweenthenon-complyingconductofonepartyandthecostsincurredbytheotherparty(50).Theimpositionofcostsrelatingtotheproceedingsshouldnotberegardedasaformofcompensationfortheadditionalcostsincurredbytheinjuredparty.Itshouldratherbeusedasameansforsanctioninggravecasesofnon-compliance.Thefactthatlevyingcostsagainstthenon-complyingpartybenefitstheotherpartydoesnotdeprivethismeasureofitspreeminentlypunitivecharacteranddeterrentpurpose.Moreover,sinceitisintendedtosanctionthenon-complyingparty,theCourtistoberegardedasbeingempoweredtotakeitirrespectiveofarequesttothateffectbytheinjuredparty.(48)Para.144ofthejudgment.(49)JointdeclarationofJudgesTomka,Greenwood,SebutindeandJudgeadhocDugard,para.7.(50)SeeLANDO,TheRoadalongtheSanJuanRiverispavedwithGoodIntentions:ProvisionalMeasuresandtheQuestforComplianceintheCostaRica/NicaraguaJoinedCases,Rivista,vol.99(2016),p.182.RESPONSIBILITYFORBREACH20
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6.InitsjudgmentinLaGrandtheCourt,whiledevotingampleattentiontothequestionofthebindingeffectofprovisionalmeasures,saidlittleabouttheprinciplesgoverningtheresponsibilityincaseofnon-compliance.Itscaselawafterthatjudgmentdoesnotprovidegreaterclarityaboutthisissue.Whenconfrontedwiththequestionofnon-compliance,theCourt’sapproachhasbeencharacterizedbyanarrowfocusonthespecificproblemsraisedineachcase.GiventhelimitedandfragmentedindicationscomingfromtheCourt,itishardtodefinetheprinciplesatworkinthisareabyelaboratingacoherentsystemwhichiscapabletoshedlightonsomeunresolvedquestions.Inanattempttosystematizetheregimeofresponsibilityforbreachesofprovisionalmeasures,thedistinctionbetweenthe“institutionaldi-mension”andthe“interstatedimension”mayprovideausefulanalyticaltoolforassessingthecontentandscopeoftheCourt’spowerinthisfield.Ontheonehand,therearethepowersconferredupontheCourtbyitsStatute.Ontheother,thereistheCourt’spowerbasedonthejurisdictionconferreduponitbytheparties.RelyingonitsStatute,theCourtcandeterminenon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasures,possiblyalsopro-priomotuorintheabsenceofjurisdictionoverthemerits;itcanalsoimposecertainformsofsanctiononthenon-complyingparty.Basingitselfonthejurisdictionconferredbytheparties,itcanassesstheclaimsofresponsibilityadvancedbytheinjuredparty,aswellasawardingrepa-rationfortheinjurieseventuallycausedtothatparty.Admittedly,inpracticethe“interstatedimension”appearstobelargelyprevailing.TheCourthasbeenverycautiousaboutexercisingthepowersthatappeartobeimplicitinArticle41orinotherprovisionsoftheStatute,thesoleexceptionbeingperhapsitsboldaffirmationofjurisdictioninRequestforInterpretationoftheAvenaJudgment.Itsfindingsincasesofnon-compliancehavebeengenerallypromptedbythespecificrequestofaparty.ItmightwellbethattheCourt’scautiousattitudeispartlydictatedbytheneedtoattenuatetheimpactoftheveryinnovativestancetakenin2001,andthatinthefuturetheCourtmightbemorewillingtotakeaproactiveroleinthisarea(51).Moreprobably,however,theprevalenceofthe“interstatedimension”isdestinedtoremainadistinctivefeatureofthisregimeofresponsibility,beingmoreinkeepingwiththeCourt’sfunctionasaninstrumentforsecuringthesettlementofdisputesbetweentheparties.PAOLOPALCHETTI(51)ForthisobservationseeMENDELSON,op.cit.,p.47.OFPROVISIONALMEASURESOFTHEICJ21
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Abstract.—AfteritsjudgmentinLaGrand,theCourthashadseveraloccasionstodealwithcaseswhereoneofthepartieshadbreachedprovisionalmeasuresindicatedonthebasisofArticle41oftheStatute.Whilerecognizingthatthisconductentailstheresponsibilityofthenon-complyingparty,sofartheCourthassaidlittleabouttheprinciplesgoverningsuchresponsibility.Themainpurposeofthisarticleistoattempttosystematizetheregimeofresponsibilityforbreachesofprovisionalmeasures.Thepointofdepartureistheconsiderationthatnon-compliancewithprovisionalmeasuresisnotamatterexclusivelyaffectingtherightsandinterestsofthecontendingpartiesandthattheCourtitselfhasadistinctandautonomousinterestinensuringrespectforprovisionalmeasures.Thisdistinctionbetweenan“institutionaldimension”—involvingtherelationsbetweenthenon-complyingpartyandtheCourt—andan“interstatedimension”—involvingtherelationsbetweenthenon-complyingpartyandtheotherparty—isthenusedasananalyticaltoolforassessingthecontentandscopeoftheCourt’spowerinthisfield.Inparticular,itisusedtoassesstwomainissues.ThefirstiswhethertheCourtmaydeterminebyitsowninitiativewhetherprovisionalmeasureshavebeencompliedwith,possiblyalsointheabsenceofjurisdictiononthemeritsofthedispute.TheotheriswhetherthelegalconsequencesprovidedunderthegeneralrulesonStateresponsibilityexhausttherangeoflegalconsequencesavailableagainsttheresponsibleparty.Thearticle’smainconclusionsarethat:(a)RelyingonitsStatute,theCourtcandeterminenon-compliancewithprovi-sionalmeasures,possiblyalsopropriomotuorintheabsenceofjurisdictionoverthemerits;(b)theCourtcanalsoimposecertainformsofsanctiononthenon-complyingparty,evenif,inpractice,theonlysanctionavailabletotheCourtseemstobethatofexpressingitscensureofthenon-complyingconduct;(c)basingitselfonthejurisdic-tionconferredbytheparties,theCourtcanassesstheclaimsofresponsibilityadvancedbytheinjuredparty,aswellasawardreparationfortheinjurieseventuallycausedtothatparty.BREACHOFPROVISIONALMEASURES22
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Annex 16
J. Gambrell, “Emirati diplomat to AP: ‘Nothing to negotiate’ with Qatar”, Associated Press (7 June 2017), https://apnews.com/3a69bad153e24102a4dd23a6111613ab

RELATEDTOPICSDubaiAPTopNewsDohaUnitedArabEmiratesInternationalNewsKuwaitMiddleEastAl-JazeeraQatarHamasBusinessTerrorismAl-QaidaClicktocopyClicktocopyEmiratidiplomattoAP:‘Nothingtonegotiate’withQatarByJONGAMBRELLJune7,2017APNEWSTopStoriesVideoTopicsListenPage1of7EmiratidiplomattoAP:'Nothingtonegotiate'withQatar8/1/2019https://apnews.com/3a69bad153e24102a4dd23a6111613ab
Annex 16
DUBAI,UnitedArabEmirates(AP)—AtopEmiratidiplomatsaidWednesday“there’snothingtonegotiate”withQataroveragrowingdiplomaticdisputeabouttheenergy-richnation’sallegedfundingofterrorgroups,signalingArabcountriesnowisolatingithavenoplanstobackdown.Speakinginarareinterview,EmiratiMinisterofStateforForeignAffairsAnwarGargashtoldTheAssociatedPressthatQatarhas“chosentoridethetigerofextremismandterrorism”andnowneededtopaytheprice,despiteQatarlongdenyingtheallegation.GargashsaidQatar“definitely”shouldexpelmembersofHamas,stopitssupportofterrorgroups“withal-QaidaDNA”aroundtheworldandreininthemanymediaoutletsitfunds,chiefamongthemtheDoha-basedsatellitenewsnetworkAl-Jazeera.WhileapplaudingaKuwaitiefforttomediatethecrisis,GargashsaidEmiratiandSaudiofficialsplannedtoconcedenothingtoQatar,hometosome10,000AmericantroopsatamajorU.S.militarybaseandthehostofthe2022FIFAWorldCup.Their“fingerprintsareallovertheplace”interrorfunding,Gargashsaid.“Enoughisenough.”QatariofficialsdeclinedtoimmediatelycommentonGargash’scomments.Itsforeignministerhasstruckadefianttoneininterviews,evenafterworriedresidentsemptiedgrocerystoresinitscapitalofDohaasSaudiArabiahasblockedtruckscarryingfoodfromenteringthecountry.ItsflagcarrierQatarAirwaysnowfliesincreasinglyoverIranandTurkeyafterbeingblockedelsewhereintheMiddleEast.Emiratiofficialsalsoshutdowntheairline’sofficesintheUAEonWednesday.Al-JazeeraofficesalsohavebeenshutdownbyauthoritiesinSaudiArabiaandAPNEWSPage2of7EmiratidiplomattoAP:'Nothingtonegotiate'withQatar8/1/2019https://apnews.com/3a69bad153e24102a4dd23a6111613ab
Annex 16
Jordan.Meanwhile,Turkey’sparliamentapprovedsendingtroopstoanexistingTurkishbaseinQatarasasignofsupport.TheinternationalagencyStandardandPoorsannouncedWednesdaythatitlowereditsratingonQatar’slong-termdebttoAA-minusbecauseofthecountry’sdisputewithitsneighbors.S&Psaidthosecountries’severingofdiplomaticandbusinesslinks“willexacerbateQatar’sexternalvulnerabilitiesandcouldputpressureoneconomicgrowthandfiscal”stability.SpeakingtotheAPfromaForeignMinistryofficeinDubai,GargashlistedanumberofterrorgroupsheallegedQatarhadfunded,includingal-Qaida’sbranchesinSyriaandSomalia,militantsinEgypt’sSinaiPeninsulaandothergroup’swith“al-Qaida-typeorganizations”inLibya.Heofferednodocumentstosupporthisclaim,butWesternofficialslonghaveaccusedQatar’sgovernmentofallowingorevenencouragingfundingofsomeSunniextremists.GargashparticularlypointedoutthetensofmillionsofdollarspaidtoShiitemilitiasandotherstofreedozensofQatarirulingfamilymembersandothersinIraqafter16monthsincaptivity.AskedforspecificsaboutwhatArabnationswantedfromQatar,GargashsaidexpellingmembersofHamasandothergroupsliketheMuslimBrotherhoodfromQatarwasimportant.Gaza’sIslamicHamasrulers,amajorrecipientofQatariaid,havecalledSaudiArabia’scallforQatartocuttieswiththePalestinianmilitantgroup“regrettable”andsaiditcontradictstraditionalArabsupportforthePalestiniancause.InGermany,SaudiForeignMinisterAdelal-JubeirsaidhewantstoseearesponsefromQatartotheArabcountries’demands“soon.”Bothal-JubeirandGargashintheircommentssuggestedtheircomplaintsaboutQatargobackyears,likelyimplyingthattheirgrievancesarefocusedonthepoliciesofSheikhHamadbinKhalifaAlThani.SheikhAPNEWSPage3of7EmiratidiplomattoAP:'Nothingtonegotiate'withQatar8/1/2019https://apnews.com/3a69bad153e24102a4dd23a6111613ab
Annex 16
Hamadbecameemirthroughapalacecoupin1995andexpandedhisnation’spresenceontheinternationalscenethroughnegotiatinghostagereleases,brieflyflirtingwithdiplomatictiestoIsrael,hostingaTalibanofficeandcreatingAl-Jazeera.SheikhTamimbinHamadAlThani,hisson,becameQatar’srulingemirin2013,butSheikhHamadstillloomslargeinthetight,insularworldofQatarirulingfamilypolitics.U.S.PresidentDonaldTrump,whotweetedTuesdayaboutQatarfundingextremists,calledSheikhTamimonWednesdayandofferedtohostleadersattheWhiteHousetoresolvethecrisis.Qatarfacedasimilarcrisisin2014thatsawmultipleArabnationspulltheirambassadorsfromthecountry.Thatcrisisendedeightmonthslater,buttherootsofitareclearlyseeninthelatestdispute.Kuwait’semir,tryingtomediatethislatestcrisis,flewtoDubaionWednesdayandmetwithEmiratileaders.AnoutspokenEmiratirulingfamilymember,thewriterandpoliticalanalystSultanSooudAlQassemi,evenraisedtheprospectofQatar’sleadershipchanging.“QatarisarequestioningwhetherthisisgoingtoendupinseeingachangeinleadershipitselfinQatar,”AlQassemitoldtheAPinhisofficeinSharjah,nearDubai.“Soitisaveryseriousissue.Again,thisisQatarisspeakingtointernationalmediawonderingwhetherthisispossibleatall.”TheGulfcountrieshaveorderedtheircitizensoutofQatarandgaveQatarisabroad14daystoreturnhome.ThecountriesalsosaidtheywouldejectQatar’sdiplomats.“Dohanowiscompletelyisolated,”AlQassemisaid.“Dohanowneedstotakeseriousstepsveryrapidlytoplacatenotonlytheirneighborsbutalsotheiralliesaroundtheworld.”APNEWSPage4of7EmiratidiplomattoAP:'Nothingtonegotiate'withQatar8/1/2019https://apnews.com/3a69bad153e24102a4dd23a6111613ab
Annex 16
HiscommentstookonfurtherstrengthastheUAE’sJusticeMinistrywarnedsocialmediausersthattheycanfacethreeto15yearsinprisontimeandfinesstartingfrom500,000dirhams($136,000)forofferingsympathyforQatar.TheministryquotedUAEAttorneyGeneralHamadSaifal-Shamsionsocialmediamakingthewarning,sayingitcameoverQatar’s“hostileandrecklesspolicy.”WhileliberalcomparedtomuchoftheMiddleEast,theUAEhastoughcybercrimeandslanderlawsunderwhichpeoplecanbearrested,imprisonedanddeportedfortakingphotographswithouttheconsentofthoseshown.ThecrisisbeganinpartoverwhattheQatarisdescribedasafalsenewsreportplantedduringahackofitsstate-runnewsagencyinlateMay.RussiadeniedWednesdayithackedtheagencyafteraCNNreportquotedanonymousU.S.officialssayingtheysuspectedRussianhackers.FBIagentsareassistingQatarinitsinvestigation,saidMeshalbinHamadAlThani,Qatar’sambassadortotheU.S.TheUAEdidnothacktheQatarinewsagency,Gargashsaid.However,hedidacknowledgetheauthenticityofrecentlyleakedemailsfromEmiratiAmbassadorYousefal-OtaibainWashington,whichseveralmediaoutletsdescribedasincludingcriticismofQatar.“ThathackshowedtheUAE’srealconcernsandthatwhatwereallysayinourprivateemailsiswhatwesaypublicly,”Gargashsaid.___AssociatedPresswritersGeirMoulsoninBerlin,KarinLaubinAmman,Jordan,JoshLedermaninWashingtonandFayAbuelgasimcontributedtothisreport.___FollowJonGambrellonTwitteratwww.twitter.com/jongambrellap.Hisworkcanbefoundathttp://apne.ws/2galNpz.APNEWSPage5of7EmiratidiplomattoAP:'Nothingtonego…
Annex 16

Annex 17
“Qatar condemns Saudi refusal to negotiate
over demands”, BBC (28 June 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40428947

28June2017QatarcrisisQatarcondemnsSaudirefusaltonegotiateoverdemandsQatar'sforeignministerhascondemneditsGulfneighboursforrefusingtonegotiateovertheirdemandsforrestoringair,seaandlandlinks.SheikhMohammedal-Thanisaidthestancewas"contrarytotheprinciples"ofinternationalrelations.SaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates,BahrainandEgyptaccuseQatarofaidingterrorism-achargeitdenies.HomeVideoWorldUS&CanadaUKBusinessTechScienceWorldAfricaAsiaAustraliaEuropeLatinAmericaMiddleEastGETTYIMAGESHomeNewsSportReelWorklifeTravelFuturePage1QatarcondemnsSaudirefusaltonegotiateoverdemands-BBCNews8/1/2019https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40428947REDACTED
Annex 17
IthasbeenpresentedwithalistofdemandsthattheSaudiforeignministeronTuesdaycalled"non-negotiable".TherestrictionshavecausedturmoilinQatar,anoil-andgas-richnationthatisdependentonimportstomeetthebasicneedsofitspopulationof2.7million.◾Qatar'facingindefiniteisolation'◾QatarcrisisdeepensasGulfsidesstandtheirgroundOnFriday,Qatarwasgiven10daystocomplywitha13-pointlistofdemandstoendthecrisisthatincludedshuttingdowntheAlJazeeranewsnetwork,closingaTurkishmilitarybase,cuttingtieswiththeMuslimBrotherhood,andcurbingdiplomaticrelationswithIran.USSecretaryofStateRexTillerson,whohassoughttoresolvethecrisis,acknowledgedthatsomeelementswould"beverydifficultforQatartomeet",butthattherewere"significantareaswhichprovideabasisforongoingdialogue".ButafterholdingtalkswithMrTillersoninWashingtononTuesday,SaudiForeignMinisterAdelal-Jubeirwasaskedbyjournalistsifthedemandswerenon-negotiable.Hereplied:"Yes.""It'sverysimple.Wemadeourpoint.Wetookourstepsandit'suptotheQataristoamendtheirbehaviour.Oncetheydo,thingswillbeworkedout.Butiftheydon't,theywillremainisolated,"hesaid."IfQatarwantstocomebackintothe[GulfCo-operationCouncil]pool,theyknowwhattheyhavetodo."EPAPage2QatarcondemnsSaudirefusaltonegotiateoverdemands-BBCNews8/1/2019https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40428947REDACTED
Annex 17
MrJubeirstressedthatthedecisiontosevertieswithQatarwasmadeaftertakingintoaccountthehistoryofitsbehaviour,whichheallegedincludedharbouringknownterroristsandfundingextremistgroupsthroughouttheregion.Qatar'sforeignminister,whometMrTillersonatthestatedepartmentlateronTuesday,calledtheSaudiposition"unacceptable".◾WhyQataristhefocusofterrorismclaims◾AllyouneedtoknowaboutQatar"Thisiscontrarytotheprinciplesthatgoverninternationalrelationsbecauseyoucan'tjustpresentlistsofdemandsandrefusetonegotiate,"SheikhMohammedwasquotedassayinginaministrystatement.SheikhMohammedsaidtheUSagreedthedemandshadtobe"reasonableandactionable",andthattheallegationsagainstQataralsoneededtobediscussed."WeagreethattheStateofQatarwillengageinaconstructivedialoguewiththepartiesconcernediftheywanttoreachasolutionandovercomethiscrisis."AFPPage3QatarcondemnsSaudirefusaltonegotiateoverdemands-BBCNews8/1/2019https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40428947REDACTED
Annex 17
TheUAEambassadortoRussiatoldtheGuardiannewspaperonWednesdaythattheGulfArabstateswereconsideringfresheconomicsanctionsonQatar."Onepossibilitywouldbetoimposeconditionsonourowntradingpartnersandsayyouwanttoworkwithusthenyouhavegottomakeacommercialchoice,"OmarGhobashsaid.Meanwhile,UNSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofexpressionDavidKaysaidtheclosureofAlJazeerawould"strikeamajorblowagainstmediapluralisminaregionalreadysufferingfromsevererestrictionsonreportingandmediaofallkinds".RelatedTopicsQatarcrisisUnitedArabEmiratesQatarSaudiArabiaPage4QatarcondemnsSaudirefusaltonegotiateoverdemands-BBCNews8/1/2019https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40428947REDACTEDREDACTED (PII)REDACTED (PII)
Annex 17
Annex 18
N. Al Wasmi, “UAE and Saudi put pressure on Qatar ahead of demands deadline”, The National (28 June 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/world/uae-and-saudi-put-pressure-on-qatar-ah…

Annex 18
Annex 18
Annex 19
O. Dörr & K. Schmalenbach, eds., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, 2018),
pp. 559–624

OliverDörrlKirstenSchmalenbachEditorsViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesACommentarySecondEdition<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:22:02.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
EditorsProfessorDr.OliverDörr,LL.M.(Lond.)UniversityofOsnabrückEuropeanLegalStudiesInstitute49069OsnabrückGermany….KirstenSchmalenbachUniversityofSalzburgFacultyofLawDepartmentofPublicLaw/[email protected].atISBN978-3-662-55159-2ISBN978-3-662-55160-8(eBook)DOI10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017958037#Springer-VerlagGmbHGermany2018Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped.Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbookarebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforanyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardtojurisdictionalclaimsinpublishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations.Printedonacid-freepaperThisSpringerimprintispublishedbySpringerNatureTheregisteredcompanyisSpringer-VerlagGmbHGermanyTheregisteredcompanyaddressis:HeidelbergerPlatz3,14197Berlin,Germany<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:22:02.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Article31Generalruleofinterpretation1.Atreatyshallbeinterpretedingoodfaithinaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningtobegiventothetermsofthetreatyintheircontextandinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose.2.Thecontextforthepurposeoftheinterpretationofatreatyshallcomprise,inadditiontothetext,includingitspreambleandannexes:(a)anyagreementrelatingtothetreatywhichwasmadebetweenallthepartiesinconnexionwiththeconclusionofthetreaty;(b)anyinstrumentwhichwasmadebyoneormorepartiesinconnexionwiththeconclusionofthetreatyandacceptedbytheotherpartiesasaninstrumentrelatedtothetreaty.3.Thereshallbetakenintoaccount,togetherwiththecontext:(a)anysubsequentagreementbetweenthepartiesregardingtheinterpre-tationofthetreatyortheapplicationofitsprovisions;(b)anysubsequentpracticeintheapplicationofthetreatywhichestab-lishestheagreementofthepartiesregardingitsinterpretation;(c)anyrelevantrulesofinternationallawapplicableintherelationsbetweentheparties.4.Aspecialmeaningshallbegiventoatermifitisestablishedthatthepartiessointended.ContentsA.PurposeandFunction.....................................................................1B.HistoricalBackgroundandNegotiatingHistory..........................................8C.GeneralIssuesofTreatyInterpretation..................................................14I.InterpretationIsAlwaysRequired.................................................14II.ThePointsofReferenceforInterpretation.........................................15III.WhoIsCompetenttoInterpretaTreaty?..........................................17IV.TheTemporalElementofInterpretation...........................................22V.DoesOneSizeFitAll?............................................................28VI.RulesofInterpretationOutsidetheVCLT?........................................32D.ElementsofArt31.......................................................................37I.TheGeneralRule(Para1).........................................................371.OrdinaryMeaningoftheTerms..............................................392.Context........................................................................433.ObjectandPurpose...........................................................524.InGoodFaith.................................................................59II.CertainElementsof‘Context’(Para2)............................................61III.InterpretativeMeansAdditionaltotheContext(Para3)..........................691.SubsequentAgreements(lita)................................................722.SubsequentPractice(litb)....................................................773.RelevantRulesofInternationalLaw:TheSystemicApproach(litc)........92#Springer-VerlagGmbHGermany2018O.Dörr,K.Schmalenbach(eds.),ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,DOI10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_34559<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
IV.SpecialInsteadofOrdinaryMeaning(Para4)....................................109E.TreatiesofInternationalOrganizations(VCLTII)....................................112A.PurposeandFunction1Nolegaltextdraftedbymancanpossiblybeperfectinawaythatitnevergivesrisetoanydoubtastoitsscopeoractualmeaning.Thatiswhyeverylegaltext,ontheinternationalaswellasonthenationallevel,needstobeinterpretedbythoseworkingwithit.Theapplicationofalegalruleinpracticepresupposesthatthepersonapplyingithasgotacertainunderstandingofitsscope,contentsandrelevance,thusinterpretationisindispensablenotonlyforunderstandingarule,butalsofortheprocessofapplyingorimplementingit.Sincethemostimportantrulesofinternationallawaretodaylaiddownintreaties,theinterpretationoftreatieshasbecomeofutmostsignificanceforthepracticeofinternationallaw.2Interpretationistheprocessofestablishingthetruemeaningofatreaty.TheVCLTrulesoninterpretation,itisrightlysaid,reflectanattempttodesignatetheelementstobetakenintoaccountinthatprocess,andtoassesstheirrelativeweightinit,ratherthantodescribe,letaloneprescribe,theprocessofinterpretationitself.1Art31inlayingdowntheso-calledgeneralruleofinterpretationformulatesacoupleofgenerallyacceptedprinciplesontheelementsandmeansoftreatyinterpretation.Theseprinciplesaremostlydrawnfrominternationaljudicialandarbitralpractice,asithaddevelopedsincethelatenineteenthcentury,andtheywereadoptedbytheILCasapragmaticcompromiseavoidingtofollowoneparticulardoctrineortheoryoftreatyinterpretation.Also,sinceitconsideredtheinterpretationofdocumentstobetosomeextentanart,notanexactscience,theCommissiondisavowedtheideaofproposinganelaboratecodeorcanonofinterpretation,butdeliberatelyconfineditselftosomefundamentalrulesrecoursetowhichis,moreover,discretionaryratherthanobligatory.23Thetaskofinterpretationis,asMcNairputit,“givingeffecttotheexpressedintentionoftheparties,thatis,theirintentionasexpressedinthewordsusedbytheminthelightofthesurroundingcircumstances.”3Ifthusinterpretationisalwaysdirectedatbringingtobeartheintentionoftheparties,itcanonlydosototheextentthatthatintentionhasfoundadequateexpressioninthetextofthetreaty.Also,theotherwayround,thewordingofatreatyhasinthetextualapproachfollowedbyArt31para1theprimeroleininterpretationbecauseitispresumedtobeanauthenticexpressionoftheintentionoftheparties.4ThisisconfirmedintheICJpracticewhentheCourtpointsoutthatinterpretationmustbebased“aboveallupon1Sinclair(1984),p.117.2CfFinalDraft,IntroductoryCommentarytoArts27–28,218,para4.3McNair(1961),p.365(emphasisomitted).4FinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,220,para11.560PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
thetextofthetreaty”.5Tobeascertainedbyinterpretationisthustheintentioninthesenseofthetruemeaningofthetreatyratherthantheintentionofthepartiesdistinctfromit.64Ontheotherhand,thetextofatreatyasitstandssincethetimeofitsconclusionisnotallthatmattersforaninterpretationlegeartis.Art31para3requirestakingaccountofsubsequentdevelopments,agreementsbetweenthepartiesandpracticeinapplyingthetreaty,andthusseemstofocusonthecurrentconsensusofthepartiesinunderstandingthetreaty.Thatconsensus,whichexistsatthetimeofinterpretation,mayinsomecasesevenoverridetheoriginalunderstandingofthetextofthetreaty,whichpriortothesubsequentdevelopmentsmayhaveappearedperfectlyclear.5Inordertostructuretheprocessofinterpretation,Art31isdesignatedtocontain‘thegeneralrule’oftreatyinterpretation.Thesingularmodeemphasizesthattheprovisioncontainsonesinglerule,thatcontainedinpara1,andthatitsthreemainelements,wording,contextandobjectandpurpose,aswellastheguidingprincipleofgoodfaith,constituteintegralpartsofthatruleandhavetobeappliedinasinglecombinedoperation.7Art31paras2and3specifywhatismeantby“context”andarethuscloselylinkedtopara1.Bothprovisionsmayappeartodrawadistinctionbetweenintrinsicandextrinsicmeansofinterpretation:para2setsoutcertainintegralelementsofthecontextrule,asitlistswhatis“comprised”bythecontext,whereaspara3,ratherthandesignatingyetotherelementsofcontext,listsinterpretativemeanstobeusedalongwiththecontext.However,despitethatdifferentwording,bothparagraphsaredesignedtoincorporatetheelementsofinterpretationsetoutthereinintothegeneralrulecontainedinpara1.8Art31para4containsanexceptiontopara1forcaseswherethepartieshaveagreed,evenimplicitly,toreplacetheordinarymeaningofatermcontainedinatreatyprovisionbyaspecialmeaning.6ItisbynowgenerallyrecognizedthattheprovisionsontreatyinterpretationcontainedinArts31and32reflectpre-existingcustomaryinternationallaw.Formanyyearsnow,theICJhasappliedtherulesofinterpretationlaiddownintheConventionascodifiedcustomtovirtuallyeverytreatythatcamebeforeit.9ThefirstexplicitendorsementofthecustomarycharacterbytheCourtseemstohavebeeninthe1991judgmentontheArbitralAwardof31July1989(GuineaBissauvSenegal),wheretheCourtstatedthatthepre-existingprinciplesoftreatyinterpretation“arereflectedinArticles31and32oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,whichmayinmanyrespectsbeconsideredasacodificationofexistingcustomaryinternationallawonthepoint.”105CfegICJTerritorialDispute(LibyavChad)[1994]ICJRep6,para41;LegalityoftheUseofForce(SerbiaandMontenegrovBelgium)(PreliminaryObjections)[2004]ICJRep279,para100.6Gardiner(2015),p.6.7ThusFinalDraft,CommentarytoArts27–28,219–220,para8.8FinalDraft,CommentarytoArts27–28,220,para8.9ThisprocessofgrowingacceptancewasalreadyaptlydescribedbyTorresBernárdez(1998),p.721etseq.10ICJArbitralAward(Guinea-BissauvSenegal)[1991]ICJRep53,para48.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation561Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Affirmationstothesameeffectcanbefoundthroughoutthesubsequentjuris-prudenceoftheCourt,withthewordsbecomingmoresweepinginmorerecentcases.11Despitethehesitationseeminglyexpressedinthequotedphraseof1991(“inmanyrespects”),theICJneverattemptedtodifferentiatebetweenrulescontainedinArts31and32thatareandthosethatarenotbindingcustomarylaw.Whileinpractice,theCourtoftenreliedonlyonthefirstparagraphofArt31,italsohadtheopportunitytoconfirmthecustomarylawcharacterofpara312andeventhatofpara3litc13ofthatarticle.Although,atfirst,ithardlyevermentionedArt33inthiscontext,theCourtoccasionallyappliedtheruleslaiddowninthatprovisionasequallyreflectingcustomaryinternationallaw.14TheviewoftheICJthattheViennarulesofinterpretationarewithoutanydistinctionuniversallybindingascustomaryinternationallawiswidelysharedbyotherinternationalcourts,suchasITLOS,15theECtHR,16theECJ17andthedisputesettlementbodies11SeeegICJTerritorialDispute(LibyavChad)[1994]ICJRep6,para41;Kasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para18;LaGrand[2001]ICJRep466,para99;AvenaCase[2004]ICJRep12,para83;ConstructionofaWall[2004]ICJRep136,para94;GenocideCase[2007]ICJRep43,para160;DisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,para47;PulpMills[2010]ICJRep14,para65;MaritimeDispute(PeruvChile)[2014]ICJRep3,para57;DelimitationoftheContinentalShelfbetweenNicaraguaandColombia(PreliminaryObjections)[2016]ICJRep100,para33;MaritimeDelimitationintheIndianOcean(SomaliavKenya)(PreliminaryObjections),2February2017,para63.12CfICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para48;SovereigntyoverPulauLigitanandPulauSipadan[2002]ICJRep625,para37;MutualAssistanceinCriminalMatters[2008]ICJRep177,para112.13CfICJOilPlatforms(Merits)[2003]ICJRep161,para41.14CfICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para25;LaGrand[2001]ICJRep466,para101.15ITLOS(SeabedDisputesChamber)ResponsibilitiesandObligationsofStatesSponsoringPersonsandEntitieswithRespecttoActivitiesintheArea,1February2011,para57.16ForthefirsttimeinECtHRGoldervUnitedKingdomAppNo4451/70,SerA18,para29(1975);latereginLoizidouvTurkey(GC)(Merits)AppNo15318/89,ECHR1996-VI,para43;LitwavPolandAppNo26629/95,ECHR2000-III,para57;Al-AdsanivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo35763/97,ECHR2001-XI,para55;MamatkulovandAskarovvTurkey(GC)AppNo46827/99and46951/99,ECHR2005-I,para111.InmorerecentdecisionstheCourtsimply,andexplicitly,drawsonArts31to33VCLTininterpretingtheEuropeanConvention,therebynecessarilyimplyingthecustomarycharacteroftheformer,cfSaadivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo13229/03,29January2008,paras61–62;DemirandBaykaravTurkey(GC)AppNo34503/97,12November2008,para65;Al-SaadoonandMufdhivUnitedKingdomAppNo61498/08,2March2010,para126;HirsiJamaaetalvItaly(GC)AppNo27765/09,ECHR2012-II,para170;HassanvUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo29750/09,ECHR2014-VI,para100.17TheECJusuallyreferstotherulesofViennaConventionwhenitinterpretsagreementsoftheEuropeanCommunity/Union,cfECJOpinion1/91[1991]ECRI-6079,para14;MetalsaC-312/91[1993]ECRI-3751,para12;El-YassiniC-416/96[1999]ECRI-1209,para47;JanyC-268/99[2001]ECRI-8615,para35;BritaC-386/08[2010]ECRI-1289,paras41–42.ExplicitlylabellingArt31acodificationofgeneralinternationallawECJAxelWalzC-63/09[2010]ECRI-4239,para23.562PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
oftheWTO,18aswellasbymanyarbitralinstitutions19andsomenationalcourts.20Finally,thecustomarycharacteroftheViennaruleshasbynowfoundexpressionintreatypracticeitself.EginArt14.16oftheFreeTradeAgreementconcludedon16October2010betweentheEuropeanUnionanditsMemberStates,oftheonepart,andtheRepublicofKorea,oftheotherpart,directsthearbitrationpanel,thatistobeestablishedincaseofdisputes,tointerprettheAgreement“inaccordancewithcustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw,includingthosecodifiedintheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties”.21Similarly,withtiny,butsignificantalterations,Art317oftheTradeAgreementbetweentheEUanditsMemberStatesandColombiaandPeru(26June2012)directsthepanelto“thecustomaryrulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallawincludedintheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties”.227Therefore,iftheruleslaiddowninArts31–33reflectuniversalcustom,theycaninprinciplebeappliedtoalltreatiesoutsidethescopeoftheConvention.Thisconcerns,first,treatiesconcludedbeforetheConventionenteredintoforce(1980),23and,second,treatiesbetweenStatesthatarenotallpartiestothe18CftheWTOAppellateBodyeginJapan–AlcoholicBeveragesWT/DS8,10–11/AB/R,PartD,10–12(1996);US–Hot-RolledSteelWT/DS184/AB/R,para57(2001);US–GamblingWT/DS285/AB/R,para159(2005);US–StainlessSteel(Mexico)WT/DS344/AB/R,para76(2008);China–AutoPartsWT/DS339,340,342/AB/R,para145(2008);China–PublicationsandAudio-visualProductsWT/DS363/AB/R,para348(2009);US–CloveCigarettesWT/DS406/AB/R,para258(2012).19CfegtheIronRhine(‘IjzerenRhin’)RailwayArbitration(BelgiumvNetherlands)(2005)27RIAA35,para45;AuditofAccountsBetweentheNetherlandsandFranceinApplicationoftheProtocolof25September1991AdditionaltotheConventionfortheProtectionoftheRhinefromPollutionbyChloridesof3December1976(NetherlandsvFrance)(2004)25RIAA267,paras58–62;Iran-UnitedStatesClaimsTribunalUnitedStates,FederalReserveBankofNewYorkvIran,BankMarkaziCaseA28(2000)36Iran-USClaimsTribunalReports5,para53;YoungLoanArbitrationonGermanExternalDebts(Belgium,France,Switzerland,UnitedKingdomandUnitedStatesvGermany)(1980)59ILR494,para16.20EgHouseofLords(UK)FothergillvMonarchAirlinesLtd[1980]UKHL6,[1981]AC251,282(LordDiplock);R(Adan)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2002]UKHL67,[2001]2AC477,516(LordSteyn);FederalConstitutionalCourtofGermany(Chamber)[2015]NVwZ361,para37;forAustraliaandNewZealandFederalCourtQenosPtyLtdvShip‘APLSydney’[2009]187FCR282,para11(FinkelsteinJ);CourtofAppealLena-JanePuntervSecretaryforJustice[2004]2NZLR28,para61(GlazebrookJ).21[2011]OJL127,6,at68.22[2012]OJL354,3,at93.23CfegICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para20(interpretationoftreatyof1890);LaGrand[2001]ICJRep466,para99(ICJStatute);AvenaCase[2004]ICJRep12,para83(ViennaConventiononConsularRelations);ConstructionofaWallOpinion[2004]ICJRep136,para95(GenevaConventionIV);DisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,para47(treatyof1885);PulpMills[2010]ICJRep14,para65(treatyof1975);MaritimeDispute(PeruvChile)[2014]ICJRep3,para57(treatyof1952);ITLOS(SeabedDisputesChamber)ResponsibilitiesandObligationsofStatesSponsoringPersonsandEntitieswithRespecttoActivitiesintheArea,1February2011,para58(UNCLOS).Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation563Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Convention,24whichisalsoacknowledgedbythirdStatesnotpartiestotheConven-tion,suchastheUnitedStatesorFrance:thediplomaticpracticeoftheUSadminis-tration,aswellastheoverwhelmingpartofUScourtpractice,reflecttheviewthattheArts31–33VCLTdoexpressbindingcustomarynorms.25Francehasacknowledgedthesameattheoccasionofarbitralproceedings.26Third,theConventionrulesoninterpretationcanascustomaryrulesbeappliedtoinstrumentsthatduetotheircharacterfalloutsidethescopeoftheConvention,suchasunwrittentreatiesortreatiesbetweenStatesandotherentitiestreatedassubjectsofinternationallaw.B.HistoricalBackgroundandNegotiatingHistory8Sinceinterpretationisanindispensableoperationinapplyingandimplementingtreaties,theproblemoftreatyinterpretationhasbeenpartofinternationallawforaslongastreatieshavebeenconcludedbetweenentitiesassubjectsofinternationallaw.ItisgenerallysaidthatitwaswithGrotius,PufendorfandVattelintheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturiesthatthefirsteffortsweremadetoidentifydetailedrulesfortreatyinterpretationandtoshapethemintocodes.27Increasingresorttoarbitrationfromthelatenineteenthcenturyonwardsresultedinagrowingrepositoryofdecisionsinter-pretingtreaties,whileinterpretativepracticeontheuniversallevelgainedmomentumwiththecaselawofthePCIJ.ItsapproachtotreatyinterpretationforeshadowedseveralelementsofwhatlaterbecametherulesoftheVCLT.Thoseelementsincluded,eg,thenaturalmeaningoftermsreflectingtheirordinaryusage,28takingintoaccountascontextotherprovisionsofthesametreatyandprovisionsofsimilartreaties,29consideringthemannerinwhichatreatyhasbeenapplied,30thehistoricaldevelopmentoftheparticularareaoflaw,31thenatureandpurposeoftreatyclauses,3224CfexplicitlyICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para18;SovereigntyoverPulauLigitanandPulauSipadan[2002]ICJRep625,para37;MutualAssistanceinCriminalMatters[2008]ICJRep177,para112.25CfthereferencesgivenbyCriddle(2004),pp.443–447.26CfAuditofAccountsBetweentheNetherlandsandFranceinApplicationoftheProtocolof25September1991AdditionaltotheConventionfortheProtectionoftheRhinefromPollutionbyChloridesof3December1976(NetherlandsvFrance)(2004)25RIAA267,para57.27Gardiner(2015),p.58.28Forexample,PCIJExchangeofGreekandTurkishPopulationsPCIJSerBNo10,20(1925);PolishPostalServiceinDanzigPCIJSerBNo11,37(1925);LegalStatusofEasternGreenlandPCIJSerA/BNo53,49(1933).29CfegPCIJCompetenceoftheILOinRegardtoInternationalRegulationoftheConditionsoftheLabourofPersonsEmployedinAgriculturePCIJSerBNo2,23(1922);SS‘Wimbledon’PCIJSerANo1,23and25–28(1923).30CfPCIJJurisdictionoftheCourtsofDanzig(PecuniaryClaimsofDanzigRailwayOfficialsWhoHavePassedintothePolishService,AgainstthePolishRailwaysAdministration)PCIJSerBNo15,18(1928).31CfPCIJTheFactoryatChorzów(Indemnities)(Jurisdiction)PCIJSerANo9,24(1927).32Ibid24–25.564PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
thesupplementaryvalueofpreparatorywork33ortheharmonizationofdifferentlanguageversionsofatreaty.349Oneofthefirstwell-knowneffortsincodifyingthelawoftreatieswasunder-takenundertheauspicesoftheHarvardLawSchoolandresultedintheHarvardDraftConventionontheLawofTreatiespublishedin1935.35Itcontainednotonlyproposedprovisionsoninterpretationbutalsodetailedcommentariesexpoundingandanalyzinglegalliteratureandcaselawonthesubject.36Itsprovisiononinterpretation(Art19)wasbasedonarigorousteleologicalapproachinthatitplacedmajoremphasisonachievingthe“generalpurposewhichthetreatyistendedtoserve”.37Inordertodeterminethatpurpose,severalelementsweretobeconsidered,suchasthe“historicalbackgroundofthetreaty,travauxprépara-toires”,“thecircumstancesofthepartiesatthetimethetreatywasenteredinto”,“thesubsequentconductoftheparties”inapplyingthetreatyand“theconditionsprevailingatthetimeinterpretationisbeingmade”.10UndertheUNCharter,theICJinitsearlyyearsdevelopeditstechniquesoftreatyinterpretationmainlybybuildingonthejurisprudenceofthePCIJ,butatthesametimeextendingandrefiningthemainprinciples.InhisfamousanalysisFitzmauricededucedsixmajorprinciplesfromtheCourt’scaselawduringthe1950s38:accordingtotheprincipleofactualityortextuality,treatiesaretobeinterpretedastheystand,andonthebasisoftheiractualtexts.ThismaximisasfundamentalastheprincipleofthenaturalandordinarymeaningwhichtheCourtformulatedforthefirsttimeintheCompetenceofAdmissioncase:“TheCourtconsidersitnecessarytosaythatthefirstdutyofatribunalwhichiscalledupontointerpretandapplytheprovisionsofatreaty,istoendeavortogiveeffecttothemintheirnaturalandordinarymeaninginthecontextinwhichtheyoccur.”39ThispreferenceforthenaturalandordinarymeaningofthetermsofatreatycanbefoundinseveraloftheCourt’searlycases.40Inthequotedpassage,theICJ,bypointingtothecontextofthetreaty,alsounderlinedtheprincipleofintegration,iethatatreatymustalwaysbereadasawhole.Theprincipleofeffectivenessaccordingtowhichtreatiesaretobeinterpretedwithreferencetotheirdeclaredorapparentobjectsandpurposes,wasappliedbytheCourtatmanyoccasions,amongthefirstbeingtheCorfuChannelandtheReparationforInjuriescases.Whileintheformer,theCourt,referringtothecaselawofthePCIJ,heldquitegenerallythat33CfegPCIJ‘Lotus’PCIJSerANo10,16–17(1927).34CfPCIJMavrommatisPalestineConcessionsPCIJSerANo2,19(1924).35CfHarvardDraft(1935)29AJILSupp,657etseq.36HarvardDraft937–977.37HarvardDraft661.38CfFitzmaurice(1951),pp.9–22;Fitzmaurice(1957),pp.210–227.39ICJSecondAdmissionsCase[1950]ICJRep4,8.40CfegICJInterpretationofPeaceTreaties(SecondPhase)[1950]ICJRep221,227;AsylumCase[1950]ICJRep266,279.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation565Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
“[i]twouldindeedbeincompatiblewiththegenerallyacceptedrulesofinterpretationtoadmitthataprovisionofthissortoccurringinaspecialagreementshouldbedevoidofpurportoreffect,”41inthelatter,itinferredacertainstatusandcapacityoftheUnitedNationsOrgani-zationfromthefactthatwithoutthem,itcouldnotdischargethefunctionsitwasclearlyintendedtohave.42Thatobjectandpurposerulewasaffirmedandappliedinseveralotherofthoseearlycases.43AfurtherprincipleclearlyappliedveryearlybytheICJisthatofsubsequentpractice,ietheCourtlookedatthewayinwhichatreatyhasactuallybeenappliedoroperatedbyitsparties44orbyorgansauthorizedtodoso.45ThesixthprinciplewhichFitzmauriceproposedtoextractfromtheCourt’searlycaselawwasthatofcontemporaneity,iethattreatytermsmustbeinterpretedaccordingtothemeaningwhichtheypossessedatthetimeofitsconclusion.IthadbeenappliedratherprominentlyintheMoroccocase.4611TheformulationofthesesixprincipleshadconsiderableinfluenceonthelaterworkoftheILConthelawoftreaties,asSRWaldock,thefirstandonlyofthefourSpecialRapporteursonthelawoftreatieswhointhisfunctiontookupthesubjectofinterpretation,consideredthemasanimportantsourceofinspirationandintroducedtheminhisworkonthetopic.47Theprovisionsontreatyinterpretation,whichheproposedin1964,correspondedtoalargeextenttotheprinciplesformulatedbyFitzmaurice.Waldock’sDraftArt70para1combinedfourprinciplesinonerule,thoseofordinarymeaning,context,contemporaneityandofgoodfaith.Assubsidi-arymeansofinterpretation,Waldockproposedrecoursetotheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty,thepreparatoryworkandthesubsequentpracticeoftheparties.48Instrumentsdrawnupinconnexionwiththeconclusionofthetreatyweretobeconsideredpartofthecontext,ratherthanmerepreparatorywork(DraftArt71para1).Theruleofeffectivenesswaslaiddowninaseparateprovision(DraftArt72)asbeingsubjecttotheordinarymeaningandtheobjectandpurposeofatreaty,thusindicatingitsproperlimits,or,asWaldockpointedoutinhiscommen-tary,containingit“withinthefourcornersofthetreaty”,stillleavingroomforsomelegitimatemeasureofteleologicalinterpretation.49Finally,Waldockdraftedaseparateprovision(DraftArt73)totheeffectthattreatyinterpretationmust“take41ICJCorfuChannel[1949]ICJRep4,24.42CfICJReparationforInjuries[1949]ICJRep174,179etseq.43CfegICJGenocideConventionOpinion[1951]ICJRep15,24;RightsofUSNationalsinMorocco[1952]ICJRep176,196.44CfegICJSouthWestAfricaOpinion[1950]ICJRep128,135–136;RightsofUSNationalsinMorocco[1952]ICJRep176,210–211.45CfegICJSecondAdmissionsCase[1950]ICJRep4,9;CertainExpensesoftheUnitedNations[1962]ICJRep151,160and165.46CfICJRightsofUSNationalsinMorocco[1952]ICJRep176,189.47CfWaldockIII55–56,para12.48WaldockIII52(DraftArt70,para2,DraftArt71,para2).49WaldockIII61,para30.566PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
account”(notmorethanthat!)ofpossiblealterationsinthelegalrelationsbetweentheparties.12AlthoughintheviewofSRWaldock,theinter-temporalaspectofinterpretation(contemporaneity)wassimplyoneoftheconditionsfordeterminingthenaturalandordinarymeaning,50andindeedamatterofcommonsense,51itwasdeletedfromthedraftduringthediscussionintheILC,asitwasthoughtthatthecorrectapplicationofthetemporalelementwouldnormallybeindicatedbytheinterpreta-tioningoodfaith.52Also,theruleofeffectivenesswasdroppedasaseparatearticle,asthemajorityintheCommissionconsideredittobeincludedintheprincipleofgoodfaithandtheobjectandpurposerule.53Inreactiontocertaincommentsbygovernments,theCommissionemphasizedthatitconsideredtheprocessofinter-pretationaunityandthatlayingdownvariousrulesoninterpretationdidnotmeanestablishinganylegalhierarchyamongthem.5413TheViennaConferenceadoptedtheILC’sproposalsontreatyinterpretationwithonlyminorchangesofdraftingandoneofsubstance,whichwasinsertingwhatisnowArt33para4.TherewasconsiderabledebateintheCommitteeoftheWholeonproposalstoamalgamatethegeneralruleofinterpretationandthatonsupple-mentarymeansintoasingleprovision,butthoseproposalsgainedlittlesupport.55C.GeneralIssuesofTreatyInterpretationI.InterpretationIsAlwaysRequired14Everytreatyneedsinterpretationandisopentoit.Evenifitsscopeandthemeaningofitstermsmayappearevidentandclear,thisisaresultofaninterpretativeoperation.Interpretationisthusnotasecondaryprocess,whichonlycomesintoplaywhenitisimpossibletomakesenseoftheplaintermsofatreaty,56anditisnotsuperfluousonlybecausetherelevantwordsintheirnaturalandordinarymeaningseemtomakesenseintheircontext.57Thisargument,evenifitgoesbacktoafamousdictumofEmerdeVattel,58iscircular,becausetoknowwhetherthewordingisclearor‘makessense’presupposesaprocessofinterpretationand50WaldockIII56,para15.51WaldockVI94,96,para7.52CfWaldockVI94,97,para13;FinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,222,para16.53Cfthedebatein[1954-I]YbILC275,288–291.54CfFinalDraft,CommentaryArts27–28,219–220,paras8–9.55UNCLOTI191–193;Gardiner(2015),pp.78–79.56ThiswastheviewofMcNair(1961),p.365,n1.57Referringtothewell-knownphraseinICJSecondAdmissionsCase[1950]ICJRep4,8:“Iftherelevantwordsintheirnaturalandordinarymeaningmakesenseintheircontext,thatistheendofthematter”.58deVattel(1758),§263:“Lapremièremaximegénéralesurl’interprétationestqu’iln’estpaspermisd’interprétercequin’apasbesoind’interprétation.”Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation567Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
cannot,therefore,precludethatoperation.Wheneverasubjectofinternationallawinvokes,appliesorgoesaboutimplementingatreaty,itcanonlydosoonthebasisofacertainunderstandingofitsterms,ergoonthebasisofaninterpretation.AsSchwarzenbergerrightlysaid:“Anyapplicationofatreaty,includingitsexecution,presupposes[...]aprecedingcon-sciousorsubconsciousinterpretationofthetreaty.”59II.ThePointsofReferenceforInterpretation15Thesearchforthetruemeaningofatreatycanhaveverydifferentobjects.Consideringthequestionsthatcaninpracticearisewithregardtothelegaleffectsofatreaty,wemightgrossomododistinguishfourpointsofreferencefortheprocessoftreatyinterpretation:interpretationcanbedirectedatestablishingthetreaty-characterofadocument,thescopeandthecontentsofatreatyanditseffectsintheinternallawofitsparties.SinceneithertheConventionrulesnorcustomaryinternationallawappearstocontainanydistinctioninthisrespect,thesamerulesandmethodsapplytoallthoseanglesofinterpretation.16First,itmaybeestablishedthroughinterpretationwhetheradocumentisatreatyinthesenseoftheVCLTatall,egwhetherthecommonwillexpressedismeantbythepartiestobebinding(!Art2MN30–34).Secondly,thescopeofatreatycanbeascertainedbyapplyingtherulesofinterpretation,thatistowhom,towhatsituationsandfromwhichmomentintimeareitsprovisionsmeanttoapply.Thirdly,thenormativesubstanceofatreaty,ietherightsandobligationsofitsparties,ortherulesoftheobjectiveregimesetupbythetreaty,canbedeterminedthroughinterpretation.Fourthlyandfinally,wemayenquirewhethertreatyprovi-sionsaresuitedtobedirectlyapplicableinthelegalorderofthepartiestothetreaty,andwhethertheydemandacertainrankinthatinternallegalorder.Ifthetreatycanintheenddevelopdirecteffect,preferencemust,ofcourse,bedeterminedaccord-ingtotherulesofthatinternalorderitself.III.WhoIsCompetenttoInterpretaTreaty?17ThequestionofwhoiscompetenttointerpretatreatyisnotdealtwithbytheVCLT,althoughtheissuehadbeenraisedintheILC’sdiscussiononthetopic.60IthadnotbeentakenupbytheCommission,probablybecausetheanswerisalltooobvious:sinceinterpretationisnecessarilyimpliedinanyactofapplyingorimplementingatreaty(!MN14),everypersonororganconcernedwithatreatyisbynecessitycompetenttointerpretit.Sincetheinternationallegalorderis59Schwarzenberger(1968),p.8.SimilarlySorelandBoré(2011),Art31MN3.60CfTsuruoka[1964-I]YbILC280,para72.568PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
inprinciplestilladecentralizedsystem61thatallowseverysubjectoflawtoapplytherelevantnormsofinternationallawpertainingtoit,itisalsoanopensystemoftreatyinterpreters.Thelatterwillveryoftenbenationalcourtsandauthorities,sinceduetotheirspecificcontents,manytreatiesarelikelytobeapplied—andthusinterpreted—chieflywithinnationallegalsystems.62Treatiesconcludedasconstit-uentinstrumentsofinternationalorganizationsorwithinsuchorganizationswillregularlybeapplied—andthusinterpreted—bythecompetentorgansofthoseorganizations.18Quiteafewtreatiesprovidethatdisputesabouttheirinterpretationorapplicationmaybereferredtosettlementbeforeaninternationalcourtortribunal.Sometreatiesestablishapermanentbodyotherthanatribunalwiththe(explicitorimplicit)powertointerpretthetreaty.EgtheInternationalConventionontheHarmonizedSystem,adoptedwithintheWorldCustomsOrganizationin1983(asamendedin1986),63providesfor“ExplanatoryNotes,ClassificationOpinionsorotheradviceasguidestotheinterpretationoftheHarmonizedSystem”(Art7)andfor“recommendationstosecureuniformityintheinterpretationandapplicationoftheHarmonizedSystem”(Art8)tobepreparedbytheCommitteeandtobeapprovedbytheCouncil.PursuanttoArt56ofthe1985ConventionEstablishingtheMultinationalInvestmentGuaranteeAgency(MIGA)64,anyquestionofinterpretationoftheprovisionsoftheConventionshallbesubmittedtotheBoardforitsdecisionandtotheCouncilforfinaldecision.The1989EuropeanTransfrontierTelevisionConventionempowersinArt21litctheStandingCommitteeto“examine,attherequestofoneormoreparties,questionsconcerningtheinterpretationoftheConvention.”65Art45oftheAgreementontheNewDevelopmentBank,concludedbetweentheBRICScountrieson15July2014,66providesthat“anyquestionofinterpretation...shallbesubmittedtotheBoardofDirectorsfordecision”:anyinterpretativedecisionmaybesubmittedtotheBoardofGovernorswhosedecisionshallbefinal.Art26.1oftheComprehensiveEconomicandTradeAgreement(CETA),concludedbetweentheEUanditsMemberStatesandCanadain2016,establishesaJointCommitteewhichissupposedtodecideon“anyissuerelatingtotheinterpretationoftheagreement”.InmuchstriktertermsArtIXpara2ofthe1994WTOAgreement67providesthat“theMinisterialConferenceandtheGeneralCouncilshallhavetheexclusiveauthoritytoadoptinterpretationsofthisAgreementandoftheMultilateralTradeAgreements”.However,astheAppellateBodyheldinUS–CloveCigarettes,thepervasivelegaleffectofthosemultilateralinterpretationspresupposesthattheiradoptioncomplieswithcertain61CfMalanczuk(1997),pp.3–7.62Obviousexamplesareprivatelawconventions,butalsotreatiesengagingdomesticproceduressuchasthoseonextradition,doubletaxationorStateimmunity.Ontreatyinterpretationinnationallegalsystems,seeGardiner(2015),pp.143–157.63Tobefoundatwww.wcoomd.org.Accessed22November2017.64Tobefoundatwww.miga.org.Accesse… Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
proceduralrequirements,suchasthattheymustbeadoptedonthebasisofarecommenda-tionfromtherelevantCouncil.68Thoseorgansthenregularlyassumeanauthoritativeroleindeterminingtheactualmeaningofthetreatyprovisions,themoresowhentheirdecisionsconcerningtheinterpretationaregivenbindingforceinthetreatyitself.69Theconsistentjurisprudenceofanauthorizedtribunalorthepracticeofotherorgansininterpretingthetreatymayinturnbeconsideredsubsequentpracticeforthepurposeofinterpre-tation.70InitsdecisionintheDiallocasetheICJexplicitlyacknowledgedtheweightwhichthejurisprudenceofindependenttreatybodiescarrieswithregardtotheinterpretationofthetreatiesunderwhichtheyareestablished,whenitheld:“AlthoughtheCourtisinnowayobliged,intheexerciseofitsjudicialfunctions,tomodelitsowninterpretationoftheCovenantonthatoftheCommittee,itbelievesthatitshouldascribegreatweighttotheinterpretationadoptedbythisindependentbodythatwasestablishedspecificallytosupervisetheapplicationofthattreaty.Thepointhereistoachievethenecessaryclarityandtheessentialconsistencyofinternationallaw,aswellaslegalsecurity,towhichboththeindividualswithguaranteedrightsandtheStatesobligedtocomplywithtreatyobligationsareentitled.Likewise,whentheCourtiscalledupon,asintheseproceedings,toapplyaregionalinstrumentfortheprotectionofhumanrights,itmusttakedueaccountoftheinterpretationofthatinstrumentadoptedbytheindependentbodieswhichhavebeenspecificallycreated,ifsuchhasbeenthecase,tomonitorthesoundapplicationofthetreatyinquestion.”7119Evenifaseparatetreatyorganissetupwiththepowertointerpretthetreaty,itismerelythepartiestoatreatythemselveswhichcangiveanauthoritativeorauthenticinterpretationtothetreaty.AsthePCIJpointedoutinitsJaworzinaopinionof1923:“itisanestablishedprinciplethattherightofgivinganauthoritativeinterpretationofalegalrulebelongssolelytothepersonorbodywhichhasthepowertomodifyorsuppressit.”72Thus,asaconsequenceoftheircontinuingrighttomodifythetreatybyconsent(!Art39MN1),thepartiescanalwaysoverrideanyinterpretationgivenbyatreatyorganestablishedforthatpurpose.Thepartiesactinginconsensusremainthemastersoftheirtreatyandcan,therefore,determineitsmeaningwithbindingforce.73Thisiswhyissuesovertreatyinterpretationarecommonlyamatterfor68WTOAppellateBodyUS–CloveCigarettesWT/DS406/AB/R,paras250–255(2012),reprintedat51ILM759.69As,forexample,doesArt50para3ofthe2008ProtocolontheStatuteoftheAfricanCourtofJusticeandHumanRights48ILM317.Art1131para2oftheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreementdeclarestheinterpretationbytheFreeTradeCommissionofaprovisionoftheAgreementtobebindingonatribunalestablishedunderitschapter11.70ForthepurposeofinterpretingtheUNChartertheICJregularlyputsmajoremphasisonthepracticeofUNorgansunderit,!MN86.71ICJDiallo[2010]ICJRep639,paras66–67.72PCIJQuestionofJaworzina(Polish–CzechoslovakianFrontier)PCIJSerBNo8,37(1923).73Villiger(2009),Art31MN16.570PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
discussion,negotiationandagreementbetweentheparties,andwhysubsequentpracticeandsubsequentagreementsamongthelatterisofutmostimportanceinestablishingthetrue(current)meaningofatreaty.Insomeinstances,itmaybedifficulttodistinguishthenbetweenanagreedinterpretationofatreatyandan(implicit)treatyamendmentbyagreementamongtheparties.20ResolutionsoftheUNSecurityCouncilraiseparticularissuesofinterpreta-tion,sincewhenadoptedpursuanttoChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,theyhaveamandatorycharacterandarebindinguponallUNMemberStates(cfArts25and48UNCharter).DoesthismeanthattheCouncilis,aspartofitsfunctiontomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity,empoweredtointerprettheCharterwithanauthoritativeeffect,thusbindingontheMemberStatesandotherUNorgans?ThetextandconceptoftheCharterdonotseemtocorroboratesuchanunderstand-ing,sincetheSecurityCouncilismerelyauthorizedtoadoptbinding‘decisions’,iemeasuresinanindividualcaseorsituation,andnotinterpretativeguidelinesofabindingcharacter.NordoesthemandateoftheSecurityCouncilcovertheauthori-tativeinterpretationofothertreatiesthantheUNCharter.However,theinterpreta-tionwhichnecessarilyunderlieseverydecisionadoptedunderChapterVIIwillalwayscarryspecialweightforunderstandingtheCharterbecauseofthebindingforceofthosedecisions.21Apartfromtheirinterpretativevalue,SecurityCouncilresolutionsthemselvesareveryoftentheobjectofinterpretation.Whileinlegaldoctrine,itisusuallythoughttobeconvenienttobasicallyinterprettheminaccordancewiththerulesoftheVCLT,74internationalpracticehasbeenquitediverseonthispoint.75TheICJacceptedinitsKosovoopinionthatArts31,32VCLT“mayprovideguidance”inthisrespect,butatthesametimepointedtodecisivedifferencesbetweenUNSCresolutionsandtreaties,which,intheCourt’sview,meanthattheinterpretationofthoseresolutions“requirethatotherfactorstobetakenintoaccount”.Inparticular,theCourtheldthattheinterpretationofUNSCresolutionsmayrequire“toanalysestatementsofrepresentativesofSCmembersmadeatthetimeoftheiradoption,otherresolutionsoftheSConthesameissue,aswellasthesubsequentpracticeofrelevantUNorgansandofStatesaffectedbythosegivenresolutions.”76OtherpracticalexamplesofSCresolutionsbeingtheobjectofinterpretationare,ofcourse,thestatutesofICTYandICTR,bothbeingcontainedinannexestoSCresolutionsandbothbeinginterpretedbytheTribunalswithexplicitreferencetoArt31VCLT.77Alsoothersecondarylegalinstruments,suchastheRegulations74Gardiner(2015),p.128;Wood(1998),pp.85–86;Orakhelashvili(2010),pp.825–826.ContraPapastravidis(2007),pp.89–94.75SeeegtheaccountbyBrandl(2015),p.290etseq.76ICJKosovoOpinion[2010]ICJRep403,para94.77CfegICTYProsecutorvAleksovski(AppealsChamber)IT-95-14/1-A,24March2000,para98;ICTRProsecutorvBagosoraetal(AppealsChamber)ICTR-98-37-A,8June1998,paras28–29.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation571Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
adoptedbytheDeepSeabedAuthorityunderUNCLOS,areinterpretedbytherelevantinstancesaccordingtotheViennarules.78IV.TheTemporalElementofInterpretation22Oneofthemostimportantgeneralquestionsoftreatyinterpretationistowhatmomentintimetheprocessofinterpretationrefers,iethemeaningoftreatyprovisionsatwhattimeitistryingtoestablish.Twodifferentapproachescanbedistinguishedinthisrespect:Thestaticapproachasksforthemeaningoftreatyprovisionsandthecircumstancesprevailingatthetimeoftheconclusionofthetreaty.Itisalsocalledtheprincipleofcontemporaneity,accordingtowhichthetermsofatreatyaretobeinterpretedaccordingtothemeaningwhichtheypossessed,orwhichwouldhavebeenattributedtothem,andinthelightofcurrentlinguisticusage,atthetimewhenthetreatywasoriginallyconcluded.79Opposedtothatisthedynamicapproach,veryoftenalsolabelled‘evolutionary’interpreta-tion,whichseekstoestablishthemeaningofatreatyatthetimeofitsinterpretation.ThetemporalaspectofinterpretationwasdiscussedintheILCbutfinallyomittedfromtheadoptedtext(!MN13),sothatArts31–33VCLTdonotaddresstheissueexplicitly.23Bothtemporalconceptscanbefoundininternationaljudicialpractice,which,onthewhole,seemstofollowthestaticapproachasabasicruleandasaparticularapplicationofthedoctrineofinter-temporallaw.Assuch,ithasbeenappliedbytheICJatseveraloccasions,egwhentheCourtlookedintolinguisticusagesatthetimewhenthetreatywasconcluded80orintotheintentionofthepartiesatthatsamemomentintime.81Moreover,theapproachfiguresveryprominentlyinseveralarbitrationcases.Thus,theEritrea-EthiopiaBoundaryCommissionfollowedinitsdecisionregardingdelimitationoftheborderbetweenthetwocountriesthe‘doctrineofcontemporaneity’,whichitdescribedasrequiring“thatatreatyshouldbeinterpretedbyreferencetothecircumstancesprevailingwhenthetreatywasconcluded.Thisinvolvesgivingexpressions(includingnames)usedinthetreatythemeaningthattheywouldhavepossessedatthattime.”8278ThusexplicitlyITLOS(SeabedDisputesChamber)ResponsibilitiesandObligationsofStatesSponsoringPersonsandEntitieswithRespecttoActivitiesintheArea,1February2011,paras59–60.79ThusformulatedbySRFitzmauriceinhissixprinciples(!MN11),reportedinWaldockIII55,para12.80ICJRightsofUSNationalsinMorocco[1952]ICJRep176,189;DisputeRegardingNaviga-tionalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,paras55–56.81ICJBoundaryBetweenCameroonandNigeria[2002]ICJRep303,para59.SeealsoNamibiaOpinion[1971]ICJRep16,para53(atthebeginning).82Eritrea–EthiopiaBoundaryCommissionDelimitationoftheBorderBetweenEritreaandEthio-pia(EritreavEthiopia)(2002)25RIAA83,110.572PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
InthewordsofSRWaldock,therequirementtointerpretatreatybasicallybyreferencetothelinguisticusagecurrentatthetimeofitsconclusionisonebothofcommonsenseandgoodfaith.83Similarly,theICJinitsmorerecentdecisionontheDisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRightspointedoutthat“[i]tistruethatthetermsusedinatreatymustbeinterpretedinlightofwhatisdeterminedtohavebeentheparties’commonintention,whichis,bydefinition,contemporaneouswiththetreaty’sconclusion.Thatmayleadacourtseisedofadispute,orthepartiesthemselves,whentheyseektodeterminethemeaningofatreatyforpurposesofgood-faithcompliancewithit,toascertainthemeaningatermhadwhenthetreatywasdrafted,sincedoingsocanshedlightontheparties’commonintention.”8424Asanexceptiontothatrule,thedynamicapproachisbeingusedforinter-pretinggenericterms,ietermsinatreatywhosecontentthePartiesexpectedwouldchangethroughtimeandwhichthey,therefore,presumablyintendedtobegivenitsmeaninginlightofthecircumstancesprevailingatthetimeofinterpreta-tion.ThisapproachwasforthefirsttimeappliedbytheICJintheNamibiaopiniontothephrase“sacredtrustofcivilisation”85andintheAegeanSeaContinentalShelfcasetotheformula‘territorialstatus’.86Also,judicialpracticeintheWTOadoptedtheevolutionarymethodforinterpretingconceptssuchas‘naturalresources’87or‘soundrecording’and‘distribution’.88Morerecently,theICJappliedthedynamicmethodtotheSpanishterm‘comercio’andinageneralstatementunderlinedthat“wherethepartieshaveusedgenerictermsinatreaty,thepartiesnecessarilyhavingbeenawarethatthemeaningofthetermswaslikelytoevolveovertime,andwherethetreatyhasbeenenteredintoforaverylongperiodoris‘ofcontinuingduration’,thepartiesmustbepresumed,asageneralrule,tohaveintendedthosetermstohaveanevolvingmeaning.”89Insuchinstances,itisindeedinordertorespectthecommonwillofthepartiesthataccountshouldbetakenofthemeaningacquiredbythetermsinquestionuponeachoccasiononwhichthetreatyistobeapplied.9025Viewedinthelightofthoseexamples,dynamicorevolutionarytreatyinterpre-tationappearsinfacttobeatwo-tierprocess:first,itistobeestablishedwhetheratermismeantbythepartiestobeinterpretedinadynamicmanner.Ifnoparticularintentiontothiseffecthasbeenexpressed,thismustbetakentobethecaseifaconceptisembodiedinthetreatythatis,fromtheoutset,evolutiveordynamic.Apartfromthat,thedeterminationthatanevolutiveinterpretationiscalledformust83WaldockVI96,para7.84ICJDisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,para63.85ICJNamibiaOpinion[1971]ICJRep16,para53.86ICJAegeanSeaContinentalShelf[1978]ICJRep3,para77.87CfWTOAppellateBodyUS–ShrimpWT/DS58/AB/R,para130(1998).88WTOAppellateBodyChina–PublicationsandAudiovisualProductsWT/DS363/AB/R,para369(2009).89ICJDisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,para66.Con-firmedinICJPulpMills[2010]ICJRep14,para204.90Ibidpara64.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation573Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
resultfromtheordinaryprocessoftreatyinterpretationonacase-by-casebasis.Second,theterminquestionmustbegiventhemeaning,whichitpossessesatthetimeofinterpretation,consideringthedevelopmentoflinguisticusage,interna-tionallawandotherrelevantcircumstancesuptothatmoment.26Aparticularapplicationofthedynamicapproachliesattheheartoftheestab-lishedjurisprudenceoftheECtHRtoconsidertheECHRa‘livinginstrument’and,asaconsequence,tointerpretit“inthelightofpresent-dayconditions”.91Here,thedynamicapproachtotreatyinterpretation,ratherthanbeingfoundedon—andconfinedto—acertaincategoryoftermsusedinthetreaty,followsfromthequasi-constitutionalcharacteroftheECHRandtheneedtoreceivedirectionsfromitforeffectivelyimplementinghumanrightsguaranteesinamodernworld.92However,theCourtalsoacknowledgedthatthisapproachtotheConventionanditsProtocolshasitslimits,becauseit“cannot,bymeansofanevolutiveinterpretation,derivefromtheseinstrumentsarightthatwasnotincludedthereinattheoutset”.9327Thedynamicapproachtotheinterpretationoftreatiesmustbedistinguishedfromtheuseofdynamicmeansofinterpretation.SomeofthemethodsprovidedforinArt31arepersedynamic,suchassubsequentagreements(para3lita)orsubsequentpractice(para3litb),buttheydonotassuchdeterminetowhatmomentintimetheinterpretationinquestionrefers.ThepracticeoftheICJshowsthatdynamicmeansofinterpretationcanalsobeusedforapplyingthestaticapproach,ietoestablishthemeaningoftreatyprovisionsatthetimeoftheirconclusion.Forexample,intheCorfuChannelcase,theCourtheldthat:“ThesubsequentattitudeofthePartiesshowsthatitwasnottheirintention[...].”94Also,intheKasikili/SeduduIslandcase,theICJappliedthestaticapproachbyusingdynamicmeans,whenitestablishedthehistoricalintentionsofthepartiestoatreatyconcludedin1890by“takingintoaccountthepresent-daystateofscientificknowledge”.95Thus,theinterpretativemeansuseddonotinprincipleprejudicethetemporalpointofreferenceoftheprocessofinterpretation.91Forexample,ECtHRTyrervUnitedKingdomAppNo5856/72,SerA26,para31(1978);MarckxvBelgiumAppNo6833/74,SerA32,para41(1979);LoizidouvTurkey(PreliminaryObjections)AppNo15318/89,SerA310,para71(1995);ÖcalanvTurkeyAppNo46221/99,12March2003,para193;MamatkulovandAskarovvTurkey(GC)AppNo46827/99and46951/99,ECHR2005-I,para121;DemirandBaykaravTurkey(GC)AppNo34503/97,ECHR2008-V,para68;HirsiJamaaetalvItaly(GC)AppNo27765/09,ECHR2012-II,para175;XetalvAustria(GC)AppNo19010/07,ECHR2013-II,para139.92OnthedynamicinterpretationoftheECHRcfCremer(2013),paras35–118.93ECtHRJohnstonetalvIrelandAppNo9697/82,SerA112,para53(1986);EmonetetalvSwitzerlandAppNo39051/03,13December2007,para66.94ICJCorfuChannel[1949]ICJRep4,25.95ICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para20.574PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
V.DoesOneSizeFitAll?28Everytreatyneedsinterpretation,butdothesamerulesofinterpretationapplytoalltypesoftreaties?Oraretherespecialrulesforcertainkindsofthem?AlthoughArts31–33donotcontainanyhinttothiseffect,itisoftenarguedthatthegeneralrulesofinterpretationundergosomemodificationswhentheyareappliedtocertaintypesoftreaties.96If,forexample,Statesassumeobligationsinrelationtooneanother,butthebeneficiaries,oreventhetrueaddressees,ofthetreatyprovisionsareindividuals(humanrightstreaties),thatspecialfeatureandthelatter’sinterestsmustbetakenintoaccountintheprocessofinterpretation.97However,itissubmittedthatthisdoesnotrequiredifferentrules,butsimplyareasonableunderstandingofthe“objectandpurpose”oftherespectivetreatywhenapplyingthegeneralrulelaiddowninArt31.9829Differingrulesmaybeapplicabletotreatiesoperatingastheconstituentinstrumentofaninternationalorganizationorconcludedwithinsuchanorganization.Art5VCLTofferssomeflexibilityinthisrespect,asitholdstherulesoftheConventiontobeapplicabletothosekindsoftreaties“withoutprejudicetoanyrelevantrulesoftheorganization”.AstheICJpointedoutinitsNuclearWeapons(WHO)opinion:“Suchtreatiescanraisespecificproblemsofinterpretationowing,interalia,totheircharacterwhichisconventionalandatthesametimeinstitutional;theverynatureoftheorganizationcreated,theobjectiveswhichhavebeenassignedtoitbyitsfounders,theimperativesassociatedwiththeeffectiveperformanceofitsfunctions,aswellasitsownpractice,areallelementswhichmaydeservespecialattentionwhenthetimecomestointerpretconstituenttreaties.”9930Nevertheless,asamatterofprinciple,thegeneralruleofinterpretationappliestoconstituenttreaties,subjectperhapstothreemodificationsthathaveariseninpractice:100first,ininterpretingtheconstituentdocumentofaninternationalorganization,theeffectivefulfillmentoftheorganization’sfunctionsisofmajorimportance;thustheobjectandpurposerulewillinthesecasesbegearedalmostexclusivelytowardstheeffectiveperformanceoftheorganizationanditsorgans.Thisbecameapparent,forexample,intheICJ’sjurisprudencewithregardtothepowersofUNorgans,101anditalsoliesatthebottomofthecaselawoftheECJ96Gardiner(2015),p.22.97TheECtHRregularlypointsoutthat,wheninterpretingtheECHR,“theCourtmustbemindfuloftheConvention’sspecialcharacterasahumanrightstreaty”,butsofarnorealconsequencesseemtofollowfromthat,cfegECtHRLoizidouvTurkey(GC)(Merits)AppNo15318/89,ECHR1996VI,para43;Al-AdsanivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo35763/97,ECHR2001XI,para55.98InasimilarveinÇali(2012).99ICJUsebyaStateofNuclearWeaponsinArmedConflict[1996]ICJRep66,para19.100SeealsoBrölmann(2012).101CfICJReparationforInjuries[1949]ICJRep174,182–183;CertainExpensesoftheUnitedNations[1962]ICJRep151,168.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation575Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
concerningthefunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(effetutile).102Second,thesubsequentpracticeoftheorganizationitself,ratherthanthatofitsMemberStates,inapplyingtheconstituenttreatiesusuallyprovestobeofcriticalimpor-tanceforthelatter’sinterpretation.Insomecases,theresultreachedbytheinterpretingcourtevenseemstobeexclusivelybasedonthatpractice,especiallywhenittendstodeviatefromthewordingofthetreaty.ExamplesforthiscanbefoundintheNamibiaandtheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritoryopinionsoftheICJ.103Thirdlyandfinally,ifanorganhasbeenempow-eredtointerprettheconstituenttreatyoftheorganization,itusuallytendstoemphasizetheneedforanautonomousinterpretation,ieonethatisindependentfromnationallegalconcepts,traditionsandterminologies.Aprimeexampleforthisapproachtotreatyinterpretationis,ofcourse,thejurisprudenceoftheECJ104whichinrecentyearsseemstoregardtheautonomousinterpretationoftheEuropeanUniontreatiesasaconstitutionalprincipleoftheUnionitself.10531Finally,itissubmittedthatthegeneralruleofinterpretationinprinciplealsoappliestotheinterpretationofinterpretationclauses,ietotreatyprovisionsthatstipulatethemselvesrulesfortheinterpretationofthetreatytheyarecontainedin.AnexampleisArt2oftheUNConventiononContractsfortheInternationalCarriageofGoodsWhollyorPartlybySea(2008)106whichunderlinesthatintheinterpretationoftheConventionregardmustbehadtoitsinternationalcharacter,totheneedofitsuniformapplicationandtotheobservanceofgoodfaithininternationaltrade.Dependingupontheexactcontentsoftheprovisioninquestion,itmayincertaincasesbetakentobelexspecialisvis-à-vistherulesoftheVCLT,andthuseffectivelypreventthelatterfromapplyingtothetreatyinquestion.Butinordertoestablishjustthat,everyinterpretationclausewouldneedtobeinterpreted,thusbesubjectedtotheapplicationoftheruleslaiddowninArts31–33VCLT.Also,treatyprovisionswhichexplicitlylaydownthepurposeoftheirtreaty107canbe102CfBrownandKennedy(2000),p.343.Hartley(2010),p.72callsthisapproach“decision-makingonthebasisofjudicialpolicy”.103ICJNamibia[1971]ICJRep16,para22;ConstructionofaWall[2004]ICJRep136,paras27–28.Withacontraryresult,theICJbasedinUsebyaStateofNuclearWeaponsinArmedConflict[1996]ICJRep66,para27thedenialofanextensiveinterpretation,interalia,ona“considerationofthepracticeoftheWHO”.104Barents(2004),p.289.105CfegECJLinsterC-287/98[2000]ECRI-6917,para43;JaegerC-151/02[2003]ECRI-8389,para58;Opinion1/09(EuropeanPatentsCourt)[2011]ECRI-1137paras67and76;Opinion2/13(AccessiontoECHR)ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454,paras183-186;CFIHosman-ChevaliervCom-missionT-72/04[2005]ECRII-3265,para40;EUCivilServiceTribunalKleinvCommissionF-32/08[2009]FP-I-A-1-5,FP-II-A-1-1320,paras35–36.106AdoptedbyUNGARes63/122,11December2008,UNDocA/C.6/63/L.6.107SuchasArtIIofthe1975ConventionfortheEstablishmentofaEuropeanSpaceAgency1297UNTS186;Art1ofthe2000UNConventionAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime2225UNTS209;Art1ofthe2003UNConventionAgainstCorruption2349UNTS41;Art1para1ofthe2006UNConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities,UNGARes61/106,13December2006,UNDocA/Res/61/106.576PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
interpretedinaccordancewiththegeneralrules,althoughinthiscase,theobjectandpurposetestwouldprobablyberathermeaningless.Inanycase,suchapurposeclausecannotpreventthetreatyinterpreterfromestablishing,byapplyingthegeneralruleofinterpretation,whetherthepurposeofthetreatyhasbeenlaiddownaccuratelyandwhatexactlythestipulatedpurposemeans.VI.RulesofInterpretationOutsidetheVCLT?32TherearemuchmorerulesoftreatyinterpretationappliedininternationalpracticeanddiplomacythanarecodifiedinArts31–33VCLT.TheConvention’srulesofinterpretationarenotexclusiveinawaythattheypreventtheinterpreterfromapplyingotherprinciplescompatiblewiththegeneralrulelaiddowninArt31.Itisthusinhisorherdiscretiontohaverecoursetoestablishedcustomaryinterpretationrulesoratleasttothewealthofmaterialontreatyinterpretation,whichprecededtheConvention.108ThequestionseemsinmanycasestobewhethertheproposedruleofinterpretationisinfactonethatliesoutsidetheConvention’ssystemorwhetheritisencompassedbythelatter’sprovisions.33Oneofthetraditionalformulaeoftreatyinterpretationistheprincipleindubiomitius,alsocalledtheprincipleofrestrictiveinterpretation,accordingtowhichtreatiesaretobeinterpretedinfavorofStatesovereignty:whereatreaty’sprovi-sionsareopentodoubt,theinterpretationthatentailsthelesserobligationforsovereignStatesshouldbeselected,andifanobligationisnotclearlyexpressed,itslessonerousextentistobepreferred.109ThePCIJappliedthatprincipleexplicitlyinthe‘Wimbledon’andFreeZonecases,whenitinterpretedlimitationsonsovereigntyrestrictively,andthatonlybecauseoftheirlimitingeffect.110IntheRiverOdercase,thePermanentCourtwasalreadymuchmorereluctantandappliedindubiomitiusasasubsidiaryprinciplewhenitpointedoutthat“itwillbeonlywhen,inspiteofallpertinentconsiderations,theintentionofthePartiesstillremainsdoubtful,thatthatinterpretationshouldbeadoptedwhichismostfavorabletothefreedomofStates.”111TracesofthatapproachcanstillbefoundinthecaselawoftheWTO.112TheICJ,however,neveradoptedit,andalsothePCIJin‘Wimbledon’emphasizedclearlimitstorestrictiveinterpretation,whenitfelt“obligedtostopatthepointwheretheso-calledrestrictiveinterpretationwouldbecontrarytotheplaintermsofthe108Gardiner(2015),p.57.109CftheexplanationandreferencesgivenbyLauterpacht(1949),p.48etseq.110CfPCIJSS‘Wimbledon’PCIJSerANo1,24(1923);FreeZonesofUpperSavoyandtheDistrictofGexPCIJSerA/BNo46,167(1932).111PCIJTerritorialJurisdictionoftheInternationalCommissionoftheRiverOderPCIJSerANo23,26(1929).112CfWTOAppellateBodyEC–HormonesWT/DS26andDS48/AB/R,para165(1998);muchmorereluctantChina–PublicationsandAudiovisualProductsWT/DS363/AB/R,para411(2009).Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation577Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
articleandwoulddestroywhathasbeenclearlygranted”.Moreover,inamorerecentdecision,theICJmadeitveryclearthatatreatyprovision,whichhasthepurposeoflimitingthesovereignpowersofaState,mustbeinterpretedlikeanyotherprovisionofatreaty,113thustherecanbenosuchprincipleasindubiomitiusintreatyinterpretation.Itisnotonlyoflittlevaluefortreatyinterpretationitself,114but,aboveall,doesnotconstitutearuleofcustomaryinternationallaw.34Anotherunwrittentoposofinterpretationthatfiguresratherprominentlyininternationalpracticeistheruleofeffectiveness,inviewofitsLatinoriginalsophrasedasutresmagisvaleatquampereat.Itsaysthattreatyprovisionsaretobeinterpretedsoastogivethemtheirfullestweightandeffectandinsuchawaythatareasonandameaningcanbeattributedtoeverypartofthetext.115TheprinciplewasappliedalreadyintheearlyjurisprudenceofPCIJ116andICJ117andhas,accordingtothelatterinFisheriesJurisdiction(1998),“animportantroleinthelawoftreaties”.118InitsCERDcaseconcerningGeorgiaandRussia,theICJappliedthe“well-establishedprincipleintreatyinterpretationthatwordsoughttobegivenappropriateeffect”tothephrase“whichisnotsettled”inArt22oftheConventionanddiscardedareadingofthatphrasewhichwouldrenderitmeaninglessanddevoidofanyeffect.119InthejudicialpracticeoftheWTO,theprincipleisusuallytakentoprohibittheadoptionofareadingofWTOprovisions“thatwouldresultinreducingwholeclausesorparagraphsofatreatytoredundancyorinutility”.120Note,however,thattheruleofeffectivenessdoesnotcarrymuchweightwithregardtodeclaratorytreatyprovisions,whichthepartiesadoptedsimplyfortheavoidanceofdoubtandnotbecausetheythoughtthemtobenecessary.121However,effectivenessasaninterpretativetoposisnotanisolatedgoalorconcept,butiscloselylinkedtotheobjectandpurposeofthetreatyinquestion122:113ICJDisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,para48.114Tothiseffect,cfalsoIronRhine(‘IjzerenRhin’)RailwayArbitration(BelgiumvNetherlands)(2005)27RIAA35,para53;Iran-UnitedStatesClaimsTribunalFederalReserveBankofNewYorkvIran,BankMarkaziCaseA28(2000)36Iran-USClaimsTribunalReports5,para67;Bernhardt(1999),p.14.115ThusdescribedbyFitzmauriceinhissixprinciplesofinterpretation(!MN10),reprintedinWaldockIII55,para12.116CfPCIJMavrommatisPalestineConcessionsPCIJSerANo2,34(1924);FreeZonesofUpperSavoyandtheDistrictofGexPCIJSerANo22,13(1929).117!MN10.CfalsoICJAnglo-IranianOil[1952]ICJRep93,105;ConstitutionoftheMaritimeSafetyCommittee[1960]ICJRep150,160.118ICJFisheriesJurisdiction(SpainvCanada)[1998]ICJRep432,para52.119ICJRacialDiscriminationConvention(PreliminaryObjections)[2011]ICJRep70,paras133–34.120ForexampleWTOAppellateBodyUS–GasolineWT/DS2/AB/R,21(1996);PanelChile–PriceBandSystemWT/DS207/R,para7.71(2002).121ICJDelimitationoftheContinentalShelfbetweenNicaraguaandColombia(PreliminaryObjections)[2016]ICJRep100,para41.122SeeIronRhine(‘IjzerenRhin’)RailwayArbitration(BelgiumvNetherlands)(2005)27RIAA35,para49.578PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
itisthelatter’sfulfillmentwhichistobemadepossibleoreffectuatedthroughinterpretation.Thus,theprincipleofeffectivenessisinfactbutaspecificapplica-tionoftheobjectandpurposetestandthegoodfaithruleand,therefore,anintegralpartofthegeneralruleofinterpretationlaiddowninArt31.123Assuch,theprinciplehasbeenappliedbytheICJ,eg,intheLaGrandcasewhentheCourtdeterminedtheobjectandpurposeofArt41ICJStatutetobe“topreventtheCourtfrombeinghamperedintheexerciseofitsfunctions[...].”12435Thesameistruefortheallegedrulethatexceptionstoageneralrulehave,forthereasonaloneofbeinganexception,tobeinterpretedrestrictively.Thisinterpretativetoposcanalreadybefoundinearlyinternationaljurisprudence,125andisstillbeingappliedtoday.126Sincetheprincipleismeanttoenhancetheimplementation,andthustheeffectivenessofthegeneralruletowhichexceptionsarebeingmadeinthetreaty,italsoconstitutesaparticularapplicationoftheobjectandpurposerule,relatingtothetelosofthegeneralrule.12736TheICJintheFisheriesJurisdictioncasethoughtitpossiblethatthecontraproferentemrule“mayhavearoletoplayintheinterpretationofcontractualprovisions”,butdenieditsapplicationtodeclarationsofacceptanceoftheCourtandreservationsmadethereto.128However,theruleaccordingtowhichatextthatisambiguousmustbeconstruedagainstthepartywhodraftedit(verbaambiguaaccipiunturcontraproferentem),hasnotbeenveryprominentininternationalpractice129andinrelationtotreatiesindeeddoesnotappeartobeverypersuasive:treatiesareusuallytheresultofacommoneffortandtheproductofnegotiations,theydonotoriginatefromdraftsimposedbyoneparty,130sothereisnoproperreasonforholdingtheambiguityofoneofitselementsagainstthepartywhointroduceditintothenegotiationprocess.D.ElementsofArt31I.TheGeneralRule(Para1)37ThegeneralruleoftreatyinterpretationcontainedinArt31para1isbasedonthetextualapproach,ieontheviewthatthetextmustbepresumedtobetheauthentic123CfFinalDraft,IntroductoryCommentarytoArts27–28,219,para6.124ICJLaGrand[2001]ICJRep466,para102.125CfPCIJNationalityDecreesIssuedinTunisandMoroccoPCIJSerBNo425(1923).126CfECtHRLitwavPolandAppNo26629/95,ECHR2000-III,para59.127HeintschelvonHeinegg(2014),§12MN19.128ICJFisheriesJurisdiction(SpainvCanada)[1998]ICJRep432,para51.129ThePCIJreliedonitonce,butwithregardtoaninstrumentthatwasnotaninternationaltreaty,cfPaymentinGoldofBrazilianFederalLoansContractedinFrancePCIJSerANo21,114(1929).130Lauterpacht(1949),p.64.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation579Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
expressionoftheintentionsoftheparties.Consequently,thestartingpointofeveryinterpretationistheelucidationofthemeaningofthetext,131ratherthanofanyexternalwilloftheparties.38Art31para1containsthreeseparateprinciplesandcombinestheminonesingleruleofinterpretation.Thefirst,interpretationingoodfaith,flowsdirectlyfromtherulepactasuntservanda(Art26).Thesecondrequireseveryinterpretationtohaverecoursetotheordinary,asopposedtoaspecial,meaningofthetermsusedinthetreaty,andthethirdprincipleisthattheordinarymeaningisnottobedeterminedintheabstractbutinthecontextofthetreatyandinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose.132Thegeneralruleofinterpretationdoesnotdescribesomehierarchicalorchronologicalorderinwhichthoseprinciplesaretobeapplied,butsetsthestageforasinglecombinedoperationtakingaccountofallnamedelementssimultaneously(!MN5).AsGardineraptlydescribesit:Anytreatyprovision“istobereadselectingtheordinarymeaningforthewordsused.Butfindingtheordinarymeaningtypicallyrequiresmakingachoicefromarangeofpossiblemeanings.Theimmediateandmoreremotecontextisthenexttextualguide,withgoodfaithandthetreaty’sobjectandpurposeasfurtheraidstothisphaseofanexerciseininterpretation.”133Tothesameeffect,theWTOAppellateBodydescribedtheprocessoftreatyinterpretationas“anintegratedoperation,whereinterpretativerulesandprinciplesmustbeunderstoodandappliedasconnectedandmutuallyreinforcingcomponentsofaholisticexercise.”1341.OrdinaryMeaningoftheTerms39Thefirstelementofthegeneralruleofinterpretationrequiresgivinganordinarymeaningtothe“termsofthetreaty”.Consideringthetextualapproachunderlyingthewholeoperation(!MN37),itseemsquitenaturalthatthe“terms”towhichthemeaningistobegivenrefertowhathasbeenwrittendownbytheparties,iethewordsandphrasesusedinthetreaty,ratherthanthebargainstruckbytheparties.135ThisisconfirmedbyArt31para4andArt33para3where“term(s)”isclearlybeingusedwithreferencetothemeaningofwrittenlanguage.Therefore,astheICJunderlinesinitsjurisprudence,interpretationmustbebased“aboveall”uponthetextofthetreaty.136131FinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,220,para11.132Ibid221,para12.133Gardiner(2015),p.222.134WTOAppellateBodyChina–PublicationsandAudiovisualProductsWT/DS363/AB/R,para399(2009).135Gardiner(2015),p.183.136CfegICJTerritorialDispute(LibyavChad)[1994]ICJRep6,para41;LegalityoftheUseofForce(SerbiaandMontenegrovBelgium)[2004]ICJRep279,para100.580PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
40Thepointofdepartureintheprocessofinterpretationisthelinguisticandgrammaticalanalysisofthetextofthetreaty,lookingfortheordinarymeaning,iethemeaningthatis“regular,normalorcustomary”.137Inthisrespect,accountcanbetakenofthekindoftreatyinvolved,thusthetestisnotsomuchanylayman’sunderstanding,butwhatapersonreasonablyinformedonthesubjectmatterofthetreatywouldmakeofthetermsused.Inordertoestablishthatkindofmeaning,internationaljudicialbodiesquiteoftenturntodictionaries,generalormorespecializedones,138eventhoughthosetypicallyaimtocatalogueall—andnotjusttheordinary—meaningsofwords.13941Aconsiderationofthegrammaticalformofatreatytermencompassesthetenseinwhichaspecificprovisionhasbeenphrased.Thus,theWTOAppellateBodyhasunderlinedtherelevanceoftheuseofpresentperfecttense:“WeagreewithChilethatArticle4.2oftheAgreementonAgricultureshouldbeinterpretedinawaythatgivesmeaningtotheuseofthepresentperfecttenseinthatprovision–particularlyinthelightofthefactthemostoftheotherobligationsintheAgreementonAgricultureandintheothercoveredagreementsareexpressedinthepresent,andnotinthepresentperfect,tense.Ingeneral,requirementsexpressedinthepresentperfecttenseimposeobligationsthatcameintobeinginthepast,butmaycontinuetoapplyatpresent.”140IntheCERDcase(GeorgiavRussia)theICJhadtointerpretthephrase“whichisnotsettled”and,amongothers,referredtoitsgrammaticalformintheFrenchversion:“TheCourtalsoobservesthat,initsFrenchversion,theabove-mentionedexpressionemploysthefutureperfectsense,whereasthesimplepresenttenseisusedintheEnglishversion.TheCourtnotesthattheuseofthefutureperfecttensefurtherreinforcestheideathatapreviousaction(anattempttosettlethedispute)musthavetakenplacebeforeanotheraction(referraltotheCourt)canbepursued.”14142Indeterminingtheordinarymeaningofterms,twoconnectedaspects,whichhavebeenmentionedearlier,mustbetakenintoaccount:thetemporalaspectoftheordinarymeaningtestreferstothequestionofstaticordynamicinterpretation(!MN22);exceptwherethepartieshaveusedagenericterm,interpretationmustlookfortheordinarymeaningatthetimethetreatywasconcluded.ThelanguageaspectfollowsfromArt33:eachauthentictreatylanguagehastobeconsultedfor137Gardiner(2015),pp.183–184.138CfegICJOilPlatforms(PreliminaryObjection)[1996]ICJRep803,para45;Kasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para30;ECtHRGoldervUnitedKingdomAppNo4451/70,SerA18,para32(1975);Luedicke,BelkacemandKoçvGermanyAppNo6210/73,6877/75,7132/75,SerA29,para40(1978);WTOAppellateBodyinCanada–AircraftWT/DS70/AB/R,para153(1999);ECandCertainMemberStates–LargeCivilAircraftWT/DS316/AB/Rpara658(2011).139Critical,therefore,astothatapproachtheDS2OAppellateBodyinUS–GamblingWT/DS285/AB/R,paras164–167(2005);China–PublicationsandAudiovisualProductsWT/DS363/AB/R,para348(2009).140WTOAppellateBodyChile–PriceBandSystemWT/DS207/AB/R,para206(2002)(footnoteomitted).141ICJRacialDiscriminationConvention(PreliminaryObjections)[2011]ICJRep70,para135.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation581Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
theordinarymeaningofthetermatissueandeachofthemisofequalvalue,sinceineveryauthenticlanguage,thetermmustinprinciplebeconsideredtohavethesamemeaning.2.Context43Theprocessoftreatyinterpretationis,ofcourse,notapuregrammaticalexercise.ThegeneralruleofinterpretationlaiddowninArt31para1doesnotallowestablishinganabstractordinarymeaningofaphrase,divorcedfromtheplacewhichthatphraseoccupiesinthetexttobeinterpreted.Instead,thetermsofatreatyhavetobeinterpreted“intheircontext”,whichmeansthattheinterpreterofanyphraseinatreatyhastolookatthetreatyasawholeand,asArt31paras2and3demonstrate,evenbeyondthat.Thesystematicstructureofatreatyisthusofequalimportancetotheordinarylinguisticmeaningofthewordsused,inordertodetermineitstruemeaning,since,asthePCIJhadalreadypointedout,wordsobtaintheirmeaningfromthecontextinwhichtheyareused.14244Theentiretextofthetreatyistobetakenintoaccountas“context”,includingtitle,preambleandannexes(cfthechapeauofpara2)andanyprotocoltoit,andthesystematicpositionofthephraseinquestionwithinthatensemble.Interpretativevaluecanbefoundinthepositionofaparticularwordinagroupofwordsorinasentence,ofaparticularphraseorsentencewithinaparagraph,ofaparagraphwithinanarticleorwithinawholesetofprovisions,ofanarticlewithinorinrelationtothewholestructureorschemeofthetreaty.45Therelevanceofthetitleofatreatyisdemonstrated,forexample,bytheICJ’sreasoningintheOilPlatformscase:“Forthemeaningoftheword‘commerce’inabilateraltreatyconcludedbyIranandtheUS,theCourtturned,interalia,totheactualtitleoftreatywhichreferredratherbroadlyto‘economicrelations’andtherebysuggestedawiderreadingoftheterm.”14346TheimportanceofpunctuationandsyntaxcanbeseenintheAegeanSeaContinentalShelfcase,wheretheICJhadtodealwiththeFrenchphrase“et,notamment,”andexplicitlypointedtothecommasused.144ThestructureofthesentencewasalsorelevantinLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute,whenanICJChamberhadtodecideonitsauthoritytodelimitdisputedmaritimeboundariesand,forthatpurpose,tointerpretthephrase“todeterminethelegalsituation”.TheChamberheld:“Nodoubttheword‘determine’inEnglish(and,astheChamberisinformed,theverb‘determinar’inSpanish)canbeusedtoconveytheideaofsettinglimits,sothat,ifapplieddirectlytothe‘maritimespaces’its‘ordinarymeaning’mightbetakentoinclude142CfPCIJCompetenceoftheILOPCIJSerBNo2,23(1922).AdoptedbytheICJinConstitutionoftheMaritimeSafetyCommittee[1960]ICJRep150,158.143ICJOilPlatforms(PreliminaryObjection)[1996]ICJRep803,para47;alsousedasanexamplebyGardiner(2015),pp.200–201.144CfICJAegeanSeaContinentalShelf[1978]ICJRep3,para53.582PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
delimitationofthosespaces.Butthewordmustbereadinitscontext;theobjectoftheverb‘determine’isnotthemaritimespacesthemselvesbutthelegalsituationofthesespaces.NoindicationofacommonintentiontoobtainadelimitationbytheChambercanthereforebederivedfromthistextasitstands.”14547Thetreatyasawholeisconsideredwhentheinterpretercomparestheuseofthesametermelsewhereinthetreatyordifferentphrasesofthesametreatydealingwiththesameissueindifferentwordings.ThelatteriswhattheChamberdidinthesaiddecisionwhenitpointedout:“Thequestionmustbewhy,ifdelimitationofthemaritimespaceswasintended,theSpecialAgreementusedthewording‘todelimittheboundaryline[...]’(‘Quedelimitelalineafronteriza[...]’)regardingthelandfrontier,whileconfiningthetaskoftheChamberasitrelatestotheislandsandmaritimespacesto‘determine[their]legalsituation[...]’(‘Quedeterminelasituacionjuridica[...]’).”14648Thetreatyasawholeisalsotakenaccountofwhenitisestablishedthatotherprovisionsofthesametreatyhaveasanecessaryconsequenceorimplicationacertainreadingofthedisputedterm.TheICJchosethatlineofargumentinDisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRightswhenitheldthatCostaRica’srighttothenavigationaluseoftheriverincludedaminimalrightofnavigationinthevillagesalongtheriver,includingtheusebyofficialvessels,andconcludedthatfromotherprovisionsofthetreatythanthoseonnavigationalrights.147Similarly,inQuestionsofMutualAssistancetheinterpretationofArt3ofthe1986ConventiononMutualAssistanceinCriminalMattersentailedthattheprovisionbereadinconjunctionwithArts1and2ofthatConvention,whichrevealedthattheremaybeexceptionsinwhichtherequestedassistancemaylegitimatelyberefused.14849Thepreambletoatreaty,usuallyconsistingofasetofrecitals,mayassistindeterminingtheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty,foritisthenormalplacewherethepartieswouldembodyanexplicitstatementtothateffect.Bystatingtheaimsandobjectivesofatreaty,apreamblecanthusbeofbothcontextualandteleologicalsignificance.Therearemanyexamplesininternationaljurisprudenceofreferencebeingmadetothepreambleofatreatyinordertoelucidatethemeaningofaparticularprovision.14950Totakeaccountofthepositionofatermorphraseinatreatyprovisionsmeansalsothatconsiderationsoftextuallogicapplyinestablishingtheordinary145ICJLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(ElSalvadorvHonduras)[1992]ICJRep351,para373.146Ibidempara374.147ICJDisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,paras77–79and84.148ICJMutualAssistanceinCriminalMatters[2008]ICJRep177,para123.149CfegICJAsylumCase[1950]ICJRep266,282;RightsofUSNationalsinMorocco[1952]ICJRep176,196;SovereigntyoverPulauLigitanandPulauSipadan[2002]ICJRep625,para51;ECtHRGoldervUnitedKingdomAppNo4451/70,SerA18,para34(1975);WTOAppellateBodyUS–ShrimpWT/DS58/AB/R,para129(1998);Chile–PriceBandSystemWT/DS207/AB/R,paras196–197(2002).Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation583Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
meaning:thus,theICJconsidereditdecisiveinthisregardifonlyoneofseveralproposedreadingsallowstheentiresentenceinatreatyprovisiontobegivenacoherentmeaning.150Whetherornotatreatyprovisioncanbegivenanacontrarioreading,mayalsobedeterminedbythecontext,forexampleifonlyonepossiblereadingoftheprovisionisreconcilablewiththetermsofanotherprovision.15151Also,comparingtheterminquestionwiththeanalogouswordingofarelatedtreatymayassistinthecontextualinterpretation.ThelatterisaptlyillustratedbytheChamberdecisionreferredtoabove:“ThesamecontrastofwordingcanbeobservedinArticle18oftheGeneralTreatyofPeace,which,inparagraph2,askstheJointFrontierCommissionto‘delimitthefrontierlineintheareasnotdescribedinArticle16ofthisTreaty’,whileprovidinginparagraph4,that‘itshalldeterminethelegalsituationoftheislandsandmaritimespaces’.Hondurasitselfrecognizesthattheislandsdisputeisnotaconflictofdelimitationbutofattributionofsovereigntyoveradetachedterritory.Itisdifficulttoacceptthatthesamewording‘todeterminethelegalsituation’,usedforboththeislandsandthemaritimespaces,wouldhaveacompletelydifferentmeaningregardingtheislandsandregardingmaritimespaces.”152AlsoinarecentmaritimedelimitationcasetheCourtdrewconclusionsfrom“thesimilarityofwording”betweenthetreatyconcernedandarelatedagreement,UNCLOSinthatcase.153Bythusextendingsystematicconsiderationsbeyondtheframeofthespecifictreatyinquestion,theroleofextrinsicmaterialintheprocessofinterpretationcomesintoplay,whichiseffectivelygovernedbyArt31paras2and3(!MN61and69).3.ObjectandPurpose52ThefinalwordsofArt31para1introducetheteleologicalorfunctionalelementintothegeneralruleofinterpretationand,bydoingso,bringtheprincipleofeffectivenessintothatrule:thetermsofatreatyaretobeinterpretedinawaythatadvancesthelatter’saims.Anyinterpretationthatwouldrenderpartsofthetreatysuperfluousordiminishtheirpracticaleffectsistobeavoided(!MN34).15453Theintroductionofthecomposite“objectandpurpose”intotheworkoftheILCdraftswasapparentlyinfluencedbytheFrenchversionoftheICJopiniononReservationstotheGenocideConvention.There,theCourtruledonthe150CfICJDisputeRegardingNavigationalandRelatedRights[2009]ICJRep213,para52.151CfICJDelimitationoftheContinentalShelfbetweenNicaraguaandColombia(PreliminaryObjections)[2016]ICJRep100,paras35–38.152ICJLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(ElSalvadorvHonduras,Nicaraguainter-vening)[1992]ICJRep351,para374.153ICJMaritimeDelimitationintheIndianOcean(SomaliavKenya)(PreliminaryObjections),2February2017,para91.154CfegICJConstitutionoftheMaritimeSafetyCommittee[1960]ICJRep150,160–161and166.584PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
admissibilityofreservationstotreatiesaccordingto“l’objetetlebut”ofthelatter,whichappearedintheEnglishversionas“objectandpurpose”.155ThisincidentallyleadstotheconclusionthattheobjectandpurposetestlaiddowninArt19VCLTforthepurposeofdeterminingthecompatibilityofareservationandcloselymodelledaftertheReservationsopinion,isinfactjustanapplicationoftheteleologicalapproachtointerpretation:thatcompatibilitycanbedecidedononlyaftertheobjectandpurposeofthetreatyhasbeendeterminedthroughinterpretation(!Art19MN75).Takenliterally,“l’objet”wouldseemtodescribethesubstantivecontentofatreaty,ietherightsandobligationscreatedbyit,while“lebut”referstothegeneralresult,whichthepartieswanttoachievethroughthetreaty.156However,inpracticeanddoctrine,bothelementsareusuallyamalgamatedintoonesingletest157applyingthetelosofthetreaty,orofoneofitsprovisions,toaproposedinterpretationofitsterms.54Althoughmanytreatieshaveinfactavarietyofdifferent,andpossiblyconflicting,purposes,Art31para1usesthesingularform“objectandpurpose”,asdootherprovisionsoftheVCLT.Thus,thegeneralruleofinterpretationclearlymeanstoreferasasingleoverarchingnotiontothetelosofthetreatyasawhole,158asdoesexpresslyArt41para1litbclii.Since,however,inpractice,theobjectofinterpretationisalwaysaspecificprovision,orapartofsuch,ratherthanthetreatyasawhole,thisglobalviewisboundtodiminishthevalueofteleologicalinterpre-tation.Therefore,inthecaseofmulti-purposetreatiesallgoalsthatareexpressedinthetermsofthetreatyaretobetakenintoaccount,andintheendthatwhichconformsbestwiththegrammaticalandsystematicconsiderationsontheterminquestionwillprevailintheprocessofinterpretation.55Therearevariouswaysofdeterminingtheobjectandpurposeofatreaty.Sometreatiescontaingeneralclausesspecificallystatingtheirpurposes,Art1UNCharterbeingtheobviousexample.159Also,recoursetothetitleofthetreatymaybehelpful.160Moreover,thepreambleofatreatyisregularlyaplacewherethepartieslistthepurposestheywanttopursuethroughtheiragreement(!MN49).Inothercasesthetypeoftreatymayitselfattractanassumptionofaparticularobjectandpurpose,suchasboundarytreaties(finalandstablefixingoffrontiers).161Generally,however,areadingofthewholetreaty,ieofallitssubstantiveprovi-sions,willberequiredtoestablishtheobjectandpurposewithsomecertainty.Also,155ICJGenocideConventionOpinion[1951]ICJRep15,24.Onthepreviouspageoftheopinion,however,theEnglish“objects”isusedtotranslatetheFrench“fins”,whichcouldimplythat“object”wasmeanttohaveapurelyteleologicalmeaning.156BuffardandZemanek(1998),p.326.157CfKlabbers(1997),pp.144–148.158Klabbers(2008),MN6–7;Klabbers(1997),pp.151–155.159Formoreexamplescfn107.160ExplicitlyemphasizedinICJDelimitationoftheContinentalShelfbetweenNicaraguaandColombia(PreliminaryObjections)[2016]ICJRep100,para39;MaritimeDelimitationintheIndianOcean(SomaliavKenya)(PreliminaryObjections),2February2017,para70.161Gardiner(2015),p.213.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation585Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
contrastingthetreatyinquestionwithrelevanttreatiesofthesamekindcanassistinestablishingthetelosoftheformer.ThatiswhattheICJdid,forexample,intheOilPlatformcase,whenitcomparedtheTreatyofFriendshipbetweenIranandtheUnitedStateswithothertypesoftreatiesoffriendshipandtherebydeterminedtheobjectiveofthetreatybeforeit.162Ingeneral,intuitionandcommonsensemayprovideusefulindicatorsinidenti-fyingtheobjectandpurpose,163withtheruleofgoodfaithpreventingthataimsandobjectivesareintroducedthroughthebackdoor,whichthedraftersofthetreatyrejectedtoinsertintoitsterms.56Considerationsofeffectivenessplayapredominantroleininterpretingtreatiesthatsetupinternationalorgansororganizationsandempowerthemwithcertainfunctionsandpowers.Here,theteleologicalelementofinterpretationcouldleadtounwritten(‘implied’)powersbeingreadintothetextinordertoenabletheorganconcernedtofulfilitstaskunderthetreaty.IntheICJ’scase-lawexamplesofdifferentversionsofthatapproachcanbefound:whileinitsReparationforInjuriesopiniontheCourtreferredforimpliedcompetencesoftheUNtothepowersexplicitlylaiddownintheCharter:“Underinternationallaw,theOrganizationmustbedeemedtohavethosepowerswhich,thoughnotexpresslyprovidedintheCharter,areconferreduponitbynecessaryimplica-tion–asbeingessentialfortheperformanceofitsduties,”164intheCertainExpensescase,onlyacoupleofyearslater,itderivedunwrittenpowerssimplyfromthepurposesoftheUN:“ButwhentheOrganizationtakesactionwhichwarrantstheassertionthatitwasappropri-ateforthefulfilmentofoneofthestatedpurposesoftheUnitedNations,thepresumptionisthatsuchactionisnotultravirestheOrganization.”165Overtheyears,theconceptofimpliedpowersseemstohavebeenveryattrac-tive,evenseductivetothosewhowantedtoseefoundingtreatiesofinternationalbodiestobeinterpretedaccordingtotheprincipleofeffetutile.However,itmaybethatthedoctrinehasinthemeantimelostquiteabitofitsappealandinterpretationinpracticenowfavorsastricterapproachtotheattributionofpowerstointerna-tionalorgans.16657Theconsiderationofobjectandpurposefindsitslimitsintheordinarymean-ingofthetextofthetreaty.Itmayonlybeusedtobringoneofthepossible162ICJOilPlatforms(PreliminaryObjection)[1996]ICJRep803,para27.163Klabbers(1997),p.155.164ICJReparationforInjuries[1949]ICJRep174,182.SeealsothedissentingopinionofJudgeHackworth[1949]ICJRep196,198whofoundtheCourt’sapproachtoowideandwantedtohaveimpliedpowerslimitedto“thosethatare‘necessary’totheexerciseofpowersexpresslygranted.”165ICJCertainExpensesoftheUnitedNations[1962]ICJRep151,168.166SeeKlabbers(2009),pp.59–73.AtellingexampleseemstobeICJUsebyaStateofNuclearWeaponsinArmedConflict[1996]ICJRep66,para25,wheretheCourtupheldthe“principleofspeciality”vis-à-visallegedimpliedpowersoftheOrganization.586PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
ordinarymeaningsofthetermstoprevailandcannotestablishareadingthatclearlycannotbeexpressedwiththewordsusedinthetext.167AstheIran-USClaimsTribunaloncepointedout:“Evenwhenoneisdealingwiththeobjectandpurposeofatreaty,whichisthemostimportantpartofthetreaty’scontext,theobjectandpurposedoesnotconstituteanelementindependentofthatcontext.Theobjectandpurposeisnottobeconsideredinisolationfromthetermsofthetreaty;itisintrinsictoitstext.Itfollowsthat,underArticle31oftheViennaConvention,atreaty’sobjectandpurposeistobeusedonlytoclarifythetext,nottoprovideindependentsourcesofmeaningthatcontradictthecleartext.”16858Furthermore,determiningtheobjectandpurposeofatreaty,orofoneofitsprovisions,must,forpracticalaswellastheoreticalreasons,bedistinguishedfromhavingrecoursetothe“circumstancesoftheconclusion”ofthetreaty.ThelattermayonlybetakenintoaccountundertheconditionsofArt32,ieasasupplemen-tarymeansofinterpretation.AsthedecisioninLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDisputedemonstrates,topointtocertainbehaviorofaStatePartyinordertodevelopviewsonthetreaty’spurposefromitmayendupasbeingtakenmerelyaspartofthose“circumstances”,andthusbeinggivenamuchlesserimportanceintheprocessofinterpretation.169Theresultis,again,thatobjectandpurposeofatreatymustprimarilybeestablishedbyreadingthelatterasawhole,andnotsomuchbyrecurringtoexternalfactors.4.InGoodFaith59Art31para1requireseverytreatytobeinterpreted“ingoodfaith”andtherebyestablishesthegeneralideaembodiedinthatwell-knownphraseassomekindofumbrellacoveringthewholeprocessofinterpretation.Embodiedintheopeningwordsofthegeneralruleofinterpretation,thatideasetsthetoneanddirectstheundertakingasawhole.Accordingtothemostfundamentalruleofthelawoftreaties,everytreatymustbeperformed“ingoodfaith”(Art26).Sinceinterpretingatreatyisanecessaryelementofitsperformance,logicrequiresthatgoodfaithbeappliedtotheinterpretationoftreaties.Goodfaithmustbeusedduringtheentireprocessofinterpretation,iewhenexaminingtheordinarymeaningofthetext,thecontext,objectandpurpose,thesubsequentpracticeoftheparties,etc.Inaddition,theresultoftheinterpretativeoperationmustbeappreciatedingoodfaithaswell.17060Althoughitisdifficulttogiveprecisecontenttotheconceptingeneral,thebottomlineofitappearstobeafundamentalrequirementofreasonablenessqualifyingthedogmatismthatcanresultfrompurelyverbalor,forthatpurpose,167ConcurringVilliger(2009),Art31MN14.168Iran-UnitedStatesClaimsTribunalFederalReserveBankofNewYorkvBankMarkaziCaseA28(2000)36Iran-USClaimsTribunalReports5,para58.169CfICJLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontier(ElSalvadorvHonduras)[1992]ICJRep351,para376.170Sinclair(1984),p.120.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation587Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
excessivelyteleologicalanalysis.171Thisisalsotheunderstandinginwhichtheconceptofgoodfaithisatleasthintedatintherulesofinterpretationthemselves,albeitonlyasanobligationofresult:whatistobeavoidedbyapplyingtheprincipleofgoodfaithissetoutinArt32litb,iethatinterpretationofatreatyshouldleadtoaresult,whichismanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable.Thus,theordinarymeaning,ifestablishedinitscontext,mustalwaysbesubmittedtothetestofreasonableness.Ifapplyingthewordsofatreatyintheirordinarymeaningwouldseemtoleadtoaresult,whichwouldbemanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable,anotherinterpretationmustbesought.Thus,toadopttheexamplegivenbyAust,thereferenceinArt23para1oftheUNChartertothe“RepublicofChina”andthe“UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics”musttodayreasonablybetakentorefertothePeople’sRepublicofChinaandtotheRussianFedera-tion,respectively.172Anyotherapproach,whichmightbeinaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningofthosenames,wouldbecontrarytogoodfaith.II.CertainElementsof‘Context’(Para2)61Art31para2designatestwotypesofdocumentsthatareregardedasformingpartofthe“context”withinthemeaningofpara1and,thus,tobeusedforthepurposeofarrivingattheordinarymeaningofthetermsofthetreaty.Theprovisionisbasedontheprinciplethataunilateraldocumentcannotassuchberegardedaspartofthe“context”buthas,inordertoattainthatstatus,toreceivesomekindofacceptanceonpartoftheotherparties.17362Thedocumentsreferredtoinpara2areextrinsictothetreaty,theyarenotintegralpartsofit.Whetheradocumentsetupwithregardtotheconclusionofatreatyconstitutesanactualpartofthattreatydependsontheintentionofthepartiesineachindividualcase.174Ifthepartiesadoptcertain‘understandings’andformallyannexthemtotheirtreaty,theyobviouslywantthemtoformpartoftheirtreatyconsensus,andnotmaterialexternaltoit.175Thisalsoappliestotreatieswhichcontainexplicitclauseswithregardtotheirowninterpretationorwhichrefertoattacheddocumentsdealingwiththeirinterpretation,suchas,eg,Art9oftheRomeStatuteontheICCintroducing“ElementsofCrimes”that“shall171CfGardiner(2015),pp.171and176.SeealsoJenningsandWatts(1992),p.1272.172Aust(2013),p.209.173FinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,221,para13.174CfICJAmbatielosCase[1952]ICJRep28,42–43;takenupbytheILCinFinalDraftCommentarytoArt27,221,para13.175Egthe1961AppendixtotheEuropeanSocialCharterETS35,andthe1996RevisedEuropeanSocialCharterETS163;the“UnderstandingswithrespecttocertainprovisionsoftheConvention”annexedtotheUNConventionontheJurisdictionalImmunitiesofStatesandTheirProperty(2004),TextannexedtoUNGARes59/38,16December2004,UNDocA/RES/59/38.588PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
assisttheCourtintheinterpretationandapplication”ofArts6–8bisoftheStatute.Those“elements”,whichcanbe,andindeedare,amendedbydecisionsoftheStatesParties,maynotbeanintegralpartoftheoriginaldocumentoftheStatute,buttheyarecertainlypartofthetreatyconsensusofthepartiesandnotextrinsicmaterialwithinthemeaningofpara2.Interpretationclausesmaybecomepartofthetreatyconsensusonlyatlaterdate,forexamplethroughasubsequentaccessionoramendmenttreaty.Suchwasenvisaged,eg,inArt5ofthenegotiatedAgreementoftheAccessionoftheEuropeanUniontotheECHR176,whichtheECJthwartedthroughitsOpinion2/13inlate2014177:TheprovisionwasmeanttoincludeintothetreatyconsensusexplicitunderstandingsoncertaintermsusedinArts35para2and55oftheConvention.Ifadocumentispartoftheactualtreatyconsensus,itisanobjectandnot,aspartofthetreaty“context”,aninstrumentofinterpretation.Theprovisioninpara2makesdocumentsoutsidethetreatyconsensus,butrelatedtoitsdevelopment,fully-fledgedinterpretativeinstruments.63Ontheotherhand,documentswithinthemeaningofpara2aretobedistin-guishedfrommeretravauxpréparatoires,sincetheyformpartofthe“context”andarethustobetreatedasanelementofthegeneralruleofinterpretation,andnotassupplementarymeansaccordingtoArt32.However,itisleftunclearinbothnorms,howthedistinctionbetweenextrinsiccontext(Art31para2)andthepreparatoryworksofatreaty(Art32)canbedrawninagivencase.Itissubmittedthatthedistinctionhangsinthephrase“inconnexionwiththeconclusionofthetreaty”containedinbothalternativesofpara2.Documentsthatareconnectedwiththeactofconcludingthetreaty,notsomuchwiththetreatyitself,leavethepreparatorystagebehindthemandrefertotheactualexistenceofthetreatyconsensus.Thedistinctionbetween“preparation”and“connexion”canbebestdrawnbytakingobjectivefactors(egthetimetakeninmakingthedocument)andtheintentionoftheactorsintoaccount.Treaty-relatedmaterialthatdoesnotfulfilltheconditionsforbeing“context”accordingtoArt31para2maystillbeconsid-eredastravauxwithinthemeaningofArt32.InMaritimeDispute(PeruvChile),theICJdistinguishedmaterialfallingunderpara2(a)fromtravauxpréparatoiresbypointingoutthatthematerialinquestion,theminutesofaconferenceoftheparties,“summarizethediscussionsleadingtotheadoptionofthe1952SantiagoDeclaration(thetreatyinquestion,O.D.),ratherthanrecordanagree-mentofthenegotiatingStates”,whichiswhytheCourtcharacterizedthemaspreparatoryworks.178AgoodexampleformaterialwithinthemeaningofArt31para2istobefoundinthedeclarationsadoptedbytheEUMemberStatesaspartofthefinalactwhichisdrawnupatMemberStateconferencesamendingthebasictreatiesoftheEU,egtheFinalActattachedtotheTreatyofLisbon.179176AspublishedintheFinalreportofthenegotiatingpartiestotheComitédirecteurpourlesDroitsdel’Homme,Doc47+1(2013)008rev2(10June2013).177ECJOpinion2/13(AccessiontoECHR)ECLI:EU:2014:2454.178ICJMaritimeDispute(PeruvChile)[2014]ICJRep3,para65.179[2007]OJC306/231,249etseq.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation589Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
64Sincetheextrinsiccontextrecognizedinpara2isanexpressionoftheconsensusofthepartiesandsincethelatter,actinginconsensus,arethe‘masters’oftheirtreaty,para2providesamethodofauthenticinterpretation(!MN19)ofthetreaty.Inthiscase,allpartiestoatreatyagreeoninterpretativeinstrumentsrelatingtothetreatyandtherebyonitsinterpretationbymeansextrinsictothetreatyitself.Thematerialacceptedasrelatingtotheconclusionofthetreatymayhelptodeterminewhichofthevariousordinarymeaningsofitstermsshallprevail.65Art31para2setsoutfourconditionsforrelatedmaterialtobecomeextrinsiccontextofatreaty:lThedocumentinquestionmustbedrawnupeitherbyallpartiestogetheror,ifdrawnuponlybyoneorseveralparties,mustbeacceptedbytheotherparties.Inordertobeconsideredextrinsiccontext,itmustbetheobjectofageneralconsensusofallparties.lThatconsensusmustbebornebyall“parties”,whichare,inaccordancewithArt1para1litg,onlythoseStatesthathaveconsentedtobeboundbythetreatyandforwhichthetreatyisinforce.Takenliterally,thiswouldmean(a)thattherecanbenoextrinsiccontextinthissensebeforethetreatyhasactuallyenteredintoforce,and(b)thatacts,viewsandinstrumentsofStatesthatmayhaveparticipatedinthenegotiationsbutintheendarenotpartytothetreatymustnotbeconsidered.lThematerialmust“relate”tothesubstanceofthetreaty,egbyspecifyingorclarifyingcertainconceptsusedthereinorlimitingitsfieldofapplication.Thatrelationmustbeoneofsubstance,butitmustalsobeencompassedbytheparties’consensus.lTheprovisiondoesnotsayatwhatmomentintimetheconsensus,eitherintheformof“agreement”orof“acceptance”,musthavebeenestablished.Inlita,Art31para2requiresthattheagreementwasmade“inconnexionwith”theconclusionofthetreaty,whichdoesnotnecessarilyrequireatemporalcoinci-dence,since“connexion”impliesanexusinpurposeandsubstance,notneces-sarilyintime.Litbdoesnotgiveanyhintastoatemporalrequirement.However,thegeneraldesignofArt31,whichdealswithactsandagreementssubsequenttotheconclusionofthetreatyinpara3,wouldseemtoimplythat“agreement”and“acceptance”withinthemeaningofpara2refertoaconsensusestablishedinacertaintemporalproximitytotheprocessofconclusion.Usually,agreementsofthissortaremadeattheoccasionofadoptingthetextofthetreaty,whileunilateraldocumentsmayverywellbepresentedbyindivid-ualpartieswhensigningorratifyingatreatyand,therefore,requireareactionbytheotherpartiesatthatlaterdate.590PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Butalsoagreementsoninterpretationareinpracticemadesubsequenttotheadoptionofthetext:Forexample,thecommoninterpretativedeclarationofthepartiestotheESM-Treaty,whichitselfhadbeensignedon2February2012,wasadoptedbythemon27September2012,thedateoftheentryintoforceoftheTreaty.180Withthatkindoftimingthecommondeclarationmaybeconsideredhavingtherequiredtemporalproximitytotheconclusionofthetreaty,thusbeingan“agreement”underpara2a),ratherthana“subsequentagreement”underpara3a).Moreover,thepartiesexplicitlypointedoutinthedeclarationthatitselements“constituteanessentialbasisfortheconsentofthecontractingStatestobeboundbytheprovisionsoftheTreaty”,thusunderliningthecloseconnexionwiththeconclusionofthetreaty.66Art31para2litadefines“agreementsrelatingtothetreaty”as“context”,providedtheyweremadebetweenallpartiesinconnexionwiththeconclusionofthetreaty.Sincetheterm“agreement”isobviouslywiderthanthenotionof“treaty”,asdefinedinArt2para1lita,italsocoversanunwrittenconsensus.181However,incommontreatypractice,those“agreements”regularlytakeontheformoffinalacts,protocolsofsignature,understandings,commentariesorexplanatoryreports,whichareagreeduponbythegovernmentalexpertsdrawingupthetextofthetreatyandadoptedsimultaneouslywiththattext.Egthe“Understandings”agreedupontogetherwiththetextofthe1976ConventionontheProhibitionofMilitaryorAnyOtherHostileUseofEnvironmentalModificationTechni-ques(ENMOD)182;the“Commentaries”ontheOECDConventiononCombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactions,adoptedbytheNegotiat-ingConferenceon21November1997;183ortheExplanatoryReportadoptedbytheCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEuropewhenitagreedonthetextoftheCriminalLawConventiononCorruption.184Thelatterexampledemonstratesthat“agreements”betweenthepartiestothetreatymayalsocomeintheformofresolutionsofaninternationalorganization,ifthetreatyhasbeendraftedundertheauspicesofthatorganization.Ratherunusual,but,ofcourse,alsorelevantforlitaareagreementsexplicitlysettingoutguidanceontheinterpretationofthetreaty.Seeegthe1973ProtocolontheInterpretationofArt69oftheEuropeanPatentConvention(revisedin2000),adoptedsimultaneouslywiththeConventionitself,185andthementionedinterpretativedeclarationtotheESM-Treatyof2012(!MN65infine).180FortheGermanversioncf[2012-II]BGBl1086.InEnglishinIrishTreatySeries2013,No14,infine.181Villiger(2009),Art31MN18.182Understandingsnotprintedin1108UNTS151,butincludedintheReportoftheConferenceoftheCommitteeonDisarmamentVolI,GAOR,31stSession,SuppNo27(1976)UNDocA/31/27,91–92.183SeeOECD(ed)(2010)Conventiononcombatingbriberyofforeignpublicofficialsininterna-tionalbusinesstransactionsandrelateddocuments,pp.13–18.184ETS173.185UNTS199,509.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation591Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Probablythemostprominentexampleinthisrespectisthe1994AgreementRelatingtotheImplementationofPartXIofUNCLOS186whichinitsArt2para1expresslysetsoutthatitsprovisionsandPartXIoftheConvention“shallbeinterpretedandappliedtogetherasasingleinstrument”.Incaseofbilateraltreatiesthepartiesoftenincludedetailsoninterpretationorapplicationofthetreatyinagreedminutesoranexchangeofletters.Seeegtheexchangeofinterpretativelettersaccompanyingthe1977UK-USAirServicesAgreement.18767Art31para2litbreferstounilateralorplurilateral“instrumentsrelatedtothetreaty”thatareacceptedassuchbyalltheotherparties.Thesecanbestatementsmadebyindividualpartiesbeforetheconclusionofthetreatyoraccompanyingtheirexpressionofconsenttobebound,butencompassedarealsounilateralinterpretativedeclarationswhichaStatepresentsatthetimeofagreeingtothetreatyandwhichregularlysharetheoutercharacteristicsofreservationstothetreaty.188Unlikeareservation,aninterpretativedeclarationsimplystatesthatthedeclarantconsidersorunderstandsprovisionXtomeanY.BymakingsuchadeclarationaStateistakingtheopportunitytoinfluenceinadvancethesubsequentinterpretationofthetreaty,theextentofthatinfluencebeingdependentonthereactionoftheotherpartiestothedeclaration.189Itis,forexample,commonpracticeintheEuropeanUnion,asitwasintheEuropeanCommunity,toadddeclarationsofoneormoreMemberStatestothefinalactsdrawnupatMemberStatesconferencesamendingthebasictreatiesoftheEU,thetextsofthosedeclarationshavingbeentakennoteofbytheotherMemberStatesattheendofthenegotiations.19068AsArt31para2litbdoesnotstipulateanyformalrequirement,the“accep-tance”bytheotherpartiescanalsobegiveninformallyortacitly.Because,however,thereisnoprovisioninArt31para2,asthereisforobjectionstoreservationsinArt20para5,totheeffectthatnon-objectionamountstoaccep-tance,apartyadvocatingacertaininterpretationonthebasisofextrinsiccontextunderlitbwillalwayshavetoshowthattheotherpartiesactuallyacceptedtheinterpretationadvanced.III.InterpretativeMeansAdditionaltotheContext(Para3)69Art31para3introducestworatherdifferentthingsasmeansofinterpretation,thecommonfeatureofwhichseemstobethattheyrelatetothepracticeoftheparties186UNTS41;33ILM1309.187UNTS21,citedbyAust(2013),p.211inn28.188CfMcRae(1978),p.155etseq;Cameron(2008).Seealso!Art19MN3.189McRae(1978),p.170.190CfegthedeclarationscontainedintheFinalActattachedtotheTreatyofLisbon(2007),[2007]OJC306,231,267etseq.592PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
tothetreatyinquestion,eitherwithregardtothespecifictreatyorintheirinternationallegalrelationsingeneral:litaandballowmaterialtobeusedthatrelatestotheimplementationofthetreatybyitsparties,whilelitcdirectstheviewoftheinterpretertootherrulesofinternationallaw,independentofthespecifictreaty,andtherebyintroducesthesystemicapproachintotreatyinterpretation.70Despiteanobviousdifferenceinthewording,thematerialmentionedinpara3ismeanttohavethesameinterpretativevalueasthatlistedinpara2(!MN5),theessentialdifferencebeingthatpara2referstotheprocessofconclusionofthetreaty,whilepara3dealswithevidencethatarisesindependentlyfromthatprocess.However,bothkindsofmaterialaresupposedtobeusedinordertoestablishthetruemeaningoftherelevanttermsofthetreatybyapplyingthegeneralruleofinterpretation.71TheissuesaddressedinArt31para3arecurrentlyunderconsiderationbytheInternationalLawCommission.AfterfirsthavingestablishedaStudyGrouponthetopicof“Treatiesovertime”in2009,theCommissiondecidedin2012toappointaSpecialRapporteurforthetopic“Subsequentagreementsandsubsequentpracticeinrelationtotheinterpretationoftreaties”(GeorgNolte)andtoincludethere-formulatedtopicinitsprogrammeofwork.In2016,theCommissionadoptedasetof13draftconclusionsonthetopiconfirstreadingandtherespectivecommen-taries.191ThedraftconclusionsweretransmittedtoGovernmentsforcommentsandobservationsuntilthebeginningof2018.1.SubsequentAgreements(lita)72The“subsequentagreements”referredtoinpara3litabearacloseresemblancetotheagreementsmentionedinpara2lita,theonlytwoapparentdifferencesbeingthattheagreementsherearemade“subsequently”,iewithacertaintimelagaftertheconclusionofthetreaty,andthattheyrelatespecificallyto“theinterpretationofthetreatyortheapplicationofitsprovisions”,andnotsimplytothetreaty.However,theredoesnotseemtobeanypracticaldifferencebetweenbothtypesofagreement:iftheyaresufficientlyclear,theywillhaveacomparableeffectonestablishingthemeaningofthetermsofthetreaty;asGardinerpointsout,whetherelucidationofthetreatyprovisionsisprovidedbythepartiesatthetimeofconclusionofthetreatyorlaterseemsoflittleimportance.192Whathasbeensaidwithregardto“agreements”underpara2(!MN66)is,thus,equallyapplicablehere.73However,itappearsfromjudicialpracticeintheWTOthatoneimportantqualificationhastobemade:asubsequentagreementcannotbeone“regardingtheinterpretationorapplication”ofthetreaty,iftheagreementitselfis,inthecaseofaconflictwiththetreaty,supposedtofollowthelatterortoadjusttoit,thusiftheagreementisconsideredbyitspartiestobeoflowerrankthanthetreatyunder191ILCReport,68thSession(2016)UNDocA/71/10,chVI.192Gardiner(2015),p.230.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation593Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
interpretation.Theexternalmeansofinterpretationmustthereforebeofequalrankastheobjectofinterpretation.Thus,inChile–PriceBandSystemtheWTOPanel,whichhadtointerprettheWTOAgreementonAgriculture,didnotacceptanEconomicComplementarityAgreementbetweenChileandMERCOSURasa“subsequentagreement”withinthemeaningofArt31para2lita,becauseinitspreambleitexplicitlystatedthatitsprovisions“shalladjust”totheWTOAgreements.19374Sinceauthorsoftheagreementsreferredtoinpara3litacanonlybethe“parties”tothetreaty,actinginconsensus,theseagreementsarealsoameansofanauthenticinterpretationofthetreatyconcerned(!MN19)andmustthere-forebereadintothelatterforpurposesofitsinterpretation.194Beingthemastersoftheirtreaty,thepartiesare,inprinciple,notlimitedinmakingsubsequentunder-standingsoragreements.Ifthelatter’scontentwouldnotcomewithintheboundsofanordinarymeaningoftheterms,theywouldamounttoanamendmentofthetreatybyimplicitagreement.ThisiswhyinTerritorialDispute(LibyavChad)theICJconsidereditirrelevanttocategorizeanAnglo-FrenchConventionof1919,whichwassupposedlyconcludedtointerpretadeclarationbetweenthetwoStatesof1899,eitherasaconfirmationormodifi-cationofthedeclaration.Inanycase,becausethepartiesdealtwiththeirowntreatyconsensus,thelateragreementconstitutedthecorrectandbindinginterpretationoftheearlierdeclaration.19575Again,sincepara3litadoesnotcontainanyformalrequirement,itwouldseemthatthe“agreements”canverywellbemadeinformally.Theydonothavetobeintreatyformbutmustbesuchastoshowthatthepartiesintendedtheirunderstand-ingtobethebasisforanagreedinterpretation.196Theprovenfact,nottheform,ofanagreementiswhatcountsunderlita.ThisalsoseemstobethepositionoftheICJintheKasikili/SeduduIslandcase,whentheCourtreviewedthevariousdealingsbetweenthelocalauthoritiesinvolvedintheborderdisputeandconcludedthattherehadbeennoagreementbetweenthem,sothatpara3litacouldnotapply.197Ifinformalagreementsorunderstandingsfallunderlita,thiswouldalsomeanthatthereisapotentialoverlapwiththeconceptof“subsequentpracticeestablishingagreementoftheparties”withinthemeaningoflitb.Onemightevensaythatthelessformalthesubsequentagreement,thegreateristhesignificanceofsubsequentpracticeconfirmingitforthepurposeofestablishingthemeaningofatreatyprovision.193WTOPanelChile–PriceBandSystemWT/DS207/R,paras7.83–84(2002).194FinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,221,para14.Draftconclusion3para2oftheILCin2016(n191);initscommentarytheCommissionpointedoutthatthisinterpretation,althoughbeingauthentic,isnotnecessarilyconclusiveorlegallybinding(para4).195CfICJTerritorialDispute(LibyavChad)[1994]ICJRep6,para60.196Gardiner(2015),p.245.197ICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para63.594PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
76Sincetheexternalappearancesofthe“agreement”underlitaareirrelevant,itmightalsotakeontheformofadecisionofatreatyorgan,providedthatitwastakenunanimouslybyallStatespartiestothetreatyorthatpartiesthatdidnotvotecanatlastbetakentohaveimplicitlyacceptedthedecisionmade.ThiswasexplicitlyheldbytheWTOAppellateBodywithregardtotheDohaMinisterialDecision,adecisionontheinterpretationoftheWTOAgreementsadoptedbyallWTOMembersmeetingintheformoftheMinisterialConference.198Moreover,theregimeofnavigationontheriverRhineundertheConventionof1868(“ActedeMannheim”)199containsvariousPrinciplesofInterpretationoftheConventionwhichwereadoptedunanimouslybytheCentralCommission,whereallfiveMemberStatesarerepresentedandhaveonevoteeach.200WithregardtotheConventionfortheRegulationofWhalingtheICJreferredtonon-bindingrecommendationsbytheInternationalWhalingCommission,anorganestablishedbythatConvention,andheldthat,whenthoserecommendationsareadoptedbyconsensusorunanimousvote,“theymayberelevantfortheinterpretationoftheConventionoritsSchedule”.201However,theCourtalsopointedoutthatresolutionsadoptedbytheCom-mission“withoutthesupportofallStatespartiestotheConventionand,inparticular,withouttheconcurrenceofJapan”,cannotberegardedasfallingunderArt31para3VCLT.2022.SubsequentPractice(litb)77Thesubsequentpracticeofthepartiesinimplementingthetreatyconstitutesobjectiveevidenceoftheirunderstandingastothemeaningofthelatterandis,therefore,ofutmostimportanceforitsinterpretation.ThisparticularvalueofsubsequentpracticehadalreadybeenpointedoutbythearbitraltribunalintheRussianIndemnitycaseof1912whenitheldthat:“l’exécutiondesengagementsest,entreEtatscommeentreparticuliers,leplussûrcom-mentairedusensdecesengagements.”203Fromthere,itisonlyasmallsteptorecognizethat,becausethepartiesarethemastersoftheirtreaty,ameaningderivedfromsubsequentpractice,whichisconsistentandembracesallpartiesofatreaty,constitutesanauthenticinterpreta-tionestablishedbyagreement,notonlyoverlappingwithagreementsunderlita(!MN74),butalsoblurringthelinebetweeninterpretationandamendmentofa198US–CloveCigarettesWT/DS406/AB/R,paras258–268(2012),reprintedat51ILM759.199Documentedatwww.ccr-zkr.org.Accessedon22November2017.200Egthedecision2003-II-10onPr… Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
treaty.204Sincetheparties,actingcollectivelythroughtheirconcordantpractice,arethemastersoftheirtreaty,theycannotonlytakeinterpretationfurtherthancouldabodychargedwiththeroleofindependentinterpretation,butalsobringaboutanimplicittreatyamendmentbypractice.205ThiswasprobablywhattheECJhadinmindwhen,mis-interpretingtheICJ’sdictuminTempleofPreahVihear,itheld:“Inthatregard,asisclearfromthecase-lawoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,thesubsequentpracticefollowedintheapplicationofatreatymayoverridethecleartermsofthattreatyifthatpracticereflectstheparties’agreement(ICJ,CaseconcerningtheTempleofPreahVihear(CambodiavThailand),judgmentof15June1962,ICJReports1962,p.6)”.206Criticalastothatapproach,butinasimilarveinastothegeneralpointwasrecentlyAdvocateGeneralWatheletinthePolisariocase,whowouldonlyacceptastreatyamendment“practice,whichisknowntoandacceptedbythepartiesandissufficientlywidespreadandsufficientlylong-termtoconstituteanewagreementinitself”.20778Subsequentpracticeasanelementoftreatyinterpretationisnowadayswell-establishedinthepracticeofinternationalcourtsandtribunals,208anditwasanimportantelementofitevenintheearlydaysofinternationaljurisprudence:Alreadyin1922,thePCIJpointedoutinitssecondadvisoryopinion:“Iftherewereanyambiguity,theCourtmight,forthepurposeofarrivingatthetruemeaning,considertheactionwhichhasbeentakenunderthetreaty.”209ThelimitsofreferringtosubsequentpracticewerealsofairlyclearlysetbytheCourtwhenitheldinLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDisputethatconsider-ationofthatelementcannotmakeitreadintothetextofatreatyacompetencethatisnotspecificallymentionedthere.210204ThiswasalreadypointedoutbyWaldockIII60,para25.205Gardiner(2015),pp.274–278.ThiswasalsotheviewoftheILCwhichinArt38ofitsFinalDrafthadexplicitlyprovidedforthepossibilitythatatreaty“maybemodifiedbysubsequentpracticeintheapplicationofthetreatyestablishingtheagreementofthepartiestomodifyitsprovisions”(FinalDraft236).Thefactthatthisarticlewastheonlyonethatwasnotadopted,butdiscardedaltogetherattheViennaConference,wasmostlybasedonitsspecificdraftingorongroundsoflegalpolicyandcannotbetakentomeanthattheconceptofimplicitmodificationofatreatybyitsparties,actinginagreement,wasrejectedbytheStates,cfKarl(1983),pp.288–295.206ECJObertoandO‘LearyJointC-464/13,C-465/13ECLI:EU:C:2015:163,para61.207InECJCouncilvFrontPolisarioC-104/16P(OpinionAGWathelet)ECLI:EU:C:2016:677,para96.208ForthejurisprudenceoftheICJ,cfthereferencesgivenbytheCourtitselfinKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para50.FortheECJseetherecentdecisionofitsGrandChamberinECJCouncilvFrontPolisarioC-104/16PECLI:EU:C:2016:973,para120.209PCIJCompetenceoftheILOPCIJSerBNo2,39(1922).CfalsoPaymentinGoldofBrazilianFederalLoansContractedinFrancePCIJSerANo21,93,119(1929);ICJCorfuChannel[1949]ICJRep4,25:“ThesubsequentattitudeofthePartiesshows[...].”210ICJLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(ElSalvadorvHonduras,Nicaraguainter-vening)[1992]ICJRep351,para380.596PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
79Whichelementsofpracticearetobetakenintoaccountunderlitbwillvaryaccordingtothesubjectmatterofthetreatyconcerned.Inprinciple,anyaction,oreveninaction,ofpartieswithaviewtoimplementingthetreatywillhavetobeconsidered.Justasintheprocessofdevelopingcustomarylaw(Art38para1litbICJStatute),thenotionof“practice”comprisesanyexternalbehaviorofasubjectofinternationallaw,hereinsofarasitispotentiallyrevealingofwhatthepartyacceptsasthemeaningofaparticulartreatyprovision.Noparticularformisrequired,sothatofficialstatementsormanuals,diplomaticcorrespondence,pressreleases,transactions,votesonresolutionsininternationalorganizationsarejustasrelevantasnationalactsoflegislationorjudicialdecisions.Infact,“practice”inthisrespectisnotlimitedtothecentralgovernmentauthoritiesofStates,ratheranypublicbodyactinginanofficialcapacitycancontributetodemonstratingthestate’spositiontowardsitstreatycommitments.Therelevanceofnationallegislationinthisrespectis,eg,emphasizedinthejurispru-denceoftheECtHRonthequestionifcapitalpunishmentwasassuchcompatiblewithArt3oftheECHR.InitsSoeringjudgmentof1989,theCourtpointedoutthatArt3mustbeconstruedinharmonywithArt2andcouldnot,therefore,betakentoincludeageneralprohibitionofthedeathpenalty,butcontinued:“Subsequentpracticeinnationalpenalpolicy,intheformofageneralizedabolitionofcapitalpunishment,couldbetakenasestablishingtheagreementoftheContractingStatestoabrogatetheexceptionprovidedforunderArt2§1andhencetoremoveatextuallimitonthescopeforevolutiveinterpretationofArt3.”211Manyyearslater,initsfirstÖcalanjudgmentof2003,theECtHRreiteratedthatinassessingwhetheragiventreatmentorpunishmentistoberegardedasinhumanordegradingforthepurposesofArt3“itcannotbutbeinfluencedbythedevelopmentsandcommonlyacceptedstandardsinthepenalpolicyoftheMemberStatesoftheCouncilofEuropeinthisfield”,anditobservedthat“thelegalpositionasregardsthedeathpenaltyhasundergoneaconsiderableevolutionsincetheSoeringcasewasdecided”,inthatforty-threecontractingStateshadbythendejureabolishedthatpenalty.212TheCourtconcludedthatthoughtheirpracticetheStateshadagreedtomodifyArt2§1oftheConventionandthatagainstthisbackgrounditcouldbeargued“thattheimplementationofthedeathpenaltycanberegardedasinhumananddegradingtreatmentcontrarytoArt3.”213Againsomeyearslater,thisinterpretationofArt3oftheConventionhasbecomegenerallyacceptedcase-lawoftheECtHR,astheCourtcon-firmedinAl-SaadoonandMufdhi.214TheECtHRadoptedasimilarapproachwithregardtotheapplicabilityofArt9ECHR(freedomofconscienceandreligion)toconscientiousobjectorsintheBayatyancase:WhiletheECommHRstillhaddeniedthattheconscientiousobjectiontomilitaryservicewascoveredbytheConvention,theCourtdiscovered“anobvioustrendamong211ECtHRSoeringvUnitedKingdomAppNo14038/88,SerA161,para103(1989).212ECtHRÖcalanvTurkeyAppNo46221/99,12March2003,paras194–195.213Ibidpara198.214ECtHRAl-SaadoonandMufdhivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo61498/08,2March2010,para120.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation597Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Europeancountriestorecognizetherighttoconscientiousobjection”andestablishedthat“thedomesticlawoftheoverwhelmingmajorityofCouncilofEuropeMemberStates,alongwithrelevantinternationalinstruments,hasevolvedtotheeffectthatatthematerialtimetherewasalreadyavirtuallygeneralconsensusonthequestioninEuropeandbeyond”.Consequentlyitheld,thatthemattertodayfallsunderArt9ECHR.21580Inordertobecomerelevantunderlitb,Stateconductmustconstituteasequenceofactsorpronouncements,since“practice”cannotbeestablishedbyoneisolatedincident.Theinterpretativevalueofthatpracticewillalwaysdependontheextenttowhichitisconcordant,commonandconsistentandthussufficienttoestablishadiscernablepatternofbehaviour.21681Practiceofthepartiesisonlyrelevantunderlitbifitoccurs“intheapplication”ofthetreaty,whichplainlyindicatesthat,justasforthedevelopmentofinterna-tionalcustomarylaw,asubjectivelinkisrequiredunderlitb:thepartieswhosepracticeisunderconsiderationmustregardtheirconducttofallwithinthescopeofapplicationofthetreatyconcernedandinprincipletoberequiredunderthattreaty.Theymustactthewaytheydoforthepurposeoffulfillingtheirtreatyobligations,ietheirsubsequentconductmustbemotivatedbythetreatyobligation.Or,astheILCrecentlyputit:“Theidentificationofsubsequentagreementsorsubsequentpracticeunderarticle31,paragraph3,requires,inparticular,adeterminationwhethertheparties,byanagreementorpractice,havetakenapositionregardingtheinterpretationofthetreaty.”217Ontheotherhand,theconductofthepartiesdoesnothavetobearaspecialreferencetoaparticularprovisionofthetreaty,butcanrelatetothetreatyasawholeortootherpartsofitthantheoneunderscrutiny.82Subsequentpracticemayalsoserveasameanstodeterminethescopeofapplicationofatreaty,andtheneventoestablishthatthelatterdoesnotapply.Thus,underlitbtheinterpretermayjustaswellconsiderthepracticeofpartiesinthe“non-applicationofthetreaty”,iedrawconclusionsfromthefactthatthepartiesdidnotapplytheirtreatywhentreatyprovisionsmighthavebeenthoughttobeapplicable.218Thiswastheapproach,forexample,oftheICJinitsadvisoryopinionontheLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,whentheCourtreferredtoStatepracticeinordertodeterminewhethervarioustreatiesappliedtotheuseofnuclearweapons:215ECtHRBayatyanvArmenia(GC)AppNo23459/03,7July2011,paras101–109.216Sinclair(1984),p.137.AdoptedbytheWTOAppellateBodyinJapan–AlcoholicBeveragesWT/DS8,10–11/AB/R,13(1996);andthePanelinChile–PriceBandSystemWT/DS207/R,para7.78–79(2002).217ILCDraftconclusion6para1,firstsentence,inReport2016(n191).218Gardiner(2015),pp.262–264.598PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
“TheCourtwillobservethattheRegulationsannexedtotheHagueConventionIVdonotdefinewhatistobeunderstoodby‘poisonorpoisonedweapons’andthatdifferentinterpretationsexistontheissue.Nordoesthe1925Protocolspecifythemeaningtobegiventotheterm‘analogousmaterialsordevices’.Thetermshavebeenunderstood,inthepracticeofStates,intheirordinarysenseascoveringweaponswhoseprime,orevenexclusive,effectistopoisonorasphyxiate.Thispracticeisclear,andthepartiestothoseinstrumentshavenottreatedthemasreferringtonuclearweapons.Inviewofthis,itdoesnotseemtotheCourtthattheuseofnuclearweaponscanberegardedasspecificallyprohibitedonthebasisoftheabove-mentionedprovisionsoftheSecondHagueDeclarationof1899,theRegulationsannexedtotheHagueConventionIVof1907orthe1925Protocol[...].”21983Althoughthewordingoflitbdoesnotsaysoexplicitly,thesubsequentpracticeconsideredrelevantforthepurposeofinterpretationmustbepracticeoftheparties,ieattributabletopartiestothetreatyconcerned.220Thus,actsorpronouncementsofnon-partiesornon-Stateactors,thatarenotattributabletotheStatesPartiesaccordingtothegeneralrulesofattribution,caninprinciplenotbetakenintoaccount.Suchconductmay,however,berelevantwhenassessingthesubsequentpracticeofpartiestoatreaty.221Again,“parties”refers,inaccordancewithArt1para1litg,onlytothoseStatesthathaveconsentedtobeboundbythetreatyandforwhichthetreatyisinforce.84Eventhoughlitbrequiresthepracticetoestablishtheagreementof“theparties”,meaningalltheparties,thatdoesnotmeanthateverypartymusthaveindividu-allyengagedinpractice.TheILComittedtheword“all”,whichhadbeencontainedinanearlierdraft,fromthisphrasepreciselyinordertoavoidthemisconceptionthatthepracticemustbeactivelyperformedbyalltheparties.222Itsuffices,therefore,thatinactivepartiesshouldhaveacceptedthepracticesetbyotherparties.Althoughitis,thus,possiblethatonlysomeofthepartiesparticipateinthesubsequentpractice,litbdoesnotallowacertaininterpretationtobeestablishedonlyamongthoseparticipatingStateswithbindingforce‘interse’,asopposedtotheotherpartiestothetreaty:ifsomeofthepartieswantedtomodifythetreatyonlybetweenthemselves,theywouldhavetopursuethemeansprovidedforinArt41VCLT,ietoconcludeanagreementtothateffectandnotifytheotherpartiesofit.223AstheILCsummarizedrecently:“Thenumberofpartiesthatmustactivelyengageinsubsequentpracticeinordertoestablishanagreementunderarticle31,paragraph3(b),mayvary.Silenceonthepartof219ICJUsebyaStateofNuclearWeaponsinArmedConflict[1996]ICJRep66,paras55–56.220Gardiner(2015),p.266.ILCDraftconclusion5para1inReport2016(n191).221ILCDraftconclusion5para2inReport2016(n191).Asexamplesfor“assessing”,theILCcommentaryreferstoinitiating,identifyingandreflectingsubsequentpracticeoftheparties.222CfFinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,222,para15.223ConcurringGardiner(2015),pp.267–268.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation599Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
oneormorepartiescanconstituteacceptanceofthesubsequentpracticewhenthecircum-stancescallforsomereaction.”22485Aslitbdoesnotexplicitlysaywhosepracticeistobeconsidered,thereisroomforotheractorsthathavebeengivenaroleintheimplementationofatreatytosetrelevantpractice.Thus,whereStatesbytreatyentrustperformanceofactivitiesunderthattreatytoaninternationalorganororganization,thefulfillmentofthosefunctionsisnotonlyattributabletotheparties(!MN83),butcanalsoinitselfconstitute“subsequentpractice”underthetreaty.Thisisofparticularrele-vancewithregardtoconstituenttreatiesofinternationalorganizations,andhereespeciallyforinterpretingtheprovisionsdealingwiththecompetencesandproce-duresoftheorganscreated.WhiletheILCSpecialRapporteurhasexplicitlydeclinedtodealwiththepracticeoforgans,225theICJunderlineditsimportancewithgreatemphasis:“theverynatureoftheorganizationcreated,theobjectiveswhichhavebeenassignedtoitbyitsfounders,theimperativesassociatedwiththeeffectiveperformanceofitsfunctions,aswellasitsownpractice,areallelementswhichmaydeservespecialattentionwhenthetimecomestointerprettheseconstituenttreaties.”226Initsrecentconclusions,theILCdistinguishedsubsequentpracticeofStatespartiestoatreatyunderArt31para3which“mayarisefrom,orbeexpressedin,thepracticeofaninternationalorganizationintheapplicationofitsconstituentinstru-ment”,frompracticeofaninternationalorganizationitselfintheapplicationofitsconstituentinstrumentwhich“maycontributetotheinterpretationofthatinstru-mentwhenapplyingarticles31,paragraph1,and32”.227Sincethepronouncementsofexperttreatybodies,iethoseconsistingofpersonsservingintheirpersonalcapacity,are,intheviewoftheILC,notattributabletotheStatespartiestotherespectivetreaty,theycannotassuchconstitutesubsequentpracticeunderArt31para3b.22886That“subsequentpractice”canalsobepracticeoftheorganizationconcernedhasforalongtimebeenapermanentfeatureofinternationaljurisprudence.Aboveall,theICJreferstopracticeoftheUNorgansinalmosteverycasewhereithastointerpretoneofitsconstituenttreaties.Thus,initsNamibiaopiniontheCourtacknowledgedthatinviewofthelongstandingpracticeintheUNSecurityCouncilthephrase“concurringvotes”inArt27para3UNCharterdoesnotactuallyrequire,asthewordingmightsuggest,thatallpermanentmembersmustvoteinfavorofaresolution,butthattherequirementisalsofulfilledbyabstentionorabsence.Toreachthatconclusion,itreferredto“theproceedingsofthe224ILCDraftconclusion10(9)para2inReport2016(n191).225WaldockIII52,59–60,para24a.226ICJUsebyaStateofNuclearWeaponsinArmedConflict[1996]ICJRep66,para19(emphasisadded).227ILCDraftconclusion12(11)paras2and3,inReport2016(n191).228CfILCDraftconclusion13(12),para3,inReport2016(n191),andtherespectivecommen-tary,inparticularpara10.600PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
SecurityCouncilextendingoveralongperiod”,especiallypresidentialrulingsandthepositionstakenbymembersoftheCouncil,anditheldthatthisprocedure“hasbeengenerallyacceptedbyMembersoftheUnitedNationsandevidencesageneralpracticeofthatOrganization”.229InitsopinionontheLegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,theICJpointedtoachangeinthepracticeoftheGeneralAssemblyforthepurposeofinterpretingArt12UNChartertotheeffectthatitprecludesrecommen-dationsoftheAssemblyonlywhentheSecurityCouncilisactuallyexercisingitsfunctionsatthatmoment.230IntheIMCOcasetheCourt,inordertointerpretArt28litaIMCOConvention,tookintoaccounttheactualpracticefollowedbytheorganization’sAssemblyingivingeffecttotheprovision,suchastheelectoralpracticeandtheapportionmentoftheexpensesoftheOrganization,aswellasaworkingpaperpreparedbytheSecretary-General.Moreover,theinterpretationwaschosenwhichwas“mostconsonantwithinternationalpracticeandwithmaritimeusage”.231InitsNuclearWeapons(WHO)opiniontheICJconsidered“thepracticeoftheWHO”,inordertoestablishwhetherthelegalityoftheuseofnuclearweaponsbelongstothescopeofactivitiesofthatOrganization.Inparticular,theCourtreferredtoreportsandresolutionsadoptedbytheWHOorgansandheldthatasingleresolution,“adoptednotwithoutopposition,couldnotbetakento[...]amountonitsowntoapracticeestablishinganagreementbetweenthemembersoftheOrganization”whichwouldberelevantfortheinterpretationofitsconstituenttreaty.232Forthepurposeofinterpretation,theCourtconsideredasrelevantpractice,interalia,therulesofprocedureofUNorgans233andtheOrganization’sbudgetarypractice.23487Subsequentpracticeofpartiesisonlyrelevantfortreatyinterpretationifit“establishestheagreementoftheparties”.Insettingupthissecondsubjectiverequirement,litbunderlinesthevalueofsubsequentpracticeasaninstrumentofauthenticinterpretation:thepractice,evenifonlysomepartiesparticipatedinit,mustbeacceptedbyalltheparties,iethepartiesasawhole.235Again,ifnoteverypartyhasparticipatedinthepractice,theremustbeatleastgoodevidencethattheother,inactivepartieshaveendorsedit.Ifthesubsequentpracticeconsistsofthe229ICJNamibia[1971]ICJRep16,para22.230ICJConstructionofaWall[2004]ICJRep136,paras27–28.231ICJConstitutionoftheMaritimeSafetyCommittee[1960]ICJRep150,168–170.232ICJUsebyaStateofNuclearWeaponsinArmedConflict[1996]ICJRep66,para27.233ICJSecondAdmissionsCase[1950]ICJRep4,9.234ICJCertainExpensesoftheUnitedNations[1962]ICJRep151,160.235CfFinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,222,para15.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation601Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
conductoforgansofaninternationalorganization,itisonlyrelevantifitisnotcounteractedbyactsorrepresentationsofthepartiestothetreatyinquestion.88Whatexactly“agreement”withinthemeaningoflitbmeansisnotclear.IntheKasikili/SeduduIslandcase,theICJseemstohaveconsideredtheconcepttomeanlessthan“agreement”inlita,sinceitconcludedafortiorifromthelatterwhenitheld:“Fromalloftheforegoing,theCourtconcludesthattheabovementionedevents[...]demonstratetheabsenceofagreementbetweenSouthAfricaandBechuanalandwithregardtothelocationoftheboundaryaroundKasikili/SeduduIslandandthestatusoftheIsland.Thoseeventscannotthereforeconstitute‘subsequentpracticeintheapplicationofthetreaty[of1890]whichestablishestheagreementofthepartiesregardingitsinterpretation’(1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,Art31,para3(b)).Afortiori,theycannothavegivenrisetoan‘agreementbetweenthepartiesregardingtheinterpretationofthetreatyortheapplicationofitsprovisions’(ibid,Art31,para3(a)).”236Thus,agreementinlitbwouldinessenceseemtomeanacceptance,eventacit,andisattheveryminimumevidencedbytheabsenceofanydisagreement.237Suchacceptancecannotbetakentoexistifthepartiesconcludedaseparatetreatywhoseprovisionstakeuptheproblemthatwassupposedtobeaddressedbythemeaningestablishedbywayofinterpretationunderpara3litb.Thus,initsSoeringjudgment(!MN79)theECtHRrefusedtointerpretArt3ECHR,becauseofthedevelopmentinnationalpolicies,inawayastoprohibitthedeathpenaltyperse,becausethecontractingStatestotheConventionhadconcludedProtocolNo6totheConventionwhichprovidedfortheabolitionofthedeathpenaltyintimeofpeace.AccordingtotheCourt“Protocol6,asasubsequentwrittenagreement,showsthattheintentionoftheContractingParties[...]wastoadoptthenormalmethodofamendmentofthetextinordertointroduceanewobligationtoabolishcapitalpunishmentintimeofpeaceand,whatismore,todosobyanoptionalinstrumentallowingeachStatetochoosethemomentwhentoundertakesuchanengagement.Intheseconditions[...]Art3cannotbeinterpretedasgenerallyprohibitingthedeathpenalty.”238Whenthe“agreement”oftheStatespartiesissupposedtobeexpressedthroughinstrumentsadoptedbyatreatyorgan(!MN76),recentICJjurisprudencewouldseemtorequirethatthoseinstrumentshavebeenadoptedbyconsensusorunani-mousvote,atleastitmustbemadesurethattheyhadthesupportofallStatesparties.23989Whatismore,“agreement”presupposes,astheICJhasalsopointedout,theknowledgeorawarenessofotherpartiesofacertainpractice:internaldocumentsor236ICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para63.237ConcurringVilliger(2009),Art31MN22.However,inDelimitationoftheContinentalShelfbetweenNicaraguaandColombia(PreliminaryObjections)[2016]ICJRep100,para44,theICJwasunabletoreadintotheabsenceofanyobjectiononthepartoftheotherpartiestothetreatyinquestionan“agreement”withinthemeaningofpara3litb.238ECtHRSoeringvUnitedKingdomAppNo14038/88,SerA161,para103(1989).239ICJWhalingintheAntarctic[2014]ICJRep226,paras46and83.602PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
actsthathaveneverbeenmadeknowntotheotherpartiescannotqualifyunderlitb.240Rather,thesubjectiveelementcontainedinthatprovisionrequiresthatapartyactsunderatreatyinthebeliefofacertainmeaningofitstermsandthattheotherpartieswereawareofthatunderstandingandaccepteditaswhatthetreatystipulates.24190Subsequentpracticebythepartiesthatdoesnotestablishanagreementbetweenthem,mayberelevantasasupplementarymeansofinterpretationunderArt32,sincethatprovisiondoesnotlistthosemeansinanexhaustivemanner(!Art32MN25).Thishasbeenrecognizedbyinternationalpractice242andinlegaldoc-trine243,andwasrecentlytakenupbytheILCinitsworkonsubsequentpractice244.ToberelevantunderArt32,however,conductbyoneormorepartiesmustoccurintheapplicationofthetreaty.24591Fromitswordingandsystematicpositionwithinpara3,itwouldfollowthat“subsequentpractice”underlitbreferstoanempiricalexercise(wasthereobjec-tivepracticebythepartiesornot?),whichrequiresanormativeinterpretationonlywhenitcomestoestablishing“agreement”amongtheparties.Especiallythepositionoflitbrightbeforelitcwouldseemtosuggestthattheformerdoesnotrequirethesubsequentpractice,inordertobematerialrelevantforinterpretation,tobeinconformitywithotherrulesofinternationallaw.Inthisperspective,thoseotherrulesonlycomeintoplayunderlitc.“However,inthePolisariocasetheECJseems,onthecontrary,tohavecombinedthetwoapproaches,byrefusingtoacceptapurportedsubsequentpracticefortreatyinterpretation,becauseit“wouldnecessarilyhaveentailedconcedingthattheEuropeanUnionintendedtoimplementthoseagreementsinamannerincompatiblewiththeprinciplesofself-determinationandoftherelativeeffectoftreaties...Suchimplementationwouldneces-sarilybeincompatiblewiththeprinciplethatTreatyobligationsmustbeperformedingoodfaith,whichneverthelessconstitutesabindingprincipleofgeneralinternationallaw...”2463.RelevantRulesofInternationalLaw:TheSystemicApproach(litc)92Art31para3litcincludesyetothermaterialextrinsictothetreatyinquestionintotheprocessofitsinterpretation.Itreferstotheinternationallegalsystemasawholeaspartofthecontextofeverytreatyconcludedunderinternationallawandtherebylaysthefoundationforthesystemicapproachtotreatyinterpretation:240ICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,para55.241Ibidpara74.242ICJKasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]ICJRep1045,paras79–80;ECtHRLoizidouvTurkey(PreliminaryObjections)AppNo15318/89,SerA310,paras79–82(1995);WTOAppellateBodyEC–ComputerEquipmentWT/DS62,67and68/AB/R,para90(1998).MorereferencesgivenintheILCcommentary(n191),Conclusion4paras26–35.243Sinclair(1984),p.138;TorresBernardez(1998),pp.726,727;Villiger(2009),Art31MN22.244Draftconclusion2(1)para4inReport2016(n191).245ILCDraftconclusion6para3inReport2016(n191).246ECJ(GC)CouncilvFrontPolisarioC-104/16PECLI:EU:C:2016:973,paras123–124.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation603Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
whatevertheirsubjectmatter,treatiesareacreationoftheinternationallegalsystemandtheiroperationisbaseduponthatfact.Inamuchmorerestrictedformtherulehadalreadybeenappliedinearlyinternationaljurisprudence,forexamplewhenthePCIJlookedattreatiesandotherdocumentshavingthesameobjectasthetreatyunderconsideration.247LatertheICJformulateditinitsNamibiaopinion,undertheimpressionofthedebateintheILCandtheadoptionoftheVCLT,inaratherbroadandgeneralmanner:“Aninternationalinstrumenthastobeinterpretedandappliedwithintheframeworkoftheentirelegalsystemprevailingatthetimeoftheinterpretation.”24893Moreover,therulelaiddowninlitchasafirmbasisintheprincipleofgoodfaith,sinceaccordingtothatprinciple,everypartytoatreatymustinprinciplebepresumedtointendtokeepitstreatyobligationinconformitywithitsotherobliga-tionsunderinternationallaw.AstheICJpointedoutintheRightofPassagecase:“ItisaruleofinterpretationthatatextemanatingfromaGovernmentmust,inprinciple,beinterpretedasproducingandasintendedtoproduceeffectsinaccordancewithexistinglawandnotinviolationofit.”249TheFrench-MexicanClaimsCommission,throughProfessorVerzijl,hadpro-ducedthesamethoughtmuchearlierinitsGeorgesPinsondecisionof1928:“Touteconventioninternationaledoitêtreréputées’enréférertacitementaudroitinterna-tionalcommun,pourtouteslesquestionsqu’ellenerésoutpaselle-mêmeentermesexprèsetd’unefaçondifférente.”25094Theinterpretativeapproachlaiddowninlitcviewstheinternationallegalorderasonesinglesystemandallowsdrawingconclusionsfromthatperspective.Ithas,therefore,greatpotentialtobeoneofthemeanstomitigatetheeffectsofthemuch-describedfragmentationofinternationallaw,sincetreatyinterpretationcanonthebasisofthisruletransgressthebordersofspecializedsubregimesofinternationallaw,suchasenvironmentallaw,tradelaw,lawofthesea,internationalcriminalorhumanrightslaw,andtrytofindameaningforthetermsinquestionthatreflectsthecommonbasisoflegalrulesinanintegratedsystemofinternationallaw.Thus,litchighlightssystemicintegrationasafunctionoftreatyinterpretation.25195Theprovisionrefersto“relevantrulesofinternationallaw”asameanstointerprettreatyprovisions.Sincenorestrictionsarecontainedinthatphrase,252and247PCIJSS‘Wimbledon’PCIJSerANo1,25–28(1923).248ICJNamibiaOpinion[1971]ICJRep16,para53.249ICJRightofPassage(PreliminaryObjections)[1957]ICJRep125,142.250GeorgesPinson(FrancevMexico)(1928)5RIAA327,para50subpara4.251CfthereportoftheILCStudyGroupon“FragmentationofInternationalLaw:DifficultiesArisingfromtheDiversificationandExpansionofInternationalLaw”(2006),UNDocA/CN.4/L.702,initsconclusions17–21.InthesamecontextalsoThiele(2008),pp.24–28.252Inanearlierdrafttheword“general”hadbeenincludedasqualifying“internationallaw”,butitwasdeletedduringthediscussionintheILC,inordertoallowspecificandregionalrulestobeused,cfGardiner(2015),pp.300–301.604PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
itsmeaningisevenwidenedbytheword“any”,itmustbetakentorefertoallrecognizedsourcesofinternationallawtheemanationsofwhichcaninprinciplebeofassistanceintheprocessofinterpretation.Theimplicitreferenceis,ofcourse,toArt38para1ICJStatute.96Thus,thetermsofatreatycan,first,beinterpretedinthelightofthoseofanothertreaty,especiallywherethelatterdealswithasimilarobjectoraddressesthesamelegalsituation.Forexample,theECtHRuses,forthepurposeofinterpretingprovisionsoftheECHR,totakeintoaccountotherhumanrightstreaties,suchastheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,theUNConventionAgainstTorture,theUNConventionontheRightsoftheChild,theEuropeanSocialCharterorconventionsconcludedundertheauspicesofILO,253aswellastheinterpretationofthoseinstrumentsbycompetentorgans.IntheRantsevcasetheCourt,afterexplicitlyreferringtoArt31para3VCLT,turnedtoaUNProtocolandtotheAnti-TraffickingConventionoftheCouncilofEurope,inordertoestablishthattraffickinginpersonsfallswithinthescopeofArt4ECHR.254InHassanvUnitedKingdomthegroundsofpermitteddeprivationoflibertyunderArt5ECHRwereinterpretedinthelightoftheThirdandFourthGenevaConventiononthelawsofwarrelatingtointernment,withtheCourtpointingoutthattheformer“shouldbeaccommo-dated,asfaraspossible”withthetakingofprisonersofwarandthedetentionofciviliansunderthelatter.255AlsotheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsreferstootherhumanrightstreaties,inordertoestablishthemeaningofprovisionsoftheAmericanConventiononHumanRights.Thus,intheStreetChildrencasetheCourtpointedoutthat“[b]oththeAmericanConventionandtheConventionontheRightsoftheChildformpartofaverycomprehen-siveinternationalcorpusjurisfortheprotectionofthechildthatshouldhelpthisCourtestablishthecontentandscopeofthegeneralprovisionestablishedinArt19oftheAmericanConvention”.256InarecentmaritimedelimitationcasetheICJexplicitlyreferredtoUNCLOSascontaining“relevantrules”withinthemeaningoflitc.257253Eg,ECtHRAl-AdsanivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo35763/97,ECHR2001-XI,para60;PinietalvRomaniaECHR2004-V,para139;SidabrasandDžiautasvLithuaniaAppNos55480/00,59330/00,ECHR2004-VIII,para47;SiliadinvFranceAppNo73316/01,ECHR2005-VII,paras85–87;SørensenandRasmussenvDenmark(GC)AppNos52562/99and52620/99,ECHR2006-I,para72;ASLEFvUnitedKingdomAppNo11002/05,27February2007,para38;EmonetetalvSwitzerlandAppNo39051/03,13December2007,para65;DemirandBaykaravTurkey(GC)AppNo34503/97,ECHR2008-V,paras69–73.254ECtHRRantsevvCyprusandRussiaAppNo25965/04,7January2010,paras273–282.255ECtHRHassanvUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo29750/09,ECHR2014-VI,paras102–111.256IACtHR‘StreetChildren’(Villagran-Moralesetal)vGuatemala,19November1999,para194.257ICJMaritimeDelimitationintheIndianOcean(SomaliavKenya)(PreliminaryObjections),2February2017,para89.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation605Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Litcalsoappliestobilateraltreatiesinforcebetweentwopartiestoadisputeontheinterpretationofamultilateraltreaty.Thus,inQuestionsofMutualAssistancetheICJpointedoutthatthegeneralclausescontainedintheearlierTreatyofFriendshipandCo-operationbetweenDjiboutiandFrance“doeshaveacertainbearingontheinterpretationandapplication”ofthe1986ConventiononMutualAssistanceinCriminalMattersbetweenthem.25897SincetheyarederivedfromtheprovisionsoftheUNCharter,basicallyamultilateraltreaty,bindingresolutionsoftheUNSecurityCouncilmayalsoplayanimportantroleintheprocessoftreatyinterpretation.Thus,theECtHRinitsLoizidoucasereferredtoSecurityCouncilresolutionsrelatingtothesituationinNorthernCypruswhenitinterpretedtheECHRwithregardtothetakingofpropertythere.25998Secondly,thegeneralrulesofcustomaryinternationallawmayservetosetthebackgroundofatreatyprovisionand,thus,containimportantguidanceastoitsinterpretation.Thisis,forexample,whattheICJdidintheOilPlatformscasewhenitinterpretedaclausecontainedinthebilateraltreatyoffriendshipbetweenIranandtheUnitedStates,whichallowedformeasures“necessarytoprotecttheessentialsecurityinterests”ofeitherparty,inthelightofthegeneralrulesofinternationallawontheuseofforceandtherighttoself-defence.TheCourtunderlinedthat“theapplicationoftherelevantrulesofinternationallawrelatingtothisquestionthusformsanintegralpartofthetaskofinterpretationentrustedtotheCourt[...].”260AlsotheECtHRreferredtointernationalcustomarylawinitswell-knownAl-Adsanicase:“TheConventionshouldsofaraspossiblebeinterpretedinharmonywithotherrulesofinternationallawofwhichitformspart,includingthoserelatingtothegrantofStateimmunity.”TheCourtinterpretedtherightofaccesstocourtgrantedinArt6para1ECHRinthelightoftheinherentrestrictionsarisingfromthecustomaryrulesofStateimmu-nity.261Inasubsequentcase,theCourtreferredtothe2004UNConventiononStateimmunity,whichhadnotyetenteredintoforceandwas,thus,notbindingontheStateinquestion,asenshriningcustomaryinternationallawand,inthatcapacity,tookitintoaccountininterpretingtherightofaccesstoacourt.262IntheBankovićcase,whentheECtHRhadtointerpretthephrase“withinitsjurisdiction”inArt1ECHR,theCourtfoundthatthat“mustalsotakeintoaccountanyrelevantrulesofinternationallawwhen258ICJMutualAssistanceinCriminalMatters[2008]ICJRep177,paras112–114.259ECtHRLoizidouvTurkey(GC)(Merits)AppNo15318/89,ECHR1996-VI,paras42–47.260ICJOilPlatforms(Merits)[2003]ICJRep161,paras40–41.261ECtHRAl-AdsanivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo35763/97,ECHR2001-XI,paras55–56.TothesameeffectECtHRCudakvLithuania(GC)AppNo15869/02,ECHR2010-III,para56;SabehElLeilvFrance(GC)AppNo34869/05,29June2011,para48.262ECtHRSabehElLeilvFrance(GC)AppNo34869/05,29June2011,paras48–67.606PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
examiningquestionsconcerningitsjurisdictionand,consequently,determineStaterespon-sibilityinconformitywiththegoverningprinciplesofinternationallaw”,263butintheenddidnotderiveanyassistancefromexternalmaterial.InMargušvCroatiatheCourt,referringtoArt31para3litc)VCLT,turnedtothe“generalprinciplesofinternationallaw”forthepurposeofinterpretingArt4ProtocolNo7(nebisinidem),and,sinceitdiscovered“agrowingtendencyininternationallawtoseesuchamnestiesasunacceptablebecausetheyareincompatiblewiththeunanimouslyrecognizedobligationofStatestoprosecuteandpunishgravebreachesoffundamentalhumanrights”,heldthatthenebisinidemruledidnotapplytosuchbreaches.264TheECJintheBritacase,whereitwastointerprettheEC-IsraelAssociationAgree-ment,applied“thegeneralinternationallawprincipleoftherelativeeffectoftreaties[...](‘pactatertiisnecnocentnecprosunt’)”andreferredinthatrespectexplicitlytothe‘relevantrules’clauseofArt31VCLT.265InAxelWalztheCourt,forthepurposeofinterpretingtheMontrealConventionontheInternationalCarriageinAir,referredtotheILCArticlesonStateResponsibility266asendorsing“aconceptofdamagewhich[...]iscommontoalltheinternationallawsub-systems”.267InthePolisariocase,theGrandChamberoftheECJreferredunderArt31para3c)VCT,amongothers,tothecustomaryprincipleofself-determinationandusedittointerpretthescopeoftheAssociationAgreementbetweentheEUandMorocco.268TheIran-USClaimsTribunal,whenithadtointerprettheword“national”containedinthebilateralClaimsSettlementDeclaration,consideredrelevantthecustomaryruleofeffectivenationalitywhichitsawashavingbeendevelopedinprecedentsandlegaldoctrine.269Similarly,intheIronRhinearbitrationthetribunaltookintoconsiderationthegeneralrulesofinternationalenvironmentallaw,inordertointerpretthetreatybeforeit.270Inthearbitrationconcerningplaintobaccopackaging(PhilipMorrisvUruguay)thetribunal,wheninterpretingthespecificinvestmenttreaty,turnedtothedevelopmentofthecustomary“fairandequitabletreatment”standard.271263ECtHRBankovićetalvBelgiumetal(GC)AppNo52207/99,ECHR2001-XII,para57.264ECtHRMargušvCroatia(GC)AppNo4455/10,ECHR2014-III,paras129–141.265ECJ(CJ)BritaC-386/08[2010]ECRI-1289,paras43–44;confirmedinECJ(GC)CouncilvFrontPolisarioCaseC-104/16P,21December2016,ECLI:EU:C:2016:973,para100.266ArticlesonResponsibilityofStatesforInternationallyWrongfulActs,AnnextoUNGARes56/83,12December2001,UNDocA/RES/56/83.267ECJ(CJ)AxelWalzC-63/09[2010]ECRI-4239,para27.268ECJ(GC)CouncilvFrontPolisarioC-104/16PECLI:EU:C:2016:973,paras86–92.269Iran-UnitedStatesClaimsTribunalIranvUnitedStatesCaseA/18(1984)75ILR175,188–194.270IronRhine(‘IjzerenRhin’)RailwayArbitration(BelgiumvNetherlands)(2005)27RIAA35,paras58–59.271ICSIDPhilipMorrisBrandsSARL,PhilipMorrisProductsS.A.andAbalHermanosS.A.vOrientalRepublicofUruguayARB/10/7,8July2016,paras317–324.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation607Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
99Althoughofminorpracticalrelevance,para3litcwouldevenallowreferencetogeneralprinciplesoflawwithinthemeaningofArt38para1litcICJStatuteinthecontextofinterpretingatreatyprovision.AfamousexampleisthedecisionoftheECtHRintheGoldercasewheretheCourtheld:“Theprinciplewherebyacivilclaimmustbecapableofbeingsubmittedtoajudgeranksasoneoftheuniversally‘recognised’fundamentalprinciplesoflaw;thesameistrueoftheprincipleofinternationallawwhichforbidsthedenialofjustice.Article6para1mustbereadinthelightoftheseprinciples.”272InitsdecisionUS–ShrimptheWTOAppellateBodyreferredtotheprincipleofgoodfaithasbeing,atonce,ageneralprincipleoflawandageneralprincipleofinternationallawand,underexplicitreferencetoArt31para3litc,soughtguidancefromitfortheinterpretationofArtXXGATT.273IntheEC–BiotechcasetheWTOPanelwaspreparedtotakeintoaccounttheprecautionaryprincipleofinternationalenvironmentallaw,ifitwereestablishedthatithadachievedthestatusofageneralprincipleoflaw(which,itfound,ithadnot).274InEC–LargeCivilAircrafttheWTOAppellateBodyconsideredtheprincipleofnon-retroactivityreflectedinArt28VCLTageneralprincipleoflaw,whichisrelevanttotheinterpretationoftheWTOcoveredagreements.275100Notwithstandingthefactthat“rules”wouldimplythatonlylegallybindinginstrumentscanplayaroleunderlitc,partsofinternationaljudicialpracticeseemtoapplythisconditionsomewhatlessrestrictivelyandalsoconsidernon-bindingdocumentsasmaterialrelevantforinterpretation.Forexample,theECtHRturns,forthepurposeofinterpretingtheECHR,tonon-bindinginstrumentsofCouncilofEuropeorgans,inparticularrecommendationsandresolutionsoftheCommitteeofMinistersandtheParliamentaryAssemblyorreportsbyvariousindepen-dentcommissions,276theUNGeneralAssembly’sUniversalDeclarationonHumanRights,277Guidelinesand“Conclusions”publishedbytheUNHighCommissioneronRefugees,278andeventhe(then)non-bindingEUCharterofFundamentalRights.279TheECJreferredinthecontextofinterpretingtheMontrealConventiontotheILCArticlesonStateResponsibility.280272ECtHRGoldervUnitedKingdomAppNo4451/70,SerA18,para35(1975).273WTOAppellateBodyUS–ShrimpWT/DS58/AB/R,para158andn157(1998).274WTOPanelEC–ApprovalandMarketingofBiotechProductsWT/DS291-3/R,paras7.76–7.89(2006).275WTOAppellateBodyECandCertainMemberStates–LargeCivilAircraftWT/DS316/AB/R,para672(2011).276CfECtHRDemirandBaykaravTurkey(GC)AppNo34503/97,ECHR2008-V,paras74–75;BayatyanvArmenia(GC)AppNo23459/03,7July2011,para107.277EgECtHRAl-AdsanivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo35763/97,ECHR2001-XI,para60.278ECtHRSaadivUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo13229/03,29January2008,para65.279ECtHRGoodwinvUnitedKingdom(GC)AppNo28957/95,ECHR2002-VI,para100;SørensenandRasmussenvDenmark(GC)AppNos52562/99and52620/99,ECHR2006-I,para72;EskelinenetalvFinland(GC)AppNo63235/00,19April2007,para60infine.280ECJAxelWalzC-63/09[2010]ECRI-4239,para27.608PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
EvenbroaderisapparentlytheapproachtakenbytheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRightswhichconsidersthat“ininterpretingandapplyingtheAmericanDeclara-tion[onHumanRights],itisnecessarytoconsideritsprovisionsinthecontextoftheinternationalandinter-Americanhumanrightssystemsmorebroadly,inthelightofdevelopmentsinthefieldofinternationalhumanrightslawsincetheinstrumentwasfirstadoptedandwithdueregardtootherrelevantrulesofinternationallawapplicabletomemberstatesagainstwhichcomplaintsofviolationsoftheAmericanDeclarationareproperlylodged.”281101Incaseswheretheprovisiontobeinterpretedrelatestothecompetencesorproceduresofinternationalorgans,theinterpretationmightseekguidanceinsimilarprovisionsinothertreatyregimesand,aboveall,intheirapplicationbycompetentorgans.Insuchcases,itisnotsomuchtheexternal(parallel)“rules”,butthepracticeunderthemwhichisbeingusedasameansofinterpretation.ThiscanbeaptlyshownintheMamatkulovandAskarovcaseoftheECtHRwheretheCourthadtodecideonthebindingcharacterofinterimmeasuresadoptedunderArt34ECHR.IntheprocessofinterpretingtheConventionnormandafterexplicitlyreferringtoArt31para3litcitbasicallyreviewedthepracticeunderotherindividualpetitionprocedures,egintheUNandtheInter-Americansystem,andconcludedfromthat:“TheCourtobservesthattheInternationalCourtofJustice,theInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,theHumanRightsCommitteeandtheCommitteeagainstTortureoftheUnitedNations,althoughoperatingunderdifferenttreatyprovisionstothoseoftheCourt,haveconfirmedintheirreasoninginrecentdecisionsthatthepreservationoftheassertedrightsofthepartiesinthefaceoftheriskofirreparabledamagerepresentsanessentialobjectiveofinterimmeasuresininternationallaw.”282IntheBayatyancase,theECtHRinterpretedArt9ECHRtocoverconscientiousobjectiontomilitaryserviceand,asoneofthereasonsbesideatrendinnationallegislationofEuropeanStates,referredto“theequallyimportantdevelopmentsconcerningrecogni-tionoftherighttoconscientiousobjectioninvariousinternationalfora”,themostnotablebeingtheinterpretationbytheUNHumanRightsCommitteeofthecorrespondingprovi-sionsoftheICCPR.283TheICJinitsCERDcase(GeorgiavRussia)referred,forthepurposeofinterpretingthecompromissoryclauseintheConvention,toitsownjurisprudenceconcerningcompa-rableclausesinothertreaties.284102Art31para3litcrequirestherulesofinternationallaw,whicharesupposedtobelookedatforthepurposeofinterpretation,tobe“relevant”.This,ofcourse,isarathervaguecondition,whichleavestheinterpretermuchroomintheselectionof281IACHRMossvilleEnvironmentalActionNowvUnitedStates,ReportNo43/10,17March2010,para43.282ECtHRMamatkulovandAskarovvTurkey(GC)AppNo46827/99and46951/99,ECHR2005-I,para124.283ECtHRBayatyanvArmenia(GC)AppNo23459/03,7July2011,para105.284ICJRacialDiscriminationConvention(PreliminaryObjections)[2011]ICJRep70,paras136–140.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation609Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
pertinentextrinsicmaterial.Itseemsthatthe“relevance”ofothertreatiesorcustomaryrulescanbeseentofollowfromvariousgrounds:itisfairlyobviouswhenthoserulesrelatetothesamesubjectmatterasthetreatyprovisionunderinterpretation.285Forexample,theexactscopeofprivilegesoffamilymembersofdiplomaticagents,whichisdescribedinArt37para1oftheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelationswiththewords“formingpartofhishousehold”,maybedeterminedbylookingattheprovisionaddressingthesameissueintheViennaConventiononConsularRelations(Art49para1).EvenifinthiscasetheEnglishtextsofbothprovisionsdonotrevealanysignificantdifferencesinwordingthatwouldassistintheinterpretation,theotherauthenticlanguageversionsinfactdo.Moreover,externalrules,regardlessoftheirsubjectmatter,canberelevantwhentheyarecreatedtosolvethesameorsimilarfactual,legalortechnicalproblems.Again,anothertreatycannotbe“relevant”inthissense,ifitisintendedbyitspartiestobeoflowerrankthanthetreatyunderinterpretation(!MN73).Anagreementthat“shalladjust”tothelatterorshallleaveitsprovisionsunaffected(etc)doesnot,therefore,qualifyasameansofinterpretationunderpara3litc.286103Finally,para3litconlyallowsthoserulestobeusedforthepurposeofinterpretationthatare“applicableintherelationsbetweentheparties”.Sincetheword“parties”isdefinedinArt2para1litg,itsmeaningseems,onthefaceofit,clear,ieStatesforwhomthetreatyunderinterpretationisinforce.However,thisdoesnotsettlethequestion,ofwhetherthenormrequiresallthepartiesofthattreatytobeboundbythe“rules”inquestion,orwhetheritsufficesthatthelatterapplyonlytosomeoftheparties,egthosehavinganimmediateinterestintheinterpretationorbeinginvolvedinadisputeoverit.Whilethecomparisonwithpara2lita,where“all”isincludedbefore“theparties”,mightpointtothelatter,lessrestrictivereading,thedefinitewording“the”partiesstronglysuggeststheformer,restrictivereading.287Thisisconfirmedbytheimmediatecontextofthenorm,thatisbypara3litb:itwouldbeincongruoustoallowtheinterpretationofatreatytobeaffectedbyrulesofinternationallawthatarenotapplicablebetweenallpartiestothetreaty,butnotbyasubsequentpractice,whichdoesnotestablishtheagreementofallpartiesregardingthemeaningofthattreaty(!MN86).288104Itisadmittedthatthisrestrictiveapproachseverelylimitstherelevanceofpara3litcfortheinterpretationofmultilateraltreatieswithawide,evenuniversalparticipation.289However,onproperconstruction,itmayallowforanexception,285TheWTOAppellateBodyconfinedtheconceptof“relevant”tothismeaninginECandCertainMemberStates–LargeCivilAircraftWT/DS316/AB/Rpara846(2011).Similarly,ICJMaritimeDelimitationintheIndianOcean(SomaliavKenya)(PreliminaryObjections),2Febru-ary2017,para89.286Thus,theWTOPanelinChile–PriceBandSystemWT/DS207/R,para7.85(2002).287Infavoroftherestrictivereading,alsoVilliger(2009),Art31MN25;Thiele(2008),pp.26–27.288ThiswasheldbytheWTOPanelinEC–ApprovalandMarketingofBiotechProductsWT/DS291-3/R,para7.68,n243infine(2006).289FavoringalessrestrictivereadingforpracticalreasonsFrench(2006),p.307.610PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
andthatisifthetreatyobligationinquestion,evenifcontainedinamultilateraltreaty,isinfactowedinasynallagmaticwaybetweenpairsofparties,ratherthanergaomnespartes:inthosecasesofabilateralimplementationstructure,thetreatyobligationmayverywellbeconsideredinthelightofotherobligationsapplyingbilaterallybetweenthosetwopartiesonly.290TherestrictiveapproachwasappliedbytheWTOPanelintheEC–Biotechcasewhenitheldthatotherrulesofinternationallaw,inthatcasetheConventiononBiologicalDiversityandtheBiosafetyProtocol,cannotbetakenintoaccountfortheinterpretationoftheWTOagreements,unlessallWTOMembersareboundbythem.291ThefactthattheUnitedStateshadsigned,butnotratifiedtheformerConventionmeantthatitwasnot“applicable”tothemandthatArt31para3litcdidnotapply.292TheWTOAppellateBodywasconfrontedwiththeissueinanothercase,butavoidedtogiveanopiniononit.293Thelessrestrictiveapproach,whichallowsexternalrulestobeusedeveniftheyarenotbindingonallthepartiestothetreaty,receivesconsiderablesupportfromthepracticeoftheECtHR:whileinsomecasesitemphasizedthefactthattheothertreatiesreferredtoforthepurposeofinterpretationwereatleastbindingupontherespondentState,theCourtadmitteditselfinDemirandBaykaravTurkeythatinsearchingforcommongroundamongtheEuropeanConventionandothernormsofinternationallawithadnotalwaysdistin-guishedbetweensourcesoflawaccordingtowhetherornottheyhadbeenratifiedbyallStatesPartiestotheConvention,orevenbytherespondentState.294105Thattheexternalrulesare“applicable”intherelationsbetweenthepartiespresupposesthatthelatterarelegallyboundbythoserules,eitherbecausetheyhavegiventheirconsenttothemastreatyrules,orbecausetheyareaddressedbythemasbindingcustomaryrulesorgeneralprinciples,orbecausetheyareboundforotherreasons,suchasacquiescenceorunilateraldeclaration.Secondly,eveniftheexternalrulesmayhaveinprinciplebindingeffecton“theparties”,theirapplica-bilitybetweenthemmustnotbeexcludedforreasonsofestoppelorthroughadmissiblereservationstoatreaty.106Inpractice,itissometimesconsideredpossiblethatrulesextrinsictothetreatyunderinterpretationwhichdonotqualifyforconsiderationunderlitc,eitherbecausetheyarenotbindingonallpartiestothetreaty,orbecausetheyfacerestrictionsofapplication,mayundercertaincircumstancesneverthelessbecomerelevantfortheinterpretationofthesametreaty.290McLachlan(2005),p.315.291WTOPanelEC–ApprovalandMarketingofBiotechProductsWT/DS291-3/R,paras7.68–7.71(2006).292Ibidpara7.74.293CfWTOAppellateBodyECandCertainMemberStates–LargeCivilAircraftWT/DS316/AB/R,paras844–846(2011).294ECtHRDemirandBaykaravTurkey(GC)AppNo34503/97,ECHR2008-V,para78,withexamplesgiveninparas79–84.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation611Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Forexample,theWTOPanelintheEC–Biotechcase,afterhavingfollowedtherestrictiveapproachmentionedabove(!MN103),thoughtitpossibletoconsidertheexternalrules,excludedunderthatapproach,“becausetheymayprovideevidenceoftheordinarymeaningoftermsinthesamewaythatdictionariesdo.Theywouldbeconsideredfortheirinformativecharacter.”295TheAppellateBodyskirtedtheissueinECLargeCivilAircraft,butwasinthefurthercourseofitsreasoningapparentlypreparedtoconsidertheexternalagreementreferredtoas“partofthefacts”.296Althoughthedifferenceis,ofcourse,thatatreatyinterpreterwouldthiswaybefreetorelyontheexternalrules,whileunderpara3litcheorsheisboundtotakethemintoaccount,theargumentappearsverymuchlikeasleight-of-hand,sinceitreintroducesinterpretativematerialthroughthebackdoorthathasbeenexcludedfollowingastrictreadingoftheruleofinterpretation.ItseemshardlycompatiblewiththeoverallstructureofArt31.Howeverthefactthatthis‘backdoorapproach’hasbeenthoughtnecessaryinpractice,maybeconsideredapracticalargumentagainsttherestrictiveapproachtothephrase“applicableintherelationsbetweentheparties”.107Eventhoughitisnotrecognizableinthetextofpara3litc,theprovisionhasanimportanttemporalelement:tothestateofthelawatwhatmomentintimedoestherulerelate,thetimeoftheconclusionofthetreatyorthatofinterpretation?The(inter)temporalaspectwascontainedinearlierdraftsoftheprovision,ithadevenbeenthereasonfordesigningitinthefirstplace,butwaslateromitted297:theprovisionalILCdraftof1964hadreferredtothegeneralrulesofinternationallaw“inforceatthetimeofitsconclusion”;afterre-consideringthearticle,theILCdeletedthetimeelementbecauseitthoughtitwas“unsatisfactory”.TheCommissionconsideredthat“thecorrectapplicationofthetemporalelementwouldnormallybeindicatedbyinterpre-tationofthetermingoodfaith”,298thus,itlefttheissuedecidedlyundecided.108Sincetheconsiderationofexternalrulesforthepurposeofinterpretationisnotperseeitherstaticordynamic,ieitcanbeusedbothways,itissubmittedthatthecorrectuseoftherulecontainedinpara3litcdependsonwhetherthestaticorthedynamicapproachappliestotheterminquestion.Ashasbeenshownearlier(!MN22–27),thisdependsupontheintentionsoftheparties,butiftheyhaveusedgenerictermsintheirtreaty,themeaningofwhichnecessarilyevolvesovertime,theyusuallymustbepresumedtohaveintendedadynamicinterpretation.Inthatcase,the“relevantrules”tobeconsideredunderpara3litcmustbethoseapplicableatthetimeofinterpretation.ThisisalsohowtheICJappliedtheruleinitsNamibiaopinion,whenitintroducedthedynamicapproachoftreatyinterpretationandadded:“aninternationalinstrumenthastobeinterpretedandappliedwithintheframeworkoftheentirelegalsystemprevailingatthetimeoftheinterpretation”.299295WTOPanelEC–ApprovalandMarketingofBiotechProductsWT/DS291-3/R,para7.92(2006).Similarly,McLachlan(2005),p.315.296WTOAppellateBodyECandCertainMemberStates–LargeCivilAircraftWT/DS316/AB/R,paras852–853(2011).297CfSinclair(1984),pp.138–139;Gardiner(2015),pp.295–298.298FinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,222,para16.299ICJNamibiaOpinion[1971]ICJRep16,(emphasisadded).612PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Similarly,intheIronRhineRailwayarbitrationthetribunalconsideredmodernprinci-plesofinternationalenvironmentallawrelevantfortheinterpretationofbilateraltreatiesconcludedbyBelgiumandtheNetherlandsin1839and1873.300IV.SpecialInsteadofOrdinaryMeaning(Para4)109Art31para4containsanexceptiontopara1forcaseswherethepartieshaveagreed,evenimplicitly,toreplacetheordinarymeaningofatermcontainedinatreatyprovisionbyaspecialmeaning.However,thenotionof“specialmeaning”referstotwodifferentkindsofcases,whicharebothcoveredbypara4.First,itmaybethatthetermsofatreatyhaveatechnicalor“specialmeaning”duetotheparticularfieldthetreatycovers.Inthiscase,theparticularmeaningmayalreadyappearfromthecontextandobjectandpurposeofthetreaty,itisessentiallytheordinarymeaningintheparticularcontext.301Itisthisreadingoftheconceptof“specialmeaning”whichlendsitselftoexplainingthepracticeofautonomousinterpretationappliedinparticularlegalregimes,suchastheECHRortheEuro-peanUnion:theautonomousmeaninggivenbytheEuropeanCourtstotheEuro-peanConventionandtheEUtreaties,respectively,representstheirordinarymeaningintheparticularsettingoftheirlegalregime.302Inthesecondcase,themeaningoftermsofatreatyis“special”becausethepartiesareusingitinawaydifferentfromthemorecommonmeaning.Itisthiscategorywhichpara4isespeciallyaimingat,andinthisunderstanding,theprovisionentailstheonlyelementintheprocessoftreatyinterpretationwhichexplicitlylookstotheintentionoftheparties,ratherthantoitsemanationinthetext,inordertoestablishtheirveryownunderstandingofatermwhichtheyused.110ThemainreasonwhytheILCdecidedtoincludeanexpressprovisiononthepointintoitsdraftwastoemphasizethattheburdenofproofliesonthepartyinvokingthespecialmeaningoftheterm,andthestrictnessoftheproofrequired.303ThatpointhadalreadybeenmadebythePCIJintheEasternGreenlandcase,whenitheld:“Thegeographicalmeaningoftheword‘Greenland’,iethenamewhichishabituallyusedinthemapstodenominatethewholeisland,mustberegardedastheordinarymeaningoftheword.IfitisallegedbyoneofthePartiesthatsomeunusualorexceptionalmeaningistobeattributedtoit,itliesonthatPartytoestablishitscontention.”304300IronRhine(‘IjzerenRhin’)RailwayArbitration(BelgiumvNetherlands)(2005)27RIAA35,paras57–60.301Gardiner(2015),p.334.302Art31para4isappliedtobothregimesbySorelandBoré(2011),Art31MN50.303CfFinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,222,para17.304PCIJLegalStatusofEasternGreenlandPCIJSerA/BNo53,49(1933).ConfirmedbytheICJinWesternSaharaOpinion[1975]ICJRep12,para116.Article31.Generalruleofinterpretation613Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Also,inConditionsofAdmission,theICJpointedoutthat“adecisivereasonwouldberequired”inordertodisplacethenaturalmeaningofthetermsused,305andthearbitraltribunalintheRhineChloridesarbitrationof2004appliedaverysimilarstandardwhenitrequiredthepartyinvokingaparticularmeaning“tomakeaconvincingcaseforit”.306InviewofthegeneraldesignofArt31,thestandardofproofrequiredtoestablisha“specialmeaning”is,thus,fairlyhigh:itisnotenoughthatonepartysimplyusestheparticularterminaparticularway,butitmustshowthatsuchausagereflectsthecommonintentionoftheparties.111However,Art31para4doesnotsaywhatkindofevidencemaybeusedtoestablishthatintention.SinceArt31containsnorestrictioninthisrespect,itseemsplausiblethatalltheevidenceavailabletotheproponentofa“specialmeaning”mayplayaroleinshowingthata“specialmeaning”wasintendedandwhatthatmeaningis.Themostcommonwayinwhichthepartiescouldindicateaparticularmeaningwouldbe,ofcourse,toincludeanexplicitdefinitionarticleinthetreaty.Ifadefinitionislacking,thetravauxpréparatoiresandtheactual,andconsented,practiceofthepartiesmayinmostcasesbeuseful.Moreover,para4doesnotexcludethatthepartiescouldagreeonspecialinterpretativeprinciples,whichdifferfromthegeneralrulelaiddowninArt31,orwhichplaceadifferentweightonsomeoftheelementsofinterpretation.307E.TreatiesofInternationalOrganizations(VCLTII)308112Theprovisionsontreatyinterpretationinthe1986ViennaConventionareidenticaltothoseinthe1969Convention,asintheILCandatthe1986ConferencetheestablishedrulesweresimplyreplicatedandinsertedintothetextoftheVCLTIIwithoutdebate.309ReferencesAustA(2013)ModernTreatyLawandPractice,3rdedn.CUP,CambridgeBarentsR(2004)TheAutonomyofCommunityLaw.Kluwer,TheHagueBernhardtR(1999)EvolutiveTreatyInterpretation,EspeciallyoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.GYIL42:11–25BrandlU(2015)AuslegungvonResolutionendesSicherheitsrats:EinheitlichevölkerrechtlicheRegelungenoder“pickandchoose”ausmöglichenAuslegungsregeln?AVR53:279–321BrölmannC(2012)SpecializedRulesofTreatyInterpretation:InternationalOrganizations.In:HollisDB(ed)TheOxfordGuidetoTreaties.OUP,Oxford,pp507–524305ICJFirstAdmissionsCase[1948]ICJRep57,63.306ConventionontheProtectionoftheRhine(n19)para67.307Gardiner(2015),p.341.308Forthetreatytextseep.1486etseq.309Cf[1982-I]YbILC22and260;UNCLOTIOI15–16.614PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
BrownLN,KennedyT(2000)TheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanCommunities,5thedn.Sweet&Maxwell,LondonBuffardI,ZemanekK(1998)The‘ObjectandPurpose’ofaTreaty:AnEnigma?ARIEL3:311–343ÇaliB(2012)SpecializedRulesofTreatyInterpretation:HumanRights.In:HollisDB(ed)TheOxfordGuidetoTreaties.OUP,Oxford,pp525–548CameronI(2008)Treaties,DeclarationsofInterpretation.In:WolfrumR(ed)TheMaxPlanckencyclopediaofpublicinternationallaw.OUP,Oxford.http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801992…–KonkordanzkommentarzumeuropäischenunddeutschenGrundrechtsschutz,2ndedn.MohrSiebeck,TübingenCriddleE(2004)TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesinUSTreatyInterpretation.VaJIL44:431–500FitzmauriceGG(1951)TheLawandProcedureoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.TreatyInterpretationandCertainOtherTreatyPoints.BYIL28:1–28FitzmauriceGG(1957)TheLawandProcedureoftheInternationalCourtofJustice1951-4:TreatyInterpretationandOtherTreatyPoints.BYIL33:203–293FrenchD(2006)TreatyInterpretationandtheIncorporationofExtraneousLegalRules.ICLQ55:281–314GardinerR(2015)TreatyInterpretation,2ndedn.OUP,OxfordHartleyTC(2010)TheFoundationsofEuropeanCommunityLaw,7thedn.OUP,OxfordHeintschelvonHeineggW(2014)AuslegungvölkerrechtlicherVerträge.In:IpsenK(ed)Völker-recht,6thedn.Beck,München,pp407–415JenningsR,WattsA(eds)(1992)Oppenheim’sInternationalLaw,VolI.Longman,HarlowKarlW(1983)VertragundspäterePraxisimVölkerrecht.Springer,BerlinKlabbersJ(1997)SomeProblemsRegardingtheObjectandPurposeofTreaties.FinnYIL8:138–160KlabbersJ(2008)Treaties,ObjectandPurpose.In:WolfrumR(ed)TheMaxPlanckencyclopediaofpublicinternationallaw.OUP,Oxford.http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801992…–85MalanczukP(1997)Akehurst’sModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw,7thedn.Routledge,LondonMcLachlanC(2005)ThePrincipleofSystemicIntegrationandArticle31(3)(c)oftheViennaConvention.ICLQ54:279–320McNairA(1961)TheLawofTreaties.OUP,LondonMcRaeDM(1978)LegalEffectofInterpretativeDeclarations.BYIL49:155–173OrakhelashviliA(2010)UnilateralInterpretationofSecurityCouncilResolutions:UKPractice.GoJIL2:823–842PapastravidisE(2007)InterpretationofSecurityCouncilResolutionsunderChapterVIIintheAftermathoftheIraqiCrisis.ICLQ57:83–118SchwarzenbergerG(1968)MythsandRealitiesofTreatyInterpretation.VaJIL9:1–19SinclairI(1984)TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,2ndedn.UniversityPress,ManchesterSorelJ-M,BoréEvenoV(2011)Article30.In:CortenO,KleinP(eds)TheViennaConventionsontheLawofTreaties.OUP,Oxford,pp804–837ThieleC(2008)FragmentierungdesVölkerrechtsalsHerausforderungfürdieStaatenge-meinschaft.AVR46:1–41TorresBernárdezS(1998)InterpretationofTreatiesbytheInternationalCourtofJusticeFollow-ingtheAdoptionofthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties.In:HafnerG(ed)FestschriftSeidl-Hohenveldern.Kluwer,TheHague,pp721–748deVattelE(1758)Ledroitdesgensouprincipesdelaloinaturelle,VolII.LondonArticle31.Generalruleofinterpretation615Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
VilligerM(2009)Commentaryonthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties.Nijhoff,LeidenWoodMC(1998)InterpretationofSecurityCouncilResolutions.MPYUNL2:73–95FurtherReadingBernerK(2016a)JudicialDialogueandTreatyInterpretation:Revisitingthe‘CocktailParty’ofInternationalLaw.AVR54:67–90BernerK(2016b)AuthenticInterpretationinPublicInternationalLaw.ZaöRV76:845–878BjorgeE(2014)TheEvolutionaryInterpretationofTreaties.OUP,OxfordBosM(1980)TheoryandPracticeofTreatyInterpretation.NILR27:3–38;27:135–170BöthK(2013)EvolutiveAuslegungvölkerrechtlicherVerträge.Duncker&Humblot,BerlinCortenO(2011)Lestechniquesreproduitesauxarticles31à33desConventionsdeVienne:approcheobjectivisteouapprochevolontaristedel’interprétation?RGDIP115:351–366vanDammeI(2009)TreatyInterpretationbytheWTOAppellateBody.DistefanoG(2011)L’interprétationevolutivedelanormeinternationale.RGDIP115:373–396DupuyP-M(2011)EvolutionaryInterpretationofTreaties:BetweenMemoryandProphecy.In:CannizzaroE(ed)TheLawofTreatiesBeyondtheViennaConvention.OUP,Oxford,pp123–137FitzmauriceM(2005)CanonsofTreatyInterpretation:SelectedCaseStudiesfromtheWorldTradeOrganizationandtheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement.ARIEL10:41–94FitzmauriceM(2008/2009)Dynamic(Evolutive)InterpretationofTreaties.HagueYIL21:101–153(PartI);HagueYIL22:3–31(PartII)FitzmauriceM,EliasO,MerkourisP(eds)(2010)TreatyInterpretationandtheViennaConven-tionontheLawofTreaties:30Yearson.Nijhoff,LeidenGardinerR(2012)TheViennaConventionRulesonTreatyInterpretation.In:HollisDB(ed)TheOxfordGuidetoTreaties.OUP,Oxford,pp475–506KlabbersJ(2005)OnRationalisminPolitics:InterpretationofTreatiesandtheWorldTradeOrganization.NordicJIL74:405–428KöckHF(1998)ZurInterpretationvölkerrechtlicherVerträge.ZÖR53:217–237LinderfalkU(2007)OntheInterpretationofTreaties.Springer,DordrechtLinderfalkU(2008)DoingtheRightThingfortheRightReason–WhyDynamicorStaticApproachesShouldbeTakenintheInterpretationofTreaties.ICLR10:109–141NolteG(ed)(2013)TreatiesandSubsequentPractice.OUP,OxfordOrakhelashviliA(2003)RestrictiveInterpretationofHumanRightsTreatiesintheRecentJurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.EJIL14:529–568OrakhelashviliA(2009)TheInterpretationofActsandRulesinPublicInternationalLaw.OUP,OxfordRosentreterD(2015)Article31(3)(c)oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesandthePrincipleofSystemicIntegrationinInternationalInvestmentLawandArbitration.Nomos,Baden-BadenVandeveldeKJ(1988)TreatyInterpretationfromaNegotiator’sPerspective.VandJTL21:281–311VilligerM(2011)TheRulesonInterpretation:Misgivings,Misunderstandings,Miscarriage?The‘Crucible’IntendedbytheInternationalLawCommission.InCannizzaroE(ed)TheLawofTreatiesBeyondtheViennaConvention.OUP,Oxford,pp105–122WhiteG(1999)TreatyInterpretation:TheViennaConvention“Code”asAppliedbytheWorldTradeOrganizationJudiciary.AYIL20:319–340YasseenMK(1976)L’interprétationdestraitésd’aprèslaConventiondeVienne.RdC151:1–141616PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-08 07:33:37.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Article32SupplementarymeansofinterpretationRecoursemaybehadtosupplementarymeansofinterpretation,includingthepreparatoryworkofthetreatyandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion,inordertoconfirmthemeaningresultingfromtheapplicationofarticle31,ortodeterminethemeaningwhentheinterpretationaccordingtoarticle31:(a)leavesthemeaningambiguousorobscure;or(b)leadstoaresultwhichismanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable.ContentsA.PurposeandFunction.....................................................................1B.HistoricalBackgroundandNegotiatingHistory..........................................6C.ElementsofArt32.......................................................................10I.SupplementaryMeansofInterpretation.............................................101.PreparatoryWorkoftheTreaty................................................112.CircumstancesofConclusion..................................................223.OtherSupplementaryMeans...................................................25II.AdmissibleUseoftheSupplementaryMeans......................................281.ConfirmtheMeaning..........................................................302.DeterminetheMeaning........................................................343.Recourse.......................................................................37D.TreatiesofInternationalOrganizations(VCLTII)......................................40A.PurposeandFunction1Art32dealswiththeuseofsupplementarymeansintheprocessoftreatyinterpre-tationandwiththerelationshipofthatusetothegeneralruleofinterpretationlaiddowninArt31.Theprovisionthereforebasicallydeterminesthecircumstancesunderwhichsuchmeansmaybeinvokedintreatyinterpretation,whatweightistobegiventothemandhowtheyrelatetotheotherrulesofinterpretation.Thecoreissueiswhatinformationandmaterialoutsidethetextofatreatycanbebroughtintotheprocessofinterpretingit,andhowthisisdonelegeartis.1Inthisrespect,Art32correspondstoArt31paras2and3,whichalsoreferstoextrinsicmaterialinordertoincludethemintothecontextofthetreaty,whereasheretheidentifiedmaterialisgivenalesservalueasbeingmerelysupplementary.2Thisdistinctionofprimaryandsupplementarymeansofinterpretationisbasedontheirproximitytothe(presumed)intentionsoftheparties,totheir“agreement”:thetextispresumedtobetheauthenticexpressionoftheirconsent,extrinsicmeanslikesubsequentagreementsandpracticeareonlyincludedamongtheprimarymeansinsofarastheyexpress“agreement”amongtheparties(Art311Gardiner(2015),p.348.#Springer-VerlagGmbHGermany2018O.Dörr,K.Schmalenbach(eds.),ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,DOI10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_35617<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
para3).Art32doesnotrequireanysuchagreement,whichiswhythemeansofinterpretationassembledhereareconsideredtobeconsiderablylessreliable.23Themostcommonlyusedandmostcontroversialofthosemeansis,ofcourse,thepreparatoryworkofatreaty,whichiscommonlyreferredtoinitsFrenchversionas“travauxpréparatoires”.TherestrictivepurposeofArt32relatesabovealltothatinterpretativetopos,itislabelledasupplementarymeansofinterpretationinordertoensurethatrecoursetopreparatoryworkisnotusedasanalternative,autonomousmethodofinterpretation,distinctfromthegeneralrule.3Themainpracticalreasonforthisgeneralscepticismastotheinterpretativevalueoftravauxseemstobethattheyareusuallyseenasbeingoftenincompleteandmisleading,thusbytheirnaturelessauthenticthantheotherelementsofinterpretation.44TheforemostpurposeofArt32is,therefore,tomakeclearthatpreparatoryworkinprinciplehasbutasupportingroleintreatyinterpretation.Itissupposedtoassumeitsinterpretativefunctiononlyaftertheapplicationofthegeneralrule,ieaftertheapplicationofthewholeofArt31.Sincetherolewhichpreparatorymaterialcanplayintheprocessofinterpretationmarkstheessentialdifferencebetweenthetextualandthe“intentions”approachestotreatyinterpretation,therestrictivedesignofArt32characterizetheprovisionasafurtherconfirmationofthefactthattheViennarulesofinterpretationareclearlybasedonthetextualapproach(!Art31MN3and37).ThissupplementaryvalueofpreparatoryworkisusuallytakentobepartofthecustomarylawcharacteroftheViennarulesofinterpretation(!Art31MN6).55Aspartoftreatyandcustomarylaw,therulelaiddowninArt32isadispositivenorm,sothatthepartiestoagiventreaty,actinginconsent,mayopttodecideotherwiseandagreethatfortheinterpretationoftheirtreatytheuseofpreparatoryworkis,forexample,toplayamoreimportantrole.Suchcanalsobestipulatedinamultilateralconvention,asisdone,forexample,inArt14para1litdVCLT,whichbindsthevalidtreatyconsentofaStatetoanintention“expressedduringthenegotiation”.B.HistoricalBackgroundandNegotiatingHistory6Therestrictiveuseoftravauxpréparatoiresintreatyinterpretationhasalonghistoryinthepracticeofinternationallaw.OneofthemostprominentdictainthisrespectcanbefoundintheLotusjudgmentofthePCIJwheretheCourtestablishedthemerelysubsidiaryvalueofthepreparatoryworkbyholdingthat2Berner(2016),p.75;Linderfalk(2007),p.153.3Sinclair(1984),p.116.4Aust(2013),p.219infine;variousreasonsaregivenbyLeBouthillier(2011),Art32MN32–38.ThetraditionaldoctrinalcontroversyontheuseoftravauxpréparatoiresisdescribedegbyMehrish(1971),pp.39–57.5LeBouthillier(2011),Art32MNpara7.618PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
“thereisnooccasiontohaveregardtopreparatoryworkifthetextofaconventionissufficientlyclearinitself.”6TheICJinitsearlycaselawexplicitlyreferredtothatrestrictiveapproachandadoptedit.7Theearlyinternationaljurisprudencefurtherdescribedthethresholdwhichmustbereachedbeforepreparatoryworkcanbetakenintoaccount.InitsopiniononthePolishPostalServiceinDanzig,thePCIJheldthat“Itisacardinalprincipleofinterpretationthatwordsmustbeinterpretedinthesensewhichtheywouldnormallyhaveintheircontext,unlesssuchinterpretationwouldleadtosomethingunreasonableorabsurd.”8Again,thatviewwasadoptedbytheICJ,whichapplieditataveryearlystageofitspracticetotheinterpretativeuseoftravauxpréparatoires.9Nevertheless,thestateofthelawseemedveryunclearinthosedays,whichledanimportantvoiceinlegaldoctrineopiningthat:“[i]tisnotpossibletostateanyrulesoflawgoverningthequestionwhether,and,ifso,towhatextentinternationalcourtsandtribunals[...]areentitledtolookat‘preparatorywork’[...].”107TherestrictiveapproachtopreparatoryworkwasalsoverymuchpresentintheworkoftheILConthelawoftreaties.Thus,SRWaldockpointedoutthatsomecautionisneededintheuseoftravaux,becausetheyaresimplyevidenceoftheintentionsofsomeoftheparties,andtheircogencydependsontheextenttowhichtheyfurnishproofofthecommonunderstandingofthepartiesastothemeaningofthetermsofthetreaty.11Theprovisiononpreparatoryworkexposedsomediffer-enceinapproachtotreatyinterpretationamongmembersoftheILC,especiallyregardingtheprecisewayinwhichrecoursetotravauxpréparatoiresshouldberelatedtothetextualapproachtointerpretation.12Inviewofthosedifferencesanddespitecriticalcommentsonthepartofsomegovernmentsindicatingapreferenceforallowingalargerroletopreparatorywork,SRWaldockthoughttherulehehadformulatedwascarefullybalancedinreconcilingtheprincipleoftheprimacyofthetextwiththefrequentandquitenormalrecoursetotravauxpréparatoiresinpractice.136PCIJ‘Lotus’PCIJSerANo10,16(1927).TothesameeffectcfPaymentofVariousSerbianLoansIssuedinFrancePCIJSerANo20,30(1929).7CfegICJFirstAdmissionsCase[1948]ICJRep57,63;AmbatielosCase[1952]ICJRep28,45;ConstitutionoftheMaritimeSafetyCommittee[1960]ICJRep150,159–160.8PCIJPolishPostalServiceinDanzigPCIJSerBNo11,39(1925)(emphasisadded).9ICJSecondAdmissionsCase[1950]ICJRep4,8.10McNair(1961),p.411.11WaldockIII58,para21.12CfWaldockVI99,para20.13CfWaldockVI99,para20.Article32.Supplementarymeansofinterpretation619Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
8InitscommentaryontheFinalDraft,theILCitselfbasicallygavetwodistinctexplanationsonwhythepreparatoryworkshouldplayalessprominentroleintreatyinterpretation:first,theelementsofinterpretationcontainedinthegeneralruleofinterpretation(todayArt31)allrelatedtotheagreementbetweenthepartiesatthetimewhenorafteritreceivedauthenticexpressioninthetext,whilethisisnotthecasewithpreparatorywork,whichcouldnottherefore,intheviewoftheCommission’smajority,havethesameauthenticcharacterasanelementofinter-pretation.Second,theCommissionpointedoutthattherecordsoftreatynegotia-tionsareinmanycasesincompleteormisleading,sothatconsiderablediscretionshouldbeexercisedindeterminingtheirvalueasanelementofinterpretation.149Theprovisiononpreparatoryworkwastheonlypartoftherulesoninterpreta-tiononwhichtherewasasubstantialdebateattheViennaConferenceinthefirstsession.Thedifferencesarisingcaninessencebedescribedtohaveexistedbetweenthosewhoassertedtheprimacyofthetextofatreatyasrevealingtheparties’commitmentsandthosewhosawtheinterpretativequestasprimarilyinvestigatingtheintentionsoftheparties,withaidinthattaskbeingsoughtfromwhereveritcouldbefound.15Intheend,theattempts,especiallyundertakenbytheUSdelegation,tohavetheruleontheuseofpreparatoryworkandthegeneralruleoninterpretationcombinedinoneprovisionand,thus,putonthesamefooting16,failed.C.ElementsofArt32I.SupplementaryMeansofInterpretation10Art32refersassupplementarymeansoftreatyinterpretationexplicitlytothepreparatoryworkofthetreatyandtothecircumstancesofitsconclusion,butatthesametimeindicates,byusingtheword“including”,thatthesearemeanttobeexamples,ratherthananexclusivelist.Theprovisionimplies,therefore,thatothermaterialmayplaya—supplementary—roleintheinterpretationofatreaty.1.PreparatoryWorkoftheTreaty11Thereisnorecognizeddefinitionininternationallawoftravauxpréparatoires,noristhereaclearruleonwhatkindofmaterialcanbetakenintoaccountinthisrespect14FinalDraft,CommentarytoArts27and28,220,para10.TheworkoftheILCwithregardtotravauxiscapturedbyMortenson(2013),pp.790–808,whodemonstratesthatthedrafterswerebynomeanshostiletoitsinterpretiveuse.15Gardiner(2015),p.348;LeBouthillier(2011),Art32MN2.16ThedebateontheUSproposalissummarizedegbyMehrish(1971),pp.58–60andGardiner(2015),pp.349–350.Mortenson(2013),pp.808–820arguesthattheprominenceofthatdebatelaidthegroundfortheconventionalwisdomthatArt32prescribestherestrictiveuseoftravauxpréparatoires.620PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
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orhowfarbackinthehistoryofthetreatytheinterpretermaygotolookforguidance.AsGardinerputsit,courtsandtribunalstendtoseizeonanythingthatlookshelpful.17Sincethepurposeoftheuseofpreparatoryworkinthiscontextistodiscoverthetruemeaningofwhatthepartiesagreedtointheirtreaty,severalconditionsmustbefulfilledbeforethematerialinquestioncanbeconsideredtravauxpréparatoires.12First,onlymaterialandprocessesthatcanbeobjectivelyassessedbyaninterpretercanqualifyaspreparatorywork.Theymustbepartoftheoutsideworld,sothatpeoplecantakecognizanceofthem.Thus,individualthoughts,plans,recollectionsandmemoirsinprincipledonotqualify;also,oralstatementsaredifficulttoevaluate,aslongastheyarenotwrittendownorcannotbecorroboratedbyotherevidence.1813Thus,preparatoryworkincludesalldocumentsrelevanttotheforthcomingtreatyandgeneratedbythenegotiatingstatesduringthepreparationofthetreatyuptoitsconclusion,forexampledrafts,memoranda,commentariesandotherstate-mentsandobservationsbygovernmentstransmittedtoeachotherortoadraftingbody,diplomaticexchangesbetweenthenegotiatingparties,negotiationorconfer-encerecords,minutesofcommissionandplenaryproceedings.Besidethedocu-mentsthemselves,preparatoryworkincludestheprocessestheyunderwentduringthenegotiations,egchangesintextsundernegotiation,butalsotherefusaltochangeatext.Thecourseofadiscussionorofadiplomaticexchangemaybeimportant,aswellasindividualcontributionsbynegotiatorsordelegations.1914Second,thematerialconsideredmustbeapttoilluminateacommonunder-standingofthenegotiatingpartiesastothemeaningofthetreatyprovisions.20Thus,thematerialinquestioncanonlyqualifyaspreparatoryworkproperifitwas,atonestageatleast,presentinthenegotiatingprocessandavailabletothenegotiatorscollectively.15Thiscaveatapplies,aboveall,todocumentsfromaunilateralsource,suchasstatementsofindividualgovernmentsorStaterepresentativesoutsidethetreatynegotiations,nationallegislativedocuments,explanationsgiventoalegislativebodyaspartofanationalratificationprocess.Thosematerialscanonlybetakenintoaccountiftheywereatsomepointintroducedintothenegotiationprocess,atleastbroughttotheknowledgeofotherparticipantsinthenegotiations,anddidnotremainunilateralhopes,inclinationsoropinions.17Gardiner(2015),p.112.18LeBouthillier(2011),Art32MN28refers,eg,tovideotapedsessionsofanegotiatingcommittee.19Forexample,theICJconsideredinNamibia[1971]ICJRep16,para69,thecourseofthedebateintheUNPreparatoryCommission.ThebilateralexchangebetweenthepartieswasconsideredinconclusiveinMaritimeDelimitationandTerritorialQuestionsbetweenQatarandBahrain(JurisdictionandAdmissibility)[1995]ICJRep6,para41.20CfIronRhine(‘IjzerenRhin’)RailwayArbitration(BelgiumvNetherlands),(2005)27RIAA35,para45.Article32.Supplementarymeansofinterpretation621Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
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IntheOilPlatformscase,theICJdidadmitandconsiderunilateraldocumentsoftheUSadministration(amemorandumsentbytheStateDepartmenttotheUSembassyinChina,andamessageoftheSecretaryofStatetransmittingseveraltreatiestotheUSSenateforconsenttoratification)inordertoconfirmaninterpretationofthebilateraltreatyoffriendshipwithIranwhichithadfoundbefore.21FromthesequenceofargumentoftheCourtitcanbededucedthatitadmittedthedocumentsunderArt32,22althoughitdidnotexplicitlycharacterizethemaspreparatorywork(whichtheyclearlywerenot).InarecentdelimitationdisputebetweenSomaliaandKenya,theCourtconsideredastravauxanotesentbytheUN-MissionofNorwaytotheUN-Secretariat,sinceNorwayhadbeeninvolvedbygivingadministrativeassistancetoSomalia.2316Thequestionarisesthenastowhethermaterialcanbebannedfrombeingconsideredifitwasnotequallyavailabletoallpartiestothetreaty.Inthisrespect,thePCIJintheRiverOdercasehadfollowedaveryrestrictiveapproach,whenitrefusedtotaketherecordoftheconferencewhichpreparedtheTreatyofVersaillesintoaccountastravaux,simplybecausesomeofthepartiestothedisputebeforetheCourthadnotparticipatedinthatconference.24Itisdoubtful,however,ifthatrulingrepresentstheactualpracticeinregardtomultilateraltreatiesopentoaccessionbyStatesthatdidnotattendtheconferenceatwhichtheyweredrawnup.25Astateaccedingtoatreatyinthedraftingofwhichitdidnotparticipatemayusuallyasktoseethetravauxbeforeacceding.Moreover,therestrictionappliedbythePCIJwouldbepracticallyinconvenient,havingregardtothegreatnumberofmultilateraltreatiesopengenerallytoaccession:accessiontoandinterpretationofthosetreatieswouldbemademuchmoredifficult,ifthepreparatoryworkcouldonlybeusedasbetweenpartiesthattookpartintheirdrafting.Therefore,theICJinitsearlyjurisprudencetacitlyrescindedtheRiverOderapproachofthePCIJ,26andtheILCexplicitlyrefusedtoadoptit.2717Thus,preparatoryworkofmultilateraltreatiesmayalsobeconsideredindisputesoninterpretationinwhichnon-negotiatingstatesareinvolved,aslongasthetravauxarepublishedorunpublished,butaccessible.28Thislastcaveat,madebytheILC,excludesconfidentialdocumentsfrombeingusedforthepurposeoftreatyinterpretation,whichwerenotaccessibletootherparticipantsinthenegotia-tions,letalonetoaccedingstates.Thequestionsremains,however,ifinagivencasethetestforrelianceonthetravauxtendstobeamoreformalone,referringtothepublicationofthematerialinquestion,orasubstantiveoneofgenuine21ICJOilPlatforms(IranvUnitedStates)(PreliminaryObjection)[1996]ICJRep803,para29.22Gardiner(2015),p.120.23ICJMaritimeDelimitationintheIndianOcean(SomaliavKenya)(PreliminaryObjections),2February2017,para104.24PCIJTerritorialJurisdictionoftheInternationalCommissionoftheRiverOder(Orderof20August1929)SerANo23,41,42.25WaldockIII58,para21.26CfRosenne(1963),pp.1380–1381.27FinalDraft,CommentarytoArt27,223,para20.28Ibidem.ConcurringSinclair(1984),p.144.622PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
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accessibility,oracombinationofboth—allthreeapproaches,itissubmitted,canbefoundinpractice.2918Theprinciplethatmaterialcanonlyqualifyaspreparatoryworkifitwaspresentinthenegotiatingprocess,alsoappliestodraftingmaterialanddiscussionprocessesinindependentbodies,suchasexpertcommitteesoreventheILCitself.Inpractice,ILCrecordsareonoccasionreferredtoaspreparatoryworkofmultilateralconventionsthathadtheiroriginsintheCommission’swork.Thus,initsContinentalShelfCasetheICJreferredexplicitlyto“therecordsoftheInternationalLawCommissionandothertravauxpréparatoiresofthe1958GenevaConventionontheContinentalShelf”.30Inlaterdecisions,theCourtusedILCmaterialtodescribe“thegenesisofthetext”ofaprovisionofthe1958ConventionontheTerritorialSeaandtheContiguousZone31andquotedcommentsoftheILCanditsSpecialRapporteuraspartofthetravauxofthatConvention.32Similarly,whentheCourtinterpretstherulesoftheVCLTitself,itreferstoILCdocumentsandtotheviewsexpressedinthem.33WhiletheliberalusethatismadeoftheILCmaterialmayseemjustifiedbythefactthatinessenceitsworkisusuallythemainsubstantivesource,oratleastthepredominantinspiration,ofthelaterconvention,thiscan,inaformalsense,onlybecorrectundertheheadoftravauxpréparatoiresinsofarasthematerialhadbeenintroducedintothenegotiationsbythepartiesortheirrepresentatives.Otherthanthat,itwouldseemthattherelevantILCrecords,orinfactmaterialofequivalentorgans,maybetakenintoaccountasother“supplementarymeans”underArt32.3419Third,inordertoberelevantastravaux,thematerialmustdirectlyrelatetothetreatyunderconsideration,itmustbepartofitsnegotiationprocessandpurporttoshedlightonitssubstance.Inpractice,however,interpreterssometimesrefertomaterialleadinguptoanidenticalpredecessortreatyandeventosimilartreatiesandapplythatmaterialasifitwerepreparatoryworktothetreatyunderconsider-ation.ThatiswhattheICJdidintheLaGrandcase,whenitinterpretedArt41ofitsStatuteinthelightofthedraftinghistoryoftheidenticalprovisioninthePCIJStatute,whichincludedanearlierbilateraltreatybetweentheUnitedStatesandSweden.35AlsointhevariousLegalityofForcecasestheCourtfounditnecessary,inordertointerpretArt35para2ofitsStatute,toexaminethedraftinghistoryofboththePCIJandthepresentStatute.3629CfMerkouris(2010),pp.81–82.30ICJContinentalShelf(TunisiavLibya)[1982]ICJRep18,para41(emphasisadded).31ICJTerritorialandMaritimeDisputebetweenNicaraguaandHondurasintheCaribbeanSea[2007]ICJRep659,para280.32ICJMaritimeDelimitationintheBlackSea[2009]ICJRep61,para134.33Eg,inICJBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeria(PreliminaryObjections)[1998]ICJRep275,para31;Kasikili/SeduduIsland[1999]Rep1045,para49.34ConcurringLeBouthillier(2011),Art32MN25.35ICJLaGrand[2001]ICJRep466,paras105–107.36Eg,ICJLegalityoftheUseofForce(SerbiaandMontenegrovGermany)[2004]ICJRep720,paras101–111.Article32.Supplementarymeansofinterpretation623Dörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
Annex 19
Itissubmittedthatmaterialrelatingtoearlierorsimilartreatiesisnotstrictosensupreparatorywork,butmay,again,beconsideredothersupplementarymeansunderArt32.20Thecollectedmaterialqualifyingaspreparatoryworkwillnecessarilybequiteheterogeneous,anditsinterpretativevaluewilldependonitscogency,itsacces-sibility,itsdirectrelevanceforthetreatytermsatissue,theconsistencywithotherthemeansofinterpretation,butalsoonthenumberofpartiesinvolvedintheevolutionoftheparticularmaterial.Moreover,themorethematerialactuallyreflectsagrowingagreement,evenacommonintentionofthenegotiatingparties,thehigheritsinterpretativevaluewillbe.Thismay,amongothers,dependonthemomentintimethematerialcomesintoexistence:documentsfromthenegotiationsthatweredrawnupimmediatelybeforethetextofthetreatywasadoptedwillprobablydeserveparticularattentionasbeingvery“close”totheagreementoftheparties,37unless,however,theyformpartofthelatterandare,therefore,tobeconsideredextrinsiccontextunderArt31para2.21ItbecomesevidentfromthestructureofArts31and32thatpreparatoryworkmustbedistinguishedfromextrinsiccontext,whichiscoveredbyArt31para2.Aspointedoutearlier(!Art31MN63),thisdistinctionisfarfromeasytodrawandprobablybestmadeaccordingtowhetherthematerialinquestionwasrelevantinpreparingthetextofthetreaty(travaux)orinunderliningthetreatyconsensuspresentatthetimeofconclusion(context).Naturally,onlymaterialsetoutbeforetheadoptionorconclusionofthetreatycanbecomepartofitspreparatorywork,butifthetime-lagbetweenthematerialinquestionreceivingtheagreementofthepartiesandtheadoptionofthetextofthetreatyitselfbecomestoosmall,thematerialmightqualifyasextrinsiccontextunderpara2litborc,ratherthanastravaux.2.CircumstancesofConclusion22Alongwiththepreparatorywork,Art32allowsthecircumstancesoftheconclusionofatreatytobetakenintoaccountasasupplementarymeansofinterpretation.AccordingtoSRWaldock,thisformulaismeanttocoverboththecontemporarycircumstancesandthehistoricalcontextinwhichthetreatywasconcluded.38Thus,referenceismadetofactualcircumstancespresentatthetimeofconclusionandthehistoricalbackgroundofthetreaty,whichissupposedtohavebeenpresentinthemindsofthosewhoconcludedit.Aboveall,theknowledgeofthosefactsmayhelptoidentifythemotivesofthepartiesand,thus,theobjectandpurposeofthetreaty,39butthefactualbackgroundmayberelevantbeyondthat.37LeBouthillier(2011),Art32MN27.38WaldockIII59,para22.39ThiswasapparentlythereasonwhytheICJinBarcelonaTractionreferredtothehistoricalbackgroundofArt37ICJStatute,beforeactuallygoingabouttointerpretthatprovision,cfBarcelonaTraction(PreliminaryObjections)[1964]ICJRep6,31–32.624PartIII.Observance,ApplicationandInterpretationofTreatiesDörr<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : A Commentary</i>, edited by Oliver Dörr, and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Springer, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyli/detail.action?docID=5223894.C… from nyli on 2019-08-09 06:19:01.Copyright © 2018. Springer. All rights reserved.
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Annex 20
A. Zimmerman et al., eds., The Statute of the
International Court of Justice: A Commentary
(Oxford University, 2019), pp. 712–798, 963–1006,
1135–1202, 1617–1650

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Annex 21
Chambers Dictionary, Definition of “national”,
https://chambers.co.uk

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Annex 272-A
Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee, dated 21 August 2019 (with certified translation),
and Exhibit A

Compensation Claims Committee [emblem:] State of Qatar
1
AFFIDAVIT OF AHMAD MOHAMMED AL-MANA, WORKING GROUP
MEMBER, STATE OF QATAR COMPENSATION CLAIMS
COMMITTEE
I. INTRODUCTION
I, Ahmad Mohammed Al-Mana, attest that:
1. My full name is Ahmad Mohammed Yousef Abdulrahman Al-Mana. I have been
employed by the State of Qatar since 15/4/2000. I am a member of a working group
that oversees Qatar’s Compensation Claims Committee (“CCC”). I was appointed
to the CCC in August 2017 by H.E. Dr. Ali Bin Fetais Al-Marri, the Attorney
General of Qatar.
2. On 25 April 2019, in connection with the case Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), I submitted a statement to explain the role of the CCC in
collecting, maintaining, and analyzing complaints filed by Qataris who have been
detrimentally impacted by the measures imposed against Qatar by the United Arab
Emirates (“UAE”) on 5 June 2017 (the “Discriminatory Measures”). Attached as
Exhibit B to that statement was a portion of the CCC Claims Database related to
the UAE (“CCC Claims Database”). The statement, together with its exhibits, was
submitted as Annex 272 to Qatar’s Memorial.
3. I provide this second statement in my official capacity, to supplement the CCC
Claims Database with updated data that has become available since 25 April 2019.
4. The facts and matters set out in this statement are within my own knowledge and
are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
5. In support of this statement, and as referred to below, I attach the following
documents:
a) Updated CCC Claims Database [Exhibit A].
Annex 272-A
Compensation Claims Committee [emblem:] State of Qatar 2 II. UPDATED DATA 6. As explained in my previous statement, the CCC received 1,548 complaints related to the Discriminatory Measures by the UAE. Of these 1,548 complaints, the CCC verified 975 complaints that state claims by Qataris for violations of the CERD, which are reflected on the CCC Claims Database (Exhibit B to my previous statement). 7. Since 25 April 2019, the CCC has received additional information about the Qatari claimants represented in the CCC Claims Database relating to their place of birth as well as their parents’ place of birth where this data was previously marked as “Unknown.” An updated CCC Claims Database that incorporates the additional data collected since 25 April 2019 is attached as Exhibit A to this statement (“Updated CCC Claims Database”). 8. As demonstrated in the Updated CCC Claims Database, of the 975 individuals who submitted complaints that have been verified by the CCC, a total of 891 (91%) were born in Qatar. Of those 891 individuals, 815 (84% of verified complaints) were born to parents who were also both born in Qatar. [signature] Ahmed Mohammed Yusuf Abdulrahman Al Mana August 21, 2019 Doha, Qatar [stamp:] Compensation Claims Committee
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