Volume II - Annexes

Document Number
172-20190429-WRI-01-01-EN
Parent Document Number
172-20190429-WRI-01-00-EN
Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICECASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONALCONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMSOF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION(QATAR v. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONSOF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATESVolume IIof IV29APRIL 2019

LIST OF ANNEXESVOLUME IIINTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND RULESAnnex1First Riyadh Agreement dated 23 and24 November 2013,United Nations Registration Number 68881 1Annex2Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement dated 17 April 2014, United Nations Registration Number 688827Annex3Supplementary Riyadh Agreement dated 16November 2014, United Nations Registration Number 6888319UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS Annex4United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, document S/RES/1373 (2001), 28 September 2001https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)25Annex5United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624, document S/RES/1624 (2005), 14 September 2005https://undocs.org/S/RES/1624(2005)31Annex6United Nations Security Council Resolution 2133, document S/RES/2133 (2014), 27 January 2014https://undocs.org/S/RES/2133(2014)35Annex7United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, document S/RES/2178 (2014), 24 September 2014https://undocs.org/S/RES/2178(2014)39
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Annex8United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396, document S/RES/2396 (2017), 21December 2017https://undocs.org/S/RES/2396(2017)49Annex9United Nations Security Council, ISIL (Da’esh)and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subai (QDi.253), 3 February 201663Annex10United Nations Security Council, Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing Abdal-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari (QDi.380), 21 September 2015 67Annex11United Nations Security Council, Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing Sa’d bin Sa’d Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka’bi(QDi.382), 21 September 201569CERDCOMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS AND CORRESPONDENCEAnnex12The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Communication submitted by Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 8 March 201871Annex13The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Response of the United Arab Emirates to the Communication Submitted by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 7 August 2018, together with Annex 16129
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Annex14Note Verbalefrom Qatar to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 29 October 2018175Annex15Letter of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations Office and Other International Organisations to the State of Qatar, 7November 2018179Annex16The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Supplemental Response of the UAE, 29November 2018183Annex17The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Response of the United Arab Emirates on the Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility to the request made by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 January 2019 (with Annexes) 223Annex18The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Response of the State of Qatar, 14February 2019353Annex19The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), UAE’s Comments on Qatar’s Response on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 19March 2019, together with Annex 4, Annex 5 and Subsequent Correspondence461
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LIST OF ANNEXESVOLUME IIINTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND RULESAnnex1First Riyadh Agreement dated 23 and24 November 2013,United Nations Registration Number 68881 1Annex2Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement dated 17 April 2014, United Nations Registration Number 688827Annex3Supplementary Riyadh Agreement dated 16November 2014, United Nations Registration Number 6888319UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS Annex4United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, document S/RES/1373 (2001), 28 September 2001https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)25Annex5United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624, document S/RES/1624 (2005), 14 September 2005https://undocs.org/S/RES/1624(2005)31Annex6United Nations Security Council Resolution 2133, document S/RES/2133 (2014), 27 January 2014https://undocs.org/S/RES/2133(2014)35Annex7United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, document S/RES/2178 (2014), 24 September 2014https://undocs.org/S/RES/2178(2014)39
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Annex 1
First Riyadh Agreement dated 23 and 24 November 2013,
United Nations Registration Number 68881
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FirstRiyadhAgreementOnSaturday, 19/1/1435 (HijriCalendar,November2013),the Custodian of theTwo Holy MosquesKingAbdullahBinAbdelAzizAl-Saud,theKing of Saudi Arabia,andhis brother HisHighnessSheikhSabbahAl-AhmadAl-Jabber Al-Sabbah,thePrince of Kuwait,andhis brother His HignessSheikhTamimbin Hamad binKhalifaAl-Thani,the prince of Qatar,metinRiyadh.Theyheldextensivedeliberationsinwhichtheyconducted a fullrevision of whattaintstherelationsbetweenthe[GulfCooperation]Councilstates,thechallengesfacingitssecurityandstability, and means to abolish whatevermuddiesthe relations.Duetotheimportance of layingthefoundationfor a newphaseofcollectiveworkbetweentheCouncil'sstates,inordertoguaranteeitoperatingwithin a unifiedpoliticalframeworkbased on theprinciplesincludedinthemainsystem of theCooperationCouncil,the following hasbeenagreed upon:(here there three signature)1.Nointerferenceintheinternalaffairs of theCouncil'sstates,whetherdirectly orindirectly. Not togive harbor or naturalizeanycitizen of theCouncilstatesthathasanactivitywhichopposeshiscountry's regimes,exceptwiththeapproval of his country; nosupport to deviant groupsthat oppose their states;andno supportforantagonisticmedia.2.NosupporttotheMuslim Brotherhood orany of the organizations, groups or individualsthatthreatenthesecurityandstability of theCouncilstatesthroughdirectsecurityworkor throughpoliticalinfluence.3.Not topresentany support toanyfactioninYementhat could pose a threattocountriesneighboringYemen.[Signatures]
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In the name of God the Merciful the CompassionateA review was conducted of theAgreementdated1/19/1435AH,correspondingto11/23/2013AD, and signed bythe Custodian of theTwoHolyShrines,KingAbdullahbinAbdul AzizAlSaud of the Kingdom of SaudiArabia,HisHighnessSheikhSabahAl-AhmedAl-JaberAl-Sabah,Emir of theState of Kuwait,andHisHighness Sheikh TamimbinHamadbinKhalifaAl Thani, Emir of theState of Qatar,which includes themeansforeliminatinganything that affects the security and stability of the Council States.We hereby support the conclusions reached in theagreement.Successis from Allah.,,,Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed H.M. King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa[signature][signature][signature]1/20/1435AH11/24/2013AD
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FirstRiyadhAgreement
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Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement
dated 17 April 2014, United Nations Registration Number 68882
English and Arabic
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MechanismImplementing the RiyadhAgreementTopSecretHavingtheForeignMinistersoftheCooperationCouncilCountriesconsideredtheAgreementsignedinRiyadhon19/1/1435AHcorrespondingto23/11/2013ADbytheCustodianoftheTwoHolyMosquesKingAbdullahbinAbdulAzizKingoftheKingdomofSaudiArabia,hisbrotherhisHighnessSheikhSabahAl-AhmedAl-JabirAl-SabahEmirofKuwaitandhisbrotherhisHighnessSheikhTamimbinHamadbinKhalifaAl-ThaniEmirofQatar.HavingtheAgreementbeenconsideredandsignedbyHisMajestyKingHamadbinIsaAl-KhalifaKingofBahrain,HisMajestySultanQaboosbinSaeedtheSultanofOmanandHisHighnessSheikhMohammedbinZayedbinSultanAl-NahyantheCrownPrinceofAbuDhabiandDeputySupremeCommander oftheUAEArmed Forces.GiventheimportanceofthesignedAgreementthatneverbeforehadanysimilaragreementbeensigned,outoftheleaders'realizationtotheimportanceofitscontent,andfortheurgencyofthematterthatcallsfortakingthenecessaryexecutiveprocedurestoenforceitscontent.Anagreementhasbeenreachedtosetamechanismthatshallguaranteeimplementationofthesameaccordingtothefollowing:Firstly:Theconcernedparty tomonitortheimplementation oftheAgreement:ForeignMinisters ofthe GCC Countries:ForeignministersoftheGCCCountriesshallholdprivatemeetingonthemarginsofannualperiodicmeetingsoftheministerialcouncilwhereinviolationsandcomplaintsreportedbyanymembercountryoftheCouncilagainstanymembercountryoftheCouncilshallbereviewedbytheforeignministerstoconsider,andraisethemtoleaders.WiththeemphasisthatthefirsttasktheCouncilshallconduct,accordingtothementionedmechanism,istomakesureoftheimplementationofallcontent,mentionedabove,withinRiyadhAgreement,consideritscontentabasistothesecurity andstability oftheGCCCountriesanditsunity,eitherwithregardtothoseissuesofinternalaffairs,externalpoliticalaspectsorinternalsecurity;andensuringthatnocountryneglectsoromitsthegrouporientationoftheGCC,andshallcoordinatewithallmembersoftheGCC;andemphasizingthatnosupportisbeingmadetoanycurrentsthatposethreatstoanymembercountryoftheCouncil.Secondly: Decision-makingbody:Leaders ofthe GCCCountries:TheleadersshalltaketheappropriateactiontowardswhattheMinistersofForeignAffairsraisetothemregardinganycountrythathasnotcompliedwiththesignedagreementbythe GCC Countries.Thirdly: Compliance procedures:
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ThisAgreementshallbeimplemented bythefollowingprocedures:1.WithRegardtoGCCCountriesInternalAffairs:-CommitthatanymediachannelsownedorsupportedbyanyGCCcountryshouldnotdiscussanydisrespectfulsubjectstoanyGCCCountry,directlyorindirectly.TheGCCCountriesshallsetalistbythesemediachannels,andthelistshallbeperiodicallyupdated.-Allmembercountriesshallcommitthatthey willnotgrantcitizensofotherGCCCountriesacitizenshipwhohavebeenproventopracticeoppositionactivityagainsttheirgovernments.Everycountryshallinformtheothercountriesonthenamesoftheoppositionfiguresresidinginsuchcountryinordertopreventtheirviolativeactivitiesand take theappropriateactions againstthem.-TakethenecessaryactionsthatwouldguaranteenointerferenceinanyGCCCountryinternal affairs,including, but not limited to:a.Governmentalorganizations,communityorganizations,individualsandactivistsshall not support oppositionfigureswith moneyorvia media.b.Nottoshelter,accept,support,encourageormakeitscountryanincubatortotheactivitiesofGCCcitizensorotherfigureswhoareprovenoppositioniststoanycountryofGCC.c.Bantheexistenceofanyexternalorganizations,groupsorparties,whotargetGCCCountriesandtheirpeoples;norprovidefootholdfortheirhostileactivitiesagainst the GCC Countries.d.Nottofundorsupportexternalorganizations,groupsorparties,thathavehostilepositions and incitements against the GCC Countries.2.Withregardtotheforeignpolicy:CommittothegrouporientationoftheGCCCountries,coordinatewithotherGCCcountriesandshallnotsupportanyentitiesor currents that pose threatsto the GCC Countries, including:a.NottosupportMuslimBrotherhoodwithmoneyorviamediaintheGCCCountries or outside.b.ApprovetheexitofMuslimBrotherhoodfigures,whoarenotcitizens,withinatime limittobeagreedupon.TheGCCCountriesshallcoordinatewitheachotheron the lists of those figures.c.NottosupportexternalgatheringsorgroupsinYemen,Syriaoranydestabilizedarea,which poseathreattothe securityand stabilityof GCCCountries.
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d.NottosupportorshelterwhoeverperformoppositionactivitiesagainstanyGCCcountry,beingcurrentofficials,formerofficialsorothers;andshallnotgivethemanyfootholdinsidetheircountriesorallowthemtoactagainstanyoftheGCCCountries.e.Closeanyacademies,establishmentsorcentresthattrainandqualifyindividualsfromGCC citizensto workagainsttheirgovernments.3.WithregardtotheinternalsecurityoftheGCC Countries:Intheeventofanypendingsecurityfilesthatneedfurtherclarificationandaredirectlyconnectedto the securitymattersofthe competentsecurityagenciesin anyGCCcountry,immediatemeetingsshallbeheldamongsecurityspecialistswiththeircounterpartstodiscussthedetailsofthesesubjectsandfindouttheirobjectives.IfanycountryoftheGCCCountriesfailedtocomplywiththismechanism,theotherGCCCountriesshallhavetherighttotakeantappropriateactiontoprotecttheirsecurityand stability.Allahis the grantorofsuccess,,,[signature]His HighnessSheikhAbdullah bin ZayedAlNahyan,ForeignMinisterofUnitedArabEmirates[signature]HisExcellencySheikhKhalidbinAhmedAlKhalifa,ForeignMinisterofKingdomofBahrain[signature]HisRoyalHighnessPrinceSaudAlFaisal,ForeignMinisterofKingdomofSaudiArabia[signature]HisExcellencyYusufbinAlawibinAbdullah, Minister ResponsibleforForeignAffairsofSultanateofOman[signature]HisExcellencyDr.KhalidbinMohammadAlAttiyah,ForeignMinisterofStateofQatar[signature]HisExcellencySheikhSabahAl-KhalidAl-HamadAl-Sabah, DeputyPrime Minister andMinisterofForeignAffairsofStateofKuwait7
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Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement
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Annex 3
Supplementary Riyadh Agreement dated 16 November 2014, United Nations Registration Number 68883
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The Supplementary Riyadh AgreementTop SecretIn the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful1.Based on a generous invitation by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdel-AzizAl-Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, the following have met in Riyadh today, Sunday, 23/1/1436 (HijriCalendar), 16/11/2014 (Gregorian Calendar): His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabbah,the Prince of Kuwait, His Majesty King Hamad Bin Eissa Al-Khalifa, King of Bahrain; His HighnessSheikh Tamim Bin Hamd Bin Khalifa Al-Thani , Prince of Qatar; His Highness Sheikh Mohamed BinRashed Al-Maktom, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and the Governorof Dubai; and His Highness Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, andthe deputy Commander of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates. This was to cement the spirit ofsincere cooperation and to emphasize the joint fate and the aspirations of the Citizens of the GulfCooperation Council for a strong bond and solid rapprochement.2.After discussing the commitments stemming from the Riyadh Agreement signed 19/1/1435 (Hijri) –23/11/2013 and its executive mechanism ; reviewing the reports of the committee following the executionmechanism and the results of the joint follow-up [operation] room; and reviewing the conclusions of thereport of the follow-up room signed on 10/1/1436 (Hijri) – 3/11/2014 (Gregorian) by the intelligencechiefs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the stateof Qatar.3.The following has been reached:a)Stressing that non-committing to any of the articles of the Riyadh Agreement and its executivemechanism amounts to a violation of the entirety of them.b)What the intelligence chiefs have reached in the aforementioned report is considered a stepforward to implement Riyadh agreement and its executive mechanism, with the necessity ofthe full commitment to implementing everything stated in them within the period of onemonth from the date of the agreement.c)Not to give refuge, employ, or support whether directly or indirectly, whether domestically orabroad, to any person or a media apparatus that harbors inclinations harmful to any GulfCooperation Council state. Every state is committed to taking all the regulatory, legal andjudicial measures against anyone who [commits] any encroachment against Gulf CooperationCouncil states, including putting him on trial and announcing it in the media.d)All countries are committed to the Gulf Cooperation Council discourse to support the ArabRepublic of Egypt, and contributing to its security, stability and its financial support; andceasing all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of Egypt in all media platforms,whether directly or indirectly, including all the offenses broadcasted on Al-jazeera, Al-JazeeraMubashir Masr, and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media.
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4.Accordingly, it has been decided that the Riyadh Agreement, and its executive mechanism, and thecomponents of this supplementary agreement, requires the full commitment to its implementation. Theleaders have tasked the intelligence chiefs to follow up on the implementation of the results of thissupplementary agreement and to report regularly to the leaders, in order to take the measures they deemnecessary to protect the security and stability of their countries.5.It has been agreed that implementing the aforementioned commitments contributes towards the unity ofthe Council states and their interests and the future of their peoples, and signals a new page that will be astrong base to advance the path of joint work and moving towards a strong Gulf entity.[Signatures]Note that the UAE has 2 signatures on this page one for His Highness Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashed Al-Maktom, the Vice president and Prime Minister of the UAE and the Ruler of Dubai; and another one by HisHighness Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the deputy Commander ofthe Armed Forces of the UAE.
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Annex 4
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,
document S/RES/1373 (2001), 28 September 2001
https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)
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United NationsS/RES/1373 (2001) Security CouncilDistr.: General28 September 200101-55743 (E)*0155743*Resolution 1373 (2001)Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on28 September 2001The Security Council,Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of12 September 2001,Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks whichtook place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001,and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism,constitute a threat to international peace and security,Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence asrecognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368(2001),Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter ofthe United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terroristacts,Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts ofterrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terroristacts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of therelevant international conventions relating to terrorism,Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation bytaking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through alllawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in itsdeclaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the SecurityCouncil in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every Statehas the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating interrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within itsterritory directed towards the commission of such acts,Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,Annex 4
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1. Decides that all States shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the
funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry
out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate
in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf
of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons
and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other
related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who
commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of
terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities
or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of
members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from
using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their
citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought
to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support
of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession
necessary for the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and
through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity
papers and travel documents;
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3S/RES/1373 (2001)3.Calls upon all States to:(a)Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operationalinformation, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons ornetworks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives orsensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and thethreat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;(b)Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic lawand cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission ofterrorist acts;(c)Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangementsand agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action againstperpetrators of such acts;(d)Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant internationalconventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the InternationalConvention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;(e)Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant internationalconventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);(f)Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions ofnational and international law, including international standards of human rights,before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seekerhas not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;(g)Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is notabused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claimsof political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for theextradition of alleged terrorists;4.Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorismand transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and otherpotentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhancecoordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels inorder to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat tointernational security;5.Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to thepurposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing,planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principlesof the United Nations;6.Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules ofprocedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members ofthe Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance ofappropriate expertise, and calls upon all States to report to the Committee, no laterthan 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according toa timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken toimplement this resolution;7.Directs the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programmewithin 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support itrequires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;Annex 4
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8. Expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure
the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities
under the Charter;
9. Decides to remain seized of this matter.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624,
document S/RES/1624 (2005), 14 September 2005
https://undocs.org/S/RES/1624(2005)
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United NationsS/RES/1624 (2005)Security CouncilDistr.: General14 September 200505-51052 (E)*0551052*Resolution 1624 (2005)Adopted by the Security Council at its 5261st meeting, on14 September 2005The Security Council,Reaffirming its resolutions 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, 1373 (2001) of28 September 2001, 1535 (2004) of 26 March 2004, 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004, and 1617 (2005) of 29 July 2005, the declarationannexed to its resolution 1456 (2003) of 20 January 2003, as well as its otherresolutions concerning threats to international peace and security caused by acts ofterrorism,Reaffirming also the imperative to combat terrorism in all its forms andmanifestations by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,and also stressing that States must ensure that any measures taken to combatterrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adoptsuch measures in accordance with international law, in particular internationalhuman rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law,Condemning in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of theirmotivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of the most seriousthreats to peace and security, and reaffirming the primary responsibility of theSecurity Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under theCharter of the United Nations,Condemningalso in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist acts andrepudiating attempts at the justification or glorification (apologie) of terrorist actsthat may incite further terrorist acts,Deeply concerned that incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism andintolerance poses a serious and growing danger to the enjoyment of human rights,threatens the social and economic development of all States, undermines globalstability and prosperity, and must be addressed urgently and proactively by theUnited Nations and all States, and emphasizing the need to take all necessary andappropriate measures in accordance with international law at the national andinternational level to protect the right to life,Recalling the right to freedom of expression reflected in Article 19 of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1948(“the Universal Declaration”), and recalling also the right to freedom of expression
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2S/RES/1624 (2005)in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted bythe General Assembly in 1966 (“ICCPR”) and that any restrictions thereon shallonly be such as are provided by law and are necessary on the grounds set out inparagraph 3 of Article 19 of the ICCPR,Recalling in addition the right to seek and enjoy asylum reflected in Article 14of the Universal Declaration and the non-refoulement obligation of States under theConvention relating to the Status of Refugees adopted on 28 July 1951, togetherwith its Protocol adopted on 31 January 1967 (“the Refugees Convention and itsProtocol”), and also recalling that the protections afforded by the RefugeesConvention and its Protocol shall not extend to any person with respect to whomthere are serious reasons for considering that he has been guilty of acts contrary tothe purposes and principles of the United Nations,Reaffirming that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to thepurposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing,planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principlesof the United Nations,Deeply concerned by the increasing number of victims, especially amongcivilians of diverse nationalities and beliefs, caused by terrorism motivated byintolerance or extremism in various regions of the world, reaffirming its profoundsolidarity with the victims of terrorism and their families, and stressing theimportance of assisting victims of terrorism and providing them and their familieswith support to cope with their loss and grief,Recognizing the essential role of the United Nations in the global effort tocombat terrorism and welcoming the Secretary-General’s identification of elementsof a counter-terrorism strategy to be considered and developed by the GeneralAssembly without delay with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy topromote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses at the national,regional and international level to counter terrorism,Stressing its call upon all States to become party, as a matter of urgency, to theinternational counter-terrorism Conventions and Protocols whether or not they areparty to regional Conventions on the matter, and to give priority consideration tosigning the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorismadopted by the General Assembly on 13 April 2005,Re-emphasizing that continuing international efforts to enhance dialogue andbroaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent theindiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and addressingunresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, includingdevelopment issues, will contribute to strengthening the international fight againstterrorism,Stressing the importance of the role of the media, civil and religious society,the business community and educational institutions in those efforts to enhancedialogue and broaden understanding, and in promoting tolerance and coexistence,and in fostering an environment which is not conducive to incitement of terrorism,Recognizing the importance that, in an increasingly globalized world, Statesact cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting sophisticated technology,communications and resources to incite support for criminal acts,
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3S/RES/1624 (2005)Recalling that all States must cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, inaccordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safehaven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute,any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in thefinancing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safehavens,1.Calls upon all States to adopt such measures as may be necessary andappropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international law to:(a)Prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts;(b)Prevent such conduct;(c)Deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credibleand relevant information giving serious reasons for considering that they have beenguilty of such conduct;2.Calls upon all States to cooperate, inter alia, to strengthen the security oftheir international borders, including by combating fraudulent travel documents and,to the extent attainable, by enhancing terrorist screening and passenger securityprocedures with a view to preventing those guilty of the conduct in paragraph 1 (a)from entering their territory;3.Calls upon all States to continue international efforts to enhance dialogueand broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent theindiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and to take all measuresas may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations underinternational law to counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism andintolerance and to prevent the subversion of educational, cultural, and religiousinstitutions by terrorists and their supporters;4.Stresses that States must ensure that any measures taken to implementparagraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution comply with all of their obligations underinternational law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law, andhumanitarian law;5.Calls upon all States to report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, aspart of their ongoing dialogue, on the steps they have taken to implement thisresolution;6.Directs the Counter-Terrorism Committee to:(a)Include in its dialogue with Member States their efforts to implement thisresolution;(b)Work with Member States to help build capacity, including throughspreading best legal practice and promoting exchange of information in this regard;(c)Report back to the Council in twelve months on the implementation ofthis resolution.7.Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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Annex 6
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2133,
document S/RES/2133 (2014), 27 January 2014
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2133(2014)
35
United Nations S/RES/2133 (2014)Security Council Distr.: General 27 January 2014 14-21793 (E) *1421793* Resolution 2133 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7101st meeting, on 27 January 2014 The Security Council,Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed and further reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, Recalling all its relevant resolutions and Presidential Statements concerning threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, Reiterating the obligation of Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, Recalling relevant international counter-terrorism instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Strongly condemning incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups for any purpose, including raising funds or gaining political concessions, Expressing concern at the increase in incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups with the aim of raising funds, or gaining political concessions, in particular the increase in kidnappings by Al-Qaida and its affiliated groups, and underscoring that the payment of ransoms to terrorists funds future kidnappings and hostage-takings which creates more victims and perpetuates the problem, Expressing its determination to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law and, in this regard, noting the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), in particular its publication of several framework documents and good practices, including in the area of kidnapping for ransom, to complement the work of the relevant United Nations counter-terrorism entities,
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S/RES/2133 (2014) 14-217932/3Recognizing the need to further strengthen efforts to support victims and those affected by incidents of kidnapping for ransom and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to give careful consideration to protecting the lives of hostages and those kidnapped, and reaffirming that States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law, as appropriate, Noting the decision of the Group of Eight Summit in Lough Erne to address the threat posed by kidnapping for ransom by terrorists and the preventive steps the international community can take in this regard and to encourage further expert discussion, including at the Roma Lyon group, to deepen understanding of this problem, and further noting that paragraph 225.6 of the Final Document of the 16th Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement condemned criminal incidences of hostage-taking with resultant demands for ransoms and/or other political concessions by terrorist groups, Expressing its commitment to support efforts to reduce terrorist groups’ access to funding and financial services through the ongoing work of United Nations counter-terrorism bodies and the Financial Action Task Force to improve anti-money laundering and terrorist financing frameworks worldwide, Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters of new information and communication technologies, in particular the Internet, for the purposes of recruitment and incitement to commit terrorist acts, as well as for the financing, planning and preparation of their activities, Recalling its resolutions 1904 (2009),1989 (2011) and 2083 (2012), which, inter alia, confirm that the requirements of operative paragraph 1 (a) of these resolutions, also apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the Al-Qaida sanctions list, Reaffirming that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, 1. Reaffirms its resolution 1373 (2001) and in particular its decisions that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists; 2. Further reaffirms its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that all States shall prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
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S/RES/2133 (2014)3/314-21793 3. Calls upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages; 4. Calls upon all Member States to cooperate closely during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups; 5. Reaffirms its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that all States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts; 6. Recognizes the need to continue expert discussions on kidnapping for ransom by terrorists, and calls upon Member States to continue such expert discussions within the United Nations and other relevant international and regional organizations, including the GCTF, on additional steps the international community could take to prevent kidnappings and to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from using kidnapping to raise funds or gain political concessions; 7. Notes that ransom payments to terrorist groups are one of the sources of income which supports their recruitment efforts, strengthens their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks, and incentivizes future incidents of kidnapping for ransom; 8. Encourages the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) to hold, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, a Special Meeting with the participation of Member States and relevant international and regional organizations to discuss measures to prevent incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups to raise funds or gain political concessions, and requests the CTC to report to the Council on the outcomes of this Meeting; 9. Recalls the adoption by the GCTF of the “Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists” and encourages CTED to take it into account, as appropriate, consistent with its mandate, including in its facilitation of capacity building to Member States; 10. Calls upon all Member States to encourage private sector partners to adopt or to follow relevant guidelines and good practices for preventing and responding to terrorist kidnappings without paying ransoms; 11. Calls upon all Member States to cooperate and engage in dialogue with all relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, as appropriate, to improve their capacities to counter the financing of terrorism, including from ransoms; 12. Encourages the Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and other relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies to cooperate closely when providing information on the measures taken by Member States on this issue and on relevant trends and developments in this area; 13. Decides to remain seized of this matter.
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Annex 7
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178,
document S/RES/2178 (2014), 24 September 2014
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2178(2014)
39
United Nations S/RES/2178 (2014) Security Council Distr.: General 24 September 2014 14-61606 (E) *1461606* Resolution 2178 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7272nd meeting, on 24 September 2014 The Security Council, Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed, and remaining determined to contribute further to enhancing the effectiveness of the overall effort to fight this scourge on a global level, Noting with concern that the terrorism threat has become more diffuse, with an increase, in various regions of the world, of terrorist acts including those motivated by intolerance or extremism, and expressing its determination to combat this threat, Bearing in mind the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and affirming Member States’ determination to continue to do all they can to resolve conflict and to deny terrorist groups the ability to put down roots and establish safe havens to address better the growing threat posed by terrorism, Emphasizing that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization, Recognizing that international cooperation and any measures taken by Member States to prevent and combat terrorism must comply fully with the Charter of the United Nations, Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter, Reaffirming that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, underscoring that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with effective counter-terrorism measures, and are an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort and notes the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and combat terrorism, and noting that failure to comply with these and other international obligations, including under the Charter
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S/RES/2178 (2014) 14-61606 2/8 of the United Nations, is one of the factors contributing to increased radicalization and fosters a sense of impunity, Expressing grave concern over the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, namely individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict, and resolving to address this threat, Expressing grave concern about those who attempt to travel to become foreign terrorist fighters, Concerned that foreign terrorist fighters increase the intensity, duration and intractability of conflicts, and also may pose a serious threat to their States of origin, the States they transit and the States to which they travel, as well as States neighbouring zones of armed conflict in which foreign terrorist fighters are active and that are affected by serious security burdens, and noting that the threat of foreign terrorist fighters may affect all regions and Member States, even those far from conflict zones, and expressing grave concern that foreign terrorist fighters are using their extremist ideology to promote terrorism, Expressing concern that international networks have been established by terrorists and terrorist entities among States of origin, transit and destination through which foreign terrorist fighters and the resources to support them have been channelled back and forth, Expressing particular concern that foreign terrorist fighters are being recruited by and are joining entities such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) and other cells, affiliates, splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida, as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), recognizing that the foreign terrorist fighter threat includes, among others, individuals supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida and its cells, affiliates, splinter groups, and derivative entities, including by recruiting for or otherwise supporting acts or activities of such entities, and stressing the urgent need to address this particular threat, Recognizing that addressing the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters requires comprehensively addressing underlying factors, including by preventing radicalization to terrorism, stemming recruitment, inhibiting foreign terrorist fighter travel, disrupting financial support to foreign terrorist fighters, countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, countering incitement to terrorist acts motivated by extremism or intolerance, promoting political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, ending and resolving armed conflicts, and facilitating reintegration and rehabilitation, Recognizing also that terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone, and underlining the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, as outlined in Pillar I of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288), Expressing concern over the increased use by terrorists and their supporters of communications technology for the purpose of radicalizing to terrorism, recruiting and inciting others to commit terrorist acts, including through the internet, and
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S/RES/2178 (2014) 3/8 14-61606 financing and facilitating the travel and subsequent activities of foreign terrorist fighters, and underlining the need for Member States to act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law, Noting with appreciation the activities undertaken in the area of capacity building by United Nations entities, in particular entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), including the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Centre for Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT), and also the efforts of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to facilitate technical assistance, specifically by promoting engagement between providers of capacity-building assistance and recipients, in coordination with other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, to assist Member States, upon their request, in implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Noting recent developments and initiatives at the international, regional and subregional levels to prevent and suppress international terrorism, and noting the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), in particular its recent adoption of a comprehensive set of good practices to address the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, and its publication of several other framework documents and good practices, including in the areas of countering violent extremism, criminal justice, prisons, kidnapping for ransom, providing support to victims of terrorism, and community-oriented policing, to assist interested States with the practical implementation of the United Nations counter-terrorism legal and policy framework and to complement the work of the relevant United Nations counter-terrorism entities in these areas, Noting with appreciation the efforts of INTERPOL to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including through global law enforcement information sharing enabled by the use of its secure communications network, databases, and system of advisory notices, procedures to track stolen, forged identity papers and travel documents, and INTERPOL’s counter-terrorism fora and foreign terrorist fighter programme, Having regard to and highlighting the situation of individuals of more than one nationality who travel to their states of nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and urging States to take action, as appropriate, in compliance with their obligations under their domestic law and international law, including international human rights law, Calling upon States to ensure, in conformity with international law, in particular international human rights law and international refugee law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, including by foreign terrorist fighters, Reaffirming its call upon all States to become party to the international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols as soon as possible, whether or not they are a party to regional conventions on the matter, and to fully implement their obligations under those to which they are a party,
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S/RES/2178 (2014) 14-61606 4/8 Noting the continued threat to international peace and security posed by terrorism, and affirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including those perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Condemns the violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, sectarian violence, and the commission of terrorist acts by foreign terrorist fighters, and demands that all foreign terrorist fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflict; 2. Reaffirms that all States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents, underscores, in this regard, the importance of addressing, in accordance with their relevant international obligations, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, and encourages Member States to employ evidence-based traveller risk assessment and screening procedures including collection and analysis of travel data, without resorting to profiling based on stereotypes founded on grounds of discrimination prohibited by international law; 3. Urges Member States, in accordance with domestic and international law, to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist networks, including foreign terrorist fighters, especially with their States of residence or nationality, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms, in particular the United Nations; 4. Calls upon all Member States, in accordance with their obligations under international law, to cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, including children, preventing foreign terrorist fighters from crossing their borders, disrupting and preventing financial support to foreign terrorist fighters, and developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters; 5. Decides that Member States shall, consistent with international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities; 6. Recalls its decision, in resolution 1373 (2001), that all Member States shall ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice, and decides that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of the offense: (a) their nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to
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S/RES/2178 (2014) 5/8 14-61606 travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; (b) the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to finance the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; and, (c) the wilful organization, or other facilitation, including acts of recruitment, by their nationals or in their territories, of the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; 7. Expresses its strong determination to consider listing pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014) individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida who are financing, arming, planning, or recruiting for them, or otherwise supporting their acts or activities, including through information and communications technologies, such as the internet, social media, or any other means; 8. Decides that, without prejudice to entry or transit necessary in the furtherance of a judicial process, including in furtherance of such a process related to arrest or detention of a foreign terrorist fighter, Member States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for the purpose of participating in the acts described in paragraph 6, including any acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated with Al-Qaida, as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2161 (2014), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals or permanent residents; 9. Calls upon Member States to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) (“the Committee”), and further calls upon Member States to report any such departure from their territories, or such attempted entry into or transit through their territories, of such individuals to the Committee, as well as sharing this information with the State of residence or nationality, as appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and international obligations; 10. Stresses the urgent need to implement fully and immediately this resolution with respect to foreign terrorist fighters, underscores the particular and urgent need to implement this resolution with respect to those foreign terrorist fighters who are associated with ISIL, ANF and other cells, affiliates, splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida, as designated by the Committee, and expresses its
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S/RES/2178 (2014) 14-61606 6/8 readiness to consider designating, under resolution 2161 (2014), individuals associated with Al-Qaida who commit the acts specified in paragraph 6 above; International Cooperation 11. Calls upon Member States to improve international, regional, and subregional cooperation, if appropriate through bilateral agreements, to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters from or through their territories, including through increased sharing of information for the purpose of identifying foreign terrorist fighters, the sharing and adoption of best practices, and improved understanding of the patterns of travel by foreign terrorist fighters, and for Member States to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law; 12. Recalls its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that Member States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, and underlines the importance of fulfilling this obligation with respect to such investigations or proceedings involving foreign terrorist fighters; 13. Encourages Interpol to intensify its efforts with respect to the foreign terrorist fighter threat and to recommend or put in place additional resources to support and encourage national, regional and international measures to monitor and prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters, such as expanding the use of INTERPOL Special Notices to include foreign terrorist fighters; 14. Calls upon States to help build the capacity of States to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including to prevent and interdict foreign terrorist fighter travel across land and maritime borders, in particular the States neighbouring zones of armed conflict where there are foreign terrorist fighters, and welcomes and encourages bilateral assistance by Member States to help build such national capacity; Countering Violent Extremism in Order to Prevent Terrorism 15. Underscores that countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including preventing radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters is an essential element of addressing the threat to international peace and security posed by foreign terrorist fighters, and calls upon Member States to enhance efforts to counter this kind of violent extremism; 16. Encourages Member States to engage relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society and adopt tailored approaches to countering recruitment to this kind of violent extremism and promoting social inclusion and cohesion;
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S/RES/2178 (2014) 7/8 14-61606 17. Recalls its decision in paragraph 14 of resolution 2161 (2014) with respect to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and urges Member States, in this context, to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources, including audio and video, to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law; 18. Calls upon Member States to cooperate and consistently support each other’s efforts to counter violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including through capacity building, coordination of plans and efforts, and sharing lessons learned; 19. Emphasizes in this regard the importance of Member States’ efforts to develop non-violent alternative avenues for conflict prevention and resolution by affected individuals and local communities to decrease the risk of radicalization to terrorism, and of efforts to promote peaceful alternatives to violent narratives espoused by foreign terrorist fighters, and underscores the role education can play in countering terrorist narratives; United Nations Engagement on the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Threat 20. Notes that foreign terrorist fighters and those who finance or otherwise facilitate their travel and subsequent activities may be eligible for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) where they participate in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of, Al-Qaida, supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to, or recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof, and calls upon States to propose such foreign terrorist fighters and those who facilitate or finance their travel and subsequent activities for possible designation; 21. Directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in close cooperation with all relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, in particular CTED, to devote special focus to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining ISIL, ANF and all groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida; 22. Encourages the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to coordinate its efforts to monitor and respond to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters with other United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, in particular the CTITF; 23. Requests the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in close cooperation with other United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, to report to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) within 180 days, and provide a preliminary oral update to the Committee within 60 days, on the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining ISIL, ANF and all groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, including:
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S/RES/2178 (2014) 14-61606 8/8 (a) a comprehensive assessment of the threat posed by these foreign terrorist fighters, including their facilitators, the most affected regions and trends in radicalization to terrorism, facilitation, recruitment, demographics, and financing; and (b) recommendations for actions that can be taken to enhance the response to the threat posed by these foreign terrorist fighters; 24. Requests the Counter-Terrorism Committee, within its existing mandate and with the support of CTED, to identify principal gaps in Member States’ capacities to implement Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) that may hinder States’ abilities to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as to identify good practices to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), and to facilitate technical assistance, specifically by promoting engagement between providers of capacity-building assistance and recipients, especially those in the most affected regions, including through the development, upon their request, of comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that encompass countering violent radicalization and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, recalling the roles of other relevant actors, for example the Global Counterterrorism Forum; 25. Underlines that the increasing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters is part of the emerging issues, trends and developments related to resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), that, in paragraph 5 of resolution 2129 (2013), the Security Council directed CTED to identify, and therefore merits close attention by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, consistent with its mandate; 26. Requests the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee to update the Security Council on their respective efforts pursuant to this resolution; 27. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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Annex 8
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396,
document S/RES/2396 (2017), 21 December 2017
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2396(2017)
49
United Nations S/RES/2396 (2017) Security Council Distr.: General 21 December 2017 17-23112 (E) *1723112* Resolution 2396 (2017) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8148th meeting, on 21 December 2017 The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1325 (2000), 1368 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1566 (2004) 1624 (2005), 1894 (2009), 2106 (2013), 2133 (2014), 2150 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014) 2199 (2015), 2242 (2015), 2249 (2015), 2253 (2015), 2309 (2016) 2322 (2016), 2331 (2016), 2341 (2017), 2347 (2017), 2354 (2017), 2367 (2017), 2368 (2017), 2370 (2017) 2379 (2017) and its relevant presidential statements, Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed, and remaining determined to contribute further to enhancing the effectiveness of the overall effort to fight this scourge on a global level, Reaffirming that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations, Emphasizing that terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization, Reaffirming its commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Stressing that Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, Reaffirming that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, underscoring that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with effective counter-terrorism measures, and are an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort and notes the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and combat terrorism, and noting that failure to comply with these and other international obligations, including under the Charter of the United Nations, is one of Annex 8
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the factors contributing to increased radicalization to violence and fosters a sense of
impunity,
Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive
approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States and
international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate
the terrorist threat,
Urging Member States and the United Nations system to take measures,
pursuant to international law, to address all drivers of violent extremism conducive to
terrorism, both internal and external, in a balanced manner as set out in the United
Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
Recalling Resolution 2178 and the definition of foreign terrorist fighters, and
expressing grave concern over the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist
fighters returning or relocating, particularly from conflict zones, to their countries of
origin or nationality, or to third countries,
Reaffirming its call on Member States to ensure, in conformity with
international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or
facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized
as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists,
Expressing continued concern that international networks have been established
and strengthened by terrorists and terrorist entities among states of origin, t ransit, and
destination, through which foreign terrorist fighters and the resources to support them
have been channelled back and forth,
Acknowledging that returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters have
attempted, organized, planned, or participated in attacks in their countries of origin
or nationality, or third countries, including against “soft” targets, and that the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Da’esh, in particular has called on
its supporters and affiliates to carry out attacks wherever they are located,
Stressing the need for Member States to develop, review, or amend national risk
and threat assessments to take into account “soft” targets in order to develop
appropriate contingency and emergency response plans for terrorist attacks,
Expressing grave concern that foreign terrorist fighters who have joined entities
such as (ISIL), the Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) and other cells, affiliates, splinter groups
or derivatives of ISIL, Al-Qaida or other terrorist groups, may be seeking to return to
their countries of origin or nationality, or to relocate to third countries, and
recognizing that the threat of returning or relocating foreign terrorist fighters includes,
among others, such individuals further supporting acts or activities of ISIL, Al-Qaida
and their cells, affiliates, splinter groups, and derivative entities, including by
recruiting for or otherwise providing continued support for such entities, and stressing
the urgent need to address this particular threat,
Having regard to and highlighting the situation of individuals of more than one
nationality who travel abroad for the purpose of the perpetration, planning,
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of
terrorist training, and may seek to return to their state of origin or nationality, or to
travel to a third state, and urging States to take action, as appropriate, in compliance
with their obligations under their domestic law and international law, including
international human rights law,
Underlining the importance of strengthening international cooperation to
address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including on information
sharing, border security, investigations, judicial processes, extradition, improving
prevention and addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing
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S/RES/2396 (2017) 3/13 17-23112 and countering incitement to commit terrorist acts, preventing radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, disrupting, preventing financial support to foreign terrorist fighters, developing and implementing risks assessments on returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration efforts, consistent with applicable international law, Recognizing, in this regard, that foreign terrorist fighters may be travelling with family members they brought with them to conflict zones, with families they have formed or family members who were born while in conflict zones, underscoring the need for Member States to assess and investigate these individuals for any potential involvement in criminal or terrorist activities, including by employing evidence-based risk assessments , and to take appropriate action in compliance with relevant domestic and international law, including by considering appropriate prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration measures, and noting that children may be especially vulnerable to radicalization to violence and in need of particular social support, such as post-trauma counselling, while stressing that children need to be treated in a manner that observes their rights and respects their dignity, in accordance with applicable international law, Noting with concern that terrorists craft distorted narratives, which are utilized to polarize communities, recruit supporters and foreign terrorist fighters, mobilize resources and garner support from sympathizers, in particular by exploiting information and communications technologies, including through the Internet and social media, Encouraging Member States to collaborate in the pursuit of effective counter-narrative strategies and initiatives, including those relating to foreign terrorist fighters and individuals radicalized to violence, in a manner compliant with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, Calling upon Member States to improve timely information sharing, through appropriate channels and arrangements, and consistent with international and domestic law, on foreign terrorist fighters, especially among law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, and special services agencies, to aid in determining the risk foreign terrorist fighters pose, and preventing them from planning, directing, conducting, or recruiting for or inspiring others to commit terrorist attacks, Recognizing that Member States face challenges in obtaining admissible evidence, including digital and physical evidence, from conflict zones that can be used to help prosecute and secure the conviction of foreign terrorist fighters and those supporting foreign terrorist fighters, Welcoming the establishment of the UN Office on Counterterrorism (UNOCT), and encouraging continued cooperation on counterterrorism efforts between UNOCT, the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and all other relevant UN bodies, and INTERPOL, on technical assistance and capacity building, in coordination with other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, to assist Member States in implementing the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, Welcoming recent developments and initiatives at the international, regional and subregional levels to prevent and suppress international terrorism, including the UN Counter-terrorism Committee’s 2015 Madrid Guiding Principles, and noting the ongoing work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), in particular its 2016 adoption of the Hague-Marrakech Memorandum Addendum on Good Practices for a Annex 8
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More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon with a focus on Returning FTFs
and its comprehensive set of good practices to address the foreign terrorist fighter
phenomenon, and its publication of several other framework documents and good
practices, including in the areas of countering violent extremism conducive to
terrorism, including online, criminal justice, prosecution, rehabilitation and
reintegration, soft target protection, kidnapping for ransom, providing support to
victims of terrorism, and community-oriented policing to assist interested States with
the practical implementation of the United Nations counter-terrorism legal and policy
framework and to complement the work of the relevant United Nations counterterrorism
entities in these areas,
Expressing concern that Foreign Terrorist Fighters may use civil aviation both
as a means of transportation and as a target, and may use cargo both to target civil
aviation and as a means of shipment of materiel, and noting in this regard that
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 9 and Annex 17 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on December 7, 1944
(the “Chicago Convention”), contain standards and recommended practices relevant
to the detection and prevention of terrorist threats involving civil aviation, including
cargo screening,
Welcoming, in this regard, ICAO’s decision to establish a standard under
Annex 9 — Facilitation, regarding the use of Advance Passenger Information (API)
systems by its Member States with effect from October 23, 2017, and recognizing that
many ICAO Member States have yet to implement this standard,
Noting with concern that terrorists and terrorist groups continue to use the
Internet for terrorist purposes, and stressing the need for Member States to act
cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting
technology and communications for terrorist acts, as well as to continue voluntary
cooperation with private sector and civil society to develop and implement more
effective means to counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, including by
developing counter-terrorist narratives and through innovative technological
solutions, all while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in
compliance with domestic and international law, and taking note of the industry led
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) and calling for the GIFCT to
continue to increase engagement with governments and technology companies
globally,
Recognizing the development of the UN CTED-ICT4 Peace Tech Against
Terrorism initiative and its efforts to foster collaboration with representatives from
the technology industry, including smaller technology companies, civil society,
academia, and government to disrupt terrorists’ ability to use the Internet in
furtherance of terrorist purposes, while also respecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms,
Noting with appreciation the efforts of INTERPOL, to address the threat posed
by foreign terrorist fighters, including through global law enforcement information
sharing enabled by the use of its secure communications network, databases, an d
system of advisory notices and procedures to track stolen, forged identity papers and
travel documents, and INTERPOL’s counter-terrorism fora and foreign terrorist
fighter programme,
Recognizing that relevant information, including information included in
INTERPOL databases from Member States, should be shared among national
agencies, such that law enforcement, judicial and border security officers can
proactively and systematically use that information as a resource, where appropriate
and necessary, for investigations, prosecutions and screening at points of entry,
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S/RES/2396 (2017) 5/13 17-23112 Recognizing that a comprehensive approach to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters requires addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including by preventing radicalization to terrorism, stemming recruitment, disrupting financial support to terrorists, countering incitement to commit terrorist acts, and promoting political and religious tolerance, good governance, economic development, social cohesion and inclusiveness, ending and resolving armed conflicts, and facilitating investigation, prosecution, reintegration and rehabilitation, Reaffirming its request in paragraph 2 of resolution 2379 (2017), to establish an investigative team, to be headed by a Special Adviser, to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da’esh) accountable by collecting, preserving, and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by the terrorist group ISIL (Daesh) in Iraq, and recalling its invitation in paragraph 29 of resolution 2388 to the Secretary-General to ensure that the work of the Investigative Team is informed by relevant anti-trafficking research and expertise and that its efforts to collect evidence on trafficking in persons offences are gender-sensitive, victim centred, trauma-informed, rights-based and not prejudicial to the safety and security of victims, Acknowledging that prisons can serve as potential incubators for radicalization to terrorism and terrorist recruitment, and that proper assessment and monitoring of imprisoned foreign terrorist fighters is critical to mitigate opportunities for terrorists to attract new recruits, recognizing that prisons can also serve to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners, where appropriate, and also recognizing that Member States may need to continue to engage with offenders after release from prison to avoid recidivism, in accordance with relevant international law and taking into consideration, where appropriate, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, or “Nelson Mandela Rules”, Noting that some member states may face technical assistance and capacity building challenges when implementing this resolution, and encouraging the provision of assistance from donor states to help address such gaps, Encouraging relevant UN entities, including UNODC and UNOCT, to further enhance, in close consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and CTED, the provision and delivery of technical assistance to States, upon request, to better support Member State efforts to implement this resolution, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 1. Recalls its decision in resolution 2178 that all Member States shall establish serious criminal offenses regarding the travel, recruitment, and financing of foreign terrorist fighters, urges Member States to fully implement their obligations in this regard, including to ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of the offense, and reiterates its call on Member States to cooperate and support each other’s efforts to counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism; Border Security and Information Sharing 2. Calls upon Member States to prevent the movement of terrorists by effective national border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents; 3. Calls upon Member States to notify, in a timely manner, upon travel, arrival, or deportation of captured or detained individuals whom they have reasonable Annex 8
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grounds to believe are terrorists, including suspected foreign terrorist fighters,
including, as appropriate, the source country, destination country, any transit
countries, all countries where the travelers hold citizenship, and including any
additional relevant information about the individuals, and further calls upon Member
States to cooperate and respond expeditiously and appropriately, and consistent with
applicable international law, and to share such information with INTERPOL, as
appropriate;
4. Further calls upon Member States to assess and investigate individuals
whom they have reasonable grounds to believe are terrorists, including suspected
foreign terrorist fighters, and distinguish them from other individuals, including their
accompanying family members who may not have been engaged in foreign terrorist
fighter-related offenses, including by employing evidence-based risk assessments,
screening procedures, and the collection and analysis of travel data, in accordance
with domestic and international law, including international human rights and
humanitarian law, as applicable, without resorting to profiling based on any
discriminatory ground prohibited by international law;
5. Calls upon Member States, in accordance with domestic and international
law, to intensify and accelerate the timely exchange of relevant operational
information and financial intelligence regarding actions or movements, and patterns
of movements, of terrorists or terrorist networks, including foreign terrorist fighters,
including those who have travelled to the conflict zones or are suspected to have
travelled to the conflict zones, and their families travelling back to their countries of
origin or nationality, or to third countries, from conflict zones, especially the
exchange of information with their countries of origin, residence or nationality,
transit, as well as their destination country, through national, bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms, such as INTERPOL;
6. Urges Member States to expeditiously exchange information, through
bilateral or multilateral mechanisms and in accordance with domestic and
international law, concerning the identity of foreign terrorist fighters, including, as
appropriate, foreign terrorist fighters of more than one nationality with Member
States whose nationality the foreign terrorist fighter holds, as well as to ensure
consular access by those Member States to their own detained nationals, in
accordance with applicable international and domestic law;
7. Calls upon Member States to take appropriate action, consistent with
domestic law and applicable international law, including human rights law, to ensure
that their domestic law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, and mil itary
entities routinely have access to relevant information, as appropriate, about suspected
terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters;
8. Urges that Member States consider, where appropriate, downgrading for
official use intelligence threat and related travel data related to foreign terrorist
fighters and individual terrorists, to appropriately provide such information
domestically to front-line screeners, such as immigration, customs and border
security agencies, and to appropriately share such information with other concerned
States and relevant international organizations in compliance with international and
domestic national law and policy; and to share good practices in this regard;
9. Welcomes the approval by ICAO of the new Global Aviation Security Plan
(GASeP) that provides the foundation for ICAO, Member States, the civil aviation
industry, and other stakeholders to work together with the shared and common goal
of enhancing aviation security worldwide and to achieve five key priority outcomes,
namely to enhance risk awareness and response, to develop security culture and
human capability, to improve technological resources and innovation, to improve
oversight and quality assurance, and to increase cooperation and support, and calls
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S/RES/2396 (2017) 7/13 17-23112 for action at the global, regional, and national levels, as well as by industry and other stakeholders, in raising the level of effective implementation of global aviation security, urges ICAO, Member States, the civil aviation industry, and other relevant stakeholders to implement the GASeP and to fulfil the specific measures and tasks assigned to them in Appendix A to the GASeP, the Global Aviation Security Plan Roadmap, and encourages Member States to consider contributions to support ICAO’s work on aviation security; 10. Further welcomes the recognition in the GASeP of the importance of enhancing risk awareness and response, underlines the importance of a wider understanding of the threats and risks facing civil aviation, and calls upon all Member States to work within ICAO to ensure that its international security standards and recommended practices as set out in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention and related to ICAO guidance material, are updated and reviewed, as appropriate, to effectively address the threat posed by terrorists targeting civil aviation; 11. Decides that, in furtherance of paragraph 9 of resolution 2178 and the standard established by ICAO that its Member States establish advance passenger information (API) systems as of October 23, 2017, that Member States shall require airlines operating in their territories to provide API to the appropriate national authorities, in accordance with domestic law and international obligations, in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted travel to, entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of foreign terrorist fighters and individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), and further calls upon Member States to report any such departure from their territories, or such attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by sharing this information with the State of residence or nationality, or the countries of return, transit or relocation, and relevant international organizations as appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and international obligations, and to ensure API is analysed by all relevant authorities, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and investigating terrorist offenses and travel; 12. Decides that Member States shall develop the capability to collect, process and analyse, in furtherance of ICAO standards and recommended practices, passenger name record (PNR) data and to ensure PNR data is used by and shared with all their competent national authorities, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating terrorist offenses and related travel, further calls upon Member States, the UN, and other international, regional, and subregional entities to provide technical assistance, resources and capacity building to Member States in order to implement such capabilities, and, where appropriate, encourages Member States to share PNR data with relevant or concerned Member States to detect foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin or nationality, or traveling or relocating to a third country, with particular regard for all individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015), and also urges ICAO to work with its Member States to establish a standard for the collection, use, processing and protection of PNR data; 13. Decides that Member States shall develop watch lists or databases of known and suspected terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters, for use by law enforcement, border security, customs, military, and intelligence agencies to screen travelers and conduct risk assessments and investigations, in compliance with domestic and international law, including human rights law, and encourages Member States to share this information through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, in compliance with domestic and international human rights law, and further encourages the facilitation of capacity building and technical assistance by Member States and Annex 8
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other relevant Organizations to Member States as they seek to implement this
obligation;
14. Encourages improved cooperation between ICAO and CTED, in
coordination with other relevant UN entities, in identifying areas where Member
States may need technical assistance and capacity-building to implement the
obligations of this resolution related to PNR and API and watch lists, as well as
implementation of the GaSEP;
15. Decides that Member States shall develop and implement systems to
collect biometric data, which could include fingerprints, photographs, facial
recognition, and other relevant identifying biometric data, in order to responsibly and
properly identify terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters, in compliance with
domestic law and international human rights law, calls upon other Member States,
international, regional, and subregional entities to provide technical assistance,
resources, and capacity building to Member States in order to implement such systems
and encourages Member States to share this data responsibly among relevant Member
States, as appropriate, and with INTERPOL and other relevant international bodies;
16. Calls upon Member States to contribute to and make use of INTERPOL’s
databases and ensure that Member States’ law enforcement, border security and
customs agencies are connected to these databases through their National Central
Bureaus, and make regular use of INTERPOL databases for use in screening travelers
at air, land and sea ports of entry and to strengthen investigations and risk assessments
of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and further
calls upon Member States to continue sharing information regarding all lost and
stolen travel documents with INTERPOL, as appropriate and consistent with
domestic law and applicable international law to enhance the operational
effectiveness of INTERPOL databases and notices;
Judicial Measures and International Cooperation
17. Recalls its decision, in resolution 1373 (2001), that all Member States shall
ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or
perpetration of terrorist acts or in support of terrorist acts is brought to justice, and
further recalls its decision that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and
regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to
prosecute and to penalize the activities described in paragraph 6 of resolution 2178
in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of the offense;
18. Urges Member States, in accordance with domestic and applicable
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to develop and
implement appropriate investigative and prosecutorial strategies, regarding those
suspected of the foreign terrorist fighter-related offenses described in paragraph 6 of
resolution 2178 (2014);
19. Reaffirms that those responsible for committing or otherwise responsible
for terrorist acts, and violations of international humanitarian law or violations or
abuses of human rights in this context, must be held accountable;
20. Calls upon Member States, including through relevant Central Authorities,
as well as UNODC and other relevant UN entities that support capacity building, to
share best practices and technical expertise, informally and formally, with a view to
improving the collection, handling, preservation and sharing of relevant information
and evidence, in accordance with domestic law and the obligations Member States
have undertaken under international law, including information obtained from the
internet, or in conflict zones, in order to ensure foreign terrorist fighters who have
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S/RES/2396 (2017) 9/13 17-23112 committed crimes, including those returning and relocating to and from the conflict zone, may be prosecuted; 21. Encourages enhancing Member State cooperation with the private sector, in accordance with applicable law, especially with information communication technology companies, in gathering digital data and evidence in cases related to terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters; 22. Calls upon Member States to improve international, regional, and sub regional cooperation, if appropriate through multilateral and bilateral agreements, to prevent the undetected travel of foreign terrorist fighters from or through their territories, especially returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, including through increased sharing of information for the purpose of identifying foreign terrorist fighters, the sharing and adoption of best practices, and improved understanding of the patterns of travel by foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and for Member States to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to support terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and consistent with their obligations under domestic and applicable international law; 23. Recalls its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that Member States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, and further underscores that this includes physical and digital evidence, underlines the importance of fulfilling this obligation with respect to such investigations or proceedings involving foreign terrorist fighters, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and consistent with obligations under domestic and applicable international law; and urges Member States to act in accordance with their obligations under international law in order to find and bring to justice, extradite or prosecute any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the direct or indirect financing of activities conducted by terrorists or terrorist groups; 24. Underscores the need for Member States to strengthen international judicial cooperation, as outlined in Resolution 2322 and in light of the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters, including, as appropriate, to use applicable international instruments to which they are parties as a basis for mutual legal assistance and, as appropriate, for extradition in terrorism cases, reiterates its call on Member States to consider strengthening the implementation of, and where appropriate, to review possibilities for enhancing the effectiveness of, their respective bilateral and multilateral treaties concerning extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal matters related to counterterrorism, and encourages Member States, in the absence of applicable conventions or provisions, to cooperate when possible on the basis of reciprocity or on a case by case basis, and reiterates its call upon Member States to consider the possibility of allowing, through appropriate laws and mechanisms, the transfer of criminal proceedings, as appropriate, in terrorism-related cases and recognizing the role of UNODC is providing technical assistance and expertise in this regard; 25. Calls upon Member States to help build the capacity of other Member States to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighter returnees and relocators and their accompanying family members, prioritizing those Member States most affected by the threat, including to prevent and monitor foreign terrorist fighter travel across land and maritime borders, and to help collect and preserve evidence admissible in judicial proceedings; Annex 8
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26. Calls upon Member States to improve domestic information sharing within
their respective criminal justice systems in order to more effectively monitor
returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and other individuals radicalized to
violence or directed by ISIL or other terrorist groups to commit terrorist acts, in
accordance with international law;
27. Calls upon Member States to establish or strengthen national, regional and
international partnerships with stakeholders, both public and private, as appropriate,
to share information and experience in order to prevent, protect, mitigate, investigate,
respond to and recover from damage from terrorist attacks against “soft” targets;
28. Urges States able to do so to assist in the delivery of effective and targeted
capacity development, training and other necessary resources, and technical
assistance, where it is needed to enable all States to develop appropriate capacity to
implement contingency and response plans with regard to attacks on “soft” targets;
Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Strategies
29. Calls upon Member States to assess and investigate suspected individuals
whom they have reasonable grounds to believe are terrorists, including suspected
foreign terrorist fighters and their accompanying family members, including spouses
and children, entering those Member States’ territories, to develop and implement
comprehensive risk assessments for those individuals, and to take appropriate action,
including by considering appropriate prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration
measures and emphasizes that Member States should ensure that they take all such
action in compliance with domestic and international law;
30. Calls upon Member States, emphasizing that they are obliged, in
accordance with resolution 1373, to ensure that any person who participates in the
financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting
terrorist acts is brought to justice, to develop and implement comprehensive and
tailored prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies and protocols, in
accordance with their obligations under international law, including with respect to
foreign terrorist fighters and spouses and children accompanying returning and
relocating foreign terrorist fighters, as well as their suitability for rehabilitation, and
to do so in consultation, as appropriate, with local communities, mental health and
education practitioners and other relevant civil society organizations and actors, and
requests UNODC and other relevant UN agencies, consistent with their existing
mandates and resources, and other relevant actors to continue providing technical
assistance to Member States, upon request, in this regard;
31. Emphasizes that women and children associated with foreign terrorist
fighters returning or relocating to and from conflict may have served in many different
roles, including as supporters, facilitators, or perpetrators of terrorist acts, and require
special focus when developing tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration
strategies, and stresses the importance of assisting women and children associated
with foreign terrorist fighters who may be victims of terrorism, and to do so taking
into account gender and age sensitivities;
32. Underscores the importance of a whole of government approach and
recognizes the role civil society organizations can play, including in the health, social
welfare and education sectors in contributing to the rehabilitation and reintegration
of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their families, as civil society
organizations may have relevant knowledge of, access to and engagement with local
communities to be able to confront the challenges of recruitment and radicalization
to violence, and encourages Member States to engage with them proactively when
developing rehabilitation and reintegration strategies;
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S/RES/2396 (2017) 11/13 17-23112 33. Stresses the need to effectively counter the ways that ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities use their narratives to incite and recruit others to commit terrorist acts, and further recalls in this regard resolution 2354 (2017) and the “Comprehensive International Framework to Counter Terrorist Narratives” (S/2017/375) with recommended guidelines and good practices; 34. Encourages Member States to collaborate in the pursuit of developing and implementing effective counter-narrative strategies in accordance with resolution 2354 (2017), including those relating to foreign terrorist fighters, in a manner compliant with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, as applicable; 35. Reiterates that States should consider engaging, where appropriate, with religious authorities, community leaders and other civil society actors, who have relevant expertise in crafting and delivering effective counter-narratives, in countering narratives used by terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters, and their supporters; 36. Recognizes the particular importance of providing, through a whole of government approach, timely and appropriate reintegration and rehabilitation assistance to children associated with foreign terrorist fighters returning or relocating from conflict zones, including through access to health care, psychosocial support and education programs that contribute to the well-being of children and to sustainable peace and security; 37. Encourages Member States to develop appropriate legal safeguards to ensure that prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies developed are in full compliance with their international law obligations, including in cases involving children; 38. Calls upon Member States to develop and implement risk assessment tools to identify individuals who demonstrate signs of radicalization to violence and develop intervention programs, including with a gender perspective, as appropriate, before such individuals commit acts of terrorism, in compliance with applicable international and domestic law and without resorting to profiling based on any discriminatory grounds prohibited by international law; 39. Encourages Member States, as well as international, regional, and sub-regional entities to ensure participation and leadership of women in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of these strategies for addressing returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their families; 40. Encourages Member States to take all appropriate actions to maintain a safe and humane environment in prisons, develop tools that can help address radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment, and to develop risk assessments to assess the risks of prison inmates’ susceptibility to terrorist recruitment and radicalization to violence, and develop tailored and gender-sensitive strategies to address and counter terrorist narratives within the prison system, consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law, as applicable and in accordance with relevant international law and taking into consideration, as appropriate, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, or “Nelson Mandela Rules”; 41. Encourages Member States to take all appropriate actions to prevent inmates who have been convicted of terrorism-related offenses from radicalizing other prisoners to violence, with whom they may come into contact, in compliance with domestic and international law; Annex 8
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United Nations Efforts on Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters
42. Reaffirms that foreign terrorist fighters and those who finance or otherwise
facilitate their travel and subsequent activities may be eligible for inclusion on the
ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List maintained by the Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015) where they participate in the
financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in
conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of, supplying, selling
or transferring arms and related materiel to, or recruiting for, or otherwise supporting
acts or activities of Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative
thereof, and calls upon States to propose such foreign terrorist fighters and those who
facilitate or finance their travel and subsequent activities for possible designa tion;
43. Directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999),
1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team, in close cooperation with all relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies,
to continue to devote special focus to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters,
specifically those associated with ISIL, ANF and all groups, undertakings and entities
associated with Al-Qaida;
44. Requests the Counter-Terrorism Committee, within its existing mandate
and with the support of Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), to review
the 2015 Madrid Guiding Principles in light of the evolving threat of foreign terrorist
fighters, particularly returnees, relocators and their families, and other principle gaps
that may hinder States’ abilities to appropriately detect, interdict, and where possible,
prosecute, rehabilitate and reintegrate foreign terrorist fighter returnees and relocators
and their families, as well as to continue to identify new good practices and to
facilitate technical assistance, upon their request, specifically by promot ing
engagement between providers of capacity-building assistance and recipients,
especially those in the most affected regions, including through the development of
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that encompass countering radicalization
to violence and the return and relocation of foreign terrorist fighters and their
families, recalling the roles of other relevant actors, for example the Global
Counterterrorism Forum;
45. Further requests CTED, in coordination with UNODC and other relevant
UN bodies, INTERPOL, and the private sector, and in collaboration with Member
States, to continue to collect and develop best practices on the systematic
categorization, collection and sharing among Member States of biometric data, with
a view to improving biometric standards and improving the collection and use of
biometric data to effectively identify terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters,
including through the facilitation of capacity building, as appropriate;
46. Requests the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999),
1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee to update the
Security Council on their respective efforts pursuant to this resolution, as appropriate;
47. Encourages relevant UN entities, including UNODC and UNOCT, to
further enhance, in close consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and
CTED, the provision and delivery of technical assistance to States, upon request, to
better support Member State efforts to implement this resolution;
48. Notes that the implementation of aspects of this resolution, especially PNR
and biometric data collection, can be resource-intensive and take an extended period
of time to develop and make operational, directs CTED to take this into consideration
when assessing Member States’ implementation of relevant resolutions, and in its
furtherance of facilitating technical assistance as requested in paragraph 47;
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S/RES/2396 (2017) 13/13 17-23112 49. Urges the Office of Counterterrorism to incorporate CTED assessments and identification of emerging issues, trends and developments as related to foreign terrorist fighters into the design and implementation of their work, in accordance with their respective mandates, as well as to enhance cooperation with relevant UN counter-terrorism entities such as CTED, UNODC, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, and INTERPOL; 50. Requests the Office of Counterterrorism, in close cooperation with CTED, including through use of CTED country assessments, to review the UN Capacity Building Implementation Plan to counter the Flow of FTFs, as called for under S/PRST/2015/11, to ensure that the Plan supports Member States in their efforts to implement the priorities of this resolution, the establishment of effective API systems, the development of PNR capability, the development of effective biometric data systems, the improvement of judicial procedures, and the development of comprehensive and tailored prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies, further requests OCT to communicate the prioritization of these projects and any updates to the plan to all Member States and relevant international, regional, and sub-regional bodies by June 2018, and to continue incorporating CTED country assessments in its Plan on a routine basis, further requests OCT to develop ways to measure the effectiveness of these projects, and calls upon Member States, as appropriate, to provide the resources needed to implement these projects; 51. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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Annex 9
United Nations Security Council, ISIL (Da’esh) and
Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subai (QDi.253),
3 February 2016
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Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website: 9 March 2009Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated: 19 February 201515 June 20153 February 2016Home(/securitycouncil/)»KHALIFA MUHAMMAD TURKI AL-SUBAIYKHALIFA MUHAMMAD TURKI AL-SUBAIYIn accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.QDi.253KHALIFA MUHAMMAD TURKI AL-SUBAIY Reason for listing: Khalifa Muhammad Turki al-Subaiy was listed on 10 October 2008 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1822 (2008) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of”, “recruiting for” and “otherwise supporting the acts or activities of” Al-Qaida and its senior leadership.Additional information: Khalifa Muhammad Turki al-Subaiy is a Qatar-based terrorist financier and facilitator who has provided financial support to, and acted on behalf of, the senior leadership of Al-Qaida (QDe.004). From the mid-2000s, he has provided financial support to Al-Qaida senior leadership in South Asia. He has also worked with Al-Qaida senior facilitators to move extremist recruits to Al-Qaida training camps in South Asia and has assisted in providing funds to them. He has also served as an envoy and communications link between Al-Qaida and third parties in the Middle East.On 3 October 2007, along with four other individuals, Al-Subaiy was charged in absentia by the General Prosecutor in Bahrain that in 2006 and 2007 he had knowingly provided support and financing to terrorist groups.On 16 January 2008, Al-Subaiy was convicted in absentia by the Bahrain High Criminal Court for financing terrorism and facilitating the travel of others abroad to receive terrorist training. He was arrested in Qatar in March 2008 and served a six-month sentence of imprisonment in Qatar. After his release, Al-Subaiy reconnected with Al-Qaida financiers and facilitators in the Middle East and resumed organizing funds in support of Al-Qaida. His involvement with Iran based facilitators continued in 2009, 2011 and throughout 2012 with money flowing to Al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan. As of early 2011, Al-Subaiy provided thousands of dollars intended for senior Al-Qaida officials in Pakistan and his funding activities in support of Al-Qaida continued into 2013.Related listed individuals and entities: Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001Ashraf Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman 'Abd al-Salam (QDi.343), listed on 23 January 2015'Abd al-Malik Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman 'Abd al-Salam (QDi.346), listed on 23 January 2015􀀰Welcome to the United Nations(http://www.un.org/en)Language:Page 1of 2KHALIFA MUHAMMAD TURKI AL-SUBAIY | United Nations Security Council4/2/2019https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/sum…...
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UNITED NATIONS(HTTP://WWW.UN.ORG/)A-Z Site Index(http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/z-site-index/)Contact(http://www.un.org/en/contact-us/)Copyright (http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/copyright/)FAQ(http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/frequently-asked-questions/)Fraud Alert(http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/fraud-alert/)Privacy Notice(http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/privacy-notice/)Terms of Use(http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/terms-use/)􀀰Welcome to the United Nations(http://www.un.org/en)Language:Page 2of 2KHALIFA MUHAMMAD TURKI AL-SUBAIY | United Nations Security Council4/2/2019https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/sum…...
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United Nations Security Council, Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari (QDi.380),
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Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website: 21 September 2015Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated: 21 September 2015Home(/securitycouncil/)»Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-KawariAbd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-KawariIn accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the Al-Qaida Sanctions List.QDi.380Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-KawariReason for listing: Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari was listed on 21 September 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Al-Qaida (QDe.004).Additional information: Abd al-Latif Bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari is a Qatar-based facilitator who providesfinancial support for, and services to, or in support of Al-Qaida (QDe.004) by transferring money to the group, raising funds for the group, and coordinating contributions to it.In early 2012, Al-Kawari worked with Al-Qaida facilitators to coordinate the delivery of funding from Qatari financiers intended to support Al-Qaida and to deliver receipts confirming that Al-Qaida received foreign donor funding from Qatar-based extremists. As of 2012, he continued to collect financial support for Al-Qaida. Early that year, he also facilitated the international travel of a courier who was carrying tens of thousands of dollars earmarked for Al-Qaida.In the early 2000s, Al-Kawari worked with Al-Qaida operative Mustafa Hajji Muhammad Khan (a.k.a. Hassan Ghul) (QDi.306) and Qatari Al-Qaida facilitator Ibrahim 'Isa Hajji Muhammad al-Bakr (QDi.344) to transfer money to Al-Qaida in Pakistan. At that time, Al-Kawari also obtained a fraudulent passport for Hassan Ghul, which Ghul used to travel to Qatar with Al-Kawari and Al-Bakr.Related listed individuals and entities: Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001Mustafa Hajji Muhammad Khan (QDi.306), listed on 14 March 2012Ibrahim 'Isa Hajji Muhammad al-Bakr (QDi.344), listed on 23 January 2015UNITED NATIONS(HTTP://WWW.UN.ORG/)A-Z Site Index(http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/z-site-index/)Contact(http://www.un.org/en/contact-us/)Copyright (http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/copyright/)􀀰Welcome to the United Nations(http://www.un.org/en)Language:Page 1of 2Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari | United Nations Security Cou...4/2/2019https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/sum…...
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Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website: 21 September 2015Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated: 21 September 2015Home(/securitycouncil/)»Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'biSa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'biIn accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the Al-Qaida Sanctions List.QDi.382Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'biReason for listing: Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi was listed on 21 September 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 ofresolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137).Additional information: Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi is a Qatar-based facilitator who provides financial support for and services to, or in support of, Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (Al-Nusrah Front) (QDe.137) by transferring money to the group, raising funds for the groups, and coordinating contributions to it.As of early 2014, Al-Ka'bi said that he had donation campaigns set up in Qatar to aid with fundraising in response to a request from an Al-Nusrah Front associate for money to purchase weapons and food. In that same time period, an Al-Nusrah Front official requested Al-Ka'bi act as an intermediary for collecting a ransom for a hostage being held by Al-Nusrah Front, and he worked to facilitate a ransom payment in exchange for the release of a hostage held by Al-Nusrah Front.In 2013, Al-Ka'bi worked closely with Kuwaiti Al-Nusrah Front fundraiser Hamid Hamad Hamid al-'Ali (QDi.326) and received funding from him to support Al-Nusrah Front. Since at least late 2012, Al- Ka'bi provided support to Al-Nusrah Front in Syria.Related listed individuals and entities: Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137), listed on 14 May 2014Hamid Hamad Hamid al-'Ali (QDi.326), listed on 15 August 2014UNITED NATIONS(HTTP://WWW.UN.ORG/)A-Z Site Index(http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/z-site-index/)Contact(http://www.un.org/en/contact-us/)Copyright (http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-website/copyright/)􀀰Welcome to the United Nations(http://www.un.org/en)Language:Page 1of 2Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi | United Nations Security Council4/4/2019https://static.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/…...
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The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Communication submitted by Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
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The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Response of the United Arab Emirates to the Communication Submitted by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
7 August 2018, together with Annex 16
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Before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination RESPONSE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES To the Communication dated 8 March 2018 Submitted by the State of Qatar Pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination Submitted to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office, Geneva, Switzerland 7 August 2018 Annex 13
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................3
QATARI NATIONALS WERE NOT EXPELLED FROM THE UAE ...............................6
THERE IS NO TRAVEL BAN RELATING TO QATARI NATIONALS ..........................7
QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATION OF OTHER RIGHTS
RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CERD LACK MERIT........................................................8
A. Right to Marriage and Choice of Spouse .................................................................9
B. Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression .......................................................10
C. Right to Health and Right to Medical Treatment ...................................................12
D. Right to Education .................................................................................................13
E. Right to Work .........................................................................................................14
F. Right to Property ....................................................................................................14
G. Right to Equal Treatment before Tribunals ............................................................16
QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY DIRECT
EVIDENCE........................................................................................................................16
A. The Qatari Committee Reports ..............................................................................17
B. Reports by Various Human Rights Bodies .............................................................19
STATEMENT OF LAW .....................................................................................................22
A. Substantive and Procedural Defects in Qatar’s Submission ..................................22
B. There is no Violation of the Convention ................................................................23
ICJ PROCEEDINGS .........................................................................................................25
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................25
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3 This Response is submitted by the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD” or “Convention”). This Response addresses the allegations made by the State of Qatar (“Qatar”) in its 8 March 2018 communication (“Submission”) to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“Committee”). A copy of Qatar’s Submission was communicated to the United Arab Emirates on 7 May 2018 by the Secretary General of the United Nations (High Commissioner for Human Rights). INTRODUCTION 1. Qatar alleges in its Submission that the UAE has violated the Convention by virtue of certain measures that it has taken following the UAE’s termination of relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017. Qatar’s complaint misrepresents the facts and the actions taken by the UAE, as well as the circumstances resulting in the UAE’s termination of relations with Qatar. Furthermore, Qatar’s complaint does not fall within the scope of CERD Article 11 because: (i) it does not involve a situation in which a “State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention,” as the UAE did not expel Qatari citizens and therefore did not deny them any protections provided for in the Convention; (ii) the UAE did not enforce the portion of the 5 June 2017 announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (“MoFA”) calling on Qatari citizens to depart UAE territory; the UAE has since made clear that Qatari citizens resident in the UAE may remain in the country and non-resident Qatari citizens can apply to enter the UAE; and (iii) Qatar has not shown that UAE domestic remedies available to Qatari citizens have been exhausted as required by CERD Article 11(3). 2. This Response first details why, contrary to Qatar’s claims, there has been no mass expulsion of Qatari citizens from the UAE. The announcement of 5 June 2017 by MoFA did not constitute an order for deportation. Under UAE law, only the Ministry of Interior has the authority to issue orders for deportation. Subsequent to the 5 June 2017 announcement, neither did the UAE Ministry of Interior issue any such orders, nor did the UAE issue any other legislation or regulations to deport Qatari citizens. Further, the UAE took no other action to compel Qataris to leave the UAE. On the contrary, as discussed in more detail in Section II of this Response, official UAE immigration records indicate that Qatari nationals remained in the UAE in overwhelming numbers and that Qatari nationals continue to reside in and visit the UAE in substantially the same numbers as they did prior to the break in relations. 3. The UAE has also not instituted a travel ban against Qataris who wish to enter the UAE. Instead, the UAE established a new requirement that Qatari nationals request permission to enter the UAE, which is a common requirement that States impose routinely on visitors to their territory of various nationalities. Section III of this Response provides information about this requirement, including official data showing that the majority of applications to enter or re-enter the UAE submitted by Qatari nationals have been approved. Indeed, given Qatar’s misstatement of the facts, MoFA made an announcement on 5 July 2018 clarifying that there was never a legal order deporting Qatari citizens from the UAE and that any Qatari citizen Annex 13
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4
could apply to enter the UAE on an individual basis and would be permitted to do so if they
do not pose a security risk and otherwise meet neutral immigration criteria.1
4. Qatar’s claims regarding the UAE’s alleged violations of the right to family, education, and
health are premised on the existence of an expulsion order and a travel ban. Since there was no
expulsion order and there is no travel ban, Qatar’s allegations regarding these alleged
violations necessarily lack merit.
5. Qatar’s claim of discrimination with respect to access to justice is equally unfounded. Qatari
nationals have access to the UAE courts as demonstrated in Section IV.G. There are presently
hundreds of active proceedings in the UAE courts to which Qatari citizens are parties.
6. Moreover, the allegation that the UAE is mounting or supporting a campaign of hate speech
against Qatari citizens, or that such a campaign exists, is unfounded.
7. The reality is that the UAE’s targeted measures are aimed at the Qatari government and not
the Qatari people. From the very beginning of the regional crisis, the UAE affirmed its “full
respect and appreciation for the brotherly Qatari people on account of the profound historical,
religious and fraternal ties and kin relations binding UAE and Qatari peoples.”2 Since then, the
UAE has made clear the entry and residence rights applicable to Qatari nationals, including as
recently as 5 July 2018, when MoFA issued a public statement confirming that Qataris continue
to have the right to live in the UAE and that there is no expulsion order applicable to Qatari
citizens.3
8. The current situation in the Gulf region unfortunately was precipitated by Qatar’s own actions
and its failure to respect its international obligations. In 2013, following years of diplomatic
engagement on the issues, several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Qatar,
concluded an agreement by which Qatar committed itself to cease supporting, financing, or
harbouring persons or groups, in particular, terrorist and extremist groups. Two supplemental
agreements for the same purpose were concluded among the Gulf Cooperation Council
members in 2014. The three agreements are collectively referred to, and known to the larger
public as, the “Riyadh Agreements.” The obligations under the Riyadh Agreements
supplemented the parties’ existing obligations under other international legal instruments,
including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and customary international law.
1 An Official Statement by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-
2018-UAE-Statement-of-MoFAIC.aspx.
2 UAE supports statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar, statement by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation (5 June 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-06-2017-UAEQatar.
aspx.
3 An Official Statement by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-
2018-UAE-Statement-of-MoFAIC.aspx.
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5 9. Qatar failed to abide by the Riyadh Agreements and continues to violate its obligations under other international agreements. To cite just one example, in April 2017 Qatar paid US $1 billion as “ransom” to entities affiliated with known terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida, a matter that the Arab Republic of Egypt brought to the attention of the Security Council.4 10. On 5 June 2017, after repeated calls upon Qatar to honour its commitments proved ineffective, the UAE and no less than ten other States took the decision to terminate or downgrade relations with Qatar. Qatar continues to fund numerous terrorist organizations, harbour and provide material support to known terrorists, and interfere in the internal sovereign affairs of States in the region. This violation by Qatar of its express commitments under the Riyadh Agreements and of its other international obligations puts at risk the national security of the UAE and the safety of its citizens. 11. Qatar’s Submission conveniently excludes these underlying facts, which provide essential and legally significant context. Instead, Qatar deliberately misrepresents the UAE’s measures against the Qatari government as measures taken against the people of Qatar. To the contrary, the UAE has taken significant steps to ensure that the current crisis with Qatar does not affect the rights of ordinary citizens. In this Response, the UAE will demonstrate that the facts do not support Qatar’s allegations. 12. Finally, the UAE would like to draw the Committee’s attention to the ongoing proceedings in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”) relating to this matter, which were initiated by Qatar. The UAE maintains that Qatar should not be permitted to advance a complaint under Article 11 while simultaneously initiating proceedings in relation to the same issues before the ICJ. The UAE intends to lodge jurisdictional objections with the ICJ on this basis. 13. As part of the ICJ proceedings, an order was issued on 23 July 2018 in respect of provisional measures requested by Qatar. The ICJ refused to grant any measures in the form sought by Qatar, and instead indicated limited measures in three areas (family re-unification, education and access to justice), in which UAE policy already reflects and complies with the order of the Court. Moreover, the Court indicated a general measure urging both parties not to take any steps that could aggravate the dispute. The UAE is confident that its practice in these areas 4United Nations Security Council, Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, S/PV.7962 (8 June 2017), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7962. See also Erika Solomon, The $1bn Hostage Deal that Enraged Qatar’s Gulf Rivals, FINANCIAL TIMES (5 June 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43; Michelle Nichols, Egypt Calls for U.N. Inquiry into Accusation of Qatar Ransom Payment, REUTERS (8 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-un/egypt-calls-for-u-n-in…; Alex Lockie, Qatar May Have Paid $1 Billion in Ransom for Release of Royal Family Members Captured While Hunting with Falcons, BUSINESS INSIDER (5 June 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/qatar-ransom-al-qaeda-iran-falconry-2017…; Egypt Calls for UN Probe on Qatar Giving Terrorists $1 Bln in Iraq, AL ARABIYA ENGLISH (8 June 2017), https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/06/08/Egypt-call…. Annex 13
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fully conforms to both the ICJ’s order and to its obligations under the CERD, and that upon a
close examination of the facts the Court will reach the same conclusion.
14. The UAE is grateful to the Committee for its work and its attention to the important matters
before it. The UAE became a Party to the CERD almost 45 years ago. It has been and remains
today firmly committed to the principles that inspired the Convention. The UAE would like to
take this opportunity to reaffirm its full commitment to the Convention’s objective of
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms.
QATARI NATIONALS WERE NOT EXPELLED FROM THE UAE
15. In its Submission, Qatar alleges that the UAE “has expelled all Qatari residents and visitors
within its borders.”5 The Submission alleges that expulsions were mass and arbitrary, stating
that “UAE authorities expelled Qatari residents with no consideration of the personal
circumstances of each individual.”6
16. The UAE unequivocally rejects these claims. The UAE has carried out no mass expulsion of
Qatari citizens, despite Qatar’s insistence on repeating these false charges. The UAE urges the
Committee to examine the evidence that Qatar has provided in support of these allegations.
Beyond merely referring to the statement issued on 5 June 2017 by MoFA, Qatar has not
provided any specific or credible evidence of such a mass expulsion or any specific examples
of individual expulsions of Qatari citizens based on their nationality.
17. To the contrary, official UAE immigration records show that thousands of Qataris continue to
reside in the UAE and have continued to visit its territory since the UAE’s termination of
relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017.
18. One aspect of the 5 June 2017 announcement was a call for citizens of Qatar to leave UAE
territory for precautionary security reasons. While this call was made as a matter of precaution,
it does not constitute a legal order for the deportation or expulsion of Qatari citizens. In the
UAE, the authority to expel individuals from UAE territory falls solely under the authority of
the Ministry of Interior by virtue of Federal Law No. 6 of 1973 Concerning Immigration and
Residence (“Immigration Law”). Absent an order by the Ministry of Interior, a person cannot
be administratively deported from UAE territory. Since the Ministry of Interior issued no such
orders, there was never any legal requirement for Qatari citizens to leave UAE territory.
19. UAE’s official immigration records confirm beyond any doubt that there were no expulsions
and that Qataris residing in the UAE understood that they were not required to leave its
territory. Those records show that the vast majority of Qatari residents in the UAE on 5 June
2017 chose to continue their residence in the UAE, and did not depart. As of mid-June 2018,
5 Qatar’s Submission, para. 4.
6 Id. at, para. 71.
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7 there were 2,194 Qatari nationals in the UAE, largely the same as the number of Qataris residing in the UAE on 5 June 2017.7 20. While the UAE issued no deportation orders and took no other steps to compel Qatari citizens to leave its territory, the Committee should note that the Qatari Embassy in the UAE did issue its own instruction for Qatari citizens to depart the UAE.8 It is possible that some Qataris who left the UAE did so as a result of the instructions of the Qatari Embassy. 21. Qatar recently repeated these false allegations of mass expulsion before the ICJ in the context of its application for provisional measures under the CERD. Qatari government-owned media outlets – which broadcast widely throughout the Middle East – have repeatedly broadcast Qatar’s false allegations. Due to this misinformation, MoFA issued a statement on 5 July 2018 affirming the UAE’s long-standing policy on the rights of Qatari citizens to travel to and reside in the UAE and, more importantly, confirming that Qatari citizens are not under any expulsion order.9 The statement reads, in part, as follows: “[t]he UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation wishes to confirm that Qatari citizens already resident in the UAE need not apply for permission to continue residence in the UAE…. the UAE has not issued any legal or administrative laws or orders relating to the expulsion of Qatari citizens from UAE territory. The UAE took no action to expel Qatari citizens and national[s] who remained in the UAE following the expiry of the 14 day period referred to in the June 5, 2017 announcement.”10 22. The Committee should note that in its order of 23 July 2018, the ICJ refused to grant the provisional measure requested by Qatar for “suspending operation of the collective expulsion of all Qataris from, and ban on entry into, the UAE.” The ICJ’s order is a tacit recognition that there has been no collective expulsion, and that no travel ban exists. Qatar’s false allegations regarding the “travel ban” are addressed in more detail in the next Section below. THERE IS NO TRAVEL BAN RELATING TO QATARI NATIONALS 23. Qatar’s Submission alleges that its citizens are banned from travelling to the UAE. As with the expulsion allegation, this is also false. While Qataris are no longer allowed to travel to the UAE on a visa-free basis, they may still travel to the UAE after requesting permission to do 7 See Immigration – Qataris in the UAE (Attached as Annex 1); Immigration - ID & Citizenship Authority Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Stats (Attached as Annex 2). 8 Qatar asks citizens to leave UAE within 14 days- embassy, Reuters (5 June 2017), https://www.zawya.com/uae/en/story/Qatar_asks_citizens_to_leave_UAE_wit…. 9 An official Statement by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem…. 10 Id. Annex 13
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so. Thousands of Qatari nationals have travelled to or from the UAE on this basis since 5 June
2017.
24. Prior to 5 June 2017, Qatari citizens could travel to the UAE without a visa or any other prior
permission. Following the termination of relations with Qatar, the UAE implemented a new
system whereby Qatari nationals must obtain prior permission to travel to the UAE. The
principle of obtaining permission prior to travel applies to many other nationalities and is a
basic immigration control measure used by governments worldwide. The right to apply entry
requirements to foreign nationals is a sovereign right reserved for all States and is not ceded in
the Convention or under international law more generally. The UAE maintains a limited list of
countries whose nationals may enter the UAE on a visa-free basis or with a visa on arrival;
citizens of most countries must apply for permission in advance, as is now the case for
Qataris.11
25. Qatari citizens may and do apply for permission to travel to the UAE through the hotline
established on 11 June 2017.12 Contrary to Qatar’s claims, the hotline operates efficiently and
the vast majority of applications for permission to travel are approved. In the first six months
of 2018 alone, the hotline received 1,390 applications. Of this total number, only 12
applications were rejected for security or other reasons, meaning that approximately 99% of
applications for entry were approved.13
26. The efficient working of the hotline is evidenced by the extensive travel logs of movements by
Qatari citizens across UAE borders, as evidenced by the UAE’s official immigration records.
Since 5 June 2017, entry and exit records enclosed with this Response show 8,442 movements
by Qatari citizens across UAE borders, all of which were facilitated by the work of the
hotline.14
QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATION OF OTHER RIGHTS
RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CERD LACK MERIT
27. As explained in the prior sections of this Response, Qatar’s claim that the UAE has carried out
a collective expulsion of Qatari nationals is demonstrably false. Qatar’s claim that the UAE
has instituted a travel ban against Qatari citizens is also false. These factual matters entirely
undermine Qatar’s other claims of violations of the CERD that are premised on the purported
expulsion and travel ban.
28. In particular, the absence of any expulsion of Qatari nationals or travel ban significantly
undermines Qatar’s claims that the UAE has interfered with the “right to marriage and choice
of spouse,” the “right to public health and medical care,” the “right to education,” the “right to
11 See Do you need an entry permit or a visa to enter the UAE?, The Official Portal of the UAE Government,
https://government.ae/en/information-and-services/visa-and-emirates-id/….
12 See Hotline - UAE MoFA Announcement re Directive for Hotline Addressing Mixed Families (Attached as Annex 3).
13 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pg. 2 (Attached as Annex 4).
14 See Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (Attached as Annex 5).
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9 work,” the “right to property” and the “right to equal treatment before tribunals” of Qatari nationals. No evidence is provided by Qatar to suggest that these rights are denied to Qataris in the UAE. Instead, these claims are premised on the false assumption that Qataris’ enjoyment of these rights within the UAE has been obstructed by their inability to enter the UAE. The fact is that none of these rights can be interpreted so expansively so as to allow a foreign national an unconditional right to enter the territory of a State. As indicated earlier in this Response, any interpretation of the CERD must take into account the fact that States have a right to determine for themselves the entry and residence restrictions applicable to foreign nationals who enter their territories. In any event, this is a moot issue, since as discussed in Sections II and III above, official UAE records indisputably show that Qatari citizens continue to reside in the UAE and travel in large numbers across its borders. 29. Nevertheless, the UAE specifically responds below to each of these separate allegations. In the following sub-sections, the UAE will explain why – aside from there having been no expulsion or travel ban – the allegations made by Qatar are without merit. A. Right to Marriage and Choice of Spouse 30. Qatar alleges that the UAE has unlawfully interfered with the rights to marriage and family life “[i]n forcing family separation by expelling Qatari nationals.”15 31. The UAE recognizes the importance of ensuring that UAE-Qatari families are not separated and that their lives are not detrimentally impacted by the absence of relations between the UAE and Qatar. As indicated earlier in this Response, the hotline has received and granted thousands of applications, refusing only a very small minority of them, and refusing almost no applications by Qatar-UAE mixed families.16 To the contrary, not only do Qatari nationals still enter the UAE in large numbers, official UAE records show that a number of marriages involving a Qatari citizen have been registered in the UAE since the start of the crisis.17 It is simply false to allege that the UAE is interfering in individuals’ right to marriage and choice of spouse, as Qatar’s Submission suggests. 32. The Committee should note that Qatar’s assertions in relation to family separation do not include any specific details to substantiate the allegations made. For example, according to Qatar, its National Human Rights Committee (“Qatari Committee”) has documented “620 cases of ‘family separation’ [of which 78 cases are allegedly attributable to the UAE].”18 Details of these families have not been provided. Further, it is notable that most of the information presented by Qatar regarding “family separation” relates to the days or weeks after the start of the crisis on 5 June 2017. There is no information regarding the current status of any of those cases or anything to suggest that those cases have not been resolved. Given their 15 Qatar’s Submission, para. 75. 16 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pgs. 15-27 (Attached as Annex 4); Part 2 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration (Attached as Annex 6). 17 See Immigration – Qataris in the UAE, pg. 50 (Attached as Annex 1). 18 Qatar’s Submission, para. 42. Annex 13
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anonymous nature, there is also no way for the UAE (or the Committee) to confirm that the
alleged complaints are in fact authentic.
33. Similarly, other human rights organizations reporting on alleged family separations provide
only general statements and statistics. No specific facts are given. For example, the report dated
December 2017 in respect of the OHCHR Technical Mission to Qatar (“OHCHR Report”)
does not mention any specific instances of family separation and simply relies upon the overall
statistics of mixed-marriages between Qataris and other Gulf states in order to give an
indication of the number of families that could potentially be affected.19 Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch simply offer conclusory statements concerning alleged family
separation unsupported by any facts.20 As such, there is no basis on which the UAE can confirm
the authenticity of the complaints.
34. The UAE reiterates that its policy since the start of the crisis has been to ensure that UAEQatari
mixed families are not separated. With Qataris having entered and exited the UAE at
least 8,442 times since the start of the crisis, it is implausible to suggest that the UAE is “forcing
family separation,” as Qatar alleges.
B. Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression
35. The UAE does not, and has not, in any manner curtailed freedom of expression or in any way
incited hatred against Qatari citizens. Qatar’s allegations in this area focus on the statement of
the UAE Attorney General, in which he is quoted as saying “strict and firm action will be taken
against anyone who shows sympathy or any form of bias towards Qatar…” and that sympathy
with the policies of Qatar could amount to a violation of Federal Decree Law No. 5 of 2012.21
As explained below, there is nothing in the Attorney General’s statement that implicates the
UAE’s obligations under CERD.
36. First, there is nothing in the Attorney General’s statement that criminalizes support for Qatari
citizens or restricts their freedom of expression. The Attorney General correctly refers to the
fact that speech in support of Qatar, in particular its policy of aiding terrorist organizations and
individuals, may constitute a criminal offense under UAE law. There is nothing controversial
about outlawing statements in support of terrorism, and there is nothing in UAE law, or in the
19 See OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on
Human Rights, December 2017, para. 34 (Attached as Annex 7).
20 See Gulf Crisis Shows How Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar Tears Families Apart,
Human Rights Watch (21 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/21/gulf-crisis-shows-how-discriminatio…-
uae-and-qatar-tears; Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses, Human Rights Watch (12 July 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abus…; Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and
Families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes, Amnesty International (19 June 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human…-
deadline-passes/.
21 Qatar’s Submission, paras. 34 and 86.
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11 Attorney General’s statement, that indicates a crime for an expression of support for the Qatari people. 37. The Committee should also note Article 7 of the UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 On Combatting Discrimination and Hatred22 (“Anti-Discrimination Law”), which exists to ensure, among other things, that the discriminatory and racially prejudicial views of terrorist groups are not propagated within the UAE. Not only would prosecuting such speech be consistent with the Anti-Discrimination Law, it would also be consistent with the aims of the Convention and, in particular, State Parties’ obligations under Article 5 to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination, and their obligations under Article 2(1)(d) to prohibit racial discrimination by any person, group or organization. 38. Second, UAE Federal Decree Law No. 5 of 2012, which Qatar cites as a law targeting Qatari citizens, is a law of general application that was enacted well in advance of the crisis with Qatar. It includes no provisions that are specific to Qatar or to Qatari citizens. It is similar to the cybercrime laws in existence in many other countries, including the cybercrime law passed by Qatar in 2014.23 Qatar’s suggestion that this law is targeted at speech supporting Qatar or Qatari citizens is entirely false. 39. Third, in furtherance of the objective of limiting discriminatory and hate speech, the UAE has blocked certain Qatari media outlets that are known to provide a platform for terrorist groups and individuals. Chiefly among those outlets is Al Jazeera, which – particularly through its Arabic language network – acts as a major purveyor of discrimination and hate speech in the region. Al Jazeera regularly interviews and disseminates the views of known terrorists, employs program hosts that sympathize with internationally outlawed groups, and gives them an outlet to broadcast their messages to audiences throughout the Middle East. 40. For example, in January 2009, AI Jazeera conducted an interview with the then leader of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Nasir al-Wuhayshi. During the interview, al-Wuhayshi called for the destruction of “America and Europe” and their “Crusader interests.”24 Al Jazeera has also interviewed senior Al Qaida leader Abu Hafs al-Mauritani several times, including as recently as 2017. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani emphasized his “joy” in seeing the 9/11 attacks and Al Qaida’s readiness to fight US and NATO forces in Afghanistan in a “crusader war.”25 22 UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015, Article 7, http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws2015/FDL_2_2015_discriminat…. 23 Qatar Law No. 14 of 2014 – Promulgating the Cybercrime Prevention Law, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=100242. 24 See Abu Basir: We support Gaza by striking Wester Interests in the region, Al Jazeera (27 January 2009), http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2009/1/ .بالمنطقة-الغربية-المصالح-بضرب-غزة-ننصر-بصير-أبو/ 27
25 See Abu Hafs al-Mauritanian. The Attacks of September 11, Al Jazeera (20 October 2012), http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/today-interview/2012/10/ 1ج-سبتمبر- 11 -هجمات-الموريتاني-حفص-أبو/ 20 .
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12
41. In the end, however, the complaint raised by Qatar against the UAE in relation to these media
outlets do not implicate CERD in any way. Contrary to the assertions in paragraph 35 of Qatar’s
Submission, the CERD applies to individuals and not corporations. Corporations are not
beneficiaries of rights under the CERD. Moreover, banning these media outlets, which
propagate hate speech, is consistent with the CERD’s objectives and does not impermissibly
curtail freedom of expression.
42. Beyond all of the above, the UAE’s legitimate criticisms of and opposition to the Qatari
government’s policies of supporting terrorism – which are shared by a number of other
countries – do not constitute racial discrimination under the CERD.
C. Right to Health and Right to Medical Treatment
43. Qatar states that “Qataris requiring medical attention in UAE that is not available in Qatar have
been denied necessary care.”26 This is followed by the allegation that “the Qatar Ministry of
Health had received 130 reports of medical complications resulting from the Coercive
Measures.”27 Notably, Qatar neither provides specific details of any of these cases, nor
elaborates upon their current status.
44. The UAE is not denying Qatari nationals access to medical treatment. Qatari citizens in the
UAE enjoy the same healthcare rights as any other residents or visitors. In fact, over 800 Qatari
nationals are currently covered by the UAE Government health insurance provider, Daman
(Abu Dhabi).28 Neither those persons, nor any other Qataris in the UAE, are under any
restriction regarding the type of medical attention they may seek within the UAE. Any
allegation that the UAE is denying medical treatment to Qataris is false, as evidenced by the
official records submitted with this Response, which include registration and visitation records
for Qatari citizens to UAE health institutions.
45. Separately, it is unclear why Qatar considers the UAE a sole and essential provider of medical
care to Qatari citizens who are outside the UAE. This claim is disingenuous and its sole purpose
seems to be to manufacture a perceived breach of the Convention, based on the false claim
regarding the existence of a travel ban. In any event, as indicated in Section III above, there is
no ban preventing Qatari citizens from traveling to the UAE. Should Qatari citizens consider
it fit to seek healthcare in the UAE, they may apply for permission to travel and may make an
appointment with any doctor of their choosing, as is the case with any other person of any other
nationality.
46. The Committee should note that the OHCHR Report, upon which Qatar relies for evidence,
states that “[m]edical services in Qatar are known to be of high quality. Since September 2017,
26 Qatar’s Submission, para. 45.
27 Id. at para. 93.
28 See Health – Qataris with Daman Health Insurance (Attached as Annex 8) (pgs. 13-19 contain records of over 300 visits from
July 2017 onward by Qatari nationals to hospitals and clinics within the UAE).
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13 the Ministry of Health recorded 388,000 visits to public health services by patients, including by 260,000 patients from KSA, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt.”29 47. Also, in paragraph 46 of its Submission, Qatar alleges that “the restrictions on ports and shipping have affected Qatar’s access to medicines and medical supplies.”30 Aside from the fact that this allegation in no manner implicates rights under the CERD, the allegation is entirely lacking in credibility given that Qatar appears to have issued a directive to all pharmacies within its territory to remove all medicines and medical supplies imported from the UAE, as well as those from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt.31 D. Right to Education 48. Qatar’s Submission states that “[o]ver 4,000 Qatari students studied alongside peers at universities in the Four States… [u]niversities in the Four States, including [the] UAE, summarily withdrew Qatari students from courses and told them to return to Qatar.”32 Further, Qatar states that “the Ministry of Education of Qatar estimates that over 200 Qatari students have been unable to transfer in order to pursue their studies for a range of reasons.”33 Qatar does not specify whether any of those complaints relate to the UAE, and further does not provide any evidence regarding the current status of those complaints today. 49. The UAE has taken no steps to prevent Qatari students enrolled in UAE educational institutions from continuing their studies, or from obtaining access to records that they may need to continue their studies elsewhere, if they so choose. While it is possible that some Qatari students may have discontinued their studies at the start of the crisis, the UAE’s long-standing policy is that those students are welcome to resume their studies within the UAE, should they choose to return and provided that they meet other entry requirements applicable to foreign nationals generally. 50. Owing to the disinformation emanating from Qatar regarding this particular issue, the UAE has taken active steps to ensure that Qatari students know that they are welcome to continue their studies in the UAE. For example, the Office of the Undersecretary of Higher Education sent instructions on 8 March 2018 to Directors of Higher Education Institutions declaring: “[b]y following up the information of the university students, it was noted that a number of students from the State of Qatar dropped out [of] university studies in the United Arab Emirates for non-academic reasons. Kindly communicate 29 See OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017, para. 45 (Attached as Annex 7). 30 Qatar’s Submission, para. 46. 31 See Qatar Health Ministry Letter Re Medical Supplies Removal, 6 June 2018 (Attached as Annex 9). 32 Qatar’s Submission, para. 48. 33 Id. at para. 49. Annex 13
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with the dropped out students immediately and check the reasons, stressing that
studies are available to all students who meet the required conditions.”34
51. Official UAE records indicate that, as of 20 June 2018, there were 694 Qatari students enrolled
or re-enrolled in educational institutions in the UAE.35 Of these, 195 students were enrolled in
pre-university educational institutions for the 2017/2018 academic year.36
E. Right to Work
52. As part of its allegations that the UAE has violated Qatari citizens’ right to work, Qatar claims
that “Qatari business owners have been prevented from entering UAE in order to manage and
oversee their businesses, renew necessary business and worker licenses, or renew their
leases.”37 As indicated in the earlier sections of this Response, it is simply not true that Qataris
have been prevented from entering the UAE.
53. The number of Qatari-owned companies in the Emirate of Dubai alone has reached 618
companies, and the number of licenses issued to Qataris nationals has reached 870.38 From 5
June 2017 to 18 June 2018, there were 390 business license transactions in the Emirate of
Dubai, including new issuances of licenses and renewals.39 Qatari entities and companies
owned by Qataris in the UAE, such as the Qatar Insurance Company, Doha Bank and Gulf
Liquid Air Factory continue to hold their business licenses to operate and continue to operate
without restriction.40 These are all Qatari-owned and managed companies. It is implausible to
suggest that the UAE is preventing Qataris from managing and operating these companies,
given their continued operations more than one year after the start of the crisis.
54. Moreover, Qataris living in the UAE continue to be employed in the UAE in significant
numbers. UAE records show that Qataris not only continue to work in the private sector, but
that Qataris also continue to be employed in public service positions by the UAE
Government.41
F. Right to Property
55. Qatar’s Submission makes two main allegations with respect to the right to property. First, that
Qatari nationals are being barred from accessing, buying or selling property within the UAE
34 See Education - Undersecretary of Academic Affairs Email (Attached as Annex 10).
35 See Immigration - ID & Citizenship Authority Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Stats (Attached as Annex 2); Immigration -
Student Entry Records (Attached as Annex 11).
36 See Qatari Student Records (Attached as Annex 12).
37 Qatar’s Submission, para. 99.
38 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pg. 14 (Attached as Annex
4).
39Id.
40 See Commercial Licenses – Sample Materials (Attached as Annex 13).
41 See Business – UAE Embassy – Authentication Records, pg. 27 (Attached as Annex 14).
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15 (including through representatives appointed through a power of attorney).42 Second, that the UAE has “advanced or condoned measures against property held by Qataris, including freezing assets of Qatari nationals and limiting financial transfers to citizens or residents of Qatar.”43 56. As stated earlier in this Response, there is no prohibition on the entry of Qataris into the UAE. Thus, it is not true that Qatari nationals are being barred from accessing their property within the UAE. 57. Even if there were such a prohibition, Qatari nationals are able to, and have, executed valid powers of attorney that allow their property to be bought, sold and otherwise managed notwithstanding that such nationals may not themselves be present in the UAE.44 Such powers of attorney have been authenticated for use in the UAE on behalf of Qataris through the various UAE embassies worldwide. In addition, since the UAE no longer maintains an embassy in Qatar, Qatari nationals can instead submit their powers of attorney, or any other documents for authentication by the UAE, to the Kuwaiti Embassy in Qatar. The Kuwaiti Embassy then forwards them for authentication to the UAE Embassy in Kuwait. After authentication, the documents are sent back to the Kuwaiti Embassy in Qatar for collection by the Qatari applicant, who may then use them for any official purpose within the UAE.45 At least 36 powers of attorney were registered on behalf of Qatari nationals between 1 June 2017 and 30 May 2018 in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi alone.46 58. Regarding Qatar’s second allegation relating to the freezing of assets of Qatari nationals, the UAE Central Bank did not issue any circular or decision with regards to dealing with or closing Qatari banks, accounts associated with Qataris or banning dealing with Qatari currency.47 59. The UAE Central Bank did issue freezing orders in relation to persons and organizations designated as terrorists or terrorist financiers pursuant to Federal Law No. 7 of 2015 on Combatting Terrorism Crimes (“Terrorism Crimes Law”). The designation lists issued by the UAE pursuant to the Terrorism Crimes Law includes citizens of Qatar, as well as a number of other countries. In addition, many of the individuals and entities designated as terrorists by the UAE have also been similarly designated by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and others.48 60. Additionally, the UAE has instituted enhanced due diligence requirements in relation to transactions involving six banks that have facilitated financial transactions for persons designated under the Terrorism Crimes Law. Those six banks are Qatar Islamic Bank, Qatar 42 Qatar’s Submission, paras. 100-106. 43 Id. at para. 107. 44 See Business – UAE Embassy – Authentication Records, pgs. 19-25 (Attached as Annex 14); Power of Attorney (Attached as Annex 15); International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (Attached as Annex 16). 45 See Power of Attorney (Attached as Annex 15). 46 See International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (Attached as Annex 16). 47 See Banking - Central Bank Circulars and Remittances, pg. 2-3 (Attached as Annex 17). 48 Id. at pgs. 6-31. Annex 13
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16
International Islamic, Bank, Barwa Bank, Masraf Al Rayan, Qatar National Bank and Doha
Bank.
61. Notwithstanding the above, there have been very substantial transfers and remittances between
the UAE and Qatar covering billions of UAE dirhams since 5 June 2017.49 Bank transfers
between the Central Bank of the UAE and Qatar banks from June 2017 to April 2018 amounted
to 42,210,763,000 UAE dirhams (about USD 11,549,087,000) in inward and outward
remittances.50 Thus, Qatar’s assertion that its nationals’ assets have been frozen because of
their Qatari nationality, or that their ability to make financial transfers has been limited, is
simply untrue.
G. Right to Equal Treatment before Tribunals
62. Qatar alleges that Qataris have been denied equal treatment before tribunals as they have been
“unable to enter [the] UAE, hire an attorney, or otherwise exercise their rights.”51 As indicated
in Section IV.F of this Response, Qatari citizens are able to execute valid powers of attorney
for any legal purpose, including to appoint lawyers to represent them before the UAE courts.
Moreover, should they choose to do so, they may apply for travel permission to attend any
legal proceedings within the UAE in person.
63. There is clear evidence showing active court filings, and participation in proceedings in the
UAE legal system generally, by Qataris. For the period between 6 June 2017 and 20 June 2018,
there have been over 340 cases involving Qataris across the various Emirates.52 These include
first instance cases, appeal cases and cases in the courts of cassation. In addition, Qataris have
freely applied for and received notarized documents; in the Emirate of Dubai alone 280
notarized documents have been issued to Qataris since 6 June 2017.53 There is absolutely no
evidence to suggest that Qataris’ access to tribunals in the UAE has been hindered or that they
do not enjoy equal treatment before those tribunals.
QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY DIRECT
EVIDENCE
64. Qatar’s Submission relies largely on two categories of documents as evidence. The first
category of documents is the reporting done by its own human rights organization, the Qatari
Committee. The second category of documents is the reporting done by other international
human rights bodies, based on information provided to them by the Qatari Committee and by
the Qatari government. As alluded to earlier in this Response, there are various deficiencies in
the evidence that Qatar has provided. The present Section addresses more specifically the
49 Id. at pg. 4.
50 Id.
51 Qatar’s Submission, para. 109.
52 See International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (Attached as Annex 16); Judicial Records
(Attached as Annex 18).
53 Id.
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17 deficiencies and lack of reliability of the information provided by Qatar to support its allegations, especially that which is sourced from the Qatari Committee. A. The Qatari Committee Reports 65. Three distinct points should be noted in regards to the reliability of information sourced from the Qatari Committee. 66. First, the Qatari Committee is an entity formed, funded by and subject to the control of the Qatari government. It has quite obviously taken the side of its government in its political dispute with the UAE and the other States that have terminated relations with Qatar. This is evident in particular from the politicized language it uses in its reports, which toes the government line. It writes of the measures taken against Qatar as a “siege” and a “blockade,” mimicking the Qatari government’s mischaracterization of those measures.54 67. There in fact is no “blockade” of Qatar. According to Oxford Public International Law, a “blockade” is “a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft … from entering or exiting specified ports, airports, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation.” A blockade “should not be confused with embargoes.”55 Aircraft and vessels arrive to and depart from Qatar on a daily basis. The UAE has taken no measures that meet the legal definition of “blockade.” The measures taken by the UAE are limited to its own territory. The Qatari Committee’s deliberate and incorrect use of the term “blockade” in all its publications is a signal of its political bias and lack of independence. 68. In fact, Qatar has announced the launching of new shipping routes to Iraq,56 Oman57 and multiple destinations in China and the Mediterranean.58 Qatar is even constructing a new port (Hamad Port) spanning 26 square kilometers to increase international shipping.59 Hamad Port director Abdul Aziz Nasser al-Yafei “highlighted the port’s commitment to providing all necessary facilities to companies, adding that it was ready to receive all types of shipments from different parts of the world.”60 Qatar is also increasing and expanding flight routes to and from Qatar. In March 2018, Qatar Airways announced 16 new destinations in line with its 54 See National Human Rights Committee First Report, 13 June 2017 (Attached as Annex 19); National Human Rights Committee Second Report, 1 July 2017 (Attached as Annex 20). 55 See Oxford Public International Law, Definition of “Blockade”, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801992…. 56 Iran Plans Direct Shipping Route to Qatar, Financial Tribune (8 July 2017), https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/67886/ir…. 57 Qatar launches new shipping routes to Oman amid food shortage fears, Reuters (12 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-ports-idUSL8N1J9112. 58 Qatar Launches Shipping Routes to China, East Mediterranean to Bypass Blockade, Albawaba Business (18 September 2017), https://www.albawaba.com/business/qatar-launches-shipping-routes-china-…. 59 http://www.npp.com.qa/overview.html. 60 Qatar Launches Shipping Routes to China, East Mediterranean to Bypass Blockade, Albawaba Business (18 September 2017), https://www.albawaba.com/business/qatar-launches-shipping-routes-china-…. Annex 13
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“aggressive expansion plans for 2018.”61 Qatar Airways Chief Executive, Akbar Al Baker
stated “[d]uring the blockade Qatar Airways continued its expansion…and Qatar Airways will
keep on expanding and keep on raising the flag for my country all over the globe.”62 These are
not the actions of a country subject to a blockade.
69. Second, the listing in the Qatari Committee reports of the complaints by anonymous
individuals, which forms the foundation of each one of the Qatari Committee’s reports Qatar
has relied upon in its Submission, constitute mere assertions, which are unverified (and
unverifiable), and unsubstantiated by any primary documentary evidence. Indeed, even
assuming these represent actually initiated complaints, there is no way of knowing whether
any or all of the alleged complaints have been resolved.
70. For example, it is stated that the Qatari Committee has found that “at least 78 families have
been separated…”63 Yet only two anonymous cases are cited in the reports.64 Moreover, 85%
of the complaints referred by the Qatari Committee in relation to the UAE were lodged prior
to 30 August 2017, and more than half of those were reported prior to the end of June 2017,
mere weeks after the start of the crisis. Assuming for the sake of argument that these claims
were actually made (a fact the Committee can neither assume nor verify), such claims would
have obviously been made in the immediate, and undoubtedly confused, aftermath of the
termination of diplomatic relations and before use of the hotline had become routine.
71. Third, as inherently unreliable as the Qatar Committee’s reports appear to be, there is the highly
relevant fact that since September 2017, the number of complaints recorded by the Qatari
Committee itself has dramatically fallen. For example, since 1 September 2017, according to
the Qatari Committee, there have been no complaints recorded against the UAE about “work”
or “residency” matters, only two complaints about health care and only four complaints about
“family separation.”65 Since 6 December 2017, the number of complaints has fallen further;
not a single complaint was recorded as having been received by the Qatari Committee against
the UAE concerning “residency” matters, “work” matters or “health” care matters, and only
two complaints regarding “education” and “family separation” matters were said to have been
received.66
72. What the Qatari Committee’s own statistics indicate as to the incidence of complaints since 5
December 2017 is that they have dramatically dropped, and in some cases disappeared
61 Qatar Airways to add 16 destinations this year, The Peninsula (8 March 2018),
https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/08/03/2018/Qatar-Airways-to-a….
62 Id.
63 See National Human Rights Committee Third Report, pg. 5 (Attached as Annex 21).
64 Id. at pg. 6.
65 Compare tables in National Human Rights Committee Third Report, pg. 5 (Attached as Annex 21), National Human Rights
Committee Fourth Report, 5 December 2017, pg. 6 (Attached as Annex 22), and National Human Rights Committee Fifth
Report, June 2018, pg. 13 (Attached as Annex 23).
66 Id.
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19 altogether. For example, since 5 December 2017, the Qatari Committee has registered the following numbers of complaints supposedly involving the UAE: a) Under Article 5(d)(iv) of CERD, right to family life: two complaints;67 b) Under Article 5(e)(iv) of the CERD, right to medical care: no complaints;68 c) Under Article 5(e)(v) of the CERD, right to education: two complaints;69 d) Under Article 5(e)(i) of the CERD, right to work: no complaints; and 70 e) Under Article 5(a) of the CERD, right to equal treatment before tribunals: one complaint.71 The dearth of new complaints in the Qatari Committee’s own reporting demonstrates that Qatar’s allegations that the UAE has systematically targeted Qatari citizens for discrimination are untrue and without basis. B. Reports by Various Human Rights Bodies 73. In conjunction with the reports of the Qatari Committee, Qatar’s Submission relies on reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as referring to the OHCHR Report. All of these reports are based substantially on information provided by Qatar. While best international practice requires human rights organizations to contact States that are concerned with their reports for comments, the reports cited by Qatar do not include any comments or input from the UAE, and therefore disregard the facts contained in this Response. The Committee must take note of these issues when assessing the reliability and completeness of these reports. 74. It is also important for the Committee to bear in mind how the OHCHR Report – which was never intended to be published – became public. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights is aware, the Qatari Committee improperly leaked the OHCHR Report during a press conference held in Doha, Qatar, on 8 January 2018, notwithstanding that the OHCHR Report was intended to be used only for internal purposes. Instead, after having requested the OHCHR Report under the guise of technical assistance, Qatar presented it as the formal and conclusive findings of the OHCHR. 75. We remind the Committee of the following statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Representative of Qatar, made on 8 March 2018, during the 37th Session of the 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Id. 71 Id. Annex 13
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Human Rights Council, in which he expressed his disapproval of Qatar’s leak of the OHCHR
Report:
“There was another question from the State of Qatar concerning the
coercive measures taken against Qatar and its effects and its demand
for providing reparations.
I have publicly spoken on this issue and a technical mission was
undertaken at the request of Qatar and an internal report was prepared,
drafted and released to the authorities of Qatar. It was not meant to be
public but it became public.”72
This statement was repeated by the High Commissioner in a letter to the UAE dated 29 June
2018. The High Commissioner re-affirmed that the OHCHR Report was not meant to be
public.73 He further stated that “the OHCHR Mission to Qatar (17-24 November 2017) was
technical in nature and did not aim at qualifying the Gulf crisis nor determining states’
responsibilities/liabilities.”
76. This would not be the first time that Qatar has misrepresented the OHCHR’s position. We
remind the Committee that in June 2017 the OHCHR took the extraordinary step of publicly
rebuking Qatar for distorting remarks made by the High Commissioner. Qatar deliberately
misrepresented the comments made by the High Commissioner regarding the current crisis,
prompting the UN Human Rights Office to issue a statement that said, in part, “[t]he UN
Human Rights Office does not normally comment on bilateral meetings with States, except on
the rare occasions where it believes the State concerned has publicly misrepresented the
content of the meeting.”74
77. Qatar similarly misrepresented other UN reports during the ICJ provisional measures hearings
that took place in June 2018. In its pleadings before the ICJ, Qatar quoted sections of the Joint
Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to
the United Arab Emirates, AU ARE 5/2017 (18 August 2017) as definitive findings of fact,
while neglecting to acknowledge with clarity to the ICJ that the portions it included in its
pleadings begin with the following language “While we do not wish to prejudge the accuracy
of these allegations ….”75
78. The Amnesty International report, upon which Qatar relies heavily, was released on 19 June
2017, a mere two weeks after the break in relations between the UAE and Qatar and one week
72 See Letter from the UAE to the OHCHR, 16 May 2018, pg. 3 (Attached as Annex 24).
73 See Letter from the OHCHR Regarding UAE letter of 16 May 2018, 29 June 2018 (Attached as Annex 25).
74 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/06/30/UNHCR-issues-corre…-.
html.
75 See CR 2018/12, pg. 55, paras. 15-16 (Goldsmith), the pleadings of Qatar before the International Court of Justice in the case
concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), 27 June 2018, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180627-ORA-01-00-B….
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21 after the procedures for use of the telephone hotline were announced.76 Other than the limited information that was available to the Amnesty International, this brief report was obviously issued in the immediate, and undoubtedly confused, aftermath of the termination of diplomatic relations and before use of the hotline had become routine. Moreover, the report clearly cannot be relied upon as evidence of the circumstances of Qatari citizens in the UAE following that date, which as the evidence provided by the UAE has demonstrated, is much the same as it was before 5 June 2017. Finally, the report obviously does not address the question whether any of the difficulties noted have since been resolved. 79. Similarly, the Human Rights Watch report was released on 12 July 2017, a little over a month after the break in relations between the UAE and Qatar.77 These brief statements – again, made over a year ago – cannot possibly be regarded as evidence of the circumstances prevailing in the UAE for Qatari citizens, particularly in light of the evidence showing that Qatari citizens are living their lives in the UAE today much the same as they were before. Moreover, it is notable that the Human Rights Watch report makes no specific allegations in respect of the UAE’s treatment of Qatari citizens within the UAE other than noting several cases of students who said they had to interrupt their education and return to Qatar.78 The evidence provided by the UAE together with this Response, showing that all UAE educational institutions were instructed to establish contact with any Qatari students who had interrupted their studies to advise them that they were welcome to return, and that almost 700 Qatari students are currently enrolled in in the UAE, indicates that the reported difficulties of the students did not concern the UAE or in any case have since been adequately resolved. 80. All of these reports relied considerably upon Qatari sources including the Qatari Committee and other Qatari government entities. Because of this reliance, these reports likewise only list broad general statistics with very little supporting detail regarding specific alleged violations.79 As examples, the OHCHR Report states that 130 individuals (from all Four States, not specifically from the UAE) reported medical issues.80 But only three anonymous examples are given, all related to KSA and not the UAE.81 In a similar fashion, it is stated that 157 students from the UAE have been affected; but no individual examples are given.82 Regarding the right to equal treatment before tribunals, the OHCHR Report simply states “legal cooperation has been suspended, including power of attorney.”83 Again no examples are given and the 76 Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes, Amnesty International (19 June 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human…. 77 Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses, Human Rights Watch (12 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abus…. 78 Id. at pgs. 3, 7 and 8. 79 See OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017 (Attached as Annex 7). 80 Id. at para. 43. 81 Id. at para. 44. 82 Id. at para. 52. 83 Id. at para. 40. Annex 13
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statement that no powers of attorney have been issued is demonstrably false, as shown in the
official records enclosed with this Response.
STATEMENT OF LAW
A. Substantive and Procedural Defects in Qatar’s Submission
81. Qatar’s complaint is defective because it does not conform to the terms of CERD Article 11,
which states:
Article 11
1. If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to
the provisions of this Convention, it may bring the matter to the attention
of the Committee. The Committee shall then transmit the communication
to the State Party concerned. Within three months, the receiving State shall
submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the
matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.
2. If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties, either by
bilateral negotiations or by any other procedure open to them, within six
months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication,
either State shall have the right to refer the matter again to the Committee
by notifying the Committee and also the other State.
3. The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available domestic
remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with
the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be
the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.
4. In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States
Parties concerned to supply any other relevant information.
5. When any matter arising out of this article is being considered by the
Committee, the States Parties concerned shall be entitled to send a
representative to take part in the proceedings of the Committee, without
voting rights, while the matter is under consideration.
82. Qatar’s complaint fails to meet key requirements of Article 11 for several reasons.
83. First, Qatar has not demonstrated that the UAE is “not giving effect to the provisions” of the
Convention pursuant to Article 11(1). As this Response shows, there has been no mass
expulsion of Qatari citizens from the UAE. Qatari citizens are able to enter and reside in the
UAE upon prior application and they enjoy the same rights within the UAE as other foreign
nationals. Qatar’s complaint simply ignores the fact that the UAE did not take any steps to
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23 deport Qatari citizens and that the Ministry of Interior, which is the UAE government entity charged with the regulating and altering the residence status of non-citizens, did issue an order deporting Qatari citizens. Above, the Committee will find detailed information showing that the vast majority of Qatari citizens remained in the UAE after 5 June 2017. Qatar’s complaint also conveniently ignores that the Qatari government itself issued orders for its citizens to leave the UAE. 84. Second, whatever the significance the Committee might ascribe to the portion of the 5 June 2017 announcement calling upon Qatari citizens to depart from UAE territory, the UAE subsequently made clear that there is no deportation order in effect and that Qatari citizens may remain within the UAE. As mentioned above, on 5 July 2018, MoFA announced that Qatari citizens in the UAE could remain and affirmed procedures – which have existed since the start of the crisis – allowing Qatari citizens outside the UAE to enter the country. Thus, there is no current or ongoing basis for Qatar to allege that the UAE “is not giving effect to the provisions of” the Convention as required by CERD Article 11(1). It is important to note in this regard that Article 11(1) uses the word “is,” evidencing an intention for the Committee to consider only matters involving present conflicts with CERD. It does not appear to contemplate that the Committee would examine measures that are no longer in effect, or were never in effect. This interpretation is confirmed by Articles 11(2) and 11(3), which call for the Committee to take up a complaint only if the parties cannot resolve the matter within six months and the Committee is convinced that available domestic remedies have been exhausted. To the extent that any of these conditions has not been met, a matter is not properly before the Committee. 85. Finally, the UAE would like to draw the Committee’s attention to Article 11(3) of the CERD, which provides that the Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with Article 11(2) after it has ascertained that “all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted.” Two issues should be noted with respect to this requirement. First, Qatar has failed to provide any evidence to show that domestic remedies have been invoked or exhausted. Second, as this Response demonstrates, it should be clear that if any individual Qatari considers himself or herself entitled to redress for any loss of rights, whether related to the CERD or otherwise, such redress is readily available through UAE institutions. Qatari nationals who seek entry to the UAE are able to apply for entry through the hotline. Persons whose property and other rights are improperly prejudiced, no matter the cause, may seek redress through the UAE judicial system, in which there is presently active participation by Qatari nationals. B. There is no Violation of the Convention 86. Qatar claims that the UAE has unlawfully targeted Qatari citizens on the basis of their nationality.84 Qatar raises claims under Articles 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the CERD, in addition to which it alleges that the UAE is in breach of the “moral principles underlying the CERD and the customary law principle of non-discrimination on arbitrary grounds.”85 Qatar asserts that the 84 Qatar’s Submission, para. 58. 85 Id. At para. 57. Annex 13
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UAE has not only “failed to enact measures to prevent, prohibit, and criminalize racial
discrimination,” but has also “engaged in racial discrimination and criminalized actions
intended to benefit Qataris.”86
87. Given the pending proceedings before the ICJ, the UAE does not consider it appropriate to put
forward detailed legal arguments in this Response. Instead, in this Section the UAE briefly
outlines two main arguments to show that the facts alleged in Qatar’s Submission –even if
assumed to be true, which they are not – do not amount to violations of the CERD.
88. First, the CERD contains no express reference to nationality as a ground of discrimination.
Qatar’s entire Submission, and allegations that the UAE has violated the CERD, is predicated
on the interpretation of the term “national…origin” in the definition of racial discrimination as
encompassing present nationality.87 The CERD contains no express reference to nationality as
a prohibited ground of discrimination but instead, based on the plain reading of Article 1 and
in conjunction with the drafting history, the CERD allows for special measures based on an
individual’s present nationality.
89. Differentiation based on nationality is common in the international practice of States and is not
uncommon in international law. Countries routinely apply different entry and residence rules
to nationals of different States, and periodically review and revise those rules. This
“discrimination” based on nationality is further supported in General Recommendation XXX
in which the Committee explicitly recognized that “Article 1, paragraph 2, provides for the
possibility of differentiating between citizens and non-citizens.”88 As the UAE’s measures are
based on present Qatari nationality, and as the measures relate at their core to entry and
residence restrictions, there is no violation of the CERD as there is no racial discrimination as
defined in Article 1.89
90. Second, the rights contained in the CERD do not create a general right of entry to a country,
which is suggested and relied upon throughout Qatar’s Submission. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that difference in treatment based on present nationality amounts to a
violation of the CERD (as Qatar claims in its Submission), the rights asserted by Qatar are
over-broad and in fact are not contained within the CERD. Qatar takes the rights enumerated
in the CERD and treats each provision (e.g. right to health, right to education etc.) as
encompassing an absolute right for an individual to enter a State for that purpose. The
provisions of the CERD are intended to outlaw racial discrimination and ensure equal treatment
in the various areas enumerated. These rights do not encompass an absolute ability for an
individual to receive the treatment listed (e.g. right to health, right to education etc.) or the
right of an individual to enter a State in order to do so. As such, Qatar’s Submission attempts
86 Id. at para. 57.
87 Id. at paras. 59 and 64-65.
88 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX (2004), para. 1 (Attached as Annex 26).
89 See CR 2018/13, pgs. 38-48, paras. 17-60 (Olleson), the pleadings of the UAE before the International Court of Justice in the
case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), 28 June 2018 https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180628-ORA-01-00-B….
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25 to create rights not contained within the CERD. As such, the UAE cannot violate these rights asserted by Qatar and furthermore, has not violated the CERD rights of Qatari individuals.90 Any conclusion to the contrary would be contrary to established State practice, which gives countries the ability to regulate the entry and residence conditions within its territory applicable to foreign nationals. ICJ PROCEEDINGS 91. Finally, the UAE recalls that Qatar has instituted proceedings against the UAE in the ICJ under Article 22 of the CERD. Specifically, on 11 June 2018, Qatar filed an Application Instituting Proceedings as well as a Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection under the CERD. The ICJ issued its order in respect of the provisional measures requested by Qatar on 23 July 2018. The ICJ refused to grant any measures in the form sought by Qatar, and instead indicated limited measures in three areas (family re-unification, education and access to justice), in which UAE policy already reflects and complies with the order of the Court. Moreover, the Court indicated a general measure urging both parties not to take any steps that could aggravate the dispute. 92. The ICJ’s provisional measures order reflects the UAE’s long-standing policy and practice with respect to the UAE residence and entry rights applicable to Qatari citizens, as well as the availability to Qatari citizens of access to UAE courts and tribunals. The UAE is confident that its practice in these areas fully conforms to both the ICJ’s order and to its obligations under the CERD, and that upon a close examination of the facts the Court will reach the same conclusion. 93. Notwithstanding the above, the UAE intends to lodge objections under which it will challenge the ICJ’s jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits. The UAE has significant jurisdictional objections in respect of Qatar’s claims in the ICJ proceedings, based on, inter alia, the pre-conditions to jurisdiction of the Court set out in Article 22 of the CERD. In particular, the UAE maintains that, having submitted an Article 11 complaint to the Committee, Qatar should not be permitted to simultaneously initiate proceedings in relation to the same issues in the ICJ. Having made the choice to submit an Article 11 complaint, Qatar must wait for that process to be completed prior to commencing proceedings in the ICJ, as is required by the plain text of Article 22 of the Convention. At this stage of the ICJ proceedings, the UAE has not yet had the opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the ICJ to hear Qatar’s complaint. CONCLUSION 94. The UAE urges the Committee to reject the complaints made by Qatar. The UAE believes that upon an examination of the evidence enclosed with this Response, the Committee will find that the UAE is not in violation of any aspect of the CERD. There are no measures instituted by the UAE limiting the rights of Qatari citizens; the restriction on entry into UAE territory is 90 Id. at pgs. 51-53, paras. 77-91. Annex 13
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applied to individuals of numerous nationalities and does not constitute any infringement of
rights of Qataris. Official UAE data shows that applications are accepted in the vast majority
of cases. Today, substantially the same number of Qataris live in the UAE as prior to the start
of the crisis on 5 June 2017. The entry and residence rights applicable to Qatari citizens, and
the rights that they may exercise within the UAE more generally, are consistent with those
available to foreign nationals of many other countries in the UAE.
95. The UAE reserves its right to supplement and amend this Response.
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TransPerfect Translations Ltd, 33 Aldgate High Street, Aldgate House, 1st Floor, London EC3N 1AH, a professional translation agency and international communications firm, is competent to translate from Arabic into English. We hereby certify that the translation attached hereto is, to the best of our professional knowledge and belief, a faithful rendering of the original document. Signed: Name: Gleb Kornevs Title: Project Manager Date: 12 July 2018
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International Cooperation Department Date: 11/10/1439AH Execution Level: Ordinary, ordinary Corresponding to: 25/06/2018AD Reference: ADJD-ADMB/OUT/ICS/2018/124262 Honourable Judge/ Abdel Rahman Murad Al-Beloushi The Esteemed Director of the International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings,,, Subject: Regarding the Request for Information on the Qatari Lawsuits Being Heard before the Court Reference to your letter, Ref. # (TDT/3/2/8/11013) dated 20 June 2018, regarding the abovementioned subject, attached please find the following information: - Statistics of the power of attorneys concluded in the period from 01 June 2017 to 30 May 2018AD for Qatari Citizenship. - Qatari First Instance lawsuits as listed on the Lawsuits Department System from 01 April 2017 to 20 June 2018AD. - Qatari Appeal lawsuits as listed on the Lawsuits Department System from 01 April 2017 to 20 June 2018AD. - Execution files as listed on the Lawsuits Department System from 01 April 2017 to 20 June 2018AD. - Appeals files as listed on the Lawsuits Department System from 01 April 2017 to 20 June 2018AD. - Total lawsuits. Kindly accept the utmost respect and regards,,, Nadia Abdullah Al-Alei Director of the International Cooperation Department [signature]
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Statistics Regarding the Powers of Attorneys Concluded in the Period from 01/06/2017 to 30/05/2018 With Respect (to Qatari Citizenship) at all Notary Public Branches – Emirate of Abu Dhabi Qatar Branch Period Bauwabet El-Sharq Mall Economic Development Department Chamber of Commerce and Industry Jazeerah Branch Abu Dhabi Court Al-Rahba Court Ruwais Court Bani Yas Court Tam-Ghayathi Centre Legal Services Unit Grand Total Jun-17 2 1 3 Jul-17 1 1 2 Aug-17 2 2 Sep-17 1 1 2 Oct-17 2 2 Nov-17 1 1 3 5 Dec-17 1 1 Jan-18 1 1 1 1 4 Feb-18 1 1 Mar-18 2 2 2 1 7 Apr-18 1 3 1 5 May-18 1 1 2 Grand Total 1 3 3 1 14 2 1 6 1 4 36
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Qatari First Instance Lawsuits as Listed on the Lawsuit Department System from 01 April 2017 to 20 June 2018 Case No.CourtType of LawsuitClaimant NationalityDefendant NationalityDate of ListingSubject of LawsuitStageGrievance-355-2017-A-Persons-MR-B-AN-2017-38Al AinGrievanceQatariEmirati02-04-2017GrievanceFinal rulingP-Person-MR-B-AD-2017-890Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari02-04-2017Cancellation of travel banDecision madeP-Person-MR-B-AD-2017-927Abu DhabiPetitionMoroccanQatari05-04-2017Travel banOngoingPersonS-MR-B-AN-2017-465Al AinPersonal StatusQatariEmirati11-04-2017Contact between father and childrenFinal rulingCP-MT-B-AB-2017-882Abu DhabiCommercial PartialEmiratiQatari19-04-2017Financial claimFinal rulingEstate-MR-B-AD-2017-479Abu DhabiEstateQatariEmirati19-04-2017Request for waiver permit in the estateDismissedOverlook-843-2015-Person S-MR-B-AD-2017-8Abu DhabiOverlooking requestsQatariEmirati19-04-2017Overlooking expenditureDismissedCP-MT-B-AD-2017-914Abu DhabiCommercial PartialEmiratiQatari24-04-2017Financial claimOngoingPerson S-MR-B-AD-2017-731Abu DhabiPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari30-04-2017Divorce for damageOngoingPerson S-MR-B-AN-2017-563Al AinPersonal StatusQatariEmirati04-05-2017Interdiction and GuardianshipFinal rulingCP-MT-B-AD-2017-1247Abu DhabiCommercial PlenaryEmiratiQatari15-05-2017Appointment of expertFinal rulingPerson S-MR-B-AD-2017-880Abu DhabiPersonal StatusOmaniQatari24-05-2017Divorce for damageFinal rulingP Person-880-2017-Person S-MR-BAD-2017-1370Abu DhabiPetitionOmaniQatari25-05-2017Extraction of evidenceDecision madeP Person-880-2017-Person S-MR-BAD-2017-1385Abu DhabiPetitionOmaniQatari25-05-2017Extraction of evidenceDecision madeG-P-MR-LB-AD-2017-291Abu DhabiLease PetitionQatariEmirati25-05-2017Reconnection of electric currentDecision madePPerson-MR-B-AN-2017-632Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati05-06-2017Travel permit for applicantDecision madePerson S-MR-B-AD-2017-955Abu DhabiPersonal StatusQataríEmirati07-06-2017Proof of marriageFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AD-2017-1478Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatarí07-06-2017Travel banDecision madePerson S-MR-B-AN-2017-757Al AinPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari22-06-2017Drop custodyDismissedP Person-MR-B-AD-2017-1757Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatarí06-07-2017Travel banDecision madeCP-MR-B-AD-2017-570Abu DhabiCivil PartialEmiratiQatari09-07-2017Division and appropriationOngoingPPerson-MR-B-AD-2017-1797Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati10-07-2017Delivery of passportsDecision madeLease-MR-LB-AN-2017-664Al AinLeaseEmiratiQatari11-07-2017EvictionFinal rulingPerson S-MR-B-AN-2017-880Al AinPersonal StatusQatariEmirati30-07-2017Submission of children passportsFinal rulingEstate-MR-B-AD-2017-753Abu DhabiEstateEmiratiQatari30-07-2017Devolution of estateFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AD-2017-2051Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari02-08-2017Trust card renewalDecision madeCP-MR-B-AN-2017-368Al AinCommercial PlenaryQatariEmirati10-08-2017Lawsuit to appoint expertFinal rulingPerson S-BS-B-AD-2017-161Abu DhabiPersonal StatusYemeniQatari13-08-2017Divorce for damageFinal rulingExpedited-MR-B-AD-2017-186Abu DhabiExpeditedEmiratiQatarí13-08-2017Appointment of expert and establish a caseDismissedP Person-MR-B-AN-2017-1037Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati22-08-2017Travel permitDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2017-2352Abu DhabiPetitionQataríEmirati28-08-2017Temporary alimonyDecision madePPerson-MR-B-AD-2017-2435Abu DhabiPetitionQataríEmirati05-09-2017Alimony and access to houseDecision madeP Person-93-2017-Person S-MR-B-AD-2017-2450Abu DhabiPetitionMoroccanQatari06-09-2017Education feesDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2017-2460Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari07-09-2017Travel banOngoingGrievance-2460-2017-P Person-MR-B-AD-2017-451Abu DhabiGrievanceEmiratiQatari10-09-2017Grievance of order on petitionDismissed
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P Person-MR-B-AD-2017-2482Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari10-09-2017Establish a case children entryDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2017-2485Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati10-09-2017Entry to residenceOngoingP Person-93-2017-Person S-MR-B-AD-2017-2543Abu DhabiPetitionMoroccanQatari13-09-2017Education feesDecision madeA.Petition-MR-B-AN-2017-2092Al AinPetitionIraqiQatari13-09-2017Cancellation of order on petitionOngoingEstate-MR-B-AD-2017-886Abu DhabiEstateQataríEmirati19-09-2017Addition of an element in estateFinal rulingA.Petition-MR-B-AD-2017-6352Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari19-09-2017AddressingDecision madePPerson-MR-B-AD-2017-2638Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari19-09-2017SchoolDecision madeA.Petition-MR-B-AN-2017-2182Al AinPetitionEmiratiQatarí24-09-2017Addressing the Traffic DepartmentOngoingCP-MT-B-AD-2017-52Abu DhabiCommercial PlenaryQatariEmirati10-10-2017Appoint banking expertOngoingP Person-MR-B-AN-2017-1304Al AinPetitionEmiratiQatarí12-10-2017Travel banDecision madeEstate-SA-B-DF-2017-23DhufraEstateQatariEmirati23-10-2017Waiver in estateFinal rulingEstate-MR-B-AD-2017-1000Abu DhabiEstateQataríEmirati31-10-2017Request to establish waiver in estateFinal rulingP Person--MR-B-AN-2017-1408Al AinPetitionEmiratiQatari02-11-2017Handover of childrenDecision madePerson S-MR-B-AD-2017-1708Abu DhabiPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari05-11-2017Divorce + establish custodyFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AD-2017-3175Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari05-11-2017Travel banDecision madePerson S-BS-B-AD-2017-241Abu DhabiPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari09-11-2017Divorce for abandonmentFinal rulingPersonS-MR-B-AN-2017-1295Al AinPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari15-11-2017Dropping custodyFinal rulingEstate-MR-B-AD-2017-1054Abu DhabiEstateEmiratiQatari16-11-2017Adding elementFinal rulingCP-MR-B-AD-2017-380Abu DhabiCivil PlenaryQatariEmirati19-11-2017Appointment of expertOngoingEstate-MR-B-AD-2017-1063Abu DhabiEstateEmiratiQatari20-11-2017Request to eliminate heirs from propertyReferredPerson S-MR-B-AD-2017-1812Abu DhabiPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari22-11-2017CustodyOngoingP Person-1708-2017-Person S-MR-B-AD-2017-3470Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari04-12-2017Not take children from schoolDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AN-2017-1562Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati10-12-2017True copiesDecision madeCP-MT-B-AD-2017-2949Abu DhabiCommercial PlenaryQatariEmirati13-12-2017Financial claimOngoingP Person-MR-B-AN-2017-1648Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati27-12-2017Travel permitDecision madeLease-MR-LB-AD-2018-136Abu DhabiLeaseEmiratiQatari08-01-2018Eviction and payment of lease valueFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-81Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari09-01-2018AddressingDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-93Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari09-01-2018Suspension of temporary alimonyDecision madeEstate-MR-B-AF-2018-4DhufraEstateQatariEmirati14-01-2018Waiver in estateFinal rulingEstate-MR-B-AD-2018-68Abu DhabiEstateQatariEmirati17-01-2018Request permission to sellFinal rulingPerson S-BS-B-AD-2018-13Abu DhabiPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari22-01-2018Establish divorceFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AN-2018-107Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati25-01-2018Addressing Al Ain MunicipalityDecision madeLease-MR-LB-AN-2018-188Al AinLeaseEmiratiQatari05-02-2018Eviction requestFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-454Abu DhabiPetitionMoroccanQatari14-02-2018Copy of passportDecision madeCP-MR-B-AN-2018-243Al AinCivil PartialEmiratiQatari19-02-2018Permit to sell landOngoingCP-MR-B-AD-2018-165Abu DhabiCivil PartialBangladeshiQatari22-02-2018Financial claimFinal rulingPerson S-MR-B-AD-2018-299Abu DhabiPersonal StatusQatariEmirati22-02-2018Divorce and alimonyFinal rulingPPerson-299-2018-Person S-MR-B-AD-2018-541Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati22-02-2018Enable access to houseDecision madeP Person-299-2018-Person S-MR-B-AD-2018-564Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati26-02-2018Temporary alimonyDecision made
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P Person-MR-B-AD-2018-583Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati27-02-2018Renewal of health cardsDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-597Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati28-02-2018Addressing Passport Dept.Decision madePPerson-MR-B-AD-2018-622Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati01-03-2018Receipt of ID cardsDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-621Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati01-03-2018Transfer of servant alimony on sonDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-659Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari05-03-2018Handover of childrenOngoingP Person-299-2018-Person S-MR-B-AD-2018-655Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati05-03-2018Handover of house keysDecision madeA.Petition-MR-B-AD-2018-1665Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari07-03-2018Renewal of work cardsDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-703Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati08-03-2018Handover of childrenDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-767Abu DhabiPetitionOmaniQatari14-03-2018ID renewalDecision madeA.Petition-MR-B-AD-2018-1889Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari15-03-2018Lifting precautionary seizeDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AN-2018-368Al AinPetitionEmiratiQatari20-03-2018AddressingDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-844Abu DhabiPetitionOmaniQatari21-03-2018ID renewalDecision madePersonal S-MR-B-AD-2018-495Abu DhabiPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari26-03-2018Spouse obedience Final rulingCP-MR-B-AD-2018-276Abu DhabiCivil PartialEmiratiQatari27-03-2018Request to eliminate heirsDismissedCP-MR-B-AN-2018-487Al AinCivil PartialEgyptianQatari10-04-2018Financial claimReferredP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-1104Abu DhabiPetitionEmiratiQatari12-04-2018Transfer of car ownershipDecision madeEstate-MR-B-AD-2018-373Abu DhabiEstateQatariEmirati12-04-2018Establish Withdrawal Final rulingP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-1123Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati15-04-2018Empower to receive childrenDecision madeLease-MR-LB-AN-2018-408Al AinLeaseEmiratiQatari16-04-2018Eviction for default on paymentFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-1163Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati18-04-2018Handover of children passportsDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AN-2018-517Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati19-04-2018Travel permitDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-1189Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati22-04-2018Children meeting and pick upDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AD-2018-1181Abu DhabiPetitionQatariEmirati22-04-2018Receipt of childrenOngoingPerson S-MR-B-AD-2018-652Abu DhabiPersonal StatusQatariEmirati22-04-2018Receipt of childrenOngoingPerson S-MR-B-AD-2018-680Abu DhabiPersonal StatusQatariEmirati24-04-2018Spouse obedienceFinal rulingPerson S-MR-B-AD-2018-679Abu DhabiPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari24-04-2018Divorce and alimonyDismissedGrievance-1163-2018-Personal S-MR-B-AD-2018-267Abu DhabiGrievanceQatariEmirati26-04-2018GrievanceDismissedCP-MR-B-AN-2018-691Al AinCommercial PartialEgyptianQatari06-05-2018Financial claimFinal rulingP Person-MR-B-AN-2018-659Al AinPetitionEmiratiQatari15-05-2018Cancel travel banDecision madeP Person-MR-B-AN-2018-717Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati28-05-2018Addressing Al Ain MunicipalityDecision madePerson S-MR-B-AN-2018-673Al AinPersonal StatusQatariEmirati28-05-2018Restraining orderOngoingLease-MR-LB-AD-2018-2265Abu DhabiLeaseEmiratiQatari06-06-2018EvictionOngoingP Person-MR-B-AN-2018-792Al AinPetitionQatariEmirati10-06-2018Receipt of childrenDecision made
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Qatari Appeal Lawsuits as Listed on the Lawsuit Department System from 01 April 2017 to 20 June 2018 Case No.CourtType of LawsuitClaimantClaimant NationalityDefendantDefendant NationalityDate of ListingSubject of LawsuitStagePersonal-MR-S-AN-2017-222Al AinPersonal Status AppealEmiratiQatari10-04-2017Appeal executionFinalrulingPersonal-MR-S-AN-2017-323Al AinPersonal Status AppealQatariEmirati28-05-2017Appeal executionFinal rulingPersonal-MR-S-AN-2017-372Al AinPersonal Status AppealQatariEmirati22-06-2017Annul appealed rulingFinal rulingPersonal-MR-S-AD-2017-929Abu DhabiPersonal Status AppealEmiratiQatari04-07-2017Annul appealed rulingFinal rulingCommercial-MT-S-AD-2017-1421Abu DhabiCommercial AppealEmiratiQatari16-07-2017Annual appealed rulingOngoingPersonal-MR-S-AN-2017-480Al AinPersonal Status AppealQatariEmirati27-09-2017Disengage from guardianshipAnnexedPersonal-MR-S-AD-2017-1232Abu DhabiPersonal Status AppealOmaniQatari23-10-2017Annul appealed rulingFinal rulingCommercial-MT-S-AD-2017-1949Abu DhabiCommercial AppealEmiratiQatari26-10-2017Annul appealed rulingFinal rulingPersonal-MR-S-AD-2017-1328Abu DhabiPersonal Status AppealMoroccanQatari15-11-2017Amend rulingFinal rulingCommercial-MT-S-AD-2017-2120Abu DhabiCommercial AppealEmiratiQatari21-11-2017Annul appealed rulingFinal rulingCommercial-MT-S-AD-2017-2246Abu DhabiCommercial AppealQatariJordanian28-11-2017Annul ruling Final rulingPersonal-MR-S-AD-2017-1445Abu DhabiPersonal Status AppealQatariMoroccan10-12-2017Annul appealed rulingAnnexedCommercial-MT-S-AD-2017-2394Abu DhabiCommercial AppealQatariEmirati17-12-2017Annul rulingFinal rulingPersonal-MR-S-AD-2018-49Abu DhabiPersonal Status AppealEmiratiQatari17-01-2018Amend rulingFinal rulingPersonal-MR-S-AD-2018-166Abu DhabiPersonal Status AppealEmiratiQatari13-02-2018Annul rulingFinal rulingCommericial-MT-S-AD-2018-479Abu DhabiCommercial AppealQatariEmirati21-02-2018Annul appealed rulingFinal rulingCommercial-MT-S-AD-2018-599Abu DhabiCommercial AppealEmiratiQatari27-02-2018Annul appealed rulingOngoingcommercial-MR-S-AN-2018-511Al AinCommercial AppealEgyptianQatari06-06-2018Annul appealed rulingOngoing
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Qatari Execution Files as Listed on the Lawsuit Department System from 1 April 2017 to 20 June 2018 Lawsuit No.CourtOfficeClaimant NationalityDefendant NationalityEntry DateGeneral E-MR-T-AD-2017-256Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeQatariEmirati06 April 2017Input E-MR-T-AD-2017-501Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeEmiratiQatari09 April 2017Output E-MR-T-AD-2017-316Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeEmiratiQatari09 April 2017General E-MR-T-AD-2017-296Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeEmiratiQatari24 April 2017General E-MR-T-AD-2017-313Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeQatariIndian02 May 2017Output E-MR-T-AD-2017-424Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeBritishQatari11 May 2017PSE-MR-T-AD-2017-1159Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeQatariEmirati29 August 2017PSE-MR-T-AD-2017-1201Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeEmiratiQatari07 September 2017Lease E-MR-T-AN-2017-567AlAinLease OfficeEmiratiQatari07 November 2017CE-MR-T-AD-2017-2442Abu DhabiCommercial OfficeQatariEmirati23 November 2017Output E-MR-T-AD-2017-1081Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeEmiratiQatari10 December 2017PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-358Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeQatariEmirati27 February 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-388Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeEmiratiQatari05 March 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-403Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeEmiratiQatari06 March 2018Input E-MR-T-AD-2018-317Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeEmiratiQatari06 March 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-399Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeQatariEmirati06 March 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-400Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeQatariEmirati06 March 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-424Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeQatariEmirati12 March 2018CE-MR-T-AD-2018-1101Abu DhabiCommercial OfficeEmiratiQatari13 March 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-671Abu DhabiPersonal Status Office EmiratiQatari18 April 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-673Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeMoroccanQatari18 April 2018CE-MR-T-AD-2018-1287Abu DhabiCommercial OfficeEmiratiQatari23 April 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-709Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeEmiratiQatari23 April 2018PSE-MR-T-AD-2018-726Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeQatariEmirati25 April 2018Input E-MR-T-AD-2018-488Abu DhabiPersonal Status OfficeQatariEmirati25 April 2018Output E-MR-T-AD-2018-565Abu DhabiGeneral Execution OfficeQatariQatari07 June 2018Problem-256-2017-General E-MR-T-AD-2017-40Abu DhabiExecution LawsuitsQatariEmirati25 September 2017
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Qatari Appeal Files as Listed on the Lawsuit Department System from 01 April 2017 to 20 June 2018 Lawsuit No.CourtType of LawsuitClaimant NationalityDefendant NationalityDate of ListingPhaseCommercial-MR-Q-AD-2017-383AppealCommercialEgyptianQatari12-04-2017ClosedCivil-MR-Q-AD-2017-151AppealCivilQatariEmirati31-05-2017OngoingPersonal-MR-Q-AD-2017-340AppealPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari12-07-2017OngoingCommercial-MR-Q-AD-2017-979AppealCommercial EmiratiQatari12-12-2017ClosedPersonal-MR-Q-AD-2017-515AppealPersonal StatusEmiratiQatari20-12-2017OngoingPersonal-MR-Q-AD-2018-165AppealPersonal StatusMoroccanQatari18-03-2018OngoingCivil-MR-Q-AD-2018-64AppealCivilQatariQatari25-03-2018OngoingCommercial-MR-Q-AD-2018-322AppealCommercialEmiratiQatari01-04-2018OngoingCommercial-MR-Q-AD-2018-400AppealCommercialQatariEmirati17-04-2018OngoingCommercial-MR-Q-AD-2018-460AppealCommercialQatariJordanian30-04-2018OngoingPlea-81-2017-Civil-MR-Q-AD-2017-13AppealReconsideration pleaEmiratiQatari21-12-2017Plea
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S Type of Lawsuit First Instance Appeal Repeal Execution Total 1 Personal Status 19 10 3 14 46 2 Estate 10 10 3 Commercial Plenary 8 8 5 2 23 4 Lease 5 2 7 5 Civil 5 2 8 15 6 Expedited 1 1 7 Petitions 55 55 8 Grievance 3 1 4 9 Post Ruling Requests 1 1 2 Total 107 18 11 27 163
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8108/5/ 8107 الى 01 /6/ الإحصائية الخاصة بالوكالات التي تمت خلال الفترة من 0
والخاصة )بالجنسية القطرية( بجنيع أفرع اللاتب العدل- إمارة أبوظبي
Qatar Branch Period بوابة الشرق
مول
دائرة التننية
الاقتصادية
غرفة التجارة
فرع الجزيرة والصناعة
محلنة
أبوظبي
محلنة
الرحبة
محلنة
الرويس
محلنة بني
ياس
مركز تم -
غياثي
وحدة الخدمات
العدليه
Grand Total Jun-17 2 1 3 Jul-17 1 1 2 Aug-17 2 2 Sep-17 1 1 2 Oct-17 2 2 Nov-17 1 1 3 5 Dec-17 1 1 Jan-18 1 1 1 1 4 Feb-18 1 1 Mar-18 2 2 2 1 7 Apr-18 1 3 1 5 May-18 1 1 2 Grand Total 1 3 3 1 14 2 1 6 1 4 36
Annex 13
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Annex 13
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Annex 13
169
Annex 13
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Annex 13
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Annex 13
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Annex 13
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Annex 13
174
Annex 14
Note Verbale from Qatar to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 29 October 2018
175
Annex 14
176
Annex 14
177
Annex 14
178
Annex 15
Letter of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to
the United Nations Office and Other International Organisations
to the State of Qatar, 7 November 2018
179
Annex 15
180
Annex 15
181
Annex 15
182
Annex 16
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Supplemental Response of the UAE, 29 November 2018
183
In a matter before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ICERD-ISC-2018/2 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE of the United Arab Emirates to the request made by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination submitted to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office, Geneva, Switzerland on 29 November 2018 Annex 16
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 2
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 2
III. QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS ARE UNFOUNDED, MADE WITHOUT EVIDENCE
AND DISTORT THE TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND
UNDERLYING ITS ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION ................................................... 5
IV. THE COMMITTEE MUST REJECT QATAR’S ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ 11
A. The Committee lacks jurisdiction in the present dispute because Qatar has not made
an Article 11 Communication that falls within the scope of the CERD’s substantive
protections ................................................................................................................... 14
B. The Committee lacks jurisdiction over Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because
there is no evidence of any ongoing violation ............................................................. 20
V. THE COMMITTEE MUST REJECT QATAR’S ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION
FOR LACK OF ADMISSIBILITY ...................................................................................... 23
A. The Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because
Qatar has failed to establish that local remedies have been invoked or exhausted as
required under Article 11.3 of the CERD .................................................................... 24
B. The Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because
Qatar, by commencing proceedings before the ICJ, has abandoned the Article 11
process ......................................................................................................................... 30
C. The Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication since that
communication amounts to no more than empty speculation and thus constitutes an
abuse of rights and process .......................................................................................... 33
VI. ANY ACTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO ENTERTAIN FURTHER OR PROGRESS
QATAR’S ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION WOULD BE ULTRA VIRES ................ 35
VII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 36
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2 I.INTRODUCTION 1.The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates (the “UAE”) to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) and refers to its submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the “Committee”) and the Secretariat dated 7 November 2018, in which the UAE indicated that it would submit before the Committee a Supplemental Response (the “Supplemental Response”) on the Communication of the State of Qatar (“Qatar”) under Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the “CERD”), dated 8 March 2018 (“Qatar’s Article11 Communication”). 2.This Supplemental Response supplements the submission of the UAE of 7 August 2018 (the “Response”). It addresses in further detail Qatar’s request, dated 29 October 2018, that its Article 11 Communication again be referred to the Committee in accordance with Article 11.2 of the CERD. II.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3.The allegations made in Qatar’s Communication and subsequent statements are entirely without merit. They are mere unsupported and empty assertions made up of self-interested speculation. Most importantly for the purposes of the Committee’s evaluation of the Communication, Qatar has provided no evidence whatsoever in support of its politically-motivated allegations. Indeed, rather than protecting the integrity of the CERD, Qatar is attempting to manipulate the Committee to further Qatar’s foreign policy, which notoriously includes the financing and promotion of extremism and international terrorism. For the present case, the Committee does not need to enter into any difficult evaluation of the level of proof required to proceed with the dispute resolution mechanisms of the CERD in an inter-State complaint: it cannot be possible that an inter-State complaint can proceed to the appointment of an ad hoc Commission without any evidence whatsoever of the assertions being made. Annex 16
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3
4. Qatar has had multiple opportunities to provide evidence in support of its factual
assertions, including in response to the UAE’s specific and detailed denials of the
allegations being made. If there had been any evidence, Qatar would have been in
possession of it and would have, of course, already submitted it to the Committee. It is
notable that judges at the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) in a pending
parallel case concerning the application of the CERD to these very same facts1 also
noted that Qatar had failed to submit any evidence to support its allegations in that
proceeding. So, in two separate judicial or investigatory proceedings dealing with the
same allegations and supposed facts, Qatar has repeatedly failed to submit any evidence
of what it alleges are publicly known facts. It would make a mockery of the CERD
dispute resolution mechanisms and certainly delegitimise the institutions of the CERD
were the Committee to proceed with an inter-State complaint merely on the basis of
politically-motivated, self-interested assertions with no evidence whatsoever of the
alleged wrongdoings. If the Committee determines that that is the standard required, it
will be opening the CERD up to become a tool for baseless and abusive manipulation.
5. With respect, the Committee lacks jurisdiction to consider Qatar’s Article 11
Communication because even on its face, Qatar’s allegations fall outwith the scope of
the CERD. Any action taken by the Committee to further Qatar’s complaint would thus
be ultra vires.
6. The UAE also submits that the Committee should decline to pursue the dispute
resolution process envisaged under Article 11 of the CERD any further. In the present
circumstances, it is clear that there is no ongoing situation of prejudice to Qatari
nationals and there is certainly no evidence to support a different conclusion.
Consequently, there is no role to play for the CERD’s forward-looking facilitation of an
amicable solution and no jurisdiction for the Committee to take any action under the
CERD.
7. The Committee should also dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication as inadmissible.
The UAE submits that three grounds of inadmissibility apply to Qatar’s complaint:
1 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice.
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4 a.First, no Qatari national supposedly affected by the measures adopted by the UAE has invoked or exhausted the available and effective domestic remedies, as required under Article 11.3 of the Convention. For that reason alone, the Committee cannot proceed to consider the matter referred to it by Qatar; b.Second, the Committee should decline to entertain Qatar’s complaint on the basis that Qatar has abused the CERD process by prematurely referring its CERD complaint to the ICJ. By doing this, Qatar has created a situation where two separate proceedings under the CERD dispute resolution mechanisms are being pursued in parallel. This is not allowed under the architecture of the CERD dispute resolution. When Qatar began the CERD process, the architecture of the CERD dispute resolution provisions required it to allow the CERD process to run its course. Under the architecture of the CERD dispute resolution provisions, an application to the ICJ is only possible if that process has not been successful. By making its premature application to the ICJ, Qatar abandoned the CERD process. It is not open for Qatar to pick and choose which parts of the CERD dispute resolution architecture it wishes to pursue, when and in which order. The case before the ICJ (the “Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings”) on 23 July 2018 produced an Order on the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (the “CERD Provisional Measures Order”).2 By doing so, Qatar itself has made the Committee process moot. Yet despite that Order, the content of which must be deemed to resolve any question about the future application of the CERD within the UAE in relation to the issues raised by Qatar in its Article 11 Communication, Qatar now seeks to resume the very process under the CERD that it previously abandoned in favour of seeking and obtaining the CERD Provisional Measures Order. Qatar is thereby illegally making the UAE the respondent in two parallel proceedings. This is not permissible under the procedures set out in the CERD. It amounts to an abuse of process and an abuse of Qatar’s rights under the CERD that affects the admissibility of its Article 11 Communication; 2 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 23 July 2018 (“CERD Provisional Measures Order”). Annex 16
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5
c. Third, Qatar’s allegations are completely without merit on fact and law. They
should therefore not be allowed to trigger a further process involving the
appointment of a Conciliation Commission. It is not consistent with a good
faith interpretation of the relevant provisions of the CERD that a State Party
should be allowed to subject other States Parties to completely spurious
claims without presenting any proof of its allegations.
8. For all of the above reasons, the UAE respectfully submits that the Committee must
dismiss Qatar’s request. It must decline to entertain Qatar’s Article 11 Communication
any further. Qatar’s litigation tactics have deprived the Committee of its legitimate role
with respect to this matter and the Committee’s further actions in this matter would be
ultra vires.
9. The UAE is mindful of the importance of the CERD and the work of the Committee
and therefore respectfully requests that the Committee carefully consider the precedents
that would be set if it progressed Qatar’s Article 11 Communication. Qatar’s Article 11
Communication represents nothing but the latest gambit in Qatar’s notorious policy of
seeking to disguise its support, instigation, financing and fomenting of extremism and
international terrorism through public relations diversions. Qatar is trying to use the
Committee, an innocent bystander, as an instrument in its international public relations
campaign to obfuscate the situation in the region and distract from its own violations of
numerous international agreements. These violations include Qatar’s historic and
ongoing violation of the Riyadh Agreements, UN Security Council resolutions and
Qatar’s violations of its own obligations under the CERD through its support and
sponsorship of terrorism and its propagation of hate speech.
III. QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS ARE UNFOUNDED, MADE WITHOUT
EVIDENCE AND DISTORT THE TURBULENT GEOPOLITICAL
BACKGROUND UNDERLYING ITS ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION
10. In its Article 11 Communication, Qatar refers to “[t]he arbitrariness of the Coercive
Measures” of which it complains.3 Yet not less than the first 40 paragraphs of its
3 Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, 8 March 2018, paragraph 61.
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6 Article 11 Communication describe in detail the diplomatic crisis among GCC countries and responses of Qatar’s neighbours to its policies and conduct, of which the UAE Statement of June 2017 is one. This exposes Qatar’s Article 11 Communication for what it is: a politically-motivated public relations exercise; there is no good faith attempt to promote and protect the CERD. Not only does this part of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication confirm that this geopolitical reality is the true reason why Qatar has made the present application to the CERD, as well as initiating other aggressive actions more broadly against the UAE elsewhere. Through this lengthy background description to its complaint, Qatar also distorts the facts underpinning the actions of its neighbours and seeks to mislead the Committee. It is notorious on the public record that Qatar has been responsible for supporting, instigating, financing and fomenting terrorism throughout the Middle East and beyond. It was in response to this overriding security imperative that, since 5 June 2017, the UAE and almost every one of Qatar’s neighbours severed or downgraded diplomatic relations with Qatar. The reasons given by Qatar’s neighbours for this cited Qatar’s ongoing breaches of international law and its continued support for extremist and terrorist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Qatar’s sustained endeavours to promote the ideologies of Daesh and Al Qaeda, which rank amongst the gravest threats to human rights and peace and security in the region and beyond. 11.Qatar egregiously violates its international obligations – including the CERD – through its direct and indirect support for terrorist activities. This is most unapologetically perpetrated in relation to heinous terrorism crimes committed against, inter alia, Christian Copts in the Arab Republic of Egypt (“Egypt”). It is notorious that Qatar is responsible for supporting, instigating, financing and fomenting terrorism throughout the Middle East and beyond.4 It is notorious that Qatar has offered and continues to offer support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which has caused untold suffering to innocent human beings, in particular in Egypt, where it has targeted the Coptic Christian minority. It is on the public record that the Muslim Brotherhood officially espouses violence, including terrorism, to promote its Islamist agenda where it deems that peaceful methods are ineffective. It has been a main instigator of terrorist attacks 4 See for instance Robert F. Worth, “Kidnapped Royalty Become Pawns in Iran’s Deadly Plot,” The New York Times Magazine, 14 March 2018 (recounting how Qatar in a ransom deal “paid vast sums to terrorists on both sides of the Middle East’s sectarian divide, fueling the region’s spiraling civil wars”). Annex 16
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7
in the region, in particular in Egypt,5 where in 2013 its supporters attacked 70 Coptic
Christian churches and put to the flame more than 1,000 homes and businesses of
Coptic Christian families.6 At least six States have banned or designated the Muslim
Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation and many other countries are actively
contemplating the same.7 Qatar’s support – both historic and ongoing – of such
activities amounts to violation inter alia of Article 6(b) of the CERD.
12. Qatar also owns and funds Al Jazeera, which is a notorious spokespiece for propaganda
of violent extremists in the Middle East, Africa and beyond.8 By allowing its State
media company to propagate hate speech, Qatar fails to give effect to CERD provisions
with respect to, inter alia, Articles 1.1, 4(a) and 5(b).
13. Qatar has further attracted severe international criticism for its treatment of migrant
workers as it prepares to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Such treatment has been
“widely depicted as a form of bonded if not forced labor”.9 In 2016, the ILO had given
Qatar 12 months to end migrant worker exploitation. The ILO withdrew its complaints
following the signature by Qatar of 36 worker protection agreements with countries that
provide much of its labour force.10 A recent report by Amnesty International however
asserts that these problems persist.11 Qatar’s actions fails to give effect to Article
5(d)(ii) of the CERD (the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return
to one’s country) and Article 5(e)(i) CERD (rights to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against
unemployment, to equal pay for equal work and to just and favourable remuneration).
5 See, for example, Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring and
Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (2016), page 33.
6 See Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act, H.R. 3892, 114th Cong. (2015-2016), page 17.
7 See for instance Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act, H.R. 3892, 114th Cong. (2015-2016),
pages 2 to 3 (referring to Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the
Syrian Arab Republic and the Russian Federation). See also Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation
Act of 2017, H.R. 377, 115th Cong. (2017-2018).
8 Several States in the Middle East share this assessment, see for instance “Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE,
Bahrain Issue a Joint Statement on Combating Terrorism”, Asharq Al-Awsat English, 9 June 2017;
“Qatar Must Stop Using Al Jazeera for Aggression Toward Bahrain – Ambassador”, Sputnik News, 16
June 2017.
9 John Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World: FIFA and Human Rights,” April 2016, page 8. See also
Amnesty International, “Unpaid and abandoned: the abuse of Mercury MENA workers,” 26 September
2018.
10 See Reuters, “ILO closes workers’ complaint against World Cup host Qatar,” 8 November 2017.
11 See Amnesty International, “Unpaid and abandoned: the abuse of Mercury MENA workers,” 26
September 2018. See also “Qatar migrant workers are still being exploited, says Amnesty report”, The
Guardian, 26 September 2018.
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8 14.Furthermore, there are news reports of additional violations by Qatar of international law in its preparations for hosting the World Cup. It has been reported that Qatar is persecuting the Al-Ghufran tribe;12 revoking the Qatari nationality of many of its members13 and seizing their lands, including for building football stadiums.14 In light of Qatar’s measures, members of the Al-Ghufran tribe have called on the United Nations,15 FIFA16 and international human rights organisations17 to intervene to bring an end to the discrimination and persecution by the Qatari authorities. 15.The Committee is, of course, already aware of Qatar’s violations. During the current ninety-sixth session of the Committee, Qatar has been faulted for allowing employers to abuse migrant workers with impunity and not making sure that judgments of its courts on such matters are made public so as to discourage future violations.18 Its access to justice for migrant workers and victims of racial discrimination has been deemed lacking, with reports that the burden of proof is unjustifiably imposed on such victims in civil and labour cases.19 Qatar has also faced criticism regarding transfer of nationality under its law, as reportedly it has within its country over 6,000 people who are Stateless. The UAE understands that the Committee and the country rapporteur has recommended changes to Qatari law in this respect. Qatar also does not ensure decent housing for migrant workers and its current housing policy was decried by one of the Committee’s experts as amounting to racial discrimination.20 12 “Qatari tribe calls on UN to urgently intervene to solve their case”, Al Sharq Al-Awsat English, 13 March 2018; “Qatar accused of building World Cup stadiums on land stolen from persecuted tribe”, Arab News, 24 September 2018. 13 “Qatari Tribe Calls on UN to Urgently Intervene to Solve Their Case”, Al Sharq Al-Awsat English, 13 March 2018; “Qatar accused of building World Cup stadiums on land stolen from persecuted tribe”, ArabNews, 24 September 2018. 14 “Qatar accused of building World Cup stadiums on land stolen from persecuted tribe”, Arab News, 24 September 2018. The persecution against the Al-Ghufran tribe by the Qatari authorities began in 1996, in retaliation for the support provided by some of its members to Sheikh Khalifa Al-Thani, the Qatari emir deposed the by his son Hamad, father of the current emir, Sheikh Tamim. Since then, more than 6,000 members of the Al-Ghufran tribe have been stripped of their citizenship and had their property seized by the Qatari authorities. 15 “Qatari tribe calls on UN to urgently intervene to solve their case”, Al Sharq Al-Awsat English, 13 March 2018. 16 “Qatar accused of building World Cup stadiums on land stolen from persecuted tribe”, Arab News, 24 September 2018. 17 “Qatari tribe calls on UN to urgently intervene to solve their case”, Al Sharq Al-Awsat English, 13 March 2018. 18 See Twitter@IMADR_Geneva #CERD #Qatar #migrant (27 and 28 November 2018). 19 See Twitter@IMADR_Geneva #CERD #Qatar #migrant (27 and 28 November 2018). 20 See Twitter@IMADR_Geneva #CERD #Qatar #migrant (27 and 28 November 2018). Annex 16
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16. Among these multiple and egregious persistent violations, Qatar’s support for terrorist
acts in particular lie at the very heart of the diplomatic crisis that gave rise to the UAE’s
declaration of 5 June 2017 invoked by Qatar in its Article 11 Communication.21 It is
unthinkable that this Committee would choose sides in the ongoing geopolitical dispute
between, on the one hand, Qatar and its support for terrorism, and, on the other hand,
almost all other States in the world. By way of example of the almost-universal
condemnation of Qatar’s support of terrorism, on 9 June 2017, the President of the
United States of America, referring to conversations with other world leaders, stated in
a public press conference:
[Qatar] has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very
high level. . . . I decided, along with Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson . . . the time had come to call on Qatar to end its
funding – they have to end that funding – and its extremist
ideology in terms of funding.22
17. As set out further in this submission and as accepted by multiple Judges at the ICJ,23
there is simply no factual or legal basis whatsoever in Qatar’s Article 11
Communication that might ground a breach of the CERD or any proper process under
Articles 11 to 13 thereof. The only tenable explanation for the Article 11
Communication is that Qatar seeks to manipulate the Committee to further its
aggressive foreign policy objectives against the UAE. The UAE respectfully urges the
Committee to remain on guard against Qatar’s hostile ideology, lest the Committee be
unwittingly co-opted, at great damage to the promotion and protection of human rights
and the CERD, into providing an instrument for Qatar’s continuing campaign to
destabilise its neighbours and foment extremism and terrorism in the Middle East
region and beyond.
18. In its Article 11 Communication, Qatar maintains that the UAE is in violation of the
CERD by virtue of certain measures that the UAE has taken following its termination
of relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017. Its allegations are untrue and misrepresent the
policies of the UAE. In fact, there has been no change in the treatment of Qatari
21 Interview with United Arab Emirates Ambassador Omar Saif Ghobash, Today (BBC Radio 4), 8 June
2017 (calling for Qatar to “completely change Al Jazeera so it isn’t just a mouthpiece for violent
extremists”).
22 Remarks by President Trump and President Iohannis of Romania in a Joint Press Conference, 9 June
2017, page 2, Official Website of the White House.
23 See below, passim.
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10 nationals, other than the introduction of legitimate and commonplace minimal requirements on the entry of Qatari nationals into the UAE. The UAE has neither expelled Qatari nationals from its territory nor instituted a travel ban against Qatari nationals who wish to enter the UAE.24 19.Nationals of Qatar with permission to enter and reside in the UAE enjoy rights to the same extent as other non-UAE nationals lawfully present within the UAE, including freedom of movement and residence, right to marriage and choice of spouse, right to freedom of opinion and expression, right to health and medical treatment, right to education, right to work, right to property and right to equal treatment before tribunals. Qatari nationals who lawfully enter and reside in the UAE enjoy all of the foregoing to the same extent as any other non-national UAE resident without any form of prohibited discrimination (whether racial or otherwise) in form or practice. Critically for the purposes of the Committee’s work, there is no evidence to the contrary. 20.It is notable that Qatar has not presented any evidence in support of its allegations to the Committee. In its Communication and over the subsequent months, Qatar has submitted many sweeping rhetorical generalities but it has supplied the Committee with no evidence to support them. The UAE has already addressed in its Response that the two categories of evidence relied upon by Qatar in its Article 11 Communication are wholly unreliable.25 Clearly, if there were credible evidence of the things that Qatar alleges, Qatar would be in possession of it. Qatar would easily be able to furnish the Committee with this evidence. The fact that Qatar has not submitted any such evidence confirms that Qatar is fabricating sensationalist stories of hardship and woe. It should be emphasised that, in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, Qatar also has failed conclusively to establish that its nationals suffered treatment in violation of CERD. 21.Out of an abundance of caution, and in the face of Qatar’s deliberate misrepresentation of the facts, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an announcement on 5 July 2018 clarifying that there was no legal order envisaging the deportation of Qatari 24 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 23 July 2018, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford (“Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford”), paragraph 4 (“it appears that no legislative or administrative action was taken to give effect to paragraph 2 [of the State of 5 June 2017 with respect to Qatari nationals]”). 25 UAE’s Response dated 7 August 2018, paragraphs 54 to 80. Annex 16
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nationals from the UAE and that any Qatari national could apply to enter the UAE on
an individual basis. The announcement also confirmed that Qatari nationals already
resident in the UAE need not apply for permission to continue such residence.26 Again,
Qatar has submitted no evidence to rebut this.
22. For Qatari nationals who left the UAE voluntarily at the start of the crisis, the UAE has
implemented special re-entry procedures managed through a hotline. This hotline has
been available to Qataris since shortly after the termination of relations on 5 June 2017.
It has been used successfully by Qataris who wish to do so to gain or re-gain entry into
the UAE. No Qatari national has been denied entry through this service by virtue of his
or her Qatari nationality – still less, on account of his or her race, colour, descent or
national or ethnic origin. The UAE provides this benefit specifically to Qatari
nationals, and not to other nationalities, thereby demonstrating the UAE’s commitment
to supporting the Qatari people during this time of conflict between the UAE and Qatari
governments. Yet again, Qatar has submitted no evidence to rebut this.
IV. THE COMMITTEE MUST REJECT QATAR’S ARTICLE 11
COMMUNICATION FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
23. In this Section IV, the UAE explains why the Committee lacks the jurisdiction to hear
Qatar’s Article 11 Communication. Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that the
Committee must reject Qatar’s Article 11 Communication and immediately terminate
the procedure under Part II of the CERD with respect to this application.
24. All international bodies established under treaty derive their jurisdiction exclusively
from the specific consent of the States Parties to that treaty. Such bodies, including
investigatory or dispute resolution bodies, are required to conduct themselves according
to the procedures established by the treaty.27 Under fundamental norms of public
international law, States submit to the binding force of a treaty and the authority of any
body established by such treaty under the principle of pacta sunt servanda.28 This
26 Official Statement by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 5 July 2018.
27 The Committee is established pursuant to Article 8 of the CERD.
28 See Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.
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12 consent to submit is necessarily constrained by the terms of the treaty to which the State has consented. 25.The Committee is such an international body. It is established under a treaty. It is subject to the norms of public international law. It enjoys jurisdiction for its authority only to the extent – and no further – that the States Party to the CERD have consented to submit to the dispute resolution procedures established in the CERD. The States Parties to the CERD have vested the Committee with jurisdiction to carry out the dispute resolution functions described in that treaty. The Committee has no jurisdiction beyond that. All other functions fall outwith the scope of the Committee’s legitimate authority. 26.The Committee can only act with legitimacy if it acts within the jurisdiction that it has been granted by the States Party to the CERD in the treaty. Any act beyond that is not a legitimate act of authority by the Committee. Such an act would be an act ultra vires the authority of the Committee. 27.In the present circumstances, the Committee must examine carefully the basis for its competence to take any action. Being an international dispute settlement body, the Committee has the inherent power to decide on the limits of its competence, within the confines of its constituent treaty. Shabtai Rosenne, a leading authority on the functions of international courts and tribunals, has summarised the legal position on this issue by noting that: It is now a generally accepted principle that an international court or tribunal has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. This power is commonly interpreted and applied as referring also to the admissibility of the case as a whole or of an individual claim in the case. … A provision to this effect is commonly found in the constituent instrument of a standing international tribunal, but the rule is also applicable in an ad hoc tribunal should a question on jurisdiction arise there.29 28.The Committee is being asked by Qatar to act far beyond its authority. This raises important questions that go to the legitimacy of the functioning of the Committee in the 29 Shabtai Rosenne, “International Courts and Tribunals, Jurisdiction and Admissibility of Inter-State Applications,” Max Planck Encyclopaedia of International Law, paragraph 23. Annex 16
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present matter. However, these questions of legitimacy are also relevant more broadly.
The functions assigned to the Committee are set out in Part II of the CERD. For
present purposes, the relevant provisions are found in Articles 11 to 13, which describe
the inter-State complaints mechanism under the Convention. The gateway provision in
Article 11.1 CERD allows a State Party to bring a matter to the attention of the
Committee if it “considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions
of this Convention” (emphasis added). This language circumscribes the Committee’s
jurisdiction, in the sense that the Committee has no competence to hear complaints
about conduct that is not prohibited by the CERD. Nor can the Committee entertain or
investigate allegations of infringement of rights that are not protected under the CERD.
29. The present inter-State communication under Article 11 falls outwith the Committee’s
jurisdiction for two fundamental reasons, each one of which on its own suffices to
dispose of the Article 11 process entirely. First, the Committee lacks any jurisdiction
because Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the
basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outwith the scope of the CERD. Second,
and at the same time, the Committee also lacks jurisdiction because the dispute
resolution procedure under Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD is strictly confined to
ongoing alleged breaches of the CERD. In the instant case, Qatar’s Article 11
Communication is entirely moot because it relies only on a non-binding policy
statement made by the UAE that was never implemented in practice, in respect of
which the UAE has already taken definitive action to rectify any possible
misunderstanding, as recognised expressly by multiple judges in the Pending ICJ
CERD Proceedings, and which in any event is currently addressed by the ICJ’s CERD
Provisional Measures Order.30 Each of these grounds is addressed in turn below.
30 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraphs 3 to 4 (“it appears that no legislative or
administrative action was taken to give effect to paragraph 2 [of the State of 5 June 2017 with respect to
Qatari nationals]”); see also See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 23 July 2018, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bhandari
(“Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bhandari”), paragraph 3.
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14 A.The Committee lacks jurisdiction in the present dispute because Qatar has not made an Article 11 Communication that falls within the scope of the CERD’s substantive protections 30.As noted above, the Committee lacks any jurisdiction in the present proceeding because Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outwith the scope of the CERD. Only a claim that falls within the scope of the CERD can possibly fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee and of any ad hoc Conciliation Commission that may eventually be appointed. 31.Allegations of differentiated treatment on account of nationality or citizenship do not come within the jurisdiction of the Committee. This is because Article 1 of the CERD critically and deliberately distinguishes between, on the one hand, discrimination on grounds of national origin, which is equated to racial discrimination and prohibited per se, and on the other hand, differentiation on the basis of nationality, which is not prohibited under the CERD.31 The CERD simply does not purport to regulate or govern in any way differentiated treatment of individuals on the basis of their nationality or citizenship, as distinct from racial discrimination on the specific grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. The drafters of the CERD made a deliberate choice in that regard and the States Party to the CERD only signed up to that. 32.The distinction between ‘nationality’ and ‘national origin’ is clearly delineated in the travaux préparatoires of the CERD. For example, in the discussions on this point, the US representative pointed out that: [n]ational origin differed from nationality in that national origin related to the past – the previous nationality or geographical region of the individual or of his ancestors – while nationality related to present status. The use of the 31 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraph 1. See also Patrick Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2016), pages 103 to 105; Natan Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Brill Nijhoff 2015), pages 33 to 34 (“it was made clear that these words [‘national origin’] were not utilized as equivalents of the term ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’”). See further Karin de Vries, Integration at the Border (Hart Publishing 2013), pages 304 to 305 (“nationality as a legal status is not included in the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ provided in Article 1(1) of the CERD”); Päivi Gynther, Beyond Systemic Discrimination: Educational Rights, Skills Acquisition and the Case of Roma (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007), page 127 (“the CERD does not prohibit as a ‘racial discrimination’ distinctions based on nationality”). Annex 16
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15
former term in the Convention would make it clear that
persons were protected against discrimination regardless of
where they or their ancestors had come from.32
33. It is notable that neither the provisional measures ordered in the Pending ICJ CERD
Proceedings, nor any of the separate or dissenting opinions issued in the case, gave any
support to the notion that ‘nationality’ and ‘national origin’ are synonymous. On the
contrary, the distinction between these two concepts has been authoritatively embraced
by a number of distinguished judges in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings. For
example, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Crawford emphasised that the distinction
between ‘national origin’ and ‘nationality’:
finds its reflection in widespread State practice giving
preferences to nationals of some countries over others in
matters such as the right to enter or to reside, entitlement to
social security, university fees and many other things, in
peace and during armed conflict.33
34. The Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian expressed the same legal
conclusion:
When the Convention considers “national origin” as one of
the prohibited bases for discrimination, it does not refer to
nationality. In our view, the two terms are not identical and
should not be understood as synonymous. The travaux
préparatoires support this view and indicate that States
sought to exclude distinction on the basis of nationality from
the scope of CERD. In the discussions of the draft
Convention in the Third Committee of the General
Assembly, an amendment specifying that “the expression
‘national origin’ does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’”
was withdrawn by their sponsors, but this was done only in
favour of the final text of Article 1, which evidently was
considered to make matters equally clear. (Emphasis
added.)34
35. Similarly, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Salam pointed out that ‘nationality’ and
‘national origin’ are two conceptually different notions and that the CERD applies only
32 Travaux préparatoires of the CERD, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304, paragraph 23.
33 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraph 1.
34 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 23 July 2018, Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and
Gevorgian (“Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian”), paragraph 4.
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16 to issues related to ‘national origin’.35 Judge Salam echoed the above statement from the travaux préparatoires in noting that ‘national origin’ targets individuals who – “regardless of their nationality at that time”36 – traced their origin to a particular country and suffered discrimination as a result of that heritage (citing the examples of US citizens of Japanese origin interned following the attack on Pearl Harbour during the Second World War, as well as discrimination against persons of German origin, regardless of their nationality, in several countries after the First World War and during and after the Second World War).37 36.Any finding that nationality falls within the scope of the CERD and within the Committee’s jurisdiction would upend this legal reality.38 Any such finding would constitute an improper, dangerous and unacceptable distortion of the clear terms of the carefully negotiated provisions of the CERD which alone determine the extent of the obligations accepted by the CERD’s contracting States under public international law. Indeed, if the States Party to the CERD had intended to include ‘nationality’ instead of ‘national origin’ in Article 1 of the CERD, they could and would have easily done so.39 They deliberately chose not to do so. The States Party did not sign up to this. And it is not open to Qatar now to impose this unilaterally upon the UAE. As noted by Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, “[t]he omission of a reference to nationality may be easily explained.”40 Indeed, these three Judges remarked in their Joint Declaration in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings that: Should CERD be considered as covering also discrimination based on nationality, the Convention would be a far-reaching instrument, that contains a clause providing that, with regard to the wide array of civil rights that are protected under CERD, all foreigners must be treated by the host State in the 35 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 23 July 2018, Opinion Dissidente de M. le Juge Salam (“Opinion Dissidente de M. le Juge Salam”), paragraphs 3(c) and 5. 36 See Opinion Dissidente de M. le Juge Salam, paragraph 5. 37 See Opinion Dissidente de M. le Juge Salam, paragraphs 5 to 6, with further reference to Travaux préparatoires of the CERD, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 and Report of the Third Committee, 18 December 1965, UN Doc. A/6181. 38 Karin de Vries, Integration at the Border (Hart Publishing 2013), pages 304 to 305 (“adding nationality in the legal sense as a ground to the definition of racial discrimination with be incompatible with the text and history of Article 1 CERD”). 39 See Opinion Dissidente de M. le Juge Salam, paragraph 7. 40 See Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian, paragraph 4. Annex 16
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same way as nationals of the State who enjoy the most
favourable treatment.41
37. The act of conferring nationality is within the jurisdiction of States. It is an attribute of
State sovereignty to determine the benefits appertaining to such status.42 Similarly, it is
uncontroversially and entirely properly within the unilateral sovereign jurisdiction of
individual States to decide which rights and benefits to confer upon foreign nationals
depending on what nationality they hold, provided that distinctions are not drawn on
the basis, for example, of colour or religion.43 Respect for this sovereign right is an
incontrovertible norm of customary international law.44 It is reflected and enshrined in
Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of the CERD, which provide that:
2. This Convention shall not apply to distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party
to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.
3. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting
in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning
nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such
provisions do not discriminate against any particular
nationality.
38. To the extent that the Committee as previously constituted might be interpreted to have
taken a different view, it is critical to note that a number of eminent ICJ judges, each of
whom is independently a highly respected authority on public international law,45
declared in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings that they were unconvinced by
statements from the CERD Committee that conflate ‘national origin’ and
‘nationality’.46
41 See Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian, paragraph 4.
42 Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Law (Oxford University Press 1998, 5.ed), pages 385, 388, 390.
43 See W. Michael Reisman et al., International Law in Contemporary Perspective (Foundation Press
1981), page 500, notes and questions No. 2. See also United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 24 (2015), pages 19 to 20.
44 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 1998, 5.ed), page
289. See also Samantha Besson, “Sovereignty,” Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law
(2011), paragraph 56. See also Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion of 5
September 1931, PCIJ, Series A/B, Individual Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, page 57.
45 The ICJ judges siding with the UAE on this point are eminent scholars and seasoned practitioners of
international law. They have published widely on public international law and human rights, held various
positions in UN bodies and appeared in various practical functions in international dispute settlement
proceedings.
46 In particular, Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian unequivocally rejected the view expressed by a
previously constituted CERD Committee in its General Recommendation No. XXX in 2004 that the
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18 39.A plurality of ICJ judges that are hearing Qatar’s identical allegations as advanced in the context of the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings have agreed that Qatar has failed to put forward a claim that falls within the scope of the CERD. None of the judges of the ICJ, including the majority, concluded that it was certain that Qatar had put forward a claim that falls within the scope of the CERD. 40.For example, Judge Crawford, one of the foremost authorities on public international law and a pioneer of international human rights law, asserted that Qatar’s allegations of collective expulsion of Qataris from UAE territory: simply … is not apparently covered by the CERD. 47 41.Similarly, Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian underlined in their Joint Declaration in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings that: [t]he basis of the alleged discrimination in the treatment of individuals by the UAE of which Qatar has complained consists in the Qatari nationality of the persons concerned. However, CERD only applies to some specific factors of discrimination: ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’. Nationality is not listed in Article 1, paragraph 1, among the bases of discrimination to which CERD applies.48 42.It is critical for the purposes of the Committee and its jurisdiction that not a single ICJ judge supported the interpretation of the CERD put forward by Qatar in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings and which Qatar has also, in identical form, put before the CERD Committee in this present Article 11 Communication. 43.Even the narrow majority of only eight judges that granted provisional measures in favour of Qatar in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings did not endorse Qatar’s erroneous view that the CERD’s reference to ‘national origin’ was synonymous with ‘nationality’. They restricted themselves to concluding that they did not need to decide the question at that preliminary stage of the proceedings for the purposes of the CERD CERD may cover differences of treatment on the basis of nationality, finding that “[i]t would be difficult to give weight to this view of the CERD Committee since it gives no reason for its interpretation that different treatment based on nationality constitutes racial discrimination under CERD, albeit only to a certain extent”, see Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian, paragraph 5. 47 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraph 1. 48 Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian, paragraph 3. Annex 16
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Provisional Measures Order.49 This part of the CERD Provisional Measures Order
situates the conclusions of the majority of the Court within the particular context of
prima facie jurisdiction, as opposed to actual jurisdiction.
44. Qatar has conspicuously failed to furnish the Committee with any arguments or proof
that any part of its Article 11 Communication falls properly within the scope of the
CERD. In its Communication of 29 October 2018, it merely asserts, with generalised
and sweeping rhetoric, that “by targeting all Qataris and only Qataris with a series of
coercive measures, the United Arab Emirates has violated multiple Convention
obligations, including its obligations under Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7”.50 With respect to
the UAE’s objection that the conduct described by Qatar in its Article 11
Communication could not come within the scope of the CERD, Qatar simply “rejects”
the UAE position. Qatar has provided no reasoning or evidence in support of its
“rejection”. This failure on the part of Qatar is notable and it is not sufficient for the
purposes of the dispute resolution mechanisms of the CERD. It is not tenable that the
Committee rely merely on a “rejection” by a State of the evidence of another party.
The Committee must bear in mind that how it deals with this sort of imperious
disregard for fact and evidence will constitute a precedent for unrelated complaints
brought by individuals against States Party to the CERD (and even complaints brought
by States Party against other States Party): if a haughty and regal “rejection” is
established by the Committee to constitute a sufficient answer, it does not take much
imagination to see how genuine complaints in the future will be responded to by States
Party. Qatar has not advanced a complaint within the scope of the Committee
jurisdiction; therefore, its Article 11 Communication must be dismissed and the present
proceeding terminated for lack of jurisdiction.
45. Were the CERD Committee to find, contrary to public international law norms, the text
of the CERD itself and the opinions of the preponderance of ICJ judges, that treatment
on the basis of nationality falls within the scope of the CERD – for example, by
progressing Qatar’s Article 11 Communication to an ad hoc Conciliation Commission –
the Committee would be putting itself at odds with customary international law,
eminent judges of the ICJ and leading public international law authorities. It would
49 CERD Provisional Measures Order, paragraph 27.
50 Qatar’s Communication to the Committee, dated 29 October 2018.
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20 undermine the very foundations of public international law by imposing upon the UAE and other States Party to the CERD a new and extraneous obligation to which those States, by becoming parties to the CERD, had never accepted. The Committee would be doing this all at a time when the ICJ, the pre-eminent Court in the United Nations system, remains seised of the very same question in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings and does not support this approach. B.The Committee lacks jurisdiction over Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because there is no evidence of any ongoing violation 46.The Committee and any ad hoc Conciliation Commission that may be appointed only has jurisdiction to consider allegations of ongoing violations of the CERD. The mechanism established under Article 11 to 13 of the CERD is a process of conciliation, aimed at arriving at an amicable solution in a situation where a State Party “is not giving effect to the provisions of the Convention”.51 The use of the present tense in the relevant text of the CERD is deliberate and determinative. To achieve an end to the situation in dispute, any ad hoc Conciliation Commission appointed under Article 12 is authorised to employ its good offices to assist the disputing Parties and to issue recommendations as it may think proper for the amicable solution of the dispute.52 The dispute resolution process established under Articles 11 to 13 is deliberately and necessarily framed in the CERD as forward-looking. The role and function of the Committee or the ad hoc Conciliation Commission thus presupposes that the situation to be reviewed is still in effect. There is no possible conceptual role for retrospective dispute resolution. 47.Thus, even on the hypothetical scenario that a State Party was failing to give effect to the provisions of the Convention at the time of a first referral to the Committee, the Committee is necessarily prevented from continuing to entertain or progress to an ad hoc Conciliation Commission a matter once that previous failure to give effect to CERD’s provisions has already been rectified. It is simply not the function or role of the Committee or any ad hoc Conciliation Commission to assign blame to States Parties for past transgressions. Thus, if the moving State cannot show an ongoing 51 See Articles 11.1, 12.1(a) and 13.1 of the CERD. 52 Article 13 of the CERD. Annex 16
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situation of prejudice to its nationals in respect of rights covered by the CERD at the
time when a decision is to be made on the admissibility of a case for the purposes of
appointing an ad hoc Conciliation Commission to deal with the matter, there is no place
for resort to conciliation under the CERD dispute resolution architecture.
48. In the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, a plurality of judges found as points of fact that,
at least as of July 2018, any adverse impact that may or may not have afflicted Qatari
nationals had been eliminated.53 For instance, Judge Crawford noted that Qatar had
failed to demonstrate that any measures directed at Qatari nationals were still in effect
or could still cause prejudice to their rights under the CERD. He acknowledged as an
established fact that the UAE took immediate action to assist any Qatari nationals
affected by its 5 June 2017 statement, to rectify any misunderstandings about the status
and rights of such individuals and to regularise the presence of such individuals in the
UAE.54 From this, Judge Crawford drew the conclusion that:
[i]t is not clear from the evidence that individuals are
continuing to suffer these consequences in July 2018. Most
of the reports by national and international organizations
submitted by Qatar relate to the period June to August
2017.55
49. Indeed, Judge Crawford noted that evidence on the record in the Pending ICJ CERD
Proceedings showed that “Qataris have entered or exited the UAE more than 8,000
times since June 2017 and that over 1,300 applications via the hotline system to enter
the UAE have been granted.”56 These conclusions of fact are based on evidence on the
record and they definitively refute the empty and unsupported allegations made by
Qatar.
50. Moreover, Judge Crawford emphasised that the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs
issued an official statement on 5 July 2018 clarifying the legal position of Qatari
nationals living in the UAE, namely that Qatari nationals “need not apply for
53 Evidence to this effect is also on the record with the Committee, having been annexed to UAE’s
Response, dated 7 August 2018.
54 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraphs 6 to 8.
55 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraph 9.
56 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraph 15.
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22 permission to continue residence in the UAE” and were encouraged to obtain prior permission for re-entry.57 51.Similarly, Judge Bhandari noted the UAE’s “unqualified statements that the declaration of 5 June 2017 has not been implemented or given effect to” and the fact that “[c]onversely, Qatar could not produce sufficiently cogent evidence, in writing or orally, to demonstrate that the declaration of 5 June 2017 has been implemented.”58 Judge Bhandari further found, referring to the above-mentioned statement by the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 July 2018, that the “unqualified undertaking by the UAE [has] removed the risk of irreparable prejudice in the circumstances”.59 52.It is also worth noting that, in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, Qatar based part of its allegations on a report of the Technical Mission of the OHCHR.60 This report relates to events which occurred many months before the ICJ’s determination. Its relevance to the circumstances prevailing at that moment and a fortiori the present moment is highly questionable and certainly has not been established by Qatar.61 53.Besides the empty assertion made by Qatar many months ago, there is nothing before the Committee even to suggest that the UAE is in violation of the CERD at this particular time. Indeed, it is notable in this respect that the submission in the instant case from the State of Qatar of 29 October 2018, although it post-dated the above-mentioned findings in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, did not even mention the statement by the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 July 2018. Even if the Committee were to accept Qatar’s complaint at face value, against the UAE’s insistent protestations that it is and always has been giving effect to the provisions of the CERD, subsequent judicial opinions by eminent ICJ judges, who have heard the same evidence 57 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraphs 12 to 16. 58 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bhandari, paragraph 3. 59 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bhandari, paragraph 9. 60 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), “OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17- 24 November 2017, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on human rights”, December 2017. This report is a gathering of information about the impact of the UAE-Qatar crisis on human rights in Qatar as of December 2017. In its report, the OHCHR concludes that the measures implemented by the UAE “have a potentially durable effect on the enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of those affected”, see at paragraph 60. The findings of the OHCHR in its report are relied upon by Qatar as factual evidence of “the violations of human rights caused by the unjust blockade and the unilateral coercive measures imposed on [the] country”; see CERD Provisional Measures Order, paragraph 37. 61 See CERD Provisional Measures Order, paragraphs 47 and 49. Annex 16
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that is before the Committee, confirm that at the very least as of July 2018, there is no
evidence that the UAE fails to give effect to the CERD. As a result, there is no ongoing
situation over which the Committee or any ad hoc Conciliation Commission has any
jurisdiction to seek to resolve through an amicable solution. To continue the procedure
before the Committee under such circumstances would be nonsensical and
irresponsible. As a result, the Committee must decline any jurisdiction to entertain
Qatar’s Article 11 Communication any further.
V. THE COMMITTEE MUST REJECT QATAR’S ARTICLE 11
COMMUNICATION FOR LACK OF ADMISSIBILITY
54. In this Section V, the UAE explains why Qatar’s Article 11 Communication is
inadmissible for any one of three independent reasons:
a. First, the Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication
because Qatar has failed to establish that local remedies have been exhausted
as required under Article 11.3 of the CERD;
b. Second, the Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11
Communication because Qatar, by commencing the Pending ICJ CERD
Proceedings, has abandoned the Article 11 process in favour of a judicial
procedure before the pre-eminent United Nations World Court now seised of
the very same dispute;
c. Finally, the Committee must also dismiss the proceeding because Qatar’s
Article 11 Communication constitutes an abuse of rights and process.
55. Whether taken separately or cumulatively, each of these grounds – addressed in turn in
further detail below – suffices to dispose of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication entirely.
As a result, if the Committee accepts even one of the above grounds, the Committee
must dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication as inadmissible and immediately
terminate the present procedure under Part II of the CERD.
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24 A.The Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because Qatar has failed to establish that local remedies have been invoked or exhausted as required under Article 11.3 of the CERD 56.In its Communication of 29 October 2018, Qatar refers the present matter to the Committee again pursuant to Article 11.2 of the CERD. Before advancing to the next step, i.e., any possible appointment by the Chairman of the Committee of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, the Committee is obligated by the terms of its jurisdiction under the CERD to establish that all domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted by persons on behalf of whom Qatar makes its Article 11 Communication. Article 11.3 of the CERD provides: The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged. 57.This rule is a reflection of the customary international law principle that States may not exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals by instituting international proceedings unless local remedies first have been exhausted.62 This well-established rule63 is embraced in ICJ jurisprudence64 and codified in the 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection65 and the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.66 It guarantees that “the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system.”67 62 See, e.g., General Assembly, Third Committee, Summary Meeting of the 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, at paragraph 42. 63 See Christopher F. Dugan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, Investor State Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2008), page 347. 64 See Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, at page 27; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (Italy v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 15, at paragraph 50; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 582, at paragraph 42. 65 See Article 14 of the 2006 Article on Diplomatic Protection (“[a] state may not present an international claim in respect of an injury to a national … before the injured person has … exhausted all local remedies”). 66 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001, vol. II(2), page 26 ff. (annexed to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 12 December 2001, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83). 67 See Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, at page 27; see also Ambatielos (Greece v. United Kingdom), (1956), XII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 83, at Annex 16
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58. The travaux préparatoires to the CERD confirm that this rule was adopted with near
consensus to operate as a preliminary condition for the bringing of inter-State
communications under the Convention. A proposal by the Tanzanian delegation to do
away with this essential requirement68 was emphatically opposed and rejected by
vote.69 Similar requirements can be found in numerous other human rights treaties.70
59. If available domestic remedies have not been exhausted in respect of an alleged
violation of the CERD, a communication made under Article 11 must be declared
inadmissible.71 The ICJ has previously held that:
Such an objection consists in the contention that there exists
a legal reason, even when there is jurisdiction, why the Court
should decline to hear the case, or more usually, a specific
claim therein. Such a reason is often of such a nature that the
matter should be resolved in limine litis, for example where
without examination of the merits it may be seen that there
has been a failure to comply with the rules as to nationality
of claims; failure to exhaust local remedies; the agreement of
the parties to use another method of pacific settlement; or
mootness of the claim.72
page 120 (“It is the whole system of legal protection, as provided by municipal law, which must have
been put to the test before a State, as the protector of its nationals, can prosecute the claim on the
international plane.”).
68 General Assembly, Third Committee, Summary Meeting of the 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965, UN
doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, paragraph 25 (Tanzania) (inclusion of a requirement of exhaustion “would be an
escape clause for any signatory which did not wish to apply the Convention in good faith”).
69 See General Assembly, Third Committee, Summary Meeting of the 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965,
UN doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, paragraph 57: (the Tanzanian proposal was rejected by 2 votes for, 70 votes
against, and 12 abstentions); see also at paragraph 28 (Italy): (“States should be left as free as possible to
deal with a case through domestic procedures, for it was a recognized international principle that all
domestic remedies should be exhausted before a matter was referred to an international body”); and at
paragraph 48 (Senegal): (the requirement to exhaust local remedies would “prevent a proliferation of
complaints at the international level”).
70 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 41.1 (c); European Convention on
Human Rights as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 and supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7,
12, 13 and 16 (“European Convention on Human Rights”), Article 35. Other human rights bodies have
also drawn on the customary general principles relating to exhaustion of domestic remedies, and have
required the exhaustion of all remedies that are available and effective. See, e.g., HRC, Communication
No. 669/1995, Malik v. The Czech Republic, Decisions of 21 October 1998, UN doc.
CCPR/C/64/D/669/1995, at paragraph 6.2.
71 See, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia
v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 456, paragraph 120 (failure to
exhaust local remedies is normally considered as a question relating to the admissibility of the claim).
See also J. R. Crawford and T. D. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies,” Max Planck Encyclopaedia of
Public International Law (2007), paragraph 5.
72 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v.
Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 456, paragraph 120.
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26 60.That a failure to exhaust local remedies must result in the inadmissibility of the complaint is further confirmed by the Committee’s jurisprudence with respect to the parallel procedure for hearing complaints from individuals under the mechanism described in Article 14 of the CERD.73 This jurisprudence has bearing mutatis mutandis on Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, as the requirement to exhaust local remedies is common to Articles 11 and 14 of the CERD. Furthermore, in the proceedings before the ICJ that bear upon this case, Qatar has acknowledged that the “local remedies requirement” applies both to the “inter-state procedure before the Committee and potentially a Conciliation Commission (Articles 11-13)” and to “an individual-State procedure before the CERD Committee (Article 14).”74 61.Under Article 11.3, CERD jurisprudence and customary international law, the requirement to exhaust local remedies may be dispensed with if there are no available remedies, if these are ineffective or if they are “unreasonably prolonged”.75 The bar is high for finding that local remedies need not be exhausted. The available exceptions do not pertain to, for instance, the likelihood of success or the difficulty or cost of the process. It is a matter of whether the municipal system of the respondent State is reasonably capable of providing effective relief.76 Indeed, in the context of individual communications under Article 14, the Committee has found the exception to be applicable only in exceptional situations. This has been the case, for example, when an administrative process had already lasted for two years in a matter that “did not require complex investigation”.77 62.Under customary international law, Qatar bears the burden “to prove that local remedies were indeed exhausted or to establish that exceptional circumstances relieved 73 See, Ahmad Najaati Sadic v. Denmark, CERD/C/62/D/25/2002 16 April 2003, Sarwar Seliman Mostafa v. Denmark, CERD/C/59/D/19/2000 15 August 2001, Nikolas Regerat et al. v. France, CERD/C/62/D/24/2002 16 April 2003, POEM and FASM v. Denmark, Communication No. 22/2002, 21 March 2003, U.N. Doc. No. CERD/C/62/D/22/2002. 74 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Response on behalf of the State of Qatar to the questions posed by Judge Cançado Trindade on Friday, 29 June 2018, 3 July 2018, at paragraph 8. 75 See, Article 15(a) of the Articles on Diplomatic Protection; Article 11.3 of the CERD. 76 See, Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Commentary to draft Article 15, paragraphs 3 to 4, ILC Yearbook 2006, vol. II(2), at pages 47 to 48. 77 CERD, Communication No. 33/2003, Mr. Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, Opinion of 9 March 2005, UN doc. CERD/C/66/D/33/2003, at paragraph 6.4. Annex 16
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[it]…of the obligation to exhaust available local remedies.”78 Customary international
law has bearing upon the CERD in this regard, as the relevant provision builds upon
that law and does not provide any specific rule on the allocation of the burden of proof.
63. Under its burden of proof, Qatar must show that local remedies have been exhausted
“in the case”, pursuant to the wording of Article 11.3.79 In other words, the case
referred to the Committee must be the same case for which available domestic remedies
have previously been exhausted. CERD jurisprudence also provides that local remedies
must be exhausted by the affected person or persons.80 It is thus incumbent upon Qatar
to demonstrate that, in a concrete case involving an affected individual on whose behalf
the present Article 11 Communication is made, all reasonably available domestic
remedies have been exhausted. Such remedies include administrative remedies, as well
as judicial ones.81
64. Qatar has failed to provide any concrete evidence that Qatari nationals have attempted
to invoke, let alone exhaust, the local remedies available under Emirati law to seek
redress for the supposed injuries they have suffered. Qatar has not established that such
remedies are unavailable as a result of measures taken by the UAE. Any perception on
behalf of Qatari nationals of a “campaign of hatred” is irrelevant to the Committee’s
determination on the issue of inadmissibility for failure to exhaust local remedies.
78 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary
Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 582, at paragraph 44; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), (Italy v. United
States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 15, at paragraph 53.
79 This follows from an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the text of the Convention, as prescribed
by the customary international law canon of treaty interpretation codified in Article 31 VCLT. This
construction finds further support from the CERD Committee’s jurisprudence with respect to the
identical condition under Article 14(7)(a) of the Convention. See CERD, Communication No. 22/2002,
POEM and FASM v. Denmark, Inadmissibility Decision of 19 March 2003, UN Doc.
CERD/C/62/D/22/2002, at paragraph 6.3; see also Communication No. 38/2006, Zentralrat Deutscher
Sinti und Roma et al. v, Germany, Opinion of 22 February 2008, UN Doc. CERD/C/72/D/38/2006, at
paragraph 7.4.
80 The Committee has rejected as inadmissible communications where domestic remedies have been
pursued by other organizations or individuals than those submitting the communication with the
Committee. See CERD, Communication No. 38/2006, Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma et al. v.
Germany, Opinion of 22 February 2008, UN Doc. CERD/C/72/D/38/2006, at paragraph 7.4;
Communication No. 22/2002, POEM and FASM v. Denmark, Inadmissibility Decision of 19 March
2003, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/D/22/2002, at paragraph 6.3.
81 See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary
Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 582, at paragraph 47. See also, e.g., HRC, Communication No.
1184/2003, Brough v. Australia, Views of 17 March 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1184/2003, at
paragraph 8.6; Communication No. 1403/2005, Gilberg v. Germany, Inadmissibility Decision of 25 July
2006, UN doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1403/2005, paragraph 6.5. See further Article 14(2) of the Articles on
Diplomatic Protection; see also Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Commentary to draft Article 14,
paragraph 5, ILC Yearbook 2006, vol. II(2), at page 45.
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28 Similarly, anecdotal accounts of individuals’ mistrust or paranoia in respect of the remedies available, including administrative remedies such as hotlines and other application procedures set up by the UAE,82 are merely self-interested assertions by Qatar and do not constitute evidence of anything. They certainly do not mean that such remedies are unavailable, ineffective or unreasonably prolonged. Such feelings in individuals, even were they fact, do not absolve them of the obligation to seek and exhaust local remedies before escalating the matter to an international dispute. The Committee itself has clarified in respect of individual communications that mere doubts on the part of the petitioner as to the effectiveness of domestic remedies do not absolve a petitioner from pursuing them.83 Finally, Qatar has not even argued, let alone established, that the resort to local remedies in the UAE is unreasonably prolonged such that local remedies need not be exhausted in the instant case. 65.To the contrary, numerous effective domestic remedies are available within the UAE to any Qatari nationals who claim to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the CERD. Qatari nationals in the UAE have at all times been entitled to access the UAE’s courts. The right of access of individuals to the UAE judicial system is firmly recognized in the UAE Constitution.84 Article 41 of the UAE Constitution guarantees the rights of individuals to challenge perceived violations of their rights and freedoms by filing “a complaint with a competent authority, including a judicial entity.”85 Further, Article 40 of the UAE Constitution enshrines that: Foreigners in the UAE enjoy the rights and freedoms stipulated in the applicable international instruments or in the treaties and conventions to which the UAE is a party and have to perform the duties which correspond to those rights and freedoms.86 66.Importantly, access to courts specifically to resolve complaints against the UAE Government is guaranteed by Article 102 of the Constitution, which states that: 82 See Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, 8 March 2018, paragraphs 44 and 81. 83 Communication No. 19/2000, Sarwar Seliman Mostafa v. Denmark, Inadmissibility Decision of 10 August 2001, UN Doc. CERD/C/59/D/19/2000, at paragraph 7.4; Communication No. 21/2001, D.S v. Sweden, Inadmissibility Decision of 10 August 2001, UN Doc. CERD/C/59/D/21/2001, at paragraphs 4.2 to 4.3; Communication No. 47/2010, Kenneth Moylan v. Australia, Inadmissibility Decision of 27 August 2013, UN doc. CERD/C/83/D/47/2010, at paragraph 6.5. 84 See UAE Constitution, Articles 40, 41 and 102 (2011). 85 UAE Constitution, Article 41 (2011). 86 UAE Constitution, Article 40 (2011). Annex 16
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[t]he UAE shall have one or more Federal Court of First
Instance which shall sit in the permanent capital city of the
UAE or in certain capital cities of the Emirates. A Federal
Court of First Instance has, within the territory of its
jurisdiction, the powers to hear … civil, commercial and
administrative disputes between the UAE and an individual
no matter whether the UAE is the plaintiff or the
defendant…87
67. The rights and freedoms guaranteed under CERD are therefore amongst the rights and
freedoms that can be directly vindicated through complaints to competent authorities,
including judicial entities. Court remedies in the UAE are available and effective and
can be pursued without difficulty, either in person or through powers of attorney.
Numerous effective administrative remedies are also available to Qatari nationals –
including through powers of attorney – to the extent that any violation of the CERD is
perceived in the form of complaint procedures specific to various governmental
authorities.88
68. Through the use of powers of attorney, available and effective local remedies may be
accessed by Qatari nationals whether or not they are physically present in the UAE.
Qatar has put forward not a shred of evidence, despite multiple opportunities to do so,
of a single Qatari national seeking to avail himself or herself of these readily available
and effective procedures if any violation of the protections in CERD is perceived.
69. Following from this, it is not surprising that evidence already submitted by the UAE
shows that Qataris can, and do, continue to use local remedies available to them in the
UAE.89 Contrary to Qatar’s allegations, the court system remains fully open to Qatari
nationals without any discrimination.90 The use by Qatari nationals of the UAE judicial
87 UAE Constitution, Article 102 (2011).
88 By way of example, the Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department (the “Department”) is tasked
pursuant to Law No. (32) of 2008 and Law No. (3) of 1996 with receiving complaints and claims made
against the Government of Dubai. Qatari nationals can file a complaint against a Dubai government
entity through the Department’s website. The Department requests and receives feedback from the
appropriate government entity in response to each complaint. The Department then attempts to settle the
dispute amicably and if this cannot be achieved, a formal statement is issued to that effect. If no
settlement is reached within two months, the complainant can file claims directly against the government
entity before the UAE courts. See Government of Dubai website “Complaints Against Government
Entities,” https://legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Services/Pages/Services-Desc.aspx?Service…; Government
of Dubai website “Complaint filed against a Government Entity,”
https://cms.legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Website/Pages/ComplaintAgainstGovernm….
89 UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, paragraphs 62 to 63.
90 In the period of June 2017 to June 2018, Qatari nationals have made frequent use of the UAE courts for
various dispute resolution and status applications. See, for example, the fact that 390 commercial
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30 system is due, no doubt in part, to its ease of access; in particular, a number of courts in the UAE provide various e-services for the filing of a claim.91 70.As there are and have been no restrictions on Qataris using this system, these remedies continue to be available and effective. In fact, Qatari nationals use the UAE judicial system in significant numbers in other areas of activity. It is striking that Qatar has made no allegation they have done so in order to complain of any violations of the CERD. Accordingly, even if the UAE were not giving effect to the provisions of the CERD (quod non), this Committee has no power to hear the Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because Qatar has failed to demonstrate that any Qatari nationals who have allegedly suffered CERD violations have in fact invoked and exhausted the local remedies available to them in the UAE. 71.Since Qatar has failed to overcome the admissibility hurdle in Article 11.3 CERD, the Committee must dismiss its Article 11 Communication and discontinue any further procedure addressing that communication. B.The Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because Qatar, by commencing proceedings before the ICJ, has abandoned the Article 11 process 72.While Article 22 of the CERD does envisage that States can resort to the ICJ to settle disputes with respect to the interpretation or application of the Convention, it makes this recourse available only at the end of a carefully crafted linear and hierarchical process. Article 22 provides: Any dispute between two or more States parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International licences to Qatari nationals were either granted or renewed in the period 5 June 2017 to 13 June 2018, pursuant to UAE’s Response dated 7 August 2018, Annex 4, page 14 and Annex 13. Similarly, more than 160 cases were pursued by Qatari nationals before the UAE courts during the relevant time period, see UAE’s Response dated 7 August 2018, Annex 16; see also for similar data Annex 18. 91 See Government of Dubai website “Case Registration Services,” https://www.dxbpp.gov.ae/portal/Services.aspx; see also Abu Dhabi Judicial Department website “eService,” https://www.adjd.gov.ae/EN/Pages/EserviceHome.aspx. Annex 16
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Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to
another mode of settlement.
73. It is clear from the plain wording of this provision that the CERD envisages that the
treaty-specific dispute resolution mechanism it offers to its States Parties should be
explored and exhausted before escalating to an ICJ process. Nevertheless, Qatar
submitted the matter for the consideration of the ICJ while the CERD Article 11
process was still underway or in fact had not even properly commenced. Qatar has thus
submitted the present matter both to this Committee and to the ICJ. The two
proceedings relate to the same factual situation, concern the same alleged violations and
apply the same international legal framework. After making its initial Article 11
Communication to the Committee, Qatar allowed the passage of no more than a third of
the time prescribed under the CERD for the UAE to provide a written explanation,92
before making an application to the ICJ.93 Having done so, and having obtained the
CERD Provisional Measures Order from the ICJ, Qatar now comes back to the
Committee and seeks to resume the very process it has previously bypassed in favour of
the ICJ.
74. Through its actions Qatar has created a lis pendens situation, where two parallel
proceedings bearing on the exact same dispute are progressing simultaneously. The
dangers and disadvantages of litigation tactics that induce parallel proceedings are well
documented:
Such duplicative practices draw heavily on scarce judicial
resources, carry the risk of legal havoc, which might be
caused by inconsistent decisions, and place an undue burden
on some or all of the parties due to increased litigation
expenses and reduced legal certainty . . . The co-existence of
two or more simultaneous proceedings before different fora
places an unusually heavy burden on the parties to litigation,
which are required to maintain two legal teams or shuttle
between two or more tribunals. It also entails the investment
of unnecessarily duplicative judicial time and resources by
courts and tribunals that are faced with similar (if not
92 Article 11.1 of the CERD.
93 Application instituting proceedings in the International Court of Justice (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates),
11 June 2018.
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32 identical) tasks and yet are unable to rely on the work of each other.94 75.By prosecuting these two procedures simultaneously, Qatar violates the principle of electa una via non datur recursus ad alteram (“when one way has been chosen, no recourse is given to another”, sometimes known as the principle of election): The choice of a specific forum can be perceived as indicative of the intent to resolve the dispute in the selected forum to the exclusion of all alternative fora. This means that a party is estopped from initiating parallel proceedings or relitigating a settled case if the first-in-time forum was seized on his or her initiative (or with that party’s approval).95 76.By failing to respect this principle, Qatar has sought to abuse the CERD complaints mechanism process and its rights under the CERD by pursuing in parallel the very same CERD complaint against the UAE before two mutually exclusive fora. This is in direct violation of the hierarchical and linear dispute resolution architecture of the CERD. 77.If the Committee nevertheless proceeds with the CERD process, there will no longer be a linear and incremental dispute resolution procedure, as set out in the CERD. This would turn the CERD complaints mechanism from a hierarchical and linear process into an “all you can eat” buffet, where States Parties are allowed to parse the aspects of that process they believe will work in their favour and manipulate the process to fit a grander and, importantly, extra-legal scheme or strategy. The UAE respectfully invites the Committee to consider the broader implications to its legitimacy that are embedded in Qatar’s conduct. If the Committee were to allow the present Article 11 Communication to continue – notwithstanding that the ICJ is presently seised of the very same dispute (as a result of Qatar’s improper and extra-jurisdictional application to it), between the very same Parties and commenced under the very same instrument – it would cause the breakdown of the legitimate institutions established by the CERD and make a mockery of both the CERD dispute resolution mechanism’s systemic integrity and the procedural rights of the UAE. 94 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2003), pages 155 to 156. 95 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2003), page 23. Annex 16
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78. With respect, the Committee must therefore decline to entertain Qatar’s complaint as a
matter of inadmissibility. In the UAE’s respectful submission, the termination of the
present Article 11 process is a necessary consequence of Qatar’s decision to abandon
the Article 11 process by invoking the formal ICJ procedure under Article 22 of the
CERD, which may be accessed only after the cumulative preconditions that any dispute
has “not been settled either by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for
in this Convention” – including the procedures under Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD –
have been met.
79. With respect, given that Qatar has abandoned the present process by commencing the
Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, the Committee must now yield to the ICJ procedures.
It would be absurd and paradoxical for the Committee to proceed in parallel at a time
when the ICJ, as the pre-eminent World Court in the United Nations system, remains
seised of the very same question in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings. To continue
in parallel would jeopardise the systemic integrity of the system and risk resulting in
fragmented jurisprudence. It would wreak irreparable harm on the procedural rights of
the UAE, which would be required to defend itself against the same allegations in two
simultaneous and overlapping procedures. Such an approach would be particularly
indefensible in the present case given that, in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, a
plurality of Judges at the ICJ has already rejected unequivocally the view expressed by
a differently constituted CERD Committee that the CERD may cover differences of
treatment on the basis of nationality.96
C. The Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication
since that communication amounts to no more than empty speculation and
thus constitutes an abuse of rights and process
80. As demonstrated above, Qatar has failed, despite many of opportunities to do so, to
present even a shred of evidence of any ongoing discrimination against Qatari nationals
– still less, any discrimination actually falling within the scope of the CERD on the
basis of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin as required under Article 1(1).
96 See Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian, paragraph 5, noting that “[i]t would be
difficult to give weight to this view of the CERD Committee since it gives no reason for its interpretation
that different treatment based on nationality constitutes racial discrimination under CERD, albeit only to
a certain extent”.
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34 Indeed, Qatar cannot produce any evidence as its allegations are without foundation either in fact or in law. Its Article 11 Communication cannot be deemed admissible within the CERD complaints mechanism because it amounts to no more than empty speculation and abuse of process. 81.Allegations that are completely without merit on fact and law should not be further entertained under Article 11 of the CERD, still less under the further procedures under Articles 12 and 13. In particular, empty allegations with no basis in law or fact cannot be used to found the constitution of any Article 12 Conciliation Commission and should be preliminarily dismissed. Although the Conciliation Commission is not a judicial body, it is a fact-finding body and its findings may result in reputational damage to the responding State. The Conciliation Commission’s review of the matter, if allowed to continue, will result in the preparation of a report, to which Qatar will be allowed to append a declaration where it may seek to make damning statements about the UAE to affect its standing among its peers. As noted above, it should be unthinkable for this Committee to choose sides in the ongoing geopolitical dispute between, on the one hand, Qatar and its support for terrorism, and, on the other hand, almost all other States in the world. The UAE respectfully urges the Committee to dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication as baseless speculation intended only to further Qatar’s hostile agenda in the region and beyond. 82.It is worth noting that nothing in the ICJ’s CERD Provisional Measures Order runs contrary to this position. This is because the ICJ in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings has thus far evaluated Qatar’s allegations only against a lower threshold of “plausibility” relevant to the provisional measures stage.97 As pointed out by Judge Crawford, the Court failed to identify any evidence to support the further statement that the situation of Qataris residing in the UAE prior to 5 June 2017 appears to remain 97 See CERD Provisional Measures Order, paragraphs 43 to 44: “At this stage of the proceedings, the Court, however, is not called upon to determine definitively whether the rights which Qatar wishes to see protected exist; it need only decide whether the rights claimed by Qatar on the merits, and for which it is seeking protection, are plausible. Moreover, a link must exist between the rights whose protection is sought and the provisional measures being requested”. The “plausibility” threshold is described by Judge ad hoc Cot as “rather low”, see Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 23 July 2018, Opinion Dissidente of Judge ad hoc Cot, paragraph 5. Annex 16
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vulnerable with regard to their rights under Article 5 of the CERD.98 Most importantly,
the Court failed to mention UAE’s Statement of 5 July 2018.99
83. By submitting, in bad faith, a self-serving application based purely on unilateral
speculation, Qatar abuses its rights to resort to the process under Article 11 of the
CERD. If allowed, Qatar may manage to force the UAE to submit to a futile and
redundant fact-finding procedure that will amount to nothing more than an opportunity
for Qatar to engage in further public relations theatrics. This is not what the dispute
resolution mechanisms of the CERD was intended to achieve. It would tarnish the
CERD for it to become a tool of cynical State Party diplomacy.
84. It would be consistent with a good faith interpretation of the CERD in light of its object
and purpose, as provided for in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,100 to require of Qatar to have proved a genuine case to answer before
progressing the matter to an ad hoc Conciliation Commission. Otherwise, the
Committee will expose the CERD procedure to the risk of abuse of process by Qatar.
The Committee is respectfully urged to prevent such abuse by dismissing Qatar’s
Article 11 Communication as inadmissible. In this respect, the Committee is reminded
of its compétence de la compétence under public international law and its role, assigned
to it under Article 11.3, to ensure that the CERD complaints mechanism is not
burdened by claims that do not meet the fundamental criteria of admissibility.
VI. ANY ACTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO ENTERTAIN FURTHER OR
PROGRESS QATAR’S ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION WOULD BE ULTRA
VIRES
85. Through its procedural tactics, Qatar has made any recourse to the dispute resolution
process under Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD moot. Through its 11 June 2018
application to the ICJ, it abandoned the CERD process. By doing so, Qatar has
deprived the Committee of its role and its authority to act. There is no longer any
98 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraph 14.
99 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paragraph 14.
100 Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary
(Springer 2012), page 587, paragraph 59.
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36 jurisdiction for the Committee to move forward with Qatar’s complaint and no proper role for the lower-hierarchy stages of the CERD dispute resolution process to play. Indeed, it is imperative that the CERD Committee presently leave the matter where Qatar itself has placed it: into the hands of the ICJ in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings. 86.Qatar cannot feasibly and in good faith litigate against the UAE in formal judicial proceedings under the CERD while simultaneously seeking to pursue the recommendatory conciliation process under Articles 11 to 13. Despite this, Qatar – having commenced and while continuing to pursue the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings – now seeks to resume the Article 11 to 13 process to achieve a two-pronged legal attack on the UAE. For the Committee to accept this abuse of its process would undermine the broader perception of legitimacy of the Committee and the CERD dispute resolution mechanisms. Fatally for Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, it would be ultra vires the Committee’s jurisdiction for the Committee to accept this abuse of process. It is not within the Committee’s competence to entertain a recommendatory conciliation process which the moving Party has abandoned by jumping ahead to the CERD’s formal judicial process under Article 22. Furthermore, were the Committee to endorse and reward Qatar’s tactics, it risks setting a dangerous procedural precedent, allowing States Party to the CERD to pick and choose the order and timing of the different dispute resolution options in the CERD in a manner wholly incompatible with the procedural rights of the responding Party. VII.CONCLUSION 87.For the reasons set out above in this Supplemental Response and in the previous submissions of the UAE before the Committee, the UAE respectfully requests that the Committee dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication in limine for lack of jurisdiction and/or lack of admissibility. 88.The UAE reserves the right to respond to any communication submitted by Qatar in this matter and respectfully requests the Committee to make provision for such responses in any time-table or order it may intend to make. Annex 16
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89. The UAE takes this opportunity to reaffirm its unwavering commitment to eliminating
racial discrimination in all of its forms and to combating hate speech.
Dated 29 November 2018
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Annex 17
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Response of the United Arab Emirates on the Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility to the request made by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of
the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 January 2019 (with Annexes)
223
In a matter before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial DiscriminationICERD-ISC-2018/2SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE ON ISSUES OF JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITYof the United Arab Emirates pursuant to the Decision adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination during its 97thSession (26 November–14 December 2018)to the request made by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discriminationsubmitted to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office, Geneva, Switzerland on14January 2019
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PageI.INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1II.CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE AND LACK OF EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGATIONS..................3III.LACK OF JURISDICTION......................................................................................................9A.The CERD Does Not Prohibit Differentiated Treatment Based on Current Nationality...............................................................................................................9B.The CERD Committee’s Jurisdiction Extends Only to Current and Ongoing Violations of CERD, Not Allegations of Past Conduct.........................12IV.LACK OF ADMISSIBILITY..................................................................................................14A.The Committee Must Decline to Hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication Because Qatar’s Initiation of Parallel Proceedings Undermines the Integrity of the Dispute Resolution Provisions of CERD and of the ICJ..............14B.The Committee Must Decline to Hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication Since the Communication Amounts to No More Than Empty Speculation and Thus Constitutes an Abuse of Rights and Process..........................................20C.The CommitteeMust Decline to Hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication Because Qatar Has Failed to Establish that Local Remedies Have Been Invoked or Exhausted Under Article 11(3) of the CERD.....................................22V.CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................30
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I.Introduction 1.The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates (the “UAE”) to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) and refers to the Office of the High Commissioner’s Noteof 14 December 2018 (ICERD-ISC 2018/2) in which the Office of the High Commissioner transmits a decision taken by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the “Committee” or the “CERD Committee”) at its 97thSession(the “Decision”)concerning the Communication under Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD” or the “Convention”), submitted by the State of Qatar(“Qatar”)to the Committee on 8 March 2018 (“Qatar’s Article 11 Communication”).2.The Decision requests the UAEto “inform the Committee whether it wishes –within a period of one month after the receipt of this request –to supply any relevant information on issues of jurisdiction of the Committee or admissibility of the communication, including the exhaustion of all available domestic remedies.”13.In response to theDecision,the UAEhas the honour to submit the present Supplemental Response on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility. This submission mustbe read together with the Response and Supplemental Response submitted by the UAE on 7 August 2018 and on 29 November 2018, respectively, in connection with these CERD Committee proceedings (“CERD Committee Proceedings”). 4.In particular, the arguments concerning issues of jurisdiction and admissibility set out in the UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018 (the “29 November 2018 Submission”) are hereby confirmed. The UAEthereforedraws the attention of the Members of the Committee to the arguments set out in the 29 November 2018 Submission, which provide more than sufficient grounds on which the Committee may 1Note from the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), dated 14 December 2018 (ICERD-ISC 2018/2).
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-2-proceed to dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication out of hand for lack of jurisdiction and for being inadmissible. 5.In light of the detailed arguments and information set out in the 29 November 2018 Submission, the UAE could have seized the possibility, mentioned in the Committee’s Decision, to state that it wished “to confine” its reply “to the information already contained in [its] previous notes.”2 It has decided not to do so for two reasons. First, because it considers that it may be of help to the Committee to have at its disposal a synthetic statement of the UAE’s objections to jurisdiction and admissibility, which moreover takes account of additional relevant evidence relating to the past several months.3 In stark contradiction to the unsupported claims of Qatar, such evidence clearly establishes the continuing freedom of entry to the UAE by Qatari nationalsand, importantly in relation to the questions before the Committee, the accessibility of the UAE courts to Qatari nationals. Second, because the UAEconsiders necessary, for legal and policy reasons, to develop further the arguments concerning the relationship between theseCERD Committee Proceedings and those pending before the International Court of Justice(“ICJ”or “Court”)(“Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings”). Both proceedings involvethe same parties and the same factual allegations and legal arguments.46.Thissubmission is organized as follows. Section II contains general remarks on the context of the dispute and the fatal lack of evidentiary support for Qatar’sclaims. Section III summarizes the UAE’s objections to the Committee’s jurisdiction, adding a number of observations related to recent developments which further reinforce the strength of those objections. Section IV then restatesthe UAE’s objections to admissibility of Qatar’sclaims, including further considerations based on the pending case on the same matter before the ICJand the lack of exhaustion of local remedies in accordance with Article 11.3 of the Convention. Finally, Section V offerssome concluding remarks. 2Id.3Seeparas. 8-12, infra.4Seeparas. 25-38,infra.
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-3-II.Context of the Dispute and Lack of Evidence of the AllegationsQatariNationals are not Mistreated or Targeted by the UAE7.The complaint Qatar has brought before this Committeerelates to allegations that theUAE has carried out a series of measures targeting Qatari nationals. As the UAE has explained in two previous submissions, and as it will further elaborate in this submission, those allegations are false. While the UAE has, along with twelveother States,severed or downgraded diplomatic relations with Qatar5and, for the reasons stated in paragraphs 14-16below,taken certain other lawfulmeasures torestrictair transportation, postal service and trade(measures which do not in any case implicate obligations under CERD), it has, since the break in diplomatic relationson 5 June 2017, taken only one measure directly affecting the treatmentof Qatari nationals. That one measure was the introduction of minimal, cost-free,requirements on the entry of Qatari nationals into the UAE, essentiallyrequiring that they apply for and obtain approval for such entries. These requirements are less burdensome than a typical entry visa which the UAE requires of nationals of many other States around the world. Prior to the current diplomatic crisis between Qatar and the UAE, Qataris enjoyed visa-free access to the UAE as did members of other neighbouring countries. By revoking these privileges and requiring Qataris to meet minimal entry requirements, the UAE is not violating the rights of Qataris or any 5Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Chad, Comoros, the Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal and Yemen also severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. SeeDeclaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 4 June 2017, available at: http://www.sis.gov.eg/section/7278/7261?lang=en-us#1, Declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 5 June 2017, available at: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637327, Kingdom of Bahrain MinistryForeign Affairs News Details, “Statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the severance of diplomaticrelations with the State of Qatar”, 5 June 2017, available at: https://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=7824&ItemId=7474&language=en…,“Chad shuts down Qatar embassy”, Emirates News Agency, 23 August 2017, available at: http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302628900, “Comoros severs diplomatic relations with Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency, 7 June 2017, available at:https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1638089, “Statement by the Government of Maldives”,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Maldives, 5 June 2017, available at: https://www.foreign.gov.mv/index.php/en/mediacentre/news/3905-statement…,“La Mauritanie décide de rompre ses relations diplomatiques avec Qatar”, Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 6 June 2017, available at: http://fr.ami.mr/Depeche-41008.html,“Senegal, Gabon join boycott of Qatar”, Middle East Monitor, 9 June 2017, available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170609-senegal-gabon-join-boycott-o…,“Yemen cuts diplomatic ties with Qatar: state news agency”, Reuters, 5 June 2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-yemen-idUSKBN18W0RS. Additionally, Jordan and Niger downgraded diplomatic relations with Qatar. See“Jordan downgrades relations with Qatar and bans Al Jazeera”, The National, 7 June 2017, available at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/jordan-downgrades-relations-with-qatar…, “Niger recalls ambassador to Qatar”, Khaleej Times, 10 June 2017, available at: https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/qatar-crisis/niger-recalls-ambassad….
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-4-provision of any international instrument, including CERD, but is merely eliminating an advantage it previously extended to one particular nationality. Notably, in D.F. v. Australia, where a New Zealand petitioner ceased to enjoy rights exclusively granted by Australia to New Zealanders, this Committee found no violation of CERD,noting that the act implementing the change “did not result in the operation of a distinction but rather in the removal of a distinction which had placed the petitioner and all New Zealand citizens in a more favourable position compared to other non-citizens.”68.That suchcost-free entry requirements are indeed minimal is evidenced by the number of Qatari nationals who have, since 5 June 2017, entered and exited the UAEdespite the politicaldifficulties between the two countries. The UAE has submitted uncontested evidence to this Committeeand to the ICJproving that,from 5 June 2017 through June 2018,“Qatari nationals have entered and exited the UAE on over 8,000 occasions”.7 Updated evidence submitted herewith for the Committee’s consideration demonstrates that from 9 July2018through 31 December 2018, 3,563 applications by Qatari nationals were lodged with the UAE authorities for entry permits to the UAE, 3,353 of which were accepted.8 The actual registered entries and exits of Qatari nationals into and out of the UAE from 1 June 2018 through 31 December 2018amounted to 2,876.99.The UAE respectfully requests the Committeeto take particular note that at no time, whether in the course of the proceedings before this Committee or in the proceedings 6CERD, Communication No. 39/2006, D.F. v. Australia, Opinion of 22 February 2008, UN doc. CERD/C/72/D/39/2006, para. 7.1.7SeeApplication of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order, 23 July 2018, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford (“Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford”), para.7, citing to evidence submitted by the UAE in the ICJ proceedings. The same evidence was attached as Annex 5to the UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018. 8Annex1, Letter from the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship,dated 10 January 2019, summarizing statistics and attaching detailed records in tables in Excel files regarding those statistics. See, in particular, Annex1.2, [Excel Redacted] Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018 (Arabic original, English translation).9Annex1, Letter from the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship,dated 10 January 2019, summarizing statistics and attaching detailed records in tables in Excel files regarding those statistics. See, in particular, Annex1.1, [Excel Redacted] Entrance and Exit for Qatari Nationals from 1 June 2018 until 31 December 2018 (Arabic original; English translation).
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-5-before the ICJaddressing the same factual and legal allegations, has Qatar contested or rebutted this evidence.10.Neither has Qatar contested nor rebutted the evidence put forwardby the UAE demonstrating that Qatari nationals continue to reside freely in the UAE, as clarified by the statement of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of 5 July 2018.10 Thedocumentary evidence submitted by the UAE showsthat there are thousands of Qatari nationals thatcontinue to visit and reside in the UAE.11 As of June2018, the number of Qataris in the UAE amounted to 2,194.12 In addition to thesefigures and those mentioned in paragraph 8above of Qataris entering or exiting the UAE since the beginning of the crisis in June 2017 until the end of 2018, the UAE Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship has confirmed that as of 10 January 2019 there are 702 Qatari nationals residing in the UAE who hold UAE identification documents.1311.There is only one conclusion theCommittee may reasonably draw from the evidence presented to it, which is that, contrary to the unfounded statements made by Qatar to this Committee,Qatarinationals are free to enter and exit the UAEandare in fact doing soin large numbers.Moreover,Qatari nationals continue residing in the UAEin the same manner asthey didbefore 5 June 2017. 10“An Official Statement by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation”, 5July 2018, available at: https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem…(“The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation wishes to confirm that Qatari citizens already resident in the UAE need not apply for permission to continue residence in the UAE.”). 11Annex1, Letter from the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship,dated 10 January 2019, summarizing statistics and attaching detailed records in tables in Excel files regarding those statistics. See also, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.United Arab Emirates),Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of28 June 2018, at 10:00 a.m.(CR 2018/13), p.12, para. 9(Alnowais). 12Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.United Arab Emirates),Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of 28 June 2018, at 10:00 a.m.(CR 2018/13), p. 64, para. 27 (Shaw). 13Annex1, Letter from the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship,dated 10 January 2019, summarizing statistics and attaching detailed records in tables in Excel files regarding those statistics. See, in particular, Annex1.3, [Excel Redacted] Holders of UAE Resident Permits (Arabic Original, English Translation).
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-6-12.Other evidence of particular relevancefor this Committee which has remained unrebutted by Qatar throughout these CERD Committee Proceedingsand the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedingsincludesthat related to:a.The unrestricted access Qatari nationalsin or outside the UAE have to domestic courts in the UAE. The evidence submitted by the UAE shows that Qatari nationals have appeared as plaintiffsor defendants before the UAE courts hundreds of timessince June 2017.14b.The number of Qatari nationals in the UAE who have received or are receiving medical treatmentat UAE medical facilities. The records show over 300 visits from July 2017 onward by Qatari nationals to hospitals and clinics within the UAE.15c.The number of Qatari nationals who are enrolled in UAE educational institutions. On this, a 3 January 2019 letter from the Ministry of Education shows that the number of Qatari students who continue to study in all Emirates and at all levelsof study for the academic year2017/2018 amounts to 477 and for the academic year 2018/2019this number amounts to 310.16d.The number of Qatari nationals who own or are engaged in operating licensed businesses in the UAE;17and e.The continuous enjoyment byQatari nationals of their right to property in the UAE, which is evidenced by their ability to own, purchase, sell and manage real 14See, e.g., UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, Annex 16 (International Judicial Cooperation Department –Ministry of Justice Letter) and Annex 18 (Judicial Records). Annex 2, Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen and being examined by the UAE courts in the period 6 June 2017 until 25 September 2018. These statistics are broken down by the Federal Courts and in some cases they contain information on the courts of some of the emirates. 15UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, para. 44, citing to Annex 8 “Health–Qataris with Daman Health Insurance”, pp. 13-19. 16Annex 3, Letter from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, dated 3 January 2019. See also, UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, para. 51, citing to Annex 11 (Immigration -Student Entry Records) and Annex 12 (Qatari Student Records). 17UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, paras. 52-54, citing to Annex 4 (Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 14) and Annex 13 (Commercial Licenses –Sample Materials).
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-7-estate in the UAE, including through the execution of powers of attorney.18 Regarding powers of attorney, statistics of the Federal Court in the period 6June 2017 to 25September 2018 indicate that there were146 powers of attorney granted by Qatari citizens.1913.Again, the UAE respectfully calls upon the Committee to take due notice that Qatar has not contested this empirical evidence with anything other than unsupported and sensationalized vitriol.20 Qatar’s silence in the face of the facts and its inability to reply in any coherent or direct manner to theevidencesubmitted by the UAEconfirms that Qatar’s allegations before this Committee of mistreatment of Qatari nationals by the UAE are false.Qatar’s Support for Extremist Violence and Terrorism Caused the Gulf Crisis14.In its previous two submissions, the UAE also asked the Committee to consider that the lawful measures taken by the UAE on 5 June 2017 did not occur in a vacuum. The context is thepersistent and pernicious support by Qatar for extremist and terrorist groupstargeting ethnic and religious minorities, established governmentsand regional stability. This conduct led in 2013 and 2014 to the conclusion of a series of agreements among the Gulf States, including Qatar (the “Riyadh Agreements”21) under which Qataragreed to 18UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, paras. 55-57, citing to Annex 14 (Business –UAE Embassy –Authentication Records, pp.19-25), Annex 15 (Power of Attorney) and Annex 16 (International Judicial Cooperation Department –Ministry of Justice Letter). 19Annex 2, Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen and being examined by the UAE courts in the period 6 June 2017 until 25 September 2018, p.2. 20See, e.g., Note Verbaleof Qatar to the CERD Committee, dated 29 October 2018, requesting the Committee to re-initiate Qatar’s complaint against the UAE, in which Qatar states, without any support whatsoever, that “It is equally clear that Qataris do not have domestic remedies to invoke or exhaust in the United Arab Emirates. Any nominal remedies are either unavailable or ineffective in light of the expulsion of Qataris from the United Arab Emirates and ensuing travel restrictions, as well as the ongoing campaign of hatred against Qatar and Qataris in the territory of the United Arab Emirates.” No reference is made in this unsupported and outrageous statement to the documented ease of access to the UAE and its courts by Qatari nationals.21First Riyadh Agreement, 23 and 24 November 2013, United Nations Registration Number 55378 (“First Riyadh Agreement”); Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, 17 April 2014, United Nations Registration Number 55378 (“Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement”); Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, 16 November 2014, United Nations Registration Number 55378 (“Supplementary Riyadh Agreement”). The Parties to the Riyadh Agreements are: the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
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-8-cease support for such groups and to stop the promotion of hate speech, including through its state-owned media outlets such as Al-Jazeera Arabic.2215.The very existence of the Riyadh Agreements, and Qatar’s signing up to them,is in itself sufficient proof that Qatar was engaging in thevile behaviourthose agreements were intended to bring to an end;indeed,it is an admission by Qatar of thatbehaviour. Moreover, there is no dearth of other evidence of Qatar’s support for groups engaged in extremist violence, both before and after theconclusion of the Riyadh Agreements. The UAE brought this to the Committee’s attentionin summary fashionin its previous submissions. The UAE further noted that Qatar’s violation of the Riyadh Agreements is what directly led to the break in diplomatic relations between numerous States, including the UAE, and Qatar on or about 5 June 2017, as well as to the other measures then taken.23 Indeed, these events were foreshadowed by the Riyadh Agreements themselves, which provided that in the event any signatory were to violate them, “the other GCC Countries shall have the right to take any appropriate action to protect their security and stability.”2416.This context is relevant to the Committee’s consideration of this matternot only because it is important that the Members of the Committee appreciate the true nature and character of the Qatari government’s actions, but also because it helps explainwhy Qatar has been prepared to advance outright falsehoods in pursuing its aggressive campaign of legal actions alleging all manner of international responsibility against the UAE, including before this Committee. The answer is abundantly clear. It is through such falsehoods and exaggerations that Qatar seeks to distract attention and cover its own responsibility for its reprehensible behavior. 22Pursuant to the Riyadh Agreements, Qatar expressly undertook not to support “the Muslim Brotherhood or any organizations, groups or individuals that threaten the security of the [GCC] states” or any type of “antagonistic media”. First Riyadh Agreement, Articles 1 and 2. Qatar further undertook not to “give refuge, employ, or support […] any person or a media apparatus that harbours inclinations harmful to any [GCC] state”. Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Article 3(c). The Riyadh Agreements also expressly referred to Qatar’s State-owned and controlled news network Al Jazeera. Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Article 3(d).23UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, paras. 8-10; UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018, paras.10-12.24Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, p. 3 (“Thirdly: Compliance Procedures, 3. With regards to the internal security of the GCC Countries”).
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-9-III.Lack of Jurisdiction17.The Committee’s attention has previously been drawn to at least two jurisdictional grounds on which Qatar’s Article 11 Communication should be rejected. Theseare (i) Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outside the scope of the CERD; and (ii)the dispute resolution procedure under Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD is strictly confined to ongoing alleged breaches of the CERD,which under any view of the facts of this dispute are not present.A.The CERD Does Not Prohibit Differentiated Treatment Based on Current Nationality18.As elaborated in greater detail in theUAE’s 29 November 2018Submission, Qatar’scomplaint before the CERD Committee is entirely based on alleged differentiated treatment by the UAE of persons having Qatari nationality.25 While the UAE has provided overwhelming and unrebutted evidence to the Committee that it has not imposed such differentiated treatment on Qatari nationalsand that Qatari nationals enjoy the same or better rights in the UAE as persons of other non-UAE nationalities, the definition of racial discrimination under Article 1 of the CERD, and thus the protections provided under the Convention, do not in any case extend to distinctions based on current nationality.26 Therefore, any such distinctions, even if they were to exist(quod non), do not involve rights protected by the CERD and could not provide a basis on which to lodge a complaint with the CERD Committee. For the same reason, and because the CERD Committee’s jurisdictionextends only to circumstances in which a State Party “is not giving effect to the provisions of thisConvention”27, the Committee has no jurisdictionto entertain thedisputeor to progress it to an ad hocConciliation Commissionas that “dispute” simply does not relate to the provisions of the Convention. 25UAE’s Supplemental Responseof 29 November 2018, paras. 30-45. 26Id.27Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 11(1).
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-10-19.While the ICJin the Order for provisional measures rendered on 23 July 2018deferredthe “question whether the expression ‘national...origin’mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD, encompasses discrimination based on the ‘present nationality’of the individual”, holding that the Court “need not decide...which of these diverging interpretations of the Convention is the correct one,”28it shouldbe noted that not a single judge pronounced his or her support forQatar’s inclusion of current nationality as a prohibited basis of differentiated treatment under the CERD.20.On the contrary, a number of eminent judges whole-heartedly supported the opposite and self-evident conclusionthat nationality, as a basis for differentiated treatment, is not proscribed by the CERD. These include Judges Tomka, Gaja, Gevorgian, Crawford and Salam, whose reasoned views on this important issue, quoted below at length, the UAE respectfully urges the Committee to adopt:a)Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian stated in a Joint Declaration that: “When the Convention considers ‘national origin’as one of the prohibited bases for discrimination, it does not refer to nationality. In our view, the two terms are not identical and should not be understood as synonymous. The travaux préparatoiressupport this view and indicate that States sought to exclude distinction on the basis of nationality from the scope of CERD...The omission of a reference to nationality may be easily explained. Should CERD be considered as covering also discrimination based on nationality, the Convention would be a far-reaching instrument, that contains a clause providing that, with regard to the wide array of civil rights that are protected under CERD, all foreigners must be treated by the host State in the same way as nationals of the State who enjoy the most favourabletreatment.”29 28Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates),Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order, 23 July 2018,para. 27. 29Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates),Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order, 23 July 2018, Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian, para. 4.
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-11-b)Judge Crawford stated that the “legal difficulty” with Qatar’s request for provisional measures “is that Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) distinguishes on its face between discrimination on grounds of national origin (equated to racial discrimination and prohibited per se) and differentiation on grounds of nationality (not prohibited as such). Moreover, that distinction finds its reflection in widespread State practice giving preferences to nationals of some countries over others in matters such as the rights to enter or to reside, entitlement to social security, university fees and many other things, in peace and during armed conflict.”30c)Judge Salam stated that “the terms ‘national or ethnic origin’used in the Convention differ in their ordinary meaning to the term nationality. … The aim of CERD is thus to bring an end, in the decolonization and post-decolonization period, to all manifestations and governmental policies of discrimination based on racial superiority or hatred; it does not concern questions relating to nationality...This question of the distinction between ‘nationality’and ‘national origin’should not, in my view, admit of any confusion.They are two different notions. An example that clearly illustrates this difference is the well-known case of American citizens of Japanese origin who were incarcerated following the attack on Pearl Harbor during the Second World War.Despite having American nationality, these citizens were subject to racialdiscrimination based on their ‘national origin’, not their nationality, and were rounded up and held in ‘War Relocation Camps’. A similar type of discrimination based on ‘national origin’also affected a large number of individuals of German origin, regardless of their nationality at that time, in several countries after both the First and Second World Wars. I would also point out that the distinction to be drawn between ‘nationality’ and ‘national origin’is confirmed by the travaux préparatoires of CERD, particularly the proposed amendments to the wording of Article 1. In any event, had States wanted to say ‘nationality’rather than ‘national origin'in Article 30Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order, 23 July 2018,Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, para. 1.
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-12-1 of CERD, they could have done so.Likewise, theycould have used the wording ‘nationality and national origin’had they intended to include both categories, which they did not do.”3121.The UAE respectfully submits that the Committee should follow the sound reasoning supporting the views of these eminent ICJ judges.B.The CERDCommittee’s Jurisdiction Extends Only to Current and Ongoing Violations of CERD, Not Allegations of Past Conduct22.As elaborated in greater detail in the 29 November 2018 Submission, under Article 11 of the Convention, the jurisdiction of the Committee extends exclusively to allegations of ongoing and current conduct, rather than retrospective dispute resolution.32 This is clear from the ordinary meaning of the terms ofArticle 11, which permits a State Party to refer a matter to the Committee whenanother State Party “is notgiving effect” to the provisions of the Convention(emphasis added). This interpretation is confirmed when reading Article 11 in its context and in the light of its object and purpose. The only remedy envisaged in the CERD for the inter-State procedure is the facilitated negotiated amicable resolution of the situation. It must therefore be for the State submitting a complaint to make a credible case that there is a situation to resolve.23.Qatar has failed to do so. It has not provided the Committee with any probative evidence of any ongoing conduct by the UAE even arguably in violation of the Convention. Indeed, even as of the time of the ICJ hearing on provisional measures in June 2018 a number of judges noted the lack of evidence of any allegations of continuing effects on Qatari nationals sincethe break in diplomatic relations between the UAE and Qatar.33 Just as importantly, Qatar has not provided to the Committee any proofto contest or rebut 31Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order, 23July2018, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Salam, paras.3(c),5, 6, 7.32UAE’s Supplemental Responseof 29 November 2018, paras. 46-53.33See, e.g., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, para. 9 (“It is not clear from the evidence that individuals are continuing to suffer these consequences in July 2018. Most of the reports by national and international human rights organizations submitted by Qatar relate to the period June to August 2017.”); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 3.
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-13-the evidence which the UAE has submitted to this Committee demonstrating that the treatment afforded to Qatari nationals in the UAE at present (including with respect to entry and exit from the country, residence, health care, education, property ownership, conducting business affairs and access to judicial tribunals) reflects no hint of mistreatment or discrimination.3424.The information provided by Qatar in support of its complaint is generalized, exaggerated and outdated. It is noteworthy that the numerous publications issued by Qatar’sNational Human Rights Committee (the “NHRC”)since June 2018 on the alleged effects of the break in relations between the UAE and Qatar essentially restate the same anonymous claims previously included in other NHRCreports.35 Certainly, none of the information relied uponby Qatar is capable of demonstrating anything near a “campaign of hatred against Qatar and Qataris in the territory of the United Arab Emirates”.3625.Under these circumstances,the claims of “coercive measures” supposedly being inflicted by the UAE on Qatari nationals in a continuing “campaign of hatred” disingenuously advanced by Qatar lack all credibility. The UAE respectfully submitsthat the Committee therefore has no reasonable evidentiary basis on which toconsider that any allegations of violations of the Convention by the UAE may be ongoing. It would therefore be 34Seeparas.7-13, supra.35The UAE notes that the website of the Qatari National Human Rights Committee(“NHRC”)includes in its section entitled “Publications” a series of 9 short reports each entitled “Effects of the Blockade on” a specific human right, such as “the right to litigation”, “the right to private property”, “the right to family reunification”, “the right of education”, “the right to freedom of movement and residence”, amongst others. SeeQatar’s National Human Rights Committee, Publications, available at: http://nhrc-qa.org/en/publications/nhrc-publications/. These reports are pamphlets that contain information with statistics as of 25 April 2018 and that merely restatethe information contained inthe five NHRC reports that Qatar submitted to the ICJ. One such example is the NHRC’s report on “Effects of the Blockade on the right to litigation”, which mentions the case of the two Qatari brothers “Mr. B. Th. And Mr. A. M.” and their alleged inability to access their inheritance in the UAE. This same case was relied upon by Qatar before the ICJ and the only evidence cited for it was the NHRC’s Report of December 2017. SeeNHRC, 6 Months of Violations, What Happens Now? The Fourth General Report on the Violations of Human Rights Arising from the Blockade of the State of Qatar, 5 Dec. 2017, p. 19. See also, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.United Arab Emirates),Request forthe Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of 27June 2018, at 10:00 a.m.(CR 2018/12), p.44, para. 44 (Amirmar); Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of 29 June 2018 at 4:30 p.m.(CR 2018/15), p. 29, para. 12 (Buderi).36NoteVerbaleof Qatar to the CERD Committee, dated 29 October 2018 (referring its dispute once again to the Committee under Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination).
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-14-inappropriate for the Committee toproceed to entertain Qatar’s request any further or to refer it to a Conciliation Commission under Articles11-13 of the CERD. Indeed, rather than entertaining such unsubstantiated claims, the Committee would be fully justified in issuing a rebuke to Qatar for pursuing them when they so obviously lack any factual basis.IV.Lack of Admissibility 26.In its previous submissions, the UAE has pointed to three grounds on which Qatar’s Article 11 Communication should be dismissed for reasons of admissibility. These grounds are summarized below, along with some additional considerationswhich the Committee should take into account.A.The Committee Must Decline to Hear Qatar’s Article 11Communication BecauseQatar’s Initiation of Parallel Proceedings Undermines the Integrity of the Dispute Resolution Provisions of CERD and of the ICJ27.Article 22 of the CERD provides:Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.28.It is clear from the ordinary meaning of the terms of this provisionthat the CERD envisages that the treaty-specific dispute resolution mechanism it offers to its States Parties (i.e., resort to the CERD Committee under Article 11) should be explored and exhausted beforeescalating to an ICJ process. Unlike other treaties, the CERD dispute resolution provisions do not provide that aState Party mayseize the ICJ of the dispute or seek provisional measures fromthe ICJ while the other methods of dispute settlement under the CERD are being pursued.37 The Court has confirmedthe linear nature of 37Cf. with respect to other permanent international tribunals, seee.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Article290, which provides that in certain situations, “[p]ending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea...may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the
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-15-dispute resolution under the CERDby holding that the lack of settlement by negotiationsor by the procedures expresslyset out in the CERD are “procedural preconditions to be met before the seisin of the Court.”38 29.This holding by the ICJ confirms that Qatar was legally obliged to exhaust the procedures expressly provided in the CERD “before the seisin of the Court”. The ordinary meaning of the term “precondition” confirms that much.30.However, Qatar submitted the matter for the consideration of the ICJ on 11 June 2018 while the CERD Article 11 process it had started by its Communication of 8 March 2018 was still underway. In fact, that processhad not even properly commenced. It is unquestionable that the two proceedings relate to thesame factual situation, concern the same alleged violations and apply the same international legal framework. A comparison between the Qatari Communication submitted pursuant to Article 11 of the CERD on 8 March 2018, and communicated to the UAEon 7 May2018, and the Qatari Applicationinstituting proceedingsbeforethe ICJ on 11 June of the same year confirms this overlap.39 After making its initial Article 11 Communication to the Committee, Qatar rushed to make its application to the ICJ.40Having done so, and having seized the Court of the same dispute which is in front of this Committee, on 29 October 201841after the setting up of the procedural calendar on the merits by the Court,42Qatar cameback to the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires.” See also, American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969, Article 63.2, which provides for the power of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to indicate provisional measures and allows for this power to be exercised at the request of the Inter-American Commission “[w]ith respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court.”38Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018,para. 29, confirming Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I),p. 128, para. 141.39SeeCommunication Submitted Pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, dated 8 March 2018; International Court of Justice, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings, 11 June 2018. 40Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofRacial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application instituting proceedings, 11 June 2018.41Note Verbaleof Qatar to the CERD Committee, dated 29 October 2018(referring again to the Committee Qatar’s complaint against the UAE).42Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 25 July 2018, Fixing of Time Limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial.
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-16-Committee in order to seek to resume the very process it hadpreviously bypassed in favour of the ICJ.31.Through its actions,Qatar has created a lis pendenssituation, where two parallel proceedings bearing on the exact same dispute between the same parties are progressing simultaneously. By its conduct of concurrently bringing and pursuing identical proceedings before the CERD Committee and the ICJ, Qatar has acted against the principle of avoidance of duplicative litigation. Case law and scholarly writing has warned againstthe dangers and disadvantages of duplicative litigation tactics such as the one employed by Qatar:The Permanent Court of International Justice in Polish Upper Silesiaexplained that the object of the “doctrine of litispendence” is “to prevent the possibility of conflicting judgments.”43Yuval Shany: “Such duplicative practices draw heavily on scarce judicial resources, carry the risk of legal havoc, which might be caused by inconsistent decisions, and place an undue burden on some or all of the parties due to increased litigation expenses and reduced legal certainty . . . The co-existence of two or more simultaneous proceedings before different fora places an unusually heavy burden on the parties to litigation, which are required to maintain two legal teams or shuttle between two or more tribunals. It also entails the investment of unnecessarily duplicative judicial time and resources by courts and tribunals that are faced with similar (if not identical) tasks and yet are unable to rely on the work of each other.”44 43German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 (Aug.25), p. 20. 44Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals(Oxford University Press 2003), pp. 155-156.
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-17-Campbell McLachlan: “[T]here is widespread acceptance that duplicative litigation within the same legal system is not permitted, as being contrary to due process and the Rule of Law...The proposition that the avoidance of duplicative litigation is a general principle of law gains further powerful support from the 2004 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International...Furthermore, the application of a general principle of the avoidance of duplicative litigation gains force from its close connection...with the doctrine of res judicata....[T]he avoidance of the risk of inconsistent judgments is one of the reasons commonly advanced for both the doctrine of res judicataand the doctrine of lis pendens.4532.Similarly, by prosecuting these two procedures simultaneously, Qatar violates the principle of electa una via non datur recursus ad alteram(“when one way has been chosen, no recourse is given to another”), sometimes known as the principle of election:The choice of a specific forum can be perceived asindicative of the intent to resolve the dispute in the selected forum to the exclusion of all alternative fora. This means that a party is estopped from initiating parallel proceedings or relitigating a settled case if the first-in-time forum was seized on his or her initiative (or with that party’s approval).4633.By failing to respect this principle, Qatar is abusingthe CERD complaints mechanism process and its rights under the CERD. It ispursuing in parallel the very same CERD complaint against the UAE before two mutually exclusive fora. This is in direct violation of the hierarchical and linear dispute resolution architecture of the CERD, and moreover may entangle the Court and the CERD Committee in conflicting interpretations of the same CERD provisions in connection with the same disputeand at the same time.34.The need to avoid conflicting interpretations should be a sufficient argument47to justify a decision of the CERD Committee declaring Qatar’s Article 11 Communication 45Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), pp. 461-463. 46Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals(Oxford University Press 2003), p. 23. 47Seepara. 31, supra, citing to Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), pp. 461-463.
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-18-inadmissible. In situations of lis pendens, other international courts and tribunals have been very sensitive to the risk generated by parallel proceedings. For example, the Arbitral Tribunal established on the basis of Annex VII to the UN Law of the Sea Convention for the settlement of the MOX Plantdispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom invoked “considerations of mutual respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions”48as a basis for suspending its proceedings while awaiting a decision of the European Court of Justice on the question whether the European Community hadexclusive or partial competence on matters dealt with by certain provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention.49 When makingitsdecisionsuspending the proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal also stressed that “a procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions on the same issue would not be helpful to the resolution of the dispute between the Parties.”50 35.There is anotherargument in support of the same conclusion that the Committee, it is respectfully suggested, should not fail to consider. If the Committee were to declare Qatar’s Article 11 Communication admissible, the architectureof the CERD system for the settlementof disputes would be compromised. It would no longer be a linear and incremental dispute resolution procedure. The clear hierarchical structure set out in the CERD under which the proceedings before the CERD Committee are “preconditions” of and, therefore, must precede those before the Court would be replaced by a confusing uncoordinated set of possibilities for engagement of whatever procedure would seem at a given moment the most convenient. 48MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 3, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, 24 June 2003, available at in www.pca-cpa.org, para. 28.49Id., para. 29. 50Id.,para. 28. The case brought in connection to the MOX Plantdispute by the European Commission against Ireland was later decided on 30 May 2006 by the European Court of Justice, affirming the exclusive competence of that very court on the basis of the obligation of EU Member States not to submit any disputes concerning the EU treaties to any method of dispute settlement other than those provided for in the EU treaties (Article292 of the EEC treaty, now Article 344 of the TFEU). Case C-459-03, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), dated 30 May 2006. Subsequently to the decision of the European Court of Justice, Ireland notified the Arbitral Tribunal of the withdrawal of its claim made against the United Kingdom and the Arbitral Tribunal took note of the discontinuance of the case. MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 6, Termination of Proceedings, 6 June 2006, available at in www.pca-cpa.org.
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-19-36.To continue in parallel would not only jeopardise the integrity of the system and risk resulting in fragmented jurisprudence. It would also wreak irreparable harm on the procedural rights of the UAE, which would be required to simultaneously defend itself against the same allegations in two overlapping and parallel procedures. 37.This would be in contradiction with the principle of the equality of the parties. Indeed, the ICJ has emphasized that: “[t]he principle of equality of the parties follows from the requirements of good administration of justice”51; that “the equality of the parties to the dispute must remain the basic principle for the Court”52; and thatequality of the parties must be preserved when they are involved, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter, in the process of settling an international dispute by peaceful means.5338.There cannot be equality of the parties when Qatarhas unilaterally taken for itself two opportunities to litigate against the UAE in overlapping and parallel proceedings.39.As the defending Party, the burden of the duplicativelitigation and the negative consequences of the improper advantage Qatar has taken for itself, fall disproportionately on the UAE. To the extent that procedural steps in Qatar’s Article 11 Communication proceedings under CERD precede those in the case before the ICJ, the UAE will be forced to choose between forsaking its rights to mount a full defence in the present CERD communication procedure or sacrificing its right to procedural equality in the ICJ case. Qatar will be afforded the wholly improper opportunity to foresee and undermine the UAE’s litigation strategy, by taking responsive steps in the case before the ICJ.40.The UAE respectfully invites the Committee to consider the broader implications to its legitimacy that are embedded in Qatar’s conduct. Qatar’s attempts at forum-shopping in 51Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. upon complaints made against the U.N.E.S.C.O.,Advisory Opinion of October 23rd, 1956, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p.86,repeated inJudgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Advisory Opinion, 1February 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012,para. 44.52Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 31.53Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia),Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order of 3 March 2014, I.C.J. Reports 2014, para. 27.
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-20-seeking to avoid the lawful responses to its blatant disregard for the security and stability in the Gulf region jeopardises the integrity of the system and risks resulting in fragmented jurisprudence. If the Committee were to allow the present Article 11 Communication procedure to continue–notwithstanding that the ICJ is presently seised of the very same dispute (as a result of Qatar’s improper and extra-jurisdictional application to it), between the very same parties and commenced under the very same instrument –it would cause the breakdown of the legitimate institutions established by the CERD and make a mockery of both the CERD dispute resolution mechanism’s systemic integrity and the procedural rights of the UAE. 41.Given that Qatar has abandoned the present process by commencing the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, the Committee must now yield to the ICJ procedure, in which Qatar is currently preparing its memorial on the merits. It would be inappropriatefor the Committee to proceed in parallel at a time when the ICJ, as the pre-eminent World Court in the United Nations system, remains seised ofthe very same question in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings. With respect, the CERD Committee, as a United Nations Treatybody,should not act in any way to undermine the integrity of the Court. B.The Committee Must Decline to Hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication Since the Communication Amounts to No More Than Empty Speculation and Thus Constitutes an Abuse of Rights and Process42.As demonstrated in the UAE’s previous responses, as well as in this submission,54Qatar has failed, despite many opportunities to do so, to presentprobative evidence of any ongoing discrimination by the UAE against Qatari nationals –still less, anydiscriminationactually falling within the scope of the CERD on the basis of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin as required under Article 1(1)of the Convention. Indeed, Qatar cannot produce any evidence as its allegations are without foundation bothin fact andin law. Qatar’sArticle 11 Communication cannot be deemed admissible within the CERD complaints mechanism because it amounts to no more than unsupported allegations and abuse of process. 54Seeparas.7-13, supra.
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-21-43.Allegations that are completely without merit on fact and law should not be further entertained under Article 11 of the CERD, still less under the further procedures under Articles 12 and 13. In particular, empty allegations with no basis in law or fact cannot be used as a basis for the establishment of any Article 12 Conciliation Commission and should be preliminarily dismissed. Although the ConciliationCommission is not a judicial body buta fact-finding body,its findings may result in reputational damage to the responding State. Moreover, asalready stated, the proceedings before aConciliation Commission will require that the UAE put forward defensive arguments which may jeopardize its strategy before the ICJ and may result in findings that may be in contradiction with those the ICJ might ascertain.44.Nothing in the ICJ’s CERD Provisional Measures Order runs contrary to this position. This is because the ICJ in the Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings has thus far evaluated Qatar’s allegations only against the lower threshold of “plausibility”, relevant to the provisional measures stage.55 As pointed out by Judge Crawford, the Court failed to identify any evidence to support the further statement that the situation of Qataris residing in the UAE prior to 5 June 2017 appears to remain vulnerable with regard to their rights under Article 5 of the CERD.56 Most importantly, as also indicated by Judge Crawford, the Court failed to mention the UAE’s Statement of 5 July 2018.5745.By submitting a self-serving applicationunsupported by evidence, Qatar abuses its rights to resort to the process under Article 11 of the CERD. If allowed, Qatar may manage to force the UAE to submit to a redundant fact-finding procedure that will amount to nothing more than an opportunity for Qatar to engage in further public relations theatrics. 55SeeApplication of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order of 23 July 2018, para.44: “At this stage of the proceedings, the Court, however, is not called upon to determine definitively whether the rights which Qatar wishes to see protected exist; it need only decide whether the rights claimed by Qatar on the merits, and for which it is seeking protection, are plausible. Moreover, a link must exist between the rights whose protection is sought and the provisional measures being requested.” The “plausibility” threshold is described by Judge ad hocCot as “fairly low”, seeApplication of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates),Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hocCot, para.5.56Dissenting Opinion of JudgeCrawford, para. 14.57Id.
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-22-This is not what the dispute resolution mechanisms of the CERD was intended to achieve.46.It would be consistent with a good faith interpretation of the CERD in light of its object and purpose, as provided for in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,58to require of Qatar to have proved a genuine case to answer before progressing the matter to an ad hocConciliation Commission. Otherwise, the Committee will expose the CERD procedure to the risk of abuse of process by Qatar. The Committee is respectfully urged to prevent such abuse by dismissing Qatar’s Article 11 Communication as inadmissible. In this respect, the Committee is reminded of its compétence de la compétenceunder public international law and its role, assigned to it under Article 11(3), to ensure that the CERD complaints mechanism is not burdened by claims that do not meet the fundamental criteria of admissibility.C.The Committee Must Decline to Hear Qatar’s Article 11 Communication Because Qatar Has Failed to Establish that Local Remedies Have Been Invoked or Exhausted Under Article 11(3) of the CERD 47.The Committee should declare inadmissible Qatar’s Article 11 Communication because Qatar has failed to establish that any Qatari nationals who have allegedlybeen aggrieved by some action of the UAE in violation of CERD have invoked, let alone exhausted, any available and effective domestic remedies in the UAEas required under Article 11.3 of the CERD. The exhaustion of local remedies is a necessary precondition for consideration by the Committee of a matter referred to it in accordance with Article 11(2). Article 11(3)provides that:[t]he Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhaustedin the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.(Emphasis added.) 58Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary(Springer 2012), p.587, para.59.
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-23-48.The requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies seeks to ensure that,before a claim is brought on the international plane, “the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system.”59 This principle requires that each injured person first seek relief from the legal remedies of judicial or administrative courts or bodies, including administrative remedies.6049.Qatar has recognized that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies both under the inter-state procedure of Articles 11-13 and under the individual communicationprocedure under Article 14 of the Convention.61 While the present inter-State communication is the first of this kind before the Committee, the Committee’s jurisprudence on exhaustion of local remedies under Article 14 is also relevant for the present purposes given the similarity of the provisions on the obligation to exhaust local remedies of Article 11.3 and 14.7(a) of the CERD. In its jurisprudence relating to individual applications the CERD Committee has confirmed that all available domestic remedies that offer a prospect of success under domestic law must be exhausted before the Committee may consider the merits of situation.62 As a matter of general international law, the burden is on Qatar to prove thatsuchlocal remedies were 59Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, at p. 27; see alsoAmbatielos (Greece v. United Kingdom),(1956), RIAA, vol. XII, p. 83 at p. 120: “[i]is the whole system of legal protection, as provided by municipal law, which must have been put to the test before a State, as the protector of its nationals, can prosecute the claim on the international plane.” 60Article 14(2), Articles on Diplomatic Protection. Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Commentary to draft Article 14, para. 5, ILC Yearbook 2006, vol. II(2), p. 45.See also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 582, at p. 601, para. 47 (the remedies which must be exhausted “include all remedies of a legal nature, judicial redress as well as redress before administrative bodies”). 61Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Response on behalf of the State of Qatar to the questions posed by Judge Cançado Trindade on Friday, 29 June 2018, 3 July 2018, para. 8.62See, e.g., CERD, Communication No. 25/2002, Ahmad Najaati Sadic v. Denmark, Inadmissibility Decision of 19 March 2003, UN doc. CERD/C/62/D/25/2002, para. 6.4.
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-24-exhausted or that the circumstances relieved it of the obligation to exhaust available local remedies.6350.Remedies capable of providing effective relief are indeed available within the UAE to Qatari nationals with respect to each violation of rights alleged by Qatar. It falls to Qatar to show either that these available remedies were in fact exhausted, or either such remedies would not have been effective in the particular circumstances of the case or that their application would be “unduly prolonged.” Qatar has not even argued, let alone established, that Qatarinationals are exempted from exhausting local remedies in the UAE on the grounds that one of the exceptions to this rule applies. Exceptions to the obligation to exhaust local remedies have only been applied in exceptional cases by the Committee.64 Regarding the exception of undue delay, the Committee found that this exception applied and thus the case was admissible when a court decision had not been rendered after over four anda half years.65 As evidenced by the documents submitted by the UAE, UAE courts promptly review and decide cases submitted to them, including by Qatari nationals.6651.The evidence to be provided by Qatar must be objective. As the Committee explained when declaring inadmissible an individual communication for lack of exhaustion of local remedies, “doubts about the effectiveness of such proceedings cannot absolve a petitioner from pursuing them.”67 63Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2007,p. 582, p. 600, para. 44; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), (Italy v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1989,p. 15, pp. 43-44, para. 53. 64UAE’s Supplemental Responseof 29 November 2018, paras.61, 64 and CERD Committee jurisprudence cited therein. 65CERDCommittee, Communication No. 29/2003, Mr. Dragan Durmic v. Serbia and Montenegro, Decision of 6 March 2006,UN Doc. CERD/C/68/D/29/2003, para.6.5. 66SeeAnnex 2, Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen and being examined by the UAE courts in the period 6 June 2017 until 25 September 2018, pp.12-13 (containing a table put together by the Courts Department of Ras Al-Khaimah indicating the date of listing and of ruling by the courts of suits filed by or against Qatari nationals after 5 June 2017). See also, Annex 16 totheUAE’s Response of 7 August 2018. 67CERD Committee, Communication No.19/2000, Sarwar Seliman Mostafa v. Denmark, Inadmissibility Decision of 10 August 2001, UN Doc. CERD/C/59/D/19/2000, para. 7.4.
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-25-52.The UAE has demonstrated in its previous submissions that there are availableand effective remedies thatQatari nationals may resortto in order to complain ofany alleged violations of their rights under the CERD.68 A non-exhaustive exposé over some avenues for redress open to Qatari nationals will nevertheless be provided here.53.Notably, the fact that UAE courts are authorized to rule on the rights and freedoms of foreigners contained in international conventions to which the UAE is a party such as CERD is confirmed by various provisions of the UAE Constitution.69 54.Qatar has put forward no evidence that these constitutionally protected remedies are in fact either unavailable to Qataris or ineffective. To the contrary, court remedies are available and effective and can be pursued without difficulty, either in person or through powers of attorney. Qatar has put forward no evidence of any Qatari national bringing a claim before the UAE courts against the UAE Government in respect of the measures at issue. By contrast, the UAE has offered proof that demonstrates that,since 5 June 2017, Qatari nationals have freely continued to resort to the UAE courts to assert their rights in legal matters, even if not necessarily related to CERD.70 Further evidence is also herewith submitted to the Committee showing that almost one hundred and fifty powers of attorney have been executed by Qatari nationals since 5 June 2017.7155.In addition, numerous administrative remedies are available to Qataris in the form of complaint procedures specific to various governmental authorities. Such administrative remedies are also effective and Qatar has offered no proof to the contrary. These remedies are easily accessible and complaints are quickly resolved. 68UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, para. 85, UAE’s Supplemental Responseof 29 November 2018, paras.61-71. 69SeeUAE Constitution (2011), Articles 40, 41 and 102; UAE’s Supplemental Responseof 29 November 2018, paras.65-66. 70SeeAnnex18 totheUAE’s Response of 7 August 2018 (containing a summary of the cases involving a Qatari citizen and being examined by federal courts during the period from 1May 2017 until 20 June 2018); Annex 2, Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen and being examined by the UAE courts in the period 6 June 2017 until 25 September 2018.71Annex 2, Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen and being examined by the UAE courts in the period 6 June 2017 until 25 September 2018, p.2 (containing a table with statistics of the Federal Courts indicating that in the period 6 June 2017 to 25September 2018 there had been 146 powers of attorney). See alsoAnnex 16 to the UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, p.2 (containing statistics regarding the powers of attorney concluded in the period from 1/06/2017 to 30/5/2018 with respect to Qatari citizenship in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi).
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-26-56.Specifically, Qatar has failed to show any instance of individuals seeking relief from the administrative complaints mechanisms in place by local UAE government. For example, the Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department is tasked with receiving complaints and claims made against the Government of Dubai.72 Qatariscan file a complaint againsta Dubai government entity through the Department’s website.73 If the dispute cannot be amicably settled within twomonths, the complainantcan file claimsdirectly against the government entitybefore the UAE courts.74 Qatar has put forward no evidence ofrecourse to such remedies. 57.Qatar also has not shown any instance of any Qatari national having recourse to local remedies addressing hate speech. UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 prohibits “discrimination of any form” by various means of expression.75Hate speech is punishable by monetary fines and even imprisonment.Various means exist for individuals (including Qataris) to bring complaints to the attention of the authorities, including under the mechanisms provided for pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 and Law No. 5 of 2012.To facilitate complaints, Dubai police offers an e-service through which an individual can report offenders.76 Qatar has put forward no evidence of recourse to such remedies.58.Qatar also has not shown any instance of Qatari nationals making complaints to relevant authorities dealing with alleged blocking of media content in pursuit of their freedom of expression. The blocking of online content may be challenged by individual users 72Law No. (32) of 2008 and Law No. (3) of 1996. See alsoGovernment of Dubai website “Complaints Against Government Entities,” https://legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Services/Pages/Services-Desc.aspx?Service… of Dubai website “Complaint filed against a Government Entity,” https://cms.legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Website/Pages/ComplaintAgainstGovernm… of Dubai website “Complaints Against Government Entities,” https://legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Services/Pages/Services-Desc.aspx?Service… Decree Law No. 2 of 2015, Article 6 (15 July 2015), http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws2015/FDL_2_2015_discriminat…“Request to Open a Criminal Case” of the Dubai Police, https://www.dubaipolice.gov.ae/wps/portal/home/services/individualservi…; see also“E Crime” of the Dubai Police, https://www.dubaipolice.gov.ae/wps/portal/home/services/individualservi….
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-27-through submissions via online forms77or by the media outlets themselves by petitioningthe National Media Councilof the UAE.78 If challenge through this process is unsuccessful, subsequent appeals to the UAE courts to judicially review the decision of the National Media Council are available.79 Qatar has put forward no evidence of recourse to such remedies.59.Qatar also has put forward no evidence that any Qatari has made use of the complaint resolution procedures with respect to the alleged violation of their right to health and right to medical treatment. The UAE’s Ministry of Health and Prevention (“MOHAP”)providesa number of avenues for an individual to file a complaint.80 Complaints are normally resolvedby MOHAPwithindays. If challenge through this process is unsuccessful, subsequent appeals to the UAE courts to judicially review the decision of MOHAP would be available. Alongside the Federal Government’s complaint procedure, for example the Dubai Health Authority haslocal complaint procedures available for individuals.81Qatar has put forward no evidence of recourse to such remedies.60.Qatar also has not shown any instance of Qatari nationals making complaints with respect to the right of education. For example,the Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge provides a complaint mechanism for secondary school students whereby an individual can raise a complaint against a UAE school, including for failure to respond to a request for provision of transcripts.82 77See“Web Content Block/Unblock Request Form,” https://etisalat.ae/en/generic/contactus-forms/web-block-unblock.jsp.78… Chairman of the Board’s Resolution No. (30) of 2017 on Media Activities Licensing, Articles 67 and 68, http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Documents/Media%20Activities%20Licensing%20…’s reliance on the existence of these remedies is without prejudice to its position that broadcasters do not benefit from the protection of the CERD, which only applies to individuals and not corporations.80SeeMinistry of Health and Prevention website “Customer Complaints,” http://www.mohap.gov.ae/en/Pages/COMPLAINS.aspx.81DHA website “Medical Complaint,” https://www.dha.gov.ae/en/HealthRegulation/Pages/MedicalComplaintsProce… of Education and Knowledge website “Raising a complaint against a Private school,” https://www.adek.abudhabi.ae/en/Parents/PrivateSchools/Pages/RCAPS.aspx.
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-28-61.Qatar also has not shownany instance of Qatari nationals making complaints with respect to the right to work, despite the availability of ample remedies. Under UAE law, a complaint system is available through the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiritisation.83 An individual can file a complaint in person or by usingthe online service.84 If a settlement is not reachedwithin two weeks, the complaint is referred to the Labor Court.85 The ruling of the Labor Court can, subject to certain limitations on small claims, be appealed to the Court of Appeals and further to the Court of Cassation.86 Qatar has put forward no evidence that any Qatari has availed himself or herself of these complaint resolution procedures. 62.Finally, Qatar also has putforward no evidence that any Qatari has availed himself or herself of the available complaint resolution procedures related to alleged infringement of the right to property or had recourse to the UAE courts. With respect to complaints relating to real property, an individual canfile a complaintby various means. For example, disputes between landlords and tenants may be addressed by the Rental Disputes Center of the Government of Dubai, with the option of appeal to the Appellate Division of the Center.87 Regarding complaintsrelating to an individual’s assets or accounts, the Central Bank of the UAE is equippedto handle thesethrough fax, online or 83As mandated by UAE Labor Law, Federal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, Article 6. SeeUAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiritisation website “Register Labour complaints,” https://www.mohre.gov.ae/en/our-services/%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%8…. See alsoFederal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, Article 6, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/11956/69376/F417089305/A… Ministry of Human Resources and Emiritisation website “Complaint Request,” https://eservices.mohre.gov.ae/MOHRE.WebForms/Home/Complaint?lang=en-gb… Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, Article 6, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/11956/69376/F417089305/A…; UAE Official Government Portal website “The system of courts,” https://www.government.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/the-feder…. 86UAE Official Government Portal website “The system of courts,” https://www.government.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/the-feder… of Dubai Rental Disputes Center website, http://www.rdc.gov.ae/Services_Pages/Services.aspx. See alsoGovernment of Dubai Real Estate Legislation Decree No. (26) of 2013 Concerning the Rent Disputes Settlement Centre in the Emirate of Dubai, Articles 13-14, http://www.dubailand.gov.ae/Style%20Library/download/EN-Legislation.pdf.
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-29-in person through various Central Bank locations.88The UAE judiciary is also naturally available to all Qataris with grievances related to property matters. Both the complaint procedures and the UAE courts are able to provide redress to individuals who successfully prove that their right to property has been unlawfully infringed. However, again, Qatar has provided no evidence that such remedies have been exhausted. 63.To sum up, Qatar’s position on the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies has been consistent. It is, in a word, denial. Thus, while Qatar has failed to provide any evidence that the Qatari nationals in question have attempted to invoke or exhaust domestic remedies in the UAE to vindicate their grievances, Qatar tries to explain this away by simply denying, without more,thatany remedies are available or are effective given “the inabilityto appear in person because of expulsion from and the ban on entry to the UAE, serious difficulties finding local lawyers to provide legal representation because of the general atmosphere of hostility towards Qatar and Qataris”.8964.Yet, such a statement is pure fiction when measured against the facts. Evidence has previously been provided to the Committee, and is supplementedby additional evidence submitted herewith, that demonstrates that, far from a “ban on entry”,Qatari nationals haveentered the UAE in their thousands since 5 June 2017.9065.As the complainant in this proceeding, Qatar bears the burden of proof to establish that domestic remedies have been invoked and exhaustedor to establish that exceptional circumstances relieve it of that obligation.91 Faced with theevidencedemonstrating the accessibility to Qatari nationals of the UAE legal system, Qatar’sburden of proof to 88Central Bank of the UAE website “Complaints and Enquiries,” https://centralbank.ae/en/form/complaints. 89SeeApplication of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.United Arab Emirates),Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of 29June 2018, at 10:00 a.m.(CR 2018/14), p.12, para. 5 (Klein). See alsoNote Verbaleof Qatar to the CERD Committee, dated 29 October 2018, requesting the Committee to re-initiate Qatar’s complaint against the UAE(“Any nominalremedies areeither unavailable or ineffective in light of the expulsion of Qataris from theUnited Arab Emirates and ensuing travel restrictions, as well as the ongoing campaign ofhatred against Qatar and Qataris in the territory or the United Arab Emirates.”).90Seeparas. 8-10, supra.91Seee.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), PreliminaryObjections, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 582, paras.42-44.
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-30-establish that the Qatari nationals who it alleges have been aggrieved by the UAE’s conduct in violation of CERD have in fact sought to invoke and have thereafter exhausted domestic remedies to seek redress for their grievancesis substantially heightened. Hiding behind blanket denialsunsupported by evidence will not sufficeand, with respect, should not be accepted by the Committee.66.There can be no doubt that Qatar has failed to overcome the admissibility hurdle in Article 11.3 of CERD. Because available domestic remedies have neither been invoked nor exhausted, Qatar has failed to meet the requirements of that provision. 67.For that reason alonethe Committee must dismiss Qatar’sArticle11 Communicationand discontinue any further procedure addressing that communication.V.Conclusion 68.For the reasons set out herein and in the UAE’s 7 August Response and the 29 November 2018 Submission, the UAE respectfully urges the Committee to dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication for lack for jurisdiction and/or lack of admissibility.69.With respect, in light of the manifest lack of jurisdiction and admissibility of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, any action taken by the Committee to further Qatar’s complaint wouldbe ultra vires.70.The UAE once again takes this opportunity to reaffirm its unwavering commitment to eliminating racial discrimination in all of its forms and to combating hate speech.
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[Annex 1, Letter from the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, dated 10 January 2019 (attaching tables in Excel files)] Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship No. 30/3/32 Date: January 10, 2019 corresponding to, First Jamadi 02, 1440 Hijri Confidential and urgent To, Director of Foreigners Affairs Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Subject, Statistics of Qatari Nationals, Reference: your letter No. 5/4/37/30403 /ش ق ج /ش ق/م ع dated December 23, 2018
We would like to send you all the respect, and according to the request in your letter, referred to above, about the statistics of the entry and exit movements for the Qatari nationals, and the permits requests, and the number of the Qatari nationals residing in the state, we would like to clarify to you the following: 1- With regards to the entry and exit movements of the Qatari nationals to the state for the period from June 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, it amounted to (2876). 2- With regards to the individuals who submitted a request for an entry and exit for the period from July 9, 2018 to December 22, 2018; the amount of the submitted requests was (3563), (3353) requests were approved and (210) requests were rejected. 3- The number of the Qatari nationals residing in the state, and who hold a UAE identification document, are (702). Attached are detailed records for the statistics mentioned above. For your attention and your procedures, Please accept our regards, Officer, Hamad Hasan Al-Shaikh Al-Ze’abi Director of Information Security Department
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A Copy to: •Director of the Office of His Excellency the Chairman of the Board of Directors, for your attention. •Deputy Director of Security Information Management, for your attention. •Director of Security Coordination Branch, for your attention. •To follow •9288- January 9, 2019 [Illegible] 9288- January 10, 2019
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33930332v1[Annex 1.1, [Excel Redacted] Entrance and Exit for Qatari Nationals from 1 June 2018 until 31 December 2018 (English translation)] FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP UNIFIED NUMBER NAME AGE SEX THE MOVEMENT DATE PORT [This column includes the numbers provided] – Numbers Redacted [This column includes the name of the Qatari nationals who entered and exited the country] Names Redacted [This column provides the age of each national] [Male or female] [Entry or Exit] [The date] [The port name whether it is Abu Dhabi International Airport, Abu Dhabi Airport, Al-Ain Airport, Al Ghuwaifat, Al-Mudeef Port, Dubai International Airport, Rashed port, Al- Shandagha port, Al-Sharjah International Airport, Khatmat Malaha port, Shaklah port, Hatta border Cross, or Hili Port]
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􀎩􀎣􀏭􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏗􀎭􀏟􀎍􀏡􀎳􀏻􀎍􀎭􀏣􀏌􀏟􀎍􀎱􀏧􀎟􀏟􀎍􀎔􀏛􀎭􀎣􀏟􀎍􀎦􀏳􀎭􀎎􀎗􀏟􀎍􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀏟􀎍36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43268􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43269􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43271􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43275􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43295􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43295􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43309􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43309􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43309􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43320􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43326􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43352􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43354􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43356􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43357􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43363􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43364􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43375􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43375􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43375􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43375􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43375􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43379􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43381􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43389􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43399􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43400􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43401􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43404􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43405􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43408􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43408􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43415􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43417􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43417􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43427􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43433􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43435􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43439􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43439􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43439􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43441􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43441􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
261
1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43257􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43261􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43267􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43269􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43269􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43269􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣79􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43272􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43282􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43284􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43286􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43286􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43290􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43290􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43291􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43298􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43299􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43299􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣74􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣77􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43304􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43307􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43307􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43307􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43307􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43308􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43312􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43316􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43290􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43290􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43318􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43318􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43318􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43320􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43320􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43321􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43321􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43321􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43322􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43325􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43325􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43326􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43326􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43326􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
262
16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43326􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣73􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣66􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43357􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43357􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43357􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43359􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43359􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43359􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43367􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43367􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43367􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43373􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43373􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43373􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43373􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43373􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43383􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣70􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43385􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43387􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43387􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43387􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43391􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43393􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43393􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43393􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43393􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43394􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43405􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43405􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣67􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣76􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43418􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43418􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43418􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43383􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43422􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43425􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43427􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43427􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43430􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣70􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43433􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43434􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43439􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣62􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43439􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43440􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43440􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43444􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43444􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43445􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣71􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣NULL􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣69􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43387􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43286􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43286􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43286􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43286􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43286􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43298􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43298􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43300􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43372􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43383􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43400􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43400􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43400􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43424􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
263
17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43289􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏥􀏳􀏌􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏥􀏳􀏌􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏥􀏳􀏌􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏥􀏳􀏌􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏥􀏳􀏌􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43289􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43321􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍28􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43388􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍54􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43408􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍35􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43427􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍39􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43446􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍19􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43275􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43281􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43290􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43291􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43291􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍39􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43321􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍39􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43356􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43448􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍19􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43254􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43254􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43262􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43268􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43275􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43295􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43295􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43295􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43295􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43316􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43338􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣50􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43338􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43338􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43341􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43342􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43342􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43347􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43347􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43358􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣49􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43403􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43412􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43412􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43422􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43422􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43434􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43434􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43436􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43439􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43443􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43443􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43443􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43445􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43441􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣73􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣46􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣33􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣118􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43254􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43261􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43268􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43272􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43276􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43279􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43279􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43279􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43291􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43293􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣60􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43304􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43304􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43305􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43306􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣69􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣64􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43312􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43312􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣41􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43312􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣
Annex 17
264
6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43315􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43315􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43315􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43316􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43316􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43318􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43318􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43326􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣42􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43348􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43348􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣54􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43351􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43352􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣35􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43352􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43357􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43365􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43368􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43385􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43385􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43389􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43391􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43392􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1817􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43392􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43394􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣59􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43394􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43410􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43412􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43413􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣50􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43415􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣67􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43412􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣71􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43418􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43419􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43419􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43419􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43419􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43420􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43421􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43421􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43428􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣49􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43430􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43437􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43437􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43439􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43439􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43439􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43441􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣54􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43443􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣35􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣48􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43453􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43455􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣43􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43257􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43264􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43266􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43270􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43271􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43283􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43289􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43290􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43290􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43304􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43307􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43308􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43308􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43309􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43309􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43309􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43321􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43322􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43322􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43322􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43322􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43326􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43327􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43327􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43329􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣64􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
265
40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43352􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43352􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43352􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43354􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43357􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣73􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43360􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43360􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43363􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43363􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43366􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43370􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43372􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43373􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43376􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43372􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43373􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43378􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43378􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43378􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43378􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43378􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43379􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43384􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43387􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43388􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43389􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43391􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43392􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43396􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43397􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43399􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43400􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43401􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43401􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43401􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43402􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43402􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43402􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43408􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43410􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43411􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43413􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43416􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43416􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43418􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43419􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43420􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43420􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43420􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43424􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43424􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43424􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43425􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43425􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43426􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43427􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43428􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43428􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣73􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43431􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43431􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43434􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43434􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣62􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43437􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43439􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43439􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43440􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43440􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43440􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43445􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43445􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣64􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
266
5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣75􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣65􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣67􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣69􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
267
28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43252􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43257􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43257􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43260􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43263􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43263􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43263􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43264􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43264􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43264􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43265􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43268􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43268􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43270􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43255􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43267􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43271􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43271􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43275􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43275􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43275􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43275􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43276􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43276􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43274􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43276􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43277􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43277􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43277􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43277􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43279􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43279􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43279􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43279􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43279􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43279􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43280􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43278􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43281􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43282􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43282􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43284􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43284􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43284􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43284􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43284􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43284􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43285􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43288􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43289􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43289􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43289􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43285􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43291􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43291􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43291􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43291􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43292􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣77􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43293􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43294􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43295􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43295􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43295􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43296􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43297􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43298􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43298􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43299􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣64􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43290􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43300􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
268
7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43301􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43302􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43302􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43304􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43304􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43304􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43304􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43305􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣62􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43306􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43307􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43307􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43308􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43308􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43304􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣69􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣78􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43314􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43314􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43314􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43315􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43316􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣67􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43316􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43318􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43319􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43321􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43321􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43322􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43323􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43324􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣48􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43330􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣73􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43334􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣70􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43336􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
269
118􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣71􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43332􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
270
7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43351􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43352􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43352􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43352􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43353􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣72􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43356􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43356􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣62􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43358􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43359􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43359􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43359􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43360􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43360􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣73􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43361􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣75􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43361􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43365􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43366􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43366􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43368􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43370􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43380􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣73􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣74􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43382􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43386􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43386􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43386􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43387􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43387􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43387􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43391􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣64􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43395􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43396􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43398􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43399􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43400􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43400􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43400􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43400􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43401􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43401􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43401􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43402􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43402􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43402􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43403􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43405􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43405􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣68􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣65􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣73􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43406􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43407􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43407􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43407􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣66􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43407􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43408􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43408􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43409􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43411􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43412􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43413􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43415􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣81􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43416􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43416􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43417􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43419􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43419􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43420􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43420􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43420􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43421􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43421􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43424􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43412􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣62􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43426􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43426􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43426􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43426􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣82􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43426􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43427􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43429􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43430􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43430􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43432􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43433􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43433􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43434􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43434􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43435􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43435􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43435􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43435􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43435􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣83􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43437􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43437􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43437􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣51􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43438􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43440􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣67􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43440􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43441􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43442􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43446􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
271
30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣65􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣71􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43453􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣53􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣60􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣40􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43457􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣62􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43408􀎩􀎷􀎍􀎭 􀋯􀎎􀏧􀏳􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43397􀏪􀏏􀎩􀏧􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀋯􀎎􀏧􀏳􀏣31􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43286􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43316􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43337􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43339􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43344􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43366􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43366􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43367􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43390􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣21􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43399􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43423􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43436􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43437􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43443􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43255􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43255􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣41􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43279􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43282􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣42􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43286􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43298􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43328􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43365􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43397􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43407􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43431􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43433􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣58􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43434􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43434􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣47􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43437􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43264􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43264􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧35􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43264􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43288􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43288􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43288􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43288􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43314􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43316􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43316􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43322􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43322􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43322􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43323􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43339􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧35􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43345􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43351􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧48􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43404􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43432􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧62􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43436􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧19􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧50􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧54􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43300􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43300􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧
Annex 17
272
3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43339􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43341􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43392􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43407􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43422􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧49􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧65􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43457􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43257􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43297􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43311􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43318􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43318􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43318􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43328􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43330􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43332􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43332􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43337􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43340􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43340􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟36􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43347􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43352􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟38􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43354􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43361􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43380􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43380􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43380􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43382􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43386􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43401􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43401􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43401􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43408􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43408􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟52􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43410􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43412􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43414􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟56􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43416􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43422􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43424􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43429􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟70􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43435􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43435􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43439􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43439􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟45􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43441􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43443􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43447􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟21􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟47􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟66􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟34􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43454􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟64􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟58􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟41􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43457􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟
Annex 17
273
1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43457􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43254􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43258􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43258􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43263􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43265􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43273􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43273􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟21􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43276􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43279􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43279􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43280􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43281􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟33􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43287􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43290􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43290􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43290􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43290􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43295􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43295􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43297􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43297􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟76􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43297􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟48􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43298􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43299􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43302􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟82􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43302􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟48􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43303􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43303􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43305􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟60􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43307􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟19􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43307􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43308􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟54􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43311􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43311􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43312􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43312􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43314􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43314􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43315􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43315􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43316􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43316􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43316􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43316􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43317􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟41􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43317􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43323􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43323􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43323􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43323􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43324􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43324􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43324􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟64􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43325􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43326􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43326􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43326􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43326􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43327􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43329􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43330􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43334􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43335􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43336􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟21􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟20􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟45􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43338􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43339􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43339􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43339􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43339􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43339􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43341􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟47􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟24􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟41􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟51􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟59􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟27􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟
Annex 17
274
2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43347􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43347􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43347􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43347􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43347􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43348􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43348􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43348􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43348􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43349􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟35􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43354􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43354􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43354􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43355􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43355􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43355􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟71􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43357􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43358􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43358􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43358􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43359􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43359􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43361􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43361􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43361􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43365􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43365􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43365􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43366􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43366􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟43􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43366􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43366􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43366􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43366􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43368􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43374􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟57􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43381􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43382􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43386􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟52􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43390􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43393􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43394􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43406􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟52􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43413􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43413􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟46􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43413􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟75􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43414􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43415􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43417􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43419􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟63􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43420􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43421􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟67􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43422􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43424􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟73􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43427􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43430􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43430􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43430􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43430􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟52􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43431􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟46􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43431􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43433􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟53􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43433􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟69􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43433􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43433􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43434􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43434􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43434􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43434􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43434􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43435􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43437􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43438􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43440􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43441􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟51􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43442􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43443􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43444􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43445􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟49􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43448􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43449􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43450􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟43􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43452􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43453􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟32􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43457􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43350􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟20􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43338􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟23􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43342􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟24􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43323􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43420􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟
Annex 17
275
75􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟61􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43358􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43371􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43386􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43454􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43264􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43265􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43265􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43282􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43284􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43284􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43285􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43285􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43285􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43285􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43285􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43288􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣52􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43293􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43294􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43294􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43294􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43296􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣39􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43297􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣15􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43296􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43302􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43304􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣18􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43316􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣59􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43319􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43323􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43323􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43323􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣16􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43328􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣50􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43338􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43338􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43343􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43344􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43351􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43360􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43372􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43379􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43379􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43421􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣64􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43430􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43435􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣42􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43442􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43446􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43446􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43446􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43446􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43449􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43449􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43451􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43451􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43452􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43452􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣45􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣55􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43377􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43378􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43378􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43378􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43378􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43378􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣118􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43378􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43387􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣21􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43389􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43400􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣48􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43411􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣43􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43420􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43420􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43420􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43436􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43436􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43439􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣39􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43454􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣60􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣34􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣53􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣83􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43307􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43324􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43335􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43335􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣27􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43336􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43336􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣40􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43347􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43349􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣43􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43350􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43351􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43351􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43355􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣36􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43356􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣58􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43359􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣72􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43369􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43374􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43374􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43385􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43385􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43398􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43411􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43415􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Entry43418􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43418􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43423􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Entry43429􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43255􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣21􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣61􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43268􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43272􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43283􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43289􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43289􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43291􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43291􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43291􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43291􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣31􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43292􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣
Annex 17
276
10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43302􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43302􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43302􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43306􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43310􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43310􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣62􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43313􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣82􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43313􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43315􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43315􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43315􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣31􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43318􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43318􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43281􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣17􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43319􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣56􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣28􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43323􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43323􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣36􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43326􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43327􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣40􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43329􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43330􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43330􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43330􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣13􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43331􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣38􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣48􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43331􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣15􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43332􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43332􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣54􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43332􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣44􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43332􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43335􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣22􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣17􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43340􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣13􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43342􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43342􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣5􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43343􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣25􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43343􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣21􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣18􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣39􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43344􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43344􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣38􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣14􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣47􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣57􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43345􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43346􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣10􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43346􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣8􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43347􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43348􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣9􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43354􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43354􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43354􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43354􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43354􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43355􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43355􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43355􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣7􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43355􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣11􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43355􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣62􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43360􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43361􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43361􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43363􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣19􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43367􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43373􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣41􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43373􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43380􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣55􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43382􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43385􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43387􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43392􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43392􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣4􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43392􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43392􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43392􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣23􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43394􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣55􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43411􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣75􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43411􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣60􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43411􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43420􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43420􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣61􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43422􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43427􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43427􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣62􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43428􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣34􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43428􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43428􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣42􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣6􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43429􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣3􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43430􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣2􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43430􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43430􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣24􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43430􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43435􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣88􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43438􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣20􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43438􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣56􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43438􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣53􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43438􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣26􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43440􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣24􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣28􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43447􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣35􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43447􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣1􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣29􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43448􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣37􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43449􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣25􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣30􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43450􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣33􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43451􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣63􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43451􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣37􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43454􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣27􀏰􀎛􀏧􀎍Exit43455􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣32􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43455􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣0􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43456􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣16􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣12􀎭􀏛􀎫Exit43337􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣
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33930333v1[Annex 1.2, [Excel Redacted] Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018 (English translation)] FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP Permit No. Permit Date Status of the permit Used Permit UNIFIED NUMBER Name in Arabic Name in English Type of Permit Type of Movement Date of Movement The Port The Reason [the number of the permit] [The date of the permit] [approved or rejected] [Yes or No] [This section includes the given numbers] Number redacted [the given name in Arabic] Name redacted [the given name in English] Name redacted [Entry or Exit] [Entry, Exit, or “blank”] [the given date of the movement, or “blank”] [Abu Dhabi International Airport, Shaklah port, Abu Dhabi Airport, Al-Mudeef Port, Mezyad port, Al-Sharjah International Airport, Al Ghuwaifat, Hili Port, Dhabi International Airport, Malaha port, Hatta border Cross, Khatmat Malaha port or “blank”] [Family relationship, medical treatment, or “Others”]
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􀎢􀏳􀎭􀎻􀎗􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏗􀎭􀎢􀏳􀎭􀎻􀎗􀏟􀎍 􀎦􀏳􀎭􀎎􀎗􀎢􀏳􀎭􀎻􀎗􀏟􀎍 􀎔􀏟􀎎􀎣􀏡􀎩􀎧􀎗􀎳􀏣 􀎢􀏳􀎭􀎻􀎗􀏟􀎍􀎩􀎣􀏭􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏗􀎭􀏟􀎍􀏲􀎑􀎭􀏌􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀎳􀏹􀎍EN 􀏡􀎳􀏹􀎍􀎢􀏳􀎭􀎻􀎗􀏟􀎍 􀏉􀏭􀏧􀎔􀏛􀎭􀎣􀏟􀎍 􀏉􀏭􀏧􀎔􀏛􀎭􀎣􀏟􀎍 􀎦􀏳􀎭􀎎􀎗􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀏟􀎍􀎏􀎑􀎳􀏟􀎍010107746190201830698114909/07/2018 10:34:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701198109/07/2018 07:52:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701160009/07/2018 07:52:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830709534911/07/2018 06:44:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830720298316/07/2018 04:33:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830724811717/07/2018 06:47:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830724813017/07/2018 07:01:50 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830822061815/08/2018 08:46:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830822077015/08/2018 08:46:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830333719/08/2018 07:35:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830340219/08/2018 07:35:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830338319/08/2018 07:35:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831590224/08/2018 01:06:24 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831662424/08/2018 03:23:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831664624/08/2018 03:23:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830833042225/08/2018 10:48:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830851345229/08/2018 09:35:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830856243231/08/2018 10:05:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830856458201/09/2018 09:55:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830858331802/09/2018 12:26:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830858331202/09/2018 12:26:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830858330302/09/2018 12:26:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830858332402/09/2018 12:26:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830866050503/09/2018 02:46:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830867829303/09/2018 10:47:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877391105/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877444205/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877370205/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877463105/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877411805/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877455305/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877356505/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877402105/09/2018 08:34:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877665405/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877682005/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877592805/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877670305/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877656605/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877700105/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877689705/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877677205/09/2018 10:04:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830880219206/09/2018 01:02:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830886066109/09/2018 11:25:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830886122009/09/2018 11:25:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830886313809/09/2018 11:25:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830886232909/09/2018 11:25:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830886197609/09/2018 11:25:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830888529909/09/2018 06:02:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830889289509/09/2018 08:29:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830889744610/09/2018 02:02:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830889750010/09/2018 02:02:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830900072412/09/2018 10:29:37 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830904951214/09/2018 12:53:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830904951914/09/2018 01:12:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830932319022/09/2018 12:50:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830932318822/09/2018 12:50:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830932318122/09/2018 12:50:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830953230626/09/2018 07:39:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830984036804/10/2018 10:23:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 10:20:50 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831001372009/10/2018 08:57:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 10:20:50 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830892846810/09/2018 04:21:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 11:21:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830892878510/09/2018 04:21:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 11:20:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830829805619/08/2018 01:14:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/08/2018 07:58:24 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831262733022/12/2018 02:53:06 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831140007415/11/2018 04:10:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 10:35:33 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831157702821/11/2018 05:43:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/11/2018 10:20:43 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831168935425/11/2018 02:14:51 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/11/2018 10:20:43 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830994722/08/2018 04:19:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/09/2018 05:26:52 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830970701402/10/2018 08:25:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 03:25:09 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830817591715/08/2018 12:39:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/10/2018 08:34:38 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831164798424/11/2018 02:12:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 06:17:49 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812070313/08/2018 10:28:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 11:08:36 AM􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831192682103/12/2018 08:35:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 01:48:37 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831236169815/12/2018 03:06:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/12/2018 06:43:20 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831236580115/12/2018 06:44:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/12/2018 06:43:33 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831224252314/12/2018 05:19:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 12:11:45 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831210165009/12/2018 02:51:27 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 05:31:33 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830803197912/08/2018 01:47:27 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/09/2018 09:39:34 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831119656010/11/2018 09:50:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 03:22:43 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831260120720/12/2018 05:39:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 01:55:30 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827571418/08/2018 11:05:55 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/08/2018 08:50:09 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830830889821/08/2018 06:10:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧11/12/2018 05:32:36 PM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830846695028/08/2018 11:58:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830921569418/09/2018 07:14:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/10/2018 10:06:13 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107748190201830921663918/09/2018 07:21:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/10/2018 10:07:59 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831019918215/10/2018 11:43:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831031468917/10/2018 10:36:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831045305121/10/2018 10:59:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/11/2018 09:15:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831262074522/12/2018 10:52:44 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831262089622/12/2018 10:52:44 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831060917925/10/2018 05:22:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224849112/12/2018 12:57:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 10:53:26 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830845819928/08/2018 09:06:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831230090612/12/2018 10:35:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 07:53:00 PM􀏡􀏭􀎗􀏛􀏣 􀏝􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830757340126/07/2018 05:40:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/08/2018 10:59:14 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830757373926/07/2018 05:50:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/08/2018 10:59:14 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831073708329/10/2018 01:58:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 08:26:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830958654828/09/2018 06:41:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830821063215/08/2018 04:47:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/08/2018 09:40:42 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830821214115/08/2018 04:47:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/08/2018 09:41:24 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830933777422/09/2018 06:18:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧25/09/2018 09:31:33 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830984957504/10/2018 10:21:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830819026015/08/2018 11:15:27 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/08/2018 09:45:11 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831042433321/10/2018 02:12:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/10/2018 03:24:19 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830996246008/10/2018 10:32:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/10/2018 09:31:18 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831032466817/10/2018 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05:09:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831068360028/10/2018 01:36:11 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 10:30:30 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831261821721/12/2018 11:52:22 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830904719613/09/2018 05:02:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/11/2018 05:37:37 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831235926615/12/2018 03:15:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 07:02:31 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831251176019/12/2018 09:24:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 07:02:31 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831236002415/12/2018 03:15:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 07:03:56 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831250954719/12/2018 09:24:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 07:03:56 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831251389419/12/2018 09:23:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 07:02:06 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831097183604/11/2018 12:33:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 10:30:42 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830793241208/08/2018 10:18:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/08/2018 01:07:22 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831127022612/11/2018 02:44:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 10:32:28 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830793460008/08/2018 10:18:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/08/2018 01:07:45 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830844560428/08/2018 01:59:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/08/2018 08:46:45 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831160971722/11/2018 12:16:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/12/2018 09:24:23 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831020744815/10/2018 02:29:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 08:01:02 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830937310623/09/2018 03:32:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830937119023/09/2018 03:32:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830995422/08/2018 04:53:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 02:20:41 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830966932301/10/2018 09:43:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/10/2018 07:48:45 PM􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830937493823/09/2018 03:32:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/09/2018 07:24:14 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831074648629/10/2018 11:29:00 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/10/2018 04:31:27 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830948899025/09/2018 09:52:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/10/2018 09:31:57 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831011457211/10/2018 09:47:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/11/2018 03:32:42 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831172757426/11/2018 12:48:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/12/2018 10:50:14 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830806717712/08/2018 05:49:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/09/2018 07:04:54 PM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831264152423/12/2018 05:32:24 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831018050714/10/2018 09:33:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/10/2018 08:28:36 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831095328903/11/2018 10:51:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/11/2018 09:20:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831174874226/11/2018 07:42:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/12/2018 07:32:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831099076205/11/2018 07:52:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧06/11/2018 10:00:07 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201830830485019/08/2018 11:08:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/08/2018 06:51:42 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830483719/08/2018 11:08:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/08/2018 06:51:42 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830487419/08/2018 11:08:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/08/2018 06:51:42 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830486819/08/2018 11:08:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/08/2018 06:51:42 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830482519/08/2018 11:08:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/08/2018 06:51:42 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831261206220/12/2018 08:31:27 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830864118403/09/2018 10:39:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/09/2018 03:39:43 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831241458216/12/2018 09:16:42 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107749190201830932305921/09/2018 10:27:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/09/2018 12:46:39 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831263595724/12/2018 03:28:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830905059514/09/2018 11:10:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/11/2018 05:03:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831011996213/10/2018 06:13:52 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/10/2018 01:18:26 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830905065914/09/2018 11:10:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/09/2018 08:45:49 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831248675018/12/2018 11:52:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 09:37:46 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831248776318/12/2018 11:52:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 09:37:07 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831248804118/12/2018 11:52:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 09:38:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830866057603/09/2018 02:55:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/12/2018 08:26:01 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830873244005/09/2018 09:28:08 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􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831030084117/10/2018 02:02:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/11/2018 10:16:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831058029924/10/2018 01:00:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧31/10/2018 02:34:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831258030220/12/2018 02:40:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831257668420/12/2018 02:40:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831164070025/11/2018 09:18:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/12/2018 07:26:54 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831119616610/11/2018 07:40:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 11:43:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831166697525/11/2018 11:41:11 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/12/2018 12:36:03 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831038040718/10/2018 10:17:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/10/2018 01:19:20 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201830934374223/09/2018 08:11:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/10/2018 11:04:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831119394810/11/2018 06:59:51 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 11:43:27 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831191919802/12/2018 01:15:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 02:09:40 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831207449307/12/2018 06:19:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831207453707/12/2018 07:07:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831207823508/12/2018 04:19:31 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830850484029/08/2018 06:14:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/10/2018 09:27:55 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831097010204/11/2018 12:33:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 12:39:17 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831119616210/11/2018 07:40:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 12:37:42 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831119559610/11/2018 07:00:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 12:39:44 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831263088622/12/2018 07:00:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830804674412/08/2018 11:58:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:38:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830870534704/09/2018 01:51:06 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:38:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831128057912/11/2018 09:45:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/11/2018 05:33:02 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830964777601/10/2018 09:20:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830926595719/09/2018 06:16:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/09/2018 11:38:09 AM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830947761725/09/2018 06:30:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/10/2018 07:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830956346527/09/2018 01:22:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/10/2018 07:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831022508915/10/2018 07:16:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/11/2018 06:08:43 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831233489513/12/2018 09:34:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 05:57:08 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831240171916/12/2018 03:55:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 07:48:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830758094628/07/2018 06:33:57 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/08/2018 05:54:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830832526225/08/2018 06:03:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/09/2018 07:30:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830830476219/08/2018 10:04:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/08/2018 03:21:17 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831186597629/11/2018 11:55:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:18:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830849749329/08/2018 03:09:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧09/10/2018 11:50:15 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830819979715/08/2018 01:15:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/10/2018 07:15:34 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831256970120/12/2018 06:08:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831184177701/12/2018 02:28:46 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/12/2018 12:01:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830892990310/09/2018 04:12:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 07:32:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830893077910/09/2018 04:26:44 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 07:31:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830882671108/09/2018 02:04:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 05:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830862343202/09/2018 07:40:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/09/2018 08:07:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830833087726/08/2018 12:27:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/08/2018 09:18:53 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830833379226/08/2018 09:29:49 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/08/2018 09:19:02 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830822321615/08/2018 09:58:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/10/2018 11:59:28 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830858219801/09/2018 11:28:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830858235001/09/2018 11:28:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
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010107749190201830833233926/08/2018 09:02:46 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/08/2018 09:19:35 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830832997325/08/2018 09:37:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/08/2018 09:20:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831033835318/10/2018 12:19:47 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/10/2018 09:49:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830938110223/09/2018 06:24:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/09/2018 09:23:13 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830938027523/09/2018 06:24:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/09/2018 09:21:24 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830938159923/09/2018 06:24:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/09/2018 09:22:38 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830938133123/09/2018 06:24:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/09/2018 09:22:03 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830938256323/09/2018 06:24:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/09/2018 09:21:44 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830903226212/09/2018 05:54:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 03:31:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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11:59:15 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830958671628/09/2018 09:46:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩30/09/2018 08:12:38 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830812393714/08/2018 02:23:32 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧02/09/2018 09:39:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831257228620/12/2018 11:11:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 06:43:22 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201831013263713/10/2018 07:51:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/12/2018 01:52:24 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830116619/08/2018 05:35:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/08/2018 09:26:43 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830890527610/09/2018 10:44:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 03:06:54 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831263084322/12/2018 07:00:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831123704211/11/2018 10:26:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:04:25 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831079862530/10/2018 11:11:50 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/11/2018 09:58:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏝􀏣􀏋010107749190201831143902117/11/2018 10:23:38 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830892989810/09/2018 04:21:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 11:20:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830806699912/08/2018 10:46:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/08/2018 03:07:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830942060324/09/2018 02:12:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831006048910/10/2018 09:43:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 08:45:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831105606919/11/2018 09:31:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 07:22:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830856002331/08/2018 01:49:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧06/09/2018 07:45:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830724231916/07/2018 07:54:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/08/2018 08:59:40 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830803356412/08/2018 09:15:29 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 08:31:44 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831226181712/12/2018 11:19:31 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 09:24:29 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831261947921/12/2018 10:26:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 06:36:00 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830800936110/08/2018 02:20:46 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/08/2018 08:40:15 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830724273716/07/2018 07:54:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/08/2018 06:48:51 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830817151214/08/2018 09:00:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/08/2018 04:25:31 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830862380302/09/2018 07:40:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/09/2018 08:08:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830876960305/09/2018 06:45:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877497605/09/2018 08:51:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830877514605/09/2018 08:51:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830894921311/09/2018 09:07:35 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830905069114/09/2018 11:08:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830905069714/09/2018 11:08:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830858232901/09/2018 11:35:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/11/2018 07:02:16 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830858236601/09/2018 11:35:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830837337727/08/2018 03:07:07 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/09/2018 05:55:03 PM􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830905064014/09/2018 11:10:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/09/2018 08:45:36 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830934185422/09/2018 09:43:39 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/09/2018 06:13:56 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830846768129/08/2018 12:26:24 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904720913/09/2018 05:08:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831191945602/12/2018 11:06:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/12/2018 10:40:08 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830932122621/09/2018 02:53:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/09/2018 09:22:02 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830970255513/10/2018 03:28:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830970113013/10/2018 03:28:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
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010107749190201831123832111/11/2018 10:26:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:04:05 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831210220509/12/2018 02:52:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 05:31:41 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830894534111/09/2018 12:32:52 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/11/2018 04:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830985360615/10/2018 07:20:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/11/2018 04:59:31 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831079187730/10/2018 01:35:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/11/2018 04:59:31 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831099393006/11/2018 01:54:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/11/2018 09:45:21 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831126578512/11/2018 02:45:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/11/2018 02:53:23 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830697518109/07/2018 08:48:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/07/2018 04:45:42 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831108203106/11/2018 07:24:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/12/2018 03:22:15 PM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/11/2018 05:24:04 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830854097230/08/2018 02:06:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩30/08/2018 09:52:47 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904919813/09/2018 09:13:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/12/2018 05:47:36 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831262833522/12/2018 03:05:09 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831237113316/12/2018 06:12:25 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 11:00:48 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831239535816/12/2018 01:25:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831207128006/12/2018 08:39:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831101943505/11/2018 03:36:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧28/11/2018 08:35:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831215470116/12/2018 10:59:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831102059005/11/2018 03:36:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧28/11/2018 08:35:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831002309510/10/2018 05:06:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/10/2018 05:00:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830854396630/08/2018 02:47:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/09/2018 06:13:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831079490830/10/2018 11:08:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 10:37:47 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830886827609/09/2018 12:40:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧12/09/2018 07:22:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831234621513/12/2018 11:08:49 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831255644919/12/2018 05:26:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 11:39:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830845811628/08/2018 06:31:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧11/09/2018 12:08:25 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831020073415/10/2018 02:29:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/11/2018 07:33:52 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830884916809/09/2018 02:18:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/09/2018 05:43:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830884918409/09/2018 03:14:24 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/09/2018 05:44:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831233880613/12/2018 09:34:24 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831143899817/11/2018 10:23:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/11/2018 12:39:15 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831268802924/12/2018 02:36:35 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831229014712/12/2018 10:38:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 10:21:01 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701519709/07/2018 09:37:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701472809/07/2018 09:37:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/07/2018 07:34:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831207797207/12/2018 07:03:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830828987719/08/2018 01:57:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 11:36:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831240743116/12/2018 09:15:42 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830697426009/07/2018 04:56:57 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/07/2018 10:02:19 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831113601409/11/2018 06:03:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/11/2018 03:13:30 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831192845304/12/2018 04:10:51 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/12/2018 07:06:25 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830907217916/09/2018 01:41:39 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/09/2018 10:59:47 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831128625412/11/2018 09:50:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 11:43:36 AM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831128813312/11/2018 09:50:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 11:44:44 AM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830822310915/08/2018 09:58:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830999299909/10/2018 02:16:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/10/2018 06:29:52 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831230438713/12/2018 04:44:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧20/12/2018 01:53:49 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831235042314/12/2018 05:21:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 12:52:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831191585101/12/2018 06:23:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830820848215/08/2018 03:59:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/08/2018 06:41:31 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830983749404/10/2018 07:12:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/10/2018 07:31:12 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831236754616/12/2018 06:17:26 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831235044116/12/2018 10:14:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831033319417/10/2018 10:28:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831236226115/12/2018 03:15:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 07:03:45 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831251041019/12/2018 09:24:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 07:03:45 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830840648727/08/2018 05:20:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 07:18:10 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
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010107749190201831206270909/12/2018 02:51:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830826013516/08/2018 06:13:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/08/2018 09:45:16 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812727914/08/2018 09:08:55 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 09:23:58 AM􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831132401313/11/2018 11:04:55 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/11/2018 08:24:33 PM􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831226232212/12/2018 11:19:31 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 09:25:24 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207325906/12/2018 10:34:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830830890421/08/2018 06:10:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/09/2018 09:15:28 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831210243409/12/2018 02:53:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 09:34:03 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831201731706/12/2018 02:23:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/12/2018 03:08:57 PM􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831219693711/12/2018 03:25:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 06:44:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831246812917/12/2018 09:12:37 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831093068501/11/2018 10:06:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/12/2018 03:26:26 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830850481529/08/2018 06:20:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 10:22:59 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830867481903/09/2018 08:07:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 10:22:59 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830809382713/08/2018 12:12:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/08/2018 05:54:48 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830873733805/09/2018 10:14:22 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 10:13:36 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831219819711/12/2018 03:21:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830854910230/08/2018 11:18:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/09/2018 10:28:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830800935510/08/2018 02:20:46 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/08/2018 08:40:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830822475716/08/2018 01:16:09 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/08/2018 07:39:46 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830961022/08/2018 04:52:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830742571122/07/2018 11:51:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/08/2018 09:48:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830866496103/09/2018 10:17:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/12/2018 07:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830814182114/08/2018 12:14:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 05:44:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830814035014/08/2018 12:14:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 05:44:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830813380314/08/2018 12:14:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 05:44:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830813883214/08/2018 12:14:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 05:44:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830812752814/08/2018 12:14:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 05:44:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830813762714/08/2018 12:14:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 05:44:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830813973514/08/2018 12:14:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 05:44:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831030602417/10/2018 01:56:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/10/2018 11:13:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831234260313/12/2018 09:39:25 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831152660320/11/2018 04:27:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧29/11/2018 11:33:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830830429319/08/2018 09:23:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/08/2018 07:07:07 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830833227526/08/2018 10:45:49 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧28/08/2018 09:58:10 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830927291719/09/2018 09:23:04 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/12/2018 07:25:27 AM􀎭􀎍􀎩􀏟􀎍) 􀏡􀏌􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831120325314/11/2018 05:36:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧25/11/2018 08:59:14 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830872821305/09/2018 12:09:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧06/09/2018 08:14:28 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827137717/08/2018 12:53:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 09:06:14 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827136017/08/2018 12:53:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 09:06:14 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830836839226/08/2018 07:54:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 09:06:14 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830836909426/08/2018 07:54:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 09:06:14 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830837167026/08/2018 09:34:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩31/08/2018 05:33:16 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830837175126/08/2018 09:34:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩31/08/2018 05:33:16 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830793336208/08/2018 10:18:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/08/2018 01:06:20 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831185544229/11/2018 05:08:59 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:28:46 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831027945817/10/2018 12:42:22 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩30/10/2018 10:25:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830845607028/08/2018 05:50:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/09/2018 09:20:41 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830855004930/08/2018 05:33:30 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􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830856157031/08/2018 03:40:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831655224/08/2018 03:38:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831659424/08/2018 03:38:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831661024/08/2018 03:38:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831144527118/11/2018 10:13:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831261962921/12/2018 11:13:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831045298021/10/2018 10:57:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107748190201830822442115/08/2018 11:55:44 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830936760823/09/2018 01:38:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830939753124/09/2018 09:40:47 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830827352617/08/2018 10:48:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830882318806/09/2018 10:28:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831072765603/11/2018 10:52:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831196258215/12/2018 02:42:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831424523/08/2018 04:59:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830854756330/08/2018 04:03:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831103248205/11/2018 07:13:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831179645227/11/2018 09:40:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831144291327/11/2018 09:02:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830858011501/09/2018 08:45:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830994912208/10/2018 02:03:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831227261312/12/2018 01:41:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830975622/08/2018 01:07:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/12/2018 09:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830974722/08/2018 01:07:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831123818712/11/2018 02:36:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107748190201830951655326/09/2018 01:27:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830856313101/09/2018 01:54:22 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831117788810/11/2018 06:58:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831229705413/12/2018 11:13:31 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831084657303/11/2018 10:49:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831225222112/12/2018 08:52:04 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830858337702/09/2018 01:01:29 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830949078226/09/2018 12:24:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎝􀏼􀏋010107746190201830991071107/10/2018 06:27:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831027127616/10/2018 07:57:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830846368328/08/2018 08:31:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830992964308/10/2018 10:20:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831071137828/10/2018 09:00:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831074623/08/2018 06:55:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830846760529/08/2018 12:29:25 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830882311306/09/2018 10:28:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830956397827/09/2018 01:22:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831094762803/11/2018 10:51:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831121339911/11/2018 11:37:51 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831049841822/10/2018 10:11:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831123956212/11/2018 02:36:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107748190201831006479911/10/2018 05:43:24 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201830841956127/08/2018 11:41:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830855647330/08/2018 07:54:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831083502801/11/2018 10:08:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831069223/08/2018 01:34:31 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830846451428/08/2018 09:06:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831011783312/10/2018 06:10:52 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831023416016/10/2018 06:21:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831192974504/12/2018 04:09:50 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831117758409/11/2018 06:01:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830960922/08/2018 04:52:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831124243111/11/2018 10:22:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831245951820/12/2018 11:04:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201831101048105/11/2018 11:42:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830871603604/09/2018 05:50:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830986291407/10/2018 10:58:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830904961814/09/2018 11:45:58 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃
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010107746190201830872843405/09/2018 03:12:03 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831038413921/10/2018 07:56:10 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831207799807/12/2018 07:03:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830932134321/09/2018 03:05:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831083490301/11/2018 10:08:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831032048117/10/2018 10:34:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831657124/08/2018 03:38:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831074723/08/2018 06:55:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831075223/08/2018 06:55:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831074923/08/2018 06:55:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831075423/08/2018 06:55:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831662724/08/2018 03:38:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831071369928/10/2018 08:42:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830861279902/09/2018 03:44:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831027140616/10/2018 07:53:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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01:02:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830802869211/08/2018 09:23:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/10/2018 02:55:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830862558302/09/2018 08:26:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/09/2018 06:27:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224255311/12/2018 10:14:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:05:37 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831230762213/12/2018 09:48:14 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831166043825/11/2018 08:08:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831261229320/12/2018 08:31:27 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830889491812/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/09/2018 09:35:12 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830806734612/09/2018 05:58:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 06:56:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830845298412/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 06:56:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831229999912/12/2018 10:38:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 10:20:39 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831136913814/11/2018 08:06:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830893091910/09/2018 04:39:46 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830945231325/09/2018 11:07:35 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830850420/08/2018 08:10:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830959522/08/2018 01:40:49 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830927328419/09/2018 09:47:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831142261716/11/2018 01:54:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830894478710/09/2018 10:48:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830937506523/09/2018 03:10:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831079192130/10/2018 04:08:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831210310409/12/2018 04:03:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830982459104/10/2018 12:47:06 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/10/2018 10:38:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831235189515/12/2018 01:43:39 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 04:02:59 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831138189615/11/2018 04:05:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/11/2018 10:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830841728627/08/2018 09:20:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830842048528/08/2018 12:28:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831123959211/11/2018 10:26:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:03:33 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830837203726/08/2018 10:06:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/08/2018 03:46:27 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830940690224/09/2018 12:09:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830831591712/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831241139117/12/2018 08:06:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831239707516/12/2018 01:45:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/12/2018 12:58:21 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830894285410/09/2018 09:41:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830830890721/08/2018 06:10:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/09/2018 08:42:17 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831210252709/12/2018 02:53:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 09:34:28 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701934110/07/2018 09:00:00 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/08/2018 11:39:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831031860117/10/2018 10:35:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/10/2018 09:04:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830843290428/08/2018 11:21:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/09/2018 12:07:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830902412312/09/2018 02:35:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/09/2018 12:07:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830841850127/08/2018 10:07:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/09/2018 09:43:47 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830841955527/08/2018 10:51:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/09/2018 09:43:47 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830886306009/09/2018 11:48:22 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/09/2018 09:43:47 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830921247118/09/2018 05:49:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/09/2018 09:22:55 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830831233323/08/2018 01:46:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 08:29:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830841763627/08/2018 09:43:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 08:29:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830841963327/08/2018 10:58:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 08:29:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830896645611/09/2018 12:49:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/09/2018 08:29:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831174295426/11/2018 05:58:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧09/12/2018 09:55:26 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831078625329/10/2018 09:07:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 06:06:07 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
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PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831264155023/12/2018 05:32:24 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830836151026/08/2018 05:16:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/10/2018 07:55:02 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830948214025/09/2018 07:19:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/10/2018 07:55:02 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831033375117/10/2018 10:28:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧31/10/2018 12:09:26 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831178230127/11/2018 09:40:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧11/12/2018 09:55:52 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831199379705/12/2018 12:55:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 01:53:10 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830731494018/07/2018 04:11:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/09/2018 08:11:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831123935711/11/2018 10:26:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:03:44 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831265706623/12/2018 01:23:31 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207362307/12/2018 06:21:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 08:59:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831208004212/12/2018 09:06:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 03:12:13 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830957280627/09/2018 03:52:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/10/2018 08:25:57 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831189340102/12/2018 01:17:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/12/2018 06:03:46 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831229917712/12/2018 10:38:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 10:23:16 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830862668502/09/2018 09:42:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831016642914/10/2018 02:16:12 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/10/2018 10:02:03 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831219663913/12/2018 04:48:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830930441320/09/2018 02:47:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831158451721/11/2018 08:26:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831185915229/11/2018 05:08:59 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:28:02 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830996495808/10/2018 10:51:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 07:32:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831083467430/10/2018 08:35:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 07:32:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830802354011/08/2018 08:33:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/09/2018 09:29:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831170920925/11/2018 08:23:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/12/2018 04:01:07 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831215874710/12/2018 10:50:00 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/12/2018 03:24:32 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830827078416/08/2018 10:46:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 01:04:32 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830827136117/08/2018 01:20:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 01:04:32 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831205316806/12/2018 02:03:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 08:21:06 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827180417/08/2018 03:28:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/08/2018 05:47:25 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830938668923/09/2018 07:38:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧25/09/2018 02:36:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831201425606/12/2018 02:23:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/12/2018 03:08:09 PM􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831111682207/11/2018 02:17:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 03:59:33 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831171299426/11/2018 06:16:02 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 11:59:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831262526222/12/2018 02:51:06 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831237087816/12/2018 06:17:26 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831236387216/12/2018 10:14:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831224295812/12/2018 10:42:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
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010107746190201831127121412/11/2018 02:44:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 10:33:07 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831038577420/10/2018 04:48:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/10/2018 04:27:06 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831148171020/12/2018 12:12:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830778395804/08/2018 04:12:58 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 10:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830809970713/08/2018 02:19:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 10:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830882463407/09/2018 01:32:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 10:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830863939603/09/2018 10:33:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830937342223/09/2018 03:32:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/09/2018 08:48:27 PM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830872185504/09/2018 07:42:04 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/09/2018 07:05:23 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830874995905/09/2018 01:11:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 03:40:43 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 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09:41:50 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830802390211/08/2018 06:06:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830766059230/07/2018 03:39:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/08/2018 11:21:36 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830766085630/07/2018 03:49:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/08/2018 11:21:36 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830697421709/07/2018 05:24:00 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:15:15 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830824413317/08/2018 02:15:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/08/2018 08:24:43 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831732725/08/2018 12:56:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/08/2018 02:37:33 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830826800117/08/2018 02:15:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831732925/08/2018 12:56:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831239115516/12/2018 12:37:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830828737718/08/2018 08:40:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830998452709/10/2018 11:27:08 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 07:02:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107786190201831118644918/11/2018 10:14:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/12/2018 07:56:56 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207370507/12/2018 06:22:39 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧10/12/2018 10:40:05 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831093196002/11/2018 03:58:06 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/12/2018 03:09:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831192607203/12/2018 10:02:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831206420209/12/2018 02:51:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830868532904/09/2018 01:15:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:06:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831186331611/12/2018 02:35:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧12/12/2018 10:11:12 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831164094723/11/2018 10:34:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 08:14:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831224792411/12/2018 10:27:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 01:15:21 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831097531104/11/2018 02:23:39 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 05:37:17 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831100678005/11/2018 10:38:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 05:37:17 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831222246512/12/2018 10:39:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 11:53:34 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831123994711/11/2018 10:26:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:05:09 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830867820/08/2018 11:17:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/08/2018 10:26:24 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831033498417/10/2018 10:29:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/10/2018 03:10:14 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831151784020/11/2018 02:05:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/11/2018 10:22:32 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831254124419/12/2018 05:33:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 05:28:03 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831111525707/11/2018 02:17:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831261841121/12/2018 10:28:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831013417613/10/2018 07:51:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/11/2018 09:00:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830802916311/08/2018 09:23:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧04/10/2018 02:54:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831072923/08/2018 01:57:31 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/09/2018 07:27:09 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107746190201830835065626/08/2018 01:02:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/09/2018 07:27:09 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830832685625/08/2018 06:53:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830835094526/08/2018 01:26:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831225202012/12/2018 02:31:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 10:18:53 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830855994630/08/2018 11:55:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧31/08/2018 05:51:10 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831117965810/11/2018 02:27:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/11/2018 07:28:22 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831191945402/12/2018 02:15:55 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830816002314/08/2018 04:51:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/08/2018 09:38:10 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830894235810/09/2018 09:41:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831257079720/12/2018 06:07:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830750562925/07/2018 12:46:55 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/09/2018 05:44:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 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05:48:39 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/07/2018 10:51:05 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830823639916/08/2018 11:32:17 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/08/2018 07:56:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830922440318/09/2018 11:40:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/10/2018 05:57:03 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831190880601/12/2018 07:30:10 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 10:01:06 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830895164611/09/2018 10:00:53 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/09/2018 07:15:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831219785811/12/2018 03:21:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 01:25:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830829721219/08/2018 01:05:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/08/2018 12:22:25 AM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201830825394916/08/2018 05:02:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/09/2018 01:07:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827142417/08/2018 05:57:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/09/2018 01:07:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830856000931/08/2018 02:47:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/09/2018 01:07:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831192840103/12/2018 10:19:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 09:57:09 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831179305527/11/2018 09:45:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 11:57:46 AM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201831246994223/12/2018 08:59:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831129196913/11/2018 09:04:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 10:22:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831235261715/12/2018 12:50:33 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830724263216/07/2018 07:54:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/08/2018 08:59:25 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831111766107/11/2018 02:17:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 03:59:56 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830867021603/09/2018 06:26:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:13:11 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831229916820/12/2018 12:18:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:13:11 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831210680909/12/2018 01:45:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831229945612/12/2018 10:38:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 10:23:34 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831186329711/12/2018 02:35:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧12/12/2018 10:06:04 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831653124/08/2018 02:28:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 08:18:27 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830816856314/08/2018 08:04:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/08/2018 09:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830725785817/07/2018 11:03:49 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/08/2018 10:33:26 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831100082005/11/2018 06:09:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/12/2018 03:13:22 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831235022114/12/2018 05:20:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 04:44:36 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831120087021/11/2018 05:42:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:53:47 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830949921/08/2018 08:55:04 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/09/2018 08:54:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831214342612/12/2018 10:42:10 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 11:00:23 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107749190201830856209931/08/2018 08:16:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/09/2018 12:10:48 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831142625817/11/2018 12:04:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/11/2018 03:17:16 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831163174822/11/2018 07:57:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/11/2018 10:13:35 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831205333906/12/2018 02:03:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 08:20:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831217718110/12/2018 04:45:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831113849608/11/2018 07:51:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/11/2018 07:14:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831160178122/11/2018 10:32:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 05:54:37 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831262322222/12/2018 12:45:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831164824524/11/2018 02:11:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 05:50:05 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831262418622/12/2018 12:45:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830804819012/08/2018 12:29:50 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AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 08:57:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831060802224/10/2018 10:23:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/11/2018 05:58:29 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831084458031/10/2018 05:36:29 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/11/2018 04:11:04 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831185699129/11/2018 05:08:59 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:28:23 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831265912123/12/2018 01:23:31 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830790534007/08/2018 01:30:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830816762114/08/2018 08:04:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/08/2018 09:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831119591610/11/2018 07:41:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/11/2018 01:38:55 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830969526401/10/2018 09:50:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/10/2018 06:01:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192448715/12/2018 02:45:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 07:02:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831045254021/10/2018 10:52:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/11/2018 06:08:40 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827157117/08/2018 01:05:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/08/2018 08:45:42 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831225198412/12/2018 01:05:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 10:18:17 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192662503/12/2018 10:16:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 10:19:44 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207812707/12/2018 07:08:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 04:37:46 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831214755611/12/2018 03:30:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830888408209/09/2018 05:15:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/09/2018 01:01:43 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831590324/08/2018 04:02:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 04:05:52 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830849933029/08/2018 03:56:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 04:05:52 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830872844405/09/2018 03:05:03 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 04:05:52 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􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830837193526/08/2018 10:12:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831206545009/12/2018 02:51:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831236060915/12/2018 02:10:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 06:35:57 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831196674605/12/2018 09:21:02 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 09:57:44 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830836805026/08/2018 07:37:46 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧31/08/2018 10:38:23 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831181118427/11/2018 10:17:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧29/11/2018 03:57:44 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831233888813/12/2018 09:38:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 02:22:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830950121/08/2018 08:55:04 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831918925/08/2018 11:06:37 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831214368112/12/2018 10:42:10 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830867950003/09/2018 10:42:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831654124/08/2018 02:28:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 07:40:06 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831246341517/12/2018 09:04:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831031552917/10/2018 10:36:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701085909/07/2018 07:52:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701183409/07/2018 07:52:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831229624512/12/2018 09:08:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/12/2018 04:23:34 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830879294006/09/2018 11:19:55 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 03:41:56 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831147392719/11/2018 04:47:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/11/2018 02:46:23 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831197075505/12/2018 09:22:03 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/12/2018 05:42:09 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830881692706/09/2018 06:15:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 10:32:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830882593707/09/2018 09:24:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 10:32:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830888513209/09/2018 05:40:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 10:32:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830827248817/08/2018 04:52:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/08/2018 06:59:10 AM􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831236950815/12/2018 09:30:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830845151028/08/2018 03:53:44 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/09/2018 08:38:45 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107749190201831247097418/12/2018 03:54:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧20/12/2018 09:45:50 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201830823709416/08/2018 11:32:17 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/08/2018 07:56:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830986241507/10/2018 01:47:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/10/2018 10:30:22 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831068360828/10/2018 01:36:11 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 10:30:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831238779816/12/2018 12:17:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/12/2018 08:41:19 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831222336312/12/2018 10:39:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 11:53:26 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831236190415/12/2018 03:06:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/12/2018 06:45:19 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207914808/12/2018 08:08:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/12/2018 12:50:13 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830837225426/08/2018 10:21:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/09/2018 05:29:51 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831192614803/12/2018 10:02:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 11:42:48 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831144186818/11/2018 05:50:39 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 07:07:36 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831144400218/11/2018 10:12:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 07:07:36 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830974936908/10/2018 10:21:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/10/2018 08:04:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830851635530/08/2018 03:23:35 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831192089115/12/2018 02:45:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/12/2018 11:16:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830851630230/08/2018 01:48:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830857522601/09/2018 05:31:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831228483912/12/2018 07:52:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 02:25:09 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831158569721/11/2018 08:26:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 08:49:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830868833104/09/2018 10:21:25 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PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/08/2018 11:37:13 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830990523207/10/2018 06:16:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/10/2018 01:38:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831105583906/11/2018 12:55:46 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/11/2018 07:36:01 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831234035413/12/2018 09:38:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 02:22:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207325407/12/2018 06:21:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 08:58:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831241309217/12/2018 08:06:45 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830801045111/08/2018 08:52:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830817590315/08/2018 12:58:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/09/2018 09:01:10 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831197828809/12/2018 01:04:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 07:27:37 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831205356606/12/2018 02:03:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 08:20:17 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831171313926/11/2018 06:25:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831171304926/11/2018 06:25:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831237096816/12/2018 06:17:26 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831236473316/12/2018 10:14:59 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830826919516/08/2018 09:33:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/08/2018 08:44:35 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831013576313/10/2018 07:51:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830998591809/10/2018 12:15:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/10/2018 07:59:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831240767816/12/2018 06:47:10 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 05:46:25 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831033188417/10/2018 10:28:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831032072217/10/2018 10:34:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812336813/08/2018 10:28:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 10:59:36 AM􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831147343419/11/2018 05:18:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/11/2018 03:17:23 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831209138109/12/2018 01:42:20 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 10:04:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831148834819/11/2018 11:35:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/12/2018 05:30:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831229527512/12/2018 09:08:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831229610012/12/2018 09:08:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831181140128/11/2018 12:30:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 10:47:58 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831181152128/11/2018 12:30:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 10:46:49 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831146508919/11/2018 05:27:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/11/2018 01:31:14 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831196731305/12/2018 09:21:02 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 09:56:27 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830828990819/08/2018 06:09:07 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧28/08/2018 03:04:47 PM􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830842055328/08/2018 07:39:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/09/2018 12:01:46 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830854866730/08/2018 04:49:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/09/2018 12:01:46 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830926222319/09/2018 05:23:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩30/09/2018 06:35:51 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831018397814/10/2018 09:35:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/11/2018 06:22:52 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831174358226/11/2018 06:00:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/11/2018 06:22:52 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830828873118/08/2018 09:50:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831261051120/12/2018 07:40:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831245843217/12/2018 09:00:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831186138629/11/2018 12:28:27 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 09:40:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830932302721/09/2018 10:27:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/09/2018 12:47:57 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107748190201831093177802/11/2018 12:09:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/12/2018 07:52:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831109406510/11/2018 02:31:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/12/2018 07:52:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831191654302/12/2018 01:17:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/12/2018 07:52:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831252185919/12/2018 02:32:39 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 01:41:36 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201831128924313/11/2018 10:26:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831257209020/12/2018 06:05:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830827033216/08/2018 10:23:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831182307728/11/2018 12:27:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830803401912/08/2018 09:15:29 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 08:27:31 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831228955512/12/2018 08:53:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 07:30:21 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831003503510/10/2018 11:56:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/10/2018 04:16:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831192089415/12/2018 02:45:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/12/2018 11:16:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831083124401/11/2018 01:14:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 08:48:45 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831239724320/12/2018 06:13:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830716316615/07/2018 12:21:55 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830807142812/08/2018 07:41:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/08/2018 05:52:02 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830808089613/08/2018 09:03:22 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧29/08/2018 02:31:19 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830837298626/08/2018 11:16:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/11/2018 06:00:17 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831104525508/11/2018 05:18:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/11/2018 06:00:17 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831262432422/12/2018 12:45:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831230523513/12/2018 04:41:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 10:37:34 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 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PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/09/2018 06:21:27 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831265936623/12/2018 01:23:31 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830970597902/11/2018 02:10:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/12/2018 01:32:04 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831183208628/11/2018 02:23:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/12/2018 01:32:04 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831199581205/12/2018 12:55:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 01:52:09 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831199857405/12/2018 12:59:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 08:19:39 AM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830841329327/08/2018 07:41:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/09/2018 05:35:23 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831247111718/12/2018 03:50:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831247062418/12/2018 03:50:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831246739817/12/2018 09:11:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831056025024/10/2018 06:18:08 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830926729219/09/2018 06:57:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830935558423/09/2018 11:00:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831246874023/12/2018 08:59:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831199240705/12/2018 12:55:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831208799109/12/2018 01:39:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831155206821/12/2018 02:34:51 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830808143213/08/2018 01:05:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/08/2018 08:50:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830862480602/09/2018 09:42:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831209801009/12/2018 02:50:26 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 01:46:33 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831100014709/11/2018 05:52:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/12/2018 10:42:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831175923626/11/2018 10:19:01 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831163524322/11/2018 10:28:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831163587522/11/2018 10:28:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830801654611/08/2018 12:36:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830832396725/08/2018 03:13:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831214787211/12/2018 03:28:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830875727905/09/2018 02:03:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/09/2018 09:40:51 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830807831613/08/2018 02:02:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/08/2018 10:20:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830723878216/07/2018 06:14:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/07/2018 01:38:45 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192453215/12/2018 02:45:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 07:03:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830815933414/08/2018 04:51:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧19/08/2018 09:39:30 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831241650216/12/2018 09:16:42 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831093269102/11/2018 02:10:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831223345212/12/2018 12:44:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 01:22:21 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812201213/08/2018 10:28:08 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PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/12/2018 04:35:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831206510606/12/2018 06:52:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830753517625/07/2018 05:22:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830753573725/07/2018 05:32:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831192963104/12/2018 04:10:51 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/12/2018 07:06:03 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830803103611/08/2018 11:08:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/08/2018 09:45:19 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207368407/12/2018 12:13:22 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/12/2018 02:45:10 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831223158212/12/2018 12:44:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 01:22:09 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830860940012/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830860798312/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830817576815/08/2018 12:58:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/09/2018 09:01:28 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831197909109/12/2018 01:04:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 07:26:43 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830735403919/07/2018 03:08:44 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/08/2018 07:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904714313/09/2018 04:30:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/09/2018 07:45:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831095518504/11/2018 05:28:08 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/11/2018 10:19:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831236938215/12/2018 09:30:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831237082015/12/2018 09:59:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831558812/09/2018 07:50:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/11/2018 09:15:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831055866224/10/2018 12:28:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/11/2018 09:15:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831237270316/12/2018 06:12:25 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 01:58:02 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827423718/08/2018 09:49:50 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/08/2018 06:27:29 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830697420009/07/2018 05:24:00 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:20:51 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831247056318/12/2018 03:53:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 06:37:55 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830828982119/08/2018 12:12:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 12:05:40 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831007240611/10/2018 05:41:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/10/2018 08:01:48 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830836714326/08/2018 08:38:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/12/2018 03:12:58 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831132045814/11/2018 09:28:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 06:47:04 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831209530109/12/2018 02:50:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831209233309/12/2018 01:42:20 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 10:03:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830816984714/08/2018 08:04:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/08/2018 09:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831058199124/10/2018 02:05:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831070219428/10/2018 12:59:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831252592319/12/2018 10:43:21 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/12/2018 07:29:36 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831116577709/11/2018 01:58:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830822298115/08/2018 09:24:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831214067811/12/2018 03:33:46 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207383507/12/2018 06:21:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 10:58:08 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831191561302/12/2018 06:46:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/12/2018 09:27:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827348517/08/2018 10:31:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/08/2018 08:02:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830838505527/08/2018 11:05:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/08/2018 08:02:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830943214524/09/2018 06:29:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/09/2018 07:51:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107746190201831081784931/10/2018 02:16:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/11/2018 12:16:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831118245810/11/2018 02:24:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/11/2018 07:27:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831164701224/11/2018 07:43:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/11/2018 07:27:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831212422209/12/2018 01:51:51 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 07:57:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207230907/12/2018 06:21:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 08:57:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831150170720/11/2018 02:12:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/11/2018 09:45:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830844294528/08/2018 01:14:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/09/2018 06:12:16 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830848090329/08/2018 11:15:34 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/09/2018 06:12:16 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831133231113/11/2018 11:10:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831186450011/12/2018 02:35:49 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PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧25/10/2018 09:39:12 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830720299916/07/2018 04:33:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/08/2018 06:35:01 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831042718421/10/2018 02:12:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/10/2018 03:23:17 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831182698006/12/2018 02:22:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 12:30:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831261951021/12/2018 10:26:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 06:32:08 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830831655824/08/2018 02:28:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/08/2018 08:16:28 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831171317726/11/2018 06:25:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831208867209/12/2018 01:39:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831146931419/11/2018 05:27:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/11/2018 01:30:48 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830867829803/09/2018 10:42:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831242105121/12/2018 10:27:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830857550101/09/2018 05:31:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/12/2018 05:09:01 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831092348201/11/2018 10:07:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/11/2018 10:28:45 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831237105816/12/2018 06:17:26 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831236580716/12/2018 10:14:59 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830836995426/08/2018 08:38:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/12/2018 03:15:42 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831030726317/10/2018 01:56:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/10/2018 01:03:37 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831202690106/12/2018 06:40:57 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/12/2018 03:07:56 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831108790806/11/2018 11:34:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/11/2018 05:48:33 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831193957004/12/2018 01:48:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 10:09:15 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831241287317/12/2018 08:06:45 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830828990719/08/2018 06:09:07 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧28/08/2018 03:04:32 PM􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107749190201830845844528/08/2018 07:39:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/09/2018 12:02:13 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830854889530/08/2018 04:49:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧03/09/2018 12:02:13 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831213889812/12/2018 11:02:26 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/12/2018 02:10:27 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830701505509/07/2018 09:37:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/07/2018 07:36:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830790620/08/2018 06:50:39 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/08/2018 03:21:04 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830866981903/09/2018 06:15:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:12:01 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831229979320/12/2018 12:18:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:12:01 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831239893320/12/2018 06:13:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831128953521/11/2018 05:42:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:57:21 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831247079718/12/2018 03:53:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 06:34:42 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830823843716/08/2018 11:32:17 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/08/2018 07:56:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830822460515/08/2018 11:44:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831201632305/12/2018 08:40:12 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/12/2018 08:48:25 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831196803805/12/2018 09:21:02 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 10:00:23 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831226170812/12/2018 11:20:30 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 12:57:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831065286526/10/2018 06:21:46 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 07:39:35 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831235174114/12/2018 11:19:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831191942315/12/2018 02:46:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831158148821/11/2018 05:52:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/12/2018 03:29:57 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830760004429/07/2018 08:45:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830912209316/09/2018 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􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830802124611/08/2018 04:53:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 11:19:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830802201811/08/2018 04:53:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 11:18:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830825700716/08/2018 04:57:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/08/2018 08:46:34 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830805736512/08/2018 02:19:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830805004412/08/2018 02:39:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 04:17:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830802143912/08/2018 04:16:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/08/2018 06:14:11 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831261980622/12/2018 04:02:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830804984312/08/2018 04:16:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/08/2018 06:13:38 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831261980322/12/2018 04:02:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830817437914/08/2018 10:15:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:47:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830872161104/09/2018 07:37:04 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:47:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830876505905/09/2018 05:03:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:47:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830878493106/09/2018 09:49:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 07:47:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830807833613/08/2018 02:39:16 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830808213913/08/2018 09:42:32 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 04:18:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830808434713/08/2018 10:13:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 04:13:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830808631513/08/2018 10:26:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/09/2018 04:16:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830809843913/08/2018 01:20:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830985361307/10/2018 10:56:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830810759413/08/2018 04:08:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/08/2018 05:47:59 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830811325613/08/2018 07:22:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 10:10:25 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831144141418/11/2018 11:46:27 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/11/2018 09:26:28 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830811575513/08/2018 07:22:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830811720113/08/2018 07:22:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 10:12:40 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830811698113/08/2018 07:22:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 10:13:11 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831144154818/11/2018 01:13:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/11/2018 09:26:53 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107746190201830811797213/08/2018 07:22:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 10:12:13 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830811734213/08/2018 07:22:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 10:11:44 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831144153418/11/2018 01:13:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/11/2018 09:26:04 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830808080413/08/2018 08:55:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/08/2018 09:23:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812332913/08/2018 10:28:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812327413/08/2018 10:28:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812162113/08/2018 10:28:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812310113/08/2018 10:28:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812322913/08/2018 10:47:10 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/08/2018 04:04:55 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812388014/08/2018 01:01:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/08/2018 07:32:01 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812503414/08/2018 05:55:10 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 09:47:52 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830817557414/08/2018 11:35:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/08/2018 06:42:36 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904971914/09/2018 02:57:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 10:41:38 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831214158812/12/2018 10:41:10 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 10:41:38 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830817568914/08/2018 11:50:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/08/2018 06:44:57 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904921813/09/2018 09:13:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 10:41:00 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904924713/09/2018 09:30:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 10:41:00 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831214271010/12/2018 06:20:57 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 10:41:00 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831228333312/12/2018 07:48:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 10:41:00 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831261411021/12/2018 01:49:35 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831175470626/11/2018 10:25:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩27/11/2018 04:39:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830877674405/09/2018 10:19:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/09/2018 08:17:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830877716605/09/2018 10:19:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/09/2018 08:17:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831099587104/11/2018 08:28:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/11/2018 04:11:32 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830882653907/09/2018 10:08:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/09/2018 06:33:46 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830893572010/09/2018 06:24:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/10/2018 06:47:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830893639410/09/2018 06:35:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/10/2018 06:47:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830882673408/09/2018 03:52:00 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/09/2018 07:33:41 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830886826809/09/2018 12:31:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830887085309/09/2018 01:02:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830888442109/09/2018 05:24:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830889747010/09/2018 01:14:10 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904972114/09/2018 04:39:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830889750110/09/2018 01:28:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830903685212/09/2018 07:41:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830828149910/09/2018 02:42:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830895260711/09/2018 10:00:53 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/09/2018 07:15:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830893578510/09/2018 06:16:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830882450711/09/2018 11:12:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830899550012/09/2018 12:50:47 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/09/2018 07:32:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830899793512/09/2018 09:30:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830900749412/09/2018 11:01:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/09/2018 06:38:31 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830900778812/09/2018 11:01:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/09/2018 06:38:47 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830900665512/09/2018 11:01:43 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/09/2018 06:39:00 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904548713/09/2018 12:12:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/09/2018 09:40:50 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831119914610/11/2018 09:50:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧14/11/2018 03:23:02 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831260204920/12/2018 05:39:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 01:56:58 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830828990512/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830671212/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201830855990712/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830876182112/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/09/2018 03:41:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎳􀎍􀎭􀎩010107748190201830882448112/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830903291212/09/2018 06:12:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/09/2018 12:06:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830827166312/09/2018 07:50:25 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904697513/09/2018 03:19:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904841113/09/2018 08:02:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/09/2018 10:05:04 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107746190201830905074515/09/2018 01:16:39 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/09/2018 03:16:07 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎳􀎍􀎭􀎩010107749190201831205993606/12/2018 07:01:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/12/2018 01:08:08 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎳􀎍􀎭􀎩010107746190201830905076415/09/2018 03:02:53 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/09/2018 03:19:24 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830913487517/09/2018 10:55:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/09/2018 10:20:46 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830943539824/09/2018 07:45:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/09/2018 10:20:46 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830916211317/09/2018 05:59:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩30/10/2018 10:06:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830953972126/09/2018 11:09:55 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831047699522/10/2018 01:12:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831067799827/10/2018 07:27:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201831126947812/11/2018 02:43:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831126998212/11/2018 02:44:16 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201830926897619/09/2018 07:44:47 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/11/2018 10:47:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830933380422/09/2018 03:08:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/11/2018 10:47:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831157432822/11/2018 07:05:55 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/11/2018 10:47:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830933470722/09/2018 03:33:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831170200429/11/2018 05:09:59 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830928950020/09/2018 11:14:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830938909723/09/2018 09:10:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩26/09/2018 03:24:06 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830931410820/09/2018 09:18:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/09/2018 06:21:03 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830957620427/09/2018 05:18:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/09/2018 06:21:03 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830943833424/09/2018 09:22:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830949821426/09/2018 10:33:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/11/2018 04:08:39 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831050822323/10/2018 05:00:16 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/11/2018 04:09:43 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831056028724/10/2018 06:18:08 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/11/2018 04:09:16 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831041949924/10/2018 02:06:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831058428624/10/2018 02:06:59 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830984209324/10/2018 10:19:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830984445424/10/2018 10:19:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830984346424/10/2018 10:19:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831060845424/10/2018 10:24:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/10/2018 05:57:08 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831181471605/12/2018 12:44:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 05:33:15 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831065863326/10/2018 06:20:46 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/11/2018 03:49:02 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831067143027/10/2018 03:57:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/10/2018 08:04:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831093290202/11/2018 06:52:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831078507029/10/2018 09:07:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 06:08:47 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831078537129/10/2018 09:07:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 06:08:12 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831068123327/10/2018 10:52:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/11/2018 03:31:07 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831070341028/10/2018 12:59:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831039751829/10/2018 03:03:51 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩31/10/2018 01:17:30 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831039795029/10/2018 03:03:51 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩31/10/2018 01:05:34 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831075766929/10/2018 08:40:56 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831078529129/10/2018 10:58:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/11/2018 01:08:53 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831079261130/10/2018 04:08:14 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09:50:46 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831093861203/11/2018 10:50:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 06:06:59 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831093984303/11/2018 10:50:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 06:07:22 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831115067608/11/2018 12:48:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎭􀎎􀏘􀏋 􀏙􀏟􀎎􀏣010107746190201831122228311/11/2018 02:14:50 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107786190201831108431909/11/2018 05:54:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/11/2018 06:05:38 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831117792009/11/2018 06:00:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 01:09:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831261946921/12/2018 10:25:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201831117788209/11/2018 08:50:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩30/11/2018 05:18:40 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831118378510/11/2018 02:24:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831117967510/11/2018 02:26:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/11/2018 05:20:04 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831202688806/12/2018 06:40:57 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩08/12/2018 05:01:22 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831120429311/11/2018 11:38:51 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩11/11/2018 08:03:13 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831121603912/11/2018 02:35:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧25/11/2018 11:36:04 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831127204612/11/2018 02:45:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 10:33:49 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831127174512/11/2018 02:45:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 10:34:14 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831125389413/11/2018 12:04:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:33:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224955612/12/2018 01:01:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:33:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831129522713/11/2018 12:05:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:32:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831225142912/12/2018 01:01:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:32:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831129684813/11/2018 12:05:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:33:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831225145412/12/2018 01:01:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:33:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831129790713/11/2018 12:07:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:32:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831225197512/12/2018 01:01:05 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩12/12/2018 04:32:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831133454613/11/2018 11:12:55 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/11/2018 08:42:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831128620414/11/2018 01:01:06 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/12/2018 09:08:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831149491620/11/2018 02:04:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/12/2018 09:08:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831136668714/11/2018 05:32:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831136495314/11/2018 05:33:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831144190018/11/2018 03:41:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 07:07:22 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831144148018/11/2018 01:13:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/11/2018 09:25:02 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831207359006/12/2018 10:34:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831147487619/11/2018 03:49:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 06:02:44 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831147652519/11/2018 04:02:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 06:02:55 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831132983519/11/2018 12:22:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831133102619/11/2018 12:22:36 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831147536219/11/2018 07:37:55 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831105835419/11/2018 09:31:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 07:23:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831105935019/11/2018 09:31:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 07:22:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831105887219/11/2018 09:31:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 07:24:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831105634319/11/2018 09:31:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 07:24:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831207913707/12/2018 10:14:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 09:14:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831207919107/12/2018 10:14:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 09:14:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831207910807/12/2018 10:19:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831152844020/11/2018 09:09:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/11/2018 12:14:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831078392421/11/2018 05:42:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:58:40 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831128958221/11/2018 05:42:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:58:13 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831128960421/11/2018 05:42:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:56:57 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107786190201831156744521/11/2018 05:43:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧30/11/2018 05:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831157332021/11/2018 05:46:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 09:36:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831157184821/11/2018 05:46:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 09:38:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831157413221/11/2018 05:46:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 09:38:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831157517321/11/2018 05:46:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/12/2018 09:37:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831156557821/11/2018 05:48:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831159539522/11/2018 02:23:31 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831159774222/11/2018 10:25:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831150918822/11/2018 12:15:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧28/11/2018 03:19:07 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831164071323/11/2018 10:32:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 07:05:10 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831164211223/11/2018 10:32:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 07:03:32 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831164233523/11/2018 11:00:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831164248124/11/2018 03:26:25 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831164050424/11/2018 08:13:28 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831165901525/11/2018 08:11:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831165921725/11/2018 08:11:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831165788525/11/2018 08:36:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831165839925/11/2018 08:36:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831178007127/11/2018 06:50:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/11/2018 10:59:06 AM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831171309826/11/2018 06:26:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831183783606/12/2018 02:22:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831175847626/11/2018 10:26:01 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831181167327/11/2018 11:19:33 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩29/11/2018 03:33:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831186212928/11/2018 11:33:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/12/2018 09:09:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831179494727/11/2018 10:09:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/12/2018 08:04:47 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831179024427/11/2018 10:21:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831169500128/11/2018 02:18:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 07:59:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831183488628/11/2018 02:23:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/12/2018 01:32:50 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831185922328/11/2018 09:46:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/12/2018 05:45:54 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831170296829/11/2018 05:09:59 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831187311329/11/2018 11:55:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:17:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831187223129/11/2018 11:55:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:17:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831186706829/11/2018 11:55:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:15:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831186904629/11/2018 11:55:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:17:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831186810329/11/2018 11:55:19 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/12/2018 08:16:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831175956929/11/2018 03:25:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224985012/12/2018 12:57:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 10:54:41 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224977512/12/2018 12:57:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 10:53:43 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224991712/12/2018 12:57:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 10:54:58 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224877712/12/2018 12:57:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 10:54:19 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224995212/12/2018 12:57:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/12/2018 10:54:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831190742530/11/2018 07:58:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831190850330/11/2018 07:58:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831199362905/12/2018 12:49:40 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06:14:57 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831252949619/12/2018 11:44:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/12/2018 06:14:03 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831253042419/12/2018 11:44:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/12/2018 06:14:20 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831256724820/12/2018 06:10:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/12/2018 06:15:13 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831148489920/12/2018 12:12:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831148468420/12/2018 12:12:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831257444820/12/2018 11:07:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831258912720/12/2018 02:35:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 01:00:13 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831258378820/12/2018 02:42:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831260086520/12/2018 04:32:45 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831259098920/12/2018 06:58:06 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 09:02:07 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831261080820/12/2018 07:41:16 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831261802721/12/2018 05:13:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831251676121/12/2018 10:25:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831261949321/12/2018 10:26:19 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 06:30:21 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831152396722/12/2018 12:15:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831152117122/12/2018 12:15:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831262803922/12/2018 03:04:09 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831263290822/12/2018 07:00:03 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831268458223/12/2018 09:51:39 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831099589304/11/2018 08:27:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201831224987512/12/2018 01:06:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201831037944318/10/2018 10:17:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/10/2018 01:19:49 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201831117458809/11/2018 02:00:49 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 08:08:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831196456106/12/2018 06:57:29 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 12:39:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830907694116/09/2018 09:32:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201830911389016/09/2018 06:56:01 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831101265705/11/2018 11:43:27 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/11/2018 11:12:02 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831212101109/12/2018 01:09:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831191938502/12/2018 01:15:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧23/12/2018 02:10:24 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831128959713/11/2018 05:39:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/11/2018 06:29:43 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830857651701/09/2018 06:20:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏼􀏋
Annex 17
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010107749190201831220116011/12/2018 03:13:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧16/12/2018 08:48:17 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830827026216/08/2018 10:44:23 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/08/2018 10:25:44 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830757977127/07/2018 08:18:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830757977627/07/2018 08:27:40 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831019238615/10/2018 09:59:11 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/10/2018 08:53:17 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830826608516/08/2018 08:04:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830807717913/08/2018 12:10:08 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830802451111/08/2018 06:06:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830959396629/09/2018 02:52:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/10/2018 02:59:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831113730908/11/2018 01:38:20 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/11/2018 08:04:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831141122615/11/2018 03:47:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/11/2018 08:04:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831246904721/12/2018 09:02:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831244870321/12/2018 09:02:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830758094928/07/2018 07:28:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/08/2018 10:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830758095528/07/2018 07:43:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩05/08/2018 10:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830830457619/08/2018 09:23:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831088416631/10/2018 08:11:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/11/2018 08:55:22 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831138559115/11/2018 04:05:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩19/11/2018 10:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830794070008/08/2018 11:47:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/08/2018 06:57:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831214759711/12/2018 03:30:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830697312008/07/2018 10:51:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/07/2018 02:33:34 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830828969318/08/2018 11:52:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/08/2018 05:19:46 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02:18:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 08:00:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831257600620/12/2018 11:06:42 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831257494520/12/2018 11:07:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830811548913/08/2018 06:52:28 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧12/10/2018 07:10:12 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830991459807/10/2018 06:08:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧12/10/2018 07:10:12 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107749190201831119301910/11/2018 05:14:35 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧15/11/2018 03:15:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830848645829/08/2018 01:08:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201831227737716/12/2018 12:18:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩23/12/2018 08:12:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831138041515/11/2018 03:56:39 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/12/2018 05:08:32 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831138054015/11/2018 04:01:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/12/2018 05:09:34 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831117424409/11/2018 01:59:49 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩10/11/2018 07:41:08 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831128137912/11/2018 09:46:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/11/2018 07:49:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831212078109/12/2018 04:17:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831258116220/12/2018 02:38:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 05:44:35 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831258499420/12/2018 02:38:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 05:45:20 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830758094428/07/2018 05:05:39 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192451815/12/2018 02:45:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831191936702/12/2018 01:12:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧22/12/2018 04:09:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831237141916/12/2018 06:16:26 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830807819513/08/2018 02:39:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/08/2018 05:24:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831174290627/11/2018 12:10:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏼􀏋010107746190201830750534524/07/2018 11:01:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩30/07/2018 01:46:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830846356328/08/2018 08:57:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩03/09/2018 08:14:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831233609613/12/2018 09:34:24 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830862480002/09/2018 09:48:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/09/2018 10:53:30 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830911300616/09/2018 06:39:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/09/2018 04:58:07 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830954228527/09/2018 09:04:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/10/2018 10:53:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831196634505/12/2018 09:21:02 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 09:51:12 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830837214426/08/2018 10:12:26 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831224051112/12/2018 10:43:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/12/2018 04:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830903774112/09/2018 07:12:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩13/09/2018 11:53:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830857554401/09/2018 06:04:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831229840412/12/2018 09:14:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831250549518/12/2018 11:53:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/12/2018 06:41:32 PM􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831202571106/12/2018 12:19:03 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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010107746190201831202491706/12/2018 12:19:03 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:54:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831201553406/12/2018 12:19:03 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/12/2018 06:53:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831192088315/12/2018 02:45:15 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧18/12/2018 11:14:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831240452216/12/2018 06:52:12 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904723913/09/2018 08:24:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/10/2018 10:25:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831197383805/12/2018 06:30:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/12/2018 07:45:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201831197476405/12/2018 06:31:48 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/12/2018 07:45:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107746190201831243060317/12/2018 01:41:57 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830872221/08/2018 01:34:48 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/08/2018 06:39:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830917315518/09/2018 01:10:22 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/09/2018 04:23:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830714316613/07/2018 08:30:52 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830722009416/07/2018 12:30:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/09/2018 08:59:33 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830721656216/07/2018 11:28:10 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/09/2018 08:59:17 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830722180716/07/2018 12:30:27 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧01/09/2018 08:59:46 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831214750411/12/2018 03:30:45 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830987537907/10/2018 11:22:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/10/2018 07:26:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830703379010/07/2018 12:15:50 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩28/07/2018 02:28:01 AM􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830727348117/07/2018 03:14:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧27/07/2018 08:55:14 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830867952903/09/2018 10:47:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830806378812/08/2018 05:21:31 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/08/2018 06:24:18 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831068099127/10/2018 10:52:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/11/2018 03:31:40 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830898873411/09/2018 07:45:49 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/09/2018 03:44:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831027361216/10/2018 07:54:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/10/2018 04:04:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831225137612/12/2018 12:53:04 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 08:12:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831221870512/12/2018 10:39:13 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧13/12/2018 11:54:12 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201831214265510/12/2018 06:20:57 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831152288922/12/2018 12:15:18 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831214805211/12/2018 03:28:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830987581307/10/2018 11:18:15 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/11/2018 08:22:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830995628508/10/2018 10:28:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩02/11/2018 08:22:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831115974008/11/2018 01:23:32 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/11/2018 05:13:57 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831229919312/12/2018 09:16:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830770046131/07/2018 05:43:44 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩06/09/2018 06:40:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830812503314/08/2018 05:45:07 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩14/08/2018 09:55:37 AM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830827164712/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830875312/09/2018 07:50:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830880929612/09/2018 07:50:25 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831166103125/11/2018 08:11:41 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/12/2018 07:12:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831190851830/11/2018 07:58:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧08/12/2018 07:12:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201831260308720/12/2018 05:32:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831191940913/12/2018 02:43:11 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831185074429/11/2018 06:47:37 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧02/12/2018 10:20:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831013365913/10/2018 07:50:22 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/10/2018 07:21:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831144585219/11/2018 01:01:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧05/12/2018 05:45:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830816890214/08/2018 07:57:58 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/08/2018 05:52:23 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831250663818/12/2018 11:54:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830145619/08/2018 05:35:40 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩21/08/2018 10:29:20 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830846348012/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831259260520/12/2018 01:19:07 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/12/2018 09:07:52 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830830126319/08/2018 04:49:41 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩20/08/2018 07:07:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
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010107746190201831239217216/12/2018 12:26:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 05:05:18 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830987457507/10/2018 11:10:13 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩24/10/2018 04:34:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎭􀎎􀏘􀏋 􀏙􀏟􀎎􀏣010107786190201831218804810/12/2018 05:54:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:50:00 AM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831218626910/12/2018 05:54:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:49:00 AM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831218825410/12/2018 05:54:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧24/12/2018 10:50:00 AM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831050816023/10/2018 01:31:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩07/11/2018 04:05:35 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831261337620/12/2018 10:43:54 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830758093628/07/2018 03:40:25 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/08/2018 10:39:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830758093828/07/2018 03:52:27 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩15/08/2018 10:39:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107749190201830758094128/07/2018 05:05:39 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 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PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩16/08/2018 08:50:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831214766311/12/2018 03:28:44 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831148554620/12/2018 12:12:38 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831109258808/11/2018 10:59:18 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩22/11/2018 04:09:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831191588302/12/2018 01:09:14 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 07:58:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831169541928/11/2018 02:18:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 08:00:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830796694209/08/2018 12:45:36 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/08/2018 08:08:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830819162115/08/2018 11:43:33 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/08/2018 08:08:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831191653001/12/2018 06:17:53 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩18/12/2018 07:58:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831212204509/12/2018 04:17:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830985358620/10/2018 04:57:05 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830904815613/09/2018 08:24:30 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/10/2018 10:25:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830848622829/08/2018 01:06:02 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩01/09/2018 10:34:21 PM􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830882293012/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831011885712/10/2018 05:23:55 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830985358106/10/2018 01:41:08 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩09/10/2018 03:38:29 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀏯􀎭􀎧􀎃010107748190201830851633312/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830851633630/08/2018 03:23:35 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831183450306/12/2018 02:22:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 12:29:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831183574606/12/2018 02:22:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 12:29:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831183193306/12/2018 02:22:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 12:30:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831183722806/12/2018 02:22:38 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 12:30:00 PM􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830985363707/10/2018 10:57:12 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/10/2018 06:18:44 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831023703116/10/2018 10:59:46 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/10/2018 06:18:44 PM􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192077802/12/2018 11:03:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192085402/12/2018 11:03:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:41:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192608603/12/2018 10:12:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192087202/12/2018 11:03:14 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:41:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192087602/12/2018 11:04:15 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192474304/12/2018 05:27:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:42:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192605003/12/2018 10:12:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:39:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192602403/12/2018 10:14:00 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192617103/12/2018 10:12:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:39:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201831192612303/12/2018 10:12:59 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩17/12/2018 09:42:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830832664425/08/2018 06:43:43 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩25/08/2018 09:30:26 PM􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831176213203/12/2018 07:38:29 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧21/12/2018 10:11:16 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830881017012/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830830876312/09/2018 05:58:08 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107748190201830827165712/09/2018 07:50:25 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107746190201830964328630/09/2018 04:28:42 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩04/10/2018 06:38:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎭􀎎􀏘􀏋 􀏙􀏟􀎎􀏣010107749190201831000109309/10/2018 05:38:20 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧11/10/2018 09:36:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎭􀎎􀏘􀏋 􀏙􀏟􀎎􀏣010107749190201831117946810/11/2018 02:30:17 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/11/2018 06:41:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎳􀎍􀎭􀎩010107749190201831176094827/11/2018 01:42:23 AM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧28/11/2018 06:47:00 AM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎳􀎍􀎭􀎩
Annex 17
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010107749190201831239066616/12/2018 12:16:21 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏡􀏌􀏧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧17/12/2018 08:40:00 PM􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣􀎔􀎳􀎍􀎭􀎩010107786190201831205430606/12/2018 02:01:34 PM􀏝􀏭􀎑􀏘􀏣􀏻􀎝􀏭􀎭􀎧􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201830805043312/08/2018 12:44:58 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201830830964222/08/2018 09:42:10 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201830878539006/09/2018 09:58:38 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201830903428412/09/2018 06:11:09 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201830903848012/09/2018 07:41:24 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201830904553813/09/2018 11:39:59 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201830931559120/09/2018 09:18:21 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831007259711/10/2018 07:41:44 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831018029515/10/2018 02:39:41 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831018229515/10/2018 02:39:41 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831073526201/11/2018 10:24:26 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831113173607/11/2018 09:51:27 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010107786190201831113208707/11/2018 09:51:27 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831104531208/11/2018 05:18:14 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831117790110/11/2018 06:58:52 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831122698911/11/2018 07:49:32 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831133422813/11/2018 11:39:57 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831125178714/11/2018 12:59:05 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831117963217/11/2018 06:35:12 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831033550418/11/2018 12:27:54 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831147902019/11/2018 07:37:55 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831105955519/11/2018 09:31:13 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831106067119/11/2018 09:31:13 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831128964621/11/2018 05:42:20 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831159767822/11/2018 11:30:21 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831159596722/11/2018 07:05:54 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831163986823/11/2018 08:27:02 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831164249624/11/2018 03:26:24 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831164723824/11/2018 02:50:08 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831176061027/11/2018 01:38:21 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831144346727/11/2018 09:02:48 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831164076128/11/2018 02:15:59 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831169685228/11/2018 02:18:59 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831175455328/11/2018 02:48:04 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831175298228/11/2018 02:49:04 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831176048129/11/2018 08:29:54 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831176825730/11/2018 02:24:45 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831188047330/11/2018 08:29:42 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831191564602/12/2018 06:46:20 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831192621203/12/2018 10:12:59 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831194559704/12/2018 03:35:58 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831192480504/12/2018 05:27:17 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831202584606/12/2018 03:10:26 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831207673808/12/2018 10:50:55 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎭􀎎􀏘􀏋 􀏙􀏟􀎎􀏣010102449009201831207674108/12/2018 10:51:55 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎭􀎎􀏘􀏋 􀏙􀏟􀎎􀏣010102449009201831208102409/12/2018 04:13:43 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831207896509/12/2018 09:38:42 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831207913909/12/2018 09:38:45 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831214804710/12/2018 10:37:56 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831219180010/12/2018 10:32:03 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831218151010/12/2018 10:42:03 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831131998610/12/2018 10:48:01 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831219913811/12/2018 03:16:42 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831219843411/12/2018 03:17:42 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831193627211/12/2018 12:05:15 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831212801011/12/2018 09:55:47 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831212845411/12/2018 09:55:47 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831219585412/12/2018 11:06:28 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831199419012/12/2018 08:45:58 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831232624113/12/2018 05:39:45 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831230600114/12/2018 03:17:20 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831235004014/12/2018 05:19:24 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831207798415/12/2018 02:41:13 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831207799715/12/2018 02:41:13 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831235191616/12/2018 06:18:26 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831237680616/12/2018 04:27:41 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831133286617/12/2018 12:11:20 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831219823217/12/2018 07:32:35 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831219810517/12/2018 07:32:35 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831226657617/12/2018 10:12:57 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831247096118/12/2018 03:53:45 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831243319618/12/2018 06:45:14 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831251473118/12/2018 10:14:01 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831250498919/12/2018 01:56:30 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102758009201831260622820/12/2018 05:58:57 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831259513320/12/2018 07:10:09 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831247132921/12/2018 05:14:19 PM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831152582322/12/2018 12:15:17 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831152344122/12/2018 12:15:18 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻010102449009201831261983322/12/2018 04:02:40 AM􀎽􀏭􀏓􀎭􀏣􀏻􀏝􀏭􀎧􀎩􀎔􀎑􀎍􀎭􀏗 􀎔􀏠􀎻
Annex 17
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[Annex 1.3, [Excel Redacted] Holders of UAE Resident Permits (English Translation)] FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP UNIFIED NUMBER NAME Movement Date Identification Document Number Port [This column includes the given numbers] Number Redacted [This column includes the name of the Qatari nationals who were given a permit to enter the country] Name Redacted [Entry or Exit] [the date of the movement] [the Number of ID] Number Redacted [The port name whether it is Abu Dhabi International Airport, Abu Dhabi Airport, Ghuwaifat, Al-Mudeef Port, Dubai International Airport, Al-Sharjah International Airport, Khatmat Malaha port, Shaklah port, Hatta border Cross, or Hili Port]
Annex 17
301
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Annex 17
302
Exit8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit10/8/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit10/8/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit10/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit10/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/9/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/11/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/19/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/17/2018􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/17/2018􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/29/2018􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/29/2018􀏲􀎑􀏅􀏭􀎑􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry2/14/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Entry11/3/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Entry12/12/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit4/20/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit4/20/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit5/14/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit5/14/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit5/18/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit5/18/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit5/18/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit6/23/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit7/9/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit7/10/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit7/10/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit8/9/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit12/12/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit12/19/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Exit12/20/2018􀎕􀎎􀏔􀏳􀏭􀏐􀏟􀎍Entry2/10/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry3/19/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry3/19/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry4/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry4/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry4/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry5/5/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry8/3/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry8/25/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry8/25/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry8/25/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry8/29/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry8/29/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry9/1/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry9/3/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry9/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry10/29/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/17/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/17/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry12/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit2/10/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit2/10/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit2/10/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit2/18/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit3/6/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit3/6/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit5/1/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit5/2/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit5/4/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit6/17/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit7/9/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit7/24/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit8/19/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit9/8/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit9/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit9/24/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit10/11/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit11/8/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit11/11/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/2/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/4/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/6/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/12/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/13/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/16/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣
Annex 17
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Exit12/17/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/18/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/20/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏑􀏳􀎿􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎫􀏔􀏧􀏣Entry1/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry2/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry2/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry3/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry3/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry3/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry3/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry4/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry4/7/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry4/24/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry5/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry5/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry6/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry6/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry6/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry6/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/8/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/8/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/9/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/10/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/11/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/11/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/11/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/24/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry8/31/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry9/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry9/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry9/9/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry9/9/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry9/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/4/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/4/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/4/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/11/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/14/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/27/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/8/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/19/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/7/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit1/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit1/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit1/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit2/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit3/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit3/8/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit3/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit3/24/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit3/24/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit3/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit5/2/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit6/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit6/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit6/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/14/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/14/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/14/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣
Annex 17
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Exit7/19/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/27/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit7/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/4/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/9/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/19/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/19/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/19/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/27/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/28/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/29/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/1/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/5/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/7/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/7/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit9/22/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit10/27/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit10/30/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/2/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/2/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/12/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/21/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/26/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/4/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/4/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/4/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/6/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/7/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/9/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/16/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/17/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏰􀎑􀎩 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry1/2/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry4/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry9/23/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry10/25/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry11/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/2/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry12/8/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit4/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit4/13/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit11/3/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/18/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Exit12/20/2018􀏰􀏟􀏭􀎩􀏟􀎍 􀏪􀏗􀎭􀎎􀎷􀏟􀎍 􀎭􀎎􀏁􀏣Entry7/6/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry8/1/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry8/9/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry8/9/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry8/26/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry9/1/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry9/7/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry10/30/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Exit8/22/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Exit8/22/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Exit8/22/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Exit11/17/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Exit12/13/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Exit12/19/2018􀏪􀎣􀏼􀏣􀏟􀎍 􀏡􀏁􀎧Entry1/18/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry4/30/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry5/29/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry6/5/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry7/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry7/29/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/5/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/19/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟
Annex 17
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Entry8/23/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/23/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/24/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/25/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/27/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry8/29/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry9/5/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry9/6/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry9/10/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry9/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry10/6/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry10/12/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry11/3/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry11/3/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry11/9/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry11/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry11/24/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry11/30/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/4/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/4/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/12/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/12/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/12/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/14/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/14/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/14/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/14/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/16/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/16/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/18/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/18/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/18/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/18/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/20/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/20/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/20/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/21/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry12/21/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit1/5/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit1/31/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit2/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit2/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit2/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit2/9/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit2/9/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit2/9/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit4/6/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit5/27/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit6/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/8/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/8/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/8/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/25/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit7/29/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/1/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/6/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/10/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/10/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/10/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/11/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/11/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/11/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/11/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/23/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/30/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/30/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/30/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/30/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/31/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/31/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit8/31/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/1/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/2/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/4/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/4/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/4/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit9/25/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit10/8/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit10/12/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/9/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/10/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/14/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/19/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/25/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/29/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit11/29/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/3/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/8/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/10/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/13/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/13/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/13/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/13/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/14/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/14/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/15/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/16/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/16/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/17/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/18/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/19/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/19/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/21/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Exit12/21/2018􀏪􀏠􀏛􀎷 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry11/15/2018􀎩􀏳􀎯􀏣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟Entry4/17/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry8/3/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry8/10/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry8/25/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry8/25/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry8/31/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/16/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣
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Entry11/17/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry11/26/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry11/30/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry12/11/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit10/3/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit10/13/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit11/1/2018􀎎􀎗􀎣 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry1/30/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry2/19/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry2/23/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry3/20/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry3/20/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry3/26/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry3/28/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry7/25/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry8/11/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry8/22/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/1/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/2/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/2/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/3/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/6/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/12/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/15/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry9/30/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry10/11/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry10/11/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry11/6/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry11/10/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Entry11/24/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit1/31/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit1/31/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit1/31/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit2/1/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit2/4/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit2/4/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit2/12/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit2/18/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit3/2/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit5/10/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit5/31/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit5/31/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit5/31/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit7/20/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit7/20/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit7/20/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/6/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/14/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/20/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/24/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/24/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/24/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/30/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit8/31/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit9/10/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit9/10/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit9/19/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit11/17/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit11/30/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/5/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/13/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/13/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/14/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/15/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/16/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/19/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣Exit12/21/2018􀏲􀏠􀏳􀏫 􀎕􀎍􀎯􀎍􀏭􀎟 􀎯􀏛􀎭􀏣
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Federal Courts Statistics…
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Judicial Inspection DepartmentStatistics DivisionStatistics on the Number of Lawsuits Filed by or against Qatari NationalsIn the Period from 06/06/2017 to 25/09/2018SubjectLitigation LevelNumberNumber of prospective and still ongoing litigations to dateFirst Instance2Appeal7Number of litigations settled by judicial rulingsFirst Instance12Appeal13Supreme Court4Number of lawsuits filed by Qatari nationalsFamily Guidance Committees3Conciliation and Reconciliation Centres3First Instance1Appeal9Supreme Court2Notary Public Statistics (Powers of Attorney)146Number of Marriage Contracts1[illegible seal]
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Emirate of Abu Dhabi Courts Statistics…
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All Qatari Lawsuits Listed from the Beginning of 2016 to September 2018StageFirst InstanceAppealCassationEnforceableTotalFinal176351015236Ongoing30874792Suspended11Total2064417623292016 LawsuitsStageFirst InstanceAppealCassationEnforceableTotalFinal54132877Ongoing421319Total5815221962017 LawsuitsStageFirst InstanceAppealCassationEnforceableTotalFinal751955104Ongoing12331533Total87228201372018StageFirst InstanceAppealCassationEnforceableTotalFinal4733255Ongoing14341940Suspended11Total61772196Listed Post 05 June 2018 with Qatari PlaintiffStageFirst InstanceAppealCassationEnforceableTotalFinal22Ongoing5139Suspended11Total711312
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Judicial Rulings where One Party is a Qatari National
Ref. No. Court
Region
In
Court
Court
Name
Full
Name
DOB Age Relation Contract
No.
Day of
Marriage
Contract
Month
of
Marriage
Contract
Year of
Marriage
Contract
Dowry Guardian
capacity
[illegible] Nationality Religion City Type of
ID
ID No. Job City
1-
2829158576
Abu
Dhabi
No Abu
Dhabi
Court of
First
Instance
01/01/1959 59 Wife
guardian
852 01 01 2018 50,000
Dirham
Father 45+ Qatar Islam Abu
Dhabi
Register
ID does
not
[illegible]
documents
Does
not
work
1-
2853843924
Abu
Dhabi
No Abu
Dhabi
Court of
First
Instance
25/11/1987 31 Wife 2,904 03 06 2018 50,000
Dirham
30-34.99 Qatar Islam Abu
Dhabi
ID Card Without
1-
2853843924
Abu
Dhabi
No Abu
Dhabi
Court of
First
Instance
01/01/1952 66 Wife
guardian
2,904 03 06 2018 50,000
Dirham
Father 45+ Qatar Islam UAE ID Card
1-
2877698614
Abu
Dhabi
No Abu
Dhabi
Court of
First
Instance
30/11/2000 18 Wife 2,914 27 06 2018 40,000
Dirham
15-19.99 Qatar Islam Abu
Dhabi
ID Card Student
1-
2877698614
Abu
Dhabi
No Abu
Dhabi
Court of
First
Instance
29/12/1974 43 Wife
guardian
2,914 27 06 2018 40,000
Dirham
Father 40-44.99 Qatar Islam UAE Passport
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Dubai Courts Statistics…
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From 05/06/2017 To30/09/20181Number of lawsuits heard before the judiciary with one party being a Qatari national(First Instance –Appeal –Cassation)522Number of lawsuitswith judicial rulings with one party being a Qatari national(First Instance –Appeal –Cassation)803Number of lawsuits filed by Qatari national (ongoing lawsuits –finalised lawsuits) (First Instance –Appeal –Cassation)724Number of documents (Notary Public) certified with one party being a Qatari national3765Number of marriage contracts with one party being a Qatari national6
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Ras Al Khaimah Courts Statistics…
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First: Statistics on the LawsuitsHeard before the Ras Al-Khaimah Court DepartmentWith one Party in the Case being a Qatari NationalIn the Period from 05/06/2017to 25/09/2018TypeFirst InstanceAppealCassationOrder onpetitionCircuitPersonal StatusCommercial PlenaryStatus AppealCommercial AppealStatus CassationCommercial Cassation6No.311111Total4226Comment:Attached are 2 statements of lawsuits and orders.
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Second: Number of LawsuitsRuled OnWith One Party being a Qatari NationalIn the Period from 05/06/2017to 25/09/2018TotalFirst InstanceAppealCassation8422Comment:Attached is a copy of the lawsuits statement with -2-copies of rulings.
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Third: Number of LawsuitsFiled byQatari NationalsAfter05/06/2017to 25/09/2018TotalPersonal StatusStatus AppealCassation4112Comment:Attached is a copy of the lawsuits statement.
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Fourth: Number of Documents Ratified With One Party being a Qatari NationalIn the Period from 05/06/2017to 25/09/2018TotalNotary Public DocumentsCertification Documents945Comment:Attached are -2-documentstatement.
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Fifth:There are No Marriage Contracts Concluded After05/06/2017to 25/09/2018With One Party being a Qatari NationalComment:Attached are -3-statements.
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United Arab EmiratesMinistry of EducationOffice of the Ministry Date: 2019/01/03 Ref: 1/1 م و
Department of Legal Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International CooperationPeace, mercy and blessings of God,The Ministry of Education presents you with the best regards and wishingyouallthe best. Referring to your letter No. 1/2/15/4989 ق د/ ق ح و م dated 16/9/2018, regarding the request for
information about Qatari students in the state.Attached below you will find statistics on the number of Qatari students who continue to study in all Emiratesand at all levels of study, alsothe number of new students enrolled in the academic year 2018/2019.The statistics do not include students' in the Dubai Free Zone, and we will inform you later about the numbers of enrolled students.Withrespect and appreciation,,,,,Mariam Ibrahim Al-AliDirector of the Minister of Education officeHigher educationGovernment educationPrivate educationAcademic year2071701002017/2018361731012018/2019
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Annex 18
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Response of the State
of Qatar, 14 February 2019
353
THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ______________________________________________________________________________ State of Qatar, Complainant v. United Arab Emirates, Respondent. ICERD-ISC-2018/2 ______________________________________________________________________________ RESPONSE OF THE STATE OF QATAR ______________________________________________________________________________ 14 February 2019 Annex 18
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-i-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1
II. THE UAE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COERCIVE MEASURES
FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE RATIONE MATERIAE OF THE CERD ................ 11
A. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the UAE’s
Discriminatory Purpose of Targeting Qataris on the Basis of Nationality ........... 12
1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin” in its
Context and in Light of the CERD’s Object and Purpose
Demonstrates that the CERD Encompasses Discrimination on the
Basis of Nationality................................................................................... 13
a. Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin” ....................... 13
b. “National Origin” in Its Context ................................................... 14
c. “National Origin” in Light of Object and Purpose ....................... 23
2. The Travaux Préparatoires Confirm that the CERD Applies to
Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality ............................................... 25
B. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the
Discriminatory Effect on Individuals of Qatari National Origin .......................... 30
III. THE COMMITTEE HAS JURISDICTION OVER QATAR’S ARTICLE 11
COMMUNICATION BECAUSE QATAR CONSIDERS THAT THE UAE
IS NOT GIVING EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CERD ...................... 36
A. The UAE Distorts the Committee’s Role and the Requirements of
Article 11 .............................................................................................................. 36
B. Qatar’s Communication is Properly Before the Committee ................................. 38
IV. QATAR’S COMMUNICATION IS ADMISSIBLE .................................................... 41
A. Article 11(3)’s Exhaustion Requirement Does Not Bar Qatar’s Claims .............. 42
1. Article 11(3)’s Local Remedies Rule Is Inapplicable to Qatar’s
Claims “In Conformity with the Generally Recognized Principles
of International Law” ................................................................................ 42
a. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in
Circumstances of Widespread Harm or Generalized State
Policies and Practices .................................................................... 43
b. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in View of
Qatar’s Claims of Direct Injury to Its Own Interests under
the CERD ...................................................................................... 48
2. The UAE Has Failed to Prove the Existence of Any Effective and
Reasonably Available Remedies that Have Not Been Exhausted ............ 55
a. The Hotline is Discretionary and Ineffective ................................ 60
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-ii- b. The UAE’s “Court Remedies” Are Neither “Reasonably Available” nor “Effective” ............................................................ 67 c. Other Alleged “Complaint Procedures” Are Neither “Reasonably Available” nor “Effective” ...................................... 78 B. The Existence of Concurrent Proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ Does Not Render Qatar’s Communication Inadmissible ............................... 86 1. Article 22 Does Not Establish a “Hierarchical and Linear” Process ........ 88 2. Neither Lis Pendens nor Electa Una Via Applies Here ............................ 93 3. Concurrent Proceedings Would Ensure the Equality of the Parties and Uphold the Integrity of the System .................................................. 100 4. The UAE’s Position with Respect to Concurrent Proceedings Would Leave Qatar with No Remedy at All ........................................... 101 C. Qatar’s Communication Is Not an Abuse of Rights and Process ....................... 101 V. THIS COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION OF QATAR’S COMMUNICATION WOULD NOT BE ULTRA VIRES ........................................ 103 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 103 Annex 18
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1
1. The Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office and other
international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“Committee”) and refers to its Communication
submitted pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the “CERD”) against the United Arab Emirates
(“UAE”) (ICERD-ISC-2018/2) (“Qatar’s Communication”), as well as its letter of 29
October 2018 referring the matter again to the Committee pursuant to Article 11(2) of the
CERD.
2. Pursuant to the Note Verbale transmitted to the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar
by the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights) on 14 December 2018 (“Note Verbale”), Qatar submits this response to the
Supplemental Response by the UAE dated 14 January 2019 and transmitted to the State
of Qatar on 15 January 2019 (“15 January Submission”), and the Supplemental
Response by the UAE dated 29 November 2018 and transmitted to the State of Qatar on 4
December 2018 (“4 December Submission”). Qatar also refers to the Response of the
UAE received by the Secretariat on 7 August 2018 and transmitted to the State of Qatar
on 8 August 2018 (“8 August Submission”) and the submission by the UAE dated 7
November 2018 and transmitted to the State of Qatar on 9 November 2018 (“9 November
Submission”). In this response, Qatar will limit its observations to issues raised in the
UAE’s 4 December and 15 January Submissions, focused on questions of jurisdiction and
admissibility, as contemplated by the Note Verbale.
I. INTRODUCTION
3. The negative impacts of the UAE’s Coercive Measures1, which include its collective
expulsion of Qataris and purposeful incitement of hatred towards Qatar and Qataris, are
extensive, ongoing, and well-documented, including by independent international human
rights groups2. The UAE has sought to coerce the Qatari Government through the
1 Qatar’s Communication, p. 1, para. 3. See also United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs &
International Cooperation, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
on Qatar (5 June 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediacenter/news/pages/05-06-2017-uae-qatar….
2 Qatar’s Communication, pp. 20, 23-24, paras. 44, 52-53. These measures are detailed in Qatar’s prior
submissions to the Committee. See Qatar’s Communication, pp. 12-18, paras. 26-40.
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2 collective punishment of the Qatari people, and its actions stand contrary to the entire foundation of human rights. As a result of the UAE’s Coercive Measures, Qataris in the UAE awoke on 5 June 2017 to find that they had only 14 days to flee the country, leaving behind family, loved ones, jobs, property, and educational opportunities—all while under the ominous threat from the UAE citing “precautionary security measures” as the ostensible reason for the collective expulsion. Qatari residents of the UAE who had returned to Qatar for Ramadan or were otherwise outside the UAE on 5 June 2017 awoke to find that they were now cut off from their homes, families, and their very lives—with no certainty as to when, if ever, they could return. 4. Overnight, the lives of Qataris living in or having any connection with the UAE were radically altered. Prior to the UAE’s imposition of the Coercive Measures, many Qataris lived, worked, studied, and owned property in the UAE. As Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) nationals, Qataris enjoyed special status in the UAE, moving freely between the two countries and entitling them to many of the same rights and benefits as Emiratis. In this particular context of openness and close connections, mixed families of Qatari and Emirati origin were commonplace, with family members, lives, education and work spanning the two countries. Almost overnight, the Coercive Measures upended this reality—solely because these individuals were Qatari. By its conduct, the UAE has violated a host of fundamental rights protected by the CERD, including the rights of Qataris to: marriage, choice of spouse, and family life; education and training; access to public health and medical care; property; work; freedom of opinion and expression; equal treatment before tribunals; and benefit from measures that protect against incitement on racially discriminatory grounds, as well as the right to a remedy for these violations. Over a year and a half later, the UAE’s violations have persisted. And since the UAE has continued in its campaign of discrimination against Qataris, the incitement of racial hatred against Qataris has only entrenched, and as the Coercive Measures move toward their second full year, the UAE’s divisive and discriminatory treatment against Qataris threatens to become a permanent fixture. Tragically, incidences of racially-motivated abuse and hate speech against Qataris are now commonplace in the UAE. Annex 18
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3
5. Tellingly, the UAE—in its submissions before the Committee and indeed, in all legal and
political fora relating to the crisis—both ignores and attempts to minimize these impacts,
largely by misrepresenting the facts. It insists that Qataris “left the UAE voluntarily at
the start of the crisis”3—despite the plain language of its directive of 5 June 2017 (the
“5 June Directive”) ordering them to do so within 14 days. It says nothing at all about its
clear campaign of incitement against Qataris. And it makes no attempt to argue that the
Coercive Measures are intended for any other purpose than to coerce and punish the State
of Qatar by targeting individual Qataris. Indeed, the UAE’s current characterization of
the Coercive Measures as “minimal” entry requirements4 must be seen for what it is: an
ex post justification for the UAE’s egregious, arbitrary, and punitive misuse of sovereign
power, enacted without warning, without exception for individual circumstances, and
without regard for the impacts on individual rights.
6. At the same time that the UAE attempts to dismiss the reach and impacts of the Coercive
Measures, the UAE also attempts to sharply curtail the reach and focus of the CERD
itself. As this Committee is well aware, the CERD is a forward-looking instrument,
which obliges State Parties not only to condemn racial discrimination but also to actively
pursue means of “eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms”5. Article 1(1)’s
definition of “racial discrimination” seeks to further this goal not only by its list of
multiple prohibited grounds, but also by explicitly covering discrimination “which has
the purpose or effect” of impairing the enjoyment of human rights6. In other words, as
this Committee has previously made clear, in addition to explicit and purposive
discrimination, the CERD’s scope encompasses actions that have “an unjustifiable
3 4 December Submission, p. 12, para. 22.
4 15 January Submission, p. 3, para. 7.
5 CERD, Preamble (emphasis added).
6 CERD, Art. 1(1) (“In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing…human rights…”) (emphasis added).
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4 disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”7. 7. In its submissions, the UAE ignores this basic fact about the ambit of the CERD, instead urging the Committee to look only to whether the Coercive Measures, as measured by the UAE’s explicit purpose of targeting Qatari “nationals”, fall within the CERD. So, the UAE’s central jurisdictional objection before the Committee—mirroring its objection before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)—remains on the basis that “nationality” does not constitute a protected ground for discrimination based on Article 1(1)’s use of the term “national origin”8. In making this argument, the UAE asserts that “present nationals” as a group are categorically excluded from the definition of “national origin”, a term which it refers to instead as being associated with a person’s “heritage” or ability to “trace” their origin to a particular country9. But the UAE’s attempt to frame the question in this manner exposes the fundamental flaw in its reasoning: the UAE overlooks the fact that the discriminatory effects of the Coercive Measures—separate and apart from the purpose of those Measures—bring the UAE’s conduct unequivocally within the ambit of the CERD. 7 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993), para. 2. See also Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Declaration of Crawford (19 April 2017), para. 7 (“[T]he definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in Article 1 of CERD does not require that the restriction in question be based expressly on racial or other grounds enumerated in the definition; it is enough that it directly implicates such a group on one or more of these grounds. Moreover, whatever the stated purpose of the restriction, it may constitute racial discrimination if it has the ‘effect’ of impairing the enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of the rights articulated in CERD.”). 8 4 December Submission, p. 14, para. 29 (“[T]he Committee lacks any jurisdiction because Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outwith the scope of the CERD.”); 15 January Submission, p. 9, para. 17 (“Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outside the scope of the CERD.”). 9 E.g., 4 December Submission, p. 17, para. 35 (relying on the dissenting opinion of Judge Salam, in which he noted that “‘national origin’ targets individuals who—‘regardless of their nationality at that time’—traced their origin to a particular country and suffered discrimination as a result of that heritage”). See also Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), CR 2018/13, p. 38, para. 19 (Olleson) (arguing that the Coercive Measures fall outside the scope of the CERD, the UAE noted that “Qatar does not suggest that the relevant measures are of any application to UAE or foreign nationals of Qatari heritage (for instance where one of their parents was Qatari)”). Annex 18
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8. That is because it is indisputable that whatever the UAE’s stated purpose in
discriminating solely on the basis of present “nationality,” the effects of the UAE’s
Coercive Measures are felt by persons of Qatari national origin in the sense uncontested
by the UAE—namely, in the historical-cultural sense of shared “heritage” or descent or
an ability to “trace” one’s origin to a particular country. The UAE was well aware of the
disparate impact of its measures on those of Qatari national origin: in Qatar, as in other
Gulf States, nationality is inextricably intertwined with, and largely restricted to, this
historical-cultural community of Qataris. As a result, the UAE’s Coercive Measures
targeting “Qatari nationals” unquestionably have a disparate effect on persons of Qatari
national origin. Thus, the UAE’s conduct indisputably falls within the scope of the
Article 1(1) definition of the CERD irrespective of whether “national origin” in Article
1(1) encompasses nationality, and accordingly, the Committee has jurisdiction.
9. But the UAE’s primary argument that Article 1(1) excludes discrimination on the basis of
nationality is also wrong. To the contrary, that present nationality is encompassed by
“national origin” in Article 1(1) of the CERD becomes clear when the ordinary meaning
of the term is read in its context and in light of the CERD’s object and purpose, in
accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”)10, as well as through an examination of the travaux préparatoires of the
CERD. Indeed, the UAE’s heavy reliance on the dissenting opinions of several ICJ
judges conveniently overlooks that a majority of the ICJ, when called upon to determine
whether the acts complained of by Qatar are prima facie capable of falling within the
provisions of the CERD, concluded in the affirmative11. As explained in the ICJ’s Order
on Provisional Measures of 23 July 2018 (“Provisional Measures Order”):
“In the Court’s view, the acts referred to by Qatar, in particular the
statement of 5 June 2017…whereby the UAE announced that
Qataris were to leave its territory within 14 days and that they
would be prevented from entry, and the alleged restrictions that
ensued, including upon their right to marriage and choice of
spouse, to education as well as to medical care and to equal
10 VCLT, Article 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
11 4 December Submission, p. 19, paras. 38-43; see also 15 January Submission, pp. 10-11, para. 20.
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6 treatment before tribunals, are capable of falling within the scope of CERD ratione materiae.”12 The UAE’s attempts to elevate the Court’s dissenting opinions cannot elide this basic fact, which alone is sufficient to conclude that the Committee has jurisdiction to appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission to hear Qatar’s claims13. 10. The UAE’s remaining objections—most of which largely mirror those raised before and dismissed by the ICJ in its hearing on provisional measures—equally have no merit, and equally attempt to restrict both the scope of the CERD’s coverage and this Committee’s ability to ensure its proper implementation. 11. Qatar’s response is thus organized as follows: 12. First, Qatar will demonstrate that, as discussed above, according to both their purpose and effect, the Coercive Measures imposed by the UAE against Qatar and Qataris unequivocally fall within the scope ratione materiae of the CERD by discriminating against Qataris on the basis of national origin (Section II)14. With respect to the UAE’s conceded purpose of targeting Qataris on the basis of “present nationality”, the Coercive Measures fall within the CERD’s scope because the text of Article 1(1) read in its context and in light of the CERD’s object and purpose, make clear that “national origin” encompasses present nationality (Section II.A). This alone is sufficient for the Committee to uphold its jurisdiction. So too is the fact that the discriminatory effects of the measures are suffered by persons of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural 12 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order (23 July 2018) (hereinafter “Provisional Measures Order”), p. 11, para. 27. 13 For example, this approach is reflected in the Committee’s analogous practice under Article 14 of the CERD, in which the Committee “consider[ed] that the petitioner has sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that his individual claim may fall within the scope of application of the provisions of the Convention” and “deem[ed] it more appropriate to determine the precise scope of the relevant provisions of the Convention at the merits stage of the petition.” Stephen Hagan v. Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003), p. 10, para. 6.2 (emphasis added). 14 Article 1(1) of the CERD provides: “the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” Annex 18
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7
sense uncontested by the UAE (Section II.B). For both of these reasons, the Committee’s
jurisdiction must be upheld.
13. Second, Qatar will show that the UAE’s argument that the Committee lacks jurisdiction
over Qatar’s Communication because there is “no evidence” of an “ongoing situation of
prejudice”15 to Qataris both misconceives the legal basis for the Committee’s (and
subsequent Conciliation Commission’s) jurisdiction and is wrong as a matter of fact
(Section III). The jurisdictional requirements set by Article 11 in this regard are minimal,
and indeed, the ICJ has found that the UAE’s Coercive Measures have plausibly
endangered rights protected under the CERD. Further, the UAE’s persistent and selfserving
denials of any CERD violations are at odds with the observations of the ICJ and
the reports of independent international human rights observers that have recorded the
continuing and severe impacts of the Coercive Measures on individual Qataris.
Accordingly, the Committee should easily be able to conclude that Qatar has satisfied the
standard established by Article 11 for a complaint to move forward to the conciliation
process contemplated by the CERD.
14. Third, Qatar will demonstrate that consideration of Qatar’s Communication is not barred
by the CERD’s Article 11(3) requirement that the Committee deal with matters referred
to it “after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and
exhausted in the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of
international law”. The exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement does not apply in
cases such as this, where the measures at issue constitute a systemic, generalized policy
and practice that impacts the rights of thousands of individuals. Further, the requirement
that domestic remedies be exhausted does not apply because Qatar also asserts claims of
direct injury to its own interests under the CERD. Finally, even if the domestic remedies
rule did apply in this case, the UAE has failed to prove the existence of effective,
available remedies that have not been exhausted. As such, the UAE’s argument that
15 Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates to the request made by the State of Qatar pursuant to
Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (29
November 2018) (hereinafter “4 December Submission”), p. 3. para. 6.
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8 Article 11(3) of the CERD acts as a bar to consideration of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication must be rejected. 15. Fourth, the UAE argues that Qatar has “abandoned” the Article 11 process before the Committee by commencing proceedings before the ICJ. This argument, too, must fail. As Qatar will demonstrate, the plain text of the CERD and its travaux préparatoires make clear that the two preconditions in Article 22 (negotiation and the CERD procedures) are alternative, not cumulative; a State party may refer a dispute to the Court without first pursuing conciliation before the CERD Committee. Nor do the lis pendens or electa una via principles have any application here. Thus, procedures before the Committee and the ICJ may be independently engaged. 16. Qatar finally notes that, as has been its practice throughout this dispute, the UAE in its 4 December and 15 January Submissions again resorts to a medley of wild and incorrect allegations against Qatar, attempting to connect Qatar to support for terrorism16. These allegations are not only unfounded, they are clearly pretextual, in a transparent attempt to cloak the UAE’s true motivation for imposing the Coercive Measures in order to coerce Qatar into relinquishing sovereign control of its internal and external affairs. Significantly, while the UAE desperately tries to characterize its terrorism pretext as broadly supported by other countries17, in fact, the opposite is true. Despite strong pressure by the four States that imposed the Coercive Measures18, only ten governments ultimately cut or downgraded diplomatic ties with Qatar19, and independent reports note 16 4 December Submission, pp. 7-10, paras. 11-16; 15 January Submission, pp. 7-8, paras. 14-16. 17 See, e,g., 4 December Submission, p. 6, para. 10. 18 See Qatar’s Communication, p. 1, para. 3 (“On 5 June 2017, the government of UAE, in coordination with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the Arab Republic of Egypt announced a campaign on unlawful political isolation and economic coercion…”). 19 The governments of Yemen, Eastern government of Libya (Beida), Maldives, Mauritania, Comoros, and Senegal cut diplomatic ties (although the Beida government had never maintained diplomatic ties with Qatar). See “Qatar-Gulf crisis: Your questions answered,” Al Jazeera (5 December 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/qatar-gulf-crisis-qu… 99.html; Jamie Prentis, “Beida government cuts off diplomatic relations with Qatar,” Libya Herald (5 July 2017), https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/06/05/beida-government-cuts-off-diplom… (describing the break in relations as “entirely symbolic: there have been no relations between the Beida government and Qatar.”). The governments of Jordan, Djibouti, Chad, and Niger downgraded diplomatic ties. See “Qatar-Gulf crisis: Your questions answered,” Al Jazeera (5 December 2017), Annex 18
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that a number of these States only supported the UAE- and Saudi-led actions in order to
avoid losing financial aid from Saudi Arabia20. Unsurprisingly, three of these
governments have since restored ties with Qatar21. Further, the international community
has recognized Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and even expressly questioned the UAE’s
motivation for making its accusations in the context of this dispute. For example, very
soon after the imposition of the Coercive Measures, on 20 June 2017, the U.S. State
Department questioned the UAE’s allegations of terrorism, asking whether the UAE’s
measures were “really about their concerns regarding Qatar’s alleged support for
terrorism, or were they about the long simmering grievances among countries in the Gulf
Cooperation Council”22. Indeed, contrary to the UAE’s claims, Qatar has in fact been an
active participant in the global fight against terrorism. Qatar’s Al Udeid air base has for
years served as a critical staging ground for U.S. and coalition forces conducting
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and currently serves as the
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/qatar-gulf-crisis-qu…-
170606103033599.html.
20 Press reports suggest, for example, that Saudi Arabia attempted to induce a number of African countries
with predominantly Muslim populations to terminate relations with Qatar by threatening to cut financial aid
and reduce these States’ quotas for Hajj pilgrims, and further tried to entice some States to join the
Blockade with the promise of additional aid and loans. See James M. Dorsey, “Stepping Up The Pressure:
Saudi Strong Arms Muslim Nations To Take Sides In Gulf Crisis,” Huffington Post (13 June 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/stepping-up-the-pressure-Saudi-str…
us_593fca4fe4b094fa859f1b8f; “Gulf crisis: Saudi Arabia seeks African pressure against Qatar,”
Al Jazeera (14 June 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/06/gulf-crisis-Saudi-arabia-se…-
pressure-qatar-170614075802810.html.
21 See Ali Mustafayev, “Senegal restores its ambassador to Doha,” AzerNews (22 August 2017),
https://www.azernews.az/region/117977.html; “Chad and Qatar restore ties cut in wake of Arab states rift,”
Reuters (21 February 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-chad/chad-and-qatar-resto…-
cut-in-wake-of-arab-states-rift-idUSKCN1G515I; “Maldives to restore ties with Qatar and Iran,”
Maldives Independent (22 November 2018), https://maldivesindependent.com/politics/maldives-to-restoreties-
with-qatar-and-iran-142905.
22 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, “State Dept. Lashes Out at Gulf Countries Over Qatar Embargo,” The New York
Times (20 June 2017) (quoting U.S. State Department spokeswoman); Patrick Wintour, “Rex Tillerson
applauds Qatar plan but Gulf rivals refuse to lift sanctions,” The Guardian (11 July 2017). Most recently,
and contrary to the UAE’s extremely misleading reference to the U.S. President’s June 2017 remarks, 4
December Submission, para. 16, on 15 January 2018, U.S. President Trump personally called H.H. the
Emir of Qatar to thank him for “action to counter terrorism and extremism in all forms.” “Trump thanks
Qatar for efforts to combat terrorism,” Reuters (15 January 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulfqatar-
usa/trump-thanks-qatar-for-efforts-to-combat-terrorism-idUSKBN1F42HT. After a meeting in the
Oval Office on 10 April 2018, President Trump acknowledged Qatar’s efforts towards “stopping the
funding of terrorism”, regarding which the Emir was a “very big advocate.” Peter Baker, “Trump Now Sees
Qatar as an Ally Against Terrorism,” The New York Times (10 April 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/world/middleeast/trump-qatar-terrori….
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10 primary staging area for operations against the Islamic State. Further, the Al Jazeera network, far from being a “spokespiece” for extremists as the UAE alleges23, is hailed as a bastion of free expression and independent content in a region where press freedom is otherwise scarce, if not non-existent24. International and non-governmental organizations have affirmed Al Jazeera’s importance as a beacon of rigorous independent reporting in the Middle East, and have roundly condemned the UAE’s attempts to silence it25. 17. These are but a few examples of the UAE’s mischaracterization of the underlying facts related to its so-called “terrorism” allegations. But the UAE’s unfounded allegations are an obvious attempt at distraction, as they are entirely irrelevant to the dispute before the Committee. Such allegations could never legally justify the UAE’s non-compliance with its CERD obligations: the fundamental protection against discrimination is a jus cogens norm and an obligation erga omnes from which there can be no derogation26, as is also reflected in the text of the CERD, which provides for no derogation. In addition, it is well established that lawful countermeasures cannot violate human rights27. 23 4 December Submission, p. 7, para. 12. 24 Zachary Laub, “How Al Jazeera Amplifies Qatar’s Clout,” Council on Foreign Relations (12 July 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-al-jazeera-amplifies-qatars-clout; see also Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), p. 12 (“The channel provides enormous reach into the Arab world. It is a popular channel, and its reports and opinions often set the tone for debates on certain issues around the region.”). 25 “Al Jazeera - collateral victim of diplomatic offensive against Qatar,” Reporters Without Borders (7 June 2017), https://rsf.org/en/news/al-jazeera-collateral-victim-diplomatic-offensi…; “Qatar: Demands to close Al Jazeera endanger press freedom and access to information,” Article 19 (30 June 2017), https://www.article19.org/resources/qatar-demands-to-close-al-jazeera-e…; “UNESCO and Al Jazeera to promote freedom of expression in the Arab World,” UNESCO (12 September 2010), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/unesco_and… (noting that UNESCO and Al Jazeera signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize the partnership). 26 See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion no. 18, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants (17 September 2003), para. 101 (“[T]he principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. . . . [D]iscriminatory treatment of any person, owing to gender, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic situation, property, civil status, birth or any other status is unacceptable.”). 27 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Art. 50(1)(b) (“Countermeasures shall not affect: ... (b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights.”). Annex 18
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11
II. THE UAE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COERCIVE MEASURES FALLS
WITHIN THE SCOPE RATIONE MATERIAE OF THE CERD
18. The UAE’s Coercive Measures have been described by the UAE itself as punitive in
nature. By design, they are limited neither in scope nor effect and have resulted in
differential treatment of Qataris in a manner that undeniably violates their most basic
human rights as set forth in the CERD. While the UAE argues that the Committee has no
jurisdiction ratione materiae to consider the matter, its argument is fundamentally flawed
because the UAE attempts to restrict CERD’s coverage only to purposive discrimination,
while ignoring the effect on individuals of Qatari national origin in the sense uncontested
by the UAE. In other words, the UAE argues that its framing of the nature of its illegal
acts as being premised solely on present nationality should determine whether the
Committee has jurisdiction; this premise is indisputably wrong. In fact, the Coercive
Measures discriminate against individuals of Qatari national origin in both purpose and
effect, either of which is sufficient for the Committee to uphold its jurisdiction.
19. Accordingly, the UAE’s Coercive Measures fall within the jurisdiction ratione materiae
of the Committee for two reasons.
20. First, the Coercive Measures explicitly and intentionally discriminate against Qataris on
the basis of their nationality, in violation of the CERD’s prohibition on national originbased
discrimination (Section A). The conclusion that the term “national origin” in
Article 1(1) of the CERD includes “nationality”-based discrimination is fully consistent
with interpretation of Article 1 of the CERD in line with Article 31 of the VCLT28. It is
also confirmed by an examination of the travaux préparatoires of the CERD, in
accordance with Article 32 of the VCLT29, as well as the previous recommendations and
practice of the Committee.
28 VCLT, Article 31 (“(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and propose. (2) The context
for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise. . . the text, including its preamble and
annexes…(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context. . . Any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; Any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”).
29 VCLT, Article 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
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12 21. Second, the Coercive Measures have the effect of discriminating against individuals of Qatari national origin as defined by their descent or ancestry, heritage, and cultural traditions (Section B). As described above, and as the UAE is well aware, the significant majority of Qatari nationals are also of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense, meaning that the UAE’s self-described “differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality”30 serves as a convenient means to target individuals of Qatari origin. And since the CERD prohibits discrimination both in “purpose” and “effect”, the fact that the Coercive Measures have the effect of adversely impacting individuals of Qatari national origin is alone sufficient to form the basis of a CERD violation and confer jurisdiction on the Committee. A. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the UAE’s Discriminatory Purpose of Targeting Qataris on the Basis of Nationality 22. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE claims that “[a]ny finding that nationality falls within the scope of the CERD” would distort its “clear terms”31. However, the “clear terms” of the CERD do not exclude nationality from the scope of racial discrimination proscribed under the CERD. Instead, when the ordinary meaning of “national origin” is read in its context and in light of the CERD’s object and purpose, in accordance with Article 31(1) of the VCLT, it is clear that it encompasses nationality-based discrimination. This conclusion is further supported by the travaux préparatoires of the CERD. resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”). 30 4 December Submission, p. 15, para. 30. 31 4 December Submission, pp. 17-18, paras. 36-37. Annex 18
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13
1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin” in its Context
and in Light of the CERD’s Object and Purpose Demonstrates that
the CERD Encompasses Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality
a. Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin”
23. Article 1(1) of the CERD defines “racial discrimination” as follows:
“[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life”.
24. As is the case for the other grounds of racial discrimination covered by the CERD in
Article 1(1), the CERD does not define the term “national origin”. Neither is it usually
defined in dictionaries or understood to have a special meaning in a particular discipline,
such as sociology or ethnography. As such, the ordinary meaning of “national origin”
must be gleaned in part through analysis of the separate terms “national” and “origin”,
though in practice the terms are usually treated together. Leading dictionaries such as the
Oxford and Cambridge dictionaries define the term “national” as “relating to or
characteristic of a nation” or “relating to or typical of a whole country and its people”32,
and define “nation”, respectively, as “a large body of people united by common descent,
history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory”33, and a “country,
especially when thought of as a large group of people living in one area with their own
government, language, traditions, etc”34. The term “origin”, on the other hand,
commonly refers to “the country from which [a] person comes”35 or a “person’s social
background or ancestry”36.
32 “National”, Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/national; “National”,
Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/.
33 “Nation,” Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/nation.
34 “Nation,” Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/nation.
35 “Origin,” Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/origin.
36 “Origin,” Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/origin.
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14 25. Taken together, these two terms suggest that “national origin” relates to the country or nation where a person is from, or where a person’s ancestors were from, extending to an individual’s association with a particular country or nation in both a historical-cultural sense, for example by virtue of an individual’s descent or heritage, as well as a legal or political sense, for example by virtue of an individual’s membership in a community defined by, and subject to, a common government. The term “national origin” therefore may be understood as encompassing a person’s membership in such a community on the basis of their past or present nationality. The official French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese versions of Article 1(1) of the CERD are consistent with this interpretation37. b. “National Origin” in Its Context 26. As is evident from the plain text of Article 1(1), the CERD’s definition of “racial discrimination” is a comprehensive one, and the CERD is designed to eliminate “all forms” of racial discrimination. Read in conjunction with Article 1(1), the subsequent sections of Article 1—namely, Articles 1(2) and 1(3)—confirm that present nationality falls within the ordinary meaning of “national origin” as the term is used in the CERD. 27. Article 1(2) creates a narrow exception to the prohibition on racial discrimination contained in Article 1(1), providing that: “[t]his Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens”. 28. Article 1(3) then further clarifies that Article 1(1) does not affect a State’s ability to confer nationality, citizenship, or naturalization, provided that, in doing so, States do not discriminate on the basis of nationality: 37 See Convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, https://www.ohchr.org/FR/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “l’origine nationale”); Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación Racial, https://www.ohchr.org/SP/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “origen nacional”); Международная конвенция о ликвидации всех форм расовой дискриминации, https://www.ohchr.org /RU/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “национального происхождения”); and 消除一切形式种族歧视公约, https://www.ohchr.org/CH/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “民族”). Annex 18
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“Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any
way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality,
citizenship, or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not
discriminate against any particular nationality.”
29. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE argues that Article 1(1) excludes present
nationality because Articles 1(2) and 1(3) enshrine an “incontrovertible norm of
customary international law” that it is “within the unilateral sovereign jurisdiction of
individual States to decide which rights and benefits to confer upon foreign nationals
depending on what nationality they hold”38. In addition to the fact that any such
sovereign prerogative is not untrammeled under general international law, the text of the
CERD itself makes clear that interpreting “national origin” as inclusive of present
nationality does not threaten the sovereign rights of States Parties to make legitimate
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens—for example, in the context of granting
voting rights—or to make legitimate distinctions between different groups of nonnationals
with respect to “nationality, citizenship, or naturalization”. Rather, Articles 1(2)
and 1(3) expressly allow States to make such distinctions, so long as States do not do so
in a way that falls afoul of Article 1(1). Indeed, as the Committee has explained,
“Article 1, paragraph 2 must be construed so as to avoid
undermining the basic prohibition of discrimination; hence, it
should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and
freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”39.
30. If racial discrimination based on “national origin” did not include nationality-based
discrimination, the specific exception and preservation clauses comprising Articles 1(2)
and 1(3), respectively, would be unnecessary, since the other protected grounds do not
encompass non-nationals as a category directly. Further, the CERD’s text makes clear
that Article 1(2) is an exception to Article 1(1), rather than an explicatory provision
intended to clarify that distinctions based on nationality are excluded from the scope of
38 4 December Submission, p. 18, para. 37; see also 15 January Submission, p. 11, para. 20(b).
39 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, UN Doc.
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), para. 2 (emphasis added).
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16 the CERD. The opening provision of Article 1(3)—“[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship, or naturalization”—also leaves little doubt on this point, as it is clearly a preservation clause rather than a clause creating additional rights and obligations40. To the contrary, this language demonstrates that for the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination to be preserved in Article 1(3), such prohibition must already exist in Article 1(1). 31. This interpretation of the interplay between Articles 1(1), 1(2), and 1(3) has been confirmed in past general recommendations of the Committee, which contradict the UAE’s position. For example, in General Recommendation No. 11, the Committee stated that: “Article 1, paragraph 1, of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination. Article 1, paragraph 2, excepts from this definition actions by a State party which differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. Article 1, paragraph 3, qualifies article 1, paragraph 2, by declaring that, among non-citizens, States parties may not discriminate against any particular nationality.”41 32. The Committee has also explained that differences of treatment between citizens and non-citizens, while permissible under the CERD, are subject to clear limitations. Indeed, the Committee has reiterated that States Parties to the CERD are “under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of” fundamental rights, and that discrimination against non-citizens is a contemporary form of discrimination of serious concern42. Further, contrary to the UAE’s framing, Article 1(2)’s exception does not grant license to discriminate against specific groups of non- 40 Emphasis added. 41 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 11 on Non-Citizens, Doc. A/48/18 (1993), para. 1; see also id. para. 3; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Rights of Non-citizens (2006), p. 8 (The CERD “requires all non-citizens to be treated similarly.”), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/noncitizensen.pdf. 42 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, UN Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), para. 3 (“Although some of these rights, such as the right to participate in elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be confined to citizens, human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all persons.”). Annex 18
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17
nationals on the basis of their nationality. To that end, the Committee has repeatedly
called on States parties to address instances of discrimination against non-citizens on the
basis of their nationality, including in contexts similar to those at issue in the present
case, such as collective expulsion and restrictions on entry. For example, in its 1998
concluding observations on Switzerland, the Committee “express[ed] disquiet” at
Switzerland’s “three-circle-model” immigration policy of the time, which assigned
different immigration rights to individuals coming from “three categories of source
countries”43. The Committee explained that its concerns over the three-circle-model
stemmed from the fact that it “classifies foreigners on the basis of their national origin”
and that “the conception and effect of this policy [was] stigmatizing and discriminatory,
and therefore contrary to the principles and provisions of the Convention”44. In
concluding observations to the Dominican Republic a decade later, the Committee
similarly expressed concerns about “information received whereby migrants of Haitian
origin” were subjected to collective deportations back to Haiti, and recommending that
the Dominican Republic “ensure that laws concerning deportation or other forms of
removal of non-citizens from the jurisdiction of the State party do not discriminate in
purpose or effect among non-citizens on the basis of race, colour or ethnic or national
origin”45. More recently, the Committee issued concluding observations to Japan
highlighting their concerns over the fact “that Koreans who have lived for multiple
generations in Japan remain foreign nationals” and that “many Korean women suffer
43 CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Switzerland, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.44 (1998), para. 6; D.M. Gross, Immigration
Policy and Foreign Population in Switzerland, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3853 (2006),
p. 21. Under Switzerland’s policy, “[t]he first circle, or inner circle, is made of EU and EFTA member
countries with which the aim is to reach free mobility and abolish the status of the seasonal worker in the
medium term. The second circle, or median circle, is made of countries economically and culturally close
to Switzerland such as North America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. . . . Finally, the third circle, or outer
circle, is made of all other countries from which new immigrants can be accepted only under exceptional
circumstances.” Id. See also CERD Committee, Initial reports of States parties due in 1995, Switzerland,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/270/Add.1. (1997), para. 56 (In its report, Switzerland describes the “three-circle”
model as a “restrictive policy towards the admission of foreigners to the increasingly specialized Swiss
labour market.”).
44 CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Switzerland, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.44 (1998), para. 6.
45 CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Dominican Republic, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/DOM/CO/12 (2008), para. 13 (emphasis added).
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18 multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination based on nationality and gender”, and recommending that Japan take steps to prevent discrimination against Koreans46. 33. Further, the Committee has previously stated that “differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination” if the criteria for such differentiation “are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim”47. Thus, even to the extent that States may differentiate between particular nationalities in implementing visa or immigration policies, the CERD does not allow for differential treatment that disproportionately negatively impacts the individual concerned, for example where it results in the denial of fundamental human rights to non-citizens. 34. In its 15 January Submission, the UAE cites D.F. v. Australia in an attempt to support its argument that the Coercive Measures are permissible under the CERD because they “merely eliminate[e] an advantage [the UAE] previously extended to one particular nationality”48. Yet in fact, that case—in which the Committee found that Australia’s legislative changes phasing out preferential access to certain benefits for New Zealand citizens residing in Australia did not fall afoul of its CERD obligations—demonstrates 46 CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Japan, UN Doc. CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11 (2018), paras. 21, 22. The CERD Committee has also noted its concern with respect to national-origin-based discrimination in Canada. See United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Supplement No. 18, UN Doc. A/57/18 (2002), para. 336 (noting “with concern that [Canada’s] current immigration policies, in particular the present level of the ‘right of landing fee’, may have discriminatory effects on persons coming from poorer countries”); CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Canada, UN Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/19-20 (2012), para. 15 (expressing concern about Canada’s Bill C-11, The Balanced Refugee Act, which proposed to expedite asylum requests for individuals arriving from “safe countries”, and recommending that Canada “take appropriate measures to ensure that procedural safeguards will be guaranteed when addressing asylum requests… without any discrimination based on their national origin”). 47 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), para. 4. See also Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark, Communication No. 10/1997, Opinion, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/54/D/10/1997 (1999) (finding that a Tunisian national with permanent residence in Denmark had suffered discrimination where he was denied a loan by a Danish bank because he was not a Danish citizen). The Committee noted that the Tunisian author of the Communication was denied the loan “on the sole ground of his non-Danish nationality and was told that the nationality requirement was motivated by the need to ensure that the loan was repaid. In the opinion of the Committee, however, nationality is not the most appropriate requisite when investigating a person’s will or capacity to reimburse a loan.” Id. para. 9.3. 48 UAE 15 January Submission, p. 4, para. 7. Annex 18
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the opposite. The limitations in that case—which related to New Zealanders’ access to
certain benefits in Australia—were not enacted suddenly or in a punitive manner, but
rather in a considered, individualized process that guaranteed protection of basic rights.
In particular, New Zealanders who were in Australia on the date the changes were
enacted, as well as those who fulfilled certain “transitional arrangements”, continued to
be treated as Australian residents for purposes of the Act (thus retaining the benefits at
issue)49.
35. In stark contrast, the UAE’s Coercive Measures were not devised and implemented as a
matter of ordinary-course consideration of visa or other entry restrictions for foreign
nationals, and cannot be divorced from the effects that they have had on fundamental
human rights of Qataris. To the contrary, as described above, the Coercive Measures
were implemented in order to punish the State of Qatar by broadly targeting the Qatari
people, and indeed, the UAE’s actions were not limited to travel and entry restrictions,
but specifically included both collective expulsion and the incitement of racial hatred
against Qataris.
36. The result of the UAE’s actions has been the nullification and impairment of the
recognition, enjoyment and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
Qataris, and the UAE’s attempt at a post-hoc distortion of the facts should not be
countenanced by the Committee. The UAE’s actions cannot be divorced from the
context in which they were enacted50. Prior to the imposition of the Coercive Measures,
the GCC’s longstanding free-mobility and common-market policies allowed Qataris, due
to their status as GCC nationals and the particular historical context, to enjoy many of the
same rights and benefits within the UAE as UAE nationals, and to move freely between
49 D.F. v. Australia, CERD Committee, Communication No. 39/2006, Opinion, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/72/D/39/2006 (2008), para. 4.1; see also D.R. v. Australia, Communication No. 42/2008,
Opinion, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/75/D/42/2008 (2009).
50 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Meaning and Scope of Special Measures
in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 5 (“The Convention . . . is a living instrument that must be interpreted and
applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society. This approach makes it imperative
to read its text in a context-sensitive manner. . . . Context-sensitive interpretation also includes taking into
account the particular circumstances of the States parties without prejudice to the universal quality of the
norms of the Convention.”).
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20 the two countries51. Indeed, prior to the Measures, thousands of Qataris resided full time in the UAE, worked and attended school in the UAE52, owned properties in the UAE, and established and ran businesses in the UAE for many years53. It was extremely common for families made up of both Qataris and Emiratis to live across State lines, and to travel regularly to see one another54. Indeed, Qataris traveled frequently and in large numbers to the UAE under the special status afforded pursuant to the GCC framework, and prior to the imposition of the Coercive Measures had little to no difficulties doing so55. Thousands of Qataris built their lives around this openness. Indeed, the rights enjoyed by Qataris historically and over time within the territory of the UAE—in which, as described 51 See, e.g., DCL-048, para. 11 (“Emiratis were very friendly in general. Whether I went by car or by plane, I never faced any issues with immigration. The immigration process was very simple: they would look at my passport and let me enter the country.”); DCL-079, para. 9 (“While we were in the UAE, we did not feel like it was any different from being in Qatar. We felt like it was an extension of our country, like we were at home…In general, we were welcomed and treated as if we were Emiratis. In my experience, this is what it was like to be a national of the Gulf Cooperation Council[.]”); Id., para. 10 (“Traveling to the UAE was very easy: the process was very fast, we used to travel without delay and it was not expensive to travel…We used to travel with only our ID cards and did not need our passports. At the Dubai and Sharjah airports, there was a line for ‘GCC nationals’ and a line for others.”). 52 DCL-073, paras. 9, 12 (“My program [at Emirates Aviation University] began in November 2016. It was part-time, with most coursework offered on the weekends…Between November 2016 and June 2017, I traveled to the UAE on a regular basis to attend classes.”); DCL-108, paras. 5, 6, 8 (“Although I was born and grew up in Doha, I moved to…the UAE…in the mid-1980s…My daughters are Qatari because I am Qatari, but they feel a strong connection to the UAE because it is where they had spent their entire lives…Life in the UAE was good. My family was happy, we lived in a nice apartment, and my business was doing very well.”). 53 DCL-048, paras. 5, 9-10 (“I purchased an apartment in the UAE…I also purchased land [ ] for investment purposes. I was planning to build two villas to either sell or rent…In addition…I owned another piece of land that was used for industrial projects[.]”); DCL-108, para. 7 (“I opened a small business [ ] in Dubai. [It] was a retail shop…The store was very successful, especially for the first few years...[T]he business paid my salary [and] paid for my family’s home in [the UAE].”). 54 DCL-079, paras. 7-8 (“[M]y family…often stayed with my mother’s family in the UAE—on average four, sometimes five, times a year. We would go to the UAE for religious holidays, including the two Eids, and we would stay there for a month. We would also make shorter trips…We were very close with our Emirati family. I had my own room at my grandmother’s house, and I did not take bags with me when I visited her because I had my own clothes there. My mother did not even take her medicine with her for the same reason.”). 55 DCL-048, para. 10 (“It was easy to travel to the UAE prior to June 5, 2017. The flight tickets were cheap…and I would stay at a hotel in Dubai. I also sometimes drove there. I would travel alone for business or with my family for weekends and vacation.”); DCL-073, para. 13 (“Travelling to the UAE was relatively uneventful…[Prior to 5 June 2017,] I felt no hostility against me as a Qatari.”); DCL-079, para. 10 (“Traveling to the UAE was very easy: the process was very fast, we used to travel without delay and it was not expensive to travel…We used to travel with only our ID cards and did not need our passports. At the Dubai and Sharjah airports, there was a line for ‘GCC nationals’ and a line for others.”); DCL-108, para. 8 (“I traveled to Qatar often to see my family and for business…These trips were easy to make because I did not even need to book a flight; I would usually drive to Doha through Saudi Arabia.”). Annex 18
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above, they are entitled to many of the same rights and benefits as UAE citizens—on its
own makes clear that the Coercive Measures instituted against them since 5 June 2017
constitute discrimination prohibited on the ground of “national origin” under Article 1(1),
and cannot be treated as “distinctions” or “restrictions” permitted against non-citizens
under Article 1(2).
37. As a result, the UAE’s sudden collective expulsion of Qataris—done arbitrarily and
without any consideration of individual characteristics or the provision of even basic due
process—and simultaneous imposition of discriminatory travel and entry restrictions on
Qataris to prevent their return and entry—again without affording even basic due
process—just cannot be reconciled with the UAE’s current, self-serving characterization
that the measures “merely eliminate[d] an advantage it previously extended to one
particular nationality”56. To the contrary, the UAE’s actions have targeted the Qatari
people as a group and damaged the exercise of Qataris’ fundamental human rights,
including rights enumerated in article 5 of the CERD.
38. The Coercive Measures’ adverse impact on the exercise of fundamental human rights by
Qataris makes clear that they go well beyond the “legitimate” and “proportional”
distinctions that the Committee has previously indicated are permissible under the CERD.
As explained above, the CERD Committee has criticized State immigration policies that
classified foreigners along nationality-based lines or had a disproportionate impact on
individuals from certain countries57. Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance
has expressed concern about similar attempts by States to enact entry bans that
disproportionately affect certain groups, stating that “[u]nder the . . . International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, blanket bans on
specific nationalities and other immigration measures that exclude on the basis of . . .
national origin are unlawful”58.
56 15 January Submission, p. 4, para. 7.
57 See supra, para. 32.
58 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/52 (2018), para. 67. See also
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22 39. And contrary to the UAE’s attempt to justify its Coercive Measures under general international law allowing States to “decide which rights and benefits to confer upon foreign nationals depending on what nationality they hold”59, the Coercive Measures also fall well beyond the bounds of permissible action under general international law60. It is without question that the expulsion of non-nationals from a State’s territory, absent “an assessment of the particular case of each individual member of the group”—of which collective expulsion based on nationality, such as that effectuated against Qataris by the 5 June Directive, is the archetypical example—is prohibited under international law61. Further, even if the Coercive Measures were solely restrictions on entry rather than a Donald J. Trump v. Hawaii, Case No. 17-965 (2018), Amici Curiae Brief of International Law Scholars and Nongovernmental Organizations in Support of Respondents, p. 3, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/41737/2018033012585227… (the amici brief was filed by eighty-one international law scholars and a dozen non-governmental organizations with expertise in civil rights law, immigration law or international human rights law; it describes a proposed ban on entry to the United States by individuals coming from particular countries as “a prohibited distinction in immigration policy based on national origin [that] violates the human right to freedom from discrimination based on national origin under the . . . International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and customary international law.”). The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, took the same stance on the ban at issue in Donald J. Trump v. Hawaii, tweeting that “[d]iscrimination on nationality alone is forbidden under #humanrightslaw.” UN Office of Human Rights, TWITTER.COM (30 January 2017), https://twitter.com/UNHumanRights/status/826034077056823296. 59 4 December Submission, p. 18, para. 37. 60 See, e.g., OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/3 (September 2004), pp. 8-9, n. 32, 34, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf (“The international minimum standard is a norm of customary international law which governs the treatment of aliens…[it applies across] a number of areas [that] include: the administration of justice in cases involving foreign nationals…full protection and security, which is usually understood as the obligation for the host State to adopt all reasonable measures to physically protect assets and property from threats or attacks which may target…certain groups of foreigners…[A]lthough the general right of expulsion by the host State has never been questioned, minimum standards have been invoked concerning the way in which it is carried out, which should be the least injurious to the person affected.”) (internal citations omitted). 61 Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, Arts. 9(1)-(3) (prohibiting collective expulsion, defined as the “expulsion of aliens, as a group,” without “an assessment of the particular case of each individual member of the group”); European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol No. 4, Art. 4 (“Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.”); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, Art. 22(1) (“Migrant workers and members of their families shall not be subject to measures of collective expulsion. Each case of expulsion shall be examined and decided individually.”); American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 22(9) (“The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 12(5) (“The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.”); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 26(2) (“Collective expulsion is prohibited under all circumstances.”). Annex 18
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23
clear expulsion order, they still violate international law because they discriminate
against one particular nationality, are not proportional to the achievement of any
legitimate aim, and fall below the international minimum standard of justice62.
40. Accordingly, in light of the indiscriminate, arbitrary and punitive nature of the UAE’s
Coercive Measures, the UAE has no basis on which to argue that the Coercive Measures
are proportional to the achievement of a legitimate aim.
c. “National Origin” in Light of Object and Purpose
41. Any interpretation of the CERD that would allow States parties to discriminate on the
basis of an individual’s present nationality would contradict the CERD’s explicit object
and purpose of eliminating racial discrimination “in all its forms and manifestations”, in
that it would limit the CERD’s ability to effectively protect against contemporary forms
of racial discrimination. As the Committee has previously explained, discrimination
against non-citizens is a concerning source of racial discrimination today63. Indeed, as
Professor Thornberry has explained:
62 See A. Xavier Fellmeth, “Nondiscrimination as a Claiming Paradigm,” in Paradigms of International
Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 119-120 (noting that “[g]enerally, only the least
discriminatory means available will be proportionate to the aim; superfluous discrimination is always
disproportionate”; also noting that the U.N. Human Rights Committee; Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights; Strasbourg Court; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights have all adopted similar
proportionality tests that suggest “laws limiting rights [must be] narrowly tailored to impinge minimally on
the right”). See also J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, OUP, 8th ed.
(2012), p. 613 (“Since the beginning of the twentieth century the preponderant doctrine has supported an
‘international minimum standard.’”); U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Human Rights of
Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/144 (1985), Art.
2(1); Neer v. United Mexican States, Doc. No. 136, Opinion (Oct. 15, 1926), R.I.A.A. Vol. IV, pp. 601-661
(setting a standard of treatment of aliens concerning denial of justice, fair and equitable treatment and the
minimum standard of treatment to be accorded to aliens under international investment law); World Trade
Organization, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Arts. I, III (incorporating the principle of nondiscrimination
in international trade law).
63 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), Preamble. While part of the objective of the CERD was to bring an end
“in the decolonization period” to racial superiority and hatred, as noted by Judge Salam (Application of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab
Emirates), Provisional Measures, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Salam, para. 3), the CERD was directed far
more broadly to address and eliminate “all forms” of racism, including as the manifestation of racism
evolves over time. This is reflected in the CERD’s explicit language, as well as in its object and purpose.
See infra paras. 50–51 (citing United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, 1313th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1313 (1965), p. 121, para. 6).
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24 “A reading of 1(2) that rules out from the Convention any concern with non-citizens could be classified in [VCLT] terms as a ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ reading of ICERD, and as not corresponding to its object and purpose. In light of the ambition expressed in the Convention to eliminate racial discrimination, and a human rights approach pro homine and pro femina, it is reasonable to prefer effective interpretations that protect the widest span of potential victims”64. 42. Under the UAE’s self-serving interpretation of “national origin”, States Parties to the CERD would be free to engage in widespread discrimination against non-citizens as part of a campaign of hatred and mistreatment implemented in an entirely arbitrary and capricious manner, so long as a State framed this discrimination as based on present “nationality” alone. The UAE’s approach eviscerates the protections contained in the CERD and cannot be reconciled with either its language or object and purpose. Indeed, such an interpretation, followed to its logical conclusion, would lead to absurd results. For example, it would suggest that, prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, discrimination in any given country against persons of Ukrainian origin was impermissible, but not against those exact same persons once Ukraine secured Statehood. The UAE’s interpretation therefore assigns the term “national origin” an arbitrary meaning—one that protects groups of persons, unless the discrimination against them is framed in terms of present nationality. Further, as the Committee has previously acknowledged, “[t]he Convention . . . is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society”65. That human rights treaties must be interpreted in accordance with their general protective purpose is 64 P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 158; see also B. Çali, “Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights” in D.B. Hollis (ed.) The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 538 (“Effectiveness is an overarching approach to human rights treaty interpretation… [O]ther more…specific interpretive principles developed in the context of each human rights treaty…all derive from the interpretive consensus that interpretations that are devoid of actual effect for human rights protections do not cohere with good faith interpretations of the wording and context of human rights treaties in the light of their object and purpose.”). 65 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Meaning and scope of special measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 5; see also Stephen Hagan v Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, Opinion, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003), para. 7.3 (“The Committee considers…that the Convention, as a living instrument, must be interpreted and applied taking into [sic] the circumstances of contemporary society.”) Annex 18
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25
universally recognized, including by the ICJ and regional human rights courts66. To this
end, the Committee has repeatedly advised States parties to the CERD to “implement real
solutions to racism so that all people, regardless of their background, could fully exercise
their human rights”67. This applies to discrimination against non-nationals, which the
Committee has previously characterized as “one of the main sources of contemporary
racism”68.
2. The Travaux Préparatoires Confirm that the CERD Applies to
Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality
43. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE argues that a “distinction between ‘nationality’
and ‘national origin’ is clearly delineated in the travaux préparatoires of the CERD”69.
In support of this point, it relies on a single amendment proposed—and ultimately
withdrawn—by the representatives of the United States and France, as well as statements
66 See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 24 (“The
object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly
and of the States which adopted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete
exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its application,
but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is
inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation
could produce such a result. . . . The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of
making reservations and that of objecting to them”); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment of 26 June 1989, IACtHR. (Ser. C) No. 1 (1994), para. 30 (“The object and purpose
of the American Convention is the effective protection of human rights. The Convention must, therefore,
be interpreted so as to give it its full meaning and to enable the system for the protection of human rights
entrusted to the Commission and the Court to attain its “appropriate effects”); Soering v. the United
Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989, ECtHR (1989), para. 87 (“In interpreting the
Convention regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the
protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make
its safeguards “practical and effective.” (citations omitted)).
67 CERD Committee, Ninety-third Session, Summary Record (Partial) of the 2457th Meeting, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/SR.2547 (2017), para. 2 (Emphasis added).
68 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), Preamble.
69 4 December Submission p. 16, para. 32. The UAE cites P. Thornberry, The International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp.
103-105 for the proposition that “differentiation on the basis of nationality [] is not prohibited under the
CERD.” 4 Decembr Submission, p. 15, n. 31. This reference does not, however, support the UAE’s
proposition; rather, it describes in general terms various discussions of “national origin” by the CERD’s
drafters.
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26 made by the United States representative to clarify the meaning of that amendment70. In fact, lengthy discussions regarding the meaning and scope of “national origin” and its relationship to “nationality” underlie the entire drafting history of the CERD, and these discussions indicate the exact opposite of the UAE’s conclusion. “National origin” and “nationality” were never delineated by the drafters as distinct terms, but instead were understood to significantly overlap in meaning and scope. 44. Throughout the CERD’s drafting, delegates expressed the view that the term “national origin” could be interpreted in a number of different ways, including to encompass nationality in the sense of citizenship as well as in the sense of an individual’s historical-cultural connections to a State71. For example, Mr. Combal, the delegate from France, explained that “the term ‘national origin’ . . . could be interpreted in two entirely different ways. In the Brazilian amendment it was used in the sociological sense, but it might also be equated with the word ‘nationality.’”72 The delegate from Iraq agreed with the latter 70 See 4 December Submission pp. 16-17, paras. 34, 35 (noting that Judges Tomka, Gaja, Gevorgian and Salam relied on an amendment “specifying that ‘the expression ‘national origin’ does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’” in concluding that the drafters of the CERD sought to exclude distinctions on the basis of nationality from the scope of the Convention); id. p. 16, para. 32 (in discussing that amendment, “the US representative pointed out that: ‘[n]ational origin differed from nationality in that national origin related to the past—the previous nationality or geographical region of the individual or of his ancestors—while nationality related to present status. The use of the former term in the Convention would make it clear that persons were protected against discrimination regardless of where they or their ancestors had come from.”). 71 E.g., United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 16 (recording the representative from Senegal’s statement that “national origin” should be retained in Article 1, “since it would offer protection to persons of foreign birth who had become nationals of their country of residence . . . as well as foreign minorities within a State”). 72 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 15. The Brazilian amendment (A/C.3/L.1209) referenced by Mr. Combal proposed the following changes to draft Article 1(1): “In this Convention the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, [national] or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. [In this paragraph the expression ‘national origin’ does not cover the status of any person as a citizen of a given State.]” Specifically, the Brazilian amendment proposed “the deletion of the words placed between square brackets” and “the addition in parenthesis of the phrase, ‘and in the case of States composed of different nationalities discrimination based on such difference’, after the word ‘origin.’” United Nations, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6181, (1965), p. 12, paras. 29-30. Annex 18
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meaning73, while other delegates used the terms “national origin” and “nationality”
interchangeably74.
45. Because “national origin” was often interpreted as inclusive of nationality in the sense of
citizenship, some delegates worried that the term’s presence in Article 1(1) would lead to
restrictions on States attempting to make legitimate distinctions between citizens and
non-citizens (e.g., in the case of political rights usually reserved to citizens, such as
voting). The delegate from Lebanon, for example, voiced this concern during early
debates of the Human Rights Commission, stating that “[t]he convention should apply to
nationals, non-nationals, and all ethnic groups, but it should not bind the parties to afford
the same political rights to non-nationals as they normally granted to nationals”75. In
subsequent discussions of the Third Committee, Mr. Gueye, the delegate from Senegal,
further explained that:
“the expression ‘national origin’ had given rise to controversy,
apparently because some delegations feared that its use would
confer on aliens living in a State equality of rights in areas,
political or other, which under the laws of the State were reserved
exclusively to nationals”76.
46. Thus, it is clear that the delegates understood “national origin” as capable of
encompassing present nationality. It was for this very reason that the debates over the
inclusion of the term “national origin” in Article 1(1) took place.
47. Although the drafters were concerned about the possibility that including “national
origin” in Article 1(1) would oblige States to guarantee equal rights to citizens and noncitizens,
they also recognized that the aim of the CERD was to prohibit discrimination in
73 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 85, para. 22.
74 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 13.
75 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights,
Twentieth Session, Summary Record of the Eight Hundred and Ninth Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.809
(1964), p. 5.
76 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 16.
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28 the enjoyment of fundamental rights to all persons, and broadly agreed that some form of the term “national origin” or “nationality” would therefore be a necessary addition to Article 1(1). And they did this in full recognition of the fact that the precise meaning and scope of “national origin” had not been clearly delineated, but instead was left open to varying interpretations depending on culture and context. This is because failure to include the term “national” in the CERD’s definition of “racial discrimination” would exclude from the CERD’s substantive protections a segment of the population that was clearly at risk for discrimination. As explained by Mr. Villgrattner, the Austrian delegate, “[d]eletion of the word [national] might lead to uncertainty concerning the rights of certain groups and perhaps, eventually, to their denial”77. 48. It was in this context that the U.S.-France amendment relied upon by the UAE was ultimately proposed. The purpose of that amendment, as the United States representative explained, “was to ensure that the Convention applied to racial discrimination in all its forms, while allowing certain accepted distinctions between citizens and non-citizens to be made by States”78. Had it been adopted, the U.S.-France amendment would have resulted in a new Article 1(2) providing : “In this Convention the expression ‘national origin’ does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’, and the Convention shall therefore not be applicable to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences based on differences of nationality of [sic] citizenship”79. 49. However, the drafters ultimately rejected the approach of explicitly excluding nationality-based discrimination from Article 1(1). Thus, the U.S.-France amendment was withdrawn in favor of a compromise amendment that provided the final text of Articles 1(1)–1(3) of the CERD: 77 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 13. 78 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1985), p. 85, para. 24 (emphasis added). 79 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6181, (1965), p. 12, para. 32 (describing the amendment of France and the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1212). Annex 18
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29
“(1) In this Convention the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.
(2) This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions,
restrictions or preferences made by a State party between citizens
and non-citizens.
(3) Nothing in the present Convention may be interpreted as
affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties
concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that
such provisions do not discriminate against any particular
nationality”80.
50. In this way, the drafters dealt with the concern that citizens and non-citizens would have
to be guaranteed the same political rights through express exceptions outlined in Articles
1(2) and 1(3). As explained by Ms. Tabbara, the representative from Lebanon and one of
the sponsors of the compromise amendment, “[t]he amendment made it clear that the
Convention would not apply to non-citizens or effect legislation on nationality,
citizenship or naturalization, provided that there was no discrimination against any
particular nationality”81. Articles 1(2) and 1(3) were therefore introduced to narrow the
broad prohibition on racial discrimination contained in Article 1(1), as explained above.
51. By adopting the compromise amendment and retaining the word “national” in Article
1(1), the drafters of the CERD aimed to maintain the CERD’s primary goal of
eliminating all forms of racial discrimination. They did this by composing a
comprehensive definition of “racial discrimination” that was devoid of any “lacunae”82.
80 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Draft International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6181
(1965), para. 37 (describing the compromise amendment put forward by Ghana, India, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland and Senegal, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1238); CERD, Arts. 1(1)-1(3).
81 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1307th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1307 (1965), p. 95, para. 1.
82 P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A
Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 119.
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30 A broad application of the terms in Article 1(1), in which “national origin” is given the widest application possible, is in line with the intent of the drafters. It also accords with the drafters’ intent to give practical effect to the CERD in the face of ever-evolving contemporary forms of racial discrimination. Indeed, the drafters largely rejected the approach of listing specific “types” of racial discrimination, such as Nazism and anti-Semitism, in order to ensure that “the Convention [would] be a timeless one, applicable . . . to every kind of racial discrimination”83. As Miss King, the representative from Jamaica, explained, “[t]he Convention was intended to condemn and provide against not only the present forms of racial discrimination but any future forms as well”84. 52. For the reasons described above, the CERD clearly encompasses discrimination against groups of individuals of a particular nationality within Article 1(1)’s prohibition on discrimination based on “national origin”. As such, the Coercive Measures enacted by the UAE violate the CERD by explicitly and intentionally discriminating against Qatari nationals. B. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the Discriminatory Effect on Individuals of Qatari National Origin 53. The UAE’s argument that “treatment based on nationality” cannot fall within the scope of CERD cannot be squared with the fact that the CERD’s prohibition on discrimination is not limited to the explicit purpose of the measures—rather, in line with the CERD’s general object and purpose of eliminating “all forms” of racial discrimination, Article 1(1) makes clear that the CERD encompasses discrimination in either “purpose or effect”85. The Committee has thus previously determined that the CERD prohibits both “purposive or intentional discrimination and discrimination in effect”86, and has stated that “[i]n seeking to determine whether that action has an effect contrary to the 83 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1313th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1313 (1965), p. 121, para. 6. 84 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1313th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1313 (1965), p. 122, para. 13. 85 CERD, Art. 1(1). 86 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 7. Annex 18
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31
Convention, [the Committee] will look to see whether an action has an . . . unjustifiable
disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic
origin”87.
54. Judge Crawford reached the same conclusion in Ukraine v. Russia, a case brought under
the CERD to the ICJ:
“[T]he definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in Article 1 of CERD
does not require that the restriction in question be based expressly
on racial or other grounds enumerated in the definition; it is
enough that it directly implicates such a group on one or more of
these grounds. Moreover, whatever the stated purpose of the
restriction, it may constitute racial discrimination if it has the
‘effect’ of impairing the enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of the rights articulated in CERD”88.
55. Thus, independent of whether nationality-based discrimination is per se prohibited under
the CERD—though it is, as discussed in Section A—the Coercive Measures violate the
CERD because they have an unjustifiable negative impact on persons who are of Qatari
national origin in a historical-cultural sense uncontested by the UAE: on the basis of
characteristics such as “heritage” or their ability to “trace” their origin to Qatar89.
56. As explained above, the dictionary definitions of “national” and “origin”, taken together,
suggest that the ordinary meaning of “national origin” refers to the belonging of a
person—or a person’s ancestors—to a given country or nation. In addition to present
nationality, the term unquestionably encompasses such belonging in the sense of
historical or family ties, geographic origins, ancestry or one’s country of birth90. The
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of belonging to a given country or nation is
87 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, U.N.
Doc. A/48/18 (1993), para. 2.
88 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian
Federation), Provisional Measures, Declaration of Judge Crawford (19 April 2017), para. 7.
89 See 4 December Submission, p. 18, para. 35.
90 Professor Thornberry has explained that the two terms “national origin” and “ethnic origin” often function
“as a yoked pair of workhorses, employed whenever issues of color (‘visible minorities’) are not the most
prominent markers of discrimination.” P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 126.
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32 therefore consistent with the CERD’s object and purpose of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination, including those forms of racism that might be related to, but not entirely covered by, other enumerated grounds such as “ethnic origin” and “descent”91. It is also consistent with the CERD’s travaux préparatoires92. 57. As the UAE knows, in the present context, “Qatari” does not only refer to a “current nationality”—it also describes a historical-cultural community linked to the modern State of Qatar and, as explained above, is defined by shared heritage or descent, particular family or tribal affiliations, and participation in national traditions and culture, as well as geographical ties to what is now Qatar. This group is easily identifiable to other people living in the Gulf, including based on their uniquely “Qatari” dialect and dress. Individuals belonging to this community also generally hold Qatari nationality, and comprise the significant majority of Qatari nationals, meaning that the UAE’s distinctions “on account of nationality or citizenship”93 discriminate in effect against Qataris in the historical-cultural sense. 58. The origins of a historical-cultural community of “Qataris” can be traced at least to the mid- to late-1800s. During this time period, members of a prominent tribe living in the area that is now Qatar began to amass influence, and by the 1850s and 1860s, the tribe’s 91 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 29 on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention (Descent) (2002), Preamble (“Confirming the consistent view of the Committee that the term ‘descent’ in article 1, paragraph 1, [of] the Convention does not solely refer to ‘race’ and has a meaning and application which complement the other prohibited grounds of discrimination.”). 92 As explained above, the drafters viewed “national origin” as inclusive of both an individual’s present nationality and historical-cultural affiliations linked to a particular State, and sought to balance the concern that non-citizens would be guaranteed equal rights to citizens if “national origin” was included in Article 1(1) against the need to ensure that the CERD would protect against “all forms” of discrimination. In that regard, the drafters of the CERD also expressed concerns about possible discrimination on the basis of an individual’s historical-cultural affiliations such as language, ancestry, or national traditions. In so doing, the delegates confirmed that a group of people defined by certain historical-cultural “national” affiliations—for example, a “mother tongue,” national traditions or beliefs, or ancestry tied to a particular geographical region—was meant to fall within the scope of the CERD’s substantive protections. See United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 85, paras. 21, 23; United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Sixteenth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411, p. 5. In practical terms, such a people might exist across different States, might exist as a minority group living within a State, or might be tied to a particular State, either presently or historically. 93 4 December Submission, p. 15, para. 31. Annex 18
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33
patriarch—Muhammed bin Thani al-Wadhiri—had begun to operate as “de facto ruler of
Qatar”94. In 1868, the British entered into a treaty with Muhammed bin Thani as head of
“a distinct political entity”95, recognizing him as the “primary local authority” of Qatar
and as representative of the Qatari people96. The Al Thani family has continuously ruled
over the territory that forms modern day Qatar ever since. In 1916, Muhammed bin
Thani al-Wadhiri’s son signed a treaty placing Qatar under British protection, a situation
that was maintained until Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1971, as a result of
which Qatar was formally established as an independent State97.
59. By the 1970s, the sense of a “Qatari” identity as the primary point of self-identification98
for the people living in this area was well-established, and it has only strengthened in the
decades since99. As historians have explained, modern-day Gulf peoples “share a similar
lifestyle but not a common identity, except perhaps in the eyes of outsiders”100. Today,
there is a strong sense of a uniquely “Qatari” identity that is tied to belonging in the
94 K. Eggeling, Cultural Diplomacy in Qatar (“The Al Thani first consolidated their power over the territory
that forms modern day Qatar through two treaties with the British in 1868 and 1916 that recognized the
tribe as the primary local authority.”).
95 Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p.
26.
96 See Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States (Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989), p. 85
(describing Qatar’s former status as a dependency of Bahrain and stating that “in the eastern villages of
Doha and Wakrah . . . . Bahrain faced intermittent opposition from the people of Qatar” prior to the
establishment of the Qatari State; also describing a meeting between Muhammed bin Thani (1868-76) and a
British official as “implicitly recogniz[ing] Muhammed bin Thani—as well as the people of Qatar—as
being independent of Bahrain.”).
97 Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), pp.
28, 35-36.
98 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 8 Concerning the Interpretation and Application of
Article 1, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. A/45/18 (1990) (noting that identification as a
member of a particular racial or ethnic group or groups “if no justification exists to the contrary, [shall] be
based upon self-identification by the individual concerned.”).
99 See Lawrence G. Potter, Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil, Center for International and
Regional Studies, Georgetown University in Qatar (2017), p. 23 (describing how “state citizenship has
increasingly become the most important identity” in the Gulf States, particularly within the last fifty years).
100 Lawrence G. Potter, “Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil,” Center for International and
Regional Studies, Georgetown University in Qatar, Occasional Paper No. 18 (2017), p. 4.
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34 historical-cultural community of Qataris and identification with the Qatari State and its leaders101. 60. Social scientists have similarly described identity in the Gulf in terms of a “civic ethnocracy”, defined as “a political system based on kinship, real or presumed”102. In the particular context of the Gulf, “the defining feature [of such systems] is not race, language or religion but citizenship conceived in terms of shared descent”103. Indeed, across the Gulf, citizenship is granted on the basis of “shared descent” or other historical-cultural ties104. 61. Article 1 of the CERD must be interpreted and applied in the light of this particular Gulf context, and the fact that nationality is generally only conferred on persons with a close historical-cultural connection to the State of their nationality. As explained above, Qatar generally requires that an individual be a member of the historical-cultural community of Qataris in order to qualify for Qatari nationality105. As a practical matter, this means that the significant majority of Qatari nationals—those belonging to the group explicitly targeted by the UAE—are also of Qatari origin in the sense of the historical-cultural 101 The collective “Qatari” identity is celebrated on Qatar National Day. As scholars have explained, Qatar’s National Day “seeks to commemorate the ascendency of a leveling nationalism over the varied pre-statal social topography.” On National Day, large tents are erected for each tribe, and celebrations include “performance[s] of tribal belonging” such as poetry readings and ceremonial performances. See Andrew M. Gardner and Ali Alshawi, “Tribalism, Identity and Citizenship in Contemporary Qatar,” 8:2 Anthropology of the Middle East 46 (2013), p. 54. 102 Anh Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy Nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio-Political System in Kuwait,” in Dresch and Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 119. 103 Anh Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy Nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio-Political System in Kuwait,” in Dresch and Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 119. 104 See, e.g., Paul Dresch, “Debates on Marriage and Nationality in the United Arab Emirates,” in Paul Dresch and James Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 141 (describing Kuwait’s nationality law, which set the pattern followed by other Gulf States and defined Kuwaitis as those who were normally resident in Kuwait before 1920). 105 See, e.g., Qatar: Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality [Qatar], 30 October 2005, Art. 1 (defining Qatari nationals, including those historically resident in Qatar and those of Qatari heritage); see also United Arab Emirates: Federal Law No. 17 for 1972 Concerning Nationality, Passports and Amendments Thereof, [United Arab Emirates], 18 November 1972, Art. 5 (“[t]he nationality of the State may be granted to…[a]n Arab individual from Omani, Qatari or Bahraini origin residing in the State on continuous and lawful basis for at least three years directly before the date of submitting [a] naturalization application”) (emphasis added). Annex 18
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35
connections described above: shared heritage or descent, particular family or tribal
affiliations, geographical ties to what is now Qatar, and participation in national traditions
and culture. That Qatari nationality is restrictive and largely coterminous with Qatari
identity in this sense is well known to the UAE, and its attempts to characterize the
Coercive Measures as “differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality”106 alone
should therefore not be credited. As the UAE is well aware, discrimination on the basis
of Qatari nationality is in fact a convenient way to target individuals of Qatari origin, as
discrimination on the ostensible basis of nationality will unquestionably have a
disproportionate impact on individuals of Qatari heritage or descent.
62. In this case, the Coercive Measures imposed by the UAE constitute violations of the
CERD regardless of their purpose, because they have in fact had a severe impact on the
historical-cultural community of Qataris107. Further, despite the UAE’s assertions that
the Coercive Measures apply only “on the basis of nationality”, they have adversely
affected many non-Qatari nationals of Qatari heritage. As noted in Qatar’s
Communication, this includes the children of Qatari mothers who hold Emirati
nationality, who have suffered from painful family separation as a result of the Coercive
Measures108.
63. Thus, the UAE’s Coercive Measures have had a large-scale, adverse impact on
individuals of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense. The discriminatory
effects of the Coercive Measures on these individuals alone constitute violations under
the CERD and bring Qatar’s Communication within the ambit of the Committee’s
competence. Further, while the effects alone are sufficient, the punitive nature of the
UAE’s actions, in combination with the specific context of the Gulf, in which nationality
is largely coterminous with “national origin” in a historical-cultural sense, suggests that
these effects are also by design. The UAE is well aware of the fact that nationality is
closely correlated with historical-cultural ties in the Gulf region, and it must have known
106 4 December Submission, p. 15, para. 30.
107 See Qatar’s Communication, pp. 19-25, paras. 41-55.
108 Qatar’s Communication, p. 20, para. 43; see also id. pp. 48-50, paras. 113-119 (noting that the UAE’s
actions were “specifically designed to encourage hostility and incite hatred against Qataris” and have
“contributed to a general culture of fear for Qataris and those related to them”).
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36 that the natural consequences of enforcing these measures against Qatari nationals would include severe adverse impacts on individuals of Qatari origin. Given this context, in addition to the UAE’s repeated assertions that the Coercive Measures were implemented as a means to punish Qatar, it is clear that the UAE used nationality as an efficient approximation to target and damage the Qatari people. III. THE COMMITTEE HAS JURISDICTION OVER QATAR’S ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION BECAUSE QATAR CONSIDERS THAT THE UAE IS NOT GIVING EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CERD A. The UAE Distorts the Committee’s Role and the Requirements of Article 11 64. Pursuant to the plain text of the CERD, the Chairman of the Committee “shall appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission” for any matter referred to the Committee under Article 11 where, in relevant part: (1) a State Party “considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention”; and (2) “the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties … within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication”109. These requirements under Articles 11(1) and 11(2) establish minimal standards in keeping with the Committee’s contemplated role under Articles 11 to 13 as a mechanism to promote conciliation as a means to resolve disputes between States Parties to the CERD110. 65. As an initial matter, Qatar categorically disagrees with the UAE’s notion that the Committee does not have jurisdiction because the UAE’s violations have ended. Qatar is not asking the Committee to find jurisdiction and proceed with the formation of a Conciliation Commission to assign blame for past transgressions; to the contrary, as addressed below in Section II.B, by virtue of the process envisaged in Articles 11 to 13, Qatar seeks to address violations that are continuing to this day. 66. But the UAE also seriously misstates the requirements of the CERD, when it argues that the Committee and any ad hoc Conciliation Commission that may be appointed “only has jurisdiction to consider allegations of ongoing violations of the CERD” because Article 109 CERD Arts. 11(1)-(2). 110 The exhaustion requirement contained in Article 11(3) is addressed in Section IV, below. Annex 18
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11 uses the present tense when it states “another State Party is not giving effect to the
provisions of this Convention”111. As an initial matter, the present tense phrase “is not
giving effect to” relates to the time at which the matter is brought to the attention of the
Committee and requires only that the violation was ongoing when Qatar submitted its
Article 11 Communication. And notwithstanding the UAE’s selective quotation, Article
11 actually starts with the language that “if a State Party considers that another State
Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may bring the matter to
the attention of the Committee”112. The “matter” that is not adjusted “to the satisfaction
of both parties” for purposes of Article 11(2) is precisely that which is referred to in the
opening sentence of Article 11(1). Accordingly, the requirement triggering the
advancement of the procedure is what a State Party “considers” to be the case as to
whether another State Party is not giving effect to the CERD.
67. That requirement is satisfied here. Qatar certainly “considers” that the UAE is “not
giving effect to the provisions of the Convention” by continuing to enforce the Coercive
Measures, and therefore has properly brought this matter to the Committee under Article
11. The October and November 2018 correspondence by Qatar and the UAE before the
Committee clearly demonstrates that the matter qualifies for referral under Article 11;
Qatar does not consider the matter to be adjusted to its satisfaction and accordingly
referred the matter back to the Committee via its letter of 29 October 2018. Accordingly,
nothing more is needed under Articles 11(1) or 11(2) for the Committee to exercise its
competence under Articles 11 to 13, including to appoint an ad hoc Conciliation
Commission pursuant to Article 12.
68. Indeed, to construe Article 11 as the UAE advocates, does harm not only to the plain
language of the CERD, but is also manifestly illogical in light of the protective purpose
111 4 December Submission, p. 22, para. 46 (emphasis added); 15 January Submission, p. 12, para. 22.
112 CERD Arts. 11(1) (emphasis added). Language of this nature is deemed to be self-judging, conferring
wide discretion on a contracting party to unilaterally consider the scope and applicability of a treaty
provision. See, e.g., Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 226, para. 135, p. 229, para. 145 (interpreting Article 2(c) of the
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between Djibouti and France, which provided that
assistance in proceedings relating to criminal offences “may be refused […] if the requested state considers
that” one of several conditions was present, as providing a State to which a request for assistance has been
made with “very considerable discretion”).
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38 of the CERD and the positive conciliatory role contemplated for the Committee through the Commission mechanism. In particular, while the UAE states that the Committee is “prevented from continuing to entertain…a matter once that previous failure to give effect to the CERD’s provisions has already been rectified”113, the UAE’s subjective opinion that it believes the matter with Qatar to be “rectified” cannot determine whether the Committee has jurisdiction to consider Qatar’s Communication. This question of whether or not a State Party is giving effect to its obligations under the CERD is precisely the matter that the Article 11 to 13 process was designed to resolve. To determine otherwise would be absurd: the Committee would be divested of jurisdiction if the allegedly offending party simply stated that the matter had been “rectified”. Nothing in the language or purpose of Articles 11 to 13 supports such a nonsensical result. B. Qatar’s Communication is Properly Before the Committee 69. To the extent the UAE argues that the Committee lacks jurisdiction because there exists insufficient evidence of its ongoing violations of the CERD114, the UAE is wrong both as a legal and factual matter. As a legal matter, the question of whether a party has put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that another party is in violation of the CERD should be considered by the ad hoc Conciliation Commission when assessing the merits of the dispute and preparing its “findings on all questions of fact relevant to the issue between the parties” in accordance with Article 13. As a result, it would make no sense for the underlying merits to be addressed by the Committee as a matter of jurisdiction or admissibility. 70. But in any event, the UAE is also wrong to question sufficiency of evidence as a factual matter. The UAE disingenuously cites the dissenting opinions of ICJ judges, but omits the fact that the majority of the ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar in those proceedings and indicated provisional measures to protect the rights of Qataris under the CERD precisely because the UAE’s Coercive Measures plausibly endangered the rights of Qataris under the CERD: 113 4 December Submission, p. 22, para. 47. 114 4 December Submission, pp. 22-24, paras. 46-53; 15 January Submission, p. 12-13, paras. 23-25. Annex 18
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“In the present case, the Court notes, on the basis of evidence
presented to it by the Parties, that the measures adopted by the
UAE on 5 June 2017 appear to have targeted only Qataris and not
other non-citizens residing in the UAE. Furthermore, the measures
were directed to all Qataris residing in the UAE, regardless of
individual circumstances. Therefore, it appears that some of the
acts of which Qatar complains may constitute acts of racial
discrimination as defined by the Convention”115.
71. In so holding, the ICJ drew from an evidentiary record that included multiple welldocumented
reports detailing the detrimental human rights impacts of the Coercive
Measures, produced by independent international observers such as the UN Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and Qatari organizations like Qatar’s National Human Rights Committee116. On this
115 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures Order, p. 20, para. 54. Indeed, in the context of
individual complaints brought pursuant to Article 14 of the CERD, the Committee has found that a
complaint is admissible so long as the violations alleged may fall within the scope of the Convention. See,
e.g., Stephen Hagan v. Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003),
p. 10, para 6.2(“As to the State party’s arguments that the petition falls outside the scope of the Convention
and/or is insufficiently substantiated, the Committee considers that the petitioner has sufficiently
substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that his individual claim may fall within the scope of
application of the provisions of the Convention. … [T]he Committee deems it more appropriate to
determine the precise scope of the relevant provisions of the Convention at the merits stage of the
petition.”). Indeed, the standard for cases brought under Articles 11 to 13 of the Convention cannot be
higher than the standard established for individual complaints under Article 14, particularly given the far
more minimal requirements set by Articles 11 to 13 that must be met in order for a State Party to bring a
matter to the Committee’s attention.
116 See Annex 11, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the
Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights (December 2017); Annex 1, Amnesty International, Families
ripped apart, freedom of expression under attack amid political dispute in Gulf (9 June 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/families-ripped-apart-fr…-
amid-political-dispute-in-gulf/; Annex 3, Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human
Dignity Trampled and Families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human…-
uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/; Annex 10, Amnesty International, Gulf dispute: Six months
on, individuals still bear brunt of political crisis (14 Dec. 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents
/mde22/7604/2017/en/; Annex 5, Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses (12 July
2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abus…; Annex 6, Human
Rights Watch, Gulf Crisis Shows How Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar Tears
Families Apart (21 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/21/gulf-crisis-shows-howdiscrimination-
saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-and-qatar-tears; Annex 2, National Human Rights Committee,
First Report Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar
(13 June 2017); Annex 4, National Human Rights Committee, Second Report Regarding the Human Rights
Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar (1 July 2017); Annex 7, National Human
Rights Committee, 100 Days Under the Blockade (30 August 2017); Annex 9, National Human Rights
Committee, 6 Months of Violations, What Happens Now? The Fourth General Report on the Violations of
Human Rights Arising from the Blockade of the State of Qatar (5 Dec. 2017); Annex 12, National Human
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40 basis, the ICJ specifically observed that “many Qataris residing in the UAE [on 5 June 2017] appeared to have been forced to leave their place of residence without the possibility of return,” noting that “a number of consequences apparently resulted from this situation and that the impact on those affected seem to persist to this date”117—namely: “UAE-Qatari mixed families have been separated; Qatari students have been deprived of the opportunity to complete their education in the UAE and to continue their studies elsewhere since UAE universities have refused to provide them with their educational records; and Qataris have been denied equal access to tribunals and other judicial organs in the UAE”118. Notwithstanding the ICJ’s indication of provisional measures, the UAE has not rescinded its Coercive Measures, going so far as to summarily reject Qatar’s offer to work collaboratively to monitor the implementation of the Provisional Measures Order119. Still today in its submissions before the Committee, the UAE views itself as never having violated the CERD120, suggesting that any change in its Rights Committee, A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar (June 2018). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/54 (30 August 2018), para. 9 (“The Special Rapporteur…continues to share the concerns expressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in June 2017 that the measures adopted are overly broad in scope and implementation, and agrees that they have the potential to seriously disrupt the lives of thousands…simply because they belong to one of the nationalities involved in the dispute.”); Annex 8, National Human Rights Committee, Report of the NHRC on Violations of the Right to Private Property due to the Siege Imposed on the State of Qatar (30 August 2017); Annex 15, National Human Rights Committee, Gulf Crisis: Continuing human rights violations by the United Arab Emirates (23 Jan. 2019). Qatar’s NHRC is an independent national human rights institution that has received an “A” rating by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (“GANHRI”) consistently since its reorganization in 2010. A GANRHI “A” rating indicates that the institution is in full compliance with the United Nations Paris Principles, which provide the international benchmarks against which national human rights institutions are accredited by GANHRI. See GANRHI, Chart of the Status of National Institutions Accredited by the Global Alliance of national Human Rights Institutions: Accreditation status as of 21 February 2018, p. 3, available at, https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Documents /Status%20Accreditation%20Chart.pdf. 117 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures Order, p. 24, para. 68 (emphasis added). 118 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures Order, p. 24, para. 68. On this basis, the Court ordered the UAE to ensure that (1) separated families are reunited, (2) Qatari students are afforded the opportunity to continue their studies in the UAE or to receive their educational records if they prefer to study elsewhere, and (3) Qataris affected by the Coercive Measures are allowed access to tribunals and other judicial organs of the UAE. Provisional Measures Order, p. 27, para. 79. 119 Annex 13, Letter from Saeed Ali Yousef Alnowais, Agent of the UAE, to Philippe Couvreur, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (12 September 2018). 120 4 December Submission, pp. 2-3, 10-12, paras. 3-4, 18-22; 15 January Submission, paras. 7-13. Annex 18
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policy or practice in actuality has not followed. Indeed, the UAE’s statement on 5 July
2018 “clarifying the legal position of Qatari nationals living in the UAE” did not absolve
it of the ongoing violations based on its initial statement and only confirmed the
continued Coercive Measures. In any case, the UAE’s violations as referred to the
Committee are clearly ongoing, and the effects of those measures are still being deeply
felt by Qataris121.
72. In sum, Qatar has provided more than sufficient evidence in support of the Committee’s
jurisdiction under Article 11. The UAE, by arguing that the Committee does not have
jurisdiction to consider the matter, seeks to create new jurisdictional requirements that
simply do not exist in the text of the CERD. Because Qatar “considers” that the UAE is
“not giving effect to the provisions of the Convention” by continuing to enforce the
Coercive Measures, and the matter “has not been adjusted” to Qatar’s satisfaction, it has
properly referred its Communication to the Committee under Article 11.
IV. QATAR’S COMMUNICATION IS ADMISSIBLE
73. The UAE also argues that Qatar’s Communication is inadmissible because, the UAE
says, (1) Qatar has failed to exhaust local remedies; (2) there are concurrent proceedings
pending before the ICJ; and (3) the Communication constitutes an abuse of rights and
process. None of these arguments is persuasive. Article 11(3)’s exhaustion requirement
does not bar Qatar’s claims (Section IV.A); the existence of concurrent proceedings
before this Committee and the ICJ does not render Qatar’s Communication inadmissible
(Section IV.B); and the Communication is not an abuse of rights and process (Section
IV.C).
121 Qataris continue to report violations of Convention-protected rights to this day—among others, families
remain separated, students continue to be denied access to education and educational records, and Qataris
continue to be denied access to justice in the UAE. See, e.g., DCL-004 and DCL-079 (describing
continued separation from family in the UAE, including one declarant’s inability to attend the funerals of
two family members); DCL-073 (describing delayed graduation date resulting from student’s inability to
continue studies in the UAE); DCL-125 (describing the continued denial of educational records); DCL-
048, DCL-135, DCL-093, and DCL-146 (describing declarants’ inability to communicate with previously
retained lawyers or to retain new counsel).
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42 A. Article 11(3)’s Exhaustion Requirement Does Not Bar Qatar’s Claims 74. The UAE submits that “the Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s … Communication because Qatar has failed to establish that local remedies have been exhausted as required under Article 11.3”122. 75. The UAE is wrong. As explained below, Article 11(3)’s requirement to exhaust local remedies does not apply to Qatar’s claims (Section IV.A.1), but even if it did, the UAE has failed to discharge its burden to prove the existence of any effective and reasonably available remedies that have not been exhausted (Section IV.A.2). 1. Article 11(3)’s Local Remedies Rule Is Inapplicable to Qatar’s Claims “In Conformity with the Generally Recognized Principles of International Law” 76. Article 11(3) provides: “The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged”123. 77. The UAE notes that Article 11(3) “is a reflection of the customary international law principle that States may not exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its [sic] nationals by instituting international proceedings unless local remedies first have been exhausted”.124 But Article 11(3) is more than just a reflection of the requirement to exhaust local remedies. Under its express terms, in assessing the local remedies rule, this Committee must apply “generally recognized principles of international law”125. And 122 4 December Submission, para. 54(a). 123 CERD, Art. 11(3). 124 4 December Submission, para. 57 (emphasis added). 125 CERD, Art. 11(3). It should also be added that the “generally recognized principles of international law” are not static; to the contrary, they evolve. M. C. Bassiouni, “A Functional Approach to ‘General Principles of International Law’”, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (1990), p. 777 (“[I]t would be stifling not to inject into the sources of any legal system the capability of growth and development. Every national legal system includes such a process, either through the jurisprudence of its courts or through doctrine as developed by scholars. Thus, it can be said that legal principles evolve and that a legal Annex 18
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those principles make it clear that the rule does not apply to claims of the kind before this
Committee. The UAE’s objection must therefore be dismissed.
78. The UAE’s measures giving rise to Qatar’s Communication constitute a systematic,
generalized policy and practice that has caused, and continues to cause, widespread
violations of the CERD. Generally recognized principles of international law do not
require the exhaustion of local remedies in cases involving breaches of this nature
(Section IV.A.1.a). Qatar is also making claims in its own right that are interdependent
with the claims brought on behalf of its nationals. Qatar’s claims are also preponderantly
based on direct injury to it, not its nationals. Under general principles of international
law, there is no need to exhaust domestic remedies in cases involving “mixed” claims of
either kind (Section IV.A.1.b).
79. Each of these reasons, which independently warrant the dismissal of the UAE’s
objection, is discussed in turn below.
a. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in Circumstances of
Widespread Harm or Generalized State Policies and Practices
80. The “generally recognized principles of international law” that Article 11(3) expressly
incorporates are unequivocal: the local remedies rule does not apply in cases of
widespread harm or generalized State policies and practices. The reason is obvious:
requiring all Qataris aggrieved by the UAE’s measures to exhaust local remedies
(assuming such remedies existed) would be impracticable, such that it would lead to the
mechanism or process for the recognition and application of this evolutive aspect of law must exist in
international law.”). Needless to say, the “generally recognized principles of international law” relevant to
human rights protection are undoubtedly more progressive today than they were even at the time the CERD
was concluded. Indeed, “[t]he Convention, as the Committee has observed on many occasions, is a living
instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary
society.”. CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXII (2009), para. 5. See also, e.g., CERD
Committee, General Recommendation XXXIII (2009), para. 1(d) (referring to the “evolution in the field of
human rights since [the] adoption” of the CERD); CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV
(2013), para. 4 (referring to this Committee’s work “in implementing the Convention as a living
instrument”.).
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44 application of alleged remedies that would unquestionably be “unreasonably prolonged” and ineffective126. 81. Indeed, in no case, before any court or body in any jurisdiction, has the local remedies rule been applied in circumstances involving widespread and systematic harms like those before this Committee. 82. For example, the ICJ has required local remedies to be exhausted only when the claims involved a discrete number of easily identifiable individuals127. By contrast, the requirement has not been applied—indeed, it is rarely even mentioned by litigant States128—in cases involving, in the words of counsel for the UAE at the hearing on provisional measures before the ICJ, “a high number of persons”129. 83. Thus, in Georgia v. Russian Federation—a case also involving the CERD—Georgia argued that Russia had committed violations of the CERD against the entire “ethnic Georgian, Greek and Jewish populations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia”130. Yet even though Georgia explicitly brought claims “as parens patriae for its citizens”131, Russia 126 See CERD, Art. 11(3) (explicitly stating that the local remedies rule does not apply “where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged”.). 127 See, e.g., Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 29 (finding that “one interest, and one alone, that of Interhandel […] induced the Swiss Government to institute international proceedings”) (emphasis added); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 43, para. 52 (noting that “the matter which colours and pervades the United States claim as a whole, is the alleged damage to Raytheon and Machlett [two US companies]”) (emphasis added); see also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 48. 128 In the current case concerning the CERD between Qatar and the UAE now pending before the Court, the UAE has invoked the local remedies rule. While the Court refused to consider it at the Provisional Measures stage, it has not yet reached a final decision. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 42. 129 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/15, p. 10, para. 12 (Treves). 130 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 16. 131 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 16 (some emphasis added). Annex 18
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45
did not argue that Georgian citizens had failed to exhaust local remedies. Nor did the
Court raise the issue proprio motu132.
84. In the ongoing dispute between Ukraine and Russia—another case involving the
CERD—Ukraine alleges that Russia is “pursuing the cultural erasure” of all “non-
Russian communities [in Crimea] through a systematic and ongoing campaign of
discrimination”133. At the provisional measures stage, neither Russia nor the Court raised
the local remedies rule134.
85. The Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo provides yet
another example. In that case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) accused
Rwanda of “massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights” under several
treaties, including the CERD135. Admissibility and jurisdiction were vigorously contested.
Yet neither the parties nor the Court raised the exhaustion issue136.
132 This is important because the Court has made clear that it has the power to “take up, proprio motu, any
preliminary question, whether of admissibility or of jurisdiction”, that “might constitute a bar to any further
examination of the merits of the Applicant’s case.” See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, para. 33 (emphasis added).
133 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian
Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 33.
134 See generally, e.g., Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order.
135 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2006, para. 1.
136 See generally Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2006. Cases not
involving the CERD but involving other widespread violations of human rights confirm the irrelevance of
the local remedies rule in the circumstances of this case. By way of just one example, in Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged
that Yugoslavia had violated numerous obligations “toward the People and state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina”. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996,
para. 13. Yugoslavia did not argue that all of the “People” of Bosnia and Herzegovina needed first to
exhaust local remedies before the State could raise claims under the Genocide Convention. See generally
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections. Nor did the Court require such showing.
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46 86. Human rights bodies similarly “attach different consequences to systematic breaches, e.g., in terms of the non-applicability of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies”137. They do so notwithstanding the existence in the underlying treaty of provisions requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of admissibility138. 87. Hence, under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), the Court “may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months” from “the date on which the final decision was taken”139. 88. Nevertheless, in Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) noted that: “A practice incompatible with the Convention consists of an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system … The concept of practice is of particular importance for the operation of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies … [I]n principle, the rule does not apply where the applicant State complains of a practice as such, with the aim of preventing its continuation or recurrence, but does not ask the Commission or the Court to give a decision on each of the cases put forward as proof or illustrations of that practice”140. 137 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), p. 113 (“when reacting against breaches of international law, States have often stressed their systematic, gross or egregious nature. Similarly, international complaint procedures, for example in the field of human rights, attach different consequences to systematic breaches, e.g. in terms of the non-applicability of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies”) (emphasis added). 138 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 46 (“Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”) (emphasis added). 139 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 35(1) (emphasis added). This language was previously contained in Article 26 of the Convention. It is now contained in Article 35(1). Although the European Convention’s exhaustion requirement only expressly applies to individual applications, the Court considers the local remedies rule to be generally applicable in the inter-State context. 140 ECtHR, Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Application No. 5130/71, Judgment (18 January 1978), para. 159 (emphasis added). Annex 18
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89. Both the ECtHR and the now defunct European Commission of Human Rights have
applied this exception to the applicability of the local remedies rule on numerous
occasions141, including in a case—analogous to this one—arising from “a coordinated
policy” of “expelling Georgian nationals” from the territory of the respondent State142.
90. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has similarly found the local remedies
rule inapplicable “in cases in which the existence of a generalized practice is alleged”,
reasoning that “[t]he mechanisms established for examining isolated instances of alleged
violations” are ill-suited “for responding effectively to cases where it is claimed that the
alleged violations occur as part of a generalized practice”143.
91. In this case, the UAE’s measures were undertaken as part of a policy ordered and
coordinated at the highest levels of government. The measures complained of represent a
generalized policy and practice that has affected all Qataris and, in accordance with
generally recognized principles of international law, the principle of exhaustion of local
remedies simply does not apply in such cases.
141 See also, e.g., European Commission of Human Rights, Greece v. United Kingdom, Application No.
176/56, Decision on Admissibility (2 June 1956), p. 3 (“the provision of Article 26 concerning the
exhaustion of domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law does not
apply to the present application, the scope of which is to determine the compatibility with the Convention
of legislative measures and administrative practices in Cyprus”) (emphasis added).
142 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 159
(“Having regard to all those factors, the Court concludes that from October 2006 a coordinated policy of
arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals was put in place in the Russian Federation which
amounted to an administrative practice for the purposes of Convention case-law. Accordingly, the objection
raised by the respondent Government on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be
dismissed.”). See also generally id., paras. 111-159.
143 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N°
11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 260. See also id., para. 258 (referring to the rule that, “in the event of
systematic generalized violations”, there is a “presumption iuris tantum that domestic remedies are neither
suitable nor effective and, therefore, the requirement to exhaust them is dispensed with as a mere
formality.”). As also explained by the former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and
current Judge at the ICJ, Prof. Cançado Trindade, “[i]n cases concerning legislative measures and
administrative practices the individual, having shown that such a practice exists, is not under the duty of
exhausting local remedies”. A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Relation to
Legislative Measures and Administrative Practices — The European Experience”, Malaya Law Review,
Vol. 18 (1976), p. 278 (emphasis in original). See further A.A. Cançado Trindade, The Application of the
Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law (1983), p. 181 (“in a case concerning a general
prevailing situation in breach of the Convention, recourse need not be had to local remedies.”).
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48 b. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in View of Qatar’s Claims of Direct Injury to Its Own Interests under the CERD 92. Even assuming arguendo that the local remedies rule did in principle apply to claims of widespread harm caused by generalized practices, it would still not apply in this case. That is because Qatar brings claims of direct injury to its own interests under the CERD that are not subject to the local remedies rule. Moreover, such claims for direct injury are both interdependent with, and preponderant over, Qatar’s claims brought on behalf of its nationals, and under general principles of international law, the local remedies rule does not apply to mixed claims of either kind. 93. According to the UAE, the local remedies rule dictates that “States may not exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its [sic] nationals by instituting international proceedings unless local remedies first have been exhausted”144. The other side of the coin is equally axiomatic: the local remedies rule does not apply where a State “is not acting in the context of protection of one of its nationals”145. 144 4 December Submission, para. 57 (emphasis added). 145 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 330 (holding that since Uganda was “not exercising diplomatic protection on behalf of the victims but vindicating its own rights under the Vienna Convention” under its second counter-claim, the “failure to exhaust local remedies d[id] not pose a barrier”); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, pp. 17-18, para. 40 (“As the Congo is not acting in the context of protection of one of its nationals, Belgium cannot rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion of local remedies.”); United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIV, para. 6.6 (“There is wide support for the view that a distinction is to be drawn between cases of diplomatic protection, on the one hand, and cases of direct injury where the State is protecting its own interests, on the other hand, and that the applicability of the rule of exhaustion is excluded in cases in the second category”); The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award (6 March 1956), UNRIAA, Vol. XII, p. 118 (defining the local remedies rule as a rule applicable in situations in which “an international action is brought for injuries suffered by private individuals”) (emphasis added); International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 44 (“Draft article 14 seeks to codify the rule of customary international law requiring the exhaustion of local remedies as a prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection”) (emphasis added); Theodor Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 35 (1959), p. 94 (“From now onwards, the discussion will be limited to genuine cases of diplomatic protection, to which cases alone the rule of local remedies can be applicable.”) (emphasis added). Annex 18
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94. In the present case, Qatar makes both types of claims146. As a State Party to the CERD,
Qatar has its own interest in ensuring that the UAE upholds its obligations under the
CERD147, regardless of the existence of harm the UAE’s actions inflicted upon
Qataris148. The CERD clearly entitles States Parties to demand compliance with its
146 Qatar does not merely assert claims as parens patriae on behalf of its nationals; it also asserts claims in its
own right. As set out in Qatar’s Communication:
“UAE has violated its obligations under (inter alia) CERD Articles 2, 4, 5, and 6, as well as the
moral principles underlying the CERD and the customary law principle of nondiscrimination on
arbitrary grounds. UAE’s actions contravene the negative and positive aspects of its obligations
under the Convention. Not only has it failed to enact measures to prevent, prohibit, and
criminalize racial discrimination, but—extraordinarily for a signatory State—UAE has actively
promoted and engaged in racial discrimination and criminalized actions intended to benefit
Qataris.”
Qatar’s Communication Submitted Pursuant to Article 11 of the International Covenant on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (8 March 2018), para. 57 (emphasis added); see also id., para. 74
(“By enacting and enforcing the Coercive Measures, UAE has violated a number of the human rights
protections recognized under international law and enumerated in Article 5 of the CERD; and has
interfered with the rights of Qatari nationals.”) (emphasis added).
147 See, e.g., Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A/B,
No. 74, 1983, p. 28 (“This act being attributable to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right of
another State, international responsibility would be established immediately as between the two States.”);
Case of the Swiss Confederation v. the German Federal Republic (No. I), Award (3 July 1958), UNRIAA,
Vol. XXIX, pp. 421-422 (“The Applicant has not made a claim for damages against the Federal Republic.
The Applicant makes no claim whatsoever, but merely requests a decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on the
interpretation and application of Annex VII in conjunction with Annex II to the Debt Agreement in a
particular dispute. In the present case, therefore, the lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be
alleged by invoking the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies in the form more precisely defined
above”); Theodor Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, British Year Book of
International Law, Vol. 35 (1959), p. 86 (“if the diplomatic negotiations between the two States prove
unsuccessful, and State B applies to the International Court of Justice complaining of a breach of certain
treaty obligations by State A (as shown by its conduct towards the injured alien) and asking principally for
a declaratory judgment based on the interpretation of the treaty, this would appear to be a case of direct
injury to which the rule of local remedies would not be applicable.”) (emphasis added); id., p. 87 (stating
that “[c]ertain categories of acts have been considered to amount to direct injuries, such as…. violations of
treaties”) (emphasis added); id., pp. 88-89 (“In such cases, an award of pecuniary compensation for its
nationals who were incidentally injured by the impugned act is a secondary object; the primary object is to
obtain from an international tribunal some declaration of the responsibility of the respondent State in
international law, …, or some other remedy such as a binding interpretation of a treaty….”) (emphasis
added).
148 See, e.g., United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United
States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIV, para.
6.12 (finding the local remedies rule inapplicable in circumstances in which the tribunal came “to the view
that the State’s obligation to use its best efforts to ensure that user charges are just and reasonable to those
airlines is independent of actual prejudice to them”) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added);
Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of America and
France, Decision (9 December 1978), UNRIAA, Vol. XVIII, para. 31 (finding the local remedies rule
inapplicable in circumstances in which it was “obvious that the object and purpose of an air services
agreement such as the present one is the conduct of air transport services, the corresponding obligations of
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50 obligations irrespective of the existence of distinct injuries suffered by individuals as a result of a breach of those obligations149. By way of example:  Under Article 2(1), States Parties “undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races”150.  Under the same article, States Parties commit “to discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial division”151.  Under Article 4, States Parties agree to “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof”152.  Under the same article, States Parties similarly agree to “declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination”.153 This Committee has made clear that “it is not enough to declare the forms of conduct in [A]rticle 4 as offences; the provisions of the article must also be effectively implemented”154.  Under Article 5, “States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms”.155 As this Committee has noted, “[w]henever a State imposes a restriction upon one of the rights listed in article 5 of the Convention which applies ostensibly to all within its jurisdiction, it must ensure the Parties being the admission of such conduct rather than an obligation requiring a ‘result’ to be achieved”) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). 149 As noted by one representative during negotiations of the CERD, “[e]veryone agreed that domestic remedies should be exhausted before a case was taken to the international level, but it should be borne in mind that one State might bring a complaint against another, not with respect to the treatment of individuals or groups of individuals, but concerning failure to comply with certain provisions of the Convention”. UN General Assembly, Third Committee, 1353rd Meeting (24 November 1965), para. 54 (emphasis added). 150 CERD, Art. 2(1). 151 CERD, Art. 2(1). 152 CERD, Art. 4. 153 CERD, Art. 4. 154 CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 17. See also, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XV (1993), para. 2 (“To satisfy these obligations, States parties have not only to enact appropriate legislation but also to ensure that it is effectively enforced.”). 155 CERD, Art. 5. See also CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX (2004), Preamble (stating that Article 5 “requires States parties to prohibit and eliminate discrimination based on race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin in the enjoyment by all persons of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms”.). Annex 18
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that neither in purpose nor effect is the restriction incompatible with article 1 of
the Convention as an integral part of international human rights standards”156.
95. That Qatar has claims in its own right is not only reflected in these and other provisions,
which can plainly be breached and result in harm distinct from any harm suffered by
individuals as a result157. It is also reflected in Qatar’s interest in preventing future
harm—a core objective of the CERD158. The local remedies rule only applies to claims
brought to protect individuals who have already been injured159. By contrast, it does not
apply to disputes that are not “confined to the past”, and relate to one State party’s
156 CERD Committee, General Recommendation XX (1996), para. 2.
157 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 10 (stating that Article 4 “has
an expressive function in underlining the international community’s abhorrence of racist hate speech”)
(emphasis added).
158 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 10 (“Article 4 comprises
elements relating to speech and the organizational context for the production of speech, serves the functions
of prevention and deterrence, and provides for sanctions when deterrence fails.”) (emphasis added); CERD
Committee, General Recommendation VII (1985), Preamble (“Bearing in mind the preventive aspects of
article 4 to deter racism and racial discrimination as well as activities aimed at their promotion or
incitement”) (some emphasis added). The preventative focus of the CERD is reflected, inter alia, in its
reporting and training requirements. See, e.g., CERD Convention, Arts. 7, 9; CERD Committee, General
Recommendation XI (1993), para. 2 (“The Committee therefore affirms that States parties are under an
obligation to report fully upon legislation on foreigners and its implementation.”); General
Recommendation XIII (1993), para. 2 (“Law enforcement officials should receive intensive training to
ensure that in the performance of their duties they respect as well as protect human dignity and maintain
and uphold the human rights of all persons without distinction as to race, colour or national or
ethnic origin.”).
159 See, e.g., The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award
(6 March 1956), UNRIAA, Vol. XII, p. 118 (the local remedies rule “means that the State against which an
international action is brought for injuries suffered by private individuals has the right to resist such an
action if the persons alleged to have been injured have not first exhausted all the remedies available to them
under the municipal law of that State”.) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Interhandel (Switzerland v.
United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 27 (“the rule has been
generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its national whose rights are claimed
to have been disregarded in another State in violation of international law.”) (emphasis added); Elettronica
Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 43, para. 52 (applying the local
remedies rule in circumstances in which “alleged damage to Raytheon and Machlett” was said to “have
resulted from the actions of the Respondent”) (emphasis added); International Law Commission, Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 1 (“diplomatic protection consists of the
invocation by a State…of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally
wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State”) (emphasis
added); International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), p. 45 (stating that paragraph 14(3) of the Draft Articles “provides that the exhaustion of local
remedies rule applies only to cases in which the Claimant State has been injured ‘indirectly’”) (emphasis
added).
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52 interest in “obtain[ing] a solution which will also relate to the interpretation and application of [the Treaty] in the future”160. 96. In the present case, of course, the harm is present and ongoing. Critically, in situations where “violations of the rights of [individuals] may entail a violation of the rights of [their national] State”, and where “violations of the rights [of the national State] may entail a violation of the individual”, the ICJ has found an “interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights” which precludes the applicability of the local remedies rule161. 97. Such interdependence exists here: By violating the rights of Qatar, the UAE has harmed individual Qataris. Conversely, by harming individual Qataris, the UAE has necessarily harmed Qatar162. 160 United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIV, para. 6.11 (emphasis added). See also id., para. 6.19 (emphasizing that in line with the “general principles of international law underlying the local remedies rule”, the rule did not apply to such disputes). 161 Indeed, in Avena and other Mexican Nationals, Mexico sought to protect its nationals on death row in the United States. It argued that it had “itself suffered, directly and through its nationals”, injury as a result of the United States’ failure to grant consular access to its nationals under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”). Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 36, para. 40. The United States objected to the admissibility of Mexico’s claims, arguing that Mexico had not exhausted local remedies before bringing its case. Id., para. 38. The Court rejected the United States’ argument, holding that “violations of the rights of the individual … may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State, and that violations of the rights of the latter may entail a violation of the rights of the individual. In these special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights, Mexico may, in submitting a claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the violation of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican nationals .... The duty to exhaust local remedies does not apply to such a request.” Id., para. 40 (emphasis added). 162 At the hearing on Qatar’s request for provisional measures before the ICJ, the UAE argued that the Court’s holding in Avena was limited to the specific context of Article 36 of the VCCR, which according to the UAE sets forth “a sui generis régime that was described by [the] Court in the LaGrand case as ‘an interrelated régime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection’”. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/15, pp. 17-18, para. 11 (Treves) (citing LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 492, para. 74). This strained attempt to distinguish Avena falls flat. Nowhere in its judgment did the Court limit the “special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights” to the narrow framework of Article 36 VCCR. If it wanted to limit the applicability of the rule to the VCCR, the Annex 18
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98. But even if it could be said that Qatar’s claims in its own right are not interdependent
with Qatar’s claims as parens patriae on behalf of its nationals (quod non), the local
remedies rule would still not bar the admissibility of Qatar’s Communication. Local
remedies need not be exhausted where a claim is based “preponderantly on an injury to
the State and not to a national”163. The injury inflicted by the UAE’s measures to Qatar’s
own interests preponderates here for at least three reasons.
99. First, as explained above, Qatar is entitled to protect its own interests whether or not it
also brings claims on behalf of its nationals164. As noted by the ICJ a few years after the
adoption and entry into force of the CERD, the protection from racial discrimination
forms part and parcel of the “principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person”, which in turn give rise to obligations that transcend the ambit of the
CERD and in respect of which “all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection”165. The prohibition of racial discrimination has since been recognized as a
peremptory norm of international law, the breach of which cannot be justified under any
Court would have said so. It did not, and wisely so—circumstances of interdependence are by no means
unique to the framework of Article 36 VCCR.
163 See Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (2008), p. 181. See also, e.g., International Law
Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 14(3) (“Local
remedies shall be exhausted where an international claim … is brought preponderantly on the basis of an
injury to a national”); United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User
Charges (United States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA,
Vol. XXIV, para. 6.18 (“Although examination of the nature of USG’s claims and of the airlines’ potential
claims reveals that they overlap to a certain extent, at the same time they present significant differences;
and taking the case as a whole and undivided into its constituent parts, the Tribunal is of the opinion that
the predominant element is the direct interest of the US itself.”); Case Concerning the Air Service
Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of America and France, Decision (9 December
1978), paras. 11, 29-30 (finding that, even though a private air carrier had allegedly been injured by a
breach of rights under the Air Service Agreement, it was not required to exhaust local remedies before its
State of nationality could bring an international claim).
164 See supra paras. 92–95
165 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962),
Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32, paras. 33-35 (adding that “[o]bligations the performance
of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are not of the same category”) (emphasis added above). See
also Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2012, paras. 68-69.
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54 circumstances, including the circumstances precluding wrongfulness accepted in general international law166. 100. Second, the UAE itself asserts that its “targeted measures are aimed at the Qatari government and not the Qatari people”167, and that “Qatar deliberately misrepresents the UAE’s measures against the Qatari government as measures taken against the people of Qatar”168. The UAE cannot therefore argue that the measures it claims were neither “aimed at” nor “taken against” the people of Qatar nonetheless give rise to claims “brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury” to those very same people suffered as a result of the UAE’s violations of the CERD169. 101. Finally, Qatar’s claims in its own right include claims for violations of the rights of individuals of Qatari origin who are not presently Qatari nationals. These claims relate to individuals who presently do not hold Qatari nationality but have suffered injury because of their Qatari heritage, descent, or past Qatari nationality.170 Because a State may not exercise the right of diplomatic protection in respect of persons who are not its nationals,171 and no special circumstance justifying derogation from this rule applies in the present context,172 Qatar does not assert these claims as parens patriae of its nationals. Qatar instead asserts such claims in its own right, which reinforces the preponderant nature of Qatar’s direct injury. 102. For all of these reasons, Qatar’s Communication plainly passes what the ILC refers to as the “but for” test: “whether the claim comprising elements of both direct and indirect injury would have been brought were it not for the claim on behalf of the injured 166 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), Art. 26, p. 85, paras. 5-6. 167 7 August Submission, para. 7. 168 7 August Submission, para. 11. 169 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 14(3). 170 See supra Section II.B. 171 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 3, p. 29. 172 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 8, p. 35. Annex 18
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national”.173 The answer here is clearly “yes”. Qatar was directly targeted and has
suffered and continues to suffer violations of interests of its own; such interests transcend
the field of diplomatic protection and indeed fall under the purview of a higher normative
order; and Qatar brings claims on behalf of non-nationals. In such circumstances, it is
impossible to construe Qatar’s Communication as having been brought “preponderantly
on the basis of an injury to a national”.174 Accordingly, the local remedies rule does not
apply.
103. In sum, under the “general principles of international law” to which Article 11(3) refers,
the local remedies rule does not apply to claims of the kind presently before this
Committee. This is not just because the UAE’s measures constitute a systematic,
generalized policy and practice giving rise to widespread violations of the CERD. It is
also because Qatar’s direct claims are interdependent with those brought on behalf of its
nationals and because, even if they were not, they are preponderantly based on direct
injury to Qatar. The UAE’s objection must therefore be dismissed.
2. The UAE Has Failed to Prove the Existence of Any Effective and
Reasonably Available Remedies that Have Not Been Exhausted
104. Qatar explained above why Article 11(3)’s local remedies rule does not apply to its
claims under “generally recognized principles of international law”175. But even if the
rule did apply, it still would not bar Qatar’s claims. The UAE has failed to prove the
existence of any effective and reasonably available remedies that have not been
exhausted.
105. The ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection state: “Local remedies do not need to
be exhausted where” there are “no reasonably available local remedies to provide
effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such
173 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p.
46.
174 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art.
14(3).
175 CERD, Art. 11(3).
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56 redress.”176 The ICJ has made clear that “[i]t is for the respondent” to prove “that there were effective remedies in its domestic legal system that were not exhausted”177. This Committee’s own Rules of Procedure confirm the point: the respondent is “required to give details of the effective remedies available to the alleged victim in the particular circumstances of the case”178. Notwithstanding the UAE’s suggestion to the contrary,179 it is thus the UAE—not Qatar—that bears the burden of proving that local remedies exist, and also that those remedies are both reasonably available and effective. 106. As a substantive matter, the local remedies rule is “riddled with many far-reaching exceptions”180. Article 11(3) expressly acknowledges one such exception in circumstances in which the application of local remedies is “unreasonably prolonged”181. Under general principles of international law, local remedies also need not be exhausted where, for example, “the local courts do not have the competence to grant an appropriate and adequate remedy to the alien”182, or where “the respondent State does not have an 176 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a) (emphasis added). As such, even if “doubts about the effectiveness” of proceedings “cannot absolve a petitioner from pursuing them”, such remedies must offer a “reasonable possibility” of success. CERD Committee, Sarwar Seliman Mostafa v. Denmark, Communication No. 19/2000, Decision (10 August 2001), UN Doc. CERD/C/59/D/19/2000, para. 7.4. 177 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 44 (emphasis added). 178 CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 92(7) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Diop v. France, Communication No. 2/1989, Opinion (10 May 1991), UN Doc. CERD/C/39/D/2/1989, para. 5.2. Qatar notes that Article 92(7) of the Rules of Procedure concerns the filing of individual complaints under Article 14, rather than inter-State complaints under Article 11, but sees no reason why the burden of proof would be allocated any differently for inter-State procedures. Indeed, the UAE itself submits that “the Committee’s jurisprudence on exhaustion of local remedies under Article 14 is also relevant for the present purposes given the similarity of the provisions on the obligation to exhaust local remedies of Article 11.3 and 14.7(a) of the CERD”. 15 January Submission, para. 49. 179 15 January Submission, para. 50 (“It falls to Qatar to show either that these available remedies were in fact exhausted, or either such remedies would not have been effective in the particular circumstances of the case or that their application would be ‘unduly prolonged.’”); id., para. 54 (“Qatar has put forward no evidence that these constitutionally protected remedies are in fact either unavailable to Qataris or ineffective.”). 180 Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law (2013), p. 564. 181 CERD, Art. 11(3). 182 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 47. See also, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 47 (“the DRC has also failed to show that Annex 18
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adequate system of judicial protection”183. Relatedly, it is “fundamental to the
effectiveness of a remedy that its independence from the authority being complained
against is observed”184.
107. Moreover, the remedies encompassed by the rule include only “legal remedies”185.
“[R]emedies of a judicial character, whether or not discharged by courts, are
encompassed by the rule, whereas remedies based on the discretionary action of public
organs are not.”186
108. As a practical matter, the exercise of legal remedies “must not be unjustifiably hindered
by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State”187. Practical obstacles
can include, for example, “the closure of transport links between the two countries”;188
means of redress against expulsion decisions are available under its domestic law”); The Ambatielos Claim
(Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award (6 March 1956), UNRIAA, Vol.
XII, p. 119; CERD Committee, Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma et al. v. Germany, Communication
No. 38/2006, Opinion (3 March 2008), UN Doc. CERD/C/72/D/38/2006, para. 7.3; CERD Committee, L.R.
et al. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, Opinion (10 March 2005), UN Doc.
CERD/C/66/D/31/2003, para. 9.2; CERD Committee, D.R. v. Australia, Communication No. 42/2008,
Opinion (15 September 2009), UN Doc. CERD/C/75/D/42/2008, paras. 6.4-6.5.
183 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 47.
184 CERD Committee, L.R. et al. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, Opinion (10 March 2005),
UN Doc. CERD/C/66/D/31/2003, para. 9.2 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Robert E. Brown (United
States) v. Great Britain, Award (23 November 1923), UNRIAA, Vol. VI, p. 129.
185 See, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), Art. 14(2) (“‘Local remedies’ means legal remedies”) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., James R.
Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (2007), para. 12 (“The rule is limited to legal remedies.”).
186 James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law (2007), para. 12 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports
2007, para. 47; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with
commentaries (2006), p. 45 (“The injured alien is, however, only required to exhaust such remedies which
may result in a binding decision. He is not required to approach the executive for relief in the exercise of its
discretionary powers.”) (emphasis added); CERD Committee, Habassi v. Denmark, Communication No.
10/1997, Opinion (6 April 1999), UN Doc. CERD/C/54/D/10/1997, para. 6.2.
187 ECtHR, Case of İlhan v. Turkey, Application No. 22277/93, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (27
June 2000), para. 97. See also, e.g., Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (29 July 1988),
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 4, para. 68.
188 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para.
156.
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58 difficulties in contacting the relevant authorities of the respondent State;189 and a “widespread climate of discrimination”190. 109. Credible fear of reprisal can also excuse the need to pursue a remedy191. Similarly, if an individual’s “indigency or a general fear in the legal community to represent him prevents” him from “invoking the domestic remedies necessary to protect a right”, he is “not required to exhaust such remedies”192. 110. In short, the existence of “available and sufficient” remedies “must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness”193. As such, “the State that alleges non-exhaustion must indicate which domestic remedies should be exhausted and provide evidence of their 189 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 156. 190 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 256. 191 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 594/1992, Views (3 December 1998), UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/594/1992, para. 6.4 (“In these circumstances, given the author’s statement that he had not filed a complaint because of his fears of the warders, the Committee considered that it was not precluded by [the Optional Protocol’s local remedies rule] from examining the complaint.”) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 154 (“the climate of precipitation and intimidation in which these measures were taken also explains the reluctance of the Georgian nationals to use those remedies.”); CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXI, para. 1(b); Human Rights Committee, Avadanov v. Azerbaijan, Communication No. 1633/2007, Views (2 November 2010), UN Doc. CCPR/C/100/D/1633/2007, para. 6.4. 192 Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 (10 August 1990), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A, No. 11, para. 42. See also, e.g., Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (29 July 1988), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 4, para. 80. 193 ECtHR, Case of Vernillo v. France, Application No. 11889/85, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (20 February 1991), para. 27. It again “falls to the respondent State to establish that these various conditions are satisfied”. Id. See also, e.g., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 (10 August 1990), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A, No. 11, para. 17; ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), paras. 150-151; James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 19; Human Rights Committee, Warsame v. Canada, Communication No. 1959/2010, Views (1 September 2011), UN Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010, para. 7.4. Annex 18
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effectiveness”194, including in the form of “examples of the alleged remedy having been
successfully utilized by persons in similar positions”195.
111. The UAE insists in these proceedings that “numerous” effective domestic remedies are
“available within the UAE to any Qatari nationals who claim to be victims of violations
of any of the rights set forth in the CERD”196. It points to only three of these supposedly
“numerous” remedies: (1) “administrative remedies such as hotlines and other application
procedures”;197 (2) “[c]ourt remedies”;198 and (3) “complaint procedures specific to
various governmental authorities”199.
112. Here again, the UAE is wrong. As explained below, the UAE has not proved that any of
these so-called “remedies” are “effective” and “reasonably available”200. They therefore
need not be exhausted “in conformity with the generally recognized principles of
international law”201.
194 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N°
11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 243. See also, e.g., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v.
Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (1 February 2000), Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Series C, No. 66, para. 53.
195 See C Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in
International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law
(2013), p. 568 (“the European Court of Human Rights has specified that the State must not only satisfy the
Court that the remedy was effective, available both in theory and practice at the relevant time, but also
frequently asks the State to provide examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by
persons in similar positions to that of the applicant.”). See also, e.g., ECtHR, Case of Kangasluoma v.
Finland, Application No. 48339/99, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (20 January 2004), para. 48
(“Nor did the Government supply any example from domestic practice showing that, by using the means in
question, it was possible for the applicant to obtain such relief. This is in itself sufficient to demonstrate that
the remedies referred to do not meet the standard of ‘effectiveness’ for the purposes of Article 13 because,
as the Court has already said … the required remedy must be effective both in law and in practice.”)
(emphasis added); ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3
July 2014), para. 157.
196 4 December Submission, para. 65.
197 4 December Submission, para. 64. See also 7 August Submission, para. 85.
198 4 December Submission, para. 67. See also 7 August Submission, para. 85.
199 4 December Submission, para. 67.
200 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006),
Art. 15(a).
201 CERD, Art. 11(3).
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60 a. The Hotline is Discretionary and Ineffective 113. The UAE submits that a so-called “hotline” through which “Qatari nationals who seek entry to the UAE are able to apply for entry”202 constitutes a remedy that must be exhausted under Article 11(3) of the CERD. The UAE made a similar argument before the ICJ and lost. The Court concluded in its 23 July 2018 Order on Provisional Measures that the UAE had not indicated “any effective local remedies that were available to the Qataris that have not been exhausted”203. 114. There are at least four independently sufficient reasons to reject this claim as the ICJ previously did. 115. First, the hotline is not a legal remedy. Indeed, the UAE has itself expressly stated that permission through the hotline may be granted “at the discretion of the UAE government”204. An injured alien is, however, “not required to approach the executive for relief in the exercise of its discretionary powers”205. 116. Second, while the UAE disparagingly dismisses so-called “anecdotal accounts” of “individuals’ mistrust or paranoia” with respect to the hotline206, the facts demonstrate that the hotline is a “police security channel”207 run in a police State208. The security 202 7 August Submission, para. 85. 203 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 42 (emphasis added). 204 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, An official Statement by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), available at https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem… (last accessed: 8 February 2019) (emphasis added). 205 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 45. 206 4 December Submission, para. 64. 207 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE Annex 4). 208 See, e.g., Christopher M. Davidson, Foreign Policy, “The Making of a Police State” (14 April 2011), available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/14/the-making-of-a-police-state-2/ (last accessed: 8 February 2019); OHCHR, Press briefing note on United Arab Emirates (4 Jan. 2019) (“Mansoor was initially convicted in May 2018 on charges of using social media to ‘publish false information that harm national unity and damage the country’s reputation’. This was in relation to tweets he posted that were critical of the Government. As the Court of State Security is UAE’s highest court, he has no further appeal rights under the UAE’s judicial system.”). Annex 18
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channel’s “service objectives” include “[c]ombating and preventing crimes” and
“[c]onsolidating the concept of ‘Security Is Everybody’s Responsibility.’”209 According
to the Abu Dhabi Police, “[a]ttention” is paid to “issues that are disturbing and recurrent
in the society and have a high impact on security”210. Indeed, the service provided
gathers information helpful “in knowing the behaviours and conducts that indicate the
commission of the crime”211.
117. In circumstances in which the UAE ordered the expulsion of every Qatari from its
territory and then criminalized expressions of sympathy towards Qatar, it is as absurd as
it is offensive for the UAE to discredit the legitimate fears of Qataris to expose
themselves and their loved ones to a “police security channel” of this kind212.
118. Third, the hotline is ineffective. In its 15 January submission, the UAE alleged “that from
9 July 2018 through 31 December 2018, 3,563 applications by Qatari nationals were
lodged with the UAE authorities for entry permits to the UAE, 3,353 of which were
accepted”213. Even more incredibly, in its 4 December submission, the UAE submitted
that “the vast majority of applications for permission to travel are approved”, and that
209 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE
Annex 4).
210 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE
Annex 4).
211 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE
Annex 4).
212 See, e.g., DCL-048, para. 24 (“I once called the hotline and was asked to provide many personal details and
documents. That just increased my fear.”). See also, e.g., Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute:
Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017) (“Some
affected families have told Amnesty International that they are too scared to call hot lines and register their
presence, or their family’s presence, in a ‘rival’ country for fear of reprisal.”); for relevant jurisprudence,
see, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 594/1992,
Views (3 December 1998), UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/594/1992, para. 6.4 (“given the author’s statement that
he had not filed a complaint because of his fears of the warders, the Committee considered that it was not
precluded by article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol from examining the complaint.”); ECtHR,
Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 154 (“the
climate of precipitation and intimidation in which these measures were taken also explains the reluctance of
the Georgian nationals to use those remedies.”).
213 15 January Submission, para. 8.
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62 “[i]n the first six months of 2018 alone, the hotline received 1,390 applications”, of which “only 12 applications were rejected for security or other reasons”214. 119. The UAE’s argument, however, flies in the face of evidence of Qataris citing repeated instances of rejections for arbitrary reasons or having received no responses from the hotline at all215. Setting aside the obvious deficiencies in the evidence produced to prove its claims216—which would suggest that the UAE began rejecting far more applications after the ICJ issued its legally binding order on provisional measures than it did before217—the numbers actually incorporate extremely large numbers of applications to exit the country218. Indeed, the reality is that applicants wanting to enter the UAE are 214 7 August Submission, para. 25. 215 See, e.g., DCL-079, paras. 20-27 (describing multiple calls to the hotline, many of which went unanswered); DCL-125, para. 7 (“I have applied for admission to the UAE on eight occasions…My applications were not approved five times, and they were approved three times. I was often given no explanation when my application was not approved”); DCL-004, para. 20 (describing the declarant’s son’s experience of being rejected and accepted); Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights (14 June 2017) (noting that measures implemented to address dual nationality families “are not sufficiently effective to address all cases”); Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses (12 July 2017) (“of the 12 Gulf nationals who said they tried to contact these hotlines, only two managed to get permission to go back and forth.”). See also, e.g., Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017). 216 For example, the contents of UAE’s Annex 4 appear to have been selectively curated from a larger document—not on the record—for use in these proceedings. See generally Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 2 (UAE Annex 4) (indicating that the original document sent by the Abu Dhabi police contained underlying documentary evidence for a much larger set of applications, including a number of rejected applications). Similarly, UAE Annex 1.2 contains no corroboration, and was clearly produced by the UAE executive solely for the purposes of litigation in these proceedings. See generally Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018 (UAE Annex 1.2). 217 The ICJ issued its order on provisional measures on 23 July 2018. If the UAE is to be believed, it nonetheless rejected seventeen times more applications from 9 July 2018 through 31 December 2018 than it did during the first six months of 2018 combined. See 15 January Submission, para. 8; 7 August Submission, para. 25. 218 While the quality of UAE Exhibit 1.2 is so poor that Qatar has been unable to convert it back to Excel for purposes of precisely tallying the numbers, it appears that a very large number, if not the majority, of the records reflect requests to exit, not enter, and that the UAE’s claim that “3,563 applications by Qatari nationals were lodged with the UAE authorities for entry permits to the UAE, 3,353 of which were accepted” is thus incorrect. 15 January Submission, para. 8 (emphasis added). See generally Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018 (UAE Annex 1.2). UAE’s Annex 4, for its part, incorporates applications of Qataris and Emiratis to both enter and exit the country. See, e.g., Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pp. 2, 19, 22 (UAE Annex 4). In fact, the exhibit itself suggests that the majority of the applications accepted were actually submitted by Emiratis wanting to visit Qatar. Cf. id., p. 2 (“The number of UAE Nationals’ requests to visit Qatar is (828 requests) since the beginning of 2018 AD.”). Annex 18
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very frequently unable to reach anyone through the UAE’s hotline despite calling
repeatedly219. When they have actually managed to apply, their applications have often
not been approved without any explanation220. Indeed, applications have sometimes not
been approved even though applications submitted with the exact same documents had
previously been accepted on different occasions221, a fact that highlights the arbitrary and
nontransparent nature of the mechanism and contradicts the UAE’s claim that Qataris are
permitted to enter if they “do not pose a security risk and otherwise meet” unspecified
“neutral immigration criteria”222.
219 See, e.g., DCL-079, paras. 20-27 (“I…called over and over again until someone answered … Between []
and [], I called the hotline at least 50 times a day. Only around six of these calls were answered… I called
the hotline another 70 times between []; they only answered six times. During my last discussion with
them, they asked me to stop calling because I was calling too frequently and told me that someone would
call me back. No one ever did. At that point, I stopped calling. We never heard back from the hotline again,
and we all missed [] funeral.”). See also, e.g., Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity
trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017) (“Several people said
they had tried in vain for hours or days to get through to the hot lines. Those who got through said officials
asked them for minimal details about their cases and told them they would receive a call back, but there had
been no follow-up.”); DCL-135, para. 25 (“During the call, I was asked about the purpose of my visit and
whether I have first degree relatives in the UAE. When I explained the purpose of my visit, the hotline
representative simply said that they would look into it and get back to me. The representative gave me no
further information. Despite the promise, they never did. After I had not heard from the hotline
representatives for over a month, I tried again in October 2018. Again, the representative promised to call
me back and did not. After this call, I gave up on the hotline.”); DCL-079, paras. 23-24 (“Whenever I
called, either a hotline operator answered, or the phone was off, or it was busy. When they did not answer,
the line cut off and I would then send a text message by WhatsApp.”).
220 See, e.g., DCL-125, para. 7 (“My applications were not approved five times, and they were approved three
times. I was often given no explanation when my application was not approved, but was instead told to
apply again without any indication as to what I had done incorrectly or what I should do differently the next
time. On at least one occasion, an application was not approved even though an application submitted with
the exact same documents had previously been accepted on a different occasion. My last four applications
have all been rejected. Every time I have been rejected I have had to contact the UAE authorities to find
out; no one has ever told me that I was rejected until I called.”). As such, even if the hotline were a remedy
encompassed by Article 11(3)—and it clearly is not—it would be a remedy that has already been
exhausted.
221 See, e.g., DCL-125, para. 7 (“On at least one occasion, an application was not approved even though an
application submitted with the exact same documents had previously been accepted on a different
occasion.”).
222 7 August Submission, para. 3. Qatar notes, moreover, that even many of those who have received approval
to travel have nonetheless been refused entry onto planes run by Emirati airlines. See, e.g., DCL-004, para.
19 (“[E]ven though he had a permit, [my son] was refused entry onto the plane traveling to []…The Etihad
Airways staff stopped him at the gate, saying that they would not allow any Qataris on-board, as they were
an Emirati company.”); DCL-125, para. 12 (“my ticket was booked through the Emirates airline, and
Emirates refused to allow me to board”).
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64 120. The UAE nonetheless asserted in its 4 December Submission that the “efficient working of the hotline is evidenced by the extensive travel logs of movements” since 5 June 2017, which allegedly “show 8,442 movements by Qatari citizens across UAE borders, all of which were facilitated by the work of the hotline”223. In its 15 January submission, it similarly claimed that “[u]pdated evidence” indicates that “registered entries and exits of Qatari nationals into and out of the UAE from 1 June 2018 through 31 December 2018 amounted to 2,876”224. 121. It will not escape this Committee that the large majority of these “movements” and “entries and exits” unsurprisingly record Qataris exiting the country225. Nor will it escape this Committee that the UAE has provided no comparative set of data on the movements of Qataris during the period before the crisis. The reason is obvious: cell phone records indicate that there has been a precipitous drop in the presence of Qataris in the UAE since 5 June 2017. One carrier reports a 96% drop in roaming in the UAE by Qatari customers226. 122. The UAE’s additional argument that “substantially” the “same number of Qataris live in the UAE as prior to the start of the crisis”227, and that “the vast majority of Qatari 223 7 August Submission, para. 26. Qatar notes that in its Supplemental Response of 4 December 2018, the UAE referred for the first time to “administrative remedies such as hotlines and other application procedures”. 4 December Submission, para. 64 (emphasis added). The UAE has given no indication of what those other “application procedures” might be, or what role they are alleged to play in light of its previous assertion that “all” travel by Qataris into and out of the country was “facilitated by the work of the hotline”. 7 August Submission, para. 26. 224 15 January Submission, para. 8. 225 See generally Excel Redacted Entrance and Exit for Qatari Nationalities (UAE Annex 1.1) (recording over 750 more exits than entries); Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (UAE Annex 5) (again recording hundreds more exits than entries). Qatar also notes that the UAE’s data does not record the dates of each movement for the year following 5 June 2017. See generally Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (UAE Annex 5). This is almost certainly because including the dates would have revealed a mass exodus of Qataris from the UAE in the immediate aftermath of the 5 June 2017 expulsion. 226 See Annex 16, Ooredoo Comparison – Before and After, p. 1 (providing comparative data on the roaming of Qatari SIM card holders “roaming” in the UAE). See also generally id.; Annex 14, Letter on Usage from the CEO of Vodafone Qatar (30 December 2018) (providing, in a letter from the CEO of Vodafone Qatar, detailed information on the calls, messages, and internet used by users of Vodafone Qatar while roaming in the UAE from January 2016 to December 2018, and showing a large and permanent drop in usage in June 2017) (certified translation). 227 7 August Submission, para. 94. See also Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (UAE Annex 5). Annex 18
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residents in the UAE on 5 June 2017 chose to continue their residence in the UAE”228,
completely fails to prove its facially implausible claim of the hotline’s supposed
effectiveness.
123. The UAE attempts to support this claim by citing immigration records, which it claims
show that “[a]s of mid-June 2018, there were 2,194 Qatari nationals in the UAE, largely
the same as the number of Qataris residing in the UAE on 5 June 2017”229. The first
problem with these assertions is that the documents the UAE cites simply do not
substantiate them. Even if the documents showed the presence of 2,194 Qataris “in the
UAE” as of mid-June 2018—and it is not at all clear that they do230—they provide no
comparative set of data on the number of Qataris in the UAE “on 5 June 2017”231. As
such, the UAE has once again failed to provide comparative data obviously within its
possession. Its failure to do so is telling.
124. But even if it were true that the number of Qataris now “in” the UAE were the same as
the number of Qataris previously “residing in” the UAE, that fact would suggest a
dramatic reduction in the overall number of Qataris in the country. After all, the number
of Qataris “in” the country would include both residents and non-residents, whereas the
number of Qataris “residing in” the country would not232.
228 7 August Submission, para. 19.
229 7 August Submission, para. 19. See also 15 January Submission, para. 10 (“As of June 2018, the number of
Qataris in the UAE amounted to 2,194.”).
230 UAE Annex 1 lists only dates of entry into the country. See generally Immigration – Qataris in the UAE
(UAE Annex 1). UAE Annex 2, which appears to be a cover page to UAE Annex 1, then states that UAE
Annex 1 shows “the number of Qatari nationals who have been in the country”, raising the question of
whether any of those Qataris have since left the country. See Immigration - ID & Citizenship Authority
Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Stats, p. 2 (UAE Annex 2) (emphasis added).
231 However, in the exhibit the UAE cites to support this claim, it did include—perhaps inadvertently—data
not only on the year following 5 June 2017, but also on an approximately one-month period before it. See
generally Immigration – Qataris in the UAE (UAE Annex 1). Incredibly, when sorted by date, the data
indicates that, of the individuals listed on the spreadsheet, significantly more entered the country in the
approximately one-month period prior to 5 June 2017 than in the following 12 months combined. See
Annex 17, Sorted Excel Spreadsheet of UAE Annex 1, Immigration – Qataris in the UAE.
232 Indeed, whereas in its Response of 7 August 2018 the UAE suggested that there were approximately 2,194
Qataris “residing in” the UAE as of 5 June 2017, in its 15 January 2019 submission, it submitted that, as of
10 January 2019, there were only “702 Qatari nationals residing in the UAE who hold UAE identification
documents”. See 7 August Submission, para. 19; 15 January Submission, para. 10 (emphasis added). Qatar
notes that the document the UAE cites in support of this latter assertion actually records 396 of these 702
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66 125. The UAE’s characterization of its own exhibits thus confirms what should be common sense: that the UAE’s measures forming the subject of Qatar’s Communication have led to an enormous decrease in the number of Qataris both residing in and visiting the UAE. 126. Finally, even if the hotline were effective—which it is not—the hotline is only available for family-related matters, as the UAE itself made clear at the hearing on provisional measures before the ICJ233. Moreover, setting aside its obvious procedural deficiencies, it could only arguably mitigate harm with respect to travel into and out of the country. It cannot remedy past harms, restore the status quo ante, afford reparation, offer guarantees of non-repetition or adjudge or declare breach234. The hotline is therefore not an adequate remedy in any sense of the word. 127. At the hearing on provisional measures before the ICJ, the UAE emphasized “that the mechanism of the hotline is more appropriate and expeditious than more traditional Qatari nationals as having exited the country. See Excel Redacted Holders of UAE Resident Permits (UAE Annex 1.3). Moreover, many of the remaining entries—a mere 306—may have actually been made by the same nationals entering the country on more than one occasion. Id. (redacting information identifying those allegedly entering the country). But even accepting the UAE’s submissions as true—and Qatar does not—there would apparently have been a more than threefold decrease in the number of Qataris residing in the UAE. That decrease would not, of course, account for the substantial numbers of additional Qataris who are no longer able to visit the country as a result of the arbitrary administration of the hotline. 233 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, para. 41 (“a Presidential Directive was issued on 6 June 2017 which instructed the authorities to take into account the humanitarian circumstances of such mixed families and in implementation a special telephone line was established to receive such cases and take appropriate action.”). See also, e.g., Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 2 (UAE Annex 4) (“in terms of taking into consideration the Humanitarian cases of the Emirati-Qatari joint families, in recognition of the brotherly Qatari people, the Ministry of Interior has set up a toll-free hotline (009718002626) to receive such humanitarian cases and take appropriate procedures to help them.”). This fact has prevented many Qataris from calling the hotline. See, e.g., DCL-135, para. 24 (“I didn’t try to contact the hotline because I heard it was for people trying to visit close relatives.”); id., para. 25 (“After I heard about the provisional measures order…I contacted the hotline to request a special permit to go to the UAE to try to retrieve the originals of my documents. During the call, I was asked about the purpose of my visit and whether I have first degree relatives in the UAE.”); DCL-093, para. 28 (“I did not try to request a special permit to go to the UAE and see my property because one of my Qatari friends told me that the special permit was only for Qataris who were visiting first-degree relatives in the UAE.”). 234 See, e.g., Francesca Capone, “Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 17 (“The responsible State is also under an obligation to make reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”); id., para. 15 (“The State responsible for the commission of a wrongful act is under an obligation to cease the conduct and to offer appropriate assurances, normally given verbally, and guarantees of non-repetition, such as preventive measures to be taken to avoid repetition of the breach.”). Annex 18
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67
mechanisms”235. The fact that the most “appropriate” mechanism is an admittedly
discretionary—and demonstrably arbitrary and nontransparent—“police security
channel”236 speaks volumes to the nature of the other purported “remedies” available.
b. The UAE’s “Court Remedies” Are Neither “Reasonably
Available” nor “Effective”
128. The UAE also submits that “Qatari nationals in the UAE have at all times been entitled to
access the UAE’s courts”237, and that “[c]ourt remedies in the UAE are available and
effective and can be pursued without difficulty, either in person or through powers of
attorney”238.
129. It is impossible to reconcile this assertion with the ICJ’s express finding that Qataris
appear to have “been denied equal access to tribunals and other judicial organs in the
UAE”239. It is equally impossible to reconcile the assertion with an undisputed fact: that,
to borrow the UAE’s own words, there is no evidence “of a single Qatari national
seeking to avail himself or herself” of the courts for perceived “violation of the
protections in CERD”240.
130. Indeed, far from assisting the UAE, this admission destroys its argument entirely. As this
Committee recently made clear to the UAE itself, “a low number of complaints does not
signify the absence of racial discrimination in the State party, but may signify barriers in
invoking the rights in the Convention domestically”241. More importantly, and as
235 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/15, p. 18, para. 12
(Treves).
236 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6
(UAE Annex 4).
237 4 December Submission, para. 65.
238 4 December Submission, para. 67.
239 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 68.
240 4 December Submission, para. 68 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., id., para. 68; 15 January Submission,
para. 54.
241 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of
the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 13. See also,
e.g., id., para. 15; CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXI (2004), para. 1 (“States parties
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68 explained above, it is “the State that alleges non-exhaustion”—in this case, the UAE—that must “provide evidence” of the effectiveness of a purported remedy242, including in the form of “examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions”243. But the UAE cannot present any examples of Qataris having successfully utilized court “remedies” with respect to the measures244, and the UAE’s argument must be dismissed for that reason alone245. 131. The reality is that thousands of Qataris have been deeply aggrieved by the UAE’s treatment of them246, but know that there are no court remedies that are either “reasonably available” or “effective”247. 132. To begin with, the UAE’s justice system is deeply and demonstrably flawed. In 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the UAE to “release should pay the greatest attention to the following possible indicators of racial discrimination: … The absence or small number of complaints, prosecutions and convictions relating to acts of racial discrimination in the country. Such a statistic should not be viewed as necessarily positive, contrary to the belief of some States. It may also reveal either that victims have inadequate information concerning their rights, or that they fear social censure or reprisals, or that victims with limited resources fear the cost and complexity of the judicial process, or that there is a lack of trust in the police and judicial authorities, or that the authorities are insufficiently alert to or aware of offences involving racism.”). 242 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 243 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (1 February 2000), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 66, para. 53. 243 Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law (2013), p. 568 (“the European Court of Human Rights has specified that the State must not only satisfy the Court that the remedy was effective, available both in theory and practice at the relevant time, but also frequently asks the State to provide examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions to that of the applicant.”) (emphasis added above). See also, e.g., ECtHR, Kangasluoma v. Finland, Application No. 48339/99, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (20 January 2004), para. 48; ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 157. 244 This is true despite this Committee’s express call on States Parties to ensure “that non-citizens have equal access to effective remedies, including the right to challenge expulsion orders, and are allowed effectively to pursue such remedies”. CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX (2004), para. 25. 245 In fact, there is no evidence that anyone in the UAE has ever alleged a violation of the CERD in domestic courts. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/50/18 (22 September 1995), para. 554 (The CERD “had thus far never been invoked before a court”.). 246 See, e.g., Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, A year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 13. 247 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a). Annex 18
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immediately and unconditionally [peaceful activists and human rights defenders] who
have been arbitrarily detained”; and to “[e]nsure the separation of powers and strengthen
the independence of the judiciary, which is under the control of the executive branch and
the State security service”248. Similarly, in a 2015 report on the UAE, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers noted, inter alia,
 that she was “especially concerned that the judicial system remains under the de
facto control of the executive branch of government”;249
 that “important pieces of legislation” contain “vague and broad definitions of
criminal offences, in contravention of international human rights standards”, and
that such provisions “defy the principle of legality and open the door to arbitrary
interpretation and abuse”250;
 that she was told that “foreigners’ lack of confidence in the justice system is such
that many of them do not report crimes or abuses”251;
 that it is “often impossible for vulnerable persons to seek remedies for abuses they
suffer, which is a breach of the principle of equality before the courts”252;
 that she was “concerned at reported instances in which judges appear to have
lacked impartiality and shown bias, especially with regard to non-nationals of the
United Arab Emirates”, and that “[a]mong foreigners residing in the United Arab
Emirates, there seems to be a perception that the domestic courts cannot be
trusted, and more specifically that judges do not treat nationals in the same way as
non-nationals”253;
248 Letter from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to UAE (7 August 2018), available at
https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session29/AE/UAE_LetterHC_… (last accessed: 8
February 2019), p. 4. See also, e.g., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (13 November 2017), para. 31 (“A group of special procedure mandate
holders urged the United Arab Emirates to end the harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders
and respect the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including on social media and the Internet.”).
249 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,
Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 33.
250 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,
Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 29.
251 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,
Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 37.
252 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,
Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 63.
253 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,
Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 37.
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70  that she was “particularly concerned at reports of serious breaches of fair trial and due process guarantees, especially regarding, but not limited to, crimes related to State security”254, and “that individuals accused of having committed crimes that jeopardize State security have extremely limited access to legal counsel”255;  that she was “alarmed at reports that some lawyers who take up cases related to State security have been harassed, threatened and had pressure exerted on them, including through constant surveillance, public campaigns of defamation, and the arbitrary deportation of non-national lawyers”256;  that “[i]mpunity surrounding such breaches of the independence of the legal profession has had a chilling effect on lawyers”, and that it was reported to the Special Rapporteur “that it has become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases”, with “[m]any lawyers refus[ing] such cases or drop[ping] them early on owing to the pressure placed on them”257; and  that she “received credible information and evidence” that many individuals “were arrested without a warrant and taken to unofficial places of detention”, and “were also subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, including in order to extract confessions of guilt or testimonies against other detainees”258. 133. These problems existed well before the UAE ordered all Qataris to leave the country, and then instituted a vague and sweeping new criminal prohibition on “expressing sympathy, 254 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 86. See also, e.g., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (13 November 2017), para. 31 (“OHCHR stated that, under the pretext of national security, many activists had been prosecuted for allegations mainly related to a person’s right to express his or her opinion and criticism of any public policy or institution.”). 255 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 56. 256 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 79. See also id. (noting that the Special Rapporteur was “alarmed at the long list of obstacles that lawyers working on State security-related cases encountered on a daily basis while discharging their professional duties and representing their clients’ interests.”); id., para. 86 (noting that the Special Rapporteur was “concerned about the harassment, pressure and threats to which some lawyers are subjected, in breach of their independence, especially when they take up cases related to State security crimes”.); id., para. 80 (“in at least one case, a lawyer was arrested when he was enquiring about the whereabouts of his clients at the State security prosecution branch.”). 257 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 81. 258 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 52. See also, e.g., Human Rights Watch, UAE Continues to Flout International Law (29 June 2018) (“Others in the UAE who speak out about human rights abuses remain at serious risk of arbitrary detention, imprisonment, and torture, and many are serving long prison terms or have felt compelled to leave the country.”). Annex 18
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bias, or affection for [Qatar], or objecting to the position of the State of the United Arab
Emirates and the strict and firm measures that it has taken against the Qatari
government”259. This new prohibition—which, needless to say, is a particularly egregious
illustration of suppression of speech260—is not an idle threat. On the contrary, the UAE
has already arrested or punished multiple people under it261—including for wearing a
Qatar national team shirt to an Asian Cup football match hosted by the UAE262—and is
notorious for using the “pretext of national security” to prosecute individuals for
“criticism of any public policy or institution”263.
134. The reality is that there is nothing remotely surprising about the fact that no Qatari has
sought to challenge the UAE’s measures in domestic courts.
259 Al Bayan Online, Attorney General Warns Against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s
Positions (7 June 2017) (certified translation).
260 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 25 (“The Committee
considers that the expression of ideas and opinions made in the context of academic debates, political
engagement or similar activity, and without incitement to hatred, contempt, violence or discrimination,
should be regarded as legitimate exercises of the right to freedom of expression.”).
261 Amnesty International, United Arab Emirates 2017/2018 (“Ghanim Abdallah Matar was detained for a
video he posted online in which he expressed sympathy towards the people of Qatar.”). See also, e.g.,
Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, A year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 34
(UAE Annex 23) (“The UAE authorities has also dismissed Mr. Youssef Al-Sarkal, Chairman of the UAE
General Authority for Sports, by reason of shaking hands with the President of the Qatar Football
Association.”).
262 See The Guardian, British man detained in UAE after wearing Qatar football shirt to match (5 February
2019) (“A British football fan has been arrested and detained in the United Arab Emirates after he wore a
Qatar national team shirt to a match.”).
263 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2
(13 November 2017), para. 31. See also, e.g., Amnesty International, United Arab Emirates 2017/2018;
Human Rights Watch, Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of the United Arab Emirates (29 June
2017) (“In March 2017, the UAE detained Ahmed Mansoor, an award-winning human rights defender. He
remains detained and is facing speech-related charges that include using social media websites to ‘publish
false information that harms national unity.’ A coalition of 20 human rights organizations said Mansoor
was the last remaining human rights defender in the UAE who had been able to criticize the authorities
publicly”) (emphasis added); Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018: United Arab Emirates (“The UAE
arbitrarily detains and forcibly disappears individuals who criticize authorities within the UAE’s borders.”);
Human Rights Watch, United Arab Emirates: Events of 2017 (2018) (“UAE authorities have launched a
sustained assault on freedom of expression and association since 2011. UAE residents who have spoken
about human rights issues are at serious risk of arbitrary detention, imprisonment, and torture.”).
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72 135. First, pursuant to the anti-sympathy prohibition, a Qatari could face criminal prosecution for even “objecting” to the measures264. It is facially unreasonable for the UAE to nonetheless demand that Qataris not only do exactly that, but that they do so before the very same courts the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has made clear are “under the control of the executive branch and the State security service”265. 136. Second, even if a Qatari were willing to take the personal risk of bringing a claim, he would be unable to find a lawyer to represent him. Not only has it “become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases”266 in general but, as the Office of the High Commissioner made clear, lawyers are particularly “unlikely to defend Qataris”, as “this would likely be interpreted as an expression of sympathy towards Qatar”267. 264 Al Bayan Online, Attorney General Warns Against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions (7 June 2017) (certified translation) (emphasis added). 265 Letter from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to UAE (7 August 2018), available at https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session29/AE/UAE_LetterHC_… (last accessed: 8 February 2019), p. 4. See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 15 (emphasis added). 266 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 81 (“It was reported to the Special Rapporteur that it has become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases.”). 267 Annex 11, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on human rights (December 2017), para. 40. In fact, many Qataris have found it difficult to find lawyers willing to represent them even on matters unrelated to challenging the measures. See, e.g., DCL-048, para. 17 (“In [] 2017, my lawyer in the UAE stopped replying to my texts and answering my calls … I continued to try and contact him until February 2018 … I then gave up.”); id., para. 18; DCL-093, paras. 30-33 (“My business partner and I have been unable to hire a lawyer to represent us before Emirati courts…[M]y partner contacted three lawyers by phone…None of these lawyers agreed to take our case. They told my business partner that they were busy, that they did not have time for our case, or that they wanted us to come to the UAE to discuss before they could take the case…They seemed eager to get rid of my partner. We felt that those were just excuses.”); DCL-135, para. 18 (“I have been trying to contact my lawyer and his secretary…since June 5, 2017…During the first week following the UAE’s June 5, 2017, directive, my lawyer or his secretary would sometimes answer my calls and tell me that they would get back to me with an update. They never did. Since the end of that week, neither by lawyer nor his secretary have answered or returned any of my calls.”); DCL-146, para. 32 (“I tried to hire a lawyer in the UAE to bring a case against the company that terminated my business’s lease and caused the loss of my business assets…I called two lawyers who work in the UAE and told them what had happened. One said that he could not do anything for me, and the other said that he could not represent me. They did not say why, but it was clear to me that they refused my case because I am Qatari.”); DCL-136., para. 10 (“I tried to contact various Emirati lawyers to represent me in Annex 18
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137. The UAE’s assertion that between 6 June 2017 and 20 June 2018 “there have been over
340 cases involving Qataris”268 cannot change this. Setting aside the fact that in many of
those cases Qataris were appellees or defendants269—including in criminal
proceedings270 resulting in at least one conviction rendered in absentia271—the fact
remains that the UAE has presented no cases in which Qataris have challenged the
measures that form the subject of Qatar’s Communication272.
the UAE, but none of them were willing to represent me. One of them specifically said that he was scared
to deal with me because I am Qatari.”).
See also, e.g., DCL-147, paras. 21-23 (“I could not trust a lawyer from the UAE. Even if I hire and pay a
UAE lawyer, he would still do what the government wants because he lives in the UAE. Because of the
UAE Government’s blockade and the anti-sympathy law, a lawyer in the UAE could not act against the
position of his government. He would be afraid to do so, and he might not even take the case on because
I’m Qatari…. I can’t be sure that a lawyer would represent me at all, and if one does I can’t trust him to act
in my best interest.”); DCL-004, para. 13 (“I would have also needed an Emirati lawyer to represent me,
but I did not think any Emirati lawyer would agree to do so…I do not believe that the Emirati courts would
ever rule in my favor because I am Qatari.”); Annex 15, National Human Rights Committee, Gulf Crisis:
Continuing human rights violations by the United Arab Emirates: Report on the non-compliance by the
United Arab Emirates with the Order of the International Court of Justice (23 Jan. 2019), p. 11.
This is entirely unsurprising, given that even neighbors, close friends and family members are often afraid
of associating with Qataris. See, e.g., DCL-135, para. 22 (“I have tried to phone a few of my Emirati
friends and acquaintances to ask for help in retrieving the documents. Some did not pick up the phone, and
others refused to help. When I called a close Emirati friend of mine and asked him to go see my lawyer and
retrieve my documents, he confirmed what I thought. My Emirati friend asked me to ‘excuse [him] from
this mission’ because he was scared of the anti-sympathy laws.”); id., paras. 24, 28; DCL-093, para. 18
(describing how declarant’s close Emirati friends have stopped speaking to declarant); DCL-079, paras. 29-
30 (describing how the declarant’s Emirati family stopped speaking with their Qatari family members);
DCL-048, paras. 13, 21 (noting that Emirati friends informed declarant they were “scared to help me in
case they ended up in jail”); DCL-146, paras. 13, 17 (noting that after the UAE’s anti-sympathy law was
passed, Emiratis“told me that because of the law they had to stop communicating with me”); DCL-136,
paras. 10-11 (describing how declarant’s Emirati friends ended communication with declarant).
268 7 August Submission, para. 63.
269 See generally Judicial Records (UAE Annex 18); International Judicial Cooperation Department –
Ministry of Justice Letter (UAE Annex 16). Indeed, in its Supplemental Response of 4 December 2018, the
UAE makes the more limited claim that between 5 June 2017 and 13 June 2018, “more than 160 cases were
pursued by Qatari nationals before the UAE courts during the relevant time period”. See 4 December
Submission, fn. 90. Yet even that claim is inaccurate. Not only were some of the cases in question
registered before 5 June 2017, but Qataris were also very frequently defendants, and the UAE’s claim that
Qatari nationals “pursued” anything in such cases is misleading to say the least. See generally International
Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (UAE Annex 16).
270 See Judicial Records, pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33 (UAE Annex 18).
271 See Judicial Records, p. 26 (UAE Annex 18). In fact, the UAE’s own exhibit accompanying its most recent
submission of 15 January 2019 indicates that only 18 lawsuits were filed by Qataris in federal courts in well
over a year. See Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen, p. 2 (UAE Annex 2).
272 See 15 January Submission, para. 54 (“the UAE has offered proof that demonstrates that, since 5 June
2017, Qatari nationals have freely continued to resort to the UAE courts to assert their rights in legal
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74 138. Third, notwithstanding the UAE’s half-hearted reference to three constitutional provisions to suggest otherwise273, the UAE’s Constitution is demonstrably inadequate to protect Qataris’ rights under the CERD274. The UAE’s reference to UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 does not assist it275. While the UAE casually claims that the law “prohibits ‘discrimination of any form’ by various means of expression”276, it ignores the fact that, as this Committee has itself previously noted277, the law does not encompass discrimination on the basis of national origin278. 139. The UAE has previously made the extraordinary submission to this Committee that “daily life is untroubled by behaviours that are incompatible with noble values, and the State does not need to enact legislation to deal with any violations of the Convention”279. In light of this submission, it is unsurprising that this Committee—which has repeatedly matters, even if not necessarily related to CERD.”) (emphasis added). See also generally Judicial Records (UAE Annex 18); International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (UAE Annex 16). 273 4 December Submission, paras. 65-66. 274 See, e.g., UAE Constitution (2010), Art. 25 (“There shall be no distinction among the citizens of the UAE on the basis of race, nationality, faith or social status.”) (emphasis added); id., Art. 37 (“A citizen may not be deported or exiled from the UAE.”) (emphasis added); id., Art. 29 (“Freedom of movement and residence is guaranteed to the citizens as provided in law.”) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 9 (“The Committee is further concerned that article 25 states that the prohibition of discrimination applies to ‘citizens of the Union’ and might not apply equally to non-citizens, who constitute approximately 90 per cent of the population (art. 1).”). 275 See 15 January Submission, para. 57. 276 See 15 January Submission, para. 57. 277 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 11 (“The Committee is concerned that the definition of discrimination in the law is not fully in line with article 1 of the Convention, as the grounds of descent and national origin are missing.”). 278 See UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015, Art. 1 (“In applying the provisions of this Decree, the following terms and phrases shall have the meanings assigned against each of them, unless the context requires otherwise: … Discrimination: Any distinction, restriction, exclusion or preference among individuals or groups based on the ground of religion, creed, doctrine, sect, caste, race, colour or ethnic origin.”). 279 See United Arab Emirates, Reports Submitted by States Parties in Accordance with Article 9 of the Convention: Seventeenth periodic report of States parties due in 2007, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/12-17 (29 February 2008), para. 72. Annex 18
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called on States parties to enact legislation, enforce it and monitor the results280—has for
decades expressed concerns regarding the adequacy of UAE law281. Indeed, as recently
as September 2017, this Committee recommended that the UAE “enact legislation to
bring its laws fully into line with the Convention”282.
140. Fourth, even if a remedy existed in theory, UAE courts are widely perceived as biased
against non-nationals in general283. There is every reason to believe a judiciary under the
control of the very same executive that ordered the expulsion of Qataris and has
280 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation I (1972); CERD Committee, General
Recommendation VII (1985), para. 1; CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), paras.
13, 17; CERD Committee, General Recommendation XV (1993), para. 2.
281 See, e.g., CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic
reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), paras. 10-11
(“The Committee is concerned that the definition of discrimination in the law is not fully in line with article
1 of the Convention, as the grounds of descent and national origin are missing.”); Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/35/18 (1980), para. 105; Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/39/18 (1984), para. 248; Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/43/18 (1988), para. 194; Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/50/18 (22 September 1995) para. 562 (noting the
“concerns of the Committee with regard to certain inadequacies in the legislation”). See also, e.g., CERD
Committee, Jewish Community of Oslo et al. v. Norway, Communication No. 30/2003, Opinion (22 August
2005), UN Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003, para. 7.2.
282 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of
the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 10. See also,
e.g., Letter from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to UAE (7 August 2018), available at
https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session29/AE/UAE_LetterHC_… (last accessed: 8
February 2019), p. 3 (calling on the UAE to “[e]nact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, which
prohibits discrimination on all grounds, including colour, language, political or other opinion, descent,
national, ethnic or social origin … and is applied not only between citizens but also to non-citizens.”).
Moreover, the UAE grossly understates its burden by suggesting that all available domestic remedies that
offer any “prospect of success under domestic law must be exhausted”. 15 January Submission, para. 49.
As the ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection make clear, local remedies need be exhausted only
where they provide a “reasonable possibility” of redress. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CERD
Committee, Jewish Community of Oslo et al. v. Norway, Communication No. 30/2003, Opinion (22 August
2005), UN Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003, para. 7.2 (in which this Committee indicated that uncertainties in
the application of domestic law made it impossible “to conclude that such proceedings constitute[d] a
useful and effective domestic remedy”.).
283 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 37 (“Among
foreigners residing in the United Arab Emirates, there seems to be a perception that the domestic courts
cannot be trusted, and more specifically that judges do not treat nationals in the same way as non-nationals.
The Special Rapporteur was told that foreigners’ lack of confidence in the justice system is such that many
of them do not report crimes or abuses.”). See also, e.g., General Recommendation XIV (1993), para. 1
(“Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any
discrimination, constitutes a basic principle in the protection of human rights.”); General Recommendation
XX (1996), para. 3 (“Many of the rights and freedoms mentioned in article 5, such as the right to equal
treatment before tribunals, are to be enjoyed by all persons living in a given State.”).
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76 criminalized “sympathy” towards Qatar would not be impartial towards Qataris—especially in a situation that the UAE portrays as implicating State security, a circumstance in which fair trial and due process concerns are particularly acute284. 141. Fifth, even if all of these obstacles could somehow be overcome, the existing “remedies” are clearly not “reasonably available”285. Setting aside the arbitrary and discretionary nature of the “hotline” through which Qataris are expected to apply to travel, the closure of transport links between the two countries—a fact found relevant to the local remedies rule in at least one case involving large-scale expulsion in the past286—means that Qataris must first take a burdensome and expensive trip through a third country287. They must then be willing to undertake the personal risk of entering the UAE, a country in which they do not feel safe288 and cannot rely on their government to protect them289. 284 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 86 (“The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned at reports of serious breaches of fair trial and due process guarantees, especially regarding, but not limited to, crimes related to State security.”). 285 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a). 286 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 156. 287 The UAE asserts that “a number of courts in the UAE provide various e-services for the filing of a claim”. 4 December Submission, para. 69. But even if this assertion were accurate—and the UAE has failed to prove that it is—the UAE has not even argued that claims can be filed by non-lawyers, with respect to the measures in question, and then actually pursued from abroad through completion of the case. 288 See, e.g., DCL-030, para. 11 (“I would never feel safe there even if I was allowed to visit it again someday.”); DCL-048, para. 23 (“I am afraid of the treatment that I could receive there.”); DCL-079, para. 16 (“I was too afraid to even think about traveling to the UAE. There was so much uncertainty as to the process, as to how we would be treated in transit and once there, as to the dangers we could face. It was just too much uncertainty….”); DCL-093, paras. 26-27 (“I am too afraid to go to the UAE … I do not trust Emirati authorities since they have imposed measures against Qatar and Qataris…. My business partner did not try to go to the UAE for the same reasons. He is also concerned that he would not be able to come back.”); DCL-135, para. 24 (“I didn’t try to contact the hotline because…I was [] scared to travel to the UAE.”); DCL-146, para. 14 (“I am afraid to travel to the UAE because I have heard many stories about Qataris who went there and were abused by UAE authorities.”); DCL-136, para. 9 (“I was scared of entering the UAE, particularly since the Qatari Embassy closed and the UAE government told all Qataris to leave within 14 days.”); DCL-113, para.12 (“[E]ven if I were allowed to visit the UAE, I would not try to go, because I am scared of what might happen to me in the UAE.”). 289 See, e.g., DCL-030, para. 18 (“Since I filed my claim before the CCC, I was told about the UAE ‘hotline,’ but I would not try to call the number, because I do not want to visit the UAE. I would not feel safe there. If something bad happened to me in the UAE, I don’t know who I would turn to for help because there is no Qatari Embassy in the country. I would feel at risk all the time…, and worried that some Emiratis would treat me badly simply because I am Qatari.”); DCL-048, para. 22 (“The only option I have now would be Annex 18
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142. The UAE’s final claim that 146 Qataris have executed powers of attorney since the
beginning of the crisis also does not assist it. Even if this claim were substantiated—and
it has not been290—146 is an extremely small number in comparison to the thousands of
Qataris who have been harmed by the UAE’s measures291. More importantly, it is a
fundamental due process right for an individual to be able to attend their own legal
proceedings in person. And even if it were not, many Qataris simply do not know anyone
trustworthy who would be willing to execute a power of attorney292. Moreover, many of
those who do know someone, and who have made the expensive and difficult trip to a
third country in an attempt to acquire a power of attorney293, have been rejected expressly
to travel to the UAE myself. However, I do not think it is safe to do so. There is no embassy, no Qatari
officials and no one would be able to guarantee my safety.”); DCL-004, para. 14 (“If something was to go
wrong in the UAE, there would be no Qatari Embassy there to protect me.”); DCL-108, para. 20 (“I have
asked my daughters to meet their grandparents in Turkey instead of [], as I don’t think it’s a good idea for
them to enter the UAE…If anything were to happen to them, there is no Qatari embassy in the country to
help them.”); DCL-136, para. 9 (“I was scared of entering the UAE, particularly since the Qatari Embassy
closed…”).
290 Indeed, the UAE’s “proof” of this claim is a single conclusory, uncorroborated line of a document prepared
by the UAE itself. See Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen, p. 2 (UAE Annex 2).
291 The fact that only 146 Qataris had even allegedly received powers of attorney—none of which the UAE has
shown were granted in connection to challenging the measures that actually form the subject of Qatar’s
Communication—thus harms the UAE’s case, rather than helping it.
292 DCL-048, para. 21 (“I initially thought about giving a POA to my Emirati lawyer, but that is not an option
anymore, as he has not been responsive. I do not know anyone else who would accept a POA in the UAE at
the moment, as my friend refused to help me.”). Similarly, many of those who do know someone they trust
have refrained from asking them to execute a power of attorney because they fear this could create
problems or be a safety issue for the person involved. See, e.g., DCL-113, para. 14 (“I have not tried to get
a Power of Attorney, because I don’t know who I could give Power of Attorney to—I am afraid that if
someone helped me by acting on my behalf in the UAE, it could put them in danger, or they could be
charged with violating the anti-sympathy law. I don’t want any of my friends or acquaintances in the UAE
to be questioned by officials or Emiratis about why they are cooperating with a Qatari or why they have a
Power of Attorney for a Qatari.”). Experience shows that such concerns are fully justified. See, e.g., DCL-
146, paras. 27-31 (“I asked the two employees with POAs to deal with my business’ lease termination, but
both were prevented and deterred from taking actions due to police scrutiny and surveillance by UAE
authorities. They said that they were being monitored and were not able to even reach my property.”).
293 See, e.g., DCL-152, paras. 21-22, 25-26 (“the matter took some six weeks, three lawyers’ offices, and visits
to two embassies and four ministries in three countries … The only reason that [the company] could
manage the complicated process is that it had preexisting relationships with lawyers in the various legal
fields and the existing transnational relationships among the law firms, as well as the Company’s
considerable resources that enabled it to complete the process at embassies and notary offices in three
countries. Without these resources, the burden of the current process and its significant cost … would have
been larger than it would have been able to bear”); DCL-030, paras. 12-13 (detailing the declarant’s trip to
Oman and visits to three different governmental entities in an attempt to acquire a power of attorney);
DCL-108, para. 13 (detailing declarant’s multiple trips to Oman to acquire powers of attorney and noting
that “[n]ormally, it costs around 150 AED to get all of the necessary stamps for a valid POA,” but that on
one occasion alone, “I spent 2,000 AED.”).
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78 because they were Qataris294. To add insult to injury, even the very small number of Qataris who have actually received valid powers of attorney have often been unable to use them295. Indeed, individuals with valid powers of attorney have been harassed, arrested and interrogated for their association with Qataris296. 143. In light of the evidence laid out above, the conclusion is inescapable: the UAE’s courts do not constitute a “reasonably available” remedy, let alone an “effective” one. c. Other Alleged “Complaint Procedures” Are Neither “Reasonably Available” nor “Effective” 144. Finally, the UAE argues that Qatari nationals can resort to “complaint procedures specific to various governmental authorities”297. 294 DCL-030, para.12 (“[T]he official working at the UAE Embassy refused to stamp the POA. He told me ‘we’re not stamping it’ and that they ‘don’t stamp anything involving Qataris.’ He said it was because he had ‘supreme orders’ not to do so. I tried to argue with him, but he wouldn’t listen—he wouldn’t even look at us or engage in conversation; he simply waved to the person in line behind us and said ‘next.’”); id., para. 15; DCL-147, para. 19 (“the UAE Embassy official refused to stamp the POA and told my friend that the Embassy would not accept anything from Qataris. My friend pressed the matter, but the Embassy official insisted that he would not stamp the POA and said next time don’t even try.”); DCL-108, para. 16 (“[T]he UAE official at the Embassy had refused to stamp the POA. The official told my friend that the paperwork could not be stamped because it was for a Qatari…The official told my friend that…the Embassy had ‘received orders’ and could not authenticate any document related to Qataris.”). In some cases, individuals who were denied powers of attorney on the basis of their nationality were later able to acquire them by trying again, thereby highlighting the arbitrary and discretionary nature of the process. See, e.g., DCL-030, paras. 12-13; DCL-108. 295 DCL-146, paras. 8, 22, 27-29 (“In order to ensure that my employees could carry out the duties of the business, I executed Powers of Attorney for some of them…My employee went to get [an impounded] car back from the authorities, but they refused to give it to him, even after he showed them the POA that I had granted him. They told him to let the Qatari come and see about his car problem.”)); DCL-030, para. 13 (describing the experiences of a declarant who was unable to use their power of attorney because it was valid for only three months, and the declarant did not find anyone willing to purchase their apartment within that short time). 296 See, e.g., DCL-146, paras. 28-31 (“At the time of the blockade, I asked the two employees with POAs to deal with my business’ lease termination, but both were prevented and deterred from taking actions due to police scrutiny and surveillance by UAE authorities. They said that they were being monitored and were not able to even reach my property. They were also afraid to raise objections to the lease termination to the authorities because of the anti-sympathy laws…About 20 days after the anti-sympathy law announcement, this employee was taken into custody by UAE authorities for interrogation. That employee stopped communicating with me after his interrogation. That made me think that he was interrogated because we had been in regular contact via phone and text messages. I know about his interrogation because another employee learned about it from him and told me. This other employee also told me that the UAE authorities warned the interrogated employee not to communicate with any Qataris. At that point forward, that second employee also stopped communicating with me out of fear of the UAE authorities.”). 297 4 December Submission, para. 67. Annex 18
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145. Qatar notes that this category of purported “remedies” is an obvious afterthought. The
UAE’s initial Response did not even mention these so-called “complaint procedures”,
and in its 4 December Submission, the entire discussion of them could be found in a
single sentence and footnote298. In that Submission, the UAE actually identified only a
single procedure, before the Dubai Legal Affairs Department299. But that procedure, too,
is clearly not a remedy encompassed by Article 11(3) of the CERD.
146. First, in the UAE’s own words, the Dubai Legal Affairs Department is tasked with
“receiving complaints and claims made against the Government of Dubai”300. However,
the measures in question were not issued by the Government of Dubai but rather by the
UAE as a whole, and the UAE has proffered no evidence that the Dubai Legal Affairs
Department is able to hear complaints made against it301.
147. Second, according to the Government of Dubai’s own website, the Dubai Legal Affairs
Department is tasked not only with considering complaints, but also with “[re]presenting
the Government and Government entities in claims and disputes before competent
judicial entities”, making clear where its loyalties lie302.
148. Third, as the UAE itself concedes, complaints to the Dubai Legal Affairs Department
represent only a preliminary step prior to litigation before the courts303. Setting aside the
fact that the Dubai Legal Affairs Department would then represent the government before
298 See 4 December Submission, para. 67, fn. 88.
299 See 4 December Submission, fn. 88.
300 See 4 December Submission, fn. 88 (emphasis added). See also 15 January Submission, para. 56 (referring
to the procedure in question as having been instituted “by local UAE government”.) (emphasis added).
301 Even if the complaints procedure before the Dubai Legal Affairs Department somehow constituted a
“reasonably available” and “effective” remedy for purposes of Article 11(3) of the CERD—and it does
not—it could not possibly be a remedy required of the many individuals with no connection to the
Government of Dubai.
302 Government of Dubai, The Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department, available at
http://www.dubai.ae/en/Lists/GovernmentDepartments/DispForm.aspx?ID=49 (last accessed: 9 January
2019).
303 See 4 December Submission, fn. 88.
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80 the courts304, as Qatar has already explained, court remedies in the UAE are neither “reasonably available” nor “effective”305. 149. Finally, the UAE has provided no evidence that the complaint mechanism has ever been used, let alone successfully and in relation to the measures that are the subject of Qatar’s Communication. The complaints procedure before the Dubai Legal Affairs Department therefore cannot possibly be considered an effective remedy for purposes of Article 11(3)’s local remedies rule. 150. In its third submission of 15 January 2019, the UAE suddenly discovered, for the first time, a number of other purported “remedies”—none of which it had seen fit to even mention before the ICJ or in the 68 pages of argument it previously submitted to this Committee on two separate occasions. Unsurprisingly, this third try is not the charm. 151. As an initial matter, Qatar notes that the UAE’s own framing of these newfound “remedies” makes clear that they could only conceivably concern narrow subsets of activity implicated by Qatar’s Communication306. Qatar also notes the UAE’s repeated suggestion that there is “no evidence of recourse to such remedies”307. But once again, this admission does not assist the UAE’s case, but instead destroys it. It bears repeating: it is “the State that alleges non-exhaustion” that must “provide evidence” of the 304 Government of Dubai, The Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department, available at http://www.dubai.ae/en/Lists/GovernmentDepartments/DispForm.aspx?ID=49 (last accessed: 9 January 2019). 305 See supra Section IV.A.2. 306 See 15 January Submission, para. 57 (concerning mechanisms that purportedly allow criminal complaints against individuals regarding “hate speech”); id., para. 58 (concerning complaints regarding the alleged “blocking of media content”); id., para. 59 (concerning complaints with respect to unspecified violations of the “right to health and right to medical treatment”); id., para. 60 (concerning an alleged complaint mechanism for “secondary school students” against “a UAE school”); id., para. 61 (concerning complaints with respect to unspecified violations of the “right to work”); id., para. 62 (concerning complaints with respect to alleged violations of the “right to property”, such as those involving disputes between “landlords and tenants”). 307 Cf. 15 January Submission, paras. 56, 57, 58, 59 (“Qatar has put forward no evidence of recourse to such remedies.”). See also, e.g., id., para. 60 (“Qatar also has not shown any instance of Qatari nationals making complaints with respect to the right of education.”); id., para. 61 (“Qatar has put forward no evidence that any Qatari has availed himself or herself of these complaint resolution procedures.”); id., para. 62 (“again, Qatar has provided no evidence that such remedies have been exhausted.”). Annex 18
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effectiveness of a purported remedy308, including in the form of “examples of the alleged
remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions”309.
152. It is, once again, little wonder that the UAE has been unable to provide any such
examples, as not a single one of its new “remedies” is “reasonably available” and
“effective”.
153. First, the UAE argues that “[v]arious means exist for individuals (including Qataris) to
bring complaints to the attention of the authorities, including under the mechanisms
provided for pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 and Law No. 5 of 2012”310.
But as Qatar has already explained, Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of national origin, and cannot possibly serve as the basis for
effective complaints. Nor can Law No. 5 of 2012, which not only does not even mention
the word “discrimination”311, but is also the very same law invoked by the UAE to
criminalize “sympathy” towards Qatar312. The fact that the UAE would suggest that
308 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N°
11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 243 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (1 February 2000), Inter-American
Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 66, para. 53.
309 Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in
International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law
(2013), p. 568 (“the European Court of Human Rights has specified that the State must not only satisfy the
Court that the remedy was effective, available both in theory and practice at the relevant time, but also
frequently asks the State to provide examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by
persons in similar positions to that of the applicant.”) (emphasis added above). See also CERD Committee,
Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab
Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 13 (“a low number of complaints
does not signify the absence of racial discrimination in the State party, but may signify barriers in invoking
the rights in the Convention domestically.”); CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXI (2004),
para. 1(b).
310 15 January Submission, para. 57.
311 See generally United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree-Law No. 5 of 2012 on Combating Cybercrimes,
available at https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/316909 (last accessed: 24 January 2019).
312 See Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2018, United Arab Emirates, available at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/united-arab-emirates (last accessed: 8 February 2019)
(“In July 2017, the cybercrime law was expanded to criminalize ‘sympathy for Qatar,’ which carries a
penalty of up to 15 years in prison.”).
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82 Qataris should nonetheless invoke these irrelevant laws by complaining through an “e-service” provided by the “Dubai police” is nothing short of absurd313. 154. Second, the UAE submits that the “blocking of online content may be challenged by individual users through submissions via online forms or by the media outlets themselves by petitioning the National Media Council of the UAE”314. But the only “online form” the UAE refers to is a basic “Request Form” provided not by the UAE, but rather by the multinational telecommunications provider Etisalat315. Setting aside its apparently discretionary nature, a corporate webpage is not even arguably a “domestic remedy”, let alone a legal one, encompassed by the local remedies rule. 155. Nor can the UAE rely on the alleged possibility of submitting “petition[s]” to “the National Media Council of the UAE”316. Even if a petition challenging the “blocking of content” were permissible in theory—and the UAE has not proved that it is317—the reality is that the National Media Council is a “federal government body”318 under the control of same executive branch that has ordered the measures subject to Qatar’s Communication319. In circumstances in which the UAE continues to maintain that its 313 15 January Submission, para. 57 (“Various means exist for individuals (including Qataris) to bring complaints to the attention of the authorities, including under the mechanisms provided for pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 and Law No. 5 of 2012. To facilitate complaints, Dubai police offers an e-service through which an individual can report offenders.”). Qatar notes in any event that the “Request to Open a Criminal Case” page to which the UAE refers is open only to those with an “Emirates ID”, and allows complaints only with respect to a “Breach of Trust Case”; a “Hassle Case”; an “Insulting Case”; an “Insulting via Mobile Case”; a “Threat Case”; and an “Assault Case”. See Dubai Police, Request to Open a Criminal Case, available at https://www.dubaipolice.gov.ae/wps/portal/home/services/individualservi… (last accessed: 24 January 2019). 314 15 January Submission, para. 58. 315 See Etisalat, Web Content Block/Unblock Request Form, available at https://etisalat.ae/en/generic/contactus-forms/web-block-unblock.jsp (last accessed: 24 January 2019). 316 15 January Submission, para. 58. 317 The UAE cites two articles of a resolution on “Media Activities Licensing” indicating the existence of a grievance procedure with respect to that resolution. See 15 January Submission, para. 58. However, it provides no indication of the manner in which a resolution on “licensing” concerns the “blocking of online content” more generally. 318 See National Media Council, About Us, available at http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Pages/About-NMC.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). 319 See United Arab Emirates, The UAE Cabinet, available at https://government.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/the-uae-cabin… (last accessed: 18 January 2019) (“The Cabinet or the Council of Ministers of Annex 18
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actions were lawful, any suggestion that the National Media Council would provide an
effective remedy is thus once again absurd.
156. Third, the UAE asserts that the UAE’s Ministry of Health and Prevention “provides a
number of avenues for an individual to file a complaint”320. The only source it cites is a
“Customer Complaints” webpage allowing “customers” to “submit complaints,
suggestions or Compliments”321. Not only is the Ministry of Health and Prevention again
under the control of the executive branch, but the webpage in question also provides no
indication that the Ministry is competent to handle complaints relating to the matters
raised in Qatar’s Communication, much less that its responses are based on anything but
discretion322.
157. Fourth, the UAE submits that the Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge
provides a complaint mechanism for “secondary school students” whereby “an individual
can raise a complaint against a UAE school”323. Unsurprisingly, it fails to note that the
complaints page in question is explicitly concerned only with complaints directed against
“[p]rivate” schools324. There is, moreover, once again no indication that the Abu Dhabi
Department of Education and Knowledge is competent to handle complaints connected to
measures instituted by the federal government, let alone in connection to the measures
that form the subject of Qatar’s Communication325. The fact that the best educationthe
United Arab Emirates is the executive branch of the federation. It executes all internal and external
affairs of the Federation as per the provisions of UAE Constitution and the federal laws … Article 60 of
the Constitution lays down the powers of the Cabinet. They are: … Controlling the conduct of work in
federal departments”) (emphasis added).
320 15 January Submission, para. 59.
321 UAE Ministry of Health & Prevention, Customer Complaints, available at
http://www.mohap.gov.ae/en/Pages/COMPLAINS.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019).
322 UAE Ministry of Health & Prevention, Customer Complaints, available at
http://www.mohap.gov.ae/en/Pages/COMPLAINS.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). Similar
considerations apply to the UAE’s reference to the “Medical Complaint” webpage of the Dubai Health
Authority, which as the UAE itself acknowledges is not even part of the federal government.
323 15 January Submission, para. 60.
324 See Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge, Raising a Complaint Against A Private School,
available at https://www.adek.abudhabi.ae/en/Parents/PrivateSchools/Pages/RCAPS.aspx (last accessed: 8
February 2019).
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84 related “remedy” the UAE could come up with is a local government webpage concerning complaints for secondary school students against private schools is truly telling. 158. Fifth, the UAE refers to the “availability of ample remedies” with respect to the “right to work”326. It submits in particular that “a complaint system is available through the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiritisation”327. Setting aside the fact that the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiritisation is—yet again—under the control of the executive branch now claiming its actions are lawful before this Committee, the UAE’s own source expressly states that it is “not possible” for a “worker outside the country [to] file a labor complaint”328. Even if that were not the case, the UAE has pointed to no substantive provision of law that could be invoked through the complaints procedure to effectively challenge the measures in question329. And even if such a provision of law existed, the complaints procedure concerns “amicable settlement”, and is accordingly entirely discretionary330. 325 See Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge, Raising a Complaint Against A Private School, available at https://www.adek.abudhabi.ae/en/Parents/PrivateSchools/Pages/RCAPS.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). The webpage in question states merely that “[a]ll cases raised through ADEC monitored complaint management system will be reviewed and monitored by ADEC for compliance to regulations”. Id. The UAE has not produced those regulations, let alone provided any indication of how local government regulations might provide a remedy to any of the Qataris affected by federal government measures. Unsurprisingly, it also has not substantiated its casual claim that complaints may be raised specifically for “failure to respond to a request for provision of transcripts”. 15 January Submission, para. 60. 326 15 January Submission, para. 61. 327 15 January Submission, para. 61. 328 See UAE Ministry of Human Resources & Emiratisation, Register labor complaints (FAQ), available at https://www.mohre.gov.ae/en/our-services/%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%8… (last accessed: 24 January 2019) (emphasis added). 329 The UAE instead cites Article 6 of Federal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, which merely permits the filing of claims concerning rights “under this law”, but is in no way proof that “this law” would actually afford an effective substantive remedy with respect to the challenged measures. See United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, Labour Law and its Amendments, available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/11956/69376/F417089305/A… (last accessed: 24 January 2019), Art. 6. 330 See United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, Labour Law and its Amendments, available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/11956/69376/F417089305/A… (last accessed: 24 January 2019), Art. 6. The UAE’s claim that disputes that are not settled can then be referred Annex 18
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159. Finally, the UAE argues that Qataris have not exhausted remedies purportedly available
with respect to “alleged infringement of the right to property”331. In particular, it asserts
that “disputes between landlords and tenants may be addressed by the Rental Disputes
Center of the Government of Dubai, with the option of appeal to the Appellate Division
of the Center”, and that “complaints relating to an individual’s assets or accounts” can be
handled by the Central Bank of the UAE “through fax, online or in person through
various Central Bank locations”332.
160. The UAE is grasping at straws. Even if private landlord-tenant disputes before local
dispute resolution centers were relevant for a small number of Qataris, the UAE has
failed to indicate the substantive law to be applied by such bodies, let alone to prove that
it would be capable of affording an effective remedy with respect to the federal measures
in question. The same considerations apply to the “Customer Complaints and Enquiries”
webpage of the Central Bank of the UAE. Setting aside questions of the Bank’s
independence from the executive, the UAE has proffered no evidence that the Bank even
has competence to hear complaints related to the measures, much less that such
complaints might prove effective333.
161. Since the UAE has not identified any other so-called “complaints procedures”, it has
failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of any reasonably available and
effective remedies that have not been exhausted334.
to certain courts does not change this, for as Qatar has already explained, the UAE’s purported court
remedies are neither reasonably available nor effective. The same holds true for every other purported
“remedy” for which the UAE claims (often without any proof whatsoever) that appeals to the courts are
possible. See, e.g., 15 January Submission, paras. 58, 59. See also id., para. 62 (“The UAE judiciary is also
naturally available to all Qataris with grievances related to property matters.”).
331 15 January Submission, para. 62.
332 15 January Submission, para. 62.
333 Qatar notes that the UAE has again proffered no indication of the substantive law—if any—to be applied
by the Bank in handling “Customer Complaints and Enquiries” (details of which are limited to 1,000
characters, or approximately 150 words). See Central Bank of the UAE, Consume Complaints and
Enquiries, available at https://centralbank.ae/en/form/complaints (last accessed: 8 February 2019).
334 Qatar submits that the UAE should not be permitted to continue invoking newfound “remedies” in each
new submission it makes, and reserves the right to respond should the UAE nonetheless make a fourth
attempt to manufacture such “remedies”, or should it introduce new evidence with respect to “remedies” it
has already invoked.
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86 *** 162. Qatar has shown that the local remedies rule does not apply to its claims under the “general principles of international law” that Article 11(3) expressly requires this Committee to apply. But even if the local remedies rule were applicable to Qatar’s claims, the UAE has failed to prove that any reasonably available and effective local remedies exist. It cannot do so: as the evidence set out above demonstrates, there are no such remedies. Its invocation of Article 11(3) must therefore be rejected. B. The Existence of Concurrent Proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ Does Not Render Qatar’s Communication Inadmissible 163. In its 4 December and 15 January Submissions, the UAE argues that the existence of concurrent proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ renders Qatar’s Communication inadmissible335. Despite several attempts, the UAE still has difficulty articulating why this is the case; its position and legal theory have changed from one submission to the next. 164. First, in June 2018, the UAE argued before the ICJ that the existence of concurrent proceedings rendered Qatar’s Application before the ICJ, not its Communication, inadmissible336. In fact, the UAE went so far as to say that “it seems perfectly clear that when a matter is referred to [the Committee], it must be allowed to fulfil its mission”337. That initial claim was consistent with the UAE’s 7 August Submission, in which the 335 15 January Submission, Section IV; 4 December Submission, Section V. 336 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, p. 19, paras. 23-24 (Pellet). The UAE did not expressly employ the word “inadmissible”, but it argued: “The way in which Qatar has proceeded is incompatible with both the electa una via principle and the lis pendens exception, since the same claim has been submitted in turn to two organs by the same applicant against the same respondent ... Perhaps Qatar can be considered to be estopped from seising this Court ....” Ibid. (translation by the ICJ). 337 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, p. 26, para. 21 (Pellet) (translation by the ICJ). Annex 18
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UAE did not challenge the admissibility of the Communication on the grounds of
concurrent proceedings338.
165. The UAE changed tack in the following months. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE
argued that the existence of concurrent proceedings rendered Qatar’s Communication
inadmissible because “Qatar … has abandoned the Article 11 process”339. It was not clear
how Qatar could have been considered to have “abandoned” the Article 11 process when
it had, just one month prior, exercised its right under Article 11(2) of the CERD to refer
the matter again to this Committee340.
166. In any event, the UAE appears now to have abandoned this legal theory in favour of still
another one. In its 15 January Submission, the UAE argues that the existence of
concurrent proceedings renders Qatar’s Communication inadmissible because it
“undermines the integrity of the dispute resolution provisions of the CERD and of the
ICJ”341. As explained in more detail below, this argument is equally unconvincing.
167. The reason why the UAE has been unable to maintain a consistent line of argument is
simple: it is entirely permissible to have concurrent proceedings before this Committee
and the ICJ. This is because, contrary to what the UAE argues, Article 22 does not
establish a “hierarchical and linear” process (Section IV.B.1); neither lis pendens nor
electa una via applies here (Section IV.B.2); and concurrent proceedings would ensure
the equality of the parties and uphold the integrity of the system (Section IV.B.3).
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the UAE’s position with respect to concurrent
proceedings would leave Qatar with no remedy at all (Section IV.B.4).
338 See 7 August Submission, Section VII. Although the UAE objected to the existence of concurrent
proceedings, it never challenged the admissibility of the Communication. Rather, the UAE merely stated
that it “intends to lodge objections under which it will challenge the ICJ’s jurisdiction to hear the case on
the merits”. Ibid., para. 93; see also ibid., para. 12.
339 4 December Submission, Section V.B.
340 Letter from Qatar to the CERD Committee (29 October 2018), p. 2.
341 15 January Submission, Section IV.A (some capitalization omitted).
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88 1. Article 22 Does Not Establish a “Hierarchical and Linear” Process 168. The UAE’s argument is premised on the view that Article 22 of the CERD establishes a “hierarchical and linear” process, with the CERD procedures first and the ICJ procedure second342. According to the UAE, “[i]t is clear from the ordinary meaning of the terms of [Article 22] that the CERD envisages that the treaty-specific dispute resolution mechanism it offers to its States Parties (i.e., resort to the Committee under Article 11) should be explored and exhausted before escalating to an ICJ process”343. The UAE’s interpretation of Article 22 is, however, incorrect. Article 22 does not suggest that “the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention” must be completely “explored and exhausted”344 before referral to the ICJ. This is obvious from the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 22, which provide: “Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.”345 169. The only ostensible authority that the UAE cites to support its interpretation is the ICJ’s pronouncement that the “procedures expressly provided for in this Convention” and “negotiation” are “procedural preconditions to be met before the seisin of the Court”346. Nevertheless, what the UAE fails to mention is that the Court did not hold that both the negotiation requirement and the CERD procedures requirement must be met (i.e., that 342 15 January Submission, para. 33; see also 4 December Submission, para. 77. 343 15 January Submission, para. 28 (emphasis omitted); see also 4 December Submission, para. 73. 344 15 January Submission, para. 28; 4 December Submission, para. 73. 345 CERD, Art. 22. 346 15 January Submission, para. 28 (quoting Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 29 (citing Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 141)). In its 4 December Submission, the UAE provided no authority for its reading of Article 22. See 4 December Submission, para. 73. Annex 18
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they are “cumulative”)347. Rather, the ICJ has repeatedly decided, on a prima facie basis,
that for it to have jurisdiction under Article 22, it is sufficient that only one requirement
be met before the seisin of the Court (i.e., that they are “alternative”)348. As a result, a
State Party may have recourse to the ICJ after negotiations without engaging the CERD
procedures at all.
170. And while the ICJ has yet to definitively confirm that the two requirements are
alternative rather than cumulative, no fewer than 13 Judges of the Court have already
opined that they are alternative349. In fact, as far as Qatar is aware, not a single Judge has
ever expressed the view that the two requirements are cumulative350.
171. This is entirely unsurprising given the many reasons why the two requirements can only
be read as alternative, some of which have already been pointed out by the
aforementioned Judges of the Court.
172. First, as cogently explained by five ICJ Judges in a joint dissenting opinion, negotiation
and the CERD procedures are “two different ways of doing the same thing, that is to say,
347 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, paras. 39-40; Application of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 183.
348 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, paras. 39-40; Application of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Provisional Measures, Order, paras. 60-61; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ
Reports 2008, paras. 116-117.
349 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada,
Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, paras. 39-47;
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade,
ICJ Reports 2011, para. 116; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Joint Dissenting Opinion
of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh and Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Tomka, Bennouna and Skotnikov, ICJ
Reports 2008, para. 17 (referring to the CERD procedures requirement as an “alternative precondition”
(emphasis added)). Although these views were all expressed in dissenting opinions, none of these Judges
were dissenting on the issue of whether the requirements are alternative or cumulative.
350 Indeed, at the provisional measures stage of the ICJ proceedings between Qatar and the UAE, although
there were seven dissenting Judges, none of them opined in their opinions and declarations that the two
requirements are cumulative.
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90 seeking an agreement premised on the parties’ ability to reconcile their positions”351. Considering them to be cumulative requirements would be, in the words of those Judges, “illogical”352, “senseless”353, “highly unreasonable”354, and “inconsistent with the spirit of the text” of the CERD355. 173. Second, if the requirements were deemed cumulative, the negotiation requirement would be rendered redundant and deprived of any effet utile. This is because, as this Committee is fully aware, negotiation constitutes an element of the CERD procedures. In particular, Article 11(2) provides that, after the initial communication and response have been exchanged, “[i]f the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties, either by bilateral negotiations or by any other procedure open to them, … either State shall have the right to refer the matter again to the Committee”356. If the two requirements were cumulative, there would be no reason to have an additional negotiation requirement in Article 22 on top of the negotiation requirement already stated in Article 11(2). 174. Third, if the requirements were cumulative, then it would lead to the unreasonable result that some disputes subject to Article 22 could never be referred to the ICJ. This is because there are some disputes “with respect to the interpretation or application of 351 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 44. Note that the judges dissented on a separate issue; this issue of cumulative versus alternative was not decided by the majority. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 183. 352 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 43. 353 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 43. 354 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 44. 355 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 43. 356 CERD, Art. 11(2) (emphasis added). Annex 18
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[CERD]”357 that could not possibly be subject to the CERD procedures because they are
not situations where “a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect
to the provisions of this Convention”358 (the only matters that may be submitted to this
Committee under Article 11(1)). For example, there could be a dispute between two
States concerning whether a State Party’s reservation to the CERD is “incompatible with
the object and purpose of [the] Convention” under Article 20, or a dispute concerning
whether a State Party properly denounced the CERD under Article 21. Such disputes are
not situations where “a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect
to the provisions of this Convention”. It would thus be absurd to insist that State Parties
must go through the CERD procedures as a precondition to going to the ICJ.
175. When States enter into international legal obligations under a multilateral treaty, the
principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith require that the terms of that treaty have
a single consistent meaning. It cannot be the case that the same words in the same treaty
provision have a different meaning depending on the nature of the “dispute … with
respect to the interpretation or application of th[e] Convention”. Only a reading of the
two requirements as “alternative” can ensure consistency of meaning and thereby protect
the Parties’ expectations.
176. Fourth, the fact that the two requirements are alternative is supported by the travaux
préparatoires of the CERD. Article 22 had originally included only the negotiation
requirement, not the CERD procedures requirement359. Just three weeks before the
adoption of the CERD, the so-called “three-Power amendment” to Article 22 was
introduced, adding the CERD procedures requirement360. When this amendment was put
357 CERD, Art. 22.
358 CERD, Art. 11(1).
359 In proposing the “final clauses” for the CERD, the Officers of the Third Committee for the General
Assembly proposed Clause VIII to read: “Any dispute between two or more Contracting States over the
interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation, shall at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice ....” UN General Assembly,
Third Committee, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Suggestions for final clauses submitted by the Officers of the Third Committee, UN
Doc. A/C.3/L.1237 (15 October 1965), p. 4.
360 UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Ghana, Mauritania and Philippines: amendments to
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92 up for consideration before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, there was virtually no debate over it, showing that the Third Committee did not consider the amendment to introduce any significant changes to the limits on the Court’s jurisdiction361. This stood in stark contrast to another proposed amendment considered at the same time that would have limited the Court’s jurisdiction;362 this amendment was heavily opposed363 and ultimately defeated364. 177. After reviewing the relevant travaux préparatoires, five Judges of the Court concluded: “The clear impression … emerges that the three powers’ intent in proposing their amendment was not to impose a further condition resulting in more limited access to the Court than under the earlier text.”365 178. The only plausible conclusion is thus that the two requirements of negotiation and the CERD procedures are alternative, not cumulative. As a result, a State Party may refer a dispute to the Court without any recourse to this Committee. Article 22 does not create the “hierarchical and linear”366 process that the UAE claims, but rather offers a prospectus of alternatives. The CERD procedures can thus be engaged independently of ICJ proceedings. the suggestions for final clauses submitted by the officers of the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.1237), UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1313 (30 November 1965). 361 See UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, 1367th Meeting, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), pp. 453-455. 362 Poland had proposed that the phrase “at the request of any of the parties” be changed to “at the request of all of the parties”. UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Poland: amendments to the suggestions for final clauses submitted by the Officers of the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.1237), UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1272 (1 November 1965). 363 See, e.g., UN General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p. 453, paras. 24-25, 28 (Canada), p. 453, para. 31 (Colombia), pp. 453-454, para. 32 (USA), p. 454, para. 38 (France), p. 454, para. 39 (Italy). 364 UN General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p. 455. 365 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 47. 366 15 January Submission, para. 33; 4 December Submission, para. 77. Annex 18
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2. Neither Lis Pendens nor Electa Una Via Applies Here
179. The UAE tries to support its argument by arguing that “Qatar has created a lis pendens
situation”367. In certain national legal systems, the doctrine of lis pendens provides that an
action may not be brought simultaneously in two different fora. But the doctrine does not
apply to inter-State proceedings, absent express language to that effect.
180. Judge Crawford has written: “Whether there is any international equivalent to the
national law doctrine[] of lis alibi pendens … is controversial.”368 This puts it mildly:
neither the ICJ nor its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”)
has ever found a claim inadmissible due to lis pendens369. This perhaps explains why the
UAE, in its 4 December and 15 January Submissions, studiously avoids claiming that lis
pendens is a “doctrine”, “principle”, or “rule” applicable in international law, and instead
merely refers to the alleged “lis pendens situation”370 or “situations of lis pendens”371.
367 15 January Submission, para. 31; 4 December Submission, para. 74.
368 See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th Edition, 2012), p. 701.
369 In fact, the ICJ and the PCIJ regularly entertain cases where the parties are simultaneously pursuing other
means for consensual settlement of the dispute. See, e.g., Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v.
Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports 1991, para. 35 (“[P]ending a decision of the Court on
the merits, any negotiation between the Parties with a view to achieving a direct and friendly settlement is
to be welcomed ....”); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, para. 68
(“Whatever their nature, the existence of procedures for regional negotiation cannot prevent the Court from
exercising the functions conferred upon it by the Charter and the Statute.”); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
ICJ Reports 1984, para. 108 (“[T]he Court is unable to accept ... that the existence of the Contadora process
constitutes in this case an obstacle to the examination by the Court of the Nicaraguan Application.”);
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports
1980, para. 43 (“The establishment of the Commission by the Secretary-General ... cannot, therefore, be
considered in itself as in any way incompatible with the continuance of parallel proceedings before the
Court.”); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Jurisdiction, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, para.
29 (“[T]he fact that negotiations are being actively pursued during the present proceedings is not, legally,
any obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function.”); Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy
and the District of Gex (France/Switzerland), Order, PCIJ Series A, No. 22, 1929, p. 13 (“[T]he judicial
settlement of international disputes, with a view to which the Court has been established, is simply an
alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the Parties; as consequently it is
for the Court to facilitate, so far as is compatible with its Statute, such direct and friendly settlement ....”).
370 15 January Submission, para. 31; 4 December Submission, para. 74.
371 15 January Submission, para. 34.
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94 181. In its 15 January Submission, the UAE cites various authorities in support of its lis pendens argument, but only to show the “dangers and disadvantages”372 and “risk”373 of concurrent proceedings. As explained in detail below, none of these authorities actually posit that the doctrine of lis pendens applies to inter-State proceedings in the absence of express language so providing. 182. In fact, the first two authorities cited by the UAE themselves expressly question whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to inter-State proceedings. The UAE first cites the Polish Upper Silesia case374, but in the very same sentence from which the UAE quotes, the PCIJ held: “It is a much disputed question ... whether the doctrine of litispendance … can be invoked in international relations ….”375 The UAE next cites a book by Professor Yuval Shany376, but just a few pages after the pages from which the UAE quotes, Professor Shany states that “it is far from clear whether the general principle of lis alibi pendens applicable to intra-systematic cases should govern the relations between international fora”377. Later in the book, he similarly concludes: “In sum, it looks as if existing case-law on the question of lis alibi pendens is also too scarce and non-definitive to establish the existence of such a general rule or principle in international law ….”378 183. The third authority invoked by the UAE—a course by Professor Campbell McLachlan at The Hague Academy of International Law—similarly does not support the applicability of lis pendens to inter-State proceedings. The UAE first quotes Professor McLachlan for his statement that “there is widespread acceptance that duplicative litigation within the 372 15 January Submission, para. 31. 373 15 January Submission, para. 34. 374 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20). 375 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 376 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), pp. 155-156); 4 December Submission, para. 74 (quoting Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), pp. 155-156). 377 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 162. 378 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 244. Annex 18
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same legal system is not permitted”379. This statement, however, is taken out of
context380. When Professor MacLachlan discusses inter-State dispute settlement bodies,
he has no difficulty pointing out that:
“Evidence of [lis pendens’] adoption by international courts and
tribunals is thus far limited to the stay orders issued by the
UNCLOS Tribunal in MOX Plant, and the developing practice of
investment arbitral tribunals. The principle does not even merit a
mention in Cheng’s classic 1953 study [on “General Principles of
Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals”], or in Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht’s earlier work on private law sources.”381
184. The reason why the MOX Plant case is not relevant is discussed below, and investment
arbitral tribunals are not inter-State tribunals. They therefore do not provide any support
for the proposition that the doctrine of lis pendens should apply to inter-State
proceedings.
185. The UAE then quotes Professor McLachlan’s reference to the 2003 Resolution of the
Institut de Droit International382, but that resolution concerned transnational litigation
before national courts, not inter-State litigation before international bodies383.
186. The fourth and final authority that the UAE relies on is the MOX Plant case before an
arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the
379 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”,
Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), p. 461).
380 The entire sentence reads: “The detailed analysis in these lectures has shown, in the first place, that there is
widespread acceptance that duplicative litigation within the same legal system is not permitted, as being
contrary to due process and the Rule of Law.” Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International
Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), p. 461. The
phrase “[t]he detailed analysis in these lectures has shown” suggests that he is referring to detailed analysis
that he already provided, which, by that point in time in his course, could only refer to his examination of
lis pendens in private international litigation (Chapter II) and non-public international arbitration (Chapter
III), not public international litigation (Chapter IV).
381 Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy
of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), p. 460.
382 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”,
Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), pp. 461-462).
383 See Institut de Droit International, Second Commission: The principles for determining when the use of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions is appropriate, Resolution (9 February 2003),
available at http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2003_bru_01_en.pdf (last accessed: 2 September
2019).
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96 Sea (“UNCLOS”)384. That case, however, was one where there was express language in two treaties prohibiting concurrent proceedings: Article 282 of UNCLOS385 and Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union386. Indeed, the MOX Plant tribunal relied on these two provisions in deciding to suspend its own proceedings387. Qatar does not deny that if there were similar provisions in the CERD, then they would apply. But in the absence of such express language, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply. 187. In addition, even if the doctrine of lis pendens were applicable to inter-State proceedings, its requirements would not be met in this case. In the Polish Upper Silesia case, the PCIJ made clear that, even if the doctrine were to apply, the objects of the two claims would have to be the same and the bodies hearing the two claims would have to be “of the same character”388. The Court in that case found that neither of these two requirements were satisfied389. The objects of the two claims were different (restitution vs. interpretation), and the bodies hearing the two claims were of different characters (the Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal vs. the PCIJ)390. 188. Here, the objects of Qatar’s claims in the two proceedings are also different: non-binding recommendations from a Conciliation Commission391 and a binding decision from the 384 15 January Submission, para. 34. 385 UNCLOS, Art. 282 (“If the States Parties … have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that [the] dispute shall … be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the [UNCLOS] procedures.”). 386 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union C 326 (26 October 2012), Art. 344 (“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.”). 387 See MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), PCA Case No. 2002-01, Procedural Order No. 3 (24 June 2003), paras. 20(v), 21, 22. 388 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 389 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 390 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 391 CERD, Art. 13(2). Annex 18
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ICJ392. Moreover, the Committee, the Conciliation Commission, and the ICJ are not
bodies “of the same character”393. The Committee is an expert monitoring body394 and, as
the UAE itself puts it, the Conciliation Commission “is not a judicial body but a factfinding
body”395. The ICJ, in contrast, is the “principal judicial organ of the United
Nations”396.
189. This latter difference is another reason why the UAE’s invocation of the MOX Plant case
is inapposite: the two competing bodies in that case were both international judicial
bodies tasked with rendering binding decisions (the Annex VII arbitral tribunal and the
European Court of Justice). That is not the case in the present proceedings. In United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), the ICJ made
clear that it can adjudicate a dispute even when there is a concurrent fact-finding
commission:
“The Commission … was established to undertake a … factfinding
mission …. [The Secretary-General] created the
Commission … as an organ or instrument for mediation,
conciliation or negotiation …. The establishment of the
Commission by the Secretary-General … cannot, therefore, be
considered in itself as in any way incompatible with the
continuance of parallel proceedings before the Court. Negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement
are enumerated together in Article 33 of the Charter as a means for
the peaceful settlement of disputes.”397
190. The UAE finally tries to support its argument about the impermissibility of concurrent
proceedings by invoking “the principle of electa una via”398, which generally provides
392 UN Charter, Art. 94(1).
393 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20.
394 See OHCHR, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, available at
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cerd/pages/cerdindex.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019).
395 15 January Submission, para. 43.
396 ICJ Statute, Art. 1.
397 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports
1980, para. 43 (emphasis added).
398 15 January Submission, para. 32; 4 December Submission, para. 75.
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98 that the election of one avenue of legal action amounts to a renunciation of other avenues. Like lis pendens, however, electa una via applies only where there is express language providing for its application. The UAE ignores this critical point. It relies solely on a passage from the book by Professor Shany to support its argument about electa una via399. Yet in the passage quoted, Professor Shany was merely noting how electa una via would operate if it were applicable400. Just two sentences before the quoted passage, Professor Shany states that electa una via, absent express language, is “the least widely accepted” when compared to res judicata and lis pendens401. Professor Shany also later in the book states that “electa una via ... does not find any meaningful support in the international jurisprudence (in the absence of explicit treaty language)”402. 191. It should also be emphasized that this Committee has already made clear that it may entertain communications that are also being considered elsewhere, unless there is express language (e.g., in a State Party’s declaration) stating otherwise. In Koptova v. Slovak Republic, for example, the Slovak Republic argued that the communication was inadmissible because the petitioner had filed a similar case with the European Court of Human Rights403. This Committee rejected this argument, declaring that “neither the Convention nor the rules of procedure prevent[] the Committee from examining a case that [is] also being considered by another international body”404. Although this case was an individual rather than an inter-State communication, this Committee did not limit its pronouncement to only individual communications405. 399 15 January Submission, para. 32; 4 December Submission, para. 75. 400 See Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 23. 401 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 23. 402 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 229. 403 CERD Committee, Koptova v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 13/1998, Opinion (1 November 2000), UN Doc. CERD/C/57/D/13/1998, para. 6.3. 404 CERD Committee, Koptova v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 13/1998, Opinion (1 November 2000), UN Doc. CERD/C/57/D/13/1998, para. 6.3. 405 Indeed, there is no reason why individual communications should be treated any differently from inter-State communications with respect to the issue of concurrent proceedings. In the context of individual communications, Rule 84(1)(g) of the CERD Committee Rules of Procedure provides that the UN Secretary-General may request clarification on “[t]he extent to which the same matter is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement”, impliedly recognizing the Annex 18
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192. Other human rights bodies take the same approach. For example, the European Court of
Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights have considered the
admissibility of applications subject to concurrent proceedings before other fora406, but
only because Article 35(2)(b) of the European Convention on Human Rights expressly
provides as such407. (No such provision of course exists in the CERD.) Similarly, the
Human Rights Committee has considered the admissibility of communications subject to
other concurrent proceedings408, but only where the relevant State has made a reservation,
understanding, or declaration to that effect to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights409.
193. It is true that many States have made declarations to the CERD removing matters subject
to concurrent proceedings elsewhere from this Committee’s competence410, but Qatar and
the UAE are not among them. Indeed, the very fact that States have made such
declarations confirms that the CERD permits concurrent proceedings.
194. The intention of the drafters of the CERD is thus clear: the Article 22 dispute settlement
procedures in the CERD cannot prejudice the States Parties’ recourse to other procedures
for the pacific settlement of disputes.
permissibility of concurrent proceedings. CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 84(1)(g). Moreover,
Rule 91, which lists the grounds for inadmissibility of communications, does not include the existence of
concurrent proceedings as one of the grounds. CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 91.
406 See, e.g., ECtHR, Peraldi v. France, Application No. 2096/05, Decision on Admissibility (7 April 2009);
ECtHR, Pace v. Italy, Application No. 22728/03, Decision on Admissibility (17 July 2008), paras. 22-29;
ECtHR, Pauger v. Austria, Application No. 24872/94, Decision on Admissibility (9 January 1995).
407 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 35(2)(b) (“The Court shall not deal with any application
submitted under Article 34 that ... is substantially the same as a matter that ... has already been submitted to
another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.”).
408 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Casanovas v. France, Communication No. 441/1990, Views (26 July
1994), UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/441/1990, para. 5.1.
409 See, for example, reservations, understandings, and declarations by Austria, Croatia, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Turkey.
410 See, for example, declarations by Andorra, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Moldova, and Slovenia.
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100 3. Concurrent Proceedings Would Ensure the Equality of the Parties and Uphold the Integrity of the System 195. Perhaps aware of the weakness of its legal arguments, the UAE resorts to vague statements about how the continuation of proceedings before the Committee and the ICJ would “compromise[]” the “architecture of the CERD system for the settlement of disputes”;411 “jeopardise the integrity of the system”;412 “wreak irreparable harm on the procedural rights of the UAE, which would be required to simultaneously defend itself against the same allegations in two overlapping and parallel procedures”;413 “be in contradiction with the principle of the equality of the parties”414 since “Qatar has unilaterally taken for itself two opportunities to litigate against the UAE in overlapping and parallel proceedings”;415 “force[]” the UAE to “choose between forsaking its rights to mount a full defence in the present CERD communication procedure or sacrificing its right to procedural equality in the ICJ case”;416 and grant Qatar the “opportunity to foresee and undermine the UAE’s litigation strategy”417. 196. These arguments are baseless. As explained above, the continuation of both proceedings is fully consistent with the dispute settlement mechanisms the CERD creates. There would be no harm to procedural rights. It is true that the UAE has to litigate two cases, but Qatar has to as well. Furthermore, there is no inequality of the Parties. Qatar and the UAE have equal procedural rights before both the Committee and the ICJ. The UAE does not have to forsake any rights: it, just like Qatar, simply has to present its arguments before two bodies, both of which are eminently qualified in their own spheres. 411 15 January Submission, para. 35; see also 15 January Submission, para. 40. 412 15 January Submission, para. 36; see also 15 January Submission, para. 40. 413 15 January Submission, para. 36. 414 15 January Submission, para. 37. 415 15 January Submission, para. 38. 416 15 January Submission, para. 39. 417 15 January Submission, para. 39. Annex 18
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4. The UAE’s Position with Respect to Concurrent Proceedings Would
Leave Qatar with No Remedy at All
197. If anything, if this Committee dismisses the proceedings before it, then there would be a
risk of harm to Qatar’s procedural rights, not the UAE’s. This is because the UAE is
simultaneously trying to convince the ICJ to dismiss the proceedings before it418, which
would then lead to the result that Qatar has no remedy whatsoever—neither before this
Committee nor the ICJ. This denial of justice would wreak far greater havoc on the
“architecture of the CERD system for the settlement of disputes” and “the integrity of the
system”.
***
198. In conclusion, the existence of concurrent proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ
is entirely permissible. And dismissing these proceedings would run a serious risk of
leaving Qatar with no remedy whatsoever with respect to the human rights violations in
question.
C. Qatar’s Communication Is Not an Abuse of Rights and Process
199. The UAE also argues that Qatar’s Communication constitutes an abuse of rights and
process419. This is not a serious argument. Qatar’s claims are fully grounded in both fact
and law, as explained in Qatar’s Communication420.
200. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE argues that “Qatar has failed, despite many
opportunities to do so, to present even a shred of evidence of any ongoing discrimination
418 At the provisional measures stage of the ICJ proceedings, the UAE argued that lis pendens and electa una
via rendered the claims before the Court inadmissible. Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures,
Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, p. 19, para. 23 (Pellet). Indeed, in its 7 August Submission, the UAE stated:
“The UAE maintains that Qatar should not be permitted to advance a complaint under Article 11 while
simultaneously initiating proceedings in relation to the same issues before the ICJ. The UAE intends to
lodge jurisdictional objections with the ICJ on this basis.” 7 August Submission, para. 12. And in its 4
December and 15 January Submissions, the UAE affirmed its view that Qatar’s Application to the Court is
“improper and extra-jurisdictional”. 15 January Submission, para. 40; 4 December Submission, para. 77.
419 15 January Submission, Section IV.C; 4 December Submission, Section V.B.
420 See Qatar’s Communication, pp. 19-23, paras. 41-51;. See also DCL-004; DCL-030; DCL-048; DCL-073;
DCL-079; DCL-093; DCL-108; DCL-113; DCL-125; DCL-135; DCL-136; DCL-146; DCL-147; DCL-
152.
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102 against Qatari nationals—still less, any discrimination actually falling within the scope of the CERD”421. It is not clear what “opportunities” the UAE is referring to. If the UAE is referring to the CERD procedures, then Qatar need only point out that Article 11 of the CERD does not require Qatar to provide any evidence: Articles 11(1) and 11(2) only state that Qatar may “bring the matter to the attention of the Committee”422 and “refer the matter again to the Committee”423, and Article 11(4) provides that “the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned to supply any other relevant information”424. To date, the OHCHR has only invited Qatar to provide its observations on the UAE’s submissions with regard to jurisdiction and admissibility425. If, on the other hand, the UAE is referring to the ICJ proceedings, Qatar need only note that Qatar did indeed furnish numerous third-party reports during the oral hearings before the ICJ documenting the discrimination committed by the UAE. Qatar would, of course, be willing to present even more evidence—whether before this Committee, a Conciliation Commission constituted under Article 12 of the CERD, or the ICJ—at the appropriate stage. 201. Moreover, the ICJ has already held that “some of the acts of which Qatar complains may constitute acts of racial discrimination as defined by the Convention”426, and has even taken the extraordinary step of indicating provisional measures preserving such rights427. For the UAE to now say that Qatar’s claims are “completely without merit on fact and law”428 is not only inaccurate, but also displays unseemly disrespect towards the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 421 4 December Submission, para. 80; see also 15 January Submission, para. 42 (“Qatar has failed, despite many opportunities to do so, to present probative evidence of any ongoing discrimination by the UAE against Qatari nationals – still less, any discrimination actually falling within the scope of the CERD.”). 422 CERD, Art. 11(1). 423 CERD, Art. 11(2). 424 CERD, Art. 11(4); see also CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 70. 425 Letter from OHCHR to Qatar (14 December 2018), para. 2. 426 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 54. 427 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 79. 428 15 January Submission, para. 43; 4 December Submission, para. 81. Annex 18
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***
202. In light of the above, there is no question that the UAE’s attempts to have Qatar’s
Communication dismissed on grounds of inadmissibility are entirely futile. Article
11(3)’s exhaustion requirement does not bar Qatar’s claims, the existence of concurrent
proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ is perfectly permissible, and the
Communication is not an abuse of rights and process.
V. THIS COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION OF QATAR’S COMMUNICATION
WOULD NOT BE ULTRA VIRES
203. The UAE’s 4 December and 15 January Submissions close with a poorly veiled threat
against this Committee: the UAE argues that “any action taken by the Committee to
further Qatar’s complaint would be ultra vires”429. Qatar considers this argument an
affront to this Committee, which is perfectly competent to decide for itself what it can
and cannot do.
204. In any case, the UAE’s argument here assumes its own conclusions. It relies entirely on
the UAE’s assertions that Qatar is engaging in an “abuse of process” and has
“abandoned” the CERD procedures430. As explained above, these assertions are false and
unsustainable. There can therefore be no question that the consideration of Qatar’s
Communication is well within the powers of this Committee.
VI. CONCLUSION
205. For the reasons stated above, the UAE’s various objections to the Committee’s ability to
consider Qatar’s claims have no merit. Qatar accordingly reiterates its request that the
Committee determine that it has jurisdiction over the Communication, find the
Communication admissible, and proceed with the formation of an ad hoc Conciliation
Commission to consider this matter.
429 15 January Submission, para. 69. The UAE’s 4 December Submission employs slightly different language:
“Any action of the Committee to entertain further or progress Qatar’s Article 11 Communication would be
ultra vires.” 4 December Submission, Section VI (some capitalization omitted).
430 4 December Submission, para. 86.
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Annex 19
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), UAE’s Comments
on Qatar’s Response on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 19 March 2019, together with Annex 4, Annex 5 and
Subsequent Correspondence
461
In a matter before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ICERD-ISC-2018/2COMMENTS ON QATAR’S RESPONSE ON ISSUES OF JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY of the United Arab Emirates pursuant to the Decision adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination during its 97th Session(26 November – 14 December 2018) to the request made by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on theElimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination submitted to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office, Geneva, Switzerland on 19 March 2019
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- i - TABLE OF CONTENTS PageI. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1 A. The CERD Should not be Used by Qatar to Pursue Political Ends ........................ 1 B. Qatar’s Procedural Antics are Politically-Motivated and Should not be Tolerated ................................................................................................................. 3 C. Qatar’s Persistent Lack of Candour, Including About the Underlying Facts of the Dispute and the Availability of Remedies for its Nationals, Reveal its Disingenuous Intentions ..................................................................................... 6 D. Qatar’s Conspicuously Misleading Discussion Concerning its Support for Extremists and Terrorists Reveals its True Colors ............................................... 14 II. LACK OF JURISDICTION:QATAR’SARTICLE 11COMMUNICATION FALLS OUTSIDE THE SCOPERATIONE MATERIAE OF THE CERD .............................................24 A. The CERD Does Not Prohibit Differentiated Treatment Based on Current Nationality............................................................................................................. 25 1. The Ordinary Meaning of “National Origin” Does Not Encompass Current Nationality ....................................................................................26 2. Taken in Context, “National Origin” Cannot Encompass Current Nationality..................................................................................................28 3. The Object and Purpose of the CERD Confirms That “National Origin” Does Not Encompass Current Nationality ....................................30 4. The Ordinary Meaning of “National Origin” Is Confirmed By the Travaux Préparatoires ...............................................................................31 5. Subsequent Practice of States Parties to the CERD ...................................40 6. General Recommendation XXX ................................................................43 B. Qatar’s New Argument that the UAE’s Measures Would Fall Within the Scope of the CERD Irrespective of Whether “National Origin” in Article 1(1) Encompassed Current Nationality Fails ........................................................ 45 III. THECOMMITTEE MUSTDECLINE TO HEARQATAR’SARTICLE 11COMMUNICATION BECAUSE QATAR HASFAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT LOCALREMEDIES HAVEBEEN INVOKED OR EXHAUSTED UNDER ARTICLE 11(3) OF THE CERD ................................................................................................................................47 A. None of the Grounds Relied upon by Qatar Bar the Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies to Qatar’s Claims ............................. 48
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- ii - B. There are Effective and Reasonably Available Remedies in the UAE that Have Not Been Exhausted .................................................................................... 57 1. The Hotline Is a Readily Available Remedy for Qatari Nationals That Want to Travel to the UAE and Is Consistent With International Practice .................................................................................60 2. Other Available and Effective Remedies in the UAE Which Have Not Been Exhausted ...................................................................................64 IV. THEEXISTENCE OF CONCURRENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CERDCOMMITTEE AND THE ICJRENDERS QATAR’SCOMMUNICATION INADMISSIBLE .........71 A. The Consistency of the UAE’s Arguments ........................................................... 72 B. Qatar’s Re-Submission to the CERD Committee Is Inadmissible........................ 73 1. Qatar’s Submission Is Inadmissible Because It Is Incompatible With The Hierarchical and Linear Dispute-Settlement System of the CERD ...................................................................................................74 2. The Risk of Lis Pendens and Electa Una Via Cannot Be Ignored ............83 V. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................85
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1.The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates (the “UAE”) to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) (the “Secretariat”) and refers to the Office of the High Commissioner’s Note of 14 December 2018 (ICERD-ISC 2018/2) in which the Office of the High Commissioner transmits a decision taken by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the “Committee” or the “CERD Committee”) at its 97th Session (the “Decision”) concerning the Communication under Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD” or the “Convention”),submitted by the State of Qatar (“Qatar”) to the Committee on 8 March 2018, and transmitted to the Permanent Mission of the UAE on 7 May 2018 (the “Article 11 Communication”). 2.Pursuant to the Note Verbale from the Secretariat to the Permanent Mission of the UAE dated 19 February 2019, transmitting the Response of the State of Qatar of 14 February 2019 (the “19 February Response”), the UAE submits its comments on Qatar’s 19 February Response. As directed by the Secretariat in its Note Verbale, the UAE will restrict its comments to issues raised in the 19 February Response. I.INTRODUCTIONA.The CERD Should not be Used by Qatar to Pursue Political Ends 3.During the preparatory work of the Convention, and specifically in the discussion of the provisions related to measures of implementation, one of the delegates of the Third Committee of the General Assembly expressed concern that establishing “some machinery” within the Convention allowing one State to lodge a complaint against another State could lead some States to “resort to that organ less in order to succour the oppressed than to pursue political ends.”1 Another delegate feared that “[s]ome 1 Third Committee, 1346thmeeting, 17 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1346, p. 331.
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- 2 - Governments would no doubt find it impossible to resist the temptation of using the international machinery for political ends”.24.Over the period of nearly 50 years since the Convention entered into force, however, not a single State found it “impossible to resist the temptation” of using the CERD Committee to pursue political ends. That restraint ended abruptly on 8 March 2018 with the submission of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, the first-ever communication filed by any State pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions of Article 11 of the CERD. And one year on since filing its communication, Qatar has made it more than obvious that far from having the purpose of giving “succour to the oppressed”, its purpose in submitting the Article 11 Communication was indeed to “pursue political ends”. In this case, the political ends Qatar appears to have in mind involve finding ways to attack the UAE for having exercised its sovereign right to break diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017 and impose economic sanctions against it in connection with the political dispute between the two countries over the UAE’s (and many other States’) contentions that Qatar has engaged in a practice of supporting, financing, tolerating and giving safe harbor to extremist and terrorist groups and individuals, threatening lives and regional stability.5.There can be no other explanation for Qatar’s repeated lack of candour, theatrics and manoeuvring in presenting its case before this Committee, and the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ” or the “Court”), than that it perceives the CERD Article 11 procedures as a tool to be used to achieve these political objectives. Moreover, its unrestrained willingness to assert false or exaggerated factual claims, to conceal other relevant facts from the Committee and to rely on ever-changing, and often far-fetched or inapplicable, legal arguments to support its case, demonstrates an unfortunate tendency to say or do anything to present and progress its case to the next stage of proceedings at all costs. 6.For the same reasons that the drafters of the Convention cautioned against establishing a dispute resolution system which one State could use for “political ends”, as well as the other jurisdictional and admissibility grounds set forth in this submission, the Committee 2 Third Committee, 1347th meeting, 18 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1347, p. 338.
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- 3 - is respectfully urged to use its authority to put an end to Qatar’s cynical abuse of the Article 11 procedures in this case and cease to entertain the matter referred to it by Qatar through its Article 11 Communication. B.Qatar’s Procedural Antics are Politically-Motivated and Should not be Tolerated 7.Qatar’s tactical manoeuvring in presenting and progressing its case furthermore highlights that it is guided not by concern for the human rights of its citizens but geopolitical goals. The Committee will have full appreciation for the procedural tactics, or antics, Qatar has used to launch and pursue its case. It initially filed the Article 11 Communication before this Committee on 8 March 2018 and its complaint was communicated to the UAE on 7 May 2018. Shortly thereafter (and before the Committee process had begun in earnest) on 11 June 2018 Qatar instituted proceedings before the ICJ on the same issues and complaints, along with a simultaneous application requesting provisional measures, resulting in a 27-29 June 2018 hearing and a decision by the ICJ issued on 23 July 2018. A few months later, on 29 October 2018, and before filing its memorial in the proceedings before the ICJ, Qatar confusingly renewed its request to the Committee to take up the dispute “again” pursuant to its procedures under Article 11. It thus asked the Committee to continue considering the same issues that were now also put before the ICJ.8.It is revealing that Qatar has not so much as sought to explain the underlying reasons for reverting once again to the Article 11 procedures, whose recommendations are non-binding, after placing its dispute squarely before the ICJ (recognized as the “last resort” in the system of implementation of the CERD by its drafters3), whose decisions are binding, much less what benefit it seeks to achieve through the non-binding Article 11 procedures for those Qataris whose interests it purports to be protecting that it could not achieve through a binding decision of the ICJ. To justify its recommencement of the Article 11 procedures, Qatar limits itself to word games, in effect saying that the two pre-conditions for submitting a dispute to the ICJ under Article 22 of the CERD (bilateral negotiations and the procedures under Article 11) are alternative, not cumulative, and that 3 Third Committee, 1344th meeting, 16 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, p. 319.
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- 4 - therefore “[t]he CERD procedures can thus be engaged independently of ICJ proceedings.”4 That is the entirety of its explanation. 9.This is of course incorrect. As further explained below, the two preconditions are cumulative, not alternative,5 and both should have been complied with before Qatar made its application to the ICJ. But Qatar’s argument also fails for other reasons. 10.Most obviously, it completely misses the point because even if (quod non) the two preconditions are alternative, and each precondition could therefore independently serve as a gateway to the ICJ, that doesn’t alter the role of the ICJ within the broader measures of implementation of the CERD as the forum of “last resort”. Not only does the text of the Convention lend itself to the self-evident conclusion that the procedures under Article 11 were meant to be used prior to, and only prior to, submitting a dispute to the ICJ, but the Convention’s travauxpréparatoires make it crystal clear that those drafting the Convention were under no misunderstanding that the CERD Committee procedures were designed to be used before reverting to the ICJ, not after having done so.11.This conclusion clearly emerges from the travaux préparatoires of the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the final working group which discussed and debated the Convention, including its articles on measures of implementation, immediately prior to its adoption.612.Having in the first instance submitted its complaint to the Committee, and then having abruptly abandoned trust in the Committee as the starting point of its dispute with the UAE by prematurely bringing its case to the ICJ before the Committee could begin to exercise or exhaust the procedures under Article 11, Qatar cannot now go back to the Committee and request that it perform its functions under Article 11 anyway. This would not only be illogical and inconsistent in relation to the dispute resolution system established under CERD in which it was clearly envisioned that referral of a dispute to the ICJ would occur only as a “last resort”, it would also engage the CERD Committee 4 19 February Response, para. 178. 5Seeinfra paras. 158-171. 6Seeinfra para. 185.
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- 5 - and any Conciliation Commission which might be established to deal with the dispute in a wasteful, time-consuming and costly exercise whose non-binding findings would in any case be made redundant and of no purpose since the ICJ has already been seized of the same issues. Qatar’s tactics thus cynically dishonor the Committee and abuse its processes. 13.Apart from these considerations, it must again be emphasized that what is most telling about Qatar’s submissions in defense of its two-track litigation tactics is that in arguing its position Qatar, incredibly, does not even attempt to justify it as somehow of benefit to the Qataris whose human rights it says it seeks to protect. The fact is, those persons’ rights do not appear to be foremost in Qatar’s calculations. Its bringing the Article 11 procedures once again before the Committee after already bringing its dispute before the ICJ can only be seen as a cynical and heavy-handed litigation tactic, designed to create legal confusion and put the UAE on the defensive in two fora simultaneously while giving Qatar continuing and multiple public relations opportunities. 14.Whatever its intentions, the concocted legal reasoning Qatar asserts for justifying the pursuit of its claims against the UAE before the ICJ and this Committee simultaneously7cannot mask the self-evident conclusion that these two-track tactics make no reasonable or logical sense, whether as a matter of coherent procedure and dispute resolution or as an effective method for investigating the allegations Qatar has made, and can have no other apparent purpose than to harass its opponent or provide public relations opportunities for Qatar as it attempts to achieve its political objectives. 15.Qatar’s other arguments in favor of its two-track tactics are frivolous and reflect, if anything, its desperation that its case is unwinding. Most clearly in this category is the cynical appeal to the Committee not to dismiss these proceedings because if it does so, and if the ICJ also dismisses the proceedings before it, then Qatar would be left with “no remedy whatsoever”.8 It should not be forgotten that Qatar chose to pursue its two-track 7See infra Section IV “The Existence of Concurrent Proceedings Before the CERD Committee and the ICJ Renders Qatar’s Communication Inadmissible”. 8 19 February Response, para. 197.
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- 6 - litigation strategy, and any resulting legal confusion which has arisen is therefore of its own making. The UAE has consistently maintained –in addition to its primary position that Qatar’s claims are outside the scope ratione materiae of the CERD– that the claims brought by Qatar should not be subject to proceedings before both the ICJ and the CERD Committee simultaneously. Indeed, the UAE would go further and say that, in fact, the CERD Committee proceedings should have been exhausted before instituting proceedings before the ICJ. But Qatar has chosen to bring ICJ proceedings before exhausting the Article 11 procedures, and the ICJ is now seised of the case. Under those circumstances, and for the reasons articulated in this submission, it would be wholly inappropriate for the CERD Committee to proceed to entertain the case. 16.Finally, it should be noted that if the ICJ dismisses the case Qatar has brought before it – substantially the same case that Qatar has brought before this Committee – then it will be established by the highest judicial body of the United Nations that Qatar’s case has no merit. Under those circumstances, a dismissal of these proceedings, leaving Qatar with no remedy under CERD for the disingenuous claims it has brought, would be entirely appropriate.C.Qatar’s Persistent Lack of Candour, Including About the Underlying Facts of the Dispute and the Availability of Remedies for its Nationals, Reveal its Disingenuous Intentions 17.The foundation of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication is that in June 2017 the UAE “expelled all Qataris within its borders, without exception”9 and banned entry of all Qataris to the UAE, “measures that remain in effect to this day.”10 In its relentless campaign of misinformation, Qatar never tires of repeating these lies, including by its 9Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings, 11 June 2018, para. 3. 10Id.
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- 7 - Agent before the International Court of Justice.11 Indeed, its own head of state, His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar, lowered himself to repeat this nonsense in a widely-broadcast television interview,12 and not to be outdone, Qatar’s submissions to the Court and to this Committee are peppered throughout with this and other outrageous falsehoods.1318.The UAE has submitted to this Committee documentary evidence establishing that thousands of Qataris (more than 11,000 and counting) have, uninterruptedly since June 2017, entered and exited the UAE,14 and that more than 700 Qataris who continue to reside in the UAE hold UAE identification documents,15 and that the number of Qataris 11Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of the Public Sitting of 27 June 2018, at 10:00 a.m. (CR 2018/12), para. 4 (“The UAE expelled all Qataris within its territory, giving them only 14 days to leave and ordered Emiratis to leave Qatar or face civil and criminal sanctions. The UAE continues to prohibit Qataris from entering the UAE.”) (emphasis added); id., para. 8 (“The UAE’s collective expulsion of Qataris and ban on their travel to the UAE has had and continues to have a devastating impact on Qataris and their families.”) (emphasis added). 12 All Qataris in the UAE “were ordered home”, “patients were kicked out from hospitals”. Interview of Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani by Charlie Rose, 29 October 2017, available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qatars-emir-stands-defiant-in-face-of-bloc…. 13 “In particular, UAE has expelled all Qatari residents and visitors within its borders”. Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, 8 March 2018, para. 4 (emphasis added). “The UAE has enacted and implemented a series of discriminatory measures directed at Qataris based expressly on their national origin-measures that remain in effect to this day. In particular, on 5 June 2017 and the days that followed, the UAE: expelled all Qataris within its borders, without exception, giving them just two weeks to leave”. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings, 11 June 2018, para. 3 (emphasis added). “For the past twelve months, the UAE has enacted and enforced measures that, inter alia, collectively expelled Qataris from the UAE and prevented their re-entry into the UAE”. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection, 11 June 2018, para. 2 (emphasis added). “As a result, the UAE’s sudden collective expulsion of Qataris-done arbitrarily and without any consideration of individual characteristics or the provision of even basic due process-and simultaneous imposition of discriminatory travel and entry restrictions on Qataris to prevent their return and entry-again without affording even basic due process”. 19 February Response, para. 37 (emphasis added). 14 UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, Annex 2 (Immigration - ID & Citizenship Authority Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Status) (indicating that as of June 2018 the number of Qatari nationals in the UAE amounted to 2,194) and Annex 5 (Annex 5 - Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records) (showing movement of Qatari nationals entering and exiting the UAE in over 8,000 occasions). UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, Annex 1 (Letter from the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, dated 10 January 2019, summarizing statistics and attaching detailed records in tables in Excel files regarding those statistics), Annex 1.1 (Excel Redacted] Entrance and Exit for Qatari Nationals from 1 June 2018 until 31 December 2018) (showing that the actual registered entries and exits of Qatari nationals into and out of the UAE from 1 June through 31 December 2018 amounted to 2,876) 15 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, Annex 1 (Letter from the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, dated 10 January 2019, summarizing statistics and attaching detailed records in tables in Excel files regarding those statistics), Annex 1.3, ([Excel Redacted] Holders of UAE Resident Permits ).
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- 8 - residing in or visiting the UAE is not substantially different than the number of Qataris who were present in the country prior to June 2017.1619.The Committee is asked to take note that Qatar has not directly challenged that evidence with any credible rebuttal evidence, because it cannot. Instead, it now weakly questions details about the statistics reflected in the evidence. For example, rather than dispute the fact that thousands of Qataris have entered and exited the UAE since June 2017, it says that the cross-border movements of thousands of Qataris into and out of the UAE “appear” to show “a very large number, if not the majority” exiting rather than entering the country.17 Given that, as Qatar itself has repeatedly pointed out, many Qataris routinely visit the UAE for business, family or shopping excursions, this revelation should not be surprising.1820.It then complains that the UAE has not provided a “comparative set of data on the movements of Qataris during the period before the crisis” so as to determine whether following June 2017 Qatari visitors to the UAE may have declined.19 As the allegation Qatar has insidiously thrown about is that there is a ban on all Qataris entering the UAE, this response, allowing that there are indeed large movements of Qatari nationals into and out of the UAE, does nothing to support Qatar’s extreme, and false, contention, and in fact it directly contradicts it.21.And with regard to the evidence the UAE has provided showing that, as of January 2019, over 700 Qatari nationals reside in the UAE and hold UAE identification documents,20Qatar attempts to question it by speculating that some of those Qatari nationals had travelled out of the country and not returned, and that “even accepting the UAE’s submissions as true — and Qatar does not — there would apparently be a three-fold 16See,Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatarv. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of 28 June 2018, at 10:00 a.m.(CR 2018/13), p. 13, para. 14 (Alnowais). 17 19 February Response, para. 119, fn. 218. 18See,e.g., 19 February Response, para. 36. 19 19 February Response, para. 121. 20 UAE’S Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, para. 10.
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- 9 - decrease in the number of Qataris residing in the UAE.”21 But, as Qatar well knows, this supposed “three-fold decrease” is another fabrication because it compares the number of Qatari nationals currently “residing” in the UAE with the number of Qatari nationals (residents and visitors) who were physically present in the UAE in June 2018.2222.Qatar’s statistical gymnastics cannot hide the obvious truth that after cutting away all of the rhetorical verbiage about “collective expulsions” and “entry bans”, even Qatar cannot sustain the extreme falsehoods set out in its own submissions. Having effectively admitted the untruth of its essential allegations — that the UAE expelled Qataris from the UAE and banned their re-entry to the country — the credibility of Qatar’s case evaporates. 23.Qatar’s response to other important allegations are equally empty and evasive. Most importantly for the Committee’s determination of whether Qatar’s complaint should be dealt with any further pursuant to Article 11(3) of the CERD, the Committee should take note that in reply to the documentary evidence submitted by the UAE showing that, contrary to Qatar’s allegations, Qatari nationals have continued to enjoy access to UAE courts and have appeared in judicial proceedings as plaintiffs or defendants in hundreds cases since June 2017,23 all that Qatar can muster as a response is that this is not a relevant consideration as “the UAE has presented no cases in which Qataris have challenged the measures that form the subject of Qatar’s Communication.”24 This response, and Qatar’s other remarks concerning the access Qataris have to UAE courts and the corresponding availability of domestic remedies, requires a number of points to be made. 24.First, it must be noted that while it references the lack of challenges by Qataris to “the measures that form the subject of Qatar’s Communication”, Qatar does not indicate what specific measures it is referring to. The reason is both obvious and significant. It is so 21 19 February Response, para. 124, fn. 232. 22 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, para. 10 (“As of June 2018, the number of Qataris in the UAE amounted to 2,194.”). 23 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, para. 12 a. 24 19 February Response, para. 137.
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- 10 - because once the fabricated “collective expulsion” and “ban on entry” allegations are stripped away, there are in fact no “measures” to point to which have allegedly targeted Qatari nationals or deprived them of any rights. Far from imposing a ban, establishing ordinary entry requirements is the UAE’s sovereign right and conforms with common state practice. Certainly Qatar does not point to any specific “measure” other than the procedures through the “hotline” established in June 2017 (available through a dedicated website since October 201825) which Qatari nationals must follow in order to obtain a permit to enter the country. Qatar has made a sustained effort to portray these entry requirements as “discriminatory” and in violation of the CERD, but this is nonsense, and an affront to the human suffering which led the international community to create the CERD.26 Indeed, Qatar should be ashamed to equate itself with those who have suffered such indignities, and to have done so for manifestly political ends. 25.Second, and once again, the Committee should note that Qatar does not actually challenge the evidence submitted by the UAE proving that, contrary to its persistent and fraudulent allegations (“As they cannot enter the UAE, Qataris are prevented from physical access to UAE courts and institutions”27), Qataris are parties in hundreds of ongoing cases before UAE courts (in many of which they are the claimants), and that Qatari nationals are not now, and have not ever been, impeded from accessing UAE courts or any judicial or administrative procedures available in the country. 26.Finally, Qatar’s response reveals one of the more deceptive aspects of its claim before the Committee that Qataris have no access to judicial or other remedies. This relates to the so-called Compensation Claims Committee (the “CCC”) established by the Qatari government just a few weeks after the break in relations between the UAE and Qatar. The members of the CCC are high Qatari government officials, including the Secretary General of the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Qatari Attorney General, 25Seeinfra para. 134. 26 Further elaboration of the reasons why preferences based on current nationality do not constitute racial discrimination are set out in paras. 55-98, infra.27Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings, 11 June 2018, para. 46.
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- 11 - among others.28 As described by the Secretary-General of the Qatari foreign ministry, the CCC receives the complaints which have been lodged with the National Human Rights Committee (the “NHRC”) so that they can be “sorted and referred to the competent local and international courts”, adding that “the compensation committee was divided into three sections: the first to examine citizens’ complaints about violations of human rights or individual damage; the second for traders who were affected by the closure of land, sea and air borders; and the third for government institutions affected by the blockade such as the Ministry of Economy and Qatari Aviation.”29 He also confirmed that “the State is responsible for the cases fees and lawyers’ fees” and that claims against Saudi or Emirati defendants are being brought in diverse tribunals, including in “the courts of their countries.”3027.A report published by the NHRC has confirmed that it refers all complaints it has received to the CCC, meaning that all of the complaints which Qatar has cited as the basis of its claims against the UAE under CERD are subject to the intervention and assistance of the CCC.31 As the description published by the NHRC makes clear, the Qatari government established and designed the CCC so as to be in a position to control and orchestrate all legal claims of its citizens arising out of its dispute with the UAE. As noted by the NHRC:That Committee [the CCC] has been tasked with the following: 1.To receive complaints and claims for compensation from individuals, private organizations, and the public sector; 2.To investigate complaints from a legal point of view to ascertain whether it was the blockade that caused harm to the injured parties; 28 Information Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doha, Qatar, Foreign Ministry Secretary General: “Compensation Claims Committee Receives 2,945 Individual Cases from NHRC”, 25 July 2017, available at: https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/07/25/foreign-ministr…. 29Id.30Id. (emphasis added). 31 National Human Rights Committee, Doha, Qatar, 6 Months of Violations, The Fourth General Report on the Violations of Human Rights Arising from the Blockade, December 5, 2017 (Annex 9 to 19 February Response).
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- 12 - 3.To instruct international law firms to investigate the possibility of initiating law suits against the blockading states to obtain compensation for the injured parties; 4.To supervise and coordinate among state authorities, the private sector, individuals, and law firms in order to ensure that they are furnished with the documentation they need; and 5.To closely monitor the claim filed by the State of Qatar to the World Trade Organization and provide the requirements thereof. A cooperative relationship exists between the NHRC and the Compensation Claim Committee, to which the NHRC refers all of the complaints it receives. Numerous meetings continue to be held with it in order to categorize the victims in order to redress injuries in accordance with the relevant international and regional treaties.3228.The existence and role of the CCC shines a spotlight on Qatar’s claims in various respects. Most crucially, it reveals that Qatar has all along been in a position to orchestrate and determine the nature, scope and forum of the legal remedies pursued (or which could be pursued) by its nationals in their alleged claims arising out of the break in relations between the UAE and Qatar, whether in UAE or other courts, through investment treaties or at a higher international level, including the Qatari citizens whose complaints against the UAE are noted in Qatar’s submissions before the CERD Committee. It is a reasonable assumption, indeed an established fact (see paragraph 30, infra) that it has been doing just that.29.Moreover, the fact that Qatar has not disclosed its direct handling, supervision and funding of its nationals’ legal cases to the Committee, particularly as the availability of local remedies is a key element in the Committee’s determination of whether to entertain a matter referred to it, is revealing, and speaks volumes about its disingenuous intentions in launching this CERD Committee proceeding. Indeed, its behaviour can only suggest that it all along intended to mislead the Committee into believing a false narrative in which Qatar’s nationals have been left on their own, helpless, with no avenues to seek 32Id., p. 4 (emphasis added).
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- 13 - redress for their grievances. Qatar clearly knows otherwise. The Committee will appreciate that this disingenuous behavior is entirely unacceptable. 30.That Qatar has in fact orchestrated the legal claims of its nationals is established without doubt by the 200 or more notices of dispute, supported by the Qatari government, which have been filed by Qatari nationals under the Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (the “OIC Investment Agreement”),33 claiming damages against the UAE arising out of the break in relations between the two countries. These claims, which pursuant to the OIC Investment Agreement may be brought in UAE national courts or through a process of agreed conciliation and then arbitration, demonstrate not only that the Qatari government is funding and controlling the filing of claims by its nationals, but as each of these claims purports to seek a remedy through arbitration rather than through the UAE courts, they also reveal that the Qatari government is instructing its nationals to purposefully forego the pursuit of redress through UAE courts. 31.Thus, Qatar’s claims that its nationals are unable to access UAE courts or lack remedies in those courts lack credibility on various counts. The evidence demonstrates that numerous Qatari nationals are in fact proceeding to seek remedies before UAE courts. And what’s more, Qatar’s conduct in supporting claims under the OIC Investment Agreement demonstrates that even where UAE courts are specifically designated as the forum of choice, Qatar has instructed its nationals not to proceed before those courts and instead to pursue arbitration. 32.In light of these considerations, and in view of the domestic remedies the UAE has identified in its previous submissions,34 it would be highly unreasonable to conclude that 33 The UAE has received notices of dispute from these alleged claimants in four batches. The first batch of 13 notices is dated 5 April 2018, and a second notice signed by 80 alleged investors is dated 16 April 2018. All of these claimants are represented by the law firms of Debevoise & Plimpton, and DLA Piper. A third notice signed by 105 alleged investors is dated 26 September 2018, and these claimants are represented by the law firms of Debevoise & Plimpton, and Carter-Ruck. Finally, on 19 December 2018, the UAE Ministry of Justice received a notice of dispute from Qatar Airways. 34 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, paras. 52–62; UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018, paras. 65–70; UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, para. 85.
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- 14 - “all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case”, a requirement for the CERD Committee to deal with a matter referred to it pursuant to Article 11 of the Convention. That the Qatari government has, for almost two years now, undertaken a process of categorizing, investigating, supervising and coordinating the claims of its nationals against the UAE or other parties arising out of the break in relations between the two states, and in certain cases supporting the initiation of proceedings, makes it abundantly clear that Qatar itself is fully aware of the availability of these remedies and of the judicial fora in which they may be pursued. Its claims to the contrary are simply not to be believed. D.Qatar’s Conspicuously Misleading Discussion Concerning its Support for Extremists and Terrorists Reveals its True Colors 33.In the 19 February Response, Qatar calls the allegations connecting it to extremist and terrorist groups as “wild and incorrect”. Qatar says that such allegations are “pretextual” and an “attempt to cloak the UAE’s true motivation” for breaking diplomatic relations with Qatar and taking the other measures it has taken in relation to Qatar, including establishing the entry requirements for Qatari nationals which are at the heart of Qatar’s CERD complaint. The “true motivation” for having taken such actions is, according to Qatar, “to coerce Qatar into relinquishing sovereign control of its internal and external affairs.”35 Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, echoes this narrative. When asked “why are they [the Quartet] doing it, for what purpose?”, he replied “[t]hey don't like our independence, the way how we are thinking, our vision for the region. We want freedom of speech for the people of the region. And they're not happy with that. And so they think that this is a threat to them.”36 On the matter of “freedom of speech”, Qatar claims that far from being a “spokespiece” for extremists as the UAE alleges, 35 19 February Response, para. 16. 36 Interview of Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani by Charlie Rose, 29 October 2017, available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qatars-emir-stands-defiant-in-face-of-bloc….
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- 15 - Qatar’s state-owned broadcaster Al Jazeera is “a beacon of rigorous independent reporting”.3734.These remarks are ironic. As noted by Reporters Without Borders, Qatar has an “oppressive legislative arsenal and … draconian system of censorship. The government, the royal family, and Islam are off limits to reporters.”38 Thus, while Qatar claims to want “freedom of speech”, it prohibits that within its own borders. Moreover, “when their coverage is deemed impermissible, non-Qataris face much tougher punishments, including ‘termination, deportation, and imprisonment.’”39 A recent report noted that “[e]ven professionals in compliance with the rules can be harassed, arrested, or denied entry into Qatar.”4035.As for Al Jazeera, and in particular its Arabic language channel, to refer to it as a “beacon of rigorous independent reporting” is perverse. Indeed, in an obvious attempt to mislead, the accounts of the professionalism of Al Jazeera which Qatar has cited in the 19 February Response all relate exclusively to its English language channel, not its Arabic language sister channel, which is the source of most of the objectionable broadcasts in support of extremist groups which the UAE and others have complained about.41 The Arabic language channels of Al Jazeera would not be mistaken as a beacon of anything except possibly outrageous intolerance. For example, one of its most prominent journalists has openly expressed enthusiastic support for Al-Qaeda’s ideology in a television broadcast, and an extended interview on Al Jazeera with the Al Nusra Front leader Muhammad Al-Jolani was reported as having been so favorable that it has been described as Qatar’s “infomercial” for the terrorist group.42 It is perhaps not surprising 37 19 February Response, para. 16. 38 Reporters Without Borders, “Qatar”, available at: https://rsf.org/en/qatar. 39 Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press 2017: Qatar”, quoted in Ilan Berman (ed.), Digital Dictators, Media, Authoritarianism, and America’s New Challenge (Rowan & Littlefield, 2018), p. 82. 40Id.41 19 February Response, para. 16. 42 Mohamed Fahmy, “The Price of Aljazeera’s Politics”, THEWASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAREASTPOLICY,26June 2015, available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-price-of-a….
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- 16 - that an on-air poll of Al Jazeera viewers revealed that over 81% of them support ISIS.43Al Jazeera has also regularly broadcast the sermons of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and someone who has referred to the holocaust as “divine punishment” of the Jews and has called on Muslims to become suicide bombers in Palestine and Iraq as a “legitimate right” and a “duty”, among other outrages.4436.As Mohamed Fahmy, former journalist of the channel who was imprisoned in Egypt in connection with his work for Al Jazeera, states in relation to his experiences in Egypt covering the Arab Spring:The more the channel was in coordination and got guidance from the Qatari government, the more it became a megaphone for Qatari intelligence. There are many biased satellite channels, but this is beyond bias. Al-Jazeera has already turned into the voice of high-risk terrorists. . . .When I started meeting with some members of the Muslim Brotherhood and their sympathizers, they told me specifically that that they were filming the fake protests and selling them to Al-Jazeera for broadcasting, and dealing seamlessly with the Al-Jazeera network and some Egyptian production companies related to the Qatari channel.4537.Fahmy’s account of Al Jazeera’s policies in Egypt, and in support of the Muslim Brotherhood, is revealing. He says that “[m]y bosses also neglected to tell me that they had commissioned Muslim Brotherhood members to cover the Brotherhood’s own antigovernment protests and sell the footage to the banned Arabic arms of the Aljazeera network.” He later talked to some of the “activists” who “openly acknowledged receiving cameras and broadcast equipment from Aljazeera.”4643 AlJazeera, “Voting”, available at http://www.aljazeera.net/votes/pages?voteid=5270. 44 Antony Barnett, “Suicide Bombs are a Duty, says Islamic Scholar”, THEGUARDIAN, 28 August 2005, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/28/uk.terrorism. 45 Elie Leik, “Al-Jazeera and the Muslim Brotherhood”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, 25 June 2017, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/959986. 46 Mohamed Fahmy, “The Price of Aljazeera’s Politics”, THEWASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAREASTPOLICY,26June 2015, available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-price-of-a….
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- 17 - 38.Fahmy says that “[i]t is clear that Qatar uses Aljazeera as a tool of influence to advance the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood” and that “[c]urrent and former Aljazeera employees have repeatedly argued that the broadcasting network lacks impartiality and promotes a pro-Islamist narrative”: “The network’s slogan, ‘The opinion and the other opinion,’ represents a mirage, as the coverage fails to give voice to Qatar’s opposition, which calls for the right to protest and form political parties and labor unions . . . Sadly, its leadership has instead manipulated the truth and has revealed itself as a mouthpiece for extremism.”4739.The false narrative promoted by Qatar that claims that its association with extremism and terrorism, including its support for such groups through its state-owned media networks, most prominently Al Jazeera, is “pretextual” is more or less repeated in every submission Qatar has made to the Committee and to the ICJ in connection with the dispute between it and its neighbors, including the UAE. This narrative is deceptive. But for purposes of the communication which is now before the Committee, it is important to focus on just a few fundamental points of relevance which emerge from the allegations which have been made against Qatar in this regard. 40.First, and in complete contradiction to the disingenuous utterances of Qatar’s Emir when asked if he saw the Quartet’s break in relations with Qatar coming (“. . . it was a shock. It was a shock because a few weeks before that, we were meeting, all of us together, in one room, including President Trump. And we were discussing terrorism, financing terrorism. And nobody brought any concern from those countries. Nobody told me anything.”48), the concerns about Qatar’s support for extremists and terrorists, financial and otherwise, have been widely known and reported upon for many years. 41.Qatar, of course, denies its links to or support for such groups, but what it cannot deny is that it is a widely-held view the world over that these links and support exist, and that the UAE, along with other States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the “GCC”), share this 47Id.48 Interview of Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani by Charlie Rose, 29 October 2017, available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qatars-emir-stands-defiant-in-face-of-bloc….
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- 18 - view and consider it a serious threat. The most obvious evidence of this reality, and of the alarm felt by the UAE and those other GCC States, are the efforts which were made by them over a number of years to persuade Qatar to cut its links with and cease its support for such groups. Thus, the UAE, along with the other States comprising the GCC, including most importantly Qatar, entered into a series of agreements, duly registered at the United Nations,49 in 2013 and 2014 (the “Riyadh Agreements”) in which Qatar undertook, among other commitments: not to interfere “in the internal affairs of the [other] GCC States, whether directly or indirectly”; not to support deviant/extremist groups, “antagonistic media” or “the Muslim Brotherhood or any of the organizations, groups or individuals that threaten the security and stability of the [GCC] States”;50 “not to support the Muslim Brotherhood with money or via media in the GCC Countries or outside” and to “approve the exit of Muslim Brotherhood figures [from Qatar], who are not citizens, within a time limit to be agreed upon”; not to support groups in Yemen, Syria or any destabilized area “which pose a threat to the security and stability of GCC Countries”51; to “support the Arab Republic of Egypt, and contribute to its security, stability and its financial support”; and “to cease all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of Egypt in all media platforms, whether directly or indirectly, including all the offenses broadcast on Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media.”5242.Importantly, the Riyadh Agreements also contain a crucial provision stating that “If any country of the GCC Countries failed to comply with this mechanism, the other GCC 49 First Riyadh Agreement, 23 and 24 November 2013, United Nations Registration Number 55378 (“First Riyadh Agreement”); Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, 17 April 2014, United Nations Registration Number 55378 (“Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement”); Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, 16 November 2014, United Nations Registration Number 55378 (“Supplementary Riyadh Agreement”). The Parties to the Riyadh Agreements are: the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. The text of the Riyadh Agreements appears in: Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar), Joint Application, Annexes 2-4, available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/173/173-20180704-APP-01-01-E…. 50 First Riyadh Agreement, November 2013. 51 Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, 23 November 2013. 52 The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, 16 November 2014.
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- 19 - Countries shall have the right to take any appropriate action to protect their security and stability.”53 This provision may be seen as a type of pre-agreed consent for the aggrieved State to take counter-measures. 43.The minutes of a number of the meetings held in implementation of the Riyadh Agreements provide a clear view of the difficulties the UAE and other GCC States had with Qatar, in particular its support for and harboring of extremist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and the broadcasts of its state-owned “antagonistic media”, most specifically Al Jazeera. The minutes also reflect the frustration felt with Qatar’s failure to adequately comply with its obligations under the Riyadh Agreements. For instance, in a meeting in July 2014, the UAE representative complained that the “State of Qatar did not implement the basic provisions of the Riyadh Agreement . . . whereas the Muslim Brotherhood has not been deported, in fact they are being received, honored and provided with financial and moral support”.5444.The minutes from a subsequent meeting held a month and a half later following a successful round of diplomacy in which Qatar agreed to mend its ways confirmed the nature of the very core issues in dispute between Qatar and its GCC neighbors and that it was hoped that, unlike in previous occasions when Qatar’s commitments were not implemented, Qatar would this time abide by its promises. Thus, as related by the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia: We presented during our meeting with His Highness Shaikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani all the points in conflict, such as the support for Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood, political policy, Libya and the issue of the media as well as the groups that work against the GCC and the consequential dangers that affect us all. We discussed this in detail and we found an acceptance by His Highness and that he is exerting efforts in resolving this problem, particularly that he ascended to the throne a year ago and that he is the first and last person responsible for all that happens in Qatar. He gave his promise to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques 53 Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, p. 3 (“Thirdly: Compliance Procedures, 3. With regards to the internal security of the GCC Countries”). 54Annex 1, Fourth Report of the Follow-up Committee on the Implementation of the Riyadh Agreement Mechanism, 15 July 2014 (Arabic original, English translation).
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- 20 - and that he was committed to this promise. His Highness requested finding indisputable evidence for the implementation and said that he was prepared to cooperate in ‘all that you want’, adding that there is no problem without a solution. We informed His Highness that we would like him to stand by Egypt and not with the Muslim Brotherhood or encourage extremists. His Highness agreed to stop the media treatment against us, and, as you know, the media is part of the political policy of any country. His Highness said the media would be committed and will not taunt Egypt, but instead will stand by Egypt and support its efforts, adding that Qatar will not have a hand in supporting extremists or encouraging them, and that this is the policy that we want. . . .Proof is in implementation, and there are prior commitments that have not been implemented and we call for their implementation.5545.It is plain that the Riyadh Agreements, and the minutes of just a few of the meetings held in connection with their implementation, show the existence of a serious disagreement between the UAE (and other GCC member States) and Qatar over its financial and other support for extremist and terrorist groups, with their “consequential dangers that affect us all”, as well as with its politicized and antagonistic state media. Indeed, these documents reveal an outright admission by Qatar, and its head of state, that it was engaged in such practices and had promised to stop them. 46.However, since undertaking the commitments set out in the Riyadh Agreements reports too numerous to mention, from a wide array of sources: continue to link Qatar with support for Al-Qaeda,56 the Al-Nusra Front,57 ISIS,58 the Muslim Brotherhood,59 various 55Annex 2, Summary of Discussions in the Sixth Meeting of their Highnesses and Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Jeddah, 30 August 2014 (Arabic original, English translation). 56 United Nations, Security Council, Press Release, “Individuals Associated with Al-Qaida – Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy”, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11790.doc.htm. 57 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on ‘Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing’”, 4 March 2014, available at: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2308.aspx (“But a number of fundraisers operating in more permissive jurisdictions – particularly in Kuwait and Qatar – are soliciting donations to fund extremist insurgents, not to meet legitimate humanitarian needs. The recipients of these funds are often terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida’s Syrian affiliate, al-Nusrah Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group formerly known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).” (emphasis added)).
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- 21 - Iranian-backed militias60 and extremist groups operating in Syria, Libya, Egypt and other States;61 reveal that Qatar has continued to give sanctuary to dangerous extremists listed on U.N. and other terrorist sanctions lists;62 allege the distribution to extremist groups of millions of dollars raised by Qatar-located “charities”;63 and confirm the payment by Qatar of millions of dollars, possibly as much as a billion dollars, to terrorist and extremist groups as “ransom” (whether genuine or concocted) for the release of hostages.6458Id.59 Eric Trager, “The Muslim Brotherhood Is the Root of the Qatar Crisis”, THEATLANTIC,2July 2017, available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/muslim-brothe… (“The emir was infamously close with Egyptian-born cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the de facto Brotherhood spiritual guide who had lived in Qatar since 1961, and Al Jazeera had long provided a platform for Qaradawi and other Brotherhood figures to promote the group’s theocratic ideology.”). 60 Con Coughlin, “White House calls on Qatar to stop funding pro-Iranian militias”, THETELEGRAPH,12 May 2018, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/12/white-house-calls-qatar-sto… (“senior members of the Qatari government are on friendly terms with key figures in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard”). 61 “Egypt: Qatar is the Main Funder of Terrorism in Libya”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, 28 July 2017, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/962246 (Original in Arabic, free translation: “Tarek al-Qouni, Egyptian ambassador and assisting the Egyptian Foreign Minister on Arab States Affairs affirmed that Qatar is the main funder to terrorist groups and organisations in Libya in addition to other countries that he did not name.”); “New Human Rights Report Accuses Qatar of ‘Harbouring Terrorism in Libya’”, 24 August 2017, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/1006966 (Original in Arabic, free translation: “The Libyan non-government organisation “Justice or Not” based in Cairo held Qatar accused in a report the State of Qatar for harbouring terrorism financially and logistically”); Khaled Mahmood, “ National Libyan Army’s Spokesperson: Qatar and Turkey Try to Change the Demographic Composition of Libya”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, 27 July 2018, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/1344606https://aawsat.com/print/1344606 (Original in Arabic, free translation: “[The National Army’s spokesperson] affirmed that the Army has evidence in the form of tapes and documents proving the support of Turkey and Qatar to extremist and terrorist groups in Benghazi, [Libya] … The Libyan National Army accused yesterday, Qatar and Turkey, once again, of trying to change the demographic composition of the Libyan State.)62 “‘Wanted Terrorist’ finished second in Qatar triathlon”, 28March 2018, THEWEEK, available at: https://www.theweek.co.uk/odd-news/92582/wanted-terrorist-finishes-seco…; United Nations, Security Council, Press Release, “Individuals Associated with Al-Qaida – Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy”, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11790.doc.htm. 63 Zoltan Pall, “Kuwaiti Salafism and Its Growing Influence in the Levant”, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FORINTERNATIONAL PEACE,7 May 2014, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/kuwaiti-salafism-and-its-growi…. 64 Erika Solomon, “The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals”, THEFINANCIAL TIMES,5 June 2017, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43?mhq5j=e2; Christian Chesnot, Georges Malbrunot, NOS TRES CHERS EMIRS, 2016, at pp.141-143 (Original in French, free translation: “For a decade, in around ten cases of hostages, Qatar settled the bill at the benefit of the hostage takers. The total amount of money hence transferred to al-Nosra may be around $ 150 million.” (emphasis added)).
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- 22 - 47.Its support for extremist groups in Libya have been repeatedly pointed out by various sources including an Egyptian diplomat65, local NGOs66 and by parts of the Libyan army67. The latter even went further as it found evidence of Qatar’s policy of harbouring terrorists resulting in a “change in the demographic composition of the State of Libya”.68Likewise, Qatar has been repeatedly criticized – in particular by the United States – for funding and supporting extremist Iran-backed militias in the MENA region.69 In Syria, Qatar’s support for a range of extremist and terrorist groups, including ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front,70 were all but acknowledged by Qatar’s foreign minister as early as 2012 when he noted that “I am very much against excluding anyone at this stage, or bracketing 65 “Egypt: Qatar is the Main Funder of Terrorism in Libya”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, 28 July 2017, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/962246 (Original in Arabic, free translation: “Tarek al-Qouni, Egyptian ambassador and assisting the Egyptian Foreign Minister on Arab States Affairs affirmed that Qatar is the main funder to terrorist groups and organisations in Libya in addition to other countries that he did not name.”). 66 “New Human Rights Report Accuses Qatar of ‘Harbouring Terrorism in Libya’”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, 24 August 2017, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/1006966 (Original in Arabic, free translation: “The Libyan non-government organisation “Justice or Not” based in Cairo held Qatar accused in a report the State of Qatar for harbouring terrorism financially and logistically”). 67 Khaled Mahmood, “ National Libyan Army’s Spokesperson: Qatar and Turkey Try to Change the Demographic Composition of Libya”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, 27 July 2018, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/1344606 (Original in Arabic, free translation: “[The National Army’s spokesperson] affirmed that the Army has evidence in the form of tapes and documents proving the support of Turkey and Qatar to extremist and terrorist groups in Benghazi, [Libya]). 68Id.,(Original in Arabic, free translation: “The Libyan National Army accused yesterday, Qatar and Turkey, once again, of trying to change the demographic composition of the Libyan State.”). 69 “The White House Invites Qatar to Stop Funding Militias”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT, 13 May 2018, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/1266656 (Original in Arabic, free translation: “After 13 days upon The Washington Post’s revelations on secret exchanges demonstrating that Doha contributed $ 1 billion to extremist militias in Syria and Iraq, The Telegraph made yesterday public that the American Administration invited Doha to refrain from funding militias directly linked to Iran.”); See also,“The Telegraph: The White House Asks Qatar to Stop Funding Iran-Backed Militias”, ASHARQAL-AWSAT,12 May 2018, available at: https://aawsat.com/print/1266391 (Original in Arabic, free translation: The American President Administration urged Qatar to stop funding Iran-backed militias, and this after revelations regarding ties between Doha and terrorist organisations in the Middle East. American security expressed voiced their concerns regarding such ties, especially as they include links with militias backed by Iran that Washington deems as terrorists organisations and groups. The British newspaper The Telegraph affirmed the demands Washington made to Doha as regards refraining from supporting and funding terrorists groups came after the discovery of various e-mails sent by Qatari high-ranked officials to leaders from Hezbollah, a militia backed by Iran and based in South Lebanon, as well as to leaders of the Iranian Revolution (…) Many high officials in the State of Qatar enjoy firm relationships with high-profile Iran Revolution leaders such as Qasem Soleimani who is in charge of the Quds Force [a unit primarily responsible for extraterritorial military activities and clandestine operations] and Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah.”). 70 “Al-Nosra, the Qatari Terrorist Arm in Syria”, SKYNEWS ARABIA, 17 June 2017, available at https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/957485.
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- 23 - them as terrorists, or bracketing them as Al Qaeda given Qatar’s necessity of removing [Bashar] Al Assad at all costs.”7148.As certain as it is, based on the history surrounding the Riyadh Agreements and the overwhelming weight of reporting by both media and governmental sources since they were concluded, that the allegations of Qatar’s continuing support for extremism and terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa are true, the UAE does not ask the Committee to reach a judgment on that question. Rather, the UAE has briefly recounted these matters in order to provide the Committee with “relevant information”, in accordance with Article 11(4) of the CERD. This information is relevant for a number of reasons. 49.First, it frames for the Committee the circumstances in which the UAE and the other members of the Quartet severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and took the other measures in question, including the establishment of entry requirements for Qatari nationals wishing to visit the UAE, the only measure which Qatar (incorrectly) has in fact pointed to as an alleged violation of the CERD. Contrary to the misrepresentations of Qatar, the rupture in relations between the UAE and Qatar was not part of some attempt to subjugate Qatar and deprive it of its independence, a proposition for which Qatar provides absolutely no evidence or reasoning. Rather, it was due to the UAE’s determination that Qatar had, notwithstanding its obligations under the Riyadh Agreements, continued to support extremism in the region, conduct which its neighbours, including the UAE, view as a grave and serious threat to stability. The brief and documented history recounted above should make this clear. 50.Second, the facts about the circumstances in which the UAE and other Quartet members severed relations with Qatar is relevant for the Committee because it may assist it in making determinations about the credibility of other factual and contrary allegations made by the parties in their submissions. The unfortunate truth is that Qatar has engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation in this case, for instance repeatedly claiming (although it 71 Elizabeth Dickinson, “The Case Against Qatar”, FOREIGN POLICY,available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/30/the-case-against-qatar/.
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- 24 - knew it was untrue) that Qataris had been collectively expelled from the UAE and that Qataris have been banned from entering the country. The further piece of Qatar’s narrative – that its neighbors sought to isolate it after it refused to succumb to a loss of independence and sovereignty – is simply another fabrication whose purpose is to avoid acknowledging the obvious reality that it was its continuing support for extremism and terrorism which brought about its isolation. When considering other factual disagreements between the parties, the Committee is asked to keep these examples, and Qatar’s demonstrated lack of credibility, in mind. II.LACK OF JURISDICTION:QATAR’SARTICLE 11COMMUNICATION FALLSOUTSIDE THE SCOPERATIONE MATERIAE OF THE CERD51.While Qatar repeatedly insists that the alleged acts of the UAE constitute discrimination on the basis of “national origin”, it is clear that Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outside the scoperatione materiae of the CERD.72 Indeed, in the 19 February Response, Qatar once again reiterates, accompanied by a lengthy analysis, that Qatar’s position is that the CERD prohibits “nationality-based discrimination” as a form of racial discrimination proscribed by the Convention.7352.Contrary to the claims of Qatar, the CERD does not prohibit a State from treating individuals differently based on their current nationality. Article 1(1) of the CERD does not contain nationality as a prohibited ground of discrimination. The inclusion of “national . . . origin” within the definition of “racial discrimination” in Article 1(1) does not extend the notion of racial discrimination to differences of treatment based solely on present nationality. 53.The Qatari claims are based on a misrepresentation of the ordinary meaning of the words of Article 1(1) of the CERD and on a misleading recitation of the travaux préparatoires.72 In its first submission before this Committee Qatar expressly stated that “In imposing the Coercive Measures, UAE has unlawfully targeted Qatari citizens solely on the basis of nationality” Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, 8 March 2018, para. 58. 73See, e.g., 19 February Response, para. 22.
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- 25 - As detailed below, the ordinary meaning of the words “national origin” in the CERD read in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention make it plain that current nationality is not a basis of discrimination under the CERD. Furthermore, the travauxpréparatoires, when not distorted, confirm the unequivocal intention of its drafters that the CERD should not cover differentiation based on current nationality. Accordingly, the acts alleged by Qatar do not fall within the provisions of the CERD nor the jurisdiction of the Committee (Section A). 54.Qatar’s new argument that the UAE’s measures would fall within the scope of the CERD irrespective of whether “national origin” in Article 1(1) encompassed current nationality because the measures “have an unjustifiable negative impact on persons who are of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense . . . : on the basis of characteristics such as ‘heritage’ or their ability to ‘trace’ their origin to Qatar”,74 a last-minute attempt to overcome the obvious flaws of its primary argument, also fails (Section B).A.The CERD Does Not Prohibit Differentiated Treatment Based on Current Nationality55.Under the customary international law rules of treaty interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “VCLT”), treaties are to be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to their terms in their context and in light of the their object and purpose.75The interpretation of the CERD follows the same rules. In accordance with these rules, the CERD cannot apply to the acts which form the basis of Qatar’s claims, namely, discrimination on the basis of current nationality.56.Article 1(1) of the CERD provides:In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 74 19 February Response, para. 55. 75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNITED NATIONS TREATYSERIES 331(1980),Article 31(1).
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- 26 - exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.7657.The ordinary meaning of “national . . . origin”, read in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention does not equate with an individual’s current nationality. This is confirmed by the travaux préparatoires of the CERD. The CERD does not prohibit the alleged discrimination of individuals of which Qatar complains, since such differentiation, as Qatar admits, is based on current nationality.1.The Ordinary Meaning of “National Origin” Does Not Encompass Current Nationality 58.As expressed by the International Law Commission when codifying the customary international law rules on treaty interpretation, “the text [of the Treaty] must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and . . . in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text”.7759.Qatar resorts to the dictionary definitions of “origin” and “national” but draws the wrong conclusions as to what the phrase “national . . . origin” means in Article 1(1). The UAE agrees that the dictionary definition of “origin” concerns “a person’s social background or ancestry”,78 even “the country from which [a] person comes”79. With respect to “national”, it is used in its adjectival form of nation, which is defined as “the people living in, belonging to, and together forming, a single state” or “a race of people of common descent, history, language or culture, etc, but not necessarily bound by defined 76 CERD, Article 1(1) (emphasis added). 77ILC Yearbook 1966, vol. II, p. 220. 78 19 February Response, para. 24, citing to definition of “origin” in Oxford Dictionaries, available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/origin. 79 19 February Response, para. 24, citing to definition of “origin” in Cambridge Dictionary, available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/origin.
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- 27 - territorial limits of a state.”80 When taken with “origin”, the second sense of “nation” is the most appropriate. 60.“National origin”, then, in its ordinary meaning, cannot be equated to nationality.81Nationality is a legal relationship between an individual and a state.82 An individual can acquire a nationality or lose it; he can even hold more than one nationality at once. But one’s origin is immutable and inherent to the individual. Whilst one might migrate to another State and be naturalized there, that cannot rewrite the history of the individual and cannot be said to have any effect on the individual’s origin. Although a person’s nationality may coincide with his national origin, it is just that: a coincidence.83 Thus, 80The Chambers Dictionary,definition of “nation,” available at: https://chambers.co.uk. (emphasis added). In one of the dictionary definitions of “nation” that Qatar refers to, that of the Cambridge Dictionary, Qatar conveniently omits reference to the second sense of “nation” therein defined as: “a large group of people of the same race who share the same language, traditions, and history, but who might not all live in one area.” Cambridge Dictionary,definition of “Nation,” available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/nation (emphasis added). 81Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018, Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian, para. 4 (“When the Convention considers ‘national origin’ as one of the prohibited bases for discrimination, it does not refer to nationality”); id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Salam, para. 5 (“This question of the distinction between ‘nationality’ and ‘national origin’ should not, in my view, admit of any confusion. They are two different notions”); See also id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, para. 1 (“Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) distinguishes on its face between discrimination on grounds of national origin (equated to racial discrimination and prohibited per se) and differentiation on grounds of nationality (not prohibited as such)”). 82 Karin de Vries, Integration at the Border: The Dutch Act on Integration Abroad and International Immigration Law (Hart Publishing 2013), p. 304 (“From a legal perspective the distinction made above [between nationality as “a politico-legal term, denoting membership of a state” and as a “historico-biological term, denoting membership of a nation”] is significant because, as is submitted here, nationality as a legal status is not included in the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ provided in Article 1(1) of the CERD. While this definition mentions ‘national origin’, this term does not refer to the legal bond between a person and a state. Instead, it follows from the travaux préparatoires of the Convention that the term ‘national origin’ should be understood in conjunction with ‘descent’ and ‘ethnic origin’ to indicate nationality in the ethnographical sense.”) (emphasis added). The 1955 Oppenheim’s International Law, current at the time of the drafting the CERD, provides this definition: “‘Nationality’ in the sense of citizenship of a certain state must not be confused with ‘nationality’ as meaning membership of a certain nation in the sense of race. Thus, according to international law, Englishmen and Scotsmen are, despite their different nationality as regards race, all of British nationality as regards their citizenship. Thus further, although all Polish individuals are of Polish nationality qua race, for many generations there were no Poles qua citizenship.” Lassa Oppenheim, International Law,(8th ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 1955), p. 645. 83 For example, a person born in Canada to Canadian parents would be considered as having a Canadian national origin. His nationality may also incidentally be Canadian. If he later migrates to Brazil and lives there for some time, Brazil may grant him Brazilian nationality. But this in no way affects his national origin. He would be a national of Brazil with Canadian national origin.
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- 28 - national origin and nationality are distinct concepts,84 and the ordinary meanings of the words do not permit the interpretation on which Qatar relies. 2.Taken in Context, “National Origin” Cannot Encompass Current Nationality61.The ordinary meaning of a treaty term “is not to be determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty.”85 The immediate “context” includes the remaining terms of the provision, the entire article, the preamble of the treaty and any annexes.8662.The context of the term “national . . . origin” in the CERD confirms that it cannot mean nationality. The ordinary meaning of “national . . . origin” is necessarily informed by the link with the concept of “ethnic origin” in Article 1(1) and immediately follows the other bases of racial discrimination under the CERD, which are race, colour and descent. These three characteristics, together with ethnic origin are all immutable. “National . . . origin,” read in this context, is no different. Thus, the CERD prohibits discrimination based on those characteristics which, like one’s national origin, are inherent and unchanging. Nationality, by contrast, is not an inherent quality but can change over time. The context of Article 1 precludes national origin meaning nationality. 63.Furthermore, if it did mean nationality, the drafters could easily have used that word. Elsewhere in the CERD, and in the same Article even, “nationality” is used.87 That the drafters did not use the term “nationality” in Article 1(1) thus suggests a deliberate choice. “National origin”, not nationality, was le mot juste to define the prohibited grounds of discrimination in a convention concluded with the aim of eliminating “all forms of racial discrimination” (emphasis added). 84 Other examples that show the two concepts are different include: a person could have Zulu national origin but South African nationality, or Aymaran national origin but nationality of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, or Inuit national origin but Canadian, Danish or American nationality. 85ILC Yearbook 1966, vol. II, p. 221. 86 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNITED NATIONS TREATYSERIES 331(1980), Article 31(2). 87 CERD, Article 1(3).
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- 29 - 64.Other provisions of the CERD confirm this delimitation of Article 1(1) to national orign as indicating immutable qualities. Article 1(2), which forms part of the immediate context of Article 1(1) expressly recognizes and carves out from the scope of application of the Convention, the right of States to make distinctions between “citizens and non-citizens”. This provision therefore in fact permits differential treatment on the basis of nationality. Similarly, Article 1(3) expressly uses the word “nationality” when providing that the CERD may not be interpreted “as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalizations, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.”8865.The conclusion that nationality does not fall within the scope of discrimination on the basis of “national origin” in Article 1(1) is also confirmed by Article 5. This provision enumerates protected rights, amongst them the right to vote and stand for election, and requires States Parties to guarantee equality before the law in the enjoyment of those rights “without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin.” It would be absurd to interpret “national origin” as meaning “nationality” in that context. On Qatar’s interpretation of “national origin”, a State that conferred on nationals of certain States the right to vote or the right to be a public servant would be obliged to confer such rights on nationals of allStates. This cannot be the meaning of the CERD. 66.The other rights protected in Article 5 confirm that “national origin” cannot mean nationality. The rights include the right to own property, the right to work, the right to public health, medical care, social security and social services, and the right to education. These are just the kind of rights for which States Parties to the CERD customarily differentiate between nationals and non-nationals, as further elaborated below.89 If Qatar is correct, then such widely accepted practice would be in breach of Article 5. Against this background, the only tenable interpretation is that “national origin” does not mean “nationality”. 88 CERD, Article 1(3). 89See infra paras. 89-93.
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- 30 - 3.The Object and Purpose of the CERD Confirms That “National Origin” Does Not Encompass Current Nationality 67.The conclusion that current nationality does not fall within the scope of the grounds of prohibited discrimination in Article 1(1) is confirmed by the object and purpose of the CERD. In the absence of a clause specifically stating the purpose of a treaty, the title of that treaty may provide helpful guidance.90 Similarly, “the preamble of a treaty is regularly a place where the parties list the purposes they want to pursue through their agreement.”91 As the name of the Convention indicates, its object and purpose is to eliminate racial discrimination. The Preamble reinforces this aim in the following terms: Reaffirming that discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin is an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples and the harmony of persons living side by side even within one and the same State. . . .Resolved to adopt all necessary measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, and to prevent and combat racist doctrines and practices in order to promote understanding between races and to build an international community free from all forms of racial segregation and racial discrimination.9268.Other parts of the Preamble equally reinforce the overall aim of putting an end to racial discrimination with no indication of any intention to prohibit discrimination on the basis 90 Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer Science & Business Media 2011), p. 546. 91Id.92 CERD, Preamble (emphasis added).
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- 31 - of present nationality.93 The substantive provisions also reveal the overarching object and purpose of the Convention.9469.Thus, taking the ordinary meaning of “national origin” in its context, and in light of the object and purpose of the CERD to stamp out racial discrimination, “national origin” is an individual’s permanent association with a particular nation of people. It does not equate to nationality. Whereas a “national origin” is perpetual and links the individual to a nation of people, nationality is a legal relationship with a State, a relationship which can come or go. The two concepts are not the same; and whilst the CERD prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin, it does not prohibit it on the basis of present nationality. 4.The Ordinary Meaning of “National Origin” Is Confirmed By the Travaux Préparatoires70.Thetravaux préparatoires confirm the interpretation arrived at by applying the “general rule of interpretation” codified in Article 31(1) of the VCLT, i.e., that the inclusion of “national . . . origin” in Article 1(1) does not extend the definition of racial discrimination to include differences of treatment based on present nationality.95 The drafters of the Convention had in mind two distinct concepts.9671.The drafting of the CERD took place in three stages: in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (the “Sub-Commission”), then 93 CERD, Preamble (“Convinced that any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere”) (emphasis added); id. (“Convinced that the existence of racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of any human society”) (emphasis added); id. (“Alarmed by manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas of the world and by governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred, such as policies of apartheid, segregation or separation.”) (emphasis added). 94See,e.g., CERD, Article 2(1) (obligation to pursue a “policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races”); id., Article 4 (condemning and obliging States to eradicate “all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin”). 95 Recourse may be had to the preparatory works of a treaty to confirm its meaning. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNITEDNATIONS TREATYSERIES 331(1980),Article 32. 96See,e.g., the Chairman at the 411th meeting of the Sub-Commission. See infra para. 78.
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- 32 - the Commission on Human Rights, and finally the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Once this process was complete, the General Assembly passed a resolution approving the final text of the CERD and opening it for signature and ratification.97 At all three stages of drafting, the delegates were aware of the distinction between “national origin” and “nationality” and were keen to avoid any overlap between the two terms. 72.In the 19 February Response, Qatar quotes and cites selectively from the travauxpréparatoires to support its conclusion that the CERD applies to discrimination on the basis of present nationality. This is not tenable. Looking at the travaux préparatoiresmore broadly it is clear that, whilst some delegates recognised “national origin” might encompass present nationality, they were eager to avoid that interpretation.73.Thetravaux préparatoires confirm what is apparent from the ordinary meaning of the words, their context and the purpose of the CERD. “National origin” does not encompass present nationality. Subsequent practice of States Parties to the CERD confirm that it cannot be otherwise.9897 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965. 98See infra paras. 90-92.
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- 33 - a)The Travaux Within the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 74.Three working drafts were initially prepared in the Sub-Commission. In two of those three drafts, the definition of “racial discrimination” included discrimination based on an individual’s “national origin”.9975.The Sub-Commission never intended “national origin” to mean nationality. This is made clear in the debates within the Sub-Commission about proposals to remove “national origin” from the draft convention or whether to include the word “nationality” in Article 1. The consensus was that the latter term would overstep the remit of a convention on racial discrimination and that “national origin” as a basis of prohibited racial discrimination should be retained, on the grounds that it was clear that “national origin” did not mean nationality.100 This view was expressed by the representative for Finland, Mr Saario, who commented that: [E]veryone understood what was meant by the term “national origin”, and he would not object to its use in the definition. . . . [T]he difference between the terms “nationality” and “national origin” was clear. In international law, the term “nationality” was 99 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by Messrs Ivanov and Ketrzynski, 15 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.314, Article 1(1) (“the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any differentiation, ban on access, exclusion, preference or limitation based on race, colour, national or ethnic origin”); Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Suggested Draft for United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by Mr Abram, 13 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.308, Articles 1 (“the term racial discrimination includes any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, or ethnic origin, and in the case of States composed of different nationalities or persons of different national origin, discrimination based on such differences”) and 2(1) (“No State Party shall make any discrimination whatsoever against persons, groups of persons or institutions on the grounds of race, colour, or ethnic origin, or where applicable, on the basis of ‘nationality’ or national origin.”). The third draft, submitted by Mr Calvocoressi, omitted any reference to “national origin”, prohibiting only racial discrimination based on “race, colour, or ethnic origin”. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by Mr Calvocoressi, 13 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.309, p. 1 (Article 1). 100 A minority of members opposed the use of “national origin” due to concerns that it might be misinterpreted to mean nationality, whereas that was not the intention. See,e.g., Mr Capotorti, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 411th meeting, 16 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411, pp. 5-6.
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- 34 - frequently used to mean “citizenship” ... the use of the term “national origin” would avoid ambiguity”.10176.Accordingly, the Sub-Commission did not consider it necessary to adopt an amendment proposed by Mr Krishnaswami, the delegate from India, which included “nationality”, but only in quotation marks and only in a special sense explained in an important footnote:“Nationality” as the term is used in this convention, is different from the meaning of the term in public international law where it indicates a recognized link between an individual and a State to which he owes allegiance and which has an international responsibility for him. It is for that reason that this term is within quotation marks. Its meaning in the present context is that which it has in the case of States composed of groups of different origin.10277.The delegate from India went on to explain that: “With that explanatory footnote, the article could not be interpreted as denying to a State its right to make special provisions regarding aliens within its territory.”103 The rejection of the inclusion of this amendment and the explanation of delegates for doing so shows that in order to avoid using “nationality” in a special sense, the term “national origin” was preferable.104101 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 411th meeting, 16 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411, pp. 6, 12. 102 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 411th meeting, 16 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411, p. 4. 103 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 411th meeting, 16 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411, p. 4. 104 Mr Cuevas Cancino, the delegate from Mexico, was opposed to the use of a special meaning of “nationality” and the use of a footnote to explain that meaning. He was not opposed to the meaning itself, or to the content of the footnote, which excluded current nationality as a basis of discrimination. Furthermore, to avoid using “nationality” in a special sense, he preferred “national origin” to the exclusion of “nationality” as a basis of discrimination. See,Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 411th meeting, 16 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411, pp. 9-10. The Chairman speaking in his personal capacity took the position of Mr Cuevas Cancino and “agreed that the term ‘national origin’ was preferable to ‘nationality’, and he would certainly not be in favour putting that word in quotation marks or using a footnote. Such a procedure would not make for clarity, a primary requirement in the convention.” Id., p. 10. One lone voice in this meeting of the Sub-Commission would have preferred “nationality” as a base of discrimination over “national origin.” Mr Calvocoressi said that he “had some doubts about the use of the term ‘national origin’ and preferred the term ‘nationality’.” Id. Without knowing his misgivings, however, and in the face of the overwhelming consensus for excluding the term “nationality”, such a statement is of little weight.
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- 35 - 78.This tension between a special meaning of “nationality” and “national origin” continued in the discussions in the Sub-Commission. In fact, the draft text of Article 1 eventually adopted unanimously by the Sub-Commission and proposed to the Commission on Human Rights defined “racial discrimination” as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, national or ethnic origin (and in the case of States composed of different nationalities discrimination based on such difference)”.105However, this was accompanied by an interpretative article, Article 8, which clarified that the term “nationalities” was being used in this draft Article 1 with a special meaning.106 The Chairman of the Sub-Commission explained that this interpretive article was intended to indicate that the draft convention “did not change the status quo ante with respect to the political rights of non-nationals”.107 The representative of the United States of America considered that the text of Article 8 served “to prevent anything from being read into the term ‘nationality’ in article 1 which that term was not intended to mean”.108 The delegate for Sudan, Mr Mudawi, also expressed his opinion in a similar way by indicating that the text of Article 8 would prevent a “misinterpretation” between “national origin” and “nationality” and would clarify that “nationality” did not refer to an individual’s legal relationship to a State.109105 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 414th meeting, 17 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.414, p. 10; Report of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 11 February 1964, doc. E/CN.4/873, p. 46. 106 “Nothing in the present convention may be interpreted as implicitly recognizing or denying political or other rights to non-nationalsnor to groups of persons of a common race, colour, ethnic or national origin which exist or may exist as distinct groups within a State Party.” Report of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 11 February 1964, doc. E/CN.4/873, p. 49 (emphasis added). 107See,Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 427th meeting, 28 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427, p. 5. 108See,Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 427th meeting, 28 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427, p. 5. 109 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 427th meeting, 28 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427, p. 3 (“[T]he object of [Draft Article 8] was to remove the difficulty arising from the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘national origin’ in article I as adopted (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.322). The terms ‘nationality’, as used in the draft convention, referred to membership in a group within a nation. Because, however, in public international law that term referred to the relationship between a citizen and his country, the provisions of the draft convention might be interpreted as implying that nationals and non-nationals must be put on the same footing.”).
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- 36 - 79.Draft Article 8 therefore also confirms that Article 1 of the Sub-Commission’s draft convention was not intended to include present nationality as a basis of racial discrimination. b)The Travaux Within the Commission of Human Rights 80.Discussions in the Commission tell the same story, i.e., that the members of the Commission agreed that racial discrimination should not include differentiation on the basis of nationality. Qatar cites the Summary Record of the 809th Meeting of the Commission to support the proposition that delegates felt “national origin” could be interpreted as inclusive of nationality.110 This is not the complete picture. Some delegates were indeed concerned that “national origin” could be construed to mean present nationality, but that is not to say that the Commission actually intended that meaning. On the contrary, delegates at that meeting desired the Convention to exclude current nationality as a basis of racial discrimination.11181.This debate over the risk of misinterpretation of “national origin” surfaced in the Commission after the Commission decided to delete the text included in parenthesis in Article 1 of the Sub-Commission’s draft112 (which read “in the case of States composed of different nationalities, discrimination based on such difference”113) and to delete draft Article 8 of the Sub-Commission’s draft, which had been designed to indicate that 110 19 February Response, para. 46, citing to Commission on Human Rights, 809th meeting, 13 March 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.809. 111 For example, the delegate from France, worried that “national origin” might mean “current nationality”, certainly did not desire that meaning, nor did he desire “current nationality” to be a base for discrimination; and therefore the delegate voted to retain draft article 8 which precluded that meaning. Commission on Human Rights, 809th meeting, 13 March 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.809, p. 4. The delegate from the USSR agreed that current nationality should not be a base of discrimination. He argued that “it was sufficiently clear from the context of article I that the reference to national origin, which was a key element of the definition of racial discrimination, bore no relation to questions of citizenship.” Id., p. 4. The delegate from the United Kingdom, despite the ambiguity of “national origin”, was convinced that the term “could not be equated with nationality because in that event, States would be prohibited from distinguishing between nationals and non-nationals in the matter of political rights.” Id., p. 5 (“If it meant the country of origin of nationals further ambiguities arose which would make it impossible for some States to undertake the obligations inherent in the convention.”). 112 Commission on Human Rights, 786th meeting, 26 February 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.786, p. 3 (indicating that the deletion of the phrase in parenthesis was adopted by 14 votes to 2 with 5 abstentions). See supra para. 78. 113 Report of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 11 February 1964, doc. E/CN.4/873, p. 46.
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- 37 - “national origin” was not the same as “nationality”.114 Without Article 8 to qualify the term “national origin”, the delegate from France believed the draft convention was no longer acceptable and so proposed deleting the word “national” before “or ethnic origin.”115 He believed “it was unnecessary to refer to nationality in a convention on the elimination of racial discrimination.”11682.The responses of the delegate from the USSR and from India are both revealing. In spite of the USSR delegate’s grave discomfort with “national origin”, he felt that to delete the word in the Russian text “would mean that discrimination was tolerated when the victim belonged to a different national group.”117 It is telling that he was concerned for victims of different “national groups” — not different nationalities. More explicitly, the delegate from India was in favour of keeping the phrase “since the Sub-Commission had in mind the plight of persons of Indian and Pakistani origin in the Republic of South Africa”.118The nationality, in a strict legal sense, of victims is irrelevant. 83.The meeting which followed reflects this conclusion. The Danish delegate proposed a compromise amendment to Article 1 which included the word “national” in square brackets and part of what had been draft article 8 in the Sub-Commission to be added at the end of the definition of racial discrimination, also in square brackets.119 This proposal read as follows: In this Convention the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, [national] or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public 114 Commission on Human Rights, 808th meeting, 12 March 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.808, p. 17 (indicating that article 8 was deleted by 12 votes to 2, with 7 abstentions). 115 Commission on Human Rights, 809th meeting, 13 March 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.809, pp. 4, 6, 7. 116 Commission on Human Rights, 809th meeting, 13 March 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.809, p. 8 (emphasis added). 117 Commission on Human Rights, 809th meeting, 13 March 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.809, p. 7. 118 Commission on Human Rights, 809th meeting, 13 March 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.809, (emphasis added) p. 8. 119 Commission on Human Rights, 810th meeting, 15 May 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.810, p. 5.
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- 38 - field.[In this paragraph the expression ‘national origin’ does not cover the status of any person as a citizen of a given State.]”12084.The Commission adopted this wording unanimously121 and this was the text that was elevated to the Third Committee of the General Assembly,122 with this phrase in square brackets that indicated that “national origin” did not cover “nationality”. c)The Travaux Within the Third Committee of the General Assembly 85.Qatar also mischaracterizes the travaux préparatoires of the Third Committee of the General Assembly by claiming that “the delegates expressed the view that the term ‘national origin’ could be interpreted in a number of different ways, including to encompass nationality in the sense of citizenship as well as in the sense of an individual’s historical-cultural connections to a State.”123 Qatar cites the delegate of France as one who saw “national origin” as encompassing the above two meanings.124 Qatar passes over, however, that the delegate of France, with the United States, suggested an amendment precisely to avoid that double meaning. The amendment suggested read: In this Convention the expression ‘national origin’ does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’, and the Convention shall therefore not be applicable to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences based on differences of nationality or citizenship.12586.Other delegates, whilst recognising the potential ambiguity of “national origin”, also intended the phrase to exclude current nationality. These include the following: 120 Report of the Commission on Human Rights on the Twentieth Session (1964), in Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-seventh session, Supplement No. 8, doc. E/CN.4/874, p. 111 (emphasis added).121 Commission on Human Rights, 810th meeting, 15 May 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.810, p. 6. 122 Report of the Commission on Human Rights on the Twentieth Session (1964), in Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-seventh session, Supplement No. 8, doc. E/CN.4/874, pp. 108-114. 123 19 February Response, para. 44. 124 19 February Response, para. 44, citing to Third Committee, 1304th meeting, 14 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1304, p. 84. 125 Report of the Third Committee – Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, doc. A/6181, para. 32.
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- 39 - •The delegate from Poland believed the phrase “national origin” was to capture those situations “in which a politically organised nation was included within a different State and continued to exist in the social and cultural senses even though it had no government of its own. The members of such a nation within a State might be discriminated against, not as members of a particular race or as individuals, but as members of a nation which existed in its former political form.”126•The delegate from Austria, seeing no ambiguity in “national origin”, was keen to see it stay.It was clear to him what the phrase aimed to eliminate: “For half a century the terms ‘national origin’ and ‘nationality’ had been widely used in literature and in international instruments as relating, not to persons who were citizens of or held passports issued by a given State, but to those having a certain culture, language and traditional way of life peculiar to a nation but who lived within another State.”127•A delegate whom Qatar quotes, Mr Gueye of Senegal, also used the phrase “national origin” as a concept distinct from current nationality. Noting the potential ambiguity, he believed that the “expression should nevertheless be retained, since it would offer protection to persons of foreign birth who had become nationals of their country of residence and who in some cases suffered from discrimination, as well as foreign minorities within a State which might also be subjected to persecution”.128•The delegate from Hungary had the same concern when he raised the “need to find a clear formulation prohibiting discrimination against persons who were full citizens of a State but had a different nationality, in the sense of another mother tongue, different cultural traditions, and so forth”.129 Again, there can be no discrimination of such citizens based on their current nationality (in the legal sense). The CERD, the delegate hoped, would rather eliminate discrimination based on their national origin, a social-cultural concept. •The delegate from the United States of America said: “National origin differed from nationality in that national origin related to the past – the previous nationality or geographical region of the individual or of his ancestors – while nationality related to present 126 Third Committee, 1304th meeting, 14 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1304, para. 5 (emphasis added). 127 Third Committee, 1304th meeting, 14 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1304, para. 13. 128 Third Committee, 1304th meeting, 14 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1304, para. 16 (emphasis added). 129 Third Committee, 1304th meeting, 14 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1304, para. 21 (emphasis added).
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- 40 - status. The use of the former term in the Convention would make it clear that persons were protected against discrimination regardless of where they or their ancestors had come from. National origin differed from citizenship in that it related to non-citizens as well as to citizens”.13087.Admittedly, as Qatar points out, the U.S. and France did withdraw their amendment which clarified in specific terms that current nationality was not a basis of discrimination prohibited by the Convention.131 However, they withdrew it in favour of a compromise amendment by nine States which ultimately became the provisions of Article 1 of the CERD.132 When withdrawing the U.S-France amendment, France’s representative explained that the nine-State amendment was “entirely acceptable to his delegation and to that of the United States of America which therefore withdrew their own amendments”.133 France and the United State of America would only have so proceeded if it was without doubt that “national origin” did not include current nationality.88.Therefore, this fairly detailed description of the travaux préparatoires at the various stages of drafting confirm what derives from the ordinary meaning of the words “national origin” read in good faith in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention,i.e., that the term “national origin” in Article 1(1) is not to be read as encompassing present “nationality.” 5.Subsequent Practice of States Parties to the CERD 89.Subsequent practice of States Parties to the CERD confirms that differentiation based on nationality in the exercise of several of the rights recognized in the CERD does not constitute “racial discrimination” prohibited by the CERD. In accordance with 130 Third Committee, 1304th meeting, 14 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1304, para. 23. 131 19 February Response, para. 49, citing to Report of the Third Committee – Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, doc. A/6181, para. 32, containing the text of the U.S.-France amendment: “In this Convention the expression ‘national origin’ does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’, and the Convention shall therefore not be applicable to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences based on differences of nationality or citizenship.” Text of the amendment cited also supra at para. 85. 132 This amendment was proposed jointly by Ghana, India, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland, Senegal and Kuwait. Report of the Third Committee – Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, doc. A/6181, para. 37. 133 Third Committee, 1307th meeting, 18 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1307, para. 8 (emphasis added).
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- 41 - Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” “shall be taken into account, together with the context” in the interpretation of a treaty.134 As explained by an authoritative commentary on the VCLT: Subsequent practice may also serve as a means to determine the scope of application of a treaty, and then even to establish that the latter does not apply. Thus, under lit b, the interpreter may just as well consider the practice of parties in the “non-application of the treaty”, i.e. draw conclusions from the fact that the parties did not apply their treaty when treaty provisions might have been thought to be applicable.13590.States Parties to the CERD often favour nationals of one State over nationals of another and have enacted legislation differentially treating nationals of different foreign Sates in respect of the specific rights listed in Article 5 of the CERD. This has never been considered by those States Parties to the CERD — Qatar and the UAE included — as “racial discrimination” in breach of the CERD. 91.By way of example, States Parties to the CERD do not grant equal enjoyment of the following rights listed in Article 5 of the CERD: •Freedom of movement, Article 5(d)(i): Australia requires nationals of other States to obtain a visa to enter Australia — apart from nationals of New Zealand who may enter without one.136•Political rights, Article 5(c): The United Kingdom grants voting rights to nationals of the Republic of Ireland and of some Commonwealth States but not to other nationalities.137•Right to education and training, Article 5(e)(v): members of the South African Development Community treat nationals of other 134 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNITED NATIONS TREATYSERIES 331(1980), Article 31(3)(b). 135 Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer Science & Business Media 2011), p. 557 (emphasis added). 136 Migration Act (Cth), s 42. 137 Representation of the Peoples Act 2000, ss 1-2.
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- 42 - members as home students for the purposes of fees and accommodation.138•Right to work, Article 5(e)(i): Jamaica does not require nationals of other CARICOM States to possess a permit to work in the country — a permit which nationals of other States do need.13992.Qatar, no less, under its domestic legislation treats nationals of different foreign States differently. This practice would be inconsistent with the interpretation of “national origin” on which Qatar relies. Either “national origin” does not include current nationality, or Qatar itself falls foul of the CERD:•Nationals of only some States may enter Qatar without a visa.140•Nationals of Gulf Cooperation Council members enjoy greater rights in land ownership,141 access to medicine,142 ability to practise certain professions,143 and admission and fees in higher education than nationals of other States.144•Jobs in government agencies are given in priority to Qatari nationals and their offspring and next to “the nationals of the Gulf Cooperation Council, nationals of the Arab World and then to nationals of other countries.”14593.Qatar’s actions are not consistent with the interpretation of “national origin” which it presents in these proceedings. That interpretation, which is in any case farfetched, 138 Protocol on education and training in the Southern African Development Community, Article 7(A)5. 139 Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Act, s 3. 140 State of Qatar, Ministry of Interior, “Qatar Visas”, available at: https://portal.moi.gov.qa/qatarvisas/index.html; Qatar Airways, “Qatar Waives Entry Requirements for Citizens of 80 Countries”, 9 August 2017, available at: https://www.qatarairways.com/en/press-releases/2017/Aug/qatar-waives-en…. 141 Law No. 17 of 2004 Regarding Organization and Ownership and Use of Real Estate and Residential Units by non-Qataris, Articles 2-4. 142 Law No. 7 of 1996 Organizing Medical Treatment & Health Services within the State, Article 2; Law No. 8 of 1989 Concerning the Treatment as Qatari Citizens of Citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States at Health Centres, Clinics and Public Hospitals, Article 1. 143 Law No. 23 of 2006 regarding Enacting Code of Law Practice, Article 13; Law No. 6 of 1983 on the Commencement of the Steps to Implement the Unified Economic Agreement between the States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf CCASG, Article 2. 144 Law No. 11 of 1988 on the Equality of Students of the States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) in the Institutions of Higher Education, Articles 1 and 2. 145 Law No. 8 of 2009 on Human Resources Management 8/2009, Article 14.
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- 43 - evidently is a desperate fabrication, aimed at bringing the present complaints within the jurisdiction of the Committee. Qatar’s own practice, however, and the widespread practice of other States Parties to the CERD (of which the above examples were only illustrative146), reveal the real meaning of the phrase as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the CERD. The acts Qatar complains of, as differentiation based on current nationality, do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee. 6.General Recommendation XXX 94.In the 19 February Response, Qatar also relies on General Recommendation XXX (2004) of the CERD Committee to support its argument that nationality-based discrimination does not fall outside the ambit of the Convention.147 The Recommendation does no such thing. Furthermore, such recommendations are not binding and do not constitute subsequent practice or agreement of the States Parties to the CERD regarding the interpretation of the Convention.14895.Qatar relies on paragraph 4 of General Recommendation XXX, which reads: Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim. Differentiation within the scope of article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention relating to special measures is not considered discriminatory.149146See, Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES:ACOMMENTARY (Springer Science & Business Media 2011), p. 557 (“Even though lit b requires the practice to establish the agreement of ‘the parties’, meaning all the parties, that does not mean that every party must have individually engaged in practice. The ILC omitted the word ‘all’, which had been contained in an earlier draft, from this phrase precisely in order to avoid the misconception that the practice must be actively performed by all the parties.”). 147 19 February Response, paras. 29-33. 148 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNITEDNATIONS TREATYSERIES 331(1980), Article 31(3)(b). Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Salam, para. 8. 149Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth session, Supplement No. 18, doc. A/59/18, pp. 93-97 (emphasis added).
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- 44 - 96.On the basis of this paragraph, Qatar argues that “even to the extent that States maydifferentiate between particular nationalities in implementing visa or immigration policies, the CERD does not allow for differential treatment that disproportionately negatively impacts the individual concerned, for example where it results in the denial of fundamental human rights to non-citizens.”15097.In making this assertion, Qatar omits any reference to the part of paragraph 4 underlined above,i.e., the fact that differential treatment must be scrutinized “judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention”. The Committee was clearly not purporting to suggest that all differential treatment based on citizenship (or immigration status) is impermissible under the Convention; any such approach would have been inconsistent not only with the clear terms of Article 1(2), but with widespread State practice, for instance, in denying or restricting entry of the citizens or nationals of specific States. The Committee’s aim was to make clear that differential treatment on the basis of citizenship or immigration status is prohibited in so far as, “judged in light of the objectives and purpose of the Convention”, the criteria used are a vehicle for disguised racial discrimination. The UAE, however, did not hide behind non-citizenship in order to racially discriminate (as defined in the CERD) against Qataris. The Recommendation has no bearing on the present case. 98.Thus on all counts the CERD does not cover differential treatment based on nationality. The words themselves, their context, and the object and purpose of the CERD all reflect the discussions which went into the making of the Convention and which reveal the clear intention of the drafters to exclude current nationality as a basis of racial discrimination. Since ratification, the practice of States, amongst them Qatar, has (rightly) assumed that interpretation. Current nationality is not a basis of racial discrimination as defined in the CERD; and the acts Qatar complain of do not, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee. 150 19 February Response, para. 33 (emphasis in original).
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- 45 - B.Qatar’s New Argument that the UAE’s Measures Would Fall Within the Scope of the CERD Irrespective of Whether “National Origin” in Article 1(1) Encompassed Current Nationality Fails 99.Qatar’s new argument, obviously concocted when it realized that its “present nationality” argument was bound to fail, is that measures taken by the UAE would fall within the scope of the CERD irrespective of whether “national origin” in Article 1(1) encompassed current nationality because such measures “have an unjustifiable negative impact on persons who are of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense . . . : on the basis of characteristics such as ‘heritage’ or their ability to ‘trace’ their origin to Qatar”.151100.This argument, presented without a shred of evidence and on the basis of a somewhat amateurish understanding of Gulf history and sociology, appears to maintain that (i) “Qatari” denotes a distinct “historical-cultural community” identifiable based on characteristics such as their “dialect and dress”,152 (ii) such identifying characteristics are evident in persons who do not have Qatari nationality, including certain individuals holding UAE nationality but one of whose parents or ancestors came from Qatar, and (iii) by taking measures which affect persons of Qatari nationality (e.g., establishing entry requirements), the UAE may have also impacted non-Qatari individuals of Qatari heritage,153 thus violating CERD by “discriminating” against persons of Qatari national origin. Qatar goes as far as saying that “the punitive nature of the UAE’s actions . . . suggests that these effects are also by design”154 and that such actions “have in fact had a severe impact on the historical-cultural community of Qataris.”155101.There are a number of obvious problems with this argument. First, it is, simply as a factual matter, difficult to associate the scenario envisioned by the argument with any plausible reality. The one example provided by Qatar where it maintains that such “discriminatory effects” might occur – where the Emirati children of a mixed Emirati-151 19 February Response, para. 55. 152 19 February Response, para. 57. 153 19 February Response, para. 62. 154 19 February Response, para. 63. 155 19 February Response, para. 62.
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- 46 - Qatari family living in the UAE who, it is presumed, identify themselves as “Qatari” in the “historical-cultural sense”, are somehow adversely affected by the entry requirements on Qatari nationals – have been shown not to be a plausible occurrence in light of the virtually automatic access to the UAE which is afforded to the members of any mixed Emirati-Qatari family. The hypothetical situation Qatar has in mind is untenable. 102.Second, Qatar’s attempt at defining “Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense” is artificial and does not engage the basis of discrimination “national . . . origin” in the CERD, which necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of “race”, an immutable concept, as explained above.156 Given the geographical proximity, the common cultural and social background, common language and the close ties and interconnectedness of the populations of Qatar and the UAE,157 any allegation that they belong to two different “races” would be unsustainable.103.Finally, if this argument were accepted, it would mean that all measures associated with any break of diplomatic relations would engage the CERD if those measures impacted on one or more national or ethnic groups living in the country with which diplomatic relations have been severed. In fact, if one were to follow Qatar’s argument to its ultimate logic, Qatar should also be alleging that the measures taken by the UAE on the basis of Qatari nationality also impact or have effect on Qatari citizens of other national or ethnic origins. It is not doing so nor could it. Article 1(1) reads: In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.158156See supra paras. 58 et seq.157SeeApplication of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatarv. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of 27 June 2018, at 10:00 a.m. (CR 2018/12), p. 15, para. 2 (Al-Khulaifi). 158 CERD, Article 1(1) (emphasis added).
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- 47 - 104.From this text, it is clear that “effect” under Article 1(1) refers to the consequence of the measure in question, not with the definition of “racial discrimination”. Therefore, the fact that a measure has an “effect” on persons of one or more national or ethnic origin is insufficient to bring the measure within the scope of the CERD if there is no discrimination “based on” national or ethnic origin. III.THECOMMITTEE MUST DECLINE TO HEAR QATAR’SARTICLE 11COMMUNICATION BECAUSE QATAR HASFAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT LOCAL REMEDIES HAVEBEENINVOKED OR EXHAUSTED UNDER ARTICLE 11(3) OF THE CERD105.In accordance with the clear text of Article 11(3) of the CERD, the exhaustion of domestic remedies is a necessary precondition for consideration by the Committee of a matter referred to it in accordance with Article 11(2). The requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies seeks to ensure that, before a claim is brought on the international plane, “the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system.”159 This principle requires that each injured person first seeks relief from the damage or harm alleged to have been incurred as a result of the State conduct in violation of the CERD pursuant to the legal remedies available from judicial or administrative courts or bodies, including administrative remedies.160106.The UAE has demonstrated in its previous submissions that Qatar has failed to establish that any Qatari nationals who have allegedly been aggrieved by some action of the UAE in violation of the CERD have invoked, let alone exhausted, any available and effective domestic remedies in the UAE as required under Article 11(3) of the CERD.161 As a 159Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, at p. 27; see also,Ambatielos (Greece v. United Kingdom), (1956), RIAA, vol. XII, p. 83 at p. 120: “[i] is the whole system of legal protection, as provided by municipal law, which must have been put to the test before a State, as the protector of its nationals, can prosecute the claim on the international plane.” 160 Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Article 14(2). Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Commentary to draft Article 14, para. 5, ILC Yearbook 2006, vol. II(2), p. 45. See also, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 582, at p. 601, para. 47 (the remedies which must be exhausted “include all remedies of a legal nature, judicial redress as well as redress before administrative bodies”). 161 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, paras. 47-67; UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018, paras. 56-71; UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, paras. 81-85.
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- 48 - consequence, the Committee should declare inadmissible Qatar’s Article 11 Communication.107.Despite this admissibility hurdle as evidenced from the clear language of Article 11(3), confirmed in the travaux préparatoires of the Convention and expressly recognized by Qatar as applicable under the inter-state procedure of Articles 11-13,162 in its 19 February Response, Qatar argues that the “[e]xhaustion requirement does not bar Qatar’s claims.”163 Qatar is wrong. First, none of the arguments relied upon by Qatar bar the application of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies to Qatar’s Article 11 Communication (Section A). Second, the UAE has discharged its burden to indicate the existence of effective and reasonably available remedies that have not been exhausted (Section B).A.None of the Grounds Relied upon by Qatar Bar the Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies to Qatar’s Claims 108.Qatar first argues that reading Article 11(3) “in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law” should lead the Committee to the conclusion that “the rule does not apply to claims of the kind before this Committee” and that “[t]he UAE’s objection must therefore be dismissed.”164109.Qatar asserts that the phrase “generally recognized principles of international law” in Article 11(3) should be read as incorporating a series of principles, such as that “the local remedies rule does not apply in cases of widespread or generalized State policies and practices.”165 To the contrary, the phrase “in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law” was discussed during the travauxpréparatoiresof the 162 Qatar has recognized that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies both under the inter-state procedure of Articles 11-13 and under the individual communication procedure under Article 14 of the Convention. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Response on behalf of the State of Qatar to the questions posed by Judge Cançado Trindade on Friday, 29 June 2018, 3 July 2018, para. 8. 163 19 February Response, Part IV.A. 164 19 February Response, para. 77. 165 19 February Response, para. 79. Besides, the assertion that the CERD must be interpreted taking into account the circumstances of a contemporary society does not affect the interpretation of the local remedies rule in Article 11(3).
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- 49 - Convention to encompass the two exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies. As explained by the delegate for the Netherlands: [T]he words “in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law” in paragraph 3 [of what is now Article 11] were meant to refer to the two exceptions to the rule that available remedies must be exhausted before a case was taken to the international level. The exceptions in question were cases where numerous precedents showed that no redress was to be expected from the available remedies or where ... application of the remedies was unreasonably prolonged.166110.Qatar argues that in no other case before the ICJ “has the local remedies rule been applied in circumstances involving widespread and systematic harms like those before this Committee”.167 This argument is misguided and unavailing. In the cases concerning the CERD before the ICJ that Qatar cites, Article 11(3) of the CERD was not engaged because the applicant States in those proceedings had not resorted to the CERD Committee.168 In another of the cases that Qatar relies on as establishing such a principle under the CERD (Armed Activities, Congo v Rwanda), not only did the States concerned not submit an Article 11 communication to the CERD Committee, but in addition the Court manifestly lacked jurisdiction under the CERD because Rwanda had made a reservation to Article 22 concerning the Court’s jurisdiction.169 Since the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application in that case, it was not required to rule on issues of admissibility such as the exhaustion of local remedies. 111.Therefore, these cases are distinguishable from Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, and indeed they are inapplicable. Qatar cannot escape the fact that it did choose to submit its Article 11 Communication to the CERD Committee and that one of the consequences of 166 Third Committee, 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR. 1353, para. 42. 167 19 February Response, para. 81. 168See, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011; Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order. 169Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, paras. 74-79.
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- 50 - resorting to that procedure is that it is subject to the express requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. 112.With respect to Qatar’s argument that human rights treaty bodies, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying treaty provisions require exhaustion of local remedies, “attach different consequences to systematic breaches”, including the “non applicability of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies”170, as the Committee will clearly appreciate, based on all the facts before it, that it is preposterous to assert that the UAE measures constitute a “generalized State polic[y] and practice[]”.171 Neither of the two constituent elements of such a practice, on the basis of the legal authorities relied upon by Qatar, are present in this case.172113.As to the first element (the “repetition of acts”), in addition to the fact that the measures taken by the UAE were based on its legitimate right to impose immigration restrictions, Qatar merely presents a small number of unconfirmed and anonymous accounts of alleged harm suffered by Qatari nationals, some or many of which appear to be traceable to the failure of the persons involved to comply with certain objective requirements for the exercise of those rights.173 When compared to the overwhelming general statistics reflected in the evidence the UAE has submitted (showing that Qatari nationals continue to enter and exit the UAE in their thousands, to access the UAE courts, have received or are receiving medical treatment at UAE medical facilities, continue to be enrolled at UAE 170 19 February Response, para. 86. 171 19 February Response, para. 80. 172 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), paras. 122-124 (defining an administrative practice as “compris[ing] two elements: the ‘repetition of acts’ and ‘official tolerance’”). 173See,e.g., infra para. 152 discussing how Qatari students claiming they had not been provided with their educational records were shown to have been given such records, and the case of a Qatari student who was not allowed to re-enroll in university because he had failing grades. Similarly, allegations that two Qatari nationals were prevented from boarding aircraft inbound to the UAE despite allegedly having obtained authorization to travel to the UAE through the hotline do not constitute or prove a generalized State policy or practice as the commercial decisions of a private company are as a general principle not attributable to the State. DCL-004, para. 19; DCL-125, paras. 12-13. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 47 (para. 1 of Commentary to Article 8), p. 52 (para. 2 of Commentary to Article 11). Moreover, as explained below at para. 125, there are certain legitimate reasons why airlines may refuse passage to a paying customer, including when, at the carrier’s discretion, there are doubts that they meet the necessary entry requirements of countries in transit or their final destination.
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- 51 - educational institutions, own or are engaged in operating licensed businesses in the UAE and continue to enjoy their right to property in the UAE174), it is absurd to regard the evidence of Qatar as meeting the high threshold of a “repetition of acts”. 114.Regarding the second element (“official tolerance” by the UAE of any practice alleged to be in violation of the CERD),175 it should be noted that, faced with allegations that Qatari nationals had been expelled from the UAE and were being prevented from exercising rights under the CERD, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs176 and other UAE authorities issued clarifying announcements that expressly disavowed any such practice. Thus, for example, there was official confirmation that Qatari nationals who were resident in the UAE could freely remain living in the country and that Qatari nationals who were part of a mixed Qatari-Emirati family could enter and exit the UAE. A further example is with respect to access to education, where all UAE educational institutions were instructed to establish contact with any Qatari students who had interrupted their studies to advise them that they were welcome to return to the UAE.177 The high number of Qatari students (over 700) that are now enrolled in UAE universities178 strongly 174 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January, para. 12 (and evidence cited therein). 175 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 124 (defining “official tolerance” as meaning that “illegal acts are tolerated in that the superiors of those immediately responsible, though cognisant of such acts, take no action to punish them or to prevent their repetition; or that a higher authority, in face of numerous allegations, manifests indifference by refusing any adequate investigation of their truth or falsity, or that in judicial proceedings a fair hearing of such complaints is denied.”). 176 “An Official Statement by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation”, 5 July 2018, available at: https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem… (“The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation wishes to confirm that Qatari citizens already resident in the UAE need not apply for permission to continue residence in the UAE.”). 177See, UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, Annex 10 (Education – Undersecretary of Academic Affairs E mail) (showing that instructions have gone out from the Office of the Undersecretary of Higher Education to the Directors of Higher Education Institutions declaring that “[b]y following up the information of the university students, it was noted that a number of students from the State of Qatar dropped out of university studies in the United Arab Emirates for non-academic reasons. Kindly communicate with the dropped out students immediately and check the reasons, stressing that studies are available to all students who meet the required conditions. Kindly provide a report about the results of communication and immediately send it to us.”). 178See, UAE’s 14 January 2019 Submission, para. 12.c, citing to Annex 3 (Letter from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, dated 3 January 2019). See also, UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, para. 51, citing to Annex 11 (Immigration - Student Entry Records) and Annex 12 (Qatari Student Records).UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, Annex 10.
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- 52 - suggests that the “educational” cases referred to by Qatar in the 19 February Response are either isolated cases or simply inaccurate, and that there is absolutely no “official tolerance” by the UAE of some alleged practice to obstruct access to UAE educational institutions by Qatari students. To the contrary, the Committee should recall that it was Qatari authorities who asked Qatari students to leave the UAE.179 The experience that the UAE has with respect to spurious claims by Qatari students before UNESCO also goes to show that in each of the instances where Qatari nationals have complained that they have been prevented from continuing their studies in the UAE or from obtaining copies of their transcripts, this was due to these students not complying with certain objective criteria required of any student (Emirati, Qatari or of any other nationality).180It had nothing to do with the fact that the student was Qatari. 115.Qatar’s assertion that the present case is analogous to the case of Georgia v. Russiabefore the European Court of Human Rights is baseless.181 As the passage highlighted by Qatar makes clear, the European Court in that case was dealing with a situation of a “coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals [which] was put in place in the Russian Federation.”182 In fact, as the Russian authorities acknowledged in that case, there had been over 4,000 “administrative expulsion orders . . . issued against Georgian nationals”, with over 2,300 of those nationals “detained and forcibly expelled.”183 In the present case, Qatar has not cited a single 179See,e.g.,Annex 4, Communications from Several UAE Universities, p. 1 (containing a letter from Zayed University to the Office of the Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education, dated 15 March 2018, informing the Office of the Undersecretary that the Qatari students attending Zayed University were suspended from studying at the request of the Qatari embassy in UAE). 180See infra, para. 152, discussing the case of the three Qatari students who submitted communications to UNESCO alleging that the UAE had failed to comply with its obligations regarding their rights to education and the UAE’s response showing that two of those students were terminated because their grades were lower than those required by the university, and that the third student recently graduated from the UAE university where the student was registered. 181 19 February Response, para. 89. 182 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 159. 183 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), paras. 130-135 (referring to the statistical data provided by both parties and assessed by the European Court of Human Rights).
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- 53 - arrest, detention or expulsion of a Qatari national. Far from the circumstances present in theGeorgia v. Russia case, Qatari citizens are able to enter and reside in the UAE upon prior application and they enjoy the same rights within the UAE as other foreign nationals. Qatar’s entire case before this Committee plainly ignores the fact that the UAE did not take any steps to deport Qatari citizens and that the Ministry of Interior, which is the UAE government entity charged with regulating and altering the residence status of non-citizens, did not issue any orders deporting Qatari citizens, let alone arrest or detain them. Qatar’s submissions before this Committee also conveniently ignore that the Qatari government itself issued instructions for its citizens to leave the UAE after the UAE made the 5 June 2017 announcement.184116.Finally, the UAE notes that if Qatar genuinely believed or was concerned that the UAE measures constituted “a serious, massive or persistent pattern of racial discrimination”185,it could have resorted to other mechanisms in the practice of the CERD that are more adequately tailored to those situations and that do not require the exhaustion of local remedies.186 Similarly, Qatar has not raised in its most recent report to the Committee under Article 9 (submitted on 6 October 2017) any effects on its nationals of the alleged 184 “Qatar Asks Citizens to Leave UAE Within 14 Days: Embassy”, REUTERS, 5 June 2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-gulf-qatar-citizens-emirates-idUSKBN18W1FT?il=0. This was also the case for Qatari students, as evidenced in the letter from Zayed University reporting that the Qatari Embassy had requested the suspension of Qatari students. Annex 4, Communications from Several UAE Universities, pp. 1 (“please be aware that Qatari students’ suspension from study and their departure to Qatar was at the request of the Qatari Embassy in the United Arab Emirates”), 21 (some students citing the Qatari Embassy’s request as a reason for interrupting their studies). 185Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth session, Supplement No. 18, 15 September 1993, doc. A/48/18, Annex 3, para. 9 (a). 186Id., Annex 3, paras. 9(a) and (b) (establishing an early warning and urgent mechanism instituted to prevent “a serious, massive or persistent pattern of racial discrimination” and indicating that “early warning concerns could include some of the following criteria: (i) The lack of an adequate legislative basis for defining and criminalizing all forms of racial discrimination, as provided for in the Convention; (ii) Inadequate implementation or enforcement mechanisms, including the lack of recourse procedures; (iii) The presence of a pattern of escalating racial hatred and violence, or racist propaganda or appeals to racial intolerance by persons, groups or organizations, notably by elected or other officials.”).
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- 54 - breach of the Convention by the UAE, another avenue that Qatar had opened for which the requirement to demonstrate exhaustion of local remedies did not apply.187117.Qatar’s alternative argument as to why the local remedies rule would not apply in this case,i.e., that it is asserting a direct injury to its own interests and that “such claims for direct injury are both interdependent with, and preponderant over, the claims Qatar has brought on behalf of its nationals”188 also fails. 118.Contrary to Qatar’s claims, as the Committee will appreciate from the evidence before it, it is clear that the preponderant objective and the true substance of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication is not to vindicate a direct injury to the State, but rather to vindicate the alleged harm caused to Qatari individuals, and that its claim would not have been brought were it not for the claims of its nationals.189 This is evident from Qatar’s Article 11 Communication before this Committee190 and was made absolutely clear in the speech of the Qatari Agent before the ICJ in Qatar’s request for provisional measures when he stated that the “severe, lasting and continuing harms to Qataris are the reason Qatar 187 CERD, Article 9. See, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Combined seventeenth to twenty-first periodic reports submitted by Qatar under article 9 of the Convention, due in 2015, 6 October 2017, doc. CERD/C/QAT/17-21. With respect to the reports to be submitted under Article 9 of the CERD and the Committee’s Concluding Observations, it also bears noting that the CERD Committee in its September 2017 Concluding Observations on the UAE’s periodic report did not make any reference at all to any possible impact of the 5 June 2017 measures taken by the UAE on the rights under the Convention. This evinces that the Committee did not think that the 5 June 2017 measures implicated any rights under the Convention. CERD Committee, Concluding Observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, 13 September 2017, doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21. 188 19 February Response, paras. 92-103. 189 Draft Articles Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries (2006), ILC Yearbook 2006, vol. II(2), p. 46 (“Closely related to the preponderance test is the sine qua non or ‘but for’ test, which asks whether the claim comprising elements of both direct and indirect injury would have been brought were it not for the claim on behalf of the injured national. If this question is answered negatively, the claim is an indirect one and local remedies must be exhausted. There is, however, little to distinguish the preponderance test from the ‘but for’ test. If a claim is preponderantly based on injury to a national, this is evidence of the fact that the claim would not have been brought but for the injury to the national. . . . [L]ocal remedies are to be exhausted not only in respect of an international claim, but also in respect of a request for a declaratory judgment brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national.”) (emphasis added). In its 19 February Response Qatar tried to extend its original claim on the basis of Qatari nationality to individuals of Qatari origin who are not presently Qatari nationals and refers to this argument as a reason reinforcing the preponderant nature of Qatar’s direct injury claim. 19 February Response, para. 101. For the reasons outlined supra at paras. 99-104, this new attempt of Qatar to place its claim under the scope ratione materiae of the CERD fails. 190 Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, para. 58 (“In imposing the Coercive Measures, the UAE has unlawfully targeted Qatari citizens solely on the basis of their nationality.”).
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- 55 - determined it had no choice but to institute proceedings in this Court”.191 Moreover, in its response to questions posed by the ICJ in those same proceedings, Qatar recognized that the fact that the inter-state procedure under Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD “contain[ed] a local remedies requirement” (and Article 22 of the CERD did not192), was “consistent with the general proposition that the local remedies rule does not apply in cases involving a direct injury to the claimant State”193, thus implying that the procedure under Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD does not concern a direct injury to the State.194 In fact, the filing by Qatar of witness statements in these proceedings is a further confirmation that Qatar’s claim is an indirect one and that, therefore, local remedies must be exhausted. 119.The preparatory work of Article 11(3) of the CERD shows that there was an overall consensus that domestic remedies should be exhausted before a case is taken to the international level. A proposal by the Tanzanian delegation to do away with the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies was emphatically opposed195 and voted 191SeeApplication of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatarv. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Verbatim Record of Public Sitting of 27 June 2018, at 10:00 a.m. (CR 2018/12), p. 16, para. 5 (Al-Khulaifi). 192 The UAE maintains that Qatar is wrong with respect to its reading of Article 22 of the CERD and the exhaustion of local remedies but for the purposes of the present proceedings before the Committee, it is not necessary for the UAE to engage with this argument. 193Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), International Court of Justice, Response on behalf of the State of Qatar to the questions posed by Judge Cançado Trindade on Friday, 29 June 2018, 3 July 2018, para. 8. 194 Qatar equally recognized that the fact that human rights treaties may give rise to obligations erga omnes character was relevant for the proceedings before the ICJ under Article 22 and not to proceedings under Articles 11 to 13 or Article 14 of the CERD, to which “the local remedies requirement does apply.” Id.195 Third Committee, 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, para. 25 (Tanzania), explaining that “it would be an escape clause for any signatory which did not wish to apply the Convention in good faith”;
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- 56 - against.196 The travaux préparatoires also show that the implementation mechanism of inter-State communications under Article 11, modelled on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,197 was being conceived as a mechanism for the State to protect individuals and not to assert a direct injury to the State.198120.Qatar’s argument that its claims for harm of its own interests as a State Party to the CERD are interdependent with the violation of the rights of Qataris and that such interdependence precludes the applicability of the local remedies rule must also be rejected by the Committee.199 While the CERD as a human rights convention has special characteristics that distinguishes it from other treaties, the special characteristics of the CERD do not allow it to be equated with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 196See, Third Committee, 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, para. 57 (“[t]he Tanzanian proposal to delete paragraph 3 was rejected by 70 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions”). See also,id., para. 28 (Italy), stating, with respect to the exhaustion of local remedies: “States should be left as free as possible to deal with a case through domestic procedures, for it was a recognized international principle that all domestic remedies should be exhausted before a matter was referred to an international body.”; id., para. 48 (Senegal), indicating that the requirement to exhaust local remedies would “prevent a proliferation of complaints at the international level”. The comment by the Argentinean representative quoted by Qatar in its 19 February Response about the types of disputes that could be brought by States before the CERD Committee was an isolated comment, not shared by any of the other delegations and in any case would not be applicable to the claim brought by Qatar as Qatar’s claim does not concern “failure to comply with certain provisions of the Convention which could be rectified by the adoption of new legislation.” See, Third Committee, 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, para. 54. 197See, Third Committee, 1353rd meeting, 24 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, paras. 20, 30 (indicating that the formula in Article 11 of the CERD was taken from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and suggesting that the same wording in the latter should be borrowed for CERD). 198See, Third Committee, 1344th meeting, 16 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, para. 63 (“However useful that system might be, it was not entirely satisfactory, for intervention by states to redress violations of human rights was usually of a political nature, and its value and effectiveness suffered accordingly. ”); Third Committee, 1346thmeeting, 17 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1346, para. 13 (“The middle course that had been contemplated did not entitle individuals or organizations to address petitions direct to the permanent executive organ. It had the advantage of eliminating groundless complaints but at the same time it set a serious limitation. It left it to the State to deal with complaints, and left the rights of the individual a matter for high level political negotiation.”). Id., p. 331 (“His delegation was not opposed in principle to the establishment of some machinery to deal with disputes between States. It was to be feared, however, that States might resort to that organ less in order to succour the oppressed than to pursue political ends.”); The preparatory works of Article 41(1)(c), the equivalent provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, show that the inter-state communication procedure was conceived as a mechanism to protect individuals and not seen as causing “immediate and direct injury” to the State. United Nations General Assembly, Tenth Session, Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. Annotation prepared by the Secretary-General, 1 July 1955, doc. A/2929, 1 July 1955, pp. 237-238. 199 19 February Response, paras. 96-98.
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- 57 - the specific treaty to which the ICJ has applied the doctrine of the interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights.200121.It is clear, therefore, that none of the arguments relied upon by Qatar bar the application of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, mandated by Article 11(3) of the CERD, to Qatar’s Article 11 Communication.B.There are Effective and Reasonably Available Remedies in the UAE that Have Not Been Exhausted 122.Qatar argues that even if the rule on exhaustion of local remedies applies to Qatar’s Article 11 Communication, it would still not bar Qatar’s claims because “the UAE has failed to prove the existence of any effective and reasonably available remedies that have not been exhausted.”201 Qatar misrepresents the position of the UAE on the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the exhaustion of local remedies.202 By reference to the customary international law position as reflected in the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection and the decision of the ICJ in the Diallo case, the UAE has explained that, in the words of the Court, “it is incumbent on the applicant [Qatar] to prove that local remedies were indeed exhausted or to establish that exceptional circumstances relieved the allegedly injured person whom the applicant seeks to protect of the obligation to exhaust available local remedies. . . It is for the respondent [UAE] to convince the Court 200Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 36, para. 40 (holding that the duty to exhaust local remedies did not apply to the Mexican claim that it had suffered “directly and through its nationals” injury as a result of the United State’s failure to grant consular access to its nationals under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations because of the “special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights”). In LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 492, para. 74, the Court described the system of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as an “interrelated regime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection.” In order to achieve that aim, Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides for consular officers, who are representatives of the sending State in the receiving State, the freedom “to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them” as well as for the right of consular officers “to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation.” Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, concluded 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967, 596 UNITED NATIONS TREATYSERIES 261, Article 36(1). 201 19 February Response, para. 104. 202 19 February Response, para. 105.
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- 58 - that there were effective remedies in its domestic legal system that were not exhausted.”203123.The Committee itself has clarified in respect of individual communications that mere doubts on the part of the petitioner as to the effectiveness of domestic remedies do not absolve a petitioner from pursuing them.204 Even Qatar agrees that a petitioner should pursue local remedies regardless of whatever doubts may exist as to their effectiveness.205124.As the UAE has already explained, and further details below, the remedies available to aggrieved Qataris are both available and effective. Effectiveness does not mean, however, that the outcome must be the desired outcome, nor that every single case is perfectly decided, but rather that the remedy available is accessible and capable of providing adequate redress.206203Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 44. UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018, para. 62; UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, para. 65. 204 Communication No. 19/2000, Sarwar Seliman Mostafa v. Denmark, Inadmissibility Decision of 10 August 2001, doc. CERD/C/59/D/19/2000, para. 7.4; Communication No. 21/2001, D.S v. Sweden, Inadmissibility Decision of 10 August 2001, doc. CERD/C/59/D/21/2001, paras. 4.2, 4.3; Communication No. 47/2010, Kenneth Moylan v. Australia, Inadmissibility Decision of 27 August 2013, doc. CERD/C/83/D/47/2010, para. 6.5 (“The Committee recalls that mere doubts about the effectiveness of domestic remedies, or the belief that the resort to them may incur costs, do not absolve a petitioner from pursuing them. In the light of the information before it, the Committee considers that the petitioner has not advanced sufficient arguments that no avenues exist in Australia to claim that a given piece of legislation has discriminatory effects on a person based on race. Notwithstanding the reservations that the petitioner may have on the effectiveness of the mechanism under section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act in his particular case, it was incumbent upon him to pursue the remedies available, including a complaint before the High Court. Only after attempting to do so could the petitioner conclude that such a remedy was indeed ineffective or unavailable.”) (emphasis added). 205 19 February Response, fn. 176, citing to the Sarwar Seliman Mostafa v. Denmark inadmissibility decision by the CERD Committee (cited supra at n. 204). Qatar qualifies this by saying that this is so only if there is a “‘reasonable possibility’ of success”. Id. However, when declaring inadmissible the communication in the Mostafa case (or in the other cases cited supra at n. 204, the CERD Committee did not make that distinction. 206 Draft Articles Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries (2006), ILC Yearbook 2006, vol. II(2), pp. 46-48 (“Article 15. Exceptions to the local remedies rule. Local remedies do not need to be exhausted where: (a) there are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress. . . . Commentary . . . In order to meet the requirements of paragraph (a), it is not sufficient for the injured person to show that the possibility of success is low or that further appeals are difficult or costly. The test is not whether a successful outcome is likely or possible, but whether the municipal system of the respondent State is reasonably capable of providing effective relief. This must be determined in the context of the local law and the prevailing circumstances. This is a question to be decided by the competent international tribunal charged with the task of examining the question whether local remedies have been exhausted.”) (emphasis added).
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- 59 - 125.Before going into Qatar’s specific complaints about domestic remedies in the UAE, it bears noting that all of Qatar’s allegations of CERD violations are premised on Qatar’s flawed case that Qatari nationals have been the subject of a “collective expulsion” and that a travel ban for Qatari nationals was implemented. As demonstrated by the UAE, this is clearly not the case. There were no expulsion or deportation orders of Qatari nationals, nor was the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s 5 June 2017 announcement ever interpreted as a mandate to remove Qataris from the UAE. All the UAE required of Qatari nationals after this statement was for them to request permission to enter the UAE through the hotline. 126.Qatar complains that the hotline’s decisions are discretionary and ineffective and that, therefore, the hotline cannot constitute an effective remedy in the UAE. However, the fact that some Qatari nationals may be denied an entry permit does not mean the hotline is discretionary or ineffective. Rather, this is the normal ordinary consequence of measures of this type, as is the case for the many visa or entry permit applications that are denied by many other countries the world over. The UAE, as any other State, has the right to control the entry of non-nationals to its territory. One of the mechanisms used by the UAE to exercise that right is the hotline, which is available to Qataris that want to travel to the UAE. 127.Second, Qatar alleges that UAE courts are neither “reasonably available” nor “effective” — but fails to explain why in the face of overwhelming evidence submitted by the UAE that Qatari nationals do resort to UAE courts and do obtain favourable judgments. The UAE submits that the volume of cases that have been initiated by Qatari nationals since mid-2017 is evidence enough that Qatar’s allegations in this respect are false. 128.Third, Qatar further alleges that other complaint procedures described by the UAE are also neither “reasonably available” nor “effective” for Qatari nationals because they could only “conceivably concern narrow subsets of activity implicated by Qatar’s Communication.”207 However, the catalogue of procedures available for Qataris that was described by the UAE was merely illustrative of certain rights. The “substantial 207 19 February Response, para. 151 (emphasis in original).
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- 60 - grievance”208 of Qatari nationals can be presented to the local courts in the forms available there for protection of various rights, including the right to property, the right to education, and the right to work. 1.The Hotline Is a Readily Available Remedy for Qatari Nationals That Want to Travel to the UAE and Is Consistent With International Practice129.Qatar alleges that the UAE’s hotline, which receives applications for entry permits from Qataris, is “not a legal remedy”,209 but rather “a ‘police security channel’”,210“ineffective”211 and “only available for family-related matters”.212 Qatar concludes that therefore, there is no need for Qatari nationals to apply to the hotline for entry permits before it can submit its communication before the CERD Committee alleging that the establishment of entry requirements constitutes a violation of the CERD. 130.Qatar’s argument effectively means that States have an international obligation to allow entry of all foreigners, that the process to issue entry visas or permits should exclude any police involvement, and implausibly, that if not all visas or permits are granted, the system is “ineffective”. Qatar is mistaken on these three points, including its allegation that the hotline is only available for family-related matters. 131.From the outset, the UAE respectfully notes that “as a matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory.”213 Indeed, as the UN Human Rights Committee itself has stressed, “[i]t is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to 208 James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, Exhaustion of Local Remedies,Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 11. See infra para. 139. 209 19 February Response, para 115. 210 19 February Response, para 116. 211 19 February Response, para 118. 212 19 February Response, para 126. 213 European Court of Human Rights, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985), Series A No. 94, para. 67.
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- 61 - its territory.”214 That is, States universally agree that barring the existence of a prohibitive rule to the contrary, it is fully within the prerogative of each member of the international community to regulate access to their territories.215 In light of this, States only rarely object to each other’s visa or entry requirements.216132.States frequently require visas, entry permits, or some type of pre-clearance — like the UAE’s hotline requirement for Qataris — prior to admitting foreign nationals into their territory. For example, the United States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, all require visas or permits for nationals of foreign States, except when their State of nationality has entered into a visa waiver agreement. 133.Even States that have agreed to visa waivers for each other’s nationals routinely require travel authorizations or pre-clearance. The United States of America is a good example. 214 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, The position of aliens under the Covenant, 11 April 1986, doc.1.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), para. 5. See also,Nishimura Ekiu v. United States 142 US 651 (1892), 659 (“It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”); Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain [1906] AC 542, 546 (“One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers his presence in the State opposed to its peace order, and good government, or to its social or material interest.”); European Roma Rights Centre and others v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, para. 11 (“The power to admit, exclude and expel aliens was among the earliest and most widely recognised powers of the sovereign State”); Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2008) p. 826 (“It is . . . unquestioned that a state may legitimately refuse to admit aliens or may accept them subject to certain conditions being fulfilled.”); Oppenheim’s International Law (8th ed. 1992), p. 897 (“By customary international law no state can claim the right for its nationals to enter into, and reside on, the territory of a foreign state. The reception of alien is a matter of discretion.”); James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law(Oxford University Press, 8th ed., 2012), p. 608 (“[A] state may choose not to admit aliens or may impose conditions on their admission.”). 215 Human Rights Council, Resolution 35/17, (adopted on 22 June 2017 at its Thirty-fifth session 6–23 June 2017) Protection of the human rights of migrants: the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, doc. A/HRC/RES/35/17 (6 July 2017), p. 3 (“Recalling that each State has a sovereign right to determine whom to admit to its territory, subject to that State’s international obligations”), para. 10 (“while States have the sovereign right to enact and implement migration and border security measures, they have a duty to comply with their obligations under relevant international law, including international human rights law and refugee law”). 216 Objections are raised, for example, when visas are denied contrary to a state’s international obligations. See,e.g.,Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth session, Supplement No. 26, Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, 2005, doc. A/60/26, pp. 8-13 (documenting instances of representatives of several States objecting to the obstacles imposed by the US in granting entry visas for travel to the UN Headquarters in New York, contravening the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success, on 26 June 1947).
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- 62 - Although nationals of countries with a visa waiver agreement with the U.S. — for example, Germany or France — do not require a visa to enter the U.S., they do need to obtain travel authorization through the U.S.’s Electronic System for Travel Authorization (“ESTA”) before being allowed to travel to the U.S.217 As a consequence, although German or French nationals are able to travel to the U.S. without a visa, they do need to apply for an ESTA authorization before traveling there, an application which is filed online.218 Needless to say, no allegations have been raised that the ESTA program is in breach of CERD. 134.The UAE’s hotline is similar to the U.S.’s ESTA. The hotline, established on 11 June 2017, is the UAE’s travel authorization program for Qatari nationals that want to travel to the UAE. The UAE Ministry of Interior — and not the Abu Dhabi police as misleadingly alleged by Qatar —219 operates the hotline and conducts any applicable security screenings with respect to the applications — much like ESTA is operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, a federal law enforcement agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Originally established as a telephone number one needed to call, operators would provide callers with information regarding the UAE travel requirements and provide them with a number to a WhatsApp account. The applicants would then need to forward the necessary documents to that WhatsApp account based on which a decision would be made whether to issue the required entry permit. In the second part of 2018, a dedicated website was added to the hotline, which continues to operate, for ordinary Qatari citizens’ convenience. Contrary to Qatar’s assertions, the hotline has never been limited to those traveling for family reasons but 217See, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Official ESTA Application Website”, available at: https://esta.cbp.dhs.gov/esta/. 218See,U.S. Department of State, “Visa Waiver Program”, available at: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visa-…. 219 In fact, the same Annex to which Qatar cites expressly provides that “the Ministry of Interior has set up a toll-free hotline”. UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, Annex 4, p. 1 (emphasis added).
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- 63 - instead is available to “all Qatari citizens” seeking permission to travel to the UAE, as the UAE expressly confirmed on 5 July 2018.220135.If an applicant is granted authorization to travel to the UAE, then the applicant is issued a letter of authorization permitting entry.221 A copy of the letter should be presented upon request by the applicant when traveling to the UAE. 136.If an application is not granted, there is nothing impeding the aggrieved party from submitting another application, as several of the very witnesses presented by Qatar in fact did.222 This is also consistent with international practice: for example, if an application for a U.S. visa is refused by a consular officer, the affected traveler may, if desired, try again. To the extent that any Qatari nationals claim to have been affected by not being allowed to travel to the UAE, then they should have availed themselves of remedies, in particular that offered through the hotline, otherwise they cannot be said to have exhausted local remedies. 137.Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, as explained above, in principle, there is no international obligation binding on the UAE — or on any other State for that matter — requiring a State to allow the entry of foreign nationals into its territory.223 The substance of Qatar’s real issue with this refusal is that Qataris were discriminated against in that 220 “An Official Statement by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation”, 5 July 2018, available at: https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem…. See also,Annex 3, Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018. A prior version of this Annex in smaller format was submitted with UAE’s Response of 14 January 2019, para. 8 as Annex 1.2. The revised version accompanied herewith as Annex 1 is a larger format version and the English translation has been revised for completeness. This document contains illustrative examples of entry/exit data processed through the hotline that did not involve family reunification and include entries for “business”, “treatment”, “ownership of a property”, “business/work”, “study” and “others”. The UAE notes that although the table submitted in this Annex was prepared for purposes of these proceedings, the statistics themselves were extracted from the database maintained by the Ministry of the Interior and other than for formatting purposes, they were not otherwise altered by the UAE. 221 UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, Annex 4, Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6. 222 19 February Response, DCL-004, paras. 19-20; id., DCL-135, paras. 7-8, 16, 18-19. 223Supra para. 131, and notes 213-215.
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- 64 - they were not allowed entry to the UAE, but the UAE had no obligation to permit them to enter. 138.Regardless, entry and exit records which have been provided to the Committee show that between 5 June 2017 and 31 December 2018, approximately 11,000 movements by Qatari citizens across UAE borders took place, all of which were facilitated by the work of the hotline.224 This shows that the hotline was effective in that Qatari nationals were in fact allowed to enter the UAE. 2.Other Available and Effective Remedies in the UAE Which Have Not Been Exhausted 139.The UAE gave examples in its previous submissions of a significant number of instances in which Qatari nationals have resorted to the UAE courts after the break in diplomatic relations between Qatar and the UAE. Other than the fact that, as demonstrated above, there are no specific discriminatory measures that Qataris could complain about as there has been no expulsion or travel ban imposed on Qataris, there is no specific form of local remedy that the UAE would need to provide for Qataris to present their complaints for violation of the CERD before the UAE authorities and courts. The “substantial grievance” of Qatari nationals can be presented to the local courts in the forms available there for protection of various rights225, including amongst others, the right to property, the right to education, and the right to work.226 However, as demonstrated further below, the Qatari nationals who claim that their CERD rights have been affected by the UAE did not even need to resort to any of these remedies or deliberately chose to ignore any possible redress to be obtained in the UAE and have resorted directly to international fora.224 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, para. 8, and Annex 1.2. The UAE is accompanying a revised version of this Annex for the Committee’s ease of reference. The tables have been printed in larger format and we have revised the English translation for completeness. Annex 1. 225 James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, Exhaustion of Local Remedies,Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 11. 226See,e.g., UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, para. 85; UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018, paras. 61-71; and UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, paras. 53-62.
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- 65 - 140.Qatar further alleges that the ICJ has expressly found that Qataris appear to have been denied equal access to tribunals and other judicial organs in the UAE.227 But Qatar cites misleadingly to the ICJ’s Order on Provisional Measures, suggesting that the ICJ made final findings of fact228 when instead, the ICJ was careful to point out that “at this stage of the proceedings relating to a request for the indication of provisional measures, the issue of exhaustion of local remedies need not be addressed by the Court”,229 and that “[t]he Court is not called upon, for the purposes of its decision on the request for the indication of provisional measures, to establish the existence of breaches of CERD . . . It cannot at this stage make definitive findings of facts”.230 For this reason alone, Qatar’s arguments premised on the ICJ making “findings” of fact231 are not credible. a)There are Local Remedies Available Against the Alleged Actions of Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways 141.Qatar also suggests that the UAE is responsible for breaches of the CERD as a result of the refusal by Emirates Airlines (“Emirates”) and Etihad Airways (“Etihad”) to fly certain passengers of Qatari nationality to the UAE. Qatar’s argument, however, again fails for multiple reasons. First, effective local remedies exist in the applicable jurisdictions. Second, the actions of both airlines were consistent with international practice, and in fact, seem fully in accordance with their contracts of carriage. Third, Qatar must show that the actions of Emirates and Etihad are attributable to the UAE. 227 19 February Response, para. 129. 228 19 February Response, para. 71. 229Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 42. 230Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 62. See also,id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, para. 14 (“[T]he Court fails to identify any evidence to support the further statement that the situation of Qataris residing in the UAE prior to 5 June 2017 appears to remain vulnerable with regard to their rights under Article 5 of the CERD. Most importantly, the UAE’s Statement of 5 July 2018 is not mentioned. The UAE’s recent Statement clarifies the legal position of Qataris living in the UAE, namely that they “need not apply for permission to continue residence in the UAE”. The Statement further clarifies that Qataris can apply for entry clearance to the UAE via a hotline.”). 231 19 February Response, paras. 129-130.
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- 66 - 142.Qatar identifies two individuals who allege to have been refused boarding, one by Emirates,232 the other by Etihad.233 Qatar glosses over the fact that these individuals were refused boarding outside of the UAE and that under the contracts of carriage and applicable conflict of laws rules, the remedies that should have been exhausted by those individuals were not limited to UAE courts. Rather, they could have resorted to the courts of the place where they were denied boarding. One of the Qatari nationals was in Muscat when he was refused boarding.234 To the extent that the city of origin was Muscat, under applicable conflict of laws rules, such individual had remedies available in Oman as he could have requested restitution or compensation from an Omani Court. Qatar has overzealously redacted the statement of the second witness who was allegedly refused boarding by Etihad,235 and so the UAE cannot comment on the specifics but it follows that the individual was neither in Qatar nor the UAE when the incident occurred. Thus, it would be reasonable to presume that the conflict of law rules applicable in such third state would also permit that individual to bring a claim against Etihad before local courts.143.For this reason alone, the Committee should consider these allegations inadmissible: Qatar needs to first identify the correct jurisdiction, i.e., in what country should the local remedies exist, and then prove that they are unavailable or are ineffective. 144.Moreover, an airline’s discretion to refuse to transport an individual who lacks the necessary documentation for travel is neither discriminatory nor a breach of international law. Qatar fails to mention that the contracts of carriage entered into by the individuals with Emirates and Etihad expressly permit the carriers to refuse boarding to any individual when “[they] appear, in [the carrier’s] exclusive opinion, not to meet requisite 232 19 February Response, DCL-125, para 12. 233 19 February Response, DCL-004, para 19. 234 19 February Response, DCL-004, para 19. 235 19 February Response, DCL-125, para 12.
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- 67 - visa requirements or not to have valid or lawfully acquired travel documents”.236 While Qatar may take issue with this practice, this is a standard practice followed by international carriers — including Qatar Airways237 — and a reality of international travel. Upon check-in, passengers are requested to show their travel documents and airlines determine whether they may carry the passenger with such documents. In fact, the media often reports incidents of passengers who are not allowed to travel — rightfully or wrongly — as a result of these types of unpopular decisions by the carriers.238However, there are means of redress available to such aggrieved passengers. But in these proceedings, Qatar’s argument is not that these passengers have been discriminated against as they were unable to claim compensation — it is a baseless argument — but that the refusal by Emirates and Etihad is tantamount to a breach of the CERD. For the foregoing reasons, this is mistaken. 145.The UAE notes further that Qatar cites two examples of Qatari nationals who, although faced with difficulties with private airline companies, were in fact allowed to fly into the UAE.239 Their complaint is that in one of their multiple trips to the UAE, they were denied boarding, and they were questioned by airline personnel and immigration 236 Emirates Airlines, “Conditions of Carriage for Passengers and Baggage”, 15 May 2006, available at: https://cdn.ek.aero/cn/english/images/coc-eng%202006_tcm27-141072_tcm32…, Article 7.1.12. Seealso, Etihad Airways, “Conditions of Carriage”, available at: https://www.etihad.com/en-ae/legal/conditions-of-carriage/, Article 7.1.2 and 7.1.2.7 (“We may also refuse to carry you or your Baggage (without any obligation to give you prior notice) on any flight (even if you hold a valid Ticket and have a boarding pass) if one or more of the following have occurred or we reasonably believe may occur: . . . you do not appear to have valid or lawfully acquired travel documents or you appear in our opinion not to meet requisite visa requirements”). 237 Qatar Airways, “Conditions of carriage”, available at: https://www.qatarairways.com/en/legal/conditions-of-carriage.html, Article 8.1.6 (“We may refuse carriage of a Passenger or a Passenger’s Baggage for reasons of safety or if, in the exercise of our reasonable discretion, we determine that: . . . You do not appear to be properly documented”) (emphasis added). 238 Anna Tims, “BA staff humiliated me by refusing to let me fly”, THEGUARDIAN, 16 January 2019, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/money/2019/jan/16/humiliated-by-british-air…; Simon Calder, “easyJet kicks couple off Turkey holiday flight for not printing visas”, INDEPENDENT, 2 April 2018, available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/easyjet-kick-coupl…; Simon Calder, “Qantas bans British couple from flight for not having visa they didn't need”, INDEPENDENT, 4 April 2018, available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/qantas-british-cou…. 239 19 February Response, DCL-004, and DCL-125.
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- 68 - authorities.240 But this is also not uncommon when visas or additional entry requirements exist in the destination. In fact, carriers flying into the U.S., Russia, China, the European Union, Canada, and other States, are invariably required to verify that passengers meet the applicable entry requirements, and when airline personnel have doubts, further questioning is undertaken. It would also not be uncommon for airlines to request signed waivers from passengers releasing the airline of any liability in case they are refused entry into their destination,241 as happened in the case misleadingly cited by Qatar.242This is not discriminatory, but rather standard commercial practice by international airlines that would otherwise incur fines or potential expenses. 146.Finally, Qatar needs to explain how and why the denial of boarding by these commercial companies is attributable to the UAE, not just why this action was contrary to the CERD.243 The customary international law rules codified in the Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission make clear that “the only conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e., as agents of the State.”244 “As a general principle, the conduct of private persons or entities is not attributable to the State.”245 However, Qatar does not explain in any way whatsoever under which test should the actions of Emirates and Etihad be attributed to the UAE.240 19 February Response, DCL-004 (explaining that he was impeded from boarding an Etihad flight once, but indicating he had taken multiple trips to the UAE), and DCL-125 (noting the single incident when he was impeded from boarding an Emirates flight). 241 The International Air Transport Association (IATA), which represents some 290 airlines, estimated in 2016 that fines averaged USD 3,500 per passenger transported with improper documentation, and that without the additional cost of returning the incorrectly documented passenger back to their country of origin. Airlines IATA, “Document Verification Travel Trouble”, 13 October 2016, available at: https://airlines.iata.org/analysis/document-verification-travel-trouble… 19 February Response, DCL-125, para. 14 (statement of a banker explaining he was required to sign a waiver releasing the airline of any liability in case he were not admitted into the UAE). 243 19 February Response, para. 119 and fn. 222. 244 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 38. 245Id., p. 47.
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- 69 - 147.For the foregoing reasons, Qatar’s allegations that the actions by the two private carriers are demonstrable breaches of CERD lacks any credibility. b)Qatari Students Who Have Not Continued Their Studies in the UAE Did So On Their Own Choice and Have Complained to International Organizations Instead of Addressing Their Complaint to the Educational Institutions Concerned 148.Qatar has alleged that Qatari students have been unable to continue their studies in the UAE or that they have not been provided with academic records as a result of discrimination by the UAE authorities and takes issue with the fact that the UAE has pointed to local remedies available within an Emirate (Abu Dhabi) rather than measures available at the federal level. 149.Qatar continues to make broad generalizations, that Qatari students were not allowed to continue their studies or that they were not provided with their educational records. 150.Qatar did finally identify two students who were allegedly refused reenrolment in UAE universities, or refused copies of their transcripts. The first example cited by Qatar is a student who was enrolled in the Emirates Aviation University and who continued his studies in Coventry University in the UK.246 There is no clear evidence on record as to why he chose not to continue his studies in the UAE, but in any case the academic records of this student were clearly available as he was able to continue his studies in Coventry University with credits for courses already completed in the UAE.247151.Regarding the second student, Qatar has chosen to redact both the University and the student’s name, and so the UAE is unable to meaningfully address these specific allegations. 152.However, if the conduct of other Qatari students is considered, then the Committee will see a pattern. Three Qatari students submitted communications to UNESCO alleging that the UAE had failed to comply with its obligations regarding their rights to education. But 246 19 February Response, DCL-073. 247See,e.g., 19 February Response, DCL-073, Exhibit J at 1 (where Coventry University is fully aware that this student “and [his] fellow independent Qatari students have already completed 3 of the modules with EAU”).
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- 70 - in that proceeding, the UAE has submitted documentation which shows that two of the students were terminated because their grades were lower than those required by the university. Both were placed on academic probation three times. One of them was given one extraordinary chance to bring his grades up, whereas the second was given two extraordinary chances.248 Regardless, in the case of the second student, the university considered certain extenuating medical circumstances and gave that student a sixth opportunity, and the registration department contacted the student on 26 September 2018, to provide the online registration link for the following studies.249 The case of the third student is perplexing as that student was attending classes at the university on the dates when the UNESCO proceeding was ongoing250 and the UAE understands from the university that the student recently graduated after successfully obtaining the degree. 153.None of those students had the need to go to UAE courts, as Qatar seems to suggest. Addressing their problems to their university was enough. To the extent that Qatar alleges that local remedies should have been available, the Committee should be mindful of the fact that the students could have resorted to UAE courts, but they opted not to. On the one hand, the Qatari Embassy itself requested the withdrawal of Qatari students.251On the other hand, students were contacted by the universities and reminded they could return.252 Finally, the students that did seek remedies sought them directly at the international level, effectively waiving any claim they did not have access to local remedies. The burden is on Qatar to show that there was a deficiency in the UAE courts to the point that any attempt to resort to local remedies was futile. 248Annex 5, Communication from the UAE in Response to the UNESCO Proceedings Initiated by Three Qatari Students, p. 1. 249Annex 5, Communication from the UAE in Response to the UNESCO Proceedings Initiated by Three Qatari Students, pp. 2-3. 250Annex 5, Communication from the UAE in Response to the UNESCO Proceedings Initiated by Three Qatari Students, p. 3. 251Annex 4, Communications from Several UAE Universities, p. 1 (“please be aware that Qatari students’ suspension from study and their departure to Qatar was at the request of the Qatari Embassy in the United Arab Emirates”).252Annex 4, Communications from Several UAE Universities (reporting the different communications between each university and their Qatari students and the responses received from such students).
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- 71 - c)Qatari Property Owners Have Resorted to Arbitration under the OIC Investment Agreement 154.Qatar complains that Qatari nationals have been prevented from enjoying their right to property as a consequence of the 5 June 2017 measures by the UAE. Qatar in its 19 February Response has submitted no less than ten witness statements that relate in some form or another with economic harm arising from the alleged impossibility of Qatari nationals to manage their property or investments in the UAE.253155.However, not only have Qatari nationals been able to travel to the UAE specifically to manage their property there,254 but also Qatar has deliberately orchestrated the submission of hundreds of claims against the UAE under the OIC Investment Agreement, purposely foregoing the pursuit of redress through the UAE courts.255* * * * * 156.There can be no doubt that Qatar has failed to overcome the admissibility hurdle in Article 11(3) of the CERD. Because available domestic remedies have neither been invoked nor exhausted, Qatar has failed to meet the requirements of that provision.157.For that reason alone the Committee must dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication and discontinue any further procedure addressing that communication. IV.THEEXISTENCE OF CONCURRENTPROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CERDCOMMITTEE AND THE ICJRENDERS QATAR’SCOMMUNICATION INADMISSIBLE158.Qatar’s 19 February Response opposes the UAE’s objection to the admissibility of Qatar’s claim based on the existence of parallel proceedings before the ICJ arguing that, 253See, e.g., 19 February Response, DCL-108, id., DCL-113. 254Annex 3, Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018. A prior version of this Annex in smaller format was submitted with UAE’s Response of 14 January 2019, para. 8 as Annex 1.2. The revised version accompanied herewith as Annex 1 is a larger format version and the English translation has been revised for completeness. This document contains illustrative examples of entry/exit data processed through the hotline that did not involve family reunification and include entries for “business”, “treatment”, “ownership of a property”, “business/work”, “study” and “others”. 255See supra para. 30.
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- 72 - contrary to the UAE’s view, Article 22 of the CERD “does not establish a ‘hierarchical and linear’ process” and that “neither lis pendens norelecta una via applies”.256A.The Consistency of the UAE’s Arguments 159.In Qatar’s view, the UAE has been inconsistent in its arguments.257 To the contrary, the UAE has consistently argued that the CERD and the ICJ proceedings cannot be pursued in parallel. In its Response of 7 August 2018, the UAE stated: “Qatar should not be permitted to simultaneously initiate proceedings in relation to the same issues in the ICJ.”258 In its 29 November 2018 Supplemental Response the UAE consistently held that the fact that Qatar had seized the ICJ could not mean anything but that Qatar had abandoned the CERD proceedings because the continuation of two parallel proceedings “would jeopardise the systemic integrity of the system and risk resulting in fragmented jurisprudence”259. Again consistently, in its 14 January 2019 Supplemental Response the UAE argued that the existence of parallel proceedings would undermine the integrity of the dispute resolution provisions of the CERD and of the ICJ.260160.Qatar wonders how could the UAE consider that Qatar had abandoned the CERD proceedings, when, invoking Article 11(2) of the CERD, it had referred the matter again to the Committee.261 As a matter of fact, the invocation of Article 11(2) of the CERD Convention came as a surprise because, after Qatar had submitted the matter to the attention of the Committee and the UAE had sent its response under Article 11(1) of the CERD Convention, no attempt to “adjust” the situation by negotiation or by other procedures as envisaged by Article 11(2) had been made by Qatar. Moreover, Qatar had 256 19 February Response, para. 167. 257 19 February Response, paras. 163-167. 258 UAE’s Response of 7 August 2018, para. 93. 259 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018, para. 79. 260 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, paras. 27-41. 261 19 February Response, para. 165 referring to the Note Verbale from Qatar to the CERD Committee, 29 October 2018, p. 2.
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- 73 - submitted the matter to the ICJ. The UAE was thus justified in assuming the abandonment of the CERD proceedings. B.Qatar’s Re-Submission to the CERD Committee Is Inadmissible 161.In any case, Qatar’s “re-submission” of the matter to the Committee with its Note Verbale of 29 October 2018 is defective.162.In its Note Verbale Qatar assumes that under Article 11(2) a State has the right to re-submit a matter to the Committee simply because the six-months time-limit has elapsed and just claiming that the matter has not been adjusted to its satisfaction.262 Qatar’s re-submission completely ignores the reference contained in Article 11(2) to bilateral negotiations or other procedures. 163.This reference, as all treaty provisions, must, however, have a meaning, an effet utile. If the reference simply meant, as Qatar assumes, that, as matter of fact, within the six months time limit no adjustment has been reached by negotiation or other procedures, it would add nothing to the simple requirement that six months must have elapsed. 164.To be meaningful, the provision requires that the claiming State has sought to engage in bilateral negotiations or in other procedures. In the present case, as mentioned, Qatar has made no attempt to engage in bilateral negotiations or other procedures. Referring to the UAE Response of 7 August 2018, it has simply assumed “that the United Arab Emirates is unwilling to engage constructively with the State of Qatar to settle the matter amicably”.263 It seems preposterous to look for the indication of a will to negotiate in a document in which the UAE, within a tight time limit, had to respond to a broad range of allegations. 165.It must be added that, if the seizure of the ICJ by Qatar were to be seen as resort to a procedure open to the parties, it would become absurd, and disrespectful to the Court, to consider the matter not adjusted before the ICJ procedure has run its full course. 262Note Verbale, from Qatar to the CERD Committee, 29 October 2018, p. 3. 263Note Verbale, from Qatar to the CERD Committee, 29 October 2018, p. 2.
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- 74 - 166.Consequently, Qatar has abandoned the CERD Committee proceedings by seizing the ICJ, and not validly resumed them with its letter of 29 October 2018. 167.In light of the above, the UAE respectfully invites the Committee to find that the re-submission of the matter as set out in Qatar’s letter of 29 October 2018 is inadmissible. 1.Qatar’s Submission Is Inadmissible Because It Is Incompatible With The Hierarchical and Linear Dispute-Settlement System of the CERD 168.The submission of Qatar is, however, inadmissible also for other reasons set out in previous defences of the UAE264 and to which Qatar responds in Chapter IV B of its 19 February Response. 169.The UAE objection to admissibility here considered is based on the contention that the CERD Committee proceedings cannot be pursued while proceedings between the same parties and concerning the same dispute are pending before the ICJ. The CERD Committee is duty bound to interpret and apply the Convention in such a way as to prevent a situation in which the system set out in Article 22 of the CERD Convention would be disrupted. 170.As indicated in the UAE’s previous submissions, this system is “hierarchical and linear”.265 With these terms the UAE means that the CERD Committee proceedings have priority over those before the ICJ (hierarchical) and that no parallel competing proceedings are admitted (linear). Qatar disagrees, holding that Article 22 “offers a prospectus of alternatives”.266171.The hierarchical and linear character of the system emerges by considering Article 22 from the two different points of view of the ICJ and of the Committee. 264See,UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, paras. 27-41. 265 UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, para. 33; UAE’s Supplemental Response of 29 November 2018, para. 72. 266 19 February Response, para. 178.
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- 75 - a)The Hierarchical Character of the System 172.From the point of view of the ICJ, Article 22 is a compromissory clause.267 It entitles States Parties to the CERD to submit unilaterally to the Court disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. It does not exclude recourse to other procedures “for settling disputes or complaints” applicable as between the parties.268173.This compromissory clause can be resorted to provided that the dispute “is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for” in the Convention. After a detailed analysis, in its Judgment of 1 April 2011, the ICJ stated that with these terms the Convention establishes “preconditions to be fulfilled before the seisin of the Court”269.The Court later specified, in its Order of 23 July 2018, that these preconditions are “procedural”.270 The hierarchical character of the relationship between the procedures set out in Articles 11 to 13 and the proceedings before the Court is thus clearly established. 174.From the point of view of the CERD Committee and of the proceedings before it, Article 22 provides that seizing the ICJ is a “last resort”, as it was argued by the Russian Federation and accepted by five dissenting judges in the Georgia v. Russian Federationcase.271 “Last resort” requires that the procedures set out in Article 11 have not succeeded in achieving a settlement of the dispute. 175.The hierarchical character of the Convention’s system and the role of the ICJ as a “last resort” are confirmed by the travauxpréparatoiresat all the stages of drafting of the Convention. Recourse to the ICJ was considered as both an implementing measure and a 267 As stated by the ICJ in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p.121, para. 118. 268 CERD, Article 16. 269Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 128, para.141. 270Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 29. 271Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 129, para. 144; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint dissenting opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 156, para. 43.
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- 76 - final clause. In each case, the delegates anticipated that the mechanism would only be available once the CERD Committee proceedings had been exhausted.272176.In its 19 February Response Qatar does not challenge the hierarchical character of the CERD Convention’s system as it, grudgingly, acknowledges the ICJ’s statement that “the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention” and “negotiation” are “procedural preconditions” to the seisin of the Court.273 In so doing it accepts the hierarchical structure of the Convention’s system. b)The Linear Character of the System 177.Qatar’s argument focuses on denying the “linear” character of the system. Such character would require that the two preconditions set out in Article 22 (negotiations and procedures provided for in the Convention) be cumulative, while in Qatar’s view they are alternative. In Qatar’s view, the consequences of such alleged alternative character would be that “a State Party may refer a dispute to the Court without any recourse to this 272 At the stage of the Sub-Commission of Human Rights, Article 17 of the Proposed Measures of Implementation stated expressly that the ICJ will only be available when no solution has been reached under the inter-state communication procedure before the CERD Committee and the ad hoc conciliation commission. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Proposed Measures of Implementation by Mr Ingles, 17 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321, p. 6 (Article 17). When these suggestions reached the Commission of Human Rights, they were met with general approval. See e.g., Commission on Human Rights, 810th meeting, 15 May 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.810, p. 7 (recourse to the ICJ was in effect seen as a right “to appeal” after no solution could be reached at the committee). The General Assembly proposed its own measures of implementation. The clauses themselves and the discussion on them confirm that committee proceedings had to be attempted and had to fail before the ICJ was open to disputing parties. Third Committee, Articles relating to measures of implementation to be added to the provisions of the draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the Commission on Human Rights by the Philippines, 11 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/L.1221, Article 18; Third Committee, 1344th meeting, 16 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, para. 69 (“Under that system, the case might be referred to the International Court of Justice as a last resort.”). As a final clause, the ICJ, again, was only available after committee proceedings had not provided a solution. Third Committee, Amendments to the suggestions for final clauses submitted by officers of the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.1237) by Ghana, Mauritania and the Philippines, 30 November 1965, doc. A/C.3/L.1313. The Ghanaian delegate makes that plain when explaining the so-called “three power amendment” (i.e., the amendment by Ghana, Mauritania and Philippines introducing the phrase “or the procedures provided for in the Convention” in what later became Article 22) which was adopted unanimously: “[T]he three-Power amendment was self-explanatory. Provision had been made in the draft Convention for machinery which should be used in the settlement of disputes before recourse was had to the International Court of Justice. The amendment simply referred to the procedures provided for in the Convention.” Third Committee, 1367th meeting, 7 December 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1367, paras. 29, 41. 273 19 February Response, para. 169.
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- 77 - Committee” and that “[t]he CERD procedures can thus be engaged independently of ICJ proceedings”.274178.The second consequence of the alleged alternative character of the preconditions in Article 22 is that the article states the obvious and goes nowhere. As regards the first consequence, it is based on the idea that, if the dispute is not settled by negotiation, it may be submitted to the ICJ without involving the Committee. But this idea is wrong because the reasons invoked by Qatar in favor of the alternative character of the two procedural conditions are unconvincing, as will be illustrated below. 179.Qatar starts its argument boldly bystating that the alternative character of the preconditions set out in Article 22 is a matter already decided by the ICJ: [T]he ICJ has repeatedly decided, on a prima facie basis,that for it to have jurisdiction under Article 22, it is sufficient that only onerequirement is met before the seisin of the Court (i.e. that they are “alternative”). As a result, a State Party may have recourse to the ICJ after negotiations without engaging the CERD procedures at all.275180.The first statement quoted is in stark contrast with the clear statements of the Court in the two most recent cases relied upon by Qatar, that “it need not make a pronouncement on the issue at this stage of the proceedings”276.181.The second statement is incompatible with the nature of prima facie findings in provisional measures cases. As the Court has stated repeatedly, and most recently: The Court may indicate provisional measures only if the provisions relied on by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction could be founded, but need not satisfy itself 274 19 February Response, para. 178. 275 19 February Response, para. 169 (emphasis in original). 276Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 39, referring to Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017,para. 60, I.C.J. Reports, 2017, pp. 125-126, para. 60.
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- 78 - in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case.277182.Qatar then recognizes that “the ICJ has yet to definitively confirm that the two requirements are alternative rather than cumulative” but argues that “13 Judges of the Court have already opined that they are alternative”.278 The dissenting opinions referred to endorse with different nuances the thesis that the preconditions are “alternative”. But the manner in which the point is made is misleading: many of these opinions do not come from judges presently sitting in the Court. Of the 13 Judges mentioned eight are not present members of the Court. Whatever the views expressed in some cases by judges (only a few of whom are still members of the Court), these opinions were included in dissents and in no case was a majority reached on the cumulative or alternative character of the preconditions set out in Article 22. 183.Qatar further argues that if the preconditions were cumulative this “would lead to the unreasonable result that some disputes subject to Article 22 could neverbe referred to the ICJ”.279 These would be disputes concerning the interpretation or application of provisions of the Convention different from those concerning situations in which one “State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to provisions of this Convention”, such as disputes about the validity of a reservation or of a denunciation.280This argument is far from convincing for two alternative reasons. Firstly, such disputes, although concerning a “final clause”, may still be held to be disputes about whether a State has given effect to a provision of the Convention. Secondly, and alternatively, it may be argued that Article 22 opens a “last resort” remedy only available for disputes having gone through negotiations and the procedures which are set out in the Convention but which are not available for other disputes for which access to the ICJ would depend on the existence of an agreement between the parties different from the compromissory 277Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 24, referring “for example”, to Jadhav(India v. Pakistan), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 May 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 236, para. 15. 278 19 February Response, para. 170. 279 19 February Response, para. 174 (emphasis in original). 280 19 February Response, para. 174.
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- 79 - clause of Article 22. There is no need to make a choice here between these two possible arguments, all of which could be reasonably made. The mere possibility of making them shows that, even when holding that the preconditions are cumulative, there would be no “unreasonable” consequences for disputes concerning the interpretation and application of provisions of the Convention different from those concerning the claim that one State Party is not giving effect to provisions of the Convention. 184.Qatar also argues that the travaux préparatoires support the view that the preconditions are alternative. It mostly relies on the assessment of the travaux préparatoires made in the Joint Dissenting Opinion of five judges to the 2011 Georgia v. Russian Federationpreliminary objections judgment.281 The Joint Dissenting Opinion recalls that the mention in what was to become Article 22 of the “procedures expressly provided for in this Convention” was introduced by a “Three Power Amendment” rather late in the negotiation and was unanimously approved with some States making brief statements in favour. After remarking that “[n]one of these statements is fully illuminating”, the Joint Dissenting Opinion states that The clear impression nevertheless emerges that the three Powers’ intent in proposing their amendment was not to impose a further condition resulting in more limited access to the Court than under the earlier text. There is nothing to indicate that the amendment was aimed at making resort to the special procedures under Part II mandatory where direct negotiations had failed. More likely, the amendment was intended to make clear that recourse to these special procedures figured among the possible avenues for negotiated settlement. That is why it was regarded by the delegates as merely a “useful addition or clarification” and was easily adopted, not as a change in the text to make it more restrictive but as a natural, and almost self-evident, clarification.282281 19 February Response, para. 176. 282Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint dissenting opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 157, para. 47.
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- 80 - 185.These remarks are far from firm. They are based on an “impression” and on an assessment of a “likely” intention.283 Moreover, looking at the travaux, one does not come to the same conclusion. When the drafters in the Sub-Commission first contemplated recourse to the ICJ, they expressly proposed to make it available only after Committee proceedings had been engaged and had failed.284 The Commission agreed.285When the Third Committee proposed its own measures of implementation, the ICJ again was only available when the dispute could not be resolved by other means.286 When the submission of disputes to the ICJ was considered as a final clause in the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the delegates were clear that the jurisdiction of the ICJ was only triggered when the dispute machinery of the Convention had failed to resolve the dispute.287 Thus, the so-called “three power amendment” (i.e., the amendment by Ghana, Mauritania and Philippines introducing the phrase “or the procedures provided for in the Convention” in what later became Article 22) which was adopted unanimously, was explained by the Ghanaian delegate as follows: [T]he three-Power amendment was self-explanatory. Provision had been made in the draft Convention for machinery which should be used in the settlement of disputes before recourse was had to the 283 In any case, the Court in its judgment in the same case “leaves aside” the “question of whether the two modes of peaceful resolution are alternative or cumulative”. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 125, para. 133. 284 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Proposed Measures of Implementation by Mr Ingles, 17 January 1964, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321, p. 6 (Article 17). 285 Commission on Human Rights, 810th meeting, 15 May 1964, doc. E/CN.4/SR.810, p. 7 (“A State party which considered that another State party was not giving effect to the provisions of the convention would be able to bring the matter to the attention of that State by written communication. If after six months the matter was not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States, either State would have the right to refer the matter to the committee. In the event of no solution being reached, the States would be free to appeal to the International Court of Justice. He stressed the usefulness of that machinery” (emphasis added)). 286 Third Committee, Articles relating to measures of implementation to be added to the provisions of the draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the Commission on Human Rights by the Philippines, 11 October 1965, doc. A/C.3/L.1221, p. 6 (Article 18). 287 Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, 7 December 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1367, paras. 26, 29, 31, 38, 39, 40, 41. The Third Committee was concerned first and foremost with the question of whether all parties had to consent to bring the dispute before the ICJ; the members were less concerned with the question of whether the dispute machinery must first have failed to reach a solution. Members almost took that latter point as a given. See,e.g.,id., para. 40 (“[Mr Cochaux] would support the three-Power amendment, which introduced a useful clarification.”). The Three-Power Amendment was adopted unanimously.
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- 81 - International Court of Justice. The amendment simply referred to the procedures provided for in the Convention.288186.But the Court also remarked in the Georgia v. Russia judgment that: at the time when CERD was being elaborated, the idea of submitting to the compulsory settlement of disputes by the Court was not readily acceptable to a number of States . . . [I]t is reasonable to assume that additional limitations to resort to judicial settlement in the form of prior negotiations and other settlement procedures without fixed time-limits were provided for with a view to facilitating wider acceptance of CERD by States.289187.These considerations make it easy to assume that the addition of the procedures expressly provided for in what was to become Article 22 was intended to make the Convention more acceptable to the then numerous States not favourable to compulsory judicial settlement of disputes. It can also be considered likely that the intent was not only “to make clear that recourse to these special procedures figured among the possible avenues for negotiated settlement”290 but also to strengthen the role of these newly established procedures.188.Qatar also argues that “[i]f the requirements were deemed cumulative, the negotiation requirement would be rendered redundant and deprived of any effet utile”. This would be, in Qatar’s view, the consequence of the fact that “negotiation constitutes an element of the CERD procedures” because “bilateral negotiations” are mentioned in Article 11(2). From this it would follow that, according to Qatar, “[i]f the two requirements were cumulative, there would be no reason to have an additional negotiation requirement in Article 22 on top of the negotiation requirement already stated in Article 11(2)”.291189.This argument is ill-conceived. The “negotiation[s]” mentioned in Article 22 are the very “bilateral negotiations” mentioned in Article 11(2). 288 Third Committee, 1367th meeting, 7 December 1965, doc. A/C.3/SR.1367, para. 29. 289Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 129, para. 147. 290Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint dissenting opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 157, para. 47. 291 19 February Response, para. 173.
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- 82 - 190.In the CERD system, as provided by Article 11(2), negotiation is a precondition to resort to the engagement of the Committee. The engagement of the Committee can be obtained only if negotiations have been held and have failed. Thus, in the CERD system there is only one procedure which starts with negotiations, and in case negotiations fail, continues with the engagement of the Committee. Article 22 must be read in light of Article 11 and of the role negotiations have in it. Negotiation and the other procedures are two steps of the same procedure. This procedure can stop if negotiations are successful but, before the “last resort” of seizing the ICJ can be utilized, it must be pursued up to an unsuccessful conclusion. In this sense, the preconditions are cumulative. c)Lack of Negotiations Renders the Re-Submission Inadmissible 191.In the present case the discussion concerning the interpretation of Article 22 is, however, not as relevant as it is in cases before the ICJ. In those cases the issue is whether for the Court to have jurisdiction it is necessary that only one or both of the procedural preconditions is satisfied. In the present case the question is whether the dispute is validly before the CERD Committee. As there have been no negotiations, and not even an attempt by Qatar to set these negotiations in motion, the condition set out in Article 11(2) is not satisfied. Consequently the request of Qatar remains inadmissible. 192.Referring to the compromissory clause of Article 22 of the CERD Convention, in its 2011 Judgment on Preliminary Objections in the Georgia v. Russian Federation case, the ICJ clarified that: . . . to meet the precondition of negotiation in the compromissory clause of a treaty . . . negotiations must relate to the subject-matter of the treaty containing the compromissory clause. In other words, the subject-matter of the negotiations must relate to the subject-matter of the dispute which, in turn, must concern the substantive obligations contained in the treaty in question.292193.In the present case there was no attempt by Qatar to engage in negotiation. Even less so in negotiations dealing with a dispute concerning alleged racial discrimination. 292Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 133, para. 161.
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- 83 - 2.The Risk of Lis Pendens and Electa Una Via Cannot Be Ignored 194.Qatar rejects the argument put forward by the UAE that Qatar’s seizure of the ICJ creates a situation of lis pendens and that it contradicts the principle of electa una via. Itcriticizes the UAE for referring to a “situation” of lis pendens and not to a “doctrine” or principle” or “rule” of lis pendens.293195.But this was the intention of the UAE. The UAE is fully aware that certain strict prerequisites – namely that the two disputes are between the same parties, have the same causa petendi and the same petitum – are sometimes required in order to deny the jurisdiction of a court based on lis pendens. It is also fully aware that different courts, tribunals and other dispute-settlement bodies are based on different treaties and that each of them is competent to decide on its jurisdiction. The UAE is, moreover, fully aware that the ICJ has declined to take a stand on this matter. In its Order of 23 July 2018 the Court stated that it did not “consider it necessary, for the present purposes, to decide whether anyelecta una via principle or lis pendens exception are applicable in the present situation”.294196.But the negative effects of a “situation” of lis pendens, in which the same parties and the same allegations based on the same facts are involved, or of a situation in which a party, while engaged in a dispute-settlement procedure, moves to another such procedure without abandoning the former, remain. These negative effects consist basically in the risk of conflicting decisions on the same issues of fact or law or both.197.In the case of the procedures before the CERD Committee, as illustrated in previous submissions by the UAE,295 which should be considered repeated here, there is the specific additional risk of creating the conditions for a clash between the Committee and the ICJ. Namely, between a respected specialized expert body competent for certain State-to-State disputes and the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 293 19 February Response, para. 180. 294Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 39. 295See, UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, para. 31.
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- 84 - 198.Contrary to what Qatar holds, the MOX Plant tribunal, notably did not rely on UNCLOS Articles 281 and 282 which, under strict conditions, deny the jurisdiction of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodieswhen the dispute is submitted to other procedures applicable between the parties.296 It preferred to rely on two considerations based on the integrity of the judicial function.297199.These are: (i) the “considerations of mutual respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to determine rights and obligations as between two States”; and (ii) that “a procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions on the same issue would not be helpful to the resolution of the dispute between the Parties”.298200.It is to be noted that the Tribunal relied on “mutual respect and comity” as regards the potential, not actual, submission of the dispute (or of a dispute similar to the one pending before it) to another court. Moreover, the court deserving respect and comity was a regional court (the European Court of Justice), while the MOX Plant Arbitral Tribunal was instituted on the basis of an open multilateral treaty binding more than three quarters of the existing States. 201.In the present case, Qatar’s submission of the dispute to the ICJ has created a real and concrete possibility of conflict of decisions and of a clash between the Committee and the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Considerations of mutual respect and comity should apply in this case even more. As illustrated in previous submissions by the UAE, the procedure before the Committee also disrupts the exercise of the procedural rights of the parties by compelling them either to restrain their arguments in one 296 19 February Response, para. 186. MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 3, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, 24 June 2003, available at in www.pca-cpa.org, mentions Article 281 and 282 of UNCLOS in paras. 18 and 23 but not for the purpose of justifying its decision to suspend proceedings. 297MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 3, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, 24 June 2003, available at in www.pca-cpa.org, para. 28. 298MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 3, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, 24 June 2003, available at in www.pca-cpa.org, para. 28.
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- 85 - procedure or to “show their hand” for later pleadings before the other dispute-settlement body.299202.It is humbly submitted that, before allowing Qatar to continue the procedure before it, the Committee should consider the dangerous implications just illustrated. These dangerous implications should encourage the Committee to rely on the legal arguments for declaring Qatar’s re-submission inadmissible, which have been illustrated above. 203.In a final attempt to dismiss the UAE’s arguments, Qatar states that, if the Committee were to declare its submission inadmissible and if the ICJ were to decide that it has no jurisdiction, this “would then lead to the result that Qatar has no remedy whatsoever – neither before this Committee nor the ICJ”.300 The question of jurisdiction and the admissibility of a claim is for each dispute-settlement body to decide. If in our case both the Committee and the ICJ were to decline entertaining Qatar’s case, it would mean that in both cases the requirements set out in the relevant international law instrument are not satisfied. V.CONCLUSION 204.For the reasons set out herein and in the UAE’s 7 August 2018 Response, the 29 November 2018 Submission and the 14 January 2019 Supplementary Submission, the UAE respectfully urges the Committee to dismiss Qatar’s Article 11 Communication for lack for jurisdiction and/or lack of admissibility. 205.The UAE once again takes this opportunity to reaffirm its unwavering commitment to eliminating racial discrimination in all of its forms and to combating hate speech. 299See, UAE’s Supplemental Response of 14 January 2019, paras. 36-39. 300 19 February Response, para. 197.
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[Page 1 of the PDF] Zayed University Office of the Vice President No. M M J/77/2018 Date: 15 March 2018 Messrs. Office of Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education, Ministry of Education Greetings, Subject: Qatari Students at the University of Zayed, and the reason of their study interruption It is my pleasure to send you my sincere greetings and appreciation. I would like to refer to your letter dated 8 March 2018, about your request to receive the information related to the reason of the interruption of the Qatar's students from studying at Zayed University without an academic reason. In this regard, please be aware that Qatari students’ suspension from study and their departure to Qatar was at the request of the Qatari Embassy in the United Arab Emirates. Attached is the requested information for the students. Please accept our best regards, [Signature] Dr. Riad Al-Muhaideb The Director of Zayed University
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[Page 2 of the PDF] Student No. Name in Arabic Gender Email Communication Method Campus SpecializationThe Last Attended Semester Date of Communication[the Number of the Student] [the name of the student in Arabic] [the gender of the student] [the email of the student] [the phone numbers that were used to contact the student] [the Campus where the student used to study] [the study field] [Spring semester 2017; for all of the mentioned students] [5 June 2017; for all of the mentioned students]
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[Page 3 of the PDF] University of Sharjah Office of the Chancellor No. 224/2017-2018 Date: 19 March 2018 Messrs. Office of Undersecretary of Academic Affairs, Peace upon you, In response to your electronical circulation on the directors of higher education institutions in the country, about the interruption of the Qatar's students from studying without an academic reason; and your invitation to contact these students, and to clarify the reasons of such interruption, and to assert that the education is available for everyone who meets the requirements. We are pleased to provide you with the attached statement summarizing all measures taken by the concerned personnel at the University of Sharjah in this regard. Kindly, review it and decide the appropriate. Thanks and regards, [Signature] Dr. Hamid Majol Al-Nuaimi The Director of Sharjah University
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[Page 4 of the PDF, this page is in English]
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[Page 5 of the PDF] United Arab Emirates University Admission and Registration Department A statement about a postgraduate student who is registered in the University Name University ID SpecializationThe Last Attended Semester Phone Number Date of CommunicationDate of Reply Comments [the name of the student] 201670201 Master in Social Service Second Semester 2016/2017 [Telephone number] March 11 The student was contacted by Email, and she expressed her desire to recommence her education at the University. She has only 15 Credited hours left.
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[Page 6 of the PDF] The list of the Qatari Student for the Academic Year 2016/2017 Institutions Name Specialization University ID The Last Attended/ admitted Semester Communication Method Date of CommunicationDate of Reply Summary [Paris-Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi] [the name of the student] [the Specialization of their study] [the student number] [the last attended semester by the student, or the semester in which the student was admitted to the University] [this column includes the email of the students] [this column includes the dates when the students were contacted] [No reply; or a dates of the received respond] [No reply; or no intention to attend the University]
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[Page 7 of the PDF] [An email that includes correspondences between “the Office of the Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education” and “The Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government”] Page 1 of 6 Re: Urgent/ the Interrupted Students for no Academic Reasons Hayatham Shukri [[email protected]] Sent on 14 March 2018, 05:13 PM Messrs. Office of Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education, Greetings, We have contacted the interrupted student from the State of Qatar at “The Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government”. The report is as the following: Student Number 00130338 Student Name [the name of the Student] Specialization Executive Master of Public Administration The Last Attended Semester Spring Semester 2017 (March 2017) Communication Method WhatsApp Date of Communication The final week of June 2017 Date of Reply The final week of July 2017 Summary of the Reply She was not able to attend Please accept out regards,
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[Page 8 of the PDF] [An email that includes correspondences between “the Office of Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education” and “The Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government”] Page 2 of 6 Best Regards, Hayathem Shukri Student Affairs Manager Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government [The School logo] From: Office of Undersecretary for Higher Education Date: March, 2018 at 11:15:17 AM GTM+4 To: undisclosed recipient, Subject: Urgent/ the Interrupted Students for no Academic Reasons Messrs. Managers of the High Education Institutions,
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[Page 9 of the PDF] [An email that includes correspondences between “the Office of the Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education” and “The Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government”] Page 3 of 6 Greetings, By following up on the information about the university students, It was noted that a number of Qatari students had been cut off from university studies in the United Arab Emirates without an academic reason. Please contact the interrupted students, and verify the reasons of the interruption, and to assert that the education is available to all students who meet their requirements. Also, please provide us with a report about the conclusion of the communications, and to be sent to us as soon as possible, which shall include the following: Student Number Student Name Specialization The Last Attended Semester Communication Method Date of Communication Date of Reply Summary of the Reply Thank you for your cooperation,
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[Page 10 of the PDF, this page is in English] [An email that includes correspondences between “the Office of the Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education” and “The Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government”] Page 4 of 6
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[Page 11 of the PDF] Islamic and Arabic Studies College The Qatari’s Students Information Student No. Student Name Level SpecializationThe Last Attended Semester Communication Method Date of CommunicationSummary of Reply [the Number of the Student] [the name of the student in Arabic] Four Islamic studies Second Semester 2016/2017 [the phone number and the email] December 2017/2018 She suspended her enrollment at the school but she will return in the year 2018/2019. [the Number of the Student] [the name of the student in Arabic] Two Islamic studies Second Semester 2016/2017 [the phone number] 14 September 2017 she suspended her enrollment for an entire one year which was 2017/2018 [the Number of the Student] [the name of the student in Arabic] First Islamic studies Second Semester 2016/2017 [the phone number] October 2017/2018 - The student is a Qatari Citizen. - The Student was cut off from education since the commencement of this academic year; she does not answer our calls.
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[Page 12 of the PDF, this page is in English]
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[Page 13 of the PDF] The name of the non-registered Qatari Students - Emirate School for Technology Student’s ID Student’s Name Specialization The Last Semester that was studied The Means of Communication The date of Communication Date of Reply Summary of Reply 1 [the number of the Student] [the name of the Student] [the specialty of the academic program attended by the student] did not sign for any courses By phone 10 March 2018 10 March 2018 her husband replied that, she does not want to finish her studies due to family conditions 2 First Academic semester 2015/2016 By phone 10 March 2018 10 March 2018 She postponed her enrolment due to family conditions and she will register in the coming first summer semester 2017/2018. 3 First Academic semester 2017/2018 By phone 10 March 2018 10 March 2018 She postponed her enrolment due to family conditions and she may register in the coming first summer semester 2017/2018. 4 Second Academic semester 2016/2017 By phone 10 March 2018 10 March 2018 Her husband said that she postponed her enrolment for health conditions, and she may register in the first coming summer semester 2017/2018. 5 Second Academic semester 2013/2014 By phone 10 March 2018 The phone is out of service The available phone numbers are out of service 6 Second Academic semester 2016/2017 By phone 10 March 2018 10 March 2018 He delayed his enrolment because of financial obligations (Building a family home), and he will continue his education after finishing these financial obligations.
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[Page 15 of the PDF] [An email that includes correspondences between “the Office of the Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education” and “the University of Al-Ain for technology”] Page 1 of 4 Re: Urgent/ the Interrupted Students for no Academic Reasons Documentation Office [[email protected]] To help you in protecting your privacy, some content of this message will be banned, if you are sure that this letter was sent from a trustworthy sender, and that you want to show the banned contents, please press here. Sent on: 13 March 2018, 10:18 AM To: Office of Undersecretary for Higher Education [[email protected]] Cc: [various emails] Messrs. Office of Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education, Greetings, Please see the table below, which contains the Qatari student data that have been interrupted from studying at the University of Al-Ain for Technology and Science, which includes only one student. Please accept out regards, University ID Student’s Name Specialization The Last Semester that was studied Phone No. The date of Communication Summary of Reply [Student No] [Student Name] Law [illegible] [phone numbers] 11 and 12 March 2018 The phone is out of service **Forwarded message** From office of Undersecretary for Higher Education, Date 8 March 2018, 11:15 GMT +04:00 Subject: Urgent/ the Interrupted Students for no Academic Reasons Messrs. Managers of the High Education Institutions,
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[Page 16 of the PDF] [An email that includes correspondences between “the Office of the Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education” and “the University of Al-Ain for technology”] Page 2 of 4 Greetings,, By following up on the information about the university students, It was noted that a number of Qatari students had been cut off from university studies in the United Arab Emirates without an academic reason. Please contact the interrupted students, and verify the reasons of the interruption, and to assert that the education is available to all students who meet their requirements. Also, please provide us with a report about the conclusion of the communications, and to be sent to us as soon as possible, which shall include the following: Student Number Student Name Specialization The Last Attended Semester Communication Method Date of Communication Date of Reply Summary of the Reply Thank you for your cooperation, [Logo]
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[Page 18 of the PDF] [An email that includes correspondences between “the Office of the Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education” and “the University of Al-Falah in Dubai”] Page 1 of 5 The Interrupted Students for no Academic Reasons [email protected] [[email protected]] Sent on: 11 March 2018, 21:37 PM To: office of Undersecretary for Higher Education Copy: [email] Messrs. Office of Undersecretary for Academic Affairs of Higher Education, Greetings, Upon your request for a report on Qatari students who were interrupted due to non-academic reasons, we would like to inform you that there is one Qatari student at the University of Al-Falah in Dubai. It should be noted that the student was cut off from studying for an academic reason, because he did not get the TOFEL Degree. Please see the student information, Student Number 201610187 Student Name [the name of the Student] Specialization Business Management\ Accounting The Last Attended Semester Second Semester of the Academic year 2016 Communication Method Phone and Email Date of Communication 8 March 2018 Date of Reply No response Summary of the Reply We did not receive any reply It should be noted that the student had studied 15 credited hours from the required courses. Regards, Dr. Yasser Ahmed Altayeb Director Quality Assurance and Institutional, Effectiveness Center (QAIEC)
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[Page 21 of the PDF] [A table that includes a summary of the communications with the Universities in UAE ] University Name Student’s Number Student’s name Major The Last Semester that was studied The Means of Communication The date of Communication Date of Reply Summary of Reply [University of Al-Falah in Dubai; Dubai University; United Arab Emirates University; Paris-Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi; American University in Sharjah; Emirate School for Technology; the University of Al-Ain for Technology and Science; Islamic and Arabic Studies College; Abu Dhabi University; The Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government; Zayed University; Sharjah university] [the Student University number] [the name of the student in Arabic] [the major that the student has attended] [the last attended semester] [phone or Email] [date of communication] [date of the reply] [No reply; showed an intention to recommence their studies; phone number is out of service; no intent to recommence do to family conditions; the phone number was closed; the student voluntarily suspended their registration; was not able to attend; by the request of the Qatar Embassy; the interruption due to financial obligations; “blank”; or “Illegible”]
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Referring to the Committee's decisions on Complaint No. 2016/1154 concerning the case of the student /, and Complaint No. 2017/1155 concerning the cases of student and student, which were decided during the 204th session for the period from 4 to 17 April 2018. The Permanent Delegation of the United Arab Emirates to UNESCO would like to report to the Committee of Conventions and Recommendations,that the competent authorities in the UAE have reviewed the Committee's decisions as well as the allegations made by the Union of Alkarama and the Arab Union for Human Rights,regarding the cases of the students mentioned above. United Arab Emirateswould liketo clarifythe situation of the mentioned students up to this date, as provided by the Department of Registration at the University of Sharjah, accompanied by supporting evidence, which refutes the allegations contained in the communications which weresubmitted by the two mentioned Unions:First: With regard to Complaints: After severing diplomatic relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017, Qatari students, who wereregistered at the University of Sharjah,have contacted the University's Registration Department,to inquire abouttheir academic status. In orderto preserve their rights, the Registration Department provided them with all the records, academic statements and the descriptions of the required courses. The University's Registration Departmentalso removedthe summer and fallcourses, so that they will not be charged for the fees of these courses, and the consequent academic conditions due to the absence (the failuredue to the absence). This action comes within the context of preserving their rights,which would be for the interest of Qatari students. 1.Complaint No. 2017/1155 related to the student / university number U00039878 - Faculty of Science Health: •The Academic Status For the student:the Student is struggling academically,where he received the third consecutive academicwarning by the end of the fall semester 2014-2015, and hewas academically dismissed from theuniversity in accordance to the regulations. Hesubmitteda petition and hewas givenan exceptional opportunity in the spring semester2014- 2015 to improve his cumulative average[GPA].However, his points average were low again in the two subsequent semesters, and therefore he received thefifth inconsecutive warningby the end of the spring semester 2016-2017, and he was academically dismissedfor the second time from the University in accordance tothe regulations (Annex 1).The studentwas officially notified duringthe academic semester on 7 August 2017 via email. (Annex 2) •The Procedures taken by the University of Sharjah to settle the student's academic status: The student is considered permanently academically dismissed from the university because of his low school performance, and he has no right to return to complete his studies at the University of Sharjah, and he was informed of this. The last communication with the student by the registration department was on 21 September 2018 via email, in which he received upon of his request, an official copy of the certificate of “to whom it may concerns”,and his documents and academic records so he canbe able to send them to other universities (Annex 3 is the document related to the University law about the academic dismissal)
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•We also want to add thatthe student has contactedthe registration department at the University of Sharjah on 22 September 2018, and asked the department to receivea (diplomaletter), and the University replied on September 23, 2018 to clarify the meaning of his request(Annex 4).It should be noted that the university can only grant him a diploma certificateafter the completion of all of the program requirements according to the regulations. As the university has explained earlier, the student is considered permanently academically dismissed. Therefore, after the completion of theregistration processes through the electronic link thatthe student has received via email, andthe access to (their own service banner),the student is entitled to get an acknowledgment about theirrequested documents and the academic records. https://uos.sharjah.ac.ae:9050/prod_enUS/twbkwbis.P_WWWLogin 2. Complaint No. 2017/1155 related to the student / - university number U00036991 - Faculty of Engineering,The Academic Status:•The Complaint containedsome unsubstantiated allegationsthat have no basisof truth. In which the student points out to an e-mail inAugust 2017,which is attached to Alkarama Union report,that “on the third day of the crisis, she was havingasummer semester at the university and received a letter from the university that her courses hadbeen withdrawn for the summer andfallsemesters, and that she cannot complete her studies at the university”.We herebywould like to informyou that the student has registered in advance for the summersemester 2016-2017, and fallsemester 2017-2018, on 26 April 2017 through the Internet in the earlystage ofregistration and prior to the resultsissuance(i.e. she registered earlier to the issuance of herresults). As for the academic status of the student and the communication procedures with her, we would like to clarify the following: •Academic status of the student:the Student is struggling academically, where she received the third consecutive academic warning by the end of the fall semester 2014-2015, and she was academically dismissed from the university in accordance to the regulations. Shesubmitted a petition request and she was given an exceptional opportunity to improve hercumulative average [GPA], by the end of the spring semester 2014- 2015. However, herpoints average were low again in the two subsequent semesters, and therefore she received the fifth inconsecutive warning by the end of the spring semester 2015-2016, and she was academically dismissed for the second time from the University in accordance to the regulations. She was given a second a second exceptional opportunity to improve her GPA by the end of the summer semester 2015-2016. The student did not improve her GPA in the summer semester 2015-2016, and she wasacademicallydismissedfor the third time from the university in accordance with the regulations. She submitted a petition reasoned bya medical excuse. The student medical conditions were considered,and considering her GPA score which was near 2.0 points, and the number of the performed credits, she was given a thirdexceptionalopportunity. In which the student was able to increase her GPA to2.03 points (acceptable) by the end of the spring semester 2016-2017 and therefore,entitling her to continue the study. (Annex 5)
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•Actions taken by the University of Sharjah in order to settle the student 's academic status: The Student is still enrolled at the University of Sharjah,and can register for the next classes to complete her studies . The registration department contacted the student on 13 March 2018 to inform her that she could return to study and her motherexplained her daughter desireto complete her studies.However, the student did not contactthe University, and did not register for thenext semester up tothisdate.The registration department contacted the student again on 26 September 2018, and she was provided with the online registration link.(Annex 6 ) It should be noted that the student is able to recommence her studies at the university as soon as she completesthe registration processes at the university, provided that her actual presence in accordance to the university regulations. 3-Complaint No. 2016/1154 relatedto thestudent / , university number U00031765, From the Faculty of Law •The measures taken by the University of Sharjah to settle the academic status of the student: The student /, was contacted on 13 March 2018, to inform him aboutthe possibility to recommence his study. On 29 August 2018,the Registration Department at the University of Sharjah provided the studentwith thecertificate (to whom it may concern) upon hisrequest (Annex 7). The student is currentlypresentin the UAE at the University of Sharjah, and has 9 credit hours left for his graduation. (Annex 8)•We also inform your esteemed committee that the Department of Registration at the University of Sharjah and in the context of its continuous communication with the Qatari students affiliated with it, the Department of Registration has addressed the students on 13 March 2018 and informed them of the possibility to returnto study in accordanceto the university regulations. Second: With regard to the authors of the communications: The United Arab Emiratesinvites theCommittee of Conventions and Recommendations,and the Member States, as is the case about fulfilling the required standards for accepting a compliant, to verify the background of the claimants, which are, the Union of Alkarama and the Arab Union for Human Rights, and to verify the reasons behind theirsubmission of the complaint andtheir use of all organs and mechanisms and the United Nations Commissions on Human Rights,intargeting of certain countries in apermanentmanners.UAE,in its previous response to the complaints,hadmadeitclear about the background of both Unions. Accordingly, the United Arab Emirates calls upon your esteemed Committee topermanentlyremove all the above-mentioned complaints from its agenda. It requests to record thememorandum of the state’s response tothe complaints mentioned inthe documents of the 205th Session of the Committee of Conventions and Recommendations.
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1 1154 المتعلق بحالة الطالب/ / شأن البلاغات رقم 2016 􀈊 جنة المذكورة 􀝏 قرارات ال 􀊄􀚲 الإشارة إ 􀈋 و
ي الطالبة/ والطالب / 􀛘 1155 المتعلق بحال / ، والبلاغ رقم 2017
. ل 2018 􀊈 1 ابر - ة من 47 􀙁􀘅 ي تم اتخاذها خلال الدورة رقم 204 للف 􀛘 وال
جنة الاتفاقيات والتوصيات 􀝍 سكو افادة 􀉲 ية المتحدة لدى اليو 􀈋 يود الوفد الدائم لدولة الإمارات العر
الادعاءات 􀊄􀚴 جنة كما اطلعت ع 􀝏 قرارات ال 􀊄􀚴 دولة الامارات اطلعت ع 􀊏􀡩 بأن السلطات المختصة
ما يتعلق 􀊏􀡩 سان 􀉲 حقوق الا 􀝍 ية 􀈋 الواردة من قبل مصدري البلاغات منظمة الكرامة، والمنظمة العر
دولة الامارات توضيح حالات الطلبة 􀊏􀡩 ن، وعليه تود السلطات المختصة 􀊈 بحالات الطلبة المذكور
ا الأدلة 􀚈􀙭 جامعة الشارقة، مرفقا 􀊏􀡩 جيل 􀜦 خه وذلك وفقا لما وافتنا به إدارة الت 􀊈 ى تار 􀛘 ن ح 􀊈 المذكور
ن:- 􀘈 ن المذكورت 􀘈 البلاغات المقدمة من قبل المنظمت 􀊏􀡩 ي تدحض الادعاءات الواردة 􀛘 الداعمة وال
ما يتعلق بالبلاغات:- 􀊏􀡩 أولا:
خ 5 􀊈 عد قطع العلاقات الدبلوماسية مع قطر بتار 􀈊 جامعة الشارقة 􀊏􀡩 ن 􀘈 ن المنتسب 􀘈􀊈 قام الطلبة القط ر
اديمية، 􀉠 أوضاعهم الا 􀊄􀚴 جامعة، وذلك للوقوف ع 􀝍 ا 􀊏􀡩 جيل 􀜦 يونيو 2017 بالتواصل مع إدارة الت
جلات والافادات الدراسية 􀜦 افة ال 􀉢 دهم ب 􀊈 و􀙂􀘅 جيل ب 􀜦 حقوقهم قامت ادارة الت 􀊄􀚴 حفاظ ع 􀝏 ول
ي لا يتم تحميلهم دفع 􀉠 ف، 􀊈 خر 􀝍 ة. كما قامت بحذف مساقات الصيف وا 􀈋 وتوصيف المساقات المطلو
سبب الغياب) . 􀈊 سبب الغياب ( الرسوب 􀈊 اديمية 􀉠 ا من أوضاع ا 􀚈􀙕 تب عل 􀙁􀘅 رسوم هذه المساقات، وما ي
ن. 􀘈􀊈 حة الطلبة القطر 􀝏 مص 􀊏􀡩 صب 􀊈 حقوقهم و 􀊄􀚴 حفاظ ع 􀝍 إطار ا 􀊏􀡩 ى 􀈖 وهذا الإجراء أ
􀊏􀚥 جام 􀝍 1155 المتعلق بالطالب/ - الرقم ا / 1ا-لبلاغ رقم 2017
حية :- 􀜶 لية العلوم ال 􀉠 من - U00039878
اديمي الثالث 􀉠 الإنذار الأ 􀊄􀚴 اديمياً حيث حصل ع 􀉠 أ 􀙁􀘆 اديمي للطالب: الطالب متع 􀉠 الوضع الأ 
جامعة وفق لال وائح، 􀝍 اديمياً من ا 􀉠 2015 وتم فصله أ - ف 2014 􀊈 خر 􀝍 اية فصل ا 􀚈􀙔 ب 􀊏􀚲 المتتا
2015 لرفع - يع 2014 􀈋 فصل الر 􀊏􀡩 حام وتم إعطاءه فرصة استثنائية 􀙁􀘅 وتقدم بطلب اسخامس 􀝍 الإنذار ا 􀊄􀚴 ن وحصل ع 􀘈 ن لاحق 􀘈 فصل 􀊏􀡩 اكمي . و انخفض معدلة مرة أخرى 􀙁􀘅 المعدل ال
جامعة وفق 􀝍 اديمياً للمرة الثانية من ا 􀉠 2017 وفصل ا - يع 2016 􀈋 اية فصل الر 􀚈􀙔 المتفرق ب
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2 خ 7 أغسطس 2017 􀊈 اديمي رسمياً بتار 􀉠 اللوائح( مرفق 1) وقد تم إعلام الطالب بالفصل الا
( ي. (مرفق 2 􀉲 و􀙁􀘅 يد الالك 􀙁􀘄 ال 􀙁􀘄 ع
عد الطالب 􀊇 اديميا: 􀉠 ة وضع الطالب أ 􀊈 سو 􀈖 ا جامعة الشارقة من أجل 􀚈􀙮 ي اتخذ 􀛘 الإجراءات ال 
ي ولايحق له 􀛜􀘟 ي تحصيله الدرا 􀉲 سبب تد 􀈊 جامعة 􀝍 ائي من ا 􀚈􀙰 ل 􀉢 ش􀈌 اديميا و 􀉠 مفصولا فصلا أ
ان آخر تواصل مع الطالب 􀉠 جامعة الشارقة وتم ابلاغه بذلك، و 􀊏􀡩 العودة لاستكمال دراسته
ناء 􀈋 جامعة، و 􀝍 ي وابلغته ا 􀉲 و􀙁􀘅 يد الالك 􀙁􀘄 ال 􀙁􀘄 2018 ع 􀙁􀘄 خ 21 سبتم 􀊈 جيل بتار 􀜦 من قبل إدارة الت
جلات 􀜦 مه الأمر والوثائق وال 􀚈􀙱 خة رسمية من شهادة لمن 􀜦 ده بن 􀊈 شأن تزو 􀈊 طلبه 􀊄􀚴 ع
جامعات اخرى ( مرفق 3 الوثيقة 􀊄􀚲 ي يتمكن من ارسالها ا 􀉠 خاصة به . وذلك 􀝍 اديمية ا 􀉠 الا
اديمي) 􀉠 شأن الفصل الأ 􀈊 جامعة 􀝍 خاصة بقانون ا 􀝍 ا
􀙁􀘄 خ 22 سبتم 􀊈 جامعة الشارقة بتار 􀊏􀡩 جيل 􀜦 • كما نفيدكم بان الطالب قام بمخاطبة ادارة الت
خ 23 􀊈 جامعة بالرد عليه بتار 􀝍 ( رسالة دبلوما)، وقامت ا 􀊄􀚴 حصول ع 􀝍 ا ا 􀚈􀙔 2018 ، وطلب م
جامعة منحه شهادة 􀝏 2018 لتوضيح ماهية طلبه ( مرفق 4). علما بانه لا يمكن ل 􀙁􀘄 سبتم
جامعة سلفا بأن 􀝍 حت ا 􀜷 نامج وفقا ل لانظمة. وكما او 􀙁􀘄 افة متطلبات ال 􀉠 عد إنجاز 􀈊 دبلوما إلا
ائي. 􀚈􀙰 ل 􀉢 ش􀈌 اديميا و 􀉠 عد مفصولا فصلا أ 􀊇 الطالب
􀙁􀘄 ده به ع 􀊈 ي الذي تم تزو 􀉲 و􀙁􀘅 الرابط الالك 􀙁􀘄 جيل ع 􀜦 عد استكمال اجراءات الت 􀈊 و عليه يحق للطالب
جلات 􀜦 افادات بالوثائق وال 􀊄􀚴 حصول ع 􀝏 خاصة به) ل 􀝍 ( خدمة البانر ا 􀊄􀚲 ي والدخول إ 􀉲 و􀙁􀘅 يد الالك 􀙁􀘄 ال
خاصة به. 􀝍 ة ا 􀈋 اديمية المطلو 􀉠 الا
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3 􀊏􀚥 جام 􀝍 1155 المتعلق بالطالبة/ الرقم ا / 2ا-لبلاغ رقم 2017
اديمي:- 􀉠 لية الهندسة الوضع الأ 􀉠 من – U00036991
􀊏􀡩 ا الطالبة 􀚈􀙕 ف 􀙁􀘈 ش􀈖 ي 􀛘 حة وال 􀜶 ي لا اساس لها من ال 􀛘 عض الادعاءات ال 􀈊 • تضمن البلاغ
بلاغ منظمة الكرامة بأنه 􀊏􀡩 شهر أغسطس 2017 والمرفقة 􀊏􀡩 ي 􀉲 و􀙁􀘅 يد الالك 􀙁􀘄 إحدى رسائل ال
جامعة بأنه قد تم 􀝍 جامعة واستلمت رسالة من ا 􀝍 ا 􀊏􀡩 انت تدرس صيفي 􀉠 ثالث يوم الأزمة 􀊏􀡩 (
جامعة) . 􀝍 ا 􀊏􀡩 ا 􀚈􀙒 أنه لا يمكن أن تكمل دراس 􀈋 ف و 􀊈 خر 􀝍 ا لفصل الصيف وا 􀚈􀙮 حب مساقا 􀜥
2017- ل مسبق لفصل الصيف 2016 􀉢 ش􀈌 جيل و 􀜦 نفيدكم هنا بأن الطالبة قامت بالت
جيل 􀜦 ة الت 􀙁􀘅 ف 􀊏􀡩 نت وذلك 􀙁􀘅 الان 􀙁􀘄 ل 2017 ع 􀊈 خ 26 ابر 􀊈 2018 بتار - ف 2017 􀊈 خر 􀝍 ولفصل ا
ما يتعلق 􀊏􀡩 جيل المبكر قبل ظهور نتائجها) . أما 􀜦 المبكر و قبل ظهور النتائج ( أي قامت بالت
:- 􀊏􀚴 اديمي للطالبة واجراءات التواصل معها فنود توضيح ما ي 􀉠 بالوضع الا
اديمي 􀉠 الإنذار الأ 􀊄􀚴 اديمياً حيث حصلت ع 􀉠 ة أ 􀙁􀘆 اديمي للطالبة: الطالبة متع 􀉠 • الوضع الأ
جامعة وفق ا 􀝍 اديمياً من ا 􀉠 2015 وتم فصلها أ - ف 2014 􀊈 خر 􀝍 اية فصل ا 􀚈􀙔 ب 􀊏􀚲 الثالث المتتا
اية 􀚈􀙔 اكمي ب 􀙁􀘅 حام وتم إعطاءها فرصة استثنائية لرفع المعدل ال 􀙁􀘅 للوائح، وتقدمت بطلب اس
􀊄􀚴 ن وحصلت ع 􀘈 ن لاحق 􀘈 فصل 􀊏􀡩 2015 .و قد انخفض معدلها مرة أخرى - يع 2014 􀈋 فصل الر
اديمياً للمرة 􀉠 2016 وفصلت أ - يع 2015 􀈋 اية فصل الر 􀚈􀙔 خامس المتفرق ب 􀝍 اديمي ا 􀉠 الإنذار الأ
اكمي 􀙁􀘅 جامعة وفق لال وائح، وتم إعطاءها فرصة استثنائية ثانية لرفع المعدل ال 􀝍 الثانية من ا
2016- الصيف 2015 􀊏􀡩 2016 و .ل م ترفع الطالبة معدلها - اية فصل الصيف 2015 􀚈􀙔 ب
عذر 􀈊 ر 􀙁􀘄 حام م 􀙁􀘅 جامعة وفق اللوائح، وتقدمت بطلب اس 􀝍 اديمياً للمرة الثالثة من ا 􀉠 وفصلت ا
حية للطالبة وقرب معدلها من ن. 2ق 0طة وعدد الساعات 􀜶 ي، فتمت مراعاة الظروف ال 􀛗 ط
2.03 نقطة 􀊄􀚲 المنجزة فأعطيت فرصة استثنائية ثالثة. وقد قامت الطالبة برفع معدلها إ
الدراسة. ( 􀊏􀡩 يحق لها الاستمرار 􀊏􀚲 التا 􀈋 2017 و - يع 2016 􀈋 اية فصل الر 􀚈􀙔 بتقدير (مقبول) ب
( مرفق 5
اديميا : الطالبة لا 􀉠 ة وضع الطالب أة 􀊈 سو 􀈖 ا جامعة الشارقة من أجل 􀚈􀙮 ي اتخذ 􀛘 الإجراءات ال 
ا وقد تم 􀚈􀙒 جيل للفصول القادمة لاستكمال دراس 􀜦 ا الت 􀚈􀙔 مك 􀊈 جامعة الشارقة و 􀊏􀡩 تزال مقيدة
انية 􀉢 خ 13 مارس 2018 لإبلاغها بإم 􀊈 جيل مع الطالبة بتار 􀜦 التواصل هاتفيا من قبل إدارة الت
ا. إلا أن الطالب لةم تراجع 􀚈􀙒 ا باستكمال دراس 􀚈􀙒 ا رغبة ابن 􀚈􀙮 العودة للدراسة وأبدت والد
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4 جامعة مجدد ا 􀝍 ا 􀊏􀡩 جيل 􀜦 خه. ثم قامت إدارة الت 􀊈 ى تار 􀛘 جل للفصل القادم ح 􀜦􀈖 جامعة ولم 􀝍 ا
جيل 􀜦 خاص بالت 􀝍 ي ا 􀉲 و􀙁􀘅 دها بالرابط الإلك 􀊈 2018 بمخاطبة الطالبة وتم تزو 􀙁􀘄 خ 26 سبتم 􀊈 بتار
( . (مرفق 6
جامعة، 􀝍 ا 􀊏􀡩 جيل 􀜦 جامعة فور استكمال اجراءات الت 􀝍 ا 􀊏􀡩 ا 􀚈􀙒 ان الطالبة استئناف دراس 􀉢 علما بأنه بإم
جامعة. 􀝍 حسب انظمة ا 􀊏􀚴 حضور الك 􀝍 شرط ا
􀡧من U00031765􀊏􀚥 جام 􀝍 ا􀡧 ا الرقم 􀡧 الطال 􀡧خاص 􀝍 ا􀡧1154/2016􀡧رقم 􀡧 -3 البلاغ
القانون 􀡧لية 􀉠
اديميا : تم التواصل مع 􀉠 ة وضع الطالب أ 􀊈 سو 􀈖 ا جامعة الشارقة من أجل 􀚈􀙮 ي اتخذ 􀛘 - الإجراءات ال
2018// خ 29 􀊈 تار 􀈋 انية العودة للدراسة ، و 􀉢 خ 13 مارس 2018 لإبلاغه بإم 􀊈 بتار 􀘈 الطالب /
􀊄􀚴 مه الأمر) وذلك بناء ع 􀚈􀙱 من 􀊄􀚲 شهادة ( إ 􀈊 د الطالب 􀊈 و􀙂􀘅 جامعة الشارقة ب 􀊏􀡩 جيل 􀜦 قامت ادارة الت
جامعة 􀊏􀡩 مقاعد الدراسة 􀊄􀚴 دولة الامارات ع 􀊏􀡩 طلبه (مرفق 7) . علما بأن الطالب يتواجد حاليا
( تخرجه 9 ساعات معتمدة. ( مرفق 8 􀊄􀚴 الشارقة ومتبقي ع
إطار تواصلها المستمر مع 􀊏􀡩 جامعة الشارقة و 􀊏􀡩 جيل 􀜦 جنتكم الموقرة بان إدارة الت 􀝍 • كما نفيد
م 􀚈􀙒 خ 13 مارس 2018 وابلغ 􀊈 ا قامت بمخاطبة الطلبة بتار 􀚈􀙕 ن ف 􀘈 ن المنتسب 􀘈􀊈 الطلبة القطر
جامعة. 􀝍 انية العودة للدراسة وفقا لانظمة ا 􀉢 بإم
ما يتعلق بمقدمي البلاغات:- 􀊏􀡩 ثانيا:
ا، وكما هو 􀚈􀙕 جنة الاتفاقيات والتوصيات والدول الأعضاء ف 􀝍 ية المتحدة 􀈋 تدعو دولة ا لامارات العر
التأكد من خلفية مقدمي الشكوى وهما منظمة 􀊄􀚲 قبول الشكوى إ 􀙁􀘈 شأن استيفاء معاي 􀈊 معمول به
ي تقف وراء تقديمهما للشكوى واستغلالهم 􀛘 ال 􀊏􀚤 سان والدوا 􀉲 حقوق الا 􀝍 ية 􀈋 الكرامة والمنظمة العر
ل دائم، وقد 􀉢 ش􀈌 ا و 􀚈􀙔 عي 􀈊 داف دول 􀚈􀙒 اس 􀊏􀡩 سان 􀉲 حقوق الا 􀝍 جان الأمم المتحدة 􀝍 افة أجهزة واليات و 􀉢 ل
ن. 􀘈 لتا المنظمت 􀉠 البلاغات خلفية 􀊄􀚴 ردها السابق ع 􀊏􀡩 حت دولة الامارات 􀜷 أو
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5 افة البلاغات 􀉠 شطب 􀊄􀚲 جنتكم الموقرة إ 􀝍 ية المتحدة 􀈋 ما تقدم تدعو دولة الامارات العر 􀊄􀚴 ناء ع 􀈋 و
البلاغات 􀊄􀚴 ائي . وتطل ب توثيق مذكرة رد الدولة ع 􀚈􀙰 ل 􀉢 ش􀈌 المذكور ة أعلا ه م ن جدول اعمالها و
جنة الاتفاقيات والتوصيات. 􀝏 وثائق الدورة 205 ل 􀊏􀡩 المذكورة
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Document Long Title

Volume II - Annexes

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