INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICEINTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATIONOF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION(THE STATE OF QATAR v.THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)MEMORIAL OF THE STATE OF QATARANNEXES 102-123VOLUME IV25APRIL 2019
VOLUME IV
ANNEXES 102 - 123
CERD Committee Documents and Proceedings
Annex 102 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 1 concerning States parties’ obligations, contained in document A/87/18 (1972)
Annex 103 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 7 relating to the implementation of article 4, contained in document A/40/18 (1985)
Annex 104 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 11 on non-citizens, contained in document A/48/18 (1993)
Annex 105 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention, contained in document A/48/18 (1993)
Annex 106 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 15 on article 4 of the Convention, Forty-second session (1993)
Annex 107 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 13 on the training of law enforcement officials in the protection of human rights, Forty-second session (1993)
Annex 108 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 20 on article 5 of the Convention, contained in document A/51/18 (1996)
Annex 109 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005)
Annex 110 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 31 on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system, Sixty-fifth session (2005)
Annex 111 CERD Committee, Reports Submitted by States Parties in Accordance with Article 9 of the Convention: United Arab Emirates,
document CERD/C/ARE/12-17 (27 March 2009)
Annex 112 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32: The meaning and scope of special measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
document CERD/C/GC/32 (24 September 2009)
Annex 113 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35: Combating racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (26 September 2013)
Annex 114 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, document CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017)
Annex 115 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response of the United Arab Emirates (7 August 2018)
Annex 116 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva to the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) referring the matter at issue in ICERD-ISC-2018/2 again to the CERD Committee (29 October 2018)
Annex 117 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response of the United Arab Emirates (7 November 2018)
Annex 118 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates
(29 November 2018)
Annex 119 Note Verbale of the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) to the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office at Geneva regarding interstate communication ICERD-ISC-2018/2 (14 December 2018), available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CERD/NV_QatarUAE_14Dec2018%20_…
Annex 120 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Supplemental Response of the UAE on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility (14 January 2019)
Annex 121 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response of the State of Qatar (14 February 2019)
Annex 122 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Comments on Qatar’s Response on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility (19 March 2019)
International Organization Documents
Annex 123 IACtHR, Entitlement of legal entities to hold rights under the Inter-American Human Rights System (Interpretation and scope of Article 1(2), in relation to Articles 1(1), 8, 11(2), 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 and 62(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as of Article 8(1)(A) and (B) of the Protocol of San Salvador), Advisory Opinion OC-22/16 (26 February 2016)
Annex 102
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 1 concerning States parties’ obligations, contained in document A/87/18 (1972)
Fifthsession(1972)*GeneralrecommendationIconcerningStatesparties’obligations(art.4oftheConvention)OnthebasisoftheconsiderationatitsfifthsessionofreportssubmittedbyStatespartiesunderarticle9oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,theCommitteefoundthatthelegislationofanumberofStatespartiesdidnotincludetheprovisionsenvisagedinarticle4(a)and(b)oftheConvention,theimplementationofwhich(withdueregardtotheprinciplesembodiedintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtherightsexpresslysetforthinarticle5oftheConvention)isobligatoryundertheConventionforallStatesparties.TheCommitteeaccordinglyrecommendsthattheStatespartieswhoselegislationwasdeficientinthisrespectshouldconsider,inaccordancewiththeirnationallegislativeprocedures,thequestionofsupplementingtheirlegislationwithprovisionsconformingtotherequirementsofarticle4(a)and(b)oftheConvention.*ContainedindocumentA/87/18.
Annex 102
Annex 103
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 7 relating to the implementation of article 4, contained in document A/40/18 (1985)
1Thirty-secondsession(1985)*GeneralrecommendationVIIrelatingtotheimplementationofarticle4TheCommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscrimination,HavingconsideredperiodicreportsofStatespartiesforaperiodof16years,andinover100casessixth,seventhandeighthperiodicreportsofStatesparties,RecallingandreaffirmingitsgeneralrecommendationIof24February1972anditsdecision3(VII)of4May1973,NotingwithsatisfactionthatinanumberofreportsStatespartieshaveprovidedinformationonspecificcasesdealingwiththeimplementationofarticle4oftheConventionwithregardtoactsofracialdiscrimination,Noting,however,thatinanumberofStatespartiesthenecessarylegislationtoimplementarticle4oftheConventionhasnotbeenenacted,andthatmanyStatespartieshavenotyetfulfilledalltherequirementsofarticle4(a)and(b)oftheConvention,Furtherrecallingthat,inaccordancewiththefirstparagraphofarticle4,Statesparties“undertaketoadoptimmediateandpositivemeasuresdesignedtoeradicateallincitementto,oractsof,suchdiscrimination”,withdueregardtotheprinciplesembodiedintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtherightsexpresslysetforthinarticle5oftheConvention,Bearinginmindthepreventiveaspectsofarticle4todeterracismandracialdiscriminationaswellasactivitiesaimedattheirpromotionorincitement,1.RecommendsthatthoseStatespartieswhoselegislationdoesnotsatisfytheprovisionsofarticle4(a)and(b)oftheConventiontakethenecessarystepswithaviewtosatisfyingthemandatoryrequirementsofthatarticle;2.RequeststhatthoseStatespartieswhichhavenotyetdonesoinformtheCommitteemorefullyintheirperiodicreportsofthemannerandextenttowhichtheprovisionsofarticle4(a)and(b)areeffectivelyimplementedandquotetherelevantpartsofthetextsintheirreports;3.FurtherrequeststhoseStatespartieswhichhavenotyetdonesotoendeavourtoprovideintheirperiodicreportsmoreinformationconcerningdecisionstakenbythecompetentnationaltribunalsandotherStateinstitutionsregardingactsofracialdiscriminationandinparticularthoseoffencesdealtwithinarticle4(a)and(b).*ContainedindocumentA/40/18.
Annex 103
Annex 104
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 11 on non-citizens, contained in document A/48/18 (1993)
1Forty-secondsession(1993)**GeneralrecommendationXIonnon-citizens1.Article1,paragraph1,oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationdefinesracialdiscrimination.Article1,paragraph2,exceptsfromthisdefinitionactionsbyaStatepartywhichdifferentiatebetweencitizensandnon-citizens.Article1,paragraph3,qualifiesarticle1,paragraph2,bydeclaringthat,amongnon-citizens,Statespartiesmaynotdiscriminateagainstanyparticularnationality.2.TheCommitteehasnotedthatarticle1,paragraph2,hasonoccasionbeeninterpretedasabsolvingStatespartiesfromanyobligationtoreportonmattersrelatingtolegislationonforeigners.TheCommitteethereforeaffirmsthatStatespartiesareunderanobligationtoreportfullyuponlegislationonforeignersanditsimplementation.3.TheCommitteefurtheraffirmsthatarticle1,paragraph2,mustnotbeinterpretedtodetractinanywayfromtherightsandfreedomsrecognizedandenunciatedinotherinstruments,especiallytheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights.**ContainedindocumentA/48/18.
Annex 104
Annex 105
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention, contained in document A/48/18 (1993)
1Forty-secondsession(1993)*GeneralrecommendationXIVonarticle1,paragraph1,oftheConvention1.Non-discrimination,togetherwithequalitybeforethelawandequalprotectionofthelawwithoutanydiscrimination,constitutesabasicprincipleintheprotectionofhumanrights.TheCommitteewishestodrawtheattentionofStatespartiestocertainfeaturesofthedefinitionofracialdiscriminationinarticle1,paragraph1,oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination.Itisoftheopinionthatthewords“basedon”donotbearanymeaningdifferentfrom“onthegroundsof”inpreambularparagraph7.AdistinctioniscontrarytotheConventionifithaseitherthepurposeortheeffectofimpairingparticularrightsandfreedoms.ThisisconfirmedbytheobligationplaceduponStatespartiesbyarticle2,paragraph1(c),tonullifyanylaworpracticewhichhastheeffectofcreatingorperpetuatingracialdiscrimination.2.TheCommitteeobservesthatadifferentiationoftreatmentwillnotconstitutediscriminationifthecriteriaforsuchdifferentiation,judgedagainsttheobjectivesandpurposesoftheConvention,arelegitimateorfallwithinthescopeofarticle1,paragraph4,oftheConvention.Inconsideringthecriteriathatmayhavebeenemployed,theCommitteewillacknowledgethatparticularactionsmayhavevariedpurposes.InseekingtodeterminewhetheranactionhasaneffectcontrarytotheConvention,itwilllooktoseewhetherthatactionhasanunjustifiabledisparateimpactuponagroupdistinguishedbyrace,colour,descent,ornationalorethnicorigin.3.Article1,paragraph1,oftheConventionalsoreferstothepolitical,economic,socialandculturalfields;therelatedrightsandfreedomsaresetupinarticle5.*ContainedindocumentA/48/18.
Annex 105
Annex 106
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 15 on article 4 of the Convention, Forty-second session (1993)
1Forty-secondsession(1993)GeneralrecommendationXVonarticle4oftheConvention1.WhentheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationwasbeingadopted,article4wasregardedascentraltothestruggleagainstracialdiscrimination.Atthattime,therewasawidespreadfearoftherevivalofauthoritarianideologies.Theproscriptionofthedisseminationofideasofracialsuperiority,andoforganizedactivitylikelytoincitepersonstoracialviolence,wasproperlyregardedascrucial.Sincethattime,theCommitteehasreceivedevidenceoforganizedviolencebasedonethnicoriginandthepoliticalexploitationofethnicdifference.Asaresult,implementationofarticle4isnowofincreasedimportance.2.TheCommitteerecallsitsgeneralrecommendationVIIinwhichitexplainedthattheprovisionsofarticle4areofamandatorycharacter.Tosatisfytheseobligations,Statespartieshavenotonlytoenactappropriatelegislationbutalsotoensurethatitiseffectivelyenforced.Becausethreatsandactsofracialviolenceeasilyleadtoothersuchactsandgenerateanatmosphereofhostility,onlyimmediateinterventioncanmeettheobligationsofeffectiveresponse.3.Article4(a)requiresStatespartiestopenalizefourcategoriesofmisconduct:(i)disseminationofideasbaseduponracialsuperiorityorhatred;(ii)incitementtoracialhatred;(iii)actsofviolenceagainstanyraceorgroupofpersonsofanothercolourorethnicorigin;and(iv)incitementtosuchacts.4.IntheopinionoftheCommittee,theprohibitionofthedisseminationofallideasbaseduponracialsuperiorityorhatrediscompatiblewiththerighttofreedomofopinionandexpression.Thisrightisembodiedinarticle19oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandisrecalledinarticle5(d)(viii)oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination.Itsrelevancetoarticle4isnotedinthearticleitself.Thecitizen’sexerciseofthisrightcarriesspecialdutiesandresponsibilities,specifiedinarticle29,paragraph2,oftheUniversalDeclaration,amongwhichtheobligationnottodisseminateracistideasisofparticularimportance.TheCommitteewishes,furthermore,todrawtotheattentionofStatespartiesarticle20oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,accordingtowhichanyadvocacyofnational,racialorreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolenceshallbeprohibitedbylaw.5.Article4(a)alsopenalizesthefinancingofracistactivities,whichtheCommitteetakestoincludealltheactivitiesmentionedinparagraph3above,thatistosay,activitiesderivingfromethnicaswellasracialdifferences.TheCommitteecallsuponStatespartiestoinvestigatewhethertheirnationallawanditsimplementationmeetthisrequirement.6.SomeStateshavemaintainedthatintheirlegalorderitisinappropriatetodeclareillegalanorganizationbeforeitsmembershavepromotedorincitedracialdiscrimination.TheCommitteeisoftheopinionthatarticle4(b)placesagreaterburdenuponsuchStatestobevigilantinproceedingagainstsuchorganizationsattheearliestmoment.Theseorganizations,aswellasorganizedandotherpropagandaactivities,havetobedeclaredillegalandprohibited.Participationintheseorganizationsis,ofitself,tobepunished.7.Article4(c)oftheConventionoutlinestheobligationsofpublicauthorities.Publicauthoritiesatalladministrativelevels,includingmunicipalities,areboundbythisparagraph.TheCommitteeholdsthatStatespartiesmustensurethattheyobservetheseobligationsandreportonthis.
Annex 106
Annex 107
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 13 on the training of law enforcement officials in the protection of human rights, Forty-second session (1993)
1Forty-secondsession(1993)*GeneralrecommendationXIIIonthetrainingoflawenforcementofficialsintheprotectionofhumanrights1.Inaccordancewitharticle2,paragraph1,oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,Statespartieshaveundertakenthatallpublicauthoritiesandpublicinstitutions,nationalandlocal,willnotengageinanypracticeofracialdiscrimination;further,Statespartieshaveundertakentoguaranteetherightslistedinarticle5oftheConventiontoeveryonewithoutdistinctionastorace,colourornationalorethnicorigin.2.Thefulfilmentoftheseobligationsverymuchdependsuponnationallawenforcementofficialswhoexercisepolicepowers,especiallythepowersofdetentionorarrest,anduponwhethertheyareproperlyinformedabouttheobligationstheirStatehasenteredintoundertheConvention.Lawenforcementofficialsshouldreceiveintensivetrainingtoensurethatintheperformanceoftheirdutiestheyrespectaswellasprotecthumandignityandmaintainandupholdthehumanrightsofallpersonswithoutdistinctionastorace,colourornationalorethnicorigin.3.Intheimplementationofarticle7oftheConvention,theCommitteecallsuponStatespartiestoreviewandimprovethetrainingoflawenforcementofficialssothatthestandardsoftheConventionaswellastheCodeofConductforLawEnforcementOfficials(1979)arefullyimplemented.Theyshouldalsoincluderespectiveinformationthereuponintheirperiodicreports.
Annex 107
Annex 108
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 20
on article 5 of the Convention, contained in
document A/51/18 (1996)
1Forty-eighthsession(1996)**GeneralrecommendationXXonarticle5oftheConvention1.Article5oftheConventioncontainstheobligationofStatespartiestoguaranteetheenjoymentofcivil,political,economic,socialandculturalrightsandfreedomswithoutracialdiscrimination.Noteshouldbetakenthattherightsandfreedomsmentionedinarticle5donotconstituteanexhaustivelist.AttheheadoftheserightsandfreedomsarethosederivingfromtheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,asrecalledinthepreambletotheConvention.MostoftheserightshavebeenelaboratedintheInternationalCovenantsonHumanRights.AllStatespartiesarethereforeobligedtoacknowledgeandprotecttheenjoymentofhumanrights,butthemannerinwhichtheseobligationsaretranslatedintothelegalordersofStatespartiesmaydiffer.Article5oftheConvention,apartfromrequiringaguaranteethattheexerciseofhumanrightsshallbefreefromracialdiscrimination,doesnotofitselfcreatecivil,political,economic,socialorculturalrights,butassumestheexistenceandrecognitionoftheserights.TheConventionobligesStatestoprohibitandeliminateracialdiscriminationintheenjoymentofsuchhumanrights.2.WheneveraStateimposesarestrictionupononeoftherightslistedinarticle5oftheConventionwhichappliesostensiblytoallwithinitsjurisdiction,itmustensurethatneitherinpurposenoreffectistherestrictionincompatiblewitharticle1oftheConventionasanintegralpartofinternationalhumanrightsstandards.Toascertainwhetherthisisthecase,theCommitteeisobligedtoinquirefurthertomakesurethatanysuchrestrictiondoesnotentailracialdiscrimination.3.Manyoftherightsandfreedomsmentionedinarticle5,suchastherighttoequaltreatmentbeforetribunals,aretobeenjoyedbyallpersonslivinginagivenState;otherssuchastherighttoparticipateinelections,tovoteandtostandforelectionaretherightsofcitizens.4.TheStatespartiesarerecommendedtoreportaboutthenon-discriminatoryimplementationofeachoftherightsandfreedomsreferredtoinarticle5oftheConventiononebyone.5.Therightsandfreedomsreferredtoinarticle5oftheConventionandanysimilarrightsshallbeprotectedbyaStateparty.Suchprotectionmaybeachievedindifferentways,beitbytheuseofpublicinstitutionsorthroughtheactivitiesofprivateinstitutions.Inanycase,itistheobligationoftheStatepartyconcernedtoensuretheeffectiveimplementationoftheConventionandtoreportthereonunderarticle9oftheConvention.Totheextentthatprivateinstitutionsinfluencetheexerciseofrightsortheavailabilityofopportunities,theStatepartymustensurethattheresulthasneitherthepurposenortheeffectofcreatingorperpetuatingracialdiscrimination.**ContainedindocumentA/51/18.
Annex 108
Annex 109
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005)
1Sixty-fifthsession(2005)GeneralrecommendationXXXondiscriminationagainstnon-citizensTheCommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscrimination,RecallingtheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,accordingtowhichallhumanbeingsarebornfreeandequalindignityandrightsandareentitledtotherightsandfreedomsenshrinedthereinwithoutdistinctionofanykind,andtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsandtheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,RecallingtheDurbanDeclarationinwhichtheWorldConferenceagainstRacism,RacialDiscrimination,XenophobiaandRelatedIntolerance,recognizedthatxenophobiaagainstnon-nationals,particularlymigrants,refugeesandasylum-seekers,constitutesoneofthemainsourcesofcontemporaryracismandthathumanrightsviolationsagainstmembersofsuchgroupsoccurwidelyinthecontextofdiscriminatory,xenophobicandracistpractices,Notingthat,basedontheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationandgeneralrecommendationsXIandXX,ithasbecomeevidentfromtheexaminationofthereportsofStatespartiestotheConventionthatgroupsotherthanmigrants,refugeesandasylum-seekersarealsoofconcern,includingundocumentednon-citizensandpersonswhocannotestablishthenationalityoftheStateonwhoseterritorytheylive,evenwheresuchpersonshavelivedalltheirlivesonthesameterritory,Havingorganizedathematicdiscussionontheissueofdiscriminationagainstnon-citizensandreceivedthecontributionsofmembersoftheCommitteeandStatesparties,aswellascontributionsfromexpertsofotherUnitedNationsorgansandspecializedagenciesandfromnon-governmentalorganizations,RecognizingtheneedtoclarifytheresponsibilitiesofStatespartiestotheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationwithregardtonon-citizens,BasingitsactionontheprovisionsoftheConvention,inparticulararticle5,whichrequiresStatespartiestoprohibitandeliminatediscriminationbasedonrace,colour,descent,andnationalorethnicoriginintheenjoymentbyallpersonsofcivil,political,economic,socialandculturalrightsandfreedoms,Affirmsthat:I.ResponsibilitiesofStatespartiestotheConvention1.Article1,paragraph1,oftheConventiondefinesracialdiscrimination.Article1,paragraph2providesforthepossibilityofdifferentiatingbetweencitizensandnon-citizens.Article1,paragraph3declaresthat,concerningnationality,citizenshipornaturalization,thelegalprovisionsofStatespartiesmustnotdiscriminateagainstanyparticularnationality;2.Article1,paragraph2,mustbeconstruedsoastoavoidunderminingthebasicprohibitionofdiscrimination;hence,itshouldnotbeinterpretedtodetractinanywayfromtherightsandfreedomsrecognizedandenunciatedinparticularintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,
Annex 109
2theInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights;3.Article5oftheConventionincorporatestheobligationofStatespartiestoprohibitandeliminateracialdiscriminationintheenjoymentofcivil,political,economic,socialandculturalrights.Althoughsomeoftheserights,suchastherighttoparticipateinelections,tovoteandtostandforelection,maybeconfinedtocitizens,humanrightsare,inprinciple,tobeenjoyedbyallpersons.Statespartiesareunderanobligationtoguaranteeequalitybetweencitizensandnon-citizensintheenjoymentoftheserightstotheextentrecognizedunderinternationallaw;4.UndertheConvention,differentialtreatmentbasedoncitizenshiporimmigrationstatuswillconstitutediscriminationifthecriteriaforsuchdifferentiation,judgedinthelightoftheobjectivesandpurposesoftheConvention,arenotappliedpursuanttoalegitimateaim,andarenotproportionaltotheachievementofthisaim.Differentiationwithinthescopeofarticle1,paragraph4,oftheConventionrelatingtospecialmeasuresisnotconsidereddiscriminatory;5.Statespartiesareunderanobligationtoreportfullyuponlegislationonnon-citizensanditsimplementation.Furthermore,Statespartiesshouldincludeintheirperiodicreports,inanappropriateform,socio-economicdataonthenon-citizenpopulationwithintheirjurisdiction,includingdatadisaggregatedbygenderandnationalorethnicorigin;Recommends,Basedonthesegeneralprinciples,thattheStatespartiestotheConvention,asappropriatetotheirspecificcircumstances,adoptthefollowingmeasures:II.Measuresofageneralnature6.Reviewandreviselegislation,asappropriate,inordertoguaranteethatsuchlegislationisinfullcompliancewiththeConvention,inparticularregardingtheeffectiveenjoymentoftherightsmentionedinarticle5,withoutdiscrimination;7.Ensurethatlegislativeguaranteesagainstracialdiscriminationapplytonon-citizensregardlessoftheirimmigrationstatus,andthattheimplementationoflegislationdoesnothaveadiscriminatoryeffectonnon-citizens;8.Paygreaterattentiontotheissueofmultiplediscriminationfacedbynon-citizens,inparticularconcerningthechildrenandspousesofnon-citizenworkers,torefrainfromapplyingdifferentstandardsoftreatmenttofemalenon-citizenspousesofcitizensandmalenon-citizenspousesofcitizens,toreportonanysuchpracticesandtotakeallnecessarystepstoaddressthem;9.Ensurethatimmigrationpoliciesdonothavetheeffectofdiscriminatingagainstpersonsonthebasisofrace,colour,descent,ornationalorethnicorigin;10.Ensurethatanymeasurestakeninthefightagainstterrorismdonotdiscriminate,inpurposeoreffect,onthegroundsofrace,colour,descent,ornationalorethnicoriginandthatnon-citizensarenotsubjectedtoracialorethnicprofilingorstereotyping;
Annex 109
3III.Protectionagainsthatespeechandracialviolence11.Takestepstoaddressxenophobicattitudesandbehaviourtowardsnon-citizens,inparticularhatespeechandracialviolence,andtopromoteabetterunderstandingoftheprincipleofnon-discriminationinrespectofthesituationofnon-citizens;12.Takeresoluteactiontocounteranytendencytotarget,stigmatize,stereotypeorprofile,onthebasisofrace,colour,descent,andnationalorethnicorigin,membersof“non-citizen”populationgroups,especiallybypoliticians,officials,educatorsandthemedia,ontheInternetandotherelectroniccommunicationsnetworksandinsocietyatlarge;IV.Accesstocitizenship13.Ensurethatparticulargroupsofnon-citizensarenotdiscriminatedagainstwithregardtoaccesstocitizenshipornaturalization,andtopaydueattentiontopossiblebarrierstonaturalizationthatmayexistforlong-termorpermanentresidents;14.Recognizethatdeprivationofcitizenshiponthebasisofrace,colour,descent,ornationalorethnicoriginisabreachofStatesparties’obligationstoensurenon-discriminatoryenjoymentoftherighttonationality;15.Takeintoconsiderationthatinsomecasesdenialofcitizenshipforlong-termorpermanentresidentscouldresultincreatingdisadvantagefortheminaccesstoemploymentandsocialbenefits,inviolationoftheConvention’santi-discriminationprinciples;16.Reducestatelessness,inparticularstatelessnessamongchildren,by,forexample,encouragingtheirparentstoapplyforcitizenshipontheirbehalfandallowingbothparentstotransmittheircitizenshiptotheirchildren;17.RegularizethestatusofformercitizensofpredecessorStateswhonowresidewithinthejurisdictionoftheStateparty;V.Administrationofjustice18.Ensurethatnon-citizensenjoyequalprotectionandrecognitionbeforethelawandinthiscontext,totakeactionagainstraciallymotivatedviolenceandtoensuretheaccessofvictimstoeffectivelegalremediesandtherighttoseekjustandadequatereparationforanydamagesufferedasaresultofsuchviolence;19.Ensurethesecurityofnon-citizens,inparticularwithregardtoarbitrarydetention,aswellasensurethatconditionsincentresforrefugeesandasylum-seekersmeetinternationalstandards;20.Ensurethatnon-citizensdetainedorarrestedinthefightagainstterrorismareproperlyprotectedbydomesticlawthatcomplieswithinternationalhumanrights,refugeeandhumanitarianlaw;21.Combatill-treatmentofanddiscriminationagainstnon-citizensbypoliceandotherlawenforcementagenciesandcivilservantsbystrictlyapplyingrelevantlegislationandregulations
Annex 109
4providingforsanctionsandbyensuringthatallofficialsdealingwithnon-citizensreceivespecialtraining,includingtraininginhumanrights;22.Introduceincriminallawtheprovisionthatcommittinganoffencewithracistmotivationoraimconstitutesanaggravatingcircumstanceallowingforamoreseverepunishment;23.Ensurethatclaimsofracialdiscriminationbroughtbynon-citizensareinvestigatedthoroughlyandthatclaimsmadeagainstofficials,notablythoseconcerningdiscriminatoryorracistbehaviour,aresubjecttoindependentandeffectivescrutiny;24.Regulatetheburdenofproofincivilproceedingsinvolvingdiscriminationbasedonrace,colour,descent,andnationalorethnicoriginsothatonceanon-citizenhasestablishedaprimafaciecasethatheorshehasbeenavictimofsuchdiscrimination,itshallbefortherespondenttoprovideevidenceofanobjectiveandreasonablejustificationforthedifferentialtreatment;VI.Expulsionanddeportationofnon-citizens25.Ensurethatlawsconcerningdeportationorotherformsofremovalofnon-citizensfromthejurisdictionoftheStatepartydonotdiscriminateinpurposeoreffectamongnon-citizensonthebasisofrace,colourorethnicornationalorigin,andthatnon-citizenshaveequalaccesstoeffectiveremedies,includingtherighttochallengeexpulsionorders,andareallowedeffectivelytopursuesuchremedies;26.Ensurethatnon-citizensarenotsubjecttocollectiveexpulsion,inparticularinsituationswherethereareinsufficientguaranteesthatthepersonalcircumstancesofeachofthepersonsconcernedhavebeentakenintoaccount;27.Ensurethatnon-citizensarenotreturnedorremovedtoacountryorterritorywheretheyareatriskofbeingsubjecttoserioushumanrightsabuses,includingtortureandcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment;28.Avoidexpulsionsofnon-citizens,especiallyoflong-termresidents,thatwouldresultindisproportionateinterferencewiththerighttofamilylife;VII.Economic,socialandculturalrights29.Removeobstaclesthatpreventtheenjoymentofeconomic,socialandculturalrightsbynon-citizens,notablyintheareasofeducation,housing,employmentandhealth;30.Ensurethatpubliceducationalinstitutionsareopentonon-citizensandchildrenofundocumentedimmigrantsresidingintheterritoryofaStateparty;31.Avoidsegregatedschoolinganddifferentstandardsoftreatmentbeingappliedtonon-citizensongroundsofrace,colour,descent,andnationalorethnicorigininelementaryandsecondaryschoolandwithrespecttoaccesstohighereducation;32.Guaranteetheequalenjoymentoftherighttoadequatehousingforcitizensandnon-citizens,especiallybyavoidingsegregationinhousingandensuringthathousingagenciesrefrainfromengagingindiscriminatorypractices;
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533.Takemeasurestoeliminatediscriminationagainstnon-citizensinrelationtoworkingconditionsandworkrequirements,includingemploymentrulesandpracticeswithdiscriminatorypurposesoreffects;34.Takeeffectivemeasurestopreventandredresstheseriousproblemscommonlyfacedbynon-citizenworkers,inparticularbynon-citizendomesticworkers,includingdebtbondage,passportretention,illegalconfinement,rapeandphysicalassault;35.Recognizethat,whileStatespartiesmayrefusetoofferjobstonon-citizenswithoutaworkpermit,allindividualsareentitledtotheenjoymentoflabourandemploymentrights,includingthefreedomofassemblyandassociation,onceanemploymentrelationshiphasbeeninitiateduntilitisterminated;36.EnsurethatStatespartiesrespecttherightofnon-citizenstoanadequatestandardofphysicalandmentalhealthby,interalia,refrainingfromdenyingorlimitingtheiraccesstopreventive,curativeandpalliativehealthservices;37.Takethenecessarymeasurestopreventpracticesthatdenynon-citizenstheirculturalidentity,suchaslegalordefactorequirementsthatnon-citizenschangetheirnameinordertoobtaincitizenship,andtotakemeasurestoenablenon-citizenstopreserveanddeveloptheirculture;38.Ensuretherightofnon-citizens,withoutdiscriminationbasedonrace,colour,descent,andnationalorethnicorigin,tohaveaccesstoanyplaceorserviceintendedforusebythegeneralpublic,suchastransport,hotels,restaurants,cafés,theatresandparks;39.ThepresentgeneralrecommendationreplacesgeneralrecommendationXI(1993).
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Annex 110
CERD Committee, General Recommendation
No. 31 on the prevention of racial discrimination in
the administration and functioning of the criminal
justice system, Sixty-fifth session (2005)
1Sixty-fifthsession(2005)GeneralrecommendationXXXIonthepreventionofracialdiscriminationintheadministrationandfunctioningofthecriminaljusticesystemTheCommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscrimination,Recallingthedefinitionofracialdiscriminationsetoutinarticle1oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,Recallingtheprovisionsofarticle5(a)oftheConvention,underwhichStatespartieshaveanobligationtoguaranteetherightofeveryone,withoutdistinctionastorace,colour,ornationalorethnicorigin,toequalitybeforethelaw,notablyintheenjoymentoftherighttoequaltreatmentbeforethetribunalsandallotherorgansadministeringjustice,Recallingthatarticle6oftheConventionrequiresStatespartiestoassuretoeveryonewithintheirjurisdictioneffectiveprotectionandremedies,throughthecompetentnationaltribunalsandotherStateinstitutions,againstanyactsofracialdiscrimination,aswellastherighttoseekfromsuchtribunalsjustandadequatereparationorsatisfactionforanydamagesufferedasaresultofsuchdiscrimination,Referringtoparagraph25ofthedeclarationadoptedbytheWorldConferenceagainstRacism,RacialDiscrimination,XenophobiaandRelatedIntolerance,heldinDurban,SouthAfrica,in2001,whichexpressed“profoundrepudiationoftheracism,racialdiscrimination,xenophobiaandrelatedintolerancethatpersistinsomeStatesinthefunctioningofthepenalsystemandintheapplicationofthelaw,aswellasintheactionsandattitudesofinstitutionsandindividualsresponsibleforlawenforcement,especiallywherethishascontributedtocertaingroupsbeingoverrepresentedamongpersonsunderdetentionorimprisoned”,ReferringtotheworkoftheCommissiononHumanRightsandoftheSub-CommissiononthePromotionandProtectionofHumanRights(seeE/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/7)concerningdiscriminationinthecriminaljusticesystem,BearinginmindthereportsoftheSpecialRapporteuroncontemporaryformsofracism,racialdiscrimination,xenophobiaandrelatedintolerance,Referringtothe1951ConventionrelatingtotheStatusofRefugees,inparticulararticle16,whichstipulatesthat“[a]refugeeshallhavefreeaccesstothecourtsoflawontheterritoryofallContractingStates”,BearinginmindtheobservationsrelatingtothefunctioningofthesystemofjusticemadeintheCommittee’sconclusionsconcerningreportssubmittedbyStatespartiesandingeneralrecommendationsXXVII(2000)ondiscriminationagainstRoma,XXIX(2002)ondiscriminationbasedondescentandXXX(2004)ondiscriminationagainstnon-citizens,Convincedthat,eventhoughthesystemofjusticemayberegardedasimpartialandnotaffectedbyracism,racialdiscriminationorxenophobia,whenracialorethnicdiscriminationdoesexistintheadministrationandfunctioningofthesystemofjustice,itconstitutesaparticularlyseriousviolationoftheruleoflaw,theprincipleofequalitybeforethelaw,theprincipleoffairtrialandtherighttoanindependentandimpartialtribunal,throughitsdirecteffectonpersonsbelongingtogroupswhichitistheveryroleofjusticetoprotect,
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2Consideringthatnocountryisfreefromracialdiscriminationintheadministrationandfunctioningofthecriminaljusticesystem,regardlessofthetypeoflawappliedorthejudicialsysteminforce,whetheraccusatorial,inquisitorialormixed,Consideringthattherisksofdiscriminationintheadministrationandfunctioningofthecriminaljusticesystemhaveincreasedinrecentyears,partlyasaresultoftheriseinimmigrationandpopulationmovements,whichhavepromptedprejudiceandfeelingsofxenophobiaorintoleranceamongcertainsectionsofthepopulationandcertainlawenforcementofficials,andpartlyasaresultofthesecuritypoliciesandanti-terrorismmeasuresadoptedbymanyStates,whichamongotherthingshaveencouragedtheemergenceofanti-Araboranti-Muslimfeelings,or,asareaction,anti-Semiticfeelings,inanumberofcountries,Determinedtocombatallformsofdiscriminationintheadministrationandfunctioningofthecriminaljusticesystemwhichmaybesuffered,inallcountriesoftheworld,bypersonsbelongingtoracialorethnicgroups,inparticularnon-citizens-includingimmigrants,refugees,asylum-seekersandstatelesspersons-Roma/Gypsies,indigenouspeoples,displacedpopulations,personsdiscriminatedagainstbecauseoftheirdescent,aswellasothervulnerablegroupswhichareparticularlyexposedtoexclusion,marginalizationandnon-integrationinsociety,payingparticularattentiontothesituationofwomenandchildrenbelongingtotheaforementionedgroups,whoaresusceptibletomultiplediscriminationbecauseoftheirraceandbecauseoftheirsexortheirage,FormulatesthefollowingrecommendationsaddressedtoStatesparties:I.GeneralstepsA.Stepstobetakeninordertobettergaugetheexistenceandextentofracialdiscriminationintheadministrationandfunctioningofthecriminaljusticesystem;thesearchforindicatorsattestingtosuchdiscrimination1.Factualindicators1.Statespartiesshouldpaythegreatestattentiontothefollowingpossibleindicatorsofracialdiscrimination:(a)Thenumberandpercentageofpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamblewhoarevictimsofaggressionorotheroffences,especiallywhentheyarecommittedbypoliceofficersorotherStateofficials;(b)Theabsenceorsmallnumberofcomplaints,prosecutionsandconvictionsrelatingtoactsofracialdiscriminationinthecountry.Suchastatisticshouldnotbeviewedasnecessarilypositive,contrarytothebeliefofsomeStates.Itmayalsorevealeitherthatvictimshaveinadequateinformationconcerningtheirrights,orthattheyfearsocialcensureorreprisals,orthatvictimswithlimitedresourcesfearthecostandcomplexityofthejudicialprocess,orthatthereisalackoftrustinthepoliceandjudicialauthorities,orthattheauthoritiesareinsufficientlyalerttoorawareofoffencesinvolvingracism;(c)Insufficientornoinformationonthebehaviouroflawenforcementpersonnelvis-à-vispersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble;
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3(d)Theproportionatelyhighercrimeratesattributedtopersonsbelongingtothosegroups,particularlyasregardspettystreetcrimeandoffencesrelatedtodrugsandprostitution,asindicatorsoftheexclusionorthenon-integrationofsuchpersonsintosociety;(e)Thenumberandpercentageofpersonsbelongingtothosegroupswhoareheldinprisonorpreventivedetention,includinginternmentcentres,penalestablishments,psychiatricestablishmentsorholdingareasinairports;(f)Thehandingdownbythecourtsofharsherorinappropriatesentencesagainstpersonsbelongingtothosegroups;(g)Theinsufficientrepresentationofpersonsbelongingtothosegroupsamongtheranksofthepolice,inthesystemofjustice,includingjudgesandjurors,andinotherlawenforcementdepartments.2.Inorderforthesefactualindicatorstobewellknownandused,Statespartiesshouldembarkonregularandpubliccollectionofinformationfrompolice,judicialandprisonauthoritiesandimmigrationservices,whilerespectingstandardsofconfidentiality,anonymityandprotectionofpersonaldata.3.Inparticular,Statespartiesshouldhaveaccesstocomprehensivestatisticalorotherinformationoncomplaints,prosecutionsandconvictionsrelatingtoactsofracismandxenophobia,aswellasoncompensationawardedtothevictimsofsuchacts,whethersuchcompensationispaidbytheperpetratorsoftheoffencesorunderStatecompensationplansfinancedfrompublicfunds.2.Legislativeindicators4.Thefollowingshouldberegardedasindicatorsofpotentialcausesofracialdiscrimination:(a)Anygapsindomesticlegislationonracialdiscrimination.Inthisregard,Statespartiesshouldfullycomplywiththerequirementsofarticle4oftheConventionandcriminalizeallactsofracismasprovidedbythatarticle,inparticularthedisseminationofideasbasedonracialsuperiorityorhatred,incitementtoracialhatred,violenceorincitementtoracialviolence,butalsoracistpropagandaactivitiesandparticipationinracistorganizations.Statespartiesarealsoencouragedtoincorporateaprovisionintheircriminallegislationtotheeffectthatcommittingoffencesforracialreasonsgenerallyconstitutesanaggravatingcircumstance;(b)Thepotentialindirectdiscriminatoryeffectsofcertaindomesticlegislation,particularlylegislationonterrorism,immigration,nationality,banningordeportationofnon-citizensfromacountry,aswellaslegislationthathastheeffectofpenalizingwithoutlegitimategroundscertaingroupsormembershipofcertaincommunities.Statesshouldseektoeliminatethediscriminatoryeffectsofsuchlegislationandinanycasetorespecttheprincipleofproportionalityinitsapplicationtopersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble.B.Strategiestobedevelopedtopreventracialdiscriminationintheadministrationandfunctioningofthecriminaljusticesystem5.Statespartiesshouldpursuenationalstrategiestheobjectivesofwhichincludethefollowing:
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4(a)Toeliminatelawsthathaveanimpactintermsofracialdiscrimination,particularlythosewhichtargetcertaingroupsindirectlybypenalizingactswhichcanbecommittedonlybypersonsbelongingtosuchgroups,orlawsthatapplyonlytonon-nationalswithoutlegitimategroundsorwhichdonotrespecttheprincipleofproportionality;(b)Todevelop,throughappropriateeducationprogrammes,traininginrespectforhumanrights,toleranceandfriendshipamongracialorethnicgroups,aswellassensitizationtointerculturalrelations,forlawenforcementofficials:policepersonnel,personsworkinginthesystemofjustice,prisoninstitutions,psychiatricestablishments,socialandmedicalservices,etc.;(c)Tofosterdialogueandcooperationbetweenthepoliceandjudicialauthoritiesandtherepresentativesofthevariousgroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble,inordertocombatprejudiceandcreatearelationshipoftrust;(d)Topromoteproperrepresentationofpersonsbelongingtoracialandethnicgroupsinthepoliceandthesystemofjustice;(e)Toensurerespectfor,andrecognitionofthetraditionalsystemsofjusticeofindigenouspeoples,inconformitywithinternationalhumanrightslaw;(f)Tomakethenecessarychangestotheprisonregimeforprisonersbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble,soastotakeintoaccounttheirculturalandreligiouspractices;(g)Toinstitute,insituationsofmasspopulationmovements,theinterimmeasuresandarrangementsnecessaryfortheoperationofthejusticesysteminordertotakeaccountoftheparticularlyvulnerablesituationofdisplacedpersons,inparticularbysettingupdecentralizedcourtsattheplaceswherethedisplacedpersonsarestayingorbyorganizingmobilecourts;(h)Tosetup,inpost-conflictsituations,plansforthereconstructionofthelegalsystemandthere-establishmentoftheruleoflawthroughouttheterritoryofthecountriesconcerned,byavailingthemselves,inparticular,oftheinternationaltechnicalassistanceprovidedbytherelevantUnitedNationsentities;(i)Toimplementnationalstrategiesorplansofactionaimedattheeliminationofstructuralracialdiscrimination.Theselong-termstrategiesshouldincludespecificobjectivesandactionsaswellasindicatorsagainstwhichprogresscanbemeasured.Theyshouldinclude,inparticular,guidelinesforprevention,recording,investigationandprosecutionofracistorxenophobicincidents,assessmentofthelevelofsatisfactionamongallcommunitiesconcerningtheirrelationswiththepoliceandthesystemofjustice,andrecruitmentandpromotioninthejudicialsystemofpersonsbelongingtovariousracialorethnicgroups;(j)Toentrustanindependentnationalinstitutionwiththetaskoftracking,monitoringandmeasuringprogressmadeunderthenationalplansofactionandguidelinesagainstracialdiscrimination,identifyingundetectedmanifestationsofracialdiscriminationandsubmittingrecommendationsandproposalsforimprovement.
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5II.StepstobetakentopreventracialdiscriminationwithregardtovictimsofracismA.Accesstothelawandtojustice6.Inaccordancewitharticle6oftheConvention,Statespartiesareobligedtoguaranteetherightofeverypersonwithintheirjurisdictiontoaneffectiveremedyagainsttheperpetratorsofactsofracialdiscrimination,withoutdiscriminationofanykind,whethersuchactsarecommittedbyprivateindividualsorStateofficials,aswellastherighttoseekjustandadequatereparationforthedamagesuffered.7.Inordertofacilitateaccesstojusticeforthevictimsofracism,Statespartiesshouldstrivetosupplytherequisitelegalinformationtopersonsbelongingtothemostvulnerablesocialgroups,whoareoftenunawareoftheirrights.8.Inthatregard,Statespartiesshouldpromote,intheareaswheresuchpersonslive,institutionssuchasfreelegalhelpandadvicecentres,legalinformationcentresandcentresforconciliationandmediation.9.Statespartiesshouldalsoexpandtheircooperationwithassociationsoflawyers,universityinstitutions,legaladvicecentresandnon-governmentalorganizationsspecializinginprotectingtherightsofmarginalizedcommunitiesandinthepreventionofdiscrimination.B.Reportingofincidentstotheauthoritiescompetentforreceivingcomplaints10.Statespartiesshouldtakethenecessarystepstoensurethatthepoliceserviceshaveanadequateandaccessiblepresenceintheneighbourhoods,regions,collectivefacilities,campsorcentreswherethepersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamblereside,sothatcomplaintsfromsuchpersonscanbeexpeditiouslyreceived.11.Thecompetentservicesshouldbeinstructedtoreceivethevictimsofactsofracisminpolicestationsinasatisfactorymanner,sothatcomplaintsarerecordedimmediately,investigationsarepursuedwithoutdelayandinaneffective,independentandimpartialmanner,andfilesrelatingtoracistorxenophobicincidentsareretainedandincorporatedintodatabases.12.Anyrefusalbyapoliceofficialtoacceptacomplaintinvolvinganactofracismshouldleadtodisciplinaryorpenalsanctions,andthosesanctionsshouldbeincreasedifcorruptionisinvolved.13.Conversely,itshouldbetherightanddutyofanypoliceofficialorStateemployeetorefusetoobeyordersorinstructionsthatrequirehimorhertocommitviolationsofhumanrights,particularlythosebasedonracialdiscrimination.Statespartiesshouldguaranteethefreedomofanyofficialtoinvokethisrightwithoutfearofpunishment.14.Incasesofallegationsoftorture,ill-treatmentorexecutions,investigationsshouldbeconductedinaccordancewiththePrinciplesontheEffectivePreventionandInvestigationof
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6Extra-legal,ArbitraryandSummaryExecutionsiandthePrinciplesontheEffectiveInvestigationandDocumentationofTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment.iiC.Initiationofjudicialproceedings15.Statespartiesshouldremindpublicprosecutorsandmembersoftheprosecutionserviceofthegeneralimportanceofprosecutingracistacts,includingminoroffencescommittedwithracistmotives,sinceanyraciallymotivatedoffenceunderminessocialcohesionandsocietyasawhole.16.Inadvanceoftheinitiationofproceedings,Statespartiescouldalsoencourage,withaviewtorespectingtherightsofthevictims,theuseofparajudicialproceduresforconflictresolution,includingcustomaryprocedurescompatiblewithhumanrights,mediationorconciliation,whichcanserveasusefuloptionsforthevictimsofactsofracismandtowhichlessstigmamaybeattached.17.Inordertomakeiteasierforthevictimsofactsofracismtobringactionsinthecourts,thestepstobetakenshouldincludethefollowing:(a)Offeringproceduralstatusforthevictimsofracismandxenophobiaandassociationsfortheprotectionoftherightsofsuchvictims,suchasanopportunitytoassociatethemselveswiththecriminalproceedings,orothersimilarproceduresthatmightenablethemtoasserttheirrightsinthecriminalproceedings,atnocosttothemselves;(b)Grantingvictimseffectivejudicialcooperationandlegalaid,includingtheassistanceofcounselandaninterpreterfreeofcharge;(c)Ensuringthatvictimshaveinformationabouttheprogressoftheproceedings;(d)Guaranteeingprotectionforthevictimorthevictim’sfamilyagainstanyformofintimidationorreprisals;(e)Providingforthepossibilityofsuspendingthefunctions,forthedurationoftheinvestigation,oftheagentsoftheStateagainstwhomthecomplaintsweremade.18.Incountrieswherethereareassistanceandcompensationplansforvictims,Statespartiesshouldensurethatsuchplansareavailabletoallvictimswithoutdiscriminationandregardlessoftheirnationalityorresidentialstatus.D.Functioningofthesystemofjustice19.Statespartiesshouldensurethatthesystemofjustice:(a)Grantsaproperplacetovictimsandtheirfamilies,aswellaswitnesses,throughouttheproceedings,byenablingcomplainantstobeheardbythejudgesduringtheexaminationproceedingsandthecourthearing,tohaveaccesstoinformation,toconfronthostilewitnesses,tochallengeevidenceandtobeinformedoftheprogressofproceedings;(b)Treatsthevictimsofracialdiscriminationwithoutdiscriminationorprejudice,whilerespectingtheirdignity,throughensuringinparticularthathearings,questioningorconfrontationsarecarriedoutwiththenecessarysensitivityasfarasracismisconcerned;(c)Guaranteesthevictimacourtjudgementwithinareasonableperiod;
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7(d)Guaranteesvictimsjustandadequatereparationforthematerialandmoralharmsufferedasaresultofracialdiscrimination.III.StepstobetakentopreventracialdiscriminationinregardtoaccusedpersonswhoaresubjecttojudicialproceedingsA.Questioning,interrogationandarrest20.Statespartiesshouldtakethenecessarystepstopreventquestioning,arrestsandsearcheswhichareinrealitybasedsolelyonthephysicalappearanceofaperson,thatperson’scolourorfeaturesormembershipofaracialorethnicgroup,oranyprofilingwhichexposeshimorhertogreatersuspicion.21.Statespartiesshouldpreventandmostseverelypunishviolence,actsoftorture,cruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentandallviolationsofhumanrightsaffectingpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamblewhicharecommittedbyStateofficials,particularlypoliceandarmypersonnel,customsauthorities,andpersonsworkinginairports,penalinstitutionsandsocial,medicalandpsychiatricservices.22.Statespartiesshouldensuretheobservanceofthegeneralprincipleofproportionalityandstrictnecessityinrecoursetoforceagainstpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble,inaccordancewiththeBasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcementOfficials.iii23.Statespartiesshouldalsoguaranteetoallarrestedpersons,whatevertheracial,nationalorethnicgrouptowhichtheybelong,enjoymentofthefundamentalrightsofthedefenceenshrinedintherelevantinternationalhumanrightsinstruments(especiallytheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights),inparticulartherightnottobearbitrarilyarrestedordetained,therighttobeinformedofthereasonsfortheirarrest,therighttotheassistanceofaninterpreter,therighttotheassistanceofcounsel,therighttobebroughtpromptlybeforeajudgeoranauthorityempoweredbythelawtoperformjudicialfunctions,therighttoconsularprotectionguaranteedbyarticle36oftheViennaConventiononConsularRelationsand,inthecaseofrefugees,therighttocontacttheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees.24.Asregardspersonsplacedinadministrativeholdingcentresorinholdingareasinairports,Statespartiesshouldensurethattheyenjoysufficientlydecentlivingconditions.25.Lastly,asregardsthequestioningorarrestofpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble,Statespartiesshouldbearinmindthespecialprecautionstobetakenwhendealingwithwomenorminors,becauseoftheirparticularvulnerability.B.Pretrialdetention26.Bearinginmindstatisticswhichshowthatpersonsheldawaitingtrialincludeanexcessivelyhighnumberofnon-nationalsandpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble,Statespartiesshouldensure:
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8(a)Thatthemerefactofbelongingtoaracialorethnicgrouporoneoftheaforementionedgroupsisnotasufficientreason,dejureordefacto,toplaceapersoninpretrialdetention.Suchpretrialdetentioncanbejustifiedonlyonobjectivegroundsstipulatedinthelaw,suchastheriskofflight,theriskthatthepersonmightdestroyevidenceorinfluencewitnesses,ortheriskofaseriousdisturbanceofpublicorder;(b)Thattherequirementtodepositaguaranteeorfinancialsecurityinordertoobtainreleasependingtrialisappliedinamannerappropriatetothesituationofpersonsbelongingtosuchgroups,whoareofteninstraitenedeconomiccircumstances,soastopreventthisrequirementfromleadingtodiscriminationagainstsuchpersons;(c)Thattheguaranteesoftenrequiredofaccusedpersonsasaconditionoftheirremainingatlibertypendingtrial(fixedaddress,declaredemployment,stablefamilyties)areweighedinthelightoftheinsecuresituationwhichmayresultfromtheirmembershipofsuchgroups,particularlyinthecaseofwomenandminors;(d)Thatpersonsbelongingtosuchgroupswhoareheldpendingtrialenjoyalltherightstowhichprisonersareentitledundertherelevantinternationalnorms,andparticularlytherightsspeciallyadaptedtotheircircumstances:therighttorespectfortheirtraditionsasregardsreligion,cultureandfood,therighttorelationswiththeirfamilies,therighttotheassistanceofaninterpreterand,whereappropriate,therighttoconsularassistance.C.Thetrialandthecourtjudgement27.Priortothetrial,Statespartiesmay,whereappropriate,givepreferencetonon-judicialorparajudicialproceduresfordealingwiththeoffence,takingintoaccounttheculturalorcustomarybackgroundoftheperpetrator,especiallyinthecaseofpersonsbelongingtoindigenouspeoples.28.Ingeneral,Statespartiesmustensurethatpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble,likeallotherpersons,enjoyalltheguaranteesofafairtrialandequalitybeforethelaw,asenshrinedintherelevantinternationalhumanrightsinstruments,andspecifically.1.Therighttothepresumptionofinnocence29.Thisrightimpliesthatthepoliceauthorities,thejudicialauthoritiesandotherpublicauthoritiesmustbeforbiddentoexpresstheiropinionspubliclyconcerningtheguiltoftheaccusedbeforethecourtreachesadecision,muchlesstocastsuspicioninadvanceonthemembersofaspecificracialorethnicgroup.Theseauthoritieshaveanobligationtoensurethatthemassmediadonotdisseminateinformationwhichmightstigmatizecertaincategoriesofpersons,particularlythosebelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble.2.Therighttotheassistanceofcounselandtherighttoaninterpreter30.EffectivelyguaranteeingtheserightsimpliesthatStatespartiesmustsetupasystemunderwhichcounselandinterpreterswillbeassignedfreeofcharge,togetherwithlegalhelporadviceandinterpretationservicesforpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble.
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93.Therighttoanindependentandimpartialtribunal31.Statespartiesshouldstrivefirmlytoensurealackofanyracialorxenophobicprejudiceonthepartofjudges,jurymembersandotherjudicialpersonnel.32.Theyshouldpreventalldirectinfluencebypressuregroups,ideologies,religionsandchurchesonthefunctioningofthesystemofjusticeandonthedecisionsofjudges,whichmayhaveadiscriminatoryeffectoncertaingroups.33.Statespartiesmay,inthisregard,takeintoaccounttheBangalorePrinciplesofJudicialConductadoptedin2002(E/CN.4/2003/65,annex),whichrecommendinparticularthat:Judgesshouldbeawareofthediversityofsocietyanddifferenceslinkedwithbackground,inparticularracialorigins;Theyshouldnot,bywordsorconduct,manifestanybiastowardspersonsorgroupsonthegroundsoftheirracialorotherorigin;Theyshouldcarryouttheirdutieswithappropriateconsiderationforallpersons,suchastheparties,witnesses,lawyers,courtstaffandtheircolleagues,withoutunjustifieddifferentiation;andTheyshouldopposethemanifestationofprejudicebythepersonsundertheirdirectionandbylawyersortheiradoptionofdiscriminatorybehaviourtowardsapersonorgrouponthebasisoftheircolour,racial,national,religiousorsexualorigin,oronotherirrelevantgrounds.D.Guaranteeoffairpunishment34.Inthisregard,Statesshouldensurethatthecourtsdonotapplyharsherpunishmentssolelybecauseofanaccusedperson’smembershipofaspecificracialorethnicgroup.35.Specialattentionshouldbepaidinthisregardtothesystemofminimumpunishmentsandobligatorydetentionapplicabletocertainoffencesandtocapitalpunishmentincountrieswhichhavenotabolishedit,bearinginmindreportsthatthispunishmentisimposedandcarriedoutmorefrequentlyagainstpersonsbelongingtospecificracialorethnicgroups.36.Inthecaseofpersonsbelongingtoindigenouspeoples,Statespartiesshouldgivepreferencetoalternativestoimprisonmentandtootherformsofpunishmentthatarebetteradaptedtotheirlegalsystem,bearinginmindinparticularInternationalLabourOrganizationConventionNo.169concerningIndigenousandTribalPeoplesinIndependentCountries.37.Punishmentstargetedexclusivelyatnon-nationalsthatareadditionaltopunishmentsunderordinarylaw,suchasdeportation,expulsionorbanningfromthecountryconcerned,shouldbeimposedonlyinexceptionalcircumstancesandinaproportionatemanner,forseriousreasonsrelatedtopublicorderwhicharestipulatedinthelaw,andshouldtakeintoaccounttheneedtorespecttheprivatefamilylifeofthoseconcernedandtheinternationalprotectiontowhichtheyareentitled.E.Executionofsentences38.Whenpersonsbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreambleareservingprisonterms,theStatespartiesshould:
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10(a)Guaranteesuchpersonstheenjoymentofalltherightstowhichprisonersareentitledundertherelevantinternationalnorms,inparticularrightsspeciallyadaptedtotheirsituation:therighttorespectfortheirreligiousandculturalpractices,therighttorespectfortheircustomsasregardsfood,therighttorelationswiththeirfamilies,therighttotheassistanceofaninterpreter,therighttobasicwelfarebenefitsand,whereappropriate,therighttoconsularassistance.Themedical,psychologicalorsocialservicesofferedtoprisonersshouldtaketheirculturalbackgroundintoaccount;(b)Guaranteetoallprisonerswhoserightshavebeenviolatedtherighttoaneffectiveremedybeforeanindependentandimpartialauthority;(c)Comply,inthisregard,withtheUnitedNationsnormsinthisfield,andparticularlytheStandardMinimumRulesfortheTreatmentofPrisoners,ivtheBasicPrinciplesfortheTreatmentofPrisonersvandtheBodyofPrinciplesfortheProtectionofAllPersonsunderAnyFormofDetentionorImprisonment;vi(d)Allowsuchpersonstobenefit,whereappropriate,fromtheprovisionsofdomesticlegislationandinternationalorbilateralconventionsrelatingtothetransferofforeignprisoners,offeringthemanopportunitytoservetheprisontermintheircountriesoforigin.39.Further,theindependentauthoritiesintheStatespartiesthatareresponsibleforsupervisingprisoninstitutionsshouldincludememberswhohaveexpertiseinthefieldofracialdiscriminationandsoundknowledgeoftheproblemsofracialandethnicgroupsandtheothervulnerablegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble;whennecessary,suchsupervisoryauthoritiesshouldhaveaneffectivevisitandcomplaintmechanism.40.Whennon-nationalsaresentencedtodeportation,expulsionorbanningfromtheirterritory,Statespartiesshouldcomplyfullywiththeobligationofnon-refoulementarisingoutoftheinternationalnormsconcerningrefugeesandhumanrights,andensurethatsuchpersonswillnotbesentbacktoacountryorterritorywheretheywouldruntheriskofseriousviolationsoftheirhumanrights.41.Lastly,withregardtowomenandchildrenbelongingtothegroupsreferredtointhelastparagraphofthepreamble,Statespartiesshouldpaythegreatestattentionpossiblewithaviewtoensuringthatsuchpersonsbenefitfromthespecialregimetowhichtheyareentitledinrelationtotheexecutionofsentences,bearinginmindtheparticulardifficultiesfacedbymothersoffamiliesandwomenbelongingtocertaincommunities,particularlyindigenouscommunities.NotesiRecommendedbytheEconomicandSocialCouncilinitsresolution1989/65of24May1989.iiRecommendedbytheGeneralAssemblyinitsresolution55/89of4December2000.iiiAdoptedbytheEighthUnitedNationsCongressonthePreventionofCrimeandtheTreatmentofOffenders,Havana,27August-7September1990.
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11ivAdoptedbytheFirstUnitedNationsCongressonthePreventionofCrimeandtheTreatmentofOffenders,Geneva,22August-3September1955,andapprovedbytheEconomicandSocialCouncilinitsresolutions663C(XXIV)of31July1957and2076(LXII)of13May1977.vAdoptedandproclaimedbytheGeneralAssemblyinitsresolution45/111of14December1990.viAdoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyinitsresolution43/173of9December1988.
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CERD Committee, Reports Submitted by States Parties in Accordance with Article 9 of the Convention: United Arab Emirates, document CERD/C/ARE/12-17 (27 March 2009)
GE.09-41160 (E) 080409 UNITED NATIONSCERDInternational Convention onthe Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination Distr.GENERAL CERD/C/ARE/12-17 27 March 2009 Original: ENGLISH COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION Seventeenth periodic report of States parties due in 2007*UNITED ARAB EMIRATES** [Original: Arabic] [29 February 2008] * This document contains the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, due on 20 July 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007, respectively. For the 7th to 11th periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates (consolidated document) and the summary records of the meetings at which the Committee considered those reports, see documents CERD/C/279/Add.1 and CERD/C/SR.1113. ** In accordance with the information transmitted to the States parties regarding the processing of their reports, the present document was not formally edited before being sent to the United Nations translation services.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 2 CONTENTSPageIntroduction ........................................................................................................................ 3 I. BASIC INFORMATION: GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATE MEASURES TO ELIMINATE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ............................. 3 A. Basic information ............................................................................................ 3 B. Political system ............................................................................................... 5 C. Economic and social development ................................................................. 11 D. Policies and procedures for the elimination of racial discrimination ................................................................................................. 14 II. COMMENTS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ARTICLES OF THE CONVENTION: MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO IMPLEMENT THE CONVENTION ........................................................................................................ 20 Article 1: Definition of racial discrimination under domestic law .......................... 20 Article 2: General policies on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination ............................................................................ 20 Article 3: Prohibition of all forms of racial discrimination ..................................... 21 Article 4: Criminal procedures ................................................................................ 21 Article 5: Right to justice and equity ....................................................................... 22 Article 6: General framework for judicial practices ................................................ 35 Article 7: Countering prejudice and improving mutual understanding and tolerance ........................................................................................... 35
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 3 Introduction 1. Ever since its inception, the United Arab Emirates has striven to observe and protect human rights and ensure that they are safeguarded under its Constitution and legislation. As accession to the international instruments in which these rights are enshrined is one of its key foreign policy goals, the State acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1974, has scrupulously adhered to its provisions and makes constant appeals, in international and regional forums, for the prohibition of racial discrimination and the right of all to a life free from discrimination on grounds of race, sex or colour.2. The United Arab Emirates has submitted its periodic reports under article 9 of the Convention, which requires States parties to submit to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for consideration and evaluation, reports on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have taken to give effect to the Convention. The United Arab Emirates submitted its twelfth periodic report to the Committee on 23 February 1995. The present report contains its thirteenth to seventeenth periodic reports on the achievements in the social, economic, legislative and regulatory domains which the State has scored in furtherance of the general rights and freedoms exercised in the United Arab Emirates. 3. The present report was prepared under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with input from all relevant federal and local institutions, in order to ensure consistency with the guidelines on reports adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.I. BASIC INFORMATION: GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATE MEASURES TO ELIMINATE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION A. Basic information 4. The United Arab Emirates was established in 1971 as a federation of seven States - Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah - with Abu Dhabi as its capital. The State, which is in Asia, occupies the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula between 22°50' and 26°N and 51° and 56°25'E. It is bounded by Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the north of the Peninsula and the west of the State, by the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the south and by the Gulf of Oman in the east. Area5. The total area of the State is 83,600 square kilometres. This includes a number of islands with a total area of approximately 5,900 square kilometres. 6. The coastline stretches for 644 kilometres along the southern shore of the Peninsula, from the base of the Peninsula, Qatar, in the west, to Ras Musandam in the east. The eastern shore extends for 90 kilometres along the Gulf of Oman. Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 4 Topography7. Most of the land, particularly in the west, consists of desert interspersed with several well-known oases, such as Al-Ain and Liwa, in addition to fertile pastureland around Al-Zafrah, where groundwater is plentiful. To the south of these areas lie the sand dunes that form the boundary of Al-Ruba’ al-Khalil (the Empty Quarter). 8. Jabal Hafit marks the southern boundary of the Buraimi Oasis, where the city of Al-Ain is found, and is approximately 1,220 metres high. In addition, the Hajar mountain range, which is 80 kilometres long from north to south and approximately 32 kilometres wide, cuts across the Musandam Peninsula, then enters the Sultanate of Oman and runs down to the eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. The city of Ras al-Khaimah stands at the foot of the northern flanks of this range, which reach an altitude of around 2,438 metres at their highest point. On the western flanks are a number of large valleys and ridges, some of which are used for agriculture. 9. Most of the coastline is sandy, except in the north, in Ras al-Khaimah, at the headland of the Hajar mountain range. 10. The territorial waters tend to be shallow, with an average depth of 35 metres and a maximum depth of 90 metres, except in the Straits of Hormuz, where the water is up to 145 metres deep. The State’s territorial waters contain many coral reefs studded with pearl oysters and teeming with fish. Climate 11. The United Arab Emirates is in the tropical dry zone that stretches across Asia and North Africa, and is also affected by local environmental factors, because of its position on the shores of the Arabian Gulf and of the Gulf of Oman, which is linked to the Red Sea through the Mandeb Straits. 12. High summer temperatures are associated with high humidity rates, and there are marked differences in climate between the coastal, inner desert and mountainous zones which together make up the topography of the State. The State is buffeted by seasonal and non-seasonal winds of two different kinds, which pick up strength in the spring and late summer. It receives little rainfall, and in variable quantities, between November and April.Population 13. According to the latest figures, the estimated population of the State was around 4,229,000 in 2006. Approximately 3.5 million persons live in urban areas and 700,000 in remote parts of the State. United Arab Emirates nationals account for around 21 per cent of the population. According to the census results, 2.5 million men and women over the age of 15 in the State are economically active. Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 5 Table 1 Geographical distribution of the population of the Emirates, 2006 Emirate No. Percentage Abu Dhabi 1 430 000 33.81 Dubai 1 372 000 32.44 Sharjah 821 000 19.42 Ajman 212 000 5.01 Umm al-Qaiwain 50 000 1.18 Ras al-Khaimah 214 000 5.06 Fujairah 130 000 3.08 Total 4 229 000 100.00 Source:The Emirates in Figures, 2007, Ministry of the Economy. Table 2 Population by nationality and sex (2005 census) Nationals Non-nationals Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 417 917407 578825 4952 388 224892 708 3 280 9322 806 1411 300 2864 106 427Source: The Emirates in Figures, 2007, Ministry of the Economy. B. Political system 14. The United Arab Emirates is a federal State with a federal political system. The Constitution defines the basic features, aims and values of the Federation and the matters entrusted to the Federation in the exercise of its sovereignty throughout the territory and territorial waters inside the international borders of the member Emirates. The member Emirates exercise sovereignty throughout the territory and territorial waters over all matters which are not entrusted to the Federation under the Constitution. The people of the Federation are one people and are part of the Arab nation. Islam is the official religion of the Federation and the sharia is the main source of legislation. The official language of the Federation is Arabic. The federal authorities established by the Constitution are the following. 1. Supreme Council of the Federation 15. This is the highest authority in the State and consists of the rulers of all the Emirates in the Federation or, in the event of their absence or inability to attend, their representatives. Each Emirate has one vote in Council proceedings. 16. The Supreme Council formulates the State’s general policy on all matters for which the Federation has competence under the Constitution, and considers all questions pertaining to the furtherance of the Federation’s goals and the common interests of the member Emirates. It also ratifies federal laws and decrees and international treaties, approves the appointment of the Prime Minister and accepts his resignation or release from his functions upon the
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 6 recommendation of the President of the Federation. It likewise approves the appointment of the president and justices of the Federal Supreme Court and accepts their resignation or dismissal under the conditions laid down in the Constitution. The Council also has supreme oversight functions with regard to the general affairs of the Federation. Article 47 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Council of the Federation shall carry out the following tasks: •Formulate general policy on all matters for which the Federation has competence under the Constitution, and consider all questions pertaining to the furtherance of the Federation’s goals and the common interests of the member Emirates •Ratify federal laws prior to their promulgation, including the Federation’s annual general budget laws and final accounts •Ratify decrees on matters subject to the Constitution •Ratify or approve Supreme Council decrees prior to their issuance by the President of the Federation •Ratify international treaties and conventions by decree •Approve the appointment of the Prime Minister and accept his resignation or his release from his functions upon the recommendation of the President of the Federation •Approve, by decree, the appointment of the president and justices of the Federal Supreme Court and accept their resignation or dismissal under the conditions laid down in the Constitution •Ensure supreme oversight of the general affairs of the Federation •Perform any other tasks stipulated in the Constitution or in federal laws 17. Article 49 of the Constitution states: “Supreme Council decisions on substantive matters are taken by a majority of five members, provided that majority includes the votes of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The minority shall abide by the majority’s decision.” 18. Council decisions on procedural matters are adopted by majority vote. These matters are defined in the Council’s rules of procedure. 2. President and Vice-President of the Federation 19. The Supreme Council of the Federation elects the President and Vice-President from among its members. The Vice-President performs all the duties of the President when the latter is absent for any reason. The President and Vice-President serve a five-year term and can be re-elected. Article 51 of the Constitution provides as follows: “The Supreme Council of the Federation elects from among its members the President and the Vice-President of the Federation. The Vice-President of the Federation performs all the duties of the President when the latter is absent for any reason.”
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 7 20. Article 54 of the Constitution states that the President of the Federation performs the following duties: (a) Presiding over the Supreme Council and guiding its deliberations; (b) Convening and ending meetings of the Supreme Council in accordance with the Council’s rules of procedure; a meeting of the Council must be convened whenever a member requests one; (c) Convening joint meetings of the Supreme Council and Federal Cabinet as and when required; (d) Signing and issuing federal laws, decrees and decisions ratified by the Supreme Council; (e) Appointing the Prime Minister of the Federation, accepting his resignation and releasing him from his functions, subject to the approval of the Supreme Council; appointing the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation and ministers, accepting their resignation and releasing them from their duties on the recommendation of the Prime Minister of the Federation; (f) Appointing diplomatic representatives of the Federation to foreign States, as well as other senior civilian and military federal officials, excluding the president and justices of the Supreme Court, and accepting their resignation and dismissal subject to the approval of the Federal Cabinet. Decisions to appoint, accept the resignation of, or dismiss these persons are taken by decree and in accordance with federal law; (g) Signing the credentials of diplomatic representatives to the Federation from foreign States and entities; accepting the accreditation of foreign diplomatic and consular representatives to the Federation and receiving their credentials; signing representatives’ letters of appointment and credentials; (h) Overseeing the implementation of federal laws, decrees and decisions by the Federal Cabinet and ministers; (i) Representing the Federation at home and abroad and in all international relations; (j) Exercising the right to grant a pardon and commute sentences, and endorsing death sentences in accordance with the Constitution and federal law; (k) Bestowing military and civilian medals and honours in accordance with the relevant laws; (l) Performing any other functions vested in him by the Supreme Council or pursuant to the present Constitution or federal law. 3. Federal Cabinet 21. As stated in article 55 of the Constitution, the Federal Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and a number of ministers. Article 56 states: “Ministers Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 8 shall be selected from among citizens of the Federation who are well-known for their skills and experience.” Article 60 states: “The Cabinet, in its capacity as the executive body of the Federation, subject to oversight by the President of the Federation and the Supreme Council, shall deal with all aspects of domestic and foreign affairs for which the Federation has competence under the present Constitution and federal law.” 22. In particular, the Cabinet carries out the following functions: (a) Following up on the implementation of the general domestic and foreign policy of the Federal Government; (b) Proposing draft federal laws and transmitting them to the Federal National Council before they are submitted to the President of the Federation to lay before the Supreme Council for ratification; (c) Preparing the Federation’s draft general annual budget and final accounts; (d) Preparing draft decrees and decisions of different kinds; (e) Formulating regulations on the implementation of federal laws without introducing any amendments, invalidating provisions or derogations, and formulating disciplinary regulations and regulations on the structure of public administration and institutions, in accordance with the present Constitution and federal laws. The competent federal minister or any other administrative body may be empowered, by means of a special legal provision or by the Cabinet, to issue certain of these regulations; (f) Overseeing the implementation by all the competent authorities in the Federation or the Emirates of federal laws, decrees, regulations and decisions; (g) Overseeing the enforcement of federal court judgements and international treaties ratified by the Federation; (h) Appointing and dismissing, in accordance with the law, federal officials whose appointment or dismissal does not need to be effected by decree; (i) Monitoring the performance of the federal administration and public institutions and the general conduct and discipline of federal employees; (j) Any other particular functions vested in it pursuant to the law or by the Supreme Council under the present Constitution. 4. Federal National Council 23. The Federal National Council comprises 40 seats which are allocated among the member Emirates as follows: Abu Dhabi: 8 seats; Dubai: 8 seats; Sharjah: 6 seats; Ras al-Khaimah: 6 seats; Ajman: 4 seats; Umm al-Qaiwain: 4 seats; and Fujairah: 4 seats.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 9 Article 69 of the Constitution states: “Every Emirate shall be left to determine the method for selecting its representatives in the Federal National Council.” Article 70 defines the conditions for membership as follows: “Members of the Federal National Council must satisfy the following criteria: “(a) They must be citizens of one of the Emirates in the Federation and reside permanently in the Emirate that they represent in the Council. “(b) At the time of selection, they must not be below 25 years of age. “(c) They must have civil capacity, a record of exemplary conduct, a good reputation and no previous convictions for dishonourable offences, unless they have been rehabilitated in accordance with the law. “(d) They must be completely literate.” 24. Article 71 of the Constitution states: “Membership of the Federal National Council may not be combined with any other public office in the Federation, including ministerial office.” With regard to the term of membership, article 72 of the Constitution states: “Membership of the Council shall be for two years, beginning on the date of the Council’s first meeting. Thereafter, the Council shall define the period remaining until the end of the transition phase referred to in article 144 of the present Constitution. Members may be re-elected when their mandate comes to an end.” 25. Article 89 of the Constitution refers to the Council’s law-making functions. It states: “Without prejudice to article 110, federal bills, including finance bills, shall be referred to the Federal National Council prior to submission to the President of the Federation for consideration and ratification by the Supreme Council. These bills shall be debated by the Federal National Council, which may approve, amend or reject them.” 26. As for international treaties, article 91 of the Constitution states: “The Government shall notify the Federal Council of the international treaties and conventions which it concludes with other States and international organizations and shall provide it with relevant background information.”27. Federal Supreme Council Decision No. 4 of 2006, concerning the method for selecting representatives of the Emirates to the Federal National Council, was a constitutional turning point in the consolidation of the democratic process on which the State has embarked, a process based on political participation by all members of society and the empowerment of the people of the Emirates to elect the members of the Council according to a procedure which combines elections with appointments in the initial stage. Article 1 of the Federal Supreme Council decision states: “Half the members shall be elected by an electoral college consisting of a minimum of multiples of one hundred times the number of representatives of each Emirate.” Article 2 states: “The other half shall be chosen by the ruler from among the members of each Emirate.”
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 10 5. The federal court system 28. Article 94 of the Constitution states: “Justice is the foundation of government. Judges are independent and in the performance of the duties are subject to no authority other than the law and their own conscience.” The court system in the United Arab Emirates consists of the Federal Supreme Court, which sits in the federal capital, and appeals courts and courts of first instance in various cities. The Federal Supreme Court is composed of the president and up to five justices. They are appointed by a decree of the President of the Federation, subject to the approval of the Supreme Council. Local judicial bodies in each Emirate deal with legal matters that do not come under the purview of the federal courts. 29. Article 99 of the Constitution defines the functions of the Federal Supreme Court as follows: The Federal Supreme Court shall issue rulings on the following matters: (a) Disputes between member Emirates of the Federation or between one or more Emirates and the Federal Government which are referred to the Court at the request of any of the parties concerned; (b) Verification of federal laws which one or more Emirates challenge on grounds of unconstitutionality, and verification of any law adopted by an Emirate which is challenged by a federal authority on the grounds of unconstitutionality or incompatibility with federal law; (c) Verification of the constitutionality of laws, legislation and regulations in general, upon the request of any domestic court hearing a case. The court concerned must abide by the Federal Supreme Court’s ruling on the matter; (d) Interpreting the Constitution, at the request of a federal authority or the Government of an Emirate; such interpretations shall be binding on all; (e) Trying ministers and senior federal officials appointed by decree for offences committed during the course of their official duties, at the request of the Supreme Council and in accordance with the relevant law; (f) Trying offences that directly harm the interests of the Federation, such as offences against internal or external security, the forging of official documents and the seals of any federal authority and counterfeiting; (g) Adjudicating disputes over jurisdiction between the federal courts and local federal bodies in the Emirates; (h) Adjudicating disputes between federal institutions in different Emirates over jurisdiction and applicable federal regulations; (i) Any other functions entrusted to it under the present Constitution or that may be entrusted to it pursuant to a federal law.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 11 C. Economic and social development 30. The development policy which the United Arab Emirates has adopted has succeeded in bringing about high rates of growth in all economic and social sectors. Gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 321 billion dirhams (Dh) in 2003 to Dh 599.23 billion in 2006. The contribution of the non-petroleum sectors amounted to Dh 375.809 billion, accounting for 62.7 per cent of total GDP and 223.4 billion dirhams, while income from the oil and gas sector accounted for 37.3 per cent of GDP. Income per capita rose from Dh 91,500 in 2003 to Dh 147,100 in 2006. 31. Since its inception, the United Arab Emirates has experienced rapid economic and social growth such as is rarely achieved in developing, or even advanced, societies. It has used growing revenue from oil sales to supply the basic needs of society. The State is one of those countries that has made a good impression on the international community, because of its generous donations of aid and assistance to Arab States and other developing countries across the world. The following are some of the State’s most important domestic achievements: (a) The establishment of a majority of existing infrastructure projects; (b) The establishment of educational and health institutions and the delivery of educational, health, social and cultural services; (c) The procurement of production and investment materials and equipment for the creation of different types of industries; (d) The enactment of laws and regulations and the creation of a modern structure for the administration of the State; (e) The enactment of flexible laws to facilitate recruitment of foreign labour and supply the necessary manpower to meet the requirements of different development projects; (f) The use of modern technologies tailored to the real needs of the State; (g) The encouragement of women’s participation in the workforce and in development efforts; (h) The creation of channels for economic, commercial, political and cultural cooperation with the outside world in furtherance of the mutual interests of the State and of friendly and fraternal States and peoples. 32. The United Arab Emirates pursues a liberal economic policy which is based on free trade, commercial exchanges and the free flow of capital and services. The policy is geared towards the development of the national economy and the diversification of sources of income. The Emirates also seeks to achieve balanced economic and social development for the State as a whole and in each member Emirate of the Federation, endeavouring to strike a balance between social development and economic growth when formulating its policies and future plans. As a result of its development policies, the United Arab Emirates has managed to place itself among the leading countries of the world. The 2005 Human Development Report published by the
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 12 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) gave the State a positive ranking, placing it in forty-first position out of the 177 States covered by the report and second in the Arab world. 33. The report shows that the State has achieved real progress when measured against the development indicators of gender and gender equality. This is the result of quantitative and qualitative changes in the areas of education and health. 34. The report also shows that the State enjoys a high standard of living in general and that the incidence of poverty and deprivation has fallen to a record low, while adult literacy rates have risen. The advances made in regard to health services delivery are clearly reflected in all the health indicators, pointing, for example, to a fall in the infant and under-5 mortality rates, in the percentage of babies with low birthweight and in the maternal mortality rate. The number of children over the age of 1 who have been fully vaccinated against tuberculosis and measles has risen, and the number of doctors per 1,000 of the population has likewise risen. The report points to an increase in the proportion of GDP spent on health services in the Emirates. 35. With regard to education and modern technology, the 2005 Human Development Report shows that the Emirates has made considerable endeavours and spent increasing amounts of money on education, raising the rate of enrolment in primary education and increasing the proportion of girls in different stages of education compared to boys. 36. There have also been major changes and a huge qualitative shift in the fixed and mobile telephones sector and in Internet use, as a result of the growing development and expansion of services. 37. By way of confirmation of the findings of the Human Development Report, the World Development Indicators 2007 report issued by the World Bank also shows that the Emirates has a high ranking when measured against the world development indicators, recording one of the strongest performances globally in education, health, the environment and the promotion of inward investment. At the same time, the sixth annual report of the World Economic Forum, on information technology in 2006-2007, which contains an indicator on network readiness as a measure of progress in the information technology and communications sector, shows that the Emirates occupies a leading position in the Arab and Islamic world, ranking twenty-ninth globally. 38. In view of the high standard of living and economic and social prosperity which the Emirates enjoys, the Mercer Human Resources Consulting company ranked Abu Dhabi and Dubai top among the cities in the Middle East and the Arab world in terms of quality of life. They shared fifty-eighth place out of a total of 215 cities across the world, which were ranked according to the health and medical services available and quality of life. 39. The delegation from the International Monetary Fund which visited the State recently praised the excellent economic performance resulting from the State’s policy of: relying on market mechanisms; strengthening economic policy; ensuring that investments of oil revenue are properly managed; according an important role in development to the private sector; and successfully turning the economy into an integrated economy where the State plays a stronger role as a regional centre for the export of services, so as to promote social development and individual prosperity.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 13 40. The delegation also welcomed the Federal Government’s achievements in regard to financial reforms, including draft budget programmes and the performance and implementation of the global Government’s financial statistics system and consolidated accounts. 41. The State has furthermore made efforts to restructure activities and devolve services provision to the private sector. The Government has introduced efficiency standards, directed additional expenditure towards the health and education sectors and subsidized housing for citizens on low incomes. The Government has also made efforts to involve the private sector more fully in infrastructure development and the delivery of services such as electricity and water, reducing the number of government-supplied services, devolving their provision to the private sector and cutting down on the number of persons in the Government’s employ. 42. The most recent statistics produced by the Ministry of the Economy show that GDP per capita has increased as a result of the State’s economic policy, as illustrated in table 3. Table 3 Indicator 2006 Average GDP per capita (In Emirates dirhams) 141.7 Total (in thousands) (United States dollars) 38.6 Workforce (in thousands) Males 2 288 Females 359 Total 2 647 Workforce as a percentage of the total Males 79.0 population; crude activity (participation) rate Females 26.9 Total 62.6 The unemployed as a percentage of the total Males 2.58 workforce (unemployment rate) Females 6.96 Total 3.17 Total allowances: 25.5 Old age allowance 1.1 Child allowance 24.4 Population density per square kilometre 54 Rural population as a percentage of the total population 17.5 Gender ratio (number of males per 100 females) 217 Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population) 14.9 Total fertility rate 1.96 Crude mortality rate (per 1,000 population) 1.55 Life expectancy at birth Males 76.5 Females 78.5 Total 77.4 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 7.3 Illiteracy rate* Males 10.0 Females 7.6 Total 9.3 Source:Emirates in figures, 2007, Ministry of the Economy. * Data for 2005.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 14 43. The United Arab Emirates uses oil wealth for social development, in keeping with the fundamental principles on which the federal State was founded and the general aims of development, namely, that the human person in the Emirates must be the beneficiary of development and social services. As a result of this policy, the State has succeeded in helping its people to escape the cycle of poverty, illiteracy and disease, and has improved their economic and social welfare, providing them with free services inter alia in the areas of education, health, housing, culture, sanitation and infrastructure. 44. In a 2005 report, the World Health Organization confirmed that the State of the Emirates has been highly successful in reducing the under-five mortality rate, which is approximately 8 per 1,000 live births. The report indicates that the vaccination rate among newborns and children under 2 has reached 98 per cent and that the Emirates are free from infant poliomyelitis and malaria. 45. As a result of various developments, family life in the Emirates has changed significantly over the past few years, with the shift from Bedouin and nomadic life to a more sedentary existence and from extended families to nuclear families. The roles played by men and women in society have continued to evolve on the basis of complementarity of roles and responsibilities, since men and women have different responsibilities and duties towards the family and society. 46. The Millennium Development Goals report prepared in 2006 by the Ministry of the Economy, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme, confirmed that the Emirates has succeeded in meeting many of the Goals, particularly those on education and health, before the May 2015 deadline, and that the relevant indicators are close to those in advanced countries. 47. The State’s development strategies are geared towards the promotion of the private sector’s role, the diversification of sources of income, the development of human resources and technology transfers and meeting all the requirements for entry into the global economy. D. Policies and procedures for the elimination of racial discrimination 1. Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination under the State’s domestic law 48. Article 46 of the Constitution provides: “The Supreme Council of the Federation is the supreme federal authority and comprises the rulers of all the Emirates that make up the Federation, or, in the event of their absence or inability to attend, their representatives in the respective Emirates. Each Emirate has one vote in Council proceedings.” 49. Article 47 of the Constitution, concerning the functions of the Supreme Council, contains a paragraph stating that the Council shall ratify international treaties and conventions by decree. Article 60 of the Constitution, concerning the functions of the Cabinet, contains a paragraph stating that one of the Cabinet’s functions is to oversee the enforcement of federal court judgements and international treaties entered into by the Federation.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 15 50. The Constitution makes it clear that a treaty which has been ratified pursuant to a federal decree and published in the Official Gazette carries the force of law and has the status of a State law, if the decree on accession, or ratification, provides that the treaty shall enter into force on the date of publication in the Official Gazette. In this way, the treaty becomes a State law which the Cabinet and relevant minister are bound to enforce. With regard to the link between human rights principles, the prohibition of racial discrimination as provided for under the Convention and the principles set out in the Constitution of the State, all these principles enjoy twofold protection under State law, because they are enshrined in the Constitution and because the Convention has the status of a domestic law, so that no provisions may be enacted that conflict with it. 2. General legal framework for the protection of human rights and prohibition of racial discrimination 51. Since its inception in 1971, the United Arab Emirates has created a legal and legislative system to regulate all relations between persons and institutions in the State. The Constitution is the fundamental reference point for legislation and laws on many different issues. 52. The constitutional guarantees of human rights in the United Arab Emirates are found in the core articles of the Constitution on public rights and freedoms, the provisions of which take precedence over ordinary legislation and laws, are endowed with a binding force and have indisputable legal value. In dealing with public rights and freedoms, the authors of the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates, were guided by the rights, freedoms and guarantees recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights treaties. Thus, the Constitution includes most of the rights set forth in those international instruments. 53. Chapter III of the Constitution deals with public rights, freedoms and duties, as provided for in the following articles: Article 25: “All persons are equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination among citizens of the Federation on grounds of origin, ethnicity, religious belief or social status.” Article 26: “Personal freedom is guaranteed to all citizens, and no one may be arrested, searched or detained other than in accordance with the law. No one may be subjected to torture or degrading treatment.” Article 29: “Freedom of movement and residence is guaranteed to citizens, subject to the limits laid down by law.” Article 30: “Freedom of opinion and of oral, written and other forms of expression is guaranteed, subject to the limits laid down by law.” Article 31: “The freedom and confidentiality of postal and telegram correspondence and other means of communication are guaranteed by law.” Article 32: “The freedom to perform religious observances in accordance with established traditions is safeguarded, without prejudice to public order or public morals.” Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 16 Article 33: “Freedom of assembly and of association is guaranteed, subject to the limits laid down by law.” Article 34: “Every citizen is free to choose his own occupation, profession or trade, subject to the limits laid down by law and having due regard for the legislation regulating certain professions and trades. No person may be subjected to forced labour other than in the exceptional circumstances provided for by law and in return for compensation. No person may be enslaved.” Article 35: “Equal access to public employment is afforded to all in accordance with the law. Public employment is national service entrusted to the holders of public positions, who must carry out their official duties solely in the public interest.” Article 36: “Homes are inviolable and may only be entered without the permission of the owners in accordance with the law and the conditions laid down therein.” Article 37: “Citizens may not be expelled from, or denied entry to, the Federation.” Article 38: “The extradition of all citizens and political refugees is prohibited.” Article 39: “The expropriation of public property is prohibited, and the penalty of expropriation of private property may only be imposed pursuant to a court order and under the conditions defined by law.” Article 40: “Foreigners in the Federation enjoy the rights and freedoms recognized in the applicable international covenants, treaties and conventions to which the Federation is a party and incur the corresponding obligations.” Article 41: “Any person may submit a complaint to the competent authorities, including judicial bodies, about violations of the rights and freedoms set out in the present chapter.” 3. Regulations on participation in camel racing 54. Act No. 15 of 2005 regulates participation in camel racing. Article 1 prohibits any form of participation by persons of either sex below the age of 18. The article also renders null and void all procedures for the recruitment of persons in this category. Article 2 prescribes a penalty of up to three years in prison and/or a fine of up to Dh 5,000 for any breach of the Act. The penalty is doubled in cases of recidivism. 55. On 5 August 2005, the United Arab Emirates signed a cooperation agreement with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) providing for the identification and registration of [child] camel jockeys and their return to their home countries, local reintegration and social and psychological rehabilitation. The authorities concerned took the necessary action by allocating close to $2.7 million to rehabilitate children involved in this work and provide for their return to their home country. The Government took steps to assist UNICEF by establishing a number of shelters for child camel jockeys who had been rescued. A total of 1,070 children were repatriated after being identified by the competent authorities as victims of trafficking. The State provided assistance to facilitate their reintegration in their home countries.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 17 56. The Emirates has acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and International Labour Organization Conventions Nos. 29, 138 and 182, which all prohibit the smuggling of children for the purposes of their employment in camel racing or hazardous work. 4. Combating human trafficking 57. In keeping with its determination to combat human trafficking offences and all forms of exploitation, particularly of women and children, the State issued Federal Act No. 51 of 2006 on combating human trafficking. Article 1 of the Act defines human trafficking as the recruitment, transfer, removal or receiving of persons by means of the threat or use of force or any other form of coercion, abduction, deception, deceit, abuse of authority, exploitation of a situation of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of sums of money or favours in order to obtain the consent of another person, for the purposes of exploitation. The subsequent articles enumerate the different forms of human trafficking as follows: “Exploitation includes all forms of sexual exploitation; exploitation of the prostitution of others; bonded labour; forced labour; slavery or practices similar to slavery; servitude or the removal of human organs.” 58. One of the most important aims of criminal policy is to ensure that domestic laws are drafted in such a way that penalties reflect the gravity of crimes. Given the gravity of human trafficking offences, because of the terrible physical and psychological harm that they do to the victims, the fact that they offend against the human values on which the sharia, the main source of domestic law, is based, and the fact that these offences are incompatible with the values of Emirates society, the legislature of the Emirates has introduced severe penalties for human trafficking, namely, a fixed term of not less than five years’ imprisonment. The penalty is increased to life imprisonment if the offence is attended by aggravating circumstances. 59. Article 12 of the Act on human trafficking provides for the establishment of a committee - the National Committee on Human Trafficking - consisting of representatives of a number of government departments such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health, as well as the security services and the Red Crescent Society. The Committee’s tasks include: •Studying and updating legislation on trafficking in order to provide victims with appropriate protection in keeping with international standards •Preparing, in conjunction with relevant State entities, reports on the measures taken by the State to combat human trafficking •Studying reports on human trafficking and taking the necessary follow-up action •Coordinating efforts to combat human trafficking with the relevant State authorities, including ministries, government agencies, institutions and other bodies, through conferences, seminars, publications and training and other events aimed at realizing the Committee’s goals Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 18 •Participating, with relevant State authorities, in international conferences and forums on human trafficking, and representing the views of the State in these forums •Carrying out any other activities entrusted to the Committee in this connection 5. Grace period for persons in breach of the Residence Act 60. On 3 June 2007 the Cabinet adopted Decision No. 331/1, granting a grace period to persons who had breached the Residence and Employment Act in order to allow them to leave the State or to resolve their situation within three months of the date of issuance of the Decision. The Decision lays down the following general principles and rules: 1. The Decision does not apply to persons arriving in the State after it enters into force because the grace period will be in effect during a number of annual events, such as the Dubai Trade Fair and Ramadan, which attract large numbers of visitors. 2. The person leaving the State must not be an investor or an employer; such persons act as sponsors for others and must resolve their situation before leaving. 3. All persons who have breached the Act must be fingerprinted, and checks must be done before they leave to ensure that they are not subject to any security restrictions. 4. Inspections will be suspended during the grace period in order to intensify efforts to complete the procedures for those in breach of the Act. 5. Agreements shall be made with embassies and foreign consular offices present in the State to facilitate the departure of persons who cannot afford to pay for a ticket home. 6. An amount of money shall be set aside for emergencies and contingencies. 7. Lists of figures containing full information on departing offenders shall be drawn up. •Operations rooms working around the clock shall be set up by the investigating judge to facilitate the exit process; a shift system will be in effect during the grace period. •Steps will be taken to ensure that airline companies do not exploit the situation but facilitate the departure of the persons concerned. The following groups will benefit from the present Decision: (a) Passport holders who have overstayed their visas, whether they have work, residence or tourist visas of any kind; (b) Persons who have lost their passports; (c) Investors and persons who have sponsors.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 19 61. The Cabinet Decision allowed persons wishing to change their status in the State to do so, on condition that they had not entered the country illegally, by making it possible to renew their residence cards and work permits using the name of the existing sponsor, without them incurring any fines or allowing for the transfer of sponsorship to another person or enterprise. If the person concerned had run away from his or her sponsor, the sponsor’s agreement would be needed for the transfer of sponsorship. 6. Establishment of women’s and children’s refuges in the United Arab Emirates 62. The President of the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent Society issued Decision No. 1 of 2008 providing for the establishment in the State of women’s and children’s refuges with legal personality, financial and administrative autonomy and a humanitarian mission of protecting women and children, whether nationals or foreigners, who are victims of human trafficking and sexual exploitation. The refuges provide the women and children in their care with suitable accommodation, guarantee respect for their human dignity, alleviate their suffering and offer them all kinds of social, legal, psychological, medical, educational and vocational support. They will also help victims during police investigations and in court, ensuring their right to a defence and helping them to return safely to their country. 7. Social welfare 63. The United Arab Emirates pursues several social action strategies which were all established, in cooperation with United Nations experts, to ensure social justice and social security, provide a decent life for nationals and foreign residents, foster social development and progress, provide for families, protect children, ensure the welfare and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities and assist older persons, widows and persons with limited financial resources by paying them regular monthly allowances that are sufficient for a decent life. 64. The Ministry of Social Affairs implements Federal Act No. 6 of 2001, concerning social security, and a series of comprehensive social programmes designed to provide all social groups with a decent life. 65. Social development centres in the different Emirates play a vital role in social development, organizing activities, including seminars, talks, field visits and training courses, and creating literacy centres and traditional crafts centres in order to train groups, particularly women, for participation in the overall development process. 66. In August 2006, the Ministry of Social Affairs began implementing a Cabinet decision providing for the creation of crèches for the children of civil servants in ministries and government bodies and institutions with 50 or more employees who have no fewer than 20 children under the age of 4 between them. 67. The State encourages the establishment of public welfare associations, and issued Federal Act No. 2 of 2008, concerning civil public welfare associations and institutions. The
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 20 Government offers technical and material support and provides premises for some associations to help them to carry out their activities. There are a total of 121 associations pursuing different aims and activities, including in the social, sports, cultural, legal and vocational domains. II. COMMENTS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ARTICLES OF THE CONVENTION: MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO IMPLEMENT THE CONVENTION Article 1: Definition of racial discrimination under domestic law 68. The United Arab Emirates consistently strives to promote the principles of justice and equality in all its domestic legislation and regulations, based on the values of the Islamic faith, which is a source of legislation. Since its inception, the State has taken care to enact laws that regulate rights and obligations and prohibit discrimination, which is incompatible with the values, customs and traditions of the people of the State. 69. In keeping with article 1 [of the Convention], which defines racial discrimination and with the provisions of that guarantee everyone, whether nationals or residents, protection against any form of discrimination, general norms have been written into the Constitution and domestic criminal, civil and economic laws, enunciating the principle of equal public rights and obligations and the prohibition of all forms of racial discrimination. Article 2: General policies on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination 70. The Emirates consistently condemns racial discrimination, promotes justice and equality and endeavours to implement laws and legislation to guard against any form of discrimination. Accordingly, it has taken steps to strengthen the judiciary, granting it full independence which ensures access to legal remedies and the recognition of rights. 71. Article 16 of Federal Act No. 2 of 2008, concerning public welfare associations and institutions, states: “No association may deviate from the object specified in its statute. Associations and their members are prohibited from stirring up sectarian, racist or religious strife.”Paragraphs (d) and (e) 72. The people of the United Arab Emirates have ever practised the values of tolerance, harmony and fellowship with different peoples and races, in keeping with the values inherent in the precepts of Islam and in the light of existing trade links and exchanges with different countries. The State is a point of contact between West and East and a conduit for commercial and cultural exchanges with the rest of the world. Hence, the people and residents of the United Arab Emirates condemn all manifestations of discrimination and live lives that demonstrate a constant awareness of the full implications of human compassion. As a result, daily life is untroubled by behaviours that are incompatible with noble values, and the State does not need to enact legislation to deal with any violations of the Convention.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 21 73. In addition, resident expatriate communities have the right to set up their own cultural associations or pursue business activities under the Public Welfare Associations and Institutions Act. Existing associations include: the Jordanian Association; the Indian Ladies’ Association; the Sudanese Women’s Association; the Islamic Indian Centre; the Indian Social and Cultural Club; and the Arab Republic of Egypt Club. 74. There is more than one business council of businessmen and investors which has been formed for a specific activity. These include the Indian Business and Professional Council; the British Business Group; the French Business Council; and the German Business Council. Chambers of Commerce and Trade regulates the statutes of these bodies. Article 3: Prohibition of all forms of racial discrimination 75. In the political positions that it has articulated in all international forums and at international and regional meetings, ever since its inception in 1971 the United Arab Emirates has consistently condemned all forms of racial discrimination and distinction, and refused to have dealings with any State that applies discriminatory policies, because it is driven by a constant desire to promote human rights principles. 76. The people and residents of the State, as well as visitors, live together in complete harmony, and the law guarantees residents the right to use health, educational and leisure facilities on an equal basis with citizens and without any discrimination. Article 4: Criminal procedures 77. In keeping with the aims of the Constitution, the Federal Criminal Code No. 3 of 1987, as amended by Federal Act No. 34 of 2005, includes several provisions outlawing violence in general. Article 312 of the Code prescribes a term of imprisonment or a fine for any person who desecrates a sacred Islamic object, denigrates an Islamic rite or insults any of the revealed religions. 78. Article 102 of the Code defines an aggravating circumstance as: taking advantage of the victim’s mental incapacity or inability to offer resistance or of circumstances which prevent the victim from defending himself or herself; using brutality in committing an offence; impersonating the victim; or a circumstance in which a civil servant abuses his authority, office or role to commit the offence. 79. The Code prescribes penalties for anyone who commits the following offences: •Offences against religious beliefs or rites •Offences against the family •Offences against the person •Offences against honour
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 22 •Defamation •Financial crimes Article 5: Right to justice and equity Paragraph (a) 80. Article 25 of the Constitution states: “All persons are equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination between citizens of the Federation on grounds of origin, place of residence, religious belief or social status. 81. Article 28 states: “Punishment is an individual matter, and accused persons are innocent until proven guilty in a fair and legal trial. Accused persons have the right to engage competent counsel to defend them at trial. The law shall specify the conditions under which counsel for the accused must be present. The infliction of physical or mental harm on an accused person is prohibited.”82. Article 41 of the Constitution states: “Everyone has the right to submit a complaint to the competent authorities, including the judicial authorities, concerning violations of the rights and freedoms set forth in the present chapter.” Paragraph (b) 83. Article 10 of the Constitution states that the goals of the Federation are to: preserve its independence, sovereignty, security and stability; repel all attacks against it or member Emirates; protect the rights and freedoms of the people of the Federation; establish close cooperation between the Emirates for the sake of the common good, in order to achieve these aims and in furtherance of prosperity and progress in all areas; provide a better life for all citizens; and ensure that each member Emirate respects the independence and sovereignty of the other Emirates in respect of their domestic affairs in the scope of the present Constitution. 84. Article 26 of the Constitution states: “Personal freedom is guaranteed to all citizens. No person may be arrested, searched, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the law, and no one may be subjected to torture or degrading treatment.” 85. Although it is in the public interest that punishment should be effective and swift, the law has established a number of safeguards to protect individual freedoms and rights. Accused persons are afforded a wide range of guarantees to enable them to defend themselves and to protect them from harm or torture. Hence, article 2 of Federal Act No. 29/2005 states: “It is prohibited to inflict bodily or mental harm on an accused person or to subject a person to torture or degrading treatment.” 86. Article 298 of the Act states: “Where a man and his wife are sentenced to deprivation of liberty, enforcement of the sentence in respect of one of them may be deferred until the other person is released, if they are responsible for the care of a minor below the age of 15.” In this way, the Act guarantees the welfare of the child as a party that is innocent of the sins of the parents and thus ensures the child’s social stability and protection.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 23 Paragraph (c) 87. With regard to political rights, chapter IV of the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates is entirely devoted to the subject of the Federal National Council, the members of which represent all the people of the Federation, as stated in article 77. 88. Supreme Federal Council Decision No. 4 of 2006, followed by Presidential Decision No. 3 of 2006 define methods for selecting representatives of the Emirates to the Federal National Council: half of its members are elected directly by an electoral college, and a national committee is formed to run the elections. 89. For the first time ever, the State conducted a new and unique experiment in which the Federal National Council was elected by designated electoral colleges between 16 and 20 December 2006. Citizens were given ample opportunity to express their views and opinions on many issues relating to development. The electoral college consisted of a total of 6,688 persons, of whom 1,189 were women. In this way, the first parliamentary assembly of the Emirates was formed, with half its members being chosen by direct ballot. 90. Women of the United Arab Emirates made a strong showing in the Council; eight were appointed and one was elected. That this number of women entered the Council for the first time testifies to the political wisdom of the leadership of the State and the attention paid to women’s role in the development of political participation. It also illustrates how the role of women in society has come to the fore in recent years, with four women ministers in the present Government line-up, one each at the Ministry of International Trade and the Ministry of Social Affairs and two occupying positions as Ministers of State. Women’s entry into the political fray is a genuine turning point in the democratic process on which the Emirates has embarked and is likely to add value to the work that women do in all fields. Paragraphs (d) (i) and (ii) 91. Article 29 of the Constitution states: “Freedom of movement and residence is guaranteed to citizens within the limits set by law.” Article 22 of Federal Act No. 17 of 1972, concerning nationality, driving licences and passports, stipulates: “Every citizen is entitled by law to a passport. A passport is a document issued by the State under the present Act and allows the holder to travel from country to country, subject to the conditions imposed by each country.” 92. Article 23 states: “No citizen of the State may leave or return to the country without a passport.”93. Article 24 states: “Departure from and return to the country may only be effected at designated ports, after the passport has been stamped.” Article 25 provides: “Citizens have the freedom to move between the member Emirates of the Federation.” 94. Federal Act No. 6 of 1973, as amended, concerning alien entry and residence, regulates the procedures for obtaining entry visas to the State, the different types of visas (tourist or work visas), and the procedures for obtaining resident status for the purposes of work.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 24 95. With regard to the legislation prohibiting travel, a person with a criminal record may be prohibited from travelling pursuant to a court order and article 329 et seq. of the Federal Code of Civil Procedures. Paragraph 3 of article 329 states: “Where a court issues an order banning a person from travelling, it may give orders for the passport of the convicted person to be placed in the court vault and may disseminate the travel ban or injunction to all ports of entry and exit in the State.” Paragraph (d) (iii) 96. Article 8 of the Constitution stipulates: “Citizens of the Federation shall have a single nationality, as defined by law, and shall enjoy abroad the protection of the Government of the Federation in accordance with the applicable international rules.” “Nationality may not be revoked or withdrawn from a citizen, other than in the exceptional circumstances specified by law.” 97. With regard to acquisition of nationality by the children of a female citizen of the United Arab Emirates who is married to a foreign man, further to instructions issued by the President of the State on 13 August 1998 asking for information to be submitted to the Office of the President on the children of female citizens married to foreigners, including the wife’s name, the name, nationality, place of work and address of the husband and the names of the children, a circular was sent to immigration and residence departments instructing them to fill in forms with the requisite information and to append supporting documentation. 98. As for the “Bidun”, Ministerial Decision No. 167 of 2006 on the restructuring of the Committee on the Status of Stateless Persons (the “Bidun”) tasked the Committee with the conduct of a census of persons entitled to nationality who were present in the State prior to the establishment of the Federation and had been counted previously. Priority was given to persons in government jobs with a long service record. The Committee was required to submit tables with the names of eligible persons and their family members. A decree was issued granting the nationality of the State to 1,294 persons. The remaining tables were submitted to the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and the procedures for granting nationality to the persons concerned will be completed in due course. Paragraph (d) (iv) 99. Article 19 of Federal Act No. 28/2005, concerning personal status, regulates marriage contracts and the conditions set out therein with a view to guaranteeing that families are established on stable foundations which ensure that the spouses carry out their duties lovingly and compassionately. 100. In keeping with the sharia, consent is a key element of the marriage contract. Indeed, this is how consent is described in article 38, paragraph 3, of the Personal Status Code. Thus, under article 61 of the Code, if consent is not given, the marriage contract is null and void. Article 39 of the Code explicitly states that the wife must consent to the marriage. Article 20 furthermore states that the spouses may stipulate whatever conditions they may agree upon, provided that they do not agree to something which is forbidden and or forbid that which is permitted. Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 25 Paragraph (d) (v) 101. Any person may legitimately own and acquire any property that he or she may desire, and such property shall be safeguarded, provided that it was lawfully acquired. This right is recognized in article 21 of the Constitution, which states: “Private property shall be protected. The law shall specify the restrictions which may be imposed on property, and no one shall be deprived of his property other than in circumstances dictated by the public good, in accordance with the law and in exchange for fair compensation.” 102. Article 22 of the Constitution articulates the principle of the inviolability of public property, while article 39 recognizes the right to protection against expropriation and revocation of property. 103. According to the Constitution, the natural resources in each Emirate constitute public property for the benefit of the national economy. Under article 23, private ownership of natural wealth and resources is prohibited. In order to prevent the over-concentration of economic power in the hands of any one party, the Constitution allows for limits to be set on private ownership and for the public expropriation of private property in exchange for fair compensation. 104. On the basis of these rights, individuals have the unrestricted right to dispose of their property by selling, leasing, gifting or legally transferring it upon the death of an ascendant or a descendant.105. Under the Constitution, members of society can freely engage in economic, trade and industrial activities. Article 24 states: “The national economy is founded on social justice and genuine cooperation between public and private enterprise.” The Trade Act and the Companies Act recognize that this right may be exercised according to the procedures set out therein. 106. The State has concluded a number of bilateral agreements on economic and trade cooperation, investment protection and the avoidance of dual taxation and is a member of the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Paragraph (d) (vi) 107. With regard to the right to inherit, which the Convention classifies as a civil right, Federal Act No. 28/2005, concerning personal status, contains detailed provisions on inheritance under the sharia rules by Muslims in the State. These provisions are binding, constituting as they do ordinary law norms from which no derogation is permitted. 108. Article 274 states: “A bequest is any property and legal title that a deceased person bequeathed.” Article 276 provides: “The claimant must submit a request to the competent court for certification of the death and the inheritance, together with an attestation indicating the date of the death, the last address of the deceased, the names and addresses of the heirs and their testamentary tutors and all the moveable and immoveable property included in the bequest.” The registry of the court will summon the heirs and testamentary tutors to appear before the court on
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 26 the date that it decides. The court will examine the testimony of trustworthy persons and may order whatever additional administrative inquiries it deems necessary. The probate certification shall be taken as legal proof, unless a judgement to the contrary is issued or the competent court rules that it is invalid. The court shall issue a document listing the names of the heirs and the share of the bequest due to each of them. 109. Foreigners who are not Muslims are subject to the rules of international inheritance law on inheritance disputes. Paragraph (d) (vii) 110. In keeping with the constitutional provisions which prohibit discrimination on grounds of belief or religion, article 312 of the Federal Criminal Code provides: “A penalty of imprisonment and/or a fine shall be imposed on any person who: (a) Desecrates a sacred Islamic object or denigrates an Islamic rite; (b) Insults a recognized revealed religion. 111. The State allows all residents who are followers of a revealed religion to practise their religious observances and to worship in approved places of worship.” Paragraph (d) (viii) 112. The Federal Printing and Publications Act No. 15 of 1980 regulates and guarantees press freedom. The Act places restrictions on the exercise of the Minister’s administrative powers in order to prevent any violation of the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under the Constitution. The Act also recognizes the right of the press to publish material at its discretion.Paragraph (d) (ix) 113. Article 2 of Federal Act No. 2/2008, concerning civil public welfare associations and institutions, provides: “A public welfare association is any group of individuals or bodies corporate established for a definite or an indefinite period of time for the purpose of carrying out social, religious, cultural, scientific, educational, vocational, women’s, creative or artistic activities, providing humanitarian services, performing charitable work or expressing solidarity through the provision of material or moral support for technical expertise. The sole purpose of all its activities must be to serve the public good without receiving any material reward. Membership must be open to everyone under the terms of the present Act. The decisive factor in defining the object of an association is the main purpose for which it was established.”114. A total of 112 civic and vocational associations, which carry out their activities in full freedom, have been established under the Act.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 27 Paragraph (e) (i) 115. With regard to the right to work and to remain in employment, the Federal Labour Code No. 8 of 1980 makes no distinction between individuals on grounds of race, sex, social class or belief. Everyone is equal before the law, save with respect to the specific requirements of a job and compliance with labour standards. Equality in employment 116. The Code provides a general and an abstract definition of a worker as follows: “A worker is any male or female who works for an employer in exchange for a wage of any kind.” This definition guarantees equality among workers, regardless of their nationality, religion, political beliefs or any other distinguishing feature. Protection of wages 117. The Code regulates and guarantees payment of wages. Pay is a central component of an employment contract and a contract is not valid unless it defines the amount of pay to be given. The legislation guarantees workers the right to dispose of their wages freely. A worker may not be obliged to purchase food or goods produced by his employer from a particular shop. The Code states that wages must be paid on a working day, in the workplace and in convertible national currency. In 2007 the Ministry of Labour signed an agreement with the Infospan Inc. company providing for the issuance of wage slips to workers residing in the United Arab Emirates. 118. The Minister for Labour and Social Affairs issued Decision No. 156 of 2003, concerning protection of wages, article 1 of which states that workers entitled to an annual or monthly salary must be paid at least once a month. Article 2 states that, without prejudice to article 1, all workers must be paid their wages at least every two weeks. 119. On 14 May 2003, the Minister of State for Labour issued administrative circular No. 11 of 2003 on the procedures for implementing ministerial Decision No. 156 of 2003, concerning the protection of wages. The Enterprise Affairs Unit was designated as the competent body in the Labour Department for implementation. In principle, the Decision applies solely to the following: (a) All enterprises in the construction and building sector (contracting and public maintenance), the cleaning and transport sector and the clothing industry which, according to the information in the Ministry’s computer database, have 200 or more employees; (b) All enterprises against which repeated complaints have been brought for non-payment of their employees’ wages, on condition that the Decision is applied upon the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Inspections, the Director of the Labour Relations Department or directors of labour offices and the reasons for applying the Ministerial Decision are explained.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 28 120. The Minister of State for Labour subsequently issued administrative circular No. 4 of 2004 on 7 March 2004, stating: “All enterprises which undertake contracting and maintenance work and employ more than 50 persons must submit salary payment tables for their employees.” Working hours and leave 121. The Code defines working hours in accordance with international labour standards. A working day must be not longer than eight hours, interspersed with rest breaks to allow workers to eat and pray. Such breaks must not exceed one hour, and Friday must be as a paid weekly day of rest for all workers. The Code defines four different types of leave: official leave, annual leave, sick leave and leave in order to undertake the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). Workers’ safety, health and social welfare 122. The Code specifies that the employer must provide safety equipment to protect workers from industrial injuries, diseases and the risks associated with the operation of equipment and use of other work tools. The employer must comply with all the safety standards specified by the competent government authority, while employees must use safety equipment and protective clothing and carry out the employer’s instructions on safety procedures and the work environment. The Code contains full details on the protection of workers, including fire prevention, workplace hygiene, ventilation, lighting, safe drinking water, toilets, regular medical tests for employees and the provision of medical care as required by the competent government authorities. Compensation for industrial injuries and diseases 123. The Code spells out the procedures to be followed in the event of an industrial injury or disease, stipulating that the employer must provide for the treatment of the employee concerned. Settlement of individual and collective labour disputes 124. An employer, a worker or a beneficiary of either party who disputes any of the rights of that party under the Labour Code must apply to the competent labour department to consider the case. The labour department will endeavour to settle the dispute amicably within a period of two weeks. If no settlement is reached, the labour department must refer the dispute to the courts and submit an accompanying memorandum containing a brief description of the dispute and of the magnitude of the losses of the two parties, together with its own comments. The court must set a date for a hearing within three days of the date on which the request is received. In this way, the dispute will continue to be heard by the courts in accordance with legal procedure. 125. The mechanism for settling collective labour disputes consists of four phases: (a) Amicable settlement through negotiations between the two sides; (b) Mediation at the request of the competent labour department; (c) Arbitration through arbitration boards including representatives of the employer and the employees concerned, in addition to a representative of the labour department;
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 29 (d) Mediation through the Higher Mediation Board for the Resolution of Collective Labour Disputes. 126. The executive branch oversees the implementation of the Labour Code through on-site labour inspections, during which employers and employees are provided with technical information and guidance on how to implement the Code. Ratification of the fundamental International Labour Organization Conventions concerning human rights 127. The State has ratified nine fundamental International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions with a view to ensuring that it keeps pace with progressive labour legislation in the contemporary world on such matters as: equality of treatment and opportunity; the rejection of any form of discrimination or distinction based on sex, status, religion and belief; respect for the human right to work without any coercion; and respect for the rights of the child. The ILO conventions concerned are: •The Employment Service Convention, 1948 (No. 89) •The Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) •The Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) •The Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) •The Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) •The Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 106) •The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) •The Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) •The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) The State has also signed two Arab Labour Organization Conventions: •Convention No. 18 of 1996 concerning the employment of Minors •Convention No. 19 of 1998 concerning Labour Inspection 128. The State has furthermore signed several bilateral memorandums of understanding on manpower with fraternal and friendly States such as India, Pakistan, China, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Indonesia in order to protect workers’ rights, regulate the process for workers’ entry into the State and familiarize these persons with their rights and obligations under their employment contract.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 30 Human resources development 129. In the framework of its efforts to diversify the economy and achieve sustainable development, the State has implemented a number of programmes and plans to modernize the labour market. In that connection, the national Human Resources Development and Employment Authority was established in November 1999 pursuant to Federal Act No. 27 of 1999 and went into operation in November 2000. The Authority carries out its work through an organizational structure which was approved by the Cabinet and consists of three specialized centres, two ancillary departments and branch offices in the Emirates of the State. 130. The Authority pursues four strategic objectives under the Act by which it was established: full employment of national human resources; reducing the proportion of foreign workers in the overall workforce; increasing the supply of qualified national human resources capable of meeting the requirements of the labour market; and developing and improving the practical skills and capacities of the national workforce. 131. Since it was established, the Authority has achieved a great deal in its fields of expertise, building platforms for communication with end-users of its services, i.e. nationals looking for work, providing advice, running training and skills development programmes and establishing good relations with employers looking for skilled national staff. The Authority has also created links with educational and training institutions at different levels. Legislation on domestic service 132. In conformity with the Government’s directives on the protection of workers’ rights, the Ministry of the Interior announced the introduction of a standard employment contract for domestic workers and persons of similar status, which entered into effect in the Federation on 1 April 2007. 133. The standard employment contract regulates the work of persons in these categories based on the nature of the work and tasks undertaken, granting these workers the right to adequate rest breaks and medical treatment and care in accordance with the health regulations in force in the State. Wages are set by agreement between the two parties. Paragraph 1 of the contract must indicate the full amount of the wage to be paid at the end of each month. The two sides must sign the wage table, drawn up in both Arabic and English, showing that payment has been made and received. The sponsor must keep the table on file in order to be able to produce it when necessary. 134. The employment contract states that the sponsor may not employ a person in work that is dangerous or incompatible with the maintenance of public order, nor may the sponsor oblige the person to work for another, as stipulated in the conditions specified in the Act on Entry and Residence of Aliens and its implementing regulation. The sponsor must provide the employee with assistance to remit his salary in accordance with the State’s banking regulations, and must enable him to communicate with his family members, to send and receive letters and ensure respect for their confidential nature. In the event that a worker dies during service, the sponsor must defray the full cost of repatriation of the mortal remains and personal effects of the deceased as promptly as possible and must remit the person’s outstanding entitlements to the relevant authority. The employment contract is valid for two years from the date of effective Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 31 commencement of employment and may be extended by agreement between the two parties. If the first party (the sponsor) wishes to terminate the contract before the expiry date, he must provide the second party (the employee) with a ticket to return to his home country and pay him a month’s salary as compensation. Under the contract, the sponsor must provide the employee with suitable living quarters and treat him in a manner which ensures his dignity and physical well-being. Paragraph (e) (iii) 135. The United Arab Emirates, in the framework of housing policy schemes and plans, has endeavoured to provide citizens with access to modern housing which meets their housing needs and is suited to their local environment. The architectural design must be such as to ensure them a decent life and social stability. Several federal and local bodies, including the Ministry of Public Works, the Sheikh Zayed Housing Programme, the Mohammed bin Rashid Housing Programme, the Sharjah Housing Committee and municipal departments of housing in the State have intensified their efforts to create tens of thousands of homes and modern cities throughout the State, complete with a comprehensive network of services. 136. As the State is determined that employers must comply with the law, the Ministry of Labour decided not to issue collective work permits (25 workers or more), unless the employer demonstrates a tangible commitment to providing workers with suitable accommodation. Enterprises must submit evidence that they have concrete plans and the resources to provide appropriate facilities. In 2007, a total of 12 companies failed to convince the Ministry that they had the capacity to provide their workers with suitable housing and their applications for collective work permits were therefore rejected. 137. In 2007, some 60 companies in the Dubai construction industry took steps to improve workers’ housing conditions; this was out of a total of 100 companies to which warnings were issued in 2006. Thirty warnings were issued to other enterprises in 2007. 138. The Department of Civil Defence has announced that it will reject applications for permits and renewal of permits from all enterprises which are unable to obtain safety certificates for all workers’ housing. The Government of Dubai has also announced that it is prohibited to house workers on industrial sites and in workshops and warehouses. 139. In March 2007, the Government of Sharjah issued a decision on providing proper living quarters. Every person must be given adequate space, and accommodation must include a washing area, a kitchen and an eating area. Enterprises which breach the regulations face huge fines - up to Dh 50,000 - which will be doubled in the event of a repeat offence. 140. In October 2007, the Riyan Investment Company, which is a private company, responded to the Government’s campaign to provide appropriate accommodation for workers with a project for the construction of a large workers’ housing complex in Abu Dhabi to accommodate up to 32,000 workers, technicians and supervisors. The project envisages the construction of six complexes around a main building, offering a range of leisure facilities, including a modern commercial hypermarket, banks, medical clinics, travel agencies, a post office, a security services unit, a mosque, dining and games halls, laundries, gardens and public courtyards. The project is expected to be completed by the middle of 2008.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 32 Paragraph (e) (iv) 141. Everyone has the right to health care and to easy access to methods to prevent, treat, and protect against, infectious diseases. This right is recognized in the Constitution of the State, article 19 of which stipulates: “Society provides citizens health care and the means to prevent and treat infectious diseases, and encourages the construction of hospitals, clinics and public and private sanatoriums.” A number of laws recognizing the right to health security and health care have been enacted, such as Federal Act No. 6 of 1975, regulating the registration of births, Federal Act No. 7 of 1975, concerning the medical profession, and Act No. 27 of 1981, concerning the prevention of infectious diseases. Hospitals and health centres are found in many different parts of the State and deliver treatment and health services free of charge to all citizens and residents of the State. The State encourages private sector participation in health services delivery, and a number of hospitals and clinics providing services for everyone in different areas of specialization have been established. 142. Pursuant to Cabinet Decision No. 1 of 1980, as amended, concerning treatment abroad, the State bears the costs of treatment in medical centres abroad which is not available in the State. The State has set up health sections in different countries to provide follow-up for patients and assistance them with treatment. 143. The State endeavours to provide high-quality services and to comply with international best practices in the delivery of treatment and preventive health services. It has taken steps to consolidate relations with the World Health Organization and specialized scientific and medical institutions in various parts of the world, establishing mechanisms for exchanges of medical and research expertise with a view to developing health services to the highest international standards. In 2007, the State had 40 hospitals in total, over 115 primary health centres, 14 Ministry of Health hospitals, 67 medical centres, 11 school health centres, 10 maternal and child health centres, 110 units for mothers and children in primary care centres, dozens of large hospitals and thousands of private clinics. 144. Article 13 of Federal Act No. 7 of 1984, concerning health services costs and fees for medical certificates and reports, deals with the subject of State provision of free public health services for all nationals and residents, including basic preventive health services for mothers and children. These services include: •Premarital screening •Breastfeeding support and promotion •Monitoring the growth and development of under-fives •Prevention of hereditary diseases •National screening programme for early detection of diseases in newborns •National screening programme for early detection of breast cancer
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 33 145. These services are offered through specialized maternal and paediatrics’ units in primary health care centres in all health districts. All preventive health services offered to children of preschool and school age are free of charge for both nationals and migrants. Private schools must provide access to health professionals and offer this service to their students. Vaccinations are free of charge, as are some health education materials. Free training for these schools is provided by the State’s school health departments. The school health programme includes the following: (a) Preventive health and treatment services; (b) Health education for schoolchildren; (c) Monitoring the school environment; (d) Improving the health of school staff; (e) School meals and monitoring the school canteen; (f) Physical education; (g) Psychological and counselling services. 146. The programme offers preventive health and treatment services to all students at government schools. Private schools are required to engage a nurse and a doctor to provide these services. These persons take part in training courses in which they learn about techniques and methods for delivering the services included in the programme. Schools provide free health and nutritional education and support for efforts to combat infectious diseases. Programme for the prevention and treatment of infectious and non-infectious diseases 147. A number of preventive programmes for all are implemented at State level, and free drugs are dispensed by preventive health units for the treatment of infectious diseases that post a threat to public health. These include: •The National Expanded Vaccination Programme, which provides free vaccination for all children from birth until they leave school. •The Infant Poliomyelitis Eradication Programme. •The Measles and German Measles Elimination Programme. •The Anti-Malaria Programme. •The Anti-Tuberculosis Programme. •The Anti-AIDS Programme. •The Anti-Cancer Programme. •The Programme against Infectious Diseases.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 34 •Emergency and first aid services. •Health education is provided to different social groups through the audio-visual media. These services are on offer in health and educational facilities and in the workplace, and are also provided by public welfare associations such as the Women’s Federation, boy scouts and girl guides’ associations, charities, etc. 148. All migrants and nationals are entitled to health services. Health services are offered in government medical facilities, either via the health card scheme in force in the northern Emirates or under a health insurance scheme such as the one in effect in Abu Dhabi pursuant to Act No. 23 of 2005. Under the Act, health insurance is compulsory for all public and private sector employees in Abu Dhabi. 149. The Ministry of Health has adopted a strategic plan for 2008-2010, under the slogan “Excellence … empowerment ... integration”, comprising the following goals: •Strengthening the Ministry’s lawmaking role in coordination with relevant institutions •Following international best practices in health-care provision •Building and developing technical and administrative capacities •Strengthening the role of the Ministry of Health in various areas of preventive medicine •Ensuring access to comprehensive health-care services for all inhabitants of the Emirates •Raising health awareness in society and reducing morbidity rates •Developing health administration and financing systems The Ministry undertook the following initiatives in implement the plan: •Establishment of a strategic planning department •Design of a self-administration system for hospitals •Creation of a system to increase the assets of the National Fund for the Financing of Health Services •Implementation of a health insurance system •Establishment of a system to promote investment in the private health sector •Commencement, by the Emirates Health Authority, of its duties and functions Annex 111
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 35 •Implementation of a modern system for maintaining medical records and a system for licensing and importing drugs in line with international best practices •Creation of a database for health information and scientific evidence Article 6: General framework for judicial practices 150. The right to bring legal proceedings and to seek a legal remedy is guaranteed to everyone under article 41 of the Constitution, which states: “Everyone has the right to lodge complaints to the competent authorities, including the judicial authorities, concerning any infringement of the rights and freedoms recognized in the present chapter.” Article 94 of the Constitution states: “Justice is the basis of government. In performing their duties, judges are independent and are subject to no authority other than the law and their own conscience.” The Code of Civil Procedures, the Criminal Code, the Code of Civil Transactions and the Judicial Authority Act specify the procedures for seeking a legal remedy. There is nothing in these laws which discriminates between nationals and residents with respect to the procedures or treatment of parties before the courts or the enforcement of judgements. Hence, everyone is equal before the courts.151. The Emirates Human Rights Association was established under Federal Act No. 6 of 1974, as amended, concerning public welfare associations, with the approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs as issued on 5 February 2006. In accordance with its statutes, the Association follows up on complaints and grievances concerning racial discrimination and works with governmental and local authorities to follow up on and resolve cases and complaints. Article 7: Countering prejudice and improving mutual understanding and tolerance 152. With regard to improving levels of education and encouraging the pursuit of learning, the Constitution affirms the right to education in article 17, which states: “Education is a basic component of social progress in the Federation, and is compulsory at the primary stage and free of charge at all stages.” 153. The State has established primary, intermediate and secondary schools, as well as universities and vocational colleges in order to offer the highest standards of State education and eradicate illiteracy. Since the founding of the State in 1971, the Ministry of Education has taken two different approaches to illiteracy. The first focuses on education of the rising generation, while the second focuses on adult education. In addition to day school, the State has opened the doors of education to those who missed the education boat, by establishing evening study centres for the employed. 154. The number of schoolchildren rose from 52,751 in 1975 to 658,814 in 2005/06, and the number of government and private schools in 2007 stood at 1,259. In addition, there are dozens of State and private universities with a total of some 69,578 students in 2004/05. The ratio of female to male students at these institutions was 186.3 per cent, while the number of graduates for the same year was 13,973.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 36 155. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education have taken steps to build up their learning curricula by including a number of subjects relating to human rights, children’s rights, women’s rights, and combating racial discrimination, including the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and disseminating the values of religious and racial tolerance among all students. The educational atmosphere in schools and universities and the involvement of all citizens and residents in education have created a cohesive and harmonious relationship between different groups which in turn have laid the foundations for tolerance and non-discrimination between social groups. 156. The State provides its nationals with opportunities to pursue higher education and to continue their studies abroad with funding from the State. The State has established several educational and cultural sections in various parts of the world to follow up on the education of its students abroad.157. A number of federal laws have been enacted, such as Federal Act No. 11 of 1972, concerning compulsory education, Federal Act No. 10 of 1972, concerning educational missions, as amended by Federal Act No. 2 of 1977, Act No. 9 of 1972, concerning private schools, Federal Act No. 4 of 1976, concerning the establishment and regulation of the University of the United Arab Emirates, as amended by Act No. 4 of 1978, Federal Decree No. 42 of 1974, concerning the establishment of nursery schools, and the Act establishing Zayed University. 158. The Constitution involves all members of society in delivering the right to education by allowing, in article 18, for the establishment of private schools and universities, as follows: “Individuals and institutions may establish private schools in accordance with the law, subject to monitoring by the competent public authorities and compliance with their guidelines.” Hence, private schools and universities with international curricula have proliferated. They provide services to different sectors of society in an atmosphere of freedom and inter-racial tolerance which is guaranteed by the State. 159. The State is bound by a number of bilateral treaties with fraternal and friendly States on education and culture, and has joined various international organizations specializing in education, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations. (UNESCO). 160. Each year, the State organizes special events to mark the occasion of International Women’s Day, Universal Children’s Day and International Workers’ Day. Commemorative mascots are handed out, the audio-visual and print media cover these events and reports are issued on the State’s accomplishments in all areas, including the promotion of human rights in society. 161. The Ministry of Education, based on the objectives of its strategy for 2007-2012, seeks to achieve a number of objectives in furtherance of the education process, including the following: Strategic objective 1: Restructure the Ministry of Education as an effective and proactive educational institution which employs highly-skilled national experts and staff, pursues decentralized decision-making policies and practices, clearly defines the relationship with educational authorities, education boards and education districts and ensures that schools are the foundation of the educational development process.
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CERD/C/ARE/12-17 page 37 Strategic objective 2: Design modern curricula and assessment methods and tools that meet international academic standards, in order to contribute to the creation of an educational environment in which students are the central focus of the education process. Strategic objective 3: Establish a modern technology infrastructure for all stages of education, and use it in the education process, while allowing schools to use it to manage and carry out their activities. Strategic objective 4: Develop human resources policies and systems in order to help improve and develop the qualitative performance of public education institutions and of education managers, teachers and other employees in the sector. Strategic objective 5: Develop and improve school buildings and facilities and supply them with equipment and resources that meet modern educational standards in order to enable schools to design and deliver curricula and planned activities. Strategic objective 6: Improve vocational development schemes and programmes for all education sector employees (managers, teachers, technicians) in order to achieve the Ministry’s goals. Strategic objective 7: Develop systems for involving parents in monitoring their children’s academic performance and for providing stakeholders in society with full information about the performance of the education system. -----
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CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32:
The meaning and scope of special measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, document CERD/C/GC/32
(24 September 2009)
UNITEDNATIONSCERDInternational Convention onthe Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination Distr.GENERAL CERD/C/GC/3224 September 2009 Original: ENGLISH COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION Seventy-fifth session 3 - 28August 2009 General recommendation No. 32 The meaning and scope of special measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination I. INTRODUCTION A. Background 1. At its seventy-first session, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“the Committee”) decided to embark upon the task of drafting a new general recommendation on special measures, in light of the difficulties observed in the understanding of such notion. At its seventy-second session, the Committee decided to hold at its next session a thematic discussion on the subject of special measures within the meaning of articles 1, paragraph 4, and 2, paragraph 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“the Convention”). The thematic discussion was held on 4 and 5 August 2008 with the participation of States parties to the Convention, representatives of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and non-governmental organizations. Following the discussion, the Committee renewed its determination to work on a general recommendation on special measures, with the objective of providing overall interpretative guidance on the meaning of the above articles in light of the provisions of the Convention as a whole.GE.09-45147
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CERD/C/GC/32page 2 2B. Principal sources 2. The general recommendation is based on the Committee’s extensive repertoire of practice referring to special measures under the Convention. Committee practice includes the concluding observations on the reports of States parties to the Convention, communications under article 14, and earlier general recommendations, in particular general recommendation No. 8 (1990) on article 1, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Convention,1 as well as general recommendation No. 27 (2000) on Discrimination against Roma and general recommendation No. 29 (2002) on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention (Descent), both of which make specific reference to special measures.23. In drafting the recommendation, the Committee has also taken account of work on special measures completed under the aegis of other United Nations human rights bodies, notably the report by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights3 and general recommendation No. 25 (2004) of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on temporary special measures.4C. Purpose 4. The purpose of the general recommendation is to provide, in the light of the Committee’s experience, practical guidance on the meaning of special measures under the Convention in order to assist States parties in the discharge of their obligations under the Convention, including reporting obligations. Such guidance may be regarded as consolidating the wealth of Committee recommendations to States parties regarding special measures. D. Methodology 5.The Convention, as the Committee has observed on many occasions, is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society. This approach makes it imperative to read its text in a context-sensitive manner. The context for the present recommendation includes, in addition to the full text of the Convention including its title, preamble and operative articles, the range of universal human rights standards on the principles of non-discrimination and special measures. Context-sensitive interpretation also includes taking into account the particular circumstances of States parties without prejudice to the universal quality of the norms of the Convention. The nature of the Convention and the broad scope of its provisions imply that, while the conscientious application of Convention principles will produce variations in outcome among States parties, such variations must be fully justifiable in the light of the principles of the Convention.1Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/45/18), chap. VII. 2 Ibid., Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/55/18), annex V. sect. C.; and Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/57/18), chap. XI, sect. F. 3 “The Concept and Practice of Affirmative Action”, Final report submitted by Mr. Marc Bossuyt, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1998/5 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/21). 4Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 38 (A/59/38), annex I.
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CERD/C/GC/32 page 3 II. EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION AS THE BASIS OFSPECIAL MEASURES A. Formal and de facto equality 6. The Convention is based on the principles of the dignity and equality of all human beings. The principle of equality underpinned by the Convention combines formal equality before the law with equal protection of the law, withsubstantive or de factoequality in the enjoyment and exercise of human rightsas the aim to be achieved by the faithful implementation of its principles.B. Direct and indirect discrimination 7. The principle of enjoyment of human rights on an equal footing is integral to the Convention’s prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin. The “grounds” of discrimination are extended in practice by the notion of “intersectionality” whereby the Committee addresses situations of double or multiple discrimination - such as discrimination on grounds of gender or religion – when discrimination on such a ground appears to exist in combination with a ground or grounds listed in article 1 of the Convention. Discrimination under the Convention includes purposive or intentional discrimination and discrimination in effect. Discrimination is constituted not simply by an unjustifiable “distinction, exclusion or restriction” but also by an unjustifiable “preference”, making it especially important that States parties distinguish “special measures” from unjustifiable preferences. 8. On the core notion of discrimination, in its general recommendation No. 30 (2004) on discrimination against non-citizens, the Committee observed that differential treatment will “constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim”.5 As a logical corollary of this principle, in its general recommendation No. 14 (1993) on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention, the Committee observes that “differentiation of treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate”.6 The term “non-discrimination” does not signify the necessity of uniform treatment when there are significant differences in situation between one person or group and another, or, in other words, if there is an objective and reasonable justification for differential treatment. To treat in an equal manner persons or groups whose situations are objectively different will constitute discrimination in effect, as will the unequal treatment of persons whose situations are objectively the same. The Committee has also observed that the application of the principle of non-discrimination requires that the characteristics of groups be taken into consideration.5 Ibid., Supplement No. 18 (A/59/18), chap. VII, para. 4. 6 Ibid., Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/48/18), chapter VIII, sect. B.
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CERD/C/GC/32page 4 4C. Scope of the principle of non-discrimination 9. The principle of non-discrimination, according to article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention, protects the enjoyment on an equal footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms “in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”. The list of human rights to which the principle applies under the Convention is not closed and extends to any field of human rights regulated by the public authorities in the State party. The reference to public life does not limit the scope of the non-discrimination principle to acts of the public administration but should be read in the light of the provisions in the Convention mandating measures by States parties to address racial discrimination “by any persons, group or organization”.710. The concepts of equality and non-discrimination in the Convention, and the obligation on States parties to achieve the objectives of the Convention, are further elaborated and developed through the provisions in articles 1, paragraph 4, and 2, paragraph 2, regarding special measures. III. THE CONCEPT OFSPECIAL MEASURES A. Objective of special measures: Advancing effective equality 11. The concept of special measures is based on the principle that laws, policies and practices adopted and implemented in order to fulfil obligations under the Convention require supplementing, when circumstances warrant, by the adoption of temporary special measures designed to secure to disadvantaged groups the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Special measures are one component in the ensemble of provisions in the Convention dedicated to the objective of eliminating racial discrimination, the successful achievement of which will require the faithful implementation of all Convention provisions. B. Autonomous meaning of special measures 12. The terms “special measures” and “special and concrete measures” employed in the Convention may be regarded as functionally equivalent and have an autonomous meaning to be interpreted in the light of the Convention as a whole, which may differ from usage in particular States parties. The term “special measures” includes also measures that in some countries may be described as “affirmative measures”, “affirmative action” or “positive action” in cases where they correspond to the provisions of articles 1, paragraph 4, and 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention, as explained in the following paragraphs. In line with the Convention, the present recommendation employs the terms “special measures” or “special and concrete measures” and encourages States parties to employ terminology that clearly demonstrates the relationship of their laws and practice to these concepts in the Convention. The term “positive discrimination” is, in the context of international human rights standards, a contradictio in terminis and should be avoided.7 Article 2, paragraph 1 (d); see also article 2, paragraph 1 (b).
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CERD/C/GC/32 page 5 13. “Measures” include the full span of legislative, executive, administrative, budgetary and regulatory instruments, at every level in the State apparatus, as well as plans, policies, programmes and preferential regimesin areas such as employment, housing, education, culture and participation in public lifefor disfavoured groups, devised and implemented on the basis of such instruments. States parties should include, as required in order to fulfil their obligations under the Convention, provisions on special measures in their legal systems, whether through general legislation or legislation directed to specific sectors in the light of the range of human rights referred to in article 5 of the Convention, and through plans, programmes and other policy initiatives referred to above at national, regional and local levels.C. Special measures and other related notions 14. The obligation to take special measures is distinct from the general positive obligation of States parties to the Convention to secure human rights and fundamental freedoms on a non-discriminatory basis to persons and groups subject to their jurisdiction; this is a general obligation flowing from the provisions of the Convention as a whole and integral to all parts of the Convention.15. Special measures should not be confused with specific rights pertaining to certain categories of person or community, such as, for example the rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture, profess and practise their own religion and use their own language, the rights of indigenous peoples, including rights to lands traditionally occupied by them, and rights of women to non-identical treatment with men, such as the provision of maternity leave, on account of biological differences from men.8 Such rights are permanent rights, recognized as such in human rights instruments, including those adopted in the context of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. States parties should carefully observe distinctions between special measures and permanent human rights in their law and practice. The distinction between special measures and permanent rights implies that those entitled to permanent rights may also enjoy the benefits of special measures.9D. Conditions for the adoption and implementation of special measures 16. Special measures should be appropriate to the situation to be remedied, be legitimate, necessary in a democratic society, respect the principles of fairness and proportionality, and be temporary. The measures should be designed and implemented on the basis of need, grounded in a realistic appraisal of the current situation of the individuals and communities concerned.17. Appraisals of the need for special measures should be carried out on the basis of accurate data, disaggregated by race, colour, descent and ethnic or national origin and incorporating a gender perspective, on the socio-economic and cultural10 status and conditions of the various 8 See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation 25 (note 4 above), paragraph 16. 9 See for example paragraph 19 of general recommendation 25 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (note 4 above), and paragraph 12 of the Recommendations of the Forum on Minority Issues on rights to education (A/HRC/10/11/Add.1). 10 Article 2, paragraph 2, includes the term “cultural” as well as “social” and “economic”.
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CERD/C/GC/32page 6 6groups in the population and their participation in the social and economic development of the country.18. States parties should ensure that special measures are designed and implemented on the basis of prior consultation with affected communities and the active participation of such communities. IV. CONVENTION PROVISIONS ON SPECIAL MEASURES A. Article 1, paragraph 4 19. Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention stipulates that “special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved”. 20. By employing the phrase “shall not be deemed racial discrimination”, article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention makes it clear that special measures taken by States parties under the terms of the Convention do not constitute discrimination, a clarification reinforced by the travaux préparatoires of the Convention which record the drafting change from “should not be deemed racial discrimination” to “shall not be deemed racial discrimination”. Accordingly, special measures are not an exception to the principle of non-discrimination but are integral to its meaning and essential to the Convention project of eliminating racial discrimination and advancing human dignity and effective equality.21. In order to conform to the Convention, special measures do not amount to discrimination when taken for the “sole purpose” of ensuring equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such a motivation should be made apparent from the nature of the measures themselves, the arguments used by the authorities to justify the measures and the instruments designed to put the measures into effect. The reference to “sole purpose” limits the scope of acceptable motivations for special measures within the terms of the Convention. 22. The notion of “adequate advancement” in article 1, paragraph 4, implies goal-directed programmes which have the objective of alleviating and remedying disparities in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms affecting particular groups and individuals, protecting them from discrimination. Such disparities include but are not confined to persistent or structural disparities and de facto inequalitiesresulting from the circumstances of history that continue to deny to vulnerable groups and individuals the advantages essential for the full development of the human personality. It is not necessary to prove “historic” discrimination in order to validate a programme of special measures; the emphasis should be placed on correcting present disparities and on preventing further imbalances from arising. Annex 112
CERD/C/GC/32 page 7 23. The term “protection” in the same paragraph signifies protection from violations of human rights emanating from any source, including discriminatory activities of private persons, in order to ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The term “protection” also indicates that special measures may have preventive (of human rights violations) as well as corrective functions. 24. Although the Convention designates “racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring … protection” (article 1, paragraph 4), and “racial groups or individuals belonging to them” (article 2, paragraph 2), as the beneficiaries of special measures, the measures shall in principle be available to any group or person covered by article 1 of the Convention, as clearly indicated by thetravaux préparatoires of the Convention, as well as by the practice of States parties and the relevant concluding observations of the Committee.1125. Article 1, paragraph 4, is expressed more broadly than article 2, paragraph 2, in that it refers to individuals “requiring … protection” without reference to ethnic group membership. The span of potential beneficiaries or addressees of special measures should however be understood in the light of the overall objective of the Convention as dedicated to the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, with special measures as an essential tool, where appropriate, for the achievement of this objective.26. Article 1, paragraph 4, provides for limitations on the employment of special measures by States parties. The first limitation is that the measures “should not lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups”. This provision is narrowly drawn to refer to “racial groups” and calls to mind the practice of Apartheid referred to in article 3 of the Convention, which was imposed by the authorities of the State, and to practices of segregation referred to in that article and in the preamble to the Convention. The notion of inadmissible “separate rights” must be distinguished from rights accepted and recognized by the international community to secure the existence and identity of groups such as minorities, indigenous peoples and other categories of person whose rights are similarly accepted and recognized within the framework of universal human rights. 27. The second limitation on special measures is that “they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they have been taken have been achieved”. This limitation on the operation of special measures is essentially functional and goal-related: the measures should cease to be applied when the objectives for which they were employed – the equality goals – have been sustainably achieved.12 The length of time permitted for the duration of the measures will vary in the light of their objectives, the means utilized to achieve them, and the results of their application. Special measures should, therefore, be carefully tailored to meet the particular needs of the groups or individuals concerned. 11 See also paragraph 7 above. 12 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 20 (2009) on Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paragraph 9.
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CERD/C/GC/32page 8 8B. Article 2, paragraph 2 28. Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention stipulates that “States parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved”. 29. Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention is essentially a clarification of the meaning of discrimination when applied to special measures. Article 2, paragraph 2, carries forward the special measures concept into the realm of obligations of States parties, along with the text of article 2 as a whole. Nuances of difference in the use of terms in the two paragraphs do not disturb their essential unity of concept and purpose. 30. The use in the paragraph of the verb “shall” in relation to taking special measures clearly indicates the mandatory nature of the obligation to take such measures. The mandatory nature of the obligation is not weakened by the addition of the phrase “when the circumstances so warrant”, a phrase that should be read as providing context for the application of the measures. The phrase has, in principle, an objective meaning in relation to the disparate enjoyment of human rights by persons and groups in the State party and the ensuing need to correct such imbalances. 31. The internal structure of States parties, whether unitary, federal or decentralized, does not affect their responsibility under the Convention, when resorting to special measures, to secure their application throughout the territory of the State. In federal or decentralized States, the federal authorities shall be internationally responsible for designing a framework for the consistent application of special measures in all parts of the State where such measures are necessary.32. Whereas article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention uses the term “special measures”, article 2, paragraph 2, refers to “special and concrete measures”. The travaux préparatoires of the Convention do not highlight any distinction between the terms and the Committee has generally employed both terms as synonymous.13 Bearing in mind the context of article 2 as a broad statement of obligations under the Convention, the terminology employed in article 2, paragraph 2, is appropriate to its context in focusing on the obligation of States parties to adopt measures tailored to fit the situations to be remedied and capable of achieving their objectives.33. The reference in article 2, paragraph 2, regarding the objective of special measures to ensure “adequate development and protection” of groups and individuals may be compared with the use of the term “advancement” in article 1, paragraph 4. The terms of the Convention signify that special measures should clearly benefit groups and individuals in their enjoyment of human rights.The naming of fields of action in the paragraph – “social, economic, cultural and other 13 The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination referred, in article 2, paragraph 3, to ‘special and concrete measures’ (General Assembly resolution 1904 (XVIII)). See also paragraph 12 above.
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CERD/C/GC/32 page 9 fields” – does not describe a closed list. In principle, special measures can reach into all fields of human rights deprivation, including deprivation of the enjoyment of any human rights expressly or impliedly protected by article 5 of the Convention. In all cases, it is clear that the reference to limitations of “development” relates only to the situation or condition in which groups or individuals find themselves and is not a reflection on any individual or group characteristic. 34.Beneficiaries of special measuresunder article 2, paragraph 2, may be groups or individuals belonging to such groups. The advancement and protection of communities through special measures is a legitimate objective to be pursued in tandem with respect for the rights and interests of individuals. The identification of an individual as belonging to a group should be based on self-identification by the individual concerned, unless a justification exists to the contrary.35. Provisions on the limitations of special measures in article 2, paragraph 2, are in essence the same, mutatis mutandis, as those expressed in article 1, paragraph 4. The requirement to limit the period for which the measures are taken implies the need, as in the design and initiation of the measures, for a continuing, system of monitoring their application and results using, as appropriate, quantitative and qualitative methods of appraisal. States parties should also carefully determine whether negative human rights consequences would arise for beneficiary communities consequent upon an abrupt withdrawal of special measures, especially if such have been established for a lengthy period of time. V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF REPORTS BY STATES PARTIES 36. The present guidance on the content of reports confirms and amplifies the guidance provided to States parties in the Harmonized guidelines on reporting under the international human rights treaties, including guidelines on a common core document and treaty-specific documents (HRI/MC/2006/3) and the Guidelines for the CERD-specific document to be submitted by States parties under article 9, paragraph 1, of the Convention (CERD/C/2007/1). 37. Reports of States parties should describe special measures in relation to any articles of the Convention to which the measures are related. The reports of States parties should also provide information, as appropriate, on: •The terminology applied to special measures as understood in the Convention •The justifications for special measures, including relevant statistical and other data on the general situation of beneficiaries, a brief account of how the disparities to be remedied have arisen, and the results to be expected from the application of measures •The intended beneficiaries of the measures •The range of consultations undertaken towards the adoption of the measures including consultations with intended beneficiaries and with civil society generally •The nature of the measures and how they promote the advancement, development and protection of groups and individuals concerned •The fields of action or sectors where special measures have been adopted •Where possible, the envisaged duration of the measures •The institutions in the State responsible for implementing the measures
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CERD/C/GC/32page 10 10•The available mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of the measures •Participation by targeted groups and individuals in the implementing institutions and in monitoring and evaluation processes •The results, provisional or otherwise, of the application of the measures •Plans for the adoption of new measures and the justifications thereof •Information on reasons why, in the light of situations that appear to justify the adoption of measures, such measures have not been taken. 38. In cases where a reservation affecting Convention provisions on special measures is maintained, States parties are invited to provide information as to why such a reservation is considered necessary, the nature and scope of the reservation, its precise effects in terms of national law and policy, and any plans to limit or withdraw the reservation within a specified time frame. In cases where States parties have adopted special measures despite the reservation, they are invited to provide information on such measures in line with the recommendations in paragraph 37 above.- - - - -
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CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35: Combating racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (26 September 2013)
GE.13-47138 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination General recommendation No. 35Combating racist hate speech*I.Introduction1. At its eightieth session, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the Committee) decided to hold a thematic discussion on racist hate speech during its eighty-first session. The discussion took place on 28 August 2012 and focused on understanding the causes and consequences of racist hate speech, and how the resources of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the Convention) may be mobilized to combat it. Participants in the discussion included, in addition to members of the Committee, representatives from permanent missions to the United Nations Office in Geneva, national human rights institutions, non-governmental organizations, academics and interested individuals. 2. Following the discussion, the Committee expressed its intention to work on drafting a general recommendation to provide guidance on the requirements of the Convention in the area of racist hate speech in order to assist States parties in discharging their obligations, including reporting obligations. The present general recommendation is of relevance to all stakeholders in the fight against racial discrimination, and seeks to contribute to the promotion of understanding, lasting peace and security among communities, peoples and States. Approach adopted3. In drafting the recommendation, the Committee has taken account of its extensive practice in combating racist hate speech, concern about which has engaged the full span of procedures under the Convention. The Committee has also underlined the role of racist hate speech in processes leading to mass violations of human rights and genocide, and in conflict situations. Key general recommendations of the Committee that address hate speech include general recommendations No. 7 (1985) relating to the implementation of article 4;1 No. 15 (1993) on article 4, which stressed the compatibility between article 4 and * Adopted by the Committee at its eighty-third session (12–30 August 2013). 1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/40/18), chap. VII, sect. B. United NationsCERD/C/GC/35 International Convention onthe Elimination of All Formsof Racial Discrimination Distr.: General 26 September 2013 Original: English
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CERD/C/GC/352 the right to freedom of expression;2 No. 25 (2000) on gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination;3 No. 27 (2000) on discrimination against Roma;4 No. 29 (2002) on descent;5 No. 30 (2004) on discrimination against non-citizens;6 No. 31 (2005) on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system;7 and No. 34 (2011) on racial discrimination against people of African descent.8 Many general recommendations adopted by the Committee relate directly or indirectly to hate speech issues, bearing in mind that effectively combating racist hate speech involves the mobilization of the full normative and procedural resources of the Convention. 4. By virtue of its work in implementing the Convention as a living instrument, the Committee engages with the wider human rights environment, awareness of which suffuses the Convention. In gauging the scope of freedom of expression, it should be recalled that the right is integrated into the Convention and is not simply articulated outside it: the principles of the Convention contribute to a fuller understanding of the parameters of the right in contemporary international human rights law. The Committee has integrated this right to freedom of expression into its work on combating hate speech, commenting where appropriate on its lack of effective implementation and, where necessary, drawing upon its elaboration in sister human rights bodies.9 II.Racist hate speech5. The drafters of the Convention were acutely aware of the contribution of speech to creating a climate of racial hatred and discrimination, and reflected at length on the dangers it posed. In the Convention, racism is referred to only in the context of “racist doctrines and practices” in the preamble, a phrase closely linked to the condemnation in article 4 of dissemination of ideas of racial superiority. While the term hate speech is not explicitly used in the Convention, this lack of explicit reference has not impeded the Committee from identifying and naming hate speech phenomena and exploring the relationship between speech practices and the standards of the Convention. The present recommendation focuses on the ensemble of Convention provisions that cumulatively enable the identification of expression that constitutes hate speech. 6. Racist hate speech addressed in Committee practice has included all the specific speech forms referred to in article 4 directed against groups recognized in article 1 of the Convention — which forbids discrimination on grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin — such as indigenous peoples, descent-based groups, and immigrants or non-citizens, including migrant domestic workers, refugees and asylum seekers, as well as speech directed against women members of these and other vulnerable groups. In the light of the principle of intersectionality, and bearing in mind that “criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine or tenets of faith” should not be prohibited or punished,10 the Committee’s attention has also been engaged by hate speech targeting 2 Ibid.,Forty-eighth Session,Supplement No. 18 (A/48/18), chap. VIII, sect. B, para. 4. 3 Ibid.,Fifty-fifth Session,Supplement No. 18 (A/55/18), annex V, sect. A. 4 Ibid.,annex V, sect. C. 5 Ibid.,Fifty-seventh Session,Supplement No. 18 (A/57/18), chap. XI, sect. F. 6 Ibid.,Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/59/18), chap. VIII. 7 Ibid.,Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/60/18), chap. IX. 8 Ibid.,Sixty-sixth Session,Supplement No. 18 (A/66/18), annex IX. 9 Notably Human Rights Committee general comment No. 34 (2011) on freedoms of opinion and expression (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 40, vol. I (A/66/40 (Vol. I)), annex V). 10 Ibid., para. 48.
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CERD/C/GC/35 3persons belonging to certain ethnic groups who profess or practice a religion different from the majority, including expressions of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and other similar manifestations of hatred against ethno-religious groups, as well as extreme manifestations of hatred such as incitement to genocide and to terrorism. Stereotyping and stigmatization of members of protected groups has also been the subject of expressions of concern and recommendations adopted by the Committee. 7. Racist hate speech can take many forms and is not confined to explicitly racial remarks. As is the case with discrimination under article 1, speech attacking particular racial or ethnic groups may employ indirect language in order to disguise its targets and objectives. In line with their obligations under the Convention, States parties should give due attention to all manifestations of racist hate speech and take effective measures to combat them. The principles articulated in the present recommendation apply to racist hate speech, whether emanating from individuals or groups, in whatever forms it manifests itself, orally or in print, or disseminated through electronic media, including the Internet and social networking sites, as well as non-verbal forms of expression such as the display of racist symbols, images and behaviour at public gatherings, including sporting events. III.Resources of the Convention8. The identification and combating of hate speech practices is integral to the achievement of the objectives of the Convention — which is dedicated to the elimination of racial discrimination in all its forms. While article 4 of the Convention has functioned as the principal vehicle for combating hate speech, other articles in the Convention make distinctive contributions to fulfilling its objectives. The due regard clause in article 4 explicitly links that article with article 5, which guarantees the right to equality before the law, without racial discrimination in the enjoyment of rights, including the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Article 7 highlights the role of “teaching, education, culture and information” in the promotion of interethnic understanding and tolerance. Article 2 incorporates the undertaking by States parties to eliminate racial discrimination, obligations that receive their widest expression in article 2, paragraph 1 (d). Article 6 focuses on securing effective protection and remedies for victims of racial discrimination and the right to seek “just and adequate reparation or satisfaction” for damage suffered. The present recommendation focuses principally on articles 4, 5 and 7 of the Convention. 9. As a minimum requirement, and without prejudice to further measures, comprehensive legislation against racial discrimination, including civil and administrative law as well as criminal law, is indispensable to combating racist hate speech effectively. Article 410. The chapeau of article 4 incorporates the obligation to take “immediate and positive measures” to eradicate incitement and discrimination, a stipulation that complements and reinforces obligations under other articles of the Convention to dedicate the widest possible range of resources to the eradication of hate speech. In general recommendation No. 32 (2009) on the meaning and scope of special measures in the Convention, the Committee summarized “measures” as comprising “legislative, executive, administrative, budgetary and regulatory instruments…as well as plans, policies, programmes and…regimes”.11 The Committee recalls the mandatory nature of article 4, and observes that during the adoption 11 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/64/18), annex VIII, para. 13. Annex 113
CERD/C/GC/354 of the Convention, it “was regarded as central to the struggle against racial discrimination”,12 an evaluation which has been maintained in Committee practice. Article 4 comprises elements relating to speech and the organizational context for the production of speech, serves the functions of prevention and deterrence, and provides for sanctions when deterrence fails. The article also has an expressive function in underlining the international community’s abhorrence of racist hate speech, understood as a form of other-directed speech which rejects the core human rights principles of human dignity and equality and seeks to degrade the standing of individuals and groups in the estimation of society. 11. In the chapeau and subparagraph (a), regarding “ideas or theories of superiority” or “racial superiority or hatred” respectively, the term “based on” is employed to characterize speech impugned by the Convention. The term is understood by the Committee in the context of article 1 as equivalent to “on the grounds of”13 and in principle holds the same meaning for article 4. The provisions on dissemination of ideas of racial superiority are a forthright expression of the preventive function of the Convention and are an important complement to the provisions on incitement. 12. The Committee recommends that the criminalization of forms of racist expression should be reserved for serious cases, to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, while less serious cases should be addressed by means other than criminal law, taking into account, inter alia, the nature and extent of the impact on targeted persons and groups. The application of criminal sanctions should be governed by principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.14 13. As article 4 is not self-executing, States parties are required by its terms to adopt legislation to combat racist hate speech that falls within its scope. In the light of the provisions of the Convention and the elaboration of its principles in general recommendation No. 15 and the present recommendation, the Committee recommends that the States parties declare and effectively sanction as offences punishable by law: (a) All dissemination of ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred, by whatever means;(b) Incitement to hatred, contempt or discrimination against members of a group on grounds of their race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin; (c) Threats or incitement to violence against persons or groups on the grounds in (b) above; (d) Expression of insults, ridicule or slander of persons or groups or justification of hatred, contempt or discrimination on the grounds in (b) above, when it clearly amounts to incitement to hatred or discrimination; (e) Participation in organizations and activities which promote and incite racial discrimination. 14. The Committee recommends that public denials or attempts to justify crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined by international law, should be declared as offences punishable by law, provided that they clearly constitute incitement to racial 12 General recommendation No. 15, para. 1. 13 The latter phrase is employed in the seventh preambular paragraph of the Convention. See also paragraph 1 of general recommendation No. 14 (1993) on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention (Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/48/18), chap. VIII, sect. B). 14 Human Rights Committee general comment No. 34, paras. 22- 25; 33-35. Annex 113
CERD/C/GC/35 5violence or hatred. The Committee also underlines that “the expression of opinions about historical facts” should not be prohibited or punished.15 15. While article 4 requires that certain forms of conduct be declared offences punishable by law, it does not supply detailed guidance for the qualification of forms of conduct as criminal offences. On the qualification of dissemination and incitement as offences punishable by law, the Committee considers that the following contextual factors should be taken into account: •The content and form of speech: whether the speech is provocative and direct, in what form it is constructed and disseminated, and the style in which it is delivered. •The economic, social and political climate prevalent at the time the speech was made and disseminated, including the existence of patterns of discrimination against ethnic and other groups, including indigenous peoples. Discourses which in one context are innocuous or neutral may take on a dangerous significance in another: in its indicators on genocide the Committee emphasized the relevance of locality in appraising the meaning and potential effects of racist hate speech.16•The position or status of the speaker in society and the audience to which the speech is directed. The Committee consistently draws attention to the role of politicians and other public opinion-formers in contributing to the creation of a negative climate towards groups protected by the Convention, and has encouraged such persons and bodies to adopt positive approaches directed to the promotion of intercultural understanding and harmony. The Committee is aware of the special importance of freedom of speech in political matters and also that its exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. •The reach of the speech, including the nature of the audience and the means of transmission: whether the speech was disseminated through mainstream media or the Internet, and the frequency and extent of the communication, in particular when repetition suggests the existence of a deliberate strategy to engender hostility towards ethnic and racial groups. •The objectives of the speech:speech protecting or defending the human rights of individuals and groups should not be subject to criminal or other sanctions.17 16. Incitement characteristically seeks to influence others to engage in certain forms of conduct, including the commission of crime, through advocacy or threats. Incitement may be express or implied, through actions such as displays of racist symbols or distribution of materials as well as words. The notion of incitement as an inchoate crime does not require that the incitement has been acted upon, but in regulating the forms of incitement referred to in article 4, States parties should take into account, as important elements in the incitement offences, in addition to the considerations outlined in paragraph 14 above, the intention of the speaker, and the imminent risk or likelihood that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will result from the speech in question, considerations which also apply to the other offences listed in paragraph 13.18 15 Ibid., para. 49. 16 Decision on follow-up to the declaration on the prevention of genocide: indicators of patterns of systematic and massive racial discrimination, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/60/18), chap. II, para. 20. 17 Adapted from the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, para. 22. 18 Human Rights Committee general comment No. 34, para. 35; Rabat Plan of Action, para. 22. Annex 113
CERD/C/GC/356 17. The Committee reiterates that it is not enough to declare the forms of conduct in article 4 as offences; the provisions of the article must also be effectively implemented. Effective implementation is characteristically achieved through investigations of offences set out in the Convention and, where appropriate, the prosecution of offenders. The Committee recognizes the principle of expediency in the prosecution of alleged offenders, and observes that it must in each case be applied in the light of the guarantees laid down in the Convention and in other instruments of international law. In this and other respects under the Convention, the Committee recalls that it is not its function to review the interpretation of facts and national law made by domestic authorities, unless the decisions are manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 18. Independent, impartial and informed judicial bodies are crucial to ensuring that the facts and legal qualifications of individual cases are assessed consistently with international standards of human rights. Judicial infrastructures should be complemented in this respect by national human rights institutions in accordance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles).19 19. Article 4 requires that measures to eliminate incitement and discrimination must be made with due regard to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention. The phrase due regard implies that, in the creation and application of offences, as well as fulfilling the other requirements of article 4, the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights in article 5 must be given appropriate weight in decision-making processes. The due regard clause has been interpreted by the Committee to apply to human rights and freedoms as a whole, and not simply to freedom of opinion and expression,20 which should however be borne in mind as the most pertinent reference principle when calibrating the legitimacy of speech restrictions. 20. The Committee observes with concern that broad or vague restrictions on freedom of speech have been used to the detriment of groups protected by the Convention. States parties should formulate restrictions on speech with sufficient precision, according to the standards in the Convention as elaborated in the present recommendation. The Committee stresses that measures to monitor and combat racist speech should not be used as a pretext to curtail expressions of protest at injustice, social discontent or opposition. 21. The Committee underlines that article 4 (b) requires that racist organizations which promote and incite racial discrimination be declared illegal and prohibited. The Committee understands that the reference to “organized…propaganda activities” implicates improvised forms of organization or networks, and that “all other propaganda activities” may be taken to refer to unorganized or spontaneous promotion and incitement of racial discrimination. 22. Under the terms of article 4 (c) regarding public authorities or public institutions, racist expressions emanating from such authorities or institutions are regarded by the Committee as of particular concern, especially statements attributed to high-ranking officials. Without prejudice to the application of the offences in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 4, which apply to public officials as well as to all others, the “immediate and positive measures” referred to in the chapeau may additionally include measures of a disciplinary nature, such as removal from office, where appropriate, as well as effective remedies for victims. 19 General recommendation No. 31, para. 5 (j). 20 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, communication No. 30/2003, The Jewish communityof Osloet al.v Norway, opinion adopted on 15 August 2005, para. 10.5. Annex 113
CERD/C/GC/35 723. As part of its standard practice, the Committee recommends that States parties which have made reservations to the Convention withdraw them. In cases where a reservation affecting Convention provisions on racist speech is maintained, States parties are invited to provide information as to why such a reservation is considered necessary, the nature and scope of the reservation, its precise effects in terms of national law and policy, and any plans to limit or withdraw the reservation within a specified time frame.21 Article 524. Article 5 of the Convention enshrines the obligation of States parties to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 25. The Committee considers that the expression of ideas and opinions made in the context of academic debates, political engagement or similar activity, and without incitement to hatred, contempt, violence or discrimination, should be regarded as legitimate exercises of the right to freedom of expression, even when such ideas are controversial. 26. In addition to its inclusion in article 5, freedom of opinion and expression is recognized as a fundamental right in a broad range of international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirm that everyone has the right to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds through any media and regardless of frontiers.22 The right to freedom of expression is not unlimited but carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but only if they are provided by law and are necessary for protection of the rights or reputations of others and for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.23 Freedom of expression should not aim at the destruction of the rights and freedoms of others, including the right to equality and non-discrimination.2427. The Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference affirm the positive role of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in combating racial hatred.25 28. In addition to underpinning and safeguarding the exercise of other rights and freedoms, freedom of opinion and expression has particular salience in the context of the Convention. The protection of persons from racist hate speech is not simply one of opposition between the right to freedom of expression and its restriction for the benefit of protected groups; the persons and groups entitled to the protection of the Convention also enjoy the right to freedom of expression and freedom from racial discrimination in the exercise of that right. Racist hate speech potentially silences the free speech of its victims. 29.Freedom of expression, indispensable for the articulation of human rights and the dissemination of knowledge regarding the state of enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, assists vulnerable groups in redressing the balance of power 21 Adapted from the Committee’s general recommendation No. 32, para. 38. 22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19. 23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, para. 3. 24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 30. 25 Durban Declaration, para. 90; outcome document of the Durban Review Conference (A/CONF.211/8), paras. 54 and 58. Annex 113
CERD/C/GC/358 among the components of society, promotes intercultural understanding and tolerance, assists in the deconstruction of racial stereotypes, facilitates the free exchange of ideas, and offers alternative views and counterpoints. States parties should adopt policies empowering all groups within the purview of the Convention to exercise their right to freedom of expression.26 Article 730. Whereas the provisions of article 4 on dissemination of ideas attempt to discourage the flow of racist ideas upstream, and the provisions on incitement address their downstream effects, article 7 addresses the root causes of hate speech, and represents a further illustration of the “appropriate means” to eliminate racial discrimination envisaged in article 2, paragraph 1 (d). The importance of article 7 has not diminished over time: its broadly educational approach to eliminating racial discrimination is an indispensable complement to other approaches to combating racial discrimination. Because racism can be the product of, inter alia, indoctrination or inadequate education, especially effective antidotes to racist hate speech include education for tolerance, and counter-speech. 31. Under article 7, States parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnic groups, as well as to propagating universal human rights principles, including those of the Convention. Article 7 is phrased in the same mandatory language as other articles in the Convention, and the fields of activity — “teaching, education, culture and information” — are not expressed as exhaustive of the undertakings required. 32. The school systems in States parties represent an important focus for the dissemination of human rights information and perspectives. School curricula, textbooks and teaching materials should be informed by and address human rights themes and seek to promote mutual respect and tolerance among nations and racial and ethnic groups. 33. Appropriate educational strategies in line with the requirements of article 7 include intercultural education, including intercultural bilingual education, based on equality of respect and esteem and genuine mutuality, supported by adequate human and financial resources. Programmes of intercultural education should represent a genuine balance of interests and should not function in intention or effect as vehicles of cultural assimilation. 34. Measures should be adopted in the field of education aimed at encouraging knowledge of the history, culture and traditions of “racial or ethnical”27 groups present in the State party, including indigenous peoples and persons of African descent. Educational materials should, in the interests of promoting mutual respect and understanding, endeavour to highlight the contribution of all groups to the social, economic and cultural enrichment of the national identity and to national, economic and social progress. 35. In order to promote inter-ethnic understanding, balanced and objective representations of history are essential, and, where atrocities have been committed against groups of the population, days of remembrance and other public events should be held, where appropriate in context, to recall such human tragedies, as well as celebrations of successful resolution of conflicts. Truth and reconciliation commissions can also play a 26 Adapted from the Rabat Plan of Action, para. 25. 27 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 7. Annex 113
CERD/C/GC/35 9vital role in countering the persistence of racial hatred and facilitating the development of a climate of inter-ethnic tolerance.28 36. Information campaigns and educational policies calling attention to the harms produced by racist hate speech should engage the general public; civil society, including religious and community associations; parliamentarians and other politicians; educational professionals; public administration personnel; police and other bodies dealing with public order; and legal personnel, including the judiciary. The Committee draws the attention of States parties to general recommendation No. 13 (1993) on the training of law enforcement officials in the protection of human rights29 and to general recommendation No. 31 (2005) on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system. In these and other cases, familiarization with international norms protecting freedom of opinion and expression and norms protecting against racist hate speech is essential. 37. Formal rejection of hate speech by high-level public officials and condemnation of the hateful ideas expressed play an important role in promoting a culture of tolerance and respect. The promotion of intercultural dialogue through a culture of public discourse and institutional instruments of dialogue, and the promotion of equal opportunities in all aspects of society are of equal value to educational methodologies and should be encouraged in a vigorous manner. 38. The Committee recommends that educational, cultural and informational strategies to combat racist hate speech should be underpinned by systematic data collection and analysis in order to assess the circumstances under which hate speech emerges, the audiences reached or targeted, the means by which they are reached, and media responses to hate messages. International cooperation in this area helps to increase not only the possibilities of comparability of data but also knowledge of and the means to combat hate speech that transcends national boundaries. 39. Informed, ethical and objective media, including social media and the Internet, have an essential role in promoting responsibility in the dissemination of ideas and opinions. In addition to putting in place appropriate legislation for the media in line with international standards, States parties should encourage the public and private media to adopt codes of professional ethics and press codes that incorporate respect for the principles of the Convention and other fundamental human rights standards. 40. Media representations of ethnic, indigenous and other groups within the purview of article 1 of the Convention should be based on principles of respect, fairness and the avoidance of stereotyping. Media should avoid referring unnecessarily to race, ethnicity, religion and other group characteristics in a manner that may promote intolerance. 41. The principles of the Convention are served by encouraging media pluralism, including facilitation of access to and ownership of media by minority, indigenous and other groups in the purview of the Convention, including media in their own languages. Local empowerment through media pluralism facilitates the emergence of speech capable of countering racist hate speech. 28 Adapted from the Rabat Plan of Action, para. 27. 29 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/48/18), chap. VIII, sect. B. Annex 113
CERD/C/GC/3510 42. The Committee encourages self-regulation and compliance with codes of ethics by Internet service providers, as underlined in the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.30 43.The Committee encourages States parties to work with sports associations to eradicate racism in all sporting disciplines.44.With particular reference to the Convention, States parties should disseminate knowledge of its standards and procedures, and provide associated training, particularly for those concerned with its implementation, including civil servants, the judiciary and law enforcement officials. The concluding observations of the Committee should be made widely available in the official and other commonly used languages at the conclusion of the examination of the report of the State party; opinions of the Committee under the article 14 communications procedure should similarly be made available. IV.General45. The relationship between proscription of racist hate speech and the flourishing of freedom of expression should be seen as complementary and not the expression of a zero sum game where the priority given to one necessitates the diminution of the other. The rights to equality and freedom from discrimination, and the right to freedom of expression, should be fully reflected in law, policy and practice as mutually supportive human rights. 46. The prevalence of racist hate speech in all regions of the world continues to represent a significant contemporary challenge for human rights. The faithful implementation of the Convention as a whole, integrated into wider global efforts to counter hate speech phenomena, represents the best hope of translating the vision of a society free from intolerance and hatred into a living reality and promoting a culture of respect for universal human rights. 47. The Committee regards the adoption by States parties of targets and monitoring procedures to support laws and policies combating racist hate speech to be of the utmost importance. States parties are urged to include measures against racist hate speech in national plans of action against racism, integration strategies and national human rights plans and programmes. 30 Durban Programme of Action, para. 147. Annex 113
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CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, document CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017)
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State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates,
ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response of the United Arab Emirates (7 August 2018)
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Before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination RESPONSE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES To the Communication dated 8 March 2018 Submitted by the State of Qatar Pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination Submitted to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office, Geneva, Switzerland 7 August 2018
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2 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................3 QATARI NATIONALS WERE NOT EXPELLED FROM THE UAE ...............................6 THERE IS NO TRAVEL BAN RELATING TO QATARI NATIONALS ..........................7 QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATION OF OTHER RIGHTS RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CERD LACK MERIT........................................................8 A. Right to Marriage and Choice of Spouse .................................................................9 B. Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression .......................................................10 C. Right to Health and Right to Medical Treatment ...................................................12 D. Right to Education .................................................................................................13 E. Right to Work .........................................................................................................14 F. Right to Property ....................................................................................................14 G. Right to Equal Treatment before Tribunals ............................................................16 QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY DIRECT EVIDENCE........................................................................................................................16 A. The Qatari Committee Reports ..............................................................................17 B. Reports by Various Human Rights Bodies .............................................................19 STATEMENT OF LAW .....................................................................................................22 A. Substantive and Procedural Defects in Qatar’s Submission ..................................22 B. There is no Violation of the Convention ................................................................23 ICJ PROCEEDINGS .........................................................................................................25 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................25 Annex 115
3 This Response is submitted by the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD” or “Convention”). This Response addresses the allegations made by the State of Qatar (“Qatar”) in its 8 March 2018 communication (“Submission”) to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“Committee”). A copy of Qatar’s Submission was communicated to the United Arab Emirates on 7 May 2018 by the Secretary General of the United Nations (High Commissioner for Human Rights). INTRODUCTION 1. Qatar alleges in its Submission that the UAE has violated the Convention by virtue of certain measures that it has taken following the UAE’s termination of relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017. Qatar’s complaint misrepresents the facts and the actions taken by the UAE, as well as the circumstances resulting in the UAE’s termination of relations with Qatar. Furthermore, Qatar’s complaint does not fall within the scope of CERD Article 11 because: (i) it does not involve a situation in which a “State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention,” as the UAE did not expel Qatari citizens and therefore did not deny them any protections provided for in the Convention; (ii) the UAE did not enforce the portion of the 5 June 2017 announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (“MoFA”) calling on Qatari citizens to depart UAE territory; the UAE has since made clear that Qatari citizens resident in the UAE may remain in the country and non-resident Qatari citizens can apply to enter the UAE; and (iii) Qatar has not shown that UAE domestic remedies available to Qatari citizens have been exhausted as required by CERD Article 11(3). 2. This Response first details why, contrary to Qatar’s claims, there has been no mass expulsion of Qatari citizens from the UAE. The announcement of 5 June 2017 by MoFA did not constitute an order for deportation. Under UAE law, only the Ministry of Interior has the authority to issue orders for deportation. Subsequent to the 5 June 2017 announcement, neither did the UAE Ministry of Interior issue any such orders, nor did the UAE issue any other legislation or regulations to deport Qatari citizens. Further, the UAE took no other action to compel Qataris to leave the UAE. On the contrary, as discussed in more detail in Section II of this Response, official UAE immigration records indicate that Qatari nationals remained in the UAE in overwhelming numbers and that Qatari nationals continue to reside in and visit the UAE in substantially the same numbers as they did prior to the break in relations. 3. The UAE has also not instituted a travel ban against Qataris who wish to enter the UAE. Instead, the UAE established a new requirement that Qatari nationals request permission to enter the UAE, which is a common requirement that States impose routinely on visitors to their territory of various nationalities. Section III of this Response provides information about this requirement, including official data showing that the majority of applications to enter or re-enter the UAE submitted by Qatari nationals have been approved. Indeed, given Qatar’s misstatement of the facts, MoFA made an announcement on 5 July 2018 clarifying that there was never a legal order deporting Qatari citizens from the UAE and that any Qatari citizen Annex 115
4 could apply to enter the UAE on an individual basis and would be permitted to do so if they do not pose a security risk and otherwise meet neutral immigration criteria.1 4. Qatar’s claims regarding the UAE’s alleged violations of the right to family, education, and health are premised on the existence of an expulsion order and a travel ban. Since there was no expulsion order and there is no travel ban, Qatar’s allegations regarding these alleged violations necessarily lack merit. 5. Qatar’s claim of discrimination with respect to access to justice is equally unfounded. Qatari nationals have access to the UAE courts as demonstrated in Section IV.G. There are presently hundreds of active proceedings in the UAE courts to which Qatari citizens are parties. 6. Moreover, the allegation that the UAE is mounting or supporting a campaign of hate speech against Qatari citizens, or that such a campaign exists, is unfounded. 7. The reality is that the UAE’s targeted measures are aimed at the Qatari government and not the Qatari people. From the very beginning of the regional crisis, the UAE affirmed its “full respect and appreciation for the brotherly Qatari people on account of the profound historical, religious and fraternal ties and kin relations binding UAE and Qatari peoples.”2 Since then, the UAE has made clear the entry and residence rights applicable to Qatari nationals, including as recently as 5 July 2018, when MoFA issued a public statement confirming that Qataris continue to have the right to live in the UAE and that there is no expulsion order applicable to Qatari citizens.3 8. The current situation in the Gulf region unfortunately was precipitated by Qatar’s own actions and its failure to respect its international obligations. In 2013, following years of diplomatic engagement on the issues, several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Qatar, concluded an agreement by which Qatar committed itself to cease supporting, financing, or harbouring persons or groups, in particular, terrorist and extremist groups. Two supplemental agreements for the same purpose were concluded among the Gulf Cooperation Council members in 2014. The three agreements are collectively referred to, and known to the larger public as, the “Riyadh Agreements.” The obligations under the Riyadh Agreements supplemented the parties’ existing obligations under other international legal instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and customary international law. 1 An Official Statement by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem…. 2 UAE supports statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar, statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 June 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-06-2017-UAE-Qatar…. 3 An Official Statement by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem…. Annex 115
5 9. Qatar failed to abide by the Riyadh Agreements and continues to violate its obligations under other international agreements. To cite just one example, in April 2017 Qatar paid US $1 billion as “ransom” to entities affiliated with known terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida, a matter that the Arab Republic of Egypt brought to the attention of the Security Council.4 10. On 5 June 2017, after repeated calls upon Qatar to honour its commitments proved ineffective, the UAE and no less than ten other States took the decision to terminate or downgrade relations with Qatar. Qatar continues to fund numerous terrorist organizations, harbour and provide material support to known terrorists, and interfere in the internal sovereign affairs of States in the region. This violation by Qatar of its express commitments under the Riyadh Agreements and of its other international obligations puts at risk the national security of the UAE and the safety of its citizens. 11. Qatar’s Submission conveniently excludes these underlying facts, which provide essential and legally significant context. Instead, Qatar deliberately misrepresents the UAE’s measures against the Qatari government as measures taken against the people of Qatar. To the contrary, the UAE has taken significant steps to ensure that the current crisis with Qatar does not affect the rights of ordinary citizens. In this Response, the UAE will demonstrate that the facts do not support Qatar’s allegations. 12. Finally, the UAE would like to draw the Committee’s attention to the ongoing proceedings in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”) relating to this matter, which were initiated by Qatar. The UAE maintains that Qatar should not be permitted to advance a complaint under Article 11 while simultaneously initiating proceedings in relation to the same issues before the ICJ. The UAE intends to lodge jurisdictional objections with the ICJ on this basis. 13. As part of the ICJ proceedings, an order was issued on 23 July 2018 in respect of provisional measures requested by Qatar. The ICJ refused to grant any measures in the form sought by Qatar, and instead indicated limited measures in three areas (family re-unification, education and access to justice), in which UAE policy already reflects and complies with the order of the Court. Moreover, the Court indicated a general measure urging both parties not to take any steps that could aggravate the dispute. The UAE is confident that its practice in these areas 4United Nations Security Council, Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, S/PV.7962 (8 June 2017), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7962. See also Erika Solomon, The $1bn Hostage Deal that Enraged Qatar’s Gulf Rivals, FINANCIAL TIMES (5 June 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43; Michelle Nichols, Egypt Calls for U.N. Inquiry into Accusation of Qatar Ransom Payment, REUTERS (8 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-un/egypt-calls-for-u-n-in…; Alex Lockie, Qatar May Have Paid $1 Billion in Ransom for Release of Royal Family Members Captured While Hunting with Falcons, BUSINESS INSIDER (5 June 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/qatar-ransom-al-qaeda-iran-falconry-2017…; Egypt Calls for UN Probe on Qatar Giving Terrorists $1 Bln in Iraq, AL ARABIYA ENGLISH (8 June 2017), https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/06/08/Egypt-call…. Annex 115
6 fully conforms to both the ICJ’s order and to its obligations under the CERD, and that upon a close examination of the facts the Court will reach the same conclusion. 14. The UAE is grateful to the Committee for its work and its attention to the important matters before it. The UAE became a Party to the CERD almost 45 years ago. It has been and remains today firmly committed to the principles that inspired the Convention. The UAE would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm its full commitment to the Convention’s objective of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms. QATARI NATIONALS WERE NOT EXPELLED FROM THE UAE 15. In its Submission, Qatar alleges that the UAE “has expelled all Qatari residents and visitors within its borders.”5 The Submission alleges that expulsions were mass and arbitrary, stating that “UAE authorities expelled Qatari residents with no consideration of the personal circumstances of each individual.”6 16. The UAE unequivocally rejects these claims. The UAE has carried out no mass expulsion of Qatari citizens, despite Qatar’s insistence on repeating these false charges. The UAE urges the Committee to examine the evidence that Qatar has provided in support of these allegations. Beyond merely referring to the statement issued on 5 June 2017 by MoFA, Qatar has not provided any specific or credible evidence of such a mass expulsion or any specific examples of individual expulsions of Qatari citizens based on their nationality. 17. To the contrary, official UAE immigration records show that thousands of Qataris continue to reside in the UAE and have continued to visit its territory since the UAE’s termination of relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017. 18. One aspect of the 5 June 2017 announcement was a call for citizens of Qatar to leave UAE territory for precautionary security reasons. While this call was made as a matter of precaution, it does not constitute a legal order for the deportation or expulsion of Qatari citizens. In the UAE, the authority to expel individuals from UAE territory falls solely under the authority of the Ministry of Interior by virtue of Federal Law No. 6 of 1973 Concerning Immigration and Residence (“Immigration Law”). Absent an order by the Ministry of Interior, a person cannot be administratively deported from UAE territory. Since the Ministry of Interior issued no such orders, there was never any legal requirement for Qatari citizens to leave UAE territory. 19. UAE’s official immigration records confirm beyond any doubt that there were no expulsions and that Qataris residing in the UAE understood that they were not required to leave its territory. Those records show that the vast majority of Qatari residents in the UAE on 5 June 2017 chose to continue their residence in the UAE, and did not depart. As of mid-June 2018, 5 Qatar’s Submission, para. 4. 6 Id. at, para. 71. Annex 115
7 there were 2,194 Qatari nationals in the UAE, largely the same as the number of Qataris residing in the UAE on 5 June 2017.7 20. While the UAE issued no deportation orders and took no other steps to compel Qatari citizens to leave its territory, the Committee should note that the Qatari Embassy in the UAE did issue its own instruction for Qatari citizens to depart the UAE.8 It is possible that some Qataris who left the UAE did so as a result of the instructions of the Qatari Embassy. 21. Qatar recently repeated these false allegations of mass expulsion before the ICJ in the context of its application for provisional measures under the CERD. Qatari government-owned media outlets – which broadcast widely throughout the Middle East – have repeatedly broadcast Qatar’s false allegations. Due to this misinformation, MoFA issued a statement on 5 July 2018 affirming the UAE’s long-standing policy on the rights of Qatari citizens to travel to and reside in the UAE and, more importantly, confirming that Qatari citizens are not under any expulsion order.9 The statement reads, in part, as follows: “[t]he UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation wishes to confirm that Qatari citizens already resident in the UAE need not apply for permission to continue residence in the UAE…. the UAE has not issued any legal or administrative laws or orders relating to the expulsion of Qatari citizens from UAE territory. The UAE took no action to expel Qatari citizens and national[s] who remained in the UAE following the expiry of the 14 day period referred to in the June 5, 2017 announcement.”10 22. The Committee should note that in its order of 23 July 2018, the ICJ refused to grant the provisional measure requested by Qatar for “suspending operation of the collective expulsion of all Qataris from, and ban on entry into, the UAE.” The ICJ’s order is a tacit recognition that there has been no collective expulsion, and that no travel ban exists. Qatar’s false allegations regarding the “travel ban” are addressed in more detail in the next Section below. THERE IS NO TRAVEL BAN RELATING TO QATARI NATIONALS 23. Qatar’s Submission alleges that its citizens are banned from travelling to the UAE. As with the expulsion allegation, this is also false. While Qataris are no longer allowed to travel to the UAE on a visa-free basis, they may still travel to the UAE after requesting permission to do 7 See Immigration – Qataris in the UAE (Attached as Annex 1); Immigration - ID & Citizenship Authority Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Stats (Attached as Annex 2). 8 Qatar asks citizens to leave UAE within 14 days- embassy, Reuters (5 June 2017), https://www.zawya.com/uae/en/story/Qatar_asks_citizens_to_leave_UAE_wit…. 9 An official Statement by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem…. 10 Id. Annex 115
8 so. Thousands of Qatari nationals have travelled to or from the UAE on this basis since 5 June 2017. 24. Prior to 5 June 2017, Qatari citizens could travel to the UAE without a visa or any other prior permission. Following the termination of relations with Qatar, the UAE implemented a new system whereby Qatari nationals must obtain prior permission to travel to the UAE. The principle of obtaining permission prior to travel applies to many other nationalities and is a basic immigration control measure used by governments worldwide. The right to apply entry requirements to foreign nationals is a sovereign right reserved for all States and is not ceded in the Convention or under international law more generally. The UAE maintains a limited list of countries whose nationals may enter the UAE on a visa-free basis or with a visa on arrival; citizens of most countries must apply for permission in advance, as is now the case for Qataris.11 25. Qatari citizens may and do apply for permission to travel to the UAE through the hotline established on 11 June 2017.12 Contrary to Qatar’s claims, the hotline operates efficiently and the vast majority of applications for permission to travel are approved. In the first six months of 2018 alone, the hotline received 1,390 applications. Of this total number, only 12 applications were rejected for security or other reasons, meaning that approximately 99% of applications for entry were approved.13 26. The efficient working of the hotline is evidenced by the extensive travel logs of movements by Qatari citizens across UAE borders, as evidenced by the UAE’s official immigration records. Since 5 June 2017, entry and exit records enclosed with this Response show 8,442 movements by Qatari citizens across UAE borders, all of which were facilitated by the work of the hotline.14 QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATION OF OTHER RIGHTS RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CERD LACK MERIT 27. As explained in the prior sections of this Response, Qatar’s claim that the UAE has carried out a collective expulsion of Qatari nationals is demonstrably false. Qatar’s claim that the UAE has instituted a travel ban against Qatari citizens is also false. These factual matters entirely undermine Qatar’s other claims of violations of the CERD that are premised on the purported expulsion and travel ban. 28. In particular, the absence of any expulsion of Qatari nationals or travel ban significantly undermines Qatar’s claims that the UAE has interfered with the “right to marriage and choice of spouse,” the “right to public health and medical care,” the “right to education,” the “right to 11 See Do you need an entry permit or a visa to enter the UAE?, The Official Portal of the UAE Government, https://government.ae/en/information-and-services/visa-and-emirates-id/…. 12 See Hotline - UAE MoFA Announcement re Directive for Hotline Addressing Mixed Families (Attached as Annex 3). 13 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pg. 2 (Attached as Annex 4). 14 See Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (Attached as Annex 5). Annex 115
9 work,” the “right to property” and the “right to equal treatment before tribunals” of Qatari nationals. No evidence is provided by Qatar to suggest that these rights are denied to Qataris in the UAE. Instead, these claims are premised on the false assumption that Qataris’ enjoyment of these rights within the UAE has been obstructed by their inability to enter the UAE. The fact is that none of these rights can be interpreted so expansively so as to allow a foreign national an unconditional right to enter the territory of a State. As indicated earlier in this Response, any interpretation of the CERD must take into account the fact that States have a right to determine for themselves the entry and residence restrictions applicable to foreign nationals who enter their territories. In any event, this is a moot issue, since as discussed in Sections II and III above, official UAE records indisputably show that Qatari citizens continue to reside in the UAE and travel in large numbers across its borders. 29. Nevertheless, the UAE specifically responds below to each of these separate allegations. In the following sub-sections, the UAE will explain why – aside from there having been no expulsion or travel ban – the allegations made by Qatar are without merit. A. Right to Marriage and Choice of Spouse 30. Qatar alleges that the UAE has unlawfully interfered with the rights to marriage and family life “[i]n forcing family separation by expelling Qatari nationals.”15 31. The UAE recognizes the importance of ensuring that UAE-Qatari families are not separated and that their lives are not detrimentally impacted by the absence of relations between the UAE and Qatar. As indicated earlier in this Response, the hotline has received and granted thousands of applications, refusing only a very small minority of them, and refusing almost no applications by Qatar-UAE mixed families.16 To the contrary, not only do Qatari nationals still enter the UAE in large numbers, official UAE records show that a number of marriages involving a Qatari citizen have been registered in the UAE since the start of the crisis.17 It is simply false to allege that the UAE is interfering in individuals’ right to marriage and choice of spouse, as Qatar’s Submission suggests. 32. The Committee should note that Qatar’s assertions in relation to family separation do not include any specific details to substantiate the allegations made. For example, according to Qatar, its National Human Rights Committee (“Qatari Committee”) has documented “620 cases of ‘family separation’ [of which 78 cases are allegedly attributable to the UAE].”18 Details of these families have not been provided. Further, it is notable that most of the information presented by Qatar regarding “family separation” relates to the days or weeks after the start of the crisis on 5 June 2017. There is no information regarding the current status of any of those cases or anything to suggest that those cases have not been resolved. Given their 15 Qatar’s Submission, para. 75. 16 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pgs. 15-27 (Attached as Annex 4); Part 2 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration (Attached as Annex 6). 17 See Immigration – Qataris in the UAE, pg. 50 (Attached as Annex 1). 18 Qatar’s Submission, para. 42. Annex 115
10 anonymous nature, there is also no way for the UAE (or the Committee) to confirm that the alleged complaints are in fact authentic. 33. Similarly, other human rights organizations reporting on alleged family separations provide only general statements and statistics. No specific facts are given. For example, the report dated December 2017 in respect of the OHCHR Technical Mission to Qatar (“OHCHR Report”) does not mention any specific instances of family separation and simply relies upon the overall statistics of mixed-marriages between Qataris and other Gulf states in order to give an indication of the number of families that could potentially be affected.19 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch simply offer conclusory statements concerning alleged family separation unsupported by any facts.20 As such, there is no basis on which the UAE can confirm the authenticity of the complaints. 34. The UAE reiterates that its policy since the start of the crisis has been to ensure that UAE-Qatari mixed families are not separated. With Qataris having entered and exited the UAE at least 8,442 times since the start of the crisis, it is implausible to suggest that the UAE is “forcing family separation,” as Qatar alleges. B. Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 35. The UAE does not, and has not, in any manner curtailed freedom of expression or in any way incited hatred against Qatari citizens. Qatar’s allegations in this area focus on the statement of the UAE Attorney General, in which he is quoted as saying “strict and firm action will be taken against anyone who shows sympathy or any form of bias towards Qatar…” and that sympathy with the policies of Qatar could amount to a violation of Federal Decree Law No. 5 of 2012.21 As explained below, there is nothing in the Attorney General’s statement that implicates the UAE’s obligations under CERD. 36. First, there is nothing in the Attorney General’s statement that criminalizes support for Qatari citizens or restricts their freedom of expression. The Attorney General correctly refers to the fact that speech in support of Qatar, in particular its policy of aiding terrorist organizations and individuals, may constitute a criminal offense under UAE law. There is nothing controversial about outlawing statements in support of terrorism, and there is nothing in UAE law, or in the 19 See OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017, para. 34 (Attached as Annex 7). 20 See Gulf Crisis Shows How Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar Tears Families Apart, Human Rights Watch (21 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/21/gulf-crisis-shows-how-discriminatio…; Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses, Human Rights Watch (12 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abus…; Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes, Amnesty International (19 June 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human…. 21 Qatar’s Submission, paras. 34 and 86. Annex 115
11 Attorney General’s statement, that indicates a crime for an expression of support for the Qatari people. 37. The Committee should also note Article 7 of the UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 On Combatting Discrimination and Hatred22 (“Anti-Discrimination Law”), which exists to ensure, among other things, that the discriminatory and racially prejudicial views of terrorist groups are not propagated within the UAE. Not only would prosecuting such speech be consistent with the Anti-Discrimination Law, it would also be consistent with the aims of the Convention and, in particular, State Parties’ obligations under Article 5 to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination, and their obligations under Article 2(1)(d) to prohibit racial discrimination by any person, group or organization. 38. Second, UAE Federal Decree Law No. 5 of 2012, which Qatar cites as a law targeting Qatari citizens, is a law of general application that was enacted well in advance of the crisis with Qatar. It includes no provisions that are specific to Qatar or to Qatari citizens. It is similar to the cybercrime laws in existence in many other countries, including the cybercrime law passed by Qatar in 2014.23 Qatar’s suggestion that this law is targeted at speech supporting Qatar or Qatari citizens is entirely false. 39. Third, in furtherance of the objective of limiting discriminatory and hate speech, the UAE has blocked certain Qatari media outlets that are known to provide a platform for terrorist groups and individuals. Chiefly among those outlets is Al Jazeera, which – particularly through its Arabic language network – acts as a major purveyor of discrimination and hate speech in the region. Al Jazeera regularly interviews and disseminates the views of known terrorists, employs program hosts that sympathize with internationally outlawed groups, and gives them an outlet to broadcast their messages to audiences throughout the Middle East. 40. For example, in January 2009, AI Jazeera conducted an interview with the then leader of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Nasir al-Wuhayshi. During the interview, al-Wuhayshi called for the destruction of “America and Europe” and their “Crusader interests.”24 Al Jazeera has also interviewed senior Al Qaida leader Abu Hafs al-Mauritani several times, including as recently as 2017. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani emphasized his “joy” in seeing the 9/11 attacks and Al Qaida’s readiness to fight US and NATO forces in Afghanistan in a “crusader war.”25 22 UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015, Article 7, http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws2015/FDL_2_2015_discriminat…. 23 Qatar Law No. 14 of 2014 – Promulgating the Cybercrime Prevention Law, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=100242. 24 See Abu Basir: We support Gaza by striking Wester Interests in the region, Al Jazeera (27 January 2009), http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2009/1/ .بالمنطقة-الغربية-المصالح-بضرب-غزة-ننصر-بصير-أبو/ 27
25 See Abu Hafs al-Mauritanian. The Attacks of September 11, Al Jazeera (20 October 2012), http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/today-interview/2012/10/ 1ج-سبتمبر- 11 -هجمات-الموريتاني-حفص-أبو/ 20 .
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12 41. In the end, however, the complaint raised by Qatar against the UAE in relation to these media outlets do not implicate CERD in any way. Contrary to the assertions in paragraph 35 of Qatar’s Submission, the CERD applies to individuals and not corporations. Corporations are not beneficiaries of rights under the CERD. Moreover, banning these media outlets, which propagate hate speech, is consistent with the CERD’s objectives and does not impermissibly curtail freedom of expression. 42. Beyond all of the above, the UAE’s legitimate criticisms of and opposition to the Qatari government’s policies of supporting terrorism – which are shared by a number of other countries – do not constitute racial discrimination under the CERD. C. Right to Health and Right to Medical Treatment 43. Qatar states that “Qataris requiring medical attention in UAE that is not available in Qatar have been denied necessary care.”26 This is followed by the allegation that “the Qatar Ministry of Health had received 130 reports of medical complications resulting from the Coercive Measures.”27 Notably, Qatar neither provides specific details of any of these cases, nor elaborates upon their current status. 44. The UAE is not denying Qatari nationals access to medical treatment. Qatari citizens in the UAE enjoy the same healthcare rights as any other residents or visitors. In fact, over 800 Qatari nationals are currently covered by the UAE Government health insurance provider, Daman (Abu Dhabi).28 Neither those persons, nor any other Qataris in the UAE, are under any restriction regarding the type of medical attention they may seek within the UAE. Any allegation that the UAE is denying medical treatment to Qataris is false, as evidenced by the official records submitted with this Response, which include registration and visitation records for Qatari citizens to UAE health institutions. 45. Separately, it is unclear why Qatar considers the UAE a sole and essential provider of medical care to Qatari citizens who are outside the UAE. This claim is disingenuous and its sole purpose seems to be to manufacture a perceived breach of the Convention, based on the false claim regarding the existence of a travel ban. In any event, as indicated in Section III above, there is no ban preventing Qatari citizens from traveling to the UAE. Should Qatari citizens consider it fit to seek healthcare in the UAE, they may apply for permission to travel and may make an appointment with any doctor of their choosing, as is the case with any other person of any other nationality. 46. The Committee should note that the OHCHR Report, upon which Qatar relies for evidence, states that “[m]edical services in Qatar are known to be of high quality. Since September 2017, 26 Qatar’s Submission, para. 45. 27 Id. at para. 93. 28 See Health – Qataris with Daman Health Insurance (Attached as Annex 8) (pgs. 13-19 contain records of over 300 visits from July 2017 onward by Qatari nationals to hospitals and clinics within the UAE). Annex 115
13 the Ministry of Health recorded 388,000 visits to public health services by patients, including by 260,000 patients from KSA, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt.”29 47. Also, in paragraph 46 of its Submission, Qatar alleges that “the restrictions on ports and shipping have affected Qatar’s access to medicines and medical supplies.”30 Aside from the fact that this allegation in no manner implicates rights under the CERD, the allegation is entirely lacking in credibility given that Qatar appears to have issued a directive to all pharmacies within its territory to remove all medicines and medical supplies imported from the UAE, as well as those from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt.31 D. Right to Education 48. Qatar’s Submission states that “[o]ver 4,000 Qatari students studied alongside peers at universities in the Four States… [u]niversities in the Four States, including [the] UAE, summarily withdrew Qatari students from courses and told them to return to Qatar.”32 Further, Qatar states that “the Ministry of Education of Qatar estimates that over 200 Qatari students have been unable to transfer in order to pursue their studies for a range of reasons.”33 Qatar does not specify whether any of those complaints relate to the UAE, and further does not provide any evidence regarding the current status of those complaints today. 49. The UAE has taken no steps to prevent Qatari students enrolled in UAE educational institutions from continuing their studies, or from obtaining access to records that they may need to continue their studies elsewhere, if they so choose. While it is possible that some Qatari students may have discontinued their studies at the start of the crisis, the UAE’s long-standing policy is that those students are welcome to resume their studies within the UAE, should they choose to return and provided that they meet other entry requirements applicable to foreign nationals generally. 50. Owing to the disinformation emanating from Qatar regarding this particular issue, the UAE has taken active steps to ensure that Qatari students know that they are welcome to continue their studies in the UAE. For example, the Office of the Undersecretary of Higher Education sent instructions on 8 March 2018 to Directors of Higher Education Institutions declaring: “[b]y following up the information of the university students, it was noted that a number of students from the State of Qatar dropped out [of] university studies in the United Arab Emirates for non-academic reasons. Kindly communicate 29 See OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017, para. 45 (Attached as Annex 7). 30 Qatar’s Submission, para. 46. 31 See Qatar Health Ministry Letter Re Medical Supplies Removal, 6 June 2018 (Attached as Annex 9). 32 Qatar’s Submission, para. 48. 33 Id. at para. 49. Annex 115
14 with the dropped out students immediately and check the reasons, stressing that studies are available to all students who meet the required conditions.”34 51. Official UAE records indicate that, as of 20 June 2018, there were 694 Qatari students enrolled or re-enrolled in educational institutions in the UAE.35 Of these, 195 students were enrolled in pre-university educational institutions for the 2017/2018 academic year.36 E. Right to Work 52. As part of its allegations that the UAE has violated Qatari citizens’ right to work, Qatar claims that “Qatari business owners have been prevented from entering UAE in order to manage and oversee their businesses, renew necessary business and worker licenses, or renew their leases.”37 As indicated in the earlier sections of this Response, it is simply not true that Qataris have been prevented from entering the UAE. 53. The number of Qatari-owned companies in the Emirate of Dubai alone has reached 618 companies, and the number of licenses issued to Qataris nationals has reached 870.38 From 5 June 2017 to 18 June 2018, there were 390 business license transactions in the Emirate of Dubai, including new issuances of licenses and renewals.39 Qatari entities and companies owned by Qataris in the UAE, such as the Qatar Insurance Company, Doha Bank and Gulf Liquid Air Factory continue to hold their business licenses to operate and continue to operate without restriction.40 These are all Qatari-owned and managed companies. It is implausible to suggest that the UAE is preventing Qataris from managing and operating these companies, given their continued operations more than one year after the start of the crisis. 54. Moreover, Qataris living in the UAE continue to be employed in the UAE in significant numbers. UAE records show that Qataris not only continue to work in the private sector, but that Qataris also continue to be employed in public service positions by the UAE Government.41 F. Right to Property 55. Qatar’s Submission makes two main allegations with respect to the right to property. First, that Qatari nationals are being barred from accessing, buying or selling property within the UAE 34 See Education - Undersecretary of Academic Affairs Email (Attached as Annex 10). 35 See Immigration - ID & Citizenship Authority Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Stats (Attached as Annex 2); Immigration - Student Entry Records (Attached as Annex 11). 36 See Qatari Student Records (Attached as Annex 12). 37 Qatar’s Submission, para. 99. 38 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pg. 14 (Attached as Annex 4). 39Id. 40 See Commercial Licenses – Sample Materials (Attached as Annex 13). 41 See Business – UAE Embassy – Authentication Records, pg. 27 (Attached as Annex 14). Annex 115
15 (including through representatives appointed through a power of attorney).42 Second, that the UAE has “advanced or condoned measures against property held by Qataris, including freezing assets of Qatari nationals and limiting financial transfers to citizens or residents of Qatar.”43 56. As stated earlier in this Response, there is no prohibition on the entry of Qataris into the UAE. Thus, it is not true that Qatari nationals are being barred from accessing their property within the UAE. 57. Even if there were such a prohibition, Qatari nationals are able to, and have, executed valid powers of attorney that allow their property to be bought, sold and otherwise managed notwithstanding that such nationals may not themselves be present in the UAE.44 Such powers of attorney have been authenticated for use in the UAE on behalf of Qataris through the various UAE embassies worldwide. In addition, since the UAE no longer maintains an embassy in Qatar, Qatari nationals can instead submit their powers of attorney, or any other documents for authentication by the UAE, to the Kuwaiti Embassy in Qatar. The Kuwaiti Embassy then forwards them for authentication to the UAE Embassy in Kuwait. After authentication, the documents are sent back to the Kuwaiti Embassy in Qatar for collection by the Qatari applicant, who may then use them for any official purpose within the UAE.45 At least 36 powers of attorney were registered on behalf of Qatari nationals between 1 June 2017 and 30 May 2018 in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi alone.46 58. Regarding Qatar’s second allegation relating to the freezing of assets of Qatari nationals, the UAE Central Bank did not issue any circular or decision with regards to dealing with or closing Qatari banks, accounts associated with Qataris or banning dealing with Qatari currency.47 59. The UAE Central Bank did issue freezing orders in relation to persons and organizations designated as terrorists or terrorist financiers pursuant to Federal Law No. 7 of 2015 on Combatting Terrorism Crimes (“Terrorism Crimes Law”). The designation lists issued by the UAE pursuant to the Terrorism Crimes Law includes citizens of Qatar, as well as a number of other countries. In addition, many of the individuals and entities designated as terrorists by the UAE have also been similarly designated by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and others.48 60. Additionally, the UAE has instituted enhanced due diligence requirements in relation to transactions involving six banks that have facilitated financial transactions for persons designated under the Terrorism Crimes Law. Those six banks are Qatar Islamic Bank, Qatar 42 Qatar’s Submission, paras. 100-106. 43 Id. at para. 107. 44 See Business – UAE Embassy – Authentication Records, pgs. 19-25 (Attached as Annex 14); Power of Attorney (Attached as Annex 15); International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (Attached as Annex 16). 45 See Power of Attorney (Attached as Annex 15). 46 See International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (Attached as Annex 16). 47 See Banking - Central Bank Circulars and Remittances, pg. 2-3 (Attached as Annex 17). 48 Id. at pgs. 6-31. Annex 115
16 International Islamic, Bank, Barwa Bank, Masraf Al Rayan, Qatar National Bank and Doha Bank. 61. Notwithstanding the above, there have been very substantial transfers and remittances between the UAE and Qatar covering billions of UAE dirhams since 5 June 2017.49 Bank transfers between the Central Bank of the UAE and Qatar banks from June 2017 to April 2018 amounted to 42,210,763,000 UAE dirhams (about USD 11,549,087,000) in inward and outward remittances.50 Thus, Qatar’s assertion that its nationals’ assets have been frozen because of their Qatari nationality, or that their ability to make financial transfers has been limited, is simply untrue. G. Right to Equal Treatment before Tribunals 62. Qatar alleges that Qataris have been denied equal treatment before tribunals as they have been “unable to enter [the] UAE, hire an attorney, or otherwise exercise their rights.”51 As indicated in Section IV.F of this Response, Qatari citizens are able to execute valid powers of attorney for any legal purpose, including to appoint lawyers to represent them before the UAE courts. Moreover, should they choose to do so, they may apply for travel permission to attend any legal proceedings within the UAE in person. 63. There is clear evidence showing active court filings, and participation in proceedings in the UAE legal system generally, by Qataris. For the period between 6 June 2017 and 20 June 2018, there have been over 340 cases involving Qataris across the various Emirates.52 These include first instance cases, appeal cases and cases in the courts of cassation. In addition, Qataris have freely applied for and received notarized documents; in the Emirate of Dubai alone 280 notarized documents have been issued to Qataris since 6 June 2017.53 There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Qataris’ access to tribunals in the UAE has been hindered or that they do not enjoy equal treatment before those tribunals. QATAR’S ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY DIRECT EVIDENCE 64. Qatar’s Submission relies largely on two categories of documents as evidence. The first category of documents is the reporting done by its own human rights organization, the Qatari Committee. The second category of documents is the reporting done by other international human rights bodies, based on information provided to them by the Qatari Committee and by the Qatari government. As alluded to earlier in this Response, there are various deficiencies in the evidence that Qatar has provided. The present Section addresses more specifically the 49 Id. at pg. 4. 50 Id. 51 Qatar’s Submission, para. 109. 52 See International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (Attached as Annex 16); Judicial Records (Attached as Annex 18). 53 Id. Annex 115
17 deficiencies and lack of reliability of the information provided by Qatar to support its allegations, especially that which is sourced from the Qatari Committee. A. The Qatari Committee Reports 65. Three distinct points should be noted in regards to the reliability of information sourced from the Qatari Committee. 66. First, the Qatari Committee is an entity formed, funded by and subject to the control of the Qatari government. It has quite obviously taken the side of its government in its political dispute with the UAE and the other States that have terminated relations with Qatar. This is evident in particular from the politicized language it uses in its reports, which toes the government line. It writes of the measures taken against Qatar as a “siege” and a “blockade,” mimicking the Qatari government’s mischaracterization of those measures.54 67. There in fact is no “blockade” of Qatar. According to Oxford Public International Law, a “blockade” is “a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft … from entering or exiting specified ports, airports, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation.” A blockade “should not be confused with embargoes.”55 Aircraft and vessels arrive to and depart from Qatar on a daily basis. The UAE has taken no measures that meet the legal definition of “blockade.” The measures taken by the UAE are limited to its own territory. The Qatari Committee’s deliberate and incorrect use of the term “blockade” in all its publications is a signal of its political bias and lack of independence. 68. In fact, Qatar has announced the launching of new shipping routes to Iraq,56 Oman57 and multiple destinations in China and the Mediterranean.58 Qatar is even constructing a new port (Hamad Port) spanning 26 square kilometers to increase international shipping.59 Hamad Port director Abdul Aziz Nasser al-Yafei “highlighted the port’s commitment to providing all necessary facilities to companies, adding that it was ready to receive all types of shipments from different parts of the world.”60 Qatar is also increasing and expanding flight routes to and from Qatar. In March 2018, Qatar Airways announced 16 new destinations in line with its 54 See National Human Rights Committee First Report, 13 June 2017 (Attached as Annex 19); National Human Rights Committee Second Report, 1 July 2017 (Attached as Annex 20). 55 See Oxford Public International Law, Definition of “Blockade”, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801992…. 56 Iran Plans Direct Shipping Route to Qatar, Financial Tribune (8 July 2017), https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/67886/ir…. 57 Qatar launches new shipping routes to Oman amid food shortage fears, Reuters (12 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-ports-idUSL8N1J9112. 58 Qatar Launches Shipping Routes to China, East Mediterranean to Bypass Blockade, Albawaba Business (18 September 2017), https://www.albawaba.com/business/qatar-launches-shipping-routes-china-…. 59 http://www.npp.com.qa/overview.html. 60 Qatar Launches Shipping Routes to China, East Mediterranean to Bypass Blockade, Albawaba Business (18 September 2017), https://www.albawaba.com/business/qatar-launches-shipping-routes-china-…. Annex 115
18 “aggressive expansion plans for 2018.”61 Qatar Airways Chief Executive, Akbar Al Baker stated “[d]uring the blockade Qatar Airways continued its expansion…and Qatar Airways will keep on expanding and keep on raising the flag for my country all over the globe.”62 These are not the actions of a country subject to a blockade. 69. Second, the listing in the Qatari Committee reports of the complaints by anonymous individuals, which forms the foundation of each one of the Qatari Committee’s reports Qatar has relied upon in its Submission, constitute mere assertions, which are unverified (and unverifiable), and unsubstantiated by any primary documentary evidence. Indeed, even assuming these represent actually initiated complaints, there is no way of knowing whether any or all of the alleged complaints have been resolved. 70. For example, it is stated that the Qatari Committee has found that “at least 78 families have been separated…”63 Yet only two anonymous cases are cited in the reports.64 Moreover, 85% of the complaints referred by the Qatari Committee in relation to the UAE were lodged prior to 30 August 2017, and more than half of those were reported prior to the end of June 2017, mere weeks after the start of the crisis. Assuming for the sake of argument that these claims were actually made (a fact the Committee can neither assume nor verify), such claims would have obviously been made in the immediate, and undoubtedly confused, aftermath of the termination of diplomatic relations and before use of the hotline had become routine. 71. Third, as inherently unreliable as the Qatar Committee’s reports appear to be, there is the highly relevant fact that since September 2017, the number of complaints recorded by the Qatari Committee itself has dramatically fallen. For example, since 1 September 2017, according to the Qatari Committee, there have been no complaints recorded against the UAE about “work” or “residency” matters, only two complaints about health care and only four complaints about “family separation.”65 Since 6 December 2017, the number of complaints has fallen further; not a single complaint was recorded as having been received by the Qatari Committee against the UAE concerning “residency” matters, “work” matters or “health” care matters, and only two complaints regarding “education” and “family separation” matters were said to have been received.66 72. What the Qatari Committee’s own statistics indicate as to the incidence of complaints since 5 December 2017 is that they have dramatically dropped, and in some cases disappeared 61 Qatar Airways to add 16 destinations this year, The Peninsula (8 March 2018), https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/08/03/2018/Qatar-Airways-to-a…. 62 Id. 63 See National Human Rights Committee Third Report, pg. 5 (Attached as Annex 21). 64 Id. at pg. 6. 65 Compare tables in National Human Rights Committee Third Report, pg. 5 (Attached as Annex 21), National Human Rights Committee Fourth Report, 5 December 2017, pg. 6 (Attached as Annex 22), and National Human Rights Committee Fifth Report, June 2018, pg. 13 (Attached as Annex 23). 66 Id. Annex 115
19 altogether. For example, since 5 December 2017, the Qatari Committee has registered the following numbers of complaints supposedly involving the UAE: a) Under Article 5(d)(iv) of CERD, right to family life: two complaints;67 b) Under Article 5(e)(iv) of the CERD, right to medical care: no complaints;68 c) Under Article 5(e)(v) of the CERD, right to education: two complaints;69 d) Under Article 5(e)(i) of the CERD, right to work: no complaints; and 70 e) Under Article 5(a) of the CERD, right to equal treatment before tribunals: one complaint.71 The dearth of new complaints in the Qatari Committee’s own reporting demonstrates that Qatar’s allegations that the UAE has systematically targeted Qatari citizens for discrimination are untrue and without basis. B. Reports by Various Human Rights Bodies 73. In conjunction with the reports of the Qatari Committee, Qatar’s Submission relies on reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as referring to the OHCHR Report. All of these reports are based substantially on information provided by Qatar. While best international practice requires human rights organizations to contact States that are concerned with their reports for comments, the reports cited by Qatar do not include any comments or input from the UAE, and therefore disregard the facts contained in this Response. The Committee must take note of these issues when assessing the reliability and completeness of these reports. 74. It is also important for the Committee to bear in mind how the OHCHR Report – which was never intended to be published – became public. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights is aware, the Qatari Committee improperly leaked the OHCHR Report during a press conference held in Doha, Qatar, on 8 January 2018, notwithstanding that the OHCHR Report was intended to be used only for internal purposes. Instead, after having requested the OHCHR Report under the guise of technical assistance, Qatar presented it as the formal and conclusive findings of the OHCHR. 75. We remind the Committee of the following statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Representative of Qatar, made on 8 March 2018, during the 37th Session of the 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Id. 71 Id. Annex 115
20 Human Rights Council, in which he expressed his disapproval of Qatar’s leak of the OHCHR Report: “There was another question from the State of Qatar concerning the coercive measures taken against Qatar and its effects and its demand for providing reparations. I have publicly spoken on this issue and a technical mission was undertaken at the request of Qatar and an internal report was prepared, drafted and released to the authorities of Qatar. It was not meant to be public but it became public.”72 This statement was repeated by the High Commissioner in a letter to the UAE dated 29 June 2018. The High Commissioner re-affirmed that the OHCHR Report was not meant to be public.73 He further stated that “the OHCHR Mission to Qatar (17-24 November 2017) was technical in nature and did not aim at qualifying the Gulf crisis nor determining states’ responsibilities/liabilities.” 76. This would not be the first time that Qatar has misrepresented the OHCHR’s position. We remind the Committee that in June 2017 the OHCHR took the extraordinary step of publicly rebuking Qatar for distorting remarks made by the High Commissioner. Qatar deliberately misrepresented the comments made by the High Commissioner regarding the current crisis, prompting the UN Human Rights Office to issue a statement that said, in part, “[t]he UN Human Rights Office does not normally comment on bilateral meetings with States, except on the rare occasions where it believes the State concerned has publicly misrepresented the content of the meeting.”74 77. Qatar similarly misrepresented other UN reports during the ICJ provisional measures hearings that took place in June 2018. In its pleadings before the ICJ, Qatar quoted sections of the Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the United Arab Emirates, AU ARE 5/2017 (18 August 2017) as definitive findings of fact, while neglecting to acknowledge with clarity to the ICJ that the portions it included in its pleadings begin with the following language “While we do not wish to prejudge the accuracy of these allegations ….”75 78. The Amnesty International report, upon which Qatar relies heavily, was released on 19 June 2017, a mere two weeks after the break in relations between the UAE and Qatar and one week 72 See Letter from the UAE to the OHCHR, 16 May 2018, pg. 3 (Attached as Annex 24). 73 See Letter from the OHCHR Regarding UAE letter of 16 May 2018, 29 June 2018 (Attached as Annex 25). 74 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/06/30/UNHCR-issues-corre…. 75 See CR 2018/12, pg. 55, paras. 15-16 (Goldsmith), the pleadings of Qatar before the International Court of Justice in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), 27 June 2018, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180627-ORA-01-00-B…. Annex 115
21 after the procedures for use of the telephone hotline were announced.76 Other than the limited information that was available to the Amnesty International, this brief report was obviously issued in the immediate, and undoubtedly confused, aftermath of the termination of diplomatic relations and before use of the hotline had become routine. Moreover, the report clearly cannot be relied upon as evidence of the circumstances of Qatari citizens in the UAE following that date, which as the evidence provided by the UAE has demonstrated, is much the same as it was before 5 June 2017. Finally, the report obviously does not address the question whether any of the difficulties noted have since been resolved. 79. Similarly, the Human Rights Watch report was released on 12 July 2017, a little over a month after the break in relations between the UAE and Qatar.77 These brief statements – again, made over a year ago – cannot possibly be regarded as evidence of the circumstances prevailing in the UAE for Qatari citizens, particularly in light of the evidence showing that Qatari citizens are living their lives in the UAE today much the same as they were before. Moreover, it is notable that the Human Rights Watch report makes no specific allegations in respect of the UAE’s treatment of Qatari citizens within the UAE other than noting several cases of students who said they had to interrupt their education and return to Qatar.78 The evidence provided by the UAE together with this Response, showing that all UAE educational institutions were instructed to establish contact with any Qatari students who had interrupted their studies to advise them that they were welcome to return, and that almost 700 Qatari students are currently enrolled in in the UAE, indicates that the reported difficulties of the students did not concern the UAE or in any case have since been adequately resolved. 80. All of these reports relied considerably upon Qatari sources including the Qatari Committee and other Qatari government entities. Because of this reliance, these reports likewise only list broad general statistics with very little supporting detail regarding specific alleged violations.79 As examples, the OHCHR Report states that 130 individuals (from all Four States, not specifically from the UAE) reported medical issues.80 But only three anonymous examples are given, all related to KSA and not the UAE.81 In a similar fashion, it is stated that 157 students from the UAE have been affected; but no individual examples are given.82 Regarding the right to equal treatment before tribunals, the OHCHR Report simply states “legal cooperation has been suspended, including power of attorney.”83 Again no examples are given and the 76 Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes, Amnesty International (19 June 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human…. 77 Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses, Human Rights Watch (12 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abus…. 78 Id. at pgs. 3, 7 and 8. 79 See OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017 (Attached as Annex 7). 80 Id. at para. 43. 81 Id. at para. 44. 82 Id. at para. 52. 83 Id. at para. 40. Annex 115
22 statement that no powers of attorney have been issued is demonstrably false, as shown in the official records enclosed with this Response. STATEMENT OF LAW A. Substantive and Procedural Defects in Qatar’s Submission 81. Qatar’s complaint is defective because it does not conform to the terms of CERD Article 11, which states: Article 11 1. If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may bring the matter to the attention of the Committee. The Committee shall then transmit the communication to the State Party concerned. Within three months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State. 2. If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties, either by bilateral negotiations or by any other procedure open to them, within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter again to the Committee by notifying the Committee and also the other State. 3. The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged. 4. In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned to supply any other relevant information. 5. When any matter arising out of this article is being considered by the Committee, the States Parties concerned shall be entitled to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the Committee, without voting rights, while the matter is under consideration. 82. Qatar’s complaint fails to meet key requirements of Article 11 for several reasons. 83. First, Qatar has not demonstrated that the UAE is “not giving effect to the provisions” of the Convention pursuant to Article 11(1). As this Response shows, there has been no mass expulsion of Qatari citizens from the UAE. Qatari citizens are able to enter and reside in the UAE upon prior application and they enjoy the same rights within the UAE as other foreign nationals. Qatar’s complaint simply ignores the fact that the UAE did not take any steps to Annex 115
23 deport Qatari citizens and that the Ministry of Interior, which is the UAE government entity charged with the regulating and altering the residence status of non-citizens, did issue an order deporting Qatari citizens. Above, the Committee will find detailed information showing that the vast majority of Qatari citizens remained in the UAE after 5 June 2017. Qatar’s complaint also conveniently ignores that the Qatari government itself issued orders for its citizens to leave the UAE. 84. Second, whatever the significance the Committee might ascribe to the portion of the 5 June 2017 announcement calling upon Qatari citizens to depart from UAE territory, the UAE subsequently made clear that there is no deportation order in effect and that Qatari citizens may remain within the UAE. As mentioned above, on 5 July 2018, MoFA announced that Qatari citizens in the UAE could remain and affirmed procedures – which have existed since the start of the crisis – allowing Qatari citizens outside the UAE to enter the country. Thus, there is no current or ongoing basis for Qatar to allege that the UAE “is not giving effect to the provisions of” the Convention as required by CERD Article 11(1). It is important to note in this regard that Article 11(1) uses the word “is,” evidencing an intention for the Committee to consider only matters involving present conflicts with CERD. It does not appear to contemplate that the Committee would examine measures that are no longer in effect, or were never in effect. This interpretation is confirmed by Articles 11(2) and 11(3), which call for the Committee to take up a complaint only if the parties cannot resolve the matter within six months and the Committee is convinced that available domestic remedies have been exhausted. To the extent that any of these conditions has not been met, a matter is not properly before the Committee. 85. Finally, the UAE would like to draw the Committee’s attention to Article 11(3) of the CERD, which provides that the Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with Article 11(2) after it has ascertained that “all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted.” Two issues should be noted with respect to this requirement. First, Qatar has failed to provide any evidence to show that domestic remedies have been invoked or exhausted. Second, as this Response demonstrates, it should be clear that if any individual Qatari considers himself or herself entitled to redress for any loss of rights, whether related to the CERD or otherwise, such redress is readily available through UAE institutions. Qatari nationals who seek entry to the UAE are able to apply for entry through the hotline. Persons whose property and other rights are improperly prejudiced, no matter the cause, may seek redress through the UAE judicial system, in which there is presently active participation by Qatari nationals. B. There is no Violation of the Convention 86. Qatar claims that the UAE has unlawfully targeted Qatari citizens on the basis of their nationality.84 Qatar raises claims under Articles 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the CERD, in addition to which it alleges that the UAE is in breach of the “moral principles underlying the CERD and the customary law principle of non-discrimination on arbitrary grounds.”85 Qatar asserts that the 84 Qatar’s Submission, para. 58. 85 Id. At para. 57. Annex 115
24 UAE has not only “failed to enact measures to prevent, prohibit, and criminalize racial discrimination,” but has also “engaged in racial discrimination and criminalized actions intended to benefit Qataris.”86 87. Given the pending proceedings before the ICJ, the UAE does not consider it appropriate to put forward detailed legal arguments in this Response. Instead, in this Section the UAE briefly outlines two main arguments to show that the facts alleged in Qatar’s Submission –even if assumed to be true, which they are not – do not amount to violations of the CERD. 88. First, the CERD contains no express reference to nationality as a ground of discrimination. Qatar’s entire Submission, and allegations that the UAE has violated the CERD, is predicated on the interpretation of the term “national…origin” in the definition of racial discrimination as encompassing present nationality.87 The CERD contains no express reference to nationality as a prohibited ground of discrimination but instead, based on the plain reading of Article 1 and in conjunction with the drafting history, the CERD allows for special measures based on an individual’s present nationality. 89. Differentiation based on nationality is common in the international practice of States and is not uncommon in international law. Countries routinely apply different entry and residence rules to nationals of different States, and periodically review and revise those rules. This “discrimination” based on nationality is further supported in General Recommendation XXX in which the Committee explicitly recognized that “Article 1, paragraph 2, provides for the possibility of differentiating between citizens and non-citizens.”88 As the UAE’s measures are based on present Qatari nationality, and as the measures relate at their core to entry and residence restrictions, there is no violation of the CERD as there is no racial discrimination as defined in Article 1.89 90. Second, the rights contained in the CERD do not create a general right of entry to a country, which is suggested and relied upon throughout Qatar’s Submission. Even assuming for the sake of argument that difference in treatment based on present nationality amounts to a violation of the CERD (as Qatar claims in its Submission), the rights asserted by Qatar are over-broad and in fact are not contained within the CERD. Qatar takes the rights enumerated in the CERD and treats each provision (e.g. right to health, right to education etc.) as encompassing an absolute right for an individual to enter a State for that purpose. The provisions of the CERD are intended to outlaw racial discrimination and ensure equal treatment in the various areas enumerated. These rights do not encompass an absolute ability for an individual to receive the treatment listed (e.g. right to health, right to education etc.) or the right of an individual to enter a State in order to do so. As such, Qatar’s Submission attempts 86 Id. at para. 57. 87 Id. at paras. 59 and 64-65. 88 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX (2004), para. 1 (Attached as Annex 26). 89 See CR 2018/13, pgs. 38-48, paras. 17-60 (Olleson), the pleadings of the UAE before the International Court of Justice in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), 28 June 2018 https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180628-ORA-01-00-B…. Annex 115
25 to create rights not contained within the CERD. As such, the UAE cannot violate these rights asserted by Qatar and furthermore, has not violated the CERD rights of Qatari individuals.90 Any conclusion to the contrary would be contrary to established State practice, which gives countries the ability to regulate the entry and residence conditions within its territory applicable to foreign nationals. ICJ PROCEEDINGS 91. Finally, the UAE recalls that Qatar has instituted proceedings against the UAE in the ICJ under Article 22 of the CERD. Specifically, on 11 June 2018, Qatar filed an Application Instituting Proceedings as well as a Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection under the CERD. The ICJ issued its order in respect of the provisional measures requested by Qatar on 23 July 2018. The ICJ refused to grant any measures in the form sought by Qatar, and instead indicated limited measures in three areas (family re-unification, education and access to justice), in which UAE policy already reflects and complies with the order of the Court. Moreover, the Court indicated a general measure urging both parties not to take any steps that could aggravate the dispute. 92. The ICJ’s provisional measures order reflects the UAE’s long-standing policy and practice with respect to the UAE residence and entry rights applicable to Qatari citizens, as well as the availability to Qatari citizens of access to UAE courts and tribunals. The UAE is confident that its practice in these areas fully conforms to both the ICJ’s order and to its obligations under the CERD, and that upon a close examination of the facts the Court will reach the same conclusion. 93. Notwithstanding the above, the UAE intends to lodge objections under which it will challenge the ICJ’s jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits. The UAE has significant jurisdictional objections in respect of Qatar’s claims in the ICJ proceedings, based on, inter alia, the pre-conditions to jurisdiction of the Court set out in Article 22 of the CERD. In particular, the UAE maintains that, having submitted an Article 11 complaint to the Committee, Qatar should not be permitted to simultaneously initiate proceedings in relation to the same issues in the ICJ. Having made the choice to submit an Article 11 complaint, Qatar must wait for that process to be completed prior to commencing proceedings in the ICJ, as is required by the plain text of Article 22 of the Convention. At this stage of the ICJ proceedings, the UAE has not yet had the opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the ICJ to hear Qatar’s complaint. CONCLUSION 94. The UAE urges the Committee to reject the complaints made by Qatar. The UAE believes that upon an examination of the evidence enclosed with this Response, the Committee will find that the UAE is not in violation of any aspect of the CERD. There are no measures instituted by the UAE limiting the rights of Qatari citizens; the restriction on entry into UAE territory is 90 Id. at pgs. 51-53, paras. 77-91. Annex 115
26 applied to individuals of numerous nationalities and does not constitute any infringement of rights of Qataris. Official UAE data shows that applications are accepted in the vast majority of cases. Today, substantially the same number of Qataris live in the UAE as prior to the start of the crisis on 5 June 2017. The entry and residence rights applicable to Qatari citizens, and the rights that they may exercise within the UAE more generally, are consistent with those available to foreign nationals of many other countries in the UAE. 95. The UAE reserves its right to supplement and amend this Response. Annex 115
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Letter from the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva to the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) referring the matter at issue in ICERD-ISC-2018/2 again to the CERD Committee (29 October 2018)
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State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates,
ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response of the United Arab Emirates (7 November 2018)
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State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates,
ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Supplemental Response of
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Note Verbale of the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) to the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office at Geneva regarding interstate communication ICERD-ISC-2018/2 (14 December 2018), available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CERD/NV_QatarUAE_14Dec2018%20_…
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State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates,
ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Supplemental Response of the UAE on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility
(14 January 2019)
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InamatterbeforetheCommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscriminationICERD-ISC-2018/2SUPPLEMENTALRESPONSEONISSUESOFJURISDICTIONANDADMISSIBILITYoftheUnitedArabEmiratespursuanttotheDecisionadoptedbytheCommitteeontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationduringits97thSession(26November–14December2018)totherequestmadebytheStateofQatarpursuanttoArticle11oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofRacialDiscriminationsubmittedtotheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights,UnitedNationsOffice,Geneva,Switzerlandon14January2019
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PageI.INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................1II.CONTEXTOFTHEDISPUTEANDLACKOFEVIDENCEOFTHEALLEGATIONS..................3III.LACKOFJURISDICTION.....................................................................................................9A.TheCERDDoesNotProhibitDifferentiatedTreatmentBasedonCurrentNationality...............................................................................................................9B.TheCERDCommittee’sJurisdictionExtendsOnlytoCurrentandOngoingViolationsofCERD,NotAllegationsofPastConduct.........................12IV.LACKOFADMISSIBILITY..................................................................................................14A.TheCommitteeMustDeclinetoHearQatar’sArticle11CommunicationBecauseQatar’sInitiationofParallelProceedingsUnderminestheIntegrityoftheDisputeResolutionProvisionsofCERDandoftheICJ.............14B.TheCommitteeMustDeclinetoHearQatar’sArticle11CommunicationSincetheCommunicationAmountstoNoMoreThanEmptySpeculationandThusConstitutesanAbuseofRightsandProcess.........................................20C.TheCommitteeMustDeclinetoHearQatar’sArticle11CommunicationBecauseQatarHasFailedtoEstablishthatLocalRemediesHaveBeenInvokedorExhaustedUnderArticle11(3)oftheCERD.....................................22V.CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................30
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I.Introduction1.ThePermanentMissionoftheUnitedArabEmirates(the“UAE”)totheUnitedNationsOfficeandOtherInternationalOrganizationsinGenevapresentsitscomplimentstotheSecretariatoftheUnitedNations(OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights)andreferstotheOfficeoftheHighCommissioner’sNoteof14December2018(ICERD-ISC2018/2)inwhichtheOfficeoftheHighCommissionertransmitsadecisiontakenbytheCommitteeontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(the“Committee”orthe“CERDCommittee”)atits97thSession(the“Decision”)concerningtheCommunicationunderArticle11oftheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(“CERD”orthe“Convention”),submittedbytheStateofQatar(“Qatar”)totheCommitteeon8March2018(“Qatar’sArticle11Communication”).2.TheDecisionrequeststheUAEto“informtheCommitteewhetheritwishes–withinaperiodofonemonthafterthereceiptofthisrequest–tosupplyanyrelevantinformationonissuesofjurisdictionoftheCommitteeoradmissibilityofthecommunication,includingtheexhaustionofallavailabledomesticremedies.”13.InresponsetotheDecision,theUAEhasthehonourtosubmitthepresentSupplementalResponseonIssuesofJurisdictionandAdmissibility.ThissubmissionmustbereadtogetherwiththeResponseandSupplementalResponsesubmittedbytheUAEon7August2018andon29November2018,respectively,inconnectionwiththeseCERDCommitteeproceedings(“CERDCommitteeProceedings”).4.Inparticular,theargumentsconcerningissuesofjurisdictionandadmissibilitysetoutintheUAE’sSupplementalResponseof29November2018(the“29November2018Submission”)areherebyconfirmed.TheUAEthereforedrawstheattentionoftheMembersoftheCommitteetotheargumentssetoutinthe29November2018Submission,whichprovidemorethansufficientgroundsonwhichtheCommitteemay1NotefromtheSecretariatoftheUnitedNations(OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights),dated14December2018(ICERD-ISC2018/2).
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-2-proceedtodismissQatar’sArticle11Communicationoutofhandforlackofjurisdictionandforbeinginadmissible.5.Inlightofthedetailedargumentsandinformationsetoutinthe29November2018Submission,theUAEcouldhaveseizedthepossibility,mentionedintheCommittee’sDecision,tostatethatitwished“toconfine”itsreply“totheinformationalreadycontainedin[its]previousnotes.”2Ithasdecidednottodosofortworeasons.First,becauseitconsidersthatitmaybeofhelptotheCommitteetohaveatitsdisposalasyntheticstatementoftheUAE’sobjectionstojurisdictionandadmissibility,whichmoreovertakesaccountofadditionalrelevantevidencerelatingtothepastseveralmonths.3InstarkcontradictiontotheunsupportedclaimsofQatar,suchevidenceclearlyestablishesthecontinuingfreedomofentrytotheUAEbyQatarinationalsand,importantlyinrelationtothequestionsbeforetheCommittee,theaccessibilityoftheUAEcourtstoQatarinationals.Second,becausetheUAEconsidersnecessary,forlegalandpolicyreasons,todevelopfurthertheargumentsconcerningtherelationshipbetweentheseCERDCommitteeProceedingsandthosependingbeforetheInternationalCourtofJustice(“ICJ”or“Court”)(“PendingICJCERDProceedings”).Bothproceedingsinvolvethesamepartiesandthesamefactualallegationsandlegalarguments.46.Thissubmissionisorganizedasfollows.SectionIIcontainsgeneralremarksonthecontextofthedisputeandthefatallackofevidentiarysupportforQatar’sclaims.SectionIIIsummarizestheUAE’sobjectionstotheCommittee’sjurisdiction,addinganumberofobservationsrelatedtorecentdevelopmentswhichfurtherreinforcethestrengthofthoseobjections.SectionIVthenrestatestheUAE’sobjectionstoadmissibilityofQatar’sclaims,includingfurtherconsiderationsbasedonthependingcaseonthesamematterbeforetheICJandthelackofexhaustionoflocalremediesinaccordancewithArticle11.3oftheConvention.Finally,SectionVofferssomeconcludingremarks.2Id.3Seeparas.8-12,infra.4Seeparas.25-38,infra.
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-3-II.ContextoftheDisputeandLackofEvidenceoftheAllegationsQatariNationalsarenotMistreatedorTargetedbytheUAE7.ThecomplaintQatarhasbroughtbeforethisCommitteerelatestoallegationsthattheUAEhascarriedoutaseriesofmeasurestargetingQatarinationals.AstheUAEhasexplainedintwoprevioussubmissions,andasitwillfurtherelaborateinthissubmission,thoseallegationsarefalse.WhiletheUAEhas,alongwithtwelveotherStates,severedordowngradeddiplomaticrelationswithQatar5and,forthereasonsstatedinparagraphs14-16below,takencertainotherlawfulmeasurestorestrictairtransportation,postalserviceandtrade(measureswhichdonotinanycaseimplicateobligationsunderCERD),ithas,sincethebreakindiplomaticrelationson5June2017,takenonlyonemeasuredirectlyaffectingthetreatmentofQatarinationals.Thatonemeasurewastheintroductionofminimal,cost-free,requirementsontheentryofQatarinationalsintotheUAE,essentiallyrequiringthattheyapplyforandobtainapprovalforsuchentries.TheserequirementsarelessburdensomethanatypicalentryvisawhichtheUAErequiresofnationalsofmanyotherStatesaroundtheworld.PriortothecurrentdiplomaticcrisisbetweenQatarandtheUAE,Qatarisenjoyedvisa-freeaccesstotheUAEasdidmembersofotherneighbouringcountries.ByrevokingtheseprivilegesandrequiringQataristomeetminimalentryrequirements,theUAEisnotviolatingtherightsofQatarisorany5Egypt,SaudiArabia,Bahrain,Chad,Comoros,theMaldives,Mauritania,SenegalandYemenalsosevereddiplomatictieswithQatar.SeeDeclarationoftheArabRepublicofEgypt,4June2017,availableat:http://www.sis.gov.eg/section/7278/7261?lang=en-us#1,DeclarationoftheKi…,“StatementoftheKingdomofBahrainontheseveranceofdiplomaticrelationswiththeStateofQatar”,5June2017,availableat:https://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=7824&ItemId=7474&language=en…,“ChadshutsdownQatarembassy”,EmiratesNewsAgency,23August2017,availableat:http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302628900,“ComorosseversdiplomaticrelationswithQatar”,SaudiPressAgency,7June2017,availableat:https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1638089,“StatementbytheGovernmentofMaldives”,MinistryofForeignAffairsoftheRepublicofMaldives,5June2017,availableat:https://www.foreign.gov.mv/index.php/en/mediacentre/news/3905-statement…,“LaMauritaniedécidederompresesrelationsdiplomatiquesavecQatar”,AgenceMauritanienned’Information,6June2017,availableat:http://fr.ami.mr/Depeche-41008.html,“Senegal,GabonjoinboycottofQatar”,MiddleEastMonitor,9June2017,availableat:https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170609-senegal-gabon-join-boycott-o…,“YemencutsdiplomatictieswithQatar:statenewsagency”,Reuters,5June2017,availableat:https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-yemen-idUSKBN18W0RS.Addit…“JordandowngradesrelationswithQatarandbansAlJazeera”,TheNational,7June2017,availableat:https://www.thenational.ae/world/jordan-downgrades-relations-with-qatar…,“NigerrecallsambassadortoQatar”,KhaleejTimes,10June2017,availableat:https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/qatar-crisis/niger-recalls-ambassad….
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-4-provisionofanyinternationalinstrument,includingCERD,butismerelyeliminatinganadvantageitpreviouslyextendedtooneparticularnationality.Notably,inD.F.v.Australia,whereaNewZealandpetitionerceasedtoenjoyrightsexclusivelygrantedbyAustraliatoNewZealanders,thisCommitteefoundnoviolationofCERD,notingthattheactimplementingthechange“didnotresultintheoperationofadistinctionbutratherintheremovalofadistinctionwhichhadplacedthepetitionerandallNewZealandcitizensinamorefavourablepositioncomparedtoothernon-citizens.”68.Thatsuchcost-freeentryrequirementsareindeedminimalisevidencedbythenumberofQatarinationalswhohave,since5June2017,enteredandexitedtheUAEdespitethepoliticaldifficultiesbetweenthetwocountries.TheUAEhassubmitteduncontestedevidencetothisCommitteeandtotheICJprovingthat,from5June2017throughJune2018,“QatarinationalshaveenteredandexitedtheUAEonover8,000occasions”.7UpdatedevidencesubmittedherewithfortheCommittee’sconsiderationdemonstratesthatfrom9July2018through31December2018,3,563applicationsbyQatarinationalswerelodgedwiththeUAEauthoritiesforentrypermitstotheUAE,3,353ofwhichwereaccepted.8TheactualregisteredentriesandexitsofQatarinationalsintoandoutoftheUAEfrom1June2018through31December2018amountedto2,876.99.TheUAErespectfullyrequeststheCommitteetotakeparticularnotethatatnotime,whetherinthecourseoftheproceedingsbeforethisCommitteeorintheproceedings6CERD,CommunicationNo.39/2006,D.F.v.Australia,Opinionof22February2008,UNdoc.CERD/C/72/D/39/2006,para.7.1.7SeeApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:Order,23July2018,DissentingOpinionofJudgeCrawford(“DissentingOpinionofJudgeCrawford”),para.7,citingtoevidencesubmittedbytheUAEintheICJproceedings.ThesameevidencewasattachedasAnnex5totheUAE’sResponseof7August2018.8Annex1,LetterfromtheFederalAuthorityforIdentityandCitizenship,dated10January2019,summarizingstatisticsandattachingdetailedrecordsintablesinExcelfilesregardingthosestatistics.See,inparticular,Annex1.2,[ExcelRedacted]RequestsforEntryorExitofQatariNationalsfrom9July2018until31December2018(Arabicoriginal,Englishtranslation).9Annex1,LetterfromtheFederalAuthorityforIdentityandCitizenship,dated10January2019,summarizingstatisticsandattachingdetailedrecordsintablesinExcelfilesregardingthosestatistics.See,inparticular,Annex1.1,[ExcelRedacted]EntranceandExitforQatariNationalsfrom1June2018until31December2018(Arabicoriginal;Englishtranslation).
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-5-beforetheICJaddressingthesamefactualandlegalallegations,hasQatarcontestedorrebuttedthisevidence.10.NeitherhasQatarcontestednorrebuttedtheevidenceputforwardbytheUAEdemonstratingthatQatarinationalscontinuetoresidefreelyintheUAE,asclarifiedbythestatementoftheUAEMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperationof5July2018.10ThedocumentaryevidencesubmittedbytheUAEshowsthattherearethousandsofQatarinationalsthatcontinuetovisitandresideintheUAE.11AsofJune2018,thenumberofQatarisintheUAEamountedto2,194.12Inadditiontothesefiguresandthosementionedinparagraph8aboveofQatarisenteringorexitingtheUAEsincethebeginningofthecrisisinJune2017untiltheendof2018,theUAEFederalAuthorityforIdentityandCitizenshiphasconfirmedthatasof10January2019thereare702QatarinationalsresidingintheUAEwhoholdUAEidentificationdocuments.1311.ThereisonlyoneconclusiontheCommitteemayreasonablydrawfromtheevidencepresentedtoit,whichisthat,contrarytotheunfoundedstatementsmadebyQatartothisCommittee,QatarinationalsarefreetoenterandexittheUAEandareinfactdoingsoinlargenumbers.Moreover,QatarinationalscontinueresidingintheUAEinthesamemannerastheydidbefore5June2017.10“AnOfficialStatementbytheUAEMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperation”,5July2018,availableat:https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem…(“TheUAEMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperationwishestoconfirmthatQataricitizensalreadyresidentintheUAEneednotapplyforpermissiontocontinueresidenceintheUAE.”).11Annex1,LetterfromtheFederalAuthorityforIdentityandCitizenship,dated10January2019,summarizingstatisticsandattachingdetailedrecordsintablesinExcelfilesregardingthosestatistics.Seealso,ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:VerbatimRecordofPublicSittingof28June2018,at10:00a.m.(CR2018/13),p.12,para.9(Alnowais).12ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:VerbatimRecordofPublicSittingof28June2018,at10:00a.m.(CR2018/13),p.64,para.27(Shaw).13Annex1,LetterfromtheFederalAuthorityforIdentityandCitizenship,dated10January2019,summarizingstatisticsandattachingdetailedrecordsintablesinExcelfilesregardingthosestatistics.See,inparticular,Annex1.3,[ExcelRedacted]HoldersofUAEResidentPermits(ArabicOriginal,EnglishTranslation).
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-6-12.OtherevidenceofparticularrelevanceforthisCommitteewhichhasremainedunrebuttedbyQatarthroughouttheseCERDCommitteeProceedingsandthePendingICJCERDProceedingsincludesthatrelatedto:a.TheunrestrictedaccessQatarinationalsinoroutsidetheUAEhavetodomesticcourtsintheUAE.TheevidencesubmittedbytheUAEshowsthatQatarinationalshaveappearedasplaintiffsordefendantsbeforetheUAEcourtshundredsoftimessinceJune2017.14b.ThenumberofQatarinationalsintheUAEwhohavereceivedorarereceivingmedicaltreatmentatUAEmedicalfacilities.Therecordsshowover300visitsfromJuly2017onwardbyQatarinationalstohospitalsandclinicswithintheUAE.15c.ThenumberofQatarinationalswhoareenrolledinUAEeducationalinstitutions.Onthis,a3January2019letterfromtheMinistryofEducationshowsthatthenumberofQataristudentswhocontinuetostudyinallEmiratesandatalllevelsofstudyfortheacademicyear2017/2018amountsto477andfortheacademicyear2018/2019thisnumberamountsto310.16d.ThenumberofQatarinationalswhoownorareengagedinoperatinglicensedbusinessesintheUAE;17ande.ThecontinuousenjoymentbyQatarinationalsoftheirrighttopropertyintheUAE,whichisevidencedbytheirabilitytoown,purchase,sellandmanagereal14See,e.g.,UAE’sResponseof7August2018,Annex16(InternationalJudicialCooperationDepartment–MinistryofJusticeLetter)andAnnex18(JudicialRecords).Annex2,StatementofthecasesinvolvingaQataricitizenandbeingexaminedbytheUAEcourtsintheperiod6June2017until25September2018.ThesestatisticsarebrokendownbytheFederalCourtsandinsomecasestheycontaininformationonthecourtsofsomeoftheemirates.15UAE’sResponseof7August2018,para.44,citingtoAnnex8“Health–QatariswithDamanHealthInsurance”,pp.13-19.16Annex3,LetterfromtheMinistryofEducationtotheMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperation,dated3January2019.Seealso,UAE’sResponseof7August2018,para.51,citingtoAnnex11(Immigration-StudentEntryRecords)andAnnex12(QatariStudentRecords).17UAE’sResponseof7August2018,paras.52-54,citingtoAnnex4(Part1ReportofAbuDhabipoliceonHotline,RealEstate,Funds,LicensesandImmigration,p.14)andAnnex13(CommercialLicenses–SampleMaterials).
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-7-estateintheUAE,includingthroughtheexecutionofpowersofattorney.18Regardingpowersofattorney,statisticsoftheFederalCourtintheperiod6June2017to25September2018indicatethattherewere146powersofattorneygrantedbyQataricitizens.1913.Again,theUAErespectfullycallsupontheCommitteetotakeduenoticethatQatarhasnotcontestedthisempiricalevidencewithanythingotherthanunsupportedandsensationalizedvitriol.20Qatar’ssilenceinthefaceofthefactsanditsinabilitytoreplyinanycoherentordirectmannertotheevidencesubmittedbytheUAEconfirmsthatQatar’sallegationsbeforethisCommitteeofmistreatmentofQatarinationalsbytheUAEarefalse.Qatar’sSupportforExtremistViolenceandTerrorismCausedtheGulfCrisis14.Initsprevioustwosubmissions,theUAEalsoaskedtheCommitteetoconsiderthatthelawfulmeasurestakenbytheUAEon5June2017didnotoccurinavacuum.ThecontextisthepersistentandpernicioussupportbyQatarforextremistandterroristgroupstargetingethnicandreligiousminorities,establishedgovernmentsandregionalstability.Thisconductledin2013and2014totheconclusionofaseriesofagreementsamongtheGulfStates,includingQatar(the“RiyadhAgreements”21)underwhichQataragreedto18UAE’sResponseof7August2018,paras.55-57,citingtoAnnex14(Business–UAEEmbassy–AuthenticationRecords,pp.19-25),Annex15(PowerofAttorney)andAnnex16(InternationalJudicialCooperationDepartment–MinistryofJusticeLetter).19Annex2,StatementofthecasesinvolvingaQataricitizenandbeingexaminedbytheUAEcourtsintheperiod6June2017until25September2018,p.2.20See,e.g.,NoteVerbaleofQatartotheCERDCommittee,dated29October2018,requestingtheCommitteetore-initiateQatar’scomplaintagainsttheUAE,inwhichQatarstates,withoutanysupportwhatsoever,that“ItisequallyclearthatQatarisdonothavedomesticremediestoinvokeorexhaustintheUnitedArabEmirates.AnynominalremediesareeitherunavailableorineffectiveinlightoftheexpulsionofQatarisfromtheUnitedArabEmiratesandensuingtravelrestrictions,aswellastheongoingcampaignofhatredagainstQatarandQatarisintheterritoryoftheUnitedArabEmirates.”NoreferenceismadeinthisunsupportedandoutrageousstatementtothedocumentedeaseofaccesstotheUAEanditscourtsbyQatarinationals.21FirstRiyadhAgreement,23and24November2013,UnitedNationsRegistrationNumber55378(“FirstRiyadhAgreement”);MechanismImplementingtheRiyadhAgreement,17April2014,UnitedNationsRegistrationNumber55378(“MechanismImplementingtheRiyadhAgreement”);SupplementaryRiyadhAgreement,16November2014,UnitedNationsRegistrationNumber55378(“SupplementaryRiyadhAgreement”).ThePartiestotheRiyadhAgreementsare:theUAE,Qatar,Bahrain,Kuwait,OmanandSaudiArabia.
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-8-ceasesupportforsuchgroupsandtostopthepromotionofhatespeech,includingthroughitsstate-ownedmediaoutletssuchasAl-JazeeraArabic.2215.TheveryexistenceoftheRiyadhAgreements,andQatar’ssigninguptothem,isinitselfsufficientproofthatQatarwasengaginginthevilebehaviourthoseagreementswereintendedtobringtoanend;indeed,itisanadmissionbyQatarofthatbehaviour.Moreover,thereisnodearthofotherevidenceofQatar’ssupportforgroupsengagedinextremistviolence,bothbeforeandaftertheconclusionoftheRiyadhAgreements.TheUAEbroughtthistotheCommittee’sattentioninsummaryfashioninitsprevioussubmissions.TheUAEfurthernotedthatQatar’sviolationoftheRiyadhAgreementsiswhatdirectlyledtothebreakindiplomaticrelationsbetweennumerousStates,includingtheUAE,andQataronorabout5June2017,aswellastotheothermeasuresthentaken.23Indeed,theseeventswereforeshadowedbytheRiyadhAgreementsthemselves,whichprovidedthatintheeventanysignatoryweretoviolatethem,“theotherGCCCountriesshallhavetherighttotakeanyappropriateactiontoprotecttheirsecurityandstability.”2416.ThiscontextisrelevanttotheCommittee’sconsiderationofthismatternotonlybecauseitisimportantthattheMembersoftheCommitteeappreciatethetruenatureandcharacteroftheQatarigovernment’sactions,butalsobecauseithelpsexplainwhyQatarhasbeenpreparedtoadvanceoutrightfalsehoodsinpursuingitsaggressivecampaignoflegalactionsallegingallmannerofinternationalresponsibilityagainsttheUAE,includingbeforethisCommittee.Theanswerisabundantlyclear.ItisthroughsuchfalsehoodsandexaggerationsthatQatarseekstodistractattentionandcoveritsownresponsibilityforitsreprehensiblebehavior.22PursuanttotheRiyadhAgreements,Qatarexpresslyundertooknottosupport“theMuslimBrotherhoodoranyorganizations,groupsorindividualsthatthreatenthesecurityofthe[GCC]states”oranytypeof“antagonisticmedia”.FirstRiyadhAgreement,Articles1and2.Qatarfurtherundertooknotto“giverefuge,employ,orsupport[…]anypersonoramediaapparatusthatharboursinclinationsharmfultoany[GCC]state”.SupplementaryRiyadhAgreement,Article3(c).TheRiyadhAgreementsalsoexpresslyreferredtoQatar’sState-ownedandcontrollednewsnetworkAlJazeera.SupplementaryRiyadhAgreement,Article3(d).23UAE’sResponseof7August2018,paras.8-10;UAE’sSupplementalResponseof29November2018,paras.10-12.24MechanismImplementingtheRiyadhAgreement,p.3(“Thirdly:ComplianceProcedures,3.WithregardstotheinternalsecurityoftheGCCCountries”).
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-9-III.LackofJurisdiction17.TheCommittee’sattentionhaspreviouslybeendrawntoatleasttwojurisdictionalgroundsonwhichQatar’sArticle11Communicationshouldberejected.Theseare(i)Qatar’sArticle11Communicationgoesonlytodifferentiatedtreatmentonthebasisofnationality,amatterfallingwhollyoutsidethescopeoftheCERD;and(ii)thedisputeresolutionprocedureunderArticles11to13oftheCERDisstrictlyconfinedtoongoingallegedbreachesoftheCERD,whichunderanyviewofthefactsofthisdisputearenotpresent.A.TheCERDDoesNotProhibitDifferentiatedTreatmentBasedonCurrentNationality18.AselaboratedingreaterdetailintheUAE’s29November2018Submission,Qatar’scomplaintbeforetheCERDCommitteeisentirelybasedonallegeddifferentiatedtreatmentbytheUAEofpersonshavingQatarinationality.25WhiletheUAEhasprovidedoverwhelmingandunrebuttedevidencetotheCommitteethatithasnotimposedsuchdifferentiatedtreatmentonQatarinationalsandthatQatarinationalsenjoythesameorbetterrightsintheUAEaspersonsofothernon-UAEnationalities,thedefinitionofracialdiscriminationunderArticle1oftheCERD,andthustheprotectionsprovidedundertheConvention,donotinanycaseextendtodistinctionsbasedoncurrentnationality.26Therefore,anysuchdistinctions,eveniftheyweretoexist(quodnon),donotinvolverightsprotectedbytheCERDandcouldnotprovideabasisonwhichtolodgeacomplaintwiththeCERDCommittee.Forthesamereason,andbecausetheCERDCommittee’sjurisdictionextendsonlytocircumstancesinwhichaStateParty“isnotgivingeffecttotheprovisionsofthisConvention”27,theCommitteehasnojurisdictiontoentertainthedisputeortoprogressittoanadhocConciliationCommissionasthat“dispute”simplydoesnotrelatetotheprovisionsoftheConvention.25UAE’sSupplementalResponseof29November2018,paras.30-45.26Id.27ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,Article11(1).
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-10-19.WhiletheICJintheOrderforprovisionalmeasuresrenderedon23July2018deferredthe“questionwhethertheexpression‘national...origin’mentionedinArticle1,paragraph1,ofCERD,encompassesdiscriminationbasedonthe‘presentnationality’oftheindividual”,holdingthattheCourt“neednotdecide...whichofthesediverginginterpretationsoftheConventionisthecorrectone,”28itshouldbenotedthatnotasinglejudgepronouncedhisorhersupportforQatar’sinclusionofcurrentnationalityasaprohibitedbasisofdifferentiatedtreatmentundertheCERD.20.Onthecontrary,anumberofeminentjudgeswhole-heartedlysupportedtheoppositeandself-evidentconclusionthatnationality,asabasisfordifferentiatedtreatment,isnotproscribedbytheCERD.TheseincludeJudgesTomka,Gaja,Gevorgian,CrawfordandSalam,whosereasonedviewsonthisimportantissue,quotedbelowatlength,theUAErespectfullyurgestheCommitteetoadopt:a)JudgesTomka,GajaandGevorgianstatedinaJointDeclarationthat:“WhentheConventionconsiders‘nationalorigin’asoneoftheprohibitedbasesfordiscrimination,itdoesnotrefertonationality.Inourview,thetwotermsarenotidenticalandshouldnotbeunderstoodassynonymous.ThetravauxpréparatoiressupportthisviewandindicatethatStatessoughttoexcludedistinctiononthebasisofnationalityfromthescopeofCERD...Theomissionofareferencetonationalitymaybeeasilyexplained.ShouldCERDbeconsideredascoveringalsodiscriminationbasedonnationality,theConventionwouldbeafar-reachinginstrument,thatcontainsaclauseprovidingthat,withregardtothewidearrayofcivilrightsthatareprotectedunderCERD,allforeignersmustbetreatedbythehostStateinthesamewayasnationalsoftheStatewhoenjoythemostfavourabletreatment.”2928ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:Order,23July2018,para.27.29ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:Order,23July2018,JointDeclarationofJudgesTomka,GajaandGevorgian,para.4.
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-11-b)JudgeCrawfordstatedthatthe“legaldifficulty”withQatar’srequestforprovisionalmeasures“isthatArticle1oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(CERD)distinguishesonitsfacebetweendiscriminationongroundsofnationalorigin(equatedtoracialdiscriminationandprohibitedperse)anddifferentiationongroundsofnationality(notprohibitedassuch).Moreover,thatdistinctionfindsitsreflectioninwidespreadStatepracticegivingpreferencestonationalsofsomecountriesoverothersinmatterssuchastherightstoenterortoreside,entitlementtosocialsecurity,universityfeesandmanyotherthings,inpeaceandduringarmedconflict.”30c)JudgeSalamstatedthat“theterms‘nationalorethnicorigin’usedintheConventiondifferintheirordinarymeaningtothetermnationality.…TheaimofCERDisthustobringanend,inthedecolonizationandpost-decolonizationperiod,toallmanifestationsandgovernmentalpoliciesofdiscriminationbasedonracialsuperiorityorhatred;itdoesnotconcernquestionsrelatingtonationality...Thisquestionofthedistinctionbetween‘nationality’and‘nationalorigin’shouldnot,inmyview,admitofanyconfusion.Theyaretwodifferentnotions.Anexamplethatclearlyillustratesthisdifferenceisthewell-knowncaseofAmericancitizensofJapaneseoriginwhowereincarceratedfollowingtheattackonPearlHarborduringtheSecondWorldWar.DespitehavingAmericannationality,thesecitizensweresubjecttoracialdiscriminationbasedontheir‘nationalorigin’,nottheirnationality,andwereroundedupandheldin‘WarRelocationCamps’.Asimilartypeofdiscriminationbasedon‘nationalorigin’alsoaffectedalargenumberofindividualsofGermanorigin,regardlessoftheirnationalityatthattime,inseveralcountriesafterboththeFirstandSecondWorldWars.Iwouldalsopointoutthatthedistinctiontobedrawnbetween‘nationality’and‘nationalorigin’isconfirmedbythetravauxpréparatoiresofCERD,particularlytheproposedamendmentstothewordingofArticle1.Inanyevent,hadStateswantedtosay‘nationality’ratherthan‘nationalorigin'inArticle30ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:Order,23July2018,DissentingOpinionofJudgeCrawford,para.1.
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-12-1ofCERD,theycouldhavedoneso.Likewise,theycouldhaveusedthewording‘nationalityandnationalorigin’hadtheyintendedtoincludebothcategories,whichtheydidnotdo.”3121.TheUAErespectfullysubmitsthattheCommitteeshouldfollowthesoundreasoningsupportingtheviewsoftheseeminentICJjudges.B.TheCERDCommittee’sJurisdictionExtendsOnlytoCurrentandOngoingViolationsofCERD,NotAllegationsofPastConduct22.Aselaboratedingreaterdetailinthe29November2018Submission,underArticle11oftheConvention,thejurisdictionoftheCommitteeextendsexclusivelytoallegationsofongoingandcurrentconduct,ratherthanretrospectivedisputeresolution.32ThisisclearfromtheordinarymeaningofthetermsofArticle11,whichpermitsaStatePartytoreferamattertotheCommitteewhenanotherStateParty“isnotgivingeffect”totheprovisionsoftheConvention(emphasisadded).ThisinterpretationisconfirmedwhenreadingArticle11initscontextandinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose.TheonlyremedyenvisagedintheCERDfortheinter-Stateprocedureisthefacilitatednegotiatedamicableresolutionofthesituation.ItmustthereforebefortheStatesubmittingacomplainttomakeacrediblecasethatthereisasituationtoresolve.23.Qatarhasfailedtodoso.IthasnotprovidedtheCommitteewithanyprobativeevidenceofanyongoingconductbytheUAEevenarguablyinviolationoftheConvention.Indeed,evenasofthetimeoftheICJhearingonprovisionalmeasuresinJune2018anumberofjudgesnotedthelackofevidenceofanyallegationsofcontinuingeffectsonQatarinationalssincethebreakindiplomaticrelationsbetweentheUAEandQatar.33Justasimportantly,QatarhasnotprovidedtotheCommitteeanyprooftocontestorrebut31ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:Order,23July2018,DissentingOpinionofJudgeSalam,paras.3(c),5,6,7.32UAE’sSupplementalResponseof29November2018,paras.46-53.33See,e.g.,DissentingOpinionofJudgeCrawford,para.9(“ItisnotclearfromtheevidencethatindividualsarecontinuingtosuffertheseconsequencesinJuly2018.MostofthereportsbynationalandinternationalhumanrightsorganizationssubmittedbyQatarrelatetotheperiodJunetoAugust2017.”);DissentingOpinionofJudgeBhandari,para.3.
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-13-theevidencewhichtheUAEhassubmittedtothisCommitteedemonstratingthatthetreatmentaffordedtoQatarinationalsintheUAEatpresent(includingwithrespecttoentryandexitfromthecountry,residence,healthcare,education,propertyownership,conductingbusinessaffairsandaccesstojudicialtribunals)reflectsnohintofmistreatmentordiscrimination.3424.TheinformationprovidedbyQatarinsupportofitscomplaintisgeneralized,exaggeratedandoutdated.ItisnoteworthythatthenumerouspublicationsissuedbyQatar’sNationalHumanRightsCommittee(the“NHRC”)sinceJune2018ontheallegedeffectsofthebreakinrelationsbetweentheUAEandQataressentiallyrestatethesameanonymousclaimspreviouslyincludedinotherNHRCreports.35Certainly,noneoftheinformationrelieduponbyQatariscapableofdemonstratinganythingneara“campaignofhatredagainstQatarandQatarisintheterritoryoftheUnitedArabEmirates”.3625.Underthesecircumstances,theclaimsof“coercivemeasures”supposedlybeinginflictedbytheUAEonQatarinationalsinacontinuing“campaignofhatred”disingenuouslyadvancedbyQatarlackallcredibility.TheUAErespectfullysubmitsthattheCommitteethereforehasnoreasonableevidentiarybasisonwhichtoconsiderthatanyallegationsofviolationsoftheConventionbytheUAEmaybeongoing.Itwouldthereforebe34Seeparas.7-13,supra.35TheUAEnotesthatthewebsiteoftheQatariNationalHumanRightsCommittee(“NHRC”)includesinitssectionentitled“Publications”aseriesof9shortreportseachentitled“EffectsoftheBlockadeon”aspecifichumanright,suchas“therighttolitigation”,“therighttoprivateproperty”,“therighttofamilyreunification”,“therightofeducation”,“therighttofreedomofmovementandresidence”,amongstothers.SeeQatar’sNationalHumanRightsCommittee,Publications,availableat:http://nhrc-qa.org/en/publications/nhrc-publications/.Thesereportsarepa…’sreporton“EffectsoftheBlockadeontherighttolitigation”,whichmentionsthecaseofthetwoQataribrothers“Mr.B.Th.AndMr.A.M.”andtheirallegedinabilitytoaccesstheirinheritanceintheUAE.ThissamecasewasrelieduponbyQatarbeforetheICJandtheonlyevidencecitedforitwastheNHRC’sReportofDecember2017.SeeNHRC,6MonthsofViolations,WhatHappensNow?TheFourthGeneralReportontheViolationsofHumanRightsArisingfromtheBlockadeoftheStateofQatar,5Dec.2017,p.19.Seealso,ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:VerbatimRecordofPublicSittingof27June2018,at10:00a.m.(CR2018/12),p.44,para.44(Amirmar);VerbatimRecordofPublicSittingof29June2018at4:30p.m.(CR2018/15),p.29,para.12(Buderi).36NoteVerbaleofQatartotheCERDCommittee,dated29October2018(referringitsdisputeonceagaintotheCommitteeunderArticle11oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofRacialDiscrimination).
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-14-inappropriatefortheCommitteetoproceedtoentertainQatar’srequestanyfurtherortoreferittoaConciliationCommissionunderArticles11-13oftheCERD.Indeed,ratherthanentertainingsuchunsubstantiatedclaims,theCommitteewouldbefullyjustifiedinissuingarebuketoQatarforpursuingthemwhentheysoobviouslylackanyfactualbasis.IV.LackofAdmissibility26.Initsprevioussubmissions,theUAEhaspointedtothreegroundsonwhichQatar’sArticle11Communicationshouldbedismissedforreasonsofadmissibility.Thesegroundsaresummarizedbelow,alongwithsomeadditionalconsiderationswhichtheCommitteeshouldtakeintoaccount.A.TheCommitteeMustDeclinetoHearQatar’sArticle11CommunicationBecauseQatar’sInitiationofParallelProceedingsUnderminestheIntegrityoftheDisputeResolutionProvisionsofCERDandoftheICJ27.Article22oftheCERDprovides:AnydisputebetweentwoormoreStatesPartieswithrespecttotheinterpretationorapplicationofthisConvention,whichisnotsettledbynegotiationorbytheproceduresexpresslyprovidedforinthisConvention,shall,attherequestofanyofthepartiestothedispute,bereferredtotheInternationalCourtofJusticefordecision,unlessthedisputantsagreetoanothermodeofsettlement.28.ItisclearfromtheordinarymeaningofthetermsofthisprovisionthattheCERDenvisagesthatthetreaty-specificdisputeresolutionmechanismitofferstoitsStatesParties(i.e.,resorttotheCERDCommitteeunderArticle11)shouldbeexploredandexhaustedbeforeescalatingtoanICJprocess.Unlikeothertreaties,theCERDdisputeresolutionprovisionsdonotprovidethataStatePartymayseizetheICJofthedisputeorseekprovisionalmeasuresfromtheICJwhiletheothermethodsofdisputesettlementundertheCERDarebeingpursued.37TheCourthasconfirmedthelinearnatureof37Cf.withrespecttootherpermanentinternationaltribunals,seee.g.,UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSeaof10December1982,Article290,whichprovidesthatincertainsituations,“[p]endingtheconstitutionofanarbitraltribunaltowhichadisputeisbeingsubmitted,theInternationalTribunalfortheLawoftheSea...mayprescribe,modifyorrevokeprovisionalmeasuresinaccordancewiththisarticleifitconsidersthatprimafaciethe
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-15-disputeresolutionundertheCERDbyholdingthatthelackofsettlementbynegotiationsorbytheproceduresexpresslysetoutintheCERDare“proceduralpreconditionstobemetbeforetheseisinoftheCourt.”3829.ThisholdingbytheICJconfirmsthatQatarwaslegallyobligedtoexhausttheproceduresexpresslyprovidedintheCERD“beforetheseisinoftheCourt”.Theordinarymeaningoftheterm“precondition”confirmsthatmuch.30.However,QatarsubmittedthematterfortheconsiderationoftheICJon11June2018whiletheCERDArticle11processithadstartedbyitsCommunicationof8March2018wasstillunderway.Infact,thatprocesshadnotevenproperlycommenced.Itisunquestionablethatthetwoproceedingsrelatetothesamefactualsituation,concernthesameallegedviolationsandapplythesameinternationallegalframework.AcomparisonbetweentheQatariCommunicationsubmittedpursuanttoArticle11oftheCERDon8March2018,andcommunicatedtotheUAEon7May2018,andtheQatariApplicationinstitutingproceedingsbeforetheICJon11Juneofthesameyearconfirmsthisoverlap.39AftermakingitsinitialArticle11CommunicationtotheCommittee,QatarrushedtomakeitsapplicationtotheICJ.40Havingdoneso,andhavingseizedtheCourtofthesamedisputewhichisinfrontofthisCommittee,on29October201841afterthesettingupoftheproceduralcalendaronthemeritsbytheCourt,42Qatarcamebacktothetribunalwhichistobeconstitutedwouldhavejurisdictionandthattheurgencyofthesituationsorequires.”Seealso,AmericanConventiononHumanRightsof22November1969,Article63.2,whichprovidesforthepoweroftheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightstoindicateprovisionalmeasuresandallowsforthispowertobeexercisedattherequestoftheInter-AmericanCommission“[w]ithrespecttoacasenotyetsubmittedtotheCourt.”38ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof23July2018,para.29,confirmingApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Georgiav.RussianFederation),PreliminaryObjections,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2011(I),p.128,para.141.39SeeCommunicationSubmittedPursuanttoArticle11oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates,dated8March2018;InternationalCourtofJustice,ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),ApplicationInstitutingProceedings,11June2018.40ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),Applicationinstitutingproceedings,11June2018.41NoteVerbaleofQatartotheCERDCommittee,dated29October2018(referringagaintotheCommitteeQatar’scomplaintagainsttheUAE).42ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),Orderof25July2018,FixingofTimeLimits:MemorialandCounter-Memorial.
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-16-CommitteeinordertoseektoresumetheveryprocessithadpreviouslybypassedinfavouroftheICJ.31.Throughitsactions,Qatarhascreatedalispendenssituation,wheretwoparallelproceedingsbearingontheexactsamedisputebetweenthesamepartiesareprogressingsimultaneously.ByitsconductofconcurrentlybringingandpursuingidenticalproceedingsbeforetheCERDCommitteeandtheICJ,Qatarhasactedagainsttheprincipleofavoidanceofduplicativelitigation.CaselawandscholarlywritinghaswarnedagainstthedangersanddisadvantagesofduplicativelitigationtacticssuchastheoneemployedbyQatar:ThePermanentCourtofInternationalJusticeinPolishUpperSilesiaexplainedthattheobjectofthe“doctrineoflitispendence”is“topreventthepossibilityofconflictingjudgments.”43YuvalShany:“Suchduplicativepracticesdrawheavilyonscarcejudicialresources,carrytheriskoflegalhavoc,whichmightbecausedbyinconsistentdecisions,andplaceanundueburdenonsomeorallofthepartiesduetoincreasedlitigationexpensesandreducedlegalcertainty...Theco-existenceoftwoormoresimultaneousproceedingsbeforedifferentforaplacesanunusuallyheavyburdenonthepartiestolitigation,whicharerequiredtomaintaintwolegalteamsorshuttlebetweentwoormoretribunals.Italsoentailstheinvestmentofunnecessarilyduplicativejudicialtimeandresourcesbycourtsandtribunalsthatarefacedwithsimilar(ifnotidentical)tasksandyetareunabletorelyontheworkofeachother.”4443GermanInterestsinPolishUpperSilesia(Germanyv.Poland),1925P.C.I.J.(ser.A)No.6(Aug.25),p.20.44YuvalShany,TheCompetingJurisdictionsofInternationalCourtsandTribunals(OxfordUniversityPress2003),pp.155-156.
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-17-CampbellMcLachlan:“[T]hereiswidespreadacceptancethatduplicativelitigationwithinthesamelegalsystemisnotpermitted,asbeingcontrarytodueprocessandtheRuleofLaw...Thepropositionthattheavoidanceofduplicativelitigationisageneralprincipleoflawgainsfurtherpowerfulsupportfromthe2004ResolutionoftheInstitutdeDroitInternational...Furthermore,theapplicationofageneralprincipleoftheavoidanceofduplicativelitigationgainsforcefromitscloseconnection...withthedoctrineofresjudicata....[T]heavoidanceoftheriskofinconsistentjudgmentsisoneofthereasonscommonlyadvancedforboththedoctrineofresjudicataandthedoctrineoflispendens.4532.Similarly,byprosecutingthesetwoproceduressimultaneously,Qatarviolatestheprincipleofelectaunavianondaturrecursusadalteram(“whenonewayhasbeenchosen,norecourseisgiventoanother”),sometimesknownastheprincipleofelection:Thechoiceofaspecificforumcanbeperceivedasindicativeoftheintenttoresolvethedisputeintheselectedforumtotheexclusionofallalternativefora.Thismeansthatapartyisestoppedfrominitiatingparallelproceedingsorrelitigatingasettledcaseifthefirst-in-timeforumwasseizedonhisorherinitiative(orwiththatparty’sapproval).4633.Byfailingtorespectthisprinciple,QatarisabusingtheCERDcomplaintsmechanismprocessanditsrightsundertheCERD.ItispursuinginparalleltheverysameCERDcomplaintagainsttheUAEbeforetwomutuallyexclusivefora.ThisisindirectviolationofthehierarchicalandlineardisputeresolutionarchitectureoftheCERD,andmoreovermayentangletheCourtandtheCERDCommitteeinconflictinginterpretationsofthesameCERDprovisionsinconnectionwiththesamedisputeandatthesametime.34.Theneedtoavoidconflictinginterpretationsshouldbeasufficientargument47tojustifyadecisionoftheCERDCommitteedeclaringQatar’sArticle11Communication45CampbellMcLachlan,“LisPendensinInternationalLitigation”,CollectedCoursesofTheHagueAcademyofInternationalLaw,Vol.336(2009),pp.461-463.46YuvalShany,TheCompetingJurisdictionsofInternationalCourtsandTribunals(OxfordUniversityPress2003),p.23.47Seepara.31,supra,citingtoCampbellMcLachlan,“LisPendensinInternationalLitigation”,CollectedCoursesofTheHagueAcademyofInternationalLaw,Vol.336(2009),pp.461-463.
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-18-inadmissible.Insituationsoflispendens,otherinternationalcourtsandtribunalshavebeenverysensitivetotheriskgeneratedbyparallelproceedings.Forexample,theArbitralTribunalestablishedonthebasisofAnnexVIItotheUNLawoftheSeaConventionforthesettlementoftheMOXPlantdisputebetweenIrelandandtheUnitedKingdominvoked“considerationsofmutualrespectandcomitywhichshouldprevailbetweenjudicialinstitutions”48asabasisforsuspendingitsproceedingswhileawaitingadecisionoftheEuropeanCourtofJusticeonthequestionwhethertheEuropeanCommunityhadexclusiveorpartialcompetenceonmattersdealtwithbycertainprovisionsoftheLawoftheSeaConvention.49Whenmakingitsdecisionsuspendingtheproceedings,theArbitralTribunalalsostressedthat“aprocedurethatmightresultintwoconflictingdecisionsonthesameissuewouldnotbehelpfultotheresolutionofthedisputebetweentheParties.”5035.ThereisanotherargumentinsupportofthesameconclusionthattheCommittee,itisrespectfullysuggested,shouldnotfailtoconsider.IftheCommitteeweretodeclareQatar’sArticle11Communicationadmissible,thearchitectureoftheCERDsystemforthesettlementofdisputeswouldbecompromised.Itwouldnolongerbealinearandincrementaldisputeresolutionprocedure.TheclearhierarchicalstructuresetoutintheCERDunderwhichtheproceedingsbeforetheCERDCommitteeare“preconditions”ofand,therefore,mustprecedethosebeforetheCourtwouldbereplacedbyaconfusinguncoordinatedsetofpossibilitiesforengagementofwhateverprocedurewouldseematagivenmomentthemostconvenient.48MOXPlantCase(Irelandv.UnitedKingdom),OrderNo.3,SuspensionofProceedingsonJurisdictionandMerits,andRequestforFurtherProvisionalMeasures,24June2003,availableatinwww.pca-cpa.org,para.28.49Id.,para.29.50Id.,para.28.Thecasebroughtincon….
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-19-36.Tocontinueinparallelwouldnotonlyjeopardisetheintegrityofthesystemandriskresultinginfragmentedjurisprudence.ItwouldalsowreakirreparableharmontheproceduralrightsoftheUAE,whichwouldberequiredtosimultaneouslydefenditselfagainstthesameallegationsintwooverlappingandparallelprocedures.37.Thiswouldbeincontradictionwiththeprincipleoftheequalityoftheparties.Indeed,theICJhasemphasizedthat:“[t]heprincipleofequalityofthepartiesfollowsfromtherequirementsofgoodadministrationofjustice”51;that“theequalityofthepartiestothedisputemustremainthebasicprinciplefortheCourt”52;andthatequalityofthepartiesmustbepreservedwhentheyareinvolved,pursuanttoArticle2,paragraph3,oftheCharter,intheprocessofsettlinganinternationaldisputebypeacefulmeans.5338.TherecannotbeequalityofthepartieswhenQatarhasunilaterallytakenforitselftwoopportunitiestolitigateagainsttheUAEinoverlappingandparallelproceedings.39.AsthedefendingParty,theburdenoftheduplicativelitigationandthenegativeconsequencesoftheimproperadvantageQatarhastakenforitself,falldisproportionatelyontheUAE.TotheextentthatproceduralstepsinQatar’sArticle11CommunicationproceedingsunderCERDprecedethoseinthecasebeforetheICJ,theUAEwillbeforcedtochoosebetweenforsakingitsrightstomountafulldefenceinthepresentCERDcommunicationprocedureorsacrificingitsrighttoproceduralequalityintheICJcase.QatarwillbeaffordedthewhollyimproperopportunitytoforeseeandunderminetheUAE’slitigationstrategy,bytakingresponsivestepsinthecasebeforetheICJ.40.TheUAErespectfullyinvitestheCommitteetoconsiderthebroaderimplicationstoitslegitimacythatareembeddedinQatar’sconduct.Qatar’sattemptsatforum-shoppingin51JudgmentsoftheAdministrativeTribunaloftheI.L.O.uponcomplaintsmadeagainsttheU.N.E.S.C.O.,AdvisoryOpinionofOctober23rd,1956,I.C.J.Reports1956,p.86,repeatedinJudgmentNo.2867oftheAdministrativeTribunaloftheInternationalLabourOrganizationuponaComplaintFiledagainsttheInternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment,AdvisoryOpinion,1February2012,I.C.J.Reports2012,para.44.52MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStatesofAmerica),Merits,Judgmentof27June1986,I.C.J.Reports1986,para.31.53QuestionsrelatingtotheSeizureandDetentionofCertainDocumentsandData(Timor-Lestev.Australia),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:Orderof3March2014,I.C.J.Reports2014,para.27.
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-20-seekingtoavoidthelawfulresponsestoitsblatantdisregardforthesecurityandstabilityintheGulfregionjeopardisestheintegrityofthesystemandrisksresultinginfragmentedjurisprudence.IftheCommitteeweretoallowthepresentArticle11Communicationproceduretocontinue–notwithstandingthattheICJispresentlyseisedoftheverysamedispute(asaresultofQatar’simproperandextra-jurisdictionalapplicationtoit),betweentheverysamepartiesandcommencedundertheverysameinstrument–itwouldcausethebreakdownofthelegitimateinstitutionsestablishedbytheCERDandmakeamockeryofboththeCERDdisputeresolutionmechanism’ssystemicintegrityandtheproceduralrightsoftheUAE.41.GiventhatQatarhasabandonedthepresentprocessbycommencingthePendingICJCERDProceedings,theCommitteemustnowyieldtotheICJprocedure,inwhichQatariscurrentlypreparingitsmemorialonthemerits.ItwouldbeinappropriatefortheCommitteetoproceedinparallelatatimewhentheICJ,asthepre-eminentWorldCourtintheUnitedNationssystem,remainsseisedoftheverysamequestioninthePendingICJCERDProceedings.Withrespect,theCERDCommittee,asaUnitedNationsTreatybody,shouldnotactinanywaytounderminetheintegrityoftheCourt.B.TheCommitteeMustDeclinetoHearQatar’sArticle11CommunicationSincetheCommunicationAmountstoNoMoreThanEmptySpeculationandThusConstitutesanAbuseofRightsandProcess42.AsdemonstratedintheUAE’spreviousresponses,aswellasinthissubmission,54Qatarhasfailed,despitemanyopportunitiestodoso,topresentprobativeevidenceofanyongoingdiscriminationbytheUAEagainstQatarinationals–stillless,anydiscriminationactuallyfallingwithinthescopeoftheCERDonthebasisofrace,colour,descentornationalorethnicoriginasrequiredunderArticle1(1)oftheConvention.Indeed,Qatarcannotproduceanyevidenceasitsallegationsarewithoutfoundationbothinfactandinlaw.Qatar’sArticle11CommunicationcannotbedeemedadmissiblewithintheCERDcomplaintsmechanismbecauseitamountstonomorethanunsupportedallegationsandabuseofprocess.54Seeparas.7-13,supra.
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-21-43.AllegationsthatarecompletelywithoutmeritonfactandlawshouldnotbefurtherentertainedunderArticle11oftheCERD,stilllessunderthefurtherproceduresunderArticles12and13.Inparticular,emptyallegationswithnobasisinlaworfactcannotbeusedasabasisfortheestablishmentofanyArticle12ConciliationCommissionandshouldbepreliminarilydismissed.AlthoughtheConciliationCommissionisnotajudicialbodybutafact-findingbody,itsfindingsmayresultinreputationaldamagetotherespondingState.Moreover,asalreadystated,theproceedingsbeforeaConciliationCommissionwillrequirethattheUAEputforwarddefensiveargumentswhichmayjeopardizeitsstrategybeforetheICJandmayresultinfindingsthatmaybeincontradictionwiththosetheICJmightascertain.44.NothingintheICJ’sCERDProvisionalMeasuresOrderrunscontrarytothisposition.ThisisbecausetheICJinthePendingICJCERDProceedingshasthusfarevaluatedQatar’sallegationsonlyagainstthelowerthresholdof“plausibility”,relevanttotheprovisionalmeasuresstage.55AspointedoutbyJudgeCrawford,theCourtfailedtoidentifyanyevidencetosupportthefurtherstatementthatthesituationofQatarisresidingintheUAEpriorto5June2017appearstoremainvulnerablewithregardtotheirrightsunderArticle5oftheCERD.56Mostimportantly,asalsoindicatedbyJudgeCrawford,theCourtfailedtomentiontheUAE’sStatementof5July2018.5745.Bysubmittingaself-servingapplicationunsupportedbyevidence,QatarabusesitsrightstoresorttotheprocessunderArticle11oftheCERD.Ifallowed,QatarmaymanagetoforcetheUAEtosubmittoaredundantfact-findingprocedurethatwillamounttonothingmorethananopportunityforQatartoengageinfurtherpublicrelationstheatrics.55SeeApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures:Orderof23July2018,para.44:“Atthisstageoftheproceedings,theCourt,however,isnotcalledupontodeterminedefinitivelywhethertherightswhichQatarwishestoseeprotectedexist;itneedonlydecidewhethertherightsclaimedbyQataronthemerits,andforwhichitisseekingprotection,areplausible.Moreover,alinkmustexistbetweentherightswhoseprotectionissoughtandtheprovisionalmeasuresbeingrequested.”The“plausibility”thresholdisdescribedbyJudgeadhocCotas“fairlylow”,seeApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),RequestfortheIndicationofProvisionalMeasures,DissentingOpinionofJudgeadhocCot,para.5.56DissentingOpinionofJudgeCrawford,para.14.57Id.
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-22-ThisisnotwhatthedisputeresolutionmechanismsoftheCERDwasintendedtoachieve.46.ItwouldbeconsistentwithagoodfaithinterpretationoftheCERDinlightofitsobjectandpurpose,asprovidedforinArticle31oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,58torequireofQatartohaveprovedagenuinecasetoanswerbeforeprogressingthemattertoanadhocConciliationCommission.Otherwise,theCommitteewillexposetheCERDproceduretotheriskofabuseofprocessbyQatar.TheCommitteeisrespectfullyurgedtopreventsuchabusebydismissingQatar’sArticle11Communicationasinadmissible.Inthisrespect,theCommitteeisremindedofitscompétencedelacompétenceunderpublicinternationallawanditsrole,assignedtoitunderArticle11(3),toensurethattheCERDcomplaintsmechanismisnotburdenedbyclaimsthatdonotmeetthefundamentalcriteriaofadmissibility.C.TheCommitteeMustDeclinetoHearQatar’sArticle11CommunicationBecauseQatarHasFailedtoEstablishthatLocalRemediesHaveBeenInvokedorExhaustedUnderArticle11(3)oftheCERD47.TheCommitteeshoulddeclareinadmissibleQatar’sArticle11CommunicationbecauseQatarhasfailedtoestablishthatanyQatarinationalswhohaveallegedlybeenaggrievedbysomeactionoftheUAEinviolationofCERDhaveinvoked,letaloneexhausted,anyavailableandeffectivedomesticremediesintheUAEasrequiredunderArticle11.3oftheCERD.TheexhaustionoflocalremediesisanecessarypreconditionforconsiderationbytheCommitteeofamatterreferredtoitinaccordancewithArticle11(2).Article11(3)providesthat:[t]heCommitteeshalldealwithamatterreferredtoitinaccordancewithparagraph2ofthisarticleafterithasascertainedthatallavailabledomesticremedieshavebeeninvokedandexhaustedinthecase,inconformitywiththegenerallyrecognizedprinciplesofinternationallaw.Thisshallnotbetherulewheretheapplicationoftheremediesisunreasonablyprolonged.(Emphasisadded.)58OliverDörrandKirstenSchmalenbach,ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties:ACommentary(Springer2012),p.587,para.59.
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-23-48.Therequirementofexhaustionofdomesticremediesseekstoensurethat,beforeaclaimisbroughtontheinternationalplane,“theStatewheretheviolationoccurredshouldhaveanopportunitytoredressitbyitsownmeans,withintheframeworkofitsowndomesticlegalsystem.”59Thisprinciplerequiresthateachinjuredpersonfirstseekrelieffromthelegalremediesofjudicialoradministrativecourtsorbodies,includingadministrativeremedies.6049.Qatarhasrecognizedthattheruleofexhaustionoflocalremediesappliesbothundertheinter-stateprocedureofArticles11-13andundertheindividualcommunicationprocedureunderArticle14oftheConvention.61Whilethepresentinter-StatecommunicationisthefirstofthiskindbeforetheCommittee,theCommittee’sjurisprudenceonexhaustionoflocalremediesunderArticle14isalsorelevantforthepresentpurposesgiventhesimilarityoftheprovisionsontheobligationtoexhaustlocalremediesofArticle11.3and14.7(a)oftheCERD.InitsjurisprudencerelatingtoindividualapplicationstheCERDCommitteehasconfirmedthatallavailabledomesticremediesthatofferaprospectofsuccessunderdomesticlawmustbeexhaustedbeforetheCommitteemayconsiderthemeritsofsituation.62Asamatterofgeneralinternationallaw,theburdenisonQatartoprovethatsuchlocalremedieswere59Interhandel(Switzerlandv.UnitedStatesofAmerica),I.C.J.Reports1959,p.6,atp.27;seealsoAmbatielos(Greecev.UnitedKingdom),(1956),RIAA,vol.XII,p.83atp.120:“[i]isthewholesystemoflegalprotection,asprovidedbymunicipallaw,whichmusthavebeenputtothetestbeforeaState,astheprotectorofitsnationals,canprosecutetheclaimontheinternationalplane.”60Article14(2),ArticlesonDiplomaticProtection.ArticlesonDiplomaticProtection,CommentarytodraftArticle14,para.5,ILCYearbook2006,vol.II(2),p.45.SeealsoAhmadouSadioDiallo(RepublicofGuineav.DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo),PreliminaryObjections,I.C.J.Reports2007,p.582,atp.601,para.47(theremedieswhichmustbeexhausted“includeallremediesofalegalnature,judicialredressaswellasredressbeforeadministrativebodies”).61ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(Qatarv.UnitedArabEmirates),InternationalCourtofJustice,ResponseonbehalfoftheStateofQatartothequestionsposedbyJudgeCançadoTrindadeonFriday,29June2018,3July2018,para.8.62See,e.g.,CERD,CommunicationNo.25/2002,AhmadNajaatiSadicv.Denmark,InadmissibilityDecisionof19March2003,UNdoc.CERD/C/62/D/25/2002,para.6.4.
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-24-exhaustedorthatthecircumstancesrelieveditoftheobligationtoexhaustavailablelocalremedies.6350.RemediescapableofprovidingeffectivereliefareindeedavailablewithintheUAEtoQatarinationalswithrespecttoeachviolationofrightsallegedbyQatar.ItfallstoQatartoshoweitherthattheseavailableremedieswereinfactexhausted,oreithersuchremedieswouldnothavebeeneffectiveintheparticularcircumstancesofthecaseorthattheirapplicationwouldbe“undulyprolonged.”Qatarhasnotevenargued,letaloneestablished,thatQatarinationalsareexemptedfromexhaustinglocalremediesintheUAEonthegroundsthatoneoftheexceptionstothisruleapplies.ExceptionstotheobligationtoexhaustlocalremedieshaveonlybeenappliedinexceptionalcasesbytheCommittee.64Regardingtheexceptionofunduedelay,theCommitteefoundthatthisexceptionappliedandthusthecasewasadmissiblewhenacourtdecisionhadnotbeenrenderedafteroverfourandahalfyears.65AsevidencedbythedocumentssubmittedbytheUAE,UAEcourtspromptlyreviewanddecidecasessubmittedtothem,includingbyQatarinationals.6651.TheevidencetobeprovidedbyQatarmustbeobjective.AstheCommitteeexplainedwhendeclaringinadmissibleanindividualcommunicationforlackofexhaustionoflocalremedies,“doubtsabouttheeffectivenessofsuchproceedingscannotabsolveapetitionerfrompursuingthem.”6763AhmadouSadioDiallo(RepublicofGuineav.DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo),PreliminaryObjections,I.C.J.Reports2007,p.582,p.600,para.44;ElettronicaSiculaS.p.A.(ELSI),(Italyv.UnitedStatesofAmerica),I.C.J.Reports1989,p.15,pp.43-44,para.53.64UAE’sSupplementalResponseof29November2018,paras.61,64andCERDCommitteejurisprudencecitedtherein.65CERDCommittee,CommunicationNo.29/2003,Mr.DraganDurmicv.SerbiaandMontenegro,Decisionof6March2006,UNDoc.CERD/C/68/D/29/2003,para.6.5.66SeeAnnex2,StatementofthecasesinvolvingaQataricitizenandbeingexaminedbytheUAEcourtsintheperiod6June2017until25September2018,pp.12-13(containingatableputtogetherbytheCourtsDepartmentofRasAl-KhaimahindicatingthedateoflistingandofrulingbythecourtsofsuitsfiledbyoragainstQatarinationalsafter5June2017).Seealso,Annex16totheUAE’sResponseof7August2018.67CERDCommittee,CommunicationNo.19/2000,SarwarSelimanMostafav.Denmark,InadmissibilityDecisionof10August2001,UNDoc.CERD/C/59/D/19/2000,para.7.4.
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-25-52.TheUAEhasdemonstratedinitsprevioussubmissionsthatthereareavailableandeffectiveremediesthatQatarinationalsmayresorttoinordertocomplainofanyallegedviolationsoftheirrightsundertheCERD.68Anon-exhaustiveexposéoversomeavenuesforredressopentoQatarinationalswillneverthelessbeprovidedhere.53.Notably,thefactthatUAEcourtsareauthorizedtoruleontherightsandfreedomsofforeignerscontainedininternationalconventionstowhichtheUAEisapartysuchasCERDisconfirmedbyvariousprovisionsoftheUAEConstitution.6954.QatarhasputforwardnoevidencethattheseconstitutionallyprotectedremediesareinfacteitherunavailabletoQatarisorineffective.Tothecontrary,courtremediesareavailableandeffectiveandcanbepursuedwithoutdifficulty,eitherinpersonorthroughpowersofattorney.QatarhasputforwardnoevidenceofanyQatarinationalbringingaclaimbeforetheUAEcourtsagainsttheUAEGovernmentinrespectofthemeasuresatissue.Bycontrast,theUAEhasofferedproofthatdemonstratesthat,since5June2017,QatarinationalshavefreelycontinuedtoresorttotheUAEcourtstoasserttheirrightsinlegalmatters,evenifnotnecessarilyrelatedtoCERD.70FurtherevidenceisalsoherewithsubmittedtotheCommitteeshowingthatalmostonehundredandfiftypowersofattorneyhavebeenexecutedbyQatarinationalssince5June2017.7155.Inaddition,numerousadministrativeremediesareavailabletoQatarisintheformofcomplaintproceduresspecifictovariousgovernmentalauthorities.SuchadministrativeremediesarealsoeffectiveandQatarhasofferednoprooftothecontrary.Theseremediesareeasilyaccessibleandcomplaintsarequicklyresolved.68UAE’sResponseof7August2018,para.85,UAE’sSupplementalResponseof29November2018,paras.61-71.69SeeUAEConstitution(2011),Articles40,41and102;UAE’sSupplementalResponseof29November2018,paras.65-66.70SeeAnnex18totheUAE’sResponseof7August2018(containingasummaryofthecasesinvolvingaQataricitizenandbeingexaminedbyfederalcourtsduringtheperiodfrom1May2017until20June2018);Annex2,StatementofthecasesinvolvingaQataricitizenandbeingexaminedbytheUAEcourtsintheperiod6June2017until25September2018.71Annex2,StatementofthecasesinvolvingaQataricitizenandbeingexaminedbytheUAEcourtsintheperiod6June2017until25September2018,p.2(containingatablewithstatisticsoftheFederalCourtsindicatingthatintheperiod6June2017to25September2018therehadbeen146powersofattorney).SeealsoAnnex16totheUAE’sResponseof7August2018,p.2(containingstatisticsregardingthepowersofattorneyconcludedintheperiodfrom1/06/2017to30/5/2018withrespecttoQataricitizenshipintheEmirateofAbuDhabi).
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-26-56.Specifically,QatarhasfailedtoshowanyinstanceofindividualsseekingrelieffromtheadministrativecomplaintsmechanismsinplacebylocalUAEgovernment.Forexample,theGovernmentofDubaiLegalAffairsDepartmentistaskedwithreceivingcomplaintsandclaimsmadeagainsttheGovernmentofDubai.72QatariscanfileacomplaintagainstaDubaigovernmententitythroughtheDepartment’swebsite.73Ifthedisputecannotbeamicablysettledwithintwomonths,thecomplainantcanfileclaimsdirectlyagainstthegovernmententitybeforetheUAEcourts.74Qatarhasputforwardnoevidenceofrecoursetosuchremedies.57.QataralsohasnotshownanyinstanceofanyQatarinationalhavingrecoursetolocalremediesaddressinghatespeech.UAEFederalDecreeLawNo.2of2015prohibits“discriminationofanyform”byvariousmeansofexpression.75Hatespeechispunishablebymonetaryfinesandevenimprisonment.Variousmeansexistforindividuals(includingQataris)tobringcomplaintstotheattentionoftheauthorities,includingunderthemechanismsprovidedforpursuanttoFederalDecreeLawNo.2of2015andLawNo.5of2012.Tofacilitatecomplaints,Dubaipoliceoffersane-servicethroughwhichanindividualcanreportoffenders.76Qatarhasputforwardnoevidenceofrecoursetosuchremedies.58.QataralsohasnotshownanyinstanceofQatarinationalsmakingcomplaintstorelevantauthoritiesdealingwithallegedblockingofmediacontentinpursuitoftheirfreedomofexpression.Theblockingofonlinecontentmaybechallengedbyindividualusers72LawNo.(32)of2008andLawNo.(3)of1996.SeealsoGovernmentofDubaiwebsite“ComplaintsAgainstGovernmentEntities,”https://legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Services/Pages/Services-Desc.aspx?Service…“ComplaintfiledagainstaGovernmentEntity,”https://cms.legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Website/Pages/ComplaintAgainstGovernm…“ComplaintsAgainstGovernmentEntities,”https://legal.dubai.gov.ae/en/Services/Pages/Services-Desc.aspx?Service…“RequesttoOpenaCriminalCase”oftheDubaiPolice,https://www.dubaipolice.gov.ae/wps/portal/home/services/individualservi…“ECrime”oftheDubaiPolice,https://www.dubaipolice.gov.ae/wps/portal/home/services/individualservi….
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-27-throughsubmissionsviaonlineforms77orbythemediaoutletsthemselvesbypetitioningtheNationalMediaCounciloftheUAE.78Ifchallengethroughthisprocessisunsuccessful,subsequentappealstotheUAEcourtstojudiciallyreviewthedecisionoftheNationalMediaCouncilareavailable.79Qatarhasputforwardnoevidenceofrecoursetosuchremedies.59.QataralsohasputforwardnoevidencethatanyQatarihasmadeuseofthecomplaintresolutionprocedureswithrespecttotheallegedviolationoftheirrighttohealthandrighttomedicaltreatment.TheUAE’sMinistryofHealthandPrevention(“MOHAP”)providesanumberofavenuesforanindividualtofileacomplaint.80ComplaintsarenormallyresolvedbyMOHAPwithindays.Ifchallengethroughthisprocessisunsuccessful,subsequentappealstotheUAEcourtstojudiciallyreviewthedecisionofMOHAPwouldbeavailable.AlongsidetheFederalGovernment’scomplaintprocedure,forexampletheDubaiHealthAuthorityhaslocalcomplaintproceduresavailableforindividuals.81Qatarhasputforwardnoevidenceofrecoursetosuchremedies.60.QataralsohasnotshownanyinstanceofQatarinationalsmakingcomplaintswithrespecttotherightofeducation.Forexample,theAbuDhabiDepartmentofEducationandKnowledgeprovidesacomplaintmechanismforsecondaryschoolstudentswherebyanindividualcanraiseacomplaintagainstaUAEschool,includingforfailuretorespondtoarequestforprovisionoftranscripts.8277See“WebContentBlock/UnblockRequestForm,”https://etisalat.ae/en/generic/contactus-forms/web-block-unblock.jsp.78…’sResolutionNo.(30)of2017onMediaActivitiesLicensing,Articles67and68,http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Documents/Media%20Activities%20Licensing%20…’srelianceontheexistenceoftheseremediesiswithoutprejudicetoitspositionthatbroadcastersdonotbenefitfromtheprotectionoftheCERD,whichonlyappliestoindividualsandnotcorporations.80SeeMinistryofHealthandPreventionwebsite“CustomerComplaints,”http://www.mohap.gov.ae/en/Pages/COMPLAINS.aspx.81DHAwebsite“MedicalComplaint,”https://www.dha.gov.ae/en/HealthRegulation/Pages/MedicalComplaintsProce…“RaisingacomplaintagainstaPrivateschool,”https://www.adek.abudhabi.ae/en/Parents/PrivateSchools/Pages/RCAPS.aspx.
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-28-61.QataralsohasnotshownanyinstanceofQatarinationalsmakingcomplaintswithrespecttotherighttowork,despitetheavailabilityofampleremedies.UnderUAElaw,acomplaintsystemisavailablethroughtheUAEMinistryofHumanResourcesandEmiritisation.83Anindividualcanfileacomplaintinpersonorbyusingtheonlineservice.84Ifasettlementisnotreachedwithintwoweeks,thecomplaintisreferredtotheLaborCourt.85TherulingoftheLaborCourtcan,subjecttocertainlimitationsonsmallclaims,beappealedtotheCourtofAppealsandfurthertotheCourtofCassation.86QatarhasputforwardnoevidencethatanyQatarihasavailedhimselforherselfofthesecomplaintresolutionprocedures.62.Finally,QataralsohasputforwardnoevidencethatanyQatarihasavailedhimselforherselfoftheavailablecomplaintresolutionproceduresrelatedtoallegedinfringementoftherighttopropertyorhadrecoursetotheUAEcourts.Withrespecttocomplaintsrelatingtorealproperty,anindividualcanfileacomplaintbyvariousmeans.Forexample,disputesbetweenlandlordsandtenantsmaybeaddressedbytheRentalDisputesCenteroftheGovernmentofDubai,withtheoptionofappealtotheAppellateDivisionoftheCenter.87Regardingcomplaintsrelatingtoanindividual’sassetsoraccounts,theCentralBankoftheUAEisequippedtohandlethesethroughfax,onlineor83AsmandatedbyUAELaborLaw,FederalDecreeLawNo.8of1980,Article6.SeeUAEMinistryofHumanResourcesandEmiritisationwebsite“RegisterLabourcomplaints,”https://www.mohre.gov.ae/en/our-services/%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%8…“ComplaintRequest,”https://eservices.mohre.gov.ae/MOHRE.WebForms/Home/Complaint?lang=en-gb…“Thesystemofcourts,”https://www.government.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/the-feder…“Thesystemofcourts,”https://www.government.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/the-feder….
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-29-inpersonthroughvariousCentralBanklocations.88TheUAEjudiciaryisalsonaturallyavailabletoallQatariswithgrievancesrelatedtopropertymatters.BoththecomplaintproceduresandtheUAEcourtsareabletoprovideredresstoindividualswhosuccessfullyprovethattheirrighttopropertyhasbeenunlawfullyinfringed.However,again,Qatarhasprovidednoevidencethatsuchremedieshavebeenexhausted.63.Tosumup,Qatar’spositionontheissueoftheexhaustionofdomesticremedieshasbeenconsistent.Itis,inaword,denial.Thus,whileQatarhasfailedtoprovideanyevidencethattheQatarinationalsinquestionhaveattemptedtoinvokeorexhaustdomesticremediesintheUAEtovindicatetheirgrievances,Qatartriestoexplainthisawaybysimplydenying,withoutmore,thatanyremediesareavailableorareeffectivegiven“theinabilitytoappearinpersonbecauseofexpulsionfromandthebanonentrytotheUAE,seriousdifficultiesfindinglocallawyerstoprovidelegalrepresentationbecauseofthegeneralatmosphereofhostilitytowardsQatarandQataris”.8964.Yet,suchastatementispurefictionwhenmeasuredagainstthefacts.EvidencehaspreviouslybeenprovidedtotheCommittee,andissupplementedbyadditionalevidencesubmittedherewith,thatdemonstratesthat,farfroma“banonentry”,QatarinationalshaveenteredtheUAEintheirthousandssince5June2017.9065.Asthecomplainantinthisproceeding,Qatarbearstheburdenofprooftoestablishthatdomesticremedieshavebeeninvokedandexhaustedortoestablishthatexceptionalcircumstancesrelieveitofthatobligation.91FacedwiththeevidencedemonstratingtheaccessibilitytoQatarinationalsoftheUAElegalsystem,Qatar’sburdenofproofto88CentralBankoftheUAEwebsite“ComplaintsandEnquiries,”https://centralbank.ae/en/form/complaints.89SeeApplicationoftheInternat…’scomplaintagainsttheUAE(“AnynominalremediesareeitherunavailableorineffectiveinlightoftheexpulsionofQatarisfromtheUnitedArabEmiratesandensuingtravelrestrictions,aswellastheongoingcampaignofhatredagainstQatarandQatarisintheterritoryortheUnitedArabEmirates.”).90Seeparas.8-10,supra.91Seee.g.,AhmadouSadioDiallo(RepublicofGuineav.DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo),PreliminaryObjections,I.C.J.Reports2007,p.582,paras.42-44.
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-30-establishthattheQatarinationalswhoitallegeshavebeenaggrievedbytheUAE’sconductinviolationofCERDhaveinfactsoughttoinvokeandhavethereafterexhausteddomesticremediestoseekredressfortheirgrievancesissubstantiallyheightened.Hidingbehindblanketdenialsunsupportedbyevidencewillnotsufficeand,withrespect,shouldnotbeacceptedbytheCommittee.66.TherecanbenodoubtthatQatarhasfailedtoovercometheadmissibilityhurdleinArticle11.3ofCERD.Becauseavailabledomesticremedieshaveneitherbeeninvokednorexhausted,Qatarhasfailedtomeettherequirementsofthatprovision.67.ForthatreasonalonetheCommitteemustdismissQatar’sArticle11Communicationanddiscontinueanyfurtherprocedureaddressingthatcommunication.V.Conclusion68.ForthereasonssetouthereinandintheUAE’s7AugustResponseandthe29November2018Submission,theUAErespectfullyurgestheCommitteetodismissQatar’sArticle11Communicationforlackforjurisdictionand/orlackofadmissibility.69.Withrespect,inlightofthemanifestlackofjurisdictionandadmissibilityofQatar’sArticle11Communication,anyactiontakenbytheCommitteetofurtherQatar’scomplaintwouldbeultravires.70.TheUAEonceagaintakesthisopportunitytoreaffirmitsunwaveringcommitmenttoeliminatingracialdiscriminationinallofitsformsandtocombatinghatespeech.
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Annex 121
State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates,
ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response of the State of Qatar
(14 February 2019)
THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ______________________________________________________________________________ State of Qatar, Complainant v. United Arab Emirates, Respondent. ICERD-ISC-2018/2 ______________________________________________________________________________ RESPONSE OF THE STATE OF QATAR ______________________________________________________________________________ 14 February 2019
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-i- TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE UAE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COERCIVE MEASURES FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE RATIONE MATERIAE OF THE CERD ................ 11 A. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the UAE’s Discriminatory Purpose of Targeting Qataris on the Basis of Nationality ........... 12 1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin” in its Context and in Light of the CERD’s Object and Purpose Demonstrates that the CERD Encompasses Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality................................................................................... 13 a. Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin” ....................... 13 b. “National Origin” in Its Context ................................................... 14 c. “National Origin” in Light of Object and Purpose ....................... 23 2. The Travaux Préparatoires Confirm that the CERD Applies to Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality ............................................... 25 B. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the Discriminatory Effect on Individuals of Qatari National Origin .......................... 30 III. THE COMMITTEE HAS JURISDICTION OVER QATAR’S ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION BECAUSE QATAR CONSIDERS THAT THE UAE IS NOT GIVING EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CERD ...................... 36 A. The UAE Distorts the Committee’s Role and the Requirements of Article 11 .............................................................................................................. 36 B. Qatar’s Communication is Properly Before the Committee ................................. 38 IV. QATAR’S COMMUNICATION IS ADMISSIBLE .................................................... 41 A. Article 11(3)’s Exhaustion Requirement Does Not Bar Qatar’s Claims .............. 42 1. Article 11(3)’s Local Remedies Rule Is Inapplicable to Qatar’s Claims “In Conformity with the Generally Recognized Principles of International Law” ................................................................................ 42 a. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in Circumstances of Widespread Harm or Generalized State Policies and Practices .................................................................... 43 b. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in View of Qatar’s Claims of Direct Injury to Its Own Interests under the CERD ...................................................................................... 48 2. The UAE Has Failed to Prove the Existence of Any Effective and Reasonably Available Remedies that Have Not Been Exhausted ............ 55 a. The Hotline is Discretionary and Ineffective ................................ 60
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-ii- b. The UAE’s “Court Remedies” Are Neither “Reasonably Available” nor “Effective” ............................................................ 67 c. Other Alleged “Complaint Procedures” Are Neither “Reasonably Available” nor “Effective” ...................................... 78 B. The Existence of Concurrent Proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ Does Not Render Qatar’s Communication Inadmissible ............................... 86 1. Article 22 Does Not Establish a “Hierarchical and Linear” Process ........ 88 2. Neither Lis Pendens nor Electa Una Via Applies Here ............................ 93 3. Concurrent Proceedings Would Ensure the Equality of the Parties and Uphold the Integrity of the System .................................................. 100 4. The UAE’s Position with Respect to Concurrent Proceedings Would Leave Qatar with No Remedy at All ........................................... 101 C. Qatar’s Communication Is Not an Abuse of Rights and Process ....................... 101 V. THIS COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION OF QATAR’S COMMUNICATION WOULD NOT BE ULTRA VIRES ........................................ 103 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 103 Annex 121
1 1. The Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“Committee”) and refers to its Communication submitted pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the “CERD”) against the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) (ICERD-ISC-2018/2) (“Qatar’s Communication”), as well as its letter of 29 October 2018 referring the matter again to the Committee pursuant to Article 11(2) of the CERD. 2. Pursuant to the Note Verbale transmitted to the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar by the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) on 14 December 2018 (“Note Verbale”), Qatar submits this response to the Supplemental Response by the UAE dated 14 January 2019 and transmitted to the State of Qatar on 15 January 2019 (“15 January Submission”), and the Supplemental Response by the UAE dated 29 November 2018 and transmitted to the State of Qatar on 4 December 2018 (“4 December Submission”). Qatar also refers to the Response of the UAE received by the Secretariat on 7 August 2018 and transmitted to the State of Qatar on 8 August 2018 (“8 August Submission”) and the submission by the UAE dated 7 November 2018 and transmitted to the State of Qatar on 9 November 2018 (“9 November Submission”). In this response, Qatar will limit its observations to issues raised in the UAE’s 4 December and 15 January Submissions, focused on questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, as contemplated by the Note Verbale. I. INTRODUCTION 3. The negative impacts of the UAE’s Coercive Measures1, which include its collective expulsion of Qataris and purposeful incitement of hatred towards Qatar and Qataris, are extensive, ongoing, and well-documented, including by independent international human rights groups2. The UAE has sought to coerce the Qatari Government through the 1 Qatar’s Communication, p. 1, para. 3. See also United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediacenter/news/pages/05-06-2017-uae-qatar…. 2 Qatar’s Communication, pp. 20, 23-24, paras. 44, 52-53. These measures are detailed in Qatar’s prior submissions to the Committee. See Qatar’s Communication, pp. 12-18, paras. 26-40. Annex 121
2 collective punishment of the Qatari people, and its actions stand contrary to the entire foundation of human rights. As a result of the UAE’s Coercive Measures, Qataris in the UAE awoke on 5 June 2017 to find that they had only 14 days to flee the country, leaving behind family, loved ones, jobs, property, and educational opportunities—all while under the ominous threat from the UAE citing “precautionary security measures” as the ostensible reason for the collective expulsion. Qatari residents of the UAE who had returned to Qatar for Ramadan or were otherwise outside the UAE on 5 June 2017 awoke to find that they were now cut off from their homes, families, and their very lives—with no certainty as to when, if ever, they could return. 4. Overnight, the lives of Qataris living in or having any connection with the UAE were radically altered. Prior to the UAE’s imposition of the Coercive Measures, many Qataris lived, worked, studied, and owned property in the UAE. As Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) nationals, Qataris enjoyed special status in the UAE, moving freely between the two countries and entitling them to many of the same rights and benefits as Emiratis. In this particular context of openness and close connections, mixed families of Qatari and Emirati origin were commonplace, with family members, lives, education and work spanning the two countries. Almost overnight, the Coercive Measures upended this reality—solely because these individuals were Qatari. By its conduct, the UAE has violated a host of fundamental rights protected by the CERD, including the rights of Qataris to: marriage, choice of spouse, and family life; education and training; access to public health and medical care; property; work; freedom of opinion and expression; equal treatment before tribunals; and benefit from measures that protect against incitement on racially discriminatory grounds, as well as the right to a remedy for these violations. Over a year and a half later, the UAE’s violations have persisted. And since the UAE has continued in its campaign of discrimination against Qataris, the incitement of racial hatred against Qataris has only entrenched, and as the Coercive Measures move toward their second full year, the UAE’s divisive and discriminatory treatment against Qataris threatens to become a permanent fixture. Tragically, incidences of racially-motivated abuse and hate speech against Qataris are now commonplace in the UAE. Annex 121
3 5. Tellingly, the UAE—in its submissions before the Committee and indeed, in all legal and political fora relating to the crisis—both ignores and attempts to minimize these impacts, largely by misrepresenting the facts. It insists that Qataris “left the UAE voluntarily at the start of the crisis”3—despite the plain language of its directive of 5 June 2017 (the “5 June Directive”) ordering them to do so within 14 days. It says nothing at all about its clear campaign of incitement against Qataris. And it makes no attempt to argue that the Coercive Measures are intended for any other purpose than to coerce and punish the State of Qatar by targeting individual Qataris. Indeed, the UAE’s current characterization of the Coercive Measures as “minimal” entry requirements4 must be seen for what it is: an ex post justification for the UAE’s egregious, arbitrary, and punitive misuse of sovereign power, enacted without warning, without exception for individual circumstances, and without regard for the impacts on individual rights. 6. At the same time that the UAE attempts to dismiss the reach and impacts of the Coercive Measures, the UAE also attempts to sharply curtail the reach and focus of the CERD itself. As this Committee is well aware, the CERD is a forward-looking instrument, which obliges State Parties not only to condemn racial discrimination but also to actively pursue means of “eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms”5. Article 1(1)’s definition of “racial discrimination” seeks to further this goal not only by its list of multiple prohibited grounds, but also by explicitly covering discrimination “which has the purpose or effect” of impairing the enjoyment of human rights6. In other words, as this Committee has previously made clear, in addition to explicit and purposive discrimination, the CERD’s scope encompasses actions that have “an unjustifiable 3 4 December Submission, p. 12, para. 22. 4 15 January Submission, p. 3, para. 7. 5 CERD, Preamble (emphasis added). 6 CERD, Art. 1(1) (“In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing…human rights…”) (emphasis added). Annex 121
4 disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”7. 7. In its submissions, the UAE ignores this basic fact about the ambit of the CERD, instead urging the Committee to look only to whether the Coercive Measures, as measured by the UAE’s explicit purpose of targeting Qatari “nationals”, fall within the CERD. So, the UAE’s central jurisdictional objection before the Committee—mirroring its objection before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)—remains on the basis that “nationality” does not constitute a protected ground for discrimination based on Article 1(1)’s use of the term “national origin”8. In making this argument, the UAE asserts that “present nationals” as a group are categorically excluded from the definition of “national origin”, a term which it refers to instead as being associated with a person’s “heritage” or ability to “trace” their origin to a particular country9. But the UAE’s attempt to frame the question in this manner exposes the fundamental flaw in its reasoning: the UAE overlooks the fact that the discriminatory effects of the Coercive Measures—separate and apart from the purpose of those Measures—bring the UAE’s conduct unequivocally within the ambit of the CERD. 7 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993), para. 2. See also Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Declaration of Crawford (19 April 2017), para. 7 (“[T]he definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in Article 1 of CERD does not require that the restriction in question be based expressly on racial or other grounds enumerated in the definition; it is enough that it directly implicates such a group on one or more of these grounds. Moreover, whatever the stated purpose of the restriction, it may constitute racial discrimination if it has the ‘effect’ of impairing the enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of the rights articulated in CERD.”). 8 4 December Submission, p. 14, para. 29 (“[T]he Committee lacks any jurisdiction because Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outwith the scope of the CERD.”); 15 January Submission, p. 9, para. 17 (“Qatar’s Article 11 Communication goes only to differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality, a matter falling wholly outside the scope of the CERD.”). 9 E.g., 4 December Submission, p. 17, para. 35 (relying on the dissenting opinion of Judge Salam, in which he noted that “‘national origin’ targets individuals who—‘regardless of their nationality at that time’—traced their origin to a particular country and suffered discrimination as a result of that heritage”). See also Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), CR 2018/13, p. 38, para. 19 (Olleson) (arguing that the Coercive Measures fall outside the scope of the CERD, the UAE noted that “Qatar does not suggest that the relevant measures are of any application to UAE or foreign nationals of Qatari heritage (for instance where one of their parents was Qatari)”). Annex 121
5 8. That is because it is indisputable that whatever the UAE’s stated purpose in discriminating solely on the basis of present “nationality,” the effects of the UAE’s Coercive Measures are felt by persons of Qatari national origin in the sense uncontested by the UAE—namely, in the historical-cultural sense of shared “heritage” or descent or an ability to “trace” one’s origin to a particular country. The UAE was well aware of the disparate impact of its measures on those of Qatari national origin: in Qatar, as in other Gulf States, nationality is inextricably intertwined with, and largely restricted to, this historical-cultural community of Qataris. As a result, the UAE’s Coercive Measures targeting “Qatari nationals” unquestionably have a disparate effect on persons of Qatari national origin. Thus, the UAE’s conduct indisputably falls within the scope of the Article 1(1) definition of the CERD irrespective of whether “national origin” in Article 1(1) encompasses nationality, and accordingly, the Committee has jurisdiction. 9. But the UAE’s primary argument that Article 1(1) excludes discrimination on the basis of nationality is also wrong. To the contrary, that present nationality is encompassed by “national origin” in Article 1(1) of the CERD becomes clear when the ordinary meaning of the term is read in its context and in light of the CERD’s object and purpose, in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)10, as well as through an examination of the travaux préparatoires of the CERD. Indeed, the UAE’s heavy reliance on the dissenting opinions of several ICJ judges conveniently overlooks that a majority of the ICJ, when called upon to determine whether the acts complained of by Qatar are prima facie capable of falling within the provisions of the CERD, concluded in the affirmative11. As explained in the ICJ’s Order on Provisional Measures of 23 July 2018 (“Provisional Measures Order”): “In the Court’s view, the acts referred to by Qatar, in particular the statement of 5 June 2017…whereby the UAE announced that Qataris were to leave its territory within 14 days and that they would be prevented from entry, and the alleged restrictions that ensued, including upon their right to marriage and choice of spouse, to education as well as to medical care and to equal 10 VCLT, Article 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 11 4 December Submission, p. 19, paras. 38-43; see also 15 January Submission, pp. 10-11, para. 20. Annex 121
6 treatment before tribunals, are capable of falling within the scope of CERD ratione materiae.”12 The UAE’s attempts to elevate the Court’s dissenting opinions cannot elide this basic fact, which alone is sufficient to conclude that the Committee has jurisdiction to appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission to hear Qatar’s claims13. 10. The UAE’s remaining objections—most of which largely mirror those raised before and dismissed by the ICJ in its hearing on provisional measures—equally have no merit, and equally attempt to restrict both the scope of the CERD’s coverage and this Committee’s ability to ensure its proper implementation. 11. Qatar’s response is thus organized as follows: 12. First, Qatar will demonstrate that, as discussed above, according to both their purpose and effect, the Coercive Measures imposed by the UAE against Qatar and Qataris unequivocally fall within the scope ratione materiae of the CERD by discriminating against Qataris on the basis of national origin (Section II)14. With respect to the UAE’s conceded purpose of targeting Qataris on the basis of “present nationality”, the Coercive Measures fall within the CERD’s scope because the text of Article 1(1) read in its context and in light of the CERD’s object and purpose, make clear that “national origin” encompasses present nationality (Section II.A). This alone is sufficient for the Committee to uphold its jurisdiction. So too is the fact that the discriminatory effects of the measures are suffered by persons of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural 12 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order (23 July 2018) (hereinafter “Provisional Measures Order”), p. 11, para. 27. 13 For example, this approach is reflected in the Committee’s analogous practice under Article 14 of the CERD, in which the Committee “consider[ed] that the petitioner has sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that his individual claim may fall within the scope of application of the provisions of the Convention” and “deem[ed] it more appropriate to determine the precise scope of the relevant provisions of the Convention at the merits stage of the petition.” Stephen Hagan v. Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003), p. 10, para. 6.2 (emphasis added). 14 Article 1(1) of the CERD provides: “the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” Annex 121
7 sense uncontested by the UAE (Section II.B). For both of these reasons, the Committee’s jurisdiction must be upheld. 13. Second, Qatar will show that the UAE’s argument that the Committee lacks jurisdiction over Qatar’s Communication because there is “no evidence” of an “ongoing situation of prejudice”15 to Qataris both misconceives the legal basis for the Committee’s (and subsequent Conciliation Commission’s) jurisdiction and is wrong as a matter of fact (Section III). The jurisdictional requirements set by Article 11 in this regard are minimal, and indeed, the ICJ has found that the UAE’s Coercive Measures have plausibly endangered rights protected under the CERD. Further, the UAE’s persistent and self-serving denials of any CERD violations are at odds with the observations of the ICJ and the reports of independent international human rights observers that have recorded the continuing and severe impacts of the Coercive Measures on individual Qataris. Accordingly, the Committee should easily be able to conclude that Qatar has satisfied the standard established by Article 11 for a complaint to move forward to the conciliation process contemplated by the CERD. 14. Third, Qatar will demonstrate that consideration of Qatar’s Communication is not barred by the CERD’s Article 11(3) requirement that the Committee deal with matters referred to it “after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law”. The exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement does not apply in cases such as this, where the measures at issue constitute a systemic, generalized policy and practice that impacts the rights of thousands of individuals. Further, the requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted does not apply because Qatar also asserts claims of direct injury to its own interests under the CERD. Finally, even if the domestic remedies rule did apply in this case, the UAE has failed to prove the existence of effective, available remedies that have not been exhausted. As such, the UAE’s argument that 15 Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates to the request made by the State of Qatar pursuant to Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (29 November 2018) (hereinafter “4 December Submission”), p. 3. para. 6. Annex 121
8 Article 11(3) of the CERD acts as a bar to consideration of Qatar’s Article 11 Communication must be rejected. 15. Fourth, the UAE argues that Qatar has “abandoned” the Article 11 process before the Committee by commencing proceedings before the ICJ. This argument, too, must fail. As Qatar will demonstrate, the plain text of the CERD and its travaux préparatoires make clear that the two preconditions in Article 22 (negotiation and the CERD procedures) are alternative, not cumulative; a State party may refer a dispute to the Court without first pursuing conciliation before the CERD Committee. Nor do the lis pendens or electa una via principles have any application here. Thus, procedures before the Committee and the ICJ may be independently engaged. 16. Qatar finally notes that, as has been its practice throughout this dispute, the UAE in its 4 December and 15 January Submissions again resorts to a medley of wild and incorrect allegations against Qatar, attempting to connect Qatar to support for terrorism16. These allegations are not only unfounded, they are clearly pretextual, in a transparent attempt to cloak the UAE’s true motivation for imposing the Coercive Measures in order to coerce Qatar into relinquishing sovereign control of its internal and external affairs. Significantly, while the UAE desperately tries to characterize its terrorism pretext as broadly supported by other countries17, in fact, the opposite is true. Despite strong pressure by the four States that imposed the Coercive Measures18, only ten governments ultimately cut or downgraded diplomatic ties with Qatar19, and independent reports note 16 4 December Submission, pp. 7-10, paras. 11-16; 15 January Submission, pp. 7-8, paras. 14-16. 17 See, e,g., 4 December Submission, p. 6, para. 10. 18 See Qatar’s Communication, p. 1, para. 3 (“On 5 June 2017, the government of UAE, in coordination with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the Arab Republic of Egypt announced a campaign on unlawful political isolation and economic coercion…”). 19 The governments of Yemen, Eastern government of Libya (Beida), Maldives, Mauritania, Comoros, and Senegal cut diplomatic ties (although the Beida government had never maintained diplomatic ties with Qatar). See “Qatar-Gulf crisis: Your questions answered,” Al Jazeera (5 December 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/qatar-gulf-crisis-qu… 99.html; Jamie Prentis, “Beida government cuts off diplomatic relations with Qatar,” Libya Herald (5 July 2017), https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/06/05/beida-government-cuts-off-diplom… (describing the break in relations as “entirely symbolic: there have been no relations between the Beida government and Qatar.”). The governments of Jordan, Djibouti, Chad, and Niger downgraded diplomatic ties. See “Qatar-Gulf crisis: Your questions answered,” Al Jazeera (5 December 2017), Annex 121
9 that a number of these States only supported the UAE- and Saudi-led actions in order to avoid losing financial aid from Saudi Arabia20. Unsurprisingly, three of these governments have since restored ties with Qatar21. Further, the international community has recognized Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and even expressly questioned the UAE’s motivation for making its accusations in the context of this dispute. For example, very soon after the imposition of the Coercive Measures, on 20 June 2017, the U.S. State Department questioned the UAE’s allegations of terrorism, asking whether the UAE’s measures were “really about their concerns regarding Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism, or were they about the long simmering grievances among countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council”22. Indeed, contrary to the UAE’s claims, Qatar has in fact been an active participant in the global fight against terrorism. Qatar’s Al Udeid air base has for years served as a critical staging ground for U.S. and coalition forces conducting counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and currently serves as the https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/qatar-gulf-crisis-qu…. 20 Press reports suggest, for example, that Saudi Arabia attempted to induce a number of African countries with predominantly Muslim populations to terminate relations with Qatar by threatening to cut financial aid and reduce these States’ quotas for Hajj pilgrims, and further tried to entice some States to join the Blockade with the promise of additional aid and loans. See James M. Dorsey, “Stepping Up The Pressure: Saudi Strong Arms Muslim Nations To Take Sides In Gulf Crisis,” Huffington Post (13 June 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/stepping-up-the-pressure-Saudi-str…; “Gulf crisis: Saudi Arabia seeks African pressure against Qatar,” Al Jazeera (14 June 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/06/gulf-crisis-Saudi-arabia-se…. 21 See Ali Mustafayev, “Senegal restores its ambassador to Doha,” AzerNews (22 August 2017), https://www.azernews.az/region/117977.html; “Chad and Qatar restore ties cut in wake of Arab states rift,” Reuters (21 February 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-chad/chad-and-qatar-resto…; “Maldives to restore ties with Qatar and Iran,” Maldives Independent (22 November 2018), https://maldivesindependent.com/politics/maldives-to-restore-ties-with-…. 22 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, “State Dept. Lashes Out at Gulf Countries Over Qatar Embargo,” The New York Times (20 June 2017) (quoting U.S. State Department spokeswoman); Patrick Wintour, “Rex Tillerson applauds Qatar plan but Gulf rivals refuse to lift sanctions,” The Guardian (11 July 2017). Most recently, and contrary to the UAE’s extremely misleading reference to the U.S. President’s June 2017 remarks, 4 December Submission, para. 16, on 15 January 2018, U.S. President Trump personally called H.H. the Emir of Qatar to thank him for “action to counter terrorism and extremism in all forms.” “Trump thanks Qatar for efforts to combat terrorism,” Reuters (15 January 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-usa/trump-thanks-qatar-fo…. After a meeting in the Oval Office on 10 April 2018, President Trump acknowledged Qatar’s efforts towards “stopping the funding of terrorism”, regarding which the Emir was a “very big advocate.” Peter Baker, “Trump Now Sees Qatar as an Ally Against Terrorism,” The New York Times (10 April 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/world/middleeast/trump-qatar-terrori…. Annex 121
10 primary staging area for operations against the Islamic State. Further, the Al Jazeera network, far from being a “spokespiece” for extremists as the UAE alleges23, is hailed as a bastion of free expression and independent content in a region where press freedom is otherwise scarce, if not non-existent24. International and non-governmental organizations have affirmed Al Jazeera’s importance as a beacon of rigorous independent reporting in the Middle East, and have roundly condemned the UAE’s attempts to silence it25. 17. These are but a few examples of the UAE’s mischaracterization of the underlying facts related to its so-called “terrorism” allegations. But the UAE’s unfounded allegations are an obvious attempt at distraction, as they are entirely irrelevant to the dispute before the Committee. Such allegations could never legally justify the UAE’s non-compliance with its CERD obligations: the fundamental protection against discrimination is a jus cogens norm and an obligation erga omnes from which there can be no derogation26, as is also reflected in the text of the CERD, which provides for no derogation. In addition, it is well established that lawful countermeasures cannot violate human rights27. 23 4 December Submission, p. 7, para. 12. 24 Zachary Laub, “How Al Jazeera Amplifies Qatar’s Clout,” Council on Foreign Relations (12 July 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-al-jazeera-amplifies-qatars-clout; see also Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), p. 12 (“The channel provides enormous reach into the Arab world. It is a popular channel, and its reports and opinions often set the tone for debates on certain issues around the region.”). 25 “Al Jazeera - collateral victim of diplomatic offensive against Qatar,” Reporters Without Borders (7 June 2017), https://rsf.org/en/news/al-jazeera-collateral-victim-diplomatic-offensi…; “Qatar: Demands to close Al Jazeera endanger press freedom and access to information,” Article 19 (30 June 2017), https://www.article19.org/resources/qatar-demands-to-close-al-jazeera-e…; “UNESCO and Al Jazeera to promote freedom of expression in the Arab World,” UNESCO (12 September 2010), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/unesco_and… (noting that UNESCO and Al Jazeera signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize the partnership). 26 See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion no. 18, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants (17 September 2003), para. 101 (“[T]he principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. . . . [D]iscriminatory treatment of any person, owing to gender, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic situation, property, civil status, birth or any other status is unacceptable.”). 27 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Art. 50(1)(b) (“Countermeasures shall not affect: ... (b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights.”). Annex 121
11 II. THE UAE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COERCIVE MEASURES FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE RATIONE MATERIAE OF THE CERD 18. The UAE’s Coercive Measures have been described by the UAE itself as punitive in nature. By design, they are limited neither in scope nor effect and have resulted in differential treatment of Qataris in a manner that undeniably violates their most basic human rights as set forth in the CERD. While the UAE argues that the Committee has no jurisdiction ratione materiae to consider the matter, its argument is fundamentally flawed because the UAE attempts to restrict CERD’s coverage only to purposive discrimination, while ignoring the effect on individuals of Qatari national origin in the sense uncontested by the UAE. In other words, the UAE argues that its framing of the nature of its illegal acts as being premised solely on present nationality should determine whether the Committee has jurisdiction; this premise is indisputably wrong. In fact, the Coercive Measures discriminate against individuals of Qatari national origin in both purpose and effect, either of which is sufficient for the Committee to uphold its jurisdiction. 19. Accordingly, the UAE’s Coercive Measures fall within the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Committee for two reasons. 20. First, the Coercive Measures explicitly and intentionally discriminate against Qataris on the basis of their nationality, in violation of the CERD’s prohibition on national origin-based discrimination (Section A). The conclusion that the term “national origin” in Article 1(1) of the CERD includes “nationality”-based discrimination is fully consistent with interpretation of Article 1 of the CERD in line with Article 31 of the VCLT28. It is also confirmed by an examination of the travaux préparatoires of the CERD, in accordance with Article 32 of the VCLT29, as well as the previous recommendations and practice of the Committee. 28 VCLT, Article 31 (“(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and propose. (2) The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise. . . the text, including its preamble and annexes…(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context. . . Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”). 29 VCLT, Article 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning Annex 121
12 21. Second, the Coercive Measures have the effect of discriminating against individuals of Qatari national origin as defined by their descent or ancestry, heritage, and cultural traditions (Section B). As described above, and as the UAE is well aware, the significant majority of Qatari nationals are also of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense, meaning that the UAE’s self-described “differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality”30 serves as a convenient means to target individuals of Qatari origin. And since the CERD prohibits discrimination both in “purpose” and “effect”, the fact that the Coercive Measures have the effect of adversely impacting individuals of Qatari national origin is alone sufficient to form the basis of a CERD violation and confer jurisdiction on the Committee. A. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the UAE’s Discriminatory Purpose of Targeting Qataris on the Basis of Nationality 22. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE claims that “[a]ny finding that nationality falls within the scope of the CERD” would distort its “clear terms”31. However, the “clear terms” of the CERD do not exclude nationality from the scope of racial discrimination proscribed under the CERD. Instead, when the ordinary meaning of “national origin” is read in its context and in light of the CERD’s object and purpose, in accordance with Article 31(1) of the VCLT, it is clear that it encompasses nationality-based discrimination. This conclusion is further supported by the travaux préparatoires of the CERD. resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”). 30 4 December Submission, p. 15, para. 30. 31 4 December Submission, pp. 17-18, paras. 36-37. Annex 121
13 1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin” in its Context and in Light of the CERD’s Object and Purpose Demonstrates that the CERD Encompasses Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality a. Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin” 23. Article 1(1) of the CERD defines “racial discrimination” as follows: “[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”. 24. As is the case for the other grounds of racial discrimination covered by the CERD in Article 1(1), the CERD does not define the term “national origin”. Neither is it usually defined in dictionaries or understood to have a special meaning in a particular discipline, such as sociology or ethnography. As such, the ordinary meaning of “national origin” must be gleaned in part through analysis of the separate terms “national” and “origin”, though in practice the terms are usually treated together. Leading dictionaries such as the Oxford and Cambridge dictionaries define the term “national” as “relating to or characteristic of a nation” or “relating to or typical of a whole country and its people”32, and define “nation”, respectively, as “a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory”33, and a “country, especially when thought of as a large group of people living in one area with their own government, language, traditions, etc”34. The term “origin”, on the other hand, commonly refers to “the country from which [a] person comes”35 or a “person’s social background or ancestry”36. 32 “National”, Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/national; “National”, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/. 33 “Nation,” Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/nation. 34 “Nation,” Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/nation. 35 “Origin,” Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/origin. 36 “Origin,” Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/origin. Annex 121
14 25. Taken together, these two terms suggest that “national origin” relates to the country or nation where a person is from, or where a person’s ancestors were from, extending to an individual’s association with a particular country or nation in both a historical-cultural sense, for example by virtue of an individual’s descent or heritage, as well as a legal or political sense, for example by virtue of an individual’s membership in a community defined by, and subject to, a common government. The term “national origin” therefore may be understood as encompassing a person’s membership in such a community on the basis of their past or present nationality. The official French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese versions of Article 1(1) of the CERD are consistent with this interpretation37. b. “National Origin” in Its Context 26. As is evident from the plain text of Article 1(1), the CERD’s definition of “racial discrimination” is a comprehensive one, and the CERD is designed to eliminate “all forms” of racial discrimination. Read in conjunction with Article 1(1), the subsequent sections of Article 1—namely, Articles 1(2) and 1(3)—confirm that present nationality falls within the ordinary meaning of “national origin” as the term is used in the CERD. 27. Article 1(2) creates a narrow exception to the prohibition on racial discrimination contained in Article 1(1), providing that: “[t]his Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens”. 28. Article 1(3) then further clarifies that Article 1(1) does not affect a State’s ability to confer nationality, citizenship, or naturalization, provided that, in doing so, States do not discriminate on the basis of nationality: 37 See Convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, https://www.ohchr.org/FR/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “l’origine nationale”); Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación Racial, https://www.ohchr.org/SP/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “origen nacional”); Международная конвенция о ликвидации всех форм расовой дискриминации, https://www.ohchr.org /RU/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “национального происхождения”); and 消除一切形式种族歧视公约, https://www.ohchr.org/CH/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (using the term “民族”). Annex 121
15 “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship, or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.” 29. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE argues that Article 1(1) excludes present nationality because Articles 1(2) and 1(3) enshrine an “incontrovertible norm of customary international law” that it is “within the unilateral sovereign jurisdiction of individual States to decide which rights and benefits to confer upon foreign nationals depending on what nationality they hold”38. In addition to the fact that any such sovereign prerogative is not untrammeled under general international law, the text of the CERD itself makes clear that interpreting “national origin” as inclusive of present nationality does not threaten the sovereign rights of States Parties to make legitimate distinctions between citizens and non-citizens—for example, in the context of granting voting rights—or to make legitimate distinctions between different groups of non-nationals with respect to “nationality, citizenship, or naturalization”. Rather, Articles 1(2) and 1(3) expressly allow States to make such distinctions, so long as States do not do so in a way that falls afoul of Article 1(1). Indeed, as the Committee has explained, “Article 1, paragraph 2 must be construed so as to avoid undermining the basic prohibition of discrimination; hence, it should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”39. 30. If racial discrimination based on “national origin” did not include nationality-based discrimination, the specific exception and preservation clauses comprising Articles 1(2) and 1(3), respectively, would be unnecessary, since the other protected grounds do not encompass non-nationals as a category directly. Further, the CERD’s text makes clear that Article 1(2) is an exception to Article 1(1), rather than an explicatory provision intended to clarify that distinctions based on nationality are excluded from the scope of 38 4 December Submission, p. 18, para. 37; see also 15 January Submission, p. 11, para. 20(b). 39 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, UN Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), para. 2 (emphasis added). Annex 121
16 the CERD. The opening provision of Article 1(3)—“[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship, or naturalization”—also leaves little doubt on this point, as it is clearly a preservation clause rather than a clause creating additional rights and obligations40. To the contrary, this language demonstrates that for the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination to be preserved in Article 1(3), such prohibition must already exist in Article 1(1). 31. This interpretation of the interplay between Articles 1(1), 1(2), and 1(3) has been confirmed in past general recommendations of the Committee, which contradict the UAE’s position. For example, in General Recommendation No. 11, the Committee stated that: “Article 1, paragraph 1, of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination. Article 1, paragraph 2, excepts from this definition actions by a State party which differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. Article 1, paragraph 3, qualifies article 1, paragraph 2, by declaring that, among non-citizens, States parties may not discriminate against any particular nationality.”41 32. The Committee has also explained that differences of treatment between citizens and non-citizens, while permissible under the CERD, are subject to clear limitations. Indeed, the Committee has reiterated that States Parties to the CERD are “under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of” fundamental rights, and that discrimination against non-citizens is a contemporary form of discrimination of serious concern42. Further, contrary to the UAE’s framing, Article 1(2)’s exception does not grant license to discriminate against specific groups of non- 40 Emphasis added. 41 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 11 on Non-Citizens, Doc. A/48/18 (1993), para. 1; see also id. para. 3; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Rights of Non-citizens (2006), p. 8 (The CERD “requires all non-citizens to be treated similarly.”), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/noncitizensen.pdf. 42 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, UN Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), para. 3 (“Although some of these rights, such as the right to participate in elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be confined to citizens, human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all persons.”). Annex 121
17 nationals on the basis of their nationality. To that end, the Committee has repeatedly called on States parties to address instances of discrimination against non-citizens on the basis of their nationality, including in contexts similar to those at issue in the present case, such as collective expulsion and restrictions on entry. For example, in its 1998 concluding observations on Switzerland, the Committee “express[ed] disquiet” at Switzerland’s “three-circle-model” immigration policy of the time, which assigned different immigration rights to individuals coming from “three categories of source countries”43. The Committee explained that its concerns over the three-circle-model stemmed from the fact that it “classifies foreigners on the basis of their national origin” and that “the conception and effect of this policy [was] stigmatizing and discriminatory, and therefore contrary to the principles and provisions of the Convention”44. In concluding observations to the Dominican Republic a decade later, the Committee similarly expressed concerns about “information received whereby migrants of Haitian origin” were subjected to collective deportations back to Haiti, and recommending that the Dominican Republic “ensure that laws concerning deportation or other forms of removal of non-citizens from the jurisdiction of the State party do not discriminate in purpose or effect among non-citizens on the basis of race, colour or ethnic or national origin”45. More recently, the Committee issued concluding observations to Japan highlighting their concerns over the fact “that Koreans who have lived for multiple generations in Japan remain foreign nationals” and that “many Korean women suffer 43 CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Switzerland, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.44 (1998), para. 6; D.M. Gross, Immigration Policy and Foreign Population in Switzerland, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3853 (2006), p. 21. Under Switzerland’s policy, “[t]he first circle, or inner circle, is made of EU and EFTA member countries with which the aim is to reach free mobility and abolish the status of the seasonal worker in the medium term. The second circle, or median circle, is made of countries economically and culturally close to Switzerland such as North America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. . . . Finally, the third circle, or outer circle, is made of all other countries from which new immigrants can be accepted only under exceptional circumstances.” Id. See also CERD Committee, Initial reports of States parties due in 1995, Switzerland, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/270/Add.1. (1997), para. 56 (In its report, Switzerland describes the “three-circle” model as a “restrictive policy towards the admission of foreigners to the increasingly specialized Swiss labour market.”). 44 CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Switzerland, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.44 (1998), para. 6. 45 CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Dominican Republic, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/DOM/CO/12 (2008), para. 13 (emphasis added). Annex 121
18 multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination based on nationality and gender”, and recommending that Japan take steps to prevent discrimination against Koreans46. 33. Further, the Committee has previously stated that “differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination” if the criteria for such differentiation “are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim”47. Thus, even to the extent that States may differentiate between particular nationalities in implementing visa or immigration policies, the CERD does not allow for differential treatment that disproportionately negatively impacts the individual concerned, for example where it results in the denial of fundamental human rights to non-citizens. 34. In its 15 January Submission, the UAE cites D.F. v. Australia in an attempt to support its argument that the Coercive Measures are permissible under the CERD because they “merely eliminate[e] an advantage [the UAE] previously extended to one particular nationality”48. Yet in fact, that case—in which the Committee found that Australia’s legislative changes phasing out preferential access to certain benefits for New Zealand citizens residing in Australia did not fall afoul of its CERD obligations—demonstrates 46 CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Japan, UN Doc. CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11 (2018), paras. 21, 22. The CERD Committee has also noted its concern with respect to national-origin-based discrimination in Canada. See United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Supplement No. 18, UN Doc. A/57/18 (2002), para. 336 (noting “with concern that [Canada’s] current immigration policies, in particular the present level of the ‘right of landing fee’, may have discriminatory effects on persons coming from poorer countries”); CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Canada, UN Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/19-20 (2012), para. 15 (expressing concern about Canada’s Bill C-11, The Balanced Refugee Act, which proposed to expedite asylum requests for individuals arriving from “safe countries”, and recommending that Canada “take appropriate measures to ensure that procedural safeguards will be guaranteed when addressing asylum requests… without any discrimination based on their national origin”). 47 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), para. 4. See also Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark, Communication No. 10/1997, Opinion, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/54/D/10/1997 (1999) (finding that a Tunisian national with permanent residence in Denmark had suffered discrimination where he was denied a loan by a Danish bank because he was not a Danish citizen). The Committee noted that the Tunisian author of the Communication was denied the loan “on the sole ground of his non-Danish nationality and was told that the nationality requirement was motivated by the need to ensure that the loan was repaid. In the opinion of the Committee, however, nationality is not the most appropriate requisite when investigating a person’s will or capacity to reimburse a loan.” Id. para. 9.3. 48 UAE 15 January Submission, p. 4, para. 7. Annex 121
19 the opposite. The limitations in that case—which related to New Zealanders’ access to certain benefits in Australia—were not enacted suddenly or in a punitive manner, but rather in a considered, individualized process that guaranteed protection of basic rights. In particular, New Zealanders who were in Australia on the date the changes were enacted, as well as those who fulfilled certain “transitional arrangements”, continued to be treated as Australian residents for purposes of the Act (thus retaining the benefits at issue)49. 35. In stark contrast, the UAE’s Coercive Measures were not devised and implemented as a matter of ordinary-course consideration of visa or other entry restrictions for foreign nationals, and cannot be divorced from the effects that they have had on fundamental human rights of Qataris. To the contrary, as described above, the Coercive Measures were implemented in order to punish the State of Qatar by broadly targeting the Qatari people, and indeed, the UAE’s actions were not limited to travel and entry restrictions, but specifically included both collective expulsion and the incitement of racial hatred against Qataris. 36. The result of the UAE’s actions has been the nullification and impairment of the recognition, enjoyment and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Qataris, and the UAE’s attempt at a post-hoc distortion of the facts should not be countenanced by the Committee. The UAE’s actions cannot be divorced from the context in which they were enacted50. Prior to the imposition of the Coercive Measures, the GCC’s longstanding free-mobility and common-market policies allowed Qataris, due to their status as GCC nationals and the particular historical context, to enjoy many of the same rights and benefits within the UAE as UAE nationals, and to move freely between 49 D.F. v. Australia, CERD Committee, Communication No. 39/2006, Opinion, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/72/D/39/2006 (2008), para. 4.1; see also D.R. v. Australia, Communication No. 42/2008, Opinion, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/75/D/42/2008 (2009). 50 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 5 (“The Convention . . . is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society. This approach makes it imperative to read its text in a context-sensitive manner. . . . Context-sensitive interpretation also includes taking into account the particular circumstances of the States parties without prejudice to the universal quality of the norms of the Convention.”). Annex 121
20 the two countries51. Indeed, prior to the Measures, thousands of Qataris resided full time in the UAE, worked and attended school in the UAE52, owned properties in the UAE, and established and ran businesses in the UAE for many years53. It was extremely common for families made up of both Qataris and Emiratis to live across State lines, and to travel regularly to see one another54. Indeed, Qataris traveled frequently and in large numbers to the UAE under the special status afforded pursuant to the GCC framework, and prior to the imposition of the Coercive Measures had little to no difficulties doing so55. Thousands of Qataris built their lives around this openness. Indeed, the rights enjoyed by Qataris historically and over time within the territory of the UAE—in which, as described 51 See, e.g., DCL-048, para. 11 (“Emiratis were very friendly in general. Whether I went by car or by plane, I never faced any issues with immigration. The immigration process was very simple: they would look at my passport and let me enter the country.”); DCL-079, para. 9 (“While we were in the UAE, we did not feel like it was any different from being in Qatar. We felt like it was an extension of our country, like we were at home…In general, we were welcomed and treated as if we were Emiratis. In my experience, this is what it was like to be a national of the Gulf Cooperation Council[.]”); Id., para. 10 (“Traveling to the UAE was very easy: the process was very fast, we used to travel without delay and it was not expensive to travel…We used to travel with only our ID cards and did not need our passports. At the Dubai and Sharjah airports, there was a line for ‘GCC nationals’ and a line for others.”). 52 DCL-073, paras. 9, 12 (“My program [at Emirates Aviation University] began in November 2016. It was part-time, with most coursework offered on the weekends…Between November 2016 and June 2017, I traveled to the UAE on a regular basis to attend classes.”); DCL-108, paras. 5, 6, 8 (“Although I was born and grew up in Doha, I moved to…the UAE…in the mid-1980s…My daughters are Qatari because I am Qatari, but they feel a strong connection to the UAE because it is where they had spent their entire lives…Life in the UAE was good. My family was happy, we lived in a nice apartment, and my business was doing very well.”). 53 DCL-048, paras. 5, 9-10 (“I purchased an apartment in the UAE…I also purchased land [ ] for investment purposes. I was planning to build two villas to either sell or rent…In addition…I owned another piece of land that was used for industrial projects[.]”); DCL-108, para. 7 (“I opened a small business [ ] in Dubai. [It] was a retail shop…The store was very successful, especially for the first few years...[T]he business paid my salary [and] paid for my family’s home in [the UAE].”). 54 DCL-079, paras. 7-8 (“[M]y family…often stayed with my mother’s family in the UAE—on average four, sometimes five, times a year. We would go to the UAE for religious holidays, including the two Eids, and we would stay there for a month. We would also make shorter trips…We were very close with our Emirati family. I had my own room at my grandmother’s house, and I did not take bags with me when I visited her because I had my own clothes there. My mother did not even take her medicine with her for the same reason.”). 55 DCL-048, para. 10 (“It was easy to travel to the UAE prior to June 5, 2017. The flight tickets were cheap…and I would stay at a hotel in Dubai. I also sometimes drove there. I would travel alone for business or with my family for weekends and vacation.”); DCL-073, para. 13 (“Travelling to the UAE was relatively uneventful…[Prior to 5 June 2017,] I felt no hostility against me as a Qatari.”); DCL-079, para. 10 (“Traveling to the UAE was very easy: the process was very fast, we used to travel without delay and it was not expensive to travel…We used to travel with only our ID cards and did not need our passports. At the Dubai and Sharjah airports, there was a line for ‘GCC nationals’ and a line for others.”); DCL-108, para. 8 (“I traveled to Qatar often to see my family and for business…These trips were easy to make because I did not even need to book a flight; I would usually drive to Doha through Saudi Arabia.”). Annex 121
21 above, they are entitled to many of the same rights and benefits as UAE citizens—on its own makes clear that the Coercive Measures instituted against them since 5 June 2017 constitute discrimination prohibited on the ground of “national origin” under Article 1(1), and cannot be treated as “distinctions” or “restrictions” permitted against non-citizens under Article 1(2). 37. As a result, the UAE’s sudden collective expulsion of Qataris—done arbitrarily and without any consideration of individual characteristics or the provision of even basic due process—and simultaneous imposition of discriminatory travel and entry restrictions on Qataris to prevent their return and entry—again without affording even basic due process—just cannot be reconciled with the UAE’s current, self-serving characterization that the measures “merely eliminate[d] an advantage it previously extended to one particular nationality”56. To the contrary, the UAE’s actions have targeted the Qatari people as a group and damaged the exercise of Qataris’ fundamental human rights, including rights enumerated in article 5 of the CERD. 38. The Coercive Measures’ adverse impact on the exercise of fundamental human rights by Qataris makes clear that they go well beyond the “legitimate” and “proportional” distinctions that the Committee has previously indicated are permissible under the CERD. As explained above, the CERD Committee has criticized State immigration policies that classified foreigners along nationality-based lines or had a disproportionate impact on individuals from certain countries57. Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance has expressed concern about similar attempts by States to enact entry bans that disproportionately affect certain groups, stating that “[u]nder the . . . International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, blanket bans on specific nationalities and other immigration measures that exclude on the basis of . . . national origin are unlawful”58. 56 15 January Submission, p. 4, para. 7. 57 See supra, para. 32. 58 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/52 (2018), para. 67. See also Annex 121
22 39. And contrary to the UAE’s attempt to justify its Coercive Measures under general international law allowing States to “decide which rights and benefits to confer upon foreign nationals depending on what nationality they hold”59, the Coercive Measures also fall well beyond the bounds of permissible action under general international law60. It is without question that the expulsion of non-nationals from a State’s territory, absent “an assessment of the particular case of each individual member of the group”—of which collective expulsion based on nationality, such as that effectuated against Qataris by the 5 June Directive, is the archetypical example—is prohibited under international law61. Further, even if the Coercive Measures were solely restrictions on entry rather than a Donald J. Trump v. Hawaii, Case No. 17-965 (2018), Amici Curiae Brief of International Law Scholars and Nongovernmental Organizations in Support of Respondents, p. 3, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/41737/2018033012585227… (the amici brief was filed by eighty-one international law scholars and a dozen non-governmental organizations with expertise in civil rights law, immigration law or international human rights law; it describes a proposed ban on entry to the United States by individuals coming from particular countries as “a prohibited distinction in immigration policy based on national origin [that] violates the human right to freedom from discrimination based on national origin under the . . . International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and customary international law.”). The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, took the same stance on the ban at issue in Donald J. Trump v. Hawaii, tweeting that “[d]iscrimination on nationality alone is forbidden under #humanrightslaw.” UN Office of Human Rights, TWITTER.COM (30 January 2017), https://twitter.com/UNHumanRights/status/826034077056823296. 59 4 December Submission, p. 18, para. 37. 60 See, e.g., OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/3 (September 2004), pp. 8-9, n. 32, 34, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf (“The international minimum standard is a norm of customary international law which governs the treatment of aliens…[it applies across] a number of areas [that] include: the administration of justice in cases involving foreign nationals…full protection and security, which is usually understood as the obligation for the host State to adopt all reasonable measures to physically protect assets and property from threats or attacks which may target…certain groups of foreigners…[A]lthough the general right of expulsion by the host State has never been questioned, minimum standards have been invoked concerning the way in which it is carried out, which should be the least injurious to the person affected.”) (internal citations omitted). 61 Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, Arts. 9(1)-(3) (prohibiting collective expulsion, defined as the “expulsion of aliens, as a group,” without “an assessment of the particular case of each individual member of the group”); European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol No. 4, Art. 4 (“Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.”); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, Art. 22(1) (“Migrant workers and members of their families shall not be subject to measures of collective expulsion. Each case of expulsion shall be examined and decided individually.”); American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 22(9) (“The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 12(5) (“The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.”); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 26(2) (“Collective expulsion is prohibited under all circumstances.”). Annex 121
23 clear expulsion order, they still violate international law because they discriminate against one particular nationality, are not proportional to the achievement of any legitimate aim, and fall below the international minimum standard of justice62. 40. Accordingly, in light of the indiscriminate, arbitrary and punitive nature of the UAE’s Coercive Measures, the UAE has no basis on which to argue that the Coercive Measures are proportional to the achievement of a legitimate aim. c. “National Origin” in Light of Object and Purpose 41. Any interpretation of the CERD that would allow States parties to discriminate on the basis of an individual’s present nationality would contradict the CERD’s explicit object and purpose of eliminating racial discrimination “in all its forms and manifestations”, in that it would limit the CERD’s ability to effectively protect against contemporary forms of racial discrimination. As the Committee has previously explained, discrimination against non-citizens is a concerning source of racial discrimination today63. Indeed, as Professor Thornberry has explained: 62 See A. Xavier Fellmeth, “Nondiscrimination as a Claiming Paradigm,” in Paradigms of International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 119-120 (noting that “[g]enerally, only the least discriminatory means available will be proportionate to the aim; superfluous discrimination is always disproportionate”; also noting that the U.N. Human Rights Committee; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Strasbourg Court; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights have all adopted similar proportionality tests that suggest “laws limiting rights [must be] narrowly tailored to impinge minimally on the right”). See also J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, OUP, 8th ed. (2012), p. 613 (“Since the beginning of the twentieth century the preponderant doctrine has supported an ‘international minimum standard.’”); U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/144 (1985), Art. 2(1); Neer v. United Mexican States, Doc. No. 136, Opinion (Oct. 15, 1926), R.I.A.A. Vol. IV, pp. 601-661 (setting a standard of treatment of aliens concerning denial of justice, fair and equitable treatment and the minimum standard of treatment to be accorded to aliens under international investment law); World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Arts. I, III (incorporating the principle of non-discrimination in international trade law). 63 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), Preamble. While part of the objective of the CERD was to bring an end “in the decolonization period” to racial superiority and hatred, as noted by Judge Salam (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Salam, para. 3), the CERD was directed far more broadly to address and eliminate “all forms” of racism, including as the manifestation of racism evolves over time. This is reflected in the CERD’s explicit language, as well as in its object and purpose. See infra paras. 50–51 (citing United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1313th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1313 (1965), p. 121, para. 6). Annex 121
24 “A reading of 1(2) that rules out from the Convention any concern with non-citizens could be classified in [VCLT] terms as a ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ reading of ICERD, and as not corresponding to its object and purpose. In light of the ambition expressed in the Convention to eliminate racial discrimination, and a human rights approach pro homine and pro femina, it is reasonable to prefer effective interpretations that protect the widest span of potential victims”64. 42. Under the UAE’s self-serving interpretation of “national origin”, States Parties to the CERD would be free to engage in widespread discrimination against non-citizens as part of a campaign of hatred and mistreatment implemented in an entirely arbitrary and capricious manner, so long as a State framed this discrimination as based on present “nationality” alone. The UAE’s approach eviscerates the protections contained in the CERD and cannot be reconciled with either its language or object and purpose. Indeed, such an interpretation, followed to its logical conclusion, would lead to absurd results. For example, it would suggest that, prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, discrimination in any given country against persons of Ukrainian origin was impermissible, but not against those exact same persons once Ukraine secured Statehood. The UAE’s interpretation therefore assigns the term “national origin” an arbitrary meaning—one that protects groups of persons, unless the discrimination against them is framed in terms of present nationality. Further, as the Committee has previously acknowledged, “[t]he Convention . . . is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society”65. That human rights treaties must be interpreted in accordance with their general protective purpose is 64 P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 158; see also B. Çali, “Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights” in D.B. Hollis (ed.) The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 538 (“Effectiveness is an overarching approach to human rights treaty interpretation… [O]ther more…specific interpretive principles developed in the context of each human rights treaty…all derive from the interpretive consensus that interpretations that are devoid of actual effect for human rights protections do not cohere with good faith interpretations of the wording and context of human rights treaties in the light of their object and purpose.”). 65 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Meaning and scope of special measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 5; see also Stephen Hagan v Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, Opinion, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003), para. 7.3 (“The Committee considers…that the Convention, as a living instrument, must be interpreted and applied taking into [sic] the circumstances of contemporary society.”) Annex 121
25 universally recognized, including by the ICJ and regional human rights courts66. To this end, the Committee has repeatedly advised States parties to the CERD to “implement real solutions to racism so that all people, regardless of their background, could fully exercise their human rights”67. This applies to discrimination against non-nationals, which the Committee has previously characterized as “one of the main sources of contemporary racism”68. 2. The Travaux Préparatoires Confirm that the CERD Applies to Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality 43. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE argues that a “distinction between ‘nationality’ and ‘national origin’ is clearly delineated in the travaux préparatoires of the CERD”69. In support of this point, it relies on a single amendment proposed—and ultimately withdrawn—by the representatives of the United States and France, as well as statements 66 See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 24 (“The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the States which adopted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation could produce such a result. . . . The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them”); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 26 June 1989, IACtHR. (Ser. C) No. 1 (1994), para. 30 (“The object and purpose of the American Convention is the effective protection of human rights. The Convention must, therefore, be interpreted so as to give it its full meaning and to enable the system for the protection of human rights entrusted to the Commission and the Court to attain its “appropriate effects”); Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989, ECtHR (1989), para. 87 (“In interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards “practical and effective.” (citations omitted)). 67 CERD Committee, Ninety-third Session, Summary Record (Partial) of the 2457th Meeting, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.2547 (2017), para. 2 (Emphasis added). 68 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), Preamble. 69 4 December Submission p. 16, para. 32. The UAE cites P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 103-105 for the proposition that “differentiation on the basis of nationality [] is not prohibited under the CERD.” 4 Decembr Submission, p. 15, n. 31. This reference does not, however, support the UAE’s proposition; rather, it describes in general terms various discussions of “national origin” by the CERD’s drafters. Annex 121
26 made by the United States representative to clarify the meaning of that amendment70. In fact, lengthy discussions regarding the meaning and scope of “national origin” and its relationship to “nationality” underlie the entire drafting history of the CERD, and these discussions indicate the exact opposite of the UAE’s conclusion. “National origin” and “nationality” were never delineated by the drafters as distinct terms, but instead were understood to significantly overlap in meaning and scope. 44. Throughout the CERD’s drafting, delegates expressed the view that the term “national origin” could be interpreted in a number of different ways, including to encompass nationality in the sense of citizenship as well as in the sense of an individual’s historical-cultural connections to a State71. For example, Mr. Combal, the delegate from France, explained that “the term ‘national origin’ . . . could be interpreted in two entirely different ways. In the Brazilian amendment it was used in the sociological sense, but it might also be equated with the word ‘nationality.’”72 The delegate from Iraq agreed with the latter 70 See 4 December Submission pp. 16-17, paras. 34, 35 (noting that Judges Tomka, Gaja, Gevorgian and Salam relied on an amendment “specifying that ‘the expression ‘national origin’ does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’” in concluding that the drafters of the CERD sought to exclude distinctions on the basis of nationality from the scope of the Convention); id. p. 16, para. 32 (in discussing that amendment, “the US representative pointed out that: ‘[n]ational origin differed from nationality in that national origin related to the past—the previous nationality or geographical region of the individual or of his ancestors—while nationality related to present status. The use of the former term in the Convention would make it clear that persons were protected against discrimination regardless of where they or their ancestors had come from.”). 71 E.g., United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 16 (recording the representative from Senegal’s statement that “national origin” should be retained in Article 1, “since it would offer protection to persons of foreign birth who had become nationals of their country of residence . . . as well as foreign minorities within a State”). 72 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 15. The Brazilian amendment (A/C.3/L.1209) referenced by Mr. Combal proposed the following changes to draft Article 1(1): “In this Convention the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, [national] or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. [In this paragraph the expression ‘national origin’ does not cover the status of any person as a citizen of a given State.]” Specifically, the Brazilian amendment proposed “the deletion of the words placed between square brackets” and “the addition in parenthesis of the phrase, ‘and in the case of States composed of different nationalities discrimination based on such difference’, after the word ‘origin.’” United Nations, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6181, (1965), p. 12, paras. 29-30. Annex 121
27 meaning73, while other delegates used the terms “national origin” and “nationality” interchangeably74. 45. Because “national origin” was often interpreted as inclusive of nationality in the sense of citizenship, some delegates worried that the term’s presence in Article 1(1) would lead to restrictions on States attempting to make legitimate distinctions between citizens and non-citizens (e.g., in the case of political rights usually reserved to citizens, such as voting). The delegate from Lebanon, for example, voiced this concern during early debates of the Human Rights Commission, stating that “[t]he convention should apply to nationals, non-nationals, and all ethnic groups, but it should not bind the parties to afford the same political rights to non-nationals as they normally granted to nationals”75. In subsequent discussions of the Third Committee, Mr. Gueye, the delegate from Senegal, further explained that: “the expression ‘national origin’ had given rise to controversy, apparently because some delegations feared that its use would confer on aliens living in a State equality of rights in areas, political or other, which under the laws of the State were reserved exclusively to nationals”76. 46. Thus, it is clear that the delegates understood “national origin” as capable of encompassing present nationality. It was for this very reason that the debates over the inclusion of the term “national origin” in Article 1(1) took place. 47. Although the drafters were concerned about the possibility that including “national origin” in Article 1(1) would oblige States to guarantee equal rights to citizens and non-citizens, they also recognized that the aim of the CERD was to prohibit discrimination in 73 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 85, para. 22. 74 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 13. 75 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Twentieth Session, Summary Record of the Eight Hundred and Ninth Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.809 (1964), p. 5. 76 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 16. Annex 121
28 the enjoyment of fundamental rights to all persons, and broadly agreed that some form of the term “national origin” or “nationality” would therefore be a necessary addition to Article 1(1). And they did this in full recognition of the fact that the precise meaning and scope of “national origin” had not been clearly delineated, but instead was left open to varying interpretations depending on culture and context. This is because failure to include the term “national” in the CERD’s definition of “racial discrimination” would exclude from the CERD’s substantive protections a segment of the population that was clearly at risk for discrimination. As explained by Mr. Villgrattner, the Austrian delegate, “[d]eletion of the word [national] might lead to uncertainty concerning the rights of certain groups and perhaps, eventually, to their denial”77. 48. It was in this context that the U.S.-France amendment relied upon by the UAE was ultimately proposed. The purpose of that amendment, as the United States representative explained, “was to ensure that the Convention applied to racial discrimination in all its forms, while allowing certain accepted distinctions between citizens and non-citizens to be made by States”78. Had it been adopted, the U.S.-France amendment would have resulted in a new Article 1(2) providing : “In this Convention the expression ‘national origin’ does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’, and the Convention shall therefore not be applicable to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences based on differences of nationality of [sic] citizenship”79. 49. However, the drafters ultimately rejected the approach of explicitly excluding nationality-based discrimination from Article 1(1). Thus, the U.S.-France amendment was withdrawn in favor of a compromise amendment that provided the final text of Articles 1(1)–1(3) of the CERD: 77 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 84, para. 13. 78 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1985), p. 85, para. 24 (emphasis added). 79 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6181, (1965), p. 12, para. 32 (describing the amendment of France and the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1212). Annex 121
29 “(1) In this Convention the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. (2) This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State party between citizens and non-citizens. (3) Nothing in the present Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality”80. 50. In this way, the drafters dealt with the concern that citizens and non-citizens would have to be guaranteed the same political rights through express exceptions outlined in Articles 1(2) and 1(3). As explained by Ms. Tabbara, the representative from Lebanon and one of the sponsors of the compromise amendment, “[t]he amendment made it clear that the Convention would not apply to non-citizens or effect legislation on nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that there was no discrimination against any particular nationality”81. Articles 1(2) and 1(3) were therefore introduced to narrow the broad prohibition on racial discrimination contained in Article 1(1), as explained above. 51. By adopting the compromise amendment and retaining the word “national” in Article 1(1), the drafters of the CERD aimed to maintain the CERD’s primary goal of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination. They did this by composing a comprehensive definition of “racial discrimination” that was devoid of any “lacunae”82. 80 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6181 (1965), para. 37 (describing the compromise amendment put forward by Ghana, India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland and Senegal, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1238); CERD, Arts. 1(1)-1(3). 81 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1307th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1307 (1965), p. 95, para. 1. 82 P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 119. Annex 121
30 A broad application of the terms in Article 1(1), in which “national origin” is given the widest application possible, is in line with the intent of the drafters. It also accords with the drafters’ intent to give practical effect to the CERD in the face of ever-evolving contemporary forms of racial discrimination. Indeed, the drafters largely rejected the approach of listing specific “types” of racial discrimination, such as Nazism and anti-Semitism, in order to ensure that “the Convention [would] be a timeless one, applicable . . . to every kind of racial discrimination”83. As Miss King, the representative from Jamaica, explained, “[t]he Convention was intended to condemn and provide against not only the present forms of racial discrimination but any future forms as well”84. 52. For the reasons described above, the CERD clearly encompasses discrimination against groups of individuals of a particular nationality within Article 1(1)’s prohibition on discrimination based on “national origin”. As such, the Coercive Measures enacted by the UAE violate the CERD by explicitly and intentionally discriminating against Qatari nationals. B. The CERD Prohibits the Coercive Measures Based Upon the Discriminatory Effect on Individuals of Qatari National Origin 53. The UAE’s argument that “treatment based on nationality” cannot fall within the scope of CERD cannot be squared with the fact that the CERD’s prohibition on discrimination is not limited to the explicit purpose of the measures—rather, in line with the CERD’s general object and purpose of eliminating “all forms” of racial discrimination, Article 1(1) makes clear that the CERD encompasses discrimination in either “purpose or effect”85. The Committee has thus previously determined that the CERD prohibits both “purposive or intentional discrimination and discrimination in effect”86, and has stated that “[i]n seeking to determine whether that action has an effect contrary to the 83 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1313th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1313 (1965), p. 121, para. 6. 84 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1313th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1313 (1965), p. 122, para. 13. 85 CERD, Art. 1(1). 86 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 7. Annex 121
31 Convention, [the Committee] will look to see whether an action has an . . . unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”87. 54. Judge Crawford reached the same conclusion in Ukraine v. Russia, a case brought under the CERD to the ICJ: “[T]he definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in Article 1 of CERD does not require that the restriction in question be based expressly on racial or other grounds enumerated in the definition; it is enough that it directly implicates such a group on one or more of these grounds. Moreover, whatever the stated purpose of the restriction, it may constitute racial discrimination if it has the ‘effect’ of impairing the enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of the rights articulated in CERD”88. 55. Thus, independent of whether nationality-based discrimination is per se prohibited under the CERD—though it is, as discussed in Section A—the Coercive Measures violate the CERD because they have an unjustifiable negative impact on persons who are of Qatari national origin in a historical-cultural sense uncontested by the UAE: on the basis of characteristics such as “heritage” or their ability to “trace” their origin to Qatar89. 56. As explained above, the dictionary definitions of “national” and “origin”, taken together, suggest that the ordinary meaning of “national origin” refers to the belonging of a person—or a person’s ancestors—to a given country or nation. In addition to present nationality, the term unquestionably encompasses such belonging in the sense of historical or family ties, geographic origins, ancestry or one’s country of birth90. The prohibition on discrimination on the basis of belonging to a given country or nation is 87 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993), para. 2. 88 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Declaration of Judge Crawford (19 April 2017), para. 7. 89 See 4 December Submission, p. 18, para. 35. 90 Professor Thornberry has explained that the two terms “national origin” and “ethnic origin” often function “as a yoked pair of workhorses, employed whenever issues of color (‘visible minorities’) are not the most prominent markers of discrimination.” P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 126. Annex 121
32 therefore consistent with the CERD’s object and purpose of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination, including those forms of racism that might be related to, but not entirely covered by, other enumerated grounds such as “ethnic origin” and “descent”91. It is also consistent with the CERD’s travaux préparatoires92. 57. As the UAE knows, in the present context, “Qatari” does not only refer to a “current nationality”—it also describes a historical-cultural community linked to the modern State of Qatar and, as explained above, is defined by shared heritage or descent, particular family or tribal affiliations, and participation in national traditions and culture, as well as geographical ties to what is now Qatar. This group is easily identifiable to other people living in the Gulf, including based on their uniquely “Qatari” dialect and dress. Individuals belonging to this community also generally hold Qatari nationality, and comprise the significant majority of Qatari nationals, meaning that the UAE’s distinctions “on account of nationality or citizenship”93 discriminate in effect against Qataris in the historical-cultural sense. 58. The origins of a historical-cultural community of “Qataris” can be traced at least to the mid- to late-1800s. During this time period, members of a prominent tribe living in the area that is now Qatar began to amass influence, and by the 1850s and 1860s, the tribe’s 91 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 29 on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention (Descent) (2002), Preamble (“Confirming the consistent view of the Committee that the term ‘descent’ in article 1, paragraph 1, [of] the Convention does not solely refer to ‘race’ and has a meaning and application which complement the other prohibited grounds of discrimination.”). 92 As explained above, the drafters viewed “national origin” as inclusive of both an individual’s present nationality and historical-cultural affiliations linked to a particular State, and sought to balance the concern that non-citizens would be guaranteed equal rights to citizens if “national origin” was included in Article 1(1) against the need to ensure that the CERD would protect against “all forms” of discrimination. In that regard, the drafters of the CERD also expressed concerns about possible discrimination on the basis of an individual’s historical-cultural affiliations such as language, ancestry, or national traditions. In so doing, the delegates confirmed that a group of people defined by certain historical-cultural “national” affiliations—for example, a “mother tongue,” national traditions or beliefs, or ancestry tied to a particular geographical region—was meant to fall within the scope of the CERD’s substantive protections. See United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1304th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (1965), p. 85, paras. 21, 23; United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Sixteenth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411, p. 5. In practical terms, such a people might exist across different States, might exist as a minority group living within a State, or might be tied to a particular State, either presently or historically. 93 4 December Submission, p. 15, para. 31. Annex 121
33 patriarch—Muhammed bin Thani al-Wadhiri—had begun to operate as “de facto ruler of Qatar”94. In 1868, the British entered into a treaty with Muhammed bin Thani as head of “a distinct political entity”95, recognizing him as the “primary local authority” of Qatar and as representative of the Qatari people96. The Al Thani family has continuously ruled over the territory that forms modern day Qatar ever since. In 1916, Muhammed bin Thani al-Wadhiri’s son signed a treaty placing Qatar under British protection, a situation that was maintained until Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1971, as a result of which Qatar was formally established as an independent State97. 59. By the 1970s, the sense of a “Qatari” identity as the primary point of self-identification98 for the people living in this area was well-established, and it has only strengthened in the decades since99. As historians have explained, modern-day Gulf peoples “share a similar lifestyle but not a common identity, except perhaps in the eyes of outsiders”100. Today, there is a strong sense of a uniquely “Qatari” identity that is tied to belonging in the 94 K. Eggeling, Cultural Diplomacy in Qatar (“The Al Thani first consolidated their power over the territory that forms modern day Qatar through two treaties with the British in 1868 and 1916 that recognized the tribe as the primary local authority.”). 95 Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 26. 96 See Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States (Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989), p. 85 (describing Qatar’s former status as a dependency of Bahrain and stating that “in the eastern villages of Doha and Wakrah . . . . Bahrain faced intermittent opposition from the people of Qatar” prior to the establishment of the Qatari State; also describing a meeting between Muhammed bin Thani (1868-76) and a British official as “implicitly recogniz[ing] Muhammed bin Thani—as well as the people of Qatar—as being independent of Bahrain.”). 97 Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), pp. 28, 35-36. 98 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 8 Concerning the Interpretation and Application of Article 1, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. A/45/18 (1990) (noting that identification as a member of a particular racial or ethnic group or groups “if no justification exists to the contrary, [shall] be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned.”). 99 See Lawrence G. Potter, Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University in Qatar (2017), p. 23 (describing how “state citizenship has increasingly become the most important identity” in the Gulf States, particularly within the last fifty years). 100 Lawrence G. Potter, “Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil,” Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University in Qatar, Occasional Paper No. 18 (2017), p. 4. Annex 121
34 historical-cultural community of Qataris and identification with the Qatari State and its leaders101. 60. Social scientists have similarly described identity in the Gulf in terms of a “civic ethnocracy”, defined as “a political system based on kinship, real or presumed”102. In the particular context of the Gulf, “the defining feature [of such systems] is not race, language or religion but citizenship conceived in terms of shared descent”103. Indeed, across the Gulf, citizenship is granted on the basis of “shared descent” or other historical-cultural ties104. 61. Article 1 of the CERD must be interpreted and applied in the light of this particular Gulf context, and the fact that nationality is generally only conferred on persons with a close historical-cultural connection to the State of their nationality. As explained above, Qatar generally requires that an individual be a member of the historical-cultural community of Qataris in order to qualify for Qatari nationality105. As a practical matter, this means that the significant majority of Qatari nationals—those belonging to the group explicitly targeted by the UAE—are also of Qatari origin in the sense of the historical-cultural 101 The collective “Qatari” identity is celebrated on Qatar National Day. As scholars have explained, Qatar’s National Day “seeks to commemorate the ascendency of a leveling nationalism over the varied pre-statal social topography.” On National Day, large tents are erected for each tribe, and celebrations include “performance[s] of tribal belonging” such as poetry readings and ceremonial performances. See Andrew M. Gardner and Ali Alshawi, “Tribalism, Identity and Citizenship in Contemporary Qatar,” 8:2 Anthropology of the Middle East 46 (2013), p. 54. 102 Anh Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy Nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio-Political System in Kuwait,” in Dresch and Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 119. 103 Anh Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy Nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio-Political System in Kuwait,” in Dresch and Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 119. 104 See, e.g., Paul Dresch, “Debates on Marriage and Nationality in the United Arab Emirates,” in Paul Dresch and James Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 141 (describing Kuwait’s nationality law, which set the pattern followed by other Gulf States and defined Kuwaitis as those who were normally resident in Kuwait before 1920). 105 See, e.g., Qatar: Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality [Qatar], 30 October 2005, Art. 1 (defining Qatari nationals, including those historically resident in Qatar and those of Qatari heritage); see also United Arab Emirates: Federal Law No. 17 for 1972 Concerning Nationality, Passports and Amendments Thereof, [United Arab Emirates], 18 November 1972, Art. 5 (“[t]he nationality of the State may be granted to…[a]n Arab individual from Omani, Qatari or Bahraini origin residing in the State on continuous and lawful basis for at least three years directly before the date of submitting [a] naturalization application”) (emphasis added). Annex 121
35 connections described above: shared heritage or descent, particular family or tribal affiliations, geographical ties to what is now Qatar, and participation in national traditions and culture. That Qatari nationality is restrictive and largely coterminous with Qatari identity in this sense is well known to the UAE, and its attempts to characterize the Coercive Measures as “differentiated treatment on the basis of nationality”106 alone should therefore not be credited. As the UAE is well aware, discrimination on the basis of Qatari nationality is in fact a convenient way to target individuals of Qatari origin, as discrimination on the ostensible basis of nationality will unquestionably have a disproportionate impact on individuals of Qatari heritage or descent. 62. In this case, the Coercive Measures imposed by the UAE constitute violations of the CERD regardless of their purpose, because they have in fact had a severe impact on the historical-cultural community of Qataris107. Further, despite the UAE’s assertions that the Coercive Measures apply only “on the basis of nationality”, they have adversely affected many non-Qatari nationals of Qatari heritage. As noted in Qatar’s Communication, this includes the children of Qatari mothers who hold Emirati nationality, who have suffered from painful family separation as a result of the Coercive Measures108. 63. Thus, the UAE’s Coercive Measures have had a large-scale, adverse impact on individuals of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense. The discriminatory effects of the Coercive Measures on these individuals alone constitute violations under the CERD and bring Qatar’s Communication within the ambit of the Committee’s competence. Further, while the effects alone are sufficient, the punitive nature of the UAE’s actions, in combination with the specific context of the Gulf, in which nationality is largely coterminous with “national origin” in a historical-cultural sense, suggests that these effects are also by design. The UAE is well aware of the fact that nationality is closely correlated with historical-cultural ties in the Gulf region, and it must have known 106 4 December Submission, p. 15, para. 30. 107 See Qatar’s Communication, pp. 19-25, paras. 41-55. 108 Qatar’s Communication, p. 20, para. 43; see also id. pp. 48-50, paras. 113-119 (noting that the UAE’s actions were “specifically designed to encourage hostility and incite hatred against Qataris” and have “contributed to a general culture of fear for Qataris and those related to them”). Annex 121
36 that the natural consequences of enforcing these measures against Qatari nationals would include severe adverse impacts on individuals of Qatari origin. Given this context, in addition to the UAE’s repeated assertions that the Coercive Measures were implemented as a means to punish Qatar, it is clear that the UAE used nationality as an efficient approximation to target and damage the Qatari people. III. THE COMMITTEE HAS JURISDICTION OVER QATAR’S ARTICLE 11 COMMUNICATION BECAUSE QATAR CONSIDERS THAT THE UAE IS NOT GIVING EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CERD A. The UAE Distorts the Committee’s Role and the Requirements of Article 11 64. Pursuant to the plain text of the CERD, the Chairman of the Committee “shall appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission” for any matter referred to the Committee under Article 11 where, in relevant part: (1) a State Party “considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention”; and (2) “the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties … within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication”109. These requirements under Articles 11(1) and 11(2) establish minimal standards in keeping with the Committee’s contemplated role under Articles 11 to 13 as a mechanism to promote conciliation as a means to resolve disputes between States Parties to the CERD110. 65. As an initial matter, Qatar categorically disagrees with the UAE’s notion that the Committee does not have jurisdiction because the UAE’s violations have ended. Qatar is not asking the Committee to find jurisdiction and proceed with the formation of a Conciliation Commission to assign blame for past transgressions; to the contrary, as addressed below in Section II.B, by virtue of the process envisaged in Articles 11 to 13, Qatar seeks to address violations that are continuing to this day. 66. But the UAE also seriously misstates the requirements of the CERD, when it argues that the Committee and any ad hoc Conciliation Commission that may be appointed “only has jurisdiction to consider allegations of ongoing violations of the CERD” because Article 109 CERD Arts. 11(1)-(2). 110 The exhaustion requirement contained in Article 11(3) is addressed in Section IV, below. Annex 121
37 11 uses the present tense when it states “another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention”111. As an initial matter, the present tense phrase “is not giving effect to” relates to the time at which the matter is brought to the attention of the Committee and requires only that the violation was ongoing when Qatar submitted its Article 11 Communication. And notwithstanding the UAE’s selective quotation, Article 11 actually starts with the language that “if a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may bring the matter to the attention of the Committee”112. The “matter” that is not adjusted “to the satisfaction of both parties” for purposes of Article 11(2) is precisely that which is referred to in the opening sentence of Article 11(1). Accordingly, the requirement triggering the advancement of the procedure is what a State Party “considers” to be the case as to whether another State Party is not giving effect to the CERD. 67. That requirement is satisfied here. Qatar certainly “considers” that the UAE is “not giving effect to the provisions of the Convention” by continuing to enforce the Coercive Measures, and therefore has properly brought this matter to the Committee under Article 11. The October and November 2018 correspondence by Qatar and the UAE before the Committee clearly demonstrates that the matter qualifies for referral under Article 11; Qatar does not consider the matter to be adjusted to its satisfaction and accordingly referred the matter back to the Committee via its letter of 29 October 2018. Accordingly, nothing more is needed under Articles 11(1) or 11(2) for the Committee to exercise its competence under Articles 11 to 13, including to appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission pursuant to Article 12. 68. Indeed, to construe Article 11 as the UAE advocates, does harm not only to the plain language of the CERD, but is also manifestly illogical in light of the protective purpose 111 4 December Submission, p. 22, para. 46 (emphasis added); 15 January Submission, p. 12, para. 22. 112 CERD Arts. 11(1) (emphasis added). Language of this nature is deemed to be self-judging, conferring wide discretion on a contracting party to unilaterally consider the scope and applicability of a treaty provision. See, e.g., Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 226, para. 135, p. 229, para. 145 (interpreting Article 2(c) of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between Djibouti and France, which provided that assistance in proceedings relating to criminal offences “may be refused […] if the requested state considers that” one of several conditions was present, as providing a State to which a request for assistance has been made with “very considerable discretion”). Annex 121
38 of the CERD and the positive conciliatory role contemplated for the Committee through the Commission mechanism. In particular, while the UAE states that the Committee is “prevented from continuing to entertain…a matter once that previous failure to give effect to the CERD’s provisions has already been rectified”113, the UAE’s subjective opinion that it believes the matter with Qatar to be “rectified” cannot determine whether the Committee has jurisdiction to consider Qatar’s Communication. This question of whether or not a State Party is giving effect to its obligations under the CERD is precisely the matter that the Article 11 to 13 process was designed to resolve. To determine otherwise would be absurd: the Committee would be divested of jurisdiction if the allegedly offending party simply stated that the matter had been “rectified”. Nothing in the language or purpose of Articles 11 to 13 supports such a nonsensical result. B. Qatar’s Communication is Properly Before the Committee 69. To the extent the UAE argues that the Committee lacks jurisdiction because there exists insufficient evidence of its ongoing violations of the CERD114, the UAE is wrong both as a legal and factual matter. As a legal matter, the question of whether a party has put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that another party is in violation of the CERD should be considered by the ad hoc Conciliation Commission when assessing the merits of the dispute and preparing its “findings on all questions of fact relevant to the issue between the parties” in accordance with Article 13. As a result, it would make no sense for the underlying merits to be addressed by the Committee as a matter of jurisdiction or admissibility. 70. But in any event, the UAE is also wrong to question sufficiency of evidence as a factual matter. The UAE disingenuously cites the dissenting opinions of ICJ judges, but omits the fact that the majority of the ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar in those proceedings and indicated provisional measures to protect the rights of Qataris under the CERD precisely because the UAE’s Coercive Measures plausibly endangered the rights of Qataris under the CERD: 113 4 December Submission, p. 22, para. 47. 114 4 December Submission, pp. 22-24, paras. 46-53; 15 January Submission, p. 12-13, paras. 23-25. Annex 121
39 “In the present case, the Court notes, on the basis of evidence presented to it by the Parties, that the measures adopted by the UAE on 5 June 2017 appear to have targeted only Qataris and not other non-citizens residing in the UAE. Furthermore, the measures were directed to all Qataris residing in the UAE, regardless of individual circumstances. Therefore, it appears that some of the acts of which Qatar complains may constitute acts of racial discrimination as defined by the Convention”115. 71. In so holding, the ICJ drew from an evidentiary record that included multiple well-documented reports detailing the detrimental human rights impacts of the Coercive Measures, produced by independent international observers such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Qatari organizations like Qatar’s National Human Rights Committee116. On this 115 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures Order, p. 20, para. 54. Indeed, in the context of individual complaints brought pursuant to Article 14 of the CERD, the Committee has found that a complaint is admissible so long as the violations alleged may fall within the scope of the Convention. See, e.g., Stephen Hagan v. Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003), p. 10, para 6.2(“As to the State party’s arguments that the petition falls outside the scope of the Convention and/or is insufficiently substantiated, the Committee considers that the petitioner has sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that his individual claim may fall within the scope of application of the provisions of the Convention. … [T]he Committee deems it more appropriate to determine the precise scope of the relevant provisions of the Convention at the merits stage of the petition.”). Indeed, the standard for cases brought under Articles 11 to 13 of the Convention cannot be higher than the standard established for individual complaints under Article 14, particularly given the far more minimal requirements set by Articles 11 to 13 that must be met in order for a State Party to bring a matter to the Committee’s attention. 116 See Annex 11, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights (December 2017); Annex 1, Amnesty International, Families ripped apart, freedom of expression under attack amid political dispute in Gulf (9 June 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/families-ripped-apart-fr…; Annex 3, Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human…; Annex 10, Amnesty International, Gulf dispute: Six months on, individuals still bear brunt of political crisis (14 Dec. 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents /mde22/7604/2017/en/; Annex 5, Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses (12 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abus…; Annex 6, Human Rights Watch, Gulf Crisis Shows How Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar Tears Families Apart (21 July 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/21/gulf-crisis-shows-how-discriminatio…; Annex 2, National Human Rights Committee, First Report Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar (13 June 2017); Annex 4, National Human Rights Committee, Second Report Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar (1 July 2017); Annex 7, National Human Rights Committee, 100 Days Under the Blockade (30 August 2017); Annex 9, National Human Rights Committee, 6 Months of Violations, What Happens Now? The Fourth General Report on the Violations of Human Rights Arising from the Blockade of the State of Qatar (5 Dec. 2017); Annex 12, National Human
Annex 121
40 basis, the ICJ specifically observed that “many Qataris residing in the UAE [on 5 June 2017] appeared to have been forced to leave their place of residence without the possibility of return,” noting that “a number of consequences apparently resulted from this situation and that the impact on those affected seem to persist to this date”117—namely: “UAE-Qatari mixed families have been separated; Qatari students have been deprived of the opportunity to complete their education in the UAE and to continue their studies elsewhere since UAE universities have refused to provide them with their educational records; and Qataris have been denied equal access to tribunals and other judicial organs in the UAE”118. Notwithstanding the ICJ’s indication of provisional measures, the UAE has not rescinded its Coercive Measures, going so far as to summarily reject Qatar’s offer to work collaboratively to monitor the implementation of the Provisional Measures Order119. Still today in its submissions before the Committee, the UAE views itself as never having violated the CERD120, suggesting that any change in its Rights Committee, A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar (June 2018). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/54 (30 August 2018), para. 9 (“The Special Rapporteur…continues to share the concerns expressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in June 2017 that the measures adopted are overly broad in scope and implementation, and agrees that they have the potential to seriously disrupt the lives of thousands…simply because they belong to one of the nationalities involved in the dispute.”); Annex 8, National Human Rights Committee, Report of the NHRC on Violations of the Right to Private Property due to the Siege Imposed on the State of Qatar (30 August 2017); Annex 15, National Human Rights Committee, Gulf Crisis: Continuing human rights violations by the United Arab Emirates (23 Jan. 2019). Qatar’s NHRC is an independent national human rights institution that has received an “A” rating by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (“GANHRI”) consistently since its reorganization in 2010. A GANRHI “A” rating indicates that the institution is in full compliance with the United Nations Paris Principles, which provide the international benchmarks against which national human rights institutions are accredited by GANHRI. See GANRHI, Chart of the Status of National Institutions Accredited by the Global Alliance of national Human Rights Institutions: Accreditation status as of 21 February 2018, p. 3, available at, https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Documents /Status%20Accreditation%20Chart.pdf. 117 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures Order, p. 24, para. 68 (emphasis added). 118 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures Order, p. 24, para. 68. On this basis, the Court ordered the UAE to ensure that (1) separated families are reunited, (2) Qatari students are afforded the opportunity to continue their studies in the UAE or to receive their educational records if they prefer to study elsewhere, and (3) Qataris affected by the Coercive Measures are allowed access to tribunals and other judicial organs of the UAE. Provisional Measures Order, p. 27, para. 79. 119 Annex 13, Letter from Saeed Ali Yousef Alnowais, Agent of the UAE, to Philippe Couvreur, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (12 September 2018). 120 4 December Submission, pp. 2-3, 10-12, paras. 3-4, 18-22; 15 January Submission, paras. 7-13. Annex 121
41 policy or practice in actuality has not followed. Indeed, the UAE’s statement on 5 July 2018 “clarifying the legal position of Qatari nationals living in the UAE” did not absolve it of the ongoing violations based on its initial statement and only confirmed the continued Coercive Measures. In any case, the UAE’s violations as referred to the Committee are clearly ongoing, and the effects of those measures are still being deeply felt by Qataris121. 72. In sum, Qatar has provided more than sufficient evidence in support of the Committee’s jurisdiction under Article 11. The UAE, by arguing that the Committee does not have jurisdiction to consider the matter, seeks to create new jurisdictional requirements that simply do not exist in the text of the CERD. Because Qatar “considers” that the UAE is “not giving effect to the provisions of the Convention” by continuing to enforce the Coercive Measures, and the matter “has not been adjusted” to Qatar’s satisfaction, it has properly referred its Communication to the Committee under Article 11. IV. QATAR’S COMMUNICATION IS ADMISSIBLE 73. The UAE also argues that Qatar’s Communication is inadmissible because, the UAE says, (1) Qatar has failed to exhaust local remedies; (2) there are concurrent proceedings pending before the ICJ; and (3) the Communication constitutes an abuse of rights and process. None of these arguments is persuasive. Article 11(3)’s exhaustion requirement does not bar Qatar’s claims (Section IV.A); the existence of concurrent proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ does not render Qatar’s Communication inadmissible (Section IV.B); and the Communication is not an abuse of rights and process (Section IV.C). 121 Qataris continue to report violations of Convention-protected rights to this day—among others, families remain separated, students continue to be denied access to education and educational records, and Qataris continue to be denied access to justice in the UAE. See, e.g., DCL-004 and DCL-079 (describing continued separation from family in the UAE, including one declarant’s inability to attend the funerals of two family members); DCL-073 (describing delayed graduation date resulting from student’s inability to continue studies in the UAE); DCL-125 (describing the continued denial of educational records); DCL-048, DCL-135, DCL-093, and DCL-146 (describing declarants’ inability to communicate with previously retained lawyers or to retain new counsel). Annex 121
42 A. Article 11(3)’s Exhaustion Requirement Does Not Bar Qatar’s Claims 74. The UAE submits that “the Committee must decline to hear Qatar’s … Communication because Qatar has failed to establish that local remedies have been exhausted as required under Article 11.3”122. 75. The UAE is wrong. As explained below, Article 11(3)’s requirement to exhaust local remedies does not apply to Qatar’s claims (Section IV.A.1), but even if it did, the UAE has failed to discharge its burden to prove the existence of any effective and reasonably available remedies that have not been exhausted (Section IV.A.2). 1. Article 11(3)’s Local Remedies Rule Is Inapplicable to Qatar’s Claims “In Conformity with the Generally Recognized Principles of International Law” 76. Article 11(3) provides: “The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged”123. 77. The UAE notes that Article 11(3) “is a reflection of the customary international law principle that States may not exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its [sic] nationals by instituting international proceedings unless local remedies first have been exhausted”.124 But Article 11(3) is more than just a reflection of the requirement to exhaust local remedies. Under its express terms, in assessing the local remedies rule, this Committee must apply “generally recognized principles of international law”125. And 122 4 December Submission, para. 54(a). 123 CERD, Art. 11(3). 124 4 December Submission, para. 57 (emphasis added). 125 CERD, Art. 11(3). It should also be added that the “generally recognized principles of international law” are not static; to the contrary, they evolve. M. C. Bassiouni, “A Functional Approach to ‘General Principles of International Law’”, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (1990), p. 777 (“[I]t would be stifling not to inject into the sources of any legal system the capability of growth and development. Every national legal system includes such a process, either through the jurisprudence of its courts or through doctrine as developed by scholars. Thus, it can be said that legal principles evolve and that a legal Annex 121
43 those principles make it clear that the rule does not apply to claims of the kind before this Committee. The UAE’s objection must therefore be dismissed. 78. The UAE’s measures giving rise to Qatar’s Communication constitute a systematic, generalized policy and practice that has caused, and continues to cause, widespread violations of the CERD. Generally recognized principles of international law do not require the exhaustion of local remedies in cases involving breaches of this nature (Section IV.A.1.a). Qatar is also making claims in its own right that are interdependent with the claims brought on behalf of its nationals. Qatar’s claims are also preponderantly based on direct injury to it, not its nationals. Under general principles of international law, there is no need to exhaust domestic remedies in cases involving “mixed” claims of either kind (Section IV.A.1.b). 79. Each of these reasons, which independently warrant the dismissal of the UAE’s objection, is discussed in turn below. a. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in Circumstances of Widespread Harm or Generalized State Policies and Practices 80. The “generally recognized principles of international law” that Article 11(3) expressly incorporates are unequivocal: the local remedies rule does not apply in cases of widespread harm or generalized State policies and practices. The reason is obvious: requiring all Qataris aggrieved by the UAE’s measures to exhaust local remedies (assuming such remedies existed) would be impracticable, such that it would lead to the mechanism or process for the recognition and application of this evolutive aspect of law must exist in international law.”). Needless to say, the “generally recognized principles of international law” relevant to human rights protection are undoubtedly more progressive today than they were even at the time the CERD was concluded. Indeed, “[t]he Convention, as the Committee has observed on many occasions, is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society.”. CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXII (2009), para. 5. See also, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXIII (2009), para. 1(d) (referring to the “evolution in the field of human rights since [the] adoption” of the CERD); CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 4 (referring to this Committee’s work “in implementing the Convention as a living instrument”.). Annex 121
44 application of alleged remedies that would unquestionably be “unreasonably prolonged” and ineffective126. 81. Indeed, in no case, before any court or body in any jurisdiction, has the local remedies rule been applied in circumstances involving widespread and systematic harms like those before this Committee. 82. For example, the ICJ has required local remedies to be exhausted only when the claims involved a discrete number of easily identifiable individuals127. By contrast, the requirement has not been applied—indeed, it is rarely even mentioned by litigant States128—in cases involving, in the words of counsel for the UAE at the hearing on provisional measures before the ICJ, “a high number of persons”129. 83. Thus, in Georgia v. Russian Federation—a case also involving the CERD—Georgia argued that Russia had committed violations of the CERD against the entire “ethnic Georgian, Greek and Jewish populations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia”130. Yet even though Georgia explicitly brought claims “as parens patriae for its citizens”131, Russia 126 See CERD, Art. 11(3) (explicitly stating that the local remedies rule does not apply “where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged”.). 127 See, e.g., Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 29 (finding that “one interest, and one alone, that of Interhandel […] induced the Swiss Government to institute international proceedings”) (emphasis added); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 43, para. 52 (noting that “the matter which colours and pervades the United States claim as a whole, is the alleged damage to Raytheon and Machlett [two US companies]”) (emphasis added); see also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 48. 128 In the current case concerning the CERD between Qatar and the UAE now pending before the Court, the UAE has invoked the local remedies rule. While the Court refused to consider it at the Provisional Measures stage, it has not yet reached a final decision. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 42. 129 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/15, p. 10, para. 12 (Treves). 130 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 16. 131 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 16 (some emphasis added). Annex 121
45 did not argue that Georgian citizens had failed to exhaust local remedies. Nor did the Court raise the issue proprio motu132. 84. In the ongoing dispute between Ukraine and Russia—another case involving the CERD—Ukraine alleges that Russia is “pursuing the cultural erasure” of all “non-Russian communities [in Crimea] through a systematic and ongoing campaign of discrimination”133. At the provisional measures stage, neither Russia nor the Court raised the local remedies rule134. 85. The Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo provides yet another example. In that case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) accused Rwanda of “massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights” under several treaties, including the CERD135. Admissibility and jurisdiction were vigorously contested. Yet neither the parties nor the Court raised the exhaustion issue136. 132 This is important because the Court has made clear that it has the power to “take up, proprio motu, any preliminary question, whether of admissibility or of jurisdiction”, that “might constitute a bar to any further examination of the merits of the Applicant’s case.” See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, para. 33 (emphasis added). 133 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 33. 134 See generally, e.g., Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order. 135 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2006, para. 1. 136 See generally Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2006. Cases not involving the CERD but involving other widespread violations of human rights confirm the irrelevance of the local remedies rule in the circumstances of this case. By way of just one example, in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that Yugoslavia had violated numerous obligations “toward the People and state of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 13. Yugoslavia did not argue that all of the “People” of Bosnia and Herzegovina needed first to exhaust local remedies before the State could raise claims under the Genocide Convention. See generally Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections. Nor did the Court require such showing. Annex 121
46 86. Human rights bodies similarly “attach different consequences to systematic breaches, e.g., in terms of the non-applicability of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies”137. They do so notwithstanding the existence in the underlying treaty of provisions requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of admissibility138. 87. Hence, under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), the Court “may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months” from “the date on which the final decision was taken”139. 88. Nevertheless, in Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) noted that: “A practice incompatible with the Convention consists of an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system … The concept of practice is of particular importance for the operation of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies … [I]n principle, the rule does not apply where the applicant State complains of a practice as such, with the aim of preventing its continuation or recurrence, but does not ask the Commission or the Court to give a decision on each of the cases put forward as proof or illustrations of that practice”140. 137 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), p. 113 (“when reacting against breaches of international law, States have often stressed their systematic, gross or egregious nature. Similarly, international complaint procedures, for example in the field of human rights, attach different consequences to systematic breaches, e.g. in terms of the non-applicability of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies”) (emphasis added). 138 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 46 (“Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”) (emphasis added). 139 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 35(1) (emphasis added). This language was previously contained in Article 26 of the Convention. It is now contained in Article 35(1). Although the European Convention’s exhaustion requirement only expressly applies to individual applications, the Court considers the local remedies rule to be generally applicable in the inter-State context. 140 ECtHR, Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Application No. 5130/71, Judgment (18 January 1978), para. 159 (emphasis added). Annex 121
47 89. Both the ECtHR and the now defunct European Commission of Human Rights have applied this exception to the applicability of the local remedies rule on numerous occasions141, including in a case—analogous to this one—arising from “a coordinated policy” of “expelling Georgian nationals” from the territory of the respondent State142. 90. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has similarly found the local remedies rule inapplicable “in cases in which the existence of a generalized practice is alleged”, reasoning that “[t]he mechanisms established for examining isolated instances of alleged violations” are ill-suited “for responding effectively to cases where it is claimed that the alleged violations occur as part of a generalized practice”143. 91. In this case, the UAE’s measures were undertaken as part of a policy ordered and coordinated at the highest levels of government. The measures complained of represent a generalized policy and practice that has affected all Qataris and, in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law, the principle of exhaustion of local remedies simply does not apply in such cases. 141 See also, e.g., European Commission of Human Rights, Greece v. United Kingdom, Application No. 176/56, Decision on Admissibility (2 June 1956), p. 3 (“the provision of Article 26 concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law does not apply to the present application, the scope of which is to determine the compatibility with the Convention of legislative measures and administrative practices in Cyprus”) (emphasis added). 142 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 159 (“Having regard to all those factors, the Court concludes that from October 2006 a coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals was put in place in the Russian Federation which amounted to an administrative practice for the purposes of Convention case-law. Accordingly, the objection raised by the respondent Government on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.”). See also generally id., paras. 111-159. 143 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 260. See also id., para. 258 (referring to the rule that, “in the event of systematic generalized violations”, there is a “presumption iuris tantum that domestic remedies are neither suitable nor effective and, therefore, the requirement to exhaust them is dispensed with as a mere formality.”). As also explained by the former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and current Judge at the ICJ, Prof. Cançado Trindade, “[i]n cases concerning legislative measures and administrative practices the individual, having shown that such a practice exists, is not under the duty of exhausting local remedies”. A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Relation to Legislative Measures and Administrative Practices — The European Experience”, Malaya Law Review, Vol. 18 (1976), p. 278 (emphasis in original). See further A.A. Cançado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law (1983), p. 181 (“in a case concerning a general prevailing situation in breach of the Convention, recourse need not be had to local remedies.”). Annex 121
48 b. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in View of Qatar’s Claims of Direct Injury to Its Own Interests under the CERD 92. Even assuming arguendo that the local remedies rule did in principle apply to claims of widespread harm caused by generalized practices, it would still not apply in this case. That is because Qatar brings claims of direct injury to its own interests under the CERD that are not subject to the local remedies rule. Moreover, such claims for direct injury are both interdependent with, and preponderant over, Qatar’s claims brought on behalf of its nationals, and under general principles of international law, the local remedies rule does not apply to mixed claims of either kind. 93. According to the UAE, the local remedies rule dictates that “States may not exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its [sic] nationals by instituting international proceedings unless local remedies first have been exhausted”144. The other side of the coin is equally axiomatic: the local remedies rule does not apply where a State “is not acting in the context of protection of one of its nationals”145. 144 4 December Submission, para. 57 (emphasis added). 145 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 330 (holding that since Uganda was “not exercising diplomatic protection on behalf of the victims but vindicating its own rights under the Vienna Convention” under its second counter-claim, the “failure to exhaust local remedies d[id] not pose a barrier”); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, pp. 17-18, para. 40 (“As the Congo is not acting in the context of protection of one of its nationals, Belgium cannot rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion of local remedies.”); United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIV, para. 6.6 (“There is wide support for the view that a distinction is to be drawn between cases of diplomatic protection, on the one hand, and cases of direct injury where the State is protecting its own interests, on the other hand, and that the applicability of the rule of exhaustion is excluded in cases in the second category”); The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award (6 March 1956), UNRIAA, Vol. XII, p. 118 (defining the local remedies rule as a rule applicable in situations in which “an international action is brought for injuries suffered by private individuals”) (emphasis added); International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 44 (“Draft article 14 seeks to codify the rule of customary international law requiring the exhaustion of local remedies as a prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection”) (emphasis added); Theodor Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 35 (1959), p. 94 (“From now onwards, the discussion will be limited to genuine cases of diplomatic protection, to which cases alone the rule of local remedies can be applicable.”) (emphasis added). Annex 121
49 94. In the present case, Qatar makes both types of claims146. As a State Party to the CERD, Qatar has its own interest in ensuring that the UAE upholds its obligations under the CERD147, regardless of the existence of harm the UAE’s actions inflicted upon Qataris148. The CERD clearly entitles States Parties to demand compliance with its 146 Qatar does not merely assert claims as parens patriae on behalf of its nationals; it also asserts claims in its own right. As set out in Qatar’s Communication: “UAE has violated its obligations under (inter alia) CERD Articles 2, 4, 5, and 6, as well as the moral principles underlying the CERD and the customary law principle of nondiscrimination on arbitrary grounds. UAE’s actions contravene the negative and positive aspects of its obligations under the Convention. Not only has it failed to enact measures to prevent, prohibit, and criminalize racial discrimination, but—extraordinarily for a signatory State—UAE has actively promoted and engaged in racial discrimination and criminalized actions intended to benefit Qataris.” Qatar’s Communication Submitted Pursuant to Article 11 of the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (8 March 2018), para. 57 (emphasis added); see also id., para. 74 (“By enacting and enforcing the Coercive Measures, UAE has violated a number of the human rights protections recognized under international law and enumerated in Article 5 of the CERD; and has interfered with the rights of Qatari nationals.”) (emphasis added). 147 See, e.g., Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 74, 1983, p. 28 (“This act being attributable to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right of another State, international responsibility would be established immediately as between the two States.”); Case of the Swiss Confederation v. the German Federal Republic (No. I), Award (3 July 1958), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIX, pp. 421-422 (“The Applicant has not made a claim for damages against the Federal Republic. The Applicant makes no claim whatsoever, but merely requests a decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on the interpretation and application of Annex VII in conjunction with Annex II to the Debt Agreement in a particular dispute. In the present case, therefore, the lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be alleged by invoking the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies in the form more precisely defined above”); Theodor Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 35 (1959), p. 86 (“if the diplomatic negotiations between the two States prove unsuccessful, and State B applies to the International Court of Justice complaining of a breach of certain treaty obligations by State A (as shown by its conduct towards the injured alien) and asking principally for a declaratory judgment based on the interpretation of the treaty, this would appear to be a case of direct injury to which the rule of local remedies would not be applicable.”) (emphasis added); id., p. 87 (stating that “[c]ertain categories of acts have been considered to amount to direct injuries, such as…. violations of treaties”) (emphasis added); id., pp. 88-89 (“In such cases, an award of pecuniary compensation for its nationals who were incidentally injured by the impugned act is a secondary object; the primary object is to obtain from an international tribunal some declaration of the responsibility of the respondent State in international law, …, or some other remedy such as a binding interpretation of a treaty….”) (emphasis added). 148 See, e.g., United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIV, para. 6.12 (finding the local remedies rule inapplicable in circumstances in which the tribunal came “to the view that the State’s obligation to use its best efforts to ensure that user charges are just and reasonable to those airlines is independent of actual prejudice to them”) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added); Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of America and France, Decision (9 December 1978), UNRIAA, Vol. XVIII, para. 31 (finding the local remedies rule inapplicable in circumstances in which it was “obvious that the object and purpose of an air services agreement such as the present one is the conduct of air transport services, the corresponding obligations of Annex 121
50 obligations irrespective of the existence of distinct injuries suffered by individuals as a result of a breach of those obligations149. By way of example: Under Article 2(1), States Parties “undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races”150. Under the same article, States Parties commit “to discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial division”151. Under Article 4, States Parties agree to “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof”152. Under the same article, States Parties similarly agree to “declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination”.153 This Committee has made clear that “it is not enough to declare the forms of conduct in [A]rticle 4 as offences; the provisions of the article must also be effectively implemented”154. Under Article 5, “States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms”.155 As this Committee has noted, “[w]henever a State imposes a restriction upon one of the rights listed in article 5 of the Convention which applies ostensibly to all within its jurisdiction, it must ensure the Parties being the admission of such conduct rather than an obligation requiring a ‘result’ to be achieved”) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). 149 As noted by one representative during negotiations of the CERD, “[e]veryone agreed that domestic remedies should be exhausted before a case was taken to the international level, but it should be borne in mind that one State might bring a complaint against another, not with respect to the treatment of individuals or groups of individuals, but concerning failure to comply with certain provisions of the Convention”. UN General Assembly, Third Committee, 1353rd Meeting (24 November 1965), para. 54 (emphasis added). 150 CERD, Art. 2(1). 151 CERD, Art. 2(1). 152 CERD, Art. 4. 153 CERD, Art. 4. 154 CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 17. See also, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XV (1993), para. 2 (“To satisfy these obligations, States parties have not only to enact appropriate legislation but also to ensure that it is effectively enforced.”). 155 CERD, Art. 5. See also CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX (2004), Preamble (stating that Article 5 “requires States parties to prohibit and eliminate discrimination based on race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin in the enjoyment by all persons of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms”.). Annex 121
51 that neither in purpose nor effect is the restriction incompatible with article 1 of the Convention as an integral part of international human rights standards”156. 95. That Qatar has claims in its own right is not only reflected in these and other provisions, which can plainly be breached and result in harm distinct from any harm suffered by individuals as a result157. It is also reflected in Qatar’s interest in preventing future harm—a core objective of the CERD158. The local remedies rule only applies to claims brought to protect individuals who have already been injured159. By contrast, it does not apply to disputes that are not “confined to the past”, and relate to one State party’s 156 CERD Committee, General Recommendation XX (1996), para. 2. 157 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 10 (stating that Article 4 “has an expressive function in underlining the international community’s abhorrence of racist hate speech”) (emphasis added). 158 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 10 (“Article 4 comprises elements relating to speech and the organizational context for the production of speech, serves the functions of prevention and deterrence, and provides for sanctions when deterrence fails.”) (emphasis added); CERD Committee, General Recommendation VII (1985), Preamble (“Bearing in mind the preventive aspects of article 4 to deter racism and racial discrimination as well as activities aimed at their promotion or incitement”) (some emphasis added). The preventative focus of the CERD is reflected, inter alia, in its reporting and training requirements. See, e.g., CERD Convention, Arts. 7, 9; CERD Committee, General Recommendation XI (1993), para. 2 (“The Committee therefore affirms that States parties are under an obligation to report fully upon legislation on foreigners and its implementation.”); General Recommendation XIII (1993), para. 2 (“Law enforcement officials should receive intensive training to ensure that in the performance of their duties they respect as well as protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons without distinction as to race, colour or national or ethnic origin.”). 159 See, e.g., The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award (6 March 1956), UNRIAA, Vol. XII, p. 118 (the local remedies rule “means that the State against which an international action is brought for injuries suffered by private individuals has the right to resist such an action if the persons alleged to have been injured have not first exhausted all the remedies available to them under the municipal law of that State”.) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 27 (“the rule has been generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in violation of international law.”) (emphasis added); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 43, para. 52 (applying the local remedies rule in circumstances in which “alleged damage to Raytheon and Machlett” was said to “have resulted from the actions of the Respondent”) (emphasis added); International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 1 (“diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State…of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State”) (emphasis added); International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 45 (stating that paragraph 14(3) of the Draft Articles “provides that the exhaustion of local remedies rule applies only to cases in which the Claimant State has been injured ‘indirectly’”) (emphasis added). Annex 121
52 interest in “obtain[ing] a solution which will also relate to the interpretation and application of [the Treaty] in the future”160. 96. In the present case, of course, the harm is present and ongoing. Critically, in situations where “violations of the rights of [individuals] may entail a violation of the rights of [their national] State”, and where “violations of the rights [of the national State] may entail a violation of the individual”, the ICJ has found an “interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights” which precludes the applicability of the local remedies rule161. 97. Such interdependence exists here: By violating the rights of Qatar, the UAE has harmed individual Qataris. Conversely, by harming individual Qataris, the UAE has necessarily harmed Qatar162. 160 United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIV, para. 6.11 (emphasis added). See also id., para. 6.19 (emphasizing that in line with the “general principles of international law underlying the local remedies rule”, the rule did not apply to such disputes). 161 Indeed, in Avena and other Mexican Nationals, Mexico sought to protect its nationals on death row in the United States. It argued that it had “itself suffered, directly and through its nationals”, injury as a result of the United States’ failure to grant consular access to its nationals under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”). Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 36, para. 40. The United States objected to the admissibility of Mexico’s claims, arguing that Mexico had not exhausted local remedies before bringing its case. Id., para. 38. The Court rejected the United States’ argument, holding that “violations of the rights of the individual … may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State, and that violations of the rights of the latter may entail a violation of the rights of the individual. In these special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights, Mexico may, in submitting a claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the violation of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican nationals .... The duty to exhaust local remedies does not apply to such a request.” Id., para. 40 (emphasis added). 162 At the hearing on Qatar’s request for provisional measures before the ICJ, the UAE argued that the Court’s holding in Avena was limited to the specific context of Article 36 of the VCCR, which according to the UAE sets forth “a sui generis régime that was described by [the] Court in the LaGrand case as ‘an interrelated régime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection’”. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/15, pp. 17-18, para. 11 (Treves) (citing LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 492, para. 74). This strained attempt to distinguish Avena falls flat. Nowhere in its judgment did the Court limit the “special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights” to the narrow framework of Article 36 VCCR. If it wanted to limit the applicability of the rule to the VCCR, the
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53 98. But even if it could be said that Qatar’s claims in its own right are not interdependent with Qatar’s claims as parens patriae on behalf of its nationals (quod non), the local remedies rule would still not bar the admissibility of Qatar’s Communication. Local remedies need not be exhausted where a claim is based “preponderantly on an injury to the State and not to a national”163. The injury inflicted by the UAE’s measures to Qatar’s own interests preponderates here for at least three reasons. 99. First, as explained above, Qatar is entitled to protect its own interests whether or not it also brings claims on behalf of its nationals164. As noted by the ICJ a few years after the adoption and entry into force of the CERD, the protection from racial discrimination forms part and parcel of the “principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person”, which in turn give rise to obligations that transcend the ambit of the CERD and in respect of which “all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection”165. The prohibition of racial discrimination has since been recognized as a peremptory norm of international law, the breach of which cannot be justified under any Court would have said so. It did not, and wisely so—circumstances of interdependence are by no means unique to the framework of Article 36 VCCR. 163 See Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (2008), p. 181. See also, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 14(3) (“Local remedies shall be exhausted where an international claim … is brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national”); United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-United Kingdom), Award (30 November 1992) (revised 18 June 1993), UNRIAA, Vol. XXIV, para. 6.18 (“Although examination of the nature of USG’s claims and of the airlines’ potential claims reveals that they overlap to a certain extent, at the same time they present significant differences; and taking the case as a whole and undivided into its constituent parts, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the predominant element is the direct interest of the US itself.”); Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of America and France, Decision (9 December 1978), paras. 11, 29-30 (finding that, even though a private air carrier had allegedly been injured by a breach of rights under the Air Service Agreement, it was not required to exhaust local remedies before its State of nationality could bring an international claim). 164 See supra paras. 92–95 165 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32, paras. 33-35 (adding that “[o]bligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are not of the same category”) (emphasis added above). See also Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, paras. 68-69. Annex 121
54 circumstances, including the circumstances precluding wrongfulness accepted in general international law166. 100. Second, the UAE itself asserts that its “targeted measures are aimed at the Qatari government and not the Qatari people”167, and that “Qatar deliberately misrepresents the UAE’s measures against the Qatari government as measures taken against the people of Qatar”168. The UAE cannot therefore argue that the measures it claims were neither “aimed at” nor “taken against” the people of Qatar nonetheless give rise to claims “brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury” to those very same people suffered as a result of the UAE’s violations of the CERD169. 101. Finally, Qatar’s claims in its own right include claims for violations of the rights of individuals of Qatari origin who are not presently Qatari nationals. These claims relate to individuals who presently do not hold Qatari nationality but have suffered injury because of their Qatari heritage, descent, or past Qatari nationality.170 Because a State may not exercise the right of diplomatic protection in respect of persons who are not its nationals,171 and no special circumstance justifying derogation from this rule applies in the present context,172 Qatar does not assert these claims as parens patriae of its nationals. Qatar instead asserts such claims in its own right, which reinforces the preponderant nature of Qatar’s direct injury. 102. For all of these reasons, Qatar’s Communication plainly passes what the ILC refers to as the “but for” test: “whether the claim comprising elements of both direct and indirect injury would have been brought were it not for the claim on behalf of the injured 166 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), Art. 26, p. 85, paras. 5-6. 167 7 August Submission, para. 7. 168 7 August Submission, para. 11. 169 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 14(3). 170 See supra Section II.B. 171 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 3, p. 29. 172 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 8, p. 35. Annex 121
55 national”.173 The answer here is clearly “yes”. Qatar was directly targeted and has suffered and continues to suffer violations of interests of its own; such interests transcend the field of diplomatic protection and indeed fall under the purview of a higher normative order; and Qatar brings claims on behalf of non-nationals. In such circumstances, it is impossible to construe Qatar’s Communication as having been brought “preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national”.174 Accordingly, the local remedies rule does not apply. 103. In sum, under the “general principles of international law” to which Article 11(3) refers, the local remedies rule does not apply to claims of the kind presently before this Committee. This is not just because the UAE’s measures constitute a systematic, generalized policy and practice giving rise to widespread violations of the CERD. It is also because Qatar’s direct claims are interdependent with those brought on behalf of its nationals and because, even if they were not, they are preponderantly based on direct injury to Qatar. The UAE’s objection must therefore be dismissed. 2. The UAE Has Failed to Prove the Existence of Any Effective and Reasonably Available Remedies that Have Not Been Exhausted 104. Qatar explained above why Article 11(3)’s local remedies rule does not apply to its claims under “generally recognized principles of international law”175. But even if the rule did apply, it still would not bar Qatar’s claims. The UAE has failed to prove the existence of any effective and reasonably available remedies that have not been exhausted. 105. The ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection state: “Local remedies do not need to be exhausted where” there are “no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such 173 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 46. 174 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 14(3). 175 CERD, Art. 11(3). Annex 121
56 redress.”176 The ICJ has made clear that “[i]t is for the respondent” to prove “that there were effective remedies in its domestic legal system that were not exhausted”177. This Committee’s own Rules of Procedure confirm the point: the respondent is “required to give details of the effective remedies available to the alleged victim in the particular circumstances of the case”178. Notwithstanding the UAE’s suggestion to the contrary,179 it is thus the UAE—not Qatar—that bears the burden of proving that local remedies exist, and also that those remedies are both reasonably available and effective. 106. As a substantive matter, the local remedies rule is “riddled with many far-reaching exceptions”180. Article 11(3) expressly acknowledges one such exception in circumstances in which the application of local remedies is “unreasonably prolonged”181. Under general principles of international law, local remedies also need not be exhausted where, for example, “the local courts do not have the competence to grant an appropriate and adequate remedy to the alien”182, or where “the respondent State does not have an 176 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a) (emphasis added). As such, even if “doubts about the effectiveness” of proceedings “cannot absolve a petitioner from pursuing them”, such remedies must offer a “reasonable possibility” of success. CERD Committee, Sarwar Seliman Mostafa v. Denmark, Communication No. 19/2000, Decision (10 August 2001), UN Doc. CERD/C/59/D/19/2000, para. 7.4. 177 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 44 (emphasis added). 178 CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 92(7) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Diop v. France, Communication No. 2/1989, Opinion (10 May 1991), UN Doc. CERD/C/39/D/2/1989, para. 5.2. Qatar notes that Article 92(7) of the Rules of Procedure concerns the filing of individual complaints under Article 14, rather than inter-State complaints under Article 11, but sees no reason why the burden of proof would be allocated any differently for inter-State procedures. Indeed, the UAE itself submits that “the Committee’s jurisprudence on exhaustion of local remedies under Article 14 is also relevant for the present purposes given the similarity of the provisions on the obligation to exhaust local remedies of Article 11.3 and 14.7(a) of the CERD”. 15 January Submission, para. 49. 179 15 January Submission, para. 50 (“It falls to Qatar to show either that these available remedies were in fact exhausted, or either such remedies would not have been effective in the particular circumstances of the case or that their application would be ‘unduly prolonged.’”); id., para. 54 (“Qatar has put forward no evidence that these constitutionally protected remedies are in fact either unavailable to Qataris or ineffective.”). 180 Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law (2013), p. 564. 181 CERD, Art. 11(3). 182 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 47. See also, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 47 (“the DRC has also failed to show that
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57 adequate system of judicial protection”183. Relatedly, it is “fundamental to the effectiveness of a remedy that its independence from the authority being complained against is observed”184. 107. Moreover, the remedies encompassed by the rule include only “legal remedies”185. “[R]emedies of a judicial character, whether or not discharged by courts, are encompassed by the rule, whereas remedies based on the discretionary action of public organs are not.”186 108. As a practical matter, the exercise of legal remedies “must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State”187. Practical obstacles can include, for example, “the closure of transport links between the two countries”;188 means of redress against expulsion decisions are available under its domestic law”); The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award (6 March 1956), UNRIAA, Vol. XII, p. 119; CERD Committee, Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma et al. v. Germany, Communication No. 38/2006, Opinion (3 March 2008), UN Doc. CERD/C/72/D/38/2006, para. 7.3; CERD Committee, L.R. et al. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, Opinion (10 March 2005), UN Doc. CERD/C/66/D/31/2003, para. 9.2; CERD Committee, D.R. v. Australia, Communication No. 42/2008, Opinion (15 September 2009), UN Doc. CERD/C/75/D/42/2008, paras. 6.4-6.5. 183 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 47. 184 CERD Committee, L.R. et al. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, Opinion (10 March 2005), UN Doc. CERD/C/66/D/31/2003, para. 9.2 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Robert E. Brown (United States) v. Great Britain, Award (23 November 1923), UNRIAA, Vol. VI, p. 129. 185 See, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 14(2) (“‘Local remedies’ means legal remedies”) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 12 (“The rule is limited to legal remedies.”). 186 James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 12 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 47; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 45 (“The injured alien is, however, only required to exhaust such remedies which may result in a binding decision. He is not required to approach the executive for relief in the exercise of its discretionary powers.”) (emphasis added); CERD Committee, Habassi v. Denmark, Communication No. 10/1997, Opinion (6 April 1999), UN Doc. CERD/C/54/D/10/1997, para. 6.2. 187 ECtHR, Case of İlhan v. Turkey, Application No. 22277/93, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (27 June 2000), para. 97. See also, e.g., Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (29 July 1988), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 4, para. 68. 188 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 156. Annex 121
58 difficulties in contacting the relevant authorities of the respondent State;189 and a “widespread climate of discrimination”190. 109. Credible fear of reprisal can also excuse the need to pursue a remedy191. Similarly, if an individual’s “indigency or a general fear in the legal community to represent him prevents” him from “invoking the domestic remedies necessary to protect a right”, he is “not required to exhaust such remedies”192. 110. In short, the existence of “available and sufficient” remedies “must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness”193. As such, “the State that alleges non-exhaustion must indicate which domestic remedies should be exhausted and provide evidence of their 189 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 156. 190 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 256. 191 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 594/1992, Views (3 December 1998), UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/594/1992, para. 6.4 (“In these circumstances, given the author’s statement that he had not filed a complaint because of his fears of the warders, the Committee considered that it was not precluded by [the Optional Protocol’s local remedies rule] from examining the complaint.”) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 154 (“the climate of precipitation and intimidation in which these measures were taken also explains the reluctance of the Georgian nationals to use those remedies.”); CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXI, para. 1(b); Human Rights Committee, Avadanov v. Azerbaijan, Communication No. 1633/2007, Views (2 November 2010), UN Doc. CCPR/C/100/D/1633/2007, para. 6.4. 192 Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 (10 August 1990), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A, No. 11, para. 42. See also, e.g., Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (29 July 1988), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 4, para. 80. 193 ECtHR, Case of Vernillo v. France, Application No. 11889/85, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (20 February 1991), para. 27. It again “falls to the respondent State to establish that these various conditions are satisfied”. Id. See also, e.g., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 (10 August 1990), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A, No. 11, para. 17; ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), paras. 150-151; James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 19; Human Rights Committee, Warsame v. Canada, Communication No. 1959/2010, Views (1 September 2011), UN Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010, para. 7.4. Annex 121
59 effectiveness”194, including in the form of “examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions”195. 111. The UAE insists in these proceedings that “numerous” effective domestic remedies are “available within the UAE to any Qatari nationals who claim to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the CERD”196. It points to only three of these supposedly “numerous” remedies: (1) “administrative remedies such as hotlines and other application procedures”;197 (2) “[c]ourt remedies”;198 and (3) “complaint procedures specific to various governmental authorities”199. 112. Here again, the UAE is wrong. As explained below, the UAE has not proved that any of these so-called “remedies” are “effective” and “reasonably available”200. They therefore need not be exhausted “in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law”201. 194 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 243. See also, e.g., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (1 February 2000), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 66, para. 53. 195 See C Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law (2013), p. 568 (“the European Court of Human Rights has specified that the State must not only satisfy the Court that the remedy was effective, available both in theory and practice at the relevant time, but also frequently asks the State to provide examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions to that of the applicant.”). See also, e.g., ECtHR, Case of Kangasluoma v. Finland, Application No. 48339/99, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (20 January 2004), para. 48 (“Nor did the Government supply any example from domestic practice showing that, by using the means in question, it was possible for the applicant to obtain such relief. This is in itself sufficient to demonstrate that the remedies referred to do not meet the standard of ‘effectiveness’ for the purposes of Article 13 because, as the Court has already said … the required remedy must be effective both in law and in practice.”) (emphasis added); ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 157. 196 4 December Submission, para. 65. 197 4 December Submission, para. 64. See also 7 August Submission, para. 85. 198 4 December Submission, para. 67. See also 7 August Submission, para. 85. 199 4 December Submission, para. 67. 200 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a). 201 CERD, Art. 11(3). Annex 121
60 a. The Hotline is Discretionary and Ineffective 113. The UAE submits that a so-called “hotline” through which “Qatari nationals who seek entry to the UAE are able to apply for entry”202 constitutes a remedy that must be exhausted under Article 11(3) of the CERD. The UAE made a similar argument before the ICJ and lost. The Court concluded in its 23 July 2018 Order on Provisional Measures that the UAE had not indicated “any effective local remedies that were available to the Qataris that have not been exhausted”203. 114. There are at least four independently sufficient reasons to reject this claim as the ICJ previously did. 115. First, the hotline is not a legal remedy. Indeed, the UAE has itself expressly stated that permission through the hotline may be granted “at the discretion of the UAE government”204. An injured alien is, however, “not required to approach the executive for relief in the exercise of its discretionary powers”205. 116. Second, while the UAE disparagingly dismisses so-called “anecdotal accounts” of “individuals’ mistrust or paranoia” with respect to the hotline206, the facts demonstrate that the hotline is a “police security channel”207 run in a police State208. The security 202 7 August Submission, para. 85. 203 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 42 (emphasis added). 204 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, An official Statement by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018), available at https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-07-2018-UAE-Statem… (last accessed: 8 February 2019) (emphasis added). 205 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), p. 45. 206 4 December Submission, para. 64. 207 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE Annex 4). 208 See, e.g., Christopher M. Davidson, Foreign Policy, “The Making of a Police State” (14 April 2011), available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/14/the-making-of-a-police-state-2/ (last accessed: 8 February 2019); OHCHR, Press briefing note on United Arab Emirates (4 Jan. 2019) (“Mansoor was initially convicted in May 2018 on charges of using social media to ‘publish false information that harm national unity and damage the country’s reputation’. This was in relation to tweets he posted that were critical of the Government. As the Court of State Security is UAE’s highest court, he has no further appeal rights under the UAE’s judicial system.”). Annex 121
61 channel’s “service objectives” include “[c]ombating and preventing crimes” and “[c]onsolidating the concept of ‘Security Is Everybody’s Responsibility.’”209 According to the Abu Dhabi Police, “[a]ttention” is paid to “issues that are disturbing and recurrent in the society and have a high impact on security”210. Indeed, the service provided gathers information helpful “in knowing the behaviours and conducts that indicate the commission of the crime”211. 117. In circumstances in which the UAE ordered the expulsion of every Qatari from its territory and then criminalized expressions of sympathy towards Qatar, it is as absurd as it is offensive for the UAE to discredit the legitimate fears of Qataris to expose themselves and their loved ones to a “police security channel” of this kind212. 118. Third, the hotline is ineffective. In its 15 January submission, the UAE alleged “that from 9 July 2018 through 31 December 2018, 3,563 applications by Qatari nationals were lodged with the UAE authorities for entry permits to the UAE, 3,353 of which were accepted”213. Even more incredibly, in its 4 December submission, the UAE submitted that “the vast majority of applications for permission to travel are approved”, and that 209 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE Annex 4). 210 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE Annex 4). 211 Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE Annex 4). 212 See, e.g., DCL-048, para. 24 (“I once called the hotline and was asked to provide many personal details and documents. That just increased my fear.”). See also, e.g., Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017) (“Some affected families have told Amnesty International that they are too scared to call hot lines and register their presence, or their family’s presence, in a ‘rival’ country for fear of reprisal.”); for relevant jurisprudence, see, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 594/1992, Views (3 December 1998), UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/594/1992, para. 6.4 (“given the author’s statement that he had not filed a complaint because of his fears of the warders, the Committee considered that it was not precluded by article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol from examining the complaint.”); ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 154 (“the climate of precipitation and intimidation in which these measures were taken also explains the reluctance of the Georgian nationals to use those remedies.”). 213 15 January Submission, para. 8. Annex 121
62 “[i]n the first six months of 2018 alone, the hotline received 1,390 applications”, of which “only 12 applications were rejected for security or other reasons”214. 119. The UAE’s argument, however, flies in the face of evidence of Qataris citing repeated instances of rejections for arbitrary reasons or having received no responses from the hotline at all215. Setting aside the obvious deficiencies in the evidence produced to prove its claims216—which would suggest that the UAE began rejecting far more applications after the ICJ issued its legally binding order on provisional measures than it did before217—the numbers actually incorporate extremely large numbers of applications to exit the country218. Indeed, the reality is that applicants wanting to enter the UAE are 214 7 August Submission, para. 25. 215 See, e.g., DCL-079, paras. 20-27 (describing multiple calls to the hotline, many of which went unanswered); DCL-125, para. 7 (“I have applied for admission to the UAE on eight occasions…My applications were not approved five times, and they were approved three times. I was often given no explanation when my application was not approved”); DCL-004, para. 20 (describing the declarant’s son’s experience of being rejected and accepted); Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights (14 June 2017) (noting that measures implemented to address dual nationality families “are not sufficiently effective to address all cases”); Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses (12 July 2017) (“of the 12 Gulf nationals who said they tried to contact these hotlines, only two managed to get permission to go back and forth.”). See also, e.g., Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017). 216 For example, the contents of UAE’s Annex 4 appear to have been selectively curated from a larger document—not on the record—for use in these proceedings. See generally Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 2 (UAE Annex 4) (indicating that the original document sent by the Abu Dhabi police contained underlying documentary evidence for a much larger set of applications, including a number of rejected applications). Similarly, UAE Annex 1.2 contains no corroboration, and was clearly produced by the UAE executive solely for the purposes of litigation in these proceedings. See generally Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018 (UAE Annex 1.2). 217 The ICJ issued its order on provisional measures on 23 July 2018. If the UAE is to be believed, it nonetheless rejected seventeen times more applications from 9 July 2018 through 31 December 2018 than it did during the first six months of 2018 combined. See 15 January Submission, para. 8; 7 August Submission, para. 25. 218 While the quality of UAE Exhibit 1.2 is so poor that Qatar has been unable to convert it back to Excel for purposes of precisely tallying the numbers, it appears that a very large number, if not the majority, of the records reflect requests to exit, not enter, and that the UAE’s claim that “3,563 applications by Qatari nationals were lodged with the UAE authorities for entry permits to the UAE, 3,353 of which were accepted” is thus incorrect. 15 January Submission, para. 8 (emphasis added). See generally Requests for Entry or Exit of Qatari Nationals from 9 July 2018 until 31 December 2018 (UAE Annex 1.2). UAE’s Annex 4, for its part, incorporates applications of Qataris and Emiratis to both enter and exit the country. See, e.g., Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, pp. 2, 19, 22 (UAE Annex 4). In fact, the exhibit itself suggests that the majority of the applications accepted were actually submitted by Emiratis wanting to visit Qatar. Cf. id., p. 2 (“The number of UAE Nationals’ requests to visit Qatar is (828 requests) since the beginning of 2018 AD.”). Annex 121
63 very frequently unable to reach anyone through the UAE’s hotline despite calling repeatedly219. When they have actually managed to apply, their applications have often not been approved without any explanation220. Indeed, applications have sometimes not been approved even though applications submitted with the exact same documents had previously been accepted on different occasions221, a fact that highlights the arbitrary and nontransparent nature of the mechanism and contradicts the UAE’s claim that Qataris are permitted to enter if they “do not pose a security risk and otherwise meet” unspecified “neutral immigration criteria”222. 219 See, e.g., DCL-079, paras. 20-27 (“I…called over and over again until someone answered … Between [] and [], I called the hotline at least 50 times a day. Only around six of these calls were answered… I called the hotline another 70 times between []; they only answered six times. During my last discussion with them, they asked me to stop calling because I was calling too frequently and told me that someone would call me back. No one ever did. At that point, I stopped calling. We never heard back from the hotline again, and we all missed [] funeral.”). See also, e.g., Amnesty International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017) (“Several people said they had tried in vain for hours or days to get through to the hot lines. Those who got through said officials asked them for minimal details about their cases and told them they would receive a call back, but there had been no follow-up.”); DCL-135, para. 25 (“During the call, I was asked about the purpose of my visit and whether I have first degree relatives in the UAE. When I explained the purpose of my visit, the hotline representative simply said that they would look into it and get back to me. The representative gave me no further information. Despite the promise, they never did. After I had not heard from the hotline representatives for over a month, I tried again in October 2018. Again, the representative promised to call me back and did not. After this call, I gave up on the hotline.”); DCL-079, paras. 23-24 (“Whenever I called, either a hotline operator answered, or the phone was off, or it was busy. When they did not answer, the line cut off and I would then send a text message by WhatsApp.”). 220 See, e.g., DCL-125, para. 7 (“My applications were not approved five times, and they were approved three times. I was often given no explanation when my application was not approved, but was instead told to apply again without any indication as to what I had done incorrectly or what I should do differently the next time. On at least one occasion, an application was not approved even though an application submitted with the exact same documents had previously been accepted on a different occasion. My last four applications have all been rejected. Every time I have been rejected I have had to contact the UAE authorities to find out; no one has ever told me that I was rejected until I called.”). As such, even if the hotline were a remedy encompassed by Article 11(3)—and it clearly is not—it would be a remedy that has already been exhausted. 221 See, e.g., DCL-125, para. 7 (“On at least one occasion, an application was not approved even though an application submitted with the exact same documents had previously been accepted on a different occasion.”). 222 7 August Submission, para. 3. Qatar notes, moreover, that even many of those who have received approval to travel have nonetheless been refused entry onto planes run by Emirati airlines. See, e.g., DCL-004, para. 19 (“[E]ven though he had a permit, [my son] was refused entry onto the plane traveling to []…The Etihad Airways staff stopped him at the gate, saying that they would not allow any Qataris on-board, as they were an Emirati company.”); DCL-125, para. 12 (“my ticket was booked through the Emirates airline, and Emirates refused to allow me to board”). Annex 121
64 120. The UAE nonetheless asserted in its 4 December Submission that the “efficient working of the hotline is evidenced by the extensive travel logs of movements” since 5 June 2017, which allegedly “show 8,442 movements by Qatari citizens across UAE borders, all of which were facilitated by the work of the hotline”223. In its 15 January submission, it similarly claimed that “[u]pdated evidence” indicates that “registered entries and exits of Qatari nationals into and out of the UAE from 1 June 2018 through 31 December 2018 amounted to 2,876”224. 121. It will not escape this Committee that the large majority of these “movements” and “entries and exits” unsurprisingly record Qataris exiting the country225. Nor will it escape this Committee that the UAE has provided no comparative set of data on the movements of Qataris during the period before the crisis. The reason is obvious: cell phone records indicate that there has been a precipitous drop in the presence of Qataris in the UAE since 5 June 2017. One carrier reports a 96% drop in roaming in the UAE by Qatari customers226. 122. The UAE’s additional argument that “substantially” the “same number of Qataris live in the UAE as prior to the start of the crisis”227, and that “the vast majority of Qatari 223 7 August Submission, para. 26. Qatar notes that in its Supplemental Response of 4 December 2018, the UAE referred for the first time to “administrative remedies such as hotlines and other application procedures”. 4 December Submission, para. 64 (emphasis added). The UAE has given no indication of what those other “application procedures” might be, or what role they are alleged to play in light of its previous assertion that “all” travel by Qataris into and out of the country was “facilitated by the work of the hotline”. 7 August Submission, para. 26. 224 15 January Submission, para. 8. 225 See generally Excel Redacted Entrance and Exit for Qatari Nationalities (UAE Annex 1.1) (recording over 750 more exits than entries); Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (UAE Annex 5) (again recording hundreds more exits than entries). Qatar also notes that the UAE’s data does not record the dates of each movement for the year following 5 June 2017. See generally Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (UAE Annex 5). This is almost certainly because including the dates would have revealed a mass exodus of Qataris from the UAE in the immediate aftermath of the 5 June 2017 expulsion. 226 See Annex 16, Ooredoo Comparison – Before and After, p. 1 (providing comparative data on the roaming of Qatari SIM card holders “roaming” in the UAE). See also generally id.; Annex 14, Letter on Usage from the CEO of Vodafone Qatar (30 December 2018) (providing, in a letter from the CEO of Vodafone Qatar, detailed information on the calls, messages, and internet used by users of Vodafone Qatar while roaming in the UAE from January 2016 to December 2018, and showing a large and permanent drop in usage in June 2017) (certified translation). 227 7 August Submission, para. 94. See also Immigration - Complete Entry-Exit Records (UAE Annex 5). Annex 121
65 residents in the UAE on 5 June 2017 chose to continue their residence in the UAE”228, completely fails to prove its facially implausible claim of the hotline’s supposed effectiveness. 123. The UAE attempts to support this claim by citing immigration records, which it claims show that “[a]s of mid-June 2018, there were 2,194 Qatari nationals in the UAE, largely the same as the number of Qataris residing in the UAE on 5 June 2017”229. The first problem with these assertions is that the documents the UAE cites simply do not substantiate them. Even if the documents showed the presence of 2,194 Qataris “in the UAE” as of mid-June 2018—and it is not at all clear that they do230—they provide no comparative set of data on the number of Qataris in the UAE “on 5 June 2017”231. As such, the UAE has once again failed to provide comparative data obviously within its possession. Its failure to do so is telling. 124. But even if it were true that the number of Qataris now “in” the UAE were the same as the number of Qataris previously “residing in” the UAE, that fact would suggest a dramatic reduction in the overall number of Qataris in the country. After all, the number of Qataris “in” the country would include both residents and non-residents, whereas the number of Qataris “residing in” the country would not232. 228 7 August Submission, para. 19. 229 7 August Submission, para. 19. See also 15 January Submission, para. 10 (“As of June 2018, the number of Qataris in the UAE amounted to 2,194.”). 230 UAE Annex 1 lists only dates of entry into the country. See generally Immigration – Qataris in the UAE (UAE Annex 1). UAE Annex 2, which appears to be a cover page to UAE Annex 1, then states that UAE Annex 1 shows “the number of Qatari nationals who have been in the country”, raising the question of whether any of those Qataris have since left the country. See Immigration - ID & Citizenship Authority Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Stats, p. 2 (UAE Annex 2) (emphasis added). 231 However, in the exhibit the UAE cites to support this claim, it did include—perhaps inadvertently—data not only on the year following 5 June 2017, but also on an approximately one-month period before it. See generally Immigration – Qataris in the UAE (UAE Annex 1). Incredibly, when sorted by date, the data indicates that, of the individuals listed on the spreadsheet, significantly more entered the country in the approximately one-month period prior to 5 June 2017 than in the following 12 months combined. See Annex 17, Sorted Excel Spreadsheet of UAE Annex 1, Immigration – Qataris in the UAE. 232 Indeed, whereas in its Response of 7 August 2018 the UAE suggested that there were approximately 2,194 Qataris “residing in” the UAE as of 5 June 2017, in its 15 January 2019 submission, it submitted that, as of 10 January 2019, there were only “702 Qatari nationals residing in the UAE who hold UAE identification documents”. See 7 August Submission, para. 19; 15 January Submission, para. 10 (emphasis added). Qatar notes that the document the UAE cites in support of this latter assertion actually records 396 of these 702
Annex 121
66 125. The UAE’s characterization of its own exhibits thus confirms what should be common sense: that the UAE’s measures forming the subject of Qatar’s Communication have led to an enormous decrease in the number of Qataris both residing in and visiting the UAE. 126. Finally, even if the hotline were effective—which it is not—the hotline is only available for family-related matters, as the UAE itself made clear at the hearing on provisional measures before the ICJ233. Moreover, setting aside its obvious procedural deficiencies, it could only arguably mitigate harm with respect to travel into and out of the country. It cannot remedy past harms, restore the status quo ante, afford reparation, offer guarantees of non-repetition or adjudge or declare breach234. The hotline is therefore not an adequate remedy in any sense of the word. 127. At the hearing on provisional measures before the ICJ, the UAE emphasized “that the mechanism of the hotline is more appropriate and expeditious than more traditional Qatari nationals as having exited the country. See Excel Redacted Holders of UAE Resident Permits (UAE Annex 1.3). Moreover, many of the remaining entries—a mere 306—may have actually been made by the same nationals entering the country on more than one occasion. Id. (redacting information identifying those allegedly entering the country). But even accepting the UAE’s submissions as true—and Qatar does not—there would apparently have been a more than threefold decrease in the number of Qataris residing in the UAE. That decrease would not, of course, account for the substantial numbers of additional Qataris who are no longer able to visit the country as a result of the arbitrary administration of the hotline. 233 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, para. 41 (“a Presidential Directive was issued on 6 June 2017 which instructed the authorities to take into account the humanitarian circumstances of such mixed families and in implementation a special telephone line was established to receive such cases and take appropriate action.”). See also, e.g., Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 2 (UAE Annex 4) (“in terms of taking into consideration the Humanitarian cases of the Emirati-Qatari joint families, in recognition of the brotherly Qatari people, the Ministry of Interior has set up a toll-free hotline (009718002626) to receive such humanitarian cases and take appropriate procedures to help them.”). This fact has prevented many Qataris from calling the hotline. See, e.g., DCL-135, para. 24 (“I didn’t try to contact the hotline because I heard it was for people trying to visit close relatives.”); id., para. 25 (“After I heard about the provisional measures order…I contacted the hotline to request a special permit to go to the UAE to try to retrieve the originals of my documents. During the call, I was asked about the purpose of my visit and whether I have first degree relatives in the UAE.”); DCL-093, para. 28 (“I did not try to request a special permit to go to the UAE and see my property because one of my Qatari friends told me that the special permit was only for Qataris who were visiting first-degree relatives in the UAE.”). 234 See, e.g., Francesca Capone, “Remedies”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), para. 17 (“The responsible State is also under an obligation to make reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”); id., para. 15 (“The State responsible for the commission of a wrongful act is under an obligation to cease the conduct and to offer appropriate assurances, normally given verbally, and guarantees of non-repetition, such as preventive measures to be taken to avoid repetition of the breach.”). Annex 121
67 mechanisms”235. The fact that the most “appropriate” mechanism is an admittedly discretionary—and demonstrably arbitrary and nontransparent—“police security channel”236 speaks volumes to the nature of the other purported “remedies” available. b. The UAE’s “Court Remedies” Are Neither “Reasonably Available” nor “Effective” 128. The UAE also submits that “Qatari nationals in the UAE have at all times been entitled to access the UAE’s courts”237, and that “[c]ourt remedies in the UAE are available and effective and can be pursued without difficulty, either in person or through powers of attorney”238. 129. It is impossible to reconcile this assertion with the ICJ’s express finding that Qataris appear to have “been denied equal access to tribunals and other judicial organs in the UAE”239. It is equally impossible to reconcile the assertion with an undisputed fact: that, to borrow the UAE’s own words, there is no evidence “of a single Qatari national seeking to avail himself or herself” of the courts for perceived “violation of the protections in CERD”240. 130. Indeed, far from assisting the UAE, this admission destroys its argument entirely. As this Committee recently made clear to the UAE itself, “a low number of complaints does not signify the absence of racial discrimination in the State party, but may signify barriers in invoking the rights in the Convention domestically”241. More importantly, and as 235 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/15, p. 18, para. 12 (Treves). 236 See Part 1 Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 6 (UAE Annex 4). 237 4 December Submission, para. 65. 238 4 December Submission, para. 67. 239 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 68. 240 4 December Submission, para. 68 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., id., para. 68; 15 January Submission, para. 54. 241 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 13. See also, e.g., id., para. 15; CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXI (2004), para. 1 (“States parties Annex 121
68 explained above, it is “the State that alleges non-exhaustion”—in this case, the UAE—that must “provide evidence” of the effectiveness of a purported remedy242, including in the form of “examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions”243. But the UAE cannot present any examples of Qataris having successfully utilized court “remedies” with respect to the measures244, and the UAE’s argument must be dismissed for that reason alone245. 131. The reality is that thousands of Qataris have been deeply aggrieved by the UAE’s treatment of them246, but know that there are no court remedies that are either “reasonably available” or “effective”247. 132. To begin with, the UAE’s justice system is deeply and demonstrably flawed. In 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the UAE to “release should pay the greatest attention to the following possible indicators of racial discrimination: … The absence or small number of complaints, prosecutions and convictions relating to acts of racial discrimination in the country. Such a statistic should not be viewed as necessarily positive, contrary to the belief of some States. It may also reveal either that victims have inadequate information concerning their rights, or that they fear social censure or reprisals, or that victims with limited resources fear the cost and complexity of the judicial process, or that there is a lack of trust in the police and judicial authorities, or that the authorities are insufficiently alert to or aware of offences involving racism.”). 242 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 243 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (1 February 2000), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 66, para. 53. 243 Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law (2013), p. 568 (“the European Court of Human Rights has specified that the State must not only satisfy the Court that the remedy was effective, available both in theory and practice at the relevant time, but also frequently asks the State to provide examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions to that of the applicant.”) (emphasis added above). See also, e.g., ECtHR, Kangasluoma v. Finland, Application No. 48339/99, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction (20 January 2004), para. 48; ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 157. 244 This is true despite this Committee’s express call on States Parties to ensure “that non-citizens have equal access to effective remedies, including the right to challenge expulsion orders, and are allowed effectively to pursue such remedies”. CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX (2004), para. 25. 245 In fact, there is no evidence that anyone in the UAE has ever alleged a violation of the CERD in domestic courts. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/50/18 (22 September 1995), para. 554 (The CERD “had thus far never been invoked before a court”.). 246 See, e.g., Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, A year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 13. 247 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a). Annex 121
69 immediately and unconditionally [peaceful activists and human rights defenders] who have been arbitrarily detained”; and to “[e]nsure the separation of powers and strengthen the independence of the judiciary, which is under the control of the executive branch and the State security service”248. Similarly, in a 2015 report on the UAE, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers noted, inter alia, that she was “especially concerned that the judicial system remains under the de facto control of the executive branch of government”;249 that “important pieces of legislation” contain “vague and broad definitions of criminal offences, in contravention of international human rights standards”, and that such provisions “defy the principle of legality and open the door to arbitrary interpretation and abuse”250; that she was told that “foreigners’ lack of confidence in the justice system is such that many of them do not report crimes or abuses”251; that it is “often impossible for vulnerable persons to seek remedies for abuses they suffer, which is a breach of the principle of equality before the courts”252; that she was “concerned at reported instances in which judges appear to have lacked impartiality and shown bias, especially with regard to non-nationals of the United Arab Emirates”, and that “[a]mong foreigners residing in the United Arab Emirates, there seems to be a perception that the domestic courts cannot be trusted, and more specifically that judges do not treat nationals in the same way as non-nationals”253; 248 Letter from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to UAE (7 August 2018), available at https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session29/AE/UAE_LetterHC_… (last accessed: 8 February 2019), p. 4. See also, e.g., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (13 November 2017), para. 31 (“A group of special procedure mandate holders urged the United Arab Emirates to end the harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders and respect the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including on social media and the Internet.”). 249 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 33. 250 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 29. 251 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 37. 252 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 63. 253 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 37. Annex 121
70 that she was “particularly concerned at reports of serious breaches of fair trial and due process guarantees, especially regarding, but not limited to, crimes related to State security”254, and “that individuals accused of having committed crimes that jeopardize State security have extremely limited access to legal counsel”255; that she was “alarmed at reports that some lawyers who take up cases related to State security have been harassed, threatened and had pressure exerted on them, including through constant surveillance, public campaigns of defamation, and the arbitrary deportation of non-national lawyers”256; that “[i]mpunity surrounding such breaches of the independence of the legal profession has had a chilling effect on lawyers”, and that it was reported to the Special Rapporteur “that it has become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases”, with “[m]any lawyers refus[ing] such cases or drop[ping] them early on owing to the pressure placed on them”257; and that she “received credible information and evidence” that many individuals “were arrested without a warrant and taken to unofficial places of detention”, and “were also subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, including in order to extract confessions of guilt or testimonies against other detainees”258. 133. These problems existed well before the UAE ordered all Qataris to leave the country, and then instituted a vague and sweeping new criminal prohibition on “expressing sympathy, 254 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 86. See also, e.g., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (13 November 2017), para. 31 (“OHCHR stated that, under the pretext of national security, many activists had been prosecuted for allegations mainly related to a person’s right to express his or her opinion and criticism of any public policy or institution.”). 255 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 56. 256 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 79. See also id. (noting that the Special Rapporteur was “alarmed at the long list of obstacles that lawyers working on State security-related cases encountered on a daily basis while discharging their professional duties and representing their clients’ interests.”); id., para. 86 (noting that the Special Rapporteur was “concerned about the harassment, pressure and threats to which some lawyers are subjected, in breach of their independence, especially when they take up cases related to State security crimes”.); id., para. 80 (“in at least one case, a lawyer was arrested when he was enquiring about the whereabouts of his clients at the State security prosecution branch.”). 257 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 81. 258 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 52. See also, e.g., Human Rights Watch, UAE Continues to Flout International Law (29 June 2018) (“Others in the UAE who speak out about human rights abuses remain at serious risk of arbitrary detention, imprisonment, and torture, and many are serving long prison terms or have felt compelled to leave the country.”). Annex 121
71 bias, or affection for [Qatar], or objecting to the position of the State of the United Arab Emirates and the strict and firm measures that it has taken against the Qatari government”259. This new prohibition—which, needless to say, is a particularly egregious illustration of suppression of speech260—is not an idle threat. On the contrary, the UAE has already arrested or punished multiple people under it261—including for wearing a Qatar national team shirt to an Asian Cup football match hosted by the UAE262—and is notorious for using the “pretext of national security” to prosecute individuals for “criticism of any public policy or institution”263. 134. The reality is that there is nothing remotely surprising about the fact that no Qatari has sought to challenge the UAE’s measures in domestic courts. 259 Al Bayan Online, Attorney General Warns Against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions (7 June 2017) (certified translation). 260 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), para. 25 (“The Committee considers that the expression of ideas and opinions made in the context of academic debates, political engagement or similar activity, and without incitement to hatred, contempt, violence or discrimination, should be regarded as legitimate exercises of the right to freedom of expression.”). 261 Amnesty International, United Arab Emirates 2017/2018 (“Ghanim Abdallah Matar was detained for a video he posted online in which he expressed sympathy towards the people of Qatar.”). See also, e.g., Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, A year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 34 (UAE Annex 23) (“The UAE authorities has also dismissed Mr. Youssef Al-Sarkal, Chairman of the UAE General Authority for Sports, by reason of shaking hands with the President of the Qatar Football Association.”). 262 See The Guardian, British man detained in UAE after wearing Qatar football shirt to match (5 February 2019) (“A British football fan has been arrested and detained in the United Arab Emirates after he wore a Qatar national team shirt to a match.”). 263 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (13 November 2017), para. 31. See also, e.g., Amnesty International, United Arab Emirates 2017/2018; Human Rights Watch, Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of the United Arab Emirates (29 June 2017) (“In March 2017, the UAE detained Ahmed Mansoor, an award-winning human rights defender. He remains detained and is facing speech-related charges that include using social media websites to ‘publish false information that harms national unity.’ A coalition of 20 human rights organizations said Mansoor was the last remaining human rights defender in the UAE who had been able to criticize the authorities publicly”) (emphasis added); Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018: United Arab Emirates (“The UAE arbitrarily detains and forcibly disappears individuals who criticize authorities within the UAE’s borders.”); Human Rights Watch, United Arab Emirates: Events of 2017 (2018) (“UAE authorities have launched a sustained assault on freedom of expression and association since 2011. UAE residents who have spoken about human rights issues are at serious risk of arbitrary detention, imprisonment, and torture.”). Annex 121
72 135. First, pursuant to the anti-sympathy prohibition, a Qatari could face criminal prosecution for even “objecting” to the measures264. It is facially unreasonable for the UAE to nonetheless demand that Qataris not only do exactly that, but that they do so before the very same courts the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has made clear are “under the control of the executive branch and the State security service”265. 136. Second, even if a Qatari were willing to take the personal risk of bringing a claim, he would be unable to find a lawyer to represent him. Not only has it “become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases”266 in general but, as the Office of the High Commissioner made clear, lawyers are particularly “unlikely to defend Qataris”, as “this would likely be interpreted as an expression of sympathy towards Qatar”267. 264 Al Bayan Online, Attorney General Warns Against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions (7 June 2017) (certified translation) (emphasis added). 265 Letter from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to UAE (7 August 2018), available at https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session29/AE/UAE_LetterHC_… (last accessed: 8 February 2019), p. 4. See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 15 (emphasis added). 266 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 81 (“It was reported to the Special Rapporteur that it has become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases.”). 267 Annex 11, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, Report on the impact of the Gulf Crisis on human rights (December 2017), para. 40. In fact, many Qataris have found it difficult to find lawyers willing to represent them even on matters unrelated to challenging the measures. See, e.g., DCL-048, para. 17 (“In [] 2017, my lawyer in the UAE stopped replying to my texts and answering my calls … I continued to try and contact him until February 2018 … I then gave up.”); id., para. 18; DCL-093, paras. 30-33 (“My business partner and I have been unable to hire a lawyer to represent us before Emirati courts…[M]y partner contacted three lawyers by phone…None of these lawyers agreed to take our case. They told my business partner that they were busy, that they did not have time for our case, or that they wanted us to come to the UAE to discuss before they could take the case…They seemed eager to get rid of my partner. We felt that those were just excuses.”); DCL-135, para. 18 (“I have been trying to contact my lawyer and his secretary…since June 5, 2017…During the first week following the UAE’s June 5, 2017, directive, my lawyer or his secretary would sometimes answer my calls and tell me that they would get back to me with an update. They never did. Since the end of that week, neither by lawyer nor his secretary have answered or returned any of my calls.”); DCL-146, para. 32 (“I tried to hire a lawyer in the UAE to bring a case against the company that terminated my business’s lease and caused the loss of my business assets…I called two lawyers who work in the UAE and told them what had happened. One said that he could not do anything for me, and the other said that he could not represent me. They did not say why, but it was clear to me that they refused my case because I am Qatari.”); DCL-136., para. 10 (“I tried to contact various Emirati lawyers to represent me in Annex 121
73 137. The UAE’s assertion that between 6 June 2017 and 20 June 2018 “there have been over 340 cases involving Qataris”268 cannot change this. Setting aside the fact that in many of those cases Qataris were appellees or defendants269—including in criminal proceedings270 resulting in at least one conviction rendered in absentia271—the fact remains that the UAE has presented no cases in which Qataris have challenged the measures that form the subject of Qatar’s Communication272. the UAE, but none of them were willing to represent me. One of them specifically said that he was scared to deal with me because I am Qatari.”). See also, e.g., DCL-147, paras. 21-23 (“I could not trust a lawyer from the UAE. Even if I hire and pay a UAE lawyer, he would still do what the government wants because he lives in the UAE. Because of the UAE Government’s blockade and the anti-sympathy law, a lawyer in the UAE could not act against the position of his government. He would be afraid to do so, and he might not even take the case on because I’m Qatari…. I can’t be sure that a lawyer would represent me at all, and if one does I can’t trust him to act in my best interest.”); DCL-004, para. 13 (“I would have also needed an Emirati lawyer to represent me, but I did not think any Emirati lawyer would agree to do so…I do not believe that the Emirati courts would ever rule in my favor because I am Qatari.”); Annex 15, National Human Rights Committee, Gulf Crisis: Continuing human rights violations by the United Arab Emirates: Report on the non-compliance by the United Arab Emirates with the Order of the International Court of Justice (23 Jan. 2019), p. 11. This is entirely unsurprising, given that even neighbors, close friends and family members are often afraid of associating with Qataris. See, e.g., DCL-135, para. 22 (“I have tried to phone a few of my Emirati friends and acquaintances to ask for help in retrieving the documents. Some did not pick up the phone, and others refused to help. When I called a close Emirati friend of mine and asked him to go see my lawyer and retrieve my documents, he confirmed what I thought. My Emirati friend asked me to ‘excuse [him] from this mission’ because he was scared of the anti-sympathy laws.”); id., paras. 24, 28; DCL-093, para. 18 (describing how declarant’s close Emirati friends have stopped speaking to declarant); DCL-079, paras. 29-30 (describing how the declarant’s Emirati family stopped speaking with their Qatari family members); DCL-048, paras. 13, 21 (noting that Emirati friends informed declarant they were “scared to help me in case they ended up in jail”); DCL-146, paras. 13, 17 (noting that after the UAE’s anti-sympathy law was passed, Emiratis“told me that because of the law they had to stop communicating with me”); DCL-136, paras. 10-11 (describing how declarant’s Emirati friends ended communication with declarant). 268 7 August Submission, para. 63. 269 See generally Judicial Records (UAE Annex 18); International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (UAE Annex 16). Indeed, in its Supplemental Response of 4 December 2018, the UAE makes the more limited claim that between 5 June 2017 and 13 June 2018, “more than 160 cases were pursued by Qatari nationals before the UAE courts during the relevant time period”. See 4 December Submission, fn. 90. Yet even that claim is inaccurate. Not only were some of the cases in question registered before 5 June 2017, but Qataris were also very frequently defendants, and the UAE’s claim that Qatari nationals “pursued” anything in such cases is misleading to say the least. See generally International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (UAE Annex 16). 270 See Judicial Records, pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33 (UAE Annex 18). 271 See Judicial Records, p. 26 (UAE Annex 18). In fact, the UAE’s own exhibit accompanying its most recent submission of 15 January 2019 indicates that only 18 lawsuits were filed by Qataris in federal courts in well over a year. See Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen, p. 2 (UAE Annex 2). 272 See 15 January Submission, para. 54 (“the UAE has offered proof that demonstrates that, since 5 June 2017, Qatari nationals have freely continued to resort to the UAE courts to assert their rights in legal
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74 138. Third, notwithstanding the UAE’s half-hearted reference to three constitutional provisions to suggest otherwise273, the UAE’s Constitution is demonstrably inadequate to protect Qataris’ rights under the CERD274. The UAE’s reference to UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 does not assist it275. While the UAE casually claims that the law “prohibits ‘discrimination of any form’ by various means of expression”276, it ignores the fact that, as this Committee has itself previously noted277, the law does not encompass discrimination on the basis of national origin278. 139. The UAE has previously made the extraordinary submission to this Committee that “daily life is untroubled by behaviours that are incompatible with noble values, and the State does not need to enact legislation to deal with any violations of the Convention”279. In light of this submission, it is unsurprising that this Committee—which has repeatedly matters, even if not necessarily related to CERD.”) (emphasis added). See also generally Judicial Records (UAE Annex 18); International Judicial Cooperation Department – Ministry of Justice Letter (UAE Annex 16). 273 4 December Submission, paras. 65-66. 274 See, e.g., UAE Constitution (2010), Art. 25 (“There shall be no distinction among the citizens of the UAE on the basis of race, nationality, faith or social status.”) (emphasis added); id., Art. 37 (“A citizen may not be deported or exiled from the UAE.”) (emphasis added); id., Art. 29 (“Freedom of movement and residence is guaranteed to the citizens as provided in law.”) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 9 (“The Committee is further concerned that article 25 states that the prohibition of discrimination applies to ‘citizens of the Union’ and might not apply equally to non-citizens, who constitute approximately 90 per cent of the population (art. 1).”). 275 See 15 January Submission, para. 57. 276 See 15 January Submission, para. 57. 277 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 11 (“The Committee is concerned that the definition of discrimination in the law is not fully in line with article 1 of the Convention, as the grounds of descent and national origin are missing.”). 278 See UAE Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015, Art. 1 (“In applying the provisions of this Decree, the following terms and phrases shall have the meanings assigned against each of them, unless the context requires otherwise: … Discrimination: Any distinction, restriction, exclusion or preference among individuals or groups based on the ground of religion, creed, doctrine, sect, caste, race, colour or ethnic origin.”). 279 See United Arab Emirates, Reports Submitted by States Parties in Accordance with Article 9 of the Convention: Seventeenth periodic report of States parties due in 2007, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/12-17 (29 February 2008), para. 72. Annex 121
75 called on States parties to enact legislation, enforce it and monitor the results280—has for decades expressed concerns regarding the adequacy of UAE law281. Indeed, as recently as September 2017, this Committee recommended that the UAE “enact legislation to bring its laws fully into line with the Convention”282. 140. Fourth, even if a remedy existed in theory, UAE courts are widely perceived as biased against non-nationals in general283. There is every reason to believe a judiciary under the control of the very same executive that ordered the expulsion of Qataris and has 280 See, e.g., CERD Committee, General Recommendation I (1972); CERD Committee, General Recommendation VII (1985), para. 1; CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXV (2013), paras. 13, 17; CERD Committee, General Recommendation XV (1993), para. 2. 281 See, e.g., CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), paras. 10-11 (“The Committee is concerned that the definition of discrimination in the law is not fully in line with article 1 of the Convention, as the grounds of descent and national origin are missing.”); Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/35/18 (1980), para. 105; Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/39/18 (1984), para. 248; Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/43/18 (1988), para. 194; Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/50/18 (22 September 1995) para. 562 (noting the “concerns of the Committee with regard to certain inadequacies in the legislation”). See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Jewish Community of Oslo et al. v. Norway, Communication No. 30/2003, Opinion (22 August 2005), UN Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003, para. 7.2. 282 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 10. See also, e.g., Letter from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to UAE (7 August 2018), available at https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session29/AE/UAE_LetterHC_… (last accessed: 8 February 2019), p. 3 (calling on the UAE to “[e]nact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, which prohibits discrimination on all grounds, including colour, language, political or other opinion, descent, national, ethnic or social origin … and is applied not only between citizens but also to non-citizens.”). Moreover, the UAE grossly understates its burden by suggesting that all available domestic remedies that offer any “prospect of success under domestic law must be exhausted”. 15 January Submission, para. 49. As the ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection make clear, local remedies need be exhausted only where they provide a “reasonable possibility” of redress. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CERD Committee, Jewish Community of Oslo et al. v. Norway, Communication No. 30/2003, Opinion (22 August 2005), UN Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003, para. 7.2 (in which this Committee indicated that uncertainties in the application of domestic law made it impossible “to conclude that such proceedings constitute[d] a useful and effective domestic remedy”.). 283 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 37 (“Among foreigners residing in the United Arab Emirates, there seems to be a perception that the domestic courts cannot be trusted, and more specifically that judges do not treat nationals in the same way as non-nationals. The Special Rapporteur was told that foreigners’ lack of confidence in the justice system is such that many of them do not report crimes or abuses.”). See also, e.g., General Recommendation XIV (1993), para. 1 (“Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes a basic principle in the protection of human rights.”); General Recommendation XX (1996), para. 3 (“Many of the rights and freedoms mentioned in article 5, such as the right to equal treatment before tribunals, are to be enjoyed by all persons living in a given State.”). Annex 121
76 criminalized “sympathy” towards Qatar would not be impartial towards Qataris—especially in a situation that the UAE portrays as implicating State security, a circumstance in which fair trial and due process concerns are particularly acute284. 141. Fifth, even if all of these obstacles could somehow be overcome, the existing “remedies” are clearly not “reasonably available”285. Setting aside the arbitrary and discretionary nature of the “hotline” through which Qataris are expected to apply to travel, the closure of transport links between the two countries—a fact found relevant to the local remedies rule in at least one case involving large-scale expulsion in the past286—means that Qataris must first take a burdensome and expensive trip through a third country287. They must then be willing to undertake the personal risk of entering the UAE, a country in which they do not feel safe288 and cannot rely on their government to protect them289. 284 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), para. 86 (“The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned at reports of serious breaches of fair trial and due process guarantees, especially regarding, but not limited to, crimes related to State security.”). 285 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), Art. 15(a). 286 ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 156. 287 The UAE asserts that “a number of courts in the UAE provide various e-services for the filing of a claim”. 4 December Submission, para. 69. But even if this assertion were accurate—and the UAE has failed to prove that it is—the UAE has not even argued that claims can be filed by non-lawyers, with respect to the measures in question, and then actually pursued from abroad through completion of the case. 288 See, e.g., DCL-030, para. 11 (“I would never feel safe there even if I was allowed to visit it again someday.”); DCL-048, para. 23 (“I am afraid of the treatment that I could receive there.”); DCL-079, para. 16 (“I was too afraid to even think about traveling to the UAE. There was so much uncertainty as to the process, as to how we would be treated in transit and once there, as to the dangers we could face. It was just too much uncertainty….”); DCL-093, paras. 26-27 (“I am too afraid to go to the UAE … I do not trust Emirati authorities since they have imposed measures against Qatar and Qataris…. My business partner did not try to go to the UAE for the same reasons. He is also concerned that he would not be able to come back.”); DCL-135, para. 24 (“I didn’t try to contact the hotline because…I was [] scared to travel to the UAE.”); DCL-146, para. 14 (“I am afraid to travel to the UAE because I have heard many stories about Qataris who went there and were abused by UAE authorities.”); DCL-136, para. 9 (“I was scared of entering the UAE, particularly since the Qatari Embassy closed and the UAE government told all Qataris to leave within 14 days.”); DCL-113, para.12 (“[E]ven if I were allowed to visit the UAE, I would not try to go, because I am scared of what might happen to me in the UAE.”). 289 See, e.g., DCL-030, para. 18 (“Since I filed my claim before the CCC, I was told about the UAE ‘hotline,’ but I would not try to call the number, because I do not want to visit the UAE. I would not feel safe there. If something bad happened to me in the UAE, I don’t know who I would turn to for help because there is no Qatari Embassy in the country. I would feel at risk all the time…, and worried that some Emiratis would treat me badly simply because I am Qatari.”); DCL-048, para. 22 (“The only option I have now would be
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77 142. The UAE’s final claim that 146 Qataris have executed powers of attorney since the beginning of the crisis also does not assist it. Even if this claim were substantiated—and it has not been290—146 is an extremely small number in comparison to the thousands of Qataris who have been harmed by the UAE’s measures291. More importantly, it is a fundamental due process right for an individual to be able to attend their own legal proceedings in person. And even if it were not, many Qataris simply do not know anyone trustworthy who would be willing to execute a power of attorney292. Moreover, many of those who do know someone, and who have made the expensive and difficult trip to a third country in an attempt to acquire a power of attorney293, have been rejected expressly to travel to the UAE myself. However, I do not think it is safe to do so. There is no embassy, no Qatari officials and no one would be able to guarantee my safety.”); DCL-004, para. 14 (“If something was to go wrong in the UAE, there would be no Qatari Embassy there to protect me.”); DCL-108, para. 20 (“I have asked my daughters to meet their grandparents in Turkey instead of [], as I don’t think it’s a good idea for them to enter the UAE…If anything were to happen to them, there is no Qatari embassy in the country to help them.”); DCL-136, para. 9 (“I was scared of entering the UAE, particularly since the Qatari Embassy closed…”). 290 Indeed, the UAE’s “proof” of this claim is a single conclusory, uncorroborated line of a document prepared by the UAE itself. See Statement of the cases involving a Qatari citizen, p. 2 (UAE Annex 2). 291 The fact that only 146 Qataris had even allegedly received powers of attorney—none of which the UAE has shown were granted in connection to challenging the measures that actually form the subject of Qatar’s Communication—thus harms the UAE’s case, rather than helping it. 292 DCL-048, para. 21 (“I initially thought about giving a POA to my Emirati lawyer, but that is not an option anymore, as he has not been responsive. I do not know anyone else who would accept a POA in the UAE at the moment, as my friend refused to help me.”). Similarly, many of those who do know someone they trust have refrained from asking them to execute a power of attorney because they fear this could create problems or be a safety issue for the person involved. See, e.g., DCL-113, para. 14 (“I have not tried to get a Power of Attorney, because I don’t know who I could give Power of Attorney to—I am afraid that if someone helped me by acting on my behalf in the UAE, it could put them in danger, or they could be charged with violating the anti-sympathy law. I don’t want any of my friends or acquaintances in the UAE to be questioned by officials or Emiratis about why they are cooperating with a Qatari or why they have a Power of Attorney for a Qatari.”). Experience shows that such concerns are fully justified. See, e.g., DCL-146, paras. 27-31 (“I asked the two employees with POAs to deal with my business’ lease termination, but both were prevented and deterred from taking actions due to police scrutiny and surveillance by UAE authorities. They said that they were being monitored and were not able to even reach my property.”). 293 See, e.g., DCL-152, paras. 21-22, 25-26 (“the matter took some six weeks, three lawyers’ offices, and visits to two embassies and four ministries in three countries … The only reason that [the company] could manage the complicated process is that it had preexisting relationships with lawyers in the various legal fields and the existing transnational relationships among the law firms, as well as the Company’s considerable resources that enabled it to complete the process at embassies and notary offices in three countries. Without these resources, the burden of the current process and its significant cost … would have been larger than it would have been able to bear”); DCL-030, paras. 12-13 (detailing the declarant’s trip to Oman and visits to three different governmental entities in an attempt to acquire a power of attorney); DCL-108, para. 13 (detailing declarant’s multiple trips to Oman to acquire powers of attorney and noting that “[n]ormally, it costs around 150 AED to get all of the necessary stamps for a valid POA,” but that on one occasion alone, “I spent 2,000 AED.”). Annex 121
78 because they were Qataris294. To add insult to injury, even the very small number of Qataris who have actually received valid powers of attorney have often been unable to use them295. Indeed, individuals with valid powers of attorney have been harassed, arrested and interrogated for their association with Qataris296. 143. In light of the evidence laid out above, the conclusion is inescapable: the UAE’s courts do not constitute a “reasonably available” remedy, let alone an “effective” one. c. Other Alleged “Complaint Procedures” Are Neither “Reasonably Available” nor “Effective” 144. Finally, the UAE argues that Qatari nationals can resort to “complaint procedures specific to various governmental authorities”297. 294 DCL-030, para.12 (“[T]he official working at the UAE Embassy refused to stamp the POA. He told me ‘we’re not stamping it’ and that they ‘don’t stamp anything involving Qataris.’ He said it was because he had ‘supreme orders’ not to do so. I tried to argue with him, but he wouldn’t listen—he wouldn’t even look at us or engage in conversation; he simply waved to the person in line behind us and said ‘next.’”); id., para. 15; DCL-147, para. 19 (“the UAE Embassy official refused to stamp the POA and told my friend that the Embassy would not accept anything from Qataris. My friend pressed the matter, but the Embassy official insisted that he would not stamp the POA and said next time don’t even try.”); DCL-108, para. 16 (“[T]he UAE official at the Embassy had refused to stamp the POA. The official told my friend that the paperwork could not be stamped because it was for a Qatari…The official told my friend that…the Embassy had ‘received orders’ and could not authenticate any document related to Qataris.”). In some cases, individuals who were denied powers of attorney on the basis of their nationality were later able to acquire them by trying again, thereby highlighting the arbitrary and discretionary nature of the process. See, e.g., DCL-030, paras. 12-13; DCL-108. 295 DCL-146, paras. 8, 22, 27-29 (“In order to ensure that my employees could carry out the duties of the business, I executed Powers of Attorney for some of them…My employee went to get [an impounded] car back from the authorities, but they refused to give it to him, even after he showed them the POA that I had granted him. They told him to let the Qatari come and see about his car problem.”)); DCL-030, para. 13 (describing the experiences of a declarant who was unable to use their power of attorney because it was valid for only three months, and the declarant did not find anyone willing to purchase their apartment within that short time). 296 See, e.g., DCL-146, paras. 28-31 (“At the time of the blockade, I asked the two employees with POAs to deal with my business’ lease termination, but both were prevented and deterred from taking actions due to police scrutiny and surveillance by UAE authorities. They said that they were being monitored and were not able to even reach my property. They were also afraid to raise objections to the lease termination to the authorities because of the anti-sympathy laws…About 20 days after the anti-sympathy law announcement, this employee was taken into custody by UAE authorities for interrogation. That employee stopped communicating with me after his interrogation. That made me think that he was interrogated because we had been in regular contact via phone and text messages. I know about his interrogation because another employee learned about it from him and told me. This other employee also told me that the UAE authorities warned the interrogated employee not to communicate with any Qataris. At that point forward, that second employee also stopped communicating with me out of fear of the UAE authorities.”). 297 4 December Submission, para. 67. Annex 121
79 145. Qatar notes that this category of purported “remedies” is an obvious afterthought. The UAE’s initial Response did not even mention these so-called “complaint procedures”, and in its 4 December Submission, the entire discussion of them could be found in a single sentence and footnote298. In that Submission, the UAE actually identified only a single procedure, before the Dubai Legal Affairs Department299. But that procedure, too, is clearly not a remedy encompassed by Article 11(3) of the CERD. 146. First, in the UAE’s own words, the Dubai Legal Affairs Department is tasked with “receiving complaints and claims made against the Government of Dubai”300. However, the measures in question were not issued by the Government of Dubai but rather by the UAE as a whole, and the UAE has proffered no evidence that the Dubai Legal Affairs Department is able to hear complaints made against it301. 147. Second, according to the Government of Dubai’s own website, the Dubai Legal Affairs Department is tasked not only with considering complaints, but also with “[re]presenting the Government and Government entities in claims and disputes before competent judicial entities”, making clear where its loyalties lie302. 148. Third, as the UAE itself concedes, complaints to the Dubai Legal Affairs Department represent only a preliminary step prior to litigation before the courts303. Setting aside the fact that the Dubai Legal Affairs Department would then represent the government before 298 See 4 December Submission, para. 67, fn. 88. 299 See 4 December Submission, fn. 88. 300 See 4 December Submission, fn. 88 (emphasis added). See also 15 January Submission, para. 56 (referring to the procedure in question as having been instituted “by local UAE government”.) (emphasis added). 301 Even if the complaints procedure before the Dubai Legal Affairs Department somehow constituted a “reasonably available” and “effective” remedy for purposes of Article 11(3) of the CERD—and it does not—it could not possibly be a remedy required of the many individuals with no connection to the Government of Dubai. 302 Government of Dubai, The Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department, available at http://www.dubai.ae/en/Lists/GovernmentDepartments/DispForm.aspx?ID=49 (last accessed: 9 January 2019). 303 See 4 December Submission, fn. 88. Annex 121
80 the courts304, as Qatar has already explained, court remedies in the UAE are neither “reasonably available” nor “effective”305. 149. Finally, the UAE has provided no evidence that the complaint mechanism has ever been used, let alone successfully and in relation to the measures that are the subject of Qatar’s Communication. The complaints procedure before the Dubai Legal Affairs Department therefore cannot possibly be considered an effective remedy for purposes of Article 11(3)’s local remedies rule. 150. In its third submission of 15 January 2019, the UAE suddenly discovered, for the first time, a number of other purported “remedies”—none of which it had seen fit to even mention before the ICJ or in the 68 pages of argument it previously submitted to this Committee on two separate occasions. Unsurprisingly, this third try is not the charm. 151. As an initial matter, Qatar notes that the UAE’s own framing of these newfound “remedies” makes clear that they could only conceivably concern narrow subsets of activity implicated by Qatar’s Communication306. Qatar also notes the UAE’s repeated suggestion that there is “no evidence of recourse to such remedies”307. But once again, this admission does not assist the UAE’s case, but instead destroys it. It bears repeating: it is “the State that alleges non-exhaustion” that must “provide evidence” of the 304 Government of Dubai, The Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department, available at http://www.dubai.ae/en/Lists/GovernmentDepartments/DispForm.aspx?ID=49 (last accessed: 9 January 2019). 305 See supra Section IV.A.2. 306 See 15 January Submission, para. 57 (concerning mechanisms that purportedly allow criminal complaints against individuals regarding “hate speech”); id., para. 58 (concerning complaints regarding the alleged “blocking of media content”); id., para. 59 (concerning complaints with respect to unspecified violations of the “right to health and right to medical treatment”); id., para. 60 (concerning an alleged complaint mechanism for “secondary school students” against “a UAE school”); id., para. 61 (concerning complaints with respect to unspecified violations of the “right to work”); id., para. 62 (concerning complaints with respect to alleged violations of the “right to property”, such as those involving disputes between “landlords and tenants”). 307 Cf. 15 January Submission, paras. 56, 57, 58, 59 (“Qatar has put forward no evidence of recourse to such remedies.”). See also, e.g., id., para. 60 (“Qatar also has not shown any instance of Qatari nationals making complaints with respect to the right of education.”); id., para. 61 (“Qatar has put forward no evidence that any Qatari has availed himself or herself of these complaint resolution procedures.”); id., para. 62 (“again, Qatar has provided no evidence that such remedies have been exhausted.”). Annex 121
81 effectiveness of a purported remedy308, including in the form of “examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions”309. 152. It is, once again, little wonder that the UAE has been unable to provide any such examples, as not a single one of its new “remedies” is “reasonably available” and “effective”. 153. First, the UAE argues that “[v]arious means exist for individuals (including Qataris) to bring complaints to the attention of the authorities, including under the mechanisms provided for pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 and Law No. 5 of 2012”310. But as Qatar has already explained, Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of national origin, and cannot possibly serve as the basis for effective complaints. Nor can Law No. 5 of 2012, which not only does not even mention the word “discrimination”311, but is also the very same law invoked by the UAE to criminalize “sympathy” towards Qatar312. The fact that the UAE would suggest that 308 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007), para. 243 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (1 February 2000), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 66, para. 53. 309 Cesare P. R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice in International Human Rights Procedures”, International Courts and the Development of International Law (2013), p. 568 (“the European Court of Human Rights has specified that the State must not only satisfy the Court that the remedy was effective, available both in theory and practice at the relevant time, but also frequently asks the State to provide examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in similar positions to that of the applicant.”) (emphasis added above). See also CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, UN Doc. CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 13 (“a low number of complaints does not signify the absence of racial discrimination in the State party, but may signify barriers in invoking the rights in the Convention domestically.”); CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXXI (2004), para. 1(b). 310 15 January Submission, para. 57. 311 See generally United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree-Law No. 5 of 2012 on Combating Cybercrimes, available at https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/316909 (last accessed: 24 January 2019). 312 See Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2018, United Arab Emirates, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/united-arab-emirates (last accessed: 8 February 2019) (“In July 2017, the cybercrime law was expanded to criminalize ‘sympathy for Qatar,’ which carries a penalty of up to 15 years in prison.”). Annex 121
82 Qataris should nonetheless invoke these irrelevant laws by complaining through an “e-service” provided by the “Dubai police” is nothing short of absurd313. 154. Second, the UAE submits that the “blocking of online content may be challenged by individual users through submissions via online forms or by the media outlets themselves by petitioning the National Media Council of the UAE”314. But the only “online form” the UAE refers to is a basic “Request Form” provided not by the UAE, but rather by the multinational telecommunications provider Etisalat315. Setting aside its apparently discretionary nature, a corporate webpage is not even arguably a “domestic remedy”, let alone a legal one, encompassed by the local remedies rule. 155. Nor can the UAE rely on the alleged possibility of submitting “petition[s]” to “the National Media Council of the UAE”316. Even if a petition challenging the “blocking of content” were permissible in theory—and the UAE has not proved that it is317—the reality is that the National Media Council is a “federal government body”318 under the control of same executive branch that has ordered the measures subject to Qatar’s Communication319. In circumstances in which the UAE continues to maintain that its 313 15 January Submission, para. 57 (“Various means exist for individuals (including Qataris) to bring complaints to the attention of the authorities, including under the mechanisms provided for pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 and Law No. 5 of 2012. To facilitate complaints, Dubai police offers an e-service through which an individual can report offenders.”). Qatar notes in any event that the “Request to Open a Criminal Case” page to which the UAE refers is open only to those with an “Emirates ID”, and allows complaints only with respect to a “Breach of Trust Case”; a “Hassle Case”; an “Insulting Case”; an “Insulting via Mobile Case”; a “Threat Case”; and an “Assault Case”. See Dubai Police, Request to Open a Criminal Case, available at https://www.dubaipolice.gov.ae/wps/portal/home/services/individualservi… (last accessed: 24 January 2019). 314 15 January Submission, para. 58. 315 See Etisalat, Web Content Block/Unblock Request Form, available at https://etisalat.ae/en/generic/contactus-forms/web-block-unblock.jsp (last accessed: 24 January 2019). 316 15 January Submission, para. 58. 317 The UAE cites two articles of a resolution on “Media Activities Licensing” indicating the existence of a grievance procedure with respect to that resolution. See 15 January Submission, para. 58. However, it provides no indication of the manner in which a resolution on “licensing” concerns the “blocking of online content” more generally. 318 See National Media Council, About Us, available at http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Pages/About-NMC.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). 319 See United Arab Emirates, The UAE Cabinet, available at https://government.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/the-uae-cabin… (last accessed: 18 January 2019) (“The Cabinet or the Council of Ministers of Annex 121
83 actions were lawful, any suggestion that the National Media Council would provide an effective remedy is thus once again absurd. 156. Third, the UAE asserts that the UAE’s Ministry of Health and Prevention “provides a number of avenues for an individual to file a complaint”320. The only source it cites is a “Customer Complaints” webpage allowing “customers” to “submit complaints, suggestions or Compliments”321. Not only is the Ministry of Health and Prevention again under the control of the executive branch, but the webpage in question also provides no indication that the Ministry is competent to handle complaints relating to the matters raised in Qatar’s Communication, much less that its responses are based on anything but discretion322. 157. Fourth, the UAE submits that the Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge provides a complaint mechanism for “secondary school students” whereby “an individual can raise a complaint against a UAE school”323. Unsurprisingly, it fails to note that the complaints page in question is explicitly concerned only with complaints directed against “[p]rivate” schools324. There is, moreover, once again no indication that the Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge is competent to handle complaints connected to measures instituted by the federal government, let alone in connection to the measures that form the subject of Qatar’s Communication325. The fact that the best education- the United Arab Emirates is the executive branch of the federation. It executes all internal and external affairs of the Federation as per the provisions of UAE Constitution and the federal laws … Article 60 of the Constitution lays down the powers of the Cabinet. They are: … Controlling the conduct of work in federal departments”) (emphasis added). 320 15 January Submission, para. 59. 321 UAE Ministry of Health & Prevention, Customer Complaints, available at http://www.mohap.gov.ae/en/Pages/COMPLAINS.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). 322 UAE Ministry of Health & Prevention, Customer Complaints, available at http://www.mohap.gov.ae/en/Pages/COMPLAINS.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). Similar considerations apply to the UAE’s reference to the “Medical Complaint” webpage of the Dubai Health Authority, which as the UAE itself acknowledges is not even part of the federal government. 323 15 January Submission, para. 60. 324 See Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge, Raising a Complaint Against A Private School, available at https://www.adek.abudhabi.ae/en/Parents/PrivateSchools/Pages/RCAPS.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). Annex 121
84 related “remedy” the UAE could come up with is a local government webpage concerning complaints for secondary school students against private schools is truly telling. 158. Fifth, the UAE refers to the “availability of ample remedies” with respect to the “right to work”326. It submits in particular that “a complaint system is available through the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiritisation”327. Setting aside the fact that the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiritisation is—yet again—under the control of the executive branch now claiming its actions are lawful before this Committee, the UAE’s own source expressly states that it is “not possible” for a “worker outside the country [to] file a labor complaint”328. Even if that were not the case, the UAE has pointed to no substantive provision of law that could be invoked through the complaints procedure to effectively challenge the measures in question329. And even if such a provision of law existed, the complaints procedure concerns “amicable settlement”, and is accordingly entirely discretionary330. 325 See Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge, Raising a Complaint Against A Private School, available at https://www.adek.abudhabi.ae/en/Parents/PrivateSchools/Pages/RCAPS.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). The webpage in question states merely that “[a]ll cases raised through ADEC monitored complaint management system will be reviewed and monitored by ADEC for compliance to regulations”. Id. The UAE has not produced those regulations, let alone provided any indication of how local government regulations might provide a remedy to any of the Qataris affected by federal government measures. Unsurprisingly, it also has not substantiated its casual claim that complaints may be raised specifically for “failure to respond to a request for provision of transcripts”. 15 January Submission, para. 60. 326 15 January Submission, para. 61. 327 15 January Submission, para. 61. 328 See UAE Ministry of Human Resources & Emiratisation, Register labor complaints (FAQ), available at https://www.mohre.gov.ae/en/our-services/%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%8… (last accessed: 24 January 2019) (emphasis added). 329 The UAE instead cites Article 6 of Federal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, which merely permits the filing of claims concerning rights “under this law”, but is in no way proof that “this law” would actually afford an effective substantive remedy with respect to the challenged measures. See United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, Labour Law and its Amendments, available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/11956/69376/F417089305/A… (last accessed: 24 January 2019), Art. 6. 330 See United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree Law No. 8 of 1980, Labour Law and its Amendments, available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/11956/69376/F417089305/A… (last accessed: 24 January 2019), Art. 6. The UAE’s claim that disputes that are not settled can then be referred Annex 121
85 159. Finally, the UAE argues that Qataris have not exhausted remedies purportedly available with respect to “alleged infringement of the right to property”331. In particular, it asserts that “disputes between landlords and tenants may be addressed by the Rental Disputes Center of the Government of Dubai, with the option of appeal to the Appellate Division of the Center”, and that “complaints relating to an individual’s assets or accounts” can be handled by the Central Bank of the UAE “through fax, online or in person through various Central Bank locations”332. 160. The UAE is grasping at straws. Even if private landlord-tenant disputes before local dispute resolution centers were relevant for a small number of Qataris, the UAE has failed to indicate the substantive law to be applied by such bodies, let alone to prove that it would be capable of affording an effective remedy with respect to the federal measures in question. The same considerations apply to the “Customer Complaints and Enquiries” webpage of the Central Bank of the UAE. Setting aside questions of the Bank’s independence from the executive, the UAE has proffered no evidence that the Bank even has competence to hear complaints related to the measures, much less that such complaints might prove effective333. 161. Since the UAE has not identified any other so-called “complaints procedures”, it has failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of any reasonably available and effective remedies that have not been exhausted334. to certain courts does not change this, for as Qatar has already explained, the UAE’s purported court remedies are neither reasonably available nor effective. The same holds true for every other purported “remedy” for which the UAE claims (often without any proof whatsoever) that appeals to the courts are possible. See, e.g., 15 January Submission, paras. 58, 59. See also id., para. 62 (“The UAE judiciary is also naturally available to all Qataris with grievances related to property matters.”). 331 15 January Submission, para. 62. 332 15 January Submission, para. 62. 333 Qatar notes that the UAE has again proffered no indication of the substantive law—if any—to be applied by the Bank in handling “Customer Complaints and Enquiries” (details of which are limited to 1,000 characters, or approximately 150 words). See Central Bank of the UAE, Consume Complaints and Enquiries, available at https://centralbank.ae/en/form/complaints (last accessed: 8 February 2019). 334 Qatar submits that the UAE should not be permitted to continue invoking newfound “remedies” in each new submission it makes, and reserves the right to respond should the UAE nonetheless make a fourth attempt to manufacture such “remedies”, or should it introduce new evidence with respect to “remedies” it has already invoked. Annex 121
86 *** 162. Qatar has shown that the local remedies rule does not apply to its claims under the “general principles of international law” that Article 11(3) expressly requires this Committee to apply. But even if the local remedies rule were applicable to Qatar’s claims, the UAE has failed to prove that any reasonably available and effective local remedies exist. It cannot do so: as the evidence set out above demonstrates, there are no such remedies. Its invocation of Article 11(3) must therefore be rejected. B. The Existence of Concurrent Proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ Does Not Render Qatar’s Communication Inadmissible 163. In its 4 December and 15 January Submissions, the UAE argues that the existence of concurrent proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ renders Qatar’s Communication inadmissible335. Despite several attempts, the UAE still has difficulty articulating why this is the case; its position and legal theory have changed from one submission to the next. 164. First, in June 2018, the UAE argued before the ICJ that the existence of concurrent proceedings rendered Qatar’s Application before the ICJ, not its Communication, inadmissible336. In fact, the UAE went so far as to say that “it seems perfectly clear that when a matter is referred to [the Committee], it must be allowed to fulfil its mission”337. That initial claim was consistent with the UAE’s 7 August Submission, in which the 335 15 January Submission, Section IV; 4 December Submission, Section V. 336 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, p. 19, paras. 23-24 (Pellet). The UAE did not expressly employ the word “inadmissible”, but it argued: “The way in which Qatar has proceeded is incompatible with both the electa una via principle and the lis pendens exception, since the same claim has been submitted in turn to two organs by the same applicant against the same respondent ... Perhaps Qatar can be considered to be estopped from seising this Court ....” Ibid. (translation by the ICJ). 337 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, p. 26, para. 21 (Pellet) (translation by the ICJ). Annex 121
87 UAE did not challenge the admissibility of the Communication on the grounds of concurrent proceedings338. 165. The UAE changed tack in the following months. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE argued that the existence of concurrent proceedings rendered Qatar’s Communication inadmissible because “Qatar … has abandoned the Article 11 process”339. It was not clear how Qatar could have been considered to have “abandoned” the Article 11 process when it had, just one month prior, exercised its right under Article 11(2) of the CERD to refer the matter again to this Committee340. 166. In any event, the UAE appears now to have abandoned this legal theory in favour of still another one. In its 15 January Submission, the UAE argues that the existence of concurrent proceedings renders Qatar’s Communication inadmissible because it “undermines the integrity of the dispute resolution provisions of the CERD and of the ICJ”341. As explained in more detail below, this argument is equally unconvincing. 167. The reason why the UAE has been unable to maintain a consistent line of argument is simple: it is entirely permissible to have concurrent proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ. This is because, contrary to what the UAE argues, Article 22 does not establish a “hierarchical and linear” process (Section IV.B.1); neither lis pendens nor electa una via applies here (Section IV.B.2); and concurrent proceedings would ensure the equality of the parties and uphold the integrity of the system (Section IV.B.3). Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the UAE’s position with respect to concurrent proceedings would leave Qatar with no remedy at all (Section IV.B.4). 338 See 7 August Submission, Section VII. Although the UAE objected to the existence of concurrent proceedings, it never challenged the admissibility of the Communication. Rather, the UAE merely stated that it “intends to lodge objections under which it will challenge the ICJ’s jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits”. Ibid., para. 93; see also ibid., para. 12. 339 4 December Submission, Section V.B. 340 Letter from Qatar to the CERD Committee (29 October 2018), p. 2. 341 15 January Submission, Section IV.A (some capitalization omitted). Annex 121
88 1. Article 22 Does Not Establish a “Hierarchical and Linear” Process 168. The UAE’s argument is premised on the view that Article 22 of the CERD establishes a “hierarchical and linear” process, with the CERD procedures first and the ICJ procedure second342. According to the UAE, “[i]t is clear from the ordinary meaning of the terms of [Article 22] that the CERD envisages that the treaty-specific dispute resolution mechanism it offers to its States Parties (i.e., resort to the Committee under Article 11) should be explored and exhausted before escalating to an ICJ process”343. The UAE’s interpretation of Article 22 is, however, incorrect. Article 22 does not suggest that “the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention” must be completely “explored and exhausted”344 before referral to the ICJ. This is obvious from the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 22, which provide: “Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.”345 169. The only ostensible authority that the UAE cites to support its interpretation is the ICJ’s pronouncement that the “procedures expressly provided for in this Convention” and “negotiation” are “procedural preconditions to be met before the seisin of the Court”346. Nevertheless, what the UAE fails to mention is that the Court did not hold that both the negotiation requirement and the CERD procedures requirement must be met (i.e., that 342 15 January Submission, para. 33; see also 4 December Submission, para. 77. 343 15 January Submission, para. 28 (emphasis omitted); see also 4 December Submission, para. 73. 344 15 January Submission, para. 28; 4 December Submission, para. 73. 345 CERD, Art. 22. 346 15 January Submission, para. 28 (quoting Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 29 (citing Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 141)). In its 4 December Submission, the UAE provided no authority for its reading of Article 22. See 4 December Submission, para. 73. Annex 121
89 they are “cumulative”)347. Rather, the ICJ has repeatedly decided, on a prima facie basis, that for it to have jurisdiction under Article 22, it is sufficient that only one requirement be met before the seisin of the Court (i.e., that they are “alternative”)348. As a result, a State Party may have recourse to the ICJ after negotiations without engaging the CERD procedures at all. 170. And while the ICJ has yet to definitively confirm that the two requirements are alternative rather than cumulative, no fewer than 13 Judges of the Court have already opined that they are alternative349. In fact, as far as Qatar is aware, not a single Judge has ever expressed the view that the two requirements are cumulative350. 171. This is entirely unsurprising given the many reasons why the two requirements can only be read as alternative, some of which have already been pointed out by the aforementioned Judges of the Court. 172. First, as cogently explained by five ICJ Judges in a joint dissenting opinion, negotiation and the CERD procedures are “two different ways of doing the same thing, that is to say, 347 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, paras. 39-40; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 183. 348 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, paras. 39-40; Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, paras. 60-61; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports 2008, paras. 116-117. 349 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, paras. 39-47; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 116; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh and Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Tomka, Bennouna and Skotnikov, ICJ Reports 2008, para. 17 (referring to the CERD procedures requirement as an “alternative precondition” (emphasis added)). Although these views were all expressed in dissenting opinions, none of these Judges were dissenting on the issue of whether the requirements are alternative or cumulative. 350 Indeed, at the provisional measures stage of the ICJ proceedings between Qatar and the UAE, although there were seven dissenting Judges, none of them opined in their opinions and declarations that the two requirements are cumulative. Annex 121
90 seeking an agreement premised on the parties’ ability to reconcile their positions”351. Considering them to be cumulative requirements would be, in the words of those Judges, “illogical”352, “senseless”353, “highly unreasonable”354, and “inconsistent with the spirit of the text” of the CERD355. 173. Second, if the requirements were deemed cumulative, the negotiation requirement would be rendered redundant and deprived of any effet utile. This is because, as this Committee is fully aware, negotiation constitutes an element of the CERD procedures. In particular, Article 11(2) provides that, after the initial communication and response have been exchanged, “[i]f the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties, either by bilateral negotiations or by any other procedure open to them, … either State shall have the right to refer the matter again to the Committee”356. If the two requirements were cumulative, there would be no reason to have an additional negotiation requirement in Article 22 on top of the negotiation requirement already stated in Article 11(2). 174. Third, if the requirements were cumulative, then it would lead to the unreasonable result that some disputes subject to Article 22 could never be referred to the ICJ. This is because there are some disputes “with respect to the interpretation or application of 351 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 44. Note that the judges dissented on a separate issue; this issue of cumulative versus alternative was not decided by the majority. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 183. 352 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 43. 353 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 43. 354 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 44. 355 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 43. 356 CERD, Art. 11(2) (emphasis added). Annex 121
91 [CERD]”357 that could not possibly be subject to the CERD procedures because they are not situations where “a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention”358 (the only matters that may be submitted to this Committee under Article 11(1)). For example, there could be a dispute between two States concerning whether a State Party’s reservation to the CERD is “incompatible with the object and purpose of [the] Convention” under Article 20, or a dispute concerning whether a State Party properly denounced the CERD under Article 21. Such disputes are not situations where “a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention”. It would thus be absurd to insist that State Parties must go through the CERD procedures as a precondition to going to the ICJ. 175. When States enter into international legal obligations under a multilateral treaty, the principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith require that the terms of that treaty have a single consistent meaning. It cannot be the case that the same words in the same treaty provision have a different meaning depending on the nature of the “dispute … with respect to the interpretation or application of th[e] Convention”. Only a reading of the two requirements as “alternative” can ensure consistency of meaning and thereby protect the Parties’ expectations. 176. Fourth, the fact that the two requirements are alternative is supported by the travaux préparatoires of the CERD. Article 22 had originally included only the negotiation requirement, not the CERD procedures requirement359. Just three weeks before the adoption of the CERD, the so-called “three-Power amendment” to Article 22 was introduced, adding the CERD procedures requirement360. When this amendment was put 357 CERD, Art. 22. 358 CERD, Art. 11(1). 359 In proposing the “final clauses” for the CERD, the Officers of the Third Committee for the General Assembly proposed Clause VIII to read: “Any dispute between two or more Contracting States over the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation, shall at the request of any of the parties to the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice ....” UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Suggestions for final clauses submitted by the Officers of the Third Committee, UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1237 (15 October 1965), p. 4. 360 UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Ghana, Mauritania and Philippines: amendments to Annex 121
92 up for consideration before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, there was virtually no debate over it, showing that the Third Committee did not consider the amendment to introduce any significant changes to the limits on the Court’s jurisdiction361. This stood in stark contrast to another proposed amendment considered at the same time that would have limited the Court’s jurisdiction;362 this amendment was heavily opposed363 and ultimately defeated364. 177. After reviewing the relevant travaux préparatoires, five Judges of the Court concluded: “The clear impression … emerges that the three powers’ intent in proposing their amendment was not to impose a further condition resulting in more limited access to the Court than under the earlier text.”365 178. The only plausible conclusion is thus that the two requirements of negotiation and the CERD procedures are alternative, not cumulative. As a result, a State Party may refer a dispute to the Court without any recourse to this Committee. Article 22 does not create the “hierarchical and linear”366 process that the UAE claims, but rather offers a prospectus of alternatives. The CERD procedures can thus be engaged independently of ICJ proceedings. the suggestions for final clauses submitted by the officers of the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.1237), UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1313 (30 November 1965). 361 See UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, 1367th Meeting, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), pp. 453-455. 362 Poland had proposed that the phrase “at the request of any of the parties” be changed to “at the request of all of the parties”. UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Poland: amendments to the suggestions for final clauses submitted by the Officers of the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.1237), UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1272 (1 November 1965). 363 See, e.g., UN General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p. 453, paras. 24-25, 28 (Canada), p. 453, para. 31 (Colombia), pp. 453-454, para. 32 (USA), p. 454, para. 38 (France), p. 454, para. 39 (Italy). 364 UN General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p. 455. 365 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 47. 366 15 January Submission, para. 33; 4 December Submission, para. 77. Annex 121
93 2. Neither Lis Pendens nor Electa Una Via Applies Here 179. The UAE tries to support its argument by arguing that “Qatar has created a lis pendens situation”367. In certain national legal systems, the doctrine of lis pendens provides that an action may not be brought simultaneously in two different fora. But the doctrine does not apply to inter-State proceedings, absent express language to that effect. 180. Judge Crawford has written: “Whether there is any international equivalent to the national law doctrine[] of lis alibi pendens … is controversial.”368 This puts it mildly: neither the ICJ nor its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) has ever found a claim inadmissible due to lis pendens369. This perhaps explains why the UAE, in its 4 December and 15 January Submissions, studiously avoids claiming that lis pendens is a “doctrine”, “principle”, or “rule” applicable in international law, and instead merely refers to the alleged “lis pendens situation”370 or “situations of lis pendens”371. 367 15 January Submission, para. 31; 4 December Submission, para. 74. 368 See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th Edition, 2012), p. 701. 369 In fact, the ICJ and the PCIJ regularly entertain cases where the parties are simultaneously pursuing other means for consensual settlement of the dispute. See, e.g., Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports 1991, para. 35 (“[P]ending a decision of the Court on the merits, any negotiation between the Parties with a view to achieving a direct and friendly settlement is to be welcomed ....”); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, para. 68 (“Whatever their nature, the existence of procedures for regional negotiation cannot prevent the Court from exercising the functions conferred upon it by the Charter and the Statute.”); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, para. 108 (“[T]he Court is unable to accept ... that the existence of the Contadora process constitutes in this case an obstacle to the examination by the Court of the Nicaraguan Application.”); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, para. 43 (“The establishment of the Commission by the Secretary-General ... cannot, therefore, be considered in itself as in any way incompatible with the continuance of parallel proceedings before the Court.”); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Jurisdiction, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, para. 29 (“[T]he fact that negotiations are being actively pursued during the present proceedings is not, legally, any obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function.”); Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France/Switzerland), Order, PCIJ Series A, No. 22, 1929, p. 13 (“[T]he judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view to which the Court has been established, is simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the Parties; as consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far as is compatible with its Statute, such direct and friendly settlement ....”). 370 15 January Submission, para. 31; 4 December Submission, para. 74. 371 15 January Submission, para. 34. Annex 121
94 181. In its 15 January Submission, the UAE cites various authorities in support of its lis pendens argument, but only to show the “dangers and disadvantages”372 and “risk”373 of concurrent proceedings. As explained in detail below, none of these authorities actually posit that the doctrine of lis pendens applies to inter-State proceedings in the absence of express language so providing. 182. In fact, the first two authorities cited by the UAE themselves expressly question whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to inter-State proceedings. The UAE first cites the Polish Upper Silesia case374, but in the very same sentence from which the UAE quotes, the PCIJ held: “It is a much disputed question ... whether the doctrine of litispendance … can be invoked in international relations ….”375 The UAE next cites a book by Professor Yuval Shany376, but just a few pages after the pages from which the UAE quotes, Professor Shany states that “it is far from clear whether the general principle of lis alibi pendens applicable to intra-systematic cases should govern the relations between international fora”377. Later in the book, he similarly concludes: “In sum, it looks as if existing case-law on the question of lis alibi pendens is also too scarce and non-definitive to establish the existence of such a general rule or principle in international law ….”378 183. The third authority invoked by the UAE—a course by Professor Campbell McLachlan at The Hague Academy of International Law—similarly does not support the applicability of lis pendens to inter-State proceedings. The UAE first quotes Professor McLachlan for his statement that “there is widespread acceptance that duplicative litigation within the 372 15 January Submission, para. 31. 373 15 January Submission, para. 34. 374 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20). 375 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 376 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), pp. 155-156); 4 December Submission, para. 74 (quoting Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), pp. 155-156). 377 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 162. 378 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 244. Annex 121
95 same legal system is not permitted”379. This statement, however, is taken out of context380. When Professor MacLachlan discusses inter-State dispute settlement bodies, he has no difficulty pointing out that: “Evidence of [lis pendens’] adoption by international courts and tribunals is thus far limited to the stay orders issued by the UNCLOS Tribunal in MOX Plant, and the developing practice of investment arbitral tribunals. The principle does not even merit a mention in Cheng’s classic 1953 study [on “General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals”], or in Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s earlier work on private law sources.”381 184. The reason why the MOX Plant case is not relevant is discussed below, and investment arbitral tribunals are not inter-State tribunals. They therefore do not provide any support for the proposition that the doctrine of lis pendens should apply to inter-State proceedings. 185. The UAE then quotes Professor McLachlan’s reference to the 2003 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International382, but that resolution concerned transnational litigation before national courts, not inter-State litigation before international bodies383. 186. The fourth and final authority that the UAE relies on is the MOX Plant case before an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the 379 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), p. 461). 380 The entire sentence reads: “The detailed analysis in these lectures has shown, in the first place, that there is widespread acceptance that duplicative litigation within the same legal system is not permitted, as being contrary to due process and the Rule of Law.” Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), p. 461. The phrase “[t]he detailed analysis in these lectures has shown” suggests that he is referring to detailed analysis that he already provided, which, by that point in time in his course, could only refer to his examination of lis pendens in private international litigation (Chapter II) and non-public international arbitration (Chapter III), not public international litigation (Chapter IV). 381 Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), p. 460. 382 15 January Submission, para. 31 (quoting Campbell McLachlan, “Lis Pendens in International Litigation”, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 336 (2009), pp. 461-462). 383 See Institut de Droit International, Second Commission: The principles for determining when the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions is appropriate, Resolution (9 February 2003), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2003_bru_01_en.pdf (last accessed: 2 September 2019). Annex 121
96 Sea (“UNCLOS”)384. That case, however, was one where there was express language in two treaties prohibiting concurrent proceedings: Article 282 of UNCLOS385 and Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union386. Indeed, the MOX Plant tribunal relied on these two provisions in deciding to suspend its own proceedings387. Qatar does not deny that if there were similar provisions in the CERD, then they would apply. But in the absence of such express language, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply. 187. In addition, even if the doctrine of lis pendens were applicable to inter-State proceedings, its requirements would not be met in this case. In the Polish Upper Silesia case, the PCIJ made clear that, even if the doctrine were to apply, the objects of the two claims would have to be the same and the bodies hearing the two claims would have to be “of the same character”388. The Court in that case found that neither of these two requirements were satisfied389. The objects of the two claims were different (restitution vs. interpretation), and the bodies hearing the two claims were of different characters (the Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal vs. the PCIJ)390. 188. Here, the objects of Qatar’s claims in the two proceedings are also different: non-binding recommendations from a Conciliation Commission391 and a binding decision from the 384 15 January Submission, para. 34. 385 UNCLOS, Art. 282 (“If the States Parties … have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that [the] dispute shall … be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the [UNCLOS] procedures.”). 386 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union C 326 (26 October 2012), Art. 344 (“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.”). 387 See MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), PCA Case No. 2002-01, Procedural Order No. 3 (24 June 2003), paras. 20(v), 21, 22. 388 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 389 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 390 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 391 CERD, Art. 13(2). Annex 121
97 ICJ392. Moreover, the Committee, the Conciliation Commission, and the ICJ are not bodies “of the same character”393. The Committee is an expert monitoring body394 and, as the UAE itself puts it, the Conciliation Commission “is not a judicial body but a fact-finding body”395. The ICJ, in contrast, is the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”396. 189. This latter difference is another reason why the UAE’s invocation of the MOX Plant case is inapposite: the two competing bodies in that case were both international judicial bodies tasked with rendering binding decisions (the Annex VII arbitral tribunal and the European Court of Justice). That is not the case in the present proceedings. In United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), the ICJ made clear that it can adjudicate a dispute even when there is a concurrent fact-finding commission: “The Commission … was established to undertake a … fact-finding mission …. [The Secretary-General] created the Commission … as an organ or instrument for mediation, conciliation or negotiation …. The establishment of the Commission by the Secretary-General … cannot, therefore, be considered in itself as in any way incompatible with the continuance of parallel proceedings before the Court. Negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement are enumerated together in Article 33 of the Charter as a means for the peaceful settlement of disputes.”397 190. The UAE finally tries to support its argument about the impermissibility of concurrent proceedings by invoking “the principle of electa una via”398, which generally provides 392 UN Charter, Art. 94(1). 393 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 6, 1925, p. 20. 394 See OHCHR, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cerd/pages/cerdindex.aspx (last accessed: 8 February 2019). 395 15 January Submission, para. 43. 396 ICJ Statute, Art. 1. 397 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, para. 43 (emphasis added). 398 15 January Submission, para. 32; 4 December Submission, para. 75. Annex 121
98 that the election of one avenue of legal action amounts to a renunciation of other avenues. Like lis pendens, however, electa una via applies only where there is express language providing for its application. The UAE ignores this critical point. It relies solely on a passage from the book by Professor Shany to support its argument about electa una via399. Yet in the passage quoted, Professor Shany was merely noting how electa una via would operate if it were applicable400. Just two sentences before the quoted passage, Professor Shany states that electa una via, absent express language, is “the least widely accepted” when compared to res judicata and lis pendens401. Professor Shany also later in the book states that “electa una via ... does not find any meaningful support in the international jurisprudence (in the absence of explicit treaty language)”402. 191. It should also be emphasized that this Committee has already made clear that it may entertain communications that are also being considered elsewhere, unless there is express language (e.g., in a State Party’s declaration) stating otherwise. In Koptova v. Slovak Republic, for example, the Slovak Republic argued that the communication was inadmissible because the petitioner had filed a similar case with the European Court of Human Rights403. This Committee rejected this argument, declaring that “neither the Convention nor the rules of procedure prevent[] the Committee from examining a case that [is] also being considered by another international body”404. Although this case was an individual rather than an inter-State communication, this Committee did not limit its pronouncement to only individual communications405. 399 15 January Submission, para. 32; 4 December Submission, para. 75. 400 See Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 23. 401 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 23. 402 Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), p. 229. 403 CERD Committee, Koptova v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 13/1998, Opinion (1 November 2000), UN Doc. CERD/C/57/D/13/1998, para. 6.3. 404 CERD Committee, Koptova v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 13/1998, Opinion (1 November 2000), UN Doc. CERD/C/57/D/13/1998, para. 6.3. 405 Indeed, there is no reason why individual communications should be treated any differently from inter-State communications with respect to the issue of concurrent proceedings. In the context of individual communications, Rule 84(1)(g) of the CERD Committee Rules of Procedure provides that the UN Secretary-General may request clarification on “[t]he extent to which the same matter is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement”, impliedly recognizing the
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99 192. Other human rights bodies take the same approach. For example, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights have considered the admissibility of applications subject to concurrent proceedings before other fora406, but only because Article 35(2)(b) of the European Convention on Human Rights expressly provides as such407. (No such provision of course exists in the CERD.) Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has considered the admissibility of communications subject to other concurrent proceedings408, but only where the relevant State has made a reservation, understanding, or declaration to that effect to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights409. 193. It is true that many States have made declarations to the CERD removing matters subject to concurrent proceedings elsewhere from this Committee’s competence410, but Qatar and the UAE are not among them. Indeed, the very fact that States have made such declarations confirms that the CERD permits concurrent proceedings. 194. The intention of the drafters of the CERD is thus clear: the Article 22 dispute settlement procedures in the CERD cannot prejudice the States Parties’ recourse to other procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes. permissibility of concurrent proceedings. CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 84(1)(g). Moreover, Rule 91, which lists the grounds for inadmissibility of communications, does not include the existence of concurrent proceedings as one of the grounds. CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 91. 406 See, e.g., ECtHR, Peraldi v. France, Application No. 2096/05, Decision on Admissibility (7 April 2009); ECtHR, Pace v. Italy, Application No. 22728/03, Decision on Admissibility (17 July 2008), paras. 22-29; ECtHR, Pauger v. Austria, Application No. 24872/94, Decision on Admissibility (9 January 1995). 407 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 35(2)(b) (“The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that ... is substantially the same as a matter that ... has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.”). 408 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Casanovas v. France, Communication No. 441/1990, Views (26 July 1994), UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/441/1990, para. 5.1. 409 See, for example, reservations, understandings, and declarations by Austria, Croatia, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Turkey. 410 See, for example, declarations by Andorra, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Moldova, and Slovenia. Annex 121
100 3. Concurrent Proceedings Would Ensure the Equality of the Parties and Uphold the Integrity of the System 195. Perhaps aware of the weakness of its legal arguments, the UAE resorts to vague statements about how the continuation of proceedings before the Committee and the ICJ would “compromise[]” the “architecture of the CERD system for the settlement of disputes”;411 “jeopardise the integrity of the system”;412 “wreak irreparable harm on the procedural rights of the UAE, which would be required to simultaneously defend itself against the same allegations in two overlapping and parallel procedures”;413 “be in contradiction with the principle of the equality of the parties”414 since “Qatar has unilaterally taken for itself two opportunities to litigate against the UAE in overlapping and parallel proceedings”;415 “force[]” the UAE to “choose between forsaking its rights to mount a full defence in the present CERD communication procedure or sacrificing its right to procedural equality in the ICJ case”;416 and grant Qatar the “opportunity to foresee and undermine the UAE’s litigation strategy”417. 196. These arguments are baseless. As explained above, the continuation of both proceedings is fully consistent with the dispute settlement mechanisms the CERD creates. There would be no harm to procedural rights. It is true that the UAE has to litigate two cases, but Qatar has to as well. Furthermore, there is no inequality of the Parties. Qatar and the UAE have equal procedural rights before both the Committee and the ICJ. The UAE does not have to forsake any rights: it, just like Qatar, simply has to present its arguments before two bodies, both of which are eminently qualified in their own spheres. 411 15 January Submission, para. 35; see also 15 January Submission, para. 40. 412 15 January Submission, para. 36; see also 15 January Submission, para. 40. 413 15 January Submission, para. 36. 414 15 January Submission, para. 37. 415 15 January Submission, para. 38. 416 15 January Submission, para. 39. 417 15 January Submission, para. 39. Annex 121
101 4. The UAE’s Position with Respect to Concurrent Proceedings Would Leave Qatar with No Remedy at All 197. If anything, if this Committee dismisses the proceedings before it, then there would be a risk of harm to Qatar’s procedural rights, not the UAE’s. This is because the UAE is simultaneously trying to convince the ICJ to dismiss the proceedings before it418, which would then lead to the result that Qatar has no remedy whatsoever—neither before this Committee nor the ICJ. This denial of justice would wreak far greater havoc on the “architecture of the CERD system for the settlement of disputes” and “the integrity of the system”. *** 198. In conclusion, the existence of concurrent proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ is entirely permissible. And dismissing these proceedings would run a serious risk of leaving Qatar with no remedy whatsoever with respect to the human rights violations in question. C. Qatar’s Communication Is Not an Abuse of Rights and Process 199. The UAE also argues that Qatar’s Communication constitutes an abuse of rights and process419. This is not a serious argument. Qatar’s claims are fully grounded in both fact and law, as explained in Qatar’s Communication420. 200. In its 4 December Submission, the UAE argues that “Qatar has failed, despite many opportunities to do so, to present even a shred of evidence of any ongoing discrimination 418 At the provisional measures stage of the ICJ proceedings, the UAE argued that lis pendens and electa una via rendered the claims before the Court inadmissible. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record, CR 2018/13, p. 19, para. 23 (Pellet). Indeed, in its 7 August Submission, the UAE stated: “The UAE maintains that Qatar should not be permitted to advance a complaint under Article 11 while simultaneously initiating proceedings in relation to the same issues before the ICJ. The UAE intends to lodge jurisdictional objections with the ICJ on this basis.” 7 August Submission, para. 12. And in its 4 December and 15 January Submissions, the UAE affirmed its view that Qatar’s Application to the Court is “improper and extra-jurisdictional”. 15 January Submission, para. 40; 4 December Submission, para. 77. 419 15 January Submission, Section IV.C; 4 December Submission, Section V.B. 420 See Qatar’s Communication, pp. 19-23, paras. 41-51;. See also DCL-004; DCL-030; DCL-048; DCL-073; DCL-079; DCL-093; DCL-108; DCL-113; DCL-125; DCL-135; DCL-136; DCL-146; DCL-147; DCL-152. Annex 121
102 against Qatari nationals—still less, any discrimination actually falling within the scope of the CERD”421. It is not clear what “opportunities” the UAE is referring to. If the UAE is referring to the CERD procedures, then Qatar need only point out that Article 11 of the CERD does not require Qatar to provide any evidence: Articles 11(1) and 11(2) only state that Qatar may “bring the matter to the attention of the Committee”422 and “refer the matter again to the Committee”423, and Article 11(4) provides that “the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned to supply any other relevant information”424. To date, the OHCHR has only invited Qatar to provide its observations on the UAE’s submissions with regard to jurisdiction and admissibility425. If, on the other hand, the UAE is referring to the ICJ proceedings, Qatar need only note that Qatar did indeed furnish numerous third-party reports during the oral hearings before the ICJ documenting the discrimination committed by the UAE. Qatar would, of course, be willing to present even more evidence—whether before this Committee, a Conciliation Commission constituted under Article 12 of the CERD, or the ICJ—at the appropriate stage. 201. Moreover, the ICJ has already held that “some of the acts of which Qatar complains may constitute acts of racial discrimination as defined by the Convention”426, and has even taken the extraordinary step of indicating provisional measures preserving such rights427. For the UAE to now say that Qatar’s claims are “completely without merit on fact and law”428 is not only inaccurate, but also displays unseemly disrespect towards the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 421 4 December Submission, para. 80; see also 15 January Submission, para. 42 (“Qatar has failed, despite many opportunities to do so, to present probative evidence of any ongoing discrimination by the UAE against Qatari nationals – still less, any discrimination actually falling within the scope of the CERD.”). 422 CERD, Art. 11(1). 423 CERD, Art. 11(2). 424 CERD, Art. 11(4); see also CERD Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 70. 425 Letter from OHCHR to Qatar (14 December 2018), para. 2. 426 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 54. 427 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, para. 79. 428 15 January Submission, para. 43; 4 December Submission, para. 81. Annex 121
103 *** 202. In light of the above, there is no question that the UAE’s attempts to have Qatar’s Communication dismissed on grounds of inadmissibility are entirely futile. Article 11(3)’s exhaustion requirement does not bar Qatar’s claims, the existence of concurrent proceedings before this Committee and the ICJ is perfectly permissible, and the Communication is not an abuse of rights and process. V. THIS COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION OF QATAR’S COMMUNICATION WOULD NOT BE ULTRA VIRES 203. The UAE’s 4 December and 15 January Submissions close with a poorly veiled threat against this Committee: the UAE argues that “any action taken by the Committee to further Qatar’s complaint would be ultra vires”429. Qatar considers this argument an affront to this Committee, which is perfectly competent to decide for itself what it can and cannot do. 204. In any case, the UAE’s argument here assumes its own conclusions. It relies entirely on the UAE’s assertions that Qatar is engaging in an “abuse of process” and has “abandoned” the CERD procedures430. As explained above, these assertions are false and unsustainable. There can therefore be no question that the consideration of Qatar’s Communication is well within the powers of this Committee. VI. CONCLUSION 205. For the reasons stated above, the UAE’s various objections to the Committee’s ability to consider Qatar’s claims have no merit. Qatar accordingly reiterates its request that the Committee determine that it has jurisdiction over the Communication, find the Communication admissible, and proceed with the formation of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission to consider this matter. 429 15 January Submission, para. 69. The UAE’s 4 December Submission employs slightly different language: “Any action of the Committee to entertain further or progress Qatar’s Article 11 Communication would be ultra vires.” 4 December Submission, Section VI (some capitalization omitted). 430 4 December Submission, para. 86. Annex 121
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State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates,
ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Comments on Qatar’s Response on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility (19 March 2019)
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IACtHR, Entitlement of legal entities to hold rights under the Inter-American Human Rights System (Interpretation and scope of Article 1(2), in relation to Articles 1(1), 8, 11(2), 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 and 62(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as of Article 8(1)(A) and (B) of the Protocol of San Salvador), Advisory Opinion OC-22/16 (26 February 2016)
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISORY OPINION OC-22/16 OF FEBRUARY 26, 2016 REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA ENTITLEMENT OF LEGAL ENTITIES TO HOLD RIGHTS UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (INTERPRETATION AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE 1.2, IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 1.1, 8, 11.2, 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 AND 62.3 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AS WELL AS OF ARTICLE 8.1.A AND B OF THE PROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Court”, “the Court” or “the Tribunal”), composed of the following Judges1: Roberto F. Caldas, President; Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, Vice President; Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Judge; Diego García-Sayán, Judge; Alberto Pérez Pérez, Judge; Eduardo Vio Grossi, Judge; and Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, Judge; Also present, Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, Secretary, and Emilia Segares Rodríguez, Deputy Secretary, pursuant to Article 64.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention” or “the Convention”) and Articles 70 to 75 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court (hereinafter “the Rules of Procedure”), issues the following Advisory Opinion structured as follows: 1 This Advisory Opinion is being issued during the 113th Ordinary Period of Sessions of the Court. In accordance with Article 54.3 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 5.3 of the Court’s Statute and Art. 17.1 of its Rules of Procedure, the judges who complete their mandates will continue to hear cases that they have already heard and which are in the sentencing phase. Therefore, Judges Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Diego García-Sayán and Alberto Pérez Pérez participated in the deliberations and signing of this Advisory Opinion. CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS COUR INTERAMERICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DIREITOS HUMANOS INTER‐AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Organization of American States] [INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS]
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[…] I PRESENTATION OF THE REQUEST 1. On April 28, 2014, the Republic of Panama (hereafter “Panama”), based on Article 64.1 of the American Convention2 and in accordance with that established in Article 70.1 and 70.2 of the Rules of Procedure3, submitted a request for an 2 Article 64.1 of the Convention: “The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court.” 3 Article 70.1 and 70.2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court: “1. Requests for an advisory opinion under Article 64.1 of the Convention shall state with precision the specific questions on which the opinion of the Court is being sought. Annex 123
Advisory Opinion on the interpretation and scope of Article 1.2, in relation to Articles 1.14, 85,
11.26, 13, 167, 21, 248, 259, 29, 3010, 411, 612 and 62.313 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, as well as of Article 8.1.a and b of the Protocol of San Salvador (hereafter “the request”
2. Requests for an advisory opinion submitted by a Member State or by the Commission shall, in addition, identify the provisions to be
interpreted, the considerations giving rise to the request, and the names and addresses of the Agent or the Delegates.”
4 Article 1.1 of the Convention: “Obligation to Respect Rights. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”
5 Article 8 of the Convention: “Right to a Fair Trial. 1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any
accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any
other nature.
2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according
to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees:
a) the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a translator or interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the
language of the tribunal or court;
b) prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him;
c) adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense;
d) the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate
freely and privately with his counsel;
e) the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does
not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law;
f) the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other
persons who may throw light on the facts;
g) the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty; and
h) the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.
3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made without coercion of any kind.
4. An accused person acquitted by a non-appealable judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause.
5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of justice.”
6 Article 11.2 of the Convention: “Protection of Honor and Dignity. […] 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference
with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.”
7 Article 16 of the Convention: “Freedom of Association. 1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political,
economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions established by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in
the interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition of legal restrictions, including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of
association, on members of the armed forces and the police.”
8 Article 24 of the Convention: “Right to Equal Protection. All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without
discrimination, to equal protection of the law.”
9 Article 25 of the Convention: “Right to Judicial Protection. 1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the
constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons
acting in the course of their official duties.
2. The States Parties undertake:
a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the state;
b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.”
10 Article 30 of the Convention: “Scope of Restrictions. The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the
enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for
reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been established.”
11 Article 44 of the Convention: “Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more
member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this
Convention by a State Party.”
12 Article 46 of the Convention: “1. Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44
or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements:
a) that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of
international law;
b) that the petition or communication is lodged within a period of six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his
rights was notified of the final judgment;
c) that the subject of the petition or communication is not pending in another international proceeding for settlement; and
d) that, in the case of Article 44, the petition contains the name, nationality, profession, domicile, and signature of the person or
persons or of the legal representative of the entity lodging the petition.
2. The provisions of paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. of this article shall not be applicable when:
a) the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have
allegedly been violated;
b) the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from
exhausting them; or
c) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies.”
13 Article 62.3 of the Convention: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of
the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized
such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.”
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or “the query”). Specifically, Panama asked the Court to address the following questions14: a) in relation to Article 1.2 of the American Convention on “the scope and protection of physical persons through legal entities or ‘legally recognized non-governmental entities’, both for exhausting the procedures of domestic jurisdiction as well as for filing complaints of human rights violations with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights”, and “the scope and protection of the rights of legal entities or ‘legally recognized non-governmental entities’ as such, as instruments of physical persons to achieve their legitimate missions”; b) “whether or not Article 16 of the Convention, which recognizes the right of human beings to associate, is limited by the restrictions on the protection of associations freely formed by physical persons as ‘legally recognized non-governmental entities,’ to protect their rights as expressed and developed through the legal entities that are formed under the right of association”; c) the interpretation of Article 1.2 in the light of Articles 29 and 30 of the Convention, and d) “the protection of the human rights of physical persons by means of non-governmental organizations or legal entities, of the […] rights [to] judicial protection and due process of Article 8 of the Convention; [to the] freedom of expression of Article 13 of the Convention; [to] private property as recognized by Article 21 of the Convention; [to] equality and non-discrimination pursuant to Articles 1.1 and 24 of the Convention; [to] the right to strike and form federations and confederations as in Article 8 of the Protocol of San Salvador to the American Convention on Human Rights.” […] 14 The full text of the request can be found at the following link on the Court’s website: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/solicitudoc/solicitud_14_11_14_esp.pdf. 4 Annex 123
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[…]
A. Literal meaning of the terms “person” and “human being” – literal interpretation
37. The Court reiterates that it has already found that Article 1.2 of the Convention establishes
that the rights recognized in said instrument correspond to people, that is, to human beings.1 In
particular, it should be noted that the American Convention did not leave open for interpretation
the way in which the term “person” should be understood, as Article 1.2 specifically seeks to
establish a definition of the term, which demonstrates that the parties’ intent was to give the
term a special meaning within the context of the treaty, as set forth in Article 31.4 of the Vienna
Convention. Therefore, this Court has held that the two terms appearing in Article 1.2 of the
Convention should be understood as synonyms.2
[…]
1 Usón Ramirez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20,
2009. Series C No. 207, para. 45, and Granier et al (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 22, 2015. Series C No. 293, para. 19.
2 Artavia Murillo et al (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of November 28, 2012. Series C No. 257, para. 219. Article 1.2 has been studied by the Court in cases in
which violations of the rights of legal entities have been claimed, which the Court has rejected because they have not
been recognized as entitled to the rights enshrined in the American Convention. Cfr. Cantos v. Argentina. Preliminary
Objections. Judgment of September 7, 2001. Series C No. 85, para. 29 and Perozo et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 195, para. 398.
46
47
46
47
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[…] D. Other human rights protection systems and comparative law – evolutionary interpretation 49. This Court has indicated on other occasions3 that human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation has to accompany the evolution of time and current conditions of life. This evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation established in Article 29 of the American Convention, 3 Cfr. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, para. 114; Atala Riffo and girls v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 83; Artavia Murillo et al (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, para. 245, and Advisory Opinion OC-21/54, para. 55. Similarly, the Preamble to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man states: “The international protection of the rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving American law.” 18 66 66 Annex 123
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as well as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties..4 Furthermore, the third paragraph
of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention authorizes the use, for purposes of interpretation of such
means as agreements or practice5 or relevant rules of international law6 that the States have
issued in relation to the subject matter of the treaty, which are some of the methods that are
associated with an evolutionary approach to interpreting the treaty. Taking this into account, the
Court will proceed to analyze: i) the protection given to legal entities in other courts or
international human rights bodies, and ii) the protections afforded to legal entities in the
domestic legislation of the States Parties.
i) International courts and bodies
50. On this point, the Court believes it is relevant in the context of an evolutionary interpretation,
to analyze the way in which the ownership of rights and access of legal entities to the main
international human rights courts and institutions, in order to determine whether there is a
common practice among them. In fact, this Court has considered it useful, on other occasions,7
to study other human rights systems in order to discover their similarities or differences with the
Inter-American system, which can help determine the scope or meaning that others have given
to a similar provision or detect the particularities of the treaty. This Court will now proceed to
examine: a) the European system, b) the African system, and c) the universal system.
a) European system
51. This Court notes that the European Convention does not contain a definition of the term
“person”, unlike the American Convention. The European Convention limits itself in all of its
articles to the use of the expression “all persons”, without specifying whether it is referring to
human persons or legal persons/entities. Similarly, the Preamble to the Convention only
mentions the value of human rights as a means to ensuring justice and peace in Europe.8 In
fact, the only articles which directly refer to legal entities are Article 34 of the European
Convention and Article 1 of Additional Protocol No. 1. In this respect, the Court observes that
Article 34 provides:
ARTICLE 34 Individual applications: The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake
not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right. (emphasis added)
4 Cfr. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, para. 114, and Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, para. 55.
5 Artavia Murillo et al (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, para. 245. Cfr. TEDH, Rasmussen v. Denmark (No. 8777/79),
Judgment of November 28, 1984, para. 41; Inze v. Austria (No. 8695/79), Judgment of October 28, 1987, para. 42,
and Toth v. Austria (No. 11894/85), Judgment of November 25, 1991, para. 77.
6 Artavia Murillo et al (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, para. 245. Cfr. TEDH, Golder v. United Kingdom (No.
4451/70), Judgment of December 12, 1975, para. 35.
7 For example, in the Advisory Opinion regarding the Obligatory Association of Journalists, the Court compared Article
13 of the American Convention regarding the right to free expression, with analogous articles in the European
Convention (Article 10) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19). The Compulsory
Membership of Journalists in an Association (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory
Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, paras. 45-50. Similarly, the Atala Riffo case looked at the
differences between the scopes of Articles 11.2 and 17.1 of the American Convention and Article 8 of the European
Convention; Atala Riffo and girls v. Chile, para. 175.
8 The Preamble to the European Convention states: Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective
political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which
they depend; Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement
of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration.
67
68 69
70
71
67
68
69
70
71
Annex 123
20 52. Meanwhile, Article 1 of Additional Protocol No. 1 indicates that: ARTICLE 1 – Protection of property: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. (Emphasis added) 53. In this sense, Article 34 of the Convention specifies who can file a petition with the European Court, namely: i) any individual person; ii) any non-governmental organization, and iii) any group of individuals. The European Court’s jurisprudence has allowed, within the concept of non-governmental organization, various types of legal entities to submit petitions thereto. In particular, the European Court has heard cases related to: i) private legal entities, of any nature, for-profit9 (civil and commercial) and not-for-profit10 (associations and foundations), or ii) public entities, provided they do not exercise governmental powers, which were not created for purposes related to public administration and are independent of the State.11 The interpretation of Article 34 of the Convention has led to the European Court not only hearing cases of legal entities related to property rights, which is expressly permitted by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention, but it has also analyzed cases related to rights such as the freedom of expression12 (Article 10 of the European Convention), the prohibition of discrimination13 (Article 14 of the Convention), the right to a fair trial14 (Article 6 of the Convention), to freedom of assembly and association15 (Article 11 of the Convention), freedom of thought, conscience and religion16 (Article 9 of the Convention), or the right to respect for private and family life17 (Article 8 of the Convention). […] 9 On this point, see TEDH, SCI Boumois v. France, (No. 55007/00), Judgment of June 17, 2003; TEDH, SCP Huglo, Lepage & Associates, Consejo v. France, (No. 59477/00), Judgment of February 1, 2005; TEDH, Klithropiia Ipirou Evva Hellas A.E. v. Greece, (No. 27620/08), Judgment of January 13, 2011; TEDH, Sociedade Agricola Do Ameixial v. Portugal, (No. 10143/07), Judgment January 11, 2011; TEDH, Nieruchomosci SP. Z O.O. v. Poland, (No. 32740/06), Judgment of February 2, 2010; TEDH, Ge.Im.A SAS v. Italy, (No. 52984/99), Judgment of February 12, 2002; TEDH, Studio Tecnico Amu S.A.S. v. Italy, (No. 45056/98), Judgment of October 17, 2000; TEDH, Lilly France v. France [n° 2], (No. 20429/07), Judgment of November 25, 2010; TEDH, Filippos Mavropoulos- Pam. Zisis O.E. v. Greece, (No. 27906/04), Judgment of May 4, 2006; TEDH, S. A. GE.MA SNC v. Italy, (No. 40184/98), Judgment of April 27, 2000; TEDH, Sordelli y C. SNC v. Italy, (No. 51670/99), Judgment of December 11, 2001, and TEDH, National & Provincial Building Society, The Leeds Permanent Building Society & The York Shire Building Society v. United Kingdom, (No. 117/1996/736/933–935), Judgment of October 23, 1997. 10 See: TEDH, Apeh Üldozötteinck Szövetsege et al. v. Hungary, (No. 32367/96), Judgment of October 5, 2000; TEDH, Boychev et al., including the Unification Church Association v. Bulgaria, (No. 77185/01), Judgment of January 27, 2011; TEDH, Cha’Are Shalom and Tsedek v. France, (No. 27417/95), Judgment of June 27, 2000; TEDH, Clube de Futebol Uniao de Coimbra v. Portugal, (No.27295/95), Judgment of July 30, 1998; TEDH, Tüketici Bilincini Geliştirme Derneği v. Turkey, (No. 38891/03), Judgment of February 27, 2007; TEDH, Association Avenir d’Alet v. France, (No. 13324/04), Judgment of February 14, 2008. 11 TEDH, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey, (No. 40998/98), Judgment of December 13, 2007, para. 80, and TEDH, Holy Monasteries v. Greece, (No. 13092/87), Judgment of December 9, 1994, para. 49. 12 TEDH, Autronic AG v. Switzerland [Full Bench, Series A], (No. 178), Judgment of May 22, 1990, para. 47. 13 TEDH, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas et al. v. Austria, (No. 40825/98), Judgment of July 31, 2008, paras. 87 to 99. 14 TEDH, Ern Makina Sanayi and Ticaret AS v. Turkey, (No. 70830/01), Judgement of May 3, 2007, paras. 28-30, and TEDH, Stoeterij Zangersheide N.V. et al v. Belgium, (No. 47295/99), Judgment of December 22, 2004, para. 36. 15 TEDH, Syndicat Nationale Des Professionnels Des Procédures Collectives v. France, (No. 70387/01), Judgment of June 21, 2006. 16 TEDH, Church of Scientology v. Sweden [D y R], (No. 16), Judgment of May 5, 1979, para. 68. 17 TEDH, Colas Est et al. v. France, (No. 37971/97), Judgment of April 16, 2002, paras. 40-41, and TEDH, Ernst et al. v. Belgium, (No. 33400/96), Judgment of June 15, 2003, para. 109. 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 Annex 123
21
[…]
57. Regarding the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter “the African
Charter”), the Court observes that it does not offer a definition of the term “person”. Neither has
the Court found an official interpretation offered by its judicial
Annex 123
22 bodies as to whether the term “peoples”18 which appears in the Charter could apply to legal persons. Therefore, it is not possible to determine conclusively whether or not the legal entities are holders of rights in the African system and whether they could be considered direct victims. 58. As in the Inter-American system, the African Charter gives legal entities the ability to send communications to the African Commission; that it, they can report violations of the human rights contained in the African Charter19 on behalf of third parties. It reflects, therefore, an actio popularis approach, according to which the author of the communication does not have to know nor have any connection to the victim of the alleged violation20, as long as the communication complies with the formal requirements established in Article 56 of the African Charter. c) Universal system 59. The Court verifies that the human rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter, the “ICCPR”) do not extend to legal persons. The official interpretation of this instrument clearly establishes that individuals alone can file a complaint with the Human Rights Committee (hereinafter the “HRC” or “Human Rights Committee”). In this respect, the HRC has established that, according to Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, individuals alone may submit complaints to the Committee.21 Similarly, General Comment No. 31 of the HRC provides that “[t]he beneficiaries of the rights recognized by the Covenant are the individuals.”22 Furthermore, in various resolutions, the Human Rights Committee has insisted that “regardless of whether its allegations appear to raise issues under the Covenant,”23 legal entities have no standing with the Committee. In addition, the Human Rights Committee requires that the person who brings the complaint must also be the victim whose rights were allegedly violated.24 60. The situation is different under the light of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which expressly prohibits discrimination against groups or organizations.25 As a result, the Committee 18 The African Charter includes “peoples” as titleholders to rights. For example, they are entitled to the right to equality (Article 19), to existence and self-determination (Article 20), to the free disposal of their wealth and natural resources (Article 21), to development (Article 22), to peace and security (Article 23) as well as to a general satisfactory environment that is conducive to their development (Article 24). 19 Section 4, Rule 93(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, 2010. This rule states: “A Communication submitted under Article 55 of the African Charter may be addressed to the Chairperson of the Commission through the Secretary by any natural or legal person.” 20 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 19 v. the Government of Eritrea, No. 275/03. Communication dated May 30, 2007, para. 65. 21 CDH, V.S. v. Belarus, No. 1749/2008. October 31, 2011, para. 7.3. (“Given the fact that under article 1 of the Optional Protocol only individuals may submit a communication to the Committee, it considers that the author, by claiming violations of the rights of the Religious Union, which are not protected by the Covenant, has no standing under article 1 of the Optional Protocol”). 22 CDH, General Comment No. 31. May 26, 2004, para. 9.. 23 CDH, A newspaper publishing Company v. Trinidad and Tobago, No. 360/1989. July 14, 1989, para. 3.2. (“A company incorporated under the laws of a State party to the Optional Protocol, as such, has no standing under article 1, regardless of whether its allegations appear to raise issues under the Covenant.”); A publication Company and A printing Company v. Trinidad and Tobago, No. 361/1989. July 14, 1989, and J.R.T. and the W.G. Party v. Canada, No. 104/1981. April 6, 1983. 24 CDH, A Group of Association For the Defence of The Rights of Disabled and Handicapped Persons in Italy v. Italy, No. 163/1984. April 10, 1984, para. 6.2. 25 For example, Article 2.1.a of the Convention states that: “1. States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races, and, to this end: (a) Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.” 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Annex 123
23
for the Elimination of Racial discrimination (hereinafter, “CERD”) has established that legal
persons can denounce violations affecting their rights, provided they have suffered harm and
can be considered victims in the case.26 In this sense, the CERD has recognized the standing of
legal persons to file complaints claiming violations of their own rights, as well as violations of
the rights of its members, shareholders and owners, both individually and collectively.27
[…]
62. After completing the above review, the Court notes that in the majority of the systems
analyzed, legal entities are not recognized as having rights, except for the European systems
(para. 53 above) and within the framework of the CERD (para. 60 above). This Court also notes
that the human rights treaties that it has studied do not contain any provisions defining how the
term “person” is to be defined, and therefore Article 1.2 of the American Convention is unique
to the Inter-American system. Taking this into account, the Court determines that at this time,
in international human rights law, there is no clear trend toward granting rights to legal entities
or toward allowing them to access - as victims - the individual petition processes established in
the treaties.
ii) Recognition of the rights of legal entities in domestic legislation
63. When practicing an evolutionary interpretation, the Court has granted special relevance to
comparative law, and for this reason, it has used domestic legislation28 or case law from
26 CERD, The Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination (DACRD) v. Denmark, No. 28/2003.
Declared inadmissible on August 26, 2003, para. 6.4, and CERD, The Jewish Community of Oslo et al. v. Norway, No.
30/2003. August 15, 2005, para. 7.4.
27 CERD, TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, No. 48/2010. February 26, 2013, paras. 11.2 and
11.3.
[…]
28 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, para. 245. Also see on this topic: Kawas Fernández v.
Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series C No. 196, para. 148.
91
92
95
91
92
95
Annex 123
24 domestic courts29 when studying specific disputes in contentious cases. In turn, the European Court30 has used comparative law as a mechanism to identify the subsequent practice of the States; that is, to specify the context of a certain treaty. In order to verify the practice of States Parties to the American Convention, we will discuss below the countries where fundamental rights have been granted to legal persons. 64. In this regard, the Court has found that in all of the countries which have ratified the Court’s jurisdiction, legal entities themselves are recognized as having fundamental rights, which can coincide with those enshrined in the American Convention. According to the information analyzed by this Court, the rights which are commonly31 recognized to legal entities are property rights,32 freedom of expression,33 petition,34 and association.35 The Court also observes that these rights are not necessarily guaranteed for all types of 29 Artavia Murillo et al (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, para. 245. In the Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama (para. 111) and Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala (para. 87) cases, the Court took into account decisions by the domestic courts of Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela regarding the absence of a statute of limitations for permanent crimes such as forced disappearances. In addition, in Anzualdo Castro v. Peru (paras. 100-101), the Court used judgments from the constitutional courts of American countries to support its delimitation of the concept of forced disappearance. Other examples are Atala Riffo and Girls v. Chile (by way of example see para. 92) and the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador (see, for example, paras. 159-164). 30 Caso Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, para. 245. For example in the TV Vest As & Rogoland Pensionistparti v. Norway case, the European Court took into account a document by the “European Platform of Regulatory Authorities” which it used to make a comparison of 31 countries in the region, in order to determine which countries permitted paid or unpaid political advertising, and in which countries this type of advertising was free. Also, in Hirst v. United Kingdom, the Court relied on the “Member States’ standards and practices” in order to determine in which countries could the right to vote be denied to someone who had been convicted of a crime, for which it studied the legislation of 48 European countries. 31 Other rights that the Court verified are given to legal entities in the region are, among others: judicial safeguards, due process, legality, the right to a hearing, to legal security, to public information, to gather, to request a correction, update, inclusion or suppression of personal information, to legal status, to the free development of personality, the freedom to teach, to freedom of religion or belief, freedom to hire, freedom to work, freedom to form a business and engage in commerce and industry, the right to free competition, to found media, to found educational centers, to equality, to a good name, to honor, and to habeas data. 32 In this regard, see: Article 16 Constitution of Barbados; Articles 14, 56, and 315.I of the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia; Judgment No. T-396/93 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, September 16, 1993; Decision: 00128 Case: 98-000128-0004-CI, First Division of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica, December 16, 1998 ; Article 2 of the Constitution of El Salvador and Judgment of March 9, 2011, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Amparo Proceeding 948-2008; Article 39 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala; Article 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti; Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of Mexico, Contradiction of Precedent 360/2013, Date of Ruling: session of April 21, 2014; Articles 103 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua; Case no. 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. and Persolar S.A.C. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Peru; Article 47 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Panama, Article 34 of the Constitution of Surinam, and Decision TC/0242/13, Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic, November 29, 2013. 33 See also: Article 35 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala; Decision No. T-396/93, Constitutional Court of Colombia, September 16, 1993; Case No. 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. and Persolar S.A.C. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Peru, and Article 26 of the National Constitution of Paraguay. 34 On this point see: Decision No. T-396/93, Constitutional Court of Colombia, September 16, 1993; Sentence of November 7, 2008, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador, Amparo Proceeding 103-2006; Article 80 of the Constitution of Honduras; Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of Mexico, Contradiction of Precedent 360/2013, Date of ruling: session of April 21, 2014; Case. no. 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. and Persolar S.A.C. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Peru; Article 41 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Panama, and Article 40 of the National Constitution of Paraguay. 35 Article 34 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala; Decision No. T-396/93, Constitutional Court of Colombia, September 16, 1993; Sentence on Case Number: 08-007986-0007-CO, Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica, September 8, 2009; Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador, Constitutional Proceeding 23-R-96, Ramírez & Marcelino v. Municipal Council of San Juan Opico, sentence of October 8, 1998; Article 31 and 31.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti; Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of Mexico, Contradiction of Precedent 360/2013, Date of Ruling: session of April 21, 2014, and Case n.° 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. and Persolar S.A.C. Judgment of Constitutional Court of Peru. 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 Annex 123
25
legal entities, given that some of them are aimed at protecting certain types of entities, as in
the case of some rights that are bestowed only on unions36, political parties37, indigenous
peoples38, Afro-descendant communities39 or specific groups or institutions40.
65. The Court also notes that in a large number of countries in the region, legal entities are
given the right to file appeals for amparo protection or similar remedies in defense of the rights
granted to them41.
[…]
36 Bolivia (Article 51 of the Political Constitution); Brazil (Articles 8, 74.IV. § 2, and 103 IX of the Political
Constitution); Honduras (Article 128.14 of the Political Constitution); Nicaragua (Article 87 Political Constitution);
Panama (Articles 68 and 69 of the Political Constitution); Paraguay (Articles 96-98 National Constitution); Peru
(Articles 28 & 42 of the Political Constitution), and Surinam (Article 32 of the Constitution).
37 Argentina (Article 38 of the National Constitution); Brazil (Articles 17, 74.IV. § 2, and 103.VIII of the Political
Constitution); Colombia (Articles 107 and 108 of the Political Constitution); Haiti (Article 31.1 of the Constitution);
Honduras (Article 47 of the Political Constitution), Nicaragua (Articles 55, 173.7, 173.11, 173.12, 173.13 of the
Political Constitution); Panama (Article 140 of the Political Constitution); Paraguay (Articles 124-126 of the National
Constitution), and Peru (Article 35 of the Political Constitution).
38 Bolivia (Articles 30 & 32 among others of the Political Constitution); Brazil (Articles 231-232 of the Political
Constitution); Colombia (Article 329 of the Political Constitution); Nicaragua (Articles 121 and 103 of the Political
Constitution); Panama (Articles 124 and 127 of the Political Constitution), and Paraguay (Articles 62-67 of the National
Constitution)
39 Bolivia (Articles 32,100.I and 395.I of the Political Constitution), and Nicaragua (Articles 89, 90 and 121 of the
Political Constitution).
40 Peru, for example, recognizes the right to exemption of all taxes on the assets, activities, or own services in the case
of universities, institutes, and other educational institutions (Article 19 of the Political Constitution). In Chile, churches,
religious confessions and institutions have the right to their property which is recognized by current laws (Article 19.6
of the Political Constitution). In Nicaragua, private religious schools have the right to teach religion as an
extracurricular course, and universities and secondary technical education institutions enjoy academic, financial,
organic and administrative autonomy, as well as tax exemption. The assets and revenues of the universities and
technical institutes promote and protect the free creation, research, and dissemination of science, technology, arts and
letters, and guarantee and protect intellectual property (Articles 124 and 125 of the Political Constitution); also in
Nicaragua, there are tax exemptions in place for certain imports brought in by social communication media and it is
prohibited to censor them (Article 68 of the Political Constitution); also in Nicaragua the right is given to farmers and
other productive sectors” to participate through their own organizations in defining agricultural reform policy (Articles
108 and 111 of the Political Constitution). In Panama, rights are given to the Official University of Panama (Articles
103 and 104 of the Political Constitution).
41 Argentina (Article 43 of the National Constitution. Also see Law No. 16.986 or the Amparo Action Regulatory Law,
Article 5); Bolivia (Article 128 and 129 of the Political Constitution. See also Decision 0763/2011 R, Constitutional
Court of Bolivia, May 20, 2011); Brazil (Article 5, LXX of the Political Constitution); Chile Article 20 of the Political
Constitution); Colombia (Decision T-411/92, Constitutional Court of Colombia, June 17, 1992); Costa Rica (Article 48
of the Political Constitution and Articles 57 and 58 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Act, Law No. 7135); Ecuador
(Articles 86 and 88 of the Political Constitution, Article 9 of the Organic Law of Jurisdictional Guarantees and
Constitutional Oversight. See also Decision No. 001-14-PJO-CC, Case No. 0067-11-JD, Constitutional Court of
Ecuador, April 23, 2014); El Salvador (Article 247 of the Constitution. See the Decision of March 9, 2011,
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Amparo Proceeding 948-2008); Honduras (Article 183 of the
Political Constitution and Article 44 of the Constitutional Justice Act); Mexico (Articles 8 and 9 of the Amparo Law. See
also: Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of Mexico, Contradiction of Precedent 360/2013, Date of Ruling: session
of April 21, 2014); Nicaragua (Article 45 of the Constitution and Article 23 of the Amparo Law, Law No. 49); Paraguay
(Article 134 of the National Constitution and Articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 340/71 which regulates Amparo); Peru (Article
200 of the Political Constitution and Article 26 of the Habeus Corpus and Amparo Act, Law No. 23506); Dominican
Republic (Article 72 of the Dominican Constitution, Article 2 of Law No. 437-06 which establishes the Amparo appeal
and Article 67 of Law No. 137-11 of the Constitutional Court and Court of Constitutional Procedure); and Uruguay
(Article 1 of Law 16011, Regulating provisions related to Amparo actions).
103 104
105 106 107
108
103
104
105
106
107
108
Annex 123
27 […] F. Conclusion regarding the interpretation 70. Having employed simultaneously and in conjunction the various hermeneutical criteria established in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, the Court concludes that based on an interpretation of Article 1.2 of the American Convention, done in good faith, according to the natural meaning of the terms employed in the Convention (paras. 37-39 above) and taking into account the context (paras. 44-67) and the object and purpose of the Convention (paras. 40-43), it is clear that legal entities are not entitled to conventional rights, and therefore they cannot be considered alleged victims in the context of adversarial proceedings brought before the Inter-American system. […] Annex 123
36
[…]
105. By virtue of the foregoing, the Court has concluded that unions, federations, and
confederations are entitled to the rights established in Article 8.1.a of the Protocol, which allows
them to resort directly before the Inter-American system to defend their own rights. Now then,
on this point, the Court believes it is relevant to recall that pursuant to Article 44 of the American
Convention, unions, federations and confederations that are legally recognized by one or more
States Parties to the Convention, whether or not they are parties to the Protocol of San Salvador,
may file individual petitions with the Inter-American Commission on behalf of their members, in
the event of an alleged violation of the rights of their members by a State Party to the American
Convention.
[…]
107. As indicated previously, this Court has reiterated that while the status of legal entities was
not expressly recognized by the American Convention, this does not restrict the possibility that,
under certain conditions, an individual may exercise their rights through such entities in order
to resort to the Inter-American system to enforce their fundamental rights, even when these
Annex 123
37 rights are covered by a legal category or legal fiction created by the same judicial system.42 […] 42 Cfr. Cantos vs. Argentina, para. 29, and Granier et al.(Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, para. 146. 153 153 Annex 123
38
[…]
111. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court feels it is necessary to make a distinction
for the purposes of establishing which situations can be examined by this Court within the
framework of the American Convention,43 when there are cases alleging that the right has been
exercised through a legal entity. In general, the Court has found that in many situations, “the
rights and obligations ascribed to legal entities are resolved in terms of the rights and obligations
of the individuals who comprise them or who are acting on their behalf or as their
representative”44. Thus, the rights that legal entities enjoy domestically within the States Parties
to the American Convention (see para. 64 above), in some cases, are not exclusive to them. On
the contrary, the recognition of the rights of legal entities may directly or indirectly imply the
protection of the human rights of the individual persons associated with those entities.
[…]
43 Cfr. Cantos vs. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, para. 29, and Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) vs.
Venezuela, para. 146.
44 Cantos vs. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, para. 27, and Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela,
para. 54.
158
159
158
159
Annex 123
39 […] 115. Similarly, in recent case law, this Court has analyzed the right to freedom of expression45 and its materialization through a legal entity. In Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, the Court found that media outlets are, in general, associations of people who have joined together to exercise their freedom of expression in a sustained manner, and therefore it is unusual today for a media organization not to be established as a legal entity, since the production and distribution of information requires an organizational and financial structure that can fulfill the demand for information.46 Likewise, just as unions constitute instruments for the exercise of workers’ right to freedom of association, and political parties are vehicles for the 45 Article 13 of the American Convention: “Freedom of Thought and Expression. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice. 2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence. 5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.” 46 Granier et al.(Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, para. 148. 169 170 169 170 Annex 123
40
exercise of the political rights of citizens, media outlets are mechanisms that serve the exercise
of the right to the free expression of those who use them as a means for disseminating their
ideas or information.47
116. Furthermore, this Court also found that the editorial position of a television channel can be
considered a reflection of the political opinions of its directors and employees to the extent that
they are involved in and determine the content of the information being broadcasted.48 Thus, it
can be understood that the critical posture of a TV channel or network is a reflection of the critical
attitude held by its directors and staff involved in determining the type of information that is
transmitted. This is due to the fact that, as indicated previously, in many cases the media are
the mechanisms through which people exercise their right to freedom of expression, which can
imply the expression of content such as political opinions or positions.49
117. Consequently, this Court indicated that restrictions on the freedom of expression often
materialize through the actions of government or private actors that not only affect the legal
entity which constitutes a medium or channel of communication, but also the collective group of
natural persons, such as its shareholders or the journalists who work there, who engage in the
act of communication through that entity and whose rights may also be violated.50 In the case
cited above, the Court established that in order to determine whether or not the effects on the
legal entity (the medium of communication in this case) had generated a certain and substantial
adverse impact on the freedom of expression of individual persons, it is necessary to analyze
the role that the alleged victims exercised within the respective communication medium, and, in
particular, the way in which they contributed to the communicational mission of the channel.51
[…]
47 Granier et al.(Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, para. 148.
48 Granier et al.(Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, para. 224.
49 Granier et al.(Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, para. 224.
50 Granier et al.(Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, para. 151.
51 Granier et al.(Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela, para. 151.
171
172
173
174
175
171
172
173
174
175
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41 120. Taking the foregoing into account, the Court finds that due to the multiple forms that legal entities can take, such as commercial companies or corporations, political parties, religious associations or non-governmental organizations, it is not feasible to establish a single formula that can be used to recognize the existence of the exercise of the rights of natural persons through their participation in a legal entity, as has been done with the right to property and to freedom of expression. Therefore, the Court will determine the way to prove the relationship when it analyzes the alleged violation of one of the rights that has supposedly been violated in a concrete contentious case. […] Annex 123
46
[…]
IX
OPINION
For the foregoing reasons, in interpretation of Article 1.2 of the American Convention on Human
Rights in relation to Articles 1.1, 8, 11.2, 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 and 62.3 of the
same instrument, as well as Article 8.1.a and b of the Protocol of San Salvador,
[…]
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CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS COUR INTERAMERICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DIREITOS HUMANOS INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CORTE INTERAMERICANADE DERECHOS HUMANOSOPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-22/16DE 26DE FEBRERODE 2016SOLICITADA POR LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁTITULARIDAD DE DERECHOS DE LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS(INTERPRETACIÓN Y ALCANCE DEL ARTÍCULO 1.2, EN RELACIÓN CON LOS ARTÍCULOS 1.1, 8, 11.2, 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 Y 62.3DE LA CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS, ASÍ COMO DEL ARTÍCULO 8.1.A Y B DEL PROTOCOLO DE SAN SALVADOR)la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante “la Corte Interamericana”, “la Corte” o “el Tribunal”), integrada por los siguientes Jueces1:Roberto F. Caldas, Presidente;Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, Vicepresidente;Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Juez;Diego García-Sayán, Juez;Alberto Pérez Pérez, Juez; Eduardo Vio Grossi, Juez; yHumberto Antonio Sierra Porto, Juez;presentes, además,Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, Secretario, yEmilia Segares Rodríguez, Secretaria Adjunta,de conformidad con el artículo 64.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (en adelante “la Convención Americana” o “la Convención”) y con los artículos 70 a 75 del Reglamento de la Corte (en adelante “el Reglamento”), emite la siguiente Opinión Consultiva,que se estructura en el siguiente orden: 1La presente Opinión Consultivase dicta en el 113 Período Ordinario de Sesiones de la Corte. De conformidad con los artículos 54.3 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 5.3 del Estatuto de la Corte y 17.1 de su Reglamento,los jueces que terminen sus mandatos seguirán conociendo de los casos que ya conocieren y que se encuentrenen estado desentencia. En razón de lo anterior, los Jueces Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Diego García-Sayán y Alberto Pérez Pérez participaron en la deliberación y firma de la presente Opinión Consultiva.
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2ÍNDICEI.PRESENTACIÓN DE LA CONSULTA................................................................................2 II.PROCEDIMIENTO ANTE LA CORTE...............................................................................5 III. COMPETENCIA........................................................................................................9 IV. CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES................................................................................9 V. LA CONSULTA SOBRE LA TITULARIDAD DE DERECHOSDE LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO......................................................................................14 A. Sentido corriente de los términos “persona” y “ser humano” –interpretación literal....15 B. Objeto y fin del tratado –interpretación teleológica.................................................16 C. Contexto interno –interpretación sistemática.........................................................17 D. Otros sistemas de protección de los derechos humanos y derecho comparado -Interpretación evolutiva.............................................................................................18 i) Tribunales y organismos internacionales.............................................................19 ii) Reconocimiento de derechos a personas jurídicas en el derecho interno..................23 E. Métodos complementarios de interpretación...........................................................26 F. Conclusión sobre la interpretación.........................................................................27 VI. LAS COMUNIDADES INDÍGENAS Y TRIBALES Y LAS ORGANIZACIONES SINDICALES.......27 i) Comunidades indígenas y tribales......................................................................27 ii) Sindicatos, federaciones y confederaciones –Análisis del artículo 8 del Protocolo de San Salvador.........................................................................................................31 VII. EJERCICIO DE LOS DERECHOS DE LAS PERSONAS NATURALES A TRAVÉS DEPERSONAS JURÍDICAS..................................................................................................................36 VIII. POSIBLE AGOTAMIENTO DE LOS RECURSOS INTERNOS POR PERSONAS JURÍDICAS....41 A. Naturaleza del requisito de agotamiento de los recursos internos en el sistema interamericano..........................................................................................................41 B. Idoneidad y efectividad de los recursos de jurisdicción interna que deben ser agotados.........................................................................................................................43 IX. OPINIÓN................................................................................................................46 I.PRESENTACIÓN DE LA CONSULTA1.El 28de abrilde 2014 la República de Panamá (en adelante “Panamá”), con fundamento en el artículo 64.1 de la Convención Americana2y de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 70.1 y 70.2 del Reglamento3, presentó una solicitud de Opinión 2Artículo 64.1 de la Convención“Los Estados miembros de la Organización podrán consultar a la Corte acerca de la interpretación de esta Convención o de otros tratados concernientes a la protección de los derechos humanos en los Estados americanos. Asimismo, podrán consultarla, en lo que les compete, los órganos enumerados en el capítulo X de la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, reformada por el Protocolo de Buenos Aires”.3Artículo 70.1 y 70.2 del Reglamentode la Corte Interamericana “1. Las solicitudes de opinión consultiva previstas en el artículo 64.1 de la Convención deberán formular con precisión las preguntas específicas sobre las cuales se pretende obtener la opinión de la Corte.
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3Consultiva sobre la interpretación y alcance del artículo 1.2, en relación con los artículos 1.14, 85, 11.26, 13, 167, 21, 248, 259, 29, 3010, 4411, 4612y 62.313de la Convención Americana 2. Las solicitudes de opinión consultiva formuladas por un Estado miembro o por la Comisión, deberán indicar, además, las disposiciones cuya interpretación se pide, las consideraciones que originan la consulta y el nombre y dirección del Agente o de los Delegados”.4Artículo 1.1 de la Convención “Obligación de Respetar los Derechos .Los Estados Partes en esta Convención se comprometen a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella y a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona que esté sujeta a su jurisdicción, sin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social”.5Artículo 8 de la Convención “Garantías Judiciales. 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías ydentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter.2. Toda persona inculpada de delito tiene derecho a que se presuma su inocencia mientras no se establezca legalmente su culpabilidad. Durante el proceso, toda persona tiene derecho, en plena igualdad, a las siguientes garantías mínimas: a) derecho del inculpado de ser asistido gratuitamente por el traductor o intérprete, si no comprende o no habla el idioma del juzgado o tribunal; b) comunicación previa y detallada al inculpado de la acusación formulada; c) concesión al inculpado del tiempo y de los medios adecuados para la preparación de su defensa; d) derecho del inculpado de defenderse personalmente o de ser asistido por un defensor de su elección y de comunicarse libre y privadamente con su defensor; e) derecho irrenunciable de ser asistido por un defensor proporcionado por el Estado, remunerado o no según la legislación interna, si el inculpado no se defendiere por sí mismo ni nombrare defensor dentro del plazo establecido por la ley;f) derecho de la defensa de interrogar a los testigos presentes en el tribunal y de obtener la comparecencia, como testigos o peritos, de otras personas que puedan arrojar luz sobre los hechos; g) derecho a no ser obligado a declarar contra sí mismo nia declararse culpable, y h) derecho de recurrir del fallo ante juez o tribunal superior. 3. La confesión del inculpado solamente es válida si es hecha sin coacción de ninguna naturaleza. 4. El inculpado absuelto por una sentencia firme no podrá ser sometido a nuevo juicio por los mismos hechos. 5. El proceso penal debe ser público, salvo en lo que sea necesario para preservar los intereses de la justicia”.6Artículo 11.2 de la Convención “Protección de la Honra y de la Dignidad. […] 2. Nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en su vida privada, en la de su familia, en su domicilio o en su correspondencia, ni de ataques ilegales a su honra o reputación”.7Artículo 16 de la Convención “Libertad de Asociación. 1. Todas las personas tienen derecho a asociarse libremente con fines ideológicos, religiosos, políticos, económicos, laborales, sociales, culturales, deportivos o de cualquiera otra índole. 2. El ejercicio de tal derecho sólo puede estar sujeto a las restricciones previstaspor la ley que sean necesarias en una sociedad democrática, en interés de la seguridad nacional, de la seguridad o del orden públicos, o para proteger la salud o la moral públicas o los derechos y libertades de los demás. 3. Lo dispuesto en este artículono impide la imposición de restricciones legales, y aun la privación del ejercicio del derecho de asociación, a los miembros de las fuerzas armadas y de la policía”.8Artículo 24 de la Convención “Igualdad ante la Ley. Todas las personas son iguales ante la ley.En consecuencia, tienen derecho, sin discriminación, a igual protección de la ley”.9Artículo 25 de la Convención “Protección Judicial. 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a un recurso sencillo y rápido o a cualquier otro recurso efectivo ante los jueces o tribunales competentes, que la ampare contra actos que violen sus derechos fundamentales reconocidos por la Constitución, la ley o la presente Convención, aun cuando tal violación sea cometida por personas que actúen en ejercicio de sus funciones oficiales.2. Los Estados Partes se comprometen: a) a garantizar que la autoridad competente prevista por el sistema legal del Estado decidirá sobre los derechos de toda persona que interponga tal recurso; b) a desarrollar las posibilidades de recurso judicial, y c) a garantizar el cumplimiento, por las autoridades competentes, de toda decisión en que se haya estimado procedente el recurso”.10Artículo 30 de la Convención “Alcance de las Restricciones. Las restricciones permitidas, de acuerdo con esta Convención, al goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidas en la misma, no pueden ser aplicadas sino conforme a leyes que se dictaren por razones de interés general y con el propósito para el cual han sido establecidas”.11Artículo 44 de la Convención Cualquier persona o grupo de personas, o entidad no gubernamental legalmente reconocida en uno o más Estados miembros de la Organización, puede presentar a la Comisión peticiones que contengan denuncias o quejas de violación de esta Convención porun Estado parte”.12Artículo 46 de la Convención “1. Para que una petición o comunicación presentada conforme a los artículos 44 ó 45 sea admitida por la Comisión, se requerirá: a) que se hayan interpuesto y agotado los recursos de jurisdicción interna,conforme a los principios del Derecho Internacional generalmente reconocidos;
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4sobre Derechos Humanos, así como del artículo 8.1.a y b del Protocolo de San Salvador(en adelante “la solicitud” o “la consulta”). En particular, Panamá solicitó que el Tribunal se pronuncie14:a)en relación con el artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana sobre “[e]l alcance y protección de las personas físicas por medio de las personas jurídicas o ‘entidades no gubernamentales legalmente reconocidas’, tanto para agotar los procedimientos de la jurisdicción interna como para plantear denuncias de violación [a]los derechos humanos ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, y “[e]l alcance y la protección de los derechos de las personas jurídicas o ‘entidades no gubernamentales legalmente reconocidas’, como tales, en cuanto instrumentos de las personas físicas para lograr sus cometidos legítimos”; b)“si el artículo 16 de la Convención, que reconoce el derecho de los seres humanos a asociarse, se ve limitado o no por la restricción de protección de las asociaciones libremente formadas por las personas físicas como ‘entidades no gubernamentales legalmente reconocidas’, para proteger sus derechos expresados y desarrollados por medio de las personas jurídicas que se conforman al amparo del derecho de asociación”;c)lainterpretación del artículo 1.2 a la luz de los artículos 29 y 30 de la Convención, yd)“la protección de derechos humanos de las personas físicas por medio de organizaciones no gubernamentales o personas jurídicas, de los […] derechos [a] la protección judicial y al debido proceso del artículo 8 de la Convención; [a] la intimidad y vida privada del artículo 11 de la Convención; [ala] libertad de expresión del artículo 13 de la Convención; [a] la propiedad privada reconocida por el artículo 21 de la Convención; [a] la igualdad y no discriminación de los artículos 1.1 y 24 de la Convención; [al] derecho de huelga y de formar federaciones y confederaciones del artículo 8 del Protocolo de San Salvador de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos”.2.Panamáexpuso las consideraciones que originaron la consulta y señaló que:El Estado invoca la práctica de la Comisión Interamericana en cuanto a la interpretación del artículo 1.2 de la Convención y cita los dos pasajes siguientes, entre otros, extractados de los pronunciamientos de la Comisión:[…] que el Preámbulo de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos así como las disposiciones del Artículo 1.2 proveen que ‘para los propósitos de esta Convención, ‘persona’ significa todo ser humano’, y que por consiguiente, el sistema de personas naturales y no incluye personas jurídicas [...] consecuentemente, en el sistema interamericano, el derecho a la propiedad es un derecho personal y la Comisión tiene atribuciones para proteger los derechos de un individuo cuya propiedad es confiscada, pero no tiene jurisdicción sobre los derechos de personas jurídicas, tales como compañías o, como en este caso, instituciones bancarias (Informe N° 10/91 del 22.II.1991, Banco de Lima –Perú considerandos 1 y 2). b) que sea presentada dentro del plazo de seis meses, a partir de la fecha en que el presunto lesionado en sus derechos haya sido notificado de la decisión definitiva; c) que la materia de la petición o comunicación no esté pendiente de otro procedimiento de arreglo internacional, y d) que en el caso del artículo 44 la petición contenga el nombre, la nacionalidad, la profesión, el domicilio y la firma de la persona o personas odel representante legal de la entidad que somete la petición. 2. Las disposiciones de los incisos 1.a. y 1.b. del presente artículo no se aplicarán cuando: a) no exista en la legislación interna del Estado de que se trata el debido proceso legal para laprotección del derecho o derechos que se alega han sido violados; b) no se haya permitido al presunto lesionado en sus derechos el acceso a los recursos de la jurisdicción interna, o haya sido impedido de agotarlos, y c) haya retardo injustificado en ladecisión sobre los mencionados recursos”.13Artículo 62.3 de la Convención “La Corte tiene competencia para conocer de cualquier caso relativo a la interpretación y aplicación de las disposiciones de esta Convención que le sea sometido, siempre que los Estados Partes en el caso hayan reconocido o reconozcan dicha competencia, ora por declaración especial, como se indica en los incisos anteriores, ora por convención especial”.14El texto completo de la solicitud puede ser consultada en el siguiente enlacede la página webde la Corte: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/solicitudoc/solicitud_14_11_14_esp.pdf.
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5[…] de acuerdo al segundo párrafo de la norma transcrita, [artículo 1], la persona protegida por la Convención es ‘todo ser humano’ [....]. Por ello, la Comisión considera que la Convención otorga su protección a las personas físicas o naturales, excluyendo de su ámbito de aplicación a las personas jurídicas o ideales, por cuanto éstas son ficciones jurídicas sin existencia real en el orden material (Informe N° 39/99 del 11.III.1999, Mevopal, S.A.-Argentina, párr. 17).Con estos dos párrafos parece entenderse que laspersonas jurídicas al ser ficciones jurídicas, por si mismas no son susceptibles de Derechos sino las personas miembros de las sociedades de la persona jurídica.Dado que esto es un tema que ha generado inquietudes entre los Estados y que hasta ahora solo se hace referencia a la opinión de la Comisión, el Estado panameño considera oportuno consultar la posición de la Honorable Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos acerca de este tema.3.Con base en lo anterior, Panamá presentó a la Corte las siguientes consultas específicas:1.¿El [a]rtículo 1, [p]árrafo [s]egundo, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, restringe la protección interamericana de los derechos humanos a las personas físicas y excluye del ámbito de protección de la Convención alas personas jurídicas?2.¿El [a]rtículo 1.2 de la Convención, puede proteger también los derechos de personas jurídicas como cooperativas, sindicatos, asociaciones, sociedades, en cuanto compuestos por personas físicas asociadas a esas entidades?3.¿Pueden las personas jurídicas acudir a los procedimientos de la jurisdicción interna y agotar los recursos de la jurisdicción interna en defensa de los derechos de las personas físicas titulares de esas personas jurídicas?4.¿Qué derechos humanos pueden serle reconocidos a las personas jurídicas o colectivas (no gubernamentales) en el marco de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y de sus Protocolos o instrumentos internacionales complementarios?5.En el marco de la Convención Americana, además de las personas físicas, ¿tienen las personas jurídicas compuestas por seres humanos derechos a la libertad de asociación del Artículo 16, a la intimidad y vida privada del Artículo 11, a la libertad de expresión del [a]rtículo 13, a la propiedad privada del [a]rtículo 21, a las garantías judiciales, al debido proceso y a la protección de sus derechos de los [a]rtículos 8 y 25, a la igualdad y no discriminación de los [a]rtículos 1 y 24, todos de la Convención Americana?6.¿Puede una empresa o sociedad privada, cooperativa, sociedad civil o sociedad comercial, un sindicato (persona jurídica), un medio de comunicación (persona jurídica), una organización indígena (persona jurídica), en defensa de sus derechos y/o de sus miembros, agotar los recursos de la jurisdicción interna y acudir a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en nombre de sus miembros (personas físicas asociadas o dueñas de la empresa o sociedad), o debe hacerlo cada miembro o socio en su condición de persona física?7.¿Si una persona jurídica en defensa de sus derechos y de los derechos de sus miembros (personas físicas asociados o socios de la misma), acude a la jurisdicción interna y agota sus procedimientos jurisdiccionales, pueden sus miembros o asociados acudir directamente ante la jurisdicción internacional de la Comisión Interamericana en la defensa de sus derechos como personas físicas afectadas?8.En el marco de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, ¿las personas físicas deben agotar ellas mismas los recursos de la jurisdicción interna para acudir a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en defensa de sus derechos humanos, o pueden hacerlo las personas jurídicas en las que participan?4.Panamá designó a la señora Farah Diva Urrutia, Directora General de Asuntos Jurídicos y Tratados del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Panamá,como agente.II.PROCEDIMIENTO ANTE LA CORTE
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65.Mediante notas de 17 de noviembre de 2014,la Secretaría de la Corte (en adelante “la Secretaría”), de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 73.115del Reglamento, transmitió la consulta a los demás Estados Miembros de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (en adelante “la OEA”), al Secretario General de la OEA, al Presidente del Consejo Permanente de la OEA y a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante “la Comisión Interamericana” o “la Comisión”). En dichas comunicaciones, informó que el Presidente de la Corte, en consulta con el Tribunal, había fijado el 30 de enero de 2015 como fecha límite para la presentación de las observaciones escritas respecto de la solicitud mencionada. Igualmente, siguiendo instrucciones del Presidente y de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 73.316de dicho Reglamento, la Secretaría, mediante notas de 17 de noviembre, 3 y 4 de diciembre de 2014 invitó a diversas organizaciones internacionales y de la sociedad civil así como a medios de comunicación y partidos políticos, e instituciones académicas, religiosas, empresariales y sindicales de la región a remitir en el plazo anteriormente señalado su opinión escrita sobre los puntos sometidos a consulta. Finalmente, se realizó una invitación abierta a través del sitio webde la Corte Interamericanaa todos los interesados a presentar su opinión escrita sobre los puntos sometidos a consulta. El plazo previamente establecido fue prorrogado hasta el 30 de marzo de 2015, por lo que contaron con aproximadamente cuatro meses para remitir sus presentaciones.6.El plazo otorgado llegó a su vencimiento y se recibieron en la Secretaría los siguientes escritos de observaciones17:Observaciones escritas presentadas por Estados de la OEA:1)República Argentina (en adelante “Argentina”);2)República Plurinacional de Bolivia (en adelante“Bolivia”)3)República de Colombia (en adelante “Colombia”);4)República de El Salvador (en adelante “El Salvador”);5)República de Guatemala (en adelante “Guatemala”);6)República de Honduras (en adelante “Honduras”);Observaciones escritas presentadas por órganos de la OEA:7)Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos;Observaciones escritas presentadas por organismos internacionales y estatales, asociaciones internacionales y nacionales, instituciones académicas, organizaciones no gubernamentales e individuosde la sociedad civil:1)Alianza Regional por la Libre Expresión e Información;2)Amnistía Internacional;3)Ana Margarita Vijil;4)Asociación Civil de Derechos Humanos “Ixtlamatque Ukari A.C” y Miguel Ángel Antemate Mendoza; 15Artículo 73.1 de dicho Reglamento“Una vez recibida una solicitud de opinión consultiva, el Secretario transmitirá copia a todos los Estados miembros, a la Comisión, al Consejo Permanente a través de su Presidencia, al Secretario General y a los órganos de la OEA a cuya esfera de competencia se refiera el tema de la consulta, si fuere del caso”.16Artículo 73.3 de dicho Reglamento“La Presidencia podrá invitar o autorizar a cualquier persona interesada para que presente su opinión escrita sobre los puntos sometidos a consulta. Si la solicitud es de aquéllas a que se refiere el artículo 64.2 de la Convención, lo podrá hacer previa consulta con el agente”.17La solicitud de opinión consultiva presentada por Panamá, las observaciones escritas y orales de los Estados participantes, de la Comisión Interamericana, así como de organismos internacionales y estatales, asociacionesinternacionales y nacionales, instituciones académicas, organizaciones no gubernamentalese individuosde la sociedad civil, pueden ser consultadas en el sitio webde la Corte. Disponibles en el siguiente enlace:http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/es/observaciones-panama. Asimismo, figuran resumidas en el anexo a la presente opinión.
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75)Carlos Rodríguez Mejía, Alberto León Gómez Zuluaga y Marcelo Ferreira;6)Centro de Derechos Reproductivos;7)Clínica de Derechos Humanos del Centro de Investigación y Educación en Derechos Humanos de la Universidad de Ottawa;8)Clínica jurídica de la Universidad San Francisco de Quito;9)Comisión de DDHH del Distrito Federal (CDHDF) México;10)Comité Ejecutivo Nacional de la Confederación de Trabajadores de México, y11)Confederación de Cámaras Industriales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos;12)Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (CONCANACO);13)Confederación Sindical Internacional y la Confederación Sindical de las Américas (International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and Trade Union Confederation of the Americas(TUCA);14)Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur (CCSC);15)David Andrés Murillo Cruz;16)EarthRights International y Juan Pablo Calderón Meza;17)Facultad de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile;18)Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM);19)Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad de San Buenaventura de Cali;20)Semillero de Derecho Internacional Económico y Derecho Humanos adscrito ala Universidad EAFIT;21)Grupo estudiantil de trabajo “Iván David Ortiz” de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia;22)International Commission for Labor Rights;23)Jorge Aguilera Suárez, Marcela Alejandra Cáceres Garza, Mario Castro Sánchez y Marion Eloisa Hidalgo García (estudiantes de la Especialidad en Derecho Internacional del Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México);24)Jorge Alberto Pérez Tolentino;25)Lucas Lixinski, Sumer Dayal, Ashna Taneja –Australian Human Rights Centre;26)Luis Peraza Parga;27)Martha María Guadalupe Orozco Reyes, Alejandra Isabel Plascencia López, Hermilo de Jesús Lares Contreras, José Benjamín González Mauricio, José Luis Castellón Sosa y Noel Velázquez Prudencio;28)Miguel ÁngelBarboza López;29)Observatorio Amazónico de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Federal de Amapá;30)Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la Subsecretaría de Derechos Humanos deQuilmes;31)Pablo Martín Fernández Barrios;32)Programa Universitario de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México;33)Rodolfo E. Piza de Rocafort;34)Santiago Bertinat Gonnet;35)Shirley Llain Arenilla, Cindy Hawkins Rada, Juan Miguel Cortés Quintero yAndrea Alejandra Ariza Lascarro–Universidad del Norte de Barranquilla;36)Sostenibilidad Legal (SAS);37)Selene Guevara Solís, Heberto Mejía García y Héctor Bravo Morráz -Universidad Centroamericana de Nicaragua, y38)Universidad Centroamericana Jose SimeónCañas.39)Wagner Balera, profesor titular de Derechos Humanos de la Facultad de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de San Paulo;
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87.Una vez concluido el procedimiento escrito, el 21 de mayo de 2015 la Presidencia de la Corte, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 73.418del Reglamento, emitió una Resolución19, mediante la cual convocó a una audiencia pública e invitó a los Estados Miembros de la OEA, a su Secretario General, al Presidente del Consejo Permanentede la OEA, a la Comisión Interamericana y a los integrantes de diversas organizaciones, sociedad civil, instituciones académicas y personas que remitieron observaciones escritas, con el propósito de presentar al Tribunal sus comentarios orales respecto de la consulta. 8.La audiencia pública se celebró el 25 de junio de 2015 en el marco del 109° Período Ordinario de Sesiones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.9.Comparecieron ante la Corte las siguientes personas:Por Argentina, el señor Javier Salgado, Director Contencioso Internacional en Derechos Humanos, y la señora Rosario Álvarez Garriga, Coordinadora de Asuntos Jurídicos Internacionales de la Secretaría de Derechos Humanos;Por Chile, el señor Embajador Miguel Ángel González Morales;Por Colombia, el señor Embajador JesúsIgnacio García Valencia y el señor Alberto Bula Bohórquez, consejero;Por Guatemala, los señores Rodrigo José Villagrán Sandoval, agente, y Héctor Rolando Palacios Lima, Embajador de la República de Guatemala ante Costa Rica, y la señora Steffany Rebeda Vásquez Barillas, agente alterna;Por Honduras, el señor Jorge Abilio Serrano, Subprocurador General;Por los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, los señores Luis Manuel Jardón Piña, Director de Casos de la Dirección General de Derechos Humanos y Democracia; Sergio Huerta Patoni, Coordinador de Asesores del Consultorio Jurídico, y Óscar Francisco Holguín González, encargado de Asuntos Políticos y Jurídicos de la Embajada de México en Costa Rica;Por la Comisión Interamericana, los señores y señoras José de Jesús Orozco Henríquez, Segundo Vicepresidente de la Comisión; Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, Secretaria Ejecutiva Adjunta; Edison Lanza, Relator Especial para la Libertad de Expresión; Silvia Serrano Guzmán, asesora, y Jorge H. Meza Flores, asesor;Por la Alianza Regional por la Libre Expresión e Información, el señor Raúl Francisco Silesky Jiménez;Por Amnistía Internacional, la señora Gabriela Quijano y losseñoresTawanda Hondoray Daniel Joloy;Por la Asociación Civil de Derechos Humanos “Ixtlamatque Ukari” y Miguel Ángel Antemate Mendoza, las señoras Marlen Rodríguez Atriano y Norma Celia Bautista Romero, y el señor Miguel Ángel Antemate Mendoza;Los señores Carlos Rodríguez Mejía, Alberto León Gómez Zuluaga y Marcelo Ferreira;Por la Universidad de Ottawa, el señor Salvador Herencia -Carrasco y la señora Penélope Simons;Por el Centro de Derechos Reproductivos, la señora Mónica Arango Olaya y el señor Juan Sebastián Rodríguez Alarcón;Por la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federalde México, las señoras Marisol Mendez Cruz y Christian Ibeth Huerta Dávila;Por EarthRights International y Juan Pablo Calderón Meza, el señor Juan Pablo Calderón Meza;Por el grupo de abogados y estudiantes de la Universidad del Norte de Colombia, la señora Shirley Llain Arenilla;Por el Grupo Estudiantil de Trabajo “Iván David Ortiz” de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, la señora Yazmyn Ayseha Umaña Dajud;Por la International Comission for Labor Rights, la señora Angela B. Cornell;Por International Trade Union Confederation(ITUC), el señor Steven Barrett;Las señoras y señores Martha María Guadalupe Orozco Reyes, Hermilo de Jesús Lares Contreras, Alejandra Isabel Plascencia López, José Benjamín González Mauricio e Irma Ramos Salcedo;Por el Programa Universitario de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, las señoras María Esther Martínez López y Brenda Hernández Zavaleta;El señor Rodolfo E. Piza Rocafort, quien se hizoacompañar por los señores Manuel José Berrocal Fábrega y Román Navarro Fallas;El señor Santiago Bertinat Gonnet;Por Sostenibilidad Legal, el señor Álvaro Francisco Amaya Villareal, yPor el Semillero de Derecho Internacional Económico y de Derechos Humanos adscrito a laUniversidad EAFIT de Medellín, la señora Sara Bustamante Blanco y los señores Federico Delgado Aguilar, Carlos Alberto Sarría Ocampo y José Alberto Toro Valencia. 18Artículo 73.4 del Reglamento“Una vez concluido el procedimiento escrito, la Corte decidirá si considera conveniente la realización del procedimiento oral y fijará la audiencia, a menos que delegue este último cometido en la Presidencia. En el caso de lo previsto en el artículo 64.2 de la Convención se hará previa consulta con el Agente”.19Disponible en: www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/solicitud_21_05_15_esp.pdf.
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910.Con posterioridad a la audiencia, se recibieron escritos complementarios de: 1)Semillero de Derecho Internacional Económico y DerechosHumanos adscrito ala Universidad EAFIT; 2) Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federalde México; 3) Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; 4) EarthRights Internationaly Juan Pablo Calderón Meza; 5) Carlos Alberto Rodríguez Mejía, Alberto León Gómez Zuluaga y Marcelo Ferreira; 6)International Trade Union Confederation; 7) Martha María Guadalupe Orozco Reyes, Hermilo de Jesús Lares Contreras, Alejandra Isabel Plascencia López, José Benjamín González Mauricio e Irma RamosSalcedo, y 8) Rodolfo E. Piza Rocafort.11.La Corte deliberó sobre la presente Opinión Consultiva durante sus 112 y 113 Períodos Ordinarios de Sesiones, dando inicio a la deliberación en cada uno de dichos períodos los días 19de noviembre de 2015 y 23de febrero de 2016, respectivamente.III.COMPETENCIA12.El 22 de junio de 1978, Panamá depositó su instrumento de ratificación de la Convención y el 18 de febrero de 1993 lo hizo respecto del Protocolo de San Salvador.IV.CONSIDERACIONES GENERALESA.Sobre su competencia consultiva 13.Esta consulta ha sido sometida a la Corte por Panamá, en uso de la facultad que le otorga el artículo 64.1 de la Convención Americana. Panamá es Estado Miembro de la OEA y, por tanto, tiene el derecho de solicitar a la Corte Interamericana opiniones consultivas acerca de la interpretación de dicho tratado o de otros tratados concernientes a la protección de los derechos humanos en los Estados americanos.14.Asimismo, la Corte considera que, como órgano con funciones de carácter jurisdiccional y consultivo, tiene la facultad inherente a sus atribuciones de determinar el alcance de su propia competencia (compétencede la compétence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz), lo que, por lo dispuesto en el artículo 64.1 de la Convención, también tiene aplicación en lo referente al ejercicio de su función consultiva, al igual que ocurre en lo atinente a su competencia contenciosa20. Ello, en particular, dado que la sola circunstancia de recurrir a aquella presupone el reconocimiento, por parte del Estado o Estados que realizan la consulta, del derecho de la Corte a resolver sobre el alcance de su jurisdicción al respecto.15.Panamá requirióuna interpretación de algunos artículos de la Convención Americana, de su Protocolo Adicional en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales “Protocolo de San Salvador” y de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre (en adelante “Declaración Americana” o “Declaración”).16.En cuanto a la Convención Americana, la función consultiva permite al Tribunal interpretar cualquier norma de la misma, sin que ninguna parte o aspecto de dicho instrumento esté excluido del ámbito de interpretación. En este sentido, es evidente que la Corte tiene, en virtud de ser “intérprete última de la Convención Americana”21, competencia 20Cfr.Caso del Tribunal Constitucional Vs. Perú. Competencia. Sentencia de 24 de septiembre de 1999. Serie C No. 55, párr. 33, y Derechos y garantías de niñas y niños en el contexto de la migración y/o en necesidad de protección internacional. Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14 de 19 de agosto de 2014. Serie A No. 21, párr. 17.21Caso Almonacid Arellano y otros Vs. Chile.Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 26 de septiembre de 2006. Serie C No. 154, párr. 124, y OC-21/14 de 19 de agosto de 2014, párr. 19.
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10para emitir, con plena autoridad, interpretaciones sobre todas las disposiciones de la Convención, incluso aquellas de carácter procesal22.17.Respecto al Protocolo de San Salvador, la Corte destaca que el Estado solicitante hizoreferencia específicamente a la protección de los derechos de formar federaciones y confederaciones (artículo 8.a) y de huelga (artículo 8.b) “de las personas físicas por medio de organizaciones no gubernamentales o personas jurídicas”. Este Tribunal reitera que, en virtud del artículo 64.1 de la Convención, sufacultad para emitir una opinión sobre “otros tratados concernientes a la protección de los derechos humanos en los Estados americanos” es ampliay no restrictiva. En efecto,“la competencia consultiva de la Corte puede ejercerse, en general, sobre toda disposición, concerniente a la protección de los derechos humanos, de cualquier tratado internacional aplicable en los Estados americanos, con independencia de que sea bilateral o multilateral, de cuál sea su objeto principal o de que sean o puedan ser partes del mismo Estados ajenos al sistema interamericano”23.18.De acuerdo con lo anterior, el artículo 64.1 de la Convención Americana autoriza a la Corte para rendir opiniones consultivas sobre la interpretación del referido Protocolo y dela Declaración Americana, en el marco y dentro de los límites de su competencia en relación con la Carta de la OEA (en adelante “la Carta”) y la Convención u otros tratados concernientes a la protección de los derechos humanos en los Estados americanos24. Por ende, al interpretar la Convención en el marco de su función consultiva, la Corte recurrirá a la Declaración Americana cuando corresponda y en los términos del artículo 29.d) de la Convención.19.Al afirmar su competencia, el Tribunal recuerda el amplio alcance de su función consultiva, única en el derecho internacional contemporáneo, en virtud de la cual y a diferencia delo dispuesto para otros tribunales internacionales, se encuentranlegitimados para solicitar opiniones consultivas la totalidad de los órganos de la OEA enumerados en el Capítulo X de la Carta y los Estados Miembros de la OEA, aunque no fueran partes de la Convención25. Otra característica de la amplitud de esta función se relaciona con el objeto de la consulta, el cual no está limitado a la Convención Americana, sino que, como ya se mencionó,alcanza a otros tratados concernientes a la protección de los derechos humanos en los Estados americanos y, además, se concede a todos los Estados Miembros de la OEA la posibilidad de solicitar opiniones acerca de la compatibilidad entre cualquiera de sus leyes internas y los mencionados instrumentos internacionales26.20.Por otra parte, la Corte constata que la solicitud de Panamá cumple formalmente con las exigencias de lo dispuesto en losartículos 70 y 7127del Reglamento, según los cuales para que una solicitud sea considerada por la Corte las preguntas deben ser formuladas con precisión, especificar las disposiciones que deben ser interpretadas, indicar las consideraciones que la originan y suministrar el nombre y dirección del agente. 22Cfr.Artículo 55 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Opinión Consultiva OC-20/09 de 29 de septiembre de 2009. Serie A No. 20, párr. 18, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 19.23“Otros Tratados” Objeto de la Función Consultiva de la Corte(art. 64 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-1/82 del 24 de septiembre de 1982.Serie A No. 1, punto decisivo primero, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 20.24Cfr. Interpretación de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre en el Marco del Artículo 64 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.Opinión Consultiva OC-10/89 del 14 de julio de 1989. Serie A No. 10, punto decisivo primero y único, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 22.25Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-1/82,párrs. 14 a 17, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 23.26Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-1/82,párrs. 14 a 17, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 23.27Artículo 71. Interpretación de otros tratados1. Si la solicitud se refiere a la interpretación de otros tratados concernientes a la protección de los derechos humanos en los Estados americanos prevista en el artículo 64.1 de la Convención, deberá ser identificado el tratado y las partes en él, las preguntas específicas sobre las cuales se pretende obtener la opinión de la Corte y las consideraciones que originan la consulta. 2. Si la solicitud emana de uno de los órganos de la OEA, se señalará la razón por la cual la consulta se refiere a su esfera de competencia.
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1121.En reiteradas oportunidades este Tribunalha establecido que el cumplimiento de los requisitos reglamentarios para la formulación de una consulta no implica que esté obligado a responder a ella28. Así, la Corte recuerda que su competencia consultiva no debe, en principio, ejercerse mediante especulaciones abstractas, sin una previsible aplicación a situaciones concretas que justifiquen el interés de que se emita una opinión consultiva29.22.Al respecto, en la solicitud de opinión consultiva Panamá indicó que, a su entender, de la interpretación que la Comisión ha hecho del artículo 1.2 de la Convención, parece derivarse que “las personas jurídicas al ser ficciones jurídicas, por si mismas no son susceptibles de [d]erechos sino las personas miembros de las sociedades de la persona jurídica” y sostuvo que “esto es un tema que ha generado inquietudes entre los Estados”. 23.Al recordar que la función consultiva constituye “un servicio que la Corte está en capacidad deprestar a todos los integrantes del sistema interamericano, con el propósito de coadyuvar al cumplimiento de sus compromisos internacionales” sobre derechos humanos30, este Tribunalconsidera que, a partir de la interpretación de las normas relevantes, su respuesta a la consulta planteada prestará una utilidad concreta para aclarar si efectivamente las personas jurídicas podrían ser titulares delos derechos establecidos en la Convención Americana y los demás tratados en el marco del sistema interamericano.24.Porende, la Corte estima que no queda necesariamente constreñida a los términos literales de las consultas que se le formulany, además, que en ejercicio de su competencia consultiva puede también sugerir, en tanto medidas de otro carácter que fueren necesarias para hacer efectivos los derechos humanos, la adopción de tratados u otro tipo de normas internacionales sobre las materias objeto de aquellas31. 25.Dado el amplio alcance de la función consultiva de la Corte que, como ya se expuso, involucra no solo a los Estados Parte de la Convención Americana, lo que se señala en la presente Opinión Consultiva también tiene relevancia jurídica para todos los Estados Miembros de la OEA que han acordado la Declaración Americana, independientemente de que hayan o noratificado la Convención Americana32, así como para los órganos de la OEA cuya esfera de competencia se refiera al tema de la consulta.26.La Corte recuerda, comolo ha hecho en otras oportunidades33, quela labor interpretativa que debe cumplir en ejercicio de su función consultiva difiere de su competencia contenciosa en que no existen “partes” involucradas en el procedimiento consultivo, y no existe tampoco un litigio a resolver. El propósito central de la función consultiva es obtener una interpretación judicial sobre una o varias disposiciones de la Convención o de otros tratados concernientes a la protección de los derechos humanos en los Estados americanos34. En este orden de ideas, las Opiniones Consultivas cumplen, en alguna medida, la función propia deun control de convencionalidad preventivo. 28Cfr. Informes de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Art. 51 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos).Opinión Consultiva OC-15/97 del 14 de noviembre de 1997. Serie A No. 15, párr. 31, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 25.29Cfr. Garantías Judiciales en Estados de Emergencia (arts. 27.2, 25 y 8 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-9/87 del 6 de octubre de 1987. Serie A No. 9, párr. 16, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 25.30Cfr. “Opinión Consultiva OC-1/82,párr. 39, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 28.31Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 30.32Cfr. Condición Jurídica y Derechos de los Migrantes Indocumentados.Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 de 17 de septiembre de 2003. Serie A No. 18, párr. 60, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 32.33Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-15/97, párrs. 25 y 26, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 51.34Cfr. Restricciones a la Pena de Muerte(arts. 4.2 y 4.4 Convención Americana sobre DerechosHumanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-3/83 del 8 de septiembre de 1983. Serie A No. 3, párr. 22, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 51.
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12B.Acerca de la presente Opinión Consultiva27.Este Tribunal recuerda que es inherente a susfacultades la de estructurar sus pronunciamientos en la forma que estime más adecuada a los intereses del Derecho y a los efectos de una opinión consultiva. En la presente Opinión Consultiva, la Corte ha resuelto establecer, en primer término, el significado de los términos “persona jurídica” y “legitimación activa” con el fin de delimitar su alcance conceptual. En segundo lugar, procederá al análisis de los asuntos específicos sometidos a su consideración. Para dar respuesta adecuada a la solicitud presentada, la Corte ha decidido agrupar las preguntas presentadas por Panamá en cuatrotemas principales, a saber: i) la consulta sobre la titularidad de derechos de las personas jurídicas en el sistema interamericano; ii)las comunidades indígenas y tribales y las organizaciones sindicales; iii)protección de derechos humanos de personas naturales en tanto miembros de personas jurídicas, y iv)agotamiento de recursos internos por personas jurídicas. De acuerdo a esta división, en el primer tema se dará respuesta a las preguntas 1 y 2 (suprapárr. 3), en elsegundoy tercerose contestarán las preguntas 4 y 5 (suprapárr. 3) y, finalmente, en el cuartose responderán las preguntas 3, 6, 7 y 8 (suprapárr. 3).28.De acuerdo a lo anterior, para efectos de la presente Opinión Consultiva, la Corte utilizará los siguientes términos con el significado señalado: a) Persona jurídicaPara definir persona jurídica, la Corte acude a lo dispuesto en la Convención Interamericana sobre Personalidad y Capacidad de Personas Jurídicas en el Derecho Internacional Privado35, a saber: “toda entidad que tenga existencia y responsabilidad propias, distintas a las de sus miembros o fundadores, y que sea calificada como persona jurídica según la ley del lugar de su constitución”.Asimismo, la Corte corrobora que la definición a nivel doméstico en varios países de la región no difiere sustancialmente de la adoptada por la Convención Interamericana. En efecto, al estudiar diferentes códigos civiles de la región puede concluirse, en términos generales, que por personas jurídicas se entiende aquellos entes, distintos de sus miembros, con capacidad de contraer obligaciones y ejercer derechos, y cuya capacidad está restringida al objeto social para el que fueron creados36. Adicionalmente, a lo largo del texto se utilizará el término “persona jurídica” para efectos de generar uniformidad. Sin embargo, ello no obsta para que se entiendan también comprendidos otros términos que aludan al mismo concepto como lo serían, por ejemplo: personas morales, personas colectivas, personas de existencia ideal o personas ficticias37. 35Convención Interamericana sobre Personalidad y Capacidad de Personas Jurídicas en el Derecho Internacional Privado, fecha de adopción: 05/24/84, fecha de entrada en vigor: 08/09/92.36Cfr.Artículos 141 y143 del Código Civil de Argentina; artículo54 del Código Civil de Bolivia;artículos 545 y 2053 del Código Civil de Chile; artículo633 del Código Civil de Colombiayartículo98 del Código de Comerciode Colombia;artículo564 del Código Civil de Ecuador;artículo52 del Código Civil de El Salvador; artículo16 del Código Civil de Guatemala; artículo1795 del Código Civil de Honduras; artículos 26 y 27 del Código Civil Federal de México; artículos 1 y 77 del Código Civil de Nicaragua; artículos38 y 71 del Código Civil de Panamá; artículos94 y 96 del Código Civil de Paraguay; artículo78 del Código Civil del Perú; artículo21 del Código Civil de Uruguay, y artículo19del Código Civil de Venezuela.37La Corte resalta que la referencia que se haga en estetexto al término “persona jurídica” no debe confundirse con el “Derecho al Reconocimiento de la Personalidad Jurídica” consagrado en el artículo 3 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Dicho artículo establece: Artículo 3.Derecho al Reconocimiento de la Personalidad Jurídica. Toda persona tiene derecho al reconocimiento de su personalidad jurídica.
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13b) Legitimación activaPor legitimación activa la Corte entiende la aptitud para ser parte en un proceso, de conformidad con lo previsto en la Ley.A nivel del sistema interamericano la legitimación activa se refiere, en virtud de lo establecido por el artículo 44 de la Convención Americana, a la facultad de cualquier persona o grupo de personas, o entidad no gubernamental legalmente reconocida en uno o más Estados miembros de la Organizaciónde presentar peticiones ante la Comisión Interamericana que contengan denuncias o quejas referentes a la presunta violación por un Estado Parte de alguno de los derechos humanos reconocidos a nivel interamericano38. Por otra parte, el artículo 61.1 de la Convención dispone que “[s]olo los Estados Partes y la Comisión tienen derecho a someter un caso a la decisión de la Corte”39. Asimismo, el artículo 50 del Reglamento de la Comisión indica que los Estados Parte en la Convención Americanagozan de legitimación activa para acceder al Sistema únicamente cuando hayanreconocido la competencia de la Comisión para recibir y examinar las comunicaciones en que un Estado Parte alegue que otro Estado Parte ha incurrido en violaciones de los derechos humanos establecidos en la Convención40.29.En suma, al dar respuesta a la presente consulta, la Corte actúa en su condición de tribunal de derechos humanos, guiada por las normas que gobiernan su competencia consultiva y procede al análisis estrictamente jurídico de las cuestiones planteadas ante ella,conforme al derecho internacional de los derechos humanos teniendo en cuenta lasfuentes de derecho internacional relevantes41.Al respecto, corresponde precisar que el corpus iurisdel derecho internacional de los derechos humanos se compone de una serie de reglas expresamente establecidas en tratados internacionales o recogidas en el derecho internacional consuetudinariocomo prueba de una práctica generalmente aceptada como derecho, así como de los principios generales de derecho y de un conjunto de normas de carácter general o de soft law, que sirven como guía de interpretación de las primeras, pues dotan de mayor precisión a los contenidos mínimos fijados convencionalmente42. 30.Complementariamente, la Corte resalta la circunstancia de que, conforme lo disponeel artículo 1.1 de la Convención, “[l]os Estado Partes [de la] Convención se comprometen a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella y a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona que esté sujeta a su jurisdicción”, para lo cual, de acuerdo al artículo 2 de la misma, en el evento de que “el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades mencionados en el artículo 1 no estuviere ya garantizado por disposiciones legislativas o de otro carácter, los Estados Partes se comprometen a adoptar, con arreglo a sus procedimientos constitucionales y a las disposiciones de [la]Convención, las medidas legislativas o de otro carácter que fueren necesarias para hacer efectivos tales derechos y libertades”.31.Tales obligaciones implican, en consecuencia, que los Estados, al adoptar medidas necesarias para hacer efectivos los derechos humanos, lo debenhacer también con respecto de personas jurídicas que se encuentren bajo su jurisdicción, a fin de evitar que eventuales acciones de ellas puedan comprometer su responsabilidad internacional en esta materia. De modo que las personas jurídicasestán, en todo caso, obligadas a respetar, en el 38Cfr. Artículos 44 de la Convención Americana y 23 del Reglamento de la Comisión Interamericana.39Cfr. Artículo 61 de la Convención Americana.40Cfr. Artículo 61 de la Convención Americana.41Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 60.42Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 60.
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14correspondiente orden interno o nacional, los derechos humanos y, en el evento de que ello no acontezca, los pertinentes Estados pueden ver comprometida su responsabilidad internacional en la medida que no garanticen su libre y pleno ejercicio por toda persona natural sujeta a su jurisdicción.En similar sentido, el artículo 36 de la Carta de la OEA establece que “[l]as empresas transnacionales y la inversión privada extranjera están sometidas a la legislación y a la jurisdicción de los tribunales nacionales competentes de los países receptores y a los tratados y convenios internacionales en los cuales éstos sean Parte y, además, deben ajustarse a la política de desarrollo de los países receptores”.32.Acordecon lo requerido por Panamá, la presente Opinión Consultiva determina a continuación, de conformidad con las normas traídas a consulta, la interpretación y el alcance del artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana en el marco de las preguntas planteadas por elEstado solicitante. 33.En virtud de todo lo expuesto, la Corte considera, en definitiva,que tiene competencia para pronunciarse sobre las preguntas planteadas por Panamá yno encuentra en la presente consulta razones para abstenerse de resolverla, por lo cual la admite y procede a pronunciarse sobre el particular.V.LA CONSULTA SOBRE LA TITULARIDAD DE DERECHOSDE LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO34.La Corte estima que el principal problema jurídico que fue planteado en la solicitud de opinión consultiva es si las personas jurídicas pueden ser consideradas como titulares de los derechos establecidos en la Convención Americana y, por tanto, podrían acceder de forma directa al sistema interamericano como presuntas víctimas. Para dar respuesta a este interrogante es imperativo realizar una interpretación del artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana, el cual establece que:“1.2. Para los efectos de esta Convención, persona es todo ser humano”.35.Enparticular,paraemitir su opinión sobre la interpretación de las disposiciones jurídicas traídas a consulta, la Corte recurrirá a la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, la cual recoge la regla general y consuetudinaria de interpretación de los tratados internacionales43, que implica la aplicación simultánea y conjunta de la buena fe, el sentido corrientede los términos empleados en el tratado de que se trate, el contexto de éstos y el objeto y fin de aquél. Por ello, la Cortehará uso de los métodos de interpretación estipulados en los artículos 3144y 3245de la Convención de Viena para llevar a cabo dicha interpretación. 43Cfr. Corte Internacional de Justicia, Caso relativo a la soberanía sobre Pulau Ligitan y Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia contra Malasia), Sentencia de 17 de diciembre de 2002, párr. 37, y Corte Internacional de Justicia, Avena y otros nacionales mexicanos (México contra los Estados Unidos de América), Sentencia de 31 de marzo de 2004, párr. 83.44Artículo 31. Regla general de interpretación. 1.Un tratado deberá interpretarse de buena fe conforme al sentido corriente que haya de atribuirse a los términos del tratado en el contexto de estos y teniendo en cuenta su objeto y fin.2. Para los efectos de la interpretación de un tratado, el contexto comprenderá, además del texto, incluidos su preámbulo y anexos:a) todo acuerdo que se refiera al tratado y haya sido concertado entre todas las partes con motivo de la celebración del tratado:b) todo instrumento formulado por una o más partes con motivo de la celebración del tratado y aceptado por las demás como instrumento referente al tratado;3. Juntamente con el contexto, habrá de tenerse en cuenta:a) todo acuerdo ulterior entre las partes acerca de la interpretación del tratado o de la aplicación de sus disposiciones:b) toda práctica ulteriormente seguida en la aplicación del tratado por la cual conste el acuerdo de las partes acerca de la interpretación del tratado:c) toda norma pertinente de derecho internacional aplicable en las relaciones entre las partes.4. Se dará a un término un sentido especial si consta que tal fue la intención de las partes.
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1536.A partir de lo anteriormente señalado, con la finalidad de dar respuesta a las preguntas 1 y 2 de la solicitud, la Corte procederá a analizar: a) sentido corrientedel término y buena fe; b) objeto y fin del tratado; c) contexto interno del tratado, y d)interpretación evolutiva. Por último, con la finalidad de confirmar la interpretación a la que se arribe,se hará referencia a uno de losmétodos complementarios establecidos en el artículo 32 de la Convención de Viena, es decir alos trabajos preparatorios de la Convención. A.Sentido corriente delostérminos “persona” y “ser humano”–interpretación literal37.La Corte reitera que ya ha establecido que elartículo 1.2 de la Convención establece que los derechos reconocidos en dicho instrumento corresponden a personas, es decir, a seres humanos46. En particular, cabe resaltar que la Convención Americana no dejó abierta la interpretación sobre cómo debe entenderse el término “persona”, por cuanto el artículo 1.2 precisamente busca establecer una definición al mismo, lo cual demuestra la intención de las partes en darle un sentido especial al término en el marco del tratado, como lo establece el artículo 31.4 de la Convención de Viena. De acuerdo a lo anterior, este Tribunal ha entendido que los dos términos del artículo 1.2 de la Convencióndeben entenderse como sinónimos47.38.Al respecto, la Corte observa que el diccionario de la Real Academia Española define “persona” en su primera acepción como “[i]ndividuo de la especie humana”48. Por su parte, dicho diccionario precisa el término“humano”o “humana”en una de sus acepciones como49:“1.adj.Dichodeunser:Quetienenaturalezadehombre (‖serracional)”. En similar sentido, este Tribunal constata que las versiones en inglés50, portugués51y francés52de la Convención Americana, las cuales son versiones auténticas del tratado, también hacen una remisión expresa al término “ser humano” como sinónimo de “persona”. Además, al verificar el sentido corriente de los términos en cadauno de estos idiomas53, éste es el mismo que se le da en Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, U.N. Doc A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, suscrita en Viena el 23 de mayode 1969, entró en vigencia el 27 de enero de 1980.45Artículo 32. Medios de interpretación complementarios. Se podrán acudir a medios de interpretación complementarios, en particular a los trabajos preparatorios del tratado y a las circunstancias de su celebración, para confirmar el sentido resultante de la aplicación del artículo 31, o para determinar el sentido cuando la interpretación dada de conformidad con el artículo 31:a) deje ambiguo u oscuro el sentido; o b) conduzca a un resultado manifiestamente absurdo o irrazonableConvención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, U.N. Doc A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, suscrita en Viena el 23 de mayo de 1969, entró en vigencia el 27 de enero de 1980.46Caso Usón Ramírez Vs. Venezuela. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 20 de noviembre de 2009. Serie C No. 207, párr. 45, yCaso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 22 de junio de 2015. Serie C No. 293, párr. 19.47Cfr.Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 noviembre de 2012 Serie C No. 257, párr. 219. El artículo 1.2 ha sido analizado por la Corte en casos en los que se ha solicitado la violación de derechos en perjuicio de personas jurídicas, lo cual ha sido rechazado por el Tribunal porque no han sido reconocidas como titulares de derechos consagrados en la Convención Americana.Cfr. Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina. Excepciones Preliminares.Sentencia de 7 de septiembre de 2001. Serie C No. 85, párr. 29 y Caso Perozo y otros Vs. Venezuela. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 28 de enero de 2009. Serie C No. 195, párr. 398. 48Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española, 23.ª ed. Madrid: Espasa, 2014. Disponible en: http://dle.rae.es/?id=SjUIL8Z49Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española, 23.ª ed. Madrid: Espasa, 2014. Disponible en: http://dle.rae.es/?id=KncKsrP50American Convention on Human Rights, Article 1.2 “For the purposes of this Convention, ‘person’ means every human being”.51Convenção Americana sobre Direitos Humanos Para os efeitos desta Convenção, Artigo 1.2 “Para os efeitos desta Convenção, pessoa é todo ser humano”.52Convention Americaine Relative aux Droits de L'homme, Article 1.2 “Aux effets de la présente Convention, tout être humainest une personne”.53En inglés, el diccionario de la Universidad de Oxford define “human being” como: “A man, woman, or child of the species Homo sapiens, distinguishedfrom other animals by superiormental development, power of articulatespeech, and uprightstance”. Disponible en: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/human-
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16español. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, es claro que de la lectura literal del artículo 1.2 de la Convención se excluye a otros tipos de personas que no sean seres humanos de la protección brindada por dicho tratado. Lo anterior implica que las personas jurídicas en el marco de la Convención Americana no son titulares de los derechos establecidos en ésta y, por tanto, no pueden presentar peticiones o acceder directamente, en calidad de presuntas víctimas y haciendo valer derechos humanos como propios, ante el sistema interamericano.39.En efecto, esta es la interpretación que la Corte Interamericana ha venido realizandodesde el primer caso54en que se enfrentó al problema de definir si las personas jurídicas podrían ser objeto de protección en el sistema interamericano, postura respecto de la cual, en principio, no encuentra razones para apartarse.Sin embargo, en el marco de la presente consulta considera pertinente estudiar si el artículo 1.2 sería susceptible de otras interpretaciones a partir de los otros métodos de interpretación existentes. En efecto, esta Corte ha afirmado que la interpretación del “sentido corriente de los términos” del tratado no puede ser una regla por sí misma sino que, además de dicho criterio y de la buena fe,el ejercicio de interpretación debe involucrarel contexto y, en especial, dentro de su objeto y fin55. Todo ello para garantizar una interpretación armónica y actual de la disposición sujeta a consulta. Por ello, este Tribunal estima necesario hacer uso de todos los demás métodos de interpretación establecidos en los artículos 31 y 32 de la Convención de Viena.B.Objeto y fin del tratado –interpretación teleológica40.La Corte ha indicado que en una interpretación teleológica se analiza el propósito de las normas involucradas, para lo cual es pertinente analizar el objeto y fin del tratado mismo y, de ser pertinente, los propósitos delsistema regional de protección56.41.Al respecto, el Preámbulo de la Convención Americana hace varias referencias que permiten establecer el objeto y fin del tratado:Reafirmando su propósito de consolidar en este Continente, dentro del cuadro de las instituciones democráticas, un régimen de libertad personal y de justicia social, fundado en el respeto de los derechos esenciales del hombre;Reconociendo que los derechos esenciales del hombreno nacen del hecho de ser nacional de determinado Estado, sino que tienen como fundamento los atributos de la persona humana, razón por la cual justifican una protección internacional, de naturaleza convencional coadyuvante o complementaria de la que ofrece el derecho interno de los Estados americanos; […]Reiterando que, conarreglo a la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, sólo puede realizarse el ideal del ser humano libre, exento del temor y de la miseria, si se crean condiciones que permitan a cada persona gozar de sus derechos económicos, sociales y culturales,tanto como de sus derechos civiles y políticos. (Subrayado fuera del texto)42.Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte ha afirmado queen el caso de la Convención Americana, el objeto y fin del tratado es “la protección de los derechos fundamentales de los being?q=human+being. Asimismo, define “person” en su primera acepción como: “A human being regarded as an individual”. Disponible en: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/person.En portugués el diccionario “VOX” define el término “humano, na” como: “adj. humano, pertencente ao homem ou próprio dele; […] s. m. homem ou pessoa humana”. Además, define “pessoa” ensu primera acepción como: “individuo da espécie humana”.En francés el diccionario Larousse define “humain, humaine” en su primera acepción como: “Qui possède les caractéristiques spécifiques de l'homme en tant que représentant de son espèce; qui est composé d'hommes: Être humain. Les races humaines”. Disponible en: http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/humain/40608?q=humain#405…. Además, define “personne” en su primera acepción como: “Être humain, sans distinction de sexe”. Disponible en: http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/personne/59812?q=personne… Cantos Vs. Argentina. Excepciones Preliminares. párr. 29.55Cfr. Propuesta de Modificación a la Constitución Política de Costa Rica Relacionada con la Naturalización.Opinión Consultiva OC-4/84 del 19 de enero de 1984. Serie A No. 4, párr. 23, y Opinión Consultiva OC-20/09, párr. 26.56Caso González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México, párr. 59, y Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Ric,párr. 257.
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17seres humanos”57, a propósito de lo cual fue diseñada para proteger los derechos humanos de las personas independientemente de su nacionalidad, frente a su propio Estado o a cualquier otro58. En este sentido, laConvención Americana prevé expresamente determinadas pautas de interpretación en su artículo 2959, entre las que alberga el principio pro persona, que implican que ninguna disposición de dicho tratado puede ser interpretada en el sentido de limitar el goce y ejercicio de cualquier derecho o libertad quepueda estar reconocido de acuerdo con las leyes de cualquiera de los Estados Parte o de acuerdo con otra convención en que sea parte uno de dichos Estados, o bien de excluir o limitar el efecto que puedan producir la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y otros instrumentosinternacionales de la misma naturaleza.43.Como se indicó el objeto y fin de tratado es “la protección de los derechos fundamentales de los seres humanos”, lo cual demuestra que este fue creado con la intención de proteger exclusivamente a aquellos. De esta forma una interpretación teleológica de la norma sería conforme con la conclusión a la cual se arribó por medio de la interpretación literal, en el sentido que las personas jurídicas están excluidas de la protección otorgada por la Convención Americana. C.Contexto interno –interpretación sistemática44.La Corte resalta que, según el criteriosistemático, las normas deben ser interpretadas como parte de un todo cuyo significado y alcance deben fijarse en función delsistema jurídico al cual pertenecen60. En este sentido, el Tribunal ha considerado que al dar interpretación a un tratado no sólo se toman en cuenta los acuerdos e instrumentos formalmente relacionados con éste (inciso segundo del artículo 31 de la Convención de Viena), sino también el sistema dentro del cual se inscribe (inciso tercero del artículo 31)61, esto es, el sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos. 45.En el marco de una interpretación sistemática de la Convención se deben tener en cuentatodas las disposiciones que la integran ylos acuerdos e instrumentos formalmente relacionados con ella, como por ejemplo, la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, por cuanto permiten verificar si la interpretación dada a una norma o término en concreto es coherente con el sentido delas demás disposiciones. Concretamente, las normas que se analizarán en este capítulo muestran la utilización de la palabra “persona” en el contexto del tratado y de la Declaración Americana.46.Alrespecto, la primera parte de la Declaración Americana se refiere a: 57El Efecto de las Reservas sobre la Entrada en Vigencia de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Opinión Consultiva OC-2/82 del 24 de septiembre de 1982. Serie A No. 2, párr. 29, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 53.58Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-2/82, párr. 29, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 53.59Artículo 29. Normas de InterpretaciónNinguna disposición de la presente Convención puede ser interpretada en el sentido de:a) permitir a alguno de los Estados Partes, grupo o persona, suprimir el goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en la Convención o limitarlos en mayor medida que la prevista en ella;b) limitar el goce y ejercicio de cualquier derecho o libertad que pueda estar reconocido de acuerdo con las leyes de cualquiera de los Estados Partes o de acuerdo con otra convención en que sea parte uno de dichos Estados;c) excluir otros derechos y garantías que son inherentes al ser humano o que se derivan de la forma democrática representativa de gobierno, yd) excluir o limitar el efecto que puedan producir la Declaración Americana de Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y otros actos internacionales de la misma naturaleza.60CfrCaso González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México, párr. 43, y Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica,párr. 191.61Cfr. ElDerecho a la Información sobre la Asistencia Consular en el marco de las Garantías del Debido Proceso Legal. Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99 de 1 de octubre de 1999. Serie A No. 16, párr. 113, y Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica,párr. 191.
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18Que los pueblos americanos han dignificado la persona humanay que sus constituciones nacionales reconocen que las instituciones jurídicas y políticas, rectoras de la vida en sociedad, tienen como fin principal la protección de los derechos esenciales del hombrey la creación de circunstancias que le permitan progresar espiritual y materialmente y alcanzar la felicidad;Que, en repetidas ocasiones, los Estados americanos han reconocido que los derechos esenciales del hombre no nacen del hecho de ser nacional de determinado Estado sino que tienen como fundamento los atributos de la persona humana;Que la protección internacional de los derechos del hombre debe ser guía principalísima del derecho americano en evolución;Que la consagración americana de los derechos esenciales del hombreunida a las garantías ofrecidas por el régimen interno de los Estados, establece el sistema inicial de protección que los Estados americanos consideran adecuado a las actuales circunstancias sociales y jurídicas, no sin reconocer que deberán fortalecerlo cada vez más en el campo internacional, a medida que esas circunstancias vayan siendo más propicias. (Subrayado fuera del texto)47.La Corte considera que el Preámbulo de la Convención Americana (suprapárr. 41), así como las primeras consideraciones de la Declaración Americana, muestran que estos instrumentos fueron creados con la intención de centrar la protección y titularidad de los derechos en el ser humano.Lo anterior se infiere de la constante referencia a palabras tales como “hombre”62o “persona humana”, los cuales denotan que no se estaba teniendo en cuenta la figura de las personas jurídicas a la hora de redactar dichos instrumentos. Sobre la Declaración Americana, el Consejo Interamericano de Jurisconsultos sobre la Conferencia de Bogotá manifestó que “[e]s evidente que la Declaración de Bogotá no crea una obligación jurídica contractual, pero también lo es el hecho de que ella señala una orientación bien definida en el sentido de la protección internacional de los derechos fundamentales de la persona humana”63.48.Por otra parte, la expresión “toda persona” es utilizada en numerosos artículos de la Convención Americana64y de la Declaración Americana65, siempre para hacer referencia a los derechos de los seres humanos. Como se analizará posteriormente (infrapárr. 108), algunos de los derechos consagrados en estos artículos son inherentes a la condición de ser humano, como por ejemplo los derechos a la vida,a la integridad personal o a la libertad personal, entre otros. Otros de estos derechos, como el de propiedad o la libertad de expresión, podrían llegar a ser ejercidos por personas naturales a través de personasjurídicas(infrapárr. 109), como una empresa o un medio de comunicación, sin embargo, ninguno de los artículos mencionados anteriormente contienen alguna expresión que le conceda a las personas jurídicas titularidad de estos derechos o que permitan inferir una excepción a lo establecido en el artículo 1.2 de la Convención. D.Otros sistemas de protección de los derechos humanos y derecho comparado -Interpretación evolutiva49.Este Tribunal ha señalado en otras oportunidades66que los tratados de derechos humanos son instrumentos vivos, cuya interpretación tiene que acompañar la evolución de los tiempos y las condiciones de vida actuales. Tal interpretación evolutiva es consecuente con las reglas generales de interpretación establecidas en el artículo 29 de la Convención Americana, 62Al respecto, la Corte resalta que la utilización de la palabra “hombre” en la Declaración Americana y en la Convención Americana debe actualizarse y entenderse como incluyente de todas las formas de identidad de género. 63Comité JurídicoInteramericano, Recomendaciones e informes, 1949-1953 (1955), p. 107.64Cfr. Al respecto, los artículos 1.1, 3, 4.1, 4.6, 5.1, 5.2, 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 8.1, 8.2, 10, 11.1, 11.3, 12.1, 13.1, 14.1, 16, 18, 20.1, 20.2, 21.1, 22.1, 22.2, 22.7, 24, 25.1 y 25.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.65Cfr. Al respecto, los artículos II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI y XXVII de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre. 66Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, párr. 114; Caso Atala Riffo y Niñas Vs. Chile. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 24 de febrero de 2012. Serie C No. 239, párr. 83; Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 245,yOpinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 55. En similar sentido, el Preámbulo de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre indica: “[q]ue la protección internacional de los derechos del hombre debe ser guía principalísima del derecho americano en evolución”.
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19así como en la Convenciónde Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados67. Además, el parágrafo tercero del artículo 31 de la Convención de Viena autoriza la utilización para la interpretación de medios tales como los acuerdos o la práctica68o reglas relevantes del derecho internacional69que los Estados hayan manifestado sobre la materia del tratado, los cuales son algunos de los métodos que se relacionan con una visión evolutiva de la interpretación del tratado.Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte procederá a analizar: i) la protección a personas jurídicas en otros tribunales u organismos internacionales de derechos humanos, y ii) la protección a personas jurídicas en el derecho interno de los Estados Parte. i)Tribunales y organismos internacionales50.Sobreeste punto, la Corte considera relevante analizar en el marco de una interpretación evolutiva la manera en que se regula la titularidad de derechos y el acceso de las personas jurídicas alos principales tribunales y organismos internacionales de derechos humanos, con la finalidad de determinar si existe una práctica recurrente en los mismos. En efecto, este Tribunal ha considerado útil, en otras oportunidades70, estudiar los otros sistemas de derechos humanos con la finalidad de constatar sus similitudes o diferencias con el sistema interamericano, lo cual puede ayudar a determinar el alcance o sentido que se le ha dado a una norma similar o a detectar las particularidades del tratado. A continuación, este Tribunal procederá a estudiar: a) el sistema europeo; b) el sistema africano, y c)el sistema universal. a)Sistema europeo51.Este Tribunal denota que el Convenio Europeo no contiene una definición del término“persona”a diferencia de la Convención Americana. El Convenio Europeo se limita en todos sus artículos al uso de la expresión “toda persona”, sin especificar si se trata de la persona humana o persona jurídica. Asimismo, el Preámbulo del Convenio hace énfasis solamente en el valor de los derechos humanos como un medio para asegurar la justicia y la paz en Europa71. En efecto, los únicos artículos en los cuales se hace alusión directamente a la persona jurídica son el 34 del Convenio Europeoy el 1 del Protocolo Adicional No. 1.Al respecto, la Corte observa que el artículo 34 establece que:ARTÍCULO 34 Demandas individuales: El Tribunal podrá conocer de una demanda presentada por cualquier persona física, organización no gubernamental o grupo de particularesque se considere víctima de una violación por una de las Altas Partes Contratantes de los derechos reconocidos en el Convenio o sus Protocolos. Las Altas Partes Contratantes se comprometen a no poner traba alguna al ejercicio eficaz de este derecho. (Resaltado fuera del texto) 67Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, párr. 114, y Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14, párr. 55.68Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica,párr. 245. Cfr.TEDH, Caso Rasmussen vs. Dinamarca, (No.8777/79), Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 1984, párr. 41; Caso Inze vs. Austria, (No.8695/79)Sentencia de 28 de octubre de 1987, párr. 42, y Caso Toth vs. Austria, (No. 11894/85), Sentencia de 25 noviembre de 1991, párr. 77.69Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 245.Cfr.TEDH, Caso Golder vs. Reino Unido, (No.4451/70), Sentencia de 12 de diciembre de 1975, párr. 35.70Por ejemplo, en la opinión consultiva sobre La Colegiación Obligatoria de Periodistas, la Corte comparó el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana, referente al derecho a la libertad de expresión, con los artículos análogos del Convenio Europeo (artículo 10) y del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (artículo 19). La Colegiación Obligatoria de Periodistas(Arts. 13 y 29 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-5/85 del 13 de noviembre de 1985. Serie A No. 5, párrs. 45 a 50. En similar sentido, en el caso Atala Riffose analizó la diferencia entre los alcances de los artículos 11.2 y 17.1 de la Convención Americana y del artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo. Caso Atala Riffo y Niñas Vs. Chile, párr. 175.71El Preámbulo del Convenio Europeo establece: Reafirmando su profunda adhesión a estas libertades fundamentales que constituyen las bases mismas de la justicia y de la paz en el mundo, y cuyo mantenimiento reposa esencialmente, de una parte, en un régimen político verdaderamente democrático, y, de otra, en una concepción y un respeto comunes de los derechos humanos de los cuales dependen; Resueltos, en cuanto Gobiernos de Estados europeos animados por un mismo espíritu y en posesión de un patrimonio común de ideales y de tradiciones políticas, de respeto a la libertad y de primacía del Derecho, a tomar las primerasmedidas adecuadas para asegurar la garantía colectiva de algunos de los derechos enunciados en la Declaración Universal.
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2052.Por su parte, el artículo 1 del Protocolo Adicional No. 1 indica que:ARTÍCULO 1 Protección de la propiedad: Toda persona física o jurídicatiene derecho al respeto de sus bienes. Nadie podrá ser privado de su propiedad sino por causa de utilidad pública y en las condiciones previstas por la ley y los principios generales del Derecho Internacional. Las disposiciones precedentes se entienden sin perjuicio del derecho que tienen los Estados de dictar las leyes que estimen necesarias para la reglamentación del uso de los bienes de acuerdo con el interés general o para garantizar el pago de los impuestos, de otras contribuciones o de las multas. (Resaltado fuera del texto)53.En este sentido, en el artículo 34 del Convenio se indica quiénes podrán someter una demanda anteel Tribunal Europeo, a saber: i) cualquier persona física; ii) toda organización no gubernamental, y iii) todo grupo de particulares. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo ha dado cabida para que, dentro del concepto de organización no gubernamental, varias clases de personas jurídicas sometan una demanda ante el mismo. En particular, elTribunal Europeo ha conocido casos relacionados con: i) personas jurídicas privadas, de cualquier naturaleza, con72(civiles y comerciales) o sin fin de lucro73(asociaciones y fundaciones), o ii) personas jurídicas públicas, siempre y cuando no ejerciten poderes gubernamentales, no hayan sido creadas para propósitos de administración pública y sean independiente del Estado74.La interpretación del artículo 34 del Convenio ha conllevado que el Tribunal Europeo no solo haya conocido casos de personas jurídicasrelacionados con el derecho a la propiedad, lo cual expresamente lo permite el artículo 1 del Protocolo No. 1 del Convenio Europeo, sino que también ha analizado casos relacionados con derechos tales como a la libertad de expresión75(artículo 10 del Convenio Europeo), a la no discriminación76(artículo 14 del Convenio), a un proceso equitativo77(artículo 6 del Convenio), de libertad de reunión y asociación78(artículo 11 del Convenio), a libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y de religión79(artículo 9 del Convenio) o a la vida privada y familiar80(artículo 8 del Convenio).54.Ahora bien, la Corte considera necesario hacer referencia en este punto al artículo 44 de la Convención Americana, dado que varias de las observaciones escritas presentadas 72Al respecto, ver: TEDH, SCI Boumois Vs. Francia, (No. 55007/00), Sentencia de 17 de junio de 2003; TEDH, Asunto SCP Huglo, Lepage y Asociados, ConsejoVs. Francia, (No. 59477/00), Sentencia del 1ro de febrero de 2005; TEDH, Klithropiia Ipirou Evva Hellas A.E. Vs. Grecia, (No. 27620/08), Sentencia de 13 de enero de 2011; TEDH,Sociedade Agricola Do Ameixial Vs. Portugal, (No. 10143/07), Sentencia del 11 de enero de 2011; TEDH, Nieruchomosci SP. Z O.O. Vs. Polonia, (No. 32740/06), Sentencia de 2 de febrero de 2010; TEDH, Ge.Im.A SAS Vs. Italia, (No. 52984/99), Sentencia de 12 de febrero de 2002; TEDH, Asunto Studio Tecnico Amu S.A.S. Vs. Italia, (No. 45056/98), Sentencia de 17 de octubre de 2000; TEDH, Lilly France Vs. Francia[n° 2], (No. 20429/07), Sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2010;TEDH, Filippos Mavropoulos-Pam. Zisis O.E. Vs. Grecia, (No. 27906/04), Sentencia de 4 de mayo de 2006; TEDH, S. A. GE.MA SNC Vs. Italia, (No. 40184/98), Sentencia de 27 de abril de 2000; TEDH, Sordelli y C. SNC Vs. Italia, (No. 51670/99), Sentencia de 11 de diciembre de 2001, y TEDH, Asunto National & Provincial Building Society, The Leeds Permanent Building Society y The York Shire Building Society Vs. Reino Unido,(No. 117/1996/736/933–935),Sentencia de 23 de octubre de 1997.73Ver: TEDH, Apeh Üldozötteinck Szövetsege y Otros Vs. Hungría, (No. 32367/96), Sentencia de 5 de octubre de 2000; TEDH, Boychev y Otros, entre ellos la Asociación de la Iglesia de la Unificación Vs. Bulgaria,(No. 77185/01), Sentencia de 27 de enero de 2011; TEDH, Cha’Are Shalom y Tsedek Vs. Francia, (No. 27417/95), Sentencia de 27 de junio de 2000; TEDH, Clube de Futebol Uniaode Coimbra Vs. Portugal, (No.27295/95), Sentencia de 30 de julio de 1998; TEDH, TüketiciBilincini Geliştirme DerneğiVs. Turquia, (No. 38891/03), Sentencia de 27 de febrero de 2007; TEDH, Association Avenir d’Alet Vs. Francia, (No. 13324/04), Sentencia de 14 de febrero de 2008.74TEDH, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines Vs. Turquía, (No. 40998/98), Sentencia de 13 de diciembre de 2007, párr. 80, y TEDH, Holy Monasteries Vs. Grecia, (No. 13092/87), Sentencia de 9 de diciembre de 1994, párr. 49.75TEDH, Autronic AG Vs. Suiza[Corte Plena, Serie A], (No. 178), Sentencia de 22 de mayo de 1990, párr. 47.76TEDH, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas y Otros Vs. Austria, (No. 40825/98), Sentencia de 31 de julio de 2008, párrs. 87 a 99.77TEDH,Ern Makina Sanayi y Ticaret AS Vs. Turquía, (No. 70830/01), Sentenciad de 3 de mayo de 2007, párrs. 28-30, y TEDH, Asunto Stoeterij Zangersheide N.V. y Otros Vs. Bélgica, (No. 47295/99), Sentencia de 22 de diciembre de 2004, párr. 36.78TEDH, Asunto Syndicat Nationale Des Professionnels Des Procédures Collectives Vs. Francia, (No. 70387/01), Sentencia de 21 de junio de 2006.79TEDH,Church of Scientology Vs. Suecia[D y R], (No. 16), Sentencia de 5 mayo de 1979, párr. 68.80TEDH, Colas Est y Otros Vs. Francia, (No. 37971/97), Sentencia de 16 de abril de 2002, párrs. 40 a 41, y TEDH, Ernst y Otros Vs. Bélgica, (No. 33400/96), Sentencia de 15 de junio de 2003, párr. 109.
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21hicieron notar que el artículo 34 del Convenio Europeo sería materialmente idéntico al artículo 44 de la Convención y que con baseen dicho artículo, el sistema europeo ha concedido el acceso a las personas jurídicas. Por lo anterior, surge la pregunta sobre si sería posible hacer extensiva la protección a las personas jurídicas como se ha hecho en el sistema europeo. Al respecto, el artículo 44 de la Convención Americana dispone que:Artículo 44: Cualquier persona o grupo de personas, o entidad no gubernamentallegalmentereconocida en uno o más Estados miembros de la Organización, puede presentar a la Comisión peticiones que contengan denuncias o quejas de violación de esta Convención por un Estado parte. (Resaltado fuera del texto)55.La Corte considera que del tenor literal de los artículos 44 de la Convención y 34 del Convenio se podría llegar a afirmar que la redacción de las dos normas es sustancialmente similar. Sin embargo, la diferencia radica en que el artículo 34 del últimoañade un requisito al establecer que puede presentar una petición cualquier persona “que se considere víctima de una violación por una de las Altas Partes Contratantes de los derechos reconocidos en el Convenio o sus Protocolos”. Esto implica que la persona que presenta la petición ante el Tribunal Europeo debe acreditar que es presunta víctima del caso, es decir, en el caso de las personas jurídicas, por ejemplo, estas tienen que encontrarse directamente afectadas en sus propios derechos por el acto o la omisión que se esté alegando y no podrían presentar peticiones respecto a presuntas violaciones a los derechos de sus miembros o de terceros.56.Lo anterior constituye una diferencia sustancial entre los dos sistemas de protección, por cuanto en el sistema interamericano se ha diferenciado entre peticionario y presunta víctima. De manera que el artículo 44 de la Convención hace referencia exclusivamente a la legitimación activa, en el sentido que establece que se pueden presentar peticiones individuales tanto a nombre propio como en el de terceras personas, sin que necesariamente deban confluir en la misma persona las dos categorías. En efecto, la Corte ha manifestado que “es claro que el artículo 44 de la Convención permite que cualquier grupo de personas formule denuncias o quejas por violación de los derechos consagrados por la Convención. Esta amplia facultad de denuncia es un rasgo característico del sistema de protección [interamericano] de los derechos humanos”81. Por ello, la Corte estima,que de la referencia que hace el artículo 44 a “organización no gubernamental o grupo de particulares”,no es posible inferir una autorización para que las personas jurídicas puedan ser presuntas víctimas, sino que se refiere a su legitimación activa,en el sentido de que las organizaciones no gubernamentales o grupo de particulares están facultados para presentar peticiones individuales ante Comisión Interamericana a favor de presuntas víctimas, incluso en casos en que no cuenten con el consentimiento de las mismas82.b)Sistema africano57.Respecto a la Carta Africana sobre los Derechos Humanos y de los Pueblos (en adelante “la Carta Africana”), la Corte observa que ésta no ofrece una definición sobre el término “persona”. Tampoco se encontró una interpretación oficial realizada por parte de sus órganos 81Caso Castillo Petruzzi y Otros Vs. Perú. Excepciones Preliminares.Sentencia del 4 de septiembre de 1998.Serie C No.41, párr. 77.82 Al respecto, la Corte en el caso Acevedo Jaramillomanifestó que “la denuncia puede ser presentada por una persona distinta a la presunta víctima, así como también puede ser presentada por un ‘grupo de personas’”. Caso Acevedo Jaramillo y otros Vs. Perú. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 7 de febrero de 2006. Serie C No. 144,párr. 137. Igualmente, en el caso Saramakaindicó que “[e]l artículo 44 de la Convención permite a todo grupo de personas presentar denuncias o quejas de violaciones de los derechos establecidos en la Convención. Esta amplia facultad para presentar una petición es una característica particular del sistema interamericano para la protección de los derechoshumanos. Asimismo, toda persona o grupo de personas que no sean las presuntas víctimas pueden presentar una petición”. Caso del Pueblo Saramaka Vs. Surinam.Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 28 de noviembre de 2007. Serie C No. 172,párr. 22.
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22judiciales,sobre si el término “pueblos”83,al que hace referencia la Carta,podría llegar a cobijar a personas jurídicas. Por ello, no es posible determinar de manera concluyente si las personas jurídicas en el sistema africano son titulares de derechos y pueden serconsideradas víctimas de manera directa.58.Al igual que en el sistema interamericano, la Carta Africana confiere a las personas jurídicas la capacidad de presentar comunicaciones a la Comisión Africana, es decir, pueden denunciar violaciones de los derechos humanos contenidos en la Carta Africana84a nombre de terceros. Se trata, entonces, de un enfoque de actio popularis, de acuerdo con el cual el autor de la comunicación no debe conocer ni tener algún vínculo con la víctima de la violación que alega85, siempre y cuando la comunicación cumpla con los requisitos de forma que exige el artículo 56 de la Carta Africana. c)Sistema universal 59.La Corte constata que los derechos humanos contenidos en el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (en adelante el “PIDCP”) no son extensivos a las personas jurídicas. La interpretación oficial de este instrumento establece de manera clara que solamente los individuos pueden someter una denuncia ante el Comité de Derechos Humanos (en adelante “CDH” o el “Comité deDerechos Humanos”). Al respecto, el CDHha establecido que, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto por el artículo 1 del Protocolo Facultativo delPICDP, solamente los individuos pueden presentar denuncias ante este órgano86. Asimismo, la Observación General número 31 del CDH establece que “[l]os beneficiarios de los derechos reconocidos por el Pacto son los individuos”87. Asimismo, en varias resoluciones,el Comité de Derechos Humanos, ha insistido en que, “independientemente de que pareciera que los alegatos tengan relación con cuestiones del Pacto”88, las personas jurídicas no cuentan con capacidad procesal ante el órgano. Sumado a esto, el Comité de Derechos Humanos exige que, quien presente la denuncia, sea al mismo tiempo la víctima de los derechos presuntamenteviolados89.60.Distinta es la situación a la luz de la Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación Racial, la cual hace referencia expresa la prohibición de discriminación en contra degrupos u organizaciones90. En desarrollo de lo anterior, el Comité 83La Carta Africana incluye a los “pueblos” como los titulares del derecho. Por ejemplo, son titulares al derecho a la igualdad (artículo 19), a la existencia y autodeterminación (artículo 20), a la libre disposición de sus riquezas y recursos naturales (artículo 21), al desarrollo (artículo 22), a la paz y a la seguridad (artículo 23) así como a un entorno general satisfactorio favorable a su desarrollo (artículo 24).84Sección 4, Regla 93(1) de las Reglas de Procedimiento de la Comisión Africana, 2010. Esta regla dice en lo conducente: “A Communication submitted under Article 55 of the African Charter may be addressed to the Chairperson of the Commission through the Secretary by any natural or legal person.”85Comisión Africana de Derechos Humanos y de los Pueblos, Caso Artículo 19 Vs. El Estado de Eritrea, No. 275/03. Comunicación del 30 de Mayo de 2007, párr. 65.86CDH, V.S. Vs. Bielorrusia, No. 1749/2008. 31 de Octubre de 2011, párr. 7.3. (“Given the fact that under article1 of the Optional Protocol only individuals may submit a communication to the Committee, it considers that the author, by claiming violations of the rights of the Religious Union, which are not protected by the Covenant, has no standing under article 1 ofthe Optional Protocol”) .87CDH,ObservaciónGeneral No. 31. 26 de mayo de 2004, párr. 9..88CDH, A newspaper publishing Company Vs. Trinidad y Tobago, No. 360/1989. 14 de julio de 1989, párr. 3.2. (“A company incorporated under the laws of a State party to the Optional Protocol, as such, has no standing under article 1, regardless of whether its allegations appear to raise issues under the Covenant.”); A publication Company and A printing Company Vs. Trinidad y Tobago, No. 361/1989. 14 de julio de 1989,yJ.R.T. y el Partido W.G. Vs. Canadá, No. 104/1981. 6 abril de 1983.89CDH, A Group of Association For the Defence of The Rights of Disabled and Handicapped Persons in Italy Vs. Italia, No. 163/1984. 10 de Abril de 1984, párr. 6.2.90Por ejemplo, el artículo 2.1.a de la Convención establece que: “1. Los Estados partes condenan la discriminación racial y se comprometen a seguir, por todos los medios apropiados y sin dilaciones, una política encaminada a eliminar la discriminación racial en todas sus formas y a promover el entendimiento entre todas las razas, y con tal objeto: a) Cada Estado parte se compromete a no incurrir en ningún acto o práctica de discriminación Annex 123
23para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial (en adelante CERD) ha establecido que las personas jurídicas pueden denunciar violaciones que afecten sus derechos, siempre y cuando éstas hayan sido perjudicadas y puedan considerarse víctimas del caso91. En este sentido, el CERD ha reconocido la capacidad de las personas jurídicas de presentar denuncias por concepto de violaciones a sus propios derechos y también por violaciones a los derechos de sus miembros, accionistas y propietarios, tanto de manera individual como colectiva92. 61.En cuanto a otros instrumentos internacionales, como lo son el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (en adelante “PIDESC”) y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas lasformas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (en adelante “CEDAW”), este Tribunal constata que éstos no cuentan con artículos similares al artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana o que otorguen derechos a otro tipo de personas. Además, la Corte corrobora que el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales no ha emitido jurisprudencia relevante para esta discusión, mientras que en el caso del Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer no se han presentado hasta la fecha denuncias departe de personas jurídicas. No obstante lo anterior, la Corte denota que tanto el artículo 2 del Protocolo Facultativo de la CEDAW93, como el artículo 2 del Protocolo adicional al PIDESC94establecen que los “grupos de personas”sí pueden presentar denuncias en nombre de individuos o grupos de individuos, siempre y cuando estos individuos aleguen, a su vez, el estatus de víctima de una violación de los derechos otorgados por las Convenciones. d)Conclusión sobre los tribunales y organismos internacionales62.Una vez realizado el anterior recuento, la Corte nota que en la mayoría de los sistemas analizados no se les reconocen derechos a las personas jurídicas, salvo en el sistema europeo (suprapárr. 53) y en el marco delCERD(suprapárr. 60). Asimismo, este Tribunal resalta que los tratados de derechos humanos que han sido estudiados no cuentan con una norma que defina cómo se debe entender el término “persona”, por lo que el artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana esuna particularidad del sistema interamericano. Teniendo en cuenta esto, la Corte estima que actualmente en el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos no existe una tendencia clara,interesada en otorgar derechos a las personas jurídicas o en permitirles acceder como víctimas alos procesos depeticiones individuales que establezcan los tratados. ii)Reconocimiento de derechos a personas jurídicas en el derecho interno63.Alefectuar una interpretación evolutiva,la Corte ha otorgado especial relevancia al derecho comparado, razón por la cual ha utilizado normativa nacional95o jurisprudencia de racial contra personas, grupos de personas o institucionesy a velar por que todas las autoridades públicas e instituciones públicas, nacionales y locales, actúen en conformidad con esta obligación”. 91CERD, The Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination (DACRD) Vs. Dinamarca, No. 28/2003. Declarado inadmisible el 26de agosto de 2003, párr.6.4, y CERD,Caso La Comunidad Judía de Oslo y Otros Vs. Noruega,No. 30/2003. 15 de agosto de 2005, párr. 7.4.92CERD, TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg Vs. Alemania, No. 48/2010. 26 de fbrero de 2013, párrs. 11.2 y 11.3.93Artículo 2. “Las comunicaciones podrán ser presentadas por personas o grupos de personas que se hallen bajo la jurisdicción del Estado Parte y que aleguen ser víctimas de una violación por ese Estado Parte de cualquiera de los derechos enunciados en la Convención, o en nombre de esas personas o grupos de personas. Cuando se presente una comunicación en nombre de personas o grupos de personas, se requerirá su consentimiento, a menos que el autor pueda justificar el actuar en su nombre sin tal consentimiento”.94Artículo 2. Comunicaciones: “Las comunicaciones podrán ser presentadas por personas o grupos de personas que se hallen bajo la jurisdicción de un Estado Parte y que aleguen ser víctimas de una violación por ese Estado Parte de cualquiera de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales enunciados en el Pacto. Para presentar una comunicación en nombre de personas o grupos de personas se requerirá su consentimiento, a menos que el autor pueda justificar que actúa en su nombre sin tal consentimiento”. 95Caso Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación In Vitro”) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 245.Ver adicionalmente en la materia: Caso Kawas Fernández Vs. Honduras. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 3 de Abril de 2009. Serie C No. 196, párr. 148.
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24tribunales internos96a la hora de analizar controversias específicas en los casos contenciosos. Por su parte, el Tribunal Europeo97ha utilizado el derecho comparado como un mecanismo para identificar la práctica posterior de los Estados, es decir, para especificar el contexto de un determinado tratado. Con la finalidad de verificar la práctica de los Estados Parte de la Convención Americana se expondrán a continuación los países en que se han reconocido derechos fundamentales a las personas jurídicas. 64.Al respecto, la Corte constata que en todoslos países que han ratificado la jurisdicción de la Corte se reconocen directamente derechos fundamentales a las personas jurídicas, que pueden coincidir con aquellos consagrados en la Convención Americana. Según la información analizada por este Tribunal, los derechos que comúnmente98se le reconocen a las personas jurídicas son los de propiedad99, libertad de expresión100, petición101y asociación102. Asimismo, la Corte observa que estos derechos no necesariamente se garantizan para todo tipo de 96Caso Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación In Vitro”) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 245.En los casos Heliodoro Portugal Vs. Panamá (párr. 111) yTiu Tojín Vs. Guatemala (párr. 87), la Corte tuvo en cuenta sentencias de tribunales internos de Bolivia, Colombia, México, Panamá, Perú, y Venezuela sobre la imprescriptibilidad de delitos permanentes como la desaparición forzada. Además, en el Caso Anzualdo Castro Vs. Perú (párrs. 100-101),la Corte utilizó pronunciamientos de tribunales constitucionales de países americanos para apoyar la delimitación que ha realizado al concepto de desaparición forzada. Otros ejemplos son los casos Atala Riffo y Niñas Vs. Chile (a modo de ejemplo ver párr. 92) y el Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku Vs. Ecuador(ver por ejemplo párr. 159-164)97Caso Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación In Vitro”) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 245. Por ejemplo en el caso TV Vest As & Rogoland Pensionistparti contra Noruega, el Tribunal Europeo tuvo en cuenta un documento del “European Platform of Regulatory Authorities” en el cual se realizaba una comparación de 31 países en esa región, con el fin de determinar en cuáles de ellos se permitía la publicidad política pagada o no y en cuáles este tipo de publicidad era gratuita. De igual manera, en el caso Hirst v.Reino Unido dicho Tribunal tuvo en cuenta la “normatividad y práctica de los Estados Parte” con el fin de determinar en qué países se permite suprimir el sufragio activo a quien ha sido condenado por un delito, por lo que se estudió la legislación de 48 países europeos. 98Otros derechos que la Corte constató que se le reconocen a personas jurídicas en la región son, inter alia: a las garantías judiciales, al debido proceso, a la legalidad,de audiencia, a la seguridad jurídica, a la información pública,de reunión,a lainviolabilidaddelacorrespondenciaydemásformasdecomunicaciónprivada,alainviolabilidaddedomicilio,a solicitar la rectificación, actualización, inclusión o supresión de los datos personales que le corresponda, a la personalidad, allibredesarrollodelapersonalidad,alalibertaddeenseñanza,a la libertad religiosa o de creencias, a la libertad de contratación,a la libertad de trabajo,a libertad de empresa, comercio e industria,a la libre competencia,afundar mediosde comunicación, a fundar centros educativos, alaigualdad,albuennombre,alahonra,yalhabeasdata.99Al respecto ver: Artículo 16 Constitución de Barbados; artículos 14, 56, y 315.I de la Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia; Sentencia No. T-396/93de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 16 de septiembre 1993; Sentencia: 00128 Expediente: 98-000128-0004-CI, Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Costa Rica, 16 de diciembre de 1998 ; artículo 2 de la Constitución de El Salvador y Sentencia de 9 de marzo de 2011, Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Proceso de Amparo 948-2008; artículo 39 de la Constitución Política de la República de Guatemala; artículo 36 de la Constitución de la República de Haití; Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México, Contradicción de Tesis 360/2013, Fecha de resolución: sesionado el 21 de abril de 2014; artículos 103de la Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua; Exp. n.° 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, CorporaciónMeier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú; artículo 47 de la Constitución Política de la República de Panamá; artículo 34 de la Constitución de Surinam, y Sentencia TC/0242/13, Tribunal Constitucional de República Dominicana, 29 de noviembre de 2013. 100Al respecto ver: Artículo 35 de la Constitución Política de la República de Guatemala; Sentencia No. T-396/93, Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 16 de septiembre 1993; Exp. n.° 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, CorporaciónMeier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú, y artículo 26 de la Constitución Nacional de Paraguay.101Al respecto ver: Sentencia No. T-396/93, Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 16 de septiembre 1993; sentencia de 7 denoviembre de 2008, Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de El Salvador, Proceso de amparo 103-2006; artículo 80 de la Constitución de Honduras; Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México Contradicción de Tesis 360/2013, Fecha deresolución: sesionado el 21 de abril de 2014; Exp. n.° 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú; artículo 41 de la Constitución Política de la República de Panamá, y artículo40 de la Constitución Nacional de Paraguay.102Artículo 34 de la Constitución Política de la República de Guatemala; Sentencia No. T-396/93, Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 16 de septiembre 1993; Sentencia con número de Expediente: 08-007986-0007-CO, Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia deCosta Rica, 8 de septiembre de 2009; Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de El Salvador, Proceso Constitucional 23-R-96, Ramírez y Marcelino vrs. Concejo Municipal de San Juan Opico, sentencia de 8 de octubre de 1998; artículo 31 y 31.1 de la Constitución de la República deHaití; Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México, Contradicción de Tesis 360/2013, Fecha de resolución: sesionado el 21 de abril de 2014, y Exp. n.° 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú.
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25personas jurídicas, dado que algunos están orientados a proteger tipos especiales de las mismas, como es el caso de algunos derechos que les son otorgados únicamente a los sindicatos103,a los partidos políticos104, a los pueblos indígenas105, a las comunidades afrodescendientes106o a instituciones o grupos específicos107. 65.Asimismo, la Corte nota que en gran parte de los países de la región a las personas jurídicas se les otorga la posibilidadde interponer una acción de amparo o recursos análogos en defensa de los derechos que les son reconocidos108.66.Por otra parte, este Tribunal observa que de los seis Estados que presentaron observaciones escritas, tres de ellos -Argentina109, Colombia110y Guatemala111-manifestaron 103Bolivia (artículo 51 de la Constitución Política); Brasil (artículos 8, 74.IV.§ 2º, y 103 IX de la Constitución Política); Honduras (artículo 128.14 de la Constitución Política); Nicaragua (artículo 87 Constitución Política); Panamá (artículos 68 y 69 de la Constitución Política); Paraguay (artículos 96-98 Constitución Nacional); Perú (artículos 28 y42 de la Constitución Política), y Surinam (artículo 32 de la Constitución).104Argentina (artículo 38 de la Constitución Nacional); Brasil (artículos 17, 74.IV.§ 2º, y 103.VIII de la Constitución Política); Colombia (artículos 107 y 108 de la Constitución Política); Haití (artículo 31.1 de la Constitución); Honduras (artículo 47 de la Constitución Política), Nicaragua (artículos 55, 173.7, 173.11, 173.12, 173.13 de la Constitución Política); Panamá (artículo 140 de la Constitución Política); Paraguay (artículos 124-126 de la Constitución Nacional), y Perú (artículo 35 de la Constitución Política).105Bolivia (artículos 30 y 32 entre otros de la Constitución Política); Brasil (artículos 231, y 232 de la Constitución Política); Colombia (artículo 329 de la Constitución Política); Nicaragua (artículos 121 y 103 de la Constitución Política); Panamá (artículos 124 y 127 de la Constitución Política), y Paraguay (artículos 62-67 de la Constitución Nacional)106Bolivia (artículos 32,100.I y 395.I de la Constitución Política), y Nicaragua (artículos 89, 90 y 121 de la Constitución Política).107En Perú, por ejemplo, se reconoce el derecho a la inafectación de todo impuesto que afecte bienes, actividades o servicios propios en el caso de las universidades, institutos superiores y demás centros educativos (artículo 19 de la Constitución Política). En Chile, se le otorga derecho a las iglesias, confesiones e instituciones religiosas con respecto a los bienes que otorgan y reconocen las leyes en vigor (artículo 19.6 de la Constitución Política). En Nicaragua a los centros educativos privados de orientación religiosa a impartir religión como materia extracurricular, así como a las universidades y centros de educación técnica superior a gozar de autonomía académica, financiera, orgánica y administrativa, y exención de impuestos. Los bienes y rentas de las universidades y centros de educación técnica superior no pueden ser objeto de intervención, expropiación ni embargo, se garantiza la libertad de cátedra, el Estado promueve y protege la libre creación, investigación y difusión de las ciencias, la tecnología, las artes y las letras, y garantiza y protege la propiedad intelectual (artículos 124 y 125 de la Constitución Política); también en Nicaragua, se establece la exención de impuestos en relación con importaciones específicas que hagan los medios de comunicación social así como la prohibición de censurarlos previamente (artículo 68 de la Constitución Política); asimismo, en Nicaragua se otorga el derecho a “los campesinos y demás sectores productivos” a participarmediante sus propias organizaciones en la definición de políticas de transformación agraria (artículos 108 y 111 de la Constitución Política). En Panamá se le reconoce derechos a la Universidad Oficial de Panamá (artículos 103 y 104 de la Constitución Política).108Argentina (Artículo 43 de la Constitución Nacional. Adicionalmente ver Ley N°16.986 o Ley Reglamentaria de la Acción de Amparo, artículo 5); Bolivia (artículo 128 y 129 de la Constitución Política. Ver también Sentencia 0763/2011 R, Tribunal Constitucional del Bolivia, 20 de mayo de 2011); Brasil (Artículo 5, LXX de la Constitución Política); Chile (artículo 20 de la Constitución Política); Colombia (Sentencia T-411/92, Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 17 de junio de 1992); Costa Rica (artículo48 de la Constitución Política y artículos 57 y 58 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, Ley N°7135); Ecuador (artículos 86 y 88 de la Constitución Política, artículo 9 de la Ley Orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional. También ver sentencia N°001-14-PJO-CC, Caso N° 0067-11-JD, Corte Constitucional del Ecuador, 23 de abril de 2014); El Salvador (artículo 247 de la Constitución. En relación ver la sentencia de 9 de marzo de 2011, Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Proceso de Amparo 948-2008); Honduras (artículo 183 de la Constitución Política y artículo 44 de la Ley sobre Justicia Constitucional); México (artículos 8 y 9 de la Ley de Amparo. Ver al respecto: Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México, Contradicción de Tesis 360/2013, Fecha de resolución: sesionado el 21 de abril de 2014); Nicaragua (artículo 45 de la Constitución y artículo 23 de la Ley de Amparo, Ley N°49); Paraguay (artículo 134 de la Constitución Nacional y artículos 4 y 5 de la Ley N°340/71 que reglamenta el Amparo); Perú (artículo 200 de la Constitución Política y artículo 26 de la Ley de Habeas Corpus y Amparo, Ley N°23506); República Dominicana (artículo 72 de la Constitución Dominicana, artículo 2 de la Ley N°437-06 que establece el Recurso de Amparo y artículo 67 de la Ley N°137-11 del Tribunal Constitucional y de los Procedimientos Constitucionales), y Uruguay (artículo 1 de la Ley 16011, Regulación de Disposiciones relativa a la Acción de Amparo).109Al respecto, el Estado argentino manifestó que “el artículo 1 (2) excluye toda posibilidad de que una persona jurídica se presente como víctima ante los órganos de protección del Sistema Interamericano. Se trata de una disposición que ha sido concebida con el claro sentido de restringir el acceso al Sistema exclusivamente a las personas físicas”. Observaciones escritas del Estado argentino (expediente de fondo, folio 1918).
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26expresamente su posición, según la cual el artículo 1.2 de la Convención no confiere titularidad de derechos a las personas jurídicas. Además, el Estado mexicano112se sumó a esta posición durante su participación en la audiencia públicade la presente solicitud.67.Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte considera que,a pesar de que pareciera que existe una disposición en los países de la región para reconocer la titularidad de derechos a las personas jurídicas y otorgarles recursos parahacerlos efectivos, lo cierto es que estos antecedentes no son suficientes, por cuanto no todos los Estados realizan el reconocimiento de la misma forma y el mismo grado. Adicionalmente, este Tribunal nota que ésta es la posición que losEstados ostentan en su derecho interno, razón por la cual no es posible modificar el alcance del artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana a partir de este método interpretativo. E.Métodos complementarios de interpretación68.Según el artículo 32 de la Convención de Viena, los medios complementarios de interpretación, en especial los trabajos preparatorios del tratado, son utilizables, inter alia,para confirmar el sentido resultante de la interpretación realizada de conformidad con los métodos señalados en el artículo 31113. Loanterior, implica que suelen ser utilizados sólo en forma subsidiaria114.69.Al respecto, la Corte estima que los trabajos preparatorios confirman el sentido en que se ha venido interpretando el artículo 1.2 de la Convención, dado que en ellos se utilizaron los términos “persona” y “ser humano” sin la intención de hacer una diferencia entre estas dos expresiones115, por lo que deben ser consideradas sinónimos. En efecto, los trabajos preparatorios denotan que este inciso fue propuesto desde un inicio116y que no hubo mayor controversia entre los Estados para su aprobación117. 110Colombia afirmó que “a la luz del derecho internacional vigente para la región americana, la idea de otorgarle derechos humanos a las personas jurídicas derivados de los instrumentos internacionales que componen el SIDH no es admisible por resultar contraria a los preceptos legales que rigen el Sistema mismo”. Observaciones escritas del Estado colombiano (expediente de fondo, folio 1863).111El Estado guatemalteco indicó que “de ninguna manera pueden ser reconocidos derechos humanos a las personas jurídicas o colectivas dentro del Marco de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, de la Convención Americana […] y de sus Protocolos o instrumentos internacionales complementarios”. Observaciones escritas del Estado guatemalteco (expediente de fondo, folio 1538).112Mexicó señaló que “el artículo 1.2 […] señala que para los efectos de la Convención Americana persona es todo ser humano, lo expresado literalmente en el artículo 1.2 tiene efectos que van mucho más allá del ejercicio de interpretación, ya que constituye una manifestación expresa de la voluntad de las partes signatarias a la Convención Americana para definir el término persona, única y exclusivamente podría significar todo ser humano”. Observaciones orales del Estado mexicano en la audiencia pública de la presente opinión consultiva.113Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-3/83, párr. 49, y Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 193. 114Cfr. Caso González y otras (“CampoAlgodonero”) Vs. México, párr. 68, y Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 193. 115Caso Artavia Murilloy otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 219.116La propuesta inicial del artículo 1 establecía que: Artículo 11. Los Estados Partes en esta Convención se comprometen a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella y a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona que esté sujeta a su jurisdicción sin discriminación alguna por motivo de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento ocualquier otra condición social.2. También se comprometen a adoptar con arreglo a sus procedimientos constitucionales y a las disposiciones de esta Convención, las medidas oportunas para dictar las disposiciones legislativas o de otro carácter que fueronnecesarias para hacer efectivos esos derechos y que no estuviesen ya garantizados por disposiciones legislativas o de otra naturaleza.3. Para los efectos de esta Convención, persona es todo ser humano.Acta de la segunda sesión de la Comisión I, Doc. 36,11 de noviembre de 1969, p. 156.117En los trabajos preparatorios consta lo siguiente:” El PRESIDENTE p[uso] a consideración el párrafo 3 del artículo 1, el cual, después de un breve cambio de opiniones, es aprobado por unanimidad, en la forma siguiente: 3. Para los efectos de esta Convención, persona es todo ser humano”. Convención Acta de la segunda sesión de la Comisión I, Doc. 36, 11 de noviembre de 1969, p. 157.
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27F.Conclusión sobre la interpretación70.Habiendo empleadoen forma simultánea y conjunta los distintos criterios hermenéuticos establecidos en los artículos 31 y 32 de la Convención de Viena, la Corte concluyeque de una interpretación del artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana, de buena fe, acorde con el sentido natural de los términos empleados en la Convención (suprapárrs. 37 a 39)y teniendo en cuenta el contexto (suprapárrs. 44 a 67)y el objeto y fin de la misma (suprapárrs. 40 a 43), se desprende con claridad que las personas jurídicas no son titulares de derechos convencionales, por lo que no pueden ser consideradas como presuntas víctimas en el marco de los procesos contenciosos anteelsistema interamericano.VI.LAS COMUNIDADES INDÍGENAS Y TRIBALES Y LAS ORGANIZACIONES SINDICALES71.La Corte ya ha establecido en esta Opinión Consultiva (suprapárr.70) que el artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana no atribuye a las personas jurídicasla titularidad de derechos reconocidos en la Convención Americana, sin perjuicio dela denominación que estas reciban en el derecho interno de los Estados tales como cooperativas, sociedades o empresas. Sin embargo, en razón de las preguntas planteadas por el Estado de Panamá, varias de las observaciones escritas y orales que fueron presentadas a lo largo del proceso de la solicitud expresaron que sería posible realizar una interpretación amplia de otras disposiciones de la Convención y del Protocolo de San Salvador que le concedería titularidad de derechos a las comunidades indígenas y a las organizaciones sindicales.Con el fin de identificar si efectivamente las comunidades indígenasy las organizaciones sindicalespodrían ser titulares de derechos protegidos por el sistema interamericano, la Corte hará referencia a la normatividad interamericana en la materia para luego realizar sus consideraciones al respecto.i)Comunidades indígenas y tribales 72.A continuación, la Corte, como intérprete última de la Convención118,reitera su jurisprudencia según la cuallas comunidades indígenas son titulares de derechos protegidos por el sistema interamericano y pueden presentarse ante este en defensa de sus derechos y los de sus miembros. Para ello, se hará referencia a la jurisprudencia de la Corte sobre la materia, así como a las algunas de las fuentes de derecho internacional e internoen la materia que este Tribunal estima coadyuvan a su jurisprudencia.73.En una primera etapa, al declarar violaciones de derechos humanos en los casos relacionados con comunidades indígenas o tribales, la Corte consideraba únicamente como sujetos de derecho a los miembros de las comunidades y no a estas últimas como tal119. Por ello, se declaraba comovíctimas alas personas individuales y no la colectividad a la que pertenecían. 74.En el año 2012, en el Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku Vs. Ecuadorpor primera vez la Corte reconoció como titulares de derechos protegidos en la Convención no solo a los miembros de una comunidad indígena sino a ésta en sí misma120.En dicho caso, este 118Caso Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación In Vitro”) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 171.119Cfr.Caso de la Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Vs. Nicaragua. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 31 de agosto de 2001. Serie C No. 79;Caso de la Comunidad Moiwana Vs. Surinam. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia 15de junio de 2005. Serie C No. 124; Caso Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa Vs. Paraguay.Fondo Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 17 de junio de 2005. Serie C No. 125; Caso Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 29 de marzo de 2006. Serie C No. 146;Caso del Pueblo Saramaka. Vs. Surinam. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 2007. Serie C No. 172,yCaso Comunidad Indígena Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 24 de agosto de 2010 Serie C No. 214.120Cfr.Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku Vs. Ecuador. Fondo y reparaciones. Sentencia de 27 de junio de 2012. Serie C No. 245, puntos declarativos 2 a 4.
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28Tribunal consideró que se habían violado los derechos del pueblo indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku a la consulta, a la propiedad comunal indígena, a la identidad cultural, a las garantías judiciales y a la protección judicial. Asimismo, sostuvo que el Estado era responsable por haber puesto gravemente en riesgo los derechos a la vida e integridad personal de los miembros de la comunidad. En este sentido, la Corte manifestó que hay algunos derechos que los miembros de las comunidades indígenas gozan por sí mismos, mientras que hay otros derechos cuyo ejercicio se hace en forma colectiva a través de las comunidades.75.Además, en el referido caso la Corte estableció que, “[e]n anteriores oportunidades, en casos relativos a comunidades o pueblos indígenas y tribales el Tribunal ha declarado violaciones en perjuicio de los integrantes o miembros de las comunidades y pueblos indígenas o tribales. Sin embargo, la normativa internacional relativa a pueblos y comunidades indígenaso tribales reconoce derechos a los pueblos como sujetos colectivos del Derecho Internacional y no únicamente a sus miembros. Puesto que los pueblos y comunidades indígenas o tribales, cohesionados por sus particulares formas de vida e identidad, ejercen algunos derechos reconocidos por la Convención desde una dimensión colectiva”121.Para concluir que las comunidades indígenas y tribales son reconocidas como sujetos de derechos, la Corte tuvo en cuenta que a nivel internacional se dio un desarrollo a través del cual diversos tratados y jurisprudencia de otros órganos internacionales han sostenido la titularidad de derechos por parte de las comunidades indígenas. 76.Este Tribunal ha reiterado desde entonces la titularidad de derechos por parte de las comunidades indígenas en sus recientes casos. Así por ejemplo, en el Caso de los Pueblos Indígenas Kuna de Madungandí y Emberá de Bayano y sus Miembros Vs. Panamá,la Corte concluyó que el Estado había violado el derecho a la propiedad122,el deber de adoptar disposiciones de derecho interno123, y derecho al plazo razonable124de la Convención Americana en perjuicio de las comunidades Kuna de Madungandí y Emberá de Bayano y de sus miembros; y el derecho a un recurso judicial efectivo125en perjuicio de las comunidades indígenas Emberá y sus miembros. Recientemente, en los casos Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo De La Cruz Y Sus Miembros126y Caso Comunidad Garífuna De Punta Piedra Y Sus Miembros127ambos Vs. Honduras, la Corte declaró lasviolaciones a los derechos a la propiedad, a lasgarantías judiciales y a la protección judicial en perjuicio de las respectivas comunidades.Asimismo, en el Caso de las Comunidades Afrodescendientes Desplazadas de la Cuenca del Río Cacarica (Operación Génesis) Vs. Colombia, la Corte encontró que el Estado había violado los derechos de circulación y residencia,y a la integridad personal, en perjuicio de las comunidades afrodescendientes de la cuenca del río Cacarica128. 77.Igualmente, es relevante indicar que la Corte ya ha establecido que las comunidades indígenas y los pueblos tribales comparten “características sociales, culturales y económicas 121Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku Vs. Ecuador, párr. 231.122Cfr.Caso de los Pueblos Indígenas Kuna de Madungandí y Emberá de Bayano y sus Miembros Vs. Panamá. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 14 de octubre de 2014. Serie C No. 284, punto resolutivo 4.123Cfr.Caso de los Pueblos Indígenas Kuna de Madungandí y Emberá de Bayano y sus Miembros Vs. Panamá, punto resolutivo 5.124Cfr.Caso de los Pueblos Indígenas Kuna de Madungandí y Emberá de Bayano y sus Miembros Vs. Panamá. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 14 de octubre de 2014. Serie C No. 284, punto resolutivo 6.125Cfr.Caso de los Pueblos Indígenas Kuna de Madungandí y Emberá de Bayano y sus Miembros Vs. Panamá, párr. 173.126Cfr.Caso Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz y sus Miembros Vs. Honduras. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 08 de octubre de 2015. Serie C No. 305.127Cfr.Caso Comunidad Garífuna de Punta Piedra y sus Miembros Vs. Honduras. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 08 de octubre de 2015. Serie C No. 304.128Cfr.Caso de las Comunidades Afrodescendientes Desplazadas de la Cuenca del Río Cacarica (Operación Génesis) Vs. Colombia. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 20 de noviembre de 2013. Serie C No. 270, punto resolutivo 4.
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29distintivas, incluyendo la relación especial con sus territorios ancestrales, que requiere medidas especiales conforme al derecho internacional de los derechos humanos a fin de garantizar la supervivencia física y cultural de dicho pueblo”129. En razón de las características comunes entre las comunidades indígenas y los pueblos tribales, la Corte considera que las conclusiones que se señalen en este capítulo respectoal acceso al sistema interamericano de protección de derechos humanos, aplican asimismo a los dos tipos de comunidades.78.Además de la jurisprudencia indicada anteriormente, la Corte resalta que el Convenio No. 169 de la OIT130y la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas131de 2007 reconocen la titularidad de derechos humanos tanto a las comunidades indígenas como a sus miembros. 79.Por otra parte, el artículo 1 común a los Pactos Internacionales de Derechos Civiles y Políticosy de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, consagra el derecho a la libre determinación y señala que, en virtud del mismo, todos los pueblos “establecen libremente su condición política y proveen asimismo a su desarrollo económico, social y cultural”. Para ello, “pueden disponer libremente de sus riquezas y recursos naturales, sin perjuicio de las obligaciones que derivan de la cooperación económica internacional […] así como del derecho internacional. En ningún caso podrá privarse a un pueblo de sus propios medios de subsistencia”132. El Comité que supervisa la implementación del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales por los Estados Parteha interpretado que el derecho a la libre determinación es aplicable a las comunidadesindígenas133.80.El referido Comité,en relación con el artículo 15.1.a, indicó que la expresión “toda persona” “se refiere tanto al sujeto individual como al sujeto colectivo. En otras palabras, una persona puede ejercer los derechos culturales: a) individualmente; b) en asociación con otras; o c) dentro de una comunidad o un grupo”134.81.Ahora bien, además de los estándares de derecho internacional anteriormente citados, la Corte nota que la titularidad de derechos delas comunidades indígenas y tribales también es reconocida a nivel internoen varios países de la región a través de sus Constituciones, legislacióno por vía jurisprudencial135. Dicha protección a nivel interno busca coadyuvar al cumplimiento de las obligaciones internacionales que los Estados han asumido en la materia. 129Cfr.Caso del Pueblo Saramaka. Vs. Surinam, párr. 86.130El artículo 3.1 del Convenio dispone que“[l]os pueblos indígenas y tribales deberán gozar plenamente de los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales, sin obstáculos ni discriminación [y que l]as disposiciones de es[e] Convenio se aplicarán sin discriminación a los hombres y mujeres de esos pueblos”. Convenio sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales en países independientes, N° 169 de5 septiembre 1991. 131El artículo 1 de la Declaración señala que “[l]os indígenas tienen derecho, como pueblos o como personas, al disfrute pleno de todos los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales reconocidos por la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y la normativa internacional de los derechos humanos”. Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas. Resolución 61/295 aprobada por la Asamblea General en su 107a. sesión plenaria, 13 de septiembre de 2007. 132Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, adoptado por la Asamblea General en su resolución 2200 A (XXI) de 16 de diciembre de 1966, entrada en vigor: 23 de marzo de 1976, y Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, adoptado por la Asamblea General en su resolución 2200 A (XXI) de 16 de diciembre de 1966, entrada en vigor: 3 de enero de 1976. 133Cfr. ONU, Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Consideración de Informes presentados por Estados Partes bajo los Artículos 16 y 17 del Pacto. Observaciones Finales sobre la Federación Rusa (trigésimo primera sesión). N.U. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.94, 12 de diciembre de 2003, párr. 11 yCaso del Pueblo Saramaka. Vs. Surinam. ExcepcionesPreliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 2007. Serie C No. 172, párr. 93.134Observación general Nº 21 de 2009,Derecho de toda persona a participar en la vida cultural (artículo 15, párrafo 1 a), del Pacto Internacionalde Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturas),párr. 9. 135Un recuento no exhaustivo de dichos derechos se hace a continuación. El reconocimiento de la capacidad de las comunidades indígenas de contraer obligaciones y adquirir derechos como colectividadesse consagra en países como Paraguay, Argentina, Colombia y Costa Rica. Tienen además en países como Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia y Perú derecho a su identidad religiosa y cultural y, de esta manera, a su cosmovisión, lengua, prácticas, costumbres y tradiciones. El derecho a la propiedad colectiva de sus tierras es reconocido en varios países tales como Argentina, Annex 123
3082.Con base en lo expuesto anteriormente, la Corte reitera que ya ha reconocido a las comunidades indígenas y tribales como sujetos de derecho en razón de la actual evolución del derecho internacional en la materia (suprapárr.72). Asimismo, este Tribunal considera relevante hacer notar que a nivel internodicha titularidad se refleja en varios países de la región. En este sentido, la titularidad de derechos humanos, en ambos ámbitos, no se ha dado únicamente a sus miembros en forma personal sino igualmente respecto a las comunidades en tanto colectividades. De dicha protección se desprende que en la medida en que el ejercicio de algunos de derechos de los miembros de las comunidades indígenas y tribales se realiza conjuntamente, la violación de dichos derechos tiene una dimensión colectiva136y no puede circunscribirse a una afectación individual. Las afectaciones aludidas acarrearán entonces consecuencias para todos los miembros de la comunidad y no únicamente para algunos determinados enuna situación específica.83.De acuerdo a lo anterior, la Corte concluye que,por disponerlo varios instrumentos jurídicos internacionales, de los que son partes los Estados del sistema interamericano, y algunas de sus legislaciones nacionales, las comunidades indígenas y tribales, por encontrarse en una situación particular,deben ser consideras como titulares de ciertos derechos humanos. Adicionalmente, ello se explica en atención a que, en el caso de los pueblosindígenas su identidad y ciertos derechos individuales, como por ejemplo el derecho a la propiedado a su territorio, solo pueden ser ejercidos por medio de la colectividad a la que pertenecen.84.Por consiguiente, la Corte reitera que las comunidades indígenas y tribales son titulares de algunos delos derechos protegidos en la Convención y, por tanto, pueden acceder ante el sistema interamericano. Por ello, la Corte no encuentra razones para apartarse de su criterio jurisprudencial en la materia y establece que las referidas comunidades pueden acceder de manera directa al sistema interamericano, como lo han venido haciendo en los últimos años, en la búsqueda de protección de sus derechos humanos y los de sus integrantes, no siendo necesario que cada uno de estos últimos se presente individualmente para tal fin. Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay y Perú. En países como Bolivia, Panamá y Paraguay tienen también el derecho a participar de manera económica, social y política en la vida de la nación. Su derecho a la educación intercultural está consagrado en países como Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Paraguay. En países como Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Perú estas comunidades sontitulares además del derecho a definir libremente sus sistemas organizativos e institucionales. Además, las comunidades indígenas son titulares de mecanismos que pueden ejercer en defensa de sus derechos en tanto colectividades en países como Brasil, Colombia, Ecuador. Asimismo, en países como Bolivia, Nicaragua y Colombia se reconocen derechos al pueblo afroboliviano, las comunidades de la Costa Caribe y la comunidad afrocolombia respectivamente. Cfr.Caso Comunidad Indígena Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay, párr. 14, yCaso de las Comunidades Afrodescendientes Desplazadas de la Cuenca del Río Cacarica (Operación Génesis) Vs. Colombia, párr. 347. Además consultar: artículos 62 y 63 de laConstitución Nacional de Paraguay;artículo 75.17 de la Constitución de Argentina; artículos 30 y 32 de la Constitución de Bolivia; artículo 9 de la Ley Orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional;artículos 107 y 121 de la Constitución de Nicaragua; artículo 231 de la Constitución de Brasil; artículo 329 de la Constitución Política de Colombia; Sentencia C-463/14de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia; Sentencia T-704/06delaCorte Constitucional de Colombia;Sentencia de la Sala Primera del Tribunal Constitucional del Perú, Ucayali Comunidad Nativa Sawawo Hito 40 representada por Juan García Campos, EXP. N.° 04611-2007-PA/TC de 9 de abril de 2010, párrs. 8 y 9; artículos 124 y 127 de la Constitución de Panamá, y artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley Nº 6172 Ley indígena de la Asamblea Legislativa de la República de CostaRica.136En relación con la dimensión colectiva de la vulneración, por ejemplo, el Decreto 4633 de 2011 de la Presidencia de la República de Colombia “Por medio del cual se dictan medidas de asistencia, atención, reparación integral y de restitución de derechos territoriales a las víctimas pertenecientes a los Pueblos y Comunidades indígenas”, señala en su artículo 42 que, para efectos del Decreto, un daño colectivo se produce “cuando la acción viola la dimensión material e inmaterial, los derechos y bienes de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas como sujetos colectivos de derechos […], lo cual implica una mirada holística de los daños y afectaciones que estas violaciones ocasionen. La naturaleza colectiva del daño se verifica con independencia de la cantidad de personas individualmente afectadas. Se presentan daños colectivos, entre otros, cuando se vulneran sistemáticamente los derechos de los integrantes de la colectividad por el hecho de ser parte de la misma”.
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31ii)Sindicatos, federaciones y confederaciones –Análisis del artículo 8 del Protocolo de San Salvador85.El Protocolo de San Salvador fue adoptado el 17 de noviembre de 1988, entró en vigor el 16 de noviembre de 1999 y a la fecha ha sido ratificado por 16 Estados137. Los derechos sindicales están consagrados en el artículo 8 del Protocoloen los siguientes términos:1. Los Estados partes garantizarán:a. el derecho de los trabajadores a organizar sindicatos y a afiliarse al de su elección, para la protección y promoción de sus intereses. Como proyección de este derecho,los Estados partes permitirán a los sindicatos formar federaciones y confederaciones nacionales y asociarse a las ya existentes, así como formar organizaciones sindicales internacionales y asociarse a la de su elección. Los Estados partes también permitirán que los sindicatos, federaciones y confederaciones funcionen libremente;b. el derecho a la huelga.2. El ejercicio de los derechos enunciados precedentemente sólo puede estar sujeto a laslimitaciones y restricciones previstas por la ley, siempre que éstos sean propios a una sociedaddemocrática, necesarios para salvaguardar el orden público, para proteger la salud o la moralpúblicas, así como los derechos y las libertades de los demás. Los miembros de las fuerzas armadas y de policía, al igual que los de otros servicios públicos esenciales, estarán sujetos a las limitaciones y restricciones que imponga la ley.3. Nadie podrá ser obligado a pertenecer a un sindicato. (Subrayado fuera del texto)86.Al respecto, la Corte reitera que tiene competencia para decidir sobre casos contenciosos en torno a los derechos contenidos en el artículo 8.1.a en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 19.6 del Protocolo. En efecto, este último permite la aplicación del sistema de peticiones individuales regulado por los artículos 44 a 51 y 61 a 69 de la Convención Americana si losderechos sindicales o el derecho a la educación (artículo 13 del Protocolo) fueran violados por una acciónu omisiónimputable directamente a un Estado Parte del Protocolo138.87.Hasta el momento, la Corte no ha tenido la oportunidad parapronunciarse sobre alegadas violaciones de los referidos derechos sindicales. Sin embargo, en un caso relativo a un dirigente sindical, el Tribunal tuvo oportunidad de hacer referencia a “lo señalado en el Protocolo de San Salvador […] y en el Convenio No. 87 de la OIT relativo a la Libertad Sindical y a la Protección del Derecho de Sindicación […], los cuales en sus artículos 8.1.a y 11, respectivamente, comprenden la obligación del Estado de permitir que los sindicatos, federaciones y confederaciones funcionen libremente”139. 88.Por otra parte, la Corte nota que la redacción del artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo es ambigua en tanto no queda claro si confiere o no titularidad de derechos a los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones. Para dar respuesta a este interrogante, el Tribunal considera relevante referirse a los métodos de interpretación mencionados anteriormente (suprapárrs. 35 y 36). Así, la Corte procederá a analizar el alcance del artículo 8.1.a, respecto a los términos “como proyección de este derecho” y “permitir”. Para ello, la Corte interpretará la referida disposición de buena fe, conforme al sentido corriente que haya de atribuirse a sus términos vistos en su contexto y teniendo en cuenta el objeto y fin del Protocolo de San Salvador (suprapárrs. 35 y 36).89.Respecto al sentido corriente de los términos (suprapárr. 37), la Corte destaca que el referido artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo hace una aparente diferenciación entre los trabajadores, por un lado, y los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones, por el otro. Inicialmente, dicho artículoseñala que debe “garantizarse” el derecho de los trabajadores a organizar 137Los Estados que han ratificado el Protocolo son: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, Suriname y Uruguay (Departamento de Derecho Internacional de la OEA, Información General del Tratado).138Cfr.Caso Gonzales Lluy y otros Vs. Ecuador. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 01 de septiembre de 2015. Serie C No. 298, párr. 234.139Caso Huilca Tecse Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 03 de marzo de 2005.Serie C No. 121, párr. 74.
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32sindicatos y a afiliarse al de su elección y, con posterioridad a ello, indica que como proyección de este derecho, se les “permitirá” a los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones su libre funcionamiento y a los sindicatos, adicionalmente, asociarse.90.La Corte pasará a determinar si el uso de los términos “proyectar” y “permitir” tiene un efecto determinante para negar el surgimiento de derechos subjetivos a favor de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones. El Tribunal nota que, según el diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua, “permitir”, “proyección” y “proyectar” tienen diferentes significados. Las acepciones de dichas palabras más cercanas al contenido del artículo 8.1.a serían: i) permitir:“[h]acer posible algo”140; ii)proyección:“[a]cción y efecto de proyectar [o r]esonanciao alcance de un hecho o de las cualidades de una persona”141,y iii) proyectar:“[i]dear, trazar o proponer el plan y los medios para la ejecución de algo [o h]acer visible sobre un cuerpo o una superficie la figura o la sombra de otro”142.91.De acuerdo al sentido corriente de los términos, la Corte entiende entonces que cuando el artículo señala que los Estados “permitirán”, lo que la norma busca es que los Estados hagan posible el libre funcionamiento de los sindicatos, las federaciones y confederaciones, así como que se asocien y formen federaciones y confederaciones nacionales, y organizaciones sindicales internacionales. Ese librefuncionamiento implica que estasorganizaciones colectivastienen la capacidad de, por ejemplo, crear sus propios estatutos, elegir a sus representantes o manejar sus finanzas. Asimismo, asociarse y formar otrasorganizaciones colectivas también supone que tienen la capacidad para llevar a cabo esos actos. La capacidad de obrar implica la existencia de la personalidad jurídica de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones. Ello conlleva a la Corte a concluir que el uso del término “permitir” en el marco del artículo 8 del Protocolo presupone entonces que los sindicatos, lasfederaciones y las confederaciones constituyen personas jurídicas distintas a sus asociados con capacidad diferente a las de ellos para contraer obligaciones, y adquirir y ejercer derechos, tales como, al libre funcionamiento. Además,las organizaciones sindicales tendrían el derechode asociarse y formar federaciones y confederaciones nacionales, y organizaciones sindicales internacionales.92.Sumado a lo anterior, cuando el artículo 8.1.a indica que “como proyección” del derecho de los trabajadores, el Estado permitirá a los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones actuar libremente así como a los sindicatos asociarse y formar federaciones y confederaciones nacionales, y organizaciones sindicales internacionales,lo que la norma hace es darle un alcance al derecho de los trabajadores más amplio que el solo hecho de poder organizar sindicatos y afiliarse al de su elección. Estolo lograespecificandolos medios mínimos a través de los cuales los Estados garantizarán el ejercicio de dicho derecho. Enconsecuencia, el derecho que la norma consagra a favor de los trabajadores constituye un marco a través del cual se generan derechos más específicos en cabeza de los sindicatos, las federaciones y confederaciones como sujetos de derechos autónomos, cuya finalidad es permitirles ser interlocutores de sus asociados, facilitando a través de esta función una protección más extensa y el goce efectivo del derecho de los trabajadores.93.Con relación auna interpretación sistemática, la Corte nota que el encabezadodel artículo 8 del Protocolo es “derechos sindicales”. En este sentido, el ámbito de aplicación de dicha disposición hace referencia a los derechos relativos a la actividad sindical que nace de la voluntad de los individuos de asociarse y se materializa en la creación de sindicatos que, a su vez, pueden asociarse entre ellos y crear federaciones, confederaciones u organizaciones sindicales cuyo funcionamiento debe ser libre para ser efectivo. En este sentido, el encabezado 140Real Academia de la Lengua, Diccionario de la lengua española, Edición del tricentenario http://dle.rae.es/?w=permitir&m=form&o=h.141Real Academia de la Lengua, Diccionario de la lengua española, Edición del tricentenario http://dle.rae.es/?w=proyecci%C3%B3n&o=h.142Real Academia de la Lengua, Diccionario de la lengua española, Edición del tricentenario http://dle.rae.es/?w=proyectar&m=form&o=h.
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33abarca los derechos reconocidos en la norma, a saber el de los trabajadores a organizar sindicatos y afiliarse al de su elección, así como el de los sindicatos a asociarse y el de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones a funcionar libremente. Adicionalmente, si bien las demás versiones originales tienen el mismo encabezado143, la Corte constata que la versión en inglés indica “Trade Union Rights” lo que podría entenderse en el sentido ya descrito en este párrafo pero igualmente como los derechos reconocidos a los sindicatos.94.Adicionalmente, como se mencionó de manera previa (suprapárr. 44), en el marco de la interpretación sistemática de una norma están comprendidos no solo el texto del tratado al que pertenece sino también el sistema dentro del cual se inscribe. En consecuencia, la Corte nota que el artículo 45.c de la Carta de la OEA144contiene el reconocimiento de la personalidad jurídica de las asociaciones de trabajadores y las de empleadores y consagra la protección de su libertad e independencia. Además, el 45.g del mismo instrumento hace un reconocimiento de la contribución de los sindicatos a la sociedad. En efecto, dicho artículo establece que:“Los Estados miembros, convencidos de que el hombre sólo puede alcanzar la plena realización de sus aspiraciones dentro de un orden social justo, acompañado de desarrollo económico y verdadera paz, convienen en dedicar sus máximos esfuerzos a la aplicación de los siguientes principios y mecanismos: […] c) Los empleadores y los trabajadores, tanto rurales como urbanos, tienen el derecho de asociarse libremente para la defensa y promoción de sus intereses, incluyendo el derecho de negociación colectiva y el de huelga por parte de los trabajadores, el reconocimiento de la personería jurídica de las asociaciones y la protección de su libertad e independencia, todo de conformidad con la legislación respectiva[…]g) El reconocimiento de la importancia de la contribución de las organizaciones, tales como los sindicatos, las cooperativas y asociaciones culturales, profesionales, de negocios, vecinales y comunales, a la vida de la sociedad y al proceso de desarrollo”. (Subrayado fuera del texto)95.Por otra parte, la Corte reitera que el Protocolo de San Salvador es parte de la Convención Americana y el principio pro personase encuentra contenido en la misma. En este orden de ideas, el Tribunal recuerda que de acuerdo a dicho principio, al interpretarse el artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo debe optarse por la interpretación que sea más garantista y que, por tanto, no excluya o limite el efecto que pueden tener otros instrumentos como la Carta de la OEA. De acuerdo a lo sostenido previamente, el artículo 45.c de este instrumentoreconoce derechos a las asociaciones de empleadores y a las de trabajadores. Asimismo, el artículo 10 de la Carta Democrática145propende, a través de su remisión a la Declaración de la OIT146, por el respeto de la libertad sindical,la cual abarca no solamente el derecho de los trabajadores a asociarse sino asimismo el derecho de las asociaciones por ellos constituidas de funcionar libremente.96.Al respecto, la Corte reitera que “la libertad para asociarse y la persecución de ciertos fines colectivos son indivisibles, de modo que una restricción de las posibilidades de asociarse representa directamente, y en la misma medida, unlímite al derecho de la colectividad de alcanzar los fines que se proponga. De ahí la importancia de la adecuación con la Convención 143La Corte constata que el encabezado es el mismo en las demás versiones auténticas del texto. En inglés: Trade Union Rights; en portugués:Direitos sindicais, y enfrancés: Droits syndicaux.144Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos. Adoptada en Bogotá, Colombia el 30 de abril de 1948. Entrada en vigor el trece de diciembre de 1951.145El artículo 10 de la Carta Democrática Interamericana establece que:“La promoción y el fortalecimiento de la democracia requieren el ejercicio pleno y eficaz de los derechos de los trabajadores y la aplicación de normas laborales básicas, tal como están consagradas en la Declaración de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) relativa a los Principios y Derechos Fundamentales en el Trabajo y su Seguimiento, adoptada en 1998, así como en otras convenciones básicas afines de la OIT. La democracia se fortalece con el mejoramiento de las condiciones laborales y la calidad de vida de los trabajadores del Hemisferio”. Carta Democrática Interamericana, Vigésimo octavo período extraordinario de sesiones 11 de septiembre de 2001, Lima, Perú.146La Declaración de la OIT establece que los miembros de dicha organización están comprometidos a respetar y promover los principios relativos a los siguientes derechos fundamentales: “libertad de asociación y la libertad sindical y el reconocimiento efectivo del derecho de negociación colectiva; la eliminación de todas las formas de trabajo forzoso u obligatorio; la abolición efectiva del trabajo infantil; y la eliminación de la discriminación en materia de empleo y ocupación”. Declaración de la OIT relativa a los principios y derechos fundamentales en el trabajo y su seguimiento, Adoptada por la Conferencia Internacional del Trabajo en su octogésima sexta reunión, Ginebra, 18 de junio de 1998.
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34del régimen legal aplicable a los sindicatos y de las acciones del Estado, o que ocurran con tolerancia de éste, que pudieran hacer inoperante este derecho en la práctica”147.De acuerdo a lo anterior, el Tribunal entiende que la protección de los derechos de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones es indispensable para salvaguardar el derecho de los trabajadoresa organizar sindicatos y a afiliarse al de su elección. Por su naturaleza misma, dichos entes colectivos buscan ser interlocutores por medio de los cuales se protejan y promuevan los intereses de sus asociados, así que una desprotección de sus derechos setraduciría en un impacto de mayor intensidad en sus asociados ya que se generaría una afectación o limitación del goce efectivo de los trabajadores a organizarse colectivamente. 97.En consecuencia, la Corte considera que la interpretación más favorable delartículo 8.1.a conlleva entender que allí se consagran derechos a favor de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones,dado que son interlocutores de sus asociados y buscan salvaguardar y velar por susderechos e intereses. Llegar a una conclusión diferente implicaría excluir el efecto de la Carta de la OEA y, por ende, desfavorecer el goce efectivo de los derechos en ella reconocidos.98.Respecto al objeto y fin del Protocolo de San Salvador, la Corte nota que el preámbulo de dicho instrumento señala que la finalidad de los protocolos a la Convención Americana es la “de incluir progresivamente en el régimen de protección de la misma otros derechos y libertades”. Igualmente,resalta la importancia de reafirmar, desarrollar, perfeccionar y protegerlos derechos económicos, sociales y culturales en función de la consolidación de la democracia en América, “así como el derecho de sus pueblos al desarrollo, a la libre determinación y a disponer libremente de sus riquezas y recursos naturales”. El preámbulo afirma que el ideal del ser humano libre puede realizarse únicamente a través de la creación de “las condiciones que permitan a cada persona gozar de sus derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, tanto como de sus derechos civiles y políticos”. Asimismo,sostiene que la vigencia de los derechos civiles y políticos y los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales tiene una estrecha relación y “las diferentes categorías de derechos constituyen un todo indisoluble que encuentra su base en el reconocimiento de la dignidad de la persona humana, por lo cual exigen una tutela y promoción permanente con el objeto de lograr su vigencia plena”. De lo anterior,se deriva que la protección de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales que se pretende alcanzar con el Protocolo de San Salvador busca salvaguardar no solo la dignidad humana sino también, y en igual medida, la democracia y los derechos de los pueblos del continente.99.La Corte recuerda que el sentido corriente que se le atribuyaa los términos debe serinterpretada con relación al contexto y el objeto y fin del Protocolo. Por consiguiente, teniendo presente lo expuesto en los párrafos precedentes, la Corte considera que una interpretación de buena fe del artículo 8.1.a implica concluir que éste otorgatitularidad de los derechos establecidos en dicho artículo alas organizaciones sindicales. Esta interpretación implicaademás un mayor efecto útil del artículo 8.1.a, reforzando con ello la igualimportancia que tiene para el sistema interamericano la vigencia de los derechos civiles y políticos y los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales.100.Por otra parte, la Corte considera relevante hacer uso de los trabajos preparatorios del artículo 19 del Protocolo de San Salvador como medio complementario de interpretación para confirmar el sentido del artículo 8.1.a resultante de la interpretaciónque se acaba de hacer. Si bien el artículo 19.6 contempla los medios a través de los cuales se protegerán los derechos contenidos en el Protocolo y, por tanto, no puede desprenderse del mismo la titularidad de derechos de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones, de sus trabajos preparatorios puede concluirse la intención de garantizar los derechos de las organizaciones 147Caso Huilca Tecse Vs. Perú, párr. 70.
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35sindicalescomo derechos de exigibilidad inmediata a través del sistema interamericano148. Esto se constata en tanto los trabajos preparatorios señalan que se concertó que el sistema de peticiones se limitaría “solamente al derecho de asociaciones y libertad sindical y a la libertad de educación”149, excluyéndose el derecho a la huelga. La referencia a “asociaciones” en lugar de a “asociación” implícitamente describe los dos tipos de asociaciones que surgen del artículo, a saber, las de los trabajadores y las de las organizaciones sindicales. Por otra parte, la mención a la “libertad sindical” para efectos del Protocolo de San Salvador cobija el derecho de las organizaciones de trabajadores a constituir federaciones y confederaciones, así como el derecho aafiliarse a las mismas, y el de toda organización, federación o confederación a afiliarse a organizaciones internacionales de trabajadores150.101.Adicionalmente, la Corte considera que la obligación general que tienen los Estados de garantizar los derechos sindicales contenidos en el artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo se traduce en las obligaciones positivas de permitir e incentivar la generación de las condiciones aptas para que tales derechos se puedan llevar a cabo efectivamente. En este sentido, la Corte acude al Convenio 87 de la OIT con el fin de mencionar ejemplos que ilustren las obligaciones positivas que surgen de la obligación general de garantizar los derechos reconocidos a los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones. En este sentido, la Corte nota que el artículo 3.1 del Convenio establece el derecho de las organizaciones de trabajadores a “redactar sus estatutos y reglamentos administrativos, el de elegir a sus representantes, el de organizar su administración y sus actividades y el de formular su programa de acción”151.102.En consonancia con lo anterior, la obligación general de los Estados de respetar los derechos implica las obligaciones negativas de abstener de crear barreras tales como legales o políticas tendientes a impedir a los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones la posibilidad de gozar de un libre funcionamiento y adicionalmente a los sindicatos la posibilidad de asociarse. En este sentido, la Corte nota que el referido artículo 3.2 del Convenio N° 87 establece que “[l]as autoridades públicas deberán abstenerse de toda intervención que tienda a limitar [los derechos reconocidos en el numeral 1 del artículo] o a entorpecer su ejercicio legal”152. 148Los trabajos preparatorios del Protocolo evidencian que en la adopción de los medios de protección de los derechos consagrados en dicho instrumento, la propuesta de la Comisión Interamericana diferenciaba entre dos tipos de medios: el sistema de peticiones individuales para aquellos derechos denominados de exigibilidad inmediata y un sistema de informes para los demás derechos. La propuesta finalmente adoptada, y establecida en el artículo 19, “contiene estas dos ideas”. Exposición hecha por la Presidenta del Grupo de Trabajo encargado de estudiar el proyecto de Protocolo Adicional, Anexo II al Informe de laComisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos sobre el Proyecto de Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Culturales y Sociales, OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc. 1938/88, 17 octubre de 1988.149Informe de laComisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos sobre el proyecto de Protocolo Adicional a la Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de derechos económicos, culturales y sociales, OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc. 1938/88, 17 octubre de 1988, p. 45150Cfr. Artículo 5 del Convenio 87 sobre la libertad sindical y la protección del derecho de sindicación, 1948 (núm.87), entrada en vigor: 04 julio 1950; Adopción: San Francisco, 31ª reunión CIT 09 julio 1948. 151Convenio 87 sobre la libertad sindical y la protección del derecho de sindicación, 1948 (núm.87), entrada en vigor: 04 julio 1950; Adopción: San Francisco, 31ª reunión CIT 09 julio 1948.Asimismo, la Corte nota que el Comité de Libertad Sindical de la OIT cuyo mandato es el de determinar si una situación concreta se ajusta a los principios de libertad sindical y de negociación colectiva, ha emitido varias decisiones en las que se reflejan obligaciones en similar sentido. Cfr. OIT, La libertad sindical Recopilación de decisiones y principios del Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT, quinta edición 2006, párrs. 389, 391, 466, 495, 512, 860, 861 y 984. 152Convenio 87 sobre la libertad sindical y la protección del derecho de sindicación, 1948 (núm.87), entrada en vigor: 04 julio 1950; Adopción: San Francisco, 31ª reunión CIT 09 julio 1948.Igualmente, la Corte nota que varias decisiones del Comité de Libertad Sindical de la OIT reflejan obligaciones en similar sentido. Cfr. OIT. Resolución del Comité de Libertad Sindical en el Caso No. 1569 “Quejas contra el Gobierno de Panamá presentadas por la Confederación Internacional de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CIOSL), el Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto de Recursos Hidráulicos y Electrificación (SITIRHE) y Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (SITINTEL)”, párr. 143.3; Cfr.Caso Baena Ricardo y otros Vs. Panamá. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 2 de febrero de 2001. Serie C No. 72, párrs. 162, 170 a 172; OIT, La libertad sindical Recopilación de decisiones y principios del Comité de Libertad Sindical del Consejo de Administración de la OIT, quinta edición 2006, párrs. 147, 130, 178, 190 y 391.
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36103.Por otra parte, el Tribunal recuerda que, en razón de lo dispuesto por el artículo 19.6 del Protocolo, únicamente podría aplicarse el sistema de peticiones individuales alos derechos contenidos en los artículos 8.1.ay 13. Así, la Corte solotendría competencia para conocer de los casos en los que los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones acudan ante el sistema interamericano buscando la protección de los derechos que les son reconocidos en el artículo 8.1.a cuando se alegue que estos fueron violados por una acción imputable directamente a un Estado Parte del Protocolo. De acuerdo a lo anterior, la titularidad de derechos y el acceso al sistema interamericano estarían limitados a las organizaciones sindicales constituidas u operantes en los Estados que hayan ratificado el Protocolo, por cuanto las obligaciones allí dispuestas no pueden hacerse extensivas a los Estados que no hayan expresado su voluntad de asumirlas. 104.LaCorte considera relevante referirse asimismo al derecho a la huelgaestablecido en el artículo 8.1.b del Protocolo. La Corte no es competente para conocer de casos en los que dicho derecho se aleguevulnerado,por cuanto, como se mencionó, el artículo 19.6 del Protocolo, únicamente le otorga competencia sobre los derechos sindicales contenidos en el artículo 8.1.a. No obstante lo anterior, la Corte recuerda que, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 1 del Protocolo de San Salvador, los Estados Parte deben adoptar las medidas necesarias a fin de lograr en forma progresiva la efectividad plena de este derecho.105.En virtud de lo anteriormente expuesto,la Corteha concluido la titularidad de los derechos establecidos en el artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones, lo cual les permite presentarse ante el sistema interamericano en defensa de sus propios derechos. Ahora bien, en este punto la Corte considera relevante recordar que en razón de lo dispuesto por el artículo 44 de la Convención Americana, los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones legalmente reconocidos en uno o más Estados Parte de la Convención, formen o no parte del Protocolo de San Salvador, pueden presentar peticiones individuales ante la Comisión Interamericana en representación de sus asociados, en caso de una presunta violación de los derechos de sus miembros por un Estado Parte de la Convención Americana. VII.EJERCICIO DE LOS DERECHOS DE LAS PERSONAS NATURALES A TRAVÉS DE PERSONAS JURÍDICAS 106.La Corte ha establecido en esta Opinión Consultiva que las personas jurídicas no sontitulares de derechos ante el sistema interamericano (suprapárr. 70), salvo en las dos situacionesparticulares descritas en el capítulo anterior. Por esta razón, si bien las preguntas número 4 y 5 propuestas por el Estado de Panamá (suprapárr.3) se relacionan exclusivamente con derechos de las personas jurídicas, esta Corte constata que el Estado dePanamá también está interesado en que se analice “la protección de derechos humanos de las personas físicas por medio de organizaciones no gubernamentales o personas jurídicas” (suprapárr. 1). Con este fin, en primer lugar, la Corte reiterará su jurisprudencia sobre la materia. En segundo lugar, estudiará el carácter inherente al ser humano de algunos de los derechos humanos reconocidos en la ConvenciónAmericana, así como algunos de los derechos que puedan ser reconocidos a una persona natural a través de su participación en una persona jurídica. 107.Como se indicó anteriormente, este Tribunal ha reiterado que si bien la figura de las personas jurídicas no ha sido reconocida expresamente por la Convención Americana, esto no restringe la posibilidad de que bajo determinados supuestos el individuo que ejerza sus derechos a través de ellas pueda acudir al sistema interamericano para hacer valer sus Annex 123
37derechos fundamentales, aun cuando los mismos estén cubiertos por una figura o ficción jurídica creada por el mismo sistema jurídico153. 108.En efecto, este Tribunal resalta la existencia de ciertos derechos que son inherentes y exclusivos al ser humano,de manera que su ejercicio sólo se puede realizar de forma personal, lo cual los excluiría de un potencial análisis en el marco de un caso en el que se alegue la violación de derechos cuya titularidad reside igualmente en las personas físicas pero el ejercicio de los cuales se hiciera a través de una persona jurídica. Al respecto, desde el Preámbulo de la Convención Americana, el sistema interamericano ha establecido que de los derechos reconocidos a los seres humanos se deriva el carácter esencial de los mismos. Por ello, estos derechos “no nacen del hecho de ser nacional de determinado Estado, sino que tienen como fundamento los atributos de la persona humana”154. La existencia de los derechos reconocidos en la Convención corresponde con la naturaleza propia de los seres humanos como sujetos de derechos. Esta afirmación encuentra su fundamento en diferentes postulados de la Convención Americana, los cuales plantean el sentido fundamental de esainmanencia. Así, mientras el artículo 5 de la Convención menciona la importancia de entender la dignidad humana como un elemento intrínseco del ser humano, el artículo 29 del mismo instrumento predica que “[n]inguna disposición de la […] Convención puede ser interpretada en el sentido de […] c) excluir otros derechos y garantías que son inherentes al ser humano”.109.Al respecto, la Corte considera que la inherencia e inalienabilidadse refieren al atributo que se predica de un derecho debido a su conexión inescindible con la naturaleza del ser humano155. En efecto, este Tribunal estima que hay derechos cuyo ejercicio únicamente puede ser llevado a cabo personalmente por la persona física titular de los mismos,porque dicho goce implica la existencia de un vínculo entre la naturaleza humana y el derecho mismo156. Así por ejemplo, la Corte ha sostenido que “para efectos de la interpretación del artículo 4.1 [de la Convención], la definición de persona está anclada a las menciones que se hacen en el tratado respecto a la ‘concepción’ y al ‘ser humano’, términos cuyo alcance debe valorarse a partir de la literatura científica”157. 153Cfr. Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina, párr. 29, y Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 146.154Preámbulo de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. 155Al respecto, ver: Sentencia C-284/15 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia, párr. 5.3.3.5.156En similar sentido, el Tribunal Constitucional del Perú ha manifestado que “[s]iendo constitucionalmente legítimo el reconocimiento de derechos fundamentales sobre las personas jurídicas, conviene puntualizar que tal consideración tampoco significa ni debe interpretarse como que todos los atributos, facultades y libertades reconocidas sobre la persona natural sean los mismos que corresponden a la persona jurídica”. EXP. N.° 4972-2006-PA/TC, La Libertad, CORPORACIÓN MEIER S.A.C. Y PERSOLAR S.A.C. Igualmente, la Suprema Corte de México señaló que “[s]i bien el vocablo "persona" contenido en el artículo 10. de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos comprende a las personas morales, la titularidad de los derechos fundamentales dependerá necesariamente de la naturaleza del derecho en cuestión y, en su caso, de la función o actividad de aquéllas. En esa medida, el juzgador deberá determinar, en cada caso concreto, si un derecho les corresponde o no pues, si bien existen derechos que sin mayor problema argumentativo pueden atribuírseles, por ejemplo, los de propiedad, de acceso a la justicia o de debido proceso, existen otros que, evidentemente, corresponden sólo a las personas físicas, al referirse a aspectos de índole humana como son los derechos fundamentales a la salud, a la familia o a la integridad física”. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, CONTRADICCIÓN DE TESIS 360/2013, Fecha de resolución: sesionado el 21/04/2014. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia también señaló que “[p]aralosefectosrelacionadosconlatitularidaddelaaccióndetutelasedebeentenderqueexistenderechosfundamentalesquesepredicanexclusivamentedelapersonahumana,comoelderechoalavidaylaexclusióndelapenademuerte(artículo11);prohibicióndedesapariciónforzada,torturas,tratosopenascrueles,inhumanosodegradantes(artículo12);elderechoalaintimidadfamiliar(artículo15);entreotros.Perootrosderechosyanosonexclusivosdelosindividuosaisladamenteconsiderados,sinotambiénencuantoseencuentraninsertosengruposyorganizaciones,cuyafinalidadseaespecíficamenteladedefenderdeterminadosámbitosdelibertadorealizarlosinteresescomunes.Enconsecuencia,enprincipio,esnecesariotutelarlosderechosconstitucionalesfundamentalesdelaspersonasjurídicas,noperse,sinoqueentantoquevehículoparagarantizarlosderechosconstitucionalesfundamentalesdelaspersonasnaturales,encasoconcreto,acriteriorazonabledelJuezdeTutela”. Sentencia No. T-411/92de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia.157Caso Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación In Vitro”) Vs. Costa Rica, párr. 176.
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38110.Lo anteriorestá en armonía con la conclusión a la cual llegó esta Corte frente a la imposibilidad de las personas jurídicas de acudir de manera directa ante el sistema interamericano (suprapárr. 70), aparte de las dos situaciones particulares descritas anteriormente (suprapárrs. 72 y 105),y que se relaciona con la idea de que los derechos humanos consagrados en la Convención están dispuestos para la protección de personas naturales y no de personas jurídicas. Sin embargo, es preciso aclarar que cada derecho implica un análisis distinto en cuanto a su contenido y forma derealización. Así, mientras algunos derechos se relacionan directamente con las funciones vitales de los seres humanos o con las funciones físicas o psicológicas del cuerpo humano, tales como el derecho a la vida, la libertad personal o la integridad personal, otros se vinculan con la relación entre los seres humanos y la sociedad. Ejemplos de esta última relación seríanlos derechos a la propiedad privada, asociación, nacionalidad, entre otros. Estos últimos serían el tipo de derechosque podrían ser objeto del análisis mencionado en los párrafos precedentes.111.A partir de lo expuesto anteriormente, la Corte ha considerado necesariohacer una distinción para efectos de establecer cuáles situaciones podrán ser analizadas por este Tribunal en el marco de la Convención Americana158, cuando en los casos se alegue que el derecho ha sido ejercido a través de una persona jurídica. De manera general, ha sostenido que en muchas situaciones, “los derechos y las obligaciones atribuidos a las personas morales se resuelven en derechos y obligaciones de las personas físicas que las constituyen o que actúan en su nombre o representación”159. Así, los derechos que las personas jurídicas gozan en sede interna en los Estados Parte de la Convención Americana(suprapárr.64), en algunos casos, no les son exclusivos. Por el contrario, el reconocimiento de los derechos a las personas jurídicas puede implicardirecta o indirectamente la protección de los derechos humanos de las personas naturales asociadas. 112.En este sentido, para efectos de admitir cuáles de estassituaciones podrán ser analizadas bajo el marco de la Convención Americana, la Corte recuerda que ha examinado la presunta violación de derechos de sujetos en su calidad de accionistas160 y de trabajadores161, en el entendido de que dichas presuntas afectaciones están dentro del alcance de su competencia. Así, por ejemplo, en casos como Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú, Chaparro Álvarez y Lapo Íñiguez Vs. Ecuador,Perozo y otros Vs. Venezuela, y Granier y otros Vs. Venezuela, se realizó dicho análisis respectoaactos que afectaron a las personas jurídicas de las cuales eran socios162.Hasta el momento, este Tribunal sólo ha conocido de casos en que el ejercicio del derecho fue realizado a través de personas jurídicas respecto al derecho a la propiedad y al derecho a la libertad de expresión. 113.Respecto al derecho a la propiedad privada163, la jurisprudencia de la Corte ha abordado dos situaciones diferentes. La primera, relativa a los casos en los que ha reconocido 158Cfr. Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina.Excepciones Preliminares, párr.29, Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 146.159Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina. Excepciones Preliminares,párr. 27, y Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 54.160Cfr. Caso Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2001. Serie C No. 74, párrs. 123, 125, 138 y 156, Caso Granier y otros(Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 19.161Cfr. Caso Baena Ricardo y otros Vs. Panamá. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 2 de febrero de 2001. Serie C No.72,párrs. 109, 110, y 130,Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs.Venezuela, párr. 19.162Cfr.Caso Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas,párrs. 119 a 131, Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 146.163Cfr.Caso Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas,párrs. 119 a131, y Caso Chaparro Álvarez y Lapo Íñiguez. Vs. Ecuador. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 21 de noviembre de 2007. Serie C No. 170,párrs. 173 y 218.Artículo 21 de la Convención “Derecho a la Propiedad. 1.Toda persona tiene derecho al uso y goce de sus bienes. La ley puede subordinar tal uso y goce al interés social. 2. Ninguna persona puede ser privada de sus bienes, excepto mediante el pago de indemnización justa, por razones de utilidad pública o de interés social y en los casos y según las formas establecidas por la ley. 3. Tanto la usura como cualquier otra forma de explotación del hombre por el hombre, deben ser prohibidas por la ley”.
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39el derecho de propiedad colectiva del cual son titulares las comunidades indígenas y tribales como lo hizo por primera vez en el Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku Vs. Ecuador(suprapárr. 74), posteriormente,en la sentencia Caso de los Pueblos Indígenas Kuna de Madungandí y Emberá de Bayano y sus Miembros Vs. Panamá, y de manera más reciente,en los casosComunidad Garífuna Triunfo De La Cruz Y Sus Miembros Vs. Honduras,y Caso Comunidad Garífuna De Punta Piedra Y Sus Miembros Vs. Honduras (suprapárr. 76). 114.La segunda situación en la que la Corte se ha pronunciado sobre elderecho a la propiedad privadaha sido para diferenciar los derechos de los accionistas de una empresa de los de la empresa misma, señalando que las leyes internas otorgan a los accionistas determinados derechos directos, como los de recibir los dividendos acordados, asistir y votar en las juntas generales y recibir parte de los activos de la compañía en el momento de su liquidación, entre otros164. En ese sentido, ha establecido que para determinar siha existido una vulneración al derecho de propiedad de los socios es necesario que se encuentre probada claramente la afectación que sobre sus derechos ha recaído165. Así por ejemplo, se ha abstenido de analizar la alegada violación al derecho a la propiedad sobre bienes que formaban parte del patrimonio de la empresa, puesto que diferenció entre el patrimonio de la misma y el de sus socios y accionistas166, que en el caso en particular correspondían al capital accionario delcual eran propietarios167. Además, este Tribunal ha manifestado que debe ser demostrado cómo el daño o afectación de los bienes de propiedad de la persona jurídica podrían llegar a implicar, a su vez, una afectación a los derechos de los accionistas o socios168.115.Igualmente, en jurisprudencia reciente, esta Corte ha analizado el derecho a la libertad de expresión169y su materialización a través de una persona jurídica. En el caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) contra Venezuela, el Tribunal sostuvo que los medios de comunicación son, generalmente, asociaciones de personas que se han reunido para ejercer de manera sostenida su libertad de expresión, por lo que es inusual en la actualidad que un medio de comunicación no esté a nombre de una persona jurídica, toda vez que la producción y distribución del bien informativo requieren de una estructura organizativa y financiera que responda a las exigencias de la demanda informativa170.De manera semejante, así como las organizaciones sindicalesconstituyen instrumentos para el ejercicio del derecho de asociación de los trabajadores y los partidos políticos son vehículos para el ejercicio de los derechos políticos de los ciudadanos, los medios de comunicación son mecanismos que sirven al 164Cfr.Caso Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, párr. 127, Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 338.165Cfr.Caso Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, párr. 127, Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 338.166Cfr.Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párrs. 338 y 352.167Cfr.Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 352.168Cfr.Caso Perozo y otros Vs. Venezuela,párr. 402, y Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 356.169Artículo 13 de la Convención Americana: “Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión. 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puedeestar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar: a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas. 3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones. 4. Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por la ley a censura previa con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2.5. Estará prohibida por la ley toda propaganda en favor de la guerra y toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que constituyan incitaciones a la violencia o cualquier otra acción ilegal similar contra cualquier persona o grupo de personas, por ningún motivo, inclusive los de raza, color, religión, idioma u origen nacional”.170Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 148.
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40ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión de quienes los utilizan como medio de difusión de sus ideas o informaciones171.116.Asimismo, este Tribunal consideró que la línea editorial de un canal de televisión puede ser considerada como un reflejo de las opiniones políticas de sus directivos y trabajadores en la medida en que estos se involucren y determinen el contenido de la información transmitida172. Así, puede entenderse que la postura crítica de un canal es un reflejo de la postura crítica que sostienen sus directivos y trabajadores involucrados en determinar el tipode información que es transmitida. Lo anterior debido a que, como ya se indicó previamente, los medios de comunicación son en diversas oportunidades los mecanismos mediante los cuales las personas ejercen su derecho a la libertad de expresión, lo cual puede implicar la expresión de contenidos tales como opiniones o posturas políticas173.117.Consecuentemente, este Tribunal indicóque las restricciones a la libertad de expresión frecuentemente se materializan a través de acciones estatales o de particulares que afectan, no solo a la persona jurídica que constituye un medio de comunicación, sino también a la pluralidad de personas naturales, tales como sus accionistas o los periodistas que allí trabajan, que realizan actos de comunicación a través de la misma y cuyos derechos también pueden verse vulnerados174. En el citado caso, la Corte estableció que para determinar si la afectación a la persona jurídica (medio de comunicación en ese caso) había generado un impacto negativo, cierto y sustancial al derecho a la libertad de expresión de laspersonas naturales, era necesario analizar el papel que cumplían las presuntas víctimas dentro del respectivo medio de comunicación y, en particular, la forma en que contribuían con la misión comunicacional del canal175.118.Como se observa de los dos derechos descritos, la Corte ha realizado un análisis de cada situación para determinar si efectivamente la persona física ejerció su derecho a través de la ficción de la persona jurídica. En primer lugar, este Tribunal ha diferenciado el alcance de los derechos de cada tipo de persona, como lo hizo con la distinción entre el patrimonio de la persona jurídica del patrimonio de sus socios o accionistas. Asimismo, la Corte ha reconocido el derecho a la propiedad colectiva de las comunidades indígenas.En segundo lugar, este Tribunal ha demostrado en casos en concreto el vínculo entre el ejercicio del derecho por parte de la persona física y la forma en que lo realiza a través de la persona jurídica.119.Al respecto, cabe señalar que,independientemente de la especificidad de cada caso, este Tribunal considera que el ejercicio del derecho a través de una persona jurídica debe involucrar una relación esencialy directa entre la persona natural que requiere protección por parte del sistema interamericano y la persona jurídica a través de la cual se produjo la violación, por cuanto no es suficiente con un simple vínculo entre ambaspersonaspara concluir que efectivamente se están protegiendo los derechos de personas físicas y no de las personas jurídicas. En efecto, se debe probar más allá de la simple participación de la persona natural en las actividades propias de la persona jurídica, de forma que dicha participación se relacione de manera sustancial con los derechos alegados como vulnerados. Además, la Corte, al amparo de lo previsto en el artículo 29.a de la Convención, considera que la mera existencia y acción de la persona jurídica en la que participa la persona natural,presunta víctima de la violación que se alegue, no puede constituir un obstáculo para que le sea sometido, conozca y resuelva el caso correspondiente. De otra manera, se estaría interpretando el artículo 1.2 del mismo texto convencional, como permitiendo “a alguno de los Estados Partes, grupo o persona, suprimir el goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en la Convención o limitarlos en mayor medida que la prevista en ella”. 171Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 148.172Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela,párr. 224.173Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 224.174Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 151.175Caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela, párr. 151.
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41120.Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte considera que debido a las múltiples formas que pueden surgir de la figura de personas jurídicas, tales como empresaso sociedades comerciales, partidos políticos, asociaciones religiosas uorganizaciones no gubernamentales, no es viable establecer una fórmula única que sirva para reconocer la existencia del ejercicio de derechos de personas naturales a través de su participación en una persona jurídica, de manera como lo ha realizado con el derecho a la propiedad y a la libertad de expresión. Por ello, la Corte determinará la manera de probar el vínculo cuando analice la alegadaviolación de uno de losderechos presuntamentevulnerados en un caso contencioso concreto. VIII.POSIBLE AGOTAMIENTO DE LOS RECURSOS INTERNOS POR PERSONAS JURÍDICAS 121.Hastaahora, la Corte ha determinado en esta Opinión Consultiva que las personas jurídicas no son titulares dederechos en el sistema interamericano (suprapárr.70). Asimismo, el Tribunal ha establecidoque tantolas comunidades indígenas comolas organizaciones sindicales (suprapárr.72 y 105) constituyen situaciones particulares. Ahora compete a la Corte examinar, de acuerdo a las preguntas 3,6, 7 y 8 planteadas por el Estado de Panamá, si a través del agotamiento de los recursos internos por parte de personas jurídicas, a título propio o en representación de sus miembros (socios, accionistas, directivos, trabajadores, etc.), se cumple con el requisito de admisibilidad señalado en el artículo 46.1.a de la Convención. Para ello, la Corte realizará sus consideraciones teniendo en cuenta: i) la naturaleza del requisito de agotamiento de los recursos internos en elsistema interamericano, y ii)la idoneidad y efectividad de los recursos de jurisdicción interna que deben ser agotados de acuerdo los principios del derecho internacional generalmente reconocidos.A.Naturaleza del requisito de agotamiento de los recursos internos en el sistema interamericano122.El requisito de agotamiento de los recursos internos es una manifestación del principio de la colaboración o complementariedad del derecho internacional público. Al respecto, esta Corte ha establecido que la responsabilidad estatal bajo la ConvenciónAmericanasólo puede ser exigida a nivel internacionaldespués de que el Estado haya tenido la oportunidad de determinar, en su caso, una violación de un derecho y reparar el daño ocasionado por sus propios medios. Lo anterior se asienta en el principio de complementariedad que informa transversalmente el sistema interamericano, el cual es, tal como lo expresa el Preámbulo de la Convención Americana, “coadyuvante o complementario de la [protección] que ofrece el derecho interno de los Estados americanos”176. Así, el Estado es el principal garante de los derechos humanos de las personas, de manera que, si se produce un acto violatorio de dichos derechos, es el propio Estado quien tiene el deber de resolver el asunto a nivel interno y, en su caso, reparar, antes de tener que responder ante instancias internacionales como el sistema interamericano, lo cual deriva del carácter coadyuvante o complementario que reviste el proceso internacional frente a los sistemas nacionales de garantías de los derechos humanos. El referido carácter complementario de la jurisdicción internacional significa que el sistema de protección instaurado por la Convención Americana no sustituye a las jurisdicciones nacionales, sino que las complementa177. En este sentido, la forma de constatar que el Estado, como primer llamado a proteger y garantizar los derechos humanos, tuvo conocimiento de las 176Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Preámbulo. San José, Costa Rica, 1969. Cfr.Caso Tarazona Arrieta y Otros Vs. Perú. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia del 15 de octubre de 2014. Serie C No. 286 párr. 137.177Cfr.Caso Acevedo Jaramillo y otros Vs. Perú. Interpretación de la Sentencia de Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 24 de noviembre de 2006. Serie C No. 157, párr. 66, y Caso García Ibarra y Otros Vs. Ecuador. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia del 17 de noviembre de 2015. Serie C No. 306, párr. 103. Annex 123
42violaciones y la posibilidad de actuar al respecto, es precisamente a través de la regla sobre el agotamiento de losrecursos internos.123.Precisamente, el requisito de agotamiento de los recursos internos implica que los peticionarios pongan en conocimiento del Estado las alegadas violaciones, “pues busca [dispensar al mismo] de responder ante un órgano internacional poractos que se le imputen, antes de haber tenido la ocasión de remediarlos con sus propios medios”178. En el sistema interamericano, este requisito se encuentra contenido en el artículo 46.1.a) de la Convención Americana. Según esta norma, “[p]ara que una petición o comunicación […] sea admitida por la Comisión, se requerirá […] que se hayan interpuesto y agotado los recursos de jurisdicción interna, conforme a los principios del Derecho Internacional generalmente reconocidos”179.124.De manera reiterada, esta Corte ha fijadoalgunos criterios procesales y materiales que deben ser cumplidos en relación conla excepción de falta de agotamiento de recursos internos180. En primer lugar, una objeción al ejercicio de su jurisdicción basada en la supuesta falta de agotamiento de los recursos internos debe ser presentada en el momento procesal oportuno, esto es, durante el procedimiento de admisibilidad ante la Comisión181. En segundo lugar, el Estado que presenta esta excepción debe especificar los recursos internos que aún nose han agotado, y demostrar que estos recursos se encontraban disponibles y eran adecuados, idóneos y efectivos182. Finalmente, este Tribunal ha manifestado que no corresponde ni a la Corte ni a la Comisión identificar ex officiocuáles son los recursos internos pendientes de agotamiento183. 125.Otro aspecto relevante en el análisis sobre el agotamiento de los recursos internos son las excepciones contenidas en el artículo 46.2 de la Convención. Esta norma constituye una excepción a la regla general establecida en el artículo 46.1 del mismo instrumento,según la cual el agotamiento de los recursos internos es un requisito indispensable para la presentación de peticiones individuales ante el sistema interamericano. De este modo, el requisito de agotamiento de los recursos aplica cuando en el “sistema nacional están efectivamente disponibles recursos que son adecuados y eficaces para remediar la presunta violación”184. Cuando esto no es así, por la inexistencia o ineficacia de los recursos185, el artículo 46.2 de la Convención prevé tres excepciones que eximen a las presuntas víctimas del cumplimiento de este requisito, a saber: i) cuando no exista en la legislación interna del Estado de que se trata el debido proceso legal para la protección del derecho o derechos que se alega han sido violados; ii) cuando no se haya permitido al presunto lesionado en sus derechos el acceso a los recursos de la jurisdicción interna, o haya sidoimpedido de agotarlos, y iii) cuando haya retardo injustificado en la decisión sobre los mencionados recursos.126.La Corte también ha determinado que en algunas circunstancias el análisis del agotamiento de los recursos internos puede estar relacionadocon el fondo del asunto, especialmente en lo que conciernea los artículos 8 y 25 de la Convención.La Corte ha 178Asunto de Viviana Gallardo y otras, Decisión del 13 de noviembre de 1981, No. G 101/81. Serie A, párr. 26, yCaso López Lone y Otros Vs. Honduras. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 5 de octubre de 2015. Serie C No. 302, párr. 20. 179Artículo 46.1.a) de la Convención Americana180Cfr.Caso Garibaldi Vs. Brasil. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia del 23 de septiembre de 2009. Serie C No.203, párr. 46.181Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Excepciones Preliminares.Sentencia de 26 de junio de 1987. Serie C No.01, párr. 88, y Caso Wong Ho Wing Vs. Perú. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 30 de Junio de 2015. Serie C No. 297, párr. 21.182Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Excepciones Preliminares, párr. 88, y Caso López Lone y Otros Vs. Honduras, párr. 21.183Caso Reverón Trujillo Vs. Venezuela. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 30 de Junio de 2009. Serie C No. 197, párr.23, y Caso López Lone y Otros Vs. Honduras, párr. 21.184CIDH. Informe No. 74/14, Petición 1294-05. Admisibilidad. Mário de Almeida Coelho Filho y Familia. Brasil. 15 de agosto de 2014, párr. 29.185 Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Excepciones Preliminares, párr. 94.
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43sostenido que “cuando se invocan ciertas excepciones a la regla de no agotamiento de los recursos internos, como son la inefectividad de tales recursos o la inexistencia del debido proceso legal, no sólo se está alegando que el agraviado no está obligado a interponer tales recursos, sino que indirectamente se está imputando al Estado involucrado una nueva violación a las obligaciones contraídas por la Convención”. Al respecto, es preciso aclarar que el examen que realiza la Comisión en la etapainicial de admisibilidad supone el análisis de las excepciones contenidas en el artículo 46.2 de la Convención comonormas con contenido autónomo “vis à vislas normas sustantivas de la Convención Americana”186.Esto significa que si bien el análisis realizado por la Comisión en la etapa de admisibilidad puede tener una relación directa con las posibles violaciones a los artículos 8 y 25 de la Convención, el estándar de apreciación es distinto en ambas etapas187. En consecuencia, “resulta necesario diferenciarla figura del retardo injustificado a que se refiere el artículo 46.2 de la Convención, aplicable en la etapa de admisibilidad de una petición, del estándar de plazo razonable, aplicable al análisis de posibles violaciones al artículo 8.1 de la Convención, en el estudio del fondo de la controversia”188.127.Como conclusión preliminar, este Tribunal reitera la importancia de la regla de agotamiento de recursos internos como una expresión de la facultad que tienen los Estados de enfrentar y solucionar las violaciones a los derechos humanos por sus propios medios, previo al sometimiento de un caso ante el sistema interamericano y en consonancia con sus obligaciones internacionales. Igualmente, recuerda lo manifestado a lo largo de su jurisprudencia en cuanto a los requisitos procesales y materiales que deben ser cumplidos por parte de aquellos Estados que aleguen esta excepción preliminar. Asimismo, considera importante enfatizar la importancia de los criterios de disponibilidad, idoneidad y efectividad que han sidomencionados de manera reiterada en la jurisprudencia de la Corte frente al requisito de agotamiento de recursos internos189. B.Idoneidad y efectividad de los recursos de jurisdicción interna que deben ser agotados 128.El artículo 46.1.a)dispone que para queuna petición sea admitida por la Comisión se deben haber interpuesto y agotado los recursos en sede interna “conforme a los principios del Derecho Internacional generalmente reconocidos”. Este Tribunal ha sostenido que la remisión del artículo 46.1.a)de la Convención a los principios del derecho internacional generalmente reconocidos, “no se refieren sólo a la existencia formal de tales recursos, sino también a que éstos sean adecuados y efectivos, como resulta de las excepciones contempladas en el artículo 46.2”190. 129.En este sentido, la Corte ha incluido en sula jurisprudencia elanálisis los criterios de “efectividad”e “idoneidad”de los recursos. En términos generales, que un recurso sea idóneo significa que la función de esos recursos, dentro del sistema del derecho interno, sea adecuada para proteger los derechos vulnerados191. EsteTribunal ha sostenido que “[e]n todos los ordenamientos internos existen múltiples recursos, pero no todos son aplicables en todas las circunstancias”192. 186CIDH. Informe No. 124/10, Petición11.990. Admisibilidad. Óscar Orlando Bueno Bonnet y Otros. Colombia. 23 de octubre de 2010, párr. 37.187CIDH. Informe No. 124/10, Petición 11.990. Admisibilidad. Óscar Orlando Bueno Bonnet y Otros. Colombia. 23 de octubre de 2010, párr. 37.188CIDH. Informe No.74/14, Petición 1294-05.Admisibilidad. Mário de Almeida Coelho Filho y Familia.Brasil. 15 de agosto de 2014, párr. 40.189Cfr.Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Fondo.Sentencia de 29 de julio de 1988. Serie C No.04, párrs. 64, 66 y 67, y Caso López Lone y Otros Vs. Honduras, párr. 21. 190Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Fondo, párr. 63.191Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Fondo, párr. 64.192Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Fondo, párr. 64.
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44130.De otra parte, laeficacia se predica cuando el recurso es capaz de producir el resultado para el que ha sido concebido193. Por ejemplo, “[el recurso] de exhibición personal puede volverse ineficaz si se le subordina a exigencias procesales que lo hagan inaplicable, si, de hecho, carece de virtualidad para obligar a las autoridades, resulta peligroso para los interesados intentarlo o no se aplica imparcialmente”194.131.Igualmente, la Corte ha dicho que “para que exista un recurso efectivo no basta con que esté previsto por la Constitución o la ley o con que sea formalmente admisible, sino que se requiere que sea realmente idóneo para establecer si se ha incurrido en una violación a los derechos humanos y proveer lo necesario para remediarla”. De modo tal que“no pueden considerarse efectivos aquellos recursos que, por las condiciones generales del país o incluso por las circunstancias particulares de un caso dado, resulten ilusorios”195. 132.Ahora bien, la Comisión manifestó en sus observaciones que su posición actual sobre la admisibilidad de las peticiones en que los recursos presentados hayan sido interpuestos por personas jurídicas, es que “si bien en principio los recursos internos deben ser agotados por parte de la persona natural alegada como víctima ante el sistema interamericano, pueden existir circunstancias en las cuales dichos recursos a favor de las personas naturales no existen, no están disponibles o no resultan procedentes frente a la acción estatal concreta dirigida contra la persona jurídica. En consideración de la Comisión, [el análisis sobre el] agotamiento de los recursos internos debe efectuarse caso por caso”196.133.En este punto, la Corte expondrá su posiciónacorde con lo establecido en el artículo 46.1.a) de la Convención.En primer lugar, este Tribunalconstata que el artículo 46.1.a) no hace ninguna distinción entre personas naturales o personas jurídicas, puesto que se concentra exclusivamente en el agotamiento de los recursos. Al respecto, este Tribunal ha sostenido que según la regla del efecto útil, la norma está encaminada a producir un efecto y no puede interpretarse en el sentido de que no produzca ninguno o su resultado sea manifiestamente absurdo o irrazonable197. Por ello, la Corte no puede interpretar el artículo 46.1.a) de modoque limite el acceso al sistema interamericano por parte de posibles víctimas y se genere una desprotección de las mismas. En este sentido, la Corte considera que resulta desproporcionado obligar a una presunta víctima a interponer recursos inexistentes, cuando se comprueba que el recurso idóneo y efectivo era el agotado por parte de la persona jurídica. 134.En segundo lugar, la Corte considera que los principios de idoneidad y efectividad son fundamentales en el análisis de admisibilidad. Así, en el marco de la situación planteada, si se comprueba que el recurso agotado por la persona jurídica protege los derechos individuales de las personas naturales que pretenden acudir ante el sistema interamericano, el mismo podrá ser entendido como un recurso idóneo y efectivo. En otras palabras, si a través de un recurso en sede interna que fue resuelto a favor de una persona jurídica se protegieran los derechos de las personas individuales, la Corte no encuentra razón alguna para entender que dicho recursono puedallegar a ser idóneo y efectivo,según el análisis de cada caso.135.En tercer lugar, este Tribunal estima que el agotamiento de los recursos internos suponeun análisis independiente del referente a la titularidad de derechos por parte de personas jurídicas. El estudio sobre el cumplimiento de este requisito debe centrarse en que se hayan presentado los recursos idóneos y efectivos en el ámbito interno, los cuales,en algunos casos,serán recursos cuya legitimación activa esté en cabeza de la persona jurídica. Así por 193Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Fondo, párr. 66. CIDH. Informe No. 50/13, Petición 1491-06. Admisibilidad. Familia Guzmán Cruz.México. 12 de julio de 2013, párr. 38. 194Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Fondo, párr. 66.195Caso Reverón Trujillo Vs. Venezuela, párr. 61.196Observaciones de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos a la Solicitud de Opinión presentada por el Estado de Panamá (expediente de fondo, folio 2424).197Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras. Fondo, párr. 63 y 64.
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45ejemplo, el Relator Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión sostuvo durante la audiencia pública198que“en muchos casos en los que se ve afectada la libertad de expresión, la única persona legitimada por activa para interponer los recursos internos idóneos es el medio de comunicación a través de su representante legal”. Por lo general, “no existe otro recurso efectivo que pueda ser empleado por una persona natural contra una decisión dirigida formalmente a un medio de comunicación”. Por ello, “exigir como condición de procedibilidad de una petición ante el sistema que la persona natural afectada sea quien plantee los recursos internos cuando no tiene legitimidad activa para ello y a sabiendas de que por tal razón va a ser rechazado, sería ir en contra del principio de economía procesal e imponer barreras desproporcionadas de acceso al sistema interamericano”.136.En concreto, esta Corte considera que se deben tener por agotados los recursos internos en cumplimiento del artículo 46.1.a) de la Convención cuando: i) se compruebe que se presentaron los recursos disponibles, idóneos y efectivos para la protección de sus derechos, independientemente de que dichos recursos hayan sido presentados y resueltos a favor de una persona jurídica, y ii) se demuestre que existe una coincidencia entre las pretensiones que la persona jurídica alegó en los procedimientos internos y las presuntas violaciones que se argumenten ante el sistema interamericano. Al respecto, el Relator para la Libertad de Expresión manifestó que “lo que se busca es que exista una coincidencia material entre las reclamaciones formuladas en el proceso que fue agotado a nivel interno y aquellas presentadas ante la [Comisión], con el objeto de asegurarse que las autoridades nacionales conocieron sobre la supuesta violación de un derecho protegido y, de ser apropiado, tuvieron la oportunidad de solucionarla antes de que sea conocida por una instancia internacional”199.137.Adicionalmente, la Corte resaltaque en estos casos la carga de la prueba sobre sobre la efectividade idoneidad del recurso la tienen los Estados cuando presentan la excepción de falta de agotamiento de recursos internos. De maneraque deberán ser los Estados los que demuestren que, por ejemplo, existía un recurso más idóneo a aquel presentado por la persona jurídica. 138.Bajo el acatamiento de estos requisitos, se respeta el núcleo esencial de la regla de agotamiento de recursos internos. Esto es, permitirle al Estado conocer de manera previa las peticiones planteadas ante el sistema interamericano para que sea él quien enfrente las violaciones a los derechos humanos. Asimismo, es preciso resaltar que el análisis que se realice sobre el cumplimiento de las reglas de admisibilidad contenidas en el artículo 46.1 en este tipo de casos, es independiente del análisis sobre el fondo de la petición, especialmente en lo que se refiere alos artículos 1.1, 8 y 25 de la Convención Americana. Así, cuando se dé por cumplido el agotamiento de los recursos internos a través de un recurso interpuesto por una persona jurídica, no se pretende imponer una obligación adicional a los Estados en el sentido de modificar su legislación interna para otorgar legitimación activa a las personas naturales. Este tipo de consideraciones se relacionan con el fondo del caso y deberán ser analizadas según el contenido de los derechos individuales reconocidos por la Convención.139.Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte concluye que la interposición de recursos por parte de personas jurídicas no implica per se que no se hayan agotado los recursos internos por parte de las personas físicas titulares de los derechos convencionales, por loque el cumplimiento de este requisito deberá ser analizado en cada caso. En efecto, la Corte reitera su jurisprudencia según la cual “no es necesario el agotamiento de la vía interna respecto de 198Observaciones escritas presentadas por el Relator Especial para la Libertad de Expresión durante la audiencia pública(expediente de fondo, folio 3216).199Observaciones escritas presentadas por el Relator Especial para la Libertad de Expresión durante la audiencia pública(expediente de fondo, folio 3216).
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46todos o cualquiera de los recursos disponibles sino que, de acuerdo a jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, ‘los recursos que deben ser agotados son aquellos que resultan adecuados en la situación particular de la violación de derechos humanos alegada’”200.En este sentido, este Tribunal estima que el artículo 46.1.a)implica un análisis que debe concentrarse en la idoneidad y efectividaddel recurso, independientemente de si el recurso fue interpuesto por una persona natural o unajurídica. 140.Considerando todo lo expuesto precedentemente y, en especial, que el artículo 1 de la Convenciónestablece las obligaciones del Estado tanto de respetar los derechos de todo ser humano bajo su jurisdicción como de garantizarle su libre y plenoejercicio, la Corte concluye que la existencia y acción de una persona jurídica a través de la cualactúa la persona natural, presunta víctima de la violación del derecho humano de que se trate, no debería constituir un obstáculo, impedimento o excusa para que el Estado deje de cumplir con las referidas obligaciones.IX.OPINIÓNPor las razones expuestas, en interpretación del artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en relación con los artículos 1.1, 8, 11.2, 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 y 62.3 del mismo instrumento, así como del artículo 8.1.a y b del Protocolo de San Salvador,LA CORTE,DECIDEpor unanimidad, que1.Es competente para emitir la presente Opinión Consultiva.Y ES DE OPINIÓNpor unanimidad, que2.El artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana sólo consagra derechos a favor de personas físicas, por lo que las personas jurídicas no son titulares de los derechos consagrados en dicho tratado, en los términos establecidos en los párrafos 37 a 70de esta Opinión Consultiva. 200Caso Escher y otros Vs. Brasil. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 6 de julio de 2009. Serie C No. 200, párr. 38, y Caso Galindo Cárdenas y otros Vs. Perú. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 02 de octubre de 2015. Serie C No. 301, párr. 33.
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47por unanimidad, que3.Las comunidades indígenas y tribales son titulares de los derechos protegidos en la Convención y,por tanto, pueden acceder ante el sistema interamericano, en los términos establecidos en los párrafos 72 a 84de la presente Opinión Consultiva.Por seis votos a favor y uno en contra, que4.El artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo de San Salvadorotorga titularidad de derechos a los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones, lo cual les permite presentarse ante el sistema interamericano en defensa de sus propios derechos en el marco de lo establecido en dicho artículo,en los términos establecidos en los párrafos 85a105de la presente Opinión Consultiva.Disiente el Juez Alberto Pérez PérezPor seis votos a favor y uno en contra, que5.Las personas físicas en algunos casos pueden llegar a ejercer sus derechos a través de personas jurídicas, de manera que en dichas situaciones podrán acudir ante el Sistema Interamericano para presentar las presuntas violaciones a sus derechos,en los términos establecidos en los párrafos 106a120de esta Opinión Consultiva.Disiente el Juez Alberto Pérez PérezPor seis votos a favor y uno en contra, que6.Las personas físicas bajo ciertos supuestos pueden agotar los recursos internos mediante recursos interpuestos por las personas jurídicas,en los términos establecidos en los párrafos 121y 140de esta Opinión Consultiva.Disiente el Juez Alberto Pérez PérezEl JuezRoberto F. Caldas hizoconoceralaCortesuVotoconcurrente, elcual acompañaestaOpinión Consultiva.El Juez Alberto Pérez Pérez hizoconoceralaCortesuVotoparcialmente disidente, elcualacompañaestaOpinión Consultiva.
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48Opinión Consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos OC-22/16. Solicitada por la República de Panamá.Roberto F. CaldasPresidente Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor PoisotManuel E. Ventura RoblesDiego García-SayánAlberto Pérez PérezEduardo Vio Grossi Humberto Antonio Sierra PortoPablo Saavedra AlessandriSecretarioComuníquese y ejecútese, Roberto F. Caldas PresidentePablo Saavedra AlessandriSecretario
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VOTO CONCURRENTEDEL JUEZ ROBERTO F. CALDASCORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOSOPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC-221.Con el fin de sumar a la respuesta dada por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en ocasión de la Opinión Consultiva 22, solicitada por el Estado de Panamá el28 de abril de 2014, es necesariohacer algunas consideraciones acerca delalcancedel artículo 21 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, en este voto concurrente. A pesar de esta Corte ya haber desarrollado un valioso análisis en cuantoa la imposibilidad de acceso al Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos por personas jurídicas, se hace necesario formular algunas consideraciones acerca delalcance de la protección garantizada al derecho a la propiedad en el ámbito del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos.2.Inicialmente, es importante observaralgo que puede ser entendido como una “baja receptividad” del derecho a la propiedad privada en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos. En este sentido, desde el inicio, es unhecho notable que este fue uno de los derechos más discutidos en el momento de la propuesta del proyecto original de la Convención Americana por la respectiva Comisión, aún en 1969:1“La discusión de este artículo, que consagra el derecho a la propiedad privada, fue tal vez uno de los más extensamente debatidosen el seno de la Comisión. Las delegaciones manifestaron, desde el primer momento, la existencia de tres corrientes ideológicas que podrían resumirse en esta forma: una tendencia a suprimir del texto del proyecto toda referencia al derecho de propiedad, a semejanza del Pacto de los Derechos Civiles y Políticos de las Naciones Unidas; otra tendencia a consagrar el texto del proyecto tal y como fue presentado, y una tercera posición conciliadora, que reforzará la función social de la propiedad.Después de un prolongado cambio de opiniones sobre este apasionante tema, prevaleció el criterio mayoritario de incorporar el derecho de propiedad en el texto de la Convención tal como aparece en el proyecto, agregando al primero de sus dos párrafos la expresión de que, tanto la usura como cualquier otra forma de explotación del hombre por el hombre serán prohibidas por la ley.”3.Las divergencias sólo fueron superadas, insertandoeste derecho en el rolde derechos protegidos por la Convención Americana, mediante la inclusión de un concepto genérico de derecho a la propiedad privada como“derecho al uso y gocede bienes” y la relativización del derecho delante del“interés social” y de la “utilidad pública”.4.Esta resistencia a la incorporación del derecho ala propiedad privada es observada también en los sistemas universal y europeo de derechos humanos. A pesar de que elderecho a la propiedad privada haya sido establecido por la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos en su artículo 17, éste acabó nosiendo contemplado por el Pacto Internacional de 1OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2. Conferencia Especializada Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos. San José, Costa Rica. 7-22de noviembre de 1969. Actas y Documentos. Informe del Relator de la Comisión I, Juan Isaac Lovato, 19 de noviembre de 1969, pág. 301.
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2Derechos Civiles y Políticos (PIDCP) o por el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (PIDESC). En lo que se refiere al sistema europeo de derechos humanos, el derecho acabó por ser excluidode la versión final de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos, siendo incluido sóloen 1952, por el I Protocolo Adicional,2de forma considerablemente restricta, inclusive dando al Estado amplios poderes para restringir el gocede tal derecho.5.A pesar del sistema interamericano haber innovado en este sentido, incorporando el derecho a la propiedad privada en la Convención Americana, existen claras limitaciones a esederecho. La primera corresponde, como anteriormente dicho, a la relativizacióndel derecho, decurrente del propio dispositivo que lo establece. Este trae en sus incisos previsiones de restricción al gocedel derecho a la propiedad privada teniendo en cuenta el interés social y la utilidad pública, inclusive estableciendo la necesidad de pago de justa indemnización en situaciones deprivación del derecho:Artículo 21. Derecho a la Propiedad Privada1. Toda persona tiene derecho al uso y goce de sus bienes. La ley puede subordinar tal uso y goce al interés social.2. Ninguna persona puede ser privada de sus bienes, excepto mediante el pago de indemnización justa, por razones de utilidad pública o de interés socialy en los casos y según las formas establecidas por la ley.3. Tanto la usura como cualquier otra forma de explotación del hombre por el hombre, deben ser prohibidas por la ley.6.Con eso, cabe señalarque a pesar de que la propiedad privada constituya uno de los derechos protegidos por la Convención Americana, se trata de un derecho con claras limitaciones a nivelinternacional. La garantía amplia y generalizada de este derecho podría acabar convirtiendoa esta Corte de Derechos Humanos en un tribunal mucho más demandado por causas empresariales o de corporaciones, a travésde sus socios o asociados que aleguen pérdida patrimonial o de propiedad, desvirtuando, así, el objetivo y la razón de ser de tales instituciones: juzgar derechos humanos, los más fundamentales. 7.Para que eso no ocurra, es necesariolimitar el alcancedel referido derecho en el ámbito interamericano, definiendo los bienes que pueden, o no, ser disputadosante el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos. No siendo expresala Convención Americana en este sentido, la Corte podría haber aprovechado la oportunidad para explicitar en qué tipo de situaciones el derecho a la propiedad puede constituir objeto de disputaante el sistema interamericano. 2Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos (Paris, 20/03/1952). “ARTÍCULO 1° Protección de la propiedad. Toda persona física o moral tiene derecho al respeto de sus bienes. Nadie podrá ser privado de su propiedad más que por causa de utilidad pública y en las condiciones previstas por la ley y los principios generales del derecho internacional.Las disposiciones precedentes se entienden sin perjuicio del derecho que poseen losEstados de poner en vigor las leyes que juzguen necesarias para la reglamentación del uso de los bienes de acuerdo con el interés general o para garantizar el pago de los impuestos u otras contribuciones o de las multas”.
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38.A pesar de indispensable la posibilidad de defensa –inclusive judicial –de todos los bienes legalmente garantizados al individuo con base en el derecho a la propiedad privada, esta actuación jurisdiccional no correspondea tribunales de derechos humanos. Es decir, cabría a los ordenamientos jurídicos internos y al respectivo sistema judicial de cada Estado la garantía de la defensa del derecho a la propiedad de formauniversal; aquí, ante el Sistema Interamericano, solamente aquella parte de la propiedad más nuclear.9.A la Corte y al sistema interamericano, por otro lado, restaría la protección judicial de bienes especialmente protegidos por la legislación interna de muchos Estados, como es el caso de bienes inembargablese inalienables. La especial protección dedicada a estos bienes se debe al hecho de estos constituir el llamado “mínimo existencial”, cuyo concepto está atado al principiode la dignidad (artículo 11 dela Convención Americana), correspondiente a las necesidades más básicas y esenciales de la persona y de su familia.10.El surgimiento del ideal de “mínimo existencial” ganó fuerza a partir de la II Posguerra, en la doctrina de Otto Bachof, sustentando que ladignidad humana no se limita a la garantía de la libertad, pero tambiénengloba, necesariamente, los recursos materiales indispensables para el mantenimiento de una vida digna. Poco tiempo después de la formulación de Bachof, el Tribunal Federal Administrativo de Alemania (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) reconoció alindividuo como titular de derechos y obligaciones en el aspecto de mantenimiento de sus condiciones de existencia.311.En otras palabras, debe ser garantizada la actuación de la Corte en defensa del derecho a la propiedad en caso deque restricciones a este derecho amenacen necesidades básicas indispensables para el mantenimiento de la existencia digna. Considerando que atentaría a los derechos humanos privar al individuo de parcela patrimonial mínima indispensable, sólo esoscasos recaerían en la esfera de competencia de la Corte.12.La definición deloque es, de hecho, abarcado por la noción de mínimo existencial es determinada por el contexto socioeconómico particular de cada Estado, por lo que cabe especialmente a los ordenamientos jurídicos internos la protección del conjunto de bienes que garanticenal propietario el mantenimiento de su existencia no sólofísica, como social, política y cultural digna.13.A pesar de reconocer la importancia y absoluta necesidad de la protección judicial del derecho a la propiedad, esta Corte no puede tomar para sí, o aceptar que le otorguen, la responsabilidad de decidir sobre las más diversas cuestiones relativas al derecho a la propiedad. Si así lo hiciese, acabaría pordesviarse de su función primaria, la protección de derechos humanos, aquellos más esenciales de la persona. Por eso, ya se debería delimitar el alcancedel artículo 21 de la Convención Americana, restringido la admisibilidad de casos anteal sistema interamericano de derechos humanos a ese núcleo inembargableo inalienable de bienes.14.Para que casos relativos al derecho a la propiedad puedan ser conocidos por los órganos que componen el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos, estos deben: (i) estar limitados a los bienes necesarios a la vida digna del individuo o (ii) representar unbien 3SARLET,Ingo Wolfgang. “Dignidad (de la persona) humana, mínimo existencial yjusticia constitucional”. Revista CEJUR TJCS, 2013.
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4vital para el desarrollo de actividad profesional, siempre y cuando seanecesariopara garantizar la vida digna de la persona.15.No se puede hablar en dignidad delapersona jurídica en campode derechos humanos. Por eso la vía judicial común nacional, y no la internacional de los derechos humanos, es la que estará accesible paraconocer de lesiones a los derechos de persona jurídica.16.Concluyo, porlotanto, que la intención del presente voto no es proponer la creación de un rol taxativo de bienes intangibles; la definición debe siempre dialogar con la realidad socioeconómica y con la visión nacional deloque representa el interés general, traído en el conjunto normativo democráticamente producido. Propone, esto sí, establecer el principio de que no son todas las propiedades que merecen protección por parte del sistema interamericano, pues ciertamente excluye propiedades superfluas, suntuarias, lujosas, esdecir, que van más allá de las necesidadeselementales de las personas, aquellas garantizadoras del mínimo existencial y da la vida digna.Roberto F. CaldasJuezPablo Saavedra AlessandriSecretario
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VOTO PARCIALMENTE DISIDENTE DELJUEZ ALBERTO PÉREZ PÉREZOPINIÓN CONSULTIVA OC–22/16SOLICITADA POR LA REPÚBLICADE PANAMÁ1.He votado en contra de varios de los puntos resolutivos de esta opinión consultiva y de los razonamientos en que ellos se fundan, por las razones que paso a exponer.I.CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES2.La principal objeción a la presente opinión consultiva aprobada por la Corte por mayoría radica en que no está enfocada desde el punto de vista del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos (como deben estarlo todos sus pronunciamientos), sino desde el punto de vista del derecho internacional tradicional. Las normas de fuente internacional cuyo contenido consiste en la consagración y protección de los derechos humanos fundamentales difieren de las normas tradicionales de derecho internacional en muchos aspectos, y en particular en lo tocante a su interpretación, regida por el principio pro persona que, en el sistema interamericano, está afirmado y desarrollado en el artículo 29 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.3.De haberse enfocado como parte del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, pocas palabras habrían bastado para contestar la primera y principal de las preguntas formuladas por Panamá, diciendo, concisa, claray contundentemente, que cuando el artículo 1.2 de la Convención dice que “Para los efectos de esta Convención, persona es todo ser humano” quiere decir precisa y exactamente eso: que persona es todo ser humano, y que “Toda persona” –es decir, todo ser humano–tiene derecho al reconocimiento de su personalidad jurídica”, como lo declara el artículo 3, titulado “Derecho al Reconocimiento de la Personalidad Jurídica”.4.Como consecuencia lógica de esa concisa, clara y contundente afirmación inicial, la respuesta a las siguientes preguntas de Panamá debería haberse formulado también de manera concisa, clara y contundente(ver infra, cap. II). Lamentablemente, la mayoría de la Corte optó por un enfoque de carácter general que, a pesar de su extensión, estuvo lejos de abarcar todos los puntos que habría correspondido incluir en un enfoque de esa naturaleza (ver infra, cap. III).II.LAS CONSULTAS ESPECÍFICASDE PANAMÁ Y LA RESPUESTA QUESEDEBIO DAR5.Las consultas específicas formuladas por Panamá fueron muy claras:“1.¿El Artículo 1, Párrafo Segundo, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, restringe la protección interamericana de los derechos humanos a las personas físicas y excluye del ámbito de protección de la Convención a las personas jurídicas?2.¿El Artículo 1.2 de la Convención, puede proteger también los derechos de personas jurídicas como cooperativas, sindicatos, asociaciones, sociedades, en cuanto compuestos por personas físicasasociadas a esas entidades?
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23.¿Pueden las personas jurídicas acudir a los procedimientos de la jurisdicción interna y agotar los recursos de la jurisdicción interna en defensa de los derechos de las personas físicas titulares de esas personas jurídicas?4.¿Qué derechos humanos pueden serle reconocidos a las personas jurídicas o colectivas (no gubernamentales) en el marco de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y de sus Protocolos oinstrumentos internacionales complementarios?5.En el marco de la Convención Americana, además de las personas físicas, ¿tienen las personas jurídicas compuestas por seres humanos derechos a la libertad de asociación del Artículo 16, a la intimidad y vida privada del Artículo 11, a la libertad de expresión del Artículo 13, a la propiedad privada del Artículo 21, a las garantías judiciales, al debido proceso y a la protección de sus derechos de los Artículos 8 y 25, a la igualdad y no discriminación de los Artículos 1 y 24, todos de la Convención Americana?6.¿Puede una empresa o sociedad privada, cooperativa, sociedad civil o sociedad comercial, un sindicato (persona jurídica), un medio de comunicación (persona jurídica), una organización indígena (persona jurídica), en defensa de sus derechos y/o de sus miembros, agotar los recursos de la jurisdicción interna y acudir a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en nombre de sus miembros (personas físicas asociadas o dueñas de la empresa o sociedad),o debe hacerlo cada miembro o socio en su condición de persona física?7.¿Si una persona jurídica en defensa de sus derechos y de los derechos de sus miembros (personas físicas asociados o socios de la misma), acude a la jurisdicción interna y agota sus procedimientos jurisdiccionales, pueden sus miembros o asociados acudir directamente ante la jurisdicción internacional de la Comisión Interamericana en la defensa de sus derechos como personas físicas afectadas?8.En el marco de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, ¿las personas físicas deben agotar ellas mismas los recursos de la jurisdicción interna para acudir a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en defensa de sus derechos humanos, o pueden hacerlo las personas jurídicas en las que participan?6.La respuesta a la primera consulta específica–que es la fundamental–está dada por el texto absolutamente claro e inequívocodel artículo 1.2. Como ya se expresó en el párrafo 3del presente voto, “cuando el artículo 1.2 de la Convención dice que “Para los efectos de esta Convención, persona es todo ser humano” quiere decir precisa y exactamente eso: que persona es todo ser humano, y que “Toda persona” –es decir, todo ser humano–tiene derecho al reconocimiento de su personalidad jurídica”, como lo declara el artículo 3, titulado “Derecho al Reconocimiento de la Personalidad Jurídica”.Por lo tanto, los derechos que la Convención Americana reconoce a las personas1son derechos de los seres humanos y no de otro tipo, clase o índole de entidad. 7.El sistema de protección establecido por la Convención solo comprende a los seres humanos, porque así ha sido concebido. Ello no excluye que en otros sistemas, internacionales o internos, se reconozcan derechos a otras entidades (artículo 29 de la Convención Americana). Pero no se tratará de derechos humanos fundamentales, que solo pueden pertenecer a la persona humana, sino de otra índole de derechos.8.La respuesta a la consulta específica 2debió ser contundentemente negativa: El Artículo 1.2 de la Convención no protege los derechos de personas jurídicas como cooperativas, sindicatos, asociaciones, sociedades, en cuanto compuestos por personas físicas asociadas a esas entidades. Distinto es el tema de la protección de los derechos de las personas físicas “asociadas a esas entidades” o integrantes de ellas, que la Corte ha resuelto en su jurisprudencia en el sentido de que “si bien la figura de las personas jurídicas no ha sido reconocida expresamente 1Ver infra,en el texto propuesto por mí para el capítuloV de la Opinión Consultiva, que se transcribe íntegramente en el párrafo 20del presente voto,párrs.15-17 (Convención Americana) y 22 (Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre.
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3por la Convención Americana, como sí lo hace el Protocolo no. 1 a la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos, esto no restringe la posibilidad [de] que bajo determinados supuestos el individuo pueda acudir al Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos para hacer valer sus derechos fundamentales, auncuando los mismos estén cubiertos por una figura o ficción jurídica creada por el mismo sistema del Derecho. No obstante, vale hacer una distinción para efectos de admitir cuáles situaciones podrán ser analizadas por este Tribunal, bajo el marco de la Convención Americana. En este sentido, ya esta Corte ha analizado la posible violación de derechos de sujetos en su calidad de accionistas”2. 9.La respuesta a la consulta específica 3debió ser igualmente clara y concisa. Las personas jurídicas pueden utilizar todos los procedimientos y recursos previstos en el derecho interno, pero ello no constituye en sí una forma de “agotar los recursos de la jurisdicción interna en defensa de los derechos de las personas físicas titulares de esas personas jurídicas”. En los casos en que un individuo acuda al Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos “para hacer valer sus derechos fundamentales, aun cuando los mismos estén cubiertos por una figura o ficción jurídica creada por el mismo sistema del Derecho”, habrá que considerar en cada caso si los recursos internos así interpuestos fueron suficientes para cumplir con los requisitos de la Convención. En el caso CantosVs. Argentina, la Corte comprobó que “todos los recursos administrativos y judiciales, salvo una denuncia penal y un amparo interpuestos en 1972, al inicio de los hechos denunciados, fueron presentados directamente por ‘derecho propio y en nombre de sus empresas’por el señor Cantos” y,en razón de ello,concluyó que “la supuesta violación de los derechos de la Convención del señor Cantos” podía ser analizada por la Corte “en la etapa de fondo correspondiente”3.10.La respuesta a la consulta específica 4 –“¿Quéderechos humanos pueden serle reconocidos a las personas jurídicas o colectivas (no gubernamentales) en el marco de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y de sus Protocolos o instrumentos internacionales complementarios?”–debió ser también concisa, clara y contundente: Ninguno.11.La respuesta a la consulta específica 5–“En el marco de la Convención Americana, además de las personas físicas, ¿tienen las personas jurídicas compuestas por seres humanos derechos a la libertad de asociación del Artículo 16, a la intimidad y vida privada del Artículo 11, a la libertad de expresión del Artículo 13, a la propiedad privada del Artículo 21, a las garantías judiciales, al debido proceso y a la protección de sus derechos de los Artículos 8 y 25, a la igualdad y no discriminación de los Artículos 1 y 24, todos de la Convención Americana?”–debió ser también clara y contundente. Las personas jurídicas no tienen ninguno de los derechos a que se refiere esta consulta, porque no son titulares de ninguno de los derechos incluidos en el sistema de protección de la Convención Americana.12.La respuesta a la consulta específica 6 –“¿Puede una empresa o sociedad privada, cooperativa, sociedad civil o sociedad comercial, un sindicato (persona jurídica), un medio de comunicación (persona jurídica), una organización indígena (persona jurídica), en defensa de sus derechos y/o de sus miembros, agotar los recursos de la jurisdicción interna y acudir a la Comisión Interamericana de 2Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina. Excepciones Preliminares.Sentencia de 7 de septiembre de 2001. Serie C No. 85, párr. 29;Caso Ivcher BronsteinVs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2001. Serie C No. 74, párrs. 123, 125, 138 y 156.3Cfr. Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina,citado,párr. 30.
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4Derechos Humanos en nombre de sus miembros (personas físicas asociadas o dueñas de la empresa o sociedad), o debe hacerlo cada miembro o socio en su condición de persona física?”–debió distinguir entre las diversas situaciones planteadas, apartir de la afirmación general de que las personas jurídicas no son titulares de derechos fundamentales protegidos por la Convención Americana:a)Una empresa o sociedad privada, una cooperativa, una sociedad civil o comercial o un medio de comunicación (persona jurídica) no puedenagotar los recursos de la jurisdicción interna y acudir a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en nombre de sus miembros (personas físicas asociadas o dueñas de la empresa o sociedad), sino que quien debe hacerlo es cadamiembro o socio en su condición de persona física que,como tal,es titular de derechos fundamentales protegidos por la Convención.b)Los casos especiales de los sindicatos y de las comunidades indígenas o tribales (no de “una organización indígena (persona jurídica)”) merecen un tratamiento separado (ver infra, caps. V y VI).13.La respuesta a lasconsultasespecíficas7–“¿Si una persona jurídica en defensa de sus derechos y de los derechos de sus miembros (personas físicas asociados o socios de la misma), acude a la jurisdicción interna y agota sus procedimientos jurisdiccionales, pueden sus miembros o asociados acudir directamente ante la jurisdicción internacional de la Comisión Interamericana en la defensa de sus derechos como personas físicas afectadas?”–y 8–“En el marco de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, ¿las personas físicas deben agotar ellas mismas los recursos de la jurisdicción interna para acudir a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en defensa de sus derechos humanos, o pueden hacerlo las personas jurídicas en las que participan?”–debió fundarse en el principio pro personay seguir los lineamientos generales de la respuesta a la consulta específica 3.III.PROBLEMAS Y OMISIONES DEBIDOS AL ENFOQUE UTILIZADO14.La opción por el enfoque general, que sin embargo no fue completa, llevó a una serie de problemas y omisiones que se habrían evitado dando respuesta concreta a lasconsultas específicas de Panamá.15.Un primer problema consiste en que,aparentando abarcar todo lo relacionado con el tema, de hecho la Corte omitió considerar algunos aspectos fundamentales. En particular, no analizó la situación de la enorme cantidad de personas jurídicas creadas en Panamá,sobre las que no correspondeque la Corte emita un juicio de valor, pero cuya existencia y cuyas actividades off shoreno puede ignorar. El enfoque general llevó asimismo a pretender dar una definición general de “persona jurídica” que no tuvo en cuenta la definición que da el propioCódigo Civil de Panamá: “Es persona jurídica una entidad moral o persona ficticia, de carácter político, público, religioso, industrial o comercial, representada por persona o personas naturales, capaz de ejercer derechos y de contraer obligaciones.” (Art. 38, párr. 3; cursiva añadida).La realidad muestra que hay muchas personas jurídicas que no tienen “miembros”, sino dueños, frecuentemente ocultos, a quienes sirven como instrumentos para lograr resultados que no podrían obtener actuando individualmente y de manera no encubierta.16.Otro problema consiste en que no se ha dado una respuesta concreta a las preguntas específicas referidas a los supuestos derechos fundamentales de “asociaciones, sociedades” y de “una empresa o sociedad privada, cooperativa, Annex 123
5sociedad civil o sociedad comercial” o “medio de comunicación” (persona jurídica”). Este aspecto ha sido abordado supra, párrs. 8y 12.17.Las referencias al derecho interno de diversos países no tiene en cuenta, entre otras cosas, la esencial diferencia con la Ley Fundamental de Bonn,cuyo art. 19.3 dispone que “Los derechos fundamentales rigen también para las personas jurídicas con sede enel país, en tanto por su propia naturaleza sean aplicables a las mismas.”18.A pesar del carácter general que se trató de dar a la respuesta a las consultas específicas formuladas por Panamá, no se tuvo en cuenta más que el derecho de países latinoamericanos, olvidando que –como se indica con razón en el párr. 19 de la opinión consultiva–el ámbito de aplicación de las opiniones consultivas, incluida la legitimación para solicitarlas, comprende a todos los Estados miembros de la OEA. Una consideración generaldel tema de la relación entre personas jurídicas y derechos fundamentales no puede dejar de abordar la peculiar interpretación que la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América ha dado a la palabra “persona” empleada en la Enmienda XIV a su Constitución4.La jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte estadounidense ha interpretado que también una persona jurídica, y en particular una corporation (aproximadamente equivalente a una sociedad anónima, y muchas veces empleado en el sentido de empresa) tiene los mismos derechos fundamentales que una persona natural, y como parte de su derecho a la libertad de expresión puede participar libremente en las campañas políticas electorales, en particular mediante contribuciones pecuniarias5. IV.INTENTO FALLIDO DE BUSCAR CONSENSO (CAPÍTULO V DE LA OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA)19.En un intento por buscar el consenso, elaboré y presenté un texto sustitutivo del capítulo V que estaba a consideración de la Corte, en el cual procuré incluir una formulación que fuera aceptable para los demás jueces (en la medida en que recogía varios de los puntos fundamentales del texto que se consideraba) pero que al mismo tiempo tuviera la claridad, concisión y contundencia que a mi juicio debía tener la respuesta a las consultas específicas de Panamá.20.El texto de mi propuesta fue el siguiente: 4El párrafo 1 de la Enmienda XIV dispone lo siguiente: “Todas las personas nacidas o naturalizadas en los Estados Unidos y sometidas a su jurisdicción son ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y de los Estados en que residen. Ningún Estado podrádictar ni dar efecto a cualquier ley que limite los privilegios o inmunidades de los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos; tampoco podrá Estado alguno privar a cualquier persona de la vida, la libertad o la propiedad sin el debido proceso legal; ni negar a cualquier persona que se encuentre dentro de sus límites jurisdiccionales la igual protección de las leyes”. (Subrayado añadido.)5Véanse, por ejemplo, los casos Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 US 394 (1886) y (después de una serie de sentencias que desde 1976 avanzaban en el mismo sentido) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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6“V.EL ARTÍCULO 1.2 DE LA CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA SÓLO COMPRENDE A LAS PERSONAS NATURALES O FÍSICAS1.La primera y principal pregunta formulada por el Gobierno de Panamá es la siguiente:¿El Artículo 1, Párrafo Segundo, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, restringe la protección interamericana de los derechos humanos alas personas físicas y excluye del ámbito de protección de la Convención a las personas jurídicas?2.El artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana dispone lo siguiente:“Para los efectos de esta Convención, persona es todo ser humano.”En consecuencia, no cabe duda de que las personas jurídicas no están comprendidas en “el ámbito de protección de la Convención” y que “la protección interamericana de los derechos humanos” sólo comprende a las personas físicas o naturales.3.La disposición es tan clara que noparecería necesario extenderse sobre los distintos criterios interpretativos previstos en los artículos 311y 322de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, la cual recoge la regla general y consuetudinaria de interpretación de los tratados internacionales3.4.No obstante, como la finalidad de las opiniones consultivas es arrojar la mayor claridad y certeza posible sobre las interpretaciones contenidas en ellas, la Corte aplicará la regla general de interpretación de los tratados (art. 31.1 de la Convención de Viena), que impone analizar el sentido corriente de los términos empleados en el art. 1.2, interpretados de buena fe, teniendo en cuenta el objeto y fin del tratado y el contexto de los términos empleados, así como lo dispuesto en elart.31.4, según el cual “Se dará a un término un sentido especial si consta que tal fue la intención de las partes”. Posteriormente la Corte utilizará, en lo pertinente, los medios de interpretación complementarios establecidos en el artículo 32 de la 1Artículo 31. Regla general de interpretación. 1.Un tratado deberá interpretarse de buena fe conforme al sentido corriente que haya de atribuirse a los términos del tratado en el contexto de estos y teniendo en cuenta su objeto y fin.2. Para los efectos de la interpretación de un tratado, el contexto comprenderá, además del texto, incluidos su preámbulo y anexos:a) todo acuerdo que se refiera al tratado y haya sido concertado entre todas las partes con motivo de la celebración del tratado:b) todo instrumento formulado por una o más partes con motivo de la celebración del tratado y aceptado por las demás comoinstrumento referente al tratado;3. Juntamente con el contexto, habrá de tenerse en cuenta:a) todo acuerdo ulterior entre las partes acerca de la interpretación del tratado o de la aplicación de sus disposiciones:b) toda práctica ulteriormente seguida en la aplicación del tratado por la cual conste el acuerdo de las partes acerca de la interpretación del tratado:c) toda norma pertinente de derecho internacional aplicable en las relaciones entre las partes.4. Se dará a un término un sentido especial siconsta que tal fue la intención de las partes.2Artículo 32. Medios de interpretación complementarios. Se podrán acudir a medios de interpretación complementarios, en particular a los trabajos preparatorios del tratado y a las circunstancias de su celebración, para confirmar el sentido resultante de la aplicación del artículo 31, o para determinar el sentido cuando la interpretación dada de conformidad con el artículo 31:a) deje ambiguo u oscuro el sentido; o b) conduzca a un resultado manifiestamente absurdo o irrazonable.3Cfr.entre otros, Corte Internacional de Justicia, Caso relativo a la soberanía sobre Pulau Ligitan y Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia contra Malasia), Sentencia de 17 de diciembre de 2002, párr. 37, y Corte Internacional de Justicia, CasoAvena y otros nacionales mexicanos (México contra los Estados Unidos de América), Sentencia de 31 de marzo de 2004, párr. 83.
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7Convención de Viena, en particular, los trabajos preparatorios de la Convención Americana. 5.Todo ello llevará a confirmar la afirmación hecha al comienzo de este capítulo: no cabe duda de que las personas jurídicas no están comprendidas en “el ámbito de protección de la Convención” y que “la protección interamericana de los derechos humanos” sólo comprende a las personas físicas o naturales.A.Sentido corriente de los términos del artículo 1.2 y sentido especial atribuido a ellos en la Convención6.El sentido corriente de los términos del artículo 1.2 es meridianamente claro. La Corte reitera que ya ha establecido que el artículo 1.2 de la Convención establece que los derechos reconocidos en dicho instrumento corresponden a personas, es decir, a seres humanos4. En particular, cabe resaltar que la Convención Americana no dejó abierta la interpretación sobre cómo debe entenderse el término “persona”, por cuanto el artículo 1.2 precisamente busca establecer una definición al mismo, lo cual demuestra la intención de las partes en darle un sentido especial al término en el marco del tratado, como lo establece el artículo 31.4 de la Convención de Viena. En este sentido, este Tribunal ha entendido que los dos términos del artículo 1.2 de la Convención deben entenderse como sinónimos5.7.“Ser humano” es todo individuo de la especie humana. “Persona” es todo individuo de la especie humana. Por lo tanto, las personas jurídicas no están comprendidas en “el ámbito de protección de la Convención” y “la protección interamericana de los derechos humanos” sólo comprende a las personas físicas o naturales. No es necesario transcribir las definiciones del diccionario de la lengua española6, ni los de los idiomas de los otros textos oficiales de la Convención Americana7. Todas ellas son concordantes en el sentido indicado.8.Así lo ha interpretado la Corte Interamericana desde el primer caso8en que se planteó la cuestión de si las personas jurídicas podrían ser objeto de protección en el sistema interamericano. Esa conclusión, que se confirmará en la presente opinión consultiva, es perfectamente acorde con el principio de buena fe, y –como se verá en los párrafos siguientes–resulta plenamente confirmada por el análisis del contexto y del objeto y fin de la Convención9. B.Objeto y fin del tratado –interpretación teleológica 4Caso Usón Ramírez Vs. Venezuela. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 20 de noviembre de 2009. Serie C No. 207, párr. 45, yCaso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) Vs. Venezuela. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 22 de junio de 2015. Serie C No. 293, párr. 19.5Cfr.Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 noviembre de 2012 Serie C No. 257, párr. 219. El artículo 1.2 ha sido analizado por la Corte en casos en los que se ha solicitado la violación de derechos en perjuicio de personas jurídicas, lo cual ha sido rechazado por el Tribunal porque no han sido reconocidas como titulares de derechos consagrados en la Convención Americana. Cfr. Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina. Excepciones Preliminares.Sentencia de 7 de septiembre de 2001. Serie C No. 85, párr. 29, y Caso Perozo y otros Vs. Venezuela. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 28 de enero de 2009. Serie C No. 195, párr. 398.6http://lema.rae.es/drae/?val=ser+humano.7Inglés: Diccionario de la Universidad de Oxford, disponible en: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/human-being?q=huma…; portugués: diccionario “VOX”, “humano”; francés: Diccionario Larousse, disponible en http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/humain/40608?q=humain#405… Vs. Argentina, Excepciones Preliminares. Sentencia de 7 de septiembre de 2001. Serie C No. 85, párr. 29.9Cfr. Propuesta de Modificación a la Constitución Política de Costa Rica Relacionada con la Naturalización.Opinión Consultiva OC-4/84 del 19 de enero de 1984. Serie A No. 4, párr. 23..
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89.La Corte ha indicado que en una interpretación teleológica se analiza el propósito de las normas involucradas, para lo cual es pertinente analizar el objeto y fin del tratado mismo y, de ser pertinente, analizar los propósitos delsistema regional de protección10.10.No puede caber duda alguna de que el objeto y fin de la Convención Americana es la protección del ser humano y sus derechos.Ya desde su Preámbulo, esta proclama enfáticamente que su propósito es “consolidar en este Continente, dentro del cuadro de las instituciones democráticas, un régimen de libertad personal y de justicia social, fundado en el respeto de los derechos esenciales del hombre”; reconoce“que los derechos esenciales del hombre no nacen del hecho de ser nacional de determinado Estado, sino que tienen como fundamento los atributos de la persona humana, razón por la cual justifican una protección internacional, de naturaleza convencional coadyuvante o complementaria de la que ofrece el derecho interno de los Estados americanos; y reitera que, “con arreglo a la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, sólo puede realizarse el ideal del ser humano libre, exento del temor y de la miseria, si se crean condiciones que permitan a cada persona gozar de sus derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, tanto como de sus derechos civiles y políticos”. 11.Por ello, la Corte ha afirmado que el objeto y fin de la Convención Americana es “la protección de los derechos fundamentales de los seres humanos”11, y que fue diseñada para proteger los derechos humanos de las personas independientemente de su nacionalidad, frente a su propio Estado o a cualquier otro12.12.Como se indicó,el objeto y fin de la Convención es “la protección de los derechos fundamentales de los seres humanos”, lo cual demuestra que ella fue creada con la intención de proteger exclusivamente a aquellos. La interpretación teleológica de la norma confirma la conclusión a la cual se arribó teniendo en cuenta el sentido corriente de los términos, según la cual las personas jurídicas están excluidas de la protección otorgada por la Convención Americana. Uno de los principios fundamentales en materia de interpretación de las normas sobre derechos humanos es el principio pro persona, que impone efectuar la interpretación más favorable para el efectivo goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades fundamentales.13.Asimismo, las pautas de interpretación contenidas en el artículo 29 de la Convención13implican que “[n]inguna disposición de dicho tratado puede ser 10Caso González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia de 16 de noviembre de 2009. Serie C No. 205, párr. 59, y Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 noviembre de 2012.Serie C No. 257, párr. 257.11El Efecto de las Reservas sobre la Entrada en Vigencia de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.Opinión Consultiva OC-2/82 del 24 de septiembre de 1982. Serie A No. 2, párr. 29, yDerechos y garantías de niñas y niños en el contexto de la migración y/o en necesidad de protección internacional. Opinión Consultiva OC-21/14 de 19 de agosto de 2014. Serie A No. 21, párr. 53.12Cfr. El Efecto de las Reservas sobre la Entrada en Vigencia de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. OpiniónConsultiva OC-2/82 del 24 de septiembre de 1982. Serie A No. 2,párr. 29.13Artículo 29. Normas de InterpretaciónNinguna disposición de la presente Convención puede ser interpretada en el sentido de:a) permitir a alguno de los Estados Partes, grupo o persona, suprimir el goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en la Convención o limitarlos en mayor medida que la prevista en ella;b) limitar el goce y ejercicio de cualquier derecho o libertad que pueda estar reconocido de acuerdo con las leyes de cualquiera de los Estados Partes o de acuerdo con otra convención en que sea parte uno de dichos Estados;c) excluir otros derechos y garantías que son inherentes al ser humano o que se derivan de la forma democrática representativa de gobierno, yd) excluir o limitar el efecto que puedan producir la Declaración Americana de Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y otros actos internacionales de la misma naturaleza.
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9interpretada en el sentido de[…]limitar el goce y ejercicio de cualquier derecho o libertad que pueda estar reconocido de acuerdo con las leyes de cualquiera de los Estados Parte o de acuerdo con otra convención en que sea parte uno de dichos Estados”, o bien de “excluir o limitar el efecto que puedan producir la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y otros actos internacionales de la misma naturaleza”.C.El contexto –interpretación sistemática14.Según el art. 31.2 de la Convención de Viena, el contexto está compuesto fundamentalmente por el texto del tratado, “incluidos su preámbulo y anexos”.Según el art. 31.2 de la Convención de Viena, el contexto comprende además “todo acuerdo que se refiera al tratado y haya sido concertado entre todas las partes con motivode la celebración del tratado” y “todo instrumento formulado por una o más partes con motivo de la celebración del tratado y aceptado por las demás como instrumento referente al tratado”; y según el art. 31.3, “Juntamente con el contexto, habrá de tenerseen cuenta” asimismo “todo acuerdo ulterior entre las partes acerca de la interpretación del tratado o de la aplicación de sus disposiciones”, “toda práctica ulteriormente seguida en la aplicación del tratado por la cual conste el acuerdo de las partes acerca de la interpretación del tratado”, y “toda norma pertinente de derecho internacional aplicable en las relaciones entre las partes.” Como no existen tales acuerdos, instrumentos, prácticas o normas pertinentes, la Corte considerará solo el texto del tratado, incluido su preámbulo.i)El texto de la Convención Americana15.Comenzando con el texto de la Convención Americana, prácticamente en todos los artículos en que se consagran derechos el sujeto a quien se atribuyen esos derechos es “toda persona”, esdecir, todo ser humano: artículos 1.1, 3, 4.1, 4.6, 5.1, 5.2, 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 8.1, 8.2 (dos veces), 10, 11.1, 11.3, 12.1, 13.1, 14.1, 16, 18, 20.1, 20.2, 21.1, 22.1, 22.2, 22.7, 24, 25.1 y 25.2. Otros artículos atribuyen los derechos a “todas las personas” (expresión equivalente a la anterior): artículos 16.1y24. Otros artículos se refieren a la totalidad de las personas comprendidas en una categoría: “todo niño” (artículo 19), “todos los ciudadanos” (art. 23.1), “el hombre y la mujer” (art. 17.2), “los contrayentes” (art. 17.3), “los cónyuges” (art. 17.4).16.Lo mismo ocurre con los artículos que establecen preceptos prohibitivos para la protección de determinados derechos fundamentales, en los que el sujeto protegido se designa como “nadie”, que según el DRAE significa “ninguna persona”, o bien directamente como “ninguna persona”: artículos 5.2, 7.2, 7.3, 7.7, 9, 11.2, 12.2, 20.3, 21.2, 22.5.17.En ninguno de los artículos mencionados se emplea expresión alguna que conceda a las personas jurídicas la titularidad de alguno de los derechos que consagran, ni que permita inferir una desviación con respecto a lo establecido en el artículo 1.2 de la Convención. ii)El sistema interamericano18.Asimismo, de conformidad con el criterio sistemático, las normas deben ser interpretadas como parte de un todo cuyo significado y alcance deben fijarse en función del sistema jurídico al cual pertenecen14. El Tribunal ha considerado que al interpretar un tratado debe tomarse en cuenta el sistema 14Cfr.Caso González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 16 de noviembre de 2009. Serie C No. 205, párr. 43, y Caso Artavia Murillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 noviembre de 2012 SerieC No. 257, párr. 191.
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10dentro del cual se inscribe, que en el caso está constituido por el sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos. 19.Dentro de ese sistema ocupa un lugar prominente la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre cuyo análisis permite verificar si la interpretación dada a una norma o término en concreto es coherente con el sentido de las demás disposiciones.20.La Declaración Americana comienza con los siguientes considerandos:Que los pueblos americanos han dignificado la persona humana y que sus constituciones nacionales reconocen que las instituciones jurídicas y políticas, rectoras de la vida en sociedad, tienen como fin principalla protección de los derechos esenciales del hombre y la creación de circunstancias que le permitan progresar espiritual y materialmente y alcanzar la felicidad;Que, en repetidas ocasiones, los Estados americanos han reconocido que los derechos esenciales del hombre no nacen del hecho de ser nacional de determinado Estado sino que tienen como fundamento los atributos de la persona humana;Que la protección internacional de los derechos del hombre debe ser guía principalísima del derecho americano en evolución;Que la consagración americana de los derechos esenciales del hombre unida a las garantías ofrecidas por el régimen interno de los Estados, establece el sistema inicial de protección que los Estados americanos consideran adecuado a las actuales circunstancias sociales y jurídicas, no sin reconocer que deberán fortalecerlo cada vez más en el campo internacional, a medida que esas circunstancias vayan siendo más propicias.21.Las expresiones transcritas demuestran que la Declaración Americana fue proclamada con la intención de centrar la protección y titularidad de los derechos en el ser humano. Lo anterior se infiere de la constante referenciaa palabras tales como “hombre”15o “persona humana”, los cuales denotan que no se estaba teniendo en cuenta la figura de las personas jurídicas a la hora de redactar dichos instrumentos. Sobre la Declaración Americana, el Consejo Interamericano de Jurisconsultos sobre la Conferencia de Bogotá manifestó que “[e]s evidente que la Declaración de Bogotá no crea una obligación jurídica contractual, pero también lo es el hecho de que ella señala una orientación bien definida en el sentido de la protección internacional de los derechos fundamentales de la persona humana”16.22.El texto de la Declaración Americana es análogo al de la posterior Convención Americana a este respecto. El titular de la protección es “todo ser humano” (art. I), cada hombre (art. XVIII), “toda persona” (arts. III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVII), “todas las personas” (art. II), “toda mujer en estado de gravidez” (art. VII), “toda persona que trabaja” (art. XIV), “toda persona, legalmente capacitada” (art. XX), “todo individuo que haya sido privado de su libertad” (art. XXV), “nadie” (art. XXV), “todo acusado” o “toda persona acusada de un delito” (XXVI). Otro tanto ocurre con los artículos relativos a deberes, que los atribuyen a “toda persona” (arts. XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII,XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII).23.En ninguno de los artículos mencionados se emplea expresión alguna que conceda a las personas jurídicas la titularidad de alguno de los derechos que consagran o de los deberes que imponen, ni que permita inferir un apartamiento del principio de que, a los efectos del sistema interamericano, persona es todo ser humano. 15Al respecto, la Corte resalta que la utilización de la palabra “hombre” en la Declaración Americana y en la Convención Americana debe entenderse como equivalente a “ser humano”, según la primera acepción del DRAE (“Ser animado racional, varón o mujer”).16Comité Jurídico Interamericano, Recomendaciones e informes, 1949-1953 (1955), p. 107.
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11iii)Otros sistemas de protección de los derechos humanos y el derecho comparado24.Este Tribunal ha consideradoútil, en algunas oportunidades17, analizar otros sistemas de protección de los derechos humanos con la finalidad de constatar sus semejanzas o diferencias con el sistema interamericano para ayudar a determinar el alcance o sentido que se le ha dado a una norma similar o a detectar las particularidades del tratado. En el presente caso, la Corte se referirá sucintamente a los sistemas europeo, africano y universal, y también hará referencia a las normas de derecho interno en la materia.a)Sistema europeo25.El Convenio Europeo emplea en susartículos la expresión “toda persona”, pero no contiene una definición del término “persona”, lo cual es una diferencia sustancial con la Convención Americana. En su preámbulo tampoco hay expresiones análogas a las contenidas en el preámbulo de la Convención Americana o en los considerandos de la Declaración Americana, pues solo se destaca el valor de los derechos humanos como un medio para asegurar la justicia y la paz en Europa18. Por otro lado, en el artículo 1 del Protocolo Adicional No. 1, relativo a la protección de la propiedad, se dispone que “Toda persona física o jurídica tiene derecho al respeto de sus bienes”. A su vez, el artículo 34 del Convenio Europeo, relativo a las demandas individuales (texto revisado en virtud del Protocolo N°11), se dispone que “El Tribunal podrá conocer de una demanda presentada por cualquier persona física, organización no gubernamental o grupo de particulares que se considere víctima de una violación”.26.Fundándose en las disposiciones indicadas, eincluso extendiendo el alcance de su aplicación, el Tribunal Europeo ha conocido de demandas de diversos tipos de personas jurídicas que alegaban haber sido víctimas de la violación de uno de sus derechos (y no sólo del derecho de propiedad). 27.No obstante, esa jurisprudencia europea no resulta aplicable al sistema establecido por la Convención Americana, en virtud de las diferencias sustanciales existentes entre las disposiciones pertinentes de uno y otro sistema. Ya se indicó que en el sistema europeo no hay una norma equivalente al art. 1.2 de la Convención Americana; yel artículo 34 del Convenio Europeo, que superficialmente podría parecer análogo al art. 44 de la Convención Americana, difiere sustancialmente de este porque que exige que quien presente una petición sea una persona “que se pretenda víctima de una violación por una de las partes contrayentes de los derechos reconocidos en la Convención”. 17Así, por ejemplo en la opinión consultiva sobre La Colegiación Obligatoria de Periodistas, la Corte comparó el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana, referente al derecho a la libertad de expresión con los artículos análogos del Convenio Europeo (artículo 10) y del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (artículo 19). La Colegiación Obligatoria de Periodistas(Arts. 13 y 29 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-5/85 del 13 de noviembre de 1985. Serie A No. 5, párrs. 45 a 50. En similar sentido, en el caso AtalaRiffola Corte analizóla diferencia entre los alcances de los artículos 11 y 17 de la Convención Americana y el artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo. Caso Atala Riffo y Niñas Vs. Chile. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas.Sentencia del 24 de febrero de 2012. Serie C No. 239, párr. 175.18El Preámbulo del Convenio establece lo siguiente: “Reafirmando su profunda adhesión a estas libertades fundamentales que constituyen las bases mismas de la justicia y de la paz en el mundo, y cuyo mantenimiento reposa esencialmente, de una parte, en un régimen político verdaderamente democrático, y, de otra, en una concepción y un respeto comunes de los derechos humanos de los cuales dependen; Resueltos, en cuanto Gobiernos de Estados europeos animados por un mismo espíritu y en posesión de un patrimonio común de ideales y de tradiciones políticas, de respeto a la libertad y de primacía del Derecho, a tomar las primeras medidas adecuadas para asegurar la garantía colectiva de algunos de los derechos enunciados en la Declaración Universal”.
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1228.De allí deriva la diferencia sustancial entre los dos sistemas de protección, pues en el sistema interamericano seha diferenciado entre peticionario y presunta víctima. El artículo 44 de la Convención hace referencia exclusivamente a la legitimación activa, pero no a la calidad de víctima o presunta víctima. La Corte ha determinado que “es claro que el artículo 44 dela Convención permite que cualquier grupo de personas formule denuncias o quejas por violación de los derechos consagrados por la Convención. Esta amplia facultad de denuncia es un rasgo característico del sistema de protección [interamericano] de los derechos humanos”19. En consecuencia, de la referencia que hace el artículo 44 a “Cualquier persona o grupo de personas o entidad no gubernamental”o no es posible inferir que las personas jurídicas puedan ser presuntas víctimas, sino que se refiere a su legitimación activa, en el sentido de que las entidadesno gubernamentales o gruposde particulares están facultados para presentar peticiones individuales ante Comisión Interamericana a favor de presuntas víctimas, incluso en casos en que no cuenten con el consentimiento de las mismas20.b)Sistema africano29.Respecto a la Carta Africana sobre los Derechos Humanos y de los Pueblos (en adelante “la Carta Africana”), la Corte observa que esta no contiene una definición sobre el término “persona”. Tampoco se encontró una interpretación oficial realizada por parte de sus órganos judiciales, sobre si el término “pueblos”21al que hace referencia la Carta podría llegar a cobijar a personas jurídicas. Por ello, no es posible determinar de manera concluyente si las personas jurídicas en el sistema africano son titulares de derechos y pueden ser consideradas víctimas de manera directa.30.Al igual que en el sistema interamericano, la Carta Africana confiere a las personas jurídicas la legitimación para presentar a la Comisión Africana comunicaciones en las que denuncien violaciones de los derechos humanos contenidos en la Carta Africana22a nombre de terceros. Se trata, entonces, de un enfoque de actio popularis, de acuerdo con el cual no se requiere que el autor de la comunicación conozca a la víctima de la violación que alegao tenga algún vínculo con ella23, siempre y cuando la comunicación cumpla con los requisitos de forma que exige el artículo 56 de la Carta Africana. c)Sistema universal 19Castillo Petruzziy Otros Vs. Perú. Excepciones Preliminares. Sentencia del 4 de septiembre de 1998. Serie C No.41, párr. 77.20Al respecto, la Corte en el caso Acevedo Jaramillo manifestó que “la denuncia puede ser presentada por una personadistinta a la presunta víctima, así como también puede ser presentada por ‘un grupo de personas’”. Caso Acevedo Jaramillo y otros Vs. Perú. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 7 de febrero de 2006. Serie C No. 144, párr. 137.Asimismo, en el caso Saramaka indicó que “[e]l artículo 44 de la Convención permite a todo grupo de personas presentar denuncias o quejas de violaciones de los derechos establecidos en la Convención. Esta amplia facultad para presentar una petición esuna característica particular del sistema interamericano para la protección de los derechos humanos. Asimismo, toda persona o grupo de personas que no sean las presuntas víctimas pueden presentar una petición”. Caso del Pueblo Saramaka vs. Surinam. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 28 de noviembre de 2007. Serie C No. 172, párr. 22.21Al respecto, la Carta Africana hace referencia a varios derechos de los “pueblos” como los titulares del derecho, por ejemplo el derecho a la igualdad (artículo 19), a la existencia y autodeterminación (artículo 20); a disponer libremente de sus riquezas y recursos naturales (artículo 21), al desarrollo (artículo 22); a la paz y a la seguridad (artículo 23) o aun entorno general satisfactorio favorable a su desarrollo (artículo 24).22Sección 4, Regla 93(1) de las Reglas de Procedimiento de la Comisión Africana, 2010. Dice esta regla, en lo pertinente: “A Communication submitted under Article 55 of the African Charter may be addressed to the Chairperson of the Commission through the Secretary by any natural or legal person.”23Comisión Africana de Derechos Humanos y de los Pueblos, Caso Artículo 19 Vs. El Estado de Eritrea, No. 275/03. Comunicación del 30 de mayo de 2007, párr. 65.
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1331.El artículo 1 del Protocolo facultativo del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (en adelante el “PIDCP”) dispone lo siguiente:“Todo Estado Parte en el Pacto que llegue a ser parte en el presenteProtocolo reconoce la competencia del Comité para recibir y considerar comunicaciones de individuos que se hallen bajo la jurisdicción de ese Estado y que aleguen ser víctimas de una violación, por ese Estado Parte, de cualquiera de los derechos enunciados en el Pacto”. No están comprendidas las personas jurídicas. El Comité de Derechos Humanos (en adelante “CDH” o “el Comité”) ha establecido que, de acuerdo con la disposición citada, solamente los individuos pueden presentar comunicaciones ante dicho órgano24. Asimismo, en la Observación general número 31 del CDH se establece que “[l]os beneficiarios de los derechos reconocidos por el Pacto son los individuos”25. En varias resoluciones el Comité de Derechos Humanos ha reiterado que, “independientemente de que pareciera que los alegatos tengan relación con cuestiones del Pacto”26, las personas jurídicas no cuentan con legitimación activa ante dicho órgano y asimismo que quien presenta la comunicación debe ser al mismo tiempo la víctima de la violación de derechos alegada27.32.Distinta es la situación a la luz de la Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación Racial (CERD), la cual hace referencia expresa a derechos de los cuales serían titulares “grupos de personas o instituciones”28. En desarrollo de lo anterior, el Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial ha establecido que las personas jurídicas pueden denunciar violaciones que afecten sus derechos, siempre y cuando éstas hayan sido perjudicadas y puedan considerarse víctimas del caso29. En este sentido, el Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial ha reconocido la legitimación de las personasjurídicas para presentar denuncias de violaciones a sus propios derechos y también de violaciones a los derechos de sus miembros, accionistas y propietarios, tanto de manera individual como colectiva30. 33.La posibilidad de presentación de comunicacionesen que cualquier persona que esté bajo la jurisdicción de un Estado Parte en el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (en adelante “PIDESC”) alegue ser víctima de una violación de cualquiera de los DESC enunciados en el Pacto no estaba prevista en el texto original del Pacto. Existe recién desde la entrada en vigor del Protocolo Facultativo de dicho, que tuvo lugar el 5 de mayo de 2013, y son muy escasos los Estados que lo han ratificado. Por lo tanto, no existe aún una prácticaque resulte pertinente para la presente opinión consultiva. Según el art. 2, “Las comunicaciones podrán ser presentadas por personas o grupos de personas 24CDH,V.S. Vs. Bielorrusia, No. 1749/2008. 31 de octubre de 2011, párr. 7.3.25CDH,Observación general No. 31. 26 de mayo de 2004, párr. 9.26CDH, A newspaper publishing Company Vs. Trinidad y Tobago, No. 360/1989. 14 de julio de 1989, párr. 3.2; Apublication Company and A printing Company Vs. Trinidad y Tobago, No. 361/1989. 14 de julio de 1989;J.R.T. y el Partido W.G. Vs. Canadá, No. 104/1981. 6 de abril de 1983.27CDH, A Group of Association For the Defenceof The Rights of Disabled and Handicapped Persons in Italy Vs. Italia, No. 163/1984. 10 de Abril de 1984, párr. 6.2.28Por ejemplo, el artículo 2.1.a de la Convención establece que: “1. Los Estados partes condenan la discriminación racial y se comprometen a seguir, por todos los medios apropiados y sin dilaciones, una política encaminada a eliminar la discriminación racial en todas sus formas y a promover el entendimiento entre todas las razas, y con tal objeto: a) Cada Estado parte se compromete a no incurrir en ningún acto o práctica de discriminación racial contra personas, grupos de personas o institucionesya velar por que todas las autoridades públicas e instituciones públicas, nacionales y locales, actúen en conformidad con esta obligación”.(Cursiva añadida.)29CERD, The Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination (DACRD) Vs. Dinamarca, No. 28/2003. Declarado inadmisible el 26 de agostode 2003 y CERD,Caso Comunidad Judía de Oslo y Otros Vs. Noruega,No. 30/2003. 15 de agostode 2005, párr. 7.4.30CERD, TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg Vs. Alemania, No. 48/2010. 26 de febrero de 2013, párrs. 11.2 y 11.3.
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14que se hallen bajo la jurisdicción del Estado Parte y que aleguen ser víctimas de una violación por ese Estado Parte de cualquiera de los derechos enunciados en la Convención, o en nombre de esas personas o grupos de personas”. Ni en el Pacto ni en el Protocolo Facultativo existe una disposición análoga al art. 1.2 de la Convención Americana. Tampoco existen disposiciones que otorguen derechos a personas jurídicas.34.Tampoco existen disposiciones de esa índole en la Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (en adelante “CEDAW”). El artículo 2 del Protocolo Facultativo de la CEDAW también prevé la posibilidad de que se presenten comunicaciones en términos idénticos a los mencionados en el párrafo anterior, es decir, por personas o grupos de personas que aleguen ser víctimas31. Hasta la fecha no se han presentado comunicaciones de personas jurídicas ante el Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer.d)Conclusión sobre los tribunales y organismos internacionales35.La Corte constata que sólo se reconocen derechos a las personas jurídicasen los sistemas en que ello se establece a texto expreso: el sistema europeo (supra, párrs. 25 a 28) y la Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación Racial (CERD) (supra, párr. 32). La Convención Americana no tiene ningún texto análogo, y en cambio es el único tratado sobre derechos humanos que contiene una disposición como el art. 1.2.iv)Reconocimiento de derechos a personas jurídicas en el derecho interno36.En el derecho interno de numerosos países que han aceptadola competencia de la Corte se reconocen a las personas jurídicas derechos fundamentales, que pueden coincidir con los consagrados en la Convención Americana. Según la información analizada por este Tribunal, los derechos que comúnmente32se lesreconocen a las personasjurídicas son los de propiedad33, libertad de expresión34, petición35y asociación36. Esos derechos 31“Las comunicaciones podrán ser presentadas por personas o grupos de personas que se hallen bajo la jurisdicción del Estado Parte y que aleguen ser víctimas de una violación por ese Estado Parte de cualquiera de los derechos enunciados en la Convención, o en nombre de esas personas o grupos de personas. Cuando se presente una comunicación en nombre de personas o grupos de personas, se requerirá su consentimiento, a menos que el autor pueda justificar el actuar en su nombre sin tal consentimiento”.32Otros derechos que la Corte constató que se le reconocen a personas jurídicas en la región son, inter alia: a las garantías judiciales, al debido proceso, legalidad, de audiencia, a la seguridad jurídica, a la información pública,de reunión,a lainviolabilidaddelacorrespondenciaydemásformasdecomunicaciónprivada,alainviolabilidaddedomicilio,a solicitar la rectificación, actualización, inclusión o supresión de los datos personales que le corresponda, a la personalidad, allibredesarrollodelapersonalidad,alalibertaddeenseñanza,a la libertad religiosa o de creencias, a la libertad de contratación,a la libertad de trabajo,a libertad de empresa, comercio e industria,a la libre competencia,afundar medios de comunicación, a fundar centros educativos, alaigualdad,albuennombre,alahonra,yalhabeasdata.33Al respecto ver: artículo 16 Constitución de Barbados; artículos 14 y 56 de la Constitución de Bolivia; Sentencia No. T-396/9316 de septiembre 1993 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia; Sentencia: 00128 Expediente: 98-000128-0004-CI Fecha: 16/12/1998 Emitido por: Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Costa Rica; artículo 2 de la Constitución y Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Proceso de Amparo 948-2008, sentencia de 9 de marzo de 2011 de El Salvador; artículo 39 de la Constituciónde Guatemala; artículo 55 de la Constitución de Haití; Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México Contradicción de Tesis 360/2013, Fecha de resolución: sesionado el 21/04/2014; artículos 103 y 14 de la Constitución de Nicaragua; Exp. n.° 4972-2006-pa/tc, La libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú; artículo 47 de la Constitución de Panamá, y artículo 34 de la Constitución de Surinam; Tribunal Constitucional de República Dominicana, Sentencia TC/0242/13. Expediente núm. TC-05-2012-0143, relativo al recurso de revisión en materia de amparo incoado por Residencial La Esmeralda, contra la Sentencia núm. 192-2012, dictada por la Primera Sala del Tribunal Superior Administrativo, 26 de octubre de 2012 Annex 123
15no siempre se garantizan para todo tipo de personas jurídicas, dado a que algunos de los mencionados están orientados a proteger sólo a personas jurídicas de determinados tipos como los sindicatos37, los partidospolíticos38, los pueblos indígenas39, las comunidades afrodescendientes40o instituciones o grupos específicos41. [Yo preferiría eliminar la mayoría de las notas al pie, habida cuenta de que este reconocimiento interno no es pertinente para la interpretación de la Convención Americana]37.Asimismo, la Corte nota que en gran parte de los países de la región a las personas jurídicas se les otorga la posibilidad de interponer una acciónde amparo o recursos análogos en defensa de los derechos que les son reconocidos42.38.Sin embargo, el reconocimiento en el derecho interno de ciertos derechos de las personas jurídicas, o de algunas de ellas, no es determinante para la interpretación de la Convención Americana. La posición que los Estados hayan adoptado en su derecho interno no habilita para modificar el sentido y el alcance del artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana.39.Por otra parte, este Tribunal observa que tres de los seis Estadosque presentaron observaciones escritas –Argentina43, Colombia44y Guatemala45– http://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentos… respecto ver: artículo 35 de la Constitución de Guatemala; Sentencia No. T-396/9316 de septiembre 1993 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia; Exp. n.° 4972-2006-pa/tc, La libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú, y artículo 26 de la Constitución de Paraguay.35Sentencia No. T-396/9316 de septiembre 1993 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de El Salvador, Proceso de amparo 103-2006, sentencia de 7 de noviembre de 2008; artículo 80 de la Constitución de Honduras; Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México Contradicción de Tesis 360/2013, Fecha de resolución: sesionado el 21/04/2014, Exp. n.° 4972-2006-pa/tc, La libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú; artículo 41 de la Constitución de Panamá, y artículo 40 de la Constitución de Paraguay.36Artículo 34 de la Constitución de Guatemala; Sentencia No. T-396/9316 de septiembre 1993 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia; Sentencia: 15060 Expediente: 08-007986-0007-CO Fecha:08/09/2010 Emitido por: Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema deCosta Rica; Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de El Salvador, Proceso Constitucional 23-R-96, Ramírez y Marcelino vrs. Concejo Municipal de San Juan Opico, sentencia de 8 de octubre de 1998; artículo 31 de la Constitución de Haití; Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México Contradicción de Tesis 360/2013, Fecha de resolución: sesionado el 21/04/2014, y Exp. n.° 4972-2006-pa/tc, La libertad, Corporación Meier S.A.C. y Persolar S.A.C. del Tribunal Constitucional delPerú.37Bolivia, Brasil, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, Surinam.38Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Haití, Honduras, Panamá39Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay40Bolivia, Nicaragua41En Perú: universidades, institutos superiores y demás centros educativos. En Chile: iglesias, confesiones e instituciones religiosas. En Nicaragua: centros educativos privados de orientación religiosa, así como universidades y centros de educación técnica superior; medios de comunicación social y respecto de ciertas importaciones y prohibición de censura previa; asimismo, en Nicaragua se otorga el derecho a organizaciones de “campesinos y demás sectores productivos” a participar mediante sus propias en la definición de políticas de transformación agraria. En Panamá se le reconoce derechos a la Universidad Oficial de Panamá42Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, México, Perú, Paraguay, República Dominicana y Uruguay.43Argentina manifestó que “el artículo 1 (2) excluye toda posibilidad de que una persona jurídica se presente como víctima ante los órganos de protección del Sistema Interamericano. Se trata de una disposición que ha sido concebida con el claro sentido de restringir el acceso al Sistema exclusivamente a las personas físicas”Observaciones escritas del Estado argentino (expediente de fondo, folio 1918).44Colombia afirmó que “a la luz del derecho internacional vigente para la región americana, la idea de otorgarle derechos humanos a las personas jurídicas derivados de los instrumentos internacionales que componen el SIDH no es admisible por resultar contraria a los preceptos legales que rigen el Sistema mismo”. Observaciones escritas del Estado colombiano (expediente de fondo, folio 1863).45Guatemala indicó que “de ninguna manera pueden ser reconocidos derechos humanos a las personas jurídicas o colectivas dentro del Marco de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos y Deberes Annex 123
16manifestaron enfáticamente su posición, según la cual el artículo 1.2 de la Convención no confiere titularidad de derechos a las personas jurídicas. Además, México46se sumó a estaposición durante su participación en la audiencia pública de la presente solicitud. Estos cuatro Estados reconocen derechos a las personas jurídicas en su sistema interno.D.Medios complementarios de interpretación40.Según el artículo 32 de la Convención de Viena, los medios complementarios de interpretación, en especial los trabajos preparatorios del tratado, son utilizables, en particular, para confirmar el sentido resultante de la aplicación del artículo 31, o para determinar el sentido cuando la interpretación dada de conformidad con el artículo 31 “deje ambiguo u oscuro el sentido” o “conduzca a un resultado manifiestamente absurdo o irrazonable”. En el presente caso no existe ambigüedad u oscuridad ni resultado manifiestamente absurdo o irrazonable, de modo que la utilización de los trabajos preparatorios se dirige a confirmar la interpretación fundada en el sentido corriente de los términos y el análisis del contexto y del objeto y fin de la Convención Americana.41.Y efectivamente el examen de los escuetos trabajos preparatorios confirma el sentido en que se ha venido interpretando el artículo 1.2 de la Convención, dado que en ellos se utilizaron los términos “persona” y “ser humano” sin la intención de hacer una diferencia entre estas dos expresiones47: “persona es todo ser humano”. Los trabajos preparatorios demuestran que el texto del párrafo 2 del artículo 1 fue propuesto desde el inicio (con la sola diferencia de que entonces era el párrafo 3, pues el párrafo 2 era un texto análogo al actual art. 2) y que solo hubo “un breve cambio de opiniones”, al cabo del cual fue “aprobado por unanimidad”48.E.Conclusión final42.La aplicación de los criterios y medios de interpretación previstos en la Convención de Viena ha confirmado la interpretación delartículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana según la cual las personas jurídicas no están comprendidas en “el ámbito de protección de la Convención” y “la protección interamericana de los derechos humanos” sólo comprende a las personas físicas o naturales (supra, párr. 2). Las personas jurídicas no pueden ser consideradas como presuntas víctimas en el marco de los procesos contenciosos ante el sistema interamericano.”* * * del Hombre, de la Convención Americana […] y de sus Protocolos o instrumentos internacionales complementarios”. Observaciones escritas del Estado guatemalteco (expediente de fondo, folio 1538).46México señaló que “el artículo 1.2 […] señala que para los efectos de la Convención Americana persona es todo ser humano, lo expresado literalmente en el artículo 1.2 tiene efectos que van mucho más allá del ejercicio de interpretación, ya que constituye una manifestación expresa de la voluntad de las partes signatarias ala Convención Americana para definir el término persona, única y exclusivamente podría significar todo ser humano”. Observaciones orales del Estado mexicano en la audiencia pública de la presente opinión consultiva..47Caso ArtaviaMurillo y otros (Fecundación in vitro) Vs. Costa Rica. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 noviembre de 2012 Serie C No. 257, párr. 219.48En los trabajos preparatorios consta lo siguiente:” El PRESIDENTE p[uso] a consideración el párrafo 3 del artículo 1, el cual, después de un breve cambio de opiniones, es aprobado por unanimidad, en la forma siguiente: 3. Para los efectos de esta Convención, persona es todo ser humano”. Convención Acta de la segunda sesión de la Comisión I, Doc. 36, 11 de noviembre de 1969, p. 157.
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21.La propuesta que antecede no fue considerada por la Corte. A pesar de la fundamentación oral que hice acerca de su pertinencia y de la conveniencia de que las opiniones consultivas fuesen aprobadas sin votos disidentes, la mayoría de la Corte entendió que no se podía dedicar más tiempo al examen del proyecto de opinión consultiva, aunque asimismo resolvió terminar nuestras sesiones un día antes de lo previsto. En los seis años que duró mi mandato como juez de la Corte Interamericana, nunca me había encontrado frente a una situación como esta. Siempre que se formularon posiciones contrapuestas, se dedicó el tiempo necesario a la argumentación en un sentido o en el otro, y o bien se llegó a una solución de consenso, o bien se adoptó por mayoría una decisión razonada en un sentido y los jueces que mantenían opiniones divergentes pudieron expresarlas en sus votos, si así lo desearon. Jamás se adoptó una decisión mayoritaria fundada solo en la alegación de falta de tiempo y no en la opción razonada en favor de unade las argumentaciones contrapuestas.V.NO SE PUEDE OPINAR SOBRE SINDICATOS SIN TENER EN CUENTA A LA OIT22.La opinión consultiva hace una interpretación de las disposiciones del Protocolo de San Salvador relativas a sindicatos y derechos sindicales. Establece, en el punto 4 de su parte dispositiva, que “El artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo de San Salvador otorga titularidad de derechos a los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones, lo cual les permite presentarse ante el sistema interamericano en defensade sus propios derechos en el marco de lo establecido en dicho artículo, en los términos establecidos en los párrafos 85 y 105 de la presente Opinión Consultiva.”23.El párrafo 85 recuerda la fecha de aprobación del Protocolo de San Salvador e indica cuántosEstados han ratificado dicho Protocolo hasta la fecha. Asimismo transcribe el Artículo 8.1.a), que dispone: “el derecho de los trabajadores a organizar sindicatos y a afiliarse al de su elección, para la protección y promoción de sus intereses. Como proyección de este derecho, los Estados partes permitirán a los sindicatos formar federaciones y confederaciones nacionales y asociarse a las ya existentes, así como formar organizaciones sindicales internacionales y asociarse a la de su elección. Los Estados partes también permitirán que los sindicatos, federaciones y confederaciones funcionen libremente”. 24.El párrafo 105 dice lo siguiente: “En virtud de lo anteriormente expuesto, la Corte ha concluido la titularidad de los derechos establecidos en el artículo 8.1.a del Protocolo de los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones, lo cual les permite presentarse ante el sistema interamericano en defensa de sus propios derechos. Ahora bien, en este punto la Corte considera relevante recordar que en razón de lo dispuesto por el artículo 44 de la Convención Americana, los sindicatos, las federaciones y las confederaciones legalmente reconocidos en uno o más Estados Parte de la Convención, formen o no parte del Protocolo de San Salvador, pueden presentar peticiones individuales ante la Comisión Interamericana en representación de sus asociados, en caso de una presunta violación de los derechos de sus miembros por un Estado Parte de la Convención Americana.”25.Ninguno de los párrafos indicados contiene una verdadera fundamentación del punto dispositivo 4. Resulta temerario aventurarse a dar una interpretación de disposiciones que hasta ahora la Corte no ha tenido oportunidad de considerar en ejercicio de su competencia contenciosa. Asimismo, tratándose de un tema respecto del cual la organización internacional Annex 123
18con competencia específica en la materia es la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), se debió haber examinado y expuesto la posición de dicha organización. Nada de eso se hizo. Peor aún, se citó el Convenio N° 87 de OIT relativo a la Libertad Sindical y a la Protección del Derecho de Sindicación, sin tener en cuenta que –como lo hice notar en las deliberaciones a este respecto–dicho Convenio no reconoce la personería jurídica de los sindicatos y las federaciones o confederaciones de sindicatos, sino que en su artículo 7 dispone que “La adquisición de la personalidad jurídica por las organizaciones de trabajadores y empleadores, sus federaciones y confederaciones, no puede estar sujeta a condiciones cuyanaturaleza limite la aplicación de las disposiciones de los artículos 2,3 y 4 de este Convenio". Tampoco se aceptó considerar si la personería jurídica en sentido tradicional es necesaria para el ejercicio de los derechos sindicales de los trabajadores, ni la distinción entre personería sindical o gremial (que se reconoce al sindicato que en su ámbito territorial y personal de actuación sea la más representativa) y personería jurídica(que pueden tener –o no–todos los sindicatos existentes en una misma rama de actividad). Esa distinción se hace nítidamente, por ejemplo, enel derecho argentino61.VI.EL CASO DE LAS COMUNIDADES INDÍGENAS26.La rica e innovadora jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana en materia decomunidades indígenasy tribales, y en particular el reconocimiento del derecho a la propiedad colectiva de la tierra ancestral, puede interpretarse como un reconocimiento de los derechos fundamentales de los seres humanos que integran dichas comunidades,y no como un derecho fundamental de las comunidades mismas. Si bien algunas sentencias recientes parecen inclinarse en el segundo sentido, no me parece que se trate de un criterio jurisprudencial específicamente fundamentado y consolidado definitivamente como para incluir en una opinión consultiva. Ello es así, en particular, habida cuenta de que entre las consultas específicas de Panamá no se hace referencia a las comunidades indígenas, sino sobre “una organización indígena (persona jurídica)”, y ello en relación con el agotamiento de los recursos internos “en nombre de sus miembros”.VII.CONCLUSIONES27.Las razones expuestas con amplitud en el texto que antecede justifican el voto negativo que emití respecto de varios de los puntos resolutivos. En cambio, voté afavor del punto resolutivo 1, a pesar de discrepar con la fundamentación contenida en los párrafos 37 a 70, porque en el debate se logró que su texto tuviera la claridad, la concisión y la contundencia necesarias según el razonamiento expuesto en este voto. 6Ley N° 23.551, sancionada el 23 de marzo de 1988 y promulgada el 14 de abril de 1988. El artículo 14 bis de la Constitución de la República dispone, en lo pertinente, lo siguiente: “El trabajo en sus diversas formas gozará de la protección de las leyes, las que asegurarán al trabajador: […] organización sindical libre y democrática, reconocida por la simple inscripción en un registro especial. Queda garantizado a los gremios: concertar convenios colectivos de trabajo; recurrir a la conciliación y al arbitraje; el derecho de huelga. Los representantes gremiales gozarán de las garantías necesarias para el cumplimiento de su gestión sindical y las relacionadas con la estabilidad de su empleo.”
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19Alberto Pérez PérezJuezPablo Saavedra AlessandriSecretario
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Volume IV - Annexes