Annexes

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
CERTAIN IRANIAN ASSETS
(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
ANNEXES TO THE OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
ON THE U.S. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
SUBMITTED BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
01 SEPTEMBER 2017
IN THE NAME OF GOD
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
CERTAIN IRANIAN ASSETS
(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
ANNEXES TO THE OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
ON THE U.S. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
SUBMITTED BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
01 SEPTEMBER 2017
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I – U.S. LEGISLATIVE ACTS
Annex 1 U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Banking Committee’s
Investigation of the Atlanta Branch BNL, Congressional
Record, 102nd Congress (1991-1992), 2 March 1992 (excerpts)
p. 1
Annex 2 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000,
Title IX of Public Law 106 387 (28 October 2000)
p. 5
PART II – U.S. EXECUTIVE ACTS
Annex 3 OFAC General License D (authorizing the exportation and
reexportation to persons in Iran of certain services, software, and
hardware incident to the exchange of personal communication,
subject to certain limitations), effective on 30 May 2013
p. 13
Annex 4 OFAC Final Rule (adding to the Iran Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations general licenses authorizing the importation into the
United States of, and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin
foodstuffs and carpets and related transactions), effective
21 January 2016
p. 17
Annex 5 OFAC General License I (authorizing certain transactions
related to the negotiation of, and entry into, contingent contracts
for activities eligible for authorization under the statement of
licensing policy for activities related to the export or re-export
to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and
services), dated 24 March 2016
p. 23
Annex 6 31 CFR, Section 560.530 (as of 01 July 2016) p. 27
PART IV – U.S. COURTS DECISIONS
Annex 7 United States of America v. Yousef et al., Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, 4 April 2003, 327 F.3d 56 (excerpts)
p. 35
PART V – IRANIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS
Annex 8 Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the Fifty-second
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York,
22 September 1997
p. 55
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Annex 9 Statement by H.E. Seyed Mohammad Khatami, Former
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the 53rd session
of the United Nations General Assembly, New York,
21 September 1998
p. 91
Annex 10 Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rohani, President of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, before the Sixty-Eight Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 September 2013
p. 99
PART VI – PRESS ARTICLES
Annex 11 K. Timmerman, “Europe’s Arms Pipeline to Iran”, The Nation,
Vol. 245, 18 July 1987
p. 109
Annex 12 Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Exclusive Issue, Autumn 1991
(excerpts)
p. 117
Annex 13 M. Waas & D. Frantz, “Abuses in US Aid to Iraqis Ignored”,
Los Angeles Times, 22 March 1992
p. 121
Annex 14 Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, issue No. 294, December 1992
(excerpts)
p. 127
Annex 15 Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Issue No. 295, February-March 1993
(excerpts)
p. 135
Annex 16 Henry Kissinger, “Clinton and the World,” News Week,
1 February 1993
p. 139
Annex 17 Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Issue No. 297, April 1993 (excerpts) p. 147
Annex 18 Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Issue No. 298, May 1993 (excerpts) p. 151
Annex 19 G. A. Nader, “Interview with President Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani”, Middle East Insight, July-August 1995, Vol. XI,
No.5
p. 155
Annex 20 CRS Report for Congress, “Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups
and State Sponsors”, 9 August 1995 (excerpts)
p. 165
Annex 21 R. Smith and T. Lippman, “White House Agrees to Bill
Allowing Covert Action Against Iran”, The Washington Post,
22 December 1995
p. 169
Annex 22 S. Robinson, “Gingrich in call to arms against Iran terror bases”,
The Daily Telegraph, 5 August 1996
p. 175
Annex 23 “Transcript of interview with Mohammad Khatami, Former
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, CNN, 7 January 1998
p. 179
Annex 24 R. Wright, “Some See Hypocrisy in U.S. Stand on Iraq Arms
Mideast: Officials say American intelligence aided Baghdad's
use of chemical weapons against Iran in 80s”, Los Angeles
Times, 16 February 1998
p. 193
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Annex 25 “Riyadh accepts for first time that bombers of US base were
Saudi”, Agence France Press, 21 May 1998
p. 197
Annex 26 S. Galster, “Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War
– Afghanistan: the Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990”, The
National Security Archive, 9 October 2001
p. 201
Annex 27 R. Erlich, “U.S. Tells Iran: Become a Nuclear Power”, Foreign
Policy in Focus, 28 November 2007
p. 223
Annex 28 “Obama says on Iran all options on the table”, Reuters, 21 April
2009
p. 231
Annex 29 J. Becker, “U.S. Approved Business with Blacklisted Nations”,
New York Times, 23 December 2010
p. 235
Annex 30 J. Becker, “Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the
Gamut”, New York Times, 24 December 2010
p. 243
Annex 31 Z. Goldfarb, “Firms licensed to do business in countries on U.S.
terror list”, The Washington Post, 24 December 2010
p. 263
Annex 32 S. M. Hersh, “Our Men in Iran”, The New Yorker, 5 April 2012 p. 267
Annex 33 D. Rohde, “The Iraq Takeaway: American Ground Invasions
Destabilize the Middle East”, The Atlantic, 20 March 2013
p. 271
Annex 34 National Security Archive, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran
Coup”, 19 August 2013
p. 275
Annex 35 “Iran, U.S. to open joint Chamber of Commerce: Report”,
Agence France Presse, 27 November 2013
p. 287
Annex 36 I. Tharoor, “Iraq’s Crisis: Don’t Forget the 2003 U.S. Invasion”,
The Washington Post, 5 April 2014
p. 291
Annex 37 D. Hussain, “ISIS: The “Unintended Consequences” of the USled
War on Iraq”, Foreign Policy Journal, 23 March 2015
p. 295
Annex 38 R. LoBianco & E. Landers, “Trump: Clinton, Obama 'created
ISIS'”, CNN, 3 January 2016
p. 301
Annex 39 K. Ng, “Donald Trump says Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
‘created Isis’”, The Independent, 3 January 2016
p. 305
Annex 40 “U.S. to buy heavy water from Iran's nuclear program”, Reuters,
22 April 2016
p. 309
Annex 41 “Boeing seals $16,6 billion deal with Iran Air”, AP,
11 December 2016
p. 313
Annex 42 “Iran Open to Business Ties with US”, Financial Tribune,
19 January 2017
p. 317
Annex 43 “Boeing Co. says it signed new $3 billion deal with Iranian
airline”, AP, 4 April 2017
p. 321
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Annex 44 D. Chaitin, “Sen. John McCain meets with Iranian dissidents
relocated to Albania”, Washington Examiner, 15 April 2017
p. 325
Annex 45 F. Zakaria, “How Saudi Arabia Played Donald Trump”, The
Washington Post, 25 May 2017
p. 329
Annex 46 J. Cook, “Trump Suggests Iran Brought Deadly Terrorist
Attacks Upon Itself”, Huffingtonpost.com, 7 June 2017
p. 333
Annex 47 Z. Jilani & R. Grim, “Bucking Bernie Sanders, Democrats Move
Forward on Iran Sanctions After Terror Attack in Tehran”, The
Intercept, 7 June 2017
p. 337
Annex 48 I. Tharoor, “Terror in Iran reveals the hypocrisy of Trump and
his allies”, The Washington Post, 8 June 2017
p. 341
Annex 49 D. Smith & S. Siddiqui, “Gulf crisis: Trump escalates row by
accusing Qatar of sponsoring terror”, The Guardian, 9 June
2017
p. 345
Annex 50 “Iranian airline finalizes deal to purchase 60 Boeing planes”,
AP, 10 June 2017
p. 349
Annex 51 N. Gaouette, D. Merica & R. Browne, “Trump: Qatar must stop
funding terrorism”, CNN, 10 June 2017
p. 353
Annex 52 P. Beaumont, “US signs deal to supply F-15 jets to Qatar after
Trump terror claims”, The Guardian, 15 June 2017
p. 359
Annex 53 R. Browne, “Amid diplomatic crisis Pentagon agrees $12 billion
jet deal with Qatar”, CNN, 15 June 2017
p. 363
Annex 54 National Security Archive, “Iran 1953: State Department Finally
Releases Updated Official History of Mosaddeq Coup”,
15 June 2017
p. 367
Annex 55 R. Shabad, “Senate passes measure to expand sanctions on Iran
and Russia”, www.cbsnews.com, 15 June 2017
p. 373
PART VII – OTHER DOCUMENTS
Annex 56 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997,
Department of State Publication 10535 (excerpts)
p. 377
Annex 57 I.R. Iran Customs Administration, Report on Commercial
Transactions with the United States of America, 2017
p. 387
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Annex 1
U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Banking Committee’s Investigation of the
Atlanta Branch BNL, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress (1991-1992),
2 March 1992
Excerpts: p. 860
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ll 860 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD .... HOUSE Marel:i. i, 1992
~ tntetests a.nd tbctr direct. &CIi ulsltlons
a! eit.her d1ttCt lnlerest or dlrC<:t
asset.s ue-aboUt 50 percent 'of tbe British
lnvestmêl:lt ln out counuy. we dQ
nQt heu rnuch . &bQut cha.t. Th1.t i5
soineth~ else that 1s ln the 1uri.sdtct!
Oll or. io~e ~ ,
Neverthèlc:ss. tbe Cooiml~ on
Ba.nk!n(, .Fln&noe a.nd G rban ' A!! a ln
b.&.C a responslbiUtY or racuslnc on the
needed lert.slatlon, tryinc t.o rea,;b a
le>'el of eonsclo=ess amone the ce&·
Jorit:, ot 01.1r. feUo'° <(J~ Mèmber:s to
the lmPort.a.n~ orJt and try t.o dnit
sucb lee{sla.t!on . û.Ji poe.s!ble und-ei'
O\/J' ~rt of· compromise procedurès a.s
"'ill be a:s heu u!èquate as lt ls hùmaruy
possible · to construCL.
. The rotiilnittee's lm-estle-ation .or
Bm partidpaUoo in Unlt.,,d States·
credlt pro.n:.-n.s has !ed to a br~der
look at th, United Sl.&tes . poile y
to...-ud Ira:i bea.1:3è of the tnazrutue!e or the Bl'<L =nd:i.l and the [ac:t lhat
ft tcuched ilpon neuly aJl . the élémènts
of .. t_he Uo!ted States polJcy
ton,rd [n.q. The BNL scindli.l she~ a
l"!'realinc ltght on United Stii.t.è:s-I.r:a.Q
relatlon3.
I aJso ,~t to rer:iind my colh:,acues
of ,;;h&t I · said la.st ,:-e,ek. that such
bank3 a.s BNL. si.ch b&nlt~ lLS most or
chose that ue m,•olvcd ln lntematlon·
al lnterest.s and· tr'ansac:tlons in our
country are rovemment ov.1\ed. BNL
1s 011.'?\ed b.7 th-!! Itlllftn Go\-ernmènt.
So · ,..e hue ~ery d~llcate add:t!oml
Questions a;bout ne.tional pollq, not
onlv our N:&tfon·s national polley but
that other country's ·national pollc,and
bow th~ Institutions !Jt ln or dld
not lnto th~ pollci,:s. ·
Durlni' las. -..eek:s speclal' on:!èr I
d~ the E:xlmoenll: program Cor
traq. ·
I sho,.,ed hoir: the Exlmbanlt t.;;.s
contlnuallr presscd by . the SUte De::;,
arunent and eçen l'rcsldent B~h. r.t
the tune Vice Pn:s!d()nt. but as I -0::Ul
indicate la.tu, enn a.(~r he tOOt. hls
oa.th or otlièe a.s President in 1989. he
"'a.s still i:,ushing for IraQ's aid.
u 13~0
'I"hls 1s crue; even thouch E>:i:nba.nk.
is charged by la~. t.nd ,., h:a,ve Jurisèictlon
o! the Eximbanl< that 1.·ill be a
rt:i.sona.ble ~ur:uice of rep&ylng ·
thosc d.,bLs.· Therc,!ore, I ha\·e l.sked
the OAO lo det.t!nnlne i! the Eximbank
\iOl&led its Ct\&rter by iTRJltinc
Ctedil LO !ra;(l.
Tod!.)' I v.·ill discuss the CoCll.énocfüy
Credit Corp0rati0n's e>:pon: promotion
progTam for Irae;.. 1 v:iU illustrw.te how
l he' Bush admirustra.tion ;:,!aeed inordl•.
r,ate imPort.ance on •the CCC pr=ni
for Iraq and _how the BNL =daJ a.1:
fec'led United St.atts policy towud
lnQ. .
An Octob<ir 1989 mcetln.g t>ctw(:en
Sccrel.3ry of Stat.e Ja..mes Sa.ku uid
l~I l'oreirn Minl..s tèr Ta.riq ~ illus-lr.>.
tès tha: point. The m3,in !oc:us or
that point turne<! out. t:o be. U,e BNL
sca.odaL
DW'inL th~ eor!y 1980's the. Unlùd
SU.t<'S pol:c;- to .. ·a.rc:1 Ir:i.q u·1.5 motl,·i.t•
ed b~· the far o( lr&nlan domltla,n.:c of
the Middle Eut.
Thcre is U>Other thîn& th&t ls lost
sta:ht o!. t.:\d l thlnk 1s Véry Uttle appreci&
ted in oui i:ounu-y. Inn l,; a. noc.
An.blc country. It 1s not an An.bic
coLiritrY. ll'Sll l.s. We tnt./.$t ttmember
the dtstioc:tlon.. because 1.Dl)à.ttlltly
·th.ose Lbat have 11:ottz.n a.li tbe notonety,
Crom Presidcot Reano to Cclonel
North and Secunt:, .Mh1scr McFarlane..
do Dot Rèlrl t.O rc&ll.ze that. They
played loto the ha.nds of people and
na.tlô~ that la\-e bl!eD at tnl', and
stUl con Unuè , ln a sta.~ or wa.r, :u:id
hue been lil a sta~ ot 'r.àr since 19-19;
thJs li. l.snd alld· i=i. · ·
Ulllcs:s we mow that. this . Middle
Ea.st l.s compl~ compUcated. bùt llke .
uiy Other ~lon of the . country,
Mlddle Eurot>è. or u ther saj, lri Germany,
Mitteleurop1., or the Pu ELst. ..-e s~tu co be t.Otally èlther aver:se or
UDa=re or uirrtlltn,- t.O be a,:;ve or
the tfeinendous corpus of hlstory tha.t
!s thcré. so our perception =not be a
correct on"' · ·
I bue a.1-..'ays · 3ald. even sl.D<:'e ttien.
chat ha.d v.·e ha.o:I the correct ~
Uon o! the countr:, '11:'e Y."ould not ha .-e
lost 54.000 soldien ln Koru 111d
sa.ooo ln Vieoeam. But thà.t ls aelther
here nor then:, The ollJy conoection
there- !s Ulat v.-e continue 1.1tll tbcse
nùs;>ei"ceptlons ln the Middle Eût.
H we lhinlt that v.-e are loored up;on
ll.S the sa11ors. let me assutt the M=be1'
3 th:at in the Middle East the Cli:ed.
rootcd percept.ion, -..·bether lt !il_ true
or not !s lmmaterial, the root.ed l)èt·
ceptlon 1s tha.t 11:e h1.ve ,tepi,ed lnto
the s.hoes o! the t-..-o dèp:t.r\ed colonial
PO-~ Fn.nce and Eneland. Be th:&t
wh aie ver lt ïs;
Til~ loeic tnu I report here ls ~t
:spelled out ln a 198¼ m=ort.odum 1.0
tben Vi« Prèsi~nt Bush rel.Lted. ta
hls elforts to hne the Exlmbank f inance
the ln.Qi AQab& pipeline
proJect. 1 a.m not golnc to lr..Q !rom it.
a.cd I bave a oopy o! the memorandum
whicli I wUI pl&oe, t.o&"ether ,i;Jt.h al!
th• docwnenLS. at the end of ms dis·
course -Lh!s moming.
I QUole: .
Th• ,....,·b<l•:«n lt-aq ï.nd lr:>n dimil>"
a!!«u c>ur vilal ln~ri:'st.11 Ln th< Mi<;ldle
&a.st. &lld p.,.ucubclr ln th• P<rsi;ui Cult.
Th!s !s Vice President Busn.
ou, ot>J,,c\J,·• 1s u, bnn.è Ult' ..-.u t.c> a n.,.
rollaU<i <nd ln .,..h(ch neithu bdl!,erent is
dotntna.nt a.nd t.M ""'·erelr:nLl' of bath 1s
pr=rved.
No,.., he l.s Vk:e President of a tegime
that ln lht me&nwhUe Ls also ·deaiing
thro1Jrh the so-ca.lled client st..tes.
evrn thoiigh Son,etimes client s1a.tc:s
beco:ne ma.st~"fs. such · a.s Israel. v:1th
Iran. a.nd therdore ·the bi, scanda.!
that l&ttr erupted. a.nd onl)• a pon:lon
o( that has been s~n. or the Lid o(
a:-ms to Iran.·
Sp ... e ...-ere foolish ehouih to thi.Iù:
thLL o;•e could be he!Pi.nlt e&ch one et
-Che ~mbaiant.s ..-lthout the other rea.
lwnc lt. Il ls absurd. Ô( course th.-y
kne,•. Thcrdorè. no respect.
1 u·ill cor.tinue. and I quole:
we· bd!~ TICI.Or'1 bJ' ell.ller slde W'TN14
1,a.., • kl'ioua -doea1&bllizl.clc dfect on u..
l'<:do~ . .
I ua roi~ to repe:at that:
W• bcl~•e 'rid,oq· bJ' etùià llld<; o:o,,ld l\a•• & .s<er1owi dcsl.&l>lll:lùlè erfecL on tt>e
~- Al l:lla point i..... 111 IM lmransir=t
p&ny. unw~ 1.o aecotla~ ln p&n. boca....,
We mw:t l.hereiore 11H& naè&N &.a bots«,r Il bel~'êl lt . ..,, win•. . . l:n Uw ...,. of ac_"'.' ·.?.ian. l Jraq's Lbilit.)' Uld r<:OG!ve "' wll.hsLuld =·
an llll.l.cks as ce.Il u ID coQ,in~ 1ran· thU
ronllnUlnr hon.llltlcs 1.1 ~less. .
Elne we leâraed anit,hlrii'~ No.
Tod-:a,y 11:e hàve beeo lnvohed l'1 begoli:
a..t.ions m0$tly to pay baclt some o!
the mon~7 that .I . spoke of that h&d
rone out of lra.n a.ad led te the ré~~
of tl':.e li,st bosta:res.. · ·
tt t:he Metnberi thlnk Ure relea.se of
t.he l:a..st hostaces wu Just. a.ccident&l..
let me :i.ssure · them that lt -.·a., : COil•
nect.ed, tjtJI our t,a~ent or aon:ie~
that hl.il been demanded, ànd ailnc:I•
dent.l.l "'1th tha.t.; al3o thuë 1s .11:t)Od
reason to lcri<>w th&t nrht · 110v. Irl.D .ts
also . belnr en:a.bl.ed · to cèt somè bel:>
t.hTOuch other countrles for anns ~
cilrernent..
Why ls· Inn buUdllle t.O suc:h :a.~
"'".ndaus point o! anas ab1Utr? \Vha.t
l.s its ~ ln the J\Clddle !:&St. ZIO"III tb.at
.we ba\-e oonq~red 1ra.Q and con_ider
lt 1. CODtb::niln& enem.Y? WhY ls lnll
bein( pumi,ed 11p ~e Uie:ie m~
lndic.ate we wère doblè wit.b. t.be es.se
. c! Iraq on th:at oc:c:a.sloa?.
Wlth ~ broàd poUcJ and stra~
ùat [ hne .11:.st quot.ed ln lnlnd. the
polieymakecs sourb.t out a p&tll to
achle\-e tbose Co&1S- Sloce tbe a.dmlnls-
. tratJon h:ad :a.~ pollc:Y of ptohibltlng-
the :sale o( Ontl.ed StaUS millta.n>
h:u-d'4-in, df.t=tl:i' to •Iraq, the optlO{IS
. &\-a.ila.ble t.o =!St. Iraq , ·er-e llaùcee!.
The administration ctiose . to · wist
l~ by l)r0\idlnr fln&.nel.&I ~ -
In detennlnine ho,.. ~ asslst Iraq nnancia.
lly; a Ma,ch lli. 1983, tntenu.l
S1..1.t.e Del)IU'tme'nt memo t.o SecttUry
or Sta~e Oeoqe Shults st.&tes. and I
quote:
Th•re à.re L1'"0 i>è='!>IHU"5 Cor lh• omcw
c~IL ror Irati: <al I:ximbar,lr; prOJl"lrn: {Dl
ccè Dleridèd crêc:11.s or ru .. rantca ter a.c,-1.
cultUn.l' Ul>Ol"'.,S.
An 0(-tober 31. 19e3. Stal~ D<'P&n·
menl c:able sho"'s the bc:nefits cf- suC"h
:. slrateo-. and_l quote:
ln eon.tidel'lnt 1L'L1' lO build lntar.ationa.
eorulde!'>~ tll ln.Q's economlc ...,4 11.n&nà11
future . .,.,. should rh-e «nous l.hous:ht ioc:t
eriJlc &xi:nbà.nlr. c:,edlU. N •• O.S. credlts.
ln o:>mblnatlot1 -.rtth O\Z1' CCC -~ "1.ll
dc·:norut~te O'.S. con!ldenc-è ln the tn.i,
e-ccnornY; Thls ln ·c.urn èou'ld e:ntou~
oU.u coun~l.ci · t.o pro11de wn!l.u &Wsl.·
a.nce. Suèb concrel..è demoQ.5tn.t1ons of .sup.
port cou jd ~, pressure on lnq,
I.ncreaslng lr:a.Q's = to credit a.1-
lowed it to !eed its people on borro'lled
mocey, Ulus !reeinr scarce !ore~ e.x•
c h .:i.nee. t.o pim:fu.se millt.ary hud-.·a.rc
to Ci&hl thé. V.'.ar r.plrut lt'UL
M I sali:! l:Ut .9'eek.' tl\e Exlmbank
,.,-a.s rei)Cateclly pl"esSured by Uie Satc
Dcparunent t.o oi:,m St.a procra,m to
I~q. On t-tir~ sepu-:1.!,e ocns!ons
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Annex 2
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Title IX of Public
Law 106 387 (28 October 2000)
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PUBLIC LAW 106-387- APPENDIX 114 STAT. 1549A-67
TITLE IX- TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT
ENHANCEMENT
SEC. 901. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act of 2000".
SEC. 902. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.-The term "agricultural
commodity" bas the meaning given the term in section 102
of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
(2) AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM.-The term "agricultural program"
means-
(A) any program administered under the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C.
1691 et seq.);
(B) any program administered under section 416 of
the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7 U.S.C. 1431);
(C) any program administered under the Agricultural
Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.);
(D) the dairy export incentive program administered
under section 153 of the Food Security Act of 1985 (15
U.S.C. 713a- 14);
(E) any commercial export sale of agricultural commodities;
or
(F) any export financing (including credits or credit
guarantees) provided by the United States Government
for agricultural commodities.
(3) JOINT RESOLUTION.-The term "joint resolution"
means-
(A) in the case of section 903(a)(l), only a joint resolution
introduced within 10 session days of Congress after
the date on which the r eport of the President un der section
903(a)(l) is received by Congress, the matter after the
resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress
approves the report of the President pursuant to section
903(a)(l) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000, transmitted on---~--·",
with the blank completed with the approp1;ate ate; and
(B) in the case of section 906(1), only a joint resolution
introduced within 10 session days of Congress after the
date on which the report of the President under section
906(2) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving
clause of which is as follows: "That Congress approves
the report of the President pursuant to section 906(1) of
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
of 2000, transmitted on ~--,--.--,---·", with the blank
completed with the appropriate date.
(4) MEDICAL DEVJCE.- The term "medical device" bas the
meaning given the term "device" in section 201 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(5) MEDICJNE.- The term "medicine" has the meaning given
the tenn "drug" in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(6) UNILATERAL AGRICULTURAL SANCTION.-The tenn "unilateral
agricultural sanction" means any prohibition, restriction,
- 8 -
114 STAT. 1549A- 68 PUBLIC LAW 106- 387- APPENDIX
or condition on carrying out an agricultural program with
respect to a foreign country or foreign entity that is imposed
by the United States for reasons of foreign policy or national
security, except in a case in which the United States imposes
the measure pw·suant to-
(A) a multilateral regime and the other member countries
of that regime have agreed to impose substantially
equivalent measures; or
(B) a mandatory decision of the United Nations Security
Council.
(7) UNILATERAL MEDICAL SANCTION.-The term "unilateral
medical sanction" means any prohibition, restriction, or condition
on exports of, or the provision of assistance consisting
of, rnedicine or a medical device with respect to a foreign
country or foreign entity that is imposed by the United States
for reasons of foreign policy or national security, except in
a case in which the United States imposes the measure pursuant
to-
(A) a multilateral regime and the other member countries
of that regime have agreed to impose substantially
equivalent measures; or
(B) a mandatory decision of the United Nations Security
Council.
SEC. 903. RESTRICTION.
(a) NEW SANCTIONS.- Except as provided in sections 904 and
905 and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President
may not impose a unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral
medical sanction against a foreign country or foreign entity,
unless-
(1) not later than 60 days before the sanct ion is proposed
to be imposed, the President submits a report to Congi-ess
that-
(A) describes the activity proposed to be prohibited,
restricted, or conditioned; and
(B) desc1ibes the actions by the for eign country or
foreign entity that justify the sanction; and
(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution stating
the approval of Congress for the report submitted under paragraph
(1).
(b) EXISTING SANCTIONS.- The President shall terminate any
unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction that
is in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 904. EXCEPTIONS.
Section 903 shall not affect any authority or requirement to
impose (or continue to impose) a sanction referred to in section
903-
(1) against a foreign country or foreign entity-
(A) pursuant to a declaration of war against the country
or entity;
(B) pursuant to specific statutory authorizat ion for the
use of the Armed Forces of the United States against
the country or entity;
(C) against which the Armed Forces of the United
States are involved in hostilities; or
- 9 -
PUBLIC LAW 106-387- APPENDIX 114 STAT. 1549A-69
(D) where imminent involvement by the Armed Forces
of the United States in hostilities against the country or
entity is clearly indicated by the circumstances; or
(2) to the extent that the sanction would prohibit, restrict,
or condition the provision or use of any agricultural commodity,
medicine, or medical device that is-
(A) controlled on the United States Munitions List
established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2778);
(B) controlled on any control list established under
the Export Administration Act of 1979 or any successor
statute (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.); or
(C) used to facilitate the development or production
of a chemical or biological weapon or weapon of mass
destruction.
SEC. 905. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.
Any unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction
that is imposed pursuant to the procedures described in section
903(a) shall terminate not later than 2 years after the date on
which the sanction became effective unless-
(1) not later than 60 days before the date of termination
of the sanction, the President submits to Congress a report
containing-
(A) the recommendation of the President for the
continuation of the sanction for an additional period of
not to exceed 2 years; and
(B) the request of the President for approval by Congress
of the recommendation; and
(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution stating
the approval of Congress for the report submitted under paragraph
(1).
SEC. 906. STATE SPONSORS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
(a) REQUIREMENT.-
(1) IN GENERAL.- Notwithstanding any other provision of
this t itle (other than section 904), the export of agricultural
commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Cuba or to the
government of a country that has been determined by the
Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism under section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 6(j )(l)
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405(j)(l )), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), or to any other entity in such a country,
shall only be made pursuant to 1-year licenses issued by the
United States Government for contracts entered into during
the 1-year period of the license and shipped within the 12-
month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract,
except that the requirements of such 1-year licenses
shall be no more restrictive than license exceptions administered
by the Department of Commerce or general licenses
administered by the Department of the Treasury, except that
procedures shall be in place to deny licenses for exports to
any entity within such country promoting international terrorism.
(2) ExcEPTION.- Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect
to the export of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical
- 10 -
114 STAT. 1549A-70 PUBLIC LAW 106-387-APPENDIX
devices to the Government of Syria or to the Government
of North Korea.
(b) QUARTERLY REPORTS.- The applicable department or agency
of the Federal Government shall submit to the appropria te congressional
committees on a quarterly basis a r eport on any activities
undertaken under subsection (a)(l) during the preceding calendar
quarter.
(c) BIENNIAL REPORTS.- Not later than 2 years after the date
of enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the applicable
department or agency of the Federal Government shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the operation
of the licensing system under this section for the preceding
2-year period, including-
(1) the number and types oflicenses applied for;
(2) the number and types oflicenses approved;
(3) the average amount of time elapsed from the date
of filing of a license application until the date of its approval;
(4) the extent to which the licensing procedures were effectively
implemented; and
(5) a description of comments received from interested parties
about the extent to which the licensing procedures were
effective, after the applicable department or agency holds a
public 30-day comment period.
SEC. 907. CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES.
(a) REFERRAL OF REPORT.- A report described in section
903(a)(l) or 905(1) shall be referred to the appropriate committee
or committees of the House of Representatives and to the appropriate
committee or committees of the Sena te.
(b) REFERRAL OF JOINT RESOLUTION.-
(1) IN GENERAL.- A joint resolution introduced in the Sen ate
shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
and a joint resolution introduced in the House of Representatives
shall be referred to the Committee on International Relations.
(2) REPORTING DATE.- Ajoint resolution referred to in paragraph
(1) may not be reported before the eighth session day
of Congress after the introduction of the joint resolution.
SEC. 908. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE AND FINANCING.
(a) PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES AsSISTANCE.-
(1) IN GENERAL.- Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no United States Government assistance, including United
States foreign assistance, United States export assistance, and
any United States credit or guarantees shall be available for
exports to Cuba or for commercial exports to Iran, Libya, North
Korea, or Sudan.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.- Nothing in paragraph (1)
shall be construed to alter, modify, or otherwise affect the
provisions of section 109 of the Cuban Liberty and Democr.atic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6039) or any
other provision of law r elating to Cuba in effect on the day
before the date of the enactment ofthis Act.
(3) WAIVER.- The President may waive the application of
paragraph (1) with respect to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and
Sudan to the degree the President determines that it is in
- 11 -
PUBLIC LAW 106-387- APPENDIX 114 STAT. 1549A- 71
the national security interest of the United States to do so,
or for humanitarian reasons.
(b) PROHIBITION ON FINANCING OF AGRICULTURAL SALES TO
CUBA.-
( 1) IN GENERAL.-No United States person may provide
payment or financing terms for sales of agricultural commodities
or products to Cuba or any person in Cuba, except in
accordance with the following terms (notwithstanding part 515
of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, or any other provision
oflaw):
(A) Payment of cash in advance.
(B) Financing by third country financial institutions
(excluding United States persons or Government of Cuba
entities), except that such financing may be confirmed or
advised by a United States financial institution.
Nothing in this paragraph authorizes payment terms or trade
financing involving a debit or credit to an account of a person
located in Cuba or of the Government of Cuba maintained
on the books of a United States depository institution.
(2) PENALTIES.- Any private person or entity that violates
paragraph ( 1) shall be subject to the penalties provided in
the Trading With the Enemy Act for violations under that
Act.
(3) ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT.-The President
shall issue such r egulations as are necessary to carry out this
section, except that the President, in lieu of issuing new r egulations,
may apply any regulations in effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act, pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy
Act, with respect to the conduct pr ohibited in paragraph (1).
(4) DEFINITIONS.-In this subsection-
(A) the term "financing" includes any Joan or extension
of credit;
(B) the term "United States depository institution"
means any entity (including its foreign branches or subsidiaries)
organized under the laws of any jurisdiction within
the United States, or any agency, office or branch located
in the United States of a foreign entity, that is engaged
primarily in the business of banking (including a bank,
savings bank, savings association, credit union, trust company,
or United States bank holding company); and
(C) the term "United States person" means the Federal
Government, any State or local government, or any private
person or entity of the United States.
SEC. 909. PROHIBITION ON ADDITIONAL IMPORTS FROM CUBA.
Nothing in this title shall be constmed to alter, modify, or
otherwise affect the provisions of section 515.204 of title 31, Code
of Federal Regulations, relating to the prohibition on the entry
into the United States of merchandise that: (1) is of Cuban origin;
(2) is or has been located in or transported from or through Cuba;
or (3) is made 01· de1;ved in whole or in part of any ar t icle which
is the growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba.
SEC. 910. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CERTAIN TRAVEL-RELATED
TRANSACTIONS WITH CUBA.
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF TRAVEL RELATING TO COMMERCIAL SALE
OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES.-The Secretary of the Treasury
- 12 -
114 STAT. 1549A- 72 PUBLIC LAW 106- 387- APPENDIX
shall promulgate regulations under which the travel-related transactions
listed in subsection (c) of section 515.560 of title 31, Code
of Federal Regulations, may be authorized on a case-by-case basis
by a specific license for travel to, from, or within Cuba for the
commercial export sale of agricultural commodities pursuant to
the provisions of this t itle.
(b) PROHIBITION ON TRAVEL RELATING TO TOURIST ACTNITIES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of
law or regulation, the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other
Federal official, may not authorize the travel-related transactions
listed in subsection (c) of section 515.560 of title 31,
Code of Federal Regulations, either by a general license or
on a case-by-case basis by a specific license for travel to, from,
or within Cuba for tourist activities.
(2) DEFTNTTTON.-ln this subsection, the term "tourist activities"
means any activity with respect to travel to, from, or
within Cuba that is not expressly authorized in subsection
(a) of this section, in any of paragraphs (1) through (12) of
section 515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, or
in any section referred to in any of such paragraphs (1) through
(12) (as such sections were in effect on June 1, 2000).
SEC. 911. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) IN GENERAL.- Except as provided in subsection (b), this
title shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act, and
shall apply thereafter in any fiscal year.
(b) EXISTING SANCTIONS.- ln the case of any unilateral agri<:ultural
sanction or unilateral medical sanction that is in effect as
of the date of enactment of this Act, this title shall take effect
120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and shall apply
thereafter in any fiscal year.
TITLE X- CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET
SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000".
SEC. 1002. FINDINGS OF CONGRESS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Consistent with the rights of the United States under
the World Trade Organization, injurious dumping is to be condemned
and actionable su bsidies which cause injury to domestic
industries must be effectively neutralized.
(2) United States unfair trade Jaws have as their purpose
the restoration of conditions of fair trade so that jobs and
investment that should be in the United States are not lost
through t he false market signais.
(3) The continued dumping or subsidization of imported
products after the issuance of antidumping orders or findings
or countervailing duty orders can frustrate the remedial purpose
of the laws by preventing market prices from returning
to fair Jevels.
(4) Where dumping or subsidization continues, domestic
producers will be reluctant to reinvest or rehire and may be
unable to maintain pension and health care benefits that conditions
of fair trade would permit. Similarly, small businesses
and Ame1;can farmers and ranchers may be unable to pay
- 13 -
Annex 3
OFAC General License D (authorizing the exportation and reexportation to persons
in Iran of certain services, software, and hardware incident to the exchange of
personal communication, subject to certain limitations), effective on 30 May 2013
- 14 -
- 15 -
~'"'"'" ;:?
CP°;?
43278 Ferlerai Register / Vol. 78, No. 139 / Friday, July 19, 2013 / Notices
Muhriz); DOB 17 Jan 1967; Passport
003308607 (Syria) (individual) [SYRIA]
On December 11, 2012, the Director of
OF AC identified two (2) entities as
falling within the definition of the
Government of Syria set forth in section
8(d) of Executive Ortler 13582. On July
13, 2013, the Director of OFAC
supplemented the identification
information for JAYSH AL- SHA'BI.
The listings on OF AC's list of
Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persans for the entities, whose
property and interests in property are
blocked , are as follows.
Entities
1. JA YSH AL-SHA'BI [a.k.a. ALSHA'BI
COMMITTEES; a.k.a. JA YSH
AL-SHAAB; a.k.a. JISH SHAABI; a.k.a.
SHA'BI COMMITTEES; a.k.a. SHA'BI
FORCE; a.k.a. SYRIAN NATIONAL
DEFENSE FORCE; a.k.a. SYRIAN
NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES; a.k.a.
"ARMY OF THE PEOPLE" ; a.k.a.
"PEOPLE'S ARMY"; a.k.a. "POPULAR
COMMITTEES"; a.k.a. "POPULAR
FORCES" ; a.k.a. "SHA'BI" ; a. k.a. "THE
POPULAR ARMY" ) [SYRIA].
2. SHABIHA [a.k.a. AL- SHABBIHAH;
a.k.a. SHABBIHA; a.k.a. SHABBIHAH;
a.k.a. SHABEEHA), Syria [SYRIA].
Dated: July 11, 2013.
Adam Szubin,
Director. Office of Foreign Assets Contrai.
[FR Doc. 2013-17135 Filed 7-18-13: 8:45 ami
BILLING CODE 4810-AL- P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Foreign Assets Contrai
Publication of Iran General License D
AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets
Contrai, Treasury.
ACTION: Notice, p ublication of general
license.
SUMMARY: The Oepartment of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Contrai ("OF AC") is publishing General
License D issued under the Iranian
transactions sanctions program on May
30, 2013. General License D authorizes
the exportation and reexportation ta
persans in Iran of certain services,
software, and hardware incident to the
exchange of persona! communications,
subject to certain limitations.
DATES: Effective Date: May 30, 2013.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Assistant Director for Sanctions
Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202- 622-
2490, Assistant Director for Licensing,
tel.: 202- 622- 2480, Assistant Director
for Policy, tel.: 202- 622- 2746, Assistant
Director fo r Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202-
622-4855, Office of Foreign Assets
Contrai, or Chief Cou nsel (Foreign
Assets Contrai), tel.: 202- 622- 2410,
Office of the General Counsel,
Departrnent of the Treasury,
Wash ington , OC 20220 (not toll free
numbers).
SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORMATION:
Electronic and Facsimile Availability
This document and additional
information concerning OF AC are
available from OFAC's Web s ite
(www.treasury.gov/ofac). Certain general
information pertaining to OF AC's
sanctions programs also is available via
facsimile through a 24-hour fax-ondemand
service, tel.: 202/ 622-0077.
Background
On May 30, 2013, OFAC issued
General License D under the Iranian
transactions sanctions program. At the
lime of ils issuance on May 30, 2013,
OF AC made General License D avaflable
on the OFAC Web site
(www.treasury.gov/ofac). With this
notice, OF AC is publishing General
License D in the Ferlera! Register.
GENERAL LICENSE D
General License With Respect ta the
Exportation and Reexportation of
Certain Services, Software, and
Hardware Incident ta the Exchange of
Person a/ Communications
(a) Effective May 30, 2013, to the
extent that such transactions are not
exempt from the p rohibitions of the
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 ("ITSR" ),
and subject to the restrictions set forth
in paragraph (b), the following
transactions are authorized:
(1) The exportation or reexportation ,
directly or indirectly, from the United
States or by U.S. persans, wherever
located , ta persans in Iran of fee-based
services incident to the exchange of
persona] communications over the
Internet , such as instant messaging, chat
an d email, social networking, sharing of
photos and movies, web browsing, and
blogging.
(2) The exportation or reexportation,
directly or indirectly, from the United
States or by U.S. persans, wherever
located , to persans in Iran of fee-based
software subject ta the Export
Administration Regulations, 15 CFR
parts 730 through 774 (the "EAR" ), that
is necessary to enable the services
described in paragraph (a)(l), provided
that such software is designated as
EAR99 under the EAR, or is classified
by the U.S. Department of Commerce on
the Commerce Contrai List, 15 CFR part
774, supp lement No. 1 ("CCL") under
export contrai classification n umber
("ECCN") 5O992.c.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPHS (a)(l) AND
(a)(2): See 31 CFR § 560.540 for provisions
relating to the exportation to persans in Iran
of publicly available, no-cost services
incident to the exchange of persona!
communications over the Internet and
publicly available, n o-cost software necessary
to enable such services.
(3) Ta the extent not au thorized by
paragraph (a)(2), the exportation or
reexportation, directly or indirectly,
from the United States or by U.S.
persans, wherever located , to persans in
Iran of certain software and hardware
that are subject to the EAR and incident
to persona] communications, as well as
related services, as specified in the
Annex ta this general license.
(4) The exportation or reexportation,
d irectly or indirectly, from the United
States or by U.S. persans, wherever
located, ta persans in Iran of consumergrade
Internet connectivity services and
the provision, sale, or leasing of
capacity on telecommunications
transmission facilities (such as satellite
or terrestrial network connectivity)
incident to persona! communications.
Note to Paragraph (a): The authorization
set Forth in paragraph (a) of this general
license extends to entities owned or
controlled by a Uni ted States persan and
established or maintained outside the United
States subject to the conditions set forth in
31 CFR § 560.556. Nothing in this general
license relieves the exporter from compliance
with the export license application
requirements of another Federal agency.
(b) This general license does not
authorize:
(1) The exportation or reexportation ,
directl y or indirectly, of the services,
software, or hardware specified in
paragraph (a) of this general license
with knowledge or reason ta know that
such services, software, or hardware are
intended for the Government of Iran.
(2) The exportation or reexportation,
directly or indirectly, of the services,
software, and hardware specified in
paragraph [a) of this general license to
any persan whose property and interests
in property are blocked pursuant to any
part of 31 CFR chapter V.
(3) The exportation or reexportation ,
directly or indirectly, of commercialgrade
Internet connecti vity services or
telecommunications transmission
facilities (su ch as dedicated satellite
links or dedicated lines that include
quality of service guaran tees).
(4) The exportation or reexportation,
directly or in directly, of web-hosting
services that are for purposes other than
persona! commun ications (e.g., webhosting
services for commercial
- 16 -
Ferlerai Register / Vol. 78, No. 139 / Friday, July 19, 2013 / Notices 43279
endeavorsl or of domain name
registration services.
(cl Effective May 30, 2013, transfers of
funds from Iran or for or on behalf of a
persan in Iran in furtherance of an
underlying transaction authorized by
paragraph (al of this general license may
be processed by U .S. depository
institutions and U.S. registered brok ers
or dealers in securities so long as they
are con sistent w ith 31 CFR § 560.516.1
and hardware incident to persona!
communications not sp ecified in
paragraph (al or the Annex to this
general license.
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)
5.)
6.)
7.)
8.)
9.)
10.)
11.)
(dl Specific licenses may be i ssued on
a case-by-case basis for the exportation
and reexportation of services, software,
Issued: May 30, 2013.
ANNEX-SERVICES, SOFTWARE, AND HARDWARE INCIDENT TO PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORIZED FOR
EXPORTATION AND REEXPORTATION TO IRAN BY PARAGRAPH (a) OF ITSR GENERAL LICENSE D
Mobile phones (including but not limited to smartphones). Persona! Digital Assistants (PDAs), Subscriber ldentity Module (SIM) cards
designated EAR99 or classified on the CCL under ECCN 5A992.c; drivers and connectivity software for such hardware designated
EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation of such hardware and software.
Satellite phones and Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5A992.c; demand
drivers and connectivity software for such hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for
the operation of such hardware and software.
Modems, network interface cards, radio equipment (including antennaes), routers, switches, and WiFi access points, designed for 50 or
fewer concurrent users, designated EAR99 or classified under ECCNs 5A992.c, 5A991.b.2, or 5A991.b.4; drivers, communications,
and connectivity software for such hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation
of such hardware and software.
Residential consumer satellite receive-only terminais, receiver equipment (including but not limited to antennaes, receivers, set-top boxes
and video decoders) designated EAR99 or classified under ECCNs 5A992.c, 5A991.b.2 or 5A991.b.4; drivers, communications, and
connectivity software for such hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation
of such hardware and software.
Laptops, tablets, and persona! computing devices, disk drives, data storage devices, computer peripherals, keyboards, and mice designated
EAR99 or classified on the CCL under ECCNs 5A992.c, 5A991 .b.2, 5A991.b.4 or 4A994.b; computer operating systems, and
software required for effective consumer use of such hardware, including software updates and patches, designated EAR99 or classified
under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation of such hardware and software.
Anti-virus and anti-malware software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of
such software.
Anti-tracking software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.
Mobile operating systems, online app stores, and related software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services
necessary for the operation of such software.
Anti-censorship tools and related software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation
of such software.
Virtual Private Networks, proxy tools, and fee-based persona! communications tools including voice, text, video, voice-over-lP telephony,
video chat, and successor technologies, and communications and connectivity software required for effective consumer use designated
EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.
Secure Sockets Layers (SSLs) designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such
software.
Dated: July 10, 2013.
Adam J. Szubin,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Contrai.
!FR Doc. 2013-17359 Filed 7-1 8-13: 8:45 ami
BILLING CODE 4810-AL-P
1 The authorization set forth in paragraph (c) of
this general license does not authorize any
transaction prohibited by any part of chapter V of
31 CFR other than part 560. Accordingly, the
transfer of funds may not be by, to, or through any
of the following: (1) A persan whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proli ferators
Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 544, or the
Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR
part 594; or (2) a person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to any
other part of 31 CFR chapter V, or any Executive
order, except an lranian financial institution whose
property and interests in property are blocked
solely pursuant to 31 CFR part 560.
- 17 -
Annex 4
OFAC Final Rule (adding to the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations general
licenses authorizing the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, certain
Iranian-origin foodstuffs and carpets and related transactions),
effective 21 January 2016
- 18 -
- 19 -
~'"'"'" ;:?
CP°;?
3330 Ferlerai Register/Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016/Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Foreign Assets Control
31 CFR Part 560 and Appendix A to
Chapter V
lranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations
AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets
Contra!, Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Contrai [OF AC) is amending the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
(ITSR) to implement certain United
States Government [USG) commitments
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) reached on July 14,
2015 between the P5+1 (China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States), the European
Union (EU), and Iran. In particular,
OF AC is adding to the ITSR general
licenses authorizing the importation
into the United States of, and dealings
in, certain Iranian-origin foodstuffs and
carpets and related transactions to
implement the USG commitment set out
in section 5.1.3 of Annex II and section
17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA. In
addition , to reflect the USG's
implementation of ils commitment set
out in section 4 of Annex II and section
17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA to
terminate Executive Order 13622 of July
30, 2012, OFAC is removing regulatory
provisions that implemented the
blocking sanctions in sections 5 and 6
of Executive Order 13622. OFAC is also
making certain technical and
conforming changes to its regulations to
reflect the implementation of the USG
commitment set out in section 4.8.1 of
Annex II and section 17.3 of Annex V
of the JCPOA to remove the individuals
and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to
Annex II of the JCPOA from OFAC's
Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persans List, the Foreign
Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the NonSDN
Iran Sanctions Act List, as
appropriate, on Implementation Day of
the JCPOA.
DATES: Effective: January 21, 2016
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The
Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Contrai: Assistant
Director for Licensing, tel. : 202- 622-
2480, Assistant Director for Regulatory
Affairs, tel.: 202- 622-4855, Assistant
Director for Sanctions Compliance &
Evaluation, tel.: 202- 622- 2490; or the
Department of the Treasury's Office of
the Chief Counsel (Foreign Assets
Contrai), Office of the General Counsel,
tel.: 202-622-2410.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic and Facsimile Availability
This document and additional
information concerning OF AC are
available from OFAC's Web site
(www.treaswy.gov/ofac). Certain general
information pertaining to OFAC's
sanctions pragrams also is available via
facsimi le thraugh a 24-hour fax-ondemand
service, tel.: 202- 622- 0077.
Background
On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States), the
Eurapean Union (EU), and Iran reached
a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) to ensure that Iran's nuclear
program is exclusively peaceful. The
JCPOA pravides that the United States
Government (USG) will undertake the
sanctions-related commitments
described in sections 17.1 to 17.4 of
Annex V of the JCPOA once the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has verified that Iran has
implemented key nuclear-related
commitments described in the JCPOA.
The date for this sanctions lifting is
referred to as "Implementation Day" in
the JCPOA. In addition, the JCPOA
provides that, on Implementation Day,
the USG will license certain activities
involving Iran as described in section 5
of Annex II and section 17 .5 of Annex
V of the JCPOA. OFAC is now amen ding
the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), to
implement the USG's commitment
pursuant to the JCPOA to license the
importation into the United States of
Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs,
including pistachios and caviar, and to
make certain technical and conforming
changes to reflect the implementation of
other USG JCPOA commitments on
Implementation Day, as set forth below.
Importation of Certain Foodstuffs and
Carpets
To implement the USG commitment
set out in section 5.1.3 of Annex II and
section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA
to license the importation into the
United States of Iranian-origin carpets
and foodstuffs, including pistachios and
caviar, OFAC is adding § 560.534 to the
ITSR to authorize by general l icense the
importation into the United States of,
and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin
foodstuffs and carpets from Iran or a
third country. OFAC's publication of
this general license as an amendment to
the ITSR fulfills the requirements of
section 103(d)(2)(A) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010, as amended, [Pub. L. 111-195) (22
U.S.C. 8501- 8551) [CISADA). In
addition, to fulfill the requirements of
section 103(d)(2)(B) of CISADA, the
Secretary of State is submitting to the
apprapriate congressional committees a
certification in writing that it is in the
national interest of the United States to
provide an excep tion to the prohibition
on the importation of Iranian-origin
goods to the extent required to
implement the sanctions commitment
described in section 5.1.3 of Annex II of
the JCPOA and a report describi ng the
reasons for this exception.
Section 560.534[a) authorizes the
importation into the United States of
lranian-origin foodstuffs intended for
human consumption that are classified
under chapters 2- 23 of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSJ. Items that are classified in
chapters 2- 23 of the HTS that are not
foodstuffs intended for human
consumption are not authorized for
importation into the United States by
this section. This section also authorizes
the importation into the United States of
Iranian-origin carpets and other textile
floor coverings and carpets used as wall
hangings that are classified under
chapter 5 7 or heading 9706.00.0060 of
the HTS. Items that are classified under
heading 9706.00.0060 ("Antiques of an
age exceeding one hundred years/
Other") that are not carpets and other
textile wall coverings or carpets used as
wall hangings are not authorized for
importation into the United States by
this section.
Section 560.534[b) authorizes U.S.
persans, wherever located, to engage in
transactions or dealings in or related ta
such Iranian-origin foodstuffs and
carpets, provided that such transactions
or dealings do not involve or relate to
goods, technology, or services for
exportation, reexportation, sale, or
supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran,
the Government of Iran, an Iranian
financial institution, or any other persan
whose property and interests in
praperty are blocked pursuant to
§ 560.211 of the ITSR, other than
services described in § 560.405
("Transactions ordinarily incident to a
licensed transaction authorized") and
transfers of funds described in § 560.516
("Transfers of funds involving Iran").
Section 560.534(c) clarifies that
§ 560.534(a)- (b) does not authorize the
importation into the United States of
goods that are un der seizure or
detention by the Department of
Homeland Security, or of goods for
which forfeiture proceedings have
commenced or of goods that have been
forfeited to the U.S. Government.
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Ferlerai Register /Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016/Rules and Regulations 3331
Section 560.534(d) clarifies that nothing
in § 560.534 authorizes the debiting or
crediting of Iranian accounts, as defined
in § 560.320.
Transactions ordinarily incident to
the transactions authorized in § 560.534
and necessary to gi ve effect thereto also
are authorized as set forth in § 560.405.
OFAC is amending § 560.405 by
inserting new paragraph (ll, which
clarifies that the scope of authorized
incidental transactions does not include
letter of credit services relating to
transactions authorized in§ 560.534.
Those letter of credit services that are
authorized are set forth separately in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of§ 560.535,
which OF AC is also adding to the ITSR.
Please see §§ 560.405(b) and 560.516
regarding transfers of funds in
connection with licensed activities.
Brokering services relating to
transactions authorized by this final rule
also are authorized. See § 560.535(c).
Executive Order 13622
On July 30, 2012, the President,
invoking the authority of, inter alia, the
International Emergency Economie
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
(IEEPA), issued Executive Ortler (E.O.)
13622. Section 5 of E.O. 13622 blocked
"ail property and interests in property
that are in the United States, that
h ereafter came within the United States,
or that are or hereafter corne within the
possession or contrai of" any U.S.
persan, including any foreign branch, of
any persan determined by the Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, to have materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological
support for, or goods or services in
support of, the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC), the Naftiran
Intertrade Company (NICO), or the
Central Bank of Iran, or the purchase or
acquisition of U.S. bank notes or
precious metals by the Government of
Iran. Section 6 of E.O. 13622 provided
that subsection 5(a) of E.O. 13622,
among other specified provisions, shall
not apply with respect to any persan for
conducting or facilitating a transaction
involving a natural gas development
and pipeline project initiated prior to
July 31, 2012, to bring gas from
Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey in
furtherance of a production sharing
agreement or license awarded by a
sovereign government other than the
Government oflran. On December 26,
2012, OFAC published a final rule in
the Federal Register (77 FR 75845) that,
inter alia, implemented sections 5 and
6 of E.O. 13622 by amending § 560.211
of the ITSR to add paragraph (c)(2) and
a corresponding note.
Pursuant to ils Implementation Day
commitment set out in section 4 of
Annex II and section 17.4 of Annex V
of the JCPOA, the United States
Government has revoked E.O. 13622.
Accordingly, OFAC is amending
§ 560.211 of the ITSR by removing
paragraph (c)(2) and the Note ta
paragraph (c)(2), which implemented
sections 5 and 6 of E.O. 13622,
respecti vel y.
Teclrnical and Conforming Changes
OFAC is also making certain technical
and conforming changes to 31 CFR
chapter V to reflect the implementation
of the USG commitment set out in
section 4.8.1 of Annex II and section
17.3 of Annex V of the JCPOA. Pursuant
to that commitment, on Implementation
Day, OFAC is removing individuals and
entities identified in Attachment 3 to
Annex II of the JCPOA from the
Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persans List (SDN List), the
Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or
the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, as
appropriate. The individuals and
entities being removed from the SDN
List include persans that OF AC has
previously identified as blocked
pursuant to E.O. 13599 of February 5,
2012 ("Blocking Property of the
Government Iran and lranian Financial
Institutions") because they meet the
definition of the terms "Government of
Iran" or "Iranian financial institution."
These individuals and entities are
marked with an asterisk in Attachment
3 to Annex II of the JCPOA. Non-U.S.
persans will no longer be subject to
secondary sanctions, including under
relevant provisions of the Iran Freedom
and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
and other applicable authorities, for
engaging in transactions or activities
with these individuals and entities,
provided that the transactions do not
include conduct that remains
sanctionable or individuals or entities
that remain on the SDN List. However,
these individuals and entities being
removed from the SDN List remain
persans whose property and interests in
property that are in the U.S., or that are
or came within the possession or
contrai of any U.S. persan, are blocked
pursuant to E.O. 13599. While OFAC is
removing these persans from the SDN
List on Implementation Day, they will
now be included on a "List of Persans
Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to
Executive Ortler 13599" (E.O. 13599
List), which OF AC is making available
on ils Web site: www.treasury.gov/
resource-center!sanctions/Programs/
Pages/13599_/ist.aspx. To reflect these
changes, OFAC is revising notes in
§§ 560.211 and 560.304 of the ITSR,
adding a new note to § 560.324 of the
ITSR, and revising a note to appendix A
to 31 CFR chapter V.
Public Participation
Because the amendment of the ITSR
involves a foreign affairs function, the
provisions of Executive Ortler 12866
and the Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of proposed
rulemaking, opportunity for public
participation, and delay in effective date
are inapplicable. Because no notice of
proposed rulemaking is required for this
rule, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601-612) does not apply.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The collections of information related
to the ITSR are contained in 31 CFR part
501 (the "Reporting, Procedures and
Penalties Regulations"). Pursuant to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507), those collections of
information have been approved by the
Office of Management and Budget under
contrai number 1505-0164. An agency
may not conduct or sponsor, and a
persan is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless the
collection of information displays a
valid contrai number.
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 560 and
Appendix A to Chapter V
Administrative practice and
procedure, Banks, Banking, Carpet,
Foodstuffs, Iran, Letters of credit.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Departrnent of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Contrai amends 31 CFR chapter V as
follows:
PART 560-IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS
AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS
• 1. The authority citation for part 560
is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 3 U.S.C. 301; 18 U.S.C. 2339B,
2332d; 22 U.S.C. 2349aa- 9; 22 U.S.C. 7201-
7211 ; 31 U.S.C. 321(b); 50 U.S.C. 1601-1651,
1701-1706; Public Law 101-410, 104 Stat.
890 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Public Law 110-
96, 121 Stat. 1011 (50 U.S.C. 1705 note);
Public Law 111- 195, 124 Stat. 1312 (22
U.S.C. 8501-8551); Public Law 112- 81, 125
Stat. 1298 (22 U.S.C. 8513a); Public Law 112-
158 , 126 Stat. 1214 (22 U.S.C. 8701- 8795);
E.O. 12613, 52 FR 41940, 3 CFR, 1987 Camp.,
p. 256; E.O. 12957, 60 FR 14615, 3 CFR, 1995
Camp., p. 332; E.O. 12959, 60 FR 24757, 3
CFR, 1995 Camp., p. 356; E.O. 13059, 62 FR
44531, 3 CFR, 1997 Camp., p. 217; E.O.
13599, 77 FR 6659, 3 CFR, 2012 Camp., p.
215; E.O. 13628, 77 FR 62139, 3 CFR, 2012
Camp., p. 314.
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3332 Ferlerai Register/Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
Subpart B-Prohibitions
• 2. Amend § 560.211 by removing the
word "or" from the end of paragraph
(c)(l), removing and reserving paragraph
(c)(2), removing the note to paragraph
(c)(2), and revising notes 1 and 2 to
paragraphs (al through (cl to read as
follows:
§ 560.211 Prohibited transactions
involving blocked property.
Note 1 to paragraphs (a) through (c) of
§ 560.211: The names of persans identified
by the Office of Foreign Assets Contrai
(OFAC) as blocked solely pursuant to
Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012
(" Blocking Property of the Government Iran
and lranian Financial Institutions") (E.O.
13599) because they meet the definition of
the terms "Government of Iran" or "Iranian
finan cial institution," whose property and
interests in property therefore are blocked
pursuant to this section, are published in the
Federal Register and incorporated into the
" List of Persans Identified as Blocked Solely
Pursuant ta Executive Order 13599") (E.O.
13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is accessible
through the following page on OFAC's Web
site: www.treasu1y.gov/resource-cented
sanctions/Programs/Pages/J 3599 _list.aspx.
The names of persans identified as blocked
or designated for blocking pursuant to bath
this part and one or more other parts of this
chapter are published in the Federal Register
and incorporated into OFAC's Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persans
List (SDN List) with the identifier "[!RAN]"
as well as the relevant identifier(s) for the
other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which
the persans' property and interests in
property are blocked. The SDN List is
accessible through the following page on
OFAC's Web site: www.treaswy.gov/sdn.
Additional information pertaining to the E.O.
13599 List and the SDN List can be found in
appendix A ta this chapter. See§ 560.425
concerning entities that may not be listed on
the E.O. 13599 List or on the SDN List but
whose property and interests in property are
nevertheless blocked pursuant to this section.
E.O. 13599 blacks the property and interests
in property of the Government of Iran and
Iranian financial institutions as defined in
§§ 560.304 and 560.324, respectively. The
property and interests in property of persans
falling within the definition of the terms
Government of Iran and Iranian financial
institution are blocked pursuant to this
section regardless of whether the names of
such persans are published in the Federal
Register or incorporated into the E.O. 13599
Lis t or the SDN List.
Note 2 to paragraphs (a) through (c) of
§ 560.211: The International Emergency
Economie Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706),
in section 203 (50 U.S.C. 1702), authorizes
the blocking of property and interests in
property of a persan during the pendency of
an investigation. The names of persans
whose property and interests in property are
hlocked pending investigation pursuant to
this section also are published in the Federal
Register and incorporated into the E.O.
13599 List or the SDN List, as appropriate,
with the identifier "[BPI- IRAN]."
Subpart C-General Definitions
• 3. Amend § 560.304 by revising Note
1 to § 560.304 to read as follows:
§ 560.304 Government of Iran.
Note 1 to § 560.304: The names of persans
that the Office of Foreign Assets Contrai
(OFAC) has determined fall within this
definition are published in the Ferlerai
Register and incorporated into one of Iwo
lists maintained by OFAC. First, the names
of persans identified as blocked solely
pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of
February 5, 2012 ("Blocking Property of the
Governmenl Iran and lranian Financial
Institutions" ) (E.O. 13599) and§ 560.211
because they meet the definition of the term
"Government of Iran" are incorporated into
the " List of Persans ldentified as Blocked
Solely Pursuant to Execulive Order 13599")
(E.O. 13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is
accessible through the following page on
OFAC's Web site: www.treaswy.gov/
resource-centerlsanctions/Programs/Pages/
13599_/ist.aspx. Second, the names of
persans identified as blocked pursuant to
E.O. 13599 and § 560.211 who are also
blocked pursuant to one or more other parts
of this chapter are incorporated into OFAC's
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persans List (SDN List) with the identifier
" [[RAN]" as well as the relevant identifier(s)
for the other sanctions program(s) pursuant
to which the persans' property and interests
in property are blocked. The SDN List is
accessible through the following page on the
OFAC's Web site: www.treaswy.gov/sdn.
However, the property and in terests in
property ofpersons fa lling within the
definition of the term Government of Iran are
blocked pursuant to § 560.211 regardless of
whether the names of such persans are
published in the Federal Register or
incorporated into the E.O. 13599 List or the
SDN List.
• 4. Section 560.324 is amended by
adding Notes 1 and 2 to § 560.324 to
read as follows:
§ 560.324 lranian financial institution.
Note 1 to § 560.324: The names of persans
that the Office of Foreign Assets Contrai
(OFAC) has determined fall within this
definition are published in the Federal
Register and incorporated into one of Iwo
lists maintained by the OFAC. First, the
names of persans identified as blocked solely
pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of
February 5 , 2012 ("Blocking Property of the
Government Iran and Iranian Financial
Institutions") (E.O. 13599) and§ 560.211
because they meet the definition of the term
" Iranian financiaJ institution" are
incorporated in to the "List of Persans
Jdentified as Blocked Solely Pursuan t to
Executive Order 13599" ) (E.O. 13599 List).
The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the
following page on OFAC's Web site:
www.treasw y .gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Programs/Pages/13599_/ist.aspx. Second, the
names of persans identified as blocked
pursuant to E.O. 13599 and §560.211 who
are also blocked pursuant to one or more
other parts of this chapter are incorporated
into OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persans List (SDN List) with the
identifier " [IRAN]" as well as the relevant
identifier(s) for the other sanctions
program(s) pursuant to which the persans'
property and interests in property are
blocked. The SDN List is accessible through
the following page on OFAC's Web site:
www.treasu1y.gov/sdn. However, the
property and interests in property of persans
falling within the definition of the term
lranian financial institution are blocked
pursuant to § 560.211 regardless of whether
the na mes of such persans are published in
the Federal Register or incorporated into the
E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List.
Note 2 to § 560.324: Section 501.807 ofthis
chapter describes the procedures to be
followed by persans seeking administrative
reconsideration of OFAC's determination that
they fall within the definition of the term
Iranian financial institution.
Subpart D-lnterpretations
• 5. Amend § 560.405 by removing the
word "and" at the end of paragraph (d),
removing the period at the end of
paragraph (el and adding "; and" in its
place, and adding paragraph (f) to read
as follows:
§ 560.405 Transactions ordinarily incident
to a licensed transaction authorized.
(f) Letter of credit services relating to
transactions authorized in§ 560.534.
See § 560.535(a).
Subpart E-Licenses, Authorizations,
and Statements of Licensing Policy
• 6. Add § 560.534 to subpart E to read
as follows:
§ 560.534 Importation into the United
States of, and dealings in, certain
foodstuffs and carpets authorized.
(al The importation into the United
States, from Iran or a third country, of
the following goods of Iranian origin is
authorized:
(ll Foodstuffs intended for human
consumption that are classified under
chapters 2- 23 of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States;
(2) Carpets and other textile floor
coverings and carpets used as wall
hangings that are classified under
chapter 57 or h eading 9706.00.0060 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States.
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Ferlerai Register/Vol. 81, No. 13/Thursday, January 21, 2016/Rules and Regulations 3333
(b) United States persans, wherever
located, are authorized to engage in
transactions or dealings in or related to
the categories of Iranian-origin goods
described in paragraph (a) of this
section, provided that the transaction or
dealing does not involve or relate to
goods, technology, or services for
exportation , reexportation, sale, or
supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran,
the Government of Iran, an Iranian
financial institution, or any other persan
whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to
§ 560.211, other than services described
in § 560.405 ("Transactions ordinarily
incident to a licensed transaction
authorized") and transfers of funds
described in § 560.516 ("Transfers of
funds involving Iran").
(c) This general license does not
authorize the importation into the
United States of goods that are under
seizure or detention by the Departrnent
of Homeland Security, as ofJanuary 21,
2016, pursuant to Customs regulations
or other applicable provisions of law,
until any applicable penalties, charges,
duties, or other conditions are satisfied.
This general license does not authorize
the importation into the United States of
goods for which forfeiture proceedings
have commenced or of goods that have
been forfeited to the U.S. Government,
other than through U.S. Customs and
Border Protection disposition, including
by selling at auction.
(d) Iranian accounts. Nothing in this
section authorizes debits or credits to
Iranian accounts, as defined in
§ 560.320.
• 7. Add § 560.535 to subpart E to read
as follows:
§ 560.535 Letters of credit and brokering
services relating to certain foodstuffs and
carpets.
(a) Purchases from Iran or the
Government of Iran or certain other
blocked persans. United States
depository institutions are authorized to
issue letters of credit in favor of a
beneficiary in Iran, the Government of
Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or
any other persan whose property and
interests in property are blocked
pursuant to § 560.211 to pay for
purchases from Iran or the Government
of Iran of the categories of Iranian-origin
goods described in§ 560.534(a),
provided that such letters of credit are
not advised, negotiated, paid, or
confirmed by the Government of Iran,
an Iranian financial institution, or any
other persan whose property and
interests in property are blocked
pursuant to § 560.211.
(b) Transactions or dealings in
Iranian-origin goods located in third
countries, other than purchases from
the Government of Iran or certain other
blocked persans. United States
depository institutions are authorized to
issue, advise, negotiate, or confirm
letters of credit to pay for transactions
in or related to Iranian-origin goods
described in § 560.534(a) and located in
a third-country, other than purchases
from the Government of Iran, an Iranian
financial institution, or any other persan
whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to
§ 560.211, provided that such letters of
credit are not issued, advised,
negotiated, paid, or confirmed by the
Government of Iran, an lranian financial
institution, or any other persan whose
property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to § 560.211.
(c) Brokering. United States persans,
wherever located, are authorized to act
as brokers for the purchase or sale of the
categories of Iranian-origin goods
described in § 560.534(a), provided that
the goods are not for exportation,
reexportation, sale, or supply, directly
or indirectly, to Iran, the Government of
Iran, an lranian financial institution, or
any other persan whose property and
interests in property are blocked
pursuant to § 560.211.
(d) Iranian accounts. Nothing in this
section authorizes debits or credits to
Iranian accounts, as defined in
§ 560.320.
Note to § 560.535: See §§ 560.304 and
560.313 for information relating to
individuals and entities that are included
within the definition of the term Government
of Iran and § 560.324 regarding entities
included within the definition of the term
Iranian financial institution. See§ 560.516
for information relating to authorized
trans fers to Iran by U.S. depos itory
institutions relating to licensed transactions.
Appendix A to Chapter V-[Amended)
• 8. The authority citation for appendix
A to chapter V is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 3 U.S.C. 301; 8 U.S.C. 1182,
1189; 18 U.S.C. 2339 B; 21 U.S.C. 1901-1908;
22 U.S.C. 287 c; 31 U.S.C. 321 [bJ; 50 U.S.C.
App. 1-44; Public Law 110-286, 122 Stat.
2632 [50 U.S.C. 1701 note); Public Law 111-
195, 124 Stat. 1312 (22 U.S.C. 8501-8551);
Public Law 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (22 U.S.C.
8513a); Public Law 112- 158, 126 Stat. 1214
[22 U.S.C. 8701-8795); Public Law 112-208,
126 Stat. 1502; Public Law 113-278, 128 Stat.
3011 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
• 9. Revise note 8 to appendix A to
chapter V to read as follows:
Appendix A to Chapter V-Information
Pertaining to the Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persans List
8. The SDN List includes tbe names of
persans determined to be the Government of
Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any
other persan whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 of
the lranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 [ITSRJ, only
when the property and interests in property
of such persans are also blocked pursuant to
one or more other parts of this chap ter. The
SDN List entries for such persans include the
identifier " [IRAN]" as well as the relevant
identifier[s) for the other sanctions
program[s) pursuant to which the persans'
property and interests in property are
blocked. The names of persans identified as
blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order
13599 of February 5, 2012 (" Blocking
Property of the Government Iran and Iranian
Financial Institutions") (E.O. 13599) and
§ 560.211 of the ITSR because they meet the
definition of the terms Government of Iran or
Iranian financial institution un der the ITSR
are incorporated into the "List of Persans
Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuan t to
Executive Order 13599" (E.O. 13599 List).
The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the
following page on tbe Office of Foreign
Assets Control's Web site: www.treaswy.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/
13599_/ist.aspx. U.S. persans are advised to
review 31 CFR part 560 prior to engaging in
transactions involving persans included on
the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List with the
identifier " (IRAN]." Moreover. the
prohibitions set forth in the ITSR, and the
compliance obligations, with respect to
persans who fa]] within the definition of the
terms Government of Iran or Iranian
financial institution set forth in §§ 560.304
and 560.324 of the ITSR, respectively, apply
regard Jess of whether such persans are
identified on the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN
List.
John E. Smith,
Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets
Contrai.
[FR Doc. 2016-01227 Filed 1- 19-16; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4810-AL-P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 165
[Docket No. USCG-2016-o019)
Security Zones; Annual Events in the
Captain of the Port Detroit Zone-North
American International Auto Show,
Detroit River, Detroit Ml
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.
ACTION: Notice of enforcement of
regulation.
SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce
a security zone associated with the
North American International Auto
- 23 -
Annex 5
OFAC General License I (authorizing certain transactions related to the negotiation
of, and entry into, contingent contracts for activities eligible for authorization under
the statement of licensing policy for activities related to the export or re-export to Iran
of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services),
dated 24 March 2016
- 24 -
- 25 -
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
lranian Transactions and Sanctions Rcgulations
31 C.F.R. Part 560
GENERAL LICENSE I
Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Negotiation of, and Entry into,
Contingent Contracts for Activities Eligible for Authorization Undcr the Statement of
Licensing Policy for Activities Relatcd to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial
Passengcr Aircraft and Related Parts and Services
(a) U.S. persons are authorized to enter into, and to engage in ail transactions ordinarily
incident to the negotiation of and entry into, contracts for activities eligible for authorization
under the Statement of Licensing Policy.fàr Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran
of Commercial Passenger Airera(! and Related Parts and Services, provided that the
performance of any such contract is made expressly contingent upon the issuance of a specific
license by the Office of Foreign Assets Contrai authorizing the activities to be performed
("contingent contracts").
Note to paragraph (a) of General License 1: For purposes ofthis general liccnse, the
term "contingent contracts" includes executory contracts, cxecutory pro forma invoices,
agreements in principlc, executory offers capable of acceptancc such as bids or proposais in
rcsponse to public tenders, binding memoranda of understanding, or any other similar agreement
(b) This general liccnse does not authorize any transactions or dealings with any pcrson
whosc property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V
other than part 560.
Dated: March 24, 2016
Andrea Gacki
Acting Director
Office of Foreign Assets Control
- 26 -
- 27 -
Annex 6
31 CFR, Section 560.530 (as of 01 July 2016)
- 28 -
- 29 -
A UTHEN TICAT[D9
\J S ÇQVERNMENT
lNfORMATlôN
GPO
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury
behalf of a person in Iran , or in circumstances
in which the benefit is oth erwise
recei ved in Iran, other t han
those described in paragraph (d)(l ) of
this section , are a uthorized, except
that nothing in this section a uthorizes
the debiting of any blocked account or
the transfer of an y blocked property .
(e) This section does not a uthorize
any transaction by an entity owned or
controlled by a United States person
and establish ed or maintained o utside
the United States otherwise prohibited
by §560.215 if the transaction would be
prohibited by a ny other part of this
chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. person
or in the United States.
[77 FR 64666. Oct. 22, 2012, as am ended a t 77
FR 75849. Dec. 26, 2012]
§ 560.526 [Reserved]
§ 560.527 Resche duling existing loans.
Specific licenses may be issued on a
case-by-case basis for rescheduling
loan s or otherwise ext e nding t he matur
ities of existing loans, and for charging
fees or interest at con11nercially
reasonable ra t es, in connecti on ther ewi
th, provided that no new funds or
credits are thereby transferred or extended
to Iran or the Government of
Iran, an Iranian financial institut ion,
or any other person whose property and
interests in property are block ed pursuant
to §560.211.
§ 560.528 Aircraft safety.
Specific licenses may be issued on a
case-by-case basis for t he exportation
or reexportation of goods, services. and
technology t o insure t he safety of civil
aviation and safe operation of U.S.-origin
comn1ercial passenger aircraft.
§560.529 Bunkering and emergency
repairs.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of t his section, goods or services
provided in the United States to a nonIranian
carrier t r a nsporting passengers
or goods to or from Iran are pennissible
if they are:
(1) Bunkers or bunkering services;
(2) Supplied or performed in the
course of emergency repairs; or
(3) Supplied or performed under circumstances
whi ch could not be antici-
§ 560.530
pated pri or to t he carrier's departure
for the United States.
(b) This section does n ot aut horize
the provision of goods or ser vices in
connection with the transport of any
goods to or from the Government of
Iran, an Iranian financial institution,
or any other person whose property and
interests in pro perty are blocked pursuant
to § 560.211.
§ 560.530 Commercial sales, exportation,
and reexportation of agricultural
com.modities, medicine, and
medical devices.
(a )(l ) One-year license requirement. (i)
The exportat ion or reexportation of agricul
tural con1modi ties, n1edicine, and
medical devices that are not covered
by t he general licenses in paragraphs
(a)(2) through (4) of this section (as set
forth in paragraph (a)(l)(ii) of t his section)
to t he Governmen t of Iran, to any
individual or entity in Iran, or to persons
in third countries purchasing specifically
for resale to any of the foregoing,
shall only be made pursuant to a
one-year specific license issued by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") for contracts entered into
during the one year period of the license
and sh ipped wit hin the 12-month
period beginning on t he date of t he
signing of the contract. No specific license
will be granted for the exportati
on or reexportation of the items set
forth in paragraph (a)(l )(ii) of this section
to any enti ty or individual in Iran
promoting international terrorism, to
any individual or entity designated
pur suant to Executive Orcier 12947 (60
FR 5079, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 356), Executive
Orcier 13224 (66 FR 49079, 3 CFR,
2001 Comp., p. 786), or Public Law 104-
132, to any narcotics trafficking enti ty
designated pursuant t o Executive
Orcier 12978 of October 21, 1995 (60 FR
54579, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 415) or t he
Foreign Narcot ics Kingpin Designation
Act (21 U.S.C. 1901- 1908), or to a ny foreign
organ ization, group, or persons
subject to any restriction for its or
their in vol veinent in weapon s of mass
destruction or missile proliferation.
Execntory con tra.cts entered into pursuant
to paragraph (b)(2) of this s ection
prior to t he issuance of a on e-year license
described in t his paragraph shall
be deemed to have been signed on the
433
- 30 -
§560.530
date of issuance of that one-year license
(and, therefore, the exporter is
authorized to make shipments under
that contract within the 12-month period
beginnin g on the date of issuance
of the one-year license).
(ii) For the purposes of this part,
"agricultural commodities, medicine,
and medical devices that a re not covered
by the general licenses in paragraphs
(a)(2) through (4) of this section"
are:
(A) The excluded agricultural commoditi
es specified in paragraph
(a)(2)(ii) of this section ;
(B) The excluded medicines specified
in paragraph (a )(3)(iii) of this sect ion;
(C) Medical devices (as defined in
par a graph (e)(3) of this section) other
than medi cal supplies (as defined in
paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section); and
(D) Agricultural commodi ties (as defined
in paragraph (e)(l ) of t his section),
medicine (as defined in paragraph
(e)(2) of this section), and medical
supplies (as defined in paragraph
(a)(3)(ii) of t h is section) to military or
law en forcement purchasers or importers.
(2)( i) General license for the exportation
or reexportation of agricultural commodities.
Except as provided in paragraphs
(a)(2)(ii) and (iii) of t h is section , the exportation
or reexportation by a covered
person (a s defined in paragraph (e )(4) of
this section) of agricultural commodities
(as defined in paragraph (e)(l ) of
this section ) (in cl uding bulk agricultural
commodi ties listed in appendix B
to this part) to the Government of
Iran, to any individual or ent ity in
Iran, or to persans in third countries
purchasing s pec ifically for resale to
any of the foregoing, and t he con duct
of related transacti ons, including, but
not limited to, the ma king of shipping
and cargo inspection arrangements, the
obtaining of ins urance, the arrangement
of financing and payment, shipping
of the goods, receipt of payment,
and the entry into contracts (including
executory contracts), are hereby authorized,
provided t hat, unless otherwise
authorized by specific license,
payment terms and financing for sales
pursuant to this general license are
limited to, and cons istent with, those
a uthorized by § 560.532 of this part; and
further provided that ail such exports
31 CFR Ch. V (7- 1- 16 Edition)
and reexports are sh ipped within the
12-month period beginning on the dat e
of the signing of the contract for export
or reexport.
(ii) Excluded agricultural commodities.
Paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section does
not authorize t he expor tation or reexportation
of t he following items: castor
beans, castor bean seeds, certified
pathogen-free eggs (unfertilized or fertilized),
dried egg albumin, live animais
(excluding live oattle), embryos
(excluding cattle embryos), Rosaryl
Jequirity peas, n on -food-grade gelatin
powder, peptones and their derivatives,
super absorbent polymers, western red
cedar, or ail fertilizers.
(iii) Excluded persons. Paragraph
(a)(2)(i) of this sect i on does not authorize
the exportation or reexportation of
agrioultural commodit ies to military
or law enforceinent purchasers or ilnporters.
N OTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(2) OF §560.530: Consistent
with sect ion 906(a)(l ) of the Tracte
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancernent
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205), each year OFAC
will determine whether to revoke this general
license. Unless revoked, the general license
will remain in effect.
(3)(i) General license for the exportation
or reexportation of medicine and medical
supplies. Except as provided in paragraphs
(a)(3)(iii) and (iv) of this section,
the exportation or reexportation
by a covered persan (as defined in paragraph
(e)(4) of this secti on) of medicine
(as defined in paragraph (e)(2) of this
secti on) a nd medical supplies (as defined
in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section)
to the Government of Iran, to any
individual or entity in Iran, or to persons
in third count r ies purchasing specifically
for resale to any of the foregoing,
and the conduct of related transactions,
inc luding, but n ot limited to,
the making of shipping and cargo inspection
arrangen1ents, the obtaining
of i nsurance, the arrangement of fin
a ncing and payment, shipping of t he
goods, receipt of payment, and t he
entry i nto contracts (in cluding execu tory
con tracts), are hereby a u thorized,
provided that, unless otherwise a uthorized
by specific Jicense, paymen t t erms
and finan oing for sales pursuant to this
general license are limited to, and con sistent
with, those a uthorized by
434
- 31 -
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury
§560.532 of this part; and further provided
that ail such exports or reexports
are shipped within the 12-month period
beginning on the date of the signing of
the contract for export or reexport.
(ii) Definition of medical supplies. For
pur poses of this general license, the
term medical supplies means those medical
devices, as defined in paragraph
(e)(3) of this section, that are included
on the List of Medical Supplies on
OFAC's Web site (www.treasury.gov/
ofac) on the Iran Sanctions page.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a )(3)(1i) OF §560.530:
The List of Med!cal Suppl!es is maintaine,1
on OFAc·s Web site (www.treasury._qovlofac)
on the Iran Sanctions page. The list also will
be published in the FEDERAL REGIS'l'ER, as
w111 any changes to the 11st. The List of Medical
Suppl!es contains those medical ctevices
for which OFAC previously ctrn not require
an Official Commodity Classification of
EAR99 issued by the Department of Commerce's
BU1·eau of Industry and Security to
be submlttecl with a spec!f!c l1ce11se appl!cation
and which are now generally l!censed.
(iii) Excluded medicines. Paragraph
(a)(3)(i) of this section does not authorize
the exportation or reexportation of
the following medicines: non-NSAID
analgesics, cholinergies,
anticholinergics, opioids, narcotics,
benzodiazapenes, and bioactive
peptides.
(iv) Excluded persons. Paragraph
(a)(3)(i) of this section does not a uthorize
the exportation or reexportation of
medicine or medical s upplies to military
or law enforcemen t purchasers or
importers.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(3) OF §560.530: Consistent
with sectio11 906(a)(l) or the Tracte
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205). each year, OFAC
will cletermine whether to revoke this general
license. Unless revoked. the general license
will remain in effect.
(4) General license for the exportation
or reexportation of replacement parts for
certain medical dev ices. (i) The exportation
or reexportation by a covered
person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of
this section) of r eplacement parts for
medical devices (as defined in paragraph
(e)(3) of this section) exported or
reexpor ted purs uant to paragraphs
(a)(l) or (a)(3)(i) of this section t o t he
Government of Iran, to any individual
or entity in Iran, or to persons in third
§ 560.530
countries purchasing specifically for
resale to a ny of the foregoing, and the
conduct of related transactions, including,
but not limited to, the making of
shipping and cargo inspection arrangements,
the obtaining of insurance, the
arrangement of financing a nd payment,
shipping of the goods, receipt of payment,
and the entry into contracts (including
executory contracts), are hereby
authorized, provided that, unless
other wise authorized by specific license,
payment terms and financing for
sales p ursuan t to this general license
are limited to, and consistent with,
those authorized by §560.532 of this
part; provided that such replacement
parts are designated as EAR99, or, in
the case of replacement parts that are
not subject to the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 et
seq. ("EAR"), would be designated as
EAR99 if they were located in the
United States; and further provided
that such replacement parts are limi
ted to a one-for-one export or reexport
basis (i.e., only one replacement part
can be exported or reexported to replace
a broken or non-operational component).
(ii) Excluded persons. Paragraph
(a)(4)(i) of this section does not authorize
the exportation or reexportation of
replacement par ts for medical devices
to military or law enforcement purchasers
or importers.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(4) OF §560.530: Consistent
with section 906(a)(l) of the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205). each year. O~'AC
will determine whether to revoke this general
license. Unless revoked. the general license
will remain in effect.
(b) General license for arrangement of
exportation and reexportation of covered
products that require a specific license. (1)
With respect to sales authorized pursuant
to paragraph (a)(l )(i) of this section
, the making of shipping a rrangen1ents,
cargo inspections, obtaining of
insurance, and arrangement of financing
(consist ent with §560.532) for the
exportation or reexportation of agricultural
commodities, medi cine, and
medical devices that are not covered
by the general licenses in paragraphs
(a )(2) t hrough (4) of this section (as set
forth in paragraph (a)(l)(ii) of t his section)
to the Government of Iran, to any
435
- 32 -
§560.530
individual or entity in Iran, or to persons
in third countries purchasing spec
ifically for resale to any of the foregoing,
are authorized.
(2) Entry into executory contracts
(including executory pro forma invoices.
agreements in principle, or executory
offers capable of acceptance
such as bicls in response to public
tenders) for the exportation or reexportation
of agricultural commodities,
meclicine, and medical devices that are
not coverecl by the general licenses in
paragraphs (a )(2) through (4) of this
section (as set forth in paragraph
(a)(l)(ii) of this section) to the Government
of Iran, to any individual or entity
in Iran, or to persans in third countries
purchasing specifically for resale
to any of the foregoing, is authorizecl,
provided that the performance of an executory
contract is expressly made
conting·ent upon the prior issuance of a
one-year specific license clescribecl in
paragraph (a)(l)(i) of this section.
(c) Instructions for obtaining one-year
licenses. In order to obtain the one-year
specific license clescribed in paragraph
(a)(l)(i) of this section, the exporter
must provide to OFAC:
(1) The applicant's full legal name
(and , if the applicant is a business entity,
the state or jurisdiction of incorporat
ion and principal place of business);
(2) The applicant's mailing and street
address (and, so that OFAC may reach
a responsible point of contact, the applicant
should also inclucle the name of
the individual(s) responsible for the application
and related commercial
transactions, a long with their telephone
and fax numbers and, if available,
email acldresses);
(3) The names, mailing addresses,
and, if available, fax and telephone
numbers and email addresses of ail parties
with an interest in the transaction.
If the goods are being exported
or reexported to a purchasing agent in
Iran, the exporter must identify the
agent's principals at the wholesale
level for whom the purchase is being
made. If the goods are being exported
or reexported to an individual, the expor
ter must iclen tify any organizations
or entities with which the inclividual is
affiliated that have an interest in the
transaction;
31 CFR Ch. V (7- 1-16 Edition)
(4) A description of ail items to be exported
or reexported pursuan t to t he
requested one-year license, including a
statemen t that the items are design
ated as EAR99, or would be clesignated
as EAR99 if they were locatecl
in the United States, and, if necessary,
documentation sufficient to verify that
the items to be exported or reexportecl
are designated as EAR99, or would be
designated as EAR99 if they were located
in the United States, and do not
fall within any of the limitations contained
in paragraph (d) of this section;
and
(5) For items subject to the EAR, an
Official Commodity Classification of
EAR99 issued by the Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security
("BIS"), certifying that the
product is clesignated as EAR99, is required
to be submitted to OFAC with
the request for a license authorizing
the exportation or reexportati on of ail
fertilizers, live horses, western recl
cedar, or medical devices other than
meclical supplies (as clefinecl in
§560.530(a )(3)(ii )). See 15 CFR 745.3 for
instructions for obtaining an Official
Commodity Classification of EAR99
from BIS.
(cl) Limitations. (1) Nothing in this
secti on or in any general or specific license
set forth in or issued pursuant to
paragraph (a ) of t his sect ion relieves
the exporter from compliance with the
export license applicati on requirements
of another Federal agency.
(2) Nothing in this section or in any
general or specific license set forth in
or issued purs uant to paragraph (a) of
this section authorizes the expor tation
or reexportation of any agricultural
commodity, medicine, or medical device
controllecl on the United States
Munitions Lis t established under section
38 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2778); controlled on any control
list established uncler the Export
Administration Act of 1979 or any successor
statute (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et
seq.); or used to facilitate the development
or product ion of a chemical orbiological
weapon or weapon of mass destruction.
(3) Nothing in this section or in any
general or specific license set forth in
or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section affects prohibitions on the
436
- 33 -
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury
sale or supply of U.S. technology or
software used to manufact ure agricultural
commodities, n1edicine, or medical
devices, such as technology to design
or produce hiotechnological items
or medical devices.
(4) Nothing in this section or in any
general or specific license set forth in
or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section affects U.S. nonproliferat
ion export controls, including the enduser
and end-use controls maintained
under part 744 of the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR part 744.
(5) Nothing in this section anthorizes
any transaction or dealing with a person
whose property and interests in
property are blocked under, or who is
designated or otherwise subject to any
sanctions under, the terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruct
ion, or narcotics t rafficking programs
administered by OFAC, 31 CFR parts
536, 544, 594, 595, 597, and 598, or with
any foreign organization, group, or person
snbject to any restriction for its
involvement in weapons of mass destruction
or missile proliferation, or
involving property blocked pursuant to
this chapter or any ot her activity prohibited
by this chapter not otherwise
authorized in or pursuant to this part.
(6) Nothing in this section or in any
general or specific license set forth in
or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section authorizes the exportation
or reexportati on of any agricultural
commodity, medicine, or medical device
that is not designated as EAR99
or, in the case of any agricultural comn1odity1
medicine, or medical device
not subject to the EAR, would not be
designated as EAR99 if it were located
in the United States.
( e) Covered items. For the purposes of
this part, agricultural commodities,
n1edicine, and medical devices are defined
below.
(1) Agricultural commodities. For the
purposes of this part, agricultural commodities
are:
(i) In the case of products subject to
the EAR, 15 CFR part 774, products
that are designated as EAR99, and, in
the case of products not subject to the
EAR, products that would be desig
nated as EAR99 under the EAR if
they were located in the United States,
in each case that fall within the term
§560.530
"agri cultural commodityn as defined
in section 102 of the Agricul tural Tracte
Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602); and
(ii) In the case of products subject to
the EAR, prodncts that are designated
as EAR99, and in the case of products
not snbject to the EAR, prodncts that
would be designated as EAR99 if they
were located in the United States, in
each case that are intended for ni timate
use in Iran as:
(A) Food for hnmans (including raw,
processed, and packaged foods; live animais;
vitamins and minerais; food additives
or s upplements; and bottled
drinking water) or animais (including
animal feeds);
(B) Seeds for food crops;
(C) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers;
or
(D) Reproductive materials (such as
live animais, fertilized eggs, embryos,
and semen) for the production of food
animais.
(2) Medicine. For the purposes of this
part, medicine is an item that falls
within the definition of the term
"drug" in section 201 of the Federal
Food, Drug, ancl Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 321) and that, in the case of an
item subject to the EAR, is designatecl
as EAR99 or, in the case of an item not
subject to the EAR, that would be designated
as EAR99, if it were locatecl in
the United States.
NOTE TO §560.530(8)(2): The Department of
Commerce's Bureau of lndustry and Sccurity
providcs a lîst on its \Vcb s i te- of mcdici ne-s
that are not desig-nated as EAR99 and therefore
not eligible for any general or specific
license under this section.
(3) Medical device. For the purposes of
this part, a medical device is an item
that falls within the definition of ·'device"
in section 201 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 321) and that, in the case of an
item subject to the EAR, is designated
as EAR99, or in the case of an item not
subject to the EAR, that would be designated
as EAR99 if it were located in
the United States.
(4) Covered person. For purposes of
this part, a covered person is, wi th respect
to the exportation or reexportation
of items subject to the EAR, a
U.S. person or a non-U.S. person, and
for purposes of items not subject to the
EAR, a U.S. person, wherever located,
437
- 34 -
§560.531
or an entity owned or controlled by a
U.S. person and established or maintained
outside the Uni ted States.
(f) Excluded items. (1) For the purposes
of this part, agricul tural commodi
ties do not include furniture made
from wood; clothing manufactured
from plant or animal materials; agricultural
equipment (whether hand
tools or motorized equipment); pesticides,
insecticides, or herbicides; or
cosmetics (unless derived entirely from
plant materials).
(2) For the purposes of this part, the
term medicine does not include cosmetics.
(g) Excluded transact'ions by U.S.owned
or -control/ed foreign entities.
Nothing in t his section or in any general
license set forth in or issued pursuant
to this section authorizes any
transaction by an entity owned or controlled
by a United States persan and
established or maintained outside the
United States otherwise prohibited by
§560.215 if the transaction would be
prohibited by any other part of this
chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. persan
or in t he United States.
[77 FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as amended at 77
FR 75849. Dec. 26, 2012; 79 FR 18993, Apr. 7,
2014)
§ 560.531 [Reserved]
§ 560.532 Payment for and financing of
exports and reexports of agricul•
tural commodities, medicine, and
medical devices.
(a) General license for payment terms.
The following payment terms are authorized
for sales pursuant to
§560.530(a):
(1) Payment of cash in advance;
(2) Sales on open account, provided
that the account receivable may not be
transferred by the persan extending the
credit;
(3) F inancing by t hird-country financ
ia l institutions t hat are not United
States persons, enti ties owned or controlled
by United Stat es persans and
established or maintained outside the
United States, Iranian financia l inst itutions,
or the Government of Iran.
Such financing may be confirmed or
advised by U.S. financial insti t utions
and by financial institutions that are
entities owned or controlled by United
31 CFR Ch. V (7-1-16 Edition)
States persans and established or
maintained outside the United States;
or
(4) Letter of credit issued by an Iranian
financial institution whose property
a nd interests in property are
blocked solely pursuant to this part.
Such letter of credit must be initially
advised, confirmed, or otherwise dealt
in by a t hird-country financial institution
that is nota United States persan,
an entity owned or controlled by a
United States persan and established
or maintained outside the United
States, an Iranian financial institution
, or the Government of Iran before
it is advised, confirmed, or dealt in by
a U.S. financial institution or a financial
institution that is an entity owned
or controlled by a United States persan
and established or maintained outside
the United States.
(b) Specific licenses for alternate payment
terms. Specific licenses may be
issued on a case-by-case basis for payment
ter1ns and trade financing not authorized
by the general license in paragraph
(a) of this section for sales pursuant
to §560.530(a).
(c)(l ) No debits to blocked accounts.
Nothing in this section authorizes payment
terms or tracte financing involving
a debit to an account blocked pursuant
to this part.
(2) No debits or credits to lranian accounts
on the books of U.S. depository institutions.
Nothing in this section authorizes
payment terms or tracte financing
involving debits or credits to
Iranian accounts, as defined in §560.320.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this part, no commercial exportation
to Iran may be made wi th
United States Governmen t assistance,
including- United States foreig-n assistance,
United States export assistance,
and any United States credit or g uarantees
absent a Presidential waiver.
(e) Nothing in this section authorizes
any transaction by an entity owned or
controlled by a United States persan
and established or maintained outside
the United States otherwise prohibited
by § 560.215 if the transaction would be
prohibited by any other part of this
chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. person
or in the United States.
(77 FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as ame nded at 77
FR 75849, Dec. 26, 2012]
438
- 35 -
Annex 7
United States of America v. Yousef et al., Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
4 April 2003, 327 F.3d 56
Excerpts: p. 1 & pp. 38-53
- 36 -
- 37 -
FindLaw WWW.FINDLAW.COM
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2001
(Argued: May 3, 2002 D ecided: April 4, 2003)
D ocket Nos. 98-1041 L
98-1197
98-1355
99-1544
99-1554
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appe!!ee,
V.
RAMZI AH.MEO YOUSEF, EYAD IS.MOJL, also known as EYAD
IS.MA IL, and ABDUL H AKIM MURAD, also known as SAEED
AH.MEO,
Defendants-Appe!!ants,
MOHAMMED A. SALAMEH, NIDAL AYYAD, MAHMUD
ABOUHALlMA, also known as Mahmoud Abu Halima, BILAL
ALKAISI, also known as Bilai Elqisi, AHMAD MO HAM.MAD
AJAJ, also know as Khurram Khan, ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN ,
also know as Aboud, and W ALI KHA .fuv!IN SHAH, also
known as Grabi Ibrahim Hahsen,
Defendants.
Before: WALKER, Chief Judge, WINTER, CABRANES, Cirmit Judges.
Appeal by Ramzi Yousef, Eyad Ismoil, and Abdul Hakim Murad from judgments of
conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of N ew York (.Kevin
Thomas Duffy,Judge) on April 13, June 2, and June 15, 1998, respectively. Judge Duffy presided
over two separate jury trials. In the first trial, Y ousef, Murad, and another de fendant were tried on
- 38 -
crews and that were destined for cities in the United States. Moreover, assertion of jurisdiction is
appropriate under the "objective territorial principle" because the purpose of the attack was to
influence United States foreign policy and the defendants intended their actions to have an
effect-in this case, a devastating effect-on and within the United States. Finally, there is no
doubt that jurisdiction is proper under the "protective principle" because the planned attacks were
intended to affect the United States and to alter its foreign policy.
3. Jurisdiction over Count Nineteen
a. The District Court's Holding and Yousef's Challenges on
Appeal
Count Nineteen, the bombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434, appears to present a less
straight-forward jurisdictional issue because the airplane that was bombed was nota United Statesflag
aircraft, it was flying between two destinations outside of the United States, and there is no
evidence that any United States citizens were aboard the flight or were targets of the bombing. The
District Court nevertheless conduded that jurisdiction over Yousef for the offenses charged in
Count Nineteen was proper, inter alia, under the principle of "universal jurisdiction." Yousef, 927
F.Supp. at 681-82.
Yousef makes a two-part argument on appeal challenging the District Court's holding with
respect to the Court's jurisdiction over Count Nineteen. First, he daims that the District Court
erred in holding that the universality principle provides jurisdiction over Count Nineteen. He bases
this daim on the argument that, if his placing the bomb on the Philippine Airlines plane constituted
terrorism, then jurisdiction under the universality principle is improper because terrorism is not
universally condemned by the community of States and, therefore, is not subject to universal
jurisdiction under customary international law. Yousef Br. at 143-48. Second, he argues that
because customary international law does not provide for the punishment of terrorist acts under the
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universality principle, such failure precludes or invalidates United States laws that provide for the
prosecution of such acts that occur extraterritorially. See id. at 139-141, 148 (arguing that jurisdiction
over Count Nineteen cannot exist apart from a jurisdictional basis supplied by customary
international law).
In light of the District Court's conclusion that Yousefs prosecution for the acts charged in
Count Nineteen was proper un der the universality principle, and in light of Yousefs arguments both
that the universality principle does not provide jurisdiction over terrorise acts30 and chat this failure
precludes United States law from proscribing such acts, we (i) first present the District Court's
holding as to its jurisdiction over this count, (ii) examine whether the District Court correctly
concluded that the universality principle provides for jurisdiction over the acts charged in Count
Nineteen, and (iii) examine whether the universality principle provides for jurisdiction over
"terrorise" acts. We hold that the District Court erred as a matter of law in relying upon the
universality principle as a basis for jurisdiction over the acts charged in Count Nineteen and further
hold that customary international law currently does not provide for the prosecution of " terrorist''
acts under the universality principle, in part due to the failure of States to achieve anything like
consensus on the definition of terrorism. However, as discussed in full below in Discussion Section
I.B.3(6), we hold that Yousefs conduct charged in Count Nineteen- regardless of whether it is
termed "terrorist"-constitutes the core conduct proscribed by the Montreal Convention and its
implementing legislation. Accordingly, Yousefs prosecution and conviction on this Count is both
consistent with and required by the United States' tteaty obligations and domestic laws. We
therefore reject Yousefs daim that jurisdiction over Count Nineteen was lacking and affirm the
substance of the District Court's ruling.
30 W/ e take no position on wh ether the acts c harged in Coun t Nin e teen constitute «terrorist acts" or "terro ri srn."
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i. The District Court's Opinion
In holding that it could exercise universal jurisdiction over Yousef for Count Nineteen, the
District Court stated:
The issue of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution
based on universal jurisdiction was also discussed in United States v. Yunis, [924 F.2d
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991)] ....
The Yunis court did not decide that universal jurisdiction was insufficient as
the sole basis for jurisdiction under the Antihijacking Act ....
Endorsing the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the prosecution of an
aircraft-related crime, the [Yunis] court stated that "aircraft hijacking may well be one
of the few crimes so clearly condemned under the law of nations that states may
assert universal jurisdiction to bring offenders to justice, even when the state has no
territorial connection to the hijacking and its citizens are not involved." Id. [at 1092.]
The court in Yunis cited to the Restatement (fhird) of the Foreign Relations
Law to support exercise of universal jurisdiction in a crimina1 prosecution related to
crimes involving aircraft. Section 404 [of the Restatement (fhird)] States, " [a] state
has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized
by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism, even where none of the other bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is
present." Restatement (fhird) § 404 (1987).
Yousef, 927 F.Supp. at 681 (additional interna! citations omitted) (emphasis removed).
The District Court then added:
The disregard for human life which would accompany the placing of a bomb
aboard an airplane with the intent for that bomb to explode while the airplane is in
flight and fully occupied with people, or otherwise sabotaging that plane, is at least as
heinous a crime of international concern as hijacking a plane.
Id. at 682.
The District Court thus held, relying on Yunis, the Restatement (fhird), and its own analogy
between "the placing of a bomb aboard an airplane" and other "heinous" crimes that support
universa1 jurisdiction, that the United States on this ground alone could exercise universal
jurisdiction to prosecute "aircraft-related crime." Id. at 681-82. Like the court in Yunis, the District
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Court relied on the Restatement (Third) for the proposition that a "state has jurisdiction to define
and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern," including "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, . . . [and] perhaps
certain acts of terrorism." Yousef, 927 F.Supp. at 681 (quoting Restatement (Third) § 404) (alteration
omitted; emphasis added). Drawing an analogy between aircraft hijacking and Yousefs act of
placing a bomb aboard an aircraft, the District Court concluded that the acts charged in Count
Nineteen are considered "by the United States and the international community to be 'Offenses
against the Law of Nations"' that support the exercise of univers al jurisdiction over Yousef. Id.
(internal citation omitted in original).
In relying primarily on the Restatement (Third) (and its incorporation into Yunis) and in
expanding the scope of uni versai jurisdiction to new offenses by judicial analogy to its traditional
subjects, the District Court erred, first, in its use of the sources of authority from which a court may
discern the content of customary international law and, second, in its conclusion that universal
jurisdiction may be expanded by judicial analogy to the crimes that currently are subject to
jurisdiction under the universality principle. We address these poin ts in turn.
ii. The Use of Authority in Determining Customary
International Law
The District Court anchored its finding of universal jurisdiction over Y ousef in the relevant
provisions of the Restatement (Third). It erred in doing so because such treatises are not primary
sources of international law. White a discussion of the sources of authority from which a court may
discover the content of customary international law may seem rarefied, we address this subject here
at some length because the incorrect use of such sources can easily lead to an incorrect conclusion
about the content of customary international law. In the instant case, misplaced reliance on a
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treatise as a primary source of the customary international law of universal jurisdiction led to the
erroneous conclusion that such jurisdiction existed over the acts charged in Count Nineteen.
The Restatement (Third), a kind of treatise or commentary, is not a primary source of
authority upon which, standing alone, courts may rely for propositions of customary international
law. Such works at most provide evidence of the practice of States, and then only insofar as they
rest on factual and accurate descriptions of the past practices of states, not on projections of future
trends or the advocacy of the "better rule." See note 31,post. Moreover, while a treatise never may
serve as a primary source of law, reliance on this section of the Restatement (Third) in particular is
error because it advocates the expansion of universal jurisdiction beyond the scope presently
recognized by the community of States, as reflected in the primary sources of international law.31
31 For a discussion of the d e partures of the Restatement (fhird) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States from the content of the Restatement (Second), sec Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restate111ent's Treatment of Sources and
Evidence oflntematio11a/La1v, 25 lnt'I Lawyer 311 (199 1).
The American Law Institute ("ALI") began îts project of preparing comprehensive "restatements" of the laws
of the U nited States in order "'to promo te the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to
socia I needs."' The A merican Law Inscitu te, Capt11ri11g the Voice of the A111erùt111 LaJ1J I11stit11te: A H andbook for A LI Reporters 1
(2001) (quoting the A LI's 1923 Certificate of Incorporation)); see also Harvey S. P erlm an, The Restate111ent Process, 10-Fall
Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 2, 2-3 (2000). Accordingly, the Restatemen ts do not rn ere ly (or necessarily) " restate" the law as it
is; the ALI handbook for reporters instructs that reporters arc "not compelled to adhere to . .. a preponderating balance
of authority but [are] instead cxpected to propose the better mie and providc the ration ale for choosing it ." Id. at 6 (internai
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
The ALI published its first Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the Uni ted States in 1965-although
this volume was entitled the Restatemcnt (Second) because it comprised part of the second series of restaternents issued
by th e ALI. Id; see also Restatement (Second) o f the Foreig n Relations Law of the United States (1965) ("Restatement
(Second)'). The Restatement (Third) is a "comprehensive revision" of the Restatement (Second). Resta tement (Third)
at 3. The Director of the AL] notes in the foreward to the Rcstatement (Third) that it is "in no sense an official
document of the United Scares," and chat "[i]n a numbcr of particulars the formulations in this Rcstatcmcnt arc at
variance with positions that have bcen takcn by the United States Govcrnment." id. ac IX . Thesc variations presumably
are intentional because, although t he ALI extended the Restatement (Third) project by a year to consider
"communications received ... from the D epartment ofState and from the justice D epartmen t," itdid not fully conform
the Restatement to the positions expressed in those communications. American Law lnstitute, Proceedings, 63d A nnual
Meeting, 1986, at 90 (1987). The Restatement (fhird) addresses for the first time the cen tral su bject of the sources o f
international law, which the Restatemenr (Second) had relegated ro the comm ents of section 1. McCaffrey, ante, ar 312.
The Resrate ment (Third)'s innovatjons on the su bject of customary international law have been controversial.
For example, the Restatement (Third) suggests that customary international law might trump prior inconsistent statutory
law, binding th e executive branch. See Restatement (Third) at § 115(2) & cmt. d & Reporters' ote 4. This proposition
is without foundation or merit. lndeed, other commentators have called the Restatement (Third)'s view that customary
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The District Court's reliance on Ytmis for the proposition that it could exercise universal jurisdiction
over Yousef sirnilarly was misplaced because the holding in Yunis was grounded in the text of the
Restatement (Third).
* * *
The "sources" of international law is a subject of much continuing scholarship. The Statute
of the International Court of Justice sets forth in its Article 38 the sources of authority that the ICJ
relies upon to determine international law. Article 38 provides in relevant part:
1. The Court, whose fonction is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59,32 judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists [i.e., scholars or
international law cou Id supersede federal statu tory law "pure bootstrapping ," notîng chat the only authority c ited for that
proposition in the Restatement (Third) is a single arti cle by the Restatement (Third)'s own Repor ter- th at is, the citation
is without cxtcrnal autho rity. Curtis A. Bradley & J ack L. G o ld smith, Custo111ary l nternatio11af LmP as Feden,I Co1J1mo11 L aw:
A Critiq"e of the Modern Positio11, 110 1-!arv. L. Rev. 815, 835-36 & nn. 142-143 (1997). Even the current President of the
ALI notes that th is rule was "much debated when the Restatement Third was under disc ussion in the Insti tute ... [and
is] not complete ly free from controversy now." Michael T raynor, "That's D e bata ble: T he ALI as a Public Policy Forum,
Part II," 25 The ALI Re porter 1, 2 (2002).
lnasmuch as the Restatemen t (Third) notes that certain of its positions are "at variance" with the praccice and
customs followed by the United States in its international relacions, and incorrectly asserts that customary inte rnational
law may trump United States s tatutory law, courts must be vigilant and careful in adopting the statements of the
Resta tem ent (Third) as evidence of the customs, practices, or laws of the United States and / or evidence o f custo mary
internatio nal law. See note 33, post.
32 Article 59 provides in fu ll: "The decis ion of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect o f that particular case." Id. at art. 59.
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"jurists"]33 of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the detennination
of ru/es of la11J.
Statu te of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, U.S.T.S. 993
(emphasis added).
Scholarly commentators themselves recapitulate the Article's schema-namely, that the acts
and decisions of States are sources of law, while scholarly works are not:
The origins of the ntles of international law, which may also be called ' the sources' of
that law ... are the opinions, decisions or acts constituting the starting-point from
which their more or less graduai establishment can be traced .
. . . . The records or evidence of international law are the documents or acts proving
the consent of States to its rules. Among such records or evidence, treaties and practice
play an essential part, though recourse must also be had to unilateral declarations,
instructions to diplomatie agents, laws and ordinances, and in a fesser degree, to the
writings of authoritative jurists.
Clive Parry, The Sources and E vidences of International La11J 2 (1965) (internai quotation marks and
citation omitted) (final emphasis added).
Thus, according to the Statu te of the International Court of Justice34 and the writings of
leading publicists themselves, publicists' writings are not true "sources" of international law, though
they may be useful in explicating or clarifying an established legal principle or body of law. Nor do
the writings of any particular publicists necessarily constitute strong evidence of a proposition of
international law or of any State's consent thereto. Rather, as Professer Parry of Cambridge
University observed, the writings of publicists are an acceptable additional source to shed light on a
33 "Publicists" is an antique w o rd used in the pa rlance o f internation al law as a synonym for writers who, in
othcr areas of scholarship, are called "scholars" or "juris ts ." "Jurist," for its part, mcans "[a} leg al scholar," though its
use may introduce amb iguity because a secondary meaning o f this tcrm is "judge." Biack 's Lmv D ictionary 767 (5th cd.
1979); see note 36, post. "Publicis" is a term used for the writings of "publicists ."
34 Acco rding to the Charter of the United Nations, " [a]ll Members o f the United Nations are ipso f acto parties to
the Statu te of the International Court of Jus tice." Charter of the United Nations,June 26, 1945, 59 Star. 1031, T.S. No.
993 (1 945), Art. 93. T he United States Senate ratified the Charter of the United Nations on July 28, 1945. 91 Co ng. Rec.
8185, 8190 (1945).
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particular question of international law only when "recourse must a!so be had' beyond the "opinions,"
"decisions," and "acts" of States, and only then "to a lesser degree" than to more authoritative
evidence, such as the State's own "declarations," "laws," and "instructions" to its agents. Id.
Sorne contemporary international law scholars assert that they themselves are an authentic
source of customary international law, perhaps even more relevant than the practices and acts of
States. The most candid and aggressive formulation of the unfounded daim to legal suzerainty by
the international law professoriate has been made by the eminent Louis B. Sohn, the emeritus Bernis
Professor of International Law at the Harvard Law School, who stated,
I submit that states really never make international law on the subject of human
rights. It is made by the people that care; the professors, the writers of textbooks and
casebooks, and the authors of articles in the leading international law joumals
.... This is the way international law is made, not by states, but by 'si!!J'professors
J1Jriting books[.]
Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International LaJ1J, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 399, 399, 401 (1996).35 This
notion that professors of international law enjoy a special competence to prescribe the nature of
customary international law wholly unmoored from legitimating territorial or national
responsibilities, the interests and practices of States, or (in countries such as ours) the processes of
35 Sorne scholars pro mulgate the view that the o pinions of scholars shou ld be preferred as a source o f autho rity
ovcr the output of States' lawmaking bodies and States' practiccs, based on the argument chat scho lars are more
indepcndcnt of narrowly national conccrns than elcctcd lawmakers and thcrcfore be cter cm body the d isin terestcd
"co11scie11ce juridique." See, e.g. , Oscar Sch ach ter, The i nvisible Coilege of l 11tematio11al Lau!Jers, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 2 17, 225
(1977). This seemingly idealistic position has been rejec ted by other scholars, who note that it is "obvious" that
"subjective factors" and "national and other prejudices" freely may enter into the writings of publicists, particularly those
who "sec themselves to be propagating new and better views." lan Brown lie, Principles of Public l 11ter11ationai L aJV 24 (5th
ed. 1999) . The claim o f scho lars ro speak for "the in tern ational community," loosely so called, however commonplace in
our rime, should be rega rde cl with skepticism . See note 36, post.
Not ail international law scholars adopt the position that scholars' views are more constitutive of customary
internatio nal law than States' practices. See, e.g., Ern est A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Custo111ary lntemationai LaJlJ, 42
Va. J. Tnt'I L. 365,391 (2002) (stacing, "Tt is hard not to see delusions of grandeur in sta tements like [Sohn's] .... Law
pro fessors defendîng the modern position are, at least to sorne extent, asscrting thcir own power.")
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democratic consent-may not be unique,36 but it is certainly without merit.
Put simply, and despite protestations to the contrary by scholars (or "publicists" or " jurists")
themselves, a statement by the most highly qualified scholars that international law is x cannot
trump evidence that the treaty practice or customary practices of States is otherwise, much less
trump a statute or constitutional provision of the United States at variance with x . This is only to
emphasize the point that scholars do not make law, and that it would be profoundly inconsistent
with the law-making processes within and between States for courts to permit scholars to do so by
relying upon their statements, standing alone, as sources of international law. In a system govemed
by the rule of law, no private person-or group of men and women such as comprise the body of
international law scholars- creates the law. Accordingly, instead of relying primarily on the works of
scholars for a statement of customary international law, we look primarily to the formal lawmaking
and o fficial actions of States and only secondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of the
established practice of States.37
36 See, e.g., State1J1ent Amicus Curiae of Inten1t1tionai Lm11 Professors, Parag111g v. Ci/more, 118 S .Ct. 1352 (1 998) (No.
97- 1390) (s tating, mo re sub tly than Professor Sohn, tloat the "views of juri sts o n points of inte rnational law (should b e]
taken into accoun t when such questio ns arise in U.S. courts"; further stating that amici, "through scho larship[,] ... have
contributed to the development o f jurisp rudence on vario us questions related to the pending matter, id. at 1-2) (note that
there is no record on Supreme Court docker sheet o f any action on the motion to file this amicus brief). On the term
"jurist" ge nerally, and the possibilities fo r confusion in the use o f this term, sec no te 33, ante.
For a survey of statements by inte rnational law scho lars attributing to thcmsclves law-making authority in the
are a of c ustomary international law, see D aniel \Y/. Drezner, On the Balance Behveen l ntematio11al L aJJJ and De111ocratic
Sovereignty, 2 Chi. J . l nt'l L. 321, 324-25 & nn.12 -14 (2001) (stating that "[r]evisio nist sch olars of international law claim
that unelected, unrepresentative g roups advocate the use of customary international law as a means of bypassing
democratic sovereignty," and citing ex tcnsively to relevant examples). See also Curtis J\ . Bradley, The Costs ojlntemationa/
H11m"n Rights Litigatio11, 2 Chi .J. lnt'l L. 457,468 (2001) (di scussing the "substanrial pride" of some " international law
scho lars" who beheve they "are engaged in a form o f law creation").
37 Our view of the marre r is entirely consistent with our understanding o f the c ustomary international law set
forth in rwo nota ble cases, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F .3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), and Filartiga v. Pena-Jrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), arising under the A lien T o rt Claims Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. l n those cases, we consid e red the character
and sources of customary international law , see, e.g., Kadic, 70 F .3d at 238 -39; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 n.7, and we
nowhere suggested that th e views o f interna tional scholars, standing alo ne and unconnected to accurate descriptio ns of
past s tate practice, could be a basis for the determinatîon of the applicable law. These cases did not address jurisdiction
under the universality principle because jurisdic tion in both cases a rose under the /\lien Tort Claim s Act.
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iii. The Universality Principle Provides for Jurisdiction over
Only a Lirnited Set of Acts Violating the Law of Nations
The District Court erred in holding that the universality principle provides a basis for
jurisdiction over Yousef for the acts charged in Count Nineteen because the universality principle
permits jurisdiction over only a limited set of crimes that cannot be expanded judicially, as discussed
in full below. The District Court's reliance on the qualified language in Yunis that aircraft-related
crime "may well bè' one of the few crimes supporting universal jurisdiction, Yousef, 927 F.Supp. at 681
(quoting Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1092) (emphasis added), is facially at odds with this requirement because
such language reflects that these crimes are not unequivocally condemned by al! States.
Yousef argues that the District Court erred in finding that he was subject to universal
jurisdiction because terrorist acts like his own are not universally condemned by the community of
States and therefore not subject to jurisdiction un der the universality principle. Yousef Br. at 144-
45. Although we are doubtful that the District Court's finding of universal jurisdiction relies on the
notion that al! acts of terrorism are universally condemned, we emphasize that the indefinite
category of " terrorism" is not subject to universal jurisdiction.
* * *
The universality principle permits a State to prosecute an offender of any nationality for an
offense committed outside of that State and without contacts to that State, but only for the few,
near-unique offenses uniformly recognized by the "civilized nations" as an offense against the "Law
of Nations."38 The strictly limited set of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction cannot be expanded
38 The phrase s " international law" and the " law of nations" frequently are used interchang eably, see, e.g.,
Restatement (T h ird) 41 (s taring, in the introductory note to Chaptcr 2, that " the law of natio ns later [was] rcfcrred to as
international law"), but these terms are not en ri.rel y synonymous. " Internation al law" is of a far mo re recen t vin rage than
" law of nations." " Law of nations" der ives from the Latin jus ge11tù1111, meaning literally " law of nations" (the root of
gentù1111 beinggens, mcaning a race, clan or people), and was uscd to rcfc r to the law applied by Rom an magistratcs in
foreign lands. The jus gentù1111 is close ly rela ted to the concepts o f natural law and natu rai rc ason ,jus 11aturale and 1U1t11nde
ratio. By co ntrast, J e rem y Bentham first coined the phrase " internation al law" in 1789. J eremy Bentham, An l11 troductio11
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by drawing an analogy between some new crime such as placing a bomb on board an airplane and
universal jurisdiction's traditional subjects. Nor, as discussed above in our consideration of the use
of sources in international law, can universal jurisdiction be created by reliance on treatises or other
scholarly works consisting of aspirational propositions that are not themselves good evidence of
customary international law, much less primary sources of customary international law. See Yousef,
927 F.Supp. at 681.
The class of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction traditionally included only piracy. See,
e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000, 41 I.L.M. at 559 1 5 (separate opinion of ICJ President
Guillaume) (stating that "universal jurisdiction is accepted in cases of piracy because piracy is carried
out on the high seas, outside ail State territory"); see also Oppenheim's International Law 753 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds., 9th ed. 1996) (discussing universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy);
Scharf, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. at 369 (same). In modem rimes, the class of crimes over which States
can exercise universal jurisdiction has been extended to include war crimes and acts identified after
to the Princip/es oJMorals and Legislation 326 n .1 (Hafner Publ'g Co. 1948) (1789) (stating that "(t]he word international, it
must be acknowledged, is a new one ... calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch oflaw which goes
commonly under the name of the laiv of nations." (em phasis in original)) . Bentham 's writings on "inte rnational law,"
howeve r, significantly expanded the scope of what p revious ly had been known as the "law of nations" ro sweep w ithin it
any area of lawmaking in which States might join for their mutual ad van cernent. Jeremy Bentham , Princip/es of
International La,v, in 2 The Wo rks of Jeremy Bentham 535-40 Uohn Bowring, cd., New Yo rk, Russell & Russell, 1 ne. 1962)
(1786-89) (stating chat " international laws [should] be made upon ail points which remain unasccrtained" amo ng nations,
particularly areas in which nations "are capable of collusion" in the furtherance of alig ned interests. I d. ac 540). Thus
while Benthamite "international law" and its p rogeny are concemed with lawmak ing in any area that could improve the
condition of, and relations between, States, the "law of nations" histori caUy consis ted of a finite set of principles be lieved
by comme ntators (primarily Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui) to be de rived from the divine order, or frorn
abstract reason and natu rai law. Stewart ]a y, The S talus ef the La1v of Nations in Ear!J1 A1J1erican Lmv, 42 V and. L. Rev. 819,
823 (1989). According to William Blackstonc, the cightcenth-ccntury British lcgal scholar and judgc, the " law of n ations
is a system of rulcs, dcduciblc by natural rcason, and cstablishcd by universal consent among the civilizcd inhabitants o f
the world"; it is founded on the principle "that different nations o ug ht in rime of peace do to o ne anocher ail the good
they can; and, in rime of war, as little harm as poss ible, without prejudice to thei.r own real interests." 4 \X'illiam
Blackstone, Commenta ries *66.
ln a notable opinion by Judge H enry J. Fric ndly, himself a practitio ner of international law for many years
be fore his appointment to our Court, we held that "a v io lation of the law of natio ns arises only when the re has been a
v io lation by one or more individuals of those standards, ru les or eus toms (a) affecting the relationship between states or
bctwecn an individual and a fo reign s tate, and (b) uscd by thosc scares for their common good and / or dcalings inter se."
IIT v. V encap, L td., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (in te rnai citation and guotation marks omittcd) .
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the Second World War as "crimes against humanity." See, e.g., Dem;anjuk v. Petrovsky , 776 F.2d 571,
582-83 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).
The concept of universal jurisdiction has its origins in prosecutions of piracy, which States
and legal scholars have acknowledged for at least 500 years as a crime against ail nations both
because of the threat that piracy poses to orderly transport and commerce between nations and
because the crime occurs statelessly on the high seas. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat) 153, 163 n.h (1820) (Story,J.) (extensively quoting the writings of, among others, the
seventeenth-century Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius to define piracy as prohibited by the "law of
nations" and subject to universal jurisdiction; upholding the defendant's conviction, however, not
based upon universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy but under the statute at issue in the case, Act
Cong. March 3, 1819, c. 7 6, id. at 153-54, which provided for the exercise of jurisdiction by the
United States over those committing acts of piracy, as provided for in the Constitution, which states
that Congress may legislate to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and off en ces against the Law of Nations," U .S. Const. Art. § I, 8, cl. 10); cf. Oscar Schachter,
International Lai// in Theory and Practice 267 (1991) (recounting that Britain during the nineteenth
century subjected slave traders apprehended at sea to universal jurisdiction on the view that they
were pirates).
Universal jurisdiction over violations of the laws of war was not suggested until the Second
World War. See Theodor Meron, International Crùninalization of Internai Atrocities, 89 Am. J. Int'l L.
554, 572 (1995) (citing Hersch Lauterpacht, The Lai// of Nations and the Punishtnent of War Critnes, 2
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 58, 65 (1944), as the first to propose universal jurisdiction over war criminals).
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Following the Second World War, the United States and other nations recognized "war crimes"39
and "crimes against humanity," including "genocide,"40 as crimes for which international law permits
the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Demja,yuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
A commentator of the rime explained that war crimes are "similar to piratical acts" because
" [i]n both situations there is ... a lack of any adequate judicial system operating on the spot where
the crime takes place-in the case of piracy it is because the acts are on the high seas and in the case
of war crimes because of a chaotic condition or irresponsible leadership in rime of war." \Villard B.
Cowles, Universa!ity of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 177, 194 (1945).
The historical restriction of universal jurisdiction to piracy, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity demonstrates that universal jurisdiction arises under customary international law only
where crimes (1) are universally condemned by the community of nations, and (2) by their nature
occur either outside of a State or where there is no State capable of punishing, or competent to
punish, the crime (as in a rime of war).
39 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which tried war criminals of the Second World War,
defined war crimes as:
violations of the laws o r eus toms o f war ... includ(ing], bu t not ... limi ted to, murder, ill- trcatmen t o r
deportacion to slave labor or for any other purpose o f civilian population o f or in occupied territory,
murder o r ill-treatment o f prisoners of war or pe rsans on the seas , killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private prope rty, wanton des truction of cities, towns, or villages, or devasta rion not jusrified
by military necessity[.]
The Charter of the Internatio nal Military Tribunal, A rt. 6(b), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the
Interna tional Mili tary Tribu nal 11 (1947).
40 The Charter describes "crim es against humanity" as:
murder, exterminatio n, enslavement, deportarion, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civil ian po pulation, before or during the war, or persecutio ns on political, racial, or religious grounds
in execu rion of or in connection with any c rime within the jurisd îction o f the Tribunal, whether or not
in vio latio n of domestîc law of the co untry whe re perpetrated .
The Charter o f the International Military Tribu nal, Art. 6(c) , i111 Tri al of the Major War Criminals be fore the
Interna tional Military Tribunal 11 (1947).
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Unlike those offenses supporting universal jurisdiction under customary international
law-that is, piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity- that now have fairly precise
definitions and that have achieved universal condemnation, "terrorism" is a term as loosely deployed
as it is powerfully charged. Judge Harry T. Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit stated
eighteen years ago in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), that " [w]hile
this nation unequivocally condemns ail terrorist acts, that sentiment is not universal. Indeed, the
nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such aggression as to make it
impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus." Id. at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
Similarly, Judge Robert H. Bork stated in his opinion in Tel-Oren that the daim that a defendant
"violated customary principles of international law against terrorismO concerns an area of
international law in which there is little or no consensus and in which the disagreements concern
politically sensitive issues . . . . [N]o consensus has developed on how properly to define 'terrorism'
generally." Id. at 806-07 (Bork, J., concurring).
Finally, in a third concurring opinion, Judge Roger Robb found the question of assigning
culpability for terrorist acts to be "non-justiciable" and outside of the competency of the courts as
inextricably linked with "political question[s]." Id. at 823 (Robb,J., concurring). Judge Robb stated
that
Id.
[I]nternational "law", or the absence thereof, renders even the search for the least
common denominators of civilized conduct in this area [defining and punishing acts
of terrorism] an impossible-to-accomplish judicial task. Courts ought not to engage
in it when that search takes us towards a consideration of terrorism's place in the
international order. Indeed, when such a review forces us to dignify by judicial
notice the most outrageous of the diplomatie charades that attempt to dignify the
violence of terrorist atrociries, we corrupt our own understanding of evil.
We regrettably are no doser now than eighteen years ago to an international consensus on
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the definition of terrorism or even its proscription;41 the mere existence of the phrase "statesponsored
terrorism" proves the absence of agreement on basic terms among a large number of
States that terrorism violates public international law. Moreover, there continues to be strenuous
disagreement between States about what actions do or do not constitute terrorism, nor have we
shaken ourselves free of the cliché that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom figh ter."42 We
41 For example, each sicle of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ch arges the other with " t errorism ," sentim ents
echoed by their allies. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, !Phal D o You M ean, 'Tenvrist'?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2002, at Week in
Review 1 ("If I srael sees its mili rary campaign in the West Bank as a justifiable echo of Mr. Bush's assault on Al Qaeda,
Palestinians daim affini ty with the American colonists1 revoit against an occupying power. "). The Organization of the
l slamic Conference met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in April 2002, to define terrorism; the host of the conference,
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir i\l[ohamad, proposed a definicion of terrorism as "ail attacks on civilians"; the
conference's final declaration, however, stated that terrorism con sists only of attacks on civilia ns p erpet ra ted by nonP
a lesti nians, stating thar the Conference "'rejects an y attem pt to link terrorism to the struggle of the Palestinian people in
the exercise o f their inalicnable righ t to establish their independent state."' Id. (9uoting statements by Mohamad and
contain ed in the conference's final declaration). Sentiments at the conference were far frorn un iform, however: The
d eputy for eign minister of Bosnia-H erzegovina stated tha t "if a persan kills o r harms a civilian ... he is a terrori st"
irrespective of the " ra ce o r religion" of the perpetrator and the v ictims. Kevin M. Cherry, on-line commenta ry, Defining
T erroris,11 D own: IJ:7hat M11s!i111 Nations Real/y Think, The Nat'I Rev., Apr. 4, 2002 (9uoting staternents of BosnianHerzegovinian
d elegate to conference).
42 Confusion on the definition of "terror ism" abounds. S ee, e.g., Craig S. Smith, D ebate Over Iraq Raises Fears of a
Shrinking Rolefor NATO, N .Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2003, at L 26 (9uoting Cel este A. Wallander, senior fellow at the Center for
Strateg ic and I nternatio nal Studi es, as s ta ting that even among members o f the North Atlantic Trea ty Alliance
(" AT O") there îs no consensus "on how to define transnational terr orism").
Te rro rism is defined variously by the perpetrators' motives, method s, ta rgets, and vic tim s. Motivc-based
de fi nitions suffer from confusion because of t he attempt to carve out an exception for assertedly legitimate armed
struggle in pursuit of self-determination. For example, under one of the variou s United ario ns resolu tions addressing
terrorisrn, armed and violent acts do not constitute "terrorism" if committed by p eoples seeking self-deterrni nation in
opposition to a violently enforccd occ upation. See) e.g., D eclaratîon o n Princip lcs of l nternation al Law Concerning
Friend ly Relations Amo ng Co-operating States in Accordance with the Charter of the United N atio ns, Oct. 24, 1970,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N . GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at21, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971 ), reprinted in 9 Int'I Legis. Mat.1292
(1970). This attempt to distinguish " terroris ts" from "freed om fighters" potentially could legitimate as non- terro ri st
certain groups nearly u nive rsally recognized as terrorist, including the Irish Republican A rm y, H ezbollah , and Hamas.
See Boitu v.Q,mmic Literacy lnst. & H o/y Laad Fo1111d.for Relief& Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7 th Cir. 2002) (describing
Hamas); Sta11ford v. Kmvait Ainvays Co,p., 89 F .3d 11 7, 120 (2d Cir. 1996) (d escribing Hezbollah); Malter of Requested
Extradition of S111yth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 11 39-40 (N .O. Cal. 1994) (describing the Irish Republican A rmy) .
By contrast, the E uro pean Convention on t he Suppression of Terrorism de fines cerrorism solely b asecl on the
metho ds of violence the perpetrator em ploys, and explici tly removes poli tical judgment of the acts by d efining most
violent acts as "non-political" (regard less of the perpetrato r's claimed motive) . E uropean Convention on the
Suppression ofTerrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Europ. T.S. No. 90. Thus, in Article 1, the Convention defines as tcrrorism
any offenses, interalia, " involving the use o f a bomb, grenade, roc ket, automatîc fir earm, or letter or p arccl bomb if this
use cndangers persans," a definition that may fail to cîrcumscribe the offense adegu ately.
Th e A rab Convention on th e Suppr ession ofTerrorism (Cairo, Apr. 22, 1998), repri11ted in I nternational
Instrum ents Related to the Preven tion and Suppression of I ntern ational Terrorism, 152-73 (United ations 2001), while
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thus conclude that the statements of Judges Edwards, Bork, and Robb remain true today, and that
terrorism-unlike piracy and war crimes-does not provide a basis of universal jurisdiction.
b. Jurisdiction Is Proper Under United States Laws Giving Effect
to Its Obligations Under the Montreal Convention
While it is true, as Yousef asserts, that the District Court erred in concluding that the
universality principle conferred jurisdiction over the crimes charged in Count Nineteen, Yousefs
d aim that principles of customary international law constrain Congress's power to enact laws that
proscribe extraterritorial conduct is simply wrong.
In Count Nineteen, Yousef was charged with, and convicted of, violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 32(6)(3). Title 18 U.S.C. § 32 was enacted as part of the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, (§ 2013) 98 Stat. 1837, 2187-88, which, as discussed above, implements the Montreal
condemning te rrorism, takes a unique ly restrictive approach to defin ing it, stating that offenses committed again st the
interests o f Arab s tates are " tcrrorist offenses," while offen ses committed clsewhere or against o ther peo ples or intcrests
are not. Id. at Art. 1.3 (d e fining " terrorist offence" as any of several d efined violent actio ns that occur "in any of the
Contracting States, or against their nationals, property or inte rests"). The Convention further de fines as legitimate (nonterrorist)
" [a]U cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle," unless such strugglcs "prejudic[e] t he
territorial integrity of any A rab Sta te." Id. at Art. Il(a).
United States legislation has adopted several approaches to defining terro rism, demonstrating that, even within
natio ns, no s ing le defin ition of " terro rism" or " terrorist act" prevails. Among numerous statu tes defining "terrorism" or
"acts of te rrorism," see, e.g., 18 U .S.C. § 2331 (defi ning terro rism by motive, stating that " international terrorism" as
certain acts rhat " ap pear co be in tended (i) co intimida te or coe rce a civilian populatio n; (ii) to influence the policy o f a
governmen t by intimidation o r coercion ; o r (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination
o r kidnapping"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (c)(2) (substancially the same); 6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(B) (defining terrorism by its effect on
United States interests, stating that "acts ofterrorism" are any acts chat are " unlawful" and that cause damage to any
"person, prope rty, or entity" in the United States, or to any United States- flag c raft o r air carrie r) ; 8 U .S.C . §
11 8 2(a)(3)(B)(ii) (in the context of what acts cause an a lien to be excludable based on par ticip ation in " terrorist activ ity,"
defin ing "terrorise accivity'' apart from any nexus to United States interests, as "any accivity which is un lawful under the
laws o f the place where it is committed (or whi ch, if committed in the United States, would be un lawful under the laws
of the United States o r any State)" and that involves, inter alia, attacks on thircl parties to influence the policy of any
government, attacks on aircraft and other vessels, or the use of ch emical, biological or nuclear weapons) .
Still other d efinitions of " tcrrorism" may foc us on the victims of the attacks or the relation sh ip b etwecn the
perpetrators and the victims. See, e.g., Alex P. Schmid & Albert J .Jongman, P olitical Terrorism 1-2 (1988) ("Terrorism is
a method of combat in which . . symbolic vic tims serve as an in strumental target of vio lence. T hese instrumental
victims sh are g roup o r class characterisrics which form the basis for th eir selectio n for victimization. Through previous
use of violence o r the crcd ible thrcat of viole nce other mcmb c rs of that group or class arc put in a s care of chronic fcar
(terror).").
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Annex 8
Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, before the Fifty-second Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, New York, 22 September 1997
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Text of the Statement by
H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Before · the Fifty - Second Session
of the United Nations
General Assembly
New York, 22 September 1997
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Statcmcat oflraoiao Foreign Mioistcr at 52• 1 JNQA
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Introduction: The Collapse of Bi-Polar Approach
Puel
Our world is a constellation of interdependent human
units. As a result of the ever-expanding international
communications, our interdependence has been increasing on a
steady basis; a reiteration of the concept of "global village". These
human units or countries have become closely interconnected
within regions, while simultaneously, regions draw closer to each
other - an imperative of the on--going trend of globalization.
ln the aftennath of the collapse of the hi-polar world, a
new order characterized by multiple powers bas emerged. The
world is no longer monopolized by two super-powers; rather it is
rendered propitious for the presence and participation of a
multitude of powers. The new world provides a historie
opportunity for various powers to engage in collective cooperation
towards common objectives, based on human solidarity, active,
equitable and transparent participation.
1. The Doctrine of Global Civil Society
At the threshold of the third millennium and under the
circumstances of unfolding interplay among not one or two but
varions powers in the shaping of new global decisions,
international relations need a new doctrine, commensurate with the
evolving conditions and emerging needs. The new doctrine,
drawing upon historical hindsight and relyîng on reason and
objectivity, should shape a new order in international relations.
The main objective of this doctrine is the graduai
realization of a "global civil society"; a society where liberty and
salvation hannoniously coincide to meet the spiritual and material
needs of humanity in an institutionalized manner; and where
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development lies at the
foundation of universal cooperation and participation.
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sie•çrpçnt of!caniao Emeign Mioi;!iler at 52.,. LJNQA Pag2
1.1. The Foundations of Global Civil Society
1be doctrine of "global civil society" is predicated on two
major principles:
1.1.1. lnstitutionalization of the Rule of Law in Domestic and
International Relations
The most significant foundation and feature of civil
society is the rule of law, which prevents despotism and anarchy
at the domestic level and hegemony and war at the international
level. Rule of law constitutes the only proper setting for the
participation of all individuals and nations in shaping their own
destiny and building a better and more prosperous tomorrow for
their national societies and the global community.
The international community today, like its constituent
member-states, sirnply cannot provide a peaceful and prosperous
life for the people through coercion, autocratie decisions and
culture of domination and hegemony. Therefore, the rule of law,
as the very foundation of order and the relations among individuals
and states, should be institutionalized.
Undoubtedly. for the rule of law to be institutionalized in
international relations, it is imperative to commit ourselves
collectively to the scrupulous and non-discriminatory
implementation of the existing booy of international law, couple<!
with its progressive reform and development through equitable
universal participation and with due consideration for the values
of ail constituent units of the global community in its entirety.
This would not only serve making the law truly universal and
globally acceptable, but it would indeed facilitate its
implementation.
l.1.2. Empowerment and Participation
General participation coupled with the r~uisite
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Slatcrnc:nt nfJonjan Foreign Mioista:: at $r" UNGA Pagç J
empowennent constitute the undeniable foundation for the
realization and stability of civil society. Similar to the process of
participation at the national level - where ail individuals,
regardless of color, race, opinion, wealth or social status have an
inalienable- right to detennine their own destiny, countries and
regions with differing cultures and resources should enjoy the
right and be empowered to participate at all stages of
decision-making and policy implementation at the global scale.
Today, North and South constitute two complimentary
domains in a single global arena. The South, with its historical
depth, rich cultural heritage, and abundant natura1 and human
r~urces, bas in its totality played a great and pivotai role in the
development of human civilization. At the beginning of the third
millennium, the South's active participation in and meaningful
contribution to the prooess of fonnation of the emerging pluralistic
world is ofparamount importance. Equilibrium and stability of the
future world order depends, in large measure, on the South's
contribution to the shaping of the nonns governing future
international relations.
Yet, the share of the South in the existing world equations,
notwithstanding its sheer size and varied merits, is neither fair nor
proportionate. During the final years of the second millennium, the
South is ~ill suffering from injustice, discrimination and double
standards. 11ùs unju~ situation needs to be rectifiai and the
countries of the South, individually as well as collectively, should
actively assert a more equitable share and a more secure standing
in the global order. The realization ofthis lofty objective requires
assertive initiatives and measures at two levels: at national and
regional settings within the South to ensure effective presence and
involvement, and simultaneously at the international level to
provide the necessary milieu and conditions for such a
participation.
The effective presence and participation by the South in
the global system necessitates the promotion of a culture of
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§li'1fTP'F'l1 oflranian foo:ign Mioiscc a1 52 .. UNGA Page•
self-ëonfidence within the South as the comer-stone of
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development at the
national level, coupled with the drive towards conflict resolution
and confidence building among the countries of the South.
Undoubtedly, promotion and institutionalization of a culture of
cooperation and establishment of mechanisms to enhance the
existing level of cooperation in various fields among the countries
of the South would facilitate effective and constructive
international participation. The govemments and the political elite
of the South should not be found failing in this daunting task ahead
ofus ail.
And at the international level, the world community should
generate resolute political will to ensure in practice respect for the
plurality of differing views and values in political, social and
cultural dimensions, and simultaneously withstand the
institutionalizarion of the dangerous trend of unilateralism - as the
embodiment of a new fonn of international despotism.
1.2. Norms of Conduct in Global Civil Society
ln our view, we can move towards the graduai realiz.ation
of a global civil society through institutionaliz.ation of the rule of
law and wriversal participation as well as collective observance of
the following norms in our interactions:
1.2.1 Pluralism and Acceptance of Variety
The world community, qui te like its constituent national
societies, is composed of varieties and pluralities. In fact, it is the
mosaic of thoughts, ideas, beliefs> traditions and values that have
given rise to culture and civilization. Ali along history, this variety
and plurality has been the very source of inspiration and
innovation and the blossoming of human creativity - whether
individual or collective -- in various societies, thus contributing to
the advancement and enrichment of humanity. Progress towards
a truly pluralistic world community is only possible through
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St11m:,ent nflnmien Foreign Ministsr 111 s2 .. t JNGA Page$
genuine respect for freedom and democratic values as well as
through understanding and acceptance of pluralism in all its
national and global dimensions.
1.2.2. Promotion ofTolerance and Moderation
Preservation and more irnportantly, progress, of a
pluralistic world with a great and ever-increasing variety of
thoughts, ideas, beliefs, traditions and vaJues depends, as a matter
of principle, on the promotion of tolerance and moderation. ln the
modem world., it is only through forbearance and moderation that
various cultures, ideas and schools of thought would find the
opportunity to flourish and corne to fruition. The idea of the
preponderance and hegemony of one particular culture and value
system over ail others is not but subjugation to dogmatism and
blind prejudice and, in the final analysis, enslavement of the mind.
Hwnanity today should, on the ~is of the principle of liberty and
also drawing upon democratic traditions, be in a position to
provide the necessary milieu and opportunity for different outlooks
and schools of thought to present themselves. The relationship
among ideas and points of view, founded on reason and logic,
cannot be one of domination and coercion; no culture or value
system should be allowed to force others into subjugation and
oblivion. In a pluralistic world, the relationship among ideas and
thoughts is by nature and definition one of coexistence, exchange
and interchange. Therefore, through the promotion of tolerance
and moderation, the seeds of a hurnane coexistence should be
planted and cherished in such a manner that would ensure the
growth and blossoming of a flower field of ideas and thoughts.
1.2.3. Dialogue Among Civilizations
Dialogue among civilizations lies at the very foundation
of a truly "global civil society" and finds its roots in the principle
of tolerance and moderation. Civilizations are the product and
manifestation of the thinking and reflections of humanity, which
despite differences, emanate from a comrnon fountain -and
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Statcroeol oflr:auiao Ea::eign Mioister at ,r• J JNGA Page6
orientation. The theory of •'clash of civiliz.ations'' is contradictory
in essence and inconsistent with history. How could rational
manifestations of hwnan thinking, which in tum embody the
striving and reflection of gre.at men of culture and reasoning, be
conceived in a state of clash and conflict?
Various human civilizations can and should - cognizant
oftheir intrinsic commonalities as well as outward differences and
varieties - engage in constructive dialogue, mutual widerstand.ing
and fruitful cooperation. Active and continuous, albeit critical,
interchange among civilizations makes them all the more creative.
opens the possibilities for evolution and understanding, and
contributes to a higher state of well-being and prosperity for the
whole humanity. lnis is a fact borne out by the long history of
civilizatiooal exchange leading to mutual enrichment. In the course
of this process of exchange, civilizations rooted in religious and
divine thinking and values can help the Western societies in
responding to the serious problems in human relations, and
simultaneousJy, benefit from the fruits of scientific and industrial
advances in the West.
1.2.4. Promotion of Human Ri&hts
The collective campaign of the world community to
define, promote and protect human rights across the globe does
indeed represent a great achievement of humanity at large. The
promotion of respect for and compliance with the wùversal norms
ofhwnan rights constitutes a basic necessity for the development
of the "global civil society". lt is evident that priority must be
accorded to the most fundamental human rights such as the right
to life, the right to self-detemùnation and the right to development,
and spccial attention must be given to addressing their massive
and systematic violation. Furthennore~ fundamental human rights
are of such high standing that they should not be manipulated as
a lever for pressure or fall victim to politically-motivated
discrimination and selectivity.
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SWc;mcgt oflnnian Foreign Mjnisacr: nt s2• UNGA Pagç 7
Promotion and protection of human rights in an
instirutionalized manner depends, first and foremost, on a correct
and realistic understanding of the concept. Human rights do not
constitute abstract concepts. Approaches and policies emanating
from "extremist individualismn - defining the human person in
abstractio~ disconnected from spirituality and religious and
historicaJ roots, and divorced from social and cultural background
-· have indeed done more harm than good to the real cause of
human rights.
Moreover, hwnan rights, as concepts of universal nature,
cannot be claimed to be ·the monopoly of any single culture or
society. They belong to the entire humanity. Their correct and
comprehensive definition hinges on their liberation from the
restrictive bounds and monopolistic claims of a particular culture
and ideology. They can be promoted in a meaningful and effective
manner only through genuine respect for the plurality of beliefs,
religions, traditions, value systems and mcxles of thinking. Broad~
participation of various cultures in the on-going process of
defining and interpreting human rights as well as in formulating
new nonns and rules not only would prevent the monopolistic
hegemony of a particular culture, but would contribute to the
universal acceptance of new standards.
1.2.5. Comprehensive. Balanced and SustAinable
Development
For development to foster progress and change for the
better and consolidate the foundations of civil society, it needs to
be comprehensive, balanced and sustainable. Comprehensive
development encompasses ail political, economic, social, cultural
and ethical realms and dimensions of human beings and the
society. Balanced development creates a harmonious interaction
among them so that none is given undue prominence over the
others or neglected in favor of another. The very concept of
sustainable development is a practical reiteration of the now
established wisdom that development is a graduai and continuous
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8111gnent oflomiao foeci&:n Mini.ûc:r ai ~2 .. UNQA Pagea
·-
process. It cannot, and in fact, should not be conceived, planned
and pursued with short-tenn and transient interests or concerns or
even exigencies of a certain segment of the population, a single
generation or one society to the detriment of other segments,
generations or societies. Most importantly, human being must be
recognized as the center, core and beneficiary of development~ al)
aspects of development as well as its fruits should serve the
elevation of the human state.
1.2.6. Justice and EquaJity of Opportunities
Justice can be established and institutionalized in the
modem world, ensuring stability and sustainability on à global
scale only if individuals and nations were to enjoy e,qual, non~
discrinunatory and non4 selective acc.ess to opportunities. It is an
undeniable fact that a1ong the historical continuum, all societies,
with varying stock of natural and human resources and scientific
and technological capabilities, have participated in the common
human endeavor and have contributed, though in different forms
and to different degrees, to human advances and achievements.
Therefore, ail individuals and nations should have the opportunity,
within a rule-based framework, to have access to the existing
possibilities, and should not be deprived through artificial barriers
from scientific and technological advances which constitute the
common heritage of hwnarùty.
2. Post-Election Iran and the Global Civil Society
The political philosophy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
1s m full accord with these fundamental foundations of the
prospective "global civil society". The presidential elections in
lran on May 23, 1997 was indeed a true reflection of the universal
outlook just defined. The elections, held in freedom and security
with the participation of about 30 million men and women -
nearly 90% of ail those eligible to vote, were a clear manifestation
of a genuinely popular, democratic and dynamic participation of
the Iranian people~ particularly women and youth, in dete~g
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their own destiny.
2.1. Strengthening the Foundations of Civil Society
The domestic program of the new govemment is geared
towards strengthening the foundations of civil society, based on
freedom, rule oflaw, pluralis~ respect for and protection of the
rights of people, tolerance, moderation, popular participation,
national hannony and social justice. These fundamental principles
are mot.cd in the ~ and values of Islam, the principles and
ideals of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic political
philosophy of the late Imam Khomeini - the great leader of the
Revolution and the architect of the Islamic Republic.
2.2. Expansion of Law-Based Global Dialogue and
Cooperation
On the basis of the same world outlook and politica1
philosophy, the main features and priorities of the new
administratioo's foreign policy - which I presented to the Islanùc
Consultative Assembly during my confirmation hearing, and
which received the overwhelming support of the Parliarnent - are
the following:
- Expansion of relations with all countries on the basis of
mutual respect, common interest and non-interference in
internai affairs of others;
Rejection of imposition of or submission to domination
and hegemony;
· Emphasis on the institutionaliz.ation of international law
as the foundation of global order and as the final arbiter
arnong states;
Establishment and strengthening of mechanisms of mutual
confidence building and security through regional
cooperation and negation of presence and influence of
foreign powers;
Striving towards reduction of tension at regionaf and
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Statcment oflcaoiao foccigp Mîoisler al s2• tJNGA Pye IO
international levels and active participation in regional
conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-keeping;
Protection of ail human rights and rejection of attempts
for selective and discriminatory abuse of human rights as
instruments of policy;
Emphasis on the fundarnental rights of oppressed
individuals and nations, particularly the Palestinian
people;
Arresting of arms race at the regional and global levels,
elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and control
of conventional weapons;
Strengthening the bonds of amity and solidarity among
Islamic and non-alignoo countries;
Active presence and constructive participation in the
United Nations and other international organizations, with
effective contribution in international efforts on global
issues, such as arms control and disannament,
comprehensive and sustainable development, human
rights, peace-keeping, combating terrorism and illicit
dru~, and reversai of unjust international arrangements;
and ·
Defending the rights of Iranian citizens ail over the world.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted concrete
measures at the regional and international levels in pursuit of these
principled policies, and is fully prepared to cooperate with all
countries towards achieving common objectives in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
3. Towards Global Civil Society: GlobaJ Cooperation to
Overcome Global Problems
ln our view, building the future global civil society is an
attainable and realistic objective, which requires, nevertheless,
energetic participation of ail member states. Thus, collective
cooperation at a global scale to strengthen the foundation and
remove the impediments to the realiz.ation of thîs lofty human_goaJ
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Stetancrt nfluniao Foreign Mioistcc Un• UNGA Page 11
is an inescapable irnperative. The major hurdles in this common
endeavor can be anatyz.ed and addressed in two categories:
New and persistent regional conflicts caused by Jack of
respect for international law and violation offundamental
human rights;
Emergence and continuation of tendencies antithetical to
the rule of law and general participation.
3.1. Law-Based Approach to the Root Causes of Regional
ConOicts
3.1.1. The Middle East Crisis and the Question of Palestine
The question of Palestine, which lies at the very heart of
the Middle East Crisis, represents the most vivid and persistent
case of disregard for international law and systematic violation of
fundamental human rights of individuals and peoples. The
occupation of foreign territory, widespread and massive violation
of the right to self-cletennination and other basic human rights,
forceful imposition of the will of one political group over the entire
region through coercio~ intimidation and official state terrorism,
disruption of regional security and stability, anns race,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rejection of the
demands of the international community and even violation of
willfully undertaken commitments under the so-called peace
process constitute the main causes of the Middle East crisis.
Regrettably, certain powerful supporters of Israel tend to ignore
or even attempt to disguise these self-evident realities through a
campaign of sensationalism and demagoguery.
The failed attack against Southern Lebanon earlier tlris
month exposed official Israeli terrorism and kidnaping one more
time. Consbuction of settlements in East Jerusalem in spite of the
undertakings by Israel under the so-called peace process and in
contravention of various United Nations resolutions - including
two resolutions adopted by the Tenth Emergency Session.of the
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Statcrocol of Icaoiag Foreign Miuis&cr g ,r lJNGA Page 12
General Assembly - illustrated that Israel considers itself above
and beyond international law, is not even committed toits om1
undertakings, and continuously seeks to consolidate its occupation
through demographic and geographic changes in the occupied
territories, particularly in AJ-Quds AI-Sharif. Unjustified
detention, suppression and torture of Palestinian people,
destruction and confiscation of Palestinian homes and property
and desecration of Islamic holy places, particularly the Al-Aqsa
Mosque, exemplify repressive policies of Israel and its systematic
and flagrant violations of human rights in the occupied terri tories.
The Middle East crisis c.an only be solved through the full
realization of the rights of the Palestinian people, in particular
their right to self-detennination, retum of refugees and the
liberation of all occupied territories, including the AI-Quds AISharif,
southem Lebanon and the Syrian Golan. The experience
of the past few years bas made it abundantly clear that any scheme
or proposai which fails to take full account of the realities in the
region or the infiunous lsraeli patterns of behavior is bound to fail.
It is indeed unfortunate that some outside powers
deliberately misconstrue or misrepresent Iran's franlc, open and
objective expose of the realities as support for terrorism and
opposition to peace and security in the region. I reiterate once
again that the lslamic Republic of Iran also seeks peace and
stability in the Middle East; a just and lasting peace that would
receive regional consensus and would cure this chronic crisis once
and for ail.
3.1.2. Afghanistan
Nearly two decades have elapsed since the crisis in
Afghanistan -- caused by disrespect for its sovereignty and
territorial integrity as well as violation of the basic rights of an
entire nation -- bas tumed into a vicious cycle of violence and
fratricide. The prolongation of the painful and disastrous war in
Afghanistan has inflicted enonnous damage and hardship on the
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Stetcmca1 of'Iaoi•o fgr;jgp Mioi§Jp; !1 ,2• uNGA Pye 13
terroriz.ed people of this country. Severe social restrictions and
flagrant violations of hurnan rights, particularly against women
and children - imposed unfortunately in the name of Islam - have
tamished the image ofthis proud country. Discrimination against
religious and ethnie groups and intransigence and inflexibility of
some warring factions have further exacerbated the crisis.
There is, wxloubtedly, no milita.ry solution to the crisis in
Afghanistan. lt is indeed regrettable to note that some of the
warring fàctions have yet to realize this evident truth. Only
through the establishment of a cease-fire, negotiations between ail
Afghan groups and fonnation of a broad-based govemment
representing aJI Afghans can the crisis in Afghanistan find a
lasting solution. A number of considerations in this regard are
essential and must be kept in mind:
lntra-Afghan dialogue as the key to the solution of the
crisis must form the basis and the priority of any
international endeavor;
Foreign intervention in Afghanistan must cease
imrnediately; and
Participation of ail ethnie and religious groups in
goveming Afghanistan must be the foundation of any
solution, so as to preclude even harboring of the idea of
domination of one group over Afghanistan.
As a fratemal neighboring country 9 the Islamic Republic
of Iran bas hosted millions of Afghan immigrants and refugees
during the past two decades, and -- in keeping with lslamic
hwnanitarian tradition -- bas used ail at its disposai to meet their
needs. In the same vein, my Govemrnent is determined to continue
its humanitarian and peace-making endeavors in Afghanistan in
tandem with the United Nations Secretary-General and the
Secretary-General of the Organization of the lslamic Conference.
1 must draw the attention of the international community to the
dire need and the urgency of humanitarian assistance to the poople
of Afghanistan.
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Statcmcm oflr:anian Foreign Mioistcr u. s211111 tJNGA
3.1.J. Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, we are witnessing pronùsing and positive
developments following the signing of the final peace agreement
in Tehran and Moscow, which was made possible through the
efforts of the United Nations, support of a number of regional
states and indeed the strong detennination and good faith of the
government and the opposition. The people and Govemment of
the Islamic Republic of Iran are satisfied with the successful
outcome ofthese efforts. We believe that the peaoe and security in
Tajikistan need care, patience, restraint and continuous
cooperation between diffèrent groups and currents in that country.
It is expected that the international community support the
outcome of the peace process and its consolidation in Tajikistan
through augmenting reconstruction and development assistanoe to
this country. We hope that the valuable efforts leading to the
establishment of peace in Tajikistan can provide a useful mooel
for the settlement of other similar disputes.
3.1.4.. Bosnia and Herzegovina
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents yet
another example of flouting international law, where the
fundamental rights of an entire people have been so blatantly
violated and obstacles continue to be created in the path of the
implcmentation of the peace agreements, whose full
implemmtation constitute the pre-requisite for peace and stability
in the Balkans. But the Serbs continue to create obstacles
regarding some key provisions of their commitments. Free
movement of people and goods have not yet been materialized and
refugees have not been able to retum to their homes. War
criminals -- who have committed horrifying crimes against
humanity and have the blood ofthousands of innocent people on
their hands -- continue to remain at large and disrupt political
affairs of that country.
While emphasizing the imperative of resp~ for
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Stllmm of Janiao Foreign Mioistcr at ,2 .. UNGA Page 1,5
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Islamic Republic of Iran considers the following
to be essential:
Utilization of ail possible means to promote and
strengthen the reintegration process in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic and multicultural
country;
Fonnation of central government's institutions and
prevention of delays and obstacles in the process of
reintegration and institution-building of the central
govemment;
Guaranteeing freedom of movement of people and goods
in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Safe retum of refugees to their homes;
Arrest of indicted war criminals and their surrender to the
War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague;
Provision of the necessary resources for reconstruction of
Bosnia by the international community and expeditious
fulfillment of commitments by countries. In this context,
high priorify should be acoorderl to equipping and training
of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in order to consolida.te peace and security in that country.
3.2. Reversai of Cold W ar Mentality
Concurrent with our joint efforts to resolve and prevent
regional crises, we need -- and indeed cannot avoid -- wtreserved
cooperation among all members of the human family to overcome
problems of g]obal characier. The Cold W ar generated a tendency
in internai and external relations, which required the existence of
real or imagined enemy. Escaping this state of mind and building
a new world based on cooperation and the rule of law not only
requires political will, but in fact careful planning in order to
foster confidence and mitigate security, economic and social
concerns at national and regional levels.
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Stalemcot of!rviiao Foreign Miaislcc Il ,2• UNGA t,ç 16
- Confidence building at national, regional and international
levels - as an essential strategy to transfonn human relations -
will not sucoeed in the absence of transparency in decision-making
and participation of ail concerned. Transparency minimizes the
concems of various players over ulterior motives of others,
whereas active participation of the widest possible range of
players in decision-making facilitates acoeptance of decisions and
theîr implementation.
The antithesis of universal participation in decisionmaking
and law-based cooperation at the international level is
unilateralism. This phenornenon finis its manifestations in various
areas including anns control, development, international trade,
envîronment and oodification of new human rights nomis. A frank
and honest review points to the conclusion that the most important
reason for resorting to unilateral measures lies in a misperception
and an erroneous analysis of the post Cold War international
situation and the illusion of the emergence of one country or belief
system as the paramount power or culture in the "New World
Order ...
Unilateral decisions are often made when internai pressure
groups in powerful cowitries -- in pursuit of their own interests -
impose policies on their national govemments that cannot attract
international consensus or agreement. Therefore, adoption of
unilateral measures clearly indicates dominance of domestic
considerations coupJed with a perception of superior role in
international affairs. Consequently, accusations leveled against
others to justify these decisions are but disguises to conceal the
true nature ofunilateraJ measures before the world public opinion.
3.3. Allaying Security Concerns
One of the main purposes of the United Nations is the
creation of an appropriate foundation for allaying security
concems of states. The first and most effective step towards
building confidence is the elimination of weapons of mass
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Statancot oflnnian Foreign Mjnista; at 52 .. UNGA P,,ge 17
destruction, reduction of conventional weapons, transparency in
the field of annaments and establishment of security and
cooperation schemes in various regions of the globe. This
endeavor requires full and non-discriminatory implementation of
existing undertalângs in the area of disannament and security and
development of new rules to address universally-accepted
priorities as well as security requirements of the international
community and its members.
3.3.1. Total Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The most important priority of humanity, essential for the
survival of human civilization, is the elimination of weapons of
mass destruction. With the Biological W eapons Convention in
place and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, two categories of weapons of mass destruction have
been banned by the international community. The entry into force
of CWC is undoubtedly the greatest achievements of humanity in
the area of disarrnament after the end of the Cold War. As a
country whose civiliàns and military personnel have suffered, both
physically and emotlonally, from tlùs inhuman weapon, the
Islamic Republic of Iran believes that every effort should be made
to fully implement the commitrnents stipulated in the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Conventions and make them truly universal
in order to save the humanity from the threat posed by these two
inhuman weapons.
Developments in the course of last two years have also
created favorable conditions for nuclear disarmament. The
indefinite extension of NPT on the basis of commitrnents
stipulated in the documents of the Review and Extension
Conference, as well as the historical decision of the International
Court of Justice that there exists a commitment under international
law to undertake gocxf-faith negotiations for nuclear disannament
have demonstrated the firm detennination of the international
community to end the nightmare of nuclear war.
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StJttcrncr4 of Jnanjan Fottign Mioiscr a1 ,2• UNGA
3.3.J.l. Obligations ofNuclear Powers
Despite the commitrnents and legal obligations, the efforts
ofnuclear-weapon-states to maintain and develop these weapons
is a cle.ar indication of the persistence of Cold War mentality,
which has paralyzed confidence building activities of the
Conference on Disarrnaments and other inter-govemmental bodies
dealing with the subject.
With the insist.ence of nuclear powers to limit the scope of
CTBT to nudear explosions, titis treaty has in practice lost its
comprehensive character and bas not prevented further
development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear powers,
utilizîng advanced technology ~ are able to further develop their
nuclear stockpiles and produce new and more complex types of
nuclear we.apons through non~xplosive tests.
3. 3.1. 2. Transparent Transfer ofTechnology for Peaceful Use
Application of double standards in the field of nonproliferation
and employing non-transparent and exclusive export
control rnechanisms in the area ofnuclear, chemical and biological
technology for peaceful use are most destructive of inter•
govemmental confidence and security. lt is evident that any
verification and control of movement of these materials arnong
c.onc.emed parties should be in accordance with the provisions of
these treaties and verification mechanism outside these treaties
should be negotiated among ail concemed. Ali state-parties of the
relevant treaties should be able, without exception, to participate
in these negotiations.
J.11.3. Cessation of Unsubstantiated Al/egations
Resorting to unfounded and irresponsible allegations
against other countries for ulterior motives, as welJ as selective
and self-serving approaches towards international institutions
responsible for verification of compliance with non-proliferation
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Slefrrorart oflranim forcign Mioïstcr at s214 UNGA Pagcl9
regimes would definitely undermine public acceptante of the rule
of law in international affairs.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the basis of Islamic
beliefs, considers weapons of mass destruction inhumane and
illegitimate. Going beyond its comrnitments under the NPT and
IAEA safeguard agreements, Iran bas al lowed repeated IAEA
inspections of ail its nuclear facilities in a transparent manner.
Several officiais of the IAEA - the sole body responsible for
verification of peaoeful nature of nuclear activities of memberstates
- have repeatedly confinned the fact that Iran's nuclear
activities are perfonned within the framework of Agency' s
regulations and follow peaceful objectives. Despite these clear
facts, some governrnents - infamous for their illegal and
provocative proliferarion of nuclear weapons in the Middle East -have
embarked upon a barrage of false and baseless accusations
against Iran during the past few years. The only objective and
~ence of ùtis mendacity is to escalate tension, mistrust and
anns raoe m the region. Therefore, the international community -not
only in the interest of supporting the truth but also of
maintaining peace and security around the globe -- should
encounter this provocative and irresponsible propaganda.
Propaganda campaigns of public deception will certainly
not change regional realities on the ground. lt is self-evident that
insecurity in the Middle east is rooted in Israeli mi1itarism and its
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, which have thwarted all
disannament initiatives and mechanisms in this region. Sorne
regional countries - motivated by their security concems arising
from lsraeli nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons - have
been reluctant to sign or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention
and do not even find it possible to participate in the United
Nations Register of Conventional Anns. Y et, unabated political
and practical support for lsraeli acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction is being rendered by one or few states. This in itself
underlines the bitter re.ality that policies and practices of extra-
77 -
Sratcrneut pOowiao Foreign Mioister at 52 .. UNGA Pagç20
to further mistrust, tension, and anns race, providing lucrative
markets for weapon manufacturers.
3. 3.1. 4. Zones Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the establishment
of z.ones free from weapons of mass destruction in various regions,
as a step towards achievement of a world free of these weapons.
In 1974, Iran suggested the establishment of a nuclear•weaponfree
z.one in rhe Middle East, which has since received the support
of various sessions of the General Assembly. However, lsrael's
refusa! to accede to the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards
continue to be the obstacle to the realization of this common
objective.
The realization of the goal of establishment of free zones
in the Southern Hemisphere and other regions bas indeed enhance.d
regional and global peace and security. The Islamic Republic of
Iran finnly believes that nuclear powers must respect international
agreements establishing these z.ones and sign the relevant protocols
and support the initiatives ofNPT state-parties to establish such
zones particularly in the Middle East. This requires exerting
pressure on Israel to join NPT and accept IAEA safeguards in line
with Security Council Resolution 487.
3.3.2. Transparency and Reduction of Conventional
Weapons
The unabated race for the acquisition of conventional
weapons not only wastes huge quantities of the limited resources
of Third World cowitries -- so desperately needed for
development, but also exacerbates an atmosphere of anxiety and
mistrust. As a first step, transparency in the transfer of
annaments can play an instrumental role in building confidence,
arresting anus race in various regions and enhancing regional and
global peace and stability. This would be particularly soif such
transparency curbed the actual sale and transfer of sophisticated
- 78 -
Statrmcot oflaoian Foreign Mioi:stcr at 52..,. UNGA Page 21
yet unnecessary weapon systems to volatile regions such as the
Middle E.a.st. Furthennore, devising realistic measures to ban antipersonnel
land mines and contrai the acquisition and transfer of
light anns to areas where such wcaponry can exacerbate civil
oonflicts are among other constructive and useful steps. However,
in our collective efforts to achieve transparency or prohibit
specific types of weapons, we must never loose sight of the
ultimate objective in the area of conventional weapons, that is the
reduction of ail categories of weapons and curbing of military
expenditures world-wide.
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is
founded on peaoe, self~restraint, confidence-building and reduction
and elimination of tension, particularly within our region. 1 wish
to infonn titis August assernbly frankly and sincerely that
throughout the Middle East, Iran allocates the lowest budget to its
military. In 1995 and 96, only 3.3% of our GDP was spent on
defense. We continue to be ready for any regionally acceptable
understanding for further reductions in defense budgets in a
manner that security concems of large and small countries are
fully addressed.
3.3.3. Regional Security and Cooperation Schemes
Confidaloe-building starts from the neighborhood. In our
interdependent world, security is indivisible. Thus, the end of
Cold War and the universal rejection of cold·war mentality must
open the way for arresting and dismantling of rival block
formations and emergence of regional arrangements for security
and cooperation.
The highest foreign policy priority of the Islamic Republic
of Iran is to make every effort to strengthen trust and confidence
and build peace in our immediate neighborhood, which in cases
such as Tajikistan have had encouraging achievements.
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Stakrocot oflranian Foreign Mioister at .52"" UNQA Page 22
(E.C.0.) bas contributed to the expansion and consolidation of
relations among its member-states through adoption of common
positions and playing an active rote in the field of economic and
technical cooperation .. The important role of ECO in promoting
trust and confidence and providing and expanding the grounds for
participation and coordination arnong ten regional countries was
recognized on the part of the international community as a result
of the decision of the 48th Session of the General Assembly,
granting it observer status. Moroover, ECO has undertaken
serious and concrete measures with a view to establish relations
with other regional organiz.ations and fora, and hopes that the
specialized agencies and funds and programs of the United
Nations will expand their relations with it in various fields and
contribute to the reahzation of its objectives.
In the Persian Gulf area, only cooperation and collective
participation can bring about security and stability for ail
countries in the region. Taking full advantage of historical
affinities, cultural ties and religious bonds and sparing no effort
for the efficient and coordinated utiliution of human and natural
potentials and resources of the region constitute the single best
long-tenn guarantee for security and tranquility. Iran -- as the
biggest country in the region enjoying historical depth of several
millennia combined with the richness oflslamic civilization - does
not need to engage in any anns build-up or competition. Our
message to our neighbors is one of friendshlp and fraternity, and
we shall warmly welcome any initiative ta strengthen the
foundations of confidence and cooperation in this region.
The Islarnic Republic of Iran, whlch will be hosting the
Eighth lslamic Summit in December, is of the view that on the
threshold of the twenty•first century, the primary task of this
Swnmit is to foster mutual confidence and establish mechanisms
for cooperation and coordination in various fields among Islamic
countries. This will undoubtedly contribute to the further
strengthening of the foundations of lasting international seçμrity
and stability.
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sr,tcmcot of1ooieo Fçmgn Mioida: et ,2 .. UNQA Pm2l
3.3.4. Uprooting Terrorism
Terrorism is the wicked result of widespread lawlessness
and violent obstruction of public participation, which - in its
various fomlS and manifestations - threatens hwnan societies at
nationa1, regional and international levels. Titis dangerous
phenornenon affects not a particular country or region, but it is a
ruthless international problem that threatens the security and
tranquility of the international community as a whole, tramples
upon the most basic princip1es of hurnan rights, and endangers
territorial integrity of states. Political exploitation of tlùs
international problem through hurling unfounded allegations in
order to advance certain ulterior motives or cover up deficiencies
in domestic or externat policy is no less dangerous than terrorism
itself. They concurrently diminish trust, stability and security at
regional and international levels.
Resolution of tlùs destructive problem requires a
determined avoidance of sensationalism and demagoguery on the
one band, and a conoerted international attempt at finding practical
measures that are reasonable, objective and realistic in combating
terrorism, on the other. More importantly, our collective success
requires the non-sele.ctive, universal and law-based application of
agreed measures by relevant international organizations.
As a country that has suffered immensely from the
inhuman phenomenon of terrorism in the post-revolution years, the
lslamic Republic of Iran is prepared to take an active part in any
international effort to combat this problem in a serious,
comprehensive and principled manner.
3.4. Arrestinz the Global Social Crisis
Complex and deep-rooted social prob1ems pose a threat to
human society at large. Poverty and unemploymen~ inter alia,
have presented formidable challenges to social cohesion,
prosperity and weU-being of the global community. They render --
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Statcmart nf Irauian Foreign Miniskt llJ 52-' lJNGA Pagç24
in these final years of the current century - concerted actions by
states and supported by international organizations indispensable.
Poverty induces many social and cultural anomalies and thus its
eradication must become vigorously pursued by the international
communîty.
3.4.1. Narcotic Drugs
Narcotic drug abuse and trafficking is perhaps the rnost
disastrous social crisis of our time, and because of its geographic
location, the Islamic Republic of Iran is faced with this crisis in a
serious manner. Strengthening comprehensive and wellcoordinated
international action in the fight against illicit drug
trafficking has become the undeniably critical and urgent requisite
for saving the sucoeeding generations from the scourge of this evil
social menace, and thereby halting the fratricidal wars whose root
causes are in illicit traffickîng in narcotic drugs. The Special
Session of the United Nations General Assembly on narcotic drugs
next year is a first step for reinvigorating international cooperation
to develop a comprehensive strategy that aims to resolve this
social problem.
lt is imponant to take note of the need to strike a balance
in strategies to bring both the supply of and demand for illicit
drugs under control in dus otherwise incornprehensive war against
drug. Implementation of international undertalcings, particularly
those under the 1988 Convention, with a view to providing
support and assistance to states in order to maintain the course of
the fight against illicit plantation, production and transit of
narcotic drugs constitute an absolutely essential factor in
international initiatives and prograrns for drug control. In this
context, we strongly support the recent initiatives in combating
organized transnational crime including the elaboration of an
international convention on the subject.
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Sfatcrucm ef Jonïao Foreign MiDi,tq et S2_. JINGA Pagç23
-
3.4.2. The Y outh
The youth are a significant and large section of the human
society. They are the principal assets and the future-builders of
our comrnunities. They play an important role in the efforts to
achieve national objectives and to draw the social and economic
picture of the future. In light of this important role and the
particular spirit of the youth, a comprehensive and thorough
planning, responsive to the noeds and concems of the youth, is
required. Only under such circumstances, one crut hope that not
only our youth may not succumb to social crises, but also they be
an innovating and generating social force serving and benefitting
from comprehensive human development.
3.4.3. Status of W omen
As one-half of the body of humanity, women have
historically been subjected to discrimination, oppression and
unfair treatment.- Regrettably, the efforts of the international
community for defining, codifying and protecting human rights of
women have not lead to the rectification of this historical injustice.
This is, in part, due to a lack of full appreciation for the lofty and
central role ofwomen in the family and the society. 11ùs in tum
bas lead to an increased commercialization of and violence against
women.
The mixed outcome of various past international efforts
has made it abundantly clear that a new vision for elaboration of
principles and strategies geared to protecting the rights of women
through enhanced collective efforts - drawing from the richness
of global cultural diversity and enJightened interpretation of divine
teachings-is an indispensable imperative for our time. This new
vision embodies a common objective of the international
community ~ to create a climate where women fully enjoy their
human rights, have access to equal opportunity in all spheres of
life including in political and economic arenas, and where women
and men alike can resoonsiblv oarticioate in social develooment
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Stalewcot oflraniaJJ Eoreigp Mioistcr at 52"" lJNQA Page 26
and the overall growth of human society.
Active~ enthusiastic and meaningful participation of
Iranian women_ in the family and society found an outstanding
climax in their determining participation in the recent presidential
election. Benefitting from such enlightened presence and
participation of women., Iran is keenly prepared to engage in
cooperation and exchange of views with other members of the
international community to achieve this hwnan objective.
3.4.4. The Family
As the primary social unit and the very foundation of
development and growth of the human society, the institution of
family needs to be respected, nourished and maintained in order to
enable the .society at large to curb social ills and crises. Therefore,
we view the family as the very pillar of development in all its
aspects, and will spare no effort to advance the special status of
dûs sacrosanct institution. In tlüs context, we are ofthe view that
the international conimunity would be best served to take stock of
the experiences of different cultures relative to family. increase
international efforts aimed at strengthening the foundation of the
family and avoid approaches and practices which have lead to
incapacitation of the family in some societies.
3.5. Overcoming Obstacles to Comprehensive
Development
Economie and social development buttressed by a
supportive and cooperative international environment helps to
bring about coherence and integration in the global economy
which would, in and of itself, become a catalyst for international
solidarity, law-based conduct and above all peace and security at
national and international levels. In this context, the process of
liberalization and globaliration of economy and trade, and the free
flow of capital, as we11 as the agreements reached during the
Uruguay Rowxl and subsequently the establishment of the World
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S,atcmcat oftw,im Foreî&n Minista: at n• UNGA Page27
Trade Organiz.ation can play a fundamental role in regularimtion
of international economy and trade. ln practice, however,
liberalii.ation and globalization of economy bas had serious
adverse effects on sustainable and comprehensive development of
the states of the South and bas further marginalîzed them.
3.S.1. Rejecting Unilaterm Extra~ Territorial Measures
Undoubtedly, any uniJateral measure with extra•territorial
effect robs some countries of the benefits of these processes,
prevents the extension of international investment and unhindered
commerce, impedes the transfer of technology and results in
undemûning a full and effective participation by members of the
international community in international economic order, and as
such violates international law, causes instability and uncertainty
in global cconomy, and consequently ends up further widening the
gap between the countries of the North and the South.
The most evident examples of unilateral coercive
economic measures· are the laws known as D' Amata and HelmsBurton,
which were promulgated in the United States for truly
baseless reasons against the Islamic Republic of Iran and some
other countries. These unilateral measures have been countered
with a ste~ serious and principled reaction from the international
community- for such unilateral and hostile economic measures
are bound to have negative impact on the international efforts for
peace, security and development.
Trade relations must be insulated from any influence
peddling and self-serving unilateral measure. The international
community should take practical steps to overcoming this
obstacle, as it invariably impedes a comprehensive and sustainable
development.
3.5.2. Protection of the Environment
Environmenta I oollution and deQ'radation which are
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Statcmcut ofkanian foreign Mioistcr at .s2• tJNGA Pagç 28
largely attributable to industrial activities of the past few decades
constitute an important obstacle to realization and maintenance of
global civil society. Countering environmental crises like depletion
of owne layers, air and water pollution, deforestation, climate
change and threats against bio-diversity are ail contingent upon the
fulfilment of legal and historical responsibilities of states.
The responsibility of states for protection of the
environment is not equal. Accepted and sound principles lilce:
"common but differentiated responsibility" and "polluters must
pay'' indicate that industrial countries, whîch have had the largest
share in polluting the environmen~ must consequently shoulder the
principal responsibility for the cleaning up of the prevailing
pollution.
lt is evident that to expect the countries of the South to
take the initiative for protection of the environrnent without
provision of financial resources and transfer of technology is
unrealistic and unfair. The Nineteenth Special Session of the
General Assembly for the Purpose of an Overall Review and
Appraisal of the lmplementation of Agenda 21 bears witness to the
wide gap that still prevails after five years between the
commitments undertaken by the industrial countries in Rio and the
degree to which they were implemented .
Believing in the indivisibility of environment and
development, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become a party to
ail existing legal instruments and agreements on the environment,
and has made a great deal of efforts to carry out the commitments
arising from them. Since Iran is faced with one of the most fragile
conditions of the envirorunent on the earth, it has allocated, despite
limited resources, a considerable degree of human and financial
resources to the protection of the environment, and has taken full
note of environmental considerations in the development plan of
the country.
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SWcrncul oflcaojan Foreign Mioistcr at 52• [JNOf\ Pa,w:;29
4. The Role of the United Nations
Resolution of complex international problems, and
rmlization ofposteeold war opportunities require participation of
ail members of the international community, on the basis of the
ndes and principles of international law, in the decision-making
process. The United Nations is the institutional embodiment of
both universal participation and the rule of law in a global scale.
lt is the only universal organii.ation which - with the help of an
efficient and capable system - c.an move towarcls finding solutions
to the problems ofhuman society and responding to post-cold war
challenges. The magnitude of this task clearly points to the need
for improving the efficiency and enhancing the rote of the
Organiz.ation by embarking on transformation and refonn in the
major bodies, programs and modes of operation of the
Organiz.ation.
4.1. Secretary-General's Report on Renewing the
Organization
I should like to express appreciation for the SecretaryGeneral
's efforts to reinvigorate the Organii.ation, and to assure
him our eamest desîre to cooperate with him in the process of
restructuring of the United Nations into a more efficient, capable
and reliable institution responsive to the nee.ds and views of aH its
members. The Secretary-General's report of 16 July of this year,
submitted for the consideration of the global community at large,
represents the milestone of his valuable efforts conceming the
question of ref orm. This report which is the result of months of
intense expert work deserve to be thoroughly studied from
different angles. In our opinion, the extensive scope and
implications of the measures envisaged in the report make it
imperative for the General Assembly to establish working groups
to examine the report thoroughly and in detail so as the views of
ail member states are identified and ta.ken into account.
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swcmcot oflnmian Foreign Ministcr u 52 .. UNGA Page30
4.2. Reform of the Security Council
After four years of deliberation, the Open-Ended Working
Group on the refonn of the Security Cowicil has yet to achieve
tangible results. There is no doubt that the current composition of
the Security Council is far from today's state of international
affairs and is not acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the
international community. In our opinion, any increase in the
membership of the Security Council or refonn of its working
methods will have to take the true share and concems of the
developing countries into account. At present, these countries do
not have an equitable representation in the Council - a problem
and deficiency which needs to be addressed within the framework
of equitable representation for all geographical groups in the
Security Council. Therefore, proposais that disregard the role and
equitable representation of the developing world in the Security
Council will not be acceptable tous.
We are fully comnùtted to the decisions of the last
Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi,
and believe that in order to adapt the Security Council to the
realities of our time, its membership should be increased to 26.
Under the current circumstances, when there is extensive
divergence of views on the expansion of permanent membership •issues
whîch understandably require further deliberation, it may be
prudent to address the increase in the number of non-pennanent
members as a first stcp.
By the same token, the reform of the working methods of
the Security Council should not be contingent upon conclusion of
the question of the increase in the mernbership of the Council; they
are two distinct subjects and thus require two separate decisions.
Major shortcomings in the working methods of the Security
CounciJ and its decision-making procedures including lack of
transparency, and absence of the concerned parties in the relevant
deliberations of the Council are issues that need to be seriously
considered and aoorooriatelv remedied. The veto nnwf":r i11;: ::11n
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SfatOJ'K'J1 of lraniao Foreign Mioistcr at S2.,j IJNGA fw31
unfair aoo anachronistic privilege, one that is inconsistent with the
rule of law or even common sense and with many purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The Open-Ended
W orking Group on the Refonn of the Security Council should
seriously consider ways to curtail this discriminatory and
unreasonable privilege as a first step towards its final elimination.
4.3. Enhancing the Role or the General Assembly
Conclusion of the work of the Working Group on the
Strengthening of the United Nations System is a positive
development, and I should like to pay tribute to the former
President of the General Assembly and the Bureau of the Working
Group. The General Assembly is undoubtedly the highest and
most representative organ of the United Nations, where ail
members of the Organization enjoy equal right to participate. On
the basis of this very unique status, the role of the General
Assernbly in all areas - including international peace and security
- must be strengthened. The Assembly should take serious interest
in addressing important international issues, putting in place
effective mechanisms for implementation of its decisions. The
body which comprises the entire membership does certainly have
the right and indeed the responsibility to address each and every
issue of global concem includ.ing in particular international peace
and security. The General Assembly ought to avail itself of the
right to review and critique the work of other organs and present
practical proposais to the Security Council and the Secretary·
General. Therefore, in the process of restructuring the United
Nations, we need to put into motion strategies which help to
achieve tlùs goal. ln tlùs context, close contact between the
Secretary-General and the Security Council with the General
Assembly are neoessary. ln the final analysis, the United Nations
System in its entirety is duty-bound to fully and completely carry
out the decisions of the General Assembly.
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Sta!emeot n(ù:aaian Foreign Mioïstcr Jt ,52.., UNOA P,rcl2
4.4. Reform of the Secretariat
W e share the view of the Secretary-General and that of
many member-states about the imperative of reforming the
Secretariat. Order and discipline in the Secretariat, avoiding
duplication ofwork and undue bureaucracy and cost-efficiency are
necessary in an effective and efficient Secretariat. However,
reduction in the number of United Nations employees, particularly
as executed in recent years, does not necessarily result in savings
or increase efficiency. The restructuring and refonn of the
Secretariat must take place in a non-discriminatory process, and
basoo on the principle of equitable geographical distribution so as
to ensure fair representation of the developing countries in the
Secretariat.
4.5. Reform in Economie and Social Fields
The report of the Secretary-General has paid particular
attention to the refonn of the divisions dealing with economic and
social issues. Any kind of change in these divisions will, first and
foremost., impact developing countries. Elimination or integration
of certain economic institutions of the United Nations would be
commendable when and if it aims to avoid duplication. But, no
change should take place under pressure from certain
industrialized countries, or at the expense of eliminating or
W1dermining the programs and activities concerning development.
ln fact, restructuring and revitali.zation should remain fully loyal
to the contents of the programs, and no substantive change should
be made in them without prior agreement of the member-states.
We are convinced that Secretary-General's proposais will embrace
success if a balanced approach is struck between economic and
social fields on the basis of the interests and views of all countries.
Otherwise, were the interests of a group of countries be given
priority over that of the rest of the membership, ail hopes and
interests that the report has engendered would be dashed.
- 90 -
Statc:mmt af Jqpim Foreign M•cistc:c at ~2~ UNGA Page33
Conclusion: United Nations and Global Civil Society
Expansion and widening of the participatory base of the
future global order on the basis of nonns acceptable to all cultures
and peoples is most conducive for building a better tomorrow, and
eosuring freedo~ security, stability and sustainable development
at nationa1, regional and international levels. The General
Assembly, providing all member-states with the opportunity for
full and equal participation in decision4 making is the most
appropriate venue for dialogue, widerstanding and adoption of
coordinated international measures to build a better and a more
equitable tomorrow. As the new Govemment of the Islamic
Republic of Iran assumes its responsibilities, 1 reiterate the
disposition and full preparedness of my Govemment to take
constructive part in this collective endeavor through promoting
dialogue, understanding, trust and solidarity.
- 91 -
Annex 9
Statement by H.E. Seyed Mohammad Khatami, Former President of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, before the 53rd session of the United Nations General Assembly,
New York, 21 September 1998
- 92 -
- 93 -
Statement by H.E. Mohilmmad Khatami
President of the Islamic Republic ofiran
before the 53rd Session o{ the United Nations General Assembly
New York, September 21, 1998
In tlie name of God, the Beneficent, tlze 1Verciful
The light ofhuman existence has been kindled v,ith inah's longing for salvadon. The essence of the
message of Divine Prophets and the content of the teachi,ngs ofpi:ominent sages have been primarily
aimed at human salvation .. Painful in the observable arena ofhi.tt:nan history is the deprivation and abject
misery ofhurnanbeings; the deprivation ofwomen, men and children ènslaved by the whims of the
ruling powers; and the ill• fate of rulers, themselves deprived of totnpassion and sympathy with their
own nation. :Hence, virtuous rule and good governance has but been evanescent in humàn history.
Ironically, much tao often will and freedom ofthought have been frustrated and liberty suffocated in
the name of salvation, and much too often salvation has been portrayed as disposing of any and all
restraints on the insatiable hurnan desires. Reason and love have thus been sacrificed at the altar of the
whim. At limes, liberty have beert trampled in the natne of justice, and yet at other titnes justice has been
obliterated in the name of freedom. The result has been the age old deprivation ofhumanity from bath
justice in liberty and liberty in justice.
It is only a few centuries since genuine knowledge was construed as the source of power, rather than
an agent ofits central. Ever since, knowledge has, instead ofserving human salvation and instead of
exalting hliman character, been used as an instrument in the hands ofthose whose only object was to
advance their narrow utilitarian self-interest.
Despite its magruficent progress, humauity has suffered massively over these centuries from
discrimination and anguish. Survivors are still among us who testify to the incalculable destruction
caused by the two World Wars ... and ... despite the birth of the United Nations" a positive achievement
for mankirid - true peace based on justice still remains a scarcity: · ·
Particularly desperate isthe situation of~he countries in tbe underdeve!oped world, where so many
still suffer from famine, illiteracy and disease and some remain at the mercy ofrulers who do not even
tàke the trouble ofpretending respect for democratic standards or enjoying popular support. So of1:èn do
they attempt to fi.Il the absence of popular support by dependence on powers, whose sole purpose is the
pursuit of domination and self interest.
Oppressive and dependent governments deny their people the opportunity to experience democracy.
By perpetuating intimidation and terror in the society, they promote a culture of violence, which
inadvertently leads their opponènts ta resort to the same. Powers that breed and nurture such regimes
could therëfore not escape blame. Primarily tesponsible here, are thosè powers Whose intelligence
services take pride in their dark record of overthrowing popular governments and supporting unpopular
ones.
This image of our world is indeed grimand repulsivè. Until the day that the wîse andthe leamed
wrest tbe reins of power from the unwise and the capricious, this image can not, a]l al once, be
transfonned.
Nonetheless, in my opinion, beyond the darkness and doom, genuine beauty can still b.e discemed in
the deeper Iayers of histoty. And, I can assert with certitû.de that, on the whole, hwna:r\. life has
blossomed spiritually and materially. · · · · ·
Anti-colorùal struggles and independence movements ofmany nations in this centwy exemplify this
blossoming and progress. The collapse of the bipolar world order in the final dec·adè of this century, and
the swift rriarch of the world towards diversity coupled with renewed assertion of identity in the .
international arena by nations demanding equality are other significant achievements in this direction.
- 94 -
!he fan tas y of a uni polar :vorl~ ruled by a single super-power is but an illusion, indicating the failure
of1ts holders to keep pace w1th lùstory. A.nd, I am confident, that powerful nations, such as the
American people, will not accept that their good name, potentials and national prestige be exploited for
the advancement of the dream of a uni-polar world by the politicians, motivated by the short-sighted
material and factional interests ofa few. The evolution of public opinion in the West in support of
peaceful relations on the basis of rnutual·respect testifies to this assertion.
And now, Mr. President and Distinguished Participants,
Allow m.e to speak here. as a rhan from the East, the origin ofbrilliant civilizations and the birth place
ofDivin:e Prophets - - Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mohammad (peace be upon them ail).
I corne from the noble land of Iran, representing a great and renown:ed nation, famous for its age old
civilization as well as its distinguished contribution to the founding and expansion of the Islamic
civilization; a nation that has survived the strong winds of despotism, reactionism and submission,
relying on its cultural and human wealth; a nation whièh pioneered in the East the establishment of civil
society and èonstitutional g6vemment in the course of its contemporazy history, even though as a result
of foreign interference and domestic deficiencies, at tunes it may have faltered in its course; a nation
which has been at the forefront of the struggle for independence and against colonialism,though its
national movement was subverted by a foreign- orchesttated coup. And, a nation wlùch carries the torch
of its populârrevolution, not won by force of arms or a coup, but by dethroning of the régime of coup
d'etat through the power of "wôrd" artd "enlighterurient". _ In the course of its ne',\,· experiénce, Our nation
bas endured eightyears of an imposed war, pressure, sanctions and various allegations. 1t has also fallen
victim to tetrorisrri, this orni•nous and sinisler phenom.enon of the twentieth century. ·
. . .
And today, the Iranian nation draws on its past to contemplate a better fomorrow while defying
reactionary tendenèies arid, backedby principles and ideals rooted in its teiigious, national, historièal
and revolutionary heritage; and benefitting from positive achievements of contemporary civilization,
marches, through trial and error, towards a prornising futUre. ·
The Isla.rnicRevolution of the Iranian people Was a revoit of reason against coercion and suppression.
Certainly, a revolution wlùch resorted to logic in the phase of de~truction is much better disposed to
resort to dialogue and reason in the phase of construction. Bence, it calls for a dialogue among
civilizations and cultures instead of a clash :t,etween them.
From thisrostrum and the pulpi t of the United Nations, I announce that humanity, despite ail _
calamities and hardship, is headingtowards emancipation and liberty. This is the unalterable Devine
providence and hurnan destiny. And the malice and depravity ofno individual cart ever violate Divine
providence and the course ofhistory.
. .
Mr. Presideht,
The word "history" predates "philosophy'' and man is the pillar of history. · History itself is the
reflection of the light ofBeing upon various facets and dimensions of human existence. Thus, it is a
unique and univetsal entity, albeit diverse in nature. Whenever, this unique entity takes on a new guise, a
new era is ùshered. Our assessment ofhistory indeed emanates from our perception ofhùmanity- its
pivot and pfüar. ·
Human beings, who in Saadi's eloquent description borrowed from a saying of the holy Prophet of
Islam, are various organs of the same body, are outside the teach ofbiology o r psychology.
Understanding human beings requires a philosophical and reflec tive view of man and its bistory.
Since "God created man with His Own f:Iand, " and in "His Ov,n Image," and since He breathed into
himof''His Own Spirit," humanity is but a single entity, and so ishuman hlstory. The "Rand ofGod"
granted hurnankind history, will and freedotn of choice; the "image of God" provided lùm culture,
spirituality and liberty; and the spirit ofGod bestowed upon him life and vitality. And thus, human
beings have corne to posseshistory, culture and liberty.
- 95 -
Not only do ail human beings originale from the one and the same origin and share a continuous and
integrated history, but,also one may further postulate a single end or telos: the telos ofhistory is none
other thàn spiritual culture and its requisite of genuine hurnan liberty.
Whether or not one subscribes to the view that man is doomed to whid in iterative historical cycles, or
to grapplewith historical moments or epochs; and whether or not one holds history to be self-driven, or
driven by human urges, orby modes of production, or by superhuman heroes, all can agree that it is only
the ever-inspiring fountain of faith that breaks every old and new shackle from humanity and am:sts the
iteratîve etemal cycle, and eventually emancipates bumankind from the bounds of historical .
determinatîon; just as it is only the vivifying breeze of liberty thàt can offer faith and spirituality to
humanity. His thusthathe can serenade that "the ùniverse I shall not abide ifnot abiding me," or that
" ... whosoever shall say ùnto this niountàin, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; and shall not
doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall corne to pass .. "
Through such an understanding of freedom, the tenets ofhuman dîgnity can be upheld in the face of
political domination and virtue and hope against baneful blasts of despalr and nihilism .. Here, one can
discem the trajectory ofhistory towards liberty.
The history of humankind is the history of liberty. Oru y that interpretàtion which describes history as
the arena for manifestation of liberty can pro vide an opening of the past for the bene fit of mankind.
Regardless of ail philosophical systems that have attempted to attribute meanings, directions and laws of
evolution to history, we êan realize that beèause humanhistory is intertwined with the history of liberty,
when human beings are .liberated from imposedconstraints of exploitation and social enslavement as
well as from unrefined animal instincts as violence and savagery, they will then side with truth and
justice in line with their human nature. Thence, human history shall become the glorious history of
Truth and realization of justice. And this could be another expression of the famous religious doctrine of
Messiahism.
Whether we embark on an empirical and inductive study of history or an intuitive one, most thinkers
. would agree that the essence of hùmanity has flourished and that more veils of ignoranêe have been
removed from the minds ofhuman beings.
I have deliberately used the word "flourish" instead of the more common terms, such as "historical
progress", in _order to emphasize that regardless ofany school ofphilosophy ofhistory we may f'ollow,
we can stiU share an understanding ofthis general and universal conception ofhistory.
The establishment and continued functioning of the United Nations is a testament to the progressive
path of the world and ofhuman society. The fact that today it does not require much argument to
establish that instead ofwar and bloodshed, one could, and indeed ought to, resort to discourse and
dialogue, has not been achieved easi!y. As if the blood-stained history ofhumanity forms an antecedent
ta this seemingly simple proposition. ·
Yet, so long as imprudent potentates can obliterate flowers and trees, laughter and hope from the face
of the earth with a quick stroke oftheir folly and cmelty, it is premature to celebi:ate the ultimate triumph
of the Logos over the sword.
The twentieth century did not only witness the manifestations of violence and hwnan sufferings at the
hands of old colonialists and the unprecedented injustice oftheir modern inheritors, but it was also the
century of the rise ànd fall of totalitarian regimes. Let us hope that in the coming century resort to force
andviolerice shall rtot be glorified, and the essence ofpoijtical power be compassion and justice,
extema!ly manifested in dialogue between civilizations.
:Mr. President; Ladies and Gentlemen,
The question is how the United Nations may undertake the necessary nteasures to respond to this
evolving global climate, and what impact it will have on the changing coûrse of the life of mankind
longing for salvation.
- 96 -
I would like to propose, in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran, that the United Nations, as a first
step, designate the'year 200 l as the "Year o f Dialogue Among Civi.lizations," with the eamest hope that
through such a dialogue, the realization of universal justice and liberty may be initiated.
Among the wôrthiest achievements ofthis century is the acceptance of the necessity and s ignificance
of dialogue and rej ection of force, promotion of understanding in cultural, economic and political fields,
and strengthening of the foundations of liberty, justice and human rights. Establishment and
enhancement of civility, whether at national or international level, ·is contingent upon dialogue arnong
societies and civilizations representing various views, inclinations and approaches. Ifhumanity at the
threshold of the new century and millennium devotes ail efforts to institutionaliz e dialogue, replacing -
hostility and confrontation with discourse and understanding, it Would leave an invaluable legacy for the
benefit of the future generations.
Similarly, it is necessary that as members of the United Nations, we revisi t the history of the
fonnation ofthis Organization with a view to reforming and improving the institution tn,rough a rational
exchange ofviews.
The United Nations took shape in a dark era of human history, when man y ofits curreilt metnbers
were still experiencing the bitter and abominable conditions of colonial rùle. As a consequence, the new
Organization reflected the domination of the powerful few. Things have changed now, and the
opportunity has presented itself to restructure this Organization, particularly i ts Security Council. Here, I
would like to refer to tqe wise words of the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Iris inaugural
address ta the Eighth Session of the Islamic Surrunit Conference in îehràn that the Islamic couiltries
representing one billion and several hundred mi llion people should acquire a permanent seat in the
United Nations Security Council with the same pri,ileges as long as they are enjoyed by current
Permanent Members.
The time has corne to reject, thtough understanding; the <liscrirninatory veto privilege, and in so doing
take another step towards the recognition of fai r and equal rights of ail member states.
Mr. President, Distinguished Delegates,
Let us alljoin hands in so lidarity against 'genocide, aggression and the humiliation ofmankind in
various corners of the wodd. Let us prevent the continuation of s hameful tragedies which have tarnished
the faée of this cetitury in Palestine, Afgharùstan, Kosovo and in many other parts of Africa, Asia and ·
Latin America.
Peace and security in the Middle East, imperative as they are, will be established only through the
recognition of the rig h t of all Palestinians to exercise soveteignty over their ancestral homeland. The
. presently oci:upied Al-Quds Al-Sharif ought to be the house of dialogue and understanding. Resonating
frorn the depth of history, its. voice speaks intrinsically against racism and Zionisrn, Great monotheistic
religions can live peaceful!y together in Al-Quds Al-Sharif, but i t is the very Israeli rule that has made
such a co-existenèe impossible. Palestine is the home of all Palestinians - Muslims, Christians and Jews
- and not the laboratory for the violent whims ofZionists.
In Afghanistan, there is l').O rnil itary solution to tbat coun try's predicament. Uni versai outrage at
massacre and genocide being perpetra.ted there, particularly the tragic killing oflranian diplomats and
joumalist aswell as at the continued captivity of the Irarùan aid workers in the hands of the Taliban, call
for sober analysis and expeditious action to bring the perpetratdrs of the se crimes to justice.
Afghanistan, the land of people of dignity and culture, has now been tutned into a h aven for violence,
terrorism and production and trafficking in narcotics. The Afghan people, as other peoples in the world,
have the inalienable right to d etermine their own destiny, and have the right to enjoy a broad-based
governmen t representingall e thnie groups, comrnunities and tendericiès in that country. This is the only
way tô r estore tranquility in Afghanistan. This requires resolute internatio nal cooperation in ordèr to
inhibit the lucrative and deadly business of production and smuggling ofnarcotics, illicit ttafficking in
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weapons and cultivation of terrorism. 1he United Nations, in cooperation with the Orgariization of the
Islamic Conference and concemed states, should bring ail the parties to the conflict to the negotiating
table, paving the way for the tyrannized and destitute Afghan people to freely determine thei.r own
destiny, and backed by solemn global support, bring the rogue elements into compliance withthe will of
the international community. It, should simultaneously engage in planning for the mobilizalion of
requisite international assistance for reconstruction of Afghanistan once the necessary political
conditions are in place.
InKosovo, the legitimate rights of the embattled people in tlùs province should be recognized and the
Yugoslav Govemrnent should be made to respect these rights . ·
Mr, President, Ladies and .Gentlemen,
· Honest and sincere efforts to combat terrorismin ail i6(fonns ând manifestations, including state
terrorism, constitute another important priority for the Govemment of thelslamic Republic of Iran.
Terrorism is a product of desperation and nihilisrn. In a wodd swirling in the orbit of violence and
oppression, serious combat against terrorism will not advance beyond the realmofWèrds and slogans.
Eradication of terrorism must be concurrent with a global search for justice. This assertion should in nb
way be interpreted as a justification for any form ofterrorism. We unequivocally oppose, as required by
our religious, moral and cultural Values and norms , al! fonns and manifestations of terrorism and we
· shall combat it vigorously and earnestly. In oi.lr view, in order to eradicate this menace, we should
engage in a serious and transparent international cooperation to combat terrorism, and a.t the saine time
redouble our efforts to attain the objeètive of global justic e. . , .
At the threshold of the third rnillennium, the world also needs to be Übêrated from the nightrnare of
nuclear war and weapons of mass destruction. Recent nuclear tests in our rêgion, which have led to
further complications, makë such a_necessity all the more imperative. We should all realize .that the idea
ofàttaining security through the acquisition of such armaments is nothing but an illusion. The • ·
manifestation of a resolute global deterrnination to elirninate al! existing arsenals of weapons of mass
destruction, within an agreedtime frame, would render clarity of objective, !end credence and add
dynamism fo the international efforts against the ptoduction and proliferàtion of these deadly weapons.
Th;e establishment of zones free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East,
constitutes an appropriate first step in alletjating tension and rnistrust emanating from these weapons.
We, in the-Islamic Republic of Iran, as !he victims of the use of weapons of mass. destruction, are
cognizant, more thananybody else, oftheit horrifying impact. We shall thus stay in the forefront of
international efforts to establish and strengthen universal arrangements for their destruction.
Security, developmentand prosperity in the Third World require the promotion of cooperation and the
utilization ofproven arrangements and mechanisms for confidence-building. In this regard, ît is
encoutaging that the EighthJslamic Sumrnit Conference in Tehrah, cognizant ofthis necessity,
established an appropria te ni.echanism to foster coniidetice through dialogue among Islamic countries.
As a firsf step in this direction, l invite our neighbors in the Petsian Gulf region - who have witnessed
two destructi Ve wars in the .span of one decade - to establish a security and cooperation system in the
area.
In short, confidence and peace cannot be attained without a sober revision of the mentality of the Cold
War. The advancementand promotion of culture of peace is contiI).gent upon the recognition of the
constructive role of nations è:oupled with avriidance of domination, unilateralism, confrontation and
exclusion .
. The Islamic Republic of Iran,. in keèping with its fundamental beliefs and deep-rooted civilizational
heritage, seeks a world blessed with peace and ttanqui!ity based on human dignity. It has accorded
removal of tension the highest priority in its foreign policy. In line with the principles of the Islamic
Revoluti on, Iran is determined to follow its balanced policy of expansion of relations with its neighbors
and other countries on the basis of respect for independence and equality of rights.
L----- - --~ - ----- -~-- .. ----- ···--·
; l
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Comprehensive peace, over and above peace among burnan beings, also calls for peace between
mankind and nature, which in turfi, requires that mankind brings to a hall the systematic devouring of
nature and iristel;ld emphasizes the coordination of man and nature. The pteservation of the environment,
as the comtnon natural heritage of rnankind, constitutes a most important priority of the corning century.
Before concluding, I would like to emphasize the paramount role of the family, women and youthin
the making of a bétter tomorrow and the consolidation of the found ations of the civil society throughout
the globe. · ·
the Îamily is the unique setting fç,r hllitlan progress and development of persona! and social identity
of individuals. Regrettab[y today, speciaHy in the industrialized countries, the foundations of home and
farnily have been undermined, threatening the emotional, ma.terial and spiritual health of hurnan life. A
global effort is required to con.front this danger, lest the flames ofthis center ofwarmth, affection and
education be gradually dimmed by the cold and vicious winds ofluring facades, lust artd material gain .
. . . . .
Efforts at the global level geared to the promotion and strengthening of respect for women and their
rights require a critical reassessment of the traditional and inappropriate views about women. The
traditional outlook, based on the erroneous notion of superiority of men over women, does injustice to
men, women and humanity as a whole; equally nefarious is the view that disregards the differences
between men and women. We should recognize that both men and women are valuable components of
hunianity that equally possess the potential for intellectual, social, cultural and political development,
and that comprehensive and sustainable dévelopment is only possible through the active participation of
both men and women in social life.
At the threshold of the new millennium; the United Nations should have faith in the new generation,
to whom thé next century belongs. It should thus be prepared to accept and embrace the requirements ôf
believing in the youth. Let us bring ourselves to accept that we are not custodians of the youth and that
the young do have the right to enjoy the social process of growth and deve!opment; a right they should
exercise consciously and willfully. ·
With such a new perspective, and drawing upon the dynàmic ability and intel!ectual capability of the
new generation, we, together, can chart a much better and brighter future for the next century.
I thank you for your attention.
·***
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Annex 10
Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rohani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
before the Sixty-Eight Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York,
24 September 2013
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· 1s1amic Republic of
======,I R A , N
Permonent Mission to the Unltéd Nations
·. (Please check against de/ivery)
Sta:temep.t by ·.
Il. E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani
.· President of the Islarnic Republic of Iran
atthe
Sixty-eight Session of the ·
United Nations Genèral Assembly
(New York, 24 September2013)
622 Third AVe, New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 687-2020 Fax: (212) 867-7086 email: [email protected]
. .
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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise 6e to (goa, tfie Lure( of t!Îe wor(cfr. 'Bfessin{j a.nâ Peace 6e uyon our
Proyfiet :Moliammacf ancC liis liin ancC cornyanions.
Mt. President, Mr. Secrctary-General,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
At the outset, I would like to offer my most sincere felicitations on your deserved election
to the.presidency ôfthe General Assembly and seize the moment to express appreciation for the
valuable efforts of our distinguished Secretary-General.
Our world today is replete with fear and hope; fear ofwar and hostile regional and _global
relations; fear of deadly confrontation of religious, ethnie and national identities; fear of
institutionalization of violence and extremism; fear of poverty and destructive discrimination;
fear of decay and destruction of life-sustainÎng resources; fear of disregard for human dignity and
rights; and fear ofrieglect of morality. Alongside these fears, however, there are new hopes; the
hope ofuniversal acceptance by the people and the elite ail across the globe of''yes to peace and
no to war"; and the hope of preference. of dialogue over conflict, and moderatio11 over
extremism.
_ The recent elections in Iran represent a clear, living exampfo of the wise choice of hope,
ratio1iality and moderation by the great pe0ple of Iran. The realization of democracy consistent
with religion and the peacefùl transfer of executiv e power manifested that Iran is the anchor of
stability in an otherwise ocean of regional instabilities. The firm belief of our people and
government in enduring peace; stability, tranquility, peaceful resolution of disputes and reliance
on the ballot box as the basis of power, public acceptance and legitimacy, bas indeed played a
key role in creating such a safe environrnent.
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,
The current critical period of transition in international relations is replete with dangers,
albeit with unique opportunities. Any miscalculation of one's position, and of course, of others,
will bear historie damages; a mistake by one actor will have negative impact on ail others.
Vulnerability is now a global and indivisible phenomenon.
At this sensitive juncture in · the history global relations, the age · of zero-sum games is
1
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over, even though a few actors stiH tend to rely on archaic and deeply ineffective ways and
means to p~èserve their old superiority and domination. Militaristn and the recourse to violent
and military means to subjugate others are failed examples of the perpetuation of old ways in
new circumstances.
Coercive economic and military policies and practices geared to the maintenance and
préservation of old superiorities and dominations have been pursued in a conceptùal mindset that
negates peace, security, human dignity, and exalted human ideals. Ignoring diffcrences between
societies and globali;ûng Western values as tmiversal ones represenfanother manifestation ofthis
conceptual .rnindset. Yet another refléction of the same cognitive mode! is the persistence ofCold
War mentality and hi-polar division of the world into "superfor us" and "inferior others."
Fanning fear and phobia around the emergence ofnew actor s on thé world scene is another.
In such an environment, governmental and non-governmental, religious, .ethnie, and even
· racial violence has incteased, and there is no guarantee that the era of quiet among big powers
will tèmain immune from such violent discourses, practices and actions. The catastrophic
impact of violent and extremist narratives should not - in fact, must not- be underestimated.
In this context, the strategîc violence, which is manifested in the efforts to deprive
regional players from their natural domain of action, containment policies, regime change from
outside, and the efforts towards redrawing of political borders and frontiers , is extremely
dangerous and provocative.
The prevalent international political discourse depicts il civilized center surrounded by
un-civilized peripheries, In this picture, the · relatiort between the center of world power and the
peripheries is hegemonic. The discourse assigning the North the center stage and relegating the
South to the periphery has led to the establishment bf a monologue at the level of international
relations. The creation of illusory identity distinctions and the current prevalent violent forms of
xenophobia are the inevitable outcoine of such a discourse. Propagandistic and unfounded faithphobic,
Is1amo-phobic, Shia-phobic, and Iran-phobie discourses do indeed represent serious
threats against world peace and human security.
This propagandistic discoursè has assumed dangerous proportions through portrayal and
inculcation ofpresumed imaginary threats. One such imaginary threat is the so-called "Iranian
threat" - which has been employed as an excuse to justîfy a long catalogue of crimes and
catastrophic practices over the past three decades. The arming of the Saddam Hussein regime
with chemical weapons and support:lng the Taliban and Al-Qaida arc just two examples of such
catastrophes. Let me say this in au · sincerity before this august world assembly, that based on
irrefutable evidence, those who hatp on the so-called thrcat of Iran are either a thrèat against •
international peace and security themse1ves or promote such a threat. Ir~n poses . absolutely no ·
threat to the world or the region. In Fact, in ideals as well as in actual practice, my country has
been a harbinger of just peace and comprehensive security. ·
2
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i
t
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Nowhere in the world has violence been so deadly and destructive as in North Africa
and West Asia. MiHtary intervention in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein's imposed war against
Iran, . occupation of Kuwait, military . interventions against Iraq, brutal repression of the
Palestinian people, assassination of cornmon people and · political figures in Iran, and terrorist
bombings in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon are examples of violence in this
regîon in the last thtee decades.
What has been - and continues to be - practiced against the innocent people of Palestine
is nothing Jess than struc.tural violence. Palestine is under occupation; the basic rights of the
· Palestinians are tragically vîolated, and they are deprived of the right of retum and access to their
homes, birthplace and homeland. Apartheid as a concept Can hardly describe the crimes and the
institutionali:ied aggression against the innocent Palestinian people.
The hurnan tragedy in Syria represents a painful example of catastrophic spread of
violence and extremism in our region. From the very outset of the ctisis and when some regional
and international actors helped · to militarize the situation through infusion of anns and
intelligence into the country and active support of extremist groups, we emphasized that there
was n:o military solution fo the .Syrian crisis. Pursuit ofexpansionist strategies and objectives and
attempts to . change thé regional balance through proxies cannot be camouflaged behind
humanîtarian rhetoric. The common objective of the international community should be a quîck
end to the killing of the innocent. While condemning any use of chêmical weapons, we welcome
Syria's acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and believe that the access by
extremist terrorist groups io such weapons is the greatest danger to the region that must be
considered in any disarmarnent plan. Simultaneously, I should underlîne that illegitimate and
ineffective threat to use or the actual use of force wîll only lead to further èxacerbation of
violence and crisis in the region.
'rerrorism and the killing of innocènt · péople represent the ultimate inhumanity of
extremism and violence. terrorism is a violent scoûrge and knows no country or natî<inal
borders. But, the violence and extreme actiôns suth as the use of drones against innocent people
in the name of combating terrorisin should also be condemned. Here, I should also say a word
about the criinînal assassinàtion of Iranian nucleat scientists. For what crimes have they been
assassinated? The United Nations and the Security Council should answer.the question: have the
perpetrators been condemned?
. .
Unjust sanctions, as manifestation of structural violence, are intrinsically inhumane and
against peacê. And contrary to the claims of those 'who pursue ànd impose them, it is not the
states and the political elite that are targeted, !?ut rather, it is the common people who are
victimized by these sanctions. Let us not forget millions of Iraqis who, as à tesult of sanctions
coveted in intematiomil legal jargon, sufferèd and lost their lives, and many more who continue
3
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to suffer ail through their lives. These sanctions are violent, pure and simple; whether called
smart or othetwise, uni!ateral or multilateral. These sanctions violate inalienable human rights, .
inter alia, the right to peace, right to development, right to access to health and education, and
above ail, the right to life. Sanctions, beyond any and ail rhetoric, cause belligetence,
warmongering and human suffering. It should be borne in mind, however, that the negative
impact is not merely limited to the intended victims of sanctions; it also affects the economy and
livelihood of other countries and societies, including the countries imposing sanctions.
Mr. President, Excellencies, ·
Violence and extremism nowadays have gone beyond the physicai realm and have
unfortunately · aftlicted · and tarnished the mental and spiritual dimensions of life in humah
societies. Violence and exiremism leave no space for understatiding and modetation · as the
necessary foundations of collective life of human beings and the modem society. Intolerarice is
the predicament of out time. We need to promote and reinforce tolerance in light of the religious
teachings ànd appropriate cultural and political approaches. The huriian society should be
elevated from à state of mere tolerance to that of collective collaboration. We should not just .
tolerate others. We should rise above mere tolerance. and darc to work together.
People ail ovet the world ài'e tired of war, violence and exttemism. Th~y hope for a
change in the status quo. And this is a unique oppo11unity - for us all. The Islamic Republic of
Iran believes that ail · challenges can be managed - successfully - thi'ough a smart, judicious blend
of hope and moderation. Warmongers are bent on extinguishing al! hope. But hope for change
for the better is an innate, i'eligious, widespread, and universal concept.
Hope is founded on the belief in the universal Will of the people across the globe to
combat violence and extretnism, to cherish change, to oppose imposed structures, tb value
choice; and to act in accordance with human responsibility. Hope is no doubt one of the greatest
gifts bestowed upon humàn beings by their All-Loving Creator. And moderation is to think and
move in a wise, judicious manner, conscious of the time and the space, and to align exalted
ideals With choice of effective strategies and policies, while cognizant of objective realities.
The Iranian people, in a judiciously sober choice in the recent elections, voted for the
discourse of hope, foresight and prude!]! moderation ~ both at home and abroad. In foreign
policy, the combination ofthese elements means that the Islatnic Republic of Iran, as a regional
power, Will act responsibly With regard to regional and international security, and is willing and
prepared to coopetate in these fields, bilaterally as well as multilaterally, With other responsible
actors. We defend peace based on democracy and the ballot box everywherè, including in Syria,
Bahrain, and other countries in the region, and believe that there are no violent solutions to world
crises. The bitter and ugly realities of the human society can only be overcome through recourse
to and reliance on human wisdom, interaction ahd moderation. Securing peace and democracy
and ensuring the legitimate rights of al! countries in the world, including in the Middle East,
4
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cannot - and will not - be realized through tnilitarism.
Iran seeks to resolve problems, not to create them. There is no issue or dossier that cannot
be resolved through reliance On hope and prudent moderation, mutual respect, and rejection of
violence and extremism. Iran's nuclear dossier is à case in point. As clearly stated by the Leader
of the Islamic Revolution, àcceptance of the inalienable right ·of Iran constitutes the . best and the
easiest way of resolving this issue. This is hot political rhetoric. Rather, it is based on a profound
recognition of the state of technology in Iran, global political environment, the end of the era of
zero-sum games, and the imperative of seeking common objectives and interests towards
reaching common understanding and shared security. Put otherwlsc, Iran and othet actors should
pursue twô common objectives as two mutually înseparable parts of a political solution for the
nucleàr dossier of Iran.
1- Iran's nuclear program - and for that matter,. that of all other countries - must
pursue exclusively peaceful purposes. I declare here,openly and unambiguously,
that, notwithstandirig the positions . of others, this bas beenj and will always be,
the objective of the lslamic RepubHc of Iran. Nuclèar weapon artd other weapons
of mass destruction have no place in lran's security and defense doctrine, and
contradict oui- fundamental religious and ethical. convictions. · Our national
interests make 'it imperative that we remove any and ail reasonable concems about
Itan's peaceful nuclear program.
2- The second objective, that is, acceptance of and respect for the implementation of
the right to enrichment inside Iran and enjoyment of other related nuclear rights,
provides the only path towards achieving the füst objective. Nuclear knowledge
in Iran has been domesticated now and the nucleat technology, 'inclusive of
enrichment, has alreatly reached industrial scale. It is, therefore, an illusion, and
· extremely unrealistic, to presume that the peaceful nature of the nuclear program
oflran could be ensured through impeding the program via illegitimate pressures.
In this ·context, the Islamic RepubJic of Iran, insisting on the Îinplementation of its rights
and the imperative of international respect and coopetation in this exercise, is prepared to engage
immediately in time-bound and result-oriented tall<s to build mutual confidence and removal of
mutual uncertainties with full transparency.
Iran seeks constructive engagement with other countries based on mutual respect and
common interest, and within the same framework does not seek to increase tensions with the
United States. I listened carefully to the statement made by President Obama today at the
General Assembly. Commensurate with the political will of the leadership in the United States ·
. and hoping tliat they will refrain from following the short-sighted interest of warmongering
pressure groups, we can arrive at à frarriework to m.anage our differences. To this end, equal
5
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footing, mutual respect, and the recognized principles of international Iaw should govem the
interactions. Of course, we expect tô hear a consistent voice from Washington.
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,
In recent years, a dominant voice .has been repeatedly heard: "The military option is on
the table." Against the backdrop of this illegal and ineffective contention, let me say loud and
clear that "peace is within reach." So, in the name of the Islamic Republic oflran I propose., as a
starting step, the consideration by the United Nations of the project: "the World Against
Violence and Extremism. '' (W A VE) Let us all join this "W A VE." I invite ail states, international
organizations and civil institutions to undertake a new effort to guide the world in this direction.
We should start thinking about "Coalition for Enduing Peace" all across the globe instead of the
ineffective "Coalitions for War" in various parts of the world.
Today, the Isliunic Republic of Iran invites you and the entire world community to take a
step forward; an invitation to joirt the WAVE: World Agaînst Violence and Extremism. We
should accept and be able to open a new horizon in which peace will prevail over war, tolèrance
over violence, progress ovér bloodletting, justice over discrimination, prosperity over poverty,
and freedom qver déspotism. As beautifully said by Ferdowsi, the renowned Iranian epic poet:
'Be re{entress in stri'vina for tfie cause of Çiooa
'Bring tfie ~1'1{}, you must, 'Banisli tfie winter, yau, sfiouüf.
. Notwithstanding ail difficulties and challengés, I am deeply optimistic about the future. I
havé no doubt that the future will be bright with the entire world solidly rejeêting violence and
extrem.ism. Prudent moderation will ensure a', bright future for the world. My hope, aside from
persona) and national expérience, emanates · from füe belief shared by ail divine religions that a
good and bright future awaits the world. As stateà in the Holy Qur' an:
And We proclaimed in the PsalmsI afü:r . We had proclaimed in the Torah, that My
virtuous servants will inherit the earth: (21 : 105)
Thank you Mr. President
6
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Annex 11
K. Timmerman, “Europe’s Arms Pipeline to Iran”, The Nation, Vol. 245, 18 July 1987
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Pagel of6
Copyright 1987. Information Access Company, a Thomson Corporation Company
ASAP . .
Copyright 1987 The Nation Company Inc.
· The Nation
July 18, 1987
SECTION: Vol. 245; Pg. 47; ISSN: 0027..:8378
LENGTH: 3512 words
HEADLINE: . Europe's arms pipeline to Iran; an InterNation story.
BYUNE: Timmerman, Kenneth R.
·eoov:
InterNation is an international consortium of publications, drawlng on a global network
of journalists, .which Will on a regular, simultaneous basis publish investigative stones on
subjects that cross national boundaries. (This ls the second InterNation article to appear
in The Nation; the flrst, "The Herltage Foundatlon Goes Abroad," appeared ln the June 6
Issue.) ·
Kenneth R. Timmerman is associate editor in Paris for the Journal of Defense &
Oiplornacy, and is completing a book about arms sales to Iran and Iraq.
The war in the Persian Gulf has produced the biggest arrns bazaar in the history of the
world. Sorne thirty-three countries currently sell arms to Iraq and Iran, most of them to
both belligerents àt once. Over the past yeàr, discreet investigations in several European
· countrles hàve turned up evidènce of complicity between government officiais and defense
contractors to break arms export laws and defy parliamentary contrais in an effort to
maintain the clandestine arms pipeline. Says Karl-Erik Schmltz, a Swede who runs the
Scandinavla .Commodities Corporation and who has become a major player in the
International blac~ market, "There are only two big consumers of munitions ln the world
today: Iran and Iraq."
Part of this multibiflion-dollar underground trade has been orchestrated by an
international cartel involving at least thirteen manufacturers who pooled their resourcès
and Jolntly fixed prices on munitions and rnHitary explosives, making immense profits
frorn keeping the gulf war alive. In another case, missiles from NATO storehouses in West
Germahy were diverted to Belgium for sale to Iran.
The major offenders a.re France and Britaln. Beyond the lure of windfall profits and the
need for new arms-export markets, those two nations are hoping to step into a power
vacuum created by the weakened U .S. strategic position ln the reg ion, and they have
used arms sales to both belligerentsas a means Of creating influence for years to corne .
But it is on sales to Iran that profits have been the highest-With markups of up to ten
tlmes the normal price. This ls an unexpected side effect of the U.S. embargo on arms
sales tô Iran, first imposed during the 1979 hostage crisis and reconfirmed by the
incoming Reagan Administration ln January 1981.
fo evadethe embargo, Iran sent hordes of agents around the world in search of new
weapons and vital spare parts for U.S.-made arms. Their search was particularly fruitful in
Israel, which, for strategic reasons, to assure the safety of Iranian Jews and ta bolster its
own arms industry, has sold Iran as much as $ 500 million worth of modern weapons per
year. Iran was also successful in Europe, wherè many countries produce U.S. weapons
under licensè. ·
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Page 2 of6
lt was to hait that lllicit flow of U.S. arms to Iran that Operation Staunch, as it has corne
to be known, was launched by the Reagan Administration in 1983. Ambassador at Large
Richard Fairbanks made the rounds of U.S. friends and al.lies abroad, cajoling them to stop
arms sales to Iran, at tlmes obllquely threatehing to terminate licensing agreements that
permitted them to manufacture U.S . arms if they refused .
Wlth a few notable exceptions, Fairbanks's àttempts to prevent high-technology weapons
systems and spare parts from reaching Iran produced results. In 1984, for exàmple,
Fairbanks succeeded in convincing the Italian firm Agusta Bell net to supply Ir~n with
Chinook helicopters it made under U.S . licehse. "It might not have. been a 100 percent
success," Fairbanks acknowledged"but we definitely managed to stop most major
weapons systems from reaching Iran from U.s. allies. By the time I retûrned toprivate
law practice inSeptember 1985, Iran'sniajor suppliers were almost ail Soviet bloc
countrieS;"
But Falrbanks and his team èncountered difficulties when they tried to tackle the black
market. Those difficultîes turried into a stone wall when allied g9vernments were
themselves involved .. "There are ways of keeping these things so quiet they . never corne
out," explained Hamilton Spence, managing director for the privately owned . British firm
Interarms. "There are very few private individuals acting on their own accouht. It is nearly
all downto governments." Britain, for example, sti!I hosts an official lrahian weçipons•
purchasing mission ln London-the IslamlcAlr Force Logistics Office and has never ceased
direct export of "non1ethal" war materiel ta Iran, such as tank engines, spare parts and
even naval assault landing craft.
Spain and Portugal were among the blggest problems fur Fafrbanks, and they remained
lmpervidus to Operatlon Staunch as long as Washington lacked the political Will to back up
Fairbanks's threats. Helping Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez through the difficult
referendum on Spain's membershlp ln the North Atlantic Treaty Organizàtion was of
greater strategic importance to the United States than stopplng thé $ 280 million in
Spanish arms deHveries to Iran that occurrêd between 1983 and 1985. Besides, most of
the Spanish and Portu9uese deliveries involved the day-today hardware of war and, as
Fairbanks explàined,"We figured there was no way in the world ta stop Iran from getting
artillery shells, bullets, bombs and weapons like that." The Portuguese, meanwhlle, were
atready beginning to assist the National Sec:urity Council's contra supply operationthrough
various proprietary èompanies run by retired Maf Gen . Richard Secord-and
continued to sell arms to Iran, ·
Aft:er Fâirbanks's resignation i n August 1985, the Western arms embargo of Iran
collapsed: Operation Staunch was relegated to the diplomatie cupboard ànd the White
House authorized the first dellveries of U.S. armsfrom Israel to Iran, which left Israel on
Augusf30 and September 14. "It might havé started as I was cléarlng out my desk,"
Fairbanks said, "but I didn't k:now about it."
Today all the NATO colinttleS, as weU as Sweden and Switzerlarid, are selling arms to
Irëln or are lubricating the deals through shipplng or flnancing. Although Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Marion Creekmore said
recently in Paris that Operation Staunch is being reinvlgorated in the wake of the
Iran/contra scandai, ail indications are that the arms borianza w ill continue well lnto the
future.
Karl-Erik Schmftz, one of iran's most capable arms brokers, has masterininded deals for
Iran worth an estimated $ 600 million from his base ln southern Sweden. Schmitz had
conducted business wlth the Shah for more than twenty years, and tran's Defense
Minister .turned to hlm for help in 1983. Swedish investigators, who interrogated Schmitz
at length, agreed that he seemed an unlikely figure to be running a sophisticated black
market arms operation. "He was handsome, a famlly man, extremely poHte/ they
said"Certainly, not the. type of persan you would Imagine dealing in weapons. " When
asked by a Swedlsh reporter whether he had any regrets about selling arms to be used in
the gulf war, Schmitz replled blandly: "The powder factories must be keptgoing. What
else would the workers do?"
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But Schmitz is also cunning arid cynical, and according to Swedish customs investigators
he has used every trick in thé black marketeer's book. To help his Danish-registered
freighters loaded with gunpowder for Iran to avoid the scrutiny of Egyptian authorlties
while passirig throtigh the Suez Canal, he produced fake documents showing the ships
were bound for Kenya. He sôld gUnpowder from Sweden,. Holland and West Germany to
Yugoslavia, then bought it back and resold lt to Iran. He faked end-usé certificates from
Pakistan and bills of lading. He shipped gunpowder across national borders to be packed
into shells and bombs,Which obscured the _orlgin and ultimate destination of the shipment.
One of Schmltz's munitions deals, for which this reporter saw pro forma invoicès and
other dcicume,nts, was worth a whopping $ JSO million. And Schmitz was involved in
dozens of deals. Although Scandiriavia Commodities Corporation was based in the port of
Màlmo, he was a world-dass operator.
To meetlrari's voracious dernand for artillery shells, Schmitz first tumed to South Africa,
whose munitions plants supplied hirn with the equivalent of 3,700 tons of gunpowder. But
ln June 1984 Pretoria eut off the supply without explanation. In fact, South Africa's state-
. owned Armaments Corporatjon had just signed a top-secret $ 400 million contract to
·supply Iraq with lorig•range àrtillery pieces. One of Iraq's conditions for the deal was an
1rnmedlatè end to South Africa's münitions deliveries to .Iran. ·
To make up the shortfall, Schmitz appealed to a little-known cartel of European munitions
makers that hàd grown out of an innocent-seemlngtrade organi:zation, the European
Association for the Study of Safety Problems in .the Pro,duction of Propellant Powder
(EASSP), which was formed in Brussels in 1975. According to a representative of the
societybasedin Paris, the group was intended tobe a forurn to share information on
safety problems ln chemical plants and intèrnatiorîal customs arid transportation
· regulàtlons ori explosives. ·
When the gulf war broke out, EASSP became a convenient cover for a cartel whose sole
purpose became supplylng Iran and Iraq with munitions. The cartel's core group of
thirteen companies included Europe's largest producers of military gunpowder: Nobel
Chemie in Sweden, PRB ln Belgiurrt, SNPE in France, Nobel Explosives in Scotland, Muiden
Chemie in Holland, Forcit and Kemlra in Finland, Rio Tinto in Italy, Snjc!BPD in Italy;
.Vinnis in Switzerland and Vass A.?. in West Germany .
. "Cartel members in Sweden, France, Holland and Belgium would meet regularly to eat and
drink together and plan how they would keep Iran and Iraq supplied wlth munitions," a
Swedish customs official explained. "They knew that no single company wouldproduce
enough gunpowder to meet the enormous demand, without raising production quotas and
attracting attention. So they decided to spread the work a round."
Durlng those long business lunches in Paris, Madrid, Geneva and Belgium, cartel members
would sit down and divide the monthly gunpowder requirements of Iran and Iraq among
themselves. Western intelligence specialists estimate that during the months of intense
fighting, Iraq and Iran each fired nearly a hait-million heavy artiUery shells. That's more
than ten tfmes the yéarly consumption of most major Ëuropean armles. And EASSP
members were supplying ail cif it. ·
The cartel was first cracked in November 1984, when SWedish customs agents raided the
headquarters of Nobel Chemie after gettlng wlnd of a suspldous gunpowder shipment that
had crossed West Germany on its way to Syria and Iran the previous month. "We found
lots of èorrespondence betwéeri Nobel and Iran," one investigator said. "So we made
another raid, ë;!nd discoveréd a real mess." îhe association was next sutprised in action in
December 1985, when Swedish customs officiais intercepted a twenty0six-ton shipment of
Nobel Chemie gunpowder en route frorn the port of Trelleborg to East German y and Iran.
The cûstoms investigators were not empowered to stop the cartel's agent, Schmitz, from
engaging in black market arms. smuggling, Indeed, once Swedlsh custorns officiais qu.ietly
put a stop to Swedish gunpowder deliveries to Iran in 1986, "Schmitz wèntto every
corner of Europe and elsewhere desperately seeking new suppliers," one investigator said.
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Page 4 of6
"He went to Holland, Belgium, Spain, Italy; Greece and especially Israel. He had to
continue those deals to avold flnancial ruin, because he had postèd performance bonds for
5 to 10 percent of the total value of. his contracts."
Schmitz himself remains unperturbed by the customs investigations, even though he faces
criminal prosecutlon. In a recent interview with the Stockholm daily Expressen, Schrnitz
declared his intention to continue doing business. "After ait," he explained, "there are so
rnany things you can sell to the Iranians." .
Schmitt's sentiment was shared by Swederi's largest arms manufacturer, Bofors, a
subsidiary of Nobel Industries Sweden A.B., maker of the RBS-70, a highly sophisticated
ground-to-air missile. The RBS-70 contrlbuted to Iraqi lasses of forty-five aîrcraft during
the Iranian offensives of January and FebrLiary. Sources in Washington said the Iranians
had become so confident in handling the Swedish missile that they brought i"right up to
the front Unes."
Although neutral Sweden forbids amis sales to countries at war or in "zones of conflict,"
since 1978 the largest Swedish arms expôrters have used fake end~use certifiCates and
falsjfied shipping documents to sellweapons to Middle Eastern countries, partieulariy
Iran. And the flrms claim they did so with the explicit approval of the K.M.L, the
govemment office responslble for granting arms export licenses. Bofors's then-managing
director Martan Ardbo expiained, "We thought we lived under a system of double morality.
They the government and the K.M.I.) wanted us to doit like this."
Bofors routinely falsified its order books, listing sales of artillery shells, 40-mm naval
guns, 155-mm field hoWltzers and at least714 RBS-70 laser-gulded antiaircràft missiles
to Singapore, which re-exported them to Iran and to other blackJlsted countries through
the state-owlied trading company Unicorn International. By 1985, Swedish foreign trade
statistics show, Slngapore had become the second largest buyer of Swedish weapons,
accounting for 14.4 percent of ail Swedish arms exports. Other Swedish firms are
currently under Investigation for similar violations . .
One of the prlmary loopholes used by Bofors was in continuing to produce weapons at its
overseas subsîdiarles or under manufacturing licenses granted abroad. Although Sweden
stopped granting new licenses as oU983, Under Secretary for Foreign Trade Carl-Johan
Aberg àdmitted that current licènsees could sel! Bofors weapons anywhere •ih the world,
"and we have no confrol over that.• .
Sweden's basic dilemma has long been to balance its standards of public morality against
the requirements of its neutrality. The late Prime Ministèr Olof Palme and others in
government realized that the political price of Sweden's neutrality was a healthy arms
lndustry, which cou Id only be malntained through extensive weapons exports: Without
export èamings, the RBS-70-vital to Sweden's air defense might never have been
developed, since by thè mid-1970s government funding for such projects haddeclined
sharply.
Sorne of the more unusual arms dèals with Iran have originated in Belgium, whose lax
customs regùlations have turned it into one of the major transshipment points for Iranian
arms purchases. The port of Zeebrugge has been used for years to tran$fer wèapons from
Sweden and France to Iran. And recently évidence has emerged that a major smuggling
operation involving TOW missiles from NAîO stockplles in the United States and Europe
was carrled ori lnslde the sealed customs zone of Brussels's Zaventem International
Airport.
According to intelligence sources in France and West Germany, Gen.
Serna rd Rogers, then NATO's commander in Chief/U.5.-European Conîrnand, ordered an
internai investigation late in l986 of reports that TOW missiles - and perhaps ôther .
military equipment-from NATôwarehouses .ln West Germany had been diverted t0 Iran ln .
1985 and 1986. A spokesrnan for Supreme Headquarters-Allied Powers ln Europe, ln
Belgium, said the investigation was ''a political issue" and. "the Pentagon has ordered us
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Page 5 of6
not to comment on it.OIThe intelligénce sources said General Rogers was "furious to leam
that NATO weapons were belng sold.to Iran without his knowledge." The Reagan
Administration recently relieved Rogers of his NATO command, which he had held for
eight years.
Belgian customs documents show that "aUeast 3,000 TOW missiles" were involved in a
shell-gamè assembly operation. Chartered cargo planes arriving from mllitary bases in the
United States brought in the TOW warheads. Shortly after they taxied to a stop ln the
customs area, additional planes, carrylng missile fuselages and motors from NATO
storehouses in Bavaria, would pull up alohgside them . Since the warheads were never
offioaded -and thus technically not importeô into Belgium-no customs documents were
requireèl.Thé _l;;erman planes· cargoes were labeled "industrial parts" and "motors," and
did not arouse the suspicion of Belglan customs officiais. The missile parts were simply
loaded onto the U.S. charter aircraft for the final leg of the journey to Iran.
It ls as yet .unClear whether those deliveries were part of the Secord-North Iran supply
network, althoügh the Belgian daily Le Soir, which reviewed Belgian customsdocuments,
declared that the whole operation "had the benedtction of the Pehtagon."
The recènt dlsdosures of arms-smuggling Qperatlons in Belglum and Sweden have led ta
calls For strlcter arms ''port controls .ln both countries. But even ironclad ,laws è:annot work
where tliere is no political witto stop illicit sales. ·
Despite extremely tight contrais, as the French press revealed shortly before the country's
parliarnentary elections .last year, the French compahy Lu chaire shipped more than $100
mllllon Worth of hec1vy artillery sheHs to Teheran, using fake end-use certlficâtes showing
their destinations as ·erazil, Portugal and Thalland. An official Investigation into the lllegal
deliveries was quletly buried by incoming Defense Minister Andre Giraud, and Luchaire's
president, far from belng disgraced; was awarded the Légion of Honor. In the meantime,
according to shlpplngdocuments revlewed by thls reporter, the .French electronlcs giant
Thomson-CSF has delhiered ground·siJrveillance radars to Iran through a subsidiary in
Argentina.
And French Intelligence sources say that an Amerlcan colonel fortnerly attached to the
U. S. ,Etnbassy ln Paris has been seen "on sëveral occasionsn supervising delivery of NATO
weapons to Iraniah aircraft at a French mllitary airport near Chateâuroux. That alrporthas
for years been used on a daily basis for loading arms bound for Iraq.
What the French have done on the sly, the British have chosen to call policy. Although
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Par'liament in Noveinber that Brltain would "not
supply any military equlpment that would prolorig or exacerbate the war," the governrnent
had dropped ail pretense of enforcing an arms embargo against Iran. A month after
Thatcher's speech, the govemment approved the sa·le of six Plessy Ad 3-D static airdefense
radars to Iran worth $ 343 mfllioh. Ostensibly the radars were intendèd ta
protect Iran's borders with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan but, as opposition MPs
polnted out, there was nothing ta prevent their use at the front fo direct lranian air force
operations aga1nst Iraq. In December The Observer reported that an official British
government sales office, International Mllitary Services, was concluding ·arms•sùpply
contracts with Iran's purchasing office ln London. A month earlier, Britain had sent$ 50
million worth of Chleftaln tank engines and spare parts to Iran justified as "resupply
under P,rewar contracts"), and slnce 1984 the British subsldlary of the Swiss firm OerlikonBuhrle
had been training lranian antlalrcraft gunners on British soit.
The Iran/contra scandai has shed some llght on the internai workings of the international
arms trade, and helped expose the complicity of E1,1ropean arms companies and
governtnents ln this Ulicit traffic. But given the nature of Europe's strategic interests in the
gulf, it is doubtful that ' Iran wit have to begin looking for new arms suppliers even if
laws are tightened . · · ·
For years Europeans had been irritated by U.S. domination of Iran's vast and lucrative
arms market; many countries hoped that the lranlan revolution would bring them new
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I'
1-
Page 6 of6
contracts. Europe's ar·ms Industries are also major employers: ln France, for example,
weapons production atcounts directly for 300,000 jobs, and another 700,000 are
weapons-relêited. Mêiny European countries, particlllarly France and Britain, are
posltlonlng themselvês for the post~Khomeini era, and their primary means ofconvincing
Iran's leadérs of their future friendship is by selling them arms today. ·
Probably most important of all is the structure of the European arms industry, which,
unlike that of _the United States, must export to survive. Swedén, for ex'ample, exports
more than 50 percent of the arms it produces each year. In France, more than 40 percent
of ail weapons produced each year are shipped abroad-and in the other NATO countries
the figure is roughly the same. Those experts, in turn, help sustain dornestic defense
programs; which are trltical ta European independence. As one official at Thomson-CSF
admltted, "We can't êillow ourserves to support embargoes wlthout jeopardizing the French
armaments industry. What if Iraq and Iransuddenly made peace? We would !ose Teheran
as a customer forever. And that is simply not possible."
IAC-NUMBER: IAC 0509627'0
IAC-CLASS: Magazine
LANGUAGE: ENGUSH
LOAD-PATE; July 10, 1995
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Annex 12
Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Exclusive Issue, Autumn 1991
Excerpts
- 118 -
- 119 -
Exclusive · issue
Autumn 1991
Chaiman of the Mofahedin Foreign Atfairs
âddressing m me O.S.Congres!i
From right 10 Ieft: Mohamrnad Mohaddessin, Ali-Rez.a Jafar-Zadeh.
Mr.Michacl van Dussan, staff dirctor of Subcomminu on Europe and the
Miè.dlc-East and one of the Congress assisstants, Mr.lkn~ Gillman,
senior mcmber of the Rcpublican whi]l in Coi:lgress subcommiuee on
Europe and the Middle-East.
( 31 )
- 120 -
- 121 -
Annex 13
M. Waas & D. Frantz, “Abuses in US Aid to Iraqis Ignored”, Los Angeles Times,
22 March 1992
- 122 -
- 123 -
Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1992 ·
Copyright 1~92 The nmes Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times
Pagel of5
March 22, 1992,. Sunday; Home Edition
. SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; National Desk
LENGTH: 2065 words
HEADLINE: ABUSES lN U.S; AID TO IRAQ1S IGNORED;
· MIDEAST: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PUSHED THROUGH $1 BILLION MORE IN
ASSISTANCE DESPlTE REPORTS OF KICKMCKS AND EVIDENCE THAT FOOD MAY HAVE
BEEN TRADED FOR ARMS.
BYLINE: By MURRAY WAA5 and DOUGLAS FRANTZ, SPECIAL TO THE TIMES; Waas is a
special correspondent and Frantz ls a Times staff writer.
OATELINE! WASHINGTON
BODY:
. The Bush Adminis'tration ignored evidence that a $5-blllion Americali aid prograrn for
Iraq was riddlêd wlth bribery and that food intended for hungry Iraqis may have been
traded for weapons, atcording to classified government documents and interviews.
Beginning ln 1989, Administration offldals learned that Saddam Hussein's regime had
dernanded millions of dollars ln brfbes from American exporters ofcommodities, the
documents indicate. The commodlties had.been sent to Iraq as part of a food ald program
undetwritten by the u.s. government. ·
Senior Administration offiéials, induding Secretary of State James A'. Baker IIl, were ·
warned of suèh àbusès in the fait of 1989, but still pushed through $1 billion in new
goverritnent loan guarantees to allow Iraq to buy more agricuJtUrai products, classified
documents show. . .
. . .
Two Administration officiais said the warnirîgs culminated in a highly dassifiêd intelligence
réport in July, 1990 -- a month before Hussein's troops overran Kuwait. The report said a
Jordànian entrepreneur heavily involved in the U.S. aid program also was assisting lratfs
covert arms-procurement network, according to the officiais who read the report.
At the sametfme, Iraq threatened to stop maklng payrnents on $2 billion it owed on
previous loans guaranteed by the United States unless new aid was approved, accordlng
to classtfied records. ·
While the Intelligence report did r\otdirectly Hnk arms deals ta food aid, an Administration
offkial said the Jotdariian businessman's dual role as arms trafficker and food middleman
should have been "sufficient evidenée" that aid was being traded for weapons.
Despite the intelligence findings and the 1taqi threat, documents show thàt the State
Departh'lent and the White House National Security Council contihued të seek the release
of a finâl $500 million in aid for Baghdad.
The disdosuresrepresent the first suggestion that American food aid may have been
bartered by Iraq to buy weapons, and they provide new details on the extent of the
. warnings about widespread irregularities in the aid program. They also rnustrate the
determination within the Administration to continue assistance to Iraq in the face of
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Page i of5
evidence of abuses . .
That determlnation contlnued even a~er an Agriculture Department investigation
complèted ln April, 1990, was unable to conclude that millions of dollars of commodities
shlpped through the Jotdanlan port of Aqaba were ever delivered to Iraq. The
department's Comrnodity Ctedit Corp. Mad financed the food purchases for Baghdad,
The Administration maintains publidy and privately that it has no evidence that U.S. food
aid was diverted for arms by Iraq, ·
In an interview, however, another Jordanian businessman, who was involved ln the CCC
progfam, sald he has firsthand knowledge that aid had been diverted by Iraq as early as
1988.
The business'man, who aske(1 that his name be withheld, said Iraqi officiais hàd bartered
U.S. food aid te the Soviet Union in exchange For a shlpment of Soviet tanks in 1988. The
food was shipped first to Aqaba and then to the Soviet Union instead of .being taken
· overland to Iraq, he said. ·
Uritll Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, the CCC program remained an lntegral-part of
President Bush's policy ofassisting Saddarn Hussein in hopes of so~enîng the Iraqi
dictator's threats to his neighbors,
The fii"stallegations that Iraq was dernanding bribes surfaced in Nove.mber, 1988,
according to a report detailing an Agriculture Départment investigation of the charges in
1990. . . ' .
"USDA had been lnformed that at leçst one Iraqi state trading enterprise had been
routlnely requestlng that exporters provide elther cash rebates or goods, either in the
form of additional commodities or non-agricultural items, as so-called 'after-sal'es' service
in the form of truéks and truck parts," said the report.
Despite.an Iraqi pledge to end such praètites in 1988, Iraq contlnued te demand
kickbacks. u.s. exportets complained repeatedly to the AgriculttJre Department that they
were forced to give Iraq spare parts with military uses, such as armored trucks, aild other
bribes in order to sell goods to the Gulf state under the Céc program.
For Instance, in a Sept. 7, 1989, letter to the department, a lumber exporter cornplafned
of increâsing pressure by Iraq to provide free trucks, trailers and tires as the price of
continued business. ·
"The reèent telex requests (from Baghdad) have exhiblted extrao.rd1narily threatening
language, where the future business relations are being judged by our response to
requests for free goods," said the letter. ·
Later court records show that Iraq also was demanding cash from U.S. exporters. Six U.S.
tobacco companies pleaded guilty in 1990 to paying more than $1.5 million in kickbacks
to Iraq. The funds were transferred to foreîgn bank accounts, some of which were in
countries that had supplied Iraq with arms, such as Bulgarla, France, Germàny and Italy.
About the same ti me that concerns Were rising ove;- the kickbacks ln 1989, federal agents
raîded the Atlanta bran.ch of italy's aanca l\lazionale del Lavàro. They seized evidence that
the branch had made $4 billion in fraudulent loans to Iraq and firms doing business with
Iraq. About $900 million of the loans was guaranteéd by the U.S. governrnent through the
CCC prograrn •..
Allegations of wrongdoing in the program became so disturbing thàt the Agriculture
Department and three other federal agencles recommended sharply curtailing or even
halting the loân guarantees to Iraq,
Secretary of State Baker was personaUy warned in a classified memo that officiais at thé
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Page 3 of5
îreasury Departmeht and the Federal Reseivè "find it hard to believe" that Iraqi
government officiais "were not aware of kickbacks and other gross lrregularities" in the
CCC program,
But the Administration, led by Baker, fought off any cuts and pushed through another $1
b!tllon ln aid. ·
The only caveàt was that the new aid would be divided into two $500-million payments •.
The second payrnent would be released as long as no substantia! lraqi government
involvement was untovered in the Banca Nationale investigation ln Atlanta, according to
documents. ·
At that point, the National Security Council was monitoring the progress of the Banca
Nazionale investigation, according to documents and interviews. other records show that
plans by the U.S. attorney's office in Atlanta to indict top Iraqi officiais a.nd offü;:ers of two
government-owned banks in the fraud scheme were delayed for more than a year.
The NSC a!so was keeplng ari eye on the internai Agrîculture investigation into possible
diversion of CCC food by lraq;
When a draft of the Agriculture Department's report was completed in the spring of 1990,
documents show that 1t was sent to Timothy Deal, a senior director at the NSC, as wel! as
to undersecretary of State Richard T. McCormack. A cover letter said the draft was
provided to the other agencies "for your teview and clearance." .
A copy of the draft obtained by The Times shows that Agriculture Department
investlgators concluded that Iraq continued to demand k!ckbacks. But the most explosive
allegation addressed by the investigators was that agricultural commodities were dlverted
and sold beforè they ever reached Iraq.
The report noted that. "geog raphicalfy, Iraq is almost entirèly lanèUocked," and that du ring
the Iran-Iraq War, its only large port city was closed to international shjpping because of
the fighting. As a result, Iraq had the commodities shipped to Aqaba as wetl as to Turkish
ports, frorn which they were transported overland to Iraq.
The investigato'rs had inspected shipping records for CCC goods at the foreign ports, but
they found the trail ended there.
"In almost every case, the records document shipments as far as the ocean port but
contained littfe or no record of the overland portion of the shipments to Iràq," said the
~~~ . .
The depllrtment asked Iraqi officiais to provide documents on a handful of the thousands
of CCC transactions so they cou Id be translated and reviewed. Even those few records
were not scrutinized, said the report, because they were in Arable and Turkish and were
not translated.
The final report sent to Congress, after having been reviewed by the NSC; conduded that
thE!re was no evidence that foodstuffs and èommodlties sent to lraq under the CCC
program were diverted or did not end up in Iraq.
One Administration official satd in an Interview thathe disagreed with the findings. "The·
facts thât our own investigator's uncovered did notsquare with the conclusion," he said.
The official added that his superiors did net want to acl<nowledge thàt they "had sent $5
billion of commodities to Iraq, and they had no system in place to conflrm thelr r!ghtful
delivery."
The official said .that if the report had concluded there had beeh a massive diversion of
food aid, it almost certalnly would have caused the cancelliltion of the CCC progrc;1m.
On May 2.1, 1990, the Agriculture Departméht drafted a press rele.ase and prepared to
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Page4 of5
brief members of Congress that it p/anned to suspend the last $500 million in food aid for
Iraq. But NSC intervenèd. A classified memo said that on May 28, NSC staff memoers
called a meeting "because they want to prevent the (loan program) from belng cance.led,
· as it would exacerbate the afready strained foreign policy relations with Iraq."
Evidence that a promirient middleman in the CCC food program was involved in Iraqi arms
trafficking soon surfaced in à widely circulated, hlghly classified intelligence report.
The July, 1990, report said that Jordanian businessman Wafai Dajani and a company he
heads, Amman Resoutces, had covertly purchased arms for Hussein's regirne; according ta
two officiais who read the report. It also said Dajàni had served as a middleman in
arranging anns purchases for Iraq .from private brokers in Portugal and Cyprus, the
officiais said •
. Dajani's company received shipments of C:CC-guaranteed commodities in Aqaba, stored
thern and was responsible for sending them on to traq. Federal investigators say Dajani
was one of the most prominent middlemen involved in the CCC program, ·
Because of the high classification of the ihtelligenée report, the two Administration officiais
declinèd to discuss its details. But they said it did notdirectly link Dajani'sarms deals to
exchanges ôf CCC aid.
Even so, one of the officiais said that Dajani's prorninent involvement with the CCC
pr'ogram and _his alleged role as an l;lrms trafficker should have set off alarm bells within
the Admlnistratlon, where the intelligence report was circulated widely. · ·
. .
Dajani has not been charged with any wrongdoing. Attempt$ to reach him in Jordan were
unsuccessful.
· A classified State Department report identifies Dajani as a confidant of Jordan's King
Hussein and thé brother of a former Jordanicm interior minister. Other records show that
he sèrved as a middreman on many of the !oans made to Iraq by-the Banca Nationale
branch in Atlanta. ·
As indictments were bèing finalized hi the Banca Nazionale case, the Justice Department
queried the State bepartment about the foreign policy implications of possibly charging
Dajani.
The State Department, whlle warning that àn indlctment of Dajahl would be "seen as a
further U.S. attempt to punish Jordan'' for siding with Iraq ln thé Gulf War, aise noted in
its men:io thàt an indictment ''would serve legitlmate law enforcement interests."
But when the U.s. attomey general finally announced the Banca Nazionale lndictment on
· Feb. 28, 1991r bajani was not among those charged. He has slnce been fdentified in ·
federal court records as ah unlridicted co-conspirator ln the Banca Nazionale case.
DaJani remains a target of the inquiry, acco.rding to law enforcement officiais.
the Treasury Department sald Dajani has been involved lri continui.ng efforts by Iraq to
ship goods to Baghdad through Jordan and evade the United Nations embargo imposed in
August, 1990. · · ·
Administration officiais acknowledged that some lllicit goods are still passing thro1.1gh
Jordan for Iraq despite the U.N. sanctions. ·
"There has been an active discussion .involvlng the overall sanctions regime and Jordan,
from the Presidènt down to (CIA Director) Bob Gates," said an Administration official. "But
a very small portion ofthe discussion focused on arms. Since August, 1990, no significant
arms shipments have gone to Iraq."
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
- 127 -
Annex 14
Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, issue No. 294, December 1992
Excerpts
- 128 -
- 129 -
Mojahed. journal, No. 294) page 6; Dece:mber 1992
Meeting between a dclegation from Iran's resistance movement and the US
president etec:t Mr. Bill Clinton., bis VP Mr, Al Gore, a number of scr..ior Senators
and Congrcssmcn, as w.ell as mcmbers of the new administration
On îucsday, Azar 17, a delegati.on from Tran's resistance movement, headed ·
by brother Seycd ol-Mohadessin, head of Mojahedio's international relations
depamnent met with US president elect, Mr. Bill Clinton. This meeting look place
on the sidelines of the Democratic party's leadership council meeting i.n
Washington DC, wbic..'IJ. was also anended by the resistance movement's delegatîon.
The fonction whlch lasted for well over fi~ hom:s, had been organized in
honor of the US president elect Mr. Bill Clinton aμd his VP, Mr. Al Gore. It was
attended by US senators and c.t,r,,gr{iSsme:ü, leaders of the Democratic _party,
promincnl US politicüms and candidates for the, various portfolios in the new
administranon.
Mr R ir,h,mi <l~phm1 _ r.nnv-P,s.s m11jority k~dc-.r, when meeting the head of
Mojahedin's international relations dep:ut:ment, said: we are ail proud of your
resistance. Your hcroicacts and your stru.ggles arf\ commendàble, and l am proud
of tlùs meeting. He sh.ared the hoJ)e that the new US congress and administratiou
will take riew measures againsc the regime that ~es over Iran.
- 130 -
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- 133 -
Issue no .. 294
Nov . Dec , 1993
t.• .. . ..
Massoud Rajavi - Nation! Council . of Rcsistance
Dcar Mas.soud,
... U.S foreign policy canner be divorced from the moral principles
most Americarts ~hare. We cannot disrcgard bow other governmcnts
treat tbeir own people.
Dcmocracies arc more reliablc trading pannert than dictatonhips.
They are mate likely to protect the environment and 10 abidc by
intemaùonal ~w.
Wc should regard incrcascd funding for dcmocratic assistance as a
lcgicimate part of our national security budget ··- we welcpme your ideas.
, ... ,_.,..Lw, ..
· parti or Prcsiden - elect Bill
Clinton's lctter 10 Ma.ssoud Rajavi
' .
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( 15 )
- 134 -
- 135 -
Annex 15
Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Issue No. 295, February-March 1993
Excerpts
- 136 -
- 137 -
issue no . 295
Feb - Mar • 1993
The /ranian Resistance in the International arena
An lran,an "Res,stance Delegat,on meets w,tn ;i number of
U.S. Secre/ar,es and ofllc,als
An Iranian Rcsistance Delcgàtion headcd by Monammad
Mohaddessin , Chairman of the Mojahedin Foreign Affairs took part in
inauguration ceremony; The Iranian Resistance Delegation was among
special foreign guests and U.S political pcrsonalities.
The Resistancc Delcgation also too k pan in events hcld in honor of
Mr.Bill Clinton presidcncy and met with a numbcr of U.S. Sccr"etarir:s
and officiais of new administration , and. mernbers of Congress , as wcll
as political figures including Mr. Walter Mondai! and Mr. Michael
Dukokiss both Democrat nomi ner:s for U.S. presidential clections in1988.
Duriog the talks with Mr. Werner Jordan , hcad of transitional team of
. ne w adroinistration , be requestcd the lranian Resistance delegation 10
offer his wann grcetings 10 Massoud Rajavi , Cha.imian of the National
Council of Rr:si.stance .
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( 2 1 )
\
- 138 -
- 139 -
Annex 16
Henry Kissinger, “Clinton and the World,” News Week, 1 February 1993
- 140 -
- 141 -
1ST STORY of Level l printed in FULL format.
Copyright 199~Newsweek
Newsweek
February l, 1993 , UNITED STATES EDITION
SÈCTION : INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 45
LEKGT H: 2559 words
H8.WLINE: Cl;i.nton and the world
SYLINE: BY HENRY A, KISSINGER
HIGHLIGHT:
PAGE 2
He must f ind arole fo!" an America that can .neither dominate nor retreat
BODY:
When Presi.derit Clinton spok e to 'I'he New York Times a week before h is
Inaugùration about how t o de a l with Saddarn Sussein, h e s a id that he was a
Baptist, and he believed in t he possibil ity· of cortversion . This comment was
widely criticized as evidence t:ha t the new president might not possess the
diplo ma t ie acurnen required t o function effectively on t he world scale .
In f act, Clinton' s attitude was not very different fro rn that of Franklin
Roosevelt, who, in the 10th year of his presidency, after Stalin ki11ed as many
Russians a s the Germans had, proclaimed that the Soviet leader was a xeasonable
pers on "possessed of stalwart good h umor. '' At t he Teherart s u mmi t, Roo s evelt wer,t
a step .furthe r by refe:tring to Stalin a s Uncle Joe and reporting afterwar d that
"the ice was brokeh and we talked like men and bro thers. 11
Cl inton•s rèmarks ref;l.ected an old l\.merican nostalgia for the conversion of
adversàries as the key to peace: As the only nation explicitly creàted to
vindicate the idea of liberty, Ameri ca has always believed that her val ues were
relevant ta the rest of ma nkind. That conviction h as been reflected i n t wo
somewhat contradictoi:y i mpulses. One . is that t hes(;! values can best be served by
concentrating on their p erfection at ~ôme -- t h is was the basis of isôlationism.
The other is a s ense of rnissior:ary obligation to c r u s a de te t ransform the world
i n our image .
The belief in cdnversi on e xplains why President Reagan , who b egan by talkihg .
about the s ovi e t Union as a n evi l empir e , .later came ta pride hims elf• on h aving
brought Gorbac h ev to an appreciation of democratic values . At . var:ious s t ages of
t he postwa r period, a nùrnber of other ôpponents have b een Similarly des cribed as
eithe:. having almost convert ed to the Ame rican viewpoint or ' a s having rea li zed
that economic cooperation and democratic progress were more important t h an.
pol itica l gain. It was a replay of the fantasy often found in Ameri can movies ,
where a villàin finds sudden illumination d üe to Sorne dramatic e v ent and, f r om
one day ta the next, turns b eni gn.
President Clinton seems to believe in bat h strands of this t radi tion - - t he
belief that America should focus on affairs at home, and t hat s h e shoul à promote
democr acy when she v e ntures abroad . And he is f a r from u nique in that respect.
Therefore , t h e r eai i ssue is not what he rnay or ma y not k now about the fine
poin ts of diplomacy, s omething he is in any c ase s ure to learn on the j o b. His
c h all enge as president will be to u nderstand that, f or t he first time in her
- 142 -
PAGE 3
Newsweek, February 1, 1993
history , Ame r ica now finds hersel.f in a world which she cannot d o minate, but
from which she also cannot simply withdraw.
Th e cold-war period was do minated by two superpowèrs. The so-called new
wor l d. order cdn tain s five or s ix power centers of nearly equal s t rength. Even
the nuclear equation is beginning to edge toward parity as START II redi.lces the
arsenals of the erstWhile superpowers into the numerical range of such nuclear
countries as France, Britain and even China. A mul tipolar world must seek
stability through balance of power - - a concei;>t to which Americ;a has been
tradi tionally hostile, préfe rring to treat all n a tions as more or less
i nc.erchangeable and hence subject to salvation by dor:iestic transformation .
Takè , . for instance, the U. S. attitude towàrd thé Pe:t.sian Gu lf. After the
fall of the Shah of Iran; the mciderate regimes in t he gul f fac'ed. twd
preponderan t threat s, neither of which they could handle by themsel ves :. radical ,
secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. Whe n these two nations started fighti ng
each other in 1980, after Iraq sought t o annex Iranian territory, a
balanc e-of-power a pproach would have dictated suppor t for the weaker èoUntry,
which was Iraq -- but only so long as it was weaker. Then, as soon às Iraq won
the war, that support s h ould h a ve been withdrawn .
The . Reagan and Bush administrations supported Iraq agains t Iran out of an
appreciation for the balance of power, but failed to carry that policy toits
logical conclusion. They chose to believe that Saddam had learned the virtues
of màderatior. and that continuing to support h i m after the war ended was hot
only exped ient but just. By extending assistance after Iraq became the
strongest i;>ower ih the gulf, they contr i buted to its later aggressiveness, wh ich
culminated in .the art:hexation of Kuwait. Today, the basic geopolitical challenge
in the gulf remains how to organize some o utside force to baiartce Iraq's
continued amb i tions a s well as the growirtg strength of Iran. And we can no
longer hope to create that balance by concili ating Iraq ,
Prdblems .of equilibrium are. emerging in other parts of the world .as well. In
t he former Sovi et Union, the growth of democracy a;1d market eèonomics is widely
seen as the solution to historie foreign-policy problems. I favor econornic
assistance to .Russia a nd .the e n couragement of its nascent democracy. But
prudent policymàke:ts must prepare for the fàct that a Russia rnade stronger by
economic reform will no doubt lead to far more complicated relations with its
neighbors . Most Russian leadership g r oups still find t h e disintegrat ion of the
old empire difficult to aècept. A stronger Russia i s likely to challenge its
neighbors with respect to the treatment of Russian minorities, bordera and
alleged commoh security concerns, creàting the p r emise for r enewed domination .
We may also see the emèrgence of a kirtd of promarket authoritàrian government
like that of Pinochet inChile. The Clinton administration would thén have to
weigh the traditional Arr.erican impuls e to ins i st o n democracy against bath the
danger of conflic::t amor,g t he repi.lblics and the political future o f Russia
itself .
Bal anci ng agent: A strategy is u rgèntly requi r e d for promoting Rus s iàn
p rogres s but also - - paradoxica lly - - for the p o tential i mpact of that evol ution
on relatio ns with Russia's n eighbors . Simila rly, Japan will no:: rest content
àuring the .Clinton presidêncy with béing an economic superpowèr while retnaini ng
politically inactiv e and militârily weak. And a rnore autonon<.ous Japan will
rattl e As ia ' s . equilibri um . As for China , i t has the h i ghest sustaine d economi c
growth rate in the worl d, which . will be increasingly translated into rnil i tary
- 143 -
PAGE 4
Newsweek, February 1, 1993
strength. Fir.ally, Korea will begin to rival the stature of European nations.
A:nerica must seek to promote a healthy evolution in its relationships, but her
role will have to be more like Britain's traditional approach to Europe, as a
balançing agent rather than as a dominant force.
Pre.sident Clinton wisely poir1ted out that there are now alSô forces in the
world that do not fall . irtto traditional categories, such as environment,
population, nuclear proliferation and catastrophic diseases. And the drive
toward popular participation in government will surely remain a dominant tlleme .
unfortunately, the importance of a challenge does net automatiêally guarantee
that American àctioncan resolve it. The so-called global problems continue to
be filtered through the prism of national perspectives. Commitment to thé
spread of democracy does net ensure our understanding how toma.ke it relevant to
other societies, how ta buttress our convictions with appropriate policies or
how to keep these slogans' from being exploited by essentially anti-democratic
groups. What are slogans in domestic politics, foreig:l policy must transpose
into international strategy.
President Cl inton' s bigg'est challenge is therefore cortceptual: ta impart tô
his impatient people goals and st:ratesies for an era whose turrnoils reflect the
painful initiationinto a hew international order. He wili, moreover, have to
do sa while being inundated by daily cables alleged to require immediate
answers, and by the pleading oJ: bureauc.racies that subtly - - or not sa subtl.y - -
will try te push him in their preferred directions. Foreign leaders wil 1
descend on him in the hope of establishing a persortal relationship or extracting
statements that they can use to their advantage la ter on. If Clinton permi ts
himself to be engulfed by· the minutiae of diplomacy, he risks losing, or never
estabiishing, a sense of direction. Foreign leaders maynot understand this,
but they would dà themselves a 1:avor by waiting ùntil Clinton •has had time to
organize his administration and think through what he must do.
Clinton woul.d be •wise te resist the pressures to conduè:t tao much persorial
diplOmacy, despite his cortsiderable charm. The latitude fôr real concessions is
definèd by the national inte·rest. It can be marginally extendèd by persônal
contact but not fundamentally altered. Moreover, when heads of govei-nment
negotiate on details, there are two risks. · one is ·a genuine potential for
misunderstanding, when eac:h thinks hê has convinced the other, but. in fact
· neithèr has. The other is that they inay make their disagreemeI".ts too explièit.
FCJr World leaders tend t oachieve their eminence with theaid of highly ·
developed eg-os, and they do not 1ike to be perceived as backing down .from
well-publicized positions. · ·
When I was in government, I generally tried to avoid situations in which the
president wouldtneet a foreign leader wi thout knowing what the·foreign leader
was going . to say ahead of time. '.!: also made every. effort to .tell foreign
leaders what the president would have to say to them. When heaà,s of government ·
meet, surprise shoÙld be reduced to a minimum and major emphasis should be
placed on conceptual unde:rstanding.
For a new president, it is important to be. wary of certain conventional
wisdoms regarding negotiations . One is tha t if two s ide s disagree, a compromise
should be sought somewhere in .the middle. If the other party knows. in advance
that this is the operatirig princ iple, it will have every incentive to stake out
an extreme pos ition so that the ,;compromise" cornes as close to .its re;al position
as possible . The r e is also the belief t hat deadlock s must always be b:token by
- 144 -
PAGE 5
Newsweek, Febr'uary 1, 1993
new American proposals as a dernonstration of Our nexibility. The practical
result is often to promote the very d eadlock One seeks to avoid. In rny view,
the best negdtiating tactic is ta stake out a rnoderate, r easonable position and
then s_tick ta it. Salami tactiës of making little concessions one at :· a time
please the. bureaucracy but confuse the other party .
President Clinton has said that he wants foreign policy made in the White
House and implemented in the State Department, This was certainly the operâting
style în my early years in the Nixon White Hause. But it was d ue to emergency
circurnstances not applicable to . currént events. The Vietnam n ego tiations, while
exha\.lsting, concerneda few relatively simple issues. T tie opening to China was
a spectacular but singular event , 1,:conomic issues we:.e not then as crucial as
they are now; In any event , it · is not a pattern ta be repeated when the
challenge is to devise a new concept of foreign policy and to implernent it
across · the erttire i'rpectrürn of q ur · natio n' s endeavars . ·
Primary voice: Given this need, it .would bè a mistake :for a president,
particularly one with little international experience, to try ta run all aspects
of for~ign policy frorn the White Hou.se. The range and complexi ty of issues
faèing the United States today are so great that a secretary of·. state .needs to
be i nvolved with the developinen!:, of concepts from the start in order ta convèy
the necessary sense of nuance ta the apparattis that must implement policy
decisions. T:i.ough the National Secu.ri ty Council staff s hould frame po l icy
options, it i,;; the secretary of st;;ate -who must have a primary voice in the final
selection.
Sorne conflict of views within the new foreign-policy tearn is i nevitable, and
should not bè discouraged by thé presi,dent, It is rnuch bétter ta be presented
with clear-cut alternatives than to insist on recornrnendations in the form of
predigested compromises . 11sually, that has the effect of · shifting the field of
the bureaucratie battle from pltraseology to interpretation. For the
foreign-policy bureaucracy has a truly. r'emari<able skill in hearing only what
s upports its preconèeptions. The president rnay think that he has approved a
pre-negotiated compromise, but e·ach department will inte:::-pret t he decision in
the way that suits its own purposes.
Ironically, President C linton, who carnpaigned on the proposition that P.merica
should place her tOJ? priority on domestic restructuring, has corne to office at a
time of great international turmoil, Yet this also presents him with an
opportunity to redefine America' s role in the world. Trl.lman knew little about
foreign policy when he started hi s presidency, yet he became responsible for
designing the . architecturé for a generation of suècessful. foreign po1,icy.
Clinton faces a similar challenge, though of course under different ·
circumstances . If he can teach America to reconcile her twin impulses of
missionary zeaf and isolationism to h e r interests, • he will have laid a
groundwork for a lasting peac e. - History will then little care how well he
u nderstood the world when he entered office.
LES ASPIN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Developed expertise as chairrnan of the House Armed Services Committee. Rejects
the Pentagon's "all··or nothing" approach to the use of force; believes new
technology enables precision responses. Keen instincts for what the public will
tolerate.
- 145 -
PAGE 6
Newsweek, ·Februa:r:y 1, 1993
SAMUEL (SANDY) BERGER
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
A depÙty to Anthony Lake -in the carter era, during the campaign he coordinated
foreign-policy advice for Clinton . Cares about hùman r ights, but believes that
"diplomacy disengaged from force isn' t much diplomacy. "
WARREN CHRISTOPHER
SECRETARY OF STATE
Old enough t o be Clinton'S father, the corporaté lawyer is careful, deliberate,
judicious. Not known foi his vision or identif ied · wi th any pa::::ticu1ar school of
foreign policy or idèology . He is a làwyer who (deftly) carries out the wishes
of his client.
ANTHONY LÂKE ·
NATIONAL SECU!l.ITY ADVISER
He split with Kissinger over the invasion of Cambodia. aut he's no dove, he
sees America as an internationalist power pushing free markets and democracy
globewide. Seen as the foreign-policy team's intellectual powe~housè .
WINSTON LORD
.ASSISTANCE SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PAC!FIC AFFAIRS
The GO!? Yalie is, like Lake, a former Kissinger protege, Ambassador to China
during the democrac'y movèment, he wi.11 be tougher on Beijing than Bush. Bu t
he's too realistic to eut the Chinese off.
PETER TARNOFF
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Will move to restore Stat e's career experts to the policy-mak.ing role that Jim
Baker's people usurped. "Process Man" is more a facilitator than thinker; may
be better at setting up the seminar t ~an answering the question.
TIMOTHY WIRTH
liNDER SECRE'.tARY FOR GLOBAL AFF.I\.IRS
Former senator bargained hard for a job at State with clout. New post
recognizes that_ environmental degradation, popula.tion growth, drug traffic:k.ing
· and refugees ·pose real threats to u . s . security.
STROBE TALBOTT
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
Anot:her Yale smooth ie, the longtime Time editor and Russian expert is a Friend
of Bill. New post . focusing on free markets ·and democracy for former u.s.S.R.
signais a Clinton priority .. Talbott has many friends amo ng the old East bloc• s
reformers.
GRAPHIC:. Picture 1, ·The American .will to convert foes ta the cause of peace:
U. S. Marines at a Somali mi litary base on t he eve of their a~rival into Baidoa,
WESLEY BOXCE - - JB PICTURES; Pictures 2 through 9, no caption, DAVIO·· BURNETT
- 146 -
PAGE 7
Newsweel<, February i, 1993
- - CONTACT, IRA WYMAN !?OR NEWSWEEK, LARRY DOWNING - - NEWSWEEK, JEFF MITCHELL
f..EUTERS-BETTMANN, JOHN HARRINGTON -- BLACK STAR, J]>;CQUES CHENEt -- NEWSWEEK, ROB
CRANDALL -- PICTURE ·GROUP, MARIO RUIZ -- TIME MAGAZINE
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
1
- 147 -
Annex 17
Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Issue No. 297, April 1993
Excerpts
- 148 -
- 149 -
issue no.297
Apr.3, 1993
Congressman Robert Andrews News Release
Blpart,san Congresstonal Dinner Calls on CJ)nton
Adm,n1strat1on to adC1pt a lougher po/1cy on /raman
Reg/me, support lramnan Res1stancf;!.
Congressmen Robert Anderws (D-NJ), Ronald Dellums ( D-CD),
James Traficant (D-OH) and Dan Burton (R-IN) sponsôred a dinner
reception on Wednesday, April 21 ac House of Represematives in honor
of Mr.Mohamrn ad Mohaddessin, Chairman of chè Fore ign Affairs
Committeè of the National Council of Resistance o f Iran (NCR), a .
coalition of democratic 9rganizations and personalities scriving for
democracy in Iran. Mr.Mohaddessin is visting the United Smes ac the
special cnvoy of Mr.Massoud Raja vi, Leader of the lr.μtlan Resis tance. In
thcir remarks, represcnta t ives Andcrs ws,member of the Fo re ign
Subcommiüee on Eu rope and Middle-East; senior House Relations
Commime members Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) and Dan Burcon, and
Congressman . Chartes· Taylor (R-NC) condemned the flagrant violadons
of human rights, e xport of fundamcn ta lism and terrorism. They declared
thcir suppôt! for the lranian Resistance, and c:,lled for a toughcr policy
by the C imon administration._
11,,,1,,ts~,."
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- 150 -
- 151 -
Annex 18
Mojahed, MKO Bulletin, Issue No. 298, May 1993
Excerpts
- 152 -
- 153 -
issue no.298
May 10, 1993
Chalrmsn of the Foreign Affairs Comm/Nee of the
National Counc1/ or Res,stanca meets w1th senator Georgè
McGovern
On Thursday April 29, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of NCR, Mohamrnad Mohaddessin met wi th Scna1or George McGovcrn.
During this meeting Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committce of
NCR elaborated on blatant violation of human rights by illegitimat e
regime of Khomcini, and the routine practicc of tortllfe and exccution in
prisons. He emphasizcd on overwhelming support of Iranian people from
the National Council of Resistancc and ultimatc downfall of tcrrorist
dictatorshi p of Mullahs. He explained the latcst developmeni in Ir-anian
just resistance for peace and freedom in the international, interna] arcna,
and the viewpoints and programmes of lhe National Council of
Resistance for a free and democratic Iran alte r Khomeini r tgime
downfall The t wo sides discussed about the plo ts and plans of ruling
tcrrorist dictatorship in Iran, and exchanged v iews on its policy of
exporting cerrorism and · rcligious fundamentalism ....
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- 154 -
- 155 -
Annex 19
G. A. Nader, “Interview with President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani”, Middle East
Insight, July-August 1995, Vol. XI, No.5
- 156 -
- 157 -
Interview with
President
Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani
By George A. Nader
Editor '.s Note: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 64, is the son of a cleric and pistachio /armer. After attending
a traditional primary school in his home village near Rafsanjan in the Kennan province, he went ta
Qom at 14 to study theology. He swdied under the Late Ayatollah Khomeini and rose to power as one of ·
his devoted disciples. When Khomeini was e:ciled in 1964, he re/ied on Rafsanjanifor fand raising and
organizing the underground movement in Iran. Rafsanjani's activities ledto his arrest in 1965 and 1971.
In 1975 he was arrested again and_jailedfor three years. After the Shahs overthrow in 1979, Rafsanjani
helped found the lslamic Republican party, served on the Revolutionciry Council, and was
Undersecrerary of the lnterior of the provisional govemment. He was elected as a depuiy [rom Tehran
ra the first post-revolution. Majlis, was immediately elected speaker, and he1d thatpost 1mtilhe was elected
President jn 1989. âfew weeks after Khomeini s death. As Khomeini s representative on the Supreme
Defense Council and later as Commander-in-Chief düring the Iran-Iraq Wa,; Rafsanjani became a
major architect of Iran s strategy. He was also a·keyfig11re in convincing Khonieini to àccept â United
Nations cease-fire resohttiq,n. Helping to r1;buildrhe countryfollowing a.'rMr that côst$350 biUion and
counrless lives; Rafsanjani has led Iran ·s ttaizsitionfrom a war economy to a peacetime.economy.1n thé
following two-hoùt candid interview at his Presidential offices in Tehtdn, President Rafsanjani diseusses
the many irttemal ani1 external challenges facing his country wïih Cëorge A.Nader, president and
editor of Middle East Insight . ',,, .
MEi: Mr. President; during the six
years 'that you have been in officê. you
have overseen [ran·s transi.ti an f~cïm a
war economy to a peacetirne ecoiiomy .
and its simultaneous transition. due the
death of the le.ader of. the revolution.
Imam Khomeini. 10 a post-Khomeini
:ra. Which of the accomplishments in
,lis period are you most satisfied about.
und what objecti ves do you hope to
accomplish during îhe remainder of
your tenure in office·' ·
Rafsanjani: ln the Name of God.
tile M.:rcifut. the Compassio natè .. ft is
very natural that after the end of the.
war our rnost important goal should b.:.
the reconstruction and rehabilitation
of the coumry. Many of c.hè infrastruc'
tural facilities and structures of th.:
country had been destroyed dur.ing
• (the lraqq war. and even bdore the
war we were a littk backward in the
infrascrùcture field, That's why we
nave designa ted the ten f·ears [at'ter
the warf as the --construction Decad~ ..
in a bid 10 carrY out infrastructllra\
works. So far we have pcoceeded
a~cording to the plan. Ah:rtost all wài'
rùins hav·e been renovated. Many
irlfrastructùral works have been done,
suèh as control or water, construètion
of dams. power plants. devèlopment
of communications, roads and railways,
transportation. àgriculrure, steel
industry. copper. lead, zinc, and
machine fodustries, We ha.Ve e;t.pand•
ed our defense industries. accivating
· the minês wnich were idle; expanded
universities t'or training of rnanpower;
and paid atténtion to deprived areas-
158 -
Transformation
... of a country
from a war-economy,
particularly
an imposed war
of eightlong
years, to an econ- .
omy of growth
and development,
requires a lot of
sacrifices; .. ,: 1
am.happy to
shoulder all the burdêtis and dîfficulties
that are inevitable for the
period· of reèonstruction
a major pilrl of which had been
delayed-fisheries. ports. etc Ail this
was included in.the plan, and "è muid
turn the bad situation at that time to ~
good condition ac th~ prê,ent.
Fortunately we have been successful
in achieving these objectives today.
In the oil and gas sectcir. wh!Ch was
gteatly darnaged {duriog the warj. 1,e
made great achievements and coday
we've supptied gas co most or our
towns. The pettochemicais in Iran were
almost nothing. We worked hard on
them to the extent that today the petrochemical
èapacity is about 12 million
tons. We also made huge investments in
the consumer industries to mceer the
domestic requi rements: Altogether. we
sp,:nt S !00 billion both. from our ll\\ n
sources and [the money/ we h31·e borrowed
from abroad. We also h~1·e the
second development pl:in in front of us.
lt's a tïve-year plan. aàd we hopè to
achieve our goals ut the èncj of the pl"n.
MEi: Mr. President, witn the m,m :
accomplishments you spoke abouc. h,l\\
currentl: "ould ;,ou characterize ·the '
scare of the lran iJn economy? Sorne
expen; haie d~scribeJ it us beirnz in an
~xtrem~I:, fragile , tare. with 1he falling
value tJf rhe rial. high intlation and
unerr.plo :-me nt. :i.nd ;orne foreign
debrs. Ho,,· did ;,our reform program
fare. and how do :ou intend ro address
lrun · ., current economic challenges?
Rafsarijani: Befoi'e launching the
[c.le 1·èlop rnentJ plJn. the econorny had
ditlicultie., anJ ""-' fragile. s·ut today
the foun d~tion, of the econom.y in this
councr;, ure solid. Îhce· t'undamencals
are chue . 1'11 giw you ari txample. in
the beginning of the, development
plan. we spent ~-;o biliion [ori investmen
: J. b u_t this :ear we are only
spenJing SIO billion and the countr:,
· :-- r~~ t.,n~trucrîu :1 i, cui1tlnuing m
the -~me -pe eJ. Thal means we ha ve
reuuce.,j (•ur ecun,,mi, dcependence on
the ,,ui,iJe. t--lJn: of the things we
hciJ , ,, 1mporc are nüw produced
in,11.k F,,r in,tJn,é. 1 non -f<:rrnus 1
méc.d,. ( inJ u,crie,: Jré . Jnnç JI! in ; ide
the country. Or chemicals-perhaps
5,000-6,000 factories are
rèceiving their macerial frorri inside
the country. We ha.ve sûpplied natural
gas to everywhère and ail the
industries canuse t\atl!ral gas. With
. the investment that we have made,
we can also meet the requirements
in meat, poultty. and eggs. ' Large
projècts, like the construction of
dams, are desigrted and constructed
in this coumry. I can say lhat rtiost
of our needs in !ran froin the
designing to engineering and production
are done inside the country.
Our foreign debcs as cornpared to
ocher countries of course is Jess. is
not that muèh, is 518 billion, bue we
have used this foreigil debt in ordèr
to strengthcn the economy; we have
inveSted in infrastructure àr\d othèr
things. They are points of strength
for our economy and we do not
have any difficuliy in repaymerit of
ôUr foreigti debts. They are paid in
installments with five ôr six years
and it will not be a heavy burden ôn
us. And 1t will be amortized by the
. year 2000. And it is a guàrancee for
the sale of our oil if the US wants t<i
prevent the se[ling of our oil. Our foreign
debt is guarant!!ed. I do not
believe tho.t we have mucli economic
difficulryin front of us. Or course. we
ha ve inflation in this country because
we have spent much money in industry
o~ pt'ojects that are not yec finished.
but. compar'ed with other countries
in the region, our inflation is low
and life ~ss expensivé. If you look
at the c. ·.cries around us-and products
fro · lran go to those countriesit
is ver: profi table for th,em to tracte.
MEI: lt is understood chat many of
· the surgical. painful rneasures you have
taken w\11 bear thiit long afcer you lea,e
oftïce. And you have guided and shaped
a new mentality among the people here
to de pend less on the govemment ,md co
bè more involved in the .free market
economy~ How do you feel about this?
Rafsanjani: îrans formation of the
economy of a country from a war-econ,
omy. particu\arly an imposed war of
eight long years. to an economy of
- 159 -
!!rowth and development. rcquires a lot
~f sacrifices. Qrowth and economic
development ofour country is possible
with patience and increas[ng efforts of
.il! segments of the popùlation. The
Government of the lslamic Republic of
Iran has adopted such policies to secure
economic growth in Iran: My u_ltimate
objective, as the President, is to acrueve
prosperity for the nation and progress
for the c:ountr)', and in tilis connection. I
am happy to shoulder ll.11 the burdens
and difficulties that are inevitable for the
~~riod of reconstruction. The prospect
lran is bright and promising. and an
o,w.vhelming majority of Iraitian peop
le realize the wisdbm of the
Qovernment policies and support them.
MEi: Mr. President, there have
recently been te ports of riOtS and
domestic disturbances over declining
living conditions in soine lranian
.les. How does your government
, iew these occurrences?
Rafsanjani: These are Usually smalt
incidents that are blown way out of proportion
by the opposition media. Por
example, ifyou compare this incident to
the incidents that rook place in
(alifornia. the USA. this is àVery small
. ident compared 10 them. For
;a,tance. the incidents in France by
the farrners. You have such things in
forkey and Pakistan mud1 larger in
proportion than what we have in Iran.
For example, most of these inciden1s
relate 10 the muriicipality ad ministration
office. They wanted to stop them
(corn the construction of buildings
1hou1 a license. and they may
. •· -ùl1 to riots. Maybe. for example.
bus tickets were made more c.~pensive
and such things hap.pened. The
people are with the· governtnent. in
this country and sàcially speaking we
do not have. big problems. IF you
,omewith the leaders ofthe country
10 one of the trips that we rnake to
·:e of the cities. you will. see how
,,d re!J1ions ex-i;t between the peopk
and the lead~r.;.
:\lEI: The r~ ,,·en~ time$ during
your piesid~ncywhen the mosc oui-
,,;r,nrtin.r, •1n..-i· ,:. 1,, ,,11 .. .,.,.;..;,. 1--•,... ,...»;rrn
issue of ail. the US-lranian relation·
ship. seèmed on the vergé of sorne
improvement. Yet now, it hits an alltime
low, with President Clincon issuing
an executive o,der on May 8 pro·
hibiting trade with and invèstment in
Iran. What went wrong after some initial
hopeful signs? Why do you think
the Clinton Administration has tough·
ened its polie y toward Iran at this lime?
Rafsanjani: This new measure we
feel is pattly b.!cause of the pressure thàt
is exened by the Zionist circles. But
gënerally speaking. from the very beginning
of the revolution, American administrations
have shown hostility towiirds
the revolution. They have never shown
good intentions. The inteinal ·conditions
of the United States, the rival ries
betwecn the two parties, and the other
interna] problems that the US has, has
made it necessary to pick up an enemy
outside. In the paSt the Soviet Union
was considered the enemy; now it is our
country, Iran. They want Iran to be a
scapegoat. When their peace plan in the
Middle East has failed, they can.not
openly say that they planned it poor!y
themselves. They have to pue the blame
on somebody else.
U nfortunately
there is not
much trust· in th($
country for the
United States . ..
That is why we
have said that the
United States
should, for once
ME!: Has Iran thought of coming up
with some creative strategy to defuse
this current tension?
Rafsanjani: !t is daomed to fail; the
Uriited States cannot do rriuch against
us. What tan possibly happen? They
s:lid the y should noc buy out oil; we can
shift and sel I to ochers. If they ban trade
wi1h us, it is the United States that is
going to !ose. The things chat we are
used 10 buying from the United States
"·è'll get from other coùntries. We have
been the targe, of such bans-even
worse ànd more severe bans-at a rime
when we had a war: These bans have
had no impact ori our economy, and they
will nec affect this country.
MEi: The United States has long
insisted that it was willing to engage in a
dialogue with authoritative Iranians, in
the open and without any preconditions.
Wouldn't it be reasonable to test US sincerity
on this issue. especially riow, and
designate an officia! persan to have any
discussions without preconditions about
many of the Outstanding matters that
your country is concemed about?
· Ralsanjani: Unfortunaoely, because
of 1he behavior of the United States,
at least, proue its·good intentions_;
so the roadcan ·be oaued- -
- 160 -
Ptact.ically speaking, we do not 'take
· any action against the peace _
plan:, . . In our uiew)[itJ•is not going
towor k out ... But if the coiitent îs
Just, the substance is just,
we shall go along with it
tlk·r .. ·-1, _ 11\1t mt1Lh ._(ru,t in l hi, 1..·t1tu! tr:
t,,r ih,· l'nitèd St,n-: , _ lt 1; 1J\ i:'è_ p ré•
,t1111(,! 111 Iran 1h,,1 thé l'nit~J S1.11~, h,1,
1111\:ri\•r 11h1{Ï\ ~:-- fpr_ lhi, prop1..bal. Th~,l
1, \\ln \\ i.' h..11.t.: "~dd {h~H ch.: L'n 1t...:J
Stttc, ,h,-::ld, r'"r ,,11,è at kJst, prove
i1-.: ~l1,•d 111t-·11tiPn .... 'l' thè roàd can .bl!
r,t'ëd 1 ,,,i.J th,11\, f,,r C\Clmpk, that as
~L -.!h1\\ vt :'.1 1t1d ,, Ill-. the~ ~an fre~ our
assets that have been i!l egally frozen in
the United States.
MEi: \Vith regard te this issue, you
have frequently mentioned the lranian
assets froze n by the US, Most
Americans believe that, afte r signing
the Algiers Accord in 19 8 l, the tribunal
at the Hague has been settling
lrariian and American cla_ims and
counter-claims, Will you ple as e define
what you mean by lranian ::issets?
Rafsanjani: Before the Rev olucion
we had a special ace ou nt for forei gn mi litary
sales, î~ was called the FMS
accoûnt, Our oil was sold and the mo ney
was deposi tèd imo this account for selling
of US arrns lO Iran, and we have subs
stantial amounts of money in that
actounc. still oumanding. The weapons
systems and armer that the United States
was supposed'to deliver were not give:1
to us, But they have taken our money .
and the mon ey is the re. ànd no wea pons
are coming: We had also bough t at that .
tirne substamial amounLS of weapons in
the United States that 'were neve r dcliv ered
and also some logistical military
prov.isions that are still therc and are
confücated by the United States,
MEi: We realize that Iran · morally
supports and inspires man y [s lamic
groups in the region, Howe,er, the
United States has alleged that [rân gives
financiàl support and trains groups li ke
Hâmas and · [slamic Jihad te èatry out
rrtilifary and terroris(ic activi(ies that
subvert the Arab-lsraeli peace process.
They point. for e,,:ample, m the Bcit Lid
botnbing, àmong others, Could you
clarify wha tis the nature o( lran's sup•
port and assistance to Hamas arid
lslamic Jihad, for e,'(a mpk?
/ Rafsanjàni: These arc baseless allegaùons
that have bèen Je,·eled again st us
on numerous occasior.s and they keep
being repeated and we have gi ,·en our
rèplies and answers to those allegacions,
We have mted ,·ery i:le;irly that w·e do
not support any terrorist groups and we
côndemn ail forms of terrorise am/ln
Lebanon, we do help. büt our help g:oes te
the Shi ·a population. Thc:y arc the: targets
of the atrocicies of the occupying forces,
- 161 -
îheir country. the southern part of
Lebanon. is occupied, and the viètims of
this occupation are helped by lran. We
also help 1hese people tO e;i:pel. push
ba,k. the occupation forces. Regarding
-r.~ Pales tini.ll\ queslion, the peace plan
chai is now under way, wé say that. in our
view, the peace plan is not going to wori<
out , :i.nd it is nota just plan. We do nothing
else; it is just a statement. We don't
see any good intention on the part of
Israel in these talks. ànd we don't even see
good intentions on the pan of the .United
S1ate's, eithcr. We do nO( see the United
· · .1tes as a neütral mediator in ùùs case .
. -1.nd the reasons have shown therrtselves
in the occupation of the new lands by the
lsraelis in Jerusalem. And the United
Scates, instead of giving a reward to the
Arab côuntries--c-you saw whathappened
at the UN Security Council--'it vetoed
the resolution [condemning lsraeli land
~i2ure s in Jerusalem] and c:rampled upon
·1e vote of I• members of the·council in
r'avor of Israel. We ask !hem wha t have
you done for four million Palestinian
refugees? Whât _,;iil the ir destin y be as a
result of this peace plan? 1s this peace
practical and durable when there still
exist 4 million refugees? _
MEi: You have rai sed many ques'
on s in my mind about the peace
· .,,ocess . What i"s your assessment ot'
the Syrian-franian relationship. and
assuming a Syrian-IsraeH peace agreement.
how will that affect lran's rela·
tionship with Syria?
Rafsanjani: At the present time'. we
have e.,cellent relations with the Syrians.
:rid we do not belii:ve that Syria will subnit
to an unjust !)<!ac.:.
ME.! : What ifa real peace agreement
tha t satis fies S yria · s needs and
aspirations is reached? What will your
position be'?
Rafsanjani: We shall wait ând see
for that do.y to corne. Then we shall
~tate: our vie \\, .
MEi: Assuming a tte:ity betWeen
lsrJtl and Lebanoh. it will have to involve
Hezbolbh. Hllw will Habollah's acquiescence
to a peace creacy affèct an lranHezbollah
relationship?
Rafs;rnjani: The objective of
Hezbollah. in the first place, is to put an
end to the occupation of the ir country
by Zionists. Were the govemment of
Lebanon to achieve suth an objective,
both Hêzbollah and we will be pleased
and happy : but, the Zionist regime is
essentially e.,pansionist.
l\,IEI: Has Iran ca.Jcul~oed the cost chat
is accruing from its opposition to the pe:ice
pruoess berween Arabs and lsr.ielis''
Rafsanjani: Of course: We have 10
p:iy a price when you defend your principles.
1 f you want to be free-minded
and de.fend your princ;iples, you should
be willing to pay the price.We are revolutionary
and Muslims, and we a·re
prepared to invest and pay the ptice for
the principles that we believe. 1 think
any free-minded- per son is willing to
pay the price in order to de fend his prineiples
of freedom.
ME'.(: Mr. Pre siden1 . if I could add to
this . . . fo !lowing your own principles of
nonintèrferenee in other peoples· and
countries · affo.irs ; and the Use in man y
instances. of your ,t!ood offices. to facilitate
contlict resolution and defuse ten,
ion in insta nces .like in Central Asia.
Afghani st.in. and me1ny 01her places,
mu td Iran clc:arly ><< itsdt' at the poinc
wh.:re it ean dc:d:ir" ils impartiali ty
· towàrd the peace procèss and the Arablsraeli
conf\ict?
Rafsanjani: Practically speak:ing,
we do no( take any action against the
~ace plan. When we see thïs whole
· process is unjust, we state our opposition
as a matter of principle. But if the
content of the peace plan is just. the substance
isjust, we shall go along with it.
MEI: Mr. President, a gtear many
peOpl~. \vho otherwise wish to see
improved relations between ltan and the
We st. are greatly discouraged by Iran's
human rights record. specifically the
continuing threat to the life of Salman
R1Jshdie. lt has. become a symbol in the
West. a symbol .that is being effectively
used by your opponents to cause unneces
sary problems for you and delay
progress with other countries. How.
c; ould Iran plan ta deal with this issue
attd go:t oui o f this vicious circle?
Rafsanjani: Of course we have ta
separate .th e cwo issues. hLlinan rights
and the Sal man Rushdie case. 1 think
human rights are used as an instrument
tD exert pres$ure and also 10 achieve
some goals that p'aniclllarly the United
S1atès pursues. For e~ample. you see in
the US an incident takes place- the
mass kill ing of the Davidian sect, the
followers or David Koresh~ but vert _
soon without wasting much tirne. they
ju,t stitl" th" matter as if rtothing has
h:ippened. But if a small incident cakes
plàce in Iran. it is blown way out of pro-
162 -
portion and is publicized for years. The
scene of mass killing of that sec:t was
very tragic. I heard on BBC yesterday
that in the US, the prisoners, who are
disproportionately black, are moved
around and taken to work with chains on
their feet. This is vcry tragic. Nothing
like that happens in Iran. ln [ran prisoners
visit with their families. They are
tr'càied with dignity and the y an: paid for
their work. ·
Regarding Salmail Rushdie, 1 think
this whole affair is created by the arrogant
powers in ordedo use it as a time
borrib, in case it is needed for the rela,
lions between Iran
and the West. The
issue is that the writer .
nuclear bomb. What is Iran ·s po lie y
toward nuclear proliferation? And how
do you respond ta those who say Iran
does not need nuclcar power because of
its natural resour<:es?
Rafsanjani: These daims a:re on ly
raised by Mr. Clinton, Christopher and
the Israelis. Have any other people
made such daims against us? Are there
any other grollp5 or people rnaking
such a claim? ·
M.ÉI: They seer11 to feel very. very
strong!y.about this.
numerous. and we cannot forego other
uses of peaceful nuc lear technology.
MEi: Mr. President, lslamic resur
·gence seems to be on the rise . Man~
neighboring countries are struggling
with this issue . What is Iran ' s view on
the widespread ls!amic resL1rgencè"
Rarsa·njani: People today look a :
Islam as a religion that can a!so govem
-a complete wày of life. It is only natural
for t_he people to seek to panicipate
in political decision-makings. Before .
it was publicized that religion is concerned
ônly wi th th~
relation between an
individual and God.
has insulted the
Prophet of Islam, and
the fatwa of ail religio.
ùs scholars in this
case ts capital punishment
for such a
person. We have this .
in our religious texts.
Even if Imam
Khomeini had not
issued the sam·e
fatwa . we had the
satne verdict in our
We believe the littoral states in the
Persian Gulf are the true oμ;ners
of this area . .. Half of.the coastlinè
belongs tolran, so Iran alone
has the same amountofrights
and responsibilities as all those
countries put together
and it has no thing to
.do with social matters.
This was a secular
way of thinlcing.
of mostly Christian , .
particularly the
. Catholic Chllrch. But
this kind of mentality
bas cha:nged among
ihe Muslirrts after the
~ictory of the Islamic
Republic in Iran.
religious books that
go as far back as ·
l 000 years. This is in the book, fiqh
[lslamic law]. and religious teachings.
1t is called Sab-al-Nabi, me·aning
swearing ihe Prophet.
MEl: Speaking of scenes of
killings, and knowing that your country.
has had its share of bombings and terroristic
attivities, how did you feel
when you first hear<:I and saw the
bombing in Oklahoma?
Rafsanjani: At that time I was visiting
, Georgia. and in a press interview
1 statèd that we condemn such terrorist
acts and are appalled by them . We consider
these acts to be crirrtinal.1but chat
incident show . the threat and dangers
thatexist insi\ , American society as a
result of the injustices there. .
. MEi: lt is said that Iran is pursuing
a covert nuclear weapons program. and
Iran is accuséd of trying to build a
Rifsanjani: ln the reg ion that I used
to live; Rafsanjan, we have a proverb;
people say that if lie had a p iece of
borie. the liar would have cb.ocked on
the bone because of lying so much. And
I say that if lie had a borie. you would
have had new ekctions for yo!Jr preside
nt nQW, because·he would have
choked by now. \Vè 'have expressed our
cleat hatred arid abhôrrence for these
weapons of mass destn(Ction that kil!
innocent and guilty tcigether.
ln response to one of your questiôns,
I stated thàt we are ready to pay a high
price for e.~prèssing our views on justice.
\Vhat greater cruelty than the one
the Americans committed in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki? Anyone who has knowledge
of that incident would not wish to
have nuclear weapons. The American
people should rest assured that wt are
. not pursuing . nor on the path of acquir.
ing, n~tlear weapons. The benefits of
nuclear technology, of cour.se. are
MEi: Sorne people
have accused Iran
ofbeing involved in récent disturbance s
· in Bahrain. Others have accused Iran of
assisting Sudan militarily and of having
links to FIS in Algeria and lslamic
groups in Egypt: How do you respond
to these accusatioits and could you tell ·
· us about the nature of your relationship
with Sudan and the AS in Algeria?
Rafsanjani: lt is our principal poli cy
not to interfere in the internai affairs
of other countries, and we insist on thi s
po l icy . Neither i n Bahrain , no r
Âlgeria.t1or in Egypt. ha ve we had a ny
relations or given any as s istance to
the se groups and the e vents thal hav e
caken place in those countries. With
respect to Sudan. we have good relaiions
and we gi ve thèm some aid from
tirrie to iime. but thnt has nOthing to cjo
with tensions. lt is a !!overnment-tô·
govemment formai rel;tionship .
- 163 -
MEi: Sorne assume that conlinuing
US p"ressurc on .Iran might lead to an
improved relationship with [raq. or cven
to an allianci: with Iraq. even with
Saddam still iri power. What is the current
condition of state between the two
::Juntries; and. considering the circum•
;[ :inces and the expériences you have
had before with Saddarn's Iraq. how do .
you foresee the developmènt of the relationship
between the tWo countries?
RaCsanjarij: Naturally we are not
happy wich the past experience we 've
had With Saddam. Wè sut"fered very
'"'\tch in thê war
._,Jda m initiated
against us. We are
Iraq was done with the mcic approva.t of
Tehrart, even though your govemment
publicly e,cpressed Strong reservacions
about the rnove. Furthermore, Turkey
has called recencly for border c hanges
and adjustments with Iraq. How do you
assess this situacion, and whac is your
position toward thé Kurdish problem.
and how would you selve it?
Rafsanjani: Wé had nô prior information
that Turkey plannedto enter lràqi
terri tory. Mr. Dèmirel called me and told
tne about it after they hàd entered Iraq.
When the re was a concentration of
MEI: ,How do you view lran's role
and responSibility àS a regional powér
in the Persian Gulf?
Rafsanjani: We believe the littoral
scates in the Persian Gulf are the truc
owners of this area. and they have the
responsibility to maintain security and
peace there. Half of the c oastline
belongs to Iran, so Iran alone bas the
same amoùnc of rights and responsibilily
as all those countries put together.
MEI: The Abu Musa and the Greàter
l\lld Lesser Tunb (slartds disputes wilh
ihe UAE - seèm to
impede improved
relations between Iran
· and the Gé:C states . opposed 10 the pressures
and coercive
actions of Saddam's
go vernmenl against
his peo ple. lt is a
dictatorship. We
,,1,0 opposed and
, ;ced our op posiiion,
especially with
. the lr:tqi aggression
against Kuwait. Buc
ifthere is going to be
a legitimate governme
nt in Iraq. we
The differences ofviews in Iran find
their synthesis within the framework
of our Constitution . ... These differences
are, in and of themselves, a
clear indication of [the] political stability
and maturity of our system .
Mr. President, wby
did this dispute fl.ue
up in the first place?
Rafsanjani: W.e
thlnk the reason is
foreign irtstiga.ciori,
corrting mainly from
the US. They waono
use this as a prete,c1
10 assert their mili- .
cary preserice in the
ha ve t o ha ve some
'i'lr! of relationship.
.~ause Iraq is our neighbor afrer ail.
Right now, we are acting according to
the limits of the United Nations . ln the
future. diffcrent conditions may arise.
We cannot predict the future.
MEi: Do you think it is time for the
U:-1 to lift sanctions against Iraq?
Rafsanjani: The people of Iraq are
1:dpkssly be;uing a greatdea! of suffering.
There are innocent people who suffer
very muchas a resu!Cof the sanctions.
Be fore they were the iarge t of oppression
by the ir own govemment, but now chey
are suffering from the outside world as
well. But as we are not sure if the Iraqi
gove rnment would abandon its adven-
. .-i,t policie~. we have to think about a
.... lution 10 these two problerru.
MEi: Sorne have SU""esced that
Turkey·s recent invasion"~f northern
Turkish forces along the lraqi borrler, 1
asked Mr. Dèmirel the reason for this.
and he told me it was because of che
problerri they had wilh the Kurds inside
Iraq. After they entered. he promised me
that théY would suppress the terrorists
and withdraw wichin a sbon: period of
cime. Of course. th:ic lasted mqoe· than
what we thoughc. and they advanced further.
but now they say chey have with ·
drawn. Of c ou rse we do oppose any
ch:inge in the borders between Iraq and
Turkey or anne :.:a tion of any cities to
Turkey [from Iraq ]. unless the p,:ople of
the two countries vote for s·uch changes
of border in both countries.
We think chat the rights of the Kurds.
14·hether in Iran or Turkey . or Iraq'.
should be given ro them and the y should
noc feel separaced. alienat~d. They
should ti!el chey are p:irt of.the country
and be tteated onan equal footing . This
is our polîcy toi•,ard our Kurds in Iran.
Pe rsian Gulf. This
issue had been
resol ved be fore the
lslamic Revolution, but ail of a sud•
den it was raised cwo years ago, and it
has been inflamed . .
ME:!: What is the ex.a.et nature and
magnitude of the military buildup on
·the islands?
Rafsaiijan i: lt is noching new. We
had the same situation during the war.
and we have checked the situation during
the war. We have defensive military postur
es on some islands.
MEi: What steps can be taken to
resolve this pro blein?
Rafsanjani: \Ve believe in the 1971
treaty berween Iran artd the UAE. 11's a
good document for the two countries to
sit down and resolve their differences.
- 164 -
1\-OEI: How would you characterize
your relationship with Saudi Arabia?
Rarsanjani: Ifs not very good.
An average telationship-even less
than average~but we would like to
see an improvemcnt.
MEi: Why is that, and what more
can be done 10 improve the relacionship?
Rafsanjani: I thinlc thcre too, there
arc foteign instigations .. The US does
not want Iran and Saudi Arabia to get
together, to work and cooperate wirh
each other. They cannot do anything
through us, and they use the Saudis to
create probletns. The United S1ates
knows that if Iran and Saudia Arabia
maintained good, friendly relation s,
then wé could resolve ffi!i"Y mattcrs
relating to oil, OPEC, and regional security
problems, and there would be no
need for the U.S. to have its militaty
bases in the Persian Gulf .. And perhaps
they want to impose thé pèace plan on
the Arab countries and present Iran as an
enemy to be scared of-as a threat
against them-so that they could
recei ve extonion from them.
ME.1: Another neighboring country
is Russia . Could you please assess
lran's relations with Ru_ssia today,
including ateas of cooperation and
areàs of conflict?
Rafsanjani: At present. our relations
with Russ ia are good. Our relations during
the Gorbachcv lime when I visited
Russia improved ii lot-a trend that sti ll
continues. Russîa is a large country in
our region with vast pôtential and specific
cin:urnstances . Pro motion of lranRussîa
·rela tio ns serves the interests of
both nations, Fortunately. the authori tiés
· of both Countries realize the importanc e
of this issue and that îs why the frie ndly
rel:ltion between the two countries is not
nffected by adve rse int ernatio nal politicaJ
tidesc ln addition to murual cooperatîon
aimed at finding pôlitical soluti ons
to regional conflicts. Iran and Russia
cooperare in th <! field of trade. cultu re .
science. industry . and tt)' tô cocrdinatè
their polkies about oil und g:i,;.
MEi: Iran seems to have a number
of competing and even conflicting
political factions. Coul d you give an
c:tplanation of the comple;,;ities of
!rani an pol i tics for those . outs ide the
country wtio do not understand it?
Rafsanjani: Li ke any other country.
whcre there are free elections, in Iran.
100, pôlitical group rivalry is serious
business. These diff~rences are nothing
new in Iran. I am aware that certain
Western quarters ,inempt tô present the
differences in Iran as a point of instabi
lity in or perhaps even threat agains t
the system of the lslarhic Republic of
Iran. However, these differences are, in
and of themselves, a clear indication of
political stability and maturity of our
system. That our Majlis [Parliament)
meticulously cortsiders the policies and
practices of the e)(ecutivc brànch of the
Go vemment and pronounces its acceptance
ot opposition to them is quite
necessary and, in final analys is, is helping
the Govemment in the long run.
The differences of views in [ran find
théir symhesis wi.thin the framework of
our Constitution: and after public
debate on the point of difference in the
media, the predominant view usua!ly ·
emerges . We do riot intend to prevent
exchange of views or to derty that con"
fllcting views exist in Iran. 1 believe , as
long as th.ese differences are within the
framew ork of the Constitu tion, they
will b.e -a ve hi·c le for growth and
progress in the country and ensut'e the
interest of the lslamic Republic of Ira n.
Of course; as the Preside nt, 1 would like
lhe Majli:S /Parliatnent]'· td be mo re in ·
lin e with and supportive of the policie s
and de cisions of my Go ve mmen t, but
as an individual who has served and
shouldered a great deal of burde n for
.the lslamic revolution for many years . 1
a·m happ ier to see that the sys tem of the
lstamic Rep ublic has been institution·
ali zed and that ail its organs fulfill the ir
constitutio nally de lineate d tasks well.
ln oth.er word s. separ atio n of powers
and the system of checks and balances
for rev iew of policy formulation and
po l icy itnpleme(lration which hiwe
been dtesigned in our system funct ion
well and rende r it às .in lsl amic . pôp ular,
democr:itic and effu:acious system .
MEi: Women have repeatedly
made some important strides in th e
[slamic Republic . P le ase explai n the
[slamic Republic ·s view of the ro le of
women irt a Mu slim society?
Rafsanjani: During the form er
régime. our women who were re li•
gious did not participate in social
aciivities very much because of the
corruption in and opposition to the ·
regirne. There was à distance bètweèn
women and social affa irs of the country
. After the revolution. we invited
the people to encourage their da ughters
to play a more active rote in the
soc iet y. And we èncourage them very
much to send their children t0 highe r
institutes of learhing and research
centers. Now, abôut 35 pen:ent of our
uni ve rsity students are women. And
over40 percent of school teachers are
women. We do ncit have many women
at the level of high management, bu t
their number is increasing i.n the parliament
arid top management. We
thin k . the status of women has been
enha nced and their future is even be cter
in this councry.
MEI: Mr. President. wh·at is your
vision of l ra n' s future? Whe re do
you see Iran heading politically and
e co nornicall y? ln what ways do you
expect the l s lamic Republ ic 10
respond and adapt in the fu ture ?
Rafsanjani: From a n ec ono mi c
point of view, I sec Iran to be ve ry
s trong in the furure. because of the ri ch
rês.ourc es. Wt: ha ve the second larges!
n atural gas r eserves in the world. Fro m
the humari reso urc es perspective. we
are also in a good position. We are
training .very good h um an resource
pools w ith brig ht futures. And priority
in în vestme nt goes 10 infrastructure
projects. Frorn t he polit ical point of
vie w. and intc tnat ion ally. we .try to
defuse the neg ativ e propagànda being
wage·d against Iran. Sinc e oür pol icy is
based ô n havi ri g friendly an d c oope rativ
e rel at ion s with ail the coûritries of
the world. it is only nat ural to haw
goàd international relations. •
- 165 -
Annex 20
CRS Report for Congress, “Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors”,
9 August 1995
Excerpts: p. 1 & p. 21
- 166 -
- 167 -
· · Terrorisnt: Middle Eastern Groups
and State Sponsors
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Afîairs
Foreign Aff airs and N a.tional Defense Division
A~t 9, 1995 ._
~-l.
- 168 -
'· I·
.CRS--21
sending agents outside lra,q to traek rêgimè opponents. Iraq wlis reportedly
responsible for attac:ks in 1994 agaimt a prominent oppoeitionist in Bei:rut
(Lebanon aubsequently broke re1'3tions with Iraq) and against me.mbers of the
family of the l.ate lraqi Shiite cleric Ayatollah Abol QDBem MuMvi-Khoi.
Iraq provides safehaven and assistance to some non-Is1.amist Palestinian
gro\lps oppoaed to the Arab-Israeli peace process, including the Abu Nidal
Organization, and Abu Abbas' faction of the PLF (Abbas reportedly enjoys
ss.nctuary fo Baghdad). Terroriat bomb-maker Abu Ibrahim alBo is based in
Ira:q. However, disruptiI1g the pààoe process appears to be a l!econdary concern
for Iraq. On many ocCSl!iéJna, Iraqi offiêi!Ûà, including Saddam, have sa.id tbat
àny_peace deal ac.oeP.table to the PLO would be acceptable to !raq, and Saddam
bas traditionally had good relations with Arafat. Despitê denials from both
Israel and Iraq, there ha.ve beèn repeated reporte since 1993 of some uoofficial
confâcts betweên the two. ·
Iraq continues to provid.e baéking for the Itanian opposition PMO!, and the
PMOI's army, the Nationâl. Liberation Army (NLA) bas bases in Iraq, near the
bnrder with Iran. Iraq appears to maintain a degree of.c.ontrol ovet PMOI
activities io Iraq, unleashing thé ôrgaoiz.atio1;1 when lnlq'e relations with Iran
deter:iorate, and reining in the gr-oup when it viants to signal an improvement
in ties with Tehran. I,aq 11uffel'S from $8vere short.ages of bard curreney as a
resvJt of international sanctions, and . it is unclear to what .. degree . '.Iraq can
financially Msist the PMOI. However, einee the war with Iran, Iraq apparently
has given the NLA a . significant amount of surplus or eaptured military
equiptnenf · ·
li•~q WEIB placed on the têrrorism liet when that li.llt WBB started on !>ec. 29, .
· 1979. ln Marcb 1982,'Ira.q ·becrune·the only country ever to be Iormally temoved
frooo the.terrorismlist.c3 ItwwH·estored to the liat on Sept. là, 1000 following
its ·iuV3.3ion of Kuwait and · re·po-.;ts ibat Iraq was pl&nning tGn-ori.st o'.(>erations
agai!'.st the nbSC6rrt: e:lliàd coalition. The United Sta~s bas .
blooked $1.66 billion in lriïqi asseta in the Unitèd States, mostly bank depoeits;
Many observera view Sudan as a passive sponsor of terrorism or, àccording
ta some, as a auriogate for Iran. The State Departmei:J.t's 1994 terrorism report
notes that there waa no evidebçe that Sudan conductad or Bponsored a epaeilic
Mt of terrorierm in 1~4. The report says $udari allows Iran to use Sudan as a
t.a:asit point for weapons · shipments té Islamie exrnraist groupe and, a.a a
_rueetm.~ :ri.tti for Irauian-ba.doe<i groupe. There are a. :reported sevenù h~ciral
!rt"n~ .. l ~ P..c·-10h,+-.io!l&ry Gui:i-ds_in Sudan helping in the government's war againBt
48 &<ter it merg,,d with North Yemen in 1900, So,ith Yemen -...u no longer on the
t=r.s.m lm, on the g:i,:)undà that South Yemen no loa~r e:risted.
- 169 -
Annex 21
R. Smith and T. Lippman, “White House Agrees to Bill Allowing Covert Action
Against Iran”, The Washington Post, 22 December 1995
- 170 -
- 171 -
WHITE HOUSE AGREES TO BILL ALLOWING COVERT
ACTION AGAINST IRAN
(Ç) www. wash i ngton post.com /archive/pal itics/ 1995/ 12/22/wh ite-house-agrees-to-bi II-al lowi ng-covert-actionaga
inst-i ran/d7 4b535e-0c62-49f6-9893-7 a83f4f91 f99/
By R. Jeffrey Smith; Thomas W. Lippman By R. Jeffrey Smith; Thomas W. Lippman December 22, 1995
Bowing to pressure from House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), the Clinton administration has agreed to accepta
House bill authorizing a small-scale covert action program aimed at moderating the radical lslamic regime in Iran,
including cultivating new opponents to the regime, according to administration and congressional sources.
Gingrich has described Iran as "the most dangerous country in the world" and for weeks had been quietly holding up
House approval of a $28 billion intelligence community spending bill in an effort to force the administration to accept
a covert program that targets the lranian government.
With support from Senate lawmakers, the administration resisted providing funding for any program aimed at
overthrowing the lranian regime, as CIA officiais said it was unlikely to succeed. But House and Senate negotiators,
acting with the consent of key administration officiais, hammered out a deal on Tuesday that authorizes secret
spending of up to $20 million for a covert anti-lran program.
lnstead of trying to overthrow the regime, however, the program would have the less ambitious aim of trying to blunt
lran's extremis! policies and encourage il to move -- even slowly -- toward becoming a democracy, several sources
said. The bill does not authorize any spending for lethal military aid to anti-lran forces, such as the assistance the
Reagan administration provided to the contra rebels in Nicaragua to try to destabilize the government there, several
sources said.
The House passed the intelligence bill containing this secret provision on Iran yesterday, sources said.
Congressional sources said the Senate was expected to approve it as well, possibly by today, and sources in
Congress and the administration predicted President Clinton will sign the legislation shortly after he receives it. Two
sources said the administration has agreed to spend some of the anti-lran funds.
"For the most part, Gingrich is satisfied with the bill," a spokesman for the House speaker said, while declining to
discuss what the bill said.
The funding plan is one of several recent U.S. initiatives that targe! the policies of lran's leadership. The government
has angered U.S. officiais, who say il has tried to undermine the Middle East peace process, supported terrorism in
the Middle East and other regions and allegedly tried to create a nuclear arsenal.
The Senate approved a bill yesterday that would tighten existing U.S. !rade sanctions against Iran by punishing
foreign companies that invest in the country's oil industry -- a bill the administration also has said il will accept.
Earlier this week, U.S. officiais formally agreed with representatives of 27 other nations to create a multilateral
organization dedicated to stopping Iran and three other nations from obtaining armaments and militarily sensitive
dual-use goods.
ln approving the new sanctions against Iran, the Senate agreed to apply the same penalties against foreign
companies that invest in Libya's oil business.
Sens. Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) went after Libya, another oil-dependent
economy, to mark the seventh anniversary of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya has
refused to hand over two suspects in the bombing, which killed 270 people.
1/3
- 172 -
The measure probably would have less effect on Libya !han on Iran because Libya, unlike Iran, is already under
United Nations sanctions prohibiting some investment in the oil industry there.
Clinton, in remarks this week to a Saudi-owned London newspaper, Asharq al-Awsat, said "our problem is not with
the people of Iran; it is with the unacceptable behavior of the lranian government." He said the !rade embargo was
meant to "demonstrate our resolve to compel Tehran to paya price for continuing ils threatening activities."
The president said Washington could begin a direct dialogue with the lranian regime only after these activities stop,
according to a transcript of the interview released by the White House.
CIA Director John M. Deutch and other U.S. intelligence officers have told lawmakers in recent months that lran's
leadership faces no serious domestic opposition for at least the next three years, and they outlined various
difficulties the CIA would face in trying to destabilize the government.
One major problem is that key lranian opposition leaders operate from the territory of Iraq, a U.S. enemy, or receive
lraqi funding. The Clinton administration has refused to have any dealings with the principal opposition group, known
as the Mujaheddin, but several members of Congress have urged the administration to reconsider its position.
On the other hand, U.S. intelligence officiais say the lranian regime has been under growing economic pressure
resulting from widespread corruption and a mountain of unpaid foreign debt. A senior U .S. defense official predicted
two weeks ago that "Iran will moderate" in the coming decade, even though it is unlikely to abandon its ambition to
become the dominant regional power.
The campaign against Iran has been strongly supported by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the chief
pro-Israel lobbying organization. AIPAC has aggressively lobbied for the new sanctions legislation, which would
impose penalties on foreign corporations, banks and lending institutions that make major investments in lran's oil
and gas industries, the country's principal source of revenue.
Clinton already has banned U.S.-based firms from doing business with Iran. Congress cannot prohibit foreign
corporations from investing there, but the Senate bill is intended to force foreign organizations to choose between
doing business with Iran and doing business with the United States.
The Senate bill was put on a fast legislative track because its chief sponsors, including D'Amato, want to set the
lranian economy back further by heading off several large new petroleum development projects for which Iran has
been seeking foreign partners.
Similar measures are under consideration in the House, where staff members of both parties predicted adoption of a
bill stronger than the Senate bill, probably including a ban on exports to the United States by foreign corporations
investing in Iran.
Gingrich has been raising alarms about Iran periodically for at least the pas! year. He has called it a "terroristic state
... committed to defeating the West in any way it can" and said lranian-backed terrorism poses "a permanent, longterm
threat to civilized life on this plane!." He has further warned that lran's efforts to develop weapons of mass
destruction could enable it "to annihilate Tel Aviv and in the long run to annihilate Chicago or Atlanta."
Gingrich told a Jewish group in October that he favored making "Iran a real project," after earlier likening the idea to
a "a serious, sophisticated campaign plan" or a battlefield effort "that applies ail sorts of indirect pressures." He has
only vaguely described what this plan should consist of but said in February that its aim should be to replace the
regime in Iran.
ln April, however, he spelled out Iwo other potential goals: "moderating" the regime, or merely guaranteeing that it
"never gets nuclear weapons." Both are comparable to what the administration states it is trying to do already, by
supporting the trade embargo and pressuring U.S. allies not to export sensitive equipment to Iran.
2/3
- 173 -
The lranian government, for its part, has attacked Gingrich for his "parochial ignorance" and "lack of mental
equilibrium." The lranian parliamentary speaker, Ali Akbar Nategh Nuri, has called Gingrich an "imbecile." Last
autumn, the country also said his criticism amounted to "state terrorism."
3/3
- 174 -
- 175 -
Annex 22
S. Robinson, “Gingrich in call to arms against Iran terror bases”, The Daily
Telegraph, 5 August 1996
- 176 -
- 177 -
1996 The Daily Telegraph plc, August 5, 1996
Copyright 1996 Telegraph Group Limited
The Daily Telegraph
August 5, 1996, Monday
SECTION: INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 10
LENGTH: 328 words
HEADLINE: Gingrich in caii to arms against Iran terror bases
BYLINE: By Stephen Robinson
BODY:
PRESIDENT Clinton must take whatever action is necessary, including military force, to close
terrorist training camps in Iran identified by United States intelligence, the Republican leadership
said yesterday. Newt Gingrich, the Bouse Speaker, called it "intolerable" that America could only
wait while up to 5,000 terrorists were being trained for attacks on Americans. He said that the
Republican leadership in Congress would back military action Mr Clinton deemed necessary, even if
it helped his re-election effort. "We have every right as a nation to defend ourselves by saying to the
Iranian govenunent either you close those camps down or we will," Mr Gingrich said. "We do
know that international terrorism is almost entitely subsidised by Iran, and that means that Iran is
engaged surreptitiously in acts of war against the United States." Mr Gingrich spoke as if offering
Mr Clinton the support of the opposition, but bis cornments could also be read as a challenge. If
evidence mounts ofiran's sponsorship of international terrorism, and especially in regard to the TWA
Flight 800 crash, Mr Clinton could find himself forced to act by the weight of public opinion.
William Perry, US Defence Secretary, said that the detonator and type of explosive used to bomba
US barracks in Saudi Arabia last month were frorn military stocks, which suggested a foreign
government's involvement. It was well known that Iran was at the forefront of attacks on American
interests, he said, and promised "strong action" ifTeheran is found ta be behind the bombing that
killed 19 American servicemen. However, he played down the likelihood of an imminent military US
operation against Iran. Michael Portillo, the Defence Secretary, said Britain would need clear
evidence of a state's involvement before it backed US military action. Iran yesterday told Washington
ta stop sabre-rattling, and asked the United Nations to intervene before the rhetoric got out of control.
- 178 -
- 179 -
Annex 23
“Transcript of interview with Mohammad Khatami, Former President of the Islamic
Republic of Iran”, CNN, 7 January 1998
- 180 -
- 181 -
Transcript of interview with
Iranian President
Mobammad Khatami
Januàcy 7. 1998
Web posted a<: 7:06 p.m . EST(0006GMT)
AMANPOÜR: Mr. President, a month ago you announced
that you had a historie message to deliver to the people of
America. I understand that message will take the form of a
short address and then we'll discuss the issues.
Pagel of 12 ·
PRESIDENT KHAT AMI: In the Narrte of Allah, the
Beneficent, the Merciful. At the outset, I would like fo
congratulate all free and noble women and men especially the
followers of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him), on the occasion
<>fthe New Year_. I take as a good 0rhen the concurrence of the
Christian New Year with the Islamic month of Ramadan, the
month ofedification and self-resttaint thàt bas been the goal of
ail divine prophets.
We are at the close of the 20th century, leaving behind a
century full of inequality, violence, and conflict. We pray to
the Almighty to enable us to begin a new century of humanity,
understanding, and durable peace, so that all humanitywould
enj oy the bles sings of life. Once again I would like to present
my felicitations to ail the followers of Jesus Christ, to ail
human beings, and particularly to the American people.
I have said earlier that !respect the great Arnerican people. In
this short span oftime, I wish tô briefl y presènt my analysis of
the American civilization so that my remarks would n0t be
taken as political nicety or a mete play on words.
The American civilization -is worthy of respect. When we
appreciate the roots ofthis civilization, its significance
becomes even more apparent. As you know, in Plymouth,
Massachusetts, there is a rock which is respected and revered
by al! Arnericans .. The secret of American civilization lies in
this rock. In early 17th century, those 125 men, women, and
children who left England irt search of a virgin land to
establish a superior civilization finally landed on this rock.
The reason why the Ame rican people respect this rock is that
it was the place where the Puritan pilgrirns first landed. Frorn
then on, the Americans celebrate the last Thursday of
November as Thanksgiving Day, thanking God for this
succéss bestowed Upon thertt.
The American civilization is founded uponthe vision ,
- 182 -
thinking, and manners of the Puritans. Certainly, others such
as adventurers, . those searching for gôld, and even sea pirates,
also arrived in the U.S. But the American nation has never
celebratêd their arrivaland never considered it to be the
beginning oftheir civilization. The Puritans constituted a
religious sect whose vision and characteristics, in addition tô
worshipping God, was in harmony with republicanism,
democracy, and freedom. They found the European climate
too restrictive for the ililplementation oftheir ideas and
thoughts.
Unfortunately, in the 16th, 17th, and èven 18th centuries, there
was a serious clash between religion and liberty. In my
opinion, one of the biggest tragedies in hum8:ll history is this
confrontation between religion and liberty which is to the
detriment ofreligion, liberty, and the human beings who
deserve to have both. The Puritans desired a system which
combined the worship of God and human dignity and
freedom.
This civilization was founded in New England and gradually
spread to the entire America and it even clashed with certain
evil trends which has caused slavery in certain states and
ultimately succeeded inaboHshing slavery. There were
numerous martyrs who gave their lives for this cause, the most
farnous of which was Abraham Lincoln, the strong and fairminded
American president.
This civilization is best described by the renoWned French
sociologist Alezj de Toquevillè who spent some two years in
the U .S. in the 19th century and wrote the valuable book ·
entitled Democracy in America, which I am sure most
Americans have read. This book reflects the virtuous and
human side of this civi!ization. In his view, the significance of
this civilization is in the fact that liberty found religion as a
cradle for its growth, and religion found protection of liberty
as its divine calling. Therefore, liberty and faith never clashed.
And as we see, even today Americans are a religious people.
Therefore, the Anglo-American approach to religion relies on
the principle that religion and liberty are consistent and
compatible. I believe thatifhumanity is looking for happiness,
it should combine religious spirituality with the virtues of
liberty. . . . .
And it is for this reason that I say I respect the American ·
nàtion because oftheir great civilization. This respect is due to
two reasons: the essence and.pillars of the Anglo-American
éivilization and the dialogue arnong the civilizations.
. . . .
You are cognizant ofthè great heritage of the Iranian nàtion
with its glorio.us civilization and culture. Irans glorious
civilization was concurrent with the Greek city states and the
Roman Empire. ·After the advent of Islam, the Iranians
ardently embraced it. The ble'nd of Iranian talents and .the
sublime Islamic teachings was a miracle. Without iritending to
den y the share of other nations in the formation of the Islarnic
civilization, I believe the great Iranian civilization had a major
role in developing and promoting the Islamic system.
Page 2 of 12
- 183 -
- · 1
Over the past two centuries, the Iranian nation has striven to
establish liberty, independence and a noble way of life. The
Constitutional Movement colonialism. Ultimately, the Islamic
Revolution had-and should have-two directions: First, an
interpretation of religion which couples religiosity with
liberty. Of course, now that four centuries have passed since
the beginning of the American civilization, human experience
has taught us that prosperous life should hinge on three pillars:
religiosity, liberty, and justice. These are the as sets and
aspirations of the Islamic Revolution as it enters the 21 st
century.-
In tenns of the dialogue of civilizations, we in tend to benefit
from the achievements-.and experienèes of ail ci vi lizations,
Western and non-Western, and to hold dialogue with them.
The closer the pillars and essences ofthese two civilizations
are, the easier the dialogue would beco.me .. With out
revolution, we are experiencing a new phase of reconstruction
of civilization. We feel that what we seek is what the founders
orthe American civilization were also putsuing four centuries
ago. This is why we sense an intellectual affinity with the ·
essence of the American civilization.
Second, there is. the issue of the independence. The American
nation was the harbinget of indêpendence struggles, the
initiàtor of efforts to estàblish independence, for whose cause
it has offered màny sacrifices, leading ultimately to the
Declaration of Independence which is an important document
on human dignity and rights. ·
Finally, I should refer to the struggles of the Iranian people
over the last two centuries which culminated in the quest for
independence during the Islamic Revolution launched by
Imam Khomeini. When Imam Khomeini launched the
revolution, Iran was in a terrible condition. In other words, the
Itanian natipn had been humiliated artd its fate was decided by
others. You know that a remarkable feature of Imam
Khomeinis stniggle was his fight against capitulation which
the Shah was forced to ratify mak.ing the Amêrican advisors
immune from prosecution in Iran. This was the worst
humiliation for our people. They rose up, fought for
independence, and emerged victorious . Of course, the war of
the revolution was one ofwords not weapons. W e , therefore,
en~e~vored to obtain a n. ovel experience of rel!gio~ and to
gam mdepcndence. Both these features are sahent m the
American civilization and we feel close to them. ·
But here I have to express pity over a tragedy which has
occurred. Unfortunately, policies putsued by American
politicians outside the United States over the past half a
century since World War II are incoinpatible with the
American civilizatioti which is founded on democracy,
· freedom and hwnan dignity. We ardently wished that thos e
who enfot ced this foreign policy were representatives of the
prominent American èivilization; a civilization which _was .
achieved at a heavy cost, and not the representatives ofthose
adventurers who were defeated by the American p eople
themselves.
This flawed policy of domination had three set backs: One was
Page 3 of 12
- 184 -
-- · 1
Page 4 of12
severe damages that it incurred upon the deprived and
oppressed nations, including our own. The other setback was
. that it dashed the hopes of the people of the colonized world,
· who had placed their trust in the U .S. tradition of struggle for
independence. When the policies for domination were
implemented in the naine of the American people, the nations
lost their trust in the Americâns. This represents a grave
damage done by the U.S. policies on the American nation. The
Third arid most important of these setbacks is that what was ·
implernented was done in name of a great people that had
risen for freèdom. I feel that the Americanpoliticiahs should
reali:ze this fact and adjùst themselves w ith the standards of
Anglo.,.American and American civilii.ation and at least
apologize to their own people because of the approach they
have adopted.
AMAN POUR: You said that you wantèd to use this interview
to deliver a message to the American people. I.'ve lived in
America, and I know the concems of the average American
when it cornes to Iran. And its the message that has corne out
ofiran for the last twenty years, the message; hostage taking,
the message of death to America, the message of buming the
Aril.erican flag, the message that almost looks like Islam has
declared a war against America and the west. Let me ask you
first about the hostage crisis which is emblazoned in every
American's mind. As you know., in all revolutions, the
commurùst revolution in Russia; the French revolution,
perhaps even the American révolution, the early years contain
many excesses. Would you say that taking the .American
hostages, at the beginning of the Iraniàn Islamic revolution
falls into the category of early revolutionary excesses? .·
PRESIDENT KHA TAMI: Thank you for your question. I
believe that first we have to analyze events within their proper
context and with circurnspection. The image of [slam which
has been pI"esented, and I dont want to accuse anyone here, bas
been an errôneous one. Islam is a religion which calls ail
humanity, irrespective of religion or belief, to rntionality and
logic. Islam invites followers of ail divine religions to unite ·
around God worship and ail Muslims to fratemity. The Islam
which we know and practice and foundèd our révolution on
recognized the right of ail humart beings to detennine their
own destiny. It declares that relations among nations must be
based on logic and mutual respect. Such Islam is enemy to no
nation, enemy to no religion. It seeks dialogue, understanding
and peace with ail nations. One of the major flaws in the U .S.
foreign policy, which I recently construed as being behind
times, is that they continue to live with cold war mentality and
try to create a perceived enemy. Here I dont wish to insult
anyone. I know that there are quite a few wise and fair-minded
statesmen in rhe United States, but the outcome ôfthe
interpl ay wilh the U.S. policy has shaped the U.S . policy in a
manner that continues tô be a prisoner of cold war mentality.
After the collapse of contmunisrn, there has beèn an. attempt
by certain circles to porttay Islam as the new enemy, and
regrettably they are targeting progressive Islam rather than
certain regressive interpretati<ins oflslam. They attack an
Islam which seeks democracy, progress and development; an
Islam which calls for utilization of achievements of hurnan
civilization including that of the west.
- 185 -
Page 5 of 12
With regard to the hostage issue which you raised, I do kno.v
that the feelings of the great American people have been hurt,
and of courSe I regret it Yet, these same feelings were also
hurt when bodies ofyoung Americans were brought back
from Viètnam, but the American people never blamed the
Vietnamese people, but rather blamed their own politicians for
dragging their country and its youth into the Vietnam
quagmire. The pressure by the American people tenninated
that senseless and inhuman Wàr; In fact the American people
themselves brought that war to an end. ·
The feelings of our people were seriously hutt by U.S.
policies. And as you said, in the heat of the revolutionary
fervor, things happen which cannot be fully contained or
judged according to usual nonns. This was the crying out of
the people against humiliations and inequities imposed upon
them by the policies of the U.S. and others, particularly in the
early days of the revolution. With the grace ofGod, today our
nèw society hàS been institutionalized and we have a .
popularly elected powerful government, and there is no need
for unconventional methods of expression of concerns and
anxiëties. And I believe when there is logic, especiaUy when
there are receptive ears, there is no need other than discourse,
debate and dialogue. ·
AMANPOUR: So, are you saying that clespite the grievances
that you talk about, with hindsight, if you had to do this ail
again, would Iran have done it differëntly at that time?
. . .
PRESIDENT K.HATAMI: As I said, evetything must be
anaiyzed within its own context. The events of those da,ys
must be viewed within the context of revolutionary fervor and
the pressures to wlùch the Iraniàn nation was subjected,
causing it to seeka way to express its anxieties and concerns.
Today we il,fe in the period of stability, and fülly adhere to aJl
nonns of conduct regulating relations between nations and
governments.
With the grace ofGod, today all the affairs of country are
being conducted within the framework oflaw, And as !have
stated, both in domestic and foreign affairs, we shall endeàvor
to strengthen the rule of law in evêty respect.
AMANPOUR: Mr. President, Americans~ the average
American, is familiar with One image c:ifiran, death to
America, the buming of the American flag, and as we talked _
about, the hostages. You talk about a new chapter in relations
between the peoples of the world. What can you say to the
Americaiis listening tonight, to show that persan that yôur Iran
is a new Iran or a different Iran?
PRESIDENT KHAT AMI: I say that the se issues should be
examined with due consideration to thèir root causes and
vatious dimensions. Thete are slogans bêing changed in Iran.
But, you as ajournalist can askall those chanting the slogans
whether they are tàrgetingthe American people. And they
would ail say no. Not only we do not harbor any il! wishes for
the American people, but in fact we consider them to be great
nation. Out aim is not even to destroy or undennine the
- 186 -
Page 6 of 12
American govemment. These slogans symbolize a desire to
terminate a mode of relations which existed between Iran and
the United States. This is a response to that grave affront by a
former U.S. defense secretary who said the Iranian nation
must be rooted out. It is also a response to the downing of the
Iranian airliner that killèd about 300 innocent people, rnostly
women and children. Even ifwe accept that the shooting was
accidental, the decoration of the commander of the American
naval vesse! responsible for the tragedy was indeed adding
irisult to inji.lry. There is also the recent allocation $20 million
by the U.S. Congress to topple the Iranian govemment. Our
people consider U.S. foreign policy to be aimed at
undermining and confrontation with itse.lf. And, in fact, they
want the death of this relationship. No one has the intention of
insulting the American nation and we even considet the U.S.
goverrunent as the legitimçite ànd lawful representative
American flag, which rêpresents its nationhood, and which
hurts the collective feelings of the nation. As far as I know, the
Leader of the Revolution and other authorities are al.se not
happy with this practice. There might be actions taking place
that might not meet with your approval. Yet I am sure that
those doing stich actions do not intertd to insult the American
people. And we hope that actions which might. be interpreted .
as anti-Arnerican people and nation would not take place.
AMANPOUR: You say that you want to talk té> the American
people. Are you prepared to sitdown eventually'and tallc to
the Arnerican goverrunent about the issues that you have just
mentioned tonight that separate and <livide you?
l'RESIDENT KHATAMI: Firstly, nothing should prevent
dialogue and understanding between two nations, especiàlly
between their scholars and thinkers. Right now, I recommend
the exchange of prof essors, writers, scholars, artists,
joumalists, and tourists. A large number of educated and noble
Iranians now reside in the U.S, as repreSêntatives of the
Irânian nation. This shows that there is no hostîlity between
the two nations. But the dialogue between civilizations and
nations is different from political relations. In regard to
political relations, we have to consider the factors which lead
to the severance of relations. If some day anotber situation is
to emerge, we must definitely consider the roots and relevant
factors and try to eliminate them. ·
Firstly, I have to state that U.S. foreign policy behavior toward
Iran has intlicted damages upon us. But is also had a positive
effect. Itcaused us to mainly focus on our domestic
capabilities and resources to advance our objectives. Now,
too, we feel no need for ties with the U.S., especially as the
modem World is so diverse and plural that we can reach our
objectives without tJ.S. assistance. I especially feel that many
progressive countries-including the Europeans- are far more
advanced in theit foreign policies than the U.S .. We are
carrying out our own activities and have no need for political
ties with the United States.
But the point is that the political behavior of gôvemments
should not deprive nations from enjoying the opportunities
provided by each side. There is a bulky Wall of mistrust
between us and the U.S . Administration, a mistrust rootedin
- 187 -
improper behaviors of the Arrierican governments. As an
example of this type of U.S. behavior, I should refer to
admitted involvement of the U.S. Govemment in the 1953
coup detat which toppled Mosaddeqs · national government,
immediately followed by a $45 million loan to strengthen
unpopular foreign installed Govemment. I should also refer to
the Capitulation Law imposed by the U.S. on Irari.
The attitùde of the U.S. after the victory of the revolution has
nôt been a civilized one. They have adopted a hostile policy
against Iran. They have tried to inflict economic damage upon
us, a cleàr example of which is the DAmato act which ..
represents a continuation of cold war mentality and the lack of
appreciation of rei:Hities to the point that they even want to
impose their will upon other countries such asEuropean
countries and Japan or the allocation of the alréady mentioned
$20 million to topple the Iranian government.
The success of our revolution has corne at a great cost to our
nation. And the U .S. has a major share ih the cost imposed
upon thé Iranian nation. There is a grave mistrust between us.
If negotiations are not based on mutual respect, they Will
never lead to positivé results. The condition is that American
foreign policy should abandon its instrumental rationality and
stop considering adopt an approach based on communicative
rationality which is irtherent in the American civilization.
There must first be a crack in this wall of mistrust to prepare
for a change and. create an opportunity to study a new
situation. Unfortunately, thé behavior of American
Government in the past up to this date has always exacerbated
the climate of mistrust and we do not detect any sign of
change ofbehavior.
We are lool_<ing for a world in which misunderstandings can be
overcome, nations can understand one artother and mutual
respect and logic govem relations among states. It is the right
of every nation to stand on its principles and values and have
the expectation of respect and dignity from others.
AMANPOUR: Then where does this dialogue, this message to
the people of the United States lead?
PRESIDENT KHAT AMI: When I speàk of dialogue, I_ intend
dialogue between civilizations and cultures. Such discourse
should be centered around thinkers and intellectuals. I believe
that ail doors should now be opened for such dialogue and
understanding and possibilities for contact even between
American understanding between our two nations, a better
· future for both countries and nations may be forged.
AMANPOUR: Let me ask you some specific issues that
concem the people of the United States. As you know, many
U .S experts say that the. evidence is overwhelmiilg, that
elements of the Iranian authorities, Iranian officiais, provide
not only political and moral, but financial support to
organizâtions that coinmitacts of terrorism, and result in the
deaths of innocent women and Children. If you wete ptesented
with proof and with evidence that any kim;l of Iranian was
Page 7 of 12
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involved in that kind of financial support or act, what would
you do aboutit?
PRESIDENT KHA TAMI: You see, this is another example of
the sort ofproblem that exists between us and the United
States .. They first level unfair and unsubstantiated accusations
against you. And when they propose to hold talks, they say
that they want to have a dialogue with you about these very
unfounded accusations. They are in fact trying to put the other
side on triai.
Weil, let me tell you this. We believe in the holy Quran that
says: slaying of one innocent person is tantamount to the
slaying of ail humanit}'. · How could such a religion, and those
. who claim tô be its followers .get involved in the assassination
of innocent indi viduals and the slaughter of innocent human
· beings. We categorically reject ail these allegations.
Secortdly, the logic ofhistory has proven that violence is not
the way to achieve desired end. I personally believe that only
. those who lack logic resort to violence. Terrorism should be
cortdèmned in àll its fonns and manifestations; assassins must
be condemned. Terrorism is useless anyway and we condemn
it categorically. Those who level these charges against ùs are
best advised to provide accurate and objective evidence,
which indeed does notexist.
AMANPOUR: lf you were provided with the proof that an
Iranian official had used any kind oflranianfünds to rèward
odinance any group or individual thatwas invàlved in an act
of terrorism, would you punish that person or that
organizatfon? ·
PRESIDENT KHAT AMI: Certainly ifI leam of any instance
of such assistance to tertorism, I shall deal with it, so will our
Leader, and so will our e.ntire system. At the same time,
supporting peoples who fight for the liberation of their land is
Mt, in inyopinion, supporting terrorisrn. lt is; irt fact,
supporting those who are engaged in combating state .
terrorism: AMANPOUR: Regardless of the motive, do you
believe that killirtg innocent womert and children is tertorism;
as.for instancewhat happens on the streets oflsrael?
PRESIDE.Nt 1<.H'.A T AMl: It is definitely so. Any form of
killing of innocent men and women Who are not involved in
confrontations is terrorism; it must be condenmed, and we, in ·
. our tenn, condernn every fonn ofit in the world.
Page 8 of12
AMANPOUR: Americans say that they have reports that
Irànian officiais abroad regularly engage in acts of
surveillance against Americans, the sort of surveillance tha:t
cùuld be interpreted as preceedirig an attack. Do you think that
is appropriate?
PRESIDENT KHA TAMI: I deny this categorically. On our
part there has been no new move, no special measures with
regard tô the United States in extemal fields; this is another
false rumor spread by thèse who bear a grudge against us.
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AMANPOUR: Iran has said that it doesn't agree with the
Middle East peace procèss. Y asser Arafat was. elected as a
representative of the Palestinian legitirpate aims. And he has
entered into a peace process. Do you think that it is ·
appropriate for any foreign power to engage in supporting the
groups that are fighting against Yasser Arafat -- the groups
such as Hamas and others?
PRESIDENT KHATAMI: First ofatl; we have declared our
Opposition to the Midd!é East peace process because we
believe it will not succèèd. At.the same time , we have clearly
said that we dont intend to impose our views on others or to
stand in their way. In our view ail Palestinians have the right
té> express theirviews about their land,including the millions
of Palestinians in Diaspora. They too have a right to self
dètermination. _ Only then can there be a lasting peace. We seek
a peace through which Jews, Muslims and Christians, and
indeed each and every Palestinian, could freely . determine _
their own destin y. And we are prepared to con tri bute. toward.s
the realization of that peace.
But let me elaborate a little for the American people oh my
views about U.S. Middle East policy. Anti-sernitism is indeed
a western phenomenon. 1t has no precedence in. Islam or. in the
east. Jews and Muslims have lived hannoniously together for •
centuries. In the east, we have had despotism and dictatorship,
but never had fascism or nazism. These, too, are . also western
phénomena, and the west has paid dearly to combat thern.
·. What concems me is that, first, this western anti-semitîsm has
tumed into a tool for the imposition of a wholerange of
improper policiès and practices on the people of the Middle
East and Muslims in general. Secondly; l am concemed that
this western dilemma may be projected elsewhere, that is
fascism and nazism are suppressed in the west, they may
resurface in another forai in western policies elsewhere .
Obviously, Washington is the U.S. capital where policy
decision oh U.S. national interests must be made . However,
the impression of the people of the Middle East and Muslims .
in general is that certain foreign policy decisionS of the U.S. are in fact madein Tel Aviv and not in Washington. And I
regret to say that the imptoperAmerican polky ofunbridled
support füt the aggressions of a .racist terrorist regime does not
serve U.S. interests, nor does iteven serve thât of the Jewish
people, Zionists constitute a small portion of the Jewish
people and have ôpenly declared and proven in practice that
they are expansionist. The IsraeH intransigence in the course
of the current peace process, and its failure to honor its own
undertakings has emaged even U.S. allies in the region. In my
view, p~ace can corne to the_Midd)e East when al!
Palesnruans, Jews and Mushms alike, can determme the future
of the land . That should include those living in Palestine as
well as those refugees living elsewhere. Only then can a stable
and lasting peace be established. Many in the world might
share our view, and many may differ with us. We simply
present Our opinion, and have the greatest respect for ail
Palestinia.ns who àre concerned about the future of Palestine. ·
Meanwhile, we believe the United States should not risk the
substantial prestige and credibility of the American people on
sù:pporting a racist regime which does not even have thê
Page 9 of 12
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Page 10 of 12
backing of the Jewish people.
The subject of Middle East peace is one that needs a sober and
pragmatic analysis. We believe that it will not succeed,
because it is notjust and it does not address the rights of ail
parties in an equitable manner. We ate prepared to contribute
to an international effort to bring about a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East.
AMANPOUR: Mr. President, you know another concem of
the west is ltan's nuclear program. Would you consider
entering a special agreement, a Special sort of situation with
the atomic energy agency, for special monitoring, if that
would !essen the fears ôfthe people you say you want to have
a better dialogue with?
PRESIDENT KBA î AMI: We are a party to the Nuclear NonPrôliferation
Treaty. The officialrepresentatives of the
International Atomic Energy Agency have înspected our .
facilities iri Iran several times, and have publicly declined that
we are not planning on building nuclear weaporis and only
aim to employ nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is
ironie that those who are so concemed about saving hwnanity
from nuclear weapons, fully support Israel which is a nuclear
power and is unwilling to join the NPT or accept IAEA
safeguards, while leveling allegations against Iran which bas
not even been able to cômplete its first nuclear power plant
which began before the revolution. These are ail pretexts for
imposing certain policies on Iran and the region and to create
panic and mistrust. We are nota nuclear power and do not
intend to become one. We have accepted IAEA safeguards
and our faèilities are routinely inspected by that agency.
AMANPOUR: Mr. President, yciu are the president of Iran .
. You have ~ade certain promises to the people of Iran, and
now you have said certain things about dialogue with other
"countries. Can you implement your promises to the people of
Iran? Do you have the authority and the room to maneuver?
And in foreign policy, are you able to implernent foreign
po!ic:y?
PRESIDENT KHAT AMI: Surely, .after being elected, one
should abide by ones promises and not to retract .on them. I am
determined to fulfill my promises and I believe the
atmosphere is conducive and would improve day by day. Each
perS<;>n will carry out hi~ tasks in his legal capac\ty. The
President ·shoulders the unportant task of enforcmg the
Constitution. I have set Up a Constitution Monitoring Group
for the first time ever and this group is aêtively working to
locate instances of violations or incorrect enforcement of the
Constitution. We will be seriously address any shortcomirtg in
the implementatiori or violation of the Constitution. And we
shall succeed. Iran has one goverrunent which makes
decisions on domestic andforeign policies within the
framework of its dutiês. Of course, there are many issues that
should be approved b,y the Parliament. The overall policies are
determined by the eminent Leadership. But it is the.
govemment that has to enfotce them. I feet there is no bârtier
along the way of the goverriment authority and the
government accepts il own responsibilitf We Will surely ·
- 191 -
implement any policy that we formulate. It is possible that .
preliminary steps in certain areas might need time. But when
we arrive at a policy, we will definitely carry it out. The
govemment is responsible to carry out duties associated with
its sovereign responsibilities in the society.
Page 11 of 12
AMANPOUR: There is quite a lot of opposition from the
conservative faction. How are you able to operate within this
climate? ·
PRESIDENT KHAT AMI: When we speak of democratic
goverrunerit, or government of the people, it means that we
accept opposition. We cartnot possibly have a society with no
opposition at ail. Such differences of opinion ai:e natural and
the_y areto be found in all societies. We should leam not to
allow such differences to turn into confrontation, but to direct
them into their legal channels. Certainly there are elements
who are opposiilg our govemment, but so long as their
opposition is practiced within the provisions of the
Constitution, we certainl_y respect them. But those wishing to
impose their wilLagainst the law wHI naturally be dealr with
through the propèr legal chailnels. We accept both internai
differences as well as any opposition that accepts the
Constitutional frarnework, even ifthey openly Oppose the
govemment. ·
AMANPOUR: On the one hand,a lot of people want more
openess, more freedom for allthe things that you have even
talked about Y ou are also appointing teform•minded
ministers. On the other. band, there are still, if I could êall
them thugs, who are on the streets, interfering with women
who theydon'tlike their appearance, preventing certain
professors fyoni going to school. There is a confrontation.
Where can you lead this confrontation?
PRESIDENT KHAT AMI: I do hot consider this a serious
cùnflicc Of course, there are various tendencies,whicliwere
present during the elections as well. The people have made
their decision. What I have said and continue to insist on is
that rule of law should be pararnount, and no .one should
consider hilllSelf above the law and try to impose his views on
· others. Sdme ofthese frictions are quite naturalin a
detnocratic society. Our objective is to bring everything within
the framework of the law .. Ther;e may be occasional
irregularities and actions outsidê-the legal framework. But we
will spare ho effort to institutionalize the rule of law. Of
course, to begin with, we have to create understanding
amongst ourselves and learn to tô[erate each other. You cannot
brîng about understanding and toletance irt the society by
force. We are determined.that there should only be one. .
govemment in the societyby force. We are detetmined that
there should onlybe oriê govemment in the society and every
one mustsubmit to the law. I think that it is universally
accepted that law is the basis of social ôrder. Fortunately, our
leader fully subscribes to this view. Ihope that we can take
rnore and more practical steps for the realization of the rule of
lawin oursociety.
AJ.\1ANPOUR: Nonetheiess there are two factions that seem to
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- 1
Page 12 of 12
have been identitied in Iran right now. The more conservative
and the one that you lead, the reform minded, the more
moderate. Where do you think that Iran will be one year from
now? Will there be the freedoms and openess that you have
talked about?
PRES1DENT KHAT AMI: Let these divisions find their
meanings within their o\vn contêxt. Terins such as
conservative, moderate and the like are more often meaningful
in the Wes1. Of course we have differences ofopinion in Iran
t6o, and one political tendency firmly bèlieves in the .
prévalence of logic and the rule of law while there might be.
another tèndency that believes it is entitled to go beyond the
law. Anyway, such issues need tolerance and we must try to
bring about such an understandirtg as to ertable us to stay
tcigether while having differencês of view but not let things
become chaotic. Should we carefully prepare the ground for
the implementation of the law in our society, there shall be no
problem vis~a-vis such oppositions. I consider thém natural
and we need not worry about it. Of course reaching an ideal
society with all its affairs in propèr order nèeds time. We have
the necèssary patience, s6 do our people and wè shall al! try to
move towards an orderly society where logic and law reign
supreme. ·
AMANPOUR: Mr. President, thank you very m:uch for
joining us. ·
PRESIDÉNT KHAT AMI: l thankyou very much and I thank
aîl dear viewers for their patience.
© 1998 Cable News Networl<, Inc.
All Rights Reserved.
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Annex 24
R. Wright, “Some See Hypocrisy in U.S. Stand on Iraq Arms Mideast: Officials say
American intelligence aided Baghdad's use of chemical weapons against Iran in 80s”,
Los Angeles Times, 16 February 1998
- 194 -
- 195 -
stos All!lelts <Uimes I m,c,.E co1.1.ECT10Ns
- Back to Original Article
Sorne See Hypocrisy in U.S. Stand on Iraq Arms
Mideast: Officiais say American intelligence aided Baghdad's use of chemical weapons against Iran in 'Bos.
February 16, 1998 I ROBIN WRJGHT I TIMES STAFF WRJTER
WASHINGTON - A decade before the current showdown over weapons of mass destruction, the United States turned a blind eye when Iraq used American
intelligence for ope rations against Iran that made rampant use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, according to senior Clinton administration and
former intelligence officiais.
The attacks against civi1ian and military targets during the Iran-Iraq War included some of the most pervasive uses of chemical weapons anywhere since
WorldWarl.
The combination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and American intelligence eventually helped turn the tide of the eight-year war in Baghdad's favor. The
collaboration reached a peak shortly after a secret U.S. estima te projected for the first time that Iran could win one of the century's bloodiest wars.
"We knew [the Iraqis] used chemicals in any major campaign," said a former U.S. intelligence official familiar with the American role. "Although we publicly
opposed the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, we knew the intelligence we gave the Iraqis would be used to develop their own operational plans
for chemical weapons."
Now, 10 years later, the United States is trying to rally world support for the use of military strikes to destroy the same kinds oflraqi weapons--on the grounds
that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein should not be allowed to use them in the future.
As the U.S. struggles to assemble a new coalition to force Iraq to give up such weapons, administration officiais acknowledge the apparent hypocrisy in U.S.
policy. The United States, under President Reagan, "virtually encouraged" the use of chemical weapons a decade ago, noted a frustrated senior Clinton
administration official.
But the shift also reflects changes in the political landscape, U.S. officiais now argue. ln the 1980s, "Saddam Hussein was the great white hope" holding back
what was then viewed as a militant lslamic tide from Iran, the administration official said. "They built this guy up and let him do whatever it took to win. And
that included the use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles."
The climax of the relationship was the 1988 Iraqi counterattack at the Faw Peninsula, a swampy but strategic southern oil port captured by Iran in 1986. Iraq
lost the peninsula in part because U .S. intelligence misread an Iranian military buildup.
To help regain the peninsula, U.S. intelligence sources provided dat a on lran's equipment and troop st ren gth that guided the lraqi military in designing and
staging a dress rehearsal of the offensive, the sou rces say. Washington had an "additional incentive" to provide detailed data because of its role in the loss of
Faw, a former U.S. diplomat said.
Iraq's 1988 counterattack was a rapid success. And the casualt ies were among the grisliest of the war. Thousands of Iranian troops were killed, many because
gas masks d id not fit snugly enough over their beards and thus allowed seepage of lethal toxins. Empty syringes, some of which had contained a faulty
a ntidote, were found beside hundreds of bodies, the sources said .
The Reagan administration never actively encouraged Iraq's use of chemical weapons or missiles. And officially, it was neutral in the Iran-Iraq War.
But Washington was well aware that Iraq began using chemical weapons in 1983 and intensified their use in 1986, creating a pattern that made it virtually
impossible not to know that Iraq intended to use chemical weapons on the Faw Peninsula, former intelligence officials said.
"By 1986, Iraq had proven itselfbetter at the use of ch emical weapons than any fighting force in the world," said a former senior U.S. diplomat involved in
Iraq. By 1988, Iraq's use of gases had also repeatedly been documented by U.N. specialists.
"It was ail done with a wink and a nad," said a former U.S. intelligence official. "We knew exactly where this stuffwas going, although we bent over backwards
to look the other way." Washington knew Iraq was "dumping boatloads" of chemical weapons on Iranian positions, he added.
Missiles were a}so pivotai in turning the war in Iraq's favor, especially when Iraq fi red Russian -made Scuds on Iranian civilian a reas and major cities,
including Teh ran. The "war of the cities," during which Iran also targeted Iraq, eventually gave better-equ ipped Iraq a st rong psychological edge in the conflict.
Today, Reagan administration officiais contend that they could not have prevented Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction.
"Get real. We couldn't have stopped him," said a former National Security Council staffer. ''The Iraqis were fighting for survival."
Policy at the time, said another former Reagan official, recognized that "Hussein is a bastard. But at the time, he was our bastard."
lronically, the most difficult task initially was p ersuading the Iraqis to believe U.S. intelligence data.
"We gave them so much help with intelligence in the conduct of overall campaigns--showing them where Iran was moving troops, where it was most
vulnerable, and projecting how to exploit both to their advantage," the former intelligence official said.
At first, Iraq ignored or discarded much of the American data. "It took a long time for them to trust us and listen to us," the official said. "Eventually, it sunk in
that we were telling them what they needed to know."
The Faw operation was the high point of a blooming relationship between Baghdad and Washington that was founded on a common fear of and deep enmity
toward Iran . Tt overcame more fundamental differences over Israel that led Iraq to sever relations with the U.S. in 1967.
After relations resumed in 1984, U.S. intelligen ce agents bega n to provide data about l ran's military oper ations, largely from satellite photography. The goal at
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one stage was to provide a counterweight to the supply of arms and intelligence the Reagan administration was providing to Iran as part of the 1985-86 armsfor-
hostages swap, according to Reagan administration officiais.
But in 1986, as the Iran-Iraq War began to turn decisively in Iran's favor, the pace of U.S. intelligence information escalated as part of a bid to at least restore
Iraq's edge.
The United States was not alone. In advance of the Faw counteroffensive, France, Egypt and Jordan provided help in reorganizing and retraining the weary
Iraqi militmy, Reagan administration officiais point out.
And the very countries now most threatened by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction helped pay for them, according to U.S. officiais. Of the $100 billion Iraq
spent on arms during the 1980s, up to $40 billion was provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, either in cash or in free oil.
itOS Àn!lf.?).e,s ilfune_s Copyright 2017 Los Angeles Times IndexbyKeyw·ord I Indexby Date I Privacy Policy I Termsof Service
2 sur 2
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Annex 25
“Riyadh accepts for first time that bombers of US base were Saudi”, Agence France
Press, 21 May 1998
- 198 -
- 199 -
(1) 21 05 1998 RIYADH ACCEPTS FOR FIRST TIME THAT BOMBERS
OF US BASE WERE SAUDI
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE World Reporter (67:01)
A Saudi official for the first time Thursday acknowledged that only Saudi
nationals were behind the June 1996 bombing that killed 19 US airmen at a
base in the eastern city of Dhahran.
The bombing of Dhahran "was carried out by Saudi hands," Saudi lnterior
Minister Prince Nayef ibn Abdel Aziz said in an interview to be published
Friday by the Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai Al-Am.
"No foreign party had a role" in the bombing which cost the lives of 19 US
servicemen, Prince Nayef told the paper.
lt is the first time that a Saudi official has so clearly ruled out any
foreign ;:iarticipation in the bombing.
ln the past the Saudi authorities have sought ta play down suggestions that
it faces any internai opposition organized enough te carry out an attack of
the sophistication of the 1996 lorry-bomb attack against the US base.
Prince Nayaf hinted that the Saudi security services were currently holding
and questioning suspects in connection with the attack.
"The authorities are net obtaining statements th rough recourse to torture,"
he said.
The Washington Post reported net long after the attack that the testimony of
some of those arrested as well as other evidence implicated Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly denied any involvement in the bombing.
Last year Riyadh requested the extradition from the United States of a Saudi
national, Hani Abdel Rahim al-Sayegh, 28.
Sayegh was extradited te the United States in June 1997 from Canada where he
had sought politcal asylum in March.
Canadian and US authorities say that Sayegh helped to plan the allack and
gave the signal for il and admitted belonging to a Saudi group using the
name Hezbollah.
The implication of Hezbollah in the bombing again puis Tehran in the firing
line, but Riyadh has refrained from painting the finger at Tehran this lime.
The government of Saudi Arabia has enjoyed a recent rapprochement with the
government of President Mohammad Khatami, the moderate cleric who came to
power twelve months age.
ln November 1996 the lranian ambassador in Riyadh congratulaled the Saudi
authorities on the objectivity of their inquiries into the bombing.
ln March 1997 Iran denied a report in the US daily Newsday that it was
sheltering the presumed mastermind of the attack.
The Canadian intelligence services named the suspect as Ahmad Ibrahim Ahmad
Mughassil.
After the bombing he fled to Syria and then on to Iran, where he is living
under the protection of the lranian government, according to a US terrorism
expert cited by Newsday.
Both Iran and Syria have formally denied any involvement in the bombing.
ln late 1996 reports that the Saudi authorities had detained two Kuwaiti
nationals in connection with the attack prompted a denial from Kuwait.
Western diplomats in Riyadh told AFP at the time that the Saudis had
arrested six suspects - three Saudi nationals and three Shiite Moslems, two
of them Kuwaiti and one Lebanese.
The diplomats said that the six were part of a Shiite network linking Saudis
with nationals of other Gulf states and Arab veterans of the war against the
then Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Saudi Arabia has a significant Shiite minority in its eastern province near
Dhahran as well as in the southwest on its border with Yemen.
Copyright 1998 Agence France Presse. Source: World Reporter (Trade Mark).
Agence France Presse, May 21 , 1998
Countries: SA Saudi Arabia, Middle East.
Subject: G132 National Security.
A 116 Terrorism.
Types: NEWS General news.
WORLD REPORTER
World Reporter (Trade Mark)
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Annex 26
S. Galster, “Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War – Afghanistan: the
Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990”, The National Security Archive, 9 October 2001
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The National Security Archive
The September 11th Sourcebooks
Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last w ·ar
AFGHANISTAN: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1973-1990
by Steve Galster
October 9, 2001
Return to full page Jump to the documents
On an August afternoon in a city thousands of miles from home, a U.S. diplomat sat within
the secure confines of his Embassy office preparing to write up his weekly summary report,
while sounds of sporadic gunfire reverberated from the surrounding mountains into the
bustling streets and bazaars outside. It was a typical scene, except this time the diplomat
decided to include in his communiqué, a rather provocative idea that would capture more
attention than usual back in Washington, D.C. It would, in fact, help push his obscure, lowlevel
assignment ail the way to the forefront of the Cold War. The overthrow of the country's
communist leadership, he wrote, "could well have positive repercussions for the U.S.
throughout the Third World by demonstrating that our adversaries' view of the 'inevitable
course' of history is not necessarily accurate. "(l)
The year was 1979. The country, of course, was Afghanistan. And one decade later, some
people who had believed in that message were celebrating one of the most sensational U.S.
victories in the history of the Cold War: the withdrawal of 100,000 demoralized Soviet troops
from Afghanistan, marking the first time that the Red Army had withdrawn under fire from a
nation it had occupied since World War II. The Afghan socialist revolution, it seemed, had
failed.
At the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Director William Webster
and his euphorie "Afghan Team" toasted ten years of effort and a multi-billion dollar project
to support the anti -communist, Muslim Afghan rebels, in what had become the CIA's largest
and "most successful" covert operation ever. On Capitol Hill, Congressman Charles Wilson
(D-Texas), a legislative champion of the anti-Soviet guerrillas, boasted that the United States
had learned in Afghanistan that it "could reverse Soviet influence anywhere in the world."
And at the White House, President George Bush hailed the withdrawal as a "watershed" in
U.S.-Soviet relations.
Six thousand miles away from the celebrations, however, the war in Afghanistan raged on.
Washington and Moscow's clients, using U.S. and Soviet-supplied weapons, continued their
internecine struggle for power, adding more civilian casualties to the 1 million who had
already <lied. Although peace had broken out between the superpowers, the legacy of their
long and bitter rivalry lived on in the rocket-prone city of Kabul, Pakistan's crowded refugee
camps and the war-ravaged villages in the Hindu Kush mountains.
The Relevance of Afghanistan
How is it that this underdeveloped, tribal-based country, tucked deep inside the rugged
crossroads of Asia and deemed strategically insignificant by the United States for decades,
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became a battleground for the bloodiest superpower proxy war of the 1980s?
What stimulated the United States to develop a sophisticated insurgency support operation
for a rebellion led by Islamic religious leaders and fought by mountain tribesmen? What was
the nature of the debate among U.S. officiais and congressmen as to what the rebels, beset
with ethnie, tribal and persona! rivalries, could accomplish against the armed forces of the
Soviet Union? What effect did this war have on Pakistan, the most important U.S. ally in
South Asia, which played a crucial role in the war by providing sanctuary for the rebels and 3
million Afghan refugees? And what lessons have the U.S. intelligence and defense
communities drawn from the Afghan conflict and applied to the emerging U.S. strategic
doctrine of "Low-Intensity Warfare"?
Why did the Soviet Union spend ten years, billions of dollars and 15-20,000 lives trying to
prop up a government that seemed constantly on the verge of collapse? Was Moscow's
intervention, as some have claimed, originally part of a grand design to seize oil fields and
warm water ports in the Persian Gulf region, or merely a move to protect a new socialist
government in a country contiguous toits sensitive southern border? Why did Mikhail
Gorbachev eventually call the Red Army home, leaving the Afghan government to fend for
itself against formidable odds? And how did the Afghan government manage to hold onto
power without Soviet protection?
No student, professor or journalist trying to answer these and the many other questions
related to the Afghan war can do justice to their research without reviewing some of the
thousands of pages of State Department cables from Kabul, Peshawar, Islamabad and
Washington; intelligence reports from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
correspondence between Congress and the executive branch; field reports from Agency for
International Development (AID) officiais in Pakistan; and other previously classified
materials found in this document set.
An overview of U.S. policy during Afghanistan's last 17 turbulent years both provides
some context for approaching these questions and demonstrates the usefulness of these
materials to those trying to answer them.
The Tenets of U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan
Although Afghanistan experienced massive changes between 1973 and 1990--four coups, the
intervention and withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces, the exile of one-third of its
population as a result of the war, and one million deaths- U.S. policy toward Afghanistan
throughout this period actually remained the same: to prevent "excessive" Soviet influence.
Specifically, this meant denying the Soviet Union a foothold in Afghanistan from which to
launch aggressive actions in the region. Afghanistan by itself was of little importance to the
United States. But the area around it-the Persian Gulf and the sea lines and ports of the
Indian Ocean-was deemed critical, and U.S. policy toward Afghanistan consistently
reflected a regional policy that sought strong and friendly ties with Iran and Pakistan. Hence,
the two factors shaping U.S. policy in Afghanistan also remained consistent: the U.S.
perception of Soviet goals in Afghanistan, and the balance of power in the region.
Until the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, the United States was able to project its power
into South Asia and protect its interests there with confidence. In exchange for massive
military assistance, the Shah provided the United States with access to military bases and
intelligence facilities, helping to safeguard the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the "free
world" while preventing potential Soviet advances toward the Gulf or Indian Ocean.
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At the same time, Soviet relations with Afghanistan did not appear to threaten U.S.
interests. Since the USSR shared a long border with Afghanistan and because the United
States enjoyed friendly ties with the other states in the region, U.S. officiais viewed Soviet
policy in Afghanistan as part of a defensive strategy. A National Intelligence Estimate written
in 1954--one year after the United States helped restore the Shah to his throne in lran-stated
that "Soviet attention to Afghanistan is part of a general effort to counter recent Western
(particularly US) gains in the Middle East-South Asia area."(l) Washington decided, in other
words, to treat Afghanistan as a "buffer" state.
Throughout the l 960s and the 1970s, relations between Moscow and Kabul grew stronger,
as the USSR became one of Afghanistan's largest sources offoreign aid. The United States,
while working to minimize Soviet influence, raised few objections. In 1962, the State
Department reasoned that "US fostering of active hostility toward the USSR [could] only
serve to weaken Afghanistan's ability to survive."Q) In 1976, the annual State Department
Policy Review stated that Afghanistan was "a militarily and politically neutral nation,
effectively dependent on the Soviet Union." Still, it concluded that the United States "is not,
nor should it become, committed to, or responsible for the 'protection' of Afghanistan in any
respect."(±) The balance of power in the region favored the United States, and no significant
Soviet threat to that balance was seen emanating from Afghanistan.
This set of circumstances-which in U.S. policy parlance is described as "regional
stability"-changed dramatically in 1979. The Shah of Iran abdicated his throne in January,
allowing an anti-American, Islamic government to take power. Ten months later, the Soviet
Union deployed 100,000 troops to Afghanistan, putting the Red Army within striking
distance of both Pakistan and a potentially vulnerable Iran. The balance in the region had
shifted. Soviet policy in Afghanistan, which was previously perceived as benign, was
suddenly described by the White House as "the gravest threat to world peace since World
Warll."
The Early Vears: 1973-1978
To gain a full understanding of these changes, one needs to go back to the early 1970s when
the power of Afghanistan 's monarchy was waning. Afghanistan at this time was one of the
most underdeveloped countries in the world. In 1974, the World Bank estimated
Afghanistan's per capita GNP to be $70, ranking it 73rd among a list of 83 underdeveloped
countries.Q) To make matters worse, Afghanistan suffered a terrible drought in 1971-1972.
Foreign aid, from such countries as West Germany, Iran, the United States, and especially
from the USSR, helped alleviate the country's economic woes.
Foreign aid alone, however, could not resolve Afghanistan's emerging political conflicts.
Many Afghans, particularly the progressive urban elite, had grown impatient with the
country's leader, King Zahir Shah. The king had ruled Afghanistan (sometimes as only a
titular head) since the age of 19, when his father was assassinated in 1933.
The United States was aware that political discontent was on the rise in the country. In
1971, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported that "[t]here has been increased leftist activity
which can be attributed to increased disillusionment and frustration with the existing
social/economic conditions and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the leadership to
tackle boldly the nation's problems."(ç) Perhaps the most disgruntled and organized of the
country's Ieftist groups was the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
The PDPA had been founded in 1965 by a group of 30 Afghans in Kabul. Its political
orientation was Marxist, with many of its members looking to Moscow for guidance and
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inspiration. Many PDPA members, in fact, had studied or received military training in the
USSR.
During its early years, the PDPA was tom by quarrels and plots between its two leaders,
Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karma!. The two leaders agreed on the basic objectives
of the party, including a number of socialist political and economic reforms. They both also
complained of Afghanistan's backward nature, pointing not only toits underdeveloped
infrastructure but also to a maldistribution of wealth and land which, they claimed, was
perpetuated by traditional tribal and religious customs. Taraki and Karma! disagreed,
however, over how to remedy these problems. Taraki and his followers argued for radical
socialist reforms using whatever means necessary to implement them; Karma! and his
supporters advocated the graduai introduction of socialist change, working within the state
system, incorporating along the way different elements of Afghan society. Karmal and
several colleagues had even served as parliamentary members during the king's rule, earning
themselves the nickname "royal communists."
In 1967, Karmal split with the party and formed his own faction, also called the PDPA, but
usually identified by the name of its newspaper, Parcham (banner). Parcham continued to
strive for the same kinds of socialist reforms pursued by Taraki's rival PDPA faction, Khalq
(masses), also named for its newspaper, but the two competed for power nevertheless.
By the early 1970s, Karmal had all but abandoned his non-confrontational, almost
cooperative approach toward the govemment. The Zahir Administration had shut down the
Parcham newspaper, quashed Parcham demonstrations, and arrested party members and put
them in jail. In response, Karma! increasingly sang the same anti-monarchy tune as the
Khalqis.
Parcham and Khalq were not the only groups opposed to the Zahir Shah Administration.
The king's cousin and former prime minister, Mohammad Daud, had his eyes on the royal
palace, as did several other former officiais and relatives of the king. Realizing that a race
was on to replace Zahir Shah, Daud, along with members of the military and Parcham,
coordinated a takeover attempt. On July 17, 1973, while the king was vacationing in Italy,
Daud, along with key military officers and the minister of interior, who was a Parcham
sympathizer, launched a successful, nearly bloodless coup, declaring an end to the monarchy
and the beginning of a republican govemment.
The exact nature of Daud's relations with Parcham during this time is still not clear. Did
the two agree on political objectives for Afghanistan, or did they merely create a marriage of
convenience? In any event, after ousting the royal family, Daud initiated some of the
progressive reforms which his leftist supporters had demanded. His commitment to a
reformist program and to his early backers was shortlived, however. Over time, Daud
consolidated his persona( power by purging the government of leftists, replacing them with
members of his own powerful Mohammadzai clan. He also sought more economic
independence from the Soviet Union by exploring doser ties with Iran and the United States.
He was careful, however, never completely to shun the Soviet Union. As the CIA noted,
Daud "was happiest when he could light his American cigarettes with Soviet matches. "(1)
The U.S. Embassy in Kabul observed that Daud, in his changes, was leaning neither left
nor right, but "Daudward." In pursuit of persona! power and a more independent foreign
policy, Daud managed to alienate Afghanistan's socialists, moderates and religious
fundamentalists. It was the latter which initially proved to be Daud's most militant
opponents.
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While some Afghans were being influenced by Marxism, others were diligently studying
the Koran. Many of these Afghans entered Kabul University's faculty oflslamic law, while
others pursued their Islamic studies in Egypt where they came into contact with and were
influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization which seeks the imposition of
strictly Islamic governments in ail Muslim countries. Sorne of those Afghans who studied in
Cairo, such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Abdul Rabb-ur-Rasul
Sayyaf, came back to Kabul determined to galvanize opposition first to Zahir Shah and then
Mohammad Daud, both ofwhose governments they criticized as corrupt and un-Islamic. This
group of Afghans wanted to integrate modernization and Islam to counter the "disruptive"
influence of both capitalism and communism.
Rabbani recruited from Afghanistan's Muslim Youth Organization and helped form the
Islamic Society party, Jamiat-i Islami. Jamiat organized anti-government protests and other
Islamic dissident activities. When Daud cracked down on Jamiat activists, Rabbani and other
Muslim leaders fled for the Afghan countryside and eventually to Pakistan where they
received arms to fight the Daud government. U.S. officiais knew very little about these
Afghan rebels and doubted they could pose a serious threat to the Daud Administration.
Sorne of the names listed in State Department cab les were those of people who, years later,
would receive covert aid from the United States in their jihad, or holy war, against the Soviet
Union.
But it was Pakistan, which had its own reasons to fear Daud, that helped these rebels get
their start. Especially alarming to the Pakistanis was Daud's pursuit of a popular cause called
Pashtunistan. Roughly half of Afghanistan's population are ethnie Pashtuns, including Daud
and practically every other leader in Afghanistan's history. Millions of Pashtuns also lived on
the other side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, an artificial line drawn by the British
during the height of their colonial rule in India. These Pashtuns, living in Pakistan's
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), looked forward to the day when they would join their
ethnie brethren in controlling their own homeland, Pashtunistan. Since Pashtuns dominated
Afghan politics, they could only gain from pursuing such a goal, and Afghan leaders, in turn,
won favor among Afghan Pashtuns for pursuing it.
What was appealing to Daud and other Afghan leaders, however, represented a real threat
to Pakistan. Pashtunistan, if ever realized, would eut deeply into the NWFP by annexing a
good portion of Pakistan. Even if the border with Afghanistan remained intact, calls in Kabul
for Pashtunistan always had the potential for stirring unrest in Peshawar and other parts of
Pakistan 's frontier. Expatriate leaders such as Rabbani, an ethnie Tajik, and Hekmatyar, an
Islamist who sought to unite Afghans belonging to ail ethnie groups through Islam, provided
Pakistan with a minor tool for keeping Daud off balance if he chose to pursue an aggressive
Pashtunistan policy.
Meanwhile, as Islamic fundamentalists rebelled against Daud's "atheistic" reforms, Daud
continued to purge more leftists from the government, banned political opposition in 1975,
and strengthened ties with Iran and the United States. The United States welcomed and
encouraged Daud's new foreign policy moves. In 1977, the State Department, remarking on
Daud's doser ties to Iran, stated that he had "made significant contributions to the
improvement of regional stability-thereby helping to fulfill another principal U.S.
objective. "(fil
The Saur Revolution
Despite U.S. approval, Daud's authoritarian rule had alienated too many at home. In
particular, PDPA members, Parchamis and Khalqis alike, had grown impatient with Daud
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and were anxious to see him removed from power. Khalq members criticized their Parcham
rivais for having deluded themselves into thinking that the PDPA could have worked with
Daud after supporting his takeover. By 1977, Khalq and Parcham formally agreed to bury
their differences and united to form one People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; Soviet
pressure reportedly played a role in the unification. Further PDPA infiltration of the military,
especially by Khalqis, put the party in a good position to influence events if and when Daud
lost his grip on power.
That day came on April 17, 1978, when Mir Akbar Khaibar, a member of the PDPA and a
vocal critic of Daud, was assassinated, possibly by Daud's minister of interior. Thousands of
mourners turned Khaibar's funeral into an anti-government rally which prompted Daud to
clamp down further on the PDPA, arresting numerous party members. His response provoked
PDPA supporters in the military to take action. On April 27, the military in collaboration with
the PDPA overthrew Daud, executed him, and replaced his republican government with a
socialist one, which proclaimed the coup as the beginning of the "Saur [April] Revolution."
Prelude to Intervention
The socialist and pro-Soviet bent of the new government caused U.S. officiais some concern
as they wondered whether Moscow had played a secret role in the PDPA takeover. U.S.
Embassy officiais in Kabul, however, detected no Soviet hand in the coup and suggested a
cautious approach to the new government. These officiais recalled that while Daud had been
busy consolidating his persona! power and pursuing new foreign ties, he had neglected the
domestic reforms that many Afghans, particularly the progressive intellectuals, had
demanded. Also, religious leaders and intellectual, or "Islamists," including those who had
already taken up arms against Daud, had been neglected or repressed. The PDPA was in a
better position than the Islamicists to seize power because of its stronger influence over the
rnilitary and within the capital city, Kabul.
The Khalq-Parcham unity was apparently not very solid. The new government, the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), was dominated by Khalqis, due mostly to
Khalq contrai of the military. Soon after the April takeover, Khalq's two main leaders, Nur
Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, quickly consolidated Khalq mie by imprisoning a
number of their Parcham rivais while sending others off to foreign diplomatie posts.
Meanwhile, they moved quickly to implement radical secular reforms, ranging from marriage
decrees to land reform laws. A treaty of "friendship" between Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union was signed in December 1978, which brought more Soviet aid and advisors to Kabul.
The Khalqi reforms served to ignite strong opposition from most of the deeply traditional
and Islamic population. The security of rural women, for example, often depended on a
sizable dowry, which was significantly reduced under new marriage laws. The land reforms,
which were meant to help small farmers, were opposed by many for having alienated them
from their former landowners, on whom they had always relied for help in growing and
selling their crops. A number of disenfranchised landowners along with many religious
leaders either took up arms against the Taraki-Amin government or left the country.
Sorne Afghans fled to Pakistan to join the Islamic Afghan dissidents such as Rabbani and
Hekmatyar. Sorne of the more prominent new rebels included: Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, who
came from a well-known family of Sufi leaders, had ties to the royal family, was related to a
prominent PDPA official (a valuable connection for most rebels), and formerly taught Islarnic
law in Kabul; Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, who was also tied to the royal family, was a Pir, or
spiritual leader, and who until his departure from Kabul owned a Peugeot car dealership;
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, who came from a prominent religious family and served in
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parliament in the 1960s where he criticized secular influence in Afghanistan, physically
attacking, at one point, another member of parliament, Babrak Karma!. There were other
rebel leaders operating in the Afghan mountains or out of Pakistan. An important one, Yunus
Khales had escaped from Afghanistan in 1974 after writing a book that criticized the Daud
Administration. Unlike some other rebel leaders, Khales depended more on his genuine tribal
support than his religious aura to galvanize Afghans in his home province of Nangarhar to
oppose the new government in Kabul.
These leaders, along with Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and another who joined in 1980, Abdul
Rabb-ur-Rasul Sayyaf, formed their own parties and would eventually unite to form the
Sunni Islamic Afghan rebel alliance, or the "Peshawar Seven" as they would later become
collectively known as. These party leaders called for a jihad, or holy war, against the PDPA.
Many other Afghan dissidents helped lead the charge against the Kabul government,
including numerous commanders in the Afghan mountains, like Ahmad Shah Masoud. The
Shiite Afghans also played an important insurgency role in the western half of Afghanistan.
Sorne of the Shiite parties based their operations in Iran where they received support from
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's government. It was the Peshawar Seven, however, who
would grab the world's attention, partly because the government of Pakistan, the host to most
rebels and refugees and the foreign journalists writing about them, chose to recognize their
parties as the only legitimate ones in Pakistan.
The United States, in the meantime, had found itself facing a policy dilemma with the
PDPA's ascension to power in Afghanistan. This dilemma was summed up in a secret
memorandum to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance following the April takeover: "We need to
take into account the mix of nationalism and communism in the new leadership and seek to
avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union than it might wish .... "
Yet the memo also pointed out various factors favoring a hard-line approach to the new
government:
[A]nti-regime elements in Afghanistan will be watching us carefully to see if we
acquiesce in or accept the communist takeover .... Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and others of our friends in the area will see the situation clearly as a Soviet
coup. On the domestic front, many Americans will see this as an extension of
Soviet power and draw the parallel with Angola, Ethiopia, etc.(2)
As a result, the United States compromised, maintaining "correct" rel ations with the
government while keeping channels open to the opposition. As dissatisfaction with the PDPA
mounted within Afghanistan, however, the United States grew increasingly uncomfortable
with the new government and its radical reforms. To make matters worse, in February 1979,
the U.S. ambassador, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage by anti-government Shiite Muslims
who demanded the release of a political prisoner. Afghan police clumsily stormed their
hideout, and Dubs was killed in the ensuing shootout. Afghan authorities stonewalled U.S.
requests for an independent investigation of the killing. Congress in tum refused to replace
Dubs with another ambassador and threatened to eut aid to the DRA.
In March 1979, Afghans in the western city of Herat responded to rebel calls for a jihad by
massacring hundreds of DRA officiais and Soviet advisors who were in charge of introducing
the women's literacy program there. Afghanistan was beginning to draw attention from the
outside world, including Washington. At the White House, National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski warned President Carter that the Soviet Union, with its hundreds of
advisors in Afghanistan to assist in reforms and counterinsurgency operations, had territorial
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designs on Afghanistan and possibly the whole South Asia region. Brzezinski and others
worried that the USSR might take advantage of its presence in Afghanistan in order to
influence events in neighboring Iran or Pakistan, two traditionally pro-American countries
that for years had helped safeguard U.S. interests in the region, namely access to oil and the
containment of the Soviet Union.
If the DRA were able to consolidate its power, Brzezinski argued, then the Soviet Union
might turn Afghanistan into a launching pad for aggression in the region. Weeks after the
Herat uprising and while President Carter was absorbed by the Iran hostage crisis, Brzezinski
pushed a decision through the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the National
Security Council (NSC) to be, as he put it, "more sympathetic to those Afghans who were
determined to preserve their country's independence."(l.Q)
Although deliberately vague as to what this meant, the evidence indicates that Brzezinski
called for moderate covert support for Afghan dissident groups which had set up
headquarters in Pakistan. Sorne, such as forces under the command of Rabbani and
Hekmatyar, had been operating out of Pakistan without much outside aid for years.
According to a former Pakistani military official who was interviewed in 1988, the U.S.
Embassy in Islamabad had asked Pakistani military officiais in April 1979 to recommend a
rebel organization that would make the best use of U.S. aid. The following month, the
Pakistani source claimed, he personally introduced a CIA official to Hekmatyar who, while
more radically Islamic and anti-American than most Afghans, headed what the Pakistani
government considered the most militant and organized rebel group, the Hizb-i Islami
(Hekmatyar).(ll)
Freedom of Information Act requests for records describing these meetings have been
denied. But CIA and State Department documents seized by Iranian students during the
takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, reveal that, starting in April
1979, eight months before the Soviet intervention and immediately following Brzezinski's
SCC decision, the United States had, in fact, begun quietly meeting rebel representatives.
Although most of the cables and memoranda released to date show that U.S. officiais politely
turned down rebel requests for U.S. assistance, others reveal CIA support for anti -DRA
demonstrations and close monitoring of Pakistani military aid for rebel parties based in
Pakistan's NWFP.
Brzezinski's decision to help the rebels was curious in light of Soviet activities in
Afghanistan at the time. According to declassified documents and this author's interviews,
Soviet officiais thought the Khalqi leadership was moving too fast with its reforms and urged
Taraki and Amin to moderate the pace of change and broaden their political base by
including non-communists in the government. This approach, however, was more amenable
to Parcham leaders who, unfortunately for Soviet officiais, were not in power. When Khalq
leaders sidestepped Soviet advice, Moscow sought other means to induce political change,
meeting with former members of the monarchy and other non-communists to seek their
participation in the DRA government. Soviet and other East bloc diplomats in Kabul kept the
U.S. Embassy informed of their efforts.
The ruling Khalqis, particularly Hafizullah Amin, had little use for Soviet counsel. The
government responded to the growing opposition with increasing brutality, and the PDPA's
base continued to narrow. Amin, who as the defense minister was in charge of the failed
counterinsurgency operations, became the focus of Soviet frustrations. State Department
intelligence learned that, in August 1979, Moscow had decided there was no practical
alternative in Afghanistan to the rule of Taraki and Amin but that Soviet officiais had
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resolved to support the more moderate Taraki against Amin.
In the same month, a high-ranking Soviet military official, General Ivan Pavlovskiy, led a
fact-finding mission to Afghanistan to assess the stability of the government. In September,
Taraki, on his way home from a Nonaligned Movement conference in Cuba, stopped in
Moscow where he and Soviet officiais reportedly discussed Amin's future. Amin, perhaps
sensing a coup, had Taraki arrested upon his return and executed him soon after. In October,
General Pavlovskiy returned to Moscow and presented the Politburo with a grim picture of
the situation below their border. The Khalqi government had lost control of 23 of
Afghanistan's 28 provinces to various rebel forces. Left with Amin, the Soviets drew up
plans for military action.
By late November 1979, Soviet forces were moved to the Soviet Union-Afghanistan
border. Warsaw Pact forces were also placed on an advanced state of readiness. Two Soviet
battalions were quietly flown into an airbase near Kabul during the first week of December,
laying the groundwork for what was to follow. On Christmas Eve 1979, tens of thousands of
Soviet troops riding in tanks and armored personnel carriers stormed across the Amudarya
River into the rugged Afghan countryside, white thousands more flew into the Kabul,
Bagram and Shindand air bases, bringing with them exiled Parcham leaders, including
Babrak Karma!, who had been hiding in Moscow. Within days, Hafizullah Amin was
assassinated and replaced by Karma! who formed a new Parcham-led government.
Superpowers and Doctrines of Hegemony
The Soviet invasion symbolized, ironically, the limits of Soviet influence in Afghanistan.
Unable to stabilize the government through political means, Moscow attempted to do so with
military force, much the same as the United States had done years before in Vietnam. To
many observers in Washington, D.C., however, Afghanistan was beginning to look like
another pawn on the Kremlin's chessboard. The invasion coincided with the decline of U.S.
influence in Iran and other Third World countries such as Angola and Mozambique in 1975,
Ethiopia in 1977 and Nicaragua in 1979 where "pro-Soviet" governments had seized power.
It also coincided with an election year in which President Carter was coming under attack
from conservatives for failing to prevent these "Soviet gains."
Many of these U .S. observers argued that the global balance of power, particularl y the
geostrategic balance in South Asia, had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. The new
dominant U.S. perception of Soviet foreign policy, as "evidenced" by Afghanistan, was that it
was expansionist in nature: the Brezhnev Doctrine of protecting socialist allies, U.S.
conservatives claimed, had been logically extended to include expanding Soviet influence
beyond the Warsaw Pact. This view was best summed up in a Defense Intelligence Agency
report issued days after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan: "The key motivation that
propelled Moscow's move was to bring its long-standing strategic goals doser within reach.
Control of Afghanistan would be a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean
and to domination of the Asian sub-continent. "(12)
Reasoning that "aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease," President Carter
warned the Soviet Union on January 23rd, 1980, that "[a]n attempt by any outside force to
gain control of the Persian Gulf region [ would] be regarded as an assault on the vital interests
of the U.S. and [would] be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."(Ll)
Journalists labeled this powerful warning the Carter Doctrine. Since, however, the United
States was neither interested in nor prepared for a war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan
or the Persian Gulf, Carter looked for alternative ways to slow down a potential Soviet drive
and make Moscow pay a heavy price for its intervention. He called for international
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economic sanctions against the USSR and a boycott of the Olympie games being held in
Moscow, sought military access agreements with several South and Southwest Asian
countries, and provided more covert aid to the mujahidin.
Not ail U.S. officiais believed that the Soviet intervention was part of an expansionist
drive. While no declassified documents reveal any criticism of rebel military aid, some
officiais subsequently recalled in this author's interviews that they had advocated quiet
diplomacy with the Soviet Union in order to provide the Kremlin with a way out of what they
believed was a political and military miscalculation.(H) Moscow had its own critics as well.
According to interviews with Soviet officiais, days after the intervention, Soviet foreign
affairs advisors pleaded with the Kremlin leadership to withdraw Soviet troops from
Afghanistan. These advisors did not believe the intervention was worth ruining d,tente with
the United States, Europe and China. What is more, the deeply traditional and Islarnic
Afghans, in their opinion, were not yet prepared for socialism.(U) Cold War attitudes,
however, prevailed in both Moscow and Washington.
A combination of fear, pride and superpower obligations caused the leader of the "free
world" and the "vanguard of socialism" to struggle violently over a destitute country the size
of Texas for the next ten years.
Political vs. Military Solution
Carter's reaction to the Soviet invasion received widespread approval among policy-makers.
Hard-liners, including Carter's opponent in the 1980 presidential elections, Ronald Reagan,
had warned numerous times that the Soviet Union was "on a roll" in the Third World and had
to be "rolled back." Moderates thought the intervention, regardless of its purpose, was an
egregious act for which the USSR should paya price. Ali agreed that the Soviet Union
should withdraw from Afghanistan. The question was how to convince Moscow.
Congressional conservatives opposed negotiations, distrusting the Soviet Union's
willingness to negotiate in good faith. According to their view, the USSR would not
withdraw unless and until it felt the costs of its occupation. Most U.S. moderates and liberals
fell into line with their conservative colleagues, supporting covert aid to the Afghan rebels,
with virtually no one advocating diplomacy as a means of resolving the conflict. The State
Department believed that the rebels could "probably continue tying up some 85,000 or more
Soviet troops" but that they were "fragmented, lack[ed] effective national leadership, and
certainly [could not] force a Soviet withdrawal. "(1§.) After minimal deliberation at the White
House, Carter opted for a two-track approach, supporting moderate levels of covert aid while
seeking a forum for a negotiated settlement.
Carter's Joss to Reagan in the 1980 presidential election signalled the end of the
negotiation track. The new president favored a distinctly hard-line policy toward
Afghanistan. Reagan sought to make the Afghan rebels and other anti-communist
insurgencies the centerpiece of the "Reagan Doctrine," an aggressive initiative designed to
increase the cost of Soviet support for Third World socialist governments. While few
believed that the Afghan rebels could force a Soviet withdrawal, Reagan and his advisors
hoped to tie Soviet troops down in Afghanistan's Hindu Kush mountains until the cost of
occupation became unsustainable.
The key to this objective was Pakistan. Since the overthrow of Mohammad Daud, Pakistan
had played host to thousands (and eventually millions) of Afghan refugees and rebels who
had fled their war-torn country for make-shift tent villages in the Northwest Frontier
Province and Baluchistan. Without the cooperation of Pakistan 's military government, led
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since 1977 by Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the rebels would have had no sanctuary from
which to launch their operations.
The Carter Administration had eut aid to Pakistan in 1977 because of concerns about its
nuclear program and General Zia's disdain for human rights and democracy. There was
ample evidence to suggest that Pakistan was actively developing an atomic bomb. In
addition, the Carter White House, with its public emphasis on respect for human rights as a
precondition for foreign aid, was forced to respond to Zia's well-known history of brutal and
dictatorial actions. The general had originally attained power by overthrowing Prime
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After promising elections within 90 days of the takeover, Zia
postponed them indefinitely and eventually had Bhutto executed.
To the United States, however, Zia's record of human rights abuses paled in significance
when compared to the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Literally days after the Soviet invasion,
Carter was on the telephone with Zia offering him hundreds of millions of dollars in
economic and military aid in exchange for cooperation in helping the rebels. Zia accepted
this quid pro quo, but his government remained wary of Washington 's stated commitment to
protect Pakistan from possible Soviet strikes across its border.
The Reagan Administration was able to gain Pakistan's confidence by offering a huge, sixyear
economic and military aid package which elevated Pakistan to the third largest recipient
of U.S. foreign aid. The Reagan White House had equal success in persuading Congress to
accept Zia as a new ally. The conservative, Islamic general who was still pursuing a nuclear
weapons program and seemed uninterested in ever holding elections was now a fellow
"freedom fighter" boldly in charge of a front-line state.
Although Zia spoke in concert with U.S. objectives of supporting Afghan "selfdetermination"
and opposing the Afghan "puppet" government, he and his military had their
own agenda in Afghanistan. Zia chose to favor the more radically Islamic rebel groups who,
in some cases, were no more popular or representative than the PDPA. He was able to di vert
a disproportionately large share of U.S.-supplied weapons to these groups, especially the
most radical one, Hizb-i Islami (Hekmatyar). Later in the war, this would cause significant
problems for the rebel movement.
Whether the United States blindly yielded to Zia's favoritism of the fundamentalists or was
in connivance with it is still in question. The relationship between the CIA and Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the arm of the military responsible for
distributing CIA-purchased weapons to the rebel s, is not well-documented. This author's
interviews with Pakistani officiais indicate that U.S. officiais in Pakistan were continually
advised by ISI officiais that Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami was the most effective rebel
organization, although some officiais from Pakistan's Foreign Ministry apparently differed
with that assessment. Many secular Pakistanis outside of the government worried that foreign
aid for Afghan fundamentalists such as Hekmatyar also served to bolster the conservative
Islamic forces in Pakistan, including the military. Available documents and chronology show
that during the ten-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, U.S. officiais developed a stronger
relationship with Pakistan's generals than with either the foreign ministry or the civilian
opposition.
Congress and Covert Aid
Afghanistan presents a unique case of congressional involvement with a covert aid program.
Whereas a divided Congress often impeded the Reagan Administration's efforts to aid the
contras in Nicaragua, congressional hard-liners, riding a wave of bipartisan support,
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consistently and successfully pushed for more covert funding for the Afghan rebels than the
White House ever requested.
Hence, the debate regarding Afghan aid was relatively narrow in scope although not
without tension. White everyone seemed to support "Afghan self-determination" and a
Soviet-free Afghanistan, several members of Congress, backed by conservative lobbying
groups, criticized the administration for not pursuing vigorously enough a mujahidin military
victory over the PDPA. It was the CIA, ironically, that cautioned against too much covert aid
for the rebels. Officiais from CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, including Deputy
Director John McMahon, warned Congress that too large a military support operation for the
rebels might provoke Soviet retaliation against Pakistan and would certainly be subject to
"leakages" and corruption.
The CIA was especially resistant to calls for providing the mujahidin with U.S.-made
weaponry. Traditionally, the Agency purchased foreign, usually Soviet-styled, weaponry in
order to "plausibly deny" U.S. involvement if the need arose. Throughout the Afghan war,
the CIA purchased Soviet-designed weapons from Egypt, China and elsewhere and
transported them to Pakistan. Cables reveal that Chinese and Egyptian AK-47 rifles and SA-7
anti-aircraft missiles arrived in Pakistan as early as 1980. This covert purchasing process not
only covered U.S. tracks, but ensured the availability of weapons that were compatible with
the kind captured by the rebels from their Soviet-supplied enemies.
In 1984, Congress passed a resolution, introduced by Senator Paul Tsongas (DMassachusetts)
and Congressman Don Ritter (R-Pennsylvania), which called for "effective"
U.S. material aid for the rebels "in their fight for freedom from foreign domination." Severa!
legislators, particularly Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-Texas) and Senator Gordon
Humphrey (R-New Hampshire), tried to use the Tsongas-Ritter resolution to increase the size
and quality of the rebel covert aid program.
While Washington and Moscow poured more weapons into Afghanistan, United Nations
officiais relentlessly pursued a diplomatie solution to end the war. In 1982, the U.N.
Secretary-General, Javier P,rez de Cuellar tasked Diego Cordovez to find a way for the
United Nations to mediate a political settlement in Afghanistan. For the next six years,
Cordovez shuttled back and forth from New York to South Asia to the Soviet Union and to
Geneva. He tried to convince the numerous parties to the conflict- the Afghan government,
the various rebel groups, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, the United States and Iran- to narrow
their differences so that they could agree on a set of principles or conditions under which the
Soviet military would withdraw from Afghanistan. Cordovez and his U.N. colleagues
brought Pakistani and Afghan government representatives to Geneva on numerous occasions
to discuss conditions for a political seulement. Since Pakistan did not recognize the Afghan
government as legitimate, Cordovez literally had to move back and forth between hotel
rooms because Pakistani officiais refused to sit at the same table with the DRA
represen tati ves.
Compounding Cordovez's difficulties was a strong sense of mistrust between the
superpowers. On a number of occasions it appeared that Pakistan and Afghanistan were
ready to sign an agreement that would prohibit Pakistan from allowing material aid for the
rebels to pass through its territory in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal. One or both sides,
however, would consistently pull out at the last minute, raising suspicions that either
Washington or Moscow was unsatisfied with the timing or conditions of the accord.
To most U.S. officiais, these U.N.-sponsored "proximity taiks" looked hopeless or even
frightening. In March 1983, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence
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Eagleburger reportedly expressed alarm at the prospect that the following round of Geneva
negotiations might result in a settlement. About the same time, Charles Cogan, then the CIA's
official in charge of covert operations in Afghanistan, told a journalist that Pakistan was not
about to sign Cordovez's proposed "Geneva Accords" at the next round "or ever." He added
that President Zia accepted the U.S. view that "Pakistan's security is best assured by keeping
the Russians tied down [in Afghanistan]."(.11) On Capitol Hill, similar sentiments were
voiced and more rebel aid was appropriated.
Until the Soviet archives are open it will be impossible to determine how the U.S. hardline
approach affected Soviet policy toward Afghanistan. Was Moscow supporting U.N.
efforts as a smokescreen for its strategy of subjugating the mujahidin, as Wilson, Humphrey
and others argued? Or did increased U.S. aid for the rebels cause the USSR to dig in deeper,
suspecting that the United States was not interested in a political solution?
Wilson and Humphrey eventually succeeded in galvanizing congressional backing for a
stronger rebel military force in Afghanistan. Despite signs of corruption in both the military
and humanitarian aid programs as early as 1982, Congress ultimately provided nearly $3
billion in covert aid for the mujahidin, more than ail other CIA covert operations in the 1980s
combined. By 1987, the United States was providing the rebels with nearly $700 million in
military assistance a year, more than what Pakistan itself was receiving from Washington.
In 1984, Wilson used his powerful position on the House Intelligence Committee to tack
on an additional $50 million for Afghan covert aid and convinced the CIA to purchase highquality,
Swiss-designed Oerlikon anti-aircraft missiles, which could pierce the heavy armor
of the USSR's most formidable counterinsurgency machine, the Hind Mi-24 helicopter. The
CIA went even further in 1985, purchasing the sophisticated British-made Blowpipe antiaircraft
missiles. And in 1986, due to pressure from several congressmen and a number of
bureaucrats at the State and Defense departments, the CIA provided the mujahidin with U.S.made
Stinger missiles, the most effective shoulder-held anti-aircraft weapon in the world. It
was the first time the CIA had provided U.S.-made weaponry as part of a covert insurgency
support operation, and the legislative branch was largely responsible. As a congressional
staffer later put it: "We finally broke the Agency's virginity."
Refugees and U.S. Policy
The di slocation of 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan-one of the most tragic results of
the war-was something Congress, the White House and the international community could
ail agree on: they needed massive assistance. Ultimately one-third of Afghanistan's pre-war
population fled the country, testifying to the destruction and chaos caused largely by heavy
Soviet/ Afghan government aerial bombing.
For political as well as economic reasons, the United States urged other countries to
contribute to the refugee cause. In 198 1, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad asserted that if
funding for the refugees were too visible, it "would damage the credibility of the mujahidin
by focusing attention on U.S. influence in the Afghan insurgency."(lfil Dozens of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) were willing to help the refugees and rebels as long as
they were provided with the necessary resources to do so. The United States channeled a
significant amount of aid through favored NGOs and urged other countries to either aid the
same organizations or to contribute to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). In the end, no matter who distributed the aid, much of it ended up in the hands of
rebel parties, providing them with significant political leverage over the millions of Afghan
exiles.
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In addition to the humanitarian grounds for providing aid to the refugees in Pakistan, the
United States also sought to alleviate political and economic pressure on Islamabad and to
help maintain a support structure for the rebels. In 1982, the CIA predicted that the presence
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan would help "generate political unrest and retard economic
development until the end of the century."(12) While many Pakistanis demonstrated great
hospitality and tolerance for the refugees, others despised their presence. Cables from
Pakistan reveal violent clashes between Pakistani border tribes and Afghan refugees over
scarce resources and political, religious and personal differences. Sorne disgruntled tribes
even took weapons and money from the Afghan government to disrupt rebel supply lines into
Afghanistan.
In fact, the Afghan government's infiltration of Pakistan and the rebel parties was
extensive and proved key toits survival. The government's ministry of state security, known
as KHAD, sought to buy or rent the loyalty of Pashtun tribes who inhabited the AfghanistanPakistan
border area (the tribes often inhabited both sides of the border). Weapons and
money were doled out to tribal militia who in turn interdicted rebel supply operations based
in Pakistan. Sorne tribal leaders responded to Kabul's material aid with political support,
attending government jirgahs (assemblies) and other PDPA-sponsored activities. President
Zia tried to undercut the Pakistan-based tribes' support for the Afghan government by,
among other means, conducting selective anti-narcotics sweeps through their home areas.
Kabul's strategy, however, continued to be successful, and ultimately contributed to the rise
of Najibullah, the KHAD's director and the man responsible for this counterinsurgency
campaign, to the leader of the DRA in 1986.
Other kinds of counterinsurgency operations, including Soviet/ Afghan government aerial
search-and-destroy missions, as well as insurgency tactics, such as the mujahidin's hit-andrun
attacks on government-held garrisons and cities, were some of the principal causes of the
refugee flow into Pakistan. But it was the aerial bombing that inflicted the most damage.
Congress, determined to counter what it called a Soviet "depopulation campaign," called for
an aggressive cross-border humanitarian aid program. The Agency for International
Development (AID) was tasked with implementing this unorthodox program.
The objective of AID's Cross-border Humanitarian Assistance Program (CBHA) was to
provide Afghans inside Afghanistan- civilians and rebels alike- with the means to survive
without having to flee to Pakistan. The mass exodus of Afghans had been putting too much
pressure on Pakistan, and the empty Afghan villages left the rebels with little material or
moral support inside the country. AID fonds went toward building hospitals and schools,
growing crops, and putting money in the pockets of local residents.
The AID reports are actually some of the richest documents in the collection, describing
the situation inside the normally inaccessible parts of war-torn Afghanistan and illustrating
some of the bizarre politics of the mujahidin. As part of a pro-insurgency operation, the
program was unique and controversial. AID was being used to maintain and build up the
rebels' infrastructure. As one U.S. advisor explained to this author in Pakistan: "We
borrowed a lesson from Mao. The Soviets were trying to drain the sea to kill the fish [rebels],
so we're trying to keep the sea filled ."GQ)
Public Diplomacy and the First Casualty of War
In addition to providing the rebels with military and humanitarian aid, the United States
provided "psychological" support. In 1983, a unique National Security Decision Directive,
number 77, was signed into action to coordinate U.S. government agencies to enhance U.S.
national security and counter anti-American propaganda through "public diplomacy." U.S.
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officiais had their work eut out for them in Afghanistan where media coverage was hindered
by war and propaganda. To overcome these obstacles, the National Security Council, in
keeping with NSDD 77, formed the inter-agency Afghan Working Group, which met twice a
month to discuss ways of increasing media coverage of the war and generating sympathy and
support for the mujahidin.
News coverage of the war was indeed limited, especially when one considers that this was
the longest war in Soviet history, the largest CIA paramilitary operation since Vietnam, and,
with 1 million dead Afghans, the bloodiest regional conflict in the world at the time.
Nevertheless, no major American newspaper saw fit to station a reporter in Peshawar,
Pakistan, the base of rebel political and military operations, and American television crews
rarely ventured up to the Khyber Pass for a glimpse of the war. A major reason for this, of
course, was the risk involved in reporting a guerrilla war, especially this one. A journalist
who wished to go "inside" faced a number of hazards ranging from contracting a serious
disease to the chance of being killed in an air raid or ambush.
What coverage there was tended to be biased toward the mujahidin. Severa] factors explain
this. Foreign correspondents and stringers who did go to Peshawar or managed to go "inside"
with the rebels encountered thousands of uprooted Afghans who all had horrifie stories to tell
about losing homes and relatives to Soviet/Afghan government counterinsurgency
operations. Indeed, craters from Soviet bombs marked the landscape, villages were often
emptied of their inhabitants, and many Afghans who found their way to Pakistan walked the
streets with artificial limbs, victims of land mines.
In addition, the Afghan government often proved to be an unreliable source of
information, causing Western journalists to rel y heavily on U.S. officiais for details of the
war. The DRA in 1980, for example, reported how "Walter Cronkite" (apparently confusing
him with Dan Rather) on a visit into Afghanistan had ordered the execution of two Afghans
-"lslamic style." That same year the DRA expelled 18 Westernjournalists for "biased"
coverage. When the government allowed journalists to return to the country in 1986, the
journalists discovered in Kabul another side to the story: victims of rebel land mines and
indiscriminate mujahidin rocket attacks on the capital.
Thus, for much of the war most reporters found it physically and journalistically safer to
rely on "Western diplomatie sources in Pakistan," the cover for U.S. officiais at the Consulate
in Peshawar or the Embassy in Islamabad.
Despite the pro-mujahidin slant of Western news coverage, however, U.S. officiais still
complained of its limited nature. In 1985, Senator Humphrey sought to remedy that problem.
He pushed legislation through Congress that tasked the United States Information Agency
(USIA) to teach Afghan rebels how to film and write about their jihad. The USIA
subcontracted Boston University's School of Communications to train Afghans in Peshawar
to become television and newsprint journalists. This pro gram stirred controversy, drawing
criticism from professors at the university and several American journalists who called the
exercise in "public diplomacy" a government propaganda operation. Documents on the
project, which went forth despite the criticism, show how the United States worked with
rebel parties, Pakistan, a CBS cameraman and several private organizations to increase and
"improve" coverage of the war.
The United States was also able to influence coverage by taking advantage of Western
journalists' inability to cover the war extensively first-hand. Once a week, a USIA officer in
Islamabad would read to foreign journalists portions of a Situation Report originating from
the Embassy in Kabul. These "Sitreps" were to serve two purposes. They provided U.S.
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officiais at home and abroad with detailed information on the political and military situation
in Afghanistan. They also formed part of the Afghan Working Group's press and public
information strategy to "punch ho les in the Soviet news blackout." The press, however, was
usually allowed to hear only the first several pages of the Sitrep, which gave a relatively
simplistic overview of the situation in the country, paying special attention to government
human rights abuses and mujahidin military gains. The following 20-25 detail-filled pages of
the many now declassified Sitreps depicted a much more complicated and bizarre war being
fought on more levels than just that of Soviet-backed communists against freedom-fighting
Muslims.
The Real War
Beyond the refugee camps and press conferences in Pakistan, a real and very destructive war
was going on inside Afghanistan. Cables from Kabul, AID cross-border reports, DIA
sumrnaries and journal articles by the few reporters who bravely ventured into war zones
reveal how pockets of mountain tribesmen, toting Chinese automatic rifles and U.S. Stinger
missiles, went up against well-armed Soviet and Afghan government forces. Rebel hit-andrun
attacks, assassinations of PDPA members, car bombs, rocket attacks on government-held
garrisons and cities and other guerrilla tactics were met with massive aerial bombardments,
mine-sowing operations, bribes and civic action campaigns from Kabul. Places like
Paghman, Khost, the Panjshir Valley, Sarobi, and Jalalabad, where the mujahidin continually
bogged Soviet forces down, became familiar names to observers of this war just as Hue and
Khe Sanh had in Vietnam, where for years Viet Cong rebels tied down U.S. and South
Vietnamese troops.
But as fierce as they were, the "Muj" were not the Viet Cong. It is true that U.S. military
aid improved the rebels' battlefield performance. One Pentagon report claimed that Stingers
forced "more tactical and air support changes in the last quarter of 1986 and the first quarter
of 1987 than in the previous 7 years of the conflict. "@ ) Also, more and better land mines
allowed the rebels to disrupt Soviet suppl y lines and ground communications, which were
already hampered by the Jack of railways and good roads. No matter how much military,
humanitarian, or psychological support the United States provided them, however, the
mujahidin remained fractious. It was not uncommon for one rebel group to turn its guns on
another.
The United States was well aware of rebel infighting even before the Soviet intervention.
In 1979, rebel leaders confided to U.S. officiais that they likened the idea of a dissident
provisional government to "putting five different animais in the same cage. "(22) Saudi
Arabia managed to stimulate some rebel unity by withholding aid from the various mujahidin
parties until they agreed to coalesce and form a united opposition front. Yet foreign aid often
did more to di vide the rebels than to unite them. The Saudi government, which deposited
many of its contributions into a CIA Swiss bank account, also gave direct support to several
fundamentalist groups. Sorne of these groups practiced Wahabbism, a puritanical brand of
Islam which was alien to the majority of Afghans.
Iran supported the Shiite rebels, who played an important military role in the western part
of the country but were left out of power-sharing arrangements made by the Sunni alliance in
Peshawar. For its part, the Pakistani military doled out a disproportionate amount of CIApurchased
weapons to Hekmatyar's radical Hizb-i Islami party, which often used the arms
against rival rebel groups.
The Jack of unity impeded rebel attempts to overthrow the PDPA. The more moderate, or
"traditionalist," rebel groups, such as those led by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Sayyid
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Ahmad Gailani, proposed finding a unifying leader, and they had a candidate: former king
Zahir Shah. ln July 1987, a poil conducted among Afghan refugees by the independent
Afghan Information Center indicated popular support for Zahir Shah as an alternative head of
state for Afghanistan. Hekmatyar and other leaders denounced the poil as propaganda by the
"monarchists." But U.S. officiais had evidence from their own observations and
conversations that many Afghans might unite around the former king for an interim period if
only to help find a more expedient way to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal and an end to the
war. Many Afghans also believed that the king, who they conceded could have been a
stronger leader during his 40-year reign, was someone they could rally around to oppose the
unpopular, but powerful, Hekmatyar. Diego Cordovez and his U.N. team also recognized the
king as a potential key to a seulement and kept in regular contact with Zahir Shah's
representatives at his Rome residence.
Pakistan, however, refused to grant Zahir Shah a visa and kept a close eye on pro-Zahir
activities. Pakistan 's President Zia and his supporters in the rnilitary were determined to put a
conservative Islamic ally in power in Kabul. U.S. officiais and private experts yielded to the
Pakistani military's objective, some supporting it, others rationalizing that the king's return
would do little good.
Sorne of these officiais argued that as a result of the war, Afghanistan had experienced a
social change: political power, they claimed, had shifted away from the tribal leaders, the
maliks, and the king's Mohammadzai clan and toward the mujahidin commanders and their
political/religious leaders in Peshawar. The Soviet presence and Islam, they reasoned, had
united Afghans of different tribes and ethnie groups to fight a common enemy. That unity
was soon put to a test.
On February 8, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev surprised the world by announcing that the
Soviet Union would withdraw its 100,000 troops from Afghanistan. Three days later, in the
rnidst of celebrations in Peshawar, Professor Sayyid Majruh, the man responsible for
conducting the controversial Afghan Information Center poil that had shown substantial
support for Zahir Shah, was assassinated in his office. His death, still a mystery, was soon
followed by a string of assassinations and acts of intimidation against other Afghan
intellectuals who shared one basic sentiment: they were almost as opposed to a
fundamentalist government in Afghanistan as they were a communist one. Divisions among
anti-government Afghans would only widen further.
The Geneva Accords and the Soviet Withdrawal
ln some ways the fragmented nature of the rebel movement worked to its advantage for much
of the war. The USSR could find no central rebel base of operations to bomb, no one strategy
planning meeting to infiltrate, no single popular leader to negotiate with- or eliminate. The
mujahidin's steady harassment came from ail directions in this war without borders. Gen.
Boris Gromov, the last commander of the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan, boasted on his
last day in the country that "[n]o Soviet garrison or major outpost was ever overrun."@ ) In
this guerrilla war, however, that proved irrelevant.
By late 1986, the Kremlin decided that the war had become too costly. Hundreds of
thousands of Soviet men had rotated in and out of service in Afghanistan and brought home
all the signs of a losing, unpopular struggle: low morale, criticism of the government's
Afghan policy, drug and alcohol abuse, and more. The war also hit home in other ways.
Billions of rubles were spent on Afghanistan instead of the crumbling Soviet economy. In the
troubled Central Asian republics, Soviet Musli ms had corne into contact with the Afghan
jihad when, at various points during the war, rebel bands crossed the sensitive Soviet border
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to foment unrest among the Islamic population. The impact of the Afghan war on Soviet
Musli ms' la ter demands for independence remains unclear.
The Soviet Union was also changing its approach toward the Third World. Gorbachev and
his advisors, faced with staggering economic problems, thought that previous Soviet
administrations had given too much unconditional support to Third World governments,
some of which seemed to rel y more on Soviet aid than broadly based domestic support.
Gorbachev decided to tie future foreign assistance to certain understandings, one being that
the recipient government had to concentrate on building a broad base of support before
implementing social and economic reforms.
Afghanistan, which enjoyed a special position in Moscow's strategy to protect the Soviets
Union's sensitive southern border, was no exception to Gorbachev's new Third World policy.
In December 1986, Gorbachev informed Afghan President Najibullah in Moscow that the
Soviet military commitment to his government was "limited."(21) Najibullah returned to
Kabul and immediately launched a policy called "national reconciliation," an effort to
broaden the government's political support base. He announced a cease-fire and an amnesty
for armed oppositionists.~ ) But the war went on.
Documents show that some U.S. officiais in Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Kabul
remained unconvinced of Soviet intentions to withdraw for quite some time. In some cases,
suspicions of Moscow's ultimate objectives lingered until the very end of the Soviet pull-out.
In November 1988, three months before the withdrawal was to be completed, a top official in
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul claimed that the Soviet leadership might cancel their pull-out to
prevent Najibullah's government from unraveling. Although most of his colleagues
disagreed, the diplomat's suspicion illustrates a point: U.S. policy toward Afghanistan right
up to the end of the Soviet occupation was based on a deep mis trust of Moscow's goals, a
mistrust which continued well after the withdrawal. Policy-makers argued that if Moscow
succeeded in keeping the PDPA in power, then "excessive" Soviet influence in Afghanistan
would continue. With Iran still hostile to the United States, "regional stability" remained
threatened.
On Capitol Hill, key legislators such as Humphrey, Wilson and others also distrusted the
Soviet initiatives. Months before the U.N.-sponsored Geneva Accords were to be signed in
April 1988, they galvanized enough congressional support to stop the White House from
guaranteeing the agreement until President Reagan had promised to continue arming the
mujahidin even after the USSR had withdrawn. As a co-guarantor of the accords, the United
States was obligated to eut aid to the rebels on the first day of the pull-out. Humphrey and
others protested that this would leave the rebels at a military disadvantage since Kabul would
continue receiving aid from Moscow. Secretary of State George Shultz took this matter up
with Soviet officiais suggesting that both sides cease supplying their respective clients when
the withdrawal began, a proposai he called "negative restraint."
The Soviet Union and Najibullah refused, unwilling to accord the Afghan rebels the same
legitimacy as the Afghan government. Soviet and Afghan officiais, however, fearing a
possible rebel onslaught following the Soviet withdrawal, tried desperately to negotiate a
power-sharing agreement with the mujahidin leaders. The rebels refused, calling the offer a
ploy to keep the PDPA in power. Due to congressional pressure and over Soviet objections,
the United States created a separate, unwritten "clause" to the Geneva Accords which
stipulated that Washington could aid the rebels as long as the Soviet Union aided Kabul. The
United States called this stipulation "positive symmetry."
Other complications almost prevented the signing of the accords. At the last minute, after
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the United Nations had convinced the Soviet Union to drop its demand for a coalition
government as a precondition to signing, Pakistan insisted on the formation of a rebeldominated
interim government, made up largely of rebel and other non-PDPA elements,
before it would sign. President Reagan called President Zia and assured him that the United
States would stand by the rebels until they seized power, and that since the USSR was
probably going to withdraw with or without an agreement, Pakistan ought to sign. Besides,
the White House had been advised that the PDPA would fall to the rebels shortly after Soviet
troops had gone.
On April 14, 1988, the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed-with the USSR
and the United States acting as their co-guarantors-to refrain from any form of interference
in each other's territory, and to give ail Afghan refugees the opportunity to return voluntarily
to their homeland. For their part, the superpowers pledged to stop interfering in Afghanistan,
with the USSR agreeing to withdraw its troops. Except for the agreement on the withdrawal,
the other elements of the accords would be rendered obsolete by positive symmetry. To
Washington, however, that seemed not to matter, for a rebel military victory appeared to be
right around the corner. On May 15, 1988, Soviet troops began their ten month withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
Notes
Part 1. The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian
Documents and Memoirs
Part 2. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet Warin Afghanistan:
Declassified
1. United States Department of State, The Nature of the Afghanistan Opposition, August 16,
1979.
2. David Gibbs, "Does the USSR Have a Grand Strategy?" Journal of Peace Research,
Volume 24, Number 1, 1987: p. 368.
3. United States Department of State, Elements ofU.S. Policy toward Afghanistan, March
27, 1962.
4. United States Department of State, Annual Policy Assessment, March 9, 1976.
5. Maxwell J. Fry, The Afghan Economy. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1974, p. 4.
6. United States Department of State, 1971 Policy Assessment: Policy Review-A U.S.
Strategy for the 1970s, June 26, 1971.
7. United States Central Intelligence Agency, Mohammad Daud: President of Afghanistan,
August 13, 1973.
8. United States Department of State, Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment, January
30, 1978.
9. United States Department of State, The Afghan Coup, April 30, 1988.
10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser.
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New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p. 427.
11. Author's interview with Pakistani military official, Peshawar, Pakistan, November 1988.
12. United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Commentary, January 7, 1980.
13. "Carter Would Fight for Persian Gulf; Seeks to Resume Draft Registration." Washington
Post, January 24, 1980.
14. Author's interview with present and former U.S. officiais, Washington, D.C., 1988-1989.
15. Author's interview with Viacheslav I. Dashichev, Moscow, November 1988.
16. United States Department of State, Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 1980.
17. Selig S. Harrison, "Inside the Afghan Talks." Foreign Policy, Fall 1988: p. 41.
18. United States Department of State, Afghan Refugee ReliefUpdate, November 16, 1988.
19. Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistan: Population Problems and Political Stability,
November 1982.
20. Author's interview with U.S. Embassy advisor, Peshawar, Pakistan, November 1988.
21 . United States Arrny, Impact of the Stinger Missile on Soviet and Resistance Tactics in
Afghanistan, March 1989.
22. United States Departrnent of State, Nature of the Afghan Opposition, August 16, 1979.
23. United States Arrny, Lessons from the Warin Afghanistan, June 1989.
24. "A Diplomatie Solution to Stalernate: Gorbachev Never Wedded to the War." Washington
Post, April 17, 1988.
25. Ibid.
20 sur 20
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Annex 27
R. Erlich, “U.S. Tells Iran: Become a Nuclear Power”, Foreign Policy in Focus,
28 November 2007
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U.S. Tells Iran: Become a Nuclear Power
• fpif.org /us_ tells iran become a_ nuclear _power/
By Reese Erlich . Edited by Erik Leaver , November 28, 2007
Editors note: The fol/owing is an excerpt from The Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U. S. Policy and The Middle
East Crisis (PoliPointPress, 2007).
Top Democratic and Republican leaders absolutely believe that Iran is planning to develop nuclear
weapons. And one of their seemingly strongest arguments involves a process of deduction. Since Iran
has so much oil, they argue, why develop nuclear power?
ln an op-ed commentary former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote that "for a major oil producer such as
Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources," a position later cited approvingly by the Bush
administration.
But U.S. leaders are engaging in a massive case of collective amnesia, or perhaps more accurately, intentional
misdirection. ln the 1970s the United States encouraged Iran to develop nuclear power precisely because Iran
will eventually run out of oil.
A declassified document from President Gerald Ford's administration, for
which Kissinger was Secretary of State, supported lran's push for nuclear
power. The document noted that Tehran should "prepare against the timeabout
15 years in the future- when lranian oil production is expected to
decline sharply." The United States ultimately planned to sell billions of
dollars worth of nuclear reactors, spare parts and nuclear fuel to Iran.
The Shah even periodically hinted that he wanted Iran to build nuclear
weapons. ln June 1974, the Shah proclaimed that Iran would have nuclear
weapons "without a doubt and sooner than one would think." lranian
embassy officiais in France later denied the Shah made those remarks, and
the Shah disowned them. But a few months later the Shah noted that Iran
"has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began
building them, then Iran might have to reconsider its policy."
If an lranian leader made such statements today, the United States and
Israel would denounce them as proof of nefarious intent. They might well
threaten military action if Iran didn't immediately hait its nuclear buildup. At
the time, however, the comments caused no ripples in Washington or Tel Aviv because the Shah was a staunch
ally of both.
Nukes and Party-Mad Dictators
ln the 1970s, successive U.S. administrations were tickled pink with the Shah's regime. As far as the United
States was concerned, the Shah had a stable government that was modernizing an economically and religiously
backward society. True, he ran a brutal dictatorship unconstrained by elections or an independent judiciary. The
National Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK), his secret police, was infamous for torturing and
murdering political dissidents. But the Shah made sure that Iran provided a steady supply of petroleum to U.S.
and other western oil companies. He had his own regional ambitions and also acted as a gendarme for the
United States.
But beginning in the late 1960s, the Shah began to worry about lran's long-term electric energy supplies. Iran
had less than 500,000 electricity consumers in 1963, but those numbers swelled to over 2 million in 1976. The
Shah worried that lran's oil deposits would eventually run out, and that burning petroleum for electricity would
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waste an important resource. He could earn far more exporting oil than using it for power generation.
Successive Republican and Democratic administrations in the United States backed the Shah's elaborate plans
to make nuclear power an integral part of lran's electrical grid, in no small part because he would buy a lot of his
nuclear equipment from the USA.
The United States established lran's first research reactor in 1967 at Tehran University. ln November of that year,
the U.S. corporation United Nuclear provided Iran with 5.85kg of 93 percent enriched uranium.
General Electric and Westinghouse ultimately won contracts to build eight reactors in Iran. By the time of the
lranian revolution in 1979, the Shah had plans to buy a total of eighteen nuclear power reactors from the United
States, France, and Germany.
Evidence has emerged since the 1979 lranian revolution that the Shah did more than make embarrassing public
references to building nuclear weapons. Documents show that Israel and Iran had discussed modification of
lsrael's Jericho missiles, which could have been fitted with a nuclear warhead. A research report from The
Nuclear Threat Initiative, an organization founded by conservative Democrat and former Senator Sam Nunn,
explained that the Shah was suspected of experimenting with nuclear weapons design, plutonium extraction and
laser-enrichment research.
Nuclear expert Sahimi argued that presidents Nixon and Ford "would not have minded if the Shah developed the
bomb because the Shah was a close ally of the United States. Remember Iran had a long border with the Soviet
Union. If the Shah did make a nuclear bomb, that would have been a big deterrent against the USSR."
Since the United States wasn't terribly concerned about an lranian Bomb in the 1970s, it also wasn't worried
about Iran enriching its own uranium. The United States gave approval when Shah bought a 25 percent stake in
a French company making enriched uranium. But the Shah wanted to build enrichment facilities inside Iran as
well. No country wants to be reliant on others for fuel that could shut down a portion of its electricity grid. The
United States actually encouraged Iran to enrich its own uranium.
Today when Iran demands that it be able to enrich uranium for nuclear power purposes, under strict international
supervision, the United States says that's proof Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons.
1s Nuclear Power lslamic?
Shortly after coming to power, lran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini scrapped the Shah's nuclear
power programs as un-lslamic. ln tact, he called nuclear power "the work of the devil."
Not coincidentally, the United States and Europeans had completely halted their devil's work in Iran. Germany
had stopped construction on the Bushehr nuclear reactor. The United States, Germans and French eut off
supplies of equipment and nuclear material. Ali three governments refused to refund any money already paid,
despite cancellation of the nuclear contracts. So while Koranic scholars might disagree on whether nuclear
power was consistent with Islam, as a practical matter, Iran wasn't getting any.
Starting in 1980, Iran fought a bloody war with Iraq. Each side feared the other might develop nuclear weapons.
Iraq repeatedly bombed lran's unfinished nuclear facilities, further setting back any possibility of completing
them.
By the end of the war in 1988 Iran was in the midst of a population explosion. lran's population grew from 39.2
million in 1980 to 68.7 million in 2006. lran's energy planners could see that demand would far outstrip supply.
Continuing to extract oil and natural gas at the projected levels wouldn't be enough to guarantee a steady supply
of electricity. An analysis by a National Academy of Sciences scientist predicted Iran could run out of oil to export
by 2015.
So nuclear power was back on the table. ln 1989 lranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani signed a ten-point
agreement with the USSR to provide nuclear materials and related equipment. The Soviets were to finish the
Bushehr reactor started by the Germans in the 1970s. ln 1990 Iran signed a ten-year nuclear cooperation
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agreement with China.
Although it was kept secret at the time, Iran also bought parts and technology from A.Q. Khan, Pakistan's socalled
father of the atomic bomb, who also had nuclear dealings with Libya and North Korea. Iran built a secret
nuclear facility in the central lranian city of Natanz. Later, after three years of inspections, the IAEA also
determined that Iran had used lasers to purify uranium starting in 1991 and had researched a rare element
called polonium 210, which could be used in a nuclear bomb trigger.
The lranians argued they engaged in the secret activity to prevent the United States from stopping their plans for
nuclear power development, and had no intention of developing nuclear weapons.
ln 2003 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa, an official religious ruling, that declared Islam
forbids the building or stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Before dismissing such a ruling as propaganda, it's worth
noting that similar religious reasoning stopped Iran from using chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war,
despite Saddam Hussein's numerous chemical assaults against lranian troops and civilians.
Iran Is Just 5-10 Years from Making a Bomb, Really
Every few years U.S. intelligence officiais estimate Iran is just years from making a bomb. ln 1995, a "senior
U.S. official" estimated Iran was five years from making The Bomb. A 2005 National Security Estimate,
representing a consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, predicted Iran could have The Bomb somewhere
around 2015.
ln early 2006 lsraeli intelligence, on the other hand, argued that Iran is much doser to having a bomb, perhaps
one to three years away. ln citing such estimates, the U.S. media don't provide any corroboration, nor explain
why the lsraeli assessment differs so widely from the CIA and IAEA. lndeed, Israel keeps postponing its
estimates of when Iran will have the bomb. At the end of 2006 Meir Dagan, head of the Mossad intelligence
agency, claimed Iran could have a bomb by 2009 or 2010.
lsrael's estimates are clearly influenced by its political and military goals. Using Ahmadinejad's statements
attacking Israel and questioning the existence of the Holocaust, Israel proclaims Iran an immediate military
threat. ln reality, Ahmadinejad poses no offensive nuclear threat to Israel. Iran would be insane to launch a first
strike against the militarily far superior Israel, let alone a nuclear strike with an arsenal of one or two bombs.
Such an action would give the United States and Israel a political excuse to wreck havoc on Iran and gain lots of
international support.
But Israel does have a vested interest in creating anxiety around a possible lranian Bomb. While Iran has no
ability to wipe Israel off the map, it does support the Palestinian group Hamas and the Lebanese political party
and guerrilla group Hezbollah. Iran gives them political, financial and military backing. Israel doesn't want to
suffer another defeat like its 2006 war against Hizbollah. So rather than give up occupied territory and agree to
establishing a Palestinian state, lsraeli leaders blame outsiders. Israel seeks to weaken or, preferably, overthrow
lran's government.
lsraeli officiais, along with U.S. hawks, argue that Iran will soon reach "a point of no return," in which they have
bath the theoretical knowledge and practical ability to create weapon's grade plutonium. After that point, the
hawks argue, Iran must be confronted militarily. The advantage of this argument, of course, is that it's ail
hypothetical. The lranians cross this point of no return at whatever time the hawks allege. Who can prove
otherwise?
ln the spring of 2006 Bush seemed to echo those sentiments, justifying a military attack by setting an impossibly
high bar for Iran to meet. 'The world is united and concerned about their [lranians] desire to have not only a
nuclear weapon, but the capacity to make a nuclear weapon or the knowledge as to how to make a nuclear
weapon .. . , " (emphasis added)Bush said in an April 2006 press conference. No one can possibly prove what
knowledge scientists might have in their brains. But according to Bush's logic, Iran is a dangerous enemy so
long as its scientists might, at some time in the future, think about building a bomb.
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On July 31, 2006, the United States rounded up European powers, and got China and Russia to acquiesce, to
pass UN Security Council Resolution 1696. The resolution demanded that Iran stop "ail enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities." (Reprocessing involves removing highly radioactive plutonium from nuclear waste
products, a procedure that can lead to production of bomb-grade fuel.) A month later, in a report not released to
the public, IAEA Director EIBaradei indicated that Iran was not reprocessing uranium.
EIBaradei criticized Iran, however, for continued attempts at uranium enrichment. "Iran has not addressed the
long outstanding verification issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated
with some of its activities .. . ," wrote EIBaradei.
An IAEA official told the New York Times that "the qualitative and quantitative development of lran's enrichment
program continues to be fairly limited ."
The IAEA report was hardly a smoking gun. But the Bush Administration huffed and puffed that lran's failure to
uphold the Security Council resolution meant the world should impose more sanctions. On March 24, 2007, the
UN Security Council voted to impose another round of sanctions, prohibiting the sale of lranian weapons to other
countries and freezing the overseas assets of more lranian individuals and organizations.
The United States failed to get any backing for military attacks on Iran to enforce the sanctions. The March
resolution even restated the UN position that the Middle East region should be nuclear free, a criticism of lsrael's
large nuclear arsenal.
U.S. officiais told the New York Times that the new sanctions went beyond the nuclear issue. "The new language
was written to rein in what they [U.S. officiais] see as Tehran's ambitions to become the dominant military power
in the Persian Gulf and across the Middle East."
Apparently, no one can hold that job except the United States.
No Nukes? Not Enough
The real dispute between the United States and Iran has little to do with lran's ability to develop nuclear
weapons. The Bush administration declared Iran to be part of the "axis of evil" and has been pursuing a policy of
"regime change," a euphemism for the U.S. overthrow of an internationally recognized government. The United
States has adopted different tactical positions, sometimes calling for tightening sanctions, other times
threatening military strikes. But the long-term goal is installing a friendly regime.
Let's say Iran stopped ail nuclear programs tomorrow, which was verified by international inspectors. The United
States could start a new campaign based on its current claim that Iran is "the most active sponsor of state
terrorism" in the world. Iran could give terrorist groups chemical weapons. Iran has missiles capable of hitting Tel
Aviv and U.S. military bases in the Middle East. Iran presents an immediate danger because of its support for
terrorism. Time for regime change.
ls Iran currently developing nuclear weapons? No. Could it do so sometime in the future? Sure. According to the
EIBaradei, some 49 countries "now know how to make nuclear arms," including Japan, South Korea, and other
U.S. allies. Neither the United States nor the UN Security Council can militarily prevent each of those countries
from making a bomb, said EIBaradei. "We are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these
countries, intentions which are in turn based on their sense of security .... "
The only way to insure Iran doesn't make nuclear weapons is to devise a political, not a military solution. If the
people of Iran have a government that truly represents them, and the United States ceases its hostility and
negotiates in good faith, Iran won't see a need to develop nuclear weapons.
So What Would You Do?
First, no more demonizing Iran. 1 would apologize for years of U.S. aggression against Iran. 1 would offer to
return the billions of dollars in illegally frozen lranian assets now held by the United States, lift ail existing
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sanctions against Iran and offer to restore full diplomatie relations. That would get lran's attention. More
importantly, it would set the basis for easing tensions on issues such as nuclear weapons.
1 would announce plans to reduce the unconscionable number of nuclear weapons maintained by the United
States in violation of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Most Americans have no idea that the Non Proliferation Treaty
not only limits other states from obtaining nuclear weapons but also requires disarmament by the existing
nuclear states, including the United States.
Then I would do something neither side expects. 1 would tell them we will phase out our nuclear power reactors
for safety reasons and because we can't safely store nuclear waste. Nuclear power plants in the United States
aren't even hardened against an airplane crash, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission refuses to require it.
Then I would suggest that Iran not develop nuclear power. Nuclear reactors and their tons of radioactive waste
are disasters waiting to happen. Iran is already planning to have 20 percent of its electricity supplied by hydro
power by 2021 . Iran has the potential to develop a lot more wind and geo thermal power as well. ln the
meantime Iran could harness its tremendous natural gas resources as a relatively efficient source of electricity
generation.
1 don't know how lranian leaders would react. These suggestions would certainly spark a lot of discussion
among lranians, a debate now largely nonexistent. Journalist and opposition leader Akbar Ganji is one of the few
lranians I met concerned about the safety of nuclear plants. "I am very worried that something like Chernobyl will
happen to Iran," he told me. "If that happens, the lranian people will pay the heaviest price."
1 would like to see Ganji's views prevail. But if after a genuine debate, lranians decided they wanted nuclear
power, so be it.
The IAEA has procedures that allow countries to develop nuclear power, subject to strict international inspection.
On March 23, 2005, Iran offered a plan to Britain, France, and Germany that would have allowed Iran to develop
nuclear power and engage in uranium enrichment. Iran agreed not to reprocess nuclear fuel, produce only lowenriched
uranium, limit the number of centrifuges and guarantee on-site inspections by the IAEA. Thal proposai
could serve as the basis for honest negotiations.
Should the world simply trust lran's leaders? No. We don't have to assume good faith. The IAEA is quite capable
of detecting NPT violations because radioactive particles inevitably show up in water and soil. Over a period of
time, and allowed full access, the IAEA can detect illegal nuclear activity. Since even U.S. intelligence agencies
agree Iran is many years from having a capability of building a bomb, why not allow the IAEA to do its job?
ln the long run, the people of Iran must change their government and revisit the nuclear power issue. 1 hope they
choose to develop safer forms of energy. But that's a decision to be made by the people of Iran, not rulers in
Washington.
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Annex 28
“Obama says on Iran all options on the table”, Reuters, 21 April 2009
- 232 -
- 233 -
Obama says on Iran all options on the table
www.reuters.com /article/idUSWAT011302
in 8 years
Obama says on Iran ail options on the table
April 21 , 2009 / 4:08 PM/ in 8 years
WASHINGTON, April 21 (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama said on Tuesday he wanted direct diplomacy with
long-time foe Iran but without taking other options off the table.
Obama also condemned as "appalling and objectionable" lranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's denunciation
of Israel as a racist state at a U.N. conference on Monday.
(Reporting by Matt Spetalnick; Editing by Doina Chiacu)
1 /1
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- 235 -
Annex 29
J. Becker, “U.S. Approved Business with Blacklisted Nations”, New York Times, 23
December 2010
- 236 -
- 237 -
U.S. Approved Business With Blacklisted Nations
t'li: www.nytimes.com /2010/12/24/world/24sanctions.html
By JO BECKER
Despite sanctions and !rade embargoes, over the past decade the United States government has allowed American
companies to do billions of dollars in business with Iran and other countries blacklisted as state sponsors of
terrorism, an examination by The New York Times has found.
At the behest of a hast of companies - tram Kraft Food and Pepsi to some of the nation's largest banks - a littleknown
office of the Treasury Department has granted nearly 10,000 licenses for deals involving countries that have
been cast into economic purgatory, beyond the reach of American business.
Most of the licenses were approved under a decade-old law mandating that agricultural and medical humanitarian
aid be exempted from sanctions. But the law, pushed by the farm lobby and other industry groups, was written so
broadly that allowable humanitarian aid has included cigarettes, Wrigley's gum, Louisiana hot sauce, weight-loss
remedies, body-building supplements and sports rehabilitation equipment sold to the institute that trains lran's
Olympie athletes.
Hundreds of other licenses were approved because they passed a litmus test: They were deemed to serve American
foreign policy goals. And many clearly do, among them deals to provide famine relief in North Korea or to improve
Internet connections - and nurture democracy - in Iran. But the examination also found cases in which the
foreign-policy benefits were considerably less clear.
ln one instance, an American company was permitted to bid on a pipeline job that would have helped Iran sell
natural gas to Europe, even though the United States opposes such projects. Severa! other American businesses
were permitted to deal with foreign companies believed to be involved in terrorism or weapons proliferation. ln one
such case, involving equipment bought by a medical waste disposai plant in Hawaii, the government was preparing
to deny the license until an influential politician intervened.
ln an interview, the Obama administration's point man on sanctions, Stuart A. Levey, said that focusing on the
exceptions "misses the forest for the trees." lndeed, the exceptions represent only a small counterweight to the
overall force of America's trade sanctions, which are among the toughest in the world. Now they are particularly
focused on Iran, where on top of a broad embargo that prohibits most trade, the United States and its allies this year
adopted a new round of sanctions that have effectively shut Iran off from much of the international financial system.
"No one can doubt that we are serious about this," Mr. Levey said.
But as the administration tries to press Iran even harder to abandon its nuclear program - officiais this week
announced several new sanctions measures - some diplomats and foreign affairs experts worry that by allowing
the sale of even small-ticket items with no military application, the United States muddies its moral and diplomatie
authority.
"lt's nota bad thing to grant exceptions if it represents a conscious policy decision to give countries an incentive,"
said Stuart Eizenstat, who oversaw sanctions policy for the Clinton administration when the humanitarian-aid law
was passed. "But when you create loopholes like this that you can drive a Mack truck through, you are giving
countries something for nothing, and they just laugh in their teeth. 1 think there have been abuses."
What's more, in countries like Iran where elements of the government have assumed contrai over large portions of
the economy, it is increasingly difficult to separate exceptions that help the people from those that enrich the state.
lndeed, records show that the United States has approved the sale of luxury food items to chain stores owned by
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blacklisted banks, despite requirements that potential purchasers be scrutinized for just such connections.
Enforcement of America's sanctions rests with Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, which can make
exceptions with guidance from the State Department. The Treasury office resisted disclosing information about the
licenses, but after The Times filed a federal Freedom of Information lawsuit, the government agreed to turn over a
list of companies granted exceptions and, in a little more than 100 cases, underlying files explaining the nature and
details of the deals. The process took three years, and the government heavily redacted many documents, saying
they contained trade secrets and persona! information. Still, the files offer a snapshot - albeit a piecemeal one - of
a system that at times appears out of sync with its own licensing policies and America's goals abroad.
ln some cases, licensing rules failed to keep pace with changing diplomatie circumstances. For instance, American
companies were able to import cheap blouses and raw material for steel from North Korea because restrictions
loosened when that government promised to renounce its nuclear weapons program and were not recalibrated after
the agreement fell apart.
Mr. Levey, a Treasury under secretary who held the same job in the Bush administration, pointed out that the United
States did far less business with Iran than did China or Europe; in the first quarter of this year, 0.02 percent of
American experts went to Iran. And while it is "a fair policy question" to ask whether Congress's definition of
humanitarian aid is overly broad, he said, the exception has helped the United States argue that it opposes lran's
government, not its people. That, in turn, has helped build international support for the tightly focused financial
sanctions.
Beyond that, he and the licensing office's director, Adam Szubin, said the agency's other, case-by-case,
determinations often reflected a desire to balance sanctions policy against the realities of the business world, where
companies may unwittingly find themselves in transactions involving blacklisted entities.
"I haven't seen any licenses that I thought we should have done differently," Mr. Szubin said.
Behind a 2000 Law
For all the speechifying about humanitarian aid that attended its passage, the 2000 law allowing agricultural and
medical exceptions to sanctions was ultimately the product of economic stress and political pressure. American
farmers, facing sharp declines in commodity prices and experts, hoped to offset their losses with sales to blacklisted
countries.
The law defined allowable agricultural experts as any product on a list maintained by the Agriculture Department,
which went beyond traditional humanitarian aid like seed and grain and included products like beer, soda, utility
poles and more loosely defined categories of "food commodities" and "food additives."
Even before the law's final passage, companies and their lobbyists inundated the licensing office with claims that
their products fit the bill.
Take, for instance, chewing gum, sold in a number of blacklisted countries by Mars Inc., which owns Wrigley's. "We
debated that one for a month. Was it food? Did it have nutritional value? We concluded it did," Hal Eren, a former
senior sanctions adviser at the licensing office, recalled before pausing and conceding, "We were probably rolled on
that issue by outside forces."
While Cuba was the primary focus of the initial legislative push, Iran, with its relative wealth and large population,
was also a promising prospect. American experts, virtually nonexistent before the law's passage, have totaled more
than $1 . 7 billion sin ce.
ln response to questions for this article, companies argued that they were operating in full accordance with American
law.
2/5
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An lranian man shopping at a store in Tehran, where products from Dole, which has a sanctions
exemptions, are sold. Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse - Getty Images
Henry Lapidas, export manager for the American Pop Corn Company, acknowledged that calling the Jolly lime
popcorn he sold in Sudan and Iran a humanitarian good was "pushing the envelope," though he did give it a try. "lt
depends on how you look at it - popcorn has fibers, which are helpful to the digestive system," he explained, before
switching to a different tack. "What's the harm?" he asked, adding that he didn't think lranian soldiers "would be
taking microwavable popcorn" to war.
Even the sale of benign goods can benefit bad actors, though, which is why the licensing office and State
Department are required to check the purchasers of humanitarian aid products for links to terrorism. But that does
not always happen.
ln its application to sell sait substitutes, marinades, food colorings and cake sprinkles in Iran, McCormick & Co.
listed a number of chain stores that planned to buy its products. A quick check of the Web site of one store, Refah,
revealed that its major investors were banks on an American blacklist. The government of Tehran owns Shahrvand,
another store listed in the license. A third chain store, Ghods, draws many top officiais from the lslamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps, which the United States considers a terrorist organization.
The licensing office's director, Mr. Szubin, said that given his limited resources, they were better spent on stopping
weapons technology from reaching Iran. Even if the connections in the McCormick case had corne to light, he said,
he still might have had to approve the license: the law requires him to do so unless he can prove that the investors
engaged in terrorist activities own more than half of a company.
"Are we checking end users? Yes," he said. "But are we doing corporate due diligence on every lranian importer?
No."
A McCormick spokesman, Jim Lynn, said, "We were not aware of the information you shared with us and are looking
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into il."
Political Influence
Beyond the humanitarian umbrella, the agency has wide discretion to make case-by-case exceptions. Sometimes,
political influence plays a role in those deliberations, as in a case involving Senator Daniel lnouye of Hawaii and a
medical-waste disposai plant in Honolulu.
On July 28, 2003, the plant's owner, Samuel Liu, ordered 200 graphite electrodes from a Chinese governmentowned
company, China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation. ln an interview, Mr. Liu said he had chosen
the company because the electrodes available in the United States were harder to find and more expensive. Two
days later, the Bush administration barred American citizens from doing business with the Chinese company, which
had already been penalized repeatedly for providing missile technology to Pakistan and Iran.
By the time Customs seized the electrodes on Nov. 5, waste was piling up in the sun. Nor did prospects look good for
Mr. Liu's application to the licensing office seeking to do an end run around the sanctions. On Nov. 21 , a State
Department official, Ralph Palmiero, recommended that the agency deny the request since the sanctions explicitly
mandated the "termination of existing contracts" like Mr. Liu's.
Thal is when Senator lnouye's office stepped in. While his electrodes were at sea, Mr. Liu had made his tirs! ever
political contribution, giving the senator's campaign $2,000. Mr. Liu says the timing was coincidental, that he was
simply feeling more politically inclined. Records show that an lnouye aide called the licensing office on Mr. Liu's
behalf the same day that Mr. Palmiero recommended denying the application. The senator himself wrote two days
later.
Mr. lnouye's spokesman, Peter Boylan, said the contribution had "no impact whatsoever" on the senator's actions,
which he said were motivated solely by concern for the community's health and welfare.
The pressure appears to have worked. The following day, the licensing office's directorat the lime asked the State
Department to reconsider in an e-mail that prominently noted the senator's interest. A few days later, the State
Department found that the purchase qualified for a special "medical and humanitarian" exception.
The license was issued Dec. 10. Two months later, Mr. Liu sent the senator another $2,000 contribution, the
maximum allowable. Mr. Levey said he could no! comment on the details of a decision predating his tenure. But he
noted that sanctions against the Chinese company had since been toughened, and added, "Certainly this
transaction wouldn't be authorized today."
Curious Exemptions
Mr. Liu's license is hardly the only one to raise questions about how the government determines that a license
serves American foreign policy.
There is also, for instance, the case of lrisl, an lranian government-owned shipping line that the United States
blacklisted in 2008, charging that because il routinely used front companies and misleading terms to shroud
shipments of banned arms and other technology with military uses, il was impossible to tell whether its shipments
were "licit or illicit."
Less than nine months earlier, the licensing office had permitted a Japanese subsidiary of Citibank to carry out the
very type of transaction it was now warning against. Records show that the bank had agreed to confirm a letter of
credit guaranteeing payment to a Malaysian exporter upon delivery of what were described as split-system airconditioners
to a Turkish importer. Though the government had yet to blacklist lrisl, sanctions rules already
prohibited dealings with lranian companies. So when the bank learned that the goods were to be shipped aboard the
lrisl-owned Iran 11am, it sought a license.
4/5
- 241 -
The license was granted, even though the Treasury Department's investigation of lrisl was well under way and the
United States had reason to be suspicious of the Iran 11am in particular; that summer, the ship had attracted the
attention of the intelligence community when it delivered a lathe used to make nuclear centrifuge parts from China to
Iran, according to government officiais who requested anonymity to speak about a previously unpublicized
intelligence matter.
Mr. Szubin said that since the blacklisting of lrisl, his agency had forced banks to extricate themselves from such
transactions. But at the time the Citibank license was issued, his agency regularly issued licenses in cases like this
one, where at the time of the transaction, the bank had no way of knowing that lrisl was involved and where the
shipping line would be paid by a foreign third party anyway. To depart from the norm, he said, risked facing a lawsuit
charging unfair treatment and tipping lrisl off that it was under investigation.
But if the government has sometimes been willing to grant American businesses a break, some companies have
recently decided that the cost to their reputations outweighs the potential profit.
General Electric, which has been one of the leading recipients of licenses, says it has stopped all but humanitarian
business in countries listed as sponsors of terrorism and has promised to donate its profits from Iran to charity.
As Joshua Kamens, the head of a company called Anndorll, put it, he knew from almost the minute he applied for a
license to sell sugar in Iran that "it would corne back to haunt me." Although he received the go-ahead, he decided to
back out of the deal.
''l'rn an American," he said. "Even though it's legal to sell that type of product, 1 didn't want to have any trade with a
country like Iran."
5/5
- 242 -
- 243 -
Annex 30
J. Becker, “Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut”, New York Times,
24 December 2010
- 244 -
- 245 -
Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut
fii: www.nytimes.com /'nteractive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html
By JO BECKER
• Examples of Licenses Details from more than 100 cases where exemptions were granted.
• Top Licensees Nearly 300 companies received five or more exemptions.
Company
3M Company
540 Sports and
Entertainment
Afghan
American
Trading
Company Inc.
AirSep
Corporation
Albemarle
Corporation
Alcoa Inc.
Alltech Inc.
Exemption
Jacqueline Berry, a spokeswoman for 3M, said the company received this license to sell certain
medical and dental products to civilian populations in Iran. Il separately received another license
to sell specialized window film to a United Nations building in Sudan.
This license authorized 540 Sports and Entertainment to place American basketball players on
lranian teams. When 540's owner, John Spencer, first received a phone call from an lranian
sports agent inquiring about such placements, he thought that the man was joking. But since
then, he said, he has placed a number of professional players on teams in Iran. On average, the
men were paid $7,000 to $40,000 per month, Mr. Spencer said. The United States has long
supported such "sports diplomacy," and while relations between the United States and Iran are
testy, Mr. Spencer said he found that everyday lranians "are fascinated with our culture, just as
we should be fascinated with theirs."
Abdul Akbarzai, who answered the phone and identified himself as the owner of this company,
said he was not in charge when this license granting an exception to America's sanctions
against the Taliban was issued. Before hanging up, he said that il was a registered foreign
company and that the man who was in charge had been transferred back to Afghanistan.
Helen Ying and Larry Hughes, who head AirSep's medical and industrial divisions, said the
company had received licenses to sell products like an oxygen machine that effectively turns a
room into an oxygen lent and central oxygen systems that supply entire hospitals. The company
uses a middleman in Iran, whom Mr. Hughes declined to name for competitive reasons, to make
the sales, and another company to do the installations. "lt's a hard way to do business," he said.
This license authorized the sale of ibuprofin in Iran.
"U.S. government officiais with intelligence and border security responsibilities" contacted Alcoa
in January 2006 to advise the company of a continuing investigation stemming from the belief
that one of ils customers in Turkey was acting as a purchasing agent on behalf of the
government of Iran, records show. The investigation was never publicly reported, but as a result
of this notification, Libby Archell, an Alcoa spokeswoman, said scheduled deliveries to that
customer were halted and the customer was notified that no additional shipments would be
forthcoming. A license was needed, however, so that Alcoa cou Id refund the eus tomer for goods
that had been paid for but not yet shipped "in order to avoid litigation and attendant 'discovery,' "
the license application states. Il is unclear what product Alcoa had been shipping to the Turkish
customer; OFAC redacted that information, and Ms. Archell declined to say. She said thatAlcoa
was "completely unaware" and had no way of knowing that ils customer was acting as a front
for the lranian government until the United States government informed the company of its
investigation. The company uses an "extremely thorough due dilligence process" to vet potential
customers, she said, adding that the customer in question was not al the lime on the
government's blacklist of sanctioned parties.
This license allowed Alltech to sell animal feed to Iran.
1/18
- 246 -
Alpha
International
Trading
Company
American
lngredients
Company
American Life
Inc.
American Pop
Corn Company
American Pulp
and Paper
Anndorll
Corporation
Archer Daniels
Midland
Company
Senator Elizabeth Dole, Republican of North Carolina, wrote in 2008 on behalf of this company,
which wanted to sell fluff pulp, a product that can be used in products like diapers, to Sarve
Caspian Hygienic Paper lndustry in Tehran. ln a letter to Mrs. Dole, Alpha's vice president
complained that he had been advised six weeks earlier that the State Department had approved
the license and that it would be issued pending some paperwork completion. "We have now
been advised by the OFAC that there is a hold on the issuance of licenses to do business into
Iran from the United States due to 'governmental policy matters.' We realize that foreign
diplomacy and policy making are complicated. We are simply a business making an effort to
export a qualified U.S. product to an overseas market." He added, "Our potential customers will
have to go to other supply options if we cannot supply U.S. product.'' The license was issued the
following month.
Senator Christopher S. Bond, Republican of Missouri, wrote to OFAC in 2004 on this company's
behalf, asking that it expedite its review. The company was seeking to export Vitamin and
Minerai Premix and a volumetric feeder to the Ministry of Health in Iran and said it was under a
"strict time schedule to receive our license from OFAC or we will not be able to participate in this
important project." The license was issued the following month.
American Lite received a license to process funds from EB-5 lranian visa applicants. The EB-5
visa program authorizes the United States to grant up to 10,000 immigrant visas per year
establishing permanent residence in the country to foreign citizens who make an investment of
$500,000 or more in a new business in the United States that creates at least 10 full-lime jobs
for American workers. "American Lite believes that the receipt and investment of funds in the
U.S. does serve the sanctions policy goal of depriving Iran and the lranian banks of economic
resources and reducing the amount of funds at their disposai," the company wrote.
TheAmerican Pop Corn Company, which makes Jolly lime microwavable popcorn, received
licenses to sell its product in Iran and the Sudan under a humanitarian exception for food and
medical aid. Henry Lapidos, the company's food products export manager, said he had no
problem selling to countries like these because it was good to "show the American flag" by
placing products like American Pop Corn's on supermarket shelves in places where antiAmerican
sentiment runs strong. "I don't see us supporting the ayatollahs. 1 don'! think the
Revolutionary Guard - that soliders would take microwavable popcorn in their backpacks when
they go to war," he said. Asked whether popcorn should be considered a humanitarian good
eligible for export exceptions, Mr. Lapidos answered this way: "Hairbrushes are not; iPods are
not. But popcorn? lt depends on how you look at it," he said. "Popcorn has fibers, which are
helpful to the digestive system. So it could be considered humanitarian, though it's pushing the
envelope."
This license authorized American Pulp and Paper to export wood pulp used for diapers to an
lranian company. According to the license, wood pulp was added by the United States
Department of Agriculture to the list of allowable exportable agricultural commodities in 2001.
Joshua Kamens, who heads Anndorll, said he knew his application to sell sugar in Iran "would
corne back to haunt me." An employee talked him into it at a time when "Iran was notas big of
an enemy to the U.S. as it is today," Mr. Kamens explained, "but it was getting there." Upon
reflection, he decided to back out of the transaction before it was completed. ''l'm an American,"
he said. "Even though it's legal to sell that type of product, 1 didn't want to have any trade with
countries like Iran."
This license authorized Archer Daniels Midland Company to fulfill a contractual obligation it had
in connection with a "string transaction." Companies enter into such transactions when they sell
goods on a commodities market. Often, they have no way of knowing where the goods will end
up. ln this case, Archer Daniels Midland found out that its goods were destined for Iran after it
entered into the transaction, according to its application. OFAC said it generallly grants licenses
in this type of situation because failing to do so could bring American commodities trading to a
hait.
2/18
- 247 -
Ardess
International
Aria Loghman
Company
Baghdad Oil
Training
lnstitute
Banca lntesa
Bank of
America
On ils Web site, Ardess International boasted of ils ability to do business "with any country in
the Middle East notwithstanding any trade sanctions." Ardess handles a number of companies
that sell weight-lifting products like Anabolic Rush, which promises to help bodybuilders "train
with a ferocity that radiales from every corner of the gym." Kenny Flores is a customer of Ardess
whose company, MRM, sells sports performance-enhancing supplements like Driven, a highperformance
workout concoction for "serious athletes that truly want to reach peak performance,
while annihilating their competition." Mr. Flores said getting approval from the lranian Ministry of
Health to sell his products there was harder than getting approval from OFAC, but that it was
well worth the effort. "Iran is a young country - close to 60 percent of the population is under 45
years of age, and they are very health conscious," he said, noting that his company had done
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of business there since obtaining the necessary
approvals. Mr. Flores said lran's nuclear ambitions are "scary" and something that 'Tm definitely
concerned about." But, he added, "as long as the government says it is O.K. to trade with them,
we will trade with them."
Carol Covert said she applied for a license because her husband needed to gel copies of his law
school transcripts from the University of Tehran, and the couple, who live in the United States,
had to pay someone to retrieve them. Aria Loghman was the middleman she paid, she said.
This license authorized the company to export drilling equipment for use in Iraq under the United
Nations Oil for Food Program. The program, notwithstanding international sanctions at that time,
established a mechanism whereby lraqi oil exports were supposed to finance humanitarian aid
to the country. The program was later widely criticized, amid accusations that some of its profits
unlawfully wound up in the coffers of the government of Iraq and in the pockets of United
Nations officiais.
On Aug. 21 , 2003, Banca lntessa blocked a transaction for an unknown amount from China
Precision Machinery Import Export to a second party. But a few months later, the bank was
given an OFAC license to release China Precision Machinery's funds to the other party in the
transaction.
This, despite the tact that the Chinese government-owned company had been sanctioned
multiple limes for providing sensitive technology to Iran and other countries under the Treasury
Department's weapons of mass destruction sanctions program. OFAC declined to say how
much money was released back to a company the United States has called a "serial
proliferator," citing the objections of a different party to the transaction, presumably Banca
lntesa. Within months of granting the license, OFAC again penalized China Precision Machinery
under its weapons of mass destruction program, this time based on "credible information" that it
and other companies had been transferring goods to Iran that could be used to "make a
'material contribution' to weapons of mass destruction or cruise missile or ballistic missile
systems." OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, said that at the time the license was granted to
Banca lntesa, the agency did not have the authority to keep the funds blocked; firms sanctioned
under the weapons of mass destruction sanctions regime face narrower penalties, such as
losing United States government contracts and losing the ability to export their products into the
United States. He said the amount in this case was small - under $10,000. And he noted that it
was not until several years later, with the levying of additional, tougher sanctions against the
Chinese company, that OFAC received the authority to order its funds frozen.
OFAC redacted so much of this license file that it is impossible to tell what exactly it authorized,
though what is clear is that it was related to another license, granted to BNP Paribas, involving
the acquisition of equipment that was of lranian origin. Bank of America, whiclh was financing
the deal, contended that the sale should be licensed because the goods had already been
exported to another country.
3/18
- 248 -
Bank of New
York Mellon
BearingPoint
Bechtel Aircraft
Ope rations
Becton,
Dickinson &
Company
Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc.
Bell-Carter
Olive Company
Bernabei &
Wachtel
P.L.L.C.
Bonyad
Shipping
Company
Brown &
William son
Tobacco
Corporation
Bruce Foods
Corporation
CNA lnsurance
Companies
This 2009 license was issued after OFAC required the Bank of New York Mellon to extricate
itself from an import-export deal after the bank learned that the goods in question were to be
shipped aboard a vessel owned by lrisl, an lranian government-owned shipping line that the
United States had blacklisted because of its involvement in lran's nuclear and ballistic missile
programs. For complex legal reasons, the bank, which had agreed to confirm a letter of credit,
required a license in order to return trade documents.
BearingPoint, previously known as KPMG Consulting, was authorized to buy payroll software
from Iran in order to complete ils work developing a finance and budgeting system for
Afghanistan's government. Iran and Afghanistan share a common language, and BearingPoint
said software purchased elsewhere would require substantial modification.
This license authorized the company to fly a United States-owned aircraft into Libya so that
executives could meet with representatives of the Libyan government.
This medical device company and ils French subsidiary were licensed to export goods, the
precise nature of which OFAC redacted, to Iran.
The documents relating to this license have been so heavily redacted by OFAC that it is
impossible to tell what was authorized. A company spokeswoman, Karen Gordon Quintal, said
Bell Helicopter had received this and another license because it needed "to store property of
Iran and Iraq that Bell had possession of in the United States on the dates, respectively, when
the assets of those countries were frozen. These licenses were required to enable Bell to store
the assets, consisting principally of spare parts, in Bell's U.S-based warehouse facility. Bell
continues to store that property."
Judy Rowcliffe, a spokeswoman for Bell-Carter Olive Company, said the company had a
contract broker representative who attended a food show in Singapore sometime around 2005
and spoke with a potential customer about selling the company's products in Iran. She said the
company, the largest olive manufacturer in the United States, received the license, but never
pursued any sales there. The company then let the license expire.
This license authorized Bernabei & Wachtel to be paid for representing KindHearts for
Charitable Humanitarian Development. The Ohio-based charity's accounts had been blocked
after the United States designated it as a progeny of groups accused of supporting terrorist
activities. The group is challenging that designation in court. OFAC has an established policy of
licensing lawyers' tees in such cases, and the law firm also received a license for representing
the Holy Land Foundation, a charity that was sanctioned on suspicion of providing support to a
terrorist organization.
This license allows Michael Mitchell, P.C., to represent Bonyad Shipping Company of Tehran in
civil litigation proceedings.
Brown and Williamson Tobacco received a license to export cigarettes under the agricultural
exemption to the United States trade embargo against Iran. OFAC redacted the names of the
businesses in Iran that would be buying the cigarettes. Iran charges an import tax of more than
7 percent on cigarettes, according to lranian customs officiais.
This license authorized Bruce Foods to export Louisiana Hot Sauce brand products under the
agricultural exemption to the United States !rade embargo against Iran. The products were to be
exported to Hall Kish on Kish Island, Iran, and Javaheri Company in Tehran.
CNA's British subsidiary was allowed to make good on certain contracts involving North Korea
and, among other things, "payment of claims into blocked accounts where necessary, and
receipt of premiums related thereto." OFAC redactions make it unclear exactly those claims and
premiums were at issue.
4/18
- 249 -
Cabot
Specialty
Chemicals Inc.
Cargill
Castle &
Cooke
Worldwide
Limited
Chevron/Exxon
Mobil
Chiquita
Brands
International
Inc.
Cisco Systems
Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
Cabot received this license after it assisted in a sales transaction of silicon dioxidebetween two
non-U.S. parties. The company applied for the exception after learning that the goods would be
shipped via the lranian government-owned shipping line known as lrisl. "The items in question
are already loaded onto containers at the dock and ready to be loaded onto the vessel, which is
due to depart the port of Antwerp, Belgium, on Monday," the company's lawyers, in the firm of
Baker & McKenzie, wrote to OFAC on May 11, 2001. OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, stressed
that the approval came seven years before lrisl was blacklisted by the United States for aiding
lran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Up until then, he said, the agency made case-bycase
exceptions to a broad prohibition against dealing with lranian companies in situations like
this one in which the company had no prior knowledge that an lranian entity was involved in the
transaction and granting the license did not involve a direct payment from a United States
person or company to an lranian entity.
Cargill, a leading agricultural and industrial company,contracted with North Korea to deliver raw
agricultural products during the well publicized famine, according to spokeswoman Lori
Johnson.
This license authorized the export of canned fruit and vegetables to entities in Iran whose
names OFAC redacted. The company's products include Dole Pineapple.
This license file is heavily redacted, but it authorized Chevron/Exxon Mobil to engage in "all
transactions necessary to deliver crude oil payments to [a redacted entity] in which the
government of Iran has an interest." ln a statement, Chevron said that the license authorized it
to deliver crude oil to a company called Tengizchevroil (TCO), which was established in 1993 as
a joint venture between Chevron and the government of Kazakhstan. Because Kazakhstan
could elect to receive ils royalty payments from TCO in the form of "in-kind" oil deliveries, and
because it could then sell that oil to Iran, Chevron said it contacted OFAC to receive assurances
that the arrangement would not be deemed a violation of sanctions. Since the license was
awarded, Kazakhstan has not elected to take oil in lieu of cash payments, though it has the right
to do so, according to Chevron.
This license was one of many given to Chiquita Brands, the banana grower, authorizing it to sell
ils produce in Iran; the purchasers' names have all been redacted by OFAC. The company was
also authorized to sell its products in Libya while that country was still under sanction by the
United States.
This license authorizes the company to help the New Zealand Embassy in Iran with a computer
project.
This license authorized Citigroup to return money to the Chinese government-owned China
Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation. Citigroup had blocked a payment by the
Chinese company to one of its customers because the United States had sanctioned the
company for providing missile technology to Iran. Although Citigroup had asked for authority to
complete the transaction, OFAC determined that the money had to be sent back, leaving the
Chinese company to find a bank outside of United States jurisdiction to make its payment.
OFAC issued several similar licenses to other banks involving wire transfers to or from China
Precision. While OFAC could have ordered the banks to seize the money, it chose not to do so
because it knew that could subject the banks to litigation, given that China was unlikely to
uphold a United States seizure order.
5/18
- 250 -
Citigroup Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
Coca-Cola
Company
OFAC granted a license on Dec. 27, 2007, to Citibank authorizing it to make good on an
agreement its Japanese subsidiary had entered into in October. The bank had agreed to confirm
that certain conditions in a letter of credit had been meet, after which a Malaysian exporter of
split-system air conditioners to Turkey would be paid. Then the bank discovered that the goods
were to be shipped aboard a vessel called the Iran 11am that was owned by the lranian
government-run shipping line known as lrisl, thus requiring that the transaction be licensed. The
license was issued even though the Treasury Department and OFAC suspected that lrisl was
being used to smuggle goods into Iran in contravention of various embargoes, including banned
technology the government needed for ils ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Moreover, at
the lime the license was issued, the United States had evidence that five months earlier, the Iran
11am itself had delivered a lathe that could be used to make precise metal parts needed for
nuclear centrifuges from China to lran's Shahid Bagheri lndustrial Group, according to
government officiais who requested anonymity to speak about an intelligence matter. lndeed,
within months of issuing the license, OFAC announced at a news conference that the United
States was adding lrisl to a special blacklist, after an investigation found that lrisl had falsified
cargo records, relied on front companies and used other trickery to mask the true nature and
destination of shipments. At the September 2008 news conference announcing the decision,
OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, warned that banks and companies worldwide should be aware
that they could be unwittingly aiding lran's quest for banned technology by doing business with
lrisl: "lrisl's deceptive practices make it nearly impossible to determine whether its shipments
are licit or illicit," he said. Mr. Szubin acknowledged in an interview that he was under no
obligation to issue the license to Citigroup, given that banks were already prohibited generally
from doing business with lranian entities. But he said that OFAC had issued licenses in cases
like this in the past in which the bank had no way of knowing that lrisl was involved and lrisl
would have been paid by a foreign third party anyway. To depart from that norm in this case, he
added, risked opening up his agency charges of unfair treatment and litigation, and tipping off
lrisl that it was under investigation.
This license had to do with a letter of credit guaranteeing a shipment of goods that Citibank later
found out involved a North Korean vessel.
This license is one of at least three that OFAC issued involving the China Great Wall lndustry
Corporation. The licenses were issued after the Chinese company was added to the United
States' special blacklist for supplying components to lran's ballistic missile development
program and before it was removed from the list on June 19, 2008. ln one case, the agency
licensed the Chinese company's lawyers, who were challenging the blacklisting, to receive legal
tees. Two other cases involved wire transactions to or from China Great Wall. OFAC could have
forced Citigroup to seize the funds, but said it chose instead to authorize the bank to return the
money because China was unlikely to agree that the funds should be seized and therefore the
bank would have almost certainly lost a legal battle to keep the funds blocked.
Coca-Cola does business in Iran through an Irish subsidiary, which sells concentrate to a
bottling company called Khoshgovar based in Mashhad, according to a spokeswoman. The
company has also received licenses to sell its products in Sudan.
6/18
- 251 -
Cometals
(Commercial
Metals
Company)
Computer
Sports
Medicine Inc.
ConocoPhill ips
Cooperative
Resouces
International
Cuvax Inc.
This license authorized the company to complete the sale and delivery of Mexican-origin goods,
the precise nature of which OFAC redacted, to China, even though the goods had been shipped
via the lranian government-owned shipping line known as lrisl. lrisl has since been designated
as an entity involved in helping the lranian regime obtain technology it needs for its ballistic
missile and nuclear programs. The license also allowed the bank that issued the letter of credit
for the sale, HSBC, to make good on ils obligations. ln granting the license, OFAC wrote that
Cometals had advised the agency that it was subject to large daily fees for every day that the
vessel was not unloaded as well as possible financial daims from the Chinese customer for
failing to deliver the goods. OFAC granted the license "in order to enable Cometals to avoid
significant financial loss," il said. While OFAC was under no obligation to grant this license given
that il involved an lranian entity, OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, stressed that Iris! was not
added to a special United States blacklist of proliferators until five years after this license was
issued. Up until then, he said case-by-case exceptions were made in cases like this one in
which the company did not know that an lranian entity was involved when it entered into the
transaction, and in which granting the license did not involve a direct payment from a United
States persan or company to an lranian entity.
This license was issued after Senator Edward M. Kennedy's office called OFAC on behalf of this
Massachusetts-based company on July 12, 2006, then wrote a follow-up letter on Nov. 29,
2006. The license authorized the sale of the HUMAC NORM Multi-Joint Evaluation and Exercise
System to Sepehran Company for resale in Iran to, among other entities, the National Olympie
Academy of Iran, which trains lran's athletes. The product, which was deemed to be an
allowable medical device export, is an exercise machine used in sports rehabilitation. Rob
Potash, the vice president of Computer Sports Medicine, said he believed that the sale of
American products to lranians helped to improve the United States' image there.
This license authorized ConocoPhillips to engage in dealings involving "refinery activities"
potentially affected by United States sanctions against Sudan. The precise nature of what was
authorized was redacted by OFAC.
Representative Steve Kagen, a Wisconsin Democrat, wrote to OFAC regarding a license for this
Wisconsin-based livestock cooperative on Sept. 17, 2007. The license was issued on Nov. 8,
2007.
This license authorizes Cuvax to sell some sort of nutritional supplements, the precise nature of
which OFAC has redacted, to an entity in Iran that has also been redacted.
7/18
- 252 -
David Ross
Group Inc. and
Tyco
Electronics
Dell Computer
Corporation
Delta
Corporate
ldentity Inc.,
The
NutraSweet
Company
Denso
Manufacturing
Tennessee Inc.
This license was heavily redacted, but relates to a telecommunications project called Gulf
Bridge, whose investors included the Qatari and Kuwaiti investment authorities. The idea of the
project was to create a new undersea cable linking the countries of the Persian Gulf to one
another and to lndia and Europe. Tyco Electronics won the contract to build the link, and the
David Ross Group, which specializes in undersea telecommunication cables, was hired to
manage the project. A spokeswoman for Tyco, Sheri Woodruff, said in an interview that both the
David Ross Group and Tyco Electronics requested licenses because materials needed for the
project would traverse lranian waters. ln requesting expedited handling of its application, the
law firm for both companies pointed out ils political connections, noting that the firm's name,
Wiltshire & Grannis, had recently changed because one of its partners had just been named by
the Obama administration as general counsel of the Department of Energy. David Ross, in
correspondence with OFAC, asked for an answer by June 2009, which came and went. Tyco
Electronics was warned that if OFAC did not move quickly to approve the license, the Gulf
Bridge project was in danger of losing its funding, Ms. Woodruff said. So the Tyco Electronics
vice president for global and government affairs, Joann Piccolo, pressed OFAC for a decision,
e-mails show. Thal pressure resulted in extremely high-level concern at OFAC -- and action at
an agency that is not widely viewed as quick-moving. On Sept. 2, 2009, Ms. Piccolo wrote to
someone at OFAC, whose name is redacted: "Sorry to interrupt your travels - attached is the
one-pager on the issue I called you about. Anything you can do to help would be most welcome
and/or help us get a meeting with the right person. As I understand it - the holdup is only
because of the number of applications, not because of any problem with the application .... " That
was followed by a flurry of e-mails about the case addressed to the very top of OFAC's
management, including the director, Adam J. Szubin. Just before the close of business, an email
to Mr. Szubin and others reported that the licenses were ready to go. The team that had
been working on the malter all day received a note of thanks from John Smith, the associate
director of OFAC. "I talked with Adam, and he's fine with this: Great work [name redacted) and
company!!" Ms. Piccolo was also pleased: "She was very grateful for their attention to it,
particularly recognizing that she was bothering someone over a holiday," Ms. Woodruff said.
This license authorized a shipment of computers to an embassy in Tehran.
This license authorized the company to make payments to the Libyan government while that
country was still under sanction, in order to protect its intellectual property. OFAC generally
licenses such payments.
This license allowed the company to import, from Japan, a chemical mixture that contains
material of North Korean origin. State Department records said that the mixture would be used
in catalytic converters and noted that Denso would not be buying the mixture directly from
companies in North Korea. At the time the license was issued, North Korea was on a United
States list of state sponsors of terrorism, and sanctions prevented the country from receiving
American economic aid, banned arms-related exports and sales to the North, controlled exports
of dual-use items, and prohibited economic assistance. But on June 19, 2000, during a brief
thaw in United States-North Korea relations, the regulations were amended to permit the
licensed importation of goods from North Korea provided they met certain criteria. lmporters had
to provide OFAC with information showing that the goods to be imported were not made by
producers engaged in missile technology proliferation activities, an activity of the North Korean
government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology,
or an activity of the North Korean government affecting the development or production of
electronics, space systems or equipment, or military aircraft. OFAC officiais acknowledged the
difficulty of making such distinctions in an opaque, state-controlled economy like North Korea's,
where anything going in and out of the country potentially indirectly benefits the government.
But they said they were confident that exporters directly involved in that country's missile and
proliferation activities were being flagged.
8/18
- 253 -
Dresser Inc.
Duke Energy
Corporation
DynCorp
International
L.L.C.
Eastman
Kodak
Company
Ekman &
Company
Esso
Exploration
and Production
Chad Inc.
Eveready
Battery
Company
FMC
Technologies
Inc.
Fruit of the
Loom Inc.
Gish
Biomedical Inc.
Halliburton
This license is so heavily redacted that all that can be said is that Dresser, an oil services
company, received a license. Il appears to have involved Dresser's pressure valve relief
division, but even the company's explanation of why granting a license would be in the United
States' foreign policy interest is redacted. Dresser did not return calls requesting comment.
Duke Energy received a license exempting il from the Treasury Department's uranium
enrichment sanctions regime, allowing the company to take delivery of a good or service from
O.A.O. Techsnabexport Company Limited. OFAC redactions make il impossible to tell what type
of good or service was al issue, or precisely why Duke would need an OFAC license. Thomas
Williams, a Duke spokesman, did not respond to a request for comment on the license. The
sanctions regime al issue relates to a Clinton-era agreement, known as the H.E.U. Purchase
Agreement. The agreement provided that 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled
Russian nuclear weapons would be blended to proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium by
2013. The material would be sold to the United States for resale as fuel for commercial nuclear
power plants.
This license authorized DynCorp, a United States contractor in Afghanistan, to ship supplies
through Iran to Afghanistan for Afghanistan's Central Poppy Eradication Force.
This license allowed the company to sell the Kodak DryView 81 SO Laser Imager in Sudan,
where il was to be used in medical clinics and hospitals for medical radiology diagnostic
purposes.
This license authorized Ekman & Company, which manufactures a paper product used in goods
like diapers and sanitary napkins, to sell ils products in Iran.
This license allowed the oil company Esso Exploration and Production Chad llnc. to take part in
a single flight on a Libyan airline while Libya was still under sanction by the United States.
This license allowed Eveready to make payments to Libya for copyright protections, a practice
that is generally allowed so that companies can protect their intellectual property rights.
This license involved the settlement of a legal dispute. Before the imposition of the sanctions
against Iran, FMC had a trade contract with Daewoo UK to provide equipment and perform
installation and warranty work al a facility on Kharg Island in Iran. The ultimate contracting
authority for the project was the National lranian Oil Company. After sanctions were imposed,
FMC ceased ail work on the project. Daewoo then iniliated a legal claim against FMC. For
complex legal reasons, the payment of a $710,000 settlement by FMC to Daewoo required a
license from OFAC.
This allowed the company to make payments to Libya for copyright protections, which are
generally allowed.
Representative Gary G. Miller, Republican of California, wrote on behalf of Gish on Aug. 29,
2006, and Gish received a license several months later to sell devices used in cardiopulmonary
bypass operations.
This license authorized the company to engage in transactions that ultimately would allow il to
withdraw from Iran. The withdrawal came after the company was criticized for doing business in
lran's lucrative energy sector through a loophole that allows foreign subsidiaries of United
States companies to do business in sanctioned countries or with sanctioned entities, activities
that would be forbidden for the American parent.
9/18
- 254 -
Hawaii Medical
Vitrification
Hollywood USA
Brands Inc.
Hughes
Network
Systems
lmEx Gulf
lntelsat Global
Service
Corporation
J.P. Morgan
Ventures
Energy
Corporation
This license involved a medical-waste disposai plant in Honolulu called Hawaii Medical
Vitrification. On July 28, 2003, the plant's owner, Samuel Liu, ordered 200 graphite electrodes
from a Chinese government-owned company, China Precision Machinery Import Export
Corporation. ln an interview, Mr. Liu said he had chosen the company because the electrodes
available in the United States were harder to find and more expensive. Two days later, the Bush
administration barred American citizens from doing business with the Chinese company, which
had already been penalized repeatedly for providing missile technology to Pakistan and Iran. By
the time Customs seized the electrodes on Nov. 5, waste was piling up in the sun. Nor did
prospects look good for Mr. Liu's application to the licensing office seeking to do an end run
around the sanctions. On Nov. 21 , a State Department official, Ralph Palmiero, recommended
that the agency deny the request since the sanctions explicitly mandated the "termination of
existing contracts" like Mr. Liu's. "The penalties are clear in this case," Mr. Palmiero wrote, "and
the responsibility rests with OFAC to implement the import ban." That is when Senator Daniel K.
lnouye's office stepped in. While his electrodes were at sea, Mr. Liu had made his first political
contribution ever, giving the senator's campaign $2,000. Mr. Liu says the timing was
coincidental, that he was simply feeling more politically inclined. Records show that an lnouye
aide called the licensing office on Mr. Liu's behalf the same day that Mr. Palmiero recommended
denying the application. The senator himself wrote two days later. Mr. lnouye's spokesman,
Peter Boylan, said the contribution had "no impact whatsoever" on the senator's actions, which
he said were motivated solely by concern for the community's health and welfare. The pressure
appears to have worked. The following day, the licensing office's directorat the time asked the
State Department to reconsider in an e-mail that prominently noted the senator's interest. A few
days later, the State Department found that the purchase qualified for a special "medical and
humanitarian" exception. The license was issued Dec. 10. Two months later, Mr. Liu sent the
senator another $2,000 contribution, the maximum allowable. Treasury Under Secretary Stuart
Levey said he could not comment on the details of a decision predating his tenure. But he noted
that sanctions against the Chinese company had since been toughened, and added, "Certainly
this transaction wouldn't be authorized today."
This license is to sell a Hollywood USA weight loss supplement called NatureFit. "lranians
absolutely love American products," said the company's owner, Rocky Hadzovic, adding that he
had no compunction against selling his products in Iran. "If we don't sell to them, someobody
else will - they're going to get product from Canada, Europe, or China."
This license file was almost completely redacted by OFAC. The file says only that it is in the
national interest to allow a redacted product or technology to be exported because it is for use in
monitoring some unknown activity, and that it will not be used or accessed by any lranians.
This license authorized the sale of medical products to Iran.
This license application is so heavily redacted by OFAC that one cannot say what type of
activity it authorized. ln records released by the State Department, however, il says that the
license would allow lntelsat to respond to a request for a proposai for the provision of public
international telecommunications service to Iran, and that granting such a license would be
consistent with the United States policy goal of promoting the free flow of information to and
from Iran.
This license involves J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy, which had recently won Federal Reserve
approval to engage in energy-related physical commodity training, including oil and gas. The
files are heavily redacted, revealing only that the company was seeking a blanket license to
engage in some redacted type of activity to cover some situation that the company said could
arise. The company refused to explain what il was doing that required a license.
10/18
- 255 -
JPMorgan
Chase
JPMorgan
Chase
Kalitta Air
Kraft Foods
International
Inc.
Lane Limited
Lasersight
Louis Dreyfus
Corporation
This license involves a request by JP Morgan to open an account on behalf of an entity, the
name of which OFAC has redacted, that was opening a news bureau in New York. Il is not clear
why a license was needed because OFAC heavily redacted the file. An e-mail between two
OFAC officiais whose names are redacted states: "We should really meet before [name is
redacted) returns .... State's input is definitely needed with regard to the identity of the principal's
name. If he's the same one we think he is, the question remains about running 'company'
business through a private account." The State Department in the end said il would be
consistent with American foreign policy to allow JP Morgan to proceed.
This license was so heavily redacted by OFAC al the request of JPMorgan Chase that il is
impossible to say exactly what was authorized other than the fact that it involved a letter of
credit that somehow ran afoul of the sanctions against Iran.
The Boeing Company was authorized to export parts, equipment and emergency flight
instruction data and to provide personnel, in connection with the repair of a Boeingmanufactured
747 aircraft operated by Kalitta Air that had sustained damage to ils spoiler panel,
in order to enable the Kalitta aircraft to depart from Libya, records show. At the time, the United
States maintained broad sanctions against Libya. The Kalitta aircraft was in Libya in connection
with the work of the weapons of mass destruction survey and elimination teams, according to
the license file. The federal government was a regular customer of Kalitta, a cargo company,
which became the subject of headlines when British officiais denounced their American
counterparts for using Kalitta to fly military hardware through Scotland to Israel during the 2006
lsraeli-Lebanese conflict.
This license allowed Kraft to sell the following products to Iran: biscuits, cereal, confectionery,
coffee, cheese, powdered beverages, mayonnaise, desserts, cooking ingredients, cake
premixes, dressings and cakes. OFAC redacted the names of the lranian importers. The
company also received a license to sell ils products in Sudan.
This license authorized Lane Limited, a tobacco company, to export smoking tobacco and little
cigars to companies that would ultimately re-export those products to the following lranian
entities: the Lariana Trading Company in Tehran for resale to BAT Pars Company in Tehran. Iran
charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to customs officiais.
Former Representative Rie Keller, a Florida Republican, wrote to OFAC on Nov. 17, 2006, on
behalf of his constituent Laserlite, which manufactures medical devices to treat vision
impairment; the license was issued on March 1, 2007.
The company was licensed to export "poultry, meat, cotton" and bulk agricultural commodities to
both Sudan and Iran. The bulk commodities ranged from kidney beans and lentils to sunflower
oil and beet sugar.
11 /18
- 256 -
Mapssy
International
Marathon Oil
Company
Mars Inc.
This license authorized Mapssy to import men's, ladies' and children's apparel from North
Korea. Sung Choi, the owner of Mapssy, said in an interview that he jumped at the chance to
import North Korean goods because garments made there were much cheaper than could be
found elsewhere. At the time the license was issued, North Korea was on a United States lis! of
state sponsors of terrorism, and sanctions against the country included a ban on American
economic aid, arms-related exports and sales, and certain dual-use items. But in June 2000,
during a brief thaw in United States-North Korea relations, the regulations had been amended to
permit the licensed importation of goods from North Korea provided they met certain criteria.
lmporters like Mr. Choi had to provide OFAC with information showing that the goods to be
imported were not made by producers engaged in missile technology proliferation activities, an
activity of the North Korean government relating to the development or production of any missile
equipment or technology, or an activity of the North's government affecting the development or
production of electronics, space systems or equipment, or military aircraft. OFAC officiais
acknowledged the difficulty of making such distinctions in an opaque, state-controlled economy
like North Korea's, where anything going in and out of the country potentially indirectly benefits
the government. lndeed, in the interview, Mr. Choi acknowledged he had "no idea" who really
owned the North Korean company with whom he did business. "lt's a Communist country so il
must be government-owned," he said. But OFAC officiais said they were confident that exporters
directly involved in North Korea's missile and proliferation activities were being flagged. Mr. Choi
said his last OFAC license expired in 2005; by that lime, he said, it was no longer worth it to him
to do business in a country that was so "hostile to the United States."
This license allowed Marathon Oil Company to withdraw from an oil development agreement
that il had with Total E&P, thus getting out of Sudan altogether. While that outcome was clearly
in the United States' foreign policy interest, the license also makes clear that OFAC had earlier
helped Marathon protect ils interest in that country. Marathon first invested in Sudan in 1980,
before the United States imposed sanctions. ln 2004, the company stated that it was informed
by Total that il had to sign a revised agreement or forfeit its investment. The reason for the
revised agreement was that the Sudanese government was threatening to seize the companies'
property. "The economic loss to Marathon of not signing the revised PSC [agreement] will be
tremendous, while the political effect on the Sudanese government of not signing will be
nonexistent. Il is important for OFAC to recognize that by signing the revised agreement,
Marathon is only protecting ils substantial investment and exploration rights in Sudan." Any
further activity, the company added, would be subject to OFAC approval. ln a statement, the
company said that from the lime the sanctions went into place to the lime il got out of the
country, Marathon never paid the Sudanese government any money. OFAC said it has granted
such "stand-still" licenses • allowing oil companies to preserve interests acquired before the
imposition of sanctions - because to do otherwise might result in the sanctioned government
receiving a windfall by seizing the property.
This license allowed the company to export confectionery, ice cream, packaged consumer food
products and pet care products to Iran. OFAC redacted the actual brand names and the names
of the ultimate buyers. A company spokeswoman, Kelly McGrail, said: "Mars lncorporated and
ils subsidiaries, including Wrigley, operate in full compliance of ail state, federal and
international regulations. We provide our products to consumers all over the world. At this lime,
Mars and Wrigley sell products to consumers in Sudan, Iran and Libya in full compliance with all
U.S. regulations, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control licensing regime. We will, of
course, continue to monitor the actions of the U.S. government on this malter and comply with
any changes in regulation."
12/18
- 257 -
McCormick &
Company
McDermott
Caspian
Contractors
International
Metso Minerais
Industries
Nabors Drilling
International
Limited
McCormick & Company was licensed to sell a range of products, including spices, seasonings,
sait substitutes, dips, marinades, food colorings, edible cake decorations, icings, imitation vanilla
extract and salad toppings, to a number of stores in Iran under the broadly written exemption for
agricultural products. Though OFAC and the State Department are required by law to vet the
companies that are buying even benign products to make sure they are not involved in
international terrorism, The New York Times found that a number of the lranian companies listed
on the application as the end purchasers of McCormick's goods were in fact connected to
entities that the United States has blacklisted for their involvement in lran's nuclear and ballistic
weapons programs and connection to terrorist activities. Take Refah, the larges! supermarket
chain in Iran. lts shareholders, according to Refah's website, include the lranian Bank of
Saderat, and Bank of Sepah, the Bank of Melli and Bank Tejarat. The Bank of Saderat was
blacklisted by OFAC for serving as a conduit between the lranian government and various
terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah and Hamas. The Bank of Sepah was blacklisted for
serving as "the financial linchpin" of lran's efforts to procure a "missile capable of carrying
weapons of mass destruction." The Bank of Melli and Bank Tejarat were blacklisted for similar
activities. Shahrvand, another of the chain stores listed in the McCormick license application, is
owned by the government of Tehran. Both Refah and Shahrvand were once run by Ali-Akbar
Mehrabian, according to the lranian press. Mr. Mehrabian is President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
minister for industries and mines, and a close adviser believed to be instrumental in smoothing
the way for the sale of government-owned assets to the lslamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, an
arm of the lranian military that the United States has also blacklisted for its involvement in the
lranian nuclear program. And a third chain store, Ghods, is closely linked with the Guards;
many top officiais in the organizations are former Guards officers. A McCormick spokesman, Jim
Lynn, said that the company has held this license for several years, but that "we were not aware
of the information you shared with us, and we are looking into it." OFAC's director, Adam J.
Szubin, acknowledged that it did not appear as though background checks had been done in
this case. But, he said, given his limited resources, they were better spent on stopping weapons
technology from reaching Iran. "Are we checking end users? Yes. But are we doing corporate
due diligence on every lranian importer? No," Mr. Szubin said. "I don't think that would be the
best use of our Farsi speakers and our lranian intelligence analysts." He added that even if the
links had corne to light, he still might not have had the authority to deny the license. That's
because Congress drafted the law mandating that licenses be issued for agricultural products in
such a way that they can be denied only if it can be shown that the purchasers are more than 50
percent owned by entities engaged in terrorism.
This 2005 license allowed McDermott Caspian Contractors International (M.C.C.I.) to ship oil
development supplies through Iran to Kazakhstan for an oil development project it was bidding
on in Kazakhstan. ln its application, the company said that it planned to procure equipment in
the United Arab Emirates and that it was extremely costly to ship its supplies via a route that did
not involve Iran. The State Department ended up agreeing to the request. But in its
correspondence with OFAC it offered a cautionary note: While it is consistent with United States
foreign policy to authorize authorize M.C.C.I. to transship certain items through Iran to
Kazakhstan, "we note, however, that transshipment issues remain sensitive and that this case
should not be construed as providing broader foreign policy guidance." That followed a backand-
forth between OFAC and John Marshall Klein at the State Department in which OFAC
pressed State as to when it was going to get a decision in the case. Mr. Klein responded by
saying that the situation was "complicated" because a deputy assistant secretary of state, David
Nelson, wanted "raise this case at a high-level Iran policy group to get clarity on a broader
issue."
Metso Minerais Industries discovered that it had been importing possible lranian-origin
manganese castings. This license authorized Metso to send the suspect lranian-origin
manganese castings back.
Nabors Drilling International wanted to buy two drilling rigs from a Danish company. Because
the rigs had been operating in lranian waters, the company needed a license to buy lranianorigin
goods. OFAC granted the license with the condition that Nabors not take possession of
the rigs until they were removed from lranian waters.
13/18
- 258 -
New Century
Tobacco Group
L.L.C.
Noble Energy
Inc.
NutraSweet
Company
Oasis Second
Parties
(Amerada
Hess,
ConocoPhill ips
and Marthon
Oil Companies)
Occidental
Petroleum
Corporation
PSL Energy
Services
PepsiCo Inc.
Philip Morris
This license authorized New Century, a tobacco manufacturer, to enter into a transaction in
which Yara Tech Company of Tehran would buy cigarette tax banderoles from the lranian
government tobacco monopoly, forward those to New Century, which would then deliver them to
a cigarette factory where they would be applied to cigarette packs to be sold in Iran. Iran
charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to customs officiais.
The license was authorized after the State Department found it would be consistent with United
States foreign policy to permit Noble and ils subsidiaries to engage in certain transactions
involving the investment in and supply of natural gas to an electricity-generating power plant in
Israel. The license was needed because an lranian entity had a stake (inactive since the 1979
revolution) in one of the lsraeli companies that planned to invest in the plant. A company
spokesman, David Larson, said the deal ultimately fell apart.
This license authorizes NutraSweet to export its artificial sweetener to Iran. The company
contended that NutraSweet's products qualify as agricultural commodities for which a license
should be granted under the agriculture and medical humanitarian sections because its
sweeteners are "food additives for humans," one of the definitions listed in the regulations. The
company, which received licenses in other years as well, was authorized to sell to the following
entities in Iran: Zam Zam Iran Company, Pars Minoo lnd. Co., Choco Parstoo Co., Iran Zak, the
Sasan Company and the Nooshab Company, all in Tehran; the Farabi Pharmaceutical
Company in lsfahan; and the Dadash Barador Company and the Shirin Asal Food lnd. Co. in
Tabriz.
On Dec. 18, 2003, Libya announced that it would give up ils unconventional weapons programs
after several years of back-channel negotiations. A few months earlier Oasis, anticipating
warmer United States-Libya relations, applied for a license to export computers, software,
computer models and other technology to Libya and to "negotiate terms for the resumption of
operations" at oil fields it had been forced to quit when the United States had imposed sanctions
against the country. On Feb. 13, 2004, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Paul Simons sent
OFAC a note recommending approval, which was granted 11 days later. The license gave Oasis
a head start of several months in re-entering the lucrative Libyan oil market; at the time,
sanctions were still in place and would not be lifted for another three months. On Dec. 29, 2005,
the partners of the Oasis group "entered into an agreement with the National Oil Corporation of
Libya on the terms under which the companies would return to their oil and natural gas
exploration and production operations in the Waha concessions in Libya," according to one of
those partners, Marathon Oil.
This license authorized travel to and from Libya on a corporate aircraft.
This license authorized the company's United States personnel to engage in transactions
relating to PSL Energy Service's oil drilling equipment. ln response to questions from The New
York limes, OFAC said that PSL Energy Services, a Scottish oil services company, had
removed the equipment from Iran after completing a project there. lt was in negotiations for the
sale of a majority of ils stock to Halliburton. Because the equipment was among the PSL's
assets and had been used in Iran, it was deemed "lranian-origin goods" under American
regulations, and thus a license was needed to allow Halliburton to deal with the equipment in the
future. Shortly after OFAC issued the license, Halliburton completed the deal to acquire PSL
Energy Services and announced it, records show.
This license authorized Pepsi to sell ils products in Iran. The company has also been licensed to
sell its products in Sudan. A company spokesperson said that the company was abiding by
United States law: "When it cornes to politically sensitive markets, we rely on rules set by the
U.S. Government, and we're committed to adhering to those rules, however they may evolve."
This license authorized Philip Morris to sell cigarettes in Iran. Iran charges an import tax of more
than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to customs officiais.
14/18
- 259 -
Philips
Electronics
R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco
Company
Raytheon
Company
Remitter: C.
Transport
Panamax
Limited;
Beneficiary:
ACS Austrian
Chartering
Service GmbH
Samco Global
Arms Inc.
Schlumberger
Sechrist
Industries Inc.
Philips Electronics received a license to sell some sort of medical devices to Iran, the exact
nature of which was redacted by OFAC. The division of the company mentioned in the
paperwork suggested that the product sold was some sort of ultrasound equipment. OFAC also
redacted the names of the lranian buyers.
This license authorizes R.J. Reynolds Tobacco to sell its cigarettes in Iran. OFAC redacted the
names of the lranian purchasers. Iran charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on
cigarettes, according to customs officiais.
After the United States invasion of Iraq, Raytheon Company was awarded a competitive
contract in January 2004 worth upward of $13 million to supply turnkey air traffic management
systems for airports in that country. The State Department found it would be consistent with
American foreign policy to issue a license to Raytheon to sell encrypted software to Iraq for a
civilian air traffic system in Baghdad International Airport.
An unknown bank blocked a wire transfer between C. Transport Panamax Limited and ACS
Austrian Chartering because the instructions mentioned the involvement of a ship owned by
lrisl, an lranian government-owned shipping line that the United States had blacklisted for its
involvement in lran's nuclear and ballistic weapons programs. The bank could have been forced
to seize the funds, but instead this license authorized it to return the money to C. Transport
Panamax.
This license authorized the company to buy nearly 5.7 million rounds of ammunition (cal. 7.9 Ball
MFG.) that were subject to sanctions because they had been manufactured in Tehran between
1950 and 1968. The Pakistani government, which had acquired the ammunition in the years
since, had offered it for sale, and Samco had jumped at the chance to buy it; at the time, there
was a shortage of ammunition in the United States, making it very expensive to buy new
ammunition, and according to the company the caliber in question is quite popular with
collectors and war re-enactors. By the time Samco discovered that the ammunition was of
lranian origin, it had already invested "time and resources toward proceeding with the
transaction," and losing the deal "would have been a hardship," a company representative said.
The high-profile gun-rights lawyer who handled the license application for Samco, Mark Barnes,
argued that Samco met a criterion that has been used by OFAC in the past to grant exceptions,
namely that because the goods the company wanted to import no longer had a substantive
connection to the sanctioned country, Iran would not benefit financially from the transaction.
When OFAC did not respond immediately, Mr. Barnes increased the pressure: "We would like to
stress to OFAC that Samco is a small company and this is a rather large transaction relative to
Samco's general import business," he wrote. "Accordingly, delays in the application process
result in a disproportionate financial impact upon Samco than a delay might impose upon a
larger importer." OFAC soon granted the license.
Schlumberger Technology Corporation was authorized to import sealed chemical radiocative
sources from Libya, for diposal by the United States Department of Energy. The goods in
question were brought into Libya by Schlumberger before the embargo to facilitate petroleum
exploration and extraction activities, according to the company, and had been held there for 17
years because of a lack of viable disposai options, and were now obsolete. According to
Schlumberger, both the Department of Energy and the State Department's Office for Nuclear
Safety had expressed an interest in recovering the goods.
Gary G. Miller, a California Republican, wrote on June 1, 2007, on behalf of this company's
application to sell medical equipment to a company in Iran called Jarf Kherad Company Limited,
which would distribute the equipment to hospitals under the control of the lranian Ministry of
Health. OFAC explained to Mr. Miller on July 12, 2007, that the company had been informed that
its paperwork was incomplete. The application was ultimately approved.
15/18
- 260 -
Siemens
Solar Turbines
lncorporated
Sportika Export
T. H. Anderson
Pump
Company
TME
Enterprises
Telenor
Satellite
Services
AS/S.S.
Sampliner &
Company Inc.
The Berliner
Law Firm
The Boeing
Company
This license authorized the company to export ultrasound equipment to Iran; the names of the
purchasers were redacted by OFAC.
Solar Turbines, a division of Caterpillar, requested this license because it wanted to bid on a
project to build a natural mixing station needed by the Turkish government-owned pipeline
company, Botas. ln its application, Solar Turbines acknowledged that the mixing station in Sivas,
Turkey, would serve a pipeline that carried lranian gas through Turkey and into Western Europe.
The United States has a clear-cut policy that it does not support pipelines that deliver lranian
gas to customers outside that country's borders, for the simple reason that lran's huge natural
gas resources prop up its economy and help finance pursuits like its nuclear program. But in
this case, the company argued, the station would primarily serve a different, United Statessupported
pipeline called the Shah Deniz, which pipes gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey, and thus
would reduce reliance on lranian gas. ln tact, according to Botas and Turkish Embassy officiais,
the opposite was true. A Turkish diplomat, Tuncay Babali, said that back in 2005, when this
license was issued, "the Sivas station was primarily for Iran gas, actually." And that is still the
case today, according to Oguz Zimamoglu, the head of Botas's central gas contrai unit.
"Primarily the gas flowing from Sivas is lranian gas," he said. A Caterpillar spokesman, Jim
Dugan, said the company relied on the best information it had in making its application, while
OFAC said in a statement that its decision was the product of an interagency review that found
that "notwithstanding an lranian nexus," granting the license was in America's foreign policy
interest. ln the end, another company won the right to build the station. But ElliottAbrams, who
at the time served as the deputy national security adviser and should have been involved in any
interagency review, said the fact that Solar Turbines was allowed to bid raises questions about
the government's vetting process. He did not recall any debate on the issue, which he called
"surprising" because "the issues are significant."
This license was to export food supplements for building muscles, like protein powder, to Iran.
Richard White, Sportika Export's chief executive, said Iran is a very good market for companies
like his. "lt appears there must be an upper class there because these items are fairly high
priced by the time you import then and pay all the duty there," he said, adding that he is
comfortable selling his products in Iran "because the government is comfortable with our doing
it."
T. Anderson, of T.H. Anderson Pump Company, an oil field equipment supplier, said this license
authorized him to sell supplies used in lraqi drilling rigs.
This license authorized the company to export a variety of its vitamin products to Iran. The
names of the lranian importers have been redacted by OFAC.
Sampliner was authorized to collect debts in Libya on behalf of a redacted client, presumably
the satellite company mentioned.
The Berliner Law firm received this license to legally represent companies affilated with lran's
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, which had been sanctioned by the United
States government for its involvement in lran's ballistic missile program. The licensing
documents were released over the law firm's objection, with OFAC determining that the law firm
lacked "sufficient justification for competitive harm," except for the potential for embarrassment
for representing a sanctioned entity.
This license authorized Boeing to cooperate with Sudan in connection with a crash of a Sudan
Airways Boeing aircraft.
16/18
- 261 -
The Boeing
Company
The Louis
Berger Group
Inc.
Trencor Inc.
Tyson Foods
Inc.
Union Carbide
Corporation
Vesuvius USA
Corporation
W.R. Grace
ln January 2004, the nose-wheel of an Iran Air Boeing 747 passenger airplane collapsed on
landing in Beijing. Iran Air and the Civil Aviation Administration of China agreed to use the
French civil aviation agency to conduct the accident investigation. This license authorized
Boeing to export an electronic data map that was needed by investigators to gain access to the
information on the flight data recorder.
ln September 2006, the United States Agency for International Development gave $1.4 billion to
the Louis Berger Group for reconstruction work in Afghanistan. This OFAC license allowed the
company to route supplies and equipment through Iran to Afghanistan, saving both money and
time, in order to fulfill its development contract for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Rehabilitation
Project.
This license allowed the company to pay a court-ordered judgment to a now defunct lranian
entity whose interests now rest with a Swiss entity.
This license authorized the export of chicken and beef and chicked-based products and beef
products to Royal Meat lndustry L.L.C. for resale to the Sham Sham Shiraz Protein lndustry
Complex in Shiraz, Iran.
This license authorizes Union Carbide to enter into transactions necessary to dissolve its lranian
branch, which the company says has conducted no business since the imposition of sanctions.
This license authorized Vesuvius USA Corporation to import dead-burned magnesite, a raw
material needed by the United States steel industry, into the United States from the North
Korean company Korea Magnesia Clinker lndustry Group. Both the State Department and the
Department of Defense recommended the approval of this application. The Korea General
Magnesia Clinker lndustry Group is a corporation that holds the rights to the production and
export of magnesite in North Korea, which is a major source of foreign currency for the country.
But on June 19, 2000, during a brief thaw in United States-North Korea relations, the regulations
had been amended to permit the licensed importation of goods from North Korea provided they
met certain criteria. lmporters had to provide OFAC with information showing that the goods to
be imported were not made by producers engaged in missile technology proliferation activities,
any activity of the North Korean government relating to the development or production of any
missile equipment or technology, or any activity of the North Korean government affecting the
development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, or military aircraft.
OFAC officiais acknowledged the difficulty of making such distinctions in an opaque, statecontrolled
economy such as North Korea's, where anything going in and out of the country
potentially indirectly benefits the government. But they said that they were confident that
exporters directly involved in that country's missile and proliferation activities were being
flagged.
This authorized the company to protect, though not profit from, its holdings in Libya. According
the application, Grace had been authorized under a previous license to "continue its ownership
of the Libyan concessions," but with the condition that the company "end our Libyan
connections as soon as practicable by selling our interests." The company, in arguing for this
license, said that it should not be compelled to sell because "we were, for all intents and
purposes" limited to selling to the Libyan National Oil Company or the Libyan government.
OFAC bought that argument, granting the license. lt appears from the records that one way the
company protected its interests was to ask OFAC for a license to transfer all its assets to
European subsidia ries that, unlike unlike its American parent company, could make good on all
of its financial and other obligations to the Libyan government. That is because United States
sanctions cover only American companies, not their foreign subsidiaries. OFAC said it generally
grants such "stand-still" licenses - allowing oil companies to preserve interests acquired before
the imposition of sanctions - because to do otherwise might result in the sanctioned government
receiving a windfall by seizing the property.
17/18
- 262 -
WILD Flavors
Inc.
Weatherford
International
Willis North
America Inc.
Wm. Wrigley
Jr. Company
World Fuel
Services
Corporation
World Wide
Sires
WorldCom Inc.
This license authorized Wild Flavors, which describes itself on ils Web site as one of the larges!
privately-held ingredient suppliers to the food and beverage industry, to export cream powder
and cheese powder to Iran under a humanitarian exception for agricultural and medical
products.
ln July 2007, this Houston-based oil-drilling and oil field services company announced in a filing
with the Securities and Exchange Commission that il had been notified that the Bureau of
lndustry and Security and Department of Justice were investigating allegations of improper
sales of products and services in sanctioned countries. Weatherford subsequently announced
plans to gel out of Iran, as well as Sudan, Syria and Cuba. This license authorized the company
to enter into dealings to make good on that promise. A similar license was issued enabling the
company to withdraw from Sudan.
This license authorized the company and ils international affiliates to "solicit and accept
participation in the KEDO light water reactor project in North Korea." The joint United StatesSouth
Korean-Japanese project, which was to provide power to North Korea, was agreed upon
after North Korea signed a deal to freeze and ultimately dismantle ils nuclear program. The
North has since reneged on that deal.
The chewing gum manufacturer, owned by Mars Inc., was licensed to export ils products to Iran
and Sudan. OFAC redacted the names of the entities buying the products. A company
spokeswoman, Kelly McGrail said: "Mars lncorporated and ils subsidiaries, including Wrigley,
operate in full compliance of all state, federal and international regulations. We provide our
products to consumers all over the world. At this lime, Mars and Wrigley sell products to
consumers in Sudan, Iran and Libya in full compliance with all U.S. regulations, including the
Office of Foreign Assets Contrai licensing regime. We will, of course, continue to monitor the
actions of the U.S. government on this malter and comply with any changes in regulation."
This license authorizes the company to make air overflight payments to Sudan, which are
generally allowed.
World Wide Sires, an artificial insemination cattle embryo and semen cooperative, received
multiple licenses to sell bull semen and other products in Iran and Sudan. This license
authorized the company to receive payment under a letter from the lranian Bank of Mellal and
ils subsidiary Persia Bank. This, even though the United States government had placed the
banks on a special sanctions blacklist for facilitating the movement of millions of dollars for lran's
nuclear program. The company argued that the transaction should be allowed to proceed
because the letter of credit was signed before the Oct. 25, 2007, blacklisting of the banks. OFAC
said il granted the license because il authorized funds to be removed from Iran for the benefit of
a United States exporter, which otherwise would not have been compensated for an authorized
export to Iran, an outcome the agency said il believed was unjust.
This license authorized WorldCom to strike a deal by which the state-owned
Telecommunications Company of Iran would pay the American telecommunications company a
rentai fee in return for a direct link to WorldCom's United States Internet backbone. OFAC said
the application was approved because il would have provided increased and more consistent
Internet access for lranians, and il is the policy of the United States to encourage such access.
18/18
- 263 -
Annex 31
Z. Goldfarb, “Firms licensed to do business in countries on U.S. terror list”, The
Washington Post, 24 December 2010
- 264 -
- 265 -
Firms licensed to do business in countries on U.S. terror list
© www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contenUarticle/2010/12/23/AR2010122305890 html
An obscure Treasury Department office has granted licenses to major U.S. companies to do business with
companies in Iran and other nations deemed state sponsors of terrorism, under a federal law that allows certain
products to be exported to those countries, Treasury officiais said Thursday.
The officiais' remarks came after the New York Times Web site reported that the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Contrai had granted nearly 10,000 licenses to companies to sell goods as varied as popcorn, chewing gum,
cigarettes and body-building supplements.
Under federal law, U.S. companies can !rade with blacklisted countries if the Treasury approves the transactions as
medical or humanitarian necessities, especially in relieving famine.
ln the past, the Treasury has also let U.S. companies do business with foreign firms accused of selling banned
technology to blacklisted nations - sometimes as a result of political pressure.
A Treasury official said Thursday evening, after the publication of the Times article, that "the great majority of the
authorized exports" are mandated under federal law, which requires that Treasury allow exports of agricultural
commodities, medicine and medical goods to Iran, Cuba and Sudan.
"Because the U.S. has the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions against Iran, allowing for the exportation of
food, medicine and medical devices is consistent with our objective of not hurting the lranian people," the official
said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
The official added that all licenses granted "advance our national security and foreign policy goals."
According to the Times report, the recipients of these licenses included Kraft Foods, Pepsi and a subsidiary of
Citigroup, as well as lesser-known firms.
The definition of a humanitarian or medical necessity under the federal law is so broad that companies have been
able to sell products that seem not to meet those criteria. For example, the Treasury approved sales of luxury food
products to chain stores in Iran owned by blacklisted lranian banks, according to The Times.
Stuart Levey, the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said in a statement Thursday night that
allowing "the export to Iran of food items like hot sauce or salad dressing from the U.S. is required by statute and, in
any event, is trivial in the context of our Iran policy."
The transactions have not been free of political interference.
ln 2003, long before Levey took his post, the Treasury had planned to deny a medical waste plant exemption
requested by a Honolulu firm seeking to buy parts from a Chinese company that had been accused of selling missile
technology to Iran and Pakistan.
But Sen. Daniel lnouye (D-Hawaii) intervened on behalf of the Honolulu firm, whose owner was a political supporter
and financial contributor. A Treasury official confirmed the account.
An lnouye spokesman, Peter Boylan, told the Times that the senator's advocacy on behalf of the firm had nothing to
do with the political contribution.
Boylan told the Post in a statement Thursday that the firm "committed to the transaction prior to implementation of
the ban and without the [parts] his business would have failed immediately and more than 90,000 pounds of
1/2
- 266 -
untreated medical waste would have been left unattended on the docks of an Oahu port."
2/2
- 267 -
Annex 32
S. M. Hersh, “Our Men in Iran”, The New Yorker, 5 April 2012
- 268 -
- 269 -
Our Men in Iran?
~ www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/our-men-1n-1ran
From the air, the terrain of the Department of Energy's Nevada National Security Site, with its arid high plains
and remote mountain peaks, has the look of northwest Iran. The site, some sixty-five miles northwest of Las
Vegas, was once used for nuclear testing, and now includes a counterintelligence training facility and a private
airport capable of handling Boeing 737 aircraft. lt's a restricted area, and inhospitable-in certain sections, the
curious are warned that the site's security personnel are authorized to use deadly force, if necessary, against
intruders.
lt was here that the Joint Special Operations Command ( JSOC) conducted training, beginning in 2005, for
members of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, a dissident lranian opposition group known in the West as the M.E.K. The
M.E.K. had ils beginnings as a Marxist-lslamist student-led group and, in the nineteen-seventies, it was linked to
the assassination of six American citizens. lt was initially part of the broad-based revolution that led to the 1979
overthrow of the Shah of Iran. But, within a few years, the group was waging a bloody internai war with the ruling
clerics, and, in 1997, it was listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. ln 2002, the M.E.K.
earned some international credibility by publicly revealing- accurately-that Iran had begun enriching uranium
at a secret underground location. Mohamed EIBaradei, who at the time was the director general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear monitoring agency, told me later that he had
been informed that the information was supplied by the Mossad. The M.E.K.'s ties with Western intelligence
deepened after the fall of the lraqi regime in 2003, and JSOC began operating inside Iran in an effort to
substantiate the Bush Administration's fears that Iran was building the bomb at one or more secret underground
locations. Funds were covertly passed to a number of dissident organizations, for intelligence collection and,
ultimately, for anti-regime terrorist activities. Directly, or indirectly, the M.E.K. ended up with resources like arms
and intelligence. Sorne American-supported covert operations continue in Iran today, according to past and
present intelligence officiais and military consultants.
Despite the growing ties, and a much-intensified lobbying effort organized by its advocates, M.E.K. has
remained on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations- which meant that secrecy was
essential in the Nevada training. "We did train them here, and washed them through the Energy Department
because the D.O.E. owns all this land in southern Nevada," a former senior American intelligence official told
me. "We were deploying them over long distances in the desert and mountains, and building their capacity in
communications-coërdinating comma is a big deal." (A spokesman for J.S.O.C. said that "U.S. Special
Operations Forces were neither aware of nor involved in the training of M.E.K. members.")
The training ended sometime before President Obama took office, the former official said. ln a separate
interview, a retired four-star general, who has advised the Bush and Obama Administrations on national-security
issues, said that he had been privately briefed in 2005 about the training of lranians associated with the M.E.K.
in Nevada by an American involved in the program. They got "the standard training," he said, "in commo, crypto
[cryptography], small-unit tactics, and weaponry- that went on for six months," the retired general said. "They
were kept in little pods." He also was told, he said, that the men doing the training were from JSOC, which, by
2005, had become a major instrument in the Bush Administration's global war on terrer. "The JSOC trainers were
not front-line guys who had been in the field, but second- and third-tier guys- trainers and the like- and they
started going off the reservation. 'If we're going to teach you tactics, let me show you some really sexy stuff .. .'"
lt was the ad-hoc training that provoked the worried telephone calls to him, the former general said. "I told one of
the guys who called me that they were all in over their heads, and all of them could end up trouble unless they
got something in writing. The lranians are very, very good at counterintelligence, and stuff like this is just too
hard to contain." The site in Nevada was being utilized at the same time, he said, for advanced training of élite
lraqi combat units. (The retired general said he only knew of the one M.E.K.-affiliated group that went though the
training course; the former senior intelligence official said that he was aware of training that went on through
2007.)
1/2
- 270 -
Allan Gerson, a Washington attorney for the M.E.K., notes that the M.E.K. has publicly and repeatedly
renounced terror. Gerson said he would not comment on the alleged training in Nevada. But such training, if true,
he said, would be "especially incongruent with the State Department's decision to continue to maintain the
M.E.K. on the terrorist list. How can the U.S. train those on State's foreign terrorist list, when others face criminal
penalties for providing a nickel to the same organization?"
Robert Baer, a retired C.I.A. agent who is fluent in Arabie and had worked under cover in Kurdistan and
throughout the Middle East in his career, initially had told me in early 2004 of being recruited by a private
American company-working, so he believed, on behalf of the Bush Administration-to return to Iraq. 'They
wanted me to help the M.E.K. collect intelligence on lran's nuclear program," Baer recalled. "They thought I knew
Farsi, which I did not. 1 said l'd get back to them, but never did." Baer, now living in California, recalled that it was
made clear to him at the time that the operation was "a long-term thing- not just a one-shot deal."
Massoud Khodabandeh, an I.T. expert now living in England who consults for the lraqi government, was an
official with the M.E.K. before defecting in 1996. ln a telephone interview, he acknowledged that he is an avowed
enemy of the M.E.K., and has advocated against the group. Khodabandeh said that he had been with the group
since before the fall of the Shah and, as a computer expert, was deeply involved in intelligence activities as well
as providing security for the M.E.K. leadership. For the past decade, he and his English wife have run a support
program for other defectors. Khodabandeh told me that he had heard from more recent defectors about the
training in Nevada. He was told that the communications training in Nevada involved more than teaching how to
keep in contact during attacks- it also involved communication intercepts. The United States, he said, atone
point found a way to penetrate some major lranian communications systems. At the lime, he said, the U.S.
provided M.E.K. operatives with the ability to intercept telephone calls and text messages inside lran- which
M.E.K. operatives translated and shared with American signais intelligence experts. He does not know whether
this activity is ongoing.
Five lranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated since 2007. M.E.K. spokesmen have denied any
involvement in the killings, but early last month NBC News quoted two senior Obama Administration officiais as
confirming that the attacks were carried out by M.E.K. units that were financed and trained by Mossad, the
lsraeli secret service. NBC further quoted the Administration officiais as denying any American involvement in the
M.E.K. activities. The former senior intelligence official I spoke with seconded the NBC report that the lsraelis
were working with the M.E.K., adding that the operations benefitted from American intelligence. He said that the
targets were not "Einsteins"; 'The goal is to affect lranian psychology and morale," he said, and to "demoralize
the whole system- nuclear delivery vehicles, nuclear enrichment facilities, power plants." Attacks have also
been carried out on pipelines. He added that the operations are "primarily being done by M.E.K. through liaison
with the lsraelis, but the United States is now providing the intelligence." An adviser to the special-operations
community told me that the links between the United States and M.E.K. activities inside Iran had been longstanding.
"Everything being done inside Iran now is being done with surrogates," he said.
The sources I spoke to were unable to say whether the people trained in Nevada were now involved in
operations in Iran or elsewhere. But they pointed to the general benefit of American support. "The M.E.K. was a
total joke," the senior Pentagon consultant said, "and now it's a real network inside Iran. How did the M.E.K. get
so much more efficient?" he asked rhetorically. "Part of it is the training in Nevada. Part of it is logistical support
in Kurdistan, and part of it is inside Iran. M.E.K. now has a capacity for efficient operations that it never had
before."
ln mid-January, a few days after an assassination by car bomb of an lranian nuclear scientist in Tehran,
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, at a town-hall meeting of soldiers at Fort Bliss, Texas, acknowledged that
the U.S. government has "some ideas as to who might be involved, but we don't know exactly who was
involved." He added, "But I can tell you one thing: the United States was not involved in that kind of effort. That's
not what the United States does."
2/2
- 271 -
Annex 33
D. Rohde, “The Iraq Takeaway: American Ground Invasions Destabilize the Middle
East”, The Atlantic, 20 March 2013
- 272 -
- 273 -
The Iraq Takeaway: American Ground Invasions Destabilize
the Middle East
IJ www.theatlantic.com /i nternat,onal/archive/2013/03/-the-, raq-ta keaway-amencan-g round-i nvas1ons-destab1I izeht:
H.,, 1 j le-easJ' 4190/
U.S. soldiers
stand near
the Swords of
Qadisiyah
monument in
Baghdad on
March 13,
2008.
(Ceerwan
Aziz/Reuters)
American
households
Will be
blanketed
this week by
a torrent of
coverage,
commentary
and regret
about the
10th anniversary of the Iraq war. Liberals claim that Twitter - if it had existed - could have stopped the invasion.
Conservatives argue that the links between Saddam Hussein and terrorism have, in fact, been underplayed.
The glaring lesson of the war is that American ground invasions destabilize the Middle East, instead of stabilizing it.
The 100,000 lraqis who perished, the 4,500American soldiers killed and the $1 trillion spent should have halted
what Tufts University professer Daniel W. Drezner has called the "creeping militarization of American foreign policy."
lnstead, the civilian American institutions that failed us before Iraq have grown even weaker.
The State Department is the first example. Drezner correctly argues that as the Pentagon's budget has ballooned in
the post-9/11 decade, so has its influence over American foreign policy. Too many former generals, he contends,
have occupied foreign policy important positions.
That trend has slowed in the second Obama administration, but the budget, planning capabilities and training
programs of the State Department are still laughably small compared with those of the U.S. military. Money equals
power, influence and a seat at the table in Washington. As one former national security reporter put it tome, weak
civilian institutions leads to fewer potential civilian responses to crises.
ln his first major speech as secretary of state, John Kerry tried to put the size of the American civilian effort in
perspective. He cited a recent poli that found most Americans believe the State Department and U.S. foreign aid
programs consume 25 percent of federal spending. ln tact, they receive 1 percent. (The military gets roughly 20
percent.)
Kerry's speech got virtually no press coverage. Just as it did a decade ago, the news media - a second vital
1/2
- 274 -
American civilian institution - is failing us. This week the media is being correctlyexcoriated for its failure to be more
skeptical of the Bush administration's central justification for the Iraq war: weapons of mass destruction that turned
out not to exist.
ln the months before the invasion, the New York Times published a series of exaggerated WMD stories by reporter
Judith Miller on its front page. At the same lime, editors at the Times and other mainstream outlets largely ignored
intrepid reports by Knight-Ridder newspapers that questioned the administration's WMD claims.
Ten years later, Miller is a Fox News contributor, and the Knight-Ridder chain no longer exists . A harrowing report
released by the Pew Research Center on Monday found that the full-lime professional editorial staff at newspapers
has declined by 24 percent since 1989. A separate analysis found that the ratio of public-relations workers to
reporters grew from 1.2 to 1 in 1980 to 3.6 to 1 in 2008.
The rise of social media and citizen journalism arguably fill the void created by dwindling newspaper resources. Eric
Boehlert of Media Matters argued this week that Twitter could have forced mainstream reporters to do a better job
before the Iraq invasion. He cited recent cases of mainstream newspapers columnists being forced to respond to a
torrent of criticism on Twitter about pieces they wrote.
Jonathan Landay , one of the Knight-Ridder reporters whose pre-invasion work questioning the WMD evidence
received little attention, said social media might have made a difference. But he hesitated to say Twitter would have
silenced the White House.
"Had the New York Times, Washington Post and the networks done the kind of reporting that we had, could the
administration have been able to take the country to war? 1 don'! know," Landay said in an email message. "But
social media would have brought far more attention to our work, and perhaps more journalists would have followed
our lead."
Looking back, Landay, a former colleague and longtime friend who now reports for McClatchy, blamed the news
media and American intelligence agencies. "The mainstream news media was as egregious in its failure to do its
job," he said, "as the U.S. intelligence community was in its failure to produce accurate intelligence on lraq's nonexistent
WMD."
Today, fears of "another Iraq" dominate America's foreign policy debate. The choice is binary. The United States can
respond to a foreign policy threat by carrying out a risky ground invasion. Or it can do nothing at all. Diplomatie,
economic and other non-military attempts to influence events overseas are given short shrift. Any American
involvement will make the situation worse, the argument goes, and create another quagmire.
The United States, of course, should not launch another ground invasion in the Middle East. But that does not mean
it should not interact in the region at ail. The Arab Spring showed that people in the Middle East, in fac!, desire
democracy. Young Arabs, in particular, want self-determination, jobs and modernity. Washington has an interest in
helping them but no inclination - and few non-military tools -- to do so.
A decade after Iraq, the State Department remains the Pentagon's Mini Me. The news media is one-third the size of
the public-relations industry. And we continue to view military force as our principal means of addressing foreign
policy challenges. ln post-lraq America, our foreign policy debate has devolved into an "invade or not invade"
dichotomy. Far more options are available. Every country is not Iraq.
This post also appears at Reuters.com, an Atlantic partner site.
2/2
- 275 -
Annex 34
National Security Archive, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup”, 19 August 2013
- 276 -
- 277 -
The National Security Archive (. ~~:\
lli2lnJ: l ill>o!J.l l - l = l l>lil2li<illllm l fQIA l =r<lll lnW:D.S.lll.o1 1llir<ll l -.W: l lllàllln!l..lW
CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup
Documents Provide New Details on Mosaddeq Overthrow and Its
Aftermath
National Security Archive Calls for Release of Remaining Classified
Record
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435
Posted - August 19, 2013
Edited by Malcolm Byrne
For more information contact:
Malcolm Byrne 202/ 994-7043 or [email protected]
Shah's ofder (known H • firman) nami,g Zahedi the new prtne
hister. Coup operatîvH made: COJl'Îl"S of the document and
.-Culaited l around Tehnln to he_, regenerate momentum fo-,wng
hecola eoftheo lnal n. Courtes ofTedHotchklss
Related Links
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953
Coup ln Iran
By Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Syrne,
Syracuse University Press, May 1, 2004
Mohammad Mosaddea and the 1953
Coup ln Iran
June 22, 2004
the Sf!cret CIA Historv of the Iran
~
November 29, 2000
CIA Secrecv Claims Are "Facially
lncredlble " Says Lawsult
August 2, 2000
The 1953 Coup 60 Years On: A
Symposium
July 24, 2013
Washington, D.C., August 19, 2013 - Marking the sixtieth
anniversary of the over1hrow of lranîan Prime Mînîster Mohammad
Mosaddeq. the National Security Archive is today posting rccently
declassified CIA documents on the United States' role in the
comrovcrsial opcration. Amcrican and British involvemcm in
Mosaddeq's ouster has long been public knowledge. but today's
posting includcs what is believed to be the CIA's first formai
1 sur 18
acknowledgement that the agency helped to plan and execute the
coup.
The cxplicit refercnce to lhe ClA's rolc appears in a copy of an
internai history. The Ba1t/efor Iran. dating from the mid~t970s. The
agency released a heavily excised version of the account in 1981 in
response 10 an ACLU l:1wsuit, but il blacked out ail references to
TPAJAX. the code name for the U.S.-led opera1ion. TI1ose rcferences
appear in the latest release. Additîonal CIA materials posted today
include working files from Kcrmit Roosevelt, the senior CIA offïcer
on the ground in Iran during the coup. They provide new specifics as
well as insights into the intelligence agency's actions before and aftcr
the opcration.
l'tlaH II flle GrNt" O-C.trat.ioa
H --.Wl• ~--1153 ,,oa-.1~:3CM
:·-:-=.---
/
This map shows the disposition or bands of "l\lffians,• pald to demonst~te bV coup organlzers,
eartv on August 19, 1953. The bands g..athered i, the bazaar and other sections of sout:hem
Tehrlln, then move<I north thtovgh the capbl. Thug leade~' n11mes appcar at ~ft, along with the
estimated siZe of their grovps, end the.- targ,ets. (Court.es.y of Ali R.ahnema, authOr or the
forthcomi"lg Thugs, Tum•coats, Soki~r"S, Spooks: Anatomy of Ovll!!rtht'owing ftfosaddeq ln Four
D.Jys.)
The 1953 coup remains a topic of global intcrest because so much
about it is still under intense debate. Even fundamental questions -
who hatchcd the plot. who ultimately carried it out. who supported it
2 sur 18
Decadu of Delay Questlonlng ClA Aatlonalu
Have the British Been Meddling with the
FRUS Retrospective Volume on 1953?
Foreign Office Worried over Very Embarrassing
Revelatlons, Documents Show
The United Ki"lgdom sovght to expvnge "ver,, embarTHSi'lg" Wormatîon
about ls role in the 1953 coup in hn from the official U.S. hi§tory of the
pcriOd. 8ri:i$h documents confrm. The Foreign Office ~ared tM-t a plame<I
State Department put,lcation would unclerm~ U.K. stand"9 ln Iran,
accordi"lg to declassl'ied records posted on the Natonal Securtv IVChive's
Web slc todav.
The Btl:lsh censorship attempt happ,ened ln 1978, but London's concems
mav ptav arole even toda)" ln hokllng up the State Department's long·
awaited history · cvcn thovgh U.S. law reqtked ls pvbication vea~ ogo.
The declllssl'ied documents, rrom the Foreign Office (Foreign and
Commonweath Office sn<:e 1968), shed lght on a protracted cont.rove~v
over crucial gaps ln the State Department's avthortative F~i9n Rel.Jtions
of IM Unitll!!d Scares (FR.US) serles. The bllnk spots on Iran 1nvo;.,e the
CIA· and M16· backed plot to overthrow the countty's prrne mlnl!iter,
Mohammad Mosaddeq. Sbc dccade,s after his oustel", some slgns point to
the ClA as the c~ for refusinQ to alow basic detailS 11bo\A the event to
be "'orporat ecl i'lto the FR.US compia,t1on.w
R.ecen~. the ClA has declassified a number or records relatinQ to the 1953
coup, nctvdlng • versiQn or an lntert'lbl hlStorv that specllc.atv m,te:s the
agencv plamed and ~d implement the coup. (The Nation11I Securtty
Archive obtained the documents throu'ilh the U.S. Freedom of Information
Act.) Thès suggests that ongoing ClA infteifibitv over the FRUS vobne is
not so mvch a functlon of the agencv's wonies about ks own role bei'lg
exposecl as a runction or Ils deslre to protect linget"tlg Brklsh sensitlvities
about 1953 • especillt, regarding the actlvities of U.K. inteligence services.
There is alSo evldence that St ate OePilrtment of'l'\ci&IS h&ve been )ust as
anxlous to shlekl Misti i'lterests over the ve11rs.
Regardless of the rusons for this cont.inved secrecv, an vnfortunate
con~vence orwthhokllng these materialS is to guarantee that Ameriean
(and worid) publc unde~tanding of thl!i Pf','o t al episode wl rem an
distorted. Another effect i5 to keep the: issue allve i, the pollical arena,
where lt is regvlarty exploled by crtles ln Ir;,n OPOOSecl to COn$lructive ties
with the Unlt-ed St11tes.
Badlground on FRUS and the MoHddeq Period
8)" statute, the FR.US senes is reqUR,d to present •a thorouoh, accurate,
and relable documentary record" of American foreign policv.W 1'hat law
came about partly as a conseqvence of the: fa~re of the orlgi'lat vok.lme
covemg the Mosaddeq periOd (pvblshed i'I 1989) to mention the U.S. role
in hiî. overthrow. The r!'action of the scholan'( commvnty and witerested
pvblc was outrage. Pnlmhent historiiln &u:e Kunh>k'n, 11 former member
of State's Policv PlilnnnQ Staff, cale<I the vok.lme ·a fraud."Ul
The fui story of the scandai has been detailed elsewhere,W but most
observl!(S i.med the omlssiQn on the lntelgence communly (IC) ror
refuslng to open ts relevant fies. ln fact, the JC was not alone. Senior
~partment officillls jOntd i'I opposlng reqvests for acce,ss to partieular
classif'ied records by the Historic:al Mvîsory Commttee (HAC), the group
of inclependent scholars charve,d wt h advising the Oepartmfflt's own
Office of the Hlstorian.LSJ The head of the HAC, Warren Cohen, reslgncd i'I
protest i'I 1990 cling his lnabitv to ensure the lntegrty of the FRUS
series. Congress became involved and, n a displav of t,jpartis11nsNp that
woulcl be stvnnhg todav (Demoe111tlc Senator Daniel P. Mo)"nll.an gettlng
Repvblcan Jesse Hems to colaborate), lawmakers passed a bll to prevent
simlar historic:al dist ortions. As Cohen and others pointed out, whille
Moscow wH disoorglng lts scandalovs Cole! War secrets, Washington wH
taklng a disthctly Sovîet appn:i11ch to Ils own hl$tory.l6J
Sv 1998, State·s historians and the HAC had decided to p,oduce a
"retrospective" vo~me on the Iran coup that would help to correct the
record. Thcv plarvicd other vo~mes to covel" acldlional prevlovst,,
ai1)rushed covert activities (ri Guatemala, the Congo, etc.). ft was a
p,omisl'l9 step, vet 15 ve11rs latet", whille a couple of pvbkations have
materialzed, several othefs have not ~ incl.ldi"lg the Iran vo~me.W
- 278 -
Donald N. WR>er, an archeobglst and a..«.horty on
anclent Pt!Blill, served as lud U.S. planner of
TP~A)( (along wlh Br'li:sh SIS offlc:er Nonnan
O.,rbysiwt). Hie wrotie th,e l'rst CIA hlStO,Y of thie
loperaton(~)-
inside Iran. and how did il succeed - are in dispute.W
The issue is more than academic. Political partisans on ail sides.
including the lranian govcrnment. rcgularly invokc the coup to argue
whethcr Iran or forcign powers are primarily responsible for the
counLry's his torical trajectory. whether the United States can be trusted
10 respect lran's sovercignty, or whether \Vashington needs to
apologize for its prior interfcrence before better relations can occur.
Pha:te 111 The Injection of Ar.-ed-Fories • nd Vnder OOVer A<,iènu - ....,1
li ~lt IIUglat itU LO:OCM.•U:00"'
-:.-·~;:= :=.:""'~ .... ..,-
·, -__
,
è_=.. ._ .:-,~• -
.-,-~;.,_._.
tt::,,~~--"''"
:-:.--:..,--·:,.·,..•"•O':I': .,7:,:.~
~ :
Pro-Shah police, mit;,ry unls ;,nd undercover ;,gents became engaged n thoe coup st;,rtng mldmomin9
August 19. (Co1,111;esy of Al Rahnema. author of the forthcoming Ttwgs, 71.m·CO<Jts,
Soklkrs, Spooks: An.tto,ny of Ov~rtNOwing HoSMkleq in Four o.iys.)
Also. the public release of 1l1csc materials is noteworthy becausc CIA
documents about 1953 are rare. fïrs1 of ail. agency officiais have
stated that most of the records on the coup wcre cither lost or
destroyed in the early 1960s. allegedly because the record-holders'
"safes were 100 full."11.1
Regarding public access 10 any remaining files (reportedly about one
cubic foot of maicrial). the intcllîgcnce community's standard
procedure for decades has been 10 assert a blanket denial. TI1is is in
spite of commitments made two decades ago by three separate CIA
3 sur 18
directors. Robert M. Gates, R. James Woolsey. and John M. Deutch
each vowed to open up agency his1orical files on a number of Cold
War-cra coven opcrations, încluding Iran. as a sign of the CIA's
purported new policy of openness after the collapse of the USSR in
199 1.11.J
Pb.aH 1111 Tanlli: INlpl a,..at and Entr &pNDt
21 M:>rdad,llt Aucrat 1H] 5,00AN-14:lOPM .,,-. ...
·----·- 1C:.-__ .....,.
·-""-"-'
Tank.s played a crllc.al ro~ on August 19, wlh pro•Shah forces ga.,lng controlof some 24 of
thiem from tt'Me m•a,y dumQ thie cour$-e of the- day. {Courtesy of Al Rahniema, author of the
forthcomlng Thugs, Tum-co.,cs, Sokllers, Spooks: Anatomy of Ov~rthrowint;J ,.,osaddeq ln Four
D.Jys.)
A clcar sign thal their plcdgc would not be honored in practice came
afler the National Security Archive filcd a lawsuit in 1999 for a wellknown
internai CIA narrative about the coup. One of the operation's
planncrs. Donald N. Wilbcr. prepared the account Jess than a year
la1er. The C IA agreed 10 release jus1 a single sentence out of the 200-
page report.
Despil.e the appearance of countless published accounts about the
opcration ovcr the ycars - including Kcrmit Rooscvclt's own detailcd
rnernoir. and the subsequent leak to Tl,e New York Times of the 200-
page CIA narrative historyl±J - inte lligence agcncies typically
refused to budge. They have insisted on mak.ing a distinction between
4 sur 18
l nstN;utk>nal Delay.s
A review of thoe available mnutes of .l::IAC..m.e:el makes lt apparent that
over the past deade muliple polcy, bureauetatic, and bgistical hurtlles
havie i'lterfie~ wlh progreu. Some of tl'tt'se are routne, ieven i'lievlabl@ -
from the complcations of mutl-agency coordhatlon to frequent personnel
changes. OUioers are more spec6: to the reBTI of htelgence, notably a
deep-seated uneasi'liess ln parts of the CtA over the notion of urwelling
putatlvie secrets.
ln the Fal of 2001, an ominous devebprnent for the HO gave a sense of
whiere much of the power lay ln ls relations~ wlh the CIA. Ac:cording to
notes of a publc HAC meetflg in October 2001, the CIA, on hstructions
from the 0.-ector of Central lntielgencie, dedded unilateraly "that therie
couic! be no new business" re(}arding FFI.US untl the two side, signed an
MOU. •ncv off,cials saki the document woukl address ~itl'nate IC
concems; HAC members worried lt would mahly boost CIA control over
the series. The ag,ency specificaly held up action on fourvol!mies to mak ie
lts point. whie HAC hrstori1ms counte~ that thie voum~s werie belng
"hekl hostage• and UW" HO was bei'lg forcl"d to wort: "la'lderthe UW'l"at of
"blackmd."(BJ
The CIA held rlrm and an al)tt!ement iemerged ln May 2002 that, at least
from available Information, appl"ars to bend over backwards to glve the IC
ieKtraordinary saff!guards witho..«. otfemg much reassurance about key HO
lnterests. For hstance. the MOU states that the CIA must •m«t HO's
stat..«.ory requrement· • hardti, som~thng ttlat seems necessary to spel
out. At the same tl'ne, il alows the CIA to review matenals not once, but
again even aftier a manuscr,:,t has passed through formai dedasst"ication,
and once more after Il. 1s otherwise ln fnal fonn and ready for l)mting. ln
the cont~lCt of the diSputed Iran volume, HAC members worried about the
"random" nature of these provisions which gave the agency •a sl"Cond bite
at the appie. "!il The Implication is that the CIA wl feiel lttle oblgaton to
hetp mieet the HO's ~gal requrl"mient r l bdevies ls own ·~ies· are at
stak~. (This of course may stl affect the Iran volume, cu~ntly schedull"d
for 2014 pobl::atîon.)
l$IttMBrltbh1
As mentloned, the CIA has begun to reteasie documentation h recent
years makln9 eKplcl Ils connectlon to the Mos.,ddeq overthrow. Even
earter, by 2002, the Statl" Oepartment and CIA Jointty began comping ;,n
Iran retrospective vok.mie. Touie a,-,e not slgns of a fuodamentaf
lnstitutlonal unwll'lgness to publish Amertcan materials on the coup
{athough parts of the CIA contrlued to r'l"Sist the notion). The HO evl"n
tried at ~ast twice previously to or;anâ:e a ,oint pro)l"Ct wth the Brt.ish
Foreign and Commonweakh Officie on Ir.tn, but the îdiea ievidently went
nowhere.[W
ln 2004, two yiear1 latier, the State D,epartment·s ôeSiptlatied histonan
thished com~ the volume. Ac.cording to lhat historian, he R:klded a
nomberof rttonH obtaincd from resl"arch at the thl"n-Publc Record Office
in London. Amoni,i hiS fndin95 was "material that OOcuments thie &tiSh
roie.• Hie added that he had also k:lcated Stat ie Oepartment records "that
~trate the Brlish role."Lll.] By no litter than June 2006, the Iran volume
had entered thl" dcclillssifk::ation queue. At the June 2006 HAC session, CIA
rep,-esentatives said "thiey believed tt'Me commltee would be sati:sfied wlh
the {diedassricat10n) revlews.•
Up to that poht, the agency's signais scemed generaly poslîve about the
prosp,ects of makhg publc prevlously closed matieria,1$. But i'I the soc y,ears
sft:e, no 11'11n volume Ns emerged. Even Statie's commhee of hl$torians
apparentty has never gotten II satlsfactory explanatlon as to why-U.2J
When the IC wlthholds rttords, •sources and methods" arie of'ten the
excuse. The CIA is loath to re~ase anything it beieves would reveal how
t he 119ency conducts ls illCtivlics. (For many ycars, the CIA kept secret
the fact that t used balOons to drop ~at'lets ovier Eastem Europ,e dufW\9
the Cold War, and would not confirm or der.y whethier t compiled
bio9raphical sketches of Communist ~adl"rs.) On the other hand,
clandestine operations have bee:n named n mo,-,e than 20 other FFI.US
publcations..[JJJ OOI" of thesc was the retrospccthll" vollme on
PBSUCCESS, thl" controversilll overthrow of Jacobo Arben: n Guatemala
in 1954. Furthermore, thie ag,ency has r-ieleased troubfr\g materials such as
assassination manuals that demoMtrate how to murder potta!
oppcnents using anythng from "edgc weapons" to "bèlre hands." ln 2007,
in response to a 15-year-old NatiOnal Securtty Afdihle FOIA request, the
CIA rnat., re~ased lts file of "famiy j,ewels" oeta_,9 an assortmient of
Wamous actlvitles. from plannln9 to poison forelgn ~aders to conductlng
llc9al surve~nce on Ameriean Joumalsts.
lfthie ag,ency fiell l could part wlth such hlgh-prorile sources and miethods
Wormatbn, ;,long wth deeply embarrassing revelatlons about ilsef, why
not n thl" Iran case1 Pcrhap,; the Brtlsh are just saying no, and thtt
American counterl)ilrts are qultt.., gong abng.
State Department Ea rty Waming - 1978
The FCO documents i'l thls postin9 (Documents 22-]S\ strongly suppcrt
this corrlJslon. Theytel a fascinating story of tnmSilllitntic cooperation and
diplomatie concem at a turtioutr!nt tiTle, Jt w as;, State Diepartment official
who frst a~rted the FCO to oians by the Oepartment's l\isto~ns to
pubkh an offlc:lilll account of the 19Sl coup pen0d. The Department's lrlln
expert wamed that the recofds could have "possi>ly damaglng
consequences• not onty for London but for the Shah of Iran, who wos
f9htng for survlval as hoe Nid 2S y,ears earlier (P9.cwncnL22.). Two days
litter, FCO offlclitls began to pass the mesSilge up the lne that •very
l"mbèlmisslng thin9s about thl" Brtish" were ._ety to be ln the upcoming
FFI.US compiation (~). FCO ol'fitials reportied that otfcers on
both thoe Ir.tn and Brlaln diesks at Statie we,-,e priepared to he\, kieiep those
mateMls out of the publc domah, at ~ast for the tl'ne belng (.QswJm.w
J.J). Atnost 35 years latl"r, those records are stl Ncccssblc.
The Brtlsh goverrment's apparent unwllngness to acknow~dge what the
worid already knows is difficul for most outsiders to understand. It
become, poslively baffling when sent0r public figutes who are fuly aware
of the l\istory have already acknowledged London's role. In 2009, former
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw publdv remar1c.ed on Brtain's part n to~
Mos.adde<i, which hoe categortr:ed as one of many outside ·nterferences· in
lranlan affa.-s ln thie last Centl.lfY.l.lil Yet, priesient lnd,c:alions a,re thaot the
UJC:. govemment is oot preparl"d to rell"ase l"ilhier ls own fill"s or evklently
to approve the opefWlg of Amencan records that might help bmg some
degree of closure to thiS pn:,tracted histone - and historiOgraphical •
iepiSod,e.
( l ump to the Brfkh domments)
NOTES
W A recent article d~wlng attientlon to the controversy is Stephen R.
Weissman, "Why 1s U.S. Wttwlolding Old Documents on Covert Ops ln
Congo, lran7" r~ O'lrlstt.tn SClenc~ Honltor, Marc.h 25, 201 L (
httn·//www amnnitor rnm/Commentarv/Opjnjpo{201 l/0325/Whv-k·
US·wf:hhoklJ'l9-old·d9CUIDCOU·90·COYCrt·9DS·lo·C9n99-lraO)
Ul Section 198, Public Law 102·138.
UJ Bruce Kunh>m, "Foreign Relations, Publc Relatbns, Accountablly,
and Undcrstandng; Americ<ln Hi5tolical Association, Pe~tlvcs, May·
Jun.ie 1990.
W ln addlion to the Kuntiom and Weissman lems cled above, see also
Stephen FI.. wieissman, "Censoring Amiertcan Diplomatie HiStory," Amiencan
HiStorlcal AssociatJOn, ~1'$(HtCtiv,n on History, September 2011.
15J Joshua Botts, Office of t hoe Historian, U.S. Oepartment of State, ""A
Bon::lien for thie Dec)a,rtment"?: To The 1991 FRUS Statutie,• FebrW,v 6,
2012, btto·J/hktorv s.urc 99y/(D11il52/cescarrb/tn-rbc - t99J -fnw- """"'·
- 279 -
~veral coup participants gather. Front row, from
lel't: Ardeshi" Zahedi (the pmle minister's son,
l!lter •mbassador to Washington), Abbas
FaruMgan, Fazlolah Zahedl, Nader
Batmanqelch, Hedayatolah Gulanshah.
Nematollh Nassiri, who attempted to serve
Mos~deq wlth a firman trom the Shah, 1$ d!rtctly
behh:I the prrne mnister. ~)
)lln ... llM•CIIIVI
l lemonlc .... lng Llal
publicly available information on U.S. activities from nongovemmenl
sources and official acknowledgement of those activi1ies,
cven scveral decades after the fact.
Anti-Mosaddcq: anned forces converved on h15 house (left sielc of map) be9i'lnio<;J around 4':00
pm, eventuatr forcng ~ to escape over a garden wal t>,efor,e '-house was <leStroy,ed. By
then, Zahedl hMl aftady addressed the nation rrom the Radio Transmission Station. (Courtesy
of Al Flahocma, author of the forthcoming Thugs, Tum•co.,ts, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of
Overthrowing H ouckkq in FourO.,ys.)
t§.l Edlof'\111, •H,story 8lieached at State, • The New ron: Tim~. M•v 16,
1990.
1ZJ Retrospectîve compi,,tions on Guatemall (2003) and the intelgence
commurwty (2007) durt"lg the 1950s have appeared; colectlons on the
Congo and Chie are among those that have not.
lB.) HAC minutes, October 15·16, 2001, htto·l/bcstory statf:: aov/abo\4:
/hjç/gçrphf[·?QQ] .
{2] HAC mi'MJtes, Jutv 22·23, 2002. h:to·l/bi&tocv statc go11/about
~; and ~cember 14-15, 2009, htto·//hk.tory SttUc goy
/about/bacldeccrobcc· 2009·
WU HAC mhute-s, July 22·23, 2002, tito'l/bktOCY staU: go11/1bCIMt ~.
UlJHAC minutes, March 6•7, 2006. htto·IJ!lililACY smc ggy/abQUI
/hac/roaoch·2006·
U2] Stt HAC mnutes for Juty, 12·13, 2004. buo·llhktary state ogy
/1bQutJblç/btt· ?PQ1'. September 20·21, 2004. t,ttp·l(h§tgry starc goy
/about/MC/Sl'otcrnl>CC:2004; September 8·9, 2008,
nuo·llhiSIOCY state oov/about/hM/seotemt>cc:2008· for e,.11ms>te.
UJJ Comments of then-FRUS series editor Edward Keefer at the February
26-27, 2007, HAC meetng, http-/(hktory stalC goy/about
/haç/ftbru1CY·2002-
!.lil Quoted n Souren Melikîan, *Show Ignores Essentilll Questiom about
~niao King'$ Role: The lntem.t~He1111d Tribune, February 21, 2009.
While the Na1ional Security Archive applauds the CIA's decision to make thcsc matcrials availablc. today's posting shows clcarly
that these materials cou Id have been safely declassified many years ago without risk of damage to the national security. (See
sidebar. "Why is the Coup Still a Secret?")
Archive Deputy Director Malcolm Byrne called for the U.S. intelligence community to make fully available the remaining
records on the coup period. "TI1ere is no longer good reason to keep secrets about such a critical episode in our rccent pas t. The
basic facts are widely known to every school chi Id in Iran. Suppressing the details only distorts the history, and feeds into mythmaking
on ail sides."
To supplcment the recent CIA rclease. the National Security Archive is including two othcr. previously available internai accounts
of the coup. One is the narrative referred to abovc: a 1954 Clandestine Services History preparcd by Donald N. Wilber. one of the
operation's chief architccts, which Tite New York 1imes obtaincd by a leak and first posted on its site in April 2000.
TI,e other item is a hcavily excised 1998 piccc- "l.endebatl. Shah!" - by an in-housc ClA historian. (The Archive has askcd the
5 sur 18
CIA to re-rcview the document's excessive deletions for future release.)
The posting also featurcs an earlier declassification of Tite Baule for Iran for purposes of comparison with the latest release. The
carlier version includes portions that were withheld in the later release. As often happens. government classification officiais had
quitc different - sometimes seemingly arbitrary - views about what could and could not be safcly made public.
Read together. the three his tories off cr fascinating variations in perspective - from an agcncy opcrative to two in-house
historians (the last being the most dispassionate). Unfortunalely, they st ill leave wide gaps in the history. including on some
fundamcntal questions which may never be satisfactorily answered - such as how to apportion responsibility for planning and
carrying out the coup among ail the lrnnian and outside actors involved.
But ail 2 1 of the CIA items posted today (in addition 10 14 previously unpublished British documents - sec Sidebar). reinforcc
1he conclusion thal the United States, and the CIA in particular. devoted extensive resources and high. Jevel policy attention
toward bringing about Mosaddeq's overthrow. and smoothing over the aftermath.
DOCUMENTS
CIA Records
ÇIA Internai His1ories
Document 1 (Cover Sheet, Summary. 1, Il, Ill, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, Appendix A, Appendix B, Appendix C,
Appcndix D, Appendix E): CIA, Clandestine Services History, Overthrow of Premier Mossadtq of Iran: November / 952 -
A11g11st 1953, Dr. Donald N. Wilber, March 1954
Source: The New York Times
Donald Wilber was a principal planner of the initial joint U.S.-U.K. coup a11emp1 of August 1953. This 200-page account is one
of the most valuable remaining records dcscribing the evcnt bccause Wilbcr wrote it within months of the overthrow and provided
a great deal of detail. Like any hislorical document, it mus! be read with care. taking into account the author's persona!
perspective, purpose in writing it. and audience. The CIA routinely prepared histories of important operations for use by futu re
open.Hives. They werc not intcnded to be made public.
6 sur 18
- 280 -
D SHRR[ 1J ,,c~ ,.. Document 2: CIA, Summary, "Campaign to lnstaH a Pro-Western Government in Iran," draft of internai history of the
coup, undated
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act releasc
This hcavily cxciscd summary was almost certainly prcparcd in connection with Donald Wilbcr's Clandestine Services History
(Document 1). By all indications wriuen not long after the coup (1953-54). it includes several of the phrases Wilbcr used -
"quasi-legal." and "war of nerves." for example. The text clearly gives the impression that the author auributes the coup's eventual
succcss to a combination of external and internai developrnents. Beginning by listing a numbcr of specific steps taken by the U.S.
under the heading "CIA ACTION." the document notes al the end (in a handwritten edit): "These actions resulted in litera) revoit
of the population. l 1 + lines excisedJ. The military and security forces joined the populace. Radio Tehran was taken over, and
Mossadeq was forced 10 nee on 17 [sic] Aug 53."
Document 3A & Document 3B: CIA, History, Tite Battle for lra 11, author's namc cxciscd, undatcd (c. mid-1970s) - (1\vo
versions - declassified in 1981 and 2011)
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release
This posting provides two separate releases of the same document, declassified 30 years apart (1981 and 2011). Each version
contains portions excised in the other. Though no date is given, judging from citations in the footnotes The Baule for Iran was
written in or after 1974. It is marked "Administrative - Working Paper'' and contains a number of handwritten edits. The author
was a member of the C IA's History Staff who acknowledges "the enthusiastic cooperar ion" of the agency's Directorate of
Opcrarions. The author provides confinnation that most of the relevant files were destroyed in 1962: therefore the account relies
on the relatively few remaining records as well as on public sources. The vast majority of the covert action portion (Section Ill)
remains classified, although the most recent declassification of the document leaves in some brief, but important, passages. An
unexpected feature of the document (Appendix C) is the inclusion of a serics of lcngthy excerpts of published accounts of the
overthrow designed, apparently. to underscore how poorly the public undcrstood the episode at the time.
Document 4: CIA, His tory,. "Zendebad, Shah!": The Central /11tellige11ce Age11cy cmd the Ft1II of l rn11ia11 Prime Mi11ister
Mohammed Mossadeq, A11g11st / 953, Scott A. Koch, June 1998
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release
The most recent known internai history of the coup, "Zendcbad, Shah!" was writtcn by an in-housc agency historian in 1998. lt is
7 sur 18
heavily excised (but currently undergoing re-review by the CIA). with virtually ail paragraphs marked Confidential or higher
omiued from the public version. Srill, it is a useful accounl wriuen by someone without a stake in the events and drawing on an
array of U.S. govcrnmcnt and publishcd sources not available to the earlîcr CIA authors.
ÇIA Records lmme,Jimelv Be(ore mu/ After 1he Coup
Document 5: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 14, 1953
Source: Cl.A Freedom of Information Act release
Kermit Roosevelt convcys information about rapidly unfolding events in Tchran. including Mosaddeq's idea for a rcfcrendum on
his remaining in office. the prospect of his closing the Majles. and most importantly the impact President Eisenhower's recent
letter has had in turning society against the prime minister. The U.S. govcmment publicized Eisenhower's undiplomatic letter
tuming down Mosaddeq's rcquest for financial aid. The move was one of the ways Washington hoped 10 weaken his political
standing.
Document 6: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 15, 1953
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release
Responding to the resignation of Mosaddeq supporters from the Majles. Kermit Roosevelt tires off a plan to ensure thal other
Majlcs mcmbcrs kecp the parliarnent functioning. the eventual goal bcing to enginecr a no-confidence in Mosaddcq. The mcmo
provides an interesting clue on the subject of whether CIA operatives ever bought votes in the Majles, about which other CIA
sources are vague. Roosevelt urges that as many deputies as possible be "persuaded" 10 take bas, in the parliament. "Recognize
will be necessary ex pend money this purpose and detem1ine precisely who does what." At the conclusion of the document he
appears 10 tie 1his scheme into the previously elaborated - but clearly evolving - coup plan.
Document 7: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 16, 1953
Source: CIA l+l'eedom of Information Act release
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- 281 -
Roosevelt reports on developing plans involving Fazlollah Zahedi, the man who has been chosen to replace Mosaddeq. CIA
sources, including the Wilber history, indicate that the military aspects of the plan were 10 be largely Zahedi's responsibility. This
mcmo supports that (cven though many details are excised), but also provides somc insight into the differcnces in expectations
between the Americans and Zahedi. With some skepticisrn ("Zahedi claims ... "). Roosevelt spells out a series of events Zahedi
envisions that presumably would bring him to the premiership, albeit in a very round-about way. His thinking is clearly prompted
by his declared unwillingness to commit '"political suicide' by extra-legal move."
Document 8: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Exciscd j, July 17, 1953
Source: Cl.A Freedom of Information Act release
The CIA's Tehran station reports on the recent resignations of independent and opposition Majles members. The idea. an
opposi tion deputy tells the station, was to avert Mosaddeq's planned public referendum. The memo gives a bit of insight into the
fluidity and uncenainry of developmcnts with each faction undoubtedly elaborating thcir own strategies and tactics to a cenain
degree.
Document 9: CIA, note to Mr. [JohnJ Waller, July 22, 1953
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release
This brief note conveys much about both U .S. planning and hopes for Mosaddeq's overthrow. lt is a request from Kermit
Roosevelt to John Waller and Donald Wilber to make sure that a formai U.S. statement is ready in advance of "a 'successful'
coup." (Sec Document 10)
Document JO: CIA, note forwarding proposed text of State Dcpartmenl release for after the coup, August 5, 1953
Source: CIA Frecdom of ln.formation Act release
1l1is draft text from the State Department appears to be a result of Roosevelt's request (Document 9) to have an official statement
availablc for use after completion of the opcration. The draft predates Mosaddeq's ousicr by two weeks. but its language -
crcditing "the Iranian people. undcr the leadership of their Shah." for the coup - tracks prccisely with the ncutral wording uscd
by both the State Department and Foreign Office in their official paperwork after the fact.
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Document 11 : ClA, Memo,. ' 'Proposed Commendation for Communications Personnel who have ser viced the TPAJAX
Operation," Frank G. Wisner to The Acting Dircctor of Central lntelLigence, August 20, 1953
Source: CIA Freedom or Information Act release
Wisner recommends a special commendarion for the work perfonned by the communîcmions specialîsts who kept CIA
headquarters in contact with operatives in Iran throughout the coup periocl. "I am sure that you are aware of the exceptîonally
heavy volume of traffic which this operation has necessitated." Wisner writes - an unintentionally poignant remark given how
little of that documentation has survived.
Document 12: CIA, Memo, "Commendation," Frank G. Wisncr to CNEA Division, August 26, 1953
Source: CIA Frccdom of Information Act release
Wisner also requests a commendation for John Waller. the coup overseer at CIA headquarters. "for his work in TPAJAX." Waller's
conduct "in no small measure. contributed to the successful result."
Document 13: CIA, ''Letter of Commendation (Excised]," author and recipient names excised, August 26, 1953
Source: CIA Frecdom of Information Act releasc
Evidently after renection. Frank Wisner concludes that there are troubling "security implications" involved in provid ing a leuer of
commenda1ion for a coven opera1ion.
Document 14: CIA, Memo, ''Anli-Tudeh Activities of Zahedi Government,'' author's name excised, September 10, 1953
Source: CIA Frccdom of Information Act rclcase
A priori1y of the Zahedi govemment after the coup was to go after the Tudeh Party. which had been a mainstay of support for
Mosaddeq, even if the relationship was mostly one of mutual convenîence. This is one of several memos reponing de1ails on
nurnbcrs of arTests. narncs of suspectcd Central Committcc mcrnbcrs. and planncd fate of arrcstccs. The report claims with high
specificity on Soviet assistance being provided to the Tudeh. including printing party newspapers at the ernbassy. Signs are
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reportedly mixed as to whe1her the party and pro-Mosaddeq elements will try to combine forces again.
Document 15: ClA, memofrom Kermit Roose,,elt to [Excised], Scptember 21, 1953
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release
Roosevelt reports on an intense period of political maneuvering at high levels in the Zahedi government. Intrigues, patronage
(including a report that the govemmcnt has bccn giving fïnancial support 10 Ayatollah Behbehani, and that the lattcr's son is
angling for a Cabinet post). and corruption are ail dcalt with in this mcmo.
Document 16: CJA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], September 24, 1953
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act r elease
A restlcss Zahedi is rcported 10 be active on a numbcr of fronts including trying 10 get a military tribunal to cxccute Mosaddcq
and urging the Shah to tire several senior military offïcers including Chief of Staff Batmangelich. The Shah reponedly has not
respondcd to Zahedi's prcvious fi vc messages.
Document 17: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roose,,elt to IExcisedl, October 2, 1953
Source: ClA Freedom of Information Act r elease
According to this account, the Shah remaincd dccply worried about Mosaddeq's influence. evcn while incarccratcd. Roosevelt
reports the Shah is prepared to execute Mosaddeq (after a guilty verdict that is a foregone conclusion) if his followers and the
Tudeh take any threatening action.
Document 18: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], Octobcr 9, 1953
Source: ClA Frcedom of Information Act release
lranian politics did not cairn down entirely after the coup. as this memo indicates. reporting on "violent disagrccments" betwecn
Zahedi and his own supporter. Hoseyn Makki. whom Zahedi threatened to shoot if he accosted any senators trying to attend a
Il sur 18
Senate session. Roosevelt also notes two recent payments from Zahedi to Ayatollah Behbchani. The source for these provocative
reports is unknown, but presumably is named in the excised portion at the top of the memo.
Document 19: CIA, memo from Kermit Roose,•elt to fExcisedl, October 20, 1953
Source: ClA Frecdom of Information Act releasc
Rooseveh notes a meeting be1ween the new prime minister. Z1hedi. and Ayatollah Kashani, a politically active cleric and once
one of Mosaddeq's chicf supporters. Kashanî rcportcdly carps about some of his forn1cr National Front allies. Roosevelt concludcs
Zahedi wants "split" the front "by wooing Kashani away."
Document 20: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, "Our National Character," undated
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act r elease
This appears to be an example of CIA propaganda aimed al undermining Mosaddeq's public standing. presumably prepared
during Summer 1953. Like other cxamples in this posling. the CIA provided no description whcn it releascd the document. lt
certainly fils the pattern of what Donald Wilber and others after him have described about the nature of the CIA's efforts to plant
damaging innucndo in local Jranian media. In this case. the authors extol the virtues of the lranian charac1er, panicularly as
admired by the outside world, then decry the descent into "hateful," "rough" and "mde" behavior lranians have begun to exhibit
"ever since the alliance between the dictator Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party."
Document 21: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, "Mossadeq's Spy Service," undated
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release
This propaganda piece accuses the prime minister of pretending to be "the savior of Iran" and alleges that he has instead built up a
vase spying apparatus which he has trained on virtually every sector of socie1y, from the army to newspapers to political and
religious leaders. Stining up images of his purponed alliance with "murderous Qashqai Khans" and the Bolsheviks. the authors
charge: "ls this the way you savc l.ran. Mossadcq? We know what you want to save. You want to save Mossadeq's dictatorship in
Iran!"
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British Records
Document 22 : FCO, Summary Record, "British•Amcrican Planning Talks, Washington," October 10.lJ, 1978
Source: The National Archives or the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) FCO 8/3216, File No. P 333/2, Folder, " Iran:
Release orConfidential Records," 1 Jan• 31 Dec 1978 (herearter: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216)
ln October 1978. a delegation of British FCO officiais traveled to Washington for two days of discussions and comparing of notes
on 1he world situation wilh their Statc Dcpartmcnt counlerparts. The director o f the Dcpartment's Policy Planning Staff. Anthony
Lake (latcr to serve as President Bill Clinton's national sccurity advisor). lcd the Arncrican sidc. Other participants wcrc experts
from various gcographical and funct ional burcaus. including Henry Prccht. the hcad of the Iran Dcsk.
Bcginning in paragraph 22. Prccht givcs a dour summary of cvcms in lran: "the worst forcign policy disastcr to hit 1hc West for
many ycars." ln a fascinating back-and-forth about the Shah. Prccht wams it is "difficult to sec how the Shah cou Id survive." The
British politely disagree, voicing confidence that the monarchy will survive. Even his State Department colleagues "showed
surprise al 1he dcpth of Mr. Prccht's gloom."
ln the course of his prescntation (paragraph 23), Prccht notes almost in passing that the Slatc Department is reviewing its records
from 1952-1954 for evcntual rclcasc. A British rcprcscntativc immcdiatcly commcnts that "if that wcrc the case. hc hopcd HMG
[Her Majesty's Govemment] would be consulted."
Document 23: FCO, Minute, B.L. Crowc to R.S. Gorham, "Anglo-Amcrican Planning Talks: Iran," October 12, 1978
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
This mcmo rccounts Precht's dramatic prcscntation on l.ran two days carlicr (sec prcvious document). "His was csscntially a
policy of despair." the author writcs. Whcn 1he British follow up with the Americans about Prccht's outlook of gloom. they fïnd
that State Department and National Security Council (NSC) staff were just as bewildered by his remarks. One NSC staff member
catis thcm "bullshit." Policy Planning Director Lake laments the various "indiscreet and sensitive things" the Americans said at
the meeting. and asks the British to "be very careful" how they handle them.
"On a complctcly differem subjcct.'' the minute continues. "Precht let out ... that he was having to go through the records of the
1952/53 Mossadeq period with a view 10 their release under the Freedom of Information Act [sicj. He said that if released, there
would be some very embarrassing things about the British in them." (Much of this passage is underlined for emphasis.) The note
gocs on: "I made a strong pitch that we should be consulted.'' but the author adds. "J imagine that it is American documents about
Lhe British raLher Lhan documents on which HMG have any lien which are involvcd." (This is a point that may still be at issue
today since the question of discussing American documents wirh foreign govemments is very diffcrent from negotîating over the
lhur 18
use of foreign govemment records.)
Document 24: FCO, Letter, R.J. Carrick to B.L. Crowe, October 13, 1978
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/32 16
An FCO official reports that Precht recently approached another Bri tish diplomat to say that "he hoped we had 1101 been 100
shocked" by his recent presen1a1ion. He says Precht acknowledged being "over-pessimistic" and that in any even1 he had not been
offcring anyone's vîcw but Iris own.W Accordîng 10 the British. NSC staff mcmbers put more stock in the asscssmcnts of the
U.K. ambassador to Tehran. Sir Anthony Parsons, than in Precht's. The writer adds that U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan
also shares Parsons· judgment, and concludes. without indicating a source, that even "Henry Precht has now accepted Sullivan's
view!"
Document 25: FCO, Letter, R.S. Gorham to Mr. Cullimore, " Iran: The Ghotbi Pamphlet and the Mussadeq Period,"
October 17, 1978
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
This cover note (to Document 24) refers to Precht's revelarion about the impending American publication of documents on the
Mosaddeq period. The author suggests giving some consideration to the implications of this for "our own record of the time."
Document 26: FCO, Letter., B.L. Crowe to Sir A. Duff, "Anglo-American Planning Talks," October 19, 1978
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
FCO official Brian Crowe summarîzes the October 10-1 1 joint U.S.-U.K. talks. The document is included here mainly for the
sake of comprehensiveness, since il is part of the FCO fol der on the FR US malter. The wriler repeats the remark f rom State's
Anthony Lake that '"some of the comments·· from the U.S. side on Iran (among other topics) were .. highly sensitive·· and should
not be disclosed - even 10 oth er American officiais.
Document 27: FCO, Letter, J.O. Kerr to B.L. Crowe, "Talks with the US Planners: Iran," October 24, 1978
14 sur 18
- 284 -
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
This brief note shows that word is moving up the line in the FCO about the forthcoming FRUS volume on Iran . The writer
conveys a request to have the U.K. cmbassy in Washington check the risks involvcd in the potcntial rcleasc of U.S. documents.
and "when the State Dcpartmcnt propose to raise them fonnally with us."
Document 28: FCO, letter, G.G.H. Walden to B.L. Crowe, "Anglo-American Planning Ta lks: Iran," November 10, 1978
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/32 16
Still more intcrcst in the possible State Dcpartment relcasc is rcflcctcd in thi s short note, now a month aftcr the joint U.S.-U.K.
talks. Herc and elsewhere. the British notes erroneously report that the release will corne under the Freedom of Information Act
(or the Public Infom1ation Act, as given here); they are actually slated for inclusion in the Foreign Relations of the Unitetl Sflltes
(FR US) se ries.
Document 29: FCO, R.S. Gorham cover note to Strcams, " Iran: Rclease ofConfidential Records," attaching draft letter to
Washington, November 14, 1978
Source : TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
This note and draft arc includcd primarily becausc they arc part of the FCO file on titis 1opic. Howcver. the draft lettcr docs
contain some differcnt wording frorn lhc final version (Document 31 ).
Document 30: U.S. Embassy London, Letter, Ronald 1. Spiers to Sir Thomas Br imelow, March 24, 1975
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/32 16
1l1rec ycars bcforc Prcchl's revelation to his British counlcrparts. the U.K. sough1 general guidance from the State Dcpartment
about how the U.S. would handle "classified information received from Her Majesly's Government.'' The month before, robust
amendments to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act had gone into effect. This letter from the numbcr two official in London at
the time. Ronald Spiers. o ff ers a detailed response. Britain's awareness of the new amendments and anxiousness about their
implications (including the fairly abstruse question of how secret documents would be handled in court cases) show how sensitive
an issue the British considered protection of their information to be. The U.S. Chargé is equally anxious to provide the necessary
IS sur 18
reassurances. (More than a decade later. Spiers would sharply oppose efforts by the State Department's Historical Advisory
Comrnittee to gain access to restricted documentation for the FRUS series.lfil)
Document 3 1: FCO, LeUer., R.S. Gorham to R.J .S. Muir, " Iran: Release of Confidential Records," November 16, 1978
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
The British embassy in Washington is alerted to the possibility of documents bcing relcased on the 1952-54 period. The FCO
clcarly cxpects that, as apparcntly has bcen 1he case in 1he past. "thcre should be no difficulty for the Americans in first rcmoving
... copies of any telcgrams etc from us and US documen1s which record our views. even in the case of papers which are not
strictly speaking 'official information furnished by a foreign govemment."' (This raises important questions about how far U.S.
officiais typically go to accommodate allied sensibilitîes. including to 1he point of censoring U.S. documents.) "What is 1101 clear,"
the lener continues. "îs whether they cou Id withhold American documents which referred to joint Anglo/US views about. say. the
removal of Musaddiq in 1953."'
Document 32: British Embassy in \Vashington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, "Iran" Release of Confidential
Records," December 14, 1\178
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/32 16
TI1is follow-up to Gorham's earlier request (Document 31) is another reflection of U.K. skittishness about the pending document
release. The embassy officer reports that he has spoken to Henry Precht "several times" about it, and that the British Desk at the
State Dcpartmcnt is also looldng în10 the malter on London's behalf. The objective is to persuade the Depanmcnt to agrcc 10
withhold not only British documents but American ones. too.
Document 33: British Embassy in \Vashington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, "Iran: Release of Confidential
Records," Dcccmber 22, 1\178
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
The embassy updates the FCO on the status of the Iran records. Precht inforrns the embassy that hc is preparcd to "sit on the
papers" to help postpone their publication. Precht's priority is the potential impact on current U.S. and U.K. policy 1oward Iran.
Conversely. a hislorian al the State Depanment makes it clear that his office feels no obligation even to consul! with the British
16sur 18
- 285 -
about any non-U.K. documents being considered. The historian goes on to say "1hat he had in the past resisted requests from other
govemmen1s for joint consultation and would resisl very strongly any such request from us." Bul the same historian admits that
the embassy might "be successful" if it approached the policy side of the Department directly.
The embassy letter ends with a "footnotc" noting that State Department historians "have read the 1952-54 papers and find thcm a
'marvelous compilation."'
lnterestingly. a handwritten comment on the letter from another FCO official gives a difTerent view about the likely consequences
of the upcoming document p ublication: "As the revolution rin Iran) is upon us. the problem is no longer Anglo-Arnerican: the first
rcvclations will be frorn the lranian sidc." ln other words. the revolution will bring its own damaging rcsults. and the
revolutionaries will not need any further ammunition from the \Vest.
Document 34: FCO, Cover Note, Cohen (?) to Lucas, circa Dccember 22, 1978
Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216
ln a handwrittcn remark at the bottom of this cover note. an unidcntified FCO official voices much lcss anxiety than somc of his
colleagues about the possible repcrcussions of the disclosure of documents on Iran. Referring to a passage in paragraph 3 of the
attached letter (see previous document). the writer asks: "why should we be concerned about 'an y other documents'?" The writer
agrees with lhe cover note author's suggestion to "let this malter rest for a while," lhen continues: "I think we ought positively to
seek the agreement of others interested 10 Y." ("Y" identifies the relevant passage on the cover note.)
Document 35: FCO, Meeting Record, " Iran: Policy Review," December 20, 1978
Source: British National Archives, FCO 8/3351, File No. NB P 011/1 (Part A), lïtle " Internai Political Situation in Iran"
British Foreign Secretary David Owen chairs this FCO meeting on the unfolding crisis in Iran. It off ers a window into London's
assessment of the revolution and British concerns for the future (including giving "highest priority to getting paid for our major
outstanding dcbts"). The document also shows that not cvcryonc at the FCO bclievcd sîgnificant harm would nccessarily corne to
British interests from the FRUS revelations. Although he is speaking about events in 1978, I.T.M. Lucas' comment could apply
just as forcefu lly to the impact of disclosing London's actions in 1953: "(l]t was commonly known in [the lranian] Government
who the British were talking to. and there was nothing we could do to disabuse public opinion of its notions about the British role
in Iran." (p. 2)
17 sur 18
NOTES
UJ Just in the last several years. books in English, French and Persian by Ervand Abrahamian. Gholam-Reza Afkhami.
Mohammad Ami ni. Christopher de Bellaiguc. Darioush Bayandor, Mark Gasiorowsk.i (and this author), Stephen Kinzcr, Abbas
Milani. Ali Rahnerna. and others have focused on. or at least dealt in depth with. Mosaddcq and the coup. They contain
sornetimes wide differences of view about who was behind planning for the ovenhrow and how it finally played out. More
accounts arc on the way (inc luding an important English-languagc volume on lranian dorncstic politics by Ali Rahncma of the
American University of Paris).
11.l Tim \Veiner. "C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup." The New York 7imes. May 29. 1997.
Ill Tim \Veiner. "C.I.A.'s Openness Derided as a 'Snow Job'." The New York 7imes. May 20, 1997; Tim Weiner, op. cir .. May 29.
1997. (See also the link to the Archive's lawsuit. above.)
H] Kermit Roosevelt, Co11111erco11p: The Srrugglefor rhe Co111rol of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979); The
New York Times, April 16, 2000.
W Precht recalls that he was originally not slaied to be at the mee1ings. which usually deputy assistant secretaries and above
attended. But lhe Near East division representative for State was unavailable. "I was drafted," Precht said. Bcing forced to "sit
through intenninable and pointless talk" about extraneous topics "when my plate was already overflowing" on Iran contributed to
a "sour mood," he remembered. (Henry Precht e-mail to author. June 2,2011.)
!fil Joshua Bons. Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, "'A Burden for the Department'?: To The 1991 FRUS Statute."
February 6, 2012, hllp://history.state.gov/frus 150/research/to-the-1991-f rus-statute.
Contents oFthis website Copyright 1995-2017 Nalîonal Security Archive. Ali rights reserved. Tenns and conditions for use of materials found on this websile.
18 sur 18
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Annex 35
“Iran, U.S. to open joint Chamber of Commerce: Report”, Agence France Presse,
27 November 2013
- 288 -
- 289 -
i=\•Hiii½fj
Iran, U.S. to open joint
Chamber of Commerce: Report
AFP, Tehran
Wednesday, 27 November 2013
Iran and the Unrted States are to establish a JQmt
chamber of commerce within a month, wilh direct
flights also ptannect, an lranian official said
Wednesday in a newspaper report
· tran-U.S. chamber of commerce will be taunched
in tess than one month," AbolfaZI Hejazi, a
member of tran's Chamber of commerce,
Industries, Mmes and Agriculture, totct the
EngtIsh-language Iran Da1ly.
ln the wake of a historie accord on Sunday
between Tehran and major powers on lran's
controversial nucrear program, Hejazi also saId
his country was ready to start direct flights to the Unrted States.
Text ste !; 8. A
TQI
T he Qatar IJ\sidcr
Pufflnt tlWt>IQôll< lll«f1l'I'(""' •C~UrCrd,I
You r comprehen~h,e ~ource of
information an #Q.at :arCrish:
Aller the 1979 revolution in Iran, Washington severed diplomatie relations With Tehran following the
seizure of lts embassy in Tehran, du ring which lslamist students held 52 u_s_ diplomats hostage for 444
days.
According to Hejazi, the proJect which he said had already been reg1stered 1n the Unrtect States would
allow the Iwo countries to work towards restoring lies
Hejazi arso said the government has authortzed the priVate sector to launch joint actJvities and that Iran
was ready to establish direct flights to the United States.
Flights woutd connect Kish Island in southwest Iran with New York, he said.
"This is because Kish Island Is a free !rade zone and lranian passengers who have U.S. citizenship will
not need to obtain visas to enter il ," he said.
Hejazi said direct flights would "enable us to export domeslic products to the US and import high-tech
products and raw materials from the country ·
On the sidelines of his v isit to the U.N. General Assembly in rate september, President Hassan Rowhani
pleclged to ease traver to Iran ror the hundrects or thousancts or lranians IMng In the United States.
LastUpjlIO: Weàlesdar, 27 No,,embe( 2013 KSA 2208 - GMT 19.00
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Annex 36
I. Tharoor, “Iraq’s Crisis: Don’t Forget the 2003 U.S. Invasion”, The Washington
Post, 5 April 2014
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- 293 -
lraq's crisis: Don't forget the 2003 U.S. invasion
© www. wash i ngton post.com / news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/ 16/i raq s-cris1s-d ont-forget-the-2003-u-s-i nvas1on/
Members of lraqi security forces patrol an area near the borders between Karbala Province and Anbar Province on
June 16, 2014. (Mushtaq Muhammed/Reuters)
We're all watching the situation in Iraq with sadness and horror. 1S1S, a loathsome jihadist group incubated in Syria,
has carved out a large territory and plunged the wider region deeper into crisis. There are reports of shocking mass
executions, while tens of thousands of lraqis are fleeing their homes as ISIS pushes forward.
ln Washington and elsewhere, pundits and politicos are indulging in the blame game. Sorne accuse the Obama
administration of being too keen to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011; others harpon the provocative Shiite
sectarianism of lraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which has created conditions for Sunni extremists like ISIS to
flourish.
Curiously, quite a few of the most outspoken critics were prominently involved in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Rarely in their current diagnoses do they acknowledge the tumult unleashed after the toppling of lraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein. ln a lengthy piece posted to his persona! Web site, former British prime minister Tony Blair went
so far as to dismiss the legacy of the war he helped start. "We have to liberate ourselves from the notion that 'we'
have caused [the current crisis]. We haven't," Blair wrote. He added: "The fundamental cause of the crisis lies within
the region not outside it."
Blair has been widely criticized for his comments in the U.K., where there's a sharper conversation on the
consequences of the Iraq war and the reasons invoked more than a decade ago to justify the invasion. Blair is right
that the various tensions now smoldering in Iraq lie "within the region" -- but outside intervention had real effects.
Here's why that should remain better in focus.
lt opened a Pandora's box of sectarianism
Saddam Hussein was a nasty, murderous tyrant who brutalized much of his country and was guilty of war crimes.
But Iraq under the rule of his nominally secular Ba'ath party was not the sectarian charnel house that it became in
the years following Hussein's overthrow and eventual execution.
The lraqi politicians who found traction in U.S.-occupied Iraq did little to build an inclusive, pluralist politics. Nor did
they have much incentive. Traumatized by decades of authoritarianism and indulged by foreign partners, they
sought to consolidate their own political fiefdoms to the detriment of the fragile lraqi state.
The Sunni-Shiite bloodletting that followed scarred communities that for centuries had lived in relative peace
alongside each other. The divisive politics of Maliki's government inflamed passions in lraq's Sunni heartland, while
violence in Baghdad saw the once cosmopolitan capital become heavily Shiite.
Meanwhile, the invasion's aftermath hollowed out the country's Christian population, with hundreds of thousands
fleeing as refugees. They were once protected minorities in both Iraq and Syria, but the upheavals that followed the
collapse of Ba'athist rule have made them vulnerable targets.
lt spawned terror groups and redrew the geopolitical map
ISIS emerged as al-Qaeda splinter group operating in the wake of the invasion, a fringe, lethal faction within a larger
Sunni insurgency. While beaten back by the U.S. surge in 2007, the elements that would reform as ISIS would find
fertile ground amid Syria's civil war, where it began a campaign of conques! and slaughter that has yielded it a virtual
mini-state.
Now, as ISIS's onslaught nears Baghdad, Shiite militias that had first risen up in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion
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are once more mustering and joining the battle. Many of these factions didn't exist -- or were deep underground -under
Hussein. This is not to say that Saddam Hussein deserved to remain in power. But the security vacuum after
his fall and the presence of foreign occupiers led to Iraq becoming a breeding ground for jihad and religious
extremism. lt also led to Iran developing significant influence in a neighboring country that was once ruled by a biller
foe.
lt offers many cautionary tales
On Monday, the strategic northern city of Tal Afar tell to ISIS fighters. lt's known for ils sizable population of ethnie
Turkmen, which has made the city vulnerable to assault in the past. But in 2006, as the Associated Press notes, Tal
Afar was hailed by the U.S., then waging counterinsurgency, as a mode! of success. President George W. Bush
said then that the city showed "the outlines of the Iraq that we and the lraqi people have been fighting for: A free and
secure people are getting back on their feet." Last week, ISIS seized Mosul, lraq's second-larges! city and another
lapsed U.S. success story. ln 2004, it was the petri dish for then-Gen. David Petraeus's much-vaunted tactics of
pacification.
These were ail fleeting victories that eventually serve, more than anything, as reminders of the limits of American
power and Washington's ability to reshape tacts on the ground. Petraeus's "Mosul mode!" is now just one more
forgotten chapter in a long, bloody journey that began in 2003. The wishful thinking of U.S. leadership in Iraq was
on display in the build-up to the war, when ils main proponents showed little appreciation for the resources and
troops the U.S. would have to deploy in a near-decade long occupation.
Now, the U.S. faces a hard set of choices, in a context shadowed by conflicting imperatives and the agendas of
other regional powers. One can understand the caution shown by the administration -- at least as much as the zeal
of those who want the U.S. to be embroiled in the region once more.
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Annex 37
D. Hussain, “ISIS: The “Unintended Consequences” of the US-led War on Iraq”,
Foreign Policy Journal, 23 March 2015
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2017-6-22 PrintFriendly.coni: Print & PDF
ISIS: The "unintended consequences" of the US-led war on
Iraq
---~-.·-·-·-·····•······•··••y• ····.·······---~-... - .• · .
l'f'!. www.fo reig n po licyjo li rn a Lcom /2015/0 3/2 3/isis .. füe-u n intended-co nseq u encos-of-the-u s-led-wa r -on-iraq/
Dilly Hussain
Wamings against trying to defeat ISIS by doing morè of the same of what led to ils rise in the first place are falling
on deaf ears.
ln a recenl interview with Shane Smith, the founder of VICE News, President Barack Obama said: ''!SIL is a direct
outgrowth of Al Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion, which is an example of unintended consequences."
This admission is evidence of the general causality between Western military interventionism in the Muslim world,
and the rise of reactionary armed militia groups. ln this particular case, the US-led invasion of Iraq undoubtedly .
paved the way for the rise of the self-professed ;lslamic State', better known as ISIS. Depending on who highlights
this "unintended consequence" when commenting on recent events in Iraq and Syria, it is usually given very little
importance or completely dismissed. Understandably, the pro-war policymakers in Washington and London who
orchestrated the invasion of a sovereign state based on false intelligence, wbuld rather focus on how to "degrade
and destroy" the nions1er they created, as opposed to acknowledging faultand accepting blame.
Furtherrriore, it appears from numerous public statements that President Obama conveniently dèflecls the
decisions made by his predecessor. George W Bush, when questioned about ISIS, by disregarding America·s
probfematic foreign policy in the Middle East, to shifting the attention exclusively to an extreme interpretation of
Islam. This rhetoric is a pattern which has been overwhelmingly consistentwith European leaders, some of whom
were brothers-in-arms with the US when ihvading Iraq. Like President Obama, British Prime Minister David
Cameron also parrots the same narrative, ignoring the misdeeds of Tony Blair in failing to take the advice of the
former head of M15, Baroness Manningham0 Buller, when she warned that the Iraq war would increase the
domestic terrer thi"eat to the UK. Similarly, the Dutch and French governments amongst other European states,
who have joined the 60 country coalitton against ISIS, also prefer to blame "lslamic extremism", instead of
introspectively learning from 'their bloody colonia I history in the M uslim world.
Though President Obarria's confession to VICE News qualifies as a substantive statement of US complicity in
creating ISIS, whether it was an "unintended consequence" or intentional negligence is entirely a different matter.
Prior to the war in Afghanistan, there was no Taliban in Pakistan. The group known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) formed in 2007 as a response ta NATO's presence in the region. Likewise, Al Shabaab did not exist before
the Western backed African Union (AU} forces and the Kenyan army entered Somalia. Same Càn be said about the
guerrilla groups that arose as a result of US interference in South America. Evidently, there seems to be a
reoccurring pattern whenever Western states; namely the US, attempts to meddle in the affairs of other sovereign
states, either through military intervention, regional proxies or subservient dictators. ln most cases, American
intrusion in other countries is to protect their economic interests or to make geopolitical advancements, and Iraq
was no exception to this rule.
History and origin of 151S
WMO's were notthe only incriminating abject that was unfounded prior to 'Operation lraqi Freedom'; there were no
Al Qaeda or ISIS either. The proto~ISIS group, Jam'at al-Tawhid wal0 Jihad (T J) led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was
born out of the Iraq war, as part of a coalition of Sunni resistance groups fighting the occupying forces. T J changed
its name on multipie occasions during its evolution to becoming ISIS. ln late 2004, T J officially joined AI-Oaeda,
after Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osa ma bin Lad en, and became known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). ln 2006, AQ 1
became the lslamic State of Iraq (ISI), which later became the lslamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) when. it
branched into the Syrian civil war.
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T J made a number of strategic errors which worsened as time progressed, and eventually became the hallmarks
of the group we know as ISIS. Firstly, it was the adoption of the un-lslamic methodology of classifying civilians as
acceptable targets in war. Secondly, T J declared war on lraqi Shias in response to man y of their prominent leaders
collaborating with US forces in attacking predominantly Sun ni villages and towns, under the justification of fighting
Al Qaeda. The US's relationship with Shia leaders, who were now the new stakeholders in post-Saddam Iraq, was
arguably the sole factor which led to the "unintended consequences" that facilitated the emergence of ISIS.
T J's sectarian war against lraq's Shia population discredited the wider resistance against Western forces, and
beèame so destructive that the general Sunni populous faced the brunt of the vengeful blowback that followed
from the government of Nouri al-Maliki. The untold horror and misery that ltaqis faced from T J and state-backed
Shia death squads allowed the US to extend their occupation as they now portrayed themselves as the 'fesser of
two evils', who were safeguarding the country from sectarian strife, and ensuring thal Iraq would become a
"be?con of democracy".
By 2006, ISl's (formerly T J) relation ship with other Sun ni resistance groups also fell a part due to their inability to
understand the nuances of lslamic laws pertaining to warfare and governance. The group considered themselves
as a 'state', and the people residing inthe areas they controlled as their citizens, who were forced to abide by their
rigid interpretation of Shari'ah law. ISI perceived any genuine criticism from lraqi Sunnis as an act of rebellion and
apostasy, which led to the summary execution of numerous Sunni tribal chiefs, and assassinations offellow
resistance leaders.
US polîcymakers witnessed the besieged Sunnis of Iraq, who were suffocated between the harsh vigilante rule of
ISI; the state sanctioned Shia militias, and the occupying military forces, until an opportunity arose.
The Sunni Awakening Council
Capitalizing on the desperation of Sunni tribal leaders and resistance groups, the US offered them money and
weapons to redirect lheir efforts towards fighting ISI. Additionally, Sunnis were promised political inclusion, as well
as positions within the lraqi army, police force and security services. The same Sunni tribes that helped !SIS take
Mosul in Juhe 2014 had created their own 'Awakening Councils' to fight 1S1. Thus, ISI had lost their Sunni allies en
masse and the territories they controlled, forcing them to go underground.
However, afler Nouri al-Maliki was selecfod by the US to replace Ibrahim al-Jaafari as the new prime minister of
'post-war' Iraq, the facilitation of ISl's return had begun before anyone could celebrate their demise. AI-Maliki's
eight-year rule was infested with paranoïa, corruption, the persecution of lraq's Sunni population, and closer lies
with Iran. îhe promises made to the Sunni tribesof Anbar province for repelling ISI were not delivered. lristead,
Sunni politicians were harassed, threatened with prosecution, imprisoned. assassinated, or exiled. Most notably,
Vice-president Tariq al Hashemi was accused of supporting terrorism and forced to flee to Turkey as he was
sentenced to death in absentia.
When the democratic process had become seemingly fruitless for lraqi Sunnis, thousands had taken to the streets
of Ramadi, Hawija, and Fallujah to voice their political and socioeconomic frustration. The anti-governrnent
protests that look place between 2012-2014 were violently quelled by the lraqi arrriy and security services;
according to some conservative estimations, this led to hundreds of deaths and arrests of peaceful Sun ni
protestors over a two-year period. ln rèality, al-Maliki was a prime minister as oppressive as any of lraq's previous
leaders -with one exception;.the lraqî army he commanded was armed and trairied by the US Army. They were
undisciplined, unprofessional, unteliable, and depended on US military support to Conduct their operations.
Under lraq·s new democratic regime which was armed by the US and backed by Iran, the Sunnis of the north
became increasingly aggrieved, and this provided the perfect opportunity for ISI to fill the power vacuum.
"Unintended consequences" or an inevitable outcome?
When ISIS. declared the re-establishment of the Caliphate on June 29, 2014, the principle of 'my enemy's enemy is
my friend' became evidently clear for. the powerbrokers involved in the region. The US and Iran had committed
themselves to train and arm the lraqi army. After taking Mosul, Fallujah, Hawija, Ramadi and Tikrit, ISIS advanced
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2017-6-22 PrintFriendly.com: Prin! & PDF
towards the oil rich city of Erbil in Kurdistah, which was followed by US airstrikes under the guise _of 'humanitarian
intervention' in protecting the Yazidis. ISIS responded to the US airstrikes by beheading American journalist, James
Foley, and ultimately that was the straw that broke the camel's back. -
More importantly, what implications do the ongoing airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria have on the US? If
history is anytlling ta go by, then there will now be an increased domestic terror threat. Clearly the lesso.ns of
Afghanistan and Iraq were ignored. when the same policymakers who backed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 began
beating the drums of war. As tempting as it may be for the US to 'fight terrorism' in every corner of the world, the
'ISIS crîsis' was a problem for the people of Iraq and Syria ta tackle thèmselves. However, when ISIS threatened
US economic interests in Erbil, it became obligatory to intervene militarily. Furthermore, arming the lraqi army and
Kurdish peshmerga to suppress a legitimate Sunni tribal uprising (which ISIS was loosely a part of) against the al•
Maliki regime exacerbated the already volatile situation.
What the US tends to forget, or intentionally ignores, is that armed reactionary groups like ISIS are born out of the
des1abilization created by Western military intervention. As mentioned earlier in this article, hostile anti-American
resistance groups gain momentum, sympathy and legitimacy from the acti.ons carried out by Western forces. For
four years the Assad regime has been murdering its own people by barrel bomb1ng entire villages and using
chemical weapons. whilst al-Maliki was ind iscrirninately killing Sunnis in Iraq. but that did not urge the Obama
administration to intervene militarily. Yet, when the Sunni uprising gained momentum in Iraq and it threàtened to
shift the balance of power from the Kurds in the north, and the Shia-led governmeht in Baghdad, the US reacted.
Since US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria oegan, more Muslims from around the world have flocked to ISIS.
Nevertheless, the US is adamantin protecting its geopolitical and economic interests in the Middl1;i East. At a time
where China and Russia are making headway economically and militarily, perhaps this was the ideal opportunity
for America to reassert its position as the commander-in-chief of the 'civilized world'. Additionally, if Obama
succeeds in eradicating the self-professed lslamic State, it would also be an ideological victory over the genuine
aspiration for a Caliphate in the future. But identical ta the advice of Baroness Manningham"Buller to the Blair
government, the words of the former head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, Jack Devine when he told Fox
News, that "attacking ISIS increases terror threats to the US", has fallen on deaf ears.
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Annex 38
R. LoBianco & E. Landers, “Trump: Clinton, Obama 'created ISIS'”, CNN,
3 January 2016
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Trump: Clinton, Obama 'created ISIS'
oe:3 edition.cnn.com /2016/01 /02/polit1cs1donald-trump-barack-obama-r llary-cl. nton-created-1s1s/index.html
Donald Trump on Saturday said the policies of President Barack Obama and former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton "created ISIS," the furthest the GOP front-runner has gone in tying the Obama administration's policies to
the rise of the terror group.
Trump offered no evidence for his claim here at the Mississippi Coast Coliseum, in which he also said escalating
tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia were signs that the lslamic Republic wanted to take over the longtime
U.S. ally in the Middle East.
"They've created ISIS. Hillary Clinton created ISIS with Obama," Trump said.
He couched his hit in a brief discussion of the lranian protests outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran , which
erupted after Saudi Arabia executed 47 people , including a dissident Shiite cleric.
"ln Tehran, they're burning down the Saudi embassy, you see that?" Trump said as he opened his remarks.
"Now, what that is is Iran wants to take over Saudi Arabia. They always have. They want the oil, OK? They've
always wanted that."
Trump has blamed both Democrats and former President George W. Bush when talking about unrest in the
Middle East, particularly citing the 43rd president's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. ln recent weeks, he's been
particularly aggressive in going after Clinton, the Democratic presidential front-runner, and her record leading the
State Department.
Two of Trump's 2016 competitors, Carly Fiorina and Rick Santorum, said in November that Clinton and Obama
were to blame for ISIS.
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Annex 39
K. Ng, “Donald Trump says Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton ‘created Isis’”, The
Independent, 3 January 2016
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Donald Trump says Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
'created Isis'
0 www.independent.eo.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-says-barack-obam…
isis--a6794406 htm
Kate Ng
Donald Trump has claimed Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are to blame for the creation of Isis.
Du ring his latest campaign rally in Mississippi , Mr Trump suggested the Obama administration has allowed the
extremist group to flourish by ignoring his call for the US to seize oil assets now owned by Isis.
''l've predicted a lot of things, you have to say, including, 'Get the oil, take the oil, keep the oil'. Right?" he said.
"l've been saying that for three years, and everybody said, 'Oh I can't do that. 1 mean, this is a sovereign
country.' There is no country!
"They've created Isis. Hillary Clinton created Isis with Obama," he continued.
Mr Trump gave no evidence to support his claims, but used his address to accuse Iran of wanting to take over
Saudi Arabia, a long-lime US ally.
This cornes du ring lranian protests outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran , which erupted after the mass
executions of 47 Sunni and Shia prisoners by Saudi Arabia.
"ln Tehran, they're burning down the Saudi embassy, you see that?" he said. "Now, what this is is Iran wants to
take over Saudi Arabia. They always have. They want the oil, ok? They've always wanted that."
After the rally, he retweeted a supporter who repeated his claims about Ms Clinton and Mr Obama. The supporter
was responding to a critic calling Mr Trump a "retard" and a "douche".
@brandonstinney @rea/DonaldTrump How can you deny this fact. @Hi/laryC/inton and
@BarackObama are the two people who made #/SIS a big problem
- Granite Hope (@Granite_Hope) January 3, 2016
ln November 2015, Mr Trump's fellow Republican candidates Rick Santorum and Carly Fiorina both said that Ms
Clinton and Mr Obama were to blame for the rise of Isis.
Mr Trump made no comment on the al-Shabaab recruitment video that was released on Friday, featuring footage
of him calling for a ban on all Muslims entering the US.
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Annex 40
“U.S. to buy heavy water from Iran's nuclear program”, Reuters, 22 April 2016
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U.S. to buy heavy water from lran's nuclear program
'l www.reuters.com 'article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKCN0XJ25G
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States will buy heavy water from lran's nuclear program and expects it to be
delivered within weeks, U.S. officiais said on Friday, a move that Republican lawmakers quickly criticized.
The U.S. Department of Energy, or DOE, will buy 32 metric tonnes of heavy water from Iran worth $8.6 million, a
department spokeswoman said. Heavy water is a component of making nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, that
is not radioactive.
Under last year's landmark nuclear deal between Iran, the United States and five other world powers, Tehran is
responsible for reducing its stock of heavy water, which it can sell, dilute or dispose of, under conditions.
Iran is permitted to keep up to 130 tonnes of heavy water at present and up to 90 tonnes once its redesigned and
rebuiltArak nuclear research reactor is commissioned.
"The United States will not be lran's customer forever," the DOE spokeswoman said. U.S. officia is hope the
purchase will pave the way for other countries to buy the heavy water, which can be used in the development of
semiconductors and nuclear magnetic resonance imaging.
lran's top nuclear negotiator, Abbas Araqchi, who discussed the sale with U.S. officiais in Vienna on Friday, told
reporters that the 32 tonnes have been sold to an American company.
Araqchi estimated Iran has about 70 tonnes in excess of what it needs and said further sales are being negotiated
with another company that is not based in the United States.
Iran, which is still under U.S. sanctions, has long had to go through third-country financial institutions for authorized
transactions for items including medicine and food.
A U.S. Treasury Department official would not discuss details of the payment for the heavy water until after the
purchase is complete, but said it would be completed under the same method.
"Regardless of whether or not this is in U.S. dollars, this licensed transaction is limited in scope," the Treasury
official said on condition of anonymity.
lran's compliance with the nuclear deal means that the heavy water was already removed from Iran, ensuring that it
would not be used to support the development of a nuclear weapon, State Department spokesman John Kirby said.
"Our purchase of the heavy water means that it will instead be used for critically important research and non-nuclear
industrial requirements," Kirby added.
The purchase, first reported by the Wall Street Journal, was slammed by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, a
Republican. Ryan said in a statement it appeared to be part of the Democratic administration's efforts to sweeten
the nuclear deal with Iran and would "directly subsidize lran's nuclear program."
The DOE expects to resell the purchased heavy water to domestic commercial and research buyers, including a
national lab.
Reporting by Timothy Gardner, Patricia Zengerle and Arshad Mohammed in Washington, Lesley Wroughton in New
York and Kirsti Knolle in Vienna; Editing by David Gregorio and Cynthia Osterman
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Annex 41
“Boeing seals $16,6 billion deal with Iran Air”, AP, 11 December 2016
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Boeing seals $16.6 billion deal with Iran Air
OEi www.cbsnews.com/nt:ws/boeing-seals-16-bill1on-deal-iran-air/
AP December 11, 2016, 1:11 PM
An Iran Air Boeing 747 passenger plane sits on the tarmac of the domestic Mehrabad airport in the
lranian capital Tehran on January 15, 2013.
BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images
TEHRAN, Iran - lran's flag carrier finalized a major deal with U.S. plane maker Boeing Co. to buy $16.6 billion worth
of passenger planes Sunday in one of the most tangible benefits yet for the lslamic Republic from last year's
landmark nuclear agreement.
Iran Air's deal for 80 jetliners is the biggest agreement Iran has struck with an American company since the 1979
revolution and U.S. Embassy takeover. lt has the potential to transform lran's creaking and accident-prone aviation
industry, which has been hobbled by years of sanctions.
Those curbs have prevented the country from buying new planes from Chicago-based Boeing and European rival
Airbus, and in many cases made it difficult for lranian airlines to secure much-needed spare parts.
The deal covers 50 single-aisle 737 Max 8s, a soon-to-be-introduced version of Boeing's existing narrow-body 737
line.
lt also includes 30 777s, a wide-body, twin-engine plane typically used on long-haul routes that is popular with other
Persian Gulf carriers such as Dubai-based Emirates. Half of the order will cover the 777-300ER version, while the
rest will be of the 777-9 model still under development.
lran's state-run IRNA news agency said the planes would be delivered over the next decade. The first will start to
arrive in 2018, Boeing said.
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ln September, Washington granted permission to Boeing and Toulouse, France-based Airbus to sell billions of
dollars' worth of aircraft to Iran. Airbus needed U .S. approval because at least 10 percent of ils planes' components
are of American origin.
The U.S. and other world powers agreed last year to lift crippling sanctions on Iran in exchange for it curbing ils
nuclear activities. The U.S. still maintains extensive sanctions on Iran for activities unrelated toits nuclear program.
President-elect Donald Trump and several
Republican lawmakers have criticized the
nuclear deal, but it's unclear whether they
'One year after Iran nuclear deal, uneasy feelings remain
would scrap the agreement, which was reached with Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China.
J
lranian Transport Minister Abbas Akhoundi, who attended the signing ceremony, said it was a "historie" day for
lranian aviation and that the deal would create 8,000 jobs for lranians.
"The deal has a clear message for the world: we support peace and security as well as the growth of Iran based on
a win-win policy," he was quoted as saying. "We hope that despite changes in the U.S. administration, the country
will remain loyal to ils commitments.
The Republican-led House of Representatives last month voted to bar commercial aircraft sales to Iran in a move
that could block the Boeing deal. Thal legislation must still pass the Senate, where it will likely face opposition from
Democrats. U.S. President Barack Obama has said he will veto the bill if it reaches his desk before he leaves office
on Jan. 20.
Boeing made a point of saying it worked closely with the U.S. government throughout the deal-making process and
will continue to "follow all license requirements." The Iran Air deal "will support tens of thousands of U.S. jobs" linked
to the 777s alone, it said.
The plane maker said the deal value was based on list prices, though in practice customers typically negotiate
discounts for bulk orders.
Most of lran's aging fleet of 250 commercial planes was purchased before 1979, and as of June only 162 were
operational, with the rest grounded because of a lack of spare parts. Iran Air, whose website lists a fleet of 43
planes, offers direct flights to over 30 international destinations, including London.
© 2016 The Associated Press. Ali Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or
redistributed.
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Annex 42
“Iran Open to Business Ties with US”, Financial Tribune, 19 January 2017
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FIN AN CIAL
TRIBUNE
FIRST IRANIAN ENGLISH ECONOMIC DAILY
National
Thursday, January 19, 2017
Iran Open to Business Ties With
us
WWW . F INAN C IALT R I B U NE . COM
National
Thursday, January 19, 2017
Iran Open to Business Ties With US
F oreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Tehran is open to economic relations with the US, despite
differences between the two sides.
"China, Russia and India remain our important partners. They have been with us during difficult times.
But we are interested in expanding our relations with the EU. We are interested in expanding our traditionally
good relations with the rest of Asia, with Japan, with Korea," he said.
larif made the statements at a panel in the World Economie Forum in Davos, Switzertand, on Wednesday,
Tasnim News Agency reported.
"We are open to economic relations even with the United States. So white we have our polltical differences with
the United States, we are not closed to economic relations, as the deal we signed with Boeing indicates," he
added.
After the historie nuclear deal with major powers, which came into force ln January last year, Iran signed a deal
with the US planemaker to purchase 80 jeciiners as part of a plan to revamp its aging aviation fleet.
Zarif also said US president-elect, Donald Trump, "will be surprised" if he tries to renegotiate the hard-won
nuclear deal.
The top diplomat noted that he's taking a "wait-and-see" 2ttitude about the Trump administration and "the jury is
out."
Not End of World
Pressed by the AP afterward on Wednesday, Zarif said it ''lvon't be the end of the world if he [Trump] tries to
walk away from the deal [officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]".
"He wants to surprise people, so he will be surprised," if he does, Zarif said with a smile, without elaborating.
Zarif also criticized the outgoing administration of Barack Obama, saying it "did net implement their slde of the
bargain in a full and complete way" notably about difficulties faced by Iranian banks.
In addition, he told the panel that Iran and Saudi Arabia should be able to work together to help end conmcts in
Syria and Yemen, after successfully cooperating over Lebanon last year, Reuters reported.
"I do not see any reason why Iran and Saudi Arabia should have hostile policies toward each other. We can in
tact work together to put an end to miserable conditions ci the people in Syria and Yemen and Bahrain and
elsewhere in the region," Zarif said.
"Iran and Saudi Arabia were able to actually stop impeding the process of the presidential election in Lebanon.
We have a success story."
Michel Aoun, a O,ristian leader, was recently elected president of Lebanon and Iran welcomed Aoun's election as
a victory for Hezbollah.
Watch the interview:
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Iran in the Region and the World
1 sur 2
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Annex 43
“Boeing Co. says it signed new $3 billion deal with Iranian airline”, AP, 4 April 2017
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Boeing Co. says it signed new $3 billion deal with lranian
airline
Il. www.cnbc.com ' o• 7/04/04tboeing-s1gns-new-3-b1 l1on-deal-with-1ranian-a1rline html
Transportation
Published 6:09 AM ET Tue, 4 April 2017 1 Updated 6:30 AM ET Tue, 4 April 2017 The Associated Press
The first Boeing 737 MAX 9 airliner is pictured at the company's factory on March 7, 2017 in Renton, Washington.
Boeing Co. said on Tuesday it has signed a new, $3 billion deal with lran's Aseman Airlines to supply 30 737 MAX
aircraft to the carrier, the first major sale by a U.S. company to the lslamic Republic under new President Donald
Trump.
The new agreement cornes on top of the $16.6 billion sale Boeing previously made in Iran following the landmark
nuclear deal struck with Tehran under the Obama administration. Trump long has criticized the atomic deal, though
he toured a Boeing plant in February and touted the firm's work as proof of a coming American manufacturing
renaissance.
Chicago-based Boeing said the deal aise includes purchase rights for an additional 30 737 MAX aircraft for Tehranbased
Aseman, which flies domestic and international routes. lt said the first deliveries would start in 2022.
"According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, an aerospace sale of this magnitude creates or sustains
approximately 18,000 jobs in the United States," Boeing said in a statement. "Boeing continues to follow the lead of
the U.S. government with regards to working with lran's airlines, and any and ail contracts with lran's airlines are
contingent upon U.S. government approval."
Aseman spokesman Amir Reza Mostafavi told The Associated Press that the deal came following several round of
talks over the past year between the airline and Boeing. He said the firms signed the deal March 18 and the first
aircraft will be delivered in 2019, contradicting Boeing.
The European Union blacklisted Aseman from European skies in December because of safety concerns. The airline
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did not operate flights to European destinations at the lime.
Less !han a week after that decision, the airline sealed a deal to lease seven planes made by European
manufacturer Airbus. Those aircraft are expected to begin arriving next month.
The new Boeing deal cornes as part of the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and world powers. After the
atomic accord, Boeing struck a December deal with Iran Air, the country's flag carrier, for 80 passenger planes worth
$16.6 billion.
Awinning
Boeing bet
6:57 PM ET
Fri, 17 March
20171 03:13
ln January, Iran
Air signed
agreements to
buy 118 planes
from Airbus,
estimated to be
worth some
22.8 billion
euros ($25
billion). Asghar
Fakhrieh
Kashan, a
deputy
transportation
minister, later
said Iran would
eut the number
of Airbus planes to 112.
Washington granted permission for Boeing and Airbus to make the sales in September. Both mainufacturers needed
the approval of the U.S. Treasury for the deal because at least 10 percent of the airplanes' components are of
American origin. The Treasury similarly would need to approve this latest deal.
lran's nuclear deal with world powers, which limits its enrichment of uranium in exchange for the lifting of some
international sanctions, specifically allowed for the purchase of aircraft and parts.
Iran represents one of the las! untapped aviation markets in the world, home to 80 million people. However, Western
analysts are skeptical that there is demand for so many jets or available financing for deals worth billions of dollars.
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Annex 44
D. Chaitin, “Sen. John McCain meets with Iranian dissidents relocated to Albania”,
Washington Examiner, 15 April 2017
- 326 -
- 327 -
Sen. John McCain meets with lranian dissidents relocated
to Albania
1: www.washingtonexaminer.com 'sen-John-mccain-meets-with-1ran1an-dissidents-relocated-toalban,
a 'a t1cle '2620377
Daniel Chaitin
Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., met with a group representing lranian dissidents in Albania on Friday.
Speaking to members of the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, the larges! of five organizations in the National Council of
Resistance of Iran, at their headquarters in Tirana, McCain spoke about his opposition to the lranian regime.
"Someday, Iran will be free. Someday, we will all gather in that square," McCain said.
He also congratulated members of the group for successfully relocating to Albania from Iraq where they had been
subject to attacks from militias backed by Iran.
"There is no doubt that the people in this room have suffered," McCain told the gathering, also attended by Maryam
Rajavi, the group's president-elect. 'They have suffered not only themselves but in the loss of their loved ones
because of the lranian tyranny, and I express my condolences to everyone in this room who has los! a loved one as
a result of the lranian tyranny and terrorism."
After the event, McCain met separately with Rajavi, the group said.
McCain has spent the first week of the congressional recess traveling across Eastern Europe. He's made stops in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro.
His office did not immediately return a request for comment on his visit to Albania.
The dissident group, also known as the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, has revealed information on lran's nuclear and terror
activities ove1r the years.
The MEK says 140 MEK members were killed in seven attacks on Camps Ashraf and Liberty in Iraq by the lranian
regime, the lraqi army and the pro-regime lraqi terrorist militias.
ln 2004, following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the MEK residing at Camp Asraf handed over their weapons and
submitted to U.S. military protection. This was after the U.S. reportedly bombed the encampment as part of a deal
with Iran, which promised to repatriate some members of al Qaeda if the U.S. attacked the MEK. The U.S. handed
over responsibility to protect the dissidents to the lraqi government in 2009, which moved the group to Camp Liberty
in 2012.
After Camp Liberty was repeatedly attacked, the MEK appealed to the United Nations to allow them to return to
Camp Asraf, which they said provided better protection. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the U.S.
supported an effort to move Camp Liberty residents out of Iraq and Albania had offered to take the refugees in.
The last remaining members of the group departed Camp Liberty and were resettled in September.
The U.S. had listed the MEK as a terrorist organization for past alleged attacks on Americans, for which MEK has
denied having any role. One senior official in the Clinton administration described the designation as a gesture of
goodwill to then-lranian president Mohammad Khatami. The MEK was removed from the list in 2012.
Editor's note: This story has been updated to better describe the structure of the MEK and to correct the original
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version which incorrect/y said the fast remaining members of the group departed Camp Liberty and were resett/ed in
August.
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Annex 45
F. Zakaria, “How Saudi Arabia Played Donald Trump”, The Washington Post,
25 May 2017
- 330 -
- 331 -
How Saudi Arabia played Donald Trump
© www.washingtonpost.com/ 1pin1onstglobal-opInions/saudi-arabia-just-played-donaldr1
mp/2017I05/25/d0932702 418 11 e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html
Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz presents President Trump with his nation's highest civilian honor. (Evan c
Vucci/Associated Press)
This week's bombing in Manchester, England, was another gruesome reminder that the threat from radical lslamist
terrorism is ongoing. And President Trump's journey to the Middle East illustrated yet again how the country central
to the spread of this terrorism, Saudi Arabia, has managed to evade and deflect any responsibility for it. ln tact.
Trump has given Saudi Arabia a free pass and a free hand in the region.
The tacts are well-known. For five decades, Saudi Arabia has spread its narrow, puritanical and intolerant version of
Islam - originally practiced almost nowhere else - across the Muslim world. Osama bin Laden was Saudi, as were
15 of the 19 9/11 terrorists.
And we know, via a leaked email from former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, in recent years the Saudi
government, along with Qatar, has been "providing clandestine financial and logistic support to [the lslamic State]
and other radical Sunni groups in the region." Saudi nationals make up the second-larges! group of foreign fighters
in the lslamic State and, by some accounts, the larges! in the terrorist group's lraqi operations. The kingdom is in a
tacit alliance with al-Qaeda in Yemen.
The lslamic State draws its beliefs from Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi version of Islam. As the former imam of the
kingdom's Grand Mosque said last year, the lslamic State "exploited our own principles, that can be found in our
books ... . We follow the same thought but apply it in a refined way." Until the lslamic State could write its own
textbooks for ils schools, it adopted the Saudi curriculum as ils own.
Saudi money is now transforming European Islam. Leaked German intelligence reports show that charities "closely
connected with government offices" of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait are funding mosques, schools and imams to
disseminate a fundamentalist, intolerant version of Islam throughout Germany.
(Thomas Johnson/The Washington Post)
ln Kosovo, the New York Times' Carlotta Gall describes the process by which a 500-year-old tradition of moderate
Islam is being destroyed. "From their bases, the Saudi-trained imams propagated Wahhabism's tenets: the
supremacy of Shariah law as well as ideas of violent jihad and takfirism, which authorizes the killing of Musli ms
considered heretics for not following ils interpretation of Islam .... Charitable assistance often had conditions
attached. Families were given monthly stipends on the condition that they attended sermons in the mosque and that
women and girls wore the veil."
Saudi Arabia's government has begun to slow many of its most egregious practices. lt is now being run, de facto, by
a young, intelligent reformer, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who appears to be refreshingly
pragmatic, in the style of Dubai's visionary leader, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum. But so far the Saudi
reforms have mostly translated into better economic policy for the kingdom, not a break with ils powerful religious
establishment.
Trump's speech on Islam was nuanced and showed empathy for the Muslim victims of jihadist terrorism (who make
up as muchas 95 percent of the total, by one estimate). He seemed to zero in on the problem when he said, "No
discussion of stamping out this threat would be complete without mentioning the government that gives terrorists ...
safe harbor, financial backing and the social standing needed for recruitment."
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But Trump was talking not of his host, Saudi Arabia, but rather of Iran. Now, to be clear, Iran is a destabilizing force
in the Middle East and supports some very bad actors. But it is wildly inaccurate to describe it as the source of
jihadist terror. According to an analysis of the Global Terrorism Database by Leif Wenar of King's College London,
more than 94 percent of deaths caused by lslamic terrorism since 2001 were perpetrated by the lslamic State, alQaeda
and other Sunni jihadists. Iran is fighting those groups, not fueling them. Almos! every terrorist attack in the
West has had some connection to Saudi Arabia. Virtually none has been linked to Iran.
Trump has adopted the Saudi line on terrorism, which deflects any blame from the kingdom and redirects it toward
Iran. The Saudis showered Trump's inexperienced negotiators with attention, arms deals and donations to a World
Bank fund that lvanka Trump is championing. (Candidate Trump wrote in a Facebook post in 2016, "SaudiArabia
and many of the countries that gave vast amounts of money to the Clinton Foundation want women as slaves and to
kill gays. Hillary must return all money from such countries!") ln short, the Saudis played Trump. (Jamie Tarabay
makes the same point.)
The United States has now signed up for Saudi Arabia's foreign policy - a relentless series of battles against
Shiites and their allies throughout the Middle East. That will enmesh Washington in a never-ending sectarian
struggle, fuel regional instability and complicate its ties with countries such as Iraq that want good relations with
both sides. But most important, it will do nothing to address the direct and ongoing threat to Americans - j ihadist
terrorism. 1 thought that Trump's foreign policy was going to put America first, not Saudi Arabia.
Read more from Fareed Zakaria's archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook.
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Annex 46
J. Cook, “Trump Suggests Iran Brought Deadly Terrorist Attacks Upon Itself”,
Huffingtonpost.com, 7 June 2017
- 334 -
- 335 -
Trump Suggests Iran Brought Deadly Terrorist Attacks
Upon ltself
IJ www.huffingtonpost.com/entryldonald-trump-iran-terrorism-b ame us 59385f43e4b0c5a35c9b8698
By Jesselyn Cook
Hours after suicide bombers and gunmen launched deadly assaults against lran's parliament and the tomb of its
former supreme leader in Tehran on Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump extended seemingly backhanded
condolences to the grieving nation.
"We grieve and pray for the innocent victims of the terrorist attacks in Iran, and for the lranian people, who are
going through such challenging times," Trump said in a press release.
He didn't stop there.
"We underscore that states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil that they promote," the president
concluded.
The twin attacks, claimed by the so-called lslamic State terrorist group, killed at least 17 people and injured
scores. The six known assailants were also killed, and five other suspects have been detained so far. lran's
Revolutionary Guards have blamed Saudi Arabia and vowed to seek revenge.
During his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump criticized Iran for fueling "the tires of sectarian conflict and terror"
and blamed the country for supporting militias and extremis! groups that "spread destruction and chaos." He
called on other nations to isolate Tehran and to stop prioritizing political correctness while addressing terrorism.
lranian foreign minister Javad Zarif slammed Trump's statement as "repugnant" on Twitter.
Repugnant WH statement & Senate sanctions as lranians counter terror backed by US
c/ients. lranian people reject such US c/aims of friendship
- Javad Zarif (@JZarif) June 8, 2017
Trump had already faced a backlash over his response to foreign terrorism last weekend when he seized on
carnage in London to promote his internationally condemned travel ban affecting several Muslim-majority
nations, including Iran.
He tweeted his condolences to the British people Saturday, then swiftly attacked London Mayor Sadiq Khan as
support and messages of solidarity flowed in from other leaders around the globe.
Members of the National lranian American Council, a nonpartisan Washington-based organization, replied to
Trump's remarks Wednesday with a statement of their own:
"We support the people of Iran who have repeatedly demonstrated their dedication to the values
of tolerance and diplomacy, despite the hardships they face. We underscore that administrations
that cannot empathize with human suffering risk losing their humanity, and presidents that cannot
genuinely recognize victims of terrorism are incapable of leading the fight against terror."
1 /1
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- 337 -
Annex 47
Z. Jilani & R. Grim, “Bucking Bernie Sanders, Democrats Move Forward on Iran
Sanctions After Terror Attack in Tehran”, The Intercept, 7 June 2017
- 338 -
- 339 -
Bucking Bernie Sanders, Democrats Move Forward On
Iran Sanctions After Terror Attack in Tehran
l!!!!I theintercept.com /2017 /06/07 /bucking-bernie-sanders-democrats-move-forward-on-iran-sanctions-aftererror-
attack in- tehran/
Zaid Jilani Ryan Grim Zaid Jilani , Ryan Grim 2017-06-07T21 :01 :37+00:00
ln the wake of an alleged ISIS terrorist attack on the lranian parliament, the U.S. Senate is marking the tragedy
with twin resolutions: one to express condolences, the second to move forward on a bill to hit the country with
new sanctions.
By a vote of 92-7, the Senate opened debate on the sanctions resolution Wednesday. But the resolution
expressing condolences is still being worked on, one senator said.
"On a day when Iran has been attacked by ISIS, by terrorism, now is not the time to go forward with legislation
calling for sanctions against Iran," Vermont's lndependent Sen. Bernie Sanders said on the floor before the
Senate did just that. "Let us be aware and cognizant that earlier today the people of Iran suffered a horrifie terror
attack in their capital, Tehran."
The vote also came in the face of warnings from former Secretary of State John Kerry that a new sanctions bill
could imperil the nuclear deal.
Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., said that it was still time to move forward. After all, it could be a chance to hit Russia.
"I think we have an opportunity on the Iran sanctions bill to amend it to include strong Russia sanctions; l'm
determined that we get that done. That's foremost in my minci," said Coons.
"I appreciate the tact that when the United States was attacked on 9/11 , Iran expressed concern and solidarity
with us. 1 do think it's important for us to express our condolences to the lranian people for their being victims of
an ISIS and I believe that resolution will be adopted today. lt seems a bit of a mixed message to me to try and
combine those two."
A number of Sanders's Democratic caucus colleagues, including California's Diane Feinstein and Delaware's
Tom Carper, joined him in arguing that the bill should be delayed in light of the terrorist attack. On her way into
the vote, Sen. Tammy Baldwin, D-Wis., told The lntercept she agreed with Sanders that it should be delayed, but
didn't think it would be. She was correct, and cast her vote in favor.
South Dakota Sen. John Thune, a member of Republican leadership, disagreed. "I hope not," he said of the
possibility of a delay, his further thoughts being eut off by the closing of the door of an elevator taking him to vote
on the measure.
Shortly before the vote to end debate on the bill, New York's Sen. Chuck Schumer - who leads the Senate
Democrats - came out and argued forcefully in favor of the sanctions, showing no concern about imperiling the
nuclear deal or the terrorist attack.
"Democrats will vote to advance this bill to the floor because we support - most of us support the bill," he
assured the Senate.
Sixty votes are needed to achieve cloture and close debate; only seven senators opposed the cloture vote:
Democrats Kirsten Gillibrand, Dick Durbin, Carper, Jeff Merkley, and Tom Udall as well as Republican Rand Paul
and Sanders.
On a day when Iran has been attacked by /SIS now is not the time to go forward with legislation
calling for sanctions against Iran. pic.twitter.comltGNUDxl2n1
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1 - Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders) June 7, 2017
President Donald Trump added insult to injury when the White House released its own statement on the lranian
terror attack on Wednesday. "We grieve and pray for the innocent victims of the terrorist attacks in Iran, and for
the lranian people, who are going through such challenging times," it read.
However, it then pivoted to blaming the victims. "We underscore that states that sponsor terrorism risk falling
victim to the evil they promote," it concluded.
A spokesperson for Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., referred questions on the condolences
resolution to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A spokesperson there didn't immediately reply to a
request for comment.
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Annex 48
I. Tharoor, “Terror in Iran reveals the hypocrisy of Trump and his allies”, The
Washington Post, 8 June 2017
- 342 -
- 343 -
Terror in Iran reveals the hypocrisy of Trump and his allies
© www. wash i ngton post.com / news/worldviews/wp/2017 /06/08/terror-m-iran-reveal s-the-hypoc;r1sy-of-trum p-andh
is-a ies/
The lslamic State has claimed responsibility for the June 7 attacks on lran's parliament and a shrine for the nation's
lslamic revolutionary leader. (The Washington Post)
Gunmen linked to the lslamic State launched a brazen assault in Tehran on Wednesday, attacking the
country's parliament building and the shrine dedicated to revolutionary lran's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. At least 17 people were killed and dozens more wounded.
lt was the first time in more than a decade that Tehran was struck by militants. Thomas Erdbrink, the New York
Times's correspondent in Tehran, reported the details: "The attacks started around 10:30 a.m., when men armed
with assault rifles and suicide vests - some of them dressed as women - descended on the Parliament building,
killing at least one guard and wounding and kidnapping other people. That standoff lasted until midafternoon."
lranian policemen evacuate a child from the parliament building in Tehran on June 7. (Omid Vahabzadeh/Agence
France-Presse via Getty Images)
Five assailants were killed. The lslamic State claimed responsibility through its online channels and released a
graphie 24-minute video showing a bloody scene from lran's parliament.
The implications of the attack "are huge," Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International Center
for the Study of Radicalization at Klng's College in London, told my colleagues. For Sunni extremlsts,
"attacking Iran is kind of like attacking the U.S. or Israel."
Iran sits at the vanguard of Shiite Islam. lt is an ideological nemesis of jihadist groups such as the lslamic State and
features prominently as a target in the propaganda of some Sunni fundamentalists. lranian proxy militias in Iraq and
Syria, to varying extents, have been locked in battles with the lslamic State and other extremist outfits.
ln the wake of the assault on Tehran, condemnations and condolences poured in from around the world. The
European Union's top foreign envoy, Federica Mogherini, expressed her sympathies for the victims and said it is
"obviously a very sad day again for us anytime there is a terror attack anywhere in the world." French President
Emmanuel Macron called his lranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, and apparently discussed expanding
"cooperation in the fight against terrorism," according to an lranian official. Russian President Vladimir Putin
condemned "these crimes" and pledged Russia's "readiness for further joint actions" with Iran.
And then there was President Trump.
The White House has made a particular habit of commenting swiftly on lslamic State-related attacks elsewhere, be
they in Paris, London, Manchester or even a phantom episode in the Philippines. But for many hours Wednesday,
Trump was conspicuously quiet. The State Department's spokeswoman issued a pro forma condemnation,
asserting that "the depravity of terrorism has no place in a peaceful, civilized world."
When Trump ultimately broke his silence, though, his message snuffed out whatever goodwill American
diplomats may have wanted to convey.
"We grieve and pray for the innocent victims of the terrorist attacks in Iran, and for the lranian people, who are going
through such challenging limes," began the statement, before concluding with a startling swipe at Tehran. "We
underscore that states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil they promote."
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Imagine US media & elite reax if President of #Iran had said after 9/11: U did al/ the se bad things &
had it coming. pic.twitter.com/AAO7hXkNYX
- Bahman Kalbasi (@BahmanKalbasi) June 7, 2017
lt's tacky and heartless in any context to try to score political points when lamenting the loss of innocent
lives. But even given the pronounced tensions between Tehran and Washington - made all the more acute
by the Trump administration putting Iran "on notice" - Trump's statement seemed to cross an unspoken
lîne in world affairs. lranian officiais, after all, issue their own routine condemnations of terrorist attacks in the
United States, such as last year's massacre at a nightclub in Orlando, without suggesting that the Great Satan was
getting its comeuppance. After the attacks of Sept. 11 , 2001, lranians held candlelight vigils.
As we've written in this space before, the Trump administration's hostility to Iran is part of its wholesale embrace of
the agenda and rhetoric of lran's major rivais in the region - Saudi Arabia and Israel. The leaders of both those
countries see Iran as an existential threat, a destabilizing actor that backs dangerous groups across the region.
There is plenty of truth in this view, given the extent to which lran's powerful and hard-line Revolutionary Guard
Corps dominates the country's foreign policy and supports militancy elsewhere.
But Iran was not attacked by Hezbollah, the influential Lebanese Shiite organization it backs. lt was hit by a terrorist
group whose ideology is far doser to the creed preached by Saudi clerics than the theologians of Qom, a
phenomenon conveniently ignored by the White House and its partners. To be sure, previous administrations have
for decades acquiesced or turned a blind eye to the destabilizing effect that Saudi-backed fundamentalism has had
on the Muslim world. Yet a Trump administration that is overtly opposed to "radical Islam" has chosen to embolden
the Saudis like never before.
Just hours after the attack, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly to push forward a bill that would impose new
sanctions on Iran. A few Democratic senators urged a postponement of the proceedings, given the timing. But they
were overruled.
On a day when Iran has been attacked by ISIS now is not the lime to go forward with legislation
cal/ing for sanctions against Iran. pic.twitter.com/tGNUDxl2n1
- Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders) June 7, 2017
Meanwhile, lran's Revolutionary Guard pointed the finger at Washington and Riyadh, the usual suspects in ils eyes.
"The public opinion of the world, especially Iran, recognizes this terrorist attack - which look place a week after a
joint meeting of the U.S. president and the head of one of the region's backward governments, which constantly
supports fundamentalist terrorists - as very significant," it said in a statement, referring to Saudi Arabia.
Given the already intensifying standoff between feuding Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf , it seems the region's
many fault lines are only deepening in the early months of the Trump presidency.
The National lranian American Council, a Washington-based organization that seeks rapprochement between Iran
and the United States, issued an angry response to the White House statement.
"We underscore that administrations that cannot empathize with human suffering risk losing their humanity," it read,
"and presidents who cannot genuinely recognize victims of terrorism are incapable of leading the fight against
terror."
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Annex 49
D. Smith & S. Siddiqui, “Gulf crisis: Trump escalates row by accusing Qatar of
sponsoring terror”, The Guardian, 9 June 2017
- 346 -
- 347 -
Gulf crisis: Trump escalates row by accusing Qatar of
sponsoring terror
f~ www.theguardian.com 'us-news/2017/jun/09/tn .. mp-qatar-sponsor-terrorism-middle-east
David Smith and Sabrina Siddiqui in Washington and Peter Beaumont in Doha
Donald Trump has accused Qatar of sponsoring terrorism at the highest levels, in an extraordinary escalation of
the diplomatie row with one America's most important military partners in the Middle East.
Speaking in the White House rose garden on Friday, Trump said he had decided "the lime had corne to call on
Qatar to end its funding ... and ils extremis! ideology."
His comments marked his most forthright intervention in a crisis triggered on Monday when Saudi Arabia and ils
Gulf allies launched a co-ordinated diplomatie and economic campaign to isolate Qatar.
Earlier this week, the US president appeared to take credit for the blockade in a string of tweets.
On Friday, Trump said that Arab leaders he met in Saudi Arabia last month had urged him to challenge Qatar,
which they accuse of backing extremis! groups and cosying up to Iran.
"So we had a decision to make: do we take the easy road, or do we finally take a hard but necessary action? We
have to stop the funding of terrorism," he said. 'The nation of Qatar, unfortunately, has historically been a funder
of terrorism at a very high level."
Trump's intervention came after Saudi Arabia and its allies on Friday sanctioned a dozen organisations and 59
people it accused of links to lslamist militancy - a number of them Qataris or with links to Qatar.
The Qatari government said in a statement on Friday: "We do not, have not and will not support terrorist groups."
US relations with Qatar have long been complicated by Doha's promotion of a conservative form of Sunni Islam,
but the tiny Gulf state is also a close military partner. More than 11 ,000 US and coalition forces are at al-Udeid air
base outside Doha, which is the centre for US air operations over Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan.
US officiais scramble to limit Donald Trump's diplomatie damage over
Qatar tweets
Qatar had previously called on Trump to intervene decisively, saying he was "crucial" to resolving the crisis.
On Thursday, Meshal bin Hamad al-Thani, Qatar's ambassador to the US, said: "We believe in his ability to cairn
this crisis down. We are courageous enough to acknowledge if things need to be amended."
But Trump's tone struck a marked contrast with comments by the US secretary of state, who just an hour earlier
urged Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain to ease their blockade of Qatar.
ln a brief statement to reporters, Rex Tillerson said that the blockade was hampering US military efforts against
lslamic State and causing unintended humanitarian consequences.
Tillerson said the US would support efforts to mediate the row, but also said Qatar must do more to crack down
on support for terror.
'The emir of Qatar has made progress in halting financial support and expelling terrorists from his country, but he
must do more and he must do it more quickly."
The UAE's ambassador to Washington welcomed Trump's comments. "The UAE welcomes President Trump's
1/2
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leadership in challenging Qatar's troubling support for extremism. The next step is for Qatar to acknowledge
these concerns and commit to re-examine its regional policies," said Yousef Al Otaiba, according to Reuters.
Ben Rhodes, who served as Barack Obama's deputy national security adviser, said Trump's remarks on the
crisis were especially confounding because there appeared to be no official US strategy.
"There's no explanation for why he's doing what he's doing," Rhodes said, warning that Trump's loose words
threatened counter-terrorism operations against Isis, US troops stationed in the region, and risked the escalation
of conflict with Iran.
"There's a short-term risk of increased danger to our national security objectives, and then there's a longer term
risk of escalating conflicts on many fronts," Rhodes said. "ln the Middle East, it's always a mistake to think that
things can't gel worse."
Qatar's foreign minister described the blockade as a violation of international law and said there was an attempt
to mobilise international opinion against the Gulf emirate. "These procedures that were taken have clear
violations of international law and international humanitarian law. They will not have a positive impact on the
region but a negative one," Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani told reporters on Friday during a visit
to Germany.
lncluded on the Saudi sanctions list - which was denounced as "baseless and without foundation in tact" by
Qatar - are the Qatari-funded Qatar Charity and Eid Charity, and several prominent figures including
businessmen, politicians and senior members of the ruling family, one a former interior minister.
The list also includes the Muslim Brotherhood's spiritual leader, Youssef al-Qaradawi, who is based in Doha, and
individuals in Libya as well as Shia groups in Bahrain seen by some Gulf Arab governments as linked to Iran.
The sanctions list further tightens the screws on Qatar, home to a key US military base and the host of the 2022
Fifa World Cup.
lt's Qatar v Saudi Arabia. But the west can't afford to pick a side I Peter
Salisbury
lt also strongly suggests a widening of the aggressive Saudi-led campaign beyond Qatar itself - not least
against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt - where Youssef al-Qaradawi was tried and sentenced to death in
absentia following the 2013 military overthrow of the elected president Mohamed Morsi, a Brotherhood member.
Although Qatar has long denied supporting or funding terror groups, western diplomats have accused it of
allowing the funding of some Sunni extremists, such as al-Qaida's branch in Syria. The same accusations have
been levelled against individuals in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
A leading diplomat from the UAE told the Guardian on Thursday that the Gulf states had lost all trust in Qatar.
Omar Sait Ghobas, the UAE's ambassador to Russia, said: "There is no trust, it has gone. So when the Qatari
foreign minister says, 'Listen, we need to engage in dialogue,' we have done that for many years - that's just a
statement for western consumption."
The crisis has provoked anxieties in Qatar, a leading gas exporter as well as an international travel hub, whose
flagship carrier Qatar Airways has been forced to fly circuitous and expensive routes over Iran and Turkey after
being blocked elsewhere in the Middle East.
2/2
- 349 -
Annex 50
“Iranian airline finalizes deal to purchase 60 Boeing planes”, AP, 10 June 2017
- 350 -
- 351 -
lranian airline finalizes deal to purchase 60 Boeing planes
lliJ nypost.com '2017/06/1 O/iranian-airline-finaI,zes-deaI-to-purchase-60-boeIng-planes/
By Associated Press
Modal Trigger
TEHRAN, Iran - lran's official IRNA news agency is reporting that the country's Aseman Airlines has finalized a
deal to purchase 60 planes from the American company Boeing.
The Saturday report said that the planes will be
delivered in two batches and the first batch will
consist of 30 737 passenger planes to be
delivered in 2019.
This is the second deal between the Chicago-based Boeing and an lranian airliner since a landmark nuclear
agreement between Iran and world powers went into practice in 2016.
ln December Iran Air, the country's flag carrier, finalized a $16.6 billion deal with Boeing to purchase 80 passenger
planes.
ln September, Washington granted permission to Boeing and its European competitor Airbus to sell billions of dollars
worth of aircraft to Iran.
1/1
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- 353 -
Annex 51
N. Gaouette, D. Merica & R. Browne, “Trump: Qatar must stop funding terrorism”,
CNN, 10 June 2017
- 354 -
- 355 -
Trump: Qatar must stop funding terrorism
C edition.cnn.com 2017 /06/09/polit1cs/trump-qatar-saudi-gulf-cris1s/index.html
President Donald Trump called on Qatar to stop funding terrorism, claiming credit for and endorsing the decision
of Gulf nations to ostracize their neighbor, even as US Cabinet officiais said their blockade is hurting the
campaign against ISIS.
"We had a decision to make," Trump said, describing conversations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.
"Do we take the easy road or do we finally take a hard but necessary action? We have to stop the funding of
terrorism."
ln doing so, the President's tone, if not his message, clashed with his most senior national security officiais,
highlighting the often mixed messages emerging from his administration since the Qatar crisis began Tuesday.
Hindering the ISIS campaign
The three Sunni Gulf countries -- Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE -- moved with Egypt to eut off diplomatie
ties with Qatar, host to the one of the Pentagon's largest military bases in the Middle East and a linchpin in the
fight against ISIS.
Read More
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, speaking to reporters shortly before Trump's remarks, said the Gulf countries'
land and air blockade of Doha is hurting the campaign against ISIS, an assessment Pentagon officiais only
partially corroborated.
"The blockade is hindering US military actions in the region and the campaign against ISIS," Tillerson said,
without providing details. The US' "expectation is that these countries will immediately take steps to resolve the
situation ," he added.
ln a sharp contrast to Trump's tone and messaging, Tillerson called on Gulf nations to de-escalate the crisis with
Qatar, citing humanitarian, economic and military costs.
"We ask that there be no further escalation by the parties in the region," Tillerson said Friday. He called on Qatar
"to be responsive to the concerns of its neighbors."
Saudi Arabia and its counterparts accuse Qatar of supporting terrorism and destabilizing the region because of
its ties to their Shiite rival, Iran, and its support for groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Qatar
acknowledges its links to these groups, but denies that it supports terrorism.
"The Emir of Qatar has made progress in halting" support for and financing of terrorist groups, Tillerson said, "but
he must do more and doit quickly."
Trump, in contrast, was much more explicit in condemnation. "The nation of Qatar has historically been a funder
of terrorism at a very high level," he said, speaking from the Rose Garden.
"I decided, along with secretary of state Rex Tillerson, our great generals and military people, the time had corne
to call on Qatar to end its funding, they have to end that funding and its extremist ideology," Trump said.
The President said he helped those countries make the decision to break off relations with Qatar during his trip
to Saudi Arabia last month. "Nations came together and spoke tome about confronting Qatar over its behaviors,"
he said.
A White House official pushed back on the notion that Trump and Tillerson are not on the same page, saying of
the President that "what he said was consistent with what secretary of state said."
While the official said that the president "believes that the issue can be "resolved on terms favorable to the United
States and United States' interests," that official also added that, "I haven't heard him express concern about the
issue of the base."
The official didn't address Tillerson's daims that the blockade was hurting the anti-lSIS campaign, according to
pool reports distributed by the White House.
Despite Tillerson's assessment that the fight against ISIS had been impacted, Pentagon officiais said there has
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been no immediate disruption. They warned, however, that their ability to make longer-term plans was being
affected.
Qatar is home to 11 ,000 US troops and the Al Udeid Air Base, the main regional center for air operations against
the terrorist group.
The Gulf nations have eut air and land access to Qatar, with some moving to close their airspace to flights on the
way to Qatar, but US military officiais said their operations continue without interruption.
"Regular supplies are moving into the base there via air," said US Navy Cap!. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon
spokesman. Davis said the Defense Logistics Agency "is looking at a number of contingencies if the thing should
corne about, but at this point there's no impact on our operations."
"Qatar remains critical"
But Davis added that "while current operations from Al Udeid Air Base have not been interrupted or curtailed, the
evolving situation is hindering our ability to plan for longer term military operations. Qatar remains critical for
coalition air operations in the fight against ISIS and around the region."
Tillerson addressed criticism that the other Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia are also complicit when it
cornes to backing or fueling extremism. "Others must do more to eliminate support for violent extremists" within
their own borders, Tillerson said, calling for "progress toward eliminating all forms of support for terrorism:
military, financial, moral or ideological."
Tillerson also noted that the Gulf countries -- all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and all involved in the
fight against ISIS -- have to stay unified for the sake of that effort. Calls to Gulf leaders over the past few days
have left him convinced there's a resolution, he said.
"lt's clear tome based on these conversation that the elements of a solution are available," Tillerson said. "We
know you're stronger together."
Unlike Trump, Tillerson stressed the possibility of reconciliation and pointed to the human cost of the Saudi-led
blockade, mentioning shortages of food, the way families had been separated and they way some children have
been pulled out of school.
"Unintended consequences"
"We believe these are unintended consequences, especially during the holy month of Ramadan," Tillerson said,
referring to the most important holiday on the Muslim calendar. "They can be addressed immediately," he said.
The White House official said that despite the tact that Trump didn't mention it, the President is, in fact,
concerned about the humanitarian situation in Qatar, particularly the separation of families and food shortages.
The official added, "easing those restrictions not the same as complete diplomatie relations."
The blockade is also impeding US and other international business activities in the region, Tillerson said,
creating hardship for the people of Qatar and people whose livelihood depends on doing business with Qatar.
Tillerson said that the US will throw ils weight behind efforts by the Emir of Kuwait to act as a mediator to bring
about a resolution to the crisis, which was reportedly sparked by an interview with the Qatari leader that Qatar
said was a taise news story. CNN is reporting that US investigators believe Russian hackers may have been
behind the effort, and the FBI has been sent to Qatar to help probe.
The US stance on Qatar has been roiled has by the mixed messages from the start. Tillerson and Defense
Secretary James Mattis have emphasized the need for Gulf unity and the importance of the US partnership with
Qatar, home to the Al Udeid Air Base, the main regional center for air missions against ISIS.
Trump has taken a starkly different tack, initially praising the move by Gulf nations to sever diplomatie relations
with Doha before reversing course on Wednesday.
ln a Wednesday phone call with the Qatari Emir, Trump extended an olive branch , offering to help the parties
resolve their differences with a White House meeting if necessary, and offered the services of Tillerson as a
mediator.
Qatar's ambassador to the United States, Meshal Hamad AIThani, tweeted that " Qatar's principles and foreign
policy reject the taise ideology of terrorism." Qatar has been working with the US on combating terrorism for
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years, he said.
"We appeal to the US administration to rely on their own sources and not on countries with political agendas," he
said.
CNN's Barbara Starr, Elise Labott, Elizabeth Landers and Laura Koran contributed to this report.
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Annex 52
P. Beaumont, “US signs deal to supply F-15 jets to Qatar after Trump terror claims”,
The Guardian, 15 June 2017
- 360 -
- 361 -
US signs deal to supply F-15 jets to Qatar after Trump
terror claims
f~ www.theguardian.com 'world/2017/jun/• 5/us-signs-dea -to-supply-f-15-jets-to-qatar-after-trump-terrorclaims
Peter Beaumont
The US has signed a $12bn deal to supply dozens of F-15 jets to Qatar, despite recent high-profile daims by
President Donald Trump alleging Qatar's "high-level funding" of terrorism.
The signing of the deal on Wednesday is the latest twist in the highly contradictory US diplomacy over the crisis
around Qatar - now in its second week - with the emirate targeted by a Saudi-led embargo.
Hailed by Qatar, the deal underlines the reigning confusion inside the Trump administration as it handles one of
its first big foreign policy crises, which was in large part triggered by Trump.
Qatar is facing a severe economic and diplomatie boycott by Saudi Arabia and its regional allies, who eut ties
last week accusing it of funding terrorist groups, a charge Doha denies.
Qataris ponder 'the situation' as blockade against emirate bites
As well as severing economic and political ties, the four governments ordered Qataris out within 14 days and
called home their own citizens. Bahrain and the UAE have also outlawed any expressions of sympathy for Qatar.
Trump has repeatedly echoed the accusations against Qatar, despite attempts by his defence secretary, James
Mattis, and secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, to offer a more neutral and nuanced position.
He doubled-down on his accusations on Friday, saying: "The nation of Qatar has unfortunately been a funder of
terrorism, and at a very high level," adding "the time has corne to call on Qatar to end its funding."
Despite Trump's remarks, Pentagon and state department officiais have moved to reassure the emirate, home to
the largest US airbase in the Middle East and the command headquarters for US military operations in the
region. Tillerson said last week that the rift was hindering the campaign against lslamic State and Mattis on
Wednesday signed the previously approved warplane deal with the Qatari defence minister, Khalid al-Attiyah.
The Pentagon said the jets sale would increase security cooperation between the US and Qatar. lt added Mattis
and Attiyah had discussed current operations against Isis and the importance of de-escalating tensions in the
Gulf.
"This is of course proof that US institutions are with us but we have never doubted that," a Qatari official in Doha
said. "Our militaries are like brothers. America's support for Qatar is deep-rooted and not easily influenced by
political changes."
The state department provisionally approved the deal at the end of the Obama administration in language
sharply at odds with Trump's recent accusations.
ln a November memorandum, the state Department said the sale would "enhance the foreign policy and national
security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country and strengthening our
strategically important relationship".
The memorandum described Qatar as "an important force for political stability and economic progress in the
Persian Gulf region".
A European diplomat in the Gulf said the timing of the deal appeared coincidental. "Presumably, the US cou Id
1/2
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have delayed the deal if they'd wanted to, although I don't think there's a great connect between sales and
foreign policy."
2/2
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Annex 53
R. Browne, “Amid diplomatic crisis Pentagon agrees $12 billion jet deal with Qatar”,
CNN, 15 June 2017
- 364 -
- 365 -
Amid diplomatie crisis Pentagon agrees $12 billion jet
deal with Qatar
Cl edition.cnn.com /2017 /06/" 4/politics/qatar-f35-trump-pentagon/index. html
Amid the ongoing diplomatie crisis between Qatar and a number of its Gulf neighbors, the US has agreed to sell
$12 billion worth of American F-15 fighters to the country.
"Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis met today with Qatari Minister of State for Defense Affairs Dr. Khalid al-Attiyah
to discuss concluding steps in finalizing the Foreign Military Sales purchase of US-manufactured F-15 fighter
aircraft by the State of Qatar. The $12 billion sale will give Qatar a state of the art capability and increase security
cooperation and interoperability between the United States and Qatar," Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Roger
Cabiness told CNN in a statement.
"The secretary and the minister also discussed mutual security interests, including the current status of
operations against ISIS, and the importance of de-escalating tensions so all partners in the Gulf region can focus
on next steps in meeting common goals," Cabiness added.
The sale of US combat aircraft represents a major signal of US support for Qatar as it faces regional isolation
and the severing of travel and trade links.
The announcement cornes after a week of somewhat mixed messages from the Trump administration regarding
the spat between Doha and number of Arab nations.
Read More
After three Sunni Gulf countries -- Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE -- along with Egypt moved to eut off
diplomatie ties with Qatar, host to the one of the Pentagon's larges! military bases in the Middle East and a
linchpin in the fight against ISIS, President Donald Trump seemed to back the move, saying last week that Qatar
had to do more to combat the funding of terrorism.
"The time had corne to call on Qatar to end its funding," Trump said.
But other officiais in the administration including Secretary of State Rex lillerson have called for the situation to
be deescalated and on Wednesday while appearing before the House foreign affairs committee lillerson played
down any suggestion the President is on a different page stating: "there is no daylight between he and I" on the
issue of Qatar.
Speaking to the House armed services committee Monday, Mattis called the diplomatie situation "very complex,"
acknowledging the large US military presence and close US-Qatar military relationship.
"We've obviously got shared interests with Qatar ... 1 will admit it's not tidy but it's something we've got to work
together on," Mattis later added.
The Qatari defense ministry issued a statement Wednesday celebrating the F-15 deal.
"This agreement underscores the longstanding commitment of the State of Qatar in jointly working with our
friends and allies in the United States," al-Attiyah said in the statement.
He also praised the US-Qatar relationship, saying the two countries had "solidified their military cooperation by
having fought together side by side for many years now in an effort to eradicate terrorism."
AI-Attiyah called the deal "yet another step in advancing our strategic and cooperative defense relationship with
the United States."
CNN's Laura Koran contributed to this report
1 /1
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- 367 -
Annex 54
National Security Archive, “Iran 1953: State Department Finally Releases Updated
Official History of Mosaddeq Coup”, 15 June 2017
- 368 -
- 369 -
Iran 1953: State Department Finally Releases Updated
Official History of Mosaddeq Coup
~ nsarch ive2.gwu .edu /NSAEB B/N SAE 88598-State-Department-rel eases-docu ments-on-U S-backed-1 953-
cou p-i n-l ra n/
Pro-Shah crowds on streets of Tehran, August 1953.
Formerly Secret Documents from State, CIA Provide New Information about Covert
Operations Planning and lmplementation Plus Contemporaneous Analyses
New lnsights into U.S. Fears of Tudeh Party, Questions about Influence of Ayatollah
Kashani, Qualms about Character of Shah
Long-Awaited Volume Supplements Earlier Publication that Whitewashed U.S., British
Roles
Posted June 15, 2017
National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 598
Edited by Malcolm Byrne
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For further information, contact: Malcolm Byrne, 202/994-7000 or [email protected]
Washington, D.C., June 15, 2017 - The State Department today released a long-awaited "retrospective"
volume of declassified U.S. government documents on the 1953 coup in Iran. The volume includes fascinating
details on lranian, American and British planning and implementation of the covert operation, as well as
information about U.S. contacts with key figures such as Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani, and insights into U.S.
concerns about the growing influence of the communist Tudeh Party.
The publication is the culmination of decades of internai debates and public controversy after a previous official
collection omitted all references to the raie of American and British intelligence in the ouster of lran's then-prime
minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. The volume is part of the Department's venerable Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS) series.
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and President Dwight O. Eisenhower, (undated photo).
For decades, neither the U.S. nor the British governments would acknowledge their part in Mosaddeq's
overthrow, even though a detailed account appeared as early as 1954 in The Saturday Evening Post, and since
then CIA and Ml6 veterans of the coup have published memoirs detailing their activities. Kermit Roosevelt's
Countercoup is the best known and most detailed such account, although highly controversial because of its
selective rendering of events. ln 2000, The New York Times posted a 200-page classified internai CIA history of
the operation.
ln 1989, the State Department released what purported to be the official record of the coup period but it made
not a single reference ta American and British actions in connection with the event. The omission led to the
resignation of the chief outside adviser on the series, and prompted Congress to pass legislation requiring "a
thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record" of U.S. foreign policy. After the end of the Gold War, the
CIA committed to open agency files on the Iran and other covert operations, and the State Department vowed to
produce a "retrospective" volume righting the earlier decision.
2/4
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But it took until 2011 for the CIA to - partially - fulfill its commitment, and even then it was only in the form of a
previously classified segment of an internai account of the coup that for the first time included an officially
released explicit reference to the agency's role in "TPAJAX," the U.S. acronym for the operation. Roughly two
years later, after years of research by historian James C. Van Hook, as well as internai negotiations between
State and CIA over access to the latter's records, the Office of the Historian at the Department produced a draft
of the retrospective volume, which then had to await top-level clearance.
What explains the refusai by two governments to acknowledge their actions, and the inordinate delays in
publishing this volume? Justifications given in the past include protecting intelligence sources and methods,
bowing to British government requests and, more recently, avoiding stirring up lranian hardline elements who
might seek to undercut the nuclear deal Iran signed with the United States and other P5+1 members in 2015.
While the volume's contents still are being sifted through, here's a description from the Preface:
This Foreign Relations retrospective volume focuses on the use of covert operations by
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations as an adjunct to their respective policies toward Iran, culminating in
the overthrow of the Mosadeq government in August 1953. Moreover, the volume documents the involvement of
the U.S. intelligence community in the policy formulation process and places it within the broader Cold War
context. For a full appreciation of U.S. relations with Iran between 1951 and 1954, this volume should be read in
conjunction with the volume published in 1989.
"This is going to be an important source for anyone interested in the tortured relationship between Washington
and Tehran," said Malcolm Byrne, who runs the National Security Archive's lran-U.S. Relations Project. "But the
fact that it has taken over six decades to declassify and release these records about such a pivotai historical
event is mind-boggling."
As Archive staff make their way through the hundreds of records in the volume, we will update this posting with
highlights.
READ THE VOLUME
3/4
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®· _ 7 F'orl"lgn Re'I, lions of lhl'
Unill'd Stuc·s, 1952-1954
Iran, 1951-1954
ld1tor l:rmo C. \"'.'.ln I lool
Grromtl F,btor Ad•m !. l-tow.nnl
Ur'lllnJ SI.Ir.li CIOn.•mniml l'\kl1~"1.tj lJtiitt
W.,,,lfli\"'"'
21m
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Iran, 1951-1954 (2017)
Editor: James C. Van Hook
4/4
- 373 -
Annex 55
R. Shabad, “Senate passes measure to expand sanctions on Iran and Russia”,
www.cbsnews.com, 15 June 2017
- 374 -
- 375 -
Senate passes measure to expand sanctions on Iran and
Russia
OE> www.cbsnews.com/news/senate-eyes-,rans-ballistic-missile-program-with-n…
By Rebecca Shabad CBS News June 15, 2017, 10:00 AM
The Senate on Thursday overwhelmingly passed legislation that would impose new U.S. sanctions that would
target lran's ballistic missile program, ils support for terrorism and human rights violations, and yet it would still
comply with the lranian nuclear deal.
Senators voted 98-2 in favor of the measure.
Bipartisan negotiations also led to the bill including expanded sanctions on Russia, in response to its intrusion
into Ukraine, efforts to meddle in the 2016 election and its support for the Syrian regime.
Iran sanctions on ballistic missile program
The overarching part of the measure -- Countering lran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 -- would impose
sanctions on any foreign person or foreign entity that does business with an entity already designated by the
administration that has a connection to lran's ballistic missile program. These sanctions, for example, could
apply to any financial institution or any foreign company that provides key parts or components to lran's missile
program.
"lt's a much more powerful sanctions measure than merely just designating lranian entities that are involved in
missile development," said Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the nonpartisan think tank Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, an expert on lran's nuclear and missile capabilities.
This cornes on the heels of two tranches of sanctions that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control rolled out in February and May in which the administration formally designated a slew of people and
entities involved in procuring materials and technology for lran's missile ballistic program. The sanctions in
February followed lran's late-January test of a medium-range ballistic missile , which other nations said violated
a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
Richard Nephew, a lead negotiator of the nuclear deal, told CBS News that he's skeptical that the legislation, if
passed by Congress, would be effective in limiting lran's progress in advancing ballistic missile development.
Nephew is currently a senior research scholar at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy and
previously served as principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the State Department from 2013 to
2015.
Nephew said he has no problem closing loopholes in existing sanctions law, but he doubts that it would add to
the U.S.'s already robust sanctions architecture. He said the measure wouldn't harm the nuclear deal, but added
that it also probably wouldn't "affect lran's ability to engage in missile proliferation."
"I wouldn't blow a trumpet here about how significant this is going to be in actually stopping missiles from being
built in Iran," he said.
lt's unclear if the legislation is even needed -- the Trump administration already has the authority to execute what
is already covered under the bill, Nephew said. lnstead, its purpose may be to send a message to Iran and other
nations.
These secondary sanctions would comply with the nuclear deal because lran's missile program is excluded from
the agreement. Obama administration officiais were unable to win that demand in the deal. While they are
separate programs, Iran wants them to operate hand in hand.
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"The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that if Iran were to deliver a nuclear device, the delivery vehicle
for that nuclear device would be a missile -- a long-range ballistic missile or intercontinental ballistic missile,"
Dubowitz said.
But the missile itself is not the obstacle for Iran.
"They have a missile right now that could land a warhead in Tel Aviv," Nephew said. "The issue is whether or not
they've perfected the kind of warhead that they would need for a nuclear weapon. The [nuclear deal] prohibits
that activity .. .it doesn't help them develop a nuclear warhead."
Status of lranian nuclear deal
After international inspectors determined that Iran had fulfilled obligations outlined by the deal, the U.S. and
European nations relieved sanctions on Iran in January 2016. lnspectors have since been constantly monitoring
declared nuclear facilities in Iran and a heavy water reactor to verify that its government is still abiding by the
imposed limits.
Those limits, however, will expire over the next decade or so. The agreement says that over the next several
years, the U.N. arms embargo will sunset, the U.N. missile embargo will expire, and then a number of nuclear
restrictions will begin to expire and accelerate, with many restrictions set to be lifted in 2030.
There's some disagreement about lran's compliance so far -- some experts say that Iran is obeying the
parameters of the deal, while others say ils government has violated it. On the same day the Trump
administration last announced the ballistic missile sanctions last month, it also announced that it will continue to
waive sanctions against Iran as it assesses U.S. policy on Iran.
Dubowitz worries that lran's "game plan" all along was to give in to temporarily suspending certain nuclear
technologies in order to work on more advanced technologies in exchange. He said he's concerned that once the
agreement's provisions expire, Iran could emerge with an industrial size nuclear program, "which at that point
will have near-zero breakout." "Breakout time" is the amount of time it would take for Iran to build a nuclear
weapon -- "near-zero" means it would take Tehran no time at all to produce a nuclear weapon.
Russia sanctions
On Wednesday, the Senate overwhelmingly adopted an amendment in a 97-2 vote into the measure that
maintains and expands sanctions against the Russian government. lt would, for instance, require a
congressional review for any lifting, suspension or termination of U.S. sanctions on Russia, impose mandatory
sanctions on entities engage in Russian energy projects and require sanctions to be imposed on people
undermining cybersecurity and secondary sanctions on people who contribute to malicious cyber activity. That
congressional review is meant to make it far more difficult for the Trump administration to unilaterally lift the
Russia sanctions.
lt would expand energy sanctions on Russian projects in the Arctic orthose that involve deepwater or shale and
require the Treasury Department to provide Congress with a study on senior Russian government officiais and
the influence of Russian oligarch's influence on the U.S. economy.
2/2
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Annex 56
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, Department of State
Publication 10535
Excerpts: Table of Contents and Introduction
- 378 -
- 379 -
Archive Site for State Department information pr ior to January 20, 2001.
This site is not updated.
RETURN to the current State Department web site.
~earch archive faq feedback ïndex
.Introduction
The S-ecretary of State
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997
Depattment ofState Publication 10535
Office of the Secretary of State
Office of the Coordinator for Countetterrorism
Released April 1998
Table of Contents
The Y ear in Review
Africa Overview
Angola
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Rwanda
Somalia
South Africa
Uganda
Asia Overview
Afghanistan
Burma
Cambodia
China
India
lndonesia
- 380 -
Japan
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
Europe and Eurasia Overview
Austtia
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Denmark
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
ltaly
Russia
Spain
Sweden
Tajikistan
Turkey
United Kingdom
Latin America Overview
Argentina
Chile
Colombia
Panama
Peru
Middle East Overview
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Israel and the Occupied Territories/Palestinian
Autonomous Areas
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Yemen
Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Cuba
- 381 -
Iran
Iraq
Libya
North Korea
Sudan
Syria
Appeodix A: Chrooology of Sigoificant Terrorist Incidents, 1997
Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups
Appendix C: Statistical Review
International Terrorist Incidents, 1978-97
International Incidents by Region, 1992-97
Casualties of International Terrorist Incidents, 1992-97
International Incidents by Type of Facility, 1992-97
Casualties of Anti-US Attacks, 1992-97
Anti-U.S. Attacks, 1997
Appendix D: International Terrorist Incidents, 1997
[end oftext]
Outreach Il Policv Il Services Il The Department Il Regions
Department of State I search I archive I mg I feedback I index
Privacy Act Notice and Disclaimers
- 382 -
Archive Site for State Department information prior to January 20, 2001.
This site is not updated.
RETURN to the current State Department web site.
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997
Introduction
Although the number of international terrorist incidents has dropped in recent years and more terrorists are
being arrested and tried for their crimes, international terrorism remains a serious, ongoing threat around
the world. Individual bombings and armed attacks, while fewer in number than last year, continue to cause
horrendous casualties. Moreover, domestic--rather than international--te1Torism continues to beset
countries such as Algeria, where numerous brutal massacres of ordinary citizens have been perpetrated by
terrorists during the past five years.
During 1997 there were 304 acts of international terrorism worldwide, an increase of eight from the
previous year. This figure is one of the lowest annual totals recorded since 1971. More than one-third of
the year's attacks occurred in Colombia, 90 of which were low-level bombings of oil pipelines that caused
damage but no casualties.
Countering the terrorist threat remains a high priority for the United States. We have developed a threepart
counterterrorist policy that has served us well over the years:
First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.
The United States has learned over time that this policy works. We supported the Govemment of Peru for
steadfastly refusing to give in to demands made by terrorists who held 72 hostages in the Japanese
Ambassador's residence in Lima for four months last year. The government's unyielding refusai to release
convicted terrorists from prison allowed it time to plan and execute a successful rescue of the hostages in
April.
Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.
Continuing a positive trend of recent years, more terrorists are being apprehended, put on trial, and given
severe prison terms for their crimes; several important trials and convictions of international terrorists
occurred in 1997. The terrorists who planned and helped carry out the February 1993 World Trade Center
bombing were convicted of the crime in New York. The terrorist who murdered two Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) employees outside CIA Headquarters in January 1993 was found guilty by a jury in
Virginia. A highly publicized judgment in Berlin demonstrated in open court that the Government of Iran
follows a deliberate policy of "liquidating" its political opponents abroad. The notorious "Carlos the
Jackal" was convicted in Paris ofthree murders that he committed there 23 years ago. A terrorist who
attempted to bomb the US Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, by launching rockets into the complex in 1986
was found guilty by a jury in Washington, DC.
- 383 -
Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorism to force them to change their
behavior.
The Secretary ofState has designated seven countries as state sponsors ofterrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. A range of bilateral and multilateral sanctions have been imposed
and remain in place to discourage these countries from continuing their support for international terrorism.
In November, President Clinton signed an executive order imposing additional, comprehensive economic
sanctions on Sudan for its sponsorship of international terrorism, its efforts to destabilize neighboring
countries, and its abysmal human rights record. The new sanctions ban ail US exports to Sudan, impose a
total ban on imports from Sudan, and prohibit US investment there.
President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which deprives foreign companies of
certain economic benefits in the United States ifthey invest in the development oflran's and Libya's
energy sectors. The Act's objective is to deny revenue to these state sponsors in advance of evidence that
those states are prepared to change their behavior. We believe that sponsorship and support of
international terrorist activities should be discouraged by the international community, not rewarded.
In March, July, and November, the United Nations Security Council reviewed Libyan compliance with
resolutions that require Libya to surrender the two named suspects in the Pan Am l 03 bombing to US or
UK authorities for trial; cooperate with the US, French, and British investigations into the attacks against
Pan Am l 03 and UT A Flight 772; pay appropriate compensation; and renounce and cease its support for
international terrmism. The Security Council found that Libya was not in compliance. 'fhe sanctions that
were imposed on Libya for its non-compliance remain in place, the November review marking the 17th
time the sanctions have been reviewed and renewed for another 120 days.
In October,. Secretary of State Albright formally designated 30 foreign te1Torist organizations under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which makes it illegal for US institutions and
citizens to provide funds or other fo1ms of material support to such groups. The law also makes members
and representatives ofthose terrorist groups ineligible for US visas and subject to exclusion from the
United States. Moreover, US financial institutions are required to block the fonds of those groups and of
their agents and to report the blocking action to the Department of the Treasury. A complete list of the
designated foreign terrorist organizations is included in appendix B.
At the Denver Summit of the Eight held in June, leaders from the United States, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom made significant progress in countering the
terrorist threat:
• The Eight worked with other UN General Assembly members to complete the work on the
Convention for the Suppression ofTerrorist Bombings, a new counterterrorism instrument that was
initiated by the Eight in December 1996. This Convention fills an important gap in international
law by creating a framework for addressing terrorist bombing attacks anywhere in the world. (The
United States signed the Convention on 12 January 1998.)
• The Eight have launched an international carnpaign to prornote by the year 2000 the universal
adoption and ratification of the existing international terrorism conventions.
- 384 -
• The Eight continue to promote improved international standards for airport security, explosives
detection, and vehicle identification. Related experts' meetings, information exchanges, and
multilateral diplomacy have sought to enhance the protection of public transportation against
terrorism.
• Agreement among the Eight to promote stronger domestic laws and controls over the manufacture,
tradiing, and transport of explosives will reduce the threat to our citizens from terrorist attacks.
The United States has trained more than 20,000 foreign law enforcement officiais from more than 90
countries in such areas as airport security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection, hostage
rescue, and crisis management. We also conduct an active research and development prograrn to use
modem technology to defeat te1TOrists.
As President Clinton declared in November following the brutal terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt: "Once
again, we are reminded of a painful truth: Terrorism is a global threat. No nation is immune. That is why
all nations must redouble our cornmitment to fight this scourge together."
Legislative Requirements
This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which
requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for
those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(]) and (2) of the Act. As required by
legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts
occurred and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to
Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list countries that have
repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism). In addition, the report includes ail relevant
information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups
known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years and
groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism.
In 1996 Congress amended the reporting requirements contained in the above-referenced law. The
amended law requires the Department of State to report on the extent to which other countries cooperate
with the United States in apprehending, convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking US
citizens or interests. The law also requires that this report describe the extent to which foreign
govemments are cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years, in preventing future acts
of terrorism. As permitted in the amended legislation, the Department of State is submitting this
information to Congress in a classified annex to this unclassified report.
Definitions
No one definition ofterrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes ofthis report, however,
we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section
2656f( d). That statute contains the following definitions:
• The tenn "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant(l) targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence
an audience.
- 385 -
• The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than
one country.
• The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that
practice, international terrorism. The US Govemment has employed this definition of terrorism for
statistical and analytical purposes sin ce 1983.
Domestic ten-orism is probably a more widespread phenomenon than international ten-orism. Because
international terrorism has a direct impact on US interests, it is the prima1y focus of this report.
Nonetheless, the report also describes, but does not provide statistics on, significant developments in
domestic terrorism.
(1) For purposes ofthis definition, the term "noncombatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to
civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on d uty. For example,
in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following US military personnel: the
19 airmen killed in the 1996 bombing of the Klmbar Towers housing facility in Saudi Arabia; Col. James
Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June
1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and
the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also
consider as acts ofterrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when astate
of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as the bombings against US bases in Europe, the
Philippines, and elsewhere.
Note
Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnie, religious, or national
group is not meant to imply that ail members of that group are terrorists. lndeed, terrorists represent a
small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. lt is those small groups--and
their actions--which are the subject of this report.
Furthermore, te1rnrist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of politically inspired violence, and at times the
line between the two is difficult to draw. To relate terrorist events to the larger context, and to give a sense
for the conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents
that are not necessarily international terrorism.
(End of Document)
Christopher W. S. Ross
Coordinator for Counte1ten-orism
Patterns of Global Terrorism Contents Il Department of State Home Page
This is an official U.S. Govemment source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S.
- 386 -
- 387 -
Annex 57
I.R. Iran Customs Administration, Report on Commercial Transactions with the United
States of America, 2017
- 388 -
TRANSLATION FROM PERSIAN
(LOGO)
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
REPORT ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
During the Periods:
FROM 21ST MARCH 2011 UP TO 18TH FEBRUARY 2017
[from 1390 to the end of the first eleven months of 1395 Iranian Calendar]
&
FROM 2009 UP TO THE END OF 2016
By: Statistics Analyses Group
Information Technology & Communications Office
- 389
Report Title:
Group:
Type of Report:
Report Contents:
Publication:
Copies:
Report ID
Report on Commercial Transactions wlth the United States of America
Durlng the perlods from 21'' March 2011 up to 18th Februarv 2017
(from 1390 to the end of the flrst eleven months of 1395 lranlan Calendar)
&
from 2009 up to the end of 2016
Statistics Analyses Group
Information Technology & Communications Office
Analytic - Managerial
Not-scrutinized
Regular Publication
Multiple
Date of Preparation
March 2017
Serial No.:
951208001
Copyright & Distribution:
Permitted, Regular, providing the source noted
2
- 390 -
QF-216-00
Import, Export & Commercial Balance
Major lmported Items
Major Exported Items
CONTENTS
Import, Export & Commercial Balance in Previous Vears
3
- 391 -
4
5
7
10
IMPORT, EXPORT & COMMERCIAL BALANCE
Importation trend from the United States of America (hereafter "US"I had regularly been witnessing as a whole
incremental growth during the period from 21" March 2011 up to 18'h February 2017 [the end of - Bahman -
eleventh month of lranian calendar], except for 81.86% decrease in the welght and 0.39% decrease ln the US
Dollar value thereof in 2013.1 The weight of the goods imported from the US has reached ta the figure of 179,000
tons in 2015 from the figure of 22,000 tons of the year 2011, and the value of the goods imported from the US
has reached ta the figure of MUSD167.00 from the figure of MUSDl00.00 respectively. During the eleven months
of the current year [lranian Calendar], tao, as compared to corresponding period of previous year, importation
of goods from the US indicated 43.39% increase in the weight and 79.20% increase in USD value, reaching to the
amount of 186,000 tons and MUSD251.00 respectively. During the eleven months of the current year [lranian
Calendar], the US rating, among the major transacting countries has promoted ta 2S'h ranking and its share of
total value of the country importation took only 0.6% of the total weight and value thereof.
Our country exportation to the US, after successive decreases in the years 2013 and 2014 witnessed growth and
remarkably increased by 4,689% in weight and 1,982% in USD value, reached ta the figures of 351 tons and
MUSDl0.00 in 2015. Nevertheless, the US share among the major countries destination of lranian export has
been very small (less than 0.03 of the export value), taking 69th rank on the table. During the eleven months of
the current year, tao, this increasing trend continued, having indicated a growth of 1,640% in the weight and
2, 784% in the USD value.
The commercial balance with the said country, too, has always been negative during the years of report. Table
No.1 indicates the amount of import, export, commercial balance, customs value average, and the amount of
changes in commercial transactions with the US since 2011 ta date.
1 The reason af 81.96% decrease in the weight af importation /rom the US in 2013, as compared toits previaus year, wos
due to hait of importation of Hhord wheat seed" /rom thot country during 2013. ln 2012, the omount of 126,000 tons af
wheat with the value MUSD42.00 was 1mported /rom the US which declmed ta Zero in 2013.
4
- 392 -
w
\0 w
Importation
~ ~
ë 0
<,, ,, ... :e lii <
fl ; i - .... !: àr :, -ï:t' !!: C :, "' .. ,g
2011 43 22,472 100,421
2012 36 126,725 132,906
2013 32 24,661 132,392
2014 31 36,412 151,559
2015 28 179,372 167,462
2016 25 185,608 250,973
Major lmported Items
TABLENO. l
Import, EKport & Commercial Balance with the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary information on
the perlod from March 2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 lranian calendar)
" " Chanaes as compared Portion of
bportallon Changes as compa,ed to
to the coneipondlng total Import Ille Portion of total export com,sponding
perlod pn,vlous year period prnioln year
a~f < ~ 2.~t
G'I l; iiJ à- Q &' ~";j
g 9-': :e ~ E < .. .. . .... ... :e 5 < &. 2., :e :; E < 0 .. ... .. .. .. fil-mn " ë .. ë .. "" i.J ., m n i ë " ë
ê g. ti ~ .. ~ .. :, .!?.. ;t 5 g. ! ,. ,r ,,
!!: C: ,gsf ":, ,"g' s.g~ :, ..
4,469 0.06 0.16 111 248 1,037 4,173 0.00 0.00
972 508.43 32.35 0.45 0.25 106 490 1,421 2,902 97.11 37.70 0.00 0.00
5,368 ·81.96 ·0.39 0.07 0.27 105 261 658 2,520 -46.66 -S3.68 0.00 0.00
4,162 47.65 14.48 0.08 0.28 110 7 480 65,569 ·97.20 •27.04 0.00 000
934 392.62 10.49 0.51 0.40 69 351 10,001 28,515 4,688.60 1,987.46 0.00 0.03
1,352 43.39 79.20 0.62 0.65 33 2,386 88,394 37,041 1,640.47 2,783.89 0.00 0.23
Commercial Balance
(ThousandUSO)
·99,384
·131.485
·131,738
·151,079
·157,462
-162,579
The major items imported from the US during the years 2011-2015 and the eleven months of the current year consisted of wood paste, pharmaceutical
and food complements, cow sperm, butter, vegetables seeds and medical equipment and in some years, the major part of the importation was allocated
to the life necessity goods. For example, in 2012 around 92.04% of the weight and 31.72% of total import from the US were allocated to 'hard wheat
seeds'. ln 2015, 'rice' and 'animal corn' were allocating 34.21% and 31.22% ofthe total weight respectively imported from the US, and in the period from
March 2016 to February 2017 [eleven months of 1395), too, 'Green Soya' took the first ra nking by 75.92% of weight and 23.92% of value.
5
Year :~..,.
2011 l
2011 2
2011 3
2011 4
2011 5
2011 6
2011 7
2011 8
2011 9
2011 10
2012 1
2012 2
2012 3
2012 4
2012 5
2012 6
2012 7
2012 8
2012 9
2012 10
2013 1
2013 2
2013 3
2013 4
2013 5
2013 6
2013 7
2013 B
2013 9
2013 10
2014 l
2014 2
2014 3
2014 4
2014 s
2014 6
2014 7
2014 8
2014 9
2014 10
TABLE NO. 2
Major Items lmported from the US durlng the years 2011-2015 and prellmlnary Information on the perlod from March
2016 to February 2017 [the flrst eleven months of the year 1395 lranlan Calendar)
,,
Wel&ht Value ~!
Tarlff Description or Tartff (kcsl (USD)
'!§!.. :0,
~~
47032100
Chemical wood paste, preparcd wnh sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of
18,242,464 20,281,572 81 18
soluble arades, semi-whltened, from the plne wood cateftory
21069080 Pharmaceutlc.>I, food complement 952,059 18,012,883 4.24
30049090 Othcr rctailcr medicines havmR no domesttc production 84,342 12,079,237 0.38
90213990 Body artlficial llmbs other than artllic,al Joints and eye contact lenscs of PMMA products 2,638 4,196,373 0.01
05111000 Cow sperm 363 3,840,171 0.00
12099100 VeRetables seeds for cultivat,on 122,969 3,789,706 0.55
040S1020 Paclced butter in form of packs w1th more than 500 1rams weight 599,825 3,212,213 2.67
90183929 Other needle<, catheter and cannulas, simllar, not mentioned other places 14,811 2,927,705 0.07
90181990 Other eledrical devices for d1a11:nos1s of d1sease, not mentioned other places 11,403 2,820,382 0.05
90185010 Vitrectomy, Phacoe and Phacovltrectomy devices wlth the relevant evacuatlon cassette 8,533 2,242,461 0.04
Total af the 1bave Items 20,039,407 73,402,701 89.18
GrandTatal 22,471,646 100,420,740 100
10011100 Hard whent seeds 125,841,352 42,160,960 92.04
04041020 Packed butter ln form or packs wlth more tnan S00 srams welRht 5,536,150 29,804,827 4.05
21069080 Food complement 656,081 14,506,662 0.48
05111000 Cowsperm 445 6,742,942 0.00
30049090 Other retaller medicine complements havinR no slmllar domestic products 7,311 6,573,566 0.01
90189090 Tools and devlces used ln medtCal, ,ur1ary, .animal hu1ba'1dry 1c1encn , not ml'ntioned ebewhere 8,629 3,802,705 0.01
47032100
Chemical wood paste, prepared wlth sodium or wlth sulpnate, other than the pastes of
2,900,414 3,129,159 2.12
soluble grades, semi•whitened, from the pine wood category
84551090 Other rollin1 machines for manufacturina tubes with a dJameter more than 3 inches 1,800 3,013,108 0.00
90213990 Body artlfic ,al llmbs other than a rtlficial joints and eye contact lenses of PMMA products 1,653 1,585,032 0.00
12099100 Vesetables seeds for culllvatlon 53,693 1,564,609 0.04
Total af the abava Items 135,007,527 112,883 569 98.74
Grand Total 136,724,711 132,905,984 100
30049040 Medicine comolements for human consume 1,513,007 39,506,639 6.14
040S1020 Packed butter ln form of packs wlth more than S00 1rams weiRht 7,664,525 37,001,513 31.08
47032100
Chemlcal wood paste, prepared wlth sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes or
12,735,780 11,270,894 51.64
soluble grades, semi·whitened, lrom the pine wood category
30049090 Other retaller medicine complements having no sirnllar dome1t1c produc:ts 107,251 5,980,433 0.43
05111000 CowSperm 652 3,672,461 0.00
90213990 Body artificial limbs other than artificial joints and eye contact lenses of PMMA products 3,388 3,124,771 0.01
90215000 Heart muscles stimulat1n1 devices (except componentl, parts and accessorie.sl 950 2,624,794 0.00
12099100 Vesetables seeds for cultivation 90,566 2,594,819 0.37
90189090 Tools and devices used in medical, • ur1erv, animal husbandrysclences, not mentioned elsewhere 4,238 1,991,661 0.02
21069080 Food complements 73,894 1,870,917 0.30
Total of the 1bave Items 22,194,251 109,638,904 90.DO
GrandTatal 24,661,495 132,393,221 100
47032100
Chemical wood paste, prepared wlth sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of
27,098,860 23,036,167 74.42
soluble grades, semi•whitened, from the pine wood category
30043990
Other medic,nes hav,ng no domest,c products, and haV1ng hormones or 2937 products,
15,536 17,065,199 0.04
lacklng antlbiotlcs, not mentloned
30049030 Medicine complements for human consume 288,541 9,993,334 0.79
30049090 Other retaller medltine< having no domesllc production 30,719 7,240,808 0.08
39069070 5olid absorber powder and acryl lc polymers 1,100,000 6,974,770 3.02
88033000 Aircraft or hehcopter parts and componeni., not mentioned elsewhere 10,533 6,768,235 0.03
04051020 Packed butter in form of padts w,th more than S00 grams weight 1,511,000 6,760,757 4.15
12099100 Vegetabl•s seeds for cult,vation 65,607 6,100,396 0.18
21069080 Food complements 236,337 5,857,563 0.65
0S111000 CowSperm 1,111 5,554,735 0.00
6
- 394 -
<{
!!. Ir '5 :,
~
20 20
17.94
1203
4.18
3.82
3.77
3.20
2.92
2.81
2.23
73.10
100
31.72
22.43
10.91
5.07
4.95
2.86
2.35
2.27
1.19
1.18
84.93
100
29.84
27 .95
8.51
4.52
2.77
2.36
1.98
1.96
l.SO
l.41
BZ.81
100
15.20
11.26
6.59
4.78
4.60
4.47
4.46
4.03
3.86
3.67
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2016
2016
2016
2016
Year
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
Total of tho above ltoms 30,358,243 95,3SU64 83.38
Grand Total 36,411,649 151,559,489 100
l 10063000 Seml•mllled rice, whollv milled rlco, smoothened and polished 61,371,SOO 34,714,871 34.21
2 47032100 Chemlcal wood paste, prepared with sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of soluble urados. seml·whltoned, from the pine wood catCRory 16,244,909 15,171,173 9.06
3 10059010 Animal corn 56,000,000 13,203,687 31.22
4 21069080 Food complements 329,816 10,917,246 0.18
5 30043990 Other medicines having no domestic products, and havlnc hormones or 2937 products, 17,510 8,021,475 0.01
lack1na ant1b1otics, not mentioned
6 30049090 Other rotaller medicines having no domestic production 13,919 5,854,617 0.01
7 10039000 Barlev oxcept seeds 21,882,548 4,891,022 12.20
8 05111000 Cow sperm 1,016 4,842,563 0.00
9 90195010 Vitrcctomy, Phacoe and Phacovitrectomy devices with the relevant evacuation cassette 17,508 4,794,847 0.01
10 90181200 Ultrasonic scanners for diagnosis of diseases 5,823 4,351,204 0.00
Total of the above Items 155,884,549 106,762,705 86.91
Grand Total 179,372,762 167,462,305 100
1 12019000 Soya beans except seods, even of grindod typo 140,913,132 60,024,930 75.92
2 21069080 Food complements 874,459 25,425,269 0.47
3 30043990 Other medicines hav,ng no domestic products, and having hormones or 2937 products, 21,696 19,153,275 0.01
lackinR antibiotics, not mentioned
4 47032100 sCohleumbliec aglr wadoeosd, speamstie-w, phrietepnaeredd, f wroitmh tshoed ipuimne o wr owoitdh c sautelpghoartye , other than the pastes of 18,647,009 14,143,S72 10.04
TABLE NO. 2 ( ... continued}
Major items Imported from the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary Information on the period from March
2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 Iranian Calendar)
.,,
"' Wel1ht Value fO
" Tariff Description of Tariff !!. :i :, (ki;s) (USD) .. 15'
7:,
􀀃a
s 12099100 Vogetables seeds for Cultivation 116,894 12,602,946 0.06
6 30043910 dOothmeers mtice dpircoindeusc thsa ving hormones or 2937 products, lacking antibiotics, with slmllar 25,121 6,895,508 0.01
7 90213990 pOrtohdeur ctbos dy an1fic1al limbs other than anificial joints and eye contact lenses of PMMA 7,67S 6,075,270 0.00
8 87032319 aOnthd ehry mbroidto mr voetohric vleesh iwclieths cylinder volume of 1500 cc up to 2000 cc except ambulance lSl,345 5,618,627 0.08
9 90189090 Other tool$ and devices used in mediul, sur1ery, 􀆕n1tnil husbandry sttences, not mentioned 9,494 5,075,418 0.01 elsewhere
Anslosraphy and Angioplasty consuming materials (merely Including anerlal sheets,
10 9018392S various types of catheter (hean, vascular, brain), balloon, stent, stent graft, guide wire, 8,280 S,068,31S 0.00
couple, occluder, hiRh pressure connector, homeostasis valvo, manifold)
Total of the above Items 160,765,105 160,083,130 86.62
Grand Total 185,608,295 250,972,611 100
Major Exported Items
During the years of Report, major items, which were exported to the US, included "dried grape", "dates",
"saffron", "carpet and other floor coverings whether hand or machine woven, Gabbah, Na mad (felt carpet)",
etc. The first ten items exported to the US exceed 90% of the total of the export.
7
- 395
6Z.91
100
20.73
9.06
7.88
6.52
4.79
3.50
2.92
2.89
2.86
2.60
63.75
100
23.92
10.13
7.63
5.64
...
< !!.
ff
a
5.02
2.75
2.42
2.24
2.02
2.02
63.79
100
u
" -
-
•
..
•
,
Year ~
~
2011 1
2011 2
2011 3
2011 4
2011 5
2011 6
2011 7
2011 8
2011 9
2011 10
2012 1
2012 2
2012 3
2012 4
2012 5
2012 6
2012 7
2012 8
2012 9
2012 10
2013 l
2013 2
2013 3
2013 4
2013 5
2013 6
2013 7
2013 8
2013 9
2013 10
2014 1
2014
2
2014 3
2014 4
2014 5
2015 l
2015 2
TABLE NO. 3
Major Items exported to the US durlng the years 2011-2015 and prellmlnary Information on the perlod from March
2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 lranlan Calendar)
..,
Tarlff Description ofTarlff
Welghl Value il (k&s) (USD) " a
57011000 Carpct and other tc><tllc lloor covcnna made of wool or animal soft nair (flufl}, knot wovcn 2,286 399,924 0.92
08062050 Sun-drlcd secd-frce grapc 101,000 206,100 40.6S
49019900 Printcd book, brochure, pamphlet and press, nol mcntloned elscwhcrc 27,653 178,226 11.13
08062030 Tizabl (nltrated) secd lrce Rr•pc (dricd grape) 63,750 136,000 25.66
08062020 Tizabl (nitratcd} grape wlth sccd (drlcd 1rape} 20,000 40,000 8.05
08041010 Frcsh or dricd Estamcran dates 25,000 22,500 10.06
94036090 Othcr woodcn furnlture, other than handlcralts 4,850 18,090 1.95
97011000 Painting tableau, bladc pencil painting, caler pencll palntln11, ail hand-drawn B20 10,500 0.33
94032090 Mctal lumlture othcr than tradltional blacksmith furnlture 1,870 10,000 0.75
30049010 Othcr rctaller medlclnes, havinR simllar domenic product 199 8.460 0.0B
Total of the above Items 247,428 1,029,8DO !l!l.58
Gr.and Total 241,463 l,036,7n 100
08062050 (5un-dried} seed frl!e erapc 225,500 496,100 46.04
0B062030 Tizabi (nlt ratcd-dried) sced free grape 213,625 469,975 43.62
57011000 Carpot and other textile floor coverlng made of wool or animal soit nair (fluff), knit woven 1,048 234,020 0.21
49019900 Printed book, brochure, pamphlet and press, not mentioned elsewhere 29,188 130,878 5.96
90181990 Other electrical devices for diagnosts of d1sease. not m,ntioned els,where ISO 56,975 0.03
08041010 Fresh or dried Estameran dates 18,000 23,400 3.68
97011000 Paint1n1 tableau, black pencll painting. color pencil painting, ail hand-drawn 670 4,400 0.14
09102011 Retaller ready made saffron in the packs less than 10 Rrams 1 2,137 0.00
84381000
Machlnery for bakery, pastry cooklng, biscuit producing and machinery for producing
100 l .500 0.02
macaroni, sparhetti, or similar products
48191000 Carton, can, box made from paper, or wavy cardboard 1.100 924 0.22
Total of th• abl>Ve Items 489,382 1,420,309 99.93
Gr.and Total 489,742 1,421.139 100
08062050 (5un-dried) seed free 1rape 159,500 350,900 61.06
08062030 (Titabi) N1trated drled seed free grape 62,250 107,987 23.83
08062060 Angouri drled seed free grape 24,500 85,750 9.38
57011000 Carpet and other textile rloor covering made of wcol or animal soft hair (fluff), knit woven 170 51,272 0.07
49019900 Prlnted book, brochure, DamDhlet and press, not mentioned elsewhere 9,550 38,183 3.66
49011000 Printed book, brochure, Damphlet and press, similar ta scparated sheets or folded sneets 2,350 9,400 0.90
09102011 Retaller ready made saffron in the packs less than 10 gram, 4 6,345 0.00
57029200 Ready for use non•velvet floor coverin1 made of synthetic or artificial textile 450 3,750 0.17
94036090 Other wooden lurnlture than the handicralts 2,000 1,998 0.77
97019000 Collage and decorative plaques, S1milar 310 1,860 0.12
Total of the above Items 261,084 657,454 99,94
Grand Total 261,229 658,204 100
57011090 Other floor covering except Gabbah, made from wool or animal soit halr (fluff} 1,519 220,937 21
44083900
Coating plates and layer plates for multilayer wood-board, with maximum thickness of 6 mm
122 212,646 2
from tropical woods, mentioned
68159990 Other thlngs made of stone or other minerais not mentloned elsewhere 3,730 29,840 51
94036090 Other wooden furnlture except handicralts 1,950 11,700 27
09102011 Retaller ready made saffron m packs with less than 10 grams 3 5,106 0
Grand Total 7,324 480,229 100
57011090 Other floor covering except Gabbah, made from wool or animal soit nair (fluff) 262,630 B,960,703 74,88
57021090
Soumak (non-needled), Karamanian Kilim, carpets (hand•waven similar not mentioned
4,378 356,471 1.25
elsewnereJ
8
- 396 -
<"8 .. :l
[f
a
38.57
19.88
17 19
13.12
3.86
2.17
1.74
1.01
0.96
0.82
99.33
1D0
34.91
33.07
16.47
9.21
4.01
1.65
0.31
0.15
0.11
0.07
99.94
1DO
53.31
16.41
13.03
7.79
5.80
1.43
0.97
0.57
0.30
0.28
99.89
100
46
44
6
2
l
100
89.60
3.56
Vear [
2015 3
201S 4
201S 5
2015 6
2015 7
201S 8
2015 9
2015 10
2016 1
2016 2
2016 3
2016 4
2016 5
2016 6
2016 7
2016 8
2016 9
2016 10
TABLE NO. 3 ( ... continued)
Major Items exported to the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary Information on the period from March
2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 Iranian Calendar]
...
Weight Value
􀀂 o
Tariff Description ofTarlff
(kgsJ (USDJ ir
"a
41139000
Leather mostly prepared after tanning or after crusting. also gazelle-like leather produced
1,100 137,500 0.31
from other animals
S7011010 Gabbah of wool or animal soft hair (fluff) 2,436 100,010 0.69
03061700 Other types of shrimp 22,008 99,036 6.28
94038900
Other furniture, entertainment or decoration movable nems for equipping the life or 9,000 54,000 2.57 work places or public and private places
49019900 Printed book, brochures, pamphlets, press. not mentioned elsewhere 10.880 43,720 3.10
09102090 Saffron In packs of morn than 30 grams 25 39,839 0.01
56022100
Felt carpet (Namad) from the animal soft wool or hair (except those smeared, daubed,
1.930 38,600 0.55
covered or stratified)
94039000 Furniture parts and components subject to 9403 5,100 30,600 1.45
Total of the above Items 319,487 9,860,479 91.10
Grand Total 350.718 10,000,572 100
57011090 Other floor coverin1, except felt carpet IGabbah] of animal soft wool or haor (fluff) 1.638,176 79,886,317 68.65
57019000 Carpet and other texture floor covering, textured from textile materials, knit woven 76,406 3,594,314 3.20
57021090
Soumak. Karamanlan Kilim (non-needled), carpets (hand-woven similar not mentioned
14,240 780,180 0.60
elsewhere)
8025210 Fresh or dried pistachio nuts 38,000 578,000 1.59
S7011010 Felt Carpet IGabbah) of wool or animal soft hair lfluff) 1S,148 565,246 0.63
57029300 Non-velvet floor covering. from synthetics or artificial textile materials, ready to use 48,730 515,926 2.04
12099100 Ve1etables seed for cultivation 1,000 264,000 0.04
9102090 Saffron in packs of more than 30 •••ms 113 201,859 0.00 9102010 Not-grinded and not-milled saffron 83 175,533 0.00
56022100
Felt carpet (Namad) from the animal soft wool or hair (except those smeared, daubed,
7,960 159,400 0.33
covered or stratified)
Total of the above Items 1,839,856 s&,no,ns n.10
G􀄢ndTotal 2,386,358 88,393,561 100
9
- 397 -
..,
< o
if
a
1.37
1.00
0.99
0.54
0.44
0.40
0.39
0.31
98.60
100
90.38
4.07
0.88
0.65
0.64
0.58
0.20
0.23
0.20
0.18
98.11
100
.
. .
1
1
1
J
1 i
1
Import, Export & Commercial Balance durlng the years 2009-2016
The foliowing Table indicates the amount of import, export and commercial balance with the US during the
years 2009-2016:
TABLENO.4
The amount of Import, Export & Commercial Balance wlth the US durlng the years 2009-2016
" " Commerclnl
Import 01anges as compared ta the Export Changes as compared ta the Balance
c0rresp0ndln1 perlod carrespandln1 perlad (Thousand
Year prevlous year prevlous yea, USD)
Welght
Value
Wel1ht
Value
(Thousand Welght Value (Thousand Welght Value
(tons)
USD) (tons) USD)
2009 333,950 292,608 .. .. 5,578 85,024 .. - ·207,584
2010 47,706 176,397 -85.71 -39.72 3,763 104,417 -32.54 22.81 -71,980
2011 31,941 141,347 ·33.04 ·19.87 176 766 -95.33 -99.27 -140,582
2012 137,983 127,561 331.70 -9.75 461 1,397 162.06 82.49 -126,164
2013 21,888 110,414 -84.13 -13.44 428 1,106 -7.17 -20.81 -109,308
2014 27,171 153,525 24.13 39.04 11 465 -97.54 -57.98 ·153,060
2015 110,163 156,275 305.44 1.79 50 643 377.87 38.40 -155,632
2016 266,914 264,812 142.29 69.45 2,076 80,471 4,020.13 12,408.22 ·184,341
10
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