Volume I - Annexes 1-60

Annex 1
Annex 1
1958] COMMERCIAL TREATIES 805
MODERN TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE
AND NAVIGATION
HERMAN w ALKER, JR.*
The bilateral "treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation" is
one of the most familiar instruments lmown to diplomatie tradition.
The title, commonly used to describe a basic accord fixing the
ground-rules goveming day-to-day intercourse between two countries,
designates the medium par ezcellence through which nations
have sought in a general settlement to secure reciprocal respect for
their normal interests abroad, according to agreed rules of law.1
The precise content of the instrument as treaty-type, and the
manner in which that content is treated, bas varied from era to era
depending on the needs of the time, the usages of the countries
involved and the foreign policy objectives in view.2 In United States
practice, however, it bas evolved into a comprehensive charter of
relations in the domrun of private affairs. In the course of that
evolution, it bas figured repeatedly in the conduct of American
foreign relations from the ea.rliest days, and with all manner of
nations, beginning with the treaty of Amity and Commerce with
France in 1778 and continuing into the present. The number of such
treaties concluded by the United States runs well over a hundred.8
This discussion focuses on the sixteen that have been signed since
1946.•
*First Secretary of Embassy, Foreign Service of the United States, Paris.
This article is without official attribution.
1. Leading writers on international law do not seem to have commented
e.'Ctensively on this treaty function. But see Fiore, Iriternational Law Codified
and Its Legat Sanction 373-74 (Borchard trans., 19U).
2. For a brief discussion of the historical development of treaties of this
type (sometimes known as ''commercial" treaties, a term which also can refer
to instrt,tments of lesser scope), see Culbertson, Commercial Treaties, Z Encyc.
Soc. Sei. 24-31 (1930). Su.mmaries of their purposive evolution in United
States policy may be found in Setser, Treaties to Aià America,i B1tsfoess
Abroad, 40 Foreign Commerce Weekly 3 (September 11, 1950); Commercial
Trcaty Program of the United States, U.S. Dept. of State Pub. 6565 (1958).
3. The treaty with France 1778, 8 Stat. 12, 'I .S. No. 83 was ne."i:t folJowed
by those with the Netherlands 1782, 8 Stat. 32, T.S. No. 249; Sweden
1783, 8 Stat 60, T.S. No. 346; and Prussia 1785, 8 Stat 84, T.S. No. 292 even
prior to the Constitutional Convention. A convenient compilation of treaty
te.xts, prepared under Senate auspices, is the four volume Treaties, Conventions,
International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United
States of America and Other Powers (1776-1909 (2 vols.) Malloy ed.; 1910-
1923, Rcdmond ed.; 1923-1937, Trenwith ed.). The Trenwith volume contains
a table from wbicb can be rcadily derived a chronological compilation of
treaties of this type, under wbatever variant title.
4. Rcpu,blic of Clibta, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871; ltalJ•, 1948,
63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965, (Supplemented by Agreement of Sept. 26,
1951, Sen. E."\'.ec. H., 82d Cong., 2d Sess.) ; Urugrtay, 1949, (Sen. Exec. D.,
81st Con., 2d Sess.); lrelmul, 1950, 1 U.S. Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements
785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155; Colmubia, 1951, (Sen. Exec. M., 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Annex 1
,
806 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:805
I. SCOPE AND CONTENT
In United States practice, although "friendship" is attributed
an honored place in the title and_ although the conclusion of a
treaty presupposes friendliness and good-will between the signatories,
these treaties are not political in character. Rather, they are
fundamentally economic and Iegal. Moreover, though "commerce"
and "navigation" complete the title and accurately describe part of
their content, their concem nowadays is only secondarily with
foreign trade and shipping. They are "commercial" in the broadest
sense of that term; and they are above-all treaties of "establishment,"
concerned with the protection of persons, natural and juridical,
and of the property and interests of such persans. They define
the treatment each country owes the nationals of the other; their
rights to engage in business and other activities within the boundaries
of the former; and the respect due them, their property and
their enterprises.
Their current preoccupation with these matters has been especially
responsive to the contemporary need for a code of private
foreign investment; and their adaptability for use as a vehicle in
the forwarding of an investment aim follows from their historical
concern with establishment matters. Familiar elements in them stood
ready to be amplified and reconditioned to meet contemporary needs
and circumstances.' The pattern formed by the series of sixteen
signed since 1946 is accordingly distinguished in complexion from
that formed by the several different series concluded in past eras. 0
withdrawn from Senate June 30, 1953); Ethiopia, 1951, 4 U.S. Treaties &
Other Int'l Agreements 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864; Israel, 1951, 5 U.S. Treaties
& Other Int'l Agreements 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Greece, 1951, 5 U.S.
'rreaties & Other Int'l Agreements 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Denmark, 1951,
(Sen. Exec. I., 82d Cong., 2d Sess.); Japan, 1953, 4 U.S. Trea.ties & Other
Int'l Agreements 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Federal Republic of Germ,my,
1954, 7 U.S. Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593;
Haïti, 1955, (Sen. Exec. H., 84th Cong., 1st Sess., withdrawn from Senate
Aug. 8, 1957) ; Iran, 1955, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Nicaragua, 1956, (Sen. Exec.
G., 84th Cong., 2d Sess.); Netlierlands, 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Korea, 1956,
T.I.A.S. No. 3947. The treaties with Ethlopia and Iran represent considerably
abridged versions and vary also from the others in that they contain provisions
on consular rights. A subject matter usually dealt with in separate conventions,
by current United States practice. The Uruguay example also bas a variant
detail in its title: "Economie Development" in lieu of "Navigation."
5. See Walker, Treaties for the Encoierageme11t and Protectio,i of
Foreign lnvestment: Presmt United States Practice, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229
(1956).
6. The 12 treatîes in the last-preceding series, the period between the two
World Wars, beginning with the German treaty of 1923, 44 Stat 2132, T.S.
No. 725, usually carried a number of articles dealing with consuls, consistent
with their scheme of devoting the major part of their space to trade
and shipping. By contrast, the major part of the significant establishment
rights, now usually spread over a dozen articles, was covered in a single
article which was given the lead position. Id. at art. I.
Annex 1
1958] COMMERCIAL TREATIES 807
N evertheless, this pattern is at the same time of a kind with its
predecessors, and in the same direct line of evolution, having the
same broad design and covering generally the same subject-matter.
There bas taken place merely a shift in inten1al emphasis away from
trade and shipping, and that which is ancillary to trade and shipping,
a shift facilitated by the recent development of alternative instruments
for dealing with international trade.7
Because of their common identification with common objectives
all sixteen of the current series show close kinship, but no two of
them of course are identical. The several units of the series each reveal
numerous variations, especially in their secondary details, owing
to having each been negotiated free-will with a different country and
having taken account of individual differences in viewpoint and condition.
They differ particularly in that, subsequent to the first two
( China, 1946 and Italy, 1948) the mode] form used to initiate
negotiations was completely recast in the interest of compactness,
greater clarity and legal suffi.ciency, and completeness of content.
Further, the form used in another two of them (Ethiopia, 1951 and
Iran, 1955) represents a specially abridged edition.8 The universality
of the program-as witness the geographical spread, the
variety in size and circumstance of the countries involved, and the
avowed willingness of the United States to treat equally all likeminded
countries-demands flexibility along with adherence to a
common core of purpose, orientation and basic content.
With the accretion of precedent and experience in framing acceptable
nonns, the later ones tend towards a greater display of uni-
7. The e."i:ecutive trade-agreement device, originally authorized by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 rev., 1948,
62 Stat. 1053, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1360-67. This type of agreement provides a flexible
framework within which specific concessions in rates of duty can be reciprocally
negotiated, item-by-item. OriginaUy, the negotiating program was bilateral
; but since 1947 the negotiations and agnements reached have been
principally under the aegis of the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 61 (5) (6) Stat. A3, A2054 T.I.A.S. No. 1700. 37 countries, accounting
for approximately 80 percent of the worl,i's international trade, now
adhere to the GATT.
S. These abridgements were occasioned, on the one hand, by the lack
of any practical need for negotiating certain provisions or elaborations of
provisions occurring in the standard form of the treaty that could be regarded
as having secondary consequence or as largely irrelevant to relations with
the countrles concemed and, on the other hand, by the desire to use the treaty
as a vchicle for dealing with the essentials of diplomatie and consular sta.tus.
For synopses of the content of typical recent tr~ties and comparison with.
that of the Ethiopia and Iran treaties, see tables in Commercial Treaties,
H earitig be/ ore a Subcommittee of the S enate C ommittee 011, Foreign Relations,
83d Cong., 1st Sess., 6-17 (1953); Commercial Treaties with Iran,
Nfrarag1ta> and the Nether/auds, Hearfog be/ore the Senate Committee on
Seuatc Foreign, Relations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-9 (1956).
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Annex 2
THE POST-WAR COMMERCIAL TREATY PROGRAM
OF THE UNITED STATES•
DURING the decade 1946-1956, the United States completed
the negotiation of commercial treaties with
sixteen countries. These countries, in geographical
distribution, size and national circumstance, comprise rather
a cross section of the world outside the Soviet bloc. In Asia
those represented include Nationalist China, Korea, Japan,
Iran and Israel; in Africa, Ethiopia; in Latin America, Colombia,
Haïti, Nicaragua and Uruguay; in Europe, Denmark,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, lreland,
Italy and the Netherlands.1 As the Department of State
avowedly stands ready to negotiate with every like-minded
country, others will undoubtedly be added to the list in due
course.
These treaties, more fully known as treaties of " friendship,
commerce, and navigation ", are long-range instruments
of a general type made familiar by international practice of
former years. ln contradistinction to limited-purpose trade
agreements dealing with commerce in the narrow sense, they
are designed to establish the ground rules regulating economic
intercourse in the broad sense, and they accordingly
must reflect a meeting of minds regarding proper international
standards of behavior on a variety of subject matters.
• The views expressed here are those of the author only and do not neccs•
sarily reflect the position of the Department of State.
1 China, 1946 (63 Stat. 1299); ltaly, 1948 (63 Stat. 2255) supplemented by
Agreement of September 26, 1951 (S. Exec. H, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.); Uruguay,
1949 (S. Exec. D, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.); lreland, 1950 (1 UST 785); Colombia,
1951 (S. Exec. M, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., withdrawn from Senate June ~o. 1953);
Ethiopia, 1951 (4 UST 2134); Greece, 1951 (5 UST 1829); Israel, 1951 (5 UST
550); Denmark, 1951 (S. Exec. I, 82d Cong., 2d Se~.); Japan, 1953 (4 UST
2063); Federal Republic of Germany, 1954 (TIAS 3593); Haïti, 1955 (S. Exec.
H, 84th Cong .• 1st Sess., withdrawn from Senate, August 8, 1957); Iran, 1955
(TIAS 3853); Nicaragua, 1956 (S. Exec. G, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.); Netherlands,
1956 (TIAS 3942); Korea, 1956 (TIAS 3947). The treaties with Ethiopia and
Iran represent considerably abridged versions and vary also from the others
in that they contain provisions on consular rights, a subject malter usually
dealt with in separate conventiom in current United States practice.
7
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58 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vm .. LXXIII
Because of the nature of the treaties and the scope of the ne·
gotiation effort, the current treaty program of the United
States, though little remarked during these ten years of crisis
and more spectacular endeavor, is thus one of some magni·
tude; and its unfolding illustrates the adaptability of a traditional
device to present international requirements.
Background and Objectives
The program now under way carries forward one of the
oldest continuing diplomatie activities of this nation, reach·
ing back to the Revolutionary War. From 1778 onward,
with varying degrees of intensity from era to era, the commercial
treaty device has been repeatedly used in the conduct
of American foreign relations. In terms and content, the
purpose of the treaties has been to promote trade relations
and to protect shipping and the citizen and his interests
abroad, according to legal principles. Throughout, they
have maintained this evident purpose. But historically they
have also had other purposes. As suggested by the wording
of their full title and preamble, they have been designed to
strengthen normal friendly relations between the signatories.2
Depending on the era in which the treaties were negotiated,
they have as well been responsive to varying special
motivations. In pre-Constitutional days, for example, they
betokened and helped secure recognition of American independence.
8 In the first half of the nineteenth century, the
period in which the American clipper became mistress of the
seas, they were employed to open foreign ports to American
shipping. The conclusion of the treaties with countries of
Latin America in this period, through emphasizing the sovereignty
and rising importance of those countries and their
ties with the United States, served to emphasize the Monroe
Doctrine; and in the era of intense power competition for
2 A typical preamble (e.g., that of the recent Netherlands treaty) recites, as
first justification of the treaty: "desirous of strengthening the bonds of peace
and friendship traditionally existing between them."
8 Our first, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, signed on
February 6, 1778, was followed on the same day by signature of the Treaty of
Alliance. Before the Revolutionary War formally ended, commercial treaties
were signed also with the Netherlands (1782) and Sweden (1783); and there•
aftcr also with Prussia (1785), prior to the Constitutional Convention.
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No. l] U. S. COMMERCIAL TREA. TIES 59
colonies and spheres of influence, they served to support the
open-door principle.
Following World War l, special motivations such as these,
pertaining to a new-born and then to a rising nation intent
upon developing its own economy and establishing its place
in the world community, no longer obtained. That war established
the United States as a world Power of first rank, a
leading international creditor and a major exporter of manufactures.
But the normal and evident purposes of promoting
commercial intercourse remained, being intensified by the
new foreign economic interests of the nation. A new series
of negotiations was therefore undertaken during that period,
with special emphasis on international trade.4 The reciprocal
trade agreements program which subsequently developed,
however, after 1934, provided a more precise and efficacious
medium for attaining trade promotion objectives.5 A new
consideration which then emerged, and which lent special
impetus to the program following World War II, was the
need for encouraging and protecting foreign investment, responsively
to the increasing investment interests of American
business abroad and to the position the United States has
now reached as principal reservoir of investment capital in
a world which has become acutely "economic-development"
conscious. The pre-existing content of the commercial treaty
(now often known as "FCN treaty ") was therefore overhauled
with a view to improving and strengthening its relevance
to investor needs; 6 and the eventuating new edition
4 This program resulted in the conclusion of treaties with twelve countries,
beginning with the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights
with Germany, 1923, and including Austria, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Norway,
Honduras, El Salvador, Poland, Hungary, Siam (Thailand) and Liberia.
5 The Trade Agreements Act of 1934, so prominently identified with
Cordell Hull, as periodically extended and revised. Under this legislation
bilateral agreements were concluded with 28 countries, 1934-46, prior to adop·
ùon of the policy of conducting trade agreement negotiations principally
within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) (q.v., infra). By contrast only two commercial treaties of the type
herein discussed were concluded between 1934 and 1946 (those with Siam and
Liberia).
6 See my article "Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign
Investment: Present United States Practice ", 5 A.merican Journal of Comparative
Law 229-247 (1956). See also, e.g.: Vernon G. Setser, "Treaties to
Aid American Business Abroad .. , 40 Foreign Commerce Weekly 3-5. 88-59
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60 POLIT/CAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL LXXJIJ
of this traditional treaty type has been repeatedly recommended
in an authoritative way, in both official and private
circles, as a vehicle for building an international " climate "
favorable to private investment.7
The current program then, in so far as the United States is
concerned, has been specially actuated by investment-related
motives. This primary investment objective is. however,
sought in the context of a larger regulation of bilateral intercourse
in the private sector, and in company with the othcr
objectives appertaining to such instruments. The treaty thus
retains its familiar outline and scope. There have always
been substantial investment elements in treaties of this type
because they have always dealt with the protection of the
citizen abroad, his property (capital) and his right to engage
in business activities (that is, to make and operate investments).
Their reworking for investment ends, accordingly,
has simply entailed the recasting, elaboration and supplementation
of familiar features. Their trade and cultural and
shipping elements are also maintained, in perspective; and
they remain, too, vehicles for generally strengthening neighborly
ties between peoples, though there is no element of
political alliance in them. In this way, they afford an ample
(Sept. Il, 1950); Robert R. Wilson, "Postwar Commercial Treaties of the
United States", 43 American Journal of International Law 262-287 (1949),
"Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties ", 45
ibid. 83-107 (1951), "Access-to-Courts Provisions in United States Commercial
Treaties ", 47 ibid. 20-48 (1953), and "Natural-Resources Provisions in United
States Commercial Treaties ", 48 ibid. 355-379 (1954).
7 For example, sec. 516(d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 (66 Stat. 146),
reënacted and revised in 1954 (68 Stat. 847); House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Foreign Economie Policy, Report on The Mutual
Security Act and Overseas Private Investment (83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953), pp.
26-29; President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom (H.
Doc. 527, 82d Cong .• 2d Sess.), vol. I, p. 68; Department of Commerce, A Study
of Factors Limiting American Private Foreign Investment (Summary of Preliminary
Findings and Recommendations, July 1953), p. 31: Commission on
Foreign Economie Policy (" Randall Commission ''), Report to the President
and the Congress Qanuary 1954), p. 17; Resolution of the Board of Directors
of the National Association of Manufacturers, quoted in the House Committee
Report, p. 26; Chamber of Commerce of the United States, What the
National Chamber Stands for in World A{fairs (June 1952), pp. 11, 13-14;
National Foreign Trade Council, various Final Declarations of their annual
New York conventions-e.g., that of 1950, pp. 16-17.
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No. l] V. S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES 61
framework within which can be harmonized the views and
interests of both the United States and each other country;
the latter may not be, and often is not, animated by quite the
same desires and needs in negotiation as the United States.
ln sum, they are multi-purpose treaties, if anything even
more so now than in the past. They seek to deal with the
whole citizen, in his person and his property, who has lawful
concerns in another country: his rights of entry and 1-esidence;
his persona! freedoms, such as liberty of conscience
and due process of law; his rights to legal benefits and recourse
to the courts in pursuit and defense of his interests;
his rîghts to establish and conduct business enterprises, to engage
in both lucrative and nonprofit activities; his right to
acquire, possess and dispose of property, and to receive a
high standard of respect for his property; the rules of financial
policy, as represented by taxes and exchange regulations,
to which he is subject. They now deal alike with juridical
persans (companies). They deal also with the various aspects
of the international movement of goods and ships, and with
such miscellaneous matters as the behavior of state-controlled
business enterprises, the letting of government contracts and
concessions, and restrictive business practices.
The Relative Rôle of Commercial Treaties
Because these treaties eut across or impinge upon fields of
interest of other international agreements, and of multilateral
conf erences and organizations, the question therefore
arises of their consonance with, and their purposiveness in
light of, the ever-growing complex of international agreements
and organizations. Where does this essentîally traditionalist
bilateral approach fit in the pattern of multilateralism
and specialized arrangements that has evolved with the
growing complexity of international society?
The principal existing multilateral conventions involving
the United States, which have a large world-wide participation
and which deal with topics also covered in the commercial
treaties, are the International Monetary Fund, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT), and the
Paris Industrial Property Convention. The first of these is
involved in the exchange-control article of the commercial
Annex 3
Annex 3
HERMAN W ALKER, JR.
Treaties :for the Encoura.gement . and
Protection <>f Foreign lnvestment: Present
United States Practice
T BE CURRENT United States interest in treaties for the encouragement
and protection of foreign investment weds two national policies of long
standing. Treaties in support of American citizens and their interests
abroad, in line with the prevailing international needs and usages of each
era, have been a normal and repeatedly use<l feature of American diplomacy
since the days of the War of Independence. Concurrently, the Republic
has from its earliest years favored the free international movement
of private capital. This was true when it was an undeveloped,
capital-deficient ex-colony; it remains true now that it bas become a world
power and reservoir of capital, able to help satisfy the investment requirements
of others. Then, to the great benefit of its own economic
growth, it embodied in its legal system principles favorable to foreign
capital ;1 now througb treaty negotiations it seeks to project similar principles
onto the international plane, a consummation responsive alike to
its own economic position and to the contemporary urge for accelerated
econo.mic development being manüested by the. members of the world
community.2
HERMAN W ALJOEB., JR.1 Member of the Foreign Service, was at the time of writing Adviser
on Commercial Treaties, Office of International Trade and Resources, Departmeot of
State. Thls article is personal, and without officia) attribution.
1 Alexander Hamilton in bis celebrated Rtptwt on M anuf,iclures, an analytical set of recommendations
addressed to the first Congress in 1790, had urged such a policy in the foJlowing
words:
"It is not impossible that there may be persons disposed to look with a jealous eye on the
introduction of foreign capital as if it were an instrument to deprive our own citizens of the
profits of our own industry. But perhaps there never could be a more unreasonable jealousy.
Instead of being viewed as a rival, it ought to be considered as a most valuable au:tlliary;
conducing to put in motion a greater quantity of productive tabor and a greater portion of
usef ul enterprise than could exist without it .. .. [E]very farthing of foreign capital ... is a
prccious acquisition." (Taussig, ed., State Papers and Speeches on the Tari.fi, Harvard 1892,
pp. 39-40).
t For a recent authoritative exposition of this view, sec! section entitled "Promotiog the
International Flow of Goods and Capital" in the President's Economie Report transmitted
January 24, 1956 (H. Doc. 280, 84th Cong., 2d sess.), carried in the Department of State
Bulletin, vol. XXXIV, pp. 253-57.
229
Annex 3
230 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OY.' COMPARATIVE LAW
I
Treaties for investment purposes deal with the basic legal conditions
which influence the degree to which potential investors are will.ing to
venture their capital in undertakings in a foreign land. They airn, on a
joint consensual basis, to establish or confirm in the potential host country
a governmental policy of equity and hospitality to the foreign invcstor.
This means, above all, assurance that the enterprise and property
of the alien will be respected and that he will be accorded equal protection
of the laws alike with citizens of the country. This fundamental idea,
then. is the raw material fro:m which the variegated content of the treaties
is elaborated.
The principal vehicle advocated by the United States Government
thus to deal by agreement with the ground rules affecting investrnent is
the bilateral treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation-·"FCN
treaty'' or "commercial treaty" for short. In the last ten yearH, such
treaties have been signed with 15 countries,3 and others are in course of
negotiation. The FCN treat:y-type became the chosen instrument presumably
because it afforded a ready-made framework into which the desired
provisions could conveniently be fitted, and because past exp,erience
had demonstrated its negotiability. The diplomatie desiderata of precedent
and tested practicability favored it.
This type of treaty is an instrument. widely used by nations over the
years to provide the juridica.1 basis for their economic intercourse and to
strengthen ties of good neîghborliness in their everyday relations. It ac•
quired in time a familiar and distinctive form and character, as a normal
medium through which to provide extensively for the rights of each country's
citizens, their property and other interests, in the territories of the
other, and for the rules mutually to govern their trade and shipping.
Around this central theme, this treaty-type bas repeatedly proved its
8 China, 1946 (63 Stat. pt. 2, 1299); ltaly, 1948 (63 Stat. pt. 2, 2255) supplem,~nted by
Agreement of September 26, 1951, S. Exec. H, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.); Ireland, 1950 (1 UST 785);
C<>lombia, 1951 (S. Exec. M, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., withdrawn from Senate, June 30, 1953);
Greece, 1951 (TIAS 3057); Israel, 1951 (S UST, pt:. 1, 550); Denmark, 1951 (S. Exec. I, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess.); Japan, 1953 (4 UST, pt. 2, 2063); Federal Republic of Germany, 1954 (S. Exec.
E, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.); H aiti, 1955 (S. Exec. H, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.); Nicaragua, 1956
(S. Exec. G, 84th Cong., 2d Sess); N etlterlands, 1956 (S. Exec. H, 84th Cong., 2d Se:;s); Uruguay,
1949 (S. Exec. D, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.); Ethiopia, 1951 (4 UST, pt. 2, 2134); :,md Iran
(S. Exec. E, 84th Cong. 2d Sess). These trea.ties fall into three patterns. Those succeeding
the China and Italy treaties refiect an extensive reorganization and condensation of the
content. The Ethiopia and Iran treaties represent a further abridgment of this materîal,
and add provisions on diplomatie and consular rights. AH are substantially similar, :b.owever,
with regard to the points discussed in this article, except as otherwise noted and except that
the Ethiopia and Iran treaties Jack some of the refinements found in the othcrs. They ail
bear the same title, except that in the Uruguay case the term "economic develonment" occurs,
and "am.ity and economic relations" in the case of Ethiopia and Iran.
Annex 3
WALIOER: TREATIES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 231
flexibility and its adaptability to the varying needs of different eras. Its
hlstory of use by the United States antedates the Constitution. Our first
treaty, in fact, was a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, concluded in 1778
with France,' as part of the arrangement which brought that country
into our Revolutionary War as an ally. Numerous other examples followed,
with countries of all conditions and locations, and with varying
emphases and motivations, depending on the circumstances of the day. 6
In more recent times, following World War I, such treaties were designed
especially to promo te international trade; and they aff orded the
medium through which this country embraced the unconditional fonn
of the most-favored-nation clause. But latterly, since the enactmcnt of
the reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934, other conventional tools
of a special sort have been fashioned and employed to serve trade promotion
and regulation: the bilateral trade agreement and now the GATT
(the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).6 With the consequent
decrease of emphasis on the FCN treaty's role in international trade, the
instrument lay ready to hand following World War II to be retooled to
fit the newly-crystallized investment neecV This retooling did not mean
abandonment of the old; the treaty remains one of commerce and navigation,
inter alia. 1t meant rather a shift in orientation and internal balance,
with the refinement, building up, and supplementing of familiar
features especially pertinent to investor requirements. How this bas been
done may be described as follows.
• Others of the pre-Constitution era included those with the Netherlands (1782), Sweden
(1783), and Prussia (1785).
'A recent publication mentions the figure "more than 130," counting those of smaller
scope and size (Departinent of State Fact Sheet entitled "Commercial Treaty Program of
the United States," March 1952, p. 3). For the various purposes historically served by these
treaties, see ibid and Setser, "Treaties to Aid American Business Abroad," XL Foreign Commerce
Weekly (U.S. Dept of Commerce, Sept. 11, 1950), pp. 3 el seq.
8 Originally negotiated at Geneva, 1947, and now adhered to by 35 countries. The present
text, with pend.ing revisions, was published in a State Department pamphlet under date of
March, 1955; and a summary exp]anation in Department of State Publication 5813, April,
1955.
7 The change in the country's international capital position did not, of course, suddenly
occur at this point of time. Even before the fust World War, when the United States was
the world's leading creditor nation, American investments abroad were growing, especially
beginning about 1900. The graph of its creditor status between the two Wars, moreover, was
uneven, tbere being periods in the 30's and early 40's when the net capital flow was markedly
inward; and considerablc foreign investment continues still to be made bere. For the evolution
of the United States position, see Lewis, America's Stake in International Investments
(Brookings, 1948); Sammons, "International Investment Position of the United States,"
XVIII Foreign Comme1·ce Weekly Uanuary 27, 1945) 5-7; Pizer and Cutter, "International
Investments and Earnings," Survey of Current Busim:ss (U.S. Department of Commerce),
August 1955, pp. 10-20. See also, e.g., the summaries in Young, The International Economy
(3rd ed. 1951) 497-502; and the OEEC Report on International lnvestment (Paris, 1950)
13-28.
Annex 4
9/1/2016 Herman Walker, 83, Professor And U.$_ Foreig, Officer, Dies - NYTimes.com
§ PAGE I TOOAY'SPAPEI< t VIDEO I MOSTPOPULAR J U.S. Edition
Obituaries
SUBSCRIBE NO'N L~ ln ReglsrerNow Help
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WORLD U.S. N.Y. / REGION BVS!Nl:'.SS I TECl·INOLO(ff SCIENCE HIW.TI! SPORTS OPINION ARTS SlYLE Tl\J\VEL, JOBS REAL ESTATE AUTOS l
Herman Walker, 83, Professor And U.S. Foreign Officer,
Dies
ByWOlFGANG SAXON
Puohlled: May 13. 1994
Herman Walker Jr., a former Foreign Service officer and emeritus
prof essor ofhistory, economics and political science at SUNY College
at New Paltz, N.Y., died on Sunday at the New Paltz Nursing Home.
A resident of New Paltz, he was 83.
He had been ill for a long time, said bis wife, Evelyn Acomb Walker,
an emiritus professor ofhistory atNew Palt:z.
A native of Nashville, Dr. Walker graduated Phi Beta Kappa from
Duke University, where be received his Ph.D. in 1937. He also studied
at the University of Paris and received a master's degreefrom
Harvard University.
FACEBOOK
TWTTER
QOOOLE+
EMAIL
SH-"RE
PRIHT
REPRINTS
He worked as an economist and legislative analyst for the Dcpartment of Agticulture. In
World War Il he setved in theArmy Air Force and the Office of Strategic Services.
Negotiatcd Friendship Treaty
From 1946 until his retirement !rom the Federal Govemment in 1962 be was successively a
treaty adviser to the Department of State, First Secretary in the United States Embascy in
Pa.ris, vice chainnan of the United States delegation to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade cooferenoe in Geneva, and chairman of the Trade Agreements C-Ommi.ssion.
ln those years be helped shape the format for the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty adopted bythe United States after World War ]L He also played a role in
negotiating political and economic treaties with France and other countries.
After leavi.ng Govenunent service, Dr. Walker taught at Duke and at George Washington
University until he moved. to New Paltz State College in 1965 as chairman of the division of
history and political economy. From 1969 until be reached emeritus status in 1977 be was
cbairman of the department of ccooomics and political science.
In addition to his wife, Dr . Walker is survived by a son from bis previous marriage to the
late Betty Friemel Walker, Steven F. Walker of Highland Park, N.J.; and a sister, Martha
Summer of Bradenton, Fla.
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Annex 5
Annex 5
Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (1981)
25 Fair Empl.Prac.Câs. (BN.A) 849, 25 Empl. Prac. bec:. P 31,768
643 F.2d 353
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
UnitA
Michael E. SPIESS, Jack K. Hardy and
Benjamin F. Rountree, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
C. ITOH & COMPANY (AMERICA),
INC., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 79-2382.
1
April 24, 1981.
Employees of a company wholly owned by a Japanese
corporation filed a class action under equal employment
opportunities provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and under the 1870 statu te providing for equal rights of ail
citizens. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas at Houston, Carl O. Bue, Jr., J ., 469
F .Supp. 1, denied a motion to dismiss but permitted the
company to take an interlocutory appeal, and a question
was certified. The Court of Appeals, Charles Clark,
Circuit Judge, held that the employer in question could
assert rights under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between the United States and Japan
and that such rights permitted the employer to hire only
Japanese personnel for executive and technical positions.
Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss.
Reavley, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*354 Fulbright & Jaworski, Joe P. Martin, Neil
Mar tin, Nancy Morrison O'Connor, Houston, Tex., for
def endant-appellant.
Foreman, Dyess, Prewett, Rosenberg & Henderson,
Edward John O'Neill, Jr., Charles E. Humphrey, Jr.,
Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Lutz Alexander Prager, Marcia Beth Ruskin, E. E. O. C. ,
Washington, D . C. , for amicus curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.
------.----------·---·----
*355 Before COLEMAN, CHARLES CLARK and
REA VLEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:
This interlocutory appeal presents an important issue
of first impression in this circuit. C. Itoh & Company
(America), a New York corporation wholly owned by
a Japanese parent corporation, argues that a 1953
treaty between the United States and Japan permits
it to hire only Japanese citizens for managerial and
technical positions, in spite of American laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of national origin. We hold
that the treaty affords American subsidiaries of Japanese
corporations the limited right to discriminate in favor of
Japanese nationals in filling these positions.
1.
Michael E. Spiess and other American employees of
C. Hoh-America filed a class action under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. section 1981. The
complaint charged that the company had discriminated
against its American employees by making managerial
promotions and other benefits available only to Japanese
citizens. C. Hoh-America filed a motion to dismiss.
asserting that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and Japan, April
2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, precluded the
plaintiffs' suit. Article VIIl(l) of the Treaty provides that
companies of either
shall be permitted to
within the territories
Party
engage,
of the
other Party, accountants and
other technical experts, executive
personnel, attorneys, agents and
other specialists of their choice.
C. Hoh-America argued that the language permitting
companies to engage executive personnel "of their
choice" cloaks the company with absolute itnmunity from
American employment discrimination laws as to these
positions. 0
WESTLAW @2017 Tho!T'son Reuters. No cla1m to oriqinal U.S. Government Works.
Annex 5
Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (1981)
25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,768
corporation is determined by the place of incorporation ."
Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co. (America), Inc., 469 F.Supp. 1,
6 (S.D.Tex.1 979). We reject this construction of article
XXI1(3).
The district court's reading of article XXII(3) is
compatible with the text of the Treaty, but it fails
to account for the unique nature of an international
agreement. Unlike domestic legislation, treaties must
create a common ground between differing cultures
before the rights of the parties can be defined.
The negotiating history of the Treaty makes clear
that article XXIl(3) was designed for this purpose.
A contemporaneous memorandum prepared by State
Department negotiators demonstrates that the provision
was intended, not to determine which forms of corporate
organization were entitled to assert Treaty rights,
but to ensure that unfamiliar organizations would be
recognized as "companies" by the legal institutions of
the respective countries. The memorandum noted the
following colloquy:
Mr. Nagai (a Japanese negotiator) then asked what
"juridical status" meant, and inquired whether the
recognition of juridical status mentioned in paragraph
three (of article XXII) meant anything more than the
recognition of the existence of a juridical person.
Mr. Bassin (the American negotiator) replied that
"juridical status" meant "legal status," the legal
position of an organization in, or with respect to,
the rest of the community. The recognition mentioned
in the second sentence of paragraph three, he added,
meant merely the recognition by either Party of the
existence and legal status ofjuridical persons organized
under the laws of the other Party.
Dispatch No. 13, Office of the United States Political
Advisor for Japan, dated April 8, *357 1952, at 5
(he.reinafter referred to as Bassin Memorandum). 1
The necessity for such a provision is well illustrated
by another excerpt from the memorandum:
Mr. Ota be inquired whether a Zaidan Hojin was
covered by paragraph 3, and, if so, what would
be the nature of national treatment accorded
such organizations in the United States. He
explained that a Zaidan Hojin is a duly organized
juridical person with given property, established
for the purpose of employing or disposing of
said property for a given public purpose. An
example of a Zaidan Hojin, he added, would be
an endowed private library.
Mr. Bassin replied such an organization would
be considered a juridical person in the United
States. pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
3, if it were so considered in Japan.
Bassin Memorandum. at 5.
FCN authority Herman Walker 2 has expressed a similar
understanding of article XXII(3). In a 1956 article,
Walker described the "distinct problems" encountered in
defining "company" broadly enough to accommodate the
varied purposes of an FCN treaty. Walker, Provisions
on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,
50 Am.J. Int'l L. 373, 380 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
Provisions on Companies). Walker noted that "(t)he
standard definition is exemplified by Art. XXII, par. 3, of
the 1953 Japan treaty." Id. at 380 n.34. In this definition,
Walker explained,
2 A State Department cable notes that Mr. Walker
formulated the modern concept of FCN treaties and
negotiated many treaties on behalf of the United
States. Airgram from Secretary of State Kissinger to
American Embassy in Tokyo, No. A-105, dated Jan.
9, 1976. Mr. Walker also served the State Department
as Advisor on Commercial Treaties. See United States
Practice, supra, at 229.
(a) "company" is defined simply and broadly to mean ...
any "artificial" person acknowledged by its creator, as
distinguished from a natural person, whether or not for
pecuniary profit. Every association meeting this simple
test of valid existence must be accounted by the other
party a company of the party of its creation, and have
its juridical status recognized without any reservation
for the laws of the forum.
Id. at 380-81. Walker also emphasized that there was a
clear distinction maintained in
the treaties between the socalled
"civil" and "functional"
capacities of companies. The
recognition of status and
nationality does not of itself
create substantive rights; these
are dealt with elsewhere on
their own merits. Thus the
acknowledgment of a fact the
existence and legitimate paternity
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Annex 5
Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (1981)
25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,768 ·
of an association is not confused
with problems associated with the
functional rights and activities of
alien-bred associations.
Id. at 383. Thus, both the negotiators on location in
Tokyo and the architect of the modern FCN treaty
agree that article XXII(3) merely guarantees Jegal
recognition to diverse forms of Jegal entities and does
not determine which of those entities can assert treaty
rights.
The Department of State has remained faithful to
this interpretation of the Treaty. In a 1976 cable
from Secretary Kissinger, the Department informed the
American embassy in Tokyo that
all that para 3 (of article XXII)
is meant to accomplish is the
establishment of a procedural test
for the determination of the
status of an association, i. e.,
whether or not to recognize it
as a "company" for purposes of
the treaty. Once such recognition
is granted, the functional rights
accorded to companies under the
FCN (for example, the Article VII
rights of a company to establish and
control subsidiaries) then accrue.
Airgram from Secretary of State Kissinger to American
embassy in Tokyo, No. A-105, dated Jan. 9, 1976. A
subsequent opinion from a State Department Jegal advisor
reaches the same conclusion. Letter from Lee R. Marks to
Abner W. Sibal (October 17, 1978). Thus, the consistent
view of the State Department has been that American
subsidiaries of Japanese corporations are entitled to the
full protection of the Treaty. 3 *358 This view weighs
heavily in our analysis. 4 See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
187, 194, 81 S.Ct. 922,926, 6 L.Ed.2d 218,223 (1961).
3 Spiess calls to our attention a State Department letter
of September 1979. in which a deputy legal advisor
suggests that "it was not the intent of the negotiators
to cover locally incorporated subsidiaries." Letter
from James R. Atwood to Lutz Alexander Prager
(September 11 , 1979). This letter represents the first
time, to our knowledge, that the State Department
departed from the position expressed in the 1952
Bassin Memorandum, the 1976 Kissinger cable, and
4
the 1978 letter by James Atwood. For this reason, we
regard it as an aberration in State Department policy.
C. ltoh-America argues that State Department
practice in adrninistering the immigration laws
is further evidence that Japanese subsidiaries
incorporated in the United States are entitled to
Trea ty protection. The company argues that articles
I, VII, and VIII of the Treaty should be read
together to create a right of "companies of J a pan"
to employ Japanese citizens. Article 1( 1) permits
Japanese citizens to enter and remain in the United
States "for the purpose of carrying on trade between
the territories of the two Parties." In C. ItohAmerica's
view, this right is implemented by section
I01(a)(15)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. s l lOl(a)(l5)(E)(i) (1970). which grants
foreign nationals special visa privileges to enter the
United States as "treaty traders." The Department
of State has granted treaty trader status to Japanese
employees working for American subsidiaries of
Japanese corporations. See 22 C.F.R. s 4140(a)
(treaty trader must be employed by "an organization
which is principally owned by a person or persons
having the nationality of the treaty country").
C. Itoh-America concludes that the Department
has permitted American subsidiaries of Japanese
corporations to assert a right to entry under article I,
and that it should be permitted to assert rights under
article VIII as well.
Article I grants only a right to individuals to enter
the country. C. Itoh-America can assert this right
only as an adjunct of its own right to employ
Japanese citizens. Thus, the argument depends on
a unitary construction of articles 1, VII, and VIII.
The company has presented no evidence, other
than the text of the Treaty and the immigration
laws, that articles I, VII, and VIII were meant to be
interpreted in this way. Walker !ends some support
to this theory. See Modern Treaties, supra, at 813
& n. 18. Nevertheless, because our decision that
C. Itoh-America can assert Treaty rights is amply
supported on other grounds, we need not, and do
not, reach this issue.
Finally, we think that the district court's interpretation of
article XXII(3) would create an unreasonable distinction
between treatment of American subsidiaries of Japanese
corporations on the one hand, and branches of Japanese
corporations on the other. According to the district
court, a company is considered a "company of Japan"
for purposes of the Treaty only if it is incorporated
in Japan. Under this analysis, American-incorporated~ L· .. \
WESTLAW "- 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to orig;'l;:,I LJ S Guvernment Works 4
Annex 6
Keproaucoo ,rom tne unc1ass111ea I Lleclassrt,ed Holdings ot the National Archives / l J. ,• Il R'
'· - ~
' } .,,./ l /~,
. " '
Office Memoran t/,~ &-Wt-m~:Ef5··s·'Ji'ATES GOVERNMENT
.. · :Aestnnt Sec,·,~,~"·\· 1
.w.,_,,..____,,,....,.,." . "''" 1 ! ' ...... ~~Q&i(-$ ...... . 1
TO : H - 11r. DATE: December 29, 1951
FROM : E - Mr. Thorp ~,,..,,,... 1
SUBJECT ,Early: Senate Considerati on
~~t n.lJ ~t., . !
G~~at:i!JS Signed During
Du.."'.'ing tl1e past year, the u. s. has signed treatles of
friendship, com..~erce and navigation w:i.th Colombia (April 26),
Greece (August 3 ), Israel (.August· 23.) and Denmark (October l);
a treaty of amity and economic relations with Ethiopia (Septe/.ffuer 7 ); ~ and
an agreement with ItaJ.y suppiemen ting the treaty of friendship,
commerce and navigation of I948 (September 26). Two of t.hese;
instruments ha.ve al.rea.dy been transmi tted to the Sena. te; those:
m.th, respectively, Colombia (Exe,cutive M) and Israel (Executive R),
82d Congress 1st session. The Report and Message' on the Ethiopia;. ·
treaty is now rea.dy to be sent t o the Secretary and Vfuite House
fer transmittal; and it is expected that the other three will.
v,ery shortly be r eady for transmittaJ..
,,..,
These ~ix instruments were a:n negotiated in connection with
the Department's program of extending and modernizing the treaty
protection of American citizens, corporati ons, capitai, trade and
shipping abroad, witll special emphasis on establishing condit i ons
favorable to private investment. The importance attached to keeping
this program moving forward suggests the eminent desirability of
Senate a_ctiori on these si..x inst rwnents during the 1952 session.
/
/
It seems lü:ely that this r esult might mos t probably be accompl i shed.
if the Foreign Relations Cornm:ittee were able to schedule them for
relatively early consideration, before the Sena.te becomes preoccupied
with other items on its agenda or with pressure for adjournment.
The major treaties of this group are of a type which has already
been given Senate consideration a nd approval in connection with
its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty of
friendship, conm.erce and navigation of 1948 wi.th Italy (Executive E~
8oth Congress, 2nd session), the treaty of friendship, commerce and
econom.ic develoμnent of 1949 with Uruguay (Executive D, 81st Congress,
2nd session), and the treaty of friendship, commerce and naVigation
· of 1950 with l.reland (Execu.tive R, 8:1.st Congress, 2nd session).
lX:;H ~t is not believed tb.a.t any of them i ~ controversial, or that.
(
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•
0
0
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c.-0nsideration of them is likely to :impose a great burden on the
., f ;,, <'S-1. .J,,/-" Gornmi.ttee. I shou1d therefore appreciate your seeing ,mat can
? ' be done to have them expediently schedmü.ed for action.
,i.· ... J"' J, -.~-, it\J. ~- : - 1.,t,·, :.,-1. 't 1 , V 1.. 1
:, · f .. Copies to: tj '
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1 ._.'f+.... . OSA - Mr •. Gerbe ri ch WE. - Mr. Tesoro., .J. •• tr 1,,y,,tvi.?.-{•i :(J) ~
/ / GTI - Mr •. Lincoln BNA - .Mr. Mont~e ry iW- ' ,,,,. /") ~ . -;r/ ~
\/ NE - Nr • Vfaldo. O'.FD /m - Mr • , Rog~ ..rl_,r} I / { • . U.- .~. f.. ~~
AF - Mr. vîellons L/T - Mr. Bevans r f t~ · 1C.: ~
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Annex 6
Annex 7
COMMERCIAL TREA TIES WITH IRAN, NICARAGU~
AND THE NETHERLANDS
HEARING
BJCFORE 'l'UE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
Execuüve E, 84th Congress, 2d session
A TREATY OF AlilTY, ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND OONSULAR
RIGHTS WlTH lR.\.N
Executive G, 84th Congress, 2d session
A T~·· OF FRitNDSHIP. COMMERCE, AND NA. VIGA.TION
WITH THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA
AND
Executive H, 84th Congress, .2d session
A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION
WITH THE KlNODOM OF. THE NETBERLANDS
,JULY 3, 1956
f~nted tor the use of the Oommlttee on Foreign .Relatiollt!
UNITED S'l.'A.TBS
GOVEBNMENT PBINTING Oll'll'ICJII
WA.SBINGTON : 1956
Annex 7
Annex 7
COMMERCIAL TREATIES WITH IRAN, NICARAGUA,
. AND THE NETHERLANDS
TUF.SDAY, roLY 3, 1956
UNITED STATES S.ENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FoREIGN R ELATIONS,
Washi11gton, D. O.
The com.mittee met, pursua.nt to call, a.t 10:30 a. m., in the committee
room, United States Ca.pitol Building, Sena.tor Walter F .
George ( cha.irma.n) presiding.
Present: Sena.tors George (cha.îrman), Fulbright, SÂ:Î:kman, Mansfield,
Smith of New Jersey Langer, Knowland, and · en.
The C-HAIRMAN. We ~ hea.r you now, Mr. Ka.Iija.rvi on the 3
commercial trea.ties and ask iou if you can combine your sta.tement
on the 3, pointing out such differences a.s ma.y exist.
~. KALIJARvr. Mr. Cha.~an, I have a.sho!t prepared sta.tement,
a littJ.e over 2 pages,. and I think. perhaps 1t will be better for mê tGread
it. I will just summarize the position af ail three treaties.
The CHAIRMA:N. All right, sir.
STATEKENT OF TBOBSTEN V. KAWARVI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, ACCOl\lPANIED·
BY VERNON G. SETSER, CHIEF, COMMERCIAL TREATIES BRANCH,
AND JOHN 1. czyzAK, ASSISTANT TO THE LEGAL ADVISE:lt,
DEPARTENT OF STATE
Mr. KALIJARVI. First of ail, the Depa.rtment apprecia.tes very mueh,
the oommittee making a pla.ce on its erowded calendar for these thr-eê
agreements which we feel s.re very importa.nt.
I am a.ppearing before the committee in support of three treaties
of friendship, commerce, and na.vigation-with the N etherla.nds,
Nic~ua., and Iran. These treaties are simila.r to others considered
by the committee duri!!g the past severa.l years, pa.rtieularly treaties
with Germany, Japan, Denma.rk, Greece, Israel, and Ethiopie.. Thet
dea.l with the eustomary subj_ects, such as the right to carry on bUSIness,
protection ofpersons ~d property, no:n,~natory trea.tment
o! trade and· shlpping_ a.nd', in tire case of th-e Iran tre&ty, consulu
nghts and privileges.
The 3 trea.ties now before the committee bring to 15 the total
number of the sam.e g_en~~ tme. t~~t ha~e. b~n negotiated during
the present progra.m, whieli wtoe" mit1a.ted at· tlle· end of the Second
Wotld W ar.. This program. is now being ca.med: forwa.rci.in accorda.nce
with the directions of the Co~ess as expressed in section 413 of th.e
M'!tual ·security Act of 19~ (.Public Law 665,_ ~3d Q>ng., 1st sess:),;
W~ch r~ea.ts- a.s. ~- ~ne.r,al subs~ce e.. lroVJS1on ~f the 1952 ~t..
This secijon p~v.ides. tha~ the ~dent ' ab.ail a.ccelera.te a p~
1
Annex 7
il
2 COM:MERCIAL TREATIES
of negotiating treaties for commerce and trade * * * which shall
include provisions to encourage and facilitate the fl.ow of private
investment to nations participating in programs under this act."
Although the principal immediate incentive in the netotiation of
these treaties, is the desire to help create conditions favorable to
foreign private investment, the treaties have a broader purpose which
is to establish: a general legal framework for the maintenance of economic
and other relations between the parties to the treaties. A particularly
desira.ble eff'ect of the treaties,.from the United States point
of view, is to strengthen the hands of the Government for the protection
of the interests of American citizens abroad in many fields of
activity.
The three treaties now under considera.tion are of the traditional
type, based upon existing rur:cedent.s; they 'contain no innovations
raising problems of reconc· · tion with domestic law. They differ
somewhat am.ong themselves and from other tree.ties negotiated in
the past. The principal variations, which result from necessa.ry adjustments
to meet negotiating problems, a.re described in the reports
of the Secretary of State that are printed with the treaty texts.
Senator KNOWLAND. Might I interrupt just a moment here?
EQUAL TREATM:ENT FOR AM:ERICAN CITIZENS
ls there anything in any 9f these treati~ that would permit discrimination
against any .Am.erican citizen because of race, creed, or color?
Mr. LLIJARVI. Are y-ou referring to re~on?
Senator KNOWLAND. Religion, or a.nything else. In other words,
a.re ail Amêrican citizens treated as American citizens? The issue
has been raised in certain agreements negotia.ted some years ago
with a Middle Eastern country. It was not negotiated during this
administration. I do want to know if a.Il American citizens are
treated equally, regardless of what their race, creed, or color may be,
under these treaties. ·
Mr. KA.LIJARVI. Y es, it is my understanding they a.re.
I have wi.th me Mr; Setser, who bas negotiated these agreements
before, and he can answer ful.ly in that respect.
Mr. SETSER. There is nothing on that score, there is no distinc·
tion between American citizens on any ground.
Senator MANSFIELD. There is no Dha.ran clause?
Mr. SETSER. No, no. ·
Senator KNoWLAND. That question will arise in future treaties that
come before us, so I trust the Depa.rtm.ent will have that in mind.
Mr. KA.LUARVI. Yes, sir. ·
The treaties with Nica.ra.gua. and the N etberlands resemble very
closely the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and N a~ation with the
Federal Republic of Germany, which was eonsidered and approved
by tbis committee and the Sena.te last session.
PROVISIONS OP IRAN TREATY
The tree.ty with Iran, on the other hand, differs appreeiably from.
the Netherlands and Nicaragua instmments both ~ .to form. and
substance. It is an a.bridged and simplμied version of the treaty
typé, ~ut incorp~rat~, nè,v:ertheless, th~ sub~~ce of most o! ~e
proteet1ve proV1S1ons· of· the longer· treaties. It does not· deal with ..-.. . .
' ..
Annex 8
Annex 8
.9ie ~eJo/ YMe bulletin
]'or sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Oovernment Printlng Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Prloo:
621.ssues, domestlc $7.00, roreign $10.~
Single COPY, 20 cents
The prlnt!ng or thfs publicstlon bas
boo:o approved by the Direct.or or the
Bureau or the Budget (1anuary 22, 1952).
Note: Contents or thls publication are not
copyrlgbted and items conta!Ded bereln may
be reprlnted. Citation or the DEP•RTMENT
or Sun: BtJU.ETIN as the BOurce will be
apprectated.
Vo1.. XXXI, No. 804 • PUBL1CAT10N _5671
November 22, 1954
.The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Covernment with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of th6 Department
of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes
selected press releases onforeign policy,
issued by the White House and
the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and
by the Secretary of State and other
officers of t he Department, as well as
special articles on 1'0rious phases of
international ajfairs and the functions
of the Department. Information
is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which th6 United States is or may
become a party and treaties of general
international interest.
Publications of the Department, as
weU as legislative material in the field
of international relations, are listed
currently.
Annex 8
Annex 8
anteed to the corresponding American commodities.
Obviously, this is something that the
American people cannot be expected to do.
Reference was made earlier to the desirability
of considering in this review the special requirements
of the underdeveloped countries. A major
objective of U.S. policy is to encourage the development
of the economically less developed countries
of the world, and it is a source of satisfaction
to my Government that the contracting parties
to the GATT include countries in all stages of development.
As a general rule the principle of
maximum possible freedom of trade which underlies
the whole of the general agreement is one
whose application is beneficial to all types of economies
and to countries in all stages of economic
development. N evertheless, it must be recognized
that special problems may be associated with economic
development. W e believe the agreement
should be sufficiently flexible to make it responsive
to such problems, subject to procedures which will
assure the safeguarding of its general objectives.
My Government is prepared to give sympathetic
consideration to proposals which would accomplish
this purpose.
In conclusion let me repeat the conviction expressed
in President Eisenhower's message, that
our efforts here must produce a more effective
agreement attuned to today's realities. The countries
adhering to the general agreement can aff ord
no other outcome, nor can the free world. If we
approach our task in the spirit that it is a rededication
as well as a review, we shall succeed.
U.S. Policy on Jerusalem
Press release 624 dated November 3
The ranking diplomatie representatives of Jordan,
Lebanon, Iraq, Y emen, Saudi Arabia, Libya,
Syria, and Egypt called on the Secretary of State
on N ovember 3 to make known the views of their
Governments with respect to the plans for presentation
of credentials in J erusalem by the appointed
American Ambassador to Israel, Edward
B. Lawson.
In the course of the conversation the Secretary
recalled the policy of the U.S. Government to look
to the United Nations as primarily responsible
for determining the future status of J erusalem.
Following normal practice, the presentation of
776
credentials would be effected by Ambassador Lawson
at the place where the Chief of State actually
is. The fact that this means that the presentation
will take place in J erusalem implies no change in
our attitude regarding J erusalem nor does it imply
any change in the location of the American
Embassy in Israel, which is at Tel Aviv.
FOA Announces Program
of Aid to Iran
The Foreign Operations Administration on
N ovember 2 announced that the United States
is prepared to off er aid to Iran in the form of
loans and grants totaling $127.3 million.
Both Iranian and U.S. Government circles have
concerned themselves rec.ently with the indication
that, even with an oil settlement accomplished,
it would be 3 years until Iran's oil revenues would
permit it to finance large-scale development from
its own resources. To help Iran during the interim
period, the United States has decided to
make available up to $127.3 million which would
be provided from both Foreign Operations Administration
and Export-Import sources. This
total includes $21.5 million for a technical-cooperation
program; $52.8 million for consumergoods
imports, which will be sold by the Iranian
Government for local currency (rials), which in
turn will be used to support basic governmental
expenditures as has been done in the past year;
and an additional $53 million la.rgely for shortterm
developmental assistance, which would be
provided for specifically approved projects.
Iran has not yet fully developed its own plans
for economic development although it has submitted
proposed projects to the Export-Import
Bank for preliminary considerations. Sorne time,
however, will be required for Iran fully to prepare
project plans and establish priorities among
them, and for the bank to make its required investigations.
Of the above $127.3 million, $85 million
is being off ered in the form of loans, the balance in
grants; $15 million of the latter has already been
allotted on an emergency basis.
With this assistance the Iranian Govermnent
will be able to .finance essential Government operations
as well as develop and initiate a sound
econômic development program.
Departmenl of Stale Bulletin
Annex 8
Novemher 22, 1954 Index Vol. XXXI, No. 804
.American Princlples. The New Envlronment of Amerlcan
Dl11fomncy (Merchnnt) . 759
Conirress, The. Current Leglslatton 793
Cuba. Trade Agreement Negottattons Involvlng J'apan 767
Economie Affaira
Cabinet Commltlee on Telecommunlcatlons 778
Exlmbank Lonn to Mexico for Electrlc Power Program • • 779
New Customs Regulatlons Regulre Fewer Certifled lnvolcee
. 779
Strengthenlng the General Agreement on Tarllfs and
Trnde (Waugh, Eisenhower) . 772
Talke on U.S.-Phll!pplne Relations 771
Trade Agreement Negotlatlons Involvlng J'apan . 767
U.S. and J'apan Diseuse Mutual Interests (Elsenhower-
Yoshlda) . • . 765
Foreiirn Service. The New Envlronment of Amerlcan Diplomacy
(Merchant) . . 759
Germany
Agreement Wlth West Germany on Publications Exchange
{te:z:t of notes) • 791
Payment to German Republic for New Embassy Building
( text of notes) 777
India. Proclamation Affirms Rectprocal Copyright Relations
Wlth Indla (text of notes. remarks, and proclamation)
. 788
Intematlonal Information. Agreement Wlth West Germany
on Publications Exchange (text of notes) 791
Iran. FOA Announces Program of Ald to Iran . 776
Israel. O.S. Pollcy on J'erusalem • 776
Italy. Itallan Cabinet Expresses Thanks for Olfer of Emergency
Ald • • 777
Japan
J'apan and the United Nations (Lodge) 766
Trade Agreement Negotlattons Involvlng J'apan 767
U.S. and J'apan Dlscuss Mutual Interests (Eisenhower·
Yoshlda) • . • • . • 765
Lib:,a. U.S.-Llbyan Base Rlghts Agreement 792
Mexico. Jilxlmbank Loan to Mexico for Electrlc Power
Progrnm . 779
Military Affaira
O.S. Endorses Report of Collective Measuree Commlttee
(Maboney) . 780
U.S.-Llbynn Base Rlghts Agreement • 792
Mutual Security
FOA Announces Program of Aid to Iran 776
Oeneral Collins Undertakes Mission to Viet-Nam 777
Standardlzatlon of FOA Procurement Rules • 778
Philippines, The. Talks on U._S.-Phlllpplne Relations 771
Presldential Documents. .Proclamation Affirma Reclprocal
Copyright Relations Wlth Indla • 788
Protection of Nationals and Property. Proclamation Affirme
Reclprocal Copyright Relations With Indla (text of
notes, remarks, and proclamation) 788
Publications
Recent Releases 794
U.N. Documents 788
Refuirees and Displaced Persons. Responslbllltles Relating
to Refugees and Dlsplaced Persona . 793
South Mrica, Union of. Treatment of Indians ln South
Afrlca (statements by Smith and text of U.N. resolutlon)
. . 783
State, Department of. Responslbllltles Relatlng to Refugees
and Dlsplaced Persona . 793
Treat:, Information
Agreement W!th West Germany on Publications Exchange
( text of notes) 791
Current Actions . • . . • • •
Proclamation Affirme Reclprocal Copyright Relations Wlth
Indla (text of notes, remarks, and proclamation)
Trade Agreement Negotiatlons Involvlng Japan
U.S.-Llbyan Base Rlghts Agreement •
United Nations
Admission of New Members (Wadsworth)
Current U.N. Documents .
J'apan and the United Nations (Lodge) ,
Treatment of Indiana in South Atrica (statements by
Smith and text of resolut!on) • • • . . . . .
U.S. Endorses Report of Collective Mensures Commlttee
(Mahoney) •
Uruirua:,.
Viet-Nam.
Nam
Trade Agreement Negotlatlons Involvlng J'apan.
General Collins Undertakes Mission to Viet-
Name Indeoe
793
788
767
792
786
788
766
783
780
767
777
Allen, George V.
Collins, J'. La wton
Dulles, Secretary
Eisenhower, President .
Hoover, Herbert, Jr.
Krekeler, Heinz L.
Laurel, José P.
790
777
777, 791
765, 771, 772, 791
789
Lawson, Edward B.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.
Mahoney, Charles H. • .
Mehta, Gaganviharl L.
Merchant, Llvingston T.
Mumford, L. Quincy
Smith, H. Alexander
Wadsworth, James J'.
Waugh, Samuel C.
Yoshlda, Shlgeru
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: November 8-14
777, 792
771
776
766
780
789
759
790
783
786
772
765
Releases may be obtained from the News Division,
Department of State, W ashlngton 25, D. C.
Press releases issued prior to November 8 which
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 600
of October 21, 612 of October 27, 613 of October 28,
622 of November 1, 624 of November 3, and 625 of
November 4.
No.
1631
*632
•633
*634
1635
*636
637
1638
t639
640
*641
t642
643
Date
11/8
11/9
11/10
11/9
11/10
11/10
11/10
11/10
11/11
11/12
11/12
11/12
11/13
Subject
Protest to U.S.S.R. in plane case.
Patterson to attend Siio Paulo fair.
Trade talks with Cuba.
Dulles : press conference transcript.
Delegation to ILO meeting.
Economie talks witb Yugoslavia.
Waugh: GATT conference.
Patents agreement with Germany.
Delegation to UNESCO conference.
Tariff negotiations involving Japan.
Educational exchange.
Shipping in Anta rctica.
Surplus commodities for Japan.
•Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the BULLETIN.
U. 5, GOYERHIUNT PRINTIHG OFFICE: 19!14
Annex 9
Annex 9
IRAN
Surplus Agricultural Commodities [1]
Agreement signed at Tehran July 26, 1960;
Entered into force July 26, 1960.
With exehanges of notes
Signed at Tehran July 26 and 28, 1960.
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN UNDER TITLE I OF THE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE
ACT, AS AMENDED
The Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Iran :
Recognizing the desirability of expanding trade in agricultural
commodities between their two countries and with other friendly
nations in a manner which would not displace usual marketings of
the United States in these commodities, or unduly disrupt world
prices of agricultural commodities or norn:i.al patterns of commercial
trade with friendly countries;
Considering that the purchase for Iranian rials of surplus agricultural
commodities produced in the U nitt!d States of America will
assist in achieving such an expansion of trade;
Considering that the Iranian rials accruing from such purchase
will be utilized in a manner beneficial to both countries;
Desiring to set forth the understandings which will govern the
sales, as specified below, of surplus agricultural commodities to Iran
pursuant to Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act,[2 ] as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
and the measures which the two Governments will take individually
and collectively in furthering the expansion of trade in such
commodities;
Have agreed as follows:
1 Also TIAS 4592, 4598; post, pp. 2208, 22.39.
2 68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1709.
· TIAS 4544 (1944)
Annex 9
11 usT] Iran-Surplus Agri. Commodities-July 26, 28, 1960
ARTICLE I
SA.LES FOR IR.4.NI.4.N RIA.LS
Subject to the availability of commodities for programming under
the Act and to issuance by the Government of the United States of
America and acceptance by the Government of Iran of purchase
authorizations, the Government of the United States of America
undertakes to finance the sale for lranian rials to purchasers authorized
by the Government of Iran of the following agricultural
commodities determined to be surplus pursuant to the Act, in the
amounts indicated :
Commodity
Wheat
Ocean Transportation
Total
Export market valtte
(mllllons)
$3.075
. 615
$3.690
Applications for purchase authorizations will be made within 90
calendar days after the effective date of this Agreement. Purchase
authorizations will include provisions relating to the sale and delivery
of commodities, the time and circumstances of deposit of the Iranian
rials accruing from such sale, and other relevant matters.
It is understood that the sale of wheat under this Agreement is
not intended to increase the availability of this or like commoditiés
for export and is made on the condition that no exports of such
commodities will be made from Iran during the period that the
wheat is being imported and \ltilized.
ART,ICLE II
USES OF IRAN/AN RIALS
The two Governments agree that the Iranian rials accruing to the
Government of the United States of America as a consequence of
sales made pursuant to this Agreement, will be used by the Government
of the United States of America, in such manner and order of
p,riority as the Government of the United States of America shall
determine, for the following purposes, in the amounts shown:
a. For United States expenditures under subsections (a), (b), (c),
(d), (f), (h), (i), (j), (k), (I), (m), (n), (o), (p), (q), and (r)
of Section 104 of the Act or under any of such subsections, the lranian
rial equivalent of $1.29-million.
b. For loans to be made by the Export-Import Bank of Washington
under Section 104(e) of the Act and for administrative expenses of
the Export-Import Bank of Washington in Iran incident thereto,
the Iranian rial equivalent of $.74-million but not more than 25%
of the currencies received under the Agreement. It is understood
that:
TIAS 4544
1945
Annex 9
1946 U .S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [ 11 UST
( 1) Such loans un der Section 104 ( e) of the Act will be made to
United States business firms and branches, subsidiaries, or
affiliates of such firms in Iran for business development and
trade expansion in Iran, and to United States firms and
Iranian firms for the establishment of facilities fo_r aiding
in the utilization, distribution, or otherwise increasing the
consumption of and markets for United States agricultural
products.
(2) Loans will be mutually agreeable to the Export-Import Bank
of Washington an<l the Government of Iran, acting through
the Bank Melli. The Governor of the Bank Melli, or his
designate, will act for the Government of Iran, and the
President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, or his
designate, will act for the Export-Import Bank of
Washington.
(3) Upon receipt of an application which the Export-Import
Bank is prepared to consider, the Export-Import Bank will
inform the Bank Melli of the identity of the applicant, the
nature of the proposed business, the amount of the proposed
loan, and the general purposes for which the loan procee<ls
would be expended.
( 4) When the Export-Import Bank is prepared to act favorably
upon an application, it wîll so notify the Bank Melli and
will indicate the interest rate and the repayment perio<l which
woul<l be used under the proposed loan. The interest rate
will be similar to that prevailing in Iran on comparable
loans, and the maturities will be consistent with the purposes
of the financing.
(5) Within sixty days after the receipt of the notice that the
Export-Import Bank is prepared to act favorably upon an
application, the Bank Melli will indicate to the Export-Import
Bank whether or not the Bank Melli has any objection to the
proposed loan. Unless within the sixty-day period the
Export-Import Bank has receive<l such a communication from
the Bank Melli it shall be understood that the Bank Melli.has
no-objection to the proposed loan. When the Export-Import
Bank approves or <leclines the proposed loan, it will notify the
Bank Melli.
( 6) In the event the Iranian rials set aside for loans under
Section 104 ( e) of the Act are not a<lvance<l within 3 years
from the dates of this Agreement because the Export-Import
Bank of Washington has not approved loans or because proposed
loans have not been mutually agreeable to the ExportImport
Bank of Washii:\gton and the Bank Melli, the Government
of the United States of America may use the Iranian
rials for any purpose authorized by Section 104 of the Act.
TIAS 4544
Annex 9
11 usT] Iran-Surplus Agri. Commodities-July 26, 28, 1960 1947
c. For a loan to the Government of Iran under subsection (g) of
Section 104 of the Act, the Iranian rial equivalent of not more than
$1.66-million for financing such projects to promote economic development,
including projects not heretofore included in plans of the
Government of Iran, as may be mutually agreed. The terms and
conditions of the loan will be set forth in separate agreements
between the two Governments. In the event that agreement is not
reached on the use of the Iranian rials for loan purposes within three
years from the date 'of this Agreement, the Government of the United
States of America may use the Iranian rials for any purposes
authorized by Section 104 of the Act.
d. In the event the total of Iranian rials accruing to the Government
of the United States of America as a consequence of sales made
is less than the Iranian rials equivalent of $3.69-million, the amount
available for a loan pursuant to this Agreement to the Government of
Iran under Section 104(g) will be reduced by the amount of such
difference; in the event the total Iranian rial deposit exceeds the
equivalent of $3.69-million 45% of the excess will be available for a
loan under Section 104 (g), 20% for loans under Section 104 ( e),
and 35% for any use or uses authorized by Section 104 as the
Government of the United States of America may determine.
ARTICLE III
DEPOSIT OF IRA.NIA.N RIALS
The deposit of Iranian rials to the account of the Government of
the United States of America in payment for the commodities and
for ocean transportation costs financed by the Government of the
United States of America ( except excess costs resulting from the
requirement that United States flag vessels be used) shall be m!l,de
at the rate of exchange for United States dollars generally applicable
to import transactions ( excluding imports granted a preferential
rate) in effect on the dates of dollar disbursement by United States
banks, or by the Government of the United States of America, as
provided in the purchase authorizations.
ARTICLE IV
GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS
1. The Government of Iran agrees that it will take all possible
mensures to prevent the resale or transshipment to other countries, or
the use for other than domestic purposes ( except where such resale,
transshipment or use is specifically approved by the Government of
the United States of Amèrica), of the surplus agricultural commodities
purchased pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, and to
assure that the purchnse of such commodities does riot result in
increased availability of these or like commodities to nations unfriendly
to the United States of America.
TIAS 4544
1948 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [11 UST
2. The two Governmonts agree that they will tako reasonable
precautions to assure that all sales or purchases of surplus agricultural
commodities, pursuant to the Agreement, will not unduly disrupt
world prices of agricultural commodities, displace usual marketings
of the United States of America in theso commodities, or disrupt
normnl patterns of commercial trade with friendly countries.
3. In carry~ng out this Agreement, the two Governments will seek
to assure conditions of commerce permitting private traders to
function effectively and will use their be.st endeavors to develop and
expand continuons market demand for agricultural commodities.
4. The Government of Iran agrees to furnish, upon request of the
Government of tho United States of America, information on the
progress of the program, particularly with respect to arrivai and
condition of commodities, and the provisions for the maintenance of
usual marketings, and information relating to exports of the same
or like commodities.
ARTICLE V
CONSULTATION
The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them,
consult regarding any ma,tter relating to the application of this
Agreement or to the operation of arrangements carried out pursuant
to this Agreement.
ARTICLE VI
ENTRY INTO PORGE
The Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.
IN wtTNESS WHEREOF, the respective representatives, duly authorized
for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.
DoNE at Tehran in duplicate this twenty-sixth day of July, 1960.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
EDWARD T. w AlLES
' Musa Khatatan.
TIAS 4544
[' 1
FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF IRAN:
Annex 9
11 usT] Iran-Surplus Agri. Commodities-July 26, 28, 1960 1949
The American Ambassador to the lrani,an Minister of Oustoms and
M onopoli.eB
No. rso2 TEHRAN, July M, 1960
ExcEr..LENCY :
I have the honor to refer to the Agricultural Commodities Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Iran signed today.
I wish to confirm my Government's understanding of the agreement
reached in conversations which have taken place between this Embassy
and the Government of Iran with respect to thè use of Iranian rials
accruing under the subject Agreement for agricultural market
development purposes by the Government of the United States
of America tmder Section 104 (a) of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act, as amended.
It . is understood that the Government of Iran will provide
facilities for the conversion of up to $74,000 worth of Iranian rials
into other currencies. These facilities for convers.ion are needed for
the purpose of securing funds to finance agricultural market
development activities of the Government of the United States in
other countries.
I shall' appreciate receiving Y our ExceI1ency's confirmation of the
above understanding.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
EDWARD T. w AILES
His Excellency
MusA KHATATAN,
Minister of Ou.'ltoms and /If onopoUes,
Tehran.
The lranian Minister of OustO'lnS and Monopolies t<J the American
Ambassador
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5679!> 0-61-PT. 2-+2
TIAS 4544
Annex 9
Annex 9
1950 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [11 UST
Translation
MINISTRY OF CUSTOMS AND MONOPOLIES
No. 11127
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Tehran.
MAIN ÛFFICE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL BUREAU
Date-M ordad 6, 1339
[July 28, 1960]
The Ministry of Customs and Monopolies presents its compliments
and confirms the contents of the Embassy's note No. 502 dated J uly 26,
1960, regarding the conversion of rials up to the equivalent of 74,000
dollars into the currencies of other countries.
MusA KHATATAN
Minûter of Oustoms and Monopolie,'j
The American Ambassador to the lranian Minûter of Oustoms and
Monopolies
No. 503 TEHRAN, July 26, 1960
ExCELLENCY :
I have the honor to refer to the Agricultural Commodities Agreement
signed today between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Iran and, wit h regard to the rials
accruing to uses indicated under Article II of the Agreement, to state
that the understanding of the Government of the United States of
America is as follows:
With respect to both paragraphs band c of Article II:
Local currency will be advanced or reimbursed to the Government
of Iran for financing agreed projects under paragraphs b and c of
Article II of the Agricultural Commodities Agreement upon the
presentation of such documentation as the United States Operations
Mission may specify.
The Government of Iran shall maintain or cause to be maintained
books and records adequate to identify the goods and services financed
for agreed projects pursuant to paragraphs b and c of Article II of
the Agricultural Commodities Agreement, to disclose the use thereof
in the projects and to record the progress of the projects (including
the cost thereof). The books and records with respect to each project
shall be maintained for the duration of the project, or until the
expiration of three years after final disbursement for the project has
been made by the USOM, whichever is later. The two Governments
shall have the right at all reasonable times to examine such books and
TIAS 4544
Annex 9
· 11 UST] Iran-Surplus Agri. Commodities-·July 26, 28, 1960 1951
records and a11 other documents, correspondence, rnemoranda and
other records involving transactions relating to agreed pl'Ojects. The
Government of Iran sha11 enable the USOM to observe and review
agreed projccts and the utilizntion of goods and services financed
under the projects, and slrnll furnish to the USOM all such information
as it shall reasonably request conceming the above-mentioned
matters and the expenditures related thereto. The Government. of
Iran shall afford, or arrange to have afforded, a11 reasonable opportunity
for authorized representatives of the Government of the United
States to visit any part of the territory of Iran for purposes related
to agreed projects. If USOM determines that any disbursement
under paragraphs b and c of Article II of the Agricnltural Commodities
Agreement made by it for· agreed projects is not supported
by the documentation submitted by the Government of Iran, is not
made in accordance with the terms of this agreement or any applicable
agreement or arrangement between the Government of the Fnited
States and the Government of Iran, or is in violation of any applicable
laws or regulations of the United States Government, the Government
of Iran shall pay to the USOM as may be requested by it, an
amount in local currency not t_o exceed the amount of such disbursement.
"\>Vhere any payment is made by the Govermnent of Iran to the
USOM pursuant to the preceding sentence on the basis of a disbursement
which has been charged as an advance under the line of credit
established by the Joan agreement, the total amount clrnrged as
advances under the line of credit shall be reduced by the amount of
such payment.
The USOM shall expend funds for agreed projects only in accordance
wit.h the applicable laws and regulations of the United States
Government. The USOM may dechne to make further disbursements
for any agreed projects if it determines that furt ]1er disbursements
would not fulfill the purpose of parng-raphs b or c of Article II of the
Agricultural Commodities Agreement.
I shall appreciate your coufirming- to me that the contents of this
note also represent the understnnding- of the Govermnent of Iran.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed nssu,·nnces of my highest
consideration.
His Excellency
MusA KHATATAN,
Minister of O,ustoms and Al onopolie8,
Tehran.
EnwAnn T. "WAtLF.S
TIAR 4544
1952 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [11 UST
The lranian /1/inÛJter of Oustoms and Mo;,,opolies to the American
Amba.sRador
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Trans'lation
MINISTRY OF CUSTOMS AND M.ONOPOLIES
No. 1112:S
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Tehran.
MAIN ÛFFICE
l NTERDJo~PARTMENTAL BUREAU
Date-A/ ordad 6, 13.3.9
[July 118, 1960]
The Ministry of Customs and l\1onopo1ies presents its compliments
and confirms the contents of note No. 503 dated July 26, 1960.
MUSA KHATATAN
M·inister of Ousto1M and 1lf onopolies
TIAS 4544
Annex 9
Annex 10
Annex 10
IRAN
Economie, Technical and Related Assistance
Agreement signed at Tehran December 21, 1961;
Entered into force December 21, 1961.
GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE .GOVERNMENT.OF .THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE IMPERIAL GOVE'RNMENT OF OEAN
PREAMBLE
Whereas the Imperia! Gov~rnment of Iran desires'to raise the stand·ard
of living of tpe people .of Iran by promoting economic
and social development of the country, and, ·
Whereas the Government of the United Stat~s of America is willing
to extend economic, technical and related assistance to Iran,
and the Government of the United States of America and
the Im'perial Government of Iran, desiring to strengthen
the traditional ties of frienship between the two countries,
have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Government of the United States of America will
f.urnish such economic, technical and related assistance hereunder as
may be requested hy representatives of the agency designated by the
Imperia} Government of Iran to cooperate in the planning and implementation
of such assistance and approved by representatives of the
agency designated by the Government of the United States of America
to administer its responsibilities hereunder, or as may be requested and
approved by other representati ves designated by the Government of
the United States of America and the Imperia] Government of Iran ..
The furnishing of such assistance shall be subject to the applicable
laws and regulations of the Government of the United States of
America; the utilization of such assistance shall similarly be subject
to the constitution, laws and regulations of Iran. It shall be made
available in accordance with written arrangements agreed upon be-.
tween the above-mentioned representatives.
(3229) TIA.S 4930
Annex 10
3230 U.S. Treaties and Other Internat'fonal Agreements [12 UST
ARTICLE II
The Imperia} Government of Iran a.grees to make the full
contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general
economic condition in furtherance of the purposes for which
assistance is made available hereunder; to bear a fair share of the costs
of such assistance and to give the people of Iran full publicity concerning
programs and operations hereunder. The Imperia} Government
of Iran will take appropriate steps to insure the effective use of
assistance furnished pursuant. to this Agreement and will aff ord every
opportùnity and facility to representatives of the Government of the
United States of America to observe and revie,v programs and opera
·tïons conducted under this Agreement and will furnish whatever
information they may need to'determine the nature and scope of operations
planned or carried out and to evaluate results.
ARTICLE III
1. ln any case where commodities or services are furnished
on a grant basis un der arrangem~nts which will r.esult in the accrual
of proceeds to the Imperia} Government of Iran from the import
or sale of ·such commodities or services, the Imperia} Government of
Iran, except as may otherwise be agreed upon by the representatives
referred to in Article I hereof, will establish in its own name a Special
Account in the Bank Markazi Iran, and will deposit prpmptly in such
Special · Account · the amount of its currency equivalent to such
proceeds. · .·
2. Except as may otherwise be agreed upon by the representatives
referred to in Article I hereof, the currency in the Special
Account will be utilized as follows: Upon notification from time to
time by the Government of the United States of America of its requirement
for the currency of Iran, the Imperia} Government of Iran
will make available. to that government in the manner requested by _it'
out of any balances in the Special Account such sums as are stàted in
such notifications to · be necessary for such requirements. · The· Imperia!
Government of Iran may draw upon any remaining balances in
the Special Account for such purposes benèficial ·to Iran as may be
_agreed upon from time to time by. the representatives referred to Îh
Article I hereof. Whenever-funds from such Speciàl Account are
used by the Imperia! Government of Iran to make loans,- ail funds
rcceived in repayment of such loans prior to the termination of assistn.
noo hereunder s}:iall be reused only as may be agreed upon by the
representatives referred to in Article I hereof. Any unencumbered
balances of funds which remain in the Special Account upon termination
of assistance hereunder to the Imperia! Government of Iran shall
be disposed of for such purposes as, subject to approval by Act or joint
resolution of the Congress of the United States of America, may be
agreed upon by the representatives referred to. in Article I hereof.
TIAS 4930
Annex 10
12 UST]· Iran-Economie, Etc., Assistance-Dec. 21, 1961
ARTICLE IV
The Imperia} · Government of Iran will receive a special
m1ss10n and its personnel to discharge the responsibilities of the
Government. of the United States of America hereunder; will consider
this special mission and its personnel as part of the diplomatie mission
. of tl1e United States of America in Iran fo1· the purposes of enjoying
the privileges and immunities accorded to that diplomatie mission and
its personnel of comparable rank; and will give full cooperation to
the specinl mission and its personnel, including the furnishing of
facilities and personnel necessary for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions hereof. lt· is understood that the detailed application of
this Article wotild, when necessary, be the subject of intergovernmental
discussion.
ARTICLE V
In order to assure the maximum benefits to the· people of
Iran from the assistance to be furnished hereunder:
(a) Any supplies, materials, equipment, commodities, or
funds introduced into or acquired in Iran by the
Government of tl1e United States of America or any
contructor financed by that Government, for purposes
of this Agreement shall, while such supplies, materials,
equipment, commodities, or funds are used in connection
with this Agreement, be exempt from any taxes
on ownership or use of property and any other
taxes, investment or deposit requirements and currency
controls in. Iran; and the import, export, purchase,
use or disposition of any such supplies, materials,
equipment, commodities or funds in connection
with this Agreement shall be exempt from any tariff's,
customs duties, import and export taxes, taxes on purchase
or disposition of property, and any other taxes
or similar charges in Iran.
(b) AU personnel, except citizens and permanent residents
of Iran, including employees of the Government of the
United States of America or its agencies or individuals
under contract, or èmployees of public or private organization
under contract, with the Government of
the. United States of America, the Imperia} Government
of Iran, or any agencies of either the Governmen
t of the Uni~ed States of America or the Imperia!
Government of Iran, who are present in Iran toperform
. work in connection herewith, shall be exempt
from income and social security taxes levied under the
laws of Iran and from taxes on the purchase, owner-
TIAS 4930
3231
Annex 10
3232 U .S. Treaties and Other International Agreements (12 UST
ship, use, or disposition of personal movable property
( including one automobile) intended for their own
use. Such personnel and members of their families
shall receive the same treatment with respect to the
payment of customs, import, and all other duties and
fees on persona} effects ( including one automobile),
equipment, and supplies imported into Iran for their
own use as is accorded by the Imperia} Gov~rnment of
Iran to diplomatie personnel of the Embassy of the
United States of America.
(c) Funds introduced into Iran for purposes of furnishing
assistance hereunder shall be convertible into currency
of Iran at the rate providing the largest number
of units of such currency per United States dollar,
which, at the time th'e conversion is made, is not
unla wful in Iran. ·
( d) The Imperia} Government of Iran will deposit, segre-
. gate, or assure titl~ to all United States funds allocated
to, or derived from, any pr~gram of assistance
undertaken hereunder by the Government of the
United States of America so that such funds shall not
be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure, or
other legal process by any person, finn, agency, corporation,
organizatiori or other government when the .
Imperia} Government of Iran is advised by the Governmènt
of the United States of America that any
· such legal process would interfere with thé attainment
of the objectives of the program of assistance
hereunder.
ARTICLE VI
. .
. 1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on
whièh it is signed by the ·two governments and it shall tenninate six
months after the close of the. first regular session of the Iranian
Parliament, i.e., the Majlis and thè Senate whichever closes later,
held after the sigiiing of this Agreement, unless, before the expiration
of said six months, the Imperia! Government of Iran shall have notified
the'Government of the United States of America that this Agreement
has been ratified, in which case it shaU- remain in force until
ninety days after receipt by either government ~f written notification
of the intention of the ot4er to terminate it. It is. understood, however,
that' the provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect after termination of the Agreement with respect to assistance
furnished pursuant to this Agreement before such termination.
2: AH or any part of the program of assistance provided
hereunder may, except as may otherwise be provided in arrangements
agreed upon pursuant to Article I hereof, be terminated by either gov-
TiAS 4930
Annex 10
12 UST] Iran-Economie, Etc., Assistance-Dec. 21, 1961
ernment if that government determines that because of changed conditions
the continuation of such assistance is unnecessary or
undesirable. The termination of such assistance uuder this provision
may include the terminat.ion of deliveries of any commodities hereunder
not yet delivered.
3. The two governments or their designated representatives
shall, upon request of either of them, consult regarding any matter
on the application, operation or amendment of this Agreement.
4. This Agreement super,sedes the Agreement relating to
the program of Technical Cooperation and Economie Development
effected by an exchange of notes signed at Tehran on J anuary 19
and 20, 1952.[1] Arrangements or agreements implementing the
above-mentioned Agreement and concluded prior to the entry into
force of this Agreement shall hereafter be subject to this Agreement.
. Done in Tehran on December 21, 1961, in the Persian and
English languages.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
J. C. HoLHES
[BEAL]
1 TIAS 2687; 8 UST (pt. 4) 4741.
70075 0 • 62 • pt. 3 • 55
FOR THE IMPERIAL
GOVERNMENT OF IRAN
H. GHODS NAKHAI
[SEAL]
TIAS 4960
3233
3234 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements
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TIAS 4930
[12 UST
Annex 10
Annex 10
12 UST] Iran-Economie, Etc., Assistance-Dec. 21, 1,961
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TIAS 4930
3236 U .S. Treaties and Other International Agreements
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TIAS 4930
[12 UST
Annex 10
Annex 10
12 UST] Iran-Economie, Etc., A.ssistance-Dec. 21, 1961
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TIAS 4930
3237
3238 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [12 UST
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TIAS 4930
Annex 10
Annex 11
Annex 11
IRAN
Peace Corps
Agreement eDected by exchange of note,
Signed at Tehran September 5 and 16, 1962;
Entered into force September 16, 1962.
The A merwan AmbaBsador to the l ranian Minuter of
Foreign Aff a:irs
No. 107 TEHRAN, September 5, 196B.
ExCELLENCY •
I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives
of our two Governments and to propose the followmg understn.
ndings w1th respect to the men and women of the United States of
America who volunteer to serve m the Peace Corps and who, at the
request of your Government, would live and work for per1ods of t1me
m Iran.
1. The Government of the Umted States will furn1sh such Peace
Corps V olunteers as may be requested by the Government of Iran
and approved by the Government of the Umted States to per:form
mutually agreed tasks m Iran. The Volunteers will work under the
1mmediate superv1s1on of governmenta.l or pnvate orgamzat1ons m
Iran des1gnated by our two Governments. The Government of the
Umted States will provide trammg to enable the Voluntoors to perform
more effoot1vely these agreed tasks.
2. The Government of Iran will accord eqmtwble treatment to the
Volunteers and the1r property, afford them full a1d and protection,
mcluding treatment no less favorable than that accorded generally
to nat1onals of the United States reslding m Iran, and fully mform,
consult and cooperate with representat1ves of the Government of the
Umted States w1th respect to all matters concernmg them. The Gov~
rmnent of Iran will exempt the Volunteers from all taxes on payments
wh1ch they rece1ve to defray the1r livmg costs and on mcome
from sources outs1de Iran, from all customs dut1es or other charges
on the1r persona! property mtroduced mto Iran for the1r own use at
TIAS 7078 (434)
Annex 11
22 UST] Iran-Peace Corps-Sept. 5 and 16, 1962
or about the t1me of the1r arnval, and from all other taxes or other
charges (including 1mm1grat10n fee.s) except license fees and taxes
1t11d other charges mcluded m the pr1oes of eqmpment, supplies and
services.
3. The Government of the U mted States will prov1de the Volunteers
w1th such lim1ted amounts of eqmpment and supplies as our two
Governments may agree are needed to enable the Volunteers to perform
their tasks effectively The Government of Iran will exempt
from all taxes, customs dut1es and other charges, all eqmpment and
supplies mtroduced mto or acqmred m Iran by the Government of the
Umted States, or any contractor financed by 1t, for use hereunder.
4. To enable the Government of the U mted States to discharge 1ts
responsibilit1es under th1s agreement, the Government of Iran will
1·ece1ve a representat1ve of the Peace Corps and such staff of the
representative and such personnel of Umted States pr1vate orgamzat10ns
performmg functlons hereunder under contract w1th the
Government of the Umted States as are acceptable to the Government
of Iran. The Government of Iran will exempt such persons from all
taxes on mcome den ved from the1r Peace Corps work or sources
011ts1de Iran, and from all other taxes or other charges (including
1mm1gratlon fees) except license fees and taxes or other charges
mcluded m the pr1ces of eqmpment, supplies and servi~. The Government
of Iran will accord the Peace Corps Re.presentatlve and h1s
staff the same treatment w1th respect to the payment of customs duties
or other charges on personal property mtroduced mto Iran for the1r
own use as 1s accorded personnel of comparable rank or grade of the
Embassy of the Umted States .. The Government of Iran will accord
personnel of Umted States pr1vate orgamzations under contract with
the Government of the U mted States the same treatment w1th respect
to the payment of customs duties or other charges on personal property
mtroduoed mto Iran for the1r own use as 1s accorded Volunteers
hereunder.
5. The Government of Iran will exempt from mvestment and depos1t
reqmrements and currency controls all funds mtroduced mto
Iran for use hereunder by the Government of the U mted States or
contractors financed by 1t. Such funds shall be convertible mto currency
of Iran at the h1ghest rate wh1ch 1s not unlawful m Iran.
6. The Peace Corps may ass1gn a phys1C1an to 1ts staff for the
purpose of medical superv1s10n of the Volunteers. In order to carry
out this work the phys1c1an will travel to the areas of Volunteer
ass1gnment. The doctor will be available to work m the Government
medical facilit1es to the extent perm1tted by h1s dut1es w1th the Peace
Corps.
TIAS 7078
435
Annex 11
436 U.S. Tr eaties and Other International Agreements
7 Appropriate representatives of our two Governments may make
from tlme to tlme such arrangements w1th respect to Peace Corps
Volunteers and Peace Corps programs m Iran as appear necessary
or des1rable for the purpose of 1mplementmg th1s agreement. The
undertakmgs of each Government herem are sub3ect to the availability
of funds and to the applicable laws of that Government.
I have the further honor to propose that, 1f these understandings
nre acceptable to your Government, th1s note and your Government's
reply note concurrmg therem shall constitute an agreement between
our two Governments wh1ch shall enter mto force on the date of your
Government's note and shall remam m force until nmety days after
the date of the wntten not1fication from e1ther Government to the
other of intention to termmate rt .
.Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my h1ghest
cons1derat1on.
His Excellency
ABBAS ARAM,
Minuter of Foreign Aff airs,
T ehram.
TI.AB TOT8
J C. HoLMFl!
[22 UST
22 UST} Iran-Peace Corps-Sept. 5 and 16, 1962
The lranianMinUJter of Foreign Aff airs to the Amerwan Amb~sador
l' , . .,1.1,
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TIA8 701'8
437
Annex 11
438 U.S. Treaties and Other lni,emational Agreementa
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TIAS 7078
[22UST
Annex 11
22 UST] Iran- Peaoe Cr>rps- Sept. 6 and 16, 1962
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TI.AS 7078
439
Annex 11
440 U.S. Treatiea and Other International Agreements [22 U8T
XINI.8TRY OJ' l'OIOEION AITAIR8
Nnmber · '180 SEP'I'DoeER 16, 1962
EJ:CZLLENOY
I have the honor to refer to your not.e No. 107, dated September 5,
1962 and to the conve1"8&tlons between repreeentat1ves of our two
C'-rovemments w1th respect to the service of the Peaoe Corps Volunteers
m Iran, and to mform you that the Impenal Govemment of Ira.n
ngrees to the underst.&ndings proposed therem, wh1ch are set forth
below
[FortheEnglish language text,see p. 434.)
This aa,reement shall enter mto force as of the date of tlus note,
and shall remam m force until n1nety days after the da.te of the
wntten not1ficat1on frorn e1ther Govemment to the other of mtent1on
t.o ternunate 1t.
Acoept, Ei:oelleney, the renewed assurance of my h1ghest
cons1deratlon.
AlmA.8 ABOI
His Excellency J uuus HoLJU.a,
Ambaaaad<>rof tke UmtedStatuof À.me,,ca,
Teh~.
TIAS 7078
Annex 11
Annex 12
Annex 12
IRAN
Education: Commission for Cultural Ex change and
Financing of Exchange Programs
Agreement signed ai Tehran October 24, 1963;
Entered into Jorce Octof,er 24, 1963.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT
OF IRAN FOR FINANCING CERTAIN EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE
PROGRAMS
The Government of the United States of America and the Imperia!
Government of Iran :
Desiring to promote further mutual understanding between the
peoples of the United States of America and Iran by a wider exchange
of knowledge and professional talents through educational contacts;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
There shall be established a Commission to be known as the United
States Commission for Cultural Exchange between Iran and the
United States (hereinafter designated "the Commission"), which shall
be recognized by the Government of the United States of America
and the Imperia! Government of Iran as an organization created and
established to facilitate the administration of an educational program
to be financed by funds made available to the Commission by the
Government of the United States of America.
Except as provided in ARTICLE 3 hereof, the Commission shall be
exempt from the domestic and local laws of the United States of
America as they relate to the use and expenditure of the funds for
the purposes set forth in the present Agreement. With regard to the
f.unds and credits, and property acquired by the Commission in
furtherance of the purposes set forth in the present Agreement, the
Imperia! Government of Iran will make available all facilities needed
by the Commission for its successful opera'tion; and, in any event, will
accord treatment not less favorable than the treatment accorded to
similar foreign institutions in Iran.
The funds made available by the Goverument of the United States
of America under the present Agreement, within the conditions and
limitations hereinafter set forth, shall be used by the Commission or
TIAS 5451 (1510)
Annex 12
14 UST] Iran-Education-Oct. 24, 1963
such other instrumentality as may be agreed upon by the Government
of the United States of America and the Imperia! Government of Iran
for the following purposes:
1. Financing studies, research, instruction, and other edticational
activities (i) of or for citizens and nationals of the United States of
America in Iran, and ( ii) of or for natfonals of Iran in American
schools and institutions of learning located in or outside the United
States of America; and
2. Financing visits and interchanges between the United States of
America and Iran of students, trainees, teachers, instructors, and
prof essors; and
3. Financing such other relàted educational and cultural programs
and activities as are provided for in budgets approved in accordance
with ARTICLE 3 hereof.
ARTICLE 2
In furtherance of the aforementioned purposes the Commissiol) may,
subject to the provisions of the present Agreement, exercise all powers
necessary to the carrying out of the purposes of this Agreement,
ihcluding the following:
1. Authorize the Treasurer of the Commission or such other person
as the Commission may designate to open and operate bank accounts
in the Bank Melli Iran in the name of the Commission. The appointment
of the Treasurer or such designee shall be approved by the
Secretary of State. ·
2. Authorize the disbursement of funds and the making of grants
and advances of funds for the approved purposes of this Agreement,
including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance and other
expenses incident thereto.
3. Plàn, adopt and carry out programs in accordance with the
purposes of the present Agreement.
4. Acquire, hold, and dispose of property in the name of the Corn.:.
mission as the Commission may consider necessary or desirable, provided,
however, that the acquisition of any real property shall be
subject to the prevailing rules and regulations of the Imperia}
Government of Iran and prior approval of the Secretary of State.
5. Recommend to the Board of Foreign Scholarships of the United
States of America, students, trainees, professors, research scholars,
teachers, and instructors, resident in Iran, and institutions of Iran
qualified to participate in the programs.
6. Recommend to the aforesaid Board of Foreign Scholarships
such qualifications for the selection of participants in the programs
as it may deem necessary for achieving the purpose and objectives of
this Agreement.
7. Provide for periodic a·udits of the accounts of the Commission
as directed by the auditors selected by the Secretary of State.
'rIAS 5451
1511
Annex 12
1512 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [14 UST
8. Engage an Executive Officer, and administrative and clerical
staff, and fix and pay the salaries and wages thereof and incur other
administrative expenses as may be deemed necessary out of the funds
made available.
9. Administer or assist in administering or otherwise facilitate
educational and cultural programs and activities that further the
purposes of the present Agreement but are not financed by funds
made available under . this Agreement, provided, however, that such
programs and activities and the Commission's role therein shall be
fully described in annual or special reports made to the Secretary of
State and to the Imperia} Government of Iran as provided in ARTICLE
6 hereof, and provided that no objection is interposed by either the
Secretary of State or the Imperia} Government of Iran -to the Commission's
actual or proposed role therein.
ARTICLE 3
All commitments, obligations and expenditures authorized by the
Commission shall be made in accordance with an annual budget, to be
approved by the Secretary of State.
ARTICLE 4
The Commission shall consist of eight members, four of whom shall
be citizens of Iran and the other four citizens of the United States of
America, and they shall serve one year, and shall be eligible for reappointment.
The principal officer in charge of the Diplomatie Mission
of the United States of America to Iran shall be honorary chairman of
.the Commission. He shall have the power of appointment and removal
of the American members,. and may cast the deciding vote in case of a
tie. The Iranian members ·on the Commission shall be appointed and
designated by the Iranian Ministry of Education. A chairman with
voting power shall be selected by the Commission from among its
members. Meetings of the Commission shall not be considered valid
unless at least two Iranian members are pl'esent. The members shall
serve without compensation but the Commission may authorize the
payment of the necessary expenses of the members in attending the
meetings of the Commission. Vacancies created by reason of transfer,
resignation, or otherwise, shall be filled in the same manner as the
original appointment.
ARTICLE 5
The Commission shall adopt such rules and appoint such committees
as it shall deem necessary for the conduct of its affai113.
ARTICLE 6
Reports, prepared in a form and with a content which conform to
the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State, shall be submitted
annually on the activities of the Commission, to the Iranian Ministry
TIAS 5451
Annex 12
14 UST] Iran-Education-Oct. 24, 1963
of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State. Special reports may
be made more often at the discretion of the Commission or at the
request of either the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the
Secretary of State.
ARTICLE 7
The principal office of the Commission shall be in Tehran but meetings
of the Commission and any of its cominittees may be held in such
other places as the Commission may from time to time determine and
the activities of any of the Commission's officers or staff may be carried
on at such places as may be approved by the Commission.
ARTICLE 8
The Government of the United States of America and the Imperial
Government of Iran agree that there may be used for the purposes of
this Agreement any funds, including the equivalent of not less than
$600,000 in the currency of Iran, held or available for expenditure by
the Government of the United States of America for such purposes.
The performance of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability
of appropriations to the Secretary of State when required by
the laws of the United States of America.
ARTICLE 9
Whenever in the present Agreement the term "Secretary of State"
is used, it shal1 be understood to mean the Secretary of State of the
United States of America or any officer or employee of the Government
of the United States of America designâted by him to act in his
behalf.
ARTICLE 10
The present Agreement may be amended by the ex change of di plomatic
notes between the Government of the United States of America
and the Imperia} Government of Iran.
ARTICLE 11
The Government of the United States of America and the Imperia!
Government of Iran shall make every effort to facilitate the carrying
out of the present Agreement and to resolve the problems which may
arise in the operation thereof.
United States citizens employed by the Commission, United States
grantees engaged in educational and cultural activities and accompanying
members of their families shall be exempt from Iranian
income taxes, duties or other charges as follows:
A.. The Commission shall be entitled to import up to three vehicles
which shall be exempt from customs duties and other taxes for three
years. Should the Commission, after the expiration of the above-
98-886 0-6~-17 TIAS 5451
1513
Annex 12
1514 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [14 UST
mentioned period, decide to sell such vehicles it should pay the due
taxes and customs duties at the current rate.
B. The Commission may import free from customs duties, directly
or indirectly, needed cigarettes, alcoholic liquors and foodstu:ffs in
such quantity as authorized for a head of Diplomatie Mission, as
determined by the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign
A:ffairs.
C. United States citizens employed by the Commission and United
States grantees, as well as the accompanying members of their families,
shall be exempt from income taxes and other similar taxes with respect
of salaries and allowances received from the funds of the Commission.
Income derived from any other Iranian source shall be subject to
current Iranian rules and regulations.
D. United States citizens employed by the Commission and United
States grantees shall not need work permits to obtain or renew
residence permits.
ARTICLE 12
The present Agreement supersedes the Agreement between the Government
of the United States of America and the Imperial Government
of Iran signed at Tehran on September 1, 1949, as amended.[1]
The present Agreement shall corne into force upon the date of
signature.
IN wrTNEss WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly
authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present
Agreement.
DoNE this 24th day of October, 1963, in duplicate at Tehran, in the
English and Persian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STA.TES OF AMERICA..
J C HoLMES
Julius C. Holmes
A.mbassador of the United
States of A merioa
Tehran
[SEAL]
FOR THE IMPERIAL
GOVERNMENT OF IRA.N.
A.A.RAM
Abbas Aram
Minister of Foreign A.ffairs
1 TIA.S 1973, 3956, 4824; 63 Stat. (pt. 3) 2685; 8 UST 2393; 12 UST 1127.
TIA.S 5451
14 UST] Iran-Education-Oct. 24, 1963 1515
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1518 U.S. 'Preaties and Other I nternational Agreements
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1520 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements
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TIAS 5451
[14 UST
14 UST] Iran-Education-Oct. 24, 1963
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TlAS 5451
1521
Annex 12
1522 U.S. Treaties and Other I nternational Agreemeriis
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TIAS M~l
[14 UST
Annex 12
Annex 13
Annex 13
MULTILATERAL
Declaration Respecting the Baghdad Pact
Signed at Lond-On July 28, 1958;
Entered into force July 28, 1958.
Declaration
1. The members of the Baghdad Pact [1] attending the Ministerial
meeting in London have re-examined tbeir position in the light
of recent events and conclude that the need which called the Pact
into being is greater than ever. These members declare their
determination to maintain their collective security and to resist
aggression, direct or indirect.
2. Under the Pact collective security arrangements have been
instituted. Joint military planning bas been advanced and area
economic projects have been promoted. Relationships are being
established with other free world nations associated for collective
security.
3. The question of whether substantive alterations should be
made in the Pact and its organisation or whether the Pact will
be continued in its present form is under consideration by the
Governments concerned. However, the nations represented at
the meeting in London reaflirmed their determination to strengthen
further their united defence posture in the area.
4. Article 1 of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad
on February 24, 1955 Pl provides that the parties will cooperate
for tbeir security and defence and that such measures
as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form
the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United States
in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional
authorization, agrees to co-operate with the nations
making this Declaration for their security and def ence, and will
promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this
co-operation.
1 British Command 9429, Miscellaneous No. 5 (1955).
23596 0-59.---69 (1077) TIAS 4084
Annex 13
1078 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [9 UST
Made and signed at Lancaster House, London, on the twentyeighth
day of July, 1958, in five copies.
For the United States of America
JoHN FosTER DuLLES
For Iran
M EGHBAL
For Pakistan
Frnoz Ki:.uN N ooN
For Turkey
A. MENDERES
For the United Kingdom of Grellt Britain
and N orthern Ireland
HAROLD MACMILLAN
TlAS 4084
Annex 14
Annex 14
IRAN
Cooperation
Agreement signed at Ankara March 5, 1959;
Enlered into force March 5, 1959.
AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN
The Government of the United States of America and the Imperia!
Government of Iran,
Desiring to implement the Decla.ration in which they associated
themselves at London on July 28, 1958; [1]
Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Coopera.tion
signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, [2] the parties signatory
thereto agreed to cooperate for their security and defense, and that,
simila.rly, as sta.ted in the above-mentioned Declaration, the Government
of the United States of America, in. the interest of world peace,
agreed to coopera.te with the Governments making tha.t Declaration
for their security and defense;
Reca.lling that, in the above-mentioned Decla.ration, the members of
the Pact of Mutual . Cooperation making tha.t Declara.tion affirmed
their determination to maintain their collective security a.nd to resist
aggression, direct or indirect;
Considering further that the Government of the United States of
America. is associated with the work of the. major committees of the
Pact of Mutua.l Coopera.tion signed a.t Baghdad on February 24, 1955;
Desiring to strengthen pea.ce in accordance with the principles of
theCharterof the United Nations; [5]
Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
Considering that the Government of the United Sta.tes of America.
regards as vital to its na.tiona.l interest and to worl'd peace the preservation
of the independence and integrity of Iran;
1 TIAS 4084; 9 UST 1077.
• British Command 9429, Mlscellaneous No. 5 (1955).
1 TS 993; 59 Stat. 1031.
TIAS 4189 (314)
Annex 14
10 UST] Iran-Cooperation-Mar. 5, 1959
Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance
granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress
of the United States of America in the Mutunl Security Act
of 1954, [1
] as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace
and Stnbility in the Middle East; [2] and
Considering that similnr agreements are being entered into by the
Government of the United States of America and the Governments
of Turkey and Pakistan, respectively,
Have agreed as follows :
. ARTICLE I
The Imperia} Government of Iran is determined to resist nggression.
In case of aggression ngainst Iran, the Government of the United
States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United -
States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the
use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged
in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in
the Middle East, in order to nssist the Government of Iran at its
request.
ARTICLE II
The Government of the United States of America, in accordance
with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws
of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements
heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Irnn, reaffirms that
it will continue to furnish the Government of Iran such military and
economic assistance as may be. mutually agreed upon between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Iran, in order to assist the Government of Iran in the preservation of
its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion
of its economic development.
ARTICLE III
The Iniperial Government of Iran undertakes to utilize such military
and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government
of the United States of America in a manner consonant with the aims
and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration
signed nt London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of
effectively promoting the economic development of Iran and of preserving
its national in<lependence and integrity.
1 68 Stat. 832; 22 U.S.C. § 1751 note.
1 71 Stat. 5; 22 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1965.
TIAS 4189
315
Annex 14
316 U. S. Treaties ar,,d Other International Agreements [10 UST
ARTICLE IV
The Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Iran will cooperate with the other Governments associated
in the Declaration signed at London on J uly 28, 1958, in order to
prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be
mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable
provisions of this agreement.
ARTICLE V
The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the cooperation
between the two Governments as envisaged in other international
agreements or arrangements.
ARTICLE VI
This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature
and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either
Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government
to terminate the agreement.
Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.
FOR THE GOVER~MENT OF THE
UNITED STA'IES OF AMERICA:
FLETCHER 'lV ARR EN.
Fletcher vVarren
[SEAL]
FOR THE UiPERIAL GOVERNMENT
OF IRAN:
Général HASSAN ARFA
General Hassan Arfa
[SEAL]
TIAS 4189
Annex 15
Annex 15
IRAN
Remote Sensing: Acquisition of Satellite Data
Memorandum of understanding signed at Washington and
Tehran Ju.ly 25 and October 29, 1974;
Entered into force October 29, 1974.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PLAN
AND BUDGET ORGANIZATION OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT
OF IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
1. The purposes of thîs agreement are t.9 set forth the responsibilities
of the parties and the procedures for providing for (a) direct
access, by a ground station to be built and operated in Iran by The
Plan rmd Budget Organîzation, to NASA ERTS-1 and ERTS-B
satellite data and to the data from any future ERTS experimental
satellites which NASA may launcli, and (b) avi\ilability to NASA of
data acquired by the lranian station pursuant to (a) above, subject
to the provisions which follow.
2. For its part, the Plan and Budget Organization will use its best
efforts to:
(a) Develop and opernte a fncility in the Greater Tehran Arca
for acquisition and processing of ERTS data as well as other data of
interest to the Plan and Budget Organization entirely at its own cost,
including the cost of the necessal'y communication links with the
NASA ERTS OCC/NDPF (Operations Control Center/NASA Data
Processing Facility) at the Goddard Space Flight Center.
(b) Provide during Phase B, as described below, processed data
to ERTS Principal lnvestigators duly selected by NASA whose test
sites are in range of the Iranian data acquisition station for the period
of coverage promised to them and under the same condit.ions as NASA
provides data to Principal lnvestigators. Should another country in
the region establish ERTS focilities, the Plan and Budget Organizntion's
obligation to provide data to Principal lnvestigators in that
country will terminnte as soon as the new facilities are capable of providing
this service. The Plim and Budget Organization will continue
to serve Principal Investigators in countries within range of the
Tehran station which do not have ERTS focilitics unless and until
alternative arrangements are concluded.
TIAS 8203 (2936)
Annex 15
26 UST] I ran-Remote Sensing-1u1
y
25
'
1974
Oct. 29, 1074
(c) Provide, to the best of its ability, any support requested by
NASA in a spacecraft emergency condition, such as the provision of
data indicated in paragraph 2(e) below should the on-board tape
record ers f ail.
(d) Provide quarterly reports in English t.o NASA on the progress
and results of the Plan and Budget Organization's experimental
program with respect especially to the ability to apply data and
analyses obtained to real-time decision niaking, and the principal
applications made.
(e) Make available to NASA, on a cost-free basis and in the
NASA-preferred format (negative imagery format with identifying
annotation) such copies of the ERTS datait acquire::; and processes
as NASA may request in reasonable quantities (except in emergency
conditions as no ted in paragra ph 2 ( c) above). The se data provided
to NASA by the Plan and Budget Organization will be made available
to the public from U.S. sources on precisely the same terms as data
acquired directly by NASA. These provisions apply as well to selected
duplicate compatible tapes. Public requests (for data) from the
area covered by the Tehran station will be referred as appropria.te
to the Plan and Budget Organization or to other regional facilities
which may be established in the area. Coordination among
such facilitics would be highly desirable.
(f) Include as output data from the Tehran station Computer
Compatible Tapes (CCT's) and 70mm roll film.
3. For its part, NASA will use its best efforts to:
(a) Program ERTS-1 and any subsequent experimental ERTStype
satellites to acquire data in areas accessible for direct read-out
by the Iranian station. The frequency of such programming will be
subject to mutual agreement by the Project Managers (see below).
It will be limited to test purposes in Phase A and expanded as agreed
in Phase B.
(b) Provide to the Plan and Budget Organization as necessary
antenna pointing clements for acquisition of the ERTS spacecraft
transmitted signal and updated definitive orbital information for use
in processing the da ta.
(c) Process, on time-available basis and as may be agreed by
the Project :rv1anagers, a, limitcd number of data tapes acquircd by the
Irnnian station in Phase A for initial evaluntion and calibration of the
station's performance.
(cl) Provide, during Phase A, ERTS data to any NASA-sclected
Iraninn Principal Investigators to the cxtent of the time-coverage
promise cl for them.
(e) Make twailablc, for comparison purposes, a limited number
of sclected NASA data tapes covcring portions of the arca accessible
to the Tehrnn station.
(f) Kccp the Plan and Budget Orgunizat,ion informcd of other
prospective ERTS facilities in the area so that rcgional co9rdination
can be effected.
TIAS 8203
2937
Annex 15
2938 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements ( 26 UST
4. The course of the project will be divided into two phases. Phase
A is for the test and checkout of the Tehran station. Phase B is for
the following period of routine data acquisition and processing at the
Tehran station. Phase A will begin when the Project Managers agree
on the readiness of the technical and operational interfaces required
to carry out the project and on a schedule for accomplishing Phase A
and B. Phase A will be concluded and Phase B begun by mutual
agreement of the Project Managers.
5. To implement the agreement, the Plan and Budget Organization
and NASA will each designate Project Managers to be responsible
for coordinating the agreed fonctions and responsibilities of each side
with the other. The Project Managers will be co-chairman of a Joint
Working Group (JWG) which will be the principal instrument for
assuring the execution of the project and for keeping both sides
continuously informed of the project status. The Joint Working Group
may establish such committees as required to carry out the project.
6. The following additional understandings are confirmed:
(a) The Plan and Budget Organization will resolve any radio
frequency difficulties in the region to the satisfaction of the parties
concerned so this cooperation can proceed without difficulty.
(b) The responsibility for spacecraft control, health and status
will remain with NASA throughout the program.
(c) There will be no exchange of funds betweèn the Plan and
Budget Organization and NASA for ERTs..:..1 operations. This agreement
assures the Plan lind Budget Organizat.ion access to the ERTS-B
satellite throughout its design life of one year without charge by NASA.
It is understood, however, that NASA may thereafter establish some
cost-sharing arrangement, such as users' fces, for participating ground
stations.
(d) It is understood at this stage that NASA cannot make a
firm commitment for future ERTS-type satellites.
(e) Decisions taken by the International Tclecommunications
Union require that radio frequencies for future operational ERTS
satellites will differ from those currently used for cxperimental satellites.
(f) It is understood that the Plan and Budget Organization and
the other Iranian agencie~ participating in the program will pursue an
ERTS open-data policy comparable to that of NASA and other U.S.
agencies participating in the program, particularly with respect to the
public availability of data. The Plan and Budget Organization will thus
ensure unrestricted public availability of the earth resources satellite
data at a fair and reasonable charge based on actual cost.
(g) Training and exchange of technical personnel will take place
as mutually agreed.
(h) The Plan and Budget Organization and NASA will frecly
share and exchange data and technical information as mutually agreed
and consistent with the laws and regulations of the two countries.
TIAS 8203
Annex 15
26 UST] I ran-Re:mote Sensing-1u1
y
25
•
1974
Oct. 29, 1974
(i) It is understood that this project is experimental in charncter
and subject to change in accordance with changes in technical requirements
and opportunities.
(j) The Plan and Budget Organization and NASA rnay eacb
release general information to the public regarding the conduct of
their own portion of the project as desired and, insofar as participation
of the other agency is concerned, after sui table coordination.
(k) The Plan and Budget Organization and NASA will assure
that the project is appropriately recorded in still and motion picture
photography and that the photography is made available to the
other agency upon rcquest for public information purposes.
(l) It is undcrstood that the ability of the Plan and Budget
Organization and NASA to carry out the responsibilities of this a.greemcnt
is subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
7. This l\.1emorandum of Understan<ling shall enter into force upon
signature by the Plan and Budget Organization and NASA and shall
continue in force for four yea1·s, subject to extension ns may be agreed
by the Plan and Budget Organization and NASA.
FOR THE PLAN AND BUDGET
ORGANIZATION
A. M. MAJIDI
A. M. Majidi, Minister of
State and Director of the
Plan and Budget Organization
Date Oct. 29, 1974
FOR THE NATION AL
AERON.A UTICS AND SPA CE
ADMINISTRATION
JAMES C. FLETCHER
James C. Fletcher
Administrator
Date 7125/7 4
RICHARD HELMS
Richard Helms, Ambassador
TIAS 8203
2939
Annex 16
Annex 16
IRAN
Civil Emergency Preparedness
Memorandum of understanding signed at Tehran November
22, 1975;
Entered into force November 22, 1975.
(3031) TIAS 8209
Annex 16
3032 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements
PREAMBLE
Memorandum of Understanding
Between the
Government of Iran
Imperia! Iranian Army
and the
Goverrunent of the
United States of America
General Services Administration
Federal Preparedness Agency
[ 26 UST
Throughout late 1974 and 1975, representatives of the
Supreme Commander's Staff, Imperia! Iranian Army, Government
of Iran, and the Federal Preparedness Agency, General
Services Administration, Government of the United States
of America, have conducted a series of exchanges concerning
a program of cooperation between the Imperial Iranian Armed
Forces and the Federal Preparedness Agency that would provide
advisory technical assistance to the Imperia! Iranian
Armed Forces in organizing a11· aspects of its civil emergency
preparedness capability.
I . PURPOSE OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Under this Memorand~m of Understanding between the
Government of Iran, Imperia! Iranian Army, hereinafter
referred to as the IIA, and the Government of the United
States of America , General Services Administration, Federal
Preparedness Agency, hereinafter referred to as the FPA,
the FPA will provide advisory technical assistance in the
form of consultants to the IIA in several emergency preparedness
areas, to include the fields of mobilization , national
readiness, and non-military defense, comprising, overall,
the civil emergency preparedness capability of the Government
of Iran .
II . SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED
The FPA is prepared to share its experience and place
it at the disposal of the IIA and to assign the requisite
temporary duty consultative personnel to a study/working
group chaired by an Iranian official and consisting of
personnel of both nationalities, organized by and under
the direct guidance and supervision of the Supreme Commander's
staff. The purpose of the study/working group will be to:
TIAS 8209
Annex 16
'26 UST] Iran-Disaster Assist.-Nov. 22, 1975
(1) develop a clear conceptual statement of the
overall mission to be accomplished in all aspects of
civil emergency preparedness (CEP);
(2) develop an organizational structure to carry
out the mission;
(3) review the basic CEP tasks to be assigned to
specific offices, ministries and agencies and recommend
modifications to existing agencies, as appropriate;
(4) develop clear guidelines governing the relationships
between elements of the government concerned with
CEP to include the kind and degree of authority needed to
coordinate and implement the total CEP effort;
(5) assess the adequacy of existing authorities to
deal with all potential contingencies, review the delegations
of authority for compatibility with organizational
arrangements and recommend modification , as appropriate;
(6) recommend an approach to personnel requirements
and training to carry out CEP functions;
(7) outline a definitive time-phased program for
the development of an effective CEP capability to include
implementation of the measures proposed.
The FPA will provide the n.ecessary technically
competent personnel (estimated to be 30 man months) to be
integrated into the lranian -directed study/working group.
Consultants are expected to be thoroughly familiar with
the CEP operations of the FPA, the Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration.
·
The IIA will organize a study/working group consist ing
of personnel of both nationalities and will provide
overall policy guidance and operating instructions directly
to the study/working group .
III. PERSONNEL
To provide the foregoing services, the FPA expects
to assign personnel for a total of thirty man months,
whose combined qualifications will include expertise in the
following areas: national security affairs; continuity of
3033
TIAS 8209
Annex 16
3034 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements [ 26 UST
government; economic evàluation; resource management; disaster
relief; and civil defense. The numbers of personnel assigned
to Iran at any one time is expected to approximate the thirty
man months figure .
IV. ESTIMATED COSTS
Estimated costs associated with the advisory technical
assistance, as discussed with the IIA, total $171,384 . 80 and
are broken down as follows: salaries (six months basis),
$83,000; transportation (to and from Iran and in-country), .
$20,000; per diem, $49,500; incidental costs (rental of in country
transportation, with driver. etc .), $15,000; pretrip
preparations, $3,884.80.
These are the best estimates that the FPA can develop
at this time. They may be more çr less than the actual
expenses which the consultants may entail as part of the
group composed of both U. S. and Iranian nationals partici·
pating in the Iranian-dir~cted planning effort.
All expenses incurred in the performance of services
in connection with the advisory tech~ical assistance program
which are to be performed by the FPA will be paid or reimbursed
by the IIA. Such expenses shall include cost of salaries,
transportation and traveling expenses, and all other properly
reimbursable expenses incurred in the performance of such
services. All such expenses incurred and reimbursement
claimed will be in accordance with applicable United States
statutes and regulations.
The compensation of consultative personnel will include
salary or fee applicable at the time of payment of the same,
per diem as prescribed oy applicable United States statutes
and regulations in force at the time of payment of the same,
and travel expenses from point of residence to Iran and
return.
If expenses exceed the estimated figures, the IIA will
be expected to defray them, since the FPA is merely provid·
ing consultants and a mechanism through which payments to
the consultants are made.
TIAS 8209
Annex 16
26 UST] Iran-Disaster Assist.-Nov. 22, 1975
V. METHOD OP REIMBURSEMENT FOR COSTS
The compensation for all services provided to the IIA
in connection with this Memorandum of Understanding will
be pa id by the FPA from funds advanced by the IIA. The
IIA will provide the amount of the estimated costs, or one
hundred seventy-one thousand, three hundred eighty-four
and eighty one-hundredths dollars (Dols. 171,384.80), by
means of a bank draft in U. S. dollars, payable to the
Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration.
The FPA will create a dollar working fund in this
amount and will control disbursements from this fund in
accordance with this Memorandum of Understanding. The FPA
will also provide the IIA with periodic reports on the
status of the account .
The IIA will replenish the working fund, upon the
request of the , FPA and the agreement of the IIA, should
costs incurred to the date of the request plus estimated
costs required to complete the advisory technical assistance
program exceed the amount already advanced by the IIA.
Any such requests will be accompanied by itemized
statements setting forth all expenditures made from the
fund which have not been reported in any previous itemized
statement and by such supporting documents as the IIA may
reasonably request. The amount of any such replenishment
shall equal the amount by which the total of costs to date
plus estimated costs to completion exceeds the amount
previously advanced. If the IIA does not agree to a requested
replenishment, the FPA is not obligated to provide the services
estimated to be necessary to· complete the advisory technical
assistance program and will be reimbursed for any uncovered
costs incurred prior to or because of termination .
Promptly following the last expenditure from the dollar
working fund and completion of· the advisory technical
assistance program, the FPA will submit a final itemized
statement ~etting out all expenditures made from the fund
which have not been reported in any previous itemized
statement and will return to the IIA any balance remaining
in the fund after such last expenditure.
TIAS 8209
3035
Annex 16
3036 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements
VI. EXEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITIES
The IIA agrees to hold the FPA and the Government of
the United States of America harmless agains t any and all
claims that may arise as a result of the technical services
furnished under this Memorandum of Understanding.
The IÏA will . on the basis of existing laws , cause the
appropriate authorities of the Government of Iran to grant
to American personnel assigned to Iran in connection with
this advisory technical assistance program exemption from
all Iranian taxes. In the absence of such exemption, the
IIA will pay all such Iranian taxes as may be assessed.
VII. LOCAL SERVICES IN IRAN
(26 UST
The IIA will provide the following local services , to
the extent necessary for the performance of the services
envisioned in this Memorandum of Understanding, to personnel
assigned in Iran in connection with the advisory technical
services -program: necessary office space and facilities;
secretarial -clerical, translating, and other local office
help; transportation for official business; assistance in
obtaining any necessary local permits , licenses, et cetera;
and other logistical support.
VI II. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into
effect on the date upon which it has been signed by the
Iranian Deputy Minister of War for the Imperial Iranian
Army and the Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency,
General Services Administration, and will remain i n f orce
until December 30, 1976. It may be renewed, amended, or
extended by the mutual consent of the parti es ther·eto.
The Memorandum of Understanding may be terminated by
either party thereto on sixty-days written .notice; such
termination will not, however, impair any obligations or
commitments properly incurred under it by either party up
to and including the èffective date of termination.
TIAS 8209
26 UST) l ran-Disaster Assist.-Nov. ~2, 1975
United States of America
General Services Administration
Federal Preparedness Agency
Government of Iran
Imperial Iranian Army
3037
TIAS 8209
Annex 16
Annex 17
Annex 17
IRAN
Tecbnical Cooperation
Agreement signed at Washington MQrch 4, 1975;
Entered into force April 5, 1976.
(975) TIAS 8235
Annex 17
976
r
U.S. Treaties and Other I nternational Agreements
AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN
The Government of the United States of
America, and the Imperial Government of Iran,
Desiring to expand and strengthen their
friendly relations,
Confirming their mutual interest in the
expansion of econornic cooperation between the
two countries ,
Recognizing the importance of technical
cooperation for the expansion of economic
relations, and
Wishing to create the most appropriate
conditions for the development of technical
cooperation,
Have agreed as follows:
TIAS 8235
[ 27 UST
Annex 17
27 UST] Iran-Technical Cooperation- M ar. 4, 1975
Article 1
The Contracting Parties undertake to
develop technical cooperation, on the basis of
mutual respect for sovereignty and noninterference
in each other's domestic affairs.
Article 2
Technical cooperation as mentioned in
Article 1 shall cover a wide variety of economic
activities including industry , agriculture,
social affairs, and the developrnent of infrastr
ucture, and may take the forrn of furnishing
technical and training services, advisory
personnel and the supply of related comrnodities
and facilities, for the irnplementation of
joint projects, as may be mutually agreed
between the contracting Parties .
Article 3
The contracting Parties shall adopt
mutually agreeable administrative, organizational
and staff arrangements to facilitate
irnplementation of this Agreement,
Article 4
The Contracting Parties or their agencies
...
or ministries may enter into specific agreements
to implement technical cooperation
described in Article 2.
TIAS 8235
977
Annex 17
978 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements
Article 5
The implementation agreements described
in Article 4 will contain, inter alia, standard
provisions on:
A. Advance payment, as rnutually agreed
upon for costs incurred in the
technical cooperation described in
Article 2 including costs of project
development, prograrn implementa ti.on,
administrative and staff support and
project termination;
B. Privileges and imrnunities, when
applicable, of personnel assigned to
engage in such technical cooperation
in the territory of the other
Contracting Party; and
c. Claims arising from such technical
cooperation.
Article 6
When requested by either Contracting Party,
representatives of both Contract.ing Parties
shall meet to review progress t~ward achieving
the purposes of this Agreement, and to negotiate
solutions to any outstanding problems.
TIAS 8235
[27 UST
27 UST] lran-Technical Cooperation-Mar. 4, 1975
Article 7
This Agreement shall be inapplicable t o
agreements and transactions relating to the
sale of defense articles and services by the
Governroent of the United States to the Imperial
Government of Iran ,
Article 8
This Agreement shall enter into force on
the date of an exchange of notes confirming this
fact between the Contracting Parties . [
1
]
Article 9
This Agreement shall remain in effect for
five years from the date it enters into force,
sub j ect to revision or extension, as mutually
agreed, and may be terminated at any tirne by
e i ther Contracting Party by one hundred and
eighty days ' advance notice in writing.
Done in Washington in dupl icate on March 4,
1975 , both origi nals heing equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:
!--, I
FOR THE IM1?ERIAL GOVERNHENT OF I RAN:
1 Ap,r. 5, 1976.
, He.nry A. l{lssinger
3 Hushang Ansa.ry
979
TIA:S 8285
Annex 17
ALGIERS ACCORDS
January 19, 1981
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
The Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, having been
requested by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America
to serve as an intermediary in seeking a mutually acceptable resolution of the crisis in their
relations arising out of the detention of the 52 United States nationals in Iran, has consulted
extensively with the two governments as to the commitments which each is willing to make in
order to resolve the crisis within the framework of the four points stated in the resolution of
November 2, 1980, of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran. On the basis of formal
adherences received from Iran and the United States, the Government of Algeria now declares
that the following interdependent commitments have been made by the two governments:
General Principles
The undertakings reflected in this Declaration are based on the following general
principles:
A. Within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the United States will restore
the financial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14,
1979.In this context, the United States commits itself to ensure the mobility and free transfer of
all Iranian assets within its jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9.
B. It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and pursuant to the
provisions of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria, to terminate all litigation as between the Government of each party and the nationals
of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding
arbitration. Through the procedures provided in the Declaration, relating to the Claims
Settlement Agreement, the United States agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in United
States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state
enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further
litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through
binding arbitration.
Point I: Non-Intervention in Iranian Affairs
1. The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United
States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs.
Annex 18
Annex 18
Points II and III: Return of Iranian Assets and Settlement of U.S. Claims
2. Iran and the United States (hereinafter "the parties") will immediately select a
mutually agreeable central bank (hereinafter "the Central Bank") to act, under the instructions of
the Government of Algeria and the Central Bank of Algeria (hereinafter "The Algerian Central
Bank") as depositary of the escrow and security funds hereinafter prescribed and will promptly
enter into depositary arrangements with the Central Bank in accordance with the terms of this
declaration. All funds placed in escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this declaration shall
be held in an account in the name of the Algerian Central Bank. Certain procedures for
implementing the obligations set forth in this Declaration and in the Declaration of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the settlement of claims by the
Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(hereinafter "the Claims Settlement Agreement") are separately set forth in certain Undertakings
of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.
3. The depositary arrangements shall provide that, in the event that the Government of
Algeria certifies to the Algerian Central Bank that the 52 U.S. nationals have safely departed
from Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the Central Bank to transfer
immediately all monies or other assets in escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this
declaration, provided that at any time prior to the making of such certification by the
Government of Algeria, each of the two parties, Iran and the United States, shall have the right
on seventy-two hours notice to terminate its commitments under this declaration.
If such notice is given by the United States and the foregoing certification is made by the
Government of Algeria within the seventy-two hour period of notice, the Algerian Central Bank
will thereupon instruct the Central Bank to transfer such monies and assets. If the seventy-two
hour period of notice by the United States expires without such a certification having been made,
or if the notice of termination is delivered by Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon
instruct the Central Bank to return all such monies and assets to the United States, and thereafter
the commitments reflected in this declaration shall be of no further force and effect.
Assets in the Federal Reserve Bank
4 Commencing upon completion of the requisite escrow arrangements with the Central
Bank, the United States will bring about the transfer to the Central Bank of all gold bullion
which is owned by Iran and which is in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
together with all other Iranian assets (or the cash equivalent thereof) in the custody of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until such time as
their transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3 above.
Assets in Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks
5. Commencing upon the completion of the requisite escrow arrangements with the
Annex 18
Central Bank, the United States will bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, to the account
of the Algerian Central Bank, of all Iranian deposits and securities which on or after November
14, 1979, stood upon the books of overseas banking offices of U.S. banks, together with interest
thereon through December 31, 1980, to be held by the Central Bank, to the account of the
Algerian Central Bank, in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required in
accordance with Paragraph 3 of this Declaration.
Assets in U.S. Branches of U.S. Banks
6. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to this declaration and
the claims settlement agreement attached hereto, and following the conclusion of arrangements
with the Central Bank for the establishment of the interest-bearing security account specified in
that agreement and Paragraph 7 below, which arrangements will be concluded within 30 days
from the date of this Declaration, the United States will act to bring about the transfer to the
Central Bank, within six months from such date, of all Iranian deposits and securities in U.S.
banking institutions in the United States, together with interest thereon, to be held by the Central
Bank in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3.
7. As funds are received by the Central Bank pursuant to Paragraph 6 above, the Algerian
Central Bank shall direct the Central Bank to (1) transfer one- half of each such receipt to Iran
and (2) place the other half in a special interest-bearing security account in the Central Bank,
until the balance in the security account has reached the level of $1 billion. After the $1 billion
balance has been achieved, the Algerian Central Bank shall direct all funds received pursuant to
Paragraph 6 to be transferred to Iran. All funds in the security account are to be used for the sole
purpose of securing the payment of, and paying, claims against Iran in accordance with the
claims settlement agreement. Whenever the Central Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the
balance in the security account has fallen below $500 million, Iran shall promptly make new
deposits sufficient to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the account. The account
shall be so maintained until the President of the Arbitral Tribunal established pursuant to the
claims settlement agreement has certified to the Central Bank of Algeria that all arbitral awards
against Iran have been satisfied in accordance with the claims settlement agreement, at which
point any amount remaining in the security account shall be transferred to Iran.
Other Assets in the U.S. and Abroad
8. Commencing with the adherence of Iran and the United States to this declaration and
the attached claims settlement agreement and the conclusion of arrangements for the
establishment of the security account, which arrangements will be concluded within 30 days
from the date of this Declaration, the United States will act to bring about the transfer to the
Central Bank of all Iranian financial assets (meaning funds or securities) which are located in the
United States and abroad, apart from those assets referred to in Paragraph 5 and 6 above, to be
held by the Central Bank in escrow until their transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3
above.
Annex 18
9. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to this declaration and
the attached claims settlement agreement and the making by the Government of Algeria of the
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will arrange, subject to the
provisions of U.S. law applicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all
Iranian properties which are located in the United States and abroad and which are not within the
scope of the preceding paragraphs.
Nullification of Sanctions and Claims
10. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will revoke all trade sanctions which were directed against
Iran in the period November 4, 1979, to date.
11. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will promptly withdraw all claims now pending against
Iran before the International Court of Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude the prosecution
against Iran of any pending or future claim of the United States or a United States national
arising out of events occurring before the date of this declaration related to (A) the seizure of the
52 United States nationals on November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention, (C) injury to
United States property or property of the United States nationals within the United States
Embassy compound in Tehran after November 3, 1979, and (D) injury to the United States
nationals or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran. The United States will also
bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran in the courts of the United States of any pending or
future claim asserted by persons other than the United States nationals arising out of the events
specified in the preceding sentence.
Point IV: Return of the Assets of the Family of the Former Shah
12. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property and assets
in the United States within the control of the estate of the former Shah or of any close relative of
the former Shah served as a defendant in U.S. litigation brought by Iran to recover such property
and assets as belonging to Iran. As to any such defendant, including the estate of the former
Shah, the freeze order will remain in effect until such litigation is finally terminated. Violation of
the freeze order shall be subject to the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S. law.
13. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will order all persons within U.S. jurisdiction to report to
the U.S. Treasury within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all information known to them, as of
November 3, 1979, and as of the date of the order, with respect to the property and assets
referred to in Paragraph 12. Violation of the requirement will be subject to the civil and criminal
penalties prescribed by U.S. law.
Annex 18
14. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will make known, to all appropriate U.S. courts, that in any
litigation of the kind described in Paragraph 12 above the claims of Iran should not be
considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity principles or by the act of state doctrine
and that Iranian decrees and judgments relating to such assets should be enforced by such courts
in accordance with United States law.
15. As to any judgment of a U.S. court which calls for the transfer of any property or
assets to Iran, the United States hereby guarantees the enforcement of the final judgment to the
extent that the property or assets exist within the United States.
16. If any dispute arises between the parties as to whether the United States has fulfilled
any obligation imposed upon it by Paragraphs 12-15, inclusive, Iran may submit the dispute to
binding arbitration by the tribunal established by, and in accordance with the provisions of, the
claims settlement agreement. If the tribunal determines that Iran has suffered a loss as a result of
a failure by the United States to fulfill such obligation, it shall make an appropriate award in
favor of Iran which may be enforced by Iran in the courts of any nation in accordance with its
laws.
Settlement of Disputes
17. If any other dispute arises between the parties as to the interpretation or performance
of any provision of this declaration, either party may submit the dispute to binding arbitration by
the tribunal established by, and in accordance with the provisions of, the claims settlement
agreement. Any decision of the tribunal with respect to such dispute, including any award of
damages to compensate for a loss resulting from a breach of this declaration or the claims
settlement agreement, may be enforced by the prevailing party in the courts of any nation in
accordance with its laws.
Annex 18
UNDERTAKINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WITH RESPECT
TO THE DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND
POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
1. At such time as the Algerian Central Bank notifies the Governments of Algeria, Iran,
and the United States that it has been notified by the Central Bank that the Central Bank has
received for deposit in dollar, gold bullion, and securities accounts in the name of the Algerian
Central Bank, as escrow agent, cash and other funds, 1,632,917.779 ounces of gold (valued by
the parties for this purpose at $0.9397 billion), and securities (at face value) in the aggregate
amount of $7.955 billion, Iran shall immediately bring about the safe departure of the 52 U.S.
nationals detained in Iran. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification
described in Paragraph 3 of the Declaration, the Algerian Central Bank will issue the instructions
required by the following paragraph.
2. Iran having affirmed its intention to pay all its debts and those of its controlled
institutions, the Algerian Central Bank acting pursuant to Paragraph 1 above will issue the
following instructions to the Central Bank:
(A) To transfer $3.667 billion to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pay the
unpaid principal of and interest through December 31, 1980 on
(1) all loans and credits made by a syndicate of banking institutions, of which a
U.S. banking institution is a member, to the Government of Iran, its agencies,
instrumentalities or controlled entities, and
(2) all loans and credits made by such a syndicate which are guaranteed by the
Government of Iran or any of its agencies, instrumentalities or controlled entities.
(B) To retain $1.418 billion in the escrow account for the purpose of paying the unpaid
principal of the interest owing, if any, on the loans and credits referred to in Paragraph
(A) after application of the $3.667 billion and on all other indebtedness held by United
States banking institutions of, or guaranteed by, the Government of Iran, its agencies,
instrumentalities or controlled entities not previously paid and for the purpose of paying
disputed amounts of deposits, assets, and interests, if any, owing on Iranian deposits in
U.S. banking institutions. Bank Markazi and the appropriate United States banking
institutions shall promptly meet in an effort to agree upon the amounts owing.
In the event of such agreement, the Bank Markazi and the appropriate banking institution
shall certify the amount owing to the Central Bank of Algeria which shall instruct the Bank of
England to credit such amount to the account, as appropriate, of the Bank Markazi or of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to permit payment to the appropriate banking
institution. In the event that within 30 days any U.S. banking institution and the Bank Markazi
are unable to agree upon the amounts owed, either party may refer such dispute to binding
Annex 18
arbitration by such international arbitration panel as the parties may agree, or failing such
agreement within 30 additional days after such reference, by the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. The presiding officer of such panel or tribunal shall certify to the Central Bank of
Algeria the amount, if any, determined by it to be owed, whereupon the Central Bank of Algeria
shall instruct the Bank of England to credit such amount to the account of the Bank Markazi or
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to permit payment to the appropriate banking
institution. After all disputes are resolved either by agreement or by arbitration award and
appropriate payment has been made, the balance of the funds referred to in this Paragraph (B)
shall be paid to Bank Markazi.
(C) To transfer immediately to, or upon the order of, the Bank Markazi all assets in the
escrow account in excess of the amounts referred to in Paragraphs (A) and (B).
Annex 18
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN
The Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, on the basis of
formal notice of adherence received from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
the Government of the United States of America, now declares that Iran and the United States
have agreed as follows:
Article I
Iran and the United States will promote the settlement of the claims described in Article
II by the parties directly concerned. Any such claims not settled within six months from the date
of entry into force of this agreement shall be submitted to binding third-party arbitration in
accordance with the terms of this agreement. The aforementioned six months' period may be
extended once by three months at the request of either party.
Article II
1. An International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby
established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and
claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises out of
the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that national's
claim, if such claims and counterclaims are outstanding on the date of this agreement, whether or
not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts (including transactions which are the
subject of letters of credit or bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting
property rights, excluding claims described in Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of the
Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981, and claims arising out of the actions of the United
States in response to the conduct described in such paragraph, and excluding claims arising
under a binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder
shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts in response to the Majlis
position.
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of the United States and
Iran against each other arising out of contractual arrangements between them for the purchase
and sale of goods and services.
3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as specified in Paragraphs 16-17 of the
Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981, over any dispute as to the
interpretation or performance of any provision of that declaration.
Annex 18
Article III
1. The Tribunal shall consist of nine members or such larger multiple of three as Iran and
the United States may agree are necessary to conduct its business expeditiously. Within ninety
days after the entry into force of this agreement, each government shall appoint one-third of the
members. Within thirty days after their appointment, the members so appointed shall by mutual
agreement select the remaining third of the members and appoint one of the remaining third
President of the Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the full Tribunal or by a panel of three
members of the Tribunal as the President shall determine. Each such panel shall be composed by
the President and shall consist of one member appointed by each of the three methods set forth
above.
2. Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its business
in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by the parties or by the Tribunal to
ensure that this agreement can be carried out. The UNCITRAL rules for appointing members of
three-member Tribunals shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appointment of the Tribunal.
3. Claims of nationals of the United States and Iran that are within the scope of this
agreement shall be presented to the Tribunal either by claimants themselves, or, in the case of
claims of less than $250,000, by the Government of such national.
4. No claim may be filed with the Tribunal more than one year after the entry into force
of this agreement or six months after the date the President is appointed, whichever is later.
These deadlines do not apply to the procedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the
Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981.
Article IV
1. All decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.
2. The President of the Tribunal shall certify, as prescribed in Paragraph 7 of the
Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981, when all arbitral awards under
this agreement have been satisfied.
3. Any award which the Tribunal may render against either government shall be
enforceable against such government in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws.
Article V
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law
rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be
applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances.
Annex 18
Article VI
1. The seat of the Tribunal shall be The Hague, The Netherlands, or any other place
agreed by Iran and the United States.
2. Each government shall designate an agent at the seat of the Tribunal to represent it to
the Tribunal and to receive notices or other communications directed to it or to its nationals,
agencies, instrumentalities, or entities in connection with proceedings before the Tribunal.
3. The expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne equally by the two governments.
4. Any question concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement shall be
decided by the Tribunal upon the request of either Iran or the United States.
Article VII
For the purposes of this agreement:
1. A "national" of Iran or of the United States, as the case may be, means (a) a natural
person who is a citizen of Iran or the United States; and (b) a corporation or other legal entity
which is organized under the laws of Iran or the United States or any of its states or territories,
the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, if, collectively, natural persons
who are citizens of such country hold, directly or indirectly, an interest in such corporation or
entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its capital stock.
2. "Claims of nationals" of Iran or the United States, as the case may be, means claims
owned continuously, from the date on which the claim arose to the date on which this agreement
enters into force, by nationals of that state, including claims that are owned indirectly by such
nationals through ownership of capital stock or other proprietary interests in juridical persons,
provided that the ownership interests of such nationals, collectively, were sufficient at the time
the claim arose to control the corporation or other entity, and provided, further, that the
corporation or other entity is not itself entitled to bring a claim under the terms of this
agreement. Claims referred to the Arbitral Tribunal shall, as of the date of filing of such claims
with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the
United States, or of any other court.
3. "Iran" means the Government of Iran, any political subdivision of Iran, and any
agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any political
subdivision thereof.
4. The "United States" means the Government of the United States, any political
subdivision of the United States, any agency, instrumentality or entity controlled by the
Government of the United States or any political subdivision thereof.
Annex 18
Article VIII
This agreement shall enter into force when the Government of Algeria has received from
both Iran and the United States a notification of adherence to the agreement.
Annex 18
ESCROW AGREEMENT
This Escrow Agreement is among the Government of the United States of America, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the "FED") acting as fiscal agent of the United States, Bank
Markazi Iran, as an interested party, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie acting as Escrow Agent.
This Agreement is made to implement the relevant provisions of the Declaration of the
Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981 (the "Declaration"). These provisions concern the
establishment of escrow arrangements for Iranian property tied to the release of United States
nationals being held in Iran.
1. In accordance with the obligations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Declaration, and
commencing upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Government of the United States
will cause the FED to:
(A) Sell, at a price which is the average for the middle of the market, bid and ask prices
for the three business days prior to the sale, all U.S. Government securities in its custody
or control as of the date of sale, which are owned by the Government of Iran, or its
agencies, instrumentalities or controlled entities; and
(B) Transfer to the Bank of England as depositary for credit to accounts on its books in
the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, as Escrow Agent under this Agreement, all
securities (other than the aforementioned U.S. Government securities), funds (including
the proceeds from the sale of the aforementioned U.S. Government securities), and gold
bullion of not less than the same fineness and quality as that originally deposited by the
Government of Iran, or its agencies, instrumentalities or controlled entities, which are in
the custody or control of the FED and owned by the Government of Iran, or its agencies,
instrumentalities or controlled entities as of the date of such transfer.
When the FED transfers the above Iranian property to the Bank of England, the FED will
promptly send to the Banque Centrale d'Algerie a document containing all information necessary
to identify that Iranian property (type, source, character as principal or interest).
Specific details relating to securities, funds and gold bullion to be transferred by the FED
under this paragraph 1 are attached as Appendix A.
2. Pursuant to the obligations set forth in paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the Declaration, the
Governmentof the United States will cause Iranian deposits and securities in foreign branches
and offices of United States banks, Iranian deposits and securities in domestic branches and
offices of United States banks, and other Iranian assets (meaning funds or securities) held by
persons or institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to be transferred to the
FED, as fiscal agent of the United States, and then by the FED to the Bank of England for credit
to the account on its books opened in the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie as Escrow
Agent under this Agreement (the Iranian securities, funds and gold bullion mentioned in
Annex 18
paragraph 1 above and deposits, securities and funds mentioned in this paragraph 2 are referred
to collectively as "Iranian property").
3. Insofar as Iranian property is received by the Bank of England from the FED in
accordance with this Agreement, the Iranian property will be held by the Bank of England in the
name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent as follows:
--- The securities will be held in one or more securities custody accounts at the Bank of
England in the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this
Agreement.
---- The deposits and funds will be held in one or more dollar accounts opened at the
Bank of England in the name of Banque Centrale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this
Agreement. These deposits and funds will bear interest at rates prevailing in money
markets outside the United States.
---- The gold bullion will be held in a gold bullion custody account at the Bank of
England, in the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this
Agreement.
---- It will be understood that the Banque Centrale d'Algerie shall have no liability for
any reduction in the value of the securities, bullion, and monies held in its name as
Escrow Agent at the Bank of England under the provisions of this Agreement.
4. (a) As soon as the Algerian Government certifies in writing to the Banque Central
d'Algerie that all 52 United States nationals identified in the list given by the United States
Government to the Algerian Government in November, 1980, now being held in Iran, have
safely departed from Iran, the Banque Centrale d'Algerie will immediately give the instructions
to the Bank of England specifically contemplated by the provisions of the Declaration and the
Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria, which are made part of this Agreement. The contracting parties
resolve to work in good faith to resolve any difficulty that could arise in the course of
implementing this Agreement.
(b) In the event that
(i) either the Government of Iran or the Government of the United States notifies
the Government of Algeria in writing that it has given notice to terminate its
commitments under the Declaration referred to above, and
(ii) a period of 72 hours elapses after the receipt by the Government of Algeria of
such notice, during which period the Banque Centrale d'Algerie has not given the
Bank of England the instruction described in subparagraph (a) above,
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie will immediately give the instructions to the Bank of England
Annex 18
specifically contemplated by the provisions of the Declaration, and the Undertakings of the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
with respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria.
(c) If the certificate by the Government of Algeria referred to in subparagraph (a) has
been given before the United States Government has effectively terminated its commitment
under the Declaration, the Iranian property shall be transferred as provided in subparagraph (a)
of this paragraph 4.
(d) The funds and deposits held by the Bank of England under this Agreement will earn
interest at rates prevailing in money markets outside the United States after their transfer to the
account of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, as Escrow Agent, with the Bank of England, and such
interest will be included as part of the Iranian property for the purposes of subparagraphs (a) and
(b) of this paragraph 4.
5. On the date of the signing of this Agreement by the four parties hereto, the Banque
Centrale d'Algerie and the FED will enter into a Technical Arrangement with the Bank of
England to implement the provisions of this Agreement.
Pursuant to that Technical Arrangement between the FED, the Bank of England and the
Banque Centrale d'Algerie, the FED shall reimburse the Bank of England for losses and
expenses as provided in paragraph 10 thereof. The FED will not charge the Banque Centrale
d'Algerie for any expenses or disbursements related to the implementation of this Agreement.
6. This Agreement will become effective as soon as it has been signed by the four parties
to it and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the FED have entered into the Technical
Arrangement with the Bank of England referred to in paragraph 5 of this Agreement.
7. Throughout its duration, this Agreement may be amended, canceled, or revoked only
with the written concurrence of all four of the signatory parties.
8. Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered as constituting, in whole or in part, a
waiver of any immunity to which the Banque Centrale d'Algerie is entitled.
9. A French language version of this Agreement will be prepared as soon as practicable.
The English and French versions will be equally authentic and of equal value.
10. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which constitutes an
original.
In Witness whereof, the parties hereto have signed this Agreement on January 20, 1981.
Annex 18
---..t.!.:,;.,- . Annex 19 .J ... - ...t.:..4- - ------· ··-·-.. · · -
·- · . -·--1---- -
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Annex 19
Middle Eastern Terrj rism
~1iddle Eastern cerrorism revolvJ around
the issues of a fulestinian homeJand. Israel 's
existence and policies. Arab states ~ckeying
for regional power. sectarian strife. •religious.
extremism. and. until recently, the!ran-Iraq_
War. The dramatic rise of Middle Eastern
terronsm is a direct result of the stea growth
of state support. Middle East groups and state
agents have operated globaJ)y and 'have ol>tained
sophisticated anns. extensive logistics.
precise intelligence. and safehaven. 1
1
This region·s most notorious pr1ctitioner
of terrorism. Libyan military dictatof Colonel
:Vluammar •.\ .1-Qadbafi. historicallv has employed
terrorism to lash out agai~Jt regime
opponents and to fu.rther his o~ foreign
policy objectives within the A.rab political
arena and withln worldwide revolutionary
movements. Llbyan People's Bureaus abroad.
Revolutionary Committees. the ,\:nti-Imperialism
Center in Tripoli. num~rous frbnt organizations.
and intelligence and security
services aJl have been called upon at tunes to
support Libyan terrorism Following the April
1986 US airstrikes. however, detectabfe Libyan
involvement in terrorist activity dropped sig·
nificamly through 1987. Nevertheless, Qadha.
fi shows no sign of forsaking terro~sm, and
Libyan agents continue to track and kill opponents
of the regime. Qadhafi h3;S tumed
increasingly to surrogates for attacks. seeking
greater plausible deniaJ and safety from
retaliation. Libva now hosts the mos~ extreme
Palestinian terrorist group - the Abu Nidal
Organization - and there are other slgns that
Libyan involvement in terrorism maylbe again
on the rise.
1
Syria. under President Assad. p{eviously
was an active. if not a more calculated. spon,;
or of terrorism. Syrian operations nonnally
were confined to the ~1iddle East. although
Western Europe occasionally has deen the
venue for its activities. Three acts df Syrian
terrorism occurred in Europe in 198{>: an attempted
bombing of the El Al a1rlinE! in Lon-
3
don. the bombing of the Gennan-Arab friendship
society in Berlin, and the bombing of
the El Al ticket counter in Madrid. These
attacks drew intense international criticism
and sanctions. forcing Syria tO distance itself
from its previously close association with ter·
rorism. although more circumspect support for
terrorist acts in the Middle East likely wiill
continue.
The Khomeini regime in Iran views terrorism
as a basic tactic to be used against US
and other Western influence and presence in
the Middle East as well as a tool to fomenc
Islamic funda.mentalist revolution. Iran also
uses terrorism to intimidate Arab states in the
Persian Gulf and as another means to wage
war against Iraq and its allies_
lran's principal surrogate. the Hizballa.h
movement in Lebanon. has ca.rried out car
bombings, kidnapings. hijackings. and other
acts of terrorism against Western interests
since 1983_ Like Libya. and previously Syna.
Iran uses its government apparatus to recruit .
train, finance. and deploy terrorists. especially
in Lebanon.
Among the most longstanding and wellknown
practitioners of terrorism in the
Middle East and elsewhere are the various
Fhlestinian organizat'ions that emerged in the
1960s and the 1970s. The best known Palestinian
organization is the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), which was founded in 1964
as a nationaJist umbrella organization dedicated
to establishment of an independent Palestinian
state. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
contrai over the PLO devolved co the leaderslù
p of the various (edayeen militia groups.
the most dominant of wlùch was the Facah.
led by Yasir Arafat. ln 1969. Arafat became
chairman of the PLO's Executive Cornmittee. a
position he still holds. The United States con.,;
1ders the PLO to be an umbrella organizat1on
that includes a number of differing constituent
groups and individuals who hold differing and
Annex 19
'f
often opposing views on terrorism. At the same
rime. US policy has taken into account that
elements of the PLO have actively advocated.
carried out. or accepted responsibility for acts
of terrorism.
ln the early 1970s. several PLO groups. În·
cluding the Fatah, carried out numerous international
terrorist attacks. ln the mid-1970s.
under international pressure. the PLO claimed.
it would restrict its attacks to lsrael and the
occupied territories. ~onetheless. several terrorist
attacks have been carried out since
then by Fatah-affiliated groups (including
the Hawari group and Force 17) and a PLONumber
of
Incidents
Middle East
Incidents
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
- - -
J rrl rf r - r r
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
0 Kidnapings
0Attacks
.Bombings
.Hijackings
'--
affiliated group (the Palestine Liberation
Front).
The most wide-ranging and vicious Palestinian
terrorist group is the Abu Nidal Organ.
i.zation. wh.ich has killed scores oî people in
locations ranging from Karaclù and Istanbul
to Rome and Vienna. Other international terrorist
groups include the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine - General Command.
the Arab Organization of 15 :\fay, and the
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction. a proPalestinian
Lebanese terrorist group that has
conducted its terrorist operations prirnarily in
~tern Europe.
Number of
Incidents
Anti -US Attacks
Middle East
20
15
10
.
s
0 1
- - - ,--
l r L 1 r
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
D Kidnapings
0Attacks
.Bombings
• Hijackings
-
Annex 19
...... ;· . ..--···--·--
August 1987 - One Israeli was ki1 led and two were wounded in two separate shooting incidents m
Gaza. Both attacks were claimed by Force 1 î.
Hizballah (lslamic Jih d)
Date Formed 1983.
Estimated Membershlp ApproP,at.ely 3.000 full-tune members.
with perhaps as many as 500 di] ctly involved in terrorist activity.
Headquarters West Beirut and 1 kaa Valley, Lebanon.
Area of Operations Middle East d Europe.
Leaderslùp A Consultative Co cil (Shura) that reports to Iran.
Leading officials are Husayn Mus wi. Abbas Musawi, Subhi Tu.fayli.
Muhammed Rad. Naim Qasim. M anuned Fennish. and Iranian Revolutionary
Guard personnel station in Lebanon. Shaykh Muhammad
Husayn Fadlallah is the overaH sp ritua1 leader of the movement.
Other Names Islamic Jihad. y of God, Revolutionary ,Justice
Organization, Orga.nization of the Oppressed.
Sponsor Iran.
Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah. spiritual leader
of the Hizballah.
Political Objectives/Target Audiences
• Establish a revolutionary Shi' 1 Islamic state in Lebanon. modeled after Iran.
• Eliminate non-Islanùc influenc and force Western interests out of the region.
• Bec.orne institutionalized as Le anon·s principal Islanùc movement.
Background
The Hizballah is a political, soci . and milita.ry organization that gives focus and general identity
in Lebanon ta Ayatollah Khome+·s Islamic militancy. The Hizballah espouses an intense hatred.
of any influence that does not su~port its views of Shïa ::vtuslùn ideology. A.n element within the
Hizballah actively employs terro1· mas a tactic to support the group·s political and religious goals.
The Hizballah movement was m as a result of the merger of Husayn Musawïs Islamic . .\.mal
and the Lebanese branch of the a·wa Party in 1982-83. Three area councils - for Beirut. the
Bekaa Valley, and south Lebanon oversee activities in their respective geographic areas. Series of
functional area committees play roles in policy recommendation and execution. The Shura functions
as the principal goveming body oni1 ay-to-day matters but actually exisrs to advise Iran on the unique
:;ituacion of the Islanuc movemen in l.ebanon. Hizballah elements receive training in the Bekaa
Valley of eastern Lebanon. Thro gh this connection. Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen provide
politicaJ indoctrination. financin . and ma.terial support. The Hizballah and the Revolutionary
Guards work in close concert on tJrrorist operations.
15
Annex 19
.f.. ., lliliC.,..10..:·:1:1 .-..-.t. c..io' >w ·-n, .•-•-·_ ..... .,_.. ,. ,.,... .. .,._.,. ..,.. ...,._ _ ._ __ ,,___ ~· 1
I' ;
I:
l J
The Hizballah itself seldom directly daims sJ,?ecific tenorist acts, but does so under codenames
such as Isla.mie Jihad.
Iran created the Hizballah movement, and so e of the Hizballah's cadres are directly tied to the
lranian Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebb on. The Hizballah's official spokesma.n. Ibrahim
al-Amin. reportedly has stated that he has no influence over certain cadres. who receive orders
directly from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. 1
Selected Incident Chronology
April 1983 - Committed suicide car bomb attac on the US Embassy in Beirut; oper ation claimed
under the name of the Islamic Jihad. Forty-nine killed and 120 wounded.
The US Marine Headquaners in Beirur.
Lebanon, was destroyed by.a truck bomb
at tack in late October 1983.
Bri tish soJdiers aid in rescue operations
at the site of the demolished US Marine
Headquarters after the Octob•r 1983 truck
bom bing t hat killed 241 Merintts.
October 1983 - "Kamikazi'" terrorists drove tw trucks carrying explosives into the US Marine
and French military barracks in Beirut. killing 241 US and 56 French. Islamic Jihad claimed
responsibility. l
November 1983 - A Hizballah operative d.rove car bomb into the Israeli headquarters in ~--re.
South Lebanon. causing numerous casualties. 1
December !983 - Staged a series of car bomb attacks against the US and French Embassies in
::::. 1984 - :\fun!w-ed Amorioan Univorai, 1 of Bein,< Pcesiden< :Mnkom Kenc. a US ci<izen.
Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
January 1984 - Kidnaped Husayn Farrash. Sauj diplomat: released May 1985.
February 1984 - Assassinated former Iranian ~keral Gholam Oveisi (Martial Law Administrator
for Tehran under the Shah) and his brother in _ 1:s.
February 1984 - Kidnaped Frank Regier. US professor: he was subsequently rescued in April 1984.
March 1984 - Kidnaped J eremy Levin. US joumList; he escaped in February 1985.
16
Annex 19
- --r... - ------~. ..
March 1984 - Kidnaped Williami Buckley, US diplomat: he was reported killed in October 198.5.
ls]amic .Jihad claimed responsibility.
1 .
• 'vfay [984 - Kidnaped Reverend Jnjamin Weir. US citizen: he was released in September 1985.
September 1984 - Committed su· ide truck bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut.
Twenty-three persons. including :2 .-\mericans. were killed. lslamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
December 1984 - Hijacked Ku1ait Air flight 221 to Tehran. Murdered two US Agency for
International Development officialk
January 1985- Kidnaped Father wrence Martin Jenco. US citizen; he was released in July 1986.
Islamic Jihad claimed responsibili y.
1
March 1985 - Kidnaped Geoffrey r ash. UK professor: he was released shortly thereafter.
March 1985 - Kidnaped Brian Le ick. UK businessman; he was released shortly thereafter.
Mar~h 1985 - Kidnaped AP journl ist Terry Anderson. US citizen.
March 1985 - Kldnaped Marcel Fontaine. Danielle Perez, and Marc-el Carton, French cliplomats:
1 fuez was released shortly thereaEer.
May 1985 - Kidnaped French itizens Jean-Paul Kaufmann, jou.nialist, and Michel Seurat.
researcher: Seurat was lùlled in ~ ch 1986.
May 1985 - Kidnaped Davjd Jaco sen. US citizen. American University of Beirut director. lslamic
Jihad claimed responsibility. He w released November 1986.
May 1985 - ~1urder of British citifen Dennis Hill (Hizballah suspected).
June 1985 - Kidnaped Thomas Sutherland. US citizen. American University of Beirut dean. lslamic
Jihad clairned responsibility. 1
1
June 1985 - Hijacked TVvA Right ~7 en route to Athens. US Navy d.iver Robert Stethem murde,red.
Hizballah held 39 US citizens host ge for 17 days in Beirut.
July 1985 - Simultaneously bomoed Northwest Orient Airlines office and a synagogue in Copenhagen.
One persan killed and 26 i1 ured. lslamic .Jihad claimecl responsibility.
December 1985 - Rocked Paris with a series of bombings. Hizballah members arrested.
:v!arch 1986 - Kidnaped four Frt nch television news team members: Ph.ilippe Rochot. Georges
Hansen. Aurel Comea. and Jean-Ibuis Nonnandin. Rochot and Hansen were released in June 1986.
Comea in December 1986. and :-;or.andin in ::-.l'ovember 1987.
April 1986 - - Bombed :,..;orthwest Jrient A.irlines office in Stockholm. Hizballah suspected.
April 1986 - Kidnaped two Cypri9t students.
September 1986 - Kidnaped Frank! Reecl. US citizen.
1
17
Annex 19
..... -------~·-----.--·----· .. ~. -- ··-·-
-!•'-• --=
September 1986 - Kidnaped Joseph Cicippio. US citizen.
A TWA Bosing 727 sits
on tt111 rarmac ac Belrur
In ternational Afrport
aftsr it was hijaclced
by lslamic Jihad
terrorists in June 1985.
One American, Navy
diver Robert Ster.hem,
was murderod by the
terrorists.
September 1986 - Assassinated Col Christian :Goutierre. French military attache. in East Beirut
(Hizballah suspected).
of Hizballah members. ·
September 1986 - Conunitted another series of,bombings in Paris. French police arrested a nwnber
October 1986 - Kidnaped Edward Austin Tracy. The ·Revolutionary Justice Organization· claimed
responsibility.
Januar_v 1987 - In two separate incidents. kidn~ped two German businessman. Rudolph Cordes and
Alfred Schmidt: Schmidt was released in Septe1 ber 1987. and Cordes in September 1988.
-Januar.,· 1987 - Kidnaped Anglican Church en
1
o_v Terry Waite.
-Jan~ar_v 1987 -:-. Kidnapecl Bei~t. Universit~ qolle~e professors Jes~ Turner. Alan Steen. Robert
Polhill - US c1t1zens - and .Mithileshwar Smgh. Smgh was released m October 1988.
1
1
Juru! 1987 - Kidnaped Charles Glass. US journ.al ist; he escaped in .. \ugust 1987 .
• Jul_v 1987 - Hijacked Air Afrique jetliner on fü~ht Crom Brazzaville co Paris. One French citizen wa:;
murdered.
February 1988 - Kidnaped Uruted Nations :\olil\ary Observer Lt Col Richard Higgins. USMC.
April 1988 - Hijacked Kuwaiti Airlines flight f2 from Bangkok to Kuwait and diverted it to Iran.
Plane refueled. flew to Cyprus. and subsequentl · flew to A.lgena. The hijackers secretly i>scaped.
18
Annex 19
Annex 20
Annex 20
S/15420
22 September 1982
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH
.LETTER DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1982 FROM 'l'BE PERMl\NENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
FRANCE TO TBE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO TSE SECRETARY-GENERAL [ *]
On instructions from my Government, I have the ~onour to inform you that the
Government of Lebanon bas officially requested the c?""Operation of France with a
view to the deployment in and arounà Beirut of a multinational force to support the
operations of its armed forces in order tô restore its authority over the area and
ensure protection for the civilian population • .
The French Government, in its desire to support decisions of the Security
Council, would have wished that a United Nations force ruight be created, as
proposed in Council resolution 521 (1982) , paragraph S.
In deciding to give an affirmative response to the Lebanese Goverrunent ' s
express request, France, realizing the extreme urgency of the situation, took into
account the consultations which you effectively conducted and from wbich it was
apparent that lengthy negotiations would be necessa~ before agreement could be
reached on the creation of a United Nations force. Moreover, the French Government
was sympathetic to the appeals addressed toit from many quarters in the Arab
countries. Lastly, it wants to ensure speedy action in accordance with Security
Council resolution 521 (1982), particularly paragraph S. To that end, the mandate
of the force will have to confonn to the objectives laid down in the resolotion.
As regards the implementation of resolution 521~ the French Government is
9ratified at the speed with which United Nations obsdrvers have been deployed in
Beirut, in sufficient numbers. These observers will 'be in a position to play a
valuable role in the coming days. The French Governnlent will ensure that the
multinational force acts in liaison with them and af~ords them its co-operation in
the mission entrusted ' to them by the Security Counci~.
1191
The French Government, whose policies are based;on the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and which, as you know, attaches great value
to the role of the Organization, will not fail to remain in close liaison with you .
I should be grateful if you would bring this leJter to the attention of the
President of the Security Council and ail its members.
(Signed) Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL
*[A similar letter from the Italian Governrnent ~ras also circulated
as U.N. Document S/15442 of October 1, 1982.]
Annex 21
Annex 21
1192
S/15435
27.September 1982
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 24 SEPI'EMBER 1982 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 'l'O THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRF.SSED TO THE
SEoeETARY-GENERAL
I have the honour to transmit the following message from the President of the
United States:
"Dear Mr. Secretary-General:
As you know, the Governrnent of the Republic of Lebanon has made known its
determination to restore its sovereignty and authority in the Beirut area and
thereby to assure the safety of persans in that area and to bring an immediate
end to the violence which has txagicaJ.ly recurred there. Pccordingly, i't has
urgently requested the deployment of a multinational force in Beirut. The
mandate of the multinational force will be to provide an interposition force
at agreed locations and tbereby provide the multinational presence requested
by the Lebanese Government to assist i t and the Lebanese armed forces in the
Beirut area. The Lebanese Government has asked for the participation of
United States military personnel in this force, together with military
personnel from France and Italy.
I wish to inform you that the United States Governrnent has agreed, in
response to this request from the I.ebanese Goverrunent, to deploy a force of
about 1,200 personnel to Beirut for a lirnited period of time. It is my firm
intention and be].ief that the presence of the troops will serve to assist the
Government of Lebanon in the furtherance of i ts objectives, and that they will
not be involved in hostilities during the course of this operation. Although
isolated acts of violence can never be ruled out, all appropriate precautions
have been taken to ensure the safety of Onited States military personnel
during their deployment in Lebanon.
The deployment of this United States force is consistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in Articles land 2
of the Olarter. It furthers the goals of the Security Council resolutions
508 (1982) and 509 (1982) adopted in June l982 at the beginning of the
Lebanese conflict, and is intended, in the absence of agreement that would
make possible the deployment of United Nations forces at this time, to serve
particularly the purposes of Security Council resolution 521 (1982) pending
further consultations between you <lnd the Government of Lebanon. The force
will plan to work closely witb the expanded United Nations Observer Group
stationed in the Beirut area.
This agreement will. support the objective of helping to restore control
by the Government of Lebanon over its own territory. It is part of the
continuing efforts of the Onited States Goverrunent to bring lasting peace to
that troubled country, which has too long endured the txials of civil strife
and armed conflict.
"Sincerely,
"Ronald Reagan. "
I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Coun~il.
(Signed) Charles M. LICHENSTEIN
Pcting Permanent Representative
Annex 22
Annex 22
1196
The initial group or groups of PLO
personnel destined for Jordan and lraq
would move from their assembly point
to the waiting commercial vesse] or
vessels for onward transport by sea.
August 22
Ali groups destined for Jordan or
Iraq will have boarded ship and will
have sailed from Beirut.
Duplicating the mode! followed on
August 21, PLO groups destined for
Tunisia assemble and move to the Port
of Beirut for departure by sea.
August 23
Ali PLO personnel destined for
Tunisia complete their assembly and embark
on commercial vesse) for Tunisia.
PLO personnel destined for South
Y emen assemble and move to a vesse)
for departure then or on August 24.
August 24-25
Assembly and departure by sea of
PLO personnel destined for North
Yemen.
August 25
Provided that satisfactory logistical
arrangements have been completed, the
initial groups of PLO personnel destined
for Syria assemble and move overland
via the Beirut-Damascus highway to
Syria.
The advance French elements of the
MNF already in the port area will have
taken up such other agreed positions on
the land route in the Beirut area as
necessary to assist in the overland
departure of the PLO personnel for
Syria.
The Lebanese Armed Forces join
with the French in occupying such positions.
(If it should be agreed that these initial
groups should go by sea to Syria
rather than by land, this departure
schedule also is subject to amendment to
assure that logistical requirements are
met.)
August 26-28 (Approximately)
The remaining forces of the MNF
(from the United States, France, and
lt.aly) arrive in the Beirut area and
deploy to agreed locations as determined
through the Liaison and Coordinating
Committee. This movement may be accompanied
by the transfer of the ad·
vance French elements previously in the
port area and elsewhere to other locations
in the Beirut area.
August 26-27-28
PLO groups destined for Syria continue
to move-by land or sea-to Syria.
August 22-September 4
Turnover to the Lebanese Armed
Forces of PLO weaponry, military equipment,
and ammunition in a continuing
and orderly fashion.
August 29-30-31
Redployment out of Beirut of the
Syrian elements of the ADF.
September 1-4
Completion of the departure to
Syria-by land or sea-of ail PLO or
Palestine Liberation Army personnel
destined for Syria.
September 2-3
Assembly and departure by sea of
all PLO personnel destined for the
Sudan.
Assembly and movement by sea of
ail PLO personnel destined for Algeria.
September 4-21
The MNF assists the Lebanese
Armed Forces in arrangements, as may
be agreed between governments concerned,
to insure good and lasting
security throughout the area of opera·
tion.
September 21-26
Departure of MNF.
EXCHANGE OF NOTES
Lebanese Note Requesting
U.S. Contribution to MNF
Beirut
August the 18th, 1982
Ambassador Robert S. Dillon
U.S. Embassy, Beirut
Your Excellency,
1 have the honor to refer to the many
conversations between their Exce!lencies the
President of the Republic of Lebanon, the
Prime Minister and myself on the one hand,
and with Ambassador Philip C. Habib,
Special Emissary to the President of the
Unit.ed States of America, on the other hand,
as well as to the resolution of the Council of
Ministers passed today. I have the honor to
refer to the schedule set up by the Government
of Lebanon, after consultations with interested
parties, in order to assure the
withdrawal from Lebanese territory of the
Palestinian leaders, offices and combatants
relat.ed to any organization now in the Beirut
area, in a manner which will:
(1) assure the safety of such departing
persons;
(2) assure the safety of the persons in the
area; and
(3) further the restoration of the
sovereignty and authority of the Government
of Lebanon over the Beirut area.
ln this context, the Govemment of
Lebanon is proposing t.o several nations that
they contribute forces to serve as a temporary
Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut.
The mandate of the MNF will be to provide
appropriat.e assistance to the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out the
foregoing responsibilities, in accordance with
the annexed schedule. The MNF may undertake
other functions only by mutual agreement.
lt is understood that, in the event that
the withdrawal of the Palestinian personnel
referred to above does not takc place in accord
with the predetermined schedulc, the
mandate of the MNF will terminnte im·
mediately and ail MNF personnel will leavc
Lebanon forthwith.
In the foregoing contexl, I have the
honor to propose that the United States of
America deploy a force of approximntely 800
personnel to Beirut, subject to the Iollowing
tenns and conditions:
• The American military force shall carry
out appropriate a.ctivities consistent with the
mandate of the MNF.
• Command authority over the American
force will be exercised exclusively by the
United States Government through existing
American milit.ary channels.
• The American force will operate in
close coordination with the LAF. To assuro
effective coordination with the LAF, the
American force will assign liaison officors to
the LAF and the Govemment of Lebanon
wil1 assign liaison officers to the American
force. The LAF liaison officers to the
Ame.rie.an force will, inter alia, perform
liaison with the civilian population and
manifest the authority of the Lcbancsc
Governement in all appropriate situations.
• ln carrying out its mission, the
American force will nol engage in combot. IL
may. however. exercise thl· nght of self.
defonse.
• The American force will depart
Lebanon not later than th1r1~· dnys nftcr ils
arriva!. or sooncr al Lhe n•quest of the· Pre!:'-i·
dent of Lebanon or at the• direction of 1he
l'nited States Govemmenl. or according tu
the termination of the mandate provided for
above.
0 The Government of Lebnnon nnd the
LAF will take all mensures nece~san· to en·
sure the protection of the Amcrican forc<''s
personnel. to include securing the assurnnces
from ail armed elements not now undl.'r the
authority of the LeLanesl• Go\·ernmcnt thul
they will comply with the C\'ase-firt• anrl
cessation of hostilities.
0 Thl' American forte will enjoy both the•
degree of freedom of mO\'ement and the righl
to undertak<' thos\' activilies det'rned
necessary for the performanc<' of its mission
or for the support of its personnel. Accord·
ingly. it shall enjoy all facilities nl'cessarv for
the accomplishment of these purposes. Per,
sonnel in the American force shall enjoy the
privileges and immunities accorded thr nd·
ministrative and technical staff of the
American Embassy in Beirut, ond shnll be ex,
empt from immigration and customs requin~
~ents, and restrictions on entering or dl.'purt·
mg Lebanon. Personnel, propcrty and equipment
of the American force introducl.'d into
Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of
tax. duty, charge or le,·y.
1 have the further honor to propose, if
the foregoing is acceptoble to your Exct·I·
lency's gnvemment. that ,·our Excellencv's
reply to that effect. together with this noll•,
shall constitute an agreement between our
two governments. to enter Înto force on the
date of your Excellency's reply.
Please accept. your E:<cellency, the
assurances of my highest consideration.
Fr AD 80\'Tl<O!'
Deputy Prime lllinistt'r/
Mini.star of Foreign Affnirs
U.S. Reply to Lebanese Note
Requesting U.S. Contribution to MNF
August 20, 1'382
I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's
note of 18 August 1982 requesting the
deployment of an American force to BeiruL J
am pleased to inforrn you on behalf of my
government that the United States is
prepared to deploy temporarily a force of approximately
800 personnel as part of a
Multinational Force (MNF) to pro\ide appropriate
assistance to the IA!banese Armed
Forces (LAF) as they carry out their respon,
sibûities concerninf; the withdrawal of
Palestioian J)"..rsonnel in Beirut from
Lebanese tenitory undcr safe and orderly
conditions, in accordanoe with the schedule
annexed to your ExceDency's note. It is
understood that the presence of such an
American force will in this v.:ay facilitate Ille
restoration of Lebanese Government
sovereignty and authority over the Beirut
area, an objective which is fully shared by my
govemment.
I have the further honor to inform you
that my go\'ernment acoepts the tenns and
conditions concemini the presence of the
American force in the Beirut area as set
fotth in your note, and that your Exoellency's
note and this reply acceordingly constitute an
agreement between our two governments.
RoBERT S. Dlt.LOX
Ambassaàor of the
United States of America
PRESIDENTS LETI'ER TO THE
U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL,
AUG. 20, 19821
Let.ter da.ted.August 20, 1982. frlY111 Ote Chnrge
d'Affaires a.i of the U.S. Permanent Mission
to the United Natwns addressed to the
Sccretarg G61W'l"tÙ
l have the honour to transmit the following
message from the President of the United
States:
"Dear Mr. Secretazy.Ceneral:
"As you know, the Govemment of the
Republic of Lebanon bas requested the
deployrnent of a multinational force in Beirut
to assist the Lebanese anned forces as they
carry out the orderly and safe <leparture of
Pa!estinian personnel now in the Beirut a.rea
in a manner which will further the restoration
of the sovereignty and authority of the
Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.
The Lebanese Government has asked for the
participation of United States military per·
sonnel in this force, together with mifüary
personnel from France and Italy.
"l wish to inform you that the United
States Government has agreed, in response
to this request from the Lebanese Government.
t.o deploy a force of about 800 person·
ne! to Beirut for a. period not exceeding 30
days. lt is my firm intention and belief that
these troops will not be involved in hostilities
during the course of this operation.
1Circnlated l!S a document of the U.N.
General Assembly and Security Council
(A/37/393-S/15371, Aug. 21, 1982).
"The deployment of this United St.ates
force is consistent v,:ith the purposes and
principles of the United Nations as set forth
in Articles I and 2 of the Charter. 1t furthers
the goals of Sccurity Council resolutions 508
(1982) and 509 (1982) adopted in June at the
beginning of the Lebanese confliet. The force
will plan to work closely with the United Na·
tions observer group stationed in the Beirut
area.
"This agreement will support the objec·
tive o! helping to restore the tcnitori:J integrity,
sovereignty and political in·
dependence of Lebanon. lt is p:1rt or the con·
tinuing efforts of the Urûted States Govemment
t.o bring lasting peaoe to that troubled
country, which has too long endured thl!
trials of civil strife and armed conflitL
Ro!>ALD Rl::AGA.'--
1 have die honour to request that the present
letter be circuJated as an o!füi3J document of
the General Assembly, under item 34 of the
provisional agenda, and of the Security
Council.
lû:N!'i!:TH L. ADEL!.!o\~,
Amb:issador
PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO THE CONGRESS,
AUG. 24, 19822
On August 18, 1982, the Go\'ernment or
Lebanon established a plan for the dep.lrtlUe
from Lebanon of the Palestine Liber:ition
Organization leadership, offices, o.nd corn,
batants in Beirut. This plan has been accepted
by the Govemment of!sroel. The
Palestine Liberation Organitation ha.s in·
formed the Government of Leb3.non that it
also has acoepted the pl311. A key e!ement of
this plan is the need for a multinational force,
including a United Stltes component, to
a.ssist the Government of Leoo.non in carr;ing
out its responsibilities conceming the
withdrawal or these personnel under s:ife and
orderly conditions. This will facilitate the
restoration of Leb:mese Govenunent
sovereignty and authority over the Beirut
area.
ln response to the formai request of the
Government of Lebanon, and in view of the
requirement for such a force in order to
secure the acoeptance by eoncerned p:lrties of
the departure plan, I have authorized the
Armed Forces of the United States to J)J.r·
ticipate on a Jimited and temporary b3Sis. ln
aoeordance with my desire that the Congress
be fully informed on this matter, and consistent
with the War Powers Resolution, I am
hereby providing a report on the deployment
and mission of these members of the United
States Armed Forces.
On August 21, in aecordanoe Y.ith the
departure plan, approximately 350 French
military personnel-the advanoe elements or
the multinational foroe- were deployed in
Beirut t.ogether with elements of the
Lebanese Armed Forces, and the depa.rture
of Palestinian personnel began. To date,
Palestinian personnel have dep;ll1ed ~banon
in accordanoe Y.ith the terms of the plan.
On August 25, approximately 800
Marines bega.n to arrive in Beirut These
2Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Spe;ù<er of the House of
Represenbtives, and Strom 'rhunnond,
President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
1.197
troop,s are equipped v.ith weapons consistent
,..;th their norKOmbat mission. including
usual infantry v;eapons.
Under our agreement with the Govemment
of Leb:ulon, thesc U.S. military personnel
will assist the Govemment of Lebanoo in
oenying out its responsibilities concerning
ltw wnhûrnw:il of J>:ilestinian personnel
under !-llfo, and orderly conditions. T~e
pri.'St' ntt of our forces y,ill in this ,,.:a;fa('
1l11.au: the restoration of Leb3J1ese Govemmen1
svvereignty and authority in the Beîrut
area. Ch1r forces \\ÏII operate in close c:oordmauon
\\1th the Lebanese Anned Forces,
whit"h wiU hzwe 2,ô00-3,500 personnel ass1gned
to this operotfon. as well as v.ith a
r ... t:11 of appNximately 800 French and 400
ltal1an military pel"SQnnel in the multination.al
force. Transporution of the personnel departing
1s being canied out by commercial air
and sea ll'3J1Sport, and by land. According to
our :Jgreement with the Covemment of
Leb:mon. the l:nited States military personnel
will he withdrawn from Lebanon within
thirty days.
1 want to emphasize that there is no intention
or expectation that U.S. Armed
Forct!S will become Ïn\'Ol\·ed in hostilities.
They are in Leb:lnon at the formai request of
the Govemment of Lebanon. Our agreement
with the Go\·emment of Lebanon e.,-pressly
rules out :i.ny eomb:it responsibilitie::: for the
U.S. forces. Ali armed elements in the area
h::i\·e gïven assurances that they will take n"
action to interfere v,ith the implernentation of
the dep:i.rture f,13n or the acthities of the
mult.mational foro:e. (The departure has been
underway for some day$ miw. and thus iar
thei:e assurant"es ha~e been fulfil!ed.) rmal[y.
the departure plan rnakes it dear that in the
e\·ent of a breakdown in its imp!ementation.
the multinational force ,.,,11 be withdrawn.
Aliliough we cannot ru(e out isolated acts of
\'iolen~e. aII appropriate precautions have
thus been taken to ~sure the saiety of t:.S.
lllllitary pers1nnel dlU'Îng their brief :i...<signment
to Leb:mon.
Thiis deployrnent of ilie L"nited States
Armed: For.:es to Lebanc.n i; being undertaken
plllSUant to the President's constitu·
tlonal authority with respect to the conduct
of foreign relations and as Commander·inChief
of the L"nited States Arrned Forces.
This step v,ill not, by itself, resoke the
situati<.1n in Leb3ll~n. let alone the problems
wlûcb ha..-e plagued the region for more than
thirty ye:irs. But I belie\·e that it will impro'"
e lhe pr.;r..pects for realizing our objet·
tÏ\·es iri Leb:inon:
• a pemunent cess:ition of host.ilities;
• estabhshment of a strong, representati\'
e c:entro.1 goiemment;
• 11.ithdrawal or ail foreign foroes;
• restoration of control by the Lebanese
Go\"ernment throughout the country; and
• establishment of conditions under
which Lebanon no longer can be used as a
launching point for attacks against. Israel
1 also belie\·e that progttSS on the IA!banon
problem .,.,;JI contnoute to an atmosphere in
the region neoessazy for progress towards
the establishment of a comprehensive peaoe
in the region under Camp David, based
finnly on U.N. Security Counol Resolutîons
242 ancl 338.
Sincerely,
Annex 22
Annex 23
Annex 23
417/2017 The Origins of Hezbollah- The Atlantic
'1tlantic
The Origins ofHezbollah
30 years ago, deadly bombings in Beirut forged a powerful new militant group.
MATTHEW LEVITT
OCT 23, 2013 1 GLOBAL
Smoke from the 19 8 3 bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut could be
seen from miles away. (Wikimedia Gommons)
Thirty years ago, three spectacular attacks in Beirut over an 18-month period
announced the debut of a patent new force in Lebanon-the Shiite Hezbollah militiaand
defined its relationship with the United States for years to corne. The October 19 8 3
bombings of Multinational Force bases took the lives of 2 41 Americans and 5 8 French.
https :/ /www .theatl anti c.com/i nternati onal/archive/2013/10/the-ori gi ns-of-hezbol lah/280809/ 1/6
Annex 23
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417/2017 BEIRUT DEATH TOLLAT 161 AMERICANS;; FRENCH CASUALTIES RISE IN BOMBINGS;; REAGAN INSISTS MARINES WILL REMAIN; BUILDIN ...
ibc· ~c\u IJork OEimcs
This copy is for your persona!, noncommercial use only. You can order presentation-ready copies for
distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, please click here or use the "Reprints" tool that appears
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article now. »
October 24, 1983
BEIRUT DEATH TOLL AT 161 AMERICANS
BEIRUT DEATH TOLL AT 161 AMERICANS; ; FRENCH
CASUALTIES RISE IN BOMBINGS;; REAGAN INSISTS
MARINES WILL REMAIN; BUILDINGS BLASTED
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, Special to the New York Times
BEIRUT, Lebanon, Oct. 23-A suicide terrorist driving a truck loaded with TNT blew up an
American Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport today, killing at least 161 marines and sailors and
wounding 75.
In an almost simultaneous attack, another bomb- laden truck slammed into a French paratroop barracks
two miles away.
According to Lebanese Civil Defense authorities, at least 27 French paratroopers were killed, 12 were
wounded and 53 were reported missing and believed buried in rubble. Official Defense Ministry figures
issued in Paris listed 12 French soldiers dead, 13 wounded and 48 missing.
It was the highest number of American military personnel killed in a single attack since the Vietnam War.
The identity of the attackers still had not been determined tonight.
Truck Loaded With TNT
According to a Pentagon spokesman, a Mercedes truck filled with some 2,500 pounds of TNT broke
through a series of steel fences and sandbag barricades and detonated in the heart of the Marines'
administrative headquarters building shortly after dawn. The explosion collapsed all four :floors of the
building, turning it into a burning mound of broken cernent pillars and cinder blocks.
Although a marine sentry was able to fire about five shots at the suicide driver and another marine threw
himself in front of the speeding, explosive- filled truck, neither could block its entry into the headquarters
building, where it exploded in a fireball that left a crater 30 feet deep and 40 feet wide.
In a haunting scene late tonight, rescue workers using blow torches, pneumatic drills and cranes worked
furiously under :floodlights to pry out the dead and wounded still crushed beneath the smouldering
debris. Marine spokesmen said there might have been as many as 300 men sleeping in the building -
which doubled as a bunk house - at the time of the blast.
'Carnage' Like That in Vietnam
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/24/world/beirut-death-toll-161-americans…... 1/5
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417/2017 BEIRUT DEATH TOLLAT 161 AMERICANS;; FRENCH CASUALTIES RISE IN BOMBINGS;; REAGAN INSISTS MARINES WILL REMAIN; BUILDIN ...
As the truck was bursting through the gate, an unidentified marine quoted by Major Jordan was taking a
drink of watr from a tank off to the side of the building.
"The marine said he heard a roar as the truck burst through the fence and approached the BLT," Major
Jordan said, "and then he remembers thinking, 'Oh God, a car-bomb.'"
Once the truck was through the fence gate, according to Major Jordan, the sergeant-at-arms standing at
the sentry post at the front door of the building ordered his sentry to Iock, load and fire his M-16 rifle.
According to the witness, the sentry fired at least five rounds at the truck. Sentry Box Smashed
But it did no good. The truck broke down the gate and then swerved around a blast wall of sandbags
about 15 feet in front of the building entry. According to the witnesses quoted by Major Jordan, another
marine threw himself in front of the truck, but to no avail.
N ow the truck was moving even faster, said Major Jordan, and the only thing between it and the building
was the sentry box at the front door. The sentry box consisted of sandbags and glass in wood frames. The
Mercedes apparently smashed right through it and drove straight into the heart of the building's lobby.
There, the driver of the truck detonated the explosive.
Sorne Marines said that the presence of mind of the driver, who steered the truck through all the barriers,
swerved around bunkers, ignored the rifle fired directed at him and then detonated the bomb not a
moment too soon was nothing short of remarkable.
SUB BEIRUT Beirut Bombing: How It Happened Driver swerves again to avoid sandbag blast wall.
Behind it, at building entrance, is guard hut with sergeant-at- arms and sentry. Sergeant calls in report
and sentry fires five shots before driver smashes through hut. Truck reaches central atrium and driver
detonates bomb. Terminal TROOPS type 2,000 soldiers - two armored squadrons, one armored car
detachment, five infantry companies, a company of engineers and a signal unit - armed with heavy
machine guns, mortars, light armored cars and conventional infantry weapons. 1,400 soldiers, armed
with heavy machine guns, mortars and conventional infantry weapons. 90 soldiers in a squadron of light
armored cars. 1,600 marines, most ashore, armed with howitzers, mortars and conventional infantry
weapons, the rest in reserve offshore in amphibious ships. Four Cobra helicopters armed with Tow
missiles and machine guns or cannon. Four M-60 tanks armed with 105-mm. guns. Three destroyers, the
battleship New Jersey and one aircraft carrier, the Dwight D. Eisenhower, carrying 84 aircraft, stationed
with amphibious ships offshore. FRENCH HEADQUARTERS HIT MARINE HEADQUARTERS HIT
map of Beirut (page A6); photo of rescuers removing wounded marine; diagram
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Beirut Death Toll Is 241
Special to The New York Times
New York Times (1923-Current file); Dec 15, 1983; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times
pg. A18
Annex 25
Annex 25
Annex 26
Annex 26
'/ •
VIII. 5 ~o, 86 IRAN 1 l
Hashemi-Rafsanjani on Alleged Mcfarlane Visit
LD04: / ! 3 Tehran Domernc Service in Persian
t 650 GMT 4 ,Vov 86
(Speech by Yiajlis Speaker Hashcmi Rafsanjani al 4 Novcmber
raily commcmoraung the capture of the U.S. Embassy in Tchran
- recorded)
(Text] ln the namc of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful.
Praise be to the Lord of the univcrsc and bencdictions and peace
be unto the apas1lc of Ailah and unto his scion and immaculate
imams! {preceding sentence in Arabie}
\1y heartfelt ihanks for your kindncsscs and pure and unblemished
rcvolutionary thoug hts and sentiments, 0 dear and beloved
brothers and sisters! This occasion o[ l3 Aban (4 November}
marks the day the autocratie Pahlavi regime eii!ed his holincss
the imam for his oppasition 10 the prescnce of U.S. specialists in
Iran, the day the blood of our best and dearest students was spi!!
in the back strec1s and alleyways and, ft nal!y, the day our hcroic,
iighting, revol utionary. and vanguard studcnts, by 1he:r revolu1ionary
move of occupying the den oî espionage, creued a
1urmng-pamt in the history of our revolution, our country, and
even world history. On such an occasion, wc observe a group of
our bcs1 youths oppasi te the Islamic Consultative Asscmbly, in
:he prcsece of the Majlis depulies. Herc, at this very cloquent and
ausp,c:ous ra!ly, l imend to givc a fresh reappraisal of the
ou.corne oî ,hc revoluuonary movc by the studcnts following the
!ir,e oi the imam on l 3 .-\ban scvcn yea rs ago. or course. 1his
~eappra1sal is not the final one si nec this is not the end of our 1ask
and we ;hould wait to sec the conclusiôn of this tumultuous
~evoluuonary move 3nd then react in a more objective manner LO
the ;,roblems at har.d.
I ;hall encicavor to brmg 10 your auentîon things 1hat as of today
could be emered in a catalog. I 1hink 1ha1 1oday l shall have for
you interesting and hitherto unheard-of 1hings in this conncc1ion,
and. , hou id time allow, in order 10 have a bc11cr idca of the value
of th1s movc, ncw golden pages in the annals of our revolu1ion
might ~c opencd with the bcginning of this discoursc which is
cnt1rely new. 1 shall summarizc the prc:imble.
Followtng the occupation of that den of espionagc and the evems
1ba1 followed, wc encountercd two oppasing and con1radictory
v1cws in our own cnvironment and in the world. One vicw
emana1ed from the dissidents who were a type of libcral, those
takcn w11h the West, and thosc who wcrc fascinated by the
Wcst's pallutcd civilization. Thcse people held the view 1ha1 the
move was a harmful one that would cmasculatc the country and
prccip11ate a statcof backwardness in material affairs. Si nec that
da te, every 1ime a new issue crops up creating somc problem,
the.se people immediately draw the conclusion that it is nothing
but the fruit of the vcry cxtremist actions whicb 100k place on
those days. Of course, tbcsc arc people whosc thinking is so
fundamentally entwined with the West that thcy cannot imagine
a i'rec. indepcndent movc in the world, imagining that should the
United States snecze a persan would be bcset by fevcr, and should
the Cnued States start brow-bcating one would be compcllcd to
;,erish!
T~ere 1s another style of thinking which draws its îundamcntal
source from the imam, who, at that very 1ime, graciously commaoded
that that act constituted the second revolution and was
of a higher nature than the firs1 revolution. ln tha1 vcry conncc-
1ion he graciously spakc of such 1hings as, "The United States
cannot do a damn thing!'' and "What necd have wc of relations
w11h the United Staces'?" and similar things which our nation
enjoys as numerous aphorisms.
The pas1tion of the lslamic Republic, the pasi1ion of sovcreignty,
and tbcrcforc the Position of the Hezbollah - whcrcby people
give up their lives, blood, and propcrtics on the fronts and behind
the fronts and arc ready to put up w1th difftcultîcs - has not
changed since the very beginning and today remains the same!
Wc only wish 10 dcvclop this position somewhat in ordcr to ftnd
out what wc have observcd during 1h1s time.
What might strike one superficially is that as a result of severing
relations with the United States we might havesuffercd ma1erial
losscs. Of course wc do no! acccpt this, belicving tha1 had tha1
aim becn absent, the United States would under no circumstanccs
have re1urncd to us the propcrtics wc had in the United
States. 3S it would have found excuses for kceping those propcr·
1ies in the bank.s: whcreas we have bcen able 10 rctricvc billions
of dollars in cash from U.S. bank.s - prompting tbem to say at
the timc 1bat that was the largcst volume of money to be moved
from one continent to anothcr in the his1ory of banking. (sentence
as hcard] But of course sincc the reverse has no1 happcncd we
cannot draw ftrm conclusions, but the iact rcmains 1bat w11h our
expcriencc and with the hostility the United States harbored for
the lslamic Revolution werc its aims not rcalized, wcrc not a
govemmcm of libcrals set up in Iran, werc not U.S. culture
rev1ved in Iran, and werc not U.S. experts able to advancc U.S.
policy in Iran. the Amcricans would ncvcr return that money to
us and wc would reccive nothing. [sentence as hcardJ
Therefore, thosc who speak of material losses do so sincc we have
not seen the reverse of the coin and thcrc is nothing thcrc!
However, from the moral, rcvolutionary standpoints which con·
stituted the aims of the rcvolution, we were victorious on ail
fronts. Righi from the start the slogan of the rcvolucion was
indepcndcncc. How could wc have indcpcndencc if the United
States enjoyed a sa1isfactory and active prcscnce in our country?
How could wc cxpcl the Pahlavi rcgime whilc retaining U.S.
experts, U.S. palicy, and a scrious U.S. presence in the shapc of
the liberals and othcrs takcn witb the West in Iran tn the
univcrsi1ics, schools, factorics, the Armed Forces, and
throughout the country? lndccd the rcvolution would have fa llen
short had wc stopped in our traclc.s at that lcvcl of progrcss!
Thercforc, whcn the imam graciously commandcd that 1his was
a htgbcr revolution. it was becausc it constitutcd the second s1cp
of the rcvolution. The ftrst stcp had becn the abolition of the
Pahlavi regimc; the second stcp was the abolition of the foreign
masters who backcd the Pahfavi rcgimc. Had the Americans and
others remaincd here, tberc were a grcat many Pahlavis in the
world and Mohammad Rez.a would have appcarcd in other forms
whose examples we witncsscd at the outset of the revolution.
Thcreiore, 1hat was the second step necessitatcd by the cvolution·
ary course of the rcvolution. Thcrcforc, we dcemed the third stcp
the ousting of Bani Sadr and the expulsion of all libcrals from
1 1
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VUI. 5 Nov 86
the political arena.This took place thanks to the decisivc vote of
the lslamic Consultative Assembly and the glorious sanction of
the imam whcrcby he graciously commandcd tbat it was up to
the lslamic Council [as heard]. Thus, the th1rd step took place
whereby we opened up our realm m the poliucal dimensions for
the movcment wc had in mind. From 01her standpoints, if l wcrc
to discuss these cxtensivcly l tbink that I would nol make much
headway in what I have in mind.
Today, had our relations with the United States stayed as they
were, our depcndence upon the ünited States would be worse
than it was at the time of the shah: because iî. as in the days of
the shah, wc wanted to rem a in dcpcndent upon the United States,
today our country and the entire region would be placed under
the American yoke. Ail our weapons, facilities. projects, our war,
defense, and evc:rything clsc would be dc:pcndent upon the Amer·
ican continent (as hcardL Our economy, income. religion, laws,
and everything else would bave came under her supervision
resulting in a situation similar to the one enjoyed by Saddam's
masters in Iraq. Look al the present situation of lraq. Today the
lraq1s are living under conditions that allow anyone around them
w1shing to suffocate them, to do so. If Turkcy wishcs to su-angle
Iraq ai a sign from the United States aod she cutS off her oil
pipel ine, then Iraq 1s finished. If at a si11n from the United States
Jordan wishes to stranglc Iraq and closes the port of' Aqaba, then
Iraq is tïnished. lf Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from the south, at
a sign from the United States, wish to boycott Iraq and if they
close down the ports. pipelines, and roads. then Iraq is finished.
[f they cut off the funds frorn Iraq, then Iraq is fimshed. If they
give her wcapons, Iraq is finisned. li the United States does not
provide political support for Iraq, lraq is finished. If the Soviet
Union docs not give ber weapons, Iraq is finished.
Weil. what kind of a life is that? Today, Iran is indcpendent. Who
,s there in tbis world, under this sky, who can say that they can
ddivcr blows upon Iran as a rcsult oftheir anger, their wrath, or
their conneetion or disconnection? Thcre is no one under the sky
except the lranian nation whocan make a decision about our fate.
There ,s nothing like it in the world and we can find no, or very
few, eitampics of sucb a nate in rc:cent world history that er.joys
such indcpendcnce. How did ail this corne about·) Were it not for
the decisive action of the students following the linc oî the imam,
if our nation bad not supported it in such a manner. and if our
leadership had not contirmed the issue as it did, how could wc
have rcacbed the preseotjuncturc?
Despitc: 1he fact tbat ail pressures were exertcd upon us through
oil. the bombing of sensitive points, the cutting off of weapons
and sparc parts, the denial of cquipment nccessary for cveryday
life, and despitc a serious economic cmbaq~o by world arrogance
against tbis nation which has cootinued for the past 5 years, after
7 years of figbtini this nation is monaer today than it was 7 years
ago. lt is more present upon the sccne and is continuina with arcat
mength tb.is large-seale war whicb is in fact a war aaainst world
arrogance. This is the situation on our side.
What did the United S1a1es pin 1 The United States became the
obJect oi the anger of our nation. lmmediatcly, it rcacted to this
and :innounccd that it would eut off relations and blocked our
accounts. Later, it told ail its fric:nds throu ahout the world to
impose an embargo, a serious and formai economic embargo, on
I 2 fRA~
us. Now. after 7 years, cspccially in a war situation. let us
evaluate the resu lts and sec what the American situauon is 3nd
look al our situation: let us sec whcther we have becomc: despcrate
or whether the Amcricans have become desperate. My house 1s
filled with many cxamples concermna the dcsperation of the
Americans and l bave a great dcal of matcrial in this connection.
bU[ 1 cannot discuss them in this meeting and thcre is no time for
it. Maybe in the future opportunities may arise enabling me to
talk about ihosc issues.
Here, I can only refer to one instance in connection wit h the issues
of Lebanon and regional mauers which are aise of interest insidc
our country. Witb their policies thcy wished to imprison us: now
let us see if we have been imprisoned. The United States saw
Pakistan durin& the trip of our presidcnt to that country. [sen·
tc:oce as hcard} How does the United States now sec the situation
inside Eaypt? How does the United States vicw Lebanon? As far
as l raq is concerned, in the Fath· 1 operations you nociced that
wc have really conquered Iraq. Today, it has bcen proved thac
the sovereignty of the Isla mie Republic over the I raqi people is
in fact greater than the S-Ovcreignty of the Ba'th Party which has
physical prescnce therc. Thesc are examplcs of thc:ir success 1n
isolating us. The: liberals say tbat when you take United States
bostagcs you bccome tbeir hostages. The same thlne is true
throughout the world, but hcre wc give as examplcs some of the
higbJights of wbat is happcnin&.
At the moment, in various ways the United States has extended
its hands towards us and has admitted to its des~Clte situation.
The United States made a historie mistake, and in order 10 :nake
amends for the grcat Joss and damage which was inllicted upon
it in this connection. it is acting :n a satanic lnd sly fash1on to
makc: up for its greai loss. 1 would li kc: to explain to you a small
part of this process. The Americans put the blame for the !>low
that was delivered to the United States in Lebanon and the
disgracc the Americans suffercd there on us: and, ini fact. they
should blame us for it. If the U.S. Marines had to tle:c Lebanon
and if a group of them also went to their graves under those
ci rcumstances, ail this was part of the inOuencc oî the lslamic
Revolu1ioo. If Israel was expc:lled in that disgraccful fasbion
from ;outhern Lcbanon. if the Phalangists who rulc Lebanon
today live there as defeated Jews, all this is a coosequence of the
lslamic Revolutton.
The issue that the United States faces in Lebanon today is the
issue ofU.S. hostages. The United States is feeling dcgradcd and
U.S. and French leaders feel degraded, and despite the iact ~hat
cach day tbey promise their naùons that they will frec the
hostagcs, each day their problems arc: incrcased. Ali 1his is duc
to the awalcenina of the people of the reiiion and the Muslims
that are in Lebanon. Today in Lebanon, which in the past was
an American safebousc, its people are so brave and courageous
that thcy capture U.S. spics and say, "Release our prisoners in
Israel, or in Kuwait, or in France;" or tbey say, "Do not engage
in more treacherous acts so that we miiht !cave you aione.'' If
OJther governmcnts take people captive and 1akc hostag~. in
Lebanon, the people and ordinary individuals who have even lost
their homes are now showin11 steadfastness and resistance in the
face of world arrogance.
Annex 26
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VUI. S Nov 86
Last year r went to Libya and Syria. On the way back. when 1
was in Syria, you may remember that the issue of the TWA
aircraft was in progress. When we arrived there the most important
incident in the world was in projlress. They had stopped an
aircraft in Lebanon's airport and wcre saying that Lebancsc
prison ers. who. contrary to ail international regula tions. had been
taken frorn one country and held prisoners in Israel, should be
freed . .Ail thosc who were involved in the incident became powerless.
When r was there the discussions we had with the Leb·
anese president and officiais showed that their view was that the
issue shol!lld be solved. ln that Cônnection we expressed an
opinion. ln an official interview I explained the views of the
lslamic Republic and said that in our vicw they should release
the aircraft in exchange for a U.S. and lsraeli guarantee of the
freedom of prisoncrs. When we came back to Iran the aircraft
was released and a number of Lebancse prisoners were also freed.
~ow see the U.S. desperation from then onwards.
When I went to Japan, I was surrounded by Western and U.S.
reporters saying that with my one effective remark the crisis in
Lebanon came to an end. They askcd if I would render further
assistance to U.S. and other hostages in France - [Rafsanjani
corrects himself] in Lebanon - from a huma ne point of view,
and other such questions. ln response I said that the United
States should put an end to it's mischief, it should leave the
Lebanese ·people alone. and the Lcbanese people would frec thcm
themselves and there would be no need for our interft:rencc. After
returning to [ran, we receivcd a lettcr from the Japanese prime
minister who, pursu ing the same issue. said that the issue was a
major wor!d problem, a festering wound in the rcgion and in the
world which could only be solved tl\rough the influence and
in:ercessation of the lslamic Republic. My reply to Mr
\'akasone's letter was not divulged at the timc. but now ( will
read ~'ou the answer.
Of cou rse. we have reported the incident and have discussed il,
but we have not rcvealed the text of the answcr. lt is an interesting
historical incident which had an even morcinteresting afterrnath,
but as nig!ht is approaching I think we should corne to the point.
There is about a page of introductory remaries which I wi!l not
read until wc corne to this point:
Regarding the issue of foreign hostages in Lebanon, unfortu·
nately there seems to us to be a numbcr of obscure points, and
we hope that they will be clarified as the rcsult of your efforts,
This is what I wrotc to the Japancse prime minister:
1. We do nol know how truc the allcgations are rcgarding the
existence of U.S. hostagcs in Lebanon.
We were not really sure whether tbe allegation conccrninll the
existence of U .S. hostages in Lcbanon was truc or whethcr they
raised this. issue in order to interfere in the reiion.
2. If the allegations are true. we do not know who the responsiblc
people are. lt is possible that U.S. and lsraeli agents have carried
0111 such acts in ordcr to achieve their own spedal advcnturist
aims.
I 3 IRAN
We werc really suspicious that even if therc were any bostagcs
thcy were taken hostagc by the lsraelis or the Phalangists for
sorne special aims.
3. Weare not at ail sure that America desires pcace in the rcaion.
It is possible that it has created such incidents in ordcr to find an
excuse for intervention and for suppression of the people.
4. Even assumini that ha.nages have bcen taken by Amcrica's
opponents, we are not certain whcther America wishes to resolve
the issue. lt is possible that it prefers the present sit1Uation to
continue in ordcr that it rnay become a means for achieving the
goal of interference in the affairs of others or for using them for
the sake of domestic U.S. goals.
5. U.S. actions aftcr the resolving of the incident of tbc hijackcd
TW A aircraft strengthen these suspicions. Syrian officiais
informed us that America guaranteed that after the resolving oi
the issue of the aircraft in Lebanon. Lebancse prisoners who had
been imprisoned in Israel, contrary to al! intcrnatiorial laws,
would be freed, but you notice that thcy arc not fulfilling their
promises. A fcw hundred prisoncrs werc lcft behind.
6. With the violation ofits promises it seems that America wishcs
to make the people of the region angry and to incite them to
engage in such dcecls.
7. If this is America's policy, therc is a serious possibility that
you and we wil! lose our credibility in the eyes of the oppressed
Lei>anesc people in the course of our ncw efforts.
8. [n my view, in order to prove the seriousness of the: issue of
hostages and Amcrica's serious intentions in finding ways of
releasing thcm, thcn America should act according toits former
promises and should frec the Lcbanese prisoners kcpt in [sraeJ.
9. It is possible that if the Lcbancse prisoners are still dctained
in [sracl, even if the hostages alleged by America arc set frcc,
such incidents might recur in a worse way.
l O. We cxpect the sagacious Japancsc officiais to pay attention
to thesc fricndly remarks, and not to be misled by deceivers so
that our efforts would not provc useless or proôuce bad rcsults.
Wc sent this lettcr. Now sce the U.S. desperation. Aftcr the issue
of the TW A aircraft, they started beg1in11 us to help them in
Lebanon through scores of channels: throu2h Japan. which had
some furthcr developmcnts I wil! rcfcr to again; through our
ncighboring countries; through our various embassies throughout
the world; through certain individuals in the United Nations: and
through arms dealers throuiih whom we purcbasc sornc of the
wcapons nceded by us, and whom the Americans kncw wcre in
contact with Iran. They began contacting us through. various
channcls.
After I sent my reply, Mr Fujio, who was also an intcrrnediary,
came ta Iran. You gentlemen may rcmember that at a meeting
in the Islamic Consultative Assembly be again refcrred to the
issue and gave us the answcr to our letter. They do have bosta11es,
they are serious. and thcy would likc thcir hostagcs to be rcleased:
thcy are prcpared to show good will. America approached us
Annex 26
Annex 26
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VIII. 5 Nov 86
through othcr channcls as wcll and totd Mr Fujio aboutit. Today
1 tooked at the record of the proceedings of the lslamic Consultative
Assembly and saw that that particular discussion is recordcd
in the proceedings.
1 told him that thcy arc net sinccrc whcn thcy say Lhat they wish
to act with good w1ll. The proof of thcir Jack of good will exists
in an incident 3t Mchrabad Airport. At that timc in a letter to
Mr Nakasonc I also pointcd out that I doubted the Amcricans
were sincere and were telling the truth as to whether the hostages
were in the hands of U.S. agents or in the hands of other people;
and. second. we were not sure whethcr America wanted them to
be released or whcther it wantcd to use them for iis own political
ends.
1 told him that if we wcre sure that America was sinccrc, then
we would take steps to help. Our grcat suspicion was that the
Americans wcre engaged m deceit and wcrc trying to deccive the
world. Repeat these commcnts to them and the y will undcmand.
Right now, thcre is evidcnce of tbcir deceitful acts at Mehrabad
Airport. ln any case, if we arc assured that they are sinccre. as a
huma ne act. we would help thcm.
Sorne deputies and sorne oïlic1als oi the Ministry of Foreign
Aff airs who werc prescnt at that meeting askcd me what the issue
was l was referring to. At the moment, J will not refcr 10 it, as it
might still have some conscquences. Thcrcforc. J will not tell you
now about the airport incident.
Following this. Japanese Foreign Minister Abc again wrote us a
lcttcr in which hc sa1d that the Amencans. had pledgcd to be
,inccre. We, he sa1d. ask you to help tbcm. Of course. they
Jpproached the issue from a humanitarian point ofview. Finally,
he asked me to allow thc1r ambassador to sec me to recc1ve an
l)ral repiy. l t0ld him that if the Amencans wcre sincere. [incomplete
sentence as heard]
So far we have advanced a step and we know that th erc are
hosta ges in Lebanon. Before, we reaily did not know that lhere
werc hosiages. However, their demands have been announced.
They have certain prisoners in various parts of the worid. Thcir
prisoners should be released.
.\s iar as we are concerned, you are asking us to interccdc. How
does :\merica get the temcrity to ask us to inte rccde'? By what
right can America make such a demand on us'? lt has cngagcd
in noLhing but hostility, animosity, plots, and conspiracy against
us. What arc U.S. satellites in the region doing to us at the
moment? Who is giving ail thesc funds to Iraq? Who is puttina
ail tbese pcrtsat lraq's disposa]? Who is making ail thesc political
th rcats'? Who is putting ail these radio stations at I raq's disposai?
1 pointed ail these things out to him. More importantly, l told
h1m that under thcse war conditions America has confiscatcd our
property in its warehouses - things we paid for 7 years ago.
Today we nced thosc things and we are buying them on the black
:narlcet in vanous pans of the world.
If America is sincere and if it is not engaaed in double-dealing 1t
should release our propcrty it kceps thcrc and allow it to be sent
to Iran. 1 told the Japanese ambassador that it would be our last
discussion with him. If the Amcricans arc net prcparcd to do this
-· -----,.
14 IRAN
he should know that they are lying. If they are telling the truth.
he could corne and talk to us again when the things that bclong
to us in the United States had arrived in Iran.
He asked me what we had thcre.1 told him to ask the Amcricans.
and if tbey were prcpared to return our goods to us. which they
should do according to law and according to an a11reement which
we concludcd with them under the Algiers Declaration, then he
could corne and talle tous again. The Japanese ambassador went
away and did not rcturn a gain and that chapter came to a dose.
After this issue other channels became active. The intcresting
part of my speech is hcre, wh1ch makes you sec Amcrica's
dcspcralion. Thosc who think that Americans have a wise and
wcll-calculated policy and that vcry capable advisors have
gathered togethcr in the White House and arc drawing plans to
play tricks on the people of the world, can now sec what kind of
people thcy arc and how they act in dcspcration rcgarding the
issues and how hopclcss they (ce! at the moment.
My evaluation is based on scores of such experienccs, but now [
will tell you of one sucb incident. 1 thought that today when our
studcnts and pupils came hcre to the Majlis, that this would be
the most sui table place to discuss this issue.
The non-Japancse channels, too, almost suifcred a fiasco in their
efforts and every timc tbey came they hcard similar things from
us and thcn obtaincd no results.
The channels of the arms brokcrs who had business hcre via our
arms purchasing officiais wbo were communicaling the conversations
to us played an cxtremcly big confidence trick on and
immensely deceived the Amcricans. Of course. tbey thought ihat
thcy were rendering a service, but the {.;nitcd States was so
deceived that the story 1 am going to tell you is unprecedented in
U.S. history. Hearing this story is mteresting to the whole
world: lt is interesting to the Americans themselvcs; Ît is interesting
to the Common Market: !t is very interes1ing toour nauon;
it is extremely, extremely interesting to the Third World: and it
is even more interesting to Syria, which is today beina subJected
to an official onslaught by the United States and Britain. ln
hcaring this story, wh1ch wc shall now humbly relate, Syria
should know that crossing swords w1th the United States is not
all that difficult and that the United States 1s not the frightcning
giant that it has portraycd itself to be. One can iigbt the United
States, can knock it down and humble 11 by turnina it into the
thi ng we have turned it into as I shall now humbly procccd to tell
you. [cheers)
One of the aircraft which uscd to bring us arms from one of the
Europcan countries askcd permission to cross our air spacc in
order to land and dcliver its arrns in Mebrabad Airport. Of
course. the arms consisted of sparc pans for somc of our complex
nceds. Those who rcccived permission to land, posing as aircraft
stewards, said thcy wcrc the live who arc usually with an aircraft
- the captain. the co-pilot and those who are normally on such
aircraft - and they gave us Irish names. Whcn the aircraft
cntcrcd Mchrabad thcy informed us that these gentlemen who
bad lcft the airerait al the airport werc saying: We are
Amencans and bave brought your country's responsible offic:ais
a message from Mr Reagan and U.S. officiais!
VII(, 5 Nov 86
We immcdiately held a meeting with our friends and the heads
oi the Armed Forces and sa1d: Arrest these gentlemen tn the
a1rport in order to find out whal is on their minds! Wc then moved
their aircraft to 1he tightcr base and detained the m. They waited
for 3 and 1 /2 hours in the airport until we were able to decide
what to do and could humbly inform the imam. The imam
graciously said tous: Thereshould be no talking with these people
and do not receive their me.1sage, but find out who they are, what
their des1gnation is, and who sent thcm!
Wc moved them inro a hotel where they said Mr - this is what
thcy claimed, for it is not yet clcar tous that that was so - thcy
said that the y were \.fr McFarlanc and one or two other adviscrs
of \,fr Reagan, who were at that timc spccial sccurity adviscrs to
Reagan, and that they had broughl a message for the lranian
authoriiies and had brought presents from M1 Reagan for our
country's responsiblc officiais. The prcsents for each one of us
consisted of a side arm, and the message was revcalcd to us in a
persona! meeting! They also brought along a cake as a key to
mablishin~ relations - and that is somcthing we have not heard
of beforc and must be some enigma or another. The boys (the
security officers] who wcre cxtrcmcly hungry waiting in the
airport, the hotel, and elsewhere took the cake and ate it! Weil,
:iothing was left to rcach us.
Wc said: My dear fello ws, in the United States wc have much
better weapans: Wc have Harpoons therc. we have (?Howitzers)
and Hawks, we have F-14 's. We have such weapans thcrc
[rciemng to arms purchascs made by the shah but not delivercd
10 Iran! and now you arc sending us Colts! We in no way accept
a gift from anyone, have nothing to say to anyonc. and do not
accept anyone's message. You must tell us how you have arrived
illcga!ly in Iran!
\Ve took the1r passporn and we now have their things here. We
have made copies of thcir passpar ts. The photograph is okay and
is sim1lar to the face of McFarlane. Of course, we are not yet 100
percent certain that it is him, since no one properly spoke to 1hese
people in order to find out whcther they were who thcy said thcy
wcrc or not. Those who dcalt with these people wcre sccurity
officiais in 1hat area. Therc was one wbo cnga2cd in arrm
purchases and was there with the broker: the arms broker also
came witb these people. ln order to follow their conversation wc
then introduced them to one of our friends who undc1stood the
languaec well, but who. although a discerning person, was not
one oi the respansible autborities.
ln brief, their t>Urposc was basically to corne along, as they put
it, and melt the cold ice separating lran and the United States,
to melt the frozen ocean! Their immediate alm was to tum us into
in1erceders in lebanon, and their distant goal was 10 create the
amicable relations and the eolden vision that tbey had in mind!
They bcgged, pleaded, and sent mcssa i es requesting that one of
our country's rcsponsible officiais receive them. They said that
since thcy werc bcaring a messa,c from the President, our
president should reccivc thcm! We said: No! He does not wisb
10 mect you! They said: Weil, let tlle Majlîs speaker receive us!
Wc sa1d: He, 100. will not receivc you! They said: Weil. let
the pnme mimstcr receivc us! We sa1d: He, too, will not mect
you!
1 5
·- -~ ----··- . __ _...
IRAN
The setf.styled ~r Mcfarlanc became angry and said: What
crazy people you are! We have come to your door.;tep in order to
solvc you1 problems! We have corne tosolve your problems! Your
airspace is controlled by lraqi aircraft, and so on and so fortb,
and wc have corne aloni to solvc your problems and thïs is how
you behavc towards us?! He said: If I had gonc to Russia -
this is an mteresting tbing so listen to this and let the world hea,r
what he said; let the Americans hear this and let the Russians
hear it too! - for he said: If I had gone to Russia in order to
purchasc furs therc - since Russian fu rs are famous and people
go there to makc purchases - had I gonc to Russia to buy furs
Gorbachev would have met me threc timcs a day! Who are you
not to speak to the spccial envoy of the U.S. President?! We
said: Birds of a fcather Oock togethcr. So go thcrc!
This is 001 the place for such talk! We are angry with the United
States. We are at war with you. You have kindled the /lames of
this war. You arc responsiblc for all these calamitics beseuing
our country. How could wc mect and 1alk 10 you! Have we
forgotten that Brzezinski met our ad interim governmcnt in
Algiers and our ad intcrim government has bcen n swept asidc)
and now you have corne inside our house. our counuy intending
to meet us!? Cou Id our nation be asleep in such matlers ?!
So they spcnt 5 days in detention in the hotcl and thcy were
terriiicd and in formed us later that the U.S. Rapid Dcp!oymcnt
Forces were put on alerl. Naturally, we do not k..iow whethcr this
was so or not. At long last, aftcr 5 days, we pcrmitted them to go.
They were angry and we gave them thcir aircraft. since up to 1hat
time lhcy had not scen it. They gol into thcir aircraft in order 10
establish direct communications. sincc thcy did not want to talk
on the public telcphone and sincc wc had told them that thcy
could nol use: it. But some1imes thcy did makc contact by
teiephonc and wcre monitorcd by us - let thcm not lhink of
denying that since we we have a tape of the voice of this s.clfsame
Mr :v1:cfar lane, if that be him, and should thcy requcsl it later
we could give them the voice rccordina for (? his torical interest),
since hc says an interesting sentence.
So you can sec how the Amcricans took such a risk in coming
here and we questioned them. saying: Sir, how dare you corne
hcre with false and wrong passports! You have cntcrcd our
country illcgally. What would happcn to you if we were lO arrest
you as spics and wcre to declare to the world tbat you have comc
to our count ry?! They said: Thesc brokers told us to do it. They
told us: You corne to Iran and thcy will welcomc you! In other
words, they really deccivcd them and I am confident 1hey
believed thcm. Of course, a broker whois a countc"evolutionary,
one of those refugees who is abroad and sometimes assists us in
our pure hases. (? has deceived these people and now wha t would
the Americans do 10 him I have no idca).
Another more intcresting fact that, God willing, we might evcn
givc you, is(word indistinct)during the messages thcy sent us and
wc told tbcm that we did not rccognize them, Mr Reagan toolc a
copy of one of the Bibles, chose one of the verses which rougbly
says that God's religions are 1ogether and ail God's religions arc
the same. wrote those verse3 in his own hand on the cover of the
Bible, signed it, and sent it to us in order to win our confidence.
Well, wc did not need the Bible, but wc have a pho1ocopy of
Reagan's words. which some day we may publish a'À.!Îi\~~ 26
! i
: 1
! 1
! 1 • 1
!
l'
1 \
..... ~ . . .,,._ ... ,·,c;
VIII. 5 No, 86
sec. This is America. Lhat hugc giant of the world. that superpawcr
which Wcstern-stricken people imagine bas such world
power that if it moves such and such wilJ happen; if il decides,
such and such will take place: and that the world revolvcs around
its finger. They face 1~ues with such futile tbouahts and vain
1maginings, wb1ch 1hcy thcn instill in the people.
Syria should cboosc our path, which it of course has donc. The
Lebanese chose our path. What could they do to thcm'? Ali of
Lcbanon is 10,000 square kilomcttrs; 11 is the size of a city. Ali
oî it is not the SJZe of one province. Il is cvcn smaller than Liam
Province. Althougb America has the Phalangists. Israel, and so
many forces there, what c:an it do? Now it has turned tous to
5olve 11.s problem.
What can France do in Lcbanon? France has gonc toits knecs
in the face of the Hezbollah in Lebanon. The world is not like
they think it is - that if a country does aot compromise with the
superpowcrs. it submits. This is due 10 the weakness of the leaders
of ihe countries. This is due to the weakness of the West-stricken
people, the self-alicnatcd people who think one should always act
with humility towards them and sbould kiss the ground they
stand on.
The world should listen to this. The Americans impase a thousand
types of e.uortions on people to allow thcm to mect 1ndiv1d·
uals such as Brzezinsk,. YlcFarlane, [word indistinct) and such.
lt 1s the source of ;>ride to the kings of the world to mcet one of
these American roughnecks. Howevcr, the lslamic Republic, :is
a is standing on its own fcet and as it is r~ymg upon God, is so
;,owerful ti1a1 thcy corne and be2 and rcquest. they corne without
permission to the country in order to arouse our sen se of pity and
LO place us :n an embarrassing situation as a guest that bas
:i.rrived as 2 ~iuslim. They bring us signed Bibles in order 10 meet
with us. :-..cvertheless, the lslamic Republic says wc cannot mcct
wuh scmeonc whose crimes can be sccn here and therc. We have
convcycd to you our words through the mass media and wc repeat
them again - the same thing we sa1d about Lcbanon through
the mass media.
L.:p to a tîme wc did not know that hostage-taldna in Lebanon
was taking place. Let them not accuse us of tcrrorism. Wc
learned that therc wcrc hostagcs therc, and somc of thcm - not
ail of them - were connected witb lslamic forces; and some of
the lslamic forces listen to what we say. From hcrc wc tell the
American and French people - 1 am not addressing governmcnts,
but nations - if your governmcnu provc tous in practice
that thcy are not fightini a11ainst us, if the y prove in practice that
thcy do not engage in trcason against us, if they provc in practice
tllat they do not confiscatc our assets through bullying tactics,
1ha1 America does not confiscatc our property there. and that
France does not without rcason block our moncy in its banlcs, if
thcy prove tbcsc facts in practice tben the Jslamic Republic in a
humane gesture is prepared to announce its views to its friencu
in Lebanon. Our fricnds also know our v1ews.
Our v1cws are as follows: The demands of the oppressed Mus·
lims of Lebanon should be satisfiw. They have a few prisoners.
Wcll, thcy arc not a governmcnt like you. able 10 kcep prisoners
in an official Jail. They are forccd to bide their prisoncrs some·
wherc. You are on one side and they are on the other. They are
( 6 IRAN
small and you arc big, the diffcrcnce bcing that they are 0111 the
side of rieht and the right is greater than you. Tbercfore. if you
satisfy thcir demands and prove 10 us. as you daim, that you are
not hosttle tous. that you have no hostility toward us. and that
evcn though you are hostile to us you do not act in a hostile
manner towards us - if you prove these things, we, too, in a
humanc gesrnre will express our views to our friends in Lcbanon
and llther places, as wc did in the case of the TW A aircraft. If
thcy heed our words thcy will release these people who are held
hos tage and 3re detained. as they have already released some of
them after receiving something from you in return. They will free
them, but the conditions are that you also stop some of thc,r
satanic deeds: and Mr Reagan, even if he is a satan, should stop
acting Iike one.
We cannot doanything about your internai difference:,. They arc
faced witb a tarie numberof such internai differcnces. ln France,
one wing is so frightcncd of the other that it cannot talte steps in
Lcbanon toward freeing thcir hostages. They are frightened of
being accuscd of being blackmailed by Iran, being blackmailed
by the Lcbanesc. The same is truc of America. One wing is
frightencd of the other. If you sinccrely wish 10 rcleasc your
hostagcs - from a domestic point of view you no doubt want to
rel case them - if you can rclease them yoursclves. wcll doit and
wc should be very happy, too. to see that a number of people arc
not needlessly detaincd. If you want our intervention, then: Woc
be 10 him whose enemy intercedes on his behalf.
At the moment, we are your encmy and you are our eaemy. If
yoa w1sh us to intercede on your behalf, we have leit the door
open. Vou should prove that you do not engaie in senseless
hostility against us. The fact that you have some real hostility
toward us and wc 1oward you. is one thing; but the fact that you
act in an ClltOrtionist manner, that you confisc.itc our propercy in
America and do not let us have it. or in France confiscatc our
property and do not let us have it - France is pouring so many
weapons into Saddam's mou1h and tben saying that Iran is itS
friend and should corne and solvc its problcm - well. acting in
such a manncr requires a great dcal of stupidity.
The lÏrst point t hat the Tslamic Republic raises is that wc are
indepcndent, free, anti-imperialist, antiarrogance, against dominat
ion and aggrcssion, we arc Muslims. and supporters of the
oppressed people. If you want us tocondemn the Lebanese people
who arc dcfcnding thcir right, we will not condemn thcm; but if.
Iikc other people, you also leave us alonc, wc wiU help you if our
Lcbane5e friends will listen to our words. Of cou ne, our Lebanese
friends are also frcc. They do not owc us anything that would
allow us to makc demands on them. and thcy bave not plcdged
themselvcs to follow our ordcrs. The is.çuc is their issue, but they
accepl us as their helpful fricnd and in some cases they hccd our
words, as they did in the case of the TW A aircraft.
I thank you sistcrs and brothers who have paùcntly Iistened to
my words. 1 hopc you will maintain the patb you have cbosen as
wcll as you have in tlle past. Ood willini, you and the [slam1c
Republic and your fiihters will bccomc victorious. Grectings and
God's blessings be upan you.
Annex 26.
Annex 27
Annex 27
Ressalat
29 Tir 1366, (July 20, 1987)
The Speech of Our Brother Mohsen Rafiqdoust atone of the Country's Factories for Defense
(Last part)
America and the U.S.S.R., two Corrupt Powers
When the Soviets realized that they were being toyed with by America, they sent their
representative to Iran to say that they were about to be caught by American traps.
America has naturally a deeper conflict of interests with us, although our conflicts
with both the U.S.S.R. and America remain the same, they are both corrupt powers and we
will fight both of them.
With the victory of the Iranian Revolution, America deeply felt the effect of our hard
blow to its corrupt body in Lebanon and other parts of the world. It knows that both the
TNT and the ideology which in one blast sent to hell 400 officers' NCOs and soldiers of the
Marine Headquarters have been provided by Iran.
This is evident and felt by America, that is why America finds itself powerless in the
Persian Gulf.
America knows that if it retreats from the Persian Gulf, it will be no more in the
position to get a ransom from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other sheikdoms of the region.
Obviously, it won 't retreat. As a insignificant member of an Islamic Republic organization
that is burdened by war, I have to tell you that we have been instructed to enter the war
against America in the Persian Gulf. What can America do against us? We will sink its
Annex 27
2
aircraft carriers because we know exactly what to do. If America wants to bomb our ports,
we will be ready to defend ourselves and to give it a devastating response.
Annex 27
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Annex 28
Annex 28
417/2017 U.S. BEI RUT EMBASSY BOMBED; 33 REPORTED KILLED, 80 HURT; PRO-IRAN SECT ADM ITS ACTION - The New York Times
ibc· ~c\u IJork OEimcs
This copy is for your persona!, noncommercial use only. You can order presentation-ready copies for
distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, please click here or use the "Reprints" tool that appears
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April 19, 1983
U.S. BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBED
U.S. BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBED; 33 REPORTED
KILLED, 80 HURT; PRO-IRAN SECT ADMITS ACTION
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, Special to the New York Times
BEIRUT, Lebanon, April 18-A bomb exploded in the American Embassy in Beirut today, killing at
least 33 people and wounding more than 80 others.
Both the Lebanese police and American officials said there was evidence suggesting that the explosion
may have been caused by a car packed with TNT driven up to the embassy's front door and detonated in
an suicide attack.
A secretive pro-Iranian Moslem group called the Islamic Jihad Organization said it was responsible for
the bombing, in a telephone statement to the Beirut office of Agence France-Presse. The same group said
it was responsible for the grenade attack against a group of American marines on March 16 in which five
men were wounded.
Precise Cause Still Unconfirmed
The precise cause of the explosion, as well as final casualty figures, will not be confirmed until rescue
workers finish clearing away the ruins of the eight-story embassy. Most of the center part of the
horseshoe-shaped structure collapsed from the blast in a grotesque avalanche of concrete chunks, pieces
of office furniture and dead bodies. Rooms in the other sections of the seafront embassy were either
gutted by fire or tom apart by flying steel and bricks.
Civil defense workers guarded by a ring of United States marines from the multinational peacekeeping
force worked through the night under floodlights to pull away the rubble in search of more bodies and
dues to the explosion. Many Casualties Were Lebanese
Most of those killed or wounded were Lebanese members of the embassy staff, pedestrians on the
fashionable Mediterranean esplanade that runs in front of the American mission and Lebanese civilians
who were packed into the groundfloor consular office applying for visas to visit the United States.
However, among the 33 people reported dead by the state-run Beirut radio were two United States
Marine guards and some diplomats. Other American diplomatie staff may still be buried under the debris
along with an undetermined number of Lebanese, police sources said.
(In Washington, Administration officials said that so far, there were six Americans known dead and two
others missing and presumed dead.)
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/19/world/us-beirut-embassy-bombed-33-rep… 1/3
Annex 28
Annex 28
Annex 29
Annex 29
4/10/2017 23 DIE, INCLUDING 2AMERICANS, IN TERRORIST CAR 80MB ATTACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY AT BEIRUT; BLAST KILLS DRIVER - The New ...
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article now. »
September 21, 1984
23 DIE, INCLUDING 2 AMERICANS, IN TERRORIST CAR BOMB ATIACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY AT BEIRUT
23 DIE, INCLUDING 2 AMERICANS, IN TERRORIST
CAR BOMB ATTACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY AT
BEIRUT; BLAST KILLS DRIVER
By JOHN KIFNER, Special to the New York Times
Editor's Note Appended
AUKAR, Lebanon, Sept. 20-A suicide car bomber raced through a hail of gunfire today and
devastated the United States Embassy here, killing at least 23 people and wounding scores.
The Beirut state radio said tonight that the death toll in the attack could reach 40.
The driver, who died in the huge explosion, negotiated the concrete- block defenses around the embassy
and detonated the vehicle in front of the six-story building. Shards of Glass, Bent Steel
The force of the explosion, which occurred at 11:44 A.M. (4:44 A.M., New York time), ripped off the front
of the embassy, shredding glass, bending steel bars and destroying cars in a nearby parking lot.
Pandemonium ensued. Marines, clutching their M-16's, pulled on flakjackets. Diplomats, some with their
clothes smeared with blood, staggered out of the wreckage holding walkie- talkies and looking for their
colleagues.
Two Americans were known to be among the dead. Most of those killed or wounded were believed to be
Lebanese, either local employees or people seeking visas.
The United States Ambassador, Reginald Bartholomew, was reported slightly hurt after he was trapped
in his office. The British Ambassador, David Miers, who was meeting with Mr. Bartholomew at the time of
the explosion, was also reported slightly hurt.
Moved From West Beirut
The embassy, officially known as the embassy annex but in fact the main American diplomatie
installation, had only recently been moved to this suburb of the predominantly Christian East Beirut. It
had been thought that the area was safer than West Beirut.
The car bombing today was the second such attack on an American embassy in Lebanon in 17 months.
On April 18, 1983, the embassy in West Beirut was destroyed in a bombing that killed 63 people,
including 17 Americans.
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/21/world/23-die-including-2-americans-te…... 1/4
Annex 29
Annex 29
Annex 29
1
Iran Charged for Attack on AMIA
Calls for the capture of a former president of that country, two former ministers and four other
former senior officials and diplomats
Thursday, October 26, 2006
By Hernán Cappiello
By holding the government of Iran directly responsible for the terrorist attack that demolished
the AMIA [Argentine Jewish Mutual Association] building 12 years ago, the prosecutors
investigating the attack yesterday requested international arrest warrants for eight former
Iranian government officials, including a former president of Iran, two former ministers,
members of Hizballah, and two former diplomats who had been assigned to the Iranian
Embassy in Argentina.
"The attack was executed by the Lebanese terrorist organization Hizballah, at the instigation of
the highest authorities of the then government of the Republic of Iran," said Prosecutors
Alberto Nisman and Marcelo Martinez Burgos, who are heading the investigation.
Now Federal Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral will have to analyze the evidence on which this
request is based and if he considers the evidence sufficient, he will issue these arrest warrants
so that if the persons named are arrested anywhere in the world, they can be extradited to
Argentina.
The persons who have been charged by the prosecutors are the former president of Iran from
1989 to 1997, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani􀊡 the former minister of intelligence and security
until 1997, Ali Fallahjan􀊡 the former minister of foreign affairs of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati􀊡 the
former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Mohsen Rezal􀊡 the head of Hizballah's External
Security Service􀊡 Imad Fayez Moughnieh (who is also wanted by the United States for the attack
on the Embassy of Israel)􀊡 the former cultural attache of the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires,
Mohsen Rabbani, the former third secretary of the Iranian Embassy, Ahmad Reza Asghari􀊡 and
the former commander of the Iranian Quds forces, Ahmad Vahidi.
The persons who have been accused now hold minor posts in the [Iranian] government and
have no immunity, judicial sources told La Nacion.
The prosecutors stated that, based on a variety of testimony, they established that the motive
for this attack in Argentina was the Argentine government's unilateral suspension of the
nuclear technology transfer program, which Iran considered crucial.
They also reaffirmed that the Trafic van loaded with explosives that blew up next to the [AMIA]
building located at 633 Pasteur, causing the deaths of 85 people, was driven by Ibrahim Huseim
Berro, a member of Hizballah.
Annex 30
Annex 30
2
In charging the highest officials of the Iran government, the prosecutors considered it proven,
based on evidence in the case, that the decision to bomb the AMIA had been made on 14
August 1993 in a meeting held in the Iranian city of Mashad, in which the persons accused took
part.
Strictly speaking, former Federal Judge Juan Jose Galeano, before he was separated from the
case and removed from the bench, on 5 March 2003 had requested the arrest of 12 Iranians
and one Lebanese national suspected of the attack. That group included four persons who are
on the present list. This was the corollary of an SIDE [Secretariat for State Intelligence] report,
prepared during the tenure there of Miguel Angel Toma, which compiled both its own
information and data from the intelligence services of the United States, Israel, and some
European countries. Galeano had been careful not to accuse Iran and instead had talked about
radicalized Iranian elements.
The persons sought at that time included the former Iranian ambassador to Buenos Aires Hadi
Soleimanpour, who was arrested in London but was later released by Great Britain because of
the dearth of solid evidence that Argentina at that time provided against him.
After the oral and public trial that ended with the acquittal of Carlos Telleldin and the former
Buenos Aires Province police agents accused of being part of the local connection, those arrest
warrants were dismissed by Interpol, which understood that they had been signed by a judge
whose actions in the case had been described as irregular.
For that reason the AMIA Prosecution Unit reviewed the entire case, rejected trails that led
nowhere, returned to others that had been ignored earlier, assembled new testimony, collated
and crosschecked telephone calls that were made 15 years ago, and arrived at new conclusions.
For example, the prosecutors established that Rabbani, when he returned [to Argentina] after
taking part in the August 1993 meeting at which the decision to proceed with this attack was
made, opened an account in the Deutsche Bank in which between March and April 1994
$150,000 was deposited. This sort of activity was totally unusual in comparison with his usual
financial transactions. This information, combined with the SIDE photo in which he is seen
shopping for vans on Warnes [Avenue in Buenos Aires], provided further circumstantial
evidence against him.
The telephone records enabled the prosecutors to establish that a call made from Rabbani's cell
phone to a mosque had been made from a place close to the parking lot where the Trafic van
was parked until it was driven to its target.
An hour later, a cell phone number in Foz de Iguazu was called from a nearby telephone booth
[near the parking lot]. This cell phone belonged to the person who coordinated the operation
from the TriBorder Area. The prosecutors established that the operations group, commanded
by Moughnieh, arrived in Argentina on 1 July 1994 and left on board a flight from the [Buenos
Annex 30
3
Aires] Aeroparque Newbery at 0715 on 18 July, just hours before the bombing. This was
established by telephone calls made to the TriBorder cell phone, which ceased on the very day
that the attack occurred. They also found other calls made from the same phone booths to a
number that the SIDE has identified as being the number of a Hizballah base in Lebanon.
Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral has already begun to analyze the prosecutors’ opinion on the
AMIA attack. "Measures that are supported, that conform to the law, will be available. It is
necessary to read the entire opinion and study each of the references to the evidence cited, do
all this work and then resolve whether to order these arrests. If all is well, I will order what the
prosecution asks," the judge told the DyN agency.
Annex 30
4/13/2017 Acusala lrin!X)[ el atacμl alaAMIA - 26.1 0.2005 - LA NACION
LANACION
Acusan a Iran por el ataque a la AMIA
Pidieron la captura de un ex presidente de ese pafs, de dos ex ministres y de cuatro
otros ex altos funcionarios y diplomaticos
JUEVES 26 DE OCTUBRE DE 2006
A 1 responsabilizar directamente al gobierno de Iran por el atentado terrorista que demoliô la
sede de la AMIA hace 12 a:fios, los fiscales que investigan el ataque pidieron ayer la captura
internacional de ocho ex funcionruios iranies, entre ellos un ex presidente de ese pais, dos ex
ministros, integrantes del Hezbollah, y dos ex diplomaticos que estuvieron destinados en la
embajada argentina.
"El ataque fue ejecutado por la organizaciôn terr01ista liba:nesa Hezbollah, a instancias de las
maximas autoridades del entonces gobierno de la Republica de Iran", dijeron los fiscales Alberto
Nisma:n y Marcelo Ma1tinez Burgos, que tienen la investigaciôn.
Ahora, el juez federal Rodolfo Canicoba Corral debe analizar las pruebas en que se basa este
pedido y si las considera suficientes hacer lugar a la medida para que en caso de ser detenidos en
algun lugar del mundo puedan ser extraditados a la Argentina.
Los acusados por los fiscales son el ex presidente de Iran entre 1989 y 1997 Ali Akbru· Hashemi
Rafsanjani; el ex ministro de Informaciôn y seguridad hasta 1997, Ali Fallahja:n; el ex ministro de
Relaciones Exteriores de Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati; el ex comanda:nte de la Guardia Revolucionaria
Mohsen Rezai; el jefe del Servicio de Seguridad Exte1ior del Hezbollah Imad Fayez Moughnieh
(ta:mbién buscado por Estados Unidos por el ataque a la embajada de Israel); el ex consejero
~-Jlwww.lanacion.ccm cr-/852740-acusan-a-iran-lX)[-el-aléQ.Je.a-la-ania Annex 3'-0
4/13/2017 Acusala lrin!X)[ el atacμl alaAMIA - 26.10.2005 - LA NACION
cultural de la embajada iranien Buenos Aires, Mohsen Rabbani, el ex tercer secretalio de la
embajada Ahmad Reza Asghrui y el ex comandante de las fuerzas QUDS iranies Ahmad Vahidi.
Los acusados actualmente ocupan cargos menores en el gobierno y no tienen inmunidad, dijeron a
LA NACION fuentes judiciales.
Los fiscales sefialaron que, por diversos testimonios, establecieron que el motivo por el cual se
produjo el ataque en nuestro pais fue la suspension unilateral por parte del gobierno argentino del
programa de transferencia de tecnologfa nuclear, que Iran consideraba clave.
Ademas, reafirmaron que la camioneta Trafic cargada de explosivos que se estrello contra el
edificio de Pasteur 633 y provoco la muerte de 85 personas, estaba conducida por Ibrahim Huseim
Berro, integrante de Hezbollah.
Para acusar a los maximos responsables del gobierno irani, los fiscales consideraron probado,
sobre la base de testimonios, que el atentado contra la AMIA fue decidido el 14 de agosto de 1993
en una reunion realizada en la ciudad irani de Mashad, de la que participaron los acusados.
En Iigor, el exjuez federal Juan José Galeano, antes de que lo apartaran de la causa y de que lo
destituyeran, habfa pedido el 5 de marzo de 2003 la captura de 12 iranies y de un libanés
sospechados por el atentado. Entre ellos se encontraban cuatro que estan en la lista actual. Fue el
corolalio de un informe de la SIDE, realizado durante la gestion de Miguel Angel Toma, que
recogio las informaciones propias y de los servicios de inteligencia norteame1icanos, israelies y de
paises europeos. Galeano se habfa cuidado de no acusru· a Iran y en cambio habfa hablado de
elementos radicalizados iranies.
Entre los buscados estaba el ex embajador iranien Buenos Aires Hadi Soleimanpour, que fue
detenido en Londres, pero liberado por Gran Bretafia ante la orfandad de pruebas que ap01to
entonces la Argentina en contra de él.
~-Jlwww. lanacion.ccm cr-/8527 4(). acusan-a-i ran-lX)[ -el-aléQ.Je.a-1 a-an i a Annex 1'-0
4/13/2017 Acusala lrin!X)[ el atacμl alaAMIA - 26.1 0.2005 - LA NACION
Tras el juicio oral y publico que termin6 con la absoluci6n de Carlos Telleldin y los ex policias
bonaerenses acusados de integrar la conexi6n local, esos pedidos de detenci6n fueron dados de
baja por Interpol al entender que fueron firmados por un juez cuya actuaci6n fue calificada de
irregular.
Por eso la Unidad Fiscal AMIA revis6 toda la causa, descart6 pistas inconducentes, retom6 otras
dejadas de lado en un principio, reuni6 nuevos testimonios, realiz6 entrecruzamientos de Hamadas
realizadas hace 15 afios y lleg6 a nuevas conclusiones.
Por ejemplo, se estableci6 que Rabani, al regresar al pais luego de participar de la reuni6n de
agosto de 1993 donde se decidi6 el ataque, abri6 una cuenta en el Deutsche Bank, donde recibi6
entre marzo y abril de 1994 transferencias de 150.000 d6lares, totalmente inusuales en sus
movimientos. Este dato, sumado a la foto de la SIDE donde se love buscando camionetas por
Warnes, suman indicios en su contra.
Los cruces telef6nicos permitieron establecer que desde el celular de Rabbani se hizo una Hamada
hacia una mezquita realizada desde un lugar cercano a la playa de estacionamiento donde estuvo
la Trafic hasta que fue conducida hacia su objetivo.
Una bora después, desde un locut01io cercano se llam6 a un celular de Foz do lguazu, que
pertenece a quien coordin6 la operaci6n desde la Triple Frontera. Establecieron que el grupo
operativo, comandado por Mougnhieh, lleg6 al pais el 1 ° de julio de 1994 y sali6 por Aeropa:rque a
las 7.15 del 18 de julio, boras antes del atentado. Esto se estableci6 por las comunicaciones
telef6nicas realizadas al celular de la Triple Frontera, las que cesaron el mismo dia en que ocurri6
el ataque. También se detectaron otras Hamadas desde los mismos locut01ios a un numero que la
SIDE identifica como una base del Hezbollah en el Libano.
Canicoba Corral
• El juez Rodolfo Canicoba Corral ya comenz6 a analizar el dictamen de la fiscalia sobre el ataque
contra la AMIA. "Se dispondran las medidas que tengan respaldo, que se ajusten a derecho. Hay
~-Jlwww. lanacion.ccm cr-/8527 4(). acusan-a-i ran-lX)[ -el-aléQ.Je.a-1 a-an i a Annex 1-0
4/13/2017 Acusala lrin!X)[ el atacμl alaAMIA - 26.1 0.2005 - LA NACION
que leer el dictamen completo y estudiar cada una de las referencias, de la prueba citada, hacer
todo este trabajo y después resolver si se ordenan las capturas. Si todo esta bien, ordenaré lo que
la fiscalia pide", dijo el juez a la agencia DyN.
Por Hernan Cappiello De la Redacci6n de LA NACION
LA NACION Polîtica
Copyright 2017 SA LA NACION I Todos los derechos reservados
~-Jlwww. lanacion.ccm cr-/8527 4(). acusan-a-i ran-lX)[ -el-aléQ.Je.a-1 a-an i a Annex 1-0
4/14/2017 BBC NEWS | Americas | Buenos Aires bomber 'identified'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4423612.stm 1/2
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Last Updated: Thursday, 10 November 2005, 02:37 GMT
E-mail this to a friend Printable version
Buenos Aires bomber 'identified'
A member of the Islamic
militant group Hezbollah was
the suicide bomber who blew
up a Jewish community
centre in Argentina in 1994,
say prosecutors.
Ibrahim Hussein Berro, 21, of
Lebanon, was identified in a
joint effort by Argentine
intelligence and the FBI, said
prosecutor Alberto Nisman.
Islamic militants, backed by Iran, have long been suspected
of carrying out the attack that killed 85 people.
Argentina's Jewish community has for years sought a
resolution to the case.
Mr Nisman said Hussein had been identified by FBI and
Argentine intelligence, and corroborated by at least three
witnesses.
He showed reporters a picture of the supposed bomber, a
young man with heavy eyebrows, dark skin and short hair
who was wearing a sports shirt and jeans.
Hussein's two US-based brothers had testified that he had
joined the radical Shia militant group Hezbollah, Mr Nisman
said.
"The brothers' testimony was substantial, rich in detail and
showed that he was the one who was killed," he added.
Unsolved attacks
But independent investigators are sceptical, pointing to
repeated incompetence and deception in the official
investigation, says the BBC's Tom Gibb in South America.
No proper autopsies or DNA tests were done on human
remains at the site. In one of the most shocking incidents,
police simply dumped in a bin a head found near the scene
thought to have been that of the bomber, our correspondent
adds.
The car bomb at the Jewish Argentine Mutual Association
(AMIA), which wounded more than 200, was one of two
attacks targeting Argentina's 200,000-strong Jewish
community in the 1990s.
The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires
also remains unsolved.
SEE ALSO:
Argentina admits bomb probe
blame
13 Jul 05 | Americas
Argentine bomb probe judge
sacked
03 Aug 05 | Americas
Argentines rally for bomb justice
09 Sep 04 | Americas
Argentina bomb suspects
acquitted
02 Sep 04 | Americas
Argentina removes bomb case
judge
03 Dec 03 | Americas
Iran blamed for Argentina bomb
06 Nov 03 | Middle East
Flashback: Argentina bomb
25 Aug 03 | Americas
RELATED INTERNET LINKS:
Argentine justice ministry
Argentine Jewish Associations
The BBC is not responsible for the
content of external internet sites
TOP AMERICAS STORIES
US lifts lid on WikiLeaks probe
Iran scientist heads home
Argentina legalises gay marriage
| News feeds
Annex 31
Annex 31
4/14/2017 BBC NEWS | Americas | Buenos Aires bomber 'identified'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4423612.stm 2/2
MMIX Back to top ^^
Argentine, US and Israeli officials have all said that Iran is to
blame - a charge Tehran denies.
Members of Argentina's Jewish community have repeatedly
accused the government of the former president, Carlos
Menem, of obstructing the inquiry, something it strongly
denies.
In July 2005, President Nestor Kirchner's government issued
a decree formally accepting a share of the blame for the
failure of investigations into the AMIA attack.
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Annex 31
2/16/2017 PR054 / 2007 / News / News and media / Internet / Home - INTERPOL
https://www.interpol.int/layout/set/print/News-and-media/News/2007/PR054 1/1
© INTERPOL 2017. All rights reserved.
07 November 2007 - Media release
INTERPOL General Assembly upholds Executive Committee decision on AMIA Red Notice dispute
MARRAKESH – Delegates at the 76th INTERPOL General Assembly have upheld the unanimous decision made by the organization’s Executive Committee to publish six out
of nine Red Notices requested in connection with the 1994 bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires.
The General Assembly, INTERPOL’s supreme governing body, voted in favour of publishing the notices requested by the Argentinean National Central Bureau (NCB) for the
following six individuals; Imad Fayez Moughnieh, Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rabbani, Ahmad Reza Asghari, Ahmad Vahidi and Mohsen Rezai.
In November 2006, NCB Buenos Aires requested the INTERPOL General Secretariat to issue Red Notices for nine individuals, eight Iranian nationals and one Lebanese
national, in connection with the 1994 bombing of the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires in which more than 80 people were killed and
countless others injured.
NCB Tehran challenged the requested issuance of these Red Notices by NCB Buenos Aires.
Despite extensive efforts by the Executive Committee and the General Secretariat to assist the two parties to resolve the matter bilaterally – efforts recognised by both parties
during the General Assembly – no agreement could be obtained from NCB Tehran and NCB Buenos Aires.
In March 2007, the Executive Committee unanimously decided to authorise the issuance of six of the nine Red Notices requested by NCB Buenos Aires. Following an appeal
by NCB Tehran against this decision, the publication of the Red Notices was suspended until the matter could be put before the 2007 General Assembly, in accordance with
Article 24 of INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Information for the Purposes of Police Co-operation.
The decision reached in March 2007 by the Executive Committee relied on NCB Buenos Aires and the case prosecutor’s presentation that the new Red Notice applications
were based on a fresh re-examination of the case and the issuance of new arrest warrants signed by a judge other than Judge Galeano, who had been fired for having acted
corruptly in the case.
After long and careful deliberation of all the information and arguments presented by both parties, the Executive Committee concluded that the reasons for having the Red
Notices cancelled in 2005 were not present in 2007.
'INTERPOL has treated both National Central Bureaus fairly and impartially and meticulously applied its rules throughout the dispute resolution process, and today’s vote by
the General Assembly endorsing the Executive Committee’s decision is the conclusion of that process,' said INTERPOL President Jackie Selebi.
'We continue however to encourage both National Central Bureaus to try and co-operate in this matter on a bilateral basis, and INTERPOL’s General Secretariat is ready to
assist in any way.'
Background explanation on Red Notices
Red Notices, or international wanted persons notices, are one of the ways in which INTERPOL informs its 186 member countries that an arrest warrant has been issued for an
individual by a judicial authority. It is not an international arrest warrant.
The individuals concerned are wanted by national jurisdictions (or International Criminal Tribunals where appropriate) and INTERPOL’s role is to assist national police.
Many of INTERPOL’s member countries, however, consider a Red Notice a valid request for provisional arrest, especially if they are linked to the requesting country via a
bilateral extradition treaty. In cases where arrests are made based on a Red Notice, these are made by national police officials in INTERPOL member countries.
The issuance or non-issuance of a Red Notice for any individual cannot be construed as an indication of the strength or weakness of the case against that individual, which is a
matter for the appropriate judicial authorities to decide.
Annex 32
Annex 32
Annex 33
Annex 33
Translation
Judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, Berlin, in the Mykonos trial
Toda y, 10 April 1997, the Berlin Superior Court sentenced the defendants, Darabi and Rhayel ,
to life imprisonment for quadruple murder and noted that they had brought a particularly grave
burden of guilt upon themselves. The Court has sentenced the defendant Amin to a prison term
of 11 years for h.is complicity in the quadruple murder, and the defendant Atris to 5 years and
3 months, wh.ich includes the punishment for another crime. ~~ iias acquitted Lhe dPfendant
Ayad of the charge of complicity in the crime of quadruple murder.
The Court's oral findings, wh.ich took several hours, included the following passages:
"With th.is judgment the Court has completed proceedings lasting nearly three and a half years
concerning the armed attack wh.ich took place in the Mykonos restaurant, Berlin, on l 7 September
1992. The Chainn~ of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Iran (DPK-I), Dr Sadegh
Sharafkandi, the Party's EÜropean representative Fattah Abdoli, its German representative
Homyoun Ardalan and their adviser and interpreter Nurulah Mohamadpour Dehkordi of
Berlin, were killed in the incident and the proprietor of the rest?.·.::-~11t was seriou;,,)' i:ijurrj_
I
The Court did not lirnit itself to merely clarifying and establish.ing how the crime had been
committed, and whether and in what manner the defendants had been involved. To have
looked only at the crime as such without its background and circumstances would have given
an incomplete picture. It would not have been possible to establish who were the perpetrators
of and the accessories to the crime and to assess the guilt and hand down a fair judgment. The
definition of the crime in terms of procedural law is wider in scope. It encompasses the entire
h.istorical process with.in wh.ich the defendants are alleged to h?"~ ..:ommitted ac.s mnc;t;tuting
a punishable offence. Thus in its investigation the Court had to take into account the question
why the victims had to die and who was to be held responsible. Moreover, it had to make
unequivocally clear that a society based on the rule of law, the principles of democracy and
every individual's right to life as guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention on Human Rights,
Annex 33
- 2 -
will not be prevented from prosecuting such crimes with the legal means at its disposal, from
calling the responsible to account and from naming the ringleaders and wirepullers.
Sorne media reports have spoken ofiran, too, being in the dock T-fowever, only ~!1e five defendants
were on trial. The sole purpose of establishing that other people not affected by the trial
had knowledge of and were the originators of the crime was to throw light on the part played
by the defendants.
II
The crime had its roots in Iran's historical development since the Islamic Revolution. The aspiration
to autonomy of the Kurds living in Iran brought this section of the population and the
political organizations representing them, inctuding the DPK-I, into opposition with the
regime. As a result, their leaders were persecuted. They were cnmpelled to gr; abroad from
where they sought to achieve their aims mainly through information and propaganda. It was for
this reason that they were observed and pursued by the Iranian Secret Service even whilst in
exile. It transpired in a television interview given by the Iranian Minister for Information and
Security, Fallahian, on 30 August 1992 that one of the most important organizations kept
under surveillance was the DPK-I. In order to silence it Iran's political leadership decided not
to fight the DPK-I's leaders with political means but to liquidate them. The killing of the
DKP-I's chairman, Dr Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, and two of his confidants in Vienna on
13 J uly 1989, as well as the crime which has been tried by this Court, are the outcome of that
decision. The connection between the assassinations in Vienna and Berlin is obvious. Any
suggestion that they were the result of conflicts among Kurdish opposition group-: can be ruled
out.
The evidence has revealed the decision-making procedures within the Iranian leadership, which
in the final analysis has led to the liquidation of opposition politicians abroad. Decisions on
such operations are in the hands of the secret, extra-constitutional "Committee for Special
Matters", whose members include the President of Iran, the Minister of the Secret Service
VEY AK, the foreign policy chief, representatives of the security forces and other organizations,
as well as the "religious leader". It needs to be stressed that this "religious leader" is not
the spiritual leader of the Muslims. Religious and spiritual leadership continues to be exclusively
in the hands of Great Ayatollahs, who are not members of the "Committ':'e for Special
Matters". The "religious leader" on this Committee, also styled "revolution leader". is the
Annex 33
- J -
holder of a political office which was created after the revolution of 1979; however, he does
have to be a senior member of the clergy
The decision taken by the "Committee for Special Matters" is a prerequisite for carrying out an
operation abroad. If the objective is to kill a persan, the "religious leader" as a political official
confirms the so-called assassination order which then serves as mock justification for the later
killing. That order is binding neither in law nor in fact even if it is accompanied by a fatwa, i.e.
a legal opinion on general and religious questions. Even Shiitc 1viuslims are not b0und by it,
rather, it constitutes an extra-judicial liquidation order issued by the government.
The "Committee for Special Matters" will as a rule place the operation in the hands of the
member who knows the most about the target person and seems best suited to carry it out.
That member in turn instructs a so-called team leader to perpetrate the actual crime. The team
leader, who is typically a battle-tried and suitably qualified and trained man, selects the people
for the "hit squad" and is in command of those who actually cany out the murder. The assassination
of Dr Sharafkandi and his party followed exactly th.is pattern.
III
After Fallah.ian had reported to the "Comrnittee for Special Matters" and it had decided to
proceed with the liquidation of Dr Sharafkandi, he was given the task of organizing the operation.
Preparations for the assassination then began under the code name "Faryad Bozorg
Alawi" (roughly translated as "the wish of the leader of the revolution"). Fallah.ian thereupon
brought in the "Council for Special Tasks", a department of VEY AK responsible for such
operations. On the instructions of the Council, Asghar Arshat and Kamali travelled to the
Federal Republic of Germany at the end of June/beginning of July 1992. Beth belonged to a
sham firm run by VEY AK and had been charged with planning the operation and reporting to
Fallahian. They called upon the services of Darabi, a local VEY·.:~ liaison officei .
Darabi had been living in Gennany since 1980. He belonged to the Pasdaran. Owing to his
intelligence activities he was particularly well suited to the task of preparing the assassination.
He also had connections with supporters of the Hezbollah, a group financed, equipped and
trained by Iran which uses rnilitary means to remove opponents of the Islamic regime and has
claimed responsibility for terrorist acts of violence.
Annex 33
- 4 -
Acting on his instructions, Darabi began forming a group of people to carry out the assassinat
ion. He recruited, among others. the Lebanese Amin, Rhayel and Ali Sabra, who belonged to
the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Amin and Rhayel had received part of their military and ideological
training in Iran. Bath of them, together with three other members of Hezbollah, including Ali
Sabra, came to Germany as asylum-seekers in l 989/1990
Atris, likewise an asylum-seeker in Berlin, was in close contact with Amin and Rhayel. Ayad,
who had also corne ta Germany as an asylum-seeker, was not a member of the Hezbollah . He
had been a member of the Amal in Lebanon until forced ta leave and was known for his considerable
experience of military operations. He was the nephew of Darabi's business partner
and brother-in-law.
Ayad had already been told about the operation in generaJ terms in July 1992. Amin, Rhayel
and Atris knew about the planned operation by the end of August 1992 at the latest and agreed
to be a part of it. Ta help his preparations, Darabi bought a mobile telephone on 25 August
1992 in order ta have a rapid means of contact ta the other members of the group which
could not be tapped.
Round about 7 September 1992 the hit team arrived in Berlin. They were under the command
of Sharif who, according to Mesbahi, the "C" source, was Abdolrahman Banihashemi, a man
who had been trained in guerrilla warfare. His job was to carry out the actual attack. As part of
his task Sharif made contact with Darabi. Sharif excluded Ayau from any further paI1h.:ipation
in the operation on account of his unreliability, about which no further details are known.
Another person recruited was Darabi's close fiiend FazajaJlah Haidar from Osnabrück. His job
was ta drive the get-away car. They were also joined by a man who worked under the name of
"Mohamed" but whose real identity is still unknown. He too was probably a member of the hit
team. On 11 September 1992 the preparations entered the final stage. Amin was sent to Berlin
where, on 12 September 1992, he met Sharif, Rhayel and Haidar at Darabi's second address.
Next day Darabi arrived there as well. He had meanwhile received the keys to a flat at Senftenberger
Ring which he had intended ta set up as a conspiratorial base. Darabi told the others ta
remove ail traces of their presence at the second address and to take ail their belongings with
them. He also informed them that he was going ta Cologne or Hamburg and that i.t the police
were ta find him he would say that he had been in the West at the time of the crime. On the
evening of 13 September 1992 Darabi took Sharif and Amin by car ta the conspiratorial flat.
There he told Sharif to telephone him when it was ail over. That same evening Darabi drave ta
Hamburg as he said he would and remained in West Germany until 18 September 1992. LikeAnnex
33
- 5 -
wise on 13 September 1992, Ali Sabra, a close friend of Darabi, bought the get-away car with
money he had received from Darabi. At the latest on the same day, Atris stole his brother's
passport so that Rhayel could use it if he had to tlee the country.
On the evening of 14 September l 992 Dr Sharaflcandi arrived in Berlin. Next day arrangements
were made for him to meet members of his party and other opposition representatives in the
Mykonos restaurant on Thursday, 17 September 1992. On 16 September 1992 the group in the
flat at Senftenberger Ring were told the time and place of that meeting by an informer who has
not been identified. On the same day Rhayel and Haidar brought the weapons, an Uzi submachine
gun and a Llama pistol, each with a silencer, into the tlat at Senftenberger Ring. That
same evening Amin and Rhayel and other members of the group did a trial run under Sharif s
instructions.
The next evening the hit men, armed with their weapons, waited for the signal to go into
action. At approximately 9.00 p.m. the telephone rang in the tlat :i.t Senftenber~er Ring. That
was the signal agreed with the informer that the victims were in the restaurant and the operatian
could begin. Immediately after the telephone call the assassins went to a place near the
scene of the crime. At app_foximately 10.50 p.m. Sharif and Rhayel entered the prernises and
went straight into the back room. Amin kept guard at the door. Before Dr Sharaflcandi or any
of the others in the group could sense what was going on and take evasive action. Sharif
shouted in Persian "sons of whores" and immediately opened tire. With his sub-machine gun he
shot through the sportsbag he was holding in both hands and hit Dr Sharaflcandi, Dekhordi.
Abdoli and Ardalan. He fired 26 shots in at least two short bursts. Rhayel, following Sharif,
fired four ;;hots from his pistol. He shot Ardalan, who had collapsed, in the back of the head
which killed him immediately. Two shots hit Dr Sharaflcandi in the head from right to left. from
which one concludes that Rhayel had moved from his position behind Ardalan and gone round
the top end of the table to approach Dr Sharaflcandi from the side. Rhayel fired another shot
into Dr Sharafkandi's stomach from a distance of less than 5 cm.
Dr Sharaflcandi, hit many times, died immediately. Abdoli also died on the spot. Nouri
Dekhordi had been taken to the clinic in Steglitz but his life could no longer be saved. Tabib
Ghaffari survived with severe injuries.
After committing the murder Sharif and Rhayel ran out of the building. Outside they met Amin
and ran to the car in which Haidar and "Mohamed" were waitinp and escaped. Tt has not yet
been possible to find out "Mohamed's" identity. Sharif escaped by air to Iran via Turkey There
Annex 33
- 6 -
he was g1ven a Mercedes 230 as reward for a successful mission. Amin and Rhayel were
arrested shortly before they were due to leave Germany as the result of a tip-off from the
Federal Intelligence Service.
IV
On the basis of these facts the defendant Rhayel was guilty of murder. He deliberately
exploited the innocence and defencelessness of the victims and his action was therefore perfidious.
He also acted from base motives. The consistent ruling of the F ederal Court of fostice
has been that a perpetrator is considered as a murderer only if his motives, according to general
moral values, are of the lowest possible kind. The motives for Rhayel's action therefore
had to be examined. There were no religious grounds for the crime. Nothing in it suggests that
religious errors on the part of the victims motivated the killings. They had not been accused of
having violated the rules of the Koran or cornmitted any other sacrilege. The reason for their
merciless persecution was naked power-politics. The fact that the government of a
"theocracy", as Iran styles itself, ordered the assassination does not alter this. The religious
trirnming does not hide the fact that the sole objective of the regime in Iran was to destroy
opposition groups operating/rom abroad.
Whether a political crime has been cornmitted from base motives is a question which cannot be
answered in general terms. It depends on the circumstances of each individual case. In this
particular instance Iran's political leadership ordered the crime purely in order to keep itself in
power. The killing of human beings in such manner on the orders of the state is utterly contemptible
because the message conveyed is that the life of a political opponent is of no value.
The deed therefore has the characteristics of a murder. Nor does the situation change when
seen from the point of view of the defendant Rhayel. He did not act out ofreligious fanaticism.
There was no religious motive whatsoever. The defendant knew that the victims were to be
killed not because of their religious beliefs but because of their opposition to the regime in
Iran. He was in no doubt as to the exclusively political nature ~f the crime. But even a politically
motivated persan must resist state orders to liquidate someone. It cannot be argued that
Rhayel felt he was in duty bound to carry out an order to kill. Even a fatwa, a legal opinion on
general and religious matters which has nothing to do with the order to kill in the present case,
cannot oblige a practising Muslim to kill another persan. If he does so nonetheless then that is
his own free will, his own decision.
Annex 33
- 7 -
The fact that the true originators of the crime and wirepullers were holders of political office in
Iran does not negate the conclusion that the crime was comrnitt:.-~ irom base mo,ive-: l'r ; t only
the crime itself deserves the utmost condemnation. The perpetrator who allows himself to be
used for the achievement of such criminal objectives is guilty of actions on the lowest moral
level. Any other assessment would suggest that terrorist activities by the state were being
condoned .
The Court also had to decide whether the defendant had burdened himself with grave guilt
within the meaning of section S 7a (1 ), first sentence, No. 2, of the Penal Code. Having considered
ail aspects of the crime and the personality of the perpetrator, it came to the conclusion
that this was the case.
The defendant Darabi is likewise guilty of a treacherous murder committed from base motives.
Darabi had been living in the Federal Republic of Gerrnany for many years and was familiar
with western attitudes, values and convictions. Especially the experience of having been sentenced
for his involvement in a violent attack by supporters of the Iranian regime on opposition
Iranian students in Mainz had made clear to him the great importance which the legal system of
this country attaches to t~e protection of a person's physical integrity. His approval of the
killing of people purely beéause they were political opponents has nothing to do with his different
cultural background. The reason for that approval lies in the fact that Darabi identified
himself in both thought and deed with the real architects of the crime and placed his services at
the disposai of a state which ordered a persan to be liquidated. t. ::yone who acts ;n tfus 1;1anner
is not merely the perpetrator but also acts from base motives, for even a persan who is prepared
to do anything to support the Islamic Revolution must stop short of participating in such
a crime. The overall assessment of the act and the personality of the perpetrator led to the
conclusion that Darabi, too, had placed a particularly heavy burden of guilt upon himself.
The defendant Amin is guilty of complicity in a quadruple murder. As the persan guarding the
door Amin clearly played an important rote which raises the question whether he was one of
the perpetrators. However, there are good grounds for assuming that Amin, because of his
attitude towards the crime, was merely an accomplice. Although the evidence has shown that
he was involved from a relatively early date, the court cannot rn!~ out that his pa11ici!')ation was
only half-hearted and that he merely became involved because he felt he had an obligation
towards Darabi. After al!, when Sharif told him he was to be one of the hit men he refused. He
gave family reasons for refusing, which shows that he had mentally and emotionally dissociated
himself from the crime. Nor was the death of the victims of any persona! interest to him . The
Annex 33
- 8 -
only reason why he took part was that he was a member of the group and that his role enabled
him to keep himself physically apart from the actual crime. This attitude shows that Amin no
longer wished to exercise a decisive influence on the course of events. He merely perforrned a
function which, having already refused his active participation, he felt he could not avoid. In
the final analysis, base motives determined his action as well. Amin knew about the details of
the crime proper. He realized that the perpetrators were committing a treacherous act. The
punishment for the accomplice must be in line with the punishment for the perpetrator, in this
case for murder. But there are cogent reasons for rnitigating the accomplice's sentence. In
these circumstances he could be given between three and fifteen years in prison. The sentence
of eleven years is therefore appropriate.
The defendant Atris, toc, is guilty of being an accessory to a quadruple murder. The scope of
the punishment is the same as that for Amin. His undertaking to hel p in the escape and his
activities in compliance with that undertaking were substantiai. He found out flight schedules
abroad, and after the crime had been comrnitted he took Rhayel to Rheine. Bv stealing his
brother's passport he placed him under suspicion of having been mvolved in the crime. On the
other hand, Atris' contribution to the crime was much less than Arnin's.
The defendant Ayad had to be acquitted because there was no evidence that he was involved in
either the complicity in or the conspiracy to commit a murder. Only towards the end of the
proceedings did the evidence suggest that, as a result of the intervention of the hit team, Ayad
may at that point have given up any thought of being involved in the crime, so that the charge
of complicity in murder could not be upheld. He could not be convicted for having conspired
to commit a crime because it remained unclear which role - that of perpetrator or accomplice -
Ayad had intended to play".
Senatsverwaltung für Justiz
- Just1zpressestelle Moabit -
P r essem i tte i lung
Nr.: 38/97 ----------------------------------------
Kammergericht:
Urteil im "Mykonos" - Proze~
B·ERLIN
re,efo" ~oo Nr
3 JO• .l9 ; ~ - 2280
l"l l err·q 9 3.3 - 22 80
) )0 , ., • 7
- i'!1eia.
OJO• 39-3
1 O. April 1997
Das Berliner Kammergericht hat heute, Donnerstag. den 1 O. April 1997, gegen die
Angeklagten Darabi und Rhayel wegen tateinheitlich begangenen Mordes in vier
Fallen eine lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe verhangt und die besondere Schwere ihrer
Schuld festgestellt. Wegen Beihilfe zum tateinheitl ich begangenen vierfachen Mord
hat das Gericht gegen den Angeklagten Amin eine Freiheitsstrafe von 11 Jahren
und gegen den Angeklagten Atris unter Einbeziehung einer weiteren Strate eine Gesamtfreiheitsstrafe
von 5 Jahren und 3 Monaten verhangt. Den Angeklagten Ayad
hat das Gericht vom Vorwurf der Beihilfe zum tateinheitlich begangenen vierfachen
Mord freigesprochen.
ln der mehrere Stunden dauernden mündlichen Urteilsbegründung hat das Kammergericht
unter anderem ausgeführt:
"Mit diesem Urteil beendet der Senat nach fast 3 1/2 Jahren ein Verfahren, dessen
Gegenstand der bewaffnete Anschlag vom 17. September 1992 in dem Lokal
Mykonos in Berlin war. Der Vorsitzende der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistan - Iran
(DPK-1) Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, der Europavertreter dieser Partei Fattah Abdoli,
der Deutschlandvertreter Homyoun Ardalan und ihr Berater und Dolmetscher Nurulah
Mohamadpour Dehkordi aus Berlin fanden dabei den Tod, der Wirt des Lokals
wurde schwer ver1etzt.
Der Senat konnte sich nicht darauf beschranken. nur den Ablauf der Tat vor Ort zu
klaren und festzustellen, ab und in welcher Weise die Angeklagten beteiligt waren.
Denn der Kern des Tatgeschehens ohne Kenntnis der Hintergründe und der die Tat
begleitenden Umstande hatte ein nur unvollkommenes Bild vermittelt. Die Fest~ex 33
lung von Taterschaft oder Beihilfe und die gerechte Bemessung von Schuld und
Annex 33
2
Strafe wâren nicht moglich gewesen. Der verfahrensre.chtliche Begrift der Tat geht
weiter. Er umfa~t den gesamten geschichtlichen Vorgang, innerhalb dessen Angeklagte
einen Straftatbestand verwirklicht haben sol/en. Die Sachaufklarung durch
den Senat hatte deshalb die Frage zu umfassen, aus welchen Gründen die Opter ihr
Leben lassen mufüen und wer das zu verantworten hat. Darüber hinaus war unmi!1-
verstandlich aufzuzeigen, da~ eine Rechtsgemeinschaft, die rechtsstaatlichen
Grundsatzen und dem in Art. 2 MRK geschützten Recht eines jeden Menschen auf
Leben verpflichtet ist, sich nicht hindern la!1t, solche Taten mit den ihr zur Verfügung
stehenden rechtlichen Mitteln zu verfolgen, die Schuldigen zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen
sowie Hintermanner und Drahtzieher zu benennen.
ln Presseberichten ist gelegentlich die Wendung gebraucht worden, der Iran saBe
mit auf der Anklagebank. Die Hauptverhandlung richtete sich indes ausschlie~lich
gegen die fünf Angeklagten. Oie Feststellung fremder Urheberschaft und Mitwisserschaft
dient allein dazu, die Tatbeitrage der Angeklagten zu beleuchten.
Il
Der Ausgangspunkt des Geschehens findet sich in den geschichtlichen Verhaltnissen
lrans, wie sie sich nach der islamischen Revolution entwickelt haben. Oas Streben
der in Iran lebenden Kurden nach Eigenstandigkeit brachte diesen Bevôlkerungsteil
und die ihn vertretenden politischen Organisationen, zu denen die DPK-1
gehërte, in Opposition zum herrschenden Regime. Die Führungspersënlichkeiten
der oppositionellen Gruppen, die den Anspruch auf Autonomie erhoben, wurden daher
verfolgt. Sie muBten siëh in das Ausland begeben und arbeiteten von dort aus im
wesentlichen durch Information und Propaganda auf ihre Ziele hin. Deshalb wurden
diese Personen auch im Exil durch den iranischen Geheimdienst beobachtet und
bekampft. Zu dessen wichtigsten Aufklarungsobjekten gehôrte die DPK-1, wie sich
aus einem Fernsehinterview des iranischen Ministers für Information und Sicherheit
Fallahian vom 30. August 1992 ergibt. Um diese Stimme zum Schweigen zu bringen,
faBte die politische Führung lrans den EntschluB, die Führung der DPK-1 nicht nur
polîtisch zu bekampfen, sondern sie zu liquidieren. Die Tëtung des damaligen Vorsitzenden
der DPK-1 Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou und zwei seiner Vertrauten am
13. Juli 1989 in Wien sowie die hier abgeurteilte Tat sind Folgen dieses Entschlusses.
Der rote Faden, der die Geschehnisse von Wien und Berlin verbindet, ist unübersehbar.
Es ist auszuschlieBen, daB sie auf Konflikte unter kurdischen Oppositionsgruppen
zurückzuführen sind.
Oie Beweisaufnahme hat einen Einblick in Entscheidungsablaufe der iranischen
staatlichen Führungsspitze gegeben, an deren Ende die Liquidierung von Regimegegnern
im Ausland steht. Die BeschluBfassung über entsprechende Operationen
liegt in den Handen des geheimen und auBerhalb der Verfassung stehenden
"Komitees für Sonderangelegenheiten", dem der Staatsprasident, der Minister des
Geheimdienstes VEVAK, der für die AuBenpolitik zustândige Chef, Vertreter des
Sicherheitsapparates und anderer Organisationen sowie der "religiôse Führer'' angehôren.
Dieser "religiëse Führer'' ist, dies muB zur Klarstellung hervorgehoben
werden, nicht das geistliche Oberhaupt der Muslime. Die religiôs-geistliche Führung
liegt nach wie var allein in den Handen von GroBayatollahs, die nicht dem "Komitee
für Sonderangelegenheiten" angehëren. Sei dem diesem Komitee angehërenden
"religiësen Führer", der auch ais "Revolutionsführer'' bezeichnet wird, handelt es
Annex 33
3
sich um ein nach der Revolution von 1979 geschaffenes politisches Amt, dessen
lnhaber allerdings ein hochrangiger Kleriker sein mu!1.
Die in dem "Komitee für Sonderangelegenheiten" getroffene Entscheidung ist Voraussetzung
für die Durchführung einer Operation mit Auslandsbezug . 1st das Ziel
einer solchen Operation die Tëtung eines Menschen, bestatigt der "religiëse Führer"
ais politische lnstanz den sogenannten Tëtungsbefehl , der die Scheinrechtfertigung
für die spatere Tëtung bildet. Verbindlichkeit entfaltet der Tëtungsbefehl weder in
rechtlicher noch in tatsachlicher Hinsicht, und zwar auch dann nicht, wenn er mit
einer Fatwa, einem Rechtsgutachten zu allgemeinen und religiësen Fragen, verbunden
ist. Er begründet selbst für schiitische Muslime keine Gehorsampflicht, sondern
stellt einen ohne Urteil verfügten staatlichen Liquidierungsauftrag dar.
Das "Komitee für Sonderangelegenheiten" übertragt die Ausführung einer beschlossenen
Operation regelmal1ig dem Mitglied, welches einen Bezug zu dem Ziel der
Operation hat und aufgrund seiner Mëglichkeiten am geeignetsten erscheint. Dieses
Mitglied betraut seinerseits einen sogenannten Teamführer mit der eigentlichen
Durchführung des Anschlags. Der Teamführer, ein kampferprobter, besonders befahigter
und geschulter Mann, wahlt seine Leute für das "Hit-Team" aus und hat gegenüber
den am Ort des Anschlags Beteiligten die letzte Entscheidungsbefugnis.
Genau nach diesem Muster ist die Ermordung Dr. Sharafkandis und seiner Begleiter
abgelaufen.
Ill
Nachdem Fallahian im "Komitee für Sonderangelegenheiten" Bericht erstattet und
dieses die Liquidierung Dr. Sharafkandis beschlossen hatte, wurde er von dem
Gremium auch mit der Durchführung der weiteren Operation betraut. Danach liefen
die Vorbereitungen für den Anschlag unter dem Codewort "Faryad Bozorg Alawi"
(frei übersetzt: Verlangen des Revolutionsführers) an. Fallahian schaltete daraufhin
die im VEVAK für derartige Operationen zustandige Abteilung "Rat für Sonderaufgaben"
ein. lm Auftrag dieses Rates reisten Ende Juni/Anfang Juli 1992 Asghar Arshat
und Kamali in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ein. Beide gehërten einer Tarnfirma
des VEVAK an und hatten die Aufgabe, die Planung der in Aussicht genommenen
Operation in die Wege zu leiten und hierüber Fallahian zu berichten. Bei der Verfolgung
ihrer Ziele bedienten sie sich Darabis, eines ërtlichen Verbindungsmannes des
Geheimdienstes VEVAK.
Darabi lebt seit 1980 in Deutschland. Er gehërte den Pasdaran an. Seine nachrichtendienstlichen
Aktivitaten wiesen ihn ais für die Tatvorbereitung besonders geeignet
aus. Aul1erdem verfügte Darabi über Verbindungen zu Anhangern der Hizballah,
einer vom Iran finanzierten, ausgerüsteten und ausgebildeten Gruppe, der sich der
Iran zur Bekampfung von Gegnern des islamischen Regimes mit militanten Mitteln
bedient und die sich zu zahlreichen, schweren terroristischen Gewalttaten bekannt
hat.
Auftragsgema13, begann Darabi, eine Gruppe für den Anschlag zusammenzustellen.
Hierfür gewann er u. a. die Libanesen Amin, Rhayel und Ali Sabra, die im Libanon
der Hizballah angehërten. Amin und Rhayel sind militarisch und ideologisch u. a. im
Iran ausgebildet worden. Beide waren 1989/1990 gemeinsam mit drei weiteren
Annex 33
4
Hizballahmitgliedern, unter ihnen Ali Sabra, ais Asylbewerber nach Deutschland gekommen.
Atris, der sich ebenfalls ais Asylant in Berlin aufhielt, hatte engere Kontakte
zu Amin und Rhayel. Ayad, der auch ais Asylbewerber nach Deutschland gekommen
war, gehorte nicht der Hizballah an. Er war im Libanon bis zu seinem Ausschlur.
i Angehôriger der Amal und galt dort ais sehr kampferfahren. Er war der Neffe
des Geschaftspartners und Schwagers Darabis.
Ayad war bereits im Juli 1992 in Umrissen in die Operation eingeweiht. Amin, Rhayel
und Atris wuf1ten spatestens Ende August 1992 von dem in Aussicht genommenen
Vorhaben und erklarten ihre Bereitschaft zur Mitwirkung. ln Vorbereitung auf den
Anschlag kaufte sich Darabi am 25. August 1992 ein Mobiltelefon, das ihm eine
schnelle und abhôrsichere Verbindung zu den Mittatern erlaubte.
Um den 7. September 1992 reiste das sogenannte "Hit-Team" in Berlin ein. Das
Kommando dieses Teams lag in den Handen von Sharif, bei dem es sich nach den
Aussagen von Mesbahi, der Quelle "C", um Abdolrahman Banihaschemi, einen
Mann mit einer qualifizierten Guerillaausbildung handelt. lhm oblag die eigentliche
Ausführung der Operation. ln Erfüllung seiner Aufgabe nahm Sharif Kontakt mit
Darabi auf. Ayad wurde von Sharif von der weiteren Mitwirkung an der Tat wegen
Unzuverlassigkeit, über deren Gründe nichts bekannt ist, ausgeschlossen. Ais weiterer
Tatbeteiligter wurde der mit Darabi eng befreundete Fazajallah Haidar aus Osnabrück
gewonnen. Er übernahm es, das Fluchtfahrzeug zu fahren. Aullerdem trat
ein noch Unbekannter namens "Mohamed", vermutlich ebenfalls ein Mitglied des HitTeams,
in die Gruppe ein. Am 11. September 1992 begann die letzte Phase der
Vorbereitungen. Amin wurde nach Berlin beordert, wo er am 12. September 1992 in
der Zweitwohnung Darabis mit Sharif, Rhayel und Haidar zusammentraf. Dort erschien
am nachsten Tag auch Darabi, der inzwischen die Schlüssel für eine Wohnung
am Senftenberger Ring erhalten hatte, die er ais konspirative Wohnung eingeplant
hatte. Darabi erteilte den Auftrag, Spuren in seiner Zweitwohnung zu beseitigen
und samtliche Sachen mitzunehmen. AuBerdem erklarte er, daB er nach Këln
oder Hamburg gehen werde; wenn die Ermittlungsbehôrden auf ihn stollen sollten,
würde er sagen, daB er zur Tatzeit im Westen gewesen sei. Am Abend des 13.
September 1992 brachte Darabi mit seinem PKW Sharif und Amin in die konspirative
Wohnung. Dort forderte er Sharif auf, ihn anzurufen, wenn alles vorbei sei. Noch
am selben Abend fuhr Darabi, wie angekündigt, nach Hamburg und blieb bis zum
18. September 1992 im westdeutschen Raum. Ebenfalls am 13. September 1992
kaufte Ali Sabra, ein enger Freund Darabis, mit Geld, das ihm Darabi zur Verfügung
gestellt hatte, das Fluchtfahrzeug. Spatestens am selben Tag entwendete Atris den
PaB seines Bruders, um diesen für eine etwaige Flucht Rhayels bereitzuhalten.
Am Abend des 14. September 1992 traf Dr. Sharafkandi in Berlin ein. Am nachsten
Tag wurde ein Treffen Dr. Sharafkandis mit Mitgliedern seiner Partei und anderen
Oppositionsvertretern im Lokal Mykonos für Donnerstag, den 17. September 1992,
vereinbart. Am 16. September 1992 wurde der Gruppe im Senftenberger Ring durch
einen nicht ermittelten Verrater Ort und Zeit dieses Treffens bekannt. Am selben Tag
brachten Rhayel und Haydar die Waffen, eine Maschinenpistole Uzi und eine Pistole
Llama, jeweils mit Schalldampfer, in die Wohnung Senftenberger Ring. Noch am
Abend desselben Tages unternahmen Amin und Rhayel sowie andere Beteiligte
unter Führung Sharifs einen Probelauf.
Annex 33
5
Mit den Watten ausgerüstet warteten die Tater am Abend des folgenden Tages auf
das Signal zum Losschlagen. Gegen 21 :00 Uhr klingelte in der Wohnung Senftenberger
Ring das Telefon. Das war das mit dem Verrater verabredete Signal, dal:s
sich die Opfer in dem Lokal aufhielten und die Operation anlaufen konnte. Unmittelbar
nach dem Anruf begaben sich die Tater in die Nahe des Tatortes. Gegen 22:50
Uhr betraten Sharif und Rhayel das Lokal und begaben sich direkt in den 1"1interen
Gastraum. Amin sicherte das Geschehen ab, indem er vor der Lokaltür Posten bezog.
Bevor Dr. Sharafkandi oder sonst einer der Teilnehmer die Situation erfassen
oder auf sie reagieren konnten, rief Sharif auf persisch das Schimpfwort "lhr Hurensë>
hne". Unmittelbar danach erë>ffnete Sharif das Feuer. Mit der MP schol:s er durch
die Sporttasche, die er in beiden Handen hielt, hindurch auf Dr. Sharafkandi,
Dekhordi, Abdoli und Ardalan. Dabei gab er 26 Schüsse in mindestens zwei kurzen
Feuerstë>l:sen ab. Rhayel, dem Sharif folgend, gab seinerseits aus der Pistole vier
Schüsse ab. Auf den in sich zusammengesunkenen Ardalan gab Rhayel einen
Fangschul:s in den Hinterkopf ab, der augenblicklich zum Tode führte. Zwei Schüsse
trafen Dr. Sharafkandi von rechts nach links in den Kopf, was darauf schliel:sen lal:st,
dal:s Rhayel seinen Standort hinter Ardalan gewechselt und um das obere Kopfende
des Tisches seitlich an Dr. Sharafkandi herangetreten war. Einen weiteren Schul:s
feuerte Rhayel aus einer Entfernung von unter 5 cm auf den Bauch von Dr. Sharafkandi
ab.
Der von zahlreichen Schüssen getroffene Dr. Sharafkandi war sofort tot. Abdoli verstarb
ebenfalls am Tatort. Nouri Dekhordi, der in das Klinikum Steglitz gebracht worden
war, konnte nicht mehr gerettet werden und starb im Krankenhaus. Tabib Ghaffari
überlebte schwerverletzf.
Nach der Tat wandten sich Sharif und Rhayel zur Flucht. Vor dem Lokal trafen sie
auf Amin. Sie begaben sich zu dem bereitstehenden Fahrzeug, in dem Haidar und
"Mohamed" warteten, und flohen mit diesen. "Mohamed" konnte bisher nicht ermittelt
werden. Sharif setzte sich auf dem Luftweg über die Türkei in den Iran ab. Dort erhielt
er ais Belohnung für die erfolgreiche Erledigung seines Auftrags einen PKW
Mercedes 230. Amin und Rhayel konnten kurz vor der geplanten Flucht aus
Deutschland aufgrund eines Hinweises des Bundesnachrichtendienstes verhaftet
werden.
IV
Nach diesen Feststellungen hat sich der Angeklagte Rhayel des Mordes schuldig
gemacht. Er hat die Arg- und Wehrlosigkeit der Opfer bewul:st für die Tat ausgenutzt
und damit heimtückisch gehandelt. Er handelte aul:serdem aus niedrigen Beweggründen.
Nach standiger Rechtsprechung des BGH verwirklicht ein Tater dieses
Mordmerkmal dann -aber auch nur dann- wenn sein Beweggrund für die Tat nach
allgemeiner sittlicher Wertung auf tiefster Stufe steht. Die Rhayel bestimmenden
Beweggründe waren deshalb zu prüfen. Die Tat hatte keinen religiësen Hintergrund.
Das gesamte Tatgeschehen bietet keinen Anhaltspunkt dafür, dal:s für die Tôtung
religiôse Verfehlungen der Opter mal:sgebend waren. Den Opfern war nicht vorgeworfen
worden, gegen Regeln des Koran verstor:sen oder sonst ein Sakrileg begangen
zu haben. Die Gründe, die zu ihrer erbarmungslosen Verfolgung geführt hatten,
waren rein machtpolitischer Art. Dal:s die Regierung eines "Gottesstaates", wie Iran
sich nennt, die Totung veranlal:st hat, andert daran nichts. Die religiose Verbramung
Annex 33
6
verdeckt n1cht. dal3i es dem herrschenden Regime in Iran allein darauf ankam, die
vom Ausland aus wirkende Opposition vernichtend zu schlagen.
Die Frage, unter welchen Voraussetzungen bei politisch motivierter Tat niedrige Beweggründe
vorliegen , laBt sich nicht allgemein beantworten. Es kommt auf die Besonderheiten
des Einzelfalles an . Hier ist die Tat dadurch gekennzeichnet, daB die
politische Führung des Iran sie allein aus Gründen der Machterhaltung angeordnet
hat. Die solchermaBen staatlich verordnete Tëtung von Menschen ist hëchst verachtenswert;
denn sie spricht dem politischen Gegner jeden Lebenswert ab. Die Tat
tragt daher Mordcharakter. Auch aus der Sicht des Angeklagten Rhayel ergibt sich
nichts anderes. Ein Handeln aus religiëser Verblendung liegt nicht var. Es fehlt jeder
religiëse Beweggrund . Dem Angeklagten war klar, daB die Opter nicht wegen ihrer
Glaubenseinstellung, sondern wegen ihrer oppositionellen Haltung gegenüber dem
herrschenden Regime in Iran getëtet werden sollten . Über den ausschlieBlich politischen
Charakter der Tat war er sich nicht im Zweifel. Auch ein politisch motivierter
Tater muB einem staatlichen Liquidierungsauftrag widerstehen. Es ist auszuschlie-
13,en, daB Rhayel sich für verpflichtet gehalten hat, einem Tëtungsbefehl Folge zu
leisten. Selbst eine Fatwa , ein Rechtsgutachten zu allgemeinen und religiësen Fragen,
die mit dem hier in Rede stehenden Tëtungsbefehl nichts zu tun hat, kann einen
glaubigen Moslem nicht verpflichten, einen anderen Menschen zu tëten. Tut er
es dennoch, so ist das sein freier Wille und seine eigene Entscheidung.
Der Wertung des Handelns aus niedrigen Beweggründen steht nicht entgegen, daB
die eigentlichen Taturheber und Drahtzieher staatliche Funktionstrager des Iran waren.
Nicht nur die Tat verdient das scharfste Unwerturteil. Auch der Tater, der sich in
den Dienst derartiger verbrecherischer Ziele stellt, handelt auf sittlich tiefster Stufe.
Jede andere Bewertung würde der Auffassung Vorschub leisten, daB Nachsicht gegenüber
staatsterroristischen Umtrieben geübt werde.
Der Senat hatte auch die Frage zu entscheiden, ob die Schuld des Angeklagten besonders
schwer im Sinne des § 57a Abs.1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 StGB wiegt. Aufgrund einer
Gesamtwürdigung von Tat und Taterpersënlichkeit hat der Senat diese Frage bejaht.
Der Angeklagte Darabi ist ebenfalls des heimtückisch und aus niedrigen Beweggründen
begangenen Mordes schuldig . Darabi lebte seit Jahren in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und war mit westlichem Gedankengut vertraut. lnsbesondere die
Erfahrung, die er durch seine Verurteilung wegen Beteiligung an einem gewalttatigen
Überfall regimetreuer lraner auf oppositionelle iranische Studenten in Mainz
gewonnen hatte, hat ihm gezeigt, welch hohe Bedeutung die hiesige Rechtsordnung
dem Schutz der kërperlichen Unversehrtheit beimil3it. Seine Billigung der Tëtung von
Menschen aus rein politischer Gegnerschaft hat nichts mit seiner Herkunft aus einem
anderen Kulturkreis zu tun. Die Ursache für diese Billigung liegt darin, daB
Darabi sein Denken und Handeln mit dem der eigentlichen Taturheber in Übereinstimmung
brachte und sich in den Dienst eines staatlichen Liquidierungsauftrages
stellte. Wer so handelt, ist nicht nur Tater, er laBt sich auch von niedrigen Beweggründen
leiten, denn auch ein zu allem bereiter Gefolgsmann der islamischen Revolution
darf sich an einem solchen Verbrechen nicht beteiligen. Eine Gesamtwürdigung
von Tat und Taterpersonlichkeit führt zu der Feststellung, daB auch die Schuld
Darabis besonders schwer wiegt.
Annex 33
7
Der Angeklagte Amin ist der Beihilfe zum tateinheitlich begangenen vierfachen Mord
schuldig. Ais Türsteher hat Amin einen objektiv wichtigen Tatbeitrag geleistet. der
die Überlegung nahelegt, ab er Mittater war. Gewichtige Gründe sprechen jedoch
dafür, Amin aufgrund seiner Einstellung zur Tat /ediglich ais Gehilfen anzusehen.
Die Beweisaufnahme hat zwar ergeben, daB Amin schon zu einem verhaltnismaBig
frühen Zeitpunkt in das Geschehen eingebunden war. Der Senat vermag aber nicht
auszuschlieGien . daGi er das nur halbherzig und lediglich aus einem Gefühl der Verpflichtung
Darabi gegenüber getan hat. SchlieGilich lehnte er es gegenüber Sharif
ab, die von ihm erwartete Rolle eines Schützen zu übernehmen. Die dafür geltend
gemachten familiaren Gründe zeigen sein inneres Abrücken von der Tat. Ein eigenes
lnteresse am Tod der Opfer hatte auch er nicht. Bestimmend für seine Mitwirkung
waren nur noch die Zugehërigkeit zur Gruppe und die Übernahme einer Tatigkeit,
die ihm auch eine raumliche Distanz zu dem eigentlichen Tëtungsvorgang erlaubte.
Diese Haltung zeigt, daB Amin nicht mehr gewillt war, auf den Ablauf der Tat
einen bestimmenden EinfluB zu nehmen. Er übte lediglich eine Funktion aus, von
der er g/aubte, daB er sich ihr nicht auch noch entziehen kënne. Niedrige Beweggründe
bestimmten letztlich auch sein Handeln. Amin wuBte um die Haupttat in ihren
Einzelheiten. lhm war bewuBt, daB die Tater heimtückisch vorgingen. Die Strafe für
den Gehilfen richtet sich nach der Strafdrohung für den Tater, hier also nach der
Strafdrohung für Mord. Die Strate für den Gehilfen ist aber zwingend zu mildern.
Unter Zugrundelegung des sich danach ergebenden Strafrahmens von drei bis zu
fünfzehn Jahren war eine Freiheitsstrafe von elf Jahren angemessen.
Auch der Angeklagte Atris ist der Beihilfe zum tateinheitlich begangenen vierfachen
Mord schuldig. Der Strafrahrilen bestimmt sich wie bei Amin. Die Zusage der Fluchthilfe
und die in Ausführung dieser Zusage geleisteten Aktivitâten sind erheblich. lm
Ausland erkundete er Flugzeiten, und nach der Tat brachte er Rhayel nach Rheine.
Durch die Entwendung des Passes setzte er seinen Bruder dem Verdacht der Tatbeteiligung
aus. Andererseits stellt sich der Tatbeitrag des Angeklagten Atris wesentlich
geringer dar ais der Amins.
Der Angeklagte Ayad ist freizusprechen, weil weder der Tatbestand der Beihilfe zum
Mord noch der der Verabredung eines Mordes erfüllt ist. Erst gegen Ende des Verfahrens
ergab die Beweisaufnahme, daB infolge des Eingreifens des "Hit-Teams" die
Überlegungen Ayads zur Tatausführung môglicherweise keine Fortwirkung entfalteten,
so dal1 der Vorwurf der Beihilfe zum Mord nicht aufrecht erhalten werden konnte.
Eine Verurteilung wegen der Verabredung eines Verbrechens konnte nicht erfolgen,
weil unklar blieb, welche Rolle - ab Tâter oder Gehilfe - Ayad sich bei der
Tatausführung zugedacht hatte."
Justizpressestelle Moabit
3/2/2017 FBI — Imam from Trinidad Convicted of Conspiracy to Launch Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2011/imam-from… 1/2
Imam from Trinidad Convicted of Conspiracy to
Launch Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
Defendant Plotted to Explode Fuel Tanks and Pipeline at
Airport
U.S. Attorney’s Office
May 26, 2011
Eastern District of New York
(718) 254-7000
BROOKLYN, NY—Following a four-week jury trial, Kareem Ibrahim was convicted today in the
Eastern District of New York of conspiring to attack John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens,
New York, by exploding fuel tanks and the fuel pipeline under the airport. The defendant believed the
attack would cause extensive damage to the airport and to the United States economy, as well as the
loss of innocent lives. The defendant faces a sentence of up to life in prison. Sentencing has been
scheduled for October 21, 2011.
The convictions were announced by Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York, and Janice K. Fedarcyk, Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
New York Field Office. The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint
Terrorism Task Force in New York.
The evidence at trial established that Kareem Ibrahim, an Imam and leader of the Shiite Muslim
community in Trinidad and Tobago, provided religious instruction and operational support to a
group plotting to commit a terrorist attack at JFK Airport. The plot originated with Russell Defreitas, a
naturalized United States citizen from Guyana, who drew on his prior experience working at JFK
Airport as a cargo handler to plan the attack on its fuel tanks and fuel pipeline. Beginning in 2006,
Defreitas recruited others to join the plot, including the defendant Kareem Ibrahim, Abdel Nur and
Abdul Kadir, a former member of parliament in Guyana.
In May 2007, Defreitas presented defendant Kareem Ibrahim with video surveillance and satellite
imagery of the targets for terrorist attack because Ibrahim had connections with militant leaders in
Iran. During cross-examination at trial, Ibrahim admitted that he advised the plotters to present the
plot to revolutionary leaders in Iran and to use operatives ready to engage in suicide attacks at the
airport. On one of the recorded conversations entered into evidence, Ibrahim told Defreitas that the
attackers must be ready to “fight it out, kill who you could kill and go back to Allah.”
According to the trial evidence, the conspirators also attempted to enlist support for the plot from
prominent international terrorist groups and leaders, including Adnan El Shukrijumah, an al Qaeda
leader and explosives expert, and Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of the Trinidadian militant group Jamaat Al
Muslimeen. Ultimately, the plotters followed Ibrahim’s direction and sent Abdul Kadir to meet with his
contacts in the Iranian revolutionary leadership, including Mohsen Rabbani, the former cultural
attache indicted for his leading role in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish cultural center in Buenos
Aires, Argentina.
Kareem Ibrahim, Nur and Kadir were arrested in Trinidad in June 2007, with Kadir aboard a plane
headed to Venezuela, en route to Iran. All three were subsequently extradited to the United States.
Defreitas was arrested in New York. After a trial in 2010, Russell Defreitas and Abdul Kadir were found
guilty and sentenced to life in prison. Nur pleaded guilty before trial to supporting the plot and was
sentenced to 15 years in prison.
The specific charges Ibrahim was convicted of are: conspiracy to attack a public transportation
system, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332f; conspiracy to destroy a building by fire or explosive, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(n); conspiracy to attack aircraft and aircraft materials, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 32; conspiracy to destroy international airport facilities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 37; and
conspiracy to attack a mass transportation facility, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(10).
“In pursuit of a radical terrorist agenda, bent on the destruction of John F. Kennedy Airport and the
murder of innocent civilians, Imam Kareem Ibrahim abandoned the true tenets of his religion,” stated
United States Attorney Lynch. “We will continue to seek out and bring to justice all those who plot to
attack the United States and its people.” Ms. Lynch extended her grateful appreciation to the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force in New York for its role in investigating and assisting in the prosecution of the
case, as well as to the Guyanese and Trinidadian law enforcement authorities who assisted with the
investigation and apprehension of the defendants.
“Ibrahim and his co-conspirators had elaborate plans to attack John F. Kennedy International Airport,
not only to cause carnage, but also to damage the economy,” said FBI Assistant Director in Charge
Fedarcyk “Today’s guilty verdict is not only a victory for the American justice system it is also a
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Home • New York • Press Releases • 2011 • Imam from Trinidad Convicted of Conspiracy to Launch Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
Annex 34
Annex 34
3/2/2017 FBI — Imam from Trinidad Convicted of Conspiracy to Launch Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
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Fedarcyk. Today s guilty verdict is not only a victory for the American justice system, it is also a
rejection of the extremist ideology he supported.”
The government’s case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Marshall L. Miller, Berit
W. Berger and Zainab Ahmad.
The Defendant:
KAREEM IBRAHIM, also known as “Amir Kareem” and “Winston Kingston”
Age: 65
Annex 34
Annex 35
2J2912Cl17 lrc11 'in Latin America terror plct' - Argentina prosecutor - BBC News
News Sport Weather Shop Earth Travel
Iran 'in Latin America terror plot' - Argentina prosecutor
29 May 2013 Latin America & Caribbean
An Argentine prosecutor has accused Iran of trying to infiltrate countries in Latin
America to sponsor and carry out "terrorist activities".
Alberto Nisman said Iran was attempting to set up intelligence-gathering stations in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and other countries in the region.
Annex 35
http1/www.l:b:.com/news/world-latin-america-Z271Z297 1/7
2J2912Cl17 lrcn 'in Léiin America terror plct' - Argentina ix-oseclior - BBC News
Mr Nisman is investigating a bomb attack that killed 85 people in a Jewish centre in Buenos
Aires in 1994.
Iran has always denied involvement in the attack.
But in an indictment handed to a federal judge in Buenos Aires on Wednesday, Mr Nisman
repeated the often-made claim that Iran sponsored the bombing.
ADVERTISEMENT
And he accused Iran of a nefarious project in the wider region.
"I legally accuse Iran of infiltrating several South American countries to install intelligence
stations - in other words espionage bases - destined to commit, encourage and sponsor terror
attacks like the one that took place against Amia," Mr Nisman was quoted as saying, referring to
the Jewish centre bombed nearly 20 years ago.
He said the countries targeted included Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Surinam.
tttp-J/www.l:b:.com/news/world-latin-america-Zl.71'm7
Annex 35
2fl
2J2912Cl17 lrcn 'in Léiin America terror plct' - Argentina ix-oseclior - BBC News
And he claimed that Mohsen Rabbani - the lranian former cultural attache in Buenos Aires who
Argentina blames for the Amia attack - was co-ordinating the alleged infiltration operation.
ln February Argentine legislators approved an agreement with Iran to set up an international truth
commission to investigate the Amia attack.
The Argentine government proposed this commission as a way to reactivate investigations into
the bombing, but the opposition and some Jewish groups in Argentina have criticised it.
Argentina has issued arrest warrants for several lranian nationals and a Lebanese national in
connection with the bombing.
Share this story About sharin9
More on this story
Argentina passes deal with Iran to probe Amia bombing
28 February 2013
Amia bombing: Israel condemns Argentina-lran probe
29 January 2013
Amia bombing: Argentina and Iran agree truth commission
28 January 2013
Iran bomb probe offer 'positive'
18 July 2011
Latin America & Caribbean
tttp-J/www.l:b:.com/news/world-latin-america-Zl.71'm7
Annex 35
317
Annex 36
United Nations
(~\ General Assembly
~ Sixty-second session
5th plena1y meeting
Tuesday, 25 September 2007, 3 p.m.
New York
AJ62IPV.5
Official Records
President: Mr. Kerim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p .m.
Add1·ess by Mt·. Mahinda Rajapaksa, President of
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
The President: The Assembly will now hear an
address by the President of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka.
Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa, President of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, was
escorted into the General Assembly Hall.
The President: On behalf of the General
Assembly, I have the honour to welcome to the United
Nations His Excellency Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa,
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, and to invite him to address the Assembly.
P1·esident Rajapaksa (spoke in Sinhala; English
text provided by the delegation) I am pleased to be able
to address the global community on the first day of the
current session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations.
Please accept my congratulations, Sir, on your
assumption of the high office of the President of the
sixty-second session. To Sheikha Haya Rashed
Al-Khalifa, I wish to convey Sri Lanka's gratitude for
her astute leadership of the sixty-first session.
Sri Lanka can boast of a very old and advanced
civilization, similar to Greek, Roman and Nile Valley
civilizations. One of the important characteristics of
our civilization is the use of living languages such as
Sinhala and Tamil, two languages used by many even
today. I therefore consider it my obligation to use
Sinhala, a living language, to address the General
Assembly.
Let me begin by quoting the immortal words of
Sir Isaac Newton: "We build too many walls and not
enough bridges". We all became Members of an
Organization that was created to let all our voices be
heard and to avoid an approach aimed at resolving
problems through violence, revenge and blame. Yet we
see a trend to find fault, to place countries in the dock
and penalize those who do not fall into line. Instead of
seeking solutions through cooperation, we have often
created suspicion and built walls bef.'Neen ourselves
through double standards.
I am proud to infonn the Assembly that, despite
the significant challenge posed by the ongoing conflict
with a mthless terrorist group in the north of our
country, we have freed the Eastern Province from
terrorism and restored law and order there. My
Govenunent has already launched a massive
programme of rehabilitation and reconstmction in the
east. We propose to make the Eastern Province of Sri
Lanka a model for development and rehabilitation,
essentially through our own effort but also with the
assistance of all donors. We are taking steps to return
the usurped rights of the people by conducting
provincial and local Government elections in the ea.st
early next year. There is a clear opportunity for the
international community to play a vital role in breaking
the cycle of conflict by focusing on development.
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original
languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature
of a member of the delegation concemed to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room
C-1S4A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.
ttÙi1Î111~ÎÎI 1i11?i1111111 111111111111
Annex 36
A/62/PV.5
12 07-51584
regrettably ensuring that one human being lives a
fulfilling life while another experiences a miserable
existence.
Representing the citizens of the world, we have
set for ourselves programmes requiring that all of us
work together to create better living conditions for
humanity and ensure that we achieve that which is
necessary for our mutual prosperity.
Together, rich and poor, developed and
developing, North and South, we can and must truly
hold hands and address the challenges of climate
change and sustainable development, work together to
defeat poverty and underdevelopment and ensure that
every human being is saved from the indecencies and
humiliations that are inseparable from poverty. But to
do that, we need first and foremost to implement the
decisions that we have adopted freely in this eminent
house of the representatives of the global community.
And so, let our actions speak louder than our words.
The Acting President: On behalf of the General
Assembly, I wish to thank the President of the Republic
of South Africa for the statement he has just made.
Mr. Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of
South Africa, was escorted from the General
Assembly Hall.
Address by Mr. Néstor Carlos Kirchner, President
of the Argentine Republic
The Acting President (spoke in French): The
Assembly will now hear an address by the President of
the Argentine Republic.
Mr. Néstor Carlos Kirchner, President of the
Argentine Republic, was escorted into the
General Assembly Hall.
The Acting President (spoke in French): On
behalf of the General Assembly, I have the honour to
welcome to the United Nations His Excellency
Mr. Néstor Carlos Kirchner, President of the Argentine
Republic, and to invite him to address the Assembly.
President Kirchner (spoke in Spanish): Allow
me at the outset to express my sincerest
congratulations to Mr. Srgjan Kerim on his assumption
of the presidency of the General Assembly at its sixtysecond
session. Argentina welcomes the new
Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, and expresses its
support for his efforts at the head of the United
Nations.
As in previous years, we have come to the
General Assembly with the aim of revitalizing this
world body and with the firm belief that this will
ensure the effectiveness of international law in settling
disputes, thus successfully dealing with any threats to
peace.
The world is facing problems. The only hope we
have of resolving them lies in respect for
multilateralism, support for local customs, observance
of international norms and conventions by all
countries, and, of course, the full realization of human
rights.
For each individual country, and for the world as
a whole, peace will be possible only if we promote
equality and work to combat poverty and
marginalization. The world cannot and must not be a
place where violations of human rights are everywhere.
Peaceful coexistence is strengthened and maintained
through true solidarity between nations based upon a
concept of humanity that goes beyond the purely
military or the predominantly unilateral.
Our international policy is based on the values of
representative democracy, sovereignty of the people,
respect for fundamental human rights, and the active
upholding of international peace and security. Those
principles are shared by the vast majority of the
Argentine people. They help to focus the Government’s
activities and are reflected in the decisions taken by the
Argentine Republic at the international level.
We firmly support the construction of more just
and equitable societies that distribute more equitably
the benefits of economic growth. We know that each
country must have the right to seek out its own
development model, without external pressure.
The past few years have been very testing for us.
Considerable efforts have been made to rescue a nation
that barely five years ago was in the throes of an
unprecedented social and economic crisis. At the time,
many people thought that recovery might be
impossible. But day by day, with a great deal of effort
and humility, we revived production in a country
burdened by a foreign debt that threatened our future
with its conditions and constraints.
Argentina — a developing country which once
demonstrated that it is truly possible to climb the social
Annex 36
A/62/PV.5
07-51584 13
ladder; a country of immigrants where workers once
succeeded in sending their children to university; a
country once without illiteracy and having almost
banished child mortality — had been reduced to a
country of workers demoralized by unemployment,
children begging in the streets instead of going to
school, and the elderly living off miniscule pensions
and becoming dependent on their children and
grandchildren.
Our country’s coffers had been emptied owing to
the rigid application of the rules of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). As a corollary, there was
violence in the streets, and Argentina experienced an
institutional crisis, with presidents lasting only days.
For the first time, Argentina sent off its own children
into an unprecedented economic exile.
Today the Argentine State has won its autonomy
and itself administers the variables of its
macroeconomy as best it can in the current
international environment. It pursues a sound,
disciplined and predictable economic policy within a
stable and democratic framework.
Our capacity for revitalization has allowed us,
even without receiving funding, to begin cancelling our
net debt with international organizations. We have even
paid off in advance all of our debt with the IMF — an
IMF that supported and promoted Governments that
were self-supporting, adjusting and patching up their
budgets, but at the cost of increasing the poverty of
their people, promoting deindustrialization and
irresponsibly plunging the country into debt.
Faced with the incredulous criticism of the
promoters of orthodox prescriptions, Argentina, thanks
to cautious monetary policies, disciplined public
expenditures and a healthy budget surplus that enabled
it to face or mitigate potential foreign crises, has
reduced the debt and registered an annual growth rate
of 9 per cent during the past five years. This was the
strongest uninterrupted economic expansion of any in
the past 100 years.
Today we represent the empirical proof that there
is life after the Fund and also the certitude that other
paths can lead to development and integration. We
serve as a reminder of the unreliability of models that
claim to be universally valid and the revindication of
the right of countries to choose their own path,
benefiting from international experience while
prioritizing their national interests and circumstances
above any other interest. Our case provides proof that
the international economic architecture must be
reformed, in particular that of IMF. The Fund is an
exponent of an old world order that is no longer valid.
Our case demonstrates the need for change in the
multilateral financial institutions so that they can
cooperate in the development of the less-well-endowed
nations and help to fight poverty and generate true
options for progress.
We are thinking, not of economic growth as
defined by economic experts or historians, but of
growth that has a strong social component and an
emphasis on equity, where citizens are the focus of the
results. Whereas one fourth of the labour force
experienced the humiliation of being unemployed,
unemployment has been reduced to 7.8 per cent since
we have taken office. We are speaking, not about just
any sort of work, but about appropriate and decent
work of the kind we advocated at the most recent
summit meeting of the Americas, which was held in
our country.
Thanks to a productive policy that generates
added value and, in addition, appeals to private
enterprises to show social responsibility, we are
reindustrializing Argentina. The economic indicators
posted by our country today would have been
impossible were it not for the complementarity of
action between the State and the private sector.
Our sales to all destinations have doubled over
the past four years, with a 16 per cent annual growth
rate. Investments have improved substantially: gross
domestic fixed investment has increased for the past 17
consecutive quarters; the ratio of investment to GDP is
between 20 and 23 per cent — in stark contrast to the
level of 2002 when it was hardly more than 11 per
cent.
When faced with that crisis almost five years ago,
we felt compelled to maintain essential assistance
policies for the most vulnerable segments of our
population. We do not regret those policies, and today
we can state that the true solution to the serious social
problems affecting our country, and many others
around the world, lies in providing jobs, health care
and education.
In the area of health, Argentina has launched a
national policy that includes prescriptions for generic
drugs and the provision of essential medications free of
charge. It also strengthens maternity and child
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programmes and everything that relates to primary
health care, in line with the goals of equity and
protection. This has enabled us to compensate in part
for the disastrous state of the public health sector a
short time ago.
Of course, education is an essential element for
renewing the social and moral fabric of the nation,
even though the time horizon for its effects to be felt is
longer than those of other public policies. In order to
remedy the tragic situation that signalled the
breakdown of society and the failure on the part of the
State to protect those who were most vulnerable, a new
law on national education was passed. It will again
focus on ensuring equality of opportunity through
guaranteed access to a quality education throughout the
territory that is linked to the labour market and
includes excellent training for teachers. Under the new
law, a deadline of 2010 has been set, by which time
6 per cent of the gross national product will be used to
finance education.
In this context of steady recovery, Argentina’s
foreign policy is being strengthened and expanded,
with a clear and decisive commitment to the national
interest. Regional integration is a priority. Over the
past two decades, through the Common Market of the
South (MERCOSUR), Argentina has strengthened its
commercial ties with the countries of the region. But
its trade relations go far beyond the region. In that
sense, multilateral negotiations within the World Trade
Organization are of particular importance because the
liberalization of our agricultural sector — in which our
country has clear competitive advantages — depends
on them, as does the adequate flexibility we need to
carry out our industrial policies.
More equitable and fairer rules in international
trade are of great importance to Argentina. We
therefore participate actively in multilateral economic
negotiations with the firm goal of achieving equity in
the norms that govern world trade and of reversing the
discrimination erected against our main products
through tariff barriers and other trade-distorting
instruments imposed by the developed countries.
Argentina will be present in all multilateral
forums, where we will participate to ensure more
equitable and democratic rules. Multilateralism is the
most effective instrument for winning the battle against
hunger, poverty, exclusion and environmental
degradation.
Everything I have said here is both cause and
consequence of institutional stability and respect for
the rule of law. The three pillars of the Argentine State
are making decisions to combat impunity and preserve
memory, truth, and justice. We have begun bringing to
justice those guilty of serious human rights violators.
Those who imagined themselves having escaped with
impunity are fiercely resisting justice and, in an
attempt to intimidate witnesses, have caused the
disappearance of one witness, Julio Lopez. They have
thereby sent a dark message to a society that is seeking
the truth about the crimes against humanity which they
committed, and that condemns such acts.
Unconditional respect for human rights is our
new national paradigm. In the past, we were known
throughout the world for violations of those rights;
today, as we strive to find the truth and to punish the
guilty, we also seek to defend those rights worldwide.
Argentina, the Mothers and Grandmothers of the
Plaza de Mayo in the monumental dignity of their
struggle, and the Argentine people have personally
suffered under the inefficiency of a broken multilateral
human rights system. Their sole comfort were the very
precious humanitarian gestures of individuals,
organizations and countries. While people were being
kidnapped, tortured and killed in my country, the
mechanisms established precisely to condemn and
prevent such horrors remained silent. It is in their
memory, so that this will never happen again, that we
support the new Human Rights Council and hope that it
will live up to the expectations of the international
community.
My Government has endorsed instruments of
great importance, including the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, adopted by this Assembly on
20 December 2006, which we signed in Paris on
6 February. That instrument, along with the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
Optional Protocol of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, gives continuity and concrete form to a policy
that ascribes a central role to the promotion of human
rights.
In our public policy, we now focus on
environmental protection, but we know that there will
be no viable solution without cooperation among all
the countries of the world, the industrialized countries
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in particular, because the nature of the problem is of a
global scale.
The issue of climate change should be of concern
to all Governments, because no corner of the planet is
unaffected by changes that have been identified as due
to human activity. The Secretary-General’s convening
of yesterday’s High-level Meeting was a timely
manifestation of the urgent need to strengthen
international cooperation as an effective and adequate
response to protect the environment and prevent the
unacceptable exportation of pollutants to the
developing countries.
One after the other, various diplomatic efforts to
halt the violence in the Middle East once and for all
have failed, but we cannot merely throw up our hands.
No military solution will lead to peace and the
tranquillity that all the peoples of the region so
desperately call for. The invasion of Iraq, which we
rejected at the time it occurred, is the tragic and painful
proof of the truth of our position. The Security Council
and the nations of the Quartet have the heavy
responsibility of accompanying and, if possible,
guiding a peace process that can succeed with courage
and great perseverance.
The Argentine Republic continues, year after
year, tirelessly to condemn the serious threat of
terrorism throughout the world. We believe that all acts
of terror are criminal and unjustifiable and that no
argument can justify them. Just as no nation of the
world is beyond their reach, the response must be a
joint effort of all nations, and especially this
Organization, to stop and eliminate this scourge. We
cannot tolerate the actions of those responsible for
terrorism or of those who defend, finance or protect
terrorists, be they individuals or countries.
Argentina has twice suffered terrorist attacks. The
Israeli embassy was attacked in 1992 and the AMIA
headquarters in 1994. Some 102 members of our
community, some of whose relatives are here with us
today, lost their lives. Those victims, united by terror to
those of this city, those of Madrid, those of London,
those of Bali, those of Istanbul and those of many other
places, impose upon us the moral mandate to respect
their memories and to commit all our energies to
hunting down, finding and prosecuting those
responsible.
Despite the difficulties that have arisen through
the passage of time, given that those attacks took place
13 and 15 years ago, respectively, and the subsequent
cover-ups, our interest and the justice system continue
to seek the truth, and we keep our memory of the
horror alive so that it will not recur.
In November last year, the Argentine justice
system called for international cooperation in the
apprehension of nine people suspected of having
initiated and planned the 18 July 1994 attack on AMIA,
and the Executive Committee of INTERPOL
unanimously recommended the apprehension of six
Iranian citizens and one Lebanese involved in the
affair. We call here for that recommendation to be
ratified during the November session of the
INTERPOL General Assembly.
In that context, we hope that the Islamic Republic
of Iran, in the context of applicable international law,
will accept and respect Argentina’s legal jurisdiction
and cooperate effectively with Argentine judges to
bring to justice those involved in these events. In that
respect, I wish to say here, at United Nations
Headquarters and before all the countries of the world,
that, unfortunately, the Islamic Republic of Iran has to
date failed to offer the required cooperation with the
Argentine justice system to resolve those issues.
We call on the Secretary-General and on all the
nations of the world to persuade the Islamic Republic
of Iran to allow the judicial process to move forward.
We do so with the sole aim of clarifying the facts and
bringing those responsible to justice. Respect for the
memory of our 102 victims requires justice to be
carried out. We request the Islamic Republic of Iran to
cooperate in the implementation of the norms of
international law to allow us to come to nothing more,
but nothing less than the truth.
Nations big and small, rich and poor, all
throughout the world will be highly vulnerable if we
fail to grasp that action against terrorism requires
urgent multilateral, intelligent and sustained action
firmly anchored in legitimacy, respect for individual
rights, proportional response and respect for
international public opinion.
Efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction can count on the firm support and full
participation of the Argentine Republic.
My country is known for the active role it plays
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Argentina
develops, consumes and exports nuclear energy for
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peaceful purposes in the framework of the strictest
respect for the norms enshrined in the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the
non-proliferation regime in its broadest sense.
Efforts to prevent proliferation are ethically and
legally correlated to progress on disarmament. Indeed,
the legal instruments on which the prohibition of
weapons of mass destruction is based specifically on
the firm commitment not to develop new weapons of
terror and destruction in the understanding that those
who possess such weapons will proceed to their
gradual and effective elimination.
In recent years, we have seen disarmament
commitments permanently eroded. Nuclear arsenals
remain disproportionately large and nuclear
disarmament agreements are in stasis. It should come
as no surprise, then, that, given the situation, there are
those who question the legitimacy of pursuing
unilateral advocacy for non-proliferation while solemn
commitments in the area of disarmament are ignored.
Conventional weapons are responsible for the
deaths of millions of people around the world. Our
country has given a high priority to initiatives
associated with the conclusion of an arms trade treaty.
Domestically, we have initiated programmes for the
voluntary handover of firearms, the initial results of
which have been encouraging.
The reform of the Security Council is still
pending. We are hoping for a reform that will make this
central body more responsible, democratically
representative and dynamic. It will not, however,
achieve this objective by creating new privileged
categories. We trust that the ongoing process of
consultations will be successful so that the Council can
be adapted to today’s world.
Before concluding I wish to raise a matter of
continuing importance to the Argentine Republic: the
question of the Malvinas Islands, which include South
Georgia, South Sandwich and the maritime areas
surrounding those islands. This year, 174 years will
have passed since the British began to occupy this part
of Argentine national territory. Ever since that act of
force in 1833, my country has protested against this
illegal occupation and has demanded that the full
exercise of its sovereignty be restored.
We would also mention that 2007 marks the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1982 conflict in the
South Atlantic, a conflict unleashed by the military
dictatorship without the backing of the Argentine
people, who had always endeavoured to find a peaceful
solution to its legitimate sovereignty claim.
The General Assembly has dealt with this matter
on many occasions, both prior to and since 1982.
Starting in 1965, when the Assembly adopted
resolution 2065 (XX), the Organization has recognized,
year after year, the existence of a sovereignty dispute
between Argentina and the United Kingdom relating to
the question of the Malvinas Islands. It urged the two
Governments to negotiate, as soon as possible, a
peaceful, just and lasting solution to the dispute, taking
into account the relevant resolutions of United Nations
bodies and the interests of the people of the islands.
The ongoing and unrenounceable objective of
regaining the full exercise of Argentine sovereignty
over this part of our territory and the permanent
readiness of my country to resume negotiations aimed
at finding a solution to the dispute have been reflected
in our national Constitution.
It is incomprehensible to us that the United
Kingdom should be unwilling to negotiate this matter,
thereby violating the provisions of General Assembly
resolution 2065 (XX) and numerous similar
resolutions.
The time has come for the United Kingdom to
shoulder its responsibility and put an end to an
anachronism: the illegal occupation for clearly colonial
purposes of territory belonging to another State.
My Government vigorously rejects the British
claim on the establishment of maritime areas
surrounding the archipelagos. In particular, it rejects
the recently divulged intention of the United Kingdom
to make a submission to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf — established by the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — relative
to the outer limits of the continental shelf of these
Argentine territories.
In this, my last message to the General Assembly
as the President of the people of Argentina, I wish to
reaffirm our profound conviction that it is only through
democracy, accompanied by freedom, social justice
and peace, that man can realize his full potential. This
Assembly of the peoples has a bounden duty to help
ensure that that will come to pass.
Annex 36
Annex 37
United Nations
(~\ General Assembly
~ Sixty-third session
5 th plena1y meeting
Tuesday, 23 September 2008, 9 a m.
New York
AJ63IPV.5
Official Records
President: Mr. Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Nicaragua)
The meeting was called to order at 9.10 a.m.
Agenda item 100
Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the
Organization (A/63/1)
The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance
with the decision taken at its 2nd plena1y meeting, on
19 September 2008, the General Assembly will hear a
presentation by the Secretary-General of his annual
report on the work of the Organization (A/63/ 1), under
agenda item 100. I give the floor to the Secreta1yGeneral.
The Secretary-General: I welcome all participants
to the opening of the general debate of the sixty-third
session of the General Assembly. It is customa1y for the
Secretary-General, on this occasion, to assess the state of
the world and to present our vision for the coming year.
We all recognize the perils of our current moment
time. We face a global financial crisis, a global energy
crisis and a global food crisis. Trade talks have
collapsed yet again. We have seen new outbreaks of
war and violence and a new rhetoric of confrontation.
Clearly, climate change threatens our planet ever more.
We often say that global problems demand global
solutions. And yet, today we also face a crisis of a
different sort. Like those others, it knows no borders. It
affects all nations. It complicates all other problems. I
refer, here, to the challenge of global leadership.
We are on the eve of a great transition. Our world
has changed more than we may realize. We see new
centres of power and leadership in Asia, Latin America
and across the newly developed world. The problems
we face have grown much more complex. In that new
world, our challenges are increasingly those of
collaboration, rather than confrontation. Nations can no
longer protect their interests or advance the well-being
of their peoples without the partnership of other
nations.
Yet, I won-y. There is, today, a danger of losing
sight of that new reality. I see a danger of nations
looking more inward, rather than towards a shared
future. I see a danger of retreating from the progress
we have made, particularly in the realm of
development and a more equitably sharing of the frnits
of global growth. That is tragic, for at this tüne one
thing is clear: we must do more, not less. We must do
more to help our fellow human beings weather the
gathering stonn. Yes, global growth has raised billions
of people out of poverty. However, if you are among
the world's poor, you have never felt poverty so
sharply. Yes, international law and justice have never
been so widely embraced as on this sixtieth
anniversa1y of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
However, those living in nations where human
rights are abused have never been so vulnerable. Yes,
most of us live in peace and security. However, we see
deepening violence in many nations that can lea.st
afford it: Afghanistan, Somalia, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Iraq and Sudan, to name but a few.
We can do something about it, and with strong global
leadership, we will.
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original
languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature
of a member of the delegation concemed to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room
C-1S4A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.
ttûi11111Î11111i11?i111111111111 1111111
Annex 37
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22 08-51570
recent example is the indirect peace talks that Syria
and Israel started under Turkey’s auspices this past
May in Istanbul.
In Iraq, too, Turkey stands firmly with the Iraqi
people and Government. Besides our bilateral efforts, I
am particularly pleased to see that the Neighbouring
Countries process, which I initiated five years ago, is
functioning well. If the international community’s
efforts are to succeed, the Iraqi people need to settle
their differences through dialogue and compromise on
controversial issues, among them the final status of
Kirkuk.
Afghanistan is another country where Turkey is
investing heavily in the future of a nation with which
we have special historical ties. Turkey will continue to
contribute to the security of the Afghan people and to
their reconstruction efforts. We will also continue our
initiatives to create an atmosphere conducive to
regional ownership and cooperation, in particular
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. That is equally vital
for the common struggle against terrorism and for the
stability of the region.
Finally, an urgent and peaceful settlement of the
question of Iran’s nuclear programme, in conformity
with International Atomic Energy Agency norms and
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
obligations and respecting the right to the peaceful use
of nuclear energy, remains high on Turkey’s active
diplomatic agenda.
I am convinced that would-be solutions to
individual conflicts in the Middle East will be
sustainable only if we adopt a comprehensive approach
based on a positive vision for the future. That is why I
invite all the parties to give serious consideration to the
longstanding idea of collective arrangements for
conflict prevention and resolution that would promote
regional security and stability by building confidence,
facilitating political dialogue and encouraging
economic and cultural cooperation in the Middle East.
Turkey gives full backing to diplomatic efforts
towards a political settlement in Cyprus. The solution
lies in the establishment of a new partnership State
composed of two constituent States of equal status. The
process towards that goal should be based on the
United Nations parameters of bi-zonality and the
political equality of the two sides. We welcome and
firmly support the comprehensive settlement
negotiations recently started between the two leaders
under the good offices of the Secretary-General.
At the same time, I believe that efforts to end the
unfair isolation of the Turkish Cypriots who voted
courageously in favour of the Comprehensive
Settlement of the Cyprus Problem in 2004 — a plan
that was unfortunately rejected by the other side — are
long overdue.
Before concluding, I would like to stress the
indispensable nature of the United Nations in resolving
all those matters. Indeed, without an effective and
functional world body, it is impossible to realize the
hopes and expectations of our nations. That is why we
attach the utmost importance to reforming and further
strengthening the United Nations system as a whole. It
is also why Turkey is constantly stepping up its
engagement in and contributions to all aspects of the
United Nations agenda, ranging from development and
peacekeeping to human rights.
It is also with that sense of responsibility that
Turkey has decided to put forth its candidature for a
non-permanent seat on the Security Council for 2009
and 2010. Turkey has not been represented in the
Council for nearly half a century, and we believe that
the main tenets of our foreign policy, together with our
economic, social and cultural attributes, will allow us
to bring added value to the work of the Council. I hope
that the General Assembly, with its valuable support,
will do us the honour of granting Turkey the
opportunity to do so.
The President (spoke in Spanish): On behalf of
the General Assembly, I wish to thank the President of
the Republic of Turkey for the statement he has just
made.
Mr. Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of
Turkey, was escorted from the General Assembly
Hall.
Address by Ms. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner,
President of the Argentine Republic
The President (spoke in Spanish): The
Assembly will now hear an address by the President of
the Argentine Republic.
Ms. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, President
of the Argentine Republic, was escorted into
the General Assembly Hall.
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The President (spoke in Spanish): On behalf
of the General Assembly, I have the honour to welcome
to the United Nations Her Excellency Ms. Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner, President of the Argentine
Republic, and to invite her to address the Assembly.
President Fernández de Kirchner (spoke in
Spanish): As the first female head of State in the
history of my country, I would like to address this
Assembly by speaking first on the issue of human
rights. Members know that, for my country, the policy
of unrestricted respect for and promotion of human
rights is one of our State policies.
In that context, I would like to urge that the
International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance — which was so
energetically promoted by our country and which I
co-signed, as First Lady of the Argentine Republic, in
Paris last year together with 73 other delegations — be
ratified by all countries that have signed it. Thus far,
only four countries — Argentina, Albania, Mexico and
Honduras — have ratified it. I know that the Republic
of France will soon be ratifying it, but it is
indispensable that we all strongly commit to ensuring
that the inviolability of persons be one of the guiding
principles for all States.
In this context, I would also like to put forward
the Latin American Initiative for the Identification of
Disappeared Persons. I would like to say that, together
with the Guatemalan Foundation for Forensic
Anthropology, the Argentine Forensic Anthropology
Team and the Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team,
we are promoting this initiative to establish genetic
identity banks to enable us to report precisely on
violations of human rights and properly identify
victims.
We deem invaluable the testimony of the women
who are with us here at the Assembly today, members
of Las Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo — the Grandmothers
of the Plaza de Mayo — who envisioned the creation
of this genetic information bank. They have been able
to recover, from oblivion and disappearance, 95 of the
500 grandchildren who disappeared, children of those
political prisoners who disappeared under the former
dictatorship in Argentina.
The work of these women is living witness to
how, even amidst adversity and against all that State
terrorism — not just in my country but in other
republics — has meant, it is possible to overcome
death and fight for life. The recovery of these children
shows how important — how crucial — it is to support
this type of initiative and underlines the importance of
the work that has been done to identify the victims of
the Balkan wars and those of the 11 September attack
on the World Trade Center.
In the fight against impunity, which is a State
policy in the Republic of Argentina, we cannot fail to
mention an issue that, for us, is undoubtedly another
cornerstone of this inexhaustible struggle. My country,
the Republic of Argentina, suffered two attacks, in
1992 and 1994: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
Embassy and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine
Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) building.
Last year, before this very Assembly, former
President Kirchner asked INTERPOL to ratify the
arrest warrants issued by my country’s Ministry of
Justice against Iranian citizens accused of participating
in the AMIA building bombing. Days later, INTERPOL
ratified them, and international arrest warrants were
issued accordingly. I call upon the Islamic Republic of
Iran, in compliance with international law, please to
agree that the Argentine justice system can bring to
trial in public, transparent courts, and with the full
guarantees given by a democratic system, those
citizens who stand accused.
Before all the countries of the world brought
together in this Assembly, and with the conviction I
have always held that innocence must be respected
until an individual has been convicted and sentenced
by a competent judge, I would like to affirm that, in my
country, those citizens will have a fair and public trial
with their full participation, with all the guarantees
afforded by Argentine law and by the oversight of the
international community. Given the gravity of these
events, this would guarantee to the Islamic Republic of
Iran that there would be fairness, truth and justice in
that trial.
I would thus urge once again that, in compliance
with international law and because ensuring access to
justice is what truly shows how we respect truth,
justice and freedom, this request from the Argentine
justice system, accepted by INTERPOL, be respected.
That would undoubtedly contribute to providing truth
for all — not just for Argentines, but for the entire
international community — at a time when truth and
justice are elusive values internationally.
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24 08-51570
In this Hall, as we have been doing since 2003, I
would also like to call for the reform of our
multilateral bodies — not only of the United Nations,
which includes us all, but also of the multilateral
financial institutions as well. That involves us all, and
it is necessary to recreate a multilateralism which has
been lost, leading to a far more insecure world. The
Organization needs to be reformed, not just from the
point of view of dogmatic approaches to the world, but
to meet the real need of all States to ensure the
functional, operational and results-oriented character of
the activities and interventions of the Organization.
In this context, I would modestly like to put
forward an example from our region, South America,
of how we were recently able to demonstrate that
multilateralism can be achieved, despite differences of
approach and vision that different Governments in our
region may have.
Here I am looking at the President Evo Morales —
the legitimate President of our sister Republic of
Bolivia. I would like to say that, a few days ago, the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) met in
support of the democratic legitimacy of that country. In
a concrete multilateral exercise, heads of State, who do
not always share the same viewpoints or interests when
we take decisions, were able to work unanimously to
forge a resolution and plan of action to help our sister
Republic of Bolivia, affected by those who do not
respect the democratic will of the people freely
expressed through elections.
That is not our only experience of
multilateralism. Previously, at the meeting of the Rio
Group in the Dominican Republic, at the time of the
incident between the sister Republics of Ecuador and
Colombia, heads of State intervened and were able to
navigate a conflict which, on the basis of history, in
other situations would surely have degenerated into an
armed conflict between two sister countries.
What I want to say with this is that, for us, the
exercise of multilateralism is not simply a hackneyed
speech. It is a deeply-held conviction and a concrete
and objective policy, showing results in what are
normally called emerging regions, where we are
capable of giving examples of multilateral
collaboration in overcoming conflicts.
The other reform that we have always promoted
is that of the multilateral credit institutions, but
fundamentally the reform of an economic model that
placed the generation of wealth at the centre of the
fictional economy and of the world of finances. Recent
days show that those matters, those positions, were not
the result of an ideological bias or closed dogmas but
of objective and timely observation of what was going
on.
Today, we cannot speak of the “caipirinha effect”
or the “tequila effect” or the “rice effect”, or the effect
that always showed that the crisis moved from the
emerging countries towards the centre. Today, if we
were to give it a name, we would have to say, perhaps,
the “jazz effect”, which moves from the centre of the
first economy of the world and spreads to the rest of
the world. That situation does not make us content or
happy.
Quite the contrary, we consider this an historic
opportunity to review behaviour and policies, because
during the period of the Washington Consensus, we —
the countries of South America — were told that the
market would solve everything, that the State was not
necessary, that State intervention was something for
which groups that had not understood how the
economy had developed were nostalgic. However, now
we are seeing the most formidable State intervention in
memory from exactly the place where we had been told
that the State was not necessary, in the framework,
moreover, of an incredible fiscal and trade deficit.
My country, the Argentine Republic — which, if
it continues to grow at the rates at which it has been
growing since 2003, will this year be completing the
largest economic growth cycle of its almost 200-year
history — has always upheld the need for a State
presence, fundamentally because the market does not
assign resources to the most vulnerable sectors and
because we see the State as connecting the interests of
society and market interests.
Since 2003, an Argentina that had been in debt up
to as much as 160 per cent of its GDP has today
reduced its debt to almost 50 per cent of GDP. We have
fully paid our debt to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and about 15 days ago we announced that we
will settle our debt with the Paris Club, which had a
cut-off date of 10 December 1983 — the very year
when the first democratic President took office, after
the dictatorship. Here in New York yesterday, in the
Council on Foreign Relations, I announced that
Argentina has received a proposal from three very
important banks that represent bond-holders who did
Annex 37
A/63/PV.5
08-51570 25
not participate in the 2005 bond exchange and who are
proposing to do so in conditions more favourable for
my country, Argentina, than those of the 2005
exchange.
Thus we believe not only that our strategy has
been correct but that it is absolutely necessary for all of
us to review, with a great deal of intellectual humility,
what is happening today in the markets and see what
are the possible solutions for overcoming the situation.
We emerging countries have a great advantage in what
we do not have: no credit risk agency will come,
nobody from the IMF will come tell us what to do, a
great country that has grown on the basis of its real
economy and today really has problems on the basis of
a casino economy or a fictional economy, where it was
thought that only capitalism can produce money. I
always say that capitalism was invented in order to
earn money, but on the basis of the production of
goods, services and knowledge. Money alone does not
produce more money. It has to go through the circuit of
production, work, knowledge, services and goods so
that there can be a virtuous cycle that can generate
well-being for the whole of society.
Finally, I want to mention a matter that affects
not only my country, beyond its geographical location,
but also concerns this Assembly and also the need to
face the twenty-first century without colonial enclaves.
Here I refer to the issue of our Malvinas Islands,
where, despite the resolutions of this body, despite all
the measures taken here for the United Kingdom to
agree, in virtue of what is set out in Article 33 of the
Charter of the United Nations, to negotiate in peace
between the parties, that country resolutely refuses to
discuss with the Argentine Republic the issue of the
Malvinas Islands.
I believe that a member of the Security
Council — one that is among the principal nations of
the world in the defence of freedom, human rights and
democracy — should give concrete proof that it is not
just talk but that it is truly convinced that it is
necessary to end this shame, that of a colonial enclave
in the twenty-first century. I want to request again, as
have the different Presidents who preceded me —
because Malvinas is for Argentineans a State policy as
well — the cooperation that this body has always
provided to once again urge the United Kingdom to
agree to comply with international law and to
demonstrate that it is serious in wishing to build a
different world and a different citizenry.
Lastly, I wish to speak to all those men and
women who have institutional governmental
responsibilities in any of the branches of the State in
their respective countries to once again advocate for
the transformation of an international policy that has
its fullest expression in this House. The reform of the
instruments that we are requesting is not simply a
question of cosmetics and formulas and changes that
barely conceal that everything is continuing as it
stands. The present situation, the complexity of the
world that is coming, in terms of food and energy,
requires all of us to re-examine our behaviour and our
paradigms. We must accept with humility that it is
necessary to build a world that is different from the one
we have had to date — one in which respect for human
rights, for the will of peoples and for those who are
different, do not think as we do or who pray to a
different god is not merely a catalogue of good
intentions set out in the United Nations Charter, but a
reality that is experienced a little more concretely
every day.
The President (spoke in Spanish): On behalf of
the General Assembly, I wish to thank the President of
the Argentine Republic for the statement she has just
made.
Ms. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, President of
the Argentine Republic, was escorted from the
General Assembly Hall.
Address by Mr. Marc Ravalomanana, President of
the Republic of Madagascar
The President (spoke in Spanish): The Assembly
will now hear an address by the President of the
Republic of Madagascar.
Mr. Marc Ravalomanana, President of the
Republic of Madagascar, was escorted into the
General Assembly Hall.
The President (spoke in Spanish): On behalf of
the General Assembly, I have the honour to welcome to
the United Nations His Excellency Mr. Marc
Ravalomanana, President of the Republic of
Madagascar, and to invite him to address the Assembly.
President Ravalomanana (spoke in French):
Eight years ago in this very Hall, we, the leaders of the
world, solemnly adopted the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Three years ago, we reviewed the
Goals to assess the progress made thus far. We realized
Annex 37
Annex 38
United Nations
(~\ General Assembly
., Sixty-fourth session
4 th plena1y meeting
Wednesday, 23 September 2009, 3 p m.
New York
A.J64!PV.4
Official Records
President: Mr. Ali Abdussalam Treki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)
The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p .m.
Address by Mrs. Cristina Femandez de Kirchne1·,
President of the Argentine Republic
The President: The Assembly will now hear an
address by the President of the Argentine Republic.
Mrs. Cristina Fernémdez de Kirchner, President of
the Argentine Republic, was escorted into the
General Assembly Hall.
The President: On behalf of the General
Assembly, I have the honour to welcome to the United
Nations Her Excellency Mrs. Cristina Femândez de
Kirchner, President of the Argentine Republic, and to
invite her to address the Assembly.
P1·esident Fernandez de Kit·chner (spoke in
Spanish): I must confess that, when I arrived in this
city to participate in this session of the General
Assembly, I had intended to begin my statement with a
strong appeal on the need to rebuild multilateralism
and cooperation as the two basic instrnments to
overcome what today is undoubtedly the central issue
in our global discussion, namely, overcoming the social
and economic crisis.
M1: Berdymukhammedov (Turkmenistan), VicePresident,
took the Chair.
However, certain events on Monday and Tuesday
oblige me to begin my statement by reporting that the
Embassy of the Argentine Republic in Tegucigalpa,
Republic of Honduras, had its electricity eut off some
tvw days ago. That, of course, was not because we had
not paid the bill, but was for far more serious reasons.
Next to the Argentine Embassy is a television
studio which broadcast the news of President Zelaya's
arrivai in Honduras, the repression and the
demonstrations in favour of the retum of democracy.
That was one of the reasons. In any event, we have had
better luck than the Embassy of the sister Republic of
Brazil, where, at an early stage they eut off not only
the electricity but the water as well - for having given
shelter to the constitutional President, Manuel Zelaya.
As a Latin American, I must recall that not even
in Chile during the dictatorship of General Pinochet, or
in Argentina during the dictatorship of General Jorge
Rafael Videla - perhaps the two cruelest dictatorships
in Latin America - was there similar behaviour
against embassies that were actively working to give
shelter to refugees.
I say this because it is crucial that we realize that
we must design and forge a multilateral strategy which
is strong and specific to retum democracy to Honduras.
We need a strategy which would actually allow for true
respect for human rights and ensure free and
democratic elections - which can take place only with
full respect for the constitution. If we do not do this,
we would be setting a harsh precedent in a region
where, for decades during the national security
doctrine, suspensions of democracy claimed the lives
of thousands and thousands of Latin Americans, led to
the exile of many other and created the region's most
serious economic and social tragedy in memory.
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original
languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature
of a member of the delegation concemed to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room
U-506. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.
on1ï1,"1111ii 1~i ri111111111111 11111111
Annex 38
A/64/PV.4
2 09-52228
I make this appeal because I played an active role
from the platform of the Organization of American
States, and also accompanied the former President of
the General Assembly, Father Miguel d’Escoto
Brockmann, to El Salvador in order to carry out a task
which would safeguard two basic values which, in my
opinion, our region has managed to develop:
democracy and respect for human rights.
Therefore, I believe that multilateralism would
also mean understanding that we have to set common
and general rules in this globalized world that must be
accepted by all countries. In this case, we are faced
with a cynical media coup which was carefully hidden
or minimized because, in fact, it was slanted against
the advent of populist progressive Governments in the
region. I believe that, for all of us, defining
multilateralism is going to require specific actions and
rules so that absolutely all of us will have the same
parameters when it comes time to judge conduct,
attitudes and institutional situations.
Yesterday I took part in the climate change event
convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in order
to bring positions closer together with a view to the
Copenhagen Conference, which will take place in a
little more than 10 weeks’ time. A decade and a half
ago we agreed on the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, dealing with
environmental protection, and we later adopted the
Kyoto Protocol in order to begin ensuring respect for
those obligations undertaken by nations. A decade and
a half later, it is clear that neither agreement is being
satisfactorily implemented.
Essentially, this is sometimes because the nations
most responsible for pollution and gas emissions,
which should bear greater responsibility for reducing
those emissions, in terms of investments both in their
own countries and in developing countries, cannot
come to an agreement either. As I was saying yesterday
in our meeting, I think we need to understand that the
only possibility of successfully approaching
globalization lies precisely in the setting of common
rules which would be respected by all nations,
developed and developing.
In this framework, we should mention the
situation of the Argentine Republic, where we still
have a colonial enclave, our Malvinas Islands, which
persists without the possibility of addressing the
question of sovereignty together with the United
Kingdom, as proclaimed in many General Assembly
resolutions. We were recently able to agree, following
a humanitarian request, that family members with
loved ones buried on the islands should be able to
travel there by air to inaugurate a cenotaph to pay
tribute to those who fought for their homeland.
All of this points to the very clear need to look at
multilateralism not only as a type of rhetorical
statement repeated every year in this or other
multilateral forums, but rather in terms of concrete
results. Otherwise, it will become increasingly
complicated, with ever more unresolved problems. For,
in the final analysis, the multilateralism we have been
persistently proclaiming since 2003 has not been put
into practice.
My country and the United States are the only
two countries to have experienced attacks of
international terrorism. For Argentina, the first was in
1992, at the Embassy of Israel, and the second was at
the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA).
Hundreds of people died in those attacks. Today, in this
Assembly, I am joined by the head of AMIA, the entity
that was bombed, as well as by family members who
have accompanied him.
In 2007, then-President Néstor Kirchner came
here to the Assembly (see A/62/PV.5) to call on the
Islamic Republic of Iran to agree to extradite officials
of its country wanted by the Argentine justice system
in order to carry out a proper investigation and assign
responsibility for that serious attack. Last year, I
myself came here (see A/63/PV.5) to call once again on
the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
accede to our request. I said that there were
constitutional guarantees in my country; that the
principle that no one is guilty until proven guilty
beyond a shadow of a doubt prevails from one end of
my country to the other; and that we have guarantees
for freedom and the administration of justice.
Nevertheless, that did not happen. Instead, this year,
one of the officials whose extradition was sought by
the prosecutor on the case was promoted to minister.
I know that some 4, 5 or 15 speakers from now
the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran will take
the floor. Surely, he will once again deny tragedies that
occurred in the course of western history in the
twentieth century. He will surely invoke the threat of
other imperialisms. And he will also surely invoke
God. I would like to say to him that my country, the
Annex 38
A/64/PV.4
09-52228 3
Argentine Republic, is not an imperialist country —
neither by way of belief nor as a reflection of our
history. To the contrary, ours is a country that suffered
from colonial oppression at its founding. During the
world’s bipolar era, we also suffered from the doctrine
of national security. I would like to tell him that, like
him, I believe in God. We may do so in different faiths
but, in the end, I believe that neither of us believes that
God could command us to prefer threats or to avoid
justice from being done.
As President of the Argentine Republic, therefore,
I humbly reiterate once again our appeal for the
extradition of the officials whom Argentina’s justice
system believes are responsible — not to be found
guilty, but to be judged and to be allowed to take
advantage of all the rights and guarantees that every
Argentine citizen and foreigner has in our country:
guarantees under democracy, whose unconditional
defence Argentina has made part of its institutional and
historical core.
I would not wish to conclude without referring to
three events that I believe are very positive, which I
would like to share with the members of the Assembly
today. The first took place quite recently, on
9 September, when the Argentine Republic received a
visit from the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, including its Chair and the President of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. That visit
occurred 30 years after the Court’s first visit, during
the dictatorship, when it came to investigate the crimes
that were being committed and to take complaints from
Argentine citizens — including our Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who is with me today and who, like
his father, was imprisoned at that time — and to hear
testimony about the serious violations that were taking
place.
Thirty years later, the men who comprised the
Commission and the men and women who are its
members today visited an Argentina where criminals
responsible for genocide under the dictatorship are
being tried by judges in accordance with the
Constitution. We have also reached an agreement with
the Inter-American Court to send a bill to our
legislature — which I have already done — to
eliminate the crime of libel and defamation against
journalists. That is homage to the freedom of
expression and of the press. But I also firmly believe
that it should apply to all citizens. It is offensive that,
in the twenty-first century, someone could be sentenced
to prison for having said something and said it freely.
We have also reached an agreement to send up
two bills — which we have also already done — to
contribute to the recovery of children born in captivity
during the dictatorship. Those will include provisions
to ensure respect for the victims, as well as on society’s
collective right to learn their identities.
The second thing that I would like to share has to
do with the fact that I listened today to the President of
the United States speak about an issue that is crucial to
world peace and security, as well as to the rights of the
Palestinian people. It is also a key component of a
strategy against international terrorism, which, as ever,
we continue to condemn. It is genuinely satisfying, and
a salve to the soul, to hear from the mouth of the
President of the United States of America that there is a
need for the Palestinian people to be able to live on
their land free of settlements of any kind, as well as,
clearly, a right for Israel’s citizens to live in peace
within their borders. The words of the President and
the timely message he delivered at Cairo University,
which many here likely followed with interest, place us
in a position that we have not occupied for many years,
namely, the possibility of beginning negotiations —
successful ones, I hope — between the Palestinian
Authority and the Government of Israel to at last
resolve a key issue for international peace and security,
namely, the Palestinian question.
Lastly, I would like to tell the Assembly that, as a
member of the Group of 20 (G-20), which will meet
tomorrow in Pittsburgh, we would like to call for the
presence of another multilateral body to be heard from
at those meetings: the International Labour
Organization. In the two previous G-20 meetings, there
was a great deal of discussion about the financial
crisis. However, as we did then, we continue to believe
that a key issue is to once again discuss the real
economy. That is why we believed it timely that
workers and business owners, as genuine actors in the
real economy and as catalysts to re-energizing it,
should be heard from as well in those forums,
alongside officials from multilateral credit institutions
and the World Bank.
We are genuinely convinced that there is a need
to build a new multilateralism in which all of us are
genuinely on an equal footing; where rights and
obligations and the road map for the course to be taken
Annex 38
A/64/PV.4
4 09-52228
are the same for rich and poor countries alike; and
where the rights and responsibilities of developing
countries are the same as those of developed States. We
therefore agreed that equal rules of the game for the
entire world was one of the basic elements of ensuring
success in building multilateralism. If we do not
achieve this, we will continue with these rhetorical
exercises year after year, but we will never achieve the
results that are not a right but an obligation for all of us
who make up this body.
In conclusion, democracy, the defence of human
rights, and equal rules for all countries in the world are
the three key elements to building a new
multilateralism. These three requirements must be
equal and the same for all countries, but above all for
those that, through their own actions and because of
their level of social and economic development, lead
the major developed countries of the world.
It is clear that those who have the greatest
responsibility and hold the greatest leadership roles —
won through military, technological, economic and
even cultural power — also have an obligation to
exercise that leadership in a responsible manner. This
is what we, the developing and emerging countries,
feel, and what we ask of the major nations of the
world. They have the responsibility to build this world.
This will no doubt be echoed in all our speeches, but
this building must be done every day through our
decisions and concrete actions.
The Acting President (spoke in Russian): On
behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the
President of the Argentine Republic for the statement
she has just made.
Mrs. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, President
of the Argentine Republic, was escorted from the
General Assembly Hall.
Address by Mr. Emomali Rahmon, President of the
Republic of Tajikistan
The Acting President (spoke in Russian): The
Assembly will now hear an address by the President of
the Republic of Tajikistan.
Mr. Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic
of Tajikistan, was escorted into the General
Assembly Hall.
The Acting President (spoke in Russian): On
behalf of the General Assembly, I have the honour to
welcome to the United Nations His Excellency
Mr. Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic of
Tajikistan, and to invite him to address the Assembly.
President Rahmon (spoke in Tajik; English text
provided by the delegation): At the outset, I should like
to congratulate Mr. Ali Abdussalam Treki on his
election as President of the General Assembly at its
sixty-fourth session. I am confident that his extensive
diplomatic experience and talent will contribute to the
fruitful and successful work of the General Assembly
at this session.
In recent decades, the world has made
considerable progress in terms of technology,
information and economic and social development,
which, due to globalization, is being spread throughout
the world. However, the negative aspects of this
phenomenon, such as international terrorism,
extremism, transnational organized crime, narcotics
trafficking, pandemic outbreaks and emerging
ecological challenges, pose a serious threat to the
international community. The United Nations plays the
key role in coordinating Member States’ efforts to
effectively meet the challenges of modern times and to
attain the Millennium Development Goals.
Tajikistan regards peacekeeping as one of the
most important aspects of the work of the United
Nations. Last year, for the first time ever, citizens of
the Republic of Tajikistan joined police forces in
peacekeeping operations, contributing to efforts to
strengthening peace and stability in conflict zones. A
national strategy on the development of Tajikistan’s
peacekeeping capacity is currently being drafted.
Tajikistan attaches the utmost importance to
strengthening the disarmament process. We hope that,
at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a
constructive exchange of views will take place on
urgent issues related to the practical implementation of
that agreement. We are convinced that the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is equally
important at the regional and global levels. Tajikistan
is therefore prepared to work to enhance its practical
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, which
came into effect on 21 March 2009.
We support the leading role played by the United
Nations in combating the illicit trade in small arms and
light weapons. We hope that important measures for
Annex 38
Annex 39
United Nations
(~) General Assembly
~
Distr.: General
2 November 2007
English
Sixty-second session
Agenda item 8
General debate
Original: Spanish
Letter dated 31 October 2007 from the Permanent Representative
of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the General Assembly
I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the written statement of the
delegation of the Argentine Republic in exercise of the right of reply to the letter
dated 28 September 2007 from the Pennanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran (A/62/485 and annex) referring to the remarks made by President
Nestor Kirchner on 25 September 2007, at the sixty-second session of the General
Assembly (see annex).
It would be highly appreciated if you could have the present letter and its
annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 8.
oùi11i 1u,111i11r111111111m111111111 °11101
(Signed) Jorge Argüello
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
A;62/519
Annex 39
A/62/519
2 07-58225
Annex to the letter dated 31 October 2007 from the Permanent
Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the General Assembly
On 28 September 2007, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made by the President of the
Nation, Nestor Kirchner, on 25 September last, at the sixty-second session of the
General Assembly, requested that a letter and a statement dated 15 October 2007 be
circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 8
(A/62/485 and annex).
The Government of the Argentine Republic rejects the unfounded and
offensive remarks made in that statement against its institutions and against
President Nestor Kirchner.
In his address to the General Assembly, the President recalled that the
Argentine Republic had repeatedly condemned the serious threat of global terrorism,
as he considers terrorist acts to be criminal and unjustifiable. He also recalled that
all States in the international community and, in particular, in the United Nations,
must work together to prevent and eliminate this scourge.
Accordingly, on behalf of the Argentine Republic, the President of the Nation
reiterated his request for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the framework of
applicable international law, to cooperate effectively with the Argentine courts in
order to clarify the facts in the AMIA (Argentine-Israelite Mutual Association) case,
in connection with the blowing-up in 1994 of the headquarters of that institution in
the city of Buenos Aires, in which 85 people lost their lives.
In that regard, President Nestor Kirchner appealed to the Islamic Republic of
Iran to process the judicial request, for the sole purpose of clarifying the facts and
judging those responsible, out of respect for the memory of the victims.
In the aforementioned proceedings, an arrest warrant has been issued against
several Iranian citizens and one Lebanese citizen who were involved. Likewise, both
the Secretary General and the Executive Committee of INTERPOL unanimously
decided to issue the arrest warrants (known as “red notices”) for those citizens. The
final decision will be submitted to the INTERPOL General Assembly, to be held in
Morocco from 5 to 8 November 2007, so that the decision of the Executive
Committee may be ratified by the Assembly.
Annex 39
Annex 40
United Nations
(~ General Assembly
~
Distr.: General
7 November 2008
English
~
Original: Spanish
Sixty-third session
Agenda item 8
General debate
Letter dated 5 November 2008 from the Permanent Representative
of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the General Assembly
I have the honour to transmit the response of the Argentine Republic to the
reply by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United
Nations to the statement made by Dr. Cristina Fernândez de Kirchner, President of
Argentina, on 23 September 2008 during the sixty-third session of the General
Assembly.
On 28 September 2008, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, speaking in exercise of the right of reply to the statement made by
Dr. Cristina Fernândez de Kirchner, the President of Argentina, on 23 September
2008 during the sixty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly,
requested the circulation of a note (A/63/468) and of its annex.
The Govenunent of the Argentine Republic strongly rejects the unfounded and
offensive expressions used in the above-mentioned Iranian statement against the
President of Argentina and head of the Argentine judiciary.
The Argentine Republic was the target of two serious terrorist attacks, which
took a tragic toll with dozens of persons killed and wounded: in 1992, against the
Embassy of Israel in Buenos Aires and in 1994 against the headquarters of the
Asociaci6n Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA).
In the context of the investigation conducted by the Argentine judicial
authorities, the INTERPOL General Assembly, held in November 2007, issued an
international arrest warrant for five Iranian nationals involved in the attack against
AMIA, thus endorsing our countiy's position, based on the principles of
international law and on international judicial cooperation.
In her statement during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, the
President strongly requested the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with the nonns
of international law and allow the Argentine judicial authorities to hold a public and
transparent trial, with the guarantees provided by a democratic system, of the
Iranian nationals accused of participating in the attack against AMIA. The President
A;63/523
Annex 40
A/63/523
2 08-59473
also urged Iran to grant the request made by the Argentine judicial authorities and
supported by INTERPOL, which would help to shed light on this attack.
The Argentine Republic once again urges the Islamic Republic of Iran to
cooperate fully with the Argentine judicial authorities in order to elucidate the
horrible attack against AMIA, in the belief that this will make a valuable
contribution to justice and to full respect for human rights and human dignity.
I should be grateful if you would circulate this note as an official document of
the General Assembly.
Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.
(Signed) Jorge Argüello
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Enclosure: 1 diskette.
Annex 40
Annex 41
United Nations
(~) General Assembly
~
Distr.: General
28 October 2009
English
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 8
General debate
Original: Spanish
Letter dated 27 October 2009 from the Permanent Representative
of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the General Assembly
I have the honour to submit the Argentine Republic 's reply to the letter from
the Pennanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations
referring to the address delivered on 23 September 2009 by the President of the
Argentine Republic, Cristina Femandez de Kirchner, at the sixty-fourth session of
the General Assembly.
On 28 September 2009, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made on
23 September 2009 by the President of the Argentine Republic, Cristina
Femandez de Kirchner, at the sixty-fourth session of the United Nations
General Assembly, requested the circulation of a letter (A/64/481) and its
annex.
The Govemment of the Argentine Republic hereby categorically rejects
the unfounded and injurious accusations levelled in the above-mentioned
Iranian letter against the President of the Argentine Republic and the Argentine
executive and judicial authorities.
In recent years, Argentina has been the victim of tv.10 serious terrorist
attacks that took a tragic toll of dozens of dead and wounded: in 1992, against
the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, and in 1994, against the headquarters of
the Asociaci6n Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA).
One of the paragraphs of the Iranian letter refers to and interprets our
feelings about these painful events. Indeed, the AMIA bombing is an open
wound in Argentine society, and the deep sorrow it has caused can be
mitigated only by punishing those responsible for the attack.
Therefore, at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, President
Femandez de Kirchner reiterated the request made by Argentina at the sixtysecond
and sixty-third sessions of the Assembly that the Islamic Republic of
Iran agree to extradite officiais of its country who are wanted by the Argentine
justice system for their alleged connection with the AMIA bombing, so that
ttfü11~1IÎ ml l~llflll 1111~~111111111° 31109
A;64/505
Annex 41
A/64/505
2 09-58246
they can be judged, while being protected by all the rights and guarantees
enjoyed by Argentine and foreign nationals in our country. It is important to
note that one of these officials has been promoted to a ministerial post.
The Argentine Republic has repeatedly urged the Islamic Republic of
Iran to accept and respect, under the applicable provisions of international law,
the jurisdiction of the Argentine justice system and effectively cooperate in
bringing to justice the persons accused in connection with the AMIA bombing
by acceding to the Argentine Republic’s request that arrest warrants be issued
for them, a request endorsed by the General Assembly of the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) in November 2007.
This action will represent an invaluable contribution to justice and full
respect for human rights and dignity.
I should be grateful if you could arrange to have this letter of reply circulated
as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 8.
(Signed) Jorge Argüello
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Annex 41
Annex 42
United Nations
(;-\ General Assembly ir m ~ Ill
Distr.: General
26 October 2015
~ Original: English
Seventieth session
Agenda items 85 and 108
The rule of law at the national and international levels
Measures to eliminate international terrorism
Letter dated 16 October 2015 from the Permanent Mission of
Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
You may recall that Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohamed Al-Khalifa, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain, had addressed a communication to you
on 2 October 2015 dealing with hostile acts by the Islamic Republic of Iran that
constituted a flagrant interference in the internai affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain,
as well as an attempt to destabilize it through support to terrorist acts in its national
territory (see annex).
I wish to request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a
document of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 85
and 108.
(Signed) Jamal Pares Alrowaiei
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
A no/445
Annex 42
A/70/445
2/5 15-18652
Annex to the letter dated 16 October 2015 from the Permanent
Mission of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General
Preserving regional security and strengthening regional peace is the mutual
and shared responsibility of all regional countries. To carry out this responsibility,
each country is obliged, in the words of the Charter of the United Nations, to
practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbo urs.
The Kingdom of Bahrain has — always and without interruption — taken steps to
discharge its obligations of good neighbourliness by striving to develop friendly
relations with all countries, harmoniously resolving differences and building
enduring ties of solidarity and cooperation.
In particular, my Government has worked tirelessly to improve Bahraini -
Iranian relations despite significant unfriendly acts on the part of the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Notwithstanding the public speech of the Iranian
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in March 2011, in which he stated that
the Iranian Government “will not make a differentiation between Gaza, Palestine,
Bahrain, Yemen” in conducting its interventionist regional policy, Bahrain
nonetheless maintained its diplomatic representation in Iran and did not withdraw
its ambassador. Even though Iran withdrew its ambassador from Manama in March
2011, Bahrain has nevertheless maintained continuous ambassadorial representation
in Tehran since that time. Ever since then, the Iranian Government has —
consistently — turned down the repeated requests of Bahrain to reinstate
ambassador-level ties.
Over the past four years, and even with Bahrain’s best efforts to amicably
reconcile differences, Iran’s distinct lack of cooperation has taken a turn for the
worse. Now, Iran is engaged in continuous actions to heighten tensions and breach
the peace — in an attempt to establish a regional zone of domination and wield
undue influence in other countries’ affairs.
Specifically, as detailed in the present letter, Iran has allowed its territory and
state resources to be used by terrorist groups to carry out armed attacks in Bahrain.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is actively engaged in spreading
weapons, such as assault rifles, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and associated technologies, to terrorist
groups, including those operating in Bahrain. Such State-sponsored proliferation is
contrary to the provisions of the Charter, is against international law and constitutes
an impermissible interference in other States’ national affairs. As a result of these
hostile actions by the Iranian Government, my country is left with no recourse but
to formally withdraw its ambassador from Tehran and declare the remaining Chargé
d’affaires of Iran persona non grata. The present letter sets out the reasons that
compelled Bahrain to take this step.
This step has become necessary because the Islamic Republic of Iran has
provided IED- and EFP-related training, information, financing, components and
technology, in addition to large caches of weapons, to certain terrorists committed to
the destruction of the Kingdom of Bahrain. Since mid-2011, the Kingdom of
Bahrain has uncovered several warehouse-scale facilities containing complex
IED-making materials supplied by Iran, intercepted a number of ships originating in
Iran laden with weapons, including large numbers of IEDs and EFPs, and
Annex 42
A/70/445
15-18652 3/5
discovered technologies, such as chemical recipes, circuit boards, compressors,
wireless modules and detonators, traceable to the techniques, tactics and procedures
developed by the Qods Force of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic
Revolution (IRGC) and its Lebanese Hizbullah proxy force. These IEDs
overwhelmingly resemble the IEDs used by terrorists and insurgents in Iraq and
Afghanistan during the 2000s.
In his Friday sermon of 15 May 2015, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei announced that
Iran would continue to support what he called the “oppressed people of Bahrain”. On
15 July 2015, Bahrain’s police intercepted a weapons shipment by boat of 43.5 kg of
C-4, eight Kalashnikov rifles, 32 rifle ammunition magazines and numerous IED and
EFP electric initiators and components traceable to IRGC. On 27 July 2015, a police
transport bus was attacked by an IED, which resulted in two police deaths and five
life-threatening injuries. On 23 September 2015, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “the
painful events in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, the West Bank and Gaza as well as in
other countries in Asia and Africa are tragedies for the Islamic nation that we must
address”. Just two days ago, on 30 September 2015, Bahrain’s police seized
1.5 tons — an unprecedented amount — of foreign-sourced high explosives, including
C4 (RDX), trinitrotoluene (TNT) and other chemical-based mixtures in a warehousesized
facility that had been clandestinely hidden, including through the digging of
underground bunkers and the construction of concealed above-ground structures.
These are the most recent incidents:
• On 30 September 2015, police raided a network of underground bunkers and
above-ground concealed structures in Nuwaidrat, Bahrain, containing 1.5 tons
of bomb-making materials including C-4 (RDX) and TNT, in addition to AK-47
rifles, pistols, Claymore mines and grenades made in Iran. Further, laboratorygrade
factory machinery was found, including a pressing machine for shaping
curved charges that are signatures of the most lethal EFPs used in Iraq. The
facility is unprecedented in its scope, in terms of the sophistication of the
concealment, the size of the structure, the complexity of the manufacturing
operation, and the number of weapons and explosives discovered.
• Two factory-sized weapons depots were discovered (in mid-2011 and June
2012). The second discovery, in Salmabad, Bahrain, uncovered 51 kg of
finished primary high explosive and enough raw material, worth well over
$100,000, to produce 12.8 kg of acetone peroxide-based primary high
explosive, hundreds of kilograms of ethylene glycol-based explosives, tens of
kilograms of urea nitrate explosives and many kilograms of TNT. In addition,
there were four viable IEDs, 5 kg of steel ball bearings, numerous pipe-bomb
casings, 61 detonators, various remote-control initiation mechanisms, and a
very large number of IED components. This discovery demonstrated that an
advanced skill set was present in the individuals who had assembled this
factory. DNA and other personal evidence discovered at the site identified the
individuals as having extensive ties to Iran.
• At least three terror cells were discovered (in November 2011, October 2012
and March 2013) through joint intelligence and law enforcement operations
with other Gulf Cooperation Council States. Among the items discovered on
the person of the members were instructions on the design and construction of
chemical explosives, guidelines on the creation and operation of terrorist cells,
a description of a plot to explode an IED on the King Fahad international
Annex 42
A/70/445
4/5 15-18652
causeway linking Bahrain with Saudi Arabia, instructions on methods of
conducting physical surveillance of United States troops stationed in Bahrain,
and confidential information on the location, capabilities and readiness of
Bahrain’s security forces. These persons were financed (about $80,000) and
directed by IRGC.
• In December 2011, an IED was discovered underneath a vehicle 50 metres away
from the British Embassy in Manama and assessed to be a response to the
expulsion of Iranian diplomatic staff members from Britain the week before. In
December 2013, Bahrain’s police intercepted a weapons shipment on a boat
originating in Iraq and bound for Bahrain that included 91.817 kg of C-4 (RDX)
explosive, 31 Claymore mines containing TNT, 12 EFPs, 6 magnetically
attached IEDs used for vehicular assassination, 295 commercial wireless dualtone
multi-frequency decoder detonators (labelled “made in Syria”), 979 bullets
(7.62 mm calibre, made in Iran), 1 Iranian-made PK assault rifle, 29 detonation
electronic circuit boards and 50 grenades (made in Iran).
As a consequence, to date, at least:
• 85 Bahrain-based terrorists have been trained by the IRGC: 54 in Iran, 29 in
Iraq and 2 in Lebanon.
• 67 wanted Bahrainis are located in Iran.
• $166,500, originating with IRGC, has been seized in various currencies
(United States dollars, Bahraini dinars and Saudi Arabian riyals) in six cases
involving 20 persons, of which 17 had received military training from IRGC.
• $100,000 of raw materials and components for explosives has been seized.
• 985 fake IEDs have been discovered, causing panic among the population and
hindering daily life.
• 439 real IEDs have been found and safely disposed of or have exploded,
causing injuries.
• 16 policemen have died.
• 3,169 police personnel have been injured seriously enough by real IEDs that
exploded to warrant hospitalization.
• In addition, there have been thousands of gas-cylinder explosions in towns and
villages, incidents of fire and arson, properties vandalized and attempts to
block main and arterial roads by tire burning and oil burning or by placing
dumpster blocks.
The police bear the brunt of these attacks. Nonetheless, they have shown
remarkable restraint — demonstrating the tangible impact of the reforms put into
place over the past two years. The fatality statistics from 2013 and 2014
demonstrate that more police officers have died than rioters.
Disappointingly the actors that could do much to calm the situation have not
taken the opportunity to do so. To date, there has not been any effective effort by
politically influential clerics, or the political and human rights groups affiliated with
them, to condemn and put a stop to the violence, nor has there been a commitment
by the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease its export of weapons, including IEDs and
EFPs, to the Kingdom of Bahrain.
Annex 42
A/70/445
15-18652 5/5
Despite the Iranian Government’s record of lack of cooperation,
unfriendliness, and hostility, the Kingdom of Bahrain remains steadfast in its
observance of the principles set out in the Charter of friendly relations and good
neighbourliness, including towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. My Government
strongly supports the strengthening of regional and international peace and security
and looks towards a better future rather than to the past.
My Government is keen to re-establish amicable, cooperative and mutually
beneficial diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, but for this to occur ,
Iran must take the initiative through the undertaking of positive, verifiable steps that
show its commitment to refrain from hostile and aggressive acts, alleviate tensions
and seek to re-establish friendly relations with the Kingdom of Bahrain. I
respectfully request your assistance in conveying this message to the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran and that you kindly circulate the present letter to
Member States.
(Signed) Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohamed Al-Khalifa
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain
Annex 42
Annex 43
2'6'2017 ln Kenya, two lnnans get life in prisoe for plcttirg att.acks - LA Times
In Kenya, two Iranians get life in prison for
plotting attacks
A court in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, sentenced lranian nationals Sayed Mansour Mousavi, left, and Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammad to life
in prison. (Dai Kurokawa / European Pressphoto Agency)
Bythe Associated Press
MAY 6, 2013, 3:39 PM
N AIROBI, Kenya - A Kenyan court on Monday sentenced two Iranian nationals convicted of
plotting attacks against Western targets to life in p1ison.
Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammad and Sayed Mansour Mousavi were arrested in June 2012 and led
officials to a 33-pound stash of the explosive RDX. Officials in Kenya say the two may have been planning
attacks on Israeli, American, British or Saudi Arabian interests in Kenya.
Magistrate Kiarie Wawern Kiarie sentenced the two to life in prison for committing acts intended to cause
grievous harm. The two were sentenced to additional prison sentences of 15 and 10 years on lesser charges. The
sentences will be served simultaneously, Kiarie said.
Kiarie said an expert for the prosecution, who testified that the cache of RDX explosives was capable of
bringing down a tall building, influenced his sentencing decision. "I shudder to imagine the amount of life and
htlp1lwww.la1imes.com/world/worldncw/1 a-fg..w11-kenya-i ran-att.acks-plct-20130500-story.htm 1 Annex 43 112
2'6'2017 ln Kenya, two lnnans get life in prisoe for plcttirg att.acks - LA Times
property that would have been forever destroyed," the magistrate said.
"Even as I hear the accused persons mitigating and crying for mercy, there is yet a louder c1y by the blood of
the previous victims of ten-orist attacks, the orphan, the widow and widower due to such heinous attacks. All
are crying for justice," Kiarie said.
Mohammad and Mousavi displayed little outward reaction when the sentences were read. Mohammad smiled
before media cameras.
Defense lawyers said they would appeal.
"The decision is outrageous. It's wrong. It's illegal. It's a nullity. The magistrate has totally misconceived the
law," said David Kirimi, who represented Mousavi.
Defense lawyer Wandugi Karathe, representing Mohammad, earlier urged the magistrate to give his client a
noncustodial sentence, arguing that Mohammad "is remorseful of the circumstances that brought him to the
court" and is a sole breadwinner for six children in Iran.
Mohammad's wife, Fatma Rhahimid, said through a translator that both men are innocent and that their trial
was heavily influenced by "extrajudicial forces."
Kenyan anti-teITor officiais said the two Iranians are members of Iran's Revolutiona1y Guard Quds Force, an
elite and secretive unit.
Militants in 2002 bombed an Israeli-owned luxury hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, killing 13 people. The militants
hied to shoot down an Israeli airliner at the same time. An Al Qaeda operative was linked to those attacks.
ALSO:
Former Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti dies
Afghanistan files formai protest after Pakistan border clash
U.N.'s Carla Del Ponte says Sytian rebels may have used sarin
Copyright© 2017, Los Angeles Times
This article is related to: Justice System, Crime, Law and Justice, Iran
tttp-Jlwww. la1i mes.corn/world/worldncw/1 a-fg..w11-kenya-i ran-att.acks-plct-20130500-story.htm 1 Annex 43 212
Annex 44
4/13/2017 lnnans' 30-txmb ~ct oo Kenya :: Kenya - The Stél'ldad
Your are here » Home (https://wwwstandardmedia.co.ke/?category!D•O) » Kenya <https://www.standardmedia.eo.ke/ ?category1D•1)
lranians' 30-bomb plot on Kenya
By By Cyrus OmbAU I Upclated Wed, July 4th 2012 at OO:OO GMT •3
SHARE THIS ARTICt.E
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subject=lraniam:'
30-bomb
plot on
Kenya&body•lranians'
30-bomb
plot on
Kenya
https://www.standardmedia.co,ke/article/2000061093/iranians-
30-
bombplot--
Kenya)
By Cyrus Ombati
Two lranian terror suspects in the hands of police have reportedly confessed they
planned to detonate a series of 30 killer bombs across Kenya at once.
The shocking confession police report to have secured from the two. not only paints how
serious the magnitude of terror planned against Kenya could be. but also shows the plot
has attained an international dimension.
Mrtke ThP Rrght Choioe For Grem Energy ; ~
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Like in the case of the 1gg8 Nairobi terror bomb targeting American Embassy. and that of
2002 against lsraeü-owned Kikambala Hotel in Mombasa. poüce reveal the Latest series of
attacks were aimed at Local US. Israel. Saudi Arabia. and Brit ish interests.
This could be the attacks Kenya's high-level security team had been warned were about
to take place. and that the isolated cases of grenade and gun attacks against civilians in
North Eastern. Nairobi. and Mombasa were diversionary Lower-Levels attacks.
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Annex 44 116
4/13/2017 lnnans' 30-txmb ~ct oo Kenya :: Kenya - The Staroerd
lt were the two lranian terror suspects arrested in Nairobi that police say Led Kenyan
security officials to a 15kg stash of explosives. which were to be used in simultaneous 30-
bomb attacks. Each kilo was to produce two bombs.
lt is from this information that lsraeLi Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Iran on
Tuesday it should take responsibility for the alleged heinous plot
lt is. however. not clear if the intelligence fed on the two lranians - calling themselves
Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammad and Sayed Mansour Mousavi - were from Kenya or lsraeli's
Mossad and America's international intelligence networks that have always had their eyes
riveted on global terror cells and their king pins.
The terror suspects reportedly planned to take advantage of the attacks being
experienced in Kenya by Al Shabaab sympathisers. though their cause was different and
focused largely not on war in SomaLia. but American, British and lsraeli. and Saudi Arabia.
the Middle East State perceived by many MusLim-dominated countries as a collaborator
of the US and Israel
Last October US agents claimed to have thwarted a plot by Iran to assassinate Saudi
Arabia's ambassador in to the United States.
"ln addit ion to holding these individual conspirators accountable for their alleged rote in
this plot. the United States is committed to holding Iran accountable for its actions." US
Attorney General Eric Holder declared after the plot was neutraLised.
"They were to target some of the embassies and other installations had their plans
materialised." revealed a senior officer familiar with the tracking of the lranians after they
entered Kenya. He spoke on condition he would not be quoted.
powerful explosives
On June 25, a Kenyan court charged two lranians with illegal possession of 15kg of the
powerful explosive RDX. according to the charge sheet Both have denied the charges.
The lranian Foreign ministry said on Saturday it was seeking information about their case,
and refused to comment.
Last week. one of the two lranians facing charges in Kenya told the court that lsraeLi
agents had interrogated him while he was in the hands of local police.
Mohammad on Wednesday said lsraeli agents interrogated the two: a daim that. if true.
would suggest security officials believe the lranians might have been targeting an lsraeliowned
property.
Kenya got the backing of the top leadership of Israel in its war on Al Shabaab last year.
with President Shimon Peres and Netanyahu declaring they would help Kenya in its
struggle to secure its borders.
The two signed a memorandum of understanding for co-operation on matters of
homeland security in Jerusalem. The Late lntemal Security minister George Saitoti signed
on behalf of Kenya. white Prime Minister Raila Odinga witnessed.
Netanyahu expressed concern that threats from miLitants threaten Kenya's tourism.
adding that Kenya's frustration with fundamentalists was similar to lsrael's and the two
countries must stand together.
Netanyahu promised to help build ·a coalit ion against fundamentalism· that brings
together like-minded regional States including Kenya. Ethiopia. South Sudan. and
Tanzania.
President Peres pledged to give Kenya all the support it needs to ensure security within
its borders and protect its citizens and economy.
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Annex 44 216
4/13/2017 lnnans' 30-txmb ~ct oo Kenya :: Kenya - The Stélldad
The lsraeli President said then Israel is ready to make 'everything available to Kenya' for
internal security and food production.
But back home. a section of Muslim leaders Led by a Cabinet minister denounced the
agreement because of the lsraeli factor.
travel ban
The US Embassy issued an alert on June 22. three days after the men were arrested,
warning Americans against travelLing to Mombasa. ordering Government workers out of
the city, and suspending Government travel there through July 1. US agents had been
involved in the Mombasa raids in which the chemicals were seized. Their plan was to use
local agents to commit the acts.
Mohamed and Mousavi. who appeared in a Nairobi court last week. were arrested on
June 19.
Another officer told The Standard the two are believed to be members of the
Revolutionary Guards' Ouds Force.
The officer revealed the lranian Government is putting pressure on Kenya to release the
two. but other interests have ecLipsed their demand.
The two had corne from Saudi Arabia and spent three days in a Nairobi hotel before one
of them travelled to Mombasa.
lt was when he travelled to Mombasa that he moved the explosives close to the
Mombasa Golf Hotel and returned to Nairobi.
Police revealed it was after he arrived back at the city hotel that they were informed these
guests had refused to have their rooms cleaned.
"An informer aware of their activities revealed they were suspicious. When we arrested
them they claimed to be businessmen. but they later Led us to Mombasa where the
chemical was found." said the officer.
After Iran sent its agents to murder the Saudi ambassador on US soil. the country has
engaged in attacks in Azerbaijan, Bangkok. Tbilisi, and New Delhi. Now. we have just
discovered a plot for a terrorist attack in Africa." Netanyahu said.
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Annex 44 :Y6
Annex 45
Annex 45
4/10/2017 FBI - Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commitîerrorist Attack at JFKAirport
New York Field Office
Home • New York • Press Releases • 2011 • Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for
Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
Defreitas and Coconspirators Plotted to Explode Fuel
U.S. Attorn.ey's Office
February 17, 2011
Tanks at Airport
Eastern. District of New York
(718) 254-7000
BROOKLYN, NY- Earlier today in the Eastern District of New York, United States District Judge Dora
L. Irizarry sentenced convicted defendant Russell Defreitas to life in prison for conspiring to commit a
terrorist attack at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens, New York, by exploding fuel tanks
and the fuel pipeline under the airport. Defreitas and his coconspirators believed their attack would
cause extensive damage to the airport and to the New York economy, as well as the Joss of numerous
lives.
The sentence was announced by Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
New York. The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) in New York.
A federaljury convicted Russell Defreitas and coconspirator Abdul Kadir in July 2010 after a nineweek
trial. The evidence at trial established that Russell Defreitas, a naturalired United States citiren
from Guyana, originated the idea to attack JFKAirport and its fuel tanks and pipelines by drawing on
his prior experience working at the airport as a cargo handler. In 2006 and 2007, Defreitas recruited
Kadir and others to join the plot during multiple trips to Guyana and Trinidad. Between trips,
Defreitas engaged in video surveillance of JFK Afrport and transported the footage back to Guyana to
show Kadir and their co-conspirators. Kadir, a trained engineer with connections to militant groups in
Iran and Venezuela, provided the conspirators with links to individuals with terrorist experience,
advice on explosive materials, and a bank account through which to finance the terrorist attack.
On December 15, 2010, Judge Irizarry sentenced Abdul Kadir to life in prison. A third defendant, Abdel
Nur, pleaded guilty before trial to supporting the plot and was sentenced to 15 years on January 13,
2011. A fourth member of the plot, Kareem Ibrahim, faces trial on the same charges as Defreitas and
Kadir.1
According to the trial evidence, Defreitas and his fellow plot members attempted to enlist support
from prominent international terrorist groups and leaders, including Abu Bakr, leader of the
Trinidadian militant group Jamaat Al Muslimeen, and Adnan El Shukrijumah, an al Qaeda leader, as
well as the Iranian revolutionary leadership. During cross-examination at trial, Kadir, a former
member of the Guyanese parliament, admitted that he regularly passed information to Iranian
authorities about sensitive topics, including the Guyanese military, and believed himselfbound to
follow fatwas from Iranian religious leaders.
On June 1, 2007, Defreitas was arrested in New York, and Kadir was arrested in Trinidad aboard a
plane headed to Venezuela, en route to Iran. He was subsequently extradited to the United States.
The specific charges Defreitas was convicted ofwere: conspiracy to attack a public transportation
system, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332f; conspiracy to destroy a building by fire or explosive, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(n); conspiracy to attack aircraft and aircraft materials, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 32; conspiracy to destroy international airport facilities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 37; and
conspiracy to attack a mass transportation facility, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(10).
"Russell Defreitas plotted to commit a terrorist attack that he hoped would rival 9/ 11," stated United
States Attorney Lynch. "But law enforcement detected and thwarted the plot, saving lives. Now, our
courts have dispensed justice by handing out the life sentence that Defreitas richly deserves." Ms.
Lynch extended her grateful appreciation to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York for its
role in investigating and prosecuting the case, as well as to the Guyanese and Trinidadian law
enforcement authorities who assisted with the investigation and apprehension of the defendants.
The government's case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Marshall L. Miller, Jason
A. Jones, Berit W. Berger, and Zainab Ahmad.
The Defendant:
RUSSELL DEFREITAS, also known as "Mohammed"
Age: 67
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Annex 45
Annex 46
Annex 46
4/10/2017 FBI - Kareem Ibrahim Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFKAirport
New York Field Office
Home • New York • Press Releases • 2012 • Kareem Ibrahim Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack al JFK Airport
Kareem Ibrahim Sentenced to Life in Prison for
Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
Ibrahim and Co-Conspirators Plotted to Explode Fuel
Tanks and Pipeline at Airport
U.S. Atton1.ey's Office
January 13, 2012
Easten1. District of New York
(718) 254-7000
BROOKLYN, NY- Earlier today, in the Eastern District of New York, United States District Judge Dora
L. Irizarry sentenced convicted defendant Kareem Ibrahim to life in prison for conspiring to commit a
terrorist attack at John F. Kennedy International .Afrport in Queens, New York, by exploding fuel tanks
and the fuel pipeline under the airport. Ibrahim and his coconspirators believed their attack would
cause extensive damage to the airport and to the New York economy, as well as the Joss of numerous
lives. At the Ibrahim sentencing, Judge Irizarry stated: "This case shows the government at its best in
terms of protecting the security ofthis country."
The sentence was announced by Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
New York. The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) in New York.
A federaljury convicted Kareem Ibrahim of multiple terrorism offenses in May 2011 after a four-week
trial. The evidence at trial established that Ibrahim, an Imam and leader of the Shiite Muslim
community in Trinidad & Tobago, provided religious instruction and operational support to a group
plotting to commit a terrorist attack at JFK.Afrport. The plot originated with Russell Defreitas, a
naturalized United States citizen from Guyana, who drew on his prior experience working at JFK
.Afrport as a cargo handler to plan the attack on its fuel tanks and fuel pipeline. Beginning in 2006,
Defreitas recruited others to join the plot, including the defendant Kareem Ibrahim, Abdel Nur and
Abdul Kadir, a former member of parliament in Guyana. In May 2007, Defreitas presented Ibrahim
with video surveillance and satellite imagery of the targets for terrorist attack because Ibrahim had
connections with militant leaders in Iran.
During cross-examination at trial, Ibrahim admitted that he advised the plotters to present the plot to
revolutionary leaders in Iran and to use operatives ready to engage in suicide attacks at the airport. On
one of the recorded conversations entered into evidence, Ibrahim told Defreitas that the attackers
must be ready to "fight it out, kill who you could kill and go back to Allah."
According to the trial evidence, the conspirators also attempted to enlist support for the plot from
prominent international terrorist groups and leaders, including Adnan El Shukrijumah, an al Qaeda
leader and explosives expert, and Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of the Trinidadian militant group Jamaat Al
Muslimeen. Ultimately, the plotters followed Ibrahim's direction and sent Abdul Kadir to meet with his
contacts in the Iranian revolutionary leadership, including Mohsen Rabbani, the former cultural
attache indicted for his leading role in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish cultural center in Buenos
Aires, Argentina.
Kareem Ibrahim, Abdul Kadir, and Abdel Nur were arrested in Trinidad in June 2007, with Kadir
aboard a plane headed to Venezuela, en route to Iran. Ali three were subsequently extradited to the
United States. Defreitas was arrested in New York. After a nine-week trial in 2010, Russell Defreitas
and Abdul Kadir were convicted of terrorism charges and sentenced to life in prison. Nur pleaded
guilty before trial to supporting the plot and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
The specific charges Ibrahim was convicted ofwere: conspiracyto attack a public transportation
system, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332f; conspiracy to destroy a building by fire or explosive, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(n); conspiracy to attack aircraft and aircraft materials, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 32; conspiracy to destroy international airport facilities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 37; and
conspiracy to attack a mass transportation facility, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(10).
"Kareem Ibrahim abandoned the true tenets of his religion and plotted to commit a terrorist attack
that he hoped would rival 9/11," stated United States Attorney Lynch. "But law enforcement detected
and thwarted the plot, saving lives. Now, our courts have dispensedjustice by handing out the life
sentence that Ibrahim deserves." Ms. Lynch extended her grateful appreciation to the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force in New York for its role in investigating and prosecuting the case, as well as to
the Guyanese and Trinidadian law enforcement authorities who assisted with the investigation and
apprehension of the defendants.
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Annex 46
Annex 47
Annex 47
·Iran:
State of Terror
An account of terrorist
assassinations by Iranian agents
By Eric Avebury
and Robert Wilkinson
.\Î~ J' ~
Parliamentary Human Rights Group
London, June 1996
ISBN O 9510238 7X
Annex 47
The Parliamentary Hurnan Rights Group
The· Parliamentary Human Rights Group was founded in 1976
as an independent forum in the British Parliament concerned with the
defence of international human rights. Since 1976, its members have
increased to a current level of 130 Parliamentarians from both the House
ofCommons and the House of Lords. With the increase in numbers has
corne an increase in the range and extent of its activities. Members of
the group represent all political parties, making the group broadly
representative. The group undertakes human rights missions, publishes
discussion papers, receives visitors and engages in dialogue with the
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.
Officers
' ......,
.<::-1'.Y.
,·-':\, ·.,
President
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Vice Chairman
Vice Chairman
Secretary
Treasurer
The Rt Hon The Lord Braine of
Wheatley PC ( Conservative)
Lord Avebury (Liberal)
Ms Ann Glywd MP (Labour)
Jeremy Corbyn MP (Labour)
Anthony Coombs MP
(Conservative)
Dr Robert Spink (Conservative)
Lord St John of Bletso
Annex 47
Main Objectives
To increase awareness in Parliament, Britain and abroad
generally of human rights abuses whenever they occur
To communicate to governments, their representatives in the
United Kingdom and visiting delegations, the Group's concern about
violations of basic human rights
To work for the implementation by all governments of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and of the UN Covenants on
civil and political, and on economic social and cultural rights
For more information, contact Lord Avebury, Chairman of the
Parliamentary Human Rights Group:
Telephone:
Fax:
Email:
Mailing address:
0171 274 4617
0171 738 7864
pbrg@ph:i;g.demon.co. uk
or [email protected]
House of Lords
London SWlA OAA
Annex 47
Table of Contents
Introduction
How the Murder Machine Works
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad
Abductions
Murder Within Iran
Foreign Targets
The Rushdie Case
Conclusion
Appendixes
1
7
11
55
63
77
85
89
92
Annex 47
Introduction
For centuries, it has been a principle of international law that
political opponents of an autocratie state could seek and obtain protection
from their oppressors abroad. In the twentieth century, the vidims of
Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Pinochet, Pol Pot, Suharto, Ceausescu,
Stroessner and Ne Win, all found safety and asylum in other countries,
where they were immune from persecution. Now, for the first time, a
dictatorship is reaching out its tentacles into the free world, to hunt
down and kill its opponents living in exile. The Iranian régime stands
accused of the widespread use of extrajudicial k.illings as part of its
reign ofterror at horn,~, but sends its agents into the farthest corners of
the earth, to plan, commit· and instigate murders and other acts of
terrorism and violence. This report is an attempt to summarise the
evidence, so that Mernbers of Parliament and others may consider what
action should be taken by the international community against the
leaders of a state which uses assassination as an instrument of policy.
The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in a Resolution of August
17, 1993, strongly condemned "the continuing flagrant human rights
violations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including ... the continuing
execution of political prisoners and the assassination of opponents
abroad". 1 This has had no effect1 and in August 1995 the Sub-Commission
were still demanding
"That the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran cease
forthwith any involvement in or toleration of murder and
1 United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/L993/L.24, August 17, 1993
Annex 47
2 Iran: State of Terror
state-sponsored terrorism against lranians living abroad
and the nationa.ls of other states". 2
The former UN Special Representative on Iran, Professor Galindo
Poh] detailed "assassinations and attempts on the lives of lranians living
_abroad" remarking that "in tfie absence of conclusive data, the Special
Representatiue has included in this analysis only those cases in which
the participation of Iranian agents has been noted by competent judicial
or administrative authorities, or by parliamentary bodies".3 The Iranian
Representative at the UN, in his statement to the Third Committee on
December 3, 1993, complained about these references, but the Special
Representative, in bis report ofFebruary 2, 1994, said that he "cannot
but mention cases in which there are statements by judicial, political or
administrative authorities containing specific indications of the
involuement of Iranian agents".4 In the latest report of the new Special
Rcpresentative, Professor Maurice Copithorne, it is said that statistics
had been presented which suggested that ''politically motivated
violence ... was continuing unabated". 5
It is in the nature of human rights investigations that very few
allegations can be proved to the standards that would be required in a
court of law. The perpetrators generally remain within tbeir own
jurisdictions, where they are not likely to be charged. Witnesses may
not be available, and where there are any, the accused are not there to
answer the charges. Mr Douglas Hogg MP, then Minister of State at
the FCO, said in relation to some of the crimes detailed below, that "it
would be a very serious matter indeed if the Iranian government were
shown to be behind these murders". The Minister at the Foreign and
2 United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/L.5/Rev. l , August 21, 1995
'Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Note by the SecretaryGeneral,
United Nations, A/48/526, November 8, 1993
J Final report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic ofiran prepared
by the Special Representaiive of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo
Galindo Pohl , pursuant to Commission resolution 1993/62 of March 10, 1993 and
Economie and Social Council dccision 1993/273, E/CN.4/1994/50, February 2, 1994
5 Report of the UN Special Representative on Iran, Professer Maurice Copithorne, E/
CN.4/1996/59, April 1996.
Annex 47
Introduction 3
Commonwealth Office who now deals with Iran, Sir Nicholas Bonsor Bt
MP still reiterates that conclusive proof is lacking:
"Press reports alleging lranian involvement in terrorism
are useful media tools in as much as they infiuence public
opinion but they do not amount to a row of beans in a court
of law. Finn, euidence that will stand up to scrutin y is quite
a different malter ... the fact remains that we do not yet have
evidence of I ranian involvement in terrorism that could be
used in court". 6
The least that can be said is that in all the cases described, there
was some involvement of persans employed by the Iranian government.
It would not follow automatically, of course, that the government itself
instigated and planned the crimes. But it is simply not credible that so
many sophisticated operations including many well-planned murders,
committed by highly trained men, were the result of individual
initiat ives. Only the government itselfhad the motive, the opportunity
and the resources to commit the whole series of assassinations and other
terrorist crimes, over a period of man y years, and egtending from Karachi
to Paris, and from Tokyo to Buenos Aires. And only the government
had the power to bring pressure to bear, when its agents were arrested,
to have them released by the French, German or Austrian Governments.
Over the last seventeen years, over 150 assassination attempts
on the lives of Iranian dissidents living abroad, and other terrorist acts,
have been committed in 21 countries. Nearly 350 people have been killed
or injured in these attacks, two thirds of which have occurred during
the seven years of Rafsanjani's rule. Nor have the operations of the
state terrorists sent out by Tehran have not been limited to lranian
citizens. Several of the translators and publishers ofT_he Satanic Verses
have been attacked. The Japanese translator was murdered in 1991;
the Italian translator escaped an attempt on his life, as did the
Norwegian publisher, and an arson attack was made on the hotel where
the Turkish tra nslator was staying in 1993. The fatwa against the
6 Sir Nicholas Bonsor Bt MP, unpublished letter to Lord Avcbury, April 4, 1996
Annex 47
4 Iran: State of Terror
author, Mr Salman Rushdie, was reiterated by President Rafsanjani
himself on February 2, 1993,7 and the reward offered for his murder
increased to $2 million. The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mr Ali
Akbar Nateq-Nouri said on the fifth anniversary of the fatwa that "every
Moslem is religiously duty bound to kill him whenever and wherever he
is able".8
The British Group of the Inter Parliamentary Union received an
invitation from this gentleman to send a delegation to Tehran, and
suggestions continue to be made from time to time about an official IPU
visit. For instance Dr Saeed Rajaie Khorasani MP, chairman of the
unofficial human rights committee of the Majles, proposed such a visit
when he met David Atkinson MP and Bob Parry MP on November 1,
1995, during their unofficial visit to Iran. The MPs felt that exchanges
were in the spirit of the European Union's policy of crfücal dialogue,
and that there should be an IPU visit during 1996.9 It would be necessary
to consider whether resumption of IPU contacts would send the right
signals to Tehran, and indeed whether the critical dialogue has had any
impact on human rights in Iran, or on the policy of murder and terrorism
abroad for which the evidence is presented here.
The 1986 wave of assassinations in France, the explosive attack
on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, and the destruction of Pan Am
flight 103 over Lockerbie are among other terrorist crimes for which
there is some evidence of Tehran's responsibility. Mohsen Rafiqdoust,
the former Guards Corps Minister, admitted that Iran carried out the
bomb attack on the US Marine Headquarters in the Lebanon:
"Bath the TNT and the ideology which in one blast sent to
hell 400 officers, NCOs-and soldiers at the Marine
Headquarters have been provided by Iran", he said.10
7 Reuters, quoting Iranian news agency IRNA, February 2, 1993
8 Reuters, guoting an interview with the Speaker published in the English-language
Tehran Times, February 16, 1994
9 David Atkinson MP, Bob Parry MP and Andrew Hull, Report on human rights abuse
and other obstacles to better British-Iranian relations, November 1995.
10 Ressalat, July 20, 1987
Annex 47
Introduction 5
Michael Eisenstadt, senior research fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near EastPolicy, testifying at the meeting of the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the US Congress on March 19, 1996, said:
"Terror and subversion have been hey instrurnents of
Tehran's foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Since then, Iranian sponsored and inspired terror has
claimed more than 1000 lives worldwide"
The use ofterrorism as an adjunct to foreign policy has developed
into an organised and professional activity over the last 15 years. It
bas been used as a lever to gain advantages from western countries or
to exert more pressure on surviving opponents of the régime. Many of
Iran's diplomats have a record of previous service with the Guards Corps
and other security organs. Hossein Sheik-ol-Eslam, Deputy Foreign
Minister for Arab and African Affairs, Mohammadi Haeri-Mostafavi,
Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry and Malaek, former
Ambassador to Switzerland and now a senior official at the Foreign
Ministry, played leading roles in the occupation of the US Embassy in
Tehran in 1979. The UK declined to receive Mr Malaek as chargé
d'affaires for that rearnn.
The Iranian régime bas close links with organisations in other
parts of the Middle East and North Africa which are themselves using
terrorism to promote their political objectives. Among these are Front
Islamique de Salut (FIS) inAlgeria, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (General Command) in Syria and Hizbollah in Lebanon,
and all are financed by Iran. There is also co-operation with the régime
ofGeneral Omar El-Beshir in Sudan, which promotes terrorism in North
Africa and is spreading subversion in Egypt, Eritrea, Uganda and
Ethiopia.
It is important to understand that the doctrine of Velayat-eFaghieh,
or guardianship of religiousjurisprudence, on which the régime
is based, places Tchran above all earthly laws and rules in its own eyes.
The régime claims authority from God, and this divine 8ancLiurijustifiei:;
any activity which is considered to uphold the law of God, as they
interpret it. Hassan Rohani, Secretary of the Supreme Security Council
Annex 47
6 Iran: State ofTerror
says that Iran would not hesitate to destroy its opponents' centres of
activity and assembly abroad and adds that to do so would not contravene
international laws and human rights. This is nota personal view, but a
logical deduction from Velayat-e-Faghieh, accepted by the Iranian
Government as a whole. The international community has to confront
the unthinkable: that a member state of the United Nations is dedicated
to subverting international law, and carrying the infection of its own
brand of religious terrorism into the four quarters of the globe. The
inference of the Special Rapporteur's comments, and of the General
Assembly Resolution which followed, is that the Iranian government is
indeed organising an international murder machine. The United
Nations bas so far developed no mechanism for dealing with a member
state which deliberately and systematically carries its violations of the
right oflife into other countries where its exiles have sought refuge, or
where people write and translate a book that a state dislikes. If the
case against Iran is supported by this evidence, the task of countering
, this infection has to be addressed without delay.
Annex 47
How the Murder Machine Works11
The planning and execution of terrorist crimes is not, as
somctimes suggested, an activity of separate groups within the hierarchy
of the Iranian régime. It is co-ordinated within the Intelligence Section
of the President's Office, a section established by Rafsanjani when he
became President, and directed by him. It is run by Ahmad Behbahani,
a relative of the President, and it designates the targets for assassination,
as well as deciding which organ is to carry out the plot.
Rafsanjani himself approves initial proposais, which then go to
the Ministry of Intelligence to be checked for their feasibility. The plan
is then submitted to the Supreme Security Council (SSC) for final
approval. Permanent members are:
• President Rafsanjani:
• Nateq Noori:
• Ayatollah Yazdi:
• Ali Fal1ahian:
• Ali Akbar Velayati:
• Ali Mohammad Besharati:
• Hamid Mirzadeh:
• General Hassan Firoozabadi:
Head of the executive
Head of the legislature
Head of the judiciary
Intelligence Minister
Foreign Ivlinister
Interior Minister
Head of the Budget and
Planning Organisation
Head of the Chiefs of Staff of
the Armed Forces
• Hassan Roohani and Ali Larijani: Two representatives of
Khamenei
• General Ali Shahbazian: Head of the Joint Chiefs of
11 Moharnmad Mohaddcssin, lslamic Fundamenla1ism-the new global thrcat, Seven
Locks Press, Washington DC, 1993, and unpublished sources
Annex 47
8
• Mohsen Rezaie:
• Mohammad Foroozandeh:
• J avad Larijani:
• Ali Aga Mohammadi:
Iran: State of Terror
Staff of the Army
Commander of the Revolutionary
Guards
Minister of Defence
Rafsanjani's aid
Chief of the Command Council
for operations inside Iraq.
After approval by the SSC, the Intelligence Section of the
President's Office decides whether the Ministry of Intelligence, the
Guards Corps' Qods Force, or both together, will execute the plan.
When the Qods Force is given the assignment, a meeting is
scheduled by Ahmad Vahidi, the Commander, who decides the list of
attendees, and they are notified by Mr Manshavi, .head of the office of
the Qods Force. Members of the Command Council, who may be present,
are Vahidi himself; the deputy commander; the director of logistics; the
director of operations; and Mohammad J afari (Sahraroodi) the
operations adviser. The meeting plans the details of the operation, and
submits the results back to the Intelligence Section of the President's
Office. The go ahead is then given at a meeting attended by the head of
the Section, the Minister of Intelligence, Mr Ahmad Vahidi and the
Deputy Foreign Minister.
The head of the Intelligence Section then writes to the Foreign
Minister detailing the extent of co-operation needed from the Ministry,
including the supply of passports and visas and the budget required.
For providing diplomatie passports, Mr Mosavi from the Intelligence
Ministry co-ordinates with Tale Masooleh from the Foreign ~inistry.
Weapons are occasionally procured loca1ly, but more often they are sent
to the target country in diplomatie pouches. (This raises the question
as to whether Iran should forfeit the privilege of sending material via
diplomatie pouches unexamined). Tickets are purchased from Iran Air
on the account of the Ministry of Defence and Support. The Iranian
Embassy in the target country is informed, and the teams establish
contact with specific persons in the Embassy, through wbom messages
are routed,
The Iranian embassy in Bonn is the centre for directing the
régime's terrorist activities throughout Europe; it is the centre for
Annex 47
How the Murder Machine Works 9
gathering information on the prospective subjects for assassination,
Iranian dissident activities and directing assassination.
The Iranian régime uses different methods to approach the victims
in order to strike the final blow. The most common method is to use
infiltrators, whose responsibility is to introduce the killers. In the case
of Mr. Bakhtiar, for instance, the infiltrator took the assassins inside
his house which was under French police protection.
Another method is using the small number of defectors w ho had
atone stage co-operated with opposition organisations and individuals.
These persons, due to their low or non-existent motivation to continue
the struggle and maintain their principles, allowed themselves ta be
bought by the régime at a la ter stage. Such people have so far provided
régime's terrorists in Europe with the most extensive intelligence and
political services. In addition to providing information on the
assassination targets to the régime, they prepare the political grounds
for the murders of the dissidents by spreading propaganda against the
individuals or organisations they had previously co-operated with,
defaming them and accusing them of being worse than the ruling régime.
According to National ·Council ofResistance oflran (NCR) sources,
the Iranian régime utilised fully the information held by one of these
elements, named Saeed Shasavandi, to assassinate Professer Kazem
Rajavi in Geneva. Shasavandi, who lives in Hamburg, Germany, was
also one of the witnesses introduced by the Iranian government to a
Swiss court in Geneva, which was dealing with a case against the
newspaper, La Suisse. Iran tried in vain to blame Professor Rajavi's
murder on his own colleagues.
Majid T was kidnapped as he was coming out of a meeting in
Fereydoon Gilani's house, and tortured later. Gilani works in close
relation with Jamshid Tafrishi who is discibed by International
Educational Development as "an agent of the Khomeini régime's Ministry
of Intelligence" in Germany.12 He also co-ordinates his activities with
Saeed Shasavandi another agent in Hamburg. Both of them are
introduced by the Iranian régime as former leaders of the Resistance
and the opposition.
11 United Nations Economie and Social Council, Document E/CN.4/sub.2/1995/NGO/
55; August 1995
Annex 47
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad
Th pattern of execution:· within Iran ha been matched by a
erics of a · ·a ·sinations of th régime'. opponents overseas. In man y of
the killing::, anù attempt~ tbere is evidcnce of direct involvcment by
the agents of Tehran, including criminals acting under the shield of
diplomatie immunity. In othcr cases, there is no clue to the identity of
the a-. a. sin. but cornmon . en. e and the lack of any othcr motive lead
the observer to the conclu ·ion that the hand of the perverted clerics
manipulate · the killer · from behind the ccne .
Reza Mazlou1nan
Even a thi report went to press news of a further killing by one
of the régime' terrori in Pari:· came in. On the evening of May 28
1996 Reza Mazlouman, a former Professor of Criminology at Tchran
Univ r ·ity and Deputy Mini ter under the Shah, was shot dead in his
own apar ment.Afriend open d he door Lo the assa in, whowas known
to Profos. or Mazlouman, hav~ng introduced himself to the victim
previously as an opponent of the régirn.e. The killer waited until the
friend had gone, and ihen fircd two shots into Mazlouman's bead, killing
hirn in. tantly.
The friend wa able ta identity the caller a Ahmad Jayhouni,
owncr of a video hop in Bonn. Th , German police, acting on the reque t
of their French counterparts, detained J yhouni for que boning, and
he immcdiately admitted that be had been to Pari to ee Profe. or
lVIazlouman on the evenincr in question, whjle denying the crirn -.13
It Wfü, fo nd on inve. tiga ion, thai Jayhouni wa, a higb-ranking
1
mcmbc.r of the Intelligence M.inisiry of the régime, nnd hnd bccn clo cly
as ·ociatcd vvith Lhc "thirdflovr" of the mullahs Emba sy in Bonn which
Annex 47
12 Iran: State of Terror
serves ;:is the Ministry's headquarters in Germany.14
The leaders of the Re sis tance
In 1996 artillery became part of the Iranian government's arsenal
of terrorist weaponry in the assassination plot against Maryam Rajavi,
the President-Elect of the Iranian Resistance.
On March 14, 1996, a cargo of arms and ammunition was
discovered on the Iranian ship Kolahdooz at the Belgian port,Antwerp.15
This arsenal had been sent by the Food Industry Company, based in the
southem Iranian ci ty of Jiroft, and headed by Ahmad Shojaie, a member
of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. The Kolahdooz left port on February
24, 1996 carrying a specially designed high-calibre mortar la un cher with
delayed-action mortar shells: packed in food containers.
A spokesman for the District Attorney's Office in Antwerp said
the mortar shell had a time-fuse allowing mid-air explosion and that
the launcher had a range of more than 700 metres.
"Loo king at the size and weight [ of the mortar grenade] it is
more than plausible that the purpose was to launch it from a
truck," ... " The sheWs explosive load has a net equivalent of
125 kilos of TNT, which has a deadly effect over a range of
650 metres through shrapnel and shock waves". 16
After the container in which the weapon was hidden was unloaded
from the Kolahdooz in Belgium, the ship sailed for Germany, where she
docked at Quay No 64 in the free port of Stade near Hamburg. The
cargo's supposed final destination was Munich where an Iranian firm
was listed as the consignee.
In Hamburg, "The German police questioned two Iranians, both
employees of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry, who were on board the
freighters when it arrived in Hamburg, according to investigators". 17
1-l Jayhowti: Khomeini régime's intelligence ministry agent, NCR press release, June
10, 1996
15 Reuters, March 18, 1996
16 Reuters, April 30, 1996
17 International Herald Tribune, May 2, 1996
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 13
The shipment was h,rnclerl over for shipping by a sea-t.ransport company
named Haml-e-Varedat, whose central office is located at 15, Garmsare-
Shargi Street, Shiraz-e-J onoubi Street, Mollah Sadra Street, Tehran.
This company has offices in Bandar Khomeini, Bandar Abbass,
Bandar Anzali, Bandar Bushehr and Khark Island. The head of Bandar
Abbass office, which handed over the shipment to the shipping company,
is Mr Hossein Daneshmand. The consignments were originally
assembled by Jiroft Food Industries, a company affiliated ta the Guards
Corps. The president afthe company is Mr Shojaieem a servingmember
of the Ca.rps.
In order to conceal the identity of the real shipper, the
consignments were registered in the name of Mohammad Khorsand
merchant company and Saeed textiles. The shipment was sealed by
the customs and was supposed to be dispatched in early February as a
'No Rush' shipment. However on February 20 Jiroft Food Industries
stated that it intended to add more gherkins and pickled garlic to th~
consignment. Export formalities for the addition were undertaken and
the container's seal was broken and re-sealed after the new
consignment, about one-fourth of the container's volume, was added.
At that time they were in a hurry for the load to reach its destination.
The consignments were handed over in Bandar Abbass to Hossein
Daneshmand, the representative of the Haml-e-Varedat company. On
February 23, 1996 he handed over the shipment, in one container, ta
the ship the following day. The ship left Bandar Abbass on the same
day.
The Iranian opposition in Paris on May 13, 1996, declared:
«Iran's Intelligence Ministry had a plan to attack the
residence of Mrs Maryam Rajavi, the Iranian Resistance's
President-elect, in a Paris suburb, using rockets and
mortars, according to information obtained {rom within
Iran". 18
The huge mortar, although ostensibly consigned to Munich, was not
18 NCR statement, May l3, 1996; French Channel 3, television. May 14. 1996 and
the Parîsian newspapcr, May 14, 1996
Annex 47
14 Iran: State of Terror
intended for any German targets, as there are good reasons to believe.
Belgium, where the weapon and explosives were unloaded, was not likely
to be a target either. Paris, three heurs drive fromAntwerp, was thought
to be the real destination.
All previous bombings and terrorist assassinations in France have
always involved shootings, stabbings or explosives placed at the target
site. With a heavy calibre mortar, the intended target must have been
heavily guarded and impossible to approach closely. The size of the
charge also indicates that a very large explosion was required to
compensate for uncertainties in the exact position of the objective. The
only desirable target in Europe for the Iranian régime matching this
description is the high security residence of Mrs Maryam Rajavi in the
suburb of Paris.
This is net the first time that Mrs Rajavi has been targeted. There
was a plot on ber life in June 1995 in Germany. American intelligence
officials concluded that Iran's embassy in Bonn had assembled a team
from the terrorist group, the Party of God, to violently disrupt a huge
rally in Germany and assassinate Mrs Rajavi who was scheduled to be
the key note speaker.19 About the same time, the American official said
·that Germany asked two Iranian intelligence officials to leave the
country because of evidence that they were planning potentially lethal
operations from German territory.20
But perhaps the most revealing circumstantial evidence is the
similarity between the specially designed weapons confiscated by the
Belgians and the one seized in Iraq a few weeks later.
A similar case in B?ghdad
Tbere is reason to believe that a similar terrorist attack was to
be launched in Baghdad against Mr Masoud Raj avi, President of the
National Council of Resistance on Iran. On May 15, 1995, at a press
conference in Baghdad, a Resistance spokesman displayed the weapons
and equipment seized from a terrorist network belonging to the
Khomeini régime's Intelligence Ministry (VEVAK).
The specially-designed we.apon for this terrorist operation seized
19 The New York Times, June 25, 1995
20 Ibid '
s> (1)
X
.+::,,.
-.:i
Weapons seized from lranian régime's
terra ris ts on disp lay at a press
conference in Baghdad. A 320 mm
mortar launcher, 1.63 m in length and
25 kg high explosive shells. Similar
weapons were discovered on an lranian
ship at the Belgian port of Antwerp,
intended for use against Mrs Maryam
Rajavi's residence in the suburb of Paris.
~ c-1-
1>,)
~
Cil
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.t.;.1.. rn
.r.n.. . p.
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~ rn
~
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Annex 47
16 Iran: State of Terror
from the hit squad, was a 320 mm calibre mortar launcher, 163
centimetres in length. Each mortar shell contained 25 kilograms of
highly explosive material. The weapon was dismantled into three pieces
for transportation over the Iranian border and to Baghdad. They were
like pieces of piping, to be joined together to make the weapon ready
for use. The Intelligence Ministry ordered the Military Industry, a
government-owned corporation, to make these special weapons. Before
transferring the weapons to Iraq, the terrorists had tested the weapons
with live ammunition.
The terrorists had also planned to detonate a bomb by remote
control in a car parked where the Resistance rnembers would have
gathered after the explosion of the first bomb. Members ofthis terrorist
network, employed and organised by the Ministry of Intelligence,
received six months of special training in the Gayoor Asli Garris on and
Navab Safavi Centre in the city of Ahvaz, another miÎitary station near
Baharestan Square in Tehran and another in Qom. Training sessions
were carried out, under the network's leader who had eight years of
experience in terrorist activities under the Khomeini régime.
The agents of the Iranian régime in order to cany out their plan,
took over a house a few hundred metres from the Mojahedin's main
headquarters. As they were about to carry out the operation, howevcr,
the terrorists were, arrested by the Iraqi authorities and the plot was
foiled.21
Hamed Reza Rahmani
At 20:00 local time (Baghdad), on Thursday March 7, 1996, a
member of the Mojahedin was assassinated on Sa'dun Street, a mile
from the Mojahedin's central office in Baghdad. The victlm, Hamed
Reza Rabmani, 33, who was an officer in the National Liberation Army
of Iran (NLA), was near the Sheraton Hotel when gun-fire shattered
the rear window ofhis four-wheel drive vehicle. He died instantly frorn
gunshot wounds to his head. His wife, Ma'soumeh Hasherni had already
been murdered by the Iranian régime several years earlier. Farid
Soleimani, a spokesman for the People's Mojahedin, blamed the attack
21 Press office of the People's Mojahedin of lran, Paris, May 15, l Sl96
Annex 47
Attack.s on Dissidents Abroad 17
on the Iranian Government and said it was the sixth assassination of
the Mojahedin members in Baghdad since 1995.22 The murder ofHamed
Reza Rahmani came on the eve of the Iranian elections for a new
parliament.23 A spokesman for the M?jahedin said:
"The [Iranianl. régime needs to engage in these types of
actions for its demoralised forces". 24
Mowlavi Abdulmaled.Mollahzadeh
and Abdul-Nasser Jamshid-Zehi
On Tuesday March 5, 1996, two Iranian Sunni Muslim clerics
were shot dead in the Pakistani port city of Karachi. The unidentified
attackers had fired about 30 bullets at the car carrying the two clerics,
setting its petrol tank ablaze and wounding a woman passer-by. 25
Mollahzadeh, 45, who had two wives and more than a dozen children,
left Iran about seven years ago and settled in Pakistan's western border
province of Baluchestan. Jamshid-Zehi, 23, was a religious man not
involved in any political activity. In an interview with Swedish Radio
on March 7, 1996, Mr Mollahzadeh's brother said that the Iranian
Government had pressured his brother to go back to Iran and that the
assassins were one hundred per cent from the Iranian régime. The
National Council ofResistance of Iran said in Paris issued on March 6:
"Mr MoUahzadeh, son of the late Mowlavi Abdul-Aziz (a
renowned clergyman in Baluchestan) was arrested and
imprisoned for some time in 1982 for protesting the régime's
policies. About to be arrested again, he went to Pakistan
in 1990".
Zah'ra Rajabi and Abdul Ali Moradi
Mrs Zahra Rajabi, a member of the NCR and one of the officials
of the Office of the Iranian Resistance's President-elect, and Mr Ali
22 AP, March 7, 1996
23 Ibid
2~ Reuters, March 7, 1996
25 Reuters, March 5, 1996
Annex 47
18 Iran: State of Terror
Moradi, one of the sympathisers of the Resistance, were murdered in
Istanbul on February 20, 1996. Gunmcn broke into the home of Mrs
Rajabi, fired five shots into her head at pojnt-blank range and then
kmed her colleague Abdul Ali Moradi.26
Mrs Rajabi, who lived in Paris, had travelled as head of an NCR
delegation to Turkey to help Iranian refugees there. Mrs Rajabi, whose
sister and husband had been murdered by the Iranian régime, had
previously been the subject of a foiled assassination attempt on her life
in Germany in 1992.27 Ali, Moradi's brother, had also been executed for
activities in support of the Resistance. 28
The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet reported:29
"The murderers of Abdul-Ali Moradi and Zahra Rajabi,
one of the officials of the People's Mojahedin Organization,
who were murdered two months ago in Istanbul, have been
arrested. Interrogation of those arrested are continuing by
the Anti-Terror Department. Three of those arre~ted are
lranian and the other three Turkish. Those arrested have
confessed that the orders for the murders came {rom
diplomats whose names are also present in the confessions
of Erfan Cagirici, Chetin Ranaj's assassin. These diplomats
who were worhing 'at the Consulate in Istanbul, are: Mohsen
Kargar Azad and Mohammad Reza Behrooz-Manesh.
The terrorists were arrested during the period when Mes ut
Yilmaz, Turkish Prime Minister, was meeting Velayati, the
Iranian Foreign Minister, who was uisiting Turkey last week.
But, to auoid a political diplomatie controuersy, the news of
the arrest of these indiuidual (terrorists) was kept secret.
The information the police gathered {rom the 3 lranians
and the 3 Turks was immediately transferred to the Foreign
and lnterior Ministries".
ltl The Sunday Tclegr;:iph. Fcbrnary 25, 1996
17 NCR statemcnt issucd Fcbruary 21, 1996
2i AFP, February 21, 1996
29 Hurriyet, April 22. J 996
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 19
In this crime, a person called Reza Ma'soumi Barzegar, an agent
of the mullahs was arrested. According to his confessions before the
Turkish prosecutors' office, while trying to establish a close relation
with the Resistance, he found out about Mrs Rajabi's trip to Turkey and
led the perpetrators to her apartment.
According to a report by the Turkish Prosecutor's Office, the
terrorists had initially intended to abduct Zahra Rajabi. The report
describes how two agents of the régime's Information Ministry, Morteza
Mohsen Zadeh (real name Sa'eed Choob-Tarash), and Sa'eed Karamatian
(real name Rahim Afshar), left Tehran for Istanbul using passports
bearing serial numbers ~144138 and Rl44140, and used·the Berr Hotel
(Room 506) as their base. The Iranian diplomats in Istanbuljoined them
later ta complete initial surveillance.
The commander of the operation from the Information Ministry,
Nasser Sarmadi-Nia (alias Haj Ghassem Zargari-Panah), passport
number 0012091, left Tehran and arrived in Istanbul on February 20th
and used Buyuk Sahzed Hotel (Room 108) as his base. Mobile phones
were used for all communications between the terrorists.
On the day of the assassination, three terrorists were positioned
outside the house and a fourth one stayed in the getaway car. Three
other people entered the building. The assassination team was
commanded by Mohsen Kargar-Azad, the régime's Consular Secretary
in Istanbul. Having entered the building, they used the lift to go ta the
fifth floor. They entered the apartment and murdered bath Mrs Rajabi
and Mr Ali Moradi. The following day, February 21st, the master-mind
of the terrorists, Sarmadi-Nia, took flight number PK-254 to Karachi
via Damascus and Dubai. Sa'eed Choob-Tarash and Sa'eed Karamatian
took flight number TK-826 to Tehran. The Prosecutor General Office's
file on the case states that Mohsen Kargar-Azad, who was still in the
Iranian Consulate in Istanbul at the time the report being prepared,
could not be arrested due to diplomatie immunity.
Many human rights advocates and personalities have condemned
the murder of Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi by the government of the
Islamic Republic. The European Parliament condemned the
assassinations on March 14, 1996 and urged EU member governments
"to increase their protection of opposition leaders living in exile in their
Annex 47
20 Iran: State of Terror
territory". With the murder of Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi, the death
to11 of Iranîan opposition members in Turkey reached fifty. 30
The Turkish paper Hurriyet referred to the most important
terrorist operation of the Iranian government:
"During the past 11 years, 7 very prominent Iranian
opposition members were killed, two others injured and two
car bombs exploded in Shishli district .... ln 1987, in a villa
in Istanbul, two gunmen opened {ire on opponents,
Mohammad Hassan Mansouri and Behnam. In 1988,
Abolhassan Mojtahedzadeh, an engineer who opposed the
régime, was kidnapped in an attempt to take him back to
Iran. In a search of the carat the border, he was found and
rescued. In 1990, Hossein Mir-Abedini and his wife were
fired at and severely injured. In 1992 also Iranian agents
bombed two cars belonging ta' Ali Akbar Ghorbani, an
impo,:tant member of the Mojahedin who lived in Shishli
district of Istanbul. The same day, SAVAMA mercenaries
{rom Hezbullah kidnapped him".31
Expulsion of four lranian diplomats
On April 11, 1996, Mr Omer Akbel, Turkey's Foreign Ministry
spokesman, said that the government had asked Iran to withdraw four
Iranian diplomats stationed in Ankara, who were implicated in a series
of attacks in 1990 against exiles and prominent Turkish secularist
writers.32
In their terrorist operations, Tehran's diplomats had used Turkish
nationals who had been influenced by fundamentalist ideas. Irfan
Cagirici, the leader of one of the Islamic terrorist groups in 'furkey, was
arrested on March 9, 1996. According to the Turkish security police, he
had been trained in Iran.33
Following bis arrest, Irfan Cagirici, the leader of the IslamicAction
:io Sa'baah, February 23, 1996
3' Hurriyet, February 23, 1996
:ii Financial Times, April 11, 1996
,:; AFP, March 11, 1996
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 21
group, admitted that he had arranged the murder of Iranian dissidents
in Turkey. He had also ordered the murder of Turkish secular writers
Turan Dursun and Cetin Emec. The Chief of Istanbul police, Orhan
Tasanlar, said:
"Cagirici visited Iran for instruction frequently ". 34 "Cagirici
named Iranian diplomats as his contacts in Turkey,
according to the police, who provided the names of 13
Iranian diplo.mats as part of their investigation. Only four
of them were still serving in Turkey, two at the Embassy
and the others at the Consulate in Istanbul. He testified
after arrest that he had organised the lûllings of two activists
who opposed the Iranian régime and that he had arranged
for members of his group to get training in Iran. Cagirici
was also behind the unsuccessful assassination attempt on
a prominent Jewish businessman in 1993 ... ".35
Mr Cagirici told the police that diplomats at the lranian
embassy and consulate in Istanbul had prouided arms and
support.36
Reasons behind the assassinations
The assassinations of Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi took place at
a time when the Tehran régime was in dcsperate need of presenting an
acceptable face. The UN Special Representative on Iran, Professor
Copithorne had recently returned after a visit therc and his report was
anticipated in March. But the Majlis (Parliamentary) elections were
being held in Iran on March 8, and this, most probably, was a factor in
the decision to go ahead with the assassinations. The Sunday Telegraph
commented:37
''As Iran enters the final phase of its election campaign,
President Hashemi Rafsanjani is believed to have ordered
lJ Reuters, March 11 , 1996.
' 5 Associaced Press (AP), April 9, t 996
~° Financial Times, April 11, 1996
37 Sunday Telegraph, April 25, 1996
Annex 47
22 Iran: State of Terror
terrorist hit squads to conduct a series of political
assassina tians in Europe... While Rafsanjani still has
another year of his presidency to run, his supporters look
set to take a hammering in the elections for the majlis
(parliament) on March 8th ... By ordering the murders of
Iranian critics who have sought refuge in Europe,
Rafsanjani is trying to proue his Islamic credentials to the
electorate in the hope of winning votes."
Three Assassinated in Baghdad
At 07:50 on lVIonday, July 10, 1995 three members of the
People's Mojahedin oflran, Seyed Hossein Sadi di, 34, Ibrahim Salimi,
36, and Yar Ali Gartabar-Firouz, 33, were assassinated by the Iranian
régime's agents at Mohammed Qasim highway in Baghdad. They
died before reaching hospital. The assassins were driving a Mitsubish.i
taxi (Baghdad numberplate 97 499) and opened fire from behind.
The Mitsubishi taxi had several nurnberplat_es stacked on top of each
other. The terrorists had three Uzi sub-machine-guns, an RPG-18
anti-tank rocket, two A-U7 assault rifles, five grenades, a round of
bullets and a pile of forged documents. Immediately after the incident,
one of the assassins was arrested at Baghdad's exit to Kout. The
ambush came a day after the Mojahedin reported that the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards had fi.red rockets into its main military base
in Eastern Iraq.38
The same day, the Mojahedin accused Iranian diplomats in
Baghdad of masterminding and organising the operation. They called
immediately on the Iraqi Government to follow up on this crime,
prosecùte the t~rrorists and close down the Islamic Republic's Embassy
in Baghdad. Al-Thawra, the official organ of the ruling Baath Party
said the Foreign Ministry summoned Iran's charge d'affaires in Baghdad
and protested.39 Al-Thawra, quoting a spokesman for the Iraqi foreign
ministry said:
38 International Herald Tribune, July 11, l 995
39 Financial Times, 11 July, 1995
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad
"Iraq strongly den.ounces and condemns this aggressiue a.et
and holds the lranian Government full y responsible for it''. 40
Effat Haddad and Fereshteh Esfandiari
23
On May 17, 1995 two Iranian women, Effat Haddad and Fereshteh
Esfandiari, were assassinated in Baghdad. This was the first known
occasion that women outside Iran have fallen victim to the régime's
assassms.
"Gunmen fired at a vehicle of an lranian exile group in
Baghdad hilling two senior wonien members and wounding
a thïrd ... ". 41
A Mojahedin spokesman said the attack occurred in the morning
in the Shaab district of the capital and the attackers fled by car. Mrs
Effat Haddad, 32 and mother of four children, was a member of the
NèR. Fereshteh Esfandiari, 35, was an official of the Mojahedin's public
relations department and the anchorwoman of the Resistance's Radio
and Television. They died instantly when terrorists machine-gunned
their car from behind. Another woman passenger of the car (Sadigheh
Khodai Sefat) was injured.
Women form a sizeable portion of the Mojahedin's fighting force
in Iraq. The Mojahedin, which opposes the Tehran government, blamed
what it called "terrorist diplornats" in the Iranian embassy in Iraq. It
urged the Iraqi government to shut clown the embassy and bring the
attackers to justice.42 In another separate terrorist attack in Baghdad,
July 10, 1995 which led to the murder ofthree members of the Mojahedin
one the terrorists, an Iranian agent was arrested. According to the
Mojahedin's officials he confessed he had also participated in the May
17 assassinations.
~0 Reuters, July 10, 1995
~ 1 Reuters, May 17, 1995
.1i Ibid
~' Reuters, January 7, 1994
Annex 47
24 Iran: State of Terror
Taha Kermanj
On January 4, 1994, Mr Ta.ha Kermanj, a member of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party oflran's Revolutionary Leadership (KDPIRL),
was assassinated by pistol shots from in the city of Corum in Turkey.
Police said that Mr Kermanj, an Iranian Kurdish dissident, was
registered by the UN as a refugee. The Turkish Daily News said
Kcrmanj, had been a leader of a faction of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party of Iran (KDPI).43
The National Council of Resistance of Iran issued a statement
frorri Paris accusing the Iranian authorities of assassinating Kermanj.
Police said that several people, including Iranian nationals, had been
detained in connection with the killing.44 An official of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Ankara said Mr
KermanJ had been registered as a refugee in July and was living in
Corum w hile the UNHCR sought a third country willing to grant him
permanent residence."Naturally the UNHCR is worried about the safety
of such people and μ;e have raised this concern with the country [Turkey]",
the UNHCR official said. Iran has asked Turkey to crack down on lranian
dissidents, including the KDPI and the People's Mojahedin Organization,
which both have adherents among the large Iranian exile community
in Turkcy.45 The International Federation of Iranian Refugees (an
international body for the defence of Iranian exiles) said on January 6,
1994:
"The assassination of Mr Kermanj on Tuesday is the work
of Iran's secret service".46
Ghafour Hamzei'i
Another KDPI member, Ghafour Hamzei'i, was shot dead as he
1efl hi, home in Baghdad on August 4, 1994. Mr Hamzei'i had been
e1ected to the KDPI central committee at the Sixth Congress in 1983,
and was the KDPI Representative in Iraq.47
.u Reuters. Junuary 7, 199'1
J:I lhid
J e, French Radio, Pcrsian section , January 6, 1994
~, Key han (London) Augusl 4, 1994
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 25
Mohammad Hassan Arbab
At 11:30 on June 6, 1993, Mohammad Hassan Arbab, also known
as Mohammad Khan Baluch, was sl;i.ot in the back and killed while
walking in the street near his home in the city of Karachi. A passer-by
was also shot and killed in the attack. 48
Mr Arbab was an activist in the Iranian opposition movement
the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), and according to
a spokesman for the movement, Mr Ali Safavi, 49 Mr Safavi blamed agents
of the Iranian government, saying it was not the first time members of
the Mojahedin had been attacked in Pakistan. Three members of the
PMOI had been killed and many injured ÎI). July 1987 when gunmen
attacked them in their bouses in Karachi and Quetta, and there had
been earlier attacks in 1982 and 1985, he said.50
Mohammad Hossein Naghdi
On the morning ofMarch 16, 1993, Mohammad Hossein Naghdi,
a member and representative of the NCR, was targeted in a terrorist
plot in Rome. Mr N aghdi, aged 42, held a bachelor's degree in geology
and worked for some time for the Iranian National Oil Company and
Atomic Energy Organization. In 1980 he travelled to Italy on a
government scholarship. Upon his return he was employed by the
Foreign Ministry and appointed as Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Rome.
In 1981 he resigned his post in protest at the Khomeini régime's
violation of human rights. He later joined the National Council of
Resistance of Iran. Since that time Naghdi remained the NCR's
representative in Italy, and was well known ta most Italian politicians
and members of parliament.
A.tnple Evidence of Authorship
On March 16, Mr Naghdi left home -for his office in the Monte
Sacro area of Rome. His assailant on the rear of a Vespa scooter fired at
him with an automatic weapon. Police spokesman Antonio Vecchione
said the driver ofNaghdi's blue car then managed to drive the 100 yards
48 Financial Times, June 7, 1993
~9 Jordan Times, June 7, 1993
50 Reuters, June 6, 1993
Annex 47
26 Iran: State of Terror
to the group's office. After the shooting the gunmen escaped through
heavy traffic. Italian authoritics said the victim was hit in the face in
the attack by two gunmen. Police revealed that Mr Naghdi had been
assigned protection three years previously after the killing in
Switzerland of Dr Kazem Rajavi.
Italian officials said the assassination on March 16 was the most
visible step in pattern in which terrorist organisations, backed by the
Iranian government, appear to be adopting a more aggressive posture.51
They had earlier received information indicating that Mr Naghdi was
on the Iranian government hit list.52 When, referring to Naghcli's murder,
the Interior Minister of Rafsanjani's government, Abdallah Nouri, was
asked about the killings of Iranian dissidents abroad, he replied:
''.Are these types of people terrorists or not? And if someone
takes action against such terrorists, does that mean they
are terrorists? I don 't think so ". 53
A taped te1ephone conversation between Mohammad Karim
Nasser Saraf, International Deputy of Mohammad Gharazi, Minister
of Post, Telegraph and Telephone and officials of the Iranian régime's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly after the Rome assassination,
provides evidence that Iranian officials ordered the assassination:
-Nasser Saraf: I talked over the phone with our own Jajji
(Minister Gharazi). He said the matter is of such a nature that could
nol be raised in Lhe cabinet.
-Foreign Ministry official: Are you serious?
NS: Anyway, the Haji (Gharazi) himself was happy with the
outcome. He said that after all they have discovered the right methods.
They strikc and thcse guys strike back. Meanwhile, the Haji said the
man [Naghdi] had gained a lot of prestige over there. He was gradually
taking the place of that Kazern [Dr Kazem Rajavi, representative of the
NCR in Geneva, assassinated on April 24, 1990]. I also said that this
:<i The New York Times, March 18, l 993
5~ Statcmcnt hy the Sccrctariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR),
Paris. March 16, J 993 and The Independem, March 19, 1993
'' The New York Times June 22, 1993
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 27
young man [Majid Hedayat-Zadeh, Iran's ambassador to Italy] is right,
because he looks more closely at a number of economic issues. We think
so too. He implicitly mentioned that tome. I can not discuss it openly
over the phone. The issue I just mentioned is scrutinised here ... I will
rai se it with other friends ofhigh ranking posts so that all of our interests
would be considered in a comprehensive manner in similar cases.
FM: And concerning what you said on the Haji remarks. I agree
with that completely. That is true, he was substituting for Kazem
[Rajavi]. Recently he [was talking about] such issues as the arrns sales
by a number of these Italian firms. Add to this his meetings in the
parliament, etc. You know, some of these parliamentarians have asked
this government to recall Italy's Ambassador from Iran and to sever
relations with Iran.
NS: Yes, you heard aboutit too? Yes, that shows how far they had
penetrated in these places.
FM: If it was not effective they would not have investigated so
much?
NS: Of course not. By the way, do you kno~ whether the folks
who carried out this act have returned or have they remained there?
FM: That I don't know because the holiday arrived and our people
scattered.
NS: Rad they informed our Majid [Hedayat-Zadeh] before that
[assassination]?
FM: I have not talked to Majid, I have not reached him yet, but
1'11 try to ... So the Haji said it was Fallahian [Minis ter of Intelligence] or
Rezai [ Guards Corps Commander]?
NS: Considering my phone conversation with the Haji, I think it
was the former [Intelligence Ministry]. I think Majid knows that well,
but perhaps he could not specify it over the phone ...
It is also clear why the régime in Iran assassinated Mr Naghdi.
First, he was the most important Iranian opposition figure in Italy.
Naghdi had played an instrumental role in some of the most important
diplomatie achievements of the Iranian Resistance in Italy, among them
the Italian government's acceptance of a parliamentary recommendation
by Italian deputies proposing recognition of the NCR, as well as the
Annex 47
28 Iran: State of Terror
statement by 377 deputies in the Italian Parliament in support of the
Iranian Resistance. Such activities were good reason for the Iranian
government's hatred of Mr N aghdi.
Le Monde had no doubt about the responsibilities for this murder:
"Beyond the police state which settle accounts with their
opponents in exiles through the burst of machine-guns (as
shown by the Tuesday assassination in Rome of yet another
Iranian dissident), fanaticism no longer recognise any
borders: It is euen in the export of this violence that these
fanatics see the primary signs of the vitality of this issue ". 54
The Mykonos Killings
On September 18, 1992, shortly before midnight, two gunmen
entered the Mykonos [Greek] Restaurant in the west Berlin suburb of
Wilmersdorf, and opened fire witb a machine-gun and a hand gun, killing
four members of the KDPI occupying a table in a back room.
The murdered men were Dr Sadegb Sharafkandi, SecretaryGenera1
of the KDPI, the KDPI European representative, Mr Fathol
Abdouli, aged 33; the KDPI representative in Germany, Mr Homayoun
Ardalan and a translator, Mr Nuri Dehkurdi.55
A Berlin police spokesman said the killers seemed to be Iranian
as survivors heard the gunmen curse in Farsi when they sprayed the
table with bullets from a machine-gun and a hand gun. 56 The two
gunrnen, screaming "you sons of whores", pumped bullets from a machine
gun into eight officials of the KDPI. A third man, armed with an
a utomatic pistol, stood guard in the doorway of the Mykonos
Restaurant.57 Mr Sharafkandi, married with .three children, had been
waiting for Iranian exiles to meet him in the restaurant. Three of the
victims who were in Berlin to attend the Socialist International
Conference, died instantly. "We think this was done by the Iranian
~~ Le Monde, March 18, 1993
;.~ International Herald Tribune, September 19-20, 1992
'" Reutcrs, Septcmber 18, 1992
57 Ibid
5~ Imcrnational Herald Tribune, September 19-20, 1992
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 29
secret service" said Selman Arslan, spokesman for the Kurdistan
Cornmittee in Cologne.58 Kurdish exiles as well as the Mojahedin of
Iran, the country's main opposition group, accused the Ir:;inian secret
service of the killings.59 Witnesses saw one of the gunmen fire repeatedly
with a pistol into Sharafkandi's prostrate body before fleeing from the
restaurant.60
Iran's intelligence Minister, Ali Fallahian, had warned on August
30 in Tehran that the Islamic Republic would track down and crush
expatriate opponents.61 On October 6, German police arrested two
Lebanese men suspected of killing the four Kurds. The two arrested
men were seized in the Rhine, between Osnabrueck and the Dutch
border, as they tried to obtain false papers to flee from Germany.1?2
Lebanese nationals, Mohammad Hassan A and Hussam Hassan C, both
Berlin residents in their twenties, were suspected of providing false
passports for the assassins to escape Gemany. 63
On October 14, German police arrested three men suspected of
aiding the assassins. They said that a 33-year old Iranian national
named only as Kazem D, [Darabi] had been charged with allowing the
gunmen to plan the murder in his Berlin apartment.64
Police also arrested Abbas Rhayel, 25, a Lebanese, on suspicion
of being a gunman, and seized 24 year-old Youssef Amin on charges of
guarding the restaurant's front door during the killings.65
Kazem Darabi was identified by German authorities as an
intelligence agent for the Tehran régime.66 Iran's Intelligence Minister,
Ali Fallahian, widely believed by Western security agencies to have been
behind many of the killings, made an unpublicised visit to Bonn in
October 1992, apparently seeking to prevent Darabi's trial. 67 Among
the officials he met was Bernd Schmidbauer, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's
59 Reuters, Septembcr 23, 1992
60 Reuters, September 18, 1992
61 The Observer, September 20, 1992
<•2 Reutcrs, October 6, 1992
63 Reutcrs, October 14, 1992
M Ibid
M fbjd
66 International Herald Tribune January 6, 1994
67 Ibid
Annex 47
30 lran: State of Terror
top intelligence aide. Britain and the United States were said to be
"furious" over the high-level meeting and the co-operation between the
security agencies of the two countries revealed by Mr Fallahian in an
interview with the Tehran Times.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher was said to have
telephoned his German counterpart Klaus Kinkel to express disrnay at
the talks.68 German federal prosecutors sought to arrest Mr Fallahian
when his presence in Bonn became known but were b1ocked by the
western trading partner, with exports totalling about 1.5 billion pounds.69
The prosecutor tried to prove that the five alleged assassins were
directed by the Iranian secret police (VEVAK). The alleged leader of
the killer squad in Berlin, Kazem Darabi is said to be a senior employee
of VEVAK but was once a member of the Revolutionary Guard. While
living in Germany he was posing as a fruit and vegetable dealer. The
German Prosecutor's documentation shows that Iran's intelligence
gathering is concentrated in three services. The main foreign spy
network is VEVAK and it is supplementcd by the military intelligence
Unit J2, which secures know-how and goods for Tehran's armed forces
and nuclear programme. The third wing is the Revolutionary Guard,
which deals with counter intelligence, persona} protection of politicians
and repression of dissidents. German Counter-Intelligence believes that
all three Iranian branches are working in the Iranian Ernbassy in Bonn
and consulates in Harnburg, Berlin, Frankfort and Munich.70
The Mykonos murders refocused public attention in Europe on
the systematic extermination oflran's political foes, at least for a while.
The bold brutality of such killings led to protests from human rights
groups and western governments. An Amnesty International report
documented and condemned the killing of Iranian dissidents abroad.
"Were ~eeing a growing pattern of hillings and this bloody trail leads
back to Tehran" said James Dea, Washington Director of the
organisation. 71
68 Annika Savil and Safa Haeri, The Independent, Fury al Germ an-lranian ialks,
October 13, 1993
69 The Independent, October 13, 1993
10 The Times, November 20, 1993
71 International Herald Tribune, November 22, J 993
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 31
The US State Department went as far as it could pending the
completion of judicial proceedings, in April 1993: «There are strong
indications that Iran was responsible for the assassinations of the leader
of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and three of his followers
in Berlin in September". 72
The investigation and trial of terrorists suspects in Berlin have
provided new insights into the operation of meticulously organised death
squads directly linked to the rule of President Hashemi Rafsanjani,
American and German officials say. 73
Three revealing documents
Other than testimonies by eye-witnesses and reports of police
investigations presented at the Mykonos trial, three key documents were
also presented to the court, demonstrating that German governmental
circles - in particular German security services and Ministry of the
Interior - are all of the opinion that Berlin assassinations were an
operation by the Iranian régime's intelligence ministry. The three
documents have been checked and verified.74
The first is a report by German Chancellor's Office, dated April
13, 1994, painting to the régime's Intelligence Minister, Ali Fallahian,
using political influence a few weeks prior to the beginning of the trial
in October 1993, to stop the proceedings. This office is headed by
Minister Bernd Schmiedbauer. He has been one of the main parties
conducting ·negotiations with the régime on the release of German
hostages and other issues relating to terrorism.
"Fallahian pointed out: Iran has provided help so far. It
has infiuenced the Hemadi family to release the German
hostages. In Berlin, however, a penal trial is being set up
in whi.ch Iran is being wrongly accused. What is the German
government doing to stop this court case?"
The second document is a report by a working group belonging to
72 Patterns of Global Terrorism, US State Department, 1992
73 International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1993
7~ Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, March 28, 1996
Annex 47
32 Iran: State of Terror
the German interna} intelligence organisation, BfV, (known as the
Federal Department for the Protection of the Constitution) which relates
to the activities of the Iranian intelligence organisations. The report
was prepared on June 29, 1993, some nine months after the
assassination. The German internal intelligence organisation refrained
from commenting on the report and its officials were not given leave to
speak about the report. This report has not been made public, but part
of it was presented to the court by a plaintiff's lawyer and it was officially
read during the session of the court on March 24, 1994, and thus it was
recorded as one of the trial's documents on March 28, 1995. The report
shows that the assassinations were guided and carried out by the
régime's Bonn embassy and the operation was code-named 'Bozorg Alavi'.
The third document is the last report by the German interior
security organisation based on information from its reliable sources.
This note, presented to the court on December 19, 1995, is the most
important document revealed so far. Klaus Grunewald, the Director
General of the foreign extremism section of the security organisation
has appeared in the court three times. The text of the report is as follows:
Federal Department for the Protection of the Constitution
December 19, 1995
Ref: Complementary to departmental information on April
22, 1993 and April 21, 1995 on the penal case against the
accused, Amin, and others suspected of murder and ... (the
trial known as 'Mykonos').
In complementing the above departmental information, the
Department for the Protection of the Constitution (German
internal security organisation), based on reliable
information which has recently been assessed by the court,
can presently inform you:
A section of Iran's Information Minist1:y's depa.rtment for
overseas operations has been involved in the assassination
attempt on the Kurdish leaders on September 17, 1992. This
section which is responsible for assassination attempts
known as Special Operations Unit, had long targeted
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad
memhers of the Iranian Democratic Party of Kurdistan. For
instance, a team {rom that section has been directly
responsible in the murder of the leader of the Democratic
Party, Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou.
The I ranian Ministry of 1 nformation and Security had
despatched a team, {rom Tehran in ea.rly September and
prior to the terrorist assassination, the team was directly
co-ordinated with the [régime's) agents residing in Berlin
and began surveillance and finalising plans for carrying
out the assassination.
Prior to the assassination taking place, the team specifically
determined the composition of the m.embers of the Iranian
Democratic Party of Kurdistan with the help of an
Information and Security Ministry's source who was directly
linked to the Kurdish leaders. Accordi ng to information
receiued, this source was present at the restaurant during
the assassination. Following the assassination, the team
left Berlin for Tehran according to a meticulously prepared
escape plan.
Signature
Grunewald
Warrant to arrest Iranian Minister
33
In March 1996, Germanjudicial authorities issued a warrant for
the arrest of Ali Fallahian, the Iranian régime's Information and Security
Minister, for his involvement in the Mykonos murders. The Federal
Prosecutor's Office in Karslruhe said,
"The suspect has been head of the ministry since 1989, and
said in an interview with the Iranian televiswn a few weeks
before the attack that his agency was targeting the murder
7~ Hcrald Tribune, March 16-17, 1996
Annex 47
34 Iran: State ofTerror
victims' party and would pursue them in Iran and abroad". 75
According to the warrant, "The task of the security section
of the Iranian's Intelligence Ministry, and the 'Qods ' force
of the Guards Corps, is to eliminate the opposition. The head ·
of this system is Ali Fallahian, who is also a member of
Supreme Security Council, in which all decisions of this
kind are taken ... "
With regard to the authority for issuing an arrest warrent, the
investigatingjudge of the Higher Court of Germany, Dr Wolse says that:
" ... since the accused would not willingly give himself up to
the judiciary, it will be impossible to clarify the attempted
assassination without arresting him ... With regard to the
existing information, there is a possiblity that the accused
would attempt ta commit other crimes of this nature ... The
terror of Kazem Rajavi, Bakhtiar and Naghdi have been
carried out during hi~ term of office and these were the
responsibity of his ministry ". 76
Two members ofGermany's END intelligence agency slipped out
of Tehran before the news broke.71 Iranian officials warned of possible
political and economic retaliations against Germany ifit pressed ahead
with its efforts to arrest and try Fallahian.78 The lranian ambassador
in Bonn, Hossein Mousavian told the news weekly Focus:
"Mr Fallahian does not live here and cannot be brought
before a court. If no legal consequences are to be expected,
you have to ask 'Why was it done ?' Then you come to the
conclusion - for political reasons."
But Federal Prosecutor Kay Nehm rejected the thesis that Fallahian,
as a minister, would always be beyond the reach of German justice.
76The Centre for lranian Political Refugees in Berlin, Press Release, April 3, 1996
77 Reuters, March 15, 1996
78 Associated Press, March 23, 1996
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad
"An arrest warrant is neuer a political act, but always the
necessary judicial reaction to a serious crime"
He told the la test edition of the news weekly Der Spiegel.
"You mustn't only see an arrest warrant as a short -term
measure. Ministerial office is nota permanent position". 79
35
This is probably the first time in European history that an a rrcst
warrant has been issued for a serving minister of another government.
It is a reflection of the uniqueness of the Rafsanjani government's
involvement in terrorism and slaughter of dissidents abroad.
Dr Shapour Bakhtiar
The last Prime Minister of Iran under the Shah, Dr Shapour
Bak.htiar, was assassinated on August 8, 1991 at the age of 76. Mr
Bakhtiar and his aide Mr Soroush Katibeh, were stabbed to death in his
home outside Paris as two police patrolled outside the house and two other
guards satin an annex.80 The murder resembled the killing of his friend
Abdel Rahman Boroumand five months earlier, just described.
The French Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the
murder· on behalf of the French government. Almost all Iranian
dissidents put the blame for Bakhtiar's murder squarely on Mr
Rafsanjani himself. "There is no doubt that it is the work of terrorists
sent by President Rafsanjani. Since last March, squadrons of death have
been dispatched to Europe" 81 said Afshin Alavi, a spokesman of the
people's Mojahedin, which also accused the Iranian Embassy in Paris
of harbouring terrorists and called for the mission's closure.82
On.Tuesday, August 6, 1991 Mr Fereidun Boyer Ahmadi had told
Dr Bakhtiar that two supporters had arrived from Tehran and wanted
to meet him. 83 The former PM described Boyer Ahmadi as his second
79 Reuters, March 23, 1996
so The Independent, August 9, 1991
81 The Independenf, August 9, 1991
81 Ibid
83 Financial Ti mes, August 12, 1991
Annex 47
36 Iran: State of Terror
son, and his name was on a list of 15 regular visitors to the house. The
three men thus had no difficulty getting past the police guarding the
premises. Once inside, Mr Boyer Abmadi fetched two serrated knives
from the kitchen, and the two killers stabbed Dr Bakhtiar, then eut off
his head and slashed his wrists in a gruesome implementation of the
11sentence" passed by Ayatollah Khomeini under Islamic sharia law. They
removed his gold Rolex wrist watch, a gift from King Fahd of Saudi
Arabia.
At that moment, Dr Bakhtiar's assistant, Mr Sorousb Katibeh,
rushed in, and he too was stabbed repeatedly, as police counted 15 knife
wounds, and found a blade broken off in his hip. The killers then eut
the telephone line and covered Dr Bakhtiar's corpse with a table cloth.
They then waited in the villa while Boyer Ahmadi retrieved their
documen~s from the police, before smuggling the men out. They left his
bouse at around 18:00 and no signs of activity were seen after that
time.84
The two bit men, MohammadAzadi and Ali Vakili Rad, were noted
by the Corps Republicaine de Sécurité (CRS) guard. They had been
recommended for visas by Massoud Hendi, an !rani an businessman with
connections in France, where he had beeil'a correspondent for Iranian
Television. Hendi later told investigators that he made the
recommendation on the order of Mr Mohammad Gharazi, the Minister
of Telecommunications. He told the French Consulate in Tehran that
the two men were telecommunications experts who wanted to attend a
course in France, but in reality they were agents of VEVAK, with the
specificjob of eliminating opponents abroad. The men were met at Orly
airport by Boyer Ahmadi and taken to a flat in Paris.
Dr Bakhtiar had been warned tbat Boyer Ahmadi was not to be
trusted but would hear no ill of him. The traitor had gained a detailed
knowledge of the layout of Bakhtiar's villa, and the police believe he
had decided to act when, at an executive meeting to elect a successor to
Mr Boroumand, Bakhtiar announced that he had decided to move bouse.
After the murder, the assassins tried to cross the border into Switzerland
using false Turkish passports, but were turned back by alert Swiss border
guards. The French guards allowed them back in without quesbon, the
~ The Daily Telegraph, August 10, 1991
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 37
bodies still remaining undiscovered. This created uncertainty among
the plotters in Tehran, and a British monitoring team in Cyprus picked
up a message from VEVAK headquarters to an Iranian embassy in
Europe asking for confirmation of Dr Bakhtiar's death.85
Meanwhile, dues began to appear. A prostitute in the Bois de
Boulogne found bloodstained clothing and Iranian passports; a taxi
driver reported taking two of the men to the Swiss border; a wallet
found in a telephone booth contained Iranian, French and Swiss money,
and calls from the booth were traced to a number in Istanbul. This led
to 11 arrests, including five Iranians, three of them VEVAK agents.
The 11 were charged with providing false passports and visas to the
assassms.
The killers finally succeeded in crossing into Switzerland, with
the police not far behind. They missed arresting the men in a Geneva
hotel by a few hours, but Vakili Rad was detained in a boat on lake
Lernan on August 21 and extradited to France. Then Hendi was picked
up in Paris on September 21 and, deciding that he would be killed if he
returned to Iran, reported the involvement of Minister Gharazi and of
Mr Ali Fallahian, Minis ter of State Security. In the case of the latter,
the information was superfluous because he had already been
congratulated by Mr Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Khomeini's successor as
spiritual leader, for his "great achievements in combating and uprooting
the enemies of Islam, inside and outs ide the country". 86
Agents or supporters of the Khomeini régime, including Anis
N accache, holder of a Lebanese passport, had tried to assassinate
Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris previously, during 1980. It was an attempt
which resulted in the death of a French woman neighbour and a police
officer.87 Naccache, a Lebanese Sunni Muslim, and three others were
given life sentences while the fifth member of the team received a 20
year sentence. All were pardoned in July 1990 and flown to Iran in July
1990, allegedly in pursuance of a bargaîn made by M Jacques Chirac,
85 Safa Haeri, Sunday Times, Iranian Ministers co face Bakhtiar charges, October 6,
1991
86 Safa Haeri, Sunday Times, Iranian Minislers to face Bakhtiar charges, Oclobcr 6,
1991
87 Financial Ti mes, October l 7. 199 l
Annex 47
38 Iran: State of Terror
who held office as Prime Minister of France from 1986 to 1988, in return
for the release of French hostage in the Lebanon.88 Relations between
Paris and Iran had warmed up after Naccache's extrajudicial liberation,
though Iranian exiles had warned that appeasement would not stop
the use of terrorism.
On October 22, 1991, a French judge issued an arrest warrant
for an official of the Iranian government on charges of acting as an
accomplice in the assassination of Shapour Bakhtiar. French
government officials said Judge Jean-Louis Brugiére ordered the arrest
of Hossein Sheikh-Attar, 42, said to be adviser to the Iranian Minister
of Post and Telecommunications, Mohammad Gharazi.89 The warrant
described Mr Sheikh-Attar as "an accomplice in murder and criminal
conspiracy in connection with a terrorist action". 90 The official said Mr
Sheikh-Attar had assisted in arranging for two of the three suspected
killers to be given visas to enter France using false identities. Mr SheikhAtar's
involvement was revealed by Massoud Hendi. Mr Hendi
reportedly arranged false Turkish pas sports to enable two of the alleged
killers to flee France. 91
A third person charged with involvement in the murder was a
woman described as an Iranian intelligence officer. She is believed to
have helped arrange temporary lodgings in Paris for the alleged
assassins. 92 Although Iran had denied involvement in the murder,
President Francois Mitterand postponed a planned trip to Tehran after
Mr Bak.htiar's death.
The Iranian newspaper, J ahan-e-Islam rejojced over the
assassination ofMr Bakhtiar. "Destruction of elements such as Bahhtiar
gladdens the nation and the suffering families of martyrs", the paper
said in an editorial.93 Most Tehran papers were quick to ho1d other
Iranian dissident groups responsible for the murders. But the People;s
88 The Independent, August 9, 1991
89 International Herald Tribune, October 23, 199 J
90 Ibid
91 Alan füding, International Herald Tribune, Paris accuses Iran aid in murdcr of
Bakhtiar, October 23, 1991
92 Alan Riding, International Herald Tribune, Pacis accuses lran aid in murdcr of
Bakhtiar, October 23, 1991
93 Financial Times, August 12, 1991
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 39
Mojahedin claimed on August 23 that "in a meeting with several rninisters
and close associates in mid-July 1991", Rafsanjani said "All of our
gouernment's problems are a result of instability, and we must show that
we are powerful and stable by assassinating people from the opposition". !J,t
In February 1994, Mr Jean-Louis Bruguiére, France's top antiterrorist
investigator, finished his inquiry into the 1991 murder of
Shapour Bakhtiar, and concluded that the assassination was organised
from Tehran. 95
Mr Bruguiére's report, ending with a request for the three suspects
held in France to be tried by an assize court, relied on records of telephone
calls to prove the Tehran link. His investigation took him to Turkey,
where be said the co-ordinator of the assassination was based during
the operation. Telephone traffic between Turkey, Switzerland - where
the alleged assassins were based before crossing into France - and Iran
turned up a Tehran number that the French DST counter-espionage
service has established was used by Iranian intelligence services. 96
After a trial lasting one month seven judges in a special antiterrorist
court sentencedAli Vakili Rad to life injail for killing Bakhtiar
and his secretary. Massoud Hendi was sentenced to 10 years in jail for
complicity in the assassination but Zeynalabedine Sarhadi, a greatnephew
of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the President of Iran, was
acquitted of charges of complicity and freed.97
Referring to the trial of Sarhadi, The Independent wrote:
"One of the defendants is related to President Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani and was stationed at the lranian
embassy in Bern. In the past, actions by Western security
services inuoluing lranian diplomats or officials have tended
to provoke reprisals against foreign diplomats in Iran". 98
Another press report at time said:
9-1 Office of the People's Mojahedin of Iran, Paris, August 23, 1991
9:î The lndependent, February 9, 1994
96 The Indepcndent, February 9, 1994
97 The Independent, December 8, 1994
98 The Independent, Novernber 3, 1994
Annex 47
40 Iran: State of Terrer
"The trial has devoted little time ta the question of Iranian
government involvement. The prosecutors have been
hampered by Tehran's refusal to co-operate. There are also
suspicions that politics might have infiuenced the course of
events. France has made considerable efforts to maintain
warm relations with the Iranian government and is
negotiating the return of money and assets stripped {rom
French companies during the 1979 revolution". 99
The opposition NCR said that the conviction of two others by a
court in Paris on Tuesday proved Iran was behind the murder in 1991.100
Hashem Abdollahi
Hashem Abdollahi, whose father was an important prosecution
witness at the trial of Shapour Bakhtiar's murderers, was killed by a
single shot to the back of bis head in bis father's flat in Paris on
September 17, 1995. His father Davoud, who found Hashem's body on
returning late that evening, is a member of the monarchist National
Resistance Movement, and it had been bis testimony above all which
had pointed the finger at the Islamic régime for the murder of Shapour
Bakhtiar.101
Abdol Rahman Boroumand
On April 18, 1991, Mr Abdol Rahman Boroumand, 6-3, an Iranian
dissident, was stabbed to deatb near his apartment in Paris. 102 Mr
Boroumand was a close collaborator of Sbapour Bakbtiar, Iran's last
Prime Minister before the 1979 anti-monarchical revolution, acting as
his Finance and Budget Minister during bis premiership. He had been
elected, two months before his death, president of the executive
committee of the national resistance movement, founded by the former
Prime Minister. In March 1992 a French court sentenced two Iranians
in absentia to five years' imprisonment on illegal weapon charges
99 The Guard.Jan, December 6, 1994
100 The Independent, December 8, 1994
101 Iran Bulletin Autumn-Winter 1995, No 10-11
102 AFP, April 18, 1991
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 41
stemming from 1986. The two had been seen waiting outside the home
of Mr Boroumand around the time of his assassina tian. 103
Cyrus Elahi
On October 23, 1990, Mr Cyrus Elahi, an Iranian dissident living
in exile, and member of the Flag of Freedom Organisation, was found
dead in the corridor ofhis apartment building. Mr Elahi had been gunned
down by numerous bullet wounds to the head and body.
Manouchehr Ganji, head of the Paris-based Flag of Freedom
Organisation, accused Iran of ordering the killing. "] am absolutely
certain that the Islamic Republic carried out the assassinatîon" he said.
Mr Ganji described Mr Elahi as his "right-hand-man" and when Mr
Ganji was Education Minister in the government of the Shah of Iran,
Mr Elahi served as his adviser.
Ayatollah Rouhani, who said he represented the Islamic Shiite
community in Europe, condemned the "terrorist ar:tion" and blamed
"Iranian extremists ". 104-
Dr Kazem Rajavi
Dr Kazem Rajavi had gone ta France as a young man in 1957 to
continue his education. In 1968 he and his French wife moved to
Switzerland. Over the years Dr Kazem earned six Doctorate degrees,
in law, political science and sociology, and taught at Geneva University
for nearly 10 years.
In 1971 the Shah's notorious secret police (SAVAK) had arrested
and brutally tortured his younger brother, Mr Massoud Rajavi, then a
leader of the. People's Mojahedin Organisation which had rapidly
established itself as a major opposition force to the Shah. Dr Kazem
campaigned vigorously to have his brother's death sentence commuted
to life imprisonment, and thus became a leading cri tic of human rights
abuses under the Shah.
After the fall of the monarchy he was nominated Iran's first
Ambassador to the United Nations European Headquarters in Geneva.
Within a year however he resigned bis post in protest against the
103 Patterns of Global Tcrrorism, US State Department, 1992
io.i International Herald Tribune, October 24, 1990
Annex 47
42 Iran: , al' of Tcrror
religiou dictatorship which had begun to take shape und r Lh,
leader ·hip of Khomeini. From this time until hi dea h Dr Kazem
remaincd the Iranian Re i tances leading reprc ent.ative to the world\
human right a emblie . He wa in trumen al in the ra ification of
nine con ecutive United Na Lion Hu man Ricrhts Commi .-ion re olution ·
rebuking the régime in Iran for human right.. violation . Dr Rajavi's
many successe had certainly made him a focu of th, régime hatrcd,
and at the January 1990 meeting of the UN Hum an Rights ommi ion,
the Iranian Ambas ador, Mr Sirou Na eri, told Dr R javi in th
presence of 8 witnesse:::.: 'We will kill you '.
The Swiss Gather Evidence
On April 24 1990 Dr Kazem Rajavi wa a a ·inat d a he
returned unprotected to his home in Copet, a uburb of Gen va. H
was ambushed and killed by gunmen in h.vo car .105 After pinning hi ·
red Datsun again t the curb, one a in opened fire v,. ith an Uzi 9mm
sub-machine gun, bitting Dr Rajavi with ix bulJet .
Swiss Police Magistra e, Roland Chatclain . ub cqu ntly
implicated 13 Iranians in the plot. According to the newspaper Le
Courrier) investigation confirmed the involvement of 13 per ·on · among
them Yadollah Samadi 33, an Iranian and Niobammad , aid Rezvani,
34, both Iranians.106 Mo t of the the 13 had entcred witzerland ,~1ith
ervice passport is ucd in Tehran on the am date with he notation
"on a ignment".107 Mo t had al o arriv cl ccordi11g ta M ChaLclain .report,
via Iran Air's Tehran-Geneva flight over ·evcral mon h.
preceding the murdcr, using tickets with consecu ive erial numb r . .
Several of the men flew from Geneva o Vienna le s than t, o hour.after
the plot. The accumulated evidence M hat.elain dedarc<l,
"permits confinncdion of a direct involuement b , one or more
official Iranian seruices".10
105 International Herald Tribune, ovcmbcr 22. 1993
106 Le Courrier, F bruary 22-23, 1992
107 International Herald Tribune, ovcmber 22, 19 3
108 R. Atkin on, European reaclion often tepid LO ·1ssa si nation of lr::in1am,. The
Washington Post. November 21. 1993
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 43
Police investigations discovered that the two diplomats named
by the media (Samadi and Rezvani) were indeed in Geneva during the
period of the crime and left Switzerland for Tehran on the day of the
assassination on a direct Iran Air flight. The commando squad which
directly carried out the act on Tuesday April 24 was apparently composed
of four persons. 109
A tape recording was given to the police of a conversation between
the Iranian Consul-General in Geneva, Mr Karim Abadi and bis bosses
in Tehran on the afternoon of the assassination in which he says:
''Yes, I know about the one that we have with us. The
indiuidual has no legal problems and l'm telling him to
telephone in to Headquarters".
Terrorist Suspects Leave Paris
The French government sparked a diplomatie row on Friday
December 31, 1993 by admitting it had secretly flown home to Tehran
two Iranian terrorist suspects, Mohsen SharifEsfahani, 33, and Ahmad
Taheri, 32, instead of extraditing them to Switzerland, at that country's
request, where they were wanted in connection with the murder of Dr
Kazem Rajavi. The two alleged terrorists had been arrested in France
on November 15, 1992. In February 1993 the High Court in Paris ordered
that they be extradited to Switzerland. The two men were believcd to
be part of a network of Iranian govermnent agents working to elirninated
political opponents living in exile.110 On Wednesday night, December
29, the pair were released from prison and were put on a flight to Tehran.
The decision to deport the men was taken, unusually, by the Prime
Minister's office for 11reasons connected to our national interests"
according to a statement issued 24 hours later by the office of Prime
Minister Edouard Balladur.111
The Swiss government made vigorous protests to France over
109 R. Chatelain, Magistrate of Cantonal Investigations, press release, June 22, I 990.
Lausanne, Switzerland
110 The Guardian, January 1, 1994
III Ibid
Annex 47
44 Iran: State ofTern>r
the affair. Il said lhnt "the French decision is not on/y surprising, but is
in flagrant violu.tion of ail international and European conventions on.
extradition,.. n.J The Swiss wcre especially galled by the French action
becausc the previom; year Switzerland had riskcd antagonising Tcbran
whcn it extradiled an Iranian wantcd by the French in conncction with
the 1991 murder of Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris. The US Statc
Departmcnt said thnt the United States did not undcrstand the decision:
"We are seehing clarification on this matter {rom the French
gouernment. The United States belieues tlwt the rule of law
should be applied to terrorists ". 11•1
According to the thcn UK Fm·cign Office Minisler Douglas Hogg MP:
"The clecision by the French Guuernment la relurn to Iran
two Iranians whose extradition hacl been rcquested by the
Swiss in connection with Mr Rajaui's murder causes us
concern. We have made our uiews clear to the French. We
have underlined to them f hat any rctreat from international
solidarity in fïghting terrorism cou/cl wzdermine our
common objectives in. this areu 11
• ni
Swiss .J usticc Minis ter Arnold Ko! Ier lold the Lausanne
newspapcr. Le Nouveau Quoliclian, that Switzcrland regard cd F'rancc's
explanution as wholly inadequate:115
"Jvfy concern is that this slwuld not lcad other ::;ta tes to follow
France's example ".
Gernrcl Fuchs, hcnd of Lhe Foreign Relation:-; Dcpartmenl of the
French Socialist Party, said the cPntrc~right goYcrnment had
m The Indcpcndent, Januar) 1. 199..t
m Rcutcrs. January 7. 1994
11~ Douglas l logg 1\IP. unpublishcd hmcr Ln LorJ :hdmr). Chairman of 1hc
Parliamemary l luman Riglw, Group. January 13. 1994
115 Ibid
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 45
dishonoured France by not sending the Iranians back to face trial in
Switzerland.116
"In the eyes of the world, France is giving the shameful
impression of lying down under the threats of a terrorist
state' said Le Journal du Dimanche, the main Sunday
newspaper in France".m
The concern shown by Washington, London, Bern and politicians
in France indicates their fear that two dangerous terrorists, sent by
Iran to commit murder in Europe, had bee~ allowed to return freely to
the centre where these assassinations are planned. The encouragement
this gave to the masters of the terrorists in Tehran probably had serious
consequences all over the world. Informed sources speaking on condition
of anonymity said that Paris had taken "with great seriousness"' Iranian
threats to launch a new wave ofterrorist operations not only in France
but also against French interests and citizens in bath Iran and Lebanon
if Paris decided to extradite the two to Switzerland.118 By their failure
to resist Tehran's blackmail, however, the French Government rnay have
succeeded only in diverting the assassins towards other innocent victims.
Tru th Prevails
Ms Myriam Gazut Godal, a staff reporter for La Suisse newspaper,
reported on April 26, 1990 that President Rafsanjani had masterminded
the assassination of Dr Kazem. The Iranian government-run press
reported on September 6, 1990 that the Khomeini régime had filed charges
in the Swiss court against Ms Gazut. In their libel suit the Iranian
government invoked article 296 of the Swiss penal code, according to which,
insults directed at a Foreign Head of State constitute a crime.
lnterestingly, this article had been invoked only once before, when the
deposed Shah had pressed a similar charge against a Swiss journalist.
On May 17, 1991, a Geneva court ruled that a foreign Head of
116 Douglas Hogg MP, unpublished letter to Lord Avebury, Chairman of the Parlia
mentary Human Rights Group, January 13, 1994
117 Ibid
118 The Times, January 3, 1994
Annex 47
46 Iran: State of Terror
State had, in effect, been insulted. However, based on article 173 of the
Swiss penal code, the court awarded the accused the right to submit
evidence proving either the truth of her statements or her good faith.
On July 16, 1991, Judge Manfrini read out the tribunal's verdict
acquitting Ms Gaz ut of the main accusation of insult to a foreign Head
of State as defined by article 296 of the Swiss penal code in relation to
the article which appeared on April 26, 1990, in La Suisse newspaper.
The court declared:
" ... that {rom a purely subjective angle, the tribunal also
considers that Ms Myriam -Oazut Godal had reason ta
belieue in good faith that the information communicated
during the press conference was sufficiently likely to be
reproduced in the La Suisse daily under the same title as
the denial by the Iranian authorities which was in a
subsequent edition of the same newspaper.
That as for the motives, the tribunal finds, in view of the
combination of circumstances, that Ms Myriam Gazut had
prouen her good faith, thereby relieving herself of all penalty.
That the tribunal condemns the Islamic Republic of Iran to
remit, in addition, to Ms Gazut a share of her lawyers' fees
of 5,000 Francs, and condemns the Islamic Republic of Iran
to court costs exceeding 2,984 Francs, which includes a
judgement fee of 500 Francs" .119
The Geneva verdict was issued after four days of testimony by
witnesses and cross-examination by the lawyers.
This trial was extraordinary, with the rights offreedom of speech
and press at stake. After more than a decade of hostage-taking, crisis
making and export of terrorism and fundamentalism, the Iranian régime
was now intent on muzzling the press world-wide. The trial's significance
however went beyond the question of upholding freedom of expression;
the Swiss courtroom marked the first international arena in which the
government of Iran had been condemned by the judiciary. The
proceedings, convened at Iran's request, rapidly be~ame an inquest into
119 The lndependent, January 1, 1994
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 47
their crimes against humanity. The unique character of the case was
underscored when the Prosecutor in a dramatic departure from Swiss
judicial tradition, asked that the accused be exonerated. Valid reasons,
he said, existcd to conclude that Tehran was involved in the murder.
Rafsanjani's condemnation at the Geneva Palais de Justice represented
a reaffirmation of the inviolable right to resist against terrorism.
Hussein Mir Abedini
On the road to Istanbul's airport, at around 16:00, local time, on
Wednesday, March 14, 1990, four terrorists obstructed the path of a car
carrying Mr Hussein Mir Abedini (Akhavan-jam), a former Tehran
University Professor and member of the People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran. As the armed terrorists attacked the. car, "Mr
Abedini, unarmed, bravely charged at them and foiled their plans for
an assassination or kidnapping". The terrorists fired a few shots, gravely
wounding Mr Abedini in the abdomen, and hnrriP.dly fled the scene_
According to a report by the French press agency, AFP, Turkish police
said that two other People's Mojahedin members were in the car at the
same time. 120
Later it became clear that the target for the Iranian régime was
Mohammad Mohaddessin a top ranking official of the Mojahedin who
was in Turkey at the same time. His trip was not publicised.
In the 14:00 local time news bulletin on March 22, the Iranian
régime's state-radio referred to the March 14 assassination attempt
against Mr. Abedini in Istanbul. The announcer said that "the target
was Mr. Mohammad Seyyed-ol-Mohaddessin ", that he was gravely
wounded and, according to the latest report, had died_ According to a
statement by the People's Mojahedin:
"Mr Mohammad Seyyed-ol-Mohaddessin, Executive
Committee member of the People's Mojahedin Organisation,
who according to Tehran radio 'was killed' in the terrorist
attack, was interviewed today by 'Voice of Mojahed'national
radio. He exposed the claims of the régime's remnants. The
clerical régime's Embassies and representatives abroad
120 Reuters, March 15, 1990
Annex 47
48 Iran: State of Terror
provide guidance and logistics for these terrorists". 121
Turkey expelled two Iranian diplomats in October 1988 after an
attempt to smuggle an Iranian dissident back to Iran in the boot of an
Iranian Embassy car.122 On March 23, Reuters reported that lranian
opposition leader, Massoud Rajavi, strongly criticised a Tehran Radio
comment on Thursday(March 22, 1990), which described the attempted
assassination of a senîor Mojahedin member in Istanbul on March 14,
as an "heroic assault".
Hussein Keshavarz
On September 14, 1989 a young Iranian refugee was shot and
critically wounded by two s_nipers riding a motorcycle outside the. office
of the United Nations High Cornmissioner for Refugees in Karachi,
Pakistan. Hospital sources identifieB. him as Hussein Keshavarz aged
22. He received two bullet wounds, one in his band and the other through
bis chest.123
There had been sirnilar incidents in the past, including an attack
on the homes of Iranian refugees in Pakistan by the Iranian régime's
agents in July 1987 in whicb three refugees were killed and many
wounded.124 Again, in December 1988, another Iranian refugee was
rnurdered outside the Karachi offices of the UNHCR. 125
Prior to the incident on September 14, students supporting the
Mojahedin of Iran had confirmed that Iranian refugees in Karachi had
been threatened by a group of their fellow countrymen belonging to the
ruling clique. They said 12 "terrorists" made up of Baluchis and Persians
had arrived in Pakistan and were staying at various places. They alleged
that these people were armed and might attack those Iranians who did
not support the Iranian revolution.126
Thousands oflranians had settled in Pakistan as refugees, many
121 Office of the People's Mojahedin Organisation, Baghdad, March 22, 1990
122 DAWN, Two Irariian diplomats leave Turkey, October 29, 1988
123 DAWN, Karachi, S~pterriber 18, 1989
12-1 Washington Post, July 9, 19&7
125 The Leader, Septemb.er '18, 'l 989
126 The Nation, May 2, 1989
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 49
ofthem in the city of Karachi. They have been forced to leave their own
country and live in Pakistan for their security and safety, and many of
the women said their sons and husbands had been executed by the
régime. They appealed to the Government of Pakistan for better security
against revenge attacks.
Bahman Javadi
On August 27, 1989 the opposition personality, Mr Bahman
Javadi, aged 33, a member of the Central Committce of the underground
Iran Communist Party and its Kamala Kurdish guerrilla forces, was
killed in Larnaca by two young men fi ring silenced 7 .65 mm pistols. 127
A companion of Mr J avadi, Mr Yussef Rashidzadeh, his brother-in-law,
was hit in the chest in the attack and seriously injured. 128 Mr Javadi
had arrived in Cyprus from Sweden to meet his mother and sister who
had travelled from Iran for a reunion after an eight year separation.
The women were walking with Mr Javadi and Mr Rashiszadeh in a
back street of Larnaca's restaurant district when the attackers opened
fire. The Swedish authorities warned Cypriot police shortly before the
killing that Mr Javadi's life was under threat and he should be protected,
but police said the warning came too late. 129
In a statement issued from Stockholm, a Kamala spokesman
blamed Tehran's revolutionary leaders for the assassination. A
prominent theory in the investigation of the assassination is that Iranian
intelligence officiais approved and monitored the departure of Mr
Javadi's relatives and sent an assassination squad to Cyprus in
anticipation of his meeting them there.130
Ataellah Bayahmadi
On June 4, 1989, Mr Ataellah Bayahmadi, the chief covert
Intelligence operative of the Paris-based Flag ofFreedom Organization,
was gunned down in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Mr Bayahmadi,
who in 1979 joined an unsuccessful coup attempt against the
127 International Herald Tribune, August 31, 1989
m AFP, August 27, 1989
129 International Herald Tribune, August 31, 1989
130 Ibid
Annex 47
50 Iran: State of Terror
revolutionary régime in Tehran, was shot after he arrived in Dubai for
a pre-arranged clandestine meeting with dissident Iranian military
officers. Western officiais believe the meeting was a trap.131
These killings, and that of Mr Qassemlou (each of which bears
the hallmark of careful planning, use of specialised weapons and
intelligence techniques) had prompted some western experts to speculate
that the death on June 3, oflran's "spiritual" leader, Ayatol1 ah Khomeini,
sparked off an aggressive programme of foreign assassinations. The
killings were seen as ameans ofkeepingforeign based opposition groups
off balance and to prevent their interference with the delicate transition
from Ayatollah Khomeini's rule.132
Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou
On July 13, 1989, Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou, aged 59 and leader
of the KDPI, was assassinated while meeting representatives of the
Iranian government.. With Qassemlou in Vienna were his European
representative, Abdallah Ghaderi and a Vienna-based Kurds' gobetween,
Fathel Rasoul, an Iraqi exile.133 On July 12, 1989, they met,
in a Viennese apartment at 5 Linkebahgasse, with three Iranian envoys
with whom Qassemblou had negotiated inconclusive1y in December 1988
and January 1989 in the Austrian capital.134
The Iranian delegation was nominally led by Mohaddad J afari
Sahraroodi and included Hadi Mustafavi (also referred to in somc
accounts as "Mustafa Hajifadi" and "Mustafa Haji" and Amir Mansour
Bozorgian. Mr Sahraroodi was deputy commander (operations) of the
15th Corps of Pasdaran, Khomeini's revolutionary guards, based in the
western Iranian city ofKermanshah. He carried a diplomatie passport
and used the pseudonym "Rahimi". Mr Bozorgian was a Kurdish agent
of the Khomeini régime, who had previously bcen an associate of Dr
Qassemlou's Party.135 He also reportedly had a diplomatie passport,
131 International Herald Tribune, August 31, 1989
132 International Herald Tribune, August 31, 1989
133 The Independent, July 25, 1989
134 The Washington Post, August 2, I 989
135 Office of the People's Mojahedin of Iran-Baghdad, July 16, 1989
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 51
and the Iranian Embassy refused to let him be questioned.136 Mr
Mustafavi was alleged to be the chief of the Vienna Bureau of Iranian
terrorist action. 137
Shortly after 19:00 local time on July 13, as Qassemlou satin an
armchair in the apartment, he was hit at close range by one bulletin
the middle of his forehead, a second just above his mouth and a third
under his right ear. His assistant Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar was hit by
eleven bullets and Fathil Rassoul by five. Sahraroodi was wounded in
the mouth. t3s Within hours police found two revolvers, an Israeli made
Uzi sub-machine gun and a bloodstained jacket in a park about a mile
from the scene of the crime. La ter, police told the Kurds, a Suzuki 500
motorcycle purchased a few days earlier by Sahraroodi had been found,
raising the possibility that Mustafavi had used it to escape.139 Afourth
confederate, known only as Montazer, is believed to have been waiting
outside the apartment to whisk Sahraroodi away .140
Austrian police believe that the killings of Abdul Rahman
Qassemlou and two the associates were carried out by Iranian agents,
two ofwhom were reported ta have taken refuge in the Iranian Embassy
in Vienna.141 Arrest warrants were issued for Bozorgian and Mustafavi
on minor charges ofleaving injured persons whose lives were in danger.142
The Iranian Embassy at first agreed to allow Bozorgian to be questioned
by police, then cancelled the appointment. The Austrian Foreign
Minister, Alais Mock, was quoted as saying it was ''probable" that Iran
was behind the killings.143
Des pite the inconclusiveness of the investigation, the government
allowed two of the Iranian suspects to leave Austria on July 29. Mr
Sahraroodi, hospitalised briefly, was allowed to depart for Iran on the
basis that there was "insufficient evidence' to have him arrested, while
Mr Montazer is reported to have left with permission on July 29. The
136 The Indepcndent July 25, 1989
rn Die Presse, July 27, 1989
i:is The Washington Post, August 2, 1989
u9 Die Presse, July 27, 1989
1.10 The Washington Post, August 2, 1989
i.it The Washington Post, August 2, 1989
, .i2 Reulers, July 21, 1989
i.i, Ibid
Annex 47
52 Iran: State of Terror
newspaper Der Standard said
"'l'lie authorities did everything to facilitate the departure
of witnesses and suspects to avoid light being shed". 144
The Qassemlou murder was covered widely in the Iranian press
and the official media confirmed that peace talks had been under way.
Vienna has for a long tirne been an important centre for Iran's terrorist
activities in Europe. According to the Austrian daily Arbeiter Zeitung:
"This kow- towing to Iran will protect Austria for a while {rom the
mullahs' wrath. But its an invitation saying 'Austria's louely, corne here
to kill '". Dr Qassemlou's party, the KDPI, asked: "How, in this age, in
the heart of Europe, could it happen for the representatives of a member
country of the United Nations to open fire at point blank range on the
representatives of a country with whom it was at war and had entered
into peace negotiations?"145
Iraqi Kurdistan
The mullahs' régime strikes repeatedly in Iraqi Kurdistan, where
it maintains a standing force of terrorists, orchestrated from the
"Information Office" of the Pasdaran in Suleimaniyeh. On August 8,
1994, for instance, armed men ambushed a car 15 km from
Suleimaniyeh, killing two members of the Communist Party of Iran
(Kumeleh).146 On June 2, another two Kumeleh members, Ossman
Farman and Ossman K:ian, were murdered in Suleimaniyeh, where they
had corne to see off thefr brothers who were returning to Iran.
In early 1995, two mernbers of the KDPI Revolutionary Command
were murdered by Iranian agents in Ranieh, and at about the same
time, two KDPI rnembers, MolaAhmed Khezri and Majid Salduzi, were
kidnapped in Rawanduz, handed over to the Iranian authorities, and
subsequently tortured in Urumieh Prison.
On January 4, 1996 the KDPI announced a number of murder
attempts and assassinations of its members in lraqi Kurdistan by the
IJJ The Washington Post, August 2, 1989 ,
14~ Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Man of Peace and Dialogue, Paris, 1989
w, lran Bulletin, Winter 1995, No 8
Annex 47
Attacks on Dissidents Abroad 53
agents of the Iranian régime. These series of assassinations took place
du ring the week starting December 27, 1995 and coinciding with visit
of an Iranian delegation led by Ali Agha Mohammadi, Rafsanjani's
personal representative, to enter into negotiations with the Iraqi Kurdish
political parties.
On Montlay March 18, 1996, Iranian agents killed yet another
four members of the KDPI. The Party said:
"Terrorists sent by the lslamic Republic' shot the four men
in a village near the Kurdish-held city of Erbil".147
The KDPI namecl the dead as Osman Rahimi, Taher Azizi, Hassan
Ebrahimzadeh, and seventeen-year old Faramarz Keshavarz. It said
four others were wounded in the attack.
The terrorist act happened only four days after the Sharm elSheikh
summit and two days after an arrest warrant was issued against
Ali Fallahian - the Iranian régime's intelligence chief - by the German
judiciary.148
The Islamic Republic régime has set up a group called Iraqi
Kurdish Hezbollah, which interferes extensively in that region.149 They
have also brought pressure to bear from time to time on the leader of
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Mr Jalal Talabani, to eject members
of the KDPI and other lranian Kurdish groups, and close down their
operations.150 Iranian agents have committed many acts of tcrrorism
in the region under the control of Mr Talabani, who is vulnerable to
blackmail by Tehran, since he is blockaded on all sicles, by the Turks,
the Iraqis and the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party, and has no other
outlet to the world except via Iran.
The KDPI says:
"The Islamic government of Iran uses the Red Crescent,
which is a humanitarian organisation, as a cover for its
1-11 Reuters, March 18, 1996
IJS }bed
i-19 Radio Israel, March 1, 1 996
150 Lord Avebury, persona! observation from a visit to Suleimaniyeh, August 1995
Annex 47
54 Iran: State of Terror
terrorist actions in Kurdish areas of Northern Jraq". 151
They add:
"A group of armed agents of the Islamic Republic
government of Iran this week attacked a camp for the
Iranian refugees near Iraqi Suleimanieh. One of the
assailants was arrested. He admitted that the Iranian
government despatches its armed forces inside the Green
Crescent ambulances to carry out terrorist operations in
Northern Iraq". 152
151 KDPI press statement, February 25, 1996
15è Radio Israel, April 25, 1996
Annex 47
The Rushdie Case
The fatwa issu ed by the late Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989
sentencing writer Salman Rushdie to death for writing The Satanic
Verses is still strongly supported by high level officiais in Iran. The
efforts toque li the proliferation of this book through assassioations of
its trnnslators is anothcr clear example of the murder machine at work.
The Japancse scholar Hitoshi Igarashi, who translatecl Sahnan
Rushdie's The Sata.nic Verses was stabbed to dcath in the normally
peaceful corridors of lhc University of Tsukuba. Professor Hitoshi
Igarashi's body was found on the morning of Friday July 21, 1991.
Professor Igarashi, 44, who taught Islamic stucliek at the university,
had bccn under police survcmance since his translation had gone on
sale in Fcbruary 1990, but protests and death threats had diecl clown
shorL!y afLerwards. Igarashi had been quoted as saying that the he was
tired of the police asking him wbere he was going, and security may
have bccn rclaxcd. "1 was really shocked that such a thing could happen
on orLr quiet campus", a university official said. This assassination came
nine clayR after another translator ofRushdie's book was attacked. Ettore
Capriolo, 61, was stabbed at bis Milan fiat on July 3 by an unknown
nrnn who had askcd him for Rushdie's home address. Capriolo suffered
cuts to his nt~ck. arms and chest, and was kicked and beatcn on the
bcad by a man who said hc was Iranian, police said.219
On October 11. 1993, Mr William Nygaard, director of the
Norweginn publishers Aschehoug, whose firm translated The Satanic
\!erses . wns shot in the back threc timcs outside bis bouse in Olso by an
unknown atlacker.2l° Few doubted Tchran was beqind this attack and
thosC' on Rusliùic's other publishers and trans1ators, according to Charles
:I' Rèutcr~ . .luly l'.2. 1991
:·
11 Rèutcr~. Octnbc, 11. 1993
Annex 47
86 fran: Stnlc ofTcrror
Richards, Middle East EdiLor o[Thc IndcpC'n<lcnt.:!21 Chriswpbcr \.Valker
in The Times quoted inLelligcncc expert:-; as 0xprcs:-;ing "certain/y" Lhat
the shooLing ofNygaard was "part o/'et pattern bloody reucngc reliant 011
lranian orders or inspiration". !ltt
Ayatollah Khomeini's original fatwa ordcrcd Moslems 1o kill noL
only Salman Rushdie, but also anyonc who kno·wingly hclped Lo publish
his novel. Now Ayatollah Hassan Sanci, who offcrcd $2 million for
Salman Rushdie's head, has exLended the Lhreat of rnur<lcr Lo all
Rushdie's supporters. He was corn men Ling on Rushdie support
committecs in the WesL, which had stcppcd up Lhcir publiciLy campaigns
around the February 14 anniversary of the fatwa.m
The Sa1man Rushdie prçiblem assumed a new dimension in .June
1995. The G7 heads of states summit wa:-; lwld on June J6, J99fi, and
prior to this rneeLing reports werc poinling Lo a slrong decision Lhat
would have becn taken against Iranian tcrrorism. Iran suddenly
announced its readiness to compromise on the Salman Rushdie issue
and negotiate with the EU on its tenns. The minimum-tcrms of the
Europeans were
"that Iran signa docwnent guaranteeÎng not to carry 011,t
the fatwa, and ta dcsist {rom, encou raging others to do sa". 224
BuL following a mild condernnation of Lhe Tranian régime in
response io Iran's new tactics, it was reporLed LhaL Iran
"rejected a call by the European Union to declare that it
will neither undertahe nor support any attenipt to hill
Salman Rushdie ... lvlahnwod Vaezi, lran's Dcputy Foreign
minister, told EU diplomats that the fatwa against the
i;i Charles Richards, The Indcpcndent, Iran clings lCl its old violent ways. Octobcr
12. 1993
111 Christopher \Valker. The Times. f ntclligenec experts sec hand of Tchran in Oslo
shoming, OcLobcr 13, 199'.1
11
' Rcuters. February 22. ! 994
~2~ The Tim~s. The Fatwa has failctl. admit il - Sa!man Rushd ie.: calls on EU leaders tu
force Iran 's hand, Fcbruary 14, 1996
Annex 47
The Hu~hdic Case 87
Bril ish writer remains in effect ... ". 225
In Paris Iast .June, after lcading everyone including lhe French
who hcld the EU Presidency, to believc that the dcal was clone, Iran
rcfused to sign suc:h a document. Under ihc Spanish presidcncy, the
mnttcr wns pursucd without success at meetings in New York and
Madrid. A proposed exchange of letters came to nothing. The prcscmt
Italian prcsîdency of the EU has issued a statement dedaring the fatwa
"'null and uoid", but that is only a unilatcral declaration. As for the
lhrcalcncci "diplomatie and economic consequences" if Iran refused to
sign, lherc is, perhaps predictably, no sign of ihem.226
Whntcvcr Iranian diplomats are saying for European
consumption about not implementing the fatwa, they are not Lo be
trustcd. The real Iranian position is spelled out by Khamcnci's allies,
who arc the ruling faction in Iran and recently strcngthened tbeir
position by gaining control of the Majlis.
The la test autboritative pronouncerncnt on the Rushdie case was
by Mohammad Yazdi, the head of Iran's judiciary, in April 1996. He
snid the fatwa
"will finally be carried out some day. The fatwa relates to
all Muslims and will some day be implemented",
and nddcd for good mcasure:
"The Rushdie problem will only be resolved through
implementing the fatwa. We cannot solve this problem
through negotiations with or pressures by some Western
countries."
'l\vo days carlicr, the Majlis speaker, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, reaffinned
his support for the fatwa and said he "regretted that Rushdie is still
a/ive". :m
"' Thl.! Daily Tclcgroph, Iran Refuses to Lift Fatwa on Rushdie, June 23, 1996
,,, The Times, The Fatwa has failed, Admit lt - Salman Rushdie calls on EU leaders to
force lran's hand, Fcbruary 14, 1996
" 7 AFP, Rushdie cdict reaflirmed, April 21, 1996
Annex 48
Annex 48
4/14/2017 EU: Members Urged Not To Send Ambassadors Back To Iran
~ ar RadioFreeEurope
, Radioliberty
ARCHIVE
EU: Members Urged Not To Send Ambassadors
Back To Iran
May 09, 1997
The Hague, 1 May 1997 (RFE/RL) - The Dutch government today urged
European Union members not to return ambassadors to Tehran after Iranian
authorities refused to welcome back German and Danish envoys.
A statement by the Dutch EU presidency urged partners who have not yet
sent back their ambassadors to suspend their return until further notice.
Dutch Foreign Minis ter Hans van Mierlo also summoned Iran' s
representative to the Hague to explain Tehran' s decision.
Iranian authorities announced yesterday that German and Danish
ambassadors would not be welcome and said the EU had no moral standing
to criticize Iran' s policies.
Tensions have soared between Iran and the EU since April 10, when a
German court ruled that Tehran authorities ordered the 1992 assassination
in a Berlin restaurant of Iranian opposition figures. The 15-nation EU
recalled its ambassadors from Tehran following the ruling and broke off
dialogue with Iran.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty© 2017 RFE/RL, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
http://www.rferl.org/a/1084877.html 1/2
Annex 49
Annex 49
Latest news http:/ /Hermes.BZ. MINBUZA.Nueurope97 /nieuwSt enieuws;093 EGBVB .htn
1 of 1
Latest News
April 10, 1997 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the
European Union on Iran
In the findings of the Superior Court of Justice in Berlin in the so-called Mykonos case the involvement
of the Iranian authorities at the highest level was established.
The European Union condemns this involvement of the Iranian authorities and regards such behaviour as
totally unacceptable in the conduct of international affairs
The European Union has always wanted a constructive relationship with Iran, and its critical dialogue
agreed at the European Council in December 1992 was designed to further that objective. However, no
progress can be possible while Iran flouts international norms, and indulges in acts of terrorism.
The Presidency invited Member States to recall their Arnbassadors for coordinated consultation on the
future relationship of the European Union with Iran. The European Union noted that under the present
circumstances there is no basis for the continuation of the critical dialogue.
The Council meeting on 29 April will review the European Union's relations with Iran and decide what
further action would be appropriate.
The European Union expects the Iranian Government to take measures against possible threats and
accusations against any Member State.and to take the necessary steps to safeguard the security of all
European Union citizens and their institutions in Iran.
04/17 97 12:4 129
Annex 50
EU PR 97-26: EUROPEAN UNION DECLARA T!ON ON IRAN wysiwyg) /content.64/hnp://www. eu runion. org:newsi presst 9 72/pr 2 6-97 .htm
1 of2
EU Homel 0.(~:> 1 i>f:~.,., f.~:·?.!c~;;.~,·r, l 1997 Apr-Jun Il What's New
April 29, 1997
No. 26/97
Prcvious: PR 97-25 Current: PR 97-26 1 Next: PR 97-27
EURO PEAN UNION DECLARATION ON IRAN
The European Union Council of Foreign M.inisters issued today in Luxembourg the following declaration
The Council had an extensive discussion on European Union relations with Iran, in the light of the
Mykonos case. It reaffirmed the Presidency's declaration of April 10, 1997. It reiterated that the
European Union has always wanted a constructive relation.ship with Iran, as expressed in the declaration
of Edinburgh of 1992. However, progress can only be made if the Iranian authorities respect the norms of
international law and refrain from acts of terrorism, including against Iranian citizens living abroad and
cooperate in preventing such acts.
It called on [ran to abide by its commitments under international agreements, including those concerning
the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as those concerning human rights. It urged
Iran to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The Council, determined to fight against terrorisrn in al! its forms, regardless of its perpetrators or
motives, agreed on the following:
• confirmation that un.der the present circumstances there is no basis for the continuation of the
Critical Dialogue between the European Union and Iran;
• the suspension of official bilateral Ministerial visits to or from Iran;
• confirmation of the established policy of European Union member states not to suppl y arms to Iran;
• cooperation to ensure that visas are not granted to Iranians with intelligence and security functions;
• concertation in excluding Iranian intelligence personnel from European Union member states.
The Council decided to keep the relation.ship with Iran under close review and instructed the Political
cornmittee accordingly. Member states will instruct their . ÀJllbassadors, after their return to Teheran, to
con tribu te in a coordinated way to the continual appraisal by the Council of the relation.ship.
The Council iovited the Associated Central and Eastern European countries, the Associated country
Cyprus and the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economie Area to
align themselves with this declaration.
Press Contacts: Ella Krucoff Maeve O'Beirne
Tel: (202) 862-9540 Tel: (202) 862-9549
0510 l:97 l l: 15 22
Annex 50
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4/10/2017 Body Dumped in Beirut ldentified as Buckley's: Hostage: Former senior GIA official, kidnaped in 1984, was reported slain in 1985. - latimes
[o.s An9ele.s OEime.s I ARTICLEcoLLECTioNs
- Back to Original Article
Body Dumped in Beirut Identified as Buckley's Hostage: Former senior CIA official,
kidnaped in 1984, was reported slain in 1985.
December 28, 1991 1 MARILYN RASCHKA I SPECIAL TO THE TIMES
BEIRUT - Even as hopes dimmed for the 1991 release of two Germans, the last two Westerners known to be held hostage here, Lebanese authorities on Friday
positively identified remains dumped hours earlier near a Beirut airport road as those of slain U .S. hostage William Buckley.
After a two-hour autopsy at the American University of Beirut Hospital, Dr. Ahmed Harati, a pathologist and the state coroner, confirmed that Buckley's
medical and dental profiles matched those of the body, which was found wrapped in a brown blanket and bound tightly with ropes.
"Tooth fillings and the bridge matched those in Buckley's dental record, and the scar of a broken right pelvis also matched," Harati said.
The remains later were taken in a flag-draped coffin to the American Embassy, where officials declined comment. State Department officials here also would
not discuss Buckley, who was dragged from his carat gunpoint March 16, 1984, while traveling the six blacks from the embassy to his 10th-story penthouse
apartment.
But the CIA in Washington issued a statement confirming what has been reported often-that Buckley was the senior American intelligence agency official in
Beirut when he was kidnaped.
The agency said that it was "carefully following reports" about the body and would make a positive identification of the remains when they are returned to the
United States.
The return of Buckley's body, the statement said, would bring to an end "the final chapter in the tragic death of this courageous and dedicated American patriot
who gave his life for his country."
Buckley, initially described as a first secretary in the U.S. Embassy's political section here, was believed to have been an expert on terrorism with wide
knowledge of CIA operations throughout the Middle East. He arrived in Beirut in the summer of 1983, charged with rebuilding American intelligence
operations after the bombing of the embassy in April, 1983.
Buckley, a Medford, Mass., native, was a Boston University graduate, a lieutenant colonel in the military reserve, and a CIA veteran with experience in the
Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe and at the Directorate of Operations at CIA headquarters. He spent much of his career developing information to
deter terrorist attacks on Americans in the Middle East.
Single and without dependents, Buckley--who was 55 when kidnaped-had expressed some concern about his safety in his dangerous post. His relatives also
werewary.
"I would say to him, 'Why don't you get out of there and corne home?' " said his sister, Maureen Moroney, of Salem, Mass. "But he'd say it was where he wanted
to be. That would be just like him to stay where he was supposed to be. To me, he was pro bably the most patriotic human being you could imagine. His country
was everything, and he would do anything for his country."
The return of Buckley's body means that al] the Americans taken hostage in Lebanon have now been accounted for. Earlier this week, the body of Lt. Col.
William R. Higgins, another slain U .S. ho stage, was found, positively identified and released to the embassy.
An anonymous calier gave police directions to Buckley's remains only hours after U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar said in New York that he
hoped Buckley's body would be returned by the weekend.
The caller, who said he spoke for Islamic Jihad, the group that claimed responsibility for Buckley's abduction, told a Western news agency: "We have dumped
Thursday night the body of American spy Buckley .. . . We have, thus, fulfilled our pledge. The U.N. secretary general ... (now) has to bring about the release of
our brethren in Israel." He apparently referred to about 200 prisoners held by Israel and its militia allies in South Lebanon. Shiite Muslim kidnapers have long
demanded that these captives be freed in return for the Westerners.
On Jan. 22, 1985, nine months after his abduction, Buckley appeared in a brief videotape released to a British television news agency, saying: "I am well, and my
friends Benjamin Weir and Jeremy Levin are also well. We ask that our government take action for our release quickly." Levin escaped his captors in February,
1985; Weir was released seven months later. Both said they had no contact with Buckley.
In October, 1985, Islamic Jihad released blurred photographs of what it said was Buckley's body. It said he was slain in retaliation for an Israeli air raid on
Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunisia.
But no body was produced, and U.S. officials said the photos did not prove Buckley was dead. Lebanese Shiite Muslim and Western intelligence sources said
then that Buckley actually may have died earlier, possibly after having been tortured. On Jan. 20, 1987, President Bush confirmed that Buckley was dead in an
oblique reference in a speech to a Washington conference on terrorism.
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4/10/2017 Body Dumped in Beirut ldentified as Buckley's: Hostage: Former senior GIA official, kidnaped in 1984, was reported slain in 1985. - latimes
Freed hostage David Jacobsen bas said that for a time be was held, blindfolded, in the same room with Buckley and that be believes Buckley, who was severely
ill, possibly as a result of torture, died June 3, 1985. Terry A Anderson, the last American hostage to be freed, said after bis release Dec. 4 that be believed
Buckley might have died in the same room with him. But be was chained and blindfolded at the time and did not see Buckley die.
Meantime, a group calling itself the Freedom Strugglers, which daims to hold the two German hostages, repeated its refusai to free the pair until the kidnapers'
demands are met. They accompanied their statement, delivered to a Western news agency, with a bizarre videotape of the German captives celebrating in front
of a twinkling Christmas tree.
"We hereby thank our kidnapers for their humanitarian and good treatment," said German aid worker Thomas Kemptner, 30, attired in a suit and shown in the
tape against a poster backdrop of a Jake and fir trees. He appeared to be in good health and was flanked by fellow hostage Heinrich Struebig, 50, shown reading
a copy of the German magazine Der Spiegel. The two, abducted in May, 1989, ate cake, smoked cigarettes and drank toasts of fruitjuice on camera.
Western diplomats said the kidnap group is under extreme pressure from Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Germany and Giandomenico Picco, Perez de Cuellar's special
hostage envoy, to free their captives unconditionally.
But in their statement, the Freedom Strugglers said it still demands, in exchange for the two Germans, freedom for two pro-Iranian Shiite Muslims serving
prison terms in Germany for terrorist crimes.
"We seize this opportunity to ask Mr. (Chancellor Helmut) Kohl to give pardon to Mohammed and Abbas Hamadi," Kemptner said.
The Germans are held by relatives of the Hamadi brothers, convicted in Germany on charges of murder, air piracy and kidnaping. Bonn bas refused to exchange
them for the hostages.
Times staffwriter Art Pine in Washington contributed to this report.
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Taking note of the letter dated 13 July 1988 from the
Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General,"
Responding to the request of the Government of
Lebanon,
1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim
period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1989;
2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its
internationally recognized boundaries:
3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general
guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the
Secretary-General of 19 March 1978," approved by resolution
426 (1978), and calls upon ail parties concerned to cooperate
fully with the Force for the full implementation of
its mandate;
4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its
mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978)
and ail other relevant resolutions:
5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations
with the Government of Lebanon and other parties
directly concerned on the implementation of the present
resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.
Adopted unanimously at th,,
2822nd meeting.
Resolution 618 (1988)
of 29 Joly 1988
The Security Council,
Taking note of paragraph 23 of the Secretary-General's
report on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon''
concerning the abduction of Lieutenant-Colonel William
Richard Higgins, a military observer of the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization serving with the Force,
Recalling the Secretary-General's special report on the
United Nations lnterim Force in Lebanon,"
Recalling also its resolution 579 ( 1985) of 18 December
1985, which, inter alia, condemned unequivocally ail acts
of hostage-taking and abduction and called for the immediate
release of all hostages and abducted persons wherever
and by whomever they are being held,
l. Condemns the abduction of Lieutenant-Colonel
Higgins;
2. Demands his immediate release;
3. Calls upon Member States to use their influence in
any way possible to promote the implementation of the
present resolution.
24 Ibid., document S/20014.
Adopted unanimouslv at the
2822nd meeting
25 Official Records of the Security Council, F orty-third )éa,; Supplement
for Janoory, February and March /988, document S/19617.
6
Decision
At its 2831st meeting, on 30 November 1988, the
Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled
"The situation in the Middle East: report of the SecretaryGeneral
on the United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force (S/20276)". 2•
Resolution 624 (1988)
of 30 November 1988
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,21
Decides:
(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement
immediately Security Council resolution 338 ( 1973) of 22
October 1973:
(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six
months, that is, until 31 May 1989;
(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the
end of this period, a report on the developments in the
situation and the measures taken to implement resolution
338 (1973).
Adopted unanimously al rhe
2831st meeting.
Decisions
At the same meeting, following the adoption of resolution
624 (1988), the President made the following statement:"
"In connection with the resolution just adopted on the
renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force, I have been authorized to make the
following complementary statement on behalf of the
Security Council:
" 'As is known, the report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force"
states, in paragraph 24: "Despite the present quiet
in the lsrael-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle
East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous
and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive
seulement covering all aspects of the Middle
East problem can be reached." That statement of the
Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security
Council. · "
26 See Official Records of the Security Council, F orty-third K>ar.
Supplementfor Octobe,; November and December /988.
"Ibid., document S/20276.
"S/20306.
Annex 53
Annex 53
(http://www.chicagotribune.com)
Fbi: Higgins Most Likely Is Hanged Man
August 08, 1989 1 By Timothy J. McN ulty, Chicago Tribune.
Recommend 1 1 Tweet
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WASHINGTON -The kidnapers' videotape of a hanged man most likely shows
the body of U.S. Marine Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, the FBI announced Montlay,
but its experts still could not determine when or how Higgins was killed.
President Bush, after being informed of the FBI' s forensic report, telephoned the
officer's widow at the Pentagon ''to offer his support and encouragement,''
White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said. ' 'The President said the U.S.
government will continue to do ail it can to obtain a full accounting of what
happened to her husband.' '
FBI pathologists said that although it was impossible to make a positive
identification with only the crudely lit videotape that was released July 31 in Beirut,
' 'numerous observable characteristics' ' led them to conclude it was Higgins'
barefoot body hanging from the end of a rope.
But their report said nothing about the cause of death, and White House
spokesman William Harlow said the FBI' s video and medical experts could not
determine from the two 15-second segments of tape when Higgins <lied.
Sorne officiais have speculated that Higgins was killed before last week, possibly as
long as a year ago, in retribution for a U.S. N avy ship mistakenly shooting down an
Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf.
The FBI reported only that ' 'within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,' ' the
person in the videotape is dead, and the pathologists believed ''the person depicted
is . . . Higgins. ' '
One FBI official said the identification was made in part with a computer-assisted
comparison between earlier pictures of Higgins and the facial characteristics of the
body in the kidnapers' videotape. Without fingerprints or body tissues for DNA
Annex 53
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lsraeli officiais Montlay reiterated there would be no exchange of captives unless
three Israeli servicemen, captured several years ago, were part of the swap.
' 'If we don' t get the lsraelis, there won' t be a deal,' ' said a Foreign Ministry
spokesman in J erusalem.
The hostage dilemma, dormant since Bush came into office in J anuary, has become
his first real foreign policy crisis, just as it plagued his two predecessors, Ronald
Reagan and Jimmy Carter.
In the morning, Bush traveled by helicopter across the Potomac River to Ft. Meyer in
Arlington, Va., to mark the 200th anniversary of the founding of the Department of
War, which later became the Defense Department. Bush ended his speech to the
assembled military officers there by saluting ' 'every brave American' ' who ever
served in the nation' s armed forces.
Tuen he mentioned the one individual who has absorbed much of the nation' s
attention for the past week.
''And we cannot leave here today without pausing to salute one who stands as a
symbol of the courage that burns in the breast of every American in uniform,' ' said
Bush, ' 'one marine who has been very much in our thoughts, Lt. Col. Higgins,
William Richard Higgins. ' '
Annex 54
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December 5, 1991
THE LAST U.S. HOSTAGE
THE LAST U.S. HOSTAGE; ANDERSON, LAST U.S.
HOSTAGE, IS FREED BY CAPTORS IN BEIRUT
By CHRIS HEDGES,
DAMASCUS, Syria, Dec. 4- Terry A. Anderson, the last American and longest-held hostage in
Lebanon, was set free tonight by his kidnappers after nearly seven years in captivity.
"l've thought about this moment for a long time and now it's here," he told reporters at the Syrian
Foreign Ministry here. ''l'm scared to death. I don't know what to say."
Mr. Anderson, who was chief Middle East correspondent for The Associated Press when he was seized in
Beirut on March 16, 1985, said he was in good health. He smiled and laughed as he recognized old
friends in the press corps assembled here for the successive release of three American hostages in as many
days. 2 Germans May Be Left
Two Germans, Thomas Kemptner and Heinrich Strubig, are believed to be still held captive in Lebanon,
and today the United Nations special envoy in negotiating the hostages' release, Giandomenico Picco,
said he would continue to work to free them. Mr. Picco is going to Bonn to discuss the situation amid
reports that a deal has been struck for the freedom of all Western captives. Mr. Anderson, though, said
he had no news from his captors about the Germans.
Asked how he survived the ordeal, Mr. Anderson, who is 44 years old, said he did it through persistence
and a little stubbornness.
''You just do what you have to do," he said. ''You wake up every day, summon up the energy from
somewhere and you get through the day, day after day after day."
[ In Wiesbaden, Germany, American military doctors who examined Alann Steen and Joseph Cicippio,
the two hostages freed immediately before Mr. Anderson, said they had suffered lasting damage from
blows and kicks to the head by their captors. Mr. Steen has seizures, they said, and Mr. Cicippio has
experienced disorientation and dizziness. Page A20. ] New Clothes, and an Escort
Mr. Anderson's release followed what has become a familiar pattern. His kidnappers in Beirut supplied
him with new clothes and drove him to a Syrian military installation. From there, the Syrians drove him
to Damascus.
[ Mr. Anderson flew to Frankfurt, Germany, on Thursday with his fiancee and the daughter he had met
for the first time, The Associated Press reported. He was then flown by helicopter to the United States
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4/10/2017 THE LAST U.S. HOSTAGE; ANDERSON, LAST U.S. HOSTAGE, IS FREED BY CAPTORS IN BEIRUT - The New York Times
have been missing in Lebanon for years.
And if there is no information on these men, they warned, they are not likely to free any more of the
Arabs being held prisoner by Israel and its surrogate militia in southern Lebanon.
Above all, the officials said, they intend to keep on holding Sheik Abdel Karim Obeid, a Shiite Muslim
cleric taken by Israeli soldiers two years ago from his home in southern Lebanon.
In much the same way that Mr. Anderson symbolized the plight of the Western hostages because of the
length of his ordeal, Sheik Obeid looms large for pro-Iranian groups that have said that freedom for him
is essential to end the hostage and prisoner taking.
Uri Lubrani, the chief Israeli negotiator, was interviewed after Mr. Anderson's release. He expressed
doubt that he would learn anything quickly about the missing servicemen.
Photos: Terry A. Anderson greeting reporters yesterday in Damascus after being freed by kidnappers in
Lebanon. (Associated Press) (pg. A1); Terry A. Anderson was surrounded by reporters and well-wishers
yesterday in Damascus after being freed from nearly seven years in captivity.; Madeline Bassil, Mr.
Anderson's wife, and their daughter, Sulome, as they awaited his arrival yesterday in Damascus.
(Associated Press) (pg. A20)
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Annex 55
'
; t
1
i .
. 90-133 F
CRS _Report for Con -~r~s _
Leban •
The Remaining .S. Hostages
A Chronology, 1984-1988
Clyde R. ark
Specialist in Middle East Aft'airs
Foreign Affairs and Natio al Defense Division
March 6, 990
Annex 55
The detailed cbronology i~ ~ The Remaining U.S. Hostapa -
A Cbronology, 1984-1988," il~~ _to IUPJ)lement the brief chronology
coveri111 1989-1990 in ·ona1 ReNarch Semce Iaaue Brief 86188,
"Lebanon: The Remaining U.S Honaps.• The lNue Brief allO includet
background on the hoetape, pa involved ln the kidnappinp, and efîorta
to free the boetapa.
1.
Annex 55
Annex 55
11/17/88 -
10/31/88 -
10/03/88 --
LEBANO :
THE REMAJNING U.S BOSTAGES
A CIIRONOLOGY, 1984-198s-
In Benghazi, Libya, the Fa Revolutionary Council (also
known as Abu Nidal) rel d two French girls - Virginie
Betille, age eeven, and ber si r Marie-Laure, age eeven - beld
captive with the girls' and five Belpan citizens since
November 1987. There are contradictory report.a about the
kidnapping; one report saya e group waa kidnapped from a
yacht off the coaat of the Strip, but another report eays
they were seized off Libya. <l>ne report aays they are ~eld in
Lebanon, but other reporta ~f! they are beld in Libya. · One
reporta eaya the kidnapped 'fup bolds dual Frenc;b-Israeli ·or
Belgian-Israeli citizensbip. I .. ·.
Peter Winkler, a Swias natio,-i working for.the International
Copimittee of the Red Cross,
1
waa kidnapped near the Ayn alHalwah
refugee camp near SidCl>n, in soutbem Lebanon. Winkler
· waa releaaed on Dec. 16, 1~
Islamic Jihad released a vidlpe of Terry Anderson, the U.S.
hostage beld aince Mar. 16, 1 5, in wbich Anderson appealed
to President Reagan to uee . 1 influence in a positive way to gain the releue or the boa*1
• • :-
Mithileshwar Singh, a citizen r lndia and a reaident alien o( the
United States, waa released i Beirut by the Islamic Jihad for
the Ll'beration of Palestine. Singh and three U.S. colleaguea, ail
teachera at Beirut University College, were kidnapped on Jan.
24, 1987. .
1
09/12/88 - Rudolph Cordes, the 55-y~ld Hoecbat pbarmaceutical
manager kidnapped on Jan.
1
1'7, 1987, wu released in west
Beirut by the "Strugglera for freedom.• West German officiais
88id there were no conditiona for Cordes releaae, and that no
ransom waa paid. The "Strugders for Freedom• aaid that Cordes
waa released after receiving ~est German •guarantees for a
1
-i>rimary sources include the Foreign B~dcast Information Service Daily
Report, the Middle East and Africa, lIS teletype wire service, the
Washington Post, the New York Times, Time, Newsweek, the Christian
Science Monitor, and otber public news so rces.
Annex 55
09/12/88 -
07/29/88 -
07/26/88 -
07/17/88 -
07/10/88 --
0'1/07/88 -
CRS-2
settlement" of t two Hamadi brothen imprisoned in West
Germany for hijf ng.
Kenneth Paul W•ll•, a 25-year-old American employed in Saudi
Arabis. 81C8ped from would-be kidnappera near Baa1bak,
Lebanon. The a pt waa made a, Wella and bis Lebaneae
bride left tbeir wedding celehration. Welle dilarmed bis
attacken and ped by uainJ loerat.e.
The U.N. Securi Council paaed unanimoully Relolution 618
(1988) condem~g the abduction of Lt. Col, William Richard
Higina of the U.N. Truce Superviaion Organization, and
demanding bis ï,mediate relea,e. Higgina waa kidnapped on
Feb. 17, 1988. 1
Iranian 1111Q1is ~ak.er Rafsaqjani aaid Iran would intercede with
the captora bolc:ijng U.S. boatapa in Lebanon if the United
Statee would re:tase Iranian llll8t8 frozen during the boatap
cri1i1 of 1979-1 1. The llll8t8 are the aubject of Iranian-U.S.
arbitration unde ~ at the Hague, Netherlanda.
Iran accepoed ul lleaolution 598 ot J,,.; ~. 1987, wbich called
for a c:ease.fiiji the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq accepted the cea,efire
ehortly the resolution wu paased. Many analyata
assumed tbat end to the war could lead to Iranian
intercesaion wi the captora holding U .S. and other bostagea
in Lebanon. 1
Tbe Sunday Express of London eited ~ports from "intelligence
aources" tbat 10 lbostages (tbree British and eeven Americans)
had been moved; from Beirut to the Bekaa Valley or to Iran.
Sucb rumore have appeared frequently in Lebanon. Another
rumor in late Ju,;ie said ail the bostagea were pthered together
at an abandoned army barracks in aouth Beirut. One rumor
circulating in ~ aaid Iran would tell the Lebanese captore to
release the u.s~ boatagea in September in an attempt to
influence the U.S. Preaidential electiona.
i
Islamic Jihad toi~ a Beirut radio ltation tbat it would n:ecute
one U.S. bostage in retaliation for the United States ebooting
down Iran Air ftight 655 over the Strait of Hormuz on July 8.
Tbere were no IUJ'Vivora among the 290 puaenpra and crew of
ftigbt 655. 1
05/27/88 - Syrian forces en1jered soutb Beirut to police a negotiated ceasefire
betwaen Am-1 and Hizballab forces. Many or the hostages
are believed to bie beld in soutb Beirut.
Annex 55
05/21/88 -·
05/13/88 -
05/04/88 -
04/18/88 -
03/04188 -
Jan Coola, a Belgian doctor, wail kidnapped out.ide a Paleatinian
refupe camp near Tyra~' ! thern Lebanon. Coole worked
with a Norwegian volunteer up helping Paleatinian and Sbia
Mualim ret'upea. On Dec. 18, 988, a lfOUP call.ed Jund al-Haq
(aoldiera or the right) . · to have kidnapped Coole. The
group claimed Coole wu an ~li IJ>Y·
William Buckley wu given J eymbolic burial, with military
honore, at Arlington Nati~ Cemetery. Buckley, the CJA
'station chier in Beirut, wu ~dnapped on Mar. 18, 1984, and
is reported to have clied in ~vity on June S. 1985. Hi• body
bas not been recovered. 1
1 Ialamic Jihad releaaed tbree ~b hoetagea, diplomate Marcel
Canton and Marcel Fontaine• beld arince Mar. 22, 1985, and
journaliat Jean-Paul Kauftn811l, kidnapped on May 22, 1985.
According to press reports, france aecured their release by
agreeing to pay a $1 billion ~t owed to Iran Crom the daya or
tbeShah. 1
1 •
Voice or Lebanon radio (eons4*'vative Christian) reported that
Lt. Col. William Richard Hi~ns, kidnapped Feb. 17, 1988, had
bêen killed aometime in the .-t month during tighting between
Amal and Hizballah forces in aouthern Lebanon. The 0.0.E.
delivered a picture of Higgina i to a news agency in Beirut Apr.
21 and aaid Higgins would bel tried for. spying.
1 -
Peter Coleridge, a British qfflcial witb Oûam, and Umar
Tarabulai, a Syrian represei,ting Oxf'am in Lebanon, were
kidnapped near Sidon in aouU. Lebanon. The two were released
Mar. 8, 1988.
03/02/88 - Two Iranians, Adil Irani and ~uauf lstf'an, were kidnapped in
west Beirut, and were reieaaea Mar. 4, 1988.
02/19/88 - The Organization for the QppT1111d or the Earth claimed
reapona1'bility for kidnapping ~lliam Richard Higgina on Feb.
17, and releaaed photocopiea o( Higgina' identifteation carde. On
Feb. 22, the group releaaed ai 70-eecond 'rideotape or Higgina.
On Mar. 1, the 0.0.E. aaid itiwould try Higginl for espionage.
0'4117/88 - Lt. Col. William Richard Higim, USMC, 181"'V'ÎDg with the U.N.
Truce Supervilory Organization CUNTSO) in aoutbern Lebanon,
was kidnapped IOUth of Tyire wbile en route back. to hi,
beadquarters at Ru Naqurah, ion the Lebanon-Iarael border. On
Feb. 18, a group calling itse*· f Ialamic Revolutionary Brigade
cl. aimed reaponsibility ror the · dnapping. (U.S. military offlcera
have served with UNTSO · its inception in 1948, wben it
was rormed to observe the ftrea in the Arab-lsraeli war.)
CW./11/88 -
02/05/88 -
01/27188 -
11/21/87 -
10~/87 -
09/07/87 -
! ·.
Two Swedilbjou~iau, reporter Folke Ryden and pbotograpber
Andre Lada, were kidnapped near the Beirut airport, but were
releued after a h houn wheu the lddnappen diacovered that
they were not wt9t Germant.
William Jor~ of Norway and Jan Steninl of Swedèn, both
or wbom worbd for the United Nationa Relier and Worb
Agency nutrition! and auppli• prosram, were kidnapped near
Sidon, ln 10Utb',m Lebanon. Accordinc to report, from
Stockholm and UNRWA offlciall, the two may bave been
kidnapped by a PLO faction Nekin, '"8DI' for UNRWA'1 firinc
or m Paleetini~ accueecl of ltealin, by Stemn,. Jorpmon
md Stening !'91 releued Mar. 1 by the "Rewlutionary Cella
Orpnlsatlon.• ' .
i
Rolf Scbray, a W~ German engineer and long-time reeident or
Beirut, wu Jdd.1,pped in Beirut. New. IIOUfflMI reported tbat
Schray W88 Jddnapped 0D the orden "' Ab4 al-Hadi Hamadi,
auppoNdly the ~ty chier for ffid>allali and ~r or
Muhammad and 1 Abbu Hemacti, both under amllt in Weet
Gennany. Schray wu releued by "Struglen for Freedom· Mar.
3;·1988. t
French hotta,-:Jean-Louiae Normandine, kidnapped Mar. 8,
1986, along wi~ tbree other memben of a French taleviaion
t.eam, and ~ Auque, a journalilt and photoerçber
kidnapped Jan. l" 1987, were nleued at the Sumrnerland Hotel
in W9IJt Beirut. "1e Rnolutionary JUltioe Orpnisation cltbnecl
the lddnappin, 1of Normandine, but no ,roup had claimed
reapon,ibility for Auque'• abduction. &JO al90 annouiiced Nov.
27 tbat it bad •leued all ita French bostapl in return for
auurancea rrom: the French pvemment tbat France would
cbanp ita '1ntenJ.iona• in the Middle Eut.
Mr. To ~ a aecntary at the South Korean embuly
in Beirut, WII r,leued to Arnal, wbo tumed bim OVW to the
Korean ~ To wu kidnapped Jan. 31, 1986, and,
according to pl'e!II reporta, wu relwed after the payment of
Sl million in raziaom.
1
1
WNt German el~cat technieian Alfred Schmidt, Jddnapped
i1l W8lt Beirut J-. 20, 1987, wu releuad to Syrian authoritiel
in Beirut. s.-na, Schmidt·• employera, denled tbat the
company paid 'ramom to the "Struglena for Freedom
Organisation· ~t c1aimed to bave kidnapped Schmidt.
1
08/31/87 - Joeepb Khuri, ~ Italian citizen of Lebanese origin, wu
kidnapped in~ Beirut. Khuri wu rel~ Sept. 61 1987,
Annex 55
with the help of the Amal • ·tia. Amal officiala tumed Khuri
over to the ltalian embell&doJt at Amal beadquarten, but would
not 18)' how tbey bad NCU bit releaae.
08/18187 - CbarlNGlaN, the.American · · kldnappedJune 17, 1987,
eacaped, or wu allowed to from bia capton ln eoutb
Beirut. Glui appeuecl at Summerland Hotel, wa tabn to
Damucua by Syrian military autboritiee, and releued to U.S.
Cbarp d'Afîaires David KanAlljOm.
06/29/87 -- Monte Carlo radio, citing · t IOU!'C88, Nid Teny Andenon
and Thomu Sutherland had tabn to Iran. Beirut radio,
citin1 London aourcee, July 1, 1987, that the two
Americam and BriU.b tor Terry Waite were in the Iran
city of' Qum. The weekly ne ol·Shira reported on June
13 tbat U.S. bottqee had bee moved to Iran. The reporta were
:not verifted.
06ti2/87 - W:eat German aovemment ao Nid the German Govemment
would reject the U.S. request for the atradition of' Muhammad
Hamadi. Accordine to preu Weet German autboritiée
promieed Attorney General win Meeae during bia June 23
viait that Hamadi would be ed for murder and air piney.
06/19/87 - President Reagan aent a I to Syrian President Hans al-
ANad otrering to improve re tiona between the two countriee.
The let.ter, in the drafting befon the Glue kidnapping on
June 17, lncluded a reference to Syrian eff'orta to f'ree the U.S.
hostaaee in Lebanon.
06/17/87 - ABC newaman Charles Gl wu k1dnapped in aoutb Beirut.
Glua was aeired by 10 wblle traveling with Ali Adil
Ul8yl'IID. aon or Lebanon'• mH Miniater, and SuJayman
Salman. Uaayran'• auard and driver: Uaayran and Salman, wbo
volunteered to accompany into captiYity, were releued
June 24, 1987.
05/26/87 - The Wuhingt.on Poet n tbat Weet Gennany .wu
comidering an arrangement tbat would he the two WNt
Oermana held in Lebanon · achanee ror tr.Yinl the Hamadi
brotben on 1euer cbar&N tba would enaure tbeir releue witbin
lix montha. Under the t, accordina to the pre1111
report, Mub•mm•d Hamadi would not be a.tradited to the
United States.
05/14/87 - ltlamic Jihad for the Li
videotape of A1ann Steen
Steen appeared healthy in
of Arab priaonera beld in
tion or PaJutine delivered a
the Beirut newapaper al-Nahar.
tape, and appeaJed for the releue
eli jaila.
Annex 55
Annex 55
03126/87 ••• In a videotape rel+a,ed by JJLP, boetage J9119 Turner ,aîd Alann
Steen wu ill, 1U$ring f'tom 9Y1Dptoma that appeared to deecribe
a etroke. L1LP repeated ite oft"er to acbanp Steen for 100
priaonen in im.1.
1
03/23/87 - &lamie Jihad for· the Liberation or Palestine Nid U.S. bostage
Alann Steen wu pveJy ill, and in danger or dying. LJLP
off'ered to ncharce Steen for 100 prilonen in larael.
1
03/12/87 - The RevolutiomJy Juttice Organization threatened to necute
French bottage J'8,11-Louile Normandine within '8 hours unleaa
the French pemment clarified remarb made by President
Mitterand on French aid to Iraq. Two daya later, the
Revolutionary Jqatice Organization repeated the threat. On
Mar. 18, RJO ~ned the esecution for one week. On Mar.
23, RJO withdrew the deatb threat against Normandine.
1
02/22/87 - Syrian troopa moived into west Beirut in an attempt *° quell the
figbting and restpre order. ·
i
02/19/87 ...: Accorclinl to ~ Voice of Lebanon radio, Hizballab tried to
kïdnap an Aus"81ian officer 888igned to the U.N. Truce
Supervisory Or~zation in Beirut, but was stopped by members
of the Amal milifia.
02/13/87 - The Nidal al~ magazine, which repreaente views of the
Palatine Popular Stniggle Front, aaid Terr., Waite bad been
abducted becaun be failed to deliver '5 million in ramom for
the four univenif;y profeasore kidnapped Jan. 24. The magazine
said the United Stat.es backed out of the ranaom arrangement
for fear of anou+r scandai.
02/09/87 -- Both the White Jiouse and the lsraeli government denied that
they were considering a three-way 1W8p of 400 Lebaneae and
Paleatinian prisonere beld by the lsraelia and the South Lebanon
Army for the fo• profeuon kidnapped Jan. 24, and the hraeli
airman held by ~zballah.
Sbortly before midnigbt (10 p.m. GMT, 5 p.m. EST), the lllamic
Jihad for the Li1-ration of Palutine (LJLP) delivered a meuap
and a picture ofi hoatage Polbill to a Weatern new1 agency in
Beirut stating tbat the midnigbt deadline bad been •deferred for
the time beïng.• IJLP said Jan. 81 that it would kill the rour
BUC prof1110rs at midnigbt Feb. 9, if Israel did not releue 400
imprisoned ~ese and Paleatinians. IJLP aaid it deferred the
deadline to allo;,, tùne to esplore •positive point.a• otrered by
Israel. Israel'• Defenae Miniater Yitzhak Rabin nid Israel would
Annex 55
CRS-7
conaider wbat it could do · it received a U.S. requeat to
excbange the Iaraeli prisonen or the Lebaneae boatagea.
02/08/87 -- Beirut televieion played a 10- nute videotape or bottage Alann
Steen reading a text tbat u the United States to •order"
Iarael to releue the 400 Lebanete and Paleltiniana in excbange
for the tbree U .S. and one lnclian citizena beld by the lslamic
Jihad for the Li'beration of Pr.·
The Revolutionary Justice C>rpnization i8lued a atatement tbat
Nid British negotiator Terry \Vaite wu detained on Jan. 20,
1987, becauae be carried a ~tter capable of tellin1 the
United States the location of tbe kidnappera wben be began bis
negotiatione Jan. 20. The •e11age wu accompanied by a
photograph of U.S. boatage Ecfward Tracy.
1 . .
02/07/87 .-- Nabih Berri, leader of the J\mal group of Lebanese Sbia
Muslima, off'ered to excbange ~ lsraeli pilot, cap~~red by An,ud
Oct. 16, 1986, for the 400 Lel,anese and Palestinians held by
Israel, which in tum would reeult in thip releaae or the three
Americana and one Indian heldi by JJLP. Iirael, which bu made
sucb exchangea before, gave ah ambiguous response to Berri',
sùggeation. On Feb. 14, 1987, IJLP announced that the
proposed exchange wu called bff'.
1
02/01/87 - The lslamic Jihad Organizatioh for the Liberation of Palestine
(IJLP) said it would excbange tbe four Beirut University College
professors kidnapped Jan. 24 fe>r 400 Lebaneae and Palestinians
detained in Israel. One IJLP •tement wu accompanied by a
pbotograpb of Alann Steen ahd anotber LJLP ·atatement wu
accompanied by a photo of J-.e Turner. lsraeli Prime Miniater
Yitzbak Shamir rejected the prcpoaed excbange the next day.
1 01/28/87 -- According to a West German ~dio report, a woman thougbt to
01/27/87 ··-
be French wu kidnapped in -.t Beirut, but wu releaaed the
next day wben ber abductors ,nacovered abe wu Swisa.
The "lslamic Jihad for the Libet'ation of Palestine" claimed credit
for kidnapped Steen, Turner, Polbill, and SiJllh Jan. 24, 1987.
!
The Reagan Administration l)anned travel to Lebanon. The
estimated 1,500 citizena, ~ witb dual citizenehip or married
to Lebanese, bave 30 daya to leave Lebanon.
1
The West German govemment arreated Ali Abbas Hsmadi, a
West German citizen and bro~r of accused bijacker Muhammad
Ali Hamadi who waa arreatJd Jan. 13. According to press
reports, anotber Hamadi bro~r,Abd al-Hadi, ia head ofaecurity
for Hizballah, the group lieved behind many of the
kidnappinp, incl ·n, the two Weat Germana Nized in midJanuary
1987.
01/24/8'1 - Four men were · pped f'rom the eamput of Beirut Uninnity
01.J'}J)/87 -
01/17/87 -
12f.l4/86 -
Collep by au poting u LebanNt police. The four are
A1ann Steen. J Turner, Robert Polbill, Ill U.S. cimen,, and
Mithilelhwar · an Indian citizen and relident of the U.S.;
all four are profl at the Collep, not to be conf'ulecl with
American U · 't.y of Beirut. ·
Alfted Schmidt, a Weat German electroniel t.echnician, wu
1ddnapped from the Summerlancl Hot.el in W81t Beirut.
Unconfirmed augpeted that the two West Germana,
Corda and dt, would be oft'erecl in an nchange for
Hamacli, unde1 ;f,
in Frankfort.
West German ineNillan Rudolf Cordel waa kidnapped by
unknown u be let\ the Beirut airport. Cordee'
lddnapJ>Î111 Muhammad* Arlei laliatJiaon.n 13 .r oHr a\mluai .dWi he,oatl .G_e,rnm liannk e..d. .t.o. it hoer
June 1985 ·• ng of TWA fligbt 847 âne( the murder of U.S.
citizen Robert S them.
French boetage urel Comea, one of four French televiaion
tecbniciam cap red on Mar. 8, 1986, wu releued in Beirut.
'nie Revolutio Juatice Organisation held Comea and
continue, t.o ho U.S. citizen, Cicippio and Tracy.
11fl7/86 - The French e Minilter'1 office denied reporta tbat France
11/11/86 -
11/04/86 ·-
would trade a victed terrorilt fol' French holtape in Beirut.
On Dec. 12, the Prime Miniater'• office denied another report
tbat France paid 15 million ftanca for the releue of two French
bCllltaget freed o Nov. 11.
Two French b Camille Sontag. an 85-year-old retired
automobile 181 and Marcel Coudary.Qbauemi, a M-yearold
· nre releued in Beirut by the Bm>lutionary
Juetice 'on, the ume group that holda U.S. citizem
Cicippio and • Sontar wu kidnapped on May '1, 1986, and
Coudary wu . dnapped in Plbruary 1986, altbouah hie
kidnappinc wu reponed until Sept. Mt 1986. Sont.a Nid
he may have!Jriahman Brian KMnan, kidnapped on Apr.
11, 1986, during captivity. Tbe French. aovernment tbeaked
Syria, Saudi ia, and Alpria for arrangïnc the releue.
The apeaker of '• Parliammt, Ali Akbar Ref'anjanl, told
reporter, in ~ that former White HOUl8 aecurity adviler
Robert McF and fout' unidentified Americanl had wited
Tehran dia u airline nrvice perlOIUl&l with an otTer to
Annex 55
Annex 55
11/0'JJ86 -
10/'24/86 --
lOtll/86 -
10/06/86 -
10/03/86 -
CRS-9
provide weapon, and lp8l'8 oe to Iran in ezcbanp for lranian
&11istance in eecurin, the leue or u.s. bostapt held in
Lebanon. Raf'aanjani 18id . arlane and the otber four were
detained at a Tebran hotel rdr five daya before being deported
f'rom Iran. No Iranien omc·1 met witb the Americam, the
9J)88ker Nid. The Wuh Poal ntported on Nov. lS tbat
"intelligence eoul'Cel• tbat McFarlane went to Iran in
May 1986.
David Jacobnn wu releaaed west Beirut near the former U.S.
Embaaay. Jacobien, the Ame ·can Univenity of Beirut (AUB)
hoepital adminiltrator kidna by lalamic Jihad, on May 28,
1985, Oew fh>m Beinat to î' witb Teny Waite, the envoy
of the Archbiabop of Cante ry who wu involved in the
negotiatione for hi• releue.
Britain broke diplomatic~oa witb Syria followlnc the trial
and conviction of a Jo · linked to Syria in an airline
bombing attempt. How the plomatic break will affect British
negotiatione for the release f the two Britia~ boatagea ia not
known.
Edward AUltin Tracy, a 65- ear-old American from Rutland,
Vermont, wu kidnapped in irut. The "Revolutionary Justice
Organization• sent a letter and two photos of Tracy to a
Western news agency in Be t claiming it kidnapped Tracy
becauae be wu a apy for and the CIA. The Revolutionary
Justice Organization also c1ai , ed to bave kidnapped U.S. citizen
Joeeph Cicippio on Sept. l 1986, and Frenchman Marcel
Coudary-Ghasaemi on Sept. , 1986. Tracy wu a convert to
Islam.
lslamic Jihad sent a televisio tape to a Western news agency
in Beirut tbat ahowed Frenc hoatagea Marcel Carton, Marcel
Fontaine, and Jean-Paul Kau The three appealed to the
French government to aecure the release of the 1 '1 priaonen in
Kuwait in ezchange for their release from Lebanon.
lllamic Jihad sent a tel · · tape to a Western newe agency
in Beirut tbat included &tait.a by David Jacobien and Terry
Anderson appealing to PrelÎ t Reagan to negotiate for their
releaae. ln the tape, both me Nid boatap William Buckley wu
dead. lslamic Jihad repeated its damand tbat the 17 men held
in Kuwait for the ~ 1983 bombinp be releaaad in
ezchange for Anderson, J~n, and Sutherland.
1
Beirut television broadcast ; tape made by memhers of the
bostages• families and rorm,r hostage Father Martin Jenco
1
10,,,1/86 -
09~-
09fl6/86 -
09/24186 -
09/16/86 -
09/14/86 -
CRS-10
appealing to lal~c Jihad for the releue or the remaining U.S.
hoetape in Ion. .
French telmei~ joumaliàt Jean.Mare Srowt1i IIC&ped from a
thed wben he ,-beld by lmocldnc a bole in a wall witb a
brick. Sroulli been lddnapped on Sept. 28, 1986, while
crouing trom Beirut int.o Wllt BeiNt.
Secretary or te George Shultz met witb Syrian Foreipi
Mlnilter Faruk at the United Natioal to dilcull Syrian
ing the m Americam htld bOltqe in IAbanon.
Em: .. 1.Y in Beirut eonfirmed tbat French telmaion
Srou,el, 41, wu lddnapped in IIOUth BeiNt.
Davicl Hint wu kidnapped by thne aummen
but aeaped by boltin1 trom hia abductor•,
it etopped in a Beinit neishborhood.
The "Organizati n. ot Revolutionary Justice• ·aent a lett.er and
pictures .to al- , the BeiNt newapaper, ·claiminc to baYe
kidnapped a citizen, Marcel Michel Coudar.,-ObalNIDi,
who the kid ra claimed wu a member of a French
intelligence ee ce counterterrorilt team. The picturee were of
Coudary.Q • and Joeeph Cicippio, the American kidnapped
on Sept. 12, 1 • AFP identified Coudary-Obeuemi u a dual
P'Nnch· national.
AFP reported a Weetem news apncy in Beinit received a
letter from !'~c Jihad tbet aCCUlld Prelident Reepn of
following a ·~ï:~r policy beeaule be wu willing to ne,&Otiate
for the releue r U.S. joumalist Nicholaa Daniloff' in MOICOW
but wu not ing to negotiate with lalamic Jihad for the
releue or J n, Andenon, and Sutherland. The I,lernic
Jihad leuer accompanied by a photograph of Jacobien and
a tbree-page ftom Jacobeen.
The "Umar al• ktar Forc81 of the A.rab Bevolutionary Cella•
claimed • ·ty tor kidnapping U.S. citizena Frank Reed
and JOIIJ)h Ci lo in a telepbone call to a Beirut ne,n apn,cy.
Umar al-Mukh wu a Libym bero in the resistance apïNt
italian occupati •
09/13/86 - The Voice of ~e?Ml~ radio (comervatlve, Cbri8tian) reported
tbat an ano oua calier elaimed that •at-Baath Cella
Orpnization• respomible tor the kidnapping or Reed and
Cicippio. Baa (Arabie for rebirtb or nnai11&nce) partiea
control Syria d Iraq, altbougb the t1'0 partiea do not
cooperate.
Annex 55
09/12186 -·
09/11/86 -
09/09/86 -
An American citizen, JONph Jamee Cicippio, the deputy
eomptroller at American UnivenJty of Beinit. waa lddnapped by
ftve gunmen while croaina the! AUB campu, in west Beirut.
Cicippio ii 66 yean old, a eonvert to lllam. and ia married to a
LebenNe woman wbo worb fbr the U.S. Embaa,y in eut
BeiNt. !
The Voice of Lebanon radio ·(cobeervatl.., Chriltian) reported
tbat an int.emational Dl'n ...oc.y in Beirut recei'f'ld a letter
from. &lamie Jihad denying bi.+J ..... t in the kidnappins or
Frank Reed cm Sept. 9, 1986. Th9 Jetter wu accompanied by
a color photograpb of captift David J'acobeen.
f
U.S. citizen Frank Herbert Reect. lhe beadmuter or the Lebaneee
International ScbooJ, WIii lddnapped in 10utb Beirut, near the
. Beirut boepital. A penon rep~nting Ialamic Jihad called the
AFP office ln Beirut to c1aim lreepon,J'bility for the 1eizure,
ltatina tbat BeecJ wu • dA aaerit and wu carrying
•compromlsing document," at the time of bit capture. The
· lelamic Jihad caller alao Nid -t Reed bad converted to lelam
and married a Syrian woman ., a cover Cor hia intelliganee
·activiliN. '
08/12186 - Syrian President Al8ad met with'a r di eleption orA rab-A:mericans
to diacua. among otber iuues, Syrian role in aecuring the
releue or the U.S. hoetape bel in Lebanon.
08l09J86 -
07126186 -
O?n.7186 -
1
lalamic Jihad eent a m88811p to the Beirut newapaper al-Noh4r
denouncing Secretary of State George Sbultz for bis statement
of Aug. 5, in wbich the Secretar, uid the United Stat.ea would
not negotiate for the re1 ... or tJJe boetapl. The Ialamic Jihad
meuage wu accompanied by a piotograpb ofU.S. hoetap Da'rid
Jacobien.
Fatber Lawrence Martin Jenco Je. releued in the Bekaa Valley
of Lebanon. Jenco wu taken to Damucua wbere be wu tumed
OY8J' to U.S. Ambaaador Willi~ Eqleton. ln Damaecua, Jaco
met w1tb Peggy Say, lilter or 1-tap Terry Andenon. Jmco
18id be bad been beld witb Andenon, Jacobien. and Sutherland,
bul lmew DOlblnJ 73 Bucldoy, JOMO corried a ?minute
videotape ofboetage Da ·d Jacobien, in wbich Jacobien
appealed to the U.S. to negotiate for the releue or
the otber hoetapa.
U.S. Congreeern•n Georp O'Broen died. Congreaaman O'Brien
had - acti .. in IIOldng dia e of dia __ boolapo
held in Lebanon, and had trave ed for Syria in August 1985 to
appeal to President Assad for · ce.
Annex 55
Annex 55
CRS-12
1 07/16/86 - Saudi diploma~ Sulayman Muhammad al-Mubarak wu
07/01/86 -
06/80/86 -
kidnapped in 'irut, but wu freed two boun later after a
~ police and army dragnet caugbt hia captors.
Steven J. Do ue, 32 yeare old from New Jeney, waa releued
after almoet o year in captivity in Lebanon. The Washington
Poal reported t Donahue uid be wu an undercover agent for
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Apncy and that be had been
releaaed after ~ family paid a $400,000 ramom. DEA denied
that Don~ue 1-8· an agent. The Department of State bad
lmown of ~'• captivity aince October 1985, but did not
eonaider him a ipolitical captive limilar to the other five U .S.
citizene etill bet. in Lebanon.
Congre•man Rpbert Dornan met with Syrian President Assad
and otber Syri officiais in Damaacu8 to present a lett.er, signed
by some 250 Me ra of the House of Representatives, appéaling
for Syrian help in freeing the five Americans 1till ~eld captive
in Lebanon. ·.
06/21/86 -· The two Cyprio atudents, Pirkides and Yiannakis, kidnapped on
Apr. 28, 1986, re released in west Beirut after an appeal by
PLO leader Y ir Arafat.
06/20/86 -- Two French h ges, Phillipe Rocbot and Georges Hansen, were
releaaed at a ho l in eaat Beirut. The two bad been kidnapped,
along with two other French membera of a television crew, on
Mar. 8, 1986.
05/07/86 -- A French citize , 84-year-old Camille Sontag, was kidnapped in
west Beirut by two armed men.
04/28/86 --- Panikos Pirkid and Stavros Yiannakis, Cypriot students at the
American Univ rsity of Beirut, were kidnapped in west Beirut.
The Abu Nid terrorist group claimed responeibility for the
adduction.
04fl3/86 - Al-Nahar, the Beirut newspaper, received a videotape film
showing a man. ing bung. The Organization of Revolutionary
Socialist Muslirbs claimed the man wu Alec Collet, missing since
Mar. 25, 1985. The ORSM claimed Collet wu killed in
retaliation for .ritish cooperation in the Apr. 15 U.S. attack on
Libya.
04/20/86 -- The body or P~ter Kilbum, 62, the former librarian at AUB,
arrived at Andtews Air Force base in Virginia.
1
1
Annex 55
04/18/86 •••
04/17/86 -·
04/11/86 -
04/08/86 --
03/28/86 -
03/10/86 -
03/08/86 -·
03/05/86 -·
CRS-13
UPI reported that one of the in found on Apr. 17 was not
AJec Collet, but wu Peter Kil~urn, the U.S. librarian at AUB
kidnapped on Dec. S, 1984. 1
The bodies of three men, belie~d to be AJec Collet, John Leigh
Douglas, and Phillip Padfield, all British citizena were found 10
milee 10utheast of Beirut. Co$et bad been kidnapped on Mar.
25, 1985, Douglas and Padfield bad been lddnapped on March
28, 1986. The Organization ofiRevolutionary Socialist Muslims
claimed to have •aecuted" ttie three men in retaliation for
British cooperation in the U .S) air attack on Libya on Apr. 15,
1986. 1
British journalist John McCarthy wu abduct.ed near the Beirut
airport. McCarthy worked for lthe World-wide Television News
of Great Britain. A group callittg itself the "Hilal ibn al-Qadhafi
Organization" ("sons of the Q'1dhafi crescent") telephoned the
Voice of Lebanon radio station! in Beirut to claim credit for the
kidnapping. j
Brian Keenan, an Irish nat~onal teacbèr. at the American
Utftversity of Beirut, was kidnapped in west Beirut.
Lebanese hunters surprîsed J ur or tive armed men with a
blindfolded and tied captive inLthe Bekaa Valley. The hunters
fired shots and the armed men Jled, leaving bebind their captive,
Michel Brillant, the French te, cher kidnapped on Apr. 8, 1986.
A French citizen, Michel Brillailt was kidnapped (n west Beirut.
Brillant is a teacher at the Prftestant College in ~irut.
1
John Leigh Douglas and Phill~p Padfield, British subjects · and
prof essors at the American Unir ersity of Beirut, were kidnapped
in Beirut.
A Beirut newspaper received al picture of French citizen Michel ·
Sauret, which the senders claifed showed Sauret after be bad
been killed. Officiais said thj picture was inconelusive.
Four members of an Antenne ltwo French television crew were
kidnapped in south Beirut after fllming a meeting of the
Hizballah Shia faction. 'l1le I four, Philippe Rochot, Georges
Hansen, Aurel Comea, and Jean-Louise Normandine, and their
Lebanese driver, were aeized 'ry Ialamic Jihad. The Lebanese
driver was released the same vening.
A letter from Ialamic Jihad to news bureau in Beirut claimed
that French citizen Michel Sa ret bad been executed.
Annex 55
02/19/86 --
01/31/86 --
01/17/86 --
11/13/85 ---
11/08/85 --
CRS-14
Spanish dipl t Pedro Sanchez and two Lebanue employees
of the Spanisb mbassy were delivered to the House of Amal
leader Nabih ami, wbo handed the tbree men over to the
Spanish AmbTor·
1 South Korean ~plomat To Cbae-Song wu kidnapped in west
Beirut. The ·,reen Bripc!es• claimed reeponsibility for the
kidnapping &n4 demanded SIO million in ramom Cor To'a
release. Anot~ group, the "Figbting Revolutionary ee11s:
claimed credit rcl,r the abduction two dayB later. Neither group
bad been knoWJ!l before the Korean'1 aeizure.
Kidnappera se~ Spanisb diplomat Pedro Sanchez and two
Lebanese emplayees or the Spanish Embuay. An unidentified
caller told AFP:i. at the tbree would be releued in excbange for
the release of o Palestinians held in Spanish jails for sboating
a Libyan diplo at in Madrid in 1984.
1
Terry Waite, a tepresentative or the Archbishop of Canterbury,
arrived i~. Beirut on the ftrst of several ~rifs ~ negotiate for the
U .S., Br1t1sb, 8'd French bostages. ·
Someone deliv~red a letter from hostages Jenco, Jacobsen,
Anderson, and $utberland to President Reagan to the Associated
Press office inj Beirut. The letter asked the President to
negotiate with the captors. Letters from the hastages to their
Camilies, to Mèbers or Congrus, and to the Archbisbop of
Canterbury wef also delivered to AP.
10/30/85 -- Three Soviet di,lomats, Nikolai Virsky, Valery Mirkov, and Oleg
Sprin, were rel~ in front of the Soviet Embasay in Beirut.
Four Soviets ~re kidnapped on Sept. 30; one wu found dead
on Oct. 2. 1
10/28/85 --
10/12/85 --
1 President Reagp met at the White House with Camilies or the
missing six Am~ricans. National Security Council adviser Robert
McFarlane told I the familles that the United States would meet
with the abdbctor.a if the opportunity presented itself.
Previously, U.S. officiais rejected meeting or negotiating witb
terrorists.
1
Islamic Jihad sent a picture, purported to be William Buckley,
to a Beirut 118$p&per to prove that the organization bad killed
Buckley as th+, claimed on Oct. 3. The group oft'ered to
exchange Bucklley's body for the release of 100 Palestinians held
by the Israelis end proposed that U.N. Secretary-General Javier
Perez de Cuell_, act as the negotiator for the exchange.
CRS-15
10/08/85 ·- British citizen, Hazel Moea and.Amanda Magrath, kidnapped on
Sept. 26, were released in Bei"*- They did not know who their
abductors were and 1aid tbey ere well treated.
10/03/85 -· Ialamic Jihad claimed to bave ·nec1 William Buckley, the U.S.
diplomat k:idnapped on Mar. 1 1984.
09/30/85 - Four Soviet national&, empl
Beirut, were k:idnapped in two
Li'beration Organization late
diplomats. On Oct. 2, one or
of the Soviet Embaasy in
parate incident.a. The Ialamic
claimed to have the Soviet
e Soviet.a wu found dead.
09fl6/85 -· Two British women, Hazel M and Amanda Magratb, were
kidnapped from their Beirut ll1>8rtment. No group claimed
responsibility f'or the kidnapp' g.
09/19/85 ·- At a Washington preaa confere ce, Rev. Benjamin Weir aaid he
was released to deliver a me to the United States tbat the
kidnappera would exchange the remaining six Americana for the
09/14/85 •••
17 Shia Muslims held in wait for the ·December 1983
bombings. Weir nid he bad n hostages Andéraon, Jacobsen,
S~tberland, and Jenco, but kne notbing of Buckley or Kilbum.
lslamic Jihad told a foreign n agency in Beirut that Benjamin
Weir had been releaaed. Sept. 18, President Reagan
announced that Weir was free d in the United Statea. State
Department officiais aaid Weir' release wu k.ept secret for four
day8 in the hope that other ~-es would aJao be releued.
09/10/85 - Israel released the last 119 o a total 700 Lebanese prisoners
beld at Atlit prison in lsra 1. Israel bad transf'erred the
Lebanese, mostly Sbia Musli from Lebanon when Israel began
ita withdrawal in April. Rcleas ot the Iaraeli boatagoa bad been
a demand for the release of th 'IWA bostages in June and for
the seven remaining American hostages.
08/11/85 - Repreaentative George O'Brien met witb Syrian President Assad
in Damascua to discuaa the h lituation.
07 /24/85 - Repreaentativea of the boeta f'amiliea bepn two days of
lobbying and public relations · Washington, D.C.
07/01/85 - President Reagan spoke by tel hone to Syrian President Assad
about the plight of the aeven rican boetages.
06/31/85 - 37 American citizens who werei hijacked on 'IWA fligbt 847 and
held in Beirut by Shia extre t.a were released in Damascua.
Annex 55
Annex 55
06/14/85 •••
06/09/85 -
06/01/85 -
05fJS/85 -
03/16/85 -·
02/14/85 -·
· 01/ /85 --
01/08/85 -·
12/03/84 •••
07/ /84 --
05/08/84 •••
04/15/84 -
· 03/16/84 -
03/07/84 --
02/10/84 -
C~16
Trans World Aïr.linee flight 847 wu hijacked after leaving
Athens, Greece,Jby Sbia gunmen. U.S. Navy diver Robert
Stetham wu 1h t by the hijacken in Beirut, Lebanon.
1 Tbomu B. SuthEtrland, the Dean of the School of Agriculture at
the American University of Beirut (AUB), wu kidnapped.
"Free Voice of ~I Radio: a clandestine, anti-Khomeini radio
station, claimed that hoatagea William Buckley and Peter
Kilbum were d d.
David Jacobsen, lthe Director of the AUB bospital, wu seized.
Terry Anderson, 1 the Chief Middle East Correspondent for the
Associated Press1 wu kidnapped. ·
Jeremy Levin w~ releued, or escaped, from captivity in the
Bekaa Valley in 1eutem Lebanon.
1 •
The second of Jo videotapes of hostage WilJiam Buckley .was
received by the~ μ.s. State Department.
Fi. Lawrence Mf·' Jenco, a Roman Catholic priest and director
of the Catholic lief Services operation in Lebanon, wu taken
hostage.
Peter Kilhurn, 1 ubrarian at AUB, wu lut seen before bis
disappearance irl Beirut.
1
The first videoJpe of bostage William Buckley wu received by
the U .S. DeJ>Ut*1ent of State. ·
i The Reverend '8njamin Weir, a Presbyterian minister, was
kidnapped in Beirut.
1
Frank Regier w+. fteed by Amal militiamen during a raid on the
bideout of an mrremist organization.
William Buckley• a political officer at the United States Embassy
in Beirut, wu $(iucted.
CNN Beirut Buru Chief Jeremy Levin was aeized in Beirut.
Frank Regier, ti. head of the Electrical Engineering Department
at AUB, was ki1napped.
Annex 56
Annex 56
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November19, 1991
THE HOSTAGE DRAMA
THE HOSTAGE DRAMA; 2 Western Hostages Freed in
Lebanon
By ELAINE SCIOLINO,
WASHINGTON, Nov.18-TheAnglican envoy, TerryWaite, and an Arnerican educator, Thomas M.
Sutherland, were released by their Shiite Muslim captors in Lebanon today, amid signs that the
remaining Western hostages may be freed soon.
The release today of two of the longest-held hostages came after intense negotiations by the United
Nations that have led to the freeing of four other Western hostages since August. It represents a dramatic
leap toward ending the nearly eight-year hostage ordeal.
At an impromptu, chaoti.c appearance before reporters in Damascus after the release to Syrian officials,
Mr. Waite said his captors had told him just before his release that they would free two American
hostages, Joseph J. Cicippio and Alann Steen, in the next five days and the other American, Terry A.
Anderson, the longest-held hostage, by the end of the month. [ Excerpts from news conference, page A16.
] A Captor's Apology
"This aftemoon, when we were sitting together in our cell, chained to the wall as we have been chained to
the wall for the last five years and, in some cases of Tom and others, for seven years -- 23 hours and 50
minutes a day -- one of our captors came in and told us that Tom and myse1f would be freed this
evening," said the 52-year-old Mr. Waite, looking thinner, his haïr grayer, than when he was abducted in
January 1987 during a mediation effort on beha1f of other hostages.
"He also said tome: We apologize for having captured you. We recognize that now this was a wrong
thing to do, that holding hostages achieves no useful, constructive purpose,' "Mr. Waite said.
Mr. Waite said he did not know when two other Western hostages -- Heinrich Strubig and Thomas
Kemptner, German relief workers -- would be set free. He did not mention Alberto Molinari, an I talian
businessman who has been missing since 1985. Sorne Lebanese security officials have said they believe he
is dead. Remarks by U.N. Leader
In brief remarks to reporters at the United Nations this morning, the usually cautious Secretary General,
Javier Perez de Cuellar, said that both the groups holding the hostages and the Iranian Government
"some time ago" had "offered" to release all of the hostages by Christmas.
The next move may be up to Israel, which has freed a number of Arab prisoners since August as part of
the negotiations, but is still holding SheikAbdul-Karim Obeid, an Islamic fundamentalist leader captured
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by Israeli commandos in southern Lebanon in 1989 and its most valuable bargaining chip.
Israel said tonight that it would not release any more of the 300 Arab prisoners in its hands until it
receives word about the fate of an Israeli Air Force navigator who was shot down. over Lebanon in 1986.
Roles of Syria and Iran
The quickening pace of hostage releases also reflects the pivotai roles played by both Syria and Iran,
which have much to gain by a resolution of the thorny issue. Teheran, which has considerable influence
over the Shüte Muslim groups holding the hostages, is eager to improve its political standing in the West
and rebuild its economy with extensive Western help. Syria, the main power broker in Lebanon and a
player in the Middle East peace talks, has tried to move closer to the West with the breakup of the Soviet
Union.
Both Mr. Waite, who had been held since January 1987, and Mr. Sutherland, who was taken captive in
June 1985, appeared in both good health and good spirits as they addressed reporters under a portrait of
President Hafez al-Assad of Syria. But their upbeat remarks also captured some of the pain they endured
during their difficult captivity, as well as the changing sentiment of their captors about the value of
keeping hostages. ;A Time of Joy'
The White House press spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, described the release today as "a time of joy," and
praised the United Nations and the govemments of Iran, Syria and Lebanon for their assistance. But he
also called for the release of the remaining hostages, adding, "Our joy is mixed, however, with deep
concem over those who remain in captivity."
President Bush has repeated.ly said he would not move to improve relations with Teheran until all
American hostages are released. And even then, Iran's continuing support for international terrorism
remains an obstacle in building the relationship, Bush Administration officiais said today.
The two countries also continue to haggle in a special tribunal in The Hague over claims stemming from
the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran in 1979. The most nettlesome are Teheran's
compensation claims for United States military equipment it says it paid for before the 1979 revolution but
never received and claims of dual nationals against Iran.
"People are thinking about what to do, but it would be wrong to leap to the conclusion that we are about
to restore relations or anything like that," said one senior Administration official. "But there may be some
small steps in that direction once all Americans are freed and if the Iranians make some statement
disavowing terrorism." Major ls 'Delighted'
In London today, Prime Minister John Major said he was "absolutely delighted" by the hostage release,
and stressed that it was accomplished with "no backstage deals."
The release of Mr. Waite, the last British hostage, removes the most serious obstacle for an improvement
in British-Iranian relations. Britain is now in a position to upgrade its diplomatie representation in Iran
by sending an ambassador toits embassy in Iran, and to offer Iran much-needed :financial help in the
form of loans, credits, joint ventures and other commercial deals.
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In his remarks today, Mr. Sutherland, a 60-year-old former Dean of Agriculture at the American
University of Beirut, thanked the United Nations, Syria, Iran and Israel for their efforts on behalf of the
detainees. Israeli Role in Lebanon
But in a thinly-veiled criticism of Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, Mr. Waite described how he
and the other captives had been living under constant shelling in the last year.
"All of us, all hostages, would plead with those who are holding the people of South Lebanon, innocent
people being held as hostages, to release them soon, to put an end to this problem, to put an end to
terrorism, and to find peaceful, humane and civilized ways of resolving the very complex problems that
face the people of the Middle East," said Mr. Waite, special envoy for the Archbishop of Canterburywho
over the years had successfully won the freedom of detainees in Iran, Libya and Lebanon before he
himself was seized while tcying to free American captives in Lebanon.
Mr. Perez de Cuellar had confided to colleagues last week that he expected all of the remaining hostages
to be released together before the end of the month. United Nations officials said the release today, which
they had known about for more than a week, was somewhat surprising. Still, the officials added, he is
confident that the last hostage will be freed before he leaves office at the end of the year. Condition of
Anderson
Mr. Sutherland offered fresh information on the condition of Mr. Anderson, who was chief Middle East
correspondent for the Associated Press when he was abducted in March 1985. Mr. Sutherland, who said
he spent most of his captivity with Mr. Anderson, said, 'We left Terry Anderson about three or four hours
ago in Lebanon and he is no longer chained to the wall, thank God, but he is still in a room that has very
little fresh air and no daylight whatsoever."
Still, Mr. Sutherland said, "He is in very good health right now; he is in very good spirits," adding that the
American journalist has written poetry during captivity, which he hopes to publish eventually.
Mr. Anderson is considered the captors' most valuable bargaining chip, both because of the length of time
he has spent in captivity and the extensive publicity his plight has been given over the years, and the Bush
Administration has assumed that he will be among the last to be released.
Both freed hostages were in such high spirits that they used their :first public statements to crack jokes
about each other.
"All I can say, though, about the English -- they take a hell of a long time to get things done," said Mr.
Sutherland of Mr. Waite's attempts to free him. "He came to get me out of there about five years ago and
it has taken him five years to get me out."
Photo: Terry Waite, left, and Thomas Sutherland, right, at a news conference yesterday in Damascus,
Syria, after theywere freed in Lebanon. With them was Josef Shakkour, Syrian Assistant Foreign
Minister. (Associated Press) (pg. Al) Photos of Terry A Anderson, Joseph James Cipippio, Alann Steen
and Mohammed Ali Hamadi (pg . .Al.6) Charts: "The Pieces of the Puzzle" Westerners Missing in Lebanon
Americans Terry A Anderson: The chief Middle East correspondent of The Associated Press, 44, has been
missing since March 16, 1985. He is being held byislamic HolyWar. Joseph James Cicippio: The acting
controller of the American University of Beirut, 61, has been missing since Sept. 12, 1986. He is held by the
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Revolutionary Justice Organization. Alann Steen: Ajournalism instructor at Beirut University College, 52,
bas been missing since Jan. 24, 1987. He is held by Islamic Holy War for the LI.beration of Palestine.
Other Alberto Molinari: The 72-year-old ltalian businessman, who lived in Beirut, has been missing since
Sept. 11, 1985. His captors are unknown. Sorne Lebanese security officiais have said that he is dead.
Heinrich Strubig and Thomas Kemptner: The two German relief workers, 50 years old and 30, have been
mis&ng since May 16, 1989. Their captors are unknown. Arab Prisoners Held in Southern Lebanon About
300 Arabs are held either by Israel or its client militia in southern Lebanon, the South Lebanon Army.
Most are Lebanese, but some are Palestinians. Most of these people are labeled terrorist by Israel. But
some are clearly being held, or were kidnapped, as potential bargaining chips. Key among them is Sheik
Abdel Karim Obeid, a Shüte clergyman and a leader of the pro-lranian Party of God whom. lsraeli
commandos kidnapped in 1989 from his home in southern Lebanon. Shiite groups say that the Israelis
must release Sheik Obeid if there is to be any progress in the comprehensive hostage negotiations. The
Israelis he will be the last to go free. Since early August, 66 prisoners have been released. Held in
Germany Two Shiite Muslim brothers, Mohammed Ali Hamadi and Abbas Hamadi, are imprisoned in
Germany for hijacking, kidnapping and murder. Hostage holders in Lebanon have occasionally warned
that freedom for the two German hostages hinges on the Hamadi brothers going free. Bonn says it will
make no deals, but there have been reports quoting unnamed 11pro-Iranian sources" that a swap
agreement has been reached. Missing Israelis in Lebanon Capt. Ron Arad, whose plane was shot down
over Lebanon in 1986, is the only missing serviceman believed to be alive. Three others, First Sgt. Zvi
Feldman, Sgt. Zachary Baumel and Cpl. Yehuda Katz, were in a tank crew battling Syrian forces in the
Bekka Valley of eastern Lebanon early in Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Publicly, Israeli officials
insist in learning what happened to them. Privately, they acknowledge these men are almost certainly
dead. Other Questions When Islamic Holy War released the British journalist John McCarthy in August,
it demanded that ail its "freedom fighters" be freed, in Israel and in Europe. Presumably, this means only
the 300 being held in Southern Lebanon and not every Palestinian held in lsraeli prisons since the start of
the intifada. The same applies for Europe. lt is not known who, other than the Hamadis, m.ight meet this
definition in other countries. Iran's Claims Missing Iranians in Lebanon Four Iranians have been missing
in Lebanon since 1982 after being captured at a checkpoint of the Christian Lebanese Forces. Iran insists
the four are alive, but diplomats in Beirut have been quoted as saying that they are probably long dead. A
leader of the Christian militia, Samir Geagea, bas said that they were killed soon after being stopped, but
he bas not produced their remains. Iranian Assets The Iran-United States Claims Tnbunal in The Hague
was set up under the Algiers accords that resolved the Teheran hostage crisis in 1981. Its purpose is to
settle claims between the two governments and claims of citizens of each country against the other
country's government. Work of the tnbunal continues slowly. The most contentious issue involves claims
filed against Iran by people who have dual citizenship, in both Iran and the United States. Iran maintains
that Iranian citizens should not be allowed to pursue claims against Iran, even though they might also be
United States citizens. Another major category of pending cases involves military equipment sold to Iran
before the fall of the Shah. Iran says it paid for much of this equipment but never received it. (pg. A16)
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Page 1 of 22
Target America
Program #2001
Original Airdate: October 4, 2001
Produced by
Michael Kirk
Martin Smith (U.K.)
Reported by
Jim Gilmore
Peter Taylor
Written by
Michael Kirk and
Peter Taylor
NARRATOR: Once, not so long ago, America faced a war against terrorists.
Pres. JIMMY CARTER: No one should underestimate the resolve of the American
government and the American people in this matter.
IRANIAN MAN: The hostages are here because this is the only thing that we can have
here against America!
NARRATOR: This incident, the taking of hostages at the American embassy in Iran, consumed
a presidency, humiliated the U.S. military and kept the nation hostage for 444 days.
NEWS ANCHOR: -and they were there for Easter. It's day number 155.
NARRATOR: A new president vowed to change all that.
Pres. RONALD REAGAN: And I think the fact that they've been there that long is a
humiliation and a disgrace to this country.
NARRATOR: And for eight years he tried to win a new kind of war.
Annex 57
Annex 57
Page 2 of 22
This is the story of those first engagements, the battles on the ground and inside the halls of
power, where the secretary of state waged bureaucratic war with the secretary of defense, while
their deputies, who would one day ascend to power themselves, learned vivid lessons about what
it would take to win a new kind of war.
BILL MOYERS, Frontline: Good evening. I'm Bill Moyers.
Tonight we continue our series of special FRONTLINE broadcasts conceived and produced
since the tragic events of September 11th. We're trying to think hard about the issues and about
the questions you have: Who and what were the forces that led to this attack? How did we
Americans fail to understand the nature of the threat? And how should we, as a country, respond
to terrorism?
In this report, we begin our exploration of today's events by searching for clues inside yesterday's
headlines.
Pres. RONALD REAGAN: Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international
behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.
NARRATOR: Once, when Americans were first targeted, the most powerful man in the world
reacted with resolve.
Pres. RONALD REAGAN: We must not yield to the terrorists' demands and invite
more terrorism. We cannot reward their grisly deeds. We will not cave in.
NARRATOR: In time, he would be sorely tested.
Pres. RONALD REAGAN: The United States gives terrorists no rewards and no
guarantees. We make no concessions. We make no deals. Nations that harbor terrorists
undermine their own stability and endanger their own people. Terrorists be on notice. We
will fight back against you in Lebanon and elsewhere.
NARRATOR: For the Reagan White House, the war on terrorism began almost right away. The
first enemy was Libya.
ROBERT OAKLEY, Dir. Counterterrorism, St. Dept. '84-'86: We were very, very worried
about Libyan terrorism. We had reports that there were Libyan hit squads loose in the United
States. There were dump trucks parked head-to-toe around the entire State Department and
Capitol Hill and elsewhere to protect against these Libyan terrorist groups that were thought to
be operating in the United States.
NARRATOR: Ronald Reagan had won election at least partly because Jimmy Carter had
looked weak in face of terrorism.
BOB WOODWARD, "The Washington Post": They felt initially you have to be tough, that
Carter was not tough enough. So toughness is the theme. Reagan was, in a sense, the mad
Annex 57
Page 3 of 22
bomber, the guy who was going to make sure that the terrorist threat was met with a very
dramatic military response, if necessary.
NARRATOR: So in response to the perception that Libya was a terrorist threat, the president
kicked their diplomats out the country, closed their embassy.
NEWSCASTER: Libya's top diplomat in Washington, Ali Houderi, was summoned to
the State Department late this afternoon. He was told that all the Libyan diplomats here
would have to leave- expelled.
NARRATOR: And Navy jets shot down two Libyan warplanes inside what was known as the
"line of death" over the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean.
L. PAUL BREMER, Dir. Counterterrorism, St. Dept. '86-'89: I think it made quite a deep
impression on the top people in the Reagan administration, from the president on down, that we
had to deal forcefully with terrorism wherever we saw it. And that was certainly an early theme
in the Reagan administration from, really, January 20th on.
NARRATOR: But it wouldn't be long before the president would be challenged somewhere
else. It all started after Israel invaded Lebanon. Dozens of villages housing Shi'ite Muslims were
destroyed as the Israeli army advanced to Beirut as part of their war against Yasir Arafat's PLO
guerrillas. The United States intervened to avoid a bloodbath.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: The Marines are going there into a situation that- with a
definite understanding as to what we're supposed to do. I believe that we are going to be
successful in seeing the other foreign forces leave Lebanon. And then, at such time that
Lebanon says that they have the situation well in hand, why, we'll depart.
NARRATOR: The Marines went ashore to oversee an orderly withdrawal of the PLO. There
was no intention to stay. The Palestinians turned evacuation into celebration. Mission
accomplished, the Marines left. America had promised the PLO that their families left behind in
Beirut would be safe. But they weren't.
With the Marines gone, Israel's allies, the Christian Falangist forces, entered the camps at Sabra
and Shatila, where the families of the PLO fighters remained. The Christian militia massacred
almost 800 unarmed civilians. For Ronald Reagan, these pictures were enough to cause him
immediately to send the Marines back into Beirut.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: My fellow Americans, the scenes that the whole world
witnessed this past weekend were among the most heart-rending in the long nightmare of
Lebanon's agony. Millions of us have seen pictures of the Palestinian victims of this
tragedy. There's little that words can add, but there are actions we can and must take to
bring that nightmare to an end.
NARRATOR: But within his cabinet, the president's men were at odds about the costs of going
back in.
Annex 57
Page 4 of 22
BOB WOODWARD: The secretary of defense, Weinberger, wanted to solve the problems of
terrorism or diplomacy with negotiation, not with military force. George Schultz, the secretary of
state, wanted to be tough and wanted to use the military. These were such powerful forces in the
Reagan White House and the administration that at times they nullified themselves.
ROBERT C. McFARLANE, National Security Adviser '83-'85: It was a very complicating
element in trying to forge sensible policy because to tackle terrorism, you have to have an
integrated approach involving diplomacy to build coalitions, but underwritten by the ability and
the means and the will to use force when necessary.
NARRATOR: The president took a middle course. A small contingent of Marines would show
the flag and separate the warring parties. The secretary of defense had lost the argument in
Washington.
CASPAR WEINBERGER, Secretary of Defense '81-'87: It's always been a source of
unhappiness to me that I wasn't persuasive enough not to put in American forces, particularly not
to put them into the Beirut Airport. So you have a force that was almost a sitting duck in one of
the most dangerous spots in the Mideast, and therefore one of the most dangerous spots in the
world, unable to protect itself, and it was a disaster waiting to happen.
NARRATOR: Now the United States was thrust into a bloody mosaic of religious factions and
feuds. Fired by the revolution in Iran, Hezbollah - "The Party of God" - rapidly emerged as an
increasingly formidable force for no less reason than that their warriors believed suicide was a
glorious end.
SHEIKH FADLALLAH, Hezbollah Spiritual Leader: [through interpreter]
[1993 interview] Martyrdom in Islamic and Christian history, and the history of all nations,
stems from the fact that man is prepared to sacrifice his own life for important causes. When
someone is a believer, he believes that he sacrifices his own life for the cause of God and that he
will be rewarded and granted a distinguished status by Allah.
NARRATOR: Hezbollah first struck when a pick-up truck loaded with explosives was driven
into the United States embassy in west Beruit. Sixty-three died in the blast. Seventeen of the
dead were Americans. Eight of them were agents of the CIA.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: As you know, our embassy in Beruit was the target this
morning of a vicious terrorist bombing. This cowardly act has claimed a number of dead
and wounded. This criminal attack on a diplomatic establishment will not deter us from
our goals of peace in the region. We will do what we know to be right.
ROBERT DILLON, Ambassador to Lebanon '81-'83: [1993 interview] The last person taken
out alive was taken out five hours after the explosion, I remember very well now the name, Mr.
Coffey. He looked like a piece of hamburger. I never thought he would live. He did, was killed
later in another terrorist attack. After five hours, it was bodies. At the end of five days, when we
stopped- we stopped searching. It was scraps of flesh. We were identifying people occasionally
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through- I remember we got some fused toes, and we knew who that belonged to, and found a
boot, and knew who the boot belonged to.
NARRATOR: The president and the country were devastated. Ronald Reagan visibly bore the
families' grief. Bewilderment and frustration were mixed with the pain. The nation had suffered
at the hands of an enemy it did not know and could not see. A deeply emotional and religious
man, the president was profoundly affected. His sorrow and anger would influence his political
judgment as the tragedy unfolded. The man who challenged the Soviet Union in the cold war
would be humiliated in Lebanon by a handful of fanatics driving trucks.
Now the president would listen to those inside his government who wanted to strike back.
GEORGE SHULTZ, Secretary of State, '82-'89: [1993 interview] I tried to carry the banner of
a much more forceful policy against terrorists. And I said we have to learn how to defend
ourselves better. We have to improve our intelligence capability dramatically. We have to be
willing to take offensive action against a threat, when we find out about it, so we preempt it. And
we have to be willing to retaliate not simply as an act of vengeance, but as an act of raising the
cost of doing these things.
NARRATOR: But the president was told by others he could do nothing.
BOB WOODWARD: The tough guys in the White House would not retaliate because the
evidence was not such that you could go on television and prove it or go to a courtroom and
prove it.
NARRATOR: The White House needed better intelligence from Lebanon, but after the embassy
bombing, there wasn't any.
Lt. Col. BILL COWAN, Pentagon Intelligence Support '83-'94: The CIA station chief and a
number of people that worked for him were killed when that happened. And so for the most part,
the CIA operations in Beirut were essentially terminated, at that point, when that station went
down.
NARRATOR: A secret team entered Beirut to find out what was happening on the ground.
Lt. Col. BILL COWAN: I was a member of this team, whose purpose was to go out and
prepare for retaliation against those who had done this to us.
NARRATOR: But the first thing the defense intelligence team saw was how completely
exposed the U.S. Marines were at the Beirut airport. They immediately sent a report to
Washington.
Lt. Col. BILL COWAN: We said in that report that it could be assumed that there would be
some kind of incident against the Marines because we had just had one against the embassy, so it
kind of makes sense that the military was at risk.
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NARRATOR: And indeed they were. As a symbol of America's resolve, but not a properly
equipped or fortified force, the Marines themselves began to take casualties as the fighting
intensified and they became targets.
1st MARINE: We're definitely taking casualties. We are caught up in this. You know,
we're not separate. We're engaged, and we are engaging other targets. That's a war, in my
opinion. That's definitely- that's combat.
2nd MARINE: [singing] It's a zippity-doo-da day. I'm the happiest Marine in the whole
U.S.A. Bullshit!
NARRATOR: And then, on October 23rd, 1983, the Americans were again the target of a
suicide bomber.
Cmdr. GEORGE PUCCIARELLI, U.S. Navy Chaplain: [1993 interview] Nothing was
moving, just absolute silence, no gunfire, no yelling, nothing. That whole four-story structure
had blown up and collapsed into one mass of rubble. It's beyond words. Beyond words. It was
seeing something move that took me out of my trance, and then I recognized, oh, yes, Marines
were in that building, a lot of Marines were in that building. And that's when I ran down. And
there was a black Marine. He looked white. The dust had just covered him.
NARRATOR: On this quiet Sunday morning, one man had driven a truck full of explosives into
the Marines' headquarters. It was the Marines' biggest loss of life in a single day since Iwo Jima
in World War II, 241 Marines.
Cmdr. GEORGE PUCCIARELLI: I knew their wives and their children and their dreams and
their visions and their youthfulness- people getting married, people with new babies, never to see
their young children again or their newborn babe. It was a traumatic event. And for about five
days and five nights after that, we just continued to jackhammer, continued to break away the
pieces of the floor, the floors of those buildings, extracting our people. And every time a body
would come out, the Marines would yell for their chaplain to bless the body before they put it in
a green bag.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: There are no words that can express our sorrow and grief over
the loss of those splendid young men and the injury to so many others. These deeds make
so evident the bestial nature of those who would assume power, if they could have their
way, and drive us out of that area.
NARRATOR: The Hezbollah leadership denied the label of terrorist.
HUSSEIN MUSAWI, Islamic Amal Leader: [1993 interview] [through interpreter] We defend
righteousness. We defend our freedoms. Don't you see that our land is occupied in the south and
the western Bekaa and Palestine? Can't you see that the Jews are committing acts of aggression
against our people and killing them? Our holy places, especially Jerusalem, are occupied by the
Israelis, who are supported by the Americans and Europeans. We are oppressed people. We are
not terrorists.
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Vice Pres. GEORGE H.W. BUSH: We're not going to let a bunch of insidious
terrorists, cowards, shake the foreign policy of the United States. And it damn sure hasn't
shaken the courage of these men, and that comes through loud and clear.
ROBERT C. McFARLANE: The president assembled his NSC. He got the best information we
could, tasked the Pentagon to plan an attack on the terrorists in the Bekaa Valley. And with high
confidence in their location and so forth, and the ability to avoid civilian causalities, he directed
an attack.
NARRATOR: The principal target was in the Bekaa Valley, 50 miles from Beirut. Here, in the
town of Baalbek, stands the Sheik Abdullah barracks. Within its walls was stationed a contingent
of Iranian Revolutionary Guards. They trained and guided Hezbollah and its allies.
HUSSAIN MUSAWE: [1993 interview] [through translator] Of course, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards help us and train us, but they are not involved in the fighting. There's no
need for the Iranians to get personally involved. It is enough for them to help with training, as the
Lebanese fighters can fulfill their mission. Iran also provides us with the financial assistance
which enables us to buy weapons to fight the enemies occupying our land.
NARRATOR: A U.S. naval aircraft carrier was offshore, waiting to launch its planes against the
barracks.
ROBERT C. McFARLANE: The attack was to occur the following morning. And
unfortunately, Secretary Weinberger aborted it.
BOB WOODWARD: There were a lot of cautious and reluctant warriors in the Pentagon, the
professional military still feeling the over-hang of Vietnam and saying, "What's the mission?
How are we going to accomplish this? Do we have a clear objective?" Just going and bombing
was not the sort of mission that they wanted.
NARRATOR: Lieutenant General Colin Powell was Secretary Weinberger's chief military aide.
BOB WOODWARD: He's watching Weinberger resist schemes coming out of the White House
or somebody saying, "Oh, go bomb," or "Go do this." And Powell is a soldier and says, "Well,
what's the objective? And how can I protect my men? How can I minimize casualties?" He's
looking for a way to make sure that we don't have more Vietnams.
ROBERT C. McFARLANE: If you have the means and the good intelligence and an accurate
location, to go back and destroy a center of terrorism, which we knew this to be, was the right
thing to do, and we should have done it. Not to do it showed a division in our government, a lack
of resolve and a paralysis.
NARRATOR: The president ordered the battleship New Jersey to shell the hills above Beirut
from the safety of the sea.
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HISHAM MELHAM, Lebanese Journalist: Ironically, it was perceived as an impotent
gesture. It's an act of absolute impotence. The New Jersey did not scare anybody. It did not scare
those people in the mountains. And that is ironic. And that's why it didn't work out.
NARRATOR: And then the president ordered the Marines to withdraw. Just four months after
the barracks bombing, the last of the Marines left.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: We are redeploying because once the terrorist attack started,
there was no way that we could really contribute to the original mission by staying there
as a target, just hunkering down and waiting for further attacks.
ROBERT C. McFARLANE: It was seen to be a defeat. There's no other way to read it. We had
been bombed, and five months later we pulled out.
ROBERT OAKLEY, Dir. Counterterrorism, St. Dept. '84-'86: The terrorists learned a few
casualties can cause us to retreat into our own shell, to give up whatever objective we were
seeking, to abandon those with whom we've been working.
Lt. Col. BILL COWAN, Pentagon Intelligence Support '83-'94: I believe, had we used
military force at that point, that we would have sent a message that would still be out there today,
that when somebody strikes at all -particularly when you kill 241 servicemen - you would think,
the American public should think, that we're going to do something about it. To not do anything
at all I believe sent a clear message.
NARRATOR: At home, the lessons of Lebanon were painful. The nation's reputation had been
tarnished. The cost in lives had been steep. The men in power had hardened their positions and
paralyzed the military. They all hoped America wouldn't be a target of terror again. And then it
was.
Suicide bombers struck the U.S. embassy in east Beirut, 24 more victims. And this time, even
though satellite photos showed who did the bombings, the United States did nothing.
GEORGE SHULTZ, Secretary of State, '82-'89: [1993 interview] We were too paralyzed
somehow by self-doubt and by questions about who all was there, were our hostages there, were
we sure, and so on. I was- it was very frustrating for me.
BOB WOODWARD: Diplomacy, his portfolio- it failed. And he was the tough guy. He's a
former Marine. Weinberger's sitting over there saying again, "What's the objectives? Who do we
hit? Give us a very clear mission." And so there's this kind of- they have an ability to neutralize
each other. And that's where the CIA fills the vacuum and comes up with some of the covert
plans.
NARRATOR: So now, to try to solve the terror problem, it was the Central Intelligence
Agency's turn.
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L. PAUL BREMER, Dir. Counterterrorism, St. Dept. '86-'89: If you look back today over
the last 25 years, it is a fact that we have had a progressive degeneration of our intelligence
community, in general, and in particular, in the field of human intelligence. It began with highly
politicized attacks by Congress on the CIA in the mid-1970s. It was followed by a disastrous
pruning of the operatives, action operatives, in the CIA in the late 1970s. But this is a long-term
degeneration of our ability to get human intelligence. And in the target of terrorism, human
intelligence is really the only good tool you've got, in terms of finding out what's going on.
NARRATOR: So William Casey, the director of the CIA, improvised.
BOB WOODWARD: Casey had lunch with Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United
States, one of the most powerful figures even today in Washington. And they went for a stroll in
the garden and they said, "We have to go off the books." And they agreed that the Saudis would
put up the money to hire some professionals to go and try to car-bomb Sheik Fadlallah.
And it was so off the books, there's no evidence that Reagan knew about it or Weinberger or
Schultz. It was Casey on his own, saying, "I'm going to solve the big problem by essentially
getting tougher or as tough as the terrorists in using their weapon, the car bomb."
[www.pbs.org: Read the full interview]
NARRATOR: The new U.S.-and-Saudi-backed Lebanese counterterrorist group set up a car
bombing near a Beirut mosque.
JIM HOUGAN, Author/Journalist: The bombing took place in a public square, when the
mosque let out and when it was thought that Fahdlallah would be coming through. In effect, you
had hundreds of people who were leaving the Muslim equivalent of church. More than 80 people
were killed. The remark at the time was that we- everyone was certain it was a CIA operation
because everybody got killed except the target.
NARRATOR: Eighty killed, more than two hundred wounded. Sheik Fadlallah survived. He'd
left the mosque late.
SHEIKH FADLALLAH, Hezbollah Spiritual Leader: [1993 interview] [through interpreter] I
was able, as a result of the bomb, to distinguish the ugliness of American terrorism. I realized
that America, which boasts about combating terrorism in the world, is in fact carrying out
terrorist acts through its intelligence services in the ugliest of ways.
JIM HOUGAN: I think that the bombing in Beralabid put a halt to covert operations. America
doesn't deal very well with failures. I think that, at that point, the American intelligence
community really was in a kind of despair, the feeling that they couldn't do anything right. And I
think that they just backed off.
[Cockpit communication with airport control tower Beirut]
Capt. JOHN TESTRAKE, TWA 847 Captain: He has pulled a hand
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grenade pin, and he is ready to blow up the aircraft, if he has to. We must - I repeat, we
must! - land at Beirut. We must-
NARRATOR: But now the pace of terror against Americans was quickening.
[www.pbs.org: Study a timeline of terrorist attacks]
GROUND: I can't give you permission because my responsible didn't give me
permission for you to land. They said the airport is closed.
NARRATOR: TWA flight 847 was hijacked.
Capt. JOHN TESTRAKE: We understand. But we must land at Beirut. The hijacker is
insisting. Thank you.
[1993 interview] -with that gunman standing directly behind me in the cockpit, holding that
cocked pistol to the back of my head, while in his other hand he had a live grenade. And he
pulled the pin on it, and he was just holding it from exploding with his fingers. And he held that
right there, directly in front of my face. I mean, it was touching my face with it.
ROBERT OAKLEY: The hijacking, which was televised live, had a very profound effect upon
the United States because it was in our homes, much as the bin Laden attack on the Trade
Towers and the Pentagon.
NARRATOR: There were over 150 passengers on board, most of them Americans, 6 from the
U.S. Navy.
Capt. JOHN TESTRAKE: [1993 interview] The thought came to me that the way things were
going, within the next five minutes we'd probably all be dead. And I think it was an accurate
assessment of the thing. It was just a violent thing that was escalating out of everybody's control.
[Cockpit communication with airport control tower Beirut]
They are beating the passengers. They are beating the passengers. They are threatening to
kill them now. They are threatening to kill them now. We want the fuel now!
Immediately!
GROUND: Please, sir. Please. We're doing our best.
Capt. JOHN TESTRAKE: Now, he's going to to kill passengers! They will open the
door and throw the killed passengers out onto the ramp. Immediately!
NARRATOR: For 17 days, it was primetime terror on international television.
NEWSCASTER: As the aircraft was refueled with its maximum load to give it four-anda-
half hours flying time, the hijackers were announcing their demands- mainly, the
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release of Arab prisoners held in Israel and the release of 17 fellow Shi'ite Muslims held
in Kuwait after an attack on the U.S. embassy there. Then they released 17 American
women and 2 children, apparently chosen at random. They were bundled off the aircraft,
down the emergency chutes, most of them leaving relatives behind on board.
NARRATOR: As the drama was played out in the shimmering heat, the White House was
paralyzed.
1st REPORTER: Are you doing anything to recover the hijacked TWA airplane?
Pres. RONALD Reagan: Everything that can be done.
1st REPORTER: Is there anything that you can do?
2nd REPORTER: How can you let them get away with that?
1st REPORTER: Is there anything? Is there anything you can do, sir?
NARRATOR: Again extremists had cornered the president of the United States. Meanwhile, on
the plane, the hijackers mercilessly assaulted a young Navy diver, Robert Stethem.
Capt. JOHN TESTRAKE: [1993 interview] By this time, they had tied young Stethem back up
en route, had beat him some more. He was unconscious. We were on the ground now. They
opened the door, pulled him to his feet, shot him and dumped his body out onto the taxiway
below. It was just such a tragic, tragic waste. And yet it was done.
Pres. RONALD REAGAN: We consider these murders, hijackings and abductions an
attack on all Western civilization by uncivilized barbarians. We will continue to act with
appropriate restraint. But let no one doubt our resolve.
NARRATOR: But the hijackers were winning and invited the world's networks to witness their
triumph.
NEWSCASTER: A small group of journalists were sent for. They were covered by two
gunmen from the aircraft. Another gunman in the cockpit made his presence felt and,
throughout the brief chat that followed, kept the gun to Captain Testrake's head.
REPORTER: Captain, many people in America are calling for some kind of rescue
operation or some kind of retaliation. Do you have any thoughts on that?
Capt. JOHN TESTRAKE: I think we'd all be dead men if they did because we're
continually surrounded by many, many guards.
REPORTER: Do you have any thoughts on whether or not the United States should ask
Israel to release the people it's holding in Israel?
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Capt. JOHN TESTRAKE: No I - I don't have a comment.
NARRATOR: The hijackers demanded the release of the 700 Shi'ite prisoners held in Israel.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: At what point can you pay off the terrorists without
endangering people from here on out, once they find out that their tactics succeed?
NARRATOR: But it seems now the hijackers knew the president was about to give in, and their
supporters gathered in the thousands at Beirut airport to bask in the glory of victory over the
United States.
ROBERT OAKLEY: The resolution of the TWA 847 hijacking is interesting because there was
an implicit but never explicit quid pro quo. So we can say there wasn't really a deal.
NARRATOR: Days after the hostages were freed from TWA flight 847, Israel began releasing
prisoners.
ROBERT OAKLEY: And it's fair enough. It depends which way you want to look at it. But it
was an implicit arrangement between the United States and Israel, with the hijackers and those
who were behind them, that Israel would resume the release of the prisoners they had been
releasing in South Lebanon.
NARRATOR: The deal opened a new phase in the war, negotiating with the enemy. A year
earlier, Muslim extremists had begun a campaign of kidnapping Americans. One of them was the
new chief of the Beirut CIA station, William Buckley.
WILLIAM BUCKLEY: [hostage video] I am well, and my friends, Benjamin Weir and
Jeremy Levine, are also well.
Lt. Col. BILL COWAN: Clearly, it was a coup to grab a CIA station chief and be able to keep
him. He died under horrible, horrible conditions, which he certainly didn't deserve. But when
you can take a CIA station chief, you're making a very substantial impact on the ability of our
government to operate.
NARRATOR: Eventually, 30 Westerners would be taken hostage.
ROBERT OAKLEY: And the people they kidnapped and held hostage were those best
guaranteed to touch the nerve of the American public, who demanded that they be released:
priests, Catholic priest, a Protestant pastor, a journalist, a professor.
BOB WOODWARD: As you look at the Reagan administration's dealing with terrorism, there's
one theme that jumps right out, and that is the President's concern and obsession and focus
guides everyone. And the secretary of state and the CIA director and the defense secretary and
the political people in the White House are sitting around the table, and you have a president like
Reagan obsessed with hostages, people will come up with schemes and ideas that in more
rational moments they would never even consider.
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NARRATOR: This was the idea. The most important player in the terrorist world, Iran, was
desperately running out of military supplies in its war with Iraq. The president was told a bargain
could be struck: Arms to Iran, hostages back to America. Reagan's men cut a deal. The secretary
of defense says he was appalled.
CASPAR WEINBERGER: Here we were, begging the world to stop sending any arms to Iran,
and there was this horrible proposal that we try to buy the friendship of these fanatics by giving
them arms and violating all of the things we were doing in trying to persuade the rest of the
world that they shouldn't sell them arms.
ROBERT OAKLEY: It completely undercut our policy. Our policy was make no deals with
terrorists, provide no arms to Iran, which is a country seen as sponsoring terrorists. And after a
while, it became visible to the entire world that we were doing both, making deals with the
Iranians by providing them with arms in exchange for the release of hostages. So it badly
damaged our policy.
NARRATOR: At first the president denied it, then he had to admit it. An independent counsel
began an investigation. And then the president faced the American people.
Pres. RONALD REAGAN: For 18 months now, we have had underway a secret
diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of
reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the
bloody six-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and
subversion and to effect the safe return of all hostages.
BOB WOODWARD: This was a real earthquake to the Reagan administration, and Reagan had
to turn to new people. He brought in Howard Baker as his chief of staff and let Shultz gain
control of the anti-terrorist policy.
Pres. RONALD REAGAN: We did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages.
VINCENT CANNISTRARO, Dir. NSC Intelligence '84-'87: I think at that point, the hardliners
won out in the debate, that we are to use strong, maybe overwhelming U.S. military force
against a state sponsor of terrorism, and one who is not very popular in the world.
NARRATOR: The White House settled on Muammar Qaddafi, the president of Libya, whose
terrorist activities, they believed, including the hijacking of an Italian luxury liner, the Achille
Lauro.
VINCENT CANNISTRARO: Quaddafi was not a popular figure anyplace, and he did strange
things, and he stood up to the Americans sometimes foolishly. So there was no question that
Quaddafi in some ways was a symbol of the frustration of the United States, but he was an easier
symbol to deal with then, say, Hezbollah and Iran.
ROBERT OAKLEY: And so we sailed a carrier task force into the Bay of Sidra to put the
pressure on the Libyans. The Libyans responded by conducting some attempted attacks by
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aircraft and by small boats, which were destroyed quickly. At that point, Quaddafi lost his cool
and decided to escalate, and we intercepted communications between Tripoli and 12 Libyan
People's Bureaus - what they call their embassies abroad - to "Go get the Americans."
NARRATOR: They "got the Americans" at the La Belle disco in West Berlin. An American
soldier died in the explosion.
BOB WOODWARD: I actually had in one of my books the language of the intercepts. And
when you lay it out, it's clear that they promoted this bombing, knew it was going to occur, and
then got a thumbs-up report back right after the discotheque had been bombed. So it was real
easy to look at that and say, "We know the Libyans are behind it. We're going to bomb their
intelligence agency, and we're going to bomb Qaddafi."
NARRATOR: Finally, the hardliners in the administration would get to do what they wanted,
send fighter planes into enemy territory.
Capt. ROBERT STUMPF, U.S. Navy Fighter Pilot: So we were really pumped, and we
started getting everything ready, putting the plans together. The Air Force took Tripoli, and we
took Bengazi. The captain just lit the burners and we- the ship just took off down through the
Straits of Messina. We had the entire battle group going through there at flank speed at sunset.
Oh, it was really cool.
And then we launched everybody on the flight deck. And I was actually the last guy off, and I
was- and I was just screaming in the cockpit, just out of frustration. I was afraid I was going to
miss it.
CASPAR WEINBERGER: We put a 200-plane raid in the air and destroyed many Libyan
targets connected with this terrorist act and drove Quaddafi underground, so that nothing was
heard from him effectively for two or three years.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: The United States won but a single engagement in the long
battle against terrorism. We will not end that struggle until the free and decent people of
this planet unite to eradicate the scourge of terror from the modern world.
NEWSCASTER: If the Americans were directly trying to wipe out Colonel Quaddafi's
home, they couldn't have got much closer. The area is badly damaged by blast, but the
house itself was not destroyed, the bombs missing by a whisker.
Lt. Col. BILL COWAN, Pentagon Intelligence Support '83-'94: Quaddafi really didn't do
anything against us after that. I think he was kind of surprised that we had done it. He probably
had a close call with death. Whether the bomb came within 500 meters or 50 miles, he realized
that we were serious about maybe doing something to him.
NEWSCASTER: Perhaps the most dramatic scene was Colonel Qaddafi's sagging
Bedouin tent less from 40 yards from where other bombs had fallen.
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Lt. Col. BILL COWAN: So that was our only real attempt to strike back at people. Qaddafi's a
little bit different situation than when you're dealing with Hezbollah or you're dealing with the
Iranians. But nonetheless, it had- it obviously had an impact. It had an effect.
NARRATOR: In the next two years, there would be fewer terrorist incidents. Then four days
before Christmas, 1988, Pan American flight 103 from London to New York explodes over
Lockerbie, Scotland. All 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground are killed.
There were many theories about who was responsible. Was it payback from Libya? Was it the
Hezbollah? Was this a group with connections to Syria or agents from Iran? No one took credit
for planting the bomb.
Pres. RONALD Reagan: Now that we know definitely that it was a bomb, we're going
to make every effort we can to find out who was guilty of this savage and tragic thing and
bring them to justice.
NARRATOR: In the very last days of his presidency, Ronald Reagan seemed to make a policy
shift in the war against terrorism. Through the next two administrations, the emphasis would be
to bring terrorists to justice.
Pres. GEORGE H. W. BUSH: [December 29, 1988] We've got to seek hard and punish
firmly, decisively, those who did this- if you can ever find them.
NARRATOR: It would take them 10 years to bring two Libyan intelligence operatives to trial.
VINCENT CANNISTRARO: Over the last three administrations, they've have had a law
enforcement response to the problems of terrorism. We're going to catch the perpetrators and
arrest them, which doesn't do very much to deter future acts of terrorism. We have basically
arrested all the perpetrators in the bombings of our embassies in east Africa in 1998. But these
are secondary parts. They're replaceable tools. The leadership, the sponsorship, is beyond law
enforcement. That's the problem with the law enforcement response. It isn't sufficient.
NARRATOR: Everything would change after September 11th, 2001. At the White House, as
they struggled to figure out their response, some of the men must have thought about lessons
from that earlier war on terror. Vice President Cheney; at Defense, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz,
whose former boss, George Shultz, had argued for military force; Colin Powell, the aide to
Secretary Weinberger, who always advocated caution. This time seems different.
CASPAR WEINBERGER: Of course, there's the horror of it. The magnitude of that was such
that there's really nothing to compare it to. People keep talking about having a measured
response, which I think is one of the stupidest comments I've ever heard because this was an
immeasurable act. You can't- there's no measured response except complete destruction of the
people who did it.
NARRATOR: Lieutenant Colonel Cowan, a former intelligence officer, has his own cautions.
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Page 16 of 22
Lt. Col. BILL COWAN: I believe any time that you conduct an operation that causes civilian
casualties, you lessen your ability to effectively work in and among those people you're trying to
target. You know, our only success in dealing with terrorists - whether they be in Lebanon or
wherever throughout the world - is our ability to find Muslims who will support us, who will do
things for us, who are willing to go into some of these areas and acquire intelligence for us. And
when we, intentionally or otherwise, kill civilians, create collateral damage, we're less likely to
find people who will do things for us.
NARRATOR: Former national security adviser McFarlane reflects on what the enemy learned
about us.
ROBERT C. McFARLANE: Well, they learned that the American people can be traumatized
by terrorism, that it can create pressure on the government, that we were not in the 1980s wellequipped,
in terms of power or political understanding, to deal with it. And so they'll continue to
use it, and they've expanded their networks and their capabilities.
NARRATOR: Ambassador Bremer, the former State Department terrorism expert.
L. PAUL BREMER: We had Quaddafi as the number-one enemy from the late '70s to the mid-
'80s. Then we had Abu Nidal, who appeared on the scene, and he was the number-one enemy
from the mid-'80s till the early '90s. Now we have bin Laden. And the implication of that is, if
you can deal with this one guy, the threat will go away. The threat doesn't go away, it evolves.
NARRATOR: And another of George Shultz's deputies, Robert Oakley.
ROBERT OAKLEY: I think the lessons that we learned then are applicable now: building
coalitions, picking your target carefully, being able to justify your target, making sure that you
have a successful operation when you undertake it, calculating the political downside as well as
the military effects. All those things were thought about at the time.
In some cases, we had the right results, in some cases we failed, and we're going through the
same process again. And I think that we have to continue to do it, but we have to understand that
we're not going to stop all terrorism for all time. That's the one thing that stands out.
[www.pbs.org: More on the lessons of the '80s]
NARRATOR: And the reporter who talked to them about what happened once, not long ago.
BOB WOODWARD: These terrorist incidents- they used the tools that were available, but it
was never in a coherent way. I know from talking to those people at the time, it was always, "Oh,
we've got this crisis. We're dealing with the Achille Lauro now," or "We're dealing with
Quaddafi," or "We're dealing with Libyan hit squads," or "We're dealing with Beirut." And it
never- they never got in a position where they said, "You know, this is a real serious threat," not
just episodically, but it's going to be a threat to this country throughout the administration, future
administrations.
Annex 57
Page 17 of 22
We need to organize to fight it. It can't be a back-bench operation for the FBI and the CIA. It's
got to be somebody's issue, so it's on their desk every day. What do we know? What's being
planned? What are the threats out there?
MOYERS: If tonight’s broadcast reminds us how soon we can forget the events and the lessons
of the recent past, in the coming weeks, we’ll be asking questions about what we’re learning
from the present crisis. I hope you’ll join us.
For Frontline, I’m Bill Moyers. Goodnight.
Target America
WRITTEN BY
Michael Kirk and
Peter Taylor (BBC)
PRODUCED BY
Michael Kirk
Martin Smith (BBC)
REPORTED BY
Jim Gilmore
Peter Taylor (BBC)
EDITOR
Steve Audette
ASSOCIATE PRODUCER (BBC)
Neil Grant
FILM EDITOR (BBC)
Shelagh Brady
PRODUCTION ASSISTANTS
Corey Ford
Ann Holland (BBC)
FILM RECORDIST (BBC)
Robin Swain
Annex 57
Page 18 of 22
CAMERA
Rob Rainey
Patrick O¡Shea (BBC)
SOUND
Don Hooper
ONLINE EDITOR
Michael H. Amundson
SOUND MIX
David Old (BBC)
Jim Sullivan
FILM RESEARCH (BBC)
Allison McAllan
RESEARCH (BBC)
Jeff Goldberg
Jim Muir
UNIT MANAGER (BBC)
Bhupinder Kholi
GRAPHIC DESIGN (BBC)
Simon Martin
ADDITIONAL SOUND
John Jenkins
ARCHIVAL MATERIALS
ABC News Video Source
AP/Wide World Photos
Corbis-Sygma
BBC News
CBS News
Lebanese TV
NBS News
Reuters TV
Sherman Grinberg
Executive Producer, BBC
Steve Hewlett
Copyright 2001 BBC
Annex 57
Page 19 of 22
FOR WNET
PRODUCER/DIRECTOR
Wayne Palmer
CAMERA
Mark Niedelson
SOUND
Paul Glaser
LIGHTING
Bob Culley
PROMPTER OPERATOR
Charles Comey
MAKE-UP
Darianne Bramberg
FOR FRONTLINE
PRODUCTION MANAGER
Tim Mangini
ON-AIR PROMOTION
PRODUCER
M.G. Rabinow
SENIOR EDITOR
Steve Audette
AVID EDITORS
Michael H. Amundson
John MacGibbon
POST PRODUCTION
COORDINATOR
Patricia Giles
POST PRODUCTION
ASSISTANT
David McMahon
Kate Guiney
Annex 57
Page 20 of 22
SERIES MUSIC
Mason Daring
Martin Brody
CLOSED CAPTIONING
The Caption Center
COMMUNICATIONS
MANAGER
Erin Martin Kane
SENIOR PUBLICIST
Christopher Kelly
PUBLICIST
Jessica Smith
PROMOTION ASSISTANT
Jenna Lowe
SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATE
Lee Ann Donner
SECRETARY
Mary Sullivan
COMPLIANCE MANAGER
Lisa Palone-Clarke
PARALEGAL
Adrienne Armor
UNIT MANAGER
Douglas D. Milton
BUSINESS MANAGER
Tobee Phipps
WEBSITE PRODUCTION
ASSISTANT
Todd Goldstein
WEBSITE ASSOCIATE
PRODUCERS
Sarah Moughty
Kimberly Tabor
Annex 57
Page 21 of 22
WEBSITE COORDINATING
PRODUCER
Stephanie Ault
WEBSITE PRODUCER/
DESIGNER
Sam Bailey
WEBSITE EDITORIAL DIRECTOR
Wen Stephenson
EDITORIAL RESEARCHER
Catherine Wright
COORDINATING PRODUCER
Robin Parmelee
SENIOR PRODUCER
SPECIAL PROJECTS
Sharon Tiller
STORY EDITOR
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EDITORIAL DIRECTOR
Marrie Campbell
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Jim Bracciale
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Louis Wiley Jr.
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER
David Fanning
A FRONTLINE coproduction with
The Kirk Documentary Group, Ltd.
© 2001
WGBH EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Annex 57
Page 22 of 22
FRONTLINE is a production of WGBH Boston, which is solely responsible for its content.
ANNOUNCER: Next time on FRONTLINE: There are so many questions. Why did the CIA
and FBI fail to find the hijackers and stop this attack? Did America's role in the world fuel this
hatred and cause this terror?
MAN: America, it is an empire that will do anything to oppress people outside the United States
borders.
ANNOUNCER: Looking for Answers next time on FRONTLINE.
There's more of this FRONTLINE report at our companion Web site: an overview of the rise of
militant Islamic movements around the world from the 1960s to now; a chronology of terrorist
attacks against Americans in the past two decades and how the U.S. responded; FRONTLINE's
extended interviews with White House advisers, policy-makers and national security experts;
readings and links on Islamic militancy and the terrorism threat in the post-cold war era and
more. Then join the discussion at pbs.org or write us an email at [email protected] or write to
this address. [DEAR FRONTLINE, 125 Western Ave., Boston, MA 02134]
For a videocassette copy of Target America, call PBS Home Video at 1-800-PLAY-PBS.
[$19.98 plus S&H]
National corporate funding for FRONTLINE is provided by Earthlink and by NPR.
In Denver, Skopje, in Teheran, Omaha, in Istanbul, in Hong Kong, Belgrade, in Decatur, in
Seattle, Beijing, in Pittsburgh, in Johannesburg. This is NPR News.
FRONTLINE is made possible by contributions to your PBS station from viewers like you.
Thank you.
Annex 57
Annex 58
Annex 58
4/10/2017 Chronology of Events in Hijacking of KuwaitAirways Flight422 With AM-Hijack Bjt
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN HIJACKING
OF KUWAIT AIRWAYS FLIGHT 422 WITH
AM-HIJACK BJT
The Associated Press, Associated Press
Apr. 12, 1988 10:52 PM ET
UNDATED Undated (AP) _ Here is a chronology of events in the hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight
422:
April 5 -The Boeing 747 with 112 people aboard, including three members of the Kuwaiti royal
family, is hijacked on a flight to Kuwait from Bangkok and diverted to Mashhad in northeastem Iran.
The Arab hijackers demand freedom for 17 pro-Iranian extremists jailed in Kuwait for their
convictions in the bombings of the U.S. and French embassies there in 1983. They threaten to blow up
the plane if the demand is not met. Kuwait refuses. One passenger with heart condition is released.
Kuwait asks Iran not to allow the plane to take off.
April 6 - Kuwait sends a team to Iran to negotiate with the hijackers but vows not to yield to their
demands. The hijackers release 24 women and call a doctor on board to treat passengers they describe
as "unwell."
April 7 - The hijackers release 32 more hostages. The plane is refueled after hijackers shoot at airport
security and threaten to force the plane to take off with fuel tanks near empty.
April 8 - The plane leaves Mashhad but is refused permission to land in Beirut and Damascus. After
seven hours in the air, the plane lands at Larnaca, Cyprus.
April 9 - The hijackers kill a Kuwaiti security guard on the plane after their demands for fuel are not
met. The pilot says captives are being beaten. Another captive is freed after a PLO official and two
Cypriot officials go to the plane and talk with the hijackers.
April 10 - Negotiations with PLO officiais continue. The hijackers threaten a "slow and quiet
massacre" and say they'll force the pilot to take off and crash into the Kuwaiti royal palace if demands
are not met. In Lebanon, the pro-Iranian Islamic Jihad terrorist group threatens to kill kidnapped
foreign hostages if any attempt is made to storm the plane.
April 11 -The hijackers kill a second captive, identified as a Kuwaiti security officer. A passenger tells
airport officiais via radio that the hijackers have threatened to shoot all the passengers if the plane is
not refueled.
April 12 - Twelve more hostages are freed.
April 13 - Plane flies from Cyprus to Algiers, Algeria.
© 2017 The Associated Press. Ali rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten
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http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/Chronology-of-Events-in-Hijacking-of-…... 1/1
UNITED NATIONS E
Economic and Social
Council
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/1995/55
16 January 1995
ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-first session
Item 12 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLONIAL
AND OTHER DEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission,
Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1994/73 and Economic and Social Council
decision 1994/263
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 - 3 3
I. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3
II. INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE . . 5 - 66 3
A. Right to life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 29 4
B. Enforced or involuntary disappearances . . . . . . 30 8
C. Right to freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . 31 8
D. Administration of justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 - 38 8
E. Excessive use of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 9
F. Freedom of expression and opinion and the
situation of the press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 45 9
GE.95-10161 (E)
Annex 59
Annex 59
E/CN.4/1995/55
page 2
CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page
G. Freedom of religion and the situation
of the Baha’i community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 - 53 11
H. Situation of women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 - 57 12
I. Freedom of association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 12
J. Political rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 - 60 13
K. Events of 6 and 9 November 1994 . . . . . . . . . . 61 - 62 13
L. Situation of refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 - 66 13
III. CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 - 109 14
A. Auspicious events for human rights at
the international level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 - 71 14
B. The 1994 mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 15
C. Sources of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 - 74 16
D. Cooperation of the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 - 76 16
E. Work of the Organization for the Defence
of Victims of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 17
F. Right to life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 - 88 17
G. Attack in Mashhad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 20
H. Torture and cruel treatment of persons arrested
or sentenced for offences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 - 92 20
I. Administration of justice and freedom of expression 93 - 101 21
J. Freedom of religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 - 103 23
K. Situation of the Baha’is . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 - 105 24
L. Situation of women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 - 107 24
M. Political rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 25
N. Situation of refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 25
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 - 113 25
Annex 59
E/CN.4/1995/55
page 3
Introduction
1. At its fiftieth session, the Commission on Human Rights decided in
resolution 1994/73 of 9 March 1994 to extend the mandate of the Special
Representative, as contained in Commission resolution 1984/54 of
14 March 1984, for a further year and requested the Special Representative to
submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session on
the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly on
the situation of minority groups, such as the Baha’is, and to report to the
Commission at its fifty-first session. In decision 1994/263 of 22 July 1994,
the Economic and Social Council endorsed that resolution.
2. Pursuant to these provisions, the Special Representative submitted his
interim report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session (A/49/514
and Add.1-2). The report relates to the human rights situation in the Islamic
Republic of Iran during the period from January to July 1994 and, owing to the
short interval between the two reports, was written as the first part of this
final report. The two documents should accordingly be regarded as one.
3. In compliance with paragraph 14 of Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1994/73 and Economic and Social Council decision 1994/263, the
Special Representative submits herewith his final report on the human rights
situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report relates to human rights
in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the year 1994, although it must obviously
be read in the light of the reports submitted by the Special Representative
since 1986.
I. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
4. On 1 November 1994, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva transmitted the following
letter to the Special Representative:
"... Information received from various sources on violation of
human rights of Iranians in certain areas in Iraqi territory has now
become public. An article from the Wall Street Journal of
4 October 1994, as annexed, is an example of such public information.
"Noting that the Special Representative has addressed, on a number
of occasions, matters related to the human rights of Iranian individuals
residing outside Iranian territory and his affirmation that groups should
also respect human rights, it is requested that the Special
Representative examine these violations of human rights of Iranians and
include his observations, conclusions and appropriate suggestions in this
regard in his reports."
II. INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
5. The following paragraphs contain a summary of some of the allegations of
human rights violations received by the Special Representative in the period
Annex 59
E/CN.4/1995/55
page 4
August to December 1994. The information received in the period January to
July 1994 is set out in the interim report submitted to the General Assembly
(A/49/514, paras. 13-80, and Add.1-2).
A. Right to life
6. Although the Iranian press has ceased to publish most of the cases of
executions, at least 63 executions were reported during 1994. In the period
August to December 1994 there were 24 executions, including 8 persons who were
stoned to death and 14 who were strangled by hanging. At least 12 executions
took place in public. During this period, nine persons were executed for
rape, procuring or adultery. Information was received on the following
specific cases in which the death penalty was applied.
7. The Iranian newspaper Hamshahri reported in its 1 August 1994 issue that
Emdad Mahrami and Mikhail Rostami-Zadeh were hanged in public in the main
square of Jolfa, a town in the northern part of the country, after
receiving 110 lashes. They were found guilty of rape.
8. The Iranian newspaper Jomhuri Islami reported on 11 August 1994 that
Mohsen Sozanian was hanged in public in the Arak stadium, after being
sentenced to death for murder.
9. Bahram Ababs-Zadeh was hanged in public on 13 August 1994 in Khayam
Square, in Zahedan. The newspaper Salam reported on 14 August 1994 that he
was sentenced to death by the Islamic revolutionary court in Zahedan on a
charge of trying to plant a bomb in a Sunni mosque. Ababs-Zadeh was arrested
on 23 June 1994 and reportedly confessed to trying to plant the explosive
device in an effort to create dissension between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.
10. The newspaper Abrar reported in its 2 October 1994 issue that a person
accused of killing a five-year-old girl was executed in Varamin prison.
According to the information published, the oral proceedings leading to this
person’s conviction lasted less than a week.
11. In its issue of 20 October 1994, Kayhan reported that Hossein Kamali,
aged 25, from Amol, was sentenced to death for killing his wife.
12. On 7 November 1994, Kayhan reported that Majid Kheirabadi was executed in
Mashhad after being found guilty by an Islamic revolutionary court of armed
robbery and assault.
13. The Iranian newspaper Abrar reported on 16 November 1994 that the
following persons were stoned to death in public on the road from Jouibar,
near Sari, capital of the province of Mazandaran, in the northern part of the
country: Ghahreman, aged 30, Akbar, aged 44, and Mrs. Moharram, aged 32. The
first two were found guilty by an Islamic revolutionary court of abducting and
raping a girl of 20 and of drinking alcohol. Mrs. Moharram was sentenced for
illicit sexual relations. Before they were stoned to death, the two men were
buried up to the waist and the woman up to the shoulders.
14. The newspaper Hamshahri reported in its 4 December 1994 issue that
two women named Horei and Iran and a man called Mohammad Rezaie, alias
Annex 59
E/CN.4/1995/55
page 5
Mammad Heiran, were stoned to death in public on 3 December 1994 in the old
cemetery in Hamdan. They were sentenced for having formed a network of
corruption.
15. Kayhan reported in its 6 December 1994 issue that 10 Iranians were hanged
in Bandar Abbas, capital of the province of Hormozgan, after being sentenced
to death by an Islamic revolutionary court, which found them guilty of armed
robbery and assault.
16. Hamshahri reported in its 8 December 1994 issue that a man and a woman
were stoned to death in December 1994 in Ramhormoz, in the south-eastern part
of the country for murder and adultery. The couple were accused of killing
the woman’s husband in order to carry on an affair. They were stoned to death
in public.
17. In its 1 August 1994 issue, Kayhan reported that Abdul Hossein Reeici,
aged 50, was killed after being arrested by agents from Tehran
Municipality No. 3, in Vanak. The agents tried to get away, but were forced
by the neighbours to take the victim to a hospital. The head of the public
relations office of the Municipality of Tehran, Mr. Jamali, said that the
official physician, Dr. Hashemi Nasab, had certified that the victim had died
of a heart attack. Dr. Nasab denied issuing any certificate whatsoever and
announced that the cause of death would be disclosed in two months’ time.
18. Jomhuri Islami reported in its 24 August 1994 issue that Ali Reza
Merkand, from Khandaq-Lou, was killed on 15 August 1994 by shots fired by
members of the security forces opposite the offices of the Department of
Education in Zanjan. Merkand was leaving the Shafieh Hospital, to which his
mother had just been admitted. A week after the incident no official
information had been provided about it nor had the victim’s body been handed
over to his family.
19. The mutilated body of Mr. Haji Mohammad Ziaie, aged 55, leader of the
Sunni Muslim community in Bandar Abbas, was found on 20 July 1994 in
Shah-Mossallam. It was reported that he had been summoned to appear on
15 July 1994 before the authorities of the security forces in Laar, in the
province of Fars. In 1981 he was arrested, tortured and sentenced to death.
After being released, it is said that he continued to be the victim of hostile
acts and threats. The body had been decapitated and an arm and a leg had been
cut off. Nothing is known of the details of the inquiry into this death or of
the findings.
20. In his interim report to the General Assembly (A/49/514, para. 59), the
Special Representative mentioned that Mr. Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani, a
well-known poet, essayist and satirical writer, had been arrested on
14 March 1994 after distributing bound photocopies of his books in response to
an editorial in Kayhan Havai which accused him of having written against Islam
in his books. It was also reported that he was being held incommunicado. In
its reply, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated the
following: "The person in question is arrested and now in detention on
charges of espionage, acts against the moral health of society, including drug
possession and use. This individual is at present in good physical and
psychological condition" (A/49/514/Add.2, p. 11). On 27 November 1994, IRNA,
Annex 59
E/CN.4/1995/55
page 6
the official Iranian news agency, reported that he had died of a heart attack.
His family, however, said that Saidi-Sirjani had had no history of heart
problems. It is said that no inquiry has been conducted into the death of
this writer. It was reported that his body was buried in Tehran and the
necessary autopsy had not been carried out.
21. On 1 November 1994, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Majlis,
enacted a law whereby members of the security forces and the Bassiji
(voluntary militia) are allowed to fire on demonstrators. Use of firearms was
authorized "to restore law and order during illegal armed rallies, at times of
unrest and during illegal armed disorders and revolts". It is also
permissible to shoot at vehicles suspected of carrying fugitives, stolen
goods, contraband or narcotics. Members of the security forces and the
Bassiji who kill or wound someone are exempt from any civil or criminal court
action for doing so. The Government undertakes to compensate the families of
any innocent person who dies from shots fired by the forces of law and order.
22. On 15 October 1994, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Ismail Shoushtari,
announced the restoration of the death penalty for businessmen guilty of
speculation or illegal hoarding of goods or excessive price rises.
23. An Agence France Presse dispatch dated 11 September 1994 reported that
the President of the Republic, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, had said that the
fatwa pronounced against the British writer Salman Rushdie was irrevocable and
consequently there was no possibility of a pardon. He added that it was not
in the interest of western countries to protect a person who had insulted a
thousand million Muslims.
24. With regard to recent assassinations of Iranian citizens, chiefly exiles
or refugees abroad, the Special Representative was told that Rafour Hamzai, a
member of the Central Committee and representative of the Democratic Party
of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK) in Baghdad was assassinated in that city
on 4 August 1994 on his doorstep.
25. The Special Representative was also informed that the Iranian citizen
Assadi Mohammad Ali was stabbed to death at his home in Bucharest, Romania, on
12 November 1994. The Romanian police reportedly arrested three Iranian
suspects. Assadi Mohammad Ali had applied for political asylum in Turkey
in 1986, but his application was rejected. A few days before he was
assassinated, he went to the UNHCR office in Bucharest and expressed fears
about his safety in Romania. He was to return to the office to back up his
statements, when the crime occurred. The Romanian newspaper Evenimentul Zilei
reported that the victim had accompanied a nephew of the last Shah who was on
a visit to Romania.
26. As to the assassination of Mr. Kazem Radjevi in Coppet, Switzerland,
on 24 April 1990, it was reported that the French Council of State had said
that the expulsion to Tehran of the two persons suspected of the
assassination, whose extradition had been requested by the Swiss authorities,
was unlawful and null and void. It will be remembered that Mosen Sharif
Esfahani, an Iranian citizen aged 37, and Ahmad Taheri, an Iranian citizen
aged 32, were arrested in France in November 1992. On 10 February 1993 the
Court of Appeals in Paris handed down an opinion in favour of their
Annex 59
E/CN.4/1995/55
page 7
extradition to Switzerland. The decree ordering the extradition was signed on
31 August 1993 by the French Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. However,
on 29 November 1993, Esfahani and Taheri were put on a plane to Tehran. This
step was justified on the grounds of national interest. The Council of State
took the view the two Iranians should have been extradited to Switzerland
under the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and the 1977 European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, both of them binding on France and
Switzerland, and that the French authorities should have specified the
overriding reasons that impelled them not to comply with the extradition that
had been ordered.
27. In connection with the killing of the former Prime Minister under the
monarchy, Shahpour Bakhtiar, and his personal secretary, Katibeh Fallouch, the
Special Representative was informed that on 6 December 1994 the Paris Special
Criminal Court sentenced an Iranian citizen, Ali Vakili Rad, aged 35, to life
imprisonment, without any possibility of conditional release for a period of
18 years. It also sentenced an Iranian citizen, Massoud Hendi, aged 47, a
former chief of Iranian Radio and Television, to 10 years’ imprisonment,
without any possibility of conditional release for a period equivalent to
two thirds of the sentence, for helping the killers to enter the country.
However, it ordered the immediate release of a third accused person, the
Iranian citizen Zeynal Abedin Sarhadi, aged 28, an employee of the Iranian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sarhadi, who had been charged with helping the
killers to escape to Switzerland, was none the less immediately expelled from
France by order of the French Minister of the Interior. In its ruling, the
Paris Special Criminal Court took the view that the killers belonged to a
criminal organization firmly established in Tehran, Istanbul, Geneva and
Paris.
28. The other two persons presumed to have killed Bakhtiar,
Farydoun Boyerahmadi and Mohammad Azadi, as well as the consultant at the
Iranian Ministry of Telecommunications, Hossein Sheikhattar, and three other
persons, were not present at the trial and will be tried later in absentia.
It should be noted that the Government Procurator, Jacques Mouton, and the two
lawyers in the civil proceedings, stated in court that agents of the Iranian
Government were to be found in the organization which allowed the two killings
to take place.
29. As to the assassination of three leaders of the Democratic Party of
Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK) and their translator, in Berlin, Germany, in
September 1992, the Special Representative was informed that
Mr. Klaus Gruenewald, director of the Federal Constitutional Protection
Office, said on 14 October 1994 that the presumed organizer of the crime, an
Iranian citizen, Kasem Darabi, had been in contact with the Iranian
secret service since early 1990 and had supplied it with information about
members of the Iranian opposition in exile. This statement was made to the
Berlin court trying the case. He added that the Iranian Minister of
Information, Ali Falahian, "had an interest in getting rid of the four Kurdish
opposition leaders". The Iranian secret service has been expressly mentioned
in the charges brought by the German Federal Department of Public
Prosecutions.
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B. Enforced or involuntary disappearances
30. The Special Representative was informed of the recent disappearance in
Isfahan of an Australian citizen, David Andrew Lindner, a 28-year-old
architect who went to the Islamic Republic of Iran to study Persian
architecture. An official of the Isfahan Police Department told one of
Lindner’s friends who was inquiring into his whereabouts that Lindner had been
arrested and executed. The Iranian authorities have denied that Lindner has
been executed and have promised to ascertain his whereabouts and investigate
the statement by the police officer. However, Lindner’s whereabouts are still
unknown.
C. Right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment
31. In addition to the cases mentioned in his interim report to the
General Assembly, the Special Representative was informed that two persons had
had four fingers of the right hand amputated in public in Dezfoul, in the
south-eastern part of the country. The Iranian newspaper Kayhan reported in
its 7 November 1994 issue that the fingers had been amputated because the two
persons had committed robbery and were recidivists.
D. Administration of justice
32. As to the administration of justice, it is appropriate to refer the
reader to the Special Representative’s interim report to the General Assembly
(A/49/514, paras. 44-56) and the replies provided by the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (A/49/514/Add.2, pp. 8-10).
33. With reference to the situation in Iranian prisons, the Chief of the
Prisons Department, Asadollah Lajevardi, reported on 10 December 1994 that the
total prison population was 100,481 inmates; more than half of them were
accused or convicted of offences connected with drug trafficking or drug use,
and a significant percentage of the rest for murder, assault, robbery, fraud
and sexual offences. According to Mr. Lajevardi’s statements, published in
the 12 December 1994 issue of the newspaper Kayhan International, there are
also a number of prisoners charged with belonging to armed opposition groups.
34. In a note published in the 17 November 1994 issue of the newspaper Salam,
one reader reported that he had spent 12 days in prison in Bandar Abbas from
20 September 1994 onwards. While he was in prison he was able to see that the
various wings, built for 150 prisoners, actually held 700 to 1,000 persons
each. Some prisoners had to sleep in the lavatories. He also said that many
prisoners suffered from various skin diseases, tuberculosis and rheumatism and
did not receive appropriate medical treatment. Furthermore, no standards of
hygiene were observed in preparing the prisoners’ food.
35. As to the list of 78 prisoners given in the Special Representative’s
interim report to the General Assembly (A/49/514, para. 79), the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided information on two of them,
Mohammad Bagher Bourzooi and Manouchehr Karimzadeh, who were pardoned and have
been released (A/49/514/Add.2, p. 14).
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36. Of particular concern has been the situation regarding
Mr. Abbas Amir Entezam, former Deputy Prime Minister of the first Provisional
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who was visited by the Special
Representative at Evin prison in December 1991. Mr. Entezam is said to have
suffered various reprisals and to have been punished for speaking with the
Special Representative, including refusal of medical treatment for an ear
infection he had at that time. In August 1992, he was injected with
substances which gave him nausea and a general feeling of faintness for weeks.
At the present time, despite various illnesses and malnutrition, he is not
allowed to receive food or medicine sent in from outside the prison or to buy
it. Recently, he has been allowed to receive a visit every two weeks,
although the visits take place in the presence of an official of the
Prosecutor’s Office and are frequently and arbitrarily interrupted and brought
to an end by prison guards. Mr. Entezam is reportedly asking to be tried with
all the guarantees set out in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the country’s laws and the international instruments to which the
Islamic Republic of Iran is party, in the presence of a jury, in public, and
with the assistance of legal counsel. Lastly, it has been reported that
Mr. Entezam rejected a proposal by some officials to grant him his freedom in
exchange for silence about what he has experienced and seen in prison
since 1979.
37. It has been reported that the number of arrests and detentions
continues to be very high. On 21 September 1994, Reuters reported that
General Reza Seifollahi, Chief of Police, said that the number of persons
arrested by his forces on suspicion of drug trafficking and smuggling during
the period 21 March to 21 September 1994 was 10,000. On 12 August 1994, nine
women were arrested in a private home in the Karim-Khan-e-Zand district in the
north of Tehran for playing cards. The Iranian newspaper Ressalat reported in
its 21 August 1994 issue that 11 adolescents were arrested in Lahidjan, in the
northern part of the country, on charges of belonging to a network of
prostitutes.
38. Kayhan reported in its 20 September 1994 issue that 264 people aged 13
to 28 were arrested in various districts in western Tehran in a crime
prevention campaign. The persons included about 30 young people wanted by the
police for evading military service or for robbery, as well as 8 drug addicts.
According to the newspaper, most of the young people were from the western
provinces and had gone to Tehran to look for work.
E. Excessive use of force
39. The Special Representative received allegations concerning excessive use
of force by the security forces in putting down protest marches and public
demonstrations. On 4 August 1994, the riot squad in Qazvin shot at
demonstrators who were protesting at Parliament’s rejection of a bill that
would have created the province of Qazvin. The shots killed at least 4 people
and wounded 50 in the Vali-Asr district and in the town centre.
F. Freedom of expression and opinion and the situation of the press
40. It was reported that, on 25 October 1994, 134 Iranian writers, academics,
translators, artists and journalists had sent an open letter to the
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authorities calling for respect for freedom of expression and opinion and an
end to censorship. The intellectuals protested "against the frustrating
obstacles and humiliating attitudes that have to be faced by those who do not
respect the Government’s dictates and against censorship and inadmissible
prohibitions". The persons who signed the letter, who were said to include
most of the well-known writers and poets living in the country, condemned "the
anti-democratic practices of the authorities" and protested particularly "at
the sentencing of writers in the name of morality and ideology". They said
that "to criticize a writer’s work is normal, but to scrutinize his private
life in order to discredit his work is an attack against his person". Lastly,
they announced the establishment of an association of writers and artists "to
oppose, collectively and at the professional level, the obstacles to reading,
to free circulation of thought and to the freedoms of expression and
publication" and to safeguard their individual independence.
41. The Special Representative was informed that a retired General,
Azizollah Amir-Rahimi, aged 73, had been arrested on 3 November 1994 after
sending an open letter to the President of the Republic urging the
implementation of democratic reforms. His son, Mehrdad Amir-Rahimi, a
28-year-old university student, was also arrested on 8 November 1994 after
sending a cable protesting to the authorities about his father’s arrest.
IRNA, the Iranian News Agency, reported on 7 November 1994 that
General Amir-Rahimi had been transferred to a hospital after confessing that
he was addicted to opium; it also said the tests confirmed that he was an
addict. In his open letter, General Amir-Rahimi said: "No writer can
describe the things that Iranian political prisoners have to face, the
flagrant abuses perpetrated by the revolutionary courts against the dignity
and honour of citizens or the sufferings of the Iranian people as a result of
systematic oppression". The former Chief of the Military Police is said to be
under psychiatric treatment and sedation at a military hospital.
42. In its 7 November 1994 issue, Kayhan reported that the Governor of Tehran
had banned the manufacture and sale of clothing, footwear and accessories with
unsuitable patterns or letters from the Latin alphabet on them. The decision
is reported to be based on the need to preserve the country’s culture and
national and religious traditions and to guarantee proper respect for the
national literature and language.
43. On 20 September 1994, the Majlis enacted a law which prohibits the
importation, manufacture, marketing and use of dish antennas for satellite
television. The law assigns the Ministry of the Interior and the Bassiji the
task of dismantling and taking away antennas as soon as possible and
stipulates fines and confiscation of goods for persons importing,
manufacturing and distributing such devices. In the event of a repeated
offence, the penalty is three to six years’ imprisonment.
44. In its 15 September 1994 issue, the newspaper Abrar reported that the
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance had cancelled permission to
publish 47 magazines and publications.
45. The Special Representative has also received information that strict
censorship is still applied in connection with importing, circulating and
translating foreign books.
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G. Freedom of religion and the situation of the Baha’i community
46. In addition to the allegations enumerated in the interim report to the
General Assembly (A/49/514, paras. 61-71, A/49/514/Add.1 and A/49/514/Add.2,
pp. 11-12), the Special Representative received the following information.
47. The New York Times reported in its 1 August 1994 issue that the Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jarad Zarif, had said that some evangelical
Christian churches were in actual fact organizations of a political character:
"We consider them to be political organizations. If someone wants to start a
political organization they must go through the process to obtain permission,
as is the case for Muslims", he said.
48. In connection with the killing of Pastor Tatavous Michaelian, various
inconsistencies have been noted in the police and court investigation. For
example, Mrs. Farahnaz Anami, accused of the killing, allegedly said that the
Pastor died from two bullet wounds, whereas the owner of the house in which
the crime was committed said he had heard only one shot, and the office of the
examining magistrate said that three bullets were found in the body. The
testimony of the owner is said to have caused some controversy.
49. Farahnaz Anami reportedly confessed to killing Pastor Michaelian;
identifying a place to bury the body of Pastor Dibaj in the Sorkheh Hesar
woods in east Tehran; planning the killings of Archbishop Iraj Mottahedeh and
Dimitri Belous; and planting explosives in the mausoleums of Hazrat Ma’soumeh
and Imam Khomeini. Mrs. Batoul Vaferi Kaleteh and Mrs. Maryam Shahbazpoor are
said to have confessed to being accomplices in these crimes and to have been
arrested while they were trying to plant bombs at these mausoleums. No
details are known about the inquiries into the killings of Pastor Dibaj and
Pastor Hovsepian Mehr.
50. The situation of the Baha’is remains the same as that described in the
Special Representative’s interim report to the General Assembly (A/49/514,
paras. 66-71). The situation of two Baha’is sentenced to death because of
their religion on 8 December 1993, Mr. Bihnam Mithaqi and
Mr. Kayvan Khalajabadi, is still precarious, for no reply has yet been
received to the appeal against the conviction lodged with the Supreme Court of
Justice. These persons have been in prison since April 1989.
51. Five other Baha’is are still in prison because of their religion.
Particular concern was expressed about the situation of Mr. Husayn Ishraqi,
aged 72, who has been in prison since 1 April 1992 and has been sentenced to
a term of 10 years. Another Baha’i, imprisoned since 17 October 1985,
Mr. Bakhshu’llah Mithaqui, has been told verbally that he has received
a further sentence of 10 years in addition to the term he is
serving in Gohardasht prison. It was also reported that, while
Mr. Ramidan’ali Dhulfaquari has been released, the charge of apostasy
against him has not been withdrawn. This person had been sentenced to death
in December 1993.
52. Further acts of discrimination and economic pressure against the Baha’is
have been reported, particularly in Mashhad, a city where the private sector
is said to be under pressure from the authorities to dismiss Baha’i employees.
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The Baha’is in Mashhad are reportedly facing major hurdles in carrying on
their professional and commercial activities. Throughout the country, many
Baha’is dismissed from the public sector on account of their religious beliefs
are still unemployed and receive no financial assistance, grant or pension.
It has even been reported that some Baha’is dismissed from the public sector
were required to return the salaries and pensions they had received when they
were working. Baha’i farmers are still denied access to farm cooperatives,
which often provide the only opportunity to obtain credits, seed, fertilizers
and pesticides.
53. It has been alleged that marriage, divorce and the right to inherit among
the Baha’is continue to be unrecognized in law. Major difficulties, mentioned
in information received previously, remain in obtaining passports and exit
visas. It is asserted that young Baha’is continue to be denied access to
higher education and, for the Baha’i community as a whole, the right to meet
freely, to elect their representatives and to maintain their administrative
institutions. The cemeteries, holy places, historical sites and
administrative centres of the Baha’i community remain confiscated or have been
destroyed. It is said that the Baha’is must bury their dead on waste land
specified by the Government and that they are not entitled to identify the
graves of their loved ones.
H. Situation of women
54. In addition to the allegations that appear in the interim report to the
General Assembly (A/49/514, paras. 72-77), the Special Representative has
received the following information.
55. An Agence France Presse dispatch of 18 September 1994 reported that the
Minister of the Interior, Ali Mohammad Besharati, had announced a step-up in
the campaign against women who did not wear the veil properly and who showed
other signs of social corruption, such as riding behind men on motorcycles, or
begging in chadors.
56. The Iranian Association Football Federation banned women from attending
stadiums to see football matches, according to the newspaper Jomhuri Islami in
its 21 July 1994 issue. The authorities considered that the presence of women
in football stadiums was not compatible with Islamic standards of conduct.
57. Reports are still being received about the strict separation of men and
women in public transport, with women being placed at the back in buses and
minibuses. It was reported that a taxi service has been set up exclusively
for women, and a hospital built exclusively for women patients, and a Women’s
School of Psychology in Rud-e-Hen, north of Tehran, in October 1994, where the
teachers have to wear the chador, as an example to their students.
I. Freedom of association
58. On 7 November 1994, Reuters reported that the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance had prohibited pen-pal clubs, which were, according to an
official release by the Ministry, regarded as a tool used by Western culture
to undermine Islamic and family values, chiefly among young people. On the
same day, Kayhan reported that a man had been arrested in north Tehran on a
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charge of running one of these clubs and recruiting members by announcing that
he spoke foreign languages. The newspaper also stated that 30 people had
confessed to being members of the club and had corresponded with persons
abroad by means of the club.
J. Political rights
59. The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Ali Mohammad Besharati, stated that in
the past 12 years no organization had asked to be registered as a political
party. However, his Ministry had registered 300 associations of a
non-political character, and he mentioned associations for occupational
groups, students and religious minorities. In a dispatch dated 19 July 1994,
Reuters reported that a representative of the Freedom Movement of Iran,
Mr. Ibrahim Yazdi, contradicted this statement, maintaining that his
organization had requested formal registration in 1983 and had still not
received any reply to its application. He added that he knew of other
organizations which had also applied to be registered as political parties,
and they had not received a reply either.
60. Mr. Dariush Forouhar, a former minister in the first Provisional
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and leader of the Party of the
Iranian Nation, was arrested on 12 August 1994 by agents of the Ministry of
Information at Behesht e’ Zahra cemetery, while he was attending the funeral
of another opposition political leader, Mr. Shamseddin Amir-Alaei. A few days
later he was released.
K. Events of 6 and 9 November 1994
61. It was reported that on 6 November 1994 a military base of the People’s
Mojahedin of Iran organization in Ashraf, Iraq, 70 km from the Iranian-Iraqi
border, had been attacked by Scud-B ground-to-ground missiles launched from
Iranian territory, without causing any victims. According to the Iranian
Government, the attack was a response to attempted infiltration by two
commandos of the organization in south-west Iran.
62. Three days later, Iranian Air Force planes attacked a base of the
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK) east of Erbil, in the north of
Iraq, killing and wounding an unknown number of persons. IRNA, the Iranian
News Agency, reported on 9 November 1994 that the Iranian Air Force had
attacked as a reprisal for various attempts at infiltration and sabotage in
the Iranian border regions.
L. Situation of refugees
63. The Islamic Republic of Iran is, according to information the Special
Representative has received, the country with the largest number of refugees
on its territory. From 1991 to the end of 1994, the number fell by 2,250,000,
because the figure for 1991 stood at 4,300,000. The number is now estimated
at 2,050,000. The refugees are mainly Afghans. Under an agreement between
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan, five return
stations have been set up on the Afghan-Iranian border. At the stations, each
Afghan refugee returning to his country receives US$ 25 and 50 kilograms of
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wheat from UNHCR. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) arranges
the transport of refugees returning with funds provided by UNHCR. IOM has
transported more than 80,000 refugees.
64. Most of the Afghan refugees, estimated to number 1,800,000, live in
temporary villages built near Iranian towns, and only a minority are in
refugee camps. Many work in construction, in the public or private sectors.
UNHCR provides health services, additional food, drinking water, education,
vocational guidance and shelter. The World Food Programme continues to
provide food aid to 260,000 Afghan refugees. The Iranian Government is also
helping refugees who return to Afghanistan at four camps and health centres in
Afghan territory. Recently, the repatriation process has slowed down, owing
to the civil war that afflicts Afghanistan.
65. Iraqi refugees also account for a significant proportion. They are
Shiite Muslims from the south and Kurds from the north of Iraq. At the
present time, the number of Iraqi refugees is around 100,000, a figure which
has not been properly established because some return to their country while
new groups of not less than 5,000 persons each arrive in the Islamic Republic
of Iran from time to time. About 50,000 live in refugee camps and the
remainder in rural settlements. In the early months of 1994, about
7,000 Iraqis arrived from the southern marsh area. Repatriation of the Iraqi
Kurds has recently been hampered by the fighting in the north of Iraq.
66. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has built 10 temporary
settlements in the territory of Azerbaijan to assist Azerbaijanis who are
displaced persons in their own country and have been affected by the war for
control over Nagorny Karabakh. Moreover, it has offered logistical support to
send humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan through Iranian territory and has
built camps in the western province of Hamedan for Azerbaijani refugees. The
number is estimated at 50,000.
III. CONSIDERATIONS
A. Auspicious events for human rights at the international level
67. There were at least three developments in 1994 which augur well for a
better coordination of activities and a better use of the human and material
resources available to the United Nations for promoting the effective exercise
of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. These were the
establishment of the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights, the first
general meeting of rapporteurs, special representatives and experts working
specifically on the protection and promotion of human rights, and the creation
of a non-governmental organization (NGO) with the specific task of cooperating
with the Commission on Human Rights - with a watchful eye, of course.
68. In its resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993, the General Assembly
created the office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
H.E. José Ayala Lasso of Ecuador, a diplomat of broad experience in
international affairs, was designated to serve in that capacity. This
positive step in the process of development and consolidation of the
United Nations human rights system heartens those who are committed to that
goal in the service of the international community. The Special
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Representative reiterates the positive view he expressed to Radio Netherlands
during the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights regarding the development
and consolidation of the international system of human rights and welcomes the
appointment of Mr. Ayala Lasso with particular satisfaction.
69. In accordance with paragraph 95 of the second part of the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/24), a meeting of rapporteurs,
representatives, experts and chairmen of working groups on special procedures
and the advisory services programme of the Commission on Human Rights was held
at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 30 May to 1 June 1994. The
purpose of the meeting, and also its justification, was the conviction, shared
by all the experts charged with implementing the extra-conventional mechanisms
established by the Commission on Human Rights, that their mandates were
basically similar without prejudice to their specificity, and that therefore,
the harmonization and coordination of their respective activities would
enhance the efficiency of each individually and of their activities as a
whole.
70. By consensus, the meeting participants recommended: avoiding the
duplication of effort by exchanging information and carrying out joint
missions; convening periodic meetings of all those responsible for the
implementation of extra-conventional mechanisms; preparing a manual or a
collection of general outlines for the use of new rapporteurs and experts;
suggesting to the Commission on Human Rights that consultative meetings be
convened in which the rapporteurs, special representatives and experts could
answer questions from Commission members and observers, thereby contributing
to the preparation of resolutions; supporting the postponement by two or three
months of the Commission’s annual meeting period; and emphasizing the
importance of field missions, field monitors and permanent observers in the
most sensitive spots in relation to the observance of international human
rights standards.
71. The objective of United Nations Watch, the new NGO, is to evaluate
United Nations human rights activities in terms of the norms established by
the United Nations Charter. Among other items, it will examine the shortfall
of human and material resources allocated to activities which are increasing
in number year after year and even day after day, and which are generally
known as special procedures. The activities of NGOs are a pillar of the
United Nations human rights system, and their contribution is an asset in
terms of its quality and timeliness.
B. The 1994 mandate
72. In renewing the mandate of the Special Representative for another year on
the basis of its resolution 1994/73 of 9 March 1994, the Commission on Human
Rights requested that its Special Representative present an interim report to
the General Assembly during its forty-ninth session, to be followed by a
definitive report to the Commission itself at its fifty-first session. In
compliance with his mandate, the Special Representative, with the assistance
of the Centre for Human Rights, has compiled and classified the new
information he received. It comprises accusations and allegations relating to
the same categories as those described in earlier reports. The data are of
various types: in some cases the veracity of the allegations could not be
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substantiated, while in others the information, given its source, can be
regarded as serious and reliable and can therefore be evaluated. As in
previous years, one of the most reliable sources has been the reports printed
in the Iranian press. On the basis of the new information, and taking into
account previous information, the Special Representative is formulating his
own views concerning the prevailing situation and, as is his duty, is
submitting them to the General Assembly and eventually to the Commission on
Human Rights.
C. Sources of information
73. It has to be stressed once again that the Special Representative does
not base his reports on just one source. He cannot rely on any one single
source, however trustworthy it may be. An official Iranian statement to the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
on 15 August 1994 treated this as grounds for contesting the credibility of
the Special Representative’s reports. The Special Representative receives
information from various sources, both inside and outside Iran. Where
individuals are concerned, their names are kept confidential at their request,
as is usual under United Nations procedures. When different sources agree
on particular points, that obviously strengthens belief in the truth or
probability of the allegations in question.
74. The Special Representative pays great attention to the Iranian press,
which, under the existing system of control, publishes reports that implicitly
have the authorities’ approval. Thus, as far as executions are concerned, the
Iranian press continues to be the main source of information, although, as
stated in a previous report, official instructions have been given to restrict
reporting of such matters, with the express intention of depriving the Special
Representative of an important source of information which can hardly be
disputed (see document A/48/526, para. 92).
D. Cooperation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
75. Over the past two years, Iranian cooperation with the mandate of the
Special Representative has diminished, although it is still at a level
allowing a working relationship to be maintained in order to deal with its
most important and urgent aspects. The Iranian Government has replied to the
allegations contained in the Special Representative’s interim report to the
General Assembly (A/49/514/Add.1 and 2). Because of the short interval
between the interim and final reports, it has not been sent the new
allegations received, which are to be found in section II of this report.
Contacts with authorized Iranian representatives indicate that there are
two sticking points that have led the Government to conclude that it has
not obtained the concessions it expected in return for its full cooperation,
the most important element of which concerns visits to Iran. One of these
points is the repeated criticism they find in the reports of the Special
Representative; the other is the absence in recent years of negotiated,
consensus-supported resolutions on the part of the competent bodies of the
United Nations. On the positive side, it should be emphasized that
consideration is once again being given to the possibility of organizing an
activity proposed several years ago by the Special Representative: the
systematic study of Islamic law in relation to international human rights
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instruments. The preliminary organizational questions have already been
discussed, and consideration is being given to working out a programme and
selecting basic texts.
76. The Iranian Government has recently, in official statements, recognized
the universality of human rights. In his statement of 15 August 1994 to the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
the representative of the Iranian Government declared: "[Human rights] are
thus universal, independent of conditions, transcend all boundaries, be they
temporal or geographical, and do not lend themselves to distinctions of race,
sex or other superficial attributes and barriers. Nor do they sacrifice the
value of the individual for the well-being of the community, or the health of
human society for the licence of the individual, and these rights emanate from
the totality of the human person. They cannot be the domain of a few powerful
States and cultures, with dubious records of human rights observance in the
past or even in the present."
E. Work of the Organization for the Defence of Victims of Violence
77. This organization, whose headquarters are in Tehran, promotes knowledge
of human rights and distributes information on the means of seeking redress.
Among other aims, it seeks to eliminate violence by means of education and the
establishment of a human rights culture. Recently the Special Representative
received a copy of the organization’s bulletin for the year 1994, in which it
states that it has distributed throughout the country a basic form for the
submission of complaints about violations of human rights, in Farsi and
English, explaining the type of information that should be provided when
asking a national or international agency to intervene. On page 2 of the
bulletin, the organization recognizes the work of the United Nations in
promoting the observance of human rights in the world, in the following terms:
"From the organization’s point of view, activity in the framework of the
United Nations Organization is of great importance. Having a correct
understanding of this gigantic body and its position in monitoring and taking
measures in [the] human rights field at national and international level can
be very effective in promoting the world situation."
F. Right to life
78. Although reporting of executions by the press in the Islamic Republic
of Iran has been severely restricted, information has been obtained
regarding 63 executions carried out in 1994. This figure is similar to the
one for 1993. There ought to be a real reduction in the number of executions.
Until such time as the press resumes the practice of publishing information on
all executions, it will be impossible to make a proper evaluation of the data
collected. A number of significant cases which were mentioned in the Special
Representative’s interim report to the General Assembly are described below.
79. The Special Representative was informed that on 31 January 1994 a woman
had been stoned to death at Evin prison in Tehran. In March, another woman,
accused of adultery and of collaborating with a prostitution network, was
stoned to death in Qom. The latest case of stoning published in the press was
in January 1990. In its reply, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
stated that these women had in fact been executed, but denied that they had
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been stoned or that the executions had taken place in public (A/49/514/Add.2,
p. 4), thus contradicting the version published by the newspapers Kayhan and
Ressalat. Information was also received that a 15-year-old girl had been
sentenced to death in January in Qazvin. On 16 May 1994, according to a
report by Agence France Presse, a 17-year-old youth was publicly hanged in
Mashhad, having been convicted of sexually assaulting an under-age girl.
In its reply on these cases, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
stated that both these persons had in fact been executed, but denied that they
had been under age (A/49/514/Add.2, p. 5). It is worth mentioning none the
less that under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(art. 6.5) sentence of death may not be imposed on persons below 18 years
of age.
80. It has recently been reported that during the period between August
and December 1994 there were eight executions by stoning. The information
comes from the Iranian newspapers Abrar (issue of 16 November 1994) and
Hamshahri (issues of 4 and 8 December 1994). During the same period,
at least 12 executions were carried out in public.
81. Particular concern has been aroused by the announcement of the
extension of the death penalty to the crimes of speculation, illegal
hoarding of goods and introduction of unjustified price rises, which was
made by Mr. Ismail Shoushtari, the Minister of Justice, on 15 October 1994,
and by the new act of 1 November 1994 authorizing the security forces to use
their firearms in suppressing protest demonstrations and dealing with
disturbances of law and order.
82. Many people throughout the world reacted with shock to the murders of
three Protestant clergymen in 1994. Further details on these cases can be
found in sections II and III A of the interim report submitted to the
General Assembly (A/49/514) and in paragraphs 48 and 49 of this report. The
Government should be asked to conduct a thorough investigation of these
murders and to prosecute the perpetrators; the latter should of course benefit
from the due process of law guaranteed in the relevant international
instruments. The victims were the Reverend Tatavous Michaelian, Interim
President of the Council of Protestant Ministers of Iran; the Reverend Mehdi
Dibaj, pastor of the Church of the Assemblies of God; and the Reverend Haik
Hovsepian Mehr, President of the Council of Evangelical Ministers of Iran and
Superintendent of the Church of the Assemblies of God. The latter had refused
to sign a document declaring that the Churches enjoyed all the rights
guaranteed by the country’s Constitution, and that the allegations contained
in the reports of the Special Representative on the subject were false. The
leaders of the evangelical congregations are known to have been summoned to
a meeting with important government representatives, at which they were
threatened and even warned that the Christmas of 1993 might be their last.
83. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should be asked to conduct
a thorough investigation into the deaths of the leader of the Sunni Muslim
community, Mr. Haji Mohammad Ziaie, and the writer, poet and essayist
Mr. Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani.
84. In a number of countries, trials are in progress to prosecute the
murders of Iranians in exile. According to statements by judicial and
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administrative authorities in the countries where these incidents occurred,
Iranian secret agents were found to have been involved. In the case of
Professor Kazem Radjavi, the judicial proceedings, begun on 24 April 1990,
are being kept open by the Swiss judge, Mr. Roland Châtelain. The judge is
in possession of 13 names, which may or may not be authentic, of persons
suspected of having participated directly or indirectly in Radjavi’s murder.
Judge Châtelain has sent the Islamic Republic of Iran, via Berne, a letter of
request followed by several reminders, but he has received no reply. Despite
international arrest warrants against them, the 13 persons are still at
liberty, and the judge was unable to obtain the extradition of 2 accused
persons who were in detention in France. Given the lack of progress in the
legal proceedings, his statement to the press of February 1992 still applies
today. At that time, he declared that he could not commit the 13 accused for
trial to be judged in their absence. The reasons that he gave at the time
are still valid: "In order to do so, it would be necessary to know who did
what and have proof of their true identities. I have names, but are they true
or false? The case will remain open. Times can change." (Le Courrier,
23 February 1992). It has recently been reported that the French Council
of State has declared the expulsion from Tehran of the two persons whose
extradition had been requested by the Swiss authorities to be null and void
and contrary to the European Conventions on Extradition of 1957 and on the
Suppression of Terrorism of 1977.
85. In connection with the assassination of Mr. Shahpour Bakhtiar and his
secretary, Mr. Katibeh Fallouch, it is reported that the Paris Special
Criminal Court passed various sentences on the Iranian citizens Ali Vakili Rad
and Massoud Hendi on 6 December 1994 and ordered the immediate release of
Mr. Zeynal Abedine Sarhadi. Six other persons, who were absent during the
trial, will be tried later (see above, paras. 27 and 28).
86. With respect to the assassination of three Kurdish leaders and their
translator, which occurred in September 1992 in Berlin, Mr. Bernd Schmidbauer,
Minister of State in the German Federal Chancellery, told the court
investigating the case on 17 March 1994 that the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran had tried to prevent the prosecution of those accused of the
assassination. On 14 October 1994, Mr. Klaus Gruenewald, Director of the
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, told the court that
Kasem Darabi, the presumed organizer of the crime, had been in contact with
the Iranian secret services since early 1990, supplying them with information
on members of the Iranian opposition in exile. The trial of four Lebanese and
an Iranian is proceeding. Iranian secret agents have been charged by the
German State prosecutor handling the case.
87. It is apparent from the foregoing that the judicial inquiry into the
murder of Mr. Radjavi has been blocked by the failure of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to cooperate. Two Iranian citizens have been convicted by the Paris
Special Criminal Court, and an international arrest warrant has been issued
against six other persons. The case of the Kurdish leaders is proceeding
normally. Mr. Taha Kermani, an Iranian Kurd who had been granted refugee
status by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), was also assassinated at Corum, Turkey, on 4 January 1994. He had
reportedly received death threats from Iranian agents. No further information
has been obtained regarding this case. Nor have any more details been
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forthcoming on the assassinations of Mr. Rafour Hamzai, member of the Central
Committee of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (POKI), on
4 August 1994 in Baghdad, and Mr. Assadi Mohammed Ali, on 12 November 1994 in
Bucharest. In the latter case, three Iranian citizens are said to have been
arrested by the Romanian police.
88. It has been reported that on 22 February 1994, as a protest against
unjust treatment, Professor Homa Darabi, paediatrician and paediatric
psychoanalyst, burned herself to death screaming "Long live freedom".
This occurred at Chemira Ne Square in the northern sector of Tehran.
Dr. Homa Darabi had been dismissed from an academic position in an institution
affiliated with the University of Tehran, reportedly for failing to adhere
strictly to the dress code. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Islam
stated that "According to the information received from the husband of the
late Dr. Homa Darabi, she had had symptoms of a psychological disorder for
some time. Gradual increase in these symptoms resulted in her unfortunate
suicide" (A/49/514/Add.2, p. 13).
G. Attack in Mashhad
89. On 20 June 1994, a very serious attack was perpetrated in Mashhad when a
bomb packed with 5 kilograms of explosives was set off in the prayer halls of
the tomb of Imam Reza, one of the holiest sanctuaries and pilgrimage sites,
leaving 26 people dead and 170 wounded. The attack occurred when thousands of
pilgrims from all parts of the country had gathered to commemorate the
martyrdom of Imam Hussein. The authorities affirm that they arrested at least
two suspects. One of them, Mehdi Nahvi, confronted the security forces in
Tehran pars, Eastern Tehran, and was seriously wounded. He died in hospital
on 2 August 1994 from the wounds he received when he was captured. This
utterly senseless attack was unanimously condemned both inside and outside the
country. Information has been received about other attacks with explosives
both in Tehran and in other towns in the interior.
H. Torture and cruel treatment of persons arrested or
sentenced for offences
90. The statements made by Mr. Helmut Szimkus, a German citizen, about the
five and a half years he spent in Evin prison have recently come to our
notice. The European press published and commented on the statements he made
upon his release. This engineer was arrested at Tehran Airport on
13 January 1989 for spying for Iraq. He claims that he was tortured without a
stop from the moment he was arrested. He says that he was blindfolded and
that he was repeatedly slapped in the face by his interrogator. He was
subjected to such abuse on a daily basis for four weeks. He was transferred
to section 209 of Evin, reportedly run by the secret service. There, he saw
bloodstains on the floor. He was tied to a wooden pole and was beaten
repeatedly on the soles of the feet with a copper cable. "They pounded me
like crazy." He ended up signing a confession. He says that he heard men and
women being tortured screaming for hours on end. In reply to these
allegations, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated the
following: "In an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine, dated 3 August 1994,
the person in question has unequivocally confessed to collaboration with
American and Iraqi agents in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This confession
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not only clarifies his previous actions, but is also a valid criterion to
assess the validity of his other statements. His numerous contradictory press
fabrications, self-explanatory as they are, could be caused by financial
motives or thirst for fame" (A/49/514/Add.2, p. 7).
91. The body of Mr. Feizollah Mekhoubad, an Iranian of the Jewish faith,
executed on 26 February 1994, bore signs of severe torture, including a
disfigured face, bruises probably caused by blows, broken teeth and contusions
on various parts of the body. In its reply, the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran stated that this person had been sentenced to death for
espionage and sabotage and that his corpse had been buried in a Jewish
cemetery according to the Jewish faith; it denied the allegations of torture
(A/49/514/Add.2, p. 4).
92. Other cases have been reported in the Iranian press. For example,
Jomhuri Islami reported on 14 March 1994 that in the central prison of Qom,
four fingers on the right hands of Mohammad Hossein Honar Bakhshi and
Karim Gol-Mohammadi were chopped off in plain view of the other prisoners. On
26 January 1994 Kayhan reported that two people had been flogged in public in
the south of the country. Three youths accused of indecent exposure were
publicly flogged in Saveh, south-west of Tehran, no further details being
given. According to a France Presse dispatch from Tehran, the Iranian press
published this information. Two of the youths were given 60 lashes and the
third, 30. Recently, in its issue of 7 November 1994, the newspaper Kayhan
reported that two persons had had four fingers of their right hands amputated
in the south-west of the country. The sentence was carried out in public.
I. Administration of justice and right to freedom of expression
93. Bearing in mind the already familiar problems, it should be noted that
there has been no known reform of Iranian criminal law designed to bring it
into line with international standards, nor do efficient measures appear to
have been taken to guarantee due process of law. Issues such as public
trials, the right to competent counsel, the right of the accused to call
witnesses and trial procedures have been extensively dealt with in previous
reports and in the Special Representative’s interim report to the
General Assembly; however, we are not aware of any new steps or at least of
any change in attitude regarding these issues. Therefore, it can be stated
that no change has been observed in the circumstances under review.
94. On 10 December 1994, Mr. Asadollah Lajevardi, Chief of the Prisons
Department, stated that there were 100,481 inmates in Iranian prisons. He
said that over half those prisoners were drug traffickers and drug addicts.
He recognized that there were some persons in prison on charges of belonging
to armed opposition groups. Other sources estimate that there are 4,000 women
and 3,776 persons of Afghan nationality in prison.
95. The Special Representative has requested specific information from the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the charges against 78 persons
who are known to be detained in various Iranian prisons and the circumstances
of their detention and prosecution. One of these persons, Mohammadi Malakeh,
is considered by non-governmental organizations to be a prisoner of
conscience. It is notable that Mrs. Malakeh was sentenced to 20 years in
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prison without having had the benefit of a qualified defence counsel during
the trial. In its reply, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
provided information on two prisoners, Mohammad Bagher Bourzooi and
Manouchehr Karimzadeh, stating that they had been pardoned and released
(A/49/514/Add.2, p. 14).
96. Of particular concern has been the situation regarding
Mr. Abbas Amir Entezam, who was visited by the Special Representative at
Evin prison in December 1991. Despite various illnesses and malnutrition, he
is reportedly not allowed to receive food or medicine sent in from outside the
prison or to buy it. He has been allowed to receive a visit every two weeks,
although the visits are said to be frequently and arbitrarily interrupted and
brought to an end by prison guards. It is also reported that Mr. Entezam
recently rejected a proposal by some officials that he should be given his
freedom in return for keeping silent about what he had seen and suffered in
prison since 1979.
97. Mr. Said Niazi-Kermani, a poet and journalist, was arrested
on 14 March 1994. The poet, essayist and satirist Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani was
arrested that same day for distributing bound photocopies of his books,
following an editorial in the Kayhan Havai in which he was accused of having
written against Islam in his books. Kayan, one of the largest dailies in the
country, speculated that the arrest of Mr. Saidi-Sirjani might have been
drug-related. Kayhan subsequently published a letter allegedly written by
Mr. Saidi-Sirjani, in which he confessed to being guilty of 40 years of
corrupt behaviour, including relations with undesirable persons, manufacture
of alcoholic beverages, frequent use of narcotic drugs, and accepting money
from the Lillian Hellman and Dashiell Hammett Foundation of New York. Persons
who knew the writer asserted that the allegation that he had written the
letter, which was published on 2 June 1994, was not credible, or that, if he
had written it, he had done so under enormous pressure. Some of his
colleagues have maintained that the handwriting which the newspaper reproduced
does not match that of the author and that the style of the letter is also
different. Moreover, the administrators of the Hellman-Hammett Prize have
indicated that Mr. Saidi-Sirjani refused to accept the money that went with
the prize which he was awarded. In the meantime, there have been
demonstrations in the streets near the prison calling for the writer to be
sentenced to death.
98. According to information provided by the American Centre of PEN,
Mr. Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani and Mr. Said Niazi-Kermani received no legal
assistance for their defence against the charges. The Centre has collected
evidence showing that the attorney, Mr. Hamide Mossadeq, was not allowed to
meet with his client, Mr. Saidi-Sirjani. The two prisoners were denied access
to defence counsel as well as visits from family members and were held
incommunicado from the time of their arrest on 14 March 1994. It is claimed
that the arrest warrants did not mention their names and that they were not
informed of the charges against them. Publication of the letter alleged to
have been written by Mr. Saidi-Sirjani could, moreover, have violated the
principles of the presumption of innocence and the impartiality of any future
trial.
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99. On 27 November 1994, the official Iranian newsagency IRNA reported that
the writer Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani had died of a heart attack. According to
his family, however, he had no history of heart problems. His body is said to
have been buried without the necessary autopsy. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran should be requested to carry out an exhaustive investigation
into the circumstances of this person’s detention and death.
100. The Special Representative has received a sketchy report about the arrest
of Mr. Nasser Anwari and his wife, whose movements have been restricted to the
city of Yazd following accusations that they attempted to provide information
to the Special Representative during one of his visits to the Islamic Republic
of Iran. In this connection, it is useful to recall Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1994/70 of 9 March 1994 in which the Commission urges
Governments to refrain from all acts of intimidation or reprisal against,
inter alia, those who seek to cooperate or have cooperated with
representatives of United Nations human rights bodies, or who have provided
testimony or information to them.
101. The criminal investigation system and the regime of punishment for
offenders will again be put to the test with the cases of the assassinations
of the Protestant ministers. It is to be hoped, and should be requested, that
the guilty parties will be tried with full respect for the guarantees of due
process of law and that appropriate penalties will be imposed.
J. Freedom of religion
102. The Bible Society of Iran and the Garden of Evangelism society remain
closed. The closure of the Christian church at Gorgan has also been reported.
The Christian churches at Mashhad, Sari, Ahwaz, Kerman and Kermanshah have
been closed. The church at Orumiyeh is open but only one religious service is
permitted each week. Christian religious services are permitted in the
Armenian and Syrian languages but not in Farsi. Christian church leaders have
signed written promises not to permit Muslim believers to attend their
religious services. An inter-faith Christian association, "Portes Ouvertes",
reported that Hassan Shahjamali, an Iranian Christian living in the
United States, disappeared mysteriously in Iran while on his way to Tehran
airport from Shiraz on 1 July 1994. The Special Representative was later
informed that Mr. Shahjamali has been detained at Shiraz and subsequently
released on 20 July 1994. Another Protestant minister, Nathaniel Beni Paul,
remains in detention at Ahwaz. Reports have also been received of alleged
acts of aggression, persecution and threats against other Protestant ministers
and Christian converts at Kermanshah.
103. In its reply to the allegations referred to in the previous paragraph,
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized that all religious
minorities enjoyed full legal rights in the country. It stated that churches
were established and operated in accordance with the law of the land and
denied that the persons in question had been arrested. It added that
religious minorities had their own private schools, at which they were free to
practise and teach their religions. Those schools were supported financially
by the Ministry of Education (see document A/49/514/Add.2, pp. 11 and 12).
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K. Situation of the Baha’is
104. Section III.F. of the interim report (A/49/514) deals with imprisoned
persons of the Baha’i faith. It also reports that on 8 December 1993, two
Baha’is, Mr. Bihnam Mithaqi and Mr. Kayvan Khalajabadi, were sentenced to
death by an Islamic revolutionary court at Tehran after being held in
detention since April 1989 without any formal charges being brought against
them. On 8 December 1993, Mr. Ramidan’ali Dhulfaqari was sentenced to death
for apostasy and later released. The charges of apostasy have not been
withdrawn, however, and his situation is therefore unclear. Mr. Bakhshu’llah
Mithaqi, who has been in prison since 1985, has been verbally notified that a
revolutionary court has extended his prison sentence by a further period
of 10 years.
105. Property of Baha’is resident at Ilkhchi and Saryan has been confiscated.
Pressure on the Baha’i community has been particularly severe in the city of
Mashhad. Cemeteries, historic sites, administrative centres and property
confiscated in 1979 have not been returned to the community.
L. Situation of women
106. The basic principles to be applied to the evaluation of standards and
practices with regard to the situation of women by the competent organs of the
international community are to be found principally in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (and in particular, arts. 1, 2, 6, 7 and 16) and
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 3), which
reads: "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political
rights set forth in the present Covenant." The Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/23) adopted during the World Conference on
Human Rights reaffirmed that the rights of women are an indivisible, integral
and inalienable part of human rights and declared that the full participation
of women in the civil, political, economic, social and cultural life of their
countries and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex
are priority objectives of the international community.
107. Section III.G. of the interim report (A/49/514) and paragraphs 54 to 57
of this report deal with the situation of women; according to reports from
various sources, matters did not change over the course of 1994. The 1993
reports, which treat the subject at length, are also still relevant
(A/48/526 and Add.1, E/CN.4/1994/50). On 5 May 1994, a student of medicine at
Beheshti University in Tehran, who had been an activist in recent student
demonstrations, was found dead, with marks of strangulation and a broken arm.
The forensic examination concluded that she had committed suicide. Her fellow
women students did not believe this version of the facts, and some 1,000 of
them occupied a university building to protest at what they considered a
murder and to demand protection. The students also called for an official
investigation of the case. In its reply, the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran stated that the student had committed suicide as a result of
family problems and that the allegation that she had been assassinated was
baseless (see document A/49/514/Add.2, p. 13).
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M. Political rights
108. The Minister of the Interior stated that over the past 12 years his
Ministry had registered 300 associations of a non-political nature and that no
organization had applied for registration as a political party. This
information was contradicted by a representative of the Freedom Movement of
Iran, who said that his organization had been applying for registration since
1983 and knew of other organizations which had also requested formal
registration as political parties but had so far received no reply.
N. Situation of refugees
109. The information given in paragraphs 63 to 66 of this report, which
supplement previous information, confirms the Special Representative’s view
that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is complying with its
international commitments with regard to refugees and that even with the
economic burden imposed on it by the enormous influx of people it is
continuing to give refuge to nationals of neighbouring countries.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
110. Not all the facts mentioned in section II of this report can be taken as
substantiated. However, the facts that can be regarded as proven constitute a
sufficient basis for a number of conclusions and recommendations that might
serve as a guide for the action to be taken by the Commission on Human Rights.
This section details the issues that, in the opinion of the Special
Representative, merit attention; some of them might be incorporated in the
resolution to be adopted on this item.
(a) The Islamic Republic of Iran should immediately resume cooperation
with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), allowing it to make
periodic visits to prisons and prisoners in accordance with the agreement
concluded in 1991 and still in force.
(b) It should be borne in mind that under article 6.5, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Iran is a full
signatory, minors under 18 years of age are exempt from the death penalty,
regardless of the seriousness of the crimes they have committed.
(c) The murders of Protestant Christian ministers and the deaths of
Mr. Haji Mohammad Ziaie, Mr. Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani, Mr. Abdul Hossein Reeici
and Mr. Ali Reza Merkand should be the subject of a thorough, careful and
impartial investigation.
(d) The investigation and prosecution of the persons found to be
responsible for the attacks carried out in 1994 will test the effectiveness of
due process guarantees, since they aroused strong feelings, and understandably
so. None the less, the temptation must be avoided to let feeling dominate
reason and to allow the desire to punish to replace the need for an objective
examination of the evidence during the criminal proceedings.
(e) Forms of punishment which entail torture, such as amputation and
flogging, and are incompatible with applicable international human rights
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instruments, continue to be inflicted; there has also been evidence of an
increase in public executions and executions by stoning.
(f) The information collected on the treatment of prisoners is
sufficient to support the conclusion that torture is used to extract
confessions, at least in politically sensitive cases. It has been some time
since the evidence received has been as direct and convincing as that provided
by the testimony of the German prisoner recently released and the condition of
the body of the Iranian citizen of the Jewish faith who was recently executed.
(g) There is an urgent need to ensure that the guarantees of due
process of law are effectively applied, particularly in proceedings held
before the Islamic revolutionary courts. To accomplish that, the laws will
need to be revised with particular attention to implementation measures. It
goes without saying that even the best laws are ineffective when they are not
applied conscientiously.
(h) There must be an end to the harassment and discrimination to which
members of the Baha’i community are subjected because of their religious
convictions, mainly in matters of marriage, divorce, succession, issue of
passports and exit visas, rights of ownership and free possession of their
places of worship, cemeteries, historic sites and administrative centres.
Careful consideration should also be given to the legal situation of Baha’is
who are in prison, particularly those who have been sentenced to death or
accused of apostasy.
(i) There must also be an end to acts of surveillance, hostility and
discrimination against Protestants, particularly converts from Islam;
permission should be given for the re-opening of churches, chapels, libraries,
bookshops and other Christian premises that have been closed down and for the
construction of new premises; and the right to hold services in Farsi without
being kept under surveillance by agents of the security forces should be
guaranteed.
(j) The situation of writers and of persons imprisoned for sending open
letters to the authorities calling for the observance of human rights is a
matter of special concern; the view expressed by the United Nations body
responsible for promoting human rights could surely have a positive effect.
(k) Uncontrolled mob attacks on the press have been described in
earlier reports. Now similar attacks are being directed at peaceful political
gatherings. An urgent appeal must therefore be made to the authorities to
intervene in timely fashion with due moderation in order to protect the
victims of such attacks and ensure that freedom of opinion and expression and
the rights of assembly and association actually prevail.
(l) The situation of women is a sensitive issue, given the historical
and cultural background, but the organizations with a mandate to monitor
compliance with applicable international human rights instruments cannot, as a
matter of duty, ignore the existence of laws and practices that discriminate
between the sexes and cannot neglect to point out the need to adapt internal
legal systems to the international legal framework.
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(m) It is to be hoped, and indeed urged, that the evidence in cases
with high political impact, such as the murders of the Protestant ministers
and the attacks using explosives, will be examined according to logical and
reasonable rules of evaluation and procedure that will support credible
conclusions, in other words, by applying what is known in legal language as
sana critica. When political crimes are involved, it should be borne in mind
that the perpetrators will try to protect themselves by dragging in red
herrings and that incriminating others is usually part of the preparation and
planning of a political crime. It is best, therefore, to be suspicious of
very obvious clues, as in the case of the woman attempting to flee the country
through the Zahedan area carrying evidence relating to the murder of the
Reverend Tatavous Michaelian.
(n) In the above-mentioned politically sensitive cases involving police
investigation and criminal prosecution, the findings would be stronger and
more credible if the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran were to
solicit the cooperation of the competent organs of the United Nations and
humanitarian organizations in sending observers to the trials and if it were
to send photocopies of the records of the judicial proceedings to the
competent organs of the United Nations. The observers would note in
particular whether the trials were held in a public forum rather than inside a
prison, and whether the accused benefited from all the guarantees of due
process of law, including the right to be notified in writing of the charges
against them; to have the assistance of a professional attorney of their
choice, given sufficient time to prepare a defence; to present evidence in
their favour and to file motions and appeals. It should be borne in mind that
inaction is incompatible with applicable international obligations.
111. It should be explained that the international cooperation referred to in
the previous paragraph is consistent with the human rights system promoted by
the United Nations, since it simply ensures the credibility and objectivity of
the acquittal or conviction handed down in the trial in question, particularly
in cases that are highly sensitive and have aroused national and international
public opinion. Such cooperation emphasizes the presence of reliable
witnesses qualified to testify that the applicable international regulations
have been complied with, and it will be still better if photocopies of the
documents relating to criminal cases can also be sent.
112. International cooperation is already common in connection with the
election of political representatives. Similar grounds can be found,
mutatis mutandis, with respect to judicial cases which give rise to
accusations and counter accusations, controversy in the media, public
discussion of the evidence for guilt or innocence and other circumstances
making for politicization, and consequently for an increased risk that the
persons on trial may be judged in ways that are not strictly and objectively
legal. This type of cooperation is compatible with State sovereignty,
provided that the Governments in question give their express or tacit consent.
113. In view of the above observations, the Special Representative considers
that continued international scrutiny of the situation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the Islamic Republic of Iran is warranted and that the
subject should remain on the agenda of the General Assembly.
- - - - -
Annex 59
E/1996/23
E/CN.4/1996/177
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SECOND SESSION
(18 March-26 April 1996)
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS, 1996
SUPPLEMENT NO. 3
UNITED NATIONS
Annex 60
Annex 60
E/1996/23
E/CN.4/1996/177
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SECOND SESSION
(18 March-26 April 1996)
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS, 1996
SUPPLEMENT NO. 3
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK AND GENEVA,1996
Annex 60
NOTE
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined
with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations
document.
A State not member of the Commission may submit proposals in accordance
with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of the functional commissions of
the Economic and Social Council. The list of participants is contained in annex I.
E/1996/23
E/CN.4/1996/177
Annex 60
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. Draft resolutions and decisions recommended for
adoption by the Economic and Social Council . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Draft resolutions
I. Question of human rights and states of emergency . 17
II. Question of a draft optional protocol to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . . . 17
III. Working group of the Commission on Human
Rights to elaborate a draft declaration
in accordance with paragraph 5 of
General Assembly resolution 49/214
of 23 December 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
IV. Protection of the heritage of indigenous people . . 18
V. Question of a draft declaration on the right and
responsibility of individuals, groups and organs
of society to promote and protect universally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms . 19
B. Draft decisions
1. Situation of human rights in Burundi . . . . . . . . 19
2. Implementation of the Programme of Action for
the Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Question of the realization in all countries of the
economic, social and cultural rights contained in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems
which the developing countries face in their
efforts to achieve these human rights . . . . . . . . 20
4. Effects on the full enjoyment of human rights of the
economic adjustment policies arising from foreign
debt and, in particular, on the implementation of
the Declaration on the Right to Development . . . . . 21
5. The right to development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
I. B. Draft decisions (continued)
6. Measures to combat contemporary forms of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Implementation of the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief . . . 22
8. Human rights of persons with disabilities . . . . . 23
9. Human rights and forensic science . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11. Report of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities . . 24
12. National institutions for the promotion and
protection of human rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
13. Right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . . 24
14. Assistance to States in strengthening the rule
of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15. Assistance to Somalia in the field of human
rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
16. Situation of human rights in Haiti . . . . . . . . 25
17. Assistance to Guatemala in the field of human
rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
18. Regional arrangements for the promotion and
protection of human rights in the Asian and
Pacific region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
19. Composition of the staff of the Centre for
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
20. Situation of human rights in Equatorial Guinea . . 26
21. Human rights situation in southern Lebanon and
West Bekaa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
I. B. Draft decisions (continued)
22. Situation of human rights in Cuba . . . . . . . . . 27
23. Situation of human rights in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the State of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
24. Situation of human rights in Iraq . . . . . . . . . 28
25. Situation of human rights in the Sudan . . . . . . 28
26. Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions . . 28
27. Situation of human rights in Afghanistan . . . . . 29
28. Situation of human rights in Rwanda . . . . . . . . 29
29. Situation of human rights in Zaire . . . . . . . . 29
30. Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action . . 29
31. Situation of human rights in Nigeria . . . . . . . 30
32. Situation of human rights in Myanmar . . . . . . . 30
33. Evaluation of the human rights programme of the
United Nations system, in accordance with the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action . . . . 30
34. Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic
of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
35. Rights of the child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
36. Effects of structural adjustment programmes on
the full enjoyment of human rights . . . . . . . . 31
37. Forced evictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
38. Systematic rape and sexual slavery during periods
of armed conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
39. Human rights dimensions of population transfer,
including the implantation of settlers and
settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
I. B. Draft decisions (continued)
40. Study on treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements between States
and indigenous populations . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
41. Organization of the work of the fifty-third session 33
42. Organization of the work of the fifty-third session 34
II. Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Commission
at its fifty-second session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Resolutions
1996/1. Situation of human rights in Burundi . . . . . 35
1996/2. Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan . . 39
1996/3. Question of the violation of human rights
in the occupied Arab territories,
including Palestine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1996/4. Israeli settlements in the occupied
Arab territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1996/5. Situation in occupied Palestine . . . . . . . 44
1996/6. Question of Western Sahara . . . . . . . . . . 46
1996/7. Middle East peace process . . . . . . . . . . 49
1996/8. Implementation of the Programme of Action
for the Third Decade to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1996/9. Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 55
1996/10. Human rights and extreme poverty . . . . . . . 56
1996/11. Question of the realization in all countries
of the economic, social and cultural rights
contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and study of special problems which
the developing countries face in their
efforts to achieve these human rights . . . . 60
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
II. A. Resolutions (continued)
1996/12. Effects on the full enjoyment of human rights
of the economic adjustment policies arising
from foreign debt and, in particular, on the
implementation of the Declaration on the Right
to Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1996/13. Human rights and the environment . . . . . . . 68
1996/14. Adverse effects of the illicit movement and
dumping of toxic and dangerous products and
wastes on the enjoyment of human rights . . . 69
1996/15. The right to development . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1996/16. Status of the International Covenants on
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1996/17. Violence against women migrant workers . . . . 78
1996/18. International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
1996/19. Tolerance and pluralism as indivisible
elements in the promotion and protection
of human rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1996/20. Rights of persons belonging to national or
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities . 85
1996/21. Measures to combat contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance . . . . . . . . . . . 88
1996/22. Effective implementation of international
instruments on human rights, including
reporting obligations under international
instruments on human rights . . . . . . . . . 91
1996/23. Implementation of the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
II. A. Resolutions (continued)
1996/24. Traffic in women and girls . . . . . . . . . . 99
1996/25. Work of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
1996/26. Minimum humanitarian standards . . . . . . . . 105
1996/27. Human rights of persons with disabilities . . 106
1996/28. Question of arbitrary detention . . . . . . . 109
1996/29. Staff members of the United Nations and of
the specialized agencies in detention . . . . 112
1996/30. Question of enforced disappearances . . . . . 115
1996/31. Human rights and forensic science . . . . . . 119
1996/32. Human rights in the administration of justice,
in particular of children and juveniles in
detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
1996/33. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment . . . . . . . . . . . 125
1996/34. Independence and impartiality of the
judiciary, jurors and assessors and
the independence of lawyers . . . . . . . . . 130
1996/35. The right to restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of grave violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . 133
1996/36. Question of human rights and states of
emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
1996/37. Question of a draft optional protocol to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . 135
1996/38. Working group of the Commission on Human
Rights to elaborate a draft declaration
in accordance with paragraph 5 of
General Assembly resolution 49/214
of 23 December 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
II. A. Resolutions (continued)
1996/39. International Decade of the World’s
Indigenous People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
1996/40. Report of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities . . . . . . . . . . . 141
1996/41. A permanent forum for indigenous people in
the United Nations system . . . . . . . . . . 143
1996/42. Preparations for the fiftieth anniversary of
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights . . 146
1996/43. The protection of human rights in the context
of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) . . 147
1996/44. United Nations Decade for Human Rights
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
1996/45. The Olympic Ideal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
1996/46. Human rights and thematic procedures . . . . . 153
1996/47. Human rights and terrorism . . . . . . . . . . 157
1996/48. Question of integrating the human rights of
women throughout the United Nations system . . 159
1996/49. The elimination of violence against women . . 162
1996/50. National institutions for the promotion and
protection of human rights . . . . . . . . . . 166
1996/51. Human rights and mass exoduses . . . . . . . . 170
1996/52. Internally displaced persons . . . . . . . . . 174
1996/53. Right to freedom of opinion and expression . . 178
1996/54. Situation of human rights in Cambodia . . . . 182
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
II. A. Resolutions (continued)
1996/55. Advisory services, technical cooperation and
the Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation
in the Field of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . 185
1996/56. Assistance to States in strengthening the
rule of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
1996/57. Assistance to Somalia in the field of
human rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
1996/58. Situation of human rights in Haiti . . . . . . 192
1996/59. Assistance to Guatemala in the field of
human rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
1996/60. Question of fundamental trade union and
workers’ rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
1996/61. Contemporary forms of slavery . . . . . . . . 203
1996/62. Hostage-taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
1996/63. Protection of the heritage of indigenous
people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
1996/64. Regional arrangements for the promotion
and protection of human rights in the
Asian and Pacific region . . . . . . . . . . . 207
1996/65. Composition of the staff of the Centre for
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
1996/66. Situation of human rights in
Equatorial Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
1996/67. Situation of human rights in Togo . . . . . . 215
1996/68. Human rights situation in southern Lebanon
and West Bekaa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
1996/69. Human rights in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
1996/70. Cooperation with representatives of
United Nations human rights bodies . . . . . . 220
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
II. A. Resolutions (continued)
1996/71. Situation of human rights in the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the state of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of
Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) . . . . . . 221
1996/72. Situation of human rights in Iraq . . . . . . 233
1996/73. Situation of human rights in the Sudan . . . . 237
1996/74. Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
1996/75. Situation of human rights in Afghanistan . . . 247
1996/76. Situation of human rights in Rwanda . . . . . 250
1996/77. Situation of human rights in Zaire . . . . . . 255
1996/78. Comprehensive implementation of and
follow-up to the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action . . . . . . . . . . . 258
1996/79. Situation of human rights in Nigeria . . . . . 261
1996/80. Situation of human rights in Myanmar . . . . . 263
1996/81. Question of a draft declaration on the right
and responsibility of individuals, groups
and organs of society to promote and protect
universally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
1996/82. Strengthening of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights . . . . . 269
1996/83. Evaluation of the human rights programme of
the United Nations system, in accordance
with the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
1996/84. Situation of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
1996/85. Rights of the child . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
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CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Page
II. B. Decisions
1996/101. Organization of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
1996/102. Indigenous issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
1996/103. Effects of structural adjustment policies on
the full enjoyment of human rights . . . . . . 289
1996/104. Forced evictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
1996/105. Recognition of gross and large-scale
violations of human rights as an
international crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
1996/106. Question of the implications for human
rights of United Nations action, including
humanitarian assistance, in addressing
international humanitarian problems in the
promotion and protection of human rights . . . 290
1996/107. Systematic rape and sexual slavery during
periods of armed conflicts . . . . . . . . . . 290
1996/108. Human rights dimensions of population
transfer, including the implantation
of settlers and settlements . . . . . . . . . 291
1996/109. Study on treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements between States
and indigenous populations . . . . . . . . . . 291
1996/110. Organization of the work of the fifty-third
session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
1996/111. Organization of the work of the fifty-third
session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
1996/112. Question of human rights in Cyprus . . . . . . 292
1996/113. Organization of the work of the fifty-third
session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
1996/114. Organization of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
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Annex 60
CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Paragraphs Page
III. Organization of the work of the session . . . . . . . 1 - 35 294
A. Opening and duration of the session . . . . . . . 1 - 2 294
B. Attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 294
C. Election of officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 294
D. Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 8 294
E. Organization of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 30 295
F. Meetings, resolutions and documentation . . . . . 31 - 34 300
G. Visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 301
IV. Question of the violation of human rights in the
occupied Arab territories, including Palestine . . . 36 - 55 304
V. Question of the realization in all countries of
the economic, social and cultural rights contained
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems
which the developing countries face in their
efforts to achieve these human rights, including:
(a) Problems related to the right to enjoy an
adequate standard of living; foreign debt,
economic adjustment policies and their
effects on the full enjoyment of human
rights and, in particular, on the
implementation of the Declaration on the
Right to Development;
(b) The effects of the existing unjust
international economic order on the
economies of the developing countries, and
the obstacle that this represents for the
implementation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 - 106 307
VI. Question of the realization of the right to
development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 - 117 315
VII. The right of peoples to self-determination and its
application to peoples under colonial or alien
domination or foreign occupation . . . . . . . . . . 118 - 134 317
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Annex 60
CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Paragraphs Page
VIII. Question of the human rights of all persons
subjected to any form of detention or
imprisonment, in particular:
(a) Torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) Status of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment;
(c) Question of enforced or involuntary
disappearances;
(d) Question of a draft optional protocol to
the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 - 208 319
IX. Further promotion and encouragement of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
question of the programme and methods of work
of the Commission:
(a) Alternative approaches and ways and means
within the United Nations system for
improving the effective enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms;
(b) National institutions for the promotion
and protection of human rights;
(c) Coordinating role of the Centre for Human
Rights within the United Nations bodies
and machinery dealing with the promotion
and protection of human rights;
(d) Human rights, mass exoduses and displaced
persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 - 284 335
X. Question of the violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, with
particular reference to colonial and other
dependent countries and territories, including:
(a) Question of human rights in Cyprus;
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Annex 60
CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Paragraphs Page
X. (b) Study of situations which appear to reveal a
consistent pattern of gross violations of
human rights as provided for in Commission
resolution 8 (XXIII) and Economic and Social
Council resolutions 1235 (XLII) and
1503 (XLVIII): report of the Working Group
on Situations established by Economic and
Social Council resolution 1990/41 of
25 May 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 - 384 347
XI. Measures to improve the situation and ensure the
human rights and dignity of all migrant workers . . . 385 - 397 366
XII. Implementation of the Programme of Action for
the Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398 - 417 368
XIII. Status of the International Covenants on Human
Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 - 425 372
XIV. Effective functioning of bodies established pursuant
to United Nations human rights instruments . . . . . 426 - 433 373
XV. Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its
forty-seventh session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434 - 473 374
XVI. Rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic,
religious and linguistic minorities . . . . . . . . . 474 - 486 379
XVII. Advisory services in the field of human rights . . . 487 - 516 381
XVIII. Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517 - 526 385
XIX. Drafting of a declaration on the right and
responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of
society to promote and protect universally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms . . 527 - 535 387
XX. Rights of the child, including:
(a) Status of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child;
(b) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale
of children, child prostitution and child
pornography;
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Annex 60
CONTENTS (continued)
Chapter Paragraphs Page
XX. (c) Programme of Action for the Prevention of
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography;
(d) Question of a draft optional protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the sale of children, child prostitution
and child pornography, as well as the basic
measures needed for their prevention and
eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536 - 567 388
XXI. Follow-up to the World Conference on Human Rights . . 568 - 579 395
XXII. Election of members of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580 - 586 397
XXIII. Indigenous issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 - 617 399
XXIV. Draft provisional agenda for the fifty-third session
of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618 - 620 403
XXV. Report to the Economic and Social Council on the
fifty-second session of the Commission . . . . . . . 621 415
Annexes
Page
I. Attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
II. Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
III. Administrative and programme budget implications of
resolutions and decisions adopted by the Commission
at its fifty-second session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
IV. List of documents issued for the fifty-second session
of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
V. Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Commission
at its fifty-second session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
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Annex 60
1996/83. Evaluation of the human rights programme of the
United Nations system, in accordance with the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
The Commission on Human Rights,
Considering that the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(A/CONF.157/23), adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on
25 June 1993 and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 48/121 of
20 December 1993, recommends that, among other relevant bodies of the
United Nations, the Commission on Human Rights consider ways and means for the
full implementation, without delay, of the recommendations contained in the
Declaration and Programme of Action and that, for this purpose, the Commission
should annually review the progress towards this end,
Recalling its resolution 1994/95 of 9 March 1994, in which it decided to
review annually the progress towards the full implementation of the
recommendations contained in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
Considering that the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action stressed
the importance of strengthening the United Nations Centre for Human Rights and
the need for it to play an important role in coordinating system-wide
attention for human rights,
Recognizing the necessity for the continuing adaptation of the
United Nations human rights machinery to current and future needs in the
promotion and protection of all human rights, to be conducted in a transparent
manner through consultations with Member States and competent
intergovernmental bodies,
Having in mind the prominent role played by the Commission on Human
Rights as a policy-making body in the field of human rights within the
United Nations system,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 48/141 in which the
General Assembly decided to create the post of United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights as the United Nations official with principal
responsibility for United Nations human rights activities,
Noting the respective functions of the Secretary-General and the
pertinent bodies in the revision of the medium-term plan of the human rights
programme of the United Nations system, especially the Committee on Programme
Planning and Coordination, the Third and Fifth Committees of the
General Assembly and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions,
Recalling that, in the ongoing review of the structures of the
Secretariat of the United Nations dealing with human rights, in particular the
Centre for Human Rights, it is necessary to ensure full implementation of the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/23) and all mandates
established by decisions of competent bodies in the field of human rights,
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Annex 60
Emphasizing the importance of maintaining a continuing dialogue between
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Member States on
these issues,
Welcoming the consultations carried out by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights in this regard,
1. Encourages the General Assembly to continue its current examination
of the proposed revisions to the medium-term plan of the human rights
programme of the United Nations system with a view to its early adoption;
2. Stresses the need for the United Nations bodies responsible for the
revision of the medium-term plan of the human rights programme of the
United Nations system to ensure full reflection of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action and of all mandates established by decisions of the
competent bodies in the field of human rights;
3. Also stresses that the process of restructuring the Centre for
Human Rights should ensure the full implementation of the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action and of all mandates established by decisions of the
competent bodies in the field of human rights;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to convene at least
twice a year in Geneva meetings with all interested States to provide
information and exchange views on the activities conducted by the Centre for
Human Rights and its process of restructuring;
5. Expresses its confidence that the Secretary-General will continue
to keep Member States informed on the follow-up of the present resolution;
6. Decides to consider this matter at its fifty-third session.
61st meeting
24 April 1996
[Adopted without a vote. See chap. XXI.]
1996/84. Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
The Commission on Human Rights,
Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights,
Recalling the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/23)
as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/121 of
20 December 1993, and in particular Part I, paragraph 1, which reaffirms,
inter alia, that human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of
all human beings and that their protection and promotion is the first
responsibility of Governments,
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Annex 60
Reaffirming that all Member States have a duty to fulfil the obligations
they have undertaken under the various international instruments in the field
of human rights,
Mindful that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party to the International
Covenants on Human Rights,
Recalling in particular its resolution 1984/54 of 14 March 1984, in which
the Commission requested its Chairman to appoint a special representative to
make a thorough study of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, based on such information as the special representative might deem
relevant, including comments and material provided by the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran,
Noting the appointment by the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
of Mr. Maurice Danby Copithorne as Special Representative of the Commission on
the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and paying
tribute to his predecessor, Mr. Reinaldo Galindo Pohl,
Welcoming the cooperation extended by the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Special Representative, who has been able to conduct a
preliminary visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Recalling its previous resolutions expressing concern at the violations
of human rights by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including
its most recent, resolution 1995/68 of 8 March 1995, and those of the
General Assembly, including the most recent, resolution 50/188 of
22 December 1995, and of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, including the most recent, resolution 1995/18 of
24 August 1995, which condemned the violations of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran,
Noting the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the human rights situation in the
Islamic Republic of Iran,
Reaffirming that Governments are accountable for assassinations and
attacks by their agents against persons on the territory of another State, as
well as for the incitement, approval or wilful condoning of such acts,
Noting the view of the Special Representative that a number of specific
topics warrant his further detailed examination, particularly in the area of
criminal procedure and the penal system,
Expressing the hope that the atmosphere for change believed to be
detected by the Special Representative will result in relevant improvements,
Welcoming the cooperation extended by the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance and the
Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, who have been able to
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visit the Islamic Republic of Iran, and bearing in mind the reports of these
Special Rapporteurs on their visits (E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2 and
E/CN.4/1996/39/Add.2),
1. Welcomes the report of the Special Representative of the Commission
and the observations contained therein (E/CN.4/1996/59);
2. Expresses its concern at the continuation of violations of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular the failure to meet
international standards with regard to the administration of justice, notably
with respect to pre-trial detention and the right of accused persons to
defence lawyers, subsequent executions in the absence of guarantees of due
process of law and cases of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, the discriminatory treatment of minorities by reason of their
religious beliefs, notably the Baha’is, whose existence as a viable religious
community in the Islamic Republic of Iran is threatened, lack of adequate
protection for some Christian minorities, some members of which have been the
target of intimidation and assassinations, violations of the right to peaceful
assembly and restrictions on the freedom of expression, thought, opinion and
the press, including intimidation and harassment of journalists;
3. Calls upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
implement fully the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Rapporteur
on religious intolerance relating to the Baha’is and to other minority
religious groups, including Christians;
4. Expresses its concern at the lack of full and equal enjoyment by
women of human rights, and calls upon the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to take effective measures to eliminate discrimination against women;
5. Expresses its grave concern at the continued use of the death
penalty in the Islamic Republic of Iran in violation of the relevant
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
United Nations safeguards;
6. Also expresses its grave concern that there are continuing threats
to the life of Mr. Salman Rushdie, as well as to individuals associated with
his work, which have the support of the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran;
7. Deplores the continuing violence against Iranians outside the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and urges the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to refrain from activities against members of the Iranian opposition
living abroad and to cooperate wholeheartedly with the authorities of other
countries in investigating and punishing offences reported by them;
8. Urges the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a State
party to the International Covenants on Human Rights, to abide by its
obligations under the Covenants and under other international instruments on
human rights to which it is party, and to ensure that all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups,
enjoy the rights recognized in these instruments;
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9. Encourages the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
continue to extend maximum cooperation to international humanitarian
organizations;
10. Welcomes the invitation extended by the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the Special Representative as well as the
Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of expression and association, and
calls upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to
cooperate with the mechanisms of the Commission, including by allowing them
continued free access to the country;
11. Decides to extend the mandate of the Special Representative, as
contained in Commission resolution 1984/54 of 14 March 1984, for a further
year;
12. Stresses the need to apply gender perspective in the reporting
process, including in information collection and recommendations;
13. Requests the Special Representative to submit an interim report to
the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority
groups such as the Baha’is, and to report to the Commission at its
fifty-third session;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to
the Special Representative;
15. Decides to continue its consideration of the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a matter of priority, at its
fifty-third session.
62nd meeting
24 April 1996
[Adopted by a roll-call vote of 24 votes to 7,
with 20 abstentions. See chap. X.]
1996/85. Rights of the child
The Commission on Human Rights,
Recalling its resolutions 1995/78 and 1995/79 of 8 March 1995 and
General Assembly resolution 50/153 of 21 December 1995,
Recalling also the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(A/CONF.157/23), in which the World Conference on Human Rights urged all
States, with the support of international cooperation, to address the acute
problem of children under especially difficult circumstances, and recalling
further that the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action stated that
exploitation and abuse of children should be actively combated, including by
addressing their root causes, and that effective measures are required against
female infanticide, harmful child labour, sale of children and organs, child
prostitution, child pornography, as well as other forms of sexual abuse,
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