INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO
CESSATION OF THE NUCLEARARMS RACE AND TO NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT
(Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)
ANNEXES
TO
MEMORIAL
OF
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Volume II
16 March 2015 ANNEX44
ANNEx44- R.Norton-Taylor, "Trident more effective with US arming deviee, tests
suggest", The Guardian, 6 April 2011,
http:/www.theguardian.com/uk/20111 apr/06/trident-us-arming-system-test
reinforctngourteclmica1,po!lti.;;ùandnnandalnuclear dependencyandafuzzy,at
best,notionofbeingardml€p!!lldentnudear power."Anew USanning,fusing.and
lirinsystem thatconttolsme detonati<mof me,.,'athi!ac,ombinedwith thehi,gh
accuracy ofBritalnTridentwarheads will ;illowtIJlto tlueatenhardtargetssuclt
asundergroundbunkers,Rltchieadded,
He saidme US programmewouldertend theservicelûeol'Trldentwarbeadsby 30
yeal'$.
The govemment was fustquestionedaboutthenew US romponents forlltitain's
TridentnûSi!ile_in2007 by NicHarvey,theLibenliDemocrat defence~polœsman
andnow atmed forŒsminister.DesBrownce !:bendefencesecretaty,toldhlm1'1am
notpreparedtodiscnssme det<illedperfonnanŒclw:aderîsticsof!lurnuclear
weapons:
The government isparticn1arlysensitiveaboutme Tridentnuclearwarheadupgrade
asitcould beseizedonbynon-nuclear statesinany forthcomingintematinnal
dî$armamemtalks.
The disdosurescome ata timewhcndiscnssionsabout how toreplaŒtheemting
Tridentsystem iscausingseverestrainswlthlnthe govmu:nem.
LiamFox,the defeneesecretary,lnsîststhee:xlstlnglieoffuursubmarlnesmustbe
replaŒd Jike.for-likeanBrita m ust perslswîthacontinuonsat-seadeterrent
{CASD) -thatis,havlngonenuclearcarmedsubmarineon patroleverydayoftheyear.
Harveytoldth" Gnatdianearliertbîsyear!hatalternativedid not.seemtohave been
givendet<illedorobjectiveassessments.•!hedebate basbeenverymuehyesorn!lto
tbîssinglenotionofhowa crt!dibledeterrentcanbeprov:ided,hesaid.
Nodate basyetbeenfhed for the "initial gadecisionon the desigofthe new
Tridentsulnnatinelleet.TheMoD fustsaidîtwouldbeannouncedinDecember.One
of meproblemsiswhatkindofnuclearreacrorwouldpropelth;:submatines. The
ehoîce ibetweenmeexistingpressutisedwater (PWR2) reactoofthe klndusedln
thenavy'sAstnte-classconvention<illyrmedsubmarinesandanewPWR3 reaetor!lf
USdesign.
Adecisionaboutthennalrnakeupofasuccessorto theexis!lngTridemsystem bas
beenputoff untilafterthigeneralelection,duein 2015. 'l'MoD wasunableto
illlllli!'diatelryespondtoSandia'sd!sclosuresormeirsign!llcance,
Moreneews
Topics
Trident
Milltary
Defence policy
Nudeat weapons ANNEX45
ANNEX45- Hansanl, HC, 8 December 2009, col. 214W,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm091208/text
/91208
w0008.htm#09120870000086
Trident !vlissîles
Angus Robertson: ·ro ask the Secretaty OfState tor Del'encewnat plahàshto modifthe gas transfer s-,stofthe Trident wamead as
partofthéMk.4Arei'urbfshmentprogramme: i!Itd which COUrltrythe gas.transfer syswillbe rnaoufactured. (3043401
Mr. Quentin DaVIe$: I rnfer the hon. Membtôthe answer gWen by my rlght hori. Friertd, the Secretaty of State foé.!3fêi'IC
Deœm~r 2009, Official R.ep&t, column 911W. Asfur :a!'lymodifications p!anned fur this system, it !s Mlnlsuy of Oeta.eè pollcy not
ttlmrnent on details of UKwal'head desigrt .asto do so wouId, or woulto,prejUdice national serur!ty and defenŒ ln théUK.
8 Dec 2009 : Column 214W
Angus Robertlion: To ask the SecretarofState tor Defence what the projecied is ofthe Mk4A refurbishment p;ograll\1l'le fof Trident
warheads; and what ptQportlon of this experulitUrt! hito!be !ncurrelnthe United States. (304.3411
Ml'. Quentin Davles: The overall cost to the UK of pro<:uringthe Mk4A tomwasean element of the estlmatMure C:Ostorthe
Atomlc Weapens Est.ablîshméht as Set out ln chapter fthéWhite Paper 'The Futuré of théUnited l<lngdom's NtiDe~err eCmtd'
6994), :puhfishedln Oecember 2006.
1 am wlthho!dlng furthet details on the costs of the Mk4A programme as their release wouid, cr wouto,prejudice national security
and defenceinthe UK.
USA:Defence
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for OefenŒ for what reaS()a(a) the dassiflcatiolî guldeilnes-Ctheexcharor ot~
material be-tweênthe UK and the us were pi'OduŒrlln 2006 artd (b} the new classification.gu!dellnes CG-U5-UK·NUC·l wete produŒd io
2008. {303887}
Mr. Qu~tln Davies: Both of these documents were producen }oinbyythe UK and US ln an effortharmt~n slsulty classitlcatlolî
guidance relatlng to sensitive nudear Information. ANNEX46
ANNEx46- Hansard, HC Deb, 28 November 2012, coL 353W,
http://www.publications.parliament. uk/palcm20 1213/cmhansrd/cm 121128/text/12112
8w0001.htm#l21!2886000058
28 Nov 2012: Column 353W
attack submru:inandHercuks C130andE-3 Seuiryain:r.>ft,àudto seekasslsiawhere
"l'l'roprlaie,fromalliepanner<.
Trident
Angus Robertson:Toask theSecretmyof State for Defen<:epursuanthe"""'"''"of 13July
2lH2to thehon.Memberfor lslingtooNorth,Officia!Reptm, colunm411\V,whmthetillesareof
ollproje<:tséurrentlyuuderwathe AtomicWeaponsEslablishrnenttoioformthederbion on
wbethertc refurbis.r replatheexlstingUK Tridentwàtbe-.ul.!129581]
Mr Dllnne:The Nude'.rrWellJl"ll'CàpàbilitySustainmentl'rogrdeasbeennnder waysince
2005.ft isa programmeat the Aiomk Weap<>ssiablishrnentto maintainand wboreneŒssoryto
developscienceandlechnnl<>gy-~pab iolivtk>pinfràS.tructllrfeacilit$!afcapnbilities
toensu:rtbattheUK bastheabilitytoundetpinanydecisiononà futureUKnuclearwarhead.
Paul Flynn: To ask theSeeretaryof State for DefenΠhowmany staff aremployed on the
Tridentmplaeémentdesignprogtannne al (a)BAE Systems,(b) BabcockMarine,( c}Rolls-RoyŒ
and (d}elsewhere.{i3002l!
Mr Donné: l referthe hon. Memberto the answer 1gave on 19Novembet2012.•Offidal Report,
colum:n239W,in whkh 1stated llrathere are appro:timately l ,100BAESystemsand 100
BahcockMarine personnelemployed on the SucŒssot submarine progtamme.Workon tbe
Soccessorprognunmeis also sustaininamund600 jobs àtRolls-Royce.
lol:Omialionon"""""""! employeddrewbete is nol beld in the fortrullteqllaudiedwould
refurthe hon. Member w the answer l gave on 19Novemher2012, Ofjiâal Report.eolumn235W,
in whîchI stated !bai there approxirnately130Ministty of Defenéepersonnelemployed solely
on!heS!.ICCesS sotmarineprogr.m:une. ANNEX47
ANNEX47- T. Postol, 'How the Obarna Administration Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Bornb,' The Nation, 10Decernber 2014
http://www.thenation.cornlarticle/192633/how-obarna-adrninistration-lear
ned-stop
worrving-and-love-bornb
DD
How the ObamaAdministration
Learnedto StopWorryingand Love
the Bomb
US nuclear poliçy îs underminîng our safety and national securlty.
The-moveupdatesa conceptthatgained curren:cyunderthe aîlîngleadOf'Leoriid
Brezhnevln the 1910s. M.that time.Soviet lead$0sterrifof Amerlcannuclear
Intentions ttheydesigneda"dêadhand" system to guarantee retalinthe event of a
successfutUS attack. ln 2006,morethanthreedecadeslater,SergeiSobyanin,chief of staff
of theRussianPresldentîalExecutiveO~resse imilarconcems.
As describedeariler,the USmodernizationprogramincludeseffortsto împrollêthe relîablflty
of fuseson bal!istic-earheads.Thlsclaim disguises.animportanttact: the:fuseshave
beenmodîffetoincreasethe kllûngpowerof the warheads.Pafnstakingeffortshavealso
goneinto improvingtheirdeliveryaccuracy.Whenthe resuitsof thesecombinedateivltles
summarizedfor Russlanpolittcalleaders, hardto=understandthe1ralarm.
Theupgradedfuseson the MlnutemanlUballis1icwarheads,tor exampJe,greatlyenhance
theUS stricapacrty. hentrajectoryerrol'$piacethe redesignedwarheadssllghtlytoo
hlgh,theywiildetonatesooner1han planned.ln etherwordwildetonatedirectlyabave
thetarge·ratherthan flyingtartherdownrange,assuringthemaximumchanceof destroying
theirtarget. techniq cule~;'burstheight compensation," is onlîthe precisîon
ofdelîveryls alreadyenormousiyhlgh.
Theimplieationsof other apparentlyminertechnlcaldetal!sareslmilartyprofound,
Enhancementsta the-lnertlalmeasurementsystemin the MmutemanIll warheadslmprove
the accuracyof the locandove!octtydathatareneededta placethe warh-eads00
lethaltrajectories. Engineerintothe Mînutemanilpropulsionsystem give mllîtary
commandersgreatercontroloverthedeploymentof weapons.Upgradesto thesubmarine
taunchedTridentIl dramaticaltyimpmvethe UScapacdestroyRussiansi!O-based
ICBMs.,andwith less wamlngtime.
13103/201509
2 of5 ANNEX48
ANNEx48- France No. 01 (2010):
http:/wwv-lukdf org.uk/assets/downloads!UKFranceDefenceCooperationTreaty.pdf
ARTICLE l
Obj~ctiV~$
The Parties,buildingon the exisiingstronlinksbetWêe i cirespèctivedefenee
and security cllmmuulties and anned fmees, uru:lértaketo bulld a long-lerm
mutuallybeneficia!pminershipindeferu:eandsecuritywiththeaimsof:
1. mmdmismg theit capacities through eoordmating develllf>inellt,
acquisition, deplnyment and maintenance of a nmge of cl'lpàbilities,
làtilities, equipmem, materials and servicesil)petfonn 1he full
spectmmllfmlssions,mcludingthemostdemandmgmissions;
2. reinforcffig the defencemdnstty of the two Parties, fostering
coopetation in research and iedmology and developffigëooperntive
eqllipmentprogrammes;
3. deployingtogetherintlltheatresin Whicooth PartieshiDieagreein be
engaged, in operations oonductedu:nderthe auspi<:eof 1he United
Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa otitheJEnuropean
Union's Common Secilriiy and Defence Policy or rn a toalition ot
bilàtetal fuunework,ns well ns$Uf>jl(lrgs, agreedon a enseby case
basis, one Party whenii iengaged in opetationsin which theO!bet
Partyis noi part;
4. éll$urtnthe viabilityand safety of their nationaldeîerrents.oonsisteni
wlththeTreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNUelearWeàjl(lns;
5. ensurlng their s!lpport for action in the United Nations, the North
Atlantiè Treàty Organisation and the EiltOpean Union undet the
Common Secilriiy and Defunte Poliey as well ns compiernentarity
between thè North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Enropean
Unionin allrelevantareas. ANNEX49
ANNEx 49- http://ww•N.ukdf.org.uklassets/dow-nloads/UKFranceNudearTrydftp
TREATYBETWEENTHEUNITEDKINGOOMOFGREATBRITAIN
AND NORTHER. .RE LAl'tDAt'lo1>HEFREl'tCHREPUBLICRELATING
TOJOL'IoR 'ADIOGRAPHICfHYDRODYNA'\liCS FACILITIES
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nortbem Ireland and the French
Republk hereinafterreferredas"The Parties",
1\;findfulof their common defence interests and of the importance of nuclear
deterrence, core element of thcit national and Allied defenee strategies, and
bearinginmind that theydo not see situationsarisingin whivitalinterestsof
èitherPartycould be threatenedwithoutthe vital interestso:fthe other also belng
threaiened.
Being determined to malntain only à tmmmum credible mll:leaçapability,
consistentwith the strateglç and secnrlty tuntext of their tommitments under
ARTICLE 5 of theNorth AtlanticTreaty,done at Washingtonon 4 Aprill94and
ronslderingtatthelrnudear forces rontributeto Europe'sset:urityas a whole,
Reaffltlllingthelr rights and obligationsunderthe Treatye Non-Proliferation
of Nudear Weapons.(NPT), done on 1 July 1968, and tommitrnents ttnder the
ComprehensiveNuciear-Test-BanTreaty,doneon 10September1996,
Reltemtîngtheir mutilaiinteres.tin keepingtheir independentnudear forcesat the
highestlevetof safety and reHabiüty,at least cosi,and detenninedtu co-opem.teto
this endin theindustrial,technolt>glndsdenlilit fields,
Seeking to improve further the effediveness uf taÏrrmed forcîn,acçordaru:e
\ViththeTreaty hetweentheUnitedKingdomof GreatBritlin andNor!hemIreland
and the FrenchRepublit fot Defence:mdSecurityCo-opemtion,signedat London
on 2 November2010,
Haveagreedon thefoliowing:
ARTICLE 1
General C<~-operation
1.1 The Parties shall c!Hlperate, induding thrmtgh the exchange of relevant
classified information, in the follo\\--ingareas:
a) safety and security of nuclear weapons;
b) stockpile certification;
c) counter nuclear or radio!ogical terrorism. ANNExSO
ANNEX50-
https://Vvvvw.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/277167
/France-UK Summit-Declaration on Security and Defence.pdf
DefeneeNuclear Cooperation
30.We are maklngexcellentprogresswith the developmentof world classscienlîfic
facilitEpure in Valduc to underwritethe safe and assured performanceof our
respectivenuclearweaponstockpiles. Fînalnaoonallnvestmentapprovalswere
recenllygranted by the two Govemrnents:a slgnlncant step that deepens our
comrnltmentin accordancewlth the Treaty.lt was agreed today tooptimlzethe
efficiencyof the Teutatesproject by taklng beneficeof the refurbîshmentof a
facîlity located in Aldermaston. We also have agreed to subject more of the
technîcaland scientificdatathal underpinswarheadcertlficallonto peer revlew;
to work togetherondevelopingenergeticmaterîalsfor the future:andto conduct
joint researehat the laser facîlitiestocatedat AWË Orion and CËA/DAM - LMJ.
There îs no greater evidence of the value we both attach to the bilateral
relationship._than()Urwîl!lfjQOélîStOW()rk.toge(herîn•
lùsmOstsensîtive_àrea, ANNEx51
ANNEX 51- http://nuclearinfo.org/article/govemment-development-awe
aldermaston/uk-and-france-extend-warhead-research-collaboration.
UK andFranceextendwarheadresearchcollaborationintonewhttp:l/nudearinfo.Qrg/articldetvelopment-a,,..ld.a
nuclear NISis anot-for·pr,dependenitnformation
semee, which works to promote pUblic
awarenesandfosterdebateon:nuclear
inftlrmation
disannainent and related andety
service environrnenilsues
The new co-opètatlon arrangements will assist AWEin work on deve!oping a successor to the current Trident
nuc!ear warhead and may al!ow the establishment's scîentists to benefit from recéntwork in déveloping
F'rance'n-ewTêteNlldéaite Océaniq(~ hrtp;}/en:wlklpèd!a ..oro/wHd/T%C3%AAte htoci3AA99ak!Uèl
(TNO) nuclear warhead, which is scheduled to enter into service next year. No formai decision has yet been
takenby the UK government on whether the existing Trident warhead design will bè refurbished or replaced.
However, workis currentiy under way at AWEto inform the decision and up to 30 November 2012 a sum of
E54.6 million had been spent on such studies.
AWE'sOrîon laser became tully operational in April 2013 and in December CEAannounced that the Laser
Megajoule had conducted its flrst experiment. High powered supèrlasers such as Orion and tM Laser
Megajouie a!low researchers to conduct experiments which subject warhead materiais and components to
immense temperatures, with the results used to mode! how a nuc!ear warhead would behave as it exploded.
Such experiments have become increasingly important to nuciear-armed states foliowing agreement of the
Comprehensive Nudear-Test-Ban Treaty, which prohibits the underground 'live' testing of nuciear weapons.
Non-government organisations have raised concerns that the experiments provide away for nuclear-armed
states to side-step their obligations under the Treaty.
The Laser Megajoule and Orion operate under different temperature and pressure regimes, meaning that
co-operation between the UK and France will allow the two governments to collectively conduct experiments ANNEx52
ANNEX52 - "Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the
Limitation of Strategie Offensive Arms", Unilateral Statement by Minister Semenov,
May 17, 1972,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4795.htm
tlerim Agreement
bttp:/Jwww.state.govitlisn/4795
iaklng tnto atcmthamtidern baltistk mtsstlecsubniartrtli:S.ihepcss-es-sifnot onlinaUnited.Stai:e5-b.utttNATOoi
alitedti5ov!.tinl aore~that fer thépêrlcdofetf'ea'.:the il'lterimfteeze Ag-rte UnltédStates and i.tsNA1oallieshave
up to50 suchsubmarineswlth ·atotal oi'up to &CDb.lil!aunchstje.lonindud"lfl94i 'US.s:ubm<uine·swlth656 baitistk mhslle.
btim.:hers).However,lfduring the period oi'esfthe Agretili':.S.aiUesln NATOshould int!lll: tlto~teit mOO"i!m
Siibinlitit.él<c:eh"'numbi!ts ofsu:bmarl:nestheYwouiop-~ra- o.tionaWltri'Ud:ioroln ihêdastgrt; o~tMure
Agre.ement,the Sovll!:tUnionWitherlght-a torresponditiflJntrthenumoortli its 5ubmarlnth~~pîNo ofthe :Sovietskie.,
the soJutionof the quértf mndam bail!st!(.rttlnih!: s'ubmarfo!n the Intil gr-aemante-nlyjlartiatlytotnpt!h!at-es forthe
st:rtlte!Jtcimbal:and~pioym oetinudear~Po .isWlsibmiilines Ofthe USSRand tM OStatM.There: tfe:o>A..-es:ltrle
btli-evesthat this q~stie ondabove_althé(tuastil)liquidattheAtnèriGlnmissile submarlnè-bases outslda the U-nltedStates, Will
be ilppf'opflate-irytsolved ln thi! course of foiiow.-oonegotlations,
On May24, Ambassador .Smithmade tM fo.lioWingreply S~i!:ln"étWV:
The Unit-edStates sirlehas studied the -s-taŒmentmadesidthf lyittttOtlt:l!mingèbmpèitforsubmarinéb.ning and SLBM
!ubmarint5 OOiongingto rhttd c.ountrie'ST.M Unitednotac:ce.ptthe vaiidityof the tottslde:ratirulsln th:atstatam-ent.
On May 26 Mln!stef semenov répeatunilat sar!~ent made.oMa~17. Amb.assadot Smith also te.peated the iJ.S.rejectio-rion May'26. ANNEX53
ANNEx53- "The Future United Kingdom Strategie Nuclear Deterrent Force",
Defence Open Government Document 80/23, Ministry ofDefence, July 1980,
http:l/fc95d419f4478b3b6e5f-
3f71dOfe2b653c4fOOD2175760e96e7 .r87.cfl.rackcdn. com/800710%20MT%20to%2
0Giscard%20%28417-181%29.pdf ANNEX54
ANNEx54- "The United Kingdom Trident Programme", Defence Open Government
Document 82/1, Ministry ofDefence, Cm 8517, March 1982
Wittrmpli~ orie9ntsottridtDJt
aL A$nôwd~1fltheriet,osrltt wJl'~~
m.:~ ,'antrd)Ct~t ïhbll'!(:~nçy~~v~
D' th .btlto wck tam:~. milltmh.,atc11oo
$il tt. ~Mofll\ilt~t\Wi .td>YasaOO''it~r~
ttrlk~;· m~ul,Pn~.,lwnl'~-h~ ~~
lbto~!îr ~QçP®~tl 'lsnd> ~t~r~jertl~l~
t:V m,d'tllharlf ~J®desol,•hll~banœ·tQ
11"Ûllltl1G~ovllm wm~thtmalltt~tutitly
~!l lath!illGf ~JUJ'\YH~ TtidlDJBY~em
fllioWpartitt•ets wi~>ttt~~.~ ••n
$)'~ lerêl11vInaUnitedKîngG®ll't falm~t
anythntigbbof a flr~abllilitylâl"ithmetk
de~~IDn tatitUtnatybeyoodi~· ~ firo
powerotilBrimtoraWilmaximum.5 FtYioaŒ
wouldb$Ufr~e aeeonty.WiYsma.fYi'l:liJDrtlon
of tht SoviètICSMsi..mbeClSàid,Tti(;4lt
wouldbesuff'ontoudeterr~d~.tH.irî\p~
to b'etr\boti$,stncethe ~binSd~tiniŒd
t<ingindlJilSi~~dttis)ofismdusarvtt)!
diffiit.hro~ fnr ochtA·.tnoS~tout in
this docum;nt~nt~lyatlme® .·t~e~nt·ofon
<:.ommoootyiththe.USt:tNtvyhe pu~()f
tht UniSta~in deploîe lll~uratTrid<mt
OSrt.istomalît t\W t~titM.abiltus·itJ
nutltltr wc.apinwlntrable.S!Ji1atf~,
~aindîteronurnbèsndty~ sftarpts im;:rudlng
spèÇifJmilitarytargeJ&made~te bvthe
incre accuraofUli..Qrmodernmbsî}e,Thû
policy.b des. utlderieAW'staplibi.for
ne,.lJ'êSIWshtehb entlrèlydeltisnoin
any wayprovlae''ttrlki:"eap:orto malte
"limitednur.~··asier. o.lîkêrtèltthe
UnltStates,the UKingdonorNATOasa'1\ihore
6 SUbstibetso cithert:ontept. ANNEX55
ANNEX55- "Progress of the Trident Programme", 422 of 1987-88, HMSO, May 11
1988
Armi~t$peé
36'fbepom.,.~Qf;myfutllteatlm\~~!1ri!!Wœlli'Cimtl!e~~-
~l]l)îQnllpQiltl!e~a~-QfUKT~~-bt·lù~~
l))';.'fltel'rlmt~hâ:s~tnd.~"t.:b:w.mtl.lel$&:imÛ!t'Ullited~liWÛ!t'~
<:ltrii/Jml~tw bthtü~!<>Wl'Jœ~ilYUJ:&W~tim<~~.At
pt$nwc.~noç;t!$fuÜ!iS~·~
new~
..~OIII)'Spet..m ...tlftlltpte~\\'lillfiDilS~itt»lle!!lillelâ~
tJI.t!J..}w~m.~·~-~ ...~~ll)-~
alldAll~ilot
'\,.pro'i'ingtMelt~~otlllli>~l'«uK~is~toaÛ!t'~
inl.l!i:UK of~f'M ~~-~ m l'llrlt.at.~,
C111mtl$bmtoa~~ Sldll)c.·_.y·•ta·.ïMb*liUW~.il>l
~lln&f!!Ch~~t9U.•~Î:Hilît)t1~Rtèoo!d~$B,~
~~~~lril:ska$S~Ofl~~·ôfl.l!i:Ut,.~.~~.is~
i:OO~®ttb~~-~.fi
la..~~puusem~Mmlllli>œtlif~•~~
at.AWE~tt. WllWed~m~·1$.t,o!Z~, t..'llle
~whièJI.~t~epM~~:~•can~mpà~.tl!ermrœtœ,..lltdlil~lif
!lliilll~ ~p~ammlit·~'ll~-Wi'f~)'t1!lliillisttl!t
~t~t.R oti•Œ ~·lii3Y'.~l ·m•bll f•u.·~:ad.UiSM
~ ih:lt$>1k~.·flct·è!iltil~o~~--*-'l"lllilllt ANNEx56
ANNEX56 - Statement by Ambassador David Broucher, NPT Preparatory Committee
2004, Cluster I, May 3 2004,
http://ploughshares. ca/wp-contentlupl oads/2009/05/UK 04-1.pdf
STATE.MEN'f
Ambusador DavidBroncher
~-.mt R!l'fl~ i;~fliietlldoOrlBril!NM~~
Jrdand
NPTPreparatorC;ommitt2004
GeneralStaternent
26April2004 Mr Chairman,
Let me begin by saying how pleased we are to see you presiding over this Third Preparatory Committee. I wish
you every success. Y ou have our full support and co-opemtion for the challenging task that lies ahead.
I would like to record at the outset our endorsement of the statement made by Ireland on behalf of th<:European
Union. ·
The past year will go dO'h'liln the NPT history books for many reasons: sorne good, sorne bad. It wî.llbe
remembered for Libya's historie decision to acknowledge and renounce its VlMD programme. It •vill be
remembered for Iran's decision to sign the Additional Protocol. But many will also remember itas the year that
AQ Khan admitted selling Pakistani nuclear technology over a number ofyears to a series ofnon-nuclear
weapon states. And the year that Iran was found not to have declared significant elements of its nuclear
programme to the IAEA.
Events over the year have shown that multilateralism can pay great dividends in the field of counter
proliferation. But they have also demonstrated how much remains to be done. L<:Jopholesin the international
machinery are being sought by states to develop clandestine weapons programmes. Terrorists are see:king
nuclear materials. These threats are not receding. Information from Pakistan thal North Korea was pursuing an
undeclared uranium enrichment programme reinforces the importance of the 6 Party Talks process under way in
Beijing. We fully support !hat process. We must redouble our counter-proliferation activities and work to
strengthen the international machinery that supports them.
The NPT is the comerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. lt retains the wholehearted support of the
United Kingdom and the vast majority of the international community. Over the past year the UK has strongly
supported NPT objectives. We have worked in co-operation with the US to faciiitate Libya's decision to
acknowledge and renounce its WMD programme. We have facilitated Libyan engagement with the appropriate
international bodies, the IAEA and the OPCW, and in co-operation with these agencies we have provided
assistance with dismantlement ofLibya's programme. Together with our EU partners, France and Ge~man wey
have encouraged Iran to resolve international concerns about the purpose ofits nuclear programme through
active co-operation 'hith the IAEA. In conjunction with the IAEA Board of Governors, we have secured Iranian
agreement voluntarily to suspend development ofits uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
We believe that Iran needs to allay the concerns of the international community about its programme, :md pave
the way for a sustainable Jong-term agreement.
There have been calls recently from sorne quarters to introduce new NPT mechanisms, including Annual
Conferences to replace the Prepcoms and a standing bureau ofthe Treaty. The idea is thal such measures would
strengthen theNPT process. We disagree. Mechanisms to tackle proliferation and non-compliance already
exist within the IAEA and the UNSC. Let's concentrate our efforts on strengthening those rather thau tinkering
with core elements of the Treaty.
Compliance
The UK remains a staunch supporter ofthe IAEA's work in all areas. We particularly congratulate 1tfor its
work over the past year. The IAEA's work on safeguards underpins the entire NPT; it is the front line of
defence against states who would cheat on their international obligations. We continue to cali upon ali states
which have not yet done soto agree, bring into force, and comply with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
and Additional Protocols to those agreements. We should aim for these to become universal in the sh011estlime
possible. No country thal is developing nuclear technology for purely peaceful purposes should have anything
tofear from such a step.
2Within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Urûted Kingdom has actively promoted the principle 1hat Participating
Govemments adopt the Additional Protocol, as a condition of supply for the most sensitive ofnuclear items
the so-called Trigger List goods. Last year States Party agreed a package ofmeasures thal effective.'ysets the
Agency's budget for a 4-year period. This included a sigrûficant increase in resources for 1heAgeJl(:y's
safeguards activities. Recent events have highlighted how vital1he Agency's work is in this area We must al!
continue to ensure that the Agency has the funding itneeds. For our part, the Urûted Kingdom has wherever
possible paid its contributions in full and on time and has made voluntary contributions to the Agcncy in the last
year worth over half a million dollars.
Counter-Proliferation
The IAEA's work alonewill not solve today's problems. A broad range oftools is required that will necessitate
action by other international bodies and by national governments.
We should expand the work of the Proliferation Security Irûtiative (PSI). Through improved inform<tion
sharing and enhanced operational readiness, PSI has created the practical basis for co-operation among states in
interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. Since its
launch last year PSI has gained the support of over 60 countries and the number continues to grow. We hope
eventually to involve ail countries that have the v.ill and capacity to co-operate.
The Global Partnership is a genuinely multilateral effort to tackle the dangers posed by the weapons l·egacyof
the fonner Soviet Union. We are now seeing results on the ground. Work under the Partnership includes
programmes for the security and disposition of fissile material, improving border security, controlhng
radiological sources, and redirecting scientists and other specialists with weapons ofmass destruction expertise
employment, including commercial ventures. The UK is a strong supporter cf the Global
into peaceful civilian
Partnership. We have committed up to $750 million over 10 years.
The UK has put domestic legislation in place to give effect to our international commitments. The An.ti
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 makes it an offence to aïd or abet the overseas use or development of
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The Export Control Act 2002 extends current end-use controls to
inelude the provision oftechrûcal assistance and the transfer of technology by any means.
We would ask other national governments to enact and enforce effective domestic laws and contrais !:1at
support non-proliferation and criminalise proliferation: there must be stiffpenalties for those that do not
comply. The United Nations Security Council is currently negotiating a resolution to advance these goals. We
hope that it v:illsoon be adopted and stand ready to help states meet the obligations contained within it.
Peaceful Uses
The United Kingdom strongly supports the principle that States Party should have access to the bencfit> of
peaceful uses ofnuclear energy as described in Article IV of the NPT. But the right to enjoy such bene:'its
should be couditional on compliance with Articles f-l!I as the Foreign Secretary said in his statement to
Parliament of25 February. States Party thal have failed to comply with their safeguards obligations Josethe
confidence of the international commurûty. We should consider whether such states should not !ose the right to
the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which are of such proliferation
sensitivity. This does not mean the states concerned could not construct and run civil nuclear power st2.tions.
These could still operate with fuel supplied by countries honouring their safeguards obligations. The fuel would
be subject to Agency monitoring while in the receiving country, and would be returned to the country of supply
when spent. This would prevent a seemingly civil programme masking a weapons programme.
3Universality
India, Pakistan and Israel remain outside the treaty. We cal! on them to adhere to the treaty as non-nuclear
weapon states. We would be against any rnove to arnend the Treaty to give them formai status as nuclear
weapon states. We belîeve that ali three should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and join us
in a moratorium on the production of fissile material and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut O;'fTreaty as
the next steps towards nuclear disarmament. We welcome recent efforts by India and Pakistan to work together
to reduce nuclear tensions in the region through confidence building measures.is an
essenùal step to avoid the risk of escaiation to a nuclear exchange. It is vital thal the two sides geta realistic
understanding each other's decision-rnaking processes and red !ines. Pakistan has been a source of nuclear
proliferation through the activîties of AQ Khan, and lndia bas developed its domestic technological base to the
extent thatuld be an attractive target for procurernent networks. We need to find effective ways in which to
work with both in the future.
1\'uclearWeapon Free Zones
The UK continues to support the principle ofNuclear Weapon Free Zones and is playing a constructi'te raie as a
Nucleareapon State in their development. The UK has continued to engage in talks with the five Central
Asian and theth East Asian states. We hope for progress on bath the Central Asian and South East Asian
nuclear weapons free zones saon.
TheUK also continues to support the objective of establishing an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of
nuclear weapons as weil as other weapons ofrnass destruction. We have submitted a report to the UN
Secretariat outlining the UK's contribution on Middle East issues, including our contribution to the realisation
of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which the UK co-sponsored.
Negative Security Assurances
Our position on NSAs has not changed. We rernain conunitted to our negative security assurance as we gave it
in 1995, as noted in UN Security Council RInaddition, the UK has given NSAs through the
Protocols it bas signed to NWFZ Treaties. Since 2000 the UK has signed and ratified the relevant protocols to
the Treaties ofRaratonga and Pelindaba, which established the South Pacifie and African Nuclear Weapons
Free Zones, respectively. We believe that these cornrnitments already give Non-Nuclear Weapons States the
assurances they seek.
Disarmarnent
l would now like to turn to the third pillar of the NPT: disarrnarnent.
The L'K.continues to support the disarrnament rneasures listed in the 2000 Final Document and the 1995
Review Conference decisions. We value ail reductions in nuclear weapon levels whether ach1eved through
lni!aterai, bilateral or multilateral rneans.
The1998 Strategie Defence Review and 2003 Defence White Pathe ar~n:ai~o~mat to tted
'IOrkincrtowards a safer world in which there is no requirernent for nut:i· goalpofns. We bke!tJeveard
;trengthening the international non-pro 11erat10nbegimlear dt'sannament ob!iaations
d b t · 1 rogress on our g o a nue "
)ver the past decaDI<hs rna e ~antt~i ~nddsmantlgnof our maritime tacticai nuclear
mder the NPTArt VI). Thlmclus te ed. , nuclear bornb; and the termination of the
:apability; the withdrawal and dismantlmg't17UShnuclear weapons held under dual-key
mclear Lance missile and roles t~ed ;ur:t~ eunon!vuclear weapons system.
.rrangements. This left Polans, latY nsup'rse e "
4Since 2000 we have completed the dismantling of our Chevaline (Polaris) warheads. We hold less than 200
operationally available warheads. This amounts to a reduction of 70% in the explosive power of our nuclear
weapons since the end of the Cold War, taking the UK from four nuclear roles to just one. We have announced
that our nuclear forces patrol on reduced readiness; only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol at
any one time, normally at severa! days "notice to fire" and with its missiles de-targeted.
These measures build on actions previously taken by the UK to build confidence and increase transparency in
Article VI related issues. Among others, we have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). In 1995 we announced that we had stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and othernuclear explosive deviees. In 1998 we were the fust NWS to declare the total size ofthese
stocks. We thenvoluntarily placed all our fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under
international safeguards where they are liable to inspection by the !AEA. In 1998 we also înitiated a .fissile
material "historical accounting" programme. The first stage of this work concluded in 2000 with the publication
of our Plutonium historical accounting record at the tirne of the t-"Review Conference.
We continue to work for the re-commencement ofnegotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile
Material Cut-OffTreaty (FMCT) and cali upon others to join us in a moratorium on production. We ·Jelieve
that global nuclear disarmament is a process, and that an FMCT is the next step in that process.
Last year we held a lunch-time seminar to introduce sorne of the work that we have been doing to develop UK
expertise in verifYingthe reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally. We have continued
with this work and we invite you to see for yourselves what we have been doing at a presentation on Friday
]unchtime. We will also be publishing a second working paper entitled: Verification ofNuclear Disarmament:
Second Interim Report on Studies into the Verification ofNuclear Warheads and their Components." There is
an information leaflet about the serninar in the UK information pack at the back of the room.
1'\uclear Terrorism
It would be wrong to conclude this speech without mentioning the threat ofnuclear terrorism. Recent events in
Madrid, Turkey, Afghanistan and Iraq have dernonstrated ali too clearly that there are individuals or groups in
the world that are determined to wreak havoc on society and kill hundreds or thousands of innocent civilians in
the promotion oftheir cause. The threat ofterrorist use ofnuclear weapons concems us ail. We welcome the
work that is being carried out to reduce this risk: by individual nations, by the counter-terrorism committee in
New York, by the !AEA, the G8 and other organisations. We also welcome work to tackle the root causes of
terrorism.
Conclusion
ln conclusion, Mr Chairman, let me repeat. The UK is fully committed to the NPT, is meeting its commitments
under it, and will continue to work nationally, bilaterally, regionally and multilateral!y to further strengthen its
regime. We want to see a universal, verifiable instrument that guarantees a world free from nuclear dmger, and
so provides the security thal ali us here today are looking for. The NPT offers the best hope of achieving !hat
goal.
Thank you Mr Chairman.
5 ANNEX57
ANNEx57- 10 Downing Street, Press Notice, Speech on NuclearEnergy and
Proliferation, 17 March
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Politics/documents/2009/03/109.pdfl guni=Article:manual
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AtomwWeapons êstabllshmwnorktwgltpattnéwom N~ t1aw ANNEX58
ANNEX 58- Hansard, HC Deb, 6 July 2010, col. 159W,
http://www.pub1ications.parliarnent.uklpa/cm1011/cmhansrd/cm 100706/text/1 0070
6w000 l.htm# 10070652000026
6Jvly2010:Column159W
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weaposntateundthenuciearon-proliferonaty.herefort,eUKwlicontineoprogresslnepladgurexî;tlnudea reterrent ANNEX59
ANNEX59- Statement by Ambassador John Duncan to the 2010 Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference:
http:!/www.un.org/en/conf/npt/20 10/statements/pdf/uk: en.pdf
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ANNEX60 - http://www.reachingcriticalwill.onr/images/documents/Disarmament
forallcom/lcoml2/eov!L46 France-UK-US.pdf
67th session ofthe United Nations General Assembly
Firsi Committee
Explanationof vote by
Mr.Guy Pellard,
Deputy PermanentRepresentative ofthe
UnitedKingdomof GreatBritainand Northernlreland
to the Conference onDisarmamefli
on behalfofFrance,the UnitedKingdomandthe UnitedStates
L46 "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations"
NewYork,6November2012
We continuetoholdgraveconcemsasto theprepar:atorayspectsofthismeetingf,tsl'Uofs
procedureandolherWorkingrnethods. lnaddition,giventhestringentfinancialclimatewe
currentlareexpèriencingw,earealsoconcemed a-tanyadditiontudgetaryimpactthis
actîviwilhave.
lisforthesereaSonsthatweare unableto.supportthisresofutlhé establishmentfthe
OEWGandanyoutcorneil mayproduce.
ThankyouMrChairman. ANNEX61
ANNEx61- Hansard, HL Deb, 15 July 2013, col. WA93,
http://www.oublications.parliamentuk/pa!ld20 1314/ldhansrd/text/130715w000 l.htm#
13071510000440
15July 2013: ColumnWA93
Nudear Dîsarmament
Question
Asked by Btirone.$S!tliller of ChilthiJFneDomet
Toask HerMajesty'sGovenimentwhetherAmbassadorJo Adrunson,United King_dom Petrnartent
Representative theConference on Disannament, will beattending meetings of the United Nations
Open-EndedWoikingGroupon TakingForwatdMultilateral NuclearDlslitiiiamentNegoriations.
[HU355]
TheSeniorMJnisterofState,Department for Commnnitiesand Local Government & Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Bàroness \Varsi): The UK voted against theResolution in the United
Nations Genetàl Assembly (UNGA) First Committee lhatptoposed the Open Ended Working Group
(OE\VG),hasnot attendedp-.tteetingsof the OEWG,Md does notintend to attendco.min,g
meetings.
The Govemtnentconsidersthatthe Conferenceon Disarrnameni,not the OEWG. providesthè
correctforumfor iaking forwardtnu1ûlater.linudeat disatnlliinentnegotiations.
The Govemment considersthat àpractical:siby step àpproochîs needed. u.singexisting
mechani1:."1chSas theNonProlifetaùonTreatyandtheConferenceonDisârtrlameni.TheUKwill
continueto workwith other nucle.arweaponsstates(the P5) and non-nuclearweapQnSstates io
22of29 lJi03120l5 12:16
Lords Haru;ardiextfor 15July1013 (ptOOOl) http~/www.pub1ications.pmi l1at<l:anr.le,!pal1d20
strengthenmutnal confidenceand funher disannament efforts. ANNEX62
ANm:x 62- Statement by Susan le Jeune d'Allegeershecque, UK Permanent
Representative to the UN in Vienna, at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian
Impact ofNuclear Weapons, 9 December 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/govemmentlworld-location-news/uk-intervention-at-the-
vienna
conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons
UK inten·ention at lM-ViennaConferenceon the HumaJÙ:tllrili..,n,
TheUK'sviewis thatthe utmostimportance-must·ogivento avokflnganyuseof nuclearweapons.to
prev-enti-he spreadof nuclearweaponsand nuclearweapontechOOogy,andtakeepingnuclear
weaponssafeandsecure. TheUKisveryactivein ali theseareas.Thatis why we areworkinghard,
andwilfcontinueto workhard-toensurea successfutNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatyReview
Conferencenextspring.Wecall on ail otherStatesPartyta dothe sarne.
TheUKagreesthatwemustalsopursuethegoal of aworldwithoutnuclearweapons,andwe are
activeheretoo.
Sornehavearguedthat thewayto thisgoalisto bannuclearweaponsnow,orto fix atimetabletOr
!.helrelimination.
TheUKconsidersthalthisapproachfailsto take accountof, andthereforejeopardîses.the slabîrtty
andsecuritywhichnuclearweaponscanhelp ta ensure.
A declaratoryban. or a timetablenotÎJnderpinnedby the necessarytrust,confidenceandverification
measures,wouldjeoparrlises1rateglcstabUi. oneofuswoutdgainfro-ma Jossofthatstabîlity.
TheUKbelieves!hatthe step-by-stepapproaohthrough the~.t i:!h.onlywayto combine!he
imperativesof dlsarmamen!andof maintainingglobalslability.Progressis difficuh,butpossible.The
USandRussiahavereducedtheîrweaponsstockpilesmasslvely.The UK hasreducedits numberof
warheadsfromaround460at itpeak. Ourcurrenl commitmenlis toreduceto 18by the mid-2020s.
Wewill worktocreatethe conditionsin whichnuctea.rweaponsarenolongerneeded.Wewillafso
maintainaminimumcrédiblenuc!eardeterrentfor as long itisMcessary.
Letmeunderlinethal the UnitedKingdombelieves!hatthe!JlDisarmamentMachineryandthe
Non·ProliferationTreatyprovidetherightforumf-orworkingtowardsaworldwithoutnuclearweapons;
tak.ingfull accountnot on!yof thedevastatinghumanîtarianimpactwhlchcouldresultfromause of
nuclearweapons,but alsoof thestabilityand seculitywhich nuclearweaponsprovlde. ANNEx63
ANN:Ex63- Written Question 907116, answered on 20 January 2015,
www. parliament. uklbusiness/pub lications/wri tten-guesti ons-answers
statements/written-guestion!Commons/20 15-01-14/907116/
Nudear Weapons:Written question • 907116 · UK Parliamhnp:/},v'"'-w.parliameni,uktbusini:sslpublicati.on5/written,ques.t.î.-cn
Q Asked by Dame Joan Ruddock (Lewisham, Deptfotd) [NJ
Foreign and Commonwealth Offtee Commons 907116
Nuclear Weapons
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwea'lthAffalrs, what
steps he plans to take în response tc the conclusions of the Vienna
Conference on the HumanîtarianImpact ofNudear Weapons, hetd ln
December 2014.
A Answered by: Mr Tobias Ellwood .Answered on: 20 January 2015
!The UKwas represented at the Vîenna conf-erenceby our Permanent
!Representative to the 'International OrganJsatlcns in Vtenna, Susan te leun-e.
;As the Vienna Conference w.asa discussion platform there were no format
::follow-up outcomes agreed. However as stated at the Conference,th-eUK
lwilcontinue- to foiJow the step·by-step approach to disanTiament through
:the existîng UN dlsarmament machlnety and the Nudear Non-Proliferation
;Treaty. ANNEX64
ANNEx64-
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/news/joint-statement-from-the-nuclear-weapo
n
states-at-the-london-p5-conference
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~ndeman dnthelégtea'.hisindudad~'"' iJh NestART impleinlmtalîilhand the
Wlrilicaûèl<perienal baththe RuS$ianFacle<aànd lllUniledStateirela!lc10lM New
$TART Trealy.was no-tedlhàl,oinceen!rînU>icrŒo!lllNPT.Ihestep.lly-<!epapproachhas
alreadydrai!!a11è!I!WédthehUmberof rn.ielo>•a"r'*'!><msheldby !heNtheil CcWat
peak.Thé P5alireaffirme.limpo~e olfulcompHance w~nexisling.làgoJ!y-biumsn
Œn!Tol,nonprolilerlillon,and <ilol greemen!andobfigali<lns"" ansssefllialelemental
1rrtemé1iopal-ac:nd-S$CWity.
ThéP5.str{!SSidaaddn;as!nrur:the_rprospesrrWCtearrl'-fatnmantQUiraqulretàininto
aétounaliat:!olhàtcouldell.glcbal sbatè1SlabllI\ dcinw lll!ly•ltessed lll!llmpor!ance
<JIngagmgin lrànl<àconslrticldialngile 10<md.
Thé PSte"it$l'a'tersfletu~dierstandiabOutthésevereconsaquemc Dfsi..tcareapon-tisa
and-UrideitinheiTé~o ovpaevanaucharittCCUti'efromhappénln lg. y-Sl:eaffirrntileir
rommilméc o e»sttngis$Wi'assuranceregatdintheuse,m tttracluse of~ucleaYi>èB.pOOS,
inciuding.in"""'*'""wlthUNSCR9ll4(1005),lll!lirreadii<"""isnon-nudear-opcn $tales
ParliesiO!he NPT!hal maYbeccimlthe vicfimsol a natlâ<:lerrt>rot clhe'!Wis~)-
the P5 diacu.s.edi;!llorisfuachieintolorce ollhe C<lmprehenewNticleat·Te<tte;.!y
{CTBT)and<ecalledlheirŒtm'rlilmènlin the20llfl"""'wConle$lce FinélD!WtimènliO
pi'DffiD!eandlacoocreiolejlsi<>lvearlyenirylnlo fcr,lllCTSTand IltJnivsrsa>zatlon.
They calledu;>ooal!sl;toup!lolnali<li\alintlratooaiJh CÇ<ldllctingèl<plx)sionli. 'lias
notaclhafaUnie'mh o~trsPShaveaUCha volunŒrtyoraJoriUn plac P5ac~n On
ifi1l'(<>andmàintainin11>lntemalionalMoollntsystemwas ré'llié'd.e PSinlento
teléa.Sejoinslatemènl on -imizinthe Impactol rtmdicalisotopepr<idu!helnlèrna!ional
MonitorinSy.lem. Ftirlhar,parüculaw.slmade ofthesuè«>sslule<Jmp!aticonf the ln!égtated
F"'ldExe<<is2014in Joroan,10\\'hienalimainoitheP5 contr;blrl quipinenl.personneland
a~cr T h.PSdeoided10conlinueregulai<>chnicl ""tîngs aimeanhancing!ha verîli<:ali<ln
T-égiltèd taholdaW'Orksho-Onda4aQUaityobjectiveSfuttadioOOcmé-àSl.Jrement~site
iri5pectk1rtS. ANNEX65
ANNEX65- "The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," 24
October 2008,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search full.asp?statiD=351
Address to !bEas t~c:st lnsthute: u'Ihe Unired NatioSe~u•.;u bttp:tlwww.un.orgl.apps/ncwslinfOcuslsg':>Jl(\::ChW'SC'art:h_fulL
Tlie!'l!a-re a~nœmstn& a "lllJ&!renal:ss Œul" oon také pbce, with tiUdl!ar ênergybcing
Silên3.1dean,~missi-on -ifnMJtlv!! at a ti-n'!èof lnto!ruJlt'ylngeffuru to ètlmbat d!Mat.! chang:<!.
tM malttWOfr'l ~that this l~litathe production \!!l'of mot!nud~rmat~ti taitn',ube
prtJtt;;:Œdagalnst prollferatlon aru:lWTorlst-thr.eats.
i:.. and l~nt:l:!'l'lé1\
~ obstadè:!ldlsar~.~ .tueot rllbie. Suthé eŒ'and rlsks oîtalti'!"riatives rt~.Vérg'@!
attèntkln lhoey de:!H!l"Yè,But o:.ns!rlî!i"Ü\è tremèr!e-<lofhl.iijè mliit3f)' budgets.
Consfd!.ltth-èvo&Srtesuurtea~tennsumll!:dhtM eridléspUMltl-ofmll!tatv supe:riQrity.
Ai:COI'diftuoJ the Sttid:Mim Int!!rJmtc'Rr!~t'Pl-sttti!!g)baimilltaty expen-d!tur'èlSMt
'fèilé!«:!Hl.d1.3 trlllior!. TBi yeats Srot~ke rstigtott ptibllshéda swdy that tstimated
thil Mtat l:ll:Otsof w~poos"lln juM~ counttyfthe UnitStat~? bèllve- $5.8 trliUoo,
indudmg futut-e deanl.il'-eyany defll'litltm, &ils W ttugeinv~t af flnaildal and
technlalll'l!SâU(eéSthat amtd ha'i-èhad many othÈJ'pus~.ctive
Cont:ll!OS"~'suth c:osts<!l'Idthe tnMrel'lt: f ruJdeafweapohall'l!dto a giobal outpouàng
otideas to br-é'atilen.mv ltMè-cal&! of nudedisatmam~ W-tha:VS~l!!!nthe W-com~l1Slt~n
led byHansSH:x,thè-NéwAg-ètlCo-alitio-nartd Norway's ~v-en-natlav!!.. Austn;lla and :Japan
haV'IjUS\i:!Undtad ttntematl tomnmisloonn Nudé01" lln~Proli nd O~a!'imllmê dvll.
sndetY groUp$ anntid.ear~w sattspavna~ made propQsals.
Thm--i$,alsôthe Hoové-iafi am piea!.:étd.o-note thèprnhMi:todayofsomê oln,at ialfort's
authoB. Or. Kissinger, l<an'lpeimcl!cwinéw thank you félryuur commitm;mt andtMogreat
wH:dl::lr'lhi!V!<~ht to thl~ort.
Stidtinitîa ddbf'h!g:~at $tpp!r. Mth!!woilrf.a(JSrt:sln tha ètOMmk<1~ edVirtmml!nta!
ah'lrtas, thére ls growh'lfl ao-théfragllîty of our planet ane~~f:tglobal solutitos.
gfobilî chatk!;ngèS. This changlng cons:I\Salso help us ri!'Jital!zè tM int:disatmami!rtt
ag!!nda.
tn thal':spirit,. 1oi'tat-let:pùint prôposaL
Flrst, lurgè ail NYf"parties, ln pàrtfculai"the nùdè.ar-weapotl·:rt•Ut!St,o fulfllthclr obllgaikli'liJi'ldertM_
tre:aty -toulldérn~otiati onnsffèd: n'~éasure.lséMtngnud~ad rl~rmam~IDt.
They eou1dpUt"SUtIh!.isgocl byagrumetrt on a fl-amésepara mllu,llyt-einfcrclng:
IMtNiru!ntsOt tfu!i:c!.lld eonsJderMgotianudéar·Wèô!JlQ!0'11W!!tlticn, badt-i!d bY a-$tron.g
$ysti'!l'n (lf Vtltitkhas1ot1b1llP,r-!)ô$edÙ'lèUrtiŒd N.atlons. Vponre~ueèsf C~a Rica
and Malaysia,haY ~rcutatew all UNmembér rotéS a dtaft of wctt~nv~n wthioorft,~a~
QOO:Pd!lintof departuré.
1ht nude:M poW<>-s-htsould .1tdvdy ·e lthothl:statOl'thf:si:Ssueàttont~r(Olfin(é.
Dlsatmamént ln GMJe:va,Ul-e-World's:.single'l'l'l.Uitillltèt-aldillfnrum. ïhé Mlrldilig
wouid alswelct~ amttin'lpt!tJfbil-atè.f311'i'ègiM;tWéetlhlt! Unlted Stati!!Sand Rli:sslan
f-edèrtltlona1med at d. d Vt!t'iil"abll'eésJ~ir~&tiv-e 3tSen!Ms.
GoV!!i't'li'nèrsthtsclulda.i$olnvest E"t'tOlrnl!v:eritd~ilopmenS-éThe.U11itêid<ingtlotn's
pi'Q.jN}tohost: a to:tll'ofnudcllr·W!!apost'.ltRS lin Vt!:isa c:ot~clstepenthorlght
di~ctfon. ANNEX66
ANNEx 66- NuclearDisarmamentandtheNPT: TheResponsibilityof theNuclear
WeaponStates, at "Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: Laying the
Practical, Technical, and Political Groundwork", Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
and Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, London, February 2008,
http://www.un.org/disarmament!HomePage/HRJ docs/2008/2008F eb16 London.pdf
3
dursi>lepu~Uj>p t:ratlmeir'othoncxp<:rl<ln'v·lIlllnnSb<!mof ""~po woh""
!msl" momllty, kgaaruUlilils "'idely oinnqu~rlo N....,w.t:,~pColls0dcrer
catl!St ir"J lrh:c>,or~· theyllkdtsen,-anyfundion '""P" tos"ohl!ltlli::b.Yet
thdr p<IJ'l'lneJJcraresnew17ohorrarist ris.ksrdotilut•.rea or "lllJw"""""
or relamaien or~ attaekson nuckŒrflreiŒl•r<h.idotr.mpruiinll•neh istms. Physicat
~urlte-·):nill-eni~of4lr-r~duc scn_ig:butncverasfa~ Qis~1:l!i(nf._
Withrcspecll ,.,_..ooetionl"llli:reill!$"!"thoare cootra<thc~u fc
.<lis.,.,mi.'11t1viouldmc!u&inthithtfullmring-
• lherl:ieulaûooofltmg-t.mnp!tîm-"1thtimr hmiZOil!multipledeŒd11<etain
orimprove:ri stdln,j~nai<,«>llpwlttheloek tuyopcrmloozdplam
\1.-iw ~oimpl~m nlntidL-n!r.~t
• !lw d<vd"ffm•ntoityp<nfnucl--wnapondelivé"'"!"""';
• thf'l"OO' ofUud,otm<>tttinetsh•t t!en~nW !lwtooUS<otn,.,tW~11po!IS,
evenai!!fnsoln-nueicor-""'"PortopŒempta p0$Sib!ùllaita<inwh-mg<>thcr
W\..oanst~f~ds-c~ioMn .e\<>:~:O<nvw L-nû~:ll
• the<"J'<'lt<nd:-affirmatioruof nllla<'1toîtn:nai"'--curand;
·• ete-efut1'IWgotlot~uss t'Y~"mootlinescnud~-weap con:enian.
ln Ibis1lgb: ll.en-llearthonud<'lltstock=lkatth"minim l;ll""lt~ID
$USllld<:iur ieoo~rl>.Ssur<sp<>emi!.tite.~t _hnit<>flb"a mndd mtional set'Uiity
posiuref1>t hu~rtrl.,l!tlll!llndltcd!lu:yh•Thedaim by!lw o:ur~mt thol
lhoylllltStrdain nue!- ""''"'hhe.:ausellllo oolrncwha.tthreourilloris" 1h<
fuw:rotould e""ily'hbyanywt>uld-benuclcormte.
Nudcar doetrin.,.,!ta>r,<:someweon!a~ aodŒsrultp<<>ljf<thialufl1 Jlh
lhw~11p to""dws. The prosp«t "fwurid "Stai e~ s.ilhil""' ~m~mimu moll.'a<
deti! ooln!U:ar.:dys<1hinter<stoflnte:matinnaandsê<u< Anidîü.slt>I<O<h<:s
us onything,lh" prospectilfpeu'<'Zln)n:mher$lUtwlthsuchadct~r i1t.bright,
rel!<ljilhat m>i! l~c~ have nowspr<odtsom ~~<j'!nite staiSÎruthewae lirst
u.'atHirŒhimnandN~i!!flsakL
A> for my fourth qu<:~onctm :la>i!~ arpuo.<ie<l_lb:tmbsmntiaipr<inrcss
<lis:rn any1mwvnmtnt away fromtl>eprevioofitmitaworenh:mdng ootiosccuri~
througltnon-nuclm"""wuuldodvmce fuipl ThU>,"""P" "'l:wlltdproz~ wou!d
projlr<$igivewayta ;lisnnnam.mts:tew1mtlativ<>,whkh wooldineludesuch activillcsos
..,elopi"nh~nc m emsof verifjdng'<<>mplçcill:!disa""":"'""'lcom,<runptlyand
relil!blyd<tcgos:sîbloviolations,prot«!lt!er<:Ven!biof<lis~t obll!\l'Û"""·
and~nsml thg<~vai1 Jfthlll$it<m'cans{botdipk!~ rnu~ tioy! o.ddi:ruling
l~giti -n-uriy nt.ew1lt~uuslng·ukat-w~pons.
lt t. also lmpotrulilpublic Md 1he wurid conmwnlty to wùtheJmll,>nofS
disan:nam<nt,ll>>nUjy~ll "''""'utts mvolvingranj~~unlltcrnationaded:uations
ofr~dw:tbi illn;l;,f ttalièrnhcwori<toconc!ud-etllll-&pl<>~~"" areinfa-t
'hemgtai•por•ndd<Stroyr<L ANNEx67
ANN:Ex 67- Foreign and CommonwealthOffice, Lifting the Nuclear Shadow, 2009,
http://carnegieendowmentorg/files/nuclear-paper.pdf
There iswidespread support fm a ME.ast
Zonefreeofnudeat .aswellasothet Weapons
ofm.:d ~ssstruc thiswouldreqüiref.sra:el
to renouncenudeat weapon-s,alistatesinthe
regiotojointhe globalbansonchemkat
and blologkalweapons,.and fullconfidenc-e
inItan'Scompliancewiitnort-pro!îfe.t.rtion
obligations.Thetreatlesestabitheseing
:zoneptovidethebestwayfottheNu-déat
Weapon States to give etrect to théstated
desire Non~Nud eeapon States ftréaty~
ba:sednegatlve s«:urity assurtham.lcl-ea-r
weaponswillnot bused a-galn.stthem.
N'udeatWeap.onCsOnvention
Ariotherproposaito achleveaglobalban
{mentionedinthe lntrodoction)lsforthe
international communtobegin îmmedîate
negotlationwithatighdeadlineto-prevent
prevarication.on a univ,erifiableand
legallyabîndingagreement t-oban-alin:uclear
weapans.Thisapptoachichampioned by
m.ânyoftheNon~Nod eaerponStatesan-d
Noh-GovemmentafOrganisations.Amodeitext
hasbeen tabled atthe UNto illustrate howthe
maln is5.uesmigberesolved.
Butmostofthe stateswtihnudear 'Weapans,
induding the UK,while accepting that some
fonnofsuchan agreement islikefbeo
necessarylndue courseto ès.tathe final
ban, conier thaîtwoutdbepŒmature and
potenti'altycounteraproductiveto focu.seffDrt5
onitnowwhen the manyothè.rtonOitlons
necessaryto enable aban haveyetto be put
fn·place.WOrdsalonewtnotridthè Worldof
·:n~e,i~itt: -_w-~?· Poni::-- ANNEX68
ANNEx68 -Hansard, HL Deb, 9 June 2010, col. 641,
http://www.pub1ications.parliarnent.uk/palld20 1011/ldhansrd/text/1 00609-
0001.htm#10060950000327
9 Jun 2010 : Column 641
subjectwit:houdtelay?W!eyensur;;t:hattheSecr-etary..J;eneorfatlheUNtei1shlhatheshou!dapPiythephrase,-,Donittakeno
forananswer"'1
LordHowell ofGuildford: amgratefutothenobleLord.PartoftheactionpianfurtheexinudearpowerslstohwolvetheUN Setretary~
Generaml u.moredoseiyand tQseekhisco-operatiin therl!tecthatthenobielordhasdescnbed1cannotvoucnfortheprecise
patternswhlchhéwilltollowb,uthisfuJilnvolvt thesemàtteSsamajorintentiooftheslgnatorietsothenewconclusions.
BaronessWlllfams:of Crosby!MyLor1stheMlnlsterdescritheexcellet ukomeof theNudearNon~Prol lreetR ettlwon
ConferenŒH.oweve rthegreatbulkonon~n.u pde arreddedtcpressfoa nudearweaponstotwentîontoabol!shnuclearweapons
completeiyby2025.ltheUghtofthatwmthenuc!eap r osturereview,whlchhasbeenwe!come:adndmentibythecoalitionGovemment,
iookintohowf.arwecanmakeprecisethefuturestetowardsdlsannamenthatweshaitake·asaGovemmentW ? Ullt afsoiookatfutt~re
ofthéBrlttshdet-errent? ·
lord HowellofGuildford:t-lylor, amgratefutotheMbieaaroness,whoobvlouslyasenotmousknowiedgoefthisubject.Theideaofa
n!ldearweaponconventfoisafineone,but wetakethvlew ,s1thlnkdoetherGovér!'ll'nes,tîlslnpractlcequestionoonestep.ata
time.Wewanttofry tomovetowards-theComprehensrT-estBanTreatyandtheFlssiieMateltut~ Orefty.Awholeseriesofthingsneed
tobedon.ebeforeonet:Oi'to thehal)sîtuatlnherethe nudearwortisdlsal'lTeddaconventiotou!dtheng:etfullsuppIfwe try
to rustoa conventlMflrstofaH,wernlghtendupdelaythedeta!lêdorkthat1sneededonthepathtogetthefe.
3ofS 13/03/2011 52:47 ANNEX69
ANNEx 69http://vvww.reachingcriticalwilLorg/images/documents/Disarmament
fora!HLM/26Sep UKUSFrance.pdf[accessed on 1March 2015].
OJ!w A:nroames.&ousmllisJrmalii!\1!
FmallMr l'resit-feworoonlbeotlapproàè tN.lcletiisamtàlnéllt.
We tullUnders,tdeserlOmnseqt!elosf ni!Crpon us mdw' i{l()lltegivthe
lùg!lprioétytavoilisûldlJ»nrillse·luel'tonl~~ ~lfeta!Î ann,
1!\iciyatè aûned1ltavotigûseofniid~s.
We.be!ie.th;Ûlll:analreadyMficlentfotl_ .pe byd.he,N~~al- -~•-·on
P~lUll l~17t,fotd.~!I oSieoessne, lçludihet1NOAFit~e, •U!eiN
l)i$Ulll;Cô!nnlÎ$i,ndtheontereno:I>i$annif w1dl~cattn<..utabythe
Jnereadeaerandeutl' !~undthnncledlsamlŒtntdebl!t.di$fbliti~S iS
beindittttcdwwiil'litîses<astJù.1-n..evMeetinghe hlnnanill~c:es
(l;lllipiO~n·EnUè Wotl<lg()rand!hepusl:floraNWeapom~tien.
We li1Qilbd1evt-h•tbeletgy_•wodavemucl\ltltte. ifçl..l~ -~.~
pr~se hc,io10ladd~lodt .agndsfnpr~ok~ioonep~ ~by-st ~!îP U!at
îooludaistalllSthalponue!eweapoi!S1.1îsclud~s S~epf s:ptontthNP'f
ACtioPlath;wu a~ hyl»î!Serin 201'11rûsadn olatîoloff ehtsstroufor
mlildptogrmonmultilatnlndead!SatmânlcWerenia~;~d ttlû$ compn:~,
sttp-b .Nppoaclto~ea~rent :anwîlll:lon~ ~lh #vils~ #11aiUN
m~:m batest.otdsend.
Mr Presidentt.Js.npâltla worlwlt.ho.ncteWreaplotl'tr,4aüy•biooW·o!k
m~ sltJ~war tdultendthi· equ ~ ·btl~d. hl·tliJitenll~!oni
envWilX!liia'!steâYpurSotptâeûêstepWileadlsŒ p îlditrillast. Wé.mnam
c:QriŒm.tâi·fuefserWilt·Sllhe-~ away·fromtl~e 11ueaJl(ibydthno.
c01nplialleeandPttJlifurntio.ncball@gesfaclngns. ·
Tbàiyon,MrPresident. ANNEX70
ANN:Ex70- Article 36 para. 2 Declarations of The Republic of the Marshall Islands
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
1'0STAAOORE:SS-ADIIESSEPOSTAl-EliHITEON...T!ONN,y,10017
CA11lADDRES$-ADI'IESSETlU.Ii'.CiiiAIUN ... TNllWYOIIK
Reference: C.N.261.2013.TREATIES-14 (Depositary Notification)
DECLARATIONS RECOGNIZING AS COMPULSORY THE JUR!SD!CTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF WSTICE UNDER ARTICLE 36,
PARAGRAPH2,0FTHESTATUTEOFTHECOURT
lliRSHAU. ISLANDS: DECLARATION UNDERARTICLE36 (2) OF THE STATUTE
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary,
communicates the following:
The above action was effected on24 April2013.
In accardance with paragraph 4 of article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
the authentic English text of the declaration and the French translation are transmitted herewith.
30 April2013
Attention: Treaty Services of l'vfinistriesof Foreign Affairs and of international organizations concemed.
Depositary notifications are issuinelectronic forrnatonly. Depositary notifications are madeavailable to
the Permanent Missions to the United Nationsin the United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet at
http://treaties.un.org, under "DepositaryNotifications (CNs)".dition, the Permanent "Missions,as well
as other interested individuals, can subscribe to receive depositary notifications bye-mail through theTreaty
Section's "Automated Subscription Services", which is also available at http://treaties.un.org. - 2- (1.4)
"His Excellency Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General
760 United Nations Plaza
United Nations
NewYork,NY 10017
Your Excellency:
Declaration of Consent to the Jurlsdiction of the International Court of Justice
I have the honorto declare on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands that
1) The Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands accepts as compulsory ipso facto and
without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, in confonnitywithparagraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as
notice may be given to terminale the acceptance, aver ail disputes arising after 17 September 1991, with
regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date, ath er than:
(i) any dispute which the Republic of Marshall Islands bas agreed with the other Party or
Parties thereto to settle by sorne ether method of peaceful settlement;
(ii) any dispute in respectf which any other Party to the dispute bas accepted the
compulsory jnrisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for
the purpose of the dispute.
2) The Govemment of the Republic of the Marshall Islands also reserves the right at any time, by
means of notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with effect as from
the moment of such notification, to add to, amend or withdraw either of the foregoing reservations or
any tbat may hereafterbe added.
Done at Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands this 151hDay ofMarch, Two Thousand
Thirteen.
(Signed) The Honorable Tony A. deBrum
?vfinisterin Assistance to the President and
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs"
Attention: Treaty Services of ?vfinistries of Foreign Affairs and of international organizations concemed.
Depositary notifications are issued in electronic formatonly. Depositary notifications are made available
the Permanent ?vfissionsto the United Nationsin the United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet at
http://treaties.un.org, onder "Depositary Notifications (CNs)". In addition, thePermanentlvlissions, as well
as other interested individuais,can subscribe to receive depositary notifications bye-mail through theTreaty
Section's "Automated SubscriptionServic ehsih is also available at http:/!treaties.un.org.United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Declaration Recognizing
the Jnrisdiction of the Court as Compulsory
5 July 2004
"L The Govemment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland
accept as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of
reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, inconformity with
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be
given to terminate the acceptance, overall disputes arising after 1January 1974, with
regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date, other than:
(i) any dispute which the United Kingdom has agreed with the other Party or
Parties thereto to settle by sorne other method of peaceful settlement;
(ii) any dispute with the govemment of any other country which is or has been
aMember of the Commonwealth;
(iii) any dispute in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in
relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where the acceptance of the
Court'scompulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other Party to the dispute
was deposited or ratified less than twelve months prior to the filing of the
application bringing the dispute before the Court.
2. The Govemment of the United Kingdom also reserve the right at anytime, by
means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and
with effect as from the moment of such notification, either to add to, amend or
withdraw any of the foregoing reservations, or any that may hereafter be added."
(Signed) Emyr Jones Parry ANNEX71
ANNEX71- Statement by Hon. Mr. Phillip Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republicf the Marshall Islands, 26 September 2013,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nudeardisarmaen.pdfdf/MH
~isjN ~I1~-~r<..k~.\ùt·i--gft\-ç_i,!:t~_~ülJ:todnn1üdi.;_~~
nciy.hb~uppù-~~tpifyr~m1d\.f .;tnanlm1ttm:"ivhlim~rrnilh."ltlal
.~curhy~
Chair.
Oi_sar tül~lthp·niw(_._ndaffri~1d..~~bbl!e)ii'Qgt$regard~
indu_ ùi_wt~c:nitiffi_StmeSusi.rge_a _H__vuca_~i1i_s.fortS
h,>tdÙheit~spùn:JihiJiÎg1>,5_eH.~timVèlSd'Sâlmam-çfU,
i't.r:sh{\:tskh~~)_,i'u1m~f0_!pllth~t1tN·aüo~_ U!!l~t~~r)Qtj~
- thfllà_tiori_atvuld;:vcC,.brVilÜlhè_r~nOf_xposü_h~O
de'\·u ip-àünnch:ùri.v<.hUNtanno.undrtluIt_r;e,pç-atsS;h riilstakt::>
itlrh<Uia(ith·-clm fhtrri.ù~n\ir·;l~~- ANNEX72
ANNEX72 - Marshall Islands Statement, Second Conference on the Humanitarian
Impact ofNuclear Weapons Nayarit, Mexico, 13-14 February 2014,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/na
yarit-
2014/statements/Marshallislands.pdf
MarshalI lslandsStatement
<:ondConferenco en the
l-lmnanitarialmft<tc tfNudear \\'eapons
Thànkyl>,>!.bn1nna. 'iltm e~!i!lr<\1~'-p'illr'!tteth!G!'•<el'l>l'!t
M:"xi<Pflt«utl n\Y<lndem!l)n host h~!imlpnrb.ntœn ~1e$olm t.,
>l5$ol;eumel v thth >tlltem®tliwr e~th!dls~h'ld glull$l<~mdh:ll
l«icptl<1Kiribatinl!behalfnJ the l'adllc hrlanilsalld tn-f\u'theu,ardfflnwj.,dg"
sptarn<bythiAm"'~•d fomrthKlng<lnnf'l'<>nl!ll. ·
Alistathyr..pr~nP llIrv\lP'<'lil<nrinsme'141î!h-v!!lli1i!ûdelir
Piilatlllàmenlt,heNlatlnmu.sllt!:helôpf"artlldw~ilpe w~hl$!11:\lring
peçe in awor!dwitllnnud~r Wei!Jl W-eu)r~~nl:ely'vluti!ll tn~>tales
fl')~m numl!arèajlît4irttel!e!fi:t""ddr ehel~<>ns.ih iimll'lt!ell
t;~wa ar~dsfuç td$r~eudi!allllllllent
lt hl!> bi>en lllm~"'~SÎ~ he;:ejll~As$emlhlm i~ ·~ llrsfiOS\l'luti<ln
establi:r<1mecbàn o~tm!el\nt!n;tfrom !Ull<Î'l>l!$fnncl!i\Viii~pl>l!S
and nthweaj~ <tldllp$"flàlsdlii:ru.:t!;;nbeen m<f!an4$ yem 1>'ili<:e
me ttl!>d\Wpi ~freaty !>nNi>!hPr<lll!fNucloW~eilor V~tt~' we ~till
fear the daywh!!tllwo""" fqtté<lto téllwS,1dn-nnwan'<1th!j)l;ftnf!Ïi>
~ufft<llr~<çonsli!quel-ldidl
flkèhuMmantl!Mar$balll.'licQnvtl!ctbamultllaten~ntia! onnDlilllwing
àl!sustàlnlnWôrldfr~oel!udeW<'l;l!àriJt>liVi>fdffid!;W1!l!ii!that
StJitJiô$$eJ>!ldl!aif:Sell'fatnl!<1\Jlhl'lletaohl~û! l~ll eptÔ,
lmm~dl taltèencérnen~n .çnoqclusof~um .ne!loW!tlon~éd> t;,y·lepl
obligationu~: tlialma-lrest ipn~eliil!<!1<1)un.mder Micle Viofl;lŒ
Ncn l'rnlifenttionTrea€i1.1Stllomlnrtm1alaw. lt iilsn Wami-d th!!
nbjedîw <fnclw di:sarrn.arrumltong ami tnniil$théUniteN~m.y i.m<l
MlîllllYmJ!î>ns lnpl.lill!îuituroJl!!!!l\$nlleh<>MrglilPJit>nés,
Mr.Chainm.m,li!tme remlPdtil!s foitwas und"' the 'l'rusi tàtehllhip
l>brshalslnmls wu~ al' atemng grt>T<ldaywe feel ahand<!tu!dby the very
institl thtweteest~hl inphrtctus. Whüt\t®tisioo tn Pkllll~(tinns
tnwards a nudeâr fr;.e~~very împi1'rb.nt,methanîsm.sln àddrei;$edout$mnding
isl!ue~ pJtlu'oattest; elju,.nyill1pWe'vewî!:nmsefartmany hnman
suffmng, ANNEX73
ANNEX73- T. Graham, Correspondence, "The Origin and Interpretation of Article
Vf', 15 NonproliferationRevie 7,v9(2008), available at
http:1cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/151correspondence.pdf
qti!!iliogrt-torufrdei~~" aite.ètf~ iflOf;:f;p Ûea3; 5e~te of
-...nt <>!'Mtip t"OOijooi""on "'!Uoli!m<:<!liliportienoor.!y"'
Honpr~r-~~ ~h i!!"IhirW~~n hà'Y'itj?-~ à~ t~-mtni. ~W~
~ whi!t ae ~ ~ on tm: tt,.~ m:atti-1ap.®'Stamé~.~:en~
eüent1 m~..~ ~ ~ p:otc~ Mucl~ d5:!t141mnt bu~ -tMh~
1hav.~' a!lat the: ln!a--e-atii ;,pecistep!,·!hat~ inthe~:WS
~~ n.,.,a .n11,.., û>mptoh<m?ieThe NP!isit-ogfftitu:mttmMy'-s
Nu~ Test-e.;, TtmOfor<#ollilng1!1 nm..m~M ~ tt.tw ·thru;~
bitS Wè~-pene~ <! fli!g~~ ;ait-<{;
"""""""~" _,.,.it l•pon~ ~œnd
!>ruile l&t!Cuwff T""'tyTh~ me -egi<: ~n. ·;:neMidi> \<1>lWo<iot.
'iuid"'-Itr~M!ilmn~ r\j)t ~i'r;usiol!>:~r1-d lnliOigMinat<!«
inén.ori -wetm.uwr~ m~af~i m e:ont c beif:~ttt~r avemc
"'Yir,gthirt tbè)i"'""Id '"'' u:;e '"'""'"'!>T.
~aj:Mm is:gll1il_wMn~;,r NPr
j:mr.er~- rnmhnW::imlw~n 5JiL~ Amlfa<.ado~ ~ Jr.
w>lll«l111mmbele~ bindlng,btr... ~~ Thmimi-mm w
,uŒ.tW!!aj:>l>ilpr-.h ""~l"iq ~!O,'INgmit>
~t~m~ mw~;. the nnlona'PO'"
ki"'cl ~<> U>r!ne me NPT lwdollr
Wièilptil tthcl~en the optfuof
u<islgtrud~rn again.Nf'mm~
nudear~~~n -stirtYW~. tt-1U1 An Argument out of Balane~
~;:ermedkl~t ·hidàt ~ Tr~tj·A~ ~"'ma~· tt4:~.,...
9
..0!nel!ét STARptl:lr'~ti<'!~in-ber :100'P·51l'·- .~~22>).>!ril•
n~r vmap~ butt~ie~ b~enno 8!WITatJ,;,:her.o..of~ii> ond
(ti!~ n~:e":g~e-d~:tti: ilm®di
crwr.mrrnlfth~Sttat. r.~rœ sl!b
Wt3pG< Sin:~t~sit:utH:s.tme~2 c<m~ al 1liJ .,_At!r.Smi<~•
Mma:!NTreaty, *'""flh vnlclinot Cotrtmi i~nclm Πtl.':l~g~la
'"""M otial ~<11\o>fm""'i!"lnlf i>lthe&.!;il!<riiUclpdid""i>l tllé
~ra m tM n~J: ~f ""'opt:ratklhJJ'it;tniwati, rudm>tŒm .t
"'*..,. .d 'pm>.met i;, 1t <nmd :newnud'twtea~ ariaii~h of
i«!, he~mtNttian èf any$! thos:'"" i1:af ..,dea< ~"'·~W.to
wenptm~ lbU~ith rn:pm.9JiJtt~; IÎTM-cl1eh~ b~- aniti-4:0t.tite
ihat the »Pl t·.rriea s~ biwe tre'"onlthe~-~ .aior~of
d~·~ -enlh~t -ruxfs~ tt:~MI lOpri>i>3ijf<l>o!Ul!llr·Iforte "
œcrnnlt~ ~wt.oMe repre;mted:t;ytundatrn ·œnr~cf '-th:e:mlS5îonsof
Mi.;. VI.
""""""woa~ to ...!< odr>! nuci&a
Givfnup f~r thim~tp~û ~atxm~i fm'"
\r.reilpooc-~vd at}:!inl~tr~m:y ··r~ prtimcié>lmtu.i~lt
thnenmrme thi:.prmclple in<Mtif~idtW:W ~.d.e<t~rnlt m~~
.bc-foa ià!ler-~.gnàr'..dtM NPT """""""'""'",...,pfim.d deviolap
p~rn# ~man nl:Ja'.il~~ ·r:na·~ rn.,i>il!hlfiilbl"lŒj:llac.mi!irtWail»<-;:;:!
'the!o;A·«~ fi momy ~arttntotb! l'!lRA}V<>tbl(o~ inl)e<..,Œt
futurttÎ$ poUù.-:ocl::e~6~i'riu:ù:1007o!iminmd '""':Willl!fundingl<>ltM ANNEX74
ANNEX74- W. Porter, et al, "The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing
Consensus", CNS Special Report, James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies,
June17,2010, p. 8, http:l/cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfnpt 2010 summarv.pdf
jliDOCi<lnfl!'e 2014jo!k.-gint01climinatinuekllarn1"withln"'!"'<!ilii<d
timctrllmrThc~perop~nd <>lheri!<:m<lgrunsupportîfut ideaa~l!y
hirulln!c.~l kiit:frmen dis~ - \'\'tea1:;dytheUnlfudStm.,.,fnm.;:e,and
Russia,wboal'Œsp<>lincoo~ m.eUnî1edKit!!!jt>înln onîyinthe lwl>custhe
<lekgati(twaltcînstn~ 'ooiil~o Isl~ ll'l~"r whluChinitn<le10~
mot<$}mpatbeli1<NAM dis~t propGsais.futtunlî:Œnee'"iÙ3J15,eque,;1ion
\\1!whcl.bhe 1'1.".S,kuiarFmll..>e and~ <<>ud r<:c~mpromis.,3n~l!
stmingtba"'ùll:ï~ol oflhnrrel!ÙÎSllmlantentprocanoll te~mdme~
shouldhepursuewithma legî'romewm kilhspedirtlmetines.~
the :amountof tcan~lù:d dliatedcvG!!0 lcquesriofIID!dîn\!$ld'g~wmk$
alih ~lll!)ltevèon înmem:cslhatl;ni!Ùis;uehasmov.:âf'lliJidfi!v.!Éltes
';rltheid.:aafa tlmc-boundfr;a.liJk<mlll!l'nlj)talci~mel_ ddlDefl!ÛMS,
many Nl\o'W(c.gNi~é r iSio,andCbile)madecl<:Mthfue;;dnats.:.olJmpD.se
strictdm<!lisutl"ilrnugllidearcommit•nmw ôillilllmltn-t!'1.'\Vut 2QHJ
Ji1oDoet!m" ènntl'lon:mdRl:cammmdationtorFoltow-o-~~. state!lgi'tod
lan_gua~e o<:'îîuleînag:r-S~l~<!ieunpde~rca~li: m-tnameot e!Wrts"and
lha'"'lltatil!!ta maki'>pcéc!tiirl<:ia!iiillne;:e.•~IvMk 10lll!rueveand
maîntaîna wm11.>itbntudeaw~apoo nstn"''thfh·e-popro~l fuxnucle:M
~m<:nt oflheS..'Cl'Nt)'-Gend>eUnit ~at.m.w'bkhprDftO.IS,tera!ia,
consid<mt!::f ne$<)tlasoalroeléar"""ap<<>nv;mûoo1lr'!Jif<enta fmmewoi!Î
gpil!l!~tU~t dmalriy$În!ilnlll~:l.l
Cbl.,, for \;,blociwapropnllili"'"'u~ba caleedome firnudctrWéapo n ù:t..:J
hattailproduetlonol'11nrk!Jedurnniuman4plotoniom{!érl:îsslmat®! tt< •:a~y
.,'mlleChina!Jelî teha~est<wed .JWdndn:;;uehmat<!twalnotpul>!lll!UlOtllltoo
iproductionmarJ:tori,n!lk.etheot!JerfourllQ>:k"in es.Thedraftectioofrom
SubsidtarBody1;:ffectiv~'alt'lhédolhérfoorNWS11>pootdlheirtlll:Miidfur
Chinato"coosida"' one.ll<>W,meÎpresidétlînaÛOI.1Jlnt,etexona fi.%ile
ma~rl pa:lkl.:m<>ratori"t"~" fromlhelbrward-toot:n~io mnd
R.ecomrnenôalloo>.
A propoSllfromUN Secr~ener nlni(J-Mo!lhatr<e~l lvO>deoslpport
suzg<t!idat ifId!eeru!< d~-'Io'C1hf<!!eru:va C-nflrml:J~~dment
{CD}con1i>tuuntildûsfull,lhcSecretary-G;houl~'vO~n ami:nl~ mrietlst;o
help··maperojl ools.'ln'w>belngconsldeby Ibmforum,iooludiflFMCTandso
Œlkd ·~ativ Stcuri~rn!>t~l<~- J 'léeyNW Snottulllor.tme.atlUlléu
nru:k.lrW!!mpooa;;;'t WS.ThisideWtireeo!l'liinlll!l:Îoi1and15 nhhe I'inttl
D~t. Hnwl:'>·ear,proposallhai~balvne~OOI lh!UN!GeneralAssémblt'l'
''<:xanûb.,., eiliss:>boubep1.tr ît1h.ybédn~movédtorwardhytheendof lh3
CO's2011 ~e on,dfi!Ctivtl!klnJll:heFMCTne!<Vtistoflhe CDmct witllppllsitlm
notoolyfromlhe N\VS(pllrlîcularly:mdFrance!rualrd>emajŒltyor'NAM,.andw-as
droppcdfromme finult::xt. .
ln ilSNud<!llrl'ol!cview,tbe UnitedSindlcllf1r1hJ:in;ttimo.ilwoulnot
klu:neha nt!<t"aratiaekagairutNNWS11>heNPTingooostanding;;mht.hcirnud""' ANNEx75
ANNEX75- H. Blix (Chairman), 'Weapons ofTerror: Freeing the World ofNuclear,
Biological and Chemical Arrns", The Weapons ofMass Destruction Commission,
(2006), p. 94,
httlwww.un.org/disarmam entleducation/wmdcommi ssion/files/W eapons of Terror
.pdf
WMDC RECOMMENDAllON
Russiaandthe United statestapossesslngyother
19 nuclear weapons, should publishate holdings of
nutlear weaPQM on active and reserve status as a baseline fot
future dlsarmament efforts. Ttoincluded also agree
specifie provisions disarmament agreements telating to
transparençy. irrevetsit>Ulty,verification and the physlcal destruc·
tion nuclear warheads.
Initiainvolailstatespossessingnuelearweapons
Irîs ofren fothNl'Tnudear disl!nnament commîtment applies
to a1lstates parties. The 'package deal' that enabled the îndefinîte extènsion
ofthrrea199înduded a<:aliforthisgoal to be'fulfilledwith determina
tion'and unudear~w eatronake systematk and progressive
efforts ro reclute nudeat weapons globally.
This in 1995.lt îthathe nudear-W<:!aponstates parties to
the Nl'T havelatgdy failed toimplementthis commltment and failedto 'pur
sue negotiations in good faith' on nuclear disarmament as requîred of them
U!J<!etrhe NPT.lndthhave nudeat weapons are still seeking
to modernize theîr nudeat capabilities.
Tbeisan urgent nted for a change ofinthisude and for ptogress
an~Waether or not parties to the Nl'T, sratésthat have acquîrèd nudear
we.apons must decide wîthout furrher delay how they can èontribute tu the
nudear disa.rmament process.The UnitedStatesan.dRussia havehugenuclear
atsenalst nolonget servethe original purpose ofmutual deterrence. They
have also not engaged in any serîous bilateral dîsàtmament talks since con
duding SORT in 2ooin implementîng the deep reductions pro
posed ahoveld encourage so111edownwthsize otent in
nudear arsenals în other states. lndivîdually or jointly, ali st.arepossessing
su.;:hweapons must participate În this global effon. Havîng unil.atetally
dedded longéntethe nucleàr club, ali nudear-weapon states must
naw recognizÎtheir duty to exit.
Franee and the UKwill have to decide whether it will be meaningful to
retain costly nudeat arsemds thatweredeveloped for anenemythatno longer
exîsts, in orclet to meet hypothetital threats against wh.lchsueh wèaponsare
of questionable value. Both coumries are now at a crossroads: going clown
....•~•·\.r{o)adljèsh?\Y \th"e-ir eesry~S~~t~ 1glmthat1l~Fleat
··f9tJh.m~ -!~?t"eUiJt1!cy\:Y,~'i-\~·lhi·~•~•II19!'Stl:<\re;ç0.~119rhl:i~i!t~~a ANNEX76
ANNEX76- G. Mukhatzhanova, "Implementation of the Conclusions and
Recommendations for Follow-on Actions Adopted at the NPT Review
Conference: Disarmament Actions 1-22", 2014 Monitoring Report, James Martin
Centerfor Non-proliferation Studies, (2014), p. 1,
htt:/www.nonproliferation. org/wp-content/uploads/20 14/04/CNS-Moni toring
Report 2014 web.pdf
INTRODUCTION
11w nln~ n:vk'Wge!< t>fTm>')\'oo théN'ü•H'"'fifinf Nud.ear Wcj><(.'FI!.<
otlti!iotfur:r-.On Apti!28,11l1!)14,NPT """p~rt "i''"ilfurt!et~ir&'"'>tl<>n
of the-Prepanttri'J r.nm(PûpC.t>rh))\l'iY<>tli•J:o~ ~ dis~;: ûf~h'\i<>n
impl,.,r ut~t~"'""']an<!de""'Mnpa.Rè\,W.(.ot>.~ {<~C.<n)1,>wpŒvi\o,,;;<
Rk~t. C(Wmf~<et:t;~rt er!:f uJ&!ùl~'i hestdépW:ty>tt::iôt1Ct_mclu.iwWsd,
Rt.~cmm~bt )ttœ(ll'..wAt~n~ m:rwJm~n~ the 2UUlAt:ti.im·Thè:ottitu~n~
l!ri-Re~t.~dàti titil.M,Kti~i,t;n ~ th~-thrc_i)tilüb~,-NP.r:nud~
di.4à.i1 ï'tiJli~ro~l;trp:r:i.tt:sù_fudê~i·®~~~ anmdr~tSe: oni#'ofi'
jltit'l"""1~ ~ impl.:m<.-toothél!l'"""-~ an th;tiit:ll>N~t..""'"
ftii:et>fn~ms,.tMd ~u,,~ ~,'."'"uf ""'-"".le<tiUetluin tlw :lEir;;cdl~
Thisi. .""thinAçti 'l.>mt>nltt,rrept>±tpnl<l"by~"!J- Ml!<.ŒCi!ntrot
Ni_)tip~~l Slud:i(CîNShi'~~Vii !eW~mpÙjtnèfltlJ:ihli$t21 âetk)-~5ioo
rtuêbtdl,.mt ~:"'l,c~,.t,!!~OOD$ oo tlwMlt!cè-""11w t.:!'<"""''b'~'
d..'V<:Iopm>t!!:.2l:1{!"'" '<l<lif<!:iwlw.."ipr<lil1l,bliglu pn:tti<'ub
pttk>&ütnApn12illli> Ap~il14.
1"htAcrfirtkmi.e:tpécte-~~ a!ithb.if~! tviwVttth~;X :PT RL"Viiwi:~:rtk~t
Htrwev du~: to gn,;~dwilnF_gt-t"~~fW'8n\t-bttn.-n~ ti tU~ttipttaç1i1f
irnpli$tn patt<ui<ln,tht<lii<~< """lioot:~ Ptle>l;~gho.ho~ """'"a.<!
Sèrit:tùrtf:Nrnhnl20l.'S~e ili:~i~~~ cnti{t\\S)hiltak~ta'til'img.,.nvi~·
of thA<.'btnlon,$ml in sit-tttn>ouwg<th>tth<A<ti<thul tr..!i>Œ$ tbê$"'f>·h]·•otl:!'
llii'!'Mthl$~ >fthhk ?-""i<nûd<:'iri"-""' t ndheNPT. l1n <;;h~;ui!mw
pt<~ <1ndi.'ll!ffi"ii~di""'rttnrn<>ng ""'n·Mt:~·" ~'"l(N"l;nt~i
~<imul tiil:èlÎ<>\>"i»' jlti!r"'"a"bllif.tn;:lisThl.~$,NN'II>ltii<.:aŒd
rob&.t-1'tWtiitvein-tp.;~.~-ys~'Whkhb:i${itt;th~ôrtV~ ofiWo-ttinf~ ooiitw::i\5
thoh~ttl'i- lfnzdof rtûii:w<apoo>:md a Higlt<!.c~th\ of th~UN Ge~
A""""'hr<>rN~>d< Pi-u'rt, itwcli» tlwe:~r.Ù> !finbO]>i;t.EhtW~
Gt(>il'.t>kinf<>" mu'!bter,dnlicro~"'""n '<"'!"!'P(tkW~G}'.l'l>eNWS"'""'
Œii:ti!dtl<!g:<>ii~·l .de.-.;..lpMdmilim>tptcttidpi't~ ~ lrnpm
~ün!ll' n;~nctOEWG. B~ thf.gt<>ik&lvib<~rt~ mitlô:m<lMn·n~
~:ï:! sJtt.}wlmd:e~:ù U1tthetru±coï>the2015RevkvtCerr!u-tt,'s,\itht1-U·ifûtttt
mb~w~ti pr~~rwt_mtiilrJ.fux:liPltlma:rulôb..it- itiW~'e-- -NvctW;tittn
ihèltt\iti1!mn.imt: nsé-ùhfi~1shtatü in:tiipt.
Ov;:rJJlpn;gn:ssir\mlplegn"'"itl """''.itti!in1:01bah<;m'"'1~>' md'!u.
""'imtm-·•·tn! tlw21l1l'rt:p('.1\ü~f them"""" "'j>lett"!"'.gihii:.nipi•ding
pt.,iW;!:inh<:tinitk <pl:!tl<'Ibl~fntuk'!"in>th~ t'lionPwb,_J ~.~:Ùwtl!.~
l-l.l'l_t;fiimtph:mci~W.U_:Jli\bj\fllmlÎltJhiliiûUi~l!ffi!ipt;itJht~~
P-te;'k1h~H-Ht-~ .t-ék':ît.";t~ki!ÙtJ~œl~ ~ thk_..;Coo. ANNEX77
ANN.Ex77- G. Evans, T. Ogilvie-White and R. Thakur, Nuclear Weapons: The State
of Play 2015 (Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, February
2015), https://cnnd.crawford.anu.edu.au/publication/cnnd/5328/nuclear-weapons
state-play-2015
L NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
§Ll Oven<lew
§12 ObjectiVesand GenèralStrategy
§1.3 Disarmament Prindples
§1.4 Redudng Weaparts Numbers
§1.5 Nudear Doctrlltè
§1.6 Nudear Force PMture
§1.7 Parallel Seeurlty Issues
§1.8 MobJH:tingPolltkal WU!
§1.1 Overvîew
Llln 2014,unhapplly, thete were still an estimated 16,372 nudearwdistrlbuŒd
among niue nudear-armed stams.M<~r tan 90 percent oftbesa.reln Russlan and US
arsenals. There are many fewer nudéar weapans today than during the Cold War, and
the risk of deliberate nudear weaporu byethe United States or Russla may w.;Ube
neglîglble. Yet, paradu:dcaUy, the ari.sksofnudear war have grown - as more
cC>untrieln more unstable reglons baveacqulredtbesédeadly weupons, terrorlstS
continue to seek them, and as ccmmand and control systems in even thé most
sopb!stkated nudear-armed states remaill vulnerable not tôsystem and human
errol'but, intteasingly,yber attack Even a 'linüted" reglomll nudear Warcould hi!ve
camsttophk global consequences.
1.2 Whl!e thé need for total midear dlsarmament ls more urgent thàn ever, its
achievement tèmains lltder no doser, hotb among the nncleat-weapon states (NWS)
asdelined Ill the Treaty on the Non-Pro!ifeofNudear Weâpôns (NPTJ,vlz. China,
France, Russlâ,he United Kingdom and the United States; tbree nudear-astams
outsidethe NPT.viz. !ndiâ, Israel, and Pakistan; and North Kotèà,théworid's anly NPT
hreiknut >-tate.There has been sorne progress ln tèdnclng tbe overall USand Rl.issian
nudear weapons stockpiles and the number of depleyed strategk weapons, and ln
improv!ng transparency among seme NWS.But there bas been only rnlnlrnal progress ln
sbif'tingnudear doctrines and postures, and no progress in elther tal<ingweapons off
hlgb-a!ert !auncb status, or ln addressing thé issues of halllstlc missile defence and
conventlonai arrru;lmbalant:èS,differences overàl'ptèsently serlously înhlbltlng
further d!sannament mowment ln 2014 thé Russl:HVest stand-off aller the crls!S
ln Ukraine made early :prugress ln the nudarms...ontroagenda even .less Ukely. ANNEX78
ANNEx78- Hansards, HC Deb, 27 November 1968, vol. 774, cc501-5501,
http:/!hansard.millbanksystems. corn/commons/1968/nov /27/non-proliferation- treatv
Air.i.Uulle• am obligecl.One of the imponant aspectscf theTreaty is tfum -commitment to-further measuresof
nucie.ar-disarmumênT Lbereisgenertùagreement,I think, thatàcompr-ehensive testbanshould be Ql.'of theearly
measures. ~:! hyn. Frieild wm k:nowthnt1made an initiativein thisregard inJuly at Geneva. I hope that -wetan make
1310312015 15:14
lUFERATION TREATY (HanSàrd,27 November 1968) http://hansard.millbanksystetni<.romlcùmmonsll968/nov/271non ..,
progress shzyrtlwhen tho,sdiscussionsT?$Ume in the new y.ear.
Mr E!dmtGrf[fitlu SinΠ!Ourmemben of the United Nationsvoied a,oalns heTrelli:yand22 absiained, and the
Pr-esiden.t.Elect of the United Statesbas gràve doubts o"·e:ts-igningit whileSovi-etttoops ar-ein CzecbQslovakia,how
soondoes therighi hon. Gentlemanexp«:t thatit will take effect"!ln vofthefact tlwi, on lhe very day that
invasion.the.United States andtheStwietUnionwere -abouttogo further in talks onoffensive ballistk: missiles. and
this.was stopped by theevents inCzechoslO\'àkîa,d-oesthe-nghthon. Gentlemannot agree.thatMr. Nixon baSg{)od
causeforcaution?
}dr.Sveak:erOrder. Qu-estions·mustbereasortablybrie[ ANNEX79
ANNEx79- International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report
2013, p. 3, http://ipfmlibrary.org/gfmrl3.pdf
1he United States, Unitediüngdo mussia, Fr.an_-ed China have -all st-opppro~
ducing HEUforwe-àporuas well as any other putpose, in :son:ase:sdetades ago.The
first fout of these states have made official dedatatb thieffe Ccti~a has done
sa irtfotittally. ln 20i2, Rili-slaanntrunt:ed that it was :resuming lhnited production of
HEUfo-tnaval and fastrex tor fuel.lnd.îal'iat-mproductng HEUfot naval fuel. Pakistan
is produt:inHE-U fot ·weapOhs.lt b possible that North Kotea aho may be producing
HEU fot weapons.
The. glùbal swckpUeof sepa.rated plutonium In 2012 was about 49± iOtons A~most
halfof thisstockpile.wasproduted forw-e.apon:w hHe -most of the rest has bepro.
duc-ed in dviliart prDgtants in rttilJo--eaptatEs. As"a-ter auout 98% of all se
parated plutonium biin the nudeat weapon states. MOstof the -untmaîntyisdue to a
lack of officia! înfortnatiort about RU5Sia'sp.lutoniUm production history
In 2012 the United States jnOVidedtm update ofitshistory ofproductionand me of
weapons plutonium and on îH plutonium stockpile as of:S~ptem 2b0e9.Its earHer
dedax:ation-tvasi1996.The United lGngdom alsohas dedared the -sizeolbweaports
plutonium stockpile. but onJy on-te, ln 2-000. The othet nucleat weapon states have
marle _publit riOinfortnatiort on tct.trreholdings or productîori of weaporu. plu...
tonh.im1other thim announcmg an end to -pioduttion for weapon purposes. Again,
-Cflinabas indkated this only inf-ormally.
Israel, lnd:l.a.an-dl'akistan continue to produce plutonium fo:rweapons. hi Septernber
2013,North Kor-eaappears to have ttosumédproduction initSpr-eviou:sd1sabledreac
tOr at Yongbyon,Nnnetheless, there has be-.eni1etd-etrease in the global plutonium
-stockp:HavaUab or~wea.pons in recent yeat.!the United States has reported send·
ing 4.-torts of plutonium dedared excess fo-rnational returîty need.s for dl:;posal as
wa.<rtn the \Vaste b:olatîoPilotPlant.irNew :Me..xkoT. hls disposai hM not beert
verified independently by internationinspect horever.
lnaeasinglran.sparency
1'hefotus of this report is increasing transpatency of nwarhead and fissile mate
rialstockpilesUnder the tenus of the 2010 ''Action-Pianon Nudear Disarrnament,"
the NPT nudein weapon states agreed to cooperate on st-epsta intrease transparency
and develop verification capabilities related to nudear disannament and in particular
to report information that can further openrtess and verification. The nuclear weapon
states are expec-ted report to the NPT Preparatoty Conunittee in 2014 on progress
towards meeting these obligations.
Chapter 2 of Global Fis.sileMaterial Report2013 lays out proposais for step.Stowards
greater t.tanspatencyhat cou!d be adoptedby the NPT weapon states as part of this
process. These proposais \\r-eresentedby IPFMin Vlenna in May2012 and in April
2013 in Geneva at the meetings of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015
N'PTReview Conference. These are summarlzed brieflbelow.
GlobaiFissileMaterialRep-rt21li33 ANNEXSO
ANNEx80- Statement by H.E. Mr. Edi Yusup, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent
Representative of the Republic oflndonesia in Geneva, on behalf of the Group of
Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement Parties to the [NPT], Cluster 1
Specifie Issues, Nuclear disarmament and seèurity assurance, 25 April2013, Geneva,
pp. 1-2, http://www.reachingcriticalwill. org/images/documents/Di sarmament
fora!npt/prepcom13/statements/25Apri1 NAM.pdf
6. While noùng reductionsof nuclearweapousdeclaredby rome N\VS,the
Groupstresses !hatany suehrèduètîons àni undermined by !be.modernizatiouof
nuclear Weapons,al1d!beir delivery systems, and relate<!înfniStrilctilieby !be
N\VS.ln orderto complywi!b theitobligationsunderArticleV1of !be'freaty,as
weilâs wlth theircomr11itmenttmderthe 13 practicastèpsànd2010ActionPlan
l
on nucleaidisarl1lamentt,he NWS mustimmedialelyCeàSètheirplans tofar!her
invest in medemizing, ùpgrnding, returbisbing, oextending the lives oftheir
!inclearWeaponsàrtdrelatedfacilities. ANNEX81
ANNEx81- J.Ruzicka and N.J. Wheeler, "The Puzzle ofTrusting Relationships in
the Nuclear Non-Proliferationeaty", International Affairs, Vol. 86(1) (2010),
http://www.posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files!The%20puzzle%20
of"/o20tru
sting%20relationships%20in%20the%20Nuclear%20Nonproliferation%20Treatv.p
df
TÎ1cNNWS iusumed ;apotentiallygreatvulnernhibty,beeauby forsaking
th<po>$îbilîtofgetdnguude:arweapons,tl1eyexpose.:t!hetusdvesto theàt:Ûons
of th,:N'WS ",,.r~sultof.~ w.h:ioemhtdit.efyueen~g~tiYee\>n$~\:!ene~$.$neh.~~
•nude;UblackmaiLTheba!icbrttg:ùoftheNPT thusr~:pt atsttingtelati011-.
shlp.Therewouldhaveb..>elnittleinecntiwforhosewhoSign<:thetreatyrodo
>oif they thoughtthey couldnotttUstheotherpd!ties.Tobe suresotnestates
;mlghthll•becu pt~;. insorcceprtngthetreàtybythesnpetpowersthrough
.atnixof sticksa1cattot>(e.a.!fY>temf vetiil<:atsecutityguarallt!!a,ild
the detctmînatinnto keepGernunyandJapandenudeari:tedthatwouldgerternte
? favourablkt ofpay~o w l!iso,herstnîghthavesignedtheNPT beeauscoef
'tlle0\1\llOi:Olilteotnhùtments(e,g.believîngtharthèpossessiandprolif·:
,eradonof nueleatweaponsweretaboo).But ptobably 1\0n:ne thar sljznedthe'
:treatyf<:JleutirelyintOtiloftheaeClltegori•s
., For most sta the~dsd,i01to euter inthetteatyrelleettdnuxof iuterem
a11dvaluesh1 acceptingthe treaty,tbeyexhibitedtrMstinattethowwell.k.ln
fact,the reluctanceof a llUmberstates-both NWS (e.g.Ftance,China)and
NNWS (e.g.lndia, Bn:zll,WestGenna11y ,apa-1Sp:ûn)-to slgnand/or ratif,v
thê trenty eve~ft itetame inw elfecin 1970showstharthesestates weteto
varyingdegrees,u11willlngo acceptthebatgain.'"lothet wotds,theydidnot
havetrust in the tre:ttyarefusedtoenter intthe ttnstiurelationshipwlth
otl!ersignatories.
The basi;:bargainofthe NPT ha$oftenbeendeseribedasunequalanddttrided
for creatingtwoda~s ocstates."'The NWSareuid ro have gotamueh hettet
l# s_~.H-.JoRtn:i'lnüldGlennM:oopc'-t..t.W; {_-çnun·;prollftnaty'..1nùr_rw
"..""14Q41:Jm.\1}7l'7.;-;jQbIl.Emll«>n'Pl1Y7<M,.M« rnti! Pl<hN'11~n
J>!"lA;;S.my 11jMoreh1977.•1'1'·>1$•'9... ...
l:U..\v•'1-'Douh Jitob!k.hmlAtollttôUth ~t.'t:Pt-\"tlî:oe;rt, tntitfi(!titd
Aff4 -j~Jdy.î!Pl'4l'J"!.m< OBl~tî,),'Nud<.r•pmtdw<>r~d,,!l«,(•,fi$1:
<.Jull;JPl'·14j~J.\.
75 dealtlmnthe NNWS. Whc:reas d1elatter are coobligeimmediatdy and not t0
pill'1>ludear weapons, the fottner ntak<a ratherv:.guefmure col!Jlnitment.
Whilethisisquitetrue,itîsâlsoindisput;tbth.'tventheNWSsignmgtheNPT
h\\veernereinto attustingtdationshipBy agreeingto theright<Jallsignatories
of theNP1' to pu1'1>Uclv.illannucleprogt.'lltlntŒi,llbcit$tlbto safegl.lams
adrtûnistetebythe ruternàrlolll torniehergy Agency{IAltA)t ,heNWSh\\ve
ac:eepte(along~'i teNh NWS,tobe sure)du:poteilrlalvulnernbilityinherentin
the possibiiityota snrnaster:inthefuel-cycleaM therebybecon1înga'virtual'
nudeat we:tpon state/' ThusaUstatesrhatlitpanyw the NPT, itrespectiveof
!theirMdear stàtl.:lse,nterintoatrustmgrelationshipwîeadt orher,The differ
lenceisinthedegreeofvulnetabilltyto whi<:hthet\>tgroupsofstatesareexposcd
1llal'esu.trexhibîtîngtrust.
Aswe atgued above,theiniti'lxpressionoftrustn]j\nifestbyenteting lntoa
trustlugrelationshipcaubeeithernrengrht11edorweilined. TheNWShàvehad
theoppottunîty tostréJ1gthetrustbymakingprogréllt> oW:ttdstlUdeardisarnm·
ment,while the NNWShavebadthe opponunity to dosobyagreeingto tnore
mingem measuré lf verification.Cottversely,littleomo~·em ileithetof
thesetwo are:ts,orltewrsal hithe Îo:tlof growing nùdcar atmarnenu by thé
NWS:md/or abuîlduptowards nudeat wcaponc:tp:tbilitbytheNNWS, would
leadtothe erosionofthelnitîaltm;ting reladonshipor, atbest,itsstabilizationat
averylow level ANNEx82
ANNEX82- A Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination, 4
European Journalof International Law 567 (1993),
http://www ejil.org/pdfs/4/l/1219.pdf ANNEx83
ANNEx83- UN Secretary-General,Messageto the Vienna Conferenceonthe
HumanitarianImpact ofNuclear Weapons,Vienna, 8December 2014.
http:/www. bmeia. gv.at/fileadmin/user upload/ZentralelAussenpolitik/Abruestung/HI
NW14/H1NW14 Message from UN Secretary General.pdf
Theseconferencheavedeepeneodurknowledgoeftherisksofuseandthe
fundamentinlabiliyfouremergencresponsseystetocopeT. hemorewe
undersianaboutthehumanitarianpactt,emoreitbecomec sleartbatwemust
pursudîsarmamea nsianurgenitmperative.
Nocountry disputetshedesirabtfachievingnudear-weapon-fw reerld.
Afteral!,thiswastheveryfrrstobjedentifidytheUnitedNationGs eneral
AssemblTy.heuniversalcceptunofthisgoalledtheInternatialourtofJusteot
detenninthatthedisarmameontligatirunscendanytreatyundisarequirement
undercustomarinternationalw.
Ihopealiparticipatomeaway withnewresolvtopursueeffectie easures
fortheachievemeonfinudeardisarmament.
P!easaccepmt ybestwishefoasuccessfuclonference. ANNEX84
ANN:Ex84- Hansard, HC Deb, 19 June 1989, vol. 155, cc.31-3W,
http:/w>v-publications.parliarnent. uk/pa/cm 198889/ cmhansrd/1989-06-19/W rittens-
4.html .
NuclN eaorn·proli Tfereaation
MrF.l:noasilSecrearytfor reancommonA wfeaihha sscertrothGovetnomtePteoplës
Repuoblhitatetonwhitheyoulprepatesighnlldoarn·pmllreato.n
Mr. a!degralh:owhhavegulprysted ovemomtePteoR~ee·uC~htoacceoehnudearn·
proliftrtiyh,yaneotlunsayndicatheterowhithlyoublprepardoso.
Mr.ly:noaskhSecretSrtaororclnCommonA wffirelsawrthconditiotArgenbteutheat
staeillnMnudenaro·proltrati.n
Mr. aldegrathebeooukrnowledgeovemomengtetisotpednClndiindwerncrgentîoau~
acceoehnudenarn-proliratto.n
MrF.lyn:asthSecretaytafrooriel~ommonA wffIrewilthlastgcoutntlelshnudear
non·pr oeatwflgdaaesigtal~eachase. ANNEx85
ANNEX85- Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1966, Volume TI,p.
211: commentary on draft Article 23 (Pacta Sunt Servanda), para. 4,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks!Ybkvolumes%28e%29/ILC 1966 v2 e.
pQf
211
Commentary with thenullityot matiesand with tbeir terminalion.
(1) Pacta.-: ~the rule!hat lteatîll$11lnd· Consequcntlyf,roma draftingpoint ô! view,.iseemed
ingonthepartiesandmustbeper!omedlngoodthlth-- anceswiththeprovisionsofthe presentarticlesto wlûch
is thefondamentalprlnclp!eô! thelaw ô! treaÜ!llts thepactit.ril111-da ruleapplleS. hewol'\i"lnforce"
!'rtperta!!s ondel'lineby thefaèt!hatitiseilllhr.ineof coUrsecovo:ttreatiin foreepro~ onderarti
m theheamble to the Charto:tof theUnited'Nalioilll.cle22as wd1 astrealilwhlchènto:lntofol'Cèellnitivety
As 1<t;eCharter itselpata!!faph2ofArticle2express!y undètatticlè21.
prQv!desthatMembo:tsare to "fultllin good faiththé
obllga!lonsmumed by them.in ac:cQrda.nc Weiththé (4)Somemèmher elt tbat therwould be àdvantage
presentCharter". in aJ$Q$tàting tbata party lllUSabstaln from acts
S:%> he! .ism,\1\ a:uthority inthe juri;;prudenceof treaty. ThèCollmlission.,howevo:r,onsideretbat this
mtertla!.ionatlribubalsfothepropositiontbat ln the was clèllrlîmplidt ln tht obligationto pertorm the
presentcontexttheptinclplof goodfaithisa legaprin· treatyingood faith andprtferteto uate thepacta.ril1f1
cîplewbichformsan integralpart oftherule pacta.runt Btfffl»>dulein as sintplea formàS pOSBible.
strWJndaThus,spealdng ofcertainvaluationto bemade
Annexes volume II