Volume III - Annexes

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING ARMED
ACTIVITIES
ON THE TERRITORY
OFCONGO
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
V.
UGANDA
COUNTER-MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
VOLUME III
ANNEXES
21 APRIL 2001
VOLUME III
ANNEXES
INDEX OF ANNEXES
IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
15 July 1999
Annex 46:
6 Aug. 1999
Annex 47:
8 Sept. 1999
Annex 48:
17 Sept. 1999
Annex 49:
5 Nov. 1999
Annex 50:
15 Nov. 1999
Annex 51:
30 Nov. 1999
Annex 52:
9 Dec. 1999
Annex 53 :
VOLUME III
Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Preliminary Deployment in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
S/1999/790, 15 July 1999
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1258, S/RES/1258 (1999), 6 August 1999
Uganda's Response to Accusations Made by
DRC to the United Nations Security Council
Against Uganda, 8 September 1999
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1265, S/RES/1265 (1999), 17 September 1999
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1273, S/RES/1273 (1999), 5 November 1999
Statement of Robert Chandia dated, 15
November 1999 (obtained from Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence)
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1279, S/RES/1279 (1999), 30 November 1999
Uganda Ministry of Defence Statement on the
Attack on Katojo Government Prison - Fort
Portal on the Morning of 9 December 1999
(obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
Jan.2000
Annex 54:
11 Jan. 2000
Annex 55:
17 Jan. 2000
Annex 56:
26 Jan. 2000
Annex 57:
24 Feb. 2000
Annex 58:
8 Apr. 2000
Annex 59:
17 Apr. 2000
Annex 60:
19 Apr. 2000
Annex 61:
May2000
Annex 62:
Report on Rural Terrorism Activities of
Congo Based ADF Rebels, January 2000
( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
A List of Prisoners who were abducted by
ADF from Katojo and were undergoing
Military Training in Bundibugyo as on 11
January 2000 ( obtained from Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence)
Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission m the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
S/2000/30, 17 January 2000
Statement by the President of the United
Nations Security Council, S/PRST/2000/2, 26
January 2000
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1291, S/RES/1291 (2000), 24 February 2000
Plan for the Disengagement and
Redeployment of Forces in Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) in Accordance with
the Lusaka Agreement ("Kampala
Disengagement Plan"), 8 April 2000
Revelations ofMunyangondo Alias Benz Who
Reported to UPDF from ADF on 17 April
2000 ( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1296, S/RES/1296 (2000), 19 April 2000
Statement of Bwambale Ali, captured by
UPDF on May 2000 ( obtained from
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence)
2
7 May2000
Annex 63:
17 May 2000
Annex 64:
25 May2000
Annex 65:
28 May2000
Annex 66:
June 2000
Annex 67:
8-9 June 2000
Annex 68:
15 June 2000
Annex 69:
16 June 2000
Annex 70:
July2000
Annex 71:
Statement of Vihamba Kule, captured by
UPDF on 17 May 2000 ( obtained from
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence)
ADF - Kabila Links - Revelations by
Commander Junju Juma Former Commanding
Officer ADF Presidential Protection Unit, 17
May 2000 ( obtained from Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence)
Report of Interrogation of Lyavaala Mpala
Ali, ADF Operative dated, 25 May 2000
( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
"Uganda's Role in the Democratic Republic of
Congo," H.E. Yoweri Museveni's Address to
Parliament, 28 May 2000
U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee
Survey 2000, June 2000
Mechanisms for Disarming, Tracking and
Quartering of Armed Groups as well as
Procedures for Handing Over Mass Killers,
Perpetrators of Crimes Against Humanity and
Other War Criminals and Elaboration of
Procedures of Disarmament of All Congolese
Civilians Who Are Illegally Armed, 8-9 June
2000
United Nations Security Council, 41561
h
meeting, S/PV.4156, 15 June 2000
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1304, S/RES/1304 (2000), 16 June 2000
Statement of Lyavala Ali, surrendered to
UPDF on July 2000 (obtained from
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence)
3
23 Aug. 2000
Annex 72:
20 Sept. 2000
Annex 73:
21 Sept. 2000
Annex 74:
25 Sept. 2000
Annex 75:
Oct. 2000
Annex 76:
13 Oct. 2000
Annex 77:
Dec. 2000
Annex 78:
6 Dec. 2000
Annex 79:
6 Dec. 2000
Annex 80:
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1316, S/RES/1316 (2000), 23 August 2000
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
prepared by Special Rapporteur, Mr. Robert
Garret6n, pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 54/179 and Commission on Human
Rights decision 2000/15, 20 September 2000
Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the
United .Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
S/2000/888, 21 September 2000
Philip Gourevitch, "Forsaken," The New
Yorker, 25 September 2000
ADF-Kabila Links-Revelations by Commander
Issa Twatera Embundu, Former Commanding
Officer of ADF, defected to UPDF on October
2000 (obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1323, S/RES/1323 (2000), 13 October 2000
Human Rights Watch World Report 2000,
Sudan: Human Rights Developments,
December 2000
The Sub Plans for Disengagement and
Redeployment ("Harare Disengagement
Plan"), 6 December 2000
Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
S/2000/1156, 6 December 2000
4
14 Dec. 2000
Annex 81:
24 Jan. 2001
Annex 82:
2 Feb. 2001
Annex 83:
12 Feb. 2001
Annex 84:
20 Feb. 2001
Annex 85:
22 Feb. 2001
Annex 86:
21 Mar. 2001
Annex 87:
29 Mar. 2001
Annex 88:
30 Mar. 2001
Annex 89:
Annex 90:
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1332, S/RES/1332 (2000), 14 December 2000
Letter dated 24 January 2001 from the
Registrar of Uganda Technical College -
Kichwamba to the Brigade Commander at
Fort Portal, Uganda (obtained Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence )
Briefing by H.E. Major General Joseph Kabila
to the 4271 st Meeting of the United Nations
Security Council, S/PV.4271, 2 February 2001
Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
S/2001/128, 12 February 2001
Press Statement on the Conflict and Peace
Process in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
20 February 2001
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1341, S/RES/1341 (2001), 22 February 2001
Letter dated 21 March 2001 from the Ugandan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of
the Democratic Republic of Congo
Bloomberg News, "Most Warring Troops in
Congo Meet UN Deadline for Pullback," 29
March 2001
Report on Evacuation of Uganda Embassy
Staff and Other Ugandans from Kinshasa in
August/September 1998, 30 March 2001
Internal Report Regarding Uganda's
Involvement in DRC (obtained from
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence)
5
Annex 91:
Annex 92:
Chronological Illustration of Acts of
Destabilisation by Sudan and Congo Based
Dissidents ( obtained from Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence)
Chart Summarizing Loss of Uganda
Government Property at Uganda Embassy,
Kinshasa
6
UCMANNEX46
UNITED
NAIIONS
Security Council
s
Distr.
GENERAL
S/1999/790
15 July 1999
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In connection with the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo on 10 July 1999 by the representatives of the
six concerned States, I think it necessary to set forth the implications for the
United Nations and to make recommendations to the Security Council accordingly
concerning preliminary action that the United Nations could take. It is my hope
that the rebels will sign the agreement without further delay and that it can
then be implemented promptly and in full.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT
Scope of agreement
2. On 10 July 1999, at Lusaka, the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of
Angola signed an agreement for a cessation of hostilities between all the
belligerent forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The representatives
of the Rally for a Democratic Congo and the Movement for the Liberation of the
Congo declined to sign.
3 . The agreement stipulates that all air, land and sea attacks are to cease
within 24 hours of the signing, as well as the movement of military forces and
all acts of violence against the civilian population. The forces are to
disengage immediately.
4. Other provisions of the agreement concern the normalization of the
situation along the international borders of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, including the control of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration
of armed groups; an open national dialogue between the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the armed opposition (Rally for a Democratic
Congo and Movement for the Liberation of Congo) and the unarmed opposition; the
need to address the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and its neighbouring countries; the opening up of humanitarian corridors; and
the establishment of a mechanism for disarming all militias and armed groups .
Modalities and timing
5 . The agreement also contains the modalities of implementation of the
S/1999/790
English
Page 2
ceasefire. These provide for the establishment of a Joint Military Commission
composed of two representatives from each party under a neutral Chairman to be
appointed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in consultation with the
parties .
6. The mandate of the Commission includes the following tasks:
(a) Establishing the location of units at the time of the ceasefire;
(b) Facilitating liaison between the parties for the purpose of the
ceasefire;
(c) Assisting in the disengagement of forces to investigate any reports of
ceasefire violations;
(d) Verifying all information, data and activities relating to belligerent
forces;
(e) Verifying the disengagement of the belligerent forces where they are
in direct contact;
(f) Working out mechanisms to disarm armed groups;
(g) Verifying the quartering and disarmament of all armed groups;
(h) Verifying the disarmament of all Congolese civilians who are illegally
armed;
(i) Monitoring and verifying the orderly withdrawal of foreign forces.
7. The Commission is to be established within one week of the signing of the
agreement (D-Day) .
8. Other modalities dealt with in the agreement concern the cessation of
hostilities; disengagement; the release of hostages and exchange of prisoners of
war; the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces; national dialogue and
reconciliation; the re-establishment of state administration over the territory
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the disarmament of armed groups; the
formation of a national army; the redeployment of forces of the parties to
defensive positions in conflict zones; the normalization of the security
situation along the common borders between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and its neighbours; and a calendar for the implementation of the ceasefire
agreement .
III. ACTIVITIES PROPOSED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
9 . The agreement also contains proposals for an •appropriate force" to be
constituted, facilitated and deployed by the United Nations, in collaboration
with OAU, to ensure the implementation of the agreement.
I ...
S/1999/790
English
Page 3
10. According to the agreement, the suggested mandate of such a force would
include the following tasks:
(a) Working with the Joint Military Commission and OAU in the
implementation of the agreement;
(b) Observing and monitoring the cessation of hostilities;
(c) Investigating violations of the ceasefire agreement and taking
necessary measures to ensure compliance;
(d) Supervising the disengagement of forces as stipulated in the
agreement;
(e) Supervising the redeployment of forces to defensive positions in
conflict zones in accordance with the agreement;
(f) Providing and maintaining humanitarian assistance to and protecting
displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons;
(g) Keeping the parties to the ceasefire agreement informed of its
peacekeeping operations;
(h) Collecting weapons from civilians and ensuring that the weapons so
collected are properly accounted for and adequately secured;
(i) In collaboration with the Commission and OAU, scheduling and
supervising the withdrawal of all foreign forces ;
(j) Verifying all information, data and activities relating to military
forces of the parties .
11. The ceasefire agreement also envisages a number of what it calls peace
enforcement operations, including the "tracking down" and disarming of armed
groups ; screening mass killers , perpetrators of crimes against humanity and
other war criminals; handing over suspected genocidaires to the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; repatriation; and working out measures for
attaining the above objectives.
12. The "armed groups" are identified as the former Rwandan government forces
and interahamwe militia, the Allied Democratic Front, Lord's Resistance Army ,
the Forces for the Defence of Democracy of Burundi, the Former Uganda National
Army, the Uganda National Rescue Front II; the West Nile Bank Front; and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola .
IV . OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
13 . The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has inflicted further
terrible suffering on a country already heavily burdened with poverty and
I . ..
S/1999/790
English
Page 4
neglect . An estimated 700,000 persons are displaced within the country, in
addition to some 300,000 refugees located on its territory . The United Nations
is aware of harrowing accounts of famine and epidemics . Food security and
economic conditions, in particular in urban centres, continue to deteriorate at
an alarming rate. The conflict has been characterized by appalling, widespread
and systematic human rights v i o l ati ons , i nc l udi ng mass killings , ethnic
cleansing, rape and the destruction of property . The war's effects have spread
beyond the subregion to afflict the continent of Africa as a whole . The success
of the Congolese parties and the other Governments involved in arriving at a
peace agreement can be viewed as a major first step towards an eventual
recovery.
14 . The international community and the United Nations should therefore do
everything in their power to assist the Congolese Government, parties and
people, as well as the other Gov ernments involved, in achieving a peaceful
solution .
15. In order to be effective, any United Nations peacekeeping mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, whatever its mandate, will have to be large
and expensive . It would require the deployment of thousands of international
troops and civilian personnel . It will face tremendous difficulties, and will
be beset by risks. Deployment will be slow . The huge size of the country, the
degradation of its infrastructure, the intensity of its climate, the intractable
nature of some aspects of the conflict, the number of parties, the high levels
of mutual suspicion, the large population displacements, the ready availability
of small arms, the general climate of impunity and the substitution of armed
force for the rule of law in much of the territory combine to make the
Democratic Republic of the Congo a highly complex environment for peacekeeping.
16. In the light of the above, I would strongly recommend that the Security
Council immediately authorize the deployment up to 90 United Nations military
personnel, together with the necessary civilian political, humanitarian and
administrative staff, to the subregion . The military personnel would serve
mainly as liaison officers to the national capitals and rear military
headquarters of the main belligerents, especially Kinshasa and elsewhere within
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kigali, Kampala, Luanda, Harare and
Windhoek, as well as a liaison cell at Lusaka. They would need appropriate
communications equipment and air assets in order to perform their functions and
keep me fully informed of the situation on the ground.
17. As a second stage, on the basis of the report of the technical survey team
and of the liaison group , I would then be prepared to recommend a further
deployment, which could involve up to 500 military observers within the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and as required to the belligerent and other
neighbouring States . It would also be necessary to ensure their security, and I
would formulate my recommendations accordingly.
18. The tasks of the military observers, which would be in accordance with the
peacekeeping functions listed in the agreement, would include the following :
(a) To establish contacts with the various parties at their headquarters
I ...
S/1999/790
English
Page 5
locations, including in the capitals of the belligerent States;
(b) To establish liai son with the Joint Mil i tary Commission and
collaborate with it in the implementation of the agreement;
(c) To assist the Commission and the parties in investigating alleged
violations of the ceasefire ;
(d) To make a general security assessment of the country ;
(e) To secure from the parties guarantees of cooperation and assurances of
security for the further deployment in-country of military observers ;
(f) To determine the present and likely future locations of the forces of
all parties with a view to developing the concept for deployment of United
Nations military personnel;
(g) To observe, subject to the provision by the parties of adequate
security, the ceasefire and disengagement of the forces and their redeployment
and eventual withdrawal;
(h) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to and
protecting displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons;
(i) To assist the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in further
refining its concept of operations for subsequent deployments.
19. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has already approached potential
troop - contributing countries to assess their readiness to provide military
observers and, ultimately, formed units for subsequent stages of deployment
subject to Council approval.
20 . I have also decided to appoint in due course a Special Representative ,
assisted by an appropriate staff, including a Chief Mi litary Observer, to lead
the observer mission, which shall be called the Uni ted Nations Observer Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). I have also ordered the
dispatch of a small advance team to the region to clarify the role to be played
by the United Nations of the 10 July 1999 agreement and to establish contacts
and liaison with the authorities in Lusaka. As soon as the conditions are in
place to allow it to do its work in all parts of the country, I will send a
technical survey team to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to make the
necessary political and military contacts to pave the way for subsequent
deployments and assess the state of logistical capacity in the mission area .
The estimated costs of the advance and reconnaissance teams and of the liaison
group will be submitted to the Council in an addendum to the present report.
21 . The problem of armed groups is particularly difficult and sensitive. It
lies at the core of the conflict in the subregion and undermines the security of
all the States concerned . Unless it is resolved , no lasting peace c an come .
22. A purely military solution appears to be impossible , if only because the
I ...
j •
S/1999/790
English
Page 6
forces most able and willing to impose a military solution have clearly failed
to do so. I therefore intend to revert to the Security Council with detailed
proposals for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, including its mandate
and concept of operations, once I have carefully reviewed the situation on the
ground in the light of MONUC's reports.
23. At the same time, it is essential for the Congolese parties to proceed with
their national debate, as provided for in the agreement, in order to work
towards national reconciliation through dialogue among all groups concerned.
For its part, the international community could then be in a position to convene
an international conference on the Great Lakes region in order to secure the
commitment of donors to the recovery of the region as a whole .
24. Even at this stage, however, I foresee the need for the establishment of a
well funded, well planned and long-term programme for the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration into society of former combatants. The
benefits of such a programme will need to be widely publicized in order to
attract the fighters now under arms. I am encouraged in this respect by the
provision in the ceasefire agreement that permits the countries of origin of
members of armed groups to take themselves all the necessary measures to
facilitate repatriation, including the granting of amnesty (except to persons
suspected of crimes against humanity or genocide). It will also be necessary to
include in the mandate of any eventual peacekeeping mission measures to address
the human rights violations that have characterized this conflict. I will
revert to the Council as soon as the situation has been clarified. The
necessary first step will be the signing of the agreement by the two rebel
groups, the Congolese Rally for Democracy and the Movement for the Liberation of
Congo amid a renewed resolve by all concerned to carry it out in good faith .
I ...
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
RESOLUTION 1258 (1999)
UCMANNEX47
Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/1258 (1999)
6 August 1999
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4032nd meeting,
on 6 August 1999
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999 and recalling the
statements of its President of 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), 11 December 1998
(S/PRST/1998/36), and 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17),
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security,
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States in the
region,
Determined to resolve with all parties concerned the grave humanitarian
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular and in the
region as a whole and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees
and displaced persons to their homes,
Recognizing that the current situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo demands an urgent response by the parties to the conflict with support
from the international community,
Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 15 July 1999 on the United
Nations preliminary deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(S/1999/790),
.S/RES/1258 (1999)
Page 2
1, Welcomes the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by the States concerned in Lusaka on
10 July 1999 (S/1999/815) which represents a viable basis for a resolution of
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ;
2 . Also welcomes the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on 1 August 1999
by the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, expresses deep concern that the
Congolese Rally for Democracy has not signed the Agreement and calls upon the
latter to sign the Agreement without delay in order to bring about national
reconciliation and lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
3 . Commends the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern
African Development Community for their efforts to find a peaceful settlement to
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in particular the
President of the Republic of Zambia, and also the Secretary-General, the Special
Envoy of the Secretary-General for the peace process in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the Representative of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes
Region and all those who contributed to the peace process;
4. Calls upon all parties to the conflict, in particular the rebel
movements, to cease hostilities, to implement fully and without delay the
provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement, to cooperate fully with the OAU and the
United Nations in the implementation of the Agreement and to desist from any act
that may further exacerbate the situation;
5. Stresses the need for a continuing process of genuine national
reconciliation, and encourages all Congolese to participate in the national
debate to be organized in accordance with the provisions of the Ceasefire
Agreement;
6 . Stresses also the need to create an environment conducive to the
return in safety and dignity of all refugees and displaced oersons;
7. Notes with satisfaction the prompt establishment of the Political
Committee and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) by the States signatories to
the Ceasefire Agreement as part of their collective effort to implement the
Ceasefire Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
B. Authorizes the deployment o f up to 90 United Nat i ons military liaison
personnel, together with the necessary civilian, political, humanitarian and
administrative staff, to the capitals of the States signatories to the Ceasefire
I . ..
S/RES/1258 (1999)
Page 3
Agreement and the provisional headquarters of the JMC, and, as security
conditions permit, to the rear military headquarters of the main belligerents in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, as appropriate, to other areas the
Secretary-General may deem necessary, for a period of three months , with the
following mandate :
To establish contacts and maintain liaison with the JMC and all
parties to the Agreement;
To assist the JMC and the parties in developing modalities for the
Implementation of the Agreement;
To provide technical assistance, as requested to the JMC;
To provide information to the Secretary-General regarding the
situation on the ground, and to assist in refining a concept of
operations for a possible further role of the United Nations in the
Implementation of the Agreement once it is signed by all parties; and
To secure from the parties guarantees of cooperation and assurances of
security for the possible deployment in-country of military observers;
9. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special
Representative to serve as the Head of the United Nations presence in the
subregion relating to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and to provide assistance in the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, and
invites him to do so as soon as possible;
10. Calls upon all States and parties concerned to ensure the freedom of
movement, security and safety of United Nations personnel in their territory;
11. Calls for safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance to
those in need in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and urges all parties to
the conflict to guarantee the safety and security of all humanitarian personnel
and to respect strictly the relevant provisions of international humanitarian
law;
12. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed of
developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to report at the
appropriate time on the future presence of the United Nations in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in support of the peace process;
I ...
. S/RES/1258 (1999)
Page 4
13 . Decides to remain actively seized of the matter .
UCMANNEX48
RESPONSE· ACCUSATIONS MADE BY DRC TO THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL AGAINST UGANDA
1. Uganda's reasons for intervening in the DRC
Uganda's military presence in the DRC is mainly because of the following
reasons:
(a) Destabilisation attacks on UGanda ficm the DRC by the ,A.OF ,
and other Ugandan rebel groups as 1he!I as by Sudan.,f
.. ·. '. ~ .
. - .. · -· + The ADF and other U£:~~dar. rebe:s groups have been:.-.
rece·,v·rng suppo· rt o,.; ·: r.,.:= ·.-. -- ·t=-r .. :;,.:.:., · -:-i .. :.:. _,-.,:..,_;,;.~ ·.,.;_;.; •.i:
J I .~· : '• ._, ...., • I : " - I : - , • I 1 - ~ .J ·- r"" U : • :1, • - ,•
destabilisation date frci.',1 th -s !ast· ten yearE ~f for:-ne:President
Mobutu's era and curing tl".& currer,t ·tegime of
President Kabila.
+ In an effort to further destsbilisa Uganda and in adciitior:
to the Northern flank though LRA;·sucJan cipened ancther . . . . .. .. . ... .. . . .:.............. ..
front through South-V'/estern · Uganda t:y directly .- ·
. .... . .... ·. . .. . .. .
supporting and reinforcing ac!ivities of Ugandan rebsi
. . .... : . -~··-· -~- ...• ~ _,. ....... , ...... ... ~- .
• . . • . .. ,. . ·: ~,...,,1{·"'.·7'':'f',Y: .~ . · ... . ,: ::··. '; ·:· t "' ·.-· : · · ···. >:· .
groups on DRC territor/. · Sucah also planr.sa to use
airports in Eastern _DRC to _laLiif<:h_ massi~,e aai;al att~d;ii . . . ' , .. .. ·- . ~ ... ,. ........ . ...
on Uganda.~-
(b) Genocide
·-::,~
' •, ..
. .,
• ~ • I • .> I
+ Former President Mobutu re-organised,, rearmed, re-~
trained and facilitated the ex-:FAR and lnterahamwe wno~
had crossed into the ther, Zaire after committing the 1994:
genocide in Rwanda:' The genocidaires were aiso given
territorial support to recapture power in Rwanda. 'In
preparation for the intended recapture of power by the
genocidaires in Rwanda, President Mobutu forged an
alliance with the NIF regime in Khartoum, Sudan, not only •
• • • • •- •• ~ • • • M •
to aid and ab~t the crime of genocide in Rwanda but also
to specifically destabilise Uganda in the hope thatthe,n-
. . . . - . ·,·: • . •. . • ••.• , ."!.'...-::·: ....
Uganda wolild not be in a position to support Rwanda:.
In fulfilment of territory this plan, attacks were launched ·
'
from DRC on two fronts; one · in North West Uganda
(West Nile) and the other.hi Weste.rn Uganda (Kasese):
At the same time the reorganisation and rearming of
genocidaires in the DRC h~d reached an adyanced ·
stage. The Uganda governl'!le~t decided to act in self
defence by first recapturing· the territory these criminals .
had occupied and following them into.Zairean territory in-
. hot pursuit as we are fully empowered to do under Art.51
·of the UN Charter. It was this act. of.~.e.!f~efe·nce_.~gainst
DRC based rebels, which was undertaken with regional
and inle.rnational . understanding and support, · th.~t .
resulted in the fall of President Mobutu. President Kabila
was a direct bi-product of this process. After President ·
Kabila assumed power in the DRC, we had hoped that
since he knew our security concerns he would address
them. Unfortunately he did not. We continued these
'.2
'.~..~ :· ~1
.·,· .
2.
'~-~~
attacks under President Kabila's regime. Of cou·rse
Uganda did not expect an· improvement to happen so
soon because of_ capacity constraints by . the DRC
government. That's v1hy tha two counlrias ~ reached a
mutual arrangement that . led to Uganda's milftary
presence in DRC, to jointly termi~afa ·eny attac!<s by_
Sudan backed Ugandan rebels. (Copy of Agreemenf'
attached).
+ Whereas Uganda 0Nsnt ii~c t'.";e DP.:: !n -·~·,:;,;:ion tc- ::1c!-3
forces were biOught faca to face with :1 n:1ked threat of
committing the mcst r:ei~cus cr:r-s ag:ab3t humar.it'j.
The evil act at Bwir.di in March 1999 by the l:ltarahamwe
. .· .;)'
serves as a iamir.c!si that ~heir 9'.'il ;-:rcgram;;;e js· still in.
place'. vVe ail hevs an coiigaticn to ensure a · nonrecurrence
gancc:da in il";e .-s;io;~; t:.":;:;r;a dt..rlng the ·f 89~ ·
• w
genocide in Rwanda ·whsr: s•,·er:,1l:cc'j fcl·:!::;d !heir
hands as ova.- one mi_llion ~ccpie •,vefe bei,1g murdered.
Prosecution of the wu by t;,a .:illia.s
...
in addition to Uganda's secur:ty ccn,;;=;m.; t!"'s,~ ·s·:'.-S ~,-·: ·:, ~r di;~<:r~ic-ri ~i:::
l ' ,.
Congolese parties.
AFDL, the politic~! alliance led by President Kabila, was narrow b~cause it
was_ composed of four political groups, all from Eastern DRC. When ·
President Kabila took power he failed or neglected to broaden his political
base. Subsequently even the four party alliance collapsed: Only one of the
original four parties constitutes the alliance. He further suppressed the
established active political opposition. Etienne Tshisekedi was condemned
to internal exile and was not allowed to travel outside the DRC. Ngandou
. .·
Kisassou W8S assassinated in Beni, under unclear circumstances, before
President Kabila took ov9r power. Masasscu who led the Bashi group was
arrested; so was Zahid i'lgoma. Bugera and others were r:narginalised,
. .
forcing tl1em to a bander the Kab!la alli-ar:ce.
In addition to the abo'Je poiitical prob!ems, the situation was exacerbated
by building a sactarler. army mainly composed of people from President
Kabila's locality led by_ his relatives. This led to total disaffection within the
ranks of those that had actually fought against Mobutu forces in the new
Congolese Armed Forces. These two factors ignited the internal rebellion.
On its part, ~wand~ w~s most concern_ed _about and preoc_~':!P!~9-with the
activities of the lnterahamwe and ex-FAR froni DRC territory. We shared
the same cuncerns in as t~r as our t'vvo territories were constantly
threatened by incursions Jroni :u-ie ciRc ;:
Therefore, in the orosecution of Ug~nd_a·~ ~e-~ensive _war iii ·the DRC, we'
forged an alliance with both Rwanda and the DRC irit~r~or._ratic
force.,:; which were in rebellion. ·
4
lfwas agreed that in prosecuting the war,· there{should be sector ccirrima'nd!
., • . . . . . . . . ,'
Rwanda was to command the Southern sector ar.d Uf:}anda was .· to; . . . . --- -· . . .
command the Northern Sector. It was further agreed that w.hichever
command ·force moved to a different sector it would then be mad.e alJ
attachment falling under the direct command of that sector commander.
High Level Coordination of intelligence, information logistics · arid
communication was to be established. The Congolese forces were to
. .. ..... · ... ·.· · . ··· . . . • .. .. ·.~- : . ·. ~ .,,. -· ,. . . -. - .. . · .. .
cooperate as · attachments. to the two principle trisndly forces in order to
improve on working relationships and operational s:<ills. · Ccingoiese·'
commanders were to participate at coordinatlon le'iei. .
3. Efforts to resolve the conflict Pemc;f·.1!1•:
Since eruption of the conflict in th~ ORC, se·::·:.• :·:.-·-···:., ::,~d .';-;es·:l~g.s at
Var.lOUS levels hav·e been held ,,·1·· ·"' the a· '1m r.,: II t.11 •- .., _ ::. 1 ••••, •_•. ,:.: ·=... _•.. . ;;..,.,.:_,,,~J·-.J:: .: •.• ,..; ,r..:...,. :_::_,~ 'i","· ";=··~-·n• .·
to the conflict. Summits were_ held in Vict:)ria F3i;s F-:n Luis, Durban,
Pretoria, Lusaka, Nairobi, Sirte, Dodoma and Dar -~s Sai~an1: DRC :12s
been an active participant at all these forces ·.vhere the 't,•10 dimensions of
the crisis in Congo were regionally and inter:1at:cnally acknowledged. In
fi:!d when the :Lusaka Summit II f~iled to ta:-:s ~!aca _President Kacila
objected to the involvement of Congolese rebels, the Mihi~tsrial meeting of.
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence twc C,:rnmitts·.:.:s f
(i) Committee on the modalities for the imi::;letr.,e:-:~::ti?;; c-: ths Cease-fire
Agreement in DRC and
(ii) Committee on Security concerns of the DRC and tha neighbo•Jring
countries.
· Jhis was arJ .. a.c~nowtedgement by tlie .region that DRC neighboursJ
. including' t.fga"iida have ·legitimate security concerns;;
.Furthermore, the parties to the conflict in Congo, signed the Cease-fire
Agreement on the 10th of July 1999 in Lusaka after intensive and pain
staking negotiations. The fact that DRC participated in the negotiations ·and ·
later on signed the Agreement means that DRC in conjunction with
members from the regions, the OAU and the UN agreed that the
Agreement was the only viable basis for a permanent"solution to the conflict
in DRC. It is therefcre absurd that DRC as a party to the Agreement has
turned round and taken the same issues to the Security Council.
With ragard·to rec..e nt dev.e iopments in ~;isangc1ni, when Member Stat~s. . .. . . :
namely Rwanda, Zimbabwe .. !\r.aoia, Na:r,ibie, DRC and Uganda signso, - . . . . . : .· :t' ·'•.' •'. ·'·
the Cease-firs Agree·T,eni, the rebels that is the RGD Kisangani and RCD
Goma and the MLC did net sign th!s .t,greement be,:;aJJse of a leadership
dispute in with the RCD ranks: However MLC subsequently signed on 1st
August 1999.
It 1N2.s agreed at .th-3 :3ame ssssion on 10th July th.at under the guidance of·
President Chilub~ a ~~rification ~xerci~~ ~h~uld b~ carriea out in th~ DRC.
in the areas controlled ~y the RCD and R~~-Ki~anganito-establish the true
position about accusations and counter accusations between RCD Gema
and the RCD Kisangani.
On the 5th August 1999 the verification team led by Hon Erj.!<J3ilwam~ar: . . .
Minister for Presidential affaiiS of Zambia~1isitad the RCD~Gbma group ~,
Kisangani and was sch:d:ilad to mee~ tha RCD i<isangani group but was
not possible for the verification team to visit the RCD Kisangaili sven on the
7th. and 8th August 1999 due to the ;:,3valiirig security. Situation in
Kisangani and the visit was called off. . .
To facilitate the process, UPDF took over the RPA positions in ord?r to
clear the ro.ute from the airport and key are9s which were sup!Jose•:! -to te ·
visited by the Zambian and South African teams. Howavsr Ugai:da
'
assured Rwanda that she would vacate cbase po.sitions as seen as the
verification teams left. This craated sorr.-::: ~s ·,fr'.)/'1.
Some days later, the verification :.• .......
·. : '";
P 'd t' I ff• • 2 i-.;- r. H--·i. , : .• : .: .. res1 en 1a a airs m am,..,a an .... 1,c : 1, . -~--=· ..... ;: .- =_~,-..:.::, .: ...· .' -~· .. ; :: :.:.; .::,. :• ... :: <->-.•L:. .•· ...
Afr··1ca among others manage"-' +,.., ,,·1-=·1~ '<" ::-: - - -. ·: ' .,,. , ,.... ··· :. · ' :.-:. -~ - ·.- · · ·.:. •"-" - . ·· ··: :· .. .. . - . .. - ....... • · - ; • ...
and carry out the verification e:<ar~:ss. ·· : · · ·· - ·· . . . .. : · .. : . - :: :: ~ .. ~- ·
the team departed.
On rece·1v·1ng the '1nI&' ormat'1on I H .E.t.h.a. p .,.: -;:,.-::, ...,, -•:; ·....• ,~-.·: ·' . ..'. ·-:'-:~·I"'• .-..·-..= ·': -. , :·.,: :•:··. . .: ...·. .. ~• .· • r. .•- :•:
President of Minister of Defence of Rwar. -:.!a \Jaj Gsi: =a,j ;<af~iT.: ar:c:
they met at Mweya Lodge in Uganda ai1: trsy agrasd :c di.s::1.;ss .:!.:r'"3,.,:·
issues affecting the resolution· of the corn: ;·:t. T:-:s D_RC ~£;re=i:;: . .
to an immediate Cease-fire
to carry out.an investigation
to determine exactly what happens·::
to demilitarise Kisangani so that instit• t 'lcr.!?I ::l!'T?:"'J~~'3:''.: ::::-' '-:<:
made on how the two forces can relate ~o ~'3cr. ~ti"~·· '>"'. :r= ·::: ::.:: ::
the outcome of the investigation re ;: •:r:.
8 September 1999
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
UCMANNEX
S/RES/1265 (1999)
17 September 1999
RESOLUTION 1265 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4046th meeting,
on 17 September 1999
The Security Council,
Recalling the statement of its President of 12 February 1999
(S/PRST/1999/6),
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999
(S/1999/957) submitted to the Security Council in accordance with the abovementioned
statement,
Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 13 April 1998 on the
"Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa" (S/1998/318) and 22 September 1998 on the "Protection for
Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and Others in Conflict Situations"
(S/1998/883), in particular their analysis related to the protection of
civilians,
Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in armed
conflicts and are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements,
gravely concerned by the hardships borne by civilians during armed conflict, in
particular as a result of acts of violence directed against them, especially
women, children and other vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally
displaced persons, and recognizing the consequent impact this will have on
durable peace, reconciliation and development,
Bearing in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining
the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution,
Stressing the need to address the causes of armed conflict in a
comprehensive manner in order to enhance the protection of civilians on a longS/
RES/1265 (1999)
Page 2
term basis, including by promoting economic growth, poverty eradication,
sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy,
the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights,
Expressing its deep concern at the erosion in respect for international
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and principles during armed conflict,
in particular deliberate acts of violence against all those protected under such
law, and expressing also its concern at the denial of safe and unimpeded access
to people in need,
Underlining the importance of the widest possible dissemination of
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and of relevant
training for, inter alia, civilian police, armed forces, members of the judicial
and legal professions, civil society and personnel of international and regional
organizations,
Recalling the statement of its President of 8 July 1999 {S/PRST/1999/21),
and emphasizing its call for the inclusion, as appropriate , within specific
peace agreements and, on a case-by-case basis, within United Nations
peacekeeping mandates, of clear terms for the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants, including the safe and timely disposal of arms
and ammunition,
Mindful of the particular vulnerability of refugees and internally
displaced persons, and reaffirming the primary responsibility of States to
ensure their protection, in particular by maintaining the security and civilian
character of refugee and internally displaced person camps,
Underlining the special rights and needs of children in situations of armed
conflict, including those of the girl-child,
Recognizing the direct and particular impact of armed conflict on women as
referred to in paragraph 18 of the report of the Secretary-General and, in this
regard, welcoming the ongoing work within the United Nations system on the
implementation of a gender perspective in humanitarian assistance and on
violence against women,
1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999, and
takes note of the comprehensive recommendations contained therein;
2 . Strongly condemns the deliberate targeting of civilians in situations
of armed conflict as well as attacks on objects protected under international
I .. .
law, and calls on all parties to put an end to such practices;
S/RES/1265 (199
Page 3
3. Emphasizes the importance of preventing conflicts which could endanger
international peace and security and, in this context, highlights the importance
of implementing appropriate preventive measures to resolve conflicts, including
the use of United Nations and other dispute settlement mechanisms and of
preventive military and civilian deployments, in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, resolutions of the Security
Council and relevant international instruments;
4. Urges all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations
under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, in particular
those contained in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as with the
decisions of the Security Council;
5. Calls on States which have not already done so to consider ratifying
the major instruments of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee
law, and to take appropriate legislative, judicial and administrative measures
to implement these instruments domestically, drawing on technical assistance, as
appropriate, from relevant international organizations including the
International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations bodies;
6 . Emphasizes the responsibility of States to end impunity and to
prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious
violations of international humanitarian law, affirms the possibility, to this
end, of using the International Fact-Finding Commission established by
Article 90 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, reaffirms
the importance of the work being done by the ad hoe Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, stresses the obligation of all States to cooperate fully
with the Tribunals, and acknowledges the historic significance of the adoption
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which is open for
signature and ratification by States;
7 . Underlines the importance of safe and unhindered access of
humanitarian personnel to civilians in armed conflict, including refugees and
internally displaced persons, and the protection of humanitarian assistance to
them, and recalls in this regard the statements of its President of 19 June 1997
(S/PRST/1997/34) and 29 September 1998 (S/PRST/1998/30);
8. Emphasizes the need for combatants to ensure the safety, security and
freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, as well as
I . . .
S/RES/1265 (1999)
Page 4
personnel of international humanitarian organizations, and recalls in this
regard the statements of its President of 12 March 1997 (S/PRST/1997/13) and
29 September 1998;
9. Takes note of the entry into force of the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994, recalls the relevant principles
contained therein, urges all parties to armed conflicts to respect fully the
status of United Nations and associated personnel and, in this regard, condemns
attacks and the use of force against United Nations and associated personnel, as
well as personnel of international humanitarian organizations, and affirms the
need to hold accountable those who commit such acts;
10. Expresses its willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict
where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is
being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration of
appropriate measures at the Council's disposal in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, and notes, in that regard, the relevant recommendations
contained in the report of the Secretary-General;
11. Expresses its willingness to consider how peacekeeping mandates might
better address the negative impact of armed conflict on civilians;
12. Expresses its support for the inclusion, where appropriate, in peace
agreements and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping missions, of specific and
adequate measures for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
ex-combatants, with special attention given to the demobilization and
reintegration of child soldiers, as well as clear and detailed arrangements for
the destruction of surplus arms and ammunition and, in this regard, recalls the
statement of its President of B July 1999;
13. Notes the importance of including in the mandates of peacemaking,
peacekeeping and peace-building operations special protection and assistance
provisions for groups requiring particular attention, including women and
children;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that United Nations personnel
involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have
appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee
law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and
communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination, and
urges States and relevant international and regional organizations to ensure
that appropriate training is included in their programmes for personnel involved
I . . .
in similar activities;
S/RES/1265 (199
Page 5
15. Underlines the importance of civilian police as a component of
peacekeeping operations, recognizes the role of police in assuring the safety
and well-being of civilians and, in this regard, acknowledges the need to
enhance the capacity of the United Nations for the rapid deployment of qualified
and well-trained civilian police;
16 . Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under
Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their
impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the needs of children, in
order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;
17 . Notes that the excessive accumulation and destabilizing effect of
small arms and light weapons pose a considerable impediment to the provision of
humanitarian assistance and have a potential to exacerbate and prolong
conflicts, endanger the lives of civilians and undermine security and the
confidence required for a return to peace and stability;
18. Takes note of the entry into force of the Convention on the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and their
Destruction of 1997 and the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) annexed to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects of 1980, recalls the relevant provisions contained
therein, and notes the beneficial effect that their implementation will have on
the safety of civilians;
19. Reiterates its grave concern at the harmful and widespread impact of
armed conflict on children, recalls its resolution 1261 (1999) of
25 August 1999, and reaffirms the recommendations contained therein;
20. Stresses the importance of consultation and cooperation between the
United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant
organizations, including regional organizations, on follow-up to the report of
the Secretary-General and encourages the Secretary-General to continue
consultations on this subject and to take concrete actions aimed at enhancing
the capacity of the United Nations to improve the protection of civilians in
armed conflict;
21. Expresses its willingness also to work in cooperation with regional
/ .. .
S/RES/1265 (1999)
Page 6
organizations to examine how these bodies might better enhance the protection of
civilians in armed conflict;
22 . Decides to establish immediately an appropriate mechanism to review
further the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General and
to consider appropriate steps by April 2000 in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations;
23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
/ ...
UCMANNEX:
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
s
S/RES/1273 (1999)
5 November
1999
RESOLUTION 1273 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4060th meeting,
on 5 November 1999
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999 and 1258 (1999) of
6 August 1999 and the statements of its President of 31 August 1998
(S/PRST/1998/26), 11 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/36) and 24 June 1999
(S/PRST/1999/17),
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political
independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States in the
region,
Reaffirming also that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815)
represents a viable basis for a resolution of the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 1 November 1999
(S/1999/1116),
Noting with satisfaction the deployment of United Nations military liaison
personnel to the capitals of the States signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement
and to the Joint Military Commission established by them, and underlining the
importance of their full deployment as provided for in its resolution
1258 (1999),
Noting also that the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee
have held meetings as mandated under the Ceasefire Agreement,
Urging all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to cooperate fully with the
technical survey team dispatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the
S/RES/1273 (1999)
Page 2
Secretary-General as indicated in his report of 15 July 1999 (S/1999 / 790), in
order to allow it to assess conditions and to prepare for subsequent United
Nations deployments in the country,
1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations military liaison
personnel deployed under paragraph B of resolution 1258 (1999) until
15 January 2000;
2 . Requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to it regularly
on developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo including on the future
presence of the United Nations in the country in support of the peace process;
3. Calls on all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to continue to abide
by its provisions;
4 . Decides to remain actively seized of the matter .
I . ..
PARTICULARS:
NAME:
AGE:
CHANDIA ROBERT
20YRS
NATIONALITY: UGANDAN
VILLAGE:
DISTRICT:
DATE:
:STATEMENT:
OBONYI
MOYO
15 NOVEMBER 1999
UCMANNEX!
lam of the above mentioned particulars and would like to state as follows:
I was a peasant farmer coupled with fishing along the R. Nile for my
livelihood. My father Jaffer Okot died in 1994 while my mother Rose
Chandia is still alive and stays in Obonyi in Moyo.
( ) WNBF rebels attacked Obonyi, Lofori and Palarinya in June 1998 from
~ Sudan and abducted about 120 youths including myself. We were tied and
::!. made to move upto Khor Kaya in southern Sudan. The abductors were
~ . about 80 WNBF rebels (all armed) and also looted shops and took items
like sugar, soap, money and clothes. Enroute, one of us called DATA
who had been abducted from Lomonya was stabbed to death after
crossing the road to Kajo Keji in Sudan. He was weak and could not move
any further.
When we reached Khor Kaya we immediately started military training
which lasted for 02 months. Khor Kaya had a WNBF force of about 200
rebels. There was also a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) camp near the
WNBF camp in Khor Kaya. Supplies from the Sudanese to us included
soap, cooking oil, peas and sorghum flour. The Sudanese also supplied us
with 120 new assault rifles after training in August 1998. They also gave
us each 90 rounds of ammunition let alone medicine during our training.
After training, we also did a one day range exercise. In October 1998, we
(the group of 120 abductees cum fresh soldiers) and the others whom we
found in Khor Kaya (about 200 rebels), were put into lorries and taken to
Juba by the Sudanese government. Juma Oris the leader of WNBF came
with the Sudanese government and military officials and addressed us. He
told us that we were being taken to Congo to fight alongside the
Congolese and on victory, we would return to our motherland Uganda.
We spent only one day in Juba and were loaded onto a big Sudanese
aircraft and flown to Kinshasha in Congo.
We spent a week in Kinshasha and after that were fragmented into
platoons (30 people each) and integrated into FAC. These mixed sub units
of FAC and WNBF would then be given axis of advance. Command was
also integrated and our groups became organic to FAC.
In our briefing our converging point was supposed to be Kisangani. We
moved by ship from Kinshasha upto a place called Ubundu.
From Ubundu we moved on foot towards Kisangani. We had moved a
distance of about 20 kms when we were ambushed by the UPDF. This
was in at 1998. The commander of my group was called Vuchiri. We lost
quite a number of our colleagues in this ambush, others who survived
including Congolese and WNBF members run in dissarray. I was injured
in the right leg and I spent six days in the bush. I had tied my wound with
my shirt to stop bleeding but with time, the wound had become septic.
I was discovered by a UPDF patrol which took me to their camp in
Kisangani and put me under medical care. After spending about six
months receiving treatment, I recovered and was put in custody for about
a month in Kisangani.
I was subsequently released and put on open arrest. I found other six
Chadian POWs in Kisangani.
We were brought to Uganda with the Chadians in November 1999. I have
since been in Uganda and was released and allowed to go home on my
own to check on my people in Moya. I have todate not seen any of my
colleagues with whom we were abducted from Obonyi in Mayo in 1998 by
the WNBF. Some I presume died while others are still in Congo. That is
all I can state and believe its true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Signed: CHANDIA ROBERT
.......... &..~Q .................................. .
Signed: LT TIMOTHY KANYOGONYA
·-c>~~G -
••.•I I I ... I I I I I I I;;;··, - : ·~,.~:-. l~""! .. J I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I /-::: . -- --
OFFICER RECORDING STATEMENT
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
RESOLUTION 1279 (1999)
Distr .
GENERAL
UCMANNEX52
S/RES/1279 (1999)
30 November 1999
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4076th meeting,
on 30 November 1999
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of
6 August 1999 and 1273 (1999) of s November 1999 and the statements of its
President of 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), 11 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/36)
and 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17),
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security,
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States in the
region,
Reaffirming also that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815)
represents the most viable basis for a resolution of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and noting the role it requests the United
Nations to play in the implementation of the ceasefire,
Expressing its concern at the alleged violations of the Ceasefire Agreement
and urging all parties to refrain from any declarations or action that could
jeopardize the peace process,
Stressing the responsibilities of the signatories for the implementation of
the Ceasefire Agreement, and calling on them to permit and facilitate the full
deployment of United Nations military liaison officers and other personnel
necessary for the fulfilment of their mandate throughout the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Welcoming the pledges of support made to the Joint Military Commission
S/RES/1279 (1999)
Page 2
(JMC) by States and organizations, and calling on others to contribute, together
with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement, to the funding of the body,
Noting with concern the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and calling on all Member States to contribute to current and
future consolidated humanitarian appeals,
Expressing its concern at the severe consequences of the conflict for the
security and well-being of the civilian population throughout the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Expressing also its concern at the adverse impact of the conflict on the
human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in
the eastern parts of the country, and the continuing violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law committed throughout the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Having considered the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in
his report of 1 November 1999 (S/1999/1116),
Reiterating the importance of the successful completion of the mission of
the technical assessment team dispatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to assess conditions and to prepare for possible subsequent United Nations
deployment in the country as well as to obtain firm guarantees from the parties
to the conflict over the safety, security and freedom of movement of United
Nations and associated personnel,
Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,
Underlining the importance of the full deployment of the United Nations
military liaison personnel as provided for by resolution 1258 (1999),
1. Calls upon all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, to
implement fully the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement, and to use the JMC to
resolve disputes over military issues;
2 . Stresses the need for a continuing process of genuine national
reconciliation, encourages all Congolese to participate in the national dialogue
to be organized in coordination with the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
and calls upon all Congolese parties and the OAU to finalize agreement on the
facilitator for the national dialogue;
I .. .
S/RES/1279 (1999)
Page 3
3. Welcomes the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special
Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to serve as the head of
the United Nations presence in the subregion relating to the peace process in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to provide assistance in the
implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement;
4. Decides that the personnel authorized under its resolutions
1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999), including a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in
the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical
support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support, which
will assist the Special Representative, shall constitute the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until
1 March 2000;
5. Decides also that MONUC, led by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, consistent with resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999),
shall carry out the following ongoing tasks:
(a) To establish contacts with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement
at their headquarters levels, as well as in the capitals of the States
signatories;
(b) To liaise with the JMC and provide technical assistance in the
implementation of its functions under the Ceasefire Agreement, including in the
investigation of ceasefire violations;
(c) To provide information on security conditions in all areas of its
operation, with emphasis on local conditions affecting future decisions on the
introduction of United Nations personnel;
(d) To plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of
forces;
(e) To maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons,
refugees, children, and other affected persons, and assist in the protection of
human rights, including the rights of children;
6. Underlines that the phased deployment of United Nations military
observers with the necessary support and protection elements in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo will be subject to its further decision, and expresses its
intention to take such a decision promptly on the basis of further
recommendations of the Secretary-General, taking into account the findings of
I ...
S/RES/1279 (1999)
P~ge 4
the technical assessment team;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to accelerate the development of a
concept of operations based on assessed conditions of security, access and
freedom of movement and cooperation on the part of the signatories to the
Ceasefire Agreement;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed and to
report to it as soon as possible on the situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and submit his recommendations on further deployment of United Nations
personnel in the country and on their protection;
* * *
9. Requests the Secretary-General, with immediate effect, to take the
administrative steps necessary for the equipping of up to 500 United Nations
military observers with a view to facilitating future rapid United Nations
deployments as authorized by the Council;
10 . Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
UCMANNEX53
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE STATEMENT ON THE ATTACK
ON KATOJO GOYER'.'JMENT ?.iUSON -FORTPORTAL ON
THE MORNINC_ilf. 09 DEC 99,
The ADF attacked Katojo govemmcnt Prison at around 3.00 a.m
this morning: At the time of the attack, there were 1'4'i, prisoners
and 56 Prisons department staff.
It has been established thaL:a65 ·prisoners are still unaccounted for
following the attack, §;37 .prisoners remained, a UPDF soldier and
a wife of a Prison warder were killed and two prison warders and a
relative a prison wardress were injured.
A prison lorry and the vehicle belonging to the deputy officer
in charge of the prison were burnt.
Some guns belonging to the prisons depa11ment were also taken by
the enemy.
For the last three weeks the UPDF has been conducting a major
offensive in the Rwenzori mountains to dislodge the ADF from its
strongholds and rear bases both in Uganda and in eastern Congo
namely:
Kiribata
Buhira
Kambasa
Kafaliso.
Kikingi
Katebwa
Bulyambawo
Ntume
Masibwe
/
. \
Butini and Bihondo forested slopes of the mountains in
Kisomoro and Buhesi sub-counties in Bunyangabu.
In Bundibugyo, enemy pockets were in the slopes
adjacent to the border with DRC and these are areas of
Kasanzi, Mboma, Kaleyaleya and Masule.
By the end of November, a big part of the enemy crossed into the
DRC in flight and the enemy that remained fragmented into
smaller mobile groups of 06-10 men in order to elude UPDF
deployments, attack soft targets, carry out abductions, raid villages
for food and carry out deceptive operations in the lowlands
especially in Bundibugyo for publicity.
The ADF took advantage of the commitment of the bigger part of
the UPDF force in the ongoing offensive in the mountains to attack
Katojo Prison.
The attack had three major objectives:
To dive1t the UPDF from the ongoing offensive in the
mountains to the lowlands and thereby reduce pressure and
allow them to reorganise.
To gain publicity.
To abduct and reinforce their depleted manpower.
The UPDF is fully aware of these intentions of the enemy and will
not be swayed or diverted from its objective of annihilating the
ADF in the ongoing offensive in the mountains.
. \
Measures will also be put in place to ensure that the enemy does
not sneak into and cause havoc in rear areas.
The UPDF is pursuing the group that attacked Katojo government
Prison in order to rescue the abductees and punish those the ADF
terrorists.
UCMANNEX~
RURAL TERRORISM ACTIVITIES OF CONGO BASED ADF REBELS
1.·- ADF active 1n Harugalu in Bundibugyo and lhandiro in Kasese
where they carry out abductions, kllllngs and loot1ng/plunder.
2. ADF rebels killed 05 c1vs and abducted 06 others on the border
with DRC along R, Tako on Feb 03 1999,
3. On 04 Feb 99, ADF rebels raided Bumadu village in Bundtbugyo
and looted oroperties.
4, Jan 95: ADF was recruiting Banande in Eastern DRC and taking
them for trg in Kiribata,
5, Interahamwe and ex-FAR rebels in Nyarabara, Rugarama, Gikongo.1
Nyamubingo, Nyabarira, Kihondo, Busarci, Bweza, Kyandego and
Murombero villages in Busanza DRC.
6. · 30 Mar 99, a former Kichwamba student escaped from ADF and
reported to UPDF in Bundibugyo, He revealed that ADF rebels ·
including 03 senior comds entered -Bundibugyo from DRC and were
in Kaleyaleya in Harungali S/countY,
7, 31 Mar 99: Ambush of civ veh at Bugando village Kisitu s/county
along Bundibugyo - Fort Portal road killing 02 people and later
burnt the veh,
8. On 03 Apr 99: ADF rebels attacked Hamukugu f1sh1nQ village
on L, George, killed 07 people, burnt a veh and m/cycle ·~nd looted
property.
9. ADF rebels ambushed vehs at Sara village Bubukwapa s/cty and
at Nyaru on Bundibugyo, Lamia border,road on 06 and 07 Apr 99
in 14 people were killed and 02 were inJured.
10. On 08 Apr 99, the ADF attacked Kikorongo village in Muhokya
s/county, Kasese district and killed one person and abducted two
others.
11. 28 June 95: 250 ADF rebels who had converged in K1ribata and
Kibatana later fragmented into smaller groups in the above two
places and in Lhume, Lugetsi and Buhira in DRC. It is from here
that ADF small groups infiltrate into Uganda to link up with their
bcks in Kiraro, Kitholu S/county and Bukonzo'·county.
12, 13 May 99: ADF rebels raided Hima parish in Kicwamba
s/county and killed 04 peoole and abduct~d 04 others.
13. 10 Aug 1999 ADF rebels raided Kibuku village in Rweblsengo
s/county and killed 02 c1vs.
14. 11 Aug 99: at-Kanyabukcito village in Kasitu s/county the RDC
Bundibugyo was nit in an ambusn and his escort injured.
15. 13 Aug 99: ADF attacked Katumba Camp for ,_d'tsplaced people in
Bubukwanga s/countY and killed 03 people.
16. 15 June 1999: ADF raid on Kyambona village of Bwera s/county
Kasese District,
17. On 06 July 1999 a group of ADF rebels attacked Nyakeya village
in Kyarumba s/county. looted food and retreated back to the Rwenzori
Mts.
18. On 30 July 99. ADF chief coordinator one Mulumba Abdallah
was arrested by own forces at Katunguru Bridge in Kasese while en
route to DRC. He revealed that he was coming from Sudan via Kenya
and was going to check on the ADF fighters.
19, A group of 30 ADF rebe(s who were terrorising areas of Burondo
and Rwamabale in Kasitu and Rweblsengo s/counties crossed through
Semliki N/Park to areas of Maroba and Kasangali in DRC on 18 Aug 99
following the attack on their camp of Burundo,
20. ADF infiltrai!on into Kibaa1J district ateas of Mpefu and
Bwikara s/counties where they killed 05 people in September 1999.
21, On 19 Sept 1999, ADF rebels attacked Mltandi SSS and killed a
student and inJured 02 others. ·
22. 05 and 06 Oct 1999: ADF rebels carried out the following
activities,
a. Ambushed a civilian vehicle between Hamukungu fishing
village and Kikorongo junction k1111ng one person .and
abducting another.
b. Ambushed a UPDF force along R. Muzizi in Kibale district.
'"'
c. Staged a roadblock at Rubira stock farm along
the ~art Portal - Kasese road and later retreated to
Mitandi hills.
d. Were engaged by tbe UPDF in Kaserebe in Bundibugyo
in which 02 assault rifles were captured by UPDF
23. 16 Oct 1999: Ambush by ADF rebels between Kikorongo junction
and Katunguru in Queen Elizabeth National Park and shot at two
vehicles and injured 07 people.
24, 17 Oct 1999: ADF rebels ambushed a civilian vehicle at Mweya
Junction along Kasese - Mbarara road. The medical superitendant
of Bwera hospital - Dr Agaba was killed.
· 25. 14 Oct 1999: Interahamwe ambushed a civilian vehicle along
Ishasha - Nyakakoma road and retreated back to Viruga N/Park,
26. 18 Oct 99: UPDF attacked a UPDF camp in Kikingi in DRC and
captured 02 SMG assault rifles, 07 boxes of new a!Mlo for LMG, 06
RPG bombs and 18 MGL bombs, 04 rebels were killed in action.
27. 20 Oct 1999: ADF rebels attacked Bwanike village in
Kinyamaseke Parish, killed a home guard and abducted four people.
28. 12 Nov 1999 : ADF rebels attacked a camp for displaced people in
Masaka ~ DRC killing 08 peole,
29. 12 Nov 1999: ADF rebels raided Butyoko village in Kisomoro
s/county of Kabarole district and killed 02 people, '
30. 16 Nov 1999: ADF rebels from Klbati hills in Rwenzori mts
attacked Bihondo camp for the displaced in Rubona - Kabarole district
and killed 02 pople.
31. 17 Nov 1999: ADF rebels ambushed and burnt civil-Ian lorry along
Kasindi-Beni road. They also abducted one person.
32, 05 Dec 1999: 06 members of the Mai Mai militia who had Joined
ADF surrendered with their 06 rifles and 02 offensive grenades.
33, 05 Dec 1999: ADF rebels attacked Rubona Trading Centre in
Kisomoro S/county Bunyangabu county and burnt one civilian vehicle,
a house, and Injured one person . They later retreated with livestock
and other property they had looted.
34. 09 Dec 1999: ADF rebels attacked KatoJo Government prison
in Kabarole district and abducted over 360 prisoners, killed
a prison warder and UPDF soldier, 1nJured 02 people and burnt
the prison lorry and the small personal vehicle of the prison
superintendant.
35. 10 Dec 1999: ADF rebels made sirnulteneous butfutile attacks
on six UPDF aisposltions · in Bundibugyo 1,e Butama detach in
Ndugutu s/county, Kabango detach in Ndugutu S/county, K1r1nd1
detach in Busaru sub-county, Ngite detach in Buseru s/county,
Kinyamirima detach in Bubukwanga s/county and Masule detach in
Harugali sub county.
UPDF lost 05 soldiers, 02 82mm mortars and ·o4 SMG a§sault rifles.
10 casualties were also registered. 09 ADF rebels were killed
in action in these encounters and 01 was taken captive.
36. 13 Dec 1999: UPDF attacked a group of ADF rebels with KatoJo
abductees at Mwembi on Ntoroko - Bwamba border near Semoaya hot
springs and 03 abductees were rescued. In another encounter the
same day, 05 other abductees of Katojo prison were rescued as
well as an assortment of weapons captured from the enemy,
37. 12 Dec 99: ADF rebels ambushed a civilian vehicle at Mantoroba
Killing one soldier on board and 06 civilians.
38. 12 Dec 99: 18 a5ductees of Katojo escaped and reported to
UPDF at Karugutu detach with one SMG rifle. '
39. 12 Dec 99: ADF rebels attacked the Police barracks and UCB
branch in Bundibugyo town but were repulsed.
40. 23 Dec 99: ADF rebels attacked Nyahuka UPDF detach which was
guarding a camp for displaced people and killed 02 civilians and
injured 02 soldiers before withdrawing to DRC.
40. 24 Dec 99: ADF rebels attacked the UPDF detach of Hakitara
and killed 05 civilians and injured 02 soldiers. The rebels were
repulsed and retreated towards DRC.
41. Interahamwe - Ex-FAR activity in areas of Nyamitwitwi,
Buhimba, Kitoboko, Busesa, Paisane, Nyabithali, Nyaburongotha and
Kide as exemolified by the following incidents:
l ,•
a. On 10 Nov 99 UPDF had contact with Interahamwe
1n K1de and recovered 01 stick grenade, 280 loose rounds
of AK47 ammo, 13 loose rounds of G2 machine gun ammo, drugs
ond documents.
b. On 16 Nov 99: Contact between UPDF and Interahamwe
in Makoka in which one rifle AK47 No.56 14/02486 with
90 rounds of ammo w.e re captured bY UPDF .
c. On 16 Nov 99: In Nyamitwitwi, Kitoboko, Kasoso,
Buhimba and Ngeso, 02 Interahamwe were killed in action.
one was captured and 200 loose AK47 ammo charged by UPDF.
d. On 16 Nov 99: In Parisana and Nyamirima contact ·
with the Interahamwe yielded the following: 02 Interahamwe
KIA, and 01 AK47 assault rifle No AEV 2306 with 107 rounds
of ammo .were captured by UPDF.
42. On 01 Mar 99: Interahamwe attacked Bwindi Tourist site,
burnt 05 vehicles, 02 motor cycles and also set ablaze all the
camps at the tourist sites. They abducted 14 tourists, eight
of whom th~later killed ·- 06 abducted tourists were rescued,
The Bwindi conservation officer Mr Wagaba was also killed by
the assailants who later retreated towards Makoka in DRC.
NB: on 08 June 1998, the Congo based ADF also attacked
Kichwamba Technical Institute 1n Kabarole district and burnt
to death 33 students in their dormitories. 11 students sustained
serious burn wounds while 106 students were abducted.
The school truck; 03 dormitories and other property were destr9yed
in the arson by the ADF rebels.
UCMANNEXSS
--,--
A LIST OF PRIS0NEJ1S WHO WERE ABDUCTED BY ADF FROM
KA TOJO AND WERE UNDERGOING MIL TRAINING IN BUNDIBUGYO
AS ON 11 JAN 2000~
5-~wt< ~ /l'!)F ,t.4.c..oUJ. .f',u,~ &.., e:,~-r. APF c..os (f.q,oiTLJ.. c,o.. 17~fl.oo)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
~-
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
~
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
\
30.
31.
\32.
33.
34.
35.
Mohammed Rumisa
Karaiba Katende
Adam Sebiranda
Ali Sekanjako
Faraj Abdallah
J amil Mbabaali
Mikail Kisembo
ZoroElnest
Hussein Maayega
Ramathan Obwangmoi
Ibrahim Bakangamba
Musa Seguya
Salim Sempa
Sulait Kiiza
Abdul Hakim Mwesigwa .
Muhammed Mbarile
Ali Yawe
Murshid Kyaaze
Mohammed Sekabira
Abdurah Salam Kimbugwe
Jamil Bosa.,Jt:-
Mustafa Kabali
Abdallah Karim Dengo
Patrick Kayigwa
Jackson Bogonza
John Kyomuhangi
Medad Katmujuna
George :William Birungi
Micheal Byaruhanga
Moses Sumbusa
J osephat'l3irungi
Alex Byamukama
James Turyatunaga
John Musalwa
James Senoga
. .......
36. Charles Byaruhanga
37. Patrie Asaba
38. Coiro !rumba
39. · Thoinas Kyaboona
40. John Mujwahuka
41. Alex Muchunguzi
42. Wilson Baluku
43. Patrick Kagweli
44. Solomon ausinge
45. Ad9n Kibulu
46. Steven Byaruhanga
47. Julius Kasuna.mera
48. Edward Bya.mukama
49. Misaaki Katongole
so. Masereka Kisangani
51. Richard Kambasa
52. Sunday Kataribaho
53. George K wehayo
54 . John Kyalimpa
55. Sheikh Idris Lwaazi
56. Franco Mugisha
57. Patrie Kulisi
58. Patrie Kasaija
59. George Masakwa
60. Richard Angwer.
NOTE:
a. All the above 60 abductees who have been undergoing military training
in Bundibugyo were recently deployed in different AJ;)F Units.
b. The 28 UPDF sold~~E~_(n~_\:l.!,.QQt,given) .)Yho . w~r(: J1_bducted frOfY!
Katojo were straight away,aepfof.ed.i,. ..
I
UNITED
NATIONS
(
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
UCMANNEX56
S/2000/30
17 January 2000
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
I . INTRODUCTION
1. By paragraph 4 of its resolution 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999, the
Security Council decided that the personnel authorized under its resolutions
1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999), including a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in
the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical
support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support, which
would assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, should
constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUC) until 1 March 2000.
2. By paragraph B of that resolution, the Security Council requested the
Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed and to report to it as soon as
possible on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and submit his
recommendations on further deployment of United Nations personnel in the country
and on their protectior, .
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS
3 . The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815) provided for the establishment
of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) which, together with the United Nations and
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), would "be responsible for executing ...
peacekeeping operations until the deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping
force". The Agreement also provided for the establishment of a ministeriallevel
Political Committee. At its last meeting in Harare in early December
1999 , JMC adopted for approval by the Political Committee papers submitted by
its four working groups on the following questions :
(a) Determination of humanitarian corridors, release of hostages, exchange
of prisoners of war and working relations with the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Committee of the Red
S/2000/30
English
Page 2
Cross {ICRC};
{b} Working out mechanisms and budget estimates for disarming, tracking
down and quartering of armed groups, as well as procedures for handing over mass
killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals, and
disarming all Congolese civilians who are illegally armed;
{c} Drafting mechanisms and procedures for the disengagement of forces;
{d} Working out mechanisms, procedures and a calendar of the withdrawal of
foreign forces and the mechanism for monitoring their implementation.
4. JMC adopted a proposal for the peaceful resolution of the situation at
Ikela, where Congolese, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops are encircled by rebel
forces {see para . 13 below}.
5. JMC also addressed the question of the stationing of United Nations liaison
officers within Democratic Republic of the Congo territory pursuant to
resolution 1258 (1999), by which the Security Council authorized the deployment,
as security conditions permitted, of United Nations military liaison officers to
the rear military headquarters of the main belligerents in the Democratic
Republic of the . Congo and to other areas the Secretary-General deemed necessary.
In that context, JMC discussed the further deployment of its own regional
structures, accompanied by OAU observers, within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. JMC endorsed the reconnaissance and possible dispatch of United Nations
military liaison officer teams to Bukavu, Bunia, Kabalo, Kisangani, Bumba,
Gemena, Isiro, Kamina, Kalemie, Kindu, Lubumbashi, Mbuji Mayi and Pepa , and
requested MONUC to submit proposals for the future reconnaissance and dispatch
of teams to Mbandaka, Matadi, Likasi and Dilolo. With some assistance from
MONUC, JMC has already deployed regional JMCs and OAU observers at Lisala,
Boende and Kabinda.
6. In order to expedite its operations and improve its response to the
changing situation on the ground, JMC set up a working group, chaired by Angola,
to draft an organizational and operational structure for JMC, together with a
budget estimate, and to submit it for adoption by JMC and approval by the
Political Committee.
7 . The Lusaka Agreement provides for the holding of an inter-Congolese
national dialogue leading to national reconciliation . To that end, a neutral
facilitator was to be chosen by the parties, and OAU was then to assist the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in organizing inter-Congolese political
/ .. .
negotiations under the aegis of the facilitator.
S/2000/30
English
Page 3
8. On 15 December, the Secretary-General of OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim, following
consultations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) (Goma), RCD-mouvement de liberation (RCD-ML)
and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), announced that the
parties had agreed that the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire,
should assume the role of the neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese
political negotiations. As provided for by the Lusaka Agreement, besides the
Congolese parties, the dialogue will include the political opposition and
representatives of the forces vives.
III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION
9. The military and security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has deteriorated since my last report, dated 1 November 1999 (S/1999/1116).
10. In November, according to various reports available to the United Nations,
the Government launched an offensive from Mbandaka into territory held by MLC in
Equateur province, apparently in response to perceived infiltrations on the part
of MLC forces into its territory . According to information provided by MLC to
United Nations military liaison officers based in Gbadolite, fighting between
government troops and MLC in Libanda and Makanza, to the north of Mbandaka,
resulted in heavy casualties. However, this information could not be confirmed.
11. Heightened military activity by some of the "armed groups" defined in the
Lusaka Agreement has also been reported in eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. These include the former Rwandan government forces and Interahamwe
militia, Burundian rebels and various Mayi-Mayi groups . Rebel sources also say
the armed groups have acquired new equipment, including radios and uniforms, and
have engaged in planning for military activity in South Kivu and Burundi.
Following allegations that the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo have also been arming, training and supplying these armed groups (see, for
example, S/1998/1096), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
have strongly denied such reports.
12. Reports from South Kivu strongly suggest the danger of large-scale violence
among different ethnic groups there . On 29 December 1999, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo convened a press conference in Kinshasa to
announce the alleged burial alive of 15 women in Kivu province by rebels,
apparently on suspicion of having been in contact with Mayi-Mayi forces . The
I . ..
S/2000/30
English
Page 4
rebels have denied the accusation . The Government has appealed to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate the alleged atrocity,
and Congolese women's groups demonstrated for several days in protest in this
connection outside MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa . An alleged massacre of 23
women and three children was also r eported near the town of Kalima, north-east
of Kindu, allegedly carried out by rebels on 14 December. The victims were
accused of complicity with the Mayi-Mayi (see sect . VII below).
13 . A force of about 700 Congolese, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops has been
encircled at Ikela by rebel forces and has been running short of supplies .
Pursuant to a decision made by JMC at its December meeting in Harare, MONUC has
been participating in an effort led by the interim Chairman of JMC, Brigadier
General Timothy J. Kazembe of Zambia, to achieve a peaceful resolution of the
situation. However, MONUC has also received reports indicating that a military
solution is being pursued to relieve the encircled troops.
IV . ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS
14 . On 11 December 1999, my Special Representative, Kamel Morjane (Tunisia),
assumed his duties in Kinshasa . On the same day, he met with the United States
Ambassador to the United Nations , Richard Holbrooke, who was visiting the
Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of his tour of the subregion.
Mr . Morjane has also met with President Kabila and other senior officials.
15. The difficulties experienced by the preliminary United Nations deployment
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in positioning military liaison officers
at the rear military headquarters of the belligerents and other key locations
are described in my last report (S/1999/1116, paras . 18-20). They related
primarily to the need to secure all the necessary guarantees of security and
freedom of movement for the operations of the technical survey team dispatched
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to inspect the locations at which it was
proposed to deploy United Nations personnel and to assess the military,
political, logistics and infrastructure situation there . Civilian staff experts
in child protection, humanitarian affairs and public information also
accompanied the technical survey team.
16 . In order to help overcome these difficulties, the Special Envoy of the ·
Secretary-General for the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Moustapha Niasse, v isited Kinshasa from 3 to 10 November and raised the issue
with President Kabila . Following his v isit, the technical survey team has been
able to visit seven locations in rebel-held territory and one in Government-held
I ...
S/2000/30
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Page 5
territory. Teams of United Nations military liaison officers have since been
positioned at the following eight locations: Gbadolite, Goma, Kananga, Kindu,
Gemena, Isiro, Lisala and Boende, and it is intended to position a team at
Kabinda later in January . However, proposed visits to important locations such
as Mbuji Mayi, Mbandaka, Lubumbashi and Matadi have yet to be approved by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. RCD (Goma) has insisted
that United Nations personnel be positioned at additional locations on
Government-held territory in order to ensure a balanced deployment. The number
of United Nations military liaison officers currently deployed in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and in the capitals of the belligerent parties and
elsewhere in the subregion is 79 (see annex).
17 . On the basis of the information sent back from their deployment locations
by the teams of military liaison officers and data available in the capitals of
the surrounding countries and in Kinshasa, MONUC has built up a picture of the
military, logistical and humanitarian situation of many of the locations
considered important to United Nations deployment. Though this picture is
incomplete and much work remains to be done in order to assemble all the
necessary information, it is in many respects quite detailed . The concept of
operations presented below is based on the partial data gathered so far .
V. RELATIONS WITH OAU, JMC AND THE PARTIES
18. As was pointed out in my report of 1 November 1999, the proper
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement requires very close coordination and
cooperation between the United Nations, the parties, JMC and OAU . The United
Nations, at Headquarters and through MONUC, has continued to do everything
possible within its mandate and resources to develop this coordination and
cooperation. MONUC provides substantial assistance to JMC on a routine basis.
19. Early in November, MONUC deployed two military liaison officers at Addis
Ababa in order to improve links between the United Nations and OAU . MONUC
officers provided training to the OAU observers deployed by JMC to serve with
the regional offices of JMC at Boende, Lisala and Kabinda, and provided
substantial assistance in their deployment to those locations. The United
Nations officers deployed in Lusaka to ensure liaison with JMC have been tasked
to assist in the establishment of "a 24-hour operations room to enable JMC to
receive information from its teams in the field. The co-location of United
Nations military liaison officer teams with the regional JMCs is improving the
flow of information to JMC headquarters in Lusaka.
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20. On 22 December 1999, I wrote to the current Chairman of OAU and the
Secretary-General of OAU to point out the importance and urgency of establishing
JMC as a standing body at the earliest possible time. The Under-secretaryGeneral
for Peacekeeping Operations wrote at that time to the Ministers of
Defence and Foreign Affairs of the signatory countries stating MONUC's readiness
to deploy to sites within the Democratic Republic of the Congo pursuant to
resolution 1258 (1999) and requesting their cooperation to that end.
21. In response to an invitation issued by the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, the Assistant Secretary-General of OAU, Said Djinnit, and General
Rachid Lallali, the Chairman of JMC, visited United Nations Headquarters on
12 January for consultations. The object of the discussions was to identify
further ways in which the United Nations could assist JMC to establish itself as
a permanent structure on a fully operational basis.
22. Mr. Djinnit and General Lallali stressed their willingness to work closely
with the United Nations and with MONUC but also described the severe constraints
imposed on them by the shortage of resources. Despite the pledges received from
a number of donors, JMC lacked the funds necessary to carry out effectively the
tasks required of it under the Lusaka Agreement. They appealed for further
assistance from the international community. For its part, MONUC will continue
to provide technical assistance to JMC and OAU observers deployed with the
regional JMC structures within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to
explore ways to improve the functioning of JMC by integrating its tasks,
including command and control and information flow, with those of MONUC.
23 . In order to assist JMC to assume its tasks under the Lusaka Agreement,
MONUC is prepared to deploy additional military officers to support its
activities. The officers would be located initially in Lusaka but would
accompany JMC to its eventual headquarters location in Kinshasa. They would
assist in the analysis of information provided by the military observers.
VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
24. There are some 960,000 internally displaced persons in eight of the 11
provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and over 300,000 refugees from
six of its nine neighbouring countries. Recent humanitarian assessments reveal
that over 2.1 million people (internally displaced persons, refugees, urban
vulnerable) or 4.3 per cent of the population of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo face critical food insecurity. Another 8.4 million (mostly urban
populations and farmers in the proximity of the frontline), or 17 per cent of
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25. The current rigid monetary policies pursued by the Government continue to
impede traditional commercial exchange and the import of foodstuffs.
Prohibitive transport costs caused by inflation and oil shortages have
dramatically driven up staple food prices. Major food shortages are reported in
urban areas. With agricultural produce unable to reach markets in recent weeks,
owing to fighting in food producing areas, the situation has worsened; it is
compounded by impassable roads and the onset of the rainy season.
26. The official exchange rate set by the Government of 4.5 CFA francs to the
United States dollar imposes very heavy costs on MONUC and the United Nations
agencies operating in Kinshasa, since the actual rate of exchange is some 28 CFA
francs to the dollar. The costs imposed by this policy have led some agencies
to consider suspending operations in the country.
27. A recent nutritional survey in Bas-Congo in western Democratic Republic of
the Congo revealed high levels of chronic and acute malnutrition in children
under five, which is particularly alarming given that Bas-Congo is traditionally
the country's breadbasket and a major supply source for Kinshasa.
28 . The World Food Programme issued a press release in December 1999 announcing
that while access had improved to some war-affected populations, aid agencies
were struggling to reach the country's interior and unless new funds were made
available immediately, 350,000 people living in precarious circumstances would
struggle to survive .
29. A major improvement in funding and resources is needed to address the
humanitarian needs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Nations
Consolidated Appeal for 2000 was launched at Geneva in December 1999, requesting
$71.3 million . The 1999 Consolidated Appeal for $38 . 6 million had only a
17-per-cent response rate, making it impossible to provide the necessary
life-saving interventions.
30. Recent exceptional floods and river overflows in Kinshasa created an
additional group of approximately 9,000 vulnerable families in several areas of
the capital city. The Governments of Belgium, France, Japan, the United States
of America, Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the European Community Humanitarian Office and United Nations agencies
contributed over $500,000 to address immediate humanitarian needs .
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VII . HUMAN RIGHTS
31 . During the period under review, the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo , on 17 December 1999, freed 156 politi cal p r isoners, some of whom
had been held without trial for months . The majority were activists of the
Unified Lumumbiste Party {PALU) or of the Union for Democracy and Social
Progress {UDPS) .
32. On the occasion of the fifty-first anniversary of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (10 December 1999), the Gov ernment decided to declare a
moratorium on capital sentences handed down by the Military Court of Justice
{Cour d'ordre militaire). It has to be recalled that some 100 individuals were
executed in 1999, following capital verdicts pronounced by that Court, whose
statute prohibits any appeal .
33 . A seminar organized in Kinshasa by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with a view to
facilitating the adoption of a national plan of action for the protection and
promotion of human rights was held, from B to 10 December 1999. Some 100
participants, including government officials and representatives of civil
society, attended the seminar . The national plan, which was adopted
unanimously, set up priorities for the period 2000 - 2002 in the fields of rule of
law, administration of justice, human rights education and the promotion of
economic, social and cultural rights .
34. Despite the above-mentioned positive developments, the human rights
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains a matter of serious
concern . Arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and restrictions imposed on
the right to freedom of expression and opinion continue to be reported .
35. In mid November, 15 Congolese women were allegedly buried alive in Mwenga,
South Kivu province, currently under the control of RCD . This act has been
attributed to Rwandese soldiers . According to a Congolese non - governmental
organization, which released the names of 14 of the victims, the women were
accused of providing support to Mayi-Mayi warriors fighting against RCD forces .
36. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed its great
concern over the incident and addressed a letter to the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, requesting an international inquiry and a strong condemnation by
the international community . RCD {Goma) has reportedly launched its own inquiry
into the allegations .
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37. As provided for in the MONUC mandate, a first group of human rights
officers will shortly be deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
order to address the current precarious human rights situation.
VIII. CHILD PROTECTION
38. Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been victimized
through displacement (the majority of the displaced are children and women),
separation from and loss of families, physical injuries, and exposure to chronic
violence and forced recruitment into fighting forces. Thousands serve as
combatants with the various fighting forces. Unaccompanied minors have been
reported in large numbers in Kivu, Kasai and Orientale provinces, among other
areas.
39. Although children remain extremely vulnerable, the response to the 1999
Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal has been poor. The recruitment of child
soldiers continues, especially in the east of the country. A Forum on the
Demobilization of Child Soldiers and the Protection of Human Rights was
organized on 10 December 1999 by the Congolese Ministry of Human Rights,
supported by UNICEF. This step, together with the release of political
prisoners mentioned above, has been viewed very positively .
40 . To ensure that the lives of children are protected, it will be necessary to
act before the fragile Ceasefire Agreement further erodes. With civilian child
protection personnel authorized under resolution 1279 (1999) in place, MONUC
could commence collecting data on child combatants and other child protection
concerns . It could also assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and United Natio~s agencies in putting together a national plan for the
demobilization of child soldiers and bring to the attention of JMC violations of
children's rights by the various armed forces operating within the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. These activities would require the deployment of further
civilian child protection officers, along with the necessary support personnel
and equipment, alongside military liaison officers in various locations within
the Democratic Republic of the Congo .
41. Their main tasks would include ensuring a comprehensive approach to child
protection throughout all stages of the making and consolidation of peace and
complementing the work of the UNICEF country office and its programme of
cooperation. This would involve, inter alia, ensuring that all personnel
involved in United Nations peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building
activities receive appropriate training on the protection and rights of
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children .
IX. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION
42. In July 1997, the Government initiated activities aimed at the
demobilization and rehabilitation of approximately 75,000 soldiers of the former
Forces armees zairoises (FAZ). In response to the Government's request, the
World Bank allocated a grant from its Post-Conflict Fund in the amount of
$700,000 to assist the Government in programme preparation. Simultaneously,
UNICEF engaged in the demobilization and reintegration of ex-child soldiers from
former government forces, first on a limited scale in Bukavu and Gema, later as
a concerted national effort. The resumption of hostilities in August 1998
effectively delayed both efforts .
43. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement allowed both activities to move forward,
through, inter alia, the Forum on the Demobilization of Child Soldiers,
mentioned in paragraph 39 above. At the same time, the Government and the World
Bank restructured the grant in view of the changed circumstances. The
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants is now being planned in
two phases. The first phase would aim at the demobilization and reintegration
of special vulnerable groups (children, the handicapped, the chronically ill,
the aged etc . ). The second phase would be linked to the full implementation of
the Lusaka Agreement and the reform of all armed forces, as envisaged in
chapter 10 of the Lusaka Agreement, and would aim at the demobilization and
reintegration of combatants not retained in the unified army. Phase II would
also address the reintegration needs of members of armed groups to be
demobilized and disarmed under chapter 9 of the Lusaka Agreement.
44. Preparation for the first phase is about to commence and will be undertaken
as a joint effort between the Government and the international community. The
key ministries involved include Human Rights, National Defence and Social
Affairs. Implementation of the grant will be managed by the International
Labour Organization in close collaboration with the World Bank, UNICEF, the
United Nations Development Programme, the World Health Organization and other
United Nations agencies.
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Conditions for demobilization
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45. The first phase of demobilization would require cooperation from all
belligerent parties for the transparent and efficient identification and
demobilization of the special target groups, the freedom of movement of
ex-combatants to their selected community of reintegration, and a stable
security situation. The second phase would depend on the unification of forces
as per the Lusaka Agreement, military restructuring under a unified command, the
completion of a transparent identification and registration process, and the
successful implementation of chapter 9 of the Lusaka Agreement on the
disarmament of armed groups. The attainment of these objectives will, of
course, depend not only on the full commitment of all the parties to carrying
out the Lusaka Agreement but also on the agreement by the armed groups
themselves to be disarmed and demobilized. Much work remains to be done in this
respect.
X. NEXT STEPS
46. In my 1 November 1999 report, I sought from the security Council prior
authorization to deploy up to 500 military observers, with the necessary support
and protection. I pointed out that, in order to be effective, the military
observers would require protection and considerable logistical support,
including vehicles and communications, as well as additional air assets to
ensure their deployment, supply, rotation and, if necessary, extraction. A
medical unit should also be deployed in support of the mission.
47. Pursuant to resolution 1279 (1999), I initiated the administrative steps
necessary for the equipping of up to SOO United Nations military observers with
a view to facilitating future rapid United Nations deployments as authorized by
the Council.
48. I had indicated in my report of 15 July (S/1999/790) that the deployment of
military observers, should the Council so decide, would constitute the second
phase of United Nations involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
security and other conditions permitting. In my report of 1 November 1999
(S/1999/1116) I also envisaged, subject to further progress in the peace
process, reverting to the Council with a further report containing
recommendations and a proposed mandate and concept of operations for an enlarged
United Nations deployment.
49. It must be said that, while progress has been made in the implementation of
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the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, some setbacks have unfortunately been
registered. In order to enable MONUC to perform all the tasks required of it by
the Security Council, it is essential that the necessary security and real
freedom of movement for United Nations and OAU personnel be assured. The
fighting that has continued in some parts of the country and the obstacles and
delays encountered in receiving the necessary clearances still constitute
problems in that regard.
50. With heavy fighting around Mbandaka in Equateur province and indications
that the armed groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement have received new arms
and training, and given the difficulties encountered by MONUC in its efforts to
deploy across the country, there appears to be a need for the renewed commitment
of the parties to the Agreement they signed in Lusaka . In this context, the
efforts made and initiatives taken by important regional actors should be noted.
President Chiluba and President Bouteflika have done much to move the process
forward, and President Mbeki has called for the urgent convening of a summit
meeting aimed at ensuring the speedy implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, an
initiative which I support.
51. With the renewed commitment of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement, fully
supported by the international community, diplomatic activity may yet succeed in
resolving the crisis. The parties should know - and the recent fighting has
furnished fresh evidence of this - that there is no military solution to the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo . The people of that country,
and of the other belligerent States, need peace in order to channel their
energies towards development. It is therefore incumbent on the United Nations
to continue to do its utmost to support efforts for peace, including the
deployment of a peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Potential for action by the United Nations
52. The signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement had in mind a specific
set of tasks for the United Nations. If the Agreement is to be carried out as
signed, the formidable tasks expected of the United Nations will need to be
carefully evaluated. In particular, it will be necessary to reflect on the
question of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the armed
groups in order to develop a realistic plan of action.
53. The United Nations can potentially play an important role if it receives
the necessary mandate and resources. Under such conditions, it will certainly
be necessary to envisage a large-scale United Nations peacekeeping operation.
Its main objectives would be as follows:
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(a) To assi st the belligerents to complete the disengagement and
withdrawal of their forces in reasonably secure conditions;
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(b) To provide security for the operations of United Nations military
personnel;
(c) To contribute to the eventual disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of former combatants , including the armed groups identified in the
Lusaka Agreement .
54 . In order to execute such a programme, a clear political agreement on the
part of all concerned is necessary . As noted above, the World Bank has already
commenced work on elements of a demobilization and reintegration plan.
55 . As was already foreseen, the political context, as well as the political,
military and logistical constraints, justify a step-by-step approach adapted to
the situation.
Logistical situation
56 . The road system throughout the country is in extremely poor condition, with
long impassable stretches and broken bridges . Road journeys between cities can
be undertaken only with great difficulty and can last day s or even weeks, with
no certainty of success. Conditions are even more difficult during the rainy
season, which is always prevalent in one part of the country or another.
57. The railway system is patchy, dilapidated and serves only a few routes .
Both rolling stock and rails are reported to be in very poor condition . Many
routes have become unusable owing to the effects of war and lack of maintenance,
while services on those lines that are still open are underfunded, slow and of
limited capacity.
58 . The main surface transport medium in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is the extensive system of inland waterways, based on the River Congo and its
tributaries. River barges vary in size, with carrying capacity of up to
600 tons. Barges can travel in groups of up to five or six vessels pushed by a
single tug, at a rate of five to eight knots . Travel time on one of the shorter
routes , from Kinshasa to Mbandaka, was estimated at 10 to 20 days, depending on
conditions , though it is bel i eved possible to reach Kisangani from Kinshasa in
only 10 days if securi ty is guaranteed . There appear s to be no restriction on
the commodities that can be carried . However, at the present time the River
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Congo is open only as far as Mbandaka because of the fighting in Equateur
Province.
59 . As a result of the difficulties associated with the surface transport
infrastructure, air transport has become the most important means of travel
within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Usable airfields are located in
all the major population centres. However, navigational aids are not widely
available, and aviation fuel can be obtained commercially only at Kinshasa.
Next stage of deployment : concept of oper ations
60. The next stage of MONUC's deployment is based on the following assumptions :
(a) The parties will respect and uphold the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and
the relevant Security Council resolutions;
(b) The JMC, with support from MONUC, will develop a valid plan for the
disengagement of the parties' armed forces and their redeployment to assembly
areas or JMC-approved defensive positions;
(c) The parties will be committed to contributing to the security of
United Nations personnel but may not be entirely able to do so.
61 . MONUC will also have to complete the reconnaissance of the intended
deployment locations and the positioning of its teams in the rear military
headquarters, as stipulated by the Council in resolution 1258 (1999).
62. Even given the willingness of the parties to provide security for MONUC
personnel, the levels of insecurity, the degraded infrastructure and the
difficult terrain in the country will require the deployment of formed units to
protect military observers and civilian staff and to facilitate their
activities. For this purpose, it is envisaged that a total force of 5,537
officers and men will be required.
63. This force will be deployed in four reinforced protected infantry battalion
groups numbering a total of 3,400 troops . In order to make optimum use of the
extensive inland waterway system, the force will also include two marine
companies of 150 troops each, with four boats per company. As indicated in
earlier reports, there will be SOO military observers. The force headquarters
unit will comprise 95 officers, aud the four sector headquarters will be staffed
by 40 officers each . The force will also need two level II medical units (35
staff each), as well as units responsible for communications, air operations,
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movement control and aviation .
64. Even assuming the use of the inland waterways, it is envisaged that, in
view of the poor state of the roads and the size of the country, MONUC will need
very substantial aviation assets, including light and medium helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft. The fixed -wing aircraft will have to fly hundreds of
sorties to deploy and sustain the military units.
65. The main military tasks of the expanded MONUC will be :
(a) To establish contacts and maintain continuous liaison at the field
headquarters of all the parties' military forces and with the Joint Military
Commission;
(b) To assist the parties in developing modalities for the implementation
of the Agreement through the collection and verification of military information
on the parties' forces and to develop plans to maintain the cessation of
hostilities, disengage the parties' forces, and redeploy the forces to defensive
positions or assembly areas;
(c) To facilitate , monitor and report on the cessation of hostilities;
(d) In cooperation with the Joint Military Commission, to investigate
violations of the Ceasefire Agreement;
(e) To verify the disengagement of the parties' forces;
(f) In cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to
facilitate the release of prisoners of war and military captives as necessary;
(g) To supervise and verify the redeployment of the parties' forces to
defensive positions or administrative assembly areas;
(h) Within its capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian operations;
(i) To support the operations of United Nations civilian staff;
(j) To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and
equipment;
(k) To prepare for the next phase of United Nations deployment .
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66. The United Nations operation described above represents the minimum
strength required for the tasks envisaged at this time. Additional tasks -
including facilitating the eventual disarmament and demobilization of armed
groups and monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces - will
require the approval of the Council for a larger operation. An operation of the
size currently envisaged will permit United Nations personnel to operate within
the vicinity of the battalions only if the parties can guarantee their security.
67. It should be understood that United Nations formed units would not serve as
an interposition force nor would they be expected to extract military observers
or civilian personnel by force. They would not have the capacity to protect the
civilian population from armed attack . MONUC military units would be able to
escort humanitarian assistance convoys only within the limits of their means and
under favourable security conditions .
68. It is envisaged to locate the battalions near the current or potential
areas of operation of the military observers and civilian personnel. Those
locations would include Mbandaka, Kisangani and Mbuji Mayi . The fourth location
should be in the south-east of the country at a site yet to be surveyed,
probably in territory controlled by the rebels . Any battalion located in that
part of the country would need to use the logistical facilities of Lubumbashi .
69 . The military observers would establish regular contacts with their
counterparts in the armed forces of the parties and would provide most of the
information on their positions and movements . It is envisaged that the United
Nations observers would at all times operate under the protection of the parties
and would conduct frequent risk assessments .
70. The task of the marine units would be to observe, monitor and verify the
activities of the parties' military forces on the rivers and waterways of the
country, and to facilitate movement by water of United Nations personnel, under
the protection of the parties.
71. As the use of landmines has been a feature of the conflict in certain areas
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a mine action capacity would be
established as part of the expanded MONUC . In addition to mine clearance and
unexploded ordnance disposal specialists, who should be deployed in the
reinforced battalions in order to meet their operational needs, a mine aceion
office should be set up within the Mission. Aimed at developing a planning
capacity in the field of mine action, its primary objective would be to assess
the real scope of the landmine and unexploded ordnance issue by establishing a
mine information system. It would also act as the mission coordinator for mine
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action activities to be implemented by MONUC, non-governmental organizations,
and United Nations and non-United Nations humanitarian agencies operating in
country. In this connection, it would particularly focus on mine/unexploded
ordnance awareness training for MONUC personnel . Finally, once the real
situation had been assessed, the mine action office would contribute to
developing a strategy to meet any short, medium and long-term requirements for
mine/unexploded ordnance action in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .
72. Along with the increase in its military activities, the expanded United
Nations mission would also be expected to assume enhanced responsibilities in
the fields of humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and the
protection of children, including child soldiers. The expanded mission should
therefore be staffed and equipped accordingly. To ensure that its role would be
properly understood by the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and in order to disseminate information concerning that role, the
mission would need to be equipped with an adequate public information component,
including radio stations. A status-of-forces agreement would have to be drawn
up with the Government, reflecting the mission's mandate and activities.
73. Progress thereafter would depend on the ability of the parties to abide by
the terms of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, including the disengagement of
their forces along confrontation lines. If United Nations personnel are enabled
to perform their mandated functions under conditions of adequate security and
freedom of movement, I would then be in a position to consider recommending to
the Council the next phase, which would involve the deployment of a larger
United Nations peacekeeping operation to assist the parties in carrying out the
remaining provisions of the Agreement.
74 . It is evident that the problem of the armed groups, including the former
Rwandan government forces and Interahamwe militia, is a key factor in the
conflict in the subregion, since it undermines the security of all the States
concerned. It is essential to resolve this question in order to establish a
lasting peace. A plan of action must be devised to facilitate the comprehensive
disarmament, demobilization and, as required, reintegration process for the
armed groups.
75. In order to pursue the full implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, it also
appears necessary to make progress in the inter-Congolese dialogue to be
undertaken under the auspices of the neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire.
76 . It is vital to create the conditions for a lasting peace in the subregion
based on the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. The elements of such a
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peace would eventually include the security of borders of the States concerned,
their territorial integrity, and their full enjoyment of their natural
resources. In order to help achieve these objectives, it will be important to
convene, at the appropriate time, a regional conference on security and
stability.
XI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS
77. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1258 (1999), 1273 (1999) and
1279 (1999), I have obtained from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions commitment authorities totalling $41.0 million for the
United Nations preliminary deployment in the Congo subregion and for the
establishment and maintenance of MONUC for the period from 6 August 1999 to
1 March 2000, inclusive of funds necessary for the equipping of 500 military
observers and additional 100 civilian support personnel expected to be deployed
subject to a further decision by the Council. To ensure that the Mission is
provided with resources to fulfil its mandate, I intend to seek assessment of
these requirements from the General Assembly during its resumed fifty-fourth
session.
78. Should the Council approve my recommendation contained in paragraph 83
below, I shall inform the Council of the related requirements and shall seek
additional resources from the General Assembly accordingly .
79 . As at 31 December 1999, the total outstanding assessed contributions for
all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,482.1 million.
XII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
80 . The deployment of additional United Nations military personnel should
contribute to restoring and maintaining momentum for the implementation of the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In this connection, the signatories bear a crucial
responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the Agreement. It is on the
basis of their renewed and strengthened commitment to the Agreement they have
signed that the international community will be ready to lend its full support
and allocate. the significant resources that will be required. In this context,
no new military offensives should be launched, the security and freedom of
movement of United Nations personnel should be guaranteed, and the spreading of
hostile propaganda, especially incitements to attack unarmed civilians, should
cease.
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81. The parties can also demonstrate their full commitment to their Agreement
by making use of the modalities contained in it. In this regard, JMC's
initiative to resolve the encirclement at Ikela is encouraging. I applaud the
action taken in this context by the Government of Zambia, and particularly by
the interim JMC Chairman, Brigadier General Timothy Kazembe, and wish them
success. In view of its essential role, the Joint Military Commission, which is
a key instrument, must very soon be established on a permanent basis, able to
react swiftly to events and provide credible and authoritative decisions.
Efforts to integrate its activities with those of MONUC should continue .
82. The inter-Congolese dialogue to be conducted under the auspices of the
neutral facilitator, with the assistance of OAU, is an indispensable step
towards national reconciliation and lasting peace and stability in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The designation of Sir Ketumile Masire as the
neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese dialogue has elevated the prospect
that the other main pillar of the Lusaka peace process will now be implemented,
with the assistance of OAU . The United Nations is committed to cooperating with
OAU in supporting the facilitator.
83. The regional efforts and initiatives undertaken in support of the peace
process, including those by Heads of State in the region, are to be commended.
I also welcome the initiative of the Government of the United States, President
of the Security Council for the month of January 2000, in encouraging the
belligerent parties to recommit themselves to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.
Subject to agreement by the parties to taking the steps outlined above, I
recommend the deployment of four reinforced protected infantry battalion groups,
accompanied by up to 500 military observers, two marine companies and the
supporting military personnel and equipment, and the additional civilian
personnel required, as described in paragraphs 62 to 72 above. I will provide
the Council as soon as possible with a statement of the estimated cost
implications of these proposals (in an addendum to the present report).
84. Until the full deployment of a United Nations force, the role of the Joint
Military Commission will remain crucial. In order to permit JMC to fulfil its
functions under the Lusaka Agreement, I reiterate my appeal to donors to provide
it with the resources, in funding or in kind, to support its operations.
85. In my report of 15 July 1999 (S/1999/790, para. 15), I stated that, in
order to be effective, any United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic
Republic .of the Congo, whatever its mandate, would have to be large and
expensive. It would require the deployment of thousands of international troops
I . ..
S/2000/30
English
Page 20
and civilian personnel. It would face tremendous difficulties, and would be
beset by risks. Deployment would be slow . This assessment has been amply borne
out by the information provided so far by MONUC personnel, particularly on the
military and logistical situation in the country. On that basis, it might be
added that the deployment of a MONUC peacekeeping operation will also create
inflated expectations that might well be unrealistic.
86. Nevertheless, it cannot be too often repeated that the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement remains the best hope for the resolution of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and, for the time being, the only prospect of
achieving it . This month will provide the leaders of the countries concerned
with a unique opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to the Agreement and,
eventually, to peace and stability in the Central African subregion .
87 . Lastly, I take this opportunity to wish my Special Representative,
Kamel Morjane, every success in his challenging assignment, and to express to
the military and civilian officers of MONUC my deepest appreciation for the
efforts they have made over the past few months, often under extremely trying
circumstances, to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council.
I . ..
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo: contributions as at 12 January 2000
Algeria
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Canada
Egypt
France
Ghana
India
Italy
Kenya
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Mali
Nepal
Pakistan
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Senegal
South Africa
Sweden
Military
liaison
7
4
4
1
1
3
3
4
5
1
1
1
2
2
8
1
5
3
5
1
1
Troops Civilian police
observers
S/2000/30
English
Page 21
Total
7
4
4
1
1
3
3
4
5
1
1
1
2
2
8
1
5
3
5
1
1
I ...
S/2000/30
English
Page 22
United Republic
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Zambia
Total
of Tanzania 2 2
6 6
4 4
_! _!
79 79
I ...
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
Distr .
GENERAL
UCMANNEX57
S/PRST/2000/2
26 January 2000
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
At the 4092nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 26 January 2000 in
connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo", the President of the Security
Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:
"The Security Council expresses its appreciation to the Heads of State
of Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and to the Foreign Ministers of Namibia, South
Africa, Burundi, Canada and the United States of America, the Vice-Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, the Minister Delegate
for Cooperation and Francophonie of France, the Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, and the Minister of
Armed Forces of Mali, who participated in its meeting on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo on 24 January 2000. The Council also expresses its
appreciation to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), the representative of the Chairman of the OAU, and the OAU-nominated
Facilitator of the Congolese National Dialogue. Their presence and their
statements attest to their renewed commitment to the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement (S/1999/815) and to the search for a durable peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. Their presence in New
York also reinforces the progress made at the Maputo Summit of 16 January
2000 and the Harare meeting of the Political Committee of 18 January 2000.
The Council expects that this progress will continue at the next Political
Committee Meeting and Summit of the Signatories to the Agreement.
"The Security Council urges all the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement to build on the momentum of these meetings in order to create and
sustain the climate necessary for the full implementation of the Agreement.
It underlines the importance of a revised implementation calendar for the
full and effective implementation of the tasks in the Agreement .
"The Security Council reaffirms the territorial integrity and national
sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including over its
natural resources, in accordance with the principles of the Charters of the
S/PRST/2000/2
English
Page 2
United Nations and the OAU . In this regard, it reiterates its call for the
immediate cessation of hostilities and the orderly withdrawal of all
foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement . The Council reaffirms
its support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and also reaffirms its
resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999, 1273
(1999) of 5 November 1999 and 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999 .
"The Security Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of
17 January 2000 (S/2000/30). The Council expresses its determination to
support the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Accordingly,
it has now begun consideration of a resolution authorizing the expansion of
the present mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) along the lines recommended by the
Secretary-General in that report . It expresses its intention to act
promptly on this basis . It also expresses its intention to consider at the
appropriate time preparations for an additional phase of United Nations
deployment and further action. It welcomes the statements by the Heads of
State and delegation in support of the proposals of the Secretary- General .
The Council welcomes the arrival of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, expresses its
support for his efforts, and urges all parties to provide him with the
assistance and cooperation he will require to carry out his functions.
"The Security Council supports the establishment of a coordinated
MONUC/Joint Military Commission (JMC) structure with co-located
headquarters and joint support arrangements. The Council believes this is
a vital step in enhancing the ability of the United Nations to support the
Lusaka Ceasefire ~greement. In this regard, the Council urges Member
States and donor organizations to continue to provide assistance to the
JMC.
"The Security Council underlines the absolute necessity of security
and access for United Nations personnel deployed in support of the Lusaka
process, and stresses that such a climate of cooperation is an essential
prerequisite for the successful implementation of the mandate of MONUC in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo . The Council calls on all signatories
to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to provide assurances of safety, security
and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, and in
this regard attaches importance to the statement by the President of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo on the security of MONUC and the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General.
I . . .
S/PRST/2000/2
English
Page 3
"The Security Council stresses the importance of the National Dialogue
as called for in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and affirms that it must
be an open, inclusive and democratic process conducted independently by the
Congolese people under the established Facilitation. It further affirms
that the National Dialogue is the best means for all Congolese parties to
address the political future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
"The Security Council strongly supports the designation of the former
President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, as the Facilitator of the
National Dialogue as provided for by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and
calls on Member States to provide full financial and other support to his
efforts and the process as a whole. The Council welcomes the declared
readiness of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to begin
the National Dialogue, and to guarantee the security of all participants.
"The Security Council stresses the need for the continued operation of
United Nations and other agencies' humanitarian relief operations and human
rights promotion and monitoring under acceptable conditions of security,
freedom of movement, and access to affected areas. The Council expresses
its serious concern over the humanitarian situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo as well as the shortfall in responses to the United
Nations consolidated humanitarian appeal. It therefore urges Member States
and donor organizations to make available the necessary funds to carry out
urgent humanitarian operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
"The Security Council expresses its concern that the presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo of non - signatory armed groups that have
yet to be demobilized constitutes a threat to the Lusaka process . The
Council recognizes that disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and
reintegration (DDRR) are among the fundamental objectives of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement. The Council underlines that a credible plan for DORR
must be based on an agreed and comprehensive set of principles.
"The Security Council expresses deep concern over the illicit flow of
arms into the region, and calls upon all concerned to halt such flows.
"The Security Council values the continuing leadership of the peace
process by the President of Zambia and the vital contribution of the
Southern African Development Community through its Chairman, the President
of Mozambique. It also expresses its appreciation to the current Chairman
of the OAU, the President of Algeria, and to the Secretary-General of the
I ...
S/PRST/2000/2
English
Page 4
OAU for the Organization's vital role in the Lusaka process . It urges them
to continue their essential efforts in close cooperation with the Security
Council and the Secretary-General."
I . ..
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
RESOLUTION 1291 (2000)
Distr.
GENERAL
UCMANNEX58
S/RES/1291 (2000)
24 February 2000
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4104th meeting,
on 24 February 2000
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of
6 August 1999, 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999, 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999,
and other relevant resolutions, and the statements of its President of
26 January 2000 (S/PRST/ 2000/2), 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17), 11 December 1998
(S/PRST/1998 / 36), 31 August 1998 (S / PRST/ 1998/ 26) and 13 July 1998
(S/PRST/1998/20),
Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and the obligation of all
States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political i ndependence of any State, or in any other manner
i nconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of the Democratic -Republic of the Congo and all States in the
region,
Reaffirming also the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
over its natural resources, and noting with concern reports of the illegal
exploitation of the country's assets and the potential consequences of these
actions on security conditions and the continuation of hostilities,
Expressing its strong support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
(S / 1999/815), which represents the most viable basis for the peaceful resolution
of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Reiterating its call for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the
S/RES/1291 (2000)
Page 2
Ceasefire Agreement,
Noting the commitment of all the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to
locate, identify, disarm and assemble all members of all armed groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1, of the
Ceasefire Agreement and the commitment of all countries of origin of these armed
groups to take the steps necessary for their repatriation, and noting that these
tasks must be conducted by the parties in accordance with the Ceasefire
Agreement,
Endorsing the selection by the Congolese Parties, with the assistance of
the Organization of African Unity, of the Facilitator of the National Dialogue
provided for in the Ceasefire Agreement, and calling on all Member States ~o
provide political, financial, and material support to the Facilitation,
Recalling the report of the Secretary-General of 17 January 2000
(S/2000/30),
Stressing its commitment to work with the parties to implement fully the
Ceasefire Agreement, while underlining that its successful implementation rests
first and foremost on the will of all parties to the Agreement,
Stressing the importance of the re-establishment of state administration
throughout the national territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as
called for in the Ceasefire Agreement,
Stressing the importance of the Joint Military Commission (JMC), and urging
all States to continue to provide it with assistance,
Emphasizing that phase II of the deployment of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) should be
based on the following considerations:
(a) that the parti~- --~-~~-~ and uphold the Ceasefire Agreement and the
relevant Council resolutions ;
(b) that a valid plan for the disengagement of the parties' forces and
their redeployment to JMC-approved positions is developed;
(c) that the parties provide firm and credible assurances, prior to the
deployment of MONUC forces, for the security and freedom of movement of United
Nations and related personnel,
I ...
S/RES/1291 (2000)
Page 3
Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety
of the United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 and
the statement of its President of 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/4),
Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize
peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other
communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,
Expressing its serious concern over the humanitarian situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and encouraging donors to respond to the
United Nations consolidated humanitarian appeal,
Stressing the importance to the effectiveness of such humanitarian
assistance and other international operations in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo of favourable conditions for local procurement and recruitment by
international organizations and agencies,
Expressing its deep concern at all violations and abuses of human rights
and international humanitarian law, in particular those alleged violations
referred to in the report of the Secretary-General,
Expressing also its deep concern at the limited access of humanitarian
workers to refugees and internally displaced persons in some areas of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and stressing the need for the continued
operation of United Nations and other agencies' relief operations, as well as
human rights promotion and monitoring, under acceptable conditions of security,
freedom of movement, and access to affected areas,
Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,
1. Calls on all parties to fulfil their obligations under the Ceasefire
Agreement;
2. Reiterates its strong support for the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of . the Congo and his overall
authority over United Nations activities in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and calls on all parties to cooperate fully with him;
3. Decides to extend the mandate of MONUC until 31 August 2000;
I .. .
S/RES/1291 (2000)
Page 4
4. Authorizes the expansion of MONUC to consist of up to 5,537 military
personnel, including up to SOO observers, or more, provided that the SecretaryGeneral
determines that there is a need and that it can be accommodated within
the overall force size and structure, and appropriate civilian support staff in
the areas, inter alia, of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public
information, child protection, political affairs, medical support and
administrative support, and requests the Secretary-General to recommend
immediately any additional force requirements that might become necessary to
enhance force protection;
s. Decides that the phased deployment of personnel referred to in
paragraph 4 above will be carried out as and if the Secretary-General determines
that MONUC personnel will be able to deploy to their assigned locations and
carry out their functions as described in paragraph 7 below in conditions of
adequate security and with the cooperation of the parties, and that he has
received firm and credible assurances from the parties to the Ceasefire
Agreement to that effect, and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council
informed in this regard;
6. Decides that MONUC will establish, under the overall authority of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a joint structure with the JMC
that will ensure close coordination during the period of deployment of MONUC,
with co-located headquarters and joint support and administrative structures;
7. Decides that MONUC, in cooperation with the JMC, shall have the
following mandate:
(a) to monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and
investigate violations of the ceasefire;
(b) to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field
headquarters of all the parties' military forces;
(c) to develop, within 45 days of adoption of this resolution, an action
plan for the overall implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement by all concerned
with particular emphasis on the following key objectives: the collection and
verification of military information on the parties' forces, the maintenance of
the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and redeployment of the
parties' forces, the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and
reintegration of all members of all armed groups referred to in Annex A,
Chapter 9.1 of the Ceasefire Agreement, and the orderly withdrawal of all
foreign forces;
I . ..
S/RES/1291 (2000)
Page 5
(d) to work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of
war, military captives and remains in cooperation with international
humanitarian agencies;
(e) to supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the
parties' forces;
(f) within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to monitor compliance
with the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition,
weaponry and other war-related materiel to the field, including to all armed
groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1;
(g) to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring,
with particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and
demobilized child soldiers, as MONUC deems within its capabilities and under
acceptable security conditions, in close cooperation with other United Nations
agencies, related organizations and non-governmental organizations;
(h) to cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue,
provide suppc~: ~~~ tech~ical assistance to him, and coordinate other United
Nations agencies' activities to this effect;
(i) to deploy mine action experts to assess the scope of the mine and
unexploded ordnance problems, coordinate the initiation of mine action
activities, develop a mine action plan, and carry out emergency mine action
activities as required in support of its mandate;
B. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides
that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its
infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect
United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and
equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
9. Calls on the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to support actively
the deployment of MONUC to the areas of operations deemed necessary by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, including through the provision
of assurances of security and freedom of movement as well as the active
participation of liaison personnel;
10. Requests the Governments of the States in the region to conclude, as
I ...
S/RES/1291 (2000)
Page 6
necessary, status-of-forces agreements with the Secretary-General within 30 days
of adoption of this resolution, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such
agreements the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/1594)
should apply provisionally;
11. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of concrete and observed
military and political progress in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement
and relevant Council resolutions, to continue to plan for any additional United
Nations deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to make
recommendations for further Council action;
12. Calls on all parties to ensure the safe and unhindered access of
relief personnel to all those in need, and recalls that the parties must also
provide guarantees for the safety, security and freedom of movement for United
Nations and associated humanitarian relief personnel;
13. Calls on all parties to cooperate with the International Committee of
the Red Cross to enable it to carry out its mandates as well as the tasks
entrusted to it under the Ceasefire Agreement;
14. Condemns all massacres carried out in and around the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and urges that an international investigation
into all such events be carried out with a view to bringing to justice those
responsible;
15. Calls on all parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to protect human rights and respect international humanitarian law and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948,
and calls on all parties to refrain from or cease any support to, or association
with, those suspected of involvement in the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes, and to bring to justice those responsible, and
facilitate measures in accordance with international law to ensure
accountability for violations of international humanitarian law;
16. Expresses its deep concern over the illicit flow of arms into the
region, calls upon all concerned to halt such flows, and expresses its intention
to consider this issue further;
17. Expresses its serious concern at reports of illegal exploitation of
natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, including in violation of the sovereignty of that country, calls for an
end to such activities, expresses its intention to consider the matter further,
I ...
S/RES/1291 (2000)
Page 7
and requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 90 days on
ways to achieve this goal;
18. Reaffirms the importance of holding, at the appropriate time, an
international conference on peace, security, democracy and development in the
Great Lakes region under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization
of African Unity, with the participation of all the Governments of the region
and all others concerned;
19 . Requests the Secretary-General to provide a report every 60 days to
the Council on progress in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and
this resolution;
20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
I .. .
UCMANNEX:
JMCI.MONUC RESTRlCTEJ? ·
PLAN FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OF
FORCES IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBIJC OF CONGO {DRQ IN
ACCORDANCE !{ITHTHE LUSAKA AGREEMENT
INTRODUCI'ION
1. Pursuant.to the Cease-fire Agreement in the DRC in particular Anicle Ill Para
14 and Chap 2 of Annex A to the Agreement. Chapter 7, Para 7.4(c) and 7.4(e),;
Chap 8, Pma 8.2.l(d) & .{e).and ChapteJ: 11 oftbe Agreement, the Governnu:nts of
Angola, The.Democratic: Republic of the Congo (DRC), Namibia, Rwanda.
Uganda. Zimbabwe and the leadership of the Movement for the L11'cntion of
Congo, the Rally for Congolese Democracy and the Rally for Congolese·
Democracy (Kisangani) hereinafter called "the Parties", have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE ONE- GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
2. The purposes of the General Obligations are~ follows:
a. During the ~cess of Disengagement and Redeployment of the forces, in
order to establish a cessation of hostilities, no Party shall~ c,r use
force against another Party. amt. under no ch:aunstances shall any armed ·
forces of any-Party enter jnto or stay within the tcnitory controlled by any
other Party without the authorization of the JMC and MONUC
b. The Parties understand and agree that within DRC all Parties shall apply
the obligatiom; undertaken in this Plan equally. All parties shall be held
responsible for their compliance herewith. which will be monitored by
MONUC/('Ihe United Nations Mission in the DRC)JMC ·
c. Each Party shall ensure that the terms of this Plan, and written orders
requiring complian~e, are immediately communicated to all of its Forces. . .
d. The l>arti.es shall comply with b "5sation of hostilities in acco~ ·
with Articles 1 and3 oftheT...usakaCeaseFJre-~.BachParty· ···
shall ensure that all personnel and organjzations with m.ilitmy capability
l.lnd~ its cont?ol or within tenitol')' under its ccmttol, including anned
civilian groups (illegally armed), Armed Orpups controlled by or in the pay
of one or other Party comply with this Plan. Y.
~. - - ~
-- -- Y.· ~ . . <l1'Y 1 -:J. /J r
1~~ JMCIMONUCRES11UC1.'EI:> ~][" ,"f' Lf r ~&-Ji_-~'1
(!. U)'-5 JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED f?!) - ~ ?-
ARTICLE TWO- COMMITMENT TO A CEASE FlRE BY ALL PARTIES
3. In carrying out the obligations set forth in Article l, the Parties undertake, in
particular. to cease the firing of all weapons and explosive devices. The Parties
shall not place any additional minefields, barriers, or protective obstacles. They
shall not engage in patrolling, ground or air reconnaissance forward of their own
force positions, or into the Disengagement Zone (DZ) , without JMC/MONUC
approval.
4. The Parties shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their
respective jurisdictim1s, by maintaining civilian law enforcemem: agencies. These
will operate in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with
respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
bv taking such otht>• measures as appropriate. They will facilitate free •
movement and access to UN and other International Agencies by providing such
status as is necessary for the effective conduct of their tasks. ntls should extend to
the civilian population, where practical. in order that normal e~onomic activity can
re-commence.
5. Whilst reserving the·right to self-defence~ within defended positions, the Parti~s
shall strictly avoid committing any .reprisals; count.er-attacks, or any unilatc:ral · ·
actions, in response to violations of this Pl!Ul by another Party. The Parties are to
report all alleged violations of the provisions of this Plan to HQ MONUC aod the . ·
JMC. .
ARTICLE THREE· CONCEPT FOR DISENGAGEMEN'f
· 6. Desired Endstate. The Desired Endstate sought is to achieve a rapid and total
cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the DRC to allow the realization
of future stages as laid down in the Lusaka Agreement.
7. Planning Assumption. This Article is based on the.assumption: that a Ceasefire,
respected by all the Parties, exists in order to f.leilitatc the immediate
deployment of MONlJC Phase 2·.
8. Prcregwsites. Tbc following prerequisites must be met before an ef·tvci ~c
disengagement can talcc place: ·
~
• a. A total Cessation of Hostilities by all Parties. , · . .
Q __ .... - ./../., - - .-..,, . ~ ~-'-f" ~;·--;MC~ON;iPSmcraolY:~£7!J}
(! IA y-S JMCJMONUC RESTIUCTED '!J -q) 'f
tgrceII>.~ by all parties on the prcc~e Zones of Confrontation. specifically
. that disengagement takes place from the current ( as at S Apr 00) front-line
positions as dccwed by all Parties.
b. Coopctation by all parties on the mediation work to be canied out by
JMC/MONUC. · .
c. The provision of MI!JNFO by all parties to allow for the implementation
of the Disengagement. ·
9. Joint and Co-loc..,ted MONUC and JMC HOs. Once disengagement bas been
completed in all areas (the target date as per Article 4 being D+70) the JMC HQ is
to collocate with MONUC HQ in Kinshas~ subject to security guazantees for all
members, and establi.shjoiot support and administrative anangements.
10.Principles ofD'.sengagement.
a. Tactical Considerations • . Nop~' ~d be plac:ed at a tactical
disadvantage by the disengagement: · · - :
b. Selection of New Defensive Positions. Sel~tion of new defensive
positions, mutually agreed upon. between JMC/MONUC and tJ;ic
coJlllllanders on the ground should depend on the tetrain. basic infrastructure
and the fucilities which will allow the easy orgamzation oflogistic support.
c. Priority for Disengagement. Disengagement will be within selected
areas. The disengagement sequence will be as follows:
(a) Forces in contact {defined as combat units being within the range
of direct-fire and indirect-fire systems of the other Party) will ·
disengage first. ·
(b)Bcsicgcd forces. (Units defined as being encircled and having lost
freedom of xoaneuver with the suaounding area dominated end
controlled by another Party).
(c) For.:es not in contact. (Defined as opposing combat units outs5Pide
the range of direct-fire and mditcct:-fixe systems .. this xangc belog
.. ' , , specified as the range of the longest system held by either Party).
. ---~-- ~~ ~- . . .
~ ~
/1,t/~ JMC/MONUC llESTRicmo
l?f" .l -·f J- , , . u1.JL- r,t __
~ -
CIA Y-S lMCIMONtJC RESTRICTED P~ - 1 o ;1 r
- 11. Verification. All disengagement will be subject to verificatioc. by the IMC and
MONUC.
12.Freedom ofMovemeDt (FoM). There will be unrestricted FoM across all areas
of control for the passage of JMC and MONUC Personnel, other UN and
International Agencies .
13.0verall Concept of Operations. Having achieved a Cease- Fire and agreement ·
as to the front lines of all parties, forces will.re-deploy simultaneously to new
defensive positions according to an agreed sequence. Thus a separate, and detailed,
sub-plan will be required for each area where troops are engaged. There will be 2
phases of disengagement:
a. Phase 1. Forces will initially withdraw to create a DZ of at least 15km
either side of the agreed Confrontation Line, in accordance with the lo.::al
geographical conditions.
b. Phase 2. Oc.ce this separation has been accomplished, forces of all
c. Parties will concentrate in Defensive Positions. These will be beyond the
borders of the DZ, and verification of the numbers and types of forces in .
these positions will be conducted by JMC/MONUC.
14.Division of Cease-Fire Zone (CFZ) Into Areas. The CFZ will be divided into
4 areas, as detailed in the attached map at Appendix 2, and as follows:
a. Area l - Lisala.
b. Arca 2 - Boende.
c. Area 3 - Kabinda
d. Area 4 - Kabala.
Each Area will be the subject of its own sub-plan as mentioned in Paragraph 13.
These plans will be produced by JMC/lv!ONUC in accordance with the Calendar at
Article 4.
15.Methodology & 11rocedures.
a. Entry into Force. Thls plan will come into force when endorsed by the
Political Committee." At their meeting in Kampala on 8 Apr 2000, Defenc~:. ~ ( gte.f. decided that D Day for implementation w~ be 14 J...pr 00 at O~~O ·\ )/ , -~---r~•• ~~ • ~ I Y. ,
JMC/MONUtREsTIUCIED ~-~
~~+ # /< if!:!::;:5/P2P ,.
C. v{ '/.;. S JMCJMONUC RESTRICTED ~ - I!),
b. Implementation. Detailed sub-pl3I!S will be developed by JMCJMONUC
and thereafter adopted and signed by the Miliwy Commanders of the
-Parties.
c. Procedure. Disengagement in each area will take place according to the
detailed sub- plan, for each area, and in accordance with the overall priority
as follows: ·
(l)No anued aircraft of any party will be allowed within SO km of the
edge of the projected DZ effective from 72.brs before the unplcmcntation
of the Disengagement and Redeployment (DR) plans in that area.
Resupply aircraft to be coordinated with JMCJMONUC.
(2)Forces to move back equal distances where possible.
(3) Where equal movement is not possible, the JMC/MONUC. working
in consultation with the parties wiij determine the location of new
de:fcnsive positions .
( 4) Where an unequal moven,.cnt bas taken place in one -are~ a
corresponding adjustment of territoxy will be made in another area to_ ...
· ensure that no side is at a tactical disadvantage. This W111 be decided by.
JMC/MONUC in consultatlon with the Parties.
(S) The t#neframe fur implementation within each area will be mutually
agreed and will vary according to the forces committed. LoJJger range .
· weapons: artillery pieces of mon, than 7Smm cahcrc, mortars of more
than SODllll, anti-akcraft guns of more than 12.7mm cah'bre. armoured
vehicles and other weapons platf orxn.s will be withdrawn first.
16.Verificatiog/Implementation. Prior to the disengagement of forces in a
particular area, the local commandffl and mobile verification teams of . ·
(JMC/MONUC) will confirm. all details of the sub-plans on lb: ground_ to ensure
the smooth coordiDation of the cijsengagement. These teams will monitor the
progress of disengagemem:..-
. e.u Y-s JMC!MONUC RESTIUCIED
ARTICLE FOUR - DISENGAGEMENT CALENDAR
17. The Disen.,.oagcment will proceed in accordance with the calendar below. The
key dates that affect this disengagement plan a.re as follows:
(BLANK)
JMC/MONUC RESTIUCIED
CtAy-s
Dates
Signature of the
. 'iPJan:
J
I
ODAY
14 Apr 2000.
0000 hrs GMT.
D+7- D+21
Principal
Cessation of
Hostilities
Provision of detailed
information, area by
area to ·
JMCIMONUC to
allow detailed
planning and
implementation.
Activity on the
Ground
Orders issued t~
Military
Commanders frorn
Political LeadeB
to cease-fire.
Confirmation~
Military .
Commanders. have
received orders to
Cease-Fire.
Remarb
Entry into Force of the Military
Plan
Decision of Defence Chiefs at
their meeting at Kampala on 8
Apr 2000. Defence Chiefs
agreed that orders to cease-fire
and disengage will be re-issued
to forces in the field. Copies of
the orders will be sent to
JMC/MONUC.
Information :required. to.enable
staff planning for
disengagement to be as
follows:
• Locations ·of forces down to
.Coy Strength by 6 fig grid
ofcentre ofmass
• Provision of all data. on
minefields by all t1ie parties
(to include detailed maps of
the minefields).
• Location (base) of all
aiJ:l:raft and helicopters of
all the parties.
• Location (base) of all boats
capable of cmrying more
than 10 men of all the
·cs and. of boats c able
I
I
F
c:.u -s
rD+7-D+30
D+70
_ .1-30 - D+86
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
Co-lo.cation of JMC
HQ with MONUC
HQ
Sequential
verification of
Disengagement of
Forces by Areas.
Deployment of
MONUCPhase
Development of
detailed sub-plans
for redeployment
and
disenga emcnt.
JMCHQand
Delegates move to
Kinshasa.
Withdrawal of
parties to create
DZ
• Location of all Artillery
above 75mm calibre and
mortars of 80mm calibre
and above.
• Preferred defensive
positions and withdrawal
routes to them.
JMC and MONUC planning
team. Includes visits to all parts
of the CFZ. .
Depending upon Political
Committee and subject to
security guarantees for all
members.
14 Days allowed for
verification of disengagement
in each area. Recommendation
of Defence Chiefs to.Political ·
Committee is for simultaneous
disengagement. ·
Following UN Decision.
C. IA'/~ S JMCJMONUC RES!RICT.ED
ARTICLE FIVE-ENTRY INTO FORCE
18. This Plan shall eater icto force upon endorsement by the Political Committee.
ADOPTED:
J1~c··
ANGOLA·
DRC
MLC
NAMIBIA
RCD
RCD-Kis
RWANDA
UGANDA
ZIMBABWE
ZAMBIA
MONUC
OAU
Chairman of JMC
!1
.JMCJMONUC RESTIUCTED
....
C LAY-5
ENDORSED:
'Party
IPOLIDCAL
CO'MMITIEE
ANGOLA
DRC
lvll.C
NAMIBIA
RCD
RCD-Kis
RWANDA
UGANDA
ZIMBABWE
ZAMBIA
MONUC
OAU
Appendices:
JMC/MONUC RESTIUCTED
Si nature
SRSG
1. Current forward positions CFL, D:Z bouilQarics, syggcsted Assembly .Areas
and locations for MlLOB teams. (1 :2 ~ ;OOO Map .Overlay- one copy only, on
display within the Meeting Room). ·
2. Outline Sector boundaries -Map .
10
JMC/MONUC RESTIUCTED
J .
UCMANNEX1
REVELATIONS OF MUNYANGONDO ALIAS BENZ (COS) WHO
REPORTED TO UPDF FROM ADF ON 17 APR 00
INTRODUCTION
1. On_ lJ__;:,;Apr _90, ,qne _Munyangondo alias Benz (APF·G.QS) an.4
Kirurtda-aliasRwijeiriaJuilior(DirectorofTrainirigand.Recruitment)
repqrte9 to UPDF 55 Bn iri Lhume'.: DRC. . . ''.
They deserted with 07 escorts 08 AK 47, 02 pistols, 04 grenades
and several rounds vf ammunition.
a. Reasons for reporting
(I) Due to intensive pressure exerted on them by UPDF Ops
"Mt Storm" and "Mt Sweep".
(2) Different signals exhibited by the Amnesty offered to the
rebels. Whereas others are willing to surrender others are
not due to fear because ofthe_atrocities they committed.
2. ADF COMD STRUCTURES
a. POLITICAL WING
(1) Chief Director - Abdallah Yusuf Kabanda is a
Mukonjo from Bwera • Karambi
sub-county.
(2) Deputy Chief Director - , Jamil Mukulu Kyagulanyi
· alias "professor''.
(3) 3rd ChiefDirector
(4) Chief Advisor
(5) Secretary General
b. MILITARYWING:
(1) Army Commander
(ADF Spokesman)
Yosiaformerly in NALU. Is
aMukonjo.
Fenekansi Kisokeranio
fonnerly in NALU. Is a
Mukonj o from Kisinga,
Kiyondo - sub-county.
Rutehenda Medison.
Henry Matovu alias Birungi
"cobra". A Nubian by
origin.
(2) Deputy Anny Comdr - Sula Byaruhanga.
(3) Chief of Staff Munyangondo alias "Benz".
Is a Munyankole from
Ibanda. (Defected ADF and
reported to UPDF 17 Apr .
· 00):
(4) ChiefofESO ;... Bihamba. Is a~on,zolP"e.
Gii~n.Jlii~],9_5-t . in ofd~t to
ritainfam- ·relationship with
:olJ~boratots and 'contacts in
....;ongQ~
(5) Chief Political commissar - Kiwanda.
2
(6) Chief of Combat operations - Isabirye Zirizovum
alias "Tiger". Is a
Musoga.
(7) Director of Training ; ·
and Recruitment K i r u n d a a I i a s
"Rwijema Junior'\ Is
a Musoga from
Mayuge - Bugiri.
(Defected ADF and
reported fo UPDF' on
17 Apr 00).
(8) Director of Military
IntelUgence Rukwebe Benedicto. Is a
Munyarwanda from M~ru.ca.
(9) Director of Transport
(10) Director of Arms
( 11) Director of Records
(12) Director of Signals
(13) Director of Social Welfare -
(14) Deputy of Director of
Training and Recruitment -
3
Baturumayo.
Muzanganda Kabona
Jamil
Haji Kinobe (husband
to Reste Nantale urban
terrorist arrested).
Eddie Butiro.
Daniel Mugoya.
Ahmed Virunga.
(15) Deputy Director of anns Mugonza.
c. FIELD COMMANDERS
(1) Byansi - I/C of Kahindangoma zone- covering
Kagando, Katwe, Kabuye.
(2) Sekoko I/C Bundibugyo.
(3) Shaban were alias Obura • I/C Bushenyi.
(4) Mbairinde I/C Queen Eli~abeth National
Park.
(5) David Lukwago - I/C Kabarole area from Rwimi up
to Ntandi and areas of Kibati,
Lubona and Nyakigumba.
(6) Zadoki Swalik - 21/C Kabarole especially in
Bugadi forest. .
(7) Issa Twatera Emundu -
(8) Jimmy Mwangye
(9) Phillip Bogere
4
I/C overall of Bundibugyo
and Semliki Park- covering
refugee camps, Hakitala,
Bundimwenda, Bundibugyo
town.
I/C Muhambo area covering
Mobuku, Nyamwamba,
Kilembe, Mapata.
21/C Muhambo area.
(10) Tenywa Mohammed Tamare - 1/C Nyahuka area.
( 11) Fred Kahinda - 1/C of Kikingi area.
(12) Kakande -
(13) Wesonga
1/C Kibaale area especially Muzizi
forest.
1/C Kirindi the area between
Bundibugyo and Nyakuha.
(14) Ali Sebowa Musana - Ntandi are covering Ntoroko and
Butuku.
(15) Umaru Mwangye alisa Ojuku - 1/C Bunyaruguru area.
(16) Lyavaala - I/C Butembo especially between Butembo -
Goma road Butembo - Beni road.
(17) Ngobi ]
Ddamulira]
Sumbusa ]Medical officers
Kasadha ]
(18) Muhiindo
(19) Kasaigura
(20) Gafa Adonia -
(21) Nj ima Edris
5
Head ofKabanda's security
Comdt of Bundibugyo Training
wing at Musuule.
Comdt ofBuhiira Training Wing.
Chief Clerk.
3. ADF STRENGTH
Estimated between 300-400 in Kabarole, Kasese and Bundibugyo.
This includes families, casualties, sick and weak. 103 prisoners who.
were abducted from. Katojo under went military training and have
al~ia:dy);'~e~ ·deployed '~i.1-l -~ifferent pl~ces:t In general , ADF has
manpower shortagP.'t Recruitment is no longer taking place following
the closure of Katungulu-Bwera-Kasindi traditional route, coupled
with several arrests of their recruiting agentfarid collaborators.
Several are killed in UPDF ops while others report/desert.-
At the beginning of 11 Nov 96 the total strength of ADF was 1332
but by 20 Dec 98, a total of27s'were confirmed deaciJ
4. STATUS OF ARMS AND AMMO
a. In 1996 during Mobutu era before Mpondwe attack, ADF.
received several weapons from Sudan government with the help
of Zaire government. Weapons received included more that
1500 AK 47, 20 12.7mm-AAC; GPMGs, RPGs, G2s, 60182mm
mors and a lot of assorted ammo~
b. In Aug 99 anci Oct 99, there were 02 air drops_Q(~ns (AK 47),
ammos and arugs m !Ciribata ar~as..ffoin Tliniha~h~ - Congo. 05
SPG~9 with 200 bombs were arriong ttie arins,_aiforopped! .
On the boxes_J:,f ~AI<47f tli~tevwere?iiiscdf{fiorts--:beMOB - ·
Democratic Republic ofCongo and°"stJb-:-315~96'\
6
. ·-
The first air drops of Aug 99 were not detected by UPDF w1Iike
the second one of Oct 99 where some anns were recovered by
UPDF. The APF ChiefD_ir~~tor Kabanda has close link~-~ith
Kabila government and· deaf§ directly with KabilaU\.ftnister of
Internal Affair(
Before the arms are air dropped the plane first detects a srriall
machine which Kabanda has.
c. Most of the arms and ammo are hidden underground in areas of
Kiribata, Kyabitondo and Kafariso. Benz knows the general
area but not exact places .
The Director of Arms one Jamil Muzanganda and his staff are
the only ones who know the exact places where guns are
, hidden.
However, one of Benz's escorts by the names Musa claims that
he can lead us to some four places where he suspects that guns
were hidden.
d. ADF has the following weapons:
04 82mm mors, 06 60mm mors, 18 12.7mm AAC (nicknamed
"Doshika"), 05 SPG-9, 03 MOL ( only two are functioning), and
several RPGs. Most of the above weapons are not being used
because they are heavy and require more manpower. For easy
and quick mobility they opt to use SMGs, RPGs, APMS, A TMs
and 60mm mors.
7
5. LOGISTICS
a. Food is just collected from abandoned sham bas of civilians.
Some other essentials like maize flo·ur, salt are bougfil:Trmn
Lume, Beni a.id Mutwanga areas in DRC. Roasted meat from
wild animals is nonnally used as dry ration.
b. A part from some drugs which were air dropped (together with
arms and ammos in Aug/Oct 99) more are got from loots they
make on dispensaries and trading centres.
ADF has four qualified medical officers i.e Ngobi, Ddamulira,
Kasadha and Sumbusa who treat those who are wounded and
sick.
c. They do not have any supply of uniforms apart from those
which they charge from UPDF soldiers during encounters. ·
They put on clothes looted from civilians and mainlyjiaek
suits which ar" bought from Congo.
d. Out of 05 Satellite phones which were brought from Nairobi by
Kasim Mulumba (arrested) and Reste Nantale (arrested), only
02 are serviceable. They are rarely used because of high costs.
There are 02 small generators and 02 solar panels which are
used for charging. They also have 02 man-pack radios but are
not functioning. Out of 10 motorolas, only 02 are functioning
and are at Kabanda's Hqs 'in Kiribata • DRC side of the
mountains.
8
. .
There were plans of acquiring 08 mobile phones from Fort
Portal to:wn °by Kabanda. Benzi does not know who will
deliver them.
e. ADF has received 02 airdrops of anns in Aug and Oct 99 in
addition to what was delivered from Sudaff·via Congoiri 1996
· (before Mpondwe attack).
Other sources of arms and ammos include UPDF i.e between 15
Api· - 2,2. Jui 98, ADF charged.· t~e. fo.llowing am,is frotn UPDF
in ambushes and several other encounters iri Bundibugyo; 35
SMGs, 04 LMQs. 02 RPGs ~d 01 MMG.
Source: ADF records.
6. DISPOSITIONS .
Small groups of 7-12 armed rebels are deployed. ADF tactical hqs
are in Kiribata - DRC side of the mts where the Chief Director
Kabanda sits. There are small forces deployed in Kiribata and
Mutwanga not for opns but for collecting food and guarding the
tactical hqs.
Other deployments are as follows:
a. Muhambo - covering Mobuku, Nya~\\'.amba, Kilembe, Hiima
and Mapata. Muhambo is acting as tactical hqs but covering
Kases Opns. ·
b. Kahindangoma - covering Kagando, Katwe, Kabuye.
c. Buhiira - covering Kiraro, Kirambi, Mpondwe, Kasanza,
9
Kayanja.
d. Kyabitondo and Kiraro • there are no deployments here. Are
used for only sanctuary purposes. In case of attack, they
become reserve areas for withdraw or for safe passages hence
no camps in these areas.
It should be noted that most of the forces have been withdrawn
from areas in DRC in order to depict a different image to UN
observers that ADF has always had no bases in Congo. ADF
has information that UN observers are supposed to visit ADF
camps in Congo.
e. Kabarole - to carry out ops from Rwimi up to Ntandi and Kibati
in areas of Lu bona, Nyakigumba . .
f. Kibale district - some forces were sent there to survey Muzizi
forest which will be a base from where to spring and carry out
opns especially ambushes along Kampala road. _
g. Ntandi coverh1g Ntoroko, Butuku via L. Albert. They nonnally
carry out ambushes along Ntoroko road.
h. Semliki Park (mobile tactical hqs) covering Bundibugyo town,
Hakitala, Bundimwenda, Bundikitala. They spring from
Semiliki to carry out ambushes. This is a very wide area where
they can be for a long time without detection.
j. Queen Elizabeth National Park - they co-ordinate with those
deployed in Bunyaruguru.
10
7.
J .
8.
k. Butembo are ... s - to carry out ambushes along the roads between
Butembo Gama, Butembo-Beni for acquisition of money to
buy food, clothes, medicine.
I. Other deployments are in Nyahuka, Kamango and Butaama.
:izi
There is a detach near Kikingi which acts as a sick bay and also
used to purchase provisions. It acts as a calling point to direct
those from Congo towards ADF camps up in the mountains. :en
TACTICS
md
a. Fragmentation of forces.
b. Highly mobH~. rea.
c. Ambushes. )0 -
d. Dawn attacks and night raids.
e. Attacks on soft military and civilian targets.
f. Pre-mature withdraw (cant stand to fight).
MORALE
Morale is low, due to s_~Y.~r.a~ p~9~leμis;.-: ling
a. Manpower sh ,rtage due to massive desertions, while others are
being killed by UPOI<. ing.
b. Adverse weather conditions.
11
c. Lack of adequate supplies i.e drugs, clothes.
d. Continued intensive UPDF Ops.
9. INTENTIONS
a. To disrupt foe forth coming referendum campaigns and
elections especially in Kabarole, Kasese, Bundibugyo, Kibaale,
Bushenyi.
Already the former ADF detaches which had been abandoned
to form joint ops in Bundibugyo have been re-opened i.e
Muhambo, and Kahindangoma
b. To harass, intimidate and kill civilians to show that the
gpvemment has no control of security during referendum
campaigns and elections. ; . . . · · ·-·· •·
c. The Buseruka prisonei"s who were recently released from Luzira
prison are being contacted in ordei· to revive terrorist activities
in Kampala. C.l'his is however not an immediate plan).
Mustafa Sewankambo has already been contacted to head the
terrorist group by linking up with Drago and Kasu]a who went
underground following the arrest several terrorists in Kampala
i.e Kayiira, Kabugo and several others.
10. COLLABORATORS (Internal/External)
a. Muhammond Saadi of KaseseJ Is one of ADF financiers. He
channels the money to ADF via Nairobi. That is why ADF has
never tempered with or destroyed his property.
12
b. Aggrey Awori - is one of ADF suppo~e~·s. Kabanda nonnally
rings him and they discuss what to present in Parliament. ·
c. ~Edward Nyamwisa (the Sherrif of Mutwanga) has strong
contacts withADF but through some informers.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
He makes arrangements for -buying ADF necessities from
Nairobi. He at one time communicated to ADF when UPDF
was about to attack their camp in Mutwanga.
The Inspector of Police in Beni (the current one). He assists in .
providing Congolese docs to people whom ADF is sending t9
Kenya disguised as Congolese businessmen·. ;{;
. .
Shaline ofBeni/Butembo. He is a mechanic.
Lendi ofBeni and his son called Didi.
Swaibu Kigon6o - based in Nairobi is the 1/C of ADF terrorists
ops in Kampala.
Fishennen at Hamukungu and Kahendero landing sites from
where ADF normally crosses are collaborators.
11. OBSERVATIONS/SUGGESTIONS ·
a. Munyangondo . alias Benz is. still reserved and unable to give
more detailed infonnation about himself especially
family/educational background and ADF because he is not yet
sure of his fate.· ·He committed a lo(of atrocities both in
. 13 '
Uganda and Congo i.elle is the one whoJed the opn·m which
several vehicles and shops in Kasese town were burnt.
He fears the public. He narrowly survived to be lynched by the
public in Lugesti when he was coming to report.
b. His low level of education (not b~yond ~. ,5) seems to be an
impediment to wider scope of knowledge about ADF's external
organizational structures and administration. .
His counterpart alias Rwigema Junior (CTR) a former NRA
Kadogo (an S I leaver) seems to be more knowledgeable on
matters pertaining to ADFs recruitment and training matters
coupled with its inclination towards Islamic Fundamentalism.
He was fonnerly an Amir ofMayuge mosque in Bugiri. ·
c. ADF. is likely to step up its attacks on soft mil and civilian
targets to show that the defection of its two commanders has
had little or no impact. on its ops.
,,.J.. /t;"
d. Some escorts of Benz i.e Mausa p 4.}Mus~afa ( 154year old wife
( daughter of late Kagoro a former ADF rebel recruiting agent
in Kampal~ se~m to be having some info~ation suspected
locations of hidden arms and some of the reasons that led totlie ·
defection of"Benz" and "Rwijemajunior".
The need to separate them at a later stage for cross examination
is paramount.
e. Benz. urges UPDF to continually deny ADF ·access.to rich food
areas down the mts coupled with occupying and dislodging
them from the mts. .
14
He insists on the use of well armed small groups of 7-15 who
are properly facilitat~d i.e with adequate dry ration. He
castigates the use of large numbers by UPDF to "Kufuata
Nyayo". and extravagant use of bullets and bombs without any
specific targets.
12. CONCLUSION
The defection of the two rebel commanders from ADF ranks will
certainly have an imp~ct ~n moral~ 9f its fig.4ter and its operations.
More other fighters are likely to defect.
15
UCMANNEX61
United Nations S,RES/1296 (2000)
(:-~ Security Council
~ ~ ~ di!
Distr. : General
19 April 2000
~
00-39903 (E)
*DD399D3*
Resolution 1296 (2000)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4130th meeting, on
19 April 2000
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, the statement of its
President of 12 February 1999 (S/PRST/1999/6) and other relevant resolutions and
statements of its President,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999 on
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/1999/957),
Expressing its appreciation to the informal Working Group established
pursuant to resolution 1265 ( 1999) for its work,
Expressing further its regret that civilians account for the vast majority of
casualties in armed conflicts and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed
elements, reaffirming its concern at the hardships borne by civilians during armed
conflict, in particular as a result of acts of violence directed against them, especially
women, children and other vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally
displaced persons, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace,
reconciliation and development,
Bearing in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining the
importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations as set out in Article I (1-4) of the Charter, and to the Principles of the
Charter as set out in Article 2 (1-7) of the Charter, including its commitment to the
principles of the political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity
of all States, and to respect for the sovereignty of all States,
Underlining the need for all parties concerned to comply with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations and with rules and principles of international law,
in particular international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and to
implement fully the relevant decisions of the Security Council,
I. Emphasizes the need, when considering ways to provide for the
protection of civilians in armed conflict, to proceed on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the particular circumstances, and affirms its intention to take into
S/RES/1296 (2000)
account relevant recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General
of 8 September 1999 when carrying out its work;
2. Reaffirms its strong condemnation of the deliberate targeting of civilians
or other protected persons in situations of armed conflict, and calls upon all parties
to put an end to such practices;
3. Notes that the overwhelming majority of internally displaced persons and
other vulnerable groups in situations of armed conflict are civilians and, as such, are
entitled to the protection afforded to civilians under existing international
humanitarian law;
4. Reaffirms the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach to
conflict prevention, invites Member States and the Secretary-General to bring to its
attention any matter which in their opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security, affirms in this regard its willingness to consider, in
the light of its discussion of such matters, the establishment, in appropriate
circumstances, of preventive missions, and recalls, in this regard, the statement of
its President of 30 November 1999 (S/PRST/1999/34);
5. Notes that the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other
protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed
conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, in this
regard, reaffirms its readiness to consider such situations and, where necessary, to
adopt appropriate steps;
6. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to refer to the Council relevant
information and analysis where he believes that such information or analysis could
contribute to the resolution of issues before it;
7. Expresses its intention to collaborate with representatives of the relevant
regional and subregional organizations, where appropriate, in order further to
improve opportunities for the resolution of armed conflicts and the protection of
civilians in such conflict;
8. Underlines the importance of safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian
personnel to civilians in armed conflicts, calls upon all parties concerned, including
neighbouring States, to cooperate fully with the United Nations Humanitarian
Coordinator and United Nations agencies in providing such access, invites States
and the Secretary-General to bring to its attention information regarding the
deliberate denial of such access in violation of international law, where such denial
may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, in this regard,
expresses its willingness to consider such information and, when necessary, to adopt
appropriate steps;
9. Reaffirms its grave concern at the harmful and widespread impact of
armed conflict on civilians, including the particular impact that armed conflict has
on women, children and other vulnerable groups, and further reaffirms in this regard
the importance of fully addressing their special protection and assistance needs in
the mandates of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building operations;
10. Expresses its intention, where appropriate, to call upon the parties to a
conflict to make special arrangements to meet the protection and assistance
requirements of women, children and other vulnerable groups, including through the
S/RES/1296 (2000)
promotion of "days of immunization" and other opportunities for the safe and
unhindered delivery of basic necessary services;
11. Emphasizes the importance for humanitarian organizations to uphold the
principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity in their humanitarian activities
and recalls, in this regard, · the statement of its President of 9 March 2000
(S/PRST/2000/7);
12. Reiterates its call to all parties concerned, including non-State parties, to
ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and
associated personnel, as well as personnel of humanitarian organizations, and
recalls, in this regard, the statement of its President of 9 February 2000
(S/PRST/2000/4);
13. Affirms its intention to ensure, where appropriate and feasible, that
peacekeeping missions are given suitable mandates and adequate resources to
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger, including by
strengthening the ability of the United Nations to plan and rapidly deploy
peacekeeping personnel, civilian police, civil administrators, and humanitarian
personnel, utilizing the stand-by arrangements as appropriate;
14. Invites the Secretary-General to bring to its attention situations where
refugees and internally displaced persons are vulnerable to the threat of harassment
or where their camps are vulnerable to infiltration by armed elements and where
such situations may constitute a threat to international peace and security, expresses,
in this regard, its willingness to consider such situations and, where necessary, adopt
appropriate steps to help create a secure environment for civilians endangered by
conflicts, including by providing support to States concerned in this regard, and
recalls, in this regard, its resolution 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998;
15. Indicates its willingness to consider the appropriateness and feasibility of
temporary security zones and safe corridors for the protection of civilians and the
delivery of assistance in situations characterized by the threat of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes against the civilian population;
16. Affirms its intention to include in the mandates of United Nations
peacekeeping operations, where appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, clear terms
for activities related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of excombatants,
including in particular child soldiers, as well as for the safe and timely
disposal of surplus arms and ammunition, emphasizes the importance of
incorporating such measures in specific peace agreements, where appropriate and
with the consent of the parties, also emphasizes in this regard the importance of
adequate resources being made available, and recalls the statement of its President
of 23 March 2000 (S/PRST/2000/10);
17. Reaffirms its condemnation of all incitements to violence against
civilians in situations of armed conflict, jiirther reaffirms the need to bring to justice
individuals who incite or otherwise cause such violence, and indicates its
willingness, when authorizing missions, to consider, where appropriate, steps in
response to media broadcasts inciting genocide, crimes against humanity and serious
violations of international humanitarian law;
18. Affirms that, where appropriate, United Nations peacekeeping missions
should include a mass-media component that can disseminate information about
3
S/RES/1296 (2000)
4
international humanitarian law and human rights law, including peace education and
children's protection, while also giving objective information about the activities of
the United Nations, and further affirms that, where appropriate, regional
peacekeeping operations should be encouraged to include such mass-media
components;
19. Reiterates the importance of compliance with relevant provisions of
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and of providing
appropriate training in such law, including child and gender-related provisions, as
well as in negotiation and communications skills, cultural awareness, civil-military
coordination and sensitivity in the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other communicable
diseases, to personnel involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building
activities, requests the Secretary-General to disseminate appropriate guidance and to
ensure that such United Nations personnel have the appropriate training, and urges
relevant Member States, as necessary and feasible, to disseminate appropriate
instructions and to ensure that appropriate training is included in their programmes
for personnel involved in similar activities;
20. Takes note of the entry into force of the Convention on the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and their Destruction
of 1997 and the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) annexed to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of
1980, recalls the relevant provisions contained therein, notes the beneficial impact
that their implementation will have on the safety of civilians and encourages those
in a position to do so to support humanitarian mine action, including by providing
financial assistance to this end;
21. Notes that the excessive accumulation and destabilizing effect of small
arms and light weapons pose a considerable impediment to the provision of
humanitarian assistance and have a potential to exacerbate and prolong conflicts,
endanger civilians and undermine security and the confidence required for a return
to peace and stability;
22. Recalls the decision of the members of the Council set out in the Note by
its President of 17 April 2000 (S/2000/319) to establish on a temporary basis an
informal Working Group of the Security Council on the general issue of sanctions,
and requests the informal Working Group to consider the recommendations
contained in the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999 relating to its
mandate;
23. Recalls the letter of its President to the President of the General
Assembly of 14 February 2000 (S/2000/119), takes note of the letter to its President
from the Presiden·t of the General Assembly of 7 April 2000 (S/2000/298) enclosing
a letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of
I April 2000, welcomes in this regard the work by the Committee with reference to
the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999
which relate to its mandate, and encourages the General Assembly to continue
consideration of these aspects of the protection of civilians in armed conflict;
S/RES/1296 (2000)
24. Req11ests the Secretary-General to continue to include in his written
reports to the Council on matters of which it is seized, as appropriate, observations
relating to the protection of civilians in armed conflict;
25. Req11ests the Secretary-General to submit by 30 March 2001 his next
report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with a view to requesting
additional such reports in future.further requests the Secretary-General to include in
this report any additional recommendations on ways the Council and other Organs
of the United Nations, acting within their sphere of responsibility, could further
improve the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict, and encourages
the Secretary-General to consult the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in the
preparation of the reports;
26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
5
J.
UCMANNEX6
NAMES: :swAMBALE ALI
AGE: 35 YRS
TRIBE: . MUKONJO
NATIONALITY: UGANDAN
lam of the above particulars and I do state that I joined "ADF" in May
1996 at Buhira in Zaire. Before joining, I was a teacher at Nakatete
secondary school in Kyazanga Masaka district. I belong to the Salaf
Moslem sect, and I had enroled for a course at Makerere.
Earlier on in 1995, a one Kabanda and a Salaf moslem who by then had
joined "ADF" contacted me to join "ADF" which I declined in prefence for
education but when I failed to get funding for my education, I abandoned
the course and a one Kagoro ( dead) contacted me and recruited me into
ADF.
He took me through Bwera and we crossed to Zaire. It seems Kagoro was
known to the boarder guards on the Zaire side since we were never
disturbed on the boarder.
When we reached Buhira, we found about 1,000 trainees and I joined
them. Our instructors were mostly "NRA" deserters.
We started our operations in Uganda in Nov1996 but we were not yet
ready for war since our plans had not yet matured.
At first we had got 200 guns from "NALU". Later on, our commanders
went, to Sudan and got some guns i.e 82mm 60mm mortars, 125mm ·
guns. (GPMGs,' RPGs, MMGs, LMGs, MGLs, and SMGs, grenades, mines
· and ammunitions.
These weapons were being ferried on Zaire government trucks escorted
by Mobutus soldiers to our location in Buhira.
Zaire Generals never visited our battle field but they could always come to
coordinate our operations at our Hqs in .Beni. We also operated in
Kiribatha in Zaire. By the time Mobutu was removed, my group had
entered Uganda. So we continued with out the support of the government
of Congo until October 1999 when we received supplies from C0nga.
They were in two containers.
One was from conga and another one had Arabic writings. Some boxes
were tagged DR-Congo but the weapons were similar i.e as above but
included SPGs.
In Dece_ml;>er 1999, we attacked Bundibugyo and in Feb 2000 we went
back to Kiribatha (Congo). (was captured in May 2000 and brought to
Kampala. I don't know what is going on now in Congo.
At first we had about 600 Congolese who had joined us but later on They
deserted and we remained with about 250. Congolese nationals within
ADF ranks; ..
During Mobutu's regime, Its Zairean troops who were providing us with
security and they were the ones coordinating our operations. They wera
. the ones escorting our commanders to Kinshasha for meetings · with,·
Mobutu and Sudanese Government officials.
Our initial contracts with Kabila were coordinated through our London
office by a one Moses and Mark whose other names I don't know. Later
on, we started communicating with Kinshasha directly through Satellite
phones.
My Appointment in ADF was Deputy Secretary General. The secretary
General was Meddie Rutehenda (still fighting).
That is all I can state and it is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief. ·
I I
Sign
/
NAMES:
AGE:
TRIBE:
VIHAMBA KULE
30YRS
MUKONJO - MUNANDI (CONGOLESE)
NATIONALITY: CONGOLESE
UCMANNEX(
lam of the above particulars and at the moment I call myself Tembo
Wekibundira.
I do state that I joined the ADF in 1996 in November at Kasindi (Zaire).
Prior to my joining ADF, I was working as an immigration officer at Kasindi
A messagte came from Kinshasha from General Mayele who was Mobutu's
Army commander, instructing us to cooperate with the ADF elements In
Zaire. The message stated that this was a directive from the Pr<:!sident.
Our main task was to facilitate the ADF's movements to and from Zaire.
On 13 Nov 1996, ADF attacked Mpondwe boarder post via Kasindi and
war started with the UPDF.
When the ADF was repulsed and persued into Zaire, I had no where to
stay so I went with the ADF.
I had retreated to a place called Lugegi on 12 Nov 1996, anticipating
serious fighting near my post.
When the ADF reached Lugegi, 'Ne went _with them to Buhira which was
the main training c.amp. They treated me well and I decided to join their
struggle. I didn'ttrain with them because since 1986, as an immigration
officer I had got enough experience in operating and handling of guns.
On 22 May 1997, I was appointed director of external security organisation
which post I held until 17 May 2000 when I was.captured by UPDF.
However before that, being a Congolese I had got tired of fighting a
foreign government without any cause and I therefore started planning
to see how I could surrender peacefully.
I made contacts with RCD Kisangani who facilitated me with others to
move to Uganda to benefit from the Amnesty we had heard of but ·when
we reached Semuliki bridge, we were arrested by UPDF. There are so
may Congolese in ADF who want to surrender but they fear because they
were only waiting to hear from us, and whether we are safe in Uganda. ·
We used to get weapons from Sudan via Bunl~. During the reign of
Mobutu, , very many . military generals used to visit our camps, . most
especially Benl where the Hqs of ADF were.
When Kabila started fighting Mobutu and eventually overthrew . him,
supplies stopped taming in and he even deployed troops to fight us in the
mountains. ·
However, .sometime early 2000, we started contacts with Kabila and our
weapons would be shipped to Kinshsha and then air dropped to our
position.
The last such air drops were made in Nov 2000.
That is all I can state and it is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Sign.
UCMANNEX6
SECRET
ADF-KABILA LINKS-REVELATIONS BY COMMANDER JUNJU
JUMA FORMER COMMANDING OFFICER ADF PRESIDENTIAL
PROTECTION UNIT (CODE NAMED MAWINGO) 17 MAY 2000
INTRODUCTION
1. In 1995 Abdallah Kabanda (ADF Chief Director) fled from
Kampala, Uganda where he was doing business to _Beni DRC,
where he started organizing logistics and negotiating for rebel
bases in DRC. In Beni he met Vihamba Tembo (arrested) former
Head ADF External operations. Vihamba was once in Mubutu and
Kabila governments and had links with NALU forces in Rwenzori
mountains.
N.B.: Vihamba has a blood relationship with Abdallah Kabanda.
In late 1995 a meeting was held in Beni between Col lbamba, a
captain, Vihamba (from Mobutu government) and Abdallah
Kabanda, Henry Birungi Cobra (died), Dr. Kyeyune and Mugaga
(from ADF rebel side).
They agreed that ADF should not fight Mobutu but instead fight
Uganda, which was a common enerpy.:.,.ADF requested for bases
in Congo (DRC) to establish camps which was granted.
In 1998 ADF agreed to take on the same agreement to Kabila
government to fight Uganda government. Col Ibamba
representing Kabila government agreed to support ADF for those
purposes. Later a link up was made between ADF-SUDAN-DRC,
which led to arms and logistics being delivered to ADF through
DRC government.
LOGISTICS RECEIVED BY ADF FROM KABILA GOVERNMENT
2. In November 1996 the first batch of arms (i.e. 60mm mortars,
AK-47 rifles (1000), 500 RPG pipes, RPG shells, 12.7mm,
I
SECRET
SECRET
ammunitions, MGL rifles) were received from Sudan by road
through Aruu-Bunia-Beni-Bulongo-Lhume to Rugetsi (ADF camps).
The second consignment of arms came by air from KinshashaKisangani-
Bunia-Beni. From Beni they were transported by road
to Rugesti ADF camps. This consignment had mainly ammunition .
for AK-47 rifles, GPMG ammo and 12. 7mm ammo plus grenades
(tortoise).
In January 1997, the third consignment of arms was airlifted from
Kisangani to Beni. From Beni, transported to Rugetsi by road.
The contents were; GPMG rifles, LMG rifles, MGL, 60mm mortars
and ammunition.
In 1998, the fourth consignment was delivered by road to Rugetsi
ADF camps. It consisted mainly of ammunition for AK-47, GPMG
and RPG shells.
In 1999 the fifth consignment was received from Kinshasha air
dropped in Kiribata-Rwenzori Mountains in ADF camps. It
comprised of; tortoise grenades, GPMG, 60mm mortars, 82mm
mortars, SPG-9, RPG pipes and others.
In October 1999, sixth batch of arms was air dropped in Kiribata
from Sudan via Kinshasha. It had 10 containers of arms same as
tt]ose in the fifth consignment.
N.B.: Funds in US dollars currency and medical drugs were
received together with arms from the same containers in
1999.
ADF CONTACTS IN KINSHASHA GOVERNMENT
3. a. President Laurent Desire Kabila
b. Brig Bambu 1998 could travel between Kinshasha
and Beni.
Respgn~!>l~J.Qr;JJ!rrying r
2
SECRET
SECRET
arms from Kinshasha to ADF in Beni.
He was in charge North Kivu.
c. Col Mayara - Based in Kinshasha
- Responsible for receiving ADF contacts/
logistics from Sudan and delivering them to
ADF in the Rwenzori mountains.
- He was formerly based in Beni transferred by
President Laurent Kabila in 1999.
d. Maj Wamulumba - ChargeQ with co-ordinating ADF
activities between Sudan-Kinshasha ·
and Kisangani.
e. Maj Kakolele
f. Maj Nasur
- Co-ordinator of ADF activities
between Kinshasha-Kisangani-Beni
and Rwenzori mountains.
- Based in An,iu.
- Chief Co-ordinator of ADF activities
between Aruu-Bunia and Beni.
g. Maj Abdallah Kule - Based in Butembo.
- Charged with overseeing ADF operations in
Butembo, received a consignment of arms
air dropped by Kinshasha government
destined to ADF.
- He is responsible for ensuring proper
establishment of ADF camp in Butembo.
Works hand in hand with Maj Kasereka.
h. Maj Kasereka - Based in Kinshasha.
- Works hand in hand with Maj Abdallah Kule
in co-ordinating ADF activities between
Kinshasha-Butembo and Rwenzori
mountains.
j. Capt Pangole - Conduit of intelligence between
3
SECRET
SECRET
Aruu and Bunia.
k. Capt James Kaseru- Based in Watcha.
Charged with linking up Interahamwe
with ADF.
- He is instrumental in the merger of forces
between Interahamwe and ADF with the
blessing of Kabila government.
I. Army Officer Benjamin (Congolese)
- Trained in terrorism in Sudan.
Based in Watcha and Lume where he had a
mother.
Works hand in hand with Moses in p below.
Chief co-ordinator of ADF activities i.e.
transportation of arms from Sudan t9 ADF
camps via DRC.
Worked with another Congolese one
Kamyufu.
m. Lt Ronald Muhindo Based in Kasindi.
Responsible for receiving
manpower/logistics destined to
ADF camps from DRC.
He works hand in hand with Sgt
Perika Adroni.
n. RSM Masereka John - Based in Lume.
Co-ordinated ADF in the Rwenzori
mountains with Kabila
government
- Conduit of intelligence/logistics
and manpower from Kinshasha
government to ADF rebels.
Charged with ensuring permanent
contact between Kinshasha
government and ADF rebels.
4
SECRET
J ,-.
SECRET
o. Sgt Perika Adroni - Based in Bulongo.
- Responsible for receiving/clearing
ADF logistics/personnel from DRC
to ADF camps and those coming
from Uganda side.
- He works together with Lt Ronald
Muhindo.
p. Civilian Moses (Congolese)
Based in Sudan.
- Conduit of ADF logistics from Sudan to DRC.
Travels between Khartoum-London-
Kinshasha.
Co-ordinating ADF activities.
Responsible for receiving orders of arms
needed by ADF from Sudan and Kins~asha,
procures and delivers arms to ADF contacts
in DRC.
Brother to Maj Kakolele.
He is also related to Mzee Kisokeranio
Fenehansi (ADF Deputy Chief Director) who
Deputises Abdallah Kabanda in ADF
command.
s._ Doctor (Congolese) - Based in Watcha.
- Responsible for receiving ADF
logistics (i.e. medical, drugs,
telephones) and grenades from
Sudan.
- Has a clinic in Lhume and Watcha.
Works hand in hand with
Kamyufu.
t. (Civilian) Kasereka Solomon - Based in Rushuru.
5
SECRET
~Chief link between ADF,
Kabila government and
SECRET
Cong·olese civilians.
- Strongman of Kabila.
6
' SECRET
Co-ordinates movement of
troops and logistics from
Kabila government and
ADF.
UCMANNEXC
CONFIDENTIAL
TO: OPS COMO
FM: ANALYSIS
DT: 25 MAY 2000
SUBJ: LYAVAALA MPALA ALI (ADF OPERATIVE)
1. INTRODUCTION
The subject was arrested by UPDF at Semuliki River on 17
May 2000. He was arrested together with:
a. Ali Bwambale - ADF Deputy Secretary General.
b. Vihamba
c. Junju - Brother in law to the subject.
d. Swalleh - Escort to the subject.
e. Said Ngoma - Escort of Bwambale Ali.
The group was arrested with 02 pistols and 09
grenades.
2. PARTICULARS
a. Age: 30 years
b. P.O.B: Kirongo village, Magoola Parish,
Buwanga sub-county, Bugiri District.
c. Occupation: ADF rebel
1
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
d. Religion: Salaaf sect
e. Marital status: Married to 04 wives with 9 children.
f. Education: P .5
g. Wives of the subject:
(1) Namusobya alias Susan Lyavaala:
- Arrested among the urban terrorists in 1999.
Daughter of Haji Hassan Mugayavu of
Naminyangwe, Bugiri.
(2) Fatuma Abdallah:
- Daughter of Late Abdalla Amurl.
- She stays in Bukonde, Bugiri township.
(3) Mariam Rashid:
- Daughter of Rashid, businessman in Busia.
- Stays with parents (Rashid).
(4) Sarah Emuran:
- Daughter of Emuran of Zirobwe in Luwero
District.
- Is an ADF rebel.
h. Brothers:
(1) Obedi Lyavaala - about 50 years.
- on treason in Luzira since
1995.
2
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) Hamuza Lyavaala - died In 1995 in ADF
Buseruka operations.
3. WORKING EXPERIENCE
a. 1983, subject was abducted by FEDEMU rebels in
Nakifuma, Mukono and did military training in Galilaya
areas, Mukono district for 3 months. He escaped from
FEDEMU in 1984.
b. In Nov 1986 he joined NRA in Mbale did military
training for 4 months in Serere.
c. He served in 25 BN, then 48 BN.
d. In March 1988, subject got a motor vehicle accident,
was hospitalised for two months.
e. In June 1988, he deserted without a weapon.
f. Before desertion, he fought in the NRA battles against
Lakwena but had not been given army number.
4. REVELATION
a. Subject mentioned one Solomon of lsaale Mutendero,
Butembo as a contact of President Kabila. Kabila
introduced Solomon1to-Yi1suf Kabandi:(a·nd Solomon's - - ··.- - . . -· -· .. ~ . . ·-·~ -. - -- - . ..
role was to co.:ordlhate a'ffd mooilise·tn-e ·fvlarrviarancr
Katangese boys to joih:ADF struggle:
b. Kikingi is an ADF base where they normally enter
Bundibugyo or leave Bundibugyo to Kiribata.
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
c. Yusuf Kabanda always communicates to Kabila on
· phone (satellite).: ,
d. · B.r~~kdown. of arms.airdropped by Svd;anese plari~s i~ ~ /
Oct .... 99;
(1) First consignment:
RPGs
SMG ammo
SPG-9
MPMG
1 O pieces and many shells.
many metallic small boxes.
6 pieces and shells
4 pieces and many boxes of their
ammo.
(2) Second consignment:
Tortoise grenades - many
SMGs - many
82mm mortar - 2 pieces and shells.
60mm mortar - 2 pieces and many shells.
Ammunition for 12.7mm.
Landmines - 06
e. Areas which were targeted by Lyavaala for ADF
recruitment as per Yusuf Kabanda's instructions to
him:
(1) lshaasha
(2) Luchuru
(3) Butembo
(4) · Bunia
(5) Mahagi
(6) Gonyeri
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
f. ADF Butembo contacts who were to work with the
subject in recruitment:
(1) Mzee Solomon - To mobilise Katangese.
• Raise funds for ADF.
(2) Mohamed Kasando - To take charge of Butembo
Luchuru and lshaasha.
The following work under Mohamed Kasando:
(3)Zainab - half-caste.
- 20 years.
ADF soldier from Bwera.
(4) Hadija Nadia - about 25 years.
• Mukonjo from Bwera.
{S)Yalala - from Bwera.
All the three ladies above were selected by Yusuf
Kabanda.
(6) Bada Alima - born from Bunla.
Married to Lukwago, an Alur.
Both are ADF rebels.
responsible for Bunia, Mahagi
and Gonyeri.
(7) Muhindo Mukongole alias Lumwanga:
- To work with Kanzembe and Muhindo (RCD
captive).
- To mobilise the Mai MaJ
- Kanzembe is a Mai Mai.
5
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
g. The subject says he learnt that Abdallah Yusuf
Kabanda sent a group of ADF rebels to Mubende,
Hoima and Kibaale for mobilisation and recruitment.
h. The subject says that Kabanda Yusuf always
· corrimunicates with President Kabila. He also says
that at one time, Kabanda told him that President
Kagame was trying to get into contact with Kabanda
but Kabanda referred the matter to ADF London office.
i. The subject claims that he was one time about to
surrender to UPDF but when UPDF attacked them,
the subject and his escorts headed to an ADF detach
at Mutungo under Junju (arrested). But this seems to
be a lie.
5. COMMENTS
a. The subject seems not to be co-operative. He has
not given much information.
b. The subject should be re-interrogated on the issue of
urban terrorism for he was supposed to replace the
urban terrorists who were arrested in 1999. He is
even the one who sent his wife Suzan Lyavaala to
Kampala to join urban terrorists.
(S KALINAKI) D!SP
Head Analysis
6
CONFIDENTIAL
UCMANNEXt
UGANDA'S ROLE I~ THE DEJ\,tOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
---,
·--- -- -- ·-··-.... . .. . -·- -··--··-·--·-- - OF ··· ····-·-· --· ---··-;··-·· -
. . . ... . -·-
CONGO
H.E. THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CENTRE
KA~1PALA
MAY 28TH 2000
I
CONTENTS
Background.............................................................. p 3
Congo's ,vealth ................•.......................... ~·············· p 6
\Vhy CPDF is in Congo ..........................•..................... p 8
The peace process in the Congo ...........................•.......•... p 9
JmplcmC:ntation of the Lusaka Accord ........_ .. ..............•..•.. pl~ _
~ - ·-· .. - -···
L'gand.1 's role fo tile pea'cc r>roc.css.~ .-................................. p 13
Harmonisation of strategy with our allies ........................... pI3
Differences in RPA-UPDF strategies ................................. p14
61
h and 171
h August 1999 ................................................. p16
5th May 2000 ............................................................... p17
The "·ay for,vard .................................... ; .................... p18
Is Uganda wasting money in Congo? ................................. p20
.. . "l. ·:· ...
; · , . I , , • }
1
_;. ; ; , , . 1 ."
BACKGROUND
I last addressed Parliament on the situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo on August 301
h I 999. I explained then, in fair amount of detail,
Uganda's role in the Congo. I distributed a document entitled
"Background to the Situation in the Great Lakes Region" which I had
first issued at the August 9th 1998 regional rummit in Victoria Falls,
Zimbabwe. The document was, subsequently, distributed to all :-.1embers
of Parliament. I later_ updated and distributed this document to members
of the United Nations Security Council during its special session on the
CO~GO in the final \\·eck of January this year. Since then, t:rdmes on
the situation h:.i\·e been prcsr:nted in the form of ministerial sw:emcnts to
Parliament.
In orJer to gi\·e a proper context of the current situation, let me, Yery
brieth. . re. cou. nt . t. he 2.e11es·1s· of U12.anaa· s Jn\"Oh·ement 111 the Con:10 . Tire· - - . .. .. . - - ···-··-·· ···· - ·-·-· ··· .. .... ·-· - .. . . -- . -
cutTent situation in the Congo is a new phase of an old cri:::;s which
stretches b:1ck into the early Sixties when the country re..::ei\·ed its
independence from Belgium. The crisis has its roots in the long period of
misrule during the Belgian colonial occupation of the country. From the
time this colonialism sta1ted, the Congolese haYe never had the benefit of
being led by an accountable government. It is now 40 years since Congo
became independent but they have never had a government which was
elected by the people. They ha,·e only known violence, misrule,
economic mismanagement and the entire attendant suffering that comes
with arbitrary exercise of power. The only elected leader of Congo,
Patrice Lumumba, was killed in 1961.
Bad governance always leads to ugly consequences both internally and
externally. Refugees, rebellions, tribal massacres, displacement of
people, economic misery and related problems inevitably follow as a
consequence of misrule. These, in tum, generate human catastrophes,
\\'hich, ine,;itably, spill over to neighbouring countries. Such has been the
character and constitution of the post-independence Congolese state.
•.S .:, · ~~ .·
The current phase of the crisis \\;as "triggereq off by, mainly, two factorsr
namely: the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; and the_Jorging .,9f. allianc~~""'-~
between the Congolese governments with the National Islamic Front of.. ..Sudan
against Uganda. When President Mobutu's ally, President
lfabyarimana of Rwanda, was defeat~.d _by,.the Rwanda Patriotic Front
tRPr) in 199-l. hlobutu resolved lo, .. tigh( back and rc:,lore th~ s1 ;;1u5 qu ,,
ant~\ i.e. bring back the sectarian r;:gime ··that u·scd to g,owrn R \'::1:1 d:1
und~r H:1byarimana. ·., ·
Mobutu's first step was to allow the defeated former Rwanda.Army to
maintain military formation, acquire arins and carry on training insid~
refugee camps which were located close to the border,_ contrary to
international law. These genocidaires also started plotting to carry out
acts of szenocide on Congo territory against Congolese Tutsis of the_t-.
fasisi arid Banya~ulenge ethnic groups. In this they received the tacit
support of Mobutu who threatened to revoke these groups' citizenship'· .
and to order them off theii~ land, which the,·_had occupied loniz before ,_
col9~iaf'o2fiij;ti~n-,~~d the ~u;;.ei1t intematl~~a) borderi;were d1:-awn up7j '. \
These groups ,,·hkh folt threatened became the nucleus of a rebellion'
against t-.t0bu1u·s regime. They soon attracted other dissident groups
from Kasai and Shaba Pro,·inces as well as the Mai Mai. This ua,·e birth
- v,'
to the allian.:e. \\'hich was ultimately to O\'erthrow Mobutu, ,,·ith the
... direct invoh·emem of Rwanda and Angolan a1111ies, as well _ a5:.Jhi!JJJOir.~.c;t
. sup11011 ot m~n):..01be1:_African countries,-including.{}ganda:'.
In order to t~~restall Uganda·s intervention in support of R,,anda in herrself-
defence '.l:.!ainst these !\fobutu plans, President Mobutu forned an
alliance with tl1e Kha1toum regime for the latter to exiend its ;cts ·of
dest2bilisation of Uganda in order to keep the Uganda am1y pinned down
and, therefore, in his calculation, incapacitated to come to the aid of
Rwanda. The Sudan Government, in collusion with President Mobutu,
therefore, launched the so-called Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) bandit
groups into \\·estem Uganda from Sudan and through eastern Congo. The
Mobutu GO\·emment also collaborated with the Sudan Government to
pro\'ide support to the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) to attack Uganda
using north-eastern Zaire . . We had intelligence that in Garamba Park in -
Congo, at the border between Sudan, Central Africar.i . Republic and
Congo, Interahamv,•e and ex-FAR were training· togethe·r with Uganda
rebels for the purpos~ of even more destibilisation of Uganda;· A large
number of fonner dictator Idi Amin's ariny \,•ere drafted and put under
the command of ldi Amin's son, Taban Amin, and sent to foriner Congo
to prepare for an invasion of ·uganda:''" i3oth the:CADF and the VlNBf&
started their attacks on Uganda using Congo territory as their rear base in · ·, ·
1996 and even before.
In I 996, Uganda began to experience ever-increasing waves of tc1Torist
attacks from Congolese ienitory. ADF bandits generally targeted pc:1sant
hom.:-steads, isolated rural schools and trading centres. Late:- on, the
tClTOi"iSt alt:1cks became 1110re da:-ino.:- , and r·aids \•:.e re carril'd OU~ C>;~ border
posts. schools, prisons ::md other institutions, .. ii1cluding camp5 or
dispb;:ed people. During April f99;6 ju5t h~fore the pre~idential ·
elections, a riff-raff group composed of Ugandans led by one Kabeba,
with the support of ex-FAR, launched an attack on Kisoro from Congo.
Later in the year attacks were launched on Mpondwe and Bwera an_d
othe~ ~r.eas in Kasese, Bundibugyo and Kabarole districts. These .
inchided the big attack on Mpondwe on 13th Nove.mber 1996. In fact,
Mpondwe was occupied for three days until a counter-attack routed ihe ..
bandits. Their aim was to proceed and capture Kasese airstrip and allow,
Bashir to send in re-_inforce1i1entscl These attacks led to loss of life and
destruction of prope11y. They 2lso generated fear, which made people
abandon their homes, with serious c0n:;equences on the economic life of
the area. Uganda, therefore, had no option but to act in self-defence by
pursuing. these bandits into the Congo with the aim of destroying their
bases .
. Our--0r~ginal-hope-had-been-that 1he--o,·~11hr6w-of ex-=-dictatorMobi.itμ -anQ . -
the coming to power of our ally, Kabila. would greatly increase secur~y
along our common bord~r. Howl!n:!r, much to our disappointment, the
ne,,· gu'.'ernment did not address the issues that were the cause ·of the
quarrel between us and Mobutu which had Jed to the rebellion and change
of leadership in Congo. As far as the security concerns of Uganda and
Rwanda were concerned, Kabila showed little inclination to address
them. Initially, both countries were inclined to give him the benefit of the
doubt although they were both alanned by the ruthless methods of
handling those who did not share his views. ,.Re.had inherited a shattered ·
economy and very weak state structures. He~therefore, understandably,
lacked the capacity to contain the menace of the interahamwe and other
rebel groups. ·
In the case of Uganda, we offered to work with him to improve security
along the common.border. This led to an agreement under which troops
of the Uganda People's Defence Forces would be stationed inside eastern
Congo for purposes of beefing up _security in the area;,.: Ror a while, this
arrangement worked well. In fa~t; iri .. ihe tripartite_ me~tt~gjn ~i!}~hasa:J_
proposed a three-nation defen'c~r,: ailia'iice ''(i;·e>'Rwanaa;""'c1rig~arui,
Uganda) in order to end this chaos once and for all. Kabila was evasive .
on this issue and he, instead, ·saidT~\fe"' shou1cf~inui'td-,,;,6i:f1
informally. That meant working without anv Jegal framework. In effect
it meant no work at all, as later ;,·ents were io:piove.
l lo,,·c-.·cr, in the mean time, thing~ w~i~ t~i'kiitg'an ugly tum in Kinshasa.
Th~ .ne,,· pn:-si<lcnt was establishin~ a hum~n ri!.!.hts record that was as bad
as th:n of f\ ·1obutu. Much to the l'l171~h.'m:1tion <;fhis former supporter!-, he
started inciting certain ethnic groups ag~inst other groups. thus once
more, raising the spectre of genocide in Congo. Former allies quickly
turned into enemies and civil war once again broke out in the country.
When the second rebellion broke out in the Congo, in August 1998,
against President Kabila, like his predecessor Mobutu had done, he
entered into an agreement ,,·ith the Sudan Government to destabilise
Uganda.· Kabila put at the disposal of the Sudan, Congo's airports to
enable the Sudanese to supply the ADF and to use these facilities to
destabiiise Uganda directly . . L~ter on the Sudan Government did in fact
commit its troops directly into the \\'ar by deploying a full brigade in
no11hem Congo, which fought alongside the former R\\"anda An11ed
Forces (ex-FAR) and the interaham\,·c in the Businga-Lissala axis - this
i~ near Gbadolite. Uganda was, therefore, involuntarily drawn into this
war because of these security threats against hei:_._ Qn_ ac.coun.t_of the ..
siJ-ppori these . bandits r~~h:~e.gularly frn):i, Khanoum,-it.Jlas..-not-been::
easy to put their acth·ities to :m .end.
-- -· ···- ·- . ··-. . ·-·· -
However, m! ha,·e made a lot of progress in reducing their menace. For
e}.ample, between June and July 1998, the UPDF overran the ADF
command and control headquarters on the Congo side of the Rwenzori
Mountains. Many Ugandan captives who were held in camps at Ntabi,
Kajumbi, Kambasa and Kafaliso were rescued and brought back home to
safety. Altogether, 15 ADF camps were destroyed during that operation.
There have been many other operations in which the lives of Ugandans
were saved, arms captured and the capacity of the bandits reduced. Now
the menace of ADF has been so downgraded that their fighters morale is
very lo\l',' and many, including their leaders, have began to surrender to
the UPDF and others have been captured in Congo. One of the rebel
leaders we captured was Kal:ianda, who was a regular 'correspondent'of
The Monitor so that paper must be missing his services as one of their
sources!
CONGO'S \VEALTH
There ha,ie been ru:no:.irs to the effect that Uganda's presence in the
Congo is somehow connected with the plundering and looting of
Congolese resources but nothing could be further from the truth. There is
a problem of lack of seriousness among African leaders. Unfortunately,
the Africans arc pampered by the European allies, or those who claim to
be their allies, and they really go off at a tangent. In my opinion 1h0s.:
so-call~d alli..!s .. :\:, in bet, called abashimygi in Runyankole - people
who pamper those w!w do 1: ..:1! r~alisc that they are being pamperl·d.
Where is the much talked-about wealth of Congo? If it is there, it must
be most inconspicuous. People are eating snakes, caterpillars, rats and
cockroaches. I have not been able to see that wealth myself and recently
I took an interest to find out about this great wealth of Congo where, in
some villages, people have never seen salt, let alone gold and diamonds!
I asked one Congolese who is very knowledgeable about that sector and
he told me that if all the investment were to be done, the maximum
annual yeild of Congo in all minerals - diamonds, gold, copper - would
only be USS2.9 billion. Since Congo is the size of India, with a
population of 50 million people, can anyone tell me what USS2.9 billion
in expo11s ,,·ould do for those people? South Korea each year earns
USS165 billion and here \\"e are \\"ith Congo's much-hyped wealth of only
USS2.9 billion at best.
___ Are we realh· seriQY.S, with oULE.uro.pean.alliesr-who,..also-peddle-aU-these_
Jies in their ne\\"spapers'?. They do not mind taking ad,-antage of a fool ·
but they are not fools themselves. We have huge mineral deposits in
Uganda - ,,·hy don ·1 ,,·e get those ones out of the ground first before we
go for the ones in Congo? Uganda, for instance, has a huge phosphates
deposit in Tororo. Since I came into government 14 years ago, I have
been looking around for someone to invest in those phosphates; but I
have not succeeded. Our iron ore deposit at Muko is the second best in
the world, after Peru's, but I have not yet found any investor willing to
exploit it either. There is petroleum in Lake Albert and some people are
now interested in getting it out. Therefore, for such lies about Congo's
wealth to be peddled so many times is simply lack of seriousness. It is
incredible how people can decide to depart from the truth - not on a
sh011-tenn basis, but as a long-tenn enterprise!
The real wealth of Congo is not talked aboμt and it consists of four
factors. First of all, with its network of rivers, Congo can have the
cheapest transport system in Africa. River transport is cheaper than land
or air transport. You can move by ship, with a few detours, from Matadi
Po11 in westem Congo up to Kindu in eastern Congo. That is a very big
2dv::mt:ig~ for Congo. The second big source of wealth in Congo is
agriculture, because of the country's abundant rain, but you cannot say
that people who are eating caterpillars are engaged in agriculture. The
third ad,·antage of Congo is a big market, with its population of 50
million . The fourth advantage is hydro-power. Congo is said to have a
potc-mi:il of 80,000 megawatts of electricity. If Uganda has a real
C' CC1iHlll1iC int ,'!"l?St in Congo, it should be to produce goods to sell to that
huge ma rket.
:\s li)r lh.: L;PDF. they ar~ under strict instruction not to eng:igc in any
i:.:onomic acth·iti.::s on Congo territory. lndi,·idual oflicc!rs ar.: also under
stri~t instruction:; to st:1.,· awa.v from o:::, cttirn1 involv.:d in business -
:h:tivitil.!s. Ug:ind~: has welcomed a proposal that the UN should !.!stablish
a commission of c-.;pcrts to in,·.:stig:ne a1iy illegal exploitation of Congo's
n~nural r.:soun:.:s .
.-\ .~!~~?id '.\·h-:n -i ~ .... ·~ at!d:·.:.)~:..=": ~°''-· ·Jn t>, ·~ i~... i_!;.: . :: !e foll ,]·.:.· i:\; -.t. ~:-.: t;~..=
:\: .:..:., :·: ., \\ :~y ~ ·;. ... :.: h ..... ~~ --·_. , .. _:1 !: :: :·::y i:· ,'\i". ~i-: ;:-.. :1~ ( .. , ;·· ; : :
·rt., n1:1Int~j :: !~.'-:·._ ...- ~ in;:~..: l·\,ng-.·~ i:1 urJ~r :~"' :'\..: ....- ~:re l ·g:·: :~ .i :?. .. s :-:.:..: ·.. .: ·l:~.
int;.!n.:St$ hy d~·-.yinJ t~:~ SudJ:;~s~ ;fl\·~n1;11.:;it an r,;';1,.1:Lt! ::!::- t,,
d\.!St3bifiS\! { =;~!:·J:? tht\ ,:!gl~ ~:!S:~rn (~~:1g.1. \\-~ J:3,:e l: -, ~1 ~ l° '. , ·!:~~:
_ ·--·-~}~~-~j-~_y.j1y .:~· . .: _· .. :)Fis ~:.11 .. 1:;,;~-:· .. i~!~ t. , g·:~:; ::= ~-t11:'~~i r~:-- .
. 2 . .. ~iJ..LJi.!n~:.J:~~~!.'\~_..). . t-~..H ~·:~.~- d~~·..;it~·.::~.~·s:;::1 ::·~-:·-..:1~·- .A._ Q;: :.
~ i· .... ~n$ure i!~~:: :>.~ r''-"li~ :.:~1i ~:::~ ~!i :11: ;::::-:r.:: :\-..: ~::5t.!b:!:: .
r..:h~! ~:1d ~--·. :··- ~i11('ilt ~1:.1....:> .. :S : :·; ·~~L.: -_,:ra; (·._:: .;,.) do :'
; ·~ "l!,J•J·
lo demobilis~ l!:=m.!.n!s of th:! im~rahim\\':! :.:.i1d ex-FAR :?.:"!C ,,:··.:·: ;::n
ti1em from ten-0 :-isin~ C;and?. and R.,\·:mda:
). To protect Cg1nda·s tetTitorial integr:ty from tn\·as1on by K:::iil3."s
forces.
R,,·:inda, on the o:her hand. \,·::i.s dra\,·n into th:! war because o~· the
se.:urity threat posed by the forces of geno.:ide based in CO:--.:GO a;1d the
threat of expulsion of the Banyamulenge into R.,rnnda by the l\lobutu
Go\·emment. :\ !e::i.md1ile, President Kabi 13 successfully mobi I ised
regional powers, n:imely: Zimbab\\·e, Angola, Namibia and Ch:id to
commit their armed forces to interYene in support of Kabila against the
internal rebellion tint had emerged in August 1998. This was a:1other
d,rnger. These coun:ries from Southern Afric:1 :?.nd else\\'h-ere other ,hJ,1
.\ngola, had no s,1Le in, or kno\,·[edgc of. CL, :1~0 or the region . Tl:~ir
uninformed im·oh·ement could complicate our delicate situ :::, :,:, •1
s;:: ;·i ·xtsly. Congo i..1d bec:11 turned into a raih,::iy station for the \\ i10le
\,·odd! Many of these countries are our brothers but they do not know
this region and th: ir im·oh·crncm can lead to \·cry serious problems. Th:-,i
·,- ·,!1·· ,,·e 11"(1 t~ , ,, 1. ., 111··c ·'L 1 r:. , ;, .. ,.,· ,~, .,.., -,,,._, · b,· n . .,. , ::·-. · , ; ... ,>' ·.· : ~ \ .' ...1. • -. . , ._,.,J- ,. L • '- 1.. ••• i ,ll -· .' . . ... .. L::,,. ... .._ '.'. • =- ..... ·:.;_• 1.. . . , - . .
t ' '. :'. ·:" .. ·h· -~:; , to d::~~:.i:1..:!~ th ~:11 f':-0:11 n1:!ki:1; , .L'i·:, >~.:riou., 11: i ~i.:.t L ~· ... .
;· :~ ; ·1 ::·:::::: ~ tu ; !·,·,.: :, .,i.: thi.- :-- li d:·: hi"·.,. ,:·i ....· :!l ~: ·..· ,:·, ,,_-·'. 1• i:·: q:·-:'. .. ·: ~.·
_. ~ :_: ·. ··...: t!; .. :
t I
THE PEACE PROCESS IN CONGO
In July and August 1999, all the belligerent forces in Congo signed The
Agreement For A Ceasefire In The Democratic Republic of Congo,
commonly referred to as the Lusaka Accord. We have actually already
scored a big victory because ali the belligerents, including Kabila, agreed
to sign the accord. The belligerents agreed that the differences thafhad
led to the hostilities in the Congo would be resolved by the
implementation of this agreement.
We, therefore, ceased being belligerents and, instead, became partners in
the pacification of Congo. Mechanisms were created for the
_jmplementation--0f- the.:agreen1em,--=--These-pr-ineipall~ns-ist~P.i-J6ilit ~Militab:
__ ( .0.111.mission (JMC) made up of representati\·es·of the signatories
to the agreement and a United Nations peacekeeping force to supervise
the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement. The
agreement also provides for the appointment of a neutral facilitator to
assist the Congolese parties in their national dialogue. A political
committee was established to oversee the whole process of
implementation.
The Lusaka Accord, therefore, is built around the two dimensions of the
conflict, namely, the internal political question and the security concerns
of the neighbours of the Congo and her own. These two issues are,
obviously, intimately linked. The government of the Congo, the anned
opposition (namely, the RCD led by "\Vamba dia "\Vamba and the MLC
led by Jean Pierre Bemba) as well as the unarmed opposition, including
the civil society, are to enter, under the aegis of a neutral facilitator, into
an open national dialogue. Toes~ inter-Congolese political negotiations
shall lead to a new political dispensation and national reconciliation.
The Congolese -parties to the agreement shall also agree on the
mechanism for the formation of a national, restructured and integrated
army, whos·e soldiers shall originate from the Congolese Am1ed Forces,
the armed forces of the RCD and the armed forces of the MLC.
The security concerns of the countries of the region are to be addressed in
a fairly elaborate process.
I. There must be a total cessation of hostilities bct\·,~~n the
belligerent forces. Cessation of hostilities means cffc::ctive cessation or
hostiliiics, military mm·emcnts and reinforcements, as well a~ lw.~!ik·
actions, including hostile propaganda It also entails cessation of all acts
of violence against the civilian population including summary executions,
torture, harassment, detention, incitement of ethnic and tribal hatred,
recruitment and use of child soldiers, or any action that may impede the
nonnal evolution of the cease-fire process.
2. This should immediately be followed by the disengagement of
forces. This means the immediate breaking of tactical contact beh\·een
the ·opposing military forces. Where disengagement by movement is
impossible: alternative solutions requiring that weapons are rendered safe
should be designed. All the forces are then required to be redeployed in
new monitored defensin! positions.
3. The JMC and the UN shall work out a schedule of withdrawal of
all the foreign forces in the C<>_ngo.
4. In the meantime, the national-dialogue should be proceeding ,,·eff.
Wi-ien it results in a new political dispensation and national reconciliation,
then state administration shall be re-established throughout the national
ten-itory of Congo.
5. The foreign forces shall then withdraw out of Congo.
6. The agreement also provides for the taking of all the necessary
measures aimed at securing the normalisation of the situation along the
international borders of the Congo including the control of the illicit
trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups. Normalisation
requires each country not to arm, train, harbour on its territory, or render
any form of support to subversive elements or armed opposition
movements for the purpose of destabilising the others.
7. In order to ac~ieve full implementation of the Lusaka Accord, a
successful strategy for addressing the problem of the anned groups
named in the agreement, which were the cause for Uganda's and
Rwanda's entry into the war in the first piace, must be devised and
implemented. This requires a successful strategy of locating and
identifying these groups in order to achieve a comprehensive
disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration programme
for them. Countries of origin of members of these armed groups must
take measures to fac ilitate their repatriation.
l:\1PLEJ\1E'.':TA no:-,; OF THE LUSAKA Acco RD
What is the status of the implementation of the Lusaka Accord? The
following has been achieved:
;
A
The National Dialogue has not commenced as we speak today. The
process delayed partly because it took a very long time to identify a
person acceptable to the Congolese parties who would then be appointed
as a facilitator.
Sir Ketumile Masi re, foriper President of Botswana, was agreed upon and
appointed in January 2000 as the facilitator. It is, however, hoped that the
process will start soon. In recently accepting the facilitator, President
Kabila has joined the other pa1ties that had earlier indicated their support
for dialogue, as provided for in the agreement: The facilitator obviously
must sort out a few preliminary but critical issues. The foremost one is
_th~question of pa1ticipants. __ Who will1-in addition to the Con!!olese _ __ _
.par.ties-to-the--agi:ee-ment,-pa1ti c~ pate'.?-=f-he-C--0ngo lese--pa1=tre-s-te-theagreement
\\'ith the help· of the facilitator,''nitist -agree oh this. Equall);
impo11ant is the question of the venue. The debate has been between
holding the dialogue inside the country and ~olding it in a neutral place
outside Congo. The sooner answers for these questions are found, the
better are the prospects for resolving the conflict peacefully. Mr l\fasire
started his consultations with the Congolese parties to the agreement last
week and has scheduled the first preliminary meeting for June 5th 2000 in
Cotonou, Benin.
The JMC together with MOl\1UC worked out a plan, which was adopted
by the Political Committee, for the disengagement and redeployment of
the military forces in the Congo. The objective of this plan is to achieve a
rapid and total cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the
Congo. April 14th 2000 was set as the D-Day for the observance of this
ceasefire. In essence this . plan creates a 30-kilometre wide
disengagement zone along the agreed confrontation !i~~ (i.e. the frontline
positions as at 5•h April 2000). The forces will pull back to new defensive
positions that will have been worked out by the JMC and MONUC and _
agreed by the parties. The forces will move back equal distances and,
where this is not possible, a corresponding adjustment of territory- will be '
made in another area to ensure that no side is at a tactical disadvantage.
This new area must be beyond the demilitarised zone. · All the parties
have provided the required military information to the JMC/MONUC to
enable them draw up detailed plans for the disengagement and
redeployment of the forces. The Political Committee will be rom·ened
next week to rccci\'e a formal rcp0n from the JMC.
; l
1.i
The JMC and MONUC have also presented to the Political Committee a
draft proposal for the Disarmament, Demobilisation Resettlement and Reintegration
(DDRR) process. Again the Political Committee will consider
this proposal at its next meeting with a view to adopting it. The main
sticking point is whether there will be peace enforcement or not. The
agreement is very clear on this and it is hoped that the UN will grant the
wishes of the parties. All of them desire that the problem end peacefully.
It is Yery clear, however, that where peaceful persuasion fails, coercive
measures \\"ill be fully applied. Should the UN feel not able to do this,
the patties shall assume their responsibility to disarm the groups that will
ha,·e refused to do so voluntarily, as we are continuing to do against our
o,,·n groups in eastern Congo. That is ho\\' \\·e managed to capture the
leaders of the ADF.
Once the process of disengagement and redeployment to new defensive
positions has been completed, JMC/l\·10).;UC ,,·ill draw up sub-plans for
the " ·ithdrawal of all foreign ·forces -from the Congo. · The noi·malisation
J-------·()1"-1lre-s1rnation at our borders will fo_llo\\· the suc.cessful implementation
. ofall tl1e above. - - .. .. -
)
All in all. although the implementation of the agreement has not been
according to the calendar for its implementation, the parties, by and large,
ha,·e demonstrated their will to resoh·e the Congo conflict by peaceful
means, notwithstanding violations of many aspects of the a£reement.
These violations have mainly been due to lack of supervision of the
ceasefire. The main impediment has been lack of resources. The UN
has estimated that the current phase of MONUC will cost up to
US$1 billion. This is a lot of money that has to be raised by the UN. The
Jl\1C also has a substantial budget, which has to be raised mainly through
donor support. The JMC failed to raise all of the required US$5.5million
that was to fund its initial activities. In order to overcome this JMC
resource constraint, however, and to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the implementation process, a joint structure of the JMC
and MONUC has been agreed. This enables the JMC to access and
utilise the UN resources.
Although the UN appeared to be quite reluctant to come in at the
beginning, it appears now that after the meeting of the Security Council
in January this year, which was attended by the relevant heads of state,
and after the adoption of Resolution 1291, the UN Security Council is
ready to help the process of implementing the Lusaka Accord. The visit,
for the first time ever to Africa, of the UN Security Council delegation
pc1in1s to th ;:, f~:11 ~.ttc ntion the matter is receiving at the UN.
,~
J .
UGANDA'S ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS
It was obvious to Uganda that the whole situation in the Congo was a
result of the long history of chaos and lack of government in that country.
Even the remnants of the colonial structures inherited from the Belgians
had collapsed. The only feasible and viable proposition for the
restoration of stability in the Congo, therefore, is the building of a state
structure that the rest of the world can deal with. Ugand~, therefore,
decided to use· its presence in the Congo to help empower the Congolese
population to moYe towards achieving this goal. Uganda has encouraged
the Congolese leaders to mobilise the population to increase and sharpen
their awareness and their historic duty to take their country's destiny in
their own hands. The UPDF has impa11ed military skills to the
population to be used as pressure on all the political actors ·to seek·a-
pofa-icat--peaceful ·-solotio-rr·w-~1f poltttcal problems. UgaricJ~ .1~~
resisted all ahenipts to' use 11iilitai-); ·means as· tlie sole' 'or e~·en principal
mechanism for solving th.! Congo conflict. -Right ·from"the--beginning;,
therefore; Uganda played a key' role.Jn the formulatioitand subseqti,~ri~~negotiations
for the Lusaka Accord:l It has continued to actively support
the accord's implementation in all fora.
HARMONISATION OF STRATEGY WITH OUR ALLIES
There were some people who thought that the best method of solving the
Congo problem was to use military means only but we did not agree with
that line. The difference between us and Angola and Zimbabwe . is a
limi.ted difference; it is not a long-tenn difference. We happened to see
things differently on Congo but otherwise we have worked with
Presidents Mugabe and Dos Santos for the last 30 years. I did not work
with President Dos Santos but I worked with his predecessor, President
Agostinho Neto. Therefore, these are our old colleagues and our
difference O!l· Congo, although impo11ant, is a limited one. We ca!'lnot
treat Zimbabwe or Namibia or Angola as enemies. They were pushing a ·
line that was dangerous for our region; we resisted them; they saw our
point; we started negotiations; and we reached an agreement and that is
the proper way to handle this issue. We are committed to the Lusaka
Agreement and it has reunited us, even with Kabila. Anybody, therefore,
who opposes the Lusaka Accord is confused and dangerous to the region
and \\'e shall resist him, as we hnn· resisted other bad people in the pnst.
DIFFERENCES IN RPA-UPDF STRATEGIES
Uganda related to Rwanda as an ally because of the two countries'
historical bonds and because in the Congo we shared similar security
concerns. Our two countries, however, have differences on how to relate
to the Congolese in the process of resolving the Congo conflict. I have,
however, been told that the differences between Uganda and Rwanda are
caused by Ugandans looking down upon Rwandese. I was told by one of
the senior leaders of Rwanda that somebody had said that the RPA was
part of the UPDF; that Rwanda is a district of Uganda; and that Brigadier
Kayumba, the RPA chief of staff, ,vas a sergeant in Uganda. \\·hat is
\\TOng with being a sergeant? I was corporal myself. When vve fought in
1972 in Mbarara against Amin and we were defeated, a lot of the people
we came with from Tanzania were killed. We came with 330 people and
by afternoon only 46 were left - all the others w~r~ .. ~U!~c;l,_ Lmanaged to
:_g_rganise-::Jhose.:.remnants...because--a11--the-=oiher-=-teaders-had-either--been
killed · or captured; When ,,;e ·got back· into Taniariia; ··a· fello,v called
Ageta said · that he was in charge and I supported him. He put me in
charge of a section and I was made corporal. If you start off as a corporal
and you do good things, e\'entually you can become a general.
Therefore, if somebody can really believe that those are the kinds of
issues that can cause people to shoot at each other, there must be
something wrong with our ideas! I told the leaders of Rwanda that some
Rwandese are always abusing me, even in the newspapers, but I cannot
take that as a national policy. Even if somebody abuses me, so what?
That is his problem, not mine. Can I pick a gun and shoot people just
because somebody has said that Museveni is senile, as they have been
saying? These, therefore, are not the kinds of things that can divert us
from fundamental aims of the people to concentrate on just puffing up the
egos of the people involved. There is something more fundamental and
we shall discover it as we go along.
For instance, I was imprisoned eight times in Tanzania: in Mwanza, in
Tabora, in Nkonga maximum security prison in Dar es Salaam, where I
was imprisoned with Hon Eriya Kategaya, together with his young son,
Julius - there is no prison in Tanzania that I don't know! However, that
cannot make me an enemy of Tanzania. These are small things that you
experience if you are a freedom fighter. If you start dwelling on those
small things, then you don't know what you · are doing because the
struggle a sacrifice and being put in prison is really a snrn !l th:nf,
considering that you could even be shot and killed.
Whereas Uganda wishes to extend a hand of support and assistance to the
Congolese population to manage their own internal politics, Rwanda
would appear to prefer playing a more assertive role~· We have discussed
this with the Rwandese - even during the time Kabila was fighting to
overthrow Mobutu. I asked ·them: "Why do you fight for Kabila? Why
don't you help him to ·fight for himself because that is more durable?
Give him anns so that he fights for himself. Even if you intervene, yoi..t · ·
should do so in a limited way and not cany somebody on your
shouiders." Howe\·er, the Rwandese appeared to have a different idea.
Jiijhis . respect," whereas ~ Ugan~a. ~ied t{?, en.courage tl'!e Congo rebel · ·
gro~ps to fonn a united front, Uganda would not force ii'on them.
If you recall our o,,·n history, when we went to Tanzania in 1971, initially
the Tanzanians tried to make us work with Obote but he did not accept
some of the fundamental points \\'e were raising. We told the Tanzanians
that we could not...ll:ork .. witlLObo1e..because....do.ino so wm,.ld .. discredit..usi~ ,
. Uganda. Obote had made a lot of mistakes, whi~h he appeared unwilling ·
to coITect. The Tanzanians eventually understood our position and that is
why they ga,·e us some little suppmt on the side as Fronasa (Front for
National Sah·ation). Eventually we sorted ourselves out inside Uganda
because the Tanzanians could not really understand who was right and
who was wrong in Uganda. In the end, the situation in Uganda sorted out
who was right and who was wrong, although it has taken almost 30 years.
Some of the Tanzanian leaders had tried to force us to work in ways that
we disagreed with. However, being a far-sighted leader, Mzee Nyerere
supported us in a small way because, although we were still young, he
realised that our line was a co1Tect one.
When it came to South African, you remember that there was a difference
between the ANC and the PAC even after Mzee Mandela had come from
prison. Dr Kenneth Kaunda called a meeting in Lusaka where there were
'international civil servants' who always come out with statements like:
"Of course unity means strength and the ANC must, therefore, unite with
the PAC.'' · After they had spoken, I put up my hand and said: "Your
Excellencies, I think that during a resistance struggle, sometimes unity is
not necessarily a good thing. Suppose enemy agents have infiltrated one
group and another has not been infiltrated, if you force them to uriite, they
will both be in danger. If they feel uncomfortable working together, you
should leave them alone. Let them unite in action in attacking the enemy,
but they do not ha\'e to unite organisationally." In the end the idea of
trying to force the ANC to unite with the PAC was abandoned.
EYentually the South African political problem \\':ls solved and when they
held elections and the PAC got only one scat.
There were also a lot of problems between ZAPU and ZANU in
Zimbabwe. The Russians sponsored some groups which they called the
'authentic' liberation movements suggesting that the others were bogus.
The authentic ones were the ANC in South Africa, Frelimo in
Mozambique; Swapo in Namibia; l\1PLA in Angola; and ZAPU in
Zimbabwe. ZANU was not 'authentic·; but when they went for elections
in Zimbabwe the situation was reversed.
When the South Africans were still fighting they asked for our support.
Since they were all against the apartheid regime, I decided that we should
support both groups and that they should bring as many people as they
could. \Ve sent the ANC people to Ka"·e\,·eta in Luwero and the PAC
group to Kabamba. In the end the AKC brought 4,000 fighters and the
PAC only brought 49. Therefore, ,,·hen you ar~_i!1~~lve~-~'.!.!h_gr9!)P..~
_Jrori1.:::0.utsiil.~1.01Lcan_onl}:...giYe-..ruhlc.e.~ut if it is refused vou should
lea\'e them alone because they know their internal situation better anq. we ·
have learnt these lessons from our long experience in the struggle to
liberate our people. We were, therefore, ready to work with all the
Congolese groups even as we encouraged them to unite or find common
ground for co-operation.
6TH AND 17TH AUGUST 1999
It was against this background of difference over strategy in Congo that
the first attack on UPDF by the Rwandese Patriotic Army occurred
between 61
h and 1 7'11 August 1999 in KisangailL The reason for this attack
was because the RP A wanted to block the verification exercise that had
been agreed upon by the Summit of the Heads of State that signed the
Lusaka Accord on July 10th 1999 at - Lusaka;· .. A : verification team
·~-·,~ :.. - ... · · ~~~ ... , . ...... ....~ ~ .. - ·· .t •• .... · 1,, · •• • •. ·1 ~.i, r!J!'f,'i,,.:.,·,:... ·,.._ , .. :. . ·. , ,. . , ....
comprising the Zambian Minis!er . for • Presidential · Affairs, Hon Eric
~1.; i .s.~·=- . . . -- . ~-~ .
Silwamba and the South African Minister of Foreign "Affairs, Hon Dr
Dlamini Zuma, were due to:~.visit ~Kisangani -_to;,;_yenfy whether RCD
(Kisangani) of Prof Wamba had a mBitary and political presence there or
not. As it had been requested by . the . summit. to do, the UPDF was
helping this verification exercise ,,,hen the Rl>A attacked tliem~:·-·
As I infonned this Parliament then, I met _\:Vith Major General Kagame at
Mweya and, subsequently, at Rwakitura and we signed a ceasefire
agreement, including the demarcation of Kisangani into two zones. It
was agreed that the nmth and east of the city be put under the control of
the UPDF and the south and west under the RPA. Each force was to keep
a co!npany at each ai111ort in either zone.
MAY 5TH 2000
On May 51
h 2000, however, theRPA once again attacked the UPDF. This
time round they apparently wanted to seize the high ground at Kapalata
and the Lubutu-Bafwasende Road. They did all this in clear ·
contravention of the Mweya and Rwakitura Agreements and without any
provocation since, contrary to the rumours the Rwandese spread prior to
this attack, there was no UPDF amassing of troops beyond a mutually
agr~ed position.
At a meetin-g I held at Rwakitura on May 8111 2000 with the l:N Security .
Council delegation and in . consultation by telephone ,,vith President
Kagame, later confirmed by the summit benveen President Kagame and I
under the chainnanship of President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania in
-Mwanza ~n--May--141L2000;-ii-was agreed ·tnartneciffoTKisangarul,e
demilitarised._ Tl~nlili!.fil)~commanders of the two countrie~ _onMay 21 s, .' ·
.. 2000 signed the ilnplementation order 'for the withdrawal and
redeployment of the forces, all forces including the rebel forces, from
Kisangani. The United Nations Observer Mission In Congo (MONUC)
shall deploy its force to exercise neutral control over the demilitarised
zone around the city and airports of Kisangani.
The attacks on the UPDF by the RPA in Kisangani and the actions of
UPDF in self-defence were most regrettable and should never have
happened. Fortunately, the leadership ~f the two countries was quick in
taking steps to ensure a quick return to · nonnalcy. In doing this,
consultation was done with the other parties to the Lusaka Accord firstly
to assure them that these clashes would not interfere with the overall
peace process in Congo and, secondly, to indicate that this would serve as
a model for the disengagement of forces on the wider Congo scene.
In all these attacks,' the UPDF exercised maximum restraint even in selfdefence
bearing in mind that these were acts which were not in the
legitimate interests of our peoples and, further, bearing in mind the
O\'crwhelming de~ire by the Ugandan leadership not to act in a way that
would jeopardise the relationship that has· long existed between the
peoples of Uganda and Rwanda.
I have been reading a lot of a11icles in the newspapers, especially The
/lfe>nitor, about how the RPA 'routed' the UPDF in Kisangani. Thcsl? arc
ju:-., childish p.::opk who have never fought any war or even seen one. I
am not a child to allow myself to be provoked into fighting useless wars
to pro,·c who is superior in militat)' arms. If you think that those dashes
in Kisangani are called a war, then you need to do much more research so
that you can find out what real war is all about. I have instructed the
Attorney General to take action against The Monitor. That paper must
stop provoking trouble and provoking people. I was told that 'politically'
this action was not good but I disagree with that view. When ~omebody
tells lies, he must be punished - that is what politics is about. These
clashes were very limited and "~.-e lost six soldiers, although in the first .
incident we had lost 32 soldiers. This is regrettable, but these were
limited clashes and the UPDF has not fought a war with Rwanda. I have
told our offi.cials to stop making statements in the newspapers. If there is
a statement to be made, T shall make it myself. The officials of both
Rwanda and Cganda should not be allowed to play with fire because they
can inflame the situation and we can find ourselves engaged in a terrible
war, like the one currently going on between Ethiopia and Eritrea. What
is amazing is that none of our African countri.~~~~ll~f~~!ures weapgn.s ..
Thefefore; ·,,·hen you ei,:i:.ourageJ!Jnpty-headed sJoganeering in the pa_p£rs.
you are-actually-giving business to the- foreign arms companies . . I am
appealing to The Monitor, and those who are using The Moniror in one
way or another, to leave the people of Uganda and Rwanda in peace.
The importance of Kisangani last year had been that Bangoka Airpon had
a long runway - more than three kilometres. Given the problems of
transport in the Congo, we needed it for transport:ng tanks. An llyushin
76 aircraft carrying a tank cannot land on runway of less than 2.8
kilometres long. However, the real interest in Kisangani now is political
because we later got a long runway at Gbadolite. That is why I had
agreed with President Kagame that we should help the people of
Kisangani at least to elect a mayor in that city of up to a million people.
If we could do that; I would be very happy because then we could remove
the armies from the town. Originally our interest in Kisangani was both
for political and security reasons but it is now mainly political. If those
Congolese people could be given a chance to elect their leaders, they
would remember that the allies had enabled them to start an era of
democratic governance in their country. In the Beni and Butembo areas,
the RCD group there agreed to hold elections and the voter tum up was
ve1)' high. The vote, by secret ballot, is the key of liberation.
THE WAY FORWARD
There have been some calls for the immediate withdrawal of the UPDF
from Congo. This would be the most unwise thing to do at this moment
for the following reasons:
I. The implications of a unilateral withdrawal are that, firstly, such
action would be in violation of the Lusaka Accord. The accord provides
that there shall be orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from Congo in
accordance with a schedule to be worked out by the UN. The calendar of
implementation was worked out in such a way that there would be a
national government and a national restructured anny resulting from the
national dialogue which would re-establish state control over the entire
ten-itpry of Congo when the foreign forces depart. If individual forces
began .withdrawing unilaterally, this could upset this carefully negotiated
sequence of events and, in fact, possibly lead to the collapse of the
ceasefire agreement as a whole.
2 Secondly, the Congolese population that has put their trnst m
Uganda would view such a withdrawal as a betrayal.
-3~T~tfrdly,aS-l-h~edl;}LStated,---the....conflict in CongO-hac:L
--divided -'the--former anti-colonial freedom · fighters ·of·A'frica for:the· first· ·
time. The Lusaka Accord restores this unity'and the opportunity to work
together as allies. \Ve are no\\' working very dosely together with
Zimbabwe . and A~gola .. J~~)~~iJ\fil.frial .. co1~1:1unity, ~s \\'ell ~~-~.):)RSI
Congolese·of all sides, view Uganda's role posmvely, hence the election·
of uganda to the chair of the Politica}J:pmmittee; the acceptance of
Kampala as the venue for meetings by all the parties; and of Kabale.by all
the rebel forces. They voted for Uganda unanimously because they could
see that our position was a balanced one. '
It should be emphasised that successful implementation of the Lusaka
Agreement requires that all the signatories abide by their commitments
and that the UN, the OAU and the international community at large lend
support to the peace process both morally and materially. The
implementation of the agreement is behind schedule because of the deficit
in support both from the signatories and from the international
community. Uganda will continue to work through the JMC and the
Political Committee to keep implementation under constant review and to
make appropriate adjustments to the calendar in accordance with the
dictates of circumstance. We recognise that there are enonnous
challenges to the implementation of the Lusaka Accord but the task we
have undertaken is so crucial to Africa's future that we cannot afford to
waver in the face of these difficulties. We have an agreement to which
all the parties have committed themselves: All we must do is to mobilise
the political will and the resources to implement it.
IS UGANDA WASTING MONEY IN CONGO?
I am always hearing false arguments by some people to the effect that we
are wasting money in Congo. Of course we are spending money, but we
were spending money anyway because we were fighting banditry here in
Uganda, only that ,ve did not have a chance to conclusively solve this
problem. We would operate on the Uganda side but the bandits would be
on the Congo side and we would not be free to do anything about it. Now
we are operating on both sides. Therefore, we are spending money, but
we are doing so profitably. That is how we have been able to capture the
bandits in Congo, including the former Amin soldiers who had been
mobilised in Gbadolite to come and form a force in Congo. Therefore,
the argument of spending money does not hold ,vater because even if you
do not operate outside your borders, if you have security problems, which
. _ar~ _P.8!1 .. of _the old __ security _problems ofQJ.JL.~Quntry,_yo.u_j\'ilLspend __
-mone~thin~ou1-:_countrr---Ho,.\.:e-+e-t~-4l.:itl-..with-fewer~-hances-0~
resoh·ing the problem if the people on the other side do not co-operate.:- ·. -· -··
It is interesting that people who get a lot of support from outside use the
argument of money all the time. The money we receive is from the
taxpayers of Europe and it is some form of solidarity between them and
us. However, the Europeans cannot express solidarity with us in security
matters. In Sie:ra Leone, Nigeria has been shouldering the burden of the
security problem in that country. Does it mean that even if I am a poor
person, I cannot extend solidarity to my brother who is in a terrible
situation? Tanzania was not a rich country but when Amin took power,
Tanzania, right from the start, gave us some solidarity, and it was that
solidarity that eventually enabled us to recover. We are now here talking
- we have a Parliament, we have an elected President, we have been able
to repair our roads - because Tanzania gave us their solidarity, in spite of
their poverty.
Money is :very important but it is not the only thing. Both from a
practical and moral point of view, it is incorrect to say that when ou~.
army operates from outside our borders, because.of the exigencies of the
times that we must confront, we are wasting money. You may waste
more money by doing nothing about a terrible situation like the one that
was unfolding in Congo. There is something called the dignity of the
human being and we have been fighting for a long time preserve the
dignity of the African people and liberate them from oppression. I would
like to conclude by appealing to the honourable members, together with
the ministers concerned, to mobilise the political will to implement the
Lusaka Accord and, with our pa11ners the donors, to mobilise the
?O
resources needed so that we can look forward to a new era of stability and
prosperity in the Congo. The Congolese, all Congo's neighbours, and the
whole world stand to benefit from a stable region.
May 281
\ 2000
Uganda lntemational Confen:nce Centre
Kampala
.. ---~-~ ........ ' ... ~·· . UCMANNEX67
AFRICA
Togo hosted more rhan 10,000 refugees at the end of
1999. the va,t majority from Ghana.
Approximately 3.000 Togolese refugees remained
outside the country at year's end. including about 2.000
in Benin and about 1.000 in Ghana. No Togolese refugees
officially repatriated in 1999.
Refugees from Ghana Inter-ethnic conflict in northem ·
Ghana in 1994 forced some 15,000 Ghanaians to flee to
Togo. Approximately 10.000 remained in northern Togo
at the end of 1999.
Togo's reception of refugees was generally hospitable.
Most refugee families were integrated into local
communities. In October. the government of Ghana
publicly expressed its willingness to receive back all Ghanaian
refugees. Most. howevet were largely self-sufficient
and probably will not repauiate. according to the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Refugees from Togo In 1993, more than 200,000Togolese
fled to neighboring countries to escape a violent aackdown
against a pro-democracy movement by Togolese President
Eyadema and the country's military. Most refugees were
from Togo's capital, Lomc. Half of the refugee population
rerumed home the following year. but subsequent incidents
of persecution forced some to flee again.
A general amnesty for Togolese refugees in 1994
and relative improvements in security in Togo led to the
large-scale return of refugees. UNHCR completed an organized
repatriation program in mid-1997. In 1998.
about 4,000 Togolese refugees returned from Ghana although
the official repatriation program had already
ended. No Togolese refugees are known to have repatriated
in 1999, according to UNHCR.
About 3,000 Togolese refugees remained out·
side the country at year's end. although some sources
estimated twice that number. Many were prominent
opponem.s of the ruling regime and were unlikely to
repatriate soon.
U!inda
Uganda hosted nearly 200,000 refugees at the end of
1999, including about 180,000 from Sudan, approximately
8,000 from Rwanda, some 8,000 from CongoKinshasa,
and 1.000 from Somalia.
An estimated 15,000 Ugandans were refugees.
including some 5.000 in Sudan. about 5,000 in Kenya,
and nearly 5,000 in Congo-Kinshasa.
Approximately 450,000 Ugandans were internally
displaced. although some estimates ranged much higher.
Armed Violence Armed insurgencies continued to destabilize
s,!veral areas of Uganda in 1999. The
government's counterinsurgency measures have led to
arbitrary kill in~ and other human rights abuses, according
to human rights observers. Ugandan authorities have
regularly pr£:dicted the rapid defeat of the rebels, but the
predictions have proven to be unfounded.
A1, many as seven insurgent groups claimed to
operate during the year. An insurgency in nonhem
Uganda suetched into its thineenth year. while conflict
in the southwest has persisted for four years. Several new
rebel groups emerged in eastern Uganda during 1999.
Insurgents rq>on:edly killed 400 people nationwide and
abducted some 1,000 civilians in 1999 alone. according
to some estimates.
The two most brutal rebel group~ were the Lore's
Resistance Almy (LRA), operating in the north, and the
Alliance for Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west The
politic.a.! goals of each group were unclear. ADF forces
reportedly consisted of o."Uemist Muslims and former
Ugandan soldiers from earlier regimes. The LRA appeared
to have roots in extremist Christian and local traditional
religions. TI1e Ugandan government has long accused
the Sudan government of providing military aid to many
of Uganda's insurgencies.
The LRA and orher rebels in the north, including
the West Nile Bank Front have killed 5,000 to 10,000
civilians during the 19 90s, according to local estimates.
ADF rebels have reponedly killed nearly 1.000· people
since 1996 in the southwest.
Insurgents regularly have abducted children, torrured
and mutilated civilian victims, pillaged local villages,
and planted landmines along roads and footpaths.
The LRA has abducted up to 20,000 people since the late
J 980s-including at least 10,000 children-according 10
estimates by UNICEF and other agencies. Rebels used
abducted children as concubines. cooks, porters. combatants,
and human shields.
Anac.ks by LRA rebels in the north were less frequent
in 1999 than in earlier years. In the southwest.
attacks by ADF insurgents against civilian targets escalated
dramatica.lly during the year, leaving a path of killing.
mutilations, abductions. and looting that Ugandan
government forces struggled to halt de.spite regular troop
reinforcements.
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni offered a
general amne.;ty in June to rwo of the oldest northern
rebel groups ,n exchange for their disarmament. The
Ugandan parliament extended the amnesty offer to all
rebel combatants in December. Relatively few rebels laid
down their w£:apons. however.
The gnvemments of Uganda and Sudan signed a
formal agreement in December to cease suppon for rebel
groups operating in the rwo counuies, but the impact of
the agreement remained unclear as the year ended.
us
.......
u.l. \.Ufflfflll"IU; FOR JlffU6EES
Uprooted Ugandans Uganda's numerous insurgencies
and other localized community violence left an estimated
450,000 per,ons internally displaced at the end of 1999.
Some estimates placed the number of displaced as high
as 540,000.
Some 300,000 to 400,000 people were uprooted
in northern Uganda. and about U0.000 to 150.000 in
the southwest region. Perhaps thousands of others were
temporarily displaced in northeastern Uganda by danbil!
ied violence there.
Aid agencies suuggled against security problems
and funding shortfalls to assist the country's huge displaced
population. UNICEF reported that its financial
appeals for programs in Uganda in 1999 were among its
most underfunded in the world, with less than one-fifth
of the needed donations. Insufficient funds prevented
the World Health Organization from conducting comprehensive
he:ilth assessments of the country's internal
displacement camps .
The UN World Food Program (WFP) reported in
mid-year that international donors had provided less than
half of r.he 59,000 tons of food aid needed throughout
the country. UN agencies complained in November of a
"genenlly poor donor response" to the country's humanitarian
needs.
The majority of families displaced in the north
were uprooted prior to 1999 and have been unable to
return home for fear of renewed attacks by the LRA and
other guerrillas. Up to SO percent of the population in
Gulu District remained displaced.
Since 1996. the government has moved tens of
thousands of northern families into about 30 so-called
"protected villages.· Some residents moved into the
camps voluntarily. while others resisted and were forced
into the sites by government security personnel.
The "protected camps" provided poor security
for inhabitants and instead became a target for rebel attacks.
resulting in the deaths, mutilation. and abduction
of displaced persons. In late 1999, LRA raids forced some
10,000 people to flee from a poorly protected displacement
camp.
Humanitarian conditions in the camps were difficult.
Many camp residents, cut off from their homes
and livelihoods. lived in abject poverty. Government
soldiers at some sites prevented displaced persons from
traveling more than two miles (three km) beyond their
camp, thus limiting acce.~s to farm land and other economic
opportunities. Camp residents often lived under
a 10 p.m. curfew.
Uprooted northern Ugandans complained that
designated camps offered poor services. Primary schools
were overcrowded and secondary schools rarely e::cisted.
Families complained that life in the camps encouraged
juvenile delinquency and was destroying social values.
Residents and local human rights organizations corn-
126
plained of harassment and other abuses by government
soldiers sr.ationcd at the camps.
Because of diminished rebel activity in the north
in 1999, government officials gradu.illy began to loosen
rules governing the displacement camps. More residents
began to engage in agricultural activities on nearby land.
or to travel home during the day. Malnutrition levels
improved in the second halfof the year. UN aid workers
reported. Relief agencies were able to travel without miliwy
escoris as security improved. WFP planned foodfor-
work programs and school lunch projects.
UN agencies warned, howevet that some displaced
families in the north would be unable to go home
because oflandmines planted in their home areas. Years
of instability have left three-quarters of the schools and
health clinics dosed in the hardest hit areas of the north.
fn southwest Uganda, security and humanitarian
conditions deteriorated during 1999 as ADF rebels
mounted several offensives and government troops intensified
countertnsurgency efforts.
Rebel artacks "caused rapid and massive displacement
and re-displacement of the majoriry of the residents"
in some southwestern areas, UN aid workers reported.
Rebel raids uprooted SO.OOO to 70,000 people
during March-April and pushed an additional 10,000
persons frc,m their homes later in the year.
The newly uprooted families joined tens of thousands
of other persons displaced in previous years. Approximately
100.000 or more uprooted people congregated
at mc,re than 35 sites in and near the south western
town of Bundibugyo. which grew to five times its nor·
ma! size. An additional 20.000 or more people remained
uprooted in the nearby Kasese District.
The displaced population in southwestern
Uganda was 'scared, daumatized, and paranoid" after
years of reb,21 atrocities, aid workers reported. Rebels tar·
geted civilians, particularly residents of displacement
camps. ADF guerrillas killed five displaced persons in
March and .1bducted 15 uprooted peopfe in June. Many
other incidents were likely unreponed.
Smlriry at displacement camps improved slightly
after government military reinforcements arrived in the
second half of the year. Some camp residents began to
work and travel outside their camps during daylight hours.
Humanitarian aid agencies temporarily evacuated
from some southwestem locations in April because
of security problems. Although aid deliveries resumed
in May, WFP suspended its work in mid-December because
of nc:w rebel attacks near Bundibugyo town. A let·
ter by ADF guerrillas in December threatened to ambush
food deliveries to the area.
More than 70 displaced persons died in southwest
Uganda early in the year because of injuries and poor
health conditions, Mideciru Sans Fronrieres reported in
~tarch. Sorr.e camp residents contracted malaria. cholAFRICA
era. and diarrhea, according to local health workers.
Malnutrition rates were generally low, but nearly six percent
of all displaced children under age five suffered severe
malnutrition in the Bundibugyo area. UN aid workers
reported in October. However, rumors of starvation
among displaced persons in southwestem Uganda in
December were unfounded, aid agencies stated.
In northeastem Uganda's I<aramoja area, violence
among local people. known as Karamojong, left hun·
dreds dead in 1999 and triggered a government military
operation to quell the unrest The area has a long history
of violence linked to local cattle rustling. The number of
persons uprooted in the violence was unknown.
"The upsurge in violence in l<aramoja ... was met
largely with silence by the international community,• a
UN report stated.
Ugandan R£fugee:s Some 15,000 Ugandan refugees re·
mained in exile at the end of 1999. About two-thirds
fled the country many years ago and have remained longterm
refugees. Several thousand fled southwest Uganda
during 1999 to escape the attacks by insurgents.
Ugandan officials have halted the organized repatriation
of Ugandan refugees from Sudan s.ince mid-
1998 to review information about the identities of potential
returnees.
General Refugee Issues The nearly 200,000 refugees in
Uganda at the end of 19 9 9 were the largest refugee population
in the country in several years. Some 15.000 new
refugees entered the country during the year.
Uganda has practiced ·a liberal refugee policy·
for many years, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) stated in 1999. The government has anempted
to place refugees into settlements with access to rum land
and has tried to avoid placing refugee populations in
crowded camps. Most refugee sites have included food
aid, primary schools, training in literacy and occupational
skills. and small credit programs to encourage business
activities.
The government and UNHCR worked jointly
during 1999 to prepare a new refugee law that would
eventually strengthen the legal rights of refugees in
Uganda. and would clarify the government's asylum procedures.
UNHCR expressed hope that government authorities
might enact the new law in 2000.
Refugees from Sudan Large numbers of Sudanese refugees
have lived in northern Uganda for years because of
civil war in their own counuy. Refugee movements back
and forth across the border have become common. linked
to the level of violence in Sudan and rebel activity inside
Uganda.
About 10.000 new Sudanese refugees entered
Uganda during 1999. Many of the ne"'' Sudanese arrivals
came from neigh boring Congo-Kinshasa after civil war
and othertensions there made continued asylum untenable
in that country.
· 1he Sudanese refugee population lived in 25
designated senlemenu in northern Uganda and nearly
equaled the local population in some dist.riets. Nearly
90 percent had access to farm land. About 25,000 grew
enough food to become self-sufficient. Others continued
to receive partial food rations during the year. In
addition t,:, standard social services, aid workers provided
training projects in carpentry and honey-making.
Ugandan officials and UNHCR continued efforts
to help Sudanese refugees become economically selfreliant
and better integrated with local communities.
The program has attempted to increase refugees' agricultural
production and vocational skills. and give refugees
equal access to local schools, health clinics. and other
routine community services. UNHCR reported "substantial
progress in the implementation of the self-reliance
strategy" in 1999.
Security for refugee settlements and aid workers
remained a concern, as in previous years. Ugandan guerrillas
have killed more than 110 Sudanese refugees since
1996 and have abducted large numbers ofrefugee women
and children.
In June 1999, Ugandan rebels temporarily abducted
at least 20 refugees. UNHCR provided counseling
to fom1er abductees. ·victims are usually traumatized
and need immediate support: UNHCR reported.
Ugandan authorities arrested 31 Sudanese and Congolese
refugees for allegedly aiding Ugandan guerrillas.
In ,1ddition to securiry threats posed by Ugandan
rebels, a Sudanese rebel group, the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA). has routinely entered refugee
sites to conscript young men and women and to
retrieve deserters from their ranks, according to relief
workers. UNHCR issued strong protests to Ugandan
officials in an effort to gain their help in halting the
SPLA conscriptions.
lnsErurity has complicated humanitarian aid to
northern U~andan refugee sites for years. Seanity concerns
in 1999 prevented UNHCR from opening a new
settlement site that aid workers had prepared. As rebel
anacks dimi11ished in northern Uganda during the year.
highways became safer and aid agencies gained better
access to Sucianese refugee populations.
UNHCR reported no significant repauiation by
Sudanese tefogees during the year.
Refugees frc,m Congo-Kinshasa Some 6,000 refugees
from Congo-Kinshasa (also known as the Democratic
Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire) lived ac designated
refugee sites in Uganda at the end of 1999. About 3,000
new Congolese refugees arrived during the year as civil
war and ethnic hostilities continued in their own coun-
127
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f... • j
i 0
U.l. lUMMlTTEE FOR JlEFUGEES
try. Thousands of othe.rs reportedly fled to Uganda temporarily
before reruming rapidly to Congo-Kinshasa.
Ugandan soldiers forcibly repatriated several
hundred Congolese refugees on the final day of 1998 and
the first days of 1999 as UNHCR prepared to transport
them to a safer location farther from the border. Ugandan
3uthorities investigated the incident, and no similar
forced returns occurred. according to UNHCR. The refugee
agency subsequently transferred some 2.000 Congolese
refugees to safer sites beyond the border area.
Most Congolese refugees lived at the Nakivale
and Kyangwali sites in southern Uganda. Two-thirds of
the refugees had access to farm land. Aid projects emphasized
increased food production by refugee families
to make them more self-reliant
Rrfugees from Rwanda Some 8,000 Rwandan refugees
lived at the Oruchinga and Nakivale settlement sites in
southern Rwanda, including about 500 new refugees who
arrived in 1999. Most of the refugees received only partial
food rations because they were already partially selfsupponing;
only one-fourth of the refugees required full
rations.
Government officials and UNHCR charged that
60 Rwandans at Nakivale refugee settlement resided there
illegally because they were not genuine refugees or did
not qualify for refugee protection in Uganda. The 60
Rwandans were pan of a larger population of nearly 2,000
Rwandan asylum seekers who had entered Uganda after
several years of asylum in Tanzania. Ugandan officials
threatened to deport the Rwandans who had arrived via
Tanzania but reportedly no deportations occurred.
About 350 Rwandan refugees repauiated with
UNHCR assistance during the year. •
Western Sahara
An estimated 110,000 Western Saharan people were refugees
at the end of 1999: some 80,000 in Algeria, about
25,000 in Mauritania, and approximately 5,000 in other
count:ries.
Pre-1999 Events Residents of Western Sahara, known
as ethnic Sahrawis, began fleeing to Algeria in the mid!
970s because of a war for control over Western Sahara.
The war initially pitted both Morocco and
Mauritania against armed Sahrawis known as the
Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia
el Hamra and Rio de Oro) . Mauritania eventually renounced
its claim to Western Sahara, but Morocco and
the Polisario continued to fight for control of the territory.
In 1988, the two sides agreed to support a national
referrndum in Western Sahara to determine
128
whether the territory should be independent or incorporated
imo Morocco.
A United Nations peacekeeping force arrived in
Western Sahara in 1991 to monitor tlle cease-fire between
Morocco and the Polisario and to supervise preparations
for the scheduled 1992 referendum.
Preparations for the referendum became seriously
stalled. however. Moroccan authorities and the
Polisario disagreed over which populations should be
eligible to vote. The Polisario and many international
observers charged that Moroccan leaders were attempting
to pad the voter list with non-Sahrawis to tilt the referendum
in Morocco's favor.
A. UN-brokered agreement on voter eligibility in
1997 temporarily raised hopes that Sahrawi refugees
could repatriate and vote in a referendum during 1998.
Additional disagreements regarding voter eligibility
blocked progress. however.
lmpuse In 1999 No Sahrawi refugees repatriated during
1999. By year's end, UN officials announced that
continued disagreements over voter eligibility would
likely delay the referendum until 2002.
Procedures lo identify eligible voters, a process
that began in 1994. resumed during the second half of
1999 after an eight-month suspension. UN officials
screened more than 40,000 people during the year; some
190,000 persons have been screened since 1994.
The UN published a provisional list of SS.OOO
eligible voters in July. Some 40,000 persons judged ineligible
by the UN screening process filed appeals to have
their cases reconsidered. The large number of appeals
overwhelmed UN staff in the region.
'Toe prospect of holding the referendum within
a reasonable period of time, instead of becoming closer,
has become even more distant," the UN secretary general
lamented in December.
The UN Security Council grudgingly extended
the 300-strong peacekeeping and monitoring force in
Western Sahara throughout the year, at a cost of :54 million
per month.
Continued paralysis in the peace process left
Sahrawi refugees preparing for a repatriation that many
realized would not occur soon. The UN Security Council.
in a fur.ile effort to create momentum toward a solution,
urged Morocco and Polisario in March "to move
ahead with the nece:ssary discussions· to repatriate refugees.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) continued its prolonged planning for eventual
repatriation. Moroccan officials granted official
recognition to UNHCR in January so that r.he agency
could begin repatriation planning inside Western Sahara.
UNHCR conducted two assessment trips to
Western Sahara during the year to collect information
.
' I •
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UCMANNEXt
AGHEEMENT FOH A CEASEFIRE IN TIIE llEi\10CHATIC HEl'UBLJC CF CONGO
I l'OLJTICAL COMMITTEE
. 6,... OUDJNARYMEETING :. I LUSAKA, zAMmA ·
I 8 - 9 -JUNE, ,2000. I
:;'
;
/j
:i :,
j_ : .
MECHANJSMS FOR DJSARMJNG, TR1CKJNG AND QUARTERJNG I
OF ARMED GROUPS AS WELL AS PROCEDURES FOR HA Nm NG I
OVER MASS ·J<JLLERS, PERPETRATORS OF CRJMES AGAJN~T I
HlJJ\1Al\TJT'rAND- OTHER- WAlr-cml\1 JN"AL$ . AND ELABORATION -
OF PROCEDURES OF ))]SARMAMENT OF ALL · CONGOLESE
1
,
CIVJLIANS WHO ARE ILLEGALLY ARMED! · ·
... .. <:..·
·:. ,!..... . .,_,r
•, ~ ...
'·.
.;:. .. ,
: •.· '
. ···~ __ ...;,.·, ··.!
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Amended and adopted by the Political Committee at its 6'h Session
. . · ,., -.. .. .. ~\ ····
· ... :.-·
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:.. __ j: .. :' '
._· .. :·:
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I
I
I
i
· AGREEMENT FORA CEASEFIRE IN THE DEMOCRAT.IC
REPPBLIC OF CONGO
POLITICAL COMMIITEE
6™ ORDINARY MEETING
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA
8 - 9 JUNE, 2000.
MECHANISMS FOR DISARMING, TRACKiNG AND
QUARTERING OF ARMED GROUPS AS WELL AS PROCEDURES
FOR HANDING OVER MASS KILLERS, PERPETRATORS OF
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND OTHER WAR CRIMINALS
AND ELABORATION OF PROCEDURES OF DISARMAMENT OF
.ALL CONGOLESE CIVILIANS WHO ARE ILLEGALLY ARMED.
The Joint Military Commission (hereinafter to as the JMC), at its~3'd Session
in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 29 November to 04 December, 1999.
CONSIDERING the Agreement for a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic
of Congo in particular Article III, paragraphs l la and b; 21 and 22;
FURTHER CONSIDERING the provisions of Chapters 7,8 and 9 of Annex
A to the Agreement in particular 7:4 (f, g and h), 8:2.1 (h) and 8:2.2 (a-e)
and those of Annex C to the Agreement;
·' · ·- - COGNISANT of paragraph 5.of Decision N9. 2 of the JMC;
AW ARE that Burundi, which is aiso a victim to acts of the armed groups
referred to in the Agreement is not represented on the JMC;
HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
1
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AMENDED AND ADOPTEl BY THE POUTICAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 6™ SESSION
I. DISARMING, TRACKING AND QUARTERING OF ARMED
GROUPS
I.I The process of disarming, tracking and quartering of armed groups
shall be carried out in eight (8) stages, viz,:
1.1. l. Identification
1.1.2. Verification
1.1.3. Disarming
1.1.4. Quartering
1.1.5. Amnesty
1.1.6. Tracking
1.1. 7. Repatriation
1.1.8. Reintegration
1.2 IDENTIFICATION
1.2.1 The methods used for identification of armed groups shall
include declarations by the Parties, declarations -by armed
groups and intelligence information gathered from prisoners of
war, the civil population, local authorities, police and any other
sources that will be available.
1.2.2 Each Party to the Agreement shall be required to declare:
a. All armed groups operating in the territory under its control;
and
>.: \ . '
b. ' All armed grbups; even if allied to it, whether or riot operating.:
in the territory under its control which, to its knowledge, are
operating anywhere on the DRC territory.
1.2.3. The declarations envisaged shall, among others, indicate, if
known,
a. The name or names of the armed groups;
2
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AMENDED AHO ADOPTED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTt:E AT ITS 6111 SESSION
b. TI1e period for which the groups have been m existence or
operation or both;
c. The Political objectives and organisation of the groups;
d. The military command, structure and organisation of the groups
e. Their positions and locations from time to time;
f. Information on the groups' allegiance and/or alliances;
g. The strength of the armed groups;
h. The types and quantities of arms m their possession or
. ownership; .. ··· · - ··- --·····-··-··--·-
1. Details of any other equipment and property belonging t.o the
groups.
1.2.4 In the case of Burundi, the same shall provide information
concerning the FDD and any other armed groups operating on the
DRC territory.
1.3 VERIFICATION
\:.-,; ,\, L3. l · The' following methods shall be used to verify infonnation
received from the Parties concerning the armed groups.
a. Physical checks of the declared groups by a force to be
established by the JMC, UN and OAU.
b. Spot checks by the force in 1.3.1 (a) above, of suspected
positions of groups which have not been declared,
including positions of any the Parties.
3
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AMENDED AND ADOPTED BY THE POLIT1CAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 6™ SESSION
c. Any other means, including technical means, used to
obtain information or such additional information on
armed groups as may be provided by any of the Parties
subsequent to the declarations.
d. It is understood that none of the methods shall involve
the use of coercive measures in contravention of the
Geneva Conventions.
e. Burundi shall be invited to participate as and when
necessary.
1.3.2 The JMC together with the UN and the OAU are encouraged to
develop independent information gathering capacity with a
view to promoting the effective enforcement of the provisions
of the Cease-fire Agreement relating to verification of the .
anned groups.
I .4 DISARMING
1.4.1 Di sarming of the identified armed groups shall involve:
a. Taking possession or arms and ammunitions and 2ny
other weapon of war including traditional weapons like
spears, machetes, bows and arrows;
b , · · Establishing and securing the centres for the collection of.
arms ammunition;
c. Recording the quantities and types or arms and weapons
in 1.4.J (a) above.
d. Securing the surrendered weapons;
e. Establishing and securing of ammunition dumps;
4
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AMENDED AND ADOPTED BY THE POLJllCAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 611t SESSION
f. Any other action regarding the disposal of the weapons;
1.4.2. The mechanisms and modalities for disarmament shall be
determined by the JMC in conjunction with the UN and the
OAU. The Parties to whom the anned groups owe allegiance
and or alliance are encouraged to take the initial step in
disarming the identified armed group. Parties should not take it
upon themselves to regularise the identified armed groups into
their main armed forces.
1.4.3. Where the Party experiences difficulties in disarn~ing the arnied
group, the Parties should be notified so that other methods can
be looked at. These may include the formation of a Joint Task
Force to carry out the exercise.
1.4.4. The Parties either through theJMC or its local body will do.the
verification of the disarmament.
1.4.5. The Parties undertake not to hinder in any way whatsoever the
disarmament effort.
1.4.6. Bun.1m!i shall be invited to participate and when necessary.
1.5 QUARTERING
1.5.1 This shall mean the establishment of a camping area large
enough to hold temporary quarters for up to 1 OOO persons.
These selected areas have the basic necessities required for-the
humane occupation of the quartered groups.
1.5.2 The designated quartering areas shall be made accessible to the
Humanitarian Organisations for the provision of any needed
humanitarian assistance.
5
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AMENDED AND ADOPTED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 6™ SESSION
1.5.3 As much as possible, the families of the members of the armed
groups to be quartered shall not be · accommodated in the
quartering areas.
1.5.4 The rules and regulations of the quartering area shall be agreed
upon jointly by the Parties.
1.5.5 The designated areas should not be for a period longer than one
month, within which time the quartered group should either be
repatriated or reintegrated in society.
1.5.6 Quartering of the armed groups shall involve :
a. Confirmation and documentation of the selected
. quartering areas.
b. Documentation and assembly of the groups i_n ~esignated
centres;
c. Securing the designated centres in 1.5.6 (a) above;
d. Provision of Humanitarian relief;
e. With the exception of suspected "genocidaires"(genocide
forces), repatriation of members of the armed groups and
their families to their countries of origin or choice of
political asylum.
.. . ; • , ..· .. ..
1.5.7. The Parties shall agree upon quartering areas jointly.
1.6 AMNESTY
1.6.1 . The Parties should create conditions conducive for the return to
their respective countries and granting of amnesty to those not
suspected of involvement in genocide and crimes against
humanity.
6
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AMENDED AND ADOPTED BY THE POLmCAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 6"' SESSION
1.6.2. The Congolese may consider the issue of amnesty after the
results of the National Dialogue and the establishment of a new
political dispensation in the DRC.
1.7 . TRACKING
1. 7 .1 The UN has the primary responsibility and obligation to track
down anned groups in the Congolese ten-itory.
1.7.2 The JMC, the UN and the OAU shall determine the practical
modalities for tracking anned groups still at large after receipt
of the relevant infonnation including information from
Burundi.
1.8 REPATRIATION
1.8.1. The Parties shall create conditions conducive for the
repatriation of both its military and civilian citizeris."
1.8.2. The UN shall work out the modalities for the repatriation.
1.9 INTEGRATION
1.9.1 . The Parties shail <::reate conditions conducive for the
reintegration of its citizens into society.
1.9.2. The UN, through its humanitarian agenr,ies, shall work out the
· modalities of assistance to persons being integrated in society.
2. PROCEDURES FOR HANDING OVER MASS KILLERS,
GENOCIDAIRE AND PERPETRATORS OF CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY AND OTHER WAR CRIMINALS
2.1 The JMC together with the UN and the OAU shall lay down the
guidelines for the identification and apprehension of know
individuals suspected to be responsible for genocide, war
7
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AMENDED AND ADOPTED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 61H SESSION
crimes and crimes against humanity. Identification lists of the
suspects should be prepared before their confinemerit and
submitted to the JMC; which lists shall be regularly updated.
2.2 Immediately after confinement, screening of mass killers shall
be carried out and suspects shall be immediately apprehended,
documented by the UN and surrendered to the appropriate
International Crimes Tribunal or national courts depending on
jurisdiction.
2.3 Identification and apprehension of suspect~. shall be a
continuous exercise.
2.4 Burundi will be invited to participate in the exercise where
appropriate.
3. DISARMING OF ALL CONGOLESE CIVILIANS -WHO ARE ILLEGALLY
ARMED
3.1 Parties shall be required to furnish information regarding the
Congolese civilians who are illegally armed. This information
shall include the following:
a. The number of civilians who received arms illegally;
b. Areas where the arms were obtained/distributed;
c. The types and quantities of arms which are in illegal
possession;
d. The leadership of the civilian groups or organisations to
whom arms were distributed.
3.2. Congolese civilians who are illegally armed should be
encouraged to voluntarily surrender their arms through
awareness campaigns to be conducted by local leaders.
8
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AMENDED AND ADOPTED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 6lll SESSION
3.3. The JMC in conjunction with the UN and the OAU should
gather information to identify civilians in unlawful possession
of arms.
· 3.4. An amnesty should be considered for civilians surrendering
arms voluntarily.
3.5. The JMC together with the UN and the OAU shall work out
modalities for tracking down or disarming civilians who so not
surrender their arms voluntarily.
9
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AMENDED AND ADOPTED BYntE POUTICAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 6™ SESSION
-----·- · · - .
United Nations
w(~\ Security Council Fifty-fifth year .
President:
Members:
Agenda
00-48158 (E)
4156th meeting
Thursday, 15 June 2000, 11.30 a.m.
New York
Mr. Levitte . . . ... . . . . . ........ ... . ............... .
Argentina . .... . . .. . .. .. ... . ...... . .. . . . .. ...... .
Bangladesh .... . . . ..... . ........ .. ....... . .. .. .. .
Canada • ... . .. .. . .... ....... . . ..... ... . ........ .
China ... .. .. .. . . . ..... . . . .................. . . . .
Jamaica . . .. . . . . .. ... . .. ..... . .. . .......... . .... .
Malaysia . ....... .... .. . ... . ... . ... .. ........... .
Mali .. ... ............ . .. .. ... .. . .... . . . ....... .
Namibia . ...... . ..... ... . ............ . . .. .... . . .
Netherlands . ... . ....... . .. .. . ... . ..... . ....... . . .
Russian Federation . .. , . . . .. .. ... .. .. . .. . .. . . . .. . . .
Tunisia ..... ... ...... .. .. .. ..... , . • ... , .. . . , ... .
Ukraine . ...... . ... . ... .... . ..... . .. . . . . .. . . .... .
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ... .
United States of America . . .... . .. . .. . ............. .
(France)
Mr. Cappagli
Mr. Chowdhury
Mr. Duval
Mr. Wang Yingfan
Mr. Ward
Mr. Hasmy
Mr. Ouane
Mr. Gurirab
Mr. van Walsum
Mr. Granovsky
Mr. Ben Mustapha
Mr. Yel'chenko
Mr. Eldon
Mr. Holbrooke
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature ofa member of the
delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.
11111 II Ill II Ill II 111111111111111 Ill 1111111111
UCMANNEX<
S/PV.4156
Provisional
S/PV.4156
The meeting was called to order at 12:05 p.m.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
The President (spoke in French): In accordance
with the understanding reached in the Council's prior
consultations, I propose to invite the members of the
Political Committee for the Implementation of the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, as well as Zambia, the
Representative of the current Chairman of the
Organization of · African Unity and the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to participate in this
meeting.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules
of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Abdelkader
Messahel, Special Envoy of the President of the
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Mr.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, current Chairman of the
Organization of Africa Unity, to take a seat at the
Council table.
Al the invitation of the President, Mr. Messahel
(Algeria) took a seal at the Council table.
The Preside11t (spoke in French): I invite the
Vice-Minister for External Relations of Angola, His
Excellency Mr. George Chicoti, to take a seat at the
Council table.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Chicoti
(Angola) look a seal al the Council table.
The President (spoke in French): I invite the
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
His Excellency Mr. Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi, to
take a seat at the Council table.
2
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ndombasi
(Democratic Republic of the Congo) took a seat
at the Council table.
The President (spoke in French): I invite the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation
of Rwanda, His Excellency Mr. Andre Sumaya, to take
a seat at the Council table.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. 811maya
(Rwanda) took a seat at the Council table.
The President (spoke in French): I invite the
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and for Regional
Cooperation of Uganda and Chairman of the Political
Committee, His Excellency Mr. Amama Mbabazi, to
take a seat at the Council table.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mbabazi
(Uganda) took a seat at the Council table.
The President (spoke in French): I invite the
Minister for Presidential Affairs of Zambia, His
Excellency Mr. Eric Silwamba, to take a seat at the
Council table.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Silwamba
(Zambia) took a seat at the Council table.
The President (spoke in French): I invite the
Charge d'affaires· of the Permanent Mission of
Zimbabwe, His Excellency Mr. Misheck Muchetwa, to
take a seat at the Council table.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Muchetwa
(Zimbabwe) took a seat at the Council table.
The President (spoke in French): I welcome the
presence at the Council table of His Excellency Mr.
Theo-Ben Gurirab, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Namibia and President of the General Assembly, who
represents the last of the States signatories to the
Lusaka Agreement and whose country is also a member
of the Security Council.
In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's
provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Dominique
Kanku, Head of External Relations of the Movement
for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), to take a seat at
the Council table.
I invite Mr. Claver Pashi, head of the delegation
of the RCD-ML to take a seat at the Council table.
I would like to inform the Council that Mr. Emile
llunga, head of the delegation of the RCD-Goma, who
at this moment is still on an aeroplane, will be joining
us this afternoon.
j'
I now invite Mr. Kamel Morjane, Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to take a seat at the
Council table.
I should like to acknowledge and welcome the
presence of the Secretary-General at this important
meeting.
The Security Council will now begin its
consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is
meeting in accordance with the understanding reached
in its prior consultations.
As President of the Security Council, I now have
the honour of addressing the Council as well as the
members of the Political Committee.
I should like warmly to welcome the Ministers
members of the Political Committee for the
Implementation of the Lusaka Agreement; the Minister
for Presidential Affairs of Zambia; the Special Envoy
of the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU); and Mr. Kamel Morjane, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General.
I should like, with the agreement of the
Secretary-General, to ask the Special Representative to
convey to all of the observers and teams now working
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, our feelings
of admiration and solidarity. They are doing admirable
work in particularly difficult conditions. I hope that
Mr. Morjane will express to them, on behalf of the
Council, the extent of our admiration for them.
I would particularly like to thank the SecretaryGeneral
for his presence here. He has delayed his
departure on an· important trip to the Middle East so as
to be here today. I would also like to thank him for his
full and courageous report, which will enlighten our
work and serve as a work of reference.
Those present will recall that the idea for this
meeting came out of a meeting that took place on 6
May in Lusaka between the members of the Political
Committee for the Implementation of the Lusaka
Agreement and the seven members of the Security
Council who undertook the Council's first-ever visit to
Africa. That 6 May meeting followed the Security
Council meeting that was held in this Chamber on 24
January, attended by representatives of the countries
signatories to the Lusaka Agreemenl. Ambassador
Holbrooke took the initiative to hold that dialogue. The
dialogue between the Security Council and the
S/PV.4156
signatories to the Lusaka Agreement attests to the will
of the Council to actively respond each time the United
Nations is called upon to contribute to a settlement of a
crisis in Africa.
The United Nations is not abandoning Africa. On
the contrary, as we are aware, the main part of the
Security Council's agenda is devoted to Africa.
However, it must be said that the context that we find
ourselves in today is particularly difficplt. It is
difficult, first of all, because the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone is now confronting serious
problems. It is also difficult because everyon!' has in
mind the war being waged between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, which has inflicted suffering on .two peoples
and caused heavy losses to the two countries involved
in the conflict. Of course, each crisis has its own
specific characteristics, but we must be aware that the
difficulties in Sierra Leone are causing reluctance on
the part of the troop-contributing countries to commit
themselves in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
What kind of analysis can we make today of the
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
One very positive element is the fact that there have
been genuine efforts on the part of all the countries of
the region to achieve a settlement - the Lusaka
Agreement. I would like to pay tribute to the
outstanding role that President Chiluba of Zambia
played in that respect. The Lusaka Agreement was
signed almost one year ago, on JO July 1999. The
Agreement provided for a settlement of the crisis in
360 days. Where are we now, almost two years after
the beginning of the conflict and almost one year after·
the signing of the Lusaka Agreement?
Unquestionably, efforts have been made in the
right direction. On the part of the belligerents
themselves, a ceasefire was declared, and a
disengagement agreement was concluded on 8 April in
Kampala. Here in New York, the United Nations
fulfilled its part of the contract. The Security Council
decided, on 24 February last, on the establishment of
the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), with
SOO military observers and a force of 5,000.
Unfortunately, despite that unquestionable progress, the
bad news has been increasing, and today the · global
balance sheet is dramatically negative in five areas.
First, hostilities are continuing. They are
continuing in the province of Equateur. They resumed
3
S/PV.4156
there at the end of last year and have been taking place
on a regular basis ever since. Fighting has also been
continuing in Kasai since March. There has been
uninterrupted violence in Kivu. Finally, in Kisangani,
fighting broke out in August last year, at the beginning
of May and again, in a particularly bloody manner, at
the beginning of this month.
Secondly, the cost in human life of this conflict is
ever higher. The Secretary-General's report has
emphasized the tragic situation of the displaced
persons and the enormous food needs. We are receiving
information through non-governmental organizations
and religious organizations regarding violence and
massacres, particularly in Kivu. These organizations
are also indicating to us that there are inter-ethnic
clashes in the north-east.
Last week the international press published the
results of a study by humanitarian organizations, which
says that in two years of war, 1.7 million individuals
have perished in the east of the Congo. They have been
the victims of massacres, or have died attempting to
flee violence, or have perished because humanitarian
assistance could not reach them due to conditions of
insecurity. We are not trying to get into a war of
statistics and figures here, but we are trying to see
reality as it is. For two years now, hundreds of
thousands of deaths have been recorded in the · eastern
provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Thirdly, as regards the process of reconciliation
between the Congolese themselves, the national
dialogue provided for by the Lusaka Agreement
remains blocked. To be sure, the facilitator of the
national dialogue, selected by the Congolese parties,
with the assistance of the OAU, has made some
preliminary assessments. Preliminary consultations
have taken place. The Security Council, which
welcomed the facilitator in New York in .January and
again in April, expressed its full support to him, and
we will be having a meeting · tomorrow with his
representative, Minister Archibald Mogwe.
But today the Council is deeply concerned by the
impasse in the national dialogue and by the lack of
cooperation on the part of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo with the facilitator.
The events in Cotonou are particularly alarming to us.
The settlement of the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo must be based on genuine
4
reconciliation among the Congolese within the
framework of the national dialogue.
Fourthly, the lack of security and the parties' lack
of goodwill is hampering the deployment of MONUC.
The continuation of hostilities is endangering the
deployment of phase II of the Mission. The failure on
the part of the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to respect the commitments undertaken in
the framework of the status-of-forces agreement, but
also on the part of the rebels through their blocking of
the movements of the force, is unacceptable. This runs
counter to the commitments that have been undertaken.
Finally, the recent manifestations of hostility to
MONUC in Kinshasa are not acceptable. The United
Nations is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
help bring about peace, and the United Nations must be
helped in turn.
Fifthly, the resumption of hostilities on 5 June
between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani
was a brutal aggravation of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. These hostilities
seemed to toll the bell for the Lusaka Agreement; they
pitted two formerly friendly countries against each
other. The particularly unjustifiable nature of the
confrontations between two foreign armies on the soil
of a third country - namely, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo - must be emphasized. These hostilities
have caused numerous Congolese civilian casualties.
At least 300 have died and 1,500 have been wounded.
Two foreign military presences, motivated by security
reasons, are today becoming a major source of
insecurity.
I must state that these events have deeply shocked
the entire international community and prompted an
immediate and unanimous response: "Enough fighting.
Withdraw your forces from Kisangani. Implement
immediately the Agreement that your Presidents
concluded in the presence of the Security Council
members."
We sec perfectly well that we are now at a
decisive moment. In his report to the Council on
Tuesday, the Secretary-General set the tone, and
everyone is familiar with that report. The war must
cease immediately, he told us, and he is right. With
regard to Kisangani, from bad events perhaps
something good can emerge. The tragedy of Kisangani
must serve for all of us as an electric shock that will
trigger the total, rapid, even accelerated
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. That
Agreement remains our touchstone. At this moment, I
express the hope that all of the prisoners of war will be
released even before the end of our work, to
demonstrate that, yes, the will docs exist, anJ lhat
movement in the right direction is possible.
On behalf of the Security Council, I say to the
members of the Political Committee for the
Implementation of the Lusaka Agreement who have
come to join us in New York that we hope to consider
the situation in depth with you. We hope together to
provide a new impetus to the Lusaka peace process and
to find a way, with you as partners, to overcome the
present crisis. You had hoped that the United Nations
would be your partner, and we have agreed to be that
partner. Together, during these two days, let us take the
necessary decisions. Let us restore hope, and let us
bring peace to the people of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and to all of the peoples of Central Africa
who are waiting so desperately for that peace. Together
Jct us manifest that will. As our British friends say,
{.5pokc in English)
"Where there is a will, there is a way".
(spoke in French)
I now give the noor to I lis Excellency Mr.
Amama Mbabazi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
and Regional Cooperation of Uganda in his capacity as
Chairman of the Political Committee.
Mr. Mbabazi (Uganda): On behalf of the
Political Committee and on my own behalf, I wish to
express our gratitude to you, Mr. President, to the
members of the Security Council delegation who
visited our region last month, and to the Security
Council as a whole for the invitation it extended to the
Political Committee to come to New York to share
information and exchange views on the process of
pacification of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
S/PV.4156
including the United Nations, as the best formula for
the resolution of the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
The Agreement addresses the two dimensions of
the conflict - that is, the internal Congolese political
question and the regional security concerns of the
Congo itself and those of its neighbours. It provides,
among other things, for the cessation of hostilities; the
creation of a new political dispensation in the Congo
through inter-Congolese political negotiations; the
disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and
reintegration of all of the armed groups in the Congo;
and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. It further
provides for the normalization of the situation at the
borders of the Congo with a view to stopping any illicit
trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups
across the borders. '
The United Nations was requested, in pursuance
of its duty to maintain international peace and security,
to take charge of the implementation of the Agreement.
The parties also created the Joint Military Commission
(JMC), where they arc all represented, to develop this
process of implementation.
Although, as you correctly observed, Mr.
President, the timetable for the implementation of the
Agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 by the States
parties and in August by the armed Congolese
rebellion, has not been met, the Agreement has held,
the various violations, many of which you referred to,
Mr. President, notwithstanding. These violations
occurred largely because the mechanism the Agreement
put in place to manage the implementation process has
to date not been fully operationalized.
The United Nations initially adopted what
appeared to be a very cautious approach to its
involvement in this implementation process. The
Political Committee was therefore delighted when last
January the Security Council decided to pay great
attention to the conflict in the Congo, a process that has
culminated in our meeting with the Council today.
We come with the hope and confidence that this
interaction will result in greater and faster engagement
of the United Nations in this process, for which the
people of Congo and the region have waited so long.
The Agreement for a ceasefire in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, popularly known as the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement, was freely negotidtcd, agreed
and signed by all the then belligerents. It was
welcomed and adopted by the ·intcrnational community,
We appreciated very deeply the visit of the
Security Council delegation, led by Richard Holbrooke,
to the region last month. For the first time we felt that,
as a result of that visit, a partnership between us and
the United Nations had begun in earnest. We therefore
have come to New York in that spirit of partnership in
the continuing dialogue, begun on 6 May in Lusaka, on
how to quickly and realistically achieve our commonly
s
S/PV,4156
shared desire to bring peace not only to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo but to the region as a whole.
The Political Committee, working together with
the Joint Military Commission and the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUC), under the able and dedicated
leadership of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, Ambassador Kamel Morjane, and
his staff, has laid the groundwork for the
implementation of the Lusaka accord. We adopted on 8
April last in Kampala the plan for the disengagement
and redeployment of forces in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Although its timetable has not been fully
met, sub-plans for the disengagement of forces in each
area were prepared, but they could not be finalized
because the JMC and MONUC lack the resources
required to carry out verification of the information
given by each party.
We look forward to discussing this question of
lack of resources with the Council during our visit
here, so that we can overcome this debilitating
limitation to the process of implementation. We expect
that when the planning teams of the JMC and MONUC
have verified the information given to them by each
party and new defensive positions have been agreed,
then the forces will begin to disengage to create the 30-
kilometre-wide disengagement zone.
The Political Committee. at its last meeting in
Lusaka, considered and adopted mechanisms for the
disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and
reintegration of members of all of the armed groups.
On the question of the release and exchange of
prisoners of war, the Political Committee requested the
parties concerned to expedite the process by quickly
complying with the requirements of the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. I hav·e reliablc
information that all of the parties ·liave since
done so. I should expect the release and exchange of
prisoners of war to commence by the end of this week.
I share the Council's optimism that this could begin
even in the course of our deliberations here in New
York.
On the issue of the inter-Congolese political
negotiations, the national dialogue has not commenced.
The Political Committee, however, welcomed the
holding of the preparatory meeting in Cotonou, Benin,
on 6 June, as a positive step in the right direction. The
Committee expressed its appreciation to Sir Ketumile
6
Masire for his efforts in facilitating the national
dialogue and called on all of the Congolese to honour
their obligations under the Agreement.
It is clear that the implementation of Lusaka has
not gone according to the plan we originally worked
out. Indeed, the Political Committee recognizes that
there are enormous challenges to the implementation of
this accord. The most recent challenge - which you
referred to, Mr. President - was the fighting in
Kisangani between the Rwandan and Ugandan forces.
The Committee expressed its concern over this
regrettable development, and, while welcoming the
efforts to bring the situation in Kisangani back to
normal, called on Rwanda and Uganda to immediately
bring an end to the fighting and to implemeni the
agreement between them for the demilitarization of
Kisangani. I am glad to inform the Council that the
fighting has since stopped.
The Political Committee restates the reaffirmation
by our leaders last January of our strong commitment
to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and reiterates our
determination for its full and expeditious
implementation. All we ask of the United Nations and
the in ternational community as a whole is that they
lend us their unqualified support in the implementation
of this accord, which we freely reached among
ourselves.
The President (spoke in French): I now give the
floor to Mr. Richard I lolbrooke, Permanent
Representative of the United States, who headed the
Security Council mission to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and who undertook the laudable initiative
of holding the summit of 24 January in this very
Chamber.
Mr. Holbrooke (United States of America): I
thank the Secretary-General for joining us today.
I thank you, Mr. President of the General
Assembly, for descending from the high podium to join
us to represent your own country. It is an honour to
have two Presidents in the room today, you and
Ambassador Levitte. I take your presence here as being
of enormous significance to all of us.
I would like to express to you, Ambassador
Levitte - the President of the Security Council - our
country's very great appreciation for the leadership that
you and France have taken on behalf of peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
S/PV.4156
I want to thank all of our friends and colleagues Thirty-six days ago, Mr. President, you and I
from the Lusaka process, who hosted us with such were in the region with out colleagues from Great
graciousness and generosity in Lusaka on 6 and 7 May, Britain, the Netherlands, Mali, Tunisia and Namibia on
for again making the long journey to New York. Their behalf of the entire Security Council. We were greatly
presence here represents their conuni1n1ent to filiding a honoured to represent all of you, and I think we did a
solution to the problems of the Congo. I hope that the fairly good job in carrying the weight of the United
world, which is focused on those problems, Nations into the Great Lakes. However, J am not sure
understands that everyone is here voluntarily to help where we are today. Nonetheless, I do note that the
solve them. · delegation - comprised of three African nations, three
I am particularly honoured in that regard to speak European nations and one country from neither Europe
after my friend, Minister Amama Mbabazi of Uganda, nor Africa, the United States - symbolized our
one of the most distinguished statesmen of Africa · common commitment. I would stress again that the
whom I have now had the pleasure to work with reason that the Latin American and Asian
increasingly in recent months and whose speech representatives were not with us was that they had gone
deserves careful perusal by all ofus. to Kosovo on a parallel mission. · .
And, of course, I am delighted at the presence of When you decided last month to convene today's
the other representatives in the Chamber, and of the meeting, Mr. President, we had anticipated that we
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, could build momentum. But the events of the lut two
'."-mbassador Morjane, who is doing an extremely good weeks have changed the nature of this meeting.
Job under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Let me start, as you did, Sir, with Kisangani, and
let me be honest with my friends from both Rwanda
and Uganda. There is no excuse for what happened in
Kisangani. Thero was no excuse when the fighting
began around 3 or 4 May. The immediate cessation of
that fighting, after the 8 May ceasefire negotiated by
the Security Council, was promising, but in the last few
weeks the fighting resumed with an extraordinarily
h!gh level of intensity, leav.ing hundreds of people
k1lh:J o111J 1huuso1nJs wuunJcd unJ causing enormous
damage to the infrastructure of Kisangani - damage
that the international community will have to pay to
clean up, otherwise it will not be done, thereby
diverting resources from long-term reconstruction and
~ssential health and education needs. That resumption
1s one of the most troubling things I have ever seen in
my career in diplomacy. I am talking now not about the
.initial fighting, but about the resumption of fighting a
few weeks ago.
This is an important day for all of us, as we
proceed with this long odyssey. Although Minister
Mbabazi was gracious in referring to the American
month, in January, discussions really began earlier than
th~t: I ~ant to pay tribute to the presidency of the
British m the month of December, and to Sir Jeremy
Greenstock and Ambassador Eldon, for starting the
process. This 11rocess has now gone on for manv
months. Lei the world sec thal the United Nations is
not turning away from Africa, and let the world sec
that there is no double standard. Africa is at the centre
of our attention. This is doubly true, as today as we are
~caling ~imultaneously with two other major African
issues: ~terra Leone and the Ethiopia/Eritrea problem.
There will be separate meetings going on concurrently
on the latter issue, in conjunction with the Organization
of African Unity (OAU).
But the problems remain, and they have become
m?r~ serious in rec~n.t days _in _at least two areas, as
Mmtsler Mbabazi's comments mad,: clear. The people
of the Co!1go a~c looking to us to help find a way out of
the hell m wluch they have been living for so long.
They.look lo us to help them build lives not defined by
conflict. There have been a lot of statements in recent
months about how the people of the Congo need peace
but these statements - many of them made her;
around this historic horseshoe in this historic
I agree with Minister Mbabazi that there is now a
ceasefire in place and that we have to lock it in. But it
Is a fragile ceasefire, and as the Secretary-General has
so correctly warned us in meeting after meeting, we are
facing a gap between the ceaesfire, which took effect a
few days ago, and the arrival of any peacekeeping
forces. We must be honest with ourselves: it is more
difficult now lo get peacekeeping forces than ii was a
few weeks ago precisely because of the events in
Chamber - have not yet been acted on. Kisangani. It is more dangerous. It is more
. problematical. Governments and their populations have
7
S/PV.4156
more reservations. And it will be harder to fund those
efforts because of what happened in Kisangani. So let
us be honest about that in this Chamber.
I personally am not interested in a court of
inquiry into who started Kisangani. The leaders of both
sides have been very clear with all of us that it was the
other side that started it. Based on similar experiences
that I have been involved with in places like Bosnia,
Kosovo and Cambodia, I am certain that we will never
get to the bottom of who started it. The issue is to stop
it permanently and never to Jet it happen again. That
can be done only with the highest level of political
leadership.
I salute you, Mr. Secretary-General, for your
around-the-clock and tireless efforts with the leaders in
the region to stop that fighting. Without your personal
involvement, I think the chances are very high that the
fighting would still be going on.
As for the fighting in Equateur Province between
the armed forces of the Congo and the Movement for
the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), that too is a
serious problem. It is threatening to bring the war
closer to the major population centres. I say it quite
frankly today, in the presence of the signatories to the
Lusaka Agreement - and, in this case in particular, in
the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the representative of the
MLC - that we need to see a willingness on your part
to halt the fighting.
Let me turn now to the national dialogue. Again,
I speak with great respect for the sovereign
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Dul I must say, in all candor, what my Government has
already said publicly. I am obligated and obliged to
repeat here in public that we do not believe that the
renunciation of the facilitator appointed by the OAU
and attacks on the national dialogue can be regarded as
anything other than an attack on the Lusaka peace
process. If there are differences between any parties in
this Chamber and the facilitator, let those be ironed
out. But let us not attack the process itself unless we
are ready to confront the extraordinary implications of
that. I have heard the problems that the Government in
Kinshasa has with the national dialogue. May be some
of them are justified. But an attack on the process itself
can only be regarded as an attack on Lusaka.
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is one of the
few things standing between order in the Democratic
8
Republic of the Congo and its degeneration into
warlord-dominated, resource-driven satrapies. Last
January, when we in this Chamber sat with the sevc~
Presidents of the region, a commitment was made to
redouble our efforts for peace. I hope that that will be
the result of this very important meeting that you are
chairing today, Mr. President, only one level below the
chief-of-State level.
In order to bolster the peace process, the
Secretary-General has recommended the reordering of
some of the Lusaka tasks, particularly the sequencing
of foreign troop withdrawals. He suggests that priority
be given to the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan
forces from the Kisangani area. I think that this
recommendation is extremely appropriate, given recent
events. That is one of the major things we will be
discussing. But, as I support the Secretary-General's
position, l would like to underscore a few critical
points.
First of all, in no way does prioritizing the
withdrawal of the forces that fought each other in
Kisangani diminish the long-standing call of the
Security Council, which is on the record in resolutions,
for the withdrawal of all - I repeat, all - foreign
forces. We are not in any way, shape or -form
abandoning Lusaka by accepting, as I hope and believe
we should, !he prioritization recommended to us by the
Secretary-General.
Secondly, there is an urgent need for all parties to
abandon all support to non-signatory armed groups,
particularly the ex-Forces Armc!es Rwandaises (FAR)
and lnterahamwe. The fact that these groups are still
allowed to stay in business is truly unacceptable. They
are among the most odious groups in Africa, if not in
the world, and they must be dealt with through
concerted regional action.
Thirdly, a discussion of withdrawing Rwandan
and Ugandan forces should not in any way detract from
the obligations of the Government of the Democratic
Republic or the Congo to participate in the national
dialogue, to allow other Congolese parties the same
right, and to abide by the results of the process.
And fourthly, in regard to this point, let us not let
this discussion detract from the legitimate need to take
into account the security concerns of Rwanda and of
Uganda. Those are legitimate - although the
explosion of fighting in Kisangani, which has noth ing
to do with those needs, was extraordinarily lamentable.
We cannot allow a situation occur where the ex-FAR
and Interahamwe resume their I 995-1996 campaign of
terror inside Rwanda.
All of this should be done to strengthen Lusaka.
Let us recall again that this is not an outside-imposed
agreement, but an African initiative: as Mr. Salim
Ahmed Salim put it, an African solution to an African
problem.
S/PV,4156
in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere,
but not through wars.
All _of this means tha~ we cannot give up hope.
Leadership can make a difference; it must make a
difference. Last January, when we embarked on the
"month of Africa", we said that 2000 would be the
"year of Africa", and you, Mr. President, have set a
very high standard by maintaining the attention of the
There are some who say that Congo's struggle Security Council with respect to these issues. At that
and the slow progress of Lusaka somehow prove that in · time the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe
some places failure is certain - that people arc simply reminded us that our commitment to peace efforts -
predisposed to killing each other. 1 heard this in from the many efforts of the United Nations around the
Dosnia; I heard it in . Kosovo; ( heard it in Viet Nam; world lo our own commitment in the United States for
and in an earlier era we heard it in regard to the great instance, lo the Middle East peace process - musi be
European Powers, which have finally, after a century of strong enough to survive numerous setbacks, some ol
brutality, put their internal differences behind them so them catastrophic and seemingly · fatal. The
that, today, wars in the central part of Europe, once so representative of Zimbabwe warned us that in Africa
common, are no longer possible. 1 hope .that we will like everywhere else, we must be prepared to accep;
see, in our lifetimes and in our professional careers, the setbacks and not let them deter us from moving ahead.
leaders of Africa reach the same level of achievement. I believe that one should accept good advice, especially
If they do so, they will have done it much faster than when it comes from such an esteemed colleague.
the Europeans did, but I hope they can _ as Setbacks are, unfortunately, part of any peace process,
Ambassador Levitte so eloquently, but I regret to say ~ut they _should not diminish our resolve; they should
unsuccessfully, put it to Prime Minister Melcs Zenawi mcrcase II.
when we were in Addis Ababa four or five days before
that war broke out - learn from Europe's mistakes.
I categorically reject the notion that Africa is not
r~ady for democracy, or that it needs "strong men" or
dtctators to ensure stability, or that among certain
pe~ples or tribes conflict is inevitable. Such ppinions,
which we all heard in regard to Bosnia as well are
uninformed and, in subliminal form at a mini~um
carry a racist con~1otation. They were wrong in Bosnia;
they were wrong m Kosovo; they arc wrong in Africa.
In conclusion, let me remind us all that we have
come here today to bolster a peace process that while
imperilled, is one to which we are all committ~d. We
hav~ not come here out of a sense of charity, or simply
to right past wrongs - although that must be done -
but because we all recognize that peace in the Congo
and peace and democracy throughout Africa are in the
national interests of us all: Europeans, Asians,
Ameri~ans, others in the Western hemisphere, friends
and neighbours alike.
Let us also stand together to reject the notion that As we proceed with our discussions today and
has gained some prominence among commentators that tomorrow, and as we move forward in the coming
some States have become "failed States". States do not weeks, I hope we will all draw inspiration from what
fail; leaders do. Much is made of the artificial nature of Ambassador Greenstock, Ambassador van Walsum and
African borders, and many claim that this makes Ambassador Andjaba saw when they made their trip to
conflicts inevitable. I share the concern about those Kananga a month ago: thousands of ordinary
b?rders and about the way they were drawn in the late Cong~lese people lining the streets of that city, deep,
nmetcenth century. But those were the borders that the deep m the heart of a beleaguered and isolated area,
countries. of Africa chose to maintain when they thousands of ordinary Congolese shouting, "Peace,
became mdependent. And once having made that peace, peace". Let us help those people fulfil their
d~ci~ion, the leaders must figure out a way to live hopes and dreams. This, members of the Council and
w1thm those boundaries. Or, if they wish to change · my friends from the Political Committee of the Lusaka
them , they may change them voluntaiily, as happened Agreement, is the best possible reason for us to
continue working for implementation of the Lusaka
S/PV.4156
Agreement and for peace in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
The President (spoke in French): I now give the
noor to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, His Excellency Mr. Yerodia Aboulaye
Ndombasi.
Mr. Ndombasi (Democratic Republic of the
Congo) (spoke in French): I find myself in a position
that reminds me of the teachings of the "Spanish
Machiavelli", Baltazar Grachin y Morales, about what
one should be and what one should do, 1n his book The
Courtier~ Oracle. I appear here as a courtier, trying to
walk on eggs without crushing them, and obliged to
reassure, to explain and to take a position.
At the outset, I convey to you, Mr. President, and
to the other members of the Council my heartfelt
congratulations on your initiative following the visit of
the Security Council mission to us in Africa.
I should also like to thank the Permanent
Representative of the People's Republic of China and
convey to him our gratitude and our congratulations on
his success in carrying out his mandate as President of
the Council last month. This is the moment to take
advantage of the good omens for your mandate as it
begins, Mr. President, and for us to pay an emphatic
tribute while voicing the hope that the work to be done
under your leadership will be crowned with success so
that a man of the court, like myself, will not vacillate.
The Lusaka Accords, United Nations resolutions
and the United Nations Charter are symbols that guide
us, the Congolese of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, to show good will throughout and readiness to
hasten the end to the war to begin national
reconciliation.
Here, in this building, President Laurent-Dt!sirc!
Kabila addressed the Council, and the terms, the words
and the meaning he imparted are still alive in the minds
of members to show that · what I am saying is not
empty, flattering rhetoric, that rather it reflects
commitments, assurances and clarifications I wish to
provide during my statement. The arrival and address
of President Kabila prompted a great deal of hope, as it
led to the adoption of resolution 1291 ( 1999). That
followed the adoption of resolution 1234 ( 1999), which
is still alive with the potential it affords us to bring a
speedy end to war.
10
This good will of all heads of States that are
signatories of the Lusaka Accords is being manifested
through subsequent provisions, particularly those of
Kampala, which ·set out the process for establishing a
climate of security for our people and for United
Nations forces, who. it goes without saying, benefit
from enhanced security when they are operating in a
country that is not at war.
For us the mere presence of uninvited foreign
forces is an act of war, and nothing can ensure the
security necessary to offer to the troop-contributing
countries who send their children to help us solve our
problems. That security is unstable and fraught with
unpredictable elements, since uninvited foreign armies
occupy the country and push their hostilities to the
point of fighting each other.
In this year of the Africa Cup and Euro 2000,
people can say whatever they please, because we do
not know the hidden sense of their insults; a period to
flex their muscles to the detriment of the infrastructure,
the people and the territorial integrity and national
sovereignty of the Congolese people, and this in
accordance with the symbol which is the United
Nations Charter. As long as these gladiator brothers are
in our country, nothing can be guaranteed, since they
arc already in the third round of their championship.
No one can guarantee what will happen from one
moment to the next, even after a ceasefire. No one can
guarantee that clashes will not resume if they remain
on our territory.
What we call aggression against our country by
our brothers from the east remains the key to further
developments and the events that have prompted us to
meet in a quest for peace in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. With regard to the security of the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the recent
evacuation of 20 of its representatives from Kisangani
shows that as long as all these people arc in our
country fighting one another, there will be no security
for MONUC. Evacuating them, given the logic of
events, was an obligation.
As a Minister of State, I am duty-bound to
provide assurances that the Democratic Republic of the
Congo needs the United Nations, needs MONUC. It
would be ridiculous for us to need MONUC, while at
the same time we complicate its work. I can give the
assurance of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo that, so far as United Nations
force deployment and the preliminary MONUC
deployment arc concerned, in accordance with the
status of forces agreement these forces will enjoy full
freedom of movement; freedom not in the sense such
as Kant spoke of, the freedom of indifference, as in: "I
do what I like when I like and cross the street when
there is a red light". Freedom is freedom of knowledge
of cause, because you know the effect that a vehicle
doing as it wishes can have on a body that crosses its
path. Freedom is organized on the form - I discussed
this with Mr. Morjanc - of notification. It is only
natural that as a sovereign Government we know when,
who an<l where MONUC an<l United Nations aircraft
will operate in our skies. This is not harassment. It is
simply something designed to avoid having something
unfortunate happen to these people who we need, as I
said a little while ago, to get us out of this business, to
put an end to the war and for us to be able to resume
national reconstruction.
I must also provide assurances to the effect that
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo negotiated, through me personally, the Lusaka
Accords and President Kabila himself signed them .
We arc in favour of the Lusaka Agreement and
call for its full implementation, even if, for example,
the timetable was set inconsistently with provisions of
the Agreement. We did not exploit that inconsistency to
call the Agreement itself into question. We are in
favour of the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement.
Everyone should clearly understand that. ·
S/PV.4156
favour of facilitation. We have already asked the
Organization of African Unity to appoint someone else
who, with the consent of the parties, can facilitate
dialogue among all Congolese.
Let me stress that, in the midst of all this, we are
a sovereign Government that is continuing to govern. It
may happen that a lack of prior coordination or
synchronicity between one particular facilitator and our
sovereign decisions leads to contradictions. Let me
assure the Council, however, that we favour
facilitation. We feel that, with respect 10· ensuring that
the role of facilitator is filled, the ball is in the United
Nations court. I hope this is done soon. contrary to
prior experience, when it took a long time to fill the
post of facilitator, through no fault of our-own but as a
result of repeated obstructions from other sides. We are
prepared to work with the new embodiment of
facilitator. Let me repeat that we are for facilitation and
the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement.
So far as we are concerned, the Security
Council's horizons are crisscrossed with references
guiding its actions. These are, in addition to the Lusaka
Agreement, which we have signed, the resolutions of
the Security Council and the United Nations Charter -
the trinity of our Bible. That is how we see it.
In conclusion, let me reassure the Council about
MONUC, which we summoned to our country. When
intolerable and repeated massacres occurred in parts of
our country not under- our control, our people were
compelled to express their profound outrage at the
incompetence of the United Nations forces and their
inability to launch such an operation. I know that some
rocks have been hurled at the United Nations building,
but I do not believe that Mr. Morjane is ready to offer
himself as a target for those directed at Mr. Bernard
Kouchner. We will see to it that such incidents do not
recur, though we do understand how young students, in
a city of 5 million that is up in arms and· outraged,
might throw some stones - Congolese stones, not
Kosovar.
Of course, when the veil that shrouds the future is
torn open, it will be easy to judge, but so long as the
present remains blind, no one can forecast with
precision what is going to happen. That is why the
Lusaka Agreement was signed and only later did it
become imperative for the dates on the timetable to be
modified, although the urgency of implementation was
never lessened. Let me repeat: we are in favour of the
Lusaka Agreement and will give our all to ensure that
its implementation is facilitated. My Government
wants inter-Congolese dialogue to be facilitated. Of
course, such facilitation is embodied in one person
whom the Organization of African Unity has appointed
and who has won the agreement of all parties.
My Government has reasons for believing that the
current embodiment of that facilitation is no longer
appropriate to the progress of the operation. We are in
I give Mr. Morjane my word that he can work in
complete freedom and in full safety and security. He
knows that he can come to my office whenever he
wan'ts and that we have devised an entire system to
facilitate contacts between ourselves and MONUC. We
have established a general government bureau for
MONUC affairs. The commissioner, Mr. Ntuaremba, is
here with me. The bureaucratic apparatus may create
11
S/rV.4156
occasional difficulties, but we are determined to solve
any that may arise as we deal with the Security
Council.
I would urge the Council to ensure that its own
resolutions - adopted with unanimity one after the
other, which is rare in itself - support the recent
progress made by our brother Mr. Kofi Annan, who
recently emerged from an atmosphere similar to that
described by Conor Cruise O' Brien in his book To
Katanga and Back. The Council must implement its
own resolutions so that this remarkable progress,
unprecedented in its boldness and courage, can be
exploited to hasten the end of the war and the
restoration of stability. Thal being our final aim, lei us
turn water into electricity, as Paul Eluard put it, and
make each man - even the man lo my right - our
brother. That is the aim of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
12
We expect the Council's decisions to speed up
that process. I assure members that my Government is
committed to m.iking inter-Congolese dialogue
easier - to facilitating facilitation and creating
conditions conducive to calm, efficient work
undertaken in secure and safe conditions by the United
Nations forces . We call on all to ensure that this is
handled boldly by, for example, linking phases II and
Ill, which I hope are soon to follow, in order to hasten
the process. The fact is that we are in a hurry.
The President (spoke in French): There are no
further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security
Council has thus concluded the official public stage of
its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council
will resume its consideration of the item at a ·private
meeting to take place later today in this Chamber.
The 111ccti11g rose at 1.20 p.111.
UCMANNEX'i
United Nations S11<.1:.:s, UU4 lLUUU)
(,-~ Security Council
~ ~
~ iii
Distr. : General
16 June 2000
~
00-48559 (E)
*0048559*
Resolution 1304 (2000)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4159th meeting, on
16 June 2000
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1234 ( 1999) of 9 April 1999, 1258 ( 1999) of 6 August
1999, 1265 ( 1999) of 17 September 1999, 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999, 1279
(1999) of 30 November 1999, 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000 and 1296 (2000)
of 19 April 2000, and the statements of its President of 13 July
1998 (S/PRST/1998/20), 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), II December
1998 (S/PRST/1998/36), 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17), 26 January 2000
(S/PRST/2000/2), 5 May 2000 (S/PRST/2000/15) and 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20),
Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security,
Reaffirming also the obligation of all States to refrain from the use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of all States in the region,
Reaffirming also the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
over its natural resources, and noting with concern reports of the illegal exploitation
of the country's assets and the potential consequences of these actions on security
conditions and the continuation of hostilities,
In this regard, calling on all the parties to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and others concerned to cooperate fully with the expert panel
on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/PRST/2000/20) in its investigation and visits
in the region,
Expressing its deep concern at the continuation of the hostilities in the country,
Expressing in particular its outrage at renewed fighting between Ugandan and
Rwandan forces in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo, which began on 5
June 2000, and at the failure of Uganda and Rwanda to comply with the ir
S/RES/1304 (2000)
commitment to cease hostilities and withdraw from Kisangani made in their joint
statements of 8 May 2000 and of 15 May 2000 (S/2000/445), and deploring the loss
of civilian lives, the threat to the civilian population and the damage to property
inflicted by the forces of Uganda and Rwanda on the Congolese population,
Recalling its strong support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815)
and insisting that all parties honour their obligations under that Agreement,
Deploring the delays in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and
the 8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement plan, and stressing the need for new
momentum to ensure progress in the peace process,
Expressing its deep concern at the lack of cooperation of the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue
designated with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
including the fact that the delegates were prevented from attending the Cotonou
preparatory meeting on 6 June 2000,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June 2000 (S/2000/566),
Recalling the responsibility of all parties to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations and
associated personnel throughout the country,
Welcoming the participation in its meetings on 15 and 16 June 2000 of the
members of the Political Committee of the Ceasefire Agreement,
Expressing its serious concern over the humanitarian situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo mainly resulting from the conflict, and stressing
the need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Congolese population,
Expressing also its alarm at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for
the security of the civilian population throughout the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and its deep concern at all violations and abuses of human
rights and international humanitarian law, in particular in the eastern part of the
country, especially the Kivus and Kisangani,
Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
I . Calls on all parties to cease hostilities throughout the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and to fulfil their obligations under the Ceasefire
Agreement and the relevant provisions of the 8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement
plan;
2. Reiterates its unreserved condemnation of the fighting between Ugandan
and Rwandan forces in Kisangani in violation of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and demands that these forces
and those allied to them desist from further fighting;
3. Demands that Ugandan and Rwandan forces as well as forces of the
Congolese armed opposition and other armed groups immediately and completely
withdraw from Kisangani, and calls on all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to
respect the demilitarization of the city and its environs;
S/RES/1304 (2000)
4. Further demands :
(a) that Uganda and Rwanda, which have violated the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic .of the Congo, withdraw all their
forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without further
delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement and the 8 April
2000 Kampala disengagement plan;
(b) that each phase of withdrawal completed by Ugandan and Rwandan
forces be reciprocated by the other parties in conformity with the same timetable;
(c) that all other foreign military presence and activity, direct and indirect, in
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo be brought to an end in
conformity with the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement;
5. In this context demands that all parties abstain from any offensive action
during the process of disengagement and of withdrawal of foreign forces;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep under review arrangements for
deployment of the personnel of the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), as authorized and in conditions
defined by resolution 1291 (2000), to monitor the cessation of hostilities,
disengagement of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces as described in paragraphs
I to 5 above and to assist in the planning of these tasks, and requests also the
Secretary-General to recommend any adjustment that may become necessary in this
regard;
7. Calls on all parties, in complying with paragraphs I to 5 above, to
cooperate with the efforts of MONUC to monitor the cessation of hostilities,
disengagement of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces;
8. Demands that the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement cooperate with the
deployment of MONUC to the areas of operations deemed necessary by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, including by lifting restrictions on the
freedom of movement of MONUC personnel and by ensuring their security;
9. Calls on all the Congolese Parties to engage fully in the National
Dialogue process as provided for in the Ceasefire Agreement, and calls in particular
on the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to reaffirm its full
commitment to the National Dialogue, to honour its obligations in this respect and to
cooperate with the Facilitator designated with the assistance of the OAU and to
allow for the full participation of political opposition and civil society groups in the
dialogue;
I 0. Demands that all parties cease all forms of assistance and cooperation
with the armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the Ceasefire
Agreement;
11. Welcomes efforts made by the parties to engage in a dialogue on the
question of disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of members
of all armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the Ceasefire Agreement,
and urges the parties, in particular the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and the Government of Rwanda, to continue these efforts in full
cooperation;
3
S/RES/1304 (2000)
4
12. n"mnnrl< that all oarti€'< comolv in narticnhr with the provisions of
Annex A, Chapter 12 of the Ceasefire Agreement relating to the normalization of
the security situation along the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
with its neighbours;
13. Condemns all massacres and other atrocities carried out in the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and urges that an international investigation
into all such events be carried out with a view to bringing to justice those
responsible;
14. Expresses the view that the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda should
make reparations for the loss of life and the property damage they have inflicted on
the civilian population in Kisangani, and requests the Secretary-General to submit
an assessment of the damage as a basis for such reparations;
15. Calls on all the parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to protect human rights and respect international humanitarian law;
16. Calls also on all parties to ensure the safe and unhindered access of relief
personnel to all those in need, and recalls that the parties must also provide
guarantees for the safety, security and freedom of movement for United Nations and
associated humanitarian relief personnel;
11. Fzll'ther calls on all parties to cooperate with the International Committee
of the Red Cross to enable it to carry out its mandate as well as the tasks entrusted to
it under the Ceasefire Agreement;
18. Reaffirms the importance of holding, at the appropriate time, an
international conference on peace, security, democracy and development in the
Great Lakes region under the auspices of the United Nations and of the OAU, with
the participation of all the Governments of the region and all others concerned;
19. Expresses its readiness to consider possible measures which could be
imposed in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations in case of failure by parties to comply fully with this resolution;
20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
UCMANNEX7
' NAME: LYAVALAALI
AGE 38 YRS
TRIBE: MU SOGA
NATIONALITY UGANDAN
lam of the above particulars and do state that I joined ADF in 1995 at Beni .
being a founder member of this rebel group. It was at a place called
Matunge. We were about seventeen people. We started recruiting people
from Uganda taking them to congo for training. We established a base at
Bunia. All this was under the direct authority of President Mobutu of DR
Congo then Zaire. We used to pass through Mahagi, Gonyeri (near
Phaida), Kasindi etc.
As we grew in numbers, we opened up a camp at Buhira in Rwenzori
(Congo side), some 30kms from Bwera.
This is where we were carrying out our training for most of the
combatants. Our main bases were those three at Buhira, Bunia and Beni.
We continued getting support from president Mobutu ·until he was
overthrown by Kabila.
When he (Mobutu) was overthrown, we lost support however, remained
in congo and all the recruits and captives were being taken to Buhira for
training.
At first Kabila didn't know that we were there since he was close to
Musaveni. That is why we had even closed our base in Bunia.
Around 1998, Kabila fell out with Meseveni. I myself started establishing
links with Kabila through his operatives in the area. The delegation h~
sent to us for negotiations included a Minister from Butembo called
PhHlipo, Solomon (mobiliser) and another whose name I do not recall. By.
this time Uganda had not entered Beni. .
The day we were to get supplies from Kinshasha, Uganda moved in troops
and took over Butembo, Bunia and Beni :··so we didn't get those weapons.
However we continued to receive support from Kabila. In around April
2000, Kabila using three aircrafts air dropped supplies from Sudan for us
. at Buhira and Kiribata. These included RPGs. SPGs, 82mm and 60mm
mortars and ammunitions and other medical and food supplies. This
continued like that (supplies on routine) until July 2000 when I
surrendered with a group of other combatants.
At one time I had to go to Sudan to meet government officials through
connection by Kinshasha officials.
They were the ones facilitating my travel and accommodation.
This is all I can state and its true and collect to the best of my knowledge.
Sign.
UCMANNEX'7
United Nations StRES/1316 (2000)
(~) Security Council
~
Distr.: General
23 August 2000
~
00-61802 (E)
*0061802*
Resolution 1316 (2000)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4189th meeting, on
23 August 2000
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999, 1291 (2000) of 24
February 2000 and 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000, and all other resolutions and
statements of its President on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Noti11g the letter of the Secretary-General to its President of 14 August 2000
(S/2000/799),
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States in the region,
Reaffirming its commitment to assisting in the implementation of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815), and noting the results of the 7 August 2000
Summit of the Southern African Development Community and the 14 August 2000
Second Summit of Parties to the Ceasefire Agreement in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo,
Noti11g with co11cem that the lack of adequate conditions of access, security
and cooperation has restricted the ability of the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to deploy up to its
authorized strength,
Reaffirmi11g its will to work with the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement and
other interested parties, including potential troop contributors, in order to create the
conditions necessary for deployment as authorized under resolution 1291 (2000),
Expressi11g its appreciatio11 to all States that have declared their willingness to
provide military units required for the deployment of the second phase of MONUC,
Calli11g on the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other
parties to lift all obstacles to full MONUC deployment and operations,
Recalling the responsibility of all parties to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations and
associated personnel throughout the country,
S/RES/1316 (2000)
2
Commending the outstanding work of MONUC personnel in challenging
conditions, and noting the strong leadership of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General,
1. Decides to extend the mandate of MONUC until 15 October 2000;
2. Emphasizes that this technical extension of the MONUC mandate is
designed to allow time for further diplomatic activities in support of the Ceasefire
Agreement and for Council reflection on the future mandate of MONUC and
possible adjustments thereto;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 21 September
2000 on progress in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and relevant
Council resolutions and make recommendations for further Council action;
4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
UCMANNEX7
United Nations ;' ii'~ General Assembly \s dJ! ~
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 114 (c)
Human rights questions: human rights situations and
reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
Distr.: General
20 September 2000
English
Original: Spanish
Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Note by the Secretary-General*
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the
report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Mr. Roberto Garret6n (Chile), pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 54/179 and Commission on Human Rights decision 2000/15, endorsed by
the Economic and Social Council in its decision 2000/248.
• In accordance with General Assembly resolution 54/248, sect. C, para. I, this report is being
submitted on 20 September 2000 so as to include as much updated information as possible.
00-65326 (E) 121000 181000
*00b532b*
A1551403
A/55/403
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
I. Introduction ............... . .. .. .. . ................. . ....... ...... .. .
A. Mandate .. . .................. . ... ... ... . . . ... . .......... . ...... .
B. Activities and administrative obstacles ....... ....... . . . ............. .
C. Pending activities and investigations ............. . ......... . ..... . .. .
D. International obligations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ....... .
E. Reprisals against individuals who cooperated with the United Nations .... .
II. The various armed conflicts ..... . ...... . .... ... . . . ... ... .... .......... .
A. The conflict between the Government and RCD . . . .. . . . .. .... ........ . .
B. The conflict between the Government and MLC .... . .............. . .. .
C. Clashes between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani ..... . . . . .... . . .. . .. .
D. Tribal conflict between the Balendu and the Bahema ................... .
E. Ceasefire agreements and observance thereof . .. . .. . ....... . ......... . .
F. Impact of the war ...................... . ..... .. ... . . ..... ...... . . .
G. Situation of persons at risk ......... . . .... . .................... . ... .
III. Political development and democratization in Government-controlled territory ..
IV. Political development and democratization in territory controlled by rebel
movements ....... . .. . ....... . ................. . .......... . ......... .
V. Human rights violations committed by the Government . ... . ..... .... .... . .. .
VI. Human rights violations committed in territory occupied by RCD and MLC ... . .
VII. Violations of international humanitarian law ..... . ....... . ... . .... ... ... .. .
A. Violations by the Government, allies and related groups ............... . .
B. Violations by RCD, RCD/ML, MLC and allied foreign military forces .... .
VIII. Conclusions and recommendations .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . . ... . . . ............... . .
A. Conclusions .. . .. . ........ .. . .. .... . ........... . .. . . . ....... .. .. .
B. Recommendations . . . . ... ... . .. ........ .. ....... . .. . .. . . . ..... ... .
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I. Introduction
A. Mandate
I. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submits his fourth preliminary report on the situation
of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (formerly Zaire) to the General Assembly,
pursuant to Assembly resolution 54/179 and
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15. The
report covers incidents that occurred up to 25 August.
B. Activities and administrative obstacles
2. The Special Rapporteur participated in the special
session of the Security Council, held in January 2000
to consider the situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, convinced that human rights matters cannot
be separated from the settlement of conflicts, whose
root cause is the violation of human rights . The
Carlsson report on United Nations responsibility in the
Rwanda genocide, which concluded that the failure to
heed the report of a Commission on Human Rights
rapporteur had been one of the main reasons for the
genocide, had already been published.
3. In order to attend the special session of the
Security Council, the Special Rapporteur had to reduce
the length of his only visit to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to only I O days and limit his
consultations to just one in Geneva, where there are
few Congolese refugees.
4. The only assistance which the Special Rapporteur
received was from an extremely efficient assistant in
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, who, however, also has
responsibility for four other States.
5. The Ambassador of the United States of America
to the United Nations, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the leaders of the
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD)
and of the Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC),
ambassadors in Kinshasa and the heads of United
Nations agencies expressed concern at the fact that the
Special Rapporteur had paid only one brief visit to the
country, which they felt would affect his credibility.
A/55/403
6. During his mission to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (13-26 August 2000), the Special
Rapporteur visited Kinshasa. He also visited Gama,
Bukavu and Kisangani, which are under the control of
RCD/Goma faction and Gbadolite, which was captured
by MLC. Both the Government and rebel authorities
permitted him to work and conduct his interviews
freely. Obstacles were encountered, however, when be
attempted to visit the military and police detention
centres in Kinshasa and Bukavu. He also had meetings
with or reviewed the reports of political parties and of
intergovernmental and non-governmental institutions
and organizations (see E/CN.4/2000/42, annexes II-V).
7. The Special Rapporteur transmitted 22
communications and urgent actions to the Government,
including 86 allegations of violations of human rights.
Three of these were acknowledged and one reply
received.
8. RCD authorities submitted two extensive reports
to the Special Rapporteur, which the latter welcomes.
C. Pending activities and investigations
Joint mission to investigate allegations of
massacres committed in 1996
9. In paragraph 5 (b) of its resolution 2000/15, the
Commission on Human Rights renewed the mandate of
the joint mission established by its resolution 1997/58
to investigate violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed in the east of
the former Zaire between 1996 and 1997.
10. The Government also requested the SecretaryGeneral
to carry out an investigation into the events
that occurred in the locality of Ituri (letter of 8
February 2000) as well as an investigation into
allegations of the deaths of 15 women who were buried
alive or burnt in Mwenga, situated in RCD-controlled
territory. Both the Government and RCD requested
special investigations into the Katogota massacre.
Because of the prevailing insecurity and lack of
financial resources, these investigations are still
pending.
3
A/SS/403
D. International obligations of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
11. Contrary to the public announcement, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo did not accede to
the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions.
The Government is late in submitting 10 reports to
treaty bodies. It has not completed a single report nor
replied to the communications addressed to it by the
respective treaty bodies.
E. Reprisals against individuals who
cooperated with the United Nations
12. The Special Rapporteur denounces the reprisals
taken against the following persons who cooperated
with him during his visits or who submitted reports to
him, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
resolution 2000/20.
13. In RCD-controlled territory: Monsignor
Emmanuel Kataliko, Archbishop of Bukavu, who had
been interviewed by the Special Rapporteur, was
detained and subsequently exiled to Butembo, on 12
February 2000. Collete Kitoga was arrested in Goma
upon her return from the fifty-sixth session of the
Commission on Human Rights.
14. In territory controlled by the Rassemblement
congolais pour Ja democratie/Mouvement de liberation
(RCD/ML), Sylvain Mudimbi Masudi was detained in
Benin for attending the session of the Commission on
Human Rights and was transferred to Uganda.
II. The various armed conflicts
15. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is
bedevilled by various armed conflicts, some
international, others internal and yet other internal
conflicts that have been internationalized (see
E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 20). Participants in these
conflicts include at least eight national armies I and 21
irregular armed groups. All of these forces are
operating entirely in the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which has seen its population
decimated and its wealth extracted by occupying and
rebel forces. 2
4
A. The conflict between the Government
and RCD
16. The conflict between the Government and RCD
began on 2 August 2000, following Rwanda's invasion
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is the most
serious of the conflicts, not only because of its political
and economic repercussions but also because it
restricts the enjoyment of the civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights of the population of the
entire region.
17. On one side are the armies of Rwanda, Burundi,
Uganda and RCD/Goma faction, together with its
paramilitary group Local Defence Unity. Allegations
have been made of the involvement of Interahamwe
deserters and Rwandan Hutu prisoners, who were
released and sent to the front. The mineral riches of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in Katanga,
Orientale province and Kasai Oriental have been
depleted by foreign troops and RCD.
18. For its part, the Government has relied for its
defence on counter-rebel militias: it has open and
confirmed ties to the Mai-Mai,3 a group that is gaining
in popularity with a local population tired of being
subjected to the control of forces they consider foreign.
It also has informal ties to other "counter rebels": RCD
deserters, Rwandan Bahutu Interahamwe, members of
the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), and
Burundian Bahutu, among others.
19. The violence is unleashed by the attacks of the
counter-rebels against military forces which they
consider to be aggressors. The response of the
Rwandan army, RCD and the Burundian army is to
attack the defenceless civilian population, committing
indescribable massacres, such as those that took place
at Katogota, on 15 May 2000, Kamanyola, Lurbarika
and Luberizi, or the massacre in July 2000 on the
Lusenda-Lubuma highway (see E/CN.4/2000/42), as
well as the events - denied, as others have been, by
RCD/Goma faction - that took place in Mwenga in
November 1999, in which 15 women were tortured and
buried alive (see S/2000/330, para. 61).
20. Another factor contributing to the violence is the
antagonism between RCD and Banyamulenge, who are
fed up at being the target of the resentment of
Congolese over the abuses committed by the Armee
patriotique rwandaise (APR).
21. By its resolution 1304 (2000), the Security
Council demanded that Uganda and Rwanda, which
have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all
their forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The withdrawal should be
followed by reciprocal actions by the other parties,
which have not taken any such action.
B. The conflict between the Government
and MLC
22. In Equateur province, the Congolese Armed
Forces (FAC), supported by Zimbabwe and Namibia,
are fighting MLC, which is supported by Uganda. It is
in this province that the parties have shown the least
respect for the ceasefire, and indeed the rebel leader
has long maintained that he felt under no obligation to
observe it. President Kabila contends that MLC has
rendered the ceasefire agreement null and void.
C. Clashes between Uganda and Rwanda
in Kisangani
23. Once again there were clashes in Kisangani, the
third largest town in the country, previously controlled
by the two RCD factions and currently controlled by
RCD/Goma, between the "uninvited armies" of
Rwanda and Uganda (supported by RCD/MLI). The
worst clashes occurred on 5 and 9 May and on 8 June
2000. The causes are economic (both armies want the
huge wealth of Orientale province) as well as political
( control of the territory).
24. During the confrontations, particularly the most
recent one, not only combatants but also close to 1,000
Congolese civilians were killed, thousands were
wounded and much of the town was destroyed, as the
Special Rapporteur in the field has confirmed.
25. Calls for a ceasefire, including from the Security
Council, went unheeded and moves towards
demilitarization were disregarded the very next day.
Only the latest one seems to be holding.
A/55/403
D. Tribal conflict between Balendu
and Bahema
26. The Ugandan occupation of the Ituri region has
led to conflict between the Bahema (of Ugandan
origin) and the Balendu, who have been in the region
longer. With support from the Ugandan soldiers, the
authorities appointed by them and RCD/ML, the
Bahema have seized land from the Balendu who have
no support. Except for some incidents in 1911, 1923
and 1955, these two ethnic groups had lived without
major difficulties for nearly three centuries. The
current confrontations, which flared up again in August
2000, have resulted in some 8,000 deaths and the
displacement of some 50,000 people.
E. Ceasefire agreements and observance
thereof
27. Following tremendous pressure from the
international community (see E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 18
and annex X), the parties concluded a ceasefire
agreement in Lusaka, in 1999. They did not abide by
the agreement and, as a result, the timetable had to be
adjusted (Lusaka, 12 February 2000, Kampala, I
March and 8 April, at which time it was agreed that
hostilities would cease from 14 April 2000). Only the
last one was observed, except in the fighting between
MLC and RCD. In spite of everything, the belligerents
have, on the whole, kept to the positions they held in
August 1999.
28. The Lusaka agreement provided for the
deployment of a United Nations force - the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) - of some 5,537
observers and security personnel in the territory in
conflict and for the demobilization and disarming of
the armed groups. MONUC quite rightly maintains that
disarming the groups, if they do not disarm themselves,
is not part of its mandate but a matter for the
signatories.
29. Inexplicably, the Government received MONUC
aggressively and blamed the United Nations for the
death of Lumumba back in 1961.4 MONUC continued
to be attacked verbally and in fact (pro-Government
demonstrations in June 2000) for its lack of objectivity,
based on the fact that its reports are said to give more
importance to the Mai-Mai and lnterahamwe attacks on
5
A/55/403
the RCD forces and their allies than to the latter's
counterattacks on civilians.
30. Despite all the statements to the contrary and
despite the conversations between Presidents Kabila
and Kagame (Eldoret, Kenya) and the influence of
Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria,
Botswana, Mozambique, Mali, the Organization of
African Unity, the United Nations and others, the
parties all seem bent on winning the war by military
means.
31. A meeting of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) on 14 August 2000 failed because
Kinshasa opposed any solution, feeling that since the
circumstances of the conflict had changed the Lusaka
agreement should be adjusted. A proposed change was
submitted to the other parties on 23 August 2000.
F. Impact of the war
32. The war has destroyed the country. More than
half the population has been affected. All public
moneys are being diverted to the war effort. There have
been terrible epidemics. Only 9 per cent of all health
districts have refrigerators for keeping medicines.
Since it is impossible to cultivate the land due to the
war, 17 per cent of the population (14 million people)
are now affected by food insecurity, according to the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO). The number of sheques (street
children) has risen alarmingly.
33. The Congolese people have looked on helplessly
while those whom it calls aggressors have taken away
all its wealth and caused enormous ecological damage.
34. There are more than 1,300,000 internally
displaced persons, many of whom are without any
assistance. The vast majority come from the occupied
territories in the east. Their situation was made worse
by the attacks carried out in July 2000 on the displaced
persons camps in Sake and Uvira, both by the MaiMai
and by Rwandan soldiers; these attacks forced
many non-governmental organizations to suspend their
relief activities.
35. If one includes those who sought asylum when
Mobutu was in power, there are Congolese refugees all
over the world. Most recently, due to the fighting
between RCD and MLC, there are reported to be some
72,000 refugees in Congo Brazzaville.
6
36. Congolese Tutsi who had sought refuge in
Rwanda are returning to Goma with support from RCD
through one non-governmental organization, but
against the wishes of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which
fears that this may lead to increased violence.
G. Situation of persons at risk
37. These are the Batutsi or people who look like
Tutsi living in the territory under government control,
who fear reprisals from the population for the
"Rwandan aggression". At the start of the war, the
Government called for their elimination (see
E/CN.4/1999/31, para. 45), but later it opted for a
position of protection and even established protection
centres (not detention centres as alleged by the
Rwandan Government and RCD) with the help of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
foreign Governments. This policy has made it possible
for many people to be repatriated or to take refuge in
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and others have found
refuge in Cameroon, Benin, the United States or
Canada. In 2000, there were 2,796 people living in the
protection camps; when the Special Rapporteur visited
the camps in Kinshasa, the number had fallen to 299.
III. Political development and
democratization in Governmentcontrolled
territory
38. The power structure described in all reports since
1997 remains intact; tremendous power (executive,
legislative and much of the judicial power) remains
concentrated in the hands of President Kabila (see
E/CN.4/1998/65, para. 32 to 37; E/CN.4/1999/31, para.
17 and E/CN.4/2000/42, paras. 32, 33 and 127).
39. The Government has made us move towards
democracy; according to all the indications, it does not
wish to do so. The only thing that has changed is that
the "national debate", which the President instituted in
1999 but which was never accepted by civil society,
has ended. Although the main moral, religious, 5
political and civil institutions are clamouring for
democracy - in the sense of Commission on Human
Rights resolution 2000/47 - and demanding the
dialogue provided for at Lusaka as a means thereto,
President Kabila has shown no interest in the matter.
J .
40. Indeed, the President has always rejected the
national dialogue. The facilitator designated by OAU,
the distinguished former president of Botswana,
Ketumile Masire, was accepted and later rejected by
the Government; the latter has consistently prevented
him from fulfilling his delicate mission; (it has levelled
vague charges of "duplicity of roles" against him;
prevented him from travelling to towns under rebel
control; rejected his work plan; failed to attend, and
prohibited political parties and civil society from
attending, the preparatory meeting in Benin; withheld
tickets and passports; refused to receive him, closed his
office and so forth).
41. In addition, the ban on political parties and civil
organizations that do not meet the draconian conditions
set by Decree Law 194 and Decree Law 195 (see
E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 33 and 70) remains; persons
who are not members of a party constituted in
accordance with the new law are not permitted to make
political speeches; pro-Government parties (the only
ones recognized) have been established; and all
political activity has been suppressed, resulting in
hundreds of arrests and personal attacks (Union pour la
democratic et la progres social (UDPS), 26 July 2000);
persecution by the People's Power Committees (CPP)
(Parti Lumumbiste unifie (PALU), 17 January 2000);
unlawful searches (MNC/L, 22 April 2000); the
discredited CPP remain (the election of members failed
due to lack of interest on the part of the population), as
does the Force d'auto-defense populaire (FAP) militia;
the agreements regarding the democratization of the
"national consultation" which had been called for by
the religious leaders and which demanded that the
Lusaka agreements and the inter-Congolese dialogue
be respected have been rejected; limited dialogues have
been convened (January, February and May 2000) but
are limited to supporters, etc.
42. On 21 August 2000, notwithstanding the Lusaka
accords, a Constituent and Legislative Assembly was
established; under the sole direction of the President
and without any consultation and without consensus, it
was decided that the Assembly's headquarters would
be in Lubumbashi. Although a few opponents were
called, in their personal capacity, the Assembly was not
accepted by the country's best known leaders. In any
event, its mandate is purely consultative and it in no
way diminishes the absolute powers of the President.
A/55/403
IV. Political development and
democratization in territory
controlled by rebel movements
Territory controlled by RCD
43. In the territory controlled by RCD, the Congolese
people's feelings of terror and humiliation not only
persist but are growing stronger (see document
E/CN.4/2000/42, paras. 43-47, 125 and 133). This
explains the increasing popularity of the Mai-Mai.
44. RCD is the only party, and it holds absolute
power to such an extent that the provincial governors
and heads of public services preside over their own
RCD cells. Party officials deny that theirs is a "State
party", saying that it is not a party but a movement of
trade unions, and that pluralism will come about
eventually. In the Special Rapporteur's view, this
explanation only confirms that the party is, in reality,
State-run. No efforts towards greater pluralism are in
evidence. The paramilitary "local defence units" are a
contributing factor in the considerable feeling of
insecurity.
45. All forms of dissidence are suppressed; any
criticism is considered an incitement to national hatred
or genocide and the whole population is suspected of
collaborating with the Mai-Mai. A typical example is
the absurd expulsion of Archbishop Emmanuel
Kataliko from Bukavu for his Christmas message,
which was considered to be an incitement to genocide.
The Special Rapporteur has read and studied the text
closely, and he can safely say that there is not a single
sentence, word or idea, taken in isolation or in context,
that could be interpreted, even with the worst of
intentions, in this way.
46. Attempts to humiliate the population continue
(see document E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 46). As a new
way of castigating the Nyndu tribe, already punished
by the horrible Kasika massacre in 1998 (see document
E/CN.4/1999/31, para. 56), RCD/Goma has taken land
from them in order to create a Minembwe territory.
RCD has provided the facilitator, Ketumile Masire,
with a list of "opposition parties", such as the Front uni
de !'opposition non armee (FRONUAR), and others
that exist in Kinshasa without representatives in the
region.
7
A/55/403
47. The population recognizes and defends the
guerrilla activities of the Mai-Mai, blaming "Rwandan
soldiers" instead for the violence.
48. The population's opposition is illustrated by
various acts of protest, such as the general strikes in
Bukavu by students on 24 January 2000 and from 31
January to 6 February 2000; a demonstration in
Kisangani by women on 31 January 2000, in Goma, on
14 February 2000; in Uvira, Kindu and Bukavu (a
week-long beer strike successfully carried out in April
2000), among others.
49. RCD has frequently split into factions (see
document E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 43), and efforts at
reunification are being made not among Congolese
leaders, who appear to be leading the factions, but
between the Presidents of Uganda and Rwanda
(November 1999; January 2000). In March 2000, three
RCD/Goma leaders defected and were later accused of
spying by Kabila; subsequently, other internal
dissidents broke away and formed RCD/National. The
Banyamulenge expressed their concern about
massacres of the local population in July 2000, which
made their own situation worse, and they organized
marches in Bukavu and Uvira.
50. In April and August 2000, attempts to depose the
President of RCD/Bunia were defeated through the
influence, once again, of the President of Uganda and
his army.
51. The small RCD/Bunia faction has also taken steps
that have stirred up the population, such as supporting
the Hema against the Lendu, or the creation of the
Kibali-lturi province to favour the former.
Territory controlled by MLC
52. In the territory controlled by MLC, the people do
not live in terror, but there is one-party rule. The
representative of civil society to Benin was appointed
byMLC.
8
V. Human rights violations committed
by the Government6
Right to life
Death penalty
53. The Government, which says it is against the
death penalty, made a number of announcements ( on I 0
December 1999 and 27 January 2000) to the Special
Rapporteur on the suspension of this penalty (see
document E/CN.4/2000/42, paras. 49 and 50), but
continued to apply it, at least until February 2000,
when 19 persons were executed. The President of the
Military Court reported that it continues to be enforced
"on the front". The Special Rapporteur visited 41
persons who are awaiting a pardon, which the President
has promised to grant.
Enforced disappearances
54. The number of reported disappearances has
declined. None of the cases recorded in previous years,
however, have been cleared up. Nicolas Bantu, Aime
Ngobe and Serge ltala have been missing since their
arrest in December 1999.
Death by torture
55 . Given the systematic and habitual practice of
torture, deaths have been reported, such as that of
Kalombo Ilunga in July 2000; he had been detained by
the police in Lubumbashi, and his corpse was found in
the morgue.
Political assassinations
56. None have been reported.
Right to physical and psychological integrity
57. Torture is brutally and systematically practised,
especially by GSSP but also by the National
Information Agency (ANR). Tolerance of the existence
of secret detention centres, lacking any control
whatsoever, contributes to this scourge. One
particularly well-known centre is that of the Litho
Moboti Group (GLM); its commander was detained on
9 March 2000 but unfortunately was freed days later,
with no charges having been filed. Torture is facilitated
by the fact that the Detection of Unpatriotic Activities
Police (DEMIAP) has no public register of detainees,
and in the provincial police inspectorate (formerly
Circo) all detainees are not placed in a single centre, as
the Special Rapporteur observed. Representatives of
the Human Rights Office of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo are not authorized to enter any centre that
is not a prison.
Right to personal liberty
58. This is the right most often threatened.
Journalists, lawyers, religious leaders, human rights
workers, politicians, trade union leaders and others are
detained, generally on the grounds of violating the ban
on political activities or of colluding with the rebels.
The times vary from a few days to years. Often, no
charges are filed against the prisoner, although
sometimes detainees are transferred to the Court of
State Security and the Military Court. No one escapes
the risk of jail, not even retired judges (for example,
the former President of the Supreme Court) or active
judges (a military magistrate), ambassadors (the
representative to Kenya), ministers (six were detained
on 2 June 2000) or other officials at this level, and
even a member of the Constitutional and Legislative
Assembly.
59. A positive step has been the admittedly partial,
discretional and conditional amnesty declared on 19
February 2000, by which some 300 prisoners were
belatedly released. In July 2000, 800 soldiers were also
released, to be sent to the front.
Right to enter and leave the country
60. It is difficult for opponents to leave the country,
since their passports and airline tickets are often
confiscated. Similar problems affect journalists, priests
and human rights activists. Representatives of civil
society were prevented from travelling to Benin to the
preparatory meeting for the national dialogue provided
for in the Lusaka Agreement.
Right to due process
61. The criticisms of the Military Court concerning
procedural irregularities (summary judgements, sole
jurisdiction and others) are still absolutely valid. (See
documents E/CN.4/1999/31, paras. 90, 91 and 137, and
E/CN.4/2000/42, paras. 63, 122 and 137.) Detainees
are held for a long time awaiting trial.
62. One indication of the lack of independence of the
judiciary, which is referred to in Commission on
A/55/403
Human Rights resolution 200/42, is that the ProcuratorGeneral
of the Court of State Security was held in
prison for 30 days for refusing to approve a raid on the
Belgian Embassy. The attorney-general was also
detained.
63. Owing to the lack of guaranties, the 15 defenders
of an independence fighter refused, with his agreement,
to defend him, and he was sentenced to four years of
hard labour.
Freedom of expression and opinion
64. The Special Rapporteur has transmitted
communications to the Government from more than 30
detained journalists, who were tried and/or convicted
by the Military Court or frightened away from
practising their profession. Mobutu's draconian laws
are still in full force. The Vice-Minister of Information
justifies this by saying "we cannot tolerate traitors",
and the President has said that "the law must be
obeyed". The main private television station was
confiscated in March 2000. Independent media have no
access to the authorities.
65. Despite the existence of some newspapers, the
judgement is categorical: there is no freedom of
expression in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Freedom of association
66. Political parties are still banned, unless they
submit to new registration requirements and risk being
rejected. Political activity, even making speeches, is
prohibited. Dozens of leaders and activists have been
detained or prevented from leaving the country or the
city where they live, and their headquarters have been
attacked and ransacked.
67. Human rights organizations suffer similar
treatment. The ban on them has not been lifted.
Economic, social and cultural rights
68. Public employees, except for some in Kinshasa,
have still not been paid, and trade union leaders who
protest against this are accused of endangering State
security. More than a third of the population lack even
the basic necessities of life. The real malnutrition rate,
according to some sources, is 26 per cent.
69. Serious epidemics have been left untreated
because the war uses up most of the country's income.
9
A/SS/403
Situation of women
70. The situation described in previous reports
remains unchanged. A new form of discrimination has
appeared: women's organizations have lost their voice
to a para-State group known as Regroupement des
Femmes Congolaises (REFECO), and their
employment and educational situation has deteriorated
as a result of the war.
71. Sources have told the Special Rapporteur that
8 per cent of women have acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), owing to poverty, Jack of education
and, especially, sexual contact with Rwandan and
Ugandan soldiers, whose countries have a high AIDS
rate.
72. Only 24 out of 300 members of the Constitutional
and Legislative Assembly are women.
Situation of children
73. The right to education has been greatly curtailed
by the war and poverty, resulting in irreparable harm to
many children. Violations of children's rights also
include child labour in inhumane conditions in the
diamond mines.
74. On a more positive note, Decree Law 66 was
enacted in June 2000, demobilizing children and other
vulnerable groups and creating a commission on
demobilization and reintegration.
Freedom of conscience and religion
75. The Special Rapporteur is dealing with this topic
for the first time. The Government regards religious
congregations as enemies who are allied with rebellion
or aggression. Peace messages are viewed with
suspicion, and the proclamation of freedom and justice
are considered subversive. Presbyterian churches, the
Ubangi-Mongola Evangelical Community, the Bundu
dia Kongo sect, the Siani and Unification/Cabinda,
together with German, Austrian and Belgian priests and
a Catholic bishop, have been repressed.
10
VI. Human rights violations committed
in territory occupied by RCD
andMLC
Violations in RCD territory
Right to life
Death penalty
76. The Special Rapporteur had welcomed the fact
that RCD did not apply the death penalty (see
E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 81). Nevertheless, on 17 March
2000, the Conseil de guerre operationnelle, in two
proceedings within 24 hours, tried a corporal, who was
executed on the spot, and three other persons
condemned to death in July 2000 were taken from the
prison and never returned.
Political murders
77. Soldiers referred to as "Banyamulenge",
"Rwandans", "Ugandans" and "Burundians" have
committed countless murders of persons suspected of
being members of the Mai-Mai or Interahamwe.
Among the victims are priests, Protestant pastors,
Baptists, traditional tribal leaders and peaceful citizens.
Three youths were murdered simply because they bore
tattoos, leading Burundian soldiers to assume that they
were members of the Mai-Mai.
Death by torture
78. The frequency and cruelty of torture was
mentioned frequently to the Special Rapporteur. One
person was arrested and tortured to death for carrying
out political activity in Kiwandja (North Kivu) in
March 2000.
Right to physical and psychological integrity
79. Most of the complaints of torture involve the
police headquarters known as chien mechant ("vicious
dog") and "Bureau II", which sources say are
administered by "Rwandan soldiers" and, in Kisangani
and Bunia, by "the Ugandans". It is claimed that
Congolese are among the victims, as well as Rwandans
transferred from Rwanda. The victims are mainly those
suspected of being members of the Mai-Mai and
Interahamwe. Representatives of the Human Rights
Office in Goma can only visit the jails, like other
detention centres. The Special Rapporteur confirmed
that the records of the RCD Sixth Brigade do not
account for all inmates.
Right to liberty of person
Arbitrary detention
80. Human rights defenders, leaders of civil society,
journalists and members of the clergy have continually
been deprived of their freedom and are at constant risk
of being detained again. The arrests are aimed at
suppressing activities lawful in a democratic society,
such as dissidence, criticism, education, culture and
freedom of conscience, or are preventive: persons
suspected of not being devoted to the RCD authorities
are detained because of actions that they might carry
out, as occurred, for example, prior to the civil strikes
carried out in Goma, Bukavu and elsewhere. Resigning
from RCD carries with it the certainty of arrest. The
same thing happens in territory occupied by
RCD/Bunia, where two high-ranking leaders of
RCD/ML were detained and tortured near Bunia in
July 2000.
Deportations
81. In Geneva in March 2000, the RCD authorities
explained to the Special Rapporteur that there are no
cases of deportation of prisoners from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to Rwanda, Uganda or Burundi
and that, at most, prisoners of war are involved. The
incidents are more frequent under RCD/Bunia than
under RCD/Goma. In any event, the Special
Rapporteur emphasizes that, during the period under
review, he learned of various cases of human rights
defenders and others (traders) detained in Congolese
territory and taken to Katuna (Rwanda) or Uganda.
Right to enter and leave one's own country
82. There are lists of persons linked to human rights
organizations who have been prevented from leaving
RCD-controlled territory; many cannot even leave
Kivu. In early March 2000 there were reports of an
ordinance which prevents all Congolese from travelling
to countries other than Rwanda or Burundi without
official permission, which is generally denied. Even
members of the Protestant clergy could not travel to a
conference in Nairobi in 1999.
A/55/403
Right to due process
83 . Generally speaking, defendants are not tried; their
release is at the discretion of the authorities. In any
event, the most serious breaches of the norms of due
process stem from the guarantee of impunity for the
massacres, murders and tortures inflicted on those
accused of inciting hatred. The so-called, belated
prosecution of the person responsible for the deaths of
15 women in Mwenga ended with the flight of the
individual who is seen as the main perpetrator and as
an emblematic figure because of his ferocity. The fact
that those allegedly responsible for the flight are being
prosecuted in no way justifies the action.
Right to freedom of expression and opinion
84. There have been no changes with regard to the
statements made in document E/CN.4/2000/42,
paragraphs 91 to 93. There is no freedom of
expression; there are no daily newspapers; Radio
Maendeleo was returned to its operators, but has been
prohibited from broadcasting political opinion and
news.
85 . In Kisangani, while Rwandans and Ugandans
shared power, the radio stations vehemently incited
racial hatred: Liberte, against the Rwandans, and
RTNC/Rebelde, against the Ugandans. But the victims
are Congolese.
Freedom of association
86. There are, of course, no political parties, except
RCD and FROUNAR, for example, which RCD formed
prior to the visit of the Facilitator, Ketumile Masire, in
May 2000. All political activity is prohibited and
punished.
Human rights organizations
87. RCD responded to the report of the Special
Rapporteur, claiming that it was established beyond a
doubt that the non-governmental organizations in South
Kivu were operating with financial support from the
Kabila Government and that they are the sources of
information for the Special Rapporteur. That point was
emphasized during the visit. In fact, the nongovernmental
organizations are severely persecuted,
always on the charge of inciting ethnic hatred, but not a
shred of evidence has been presented in this regard.
Many defenders have been imprisoned, tortured and
threatened and many have had to seek refuge abroad.
11
A/55/403
Freedom of assembly
88. No aJlegedly critical gatherings are tolerated, and
the protests called villes mortes (civil strikes) have
been suppressed with arrests and threats.
Economic, social and cultural rights
89. The extremely serious situation throughout the
country is particularly serious in the east: malnutrition
in Kisangani reportedly affects 30 per cent of adults
and 60 per cent of children. Civil servants remain
unpaid. The health care system is destroyed and family
members usuaJly take turns eating.
Situation of women
90. In addition to the Mwenga incident, mention
should be made of the arrests of feminist activities,
rapes and beatings of female secondary-school students
detained for insisting on the validity of their
examinations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and continual cases of rape of women detainees.
Situation of children
91. As in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
RCD is establishing a commission for demobilization
of child soldiers. Nevertheless, the Mission has noted
that the level of recruitment of children is much higher
in the east than under Kabila. An example of this is
Nyaleke, near Beni, where Ugandan soldiers are
training 10-year-old children.
Freedom of conscience and religion
92. In RCD territory, too, the Catholic and Protestant
churches are persecuted because of their messages of
peace; this has made it possible to assert that the only
thing that unites Rwandans and Ugandans is their
hatred of the Christian churches. In the east the
majority Catholic Church has been the most
persecuted: murders of several priests, banishment of
the Archbishop of Bukavu, attacks on convents and
parish houses, and so on.
Human rights violations in MLC
territory
93 . There is minimal information on the region,
which has negligible civic activity. There arc very few
non-governmental organizations and newspapers. The
12
Special Rapporteur spent a few hours visiting the smaJI
hamlet of Gbadolite, but was unable to visit other
towns in which there are more victims of human rights
violations.
VII. Violations of international
humanitarian law
A. Violations by the Government, allies
and related groups
Government
94. The Government is responsible for the bombings
of the Libenge hospital on 27 July 2000; of Gemena
and elsewhere, which affected civilian populations; and
of aircraft loaded with poliomyelitis vaccines ( war
against MLC).
Mai-Mai
95. The Government's support for the Mai-Mai
makes it responsible for the offences perpetrated by the
latter. While, generaJly speaking, they attack Rwandan
and RCD soldiers, they have also committed violence
against civilians suspected of coJlaborating with those
whom they regard as the "enemy". The growing
popularity which they enjoy among the Congolese does
not absolve them of responsibility. Among their acts of
brutality are those at Lubero in April 2000, Nyabibwe,
Numbi (50 dead) and Kihuha in July 2000.
Interahamwe/ex-FAR combatants
96. The Interahamwe and ex-FAR combatants are
responsible for attacks on the civilian population
(Loashi, Luhinzi, Rutshuru, Kione, Ngesha and many
others). In the villages which they attack they
commonly rape women and girls.
Freed Rwandan prisoners
97. It should be noted that freed Rwandan prisoners
who had been held in Kinshasa acknowledged that they
had been weJI treated while they had been prisoners of
the Zimbabweans, to the point where at least four
preferred to stay in Kinshasa rather than return to their
homeland.
B. Violations by RCD, RCD/ML, MLC
and allied foreign military forces
Components of RCD
98. The population does not distinguish among the
various components of RCD, which it identifies as
Rwandan soldiers or Banyamulenge.
99. Any attack by members of the Interahamwe, MaiMai,
and so on is met by totally disproportionate
violence; massacres are committed, resulting in many
deaths. Mere suspicion of sympathy with the Mai-Mai
provokes reprisals against the civilian population:
Ngenge (November 1999); Kalehe (December 1999, 23
dead); Kilambo (February 2000, 60 dead); Katogota
(May 2000, 40 to 300 dead); Kamanyola, Lurbarika,
Luberezi, Cidaho, Uvira, Shabunda; Lusenda-Lubumba
(July 2000, 150 dead).
100. Particularly reprehensible is the treatment of
prisoners by Rwandan soldiers. The Special Rapporteur
visited one Congolese soldier taken prisoner in
Katanga who was beaten, tortured, castrated and
abandoned, a practice condemned earlier by the Special
Rapporteur (see E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 117).
10 I. Humanitarian assistance has been intercepted and
diverted to Congolese Batusti repatriated from
Rwanda.
Burundian soldiers
102. Burundian soldiers are accused of killing nine
civilians in Sebele in reprisal for a Mai-Mai attack in
April 2000.
Ugandan troops
103. Ugandan troops have murdered civilians. The
most serious incidents occurred during the UgandanRwandan
battle at Kisangani, in whose vicinity,
furthermore, they planted antitank and ·anti-personnel
mines.
104. In alliance with the Bahema, they have committed
atrocities against civilians (for example, Libi, March
2000, nine dead) and taken civilians prisoner, including
children (Walendu Tatsi).
105. Ugandan troops also shelled a boat in which
women and children were fleeing the war, causing
some 30 deaths; no assistance was given to them.
106. They recruit many child soldiers.
VIII. Conclusions and
recommendations
A. Conclusions
The catastrophe in Central Africa
A/SS/403
I 07. Central Africa is a region of great riches, but its
inhabitants are living in extreme poverty. The terrible
history of unscrupulous dictators - all of whom,
however, had support from abroad - is one of the
causes of the catastrophic situation that now exists.
Eight national armies and numerous armed groups are
involved in the primary war between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi, which may rightly be called the first world
war in Africa, and nine more armed conflicts are taking
place in the same country. Extreme poverty, which
existed even prior to the current wards, has reached
catastrophic levels that have been further increased by
the war. The Congolese people cannot understand why
those responsible for their problems, who are members
of the international community, do not come to their
aid now.
108. The parties, their allies, other African countries,
the major Powers, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and the United Nations have failed to achieve
peace since it seems that economic and political
interests other than those of the Congolese people are
involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
the Congolese are aware of this fact. There can be no
peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without
lasting peace in the region. There are historical
conflicts and ambitions that require long-term solutions
based on respect for principles on which there can be
no disagreement: respect for the human rights of all
Congolese, justice for those responsible for the crimes
against humanity which have been committed and
respect for the borders inherited from the colonial era.
The armed conflict
109. None of the parties to the nine conflicts, whether
internal, internationalized internal or international, is
fully respecting the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement,
although there has been no significant change in their
positions. The Congolese consider the Rwandan,
Ugandan and Burundian armies to be "aggressors"
rather than as providing support to the rebels. While
the activities of the Interahamwe and Mai-Mai are the
13
A/SS/403
primary cause of the violence, it is the armies of
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Rassemblement
congolais pour la democratie (RCD) which are causing
the greatest damage and which have once again
committed terrible massacres of the civilian
population. In addition, Rwanda and Uganda have
expanded their own conflicts into Congolese territory,
causing death and destruction on neighbouring soil.
The occupation of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
110. The Special Rapporteur has often been asked
whether the occupation of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo should be considered permanent. That issue
should not even be raised since there can be no
justification for the conquest or partition of a country
by foreign forces. This is the position stated in the
fourth preambular paragraph of Security Council
resolution 1304 (2000). In occupied territory, the sense
of humiliation and terror described in previous reports
still prevails.
Immediate effects of the Special Rapporteur's
visit
111. Days prior to the visit, and particularly during his
visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, both in
Government- and RCD-controlled territory, prisoners
were freed or transferred from illegal detention centres
to official jails; judicial proceedings that should have
begun months previously were opened; sick prisoners
were given better medical care and journalists were
given greater access to information sources.
Violations of international humanitarian law
112. The most serious incidents were the massacres
committed by RCD and Rwandan forces, attacks on
civilians during the Rwandan-Ugandan wars and
Government bombing of civilian populations in the
north.
Human rights
113. In the Government-controlled territory, the rights
most affected are political rights (participation,
assembly, association and freedom of expression). In
RCD- and RCD/ML-controlled territory, the rights
most often violated are human rights (life and physical
integrity) without prejudice to political freedom. There
14
is insufficient information on the MLC-controlled
territory.
Right to democracy
114. Neither the Government authorities nor those of
RCD, RCD/ML or MLC have taken any steps towards
democracy. The Government continues to reject all
dialogue with the national democratic opposition; it
persecutes political parties, continues to declare them
illegal and punishes their leaders and activists. It
rejects the mediator whom it had previously accepted.
It is establishing new and illegal structures. In the
occupied territories there is only one party, either RCD
or MLC. Other parties only appear to exist. Those not
in sympathy with RCD have ceased all activities and
their leaders have chosen exile. MLC is the only party
in the territory it controls.
Human rights advocates
115. They are persecuted by both sides; one considers
them to be "in league with the rebels", the other
considers them to be "in Kabila's pay" or
"Interahamwe or Mai-Mai collaborators".
Death penalty
116. The Government maintains it but has not
implemented it since February 2000. RCD, which had
never implemented it, began to do so in 2000.
Liberty of person
117. It is constantly violated, and there are many
political prisoners on both sides. The Kinshasa amnesty
was encouraging, but it did not affect all prisoners and
politically-motivated imprisonment of, inter alia,
Ministers and other high-level officials has continued.
Freedom of expression
118. There is none. In Government-controlled
territory, there are a few newspapers with a limited
circulation and journalists are regularly harassed. In
RCD-controlled territory there are no opposition
newspapers and the few independent radio stations
have been shut down, censored and prevented from
broadcasting any news programmes other than the
official ones.
j.
Torture
119. Torture is practised by all parties and in many
instances it has resulted in death.
Right to due process
120. It is not respected by any of the parties. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Military Court,
which is the only court in which civilians, journalists
and human rights advocates are tried, remains fully
functional. Victims of human rights violations are not
granted redress, a fact which further confirms impunity.
In RCD-controlled territory, the death penalty has been
reinstituted through trials of the most summary nature
in which no defense is admitted.
Freedom of movement
121. In both Kinshasa and Goma, members of the
opposition are prevented from leaving the country and
even from movement within it.
122. But the most serious issue is the deportation of
Congolese citizens to Rwanda, where, in many cases,
all trace of the prisoner is lost.
Freedom of conscience
123. In both sectors, religious persecution has been a
constant throughout the year. Bishops, priests and
ministers have been arrested, tortured, expelled and
murdered. The most emblematic case has been that of
the Archbishop of Bukavu, who was expelled from his
diocese by RCD.
Persons at risk
124. The Government, with international assistance,
has continued to provide protection to people who look
like Tutsi in order to prevent reprisals against them,
thereby disproving accusations of genocide.
Women and children
125. The situation continues to worsen. The
Government and RCD have taken steps to demobilize
children, but neither MLC nor the Ugandan troops have
done so.
A/55/403
B. Recommendations
The parties in the wars
126. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
parties in the wars should: (a) fully implement the
Lusaka Agreement and the necessary agreed
adjustments thereto, considering the provisions of
Security Council resolution 1304 (2000); (b) cooperate
with the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC); and (c)
put an end to all forms of impunity.
The Government
127. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
Government should: (a) immediately establish the
inter-Congolese dialogue, cooperating closely and
actively with the Facilitator, who is a friend of the
Congolese people, and with those who accompany him;
(b) repeal the legislation on political parties and nongovernmental
organizations, recognize those which
already exist and allow them to operate; (c) abolish the
death penalty; (d) eliminate the Military Court; (e) free
all political prisoners; (f) cease all forms of pressure or
censorship of the press; (g) abolish the Constitutional
and Legislative Assembly in order to permit the
dialogue agreed to in Lusaka; {h) cease all cooperation
with the Mai-Mai and the Interahamwe; (i) commute
death sentences; (j) begin the demobilization of child
soldiers; (k) restore relations with other States,
intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations
and OAU and attend the conferences and meetings
organized by them since none of them is an enemy of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all of them
are simply endeavouring to assist it; (I) authorize the
Human Rights Field Office in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to visit not only the jails, but all places of
detention; (m) implement a human rights action plan;
and (n) give international human rights instruments
precedence over national law and honour the
commitments made under them.
RCD and other rebel groups
128. The Special Rapporteur recommends that RCD
and other rebel groups should: (a) cease all cooperation
with foreign armies; (b) avoid committing any act
which implies the exercise of sovereignty· over foreign
armies (including the flying of flags, partition or
creation of provinces, town-twinning or sale of public
property); (c) refrain from issuing fictitious accounts of
15
A/55/403
the atrocities committed by their troops and foreign
allies and conduct objective investigations of
allegations; ( d) free political prisoners; ( e) demand that
their foreign allies return the deported Congolese to the
State; (f) abolish the death penalty; (g) cease to
interpret all acts of opposition as an alleged incitement
to ethnic hatred; (h) permit organizations of civil
society, particularly human rights organizations, to
function freely; and (i) demobilize child soldiers.
Foreign armies occupying Congolese territory
129. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
foreign armies occupying Congolese territory should:
(a) implement the Lusaka Agreement and, in particular,
Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), which
demands that they should withdraw immediately and
prior to the withdrawal of the forces present at the
Government's invitation; (b) accept the fact that they
have lost all respect in the eyes of the Congolese
people and refrain from all reprisal; ( c) permit
investigations of violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law and, in particular, of the
massacres that took place on 2 August 1998;
{d) provide immediate compensation to the victims of
the incidents that occurred at Kisangi and in other parts
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
( e) return the Congolese property that has been taken
from the country since 1998.
Organs of the United Nations
130. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
organs of the United Nations should: (a) continue to
support the peace process in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the inter-Congolese dialogue;
(b) heed the words of the special rapporteurs on human
rights in order to prevent recurrence of the incident
reported in the Carlsson report on the occasion of the
genocide in Rwanda, which a special rapporteur had
predicted a year in advance without any action being
taken. This recommendation is especially important in
light of the establishment of peacekeeping
mechanisms; (c) provide greater financial and logistical
assistance to the mechanisms of the Commission on
Human Rights; and (d) establish an effective arms
embargo on all countries involved in the Congolese
conflict.
16
Other organs of the international community
131. The Special Rapporteur recommends that other
organs of the international community should:
(a) support the peace process, the inter-Congolese
dialogue and the democratization process; and
(b) make their voices heard and their moral authority
felt with regard to the massacres committed on
Congolese soil.
Notes
1 Chad withdrew its forces on 26 May 1999. The Sudan
has troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but
these are not participating in the fighting.
2 The Security Council (see S/PRST/2000/20) established
an expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
1 The Mai-Mai guerrillas, originally from the Banande and
Bahunde tribes, have en listed thousands of young people
from all ethnic groups who are opposed to what they
refer to as "Rwandan aggression". See E/CN.4/1999/42,
note 4.
4 In his report to the Commission on Human Rights (see
E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 18), the Special Rapporteur stated
that there is a general feeling throughout the country that
the international community is not doing anything to end
the conflict but that when that abstraction does do
something, it is rejected for doing so. This reaction
confirms this.
' See, for example, the statement by the Conference of
Catholic Bishops in August 2000.
6 The Special Rapporteur's report to the Commission on
Human Rights (E/CN.4/2000/42) deals with individual
cases of human rights violations.
UCMANNEX7
United Nations S,20001888
(•) Security Council
~ ~
Distr.: General
21 September 2000
Original: English
Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
I. Introduction
I. In its resolution 1316 (2000) of 23 August 2000,
the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of
the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 15
October 2000 to allow time for further diplomatic
activities in support of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
(S/1999/815, annex).
2. In the same resolution, the Security Council
requested the Secretary-General to report on progress
in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and
relevant Council resolutions and to make
recommendations for further Council action. The
present report is submitted pursuant to that request and
reflects developments since the Secretary-General's
third report on MONUC, dated 12 June 2000
(S/2000/566 and Corr. I).
II. Political developments
3. Following the meeting on 28 July of the Political
Committee established under the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement, a summit of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) was convened in
Windhoek on 7 August with a view to discussing,
among other issues, ways and means to overcome the
difficulties encountered in the · implementation of the
Agreement.
4. Subsequently, President Chiluba of Zambia
convened and chaired a summit of the parties to the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and SADC countries, held
00-64944 (E) 210900
*DD64944*
in Lusaka on 14 August. The summit was attended by
the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe,
Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Lesotho,
South Africa, Swaziland and the United Republic of
Tanzania. My Special Representative for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the SecretaryGeneral
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
and the Secretary of SADC also participated in the
summit.
5. The summit, which ended in the early hours of 15
August after some 18 hours of continuous discussion,
failed to make any progress on the issues referred to in
paragraph 3 above, principally because of the
reluctance of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to allow the deployment of
MONUC troops to government-controlled territory and
to accept Sir Ketumile Masire as the neutral facilitator.
6. The communique issued at the end of the Lusaka
summit welcomed the readiness of the United Nations
to commence deployment, acknowledging, at the same
time, that the existing conditions in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo had not made it possible for
such deployment to begin. The summit recalled the
guarantees that the signatories to the Lusaka
Agreement had given on 23 February 2000 to ensure
the safety, protection and freedom of movement of
United Nations personnel, and appealed to the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to cooperate fully with MONUC and to satisfy the
conditions necessary for deployment. With the
exception of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the participants in the summit
S/2000/888
reaffirmed their support for the neutral facilitator. An
appeal was made to the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to reconsider its position in
order to ensure the speedy finalization of arrangements
for the convening of the inter-Congolese dialogue.
Mission of the Special Envoy to the
region
7. During the reporting period, maintained
extensive contacts with regional leaders, in particular
President Chiluba. However, despite the efforts of all
concerned, the peace process remained at an impasse. I
therefore took the decision to dispatch a Special Envoy
to the subregion to discuss with President Kabila and
other regional leaders the issues outstanding.
8. After obtaining the concurrence of the Security
Council, I appointed General Abdulsalami Abubakar,
former Head of State of Nigeria, as my Special Envoy
to undertake this challenging mission. From 20 to 24
August, General Abubakar travelled to Kinshasa,
Lusaka and Addis Ababa to convey the position of the
United Nations with regard to the status of the peace
process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
President Kabila, as well as to President Chiluba and
the Secretary-General of OAU, Salim A. Salim.
9. During his meeting with President Kabila, my
Special Envoy reaffirmed the mandate of MONUC and
emphasized that the cooperation and support of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
were indispensable to the successful implementation of
the Lusaka Agreement. He requested the Government
to cease all hostilities, extend full freedom of
movement to MONUC and comply with the provisions
of the status-of-forces-agreement concluded between
the Government and the United Nations. My Special
Envoy also stressed that the Government should cease
any participation in or support for the campaign of
vilification conducted against MONUC and the United
Nations in the Kinshasa press. In addition, General
Abubakar underscored that progress could not be made
in the military aspects of the Lusaka Agreement unless
the inter-Congolese dialogue were permitted to
proceed. In this regard, the issue of the neutral
facilitator was also extensively discussed.
I 0. While appreciating the firmness of the message
delivered, President Kabila maintained that the
obstacles to the implementation of the Lusaka
2
Agreement were not caused by the Government but by
the "aggressors". He criticized the international
community for closing its eyes to the problems of his
country and to the fact that it was a victim of
aggression. He insisted that the invasion of his country
be urgently addressed and that the uninvited foreign
forces be asked by the international community to
leave without delay. My Special Envoy briefed the
members of the Security Council on his mission to the
region on 30 August.
11. On 23 August, the day of the Special Envoy's
departure, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the
Minister of the Interior of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo jointly informed my Special Representative,
Kamel Morjane, that the Government would
thenceforth authorize the deployment of United
Nations battalions to Mbandaka, Kananga, Kindu and
Kisangani. The ministers also advised him of a
relaxation of the restrictions on the Mission's freedom
of movement and authorized the deployment of a small
United Nations military headquarters support unit to
Kinshasa, on the condition that its personnel would
bear arms only while on duty. Subsequently, MONUC
received a note verbale dated 24 August from the
Commissariat General of the Government in charge of
MONUC affairs, reiterating, albeit with a somewhat
different interpretation, the above undertakings by the
Government.
12. The measures announced by the ministers, and
generally confirmed by the note verbale, represented
only some of the specific measures my Special Envoy
had put forward to President Kabila. In particular, the
Government did not authorize the deployment of
MONUC specialized military units from a potential
troop-contributing country to government-controlled
territory, without which other formed units cannot be
deployed in the near future. Moreover, on the same day
the above long-awaited concessions were announced,
another government minister made a public statement
suspending the Lusaka Agreement and calling for
direct negotiations between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda under the
auspices of the United Nations and OAU as well as for
direct talks between the Government and the rebels.
13. In a letter from President Kabila addressed to me
dated 28 August, many of the sentiments that he had
expressed to my Special Envoy were repeated. The
President recalled that his country was the victim of
aggression. Citing the three clashes waged between
Rwandan and Ugandan troops in Kisangani, the
President reiterated that the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement had failed to address the major concerns of
his Government, including putting an end to the
hostilities. He believed that the Agreement was flawed
and urgently needed to be adjusted. In the letter,
President Kabila also stated that the problem of
aggression should be "disassociated" from the issue of
internal Congolese political dispensation. The
President proposed an international mediation effort to
help bring together the belligerent parties through
direct negotiations. There was no mention of any views
with regard to the deployment of MONUC.
14. The next day, however, the Permanent
Representative of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo addressed a letter to the President of the
Security Council transmitting the position of his
Government with regard to the peace process
(S/2000/837, annex). The Government concluded that
the Lusaka Agreement needed to be revised to reflect
the new factors resulting from the fighting in Kisangani
and from Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) of
16 June 2000. The Government reiterated its belief that
the "war of aggression" needed to be separated from
the political conflict between the Government and a
number of armed Congolese factions, and repeated the
proposal with regard to the direct talks with the
uninvited foreign forces . In the letter of 29 August, it
was also noted that the Government had decided to cut
back on the "precautionary measures" taken thus far
with respect to MONUC as regards both the status and
movements of MONUC troops, and listed the
undertakings of the Government along the lines of
those given to my Special Representative by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the
Interior on 23 August.
15. On 11 September I met with Foreign Minister
Yerodia, who was visiting the United Nations as
President Kabila 's Special Envoy to the Millennium
Summit. I took this opportunity to explain once again
the position of the United Nations with regard to the
deployment of MONUC, underscoring major
difficulties still experienced by the Mission and my
concern over the continuing ceasefire violations
committed by the Government as well as by rebel
forces and their allies. The Minister stated his
Government's belief that MONUC troops should serve
as an interposition force . When I suggested that this
could be considered in the third phase of MONUC
S/2000/888
deployment, he observed that the Congolese people
would not understand the reasons for such delays and
could not wait in vain.
16. With regard to the inter-Congolese dialogue, Mr.
Yerodia reiterated his Government's request to replace
Sir Ketumile as facilitator. I urged him to consider
working with a facilitation team so that the peace
process could move forward, as was proposed by my
Special Envoy during his visit to the region. The
Foreign Minister also indicated that since, according to
him, the already fragmented rebellion did not and could
not exist without its external sponsors, his Government
wished to engage thenceforth in a direct dialogue with
the uninvited foreign forces .
17. In his contacts with senior United Nations
officials during his stay in New York, Mr. Yerodia
reiterated his Government's acceptance of the
deployment of United Nations troops along the lines
indicated in paragraphs 11 and 14 above.
Inter-Congolese dialogue
18. As indicated above, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has continued to
reject the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese
dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire. After withdrawing its
confidence from Sir Ketumile and requesting OAU to
propose a new facilitator, the Government temporarily
sealed off his Kinshasa office on 20 June. In an attempt
to overcome the impasse, President Bouteflika of
Algeria, in his capacity as Chairman of OAU, tried in
vain to organize a mini-summit in Algiers on 4 July.
Likewise, the absence of some dignitaries, including
President Kabila, at the thirty-sixth ordinary session of
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government,
held in Lome from 10 to 12 July, frustrated efforts to
address this issue at the highest level. The summit
adopted a decision urging the Congolese parties, and
particularly the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, to extend full cooperation to
the neutral facilitator. However, at subsequent meetings
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo indicated that it was not ready to modify its
position regarding the facilitator.
19. On 25 July, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo stated in a press
conference that the decision not to cooperate with Sir
Ketumile was irrevocable. Mr. Yerodia added that the
3
S/2000/888
Government now considered the newly established
Constituent Assembly as the appropriate forum for a
national dialogue. The Assembly, whose 300 members
have been appointed by president decree, was
inaugurated on 21 August in Lubumbashi with the
mandate to examine the draft constitution, elaborate
laws on political institutions and oversee Government
activities. At the Assembly's special session on 13
September in Kinshasa, the Justice Minister announced
the establishment of a special parliamentary
commission for the inter-Congolese dialogue.
Kisangani assessment mission
20. Pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1304
(2000), I sent a mission to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo from 13 to 23 August to assess the loss of
life and property damage inflicted on the civilian
population of Kisangani as a result of renewed fighting
between Rwandan and Ugandan troops between 5 and
11 June. The mission, led by Omar Bakhet, Director of
the Emergency Response Division of the United
Nations Development Programme, consisted of
personnel from various United Nations departments
and was accompanied by United Nations agency
officials based in Kinshasa. The team was also assisted
by MONUC, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs and non-governmental
organization staff based in Kisangani . The sudden
death of a member of the advance party in Kisangani
on 18 August delayed the arrival of the full team to the
city until 22 August. Despite this regrettable event, the
team was able to visit the city, conduct meetings in
Kinshasa and make a preliminary assessment.
III. Military developments
Ceasefire violations
21. During the reporting period the parties continued
to conduct significant military operations. Moreover,
there have been indications of intensive military
preparations by the parties. These include the
procurement of large quantities of weapons and
military equipment, extensive recruitment of young
males and freed prisoners; retraining of combat units,
forward deployment of battalions and reinforcement of
front-line units.
4
22. The most intense fighting occurred in the
northern part of Equateur province. After reportedly
blocking the southern movement of elements of the
Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC) along the
Ubangi River, government forces and their allies
pushed the MLC troops back and captured the town of
Imese. Thereafter, the Congolese armed forces (FAC)
were reported to have advanced northward, capturing
Dongo and reaching Libenge. However, on 4 August
MLC claimed that it had halted the government
offensive 50 to 60 kilometres south of Libenge.
23. Following the reinforcements reportedly received
by units of the Ugandan People's Defence Force
(UPDF), MLC launched a major counter-attack in the
south of Libenge, resulting in a high number of
casualties. On 10 August the Government announced
its unilateral decision to end its offensive. In response,
MLC demanded the withdrawal of government forces
back to the 8 April Kampala disengagement line. Since
then, reports indicate that MLC captured the town of
Dongo on 8 September, while FAC and its allies
reinforced their forces in Mbandaka. On 13 September
the MONUC Force Commander travelled to Gbadolite
for a meeting with MLC Chairman Bemba in an
attempt to persuade him to stop the MLC offensives.
24. In a related development, the Government of the
neighbouring Republic of the Congo and the Central
African Republic have recently expressed alarm that
fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
especially in the immediate border areas, has affected
their countries. In particular, large numbers of refugees
continue to enter both countries, and vital maritime
traffic on the Ubangi River has been interrupted,
causing heavy economic losses.
25. On 21 August, the Permanent Representative of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed a
letter to the President of the Security Council
(S/2000/817) in which he alleged that a large-scale
offensive was being prepared by the Ugandan armed
forces. The Government demanded that the Ugandan
and Rwandan forces be withdrawn immediately from
Kisangani and from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo without further delay, and that
all parties abstain from any offensive action during the
process of disengagement and of withdrawal of foreign
forces.
26, Fighting on a less intense scale also occurred in
southern Equateur province around the town of Ike la, a
strategic half-way location on the road connecting
Kisangani and Boende, where troops of the
Rassemblement congolais pour Ja democratie (RCD)
and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) reportedly
attempted to cut off this important outpost. In Kananga
province, RCD reported a number of attacks by
government forces to the south of Kabalo. MONUC
has not been able to verify the accuracy of these
reports, and neither side appears to have gained any
major ground.
27. The military and security situation in the eastern
part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
especially in the Kivus, remained highly volatile. RCD
has complained that pro-government armed groups
continue to launch numerous attacks in North and
South Kivu. One such attack occurred near Uvira on 9
July and resulted in the death of an international relief
worker. Another serious incident took place on JO July,
when the Interahamwe and Mayi Mayi fighters
reportedly attacked a camp for displaced persons at
Sake, near Goma. On 26 August a grenade attack in
Bukavu killed 8 and injured some 40 people. Although
the armed groups responsible for these attacks are not
signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, there
are persistent reports that they receive arms and
training from one of the parties.
Situation in Kisangani
28. Pursuant to resolution 1304 (2000), Rwanda and
Uganda have withdrawn their forces to a distance of
some I 00 kilometres from the centre of Kisangani.
RPA military units have moved south while UPDF
military units withdrew towards the north. Persistent
rumours of re-infiltration and the clandestine presence
of RPA and UPDF soldiers could not be confirmed by
MONUC military observers.
29. However, military and political elements of RCD
have maintained control over the city. On 8 August,
during a meeting with my Special Representative, RCD
leaders indicated their willingness to withdraw their
forces from the city in accordance with a timetable to
be agreed upon with MONUC. This undertaking
notwithstanding, RCD increased its military presence
in Kisangani during the month of August, citing the
threat of an attack by government forces.
S/2000/888
Withdrawal of foreign forces
30. On 22 June Uganda began withdrawing five
UPDF battalions from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, which it characterized as a unilateral gesture in
support of the Kampala disengagement plan. The
Ugandan authorities undertook to withdraw the
remaining troops in accordance with the provisions of
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. MONUC liaison
officers monitored the repatriation of the first troops
who arrived in Entebbe from Buta (Orientale province)
on 2 August. While UPDF officials advised MONUC
that subsequent flights had taken troops to airports in
central and northern Uganda, the veracity of this
information could not be ascertained.
31. On 8 August Rwanda announced the return of
1,000 of its troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. On the same day the Government of Rwanda
announced a proposal for RPA troops to disengage
from certain positions on the front line in order to
provide a clear and wide disengagement zone pursuant
to the Kampala disengagement plan (S/2000/782,
annex). The main elements of the proposal, as
communicated to my Special Representative, included
the redeployment of RPA forces approximately 200
kilometres from the present front line to an
intermediate disengagement line defined by Kole, Bena
Dibele, Lusambo, Lubao, Manao and Moba, and
subsequent redeployment to a line close to the Congo
River delineated by Lubulu, Punia, Kindu, Kibombo,
Samba, Kongolo, Kabalo, Nyunzu and Kalemie.
32. On 28 August the Force Commander of MONUC
held talks with senior Rwandan officials in Kigali and
thereafter forwarded details of the disengagement
initiative to the military authorities of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Force Commander also
wrote to the acting chairman of the Joint Military
Commission on 30 August providing him with details
of the proposed disengagement plans and requesting
that they be presented to the Commission for
consideration at the earliest opportunity.
IV. Cooperation with the Joint
Military Commission
33. MONUC continued to cooperate closely with the
Joint Military Commission and maintained a team of
liaison officers in Lusaka for that purpose. The Mission
5
S/2000/888
assisted in the deployment and logistical support of
regional Jomt military comm1ss1ons in Boende
(Equateur province), Kabinda (Kasai Orientale
province), Kabalo (Katanga province) and Lisala
(Equateur province). Current MONUC liaison officers
are co-located with each regional comm1ss1on.
However, representatives of Rwanda, RCD and MLC
have yet to deploy to the regional joint military
commission in Kabinda. Also, the lack of resources has
not allowed for the deployment of a regional
commission to Kisangani.
34. Following the meetings of the Joint Military
Commission and the Political Committee, held in
Lusaka from 2 to 9 June, and in coordination with the
International Committee of the Red Cross, an exchange
of prisoners of war took place during the second week
of June as follows: the authorities of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo released 88 Rwandan prisoners;
Zimbabwe released 43 Rwandan prisoners; and
Rwanda released 11 Namibian and 35 Zimbabwean
prisoners.
35. At the subsequent plenary meeting held in Lusaka
on 26 and 27 July, the Joint Military Commission
considered detailed plans for disengagement in four
front-line areas: Kabalo, Kabinda, Ikela and the
Kananga-Kinda road. Prior to the plenary meeting,
draft proposals had been discussed and accepted in
principle. The Commission was, however, not able to
approve the plans after the representative of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo announced that he
was under instructions to withhold agreement on the
demilitarization of Ikela and to leave the session unless
the Commission discussed the implementation of
Security Council resolution 1304 (2000). This
approach caused the Commission to suspend its
deliberations on the disengagement plan.
36. At a meeting of the Political Committee that
followed the Joint Military Commission session, the
representative of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo contended that Security Council resolution 1304
(2000) recognized that his country was being occupied
by foreign armed forces and that his Government
would therefore be seeking a revision of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement as well as the mandate of
MONUC. In response, the RCD and MLC movements
stated their support for the Lusaka Agreement.
6
V. Status of deployment of the
Mission
Current deployment
37. As at 15 September, MONUC had a total of 258
liaison officers and military observers. Within the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, teams of military
liaison officers are deployed at the headquarters of the
rebel movements (Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and the
four regional joint military commissions (Boende,
Kabalo, Kabinda and Lisala), in addition to Kinshasa.
Military observer teams are also stationed in six other
locations (Gemena, Isiro, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani
and Mbandaka). Twenty-four liaison officers are
stationed in the capitals of neighbouring countries.
38. MONUC continued to plan and reconnoitre new
sites for military observer teams, but with only limited
success because of the severe restrictions imposed on
the Mission's movement and access. The lack of a
ceasefire in many areas compounded the difficulties, as
the parties have not been disposed to allow deployment
of MONUC military observers in the areas of
confrontation. At the beginning of September, a
number of military observers still awaited, deployment
in Kinshasa because of difficulties preventing their
being dispatched to field sites.
39. Despite numerous problems experienced with the
parties, MONUC undertook technical surveys at
Kisangani, Kananga, Mbandaka and Kindu to assess
their suitability for the stationing of United Nations
battalions. All of these locations represent significant
logistical challenges and require full cooperation from
the Government and other authorities, as well as the
earliest release of facilities currently in use by the
forces occupying those locations. For various logistical
and security reasons, Kindu has been found to be
unsuitable, and the alternative of Kalemie is under
active consideration. MONUC also surveyed facilities
for four sector headquarters that are required for the
implementation of the Kampala disengagement plan.
The first interim sector headquarters, with a small staff
of military and civilian officers, was provisionally
established in Kisangani in early June. A second
interim headquarters is being set up in Kananga.
40. Notwithstanding major difficulties, MONUC set
up elements of a logistics base in Kinshasa to provide
support for the Mission headquarters and teams located
in the western provinces of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. An interim logistics base was also
established in Goma. With the welcome cooperation
extended by the Government of the Central African
Republic, the Mission has made use of the facilities
formerly used by the United Nations Mission in the
Central African Republic (MINURCA) at the airport in
Bangui, which is particularly suited for use as a staging
point for the deployment of contingents and observer
teams. It is anticipated that a status-of-mission
agreement with the Government of the Central African
Republic will be concluded in the near future.
Security of Mission personnel
41. The most serious threat facing MONUC
personnel is the highly volatile confrontations between
the belligerent parties. This risk became clearly evident
in June in Kisangani, where unarmed MONUC
personnel were caught in the middle of cross-fire
between the Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Similar
risks are particularly present in Equateur province.
MONUC flights in this province are also vulnerable; on
at least one occasion MLC threatened to shoot down
United Nations aircraft for not complying with its air
traffic restrictions. In Orientale province, a group of
armed soldiers of the Rassemblement congolais pour la
democratie-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-ML)
occupied the premises of the MONUC observer team in
Bunia on 31 August, seeking protection from an
opposing faction . While this incident was resolved
peacefully, it highlighted the vulnerability of unarmed
MONUC personnel.
42. In Kinshasa, MONUC headquarters often became
the scene of organized demonstrations. The Mission
has also been targeted by an inflammatory propaganda
campaign conducted in the Kinshasa media, some
members of which are known to be closely associated
with the Government. Of special concern are the
allegations made against indjvidual United Nations
staff members. On one occasion, after the publication
of a particularly virulent article, the staff member
concerned received death threats and had to be
withdrawn from MONUC. The very disturbing nature
of the allegations against United Nations staff,
including my Special Representative, prompted the
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,
Bernard Miyet, to write to the Minister for Foreign
S/2000/888
Affairs on 16 August to protest the campaign and
request restraint.
Cooperation of the parties
43. The parties continued to impose severe
restrictions on the Mission's freedom of movement.
The Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo has yet to replace the system of authorizing
flights on a case-by-case basis with a system for
advance notification en bloc, an arrangement that is
essential for the management of the large fleet of
aircraft required. Despite the decisions communicated
to my Special Representative on 23 August (see para.
11 above), the new notification procedure has yet to be
implemented satisfactorily. On 6 and 7 September
MONUC was denied clearance to land at Mbuji Mayi.
Similarly, since 8 August the military authorities in
Mbandaka have refused MONUC flights permission to
land or depart. As a result, the MONUC team in the
city is in urgent need of resupply.
44. At the same time, MLC continues to block the
Mission's efforts to deploy its team to Basankusu and,
as indicated above, has imposed a flight clearance
regime over northern Equateur province. For its part,
the UPDF has restricted MONUC access to the airport
in Lisala. On 11 and 13 September, RCD refused to
provide MONUC with clearances for its scheduled
flights between Goma and Kabala.
45. Despite its numerous approaches, MONUC has
been unable to obtain the necessary cooperation from
local civilian and military authorities in the four
locations proposed for MONUC battalions. Apart from
the limited cooperation from local officials in
Kisangani, none have complied with the Mission's
requests for assistance in identifying suitable sites or
premises. Nor have any agreements been reached on
the use of airport facilities at the deployment locations.
46. As stressed in previous reports, the deployment of
United Nations observers and formed units in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo presents
particularly acute logistical problems. The complexities
and costs of the operation render it imperative that the
parties respect fully the provisions of the status-offorces
agreement. It is unacceptable that, despite the
signing of the agreement, MONUC is still experiencing
serious difficulties involving flight clearance, direct
and indirect taxes, built-in fuel charges (which may
7
S/2000/888
increase the operational costs of MONUC by $10
million per year), provision of communication services
and a highly unfavourable exchange rate (23 .5
Congolese francs to the United States dollar compared
with a market rate that is reaching I 00 francs to the
dollar).
Deployment of United Nations formed
units
47. On 4 July the Government advised MONUC that
it would not tolerate the presence of any "foreign
armed groups", either in Kinshasa or in the large cities.
My Special Representative sought clarification and was
advised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the
restriction was not intended to apply to all proposed
United Nations contingents. On 14 July MONUC
informed the Government of the impending arrival of a
headquarters support unit. However, in a public
statement on 21 July, President Kabila accused
MONUC of being inactive and failing to protect his
country from external aggression and asked the United
Nations not to deploy any armed troops to Kinshasa
and Mbandaka. Immediately thereafter, my Special
Representative met with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who reiterated the Government's position
prohibiting the deployment of United Nations armed
troops to Kinshasa or any large city in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
48. During a meeting with my Special Representative
on 23 July, President Kabila maintained the same
position and spoke of a "misunderstanding" between
the Untied Nations and the Government regarding the
mandate of MONUC. It was the Government's view
that MONUC should deploy exclusively to the rebelcontrolled
areas in order to accompany foreign armed
forces to the border. My Special Representative
explained to the President that the position of the
United Nations was guided by the provisions of
Security Council resolutions 1291 (2000) and 1304
(2000) regarding the freedom of movement and
cooperation to be accorded to MONUC. President
Kabila asked for a period of reflection to review the
situation. On 27 July the Government restated its
opposition to the deployment of United Nations troops
on government-controlled territory. This position was
confirmed when the Minister for Human Rights, in his
capacity as President Kabila 's Special Envoy, met with
8
the members of the Security Council on 3 August in
New York.
49. In view of the restrictions imposed by the
Government, MONUC was obliged to postpone the
deployment of the headquarters support unit and a
reconnaissance team of one of the planned battalions.
The Government also continued to reject a potential
troop-contributing country that was to provide the bulk
of the specialized units. Plans to deploy formed units
have therefore been placed on hold.
50. Despite these developments, the Secretariat has
actively continued preparations for phase II
deployment of MONUC by working closely with
potential troop contributors. Its efforts notwithstanding,
the United Nations still lacks the necessary offers for
indispensable specialized units, especially in cargo
handling. In addition, some battalions that have been
offered by troop contributors still require some major
equipment in order to be fully operational; I once again
appeal to potential donors to consider providing them
with the necessary equipment and training.
Practical measures necessary to initiate
phase II deployment
51. Pursuant to the recently adopted position of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
that it would authorize United Nations troops to deploy
to the four proposed cities (see paras. 11 and 14
above), the United Nations developed a list of practical
measures necessary to initiate phase II deployment,
which was conveyed to Foreign Minister Yerodia on 11
September. These essential practical measures, which
are in conformity with the provisions of the status-offorces
agreement, included full freedom of movement
of MONUC, joint air safety measures at airports,
provision of and access to facilities at airports,
presence of MONUC air operations officers at air
terminals when MONUC flights are departing or
landing, access to river ports and facilities, granting of
communication licences and frequencies and resolution
of the issues of the currency exchange rate and the
impos1tlon of indirect taxes, as well as other
indispensable requirements.
VI. Humanitarian aspects
52. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo continued to deteriorate over
the past three months. The number of displaced persons
is estimated by the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to have risen from 1.4
million in June to 1.8 miJlion in mid-September,
principally as a result of the clashes between Rwandan
and Ugandan troops in Kisangani, intensified hostilities
in the Kivus and the current fighting in northern
Equateur province. In addition, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that
the number of Congolese refugees in the Republic of
Congo has reached 85,000, and as many as 20,000
Congolese refugees may have fled into the Central
African Republic. Humanitarian assistance could not
reach a significant proportion of those refugees
because of the fighting or other difficulties.
53. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Sadako Ogata, visited the Democratic
Republic of the Congo from 21 to 23 June and met
with President Kabila to discuss key issues in the
humanitarian crisis. She stressed the human costs that
the conflict has incurred and asked that the
Government take this into consideration during peace
negotiations.
54. The United nations humanitarian agencies have
recently launched a major initiative in Equateur
province to deliver urgently needed life-saving support
to more than 400,000 war-affected persons. However,
agencies involved in this operation are currently
encountering serious problems in obtaining
Government clearance to operate in southern Equateur
province.
55. The number of persons estimated to be in critical
need of food in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
remains 16 million, or roughly 33 per cent of the
country's population. The uprooting of rural
populations and isolation from their traditional food
sources as well as the declining economic situation
continue to be the underlying causes of this troubling
situation. Chronic food shortages are steadily reaching
critical dimensions, most notably in displaced
communities in northern Katanga province (Pweto) and
southern Equateur province (Bokungu-Ikela).
56. In Kisangani, the clashes between Rwandan and
Ugandan forces in early June are estimated to have
S/2000/888
resulted in the deaths of as many as 760 civilians and
the displacement of some 61,000 persons. More than
1,740 injured civilians were treated in medical centres
from 11 to 16 June. Among the humanitarian agencies,
one staff member of Medecins sans frontieres (MSF)Belgium/
Holland was killed and three United Nations
staff members were injured. Unexploded mines and
shells continue to pose a danger in the city and its
environs. Material losses in the city include 4,000
homes damaged or destroyed and more than 60 schools
and other public buildings damaged, including the
Catholic cathedral and the Tshopo power plant, which
were hit by shells. Buildings occupied by the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and MONUC and
by MSF were also hit.
57. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, the World Food Programme, UNICEF, the
World Health Organization (WHO) and many nongovernmental
organizations have been active in
responding to the crisis in Kisangani. MONUC
provided air and vehicle transport for the emergency
response. Donors, including the Governments of
Belgium, Italy and the United States of America as
well as the European Union provided timely financial
assistance. A total of 170 tons of emergency food and
non-food items were airlifted into Kisangani from
Kinshasa and 172.5 tons were airlifted from Goma
during the initial stages of the crisis, and more
assistance followed.
58. The health situation in the country has also
continued to decline. The war, poor sanitary conditions
among displaced populations and residents and
malnutrition have created a fertile ground for the
outbreak and spread of numerous iJlnesses and
infectious diseases, including sexually transmitted
diseases. Women and children are among the groups
most affected by the crisis. In addition to epidemic
outbreaks of cholera, mening111s, dysentery and
malaria, WHO has reported the emergence and reemergence
of other serious illnesses, such as
haemorrhagic fever.
59. UNICEF and WHO, in conjunction with Rotary
International and a number of national and
international partners, launched the second consecutive
nationwide polio vaccination campaign. During the
first and second phases, more than I 0.2 million
children throughout the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, representing 96 per cent of the target group,
were vaccinated. Only three health zones - all located
9
S/2000/888
in Equateur province - did not carry out any
immunization because of the ongoing fighting between
Government forces and the MLC troops. In the interior
of the country, MONUC personnel assisted in the
implementation of the vaccination programme. The
Executive Director of UNICEF, Carol Bellamy, visited
the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 10 to 13
August and took part in the launching of the second
round of national immunization days in Mbuji Mayi on
11 August. The final phase of the immunization
campaign was inaugurated on 15 September in
Lubumbashi, Katanga province.
60. In the Kivus, the increased security risk to health
personnel has forced the suspension of humanitarian
operations by some agencies, further increasing the
vulnerability of displaced persons and residents. Armed
groups continue to attack civilians, causing numerous
casualties and rendering travel in the area extremely
dangerous.
VII. Human rights
61. The human rights situation throughout the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
continued to be cause for grave concern. Since my
previous report, the situation in the rebel-controlled
areas has deteriorated significantly with indications
that belligerents may be pursuing a deliberate strategy
to terrorize the civilian population. The situation in the
eastern provinces is particularly troubling owing to the
existence of myriad bands of armed militiamen, the
destruction of civil society and the absence of
governmental structures. The violence in the east
frequently occurs along ethnic lines, particularly in
Ituri and the Kivus. In this context, the high incidence
of murder of women and children of Rwandan origin
should be noted.
62. In September the situation in Bukavu became
particularly worrisome with the arbitrary arrest and
detention of four members of the Constituent Assembly
and grenade explosions that killed eight people. With
respect to Kisangani, the clashes between Rwandan and
Ugandan troops subjected its inhabitants to extensive
and indiscriminate bombing and destruction. As a
result, the human rights situation there continues to
rank as one of the most serious. However, on a positive
note, Archbishop Kataliko was recently authorized by
the RCD to return to Bukavu, seven months after being
prevented from returning by RCD authorities. The four
JO
detained members of the Constituent Assembly were
reportedly released on 19 September.
63. On Government-controlled territory, despite the
authorities' stated commitment to a moratorium on the
death penalty and the establishment of a military court
appeals chamber, executions continued, albeit at a
reduced rate. There are also no indications that the
military court system will be reformed. The system was
established to try cases of abuse by military and police
officers and armed robbery. However, civilians such as
journalists and political opponents continue to be tried
by these courts for other crimes, in violation of
international law. Moreover, notwithstanding the use of
death penalty sentences, defendants before military
courts have no right of appeal and, in some cases, no
legal representation. Recently, a state prosecutor sought
the death penalty for students convicted of the minor
offence of vandalizing.
64. Another matter of concern is the recent
announcement by the Minister of the Interior that the
Government will prosecute for "high crimes against
State security" persons not affiliated with a registered
political party who make political statements. The
Director of the special branch of the national police
announced that any individual involved in unauthorized
political act1v1t1es would be arrested. As a
consequence, the leader of People's Revolutionary
Movement was arrested on 22 July for calling upon
President Kabila to meet with the political opposition
and participate in the inter-Congolese dialogue. While
the leader was temporarily released to receive medical
treatment on 8 August, she was reportedly sent back to
prison on 12 September. Also, 10 members of the
Democratic Union and the Social Progress Party have
been arrested and detained for holding party meetings.
These targeted restrictions on freedom of expression
and freedom of association are completely at odds with
fundamental human rights, as well as the express
requirements of the Lusaka Agreement.
65. Recently, several non-governmental organizations
concerned with human rights issued communiques
denouncing the gross violations of human rights in
both government- and rebel-held areas. They called
upon the Government to respect fundamental freedoms
and the rule of law and stated that the country's longterm
development depended on making human rights a
central concern - with human rights conceived in
terms of authentic political participation, credible
governmental representation and legal accountability.
66. The Special Rapporteur on the human rights
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Roberto Garreton, visited the country from 13 to 26
August. He held meetings with civil, judicial and
military officials, representatives of human rights
organizations, non-governmental organizations, trade
unions and religious and political groups and
journalists. He also visited prisons and detention
centres in both government- and rebel-controlled areas.
Mr. Garreton observed that positive steps had been
taken by the Government, including the promulgation
of a decree on amnesty, which led to the release of
several hundred prisoners of conscience. However,
further improvements, such as military court reform,
the elimination of the death penalty and ratification of
the two additional protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, were still being awaited.
VIII. Child protection
67. On 9 June President Kabila signed a decree
banning the recruitment of children under the age of 18
into the armed forces and the deployment of child
soldiers to combat zones. My Special Representative
for children and armed conflict, Olara Otunnu,
welcomed the new law and urged both the Government
and rebel factions to begin immediately to disarm
under-age combatants, remove them from the front line
and return them to their homes and schools. On 15 May
the RCD rebel movement also issued an instruction to
establish an interdepartmental commission on the
demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers in the
territory under their control. However the commission
has yet to be established.
68. Reports from MONUC observers indicate that the
belligerent parties continue to recruit children and send
them to the front line for combat duties. A serious
decrease in school attendance has been reported in the
eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
owing in part to the intensified recruitment practices.
Parents are reported to have become reluctant to send
their children to school because of the danger of
forcible recruitment.
69. MONUC has continued to provide training on
child protection issues to the newly arrived military
observers· and to inform all parties of the rights of
children, including the importance of implementing
immediately minimum protection measures. During
S/2000/888
this period, a MONUC child protection adviser was
deployed to Goma.
IX. Exploitation of natural resources
70. In a presidential statement dated 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested the
Secretary-General to establish a panel of experts on the
illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms
of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Accordingly, on 31 July I addressed a letter to the
President of the Security Council informing her that I
intended to appoint as Chairperson of the panel
Satiatou Ba-N'Daw, former Minister of Energy of Cote
d'Ivoire, and that I also intended to appoint four
members to the panel. The panel members assembled
in New York during the week of 12 September and
received the necessary briefings. The panel will be
based in Nairobi, where it is expected to begin
activities by the end of September.
X. Financial aspects
7 I. The General Assembly, by its resolution 54/260 A
of 7 April 2000, granted me commitment authority,
with assessment, in the amount of $200 million to
cover the Mission's immediate requirements and to
enable it to initiate logistical preparations for the
phased deployment of the formed military personnel.
Subsequently, in its resolution 54/260 B of 15 June
2000, the Assembly, taking into account the amount of
$58.7 million committed for MONUC during the
period ending 30 June 2000, authorized me to use,
during the 12-month period beginning I July 2000, the
amount of $141.3 million, representing the balance of
the commitment authority provided for MONUC in its
resolution 54/260 A.
72. As at 31 August, unpaid assessed contributions to
the MONUC special account amounted to $136.4
million. The total outstanding assessed contributions
for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted
to $2,434 million.
XI. Observations and conclusions
73. Over the past three months, and in particular
since the adoption of resolution I 316 (2000), efforts
have intensified by many concerned to put the peace
11
S/2000/888
process back on track. The dedication and perseverance
of regional leaders who have been working tirelessly
towards this goal should be particularly acknowledged.
I also welcome the presidential statement issued by the
Security Council on 7 September concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/PRST/2000/28),
demonstrating the importance the international
community attaches to this vital issue.
74. However, I regret to inform the Security Council
that there has been little progress, if any, in the
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.
The ceasefire has been consistently violated in the
intensified fighting between government and rebel and
UPDF forces in northern Equateur province. The
hostilities have not only imperilled the peace process,
but have also spilled over into the Republic of the
Congo and the Central African Republic. The two
countries are extremely worried about the negative
impact of the conflict on security, economic and
humanitarian conditions and called for international
support to improve the situation. At the same time, the
highly volatile environment in the Kivus, marked by
frequent and violent clashes between the RCD/RPA
troops and the armed groups, also continues to be a
matter of serious concern.
75. Progress in developing the disengagement plan
adopted in Kampala on 8 April has been stalled since
late July, when the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo decided to withdraw from the
Joint Military Commission deliberations on this
subject. This agreement has been further undermined
by the recent hostilities, the large-scale recruitment and
training of troops and the continuing purchase of
weapons and ammunition.
76. During this period, the rebel movements
intensified their attempts to achieve a united front
opposing the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. While MLC and RCD-Goma pursued the
talks towards this end, the latest round of which was
held in Gbadolite on 1 September, RCD-ML has not
been involved in this process because of the persistent
infighting within this faction. This was vividly
demonstrated by the incident on 30 August in which an
RCD-ML commander had to seek protection at the
MONUC team site in Bunia.
77. At the same time, the efforts of the United
Nations to assist the parties in implementing the
Lusaka Agreement have been frustrated by persistent
12
restrictions on the Mission's freedom of movement,
lack of compliance with the provisions of the status-offorces
agreement and opposition, until recently, to the
deployment of United Nations troops. In addition, a
propaganda campaign directed against MONUC
increased concerns regarding the safety of the
Mission's personnel. Following the visit of my Special
Envoy, the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo authorized the deployment of United
Nations troops to some government-controlled
locations and announced the relaxation of certain
restrictions on the Mission's freedom of movement.
These concessions, however, fell short of what was
requested and have yet to be fully implemented.
78. Moreover, the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has recently questioned the
validity of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and has
called for its revision. While it is up to the signatories
themselves to agree to a revision of the Agreement, it
should be recalled that the Agreement is the basis of all
relevant Security Council resolutions authorizing the
presence of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Clarity on this fundamental issue would be
indispensable for any decision on the future
deployment of United Nations troops.
79. Similarly, prospects for the early implementation
of the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement concerning
the inter-Congolese dialogue have receded, owing to
the refusal of one party to cooperate with the
facilitator. Recent negative public statements in
Kinshasa concerning the facilitator do not augur well
for the resumption of the facilitation process.
80. Despite the difficulties encountered, there have
been some positive developments. Pursuant to
paragraph 3 of resolution 1304 (2000), Rwandan and
Ugandan forces have withdrawn from Kisangani,
although whether or not they have been redeployed to
other areas of confrontation has yet to be ascertained.
Also, the release of prisoners of war, pursuant to one of
the key aspects of the Lusaka Agreement, was a
valuable confidence-building measure undertaken by
the parties. The Government of Rwanda also proposed
a plan for the disengagement of the Rwandan and RCD
forces in Kasai. It would be important that the next
meetings of the Joint Military Commission and the
Political Committee, scheduled for the end of
September, review the situation and examine this and
other proposals made within the context of the peace
process. As a matter of priority, these meetings should
also urgently address the continuing ceasefire
violations.
81. The deteriorating humanitarian and human rights
situation throughout the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is yet another cause for grave concern. Civilians
continued to pay an unacceptably high price for the
conflict. It is extremely worrisome that intensive
military confrontations have hindered access by
humanitarian agencies to many areas, including the
eastern part of the Republic of the Congo, leaving
vulnerable populations without much-needed
assistance. The continuing fighting and widespread
insecurity have also worsened the situation of children
and require sustained action aimed at protecting their
rights.
82. In view of all the above-mentioned factors, I
recommend that the Security Council consider
extending the mandate of MONUC for a period of two
months. Such an extension would signal the
determination of the United Nations to remain
committed to the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo while at the same time
indicating to all the parties that these months should be
used to unequivocally demonstrate their will to move
the peace process forward and to create conditions
necessary for phase II deployment of MONUC. In the
meantime, the United Nations will continue to make
the necessary preparations for the deployment.
83. In this context, the importance of the interCongolese
dialogue cannot be underestimated. Clearly,
there will be no durable solution to the conflict without
a meaningful political dialogue between the Congolese
parties leading to a new political dispensation. Efforts
should intensify to help overcome the current
apprehensions blocking progress in this regard.
Otherwise, lack of progress in the inter-Congolese
dialogue could result in the fragmentation of the
country, with all the consequences such a prospect
would have for the whole region.
84. At the same time, disiurbing reports persist
regarding the illegal exploitation of natural resources in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The profits
from these illicit activities not only exacerbate the
conflict but also enrich those who want to see
confrontations continue. I am pleased that the expert
panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources
and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic
S/2000/888
of the Congo has been established, and look forward to
receiving its report in due course.
85 . It is very much hoped that this short-term
extension of the Mission's mandate will be used wisely
by the parties to relaunch the peace process. The
international community is looking for their
unequivocal commitment, since the success of United
Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo depends, first and foremost, on the cooperation
of those directly involved. Lack of any progress in the
peace process would make it difficult to justify not
only the commencement of the second phase of United
Nations deployment but also the continuation of the
current level of the Mission's presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is clear that
United Nations peacekeeping operations cannot serve
as a substitute for the political will to achieve a
peaceful settlement.
86. I wish to express my appreciation to my Special
Representative, to the Force Commander and to the
military and civilian personnel of MONUC and other
United Nations personnel operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Their tireless contribution to
the cause of peace in that country under extremely
difficult conditions is truly commendable.
13
S/2000/888
14
S/2000/888
Annex
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
contributions as at 15 September 2000
Military observers Staff officers Total
Algeria 12 13
Bangladesh 9 7 16
Benin 5 3 8
Belgium
Bolivia 2 2
Burkina Faso 2 2
Canada 2 2
Czech Republic 3 I 4
Denmark 2
Egypt 12 12
France 2 3
Ghana 8 8
India 8 3 II
Jordan 2 2
Kenya 5 5
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 4 4
Malaysia 2 7 9
Mali 3 3
Morocco 4 4
Nepal 9 9
Niger 2 3
Nigeria 6 6
Pakistan 14 13 27
Peru 3 3
Poland
Romania II 12
Russian Federation 5 5
Senegal 13 17 30
Sweden
Switzerland
Tunisia 6 6
Ukraine 4 4
United Kingdom 4 4
United Republic of Tanzania 6 7
Uruguay II 8 19
Zambia 9 9
Total 179 79 258
15
UCMANNEX75
A REPORTER AT LARGE
FORSAKEN
Congo seems less a nation than a battlefield far countless African armies.
BY PHILIP GOUREVITCH
Three years after Laurent-Desire Kabila
proclaimed himself President
of the Democratic Republic of Congo,
the streets of the capital are draped with
lies. Banners read, "Laurent-Desire Kabila,
the People's Choice"; "Power for the
People"; "The Voice of the People Is the
Voice of God."
Beneath the banners, the people
themselves are forever on display, standing
in a roadside haze of heat and dust
and dampness, staring at oncoming traffic.
The haze smells of diesel and charcoal
and kerosene, of burned meat and
smoked fish, of frying bananas and tropical
blooms, of compost and sewage, of
beer, mildew, and sweat. It clings in the
nose and maddens the brain, like the
stink of dead earthworms after a rain. To
stand by the road in Kinshasa for any
stretch of time requires a ~irit of Sisyphean
endurance. So when I arrived in
the city one morning, and saw the banners
and the masses of people beneath
them, I asked the university student rn
hired to drive me around what the occasion
was. "It's Thursday," he said. "But it
could be any day." The Congolese are
given to an ironic sort of gallows humor
that reflects their circumstances---ask
someone how it's going, and you're likely
to be told, "Same as the country," meaning
not well-but if my driver was joking
I didn't get it. I'd been in Kinshasa
before, and I didn't remember seeing
such multitudes standing around, doing
nothing. ~Things are worse now," my
driver said. "But the people aren't doing
nothing. They're waiting."
Waiting for what? I asked, and he
told me, "To move."The city was in the
grip of a transportation crisis. "The vehicles
exist," he said. "Minibuses, buses,
taxis, trucks. They exist, plenty of them.
And yet nothing budges. It's a political
problem. The regime is the problem.
'fhe economy is totally fucked. This
transport mess is just a tiny example, but
it's typical." He said that the cost of many
essential goods and services is fixed by
the state, and that earlier this year the
price of fuel had tripled, from one day to
lAurent Kabila, Congos President, has made new enemies of old allies. Rwandanhackd
rebels in Kisangani ( above), a ri1J laid waste by the fighting.
lHE NEW mnKEJI, SEPTEMDEJI 25, 2000 53
the next, while the price of transport remained
constant, at a very low rate. "It's
impossible for those who own the.vehicles
to make a profit," my driver said. "So
there is this paralysis. The policy is meant
to protect the people from exploitation,
and instead it punishes them. The people
complain. But you see the result."
Then he said something that I would
hear, in one form or another, from almost
everyone I talked to in Kinshasa
who wasn't on Kabila's payroll. He said,
"The people have no voice."
More banners hung overhead:"United
AroundLaurent-DesireKabilatoAchieve
Dignity"; "United Around LaurentDesire
Kabila to Achieve Prosperity";
"National Unity Around LaurentDesire
Kabila for a Radiant Future."
Of course, it was still possible for
transport operators to earn a few Congolese
francs if they packed in the passengers
and cut all other costs, such as
maintenance. So, periodically, a terrifyinglooking
jalopy would coast to a halt by
the curb-not so much a car or a van as
the ghost of a car or a van, patched over
like a fool's motley with bits of scrap
metal, plastic sheeting, duct tape, and
string, its windshield shattered, and
with arms, legs, heads, and other body
parts poking from its open doors and
windows. Before it reached a full stop,
a boy would jump out, demonstrating
with imperious shouts and gestures that
he was in charge; then he'd discharge a
few passengers and select replacements
from the waiting flock, shoving them
into place with the help of a short
baton. Travelling in this fashion, my
driver told me, it is typical for many of
Kinshasa's five million citizens to spend
two or three hours traversing the sprawling
city from home to work, and two or
three hours again from work to home.
As we spoke, it began to rain, lightly at
first, then heavily. The roadside crowds
thinned but did not disappear. Those
who remained took off their shoes and
stood barefoot and bareheaded, or covered
themselves as best they couldwith
umbrellas or bits of cloth or briefcases,
or by tugging the collars of their
jackets or shirts over their heads--and
many started walking. The rain let up
shortly after it began, but by then the
drainage ditches and open sewers that
ran alongside the potholed pavement
had backed up and flooded the road-
54 THE NEW )01\KEI\. JEl'1EMDE1\ 25, 2000
way. Traffic slowed to a crawl "Voila,"
my driver said, as we forded our way
through a long stretch of knee-deep
· water, strewn with stalled cars and foul
flotsam. "Lake Kabila."
Three years ago, my driver would
have called the submerged street
"Lake Mobutu," giving the credit for
Congo's degradation where it was due, to
President Mobutu Sese Seko, who had
named the country Zaire and robbed it
to ruin for thirty-two years before Kabila
took over. Even now, Mobutu remains
fixed in the international imagination
as the grotesque apogee of the postoolonial
African bullyboy. Spectacularly corrupt,
insatiably predatory, dapper and
deeply weird in his leopard-skin cap,
dark glasses, and sorcerer's swagger stick,
he kept himself swaddled in luxury,
and buttressed by doting Cold War patrons
in Washington, Brussels, and Paris,
as he sponsored cross-border insurgencies
against neighboring countries and
crushed or bought off all domestic opposition.
He liked to call himself Papa,
the nation's "founder" and "guide," but he
treated its children with rank disdain,
systematically reducing their lot-body
and soul-to a condition of want and
disarray akin to that of orphanhood.
One might imagine, then, that Mobutu
should not have been a hard act to
improve upon, and that was certainly
Kabila's attitude when he came to power,
presenting himself as a lifelong antiMobutist
revolutionary. The reality of
Kabila's resume, however, was not so
glorious. It was true that from 1967 to
1986 he had managed, as a rebel warlord,
to hold out against Mobutu's forces
in a tiny redoubt in the mountains of
eastern Congo. But his record there was
grim enough to make Mobutu look almost
benign by comparison. Kabila,
preaching a crude sort of Maoist doctrine,
had ruled with an absolute hand,
and what he called a "liberated" zone
rapidly descended into the sorriest state
of dystopia. While his cadres chanted
Mobutu-style slogans ("We are the men
of President Kabila ... founder .•.
guardi:m ... light ... creator"), he enriched
himself with gold from local
mines. He trusted nobody, betrayed those
who trusted him, and grew fantastically
paranoid. In 1979, as Wilungula B.
Cosma, a Congolese historian who stud-
········---···· ··--------
ied Kabila's failed "resistance" movement,
writes, "he made the unpopular decision
to kill all the sorcerers" in his domain:
To this end, he concocted a potion of numerous
roots and herbs. The potion was very
strong, of a kind that made any physically
weak person who swallowed it or received it
in the eyes dizzy. Now, dizziness is an indica·
tion of sorcery. So e\'er)'one who manifested
dizziness after this test was considered a sorcerer
and had to be burned alive. At the end
of the operation, two thousand people had
been killed, ninety percent of whom were
adults of advanced age.
This slaughter, coupled with the fact
that "the victims of hunger became as
numerous as those of the war," led to a
mass flight of partisans from Kabila's
zone. "Instead of social well-being for
all, it was total immiserization for all,"
Wilungula notes, and Kabila, too, eventuallywent
into exile. He spent a decade
in East Africa, operating as an entrepreneur
under various aliases, and he did
not reappear on the Congolese scene
until October of 1996, when he emerged
first as a spokesman for, then as the
leader of, the rebel alliance that finally
carried him to the Presidency.
When Kabila arrived in Kinshasa in
May of 1997, he cast himself as the
emancipator of Congo from dictatorship.
But, once again, the truth lay elsewhere,
and he did not enjoy a hero's welcome.
After all, the rebel alliance that
had driven Mobutu into exile (where
prostate cancer soon finished him) was
organized and led by the Army of neighboring
Rwanda and backed by neighboring
Uganda. Its victorious sweep
across the country had ultimately received
the military or political support of
at least ten other African governments.
Rwanda's reason for fighting was paramount:
in 1994,Mobutu had supported
the Hutu Power leaders of the Rwandan
genocide, which left at least eight hundred
thousand Tutsis and politically
moderate Hutus dead; and he continued
to support the killers after they fled to
United Nations-run camps just inside
the Congolese horder, helping them to
regroup, rearm, and recruit a massive
force with the aim of returning home to
complete their extermination campaign.
Major General Paul Kagamc, the chief
of Rwanda's predominantly Tutsi Army,
told me at the time that his troops had
moved into Congo in a political "marriage
of convenience" with Kabila's rebel
alliance, and that it was Rwandans who
had led the fight against Mobutu and
the genocidaires all the way to Kinshasa.
But years of rabid anti-Rwandan
(and specifically anti-Tutsi) propaganda,
spread by both Mobutu and his domestic
critics, had had its effect. So, while
Kabila spoke of "liberation," the Congolese
spoke resentfully of being recolonized.
Kinshasans, in particular, were
galled to think that the destiny of their
resource-rich land-which is the size of
,vestem Europe-had been detennined
by a dirt-poor neighbor that is eightynine
times smaller and nearly a thousand
miles from Kinshasa. Kabila didn't even
have his own army, and it didn't soothe
the wounded national pride when heappointed
a contingent of crack Rwandan
fighters, on loan from General Kagame, to
organize a new Congolese military. Many
Kinshasans, glad as they were to be rid of
Mobutu, were inclined to view Kabila as
a political fossil, a usurper, and a quisling.
Still, Kabila was President, "like it or
not," he himself said in his inaugural address,
as he proclaimed an "order" that
would be the "antithesis" of Mobutism.
He promised justice, public accountability,
economic renewal, an end to cronyism
and the Old Man's l'etat c'est moi
cult of personality, and, within two years,
democratic elections. Kabila gave no clue
how he meant to achieve such wonders;
nor did he inspire much confidence
when he promptly banned all political
acti\~ty, unleashed several competing securit:
y services witl1 the authority to arrest
people and seize property at will, and
hired as his propaganda chief a Christian
evangelist named Dominique Sakombi
Inongo, who had served Mobutu
in the same capacity for twenty-five years.
Sakombi was the man responsible for
stringing the landscape with inspirational
banners, and for erecting billboards
featuring Kabila's massive head-portraits
whose most striking feature is that
the}'\\ill not look you in the eye. Sakombi,
howe\"er, is something of an anomaly in
Kabila's Cabinet, inasmuch as 11e can be
said to be qualified for his job. The general
run of ministers is distinguished
only by a level of incompetence that even
inexperience cannot explain: "a bunch of
mediocrities," a former Western political
consultant to Kabila said. And he was
speaking as a supporter of the regime.
Kabila, in using Mobutu as his foil,
seemed to assume that things could not.
get worse than they had been, and the
national prospect would be bad enough
if he were right: stasis is always a kind of
rot. But these days, when the Congolese
express the desire for the country to retun1
to "normal," they mean the way it was
before Kabila came along. As a Congolese
businessman said to me, "People
here don't know what normal is. The word
has become meaningless. What is called
normal should be called unacceptable."
On the third anniversary of Kabila's
assumption of power, a dispatch from
the Panafrican News Agency reviewed
Congo's condition like this:
(B]asic infrastructure is in total decay.
Major sections of trunk "A" roads ... arc
nor usable. Proposals for the rehabilitation
of other facilities, such as hospitals, indus·
tries, manufacturing, and other structures,
have also been stalled. On the social front,
dirt and environmental decay have spewed
all sorts of diseases .... Smallpox, diarrhea,
sleeping sickness, among others, have come
back in force while AIDS, malaria and po·
liomyclitis continue to devastate a population
already weakened by under-nourishment .•..
More than 60 percent of the country's work·
ing population is not at work.
By the end of June, as the fortieth
anniversary of Congolese independence
from Belgian colonial rule was
marked without popular celebration,
the government-sponsored newspaper,
L'Avenir, declared that the country was
"still at step one."The independent daily
Le Potentielwas not so optimistic. "Independence,"
it said, "has turned out to
be a nightmare."
And, of course, Congo is at war. For
a little more than two years, the
armies of seven African nations and
more than a dozen guerrilla and rebel
forces have been fighting there, in a conflict
so messy, so broad, and so resistant
to any comprehensive resolution that it
is sometimes spoken of as Africa's First
World War. In fact, the current war is
largely a continuation of the last war in
Congo, a renewal of the continental upheaval
brought on by the aftershocks of
the Rwandan genocide.
The trouble this time started less than
a year after Kabila's installation, when he
turned against his Rwandan patrons and
allied himself with his former Rwandan
enemies: the renegade army and militias
of the Hutu genocidaires (as many as
thirty thousand fighters), who had scattered
throughout neighboring countries,
where many were once again living in
U.N. refugee can1ps. Even by Congolese
standards of political treachery, this was
an astonishing turnaround. During KaCongo
has been split roughly in two, in a war involving seven natiom; Kabila controls the west and his enemies occupy the east.
bila's rebellion, these Hutu Power outlaws
had served as Mobutu's most vigorous
defenders; and tens of d1ousands
of them and their civilian followers
had been slaughtered as they fled the
Rwandan-led anti-Mobutist alliance, in
massacres for which Kabila was widely ·
condemned by internatio~ humanrights
investigators.
Frictions between Kabila's Congolese
entourage and the Rwandan military officers
who had been charged with forming
a new national Army had escalated,
by early 1998, to a state of open hostility.
But, notwithstanding the enemy-of-myenemy-
is-my-friend logic that dominates
central-African politics, Kabila's
sudden embrace of Hutu Power baffied
even his Ambassador to the United
States, Faida Mitifu, who told me recently,
"I don't see how our government
56 THE NEW 'r01\K£JI. SEJ'TEMOEI\ 25. 2000
can associate itself with the authors of
the 1994 genocide." At the very least, in
repeating Mobutu's fatal error, Kabila
had to recognize the magnitude of the
provocation he was presenting to Rwanda.
Sure enough, in late July of 1998,
Rwanda withdrew its forces from Congo
in an orderly fashion, only to return with
a vengeance on August 2nd, launching a
commando invasion and sponsoring a
new Congolese rebellion, with the explicit
objective of taking Kabila out.
Despite Rwanda's size, General Kagame,
who became the country's President
in April, has built its Army into
L'1c most formidable fighting force in
central Africa, and he has done so without
recourse to sophisticated weaponry.
Rather, what distinguishes his commanders
and soldiers is their ferocious motivation.
Having single-handedly brought
the genocide to a halt, in 1994, the
Rwandan Patriotic Army has continued
to treat its almost ceaseless battlefield
engagements as one long struggle for
national survival. (The analogy that's
sometimes made between Rwanda's aggressive
defense policy and that of Israel-
another small country with a vivid
memory of genocide which has endured
persistent threats of annihilation from
its neighbors-is inexact but not unfounded.)
During the war against Mobutu,
Rwanda's soldiers astonished the
world by traversing .nearly a thousand
miles of Congo's jungles on foot in just
seven months. But when they came after
Kabila the Rwandans made that look
like slow motion. z
The operation ,vas led by James Ka- Q
barebe, a Rwandan colonel who, until :
a few weeks earlier, had been serving i
Kabila as the chief of staff of the Congolese
Army. So Kabarebe !mew the terrain,
and on the third day of the campaign,
as Rwandan troops poured over
the frontier, he commandeered a Congolese
transport plane in the eastern city
of Goma, loaded it with soldiers, and
flew twelve hundred miles to the Atlantic
coast to land at a military base
called Kitona, where he induced several
thousand local soldiers to mutiny and
join him in a sweep toward Kinshasa.
Along the way, this force seized control
of the Inga dam, a hydroelectric facility
that powers Kinshasa, and, with the flip
of a switch, the city was plunged into
darlmess. Less than three weeks after
the invasion began, Kabarebe's men
were on the outskirts of the capital, and
the Times was reporting that the Kabila
era could be over within a few days.
The dazzling tactical stuntsmanship
of the Rwandan blitzkrieg was
stimulated, in large part, by the fact that
from the moment the war began the Kabila
government, incapable of mounting
a coherent battlefield defense, had resorted
to whipping up a propaganda
campaign that identified all Tutsis as enemies
and instructed the Congolese citizenry
to wipe them out. Never mind
that T utsis made up less than one per
cent of Congo's population; the language
that suddenly streamed over state radio
was virtually indistinguishable from the
Hutu Power broadcasts that had driven
the massacres in Rwanda in 1994. People
were urged to take up any weapon they
could find-"machetes, spears, arrows,
hoes, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons,
irons, barbed wire, stones, and the like"and
"kill the Rwandan Tutsis." Kabila
himself spoke of this effort to extirpate
the Tutsi-led rebels as a "popular war,"
and, sadly, for once he was right. In the
first weeks of the pogrom, civilian mobs,
escorted by police and soldiers, swept
through Kinshasa, hunting down the
city's tiny Tutsi population; dozens were
murdered, and hundreds were taken hostage
in military camps.
"It was an extraordinary thing," a
longtime American resident of Kinshasa
recalled. "Ordinary people, who wanted
to defend their country against foreign
aggression, just tore into anyone who
was unknown to them, any out-oftowner.
A guy would come along asking
how to get to the airport and someone
would say, 'Ah! Why don't you know the
way? I've never seen you before. Infiltrator!
Rebel!' And he'd be finished." A
celebratory film clip that ran on Congolese
state television that August showed
three men carrying a fourth man-tall
and skinny, like the stereotypical Tutsislung
bet\Veen them by his arms and
legs, then swinging him over the railing
of a bridge, letting him go, and shooting
at him as he fell. Such was the patriotic
spirit that had been harbored against
Kabila when he was seen as a Rwandan
pawn, and that, with thuggish ingenuity,
he now rallied in his support as he faced
what appeared to be imminent defeat.
Kabila himself had vacated Kinshasa
in the second week of the war, sparking
rumors that he was preparing to
flee. Those rumors stopped, however, in
the last weeks of August, when Angola
and Zimbabwe, unhappy with Rwanda's
unilateral intervention, suddenly sent
their armies into Congo to fight on Kabila's
behal£ · A few days later, as Colonel
Kabarebe--outgunned by Kabila's
new defenders, who came with tanks
and aircraft-retreated from Kinshasa,
Uganda deployed additional troops,
joining its old ally Rwanda on the eastern
front. Soon, Namibia joined the progovernment
forces, as did Chad for a
time, and Burundi fell in with the Rwandans
and the Ugandans, while various
guerrilla armies from around the continent
also took sides in the fray. In this
way, the Pan-African alliance that had
come together to put Kabila in power divided
against itself, and the country, too,
was soon split roughly in two, with Kabila
and his defenders controlling the
western half, and the forces arrayed
against him occupying the east. And
so Congo has remained for the past
twenty-four months, a place that does
not resemble a country so much as an
all-purpose African battlefield.
Yet in Kinshasa, whenever I asked
people how things were going, they
would complain first about the economic
collapse and Congo's history of
abysmal government, and only then
would they mention the war-as if it
were more a symptom than a cause of
the country's woes. "The war is instrumentalized
by the regime as a pretext,
an alibi, to justify all the deficits and
abuses of leadership and rights, and also
the failings on the socioeconomic level,"
said Floribert Chebeya, the president
of Congo's oldest human-rights advocacy
group, the Voice of the Voiceless.
"Kabila really needed the war because
his relations with all his foreign allies
were bad, and the people rejected him."
Modeste Mutinga, the editor of Lt
Potentiel, agreed. "The legitimacy of Kabila
is based on coming to power by
arms, and that legitimacy has been contradicted
by the fact that those arms are
now turned against us and the country is
split in Mo," he told me, adding, "So
let's solve that-restore the integrity of
the national territory-and we'll deal
with the problem of Kabila aftenvard.
Because who brought the Ugandans and
Rwandans in here in the first place? He
did."Yet the problem remained: the war,
which was a result of Kabila's weakness
as a leader, had made him stronger. "The
war does legitimize him a little," a writer
in Kinshasa said. "So we must ask, Do
these leaders really want peace?"
Efforts to end the fighting in Congo
got under way almost as soon as the
war began. But the realignments of
forces in the combat kept outpacing the
diplomatic initiatives, which also seemed
to multiply uncontrollably. The conflict
in Congo had become what Lewis Carroll
might have called a portmanteau
war-a collection of wars folded together.
And, while the search for a resolution
to each of these sub-wars requires
that they be examined on their own
terms, they are now so mixed up with
one another that they cannot be resolved
unless they are also treated collectively.
So it was considered a great triumph,
last summer, when the heads of state of
the six countries with major troop deployments
still engaged on Congolese
territory-Angola, Namibia, Rwanda,
Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Congo itselfas
well as the leaders of the main Congolese
rebel factions, signed a peace
accord in Lusaka, Zambia. The centerpiece
of the Lusaka accord was a call for
the deployment of an aggressive United
Nations peacekeeping force, charged
with supervising the ,vithdrawal of foreign
troops from Congolese territory,
and the disarming of the Hutu Power
genocidaires and a host of other foreign
and domestic guerrilla groups operating
in the country, which are collectively
THE NEW \'O~IIEII. JErTEMDffi 25. 2000 57
j .
referred to in the accord as "negative
forces." At the same time, Lusaka mandated
that the Congolese rebels and the
Kabila regime should engage in a process
of "national dialogue," with the aim of
establishing a transitional power-sharing
arrangement and, eventually, a new national
government.
The appeal of the Lusaka accord
was that it identified and addressed the
chief causes of the Congo war broadly
enough to give everyone who signed it
something to be thankful for. But the
accord's ambitious comprehensiveness
was also its greatest weakness. As an
American diplomat I met in Kinshasa
put it, "Lusaka, while laudable, imagines
a process to make this place a real working
country, which in the best case will
take centuries." In the meantime, a year
after the accord went into effect, not
one of its goals has been met, and the
Congolese people have suffered accordingly.
A comparative study of prewar
and postwar mortality rates, published
recently by the International Rescue
Committee, found that since 1998 the
Congo war has led directly ( through violence)
or indirectly (through displacement,
and the hunger and disease that
go with it) to the deaths of 1. 7 million
men, women, and children. The report
argued persuasively that this figure was
probably conservative, and that casualty
rates in areas controlled by pro-Kabila
forces and in zones occupied by his enemies
were essentially equal.
Yet, while all the sides in the Congo
war have violated the pledges they made
at Lusaka--and the U.N., for its part,
has yet to send more than a skeleton
crew of some two hundred military
observers to the country-the Kabila
government has been alone in repudiating
the peace accord outright. In late
August, after a year of nearly non-stop
obstruction of the peace process, Kabila
simply declared that the Lusaka accord
was no longer valid, because it did not
pay sufficient respect to Congolese sovereignty.
Within two days, Kabila had
reversed himself again, saying that he
would welcome the deployment of a
U.N. peacekeeping force, but by then
even his allies no longer believed him.
"There is no commitment to Lusaka
from this government, and not much
from the other side," an exasperated official
at the U.N. peacekeeping office in
Kinshasa told me. "Here they don't even
pretend. They keep asking to renegotiate
the deal, declaring it illegitimate,
mocking it." And, the U.N. official went
on, "Kabila and his people constantly
stand us up for meetings. They yell at us.
They orchestrate so-called popular protests
against us. But there's no real unity
in this country, even ,vithin the government.
One guy says one thing, the other
says tl1e opposite. Look, the U.N. mission
here is inadequate, badly organized,
weak, and probably not really serious itsel£
Anything bad you want to say about
it, I could tell you worse. But even the
super-best mission in the world would
be stuck here ,Yith a government that is
afraid of peace."
I got a taste of what the U.N. man was
talking about on my last night in Kinshasa,
when I met with Yerodia Abdoulaye
Ndombasi, a Lacanian psyclloanalyst,
who lived and practiced in Paris
for nearly thirty years and is now Kabila's
Foreign Minister. He received me at his
office in the Palace of the Nation, a vast
concrete block built by l\fobutu in the
overbearing Fascist style of architecture
favored by Romania's Ceau~escu. The
place sits alone in a deserted comer of the
cit}, surrounded bya black wrought-iron
fence and several acres of empty parking
lots; its massive plate-glass windows are
filthy and cracked, and the red carpets on
its oversize staircases are in tatters.
Yerodia, a short, potbellied man, with
a highly mobile range of odd expressions
and a reputation as a bombastic and erratic
orator, was wearing Beatle boots
and a vest of his own design, with no
collar and a couple of long, narrow breast
pockets for holding cigars. A bodyguard
carried his briefcase as he ushered me
along ill-lit halls, through a padded privacy
door, and into his office. There
Yerodia proceeded to tell me that tl1e
war in Congo, as a war of foreign aggression
and occupation, violates the
Charter of the United Nations. Therefore,
he said, the Lusaka accord, by recognizing
the aggressors as parties to the
peace process, is itself "not in accord
with the U.N. Charter." As a young
man, Yerodia had been a Congolese revolutionary,
fighting against the U.N. in
the post-independence rebellions that
Che Guevara helped to organize. But
now he held forth as if he were the last
true champion of U.N. tradition. "Was
there an aggression or not?" he shouted
at me. "Were there countries that crossed
the border to occupy another country?
Yes or no?" Then, more calmly, he said
· that Congo had signed at Lusaka "because
we want the war to end." And he
said, "You see our good faith?"
As for Rwanda, Yerodia said, "You
know the fable of the frog who wants to
become a bull?" He recited the comparative
size of the two countries in square
kilometres and said that Rwanda was
simply gobbling up Congolese territory in
a fit of expansionist gluttony. He scoffed
at the notion that Rwanda had moved
into Congo to defend itself against a Hutu
Power threat. Fugitive g!nocidaires could
also be found throughout Europe, he said,
and asked, "Why don't they go ocrupy
France, from Dunkirk to Marseilles?"
Yeroclia's mean-spiritedness about the
genocide didn't surprise me. During the
first weeks of the war, he had been one of
the most prominent government leaders
to rally the masses to carry out an
anti-Tutsi pogrom. At the time, he was
the chief of Kabila's Cabinet, and, when
he called on the people to "crush" the
"vennin" and the "cockroaches," he had
been clearly understood. For nearly forty
years, "cockroach" has been a code word
for Tutsis in Rwanda, and since the
genocide its usage has spread throughout
the region. (In early July of this year, a
Belgian court issued an international
arrest warrant against Yerodia for inciting
racial hatred and genocide against
Tutsis in August of 1998.) I wondered
why Yerodia, as a psychoanalyst who was
dearly sensitive to language, had become
a cheerleader for terror.
"Because a psychoanalyst must refuse
rabble,"Yerodia said. ''A psychoanalyst
can't perform miracles. When there
are rabble, one has to condemn them to
be rabble, and the psychoanalyst can do
nothing. And when one says 'vermin'and
I repeat again, these are vermina
vermin is something that introduces
itself insidiously into a body, or a piece
of wood, or a plant, or clothes, and
moves on. That's what they did." He
made no apologies. "I refer you to Foucault.
You'll see that, before using a word,
you must look at the thing the word describes,"
he said, recalling how children
had died in the hospitals of Kinshasa
during the blackouts imposed by the
Rwandans. "These things--how would
you call them, you defender of human
rights? Five million people here, and the
spigots ran dry, because the electricity
was cut. The people had to drink dirty
water from the river, with all that implies."
Yerodia said that his own home
village had been burned down by the invaders.
"I tell you these things so that
you can comprehend the weakness of
this word"--vermin-"in relation to the
gravity of the things it describes," he
said, and added, "I'm a psychoanalyst. I
know what exclusion is."
0 n the road to Kinshasa's Ndjili Airport,
just after dawn, the crowds
waiting for transport, and the roadside
signboards-a raised fist clutching a
sword, and the legend "To vanquish the
aggressor is a sacred duty," or "Peace has
a price. Peace must be won"-looked almost
festive in the soft, hazy light. I
knew that foreigners, and especially foreign
journalists, were regularly arrested
at the airport, accused of spying or
money smuggling (the regime had outlawed
the use of foreign currency, and
my insoles were stuffed with dollars).
But I was in good hands. For twenty
.:ontraband dollars, I had hired a "facilitator"
to steer me through the airport.
The man came highly recommended;
he had been a top immigration official
in the Mobutu years, and as he told
me, "The system hasn't changed much."
With a wave here and a commanding
nod there, my facilitator arranged
for our car to zip through several security
gates and deposit us directly at the door
to tl1e departure area. For a moment, before
getting out, he surveyed the scene,
which was one of pure chaos: domesticflight
passengers scrambling through a
twenty-foot gantlet of unifonned agents
from several different security services,
who pushed men and groped women,
reaching into their bags or knocking
their luggage to the ground and examining
the spilled contents. Then, just as a
woman with a bursting carton of frozen
chickens was slapped in the face, my facilitator
said, "Follow me," and with his
left fist, full of Congolese francs, extended
in front of him, and the other clamped
firmly around my suitcase at his side, he
ducked from the car, head down but smiling
ingratiatingly, and plunged straight
through the one clear passage into the
terminal, with me hard on his tail.
So it went: with a few banknotes shed
every twenty feet, no more than five dollars
in all, he spirited me through pass-
THE NEW )01\l(fl\. SEJ>TEMOEII 25, 2000 59
port control, check-in, and customs in
fifteen minutes flat, while around me I
watched sweating men and women endure
hour-long shakedowns as their passports
disappeared for "closer inspection"
or their luggage was rifled through, sock
by sock. Nobody opened my suitcase. My
facilitator even made it a point of pride,
despite my protests about security, not to
allow my carry-on bag to pass through
the X-ray machine. "It's beneath you," he
said. And when we were settled in the departure
lounge, sipping Cokes, he told me,
"You see how it works. People aren't paid.
They just want a little tip for their service,
and then everything runs perfectly."
I was on my way to Rwanda, through
the old colonial hub of Brussels. It was
an absurdly roundabout route, but at
the Congolese mission in New York I
had been warned against carrying anything
to Kinshasa that might associate
me with the enemy: a passport with
Rwandan or Ugandan stamps, an airline
60 THE NEW '\'ORIWI. SEJ'TEMDEJI 25, 2000
ticket to those places, or maps of them,
or phone lists of contacts in them, or
any printed matter that mentioned them.
"You will surely be arrested, and eventually
deported," I was told. So I had left
my Rwandan kit in Brussels, and I didn't
mind ducking briefly out of Afiica.
As the plane descended over Belgium,
the world's nearly perfect unfairness
flashed up at me through the clouds:
enchanting tiled roofs, bicyclists and
Lego-bright trucks whizzing along neat
ribbons of macadam, trees in rows, so
Euclidean, and a red-helmeted equestrian,
trotting in a ring of groomed dirt.
""l ]{ That war?" a longtime Rwandan
V V acquaintance of mine said when
I told him why I was back in Kigali. He
waved a hand around his head loosely,
in a gesture at once dismissive and allinclusive.
"This country's at peace," he
said. Over the years, I had known this
man to be an ac~rate ~arometer of the
prevailing attitudes of Kigali's postgenocide
Tutsi establishment. He was
well connected to the ruling party, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, and an admirer
of General Kagame, but I remembered
him as being more of a loyal critic
than a booster of the government's military
adventures. He was also passionate
about Congo; as a young man, he had
been a refugee there, and had attended
university there, and when we first met,
in Kigali four years ago, he was fond of
saying, "My blood makes me Rwandan,
but my heart's in Congo." So I was surprised
to hear him say of the war, "It's
not an issue here. We must have security.
We want the ginoddaires. We want every
one of them, and we must do what it
takes." He nodded sombrely at his nineyear-
old daughter, who was skipping
around in the yard, and told me, "I am
thinking of her survival."
It was true that the war in Congo had
brought a measure of peace to Rwanda.
When I last visited the country, three
years ago, Hutu Power guerrillas, who
had returned from the U.N. border
camps, were terrorizing both Tutsis and
Hutus in large patches of the country.
The killings were constant, particularly
in the Hutu Power heartland, in the
northwest. The Rwandan Army fought
back, mounting a counterinsurgency
campaign that also claimed many lives
and left more than half a million civilians
displaced. It wasn't until the invasion
of Congo, in August of 1998, that
security was restored throughout the
land. From the Rwandan side of the border,
then, the Congo war was seen as a
classic buffer-zone conflict, and to my old
acquaintance the reliefit brought was all
that mattered. But didn't the bloody occupation
of eastern Congo carry a heavy
price for Rwanda-at the very least, a
loss of the moral high ground?
"So the world hates us," he said. "So
to hell with them."
The sense of fatalism I had experienced
in Kinshasa, where people seemed
to view the war as a circumstance beyond
their control, was TCJ>laced in f{jgali by
a spirit of militant survivalism which
could seem equally depressing. "The
lesson of the genocide is that either we
are able to organize ourselves and look
afterourselves orwe perish," General Kagame's
veteran aide and spokesman, Emmanuel
Ndahiro, told me, adding, "The
reason we went into Congo the first time
had nothing to do with Kabila, and Kabila
did not solve the problems we went
in to solve, so we went in again. We had
no legitimacy the first time and we went
in without legitimacy this time. We went
just using force, and if we had had no
force to use we would be destroyed."
Of course, Ndahiro acknowledged,
mistakes had been made as a result of
this attitude, and the biggest mistake was
Kabila. "During the first Congo war, nobody
here was seriously interested in the
politics-in who would take over Congo.
Everything was military," he said, adding
that the Rwandans had realized only
after the fact that Kabila had "used"
them to become a new dictator. "And he
just kept using us," Ndahiro said.
I had spent a lot of time in Rwanda
after the genocide, and I had never heard
a top Rwandan Anny man complain of
being outwitted by an adversary. But
James Kabarebe, the Rwandan colonel
who had served as Kabila's army chief
before leading the commando raid on
Kinshasa in August of 1998, told me
the same story. "Kabila was never a puppet,"
he said. "I could never do anything
that Kabila didn't want." On the contrary,
K.'lbarebe said, "Kabila twisted us
the way he wanted," and he added, "Kabila
is an experienced con man, an intriguer,
and a shrewd person. When
he wants to humble himself, he will
humble himself and achieve what he
wants. When he wants to come out and
become aggressive and dangerous, he
will prepare for it and he will do so. He's
a bully, and he believes in coercion."
If the Rwandans had made such a
mistake in installing Kabila, I wondered
how they had intended to go about replacing
him if their blitzkrieg on Kinshasa
wasn't repelled. Kabarebe said a
primary objective of that campaign had
been to rescue the endangered Congolese
T utsis there. "But what if you had
taken the city?" I asked. "What was the
political plan?" Kabarebe thought about
this for a moment. "The political plan?"
he said. "The most important thing was
that Kabila would have gone."
General Kagame was equally vague
about the original political objectives of
the Congo war. He regretted that "the
takeover of Kinshasa" had "failed narrowly,"
but he didn't think that meant it
had been wrong to try. "If we had sueceeded,
it would have meant saving a lot
of trouble for a lot of people-even for
the Congolese. A new leadership could
have been easily put in," Kagame told
me, and he added, "Having learned from
the experience of Kabila, the storywould
have been different this time."
Listening to him, I couldn't help recalling
how optimistic he had been when
we last met, in 1997, a few weeks after
Kabila had taken power. Kagame, who is
as skinny as Kabila is round, tends to
speak with a dry, wraithlike directness,
but on that occasion he had seemed almost
jubilant, chuckling freely as he argued
that armed struggle shouldn't be
seen only as a cause of Africa's problems
but also as a means of resolving them.
"Actually, some conflicts consume less
lives than bad systems and create better
situations," he had said, and he told me
that the success of the Pan-African alliance
that had come together in Congo
gave him "a great amount of satisfaction."
Now the members of that alliance were
at one another's throats, and it sounded
as if Kagame had no idea how to get out
of Congo. I wondered if he ever regretted
getting in there in the first place.
No, he said. He reminded me that
Rwanda had not created the trouble in
Congo but had reacted to trouble that
Mobutu had created by sponsoring the
gtnocidaires. "We did what we ought to
have done at that time," Kagame said,
and added, "Today, of course, we find
ourselves in a different situation, but
again with a sense of great achievement
as well. Look at the internal situation
here in Rwanda, the very fact that there
is peace." And, he said, "It doesn't matter
that we are still involved in a war somewhere
else. This is part of the price we
have to continue paying. We are glad to
do that."
I suggested that the way things were
going it looked as if Rwanda might be in
the Congo for at least ten more years.
Kagame, who is only forty-two years
old, seemed to consider this a modest
proposal. "It will be O.K if we have to be
there for very long," he said.
0 ne evening last spring, I was discussing
the Congo war ,vith two
top Rwandan Army officers on a hotel
terrace in Kigali when both of their cell
phones began ringing. They took the
calls in Kinyarwanda, the language of
the country, then exchanged a few words
with each other before casing back into
English. "Idiotic," one of them said.
"Absurd," said the other. "Jerks," said the
first. "Thugs," said the second. They
spoke in sepulchral, whispery tones,
which is the style among Rwandan commanders-
blunt, world-weary, bleak,
and vaguely bemused-but their distress
,vas clear. They had just received word
that the Ugandan Anny was massing
troops in the Congolese city of Kisangani.
"What are they up to, our Ugandan
brothers?" the first officer said, and the
second said, "Mischie£"
Rwanda and Uganda were once close
allies. The Rwandan Patriotic Front
had been founded in Uganda, in the
late eighties, by Rwandan refugees who
had grown up there and had learned to
fight in the Anny of President Yoweri
Museveni. General Kagame had once
served as l\1useveni's chief of military
intelligence, and the friendship between
the two men was one of the defining
features of central-African political life
in the past decade. It was Museveni
who had introduced Kabila to Kagame
in 1994, and although the Ugandan
Army had little involvement in the war
against Mobutu, Museveni had been
Kagame's first and most important ally
in that campaign.
But since Uganda joined Rwanda in
the fight against Kabila, in 1998, and
their armies each seized control of large
swaths of eastern Congo, relations between
the two countries and their leaders
have steadily deteriorated. The first
blatant sign of discord came early last
year, after they began sponsoring competing
Congolese rebel factions. But it
was in Kisangani, where the two countries
had attempted to run a joint occupation,
that things fell apart. In August
of 1999, the Rwandan and the Ugandan
forces in Kisangani turned their guns on
· each other, in a bitter four-day battle in
the city centerwhich neither side has ever
THE NEW 'IOI\KEII. JE.l'ITMDEJ\ 25, 2000 GI
been able to explain, except by accusing
the other of pettiness, treachery,
indiscipline, and of firing the first shot.
Rwanda prevailed in the combat, which
left as many as four hundred dead, most
of them Ugandans. But it was impossible
to speak meaningfully of victory in a
mindless feud thar had disgraced both
countries-and now it looked as if they
would fight again.
"These Ugandans want to get even,"
one of the Rwandan officers on the hotel
terrace said. He reminded me that it
was his Army that had captured the city
from Kabila's forces, only then inviting
the Ugandans to share it, and he said,
"One does not just walk away quietly
from such a prize." Kisangani, after all,
is Congo's third-largest city, a major
diamond-trading center, the commercial
hub of the east, the upstream terminus
of Congo River boat lines, the gateway
to the capital, and-more symbolically
but no less importantl,r-a place where
Congolese history has a way of coming
to its defining crises. "We can leave it
only if Uganda leaves, too," the officer
said, and added, "It's the biggest ego war,
very sn1pid. So we would wish to avoid
it, but if they hit us we shall hit them,
and this time they can lose very badly."
The other officer hummed in agreement.
"It's an interesting time in Kisang-
Jni," he told me. "I'll find you a flight."
Two d.1ys later, I was ushered aboard
a dubious-looking relic of the So\~
et Air Force, a forty-year-old twinprop
Antonov-8 that was flown by a
duly scarred and angry pair of Ukrainians,
and loaded with wooden crates containing
several tons of automatic-rifle
ammunition and artillery rounds. Looking
down, as we flew west and slightly
northward out of Kigali, the intricate .
patch\\'ork of Rwanda's relentlessly cultirnted
hills and \~illeys soon gave way to
a solid green sea of Congolese jungle,
and for tl1e neJ.."t hour and a half that was
all~ canopy of towering trees, broken
here and there by the dull, \\~nding glint
of a murk·y bro1\n ri\·er, and occasion.illy
hy a half-mile-long stripe of red dirt,
flanked by a fc\\' huts, which suggested a
road and a village, or an attempt at a
road and a village. But the huts looked
abandoned, and the roads connected
nothing to nowhere.
Kisangani materialized out of this
62 THE NEW YOMEI\. SEPTEMBER 25, 2000
wilderness at what seemed like the last
possible moment in the Antonov's descent.
I have never been anywhere lonelier.
It had the look of an important city,
spread out long and wide against the
great bend in the Congo River. And it
had a major city's self-important sense of
design and display: ambitiously broad
streets lined with old trees and grand
buildings with deep porches, Italianate
turrets, and Art Deco curves, a centuryold
cathedral perched on a knoll overlooking
the riverbank, an impressive port
crowded with cranes and warehouses. It
even had some of the camival sass and
mercantile swagger that a true city requires
at its center, where block after
block of massive whitewashed storefront
diamond-trading parlors were brightly
painted with icons of twinkling blue
gems or rippling hundred-dollar bills,
and business names like Oasis, Top Correction,
Force Tranquille, and Jihad. And
yet Kisangani did not feel like a citymore
like the memory of a city.
I arrived at five on a weekday afternoon-
rush hour-and it may as well
have been Sunday at dawn. There were
plenty of people along the roadside,
walking, bicycling, carrying loads, selling
and buying, standing and talking, but,
still, the streets felt empty, and everything
appeared to be happening in slow
motion. It wasn't just that the place was
old-essentially undeveloped since the
end of Belgian colonial rule, in 1960-
or in decay: gutted university halls behind
lawns of waist-high weeds; battered,
cracked, and crumbling municipal
buildings; bushes sprouting from the
damp concrete of hotel roofs; rusting,
faded signs for things that were no
longer there, such as a Mobil station-a
flaking red Pegasus leaping into the
steamy jungle air. I've seen far more ancient
cities, and cities in much deeper
ruin, that thrum with life. Even in Kinshasa,
one felt a constant surge of urban
energy amid the presiding atmosphere
of blight. Stuntedness and degeneration
hardly distinguished Kisangani.
No, what made it strange was its
quietness. During the course of a twentyminute
drive across the city, I saw only
three other vehicles on the road, and
when I stopped and the engine was cut
there were no other sounds of machinery
to be heard. In the middle of a major
intersection, in the center of town, you
could hear a quavering laugh in a distant
room, the creak of a metal gate two
blocks away, bare feet and bicycle tires
swishing over the pavement. Here was a
city of more than half a million people,
in a country atwar, moving in the bright,
hot hush of a ghostly enchantment, at
once premodern and postapocalyptic.
"This is a dying town," a Rwandan
major in Kisangani told me. The
house he occupied made the point for
him. It was a cla'ssic nineteen-sixties
split-level, and in more promising times
it had served as the British consulate. A
heavy, oval-shaped enamel plaque ornamented
with the lion and unicorn lay on
a bar in the entryway; reproductions of .
equestrian and nautical paintings hung
on wood-panelled walls, alongside a satin
pendant from a Rotary Club in Belgium;
and the stripped metal carcasses of two
vintage MG sports coupes rusted in the
carport. The major sat in a vintage butterfly
lawn chair, surrounded by mosquitoes
in the gloom of a single dim light
bulb, slowly drinking a carton of milk.
He had a habit of repeating his own
phrases with slight variations, and after a
while he said, "Yes, this again is a dying
t(!wn." I wondered what he meant by
"again," and he told me, "It died first
under the Belgians, it died after independence,
it died under Mobutu, it died
under Kabila, and now we are here with
the Ugandans, and it dies." After all, he
said, "Our first purpose in Congo is to insure
tl1e security of Rwanda, and in that
we have not failed. But we also say we've
come here to mobilize the Congolese for
political change, and with this we are not
succeeding. Uganda explains its purposes
the same way. So how do we call ourselves
allies when we are fighting eacll other,
and not organizing the Congolese?"
The Congolese I spoke with all asked
similar questions: What's wrong with
these foreigners? Why must they fight
here? What do they want with us? Earlier
in the week, rumors of impending
trouble had left the city largely deserted,
and although the panic had eased, everyone
had stories of troops comeiging on tile
city from the S1Jn0unding bush. A priest at
tile catlledral told me that some of his colleagues
had found the road norm of Kisangani
"thick witll Ugandans, who made
them pay a toll to continue," while Rwandans
were moving in from the south. A
Lebanese diamond buyer confirmed this.
"No stones," he said. "We've seen almost
nothing this week People don't dare to
move on the roads." On his satellite television,
"Braveheart," dubbed in Arabic,
was being broadcast from Syria, and he
pointed past the TV to a series of holes
that ran in a ragged diagonal through the
curtain that hung over his second-story
window-the trail of machine-gun fire
from last August's fighting. "Why repair
anything when we're just waiting for the
next round?" he asked.
Nobody in Kisangani doubted that
a battle was in the offing. The only question
was when. "Ask the Ugandans," the
Rwandan major told me. But the Ugandans
weren't talking. At their bases on the
outskirts of the city, I was either turned
away at the gate or asked to wait, then
turned away. Eventually, I tracked down
a Ugandan major, who was eating lunch
in town. "Everything is as it seems," he
told me, and when I said, "It seems like
there will be a fight" he said, "That is an
assumption. People assume these stories.
But I don't have any details."
After each stop, my driver would say,
"So? Tell me," and when I then held my
hands up empty he'd say, "They're hiding
something." In the repetition of this ritual,
I began to understand that the uncanny
quiet that hung over Kisangani was the
sound of oblivion. "Aye, aye, aye," he said
at one point, "we Congolese are nobody's
concern," and one morning at the city's
top hotel-a clammy riverside pile, called
the Palm Beach, where the tap water ran
green and the breakfast menu in the vast,
empty restaurant was a choice of CocaCola
or beer----t:he desk clerk said, "When
you return to the world outside, please remember
that we here are forgotten."
The provincial Vice-Governor put
the problem more practically. "We're cut
off," he told me. "The railroad doesn't
run, the river's cut by the war, and there
are no roads and no phones. The only
way in or out is by airplane." And the airplanes
operated without a clear schedule.
When I wanted to leave, I learned that
the trick was to listen for the roar overhead,
then race to the airport and find out
where the plane was going next. Eventually,
the Antonov that had brought me in
reappeared. As I waited for one of the
Ukrainian pilots to run imo'town-{tobay
a pair of endangered forest-elephant
tusks), the Rwandan major arrived and
told me that an agreement had been
reached with the Ugandans.
"We will not fight now," he said, and
he was right. The fighting didn't start
again until early May, when a nasty oneday
battle tore through the city. As flareups
continued, Rwanda and Uganda
agreed to withdraw their forces, to a
distance of a hundred kilometres from
Kisangani. The withdrawal was to be
carried out in four phases, and the first
three went without bloodshed But plenty
of men and guns were left behind for the
final phase, when, once again, the two
armies began fighting, with insane fury.
The battle got under way around midmorning
on Monday, June 5th, and by
Saturday evening some six thousand artillery
rounds had fallen on the city. Hundreds
of civilians were killed in the crossfire,
and more than a thousand were
wounded. A mortar shell had wiped out
the only functioning turbine in the municipal
power plant, leaving the city without
electricity or running water. At the
main hospital, doctors without medical
supplies washed their hands in buckets of
murky brown river water, and watched
their patients die in the dark. Food was
running out Tens of thousands of Kisanganians
had fled, on foot or by dugout
-canoe, intoi:hebush, bunome"tWoimndred
thousand people, including thousands
of lost and disoriented children, remained
pinned down in the city center,
where they were caught when the fighting
began, cowering in hiding places, too
terrified to venture out amid the spray of
bullets and shrapnel to bury the flyblown
corpses that lay putrefying in the
rubble of blasted buildings and the otherwise
deserted streets.
Then, on Sunday, it was over. Uganda
retreated, Rwanda declared victory, each
country blamed the other for firing the
first shot, and both said they really would
now leave the city they had laid waste,
and Kisangani lapsed back into silence.
Oh, Congo. What a wreck. It hurts
to look and listen, and it hurts to
turn away.
When V. S. Naipaul set his novel ''A
Bend in the River" in Kisangani, he
opened it with the sentence "The world
is what it is; men who are nothing, who
allow themselves to become nothing,
have no place in it." But what if a country
of nearly fifty million men, women,
and children becomes nothing? \/\'hat is
its place in the world?
After the fighting in Kisangani, in
June, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General
of the U.N., demanded that Rwanda
and Uganda withdraw "promptly" from
"Congo, =d ne .hreatened "to use force
against them if they didn't. But the threat
was meaningless. What force? This February,
half a year after the Lusaka accord
called for an aggressive U.N. peacekeeping
mission in Congo, the Security
Council decided that it would suffice for
a team of five hundred military oh-
THE NEW )ON(Ell. .!El'TIMOER 25. 2000 GS
servers, backed by five thousand military
and civilian personnel, to be sent in
with a mandate that allows them to use
force only if attacked. That force is half
the size of the misbegotten U.N. mission
to Sierra Leone, for a country thirty-three
times larger, and for a war with at!east five
times as many parties.
In recent weeks, Kabila has mounted
a series of new offensives, apparently
taking encouragement from the disarray
of the Rwandan-Ugandan alliance as
grounds for imagining that he might
win tl1e war on the battlefield. As usual,
he is alone in his belief, but his conspicuous
absence from the gathering of
world leaders at this month's U.N. Millennium
Summit in New York insured
that no meaningful discussions could be
held there about peace in Congo. And so
far the U.N. has failed to muster, much
less to deploy, more than a tiny fraction
of its proposed feeble force.
"The world is not serious," Kagame's
adviser Emmanuel Ndahiro said. "The
world doesn't care." And on this point, at
least, the Rwandans and the Ugandans
{who have, for the moment, withdrawn
from Kisangani and reaffirmed their alliance)
were agreed. "Except for those
who are fighting in Congo, nobody is
paying attention," Colonel Kahinda
Otafire, an adviser to Uganda's President
Museveni, told me. "Nobody even tries
to understand. The world has abandoned
Congo entirely."
But what would it really mean for
the "world" to get serious about Congo?
A massive invasion? A Marshall Plan?
Such international seriousness about a
vast tract of African jungle teeming
,vith "negative forces" is nearly inconceivable.
Last year, shortly after NATO's
jets forced Serbian forces to withdraw
from Kosovo, I listened to a triumphant
Clinton adviser claim that, for the first
time ever, the great vVestern powers had
waged a war that was not about their
narrowly defined political, economic, or
military interests but simply "about humanity."
VVhen I asked him whether
Africans, who suffer the abuses of ruthless
leaders on a scale that consistently
dwarfs e\·en the horrors witnessed in
Kosovo, also belonged to the White
House's definition of humanity, he
thought about it for a moment and said,
"It's a good question."
There is no reason to imagine that
66 THE NEW '\'O~KEI\. JErTEMDm 25. 2000
the nt:ll.1: American President will adopt a
different attitude toward African conflicts.
What's more, it is doubtful that the
Africans who feel abandoned in their
current struggles would really welcome
more vigorous international military attention.
Considering the debilitating
legacy of outside meddling in the continent's
political affairs, why should they
ha,·e any hope of better treatment in the
future? That's not what the world is.
And by their presence in Congo the
Africans who are mixing it up there
show that they know it.
In Kinshasa one day, I wrote the word
"Optimists" atop a clean page in my
notebook, with the idea of recording the
most upbeat remarks people made to me
about life in Congo, and what I came up
,vith was this:
A mctis-mixed blood, half European/
half Rwandan-businessman said, "One
good thing the r:ongolese have learned
through their suffering is to live without a
functioning gm·ernment. They can keep on
going like this forever."
A Muslim Indian dry-goods trader said,
"If you wa111 to cure an atheist of his disbelief,
just put him here, and let him see
the miracle-that life goes on, in spite of
everything." ·
An American expatriate said, "You have
10 recognize that the Congolese are people
who have not only survived but in many cases
actually thrived under conditions of extreme
difficult)' and hardship. The human resources
of this country are simply staggering."
Another American said, "Forget about
politics for a minute. If you want to see what
the Congolese do right, you've got to see how
they party."
I'm sure I heard other encouraging
things in Congo, but after a while I forgot
about my "Optimists" page, and
when I came across it again the other day
I was struck by two things: none of the
speakers were Congolese, and their remarks
were all essentially the same-cheerful
tributes to the ingenuity and
pluck with which the forsaken folk
around them got on with their meagre
lives. I couldn't help feeling that these remarks
reflected a self-protective urge not
to recognize desperation too starkly.
What choice do people have but to survive
as best they can?
"The Congolese have been so humiliated
so many times. It's terrible to think
about," one of Kagame's deputies said to
me with an odd mixture of sympathy
and disdain. "So mum humiliation. It's
like they expect it and ~ow nothing
else." Uganda's Colonel Otafire put the
problem a bit more gently: "If someone
has never had a refrigerator, he doesn't
know that a refrigerator exists, and he
doesn't know that a refrigerator is useful,
and so he can't miss it. The Congolese
people have never had a good government,
so it doesn't occur to them to fight
for one."
But the great majority of the Congolese
I met with, in all walks of life, did
not want to fight. They spoke of politics
and the war in the way that the myths of
antiquity describe how the feuding of
the Greek gods buffeted and battered
great swaths of humanity-as something
awfully like destiny. Time and
again, the Congolese told me, as a point
of pride, that they were a people of gre.at"
patience. All they wanted, they said, was
to be left alone to get on with their lives.
One night in Kinshasa, the American
op:imist who told me that I should see
how the Congolese party took me
to meet some friends of his in La Cite, a
district fam ous for its night life, and
as the ,mm:e of much of the best of
Congo's irresistibly danceable music.
l\fobbed streets were lined with open-air
bars, each blasting its own ferociously
juking melodies, and we settled in at one
to a feast of beer and superbly grilled
goat meat, sitting around a table that
commanded a fine view of the passing
parade: a ceaseless stream of elegant men
and women, ambling through the dusty
haze, with ragged street children darting
playfully among them, and peddlers
hawking everything from peanuts and
cigarettes to plastic handbags and nylonlace
napkins.
As the music got louder, and the
other drinkers around us rose from their
chairs into a dancing throng, a clown
suddenly appeared at the curb in front of
us. He was a gaunt, white-haired man,
wearing a silly little porkpie hat, enormous
plastic spectacles, a bright-orange
shirt, baggy pants cinched high over his
hips by a belt with a huge silver buckle,
and overlarge shoes that made his bony
ankles look almost too thin to support
him. At first, he just stood there, looking
shabby and sorrowful. Then, when he
sensed that his peculiarity was being noticed
by a few of us around the tables of
the bar, he began to shuffle his feet to
the music, then to gyrate his hips wildly.
As he danced, his audience grew, because
despite his ludicrous getup and
deliberately gawJ...-y movements it was
clear that he was a man of extraordinary
physical and comic grace, and that he
had come to entertain. us. He ducked,.
and he spun, and he kicked up his heels,
and he took off in high leaps, touching
down with a fluttering ease to spin and
wriggle some more. Then he stopped,
unzipped his fly, and, reaching through
it deep into his trouser leg, extracted
a necktie, and made a great show of
cleaning his giant spectacles with it,
before tucking and zipping it tightly
away again.
The crowd loved the clown. People
clustered around him, dancing, with
their hands raised high above their
heads, as if they were bearingwimess in
a charismatic gospel church. He never
said a word, but his pantomime was eloquent,
and when he approached a table,
. and helped himself, with a little bow
and a nod, to a man's bottle of beer and
his lighted cigarette, others eagerly
thrust their beers and cigarettes at him.
But the clown wasn't interested. Even
when a fight broke out in the street behind
him, he paid no attention. He was
dancing again-now with the beer bottle
balanced on his head-whirling and
undulating, and playing with his cigarette,
smoking it from one nostril, then
the other, even tucking it into his ear for
a while. Finally, turning away from us
and hiking his pants up, he clenched
the cigarette between his scrawny buttocks
and flexed them in such a way that
he appeared to be blowing smoke out of
his ass.
"Fantastic," one of the Congolese at
my table said. "This man is the true
spirit of this place." He got out a wad of
Congolese francs, and when, at last, the
clown stopped dancing and came over
to collect the money, I, too, reached for
my pocket. But the clown held out his
hands to stop me. He bowed and smiled
wanly, still without a word, and then
suddenly he spoke. His voice was high
and nasal, his words came quickly, and
for a puzzled moment I imagined he
was speaking Italian. But it was French,
and what he said was "When you go
back where you come from, will you
take me in your suitcase?"+
THE NEW )01\K_EII. SEl'TEMDEI\ 25, 2000 67
·--
UCMANNEX76
SECRET
ADF-KABILA LINKS-REVELATIONS BY COMMANDER. ISSA
TWATERA EMBUNDU FORMER COMMANDING OFFICER OF
ADF
The subject can re·call the following facts about DRC (Kabila
government) support to the ADF rebellion. He states as follows:
1. At first there was a joint operation between UPDF and FAC to rout
ADF out of Buhira in 1997. The joint forces landed into an ADF
ambush in Kamunyu ( 4 kms away from ADF bases) which killed
02 FAC senior officers and one UPDF Major who was airlifted from
Buswanga. Many other Congolese soldiers died in this fighting.
This "defeat" according to the subject is what led FAC forces to
co-operate with ADF for fear of being ambushed. They sent an
emissary called Fatuma (beer seller in Busange) to tell ADF that
they were ready tci co-operate with them and provide logistics:
ADF was thus had to stop hostilities against FAC (Kabila's a·~my):
2. The subject who was then CO mountains of the moon (1 Bn)
received the above message and sent it to his Bde comd called
Onecho who encouraged him to continue strengthening the
relationship. A meeting with 03 FAC comds followed. The chef
(local leader) of Masambu arranged for the meeting to take place.
The three comds expressed disappointment with Museveni's
government and pledged support to ADF. After this meeting they
reported to Col Ibamba of FAC in Bunia who took the message to
President Kabila (RIP) who agreed to support to ADF:
a. The government of Congo then started by supplying ammo:
(1) 15 boxes of 7.62mm were supplied to FAC detach at
Rugetsi. They planed a fake ADF attack on the detach
in order for ADF to collect this ammo.
(2) 08 boxes of 7 .62mm were supplied through Njiji FAC
detach also through a fake attack by ADF on the camp ..
SECRET \
SECRET
(3) In September . 1997, FAC started supplying arms and.·
ammo in big quantities, equipment were airlifted from
Sudan to Kisangani, but UPDF captured Kisangani before
ADF could pick the arms. Kabila then arranged for more
weapons· and sent for ADF to collect them. A team of 5
people led by Moses was sent to Kinshasha to negotiate
with Kabila through Khartoum. This was followed by
two air droppings of arms and ammo in Rwenzori ADF
bases.
b. This was followed by a pledge from Kabila to provide troops
who would fight along side ADF. At first a senior Mai Mai
comd with 25 troops were received by the subject at Kiribata .
detach in Bundibugyo. The troops were integrated into ADF.·
The subject does not have more details because he had left
DRC territory to operate inside Uganda.
c. The subject also recalls that two satellite phones· were
supplied by Kabila and most of the communication with ADF
was done on these phones.
d. Collaborators:
(1) Kassim Mulumba (Now detained in Kigo)
He used to go and meet Kabila after which he would
report back to ADF Hqs.
(2) Moses
. He operated as a liaison agent between Kabila and Jamir
Mukulu in Nairobi.
(3) Mark
Operated as a liaison agent between ADF and DRC,
Zimbabwe, Angola and Sudan governments after which
he would report back to Jamir Mukulu.
2
SECRET
SECRET
(4) DRC Army Officers
Their work was to deliver arms and ammunitions. They
include: ·
(a) Col Ibamba
(b) Lt Col Mayara
(c) Capt Kasereka
(d) Capt Pangole
(5) Dr Ngerese - based in Lhume, his work was to treat
ADF casualties.
(6) Fatuma - already mentioned above she was a liaison
agent between Kabila and ADF. However, she was later
killed by ADF on suspicion that she was leaking secrets to
UPDF. ..
(7) Bihande (Current LC V Chairman Kasese)
He is known to Yusuf Kabanda, who would send him to
negotiate with Kabila on his behalf. This he would do
under the cover of being a government official.
Note: The subject was in ADF for over ten years and served in the
following capacities:
CO 1 Bn - mountains of the moon.
Overall comd 3 Bdes- 113 Bde
107Bde
11 Bde
- He defected to UPDF in Oct 2000.
3
SECRET
UCMANNEX 7'
United Nations S/RES/1323 (2000)
(,-~ Security Council
~ ~ ~-ii
Distr.: General
13 October 2000
00-68758 (E)
•0068758*
Resolution 1323 (2000)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4207th meeting,
on 13 October 2000
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000, 1304 (2000) of 16
June 2000 and 1316 (2000) of 23 August 2000, the statement adopted by its Summit
meeting of 7 September 2000 (S/PRST/2000/28), and all previous resolutions and
statements of its President relating to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo,
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States of the region,
Deploring the continuation of hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the lack of cooperation with the United Nations, and the lack of progress on
the national dialogue,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 September 2000
(S/2000/888) and its recommendations, as well as the observations contained in
paragraphs 82 and 85,
Reaffirming its readiness to assist in the peace process, in particular through
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC), in accordance with resolution 1291 (2000),
Expressing its deep concern at the dire consequences of the conflict for the
humanitarian and human rights situations, as well as at reports of the illegal
exploitation of the natural re~ources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
I. Decides to extend the mandate ofMONUC until 15 December 2000;
2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Human Rights Watch World Repmt2001: Sudan: Human Rights Developments
UCMANNEX78
Pagel of8
HUHAN RIGHTSWATCH I ~BU) REPOKT2001 CONTENTS I DOWHLOAD I PRINT I ORDER I HRW HONE
~'fl\Sudan
INTROOUCllON
Af-RICA
• AMERICAS
• ASIA
.. l:UROP£ ANO
C£N1 MLASIA
~ HIDOLE EAST AND
HOM.TH AFRICA
• :liPECIAL ISSLJU
ANO CAMPAIGNS
, UNIT LU STATE'S
• Ak11S
CHILOJU,H·s IUCH rs
WOMlN'!i
HUMAN IUGHt~
, APl'laNUIX.
~ Human Rights Developments
Defending I:Iuman Rights
The .Role qf the Intem~ti9114J Com111uuity
Human Rights Developments
World Report 2000
Curronl Events
Nows Archivo
COUNTRIES
A!l9llli!
ll...l!ll!llll!
The government of Sudan remained a gross human rights DllJll9C.r-"lic
abuser, while rebel groups committed their share of ~..P!l'21ic_oJ.C.Ql!9Q
violations. Jn the seemingly endless seventeen-year civil [i~o~,~ Repl!_Q!ul
war, the government stepped up its brutal expulsions of ~
southern villagers from the oil production areas and ~
trumpeted its resolve to use the oil income for more Mozambique
weapons. Under the leadership of President (Lt. Gen.) Omar l!!i9.erlll
El Bashir, the government intensified its bombing of civilian =eone
targets in the war, denied relief food to needy civilians, and S..Ql!!h.Afril;a
abused children's rights, particularly through its military and Sudan
logistical support for the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Zilmbra
Army (LRA), which held an estimated 6,000 Ugandan
children captive on government-controlled Sudanese
territory. As for the Sudan People's Liberation
CAMPAIGNS
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the principal armed movement
of the south and ofall Sudan, its forces continued to loot
food (including relief provisions) from the population,
sometimes with civilian casualties, recruit child soldiers,
and commit rape. On both sides, impunity was the rule.
Sudan's human rights record of gross abuses was one factor
in the General Assembly vote in October that denied a
Security Council to Sudan, nominated by the Organization
of African Unity, and instead granted the African seat to
Mauritius.
In Khartoum and other government-controlled areas, the
Islamist government's repression of political opponents
continued. While some openings in civil liberties occurred,
and one major opposition party, the Umma Party, returned
from exile, these openings did not appear to be uniformly
applied. The Umma Party sought more human rights
guarantees before it would participate in presidential and
legislative elections that the government announced for
December 2000.
The government's outreach to exiles appeared to grow out of
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Sudan: Human Rights Developments
the internal power struggle within the ruling Islamist party,
the National Congress (previously the National Islamic
Front or NIF), which the president controlled. Expulsion of
the Hassan al Turabi faction led him to create a new
political party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), which
felt the heat of arrests and injuries in anti-government
demonstrations.
Negotiations to end the war appeared fruitless, whatever the
forum or venue. The parties remained stalled on the issues
of the relation of religion to the state and self-determination.
Sudan's Arab and African, Muslim and non-Muslim
population is spread between nineteen major ethnic groups
and 597 subgroups speaking Arabic and more than 115
indigenous languages.
Government Abuses
Torture and impunity remained a government policy.
Security forces continued a campaign of harassment,
intimidation, and persecution targeting political opponents
and human rights defenders by means of arbitrary searches
and arrests, followed by incommunicado and protracted
arbitrary detention without judicial review. Security used
"non-detention" as a ploy as in prior years: it ordered
individuals to report to security headquarters early in the
morning and sit there all day, doing nothing. They were
released at night but ordered to return the next day.
Two Catholic priests and more than eighteen other
defendants who had been tortured to confess to charges of
sabotage and conspiracy in 1998 were pardoned in January
2000. Their credible allegations of torture were not
investigated. Islamic student militias operating under the
protection of the security forces abducted and tortured a
number of student activists. Security agents enjoyed de jure
and de facto immunity from prosecution. Despite formal
complaints by families of torture victims and the U.N.
special rapporteur for Sudan, the government did not
seriously investigate any cases. A doctor at Atbara hospital
demanded an investigation into the torture he suffered at
security's hands, but government officials disavowed
responsibility, downplaying torture as a personal act
committed by security agents whom the state cannot control.
Some sixty or more PNC members were arrested by security
and blamed for fomenting a series of September
demonstrations where deaths and destruction of public
property occurred, as in western Fashir, where one woman
Page2 of8
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Sudan: Human Rights Developments
student was killed and fourteen injured (as were five police)
in a street protest against utility shortages and nonpayment
of teachers' salaries.
Press-gang military recruitment of young men and underage
boys from buses and public places continued. Demonstrators
in Khartoum and other cities participated in anticonscription
protests that damaged government property and
banks. Authorities responded with what appeared to be
excessive force, killing several students and unemployed.
Conditions in Omdurman Women's Prison remained
shocking: chronic overcrowding, lack of sanitation,
diseases, and death from epidemics among children who
lived with their mothers. The government annually pardoned
women, temporarily easing overcrowding before bringing in
the next batch of prisoners; in 2000, the government
pardoned more than 700 women. These included more than
500 mostly poverty-stricken, illiterate southerners convicted
of brewing and selling alcohol to help their families survive.
Public Order Police frequently harassed women and
monitored women's dress according to the government's
stereotype oflslamic correctness. Public Order Courts
remained the state's primary weapon against women striving
for freedom and equality; women received summary justice
in these courts, often followed immediately by flogging,
without effective right to appeal.
In September 2000, the governor of Khartoum State decreed
that women would be banned from some public service jobs
such as gas station attendant and restaurant and hotel
employee. Security forces tear-gassed and beat women
demonstrating against the decree, arresting twenty-six of
them for trial by Public Order Courts. Even the governmentcreated
unions protested and the court suspended the decree
in September pending a judicial hearing.
The nongovernmental press exercised more freedom despite
arrests of journalists. In March 2000, security authorities
held five journalists and a poet for questioning over articles
deemed "anti-government" and critical of the armed forces.
In August, security forces arrested two journalists from
private newspapers, both of which had been shut down
several times in 1999 for accusing the government of
corruption.
In an encouraging development, in July the government
issued exit visas to some political party leaders, advocates,
Page 3 of8
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Sudan: Human Rights Developments
and activists to attend a convention in Kampala, Uganda,
also attended by NDA and civil society members, on the
future of Sudan and human rights in transition.
Representatives of the Masaalit in western Sudan denounced
new attacks on their people, and on the Dagu, Fur, and
Zaghawa, by Arab militias armed, supported, and given
immunity from prosecution for their acts by the government.
In July, reported massacres of these Africans by Arab
militias claimed nineteen, sixteen, and five victims in
different incidents.
The government pursued its policy of harassment of
Christian churches and believers. Apostasy, or conversion
by Muslims to another faith, remained a capital crime. The
accelerated top-level discourse of jihad to encourage
enlistment for the war against the infidels in central, east
and southern Sudan sustained a climate of intolerance.
About twenty security officers stormed and searched the
Catholic Comboni College compound in July 2000. In early
July, a Mexican clerical student was detained and suffered
abuse at the hands of security. The Khartoum state
government continued to destroy Christian structures such
as chapels, schools, and clinics that served the southern
population in the city's vast slums. Two of the four million
Khartoum residents were people displaced from other parts
of the country, most of whom struggled to survive in the
informal economy.
War-Related Abuses
Government of Sudan
Fighting spread further into the southern area of Western
Upper Nile, inhabited mainly by the African Nuer. The
government continued its campaign of creating a cordon
sanitaire around new oil fields by forcibly displacing the
Nuer population. In addition to aerial bombardmentand
scorched-earth attacks by government troops, the
government armed Nuer proxies to fight against antigovernment
Nuer. The government routinely banned U.N.
relief aircraft from Western Upper Nile on security grounds,
although its military campaigns produced tens of thousands
of freshly displaced civilians, who were burned and looted
out of their homes by pro-government Nuer militia and the
government army.
The government's 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement with
former rebel forces, headed by Nuer ex-rebel leader Riek
Page 4 of8
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Sudan: Human Rights Developments
Machar, unraveled when Machar, claiming the government
had materially breached the agreement, resigned in January
2000 from the government and returned to the bush. He
formed a new rebel group. Many Nuer commanders, without
Machar's presence, had reached a degree of unity at a
conference at Waat, Upper Nile, where on November 4,
1999, they announced they were fighting against the
government. That ended in July, when Machar's new rebel
group fought in the oil fields against the Nuer troops of
Peter Gatdet, who was by then allied with the SPLA.
Machar's troops had apparently accepted government arms
again.
The warlord syndrome, where human rights were rarely
recognized by the local toughs, spread in Upper Nile
wherever local commanders could secure direct government
funding and arms, serving as government militias.
The Mine Ban Treaty, signed by Sudan in 1997, remained
unratified and the government did not destroy antipersonnel
landmines as required. It continued to use landmines in
some areas, such as the eastern front. The government
refused the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) access to those detained in connection with the
conflict; failure to acknowledge holding rebel soldiers
prisoner pointed to a continuing government policy of secret
summary executions.
The government announced that its new oil revenue,
constituting 20 percent of its 2000 revenue, would be used
for defense, including an arms factory near Khartoum.
Defense spending in dollars increased 96 percent from 1998
to 2000. Not coincidentally, government use of air power
and bombing increased.
When SPLA violations of the cease-fire in Bahr El Ghazal
temporarily halted the movement of the government's
military train, the government counterattacked by bombing
not only the cease-fire area, but also the rest of the south, the
Nuba Mountains, and the eastern front. In July, 250 bombs
hit civilians and their infrastructure in the attacks, which set
a new high, according to conservative calculations based on
U.N. reliefreports. In August, government forces stepped up
targeting ofrelief, health, and school facilities, apparently
aiming to deter or shut down the U.N.-led humanitarian
operation in the south, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).
And despite promises to stop the bombing in September,
more government bombs in October hit Catholic church
facilities in different locations in Equatoria.
Page 5 of8
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Sudan: Human Rights Developments
The government bombed a school in the Nuba Mountains in
February, killing fourteen, mostly children and one teacher.
Although the government gave permission for U.N. needs
assessments in the rebel areas of the Nuba Mountains in
1999, only two were completed before the government put a
halt to the activities, in the middle of a vaccination
campaign.
The government also armed tribal militias of the Arabized
Baggara tribes (the muraheleen of Western Sudan) for use as
proxy fighting forces against the Dinka civilian base of the
SPLA in Bahr El Ghazal. Although slave-taking became
their trademark, the muraheleen conducted few successful
slave raids in 2000 because the SPLA deployed forces in
northern Bahr El Ghazal and armed the Dinka boys guarding
the cattle camps. Even so, the government continued to use
the muraheleen to guard the military train to Wau, from
which they attacked villages and looted cattle and food.
Meanwhile, those captured in prior years remained in
slavery-like conditions, forced to work hard for no pay:
physical punishment and verbal and sexual abuse were
common. The numbers of those still in captivity were
estimated by different groups to be from 5,000 up. The
government denied all slavery allegations, but in May 1999
set up the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction
of Women and Children (CEA WC) to address abduction
and forced labor. Its members included James Agware, a
Dinka nongovernmental activist experienced in locating jl.lld
retrieving Dinka children from slavery. Although the
committee retrieved slaves from their owners through local
political/tribal intervention, its work was marred by the
detention of Agware himself several times by local
authorities. The government's deliberate decision to not
record the identity of the abductors or forced labor owners,
let alone prosecute l;lllyone involved, was a serious setback
in the fight against abuse of women and children. All the
while, Western anti-slavery groups continued to redeem
slaves by the thousands, notwithstanding UNICEF's
denunciation of the buying of human beings for any
purpose.
At an international conference on war-affected children in
Canada in September, the Sudanese government was
condemned in strong language by the former UNICEF
Deputy Director Stephen Lewis, who claimed the
government routinely lied to and manipulated the donors.
He denounced Sudan's broken promises to facilitate the
Page 6 of8
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 : Sudan: Human Rights Developments
release of some 6,000 Ugandan children held in LRA camps
inside Sudan. His remarks received a standing ovation.
Sudan and Uganda agreed in October that the LRA would
be disarmed and its camps moved 1,000 kilometers from the
Ugandan border, and that the abducted Ugandan children
would be returned. Uganda agreed to halt support for the
SPLA.
SPLA and Otlter Rebel Groups
Despite church peacemaking efforts between the Didinga of
Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria, and the Bor Dinka who
dominated the SPLA garrison in Chukudum, hostilities
continued. Sometime after the August 1999 cease-fire, the
SPLA assigned commanders oflocal origin to the garrison,
but the local population remained reluctant to return to their
homes and fields because of the landmines that the SPLA
promised to remove but did not.
Even though SPLA leaders promised to stop their troops'
looting, the confiscation ofrelief food from civilians by
SPLA soldiers and officers continued. In March 2000, an
SPLA commander in Bahr El Ghazal took the entire
contents of a relief warehouse, valued at $500,000,
according to an investigation carried out by the SPLA's
relief arm and international relief agencies. Several looting
incidents, at or after relief food distributions, occurred in
Eastern Equatoria. When angry civilians on one occasion
tried to prevent the SPLA from taking the food, the soldiers
fired into the crowd, killing several.
In 2000, negotiations on a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) between the SPLA's Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation
Association (SRRA) and the nongovemmental organizations
(NGOs) operating in SPLA territory-in which the SPLA
sought to impose new demands and operating conditions on
relief organizations-foundered. Some eleven of forty NGOs
operating in SPLA territory refused to sign for fear of
compromising their neutrality and safety. They had to
withdraw from that territory by the SPLA deadline of March
l, 2000. The SRRA's executive director claimed he did not
care if 50,000 or 100,000 southerners died as a result of the
NGO pullout. In later months, several nonsignatories signed
the MoU or restarted operations in SPLA territory. Some
NGOs did not return. Meanwhile the E.U. withheld funding
from NGOs who signed the MoU.
Visitors to rebel areas continued to see armed youth who
looked younger than eighteen. Cooperation with UNICEF's
Page 7 of8
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 : Sudan: Human Rights Developments
l!ArK TO -1:or
Copyright t!:> 2001
Human Rights Watch
program for demobilization of child soldiers was uneven.
One SPLA commander remobilized several hundred boys
when UNICEF failed to provide promised school books and
other supplies for the boys. On the eastern front, visitors
received credible complaints from military and civilian
victims that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA
member, committed abuses against its soldiers accused of
spying or defecting to another rebel group, including
summary executions, torture, and detention of prisoners in a
pit in the ground. The allegations were denied by the SAF.
Page 8 of8
HUHAN RICHTSWATCH I WORLD REPORT2001
· IUTKOIJUCllON
• AFRJCA
~ AM£k1CAS
.. AIIA
• EUA01'£AND
CENTAALASIA
~ t110Dl £ l;AST AUD
NOKTH AFRICA
" $,ECIAL ISSUU
ANO CAMJ'AICiHS
UNI f Lt> S JA'TU
ARMS
· CHILOkGN'$ RIGtlU
•· WOHE.N·~
HU HAN RIGHtS
· APPLNDIX
11-\CKTOTOI'
Copyright C> 2001
Human Rights Watch
Human Rights )levelogments
• Defending Human Rights
The Role of the International Community
Defending Human Rights
World Report 2000
Currant Events
Nows Archlvo
COUNTRIES
An9l!lll
iMuru!l
While one organization, the National Alliance for the ~.
Restoration of Democracy, continued in outspoken defense BMublic of Congo
of political detainees and others, no other independent = Republic of
human rights organization existed in government-controlled ~
areas until a small group, operating with a commercial l.lb!lrla
rather than nonprofit license, started up low profile in mid- Mozambique
2000. Independent attorneys defended those tried for = sabotage, conspiracy, and related charges but the judicial s;erra Leone
system remained useless for security cases. Churches south Africa
attempted to defend their parishioners' rights, and the Dinka Sudan
committee retrieving enslaved Dinka children continued its Zrunbli
work, under government CEA WC sponsorship. Women's
groups, usually considered less threatening, were organized CAMPAIGNS
on a small scale and made their voices heard when the
Khartoum governor attempted to ban some women's work.
Human rights monitors operated in the SPLA areas of the
Nuba Mountains, but there were no human rights
organizations in southern rebel-held areas. The Nairobibased
South Sudan Law Society and women's organizations
such as Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi (SW AN)
raised human rights issues in various forums. The Sudan
Human Rights Ass·ociation, based in Kampala. monitored
conditions at Sudanese refugee camps in Kenya and
Uganda. The New Sudan Council of Churches in Nairobi
( encompassing churches working in rebel areas of Sudan)
conducted one other peace and reconciliation meeting, but
was slow to reinforce the Wunlit agreement of 1999.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH I WORLD REPORT2001
.,. mlRObUCflON
I• AFRICA
• AMEIUC:AS
.. ASIA
i,. lVAOr.E.AND
ClNTRALASIA
• HIDOLE £ASif AHO
NOllt HAFlllCA
• Sl'E.CIAL ISSUU
ANO CAMPAIGNS
UHlfLU SlATES
ARHi
, CHILDREN'S RJGHfS
· WOMEN'$
ttUHAN IUC:IIYS
· APPLNOIX
Human Rights DeveloP-ments
Defending Human Rights
• The Role of the International Community
The Role of the International Community
United Nations
World Report 2000
Current Evonts
Nows Archive
COUNTRIES
Aag!IJa
f!li.!llOl!I
~
Republic of Congo
The U.N. contm• ued i•t s massi•v e emergency assi•s tance fflebdiQerlalila Republic of
program for Sudan under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline KllllYll
Sudan. Several organizations withdrew from OLS in protest Lll!8!ia
of its failure to take a lead in negotiating access on their Mozamblgue
behalf with the SPLA in the MoU controversy among other = things. OLS remained severely underfunded due to donor Sierra Leone
fatigue. Several U.N. agencies on occasion protested in South Africa
press statements or quietly the government's denial of Sudan
humanitarian access and government bombing of relief and Zim!21i
other civilian facilities.
In April 2000, the U.N. Commission on Human Itjghts
expressed concern about human rights violations in Sudan
by the government and SPLA. It renewed the mandate of the
special rapporteur on human rights in Sudan. Jn October, the
General Assembly voted against Sudanese membership on
the Security Council and for the membership of an African
country with a more credible human rights record,
Mauritius.
European Union members continued to urge that greater
engagement and a less confrontational approach on human
rights would lead to improvements. E.U. countries rushed to
do business in the petroleum sector, despite government of
Sudan statements that oil development would be put to
military use.
But in July, the European Parliament issued a declaration
condemning the LRA and the government of Sudan for
sponsoring it, and in August the E.U. Presidency issued a
declaration expressing deep concern about the government
bombing of civilian targets in the south. The ACP-E.U.
Parliament also issued a resolution condemning Sudan and
the SPLA for human rights violations.
CAMPAIGNS
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom continued to monitor human rights
and raise human rights issues with the government.
Domestically, it denied many Sudanese applicants political
asylum and issued a visa application form for Sudanese that
sought to curb their right to apply for political asylum once
they reached the U.K. That form was withdrawn with an
apology after being widely denounced. The U.K.'s
international commerce agency touted Sudan as a country
suitable for investment until the Foreign Office, under
pressure, reminded the agency of Sudan's human rights
problems.
United States
The United States government's policy of isolating the
Sudan government diplomatically proved unworkable. The
U.S. worked successfully for months, however, on a
unilateral campaign to deny Sudan a seat on the U.N.
Security Council.·
Congressional conservatives sponsored one-year legislation
that permitted the president, at his discretion, to provide
food aid to the military members of the NOA, of which the
SPLA constituted the largest force. In February 2000,
President Clinton declined to authorize food aid to the
NOA.
Harry Johnston was appointed U.S. Special Envoy for
Sudan in 1998 with a mandate to focus on three areas:
human rights, humanitarian issues, and peace negotiations.
One of the benchmarks the U.S. administration proposed to
the Khartoum government for improving relations was that
it call a halt to bombing civilians. While Johnston was still
in Khartoum with this message, the government bombed a
hospital in the south sponsored by a U.S. nonprofit religious
group.
A 1997 executive order imposing stiff sanctions on all
financial transactions between U.S. and Sudanese persons
and entities remained in effect. The State Department's
annual human rights report accused both government and
opposition forces of human rights abuses.
IIAC!,; J'O JO.P
Copyright C 2001
Human Rights Watch
A divestment campaign against Talisman Energy Inc., a
Canadian company engaged in production and development
of oil in W estem Upper Nile, was endorsed by Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright. The U.S. government balked at
another tactic, denial of the use of U.S. capital markets to
Sudan and its business partners.
Canada
Canadian church groups and NGOs waged a struggle to
force the government to impose sanctions on all Canadian
companies doing business with Sudan. Canada's Foreign
Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, announced in October 1999 that
he would send a human rights team to investigate whether
oil development, and specifically Talisman Energy Inc., had
caused an increase in human rights abuses and
exacerbatedthe conflict. If so, he threatened, the Canadian
government would consider imposing sanctions on its
companies operating in Sudan. In February 2000, the human
rights team headed by John Harker responded affirmatively
to both questions after visiting north and south Sudan and
Canadian operations there. Sanctions, however, were never
imposed.
UCMANNEX79
.iMC/MONUC RESTRICTEIJ
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE Ot_;;MOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
.---------O-R-G-A,N lZATION OF AFRIC.A-N- U-NI-TY- ------,
MISSION DEL' ORGANSATION DES NATIONS llNIES AU CONGO
ORGANISATION DE L'lNITE AFRlCAINE
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JMC/l\tONUC RESTRICTED
SUB - PLANS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT (DR) OF FORCES IN
ACCORDANCE Willi THE DR PLAN SIGNED AT KAJ\,IPALA ON 8 APRIL 00
References :
A. Disengagement and Redeployment (DR) Plan signed at Kampala on 8 April 00.
B. Declaration by the Parties positions of their Forces in DRC as on 5 April,
preferred New Defensive Positions (NDP) and other MJLINFO as required by
Kampala DR Plan.
C. Rwanda plan for disengagement dated on 28 August 00.(See Note)
D. RCD Conununique No. 020/RCD/DEL-CMM/2000 dated on 13 September 00.
(See Note)
I. Introduction. In accordance with the Kampala DR Plan (8 April 00), all Parties have
declared the forward positions for their forces in DRC to facilitate disengagement and
redeployment of forces to New Defensive Positions (NDP). The Sub-Plans for DR are
set out for the following areas:
a. Area I - LISALA To include all positions ofMLC/UPDF
b. Area 2 - BOENDE
c. Area 3 - KABINDA
d. Area 4 - KABALO
2. Confirmation. After an agreement on the Sub-Plans, JMC/MONUC and the concerned
Parties will confirm respective forward positions and strength of forces on the ground.
3. Implementatior.. The Sub-Plans will be implemented simultaneously in all Areas by
the Parties, in accordance with an agreed calendar and in co-ordination with
JMC/MONUC.
4. Verification and Monitoring. Disengagement in each Area will be verified and
monitored by JMC/MONUC.
NOTE: The wording "Final Positions" in reference C and D is interpreted by JMC members as
"New Defensive Positions".
t(c.c C6} ~ ; CJU-· J? ,/!;)
11 i \7)<t- }}\ ~) ::, Ll(. Version appro,cd b~ JMC
~ J ~ ~~~ ... , .. , .• ,,~
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
DR SUB - PLAN FOR AREA i - LISALA
Reference: Map scale I: IOOO OOO and I: 250 OOO Sheet numbers NA 34-5 to NA 34-16
1. Situation
a. Forces of MLC and UPDF and of FAC and their Allies have declared the
following forward positions:
(I) MLC and UPDF
(a) IMESE
(b) LIBANDA
(c) WENGA
(d) BASANKUSU
(e) WAKA
(2) F AC and Allies
(a) BUBURU
(b) ElvlA.TE - LOA
(c) LOSOMBO
(d) ABUNAKOMBO
(e) DJEFERA
18° 20' E, 2° 30' N
18°25' E, 1°30' N
19°20' E, 1° 10' N
19°50' E, 1° 10' N
20° 10' E, 1° 00' N
18° 00' E, 1° 30' N
18°40' E, 1°20' N
19° 10' E, 1° 10' N
19° 20' E, 0° 50' N
20° 30' E, 0° 50' N
b. In accordance with the Kampala DR Plan, above-mentioned forces will
disengage and re-deploy to New Defensive Positions (NDP) in order to
create a Disengagement Zone (DZ).
2. Mission
a. Forces ofMLC and UPDF and of,FAC and their Allies will disengage and
re-deploy to NDP in accordance with an agreed calendar. ;·
b. To create a· Disengagement Zone (DZ), minimum 30 km., between
forw~d positions of both forces
3. Execution
a.
b.
Scheme of Maneuver. ~Forcei;of the Parties ·will s~'iJi~'~;J~;ly r~-deploy~
to NDPs, creating a DZ, in accordance with an agreed calen_dar.
New Defensive Positions. The NDP declared by the Parties are as follows:
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
(I) MLC and UPDF
(a) IMESE
(b) LIBANDA
(c) WENGA
(d) BASANKUSU
(e) WAKA
(2) FAC and Allies
(a) BUBURU
(b) EMATE - LOA
(c) LOSOMBO
(d) ABUNAKOMBO
(e) DJEFERA
c. Coordinating Instructions.
18° 20' E, 2° 30' N
18°25' E, 1°30' N
19°20' E 1° 10' N
19°50' E: 1° 10' N
20° 10' E, 1° 00' N
18° 00' E, 1° 30' N .
18°40' E 1°20' ~
19° 10' E: 1° 10' N
i9°20' E,0°50' N
20° 30' E, 0° 50' N
(I) Sequence of Disengagement. Simultaneous on Disengagement Day· .. '.
(2) Disengagement Zone. As defined by the forward positions ofNDP
of either Party. After verification, forces of Parties will under no
circumstances enter the DZ. Should there be a need to do so it will
only be after explicit permission of JMC/MONUC.
(3) Verification and Monitoring.
(a) Will be conducted by JMC/MONUC
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
SUB DR PLAN FOR AREA 2 BOENDE
Reference: Map scale I :1000 OOO and I: 250 OOO Sheet numbers SA 34-2 to SA 34-10
1. Situation
a. Forces of RCD and RP A and F AC and their Allies have declared the
following forward positions:
(1) RCD and RPA
(a) YAHUMA
(b) DJOLU
(c) WAMBA
(d) BOMANDJA
(e) MOBOKA
(f) Y ALUSAKA
(g) BAKOLE
(h) YAYAMA
(i) ENE
U) LOMELA
(2) F AC and Allies
(a) LIKETE
(b) BOENDE
(c) WEMA
(d) DJOLU
(e) BOKUNGU
(f) MONDOMBE
(g) Y ALUSAKA
(h) IKELA
23° 10' E, 1°05' N
22°30'E !0 40'N
22° 35' E: 0° 05 ' N .
23° 25' E, 0° 55' S
(Not traceable on the map)
22°55' E, 1°05' S
23°24' E 1° 12' S
23°00' E'. 1°30' S
23°20' E: 1° 00' S
23° 16· E, 2° 17' S
21 ° 30' E, 0° 40' S
20° 45' E 0° 10' S
21°40'E' 0°25'S
22° 30· E: 1° 40' N
22° 20· E, 0° 40' S
22° 50' E o0 55' S
22° 55° E: 1°05' S
23° 20° E, 1° 10' S
b. In accordance with the Kampala DR Plan, above-mentioned forces will
disengage and re-deploy to New Defensive Positions (NDP) in order to
create a Disengagement Zone (DZ).
2, Mission
3.
a. Forces of RP A and RCD and FAC and Allies will disengage and re-deploy
to NDPs (via Intermediate positions or directly) in accordance with an;.
agreed calendar. tb.
To create a Disengagement Zone (DZ), minimum 30 km., between
forward positions of both forces. : ... \J ,
=E~:xe~c.c.c..u t"'"'io=n f{t,,'l Q ~&Z) 5 $ Version approved by JMC
·~l~1 ~jJ -ty <~;~ "'"'")7
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
a. Scheme ofManeuver. Forces of the Parties will simultaneously re-d~ploy
to NDP (via Intermediate positions or directly), creating a DZ, in
accordance with an agreed calendar.
b. Intermediate Defensive Positions. The declared Intermediate Positions by
the Parties are as follows:
c.
d.
(I) RCD and Allies.
(a) YAHUMA
(b) LOPORI
(c) ANZI
(d) MOGDA
(e) YOLOMBO
(f) LOMELA
New Defensive Positions. The declared
follows:
(I) FAC and Allies
(a) DJOLU
(b) MONDOMBE
(c) IKELA
(2) RCD
(a) ISANGUI
(b) OPALA
(c) UBUNDU
(3) RPA
(a) LUBUTU
(b) PUNIA.
Coordinating Instructions.
23° 10' E 1° 10' N
23° 10' E: 1° 10' N
23°20' E 1° 10' S
23°40' E: 1°50' S
23° 15' E, 1°35' S
23° 16. E, 2° 17' S
NDPs by the Parties
22° 30· E, 1°35' N
22° oo· E, o0 oo· s
23° 20° E, 1° 10' S
24° 20· E, o0 so· N
24° 20' E, 0° 40' S
25° 40' E, 0° 50' S
26° 35· E, 0° 45' S
26°20' E, !0 20' S
are as
(I) Sequence of Disengagement. Simultaneous on Disengagement Day
(2) Disengagement Zone. As defined by the forward positions of
Intermediate Defensive Positions and then the NDP of either Party .
. After verification, forces of Parties will under no circumstances enter
the DZ. Should there be a need to do so it will only be after explicit
permission of JMC/MONUC.
(3) Verification and Monitoring
Will be conducted by JMC/MONUC.
181h No,·emb<r .2000
JMC/MOl'iUC RESTRICTED
SUB DR PLAN FOR AREA 3 KABINDA
Reference: Map scale 1: IOOO OOO and 1: 250 OOO Sheet numbers SA 34-10 to SA 34-16,
SB 34-2 to 34-16, SB 35-5, 9 and 13
1. Situation
a. Forces of RCD and RP A and F AC and their Allies have declared the
following forward positions:
(I) RCD and RPA
(a) BONKJTA
(b) DEKESE
(c) GANGWA
(d) IDUMBE-LONGAPORT
(e) DJONGO-SANGA
(f) KINDA
(g) BEYA BWANGA
(h) TSHIMBADI
(i) BAKWAK.ENGE
U) BENALEKA
(k) DEMBA
(I) KAMPAMBWE
(m)MPOLE
(n) KAMBA KALELE
(o) K.ABAMBA
(p) TUNTA- KJPANGA
(q) LUKONJOLO
(r)TANGALA
(s) KAMENDE
(t) LUBUILANn
(2) F AC and Allies
(a) OSHWE
(b) BUTALA
. (c) ILEBO
(d) BOSANGU
(e) LODI
(f) BOK.ILA
(g) KJLENDALE
(h) MISUMBA
(i)KAKENGE
(j) BEYA DWANGA
21°00' E, 2°30' S
21 ° 26' E, 3° 28' S
20° 56' E 3° 30' S
21°00'E'.3°45' S
21° 00' E 3° 55' S
21°54' E: 4°45 ' S
22° 05' E, 5° 05' S
22° 05' E, 5°03' S
22° 03' E, 4° 45' S
22° 10' E 5° 08' S
2?0 13' E' 5° 31' S
22° 00' E' 5° 35' S
23° 06' E: 5° 35' S
23°10'E 5°45'S
24° 00' E' 5° 50' S
' (Not traceable in the map)
24° 30° E 5° 50' S
·24° 45' E' 6° 10' S
24° 50' E' 6° 05' S
24° 02° E: 6° 30' S
19°30' E, 3°23' S
20° 55' E, 4° 05' S
20° 36' E, 4° 19' S
20° 20· E, 4° 20' S
21° 20' E, 4° 00' S
21° 39' E, 4°03° S
21° 50' E, 4°05' S
21° 57' E, 4° 16' S
21° 55' E, 4° 52. S
22°05' E, 5°05' S
~1;-~~\W 1~~f-JY} 7 Version appro,·cd by JMC /
~\~~;F~
JMC/MON'UC RESTRICTED
(k) BENA LEK.A
(I) BULULU WEST
(m) SAPO SAPO
(n)KANANGA
(o) PANGA
(p) LAC MUKAMBA
(q) MB Un MA YI
(r) KABrNDA
(s) GANDAnKA
22° 10' E, 5°08' S
21° 50' E 5°45' S
22° 21' E' 5° 23' S
22° 28' E'. 5° 55' S
22° 50' E, 5° 45' S
23° 05' E, 5° 45' S
23° ·34' E, 6°06' S
24° 29' E 6° 07' S
23° 57° E: 6° 46' S
b. In accordance with the Kampala DR Plan, above-mentioned forces will
disengage and re-deploy to New Defensive Positions (NOP) in order to
create a Disengagement Zone (DZ).
2. l\'lission
a. Forces of RP A and RCD and F AC and Allies will disengage and redeploy
to NDPs (via Intem1ediate positions or directly) in accordance with
an agreed calendar.
b. To create a Disengagement Zone (DZ), minimum 30 km., between
forward positions of both forces
3. Execution
a. Scheme of Maneuver. Forces of Parties will simultaneously re-deploy to
NDP(via Intermediate positions or directly), creating a DZ, in accordance
with an agreed calendar.
b. Intermediate Defensive Positions. The declared Intermediate Positions by
the Parties are as follows:
(I) RCD and Allies
(a) KOLE.
(b) BENA DEBELE
(c) t..USAMBO
(d) LUBAO
22°25'E 3°35'S
22° so· E' 4° oo· s
23° 20' E', 5° 00' S
25° 45' E, 5° 20' S
c. New Defensive Positions. The declared NDPs by the Parties are as follows:
(I) F AC and Allies
(a) KILENDALE 21° 50' E 4°05' S
(b) KAKENGE 21° 55' E: 4° 52° S
(c) BENALEKA 22° JO' E, 5°08' S
~ (I;/, (d) KAN ANG A 22° 28' E, 5° 55' S
J{Q; ~A.r-ii &tJ 8 Version appro,·ed hi· JMC L \, ¥) 6L. J @M"7ooo
l'rY\ - . I
d.
(2)
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
(e) LAC MUKAMBA
(f) KABfNDA
RCD and RPA
(a) KINDU
(b) SAMBA
23° 05' E, 5° 45' S
24° 29' E, 6° 07' S
25° 55' E, 3° 00' S
26° 20' E, 4° 40' S
Coordinating Instructions.
(I)
(2)
(3)
Sequence of Disengagement. Simultaneous on Disengagement Day{,
Disengagement Zone. As defined by the forward positions of
Intennediate Defensive Positions and then the NDP of either Party.
After verification, forces of Parties will under no circumstances
enter the DZ. Should there be a need to do so it wiU only be after
explicit permission of JMC/MONUC.
Verification and Monitoring
(a) Will be conducted by JMC/MONUC .
..
JMC/MONUC RESTR1CTED
SUB DR PLAN IN AREA 4 KABALO
Reference: Map scale 1:1000 OOO and I: 250 OOO Sheet numbers SB 35-5 to SB 35-16,
SC 35-1 to SC 35-4
I. Situation
a. Forces of RCD and RPA and FAC and their Allies have declared the
following forward positions:
(I) RCD and RPA
(a) MANI
(b) KJSENGWA
(c) KALOKO
(d) KJTANDA
(e) KABALO
(f) LUALA
(g) MUKOMWENZO
(h) MUYUMBA
(i) MULONGO
U) KAMESHA
(k) MONGA
(I) KAYEYE
(m) PANGO
(n) KANTAHULA
(o) KAPULO
(p) MUSOSA
(I) F AC and Allies
(a) KALOKO
(b) KJTANDA
(c) GWENA
(b) KAI
(c) KASfNDE
(d) TUTA
(e) ANKORO
(f) MALEMBA NKULU
(g) MITWABA
(h) PWETO
25° 30' E, 6° IT S
25° 50' E, 6° 05' S
25° 45' E, 6° 40' S
26° 28' E. 6° 37' S
26° 55' E: 6°05' S
27° 27' E, 6°28" S
27° 40' E. 6° 40· S
27° 02' E, 7° Ii S
21° oo· E, 1° so· s
27° 06' E, 8° 00' S
27° 57' E 8° 00' S
27° 40' E: 8° 15' S
28°20' E. s0 2s· S
28° 57' E, 8° 25 ' S
29° 10' E, 8°20' S
29° 40' E, 8° 20' S
25°45'E 6°40' S
26° 28' E: 6° 37' S
26° 40' E 6°28' S
26° 40' E: 6° 20· S
26° 58' E 6°20' S
26° 55' E: 6° 40' S
26° 55' E, 6° 45' S
26° 40' E, 8° 00' S
27° 20' E, 8° 35' S
26° 55' E, 8°28' S
b. In accordance with the Kampala DR Plan, above-mentioned forces will
disengage and re-deploy to New Defensive Positions (NDP) in order to
create a Disengagement Zone (DZ). \ f. /ltic~1~ Version approved bi· JMC
1;)__' ~ S'Lt 1k' Y' o& @~~·~
/
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
2. Mission
a. Forces ofRPA and RCD and FAC and Allies will disengage and re-deploy
to NDPs (via Intermediate positions or directly) in accordance with an
agreed calendar.
b. To create a Disengagement Zone (DZ), minimum 30 km., between
forward positions of both forces
3. Execution
a.
b.
Scheme of Maneuver. Forces of Parties will simultaneously re-deploy .to
NDP (via Intermediate positions or directly), creating a DZ, in accordance
with an agreed calendar.
Intermediate Defensive Positions. The declared Intermediate Defensive
Positions by the Parties are as follows:
(I) RCD and RPA
(a) LUBAO
(b) KATEA
(c) KABALO
(d) MANONO
(e) MOBA
25° 35' E. 5°20· S
26°40' E, 6° 10' S
26° 55' E, 6° 05 ' S
27° 06' E. 7° 40' S
29° 50' E: 7° 00' S
c. New Defensive Positions. The declared NDP by the Parties are as follows:
(I) F AC and Allies
(a) K.ALOKO
(b) KITANDA
(c) GWENA
(d) KAI
(e) ANKORO
(f) MITWABA
(g) PWETO
(h) KABUSONGE
(2) RCD and RPA
(a) KONGOLO
(b) KABALO
(c) NYUNZU
(d) K.ALEMIE
d. Coordinating Instructions.
25° 40' E, 6° 40' S
25° 28' E 6° 37' S
26° 40' E' 6°28' S
26° 40' E: 6° 20· S
27° 05' E 6° 40' S
27° 20' -E'. 8° 35' S
26° 55' E, 8° 28' S
(Not traceable on the map)
27° OO'E, 5° 30' S
26° 55' E, 6° 05' S
28° 00' E, 6° 00' S
29° 10' E, 5° 50' S
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
(I) Sequence ofDisengaeement. Simultaneous on Disengagement Day
(2) Disengagement Zone. As defined by the forward positions of
Intermediate Defensive Positions and then the NDP of either Party.
After verification, forces of Parties will under no circumstances
enter the DZ. Should there be a need to do so it will only be after
explicit permission of JMC/MONUC.
(3) Verification and Monitoring.
a. Will be conducted by JMC/MONUC.
Version :,ppro,"Cd by JMC
:::::,. ~ t:_ IS1h No,·cmb<r.2000
~~
-PN Jl
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
.-.. , - I ..... .... , __' .. ·:,
-·· ..........
AREAl
/
.•. . ,- .. , . •..: :, _.. , . .... : ..... ~ .. ......... ..
:'
-··-···. '- ..... .. . - ...... . • J
,
IMESE•'
UBAIID~'i
·-,
.' .... ·-. \
....
. -: ··-. ··:.:
....... ) .. ': .. ~ . .: .. ·""" ·- · .
....... -· ·-·
... BOBURU~ ~iE=~:ANKUSU
EMALTdE~lOOf~,1. .e. 6-·-'• ~-t..~ ~~~
. .' ·'
·- · ·--.
:'
ABIY NAKOl,1BO--OjtA·ROAJOL-U\ L<~l'~-O..R..I .{.A NOUI l
MONOOl,1BEt~orA ...UBU
AREA
!KELA ~ANZ! -~
0
/LUBUTu
2 . •lDLOMBO
______. ;_!_ ...~. "'-- I PUMA
,.~ .. .,:-=:~---· ~
·,.
/.
#~OMELA .
,;, KINOJ\
I 1• K OLE
KILENOALE'f. , •
AREKAAK 3E NG·~,, '•.(. .'!;"''ABO SAIIIB
·'
L.
_•.:.:
'.
;.;.-·"·
/'
e,BENALEKA" • • _ ~ 'I, LAc;._P,IUKAUB~U(A KONOOLO
KA NANGK-A;O-IN-O--Ao. •TK'\NADTEA•. II'• ••/ <~ABUAL~O LEr\ ',. uE
ALOKO-., .... tA\ NYUNZU'"
OWEN/I, \ ,··-·;,._.
· ..... · . c ·,- -~.
ANKORO!(,\ •M ANONO- - .. ~· •O BA
AREA4 LIIT ... .il..-.~-·-··\. A . JWETO "'. - •-.
-~ . .::::;, NE'.'V DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ~---.... "· ·:···
INTERMEDIATE DE FENSIVE POSITIONS I•I •• ,. • ;• , ..... _._;··.\ .. . ..
:-··-··-!· ... ,
' I, ~A ll~ 6X- 13
SL~ . BtJ
~ (() ' _.#- '"'00
""""' S, JMC 'f~ r(J' l/"V I Blh Novcmbcr,2000 }
.JMC/MONIIC HF:STRICTF:D
..... -~- - .. -··· -······ ... -- .. -···· - .......
KF:Y F:VENTS ACTIVITY ON THE GROUND RF:MAHl<S " Signature of Sub DR Plans 6 Dec 00 (Dday)
by the Chiefs of Staff.
Disengagement orders.
Phase I
Ceasefire in effect on D day. Cessation of hostilities.
(D to 0+45)
lmplcmcnlalion of the sub-pl;ms begins
Parties must give the orders conccming the
Prcpnr:1tion,
D+9.
s11b-pl:111s lo their Conmmndcrs on the
ground. A copy will be fon\'ardcd to
MONUC and JMC.
Establish MONUC liaison with RJMCs.
reccc and deploy MILOBs. Freedom of movement and security
guarnntces for MONUC personnel arc
Details of LOs to be provided to JMC. effective.
Information on forces, equipment and minefields
Relevant military information to be required per Article 4 of Calendar for
provided by the Parties to MONUC and the Disengagement of Kampala DR Plan.
JMC on the understanding that it will
remain confidential.
MONUC and JMC to produce a plan for_
monitoring and verification or the
discmr.l!!cmcnt
Phase 2 Disengagement lo occur simultaneously :md FAC and Allies (Zimbabwe, Namibia and RJMCs to be collocated at MON UC Sector HQs.
{0+46 to 0+115) vcrific.1tion sequentially by Sector (14 days Angola). MLC, and UPDF begin 'NOP'= New Defensive Positions
Oiscngngement and each) by MONUC MILOBs and JMC. discng;1gcmc111 and re-deployment lo NDPs. 'IDP' = lntcnucdi:11c Defensive Positions ·
,•crilication
RCD and RPA begin disengagement and redcplovmcnt
lo IDPs/NDPs.
Phase J Enhanced MONUC deployment (;mncd
(0+56 to 0+1110) component).
Enhanced MONUC ;
Deployment
u nJ C _j,- cfk--. "
~ ~ . r ~t<f;~@Z)
<:; L{;:,cp~ ?,.\ Vcrsin1111pprnvc~I hy JMC
({J.; ~ l~lh Nnvcmhcr,2:;;__
JMC/MONUC RESTRICTED
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Plan shal!_~ter into force upon endorsement by the Defense Chiefofthe Parties.
ADOPTED ONl!a._ DAY OF (}ece"1hY2000 BY TifE DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE PARTIES
PARTY
JMC CHAIRMAN
ANGOLA
DRC
MLC
NAMIBIA
RCD
RCDK/ML
RWANDA
UGANDA
ZIMBABWE
ZAMBIA
MONUC
SIGNATORY SIGNATURE
· . • C..A . . ..
1\,, '}~' ,<..' l u'\L. Le
15 Version ·approved by JMC
I 81h_ Novcm~cr.2000
/
DRAFT
DISENGAGEi'vfENT Al".fD REDEPLOYi\,[ENT OF FORCES ORDER
To: Operations Commander
You are ordered:
l. To disengage from cuITent forward positions to New Defensive
positions as stipulated in the Sub-Plans for disengagement and
redeployment of forces approved by the flv(C on !SL, November 2000-:
and adopted by the Political Committee and signed by the Parties
Defence Chiefs at Harare, Zimbab\'1:e on 6.12.00. The disengagement
and redeployment shall be in accordance with the Cakndar attached
as Annex 8 to the Disengagement and Redeployment Sub-Plans.
2. This order shall be disseminated through established Command
channels to all Commanders at all levels of all iVfilitary Units
deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
3. You are fun her ordered to ensure that monitors/observers Deployed ·
by the flv(C f?v[ONUC and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
are granted freedom of movement and Accorded protection in order to
permit the effective monitoring and verification of the disengagement
and redeployment of forces.
4 Acknowledgement of receipt of orders to be passed to MONUC and
Ji'v(C by l.:! Dec 00.
Signature
I NJ•
-:,.) ~- 06 .12 .00 C)
Defence Chief
0),1~
s u::,
United Nations
(,-~ Security Council
~ ;
~
UCMANNEX80
St200011156
Distr.: General
6 December 2000
Original: English
Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
I. By its resolutions 1291 (2000) of 24 February
2000 and 1316 (2000) of 23 August 2000, the Security
Council requested the Secretary-General to report on
the progress made in the implementation of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815, annex) and relevant
Council resolutions.
2. In his fourth report to the Security Council, dated
21 September 2000 (S/2000/888), the SecretaryGeneral
recommended a two-month extension of the
mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The
purpose of the recommendation was to signal the
determination of the United Nations to remain
committed to the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo while at the same time
indicating to all the parties that these months should be
used to demonstrate unequivocally their will to move
the peace process forward and to create the conditions
necessary for the phase II deployment of MONUC.
3. By its resolution 1323 (2000) of 13 October 2000,
the Security Council, reaffirming its readiness to assist
in the peace process, in particular through MONUC,
decided to extend the mandate of MONUC until 15
December 2000.
4. The present report contains a summary of the
events that have taken place since the most recent
report, an analysis of the extent to which the parties
have indeed used the past two months to create the
necessary conditions for the deployment of MONUC,
and recommendations regarding the future of MONUC
beyond 15 December.
00-77769 (E) 061200
*0077769*
II. Political developments
5. Considerable high-level diplomatic activity has
taken place since my most recent report, indicating the
willingness of subregional leaders to find ways of
moving the peace process forward. Of particular note
are the meetings convened by President Mbeki and
President Chissano at Maputo on 16 October and 27
November 2000 and the related ministerial level
meeting at Pretoria on 3 November; the Kinshasa
summit meeting, held on 27 October; and the Tripoli
summit meeting, held on 7 and 8 November. Meetings
have also been held between the leader of the
Movement de liberation de Congo (MLC), Jean-Pierre
Bemba, and the Angolan Foreign Minister, and visits
by President Kabila to Luanda, Harare and Windhoek.
6. On 27 September, I wrote to President Kabila
outlining the position of the United Nations with regard
to the status of the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. I emphasized that the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement formed the basis for the relevant
Security Council resolutions authorizing the presence
and activities of MONUC, and expressed the hope that
all parties would engage in translating the spirit of the
Agreement into action. I conveyed my concern over the
number of ceasefire violations and stressed the need to
lift the restrictions hindering the operations of
MONUC. I also expressed the hope that the extension
of the mandate of MONUC by two months would
provide an opportunity to the parties to create the
conditions necessary for MONUC phase II deployment
and to move the peace process forward.
7. On 9 October, President Nujoma invited President
dos Santos, President Kabila and President Mugabe to
S/2000/1156
Windhoek to discuss the situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. At the conclusion of the
discussions, President Nujoma indicated that President
Kabila was prepared to allow the deployment of United
Nations troops to government-controlled territory
without restriction.
8. President Mbeki convened and chaired a mini
summit meeting at Maputo on 16 October. The meeting
was attended by the heads of State of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Namibia,
Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The leaders agreed
that all armed forces in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo would immediately start disengaging to
positions set out in the Kampala disengagement plan of
8 April 2000. Uganda and Rwanda undertook to move
further than the 15 kilometres stipulated in the
disengagement plan. The other parties agreed that once
MONUC had verified this process of further
disengagement, they would reciprocate. The summit
meeting requested the creation of a committee
composed of ministers for defence to study the issues
of the Rwandan withdrawal and disarmament of armed
groups, and agreed to reconvene for the purpose of
reviewing progress.
9. On 26 October, President Kabila received my
Special Representative, Kamel Morjane, and confirmed
that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo wished to facilitate the deployment of United
Nations troops. It was agreed that officials of the
Ministry of Defence would accompany MONUC
officers to review potential sites for deployment at
Mbandaka and Kananga. President Kabila expressed
his support for the Kampala disengagement plan and
for the decisions taken at the Maputo mini-summit
meeting. My Special Representative welcomed the
offer of cooperation and drew the President's attention
to the list of practical measures necessary to facilitate
MONUC phase II deployment provided to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo on 11 September by the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations
Secretariat.
10. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo hosted a mini summit meeting of Central
African countries at Kinshasa on 27 October. The
meeting was attended by President Bongo, President
dos Santos, President Kabila, President SassouNguesso,
the Prime Minister of the Central African
Republic and the Prime Minister of Equatorial Guinea.
2
In a communique, the participants called for a stronger
commitment by the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the
crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
praised the initiative taken at the Maputo summit
meeting for direct talks between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and Uganda.
Although it contained an endorsement of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement as an important basis for peace in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
communique called for its revision and proposed the
deployment of neutral interposition troops along the
common border of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. An ad hoe
ministerial committee under the chairmanship of
President Bongo was established to follow up the
decisions of the summit meeting.
11. My Special Representative travelled to Togo on 7
November for a meeting with President Eyadema, the
current Chairman of OAU. Their discussions focused
principally on the difficulties encountered by the Joint
Military Commission (JMC) and the process of the
inter-Congolese dialogue. The Chairman of OAU
acknowledged the need for better coordination of the
various diplomatic initiatives aimed at reviving the
peace process and disclosed that approaches had been
made to him by the Congolese parties. He was
exploring ways of helping to establish contacts and
dialogue between President Kabila and the rebel
movements.
12. On 7 November, I met with Ambassadors of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC),
who expressed disappointment at the lack of progress
in the peace process and their concern this would result
in the termination of MONUC. They considered the
consequences for the African continent to be ominous,
should the mission be withdrawn. While
acknowledging that the parties needed to recommit
themselves to implementation of the Lusaka
Agreement, the Ambassadors considered that I should
become more directly involved in the peace efforts and
suggested a visit to the region. In response to my
question as to whether it was advisable to insist on a
revision of the Agreement, the representative of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo stated that an
improvement .or adjustment was desired, not
necessarily renegotiation.
13 . The SADC ambassadors also met with the
President of the Security Council to convey their
conviction that the Council should remain involved in
the search for a resolution of the conflict. They
considered the Council to be over-cautious in expecting
standards not demanded in other areas. In addition,
they requested the Council to implement all of its
relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1234
(1999) of 9 April 1999 and 1304 (2000) of 16 June
2000.
14. A third peace initiative was launched on 8
November by President Muammar Qaddafi, who hosted
a mini summit meeting at Tripoli to address the
situation in the Great Lakes region and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in particular. The meeting was
attended by President Kagame, President Konare,
President Mugabe and President Museveni, and
representatives of Angola, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Namibia and South Africa. The summit
meeting agreed on the immediate deployment of a
neutral African force to guarantee the security of the
borders of Rwanda and Uganda, and that the force
should assess the magnitude of armed groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo with the objective
of disarming, disbanding and resettling them. In a letter
dated 9 November addressed to me, President Qaddafi
suggested that Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should participate in the
neutral force and proposed that the United Nations
should undertake the leadership, funding and
supervision of those forces.
15. On 27 November, the heads of State of South
Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and
representatives of Namibia and Angola met at Maputo
to discuss the situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. My Special Representative and Force
Commander General Mountaga Diallo also attended.
The participants agreed to reaffirm the Kampala
disengagement plan of 8 April, confirmed the role of
MONUC in monitoring the disengagement of forces,
and confirmed that the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo was responsible for the timely
resolution of the remaining difficulties hindering the
deployment of MONUC. The Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo confirmed that
MONUC flights need not be routed through Kinshasa
and agreed in principle to the deployment of armed
United Nations troops at Kinshasa airport. No
agreement was reached on the disarmament and
demobilization of armed groups and the withdrawal of
S/2000/1156
foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
16. At its meeting on 29 November, the Political
Committee established under the Lusaka Agreement
endorsed the disengagement plan and scheduled a
meeting of the military chiefs of staff of the parties for
5 December to approve the documentation relating to
the subplans. The Force Commander attended the
meeting.
Congolese rebel movements
17. The rebel movements were not invited to any of
the summit meetings mentioned above. Following the
Maputo summit meeting on 16 October, the head of
MLC, Jean-Pierre Bemba, is reported to have observed
that since he had not been invited to the meeting he had
nothing to do with the agreements reached therein. It
was also reported that, following the same summit
meeting, the reaction of the then head of the
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD),
Emile Ilunga, was one of suspicion of President
Kabila 's intentions.
18. In a meeting with my Special Representative, Mr.
Bemba expressed his view that the only viable solution
to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
lay in the application of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement. He underlined his desire for a political
solution to be found to the crisis and gave his
assurance that MLC would accept any decision arrived
at democratically. The leaders of RCD also emphasized
to my Special Representative that they respected the
Lusaka Agreement and remained committed to the
Kampala disengagement plan.
19. On 28 October, RCD underwent a change in
leadership when Mr. Ilunga announced that he and the
two vice-presidents had resigned from their positions.
Although there were reports of differences among the
leaders, a spokesman for RCD maintained that the
ideals of the movement remained the same. The new
RCD President is Adolphe Onusumba, the fourth since
the movement was formed in 1998.
20. An internal leadership conflict has also occurred
within the Rassemblement congolais pour la
democratie-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-ML),
between the supporters of Ernest Wamba dia Wamba
and his deputy, Mbusa Nyamwisi. A violent
confrontation at Bunia Jed to intervention by Ugandan
3
S/2000/1156
officials and the subsequent departure of both Mr.
Wamba and Mr. Nyamwisi to Kampala in an effort to
find a solution to their dispute.
Inter-Congolese dialogue
21. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has confirmed on many occasions its
rejection of the neutral facilitator of the interCongolese
dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire. During the
reporting period, the Government has reiterated its
position in writing, in public statements and during
discussions with my Special Representative. On 12
October, the Permanent Representative of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo informed the
President of the Security Council that the rejection of
Sir Ketumile Masire was final but that his Government
would be ready to expedite the appointment of a new
facilitator.
22. Despite the position of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the neutral
facilitator has made renewed efforts to revive the
dialogue process. Sir Ketumile has consistently
maintained that he intends to remain as the neutral
facilitator since only one party to the Lusaka
Agreement was opposing him. In a communique issued
on 19 October, the Minister of Information of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo announced that the
Government might "take action" against Sir Ketumile
should he continue to call for the convening of the
inter-Congolese dialogue although rejected as
facilitator.
23. In a meeting with my Special Representative on
26 October, the Minister of Information outlined the
proposals of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for the inter-Congolese
dialogue. The Minister assured my Special
Representative that the Government recognized the
need for political negotiations among the Congolese
parties to achieve a resolution- of the conflict. In the
Government's view, the purpose of these negotiations
was not to achieve transitional power-sharing
arrangements but to agree on a new constitution and an
electoral commission. The Government favoured the
establishment of joint committees, with equal
representation from the Constituent Assembly and the
opposition parties, to take matters forward. The time
frame for elections could be within a few months of an
agreement on a constitution, but the withdrawal of all
4
uninvited foreign forces would be a prerequisite to the
completion of the proposed political process.
24. In contrast to the Government, the rebel
movements have continued to express their support for
the inter-Congolese dialogue, as provided by the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and for Sir Ketumile
Masire as the neutral facilitator. Both MLC and RCD
have rejected approaches from the Government to
engage in political negotiations through the medium of
committees drawn from the Constituent Assembly.
Military developments
25. The main military activity during the reporting
period took place in Equateur province, in Katanga
province and in the east of the country. This activity
includes aerial bombing raids against Gemena, Moba
and other rebel-held locations which have caused
civilian casualties. The situation in Kisangani has
remained generally calm. Although fighting in most of
the country appeared to abate in late November,
information was received as the present report was
being completed about bombing attacks at Kalemie in
the first few days of December. Heavy fighting was
also reported in the vicinity of Pweto which, according
to a spokesman of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), drove
some 60,000 people across the border into Zambia.
Ceasefire violations
26. In northern Equateur province, the perceived
threat posed by MLC forces to Mbandaka prompted
action by the Forces armees congolaises (FAC) and
their SADC allies to reinforce frontline units along the
axis of the Ubangui and Congo rivers. On 3 October,
the MONUC Force Commander was advised by
General Chingombe, the allied Task Force Commander,
that a presidential order of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo to halt offensive operations in Equateur
province was being strictly observed. The only
exception was on the Congo River, where FAC and the
allies were concerned over MLC occupation of Emate
and Nganda Paris and where fighting continued until
10 October.
27. On 17 October, the Force Commander met
General Chingombe to brief him on earlier discussions
held between my Special Representative and the head
of MLC. General Chingombe agreed that, if MLC
forces made no forward movements, FAC and the allies
would not initiate any further military action. The FAC
air force had been placed under his operational
command and future air operations would be conducted
only for defensive purposes. After being advised of the
proposed understanding, Mr. Bemba assured my
Special Representative that his forces would not
advance from their current positions or initiate any new
attacks. The situation in Equateur province has since
remained generally stable.
28. The Governments of the neighbouring Republic
of the Congo and the Central African Republic
continue to be concerned that fighting in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the
immediate border areas, has affected their countries. In
particular, large numbers of refugees continue to enter
both countries and vital maritime traffic on the
Ubangui River has been interrupted, causing heavy
economic losses. Harassment of shipping of the Congo
and FAC intrusions on islands in the Congo and
Ubangui rivers prompted the Congo to deploy forces to
secure its border. Operations by coastguards of the
Congo starting on 6 October are reported to have
resulted in several FAC fatalities and a number of
injuries before the forces of the Congo succeeded in
securing all islands on the Ubangui River up to Longo.
29. MONUC received reports from FAC liaison
officers at Mbandaka that troops of the Congo had
shelled FAC defensive positions opposite Buburu on 16
October. Military action by the Congo in the vicinity of
Buburu risked being interpreted as operations in
support of MLC, raising concern about the Congo
becoming embroiled in the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. There have been no incidents
reported since mid-October. President Nguesso and my
Special Representative have agreed that it would be
advantageous for MONUC to establish a liaison
presence in Brazzaville.
30. According to allegations made by RCD and the
Government of Rwanda, FAC units launched a major
offensive in north-eastern Katanga province on 13
October. The FAC troops were said to be supported by
armed groups, including former Rwandan government
forces (ex-Forces armees rwandaises (FAR)) and
Interahamwe militia, Burundian rebels of the Front
pour la defense de la democratie (FDD) and the local
Mayi-Mayi militia, as well as Zimbabwean and
Namibian troops. These forces allegedly captured a
S/2000/1156
number of RCD positions, including the town of Pepa
on, 22 October and attacked the Lake Tanganyika port
of Moba. Government and allied forces were alleged to
have used long-range artillery, tanks, aircraft and
gunboats. The position of the Government of Rwanda
is contained in the letter dated 25 October from its
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/2000/1045).
3 I. MONUC military observers travelled to Moba
and received eyewitness reports of the bombing of the
town on 22 October by one Antonov-26 escorted by
three MiG aircraft. It was reported that up to 15 bombs
had been dropped, resulting in the deaths of 14
civilians and many others injured. Six bombs failed to
explode, some of which the MONUC observers were
able to view.
32. The allied Task Force Commander denied to
MONUC that any Namibian or Zimbabwean forces had
taken part in fighting in Katanga province.
Subsequently, both the Permanent Representatives of
Namibia and Zimbabwe to the United Nations wrote to
the President of the Security Council to reject
allegations of their countries' involvement
(S/2000/1074 and S/2000/ 1076). For its part, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
also denied involvement and President Kabila informed
my Special Representative that the fighting in Katanga
started between Rwandan forces and Congolese serving
with RCD as a result of "bad blood" between them;
subsequently, some Mayi-Mayi groups had come to the
support of the RCD elements.
33. On 10 November, RCD claimed that its troops
had recaptured Pepa. In the weeks following this
action, some I ,OOO civilians crossed into northern
Zambia. UNHCR has assisted in the movement of
registered refugees to Kala, which was already home to
over 2,300 Congolese refugees. Over 500 soldiers also
crossed over from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo into Zambia. RCD has claimed that these are
members of armed groups, and has requested the
Zambian authorities to disarm and identify them in
accordance with article III of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement. The Zambian Defence Minister has
declared that his country will not allow foreign soldiers
to enter its territory with arms and those not
renouncing their military status will be escorted back to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Zambian
authorities.
s
S/2000/1156
34. The security situation in eastern parts of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo remained highly
volatile. RCD has complained that pro-Government
armed groups continue to launch numerous attacks in
the North and South Kivu provinces. Although the
armed groups responsible for these attacks are not
signatories to the Lusaka Agreement, there are
persistent reports that they receive arms and training
from one of the parties. The most serious fighting took
place at Salambila, in South Kivu. RCD reported that a
large force of Mayi-Mayi, Interahamwe and FAC
attacked their position on 11 November and succeeded
in capturing the town three days later. Subsequently,
MONUC observers were informed that an RCD force
drawn from two brigades had launched a counter-attack
leading to the recapture of the area on 22 November.
35. In a report distributed to the participants and to
me prior to the second Maputo summit meeting,
President Mbeki summarized the proceedings and
discussed issues relating to MONUC deployment and
the obstacles it had encountered. In his report,
President Mbeki noted complaints made by President
Chiluba concerning the deployment by the Government
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of five
military assault boats on Lake Tanganyika. President
Chiluba had informed President Mbeki that these boats
were brought in through Zambia under the pretext that
they were fishing boats. They had been used to
transport heavily armed members of the Burundian
FDD and Interahamwe/ex-FAR and had landed in the
United Republic of Tanzania, raising fears that this
could seriously compromise the Burundi peace process.
36. MONUC intends to dispatch a team of military
observers to Kalemie, on Lake Tanganyika, to
investigate reports that the town was bombed on 1
December, resulting in one fatality and 18 persons
injured, most of them schoolchildren. According to the
reports, which were received from RCD and from
humanitarian sources, Kalemie was twice attacked on
the morning of I December by an Antonov aircraft
accompanied by a MiG. The MONUC team will be
sent as soon as aircraft and fuel availability permits.
3 7. On 5 December, the Secretariat received reports
of heavy fighting in the vicinity of Pweto, on Lake
Mweru, apparently resulting from an attack on the
town by RCD and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)
forces. According to a statement issued that day by
UNHCR, some 60,000 people were driven across the
border into Zambia by the fighting.
6
Kisangani
38. In compliance with Security Council resolution
1304 (2000), Rwanda and Uganda have continued to
limit their forces to a distance of some 100 kilometres
from the centre of Kisangani. RCD military elements
have, however, remained in the city, with its leaders
maintaining that security concerns do not allow them to
withdraw their forces prior to the arrival of United
Nations troops. Since July, the area around Kisangani
has been de facto divided into quadrants: RCD
occupies the city centre, the south and the west; MLC
and the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) the
north-west and the north; and UPDF solely the east.
This dispersal is generally adhered to, except for
isolated skirmishes, usually between RCD and MLC in
the north-west and the north. All parties have
contributed to the overall equilibrium and appear
reluctant to partake in anything other than acts of
posturing.
39. Pursuant to paragraph 14 of Council resolution
1304 (2000), I sent an assessment mission to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo during the period
from 13 to 23 August to assess the loss of life and
property damage inflicted on the civilian population of
Kisangani as a result of fighting between Rwandan and
Ugandan troops between 5 and 11 June. The mission,
led by the Director of the Emergency Response
Division of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), consisted of personnel from
various United Nations departments and was
accompanied by United Nations agency officials based
at Kinshasa. The team was also assisted by MONUC,
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs and staff of non-governmental organizations
based at Kisangani. The report on the assessment
completed by the team has been issued in document
S/2000/1153.
Withdrawal of foreign forces
40. Pursuant to the summit meeting held at Maputo
on 16 October, the ministers for defence of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa,
Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe met at Pretoria on 20
October to consider proposals for the withdrawal of
Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. No agreement was
reached, with the participants differing on the sequence
and modalities of disarming the non-signatory armed
groups, including the Rwandan Interahamwe.
41 . The ministers for defence met again at Pretoria on
3 November. The meeting, to which the Force
Commander of MONUC was invited, discussed
withdrawal plans put forward by the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Both plans,
however, assume the deployment of a United Nations
interposition force on the borders of Rwanda and
Uganda, which would be responsible for disarming the
armed groups. General Diallo made it clear that
MONUC had no mandate to perform such tasks.
III. Cooperation with the Joint
Military Commission
42. MONUC continued to cooperate closely with
JMC and maintained a team of liaison officers at
Lusaka for that purpose. The Mission assisted in the
logistical support of regional joint military
commissions at Boende (Equateur province), Kabinda
(Kasai Orientale province), Kabalo (Katanga province)
and Lisala (Equateur province), and MONUC liaison
officers are co-located with each regional JMC.
Representatives of Rwanda, RCD and MLC have,
however, yet to deploy to the regional JMC at Kabinda.
Also, the lack of resources has not allowed for the
deployment of a regional JMC to Kisangani.
43. The Joint Military Commission has been
functioning without a full-time chairman for nine
months and General Kazembe of Zambia, who holds a
full-time appointment in his country's military forces,
has been obliged to carry out the duties of Chairman.
Participants in the summit meeting held at Maputo on
16 October agreed to make an urgent request to the
Secretary-General of OAU to assist in identifying an
experienced military officer from the region to be
appointed as chairman.
44. Following a request from the acting Chairman,
MONUC assisted in the withdrawal of the 29 OAU
neutral observers assigned to the regional joint military
commissions. Financial constraints on JMC did not
allow for the repatriated OAU observers to be replaced.
45. At its plenary meeting held at Lusaka on 17 and
18 November, JMC considered detailed plans for
disengagement in four front-line areas: Kabalo,
Kabinda, Ikela and the Kananga-Kinda road. JMC was,
S/2000/1156
however, prevented from adopting the plans by the
absence of the delegation of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
46. The 29 November meeting of the Political
Committee (see para. 16 above) and the subsequent
meeting of the military chiefs of staff scheduled for 5
December represent a welcome resumption of activity
on the part of this important organ of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement. The relocation of JMC to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo could help to reenergize
that body as well.
IV. Status of deployment of the
Mission
Current deployment
47. As at I December, MONUC had a total of 224
liaison officers and military observers (see annex). In
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to
Kinshasa, teams of military liaison officers are
deployed to the headquarters of the rebel movements
(at Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and the four regional
joint military commissions (at Boende, Kabalo,
Kabinda and Lisala). Military observer teams are also
stationed at six other locations (Gemena, Isiro,
Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani and Mbandaka). Twentythree
liaison officers are stationed in the capitals of
surrounding countries ( see map).
48. MONUC continued to plan and reconnoitre sites
for the sector headquarters required for the
implementation of the Kampala disengagement plan.
The first interim sector headquarters, with a small staff
of military and civilian officers, has been established at
Kisangani. In addition, technical surveys have been
undertaken at Kisangani and Mbandaka for the
stationing of United Nations battalions. MONUC
logistic bases necessary to support the deployment of
observers and troops are established and operational at
Kinshasa and Goma, and at Bangui in the Central
African Republic.
Security of Mission personnel
49. The most serious threat facing MONUC
personnel is the highly volatile confrontations between
the belligerent parties. In North Kivu, RCD reported an
attack by Interahamwe one kilometre north of Goma
7
S/2000/1156
airport, the site of a MONUC logistics base. MONUC
verified the incident in which nine Interahamwe
fighters were killed as they attacked the village of
Muningi on 1 November, killing nine civilians and
dispersing the population. MONUC flights are also
vulnerable; on 30 October, a MONUC helicopter
approaching Bangui airport was fired upon from the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
received light damage. No injuries were sustained by
passengers or crew. The MLC leader, Mr. Bemba,
subsequently called my Special Representative to
apologize and inform him that an MLC soldier, who
admitted firing at the helicopter, had been disciplined.
50. At Kinshasa, the inflammatory propaganda
campaign conducted in some pro-Government media
against MONUC has abated following the letter sent on
16 August by the Under-Secretary-General of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, protesting the campaign and requesting
restraint, and the interventions of my Special Envoy
and Special Representative with President Kabila. The
more positive attitude that the authorities and the
media now show towards MONUC may also be
attributed to the weekly press briefing instituted by the
Mission's Public Information Section and a weekly
bulletin that it issues on MONUC activities.
Cooperation of the parties
51. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has yet to replace the system of flight
notification and clearance on a case-by-case basis with
a system for advance notification en bloc, an
arrangement that is essential for the management of the
large fleet of aircraft that would be required for
MONUC phase II deployment. Notwithstanding this,
there has been a more positive attitude and a marked
relaxation in regard to other restrictions, in particular
lifting the obligation to land at a neutral airport during
a return trip from rebel-controlled areas.
52. Pursuant to the decision of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo that it would
authorize United Nations troops to deploy in the
country, the United Nations developed a list of
practical measures necessary to initiate phase II
deployment, which was transmitted on 11 September to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (see S/2000/888, para. 51).
8
Since 30 September, joint meetings between MONUC
and the Commissariat general charge des affaires de la
MONUC have been held on a weekly basis, in order to
assess the compliance by the Government with the
provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
This improved liaison has yielded some positive
results, in particular with regard to customs clearances,
exemption of direct and indirect taxes, authorization
for a frequency and telecommunications network,
facilities at Kinshasa airport and joint reconnaissance
m1ss1ons of MONUC and the Government to
Mbandaka and Kananga, as announced by President
Kabila during the second Maputo summit meeting.
Further progress is anticipated with regard to an
exemption from the strategic stock fuel charge.
53 . Improved cooperation has also been facilitated by
the decision of the SADC allies to appoint a special
representative at Kinshasa, whose mandate includes the
promotion of relations between the SADC allies and
MONUC with regard to the peace process and the
deployment of United Nations peacekeepers in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
54. In field locations, MONUC military observers
have encountered some limitations on their freedom of
movement that have been imposed by local
commanders who have forbidden the unrestricted
monitoring of airfields.
V. Humanitarian affairs
55. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has continued to deteriorate. At
the end of November, the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that the number of
displaced persons was around 2 million, with less than
one half receiving humanitarian assistance. In addition,
UNHCR reports that the number of Congolese refugees
in the Congo has reached 100,000 and as many as
20,000 may have fled to the Central African Republic.
Owing to the fighting and other difficulties,
humanitarian assistance could not reach a significant
proportion of these refugees. In response to a request
from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, MONUC has agreed in principle to provide
logistics support to efforts to gain access and deliver
assistance to them.
56. Over the past six months, Equateur province has
been affected by massive displacements of populations,
either to neighbouring countries or to areas in the
province considered to be more secure. The United
Nations humanitarian agencies have recently launched
a major initiative in Equateur province to deliver the
urgently needed lifesaving support to over 400,000
war-affected persons. Agencies involved in this
operation have, however, encountered serious problems
in obtaining government clearances to operate in
southern Equateur.
57. The number of persons in critical need of food in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains at an
estimated 16 million, or roughly 33 per cent of the
country's population. The uprooting of rural
populations and isolation from their traditional food
sources, together with the declining economic
situation, continue to be the underlying causes of this
troubling situation. The situation is aggravated at
Kinshasa, where it is estimated that 70 per cent of the
population of seven mi11ion live on less than US$ 1 per
day for food. Some 18 per cent of children in the inner
city and over 30 per cent in the outskirts suffer from
chronic malnutrition. The food deficit of Kinshasa for
the ongoing year is estimated at one million tons. A
number of factors contribute to the crisis in the capital,
including the swelling population caused by the war, a
deterioration of the road infrastructure, inadequate food
supply from Equateur and the eastern provinces, a
scarcity of fuel and overvaluation of the official
exchange rate.
58. The health situation in the country has also
continued to decline, with Jess than 37 per cent of the
population having access to essential medical facilities.
Less than 47 per cent of the population is estimated to
have access to safe drinking water. In addition to
epidemic outbreaks of cholera, meningitis, dysentery
and malaria, the World Health Organization (WHO)
has reported the emergence and re-emergence of
serious illnesses, such as haemorrhagic fever. Women
and children are among the vulnerable groups most
affected by the crisis.
59. The war, poor sanitary conditions among
displaced populations and residents, and malnutrition
have created a fertile ground for the outbreak and
spread of numerous i11nesses and infectious diseases,
including those that are sexually transmitted. There are
20,000 new cases of HIV this year, according to the
national AIDS programme, adding to the figure of one
million infected adults, which includes at lt:ast 600,000
S/2000/1156
women. There are an estimated 680,000 orphans with
AIDS, whose parents have died of the disease.
60. In the Kivus, the increased security risk to health
personnel has forced the suspension of humanitarian
operations by some agencies, further increasing the
vulnerability of displaced persons and residents. Armed
groups continue to attack civilians, causing numerous
casualties and rendering travel in the area extremely
dangerous.
61. On 4 and 5 October, the inter-agency and donor
country meetings were held at Geneva to consider the
humanitarian response strategy to be adopted in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Donors called for
enhanced coordination and stressed that humanitarian
action should be broadened and deepened, as should
cooperation with local structures. At the meeting
attended by my Special Representative, three main
themes came to light: the need to allocate more
resources to existing humanitarian projects, the need to
reach more people through a more flexible
humanitarian action response with the objective of
saving more lives, and the need to increase the capacity
of international humanitarian agencies working in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to manage an
enhanced response.
62. The consolidated appeal for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for 2001 was launched at the
end of November; US$ 139.5 million was requested to
address the critical humanitarian needs of the waraffected
populations. The appeal seeks to provide
household food security and health interventions at the
local community level, as well as initiatives at the
national level, such as immunization days and transport
corridors for essential medicines and food supplies.
63 . A United Nations inter-agency m1ss10n,
consisting of senior representatives of the Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, the
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR,
the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAQ)
and WHO, visited the Democratic Republic of the
Congo from 20 to 24 November to examine ways of
improving the coordination of humanitarian relief
operations in the country. The mission report and
recommendations were presented to the Executive
Committee on Humanitarian Assistance on 4 December.
64. MONUC has prepared and submitted an aidememoire
which is to be presented to the Security
9
S/2000/1 I 56
Council and which proposes the strengthening of the
humanitarian mandate of the Mission and requests the
allocation of programme funds to support a series of
projects. The most notable of the projects is a request
for US$ 2.5 million to provide air logistics support
with MONUC aircraft to humanitarian agencies in the
Congo. This support could come in the form of an
appeal by the Security Council to Member States to
contribute to a trust fund established for such projects.
Until funds are in place, MONUC could make an
important contribution to relieving humanitarian
suffering in this country by being able to use the
existing funds and resources of the Mission, especially
the many MONUC aircraft with their considerable
underutilized capacity, in support of humanitarian
work. This would also contribute to the central
peacekeeping mandate of the Mission by increasing
understanding and trust of the Mission by the people of
the country and by all parties concerned. At its meeting
held at Lusaka on 29 November, the Political
Committee adopted an agreement aimed at improving
the humanitarian situation of populations at risk, which
included guaranteed access to them.
VI. Human rights
65. The human rights situation throughout the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
continued to give cause for grave concern. The
situation in the eastern provinces is particularly
troubling, owing to the absence of governmental
structures in rebel-controlled areas. Arbitrary arrests,
illegal detention, forced deportation and ill-treatment
have been used to harass and intimidate the population,
human rights groups, church associations and nongovernmental
organizations. In addition, the dire
economic situation has led soldiers and gangs of armed
men to resort to extortion and looting, thus creating an
atmosphere of insecurity and terror among vulnerable
groups.
66. Recent months have · seen an increase in
leadership struggles in the rebel movements, rising
inter-ethnic rivalries and increasing resentment among
Congolese ethnic groups vis-a-vis the Tutsi in general.
These developments have put the civilian population in
greater danger than previously reported. There has also
been a marked increase in the number of warlords in
remote areas who have engaged in a pattern of
systematically destroying the institutions of civil
10
society, and manipulating the regions' clan system and
ethnic groups against each other. The violence between
opposing members of the Hema and Lendu tribes in the
north-eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is particularly worrisome and civilian casualties
are mounting.
67. The Mayi-Mayi militia and predominantly Hutu
armed groups have continued to commit widespread
human rights abuses. They have regularly attacked
villages, forced people to hand over their belongings
and killed them if they refuse to do so. In this context,
the high incidence of murder of women and children of
Rwandan origin should be noted. It has also been
reported that Hutu armed groups use rape as a weapon
of war.
68. In government-controlled territory, despite the
authorities' stated commitment to a moratorium on the
death penalty and the establishment of a military court
appeals chamber, executions continue to take place,
albeit at a reduced rate. There are also no indications
that the military court system will be reformed. The
system was established to try cases regarding abuses by
military and police officers, and armed robbery.
Civilians such as journalists and political opponents
continue, however, to be tried by these courts for other
crimes, in breach of international law. Moreover,
notwithstanding the use of death penalty sentences,
defendants appearing before military courts have no
right of appeal and in some cases, no legal
representation.
69. The prohibition of political parties continues,
with only those parties newly registered with the
Government being allowed to function, a justification
for the arbitrary arrest and detention of persons
affiliated with non-registered political parties.
Although the Ministry of Information had announced
its intention to introduce a law abolishing
imprisonment for press offences, reports indicate that
journalists and human rights activists continue to suffer
attacks, intimidation and imprisonment. An important
radio and television station, Radio-Television KinMalebo
(RTKM), was nationalized on the basis that it
had secret ties to the rebellion. Its employees have been
subjected to harassment and arrest. These targeted
restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of
association are completely at odds with fundamental
human rights.
70. During her visit from I to 3 October, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights met
with President Kabila. The High Commissioner
identified a number of human rights violations that the
Government had to address in order to conform with
Congolese law and international human rights
standards and norms. She sought the immediate release
of 253 political prisoners, many of them journalists and
human rights activists, who have yet to benefit from
the general amnesty law. She demanded the abolition
of the Court of Military Order and the suspension of
the death penalty and executions; she raised the issue
of administrative detentions and the prohibition of
torture, the rights of the accused and respect for
fundamental human rights even in times of war, while
referring to relevant United Nations resolutions,
international treaties ratified by the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement.
71. While the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo made commitments to respect
human rights and take the actions specified by the High
Commissioner, no enforcement action has been taken
to end those abuses and to establish a system of
accountability and rule of law. The Court of Military
Order is still being used to punish those suspected of
collaborating with the rebel movements. On 9 October,
the Court sentenced to death a former director of the
security service, Ndjango Mfungazam, for allegedly
passing on information to the rebels. On 30 October, a
former Commandant of FAC was arrested by the
President of the Military Court for allegedly plotting to
overthrow the Government. Several members of his
ethnic group in FAC and the opposition parties are
reported to have disappeared from their homes.
VII. Child protection aspects
72. The situation of children has continued to be of
serious concern. The education situation in the eastern
provinces remains disastrous, with between 40 per cent
and 50 per cent of school-aged children out of school
and prone to becoming targets for forced recruitment
into the armed forces or militia groups that operate in
the region. According to recent reports, between 15 per
cent and 30 per cent of newly recruited combatants are
children under 18 years of age, with a substantial
number less than 12 years old.
S/2000/1156
73. On 15 May, RCD issued an instruction
establishing an inter-departmental commission on the
demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration of
child soldiers. The commission, however, has yet to be
established. On 15 and 16 November, the local radio
and television station at Gama broadcast an appeal
from the head of RCD, inviting parents to allow their
children to be recruited into the movement's military
forces . The Governor of North Kivu Province reiterated
the call on 19 November, urging that children be
enrolled for local defence. Following reports of the
recruitment of children aged 13 to 17 years at Rutshuru
on 19 November, my Special Representative contacted
the RCD leadership, drawing its attention to these
violations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
74. MONUC and the UNICEF offices at Kinshasa
and Kampala are closely following the matter and have
contacted the relevant authorities. As a result of joint
advocacy efforts by MONUC and UNICEF, RCD-ML
has recently taken steps towards setting up a
coordination unit for the demilitarization,
demobilization and reintegration process in areas under
its control. Similar advocacy directed at MLC is
planned.
75. MONUC has received confirmation of the crossborder
deportation of recruited Congolese children
from the Bunia, Beni and Butembo region to Uganda
after the August "mutiny" of troops against the
leadership of RCD-ML. In line with Council resolution
1304 (2000), the cross-border recruitment and
abduction of children is strongly condemned.
76. President Kabila signed a decree on 6 June
ordering the demobilization and reintegration of
vulnerable groups, including child soldiers. Despite the
positive reaction from the international community and
the willingness shown by donor countries to assist in
implementation of the decree, no substantial progress
has been recorded. The national coordination unit for
the demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration
of vulnerable groups, including child soldiers, is still to
be set up by the Government.
77. During the reporting period, the two MONUC
child protection advisers have undertaken field trips to
Bukavu, Kabala, Kindu, Isiro, Kananga and Bunia to
meet with all child protection partners and obtain firsthand
information on children affected by the conflict.
These trips have also provided the opportunity to train
II
S/2000/1156
MONUC military observers with regard to child
protection issues.
VIII. Exploitation of natural resources
78. In the statement by its President on 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested me
to establish a panel of experts on the illegal
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Accordingly, I appointed four members to the Panel
with Safiatou Ba-N'Daw, former Minister of Energy of
Cote d'Ivoire, as Chairperson. The panel has been
based in Nairobi since mid-September and has
undertaken extensive consultations with the parties and
visits within the region.
IX. Financial aspects
79. The General Assembly, by its resolution 54/260 A
of 7 April 2000, granted me commitment authority,
with assessment, in the amount of US$ 200 million to
cover the Mission's immediate requirements and to
enable it to initiate logistical preparations for the
phased deployment of the formed military personnel.
Subsequently, by its resolution 54/260 B of 15 June
2000, the Assembly, taking into account the amount of
US$ 58.7 million committed for MONUC for the
period ending 30 June 2000, authorized me to use,
during the period beginning 1 July 2000, the amount of
US$ 141.3 million, representing the balance of the
commitment authority provided for MONUC in
resolution 54/260 A.
80. As at 15 November 2000, unpaid assessed
contributions to the MONUC special account amounted
to US$ 90.8 million. The total outstanding assessed
contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that
date amounted to US$ 2,075 million.
X. Next steps
81. The agreements reached at Maputo on 27
November represent forward movement, and the recent
improvements in the Government's attitude towards the
deployment of MONUC are welcome. It should also be
noted that, with some exceptions, such as at Kisangani
in June, the security guarantees provided by the parties
at the time of the deployment of United Nations liaison
12
officers have been honoured. It has also been possible
to keep the liaison officers and military observers in
the field supplied, despite the serious restrictions
placed on the Mission's freedom of movement.
82. In the light of the above and of the experience
gained since September 1999, when MONUC was first
deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
Secretariat has developed plans to monitor and verify
the actions taken by the parties in compliance with the
Kampala disengagement plan of 8 April, including
local ceasefire arrangements and disengagement
movements, through the use of unarmed military
observers.
83. The deployment of military observers would
entail the maintenance of MONUC Force headquarters
at Kinshasa and with JMC at Lusaka, the military
liaison teams in regional capitals and with the parties'
military headquarters remaining as they are at present
(see annex and map). In addition, up to 500 military
observers would be deployed in static and mobile
teams to monitor and verify actions taken by the parties
pursuant to the disengagement plan. Security would be
provided by the parties' armed forces . This option
would require the provision of limited specialized
support, including medical, aviation and possibly
riverine units. The logistics bases which, in the absence
of formed units, have been established by MONUC at
Kinshasa, Bangui and Goma over the past few months,
would ensure the necessary support to the observer
teams.
84. The objectives of the military observer teams
would be to: (a) monitor and verify the parties'
implementation of the Kampala disengagement plan of
8 April, including the disengagement of forces to
brigade level, their redeployment and their eventual
withdrawal from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo; (b) monitor the continuing
demilitarization of Kisangani; ( c) investigate and verify
allegations of ceasefire violations; ( d) maintain
effective contact with the parties; (e) assist the parties
in the conduct of their JMC activities; and (f) ensure
the provision of the necessary information to me and to
the Security Council through MONUC.
XI. Observations and
recommendations
85. The past two months has witnessed intense
diplomatic activity in support of the peace process in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I welcome the
personal initiatives of heads of State in the region and
commend their dedication and perseverance in efforts
to put the peace process back on track. I also commend
the role that OAU has continued to play in this regard.
86. Despite substantial compliance with the ceasefire
in most parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
fighting has occurred in Equateur and Katanga
provinces. This fighting not only complicated and
imperilled ongoing peace efforts but, since the clashes
occurred in border areas, threatened to spill over into
the Congo and the Central African Republic to the
north and into Zambia to the south. At the same time,
the highly volatile environment in the Kivus marked by
frequent and violent attacks by the non-signatory
armed groups has continued to be a most serious
concern.
87. The situation around Kisangani has shown some
improvement, and I welcome the restoration of calm
there after the outbreaks of fighting in June. Security
Council resolution 1304 (2000), however, in which the
Council demanded the withdrawal of Rwandan and
Ugandan forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo without further delay, in
conformity with the timetable of the Lusaka Agreement
and the Kampala disengagement plan of 8 April, has
yet to be implemented in full. By the same resolution,
the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
made a number of other demands on the parties,
including cooperation with the deployment of MONUC
and full engagement in the national dialogue process.
These demands also have yet to be met.
88. In view of the situation summarized above, I
recommend that the Security Council extend the
mandate of MONUC for a further six months, until 15
June 200 I. During that period, in order to monitor and
verify the parties' implementation of the ceasefire and
disengagement plans adopted at Maputo and Lusaka,
MONUC should, as a first step, deploy additional
military observers, accompanied by the necessary
medical, aviation, riverine and logistical support units.
A deployment of this kind could be effected within the
current mandate approved by the Council in resolution
S/2000/1156
1291 (2000), and with the mandate described in
paragraph 84 above.
89. In principle, would also be prepared
subsequently, with the guidance of the Security
Council, to recommend that infantry units be deployed
in support of the military observers, if conditions both
required and permitted such deployment. At the
appropriate juncture, I would accordingly submit to the
Council an updated concept of operations, taking into
account developments on the ground and the precise
nature of the tasks that the troops would realistically be
able to perform. I have requested the Secretariat to
continue to liaise closely with potential troopcontributing
countries in order to ascertain their
continued readiness to provide the necessary personnel
and specialized units.
90. At the same time, however, it is clear that broader
agreement needs to be reached on the key questions
that have so far not been resolved. In my view, the best
way of doing so would be to build on the valuable
diplomatic initiatives taken in recent weeks and to
provide a framework and a stimulus for their followup.
I am therefore considering the type of action that
the United Nations could take to help to achieve this
result.
91. The objective of this meeting would be to focus
on the underlying questions at the core of the conflict
that have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. These
include the withdrawal of foreign forces; the
disarmament and demobilization of armed groups; the
security of the borders of Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi with the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
the return of refugees in safety; the inter-Congolese
dialogue; and regional economic reconstruction and
cooperation.
92. It may be necessary to consider the establishment
of a permanent mechanism to pursue genuine and
workable arrangements for attaining these objectives.
In order to ensure that the measures under discussion
were practical and likely to enjoy the support of the
Security Council, it would be necessary for the United
Nations to support and participate in such a
mechanism.
93. Finally, I wish to express my deep appreciation to
my Special Representative, to the Force Commander,
and to all the military and civilian personnel of
MONUC for the strenuous efforts that they continue to
make, often under adverse conditions, to help to restore
peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
13
S/2000/1 I 56
Annex
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: contributions as at 30 November 2000
Military observers Staff officers Total
Algeria 9 9
Bangladesh 6 8 14
Benin 5 3 8
Belgium
Bolivia 1
Burkina Faso 2 2
Canada 2 2
Czech Republic 3 3
Denmark 1 2
Egypt 9 9
France 1 2 3
Ghana 8 8
India 5 2 7
Jordan 2 2
Kenya 4 4
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 3 3
Malaysia 2 7 9
Mali 3 3
Morocco 4 4
Nepal 8 8
Niger 2 3
Nigeria 6 6
Pakistan 13 9 22
Peru 3 3
Poland 1
Romania 7 8
Russian Federation 4 4
Senegal 12 17 29
South Africa I
Switzerland
Tunisia 6 6
Ukraine 4 4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland 4 4
United Republic of Tanzania 5 6
14
S/2000/1156
Military observers Staff officers Total
Uruguay 8 8 16
Zambia 8 8
Total 148 76 224
15
UCMANNEX8
United Nations StRES/1332 (2000)
,.~ Security Council
~ ~ ~ di!
Distr.: General
14 December 2000
~
00-79815 (E)
*0079815*
Resolution 1332 (2000)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4247th meeting,
on 14 December 2000
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of6 August
1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999, 1279
(1999) of 30 November 1999, 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000, 1296 (2000) of
19 April 2000, 1304 (2000) of 15 June 2000 and 1323 (2000) of 13 October 2000,
and the statements of its President of 13 July 1998 (S/PRST/1998/20), 31 August
1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), II December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/36), 24 June 1999
(S/PRST/1999/17), 26 January 2000 (S/PRST/2000/2), 5 May 2000
(S/PRST/2000/15), 2 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20) and 7 September 2000
(S/PRST/2000/28),
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of all States in the region,
Reaffirming further the obligation of all States to refrain from the use of force
against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
Reaffirming also the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
over its natural resources, and noting with concern reports of the illegal exploitation
of the country's assets and the potential consequences of these actions on security
conditions and the continuation of hostilities,
Deplori11g the continuation of hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the numerous ceasefire violations, and the lack of progress on the interCongolese
dialogue,
Reaffirmi;,g its support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/~ 1.5), ..
Welcoming the agreements reached at Maputo on 27 November 2000
concerning the disengagement of forces, as well as the signing of the Harare
Agreement, pursuant to the Kampala disengagement plan,
Taki11g 11ote of recent statements, assurances and actions of the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo supporting the deployment of the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC),
S/RES/1332 (2000)
and expressi11g the hope that the practical measures necessary to facilitate the full
deployment of MONUC will be taken accordingly,
Recal/i11g the responsibilities of all parties to cooperate in the full deployment
ofMONUC,
Takillg 11ote with appreciation of the Secretary-General's report of 6 December
2000 (S/2000/1156) and its recommendations,
Recallillg the responsibility of all parties to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations
military and civilian staff and associated personnel throughout the country,
Expressillg its serious concern over the humanitarian situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo mainly resulting from the conflict, and stressing
the need for increased humanitarian assistance to the Congolese population,
Expressing also its serious concern over the severe political, economic and
humanitarian consequences of the conflict on the neighbouring countries,
Expressing its alarm at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the
civilian population throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and its deep concern at all violations and abuses of human rights and
international humanitarian law, including atrocities against civilian populations,
especially in the eastern provinces,
Deeply concerned at the increased rate of HIV/AIDS infection in particular
amongst women and girls as result of the conflict,
Gravely concerned by the continued recruitment and use of child soldiers by
armed forces and groups, including cross-border recruitment and abduction of
children,
Expressing serious concern over the difficulties, including those created by
continued hostilities, faced by humanitarian agencies in delivering assistance to a
large number of refugees and internally displaced persons,
Commending the outstanding work of MONUC personnel in challenging
conditions, and noting the strong leadership of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General,
Welcoming the diplomatic initiatives by African leaders, and stressing the need
for a coordinated approach involving the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) to create new momentum for further progress in the peace
process,
I. Decides to extend the mandate ofMONUC until 15 June 2001;
2. Calls 011 all parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to cease hostilities
and to continue to intensify their dialogue to implement this agreement, as well as
the Kampala, Maputo and Harare Agreements, and to take additional steps, within
the framework of these Agreements, to accelerate the peace process;
3. Calls on all parties, and in particular the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, to continue to cooperate in the deployment and operations of
MONUC, including through full implementation of the provisions of the Status of
Forces Agreement;
S/RES/1332 (2000)
4. Endorses the proposal made by the Secretary-General to deploy, as soon
as he considers that conditions will allow it an.d in accordance with the relevant
provisions of resolution 1291 (2000), additional military observers, in order to
monitor and verify the parties' implementation of the ceasefire and disengagement
plans adopted in Maputo and Lusaka;
5. Invites the Secretary-General to consult the OAU and all parties
concerned on the possibility of organizing in February a follow-up meeting between
the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the members of the Security
Council;
6. Requests in that connection the Secretary-General to present to the
Security Council, prior to the convening of the meeting suggested in paragraph 5
above, a review of the implementation of the current mandate of MONUC, including
an assessment of the implementation by the parties of the ceasefire and
disengagement plans and elements for an updated concept of operation;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit in that report proposals to the
Security Council on ways to address the situation in the eastern provinces of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in the areas bordering Rwanda,
Uganda and Burundi;
8. Expresses its readiness to support the Secretary-General, as soon as he
considers that conditions allow it, in the deployment of infantry units in support of
the military observers in Kisangani and Mbandaka in due course and, subject to the
proposals submitted by him under paragraph 7 above, to other areas he may deem
necessary, including possibly to Goma or Bukavu;
9. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council, in
consultation with all parties concerned, detailed proposals concerning the
establishment of a permanent follow-up mechanism which could address in
consultation with existing mechanisms in an integrated and coordinated manner the
issues of the full withdrawal of foreign forces, the disarmament and demobilization
of armed groups, the security of the borders of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons in safety, the inter-Congolese dialogue and regional economic
reconstruction and cooperation;
10. Calls for the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces, and of all
other foreign forces, from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
compliance with resolution 1304 (2000) and the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and
urges the forces to take urgent steps to accelerate this withdrawal;
11 . Calls on all the parties to the conflict to cooperate in taking forward the
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation/resettlement of all armed
groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, in
particular the Burundian Front pour la Defense de la Democratie (FDD), the
Rwandan ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF);
12. Calls on all Congolese parties concerned to cooperate fully in the interCongolese
dialogue as called for in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement;
13 . Reiterates its call on all parties to the conflict, including all armed groups
referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, to take
immediate steps to prevent human rights abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law and to ensure safe and unhindered access to humanitarian
3
S/RES/1332 (2000)
4
personnel for providing assistance to all those in need, including the refugees and
the internally displaced persons;
14. Calls on all armed forces and groups immediately to cease all campaigns
for the recruitment, abduction, cross-border deportation and use of children, and
demands immediate steps for the demobilization, disarmament, return and
rehabilitation of all such children with the assistance of relevant United Nations and
other agencies and organizations;
15. Stresses the need to strengthen the human rights componclll uf MO:,.;.:,
and requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures to that end,
including through active cooperation and coordination with the United Nations
Human Rights Commission in a country-wide effort;
16. Calls once again on all the parties to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and others concerned to cooperate fully with the expert panel
on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/PRST/2000/20) in its investigation and visits
in the region;
17. Calls 011 all parties to fully implement their commitments under the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement;
18. Expresses again its readiness to consider possible measures which could
be imposed in accordance with its responsibility and obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations in case of failure by parties to comply fully with this
resolution;
19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
UCMANNEX~
··--- /_-/. ; 6d KAffer7iJ.'S '1~~Tto7<J:
m_:~-K/Bl
Out Ref: ... .... ... . ... .. .
Your Re[: ............... .
The Brigade Commander,
309 Brigade - Muhoti,
P.O. Box46,
FORT PORTAL.
Dear Sir,
Fort !'o:-t~I
UGA1'."D,24/l/ 2001.
D~t~ ..... .. . · .... ..... .
RE: LIST OF STUDENTS WHO WERE BURNT IN THEIR HOSTELS BY THE
ADFREBELS ON 8ra JUNE 1998 AND WERE BURIED IN A MASS GRAVE ON
11 m JUNE 1998.
NAMES COURSE
l. Ssck.atawa. Christopher ODBCE
2. Ssckamate Fredrick "
3. Lv.'llllga Paul
4. Kulc M .Amiram ..
5. Ddungu Patrick Mark "
6. Musok.c Aloysius Moses "
7. Tuh~Eric
8. Nzabakurlldze. Benon ..
9. Lulcyamuzi Yusuf ODEE
10.~lcs
11. MokasaHcnry ..
12. · Lule Wilson "
13. Nsim.bi Christopher "
14. Turyazayo 1Caleb "
IS. Ssckitto Charles ODME
16. Sscbugwawo Charles
17. Byomuhangi Richard
18. Bahe:muka Joseph AEM
19. KaigoJoab BCP
20. Muyomba James "
21. Baguma Francis CJ
22. IgaThomas CJAdv.
23. Kakembo James EI
24. Lubcga Robert MVT
25. Allelua Stephen "
26. Mukungu Samuel Rwabwogo ..
27. Aliyo Kahebu Hillacy "
STUDENTS WHO DIED OF BURNS AND THEm. BODIES WERE BURIED AT
THEm.RESPECTIVE HOMES: .
1. Mukasa Samuel Wilfred
2. Ntun.,,"Wa Fred
3. -K:ighoma N. Emmao.uel
ODEE
AEM
STUDENTS WHO l>IED OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS AND WERE BURIED AT
THEIR RESPECTIVE IIOMES:
1. Etibu M. Pius
2. Longa Henry
3. AbebwaKen~
ODME
BCPAdv.
CJ.
STUDENTS REPORTED TO HA VE BEEN MURDERED IN CAPTIVITY BY
ADFREBELS:
I. Kakuru David
2. Mugisba Benon
3. Ndora Rober;t
4. Alaunpa He~rt
S. Sentai Mohammed
6. Happy Patrick
7. Tmnwcsigyc David
8. KijaraN. W. Cylus
9. Balinda William Wilbenorce
10. KisemboMobammed
11. MusiQguziJumah
12. Murungi Mum1 Charles·
13 •. Rwabuhinga Peter
14. KasaijaMasmaEddie
15. Mbu.sa Sabuni
16. IGnmgi Richard
17. LutaloJobnBosco
18. Kasaija Elisha
19. Agaba Oeofmy
20. Mpanga Moses
21. Mwanguhya Kise:mbo (Kabuleeta Elvis )
22; Manyindo cliristopher ·
23. Kyornuka Sau;i
ODB.. CE
:ODMB
BCP
BCPAdv.
ABM
"
BCP
C1
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CJAdv.
ODBCE
AE!d
CJ
BCPAdv.
EI
ODBCE
STUDENTS WHO ESCAPED FROM CAPTIVITY; :
1; Agaba Dcogratius
2. Manzi Hillary
3. Kule-Andrew
4. Mugabe Robert
5. M:uhairwe Moses
6. lsingoma Dczidcrio
7. Mujuni Elias
8. Akankwasa Emmanuel
9. Kwikiriza Abraham
10. Bwambale James
11. Tl'llinomujuni John Bosco
12. Friday Jude
13. ByaruhangaRobert
14. Kabapmbe Iyam Ernest
15. Mugenyi Robert
16. Nyakahuma Lawrence
17. Kasaija William
18. KiizaJames
19. Kii.za Erisa
20. Mugisha Evans
21. Dusabc George
22. Natukunda Milton
23. Kaganda Henry
24. Happy James Buroleexro
25. ByamukamaPatrick
26. Asilmwe Richard
21. NyemeriRic.hard
28. Zomugisha Alex
STUDENTS EXPECTED TO J3E STILL IN CAPI'IVITY:
1. Muherer.a Francis BCP Adv.
2. Mwesigye Jaclcson
3. Muhumuza Daniel
~~-
MA.NYIRAHO AMOS
REGISTRAR.
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"
UCMANNEX83
United Nations
\(.m~'J\ Security Council Fifty-sixth year
~
President:
Members:
Agenda
01-23767 (E)
*D123767*
4 2 71 st meeting
Friday, 2 February 2001 , 3 p.m.
New York
Mr. Ben Mustapha . . ........ ...... ... ..... . ...... .
Bangladesh .... . .... .. ... .. ............... . .. .. . .
China .. ... . ........ .... . ... . ................ .. .
Colombia . ....... . . .. .... ... ................... .
France .. .. .... . ....... .... ... .................. .
Ireland .... . . .... . ................ .. .... .... .. . .
Jamaica ...... . ................. ... .. . . .. . ..... . .
Mali ................... . ...... ... ........... . . .
Mauritius ...................................... .
Norway . .. .. ..... .... .. ... .. . . ..... . ... ..... ... .
Russian Federaion . ... .. . . . .. ... .... .. . . ......... .
Singapore ................. ..... . .. .. ... . . . . . ... .
Ukraine ..... ... ... ... . . ...... . ................. .
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ... .
United States of America .. . .. . .. . .... ... . ...... . . . .
(Tunisia)
Mr. Chowdhury
Mr. Shen Guofang
Mr. Valdivieso
Mr. Levitte
Mr. Ryan
Miss Durrant
Mr. Ouane
Mr. Neewoor
Mr. Kolby
Mr. Lavrov
Mr. Mahbubani
Mr. Kuchynski
Sir Jeremy Greenstock
Mr. Cunningham
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Briefing by His Excellency Major General Joseph Kabila, President of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submilled to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the
delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.
StPV.4271
Provisional
S/PV.4271
The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.
Expression of thanks to the retiring President
The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the
first meeting of the Security Council for the month of
February, I should like to take this opportunity to pay
tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency
Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, Permanent
Representative of Singapore to the United Nations, for
his service as President of the Security Council during
the month of January 200 I. I am sure that I speak for
all members of the Council in expressing deep
appreciation to Ambassador Mahbubani for the great
diplomatic skill with which he presided over the
Council last month.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Briefing by His Excellency Major General Joseph
Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance
with the understanding reached in the Council's prior
consultations, I request the Chief of Protocol to escort
His Excellency, Major General Joseph Kabila,
President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to
a seat at the Council table.
Major General Joseph Kabila, Preside11t of the
Democratic Republic of the Co11go, was escorted
to a seat at the Cou11cil table.
The President (spoke i11 Arabic): The members
of the Security Council highly appreciate the initiative
of President Joseph Kabila to meet witli them at this
stage of his first visit outside the Democratic Republic
of the Congo since he assumed its presidency. The
members of the Council attach great importance to this
meeting and pin high hopes on its conclusions. We
wish President Kabila every success in his noble
mission to lead his people towards peace, security,
stability and progress.
One year ago, on 24 January 2000, under the
presidency of the United States, the Security Council
convened an important meeting at which leaders of the
2
States signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
participated. On that occasion, the leaders reiterated
their commitment to the Agreement. The meeting
enjoyed the strong and broad support of the
international community in general and of the Security
Council in particular. The Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement, which upholds the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, gave high hopes that the conflict in that country
might be ended and the peace and security of the
neighbouring States restored.
Since then, the Lusaka Agreement has gone
through critical phases and faced many challenges.
Foreign troops have not withdrawn from the territory
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
national dialogue has come to a standstill. The full
deployment of the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) has been delayed. Throughout this time, the
suffering of the people of the Congo has been
perpetuated by the war.
The Council has followed with grave concern the
developments in the situation and dispatched a mission
of its members. The Council has adopted a number of
resolutions and presidential statements. In this context,
I would cite in particular resolution 1304 (2000),
adopted on 16 June 2000 under the presidency of
France in the wake of a meeting of the Security
Council with the Political Committee of the Ceasefire
Agreement.
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement remains the
most appropriate framework for reaching a negotiated
settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The Security Council expects all parties
to the Agreement to demonstrate their commitment to
the relevant Security Council resolutions and to the
Agreement and to take concrete steps to move the
peace process forward. In this regard, I pay a special
tribute to the role played by the Organization of
African Unity (OAU).
Last Friday's address by President Kabila to the
Congolese people reiterated his support for the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement and his resolve to pursue national
dialogue and reconciliation. He underscored his
commitment to cooperating with the OAU and the
United Nations and to the deployment of MONUC; his
demand that foreign troops withdraw from his
country's territory; and his desire to establish goodneighbourly
relations with neighbouring countries.
The Security Council has consistently stressed the
need for respect for the Democratic Republic of the
Congo's sovereignty, territorial integrity and control
over its natural resources. It is also concerned that the
sovereignty of all States be equally respected. President
Kabila will find the Council in full support of his
contributions to moving the peace process forward. The
Council's interest in the situation concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is reflected in the
series of meetings which it intends to convene this
month on that issue, in particular its meeting with the
Political Committee of the Ceasefire Agreement. The
members of the Council look forward to the
achievement of concrete results at these meetings that
will help to revive the peace process and assist the
brotherly people of the Congo in fulfilling their
aspirations.
I now invite the Secretary-General to address the
Council.
The Secretary-General: We are meeting today to
discuss once again one of the biggest challenges
currently facing Africa and the United Nations - the
challenge of bringing peace and stability to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the region
around it.
Let me begin by welcoming President Joseph
Kabila to the United Nations and congratulating him on
his inauguration as Head of State of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. I have already had the
opportunity of extending to President Kabila my
sincere condolences on the loss of his father.
The Lusaka Agreement, signed in July and
August 1999 by six States and three rebel movements,
has yet to be translated into action, but for the last two
weeks the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) has
reported almost no ceasefire violations throughout the
country. This is surely a moment of opportunity, which
must be seized by the parties and those who wish to
help the people of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The time appears ripe for a resolute effort to
implement the Lusaka Agreement, including through a
genuine dialogue among all Congolese on the future of
their country.
S/PV.4271
I welcome the calm that has descended on the
confrontation lines between the various forces in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and hope that all
the parties concerned, and all their military
commanders, will take the necessary measures to
ensure that it continues. Any regional initiative aimed
at achieving this objective is to be commended.
In this regard, I urge the parties to adhere to the
plan for the disengagement of forces they agreed to in
Harare on 6 December. Within its current resources,
MONUC has already begun to take the measures
necessary to support the disengagement. In my
forthcoming report to the Security Council, as
requested in resolution 1332 (2000), I will propose the
elements of a revised concept of operations for
MONUC deployment in support of the disengagement
plan. Once the Council has adopted the new concept,
MONUC will take the necessary steps to carry it out.
Peace and stability will not return to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours
unless and until all Congolese are engaged in a
meaningful dialogue to decide how their country is to
be governed. By the same token, all countries of the
region should continue to engage in dialogue to resolve
this conflict. This requires the new Congolese
authorities to confirm their strong commitment to
peaceful negotiation, notably by taking steps to
liberalize the political climate in the country. I am glad
to note that the new Government is prepared to work
with Sir Ketumile Masire, the neutral Facilitator
appointed under the Lusaka Agreement, with the help
of a co-Facilitator. I look forward to the early
identification of such a co-Facilitator by the Congolese
parties, with the help of the Organization of African
Unity. Any support that can be provided by other heads
of State in the subregion will surely also be welcome.
By its resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000,
and reaffirmed in resolution 1332 (2000), the Security
Council demanded the withdrawal of Ugandan and
Rwandan forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in conformity with the
timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement and the Kampala
disengagement plan of 8 April. I look forward to the
early withdrawal of all foreign forces, as provided for
by the Lusaka Agreement. In future phases of its
operations, with the approval of the Security Council,
MONUC will be ready to deploy to assist in this
important objective.
3
l .
S/PV.4271
The commitment to peace that President Joseph
Kabila has already demonstrated is welcome for many
reasons. Respect for the ceasefire could permit
humanitarian agencies to gain access to populations in
need. Greater attention can then be paid to human
rights and the rights of children, including child
soldiers, once the fighting has stopped. It would also be
possible to address outbreaks of communal violence
not directly related to the main conflict, such as those
in Ituri and South Kivu.
Finally, it remains only for me to wish President
Kabila every success. I am sure I speak for the
international community as a whole in assuring him
that he will enjoy our full support in his efforts to
restore peace and promote democracy and development
in his great country in the heart of Africa.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
Secretary-General for his statement.
It is my honour now to give the floor to His
Excellency Major General Joseph Kabila, President of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
President Kabila (spoke in French): It is a great
honour for me to speak here for the first time before
the Security Council. The Government and the people
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would like to
thank the President, as well as the Council as a whole,
for having involved us in today's discussion of the
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Before continuing, I should like to extend my
warmest congratulations to the President on his
assumption of the presidency of the Security Council
for the month of February. My delegation is pleased to
see the Security Council being led this month by the
representative of a friendly country, Tunisia, as this
principal organ of the United Nations responsible for
the maintenance of international peace and security
once again addresses the situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
I should also like to offer my thanks to the
Permanent Representative of Singapore for the new
dynamism he was able to bring to the Security Council
during his presidency of the Council last month.
Lastly, I would like to pay genuine tribute to a
man who spares no effort in order to give significant
impetus to our worldwide Organization and who
deserves our greatest respect: Mr. Kofi Annan, the
Secretary-General. My country owes him a great deal
4
for the persistent and intensive efforts that he has made
to promote the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and, in particular, to bring peace
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
As I take the floor here for the first time in the
Security Council, I remember the historic day, 24
January 2000, when President Laurent-Desire Kabila,
in this same Chamber, called for a withdrawal from our
national territory of the armies of aggression of
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, on the basis of Security
Council resolution 1234 (1999) of9 April 1999. A year
after his speech, the situation has not changed despite
the many efforts made. Indeed, on the contrary, the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has
lasted for almost three years now, and the casualties
have been extremely heavy. Some 1.7 million people
died in 22 months in the occupied territory in the
eastern part of our country, according to a report from
the International Rescue Committee issued in May
2000. Today, that figure is clearly low, because it does
not take into account the additional casualties that have
occurred since May 2000 due to the continuing war of
aggression since then.
The illegal exploitation of the natural resources of
our country - primarily tantalite, coltan, timber, gold
and diamonds - that finance the war effort of the
aggressor countries is a devastating phenomenon, and
it will have serious consequences for present and future
generations in my country. An end must be put to this
illegal exploitation.
My Government would like to assure the Security
Council that it will do its utmost to cooperate fully
with the Ad Hoe Expert Group, made up of eminent
internationally recognized individuals of proven
competence. We reiterate to them our fullest
confidence and support.
It is our ardent hope that the panel of experts will
submit to the Security Council in March a full report
on the situation, which will enable the Council to take
decisions on the basis of complete information. We
would like the report to be a fair and equitable one that
can establish the truth about the tragic plundering of
the natural resources of our country.
My Government has often spoken to the Security
Council of the very deep-seated yearning for peace felt
by all sectors of the population of my country. This is
why, given the challenges involved in the restoration of
peace and the strengthening of national harmony in a
country that has been torn apart, I have decided on
behalf of my people to work towards a policy that
fosters dialogue and reconciliation.
I invite the authorities in Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi to return to a better sense of goodneighbourliness,
with a view to achieving a peaceful
settlement of differences and to cooperating fruitfully
for progress in Africa.
Therefore, in accord with and in consultation with
the allied countries that support us in facing the
aggression, we are going to examine ways and means
of relaunching the Lusaka Agreement so that it will not
only lead to an effective ceasefire but will also restore
peace to the Great Lakes region, while at the same time
preserving the fundamental attributes of our Republic:
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and
unity, which the Council has continuously reconfirmed.
To be effective, the Lusaka Agreement must be
reinforced by a binding mechanism that could set an
example by punishing the parties that violate the
ceasefire and do not respect the measures taken for
deployment and disengagement. We ask the Security
Council to consider during this month of February a
new and precise timetable that would cover four points:
the disengagement provided for in the Harare
agreement, the deployment of United Nations troops,
the unconditional withdrawal of uninvited forces and,
finally, the withdrawal of troops from countries that
were invited. To confirm the commitment of the
Congolese Government to take an active part in this
process, I would like to point out to the Council that
my Minister for Foreign Affairs is present at this
meeting.
As I said in my address to my nation on 26
January 2001, the problems linked to democratization
must be resolved within the framework of the interCongolese
dialogue. Accordingly, we reiterate our
urgent appeal to all political players and members of
civil society to join unreservedly in preparatory efforts
to ensure the success of the dialogue, notably the
continuing efforts to complete the Libreville process.
In my capacity as the person responsible for my
country, I urge all of my Congolese brothers, regardless
of their social origins, regardless of their views, and
including those who have taken up arms, to come and
sit down with us around a table to talk of peace and of
how to organize the future political landscape in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to talk of the
S/PV.4271
urgent need for our country to rebuild and to lay the
foundations of sustainable development for the wellbeing
of the Congolese people.
This is why, once again, I launch an urgent appeal
to the international community to support the
Congolese people as they move towards this dialogue,
which must be among the Congolese people without
any interference. For how can we not accept for
ourselves what we undertook in support of our
neighbour, Burundi, and what was unanimously
supported in this Council? In that way, we
demonstrated our nation's strong resolve to contribute
not only to the return of peace to our own country but
also to the peace of our neighbouring countries, and
even more particularly of those that are occupying a
large part of our national territory.
If a solution to the crisis in Burundi is indeed an
indispensable and inseparable element of the crisis in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, because of the
consequences for our own territory of inter-ethnic
conflict in that country, the same also applies to the
need for democratization in Uganda and Rwanda.
National consensus in all of our countries is a
prerequisite for stabilization in the Great Lakes region.
In the course of this month, this Security Council
is certainly going to take a decision on the possibility
of phase II deployment of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUC). We reiterate to the Council and
to the entire world the commitment of my country to
cooperate closely with MONUC so that it can
effectively discharge its mandate, in particular as
regards the urgent deployment of forces to Congolese
territory in order to restore peace.
We would venture to believe that the Security
Council will stand by its commitments, inter alia, by
swiftly deploying its forces in accordance with the
resolution I mentioned earlier and the subsidiary
disengagement plan adopted recently at Harare, which
provides for an initial deployment along the line of
demarcation, followed by another deployment along
the adjacent borders with Uganda and Rwanda, in order
to provide security along our common borders.
We welcome the mutual understanding and close
collaboration between MONUC and our Government,
and we would like to convey to you our great
appreciation for the quality of work done by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
s
S/PV.4271
Ambassador Kamel Morjane, who has enhanced the
prestige of United Nations diplomacy. We encourage
him to continue along the road that he has considered
useful and necessary to restore lasting peace to our
country. We are grateful to him, and we are sure that
the Congolese people as a whole are also grateful to
him.
By way of conclusion, may I say that my
Government and I have given ourselves the task of
continuing to rebuild our devastated country and to
meet the expectations of our people. We want to bring
together all Congolese, while respecting their
differences, because it is the Congolese people as a
whole we must serve in its diversity, as well as in its
common love for the country. We must also respond to
the people's deepest aspirations for a beiter quality of
life.
Once peace has been regained and territorial
integrity restored, our work will involve, with your
assistance and that of the international community,
preparing free and transparent elections so that the
people can choose the person who will preside over the
future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We are also among those who believe that the
peaceful settlement of disputes and recognition of the
inherent dignity of every member of the human family
and of their equal rights are the basis of freedom,
justice and peace in the world. This is the Congolese
approach, which must, in my view, lead us to the
restoration of peace in the Great Lakes region.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I wish to thank
His Excellency President Joseph Kabila, President of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for his kind
words addressed to me and to my country, Tunisia.
Mr. Cunningham (United States of America):
Before I begin, I want publicly to recognize Tunisia's
extraordinary contribution to the cause of peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition to
personnel of the United Nations Organization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congq (MONUC),
Tunisia has dedicated three of its finest diplomats to
this effort. I refer, of course, to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, Kamel
Morjane, Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi and
you, Mr. President. We are deeply grateful to the
Government of Tunisia for devoting so much of the
coming month to the situation in the Democratic
6
Republic of the Congo, and we pledge our full support
and cooperation.
I join in welcoming President Kabila to the
Security Council and to New York. We express to
President Kabila, both in his official role and his
private capacity, our deepest condolences for the death
of his father and late President. We are deeply moved
that in his time of grief, President Kabila has reassured
the Congolese people and the international community
of his commitment to moving ahead with the peace
process. The eyes of the world were on President
Kabila when he assumed his office. They followed him
to Paris, Washington and now New York. Now is the
time for bold and statesman-like steps on the part of all
the parties, including the United Nations. We must all
work together.
There are four important messages that we want
to communicate to the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
First, whether in the field of peacekeeping,
humanitarian relief or development, the United Nations
is and will remain a friend of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
Secondly, it gave us new hope when President
Kabila 's first words to the Congolese people and the
international community were a renewed call for peace
and democratization. We warmly welcome President
Kabila 's clear affirmation of his Government's
commitment to the successful implementation of the
peace process and his pledge to continue and intensify
cooperation with MONUC.
Thirdly, we support the Lusaka process and urge
all the signatories to ensure that peace finally comes to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.
Fourthly, and most importantly, now is the time
for action. We want MONUC to deploy and peace to
succeed. For this to happen we require an operational
plan for the disengagement of forces and their
redeployment, and the parties must create and sustain
the conditions needed for further MONUC operations.
This includes the provision of adequate assurances for
the security and freedom of movement of United
Nations and related personnel.
The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has a right, under the United Nations
Charter, to demand that uninvited foreign forces depart
its territory. The Governments of Rwanda and Uganda
have a right, under the United Nations Charter, to
demand that the Congolese territory not be used as a
launching pad for attacks against their countries.
There is an obvious political settlement here. The
Governments of the region need to work together,
rather than against each other, to bring about what they
and the entire region need: a stable and secure
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The pursuit of
common interests is the only means by which this crisis
will be resolved.
While foreign Powers cannot dictate the internal
politics of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we
believe that the call for democratization is not a foreign
demand. The new political dispensation called for
under the Lusaka Agreement is and must remain the
sovereign domain of the Congolese people. As the
Security Council delegation witnessed in Kinshasa,
political parties, civil society, organizations and
religious commumtles are calling for political
participation and accountable governance in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. United States
support for democratic development within the Congo
is based on the belief that democracy and long-term
stability are inseparable. We also believe that the best
means to delegitimize armed opposition is to allow
unarmed political opposition to flourish.
The Lusaka Agreement provides for an interCongolese
dialogue under neutral facilitation. We hope
for early progress in re-engaging the facilitation
appointed by the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), and we hope also that the dialogue can begin.
We continue to believe that Sir Ketumile Masire is an
outstanding former head of State who can fulfil his
mandate, and we hope that he will reach out to the
parties in the spirit of compromise and democracy for
which his country is so well known.
It has been almost a year since the Security
Council authorized phase II of the United Nations
mission in the Congo. The Secretary-General delayed
the deployment of additional United Nations personnel
because conditions on the ground were not yet
conducive to a successful mission. This was not a
popular decision, but we believe that it was the right
one, as neither the Lusaka Agreement nor the Council's
resolutions had been implemented. If President
Kabila 's recent statements are followed by concrete
actions by all the parties, the United Nations will, at
S/PV.4271
last, be able to play its full role in the peace process,
and my Government wants that to happen.
The critical short-term task remains a fully
effective cease-fire and the disengagement of forces.
While disengagement cannot substitute for a broader
peace process, it will provide the enabling environment
for progress on the political front. The SecretaryGeneral
is revising the concept of operations to reflect
the changing situation on the ground. Just as we have
supported his decision not to deploy additional
personnel until the situation allows, we will support
deployment as soon as conditions permit, and we look
forward to his advice.
Pueto in Katanga province remains a potential
flashpoint, but it also represents an opportunity for the
parties to put the peace process on track. In this zone in
recent months the cease-fire was violated. We welcome
Rwanda's readiness to withdraw from Pueto, and we
urge movement there as soon as possible.
President Kabila has created an opening for the
peace process by his reaffirmation of the Lusaka
Agreement, his offer to work with his neighbours on
security issues and a pledge of full cooperation with
MONUC. It is up to the other Lusaka signatories to
respond with initiatives of their own.
Turning the Congo into a battleground of foreign
armies inflicts misery on the Congolese people and
adds to instability in the region. Rwanda and Uganda
must present the Government of Kinshasa with
credible, concrete actions that demonstrate that they are
committed to peace, the withdrawal of their forces and
the territorial sovereignty of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo as a unified nation. All the State parties
need to work together based on the mutual recognition
that armed non-State actors using the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo pose a threat to
regional stability. Whether we are discussing UNITA,
the Front pour la defense de la democratie (FDD) or
the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), the common
denominator is that the Congolese people want them all
to leave their country.
One group in particular, former members of the
Rwandese Armed Forces (FAR) and Interahamwe,
poses a major threat to regional stability and to the
successful implementation of the Lusaka Agreement.
Just as the international community is justified in
calling for the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan
forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so
7
S/PV.4271
too must we call on all the Lusaka signatories to
abandon support for the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. In
that way, the path will be open for the disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and resettlement of the
ex-FAR and Interahamwe, as well as of other armed
groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
At the end of the day, common security interests
of all the States in the region converge, and those
common interests can form the basis for peace. All
involved have the responsibility to achieve the peace
their people so clearly need and so justly deserve. We
reiterate our call for the parties to go beyond
statements and to use the coming days to take concrete
steps needed to disengage their forces, bring about th~
conditions for further deployment of the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and begin the national dialogue
called for in the Lusaka Accords.
My Government wishes President Kabila every
success.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of the United States for the kind words
he addressed to Tunisia and to its diplomatic
representatives.
Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French) : I wish at
the outset to thank you, Mr. President, for having
placed the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the
heart of the Security Council's agenda for the month of
February, during which you will be presiding over the
work of the Council. I want also to thank the SecretaryGeneral
for the message of hope he has just conveyed
to the Security Council: hope that peace will be
restored in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
I thank President Joseph Kabila for his presence
here today, and for the statement he has just made. On
behalf of the French leadership, I extend our
condolences to President Kabila on the tragic death of
his father, President Laurent-Desire Kabila. We believe
that President Joseph Kabila's decision to come to New
York to address the Security Council, only a few days
after officially taking office, is particularly significant
and encouraging. That gesture reflects a desire for true
relations of trust and partnership between the United
Nations and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and we hope that those relations will continue and
deepen.
8
In his statement, President Joseph Kabila has just
reaffirmed an approach based on dialogue and
reconciliation, which we welcome. His inauguration
statement before the Congolese nation had already laid
the foundations for that. Further, President Kabila
discussed this with President Chirac two days ago in
Paris, and President Chirac indicated to President
Kabila that he supported his avowals of peace and
dialogue. We are particularly encouraged by President
Joseph Kabila 's commitments with respect to peace
and to the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
through the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement
and the relaunching of the inter-Congolese dialogue.
Also encouraging is the President's wish to facilitate
the deployment of the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC), under the fine leadership of Ambassador
Kamel Morjane, to whom we convey our greetings.
The role of the international community here is
resolutely to encourage and support the Congolese
authorities on the path of peace and dialogue, while, of
course, g1vmg them time to build these new
approaches. The international community must
encourage the other signatories of the Lusaka
Agreement to respond without delay to the overtures
made by the new President of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
My country's position on the resolution of the
Congolese crisis was clearly reflected in the recent
conclusions adopted by the Council of Ministers of the
European Union. Here, my delegation wishes to recall
several simple principles that should guide the
implementation of the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
First, it is essential that all the parties implement
their commitments under the Lusaka Agreement and
that they respect the various resolutions of the Security
Council. The withdrawal of foreign forces from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially the
withdrawal of uninvited forces, is imperative. Without
such a withdrawal there can be no lasting peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Secondly, as President Kabila has just forcefully
said, the plundering of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo must cease. This
ongoing violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is unacceptable. Those who
carry out such activities should in due course be
punished by the international community. France
eagerly awaits the final report of the panel of experts
on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Thirdly, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo must be
accompanied by rapid deployment of MONUC.
MONUC observation of the disengagement and
withdrawal of forces and the regular reports on this
matter to be made to the Security Council will serve as
a guarantee to the parties and will encourage them to
carry out their commitments. All parties concerned
must effectively ensure the safety, security and
freedom of movement of MONUC personnel. France is
also well aware of the security problems that could
arise along the borders with some countries
neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We continue to support the principle of MONUC
deployment in border areas, especially Gama and
Bukavu.
Finally, the relaunching of national dialogue, in a
framework that can undoubtedly be adjusted, should
facilitate the solution of the specific political
difficulties of the Congolese. As President Kabila has
just said, the door to inter-Congolese dialogue must be
open to all, without preconditions and without
exclusion.
France encourages President Joseph Kabila to
continue the constructive talks with Burundi that have
been underway for some months - as he has just said
he will. As President Kabila has just indicated, peace in
the region must be comprehensive and lasting if it is to
lead at last to the implementation of the policies of
development, growth and democracy for which the
peoples of the Great Lakes region long.
Today's gathering inaugurates a series of
meetings which will include the visit here on 21 and 22
February, under your presidency, Sir, of the members
of the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement.
We must take the opportunity vigorously to relaunch
the peace process and to hasten the settlement of a
conflict that has caused all too much harm to civilian
populations. It is in that spirit that France will work in
the coming weeks - a period that we hope will be
decisive.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of France for the kind words he
addressed to me.
S/PV.4271
Mr. Chowdhury (Bangladesh): We convey very
warm greetings to you, Sir, as you assume the
presidency of the Council for the month of February.
We are very pleased that you are leading the Council
this month.
This is a special opportunity for the Security
Council to welcome His Excellency President Joseph
Kabila soon after his assumption of the presidency of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
It was encouraging to hear the commitment of the
President to pursue the Lusaka peace process. We noted
in particular his determination to make fresh efforts to
bring peace to the country and to hold free and fair
elections. His willingness to extend full cooperation to
the United Nations observer mission, and his assurance
to us of his support for the implementation of the
resolutions of the Security Council, are very
encouraging.
Today's meeting provides an opportunity to think
together about a new departure in our common
endeavour for peace in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The Secretary-General has given us a
perspective on the course of action ahead. We are in
full agreement with him. We also appreciate the
briefing on the situation that we received this morning
from his able Special Representative, Ambassador
Kamel Morjane.
It has been widely recognized that there can be no
military solution to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It is important that all
concerned parties come to the same conclusion.
According to our understanding, the Lusaka Agreement
provides for a workable compromise for all parties. We
urge the leadership in the region, as well as the rebel
movements, to take a pragmatic approach to the peace
process. In this context, we look forward to our
meeting here next week with President Kagame of
Rwanda. The insistence on finding a military solution
or taking irreconcilable positions has not helped
resolve the conflict. It has only increased the suffering
of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and their neighbours.
We understand that efforts are being made for a
regional meeting, possibly at the summit level,
involving all signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement. For practical reasons, such a meeting
should preferably be held prior to our meeting here
with the Political Committee later this month. We shall
9
S/PV.4271
be expecting concrete steps from the Political
Committee and the Joint Military Commission
meetings this month.
In order for the Council to take a decision on full
deployment of the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) at its authorized strength, we will certainly
want to see some real progress on the ground. There
have been arguments in favour ofMONUC deployment
as the forces withdraw, in order to prevent any security
gap. For that to take place, the parties will have to
demonstrate their commitment by effectively
withdrawing as per the Kampala disengagement plan
and the Harare subplan. We shall be guided by the
advice of the Secretary-General with regard to the
further deployment of the United Nations observers,
assisted by the troops.
A fundamental element in the peace process is the
inter-Congolese dialogue for national reconciliation.
We shall call upon the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to revive the facilitation process
at an early date.
Bangladesh particularly welcomes President
Kabila 's pledge to prepare free and transparent
elections to enable the people to choose for themselves
a leader to preside over the destiny of the country. The
war of attrition in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo has cost the lives of thousands of people; it
continues to destroy the lives of thousands more; it has
kept a whole nation hostage. The people of Congo have
suffered some of the worst atrocities, and this must
stop.
We call upon the leadership in the region to forget
the acrimonious past and commit themselves to a future
of mutual trust and confidence. It is time they took a
decisive step to end the conflict. A peaceful, united and
prosperous Democratic Republic of the Congo will be
in the best interests of all the people of the region. The
Security Council and the rest of the international
community will stand behind them in their efforts. A
courageous first step has to be made here. Today, with
President Kabila 's commitment to bringing peace to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, we have a window
of opportunity. We should seize that opportunity in
earnest.
Mr. Ouaue (Mali) (spoke in French): I should
like first of all to thank you, Mr. President, for having
taken the initiative to convene this important public
10
meeting of the Security Council to consider the
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I
should also like to welcome the participation in this
meeting of Major General Joseph Kabila, President of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to whom I
renew the heartfelt condolences of the people and the
Government of Mali for the tragic death of President
Laurent-Desire Kabila. I should also like to thank
President Kabila for the important statement that he
made. Finally, I should like to welcome the SecretaryGeneral
to this meeting and thank him for the message
of hope that he has just conveyed to us regarding the
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
With regard to that situation, I should like, in the
context of today's debate, to make several points.
First, Mali supports the search for a peaceful
settlement to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. In this regard, my delegation welcomes the
renewed commitment of President Joseph Kabila to
work for a solution that gives priority to dialogue and
reconciliation. The continuation of the inter-Congolese
dialogue and the Libreville process will, in the view of
my delegation, be an effective means of achieving
national reconciliation and arriving at a stable external
environment. It is a fact that peace processes and
reconciliation go hand in hand. That is why we support
the appeal made to all political players, including civil
society, and to neighbouring countries aimed at
achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
Secondly, we believe that it is of fundamental
importance to create the conditions for a lasting peace
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the basis
of the full implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. In
this context, we believe the relaunching of the Lusaka
process to be a vital necessity. We encourage the
authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
consider the ways and means of relaunching the
process in order to achieve an effective ceasefire and to
contribute to the restoration of peace in the Great
Lakes region.
In the same context, we welcome the efforts made
by the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization of
African Unity and by President Frederick Chiluba, who
is presiding over the regional initiative, and we
encourage them to persevere in their efforts.
Thirdly, my delegation believes that the rapid
implementation of the second stage of the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is essential for
ensuring that the conflict in that country is resolved. In
this connection, we support the appeal made to the
signatories of the Lusaka Agreement to reaffirm their
commitment to the implementation of that Agreement
and comply with its provisions, particularly those
relating to the implementation of the plan and the
subplans for the redeployment of forces in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the deployment
of MONUC. It is also important that Security Council
resolution 1332 (2000) of December 2000 be fully
implemented.
That is why we also look forward to the next
report of the Secretary-General on the new concept of
operations of MONUC. We also look forward to
contributing usefully to the Security Council's meeting
with the members of the Political Committee
established under the Lusaka Agreement, scheduled to
take place on 21 and 22 February.
In conclusion, I wish to stress that, given the
gravity of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and all that is at stake, the international
community must act speedily and practically. The
Security Council in particular must shoulder all its
responsibilities and firmly uphold the peace process in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mali will do its
full share in that necessary and urgent process.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): I
warmly welcome you, Sir, to the Council chair and
offer you my compliments for starting your presidency
with this important meeting.
I congratulate President Joseph Kabila on his
assumption of the presidency of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and offer my delegation's warm
thanks to him for his extraordinary initiative in coming
to New York so early in his presidency and seeking this
meeting with the Council. I also renew the United
Kingdom Government's and people's sincere
condolences on the loss of his father.
The United Kingdom values highly the
opportunity to have this discussion today. We must
make the most of it to confirm our commitment at last
to moving the peace process forward. The principles
are all set out and were signed up to more than 18
months ago in the Lusaka Agreement. The Kampala
and Harare disengagement plans have followed. We
now need to see the solid, steady implementation of the
peace process which has been missing for the past year
S/PV.4271
or so. This means a strong focus on the Lusaka
Agreement and we welcome President Kabila 's clear
reaffirmation of its importance today.
I think there are three key areas to address in the
run-up to our meeting with the Political Committee on
21 and 22 February. On the military side, we welcome
the general restraint shown by all the parties in recent
days. This needs to be sustained and built upon. It is
essential for the parties to be in contact and to get back
to work on disengagement and withdrawal plans,
mapping out achievable, concrete steps and setting a
realistic timetable. They then need to take forward
those plans. In this light, it is welcome news that
President Kabila met yesterday in Washington with
President Kagame and we would be most grateful if the
President or his Foreign Minister could give us a
summary account of that meeting or an assessment of
its import. There can be no progress towards a political
solution without direct communication between the
opposing parties to the conflict.
This Council insists on a political solution to the
conflict. A military solution is clearly unachievable,
but the political track can only truly come alive if
credible progress is made in creating a political
framework that will give a voice to all Congolese
people. If we all put the rights and wishes of the
ordinary, peace-loving people of the Congo first, we
will reach a solution to this conflict surprisingly
quickly.
We wish therefore to see the early establishment
of an open, inclusive dialogue, as set out in the Lusaka
Agreement, that will allow the people of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to map out a new
future for their country and suffer no longer the
presence of foreign troops on their soil. We encourage
the Congolese authorities to reengage with the
facilitation appointed by the Organization of African
Unity in taking this forward. I make a particular appeal
to President Kabila to take the lead in this. He has the
most important role to play, not just in moving forward
dialogue among the Congolese people, but much more
generally in creating an atmosphere that will allow
truly open and representative dialogue to flourish.
In this respect, the United Kingdom very much
welcomes the pledge in President Kabila 's inaugural
statement to restore normal democratic life in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, with full respect
for human rights and justice, and to hold nationwide
11
' .
S/PV.4271
elections. We call on all the Lusaka parties fully to
respect human rights and humanitarian standards. It
also might be useful to explore the scope for a multidonor
mission to assess the humanitarian situation
across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which
would give us a much better understanding of the scale
of the problem and the level and kind of assistance
needed.
Then, there is the question of the United Nations
role. I come to this thirdly because the way in which
we can move forward depends first on the progress
made by the parties. In December last year, we rolled
over the mandate of the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) for a further six months. We need to use this
period to move forward. The United Nations has been
in limbo for far too Jong, and the Secretary-General
made it clear to us this afternoon that he wishes this to
change.
But MONUC, so ably Jed by Ambassador
Morjane and keen to carry forward its purpose, can
deploy and carry out its role only in parallel with
implementation by the parties to the peace process. The
parties must give MONUC their full, practical
cooperation. As host Government, the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo has a
particularly important role in this respect. Free access
and security must be provided for MONUC, as well as
for humanitarian agencies. We very much welcome the
early positive indications from President Kabila in that
respect. At the request of the Council, the SecretaryGeneral
will this month be reviewing the situation on
the ground and the MONUC concept of operations. We
want to move forward, but we can do so only when the
Secretary-General is satisfied that the conditions are
right and will allow us to play a useful role. This
depends on forward movement by the parties and on
clear evidence of support and protection from the
Government and armed forces of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
We now have a programme and a clear
opportunity for making real progress in implementation
of the peace process, leading up to the Council's
meeting on 21 and 22 February. Let us make the most
of it. The United Kingdom will contribute forcefully to
that objective. Let us hope that we will soon be
applauding President Kabila for making the crucial
difference in ensuring the success of that programme.
12
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of the United Kingdom for his kind
words addressed to me.
Mr. Ryao (Ireland): May I extend warmest
congratulations to you, Sir, on Tunisia's assumption of
the presidency of the Council.
In welcoming President Joseph Kabila to the
Council today, may I also extend our condolences to
him and to his family on the death of the late President
Laurent Kabila.
We commend the initiative of President Kabila to
engage with the international community at this
potential turning point. We have studied carefully and
welcomed his inaugural speech to the nation and we
have heard his comprehensive address to the Council
today. We welcome his clear commitment to bringing a
strong impulse to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement so
that it may lead not only to an effective ceasefire, but
also to a restoration of peace and stability in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the region
generally.
The meetings of President Kabila with Presidents
Mbeki and Chirac, Secretary of State Powell, the
United Nations Secretary-General and now the Security
Council are evidence of his stated intention to
contribute to the relaunching of the Lusaka Agreement
and of his commitment to helping the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUC) in carrying out its tasks.
Yesterday's meeting with President Kagame was of
particular importance and a most encouraging
indication of the intention of both parties to respect the
Agreement.
Out of the recent tragedy has come, we believe, a
widely perceived opportunity to reach a peaceful
settlement to this conflict. We have urged the parties to
the conflict to engage in direct contact together in
this regard. We reiterate that call today and we urge
each party to take steps to engender the confidence of
the other parties.
It is our absolute conviction that the Lusaka
Agreement provides the consensual basis for peace in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the wider
region. We urge all the parties to the conflict, and in
particular the new authorities in Kinshasa, to seize this
opportunity in a sustained process and to get together
behind the Lusaka Agreement and to commit
themselves to its full implementation in letter and in
spirit.
We welcome President Kabila's emphasis on this
essential point in his remarks earlier. The Lusaka
Agreement offers, by far, the best way forward. We
strongly believe that no party to the Agreement should
attempt to manipulate it in its own interest, but should
honour strictly its obligations under it. All parties must
move towards the national dialogue and reconciliation,
as foreseen in the Lusaka Agreement, in order to form
a freely elected, democratic Government that is
representative of all the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. We welcome President Kabila 's
stated commitment to solving political problems within
the framework of the inter-Congolese dialogue.
We urge the authorities of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to make early contact with the
facilitator with a view to making early progress on this
issue. In this regard, we have noted Foreign Minister
Okitundo 's call for a co-Facilitator in the interCongolese
dialogue as further evidence of the
willingness to fully re-engage with the process. A
permanent cessation of hostilities, the full withdrawal
of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the disarmament and demobilization of armed
groups and the securing of international borders in
accordance with the Lusaka Agreement and subsequent
disengagement plans is an absolute priority now to be
worked towards together by all involved parties.
We welcome the commitment of the authorities of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo to collaborate
closely with MONUC, as clearly stated by President
Kabila in his inaugural statement and again here today,
so as to enable it to discharge its mandate efficiently.
We call on all the parties to move immediately to bring
about the conditions in which the United Nations can
assist and in which MONUC can effectively operate.
We look forward to the next report of the SecretaryGeneral,
in which he will address the future shape of
the United Nations presence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In this regard, we expect also
that the United Nations operation will enjoy the full
cooperation of all the parties involved. President
Kabila has expressed today his own commitment in this
regard.
The European Union has said, and we fully share
the conviction, that lasting peace in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo will be possible only through a
S/PV.4271
negotiated peace settlement that is fair to all parties,
that respects the territorial integrity and national
sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
that upholds democratic principles and human rights
and that takes account of the security interests of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and all other
countries of the region.
President Kabila has committed to bringing about
the normalization of democratic life, strengthening of
the rule of law, consolidation of democracy and good
governance and a guarantee of human rights and
justice. We welcome these clear commitments, and we
look forward to evidence of early progress. We also
look forward to building on this meeting today and on
this clear opportunity for peace at the meeting of the
Political Committee later this month. We see the
presence of President Kabila today as a signal of his
commitment to this process, and we welcome this
pragmatism.
We hope that President Kabila, having listened to
the views of Council members, will return to Kinshasa
with a clear understanding of the shared expectations
of the international community and with a strengthened
purpose to re-engage with the Lusaka process and to
comply fully with the resolutions of this Council. The
international community has repeatedly reaffirmed its
commitment to help the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Once again, on our part, we
reiterate our willingness to do so. Ireland and the Irish
people have shown solidarity with the people of the
Congo since long before that country won its
independence. As an active participant in United
Nations peacekeeping operations, Ireland shared the
pain that accompanied Congo's birth as a nation.
Ireland will now spare no effort within this Council in
support of the process that will bring to the Congolese
people the peace, development and tranquillity that
they surely deserve and that their leaders can bring
about.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of Ireland for his kind words addressed
to me.
Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I
would like to kindly request the members of the
Council to be as brief as possible in their statements so
as to allow time for President Joseph Kabila to
comment on the Council members' important
statements if he wishes.
13
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Mr. Sheu Guofang (China) (spoke in Chin ese):
At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President,
for organizing this important meeting today.
We have noted that one of the priorities in the
work of the .Council this month is the question of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. This morning,
Ambassador Morjane gave us a very important
briefing. This afternoon, we are having this formal
meeting. This is the beginning of a series of meetings
on the question of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in the Council. We hope that all this input will
advance the peace process in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
China warmly welcomes President Joseph Kabila
to the Security Council for this useful dialogue and
interaction with the members of the Council. We also
welcome the important statement made by President
Kabila just now. A few days after his assumption of the
presidency, he has come to the Council to have this
dialogue with us . This demonstrates his Government's
sincere determination to advance the peace process in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
I would also like to take this opportunity to once
again convey the sincere condolences of the Chinese
Government and people to him for the loss of his
father, the late President Kabila.
China is of the view that the peace process in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is now at a critical
juncture and a potential turning point. At present, it is
imperative to seize the opportunity to move the peace
process forward so that progress can be made. China is
happy to note that President Kabila has repeatedly
emphasized his intention to implement the Lusaka
Agreement and his commitment to the inter-Congolese
dialogue so as to achieve national reconciliation. We
highly appreciate this commitment by President Kabila .
We are of the view that the inter-Congolese dialogue is
of great significance.
The solution to the question of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is ultimately up to the people of
that country. It is our hope that all the Congolese
people will answer the call of President Kabila and will
seize this opportunity to come back to the negotiating
table to resolve their issues peacefully, free from
outside interference.
China also is convinced that the United Nations
and the Security Council have a positive role to play in
14
a solution to the question of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and supports their playing that role.
China hopes that we can make the most of this
momentum and make timely political decisions.
China believes that the role of the United
Nations, and that of the Security Council in particular,
should be reflected in the support given to the
sovereign Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo in its efforts to restore peace there.
Experience shows that we cannot afford to
underestimate the difficulties that may occur along the
road ahead. China is convinced that, in order to
overcome those difficulties and constantly to push
forward the peace process, the relentless efforts of all
the parties, including the United Nations and the
Security Council, are required. However, the political
will of the parties to the conflict cannot be replaced by
any other factors.
We look forward to all of the parties seizing the
opportunity, to their taking a courageous step and
building up mutual trust and confidence so as to create
conditions for breaking the impasse and for the United
Nations to play a role in this process. We hope that the
Security Council will, in light of the changing
situation, take specific steps for the deployment of the
second phase of MONUC. This deployment should be
based on considerations regarding the prevention of the
outbreak of internal conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It should also be based on the
effective guarantee of security along the borders
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its
neighbours. China supports regional organizations in
their continued efforts. However, we hope that all of
these efforts will be coordinated.
Before concluding, my delegation would like to
reiterate that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo must be fully respected and safeguarded.
This is the prerequisite for a solution to the conflict in
that country. It is also a principle with which all
Member States of the United Nations should comply.
Mr. Valdivieso (Colombia) {spoke in Spanish):
Mr. President, I would like to say how pleased my
delegation is at your assumption of the presidency of
the Council, and I would like to reiterate to you our
readiness to contribute to the successful fulfilment of
your functions.
On this solemn occasion, I also wish to extend a
cordial welcome to the President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. We regret the painful fact of
the death of his father, former President Laurent
Kabila, and we wish to convey words of comfort to his
family and to the Congolese people as a whole.
The presence of President Joseph Kabila in the
Security Council, and his statement at this meeting, are
of great significance to peace in the world and give us
grounds for hope. They reflect a clear commitment to
peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a
peace that we recognize to be the profound aspiration
of 52 million Congolese, with whom we identify as
members of the international community.
When we joined this Council, we promised the
Members of the United Nations to work for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and it
is our intention to fulfil that promise. Therefore, we
wish today to express a threefold purpose.
First we must work to ensure respect for the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, as well as of all the neighbouring States in
central Africa, as has been expressed by this Council
on many occasions.
Secondly we must demand, as is our duty, of all
the signatory parties of the Lusaka Peace Agreement
that they fulfil their obligations. This means the
demobilization of irregular forces, political dialogue
leading to free elections, the withdrawal of foreign
troops from Congolese territory and respect for human
rights and international humanitarian law, among many
other aspects.
The third component is to contribute to the
prompt deployment of the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
under guarantees of security for its personnel, freedom
of movement and logistical support, which are
indispensable for the conduct of its operations.
We hope that the expectations of the moment will
generate an atmosphere of confidence that will make it
possible for us successfully to hold the meeting
scheduled for 21 February between the Security
Council and the Political Committee composed of the
signatories to the Lusaka Agreement.
Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
a commitment that this Council has to humankind. It is
S/PV.4271
a commitment that we have assumed towards the
Congolese people, the peoples of Africa and those of
the entire world. We call for the reconciliation of the
Congolese people with itself and with its neighbours,
and we are prepared to contribute from this office to
that goal.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of Colombia for the kind words he
addressed to me.
Mr. Neewoor (Mauritius): Mr. President, allow
me first to congratulate you warmly on your
assumption of the presidency of the Council. We thank
you for starting your presidency with this important
meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
also for placing that country and Africa high on the
Council's work programme during the month of
February.
My delegation joins the other members in
extending a very warm welcome in the Security
Council Chamber to His Excellency Mr. Joseph Kabila,
President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
First of all, on behalf of the Government of
Mauritius, I wish to present to the President, the
Government and the people of the Democratic
Republic of Congo the sincere condolences of the
Government and people of Mauritius on the tragic
death of the President's father, the late President
Laurent Kabila. We also wish to felicitate the
Government and people of Congo for the courage they
have demonstrated during the difficult time following
the recent tragic event in Kinshasa and for the
remarkable manner in which the transition is being
managed.
We have listened very attentively to the important
statement that President Joseph Kabila has just made
before the Security Council, and we feel greatly
reassured by it. We believe that he has the right vision
to achieve the goal of peace and security within the
framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of his country. The road to peace and security there
requires, obviously, the participation of all the
Congolese people in an inclusive political process. The
Lusaka Accord that all the Congolese parties, as well
as the non-Congolese parties involved in the conflict,
signed in July 1999 remains unquestionably the
foundation upon which peace and normalcy should be
built in the Congo.
15
S/PV.4271
Unfortunately, so far the inter-Congolese
dialogue, which is an essential and integral part of the
Lusaka Accord, has not really got off the ground, and
in a significant measure this has resulted in the
stagnation of the Lusaka process. We are confident that
President Kabila will do what is necessary for the interCongolese
dialogue to begin without delay, in
accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka
Agreement. We urge all the parties to the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement to recommit themselves to
implementing this Agreement in all its aspects and to
comply with all its provisions.
In the wake of the recent events in Kinshasa, the
Security Council promptly received communications
from Rwanda and Uganda to the effect that they did not
intend to take any advantage of the situation. This has
been very much appreciated.
We have no doubt about the commitments of both
Rwanda and Uganda for the full and early
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. In this
regard, we welcome the meeting earlier in Washington,
D.C., between President Kagame and President Kabila.
That bilateral meeting will help build confidence for
the peace process. In the same vein, my delegation
would like to urge Rwanda and Uganda, the two
important neighbours of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, to take steps to implement the
disengagement plans which they signed in Harare a few
weeks ago along with the other parties. This important
step should mark the beginning of a process for the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pursuant to the
Lusaka Agreement.
There is absolutely no question that the
deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping
operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
necessary for the implementation of the Lusaka
Agreement. Indeed, the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo have already been waiting far
too long for the deployment to take place. There are
certainly many reasons why the Lusaka process has not
moved forward in the last year and a half since it was
signed by all concerned parties. The undue delay in the
deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping
operation has undoubtedly contributed to the stagnation
of the Lusaka process.
Today there are hopeful signs all around for the
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. President
16
Joseph Kabila has stated his clear intention, both in
Kinshasa and in his important statement today in the
Security Council, to move the peace process forward.
We also have assurances in this regard from the other
capitals concerned. We have no doubt that all the
Congolese parties will also rally in a spirit of
patriotism and solidarity and will help bring peace and
stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The inter-Congolese dialogue can ultimately
determine the future political course of the country.
The United Nations, for its part, must fulfil its
responsibility and deploy the long-awaited
peacekeeping operation without any further delay, in
accordance with Security Council resolutions 1291
(2000) and 1332 (2000).
Before concluding, I wish to commend the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
Ambassador Kamel Morjane, and his small team of
observers for their remarkable work in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. I also wish to pay tribute to the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, the International Committee of the Red
Cross and the other relief organizations for their
important humanitarian work in providing relief and
assistance to numerous refugees, internally displaced
persons and other victims of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Finally, I wish to state that Mauritius wishes to
President Joseph Kabila every success in his
endeavours to bring peace, unity and democracy to his
great country.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of Mauritius for his kind words
addressed to me.
Mr. Kuchyoski (Ukraine) (spoke in French) :
Permit me at the outset to extend to you, Mr. President,
my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the
presidency of the Security Council. I also wish to
congratulate the members of your delegation, who
assist you in your work as President. I assure you of
the Ukrainian delegation's full support. I also wish to
extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Kishore
Mahbubani, my most sincere compliments on his
excellent work during his term as President in January.
I also wish to join preceding speakers in
welcoming Mr. Joseph Kabila, President of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to thank him
for his statement, which is very useful in connection
with the Council's consideration of the situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, both internally and
at the regional level.
On behalf of Ukraine, I also wish to extend
sincere condolences to President Joseph Kabila and,
through him, to all the Congolese people on the tragic
death of his father, Laurent-Desire Kabila.
(spoke in English)
The situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is one of the most sensitive and complex issues
on the African continent. We note with satisfaction
that, as the Secretary-General's Special Representative
for the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mr. Morjane, indicated this morning, the situation in
the country at this moment is more favourable than
ever before, which we believe is due to the strenuous
efforts of President Joseph Kabila. We welcome the
relentless high-level diplomatic efforts; we take them
as an indication that leaders of the countries of the
region are willing to search for ways to advance the
peace process.
We also welcome and support the willingness of
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo - which was quite clearly expressed by
President Joseph Kabila in his inaugural speech, as
well as during his meetings in Paris and Washington
and during his speech today at United Nations
Headquarters - to move towards a peaceful settlement
of the conflict on the basis of transparency, a
constructive approach and comprehensive dialogue
with all the parties concerned.
At the same time, we can see that not everything
goes as planned and expected. In this connection, we
would like to underline, among other elements, the
importance of additional political steps by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
aimed at promoting the inter-Congolese dialogue,
which is, in our view, a key element in advancing the
peace process in the country. To this end, it is
necessary to intensify political negotiations between
the Congolese parties - and this, quite obviously, is a
very difficult task - in order to defuse the conflict. It
is absolutely clear that a necessary precondition for
this, or the necessary background, should be the
withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, as has been
S/PV.4271
repeatedly called for in relevant Security Council
resolutions.
We are convinced that the continued movement of
the parties concerned towards the peaceful resolution
of the conflict should, as before, be based on the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, as well as on the
Kampala, Harare and Maputo arrangements, and that
the language of arms cannot be a means of defusing the
conflict.
We firmly believe that all parties to the conflict
should continue constructive dialogue to that end and,
within the framework of the documents, should take
additional measures to accelerate the peace process. In
our view, the activities of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo should be regarded as an impetus to that
process. The parties concerned should do their best to
facilitate its effective and comprehensive deployment,
inter alia by fully implementing the provisions of the
Status of Forces Agreement. I take this opportunity to
reaffirm my country's readiness to contribute to United
Nations peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
It will be necessary, of course, to focus on solving
quite a number of issues underlying the conflict that
need to be addressed without delay. These include the
withdrawal of foreign forces; the disarmament and
demobilization of members of armed groups; ensuring
the security of the borders between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi;
the safe return of refugees; inter-Congolese dialogue,
as mentioned before; the restoration of the national and
regional economy; and regional economic cooperation.
These and other issues pertammg to the
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement will be
discussed at the meeting of its signatories to be held on
21 and 22 February here in New York. We are certain
that all these problems, difficult and complex as they
are, can be resolved only through constructive dialogue
among all parties to the conflict, one of which is the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Finally, I would like to wish President Joseph
Kabila and his Government patience, tolerance,
perseverance and every success along the bumpy road
to peace and prosperity in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
17
S/PV.4271
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of Ukraine for the kind and encouraging
words he addressed to me and to my delegation.
Mr. Kolby (Norway): I congratulate you, Sir, on
your assumption of the presidency, and I thank
Ambassador Mahbubani for his excellent presidency
last month.
My delegation Joms others in welcoming His
Excellency President Joseph Kabila to this meeting. We
commend him for his diplomatic initiatives and for his
very important statement. We also would like to join
others in expressing condolences to President Kabila
on the tragic death of his father.
The Government of Norway supports the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement as the way forward towards a
peaceful solution to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. We note with great interest
President Joseph Kabila 's expressed desire to pursue a
policy of reconciliation, and we urge the Government
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to engage in
constructive dialogue with all involved parties in
accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement,
including through the rapid commencement of a
constructive inter-Congolese dialogue. Full
commitment to peaceful negotiations remains
indispensable in the search for a lasting solution to the
conflict in the war-torn country of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Against that background, we look forward to
immediate and constructive initiatives from President
Joseph Kabila that will re-energize the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement, and we would also like to
welcome his expressed intent to cooperate fully with
the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). It is
important to facilitate the full deployment of MONUC.
Furthermore, all parties involved in the conflict must
continue to exercise restraint and must comply with the
provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions.
The implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement must be based on full respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and on the legitimate security
concerns of all parties, including States neighbouring
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
Government of Norway emphasizes the need for the
complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo based on schedules
18
drawn up by the United Nations, the Organization of
African Unity and the Joint Military Commission; the
disarmament and demobilization of armed groups; and
the subsequent safe return of refugees and internally
displaced persons. We urge all parties and ethnic and
armed groups to cease acts of violence against
civilians, to respect and protect human rights, and to
ensure the safety and security of all international
personnel.
Furthermore, the efforts to rebuild a peaceful and
democratic Democratic Republic of the Congo must
take due account of the ongoing illegal exploitation of
natural resources and other forms of wealth in the
country. We strongly urge the parties to the conflict to
cooperate with the United Nations panel of experts
established in that regard. The role of diamonds and
other forms of resource wealth in fuelling conflict is
well established, and any party's lack of cooperation
with the expert panel will be viewed in that light.
A number of high-level meetings have taken
place over the course of the past few months,
indicating the willingness of leaders to support peace
efforts in the Great Lakes region. My Government
wholeheartedly supports such regional initiatives.
Notwithstanding the responsibility of the Congolese
Government and of Congolese leaders in generating
democratic developments in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the active and constructive involvement
of African leaders is crucial for the achievement of
comprehensive and sustainable peace in the region. My
Government attaches great importance to the planned
meeting between the Political Committee of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement and the Security Council, to be
held in New York later this month. We urge the parties
to explore thoroughly, through prior regional
consultations, the political avenues that could be
available for further consideration at that meeting. In
that light, we note with interest the recent meeting in
Washington between President Kabila and President
Kagame.
The Government of Norway has supported
financially the efforts to facilitate the process towards
inter-Congolese dialogue, and we would consider
doing so again if tangible progress were to emerge.
Last year, Norway also allocated some $20 million to
humanitarian and peace-building assistance to the
Great Lakes region. Through our budget for 2001, a
similar amount has been tentatively allocated with a
view to contributing to conflict resolution in the
broader perspective of development.
In conclusion, let me compliment the work done
so far, under the most difficult of circumstances, by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Great Lakes region, Mr. Dinka; the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Morjane; the
MONUC Force Commander; military and civilian
personnel; and other United Nations and international
personnel, including those of non-governmental
organizations, operating in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of Norway for the kind words he
addressed to me.
Miss Durrant (Jamaica): The Jamaican
delegation is pleased, Sir, to see you presiding over the
Council's deliberations for the month of February. We
wish to assure you and the delegation of Tunisia of our
full cooperation and support. Let me also express our
appreciation to His Excellency Mr. Kishore Mahbubani
and to the delegation of Singapore for the dynamic and
effective manner in which the affairs of the Council
were handled last month.
Let me join others in welcoming President Joseph
Kabila to the Security Council. On behalf of the
Government and the people of Jamaica, I wish to
extend condolences to President Kabila and to his
family on the untimely passing of his father, with
whom the Security Council had the honour to meet in
January of last year. Now that the mantle has passed to
President Joseph Kabila, we assure him of my
delegation's continued support for and solidarity with
the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Our message to President Kabila today is one of
encouragement as he and the people he leads face the
daunting challenges that lie ahead.
As the Secretary-General indicated, President
Kabila may be assured that the international
community stands ready to assist in bringing peace to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the entire
Great Lakes region of Africa.
The fact that he has come to New York to meet
with the Security Council so soon after his
inauguration is a clear indication of his wish to move
the process forward. We are indeed heartened by his
S/PV.4271
recent diplomatic m1t1at1ves, both regional and
international, and are encouraged by his call to all
parties to come to the peace table. These gestures,
reiterated in his important statement to the Council
today, could be important confidence-building
measures, which we hope will be reciprocated.
My delegation is well aware of how seemingly
intractable the problems in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo appear to be. But no matter how difficult it
might seem to be to find solutions, the suffering of the
people involved impels us to use our best efforts to put
an end to their misery. My delegation continues to
believe that the Lusaka Agreement remains the most
viable basis for sustainable peace in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In this connection, we support
the call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and
reaffirm our support for the unity, stability and
territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU). We also call
on all concerned to demonstrate their commitment to
implement the Kampala and Harare agreements, as
well as to cooperate with the Libreville process.
Jamaica fully supports the pursuit of the interCongolese
dialogue. We believe that this political
dialogue is an indispensable step towards national
reconciliation. We therefore welcome the commitment,
stated here today by President Kabila, to resume the
process of national dialogue, and we emphasize the
need for full cooperation by all concerned with the
office of the Facilitator.
We urge those who believe that they have a
legitimate right to justice and to governance in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to pursue it through
the processes provided for at the bargaining table and
not through the barrel of a gun. We firmly believe that
there is no military solution to the crisis in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Another issue of concern to my delegation is the
continued illegal exploitation of mineral resources. The
interim report of the panel of experts clearly indicates
the link between the conflict and the exploitation of
resources which should be used for the economic and
social development of the people of the Congo. As the
conflict widens, with some 16 million people being
affected, including over 2 million internally displaced
persons and refugees in neighbouring States, we have
19
S/PV.4271
the makings of an immense humanitarian tragedy, the
extent of which is unknown, given the lack of access
for humanitarian workers to the populations in need.
We realize, however, that the humanitarian and
security situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo can be addressed in a lasting manner only
within the framework of a comprehensive peace in a
regional context involving the entire Great Lakes
region. Jamaica therefore fully supports the holding of
an international conference on the Great Lakes, in
parallel with the national dialogue, under the auspices
of the OAU and the United Nations.
In conclusion, my delegation wishes to express
appreciation to the Secretary-General, to his Special
Representative, Ambassador Kamel Morjane, and to
the men and women of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo for their efforts to bring peace to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We look forward to the report of the SecretaryGeneral,
which will set the stage for the Council's
discussions later this month with the Political
Committee of the Lusaka Agreement and for further
action by the Security Council.
The President (spoke in Arabic) : I thank the
representative of Jamaica for her kind words addressed
to me.
Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in
Russia11): First of all, we should like to wish you, Sir,
and your delegation, every success during your
presidency of the Security Council for the month of
February. We should also like to thank Ambassador
Mahbubani of Singapore and his delegation for their
work during Singapore's presidency last month.
I should like to welcome President Joseph Kabila,
and I extend to him our condolences on the tragic death
of his father, the late President Laurent-Desire Kabila,
one of those who was present at the beginning of the
struggle for independence in Africa. The Russian
Federation wishes President Kabila every success in his
high office, which was entrusted to him by his
compatriots at a very difficult and trying time for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Russia's principled position in support of a
political settlement in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo on the basis of the Lusaka Agreement, as soon
as possible, remains unchanged. In resolutions 1304
20
(2000) and 1332 (2000), the Security Council sent the
parties to the Congolese conflict a clear signal about
the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the
withdrawal of foreign forces from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the steady implementation
of commitments undertaken under the Lusaka
Agreement, without any backing away. Russia hopes
that the very tragic events in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo will not in any way jeopardize the hopes
for a political settlement to the protracted Congolese
crisis on the basis of the preservation of the territorial
integrity of the country, in accordance with the Lusaka
Agreement, subsequent agreements and Security
Council resolutions.
We call on all the parties to the Congolese
conflict to resist the temptation to take advantage of the
present situation for their own ends. We believe that it
is extremely important for all parties to cooperate fully
with the United Nations Mission in implementing the
Lusaka Agreement, the resolutions of the Security
Council and the decisions of regional summits. We
attach great importance to the actual launching of the
Congolese national dialogue, with the participation of
all political forces in the country, through international
facilitation as provided for in the Lusaka Agreement.
We welcome the declaration by President Joseph
Kabila that he is committed to the goal of national
reconciliation. We call on all the parties to the conflict
not to allow any violations of human rights or norms of
international humanitarian law. We call on them to
cooperate in the disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and repatriation of members of illegal
armed groups with a view to establishing conditions of
security for all countries of the subregion.
This month, there will be a review of how the
parties to the conflict are implementing their
commitments with regard to the ceasefire and
disengagement. If the results of the review show that
genuine political will exists on the part of the parties
for implementing these tasks, that will certainly help
the Security Council when it takes up the question of
deploying phase II of the peacekeeping operation to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of the Russian Federation for his kind
words addressed to me.
Mr. Mahbubani (Singapore): Given the lateness
of the hour, please allow me to quickly but warmly
congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of
the Council, and to say that the Council is in very good
hands this month. Like the delegation of the United
States, we are delighted to see a powerful constellation
of Tunisian diplomats in this Chamber today.
I should also like to warmly welcome President
Joseph Kabila and thank him for his statement. I should
also like to thank him and you, Mr. President, as well
as all of our other colleagues, for the warm
compliments they paid to Singapore for its presidency
last month.
I should also like to convey my deepest
condolences to President Kabila for the tragic death of
the late President Laurent-Desire Kabila.
Clearly, the issue of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo remains one of the most complex and
challenging crises facing the international community,
and we have not heard much good news on this front.
The bad news is contained in my text. I will not
read it out, but I do want to say that, despite all these
setbacks, we believe that we now have a window of
opportunity to relaunch the peace process. We hope
that today's dialogue with President Kabila, under the
presidency of Tunisia, will mark the start of a new
process to bring peace to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and to bring peace to the region. Later this
month, the Security Council will have another occasion
to meet with the members of the Political Committee
and to resume the useful and productive dialogue
initiated last June under the presidency of France.
We are therefore encouraged to hear President
Joseph Kabila say that the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo will extend its full
cooperation to the United Nations. The United Nations,
in turn, stands also ready to extend its full cooperation
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But for this
cooperation to take place, it is essential for the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to take several concrete steps.
Here again, the steps are spelled out in my text. I
will not read them out, but I would like to emphasize
the fifth point, in which we encourage President Kabila
and his Government to cooperate fully with the neutral
Facilitator in the inter-Congolese dialogue. The
dialogue is a key element of the Lusaka Agreement, as
indeed has been emphasized by so many speakers this
afternoon, and we believe that, if successfully carried
S/PV.4271
out, it can significantly change the political climate in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
At the same time, the push for peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo must be part of a
collective effort. MONUC's deployment remains
contingent on the disengagement of all foreign troops.
All the parties must adhere fully to the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement, as well as to the Kampala,
Maputo and Harare disengagement sub-plans. We urge
swift implementation of all Council resolutions,
particularly resolutions 1304 (2000) and 1332 (2000).
There can be no peace as long as foreign forces remain
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and we
therefore strongly support the call made here a few
minutes ago by the Secretary-General for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
The search for peace in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo is also part of a wider goal - the search
for peace and stability in the Great Lakes region. We
would therefore encourage the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, under the
stewardship of President Kabila, to continue the
process of rapprochement with the Government of
Burundi initiated by the late President Laurent Kabila
at Libreville. Clearly, the future of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is linked to the peace and
stability of the entire region.
In conclusion, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo stands at a critical crossroads today. Let us not
underestimate the enormous challenges that lie ahead.
President Kabila not only has to contend with crippling
colonial and cold-war legacies, but he must now also
confront a complex political and military equation. He
has undertaken the responsibility of leading the
Government and the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo towards national reconciliation,
peace, stability and development. We assure him of our
full support in working towards a peaceful resolution
of the conflict. The risks are great, but so are the
rewards.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank the
representative of Singapore for his kind words
addressed to me and to members of my delegation.
I shall now make a statement in my capacity as
representative of Tunisia.
21
S/PV.4271
At the outset, I should like to express our
condolences to President Kabila for the Joss of his late
father, Laurent-Desire Kabila, one of the first African
militants of freedom and dignity for his people and for
the countries of Africa. Tunisia, which has made
African issues a priority of its foreign policy, welcomes
this opportunity to hear him speak before the Council
and to exchange views on the present and future of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the potential for
peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region.
As a member of the Security Council, Tunisia
insists on the need to respect the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, independence and control of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo over its natural resources. The
pillage of these resources, the property of the brotherly
Congolese people, must stop. The people of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has suffered and
continues to suffer under the scourge of war and its
negative consequences. They look forward to a better
future of peace, security, stability and prosperity, as
well as to the solidarity and support of the international
community.
Tunisia is resolved and happy to stand with
President Kabila and the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo at this critical time in their
history. We believe that there is no alternative to a
peaceful settlement of the dispute in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement is the best framework, accepted by all
parties, for fulfilling that objective.
Tunisia endorses and encourages any initiative or
step of President Kabila towards dialogue and national
reconciliation. We would also endorse any initiative he
might take towards dialogue, reconciliation and
cooperation with neighbouring States, within the
framework of mutual respect by all States for their
independence and territorial integrity. All parties have
expressed their willingness to move towards peace. We
look forward to all parties' taking practical steps
towards that objective. We believe that conditions are
ripe for a new momentum in the peace process in
which all parties would participate through immediate
action to implement relevant Security Council
resolutions, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the
deployment of the second phase of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUC).
22
We look forward to enabling MONUC to deploy
as soon as possible, reflecting the intention of the
international community to assume its responsibility
for the situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The critical situation there and in the region
calls for the firm resolve of the international
community to help all parties to build a solid and
lasting peace in the region, leading to prosperity,
solidarity, stability, cooperation and development for
the entire African continent.
In conclusion, I offer my best wishes to President
Kabila as he leads the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo towards peace, security,
stability and prosperity.
I now resume my functions as President of the
Security Council.
I call on Major General Joseph Kabila, President
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to respond,
if he so wishes, to the comments of the members of the
Security Council.
President Kabila: I should like first of all to
thank all those who have expressed their condolences
to me in person and, of course, to the people of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. I should also like
to thank all those who have encouraged the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to stay on track and to move on
in the way that it has chosen - the way towards peace.
At the same time, I would like to remind the
: Security Council that its unwavering support is needed
to accomplish this particular task in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. I would also like to reaffirm the
commitment of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and of myself as the President
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to seeing to it
that we reach those objectives that we have set - the
final objective being the democratization of the
political life of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate if I do not
add that this chain of events wiJJ come about only if the
forces that invaded the Democratic Republic of the
Congo are one way or the other forced to get out of it
so that it regains its national territorial integrity. All the
good words that have been expressed wiJJ not erase the
fact that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
under foreign occupation - an unjust occupation in
relation to all international Jaws - and that this
occupation must end as soon as possible.
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The President (spoke in Arabic): Since I have no
other speakers on my list, the Security Council has thus
concluded the present stage of its consideration of the
item on its agenda.
However, allow me at the end of this important
meeting to express once again to His Excellency
President Kabila the thanks of the members of the
Security Council for his initiative of coming to meet
with us and exchange views on the situation. The
S/PV.4271
members of the Council have listened with great
attention to President Kabila 's important statement - a
very clear message concerning his view of the future of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and ways and
means of re-establishing peace and security in the
Great Lakes region. The Security Council will be
following this matter with a great deal of attention
during the course of the month.
The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.
23
United Nations
(,-~ Security Council
~ ~ ~ dll ~
UCMANNEX:
S1200l/l28
Distr.: General
12 February 2001
Original: English
Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
I. Introduction
I. By its resolution 1332 (2000) of 14 December
2000, the Security Council decided to extend the
mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until
3. The present report is submitted in accordance
with these requests and reflects developments since the
Secretary-General's fifth report on MONUC of
6 December 2000 (S/2000/1156).
II. Political developments 15 June 2001, and endorsed the Secretary-General's
proposal to deploy additional United Nations military
4
_
observers to monitor and verify the implementation of President Laurent-Desire Kabila was shot and
fatally injured by a member of the presidential
bodyguard in Kinshasa on 16 January. I condemn
assassination and the use of force as a means of settling
political differences. It is gratifying that the other
parties concerned have refrained from taking advantage
of the situation.
the ceasefire and disengagement plans adopted by the
parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
(S/1999/815, annex).
2. In the same resolution, the Security Council
invited the Secretary-General to consult with the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the parties
concerned on the possibility of organizing in February
2001 a follow-up meeting between the signatories of
the Lusaka Agreement and members of the Council. In
addition, the Council requested the Secretary-General
to:
(a) Present a review of the implementation of
the current mandate of MONUC, including elements
for an updated concept of operations;
(b) Submit proposals on ways to address the
situation in the eastern provinces of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo;
(c) Submit proposals for a mechanism to follow
up on the withdrawal of foreign forces, the
disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, the
security of the borders of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, and
related issues.
01-24614 (E) 120201
*0124614*
5. On 17 January, Major General Joseph Kabila was
entrusted with the powers and responsibilities of Head
of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces armees
congolaises (FAC) by a joint meeting of ministers and
senior military officers. After the State funeral of
President Laurent-Desire Kabila, members of the
Congolese transitional parliament approved
unanimously the Government's nomination of Major
General Joseph Kabila as President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, both the rebel groups
and some elements of the Congolese political class
have rejected the emergence of Major General Kabila
as Head of State.
6. On 21 January, the Heads of State of Angola,
Namibia and Zimbabwe issued a communique in which
they undertook to maintain their respective military
forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
reinforce the security of the population, the
Government and foreign citizens, including personnel
S/2001/128
of the United Nations and non-governmental
organizations. The leaders appealed to all parties to the
Lusaka Agreement to refrain from any offensive
military movement; encouraged all parties to search for
a political solution to the conflict, expressing their
conviction that dialogue and consultation were the
paths to follow; and called upon the United Nations to
deploy additional military observers to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
7. President Joseph Kabila made positive overtures
to the international community by receiving, prior to
his inauguration on 26 January, members of the
diplomatic corps in Kinshasa, including the
ambassadors of Belgium, and the 25 African countries
and the permanent members of the Security Council. In
two meetings with my Special Representative,
Mr. Kamel Morjane, the new President stated that the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
wished to extend its cooperation to the United Nations
and counted upon MONUC to continue fulfilling its
mandate. The President also attached great importance
to the implementation of Council resolutions,
particularly those relating to the process of
disengagement, the withdrawal of foreign forces and
the inter-Congolese dialogue. Mr. Morjane reiterated
on my behalf to the President the full commitment of
the United Nations to assisting the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in restoring peace and sought
his support in creating the conditions necessary for the
deployment of additional United Nations military
observers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
8. On 26 January, in his first address to the
Congolese people, President Joseph Kabila outlined his
vision for achieving peace in his country and the
region. Calling for the immediate withdrawal of the
armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi from
Congolese territory, the President advocated a policy of
dialogue and reconciliation with neighbouring States.
The President committed himself to working, in
conjunction with his country's allies, to relaunch the
Lusaka Agreement and indicated that he would seek
national reconciliation by means of political dialogue.
In this regard, he expressed gratitude to OAU for its
involvement in the search for peace in his country, and
called for its further engagement in the process of cofacilitation
of the inter-Congolese dialogue. The
President envisage·d that once peace was consolidated
in the country, free and transparent elections would be
held.
2
9. On 31 January, President Kabila visited Paris,
where he met with President Chirac. After attending an
event organized by the Congress of the United States of
America on I February, President Kabila then visited
me in New York. I took the opportunity to extend to
him my condolences on his loss and to discuss the
action to be taken to advance the peace process.
President Kabila also met with the Security Council.
The record of that meeting appears in document
S/PV.4271.
10. On 7 February, President Kagame, who had also
attended the Congressional event in Washington, D.C.,
met with me at United Nations Headquarters. He then
met with the Security Council (see S/PV.4273).
11 . Following discussions among regional leaders,
the Joint Military Commission (JMC) is expected to
meet on 10 and 11 February in Lusaka, followed by a
meeting of the Political Committee on 11 and 12
February. A summit meeting is scheduled to take place
in Lusaka on 13 February. Preparations are also going
forward for the meeting of the Security Council with
the Political Committee in New York on 21 and
22 February.
Congolese rebel movements
12. Following news of the assassination of President
Laurent-Desire Kabila, the rebel movements denied
any involvement in the act. They also condemned the
use of violence and reaffirmed their commitment to the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. All rebel leaders called
for immediate progress in convening the interCongolese
dialogue stipulated in the Lusaka
Agreement and denounced the installation of Major
General Joseph Kabila as President. Rebel leaders were
unanimous in demanding the establishment of a
transitional government. In response to President
Joseph Kabila's national address on 26 January, rebel
leaders reiterated their call for the inter-Congolese
dialogue to be convened without delay or
conditionality.
13. On 17 January, three rebel movements merged to
form the Front de liberation du Congo (FLC). The new
movement comprises the Mouvement pour la liberation
du Congo (MLC}, the Rassemblement congolais pour
la democratie-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-ML) and
RCD-National (RCD-N). The merger envisages a
single military force and strategy vis-a-vis the
government side. The current president of FLC is
Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the former leader of MLC.
Although Mr. Wamba dia Wamba was said to have
been appointed as vice-president, reports suggest that
he has been excluded from the FLC leadership
following his denouncement of the merger as an
agreement of military convenience.
14. Further consolidation on the rebel side has been
indicated by a senior member of RCD, Mr. Bizima
Karaha, who has announced that RCD and FLC share a
common vision on political issues which may lead to
the formation of a common front under the same
political and military leadership. He predicted that
unification would take place within the near future .
These developments represent the latest of many
efforts on the part of the rebel groups to achieve
unification.
Inter-Congolese dialogue
15. During the reporting period, Sir Ketumile Masire
has remained committed to fulfilling his
responsibilities as neutral facilitator of the interCongolese
dialogue. He has continued to enjoy the
explicit support of the Congolese rebel movements and
main political parties and civil society.
16. On 16 December, at the request of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
President Bongo sponsored a meeting between
President Laurent-Desire Kabila and Congolese
opposition groups. Although President Kabila travelled
to Libreville, the meeting did not take place owing to
the non-attendance of the opposition invitees.
17. While the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has not formally withdrawn its
rejection of Sir Ketumile Masire as the neutral
facilitator, there have been increasing indications that it
is prepared to accept the appointment of a francophone
co-facilitator to work with S_ir Ketumile. President
Joseph Kabila appeared to endorse the arrangement
and, in his inaugural speech, requested OAU· to- help
revive the peace process, particularly with regard to the
designation of a co-facilitator. However, the leader of
RCD later described the President's reference to cofacilitation
as a violation of the Lusaka Agreement,
which does not provide for such a function.
18. Political parties in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, which have hitherto been silent owing to
S/2001/128
the continuing ban on their ac11v11les, are becoming
vocal in calling for implementation of the Lusaka
Agreement, and specifically for the convening of the
inter-Congolese dialogue. They generally support the
appointment of a francophone co-facilitator. On 29
January, President Joseph Kabila met with
representatives of four principal political parties in
Kinshasa.
III. Military developments
19. Though much of the country has remained quiet
during the reporting period, particularly over the past
three weeks, military action was observed in both
Equateur province and Katanga in December and early
January 200 I. Scattered fighting, often involving
armed groups, has been reported from the Kivus.
Situation in Katanga
20. In late November, following attacks by
government forces (FAC) in Katanga, RCD and the
Rwandan People's Army (RPA) launched a counterattack
which culminated in their capture of Pweto on
6 December. Thousands of combatants and refugees
fled into Zambia to escape the fighting. Figures from
the Zambian authorities indicate that over 5,000
combatants crossed the border. Subsequently, some
3,000 FAC and 200 Zimbabwean soldiers were
disarmed and escorted back into the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Approximately 1,925
combatants, belonging to the Burundian Front pour la
Defence de la Democratie (FDD), evaded disarmament
by using barges to cross Lake Mweru and enter the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. At present, some
144 disarmed soldiers remain in northern Zambia; 115
are seeking refugee status; and 29 are under
investigation for membership of the former Rwandan
Armed Forces (ex-FAR), Interahamwe or FDD.
21. Following a meeting in Kinshasa on 22 December
between President Laurent-Desire Kabila, President
Mugabe and President Nujoma, President Mugabe
warned that the rebels would be forced out of Pweto if
they did not leave voluntarily. Subsequently, there was
a build-up of Government and allied forces · with
reports of over 2,000 Angolan, 600 Zimbabwean and
3,000 FAC troops deployed between Kasenga and
3
S/2001/128
Pweto. On the rebel side, six RCD battalions are said to
be holding Pweto with two RPA brigades in support.
22. During December and early January, there were
numerous claims of ceasefire violations and allegations
from both sides that the other was preparing for an
offensive. On 28 December, the Permanent
Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations,
claiming his country had acted in self-defence, wrote to
the President of the Security Council to complain of an
ongoing campaign of misinformation directed against
his country (S/2000/ 1244). The Permanent
Representative reiterated his Government's offer of a
200-kilometre disengagement and its preparedness to
withdraw from Pweto if MONUC deployed there. On
the same day, the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to the United Nations wrote to the President of
the Council to inform him that a brigade of RPA,
supported by members of the Uniao Nacional para a
Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), had launched
attacks on Katanga from Zambian territory
(S/2000/1245).
23 . Since early January, the MONUC Force
Commander, General Mountaga Diallo, has been
discussing with the Governments and military
authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Rwanda, and with RCD, the Rwandan offer to
withdraw from Pweto if MONUC deployed a military
observer team to the town. MONUC has in fact
prepared a team to be deployed to Pweto. However,
despite encouraging signals from the Governments of
both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Rwanda, discussions on the specific modalities of the
agreement are still continuing with the military
authorities of both sides. RCD has insisted that its
concerns should be addressed separately from those of
Rwanda.
Fighting in Equateur province
24. In mid_-December, MLC began a military
offensive across a broad front in northern Equateur,
capturing Imese and Befale. Government and allied
forces reinforced their positions around Mbandaka. In
mid-January, MLC forces attacking Bolomba were
repulsed after heavy fighting. Since 18 January, the
military situation has become static, with no reports of
significant fighting.
4
Eastern provinces
25 . The security situation in parts of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo remains highly
volatile. RCD has complained that armed groups
continue to launch numerous attacks in the Kivus.
Although the armed groups responsible for these
attacks are not signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement, there are persistent reports of their
receiving arms and training from FAC. (The situation
in the eastern provinces is explored in more detail in
paras. 85-88 below.)
26. In the Ituri area, ethnic tension between the
Lendu and Hema communities increased dramatically
on 19 January when Lendu tribesmen attacked a
Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) and an RCDML
position at Bunia airfield. The fighting resulted in
serious casualties and was followed by attacks mounted
by the Hema population on Lendu civilians (see paras.
56-57 below).
27. MONUC dispatched a military and humanitarian
team to Kampala and Bunia on 24 January. In
Kampala, the Ugandan Army Commander accepted
that UPDF was responsible for the security of the
civilian population in the Bunia area and undertook to
make every effort to contain the violence. Since 22
January, MONUC military observers in Bunia have
reported the situation in the town to be tense but with
UPDF in effective control. MONUC is discussing with
the humanitarian agencies follow-up action aimed at
improving relations between the two communities.
28. Concern has also been expressed over repeated
attacks on the Banyamulenge population in South
Kivu. This matter is dealt with in more detail in
paragraph 59 below.
Kisangani
29. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304
(2000), Rwanda and Uganda have continued to keep
their forces at a distance of some I 00 kilometres from
Kisangani. However, RCD military elements have
remained in the city, with its leaders maintaining that
security concerns do not allow them to withdraw their
forces before the arrival of United Nations troops . The
area around Kisangani has been de facto divided into
quadrants: RCD occupies the south and west; MLC and
UPDF the north-west and the north; and UPDF solely
the east. This dispersal is generally respected, except
for isolated skirmishes usually between RCD and
MLC/RCD-N in the diamond mining area to the north
of the city.
Implementation of disengagement
plans
30. The military chiefs of staff of the parties, with the
exception of MLC, ratified the detailed sub-plans for
disengagement and redeployment in Harare on
6 December. The MLC delegate had received
instructions not to sign the document, as it did not
contain a reference to the inter-Congolese dialogue.
Subsequently, a spokesman for RCD indicated that its
forces, too, would not comply with the disengagement
plans unless President Laurent-Desire Kabila opened
talks on the formation of a transitional government and
disarmed pro-government militias in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
31 . Pursuant to the Harare disengagement plan,
MONUC received notification from Angola, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda,
Uganda and Zimbabwe that executive orders had been
issued to their military forces to begin the
disengagement process. No notification has yet been
received from the rebel movements.
32. The Harare disengagement plan stipulated that
the military forces of the parties would undertake a 15-
kilometre disengagement over a two-week period
starting 21 January. None of the parties has yet
complied. There are indications that the
implementation of the disengagement plans has
become dependent on progress in convening the interCongolese
dialogue envisaged by the Lusaka
Agreement, as the Congolese rebel movements insist
that the two processes - military and political - are
inextricably linked. Nonetheless, MONUC is
proceeding on the assumption that the parties will
indeed carry out their disengagement plan.
Withdrawal of foreign forces
33. On 9 January, President Laurent-Desire Kabila
brokered talks in Libreville between President Buyoya
and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, the leader of FDD,
the main Burundian rebel group. Subsequently,
Leonard She Okintundu, Foreign Minister of the
S/2001/128
Democratic Republic of the Congo, informed the
Kinshasa diplomatic corps that both parties had agreed
to withdraw their forces from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. On 23 January, FDD made it known that
the death of President Laurent-Desire Kabila had not
affected its willingness to continue talks with the
Burundian Government. In a statement, the Burundian
Government confirmed that its meetings with FDD had
been successful and would be pursued.
34. Resolutions 1304 (2000) and 1332 (2000), in
which the Security Council demanded the withdrawal
of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo without further
delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Lusaka
Agreement and the Kampala disengagement plan, have
yet to be implemented in full. Reports indicate the
presence of approximately 20,000 RPA and 10,000
UPDF troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and there has been no clear indication of any
significant reduction in force levels. Senior Rwandan
officials have continued to emphasize their country's
security concerns, and to demand that measures be
taken to disarm and demobilize the armed groups in the
eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo before the withdrawal of RPA proceeds.
Ugandan officials, including President Museveni, have
recently indicated that, following the defeat of Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels, the underlying
objective of their intervention has been achieved.
35. On the government side, it is estimated that there
are approximately 12,000 Zimbabwean, 7,000 Angolan
and 2,000 Namibian troops deployed in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Since my last report, the force
levels of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) allies have increased in response
to the military reversals in Katanga and the security
concerns in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi following the
assassination of President Laurent-Desire Kabila.
There are persistent allegations from Rwanda that FAC
contains large numbers of ex-FAR and Interahamwe
fighters.
IV. Cooperation with the Joint
Military Commission (JMC)
36. The operations of JMC have continued to be
hindered by a lack of resources. OAU has advised JMC
s
S/2001/128
that it is unlikely that there will be sufficient funds to
cover envisaged requirements this year.
37. On 26 January, the OAU secretariat announced
that Brigadier Njuki Mwaniki of Kenya had been
appointed as the new Chairman of JMC. Brigadier
Mwaniki assumed his duties in Lusaka at the end of
January and has undertaken a briefing mission to
Kinshasa and other locations.
V. Status of MONUC deployment
Current deployment
38. As of 8 February, MONUC had a total of 200
military personnel. Within the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, in addition to Kinshasa, military liaison
officers are deployed to the headquarters of the rebel
movements (Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and the four
regional joint military commissions (Boende, Kabalo,
Kabinda and Lisala). Military observer teams are also
stationed in six other locations (Gemena, Isiro,
Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani and Mbandaka). In
addition, a team has been deployed at Nchelenge in
northern Zambia. Twenty-three liaison officers are
stationed in the capitals of surrounding countries,
including 14 officers who provide planning support to
JMC in Lusaka. Finally, MONUC maintains one
military liaison officer with OAU in Addis Ababa (see
map and annex).
39. MONUC has established three sector
headquarters for the implementation of the Kampala/
Harare disengagement plans. The first, with a small
staff of military and civilian officers, was opened in
Kisangani in June. Since my last report, sector
headquarters have been opened in Mbandaka and
Kananga. MONUC logistic bases necessary to support
the deployment of observers and troops are operational
in Kinshasa, Goma and Bangui in the Central African
Republic.
Security of MONUC personnel
40. The parties have continued to provide generally
satisfactory security for MONUC military and civilian
personnel. In Bunia, UPDF are responsible for
protecting MONUC premises. In Kinshasa, the
Government has, since 15 December, assigned 35
civilian policemen for the protection of the premises
6
and assets of MONUC at its headquarters, logistic base
and Kinshasa airport. Despite the uncertainty created
by the assassination of President Laurent-Desire
Kabila, the capital has remained calm.
41. In South Kivu, the frequency of attacks by armed
groups has forced international agencies and nongovernmental
organizations to suspend many of their
operations. The threat posed by the armed groups
precludes the deployment of MONUC military
observers in the eastern provinces at this time.
Cooperation of the parties
42. Since 30 September, weekly meetings between
MONUC and the Commissariat general charge des
affaires de la MONUC have been held to assess the
compliance by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo with the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) provisions. This improved liaison
has continued to yield positive results; and past
difficulties over customs clearances, exemption of
direct and indirect taxes, fuel surcharges, authorization
for a frequency and telecommunications network and
facilities at Kinshasa airport have been resolved
harmoniously. Joint MONUC/Government
reconnaissance missions to Mbandaka and Kananga
have also been completed.
43 . The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has yet to replace the system of flight
notification on a case-by-case basis with a system for
advance notification en bloc, an arrangement that is
essential for the management of the large fleet of
aircraft required for MONUC phase II deployment. The
Commissariat has assured MONUC that such a system
will be introduced once phase II deployment
commences. Nevertheless, there has been a more
positive attitude and lifting of restrictions, in particular
the obligation to land at a neutral airport during a
return trip from rebel-controlled areas and the
requirement to route all MONUC flights through
Kinshasa.
44. In field locations, MONUC military observers
have encountered occasional limitations on their
freedom of movement imposed by local commanders.
However, the greatest impediment to the movement of
military observers is the nature of the terrain, since
most routes become impassable more than 25
kilometres from any MONUC base.
VI. Humanitarian aspects
45. Owing to the continuing fighting in the Equateur
region, North and South Kivu, Katanga and Province
Orientale, the latest estimate concerning the number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is 2 million, and this figure is
expected to rise further. Added to the refugee
population, the total affected population in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is over 2,335,000.
Fewer than half of these displaced individuals receive
humanitarian assistance. There are thought to be some
640,000 IDPs in North Kivu, over 350,000 in South
Kivu, 305,000 in Katanga and 300,000 in Equateur. In
the Kivus alone, this number has increased more than
fourfold over the last 12 months. As a result of violent
confrontations between Lema and Hendu tribes in the
Ituri district in Province Orientale, some 12,500 people
are said to have fled Bunia for the outlying countryside
and the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assesses that
another 6,000-9,000 have sought refuge in Uganda
over the past few weeks. The refugee population in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is estimated at
332,000. Non-assisted Angolan and Rwandan refugees
number 67,000 and 48,000, respectively. The assisted
refugees include people from the Sudan, Uganda and
Burundi.
46. Following fighting during the year 2000,
Congolese refugees have arrived in the Betou,
Impfondo and Loukolela areas in the Congo. It is
estimated that 100,000 refugees from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are now in the Congo, of which
12 per cent are considered vulnerable. UNHCR plans
to provide emergency assistance to these refugees to
facilitate their integration into their new communities.
The World Food Programme (WFP) is expected to
provide essential needs (rice, beans, salt) for a period
of six months. Though the security situation has been
relatively calm, any deterioration could hamper aid
efforts.
47. As a result of recent fighting in the Pweto region
(Katanga), a considerable number of people have
sought refuge in neighbouring Zambia; about 9,000 of
them are hosted in a refugee camp near Kala in
Zambia's northern province, and a further 15,000 have
settled in villages in the same area.
48. It is estimated that there are some 16 million
people with critical food needs throughout the
S/2001/128
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The main reasons
behind the food security crisis include prolonged
displacement, the intensification of the war resulting in
the rupturing of traditional sources of supply, and a
staggering increase in prices coupled with a decline in
purchasing power. As previously reported, the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAQ) estimates that 70 per cent of the 6 million-?
million people living in the capital city cannot afford
$1 a day for food. In addition, children are hardest hit
by chronic malnutrition, especially in the major urban
centres of Kinshasa, Kabinda, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi,
Mbandaka and Kisangani.
49. The health situation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo has continued to deteriorate with the
continuing neglect of health facilities, the lack of
essential medication, and the difficulty of dispatching
medical supplies to the regions of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The health system is also
seriously afflicted by the lack of equipment,
insufficient training of medical personnel, and a
significant lack of funding. In addition, it is estimated
that only 3 7 per cent of the population has access to
essential medicine and 47 per cent to potable water.
Mother and child mortality rates remain very high, and
overall vaccination coverage is low (tuberculosis: 30
per cent; polio: 22 per cent; measles: 24 per cent).
Inadequate sanitary and hygiene conditions, as well as
malnutrition, have created a fertile environment for the
spread of diseases. In Pweto, some 4,700 cases of
cholera with 360 deaths were recorded during the year
2000. New diseases are also emerging, among which
haemorrhagic fever and monkey pox pose the greatest
threat. Finally, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
prevalence among the population aged 15-49 years is
of the order of 5 per cent, and a total of 1.1 million
peuph: are infected. Oi:m:rally speaking, standard
health indicators today have not improved since the
survey carried out by the Health Ministry and the
World Health Organization (WHO) in 1998.
50. Last November, a consolidated appeal was
launched for a total of $37 million. To date, only 30.5
per cent of the amount has been received.
51. After the United Nations Inter-agency Mission
that came to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
November 2000 submitted its report in New York and
following further discussions in the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC), it was decided that the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
7
S/2001/128
Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo would also be the
Humanitarian Coordinator for the country in order to
ensure the most effective response to the situation. At
the subnational level, the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations
Secretariat (OCHA) will continue to maintain a
Coordinator for the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo based in Goma. In a related development, the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of
the United Nations Secretariat will be opening an
office in Lubumbashi.
52. In South Kivu, the National Immunization Days
2001 are being prepared, following the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF)/WHO workshop on
national planning which was held in Goma in midDecember.
The workshop planned by the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat to take place in Kisangani from 9 to
12 December was postponed owing to lack of
governmental participation.
53. The Governments of the Republic of Congo and
the Central African Republic have continued to express
concern that the fighting in Equateur, especially in the
immediate border areas, is affecting their stability. In
particular, refugees continue to enter both countries
and maritime traffic on the Ubangui River has been
interrupted causing heavy economic losses. There have
also been persistent rumours of MLC elements
infiltrating down the Ubangui on the west bank towards
the confluence of the Congo and Ubangui rivers.
VII. Human rights
54. The human rights situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo remains a cause of serious
concern. Numerous human rights violations have been
continuing with impunity, compounded by renewed
outbreaks of political and ethnic tensions. Some of
these take the form of clashes between various armed
groups and ethnic groups, including the Hema and
Lendu in the Ituri district, and the Banyamulenge in
South Kivu. The creation by the Government of armed
self-defence groups (Forces d' Auto-defense Populaire
(FAP)) has also caused unease.
55 . Widespread killings and the destruction of
property, extrajudiciary executions and forced
disappearances, arbitrary arrests and illegal detention
8
of local staff members of international organizations,
civil society, business leaders and foreigners living in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as
serious restrictions on the freedom of the press and of
movement, have characterized the situation recently.
56. From 29 to 31 January, a delegation of the Field
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights undertook a mission to Bunia. The
delegation was able to collect first-hand information
and interview eyewitnesses. On the basis of these
preliminary findings, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights team confirmed
that a massacre of ethnic Lendu had been carried out
by ethnic Hema militias in Bunia on 19 January. At
least 200 people were killed and some 40 wounded.
The majority of the victims were civilians, including
women and children. Some of them were killed with
machetes and some decapitated. Some of the bodies
were thrown into open latrines. UPDF troops stood by
during the killings and failed to protect the civilians.
57. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mr. Roberto Garret6n, issued on 26 January a press
release condemning the massacre in Bunia. He called
on the Government of Uganda and FLC to order their
troops immediately to protect non-combatants and
civilians and to launch investigations of the abovementioned
incident with a view to identifying those
responsible and bringing them to justice.
58. In addition, serious human rights violations were
also reported in the Kivus following the repeated
attacks and retaliation by various armed groups. In
Bukavu, the local authorities have arrested
representatives of civil society and other civilians.
Reports have been received that some of the arrested
persons have been tortured.
59. Serious inter-ethnic tensions have also been
reported in South Kivu Province. According to some
reports, massacres of the Banyamulenge population
have taken place. Human rights staff from MONUC
intend to visit the area to evaluate the Situation on the
ground, sensitize the local authorities on the alarming
reports received and propose further action to be taken
to resolve the crisis.
60. In the Government-controlled areas, the
representatives of civil society are also subjected to
harassment, arbitrary arrest and illegal detention.
Recently in Kinshasa, four leaders of the civil society,
and members of a political party and of business were
arrested and detained without cause. Journalists
working for private media can no longer carry out their
functions freely. A recent decision of the Minister of
Communications has prohibited the publication of
more than I 00 local newspapers for non-compliance
with government legislation.
61. Cases of arbitrary arrests, summary and
extrajudiciary executions are still frequently reported.
A recent example is the case of Commander Masasu, a
senior army officer arrested for allegedly planning a
coup against the late President. The Government has
continued to deny reports that Commander Masasu was
executed in December. Several other military personnel
and civilians from the Kivus and others close to
Masasu have also been arrested and detained. These
included a local staff member of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
in the Congo who was arrested in Kinshasa on 3
January and held by DEMIAP (Detection militaire des
activites anti-patrie) until his release on 10 January,
with serious restrictions on his freedom of movement.
62. The Military Court continues to apply the death
penalty. Many defendants are being arbitrarily
condemned to death. Recently, on 11 December, the
bodyguard of the Chief of Staff of the Police, was
condemned to death by this special court. He was
accused of having broken into the residence of the
Governor of the Central Bank of the Congo even
though he insisted that he was innocent. He was
executed the following day with seven others from the
Central Prison of Kinshasa without having been given a
chance to appeal according to conventional
international human rights norms. However, in January
another suspect was arrested for the same offence.
63. Continuing human rights violations, coupled with
the absence of democratic reforms, have brought the
country to a political standstill. Even as many members
of the opposition are being freed from detention
centres, many leaders of the political parties live
abroad to avoid harassment and restrictions._
64. Against this background, there have been two
positive developments since the visit in October 2000
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Mrs. Robinson, and the commitment made then
by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to improving the human rights situation. Firstly,
the Government released 900 detainees, including over
S/2001/128
200 political prisoners and journalists. Secondly, the
new President has announced that respect for human
rights, the security of the individual and of property,
the reform of military justice and the constitutionality
of governmental action will be the priorities of his
Administration. Effective immediately, the jurisdiction
of the military courts will be restricted to matters
falling under the code of military justice.
VIII. Child protection
65. The situation relating to the recruitment of
children into armed forces and various warring groups
has not improved significantly during the reporting
period. Owing to the growing protest of nongovernmental
organizations, UNICEF and MONUC,
RCD has halted its military recruitment campaign in
urban areas. However, RCD has contested the
allegation that it was recruiting child soldiers and
indicated that the young people had joined the
movement of their own accord. They were not
deployed to the front lines. However, information
received from other sources indicates that recruitment
is continuing in rural areas of Kivu, including Kahele,
Idjwi Island, Musongati and Rugano. It has also been
reported that all newly recruited children are
transported to camps in Masisi for military training.
The Mushaki camp is believed to have received over
3,000 newly recruited young soldiers, more than 60 per
cent of whom are under age 18. MONUC has sought
and received from RCD permission to visit the camps.
It is hoped that better RCD cooperation with MONUC
and UNICEF can lead to the implementation of RCD's
15 May decision to start demobilizing child soldiers.
66. As indicated in my 6 December 2000 report, a
considerable number of Congolese children were taken
from the Bunia, Beni and Butembo region, apparently
for military training in Uganda (para. 75). Concern has
been expressed at the possibility that these children
will be deployed back to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo as soldiers. As the present report was being
finalized, information was received that 600 children
would be transferred to the custody of humanitarian
organizations next week.
67. The late President Kabila had granted access to
the military camps for the 1mt1allon of the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.
This is a first step towards the implementation of the 9
June decree on demobilization. UNICEF has
9
S/2001/128
established a working agreement with the local branch
of an international NGO, the Bureau International
Catholique de l'Enfance (BICE), as the major partner
for the process, which will be undertaken in
collaboration with the Government.
IX. Financial aspects
68. The General Assembly, by its resolution 54/260 A
of 7 April 2000, granted me commitment authority,
with assessment, in the amount of $200 million to
cover the Mission's immediate requirements and to
enable it to initiate logistic preparations for the phased
deployment of the formed military personnel. By its
subsequent resolution 54/260 B of 15 June 2000, the
Assembly, taking into account the amount of $58.7
million committed for MONUC during the period
ending 30 June 2000, authorized me to use during the
period beginning I July 2000 the amount of $141.3
million representing the balance of the commitment
authority provided for MONUC in its resolution
54/260 A.
69. Should the Security Council adopt the draft
revised concept of operations for MONUC contained in
paragraphs 71 to 84 below, the related immediate costs
will be met from within resources already approved by
the General Assembly for the current financial period.
With regard to the financial period 2001-2002
beginning on I July 200 I, I shall seek the necessary
resources for MONUC from the Assembly during its
resumed fifty-fifth session.
70. As at 31 January 2001, unpaid assessed
contributions to the MONUC special account amounted
to $79.7 million. The total outstanding assessed
contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that
date amounted to $2,652.4 million.
X. Next steps
. Updated concept of operations
71 . On the basis of the experience gained since
September 1999, when MONUC was first deployed to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Secretariat
has developed a revised draft concept of operations for
a deployment of military personnel to monitor and
verify actions taken by the parties in compliance with
the disengagement and redeployment plan they signed
JO
at Harare on 6 December. The updated draft concept
was elaborated during a visit of Department of
Peacekeeping Operations planners to MONUC between
8 and 19 January.
72. Given the fragile ceasefire, the size of the country
and the difficulties of access and mobility beyond
major towns, the concept of operations is based upon a
gradual build-up of capability that encourages the
parties to cease hostilities, positions MONUC to
respond in a timely and effective manner once the
parties begin the disengagement and redeployment
process, and minimizes risks to United Nations
personnel.
73 . Simultaneously, the measures proposed to be
taken by MONUC can set in place the conditions for
subsequent expansion of the mission for possible later
tasks in the eastern provinces.
74. The revised concept of operations has four
phases. During the preparatory phase, which is now
under way, MONUC will make maximum use of its
existing resources to build on its presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by deploying
further military observer teams and redeploying others
to establish sector headquarters at Kisangani,
Mbandaka, Kananga and Kalemie.
75 . These sector headquarters are an integral part of
the command, control and communications
infrastructure that will enable MONUC to coordinate
the additional military observer teams required for
verification and monitoring of the disengagement and
redeployment. The four regional joint military
commissions ( currently located at Lisala, Boende,
Kabinda and Kabalo) will be relocated with the
MONUC sector headquarters to facilitate the close
liaison, coordination and confidence-building required
to effect the verification and monitoring process. The
regional joint military commissions have requested that
MONUC provide them with limited logistic support to
enable them to fulfil their functions .
76. The draft concept proposed in the present report
envisages the deployment of up to 550 military
observers. It will also be necessary to deploy up to
1,900 armed personnel to guard equipment, facilities
and supplies located at the sector headquarters and
support bases. Two riverine units totalling some 400
troops are also envisaged, as well as the necessary
rotary and fixed-wing air assets. At least initially, all
deployment and sustainment are expected to take place
through air transportation. The use of specialized
support services, whether provided by military units or
through commercial contracts, is also envisaged. The
total military personnel required will therefore amount
to approximately 3,000 officers and other ranks.
77. It is important to stress that the function of the
1,900 armed personnel will be exclusively to guard
United Nations facilities, equipment and supplies
against tampering or pilfering. They will not be able to
extract other United Nations personnel at risk, or
accompany humanitarian convoys, nor will they be
able to extend protection to the local population.
United Nations personnel will be withdrawn from any
situation where undue risk appears to be developing.
The guard units may be able to assist in any such
evacuation.
78. The Harare disengagement plan allows two weeks
for the completion of the verification phase, which
begins once the parties have disengaged and moved to
designated intermediate and new defensive positions.
Thereafter MONUC is to conduct verification and
monitoring of the process sequentially across the four
areas identified within the plan, in blocks of 14 days,
for which an additional 32 four-person military
observer teams will be required. These teams will
initially be based at the sector headquarter sites. They
will also be deployed to conduct verification of the
redeployment, predominantly by air, employing a mix
of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft.
79. The military observer teams currently deployed at
the 13 team sites within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo contribute significantly to stability in their
immediate vicinity and will remain in place to continue
their liaison and reporting functions. Where access
permits, they will also conduct verification and
monitoring tasks .
80. Significant resources will be required to support
completion of the verification phase· and enable
MONUC to maintain effective monitoring thereafter.
Appropriate medical facilities, air assets (including full
air operations and ground support), communications,
general support services and administrative staff will
be deployed to each of the sector headquarters.
81. In order to maximize the confidence-building
aspects of the MONUC military deployment, it would
also be my intention to deploy civilian staff, including
political, human rights, humanitarian, public
information and child protection officers, to the sector
S/2001/128
headquarters as the operation proceeded. These civilian
officers would need to be provided with appropriate
support and equipment, including vehicles and
communications facilities.
82. Once the initial redeployment verification is
complete, MONUC will continue to monitor the 27
new defensive positions to be occupied by the
FAC/SADC allies and MLC/UPDF and the 15
intermediate positions of RCD/RPA. A second
redeployment of RCD/RPA will follow, under MONUC
verification, resulting in the consolidation of these
forces at 12 new defensive positions.
83. Upon completion of the disengagement and
redeployment operation, MONUC will be positioned
and capable of monitoring continuously the parties'
forces occupying a total of 39 new defensive positions.
In addition, MONUC will need the capability to deploy
military observers to investigate specific incidents,
report on alleged violations and monitor the activities
of any sizeable forces not declared as part of the
disengagement plan but within 50 kilometres of the
disengagement zone. It is anticipated that a further 38
military observer teams will be required to sustain this
prolonged monitoring phase. In the event that RPA
withdraws some of its units to any of its 11 designated
new defensive positions, further observer teams may be
required to provide constant monitoring of up to 53
separate positions. If required, four small coordination
centres, subordinated to the four sector headquarters,
will be established to ease control of the increased
military observer activity.
84. It is intended to deploy river boat units, probably
at Kinshasa and Mbandaka, to build confidence by
showing a United Nations presence, enhancing the
flexibility of MONUC re-supply activities and assisting
with the movement of military observers where access
is otherwise restricted. An additional benefit could be
the stimulation of trade along the river. MONUC also
intends to put in place a public information capability
that will enable it to explain and clarify MONUC's
intentions and activities and to respond in a more
timely and effective manner to statements by the
parties.
Deployment of infantry units
85. In paragraph 8 of its resolution 1332 (2000), the
Security Council expressed its readiness to support the
II
S/2001/128
Secretary-General, as soon as he considered that
conditions allowed it, in the deployment of infantry
units in support of the military observers in Kisangani
and Mbandaka in due course and, subject to the
proposals submitted by him under paragraph 7 of that
resolution, to other areas he might deem necessary,
including possibly to Goma or Bukavu.
86. MONUC will continue to assess the conditions
for infantry deployment in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, within the context of paragraphs 7 and 8 of
Security Council resolution 1332 (2000). The situation
in this regard is expected to become clearer following
the successful completion of the present disengagement
and redeployment plan, and a separate report will be
submitted at that time.
Situation in eastern provinces and
border areas
87. The situation in the eastern Democratic Republic
of the Congo, in particular the Kivus, remains volatile.
The present conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and its predecessor in 1996, began in the
Kivus. The territories are now home to the RCD rebels,
RPA troops and several militia groups. They are highly
militarized zones and have been the site of widespread
suffering, humanitarian deprivation and human rights
violations. The economy and society of the Kivus have
been devastated and long-standing ethnic tensions have
been inflamed by repeated heavy flows of refugees and
displaced persons.
88. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement acknowledged
the concerns of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi over the
presence of the armed groups which threaten the
security of their borders, and recognized that the
withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops would be
linked directly to progress made in the disarmament
and demobilization of the militias. The Agreement
called for a mechanism for the disarming of militias
and armed groups, including the genocidal forces.
89. The issue was raised in the summit meeting
convened by President Qaddafi in November 2000 (see
S/2000/1156, para. 14). Subsequently, following the
Maputo summit of 16 October, two meetings of
Defence Ministers took place in Pretoria to consider
plans put forward by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Rwanda. However, both plans merely
assumed that a United Nations force on the borders of
12
Rwanda and Uganda would have the responsibility for
disarmament of the armed groups.
90. MONUC has assessed that a peacekeeping force
on its own is unlikely to achieve the desired result of
restoring peace, security and stability to the Kivus.
Additional efforts are required to repair relations
between ethnic groups in the Kivus, ensure respect for
human rights, address the humanitarian disaster
engulfing the population, and resolve land and
citizenship issues.
Establishment of a permanent
follow-up mechanism
91 . In my last report, I detailed the intense diplomatic
activity and personal initiatives of Heads of State in the
region and commended their dedication and
perseverance in efforts to put the peace process back on
track. I observed, however, that broad agreement on the
key questions had so far not been achieved, and
expressed the view that the best way to achieve such
agreement would be to build on the valuable diplomatic
initiatives taken and to provide a framework and a
stimulus for their follow-up. As noted in paragraph 2
above, the Security Council requested me to report
further on this matter.
92. My consideration of the need for the
establishment of a mechanism to draw together the
various diplomatic initiatives and pursue workable
arrangements came at a time when little progress was
being made in the peace process. While the underlying
problems at the heart of the conflict have not yet been
resolved, the positive signals given by the new
President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
regarding the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement
and his openness towards the international community
give reason to hope that the goodwill that he has
demonstrated can be translated into progress in
convening the inter-Congolese dialogue, implementing
the Harare disengagement plan and addressing the
complex issue of the armed groups. In addition, an
increased level of bilateral contacts have been taking
place that could do much to build confidence between
the parties and lead to tangible results. The direct talks
between President Buyoya and the leader of FDD, and
between President Kabila and President Kagame in
Washington, D.C., on 1 February, are an indication of a
more positive approach by the parties concerned and
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in particular.
93. I believe that sufficient time should be allowed
for the new positive .spirit and encouraging contacts to
bear fruit. Accordingly, I believe it would be prudent to
delay submitting proposals for the establishment of a
new mechanism within the peace process and to keep
the situation under review. I encourage the Heads of
State in the region to pursue their initiatives to
reactivate the peace process.
Strengthening the MONUC human
rights component
94. The main activities of MONUC's human rights
component so far have been monitoring and reporting
government activities. With a view to expanding its
activities, MONUC, together with the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
has been designing programmes aimed at building the
capacity of the justice and prison systems of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as technical
assistance to civil society. Once implemented, these
would help the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to meet its human rights
obligations under the Constitution of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the international human
rights instruments it has ratified.
95. Additional programmes include raising human
rights awareness and stimulating debate; the exercise
of individual rights; strengthening civil society; and the
integration of human rights principles into the activities
of the international community in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. MONUC also intends to deploy
human rights officers to the military sector
headquarters identified in paragraph 74 above, as well
as in Bukavu, Kindu, Gbadolite, Kananga and Boende.
XI. Observations and
recommendations
96. The tumultuous events in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, tragic as they were, have
transformed the situation in a way that gives grounds
for cautious hope. The successive visits of President
Joseph Kabila and President Kagame, first to
Washington, D.C., and then to United Nations
Headquarters to meet with me and with the Security
S/2001/128
Council, can be seen as marking the beginning of a
new stage in the consideration by the United Nations of
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
97. I am heartened by the calm that has descended on
the confrontation lines that divide the hostile forces in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Almost since it
was signed, in July and August 1999, the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement has been subjected to regular, and
sometimes large-scale, violations by the parties that
signed it. That fact that no significant violations of the
ceasefire have been reported since mid-January is in
itself a cause of satisfaction.
98. Equally hopeful are the signs, which await
clarification, that the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo may be willing to accept the
role of Sir Ketumile Masire, the neutral facilitator
appointed pursuant to the Lusaka Agreement to help
bring together all Congolese to discuss the governance
of their country. When Sir Ketumile can resume his
essential functions in this regard, and whether he will
do so in collaboration with a co-facilitator, or some
other form of high-level assistance, are questions that
remain to be resolved. I look forward to further
developments in this matter, and would be grateful for
any advice and assistance that OAU may be able to
offer. The general liberalization of the political climate
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would do
much to set a positive tone for this wide-ranging
dialogue.
99. Amid these grounds for cautious optimism, the
United Nations should be ready to advance, at least
with small steps. The revised concept of operations,
which I propose to the Security Council in paragraphs
71 to 84 above, is designed to equip MONUC to assist
the parties in carrying out the disengagement of their
forces along a confrontation line that currently divides
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in half. A
successful disengagement, under the monitoring and
verification of United Nations military observers,
would be an important advance towards the goals that
have been endorsed both by the Lusaka Agreement and
by the Council. I refer to the early withdrawal of all
foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
100. I therefore recommend to the Security Council
the adoption of the draft concept I have proposed, and
call for the support of Council members and troopcontributing
countries as we take the steps necessary to
13
S/2001/128
carry it out. I also recommend that MONUC be
strengthened with the addition of the necessary
additional civilian staff, including a reinforced human
rights component, as outlined above.
IOI. The commitment to peace that President Joseph
Kabila has already demonstrated is welcome for many
reasons. Respect for the ceasefire could permit
humanitarian agencies to gain access to all populations
in need. Greater progress could be achieved in
promoting human rights and the rights of children,
including child soldiers, once the fighting has stopped.
It would also be possible to address outbreaks of
communal violence not directly related to the main
conflict, such as those in lturi and South Kivu.
102. I deplore the outbreaks of intercommunal
violence in Bunia and in South Kivu. I call on the local
authorities in each case to find peaceful ways of
resolving the issues, to permit secure humanitarian
access as soon as possible, and to refrain from taking
any action that might inflame those issues. I also call
on them to cooperate with MONUC human rights
officers and the Special Rapporteur in any investigation
that might be launched into these outbreaks of
violence.
I 03. The involvement of regional Heads of State in the
search for solutions to the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has been a considerable asset to
the international community. I commend the initiatives
launched by the Heads of State most concerned aimed
at building on agreements reached at Lusaka, Maputo
and elsewhere. I had the opportunity to discuss some of
these initiatives at the Afrique-France conference at
Yaounde in mid-January and at the Davos economic
summit at the end of that month.
104. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to my
Special Representative, Kamel Morjane, and to the
MONUC Force Commander and to all the civilian and
military personnel of MONUC for their commitment,
and encourage them to continue their efforts as they
prepare for the next stage of their activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
14
S/2001/128
Annex
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo as at 8 February 2001
Military observers Staff officers Total
Algeria 6 6
Bangladesh 4 8 12
Belgium
Benin 5 3 8
Bolivia I
Burkina Faso 2 2
Canada 2 2
Czech Republic 3 3
Denmark I 2
Egypt 9 9
France 2 3
Ghana 4 4
India 5 2 7
Jordan 2 2
Kenya 4 4
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 3 3
Malaysia 2 7 9
Mali
Morocco 4 4
Nepal 7 7
Niger 2 3
Nigeria 6 6
Pakistan 13 9 22
Peru 3 3
Poland I
Romania 5 6
Russian Federation 2 2
Senegal 8 17 25
South Africa
Switzerland I
Tunisia 6 6
Ukraine 4 4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 4 4
United Republic of Tanzania 4 I 5
Uruguay 8 8 16
Zambia 5 5
Total 124 76 200
15
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UCMANNEX85
Ministry of 1-orell:Jll Am11r~
P. O . Box 7048,
Kampala
Uganda
PRESS STATEMENT ON THE CONFLICT ANO PEACE PROCESS
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.
1. Ever since the eruption of the Conflict in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda has been working closely
with the regional and international fraternity towards the
finding of a peaceful and permanent solution to the problem in
the Congo.
2. Uganda's active participation in the peace process for the DRC
is born out of the fact that DRC is a neighbbouring country.
Most importantly, Uganda was sucked Into the DRC conflict
leading to our military presence there mainly because of the
following reasons:
(a) Destabilisation attacks on Uganda from the DRC by the .
ADF and other Ugandan rebel groups as well as by.
Sudan. The ADF and other Ugandan rebel groups have
been receiving support on DRC territory, dating from the
last ten years of former President Mobutu's era. In an
effort to further destabilise Uganda and in addition to the
Northern flank through LRA, Sudan opened another front .
through South Western Uganda by directly reinforcing
activities of Ugandan rebel groups on DRC territory.
Sudan also planned to use airports in Eastern DRC to
launch massive aerial attacks on Uganda. It would have
been a grave omission of its national security duty if
· Uganda government had not taken appropriate measures
to address the threat against our national stability.
(b) Whereas Uganda went Into the DRC in reaction to acts of
destabilisation emanating from DRC territory, our forces
were brought face to face with a naked threat of another
genocide in the region. There is continued open support
to Interahamwe and ex-FAR on DRC territory. The latter
are not only a threat to the region but also have an
unf9rgettable record of committing the most heinous
crime against humanity. The evil act at Bwlndi In March
1999 by the Interahamwe serves as a reminder that their
evil programme is still in place. We all have an obligation
to ensure a non-recurrence of genocide in the region
unlike during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda when
everybody folded their hands as over one million people
were being murdered.
3. As a result of our military presence in the DRC, activities of
Ugandan rebel groups have been checked and reduced.
Uganda Is ready to withdraw all her forces as soon as measures
spelt out In the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement are put In place.
4. The Security concerns of Uganda, among other neighbouring
countries to the DRC, are regionally and internationally
acknowledged. That is why they are provided for in the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement. The Agreement remains the most viable
framework for the resolution of the DRC conflict especially in as
far as it addresses:
(a) the security concerns of the DRC and the neighbouring
countries;
(b) the internal dimension of the conflict through a National
dialogue involvlng all the Congolese parties with equal
say.
5. Uganda government reaffirms Its commitment to the peace
process In the DRC and in particular to the full implementation
of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. We support the Kampala
Disengagement Plan and the subsequent Sub-Plans signed in
Harare on 6 December 2000. It is Uganda's ardent hope that
all the other parties to the Agreement will continue moving in
the same positive direction, as reaffirmed by all the Parties at
the Summit of 15 February 2001 in Lusaka.
6. Uganda welcomes the followlng recent developments:
(a) DRC government's Improved rapport with MONUC, as this
will contribute towards the early deployment of UN
observers to Inter alia monitor the disengagement and
deployment exercise.
(b) DRC government's expressed commitment to the National
dialogue under the facilitation of H.E Sir Ketumile Maslre;
(c) The planned deployment by the UN of MONUC Observers
on 26 February 2001;
(d) Reaching of consensus, at the Lusaka Summit, by all the
parties to implement the area to area Disengagement and
Redeployment Plans.
7. As a demonstration of Uganda's commitment to a successful
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and in
order to encourage further progress, Uganda government has
decided to withdraw additional 2 battalion from the DRC and
invites MONUC to wi,tness the withdrawal. The withdrawal will
be in addition to the 5 battalion that were withdrawn In August
last year. Uganda expects the other parties to reciprocate this
gesture of good-will by implementing all outstanding provisions
of the Agreement to enable a total withdrawal of all foreign
forces In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.
·• i
e. on DRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Uganda has no
problem with that. In fact, DRC's Sovereignty and territorial ··
integrity is recognised in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.
Uganda's concern Is her security especially In as far as It is
threatened by activities from the DRC territory. Uganda has
neither territorial ambition nor economic interests beyond the
normal course of trade between two nations. Uganda believes
that her own security will be assured if there is peace and
stability in the DRC and in the Great Lakes Region as a whole.
(
~~~
Amama Mbabazi
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
(Regional Cooperation)
Kampala: 20th February 2001
UCMANNEX86
United Nations StRES/1341 (2001)
(,-~ Security Council
~~ J~
Distr.: General
22 February 2001
~
Resolution 1341 (2001)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4282nd meeting,
on 22 February 2001
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of6 August
1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1273 (1999) of5 November 1999, 1279
(1999) of 30 November 1999, 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000, 1296 (2000) of 19
April 2000, 1304 (2000) of 15 June 2000, 1323 (2000) of 13 October"2000 and 1332
(2000) of 14 December 2000 and the statements of its President of 13 July 1998
(S/PRST/1998/20), 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), 11 December 1998
(S/PRST/1998/36), 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17), 26 January 2000
(S/PRST/2000/2), 5 May 2000 (S/PRST/2000/15), 2 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20)
and 7 September 2000 (S/PRST/2000/28),
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of all States in the region,
Reaffirming further the obligation of all States to refrain from the use of force
against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
Reaffirming also the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
over its natural resources, and noting with concern reports of the illegal exploitation
of the country's assets and the potential consequences of these actions for security
conditions and the continuation of hostilities,
Expressing its alarm at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the
civilian population throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and displaced persons
and stressi11g . the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the
Congolese population,
Expressing its deep concern at all violations of human rights and international
humanitarian Jaw, including atrocities against civilian populations, especially in the
eastern provinces,
Deeply concerned at the increased rate of HIV/AIDS infection, in particular
amongst women and girls as a result of the conflict,
01-26220 (E)
"0126220"
S/RES/1341 (2001)
2
Gravely concerned by the continued recruitment and use of child soldiers by
armed forces and groups, including cross-border recruitment and abduction of
children,
Reaffirming its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Reaffirming its support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815), as
well as the Kampala plan and the Harare sub-plans for disengagement and
redeployment,
Stressing the importance of giving new impetus to the peace process in order
to secure the full and definitive withdrawal of all foreign troops from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Also stressing the importance of advancing the political process called for
under the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and facilitating national reconciliation,
Recalling the responsibilities of all parties to cooperate in the full deployment
of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUC), and noting with satisfaction the recent statements by the
President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and his assurances of support for
the deployment ofMONUC,
Welcoming the participation of the members of the Political Committee of the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in its meetings of 21 and 22 February 2001, and
stressing the need for the parties to honour the commitments they made to take
concrete steps to advance the peace process,
Commending the outstanding work of MONUC personnel in challenging
conditions, and noting the strong leadership of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General,
Taking note of the Secretary-General's report of 12 February 2001
(S/2001/128) and his conclusion that the necessary conditions of respect for the
ceasefire, a valid plan for disengagement and cooperation with MONUC are being
met,
Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Notes the recent progress made in achieving respect for the ceasefire, and
urgently calls on all parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement not to resume
hostilities and to implement this agreement, as well as the agreements reached in
Kampala and Harare and the relevant Security Council resolutions;
2. Demands once again that Ugandan and Rwandan forces and all other
foreign forces withdraw from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
in compliance with paragraph 4 of its resolution 1304 (2000) and the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement, and urges these forces to take urgent steps to accelerate this
withdrawal;
3. Demands that the parties implement fully the Kampala plan and the
Harare sub-plans for disengagement and redeployment of forces without
S/RES/1341 (2001)
reservations within the 14-day period stipulated in the Harare Agreement, starting
from 15 March 200 I;
4. Welcomes the commitment by the Rwandan authorities in their letter of
18 February 2001 (S/2001/147), to withdraw their forces from Pweto in accordance
with the Harare Agreement, calls on them to implement this commitment, and calls
on other parties to respect this withdrawal;
5. Welcomes also the commitment of the Ugandan authorities to reduce
immediately by two battalions the strength of their forces in the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, calls on the Ugandan authorities to implement
this commitment, and calls on MONUC to verify it;
6. Urges the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to prepare and
adopt not later than 15 May 2001, in close liaison with MONUC, a precise plan and
schedule which, in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, would lead to
the completion of the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and requests the Secretary-General to report
to it by 15 April 2001 on the progress of these efforts;
7. Demands that all the parties refrain from any offensive military action
during the process of disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces;
8. Urges all the parties to the conflict, in close liaison with MONUC, to
prepare by 15 May 2001 for immediate implementation prioritized plans for the
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of all armed
groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1, of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and
demands that all parties cease all forms of assistance and cooperation with these
groups and use their influence to urge such groups to cease their activities;
9. Condemns the massacres and atrocities committed in the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and demands once again that all the parties
concerned put an immediate end to violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law;
10. Demands that all armed forces and groups concerned bring an effective
end to the recruitment, training and use of children in their armed forces, calls upon
them to extend full cooperation to MONUC, the United Nations Children's Fund,
and humanitarian organizations for speedy demobilization, return and rehabilitation
of such children, and requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts with
pursuing these objectives on a priority basis;
11. Calls on all parties to ensure the safe and unhindered access of relief
personnel to all those in need, and recalls that the parties must also provide
guarantees for tlie safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and
associated humanitarian relief personnel;
12. Calls also on all the parties to respect the principles of neutrality and
impartiality in the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
13. Calls on the international community to increase its support to
humanitarian relief activities within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in
neighbouring countries affected by the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo;
3
S/RES/1341 (2001)
4
14. Reminds all parties of their obligations with respect to the security of
civilian populations under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and stresses that occupying
forces should be held responsible for human rights violations in the territory under
their control;
15. Welcomes the expressed willingness of the authorities of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to proceed with the inter-Congolese Dialogue under the aegis
of the neutral Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, and in this regard welcomes the
announcement by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the
Summit in Lusaka on 15 February 2001 that the Facilitator has been invited to
Kinshasa, and calls on all Congolese parties to take immediate concrete steps to take
forward the inter-Congolese dialogue;
16. Reiterates that MONUC shall cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the
Inter-Congolese Dialogue, provide support and technical assistance to him, and
coordinate the activities of other United Nations agencies to this effect;
17. Calls on all the parties to the conflict to cooperate fully in the
deployment and operations ofMONUC including through full implementation of the
provisions and the principles of the Status of Forces Agreement throughout the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and reaffirms that it is the
responsibility of all the parties to ensure the security of United Nations personnel,
together with associated personnel;
18. Requests the parties, as a follow-up to the discussions on this matter at
the Lusaka Summit on 15 February 2001, to relocate the Joint Military Commission
(JMC) to Kinshasa, co-locating it at all levels with MONUC, and calls on the
authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure the security of all the
JMC members;
19. Reaffirms the authorization contained in resolution 1291 (2000) and the
mandate set out in its resolution for the expansion and deployment of MONUC, and
endorses the updated concept of operations put forward by the Secretary-General in
his report of 12 February 2001, with a view to the deployment of all the civilian and
military personnel required to monitor and verify the implementation by the parties
of the ceasefire and disengagement plans, stressing that this disengagement is a first
step towards the full and definitive withdrawal of all foreign troops from the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
20. Emphasizes that it will be prepared to consider a further review of the
concept of operations for MONUC, when appropriate and in the light of
developments, in order to monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign troops and
the implementation of the plan mentioned in paragraph 8 above and, in coordination
with existing mechanisms, to enhance security on the border of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo with Rwanda, .Uganda ·and Burundi, and requests the
Secretary-General to make proposals when appropriate;
21 . Reaffirms that it is ready to support the Secretary-General if and when he
deems that it is necessary and it determines that conditions allow it to deploy troops
in the border areas in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including
possibly in Goma or Bukavu;
S/RES/1341 (2001)
22. Welcomes the dialogue initiated between the authorities of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, urges them to continue their
efforts, and emphasizes in this respect that the settlement of the crisis in Burundi
would contribute positively to the settlement of the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo;
23. Welcomes also the recent meetings of the parties, including the meeting
of the Presidents of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, encourages
them to intensify their dialogue with the goal of achieving regional security
structures based on common interest and mutual respect for the territorial integrity,
national sovereignty and security of both States, and emphasizes in this respect that
the disarmament and demobilization of and cessation of any support to the exRwandese
Armed Forces and Interahamwe forces will facilitate the settlement of the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
24. Expresses its full support for the work of the expert panel on the illegal
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and once again urges the parties to the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other parties concerned to cooperate
fully with it;
25. Reaffirms that it attaches the highest importance to th.e cessation of the
illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, affirms that it is ready to consider the necessary actions to put an end to this
exploitation, and awaits with interest in this respect the final conclusions of the
expert panel, including the conclusions relating to the level of cooperation of States
with the expert panel;
26. Reaffirms also that an international conference on peace, security,
democracy and development in the Great Lakes region, with participation by all the
Governments of the region and all the other parties concerned, should be organized
at the appropriate time under the aegis of the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity with a view to strengthening stability in the region and working out
conditions that will enable everyone to enjoy the right to live peacefully within
national borders;
27. Expresses its . intention to monitor closely progress by the parties in
implementing the requirements of this resolution and to undertake a mission to the
region, possibly ir. May 2001, to monitor progress and discuss the way forward;
28. Expresses its readiness to consider possible measures which could be
imposed, in accordance with its responsibilities and obligations under the Charter of
the United Nations, in case· of failure by parties to comply fully with this resolution;
29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
s
UCMANNEXi
ADM/ 186/270/01
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda presents its
compliments to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Congo
accredited to Uganda and has the honour to refer to a meeting which
took.place between the Permanent Secretary, Mr Ralph W Ochan, and
the Charge d'Affaires, Mrs Isabelle Iboula on 20 March, 2001.
The Ministry wishes to reiterate a verbale request made by the
Pennanent Secretary that the distinguished Government of the .
. . .,..
Democratic Republic of Congo asks Mr Taban, son of !di Amin Dada,
to vacate the Uganda Embassy's premises (Chancery and 08:ici.8:1~:."I
Residence) he has been occupying in Kinshasa. The Uganda
Government has no arrangement for Mr Taban to occupy those
premises.
The Ministry further wishes to state that the Uganda Government
would rather have an agent of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Congo occupy the Embassy's premises than Mr Taban,
who is a dissident.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda avails itself
of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Democratic
Republic of Congo accredited to Uganda the assurances of its highest
consideration.~
Kampala: 21 March 2001
The Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Congo
accredited to Uganda
KAMPALA
UCMANNEX88
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Most Warring Troops in Congo Meet UN Deadline for Pullback
United Nations, March 29 (Bloomberg} - United Nations obserwrs in the Democratic Republic of Congo reported that most
armed forces of warring nations and rebel groups haw withdrawn their troops to positions mandated in last month's
agreement.
Six Afiican nations and rebel forces haw been fighting for control of Congo's natural resources, including cobalt, diamonds
and copper, in a land area four times the size of France. They agreed in February to pull back nine miles by today, and the
UN said it would send more than 3,000 obserwrs and armed troops to Congo, formerly Zaire, to wrify the mowment.
Congolese troops and soldiers from Rwanda and the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy haw left the towns of Pweto and
Kabinda In the south, Ugandan forces haw withdrawn in the northeast, and the Congolese go11emment claims to haw
withdrawn across the Ubangi Riwr in the far north, according to UN spokesman Fred Eckhard.
The rebel Congolese Liberation Mo\ellent has not begun to pull back its troops in the northeast region, and its officers said
they wouldn't do so until UN forces mow in to protect ci'.ilians and progress is made in inter-Congolese dialogue, Eckhard
said.
What's more, while Congolese and Namibian forces haw receilled orders to withdraw from Kananga, in the south-<:entral part
of the country, no mowment has been seen, Eckhard added.
UN obserwrs are molAng into positions across Congo to monitor troop mowments and begin a 11erification process expected
to take 56 days.
A contingent of 11 O troops from Uruguay arrilled at Kalemie near Lake Tanganyika, almost 1, OOO miles east of the capital,
Kinshasa, to set up one of four bases to protect supplies and 11ehicles the obserwrs will use, Reuters reported. The lake forms
part of the eastern border of the country.
Mar/29/2001 16:08 ET
For more stories from Bloomberg News, click here.
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-day,Aprt1 11, 2001 AmortcaOnllne:PRUW - : 1
UCMANNEX8~
REPORT ON EVACUATION OF UGANDA EMBASSY STAFF AND
OTHER UGANDANS FROM KINSHASA IN
AUGUST /SEPTEMBER 1998
Circumstances
1. After eruption of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) on 2 August 1998 or there about, the Embassy of
the Republic of Uganda in Kinshasa was affected in a number
of ways, including: ·
(a) There were sporadic arrests and harassment of Ugandan,nationals
In the DRC, Including Embassy staff/ In fulfillmenfof
its consular responsibilities, the Embassy was from time to
time involved In ensuring the safety of the affected Ugandans.
Sometimes the ."bRt ai.i"thorities·'cooperatea ·and ·sometimes thet
did not ·
(b) A total of thirty two (32) Ugandan nationals sought protection
and camped at the Official Residence and at the Chancery.
This attracted further harassment of Embassy staff.
(c) On 11 August 1998 or there about;·oRC Soldiers stormed the
Chancery by forcing their way through)he main gat!:l of ifie·
fence. They held the ~bassador aria another diplomat on. gu_ri
point, deman~ing. f9L .. ~\Y.a_ndes.~ ... ,n~Uiij~;p~rpor:ted. to hav~ .·
been kept by the Embassy. They left after they were allowed ·
to loot some money. The Embassy protested to the authorities.
First Evacuation
. .. .
2. Ms. Margaret Kedisi, Second Secretary, who had left Kinshasa
for Kampala at the beginning of August 1998, was advised by
the Ministry headquarters not to return to Kinshasa because of
the prevailing circumstances. Similarly, all Ugandan nationals
in the DRC were advised to evacuate the country.
... ~ '. .
I . • .
Second Evacuation
3. Seventeen out of the thirty two Ugandan nationals, who had
sought protection at the Embassy, and the Administrative
Attach of the Embassy (Ms. Jane F. Onega Owachgiu) were
evacuated to Brazzaville by air through Ndjili Airport on 20
August 1998. UNHCR provided a helicopter. The evacuees
were accompanied by the First Secretary (Mr. Henry Picha
Okello), the Second Secretary (Mr. Richard K. Bamuturakl) and
a Protocol Officer from the (DRC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The exercise was very difficult as stated below.
• The evacuees were detained at the Airport (Ndjili) for more.
than three hours while being beaten, insulted and robbed of
their valuables and liquid cash; · ..
+ The Second Secretary and the Protocol Officer· were ·aiso
detained and suffered the same fate as the evacuees. ·
4. After that ill-treatment, the Embassy feared to release the other
remaining group, which was still at the Embassy waiting for
transport, until security would be guaranteed by the (DRC)
authorities. The Empassy strongly -protested to the (DRC)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and requested for more security to
enable the next evacuation. '
Third Evacuation
s. On or around 28 August 1998, five DRC Ministers, including
those of Internal Affairs and Defence, the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps (Ambassador of Switzerland), the Dean of the
African Diplomatic Corps (Ambassador of Togo), the UNDP
Resident - Representative, the UNHCR Representative,
Representatives of the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DRC
Immigration Officers assembled at the Embassy and held a
meeting with the Ambassador (Dr. Cos Kamanda Bataringaya)
and other Embassy Staff. The following transpired.
; ·~.
t .....
• It was communicated that evacuation of the remaining
Ugandans would take place that day;
• Details of how evacuees, including all remaining Embassy
staff, would move from the Chancery to the (river) Port on
to Brazzaville were communicated;
• Ambassador Bataringaya informed the (RDC) authorities
that Embassy staff were to accompany the other evacuees
to Brazzaville. That Embassy staff would evacuate to
Brazzaville temporarily and return to Kinshasa as the
security situation improved. He therefore requested the,
DRC authorities to ensure the safety and security · of.,
Embassy properties by positioning surveliiancet' security
outside and around the fen~es_ of the_ Chancery_ aod.~!~i
Official Residence: That a local employee, one Mr. SenkunJa
(Uganda), would be the caretaker inside the fences of both
premises in addition to Embassy employed-Askaris who
would man the fence gates. Note that flats of the four
Embassy diplomatic staff were located at the Chancery
compound.
• Immigration Officers checked passports of all evacuees and
counseled their visas, including those of Embassy diplomatic
staff. The latter were advised to re-apply for new entry
visas at the DRC Embassy in Brazzaville;
• The DRC authorities .reasoned tha(since'Embassy staff were
temporarily relocating to Brazzaville · and.'Wpul_g return to
Kinshasa, they should _hand~ovet .. the. corrldot,~key ·of the . I
Chancery in case of a. fire .... outbreak.- · ·-·· The key was ·
accordingly handed over . to the . DRC :.D.~P®' .Minister of ·
Defence; . '
+ Meanwhile, security at both the Chancery and the Official
Residence had been beefed-up.
6. The evacuation exercise went on as planned despite sporadic
gun fire around the town, including gun shots at the boats that
carried the evacuees. The boats were arranged by UNHCR,
among others. Across the River Congo, in Brazzaville, the
evacuees were, inter-alia, received by the Minister in Charge of
Security of the Republic of Congo.
7. From Brazzaville, the other evacuees were transported to their
destinations. Embassy staff (namely; Amb. Cos Kamanda
Bataringaya, Mr. Henry Piche Okello, Mr Richard K. Bamuturaki ·
and Ms Jane F. Onega Owachgiu) remained in Brazzaville for
sometime until it became untenable for them to return to
Kinshasa. They were accordingly Instructed to return to ..
Kampala.
Aftermath of the evacuation
8. In December 1998, the. Ministry headquarters was ·able , to ,.,
receive a confirmed 'report. thaf DRC . soldiers. had . broken Into'
both Premises (Chancery and Official Residence) and effectively ..
occupied them In September 1998, including flats at the'
Chancery. The caretaker and all Askaris were forced ·away.
The Ministry protested the act (copy of diplomatic Note No.
XC/N11504/12 dated 18 December 1998 Is herewith attached).
9 Recently, it came . to . th.e attentlo'n°'··of:"ttie . Ministry that Mr.
Taban, son of Idi Amin Dada and a Ugandan dissident, is now
occupying and using the two premises. The attached copy of
Protest Note No. ADM/186/270/01 dated 21 March 2001 refers: ." ..
Dir&n~I Cooperation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KAMPALA
30th March 2001.
UCMANNEX
UGANDA'S INVOLVEMENT IN DRC
1. The reasons fgr entry into DRC predate Kabila's
government and remained despite the misplaced hope that
they would be addressed and resolved with the exit of
Mobutu.
I
The timing of the deployment of troops into DRC was
determined by:
a. Initially, goodwill of the DRC government towards
Uganda and acknowledgement of Uganda's security
concerns.
b. Subsequently, by the accelerated change of
attitude of the DRC government which demonstrably
deteriorated from· inability to police eastern and North
eastern DRC areas harbouring Uganda's enemies, to
indifference and covert support of Uganda's enemies
and then lastly to overt hostility and support to
subversive activities against Uganda in concert with the
Sudan as it had ,~een earlier during Mobutu's era, onlY;
with variations in p,agnitude.
c. The magnitude of the threat consequently
determined the extent of the response.
2. The reasons for Uganda's involvement in DRC are its
legitimate security concerns which will be illustrated at
length later but are briefly the following:
a. Sudan's long-standing schemes and designs
against Uganda through its support, sponsorship,
training,offering bases and arming Ugandan rebel
groups in DRC to subvert the government of Uganda
This attitude and policy by the Sudan government is
well documented and dates back to Aug 1986 when the
Pariah international terrorist and fundamentalist regime
reorganised and re"'armed remnants of the defeated
defunct Ugandan army(UNLA) to attack Bibia.
This attack was repulsed but signalled the beginning of
an insurgency by the remnants fuelled and backed by
the Sudan who have caused untold suffering to tne
people of Northern Uganda in the districts of Gulu,
Kitgum and West Nile.
This was coupled with Sudan's naked and blatant
aggression against Ugancd~ through its repeated aerial
raids of areas of Koboko, ~rua and Adjumani which
resulted in destruction of lives and property.
When Sudan failed to ma~e headway in this Northern
investment, it decided in concert with Mobutu and
subsequently Kabila, to create another front in
Western Uganda in order to stretch the Ugandan army
by creating bases for Ugandan rebels in North eastern
and eastern DRC to be used as launching pads of
attacks against Uganda.
2
The Sudan- created and sponsored Ugandan rebel
groups active in DRC with their bases indicated are:
(1) LRA (Lords Resistance Army): Superstitious
and murderous group led by Joseph Kony which is
responsible for unleashing untold terror and
suffering to the people of Northern Uganda
through grisly murders, torture, maiming and
disfigurement by cutting off limbs of victims,
arson, rape, defilement and abductions. Since
1995 over 100,000 children from Northern Uganda
have been abducted including the 139 students of
. Aboke senior secondary school abducted and
taken to Sudan in Oct 1996.
The group has bases in Nesitu and Jabellin in
Sudan.
(2) UNRF II (Uganda National Rescue Front):
Lead by a former officer in Idi Amin's repressive
army called Bamuze. Has been engaged in
abducting youths in West Nil~ whom they take to
Sudan for training. The gro~p has a bas~ in Rojo
in Sudan where its abductees are undergoing
training under Sudanese Army supervision.
(3) WNBF (West Nile Bank Ftnt): This group is
led by ex-Amin Minister Col Juma Oris and was
routed by the UPDF when it attacked West Nile in
1997 but the remnants went back to their base in
Juba in the Sudan and are busy regrouping.
(4) UNFA·(Uganda National Freedom, Army):
This one is led by young militant Islamic
fundamentalists and has also been engaged in
abductions from West Nile. It intends to launch a
terrorist campaign in West Nile. It is based in
Khor Kaya in the Sudan.
(5) ADF (Allied Democratic Front): It is led by
Shiekh Jamil Mukulu. This is an Islamist,
fundamentalist and militant group created,
sponsored and supervised by the Sudan to offer
alternative armed opposition to the government of
Uganda in the West having registered no
progress with their campaign through the
aforementioned groups in Northern and North
Western Uganda.
This group's activities started in 1993 veiled as a
radical religious agitation against the ,mainstream
,~bnservative muslim establishment. U manifested
i~s violent nature when it forcefully tQok over the
Old Kampala mosque. The group killed a
policeman when it was being evicted.
The group launched its armed campaign against
the government in 1994-95 by establishing a camp
in Buseruka in Hoima district bordering the Congo.
This camp .. was overrun by the UPDF in Feb 1995
with many militants killed in the engagement, 148
captured alive and imprisoned while 45 fled across
L. Albert into the DRC and joined remnants of
NALU urder .Ngaimoko in a place called Buhira in
Con90.
These Buseruka remnants entered Congo with 15
rifles and reported to the defunct Zaire Army
(Ex-FAZ) Unit in Bunia from where they were
transported to various Ex-FAZ detachments one of
which was Nyangarai in Bunia. These remnants
included the following:
(a) Kassim Mulumba (was arrested this year
by UPDF enroute to Congo)
(b) Menya Muzadaki.
I (G)/ Medi Basoga
i
(d) Kawuma Peter
(e)\ Katumba
I
(f) Baker Matovu and others.
Others were taken to Rugeji detach. Zaire was
also a conduit for weapons from Sudan to
Ugandan dissidents connecting from Baazi on the
Congo Sudan border to Aruu-Ariwara and on to
Beni and Bun:a where the weapons would be
offloaded and carried to Buhira by the ADF.
It is these weapon supplies that enabled the ADF
force of 1400 to attack Mpondwe, Karambi and
Bwera on 13 Nov 96. ·
Their intention had been to capture Kasese ~irfield _
in order to create a forward re-supply and
reinforcement terminal for logistics and manpower
from Sudan and Congo.
The attack was repulsed by UPDF and ADF
retreated back into their safe h~vens in Congo
where they had,~stablished camps in Lhume,
Buhira, Kiribata, ~useke, Mumbiri Lugetse
Burangwa, Mutwanga, Nkingi, Kimbe, Kiraro,
Kikura and Mughina. They also retreated to places
in Uganda but just on the border with DRC for
· easy thinning out! into Congo in case of pursuit like
Kahindangoma, Ngwengwe, Kambasa and
Kyabitondo.
(,
ADF continued to be replenished by Sudan and
would launch tecrorist attacks on the rural
population in the countryside areas of Kasese,
Bundibugyo and Kabarole districts.
b. The complicity of the ther Zaire government in
Sudan's terrorist schemes against Uganda.
c. The presence of Rwandese genocidal elements of
the notorious Interahamwe militia and former
Rwandese army (Ex-FAR) elements in eastern DRC in
areas of Rutshuru, Kanyabayonga and Virunga National
Park from where they would sneak into both Rwanda
and Uganda to kill civilians and then withdraw back to
their safe havens in DRC.
d. The political/Administrative vacuum in eastern
DRC w.hich allowed free reign to these criminal groups
and offered them and their mentor Sudan spring
boards from which to continue launching attacks on
Uganda.
e. The direct commitment of Sudanese troops to
back up these groups and Kabila's army in their
destructive schemes against Uganda.
. . . . .
3. Following Mobutu's exit and the coming into power of
Kabila and his AFDL on 17 May 97, there was a lot of
optimism that Uganda's legitimate security concerns would
be addressed and it was in this context when the euphoria of
good will from Kabila lasted, that Uganda and DRC agreed to
7
the deployment of UPDF into Congo to conduct joint
operations with the DRC army (FAC) against all the
aforementioned criminal groups in a Protocol signed by both
countries in Kishasha ~;m 27 Apr 98.
4. As earlier mentioned, the good will of the Kabila
government towards Uganda did not last and President
Kabila embraced the enemies of Uganda 1as Mobutu had
been doing and even started conspiring with Sudan against
Uganda.
When the RPA started pulling out in September 1997, the
FAC officers' attitude degenerated drastically. Even during
the time when the .Rwandese were still there, FAC
commanders would cohabit with ADF claiming that these
were Uganda's enemies and not enemies of DRC.
An example was Col Ebemba, Mobutu's man who had been
instrumental in planning the 13 Nov 96 ADF attack on
Mpondwe, was posted on Kabila's orders to eastern DRC to
continue his old liaison with ADF.
Kinsha~ija also started to train ADF and ·interahamwe in
Kamina in DRC.
5. Due to internal contradictions in DRC, .another revolt
broke owt on 2 Aug 98 in the western town of Gama and
popped Jup in the Garrison towri of Kitona, Bai 1ana andto the
oil town of Muanda. Uganda's presence in Congo then was
at the periphery (near its western border with DRC) and was
no where near these events in Kitona, where upto 20000
Ex-FAZ soldiers and Interahamwe were being in corporated
into FAC at the time the rebellion broke out.
8
6. The factual illustration of events in DRC including gross
violations of human rights by Kabila's army, incitement of
genocide and integration of the Rwandese genocidal
I .
Interahamwe · and Ex-FAR elements into Kabila's army, the
Sudanese and Ugandan dissident groups i.e LRA, WNBF,
ADF, and UNRF and the co-option of Burundi extremist
groups like CNDD and FDD is as follows:
a. On 05 Aug 99 FAC soldiers killed civilians enmass
in Uvira and Bukavu for allegedly being supportive of
the rebellion.
b. The CNDD/FDD are active in Bukavu and .Moba
and are involved in fighting in Pepa along lake
Tanganyika with an unspecified number deployed in
Manono.
The RN~ (News Agency) of 10 Aug 98 at 173,6 GMT
reporteq the following about the unfolding ev~nts in
DRC: 1
(1) I On the situation in Kinshasha, the agency
citEld unnamed diplomatic sources as s$ying that
the witch hunt for ethnic Tutsis and other
Congolese with features similar to Rwandese
continues to make many victims.
9
(2) In Goma, residents expressed great concern
about the plight of their relatives being harassed
or killed by Kabila's forces.
(3) Among 'the cases brought to the attention of
the media in Goma, there was a one Mrs
Mukadona, ages 45, a resident of Kisangani who
was impriso~ed by forces loyal to Kabila. she wa~
arrested because she was allegedly of Rwanc!ese
origin one of her relatives in Goma told RNA.
(4) Other people killed in Kisangani include one
Faustin, an Engineer in agronomics and several
workers of the private Sun Air Company. He was
murdered and his sister Sylvia had also gone
missing.
Oth'=r workers of the Company who were
"Kinyarwanda" speaking or of ethnic Tutsi origin
were killed or detained in unknown places by
government forces.
I
Capt Mastakj an Ex-FAZ officer reintegrated into
FAC and Lt ~ol Ngonga were among those
reportedly kill~d by FAC.
Others take~ to unknown places by government
forces were I the manager of the Intercontinental
Hotel Mr. Clement Ngirabatware of the ethnic
Congolese Bagongwe tribe from eastern DRC as
well as Leonard Bukombe working with Petro
Congo.
A Rwandan banker, Alex Kalisa was also reported
to be in the hands of Kabila's Presidential guards.
He was the manager of the Bank o(Commerce
and Industries which had several branches in DRC.
(5) These excesses were condemned by UNHCR
and Human rights watch among others.
(6) Kabila and his government used the media
and other fora to incitr ethnic clea~g by
invoking false nation9ism. Groups" were targeted
were the Banyamulenge who · were declared
Rwandese, the Basisi and Mai-Mai.
This echoed the resurgence of genocide akin to
the one that took place in Rwanda and where its
main perpetrators the Interahamwe and Ex-FAR
were now Kabila's· allies.
j
d. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Ms Susan rice in a statement she made to the
I US House of Representatives International Relations
I committee's Sub - committee on Africa on 15 Sept 1998
Inter alia said:
ii
(1) Credible reports of inter - ethnic violence,
communal .massacres and attacks against noncombatants
because of thei'r ethnicity echo the
tragedies of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the
subsequent alleged massacres inside Zaire in late
1996 and 1997.
(2) There were mass graves left by fleeing
government soldiers.
(3) That the political course and economic
prospects in DRC had enormous implications not
only for the people of Congo but also for many in
the central and southern Africa Region as well
because it was home to 50 million people and
bordered 09 countries.
( 4) That the Rwandan genocide set the stage for
the recent crisis because while technically the
genocide ended with the qssumption of power of
RPF government in Rwandij in July 1994, those
who committed genocide cpntinued to attacks
inside Rwanda from the security of the Refugee
camps of former Zaire.
(5) That the present conflict had both internal
and external antescedents.
(6) That the US was gravely concerned by the
detention by Congolese security forces of
hundreds if not thousands of Congolese ethnic
Tutsis and others believed to be Tutsi or rebel
sympathisers many of whom had been
reportedly tortured and summarily executed
simply because of their presumed ,ethnicity.
(7) The Congolese government Radio had
broadcast hate messages sometimes issued by
senior government officials that were reminiscent
of those that incited the genocide in Rwanda in
1994.
(8) That the US shares the perspective of
regional leaders that a lasting solution will require
the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the
launching of both comprehensive negotiations to
address both the issues of border security for all
the parties concerned and issues of inclusive
governance for the Congolese.
(9) That the US had indicated tDj both Uganda
and Rwanda its full understanding of their
legitimate security interests in countering
insurgent attacks from Congolese ~oil.
(10) That the US government shares regional and
international frustration with the Kinshasa
government's failures with respect to both
democratisation a~d human rights.
1:,
(11) That internally, there will never be long term
stability in the Congo and neighbouring states
until there is a more inclusive government and a
political process firmly based on democracy and a
healthy respect for all of Congo's citizens. ·
(12) That externally, there will never be long
term regional stability until meaningful action is
taken to address the threat that Congolese based
insurgents and genocidaires pose to regional
states.
(13) That a way must be found to bar the
Democratic Republic of Congo from being used as
a base for insurgent movements that carry out
genocide.
(14} That given the political and administrative
vacuum in eastern Congo, any solution to the
current crisis will depend upon creating new
border security arrangements.
(15) That the Congolese government has thus far
failep to prevent UNITA as well as Rwandan J
genocidaires and Sudan backed Uganda rebels
from, operating inside Congo.
(16) That the Congolese government has failed to
resolve the crucial issue of Banyamulenge
citizenship, to ensure that ethnic Tutsi who have
lived in Congo for generations enjoy national rights
and privileges.
1-1
(17) That these failures have undermined regional
security and, contributed to the present perilous
situation.
(18) In addition, concern was raised by the US
about the Kjnshasa governments' collaboration
with pariah regimes like Sudan who support
International terrorism.
(19) That to prevent the resurgence of genocide
and ensure the protection of human rights in the
Great Lakes region, the US is pursuing the creation
of an international coalition against genocide
called for at the Entebbe summit attended by
president Clinton in March 1998.
e. In January 1999, over 600 Rwandese Hutu
genocidaires were flown to Mbandaka and Gbadolite
from Buburu- Bomingo and Kinshasha by the Congolese
government.
f. On 7 Feb 1Q99, an unspecified big number of
these perpetrators of crimes against humanity in
Rwanda were again flown from Kamina to Mwene - Dit1J
for deployment irl various areas to beef up FAC and
were deployed i~lYakoma, Gbadolite, Gemena,
Kananga. Mbandaka, Mwene-ditu,Mbuji-Mayi and
Pweto.
i:,
g. Kabila and . Bashir agreed that Sudan uses the
airports of Isiro, Bunia, Beni, Butembo, Aketi, Dulia and
Kisangani in DRC to replenish Ugandan dissident
groups.
h. On 24 August 1998 Kabila held talks with
Sudanese Vice President Ali Othman Taha in Gbadolite
and they agreed to reinforce Ugandan rebel bases in
Congo in order to destabilise Uganda from the West.
i. Some of the Ugandan rebels were captured in
Kindu by the RCD when it fell and they revealed that
they were recruited from Sudanese refugee camps by
Kabila's son Joseph and Ex-dictator Amin's son Taban
Amin.
j. In May 1998, when the genocidaires were about
to be flashed out of DRC, Kabila issued a directive that
all captured Interahamw~ and Ex-FAR (about 5000), be
taken to Kamina military training centre in Katanga
where they underwent tr,aining and were absorbed into
FAC. Thousands of dormant Ex-FAR in the southern
interior of Rwanda were also targeted for recruitment.
k. The genocide threat, became real when at the
beginning of the present crisis, Kabila's government
incited Congolese to arm themselves with machetes in
Isiro and eliminate all people of Rwandese origin or
extraction including Cong_olese Banyamulenge which
j(,
constituted grave consequences as regards stability in
the region.
I. After their .. defeat in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in
Rwanda at the hands of RPA in 1°998, many
Interahamwe withdrew to Masisi in DRC.
m. In late January 1999 a force of soo.:.300 I
Interahamwe moved to Rutshuru zone in DRC and
started destabilising areas along the Uganda-Congo
border i.e Ishasha in Rukungiri, Rubaya, Ndorwa and
Bufundi in Kabale and Bunagana, Muramba, Nyarusiza
and Busanze in Kisoro.
n. Sudan's direct military involvement in DRC is
further exemplified by the following:
(1) Sudan trained Ex-FAZ, Ex-FAR, WNBF,
UNRF II, Interahamwe and Chadian soldiers at kit,
Frangosika, Tanumule, Rajafu and Kodokonyo
camps in Sudan and ferried them to DRC.
(2) On 14 Aug 98 SudaneJe Armed Forces
Brigadier Saladin Khalil deliyered 03 plane loads of
weapons to DRC.
(3) On 26 Aug 98 Sudanese Antonov aircrafts
bombed Bunia.
(4) On 2 Sept 98 Cargo planes from Yemen
ferried weapons to Khartoum for the UNRF II Unit
in DRC and the cori_signment was sent to Gbadolite
in the company Col Ibrahim Ismail Habiballah.
17
(5) On 14 Sept 98 Kabila's aides announced that
Sudan and DRC had agreed to jointly reinforce
their deployment along Rwanda and Uganda's
borders and a one Talindima was appointed by
Kabila to co,.ordinate the military ,activities of the
Congo based Ugandan rebel gruups.
(6) On 15 Sept 98, military Cargo planes from
Yemen left Khartoum airport for Kinshasha and
Gbadolite.
(7) On 18 Sept 98, President Kabila met the
National Islamic Front government leaders in
Khartoum and was given Sudanese troops and
military equipment.
He also met and held discussions with leaders of
the Ugandan rebel groups of LRA, WNBF, UNRF
II and ADF.
5. T~e standard operation procedure of the LRA, WNBF,
UNRF II, UNFA, ADF, and Interahamwe is murder, torture,
rape, defilement, arson, disfigurement and maiming by
cutting of bodily limbs and abductions.
Notable grisly accounts of their atrocities against the people
of Uganda from their bases in Congo and Sudan are:
J.
a. AD_E: ..
(1) On 15 Jun 1997 ADF moved from their
bases in DRC and attacked Bundibygyo, looted the
town and massacred 121 civilians and abducted
many;more . .
200,000 people became displaced.
(2) The attack on Kiburara seminary and murder
of students and abduction of others in 1997.
(3) The attack of Kitchwamba Technical Institute
in Kabarole district in which 33 students were
burnt to death in their dormitories and 106 others
abducted on 8 Jun 98.
(4) The attack on Kasese town in July 1998 in
which a lodge and vehicles were brunt and some
people killed.
(5) The attack of a tourist camp at Mainarp in
Kibale district in which 03 people were killed in
May 99.
(6) r·,1J,:,n• 1 otht=ir ·1c;o•~t-pd -H-,:,c'KS on l--f,-:. rj·. ,;r';?.'l r..J 'f ~; - .. ! """'~ - a~ .. c...; . . L, . ·.:. \.. . V ii ..... ,
- , )f""\1 ;; -, j-.n .-i--~r· ·-··io··1 r\~ """-Jo-.,..'- I -·1 :~f"lC. -nn ~ ,-; ..i.c~ ,·-•, ,1 u '~.:>l. ·..; ·-l, ! v: f-1• . ,;,:i L'11 -,;: le..:::~ a ...,
abd~cUons in the country ~ide 2re.as of K:jses-2 1
E3ur.dibugyo and Kab3:-ole oistricts.
:·,
(7) From November 1996 upto November 1998,
552 people had been killed by ADF, over 300
injured, over 1500 abducted and 35000 and
200000 internally displaced in Kasese and
Bundibungyo respectively.
b . .LRA;_
(1) The cutting of limbs of civilians in Gulu and
Kitgum district.
(2) The rape and defilement of women and girl
children.
(3) Abductions in which over 10,000 children
from No:thern have been abducted, abused and
violated and conscripted into rebellion let alone
the girl children being forcefully married to LRA
commanders in the Sudan. These children include
the 139 girl~ students of Aboke senior secondary
school abdticted in Oct 1996 and taken to Sudani
j J
( 4) The Atiak massacre in which LRA attacked a
refugee camp and indiscriminately massacred over
200 people ipcluding women and children.
(5) The Karuma ambush of a convoy of civilian
vehicles of 1995 in which lives and
property were destroyed.
2(1
(6) The·.use of laqd mines supplied by the Sudan
against the local population.
(7) The killing of elders who had been sent as
emissaries of peace between the government of
Uganda and LRA.
All the foregoing are testimony that Kabila and allies are
the ones that have distinguished themselves as icons of
gross human rights violations, aggression and
destabilisation of their neighbours which warranted
reprisals to safe guard Uganda's sovereignty.
c. Interahamwe:
The attack of Bwindi tourist camp on 01 March 99 in
which foreign tourists were abducted and brutally
murdered by these marauding criminals who retreated
back to DRC.
6. Uganda's commitment to Peaceful resolution of the
conflict in Congo is exemplified by its active participation in
the following summits and ministerial meetings:
a. The Victoria Falls Summit (7th - 8th Aug 1998).
b. The Pretoria Summit (23rd august 1998).
c. The Durban Consultations .
.::1
d. The 2nd Victoria Falls Summit.
I
e. The meeting of Defence 1vlinisters and other
officials of countries participating in the Victoria Falls II
summit of 10th - 11th September 1998 in Adis-Ababa.
f. The SADC summit (Port Louis 12 - 14 September
1998).
g. The Libreville Summit (24th September 1998)
h. The East African Cooperation Consultative Summit
of Nairobi (18 October 1998).
i. The meeting of the Adhoc Committee of Ministers
(Gabarone: 20th - 21 November ~ 998).
j. The France-Africa Conferenqe held in Paris from
26-28 November 1998.
k. The Windhoek Summit of 17 - 18 January 1999.
m. The Lusaka Experts committee meeting of 29
January to 8 February 1999.
n. The Sirte Peace Agreement of 18 Apr 1999 signed
in Libya.
o. ; The cease-fire Agreement signed in Lusaka on 10
Jui 99.
UCMANNEX91
CHRONOLOGICAL ILLUSTRATION OF ACTS OF l>ESTADILISATION DY SUl>AN AND CONGO BASED
DISSIDENTS
SINO DATE TIME PLACE DESCRIPTION DAMAGE TO IDENTITY OF REMARKS
OF ATTACK PERSONS/PRffi' ATTACKERS
ERTY
OJ 29 Aug1989 1640 hrs Kiwanja in Zaire Robbery of The MN which was
MNeh belonging robbed from Uganda
to Ministry of was seen at Kiwanja
Lands in Zaire under the
charge ofFAZ
soldiers.
02 29 Oct 1989 1530 hrs Mubirene S/county Robbery ofM/v The snid robbed M/V
Goma town land Cruiser Reg was sighted at the
No urn 368. home of a one
Limpambo being
used by FAZ soldiers
and had bullet holes
on its wind screen.
25 Dec 1989 1400- Bwera FAZ soldiers SVC Terrorised the FAZ soldier The culprit later
1500 hrs No ZA/80150 Cpl civilian crossed back into
Namigobe E ___ . P9p11!ati1;m .io __ -· Zaire_
.. crossed into Bwera Bwera and
while armed. extorted money
from them.
04 27 Dec 1989 0500- Bwera-Uganda FAZ soldiers The FAZ soldier FAZ soldiers The soldier later Oed
0600 hrs entered Uganda defiled a girl, and back into Zaire.
while armed al robbed 4,750=
Bwera from a civilian
and some: maiu
nour.
OS 05 Fb 199S 22001us Koboko An anti-Pc:rsonnel The: mine: hit the WN8Frebels The rebels withdrew
mine was plantc:d daughter of the back to Zaire after
near the residence rcsidc:nt severing 'f>!!lnting the mine.
of a civilian in off one of her
Koboko lel!S,
06 15 May 1995 0600hrs Paidha-Nebbi A rebel force a of The rebel group WN!)F rebels Thi; group was led by
district I 5 ruided Paidha shot a policeman notorious Ex-UNLA
UCll branch dead. Sgt Sokolo who was
·rubsequently killed in.
a shoot out wiih the
-Uaandan POiice.
07 04Jun 1995 2200ha Nyakaro-Kcri Land miltlul an 03 people on the WNfiF re_bcls TI1e rebels later
division Koboko Isuzu lorry. lorry were ·r~rcated back to
county on the seriously injured Zaire after planting
Kohoko- Oraha and lost limbs. 11icmine.
road."
08 JO Jun 1995 1400 lus Mpondwe-Kasindi A Ugandan, one Killing of one FAZ soldiers No action was taken
road. Paluku, .was shot Paluku by the Zarois
dead after crossing authorities which ·
into Zaire . . reinforced the
culpability of their
trigger happy soldiers
in tl1is murder.
09 16Jwi 1995 1800lus ULEPI-Madi- 16 rebels tried to Nodamase WNDF.n::bels TI1e rebels left behind
·-· . ·-- -· · - Okollo on A111a- . - plant mines on the- ·caused · 03 army green land
I ---- Pukwach road. road, but their mines of 4 kgs @ and
intention aborted 08 an1i-pcrsonnel
when they were .;. mi~ with their
seen by the local fuses. ..
2
Administration .
Police and fled. ..
10 24-28 Jun 95 - Turupa, Odumino Rebels from None WNBF rebels. The {ebels, who had
andGombe Alerobo in Sudan intel)~ed to attack
were allowed free anny units in
passage in Zaire Koboko, stopped at
upto the Ugandan Nyaiigalia on the
- Zaire border Uganda/Zaire border
areas of Turupa, and retreated back to
Oduminoand 2aii-e.
Gombe. •·.
II 11 Jui 1995 2400 hrs Gihita village- 03 rebels The 02 people EX- The culprits later
Nyarusiza in infiltrated from killed are: James FAR/Jnteraha retreated back into
Kisoro district. Zaire and killed 02 Baryabwiriza and mwe Zair~ but one of them
Lgandans. christopher . Hak(zimana John
Mbonye Baptist was arrested,
taken to court and
extradicted to
Rwanda for further
actic,n.
12 10Aug1995 1300hrs Kanombe-Sabinili FAZ military None Later flew back to
helicopter- violated FAZ helicopter Zaire. I
Uganda' airspace
-· . - -· .. - .. - - . -
13 14 Aug 1995 0600hrs Koboko-town. A small rebel • Destroyed a new WNBFrebels Retreated back to
group atlacked the building in town Zaire: Col Nelson
town. with RPG shells. Katagara and Capt
No death Nazario Mwekwasize
registered. then in W/Nile can
testifv.
14 15 Aug 1995 2300hrs Arna town Rebels detonated NIL WNBFrebels Later retreated back
3
an offensive into Zaire.
grenade in town
15 17 Aug 1995 IOOOhrs Zaire Uganda Murder of a Tembo Mathias FAZ troops
border Ugandan who had Kisekwa from
entered Zaire to Karambi sub
sell his piece of county was killed.
land (the people
along the border
are the same i.e
Nande).
16 20 Aug 95 1500hrs Andelirwa Ajono- An anti-tank mine Amotorveh, WNBFrebels The victims were
Vurra county was planted on the Mitsubishi Reg Nyakuni Ajua,
Arua - Ediofe road NoUW0828 Jimmy Andrua and
by rebels. belonging lo -· La.wrence !",tibuni.
Ministry of Ramadhan Issa was
Works was inj\lred and admitted
destroyed and 03
peoFle killed and
in t,rua hospital.
01 injured. . ...
17 22 Aug 1995 2300hrs 03 thugs entered Fired in the air and 04 heads of cattle Ex-FAR/ The rebels retreated
areas of Gasovu in took 04·heads of belonging to a lnterahamwe back to Zaire.
Nyaruysiza calllc belonging to one Mr Kwizera
$/county of Kisoro Mr. Kwizera. forcefully taken.
district. .
18 24 Aug 1995 1600hrs Adraga-Al!lyavu Landmine plallted MN Reg No W!'I_BF rebels 11\e rebels retreated
road which join,s - . along the road. - _.. . UPE 113 · back inti:fZaire.
Vurra customs destroyed and 02
from Bondo. civilians iniured. ..
19 27 Aug 1995 1800hrs Rwenzori side of Rebels crossed Food stuffs of the ADF rebels Tfie rebels retreated
U!landa. from Zaire, looted oonulation looted. back to Zaire.
4
food stuffs and
crossed back.
20 01 Sept 1995 1400hrs Kitoro on Uganda Raided a market Loot taken to WNBFrebels RefNew~sion
'
Congo border and looted goats Congo. Newspaper of 15
and chicken Sept ,1995 marked as
anAMex. ! 21. 01 Sept 1995 2300hrs Nyamsiza Kisoro Rebels raided the 15 heads of cattle Ex-FAR/ Retrellted back into
district. area and killed a taken and 01 lnterahamwe Congo where they
civilian and stole person killed. elements. had come from.
15 heads of cattle.
22 01 Sept 1995 1200hrs Nebbi A Zairois called
Kambabawa
Kabamba alias
Hassan Abdalla
claiming to be the
leader of the Army
for ifie. Liberation of
Zaire was arrested in
Nebbi and forwarded
toGulu.
02 Sep 1995 1900hrs Busiga village Armed thugs Home of one ADF rebels The rebels later
Bunyangule parish crossed into Ngasirwa (LC retreated back into
in Bundibugyo Uganda and raided official) raided Zaire.
the: home of an LC and his sister ..
. official. . Mbamba .. Saforoza raped
· ·and shot.
2-1. 12 Sep 1995 I IOOhrs ULEPI Primary Group of06 armed Looted property WNBFrebels The rebels later
School rebels crossed and extorted retreated back into
from Zaire into money from the Zaire:·
Arua and stalled a civilian
5
road block near population. "
Ulepi P/Sch and
extorted money.
J .
25 15Sep1995 1300hrs Nyori sub county A group of rebels Property looted FAZ soldiers The culprits later
entered from from the civilian together with retreated back to
Congo and looted population. WNBF rebels. Zaire.
property from the
nooulation.
26 21 Nov 1995 1400hrs Anyakario and • A group of rebels Pillage including WNDFrebels Mounted illegal road
staged road block entered Uganda forceful taking of block at Wanju
at Wanju Bridge in via Anyakario on property of the bridge to extort from
Adilang. the border with population and the nopulation and
Zaire. raping of women. later fled back into
,' ZairC:"
27 01 Dec 1995 IOOOhrs Malaba Market The LC Ill sec for The Ugamlan LC FAZ soldiers
Zaire informalion of official was
Midia Division of tortured and
Koboko town mistreated by
; board Mr.
Christopher Drata
FAZ soldiers.
was arrested by
FAZ soldiers.
28 06 Dec 1995 2100hrs Arua-Gilgil Road Planting of mine. None because it WN~Frebels Fie~ .~ack to congo. . was detected and --- .... .
'removed by the
army bfore
causing any
damal!e.
i29
22 Apr 1996 0530hrs Kisorotown 120 rebels from 07 UPDF soldiers Ex-FAR/ The rebel group
Congo attacked and wife ofa lnterahamwe which had entered
Kisorotown soldier and child and Ul!llndan Uga.rida via Busaiiza
6
coming from killed dissiuents led was later routed by
Rutshuru in by llajji UPDFafler
Congo. The Mohammed reinforcements were
UPDF25 Bn Kabeba. sent 10 Kisoro. Hajji
defence was .. Kabq~a was later
attacked. arrested in
Kanyabayonga in
Coniio but died in
prison, Maj G
Sambwa to testify.
30 29 May 1996 0630- Kohoko Marach Over I 00 rebels Blew bridge at WNBF Later retreated back
0930 County crossed into Kivu between into Zaire. Col
Uganda from Zaire Koboko-Maracha Nelson Katagara and
from Ongbokolo- border. Capt. Nazario
Kumaro and Mwekwasizc to
Leiko-lrumu areas. testify.
31 0-1 Jui 1996 05:00- Bugoye S/county Pillage and Houses of the ADF The rebels later
0600hrs of Kasese Plunder population retreated back into
torched, 03 Zaire.
people killed and
Toyota Pick-Up
burnt.
~ 03 Aug 1996 0600hrs Emissi Trading Rural terrorism. Businessman WNBF RDC Nebbi then
Centre in Nebbi killed on I O Feb Pete~.Kalagala wrote
district.· . 96at Emissi a protest letter to the
T/centre. DCMahagiMr
Mabasi Maroba about
Ugaiiclan rebels
training in Goma
with the support of
Zaire authorities. Ref
7
~ New Visision of03
aug 1996 on the letter
oforotest.
33 26 Sep 1996 2000hrs Rebels crossed Shot dead a civilan 0 I person shot EX-FAR/ The tl)ugs later
from Zaire into one R wagasore dead lntarahamwe retreated back to
Kisoro while Aggrey. elements Zaire.
am1ed at a place
called Mabanga in
Nvarusiza.
34 From 96- Kasese Abductions Total of366 ADF Refer J.o the New
Augl998 children (less Vision Newspaper of
Adults) abducted 10 August 1998
from Kasese quoting Kasese LC V
alone since 1996- chairman Bamusede
Ault 1998. Butambale.
35. 09 Oct 96 1700hrs Kazima near Rebels crossed Property of the EX-FARMgahinga
N/Park from Kanombe in population looted. lnterahamwe
Zaire and (ired elements
randomly in th: air
and looted
property of the
civilains.
100ct96 1500hrs Kisoro lnterahamwe lnterahamwe The culprit was
. called Alfred genocidairc subsequently Hakizimana . hospitalised in Kisoro
infiltrated from hospitAI.
Zaire while armed
and was shot and· -·
injured by own
forces.
37 12 oct 96 1015 hrs Simbiri-Gombc About 120 rebels UPDF sustained WNBF The rebels.who
8
. '
38 14 Oct96 2100hrs Xibaya village
39 160ct96 200hrs Bunagana T/cenln:
40 23 O.:t 96 :MOO hrs Rukonga parish,
Murora village in
- .. .... N~-Kisofi>
district
'41 29 Oct 96 I IOOlus Bunaaana
. ·' • ,~·- • '·· ' t.
: .F . . .
entered Uganda
from Zaire
FAZ soldiers
crossed from
Katare in Zaire
and robbed 22
heads of caule.
Aucmpt to disarm
a UPDFsoldicron
duty.
Armed .
interahamwe ·crosse,rtnia ·-
Kanombcin
Congo and raided
a home of a local.
9
.. ~ .. ... ·:'\ '·''
..-~
0 I casually in the entered through
fight that ensued Sini\!.iri-Oome were
to chase this later.routed and their
group of attackers commander one Capl
Moro and 2S of his
men killed.
22 heads of caulc FAZ soldiers UPDF pursued the
stolen attackers upto
Kyi;ngeraa _in Zaire
and in the ensuing
exhange·offire FAZ
released 02 mortar
. bombs which landed .. in Btinagana T/cciltre but caused no
damal!e.
The assailant was lnterahamwe The fdterahamwe wu
shot and injured called Madagara and
in the leg. . came·from Kibaya .. and 'ile latenctreated back to Congo. He
was ·l/_oa
.. rec.o nnaissance .. m1ss1on.
Took a bull lntemhamwe Later. relrealed back
~!Q!!si.!!810..lh!: .
. :into 'Congo. • ·-
locaJ resident a
one Charles ',
Munyankende. .
- Over 2250 Congolese
refugees crossed into
Uganda and were
registered at
Bunagana. Included
a FAZ officer anned
with.JI pistol No
245PM 21784.
-12 30 Oct 96 IOOOhrs lshasha and A total of 4027
Nyakabare Congolese refugees
s/county Hqs in crossed into Uganda
Kisoro wer.e registered at
lshasha and 3000
were registered at
Nyakabare sf.county
llas in Kisoro.
-13 31 Oct 96 1200hrs- lshasha Rukungiri 3 79 Congolese
1700hrs district. refugees crossed into
Uganda and were
registered at lshasha
border post.
~-I 02 Nov 96 0600hrs Longem-Ojigo 30 rebels crossed Released 70 WNBF rebels Retreated back to
prison in Nc:bbi from Zaire and prisoners killed Zaire.
district. raided the prison. 03 warders and
took their 11.uns. -
45 08 Nov 96 1300hrs Okoro Land mine planted Tata lorry Reg WNBF'rebels
along the road. No. UBX 057 of . .
·onc-Yekll"Aiijo
of Arua town
destroved.
46 13 Nov 96 06.00 hrs Bwera-Mpondwe About 1400 well A lot of property ADF'rebels The g'enesis of this
and Karambi in anned rebels was . or11.anised and big
10
:•
Kasese district. attacked destroyed/looted, sized ullack dales
simullenously the thousands of back to the Feb 1995
towns of 13wera, pt:ople were incident when the
Karambi and displaced and ADF's internal and
Mpondwe. After others killed by pioneer camp at
07 days of serious the enemy. Many Buscnika's Kayera
fighting, the rebels people were also Gorge ·in Hoima
were repulsed and abducted by the district was
retreated back into enemy. discovered by
the Congo. The govc'mmcnt forces
rebels came from and destroyed •
13uhira in Congo. About SO rebels were
killed in action, 148
were captured ~live
(including the ones
whose pictures arc
attachcll as Annexes)
and others escaped
across L. Albert with
about 15 guns . The
45 who fled into
Congo linked up with
NALU remnants
. under ii one Ngaimoko in a place
called Buhira in
Congo.-1'hcy were
later taken to a FAZ
Unit in Bunia from
where they went to
several FAZ
II
detachments
including Nyangarai
and luigeji. This
nucle11s group
embarked on
reorgllnisation,
mobilisation,
recmitment and
armament with the
support of both Zaire
and Sudan and the 13
Nov 96 auack on
Mpondwe, Bwera
and Karambi was the
out come of this long
preparedness using
safe ~vens and
facilities offered by
Zaire and Sudan . ..
The 45 Busemka
remnants who fled to
Congo included
Menya Muzadaki, . Medi Basoga,
.. ·- --·- - · Kawt1ma ·Peter;
Katumba , Baker
Matovu and Kassim
Mulumba who is now
in prison following
his arrest bv the
12
authorities in Kasese ·
while enroute to
conga in 1999.
The witnesses to the
Buse.ruka rout of
ADF fo Feb 95 are
Brig Steven Kashaka,
Maj ~wija and Maj
Fred'tvlugisha.
The. witnesses on the
13 Nov 96 attack in
Kasese arc Col
Aro;jda then Deputy
DM( Lt Col Kakari
then JI Bn Comd, Lt
Col G Muhesi, Col P
Kerim then Div .
Comd and Lt Col
Oyera:
Mulumba, who is a
. survivor of Buseruka participated in_tl:!~.JJ •
Nov 96 attack and
was very high in the
ADF hierarchy can
also corroborate all
this. ~fphotos
,. marked 81-86
13 .
,.
47 14 Nov96 2200hrs Arua-Koboko road Land mine planted Destroyed 08 WNDl'rebels The Bridges
bridges along destroyed were Inve,
Ama Kobkobo Tinyou, Olife, Ayi,
road Yeyo, Dranye, Kivu
and Nvc11ali brideiies.
48 18 Nov 96 0600- Odrama Chako About 80 rebds 01 Home guard WNBF rebels 05 of the attackers
0730hrs attacked from killed by the were killed by own
Zaire. rebels and his gun forces and the rest
charged. retre11ted back to
Zaire.
49 21 Nov96 1600hrs Kulukulinge road. Ambush Motor vehicle WNBFrebels The NGO could
belonging to furnish details of the
NGO called incident.
Assist set atL'2e
and 01 emp[loyee
oftheNGO
killed. ..
50 21 Nov96 0630- Dramoli Parish, 50-60 rebels Abducted 12 WNBF rebels
0700hrs Olebe division, altacked. Young boys
Maracha county whom they took
to Zaire for
training and
conscription into
rebelion. ----= 51 30 Nov96 0530- Atoro Trading Raided Tradin_g • Killed_ 0 I ciyilian _ .WNBF..rebels Fled back10-zaiti;;.
0600 hrs .· centre ···· ·· ·centre. · and looted 09
heads of cattle.
52 04 Dec 96 0700- Kanyatsi Dwera, About I 00 rebels 25 houses set a ADF rebels Entered through
0800hrs Kasese. crossed into blaze Kanyatsi (10 kms
Uganda. from Bwera) 50 of
,. them were killed and
14
others fled back to
Zaire Ref New
Vision S/12/96.
53 15 Dcec 96 Kosindi cusloms Incursion from Motel at Kasindi ADF rebels Ref photo marked B
post Zaire on t.he border post destroyed. 7.
llOSI. .. ,.
5-1 27 Dec 96 Arua Nebbi road. Ambush Toy!)ta pick-up WNBF rebels OWl)!>cr of pick-up
destroyed at can·t.~stify.
Unepi 01 person
killed, 03 iniured
55 1-1 Feb 97 Daylong Ariwara in Zaire Hot pursuit by Rebel commander BrigWarrtala
UPDI' againsl 'Col' Aziz Amua Katumba then Col,
rebels inside Zaire. killed. commanded the
repr.isal mission and
can testify RefNew
Vision 1412197.
56 29 Mar97 Surrender on mass UPDF hot pursJit
ofWNBF afterr into Zaire and Sudan
reprisal atlacks by resulling in the
UPDF surrender of 353
WNBF rebels wilh
276 rifles.
57 16 Jun 97 0530- Bundibugyo T errorisl atlack on Burnt 12 people ADF Ref East African
0600hrs lhe rural and shot I O at New paper of June
population. . Bugombwa 22-28 1998.
-- - -- .villa2e ... . ... - . . . .
58 12 Oct 97 osoo; · Kisinga sub county Abduction of 39 Seminarians ADF rebels St M\i:hael Seminary.
0600hrs students abducted. ...
59 20 Feb 98 Milandi secondary Abduction and Abducted 30 Retreated back to
school in Kabarole· killin~ of studenls studenls and Cong..o. with the
15
district killed 02 students. abductecs.
60 08 Jun 98 05 30 hrs Kichwamba Pillage and Arson 33 Students burnt ADF rebels The UPDF detach at
Technical Institute to death in their Kanyamura was also
in Kabarole district dormitories 11 attacked and five
sustained serious soldiers killed. The
burn wounds, I 06 enemy also loo.ted
were 'abducted and destroyed
and 08 were property of the
rescued. School instit11te and iri the
truck and OJ T/ce_ri!res _ofKihondo
dormitories burnt. and Kyamukuba a .
number of civilians
were iilled and
others abducted: Sec
photos marked El-E7
61 10 Jun 98 0530- 3 kms from Rebels raid the 05 people killed. ADFrebels The· monitor 11 June
0600hrs Kichwamba country side.
..
1998.'
Techinical
Institute.
'.!6 Jun 98 0530- Banyangule Rebels raid the 05 people killed, ADF rebels The Monitor
0600hrs village Ndugutu, country side 06 wounded and Newspaper 26/6/98.
Bundibugyo OJ houses set
district ablaze.
63 5 July 98 0500hrs Kiburara Kasese Rebels attacked 19 Seminarians ADF rebels New Vision --
the.Seminary. · --were abducted . Newspaper of 6 July
from St John's 98 and Monitor
Seminary Newspaper of 18 July
98. 02 of the
abductccs were
rescu;a.
6-t 01 Aug 98 0500hrs Kasese town 25 vehicles burnt, 25 vehicles burnt ADF rebels. . The rebels attacked
16
;.
Moon light hotel , Moonlight hotel the UPDF officers
destroyed and destroyed shops
..
mess in town but
some shops vandalised and 03 were repulsed (see
ransacked and people killed. photos marked FI -
vandalised. F4).
65 05 Aug 98 0400 hrs Kasese M/veh-Benz Vehicles and ADF rebels Ref monitor
lorry burnt with building burnt. Newspaper of 6 Aug
cement along with 98.
other vehicles.
Kisera lodge also
burnt.
66 6 Aug 98 0300 hrs Kyarumba Trading 33 people killed ADF
centre, kasese in the attack
68 05 Sep 98 0500 hrs Kasese district Country side Elderly man ADF_rebcls New.Yision
attack called Yeremia New.spa per of 05
Andyoka killed . Sept 1998.
and 02 members
of his family
wounded.
29 Sep 98 Bundibugyo Kikye Antonov aerial Dropped bombs F AC airforce New Vision
strike/raid at Kikye, 13 kms plane Newspaper of29
from the congo Seot 0£998.
70 29 Sept 98 Rwenshama AbdductiOl)S 20 ugandan FAC New Vision report.
Rukungiri district. fishermen ..
. abducted. - ..
. ---
71 27 Oct 98 Khartoum ADF l)lader Shiekh
Jamil Mukulu visits
Sudan: RefNew
vision of27 Oct 98.
72 01 Mar99 Between Bwindi tourist site, Marauding BurntA, K lnterahamwe The attackers
17
0630 hrs- Kisoro district genocidairc:s Kitandara and segregated French
09 30 hrs m1mbc:ring Community Naifonals whom they
bc:tween 130-150 camps as well as released and took the
armed with 05 vehicles and rest.,' They were
automatic riffic:s 02 M/cycles, particularly irked by
and machetes and burnt to death the the Americans and
speaking French Bwindi Britons. They later
and Swahili conserrvation heaili:d towards
attacked the officer one Mr. Makoka in DRC.
Bwindi t~urist site. Wagaba, Camps of
abducted 14 Interahamwe were in
foreign tourists Nteko, Mugogo
and killed 08 of Nya6imira arid
them. Charged Rubona all in
04 guns of Rutshsuru zone in
rangers, 03 radio DRC. Peltier Anna, a
sets and 04 french diplomat at the
walkie talkies secc:ne can testify as
well as Lt Col Benon
Birar<i (then 2
Division Comd.)
The fnterahamwe had
causod the following
havo.;. .in Ki:10ro
- distric.t in Feb 99:
a. Of\08 Feb 99
thc;r raided
Mabuyemeru
Boardinl? primarv
18
school in Busanza
sub-county of
Kisoro and looted
food, cash and
other property.
b. Jney also killed
Muhigiiwa (LC II
vice chairman,
, and Ndagije of
Dusigyi village . . TheY, sent threatening
leters to the
following:
. Father Sabatware,
the parish priest
~f Kinanira,
. C.apl Deo Kaita's
f~mily,
. Claver Gasasira
(GISO Busanza) -
.. .. "iinifiine
Rutajengwa.
c. 0~ 11 Feb 99, 20
people were abducted
at Kinvamahoro and
19
a faajily of07 was
killecl al Rubara. See
photos marked G IG
I ii'(Annexs)
73 09 Dec 99 06:30hrs Katojo Prison in About 70 rebds A lillle over 200 ADF"rebels The; prisoners
Kabarole. raided the prison prisoners released but taken by
and abducted 365 abducted, 0 I the a!iackers included
prisoners 118 of UPDF soldier 57 ADF terrorist
whom were killed as well as a suspects held in
subsequently prison wardress, Katojo Gvt prison.
rescue,Vreported lhe prison truck
back. and the vehicle of
the OC prison
bumland20
prison rifles
taken.
7-1 10 Dec 99 06:30 hrs Bundibugyo Simulleneous Soldiers wife and ADF rebels These .imulleneous
district in lhe dawn allacks on kid killed al the allacks on army
folowing places: UPDF Butama detachments were
Kanyamirima in detachments which detachmet. peculiar because
Bubukwanga, were all repulsed. ADF',s targets and
Ngite in Busaru, standlird operation
Kabangoin procedure was to
Ndugutu, Butama attack and terrorise
in Ndugotu and civilians. This
Masuleand -··- .. however was
..
Kinyanga UPDF adec~,ptive ploy to
detachments divert the UPDF from
the offensive in the
high altitude areas of
the R wenzori and in
20
easlem DRC which it
had dominated and
where the ADF has
its rear bases.
More deceptive
auacJ.:s in the lowland
area~. of Bundibugyo
followed in Dec 99.
Ref Monitor
New.spaper of I O Dec
99 and New vision of
27/12/99. Col Torit
and. Capt Kashure (2
Div. Commander and
intelligence officer
respec1ively) can
teslify as can Brig
Kazini the overall
commander of
operalions against
ADF in lhe seclor.
75 09 0~1 1996 0530- Abokc: lligh Rebels raided lhe 139 school girls LRA rebels Some of these young
0600hrs School Apac School and ranging belween girls have since been
dislrict: 11bduc1ed 139 girls. the ages of 12-18 !JJled_ while.others - -
- ·abdiic1caaiiil - were.violated and
laken to Sudan married lo LRA
commanders in
Suda~ SISTER
RACl;iELthe
H/mistress can leslifv
21
UCMANNEX~
LOSS OF UGANDA GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AT UGANDA EMBASSY,
KINSHASA
ITEM PARTICULARS QTY U1"1TPRJCE . TOTAL. PRTCJ::l
(USS} __cy_~.JL_
A. PRF.MIS.ES
Official Residence for Ambassador
01 A Doubk-storeyed Building with a
perimeter wall ( newly renovated), siru~red at
12, Avenue de l'Ouganda, zone de la Gombe,
Kinshasa I 2,000,000 2,000,000
02 Chancery wirh two detached build ings (three- --
. storeyed and double storeyed) with a perimeter
wall situated at 17, Avenue Tombalbaye/Avcnue
de Travailure, Kinshasa I 3,000,000 3,000,000
B. VEHICLES
03 A Mercedes Benz 240E(one-wcck old at rhc I 45,000 45,000
time of evacuation)
04 A Mercedes Benz 280S ( in perfect condition) I 25,000 25,000
C. Furniture al the Official.Residence and
Officers' House,
OS Settees (Set) 3 5,000 lS,000
06 Easy Chairs (Set) 7 2,000 14,000
07 Wing Chairs 2 600 1,200
08 Dinning Chairs 60 200 12 OOO
09 Elbow Chairs 2 600 1,200
10 Single Chairs 15 200 I 3,000
11 Uoholstered Dress in!! Chair l 3SO 350
12 Bedroom Chairs 10 300 3,000
13 Long Chairs 2 800 1,600
14 Writing Chairs s 300 1,500
15 Divans (SeLs) 6 5,000 30,000
16 Curtains (Pairs) 60 400 24,000
17 Curtains Boxes 30 100 3,000
18 Curtains Rails 60 50 3,000
19 Ordinary Tables 17 150 2,550
20 Coffee Sets 16 SOO 8,000
21 Dinning Tables 6 2,000 12,000
22 Carving Tables 6 350 2,100
23 Dressing Tables s I 500 7,500
I 24 Side Tables 6 200 1,200
' 25 Nests of Tables (Sets) 5 400 2,000
26 Occasional Tables 4 1,200 4,800
27 Trolleys 6 450 2,700
28 Sofa Chairs (Sets) 6 2,500 15,000
29 Double Beds 15 3,000 45,000
30 Table Flags 2 50 100
31 Flae Stand 2 300 600
32 Flee Mast I SOO 500
33 Rues 27 4,000 !OS.OOO
34 Writin!! Desks 5 I.OOO I 5,000
35 Caroets (m·) l ,700m· 40 68,000
36 Sideboards 6 7,000 42.000
37 Dressing Chests 2 900 1,800
3S Headboards 6 1,500 9,000
39 Bcdsidt Lockers 42 300 126,000
40 Standard Lamps 12 200 2,400
I
~-----psideLa~ --- --i--. 26 -~ 100 =-=t= 2.600 J <:2 I.amp Shades ==t= 12 so 600 I 43 Chests of Drawers ----- ---6·=:--350----""T.ioo--
44 Btdside Rugs 32 150 4,800 I
45 Welsh Dressers 2 4.ooo s.ooo I
46 ' Wardrobes 16 1,500 24.000
47 Desk Lamos 5 150 ·- 750
48 Cuoboards 2 800 1:~-
49 Bedside Cabinets 2 300 600--
so Book Cases 5 1,500 7,500 -
SI Mattresses IS 800 12,000
52 Pillows 42 50 2,100
53 Ash Travs 20 10 200
S4 Waste Bnskets 30 10 300
..
SS Dust Bins II 20 220
56 Portraits 7 SOO 3,500 ·-
57 Art Crafts 70 SOO 35.000
SS Flal!s (Standard) 3 so 150
59 · Maos 13 so 650
60 Bathroom Curtains 14 200 2,800
61 Bathroom Mirrors 14 70 980 --
62 Bathrooms Mats (Sets) 14 150 21,000
63 Door Mats 10 30 I 300·-
64 Tronin2e Boards s 70 350
65 Sundrv Items Various . 2,000
D. FURNITUREAT CHANCERY
66 · Executive Desks 4 2,000 8,00~
67 Executive Chairs 4 SOO 2,000
68 Side Drawers s 200 1,000
69 Sofa Chairs ( Sets) 7 2,500 17,500
70 Easy Chairs (Sets) 3 2,000 .. 6.0~
71 Coffee Sets 7 400 2,800
72 Ordina1v Tables 4 150 600
73 Ordinarv Chairs 14 so 700
74 Side Tables 4 80 320
75 Nests of Tables (Sets) 2 400 800
76 Carocl< <m' ) SOO 40 20,000
77 Sideboards 2 I 7,000 14,000 ..
78 Lamos and Lamo Sheds 4 250 1 OOO
79 Filinl!. Cabinru 14 200 2,800
80 Trolleys 2 450 900 -
81 Secretarial Desks 2 1,500 3,000
82 Secretarial Chairs 2 300 600 ! 83 Lon!! table I 500 500
84 Stools s 30 ISO
85 Cuoboards 4 800 3,200
86 Book Shelves 4 1,500 6,000
67 Ash Trays 10 10 100
88 Waste Baskets 10 10 100
89 Dust Bins 2 20 40
90 Portraits 6 SOO 3,000 ··- 91 Arc Crafts 20 500 10,000
92 Flaes I 100 100
93 Flz2Mast I 500 · I 500 --.
94 I Table Fla~s I 50 50
95 : Sal~s 2 4,000 8,000~
96 I Curtains (Pairs) 20 400 8,000
2
97 Curtains Boxes _::::::::---r ;: -,~ . I ::~: ] 98 Curtain Reils
99 Door Mais ~ 2 30 ---i-·~
100 Maps -s-· so i--~·
101 Sundr,, items variou~ ---_--·-- · 2,000 --1
E. OFFICE AND OTHER. EQUIPMENT AT
CHANCERY
102 Comoutcrs 2 2,000 4.0~
103 PrinlL'TS 2 700 l,400 ·-
104 Photocopier J IS,000 15,000
105 Fax Machine I 1,500 I SOO
106 Television I J,500 1,500
107 Video Recorder I 700 700
108 Radio J 1,200 1,200
109 Refrieerator 2 800 J,600
110 Cooker I 800 800 ·-
Ill Vacuum Cleaners l 500 500
I 12 Telephone Switch Board I 12,000 12,000
113 Shredders 4 350 1,400 ·-
114 Fans 10
..
ISO 1,500
I IS Air Conditioners 6 250 1,500
116 Pw,ches s 10 so
117 Staplers 5 10 50
I 18 Heaters (Water) 2 300 600
119 Gardenin!! Tools Assortment . 300 - 120 Car Tools Assortment . 1,000
121 !..awn Mower 1 450 450
122 Tvocwriters 3 300 900
123 Teo.Set I JOO JOO I .
124 . Coffee Set I 100 JOO
125 Trays 3 20 60
126 ' Cutlery Various . - 300 127 Sundrv Eouipment various . 1,500
F. HOUSEHOLD AND OTHER EQUIPMENT AT THE OFFICIAL I
RESIDENCE AND OFFJCERS'HOUSES .
128 Refii2erators 7 1,000 7,000
129 Freezers 2 800 1.600
130 Cookers 7 800 5,600
131 Televisions 2 1,500 3,000
132 Video Ree.orders 2 700 1.400
133 Microwave I 400 400
134 TV Racks 2 175 .. 350
135 Kitchen Chef I 1,500 . l,500
136 Lawn Mower l 450 450
137 Fans 20 ISO -- 3,000
138 Air Conditioners 22 250 S SOO
139 Vacuum Cleaners s SOO 2,SOO
140 Gardening Tools Assortment ' . 600
141 Hcatm (Watc-r) 6 300 1,800
142 Radio 2 1,200 2,400
143 Flat Irons 5 100 500
144 Kettles 5 50 250
145 Flasks JO 25 i 250
146 Brandy Glasses 24 3 I 72 j 147 Sherr,, Glasses 24 3 72
148 Liqueur Glasses 24 3 72
3
1'9' c,.,.01..,. ==== £" E , , . ;, ----j 150 1 umblers 68 4 272
ISI Glass Butter Dishes • ·--6- ' --5- . 30 I
152 Table Forks fDOZ) 10 24 i,io
153 Table Knives (DOZ) 'j~ ---24___ 240
154 Table Spoons (DOZ) 10 24_ __ ---240
155 Soun Scoons (DOZ\ JO 24 240
156 Dessert Scoons (DOZ) 10 24 240 ·-
157 Dessert Forks /002) 10 24 240
158 Tea Scoons !DOZ) 10 24 240
159 Coffee Scoons (DOZ) 10 24 240
160 fish F.aters IDOZ) JO 24 240
161 Sauce Ladles JS 5 90 --
162 Su~arTon~ 6 3 18
.. _
163 Beef Carvers 2 5 10
164 Cheese Knives (DOZ) 5 ..
24 120
165 Grape Fruit Spoons (DO:l) 5 24 120
166 Meat Plate (China) JO 15 150
167 Puddinl! Plates (DOZ) 10 24 240
168 Cheese Plates (DOZ) 5 24 120 ··-
169 Fish Plates <DOZ) 10 " 24 240
170 Soup Plates (DOZ) JO 30 300 ··- ..
171 Dishes 40 30 1.2~
172 Sauce Boats and Stands (Sets) 6 20 120
173 Vegetable Tureens and Covers 6 20 120
174 Electric Washine: Machines I 800 800
175 Saucecans for E!eccric Stove 40 IS 600
176 Milk Sauceoans for Electric Stove (Sets) 6 40 240
"' 177 Cream Bowls 6 20 . 120
178 Tea Cups and Saucers (China) (DOZ) 10 100 1,000
179 Tea Plat~s (DOZ) 10 30 300
180 Coffee Cups and Saucers (DOZ) - 10 100 - 1,000 181 Suga: Bowls 6 5 30
182 Dish Washers I 550 - 550
183 Salad Bowls 7 20 140
184 Travs 12 20 240-
185 Soup Bowls 10 24 240
· 186 Spatulas 8 10 80--
187 : Potato Mashers .. 6 5 30
188 Strainer Spoons 6 3 -- 18 189 Sandwich Machine l 40 40
190 Sausa!!e Tins 6 s .. 30
191 Bun Tins 6 5 30
192 Cake Trays 6 8 4~
193 Bakin~ Tins 6 8 48
194 Biscuit Tins 6 8 48
195 Cake Tins, 6 8 48
196 Toilet Brus..li Holders 11 2 22
197 Linen Boxes 2 30 60
198 Fruit SetS 2 so 100
199 Table Clothes 4 60 -· 240 200 Napkins (DOZ) 4 15 60 ·- ·
201 MilkJu~s 10 10 100
202 Dusters 20 2 40
203 E g_~ Beaters 2 so 100
I 204 Omelette Pans 3 20 60··--·-· ,
• 205 I Dustoans 2 10
1
2:0~=·=1 206 Tea Pots 8 20
4
207 Coffoc Pots ------~8 ' ___2_ u =E ·-=.J
208 w,.,,,,. ~" "" 209 lccBucketsandTongs 6 -~ ~180 ·-=1 ~ ...
210 Vose Curs JO 20--r 20U
2! J Soup Cups and Saucers (DOZ) _J_O__ ~ -- --~--
212 Dasins 5 2 IO--
213 1 Canister Racks 2 5 10
214 Kitchen Knives 20 2 40
215 Pedal Bins 6 3 18 --
216 Glass Jars 8 s 40
217 Buckets s 2 10·- ·- 218 Brushes 15 I 15
219 Rolling Pins s 2 10
' 220 Mops 20 2 40
221 Choooin!! Boards 6 - JS 90
222 Brooms 20 3 60
223 Can Openers 6 2 12
224 Strainers 7 2 - 14 225 Tea Sa·aincrs 7 I 7
226 Oval Plates (DOZ) 2 30 60
227 Casseroles <DOZ) 2 20 40
I 228 Roasters 2 so JOO ~ . 229 Beverai:e Openers (Assortment) . 2 20
230 Ju!!S 10 s so
231 Servicing Mats (DOZ) 4 15 60··-
232 Cocktail Mats (DOZ) I 8 s 40 -- 233 Bath Towels J 180 180
234 Blankers 2 200 1500
235 Sundt\• Household items Assorted . .
G. DOCliMENTS AT THE CHANCERY
236 Confidential Files - - Priceless
, 237 Open files - - Priceless
238 · Dooks - - Priceless
239 Agreements - - Priceless
240 Titles - - Priceless
241 Certificates - ; - Priceless
242 Printed Materials - - Priceles.~
·- 243 Inventories - - Priceless
244 Registers - - Priceless
245 Passpo11s for renewal - - Priceless
246 Archives - - Priceless
247 Sund!}' docwnents - - Priceless ·-- I IL SUPPLIES AT THE CHANCERY ASD I OFFICIAL RESIDENCE
248 An assortment of detergents and other Cleaning
Materials - . 3.000
249 Stationery 10,000
250 Beverages and related Office Sundry Supplies - - 3,000 - 251 Flags (DOZ) - siandard - I - 600
s
I. PRIVATE PROl'ERT\' AT THE
... ,
OFFICIAL RESIDENCE I
252 Computers for Uganda Airlines 2 ·- 2 OOO 4.000
253 Printers 2
...... _.
600 1,200
254 Fax :'.vlachine I 1,600 1,600
255 File and Do.:ument - - Priceless
256 Nissan Saloon Car belonging to a Ugandan I 12,000 12,000
(Mrs. Jachlean Mbabazi) ·- 257 Mercedes Benz Car beloncing to a U~andan I 20,000 20 OOO
258 Mazda Saloon Car belon!(ing to a Ugandan I 11,000 11,000
PROPERTY LOOTED FROM
DIPLOMATS IN KINSHASA MISSIONDRC
·--··-
J. COSKAMANDABATARINGAYA(DR)
259 One Brand New Nissan vehicl~ I 38,000 38,000
260 Two New leather sofa sets 2 5,000 10 OOO
261 One Deco Freezer 1 1,800 -·1:soo
262 One Music Svstem I 6,000 6,000
263 One Cooker I !,OOO J,000
264 Clothing (10 suits, 13 shins, 8 trousers 3 night
dresses, shorts, socks, ties - 13.000 13,000
26S Beddings (2 mattresses, 8 pairs of bedsheets, 4
bed covers, towels . - 2,000
266 4 suitcases, 2 travelling bags and one brief case - 1.700 1,700
267 Set, of tables (glass) 3 - 2,000 --- K. HENRY PlCHO-OKELLO
268 Brand new Lap-top computer complete with its
components, stabiliser and electric wire
connections ete I 3,500 3,500
.. -
269 Brand new portable office organiser I 300 300
270 Brand new Ca.•1iera with zooming lens l 50 50
271 Clothing: (8 suits, 16 shirts, 6 trousers, 2
sleeping clothes, 2 bath robes, 12 silk-ties, socks
han.1<ies etc) - - 5,620
272 4 pairs of shoes l.lld 2 pairs of sandals - . 450
273 Bedding: ( 8 pairs of bed-sheets, 3 bed covers, 4 - . 1,190
complete set of towels, 3 mosauito nets)
274 2 suit cases, I travelling bad . I - 350
L. M. KEDIS1
275 Household property/furniture . . 4,500
276 Beddings i . . 4,000
277 Clothes . . 3,000
278 Fax Machine 1 I 200 1,200
279 Decoder 1 2,000 2 OOO
280 Video Recorder I I 1,500 !,500
281 T.V ... I 900 900
282 Music System I 1,200 1,200 __
M. BA~UTURAKI K, RICHARD
6
284 One Deep.Freetcr/Fridge Worth _-_ __
I
I +-""i_LlQQ_ - ·· ..J
285 One Computer (Pancard: Model April, 1991
together with all it, Components namely UPS,
Printer/Fax (Canon: 5 ln one(, stabiiiscr, wire I '·"' .J coMections etc ... I
2S6 OneTV Worth I
..
800 800
287 One Video Deck Worth I SOO SOO
288 Radio Worth I so 50 --
289 One Cooker Worth l 700 .. 700
290 Household property such as clothes, cutlery,
voltage stabilisers for different electronic
!!adeets e.t.c. I 8,000 8,000
N. F. ONEGA-WACHHGIU ..
291 !. Music Systems:
(i) One Unit Multi System TV and Video
R.ecordor Full Set with Table I 2,500 2,500
(ii) One Unit HIH Stereo System mid size
stereo equipment with amplifiers,
surround prologic, tuner double deck,
equalizer, SCD I 3,000 3,000
(iii) Audio Accessories, Adaptors, Alann I 1,200 1,200
Clock, Flask lights, torch etc
292 Beddings
Bed Linens. Blanket, Bed sheets, 5 Pillows, 3
I
Mattresses, 4 Mosquito nets, Tables Cloths,
Bath Towels, Robes, etc - - 3,000
293 Clothing
Dresses, Ladies Shoes & Slippers, Ladies
Shoulder 2 Hand Bags, 2 Travelling Bags,
Ladies Fra~ances, Lingerie, ctc - - 6,000
294 Furniture and Equipment
9 Black Ebony Stools, 1 Coffee Sd, etc - SOO 800
295 Cookeries and Cutleries
Proclaim, Glassware, Tableware, Stainless Steel - Wares etc 1,200 1,200
296 Household Accessories & Appliances
! 1 Water distiller, I Electric Flat Iron, 1 Electric
Kettle, l El~ctric Fan, I Hair Drier, I Juice - 800 800
Extractor etc
Total
7
CERTIFICATION
The undersigned Agent of the Republic of Uganda
hereby certifies that the texts of the Documents
reproduced in this Volume, as attachments to the
Counter-Memorial submitted by Uganda in the
proceedings relating to Democratic of the Congo v.
Uganda, are accurate copies of the texts of the
documents they purport to reproduce.
21 April 2001
Honourable Bart M. Katureebe
Attorney General
Republic of Uganda
(signed)
Agent of the Republic of Uganda